Abstract

Godly Lives: Asceticism and Anthropology, with special reference to Sexuality, in the Writings of St. Irenaeus of Lyons and St. Clement of Alexandria

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Abstract of a thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Faculty of Theology, University of Oxford.

This thesis aims to restore the balance of modern investigations into Christian asceticism and anthropology by reading the texts of Sts. Irenaeus and Clement within their theological perspectives, and thereby examine the presuppositions determining how we think about sexual difference.

In the Introduction I examine the projects of M. Foucault and P. Brown, arguing that they do not remain faithful to the concerns of the texts which they treat.

In Part One, I show how asceticism, for Irenaeus, is the expression of the human living the life of God in the body, that which is most characteristically human and the image of God. Sexuality is fundamental to human existence, forming a permanent part of the framework within which humans grow towards God. This growth results from humans acting responsively to the creative activity of God. That God is the source of the life which is lived by humans, demands an openness on their part towards God. Any attempt to avoid the reality of their created nature, for instance, through a self-imposed continence, overturns the basic structure of this relationship.

In Part Two, I consider the asceticism proposed by Clement, which strives, through human effort, to achieve a godlike life, buttressing the rational mind, that which is properly human and in the image of God, by the exercise of virtues, so protecting it from disturbances, especially those arising from the body and the vulnerability of dependency. Whilst Clement has a vivid sense of the new life granted in baptism, and praises marriage, this desire for a divine life leads inexorably to the restriction of human sexuality to the function of procreation and its redundancy thereafter.

After summarizing, I indicate possible lines for further investigation, and suggest that only within the Irenaean perspective can the issue of sexual difference be raised meaningfully.

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In this thesis I aim to redress the balance of modern investigations into Christian asceticism and anthropology by reading the texts of Sts. Irenaeus and Clement within their theological perspectives, and thereby examine the presuppositions determining how we think about sexual difference.

In the Introduction I examine the projects of M. Foucault and P. Brown, arguing that they do not remain faithful to the concerns of the texts which they treat, but have overlooked the texts' own interpretative frameworks in their concern to trace the history of the modern sexual subject as they see it. Their work, nevertheless, is provocative and useful, inasmuch as it draws our attention away from the outward forms of asceticism to the internal dynamics at work within different styles of asceticism.

In Part One I examine the works of St. Irenaeus. The most striking aspect of Irenaeus' theology is the intimate link between anthropology and theology: the truth of the human being is revealed in the Incarnation, which at the same time is the revelation of God. Adam was created as a type of the One to come, and the manifestations of God in the Old Testament were prophetic revelations of the Incarnate Son. Adam was animated by the breath of life, which prefigured the future vivification of the sons of God by the Spirit: initially, of the Incarnate Son, and, subsequently, through the grace of baptism, of those adopted as sons. Christ revealed the full truth of the human being, vivified by the Spirit; in the present, adopted sons possess a pledge of the Spirit, preparing them for their full vivification in the resurrection. Thus the truth of the human being still 'lies hidden with Christ in God': an eschatological reality, anticipated in the Christian life even now, and revealed most fully in the confession of martyrdom. Within Irenaeus' understanding of salvation history, the apostasy plays a positive role: we become truly human through the experience both of our own weakness and the power of God. To be fully human demands our engagement with the concrete situtations in which we find ourselves. There is no room for an ethics characterized by a suspicious abstention or an evasive virginity.

Irenaeus emphasizes the body, fashioned in the image of God, almost to the extent of ignoring human interiority. Although the importance of the body was a key feature in the anti-Gnostic polemic, for Irenaeus the importance derived from the whole matrix of salvation history: as it is in the body that God has chosen to reveal both Himself and the truth of the human being, the body is perhaps the most essential characteristic of the human being.

It is, furthermore, a body, or flesh, to use Irenaeus' preferred term, which is either male or female. Sexuality is fundamental to human existence, forming a permanent part of the framework within which humans grow towards God. This growth results from humans acting responsively to the creative activity of God. That God is the source of the life which is lived by humans, demands an openness on their part towards God. Any attempt to avoid the reality of their created nature, for instance, through a self-imposed continence, overturns the basic structure of this relationship.

These themes result in Irenaeus' characteristic understanding of asceticism and anthropology: humans living the life of God in the flesh. It is the Spirit that absorbs the weakness of the flesh and manifests living human beings: living, because of the Spirit, 'their Spirit'; and human, because of the flesh. Christians do not so much develop and exercise virtues, as manifest the virtue of God in their body. Nevertheless it is always the human who lives, who personalizes the life given to them by God. With his insistence on the reality of the flesh, and his presentation of asceticism in terms of the strength of the Spirit overcoming the weakness of our flesh, rather than as the development of virile virtues, Irenaeus is never tempted to suggest that both men and women become male in the exercise of such virtues, or that we outgrow or shed our sexual existence. Whilst procreation is proper to humans at the appropriate age, it does not exhaust the significance of our existence as male and female, the full significance of which, along with the truth of our human nature, lies in the eschaton.

In Part Two, I consider the anthropology of St. Clement and the asceticism he proposes. His asceticism and anthropology is governed by the fact that for him it is not the body which is in the image of God, but the human mind, the νοῦς, and the scope and capability he ascribes to free will. He by no means disparages the body. In fact he praises the body as capable, when suitably purified, of being a shrine of the Spirit. Clement also develops a very interesting analysis of the nature of the baptized's new existence in terms of a proleptic eschatology: the anticipatory possession of the new eschatological life, here and now, in which the baptized is already perfect, sanctified, and illumined. Moreover, Clement is genuinely concerned to maintain, at length, the dignity and sanctity of marriage.

However, the manner in which Clement develops a theology of asceticism makes the picture much more problematic. The numerous precepts and ideals, advising a life lived according to the λόγος, which Clement borrowed from contemporary philosophy, especially Stoicism, were indeed transformed by being placed within the context of the Incarnate Logos. But the example of the Incarnate Logos actually curtails, rather than inspires, Clement's ascetic tendencies. Clement clung to an ideal of inner tranquillity and serenity, which was to be attained and maintained by buttressing the mind, that which is properly human and in the image of God, through the exercise of virtue against anything which might disturb or ensnare it, in particular the pleasures which are associated with the body's natural needs. Christians are to dissociate themselves from whatever natural pleasures might accompany their actions. Clement's proposed asceticism is one of a suspicious abstention: Christians are to 'tiptoe on the earth', inwardly aspiring to higher things, rather than being fully engaged in their bodily lives.

The higher Christian life of the true Gnostic intensifies the pattern seen on the level of the newly baptized. True Gnostics 'form and create themselves' by desiring not only to be saved, but also to perfect their lives through an intensifed asceticism and learning, that they might be saved 'rightly and becomingly'. Achieving this state, the Gnostics attain to an angelic, fleshless condition, in which they live above the world, 'magnanimously dispising' the good things of the world, enjoying, rather, their own 'harmless pleasures', whilst practicising ceaseless interior prayer and holding a continual festival.

This attempt to achieve a godlike life, by buttressing the rational mind through the exercise of virtues, has an immense effect upon Clement's appreciation of human sexuality. Despite genuinely praising marriage, his suspicious attitude to human sexuality is characterized by his advice to men that it is better not to look at women, because it is possible to fall into desire if we do so; our existence as male and female is a danger and threat to Clement's ideal of inner tranquility, rather than a possible horizon for manifesting the life and love of God. In contrast to some of the contemporary philosophers, Clement rarely speaks of love between the spouses. As sexual intercourse is natural, but necessary only to the extent that it enables the continuation of the race, Clement's overriding concern is that marriage should be governed by the finality of procreation. As this is the only function he concedes to human sexuality, he is inevitably led to suggest that in the resurrection, when we no longer need to marry or procreate, we will shed the sexual characteristics of our flesh. This state is, moreover, to be anticipated once married couples have ceased having children.

After summarizing, I indicate possible lines for further investigation, and suggest that, as Foucault's and Nussbaum's work indicates that Clement's approach to asceticism and anthropology is not untypical, it is only within the Irenaean perspective can the issue of sexual difference be raised meaningfully.

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Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this thesis. The numeration of the editions cited in the Bibliography is followed, except where stated otherwise. For the works of Philo, I have used the abbreviations as given after the title in the Bibliography.

AH	Irenaeus, *Against the Heresies* (referring to the numeration of Massuet).
Arm.	The Armenian version of Irenaeus, *Against the Heresies* Books 4 and 5 (referring to the page and line numbers).
Dem.	Irenaeus, *Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching.*
EH	Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History.*
Exc. Th.	Clement of Alexandria, *Excerpta ex Theodoto.*
GNO	*Gregorii Nysseni Opera.*
PG	*Patrologia Graeca.*
PO	*Patrologia Orientalis.*
Prot.	Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus.*
Paed.	Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus.*
QDS	Clement of Alexandria, *Quis Dives Salvetur.*
SC	*Sources Chrétiennes.*
Strom.	Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata.*
SVF	*Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta.*
TU	*Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur.*

Textual Note

I have made use of the various translations cited in the Bibliographies, but, unless stated otherwise, I have emended them as necessary. I have generally given, in a footnote, the Greek original for my quotations from Clement. For Irenaeus, where the original, for the most part, no longer exists, I have used both the Armenian and Latin versions, citing them as appropriate.

There is, today, a particular difficulty in translating the Greek word ἄνθρωπος, together with the corresponding pronouns. In a work on anthropology this difficulty extends beyond the translations to the text itself. Rather than using the more traditional translation, 'man', together with masculine pronouns, and preferring not to use expanded paraphrases, such as 'the human person' or 'the human being', which are both an interpretation and a restriction in meaning, I have chosen to use the word 'human' in its somewhat unfamiliar role as a noun. To avoid using gender-specific pronouns, I have frequently resorted to using the word in the plural, even in the context of a translation.

The Latin text of the *Sources Chrétiennes* edition of *Against the Heresies* uses both 'v' and 'j' in *AH* 4 and 5, and 'V/u' and 'i' in *AH* 1, 2, and 3; I have used the latter throughout.

Introduction

> The question of women and the priesthood is but one important instance of what I see to be the most critical issue of our time: the issue of the meaning and purpose of the fact that human nature exists in two consubstantial forms: male and female. This is a new issue for Christians; it has not been treated properly in the past. But it cannot be avoided today. How we respond to it, I believe, clearly demonstrates what we believe about everything: God and man, Christ and the Church, life and death.[1]
>
> Sexual difference is one of the major philosophical issues, if not the issue, of our age. According to Heidegger, each age has one issue to think through, and one only. Sexual difference is probably the issue of our time which could be our 'salvation' if we thought it through.[2]

As these two contemporary statements, from authors of widely different backgrounds and disciplines, an American Orthodox theologian and a French feminist philosopher, testify, the issue of sexual difference is one of paramount importance. Beyond (if, indeed, there is a beyond) the procreative faculty, the significance of the fact that humans exist as both male and female has never been thoroughly investigated, neither within theology nor philosophy; and upon this fact depends further, wide-ranging, inter-personal, societal, and ecclesiastical issues that are being vigorously debated today.

The purpose of this thesis is not to speculate upon the meaning of 'sexuality', of our existence as male and female, nor upon any of the related 'gender' problems. Rather, I hope to show the existence of an unresolved prior issue: I want to look at the way in which we construct an asceticism, using this term in a broader sense than is usual, to mean the way in which we think about our nature and existence as human beings, that

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[1] T. Hopko, 'Women and the Priesthood: Reflections on the Debate', p.190.
[2] L. Irigaray, *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*, p.5.

is, the way in which we allow our reflections about what it is to be human to shape our lives and, reciprocally, our chosen life style to influence our anthropology; for only having carefully examined this dimension can we then go on to think clearly about such issues as sexuality. For instance, to take a somewhat facile example, if we articulate our asceticism in such a way that we idealize a sexless state of virginity, taking literally such assertions as Gal. 3.28, 'neither male nor female', then what sense does it make to speak of sexuality at all? It is my contention that modern theological discussion on sexuality has reached an impasse, a stagnant situation from which, because of the presuppositions underlying the way that we habitually think about asceticism, we can make no progress nor give any answers. To demonstrate this contention I will examine the understanding of the being and existence of the human person in the theologies of St. Irenaeus of Lyons and St. Clement of Alexandria. These two writers present us with vastly different styles of asceticism, which have significant implications both for their anthropology as a whole, and, specifically, for their appreciation of the sexual existence of the human being.

The development of Christian asceticism has continually been a subject of fascination. So too has the question of what is the specifically Christian character of such asceticism. It has long been popularly supposed that the ideals of virginity, abstinence and continence were unique to Christianity and stood in stark contrast to a sensual and licentious antiquity, or, alternatively, that Christianity introduced a repressive sense of guilt and shame into an ancient world that otherwise had a more healthy attitude towards sexuality.[3]

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[3] P. Veyne: 'If any aspect of ancient life has been distorted by legend, this

However, neither of these two representations accurately reflect the way that early Christians, and their pagan contemporaries, themselves reflected on the distinctiveness which marked Christians out as a 'third race', neither Jew nor Gentile but children of the one God. Justin Martyr, for instance, writing in the middle of the second century, certainly knew of various practices of virginity and continence. He relates an interesting anecdote about a Christian youth who was so enthusiastic that he went to the governor of Alexandria to request permission for the surgeons to castrate him (Justin, interestingly, shows no signs of disapproval for this act).[4] Justin also insists that sexual intercourse was to take place only for the sake of procreation, and that one could find many men and women in the Christian communities who had chosen to remain virgin.[5] However, Justin never supposed that such practices were the distinguishing features of Christian life. Similarly Athenagoras, a little later, describes procreation as the limit set for our lust, and states, as if it were an accepted commonplace, that virginity and abstention from sexual intercourse

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is it. It is widely but mistakenly believed that antiquity was a Garden of Eden from which which repression was banished, Christianity having yet to insinuate the worm of sin into the forbidden fruit.' 'The Roman Empire', p.202. The first contrast is typically drawn by theologians, for instance, W. Rordorf: 'We know quite well that the mistrust of the Church Fathers in regard to sexuality was a reaction against the debauchery of the late Roman Empire,' 'Marriage in the New Testament and the Early Church', p.208; and H. I. Marrou, 'Virginity as an Ideal, and the Position of Women in Ancient Civilisation'. The latter contrast is one generally favoured by historians: it was standardized by Gibbon in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, and was still being drawn two centuries later, for instance, by E. R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety*, pp.32-36, who nevertheless argues that Christian asceticism was an extreme representative of a more 'endemic disease' in the later Empire; see also R. L. Fox, *Pagans and Christians*, pp.336-374.

[4] *First Apology*, 29.

[5] *Ibid.* 29; 15.

brings us closer to God.[6] But, like Justin, in the context of an apologetic text, these assertions were intended to defend devout Christians from the charge that promiscuous intercourse formed part of their mysteries and to assimilate them to the cultivated ideals of the time. The clearest text which demonstrates that Christians saw themselves as a 'third race', yet did not differ from the rest of the population as regards the outward expression of their lives, is found in the *Epistle to Diognetus*:

> For the distinction between Christians and other humans is neither in country nor language nor customs. For they do not dwell in cities in some place of their own, nor do they use any strange variety of dialect, nor practice (ἀσκοῦν) an extraordinary kind of life. [...] Yet while living in Greek and barbarian cities, according as each obtained their lot, and following the local customs, both in clothing and food and in the rest of life, they show forth the wonderful and confessedly strange constitution of their own citizenship. (5.1-4).

The specificity and distinctiveness of Christian existence, that which makes them a 'third race', is not to be found in the outward forms and practices of their lives, but in 'the constitution of their citizenship'.

Contemporary pagan evidence leads to the same conclusion. For example, in a commentary on Plato, preserved in Arabic, Galen writes of Christians:

> For their contempt of death and of its sequel is patent to us every day, and likewise their restraint in cohabitation. For they include not only men but also women who refrain from cohabiting all through their lives; and they also number individuals who in self-discipline and self-control in matters of food and drink and in their keen pursuit of justice have attained a pitch not inferior to that of genuine philosophers.[7]

Galen praises the Christians for possessing three important virtues: valour, temperance and justice. Rather than being struck by the practice of temperance displayed by the Christians, in matters of food and sexual relations, Galen takes it as a sign of their cultivation: by demonstrating

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[6] *Legatio*, 33.2; 33.3.

[7] Cited in R. Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, p.65.

these virtues, Christians are 'not inferior to genuine philosophers.'[8] The supposed harmfulness of sexual activity was a problem that continually vexed ancient doctors from the time of Hippocrates. Some, including Galen, suggested that, if practised under a strict regime, sexual intercourse need not necessarily be harmful. However, most doctors concurred in believing that sexual abstinence was the ideal.[9] More importantly, such thought did not develop in a vacuum. According to A. Rousselle, self-imposed restraint in sexual relations and the desire for a life of continence had become such a common phenomenon in late antique society that research was dedicated to the problems such abstention might cause, whilst reassurance had to be given to those who were unable to abstain completely from sexual activity.[10]

The popular and hackneyed contrast between the pleasure-loving, licentious (or healthy) pagans and the virtuous, chaste (or repressed) Christians does not stand up to close scrutiny. As Foucault comments, regarding different moralities:

> [...] one notices that they ultimately revolve around a rather small number of rather simple principles: perhaps men are not much more inventive when it comes to interdictions than they are when it comes to pleasures.[11]

The similarities between the philosophical moralities of late antiquity, especially Stoicism, and early Christian morality are striking, at least in their external codification. Simply to affirm a continuity, however, between the precepts and prohibitions of pagan and Christian morality is to

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[8] H. I. Marrou cites the first half of the second sentence as a demonstration that the idea of virginity or chastity was practically foreign to the pagan mentality of the Greco-Roman world. 'Virginity as an Ideal, and the Position of Women in Ancient Civilization', p.28.

[9] Cf. Soranus, *Gynaecia*, 1.7.30-32.

[10] A. Rouselle, *Porneia*, chp. 1; the reference is to p.32 (Eng. trans. p.20).

[11] M. Foucault, *L'Usage des plaisirs*, p.39 (Eng. trans. p.32).

miss the specificity of each. The debate concerning the relationship of Epictetus to Christianity, for instance, has added little to our knowledge of either.[12] To achieve a fuller appreciation of their particular characteristics, it is necessary to analyse the internal dynamics at work within each morality, their particular style of asceticism.[13]

The gradual erosion of the traditional boundaries between academic disciplines that has occurred during the second half of this century has resulted in a move away from the traditional accounts of the development of Christian dogma or philosophical thought, written in and for themselves, to take into account the new scholarship and fresh insights from other disciplines that have affected our understanding of late antiquity as a whole, arising from investigations into such topics as social relations, marriage and the family, and the changing patterns of morality.[14] This phenomenon has prompted a more considered investigation into the question of the continuity or lack of continuity between pagan and Christian morality, and their understanding of sexuality, by concentrating on the internal mechanisms of morality or the particular style of asceticism advocated.

Amongst the many works written on the subject in recent years, there have been two outstanding contributions to our comprehension of the internal dynamics of the morality, the asceticism displayed in the ancient, late antique and early Christian worlds, especially as it relates to human

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[12] Cf. M. Foucault, *Le Souci de soi*, pp.269-271 (Eng. trans. pp.235-237).

[13] Cf. P. Veyne, 'The Roman Empire', p.49.

[14] Cf. E. A. Clarke, 'The State and Future of Historical Theology: Patristic Studies'; A. Cameron, 'Redrawing the Map: Early Christian Territory after Foucault'; J. Behr, 'Shifting Sands: Foucault, Brown and the Framework of Christian Asceticism'.

sexuality. Firstly, in 1984, the second and third volumes of Michel Foucault's *Histoire de la sexualité*: *L'Usage des plaisirs* and *Le Souci de soi*, respectively; and secondly, in 1988, *The Body and Society* by Peter Brown.[15] Both of these works, in different ways, direct our attention away from the outward forms or codes of morality, to focus, instead, on how and why they were framed, what mechanisms were at work within them, and what were the implications either for the individuals whose lives took shape within this asceticism, or, more generally, for the relationship between the individual and society. By this reorientation, both works also avoid the common attempt to trace the principles of sexual restraint back to the Greek dualism of body and mind, and its consequent discomfort with the body, which, it is argued, had festered since the days of Plato and plagued the early years of Christianity.[16]

Foucault argued that the medical and philosophical thought of antiquity offered a set of techniques for the formation and shaping of the self, of the ethical subject in particular. For Foucault, this formation of the individual as an ethical subject was not simply a matter of the individual's self-awareness. Rather, Foucault expressly broke with the common assumption of Western thought, that there is a universal form of the subject which is the foundational ground of all experience.[17] Instead he investigated how,

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[15] For a more detailed analysis of their positions, and their problems, see my article, 'Shifting Sands: Foucault, Brown and the Framework of Christian Asceticsm'. Mention must also be made of A. Rouselle's fascinating book, *Porneia*. As her work primarily focuses on the historical study of behaviour, the various practices of abstention and their effects, rather than the problematization that led to such behaviour, whilst being very useful, it remains outside the concerns of this thesis.

[16] For such an explanation see most recently, E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.* pp.1-36.

[17] Cf. 'An Aesthetics of Existence', pp.50-51: 'In the first place, I do indeed believe that there is no sovereign founding subject, a universal form

through differing styles of life and various processes of subjectivization, a subject, or rather a mode of subjectivity, is formed, a subjectivity which is only one of the possible forms of the organization of self-consciousness.[18] Foucault explained what he meant by this process of subject formation by appealing to the practices referred to as the 'arts of existence', an idea he derived from Burkhardt's studies on the Renaissance. By these 'arts of existence', or, in his terminology, these 'technologies of the self', Foucault understood:

> [...] those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an *oeuvre* that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria.[19]

So instead of a history of behaviours, or a history of their codification in moral systems, Foucault's intention was to write a history of the technologies of the self; a history of the various ways in which individuals constitute themselves as subjects of their experience. This would be a history of 'ethics' or 'ascetics', in which the study of the experience and problematization of sexuality in antiquity was but an initial chapter.

The formation of individuals as ethical subjects involves a fourfold process: (a) of delimiting and defining that part of themselves and their experience which is to be the object of their moral practice, the ethical substance; (b) of determining a relationship to the precept codifying or expressing such behaviour, the mode of subjection; (c) thereby establishing

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of subject to be found everywhere. [...] I believe, on the contrary, that the subject is constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices of liberation, of liberty, as in Antiquity, on the basis, of course, of a number of rules, styles, inventions to be found in the cultural environment.'

[18] Cf. M. Foucault, 'The Return to Morality', p.253.

[19] M. Foucault, *L'Usage des plaisirs*, pp.16-17 (Eng. trans. pp.10-11).

a relationship to themselves; and (d) deciding upon a manner of being that is to be the goal of the moral activity, the final *oeuvre* of the arts or technologies of the self. Whilst any number of forms of subjectivity can be constructed through this process, there are basically only two directions which can be taken. Either the relationship between our action and its codification is paramount, in which case the resulting morality will be primarily concerned with the codification of behaviour, stipulating, for instance, what is permissible or according to nature and what is not. In such a system the relationship between the subject and the codes will be one of obedience, to a divine law, perhaps, or to a utilitarian principle. Alternatively, the greatest weight can be given to the relationship with the self. This will result in an ethics or 'ascetics' which is primarily concerned with the practices of the self, the formation of the self as a work of art or through whatever other criterion one takes as the standard or goal.

Although Foucault's projected fourth volume of the *Histoire de la sexualité* in which he intended to study the early Christian experience of sexuality, never appeared, it is possible to see the general lines along which it would, perhaps, have developed, from the comments which he makes in the second and third volumes together with various articles and interviews published in the last years of his life.[20] It was Foucault's contention that despite the fairly constant character of the problematization of sexual activity throughout history (similar themes and principles recur in various

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[20] The main sources are: 'The Battle for Chastity', which Foucault prefaced by stating that it belonged to the third volume of his *Histoire*, although it seems to have been intended for the fourth volume, *Les Aveux de la chair*; 'Technologies of the Self'; and 'The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom'.

moralities, albeit with a difference of degree and emphasis), the ethical subject and the construction of human 'sexuality' in early Christianity was markedly different to that of earlier epochs in all four of the dimensions involved in the formation of the ethical subject.

According to Foucault, in Classical Greece the ethical subject was elaborated by (a) delimiting the *aphrodisia*, sexual activity itself, as the substance of moral concern; (b) the style of subjectivity was developed through a concern for the way in which these pleasures were used, rather than by codifying the legitimate forms of sexual activity; (c) this demanded virile moderation, an agonistic form of self-mastery or *enkrateia*, in the use of pleasure; and (d) the goal of this asceticism was *sophrosyne*, a freedom from the potential enslavement to the *aphrodisia* that one risked in their use. This 'heautocratic' structure of subjectivity, nevertheless, needed to buttress itself by advising austerity in the domain of sexual activity. The Imperial epoch retained the same basic 'heautocratic' structure, but increasingly brought it under a preoccupation with the self, and by this attention strengthened and intensified the themes of austerity. Both of these technologies of the self were centred upon the acceptance of death: that their reputations, the *oeuvres* which they made of their lives, would be the only memorial left for posterity, freed the individuals for a care for the self based entirely upon the self.

Christianity, however, upset this balance by introducing the idea of a salvation beyond this life, connected with a certain transformation of the self in this life.[21] Foucault asserts that the specifically Christian

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[21] Cf. M. Foucault, 'The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom', p.9.

technology of the self and style of subjectivity is characterized, quite differently, by (a) the stigmatization of the ethical substance, desires, rather than the *aphrodisia*, as evil in themselves rather than in their effects; (b) a mode of subjection which took the form of obedience towards divine precepts and the confessor; (c) a relationship to oneself elaborated in terms of a hermeneutics of the self, probing ever deeper into the realm of desires that lurk within the heart and that need to be deciphered; and (d) the ideal of self-renunciation as the goal and fulfilment of this asceticism. It is this necessity for verbalization, developed within the Christian confessional, but elaborated, within the context of the 'human sciences', on the psychoanalyst's couch, without, however, a corresponding demand for renunciation, that Foucault considers to be the process at work in the formation of the modern subject.[22]

The work of Peter Brown presents Christian asceticism and its experience of sexuality from a different perspective to that of Foucault. Rather than analysing different styles of subjectivity, Brown attempts to explain what the ideals of chastity and renunciation meant for the early Christians in their understanding of sexuality, by reconstructing, in a series of vivid sketches situated throughout the lands of the Mediterranean, the experiences of individuals and their communities.[23] His analysis is developed through three major 'tectonic plates', structural axes or tendencies which were operative in shaping Christian asceticism. Firstly, the tendency to treat

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[22] Cf. M. Foucault, 'Technologies of the Self', pp.48-49.

[23] In addition to his magnum opus, *The Body and Society*, see also his earlier work, 'The Notion of Virginity in the Early Church', and especially his later work, 'Bodies and Minds: Sexuality and Renunciation in Early Christianity', in which he attempts to summarize his early work in terms of the interplay between three 'tectonic plates'; the reference is to 'Bodies and Minds', p.480.

sexuality as an indication of the most irreducible aspects of the human will; secondly, the idea that sexual renunciation was constitutive and descriptive of true human freedom; and, finally, the defiant struggle, through the body itself, for freedom from the demand for procreation placed upon the body by the needs of society.

The first tendency is a result of the sexualization of the hidden impulses of the heart. The heart was the place where Christians expected to meet God; but it was also the domain in which desires and thoughts remained unspoken and even unknown to the subjects themselves. To meet God face to face in the heart required a transparency, a simplicity. With the sexualization of the hidden desires, the attempt to avoid the doubleness of a soul trusting in God but still caught up in the affairs of the world, became, somewhat exclusively, the pursuit of chastity. The connection between freedom and sexual renunciation developed through the attempt to realize the victory achieved by Christ over the 'present age'. As sexuality was a result of the Fall, if, indeed, it had not caused the Fall, sexual renunciation was understood as a means of reversing the momentum of the 'present age', while continence and virginity were emblems of this victory, anticipating the angelic state of those worthy of the resurrection.[24] Finally, the connection between sexuality and the 'present age' meant that the struggle for freedom through sexual renunciation became a social battle. This resulted in a new 'horizontal' dualism, that of the individual against

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[24] The protological and eschatological dimensions of sexual renunciation have been the subject of many recent studies. For general surveys, see T. H. C. van Eijk, 'Marriage and Virginity, Death and Immortality', and G. Sfameni Gasparro, *Enkrateia e Antropologia: Le motivazioni protologiche della continenza e della verginità nel cristianesimo dei primi secoli e nello gnosticismo*.

society, rather than the older 'vertical' relation of the individual to the cosmos; and it was through this horizontal dualism that sexuality and its renunciation acquired both intensity and new significance.[25]

It is via the interplay of these three tendencies that Brown guides us through the first five centuries of the history of Christian asceticism. The three forces were not always of equal importance: insistence on the resurrection of the body balanced pretensions to an angelic life, although the imagery was to remain; while the Christianization of the Empire and the development of monasticism necessarily redirected the battle against society. For Brown, the most important and most influential aspect of Christian asceticism was the tendency first delineated: that sexuality was used as a 'seismograph' of the hidden recesses of the heart meant, or, in reverse, that sexuality became the most personal aspect of the individual. Body and mind were thus connected in and through sexuality, resulting in a new form of the unity of the self, a unity based upon our own sexuality.[26]

Although various individual details of their analyses are debatable, Foucault's and Brown's works have the great merit of drawing our attention away from the outward forms and codes of morality and directing it instead to the inner mechanics, the style of asceticism and the mode of subjectivity, at work within different moralities. However, as I have argued elsewhere, neither the work of Foucault nor that of Brown are really adequate to the early Christian texts themselves.[27] Perhaps this is a result

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[25] Cf. P. Brown, 'Bodies and Minds', p.485.

[26] Cf. *Ibid.* p.492.

[27] Cf. 'Shifting Sands: Foucault, Brown and the Framework of Christian Asceticism'. See also A. Louth's review of P. Brown, *The Body and Society.*

of their desire to understand early Christian asceticism in terms of the movements that led to the formation of the modern subject and the modern experience of sexuality.

With regard to the first tendency Brown delineates, διψυχία was certainly a problem for early Christians, but it is doubtful whether our hidden thoughts were ever sexualized as exclusively as Brown's argument suggests; monastic literature in particular remained sensitive to all types of known or unknown thoughts which might shut us off from God. The interplay between protology and eschatology as a motivation for asceticism certainly entered Christian theology in the third century, finding its apogee in the works of St. Gregory of Nyssa, but it does not form part of the matrix of the thought of Justin and Athenagoras, referred to earlier. Neither, as we will see, does it significantly influence the theologies of Irenaeus and Clement. Indeed, in the second century, this perspective seems to have been the exclusive concern of the Gnostics and the Encratites. This is not to suggest that such arguments may not thereafter be adopted by writers of the 'Catholic' Church, but great care needs to be taken in determining to what extent such arguments are intrinsic to the broader context of Christian theology, or whether they were used as an *ad hoc* or *post factum* justification of a style of asceticism already practised by Christians, that, for instance, proposed by Justin, Athenagoras and Clement. It is, finally, doubtful whether the 'horizontal' or social dimensions of sexual renunciation contains anything that is intrinsic to the Christian revelation: one does not need to be 'born again' to act defiantly towards society.

Brown's socio-historical analysis certainly provides an insight into some of the roles that Christianity was made to play and the battles that were being

fought through it, aspects which were no doubt important both for the early Christians and for us as we try to understand their concerns, frequently in terms of our own preoccupations. But it is questionable whether Brown's own interpretative framework, in his reconstruction of early Christian asceticism, is sufficiently open and sensitive to those of his subjects as they themselves attempted to explain and interpret their own experience. We do not possess their experiences as raw data for our own historical reconstructions; rather, we gain access to their experience through their texts, their experience as they themselves interpreted and understood it. And for the early Christian writers, their interpretative frameworks and the resulting texts were primarily theological, concerned with the Christian revelation. Brown's work is full of references to theological thematics, but these are always subordinated to his overall project.

Foucault's analysis of Christian asceticism in terms of a new style of subjectivity seems to be more promising, as the early Christians themselves felt that they were a 'third race'. However, his analysis of the Christian style of subjectivity as the interplay between obedience, the hermeneutics of the self in the realm of desires, and renunciation, suggests that he too 'bracketed' too many of the concerns expressed by the early Christians themselves as a result of his self-confessed interest in the relationship between, and deployment of, power and knowledge. More importantly, we cannot assume, in a comparison of the problematization of sexual activity elaborated by Christians and their pagan contemporaries, that we are dealing with parallel or equivalent modalities of subjectivity. For, beyond the horizontal plane of the differing technologies of the self offered by the philosophical schools of late antiquity, the Christian style of subjectivity is elaborated in a vertical and eschatological perspective. Consequent upon

the Incarnation, Crucifixion, and Resurrection of Christ, Christians were born again as children of God, a 'third race'. Granted a personal immortality in Christ, Christians did not need to stylize their lives into an *oeuvre*, which could only ever gain them a relative immortality. It is on the foundation of the evangelical proclamation that early Christian texts were written, and it is only within this perspective that we can begin to appreciate what was distinctive in their style of subjectivity, their asceticism. We might wish to suspend our belief in these claims, but it would be hermeneutically unsound not to take account of the perspective from which the early Christian texts were written. The temptation to do so is, perhaps, the shadow side of the erosion of the boundaries between academic disciplines, a phenomenon which has otherwise offered so much and has revitalized our interest in the late antique world.

More recently, Martha Nussbaum has extended her earlier work, *The Fragility of Goodness*, by investigating how the contrast between luck and ethics, which dominated ancient Greek thought, from the poets and the tragedians to Plato and Aristotle, influenced Hellenistic philosophy.[28] In her earlier work, Nussbaum argued that, while the poets had suggested that the special quality of human excellence was precisely its vulnerability, ancient thought about the human good was concerned to stress the dignity of reason. Although we might resemble the lower forms of life, and seem to live in subjection to nature and fate, nevertheless, there is a part of us, the Greeks wanted to claim, which is 'divine, immortal, intellectual, unitary, indissoluble, ever unchanging'[29]. It was this rational element that the

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[28] *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics.*
[29] Plato, *Phaedo*, 80b.

Greeks trusted to govern the rest of our being, thereby securing us from the vicissitudes of fate. As Nussbaum puts it:

> A raw sense of the passivity of human beings and their humanity in the world of nature, and a response of both horror and anger at that passivity, lived side by side with and nourished the belief that reason's activity could make safe, and thereby save, our human lives - indeed, must save them, if they were to be humanly worth living.[30]

However, as Nussbaum is quick to point out, this demand for self-sufficiency, the attempt to immunize oneself against the contingencies of human life, contained, in reverse, the risk that one also eliminated what belongs to the true, vulnerable beauty of human nature.

With regard to the ethical thought of Hellenistic philosophy, Nussbaum agrees with Foucault that the different philosophical schools (with the possible exception of Skepticism) can indeed be seen as offering sets of techniques for the formation and shaping of the self. But Foucault's assumption that reason is only one of the many possible masks of power obscures, Nussbaum argues, the most distinguishing mark of philosophy, of Stoicism at any rate (Foucault's main concern in *The Souci de soi*), which was the respect that it showed for the dignity and intrinsic value of human reason. According to Nussbaum, there were many forms of 'technologies of the self' on offer in the ancient world. The daring claim of philosophy to be *the* 'art of life' asserts that it can do more than other sources of *logos* in healing and governing the soul. In contrast to superstition and popular philosophy, where the outcome is always uncertain, philosophy claims 'to remove that element of darkness and uncontrol from human life, making *tuche* subordinate to an intelligent and intelligible *techne*'.[31] In doing

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[30] *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, p.3.

[31] *The Therapy of Desire*, p.50.

this, the different philosophies also claimed to offer their disciples a '*godlike* life'.[32] For the Stoics, in particular, the virtuous, philosophical life attempted to emulate the self-sufficiency of the virtuous god who ruled the universe.[33]

Nussbaum's analyses are indeed fascinating, especially when they deal with the various attempts of Greek philosophy to come to terms with the reality of the vulnerability of human nature challenged by love, erotic love in particular. Unfortunately, however, from our point of view, her work does not extend to early Christian texts.

Nevertheless, her characterization of the pursuit of Greek ethical thought as the attempt to secure the human being by 'making *tuche* subordinate to an intelligent and intelligible *techne*' is extremely suggestive. It is, in fact, the paradigm that we will find when looking at the style of asceticism proposed by Clement of Alexandria. Wanting to maintain the cultivated, god-like ideal he established for the Christians, one of a self-sufficient being who 'tip-toes on the earth', Clement elaborated a framework for life in terms of a system of rational actions, buttressed by the virtues of ἐγκράτεια and σωφροσύνη understood in terms of self-control and self-imposed restraint. Clement also develops this asceticism in terms of a 'synergy', a co-operation between God and the human being, although, as we will see, the manner in which he articulates this 'synergy' is particularly problematic. More importantly, this style of asceticism has significant consequences for his evaluation of the sexual dimensions of the human being. Despite his

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[32] *Ibid.* p.497.

[33] Cf. *Ibid.* p.333.

genuinely warm praise for marriage, Clement is led, by the internal logic of his asceticism, to subordinate human sexuality to the function of procreation, which in itself was nothing new, and from that to postulate a sexless, or rather, an exclusively male existence in the resurrection.

This was not the only way, however, that asceticism was understood in early Christianity. In looking at Irenaeus we will find an alternative, more positive appreciation of human reality and human sexuality. Rather than understanding asceticism as the human's attempt at a god-like life, Irenaeus developed his theology of asceticism in terms of human life as participation in the life of God, the life of God lived by human beings. Instead of starting with two agents, two poles which, somehow having been divided, have then to be reconciled through the idea of 'synergy', Irenaeus has a much more theocentric anthropology than Clement. For Irenaeus, the distinguishing feature of human existence is not located exclusively in our rationality, but in the human body - the human body in which God has chosen to reveal Himself to us, which He animated by His breath at our creation and vivifies directly by His Spirit through our adoption as sons of God. Asceticism, for Irenaeus, is not intended to buttress an exalted rationality against the life and demands of the body, as it is swayed by nature and fate (or providence), but to manifest the life of God in the fulness of our bodily nature. A concern for the weakness of the flesh runs throughout Irenaeus' theology, yet this is not conquered by the exercise of human virtue, but by the Spirit who absorbs the weakness of the flesh and manifests the truly living human being. From this perspective, humans have no need to immure themselves in a self-sufficiency achieved through self-control and self-imposed restraint, for they are vivified and strengthened by the power of the life-giving Spirit of God. The character

of this style of asceticism is fundamentally one of openness, both towards God, as the source of life, and towards our human reality, as He has created it.

These two very different writers, Irenaeus of Lyons and Clement of Alexandria, were chosen for various reasons. Firstly, they are two of the earliest Christian writers of whose work a sizeable body remains. Tertullian would have been an obvious companion, but the problems which arise from a study of his writings, as he left the Catholic Church to join the Montanists, are too numerous to be dealt with adequately here. Secondly, Irenaeus and Clement were near contemporaries, writing at a time before Christian asceticism found its more enduring form in monasticism. This means that they were writing before asceticism became a detachable phenomenon of Christian life: for both of them, asceticism was not a specialized technique within the more general life of the Christian, the domain of the ascetic specialists, the monastics. Rather, asceticism was the realization, the putting into practice of the new eschatological life granted in baptism within the confines of the present life. Thirdly, both Irenaeus and Clement were engaged in the same theological debate with Gnosticism. Whilst not wishing to minimize the significance of the polemical context, it has not proved necessary, in my analyses of Irenaeus' and Clement's theologies, to dwell upon the relationship of their positions to Gnosticism. The number of studies on Gnosticism is growing so rapidly that it would not be possible, in this work, to examine it adequately. Moreover, most of the studies written in recent decades, especially on Irenaeus and somewhat less so for Clement, have treated this dimension. Indeed it seems to have become standard practice to preface a work on Irenaeus by a study of Gnosticism. Finally, as indicated above, the styles

of asceticism, together with their understanding of the human person and sexuality, proposed by Irenaeus and Clement are sufficiently different to merit a full investigation.

As I stressed earlier, it is necessary to attempt to understand early Christian texts within their own terms of reference. This will mean that whilst my analyses are intended to describe the asceticism and anthropology of Irenaeus and Clement, they will necessarily be much broader, as these themes fall within a wider context, one which is properly theological. Therefore, my analyses will tackle the full spectrum of theological issues concerning the nature and existence of human beings, from our creation in the image and likeness of God to the resurrection and eschatology. However, whilst tackling many different issues, I will not necessarily proceed along traditional lines. It is important, for an adequate interpretation of both authors, that we do not approach their works with unacknowledged, preconceived ideas or paradigms (for instance, concerning the Fall or the question of the presence of the Spirit in the human person) derived from later theological developments. We are fortunate, in the case of Irenaeus, that he himself directs the theologian on how to proceed with theological inquiry. Clement, however, can be deliberately enigmatic, and I have tried to approach his works in the way that seems to do them most justice. As my readings of the texts of Irenaeus, and to a lesser degree those of Clement, differ significantly from standard interpretations, especially in the complex question of the relationship between the soul, the breath of life and the Holy Spirit in Irenaeus' theology, my analyses might appear to be both more intensive and extensive than immediately seems necessary. It has at times been a question of the correct interpretation of a single sentence of Irenaeus (especially AH 5.18.2), referring both to the

Latin and the Armenian versions, but it has also been necessary to establish such particulars within a more comprehensive reading.

There are, therefore, three different dimensions to this thesis. Firstly, on the level of patristic scholarship, it establishes a reading of Irenaeus and Clement. Secondly, on a historiographical level, this thesis attempts to redress the balance in modern scholarship on the history of early Christian asceticism, its anthropology and understanding of sexuality, by approaching the texts in question with attention to their properly theological perspective, whilst, nevertheless, benefitting from the work of the philosophers and historians engaged in the same field. And finally, on a more theological level, it is my hope that this thesis has contributed in some way to the issue of our time, the issue of sexual difference. This thesis has not addressed this question directly, but it has attempted to investigate within what parameters, what asceticism and anthropology, we could meaningfully address the issue of sexual difference.

Part One

St. Irenaeus of Lyons:

From Animation to Vivification

1: Introduction

'No early Christian writer has deserved better of the whole Church than Irenaeus.'[1] This assessment by H. B. Swete, writing early in this century, is unfortunately borne out both by the transmission of Irenaeus' writings themselves and by much of modern scholarship, at least until the middle of this century. Of Irenaeus' writings, only two have survived to the present day: first, *The Refutation and Overthrow of Knowledge falsely so-called*, or more simply, *Against the Heresies*[2]; and, second, *The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*.[3] The *Demonstration* exists only in an Armenian translation, made in Constantinople probably in the fifth or sixth century, but rediscovered, in a thirteenth-century manuscript, only in 1904.[4] A copy of the Greek text of *Against the Heresies* was consulted by Photius in Bagdad in the ninth century, but this was probably lost in the sacking of the city in 1258.[5] The complete text (apart from an important paragraph in AH 5.36.3) survives only in a Latin version, originating in a translation probably made in the last quarter of the fourth century. The rediscovery of Irenaeus began in 1526, when Erasmus published the first edition of the Latin text of *Against the Heresies*; he was so pleased with having unearthed

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[1] H. B. Swete, foreword in F. R. M. Hitchcock, *Irenaeus of Lugdunum: A Study of his Teaching*.

[2] The first title is given by Irenaeus himself in *AH* 4.Pref.1; it is mentioned by Eusebius, *EH* 5.7.1, who also uses the abbreviated 'title', *EH* 3.23.3.

[3] This is the title given by Eusebius, *EH* 5.26.

[4] No translation of the *Demonstration*, perhaps inevitably, is wholly satisfactory. I have used the translation of J. P. Smith, comparing it to those of L. M. Froidevaux and S. Weber, whilst refering to the Armenian as given in the edition of K. T. Mekerttschian and S. G. Wilson, noting the emendations suggested by C. Mercier, *SC* 62, pp.180-182.

[5] Cf. B. Hemmerdinger, 'Les "Notices et extraits" des bibliothèques grecques de Bagdad par Photius'.

an all but forgotten treasure, which vividly described the life and theology of the early Church, that he referred to its author as 'my Irenaeus'.[6] Since then numerous Greek, Syriac and Armenian fragments have been located, preserved in the works of other authors. But, most importantly, in addition to the *Demonstration*, the manuscript found in 1904 also brought to light an Armenian translation of *AH* 4 and 5.[7] The surviving Greek fragments demonstrate that Irenaeus' works were used mainly as source material by later heresiologists, and were never themselves the inspiration for later Patristic writers.[8] It is a paradoxical fact that Irenaeus' work, which, in von Balthasar's words, marks the 'birth of Christian theology' and which was produced in conscious opposition to the real threat of Gnosticism, would later be used systematically only by those cataloguers of heresies for whom

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[6] D. Erasmus, ed., *Opus eruditissimum divi Irenaei episcopi Lugdunensis in quinque libros digestum* [...], a2.

[7] For a history of the various translations and manuscript traditions see the chapters by B. Hemmerdinger, L. Doutreleau, C. Mercier, and A. Rousseau, in *SC* 100, pp.15-191. The discovery of an Armenian translation made from the Greek, independently of the Latin translation, has enabled an assessment of both translations, and persuaded Rousseau to undertake a Greek retroversion. Both translations show a high degree of literalism; but while the Latin translator had a tendency to rethink (and occasionally to modify deliberately) what he was translating, the Armenian translator kept more slavishly to the original (cf. A. Rousseau, *SC* 100, pp.107-157). As the variant readings of the Armenian version are presented in the *Sources Chrétiennes* edition in a Latin translation (which, due to the idiosyncrasies of the languages, is necessarily an interpretation) it is still necessary, despite the remarkable achievement of A. Rousseau et al., to refer to the Armenian text edited by K. Ter-Mekerttschian and E. Ter-Minassiantz, noting the emendations suggested by C. Mercier at the end of *SC* 100, prt.1, and 152. I have given the quotations in Greek when they exist, otherwise in Latin and Armenian when necessary.

[8] Apart from the fragments preserved in the papyri (Oxyrhynchus 405 and Iena) there are occasional fragments in the Catenae on the Scriptures and St. John of Damascus' *Sacra Parallela*, and, less frequently, citations in Patristic works, for instance, St. Basil, who cites Irenaeus twice in Chp. 29 of *On the Holy Spirit*, amongst the many Fathers who testify to the divinity of the Spirit. In contrast, about eighty percent of Book 1 of *Against the Heresies* is preserved in the works of Hippolytus, Epiphanius and Theodoret of Cyrrhus. Cf. J. Fantino, *L'Homme, image de Dieu chez Saint Irénée de Lyon*, pp.188-190.

Gnosticism was no longer a living force.[9]

With regard to modern scholarship, Swete could not have foreseen the massive assault that would be launched two decades later as the methodology of 'Quellenforschung' was pushed to its limits. Building on the work of Harnack[10] and Bousset[11], Loofs autoptically dissected *Against the Heresies* into its various supposed 'sources' (even if these 'sources' have disappeared), and, by discounting any traces of their influence, delimited what he claimed was 'Irenaeus selbst'; not surprisingly he concluded that: 'Irenaeus ist als theologischer Schriftsteller viel kleiner gewesen, als man bisher annahm. [...] Noch kleiner wird Irenaeus als Theologe.'[12] As Benoît notes, in his study of Irenaeus, the imposing character of Loofs' tome was such that it effectively halted work on Irenaeus for the following decades.[13] However, Benoît himself, despite setting his 'literary analysis' in conscious opposition to Quellenforschung, in an attempt to break free from the influence of Loofs' work, did not successfully manage to escape the divisive tendencies of earlier German research.[14] He concluded, and this was

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[9] H. U. von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord*, pp.31-32. Cf. F. Sagnard, 'Nous n'avons donc pas affaire à un collectionneur d'hérésies travaillant à son bureau, comme plus tard Épiphane, ou à un érudit, comme Eusèbe, exhumant des documents de bibliothèque. Les adversaires d'Irénée sont des êtres de chair et d'os [...].' *La Gnose valentinienne*, p.82.

[10] A. Harnack, 'Der Presbyter-Prediger des Irenäus (IV,27,1-32,1), Bruchstücke und Nachklänge der ältesten exegetisch-polemischen Homilien'.

[11] W. Bousset, *Jüdisch-Christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom: Literarische Untersuchungen zu Philo und Clemens von Alexandria, Justin, und Irenäus.*

[12] F. Loofs, *Theophilus von Antiochien Adversus Marcion und die anderen theologischen Quellen bei Irenaeus*, p.432.

[13] A. Benoit, *Saint Irénée: Introduction à l'étude de sa théologie*, pp.33-34.

[14] Benoît, *ibid.* pp.40-41. Cf. H. I. Marrou: 'Il est permis de penser qu'il reste encore trop dans le sillage des grands historiens allemands de la période libérale - Bousset, Harnack et surtout Loofs.' Review of Benoit's book, p.453.

the general consensus, that, whilst displaying the unity one would expect from the work of a single author, Irenaeus' work was nevertheless composed from several sources put together somewhat thoughtlessly and clumsily.[15]

Beginning with G. Wingren's book, *Man and the Incarnation*, the last forty years have seen a new appreciation of Irenaeus' writings and theology.[16] Learning how to read Irenaeus on his own terms has been a long process. With regard specifically to *AH* 4, the primary focus of the source critics' attention, P. Bacq magisterially established the unity, not only of theological content, but also of literary form.[17] Scholars have long regarded Irenaeus as a Biblical theologian[18], but the scope of this assessment must now be extended beyond Irenaeus' fidelity to Biblical thought, to include his literary style, for, as Bacq has demonstrated, the coherence and unity of *AH* 4 is located not, as we tend to expect from a work, in a systematic, linear and logical development of ideas, but precisely in Irenaeus' use of 'the words of the Lord', joined together by means of a series of *mots crochets* or other scriptural quotations - Irenaeus

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[15] 'Ainsi le résultat de l'analyse littéraire est double: d'une part, unité: Irénée a une idée directrice, [...]; d'autre part, diversité, il intègre dans ce plan un certain nombre de sources, mais de manière assez maladroite, en sorte qu'on a l'impression que ces sources ne sont ni toujours assimilées, ni toujours repensées.' Benoît, *op. cit.* p.199. As a typical example, cf. J. Quasten: 'The whole work suffers from a lack of clear arrangement and unity of thought. Prolixity and frequent repetition makes its perusal wearisome. [...] Evidently he did not have the ability to shape his materials into a homogeneous whole.' *Patrology*, 1, p.289.

[16] For works published between 1970 and 1984, see M. A. Donovan, 'Irenaeus in Recent Scholarship'.

[17] P. Bacq, *De l'ancienne à la nouvelle alliance selon S. Irénée.*

[18] Cf. R. Seeberg's oft repeated dictum: 'Irenäus ist Biblizist und er ist der erste große Vertreter des Biblizismus.' *Lehrebuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 1, p.365. For a negative assessment, see the works of the nineteenth-century German theologians, who saw in Irenaeus an unresolved juxtaposition of a mystical-realism and apologetic-rationalism: J. Werner, *Der Paulinismus des Irenaeus*, and A. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, 2, pp.231-279.

is, perhaps uniquely, a scriptural theologian whose theology and manner of expression is founded upon Scripture.[19]

In addition to his scriptural mind, two other dominant characteristics of Irenaeus' theology need to be mentioned. The first is his realism. This is primarily expressed in seeing, and accepting, what is, as it is. Irenaeus insists that we must found our theology on what actually exists, so that we might never wander from the true comprehension of things as they are, both regarding God and ourselves.[20] As von Balthasar put it, for Irenaeus:

> Theology begins by seeing what is. [...] It is either realistic or it is not theology at all. [...] The primary aim is not to think, to impose Platonic intellectual or even mythical categories on things, but simply to see what *is*.[21]

This 'seeing' corresponds both to God's activity of revelation in the world, the Father revealing Himself through the Son in the Holy Spirit, and to the manifestation of God, the Creator, through the created world; and in both cases the 'seeing' in question is not a form of inward contemplation to be attained through a process of detachment, but of vital, life-creating importance for all.[22] There is a fundamental and unbreakable relationship between 'seeing' God, life, and the thankful enjoyment of God's goodness.[23]

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[19]Cf. P.Bacq: 'C'est l'unité de l'Écriture qui fait en somme l'unité de la théologie d'Irénée, tant au niveau littéraire qu'au niveau du contenu de l'oeuvre.' *Op. cit.* p.294.

[20]Cf. *AH* 2.25.1; 5.2.3: [...] ἀλλ' εἰδῶμεν τί ὁ Θεὸς δύναται καὶ τί ἄνθρωπος εὐεργετεῖται, καὶ μὴ σφαλῶμεν ποτε τῆς ἀληθοῦς περὶ τῶν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι καταλήψεως, τουτέστι Θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

[21]H. U. von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord*, p.45; cf. R. Tremblay: '[...] nous n'insisterons jamais assez sur le fait qu'il fut un *homme du "voir"*.' *La Manifestation et la vision de Dieu selon Saint Irénée de Lyon*, p.19.

[22]Cf. eg. *AH* 4.20.7: 'gloria enim Dei uiuens homo, uita autem hominis uisio Dei. Si enim quae est per conditionem ostensio Dei uitam praestat omnibus in terra uiuentibus, multo magis ea quae est per Verbum manifestatio Patris uitam praestat his qui uident Deum.' Cf. H. U. von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord*, p.47.

[23]Cf. *AH* 4.20.5.

'Seeing' the world as God's creation implies a thankful acceptance and love of it. For Irenaeus, the world in its rich diversity is a place of awe-inspiring wonder which testifies to its having been created by an infinitely loving and bounteous God for the sake and pleasure of the human race. It is inconceivable that it should have been produced by a jealous God or an inferior demiurge.[24] Indeed, as D. Minns observes, Irenaeus seems unable to empathize with the Gnostics' feeling of alienation from the world and their contempt of it.[25] The recurring charge that Irenaeus makes against the Gnostics is that they are ungrateful, they are not thankful for the world and all the gifts which God has bestowed on the human race. True love of God is inseparable from the love of His gifts and a thankful enjoyment of them.

The second notable characteristic of Irenaeus' theology is its emphasis on, and grounding in, unity, at all levels.[26] Gnostic thought tended to be divisive, distinguishing between the true, unknown God and the creator, between Jesus and Christ, the Spirit and the pneuma constituting the essential reality of the elect, and between three distinct 'classes' of humans. In deliberate contrast, Irenaeus repeatedly emphasized that there is but One God, the Father and Creator, who has made Himself known in the one Son, Jesus Christ, through the one Holy Spirit, to the one human race. As it is in the human nature of the one Jesus Christ that God has chosen to make Himself manifest, the Old Testament theophanies are proleptic, prophetic events, referring to the Incarnation, and, consequently, we share

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[24] Cf. *AH* 2.2.1, 4.3, 10.3, 25.2, 26.3, esp. 30.3.

[25] D. Minns, *Irenaeus*, p.25.

[26] Cf. A. Benoit, *op. cit.* pp.203-219, who draws together a useful compilation of texts illustrating the various 'unities' stressed by Irenaeus.

one and the same faith with Abraham, and are thus his true descendants.[27] In this way, Irenaeus can maintain the singleness of God's purpose in his dealings with the human race throughout history, in the various covenants and epochs, instructing and guiding His creatures in the vision of God, to the point where created human eyes can rest upon the Uncreated God.[28] In the unfolding of this historical relationship between God and humanity, every event has its place, purpose and significance, its *kairos*.[29]

The path and the goal of this process brings us to the final dimension of unity in the theology of Irenaeus: that of God and the human person, Creator and created. Unlike the Gnostic universe of incommunicability and

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[27]Cf. *Dem.* 44-45, commenting on Gen. 18.1-3, 19.24: 'So Abraham was a prophet, and saw what was to come to pass in the future, the Son of God in human form, that He was to speak with humans and eat food with them. [..., (Gen. 28.12-15)] All visions of this kind indicate the Son of God, in His speaking with humans and being with them.' See also *AH* 4.5.2-8.1. Irenaeus, following Theophilus (*Ad Autolycum*, 2.22), also interprets the 'Voice of the Lord God walking in the Garden' (Gen. 3.8) as the Word of God, adding that 'He would walk round and talk with the human, prefiguring what was to come to pass in the future, how He would become [their] kinsman [ընակից], and talk with them and come among humankind, teaching them justice.' *Dem.* 12, cf. *AH* 5.15.4. A. Orbe, *Hacia la primera teología de la procesión del Verbo*, pp.407, 665-559, and J. Ochagavia, *Visibile Patris Filius: A Study of Irenaeus' Teaching on Revelation and Tradition*, pp.69, 89-92, have tried to argue that, prior to the Incarnation, the Word was visible to the mind, an essential visibility or cognoscibility, fundamentally different to His visibility to the eyes of flesh; two types of visibility corresponding to His two generations, ex Patre Deo and ex Matre Virgine. Such an interpretation, however, undermines the unity and uniqueness of the revelation of God in the Incarnate Christ, and, furthermore, ignores the realism of Irenaeus' understanding of 'seeing', while misunderstanding the nature of prophecy and Biblical typology. Cf. A. Houssiau, *La Christologie de Saint Irénée*, pp.87-93; R. Tremblay, *op. cit.* pp.67-76, 91-103.

[28]Cf. *AH* 4.20.5; R.A. Markus: 'The gnostics had seen their salvation as *by* nature, *from* history: Irenaeus sees salvation as *by* history, *in* nature.' 'Pleroma and Fulfilment', p.219. It must, however, be recognized that some Gnostics did grant a certain value to history: for instance, according to Ptolemy, historical time enables the development of the pneumatic seed deposited in the Gnostic elect to the point where it is ready to be liberated from this world and its history, cf. *AH* 1.5.6.

[29]Cf. H. U. von Balthasar: 'It is the first great theology of the *kairos*, the *aptum tempus*, [...].' *The Glory of the Lord*, p.76.

dissociation, Irenaeus' universe is characterized by communion and participation: the God who first bestowed life on the human race tirelessly works to bring it into ever closer union with Himself, to share ever more completely in His own life and incorruptibility.[30] It is this relationship between God and the human person which makes Irenaeus' anthropology theocentric. We must discard distinctions created by later theology, such as 'natural' and 'supernatural', if we want to get to the heart of Irenaeus' thought: the becoming fully and truly human of both God and His handiwork: God becoming like us so that we might become like Him.[31]

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[30] For a short but elegant sketch of this contrast, see P. Lebeau, 'KOINONIA: la signification du salut selon saint Irénée'.

[31] Cf. *AH* 5.Pref.: The Word of God, Jesus Christ, διὰ τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν αὐτοῦ ἀγάπην γεγονότι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐσμέν, ἵνα ἡμᾶς εἶναι καταρτίσῃ ἐκεῖνο ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτός. Cf. *AH* 3.10.2, 3.19.1, 3.20.2, Cf. G. Wingren, *Man and the Incarnation*, *passim*, esp. pp.ix-xiii.

2: The Economy of God

In order to get to the heart of Irenaeus' anthropology and his understanding of asceticism, it is first necessary to determine how Irenaeus himself addressed such topics, thus orientating ourselves in Irenaeus' own perspective. Irenaeus is sometimes thought of as a somewhat timid theologian, holding restrictively to the rule of truth in the face of ever increasing Gnostic speculations.[1] As noted, Irenaeus does not develop his thought in a manner that we might think of as systematic; rather, the bulk of his work consists of scriptural exegesis which can appear both repetitious and unwieldy. Irenaeus does, however, give us guidelines for theological investigation within the parameters of the rule of truth, guidelines which, if applied to his own writings, open out onto a tremendously dynamic theological vision of the existence of human beings, in which everything 'strains forward to what lies ahead' (Phil. 3.13), its fulfillment in Christ in 'the last times' and its realization in humans in the eschaton.

After stating the rule of truth in *AH* 1.10.1, Irenaeus asserts that this rule is held equally by all churches who hold to one and the same tradition, whether they are in Germany, Spain, Gaul or Libya. Furthermore, eloquent leaders of the Church can add nothing to the fulness of this tradition, no more than poor speakers may detract from it. Yet Irenaeus recognizes that some, by virtue of their intelligence or insight (κατὰ σύνεσιν *AH* 1.10.3), know more than others. Such people do not acquire more knowledge by positing the existence of another God besides the Creator, nor another

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[1] Cf. E. Pagels's characterization of Irenaeus throughout her book, *The Gnostic Gospels*.

Christ, teachings which would clearly contradict the rule of truth.[2] Rather they know more by:

> [...] bringing out more fully the meaning of whatever was said in parables and adapting it exactly to the doctrine of the truth; and by explaining the arrangement and economy of God (τὴν πραγματείαν καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ), which is for the sake of the human race; by making it clear that God was patient in regard to the apostasy of the angels who transgressed and in regard to the disobedience of humans; by announcing why one and the same God made some things temporal, others eternal, and some heavenly, others earthly; by understanding why God, who is invisible, appeared to the prophets, not under one form, but differently to different prophets; and by indicating why several covenants were made with the human race; by teaching the character of each of the covenants; and by searching out why God 'consigned all to disobedience, that He may have mercy on all' (Rom.11.32); by thankfully acknowledging why 'the Word became flesh' (Jn.1.14) and suffered; by announcing why the coming of the Son was in the last times, that is, why the Beginning appeared at the end[3]; by unfolding as much as is contained in the Scriptures about the end and the things that are to come; by not passing over in silence why God made the Gentiles, who were despaired of, 'fellow heirs, members of the same body and partakers' with the saints (Eph. 3.6); by proclaiming how 'this mortal flesh will put on immortality, and the corruptible, incorruptibility' (1 Cor.15.54); and by preaching in what sense God says: 'Those who were not a people are "my people"; and she who was not beloved is "my beloved"' (Hos.2.23; Rom. 9.25); in what sense He says: 'For the desolate has more children than she who has a husband.' (Is. 54.1; Gal. 4.27). (*AH* 1.10.3)

This programmatic passage encapsulates the many dimensions and events of God's dealings with His creation throughout history that Irenaeus enlarges upon in his scriptural exegesis. While earlier writers, both Christian and Gnostic, as well as Irenaeus, had used the term 'economy' or 'economies' to describe particular salvific acts of God, such as the Incarnation or the

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[2]Elsewhere Irenaeus excludes speculation about what God was doing before the creation of the world (*AH* 2.28.3) and the use of human analogies to explain the indescribable generation of the Word by the Father (*AH* 2.28.4-6). Irenaeus criticizes the Gnostics for thinking up something more novel every day, cf. *AH* 1.18.1, 21.5.

[3]Following the Greek preserved by Epiphanius, καὶ διὰ τί ἐπ' ἐσχάτων τῶν καιρῶν ἡ παρουσία τοῦ Υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, τουτέστιν ἐν τῷ τέλει ἐφάνη ἡ Ἀρχή, ἀπαγγέλλειν· , and the Armenian, *PO* 39.1, p.36, rather than the Latin: 'et quare in nouissimis temporibus aduentus Filii Dei, hoc est in fine apparuit et non in initio, adnuntiare'. Cf. *AH* 4.20.4, and Rousseau's note, *SC* 263, pp.228-9.

Passion[4], it seems probable that it was Irenaeus who first used the term in a singular, universal sense, bringing together all the various aspects of this relationship into one all-embracing divine plan or economy.[5] If this universal sense of 'economy' originated in Irenaeus' polemic against the Gnostics[6], it nevertheless enabled Irenaeus to achieve a unified understanding of a purposeful arrangement of history. Indeed, Irenaeus' theology is primarily the exposition of the unity of this salvation history. Moreover, as his directions to theologians indicate, for Irenaeus, theological research is to be developed within the perspective of salvation history. As such I will begin by examining his treatment of the divine economy, following the programme delineated in *AH* 1.10.3, to determine the proper context, and hence significance, for Irenaeus' theology, of the being and existence of the human.

I: The Handiwork of God

The first and most obvious characteristic of this economy is that the economy itself and all its various stages relate to the human race, to what God has done for us. Although, as a consequence of his insistence on the creative activity of the One God, Irenaeus does develop a fairly

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[4] Eg. Eph. 1.10, 3.9; Ignatius, *Eph.* 18.2, 20.1; Justin, *Dialogue with Trypho,* 30.3, 31.1, 45.4, 87.5, 103.3, 120.1; Basilides, *AH* 1.24.4; Markus, *AH* 1.14.6, 15.3.

[5] Eg. *AH* 3.16.6, 24.1; 4.1.1; 5.2.2. Cf. M. Widmen, 'Irenäus und seine theologischen Väter', For a summary of modern interpretations of Irenaeus' use of the word 'economy' see Y. de Andia, *Homo vivens: Incorruptibilité et divinisation de l'homme selon Irénée de Lyon*, pp.88-89.

[6] Widmen suggests that its primary function was in fact anti-Gnostic, *art. cit.* p.159.

sophisticated theology of creation *ex nihilo*[7], the question of the origin of matter and the act of creation is not the centre of his concern. Rather, his attention is captivated by the divine activity of the Hands of God, the Son and the Spirit, fashioning the creature formed from mud into the image and likeness of God. It is in the human race, in each generation, that the 'economies' of the Father and Son are performed or enacted by the Holy Spirit according to the will of the Father.[8] Likewise, it is in the one human race that 'the mysteries of God, which the angels desire to see, are wrought'[9], and the workings of God, and His power and wisdom, are deployed.[10]

In *AH* 4.14.1 Irenaeus examines why God initiated the whole economy. It is within the vision of the trinitarian life of glory, evoked by Christ in the sacerdotal prayer recorded in the Gospel of St. John, that Irenaeus inscribes this economy, beginning with the creation of the human race. Having described how God accepted the friendship of Abraham, not because He was in need of it, but so that He might bestow eternal life upon Abraham,

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[7] Cf. G. May, *Creation* Ex Nihilo: *The Doctrine of 'Creation out of Nothing' in Early Christian Thought*, pp.164-178; A. Orbe, 'San Ireneo y la creación de la materia'; and J. Fantino, 'La Création *ex nihilo* chez Saint Irénée: Étude historique et théologique', note his criticisms of Orbe, p.436.

[8] *AH* 4.33.7: [τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ . . .] τὸ τὰς οἰκονομίας Πατρός τε καὶ Υἱοῦ σκηνοβατοῦν καθ' ἑκάστην γενεὰν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καθὼς βούλεται ὁ Πατὴρ. This is the Greek text as preserved in the *Sacra Parallela*, edited by Holl. Rousseau translates σκηνοβατοῦν, following the Latin, 'exposuit', as 'publie' and prefers the variant εἰς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, 'en vue des hommes'. The Armenian translator seems to have taken σκηνοβατέω in the sense of σκηνόω, *to tabernacle, to dwell*. I have preferred the primary sense of σκηνοβατέω, *to put on stage, to enact, to perform,* rather than the derived meaning, *to publish,* as it preserves the immediacy of God's activity in and on the human race, in accord with Irenaeus' fundamental axiom: *AH* 4.11.2: 'Et hoc Deus ab homine differt, quoniam Deus quidem facit, homo autem fit.'

[9] *AH* 5.36.3.

[10] Cf. AH.3.20.2: 'Gloria enim hominis Deus, operationis uero Dei et omnis sapientiae eius et uirtutis receptaculum homo.'

for the friendship of God imparts immortality to those who embrace it[11], Irenaeus continues:

> Neither in the beginning was it because God had need of humans that He formed Adam, but that He might have someone on whom He might confer His benefits. For not only before Adam, but also before all creation, the Word glorified His Father, remaining in Him, and was Himself glorified by the Father, as He did Himself declare, 'Father, glorify Thou Me with the glory which I had with Thee before the World was.'(Jn.17.5)[12]

To follow the Saviour is to be a partaker in salvation, in the same way that to follow light is to be illumined: those who are in the light contribute nothing to the light, but are themselves illumined by it. So also, those who serve and follow God give nothing to God, but God bestows on those who follow Him 'life, incorruption and eternal glory'.[13] That is, if human beings orientate themselves to God, if they follow Him, they are able to receive His life and share in His incorruptibility and glory. Humans do not themselves possess life, nor even a spark or seed of divinity. As created beings, humans need God:

> For as much as God is in want of nothing, by so much does the human stand in need of communion with God. For this is the glory of the human, to continue and remain permanently in God's service.[14]

A few lines later Irenaeus again picks up the theme of glory evoked by the

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[11] *AH* 4.13.4: 'Sed neque Abrahae amicitiam propter indigentiam assumpsit Dei Verbum, exsistens ab initio perfectus - 'Ante' enim 'quam Abraham esset, ego sum' (Jn 8.58), inquit - sed ut ipsi Abrahae donaret aeternam uitam, exsistens bonus, quoniam amicitia Dei immortalitatis est condonatrix his qui aggrediuntur eam.'

[12] *AH* 4.14.1, following the Armenian reading instead of the Latin: 'Igitur initio non [...]', cf. Rousseau's note *SC* 100, pp.233-234.

[13] *AH* 4.14.1. These three terms act almost as synonyms in Irenaeus' writings, and always refer to God Himself, cf. *AH* 2.13.9: '[...] quoniam Deus uita est et incorruptela et ueritas'. For a synopsis of the function of these terms in Irenaeus see Andia, *Homo vivens*, pp.16-31, whose study is centred on incorruptibility in Irenaeus' theology.

[14] *AH* 4.14.1: 'In quantum enim Deus nullius indigens, in tantum homo indiget Dei communione. Haec enim gloria hominis, perseuerare ac permanere in Dei seruitute.'

prayer of Christ: 'I will, that where I am, there they may also be, that they may behold my glory' (Jn.17.24); not that Christ vainly boasted of His glory, but that in beholding His glory, His disciples may also participate in it.[15] Irenaeus concludes this section, as he began it, by emphasizing our participation in the glory of God as the inspiration for creation. In typical fashion, demonstrating the unity between the Old and New Testaments, Irenaeus cites a passage from Isaiah regarding the gathering of the Posterity from the four corners, of 'everyone who is called by my name, whom I created for my glory, whom I formed and made' (Is. 43.6-7), and links this to the words of Christ:

> Inasmuch, then, as 'wheresoever the carcase is, there shall also the eagles be gathered together' (Mat. 24.28), participating in the glory of the Lord, who has both formed us and prepared us for this, that when we are with Him, we may partake of His glory.[16]

The divine economy thus begins in the glory which the Word had with the Father before the creation of the world, and culminates in the glorification of the Incarnate Son by the Father, a glory in which the disciples, by beholding, participate.

The relationship between God and the human is based on the unalterable fact of creation: it is God who has skilfully created the human, while the human has been made by God. And, being made, the human must also have a beginning and receive growth and increase:

> And indeed in this respect God differs from the human, that God indeed makes, but the human is made. And He who makes is always the same, while he who is made must receive a beginning, a middle, addition and increase. And God does indeed make well, while the

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[15] *AH* 4.14.1: '[...] non uane glorians super hoc, sed gloriam suam participare uolens discipulis suis'.

[16] *AH* 4.14.1: 'Hoc ideo quoniam 'ubicumque est cadauer, illuc congregabuntur et aquilae', participantes gloriae Domini: qui et formauit et ad hoc praeparauit nos, ut dum sumus cum eo participemus gloriae eius.'

human is made well.[17]

Irenaeus frequently uses the word *plasma*, 'handiwork', to denote the human, particularly Adam.[18] This word has the advantage of emphasizing the immediacy of our being fashioned by God: it is, quite literally, a 'hands-on' affair. It also underlines the materiality of the human, the

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[17] *AH* 4.11.2: 'Et hoc Deus ab homine differt, quoniam Deus quidem facit, homo autem fit. Et quidem qui facit, semper idem est, quod autem fit et initium et medietatem et adjectionem et augmentum accipere debet. Et Deus quidem bene facit, bene autem fit homini.' Rousseau's justification of his translation of 'adjectionem et augmentum' by 'une maturité' (ἀκμήν) is exceptionally contorted, *SC* 100, p.228. He argues that, having received a beginning and a middle, one would 'a priori' expect 'le point culminant ou maturité', and refers to the last lines of *AH* 4.11.1 (in his reading) to justify the point: 'Plasmauit enim eum in augmentum et incrementum, quemadmodum Scriptura dicit: "crescite et multiplicamini".' (Gen.1.28). The Latin 'in augmentum et incrementum' corresponds to the Armenian: յաճումն և յաճումն (Arm. p.35. 8-9; = in augmentum et in augmentum). As this does not satisfy him, Rousseau digs up another text (*AH* 5.34.2) where յաճումն is conjoined to իգարգացումն (Arm. p.238.5); the latter word only occurs in that one instance, but the corresponding verb գարգանամ appears three times in *AH* 5.12.2 and 5.36.1 (where the Greek, ἀκμάζω, is preserved) and in 5.35.2. This suggests to Rousseau that the substantive in *AH* 4.11.1 and 11.2 should be ἀκμή. As further proof, Rousseau cites the Greek text of *AH* 3.4.3, where Valentinus is described as ἤκμασε under Pope Pius; for here the Greek has been translated by 'increuit'. However, in *AH* 3.4.3 the meaning is clearly that Valentinus 'flourished' under Pius, not that he reached the culminating point of his growth. Moreover, in his train of reasoning, Rousseau forgets the glaringly obvious fact that գարգացումն does not appear in either *AH* 4.11.1 or 4.11.2. With regard to this latter passage, Rousseau also fails to take into account that where the Latin has 'et adjectionem et augmentum', the Armenian has: և աճումն - the most likely explanation for which is that the translator rendered two words, which he considered identical, by one. The sense of both these passages must, ultimately, reflect the quotation from Genesis: 'Increase and multiply'. The context is no less clear: a few lines later, Irenaeus specifically states that the perfection of the human is to continue indefinitely progressing towards God, 'homo in Deo inuentus semper proficiet ad Deum', for while God is uncreated, and so eternally the same, it belongs to the very nature and existence of the human to draw ever closer to his Creator. Bacq, who follows Rousseau's text, observes that there is no necessary opposition between reaching a maturity and continuing to grow, *op. cit.* p.96 ftn.2; yet such continuing growth is precisely what Rousseau has ruled out by placing 'le point culminant de l'épanouissement d'un être, son accomplissement plénier, sa maturité' as the final term of the sequence: beginning, middle, ---.

[18] For Irenaeus' use of the word *plasma* and its cognates, see G. Joppich, *Salus Carnis: Eine Untersuchung in der Theologie des hl. Irenaus von Lyon*, pp.49-55.

fact that we are made from the earth, from mud. The human is, for Irenaeus, essentially and profoundly fleshy, earthy; human beings are skilfully-fashioned mud.[19] Furthermore, the term *plasma* indicates the solidarity of the whole human race 'in Adam', a prominent and important principle for Irenaeus.[20]

There are two aspects of the divine fashioning of the human that should be noted. First, that in this activity each Person of the Trinity has a particular role: the Father plans and orders, the Son executes these orders and performs the work of creating, and the Spirit nourishes and increases, while the human makes continual progress.[21] The Father is the origin of all creation, expressed by the prepositions ἐκ and ἀπό, but He created everything through (διά) and in (ἐν) the Word-Son and Wisdom-Spirit, making creation a trinitarian activity of the One God.[22] The second important point is the continuity of the creative activity of God, the ordering of the Son and the nourishing of the Spirit: 'For never at any time did Adam escape the Hands of God, to Whom the Father speaking said "Let us make the human in our

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[19] Cf. Orbe, who characterizes the anthropology of the Gnostics (true human = seed of divine pneuma) as pneumatology, of Origen (true human = nous) as psychology, and Irenaeus's anthropology as sarcology. *Antropología de San Ireneo*, pp.527-8.

[20] Eg. *AH* 1.9.3; 3.21.10; 5.1.3.

[21] Cf. *AH* 4.38.3: [...] τοῦ μὲν Πατρὸς εὐδοκοῦντος καὶ κελεύοντος, τοῦ δὲ Υἱοῦ ὑπουργοῦντος καὶ πράσσοντος, τοῦ δὲ Πνεύματος τρέφοντος καὶ αὔξοντος, τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ἠρέμα προκόπτοντος καὶ ἀνερχομένου πρὸς τὸ τέλειον, [...]. Cf. *AH* 2.30.9; 3.24.2; 4.20.1; *Dem.* 5; Andia, *Homo vivens*, pp.65-67; Fantino, 'La Création *ex nihilo* chez Saint Irénée', pp.428-438.

[22] Cf. Fantino: 'Le Père est l'origine de l'oeuvre qu'il accomplit par l'intermédiaire du Fils et qu'il organise et développe par l'Espirt. Mais, bien qu'il y ait ainsi une différence entre les trois, il s'agit bien d'un seul agir.' *Ibid.* p.429.

image and after our likeness."'[23] As there is one God, so there is but one Word and one Spirit, Who are always present with the one human race throughout the various events which constitute the one economy of God. Yet, as it is but recently that the Word was made manifest, and 'in the last times' that the Spirit was poured out in a new manner, all our knowledge of God is thus bound to His manifestation in the Incarnation of Christ and His bestowal of the Spirit; that the Word and the Spirit were no less present in the Old Testament economies indicates their prophetic or proleptic, and preparatory, but no less real, presence in that period of history.[24]

Whilst God is perfect in all things, the human receives advancement and growth towards God; and while God, as uncreated, is always the same, so also the human, as created, will always advance towards God, his Creator.[25] God never ceases from bestowing His benefits upon the human race and enriching them, nor does the human ever cease from receiving these benefits and being enriched. It is for each human being to choose how to respond to God's bounteousness, thankfully or ungratefully, and everything depends upon this reaction:

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[23] *AH* 5.1.3: 'Non enim effugit aliquando Adam manus Dei, ad quas Pater loquens dicit: "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram."' Cf. *AH* 5.16.1, 28.4.

[24] Cf. *Supra* pp.29-30. In a formula that has the characteristic of a rule of truth, Irenaeus states that a truly spiritual disciple will: '[...] semper eundem Deum sciens, et semper eundem Verbum Dei cognoscens etiamsi nunc nobis manifestatus est, et semper eundem Spiritum Dei cognoscens etiamsi in nouissimis temporibus [Arm.: fine temporum] noue effusus est in nos, et a conditione mundi usque ad finem idipsum humanum genus, [...].' *AH* 4.33.15. For the continuing presence of the Word, cf. eg. *AH* 3.16.6: '[...] Verbum [...] qui semper humano generi adest,', 18.1; and of the Holy Spirit, cf. *AH* 4.33.1: 'Talis discipulus uere spiritalis recipiens Spiritum Dei, qui ab initio in uniuersis dispositionibus Dei adfuit hominibus et futura annuntiauit et praesentia ostendit et praeterita enarrat, [...].' Cf. *AH* 4.33.7.

[25] *AH* 4.11.2.

> For the vessels of His goodness and the instruments of His glorification are the humans who are thankful towards Him that made them; and again, the vessels of His just judgement are the ungrateful humans, who despise their Maker and are not subject to His Word. (*AH* 4.11.2.)

Corresponding to the basic principle of the relationship between God and the human, that God makes and the human is made, is the necessary attitude of thankfulness with which the human must respond in order to be able to receive and benefit from the goodness of God: humans must *allow* themselves to be made, to be fashioned in the image and likeness of God.

II: The Temporality of the Economy

The second important feature of this divine economy is that it is historical, it unfolds in time.[26] Irenaeus states the connection between the divine economy and temporality more explicitly in a shorter rule of truth given in *AH* 1.22.1:

> Now, it is the Father who made all things through Him [the Word], whether visible or invisible, whether sensible or intelligible, whether temporal, for the sake of some economy, or eternal.[27]

God Himself has created all things in the same manner, that is, through the Word. Some things were created invisible and intelligible, the spiritual beings who are eternal and thereby neither subject nor able to change, at least within the course of human temporality. It is not that they themselves are eternal, sustained indefinitely by their own nature, independently from God, for, like all created things, they exist as long as

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[26] Cf. J. Daniélou, 'S. Irénée et les origines de la théologie de l'histoire'; R. A. Markus, 'Pleroma and Fulfilment'; J. Fantino, 'La Création *ex nihilo* chez Saint Irénée', pp.438-442.

[27] *AH* 1.22.1: '[...] siue temporalia propter quandam dispositionem siue sempiterna et aeonia, [...].' Rousseau suggests that 'sempiterna et aeonia' is a doublet for αἰώνια.

God wills them to.[28] Rather their indefinite existence is itself a gift from God and depends on Him to maintain it.[29] Others, however, were created visible and sensible, and these are temporal and are thus subject to change. It is, therefore, God Himself who is responsible for the temporal nature of the sensible universe, and hence its mutability.[30]

More specifically, God created the sensible world and the things in it to be of a temporal or transitory nature in view of an economy. In *AH* 4.4.1-5.1 Irenaeus provides an important analysis of the rationale for this. The Gnostics argued that if the Author of the Law was indeed the true God, then Jerusalem, 'the city of the great King' (Mat. 5.35), should not have been deserted. Irenaeus suggests that this is similar to maintaining that if straw or vine twigs were a creation of God they would never be separated from the wheat or grapes. The truth, rather, is that they were created for the sake of the fruit that they produce. All things created in time necessarily have an end in time, and so the passing away of the things of the world is a natural occurrence.[31] So, the law of bondage, which originated with Moses, finished with John, when Christ came to fulfill the law and produced the fruit of liberty. Similarly, Jerusalem, which began with David, fulfilling its own time of legislation, came to an end when the

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[28] Cf. *AH* 2.34.3: 'Quemadmodum enim caelum quod est super nos, firmamentum et sol et luna et reliquae stellae et omne ornamentum ipsorum, cum ante non essent, facta sunt et multo tempore perseuerant secundum uoluntatem Dei, sic et de animabus et de spiritibus et omnino de omnibus his quae facta sunt cogitans quis minime peccabit, quando omnia quae facta sunt initium quidem facturae suae habeant, *perseuerant autem quoadusque ea Deus et esse et perseuerare uoluerit.*' [My italics].

[29] Cf. J. Fantino, 'La Création *ex nihilo* chez Saint Irénée', pp.438-439.

[30] Cf. *AH* 2.3.1-2.

[31] *AH* 4.4.1: 'Queacumque enim temporale initium habent, necesse est ea et finem habere temporalem.'

New Covenant was revealed. This does not apply only to Jerusalem, for 'the fashion of the whole world must also pass away when the time of its disappearance has come', so that the fruit may be gathered into the granary and the chaff be consumed by the fire.[32] In speaking of the 'fashion of the world' as passing away, Irenaeus is making an important distinction between the nature of the world as such, the reality created by God, and its present 'fashion' or mode of existence.[33] In *AH* 5.36.1, referring to a 'preceding book' in which he has explained as far as possible 'the cause of the creation of this world of temporal things', Irenaeus specifies that it is the 'fashion' (*figura*, σχῆμα) of this world that will pass away, that is, that in which the transgression occurred and the human race has grown old, while the nature or substance (ὑπόστασις, οὐσία) will remain, as its Creator is true and faithful.[34] The beginning and end of all these things is with

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[32] *AH* 4.4.3: 'Et quid de Hierusalem dicimus, quandoquidem et figuram mundi uniuersi oporteat praeterire, adueniente tempore praeteritionis ipsius, ut fructus quidem in horreum colligatur, paleae autem derelictae comburantur?' (Followed by a citation of Mal. 4.1 and Mat. 3.11-12). In speaking of 'the fashion of the world', Irenaeus is referring to 1 Cor.7.31, and to his discussion in *AH* 4.3, where he demonstrated the unanimity of Paul, David (Ps.101.26-69, LXX) and Isaiah (51.6) on the passing away of the form of the world, but the preservation of God and His servants. It is because of the restricted scope of what will 'necessarily pass away' in *AH* 4.4, ie. the things created not for themselves but for the fruit which they will bear, that Ireneaus, in *AH* 2.34.2, can put the same philosophical principle into the mouth of an opponent who denies the perpetuity of the soul. According to Irenaeus, souls, although created in time, nevertheless remain perpetually in existence, sustained by the will of God. Cf. A. Rousseau, 'L'Éternité des peines de l'enfer et l'immortalité naturelle de l'âme selon S. Irénée', pp.845-856.

[33] Cf. J. Fantino, 'La Création *ex nihilo* chez Saint Irénée', pp.437-442.

[34] *AH* 5.36.1: Οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὑπόστασις οὐδὲ ἡ οὐσία τῆς κτίσεως ἐξαφανίζεται - ἀληθὴς γὰρ καὶ βέβαιος ὁ συστησάμενος αὐτήν -, ἀλλὰ <τὸ σχῆμα παράγει τοῦ κόσμου τούτου>, τουτέστιν ἐν οἷς ἡ παράβασις γέγονεν, ὅτι ἐπαλαιώθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν αὐτοῖς. This ageing of the human in the world in which the transgression occurred is to be distinguished from the growth and maturing which brings the human, as a creature, ever closer to the Creator. The ageing described in *AH* 5.36.1 is contrasted with the renewing of humans in a new heaven and new earth, where they continually hold new converse with God.

God, 'who does all things by measure and in order', for they have been realized by the Son who is Himself the measure of the immeasurable Father.[35]

In the midst of all these temporal economies is the human being, who being created is also changeable, but who has been created for immortality. Unlike the wheat and the chaff, where the One who creates them is also the One who separates them, humans have been created like God, endowed with reason and with free will, and so are themselves the cause of becoming wheat or chaff.[36] The human race belongs to the world of changeable things, yet differs from the rest of the world in that the world was created to enable the growth of the human race into the immortality of God.[37] So Irenaeus concludes this section in *AH* 4.5.1 thus:

> God, therefore, is one and the same, who rolls up the heaven like a book and renews the face of the earth; who made the temporal things for humans, so that maturing in them, they may bear as fruit immortality, and who, through His kindness, also confers eternal things, 'that in the ages to come He may show the exceeding riches of His grace'.[38]

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[35] *AH* 4.4.2: 'omnia enim mensura et ordine Deus facit, et nihil non mensum apud eum, quoniam nec incompositum. Et bene qui dixit ipsum immensum Patrem in Filio mensuratum: mensura enim Patris Filius, quoniam et capit eum.' Cf. *AH* 4.19.2; Bacq, *op. cit.* p.58, ftn.2.

[36] *AH* 4.4.3: 'homo uero rationabilis, et secundum hoc similis Deo, liber in arbitrio factus et suae potestatis, ipse sibi causa est ut aliquando quidem frumentum, aliquando autem palea fiat.' Irenaeus here is countering the Valentinian position, in which some humans are good by nature, and others bad, cf. *AH* 1.7.5. The literature on Gnosticism is vast; for more recent comparisons of the anthropolgy of Irenaeus and the Gnostics, see, R. Berthouzoz, *Liberté et grace suivant la théologie d'Irénée de Lyon*; Y. de Andia, *Homo vivens*; and the numerous studies by A. Orbe.

[37] Cf. *AH* 5.29.1: Τὰς δὲ αἰτίας ἀπεδώκαμεν ἐν ταῖς πρὸ ταύτης βίβλοις, δι' ἃς ἀνέσχετο ὁ Θεὸς τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀπεδείξαμεν ὅτι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπὲρ τοῦ σῳζομένου ἀνθρώπου γέγονεν, τὸ αὐτεξούσιον αὐτοῦ πεπαίνοντα πρὸς τὴν ἀθανασίαν καὶ ἐπιτηδειότερον αὐτὸν πρὸς τὴν εἰς ἀεὶ ὑποταγὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ καταρτίζοντα. [End of Greek fragment] 'Et propter hoc conditio insumitur homini: non enim homo propter illam, sed conditio facta est propter hominem.'

[38] *AH* 4.5.1: '[...] qui temporalia fecit propter hominem, uti maturescens in

Thus these various temporal economies have as their goal the growth of the human into the immortality of God. As the present fashion (σχῆμα) of the world will pass away, so also, when they participate in His immortality, God transfigures (μετασχηματίσει) the initial fashion of the human, conforming the corruptible body to the body of His glory.[39] Although they will remain created beings, humans have the possibility of sharing in the eternal life of God, and thus of receiving the power of the Uncreated.[40] Only things which are subject to time can grow and have the possibility of changing their mode of existence whilst remaining what they are by nature. Thus, the temporality of sensible creation is a precondition for the possibility of the created being able to share in the life of the Uncreated, and this is precisely the outcome of the economy, the reason for which sensible creation was created as temporal.

A further point of interest is that, although made to be the lord of the earth, as the human was recently created, he appeared as a child in a world specially prepared for his nourishment and growth. The angels also were appointed to be the servants of the human. But as they are eternal and thus not subject to change or growth within the unfolding of human temporality,

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eis fructificet immortalitatem, et qui aeterna superducit propter suam benignitatem, [...]'; Eph. 2.7. For *AH* 4.5.1 concluding the first section of *AH* 4, see Bacq, *op. cit.* p.60.

[39]Cf. *AH* 5.13.3, commenting on 1 Cor. 15.53-55, Phil. 3.20-21: Μετασχηματισμὸς δὲ αὐτῆς, ὅτι θνητὴ καὶ φθαρτὴ οὖσα ἀθάνατος καὶ ἄφθαρτος γίνεται, οὐκ ἐξ ἰδίας ὑποστάσεως, ἀλλὰ <κατὰ τὴν> τοῦ Κυρίου <ἐνέργειαν [τοῦ] δύνασθαι αὐτὸν> τῷ θνητῷ τὴν ἀθανασίαν καὶ τῷ φθαρτῷ περιποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν. The [τοῦ] is Rousseau's emendation of the text of the *Sacra Parallela*, cf. *SC* 152, p.263.

[40]Cf. *AH* 4.38.3: Κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ γεγενῆσθαι αὐτά, οὐκ ἀγένητα· κατὰ δὲ τὸ παραμένειν αὐτὰ μακροῖς αἰῶσι, δύναμιν ἀγενήτου προσλήψεται, τοῦ Θεοῦ προῖκα δωρουμένου τὴν εἰς ἀεὶ παραμονὴν αὐτοῖς.

they were already fully developed. The infant human was thus 'secretly' established as their lord.[41] Neither in protology nor in eschatology does Irenaeus ever characterize or assimilate the human or human life to the angelic: it is the human, and the becoming fully human in communion with God in Christ that is the centre of the divine economy and of Irenaeus' theology.[42]

III: The Sign of Jonah

If the aim of God in creating the human race was to create beings Who could partake of His glory and incorruptibility, why then did He not create human beings as 'gods' from the outset, rather than 'be patient (ἐμακροθύμησεν) in regard to the apostasy of the angels who transgressed and in regard to the disobedience of humans', and 'consign all to disobedience, that He may have mercy on all' (Rom. 11.32; *AH* 1.10.3)? Irenaeus provides a sustained discussion of this question in *AH* 4.37-39 and *AH* 3.20.1-2. *AH* 4.37-39 is an exposition, based on Scripture, of 'the ancient law of human liberty', the fact that 'God created humans as free, having, from the beginning, power over themselves.'[43] Only such creatures are capable of initiative and

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[41] *Dem.* 12. Cf. *Dem.* 16, where Irenaeus explains that the angel 'becoming jealous of the humans and looking on them with envy because of God's many favours which He had bestowed on the humans, both ruined himself and made the human a sinner, persuading them to disobedy God's command.' Cf. A. Orbe, *Antropología de San Ireneo*, pp.134-135, etc.

[42] For eschatology, see *AH* 5.36.3. Cf. A. Orbe, *Antropología de San Ireneo*, pp.206-207; 'Supergrediens angelos'; *Teología de San Ireneo*, 3, pp.659-664. The idea of becoming equal to or like the angels played a great role in some strands of contemporary Gnosticism and later Christianity, for the latter cf. [K.] S. Frank, **ΑΓΓΕΛΙΚΟΣ ΒΙΟΣ**.

[43] *AH* 4.37.1. The place of *AH* 4.37-39, the so-called 'Treatise on Free Will', in *Against the Heresies* has been the subject of much controversy over the last one hundred years: on a theological level, it has been argued that the theology of growth described in this section is incompatible with the idea

response. This is of fundamental importance if the creature is to grow into the immortality of God. Suggesting why God did not create the human as a 'god' from the beginning, Irenaeus puts this question rather bluntly as an objection:

> 'But', they say, 'He should not have created angels such that they were able to transgress, nor humans such that they immediately [statim] became ungrateful towards Him, because they were created rational and capable of examining and judging, and not like irrational or inanimate creatures which are not able to do anything of their own will but are drawn by necessity and force towards the good, with one inclination and one bearing, unable to deviate and without the power of judging, and unable to be anything other that what they were created.' (*AH* 4.37.6)

Irenaeus' answer to this objection is simply to point out that, if this had been the case, it would not have benefited either God or humans: communion with God would be something neither to be desired nor sought after, it would be by nature, not by choice.[44] Therefore, freedom, along with temporality, is a precondition for creatures to be able to become 'other' than what they were created: for creatures to enter into communion with God, and so to be transfigured.

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of recapitulation; while on a literary level, it has been suggested that Irenaeus incorporated, or was at least heavily dependent on, an earlier work. For a summary of the scholarship on this question, and a demonstration of both the theological and literary uniformity with the rest of *Against the Heresies* see Bacq, *op. cit.* pp.363-388. For a more comprehensive analysis of the section, see R. Berthouzoz, *Liberté et grâce suivant la théologie d'Irénée de Lyon*, pp.189-243. For Irenaeus' understanding of 'free will', see Orbe, *Antropología de San Ireneo*, pp.165-195; Berthouzoz, *op. cit.* pp.195-198.

[44] *AH* 4.37.6: 'sic autem nec suaue esset eis quod est bonum, neque pretiosa communicatio Dei, neque magnopere appetendum bonum quod sine suo proprio motu et cura et studio prouenisset, sed ultro et otiose insitum, ita ut essent nullius momenti boni, eo quod natura magis quam uoluntate tales exsisterent et ultroneum haberent bonum, sed non secundum electionem, et propter hoc nec hoc ipsum intellegentes quoniam pulchrum sit quod bonum neque fruentes eo.'

Ireneaus continues, in *AH* 4.37.7, by citing Mat. 11.12 and 1 Cor. 9.24-27 to emphasize the need for struggle, as our endeavour heightens our appreciation of the gift. Moreover, as the faculty of seeing is desired more by those who know what it is like to be without sight, so also is health prized more by those who know disease, light by contrast with darkness, and life by death. In *AH* 4.39.1 Irenaeus develops this analysis by contrasting two types of knowledge: that gained through experience and that arrived at by opinion. As the tongue learns of bitterness and sweetness only through experience, so also the mind receives the knowledge (disciplina) of the good - obedience to God, which is the life of humans - through the experience of both good and evil - disobedience, which is death. In this way, through experience of both, and casting disobedience away through repentance, humans become ever more tenacious in their obedience to God. But if humans try to avoid the knowledge of both of these, and the twofold faculty of knowledge, they forget themselves and kill their humanity.[45] So Irenaeus continues, in *AH* 4.37.7, the heavenly kingdom is more precious to those who have known the earthly kingdom, and, if we prize it more, so also will we love it more: and, loving it the more, we will be more glorified by God. Irenaeus thus concludes:

> God therefore has borne[46] all these things for our sake, in order

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[45] *AH* 4.39.1: 'Si autem utrorumque eorum cognitionem et duplices sensus cogitationis quis defugiat, latenter semetipsum occidit hominem.' On this passage see Berthouzoz, *Liberté et grâce*, pp.234-238.

[46] Rousseau translates 'sustinuit' by 'a permis'; however, as Berthouzoz observes, such a translation characterizes a later theological perspective, and so he proposes 'a supporté' instead, refering to the Armenian (p.244 ?) for support, *op. cit.* p.216, ftn.79. This whole passage, a common theme in Irenaeus, has, as Rousseau notes (*SC* 100, p.281) a close parallel in *AH* 5.2.3, which is useful as an indication of the underlying Greek: Καὶ μήτι γε, καθὼς προείπαμεν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἠνέσχετο ὁ Θεὸς τὴν εἰς τὴν γῆν ἡμῶν ἀνάλυσιν, ὅπως παντοίως παιδευθέντες ἐν πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὦμεν ἀκριβεῖς, μήτε θεὸν μήτε ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες; As with most of Irenaeus' vocabulary, the inspiration is usually the NT,

> that, having been instructed through all things, henceforth we may be scrupulous in all things and, having been taught how to love God in accordance with reason, to remain in His love: God exhibiting patience [magnanimitatem] in regard to the apostasy of the human, and the human being taught by it, as the prophet says: 'Thine own apostasy shall heal you'. (Jer. 2.19).

Irenaeus immediately continues by placing this particular action of God within the economy as a whole:

> God, thus, determining all things beforehand for the perfection of the human, and towards the realization and manifestation of His economies, that goodness may be displayed and righteousness accomplished, and that the Church may be 'conformed to the image of His Son' (Rom. 8.29), and that, finally, the human may be brought to such maturity as to see and comprehend God. (*AH* 4.37.7)

That Irenaeus can inscribe the apostasy of humans into the unfolding of the divine economy indicates that he did not consider the economy simply as a plan which progresses automatically. Rather, God created beings capable of initiative, as only such beings would be able to respond freely to God and to love Him. The aim of the whole economy is twofold: the perfection of the human race, by the realization and manifestation of His economies; a perfection which, at the same time, displays His goodness and realizes His justice. Finally, if *AH* 4.37-39 has discussed the question of human freedom, and has seemed to isolate the relationship to God of each human person by emphasizing the need for each to gain personal experience and to endeavour to love God more, the section nevertheless ends with the assertion that through this process the Church, a community, is conformed to the image of the Son, and in this way, each is brought to such perfection as to see

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where ἀνέχω always appears in the middle voice, generally with the sense of *to bear, to endure*; a similar use of the word can be seen in Christ's answer to His disciples: ὦ γενεὰ ἄπιστος καὶ διεστραμμένη [...] ἕως πότε ἀνέξομαι ὑμῶν; Mat. 17.17 etc. The Armenian, ընկալա յանձին, seems to be an attempt to explain the middle voice, 'He took to Himself' (*AH* 4.37.7, Arm. p.137.23; cf. *AH* 5.2.3, Arm. p.157.5). On the specifically paedagogical role of the experience of death, see also *AH* 3.20.2. The idea mentioned in *AH* 5.2.3, that we should not be ignorant of ourselves, echoes Irenaeus' startling words at the end of *AH* 4.39.1, cited in the previous note.

and comprehend God.

In *AH* 4.38, Irenaeus approaches the same problem from a different angle. He argues that God could have created the human race perfect, or 'gods', from the beginning, for all things are possible to Him. However, created things, by virtue of being created, are necessarily inferior to the One who created them, and so fall short of the perfect: they are of a later date, infantile, and so unaccustomed to, and unexercised in, perfect conduct.[47] As it is possible for a mother to give an infant solid food, so also God could have made the human race 'perfect' from the beginning, but humans, still in their infancy, could not have received this perfection.[48] It is not that the omnipotence of God is restricted by the nature of that on which He is working[49], nor that the infantile state, despite only beginning to grow

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[47] *AH* 4.38.1: Οὐ γὰρ ἠδύνατο ἀγένητα εἶναι τὰ νεωστὶ γεγενημένα· καθ' ὃ δὲ μή ἐστιν ἀγένητα, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὑστερεῖται τοῦ τελείου· καθ' ὃ γὰρ νεώτερα, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ νήπια, [καὶ καθ' ὃ νήπια,] κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀσυνήθη καὶ ἀγύμναστα πρὸς τὴν τελείαν ἀγωγήν. The words in [ ] are Rousseau's emendations, based on the Latin and Armenian.

[48] *AH* 4.38.1: [...] οὕτως καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς μὲν οἷός τε ἦν παρασχεῖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ τέλειον, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἀδύνατος λαβεῖν αὐτό· νήπιος γὰρ ἦν. In *AH* 4.38.4, commenting on Ps. 81.6-7 (LXX), Irenaeus seems to suggest that God did indeed bestow the power of His divinity on the human race, but as we were unable to bear it, we lost it and died: 'Nos autem imputamus ei quoniam non ab initio dii facti sumus, sed primo quidem homines, tunc demum dii, quamuis Deus secundum simplicitatem bonitatis suae hoc fecerit, ne quis eum putet inuidiosum aut impraestantem: "Ego", inquit, "dixi: Dii estis et filii Excelsi omnes"; nobis autem potestatem diuinitatis baiulare non sustinentibus: "Vos autem", inquit, "uelut homines moriemini", utraque referens, et illud quod est benignum suae donationis et infirmitatem nostram et quod essemus nostrae potestatis.' Such is Bacq's interpretation, *op. cit.* p.384, in his attempt to demonstrate the underlying unity of such passages with those emphasizing the recapitulation in Christ of what we lost in Adam. Bacq, however, is mistaken in interpreting *AH* 4.38.4 in an Adamic perspective. In the whole section *AH* 4.37-39, Irenaeus is not speaking of protology, but of the law of human growth which applies to all. Cf. eg. *AH* 4.39.2: 'Oportet enim te primo quidem ordinem hominis custodire, tunc deinde participari gloriae Dei.'

[49] On this apparent flaw in Irenaeus' argument, see Minns, *Irenaeus*, pp.73-74.

towards its full potential, is itself imperfect.[50] As a creature, the human being can never be uncreated, can never cease existing in the mode proper to a creature, that is, being created. But the aim of this creating or fashioning of the human being is that it should come to be ever more fully in the image and likeness of the uncreated God. Human beings can never reach an end to this process of becoming like God, for they can never be uncreated; their perfection lies in their continual submission to the creative activity of God, through which they are brought to share in the glory of the Uncreated.[51] Finally, Irenaeus concludes *AH* 4.38 by sketching the preceding discussion in brief strokes:

> It was necessary, first, for nature to be manifest; after which, for what was mortal to be conquered and swallowed up by immortality, and the corruptible by incorruptibility, and for the human to be made in the image and likeness of God, having received the knowledge of good and evil.[52]

Thus creation and salvation, the appearance of human nature and the

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[50] On the relationship between the vocation of growth and the human state of childhood, see esp. Wingren, *Man and the Incarnation*, pp.20, 26-35.

[51] *AH* 4.38.3: [...] ὑποταγὴ δὲ Θεοῦ ἀφθαρσία, καὶ παραμονὴ ἀφθαρσίας δόξα ἀγενήτου. Διὰ ταύτης τῆς τάξεως καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀγωγῆς, ὁ γενητὸς καὶ πεπλασμένος ἄνθρωπος κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν γίνεται τοῦ ἀγενήτου Θεοῦ, τοῦ μὲν Πατρὸς εὐδοκοῦντος καὶ κελεύοντος, τοῦ δὲ Υἱοῦ ὑπουργοῦντος καὶ πράσσοντος [πλάσσοντος], τοῦ δὲ Πνεύματος τρέφοντος καὶ αὔξοντος, τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ἡμέρα προκόπτοντος καὶ ἀνερχομένου πρὸς τὸ τέλειον, πλησίον τουτέστι τοῦ ἀγενήτου γινομένου· τέλος [τέλειος] γὰρ ὁ ἀγένητος, οὗτος δέ ἐστι Θεός. Words in [ ] are Rousseau's suggested emmendations. On the continual growth of the human towards God, see also *AH* 4.11.2: 'Quemadmodum enim Deus semper idem est, sic et homo in Deo inuentus semper proficiet ad Deum.' The whole tenor of Irenaeus' thought on this point is strikingly similar to that of St. Gregory of Nyssa: αὕτη γάρ ἐστι <ἡ> ὡς ἀληθῶς τελειότης τὸ μηδέποτε στῆναι πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον αὐξανόμενον μηδέ τινι πέρατι περιορίσαι τὴν τελειότητα. *De Perf. GNO* 8.1, p.214. Cf. J. Daniélou, *L'Être et le temps chez Grégoire de Nysse*, p.114.

[52] *AH* 4.38.4: 'Oportuerat autem primo naturam apparere, post deinde uinci et absorbi mortale ab immortalitate et corruptibile ab incorruptibilitate, et fieri hominem secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei, agnitione accepta boni et mali.' Cf. 2 Cor. 5.4; 1 Cor. 15.53; Gen. 1.26; 3.5, 22.

conquering of mortality by immortality belong to the same economy, the purposeful arrangement of history, in which the acquisition of the knowledge of good and evil has its place, contributing to the realization in the end of the original divine intention of making the human in the image and likeness of God.

In *AH* 4.37-39, Irenaeus speaks of God's patience in the face of the apostasy of humans, and explains it, within the framework of God's overall economy, by the general principle of the need for newly created human beings to acquire experience, both of good and evil, in order to hold ever more firmly onto the good and to continue indefinitely progressing towards God, becoming ever more fully in His image and likeness. Irenaeus treats the same question of God's long patience in the face of human apostasy in *AH* 3.20.1-2, but this time he makes two points clearer: first, how the vocation of growth, as described in *AH* 4.37-39, relates to the specific economy of the Incarnation, the Passion and Christ's work of recapitulation[53]; and second, how the general principle, elaborated in *AH* 4.37-9, relates to protology.

Irenaeus begins *AH* 3.20 by asserting that God was patient with the human apostasy, as He foresaw the victory which should be granted to the human race through the Word, for while strength was made perfect in weakness, He demonstated the goodness and the magnificent power of God.[54] As an example

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[53] That is not so say, however, that these themes are absent from *AH* 4.37-39, nor that the theology of growth described therein is absent from the rest of Irenaeus' work. Cf. *Supra* p.46, ftn. 43; Bacq: 'La théologie de la croissance et de la récapitulation ne s'opposent donc pas l'une à l'autre. Elles abordent la même mystère selon deux points de vue différents et complémentaires.' *Op. cit.* p.382.

[54] *AH* 3.20.1: 'Magnanimis igitur fuit Deus, deficiente homine, eam quae per

of this, Irenaeus gives the case of Jonah, who, by God's arrangement, was swallowed up by the whale, not that he should perish, but that, having been cast out, he might be more obedient to God and so glorify more the One who had unexpectedly saved him.[55] Irenaeus continues:

> ... so also, from the beginning God did bear[56] the humans to be swallowed up by the great whale, who was the author of transgression, not that they should perish altogether when so engulfed, but, arranging in advance[57] the finding of salvation, which was accomplished by the Word, through the 'sign of Jonah' (Mat. 12.39-40), for those who held the same opinion as Jonah regarding the Lord, and who confessed, and said, 'I am a servant of the Lord, and I worship the Lord God of heaven, who made the sea and the dry land' (Jonah 1.9), that the humans, receiving an unhoped for salvation from God, might rise from the dead, and glorify God, and repeat 'I cried to the Lord my God in my affliction, and He heard me from the belly of hell' (Jonah 2.2), and that they might always continue glorifying God, and giving thanks without ceasing for that salvation which they have obtained from Him, 'that no flesh should glory in the Lord's presence' (1 Cor. 1.29), and that the humans should never adopt an opposite opinion with regard to God, supposing that the incorruptibility which surrounds them is their own by nature, nor, by not holding the truth, should boast with empty superciliousness, as if they were by nature like to God. (*AH* 3.20.1)

So, for Irenaeus, God has borne the human race, from the beginning, while it was swallowed up by the whale.[58] Although God did not actually create the

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Verbum esset uictoriam reddendam ei praeuidens. Cum enim perficiebatur uirtus in infirmitate (2 Cor. 12.9), benignitatem Dei et magnificentissimam ostendebat uirtutem.'

[55] For a discussion of this passage see G. Jouassard, 'Le "Signe de Jonas" dans le livre IIIe de l'*Adversus haereses* de Saint Irénée'.

[56] Although the latin is 'fuit patiens', Rousseau suggests that the Greek was ἠνέσχετο and translates this again by 'a permis'; I have preferred 'bear', cf. *supra*, p.48, ftn. 46. If the parallel with Jonah is indeed to hold, God was more actively involved in this event that would justify the translation 'a permis'; in Jonah 2.1 it is said that the Lord appointed (προσέταξεν) a great whale to swallow up Jonah.

[57] Rousseau suggests that 'praestruens et praeparans' is a doublet for προκαταρτίσας.

[58] '[...] ab initio fuit patiens Deus hominem absorbi a magno ceto [...].' For a similarly strong assertion, see St. Maximus the Confessor, who speaks of the first human inclining towards the senses, rather than following his natural desire for God, ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι *Ad Thal.* 61, *PG* 90.628a. For both Irenaeus and Maximus there is no protological age of original perfection: true human perfection is to be found in the eschaton, realized by Christ 'in

human race *in* this condition, there was, nevertheless, no period of time before which human beings were not engulfed: there is, for Irenaeus, no lost golden age of primordial perfection.[59] This is not to deny that the human transgressed or apostatized, and that there was an 'author of transgression', an *agent provocateur* of the human transgression.[60] However, the law which God gave Adam and Eve to obey was that of recognizing that they had as their Lord the Lord of all, the general law of human existence, confessed by Jonah in the above quotation.[61] Had they kept this law, they would have remained immortal; but if they were to take up 'an attitude of self-conceited arrogance', to suppose that the immortality or incorruptibility that they enjoyed was theirs by nature, as it is God's by nature, then, no longer receiving the gift of existence from God, they would become subject to death.[62] Thus the Devil's temptation is to offer what he could not give: Adam and Eve were beguiled 'under the pretext of immortality'.[63] Human death is a result of the apostasy, a turning away

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the last times', and anticipated by Christians in this present age.

[59] Irenaeus does nevertheless speak of the pre-lapsarian existence of Adam in occasional comments and discussions in *Against the Heresies*, eg. *AH* 3.22-3, where he is countering Tatian's denial of the salvation of Adam; the comments here, however, are made within the Pauline Adam-Christ framework. In the *Demonstration*, 11-16, Irenaeus provides a sustained commentary on the creation and paradisical life of Adam and Eve, which we will analyse later. It is to be noted, however, that the theology which Irenaeus develops out of the opening chapters of Genesis is that of the dependency of the human race on God and the need for grateful obedience, human infancy and their need for growth: that is, it *functions*, within the *Demonstration*, to establish the framework within which salvation history unfolds, as, for instance *AH* 4.14.1 does with respect to 14.2, dealt with in the previous section and the next respectively pp. 35-37, & pp.58-61.

[60] For the devil's role in the human apostasy, cf. *AH* 3.23.1-3; 4.Pref.4, 40.3; *Dem.* 16.

[61] Cf. esp. *Dem.* 15.

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] Cf. *AH* 3.23.5; 4.Pref.4.

from the one and only Source of life, it is an expression of the Devil's dominion over the human race.

The newly-created humans were, however, as we have seen, inexperienced, and so immediately gave way to the temptation.[64] But, just as Jonah was swallowed by the whale that he might learn the true attitude to take with respect to God, so too was the human race engulfed from the beginning as part of the divine paedagogy, receiving an unhoped-for, but nonetheless divinely foreseen, salvation, accomplished by the Word through the 'sign of Jonah'. This paedagogy, the divine economy, thus acquaints humans both with their own weakness, their total dependence on God, but also with the strength and graciousness of God. As Irenaeus explains:

> Such then was the patience of God, that the humans, passing through all things and acquiring the knowledge of death, then attaining to the resurrection from the dead, and learning by experience from whence they have been delivered, may thus always give thanks to the Lord, having received from Him the gift of incorruptibility, and may love Him the more, for 'he to whom more is forgiven, loveth more' (cf. Lk.7.42-3), and may themselves know how mortal and weak they are, but also understand that God is so immortal and powerful as to bestow immortality on the mortal and eternity on the temporal, and that they may also know the other powers of God made manifest in themselves, and, being taught by them, may think of God in accordance with the greatness of God. For the glory of the human is God, while the vessel of the workings of God, and of all His wisdom and power is the human.[65]

God was thus patient while the humans learnt by experience their own weakness and death in their ungrateful apostasy, knowing that having passed

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[64] Cf. esp. *AH* 4.40.3, where Irenaeus mitigates the disobedience of humans by attributing it to a lack of care, inexperience, in contrast to the conscious sowing of tares by the devil: Διὸ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τὸν μὲν παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ζιζάνιον λάθρα ἐπισπείραντα, τουτέστι τὴν παράβασιν εἰσενεγκόντα, ἀφώρισε τῆς ἰδίας μετουσίας· τὸν δὲ ἀμελῶς μὲν ἀλλ' ἀκάκως παραδεξάμενον τὴν παρακοὴν ἄνθρωπον ἠλέησε [. . .]. And *AH* 3.23.3, where Irenaeus explains why God pronounced no curse against Adam, but let it fall on the ground which Adam must henceforth work 'in the sweat of his brow', while the woman received the pains of labour and subjection to her husband; the curse in its fulness fell upon the serpent.

[65] *AH* 3.20.2; cf. *AH* 5.2.3.

through this experience, and having an uphoped-for salvation bestowed upon them, they would remain ever more thankful to God, willing to accept from Him the eternal existence which He alone can give. It is in this perspective that Irenaeus immediately cites, and gives us to understand, St. Paul's assertion that 'God has consigned all to disobedience, that He may have mercy on all' (Rom.11.32). Both dimensions of this economy, the engulfing of the human and the salvation wrought by the Word, are represented by Jonah, who thus becomes a type of both the transgressing human race and the Saviour.

Thus, for Irenaeus, human death plays a paedagogical role within the divine economy, enabling humans to experience to the uttermost their weakness and mortality in their apostasy from God, the source of all life.[66] Irenaeus also follows Theophilus of Antioch in ascribing a positive, remedial value to death. In *AH* 3.23.6, Irenaeus describes the action of God in response to the apostasy:

> Wherefore also He drove him [Adam] out of paradise, and removed him far from the tree of life, not because He envied him the tree of life, as some venture to assert, but having mercy on him, that he should not continue a transgressor for ever, nor that the sin which surrounded him should be immortal, and evil interminable and irremediable. But He set a bound to his transgression, by interposing death and causing sin to cease, putting an end to it by the dissolution of the flesh, which should take place in the earth, so that the human, ceasing at length to live to sin, and dying to it, might begin to live to God.[67]

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[66] With regard to the problem of death in nature apart from the human, Irenaeus sometimes seems to consider death as a natural occurrence, for what comes to be will also cease to be; although it is possible that he envisaged the abolition of all death in the Kingdom of the Son. Irenaeus never specifically attempted to tackle this point, but kept within Scripture, which clearly teaches that the human was created for life and that death is the result of the apostasy. Cf. Wingren, *Man and the Incarnation*, pp.55-60, 193-197.

[67] *AH* 3.23.6; Gen. 3.22-24, Rom. 6.2, 10. Cf. Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autolycum*, 2.26. This positive evaluation of death, as putting an end to

Thus, from this perspective, the subjection of the human to death was an act of mercy, for had the human been created in such a way as to be able to remain immortal after apostatizing from God (if, for instance, it possessed a life of its own, other than the one it receives from God), then sin and evil would also have remained immortal and thus irremediable, and so God's economy would have been frustrated, conquered by the serpent.[68] It has to be noted, however, that despite the paedagogical character of the apostasy, and the paedagogical and remedial characteristics of death, Irenaeus does not trivialize either. Whilst the apostasy and death can be seen positively from the point of view of the unfolding of the economy, they are, nevertheless, nothing less than a catastrophe: the being created by God for communion with Himself in His glory turned his back on Him; the human, the image of God, created for life, decays in the earth. This is the victory of the Devil over the human: his power consists of apostasy and transgression, and into this he has enticed and imprisoned the human.[69] It was not possible for the human who had been conquered and destroyed by disobedience, to fight back and obtain the prize of victory. This could only be done by the Word of God, becoming Incarnate, stooping low, even to death, and so fulfilling the economy of salvation.[70] Although from different perspectives we can

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sin through the resolution of the human into the earth, recurs in later patristic writings, eg. St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Orat. Cat.* 8, cf. P. Nellas, *Deification in Christ*, pp.64-66. The positive paedagogical value of death, within the whole economy, seems to be peculiar to Irenaeus.

[68] Cf. *AH* 3.23.1.

[69] Cf. *AH* 5.21.3.

[70] Cf. *AH* 3.18.2: 'Quia enim non erat possibile eum hominem qui semel uictus fuerat et elisus per inobaudientiam replasmari et obtinere brauium uictoriae, iterum autem impossibile erat ut salutem perciperet qui sub peccato ceciderat, utraque operatus est Filius, Verbum Dei exsistens, a Patre descendens et incarnatus et usque ad mortem descendens et dispensationem consummans salutis nostrae.' Minns is probably right to consider 'replasmare' as a misreading of ἀναπλησσειν rather than a

discern two dimensions to the apostasy and death, paeadagogic and catastrophic, these remain a matter of perspective: for Irenaeus, there is but the one economy of the one God, which is the history recorded in Scripture.

IV: The Unfolding of the Economy

Irenaeus continues his analysis of the finality of the act of creation in *AH* 4.14.1, with a summary description, in *AH* 4.14.2, of the progressive unfolding of the economy in time:

> Thus God, from the beginning, fashioned the human race for His munificence; and chose the patriarchs for the sake of their salvation; and formed in advance a people, teaching the uneducated to follow God; and prepared the prophets, accustoming the humans on the earth to bear His Spirit and to hold communion with God; He Himself, indeed, having need of nothing, but granting communion with Himself to those who stood in need of it. To those that pleased Him, he sketched out like an architect, the construction of salvation[71]; and to those who did not see, in Egypt, He Himself gave guidance; and to those who were unruly, in the desert, He promulgated a very suitable Law; while to those who entered into the good land He bestowed the appropriate inheritance; finally, for those converted to the Father, He killed the fatted calf and presented them with the finest robe.[72] Thus, in many ways, He

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translation of ἀναπλασσεῖν, *Irenaeus*, p.101, nt.18. The same confusion is evident in *AH* 4.24.1: '[...] hominem in hominibus factum reformasse quidem humanum genus, destruxisse autem et uicisse inimicum hominis [...]', where, for 'reformasse' the Armenian has մարտնչել և մրցել , 'to fight and strike' (Arm. p.83.3).

[71] Bacq suggests the reference is to Gen.6.13-16, where God describes the plan for the ark to Noah, *op. cit.* p.117.

[72] Following Rousseau's translation of 'primam stolam', which he interprets as a 'symbole du don de la vie éternelle aux hommes' (*SC* 100, p.234). A problem is often made out of the relationship between this 'prima stola' and the 'robe of holiness' which Adam had 'from the Spirit' in *AH* 3.23.5, and the relationship of both to the ὁμοίωσις Θεῷ and the presence of the Holy Spirit in the human person. A. Orbe suggests that the 'primam stolam' is to be identified with the original, exceptional vigor of the ὁμοίωσις that Adam possessed in Paradise, the original vigor of the Spirit. Thus, the adjective 'prima' means 'original' rather than 'best'. Cf. *Antropología de San Ireneo*, pp.214-218, esp. p.218, ftn.126. Such an interpretation is taken up by H.-J. Jaschke, *Der Heilige Geist im Bekenntnis der Kirche*,

harmonized the human race to the symphony of salvation.[73]

This 'construction of salvation' encompasses the whole history of the human race. In this passage Irenaeus summarizes this history twice, in two parallel sequences. Following the initial munificent creation, God chose the patriarchs 'for their salvation', that is, He selected those who were to be fathers of a race, individuals whose name was to have a universal signification. To these, He sketched out the construction of salvation, for in them and through them salvation is to be achieved.[74] This is accomplished through the theophanies recorded in Genesis, in which the future Incarnation and the economy of the Passion is prophetically foreseen in the Spirit and finds a response in the patriarchs' faith and trust, thereby effecting

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pp.254-256, who simply identifies the two 'robes' with the presence of the Spirit: what we lost in Adam, we regain in Christ. Similarly Andia, *Homo vivens*, pp.95-99; despite making a point of adopting Rousseau's translation, cf. *ibid.* p.54, ftn.9. The question of the presence of the Holy Spirit in the human race, is, for Irenaeus, both more subtle and more simple than is usually thought, as we will see when examining Irenaeus' anthropology. Here, in *AH* 4.14.2, the context is clearly an exegesis of the parable of the Prodigal Son (Lk. 15.11-32), where the father simply bestows on His repentant son the best that he has, and no reference is made to what type of clothing he may have worn before his adventure. As Bacq notes: 'Irénée utilise en effet l'expression *primam stolam donans,* et non pas *restaurans* ou *restituens*, comme il le fait lorsqu'il décrit la rédemption comme un retour à l'état des origines.' *Op. cit.* p.118, ftn.1.

[73] Bacq mentions that Rousseau has suggested the following correction of his Greek retroversion (lines 57-8), based on the Armenian, which has 'sonibus' where the Latin has 'modis', thus indicating a musical context: κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ῥυθμίζων τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα πρὸς τὴν συμφωνίαν τῆς σωτηρίας. *Op. cit.* p.118, ftn.2. The συμφωνία is a further reference to the parable of the Prodigal Son: ' ... as he [the elder son] came and drew near to the house, he heard music (συμφωνίας) and dancing.' (Lk. 15.25). The musical metaphor of a 'symphony', and the adjective, σύμφωνος, occurs throughout Irenaeus' work, eg. *AH* 4.18.5: 'Nostra autem consonans est sententia Eucharistiae [...]'. This theme is picked up by Andia, *Homo vivens*, pp.55, ftn.15; 240; 302; 335. On the 'accustoming' between God and the human race, see P. Évieux, 'Théologie de l'accoutumance'; for *AH* 4.14.2 see esp. pp.18-21.

[74] Cf. *AH* 4.5.4: 'In Abraham enim praedidicerat et assuetus fuerat homo sequi Verbum Dei.' The whole section merits close attention.

salvation.[75]

Having chosen the heads of the race, God then forms a people for Himself, a community, grounded and unified by the guidance given in Egypt and the Law given through Moses. Irenaeus continues, in *AH* 4.14.3, by explaining how this community is founded not only upon the Word given in the Law, but also through the tabernacle and temple, the sacrifices and oblations, 'types' by which 'they learned to fear God and to continue in His service.' This formation of the people is nevertheless preparatory, anticipating the future economies and the establishment of the Church.

After the journey through the desert, God bestowed on the people who entered into the good land an appropriate inheritance.[76] The next stage in the divine economy is that of the prophets. Like the patriarchs, the prophets have a two-fold significance: individually, they are animated by the Holy Spirit; and universally, in them the humans on earth are accustomed to bear the Spirit and to hold communion with God ('in terra assuescens hominem portare eius Spiritus et communionem habere cum Deo'). This stage still points forward: in the prophets the people can learn to recognize in an individual someone sent from God, and in their suffering, the suffering of

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[75] Cf. *AH* 4.5.5: 'Propheta ergo cum esset Abraham et uideret in Spiritu diem aduentus Domini et passionis dispositionem, per quem ipse quoque et omnes qui similiter ut ipse credidit credunt Deo saluari inciperent, exsultauit uehementer.'

[76] The entry into the good land described in Joshua also plays a typological role, referring to the reign, in the resurrection of the just, of the patriarchs, to whom the promise was made, and their seed (the Church, through adoption) together with Christ on the earth into which they never entered. Cf. AH 5.32.2: 'Si ergo huic promisit Deus hereditatem terrae, non accepit autem in omni suo incolatu, oportet eum accipere cum semine suo, hoc est qui timent Deum et credunt in eum, in resurrectione iustorum. Semen autem eius Ecclesia per Dominum adoptionem quae est ad eum accipiens, [...].'

the One to come; finally, the One to come will also realize in perfection the communion between God and man, bearing and imparting the fulness of the Spirit.

Finally, for those who converted (his qui convertuntur) to the Father, that is, the Gentiles[77], God sacrificed His Son, the 'fatted calf' and bestowed on them the 'finest robe'. Such are the manifold ways by which God has harmonized the human race in the symphony of salvation which is the divine economy: choosing His friends, forming a people out of them, and finally making those who were not a people into His people.

Irenaeus continues by considering the multiplicity of the ways in which the human race is brought to salvation from the point of view of God, who, though Himself simple[78], nevertheless accomplishes His economy in manifold fashions. In his idiosyncratic manner, Irenaeus immediately joins to the 'many ways of the symphony of salvation', a quotation from the Apocalypse: 'And His voice was as the sound of many waters'.[79] For 'the Spirit of God is like many waters', and the Father is 'both rich and multiple', and the Word also is 'rich and multiple', manifesting the Father in different forms or figures according to the particular economy.[80] The image of a symphony or melody

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[77] The identification of the prodigal son with the Gentiles is made by Bacq, *op. cit.* p.117. The only other place that Irenaeus refers to this parable is in *AH* 4.36.7, where Irenaeus explains that the Father 'did not even allow a kid to his elder son' but for the one who had been lost 'he ordered the fatted calf to be killed and gave him the best robe'. In *AH* 4.36.7-8 Irenaeus uses various parables to demonstrate that both those called at the first, Israel, and those called later, the Gentiles, have one and the same Father. But while the elder son refused the invitation to the feast, and so received nothing, the Gentiles, abandoning their idolatry and turning to the Father, benefit from the sacrifice of the Son and receive the 'best robe', cf. Bacq, *op. cit.* p.249.

[78] Cf. eg. *AH* 2.13.3, 28.5.

[79] Apoc.1.15. The connecting word being the φωνή of Apoc. 1.15, which picks up on συμφωνία, which itself is an allusion to the parable of the prodigal son commented on by Irenaeus in the preceeding lines, cf. Bacq, *op. cit.* p.118, ftn.2.

[80] *AH* 4.14.2, 20.11.

occurs again in *AH* 4.20.7, harmonizing the various economies and the 'richness' of God, and bringing all into its appropriate time, its καιρός, for the benefit of the human race:

> Thus, from the beginning, the Son is the Revealer of the Father, since He is with the Father from the beginning: the prophetic visions, the diversity of graces, His ministries, the glorification of the Father, all these, in the manner of a melody, compositely and harmoniously, He has unfolded to the human race at the appropriate time for their advantage. For where there is a composition, there is a melody; where there is a melody, there is appropriate time; and where there is appropriate time, there is advantage.[81]

It is for this that the Word, in the Incarnation, became the 'dispenser of the Paternal grace' for the advantage of the human race, 'revealing God to the human race, and presenting the human race to God'. There is a dialectic in this revelation, for the Word always preserves the invisibility of the Father, lest we become despisers of God and that we might always have something towards which to advance, yet reveals God to the human race, so that we should not cease to be.[82] Humans can never see God by their own powers, but only as, when and how God wills, for He is powerful in all things. Whilst God had earlier been seen prophetically in the Spirit, He is now seen adoptively in the Son; only in the Kingdom will He be seen 'paternally', having been prepared by the Spirit for the Son, who leads the human to the Father, who bestows incorruptibility and eternal life.[83]

We saw earlier how the whole divine economy was undertaken to extend the

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[81] *AH* 4.20.7, following Rousseau's translation.

[82] *AH* 4.20.7.

[83] *AH* 4.20.5: 'Homo etenim a se non uidebit Deum; ille autem uolens uidebitur hominibus, quibus uult et quando uult et quemadmodum uult: potens est enim in omnibus Deus, uisus quiden tunc per Spiritum prophetice, uisus autem et per Filium adoptiue, uidebitur autem et in regno caelorum paternaliter, Spiritu quidem praeparante hominem in Filium Dei, Filio autem adducente ad Patrem, Patre autem incorruptelam donante in aeternam uitam, quae unicuique euenit ex eo quod uideat Deum.'

inner trinitarian life of glory by the disciples' contemplation of the Son of God in the flesh, glorified with the glory He had with the Father from before all time, and so their participation in this glory. Now, in the context of *AH* 4.20.7, Irenaeus explains what this glory is:

> For the glory of God is a living human, and the life of the human consists in beholding God: for if the manifestation of God affords life to all living on earth, much more does that revelation of the Father which comes through the Word give life to those who see God.[84]

This is perhaps the most profound and beautiful reflection of Irenaeus: the vibrant unity between the glory of God and the living human, the life-giving manifestation of God and the vision of God by His creatures.[85] Rather than seeing human life as governed by an injunction to glorify God, for Irenaeus it is God who seeks to glorify the human, bringing him to share ever more fully in His own glory.[86] It is this desire of God that prompted His initial

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[84] *AH* 4.20.7: 'gloria enim Dei uiuens homo, uita autem hominis uisio Dei. Si enim quae est per conditionem ostensio Dei uitam praestat omnibus in terra uiuentibus, multo magis ea quae est per Verbum manifestatio Patris uitam praestat his qui uident Deum.'

[85] Irenaeus had already made the identification of life and the vision of God in *AH* 4.20.5: Ὡς γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος αὐτοῦ ἀνεξιχνίαστον, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἀγαθότης αὐτοῦ ἀνεξήγητος, δι' ἧς βλεπόμενος ζωὴν ἐνδίδωσι τοῖς ὁρῶσιν αὐτόν. Ἐπεὶ ζῆσαι ἄνευ ζωῆς ἀδύνατον, ἡ δὲ ὕπαρξις τῆς ζωῆς ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ περιγίνεται μετοχῆς, μετοχὴ δὲ Θεοῦ ἐστι τὸ ὁρᾶν Θεὸν καὶ ἀπολαύειν τῆς χρηστότητος αὐτοῦ. Following Rousseau's emended Greek text, see his comments, *SC* 100, pp.159-161. There is a pervasive trend in current scholarship to assert that the life that Irenaeus speaks of in *AH* 4.20 is '[E]vidently [...] other than physical and is the true life of humans', M. A. Donovan, 'Alive to the Glory of God', p.289. Although Irenaeus does speak of the created life, or breath of life, and the uncreated life, the life-giving Spirit, the contrast between a 'physical' or natural life and a 'true', supernatural life, which is not physical, is utterly foreign to Irenaeus' thought and vitiates its dynamism: as the human, for Irenaeus, is essentially physical, made from mud, it is difficult to see how the human can possess or live a life in a manner other than physical, unless we spiritualize our notion of life and our understanding of the 'true' human being in a Gnostic fashion. Cf. *AH* 5.3.3: when God provides life - we live: ἐκείνου γὰρ παρέχοντος ἡμῖν τὴν ζωήν, ζῶμεν. On the significance and scope of 'life' in Irenaeus' writings, see *infra* Part 1, Chp. 3: The Human Formation.

[86] Cf. A. Orbe, 'Gloria Dei vivens homo: Análisis de Ireneo, *adv, haer.* IV.20.1-7', p.263.

creation of the human, in a world specially prepared for this, and that has guided His diverse dealings with the human race throughout the one economy.

V: At the End, the Beginning

Having seen how the divine economy is directed towards the growth of the human into the life, incorruptibility and glory of God, and the way in which Irenaeus considered that the human race apostatized, was engulfed, from the beginning, we are now in a position to consider the most striking character of the programme that Irenaeus sets before the theologian in *AH* 1.10.3: that the Beginning, Christ, true God and true human, appeared at the end.

We have had occasion to see something of how, for Irenaeus, God's self-manifestation and self-communication refers exclusively to the event of the Incarnation of the Word. The Old Testament theophanies were prophetic, proleptic events always referring to the Incarnation, preparing the human race for the reception of this event and training them to follow God. Likewise, in the Old Testament, the human race was gradually accustomed to bear the Spirit, who, in the economy of the Incarnation, at the baptism, was the unction with which the Father anointed Jesus to be the Christ[87], so that the Spirit Himself might also 'with Him [Christ] become accustomed to dwell in the human race and to rest in humans and to reside in the handiwork of God'.[88] It is only in the eschatological event, 'at the end of time', that

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[87] Cf. *AH* 3.9.3: '[...] Verbum Dei [...] qui est Iesus [...] qui et adsumpsit carnem et unctus est a Patre Spiritu, Iesus Christus factus est.' *AH* 3.6.1, 12.7, 18.3; *Dem.* 40, 41.

[88] Cf. *AH* 3.17.1: 'unde et in Filium Dei Filium hominis factum descendit, cum ipso adsuescens habitare in genere humano et requiescere in hominibus et habitare in plasmate Dei, [...]'.

God fully reveals Himself in Christ and fully communicates His Spirit, and that the full perfection of the human is manifested. The truth of the human being is eschatological, not protological: it lies hidden with Christ in God (cf. Col. 3.3). It is in this sense that Irenaeus interprets St. Paul's description of Adam as τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος (Rom. 5.14). The genealogy given at the beginning of the Gospel of St. Luke demonstrates, according to Irenaeus, how Christ recapitulated all generations back to Adam, uniting the end to the beginning:

> Hence also Adam himself was termed by Paul 'the type of the One who was to come', because the Word, the Maker of all things, prefigured in him the economy that was to come of humanity in regard to the Son of God; God having established that the first human should be psychical, namely, that he should be saved by the spiritual. For, since He who saves already existed, it was necessary that he who would be saved should come into existence, that the One who saves should not exist in vain.[89]

In Adam the Word prefigured, sketched out in advance, the fulness of the human being that would be manifested in the economy of the Incarnation. Hence Adam is a type of the One who was to come.[90] However, the One who was to come existed before Adam; it was by Him and for Him that Adam came into being. So, although only appearing at the end, this One is indeed the Beginning.

This passage from *AH* 3.22.3 also introduces a second great Pauline theme, that the first Adam was psychical, while the last is spiritual.[91] Adam was

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[89] *AH* 3.22.3, on this difficult text see Rousseau's notes, *SC* 210, pp.371-2; J. A. de Aldama, 'Adam, Typus Futuri'.

[90] It is important to note the literalism of Irenaeus' understanding of a τύπος, as an imprint or impression. As a type of Christ, Adam 'does not simply prefigure Christ, but bears in his own body the lineaments of the incarnate Son of God.' Cf. Minns, *Irenaeus*, p.86. We will see more of this when we look at Irenaeus' understanding of the 'image' of God, *infra* Part 1, chp. 3: The Human Formation.

[91] 1 Cor. 15.45-48: οὕτως καὶ γέγραπται· ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν, ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζῳοποιοῦν.

established as a psychical being, animated by the breath of life, as a type of, and to be saved by, the spiritual One, He who was vivified by the Spirit. In this schema, Irenaeus makes no mention of the human apostasy: the apostasy rendered the creature who had been created for immortality, mortal; it did not transform an originally spiritual Adam into a merely psychical being. Through the apostasy Adam and Eve lost the 'strength' of the 'breath of life', they did not 'lose' the Spirit.[92] The Spirit was certainly present with Adam in Paradise, yet never ceased being present with the human race throughout the foreseen apostasy[93]; but the Spirit was present with Adam and the human race in a preparatory manner, typifying the fulness which was and is to come. The way in which the economy unfolded includes the apostasy. Nevertheless, this fact does not determine the relationship of salvation described in *AH* 3.22.3: Irenaeus understands 'salvation' as the continual process of God's activity in His handiwork, the humans, bringing them, when they allow themselves to be skilfully fashioned, to the stature of the Saviour.

Irenaeus draws a similar parallel between the first, psychical Adam, and the perfection of the human in the Word and Spirit in the last times, in *AH*

ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον τὸ πνευματικὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ψυχικόν, ἔπειτα τὸ πνευματικόν. ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός, ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. Cf. Gen. 2.7

[92]Cf. *Dem.* 14. Smith's translation of ⲡⲛⲉⲩⲙⲁ, 'breath', by 'spirit' is a serious distortion of Irenaeus' thought, demonstrating the tendency of much of contemporary scholarship to want to distinguish too sharply between the breath and the Spirit, attributing to the former a merely natural life, and to the latter a supernatural life with supernatural gifts, rather than hold both together in a typological relationship; see Smith's justification, *Proof of the Apostolic Preaching*, pp.151-152, notes 82, 83. For the relationship between the 'breath of life' and the 'life-giving Spirit', see *infra* Part 1, chp. 3: The Human Formation.

[93]Cf. *Supra* pp.39-40.

5.1.3. Here the parallel is made slightly more complicated, as Irenaeus includes in the picture the apostasy of Adam, and our state of death in Him. Irenaeus is speaking of the Ebionites, for whom Christ was the human child of Mary and Joseph, and who, therefore, denied the possibility of the union of God and human and so rejected the possibility of a new generation:

> [...] they remain in that Adam who had been conquered and was expelled from paradise: not considering that as, at the beginning of our formation in Adam, that breath of life which proceeded from God, having been united to what had been fashioned, animated the human, and manifested him as a being endowed with reason; so also, in the end, the Word of the Father and the Spirit of God having become united with the ancient substance of Adam's formation, rendered the human living and perfect, receptive of the perfect Father, in order that as in the psychical we all die, so in the spiritual we may all be made alive.[94]

Here the parallel is drawn between our original formation in Adam, as a psychical being, animated with the breath of life that comes from God, and the union of the Word and the Spirit with that formation, rendering the human living and perfect. Encompassing this parallel is the observation that Adam was conquered and expelled from Paradise, becoming subject to death, as also are those who remain in this formation, in its post-lapsarian state. But rather than a return to the pre-lapsarian state of the psychical formation, through the Incarnation, the union of the Word and the Spirit to the ancient substance of Adam's formation, we have the opportunity to be made alive again, this time, however, in the spiritual One, ourselves also thereby becoming spiritual.

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[94] *AH* 5.1.3: '[...] perseuerantes autem in eo qui uictus est Adam et proiectus est de paradiso, non contemplantes quoniam, quemadmodum ab initio plasmationis nostrae in Adam ea quae fuit a Deo aspiratio uitae unita plasmati animauit hominem et animal rationabile ostendit, sic in fine Verbum Patris et Spiritus Dei adunitus antiquae substantiae plasmationis Adae uiuentem et perfectum effecit hominem, capientem perfectum Patrem, ut, quemadmodum in animali omnes mortui sumus [մեռանիմք] sic in spiritali omnes uiuicemur [կենացգործիմք].' (Arm. p.154; cf. 1 Cor. 15.22) On the singular verbs 'adunitus' and 'effecit' referring to both the Word and Spirit, see Rousseau's note, *SC* 152, pp.209-210.

The Incarnation of the Word is thus central to the accomplishment of the divine economy, and although, perhaps, conditioned by human apostasy, the Incarnation is not occasioned by the apostasy.[95] The goal of the economy is the manifestation of the glory of God in a fully living human, partaking in the life, incorruptibility and glory of God. But, how can the created become a partaker of the Uncreated, unless the Uncreated joins Himself to his creature? This requirement is decisive in Irenaeus' understanding of the Incarnation:

> For it was for this that the Word of God was made man, and He who was the Son of God became the Son of man, that the human, joined [commixtus] to the Word and receiving adoption, might become the son of God. For by no other means could we participate in incorruptibility and immortality, unless we had been united to incorruptibility and immortality. But how could we be joined to incorruptibility and immortality, unless, first, incorruptibility and immortality had become that which we also are, so that the corruptible might be swallowed up by incorruptibility and the mortal by immortality, 'that we might receive the adoption of sons'?[96]

The growth and increase that God set before the creature from the beginning could not itself have brought about such an outcome; rather, the growth was intended to accustom the human to be able to receive this adoption. On the one hand, God Himself needed to be incarnate, to become human, so that we humans, joined to, or bearing the Word, might be adopted as sons of God;

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[95] D'Alès, in his article, 'La Doctrine de la récapitulation en S. Irénée' thought that he could discern the future position of both Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas in Irenaeus, pp.191-192, and so began a lengthy debate, which, as Wingren observed, 'might lead one to ask if the main question is really whether Irenaeus followed Thomas or Duns Scotus!' *Man and the Incarnation*, pp.92-93, ftn.37. Orbe, in his chapter on 'The sin of Adam and the Incarnation' notes that Irenaeus never speculates about what would have happened had Adam not sinned, but nevertheless considers that it is possible to answer this question with surety. His discussion of what would have happened had Adam not sinned, or, if Adam remained innocent, while some of his sons had sinned and other's did not, simply defies credulity, *Antropología de San Ireneo*, pp.495-502.

[96] *AH* 3.19.1, referring to 1 Cor. 15.53-54; 2 Cor. 5.4; Gal. 4.5. Cf. *AH* 3.10.2, 16.3, 18.7; 5.Pref, 1.1; *Dem.* 31.

whilst, on the other hand, the human needed to be trained in preparation for this 'ascent towards God'.[97]

However, as the human apostasy and death are not simply part of the unfolding of the economy, but the catastrophic response of the human, prompted by the Devil, and its result, so too the Incarnation does not simply function within the economy, as it actually unfolded in history, only to render the psychical being fully spiritual, to bring the created being into full communion with the incorruptibility, immortality and glory of God, an event for which the paedagogy of the economy was but a preparation. As the human, after the apostasy, is dead 'in Adam', enslaved by the Devil, so Christ came to set the human free:

> For He fought and conquered; for, on the one hand, He was human contending for the fathers, and through obedience doing away with disobedience completely: and on the other hand, He bound the strong man, and set free the weak,[98] and endowed His own handiwork with salvation, by destroying sin.

The liberation of the human from the tyranny of the Devil is effected by Christ, who as human, fought the enemy, and loosed the disobedience through obedience, and as God, set free the weak and gave His handiwork salvation.[99]

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[97] *AH* 3.19.1: Those who deny the Incarnation deprive the human of τῆς εἰς τὸν Θεὸν ἀνόδου.

[98] *AH* 3.18.6, referring to Rom. 5.19; Mat. 12.29. For the image of Christ binding the strong one, cf. *AH* 3.18.2, 23.1; 4.33.4; 5.21.3, 22.1; *Dem.* 31.

[99] This relationship between the human and the divine in Christ is continued in *AH* 3.18.7: [Συνῆψεν] οὖν [καὶ] ἥνωσεν, καθὼς προέφαμεν, τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ Θεῷ. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄνθρωπος ἐνίκησεν τὸν ἀντίπαλον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως ἐνικήθη ὁ ἐχθρός. Πάλιν τε εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἐδωρήσατο τὴν σωτηρίαν, οὐκ ἂν βεβαίως ἔσχομεν αὐτήν. Καὶ εἰ μὴ συνηνώθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ Θεῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἠδυνήθη μετασχεῖν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας. Ἔδει γὰρ τὸν μεσίτην Θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων διὰ τῆς ἰδίας πρὸς ἑκατέρους οἰκειότητος εἰς φιλίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους συναγαγεῖν, καὶ Θεῷ μὲν παραστῆσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ γνωρίσται τὸν Θεόν. The words in [ ] are Rousseau's additions, based on the Latin.

As the two dimensions of the apostasy, catastrophic and paedagogic, are but a matter of perspective, so also are the two dimensions of Christ's work of salvation, liberating the weak human from the Devil and bestowing incorruptibility, a matter of perspective, relating to the human and divine in Christ.[100] Jesus Christ, not Adam, is the first manifestation in history of the true, fully human being: so, while the human, in Adam, was inexperienced, weak, and so, from the beginning, easily led into apostasy, the human in Christ, being strong, conquered the enemy by remaining obedient. Likewise, Adam was a psychical being, and, whilst obedient, he could have remained immortal, yet he could not have become a partaker in incorruptibility, nor have been united to the Spirit, had not God united Himself to the human in Christ. These two aspects are inseparable: they were realized by the one historical Jesus Christ.

It is important to note that, in accordance with his general understanding of the human person, the focus of Christ's work, for Irenaeus, is located in the flesh: it is in the flesh that Christ suffered, and through His flesh that He reconciled that flesh which was in bondage, bringing it into friendship with God.[101] Nevertheless, the work of redemption is solely the work of God, the incarnate Son, throughout:

> [...] the Lord has redeemed us through His own blood, giving His soul for our soul, His flesh for our flesh, and has poured out the Spirit of the Father for the union and communion of God and humans, bringing God down to humans through the Spirit, and lifting the human up to God through His Incarnation, and by His coming granting to us incorruptibility, firmly and truly, through communion with Him. (*AH* 5.1.1)

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[100] On Irenaeus' christology see A. Houssiau, *La Christologie de Saint Irénée* and G. Wingren, *Man and the Incarnation*.

[101] Cf. *AH* 3.18.6-7; 5.14.2: '"In corpore", ait, "reconciliauit carnis eius" (Col. 1.22), hoc quoniam iusta caro reconciliauit eam carnem quae in peccato detinebatur et in amicitiam adduxit Deo.' Cf. A. Orbe, 'San Ireneo y la doctrina de la reconcilación'.

Again, it is God who, in the human, by Himself becoming human, accomplishes the economy.

That God did indeed become human is thus the foundation upon which the economy is built and salvation achieved. But this must not be understood in a too mechanical or physical manner, for the work of salvation was accomplished by Christ through His obedience, suffering and death.[102] Both of these dimensions are expressed in Irenaeus' use of the idea of recapitulation. Christ, in becoming human, recapitulates the ancient formation of Adam, that He should be truly human, so that what He had created in the beginning, might now be saved. The virgin birth, far from depriving Christ of full humanity, is in fact the indication that, in this recapitulation, He became fully human:

> And just as the first-fashioned Adam had his substance from untilled and yet virgin soil, 'for God had not yet sent rain, and there was no man to till the ground' (Gen.2.5), and was fashioned by the Hand of God, that is, by the Word of God, for 'all things were made through Him' (Jn. 1.3), and the Lord took mud from the ground and fashioned the human (Gen. 2.7); so, when the Word, Himself, recapitulated Adam in Himself, he rightly received from Mary, who was yet a virgin, that generation which was the recapitulation of Adam. If then the first Adam had a human for his father, and was born from male seed, they would be right to say that the second Adam was begotten of Joseph. But if the former was taken from the mud, and fashioned by the Word of God, so the Word Himself, when bringing about the recapitulation of Adam within Himself, ought to have had the same kind of generation. Why then did God not once again take mud, rather than work this fashioning from Mary? So that there should not be another fashioning, nor that it should be another fashioning which would be saved, but that the same thing should be recapitulated, preserving the similitude.[103]

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[102] It is the merit of G. Wingren's *Man and the Incarnation* to have emphasized how the 'physical' and the 'moral' aspects of salvation are inseparably bound together, indeed, perhaps, a matter of perspectives, against the earlier, mainly German Protestant scholars, who criticized Irenaeus for having taught a 'physical' understanding of salvation, consequent upon his supposed lack of appreciation for the really catastrophic dimensions of sin. Cf. Minns' perceptive comments, *Irenaeus*, pp.89-91.

[103] *AH* 3.21.10. Cf. *AH* 1.9.3; 3.18.7, 21.9, 22.1; 5.1.2, 12.4, 14.1-3.

That the manner of Christ's incarnation preserved the manner of Adam's formation is due both to the fact that Adam was a type of Christ, and to the need for Christ's flesh to be that of Adam's, if He is to recapitulate all in Himself, so becoming the head of all those whose 'head' had been Adam.[104]

For Christ's work of recapitulation to be complete, He has to recapitulate not only Adam's formation, to become human, but also all the stages pertaining to the human: 'He therefore passed through every age, becoming an infant for infants, thus sanctifying infants', a child for children, a youth for youths, and an old man for old men, offering to each an example appropriate to their age.[105] Likewise, becoming 'man in order to undergo temptation'[106], He recapitulated Adam's temptation. But while Adam was defeated through disobedience, through His own obedience, Christ reversed that defeat. The parallels between Adam's temptation and disobedience and Christ's tempations in the desert and His obedience are worked out in great detail in *AH* 5.21.1-2. Irenaeus extends the dynamics of typological parallelism to include many other features of the one economy. Most importantly, the parallel between Eve, the wife who was as yet a virgin, and who, seduced by the angel, by her disobedience, became the cause of death to herself and to the human race, and Mary, the obedient virgin wife of Joseph, who, by obedience to the word of God conveyed by the angel, became the cause

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[104] Note the connection between the recapitulation of Adam and all his progeny in Christ, and the description of Christ as τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος (Rom. 5.14) in *AH* 3.22.3. Similarly, *AH* 3.18.1: 'sed quando incarnatus et homo factus, longam hominum expositionem in seipso recapitulauit, in compendio nobis salutem praestans, ut quod perdideramus in Adam, id est secundum imaginem et similitudinem esse Dei, hoc in Christo Iesu reciperemus.'

[105] *AH* 2.22.4. Cf. *AH* 3.18.7.

[106] *AH* 3.19.3.

of salvation to herself and the human race.[107] While Adam was disobedient on the occasion of the tree, and thereby brought about death, so Christ was obedient unto death on the tree.[108] Finally, Christ, in His work of recapitulation, waging war against the enemy, also recapitulated the enmity between the woman and the serpent and between their offspring, trampling on the head of him who had led us away as captives in Adam.[109]

Christ's work of salvation culminates in His Passion and Resurrection, foreshadowed by Abraham's readiness to sacrifice his only son to God.[110] Although the Incarnate Son was annointed as Christ at His baptism, it is not until His Passion and Resurrection, that His flesh is permanently transfigured by the glory of the Father and so made incorruptible:

> [...] when 'the Word became flesh' (Jn.1.14) He received all power from the God who made all things by the Word and adorned them with Wisdom, so that, just as He had, as Word of God, first place in the heavens, so He should have first place on earth, as the just human who 'committed no sin neither was guile found in his mouth' (Is. 53.9), and that He might have first place also of those under the earth, He became 'the first-born of the dead' (Col. 1.18), so that all should see their King [...] and so that the paternal light might fall on our Lord's flesh, and from His resplendent flesh come to us, and so the human might attain to incorruptibility, wrapped around with the paternal light. (*AH* 4.20.2).

By His real Passion, Christ both destroyed death and put an end to

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[107] Cf. *AH* 3.22.4, in which Irenaeus explains that the back-referencing from Mary to Eve (and Christ to Adam) could not be put asunder other than by the inversion of the process by which these bonds of union had arisen. For Mary-Eve, cf. *AH* 5.19.1; *Dem.* 33.

[108] Cf. *AH* 5.16.3; *Dem.* 34; referring to Phil. 2.8.

[109] Cf. *AH* 4.40.3; 5.21.1; referring to Gen. 3.15.

[110] Cf. *AH* 4.5.4: 'Iuste autem et nos, eandem fidem accipientes quam habuit Abraham, tollentes crucem quemadmodum ligna Isaac, sequimur eum. In Abraham enim praedidicerat et assuetus fuerat homo sequi Verbum Dei. Etenim Abraham secundum suam fidem secutus praeceptum Verbi Dei, prono animo unigenitum et dilectum filium suum concessit sacrificium Deo, ut et Deus beneplacitum habeat pro uniuerso semine eius dilectum et unigenitum Filium suum praestare sacrificium in nostram redemptionem.'

corruption, whilst manifesting life, revealing truth and bestowing incorruptibility.[111] Similarly, it is by hanging on the tree that Christ, who as the Word contains all things and is inherent in the entire creation, recapitulates all things in Himself.[112]

It is thus through Christ's recapitulation of the ancient formation of Adam, and of the various aspects pertaining to human growth in the economy, that salvation, the divine fashioning of the human, in its fulfillment, was achieved. All the events of the Old Testament pertaining to the unfolding of the economy, from the initial fashioning of Adam onwards, typify, or have their reality in, that which was to happen in and through Christ.

As this reality was not realized, nor could it have been, except by God Himself becoming incarnate, the Son of God becoming the Son of man, so, in reverse, our entry into the reality manifested in the Incarnate Son of God is not achieved by our own powers, but by adoption, υἱοθεσία, by being established as a son of God. Irenaeus, following one of his predecessors, notes that the term 'son' has a twofold meaning: according to nature or according to teaching.[113] According to nature, the word 'son' applies both to the offspring and to the work or product of a Creator, with the difference

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[111] Cf. *AH* 2.20.3.

[112] Cf. *AH* 5.18.3: 'Mundi enim Factor uere Verbum Dei est: hic autem est Dominus noster, qui in nouissismis temporibus homo factus est, in hoc mundo exsistens, et secundum inuisibilitatem continet quae facta sunt omnia, et in uniuersa conditione infixus, quoniam Verbum Dei gubernans et disponens omnia; et propter hoc "in sua" inuisibiliter "uenit", et "caro factum est", et pependit super lignum, uti uniuersa in semetipsum recapituletur.' Referring to Jn. 1.11, 14. Cf. *Dem.* 34.

[113] Cf. *AH* 4.41.2-3, Irenaeus does not inform us who his source was. There is a significant difference between the Latin and the Armenian versions of an important passage in *AH* 4.41.2. I have followed Rousseau in giving preference to the Armenian version, cf. *SC* 100, pp.283-285.

that the offspring is begotten while the work is made. Inasmuch as we were created by God, we are all sons of God. With regard to teaching, if we keep the true belief and remain in filial obedience to God, we can also be called sons of God. But as a son can be disinherited, so will we be regarded as sons only so long as we remain in filial obedience to Him. If, turning aside from this filial obedience, we join the apostasy of the Devil and do his works, we become his sons. Through conversion and repentance, an apostate son can return to his filial inheritance. Although a return to the sonship of filial obedience is of great importance for Irenaeus, the sonship to which we are called is more than this. While the Creator is God of all, of Jews, Gentiles and believers, to the Jews He was as a Lord and Lawgiver (sonship in filial obedience), and to the Gentiles He was the Maker and Creator (sonship to their Maker), but 'to the faithful He is as a Father, for in the end of times He has opened the covenant of adoption'.[114] As a creature, the human clearly was not begotten of God, nor can be, in the same way as the only-begotten Son of God. But, to be adopted as a son of the Father means more than God regarding us as His sons, for He has *established* us as His sons, incorporating us into the sonship of the Son of God, who became the Son of man for this end.[115] Becoming thus true sons of God, Irenaeus does not hesitate to describe the faithful as gods:

> 'God stood in the congregation of gods, He judges in the midst of the gods': [this text] speaks of the Father and the Son and those who have received the adoption, for they are the Church.[116]

It is, thus, by adoption that we become established as sons of God, as gods,

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[114] *Dem.* 8.

[115] Cf. *AH* 3.19.1 etc, cited *supra* pp.68. Cf. Minns, *Irenaeus*, pp.110-112.

[116] *AH* 3.6.1, citing Ps. 81.1 (LXX); cf. *AH* 4 Pref.4: '[...] neminem alium Deum appellari a Scripturis, nisi Patrem omnium et Filiu et eos qui adoptionem habent.' Cf. *AH* 3.6.2; 4.1.1.

and gathered together, in and through the Son, we form the Church, the congregation of God.

We have already seen something of how the Church was established, when looking at the unfolding of the economy, how God called the Gentiles to the faith of Abraham, making 'His people' those who were not His people, and how the Church is conformed to the image of the Son through the paedagogy of the economy. In the context of exhorting us to flee from the doctrines of heretics and take refuge in the Church, nurtured in her bosom and nourished by the Lord's Scriptures, Irenaeus describes the Church as having been 'planted as a Paradise in this world'.[117] The direction 'to eat freely from every tree of the paradise' (Gen. 2.16) refers to our freedom 'to eat from every Scripture of the Lord', but not with an uplited mind nor to touch any heretical discord, lest we be cast out of the 'paradise of life',

> [...] into which the Lord has introduced those who obey His proclamation, 'recapitulating in Himself all things which are in heaven, and which are on earth' (Eph.1.10); but the things in heaven are spiritual, while those on earth are the arrangements concerning the human.[118] These things, therefore, He recapitulated in Himself, uniting the human to the Spirit and making the Spirit to dwell in the human, becoming Himself the head of the Spirit, and giving the Spirit to be the head of the human: through Him we see and hear and speak. (*AH.* 5.20.2).

The Church is thus the paradise which the Garden of Eden prefigured. The

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[117] *AH* 5.20.2: 'Plantata est enim Ecclesia paradisus in hoc mundo.' Cf. Gen. 2.8: καὶ ἐφύτευσεν κύριος ὁ Θεὸς παράδεισον ἐν Εδὲμ [...].

[118] '[...] quae autem in terris secundum hominem est dispositio.' Rousseau, on the basis of the Latin and Armenian, conjectures that the original was πραγματεία, and translates as: 'cet ouvrage qu'est l'homme.' Cf. *SC* 152, p.307. The terms οἰκονομία and πραγματεία are clearly related in Irenaeus' writings, eg. *AH* 1.10.3; 5.19.2; both designate the activity of God in respect to the human, but, as Rousseau suggests, from different perspectives: πραγματεία is the progressive realization of a preconcieved οἰκονομία, cf. *SC* 152, pp.305-306. I have accordingly tried to keep this sense in my translation.

Church is also prefigured in all the 'prophets and righteous'[119] who desired to see the day of the Lord, that is, in all those who, under the various stages of the one economy, feared and loved God, practised justice and piety, and desired to see Christ. In reverse, it is in their true descendants, those of the Church, that the patriarchs and forefathers receive their recompense.[120]

The fulfillment of the prefigurations of the Church effected by Christ in His Incarnation, joining God to the human, and through His work of recapitulation, is described in *AH* 5.20.2 in terms of the bestowal of the Spirit, making the Spirit to dwell in humans, to be their head as He is the head of the Spirit. The gift of the Spirit is itself placed in the relationship of type-fulfillment in *AH* 3.24.1, where it is compared to the breath of life of Gen. 2.7: as the breath animated the human at the beginning, so also the Spirit vivifies those in the Church:

> It is to the Church itself that this gift of God has been entrusted, as was the breath to the handiwork, for this purpose, that all the members receiving it may be vivified; and in it [the Church] is deposited the communion with Christ, that is, the Holy Spirit, the pledge of incorruptibility, the means of confirming our faith, and the ladder of ascent to God.[121]

The Church is the locus of the Spirit. So Irenaeus continues: 'For where the Church is there is the Spirit of God, and where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church, and every kind of grace; and the Spirit is truth.' (*AH*

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[119] Cf. Mat. 13.17, *AH* 4.22.1-2.

[120] Cf. *AH* 4.22.2: 'Quemadmodum enim in primis nos praefigurabamur et praenuntiabamur, sic rursum in nobis illi deformatur, hoc est in Ecclesia, et recipiunt mercedem pro his quae laborauerunt.'

[121] *AH* 3.24.1, see Rousseau's notes on this text, *SC* 210, pp.390-393. See also *Dem.* 11, where Irenaeus describes how God fashioned the human and breathed into him the breath of life so that 'the human became like God in inspiration and formation' - both refer to Christ, cf. *infra* Part 1, chp.3: The Human Formation.

3.24.1). It is, thus, in the paradise which is the Church that the human, trained to follow the Word and accustomed to bear the Spirit through the paedagogy of the economy, can, by being vivified by the Spirit, attain the fulness of humanity, prefigured by the 'psychical Adam' but realized for the first time by Christ.

Jesus, at His baptism, was anointed by the Father with the Spirit so that we might also share in the abundance of His Unction which made Him Christ.[122] At first it was in Jesus Christ that the Spirit became accustomed to dwell in the human race, 'working the will of the Father in them, and renewing them from oldness to the newness of Christ.'[123] But after His passion and resurrection, the same Spirit was poured out on all the disciples at Pentecost, uniting all nations, bringing them to life and opening the New Covenant, so that with one accord they praised God in many languages, reversing the divisive consequences of Babel (*AH* 3.17.2). After Pentecost, entry into the Church, adoption to sonship in Christ, is through baptism. Irenaeus was fond of using water imagery for the Spirit[124], and he continues in *AH* 3.17.2 by describing the work of the Spirit at Pentecost and in baptism in such terms:

> Wherefore also the Lord promised to send the Paraclete who would make us fit for God. For just as a lump of dough or a loaf of bread cannot be made from dry flour without water, so neither could we, being many, be made one in Christ Jesus without the Water from heaven. Just as dry earth, unless it receives water, does not fructify, so we, who formerly were dry wood, would never have borne,

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[122] Cf. *AH* 3.9.3: 'Spiritus ergo Dei descendit in eum, eius qui per prophetas promiserat uncturum se eum, ut de abundantia unctionis eius nos percipientes saluaremur.'

[123] *AH* 3.17.1: '[...] uoluntatem Patrem operans in ipsis et renouans eos a uetustate in nouitatem Christi.' Cf. *Dem.* 6.

[124] Cf. *AH* 3.17.2-3; 4.14.2, 33.14, 36.4, 39.2; 5.18.2; Andia, *Homo vivens*, pp.205-223.

> as fruit, life without the willing Rain from above.[125] For, by the washing, our bodies have received that unity which is towards incorruptibility, while our souls have received it from the Spirit. Wherefore both being necessary, since both contribute towards the life of God, our Lord took pity on that unfaithful Samaritan woman [...] by showing and promising her living Water, so that she should thirst no more, nor occupy herself in acquiring the moistening water obtained in labour, having in herself a Drink welling up to eternal life, [a Drink] which the Lord received as a gift from the Father, and Himself gives to those who are partakers of Himself, sending the Holy Spirit upon all the earth. (*AH* 3.17.2).

As God established the creation by His Word and bound it together by His Spirit[126], so also to be made one in Christ we need the Water from heaven. Our bodies need to be washed in baptism to receive the unity or cohesion which opens out into incorruptibility, whilst our souls received it directly from the Spirit.[127] The Spirit is the author of our communal unity in Christ and of the cohesion that enables us, personally and bodily, to abide everlastingly. The Spirit, as the willing Rain, is also the author of our fruitfulness, enabling us to bear, as fruit, life. Having received the Water from heaven, the willing rain, and having been washed in baptism, the believer also becomes a source of living Water, a Drink which wells up to eternal life, having received the Spirit from Christ, who Himself received it from the Father.

Irenaeus seldom speaks of baptism being for the remission of sins.[128] Being

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[125] '[...] numquam fructificaremus uitam sine superna uoluntaria pluuia.' Cf. Ps. 67.10 (LXX): βροχὴν ἑκούσιον.

[126] Cf. *AH* 3.24.2: '[...] Verbo suo confirmans et Sapientia compingens omnia [...]'

[127] In *Dem.* 41 both the soul and the body together are described as being 'cleansed by the baptism of water and the Holy Spirit.'

[128] An explicit connection is made only in *Dem.* 3, where Irenaeus asserts that the faith handed down to us reminds us first of all 'that we have received baptism for the remission of sins'; and *AH* 3.12.7, where Irenaeus, commenting on Peter's speech in Acts 10.34-43, states that Peter commanded them to be baptized into Christ 'for the remission of sins' (Acts 10.43). Irenaeus, in a different context, speaks of the remission of sin for those

in transgression in the formation of Adam, the human needs the washing of regeneration.[129] Remission of sins or a purificatory washing would still leave us in 'in Adam'. We have already seen the importance and necessity of our adoption as sons of God and our participation in incorruptibility, and it is within this framework that baptism is, for Irenaeus, primarily regeneration (ἀναγέννησις).[130] It is as a reception of the unity which leads to incorruptibility that Irenaeus speaks of the baptismal washing in *AH* 3.17.2. In the *Demonstration* Irenaeus defines baptism as:

> [...] the seal of eternal life and regeneration unto God, that we be no more children of mortal men, but of the eternal and everlasting God. (*Dem.* 3)

Baptism is a 'regeneration unto God' which accomplishes our adoption as sons of God. It is a regeneration, effected by the new generation of Christ from the Virgin, which liberates us from the 'generation of death'.[131] However, this regeneration (ἀναγέννησις) is but a prelude to the 'second generation' of the human race at the resurrection after their dissolution into the earth.[132]

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who have been reconciled to the Father by being incorporated into the righteous flesh of Christ, but no explicit mention is made of baptism, eg. *AH* 5.14.2-3. Cf. A. Benoit, 'Ce qui caractérise le baptême pour Irénée, ce n'est donc pas la rémission des péchés, mais bien la régénération.' *Le Bapteme chrétienne au second siècle: La théologie des Pères*, p.189, A. Houssiau, 'Le Baptême selon Irénée de Lyon', p.52.

[129] *AH* 5.15.3: 'Et quoniam in illa plasmatione quae secundum Adam fuit in transgressione factus homo indigebat lauacro regenerationis, [...].'

[130] Cf. *AH* 1.21.1; 3.17.1; *Dem.* 7.

[131] Cf. *AH* 4.33.4: 'Quemadmodum autem relinquent mortis generationem, si non in nouam generationem mire et inopinate a Deo, in signum autem salutis datam, quae est ex Virgine, per fidem regenerentur?' Cf. *AH* 3.19.1; 4.33.11; 5.1.3. On the connection between the 'noua generatio' of Christ and that of the believers see Rousseau's notes, *SC* 100, pp.269-270; *SC* 152 pp.205-207.

[132] *AH* 5.15.1: '[...] is qui ab initio condidit hominem post resolutionem eius in terram promisit ei secundum generationem [...].' Irenaeus is referring to the 'first resurrection' of the just in the Kingdom of the Son (cf. *AH* 5.32.1-2, 35.1, 36.3), cf. Mat. 19.28: [...] ἐν τῇ παλιγγενεσίᾳ, ὅταν καθίσῃ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ θρόνου δόξης αὐτοῦ. Cf. A. Orbe,

Regenerated and adopted as sons of God, we are no longer subject to the law of slavery, the paedagogue which led us to Christ (cf. Gal. 3.24), for Christ has cancelled it by the 'new covenant of liberty'.[133] The natural precepts of the love of God and justice towards one's neighbour, the free and willing observance of which was sufficient for those who were justified by faith, were implanted by God in the human heart.[134] These precepts were forgotten during the slavery in Egypt, and so, having been led out of Egypt, the Decalogue was instituted that the people might once again become followers of God.[135] However, when they turned back to the golden calf they showed that they had returned to Egypt in their hearts, preferring the state of slavery, and so they were subjected to the 'yoke of slavery' through the various precepts promulgated by Moses.[136] It is these precepts that Christ has abolished in the 'new covenant of liberty' which He has inaugurated. However, Christ did not abrogate the natural precepts implanted in the heart, but has 'extended and fulfilled them'.[137] Whereas the Law prohibited adultery and murder, Christ forbade lust and anger. This must not be misunderstood as an 'interiorization' or 'spiritualization' of the Law.[138]

Teología de san Ireneo, 2, pp.7-8.

[133] *AH* 4.16.5. The whole section *AH* 4.9-16 is an extended discussion on the relationship between the Law and the Gospel. Cf. M. F. Berrouard, 'Servitude de la Loi et liberté de l'Evangile selon Saint Irénée'.

[134] Cf. *AH* 4.13.1, 13.4, 15.1.

[135] Cf. *AH* 4.15.1, 16.3.

[136] Cf. *AH* 4.15.1.

[137] Cf. *AH* 4.13.1-4, 16.4-5; *Dem.* 96.

[138] As, for instance, Berrouard, *art. cit.* pp.50-51. Cf. H.-J. Jaschke: 'Irenäus formuliert eine überlegte Aussage, die sich nicht im Moralisieren oder in der Forderung nach Innerlichkeit erschöpft: Entscheidend ist der Glaube an den menschgewordenen Sohn, den Grund für die im Neuen Bund gegebene Unmittelbarkeit zu Gott.' 'Pneuma und Moral: der Grund christlicher Sittlichkeit aus der Sicht des Irenaeus von Lyon', p.272.

Rather, if piety and obedience is required just as much from sons as from slaves, in sons it is expressed voluntarily and they in turn possess greater confidence and liberty.[139] Paradoxically, however, the liberty given to the sons in the new covenant of liberty is also realized in a greater subjection to God.[140] As humans are the handiwork of God, subject to the creative activity of God, the more ready they are to be fashioned by God, the more He can fashion them. As such, the 'extension and fulfillment' of the natural precepts in the words of the Lord do not indicate an interiorization, but a greater subjection to the creative activity of God, appropriate to those who have been adopted as His sons.

Besides being nourished by the Scriptures (*AH* 5.20.2), in the Church we are also nourished and prepared for incorruptibility by the reception of the Eucharist, which, as the Body and Blood of Christ, is itself a union of flesh and Spirit:

> For we offer to Him His own, fittingly proclaiming the communion and union of the flesh and the Spirit. For just as bread which is from the earth, when it has received the invocation of God, is no longer ordinary bread, but Eucharist, consisting of two things, earthly and heavenly, so also our bodies, receiving the Eucharist, are no longer corruptible, having the hope of the resurrection.[141]

'Interiority' plays no role within Irenaeus' understanding of human life in the unfolding economy, and it is doubtful that it has any place in his anthropology.

[139] Cf. *AH* 4.13.2.

[140] Cf. *AH* 4.13.3: 'Haec autem omnia, quemadmodum praediximus, non dissoluentis erant legem, sed adimplentis et extendentis in nobis, tamquam si aliquis dicat maiorem libertatis operationem, et pleniorem erga liberatorem nostrum infixam nobis subiectionem et affectionem.' See the interesting article by B. Aland, 'Fides und Subiectio: zur Anthropologie des Irenäus'.

[141] *AH* 4.18.5. This text, which is preserved in Greek, is presented in parallel columns by P. Gächter, 'Unsere Einheit mit Christus nach dem hl. Irenäus', p.517, and slightly differently by Andia, *Homo vivens*, p.242. For a summary of modern scholarship on the question of the 'two things' of *AH* 4.18.5, see Andia, *ibid.* pp.254-255.

That flesh is nourished by the Body and Blood of Christ is evidence, for Irenaeus, that it can also partake of incorruptibility and life. Our bodies, by partaking of the Eucharist, become as the Eucharist, no longer common bread or corruptible flesh, but as the Eucharist is the 'union and communion of flesh and Spirit', so our bodies have the hope of the resurrection, that is, our flesh is nourished, even now, by that for which we are being prepared, the reception of incorruptibility.

Irenaeus develops this parallel in *AH* 5.2.3, where he uses the same image of the fecundity caused by the Spirit as in *AH* 3.17.2. He has been emphasizing that as our flesh 'has grown and been strengthened' by the mixed cup and manufactured bread which has received the Word of God, and so is the Body and Blood of Christ, our flesh is also capable of receiving eternal life from God. Furthermore, when the Apostle describes us as 'members of His body and of His flesh and of His bones' (cf. Eph. 5.30), he is not speaking of a spiritual human being, 'for a spirit has neither flesh nor bones' (Lk. 24.39), but of a genuine human being, made of flesh and bones, nourished by Christ's Body and Blood. Irenaeus continues:

> Just as the wood of the vine, planted in the earth, fructified in its own time, and the grain of wheat, falling into the earth and being decomposed, was raised up manifold by the Spirit of God who sustains all, then, by wisdom[142], they come to the use of humans, and receiving the Word of God, become Eucharist, which is the Body and Blood of Christ; in the same way, our bodies, nourished by it, having been placed in the earth and decomposing in it, shall rise in their time, when the Word of God bestows on them the resurrection to the glory of God the Father, who secures immortality for the mortal

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[142]The Greek, preserved in the *Sacra Parallela*, has διὰ τῆς σοφίας τοῦ Θεοῦ, while the Latin and Armenian simply have 'by wisdom'. The context indicates a threefold process: the production of fruit by the Spirit, which are then made into bread and wine, and which then receive the invocation of the Word. Thus, at the beginning of *AH* 5.2.3, Irenaeus refers to τὸ κεκραμένον ποτήριον καὶ ὁ γεγονὼς ἄρτος. The σοφία in question would thus seem to refer to that of human art. Rousseau translates as, 'grâce au savoir-faire', cf. his note, *SC* 152, pp.213-215.

> and bountifully bestows incorruptibility on the corruptible, because the power of God is made perfect in weakness, that we may never become puffed up, as if we had life from ourselves, nor exalted against God, entertaining ungrateful thoughts, but learning by experience that it is from His excellence, and not from our own nature, that we have eternal continuance, that we should neither undervalue the true glory of God nor be ignorant of our own nature, but should know what God can do and what benefits the human, and that we should never mistake the true understanding of things as they are, that is, of God and the human.[143]

There is clearly a close relationship between the dynamism and fecundity of the Spirit and the action of the Word operative in the processes that lead both to the Eucharist and to the resurrection. This relationship, however, is more than a simple correspondence or parallelism[144]: it is *by receiving* the Eucharist, as the wheat and the vine received the fecundity of the Spirit, that we are prepared, as we also make the fruits into bread and wine, for our resurrection effected by the Word, at which point, just as the bread and wine receive the Word and so become the Body and Blood of Christ, the Eucharist, so our bodies will receive immortality and incorruptibility from the Father. We ourselves need to use the fruits of the world eucharistically, for it is by these that we are prepared for the resurrection and the gift of immortality. This understanding of the Eucharist falls quite clearly within Irenaeus' theology of the economy of God: it is within the temporal things of this world that we are prepared, maturing in order to be able to bear the fruit of immortality.[145] As such, the divine economy can be seen as the Eucharist of God, or of the Father.

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[143] *AH* 5.2.3, for the Greek text printed in parallel, see Andia, *Homo vivens*, p.244.

[144] That is, it is not a correspondence between a merely natural process and a mystical process. H.-D. Simonin emphasizes that it is 'ce que l'on a appelé, faute de mieux, le dynamisme de la sacramentaire grecque, dynamisme à la fois cosmique et mystique', 'A propos d'un texte eucharistique de S. Irénée' p.285. Andia's analyses of the different transformations seems somewhat scholastic, *Homo vivens*, pp.245-247.

[145] Cf. *AH* 4.5.1.

This relationship between the Eucharist and the divine economy is further emphasized by the role of death in both. We saw earlier, when looking at 'The Sign of Jonah', how death functions paedagogically within the economy, as the means by which humankind experiences both their own weakness and the strength of God deployed in such weakness. Irenaeus reiterates these themes in *AH* 5.2.3, adding that in this way humans come to learn the truth about both God and themselves. However, in *AH* 5.2.3, human death is not simply paedagogical or remedial, but functions within the 'Eucharist' of God.

It is also important to note that the activity of humans in the preparation of the Eucharist corresponds to a passivity or receptivity with regard to their resurrection and the bestowal of incorruptibility. They are the ones who make bread and wine out of the fruits of the earth[146], which, receiving the invocation (ἐπίκλησις *AH* 4.18.5) and the Word of God, become the Body and Blood of Christ; while they themselves, prepared by their reception of the Eucharist, will be raised by Christ and will be rendered immortal by the Father. It is, thus, as we have continually seen throughout our investigation of Irenaeus' theology of the economy, a matter of the humans' receptiveness to the gifts of God and their thankfulness for them: their thankful use of the material things provided by God, in and through which they learn where their life has its source, and, in an attitude of thankfulness, come to share ever more fully in that life.

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[146] St. Nicholas Cabasilas observes, in his *Commentary on the Divine Liturgy*, 3.4, that the human is essentially a cooking animal: Ἀνθρώπινον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο λέγομεν τὸ μόνῳ διαφέρον ἀνθρώπῳ· τὸ δὲ κατασκευῆς ἄρτου δεηθῆναι ὥστε φαγεῖν, καὶ μηχανήσασθαι οἶνον ὥστε πιεῖν, ἀνθρώπου μόνον ἴδιον.

As Israel, having passed through the Red Sea, sojourned in the desert, sustained by manna from heaven, before entering the Promised Land, so also believers, although having passed through the waters of baptism and being nourished and strengthened by the Eucharist, still have not entered the Promised Land. In the two passages concerning the Eucharist that we have considered, the Eucharist is said to provide 'the hope of the resurrection' (*AH* 4.18.5) or a nourishment which sustains and prepares us for the resurrection (*AH* 5.2.3). Similarly, although we have been adopted as sons, we have received the Holy Spirit as a 'pledge of incorruptibility', and whilst those who have received the Spirit are everywhere, and so the Church is everywhere[147], the Church, though in the world, is located in the Spirit (*AH* 3.24.1). It is in *AH* 5.8.1 that Irenaeus provides his most sustained analysis of the nature and function of this 'pledge':

> For now we receive a certain portion of the Spirit towards perfection and preparation for incorruptibility, being slowly accustomed to contain and to bear God, which the Apostle called 'a pledge', that is, a part of the honour which God has promised us, saying, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, "In Him you also, having heard the word of truth, the Gospel of your salvation and believing in Him, have been sealed with the Holy Spirit of the promise, which is the pledge of our inheritance" (Eph. 1.13-14). This pledge, therefore, thus dwelling in us, renders us spiritual even now, and the mortal is swallowed up by immortality - for he declares, "you are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if the Spirit of God dwells in you" (Rom. 8.9) - and this not by a casting away of the flesh, but by the communion of the Spirit, for those to whom he was writing were not without flesh, but those who had received the Spirit of God, "in whom we cry, Abba, Father" (Rom. 8.15); if then now, having the pledge, we cry "Abba, Father", what shall it be when rising again we behold Him face to face, when all the members shall burst forth in a continuous hymn of exultation, glorifying Him who raised them from the dead and gave them eternal life? For if the pledge, gathering the humans together into themselves, makes them now say "Abba, Father", what shall the full grace of the Spirit, which shall be given to the humans by God, effect? It will render us like unto Him, and perfect the will of the Father: for it shall make the human in the image and likeness of God. (*AH* 5.8.1)

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[147] Cf. *AH* 4.36.2.

We now receive a 'certain portion' (partem aliquam) of the Spirit towards our perfection and preparation for incorruptibility, when we will be able to contain and bear God. By this we are enabled to call on God as 'Abba, Father', and are rendered spiritual *even now*. Irenaeus is emphatic, as one would expect, that this takes place in the flesh: we become spiritual not by abandoning the flesh, but by being 'in the Spirit', having the Spirit dwelling in us: as Adam became a psychical being, flesh animated by the breath of life, so too, by the imparting of the Holy Spirit, do we become a spiritual being, flesh vivified by the Spirit. Nevertheless, what we have received by being adopted and sealed with the Spirit, is but a 'pledge' of what is promised to us when we are raised again to see God 'face to face' and to receive the full grace of the Spirit. As the Incarnate Son was anointed with the Spirit at His baptism, but only through His death and resurrection radiated the glory of the Father in flesh rendered fully incorruptible, so also do those who have been baptised have the Spirit dwelling in them, 'working the will of the Father in them and renewing them from their oldness to the newness of Christ' (*AH* 3.17.1), but it is only through their own death, the dissolution of their flesh into the earth, the cessation of sin (*AH* 3.23.6), that they might be raised again and fully receive incorruptibility from the Father, so becoming the image and likeness of God.

The cross of Christ, His suffering and death, is the same as that which His disciples must endure and undergo. A propos of Christ's words, 'If any man would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me. For whoever will save his life, shall lose it; and whoever will lose his life for my sake, shall save it' (Mat. 16.24-5) and 'You will stand before governors and kings for my sake, and they shall scourge some of you, and

slay you and persecute you from city to city' (cf. Mat. 10.18, Mk. 13.9, Mat. 23.34), Irenaeus comments:

> He knew, therefore, those who would suffer persecution, and He knew those who would be scourged and slain because of Him; and He did not speak of any other cross, but of the Passion which He should Himself undergo first, and His disciples afterwards. (*AH.* 3.18.5).

Those who would be disciples of Christ must also take up His cross, deny themselves and lose their lives for His sake, and this has no referent other than the Passion, which Christ and His disciples, following Him, suffer. His disciples are those

> [...] who are slain on account of the confession of the Lord, and who endure all things predicted by the Lord, and who in this way strive to follow the footprints of the Lord's Passion, becoming martyrs of the suffering One.[148]

Irenaeus thus understands martyrdom in terms of Christ's own Passion, His death and resurrection.[149] In their martyrdom, His disciples undergo the same suffering and death as Christ.

This identity between the death of Christ and that of the martyr extends to an identification between Christ and those confessing Him. The idea that the martyr imitates Christ, and that Christ is united with the martyr in suffering, is a commonplace in the acts of the martyrs. It is vividly illustrated in the martyrdom of Blandina as recorded in the 'Letter of the churches of Vienne and Lyons to the churches of Asia and Phrygia', preserved in Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*, and which is quite possibly composed by Irenaeus himself.[150] According to this letter,

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[148] *AH* 3.18.5: '[...] et secundum hoc conantur uestigia adsequi passionis Domini, passibilis martyres facti.' Cf. St. Ignatius of Antioch, *Ad Polyc.* 3.2: [...] τὸν ἀπαθῆ, τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς παθητὸν [...].

[149] So the Cross is described as the 'tree of martyrdom' by which He draws all things to Himself and vivifies all, *AH* 4.2.7.

[150] As argued by P. Nautin, *Lettres et écrivains chrétiens des IIe et IIIe siècles*, pp.54-61.

> Blandina was hung on a stake and offered as food for the wild beasts that were let in. She, by being seen hanging in the form of a cross and by her vigorous prayer, caused great zeal in the contestants, as, in their struggle, they beheld with their outward eyes, through the sister, Him who was crucified for them, that He might persuade those who believe in Him that everyone who suffers for the glory of Christ for ever has communion with the living God. [...] the small and weak and despised woman had put on the great and invincible athlete, Christ, routing the adversary in many bouts, and, through the struggle, being crowned with the crown of incorruptibility.[151]

Blandina became an image, a living icon, of Christ for those who were suffering alongside her. It is in Blandina's weakness that the strength of God is victorious, and through her martyrdom that incorruptibility is bestowed upon her. The description is not simply a literary convention or topos, but clearly inscribes itself within, and gives a very real sense of, Irenaeus' understanding of the economy: the strength of God being manifested in the weakness of humans, bestowing incorruptibility on those who follow Him, through martyrdom, and who become, in this way, in the image and likeness of God.

Irenaeus picks up this theme of becoming in the image and likeness of God through martyrdom in *AH* 5.28.4. However, the image used here is not that of following Christ and sharing in His Passion, but that of the Eucharist: as death, besides its paedagogical and remedial function, falls within a eucharistic understanding of the economy, so too do the sufferings of martyrdom prepare us for God, in the same way that we prepare bread for the Eucharist.[152]

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[151] Eusebius, *EH* 5.1.41-42.

[152] Cf. *AH* 4.18.3, where Irenaeus, in the midst of a discussion concerning the relationship between the sacrifices offered under the Law and those offered by the Church, and the need for thankfulness and righteousness in offering sacrifices, suggests that God always delivers the righteous that, suffering and enduring, they may be proved. The eucharistic framework for understanding martyrdom is also demonstrated in *The Martyrdom of Polycarp*, where the structure of the narrative closely parallels that of the Last

> And therefore throughout all time, the human, formed at the beginning by the Hands of God, that is, by the Son and the Spirit, becomes after the image and likeness of God: the chaff, that is, the apostasy, being cast away, while the wheat, that is, those who bear as fruit faith in God, being gathered into the granary. And therefore tribulation is necessary for those who are being saved, that, in a certain way, having been threshed and kneaded together, through endurance, with the Word of God, and baked in the fire, they may be suitable for the banquet of the King, as one of ours said, when condemned to the wild beasts because of his testimony [μαρτυρία] to God: "I am the wheat of Christ, and I am ground by the teeth of the wild beasts, that I may be found [to be] pure bread of God."[153]

The perspective of this passage is orientated towards the fashioning of the human in the image and likeness of God. The human formed at the beginning by the Word and the Spirit is continually fashioned throughout all time into the image and likenss of God.[154] We have seen how God bore the apostasy of the humans, that they might come to learn of their own mortality and acknowledge the one and only Source of life. Here the process of fashioning the human into the image, salvation, is described from a different perspective: threshed by tribulation, the chaff or apostasy being cast away, we are kneaded together with Christ, and through the fire we are made into bread suitable for the Father's celebration. As Christ's death and resurrection is the basis on which we celebrate the Eucharist, so too, the martyr's death, kneaded together with the Word, and resurrection, as appropriate bread, is celebrated by God.

We saw earlier how through baptism we receive a 'pledge' of the Spirit, rendering us spiritual even now, absorbing what is mortal into the Spirit's

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Supper.

[153] *AH* 5.28.4, referring to St. Ignatius of Antioch, *Ad. Rom.* 4.1.

[154] Cf. A. Orbe: 'Ireneo no admite - al modo filoniano u origeniano - las dos creaciones - de Gen 1,26s y Gen 2,7 -, sino una única ('creación = plasmación'), en dos aspectos: inicial, y progressivo o histórico.' *Teología de San Ireneo*, 3, p.192.

own immortality, and so preparing us for incorruptibility (*AH* 5.8.1). In the same way that the Incarnate Word was anointed by the Spirit, but in undergoing death was vivified by the Spirit to the point where His flesh became permanently incorruptible, transfigured by the glory of the Father, so too members of the Church, receiving a 'pledge' of the Spirit in baptism, are vivified by the Spirit in their martyrdom:

> For it is testified by the Lord that as "the flesh is weak", so "the Spirit is ready", that is, is able to accomplish what it wills. If, therefore, anyone mixes the readiness of the Spirit as a stimulus to the weakness of the flesh, it necessarily follows that what is strong will prevail over what is weak, so that the weakness of the flesh will be absorbed by the strength of the Spirit, and such an one will no longer be carnal but spiritual because of the communion of the Spirit. In this way, therefore, the martyrs bear witness and despise death: not after the weakness of the flesh, but by the readiness of the Spirit. For when the weakness of the flesh is absorbed, it manifests the Spirit as powerful; and again, when the Spirit absorbs the weakness, it inherits the flesh for itself, and from both of these is made a living human: living, indeed, because of the participation of the Spirit, and human because of the substance of the flesh.[155]

The strength of God is made perfect in weakness, and so, paradoxically, it is in their death, their ultimate vulnerability, that the martyrs bear witness to the strength of God. Not that they reckon death to be a thing of no importance, but that in their confession they are vivified by the Spirit, they live the life of the Spirit, who absorbs the weakness of their flesh into His own strength. When the Spirit so possesses the flesh, the flesh itself adopts the quality of the Spirit and is rendered like the Word of God.[156] It is thus not only in the resurrection that the human comes to be vivified by the Spirit. Rather, our paradigm of the living human, - flesh

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[155] *AH* 5.9.2. Cf. *PO* 12.5, pp.738-739 (frag. 6); *TU* 36.3, pp.14-19 (frag. 10).

[156] Cf. *AH* 5.9.3: 'Ubi autem Spiritus Patris, ibi homo uiuens, sanguis rationalis in ultionem a Deo custoditus, caro a Spiritu possessa, oblita quidem sui, qualitatem autem Spiritus assumens, conformis facta Verbo Dei.'

vivified by the Spirit - is the martyr.[157]

As the Patriarchs learnt to follow the Word, but did not enter the Promised Land before their death, so also their descendants, the followers of Christ, do not receive the fulness of the promise until the resurrection. And as it was precisely *land* that was promised to the Patriarchs, so it is the transfigured, though fully material, world that their race will inhabit after the resurrection. The economy, which, as we have repeatedly seen, is centred on the flesh formed from mud being fashioned into the image of God, culminates not in a mystical union of the soul with God but in an earthly Kingdom, fulfilling the promises made to the Patriarchs.[158] Irenaeus' emphasis on this fact is striking. As von Balthasar observes:

> In his eschatology Irenaeus produces an important counterweight to the flight from the world and the failure to take seriously the resurrection of the flesh which marks the Platonising Christian eschatologies of a later period and indeed the average Christian consciousness.[159]

Irenaeus' main thrust in *Against the Heresies* was to counter the teaching of the Gnostics, in whose anthropology and soteriology there was, as he put it, nothing left of the human to enter the Pleroma.[160] Yet he knew that his own views on the resurrection of the flesh in the material world were already under attack by some reputedly orthodox churchmen who despised the handiwork of God, denied the salvation of the flesh and so rejected the complete resurrection.[161] Although he tactfully refrains from mentioning his opponents

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[157] Cf. H.-J. Jaschke: 'Das Martyrium ist die Grundform christlicher Existenz.' 'Pneuma und Moral', p.265; Y. de Andia, 'La résurrection de la chair selon les Valentiniens et Irénée de Lyon', p.69.

[158] Cf. *AH* 5.30.4, 32.1-2.

[159] H. U. von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord*, p.93.

[160] Cf. *AH* 2.29.3.

[161] Cf. *AH* 5.31.1: 'Quoniam autem quidam ex his qui putantur recte credidisse [...] despicientes plasmationem Dei et non suscipientes salutem carnis suae

by name, Irenaeus did not shrink from responding with vivid, earthy descriptions of the Kingdom to come. Within a few decades, Dionysius of Alexandria began writing against those who, by a too literal interpretation of Scripture, especially the Book of Revelation, taught that the Kingdom of Christ would be on the earth - Dionysius adds the polemical slur that they dream that the Kingdom will consist of those things that were the object of their desires, eating, drinking, sexual desire and marriage, for they were nothing but carnal lovers of the body.[162] According to Eusebius, the idea that 'there will be a millenium, after the resurrection from the dead, in which the Kingdom of Christ will be established in a bodily way on this earth' stems from Papias, who had presented this idea as an 'unwritten tradition', but had come to it by 'misunderstanding' the apostolic accounts, for he was a man of 'very little intelligence' and had not realized that they were to be read symbolically (μυστικῶς). Eusebius excuses Irenaeus for having followed Papias (cf. *AH* 5.33.4), on the grounds that Irenaeus had been impressed by his antiquity.[163]

The increasing distance placed by such churchmen between themselves and the

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[...] qui ergo uniuersam reprobant resurrectionem [...]'. Orbe identifies this group with those mentioned in *AH* 5.2.2-3, who '[...] uniuersam dispositionem Dei contemnunt et carnis salutem negant et regenerationem eius spernunt, dicentes non eam capacem esse incorruptibilitatis.' As Irenaeus, in *AH* 5.1.2-2.3 has already tackled the Docetists (= the Valentinians, cf. *AH* 5.1.2, line 59), the Ebionites and the Marcionites, the group of *AH* 5.2.2, who do not deny the earthly reality of Christ, the divinity of His Person, nor separate the Creator from the true God, are a group within the Church who deny the salvation of the flesh. Cf. 'Adversarios anónimos de la *Salus carnis*'; *Teología de San Ireneo*, 1, p.129-130. Similar groups are mentioned by Justin Martyr in the *Dialogue with Trypho*, 80.4; Tertullian, *De Res.* 2.

[162] Eusebius, *EH* 7.24-25.5.

[163] Cf. *EH* 3.39.12-13 - Eusebius inserts an extra generation between the apostle John and Papias, *EH* 3.39.2.

theology of the resurrection of the flesh and the Kingdom of Christ on earth, as represented by Irenaeus, has, as its correlate, an increasing allegorization or mystical interpretation of Scripture and an increasing 'spiritualization' of the resurrection. Irenaeus, although not averse to the occasional allegory, emphasized that the resurrection and the Kingdom spoken of in Scripture cannot be allegorized.[164] However, it was the 'spiritualization' of the human, rather than the legitimate scope of allegory, that was the greatest concern of Irenaeus, and which he attacked by maintaining a literal reading of Scripture. It was easy to pass from the teaching of the resurrection of the flesh to that of the body, a term which is open to many interpretations, and thence to an understanding of the spiritual body or flesh as a *sui generis* body of the soul or the real, inner person, rather than flesh which has been vivified by the Spirit.[165] With such an understanding of what is properly human, salvation concerns the soul or the inner person alone in its ascent to a mystical union with God in a manner similar to Gnostic soteriology. Although later church theologians never, as some of the heretics had done, castigated the body and material creation as evil, or deprived it of any function in salvation history, few theologians matched the central importance given to the flesh in the

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[164] Cf. *AH* 5.35.1-2; 35.2: 'Et nihil allegorizari potest, sed omnia firma et uera et substantiam habentia, ad fruitionem hominum iustorum a Deo facta. Quomodo enim uere Deus est qui resuscitat hominem, sic et uere resurget homo a mortuis et non allegorice, quemadmodum per tanta ostendimus;'.

[165] The most notable example of this is of course Origen. For a discussion of his understanding of the term 'body' in comparison to Irenaeus' theology, cf. A. Orbe, *Antropología de San Ireneo*, pp.25-27; 'Adversarious anónimos de la *Salus carnis*', pp.18-28. A propos of Origen's thought on the resurrection body, his comments in *Peri Archon* 2.10.3, may well be directed at Irenaeus amongst others: 'We now direct the discussion to some of our own people, who either from poverty of intellect or from lack of instruction introduce an exceedingly base and abject sense of the resurrection of the body.'

unfolding of the economy as described by Irenaeus.

The time before the resurrection and the coming of the Kingdom is a time of tribulation and martyrdom, separating the wheat from the chaff. Before Christ returns, the Antichrist will come and establish his kingdom, sitting in the temple at Jerusalem for three years and six months.[166] The Antichrist will recapitulate in himself all the diabolic apostasy and error, and every iniquity and deceit. Having been summed up in him, the whole apostasy can be sent altogether to the eternal furnace.[167] This will be accomplished when Christ comes again in the glory of the Father, casting the Antichrist into the lake of fire (cf. Rev. 19.20), and bringing the just into the Kingdom which is the rest of the seventh day.[168]

For Irenaeus, the rhythm of the events of the last times is based on the opening verses of Genesis, for 'this is an account of what happened, as it happened, as also it is a prophecy of what is to come.'[169] As God finished His work on the sixth day and rested on the seventh (Gen. 2.2), and as a day of the Lord is as a thousand years[170], so the completion of creation took six

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[166] *AH* 5.25-26, 28-30; the three years and six months (*AH* 5.30.4) would seem to refer to the 'half week' of Daniel 9.27.

[167] Cf. *AH* 5.25.1, 5; 28.2; 29.2; 30.1. As a sign of this, the number 666 is said to recapitulate the apostasy which has taken place during the six thousand years, *AH* 5.28.2; 30.1.

[168] *AH* 5.30.4.

[169] *AH* 5.28.3: τοῦτο δ' ἔστι καὶ τῶν προγεγονότων διήγησις, ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων προφητεία.

[170] Cf 2 Pet. 3.8. Minns suggests that Irenaeus may simply have meant a long time, *Irenaeus*, p.126. Orbe, on the other hand, thinks that the brief comments of Irenaeus are sufficient for a more precise analysis: he claims that God ordained, even before the original sin, the date of the Incarnation of the Son, to be in the fifth thousandth year, after the five days/thousand years of creation and the preparation of the human for the second Adam. The transfiguration will then take place after the sixth thousand years. Cf. *Antropología*, pp.513-515. Orbe was working from Harvey's text, and so did

thousand years. The seventh thousand-year period will be the Kingdom of the Son in which the just will reign with Him in a renewed earthly Jerusalem. This period is inaugurated by the first resurrection:

> John, therefore, foresaw precisely the first resurrection of the just (cf. Lk. 14.14, Rev. 20.5-6) and the inheritance of the earth in the Kingdom, and concordantly also have the prophets prophesied concerning it. For this is what the Lord also taught, promising to drink the new mingled cup with His disciples in the Kingdom (cf. Mat. 26.29), and again when He said, 'the days are coming when the dead in their tombs will hear the voice of the Son of Man and those who have done good will rise to the resurrection of life, but those who have done evil will rise to the resurrection of judgement' (cf. Jn. 5.28-29), saying that those doing good will be raised first, going to the rest, and then those who are to be judged will be raised, just as the Book of Genesis has the completion of this world on the sixth day, that is, the sixth thousandth year, and then the seventh day of rest, of which David says 'this is my rest, the just shall enter into it' (cf. Pss. 131.14, 117.20, LXX), that is, the seventh thousand years of the Kingdom of the just, in which the just shall grow accustomed to incorruptibility, when the whole of creation will be renewed for those who have been preserved for this.[171]

The just who are raised in the first resurrection enjoy the land promised to the Patriarchs and drink the fruit of the vine with Christ as He promised to His disciples (Mat. 26.29).[172] Isaac's blessing on Jacob (Gen. 27.27-29), is extended to the field of the world (cf. Mat. 13.38), and so the blessing foreshadows the times of the Kingdom, when the just are raised and reign, and 'creation, also, having been renovated and set free, shall fructify with an abundance of all kinds of food, from the Dew of the heaven and from the fertility of the earth.'[173] This earth, in the Kingdom of the just, provides

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not take account of the passage in *AH* 5.36.3 preserved only in Armenian, which, nevertheless, in his *Teología de San Ireneo*, while accepting as having an Irenaean tone, he considers as breaking the flow of *AH* 5.36.3 and suggests that it was added in a later redaction, either by Irenaeus himself or by some other, *ibid.* 3, pp.616-617.

[171] *AH* 5.36.3. The portion running from 'and again when He said ...' to the end of the quotation is preserved only in Armenian (Arm. p.244.23-245.2).

[172] Cf. *AH* 5.33.1.

[173] *AH* 5.33-34. Citation from *AH* 5.33.3.

a banquet at which God Himself has promised to serve.[174] It is in this renewed creation that the human is further trained and accustomed to bear God, to partake of incorruptibility, and to receive the glory of the Father.[175]

At the end of the period of the Kingdom, those who are judged are raised and cast into 'the lake of fire, the second death' Gehenna or the eternal fire.[176] Irenaeus stresses that the meaning of the term 'judgment' is separation, and that as everyone has been created with free will and understanding, the choice whether to join the just or the judged rests with them, not with God Who 'makes His sun to rise on the evil and on the good'.[177] It is not the light that has blinded them, but they that have preferred the darkness, and as such, God's 'judgement' is simply a recognition of their own freely-chosen separation.[178]

With death, the 'last enemy', thus destroyed, the Son will yield up His work to the Father, that He might be all in all.[179] The nature or the substance (ὑπόστασις, οὐσία) of the creation will remain, but 'the fashion of the world will pass away' (1 Cor. 7.31), the fashion, that is, in which the apostasy took place and the human grew old.[180] The fundamental characteristic of that which will replace the present fashion of the world is its continuing newness:

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[174] *AH* 5.34.3.
[175] Cf. *AH* 5.32.1; 35.1-2.
[176] *AH* 5.35.2; Rev. 20.14.
[177] Cf. *AH* 5.27.1; Mat. 5.45.
[178] Cf. Jn. 3.19-21; *AH* 5.27.2. Cf. *AH* 4.11.2.
[179] *AH* 5.36.2; 1 Cor. 15.24-28.
[180] Cf. *AH* 5.36.1.

> When this fashion passes away, and the humans are renewed and flourishing with incorruptibility so that they are no longer able to become old, 'there shall be a new heaven and a new earth', in which the new humans will remain, conversing with God in a manner forever new.[181]

As to what it is that the Father will bestow on us, in a 'paternal manner' (paternaliter) after the completion of the Kingdom of the Son, Irenaeus does not dare speculate, but reminds us that of these things 'no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived'.[182] Only one, the Only-begotten, knows the Father, and only He has manifested the Father to us (cf. Mat. 11.27, Lk. 10.22). Irenaeus concludes his *Against the Heresies* by recapitulating his great work, summing up the whole economy in one sentence:

> For there is one Son, who accomplished His Father's will, and there is one human race, in whom the mysteries of God are wrought, 'which the angels desire to see' (1 Pet. 1.12), not being able to search out the Wisdom of God, through which His handiwork, conformed and incorporated with the Son, is perfected, [the Father's will] that His Offspring, the First-begotten Word, should descend to the creature, that is, to the handiwork, and be borne by it, and, on the other hand, the creature should bear the Word and ascend to Him, passing beyond the angels and becoming in the image and likeness of God. (*AH* 5.36.3)

This is the economy of God, the fashioning of His handiwork, bringing the creature made of mud to share in His own life, incorruptibility and glory,

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[181] *AH* 5.36.1: Παρελθόντος δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τούτου καὶ ἀνανεωθέντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἀκμάσαντος πρὸς τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν ὥστε μηκέτι δύνασθαι παλαιωθῆναι, <ἔσται ὁ οὐρανὸς καινὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ καινή>, ἐν οἷς καινὸς παραμενεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀεὶ καινῶς προσομιλῶν τῷ Θεῷ. Referring to Is. 65.17. Following Rousseau's emended Greek text.

[182] *AH* 5.36.3. 1 Cor. 2.9. Orbe, undaunted, subjects this quotation to a lengthy analysis in terms of the vision of God with corporeal eyes, *Teología de San Ireneo*, 3, pp.628-633, and more broadly, pp.646-651. The most profitable comparison of this passage is with *AH* 4.20.5, which speaks of three different modes or means of seeing God: '[...] uisus quidem tunc per Spiritum prophetice, uisus autem et per Filium adoptiue, uidebitur autem et in regno caelorum paternaliter'. We do not ascend to a vision of God Himself, the Father, for God has made Himself manifest in the flesh of His Son, and the manifestation of God by the Son preserves the invisibility of the Father that we should always have something towards which we can continually advance. The vision of God 'paternaliter', in *AH* 4.20.5, has as its corresponding explanation, the bestowal of incorruptibility and eternal life by the Father.

in His Incarnate Son, true God and true human. The unfolding of this economy, salvation history, is centred and culminates in Christ: what has gone before typifies its realization in Him, as He realizes what will be wrought in those who follow Him. For Irenaeus, both protology and eschatology are Christocentric: humankind, from their initial formation and throughout the paedagogy of the economy, can only be understood in the light of Christ.

3: The Human Formation

We have seen how, for Irenaeus, the divine economy is directed towards the becoming human of both God and human beings, first realized 'in the last times' in Christ and in the eschaton in the adopted sons of God. Adam is a type of Christ, and the various events of the economy both typify and prepare the human race for the fulfillment achieved in Christ. It is a movement from animation to vivification: as Adam was animated by the breath of life, so Christ was vivified by the life-creating Spirit. But as the resurrection still lies in the future, those baptized into Christ and nourished by His body and blood have received a 'pledge' of the Spirit which will vivify them fully in the Kingdom, preparing them for the reception of incorruptibility and enabling them to bear martyrdom as witnesses of the dynamics of salvation being wrought in them.

So far we have followed the directions that Irenaeus himself gives, in *AH* 1.10.3, to the theologian, by investigating the unfolding of this divine economy. That Irenaeus' understanding of the human cannot be detached from this setting cannot be over-emphasized: Irenaeus' reading of the verses in Genesis relating to the creation of the human, his protology, as much as his eschatology, is Christocentric, centred on the Incarnation of God, true God and true human. Furthermore, Irenaeus' writings, though polemical, are exegetical - demonstrating from the Scriptures that there is but one God, one Christ, one Spirit, and one human race in which the one economy unfolds - rather than analytical, describing the human constitution in static, philosophical terms. There are, nevertheless, a number of passages and aspects which, understood within the framework of the economy, deepen our understanding of Irenaeus' theology. Irenaeus' most detailed and sustained

discussion on protology is to be found in chapters 11-15 of the *Demonstration*, and it is these chapters which we will now follow, supplementing them with details taken from elsewhere.

Unlike Philo, and those Fathers who followed in his wake, Irenaeus does not distinguish between the two accounts of the creation of the human given in Genesis.[1] There was a single creation of the human and Irenaeus cites both Gen. 1.26 and 2.7 together to support this.[2] After having discussed the rule of truth and various matters pertaining to angels, Irenaeus begins his discussion of protology with the formation of the human:

> But He fashioned the human with His own Hands, taking the purer, the finer and the more delicate[3] of the earth, mixing with the earth, in measure, His own power; and He sketched on the handiwork His own form, in order that what should be seen should be Godlike, for He set the fashioned human upon the earth in the image of God[4]; and, that he might be living, He 'breathed into his face a breath of life' (Gen. 2.7), so that both according to inspiration and according to the formation, the human became like God. And he was free and master of himself, having been made by God to rule over everything upon earth. And this great created world, prepared by God before He fashioned the human, was given to the human as his

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[1] Philo had distinguished between Gen. 1.26, the ideal human, neither male nor female, created in the image, the true human or νοῦς, and Gen. 2.7, the fashioning of mud into the sensible and corruptible body. Cf. *de Opif.* 46, 134. The terms were changed by Origen into the Pauline contrast between the 'inner man' and the 'outer man', but the distinction remained, cf. eg. *Hom. 1 in Gen.*, 13.

[2] Cf. *AH* 4.20.1. Cf. Orbe, *Antropología*, pp.13-27; Andia, *Homo vivens*, pp.62-63.

[3] C. Mercier notes that և զփափկագոյն, 'and more delicate', is omitted in the printed edition, as it is from the French translation of Froidevaux. This string of adjectives is perhaps meant as an explanation of the term χοῦς in Gen. 2.7.

[4] C. Mercier notes that the manuscript has the preposition, ի , before, կերպարան thus necessitating the translation 'in the image', rather than 'as an image' as Smith has it. Froidevaux refers the participle ստեղծեալ (fashioned) to the 'image': 'car [c'est] en tant que façonné à l'image de Dieu que l'homme fut placé sur la terre.' I have preferred to retain the sense given by the structure of the clause which, literally translated, runs: 'for in the image of God upon the earth He set the fashioned human'.

domain, with everything in it.[5]

Irenaeus combines both creation accounts to give a continuous description of the creation of the human. Not only is there no distinction between the 'making' (ποίησις) of Gen. 1.26 and the 'fashioning' (πλάσις) of Gen. 2.7, but Irenaeus explains how God made the human in His image by the action of the Hands of God fashioning the earth.[6]

That it was from the earth itself that God took the material He used for the human was important to Irenaeus. In *AH* 5.15.2-4 Irenaeus argues against the Gnostics who maintained that the human was not fashioned out of this earth, but from 'a fluid and diffused matter'.[7] According to Irenaeus, the healing of the blind man by Christ - spitting on the ground, making mud, and smearing it on his eyes - indicates the original fashioning of the human, by the same Hand of God with the same earth. As 'the work of God is the fashioning of the human', God omitted to form his eyes in the womb, 'that the work of God might be made manifest in him.'[8]

The act of Christ spitting on the ground is paralleled in *Dem.* 11 when Irenaeus introduces a supplementary action of God into Genesis 2.7, the mixing of His power with the dust from the earth, as a preparation for the formation of the human. We have already seen, in connection with baptism, how, for Irenaeus, dry earth, unless it receives the 'willing Rain from

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[5] *Dem.* 11; In this passage I have translated ստեղծուած, which is used frequently in the Armenian version of *AH* to render πλάσμα (Cf. Reynders, *Lexique comparé*, 2, p.239), by 'handiwork' and 'formation' as the context determines.

[6] Cf. *AH* 4.20.1.

[7] *AH* 5.15.4: 'Excidunt itaque et hi qui a Valentino sunt, dicentes non ex hac terra plasmatum esse hominem, sed a fluida materia et effusa.' Cf. *AH* 1.5.5; Orbe, *Antropología*, pp.53-57.

[8] *AH* 5.15.2; Jn.9.3.

above', can neither bear fruit nor be made into one body.[9] This connection has led various scholars to assert that the 'power' of God spoken of in *Dem.* 11 is the Spirit.[10] Irenaeus does not, however, speak of the Spirit here. A more fruitful comparison may be made with *AH* 5.3.1-3, where Irenaeus comments on 2 Cor. 12.9: the power of God is made perfect in weakness. Irenaeus asserts that the flesh, which at the beginning was skilfully formed by God into its various parts, will, by the same power of God be raised from the dead. Irenaeus describes with wonder the physical constitution (or economy[11]) of the human, the eyes, ears, arteries, lungs and so on. He concludes:

> It is not possible to enumerate all the [melodious] parts of the human organism, which was not made without the great wisdom of God. Whatever participates in the art and the wisdom of God also participates in His power. The flesh, therefore, is not without part in the art, the wisdom and the power of God, but His power, which produces life, is made perfect in weakness, that is, in the flesh.[12]

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[9] Cf. *AH* 3.17.2; see also the parallel drawn between the formation of Adam from 'untilled and virgin soul' and Christ's formation from Adam, *AH* 3.21.10.

[10] Eg. J. Fantino, who, in his attempt to prove that the 'likeness' of Gen. 1.26 consists in the 'gift of the Holy Spirit', mistakenly reads into *Dem.* 11 the assertion that Adam realized the 'likeness' to God, and so concludes that the 'power' of God can be nothing other than the Holy Spirit. *L'Homme, image de Dieu chez Saint Irénée de Lyon*, p.157. Orbe identifies the 'power' with the Spirit of God of Gen. 1.2, who gives cohesion to the world in the manner of an *anima mundi* and so is not to be identified with the 'personal Spirit'. *Antropología*, pp.59-61. It is difficult to believe that Irenaeus, who continually emphasized unity, One God, one Son, one Spirit, ever envisaged such a distinction. Andia, commenting on these passages, asserts that water was added to the dust, making it mud, before the 'power of God' is mixed in. *Homo vivens*, pp.75-76. On the question of whether Irenaeus considers that God took dust or mud/clay from the earth, cf. Fantino, *L'Homme*, p.226, note. 463: the two terms are used interchangeably by Irenaeus, and the choice depends on context.

[11] *AH* 5.3.2: [...] ὀστέων τε καὶ νεύρων καὶ τῆς λοιπῆς τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οἰκονομίας [...].

[12] *AH* 5.3.2-3: Οὐκ ἔστιν ἀριθμὸν εἰπεῖν πάσης τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μελοποιΐας, ἥτις οὐκ ἄνευ σοφίας πολλῆς Θεοῦ ἐγένετο. Τὰ δὲ τέχνης καὶ σοφίας μετέχοντα Θεοῦ μετέχει καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ. Οὐκ ἄρα οὖν ἄμοιρος ἡ σὰρξ τέχνης καὶ σοφίας

Although, as we will see later, it is the Spirit who is life-creating, the idea behind both *Dem.* 11 and *AH* 5.3.1-3 seems to be that whatever is created receives, and so participates in, the art, power and wisdom of the Creator.[13] This is especially so in the case of the fashioning of the human, who is 'the vessel of the work of God and of all His wisdom and power'.[14] It is by receiving this power, or having it 'mixed in', that the dust taken from the earth becomes God's handiwork (πλάσμα). The way that Irenaeus cites Gen. 2.7 in *AH* 5.3.2, 'and God, taking dust from the earth, fashioned (ἔπλασε[15]) the human', parallels the description of *Dem.* 11: God, taking the dust, mixed His own power with it, and so produced His handiwork (πλάσμα).

Before going on to Gen 2.7b, Irenaeus, in *Dem.* 11, turns to Gen. 1.27 in order to explain in what form God fashioned the human. It is in His own image that God fashioned His handiwork. Irenaeus explicitly rejected the possibility of locating the image of God in an immaterial part or quality of the human.[16] Arguing against the Gnostics, Irenaeus stressed that an image must have a form, and a form can only exist in matter.[17] Consequently he is emphatic that the 'image' of God in the human is described quite concretely

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καὶ δυνάμεως Θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ, ἥτις ἐστὶ ζωῆς παρεκτική, ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ τελεῖται, τουτέστιν ἐν σαρκί. Greek text from the *Sacra Parallela*, emended in accordance with the Iena papyri, and the Latin and Armenian versions. While the context suggests that the primary referent of the very rare word μελοποιΐα is that of the bodily limbs, the double meaning of melody-making can hardly be accidental. Rousseau's note, *SC* 152, p.218.

[13] Cf. *AH* 5.17.1, 18.1: '[...] propria conditio, quae ex uirtute et arte et sapientia Dei substitit, [...]'.

[14] *AH* 3.20.2: 'Gloria enim hominis Deus, operationis uero Dei et omnis sapientiae eius et uirtutis receptaculum homo.'

[15] The *Sacra Parallela* has ἐποίησε, but both the Latin and Armenian suggest ἔπλασε.

[16] Cf. Fantino, *L'Homme*, pp.87-89.

[17] Cf. esp. Irenaeus' discussion in *AH* 2.7, 19.6.

in the flesh.[18] There must be a common substance and form for something to be an image of something else. An image also has a revelatory function: the image reveals the archetype of which it is an image. If the image of God is located in the flesh of the human, then that very flesh must reveal God. But as God Himself is immaterial, and therefore formless, the archetype of the image of God in us must be the Incarnate Son of God. As Irenaeus puts it:

> For 'He made the human in the image of God', and the image of God is the Son, in whose image the human was made, and for this cause He appeared in the end of times, that He might show the image to be like Himself.[19]

The Son reveals the true human form through His Incarnation, demonstrating at the same time that the human is indeed in the image of God.[20] Adam, as the 'type of the One to come' (Rom. 5.14; *AH* 3.22.3), typifies, in his flesh, the incarnate Son. Thus the fashioning of the human flesh is intimately connected to Christ, the Archetype of the human, and His revelation of the image of God, the manifestation of both God and the human.

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[18] Stated most explicitly in *AH* 5.6.1: 'perfectus autem homo commixtio et adunitio est animae assumentis Spiritum Patris et admixtae ei carni quae est plasmata secundum imaginem Dei.' And a little later on: 'Si autem defuerit animae Spiritus, animalis est uere qui est talis et carnis derelictus imperfectus erit, imaginem quidem habens in plasmate, similitudinem uero non assumens per Spiritum.' Cf. Fantino, *L'Homme*, pp.94-106.

[19] *Dem.* 22; Gen. 9.6. Fantino points out that there is no other text in which Irenaeus describes the Son as the 'image of God' or the 'image of the Father' (cf. 2 Cor. 4.4, Col. 1.15), and that this text should not be read as asserting that the human was created in the image of the pre-incarnate Son who was the image of the invisible Father, but rather that this phrase should be understood in the light of what follows, that is, that the human was made in the image of the incarnate Son. *L'Homme*, pp.145-154. We have repeatedly seen the uniqueness of God's self-manifestation in the Incarnation, and it is this fact which makes the Son the image of the invisible God.

[20] Cf. *AH* 5.16.2.

Alongside this indelible image relationship, located in the flesh, humans are also like God in their possession of free will. That the human was made 'free and master of himself' is mentioned in *Dem.* 11, and in *AH* 4.37.4 this fact is brought into a relationship of similitude with God:

> Because the human is possessed of free will from the beginning, and God is possessed of free will, in whose similitude the human was created, advice is always given to them to keep fast the good, which thing is done by means of obedience to God. (*AH* 4.37.4)

J. Fantino argues forcibly that we must carefully distinguish between two uses of the word 'similitudo', depending on whether it translates ὁμοιότης or ὁμοίωσις.[21] We will have to wait until we have finished considering Irenaeus' protology to see what he meant by the latter sense, the ὁμοίωσις, the 'likeness' we lost in Adam and regained in Christ. In the former sense it refers to our free will which makes us like or similar to the Creator and Father.[22] It is a freedom which extends beyond actions to include a freedom of faith[23], and, as the foundation for human response towards God, it has always been preserved intact by God.[24] To be human is to be in the image of God, and this implies acting and believing in a manner appropriate to the image of God, and so necessitates being free.

The final aspect of the fashioning of the human as described in *Dem.* 11 is

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[21] Cf. Fantino, *L'Homme*, pp.110-118.

[22] Fantino suggests that while the 'image' refers to the Son, the 'similitude' refers to the Father, and through these is achieved the 'likeness' effected by the Spirit: the first two are anthropological categories, while the latter is a soteriological notion which is the central axis of the relationship between God and the human. Cf. Fantino, *ibid.* esp. p.118.

[23] Cf. *AH* 4.37.5: 'Et non tantum in operibus sed etiam in fide liberum et suae potestatis arbitrium hominis seruauit Dominus, dicens: "secundum fidem tuam fiat tibi" (Mat. 9.29) propriam fidem hominis ostendens, quoniam propriam suam habet sententiam.'

[24] *AH* 4.15.2: '[...] liberum et suae potestatis in homine semper seruasse Deum [...].'

the animation with the breath of life, which renders the human like God both in bodily formation and in 'inspiration'. It is striking that Irenaeus does not speak at all of the soul and its role in the formation of the human. Irenaeus is not interested so much in the soul itself, as a principle of interiority, as in its animation of the flesh. In one of his few comments on the soul itself, Irenaeus describes it as the intellect of the human, 'mind, thought, mental intuition and such like'.[25] Inasmuch as the soul animates the body, it is the breath of life to the body. In the context of inquiring what it was that the Apostle described as the 'mortal body' which will be raised by the Spirit, Irenaeus denies that it refers to the soul, and continues:

> But souls are incorporeal when compared to mortal bodies; for God 'breathed into the face' of the human 'a breath of life, and the human became a living soul', and the breath of life is incorporeal. But one cannot call it[26] mortal, since it is the breath of life. (*AH* 5.7.1)

The soul is the breath of life to the body, whilst itself being the locus of intellectual activity.[27] The soul does not simply animate the body, but uses the body as an artist uses an instrument. Although the body may slow down

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[25] *AH* 2.29.3: 'Sensus enim hominis et cogitatio et intentio mentis et ea quae sunt huiusmodi non aliud quid praeter animam sunt, sed ipsius animae motus et operationes, nullam sine anima substantiam habentes.' Irenaeus only makes this comment on the properties and activity of the soul itself because he is discussing the Gnostic idea of the separate destinies for each 'part' of the human.

[26] To what does this 'it' refer? The Latin has 'ipsum', referring back to the breath of life. Rousseau' thinks that this is a misinterpretation on the part of the translator, and that it should be 'ipsam' referring back to the soul [the Greek in either case would be αὐτὴν]. Cf. *SC* 152, pp.236-237. I have left it open. However, an identification between the soul and the breath of life is made more explicitly a few lines later on when speaking of death: 'Hoc autem neque animae euenit, flatus est enim uitae, [...]'.

[27] The breath of life, bringing the human to life, can also be described as showing the human to be a rational animal: *AH* 5.1.3: '[...] ab initio plasmationis nostrae in Adam ea quae fuit a Deo aspiratio uitae unita plasmati animauit hominem et animal rationabile ostendit, [...]'.

the speed of the soul's own movement, the body enables the soul to operate in the material world.[28] When describing how the soul animates the body, Irenaeus is careful to maintain that the soul does not lose any of the operations proper to it, such as knowledge and memory: 'while, as it were, sharing life with the body, it does not itself cease to live.'[29] Whilst animating the body, the soul in return assumes the shape of the body, to the extent that its form can be recognized after the body and soul are separated at death.[30]

However, whilst taking the role of the breath of life in animating the body, and as such immortal[31], the soul itself is not life. This is stated most explicitly in *AH* 2.34.2-4, a passage which shows a marked dependency on Justin's *Dialogue with Trypho* 5-6.[32] Here Irenaeus argues against those who

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[28] Cf. *AH* 2.33.4.

[29] *AH* 2.33.4: 'Corpus enim organo simile est; anima autem artificis rationem obtinet. Quemadmodum itaque artifex uelociter quidem operationem secundum se adinuenit, in organo autem tardius illam perficit propter rei subiectae immobilitatem, et illius mentis uelocitas admixta tarditati organi temperatam perficit operationem: sic et anima participans suo corpori modicum quidem impeditur, admixta uelocitate eius in corporis tarditate, non amittit autem in totum suas uirtutes, sed quasi uitam participans corpori ipsa uiuere non cessat. Sic et de reliquis ei communicans, neque scientiam ipsorum perdit neque memoriam inspectorum.'

[30] Irenaeus never says that souls possess a sui generis body (σῶμα), as did the Stoics (eg. *SVF* 2.790, p.219.24-28), but simply that they retain the form of the body, *AH* 2.19.6: '[...] quando ipsae animae corporis habeant figuram: [...].'; *AH* 2.34.1, a propos of the history of Lazarus and the rich man, (Lk. 16.19-31): 'Plenissime autem Dominus docuit non solum perseuerare non de corpore in corpus transgredientes animas, sed et characterem corporis in quo etiam adaptantur custodire eundem, [...].'

[31] For the immortality of the soul, see *AH* 5.4.1, 7.1, 13.3; A. Rousseau, 'L'Éternité des peines de l'enfer et l'immortalité naturelle de l'âme selon S. Irénée'.

[32] The similarity between these passages is denied by Rousseau on the ground that the 'life' spoken of in each signified a different reality: for Irenaeus, the 'life of the Spirit'; for Justin, the 'natural life of the soul'. Cf. *SC* 293, p.348. The relationship between the two passages is upheld by J. C. M. van Winden, *An Early Christian Philosopher: Justin*

too rigidly apply to the soul the philosophical principle that what begins in time is subject to corruption and so must also end in time.[33] Irenaeus stresses that only God is without beginning or end, remaining ever the same, and everything else depends on Him, both for their initial coming-into-being and for their continuance in existence. All things continue as long as God wills them to be and to continue. Irenaeus then comments on Ps. 20.5 (LXX):

> And again, he thus speaks of the human being saved [de salvando homine]: 'He asked life of Thee, and Thou gavest him length of days for ages of ages', as the Father of all bestowing also continuance for 'ages of ages' on those who are saved. For life does not arise from us, nor from our own nature; but it is bestowed according to the grace of God. And therefore, those who will have preserved the gift of life, and have given thanks to Him who imparted it, will also receive 'length of days for ages of ages'. But those who will have rejected it, and will have proved themselves ungrateful to their Maker, inasmuch as they have been made and will not have recognized the Bestower, deprive themselves of continuance for ages of ages. And, for this reason, the Lord declared to those who showed themselves ungrateful towards Him: 'If ye have not been faithful in that which is little, who will give you that which is great?' (Lk. 16.11) indicating that those who, in this brief temporal life, have shown themselves ungrateful to Him who bestowed it, shall justly not receive from Him 'length of days for ages of ages'. (*AH* 2.34.3).

This passage contains many of the themes which we encountered in the study of the divine economy, primarily that our existence should be one of thankfulness towards the God who has bestowed life upon us. What we learn through the economy, our experience of our own weakness and death, that we should not 'be puffed up, as if we had life from our own nature'[34], is here stated as a general principle. God is the source of all life. If we show ourselves to be thankful, in our use of this 'gift of life' in this 'brief temporal life', towards Him who bestowed it, we will receive from God

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Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, pp.105-106, and Andia, *Homo vivens*, pp.271-273, who usefully prints both texts in parallel.

[33] Cf. This philosophical commonplace goes back to Plato, cf. *Rep.* 8.546a: [...] γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορά ἐστιν [...].

[34] *AH* 5.2.3.

'length of days for ages of ages', that is, continuance in the life bestowed by God.

A. Rousseau, in his desire to maintain the 'natural immortality' of the soul against H. Lassiat, seriously vitiates the profundity of Irenaeus' thought on this point.[35] According to Rousseau, Irenaeus' use of the word 'life' in this section from *AH* 2.34.4 is determined by the mention of 'salvation' introducing the quotation from Ps. 20.5.[36] Rousseau asserts that Irenaeus is not speaking of the physical or biological life of the human, but of 'la vie supérieure qu'instaure en nous l'Esprit Saint par sa présence sanctificatrice et divinisante'.[37] However, it is a mistake to isolate this passage from the discussion, which extends throughout *AH* 2.34, concerning how it is that created beings might remain indefinitely in existence: all is from God and all is maintained in existence by Him as long as He wills. If Irenaeus upholds the 'natural immortality' of the soul, this is a point which must be carefully distinguished from the question of the life and immortality which belong by nature to God alone and which are to be participated in by the whole human being, body and soul. According to Irenaeus, the soul endures after death, as his commentary on the history of Lazarus and the rich man at the beginning of this section demonstrates (*AH* 2.34.1), but Irenaeus never describes this continuance, nor that of the

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[35] Rousseau's article, 'L'Éternité des peines de l'enfer et l'immortalité naturelle de l'âme selon S. Irénée' and his 'notes justificatives' pertaining to this passage are directed against the thesis of H. Lassiat, *Pour une théologie de l'homme. Création ... Liberté ... Incorruptibilité ...*, published in a shortened form as *Promotion de l'homme en Jésus-Christ d'après Irénée de Lyon*. Lassiat responded to Rousseau in 'L'Anthropologie d'Irénée'.

[36] Cf. *SC* 293, pp.348-349.

[37] Rousseau, *Art. cit.* p.854. Cf. *ibid.* pp.842-843; *SC* 293, p.346.

damned in the eternal fire, as immortality: it is possible for the soul to endure without life, just as it is possible, in reverse, for the naturally corruptible body to participate in life, immortality and incorruptibility. Furthermore, although the question of life, as we shall see, is connected with the life-creating Spirit, Irenaeus does not speak of the Spirit in this section.

Most important, however, is Rousseau's assumption that the 'life' in question in this section is somehow other than the physical or biological life of the human.[38] Given Irenaeus' emphasis on the essentially physical, fleshy nature of the human, it makes no sense to speak of the human possessing a life which is not lived in the flesh, in a realistic, physical manner. Lassiat's criticism of Rousseau, that he 'gnosifies' the thought of Irenaeus, is apt indeed.[39] Irenaeus does not make any such distinction in this passage. The only qualification that Irenaeus makes, in *AH* 2.34.3, with regard to life is that 'the gift of life' given by God is presently a 'brief temporal life', in which we demonstrate our readiness to accept it for 'length of days for ages of ages'. In *AH* 5.3.3 Irenaeus gives us a further insight into the relationship between the present temporal life and eternal life. In this section Irenaeus is arguing against those who deny that the flesh can be vivified by God:

> But if they now live, and if their whole body partakes of life, how can they dare to say that the flesh is not able to partake of life, when they do confess that they have life at the present moment?

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[38] 'On voit d'emblée qu'Irénée situe "la vie" à un autre niveau que celui du physique ou du biologique, voire de tout ce qui ne serait que le déploiement des virtualités que l'homme porte en sa nature [...]' *SC* 293, p.346; cf. *art. cit.* p.843. This problem has already been referred to a propos of *AH* 4.20.5 and Donovan's comment that '[E]vidently the life referred to is other than the physical and is the true life of humans.' 'Alive to the Glory of God', p.289, cf. *supra* p.63.

[39] Iassiat, 'L'Anthropologie d'Irénée', p.405.

> [...] If the present temporal life, which is much weaker than that eternal life, is nevertheless able to vivify our mortal members, why should not eternal life, being much more powerful than this, vivify the flesh, already exercised and accustomed to sustain life? For that the flesh is capable of receiving life is shown from the fact of its being alive; for it lives as long as God wants it to live. It is manifest, too, that God has the power to confer life upon it, for when He grants life, we live.[40]

Like *AH* 2.34, this passage from *AH* 5.3.3 emphasizes that we live as long as God wants us to or as long as God confers life on our flesh. The most significant feature of this passage is that there is a direct continuity between the life which humans (even the Gnostics) presently live and the eternal life which will vivify us in the resurrection. The only distinction made between the two is that of 'weaker' and 'stronger', with their correlates of 'temporal' and 'eternal'.[41] There is no suggestion that they are two different types of life, physical/biological and spiritual/the presence of the Spirit. That the flesh has become accustomed, in this present temporal life, to bear life, demonstrates that it is capable of being vivified by eternal life. If it were a question of two different 'lives', Irenaeus' argument would be undermined.

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[40] *AH* 5.3.3: Εἰ δὲ ζῶσι νῦν καὶ ὅλον αὐτῶν μετέχει τὸ σῶμα τῆς ζωῆς, πῶς τολμῶσι λέγειν μὴ εἶναι τὴν σάρκα μετοχικὴν τῆς ζωῆς, ὁμολογοῦντες ἔχειν ζωὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι; [...] Εἰ δὲ τὸ πρόσκαιρον [τοῦτο] ζῆν πολλῷ ἀσθενέστερον ἐκείνης τῆς αἰωνίας ζωῆς ὅμως τοσοῦτον δύναται ὥστε ζωοποιεῖν ἡμῶν τὰ θνητὰ μέλη, ἡ τούτου δραστικωτέρα καὶ αἰώνιος ζωὴ τί ὅτι οὐ [ζωοποιήσει] τὴν σάρκα τὴν ἤδη μεμελετηκυῖαν καὶ εἰθισμένην βαστάζειν τὴν ζωήν; Ὅτι [δὲ] ἐπιδεκτικὴ ζωῆς ἐστιν ἡ σάρξ, ἐκ τούτου [τοῦ] ζῆν δείκνυται· ζῇ [γὰρ] ἐφ᾽ ὅσον αὐτὴν ὁ Θεὸς θέλει ζῆν. Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς δυνατὸς παρέχειν αὐτῇ τὴν ζωήν, δῆλον· ἐκείνου γὰρ παρέχοντος ἡμῖν τὴν ζωήν, ζῶμεν. The words in [ ] are Rousseau's suggested emendations. On this passage see P. Évieux, 'Théologie de l'accoutumance chez Saint Irénée', pp.36-40.

[41] In *AH* 4.9.2 Irenaeus states that the adjectives 'more' and 'less' can only be applied to things of the same nature, such as water, light and grace. All life is of the grace of God, and thus there is no distinction in 'nature' between the weaker and the stronger.

A futher important point to be noted from *AH* 5.3.3 is that although it is God who provides us with life, we *live*. Participating in the life provided by God, humans do not lose their identity, nor does the gift exist apart from them or superadded in them, but, rather, the gift is 'personalized' by each human: the gift is life, yet it is the human who lives this life.

Irenaeus concludes *AH* 2.34 by bringing the discussion back to Gen. 2.7:

> But as the animated body is certainly not itself the soul, yet it participates in the soul as long as God pleases; so also the soul herself assuredly is not life, but partakes in that life bestowed by God Himself. Wherefore also the prophetic word declares of the first-formed human, 'he became a living soul', teaching us that by participation of life the soul was made 'living', so that the soul is thought of separately, and separately is the life which is in her. With God therefore bestowing life and perpetual continuance, it comes to pass that even souls which did not at first exist should henceforth continue, since God will have both willed them to be and to continue. (*AH* 2.34.4).

The soul, created out of nothing, does not in itself possess life but participates in the life bestowed by God. Becoming, in this way, a 'living soul', the soul can also animate the body, and as such is a 'breath of life' to the body (*AH* 5.7.1).[42] Those who claim that the life in question here is the life of the Holy Spirit given to the first Adam, lost by him, yet regained in the second Adam[43], grossly misinterpret: (1) Genesis 2.7, which

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[42] In *AH* 5.4.1, Irenaeus might be suggesting that the soul lives by its own nature: 'a sua natura adest vivere'. This statement occurs in a sentence in which Irenaeus criticizes the Gnostic idea of God, who does not vivify the whole person, ie. body and soul, but only the soul. As such, the statement that soul lives by its own nature might refer to the Gnostic position, and so Irenaeus would be emphasizing that the Christian God vivifies both soul and body. This was the position taken by H. Lassiat, cf. *Promotion de l'homme en Jésus-Christ d'après Irénée de Lyon*, pp.165-166; 'L'Anthropologie d'Irénée', pp.411-412, and criticized by Rousseau, 'L'Éternité des peines de l'enfer et l'immortalité naturelle de l'âme selon Saint Irénée', pp.847-848. If Irenaeus is indeed affirming that it is the nature of souls to live, this is simply because his interest in the soul is primarily, even almost exclusively, as a principle of animation for the body.

[43] Cf. Rousseau: 'La "vie" dont il est question dans tout ce passage est évidemment celle dont il a été question déjà au paragraphe précédent,

only speaks of the first human becoming a 'living soul' (ψυχὴν ζῶσαν); (2) St. Paul, who specifies that it is the last Adam who became a life-creating spirit (πνεῦμα ζῳοποιοῦν) in contrast to the first Adam who was a 'living soul' (1 Cor. 15.45-6); (3) the whole movement of Irenaeus' theology of the economy, which moves from 'animation' to 'vivification': as Adam was animated by the breath of life, so Christ was vivified by the Spirit, as also will be those who, as adopted sons, presently have the pledge of the Spirit.

The confusion seems to arise from a reluctance to accept that the Holy Spirit is present with creation, and especially with the human, not only in the protological time of Adam's prelapsarian existence, but also throughout the apostasy, preferring instead to associate the presence of the Spirit with the 'likeness' which we lost in Adam and regained in Christ. This reluctance is combined with a desire to avoid the charge, first made in the sixteenth century by the Magdeburgian Centuriators, that Irenaeus taught that man was not created 'perfect', so turning the effect of the Incarnation into a return to the prelapsarian state of Adam.[44] If one holds that the

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c'est-à-dire la vie qui rend l'âme véritablement "vivante" en rendant participante de la vie de Dieu lui-même. [...] en citant *Gen.* 2.7 [...] à cet endroit, Irénée témoigne de sa conviction que, à l'instant où il sortit des mains créatrices de Dieu, le premier homme était vivant de la vie de l'Esprit; il n'était pas un simple composé d'âme et de corps, mais un composé de corps, d'âme et d' Esprit Saint; à l'instant même où le premier homme recevait son corps et son âme, ce corps et cette âme étaient assumés dans la vie de l'Esprit; et c'est cette vie même qui, après avoir été perdue par la désobéissance du premier Adam, devait nous être rendue par l'obéissance du second (cf. III.18.1; V.16.3...).' *SC* 293, p.347. The two passages referred to by Rousseau say nothing about what 'life' it was Adam had; they speak only of the 'likeness' lost by Adam and reestablished by Christ.

[44] Cf. Wingren's pertinent comments on the false perspective of the approach which wants to ask of Irenaeus if Adam was 'perfect' in his 'original state', *Man and the Incarnation*, pp.28-29. Wingren also repeatedly stresses that all life is from God, is communion with God, *ibid.* esp. pp.14; 54, ftn.36; 108; 120.

life-creating Spirit was not present to the human race during the apostasy, then one must also postulate a separate source of life, a breath of life, which is merely physical and has nothing to do with communion with God.[45] But when looking at the economy, we have seen that Irenaeus does in fact envisage the continual nourishing presence of the Spirit, which, nevertheless, was bestowed in a new manner in Christ at the end of time, and which thus, in its fulness, remains an eschatological reality, of which the adopted sons, at the present, receive a pledge.[46]

So far, following the sequence suggested by *Dem.* 11, we have considered Irenaeus' comments on the formation of the body, its animation by the breath of life and the relationship of the soul to both the body and the life in which it participates. What then does Irenaeus say regarding the presence of the Spirit in the human formation?

Irenaeus knows the philosophical definition of the human as 'an animal composed of a soul and a body', but he never uses it as a definition of a self-sufficient 'natural' human to which the Spirit is superadded. For the most part, when Irenaeus speaks of the human as 'composed of soul and body' it is in the context of exhorting us to live righteously in both soul and body, or, alternatively, defending the resurrection of both.[47] More important is the fact that only the body and soul, both created out of nothing, can, strictly speaking, be described as human or be called 'parts'

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[45] Andia, in *Homo vivens*, continually vacillates between this position and wanting to maintain that all life is from God. Cf. *Ibid.* pp. 25-26; 58-59; 78-79; 264-265; 273-275; 321-327; 333-344.

[46] Cf. *AH* 4.33.1, 7, 15 (all of which have the character of 'rules of truth'); 5.1.3, 28.4; *supra* pp.39-40.

[47] Cf. eg. *Dem.* 2; *AH* 5.20.1.

of the human - the life in which they participate, although integral to a living human, comes from God. Thus, on occasion, Irenaeus describes the human as a 'compound being'[48], a 'mixture' or 'union' of flesh and soul.[49] But as the soul, and through it the body, must participate in life to be a living human, such descriptions are not sufficient definitions of the living human being.

When looking at the significance of martyrdom in the unfolding of the economy, we saw something of the role of the Spirit in the vivification of the human: when the Spirit absorbs the weakness of the flesh, from both of these a living human is made, 'living, indeed, because of the participation of the Spirit, and human because of the substance of the flesh.' (*AH* 5.9.2) In this perspective Irenaeus can, in the context of a discussion on the similarity between the formation of Adam and the birth of Christ, describe the human being as 'a body taken from the earth, and a soul receiving the Spirit from God.'[50] Similarly, Irenaeus asserts that death befalls neither the soul, for it is a breath of life, nor the Spirit, for it is simple and cannot be decomposed, and 'is Itself the life of those who receive it.'[51] The Spirit is clearly connected to the life lived by humans: the Spirit is indeed life-creating. Yet in the same way that Irenaeus carefully distinguished, in *AH* 2.34, between the human, body and soul, and the life in

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[48] *AH* 2.28.4: '[...] qui [homo] est compositum animal [...]'. Cf. *AH* 2.13.3: '[... homines] sint compositi natura et ex corpore et anima subsistentes.'

[49] *AH* 4.Pref.4: 'Homo est enim temperatio animae et carnis [...]'; *AH* 5.8.2: '[...] substantia nostra, hoc est animae et carnis adunatio, [...]'.

[50] *AH* 3.22.1: 'Nos autem quoniam corpus sumus de terra acceptum et anima accipiens a Deo Spiritum omnis quicumque confitebitur.'

[51] *AH* 5.7.1: 'Hoc autem neque animae euenit, flatus est enim uitae, neque Spiritui, incompositus est enim et simplex Spiritus qui resolui non potest et ipse uita est eorum qui percipiunt illum.'

which they participate, so also the Spirit must not be thought of as a 'part' of the human.

That the Spirit is essential to Irenaeus' understanding of the human yet is not a 'human part' of our constitution, is brought out by two passages. It appears most clearly in *AH* 5.6.1, where Irenaeus is discussing the eschatologically 'perfect' human, made spiritual by the full bestowal of the Spirit in the manner made possible by Christ, and so made in the image and likeness of God. The passage is long, but its importance merits it being cited at length:

> Now the soul and the Spirit can be a part of the human, but by no means a human; the perfect human is the commingling and the union of the soul receiving the Spirit of the Father and joined to the flesh which was moulded after the image of God. For this reason the Apostle says 'We speak wisdom among them that are perfect' (1 Cor. 2.6), calling those 'perfect' who have received the Spirit of God, [...] these the Apostle also calls 'spiritual' - being spiritual by a participation in the Spirit and not by a deprivation and removal of the flesh [and merely that itself alone]. For if anyone take away the substance [of the flesh, that is] of the handiwork, and merely considers only the Spirit itself, such is no longer what is a spiritual human, but the Spirit of the human or the Spirit of God.[52] But when this Spirit, commingled with the soul, is united to the

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[52] The words in [] are omitted in the Armenian version. Rousseau's translation of 'et nude ipsum solum Spiritum intellegat' (which he renders in Greek as: καὶ ψιλῶς αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ πνεῦμα νοήσῃ) as 'pour ne considérer que ce qui est proprement esprit' is misleading - enabling his interpretation of the following phrase, 'Spiritus hominis', as the human soul distinct from the 'Spiritus Dei'. But Irenaeus never refers to the soul as 'spiritus', and the whole emphasis in this passage, is that the Spirit of God is present in the human to such an extent that it can be considered 'their Spirit', without it being a 'part' of the human, as Rousseau accepts in his comments on the quotation of 1 Thess. 5.23 (ὑμῶν τὸ Πνεῦμα) in *AH* 5.6.1, cf. *SC* 152, pp.233-234. This is precisely the point that Rousseau makes in his comments on the phrase 'their Spirit[s]' in *AH* 2.33.5 - cf. *SC* 293, pp.339-342. There is one passage where Irenaeus speaks of the 'spirit' of a person in a way which might refer to the soul: in *AH* 2.31.2 Irenaeus speaks of 'the spirit of the dead man' being returned through the efficacy of the prayers of the local church. However, Irenaeus prefaces this by likening it to the raising of the dead by Christ, and so the choice of word probably reflects Lk. 8.55: καὶ ἐπέστρεψεν τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτῆς. The use of the word 'pneuma' in this passage is consistent with the interpretation of *AH* 5.6.1; and of 2.33.5 and 5.18.2 as we will see.

> handiwork, because of the outpouring of the Spirit the human is rendered spiritual and perfect, and this is the one who was made in the image and likeness of God. But if the Spirit is lacking from the soul, such a one, remaining indeed animated and fleshly, will be imperfect, having the image, certainly, in the handiwork, but not receiving the likeness through the Spirit. Likewise this one is imperfect, in the same manner again, if someone takes away the image and rejects the handiwork - one can no longer contemplate a human, but either some part of the human, as we have said, or something other than a human. For neither is the handiwork of flesh itself, by itself, a perfect human, but the body of a human and a part of the human; nor is the soul itself, by itself, a human, but the soul and a part of the human; nor is the Spirit a human, for it is called Spirit and not human. But the commingling and union of all of these constitutes the perfect human. (*AH* 5.6.1)

The soul and the Spirit together are a part of the human, but not the human - for this we need flesh. Irenaeus' emphasis on this fact is striking: what is important for him is not so much the presence of the Spirit in the human being, but the reality of the flesh. Yet while the body, soul and Spirit cannot individually be called a human, the body and soul can be called 'parts' of the human in a way in which the Spirit cannot - for it is the Spirit, something other than the human. In this passage it is no longer a question of flesh being animated by the breath of life, but of flesh which is fully vivified or made spiritual by the Spirit: that it is an eschatological description is made clear by the citation of 1 Thess. 5.23 towards the end of the section.[53] If we take away the Spirit, as it is given in Christ, we are left with an animated and fleshly being. We have seen how the soul animates the flesh by participating in the gift of life, and as such belongs to the handiwork which is animated by the breath of life. Thus, if we take away the substance of the handiwork we are left with 'only the Spirit itself', which Irenaeus describes as 'the Spirit of the human or the Spirit of God.' The Spirit itself is not the human, nor even a part of the human, but is given to the human in such a manner that it can be

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[53] Cf. Andia, *Homo Vivens*, pp.84-85.

legitimately described as their Spirit.

This fact is brought out by the second passage, *AH* 2.33.5, where Irenaeus discusses the resurrection:

> [...] all those who have been enrolled for life shall rise again, having their own body, their own soul, and their own Spirit, in which they had pleased God. Those, on the other hand, who are worthy of punishment, shall go away into it, they too having their own souls, and their own bodies, in which they stood apart from the goodness of God.[64]

Here we see the same dynamics that are operative in Irenaeus' discussion of life in *AH* 2.34 and *AH* 5.3.3: those who have been thankful for the gift of life in this temporal life, and are thus pleasing to God, will be raised and maintained in eternal life. But this time it is expressed in terms of the Spirit, which is given to each in a manner that makes It 'their Spirit'. Thus, those who have pleased God in their body, soul and Spirit will be raised in their body, soul and Spirit. The parallel dynamics of these texts, and the fact that it is *in* their body, soul and Spirit that they pleased God, demand that it is also in their body, soul *and* Spirit that others have shown themselves worthy of punishment and so are raised in their body and soul for the punishment of an existence without the Spirit, without participation in life.[65]

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[64] The words 'body', 'soul' and 'Spirit' are given in the plural in both the Latin and the Greek (from the *Sacra Parallela*). I have followed Rousseau in translating these terms in the singular: 'Ce n'est pas que nous ayons songé à modifier la pensée d'Irénée, mais parce que, spontanément, le français [and English] exprime l'idée que chacun possède son propre corps, sa propre âme, son propre Esprit.' *SC* 293, pp.341-342.

[65] Rousseau prefers to restrict the possession of 'Spirit' to those who have been justified: 'L'Esprit Saint est en effet si réellement "donné" à tous les hommes justifiés que chacun de ceux-ci possède véritablement comme sien, d'une manière analogue à celle dont il possède son propre corps et sa propre âme.' *SC* 293, pp.339-340. This parallels his distinction between two types of life, the physical, which has nothing to do with the Spirit, and that life given by the Spirit.

So the Spirit is vital to a proper appreciation of Irenaeus' understanding of the human being. There is no 'complete' or 'perfect' human without the Spirit, yet the Spirit is not a 'part' of the human being; just as humans do not live without participating in life, yet they do not possess life in their own nature. Although we have seen, when looking at the unfolding of the economy, the continual nourishing presence of the Spirit in creation, the passages examined concerning the presence of the Spirit in the human being have been of limited scope: *AH* 5.6.1 speaks unambiguously of the 'perfect', spiritual and eschatological human being, possessing the fulness of the Spirit as it is given in Christ; *AH* 2.33.5 asserts that those who have pleased God will rise in their body, soul and Spirit. It can, however, be legitimately inferred from this latter passage that they, and those who did not please God, had 'their' Spirit before their death.

There is one further passage which merits close attention. Having described in *AH* 5.18.1, how the creation 'which subsists by the power, the skill and the wisdom of God' is borne in an invisible manner by the Father, but itself bore the Word in a visible manner, Irenaeus, before going on to cite and comment on Eph. 4.6, continues in *AH* 5.18.2:

> And this is true. For the Father simultaneously bears the creation and His own Word, and the Word borne by the Father bestows the Spirit on all as the Father wills,

Due to the difficulties of translation, the remaining part of the sentence must be given in both versions:

> quibusdam quidem secundum conditionem, [quod est conditionis], quod est factum;
> quibusdam autem[56] secundum adoptionem, quod est ex Deo, quod est generatio.

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[56] The words in [] are omitted in two main manuscripts, Claromontanus and Vossianus. The Armenian is found in Arm. p.197, lines 3-5; I have followed C. Mercier's emmendation of զաշխարհի to զաշխարհիս.

այնոցիկ, որ ըստ աշխարհիս են, զաշխարհիս,
որ է եղեալն,
իսկ այնոցիկ, որ ըստ որդեգրութեանն են, զի՛ի չարչէն,
որ է ծնունդն նորա:

The perplexity of the latin scribes at this sentence is shown clearly by the omission of 'quod est conditionis' from two of the main manuscripts and by the fourfold use of 'quod est' without a preceding neuter substantive. Not wanting to accept that the Spirit might be present in creation outside Christ, Massuet asserted that the 'Verbum praestat spiritum omnibus, quemadmodum uult Pater, sed non eumdem'[57], and this view has since predominated. Rousseau explains the use of the neuter relative by suggesting a careless translation from the Greek (in which πνεῦμα is neuter)[58], and translates as follows:

> [...] et le Verbe, porté par le Père, donne l'Esprit (esprit) à tous, de la manière que veut le Père:
> aux uns, en rapport avec leur création, il donne l'esprit appartenant à la création, esprit qui est une chose fait;
> aux autres, en rapport avec leur adoption, il donne l'Esprit provenant du Père, Esprit qui est la Prógeniture de celui-ci.

Rousseau's reading of the text, and the whole of his lengthy 'note justificative' is intended to demonstrate that Irenaeus is using the word 'Spiritum' to mean two different things - both a created 'spirit', which Rousseau identifies with the soul or the breath of life, and the Holy Spirit.[59] However, as we have seen, Irenaeus never calls the 'soul'

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[57] *PG* 7.1173, ftn.72.

[58] Cf. *SC* 152, p.287: 'Il faudrait tout ignorer des procédés ... ou des maladresses des anciens traducteurs latins, et, en particulier, du traducteur de l'*Adversus haereses*, [...].' Rousseau refers to S. Lündstrom's study *Übersetzungstechnische Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete der christlichen Latinität*, for a survey of such examples. It is important to note that mistranslations can occur into any gender, cf. *ibid.* pp.240-274.

[59] Rousseau's interpretation is followed by both H.-J. Jaschke, *Der Heilige Geist im Bekenntnis der Kirche*, pp.206-207, and Andia, *Homo vivens*, pp.338-343. Orbe, in his idiosyncratic way, maintains that the 'created

'spirit', and, moreover, does not play with words to this extent.[60] Furthermore, Rousseau's reading necessitates applying 'quod est generatio [eius]', որ է ծնունդն նորա, to the Holy Spirit. Rousseau, acknowledging that the description of 'Prógeniture' for the Holy Spirit is somewhat unusual in patristic literature, points to *AH* 5.36.3, where Irenaeus applies the term 'progenies' to the Son, and to *AH* 4.7.4, where, in his interpretation, it is applied both to the Son and the Spirit.[61] Looking further afield Rousseau can only adduce one passage, from Leontius of Byzantium, where the term γέννημα is applied to the Spirit.[62]

The most striking aspect of this reading of *AH* 5.18.2 is its divisive interpretation of the 'Spirit'. The very structure of the passage demands that it is one and the same Spirit that is given to all, in different

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spirit' cannot be identified with the soul, but is the Spirit as an *anima mundi*, distinct from the Personal Spirit, *Teología de San Ireneo*, 2, pp.211-218. But, as with his interpretation of the 'power of God' of *Dem.* 11, there is no reason, from Irenaeus' text, to think that this should be so.

[60] The only comparison that Rousseau can adduce is his interpretation of *AH* 5.6.1: '[...] et nude ipsum solum Spiritum intellegat, iam non spiritalis homo est quod est tale, sed Spiritus hominis aut Spiritus Dei.' Cf. *supra* p.117, ftn.52

[61] However Rousseau's justification fails to persuade. In *AH* 4.7.4 Irenaeus explains that God did not need the help of angels to bring creation into being and form the human: 'ministrat enim ei ad omnia sua progenies et figuratio sua, hoc est Filius et Spiritus, Verbum et Sapientia, quibus seruiunt et subiecti sunt omnes angeli.' Where the Latin has 'figuratio sua' the Armenian has իւր ձեռն , 'His own hands'. It is much more likely that the term ձեւն (figure) was mistranscribed as ձեռն (hands), than that the term 'figuratio' should somehow find its way into the Latin text - something for which Rousseau has no explanation. Cf. *SC* 100. pp.212-219; J. A. Robinson, 'Notes on the Armenian version of Irenaeus' *Adv. Haereses* IV, V' pp.156-157. These two cases (*AH* 4.7.4; 5.36.3) are the only instances of the term being applied in a trinitarian context; Rousseau also lists various other uses which have no bearing on *AH* 5.18.2, cf. *SC* 152, pp.294-295.

[62] *De Sectis*, *PG* 86.1220b; this is in fact the only occurence of the application listed in Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p.312.

manners, certainly, as the Father wills, but the same Spirit nevertheless. How then is the passage to be understood?

The Armenian word ծնունդ is used twenty-three times in the Armenian version of *Against the Heresies*[63]: in the majority of cases it conveys the idea of generation or engendering (γέννησις), referring either to our natural birth or to a rebirth, a new birth or second birth[64]; much less frequently does it refer to that which is thus born (γέννημα). As such it makes sense to read ծնունդ as 'engendering', and so to refer որ է ծնունդն նորա (which is an engendering of him) back to որդեգրութեանն (adoption), rather than զի ի Հաւրէն (the [Spirit] from the Father). This latter phrase is the only phrase in the clause with the definite object marker, զ , indicating that it is the [Spirit] from the Father which is being given. As such the second clause runs:

> to others, who are according to adoption, which is his engendering, He gives the Spirit of the Father

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[63] Latin equivalent.

progenies	*AH* 4.7.4,	line 68 (Arm. p.26.17) (of the Son of God)
	AH 4.41.3,	line 46 (Arm. p.148.2-3)
	AH 5.36.3,	line 70 (Arm. p.245.17) (of the Son of God)
filius	*AH* 5.33.4,	line 100 (Arm. p.236.16)
natiuitas	*AH* 4.21.3,	line 37 (Arm. p.77.31)
	AH 5.15.2,	line 59 (Arm. p.189.24)
	AH 5.15.3,	line 90 (Arm. p.190.20)
conditio	*AH* 4.33.5	line 334 (Arm. p.117.15)
generatio	*AH* 4.21.3	line 42 (Arm. p.78.3)
	AH 4.33.2	line 43 (Arm. p.108.28)
	AH 4.33.4	lines 81, 82 (Arm. p.110.3)
	AH 5.1.3	lines 63, 68, 69, 70 (Arm. p.153.13, 18, 19, 20)
	AH 5.18.2	line 35 (Arm. p.197.5)
	AH 5.33.1	lines 7, 13, 15, 19 (Arm. p.233.19, 25, 27; p.234.1)
	AH 5.15.1	line 3 (Arm. p.188.3)
genesis	*AH* 4.33.4	line 85 (Arm. p.110.7)

[64] Cf. esp. the use of the word ծնունդ (generatio) in *AH* 4.33.4, lines 80-86, which connects the birth, given as a sign of salvation, from God, regenerating us by faith, with the adoption we receive from God.

As the two clauses are clearly structured in parallel, the phrase, որ է եղեալն (which is made) refers back to the term աշխարհիս (the/this creation), rather than the term զաշխարհիս , which, with the definite object marker, refers to that which is given (the [Spirit] of the/this creation), and so the first clause runs:

> to some, who are according to the creation, which is made, He gives the Spirit of creation

Thus the sentence as a whole, translated a bit more freely, runs:

> For the Father simultaneously bears the creation and His own Word, and the Word borne by the Father bestows the Spirit on all as the Father wills,
> to some, who are in a created state, which is made,
> He gives the Spirit pertaining to creation;
> to others, who are according to adoption, his engendering,
> He gives the Spirit of the Father.

This text, so rendered, affirms what has been evident throughout. That the Spirit of God, who was present with creation throughout the whole of the economy, was nevertheless bestowed in a special manner on those who have been adopted as sons of God: as sons, they can receive the Spirit from the Father. Those who have not been adopted as sons, but who remain in their created state, can only receive the Spirit as It is present throughout creation.

What then is the relationship between the Spirit and the breath of life? Irenaeus describes this relationship in *AH* 5.12.1-2, an important passage which needs to be described fully. This passage follows Irenaeus' discussion of 1 Cor. 15, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom, but can be inherited by the Spirit when vivified by the Spirit (1 Cor. 15.50; *AH* 5.9-10). Likewise, while working the deeds of the flesh, we have borne the image of the earthly one, but having been baptised and received

the Spirit, we bear the image of the heavenly one, made alive by the workings of the Spirit (1 Cor. 15.48-49; *AH* 5.11). As in *AH* 5.6.1, the vivifying presence of the Spirit is that bestowed in baptism and the resurrection.

In *AH* 5.12 Irenaeus continues working backwards on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, to explain 1 Cor. 15.45-6. The breath of life which animated the human is other than the life-creating Spirit which makes them spiritual.[65] Irenaeus cites two passages from Isaiah (Is. 42.5, 57.16) to demonstrate that, whilst the breath of life is common to all people upon earth, the Spirit is peculiar to those who tread down their earthly desires, and, furthermore, is poured out upon the human race in the last times through adoption. Picking up on Is. 57.16, 'For the Spirit shall go forth from Me, and I have made every breath', Irenaeus describes the breath of life as something 'made', and thus to be differentiated from from that which makes.[66] As something made, the breath is temporal and in a short time will leave its abode bereft of breath. But when the Spirit pervades the human, inside and out, it is permanent and remains with the human.[67] Irenaeus then cites 1 Cor. 15.46 to demonstrate that as it is the 'animated' which is first, and only then the 'spiritual', so 'it was necessary first for the human to be fashioned, and having been fashioned to receive the soul, and then to receive communion with the Spirit.'[68] That Irenaeus has changed from

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[65] *AH* 5.12.2: Ἕτερον [γάρ] ἐστι πνοὴ ζωῆς ἡ καὶ ἀπεργαζομένη τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἕτερον Πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν τὸ καὶ πνευματικὸν αὐτὸν ἀποτελοῦν.

[66] *AH* 5.12.2: [. . .] καὶ ποίημα ἀναγορεύσας αὐτήν. Ἕτερον δέ ἐστι τὸ ποιηθὲν τοῦ ποιήσαντος.

[67] *AH* 5.12.2: [. . .] τὸ δὲ Πνεῦμα περιλαβὸν ἔνδοθεν καὶ ἔξωθεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἅτε ἀεὶ παραμένον, οὐδέποτε ἐκλείψει αὐτόν.

[68] *AH* 5.12.2. 'Oportuerat enim primo plasmari hominem et plasmatum accipere

speaking of the 'breath' to the 'soul' is due to the fact that he is now commenting on 1 Cor. 15.46, and follows his comments by citing 1 Cor. 15.45. Irenaeus concludes this section thus:

> Therefore, just as the one who became a living soul turning to the evil, lost life, so again, that same one, in turning to what is better and receiving the life-creating Spirit, finds life.[69]

The relationship between the breath of life and the Spirit is characterized by the description of the Spirit as life-creating. Those who have not received the Spirit through adoption possess only the breath of life. Not being an adopted son of God, they can only receive the Spirit in a manner pertaining to their created state, and so, a propos of Is. 57.16, Irenaeus describes this as a created breath. Yet that which is created is placed in direct relationship to the One who creates it. It would be a mistake to reify the breath of life, to treat it as something which once created exists independently of its source. Humans do not have independent life, but depend on God and their acknowledgement of God as the Source of life. In *AH* 5.12.2, the breath of life is described as not only temporal, but also mortal. This is undoubtedly due to the context, which contrasts life outside Christ with that given by the Spirit in Christ. In his most detailed presentation of protology, the opening section of the *Demonstration*, Irenaeus asserts that the humans, animated by the breath of life, would have remained immortal by continuing to acknowledge God as the Lord of all.[70] When they transgressed this basic structure, the breath of life lost its 'strength' and they eventually died. This life did not change

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animam, deinde sic communionem Spiritus recipere.'

[69] *AH* 5.12.2: Ὡς οὖν ὁ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν γεγονὼς ῥέψας ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀπώλεσε τὴν ζωήν, οὕτως πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπανελθὼν καὶ προσλαβόμενος τὸ ζωοποιοῦν Πνεῦμα εὑρήσει τὴν ζωήν.

[70] Cf. *Dem.* 15.

from being the direct vivification by the Spirit to 'mere' animation, for direct vivification is only possible for the human adopted in Christ. Similarly, in *AH* 5.12.2, Irenaeus states that by turning aside to evil, the one who was a living soul lost life. But when the same one returns to God, through Christ as an adopted son, he will receive the life-creating Spirit and find life. Those who through adoption possess the Spirit, either as a pledge in the present or in fulness in the resurrection, are vivified by the very One who creates life and never ceases from so doing. They are vivified 'inside and out' in a permament fashion; the Spirit takes possession of its inheritance, flesh and blood, and the result is a living, rather than an animated, human. The former life, as Irenaeus says in the last lines of *AH* 5.12.1, is expelled, as it was given through the breath and not through the Spirit.[71] Unlike those who are animated by the breath of life, created by the presence of the life-creating Spirit, the adopted sons of God receive the vivifying Spirit itself, 'communion with the Spirit.' Thus there are not two 'sources' of life, independent from each other: only the Spirit is life-creating, the difference between animation and vivification turns upon our receptive capacity, either as a created being or as an adopted son of God, as described in *AH* 5.18.2.

An analogy might be helpful. The created world is illumined and nourished by the light and warmth of the sun. The light and warmth which the world reflects or absorbs are a created state in the matter of the world, but are nonetheless continually dependent upon the one source of light and warmth. If they are overshadowed, breaking the direct relationship between the

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[71] *AH* 5.12.1: 'Expulsa est autem pristina uita, quoniam non per Spiritum sed per afflatum fuerat data.'

source and its recipient, the matter will gradually lose its warmth and then turn cold. But the fading warmth of the matter, whilst it is overshadowed, is still that of the sun. Similarly, human life depends on God, who sustains and nourishes His creation. If humans turn away from God, they will continue for a while and then die; the breath of life, with which God animated the human, will have lost its strength. Nevetheless its life is still that which has been effected by the presence of the life-creating Spirit: it will have lost its strength, but it does not change from being a 'spiritual' life to animation. As the light and warmth of the material world is but a pale reflection of that of the sun itself, so human life, outside Christ, is but a snatched breath compared to vivification by God Himself. But as God has become incarnate, He has enabled His sons, those adopted in Christ, to be illumined and warmed, or vivified, directly by His own life or life-creating Spirit.

As those outside Christ only have a breath of life which has lost its strength, that is, a life which has become mortal, Irenaeus occasionally describes such people as being dead. In *AH* 5.9.1, for instance, again in the context of a comparison between mortal life outside Christ and the possession of the Spirit, Irenaeus describes the soul as situated between the Spirit, which saves and fashions, and the flesh, which is saved and fashioned: sometimes the soul follows the Spirit and at other times it is persuaded to follow the flesh. Those who do not have the life-creating Spirit in themselves are mere flesh and blood, and it is these that Christ calls 'dead' (Lk. 9.60).

The idea that breath is common to all upon earth, whilst direct vivification by the life-creating Spirit belongs to those adopted in Christ, yet there being but one source of life, as presented in *AH* 5.12.2, and the idea of the

relative strengths of life discussed in *AH* 5.3.3, are brought together in *AH* 4.20 in Irenaeus' favourite term, that of the vision of God. In *AH* 4.20.5, Irenaeus emphasizes that it is not possible to live without life, and life is only to be found in communion with God, which is to see God and enjoy His goodness.[72] After describing the various prophetic visions of God in the Old Testament, Irenaeus continues:

> For the glory of God is a living human, and the life of the human consists in beholding God: for if the manifestation of God affords life to all living on earth, much more does that revelation of the Father which comes through the Word give life to those who see God.[73]

Again, there is only one Source of life, though it is bestowed upon the human through two modes: all those upon earth live by seeing the Creator through the creation; while those who see the Father in the Son are vivified in a stronger fashion. Moreover, there is no suggestion that those who recognize the Creator have a mortal life. They become subject to death when they no longer acknowledge themselves as created beings, dependent upon God.

Returning to *Dem.* 11, Irenaeus states that God breathed the breath of life into His handiwork so that 'both according to inspiration and according to formation the human became like God.' As the formation, the image of God located in the flesh, typifies Christ, so also the inspiration, the animation by the breath of life, typifies or prefigures the vivification of Christ, and those adopted in Him, by the Spirit. Full vivification by the

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[72] *AH* 4.20.5: Ἐπει ζῆσαι ἄνευ ζωῆς [ἀδύνατον], ἡ δὲ ὕπαρξις τῆς ζωῆς ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ περιγίνεται μετοχῆς, μετοχὴ δὲ θεοῦ ἐστι τὸ [ὁρᾶν] θεὸν καὶ ἀπολαύειν τῆς χρηστότητος αὐτοῦ. The words in [] mark Rousseau's emendations to the Greek text, as found in the *Sacra Parallela*, on the basis of the Latin and Armenian versions.

[73] *AH* 4.20.7: 'gloria enim Dei uiuens homo, uita autem hominis uisio Dei. Si enim quae est per conditionem ostensio Dei uitam praestat omnibus in terra uiuentibus, multo magis ea quae est per Verbum manifestatio Patris uitam praestat his qui uident Deum.'

Spirit is eschatological, though manifest in the death of the martyrs who bear witness to salvation. Adopted sons now receive the pledge of the Spirit, possessing a 'part of the Spirit' (*AH* 5.8.1) which prepares them for the fulness to come. The rest of the people living upon earth have received the breath of life, created by the presence of the Spirit in creation, as a type of the vivification to come. The whole process, the movement of the economy itself, is one of God and the human becoming accustomed to each other: of the human learning, throughout the Old Testament, to follow and acknowledge God, of the Spirit, in Christ, becoming accustomed to dwell in and vivify the human, and of the human, as an adopted son in Christ, being prepared for vivification by the life-creating Spirit, and so for the incorruptibility and immortality of God.

Following the description of the creation of the human in *Dem.* 11, and supplementing it with information gained from more detailed analyses elsewhere in Irenaeus' writings, we have so far looked at Irenaeus' understanding of the human body, fashioned in the image of God, its relationship to the soul, and the relationship between the breath of life and the life-creating Spirit. We need to consider a few more details of Irenaeus' protological descriptions before we can conclude this section by looking at Irenaeus' understanding of the 'likeness', that which was lost in Adam and regained in Christ.

Irenaeus presents us with a unitary account of the creation of the human, combining both Gen 1.26-7 and Gen. 2.7 to describe the creation of a unified being, animated flesh. Ireneaus continues in *Dem.* 12 by suggesting that, as newly created, the human was but an infant, who needed to grow to reach full

perfection.[74] It was to nourish this growth, according to Irenaeus, that God prepared a place better than this present world, a beautiful Garden[75] with a good climate, light and full of good things to eat and drink. So beautiful and good was this Garden, that:

> [...] the Word of God was constantly walking in it; He would walk round and talk with the human, prefiguring what was to come to pass in the future, how He would become [their] kinsman, and talk with them and come among humankind, teaching them justice. (*Dem.* 12)

Irenaeus clearly refers the protological descriptions of the Garden in Genesis to the Church, a 'paradise in this world' (*AH* 5.20.2) though located in the Spirit, and its fulfillment in the Kingdom of the Son. His understanding of the account of Genesis is, again, both christological and eschatological.

Irenaeus extends the unitary account of the creation of the human to the formation of Eve. In *Dem.* 13, Ireneaus paraphrases and extends Gen. 2.18-23:

> And He decided also to make a help for the man, for 'God said: it is not good for the man to be alone; let us make him a helper like unto himself'. For among all other living things there was not to be found a helper equal to and the peer and the like of Adam. God thus Himself 'brought a trance upon Adam, and put him to sleep', to accomplish a work from a work, sleep not being in the Garden, it was upon Adam by the will of God. And God 'took one of Adam's ribs, and filled up flesh for it, and built up the rib which He took into a woman, and so brought her to Adam'. And he, seeing her, said: 'This is now bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman, because she was taken out of her man.' (*Dem.* 13).

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[74] Irenaeus' depiction of Adam and Eve as children, and many of his protological descriptions, seems to be dependent upon Theophilus of Antioch (*Ad Autolycum* 2.20-28) either directly or through a common Asiatic tradition. Cf. F. Loofs, *Theophilus von Antiochen adversus Marcionem und die anderen theologischen Quellen bei Irenaeus*, pp.58-72.

[75] The word դրախտ or դրաստ translates παράδεισος, cf. Reynders, *Vocabulaire de la 'Demonstration' et des fragments de Saint Irénée*, p.18.477. In the context of the protological descriptions of the *Demonstration* I have translated it as 'Garden', as Smith and Froidevaux, following the standard rendering of Gen. 2.8, the Garden of Eden.

Irenaeus keeps to the Biblical text, and does not refer the formation of woman in any way to God's foresight of the apostasy and mortality nor even to the function of procreation. Irenaeus adds to the Genesis account of God putting Adam to sleep, by stating that sleep did not yet exist in the Garden, and he explains this temporary 'suspension' of Adam's existence by the intention of God to accomplish 'a work from a work'.[76] This divine initiative reaches its conclusion in the formation of the woman. Bone from bone, Eve is of the same formation as Adam. The formation of the human as a sexual being thus belongs to the arrangements of God for the growth and maturation of the human: He prepares a 'helper' suitable, like and equal to Adam.

Irenaeus continues, in *Dem.* 14, by describing the life of Adam and Eve in the Garden:

> And Adam and Eve (for this is the name of the woman) 'were naked and were not ashamed' (Gen. 2.25), for in them was an innocent and childlike intention[77], and they had no conception or imagination of whatever, through evil, is engendered in the soul by desires and shameful pleasures, for they were then in their integrity, maintaining their natural state, for what had been breathed into the handiwork was the breath of life. Now, while the breath remains in its order and strength, it is without thought or imagination of ignoble things. Thus they 'were not ashamed' when kissing, embracing each other in holiness as children. (*Dem.* 14).

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[76] A. Orbe tries to find in this sleep a relaxation or slackening of the spirit, of the state of vigil or an interruption to Adam's converse with the Word. Had the initiative for this come from Adam, it would have been culpable; but coming from God it is acceptable, as it fits in with His plan to fashion the woman. Cf. *Antropologiá de San Ireneo*, pp.201-203. In this way, the woman is associated with the interruption of man's converse with God, and so becomes the occasion for the fall, *ibid.* pp.251-253. Orbe bases his interpretation on his earlier studies: 'El pecado de Eva, signo de division'; 'El sueño y el Paraíso'; 'La atonia del espiritu en los Padres y teologos del s.II'. His argument is closely followed by D. Ramos-Lissón, 'Le rôle de la femme dans la théologie de Saint Irénée'.

[77] Reynders suggests βουλή for ⲧⲛⲟⲩⲛⲁⲓⲣⲉ, *Vocabulaire de la 'Demonstration'*, p.27.748.

While the breath of life maintained its order and strength, and Adam and Eve remained in their integrity and natural state, they were able to embrace each other in holiness, without the base thoughts which arise through desire and shameful pleasures. Similarly, in *AH* 3.23.5, Irenaeus describes Adam as having lost his 'natural and childlike mind' ('indolem et puerilem amiserat sensum') when he lost 'that robe of sanctity which I [Adam] had from the Spirit' ('ab Spiritu sanctitatis stolam').[78] While the humans remain directed towards God, and the breath of life thus maintains its strength and order, they remain in the holiness that is God's, clothed, as it were, in a robe of sanctity. Not only is bipolarity as male and female the human's created state, but interaction between the two, in holiness, is clearly envisaged as a dimension of their life, growth and maturation.

In *Dem.* 17, Irenaeus follows Genesis, in a non-aetiological manner, by mentioning that Adam knew his wife Eve after their expulsion from the Garden. Elsewhere, while describing the parallel between the disobedient virgin Eve and the obedient virgin Mary, Irenaeus has this to say as an aside:

> [...] in paradise 'they were both naked and were not ashamed', inasmuch as they, having been created a short time previously, had no understanding of the procreation of children: for it was necessary that they should first come to the adult age, and then multiply from then onwards. (*AH* 3.22.4).

It seems that Irenaeus understood the blessing of God in Gen. 1.28 (αὐξάνεσθε καὶ πληθύνεσθε) in a sequential manner: grow/increase and [then]

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[78] This text has become something of a locus classicus for Irenaean scholars, who see in it evidence that Adam 'possessed' the Holy Spirit in paradise and lost this in the fall. Cf. Andia, *Homo vivens* pp.96-97; Fantino, *L'Homme*, pp.161-162; Jaschke, *Der Heilige Geist*, pp.254-257. That Adam 'possesses' the Spirit as a 'robe', is taken to indicate the character of this 'possession' as a *donum superadditum*, cf. E. Klebba, *Die Anthropologie des hl. Irenaeus*, p.33; such language is avoided by contemporary scholars, although the general sense remains.

multiply. The procreation of children is part of God's economy for the human race, which would come into effect when the newly created 'children' reached a suitable age and maturity. Accordingly, when they attain such maturity, they would be able to conceive children whilst remaining in holiness, robed in sanctity. Elsewhere, speaking in a post-lapsarian context, Irenaeus asserts that God has foreordained the number to which the human race should increase. On the completion of this number, they shall cease from begetting and being begotten, from marrying and giving in marriage, so preserving the harmony formed by the Father.[79] Thus the intention of procreation is the same both in the Garden before the apostasy and after the apostasy in the human life of mortality. There is no suggestion, as for instance in Athenagoras, that the procreation of children is the human response to a life of mortality, an attempt to make the mortal immortal[80], it belongs to the growth which God has set before the human. Nor does Irenaeus, whilst speaking of adulthood as the age for procreation, ever restrict human sexuality to the function of procreation. Procreation shall cease once the fore-ordained number has been reached; human existence as male and female will not cease, for it is the condition and framework, as created by God, for human maturation and growth towards God.

A final aspect of Irenaeus' protology, discussed in *Dem.* 15, needs to be

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[79] *AH* 2.33.5: Καὶ παύσονται ἑκάτεροι τοῦ γεννᾶν ἔτι καὶ γεννᾶσθαι καὶ γαμεῖν καὶ γαμεῖσθαι, ἵνα τὸ σύμμετρον φῦλον τῆς προωρισμένης ἀπὸ θεοῦ ἀνθρωπότητος ἀποτελεσθὲν τὴν ἁρμονίαν τηρήσῃ τοῦ Πατρός. Cf. Mat. 22.30.

[80] Cf. *De. Res.* 12.2: ποιεῖται δὲ καὶ παῖδας [...] ἐπὶ τῷ εἶναί τε καὶ διαμένειν καθόσον οἷόν τε τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεννωμένους, τῇ τῶν παίδων καὶ τῶν ἐγγόνων διαδοχῇ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελευτὴν παραμυθούμενος καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ θνητὸν ἀπαθανατίζειν οἰόμενος. Athenagoras is echoing a standard classical theme, cf. Plato, *Symp.*, 208e; T. H. J. van Eijk, 'Marriage and Virginity, Death and Immortality.'

mentioned. God established the human as the lord of the earth and everything in it (*Dem.* 12). In order to help the humans remain in the proper, thankful, attitude towards their Creator, and not to have thoughts of grandeur nor assume an attitude of 'self-conceited arrogance' towards God, they were given a law by God, that they 'might know that they have for the lord the Lord of all' (*Dem.* 15). It is thus that Irenaeus understands the function of the commandment of Gen. 2.16-17.[81] If they were to keep to this commandment, acknowledging God as their Creator, they would remain immortal, otherwise they would become mortal and return to the earth. But, being inexperienced children, they were easily misled by the Deceiver and so cast out of the Garden (*Dem.* 12, 16). Irenaeus thus places the tree of the knowledge of good and evil within the context of life and death. As we saw when looking at the role of the apostasy within the unfolding of the economy, it is by a knowledge of both life (the good) and death (the evil), that the human comes to be in the image and likeness of God.[82] The acknowledgement of the Creator which the law demands is the basic structure of human life, and its transgression is death.[83]

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[81] Similarly in *AH* 5.20.2, 23.

[82] Cf. esp. *AH* 4.38.4: 'Oportuerat autem primo naturam apparere, post deinde uinci et absorbi mortale ab immortalitate et corruptibile ab incorruptibilitate, et fieri hominem secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei, agnitione accepta boni et mali.'

[83] According to A. Orbe, Irenaeus does not linger in his exegesis of Gen. 2.16-17: 'Sólo por conjeturas, indirectamente, entendemos el objeto de la prohibición.' *Antropología de San Iréneo*, p.245. By a sophisticated analysis of the relationship between the two virgins (*AH* 3.22.4), he concludes that for Irenaeus, the object of Gen 2.17 was, as for Clement, Origen and others, 'el uso del matrimonio carnal.' *Ibid.* p.251. God prohibited it, according to Orbe, not to measure the obedience of His creatures, but so that Adam and Eve could first grow stronger in their knowledge of God; as the natural act of marriage distracts from God, they needed to practice a life of continence, before they could engage in carnal union without detracting from the union with God. *Ibid.* p.252. Again, Orbe is closely followed by D. Ramos-Lissón, 'Le rôle de la femme dans la théologie de Saint Irénée'. It is difficult to see how this position can be

Having looked at Irenaeus' protology, the formation of the human and the character of their existence in the Garden, we can turn to the final category of Irenaeus' theological anthropology, the notion of 'likeness' (ὁμοίωσις). So far we have only come across this term once, in *AH* 5.6.1, where, in distinction to the image, located in the flesh, the likeness was said to be 'through the Spirit'. As noted, J. Fantino has rendered a valuable service by carefully analyzing the use of 'similitudo' in the Latin text of *Against the Heresies*, attempting to discern whether the underlying Greek is ὁμοιότης or ὁμοιώσις. The former, 'similitude', as we have seen, seems to denote our similarity to God through our possession of free will. What then of the 'likeness' which is 'through the Spirit'?

Irenaeus' most characteristic statement about the 'likeness' is that while we lost it in Adam, we have regained it in Christ. The most detailed and important text is from *AH* 5.15.2:

> For in times long past it was said that humans were made in the image of God, but it was not shown [to be so]; for the Word was as yet invisible, after whose image the humans were created; and because of this they easily lost the likeness. When, however, the Word of God became flesh, He confirmed both of these: for He both showed forth the image truly, Himself becoming that which was His image, and He reestablished the likeness in a sure manner, by assimilating the human to the invisible Father through the Word become visible.[84]

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deduced from the text of Irenaeus without some fairly large presuppositions about human sexuality, and the illegitimate assimilation of Irenaeus' own position *to* those of his contemporaries or successors, rather than an interpretation *in* such a context. Again, it is not surprising that Orbe worked out the basic lines of his interpretation in his earlier studies on the broader spectrum of second and third century thought: 'El pecado de Eva, signo de division'; 'El pecado original y el matrimonio en la teología del s.II'.

[84] *AH* 5.16.2: Ἐν τοῖς [γὰρ] πρόσθεν χρόνοις [ἐλέγετο μὲν] κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ γεγονέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐκ ἐδείκνυτο δέ· ἔτι γὰρ ἀόρατος ἦν ὁ Λόγος, οὗ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγεγόνει· διὰ τοῦτο [δὲ] καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ῥᾳδίως ἀπέβαλεν. Ὁπότε δὲ σὰρξ ἐγένετο ὁ Λόγος τοῦ

This text demonstrates what we have seen concerning the uniqueness of the manifestation of God in the Incarnate Word, at the same time both God and human. The Word becoming incarnate, becoming Himself the image, truly demonstrated what the image of God is, that is, the reality of the human as the image of God. According to Irenaeus it was because this fact had previously only been asserted, and not seen, that the human lost the likeness easily. But Christ, being Himself God made visible, 'the visible of the invisible Father'[85], assimilates in Himself the human to the invisible Father, thus re-establishing the likeness in a steadfast manner.

What is this likeness, then, that we lost in Adam and regain, in a sure manner, in Christ? Although in *AH* 5.6.1 it is said to be 'through the Spirit', it cannot, as Fantino argues, simply be the presence of the Spirit, for, as we have seen, the Spirit is present with creation throughout the unfolding of the economy; nor can it be the gift of the Spirit as it is received in baptism and adoption, for this was only made possible in Christ.[86] That which Adam lost in the apostasy was the strength of the breath of life, which would have kept Adam immortal, and his 'natural and childlike mind' or the 'robe of holiness from the Spirit', and both of these are the expressions or results of the humans seeing God through the creation, recognizing the fact that they are created and therefore depend

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Θεοῦ, τὰ ἀμφότερα ἐπεκύρωσεν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα ἔδειξεν ἀληθῶς, αὐτὸς τοῦτο γενόμενος ὅπερ ἦν ἡ εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν βεβαίως [ἀποκατέστησεν], συνεξομοιώσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ ἀοράτῳ Πατρὶ διὰ τοῦ βλεπομένου Λογοῦ. Words in [ ] are Rousseau's emendations of this Greek text, preserved in the *Sacra Parallela*, based upon the Latin and Armenian. Cf. *AH* 3.18.1.

[85] Cf. *AH* 4.6.6: 'inuisibile etenim Filii Pater, uisibile autem Patris Filius.'

[86] Cf. Fantino, *L'Homme*, pp.117-118.

upon their Creator, an attitude of thankfulness and obedience. It is this recognition and disposition that enables humans to live, whether animated by the breath of life or vivified directly by the life-creating Spirit. This living human is the glory of God, and this is the one who was created in the image *and likeness* of God. Having lost the strength of the breath, our life is now mortal. But in Christ we have been given the possibility of living by seeing the Father, by receiving, as an adopted son, a pledge of the Spirit which prepares us to be fully vivified by the Spirit in a permanent fashion, thus rendering the likeness secure.

4: The Growth of the Human

'The work of God is the fashioning of the human' (*AH* 5.15.2): this is the basic structure of Irenaeus' thought. It determines his theology at all levels: God has revealed Himself to us, uniquely, in human nature, and, while God is life and life-creating, it is humans who live in the nature with which God has created them, that is, fleshly and sexual. As Berthouzoz admirably expressed it: 'tout est de Dieu, tout n'advient que par l'homme'.[1] This is not to question the reality of the eternal being of the One God, Father, Son and Spirit, Who had no need of the human race, but created the human race so that they might enjoy His goodness and come to share in His glory. Rather it demonstrates the realism and economic nature of Irenaeus' theology. The manifestation of God in Christ is also the revelation of the truth of the human being, and so, to become human is to become that in which God has revealed Himself to us.[2]

How then are we to become a human, become a god? The answer is contained in the same structure: 'God makes, the human is made' (*AH* 4.11.2). In *AH* 4.38-39, Irenaeus argues against those who display ingratitude by refusing to accept that they are what God has created them to be, 'humans subject to passions' ('homines passionum capaces', *AH* 4.38.4), but want to be even as God. Such people betray an ignorance of the divine economy, in which God has revealed Himself to us as a human, and a lack of confidence in their Creator. They establish their own agenda for becoming what they want to

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[1] R. Berthouzoz, *Liberté et grace*, p.240.

[2] Irenaeus clearly follows in the line of Theophilus of Antioch. Cf. *Ad. Autolycum* 1.2: Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν φῇς <Δεῖξόν μοι τὸν Θεόν σου>, κἀγώ σοι εἴποιμι ἄν· <Δεῖξον μοι τὸν ἄνθρωπόν σου κἀγώ σοι δείξω τὸν Θεόν μου>.

be. To become truly human, and a god, we must allow God to fashion us, and this requires that we be open and responsive. In *AH* 4.39.2-3, Irenaeus describes this interaction using various themes with which we are already familiar: the artistic work of the Word of God, the presence of the Spirit, as Water, enabling the formation, and our trust in God, letting Him work in us:

> How then will you be a god, when you are not yet made human? How perfect, when only recently begun? How immortal, when in mortal nature you did not obey the Creator? It is necessary for you first to hold the rank of human, and then to partake of the glory of God. For you do not create God, but God creates you. If, then, you are the work of God, await the Hand of God, who does everything at the appropriate time - the appropriate time for you, who are being made. Offer to Him your heart, soft and pliable, and retain the shape with which the Fashioner shaped you, having in yourself His Water, lest you turn dry and lose the imprint of His fingers. By guarding this conformation, you will ascend to perfection; the mud in you will be concealed by the art of God. His Hand created your substance; it will gild you, inside and out, with pure gold and silver, and so adorn you that the King Himself will desire your beauty. But if, becoming hardened, you reject His art and being ungrateful towards Him, because He made you a human, ungrateful, that is, towards God, you have lost at once both His art and life. For to create is the characteristic of the goodness of God; to be created is characteristic of human nature. If, therefore, you offer Him what is yours, that is, faith in Him and subjection, you will receive His art and become a perfect work of God. But if you do not believe in Him, and flee from His Hands, the cause of imperfection will be in you who did not obey, and not in Him who called you. For He sent messengers to call people to the feast; but those who did not obey deprived themselves of His royal banquet. (*AH* 4.39.2-3).

Rather than hardening ourselves, trying to become what we might want to be, which can only result in death, we must remain pliable, open and responsive to the creative activity of God. As D. Minns puts it, 'What the earth creature [the human] needs to learn above all is to relax in the hands of God, to let God be the creator'.[3] Irenaeus characterizes this readiness to accept the designs of God for us as faith and subjection, a trusting obedience, and specifies that it is this which the human can and must offer.

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[3] D. Minns, *Irenaeus*, p.64.

Within this perspective, apostasy is a refusal to submit to the creative activity of God. In *AH* 3.23.5 Irenaeus describes the archetypal and paradigmatic example of such apostasy, that of Adam, who hid himself from God and clothed himself with fig-leaves (Gen. 3.7-8). Irenaeus is contrasting the repentance shown by Adam to the lack of repentance in Cain:

> With Adam, however, nothing of this kind happened, but everything was the opposite. For having been beguiled by another under the pretext of immortality, he is immediately seized with terror, and hides himself; not as if he were able to escape from God, but confused, since having transgressed His command he is unworthy to appear before and to hold converse with God. Now, 'the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom' (Prov. 1.7 etc.), and the perception of transgression produces repentance, and God bestows His bounty upon those who are repentant. [Adam] showed his repentance in deed, by means of the girdle, covering himself with fig-leaves; while there were many other leaves which would have irritated his body to a lesser degree, he, nevertheless, made a garment conformable to his disobedience, being terrified by the fear of God: and resisting the lustful propensity of his flesh, since he had lost his natural and childlike mind, and had come to a knowledge of evil things, he girded a bridle of continence (frenum continentiae) upon himself and his wife, fearing God and waiting for his coming, and indicating, as it were, some such thing: 'Inasmuch as', he says, 'I have by disobedience lost that robe of sanctity which I had from the Spirit, I do now acknowledge that I am deserving of a covering of this nature, which affords no pleasure, but which gnaws and frets the body.' And thus he would no doubt have retained this clothing for ever, thus humbling himself, if God, who is merciful, had not clothed them with garments of skin instead of fig-leaves.
> (*AH* 3.23.5)

The state of continence which Adam adopted after his act of disobedience is, according to Irenaeus, one which is self-imposed. Furthermore, it is one which Adam imposes on himself and his wife in his state of confusion, in which, having lost his natural and childlike mind, he is unworthy to approach and hold converse with God. As such, one might describe it as an adolescent reaction of the disobedient human to his new situation.[4] Yet it is also Adam's attempt to express repentance, to make amends and cover up

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[4] Cf. J. Behr, 'Irenaeus *AH* 3.23.5 and the Ascetic Ideal'; D. Minns, *Irenaeus*, p.64.

the mistake he made by conforming himself to what he supposed to be god-like. In *AH* 4.39.1, when describing why knowledge of both good and evil are necessary for the human in apostasy, Irenaeus explains that it is through repentance that we cast away disobedience, and return to hold more tenaciously to what is good, that is, life in obedience. In *AH* 3.23.5, the knowledge of evil is not referred to sexual activity, but to the transgression of the commandment, the refusal to acknowledge God as Lord. It is this transgression which results in the loss of the child-like mind and the 'lustful propensity of the flesh', and it is this which the confused Adam, mistaking the symptom for the cause, then tries to control or negate by adopting a state of continence, one which 'gnaws and frets the body'. In such a state of repentant but self-imposed continence, the human would not have been able to receive the growth and increase which God has set before him. Thus the economy of God, in this instance, is to replace these fig-leaves, the self-imposed continence, with the garments of skin. The Gnostics, according to Irenaeus, taught that the garments of skin, as the fleshly, sensible, element, were added last, as the most exterior level, in the formation of the human.[5] Irenaeus does not, himself, mention the garments of skin elsewhere in his writings, and it is difficult to ascertain exactly what he understood by them in *AH* 3.23.5. Two things, however, are clear: firstly, that it refers to the Adam and Eve's existence in apostasy, and secondly, that it is otherwise than the bridle of continence. God replaces their self-imposed continence with a garment suitable for life in apostasy, in which they can continue to live according to God's original plan of growth and increase.

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[5]Cf. *AH* 1.5.5. On the use of the 'garments of skin' by later patristic writers, see, P. Nellas, *Deification in Christ*, pp.43-91.

A similar theme is developed in Irenaeus' discussion of the relationship between the Law and the law of bondage. As God, in Christ, has granted the abrogation of the precepts of the law of bondage, and restored the human to the ancient law of liberty extended into one suitable for sons, Irenaeus is extremely critical of those who prefer to keep zealously to the precepts of the law of bondage while neglecting the rationale of those precepts, the salvation realized in the law of love. Irenaeus asserts that God has assigned everlasting perdition to those who, as he puts it, 'pretend that they do themselves observe more than what has been prescribed, as if preferring their own zeal to God Himself' (*AH* 4.11.4).

The same dialectic between the laws of bondage and the original Law, the freedom of which has been re-established in the New Covenent, is discussed in the *Didascalia Apostolorum*, probably composed in the early half of the third century. Those who have become disciples of Christ, 'through the Gospel yield to the Law and completely abstain from the second legislation'.[6] The author is extremely critical of those who then choose to keep to the practices of the second legislation:

> But if there be any who are scrupulous and desire, according to the second legislation, to keep the habits of nature and fluxes and intercourse, first let them know that, as we have already said, together with the second legislation they affirm the curse against our Saviour and condemn themselves vainly. And again, let them tell us, in what days or in what hours they observe to pray and to receive the Eucharist, or to reading the Scriptures - let them tell us whether they are devoid of the Holy Spirit. For through baptism they receive the Holy Spirit who is always with those that work righteousness and does not depart from them by reason of natural fluxes and the intercourse of marriage, but always perseveres with those who possess Him and keeps them.[7]

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[6] *Didascalia Apostolorum*, 26, p.237, trans. A. Vööbus.

[7] *Ibid.* 26, p.238.

The author is emphatic that neither the workings of the solitary body, such as menstrual fluxes and male 'fluxes' or 'issues'[8], nor conjugal intercourse, defile the cleansing effected by baptism and as such are not a reason to abstain from prayer, the Eucharist or the reading of Scripture.

A similar example of self-imposed continence is described in the 'Letter of the churches of Vienne and Lyons to the churches of Asia and Phrygia'. As a corrollary to remaining open and responsive to our Creator, Irenaeus, as we have repeatedly seen, exhorts us to enjoy His bounty and to use His gifts, the world which He has prepared for our nourishment and growth, with thankfulness. This was the very lesson that one confessor taught another:

> There was among them a certain Alcibiades, who was living a very austere life, and at first was not partaking of anything at all, but used merely bread and water and was trying to live thus even in the jail. But it was revealed to Attalus after the first contest which he underwent in the amphitheatre that Alcibiades was not doing well in not making use of the creations of God, and offering an example of offence to others. Alcibiades was persuaded and began to partake of everything without restraint and gave thanks to God; for they were not without help from the grace of God but the Holy Spirit was their counsellor.[9]

Alcibiades' action could have been deemed offensive if it was supposed to stem from a belief that the material world was tainted with evil. However, this was not the primary charge, which was, rather, that Alcibiades, by not using the material creation, was not doing well. The proper approach is not to impose restictions upon oneself, but, as he was taught by another confessor, both under the counsel of the Holy Spirit, to partake of everything without (self-imposed) restraint and give thanks to God.

Thus, if we are to grow and be fashioned by the creative activity of God,

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[8] Cf. *Ibid.* 26, p.242.

[9] Eusebius, *EH* 5.3.2-3, trans. K. Lake.

rather than hardening ourselves in self-imposed and self-determined continence, we must remain open to God and His blessings. But it is important to note that this required responsiveness is not merely passive nor docile. Just as we do not have any life other than that which we receive from partaking in the Spirit, through different modalities, so it is not through our own strength that we perform the works of God, but the Spirit itself is the stimulus, capable of working out its own suggestions, so manifesting the strength of God in the weakness of our flesh (cf. *AH* 5.9.2). The life and the strength are of the Spirit, but it is quite unambiguously the human, who is and remains free, that lives and works. Irenaeus, in *AH* 3.17.3, describes this relationship in terms of the parable of the good Samaritan (Lk. 10.29-37):

> Wherefore, we have need of the Dew of God, that we be not consumed by fire, nor be rendered unfruitful, and that where we have an accuser, there we may also have an Advocate, the Lord, commending to the Holy Spirit His own human, who had fallen among thieves, on whom He Himself had compassion, and bound up his wounds, giving two royal denarii, so that we, receiving by the Spirit the 'image and the superscription' (Mat. 22.20 etc.) of the Father and the Son, might fructify the denarium entrusted to us, counting out the increase to the Lord. (*AH* 3.17.3)

We can only be fruitful, multiplying what God has given us, through the Dew of God, the Spirit. But it is nevertheless humans, thus nourished, who act, fructifying what God has entrusted to them. Similarly, in another context Irenaeus writes:

> Wherefore, also, those who are in truth His disciples, receiving grace from Him, do in His name act for the benefit of others, according to the gift which each one has received from Him. (*AH* 2.32.4).

The gift which each one has received, is put into practice for the benefit of others, through the grace received. The grace thus received finds its natural expression within the horizon of the community, each using their particular gift for the welfare of all the others, rather than within the

restricted perspective of the individual's own 'spiritual' life or development.

It is also important to recall that living and acting by the strength of God is an expression of freedom. As God is the One who fashions us, and the source of our life, the more we remain in subjection to Him the greater will be our freedom as a living human being. True freedom, and the proper exercise of that freedom, is found in subjection to God, freely performing the works of the Spirit in the flesh. The only possible alternative to this, the only thing that we can do of ourselves, is to perform the works of the flesh, a slavery which leads to death. This opposition is described repeatedly by Irenaeus in *AH* 5 in terms of the Pauline opposition between the spiritual and the carnal:

> Those, then, who have the pledge of the Spirit, and who are not enslaved by the lusts of the flesh, but subject themselves to the Spirit and who walk in all things according to the reason, does the apostle properly call 'spiritual', because the Spirit of God dwells in them: for spiritual humans will not be incorporeal spirits, but our substance, that is, the union of the soul and flesh, receiving the Spirit of God, makes up the spiritual human. But those who reject the Spirit's counsel and are the slaves of fleshly lusts, and lead lives contrary to reason, and who, without restraint, plunge into their own desires, having no longing after the Divine Spirit, these humans does the apostle properly call 'carnal', because they have no thought of anything else except carnal things. (*AH* 5.8.2).

The opposition is not between works pertaining to the flesh and 'spiritual' deeds, for we live only in flesh, but between living in the flesh by the power of the Spirit, in obedience to the Spirit, and trying to live by the flesh alone. The first is the action of a truly free and spiritual person, the latter is merely carnal, a slave to the flesh and its desires, and as such mortal. Authentic liberty is only truly realized in subjection to God, a life, which is participation in God and the presence of the Spirit in us, lived by the human, with the strength of the Spirit overcoming the weakness

of the flesh, and so rendering us truly spiritual, a truly living human.

The passage from *AH* 4.39.2-3 cited above also emphasized that God does everything at the appropriate time, appropriate, that is, for the human who is being fashioned. The creative activity of God effects and matches the growth of the human. When speaking of growth, Irenaeus emphatically distanced himself from the idea of 'spiritual development' found in various representatives of Gnosticism, the idea that a 'divine seed' was deposited in the human as in a womb, to grow therein until it is ready for perfect gnosis.[10] Irenaeus does not even speak of humans as possessing a 'seed' of the Spirit which grows with them until they receive the fulness thereof[11]: the Spirit is an eschatological gift, typified in the breath and given as a pledge in adoption. Neither does Irenaeus speak of growth as 'becoming male'.[12] Virtue, for Irenaeus, does not have a merely human character, let alone a male character, and so he does not speak of the female becoming male in living a full Christian life. All virtue is of God, who deploys His strength in the weakness of human flesh, and is thus manifested in humans when they lead their lives in obedience to the Spirit, who alone makes them spiritual.

Irenaeus does not speak of the growth of the interior or spiritual

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[10] Cf. eg. *AH* 1.5.6.

[11] As Andia, *Homo vivens*, eg. p.336.

[12] As, for instance, *The Gospel according to Thomas*, Log. 114 (99.18-26): 'Simon Peter said to them: 'Let Mary go out from among us, because women are not worthy of the Life.' Jesus said: 'See, I shall lead her, so that I will make her male, that she too may become a living spirit, resembling you males. For every woman who makes herself male will enter the Kingdom of Heaven.' We will see this idea taken up by Clement of Alexandria in the next section, after which it becomes a standard theme in Christian literature.

dimensions of the human person.[13] From what we have seen, it is clear that Irenaeus is not interested in such interiority. Rather, when speaking of growth, Irenaeus, more simply and more realistically, focuses on the fashioning of the handiwork of God into a human being. And this activity and growth has a pattern and rhythm:

> By this order and such rhythms and such a movement the created and fashioned human becomes in the image and likeness of the uncreated God - the Father planning everything well and commanding, the Son executing and performing, and the Spirit nourishing and increasing, and the human making progress day by day and ascending towards perfection, that is, approaching the Uncreated One. For the Uncreated is perfect, and this is God.
> Now, it was first necessary for the human to be created;
> and having been created, to increase;
> and having increased, to become an adult;
> and having become an adult, to multiply;
> and having multiplied, to strengthen;
> and having strengthened, to be glorified;
> and being glorified, to see his Master:
> for God is He who is yet to be seen, and the vision of God produces incorruptibility, and incorruptibility renders one close to God (Wis. 6.19). (*AH* 4.38.3).

This is the rhythm and pattern which God has arranged for the growth of humans to their full perfection. It is obvious that this arrangement is that of the course of each human life. It is no less clear that its progression unfolds with the divine economy. Each human being, like the human race itself, comes into being as an infant, who must grow to adulthood, the age for procreation, and then strengthen into the fulness of human maturity, before passing into the glory and vision of God. As the economy has unfolded historically, this includes death, which is followed by the Kingdom of the Son upon earth, where we mature in the glory of the Son before everything is submitted to the Father.

One of the most noteworthy aspects of Irenaeus' historical sense of the

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[13] Cf. Wingren, *Man and the Incarnation*, pp.32-35.

unfolding of the economy is how it places a positive value upon our experience of evil and our own weakness, which ultimately concludes in death. Within the framework of the progression of each individual life, this same perspective demands that to become truly human we must fully engage ourselves in our concrete lives and situation. We learn by experience. We cannot simply abstain, through a self-imposed continence, from anything that carries with it a risk that we might become ensnared thereby in apostasy.[14] Irenaeus does not exalt a state of primal innocence, nor exhort us to recapture it through an evasive virginity, for, as the economy has unfolded, it is through a knowledge of good and evil, and the consequent rejection of evil, that we become like God (cf. Gen. 3.22).

A final point that must be noted is that as adopted sons in Christ we have received only a pledge of the Spirit, the fulness of the vivification and liberty is, for us, yet to come. We are still being prepared and accustomed to bear the Spirit in full authentic liberty. In *AH* 4.15.2, while discussing the dialectic between the ancient law of liberty and the new, extended, law of liberty, in which the laws of bondage are cancelled, Irenaeus makes an interesting reference to 1 Cor. 7, demonstrating the unity of intent between the original Law of God and the precepts issued by Moses, by referring to Mat. 19:

> [4] He answered, 'Have you not read that He who made them from the beginning made them male and female, [5] and said: "For this reason shall a man leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall be one flesh"? [6] So they are no longer two but

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[14] Cf. R. Berthouzoz: 'En conséquence, l'humanisation de l'homme demande un engagement de sa part, ce qui est évident à l'expérience, et comporte l'acceptation corrélative d'un risque, en particulier celui de se tromper. Par là se trouvent exclues l'éthique de l'abstention préventive, toute valorisation de l'innocence originelle et indifférenciée et, surtout, l'hétéronomie comme instance de conduite morale, adulte.' *Liberté et grâce*, p.236.

> one flesh. What therefore God has joined together, let no man put assunder.' [7] They said to Him, 'Why then did Moses command one to give a certificate of divorce, and to put her away?' [8] He said to them, 'For your hardness of heart Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so. [...]'[15]

Moses adapted the initial Law of God to the hardness of the Israelites' hearts that they might be trained, with what they could bear, and so turn from their disobedience towards obedience to God and His Law. Irenaeus continues by indicating the same phenomenon in the New Testament. According to Irenaeus, all the things that Paul wrote in 1 Cor. 7, not from the Lord, but 'by concession' or 'from himself', that is, his recommendations concerning virgins, and temporary abstinence from sexual activity to devote greater time to prayer, were written with regard to human weakness and incontinence. They were written lest those who could not as yet bear the freedom given in Christ should 'become hardened, and despairing of their salvation, should become apostates from God.'[16] Nevertheless Paul also states as a basic premise that which Christ affirmed was from the beginning: that, to prevent sexual immorality, it is good for each man to have his own wife, and each woman her husband, that each spouse rules over the other's body, and that each should give to the other their 'conjugal rights'.

The concessions that Paul makes in 1 Cor. 7 are precisely that: concessions. They are not interpreted by Irenaeus as an exhortation towards a 'higher way'. As Paul places these concessions within the context of the imminence of the Parousia, so also Irenaeus interprets these concessions as a

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[15] Mat. 19.4-8. Irenaeus in fact only cites v.7-8; I have also given Christ's initial statement, to explain what was from the beginning.

[16] AH 4.15.2: ' [...] in nouo testamento quaedam praecepta secundum ignoscentiam Apostoli concedentes inueniuntur propter quorundam incontinentiam, ut non obdurati tales in totum desperantes salutem suam apostatae fiant a Deo, [...].'

preparation for the full perfection and liberty which we have yet to receive. Although Christ has abrogated the laws of bondage, the human is still not ready to embrace fully the liberty which Christ has brought: those tempted to incontinence still need to be trained through such concessions, that they too may come to know the fullness of liberty in life granted by God to His adopted sons.

We can now see the significance of the eschatological dimension of Irenaeus' protological descriptions, reiterated by Christ Himself: 'He who made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said: "For this reason shall a man leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall be one flesh"'. Irenaeus' description of Adam and Eve 'kissing and embracing each other in holiness' (*Dem.* 14) is not simply a quaint mythological picture, but that towards which we are being trained: it does not refer to a protological innocence, but to our existence in Christ and the Law of love and freedom established by Him. This is something to which, due to our weakness and incontinence, salvific concessions still need to be made, whilst we are trained by the pledge of the Spirit. As such these concessions are not a true expression of the fulness of liberty granted by Christ.

Both Irenaeus' anthropology and asceticism are fundamentally theocentric and theophanic. Our very body is fashioned in the image of the Incarnate God, who, in 'the last times', has revealed both God and the truth of the human being to us, enabling us, through adoption, to be prepared by the pledge of the Spirit for the full vivification by the Spirit in the last times. Our life, from the first breath to the last vivification by the Spirit, is a participation in the very life of God, and this determines the outward

expression of our life, our asceticism. Rather than subjecting ourselves to a self-imposed continence, undertaken either to conform ourselves to what we might suppose to be pure, innocent, and god-like, or to avoid the demands that might arise from our passionate nature (*AH* 4.38.4) or the unpredictable events of life, we are to engage fully with the concrete circumstances of our life, for it is only through our experience, and ultimately through death, that we learn to hold ever more firmly to God. We are still being trained by the pledge of the Spirit, and by salvific concessions, for the fulness, realized by Christ, but which for us is yet to come: the fulness of the authentic liberty, realized in the full subjection to God, enabling the direct vivification of the human, in the totality of their God-given, fleshly and sexual existence, by the Spirit. This will be the truly living human - the glory of God.

Part Two

St. Clement of Alexandria:

Tiptoeing on the Earth

1: Introduction

Clement of Alexandria intentionally, and perhaps unintentionally, equalled the apostle's claim of being all things to all people: intentionally, in that his surviving writings are addressed to pagans, to the recently reborn children of Christianity, and to the mature Christian Gnostics, in a dialogue with Greek philosophy and a confrontation with heretical (or falsely-called) Gnosticism, whilst attempting to establish, for the first time, a comprehensive treatment of Christian theology; unintentionally, in that contemporary research has portrayed Clement as everything from a 'pure' Christian who, from evangelical motives, veils his true thought in philosophical language, to a thinker whose thought is no more than the fusion of the Jewish-Alexandrine tradition, the Platonic tradition and Gnosticism, the only Christian element stemming from Christian Gnosticism.[1]

The vexed Athens/Jerusalem question has to a certain extent been superseded by the more productive investigation of specific problems and themes raised within Clement's own work.[2] Yet, even within narrowly defined terms, his theological position is problematic and there remains in modern scholarship a lack of consensus. This is undoubtedly due to the peculiar character of Clement's work itself. According to Jerome, he was the most learned of all the fathers.[3] His work abounds in a plethora of quotations and parallels, which he used to show how Christianity summed up all that was best in earlier traditions. Clement was a complex and subtle thinker, yet he was in

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[1] For the most comprehensive representative of the first stance, see, W. Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus*, and for the latter, S. R. C. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism*.

[2] Cf. E. Osborn, 'Clement of Alexandria: A Review of Recent Research, 1958-1982.'

[3] *Ep.* 70.4: 'omnium eruditissimus'.

no sense systematic, especially in his terminology. Indeed, in the *Stromateis* he deliberately aims to be obscure, 'to speak imperceptibly, to exhibit secretly and demonstrate silently,'[4] both to avoid divulging the mysteries of theology to those who are not prepared to receive them and to sweeten the delicacies of theology with the effort of application.[5] We must, therefore, pay careful attention not only to his overt assertions, but also to the movement of his thought, with its tensions and apparent inconsistencies.

With regard to asceticism, Clement raises themes which prefigure much of the later developments in monastic spirituality: he speaks extensively about inner peace, perpetual inward prayer, contemplation, apatheia and detachment; he touches upon spiritual fatherhood, on the possibility of a second baptism of tears, on being a true presbyter and deacon without receiving ordination from men, and is perhaps the first to speak of the Christian as living in the city 'as in the desert'.[6] Yet his asceticism is not simply directed at a retreat from the world into the desert. Indeed, writing before the desert became a city, Clement advises socially responsible Christians, both married and single, how to direct their worldly affairs in a decorous manner according to God.[7] Furthermore, his works abound in affirmative statements about the beauty of the world, and the need to use its pleasures thankfully and respectfully. This strain in his work

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[4] *Strom.* 1.1.15.1; cf. *Strom.* 7.17.110.4-111.3.

[5] Cf. *Strom.* 1.2.21.1.

[6] Most of these themes can be found scattered throughout Clement's works: more specifically, for perpetual inward prayer, see esp. *Strom.* 7.7.39.6-40.3; contemplation, esp. *Strom.* 5.6.40.1; spiritual fatherhood, *QDS* 41.1; baptism of tears, *QDS* 42.14; unordained ordination, *Strom.* 6.13.106.2; living 'as in a desert', *Strom.* 7.12.77.3.

[7] *Paed.* 3.11.78.3: [...] τὰ ἐν κόσμῳ κοσμίως κατὰ Θεὸν, [...].

has, since the study of Tollinton, earned him the title of the Christian Liberal or Humanist. Yet, whilst these two tendencies in Clement are not localized in different works aimed at different audiences, the simple faithful on the one hand and the mature Christian Gnostic on the other, neither are they fully reconciled with each other. The constant oscillation between an attidude of openness towards the world and a rigorous demand for detachment can only find its resolution in the person of Clement and the task he set himelf. He was, in the words of Wagner, a 'Verteidiger der Welt und Prediger der Weltflucht in einer Person.'[8]

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[8] W. Wagner, *Der Christ und die Welt nach Clemens von Alexandrien: Ein noch unveraltetes Problem in altchristlicher Beleuchtung*, p.78.

2: Anthropology

Before looking at Clement's description of Christian life, the character of asceticism involved in the growth from faith to γνῶσις, and its relation to the sexual being of the human being, it will be useful to consider his description of Adam and Eve, their life in Paradise, and their Fall, together with his general anthropological framework.[1] Although Clement does not develop any sustained treatment on Adam and the character of his prelapsarian life, his comments will help us to understand the fundamental orientation of his anthropology. In common with Theophilus and Irenaeus, Clement represents Adam and Eve as children together in Paradise.[2] As a child of God, Adam played freely in Paradise, and, by reason of his simplicity, he was free from passions and their pleasures.[3] According to Clement, Adam enjoyed an immortal life in Paradise.[4] The human is a 'heavenly plant', constituted by nature so as to have fellowship with God.[5] Clement speaks of 'the innate original communion between humans and heaven,' obscured through ignorance, but which now shines clearly again.[6] There is no natural or ontological kinship between God and the human, but they are

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[1] Clement's thought on Adam is the subject of a monograph by T. Rüther, *Die Lehre von der Erbsunde bei Klemens von Alexandrien*, which is useful for the details it accumulates, but is somewhat anachronistic in its perspective, eg. pp.135-136.

[2] Cf. *Prot.* 11.111.1; *Strom.* 3.17.103.1.

[3] *Prot.* 11.111.1: ὁ πρῶτος ὅτε ἐν παραδείσῳ ἔπαιζε λελυμένος, ἔτι παιδίον ἦν τοῦ Θεοῦ· ὅτε δὲ ὑποπίπτων ἡδονῇ [...] παρήγετο ἐπιθυμίαις, [...] ὁ δι' ἁπλότητα λελυμένος ἄνθρωπος ἁμαρτίαις εὑρέθη δεδεμένος. Cf. *Strom.* 7.7.46.6, where some angels are described as remaining fallen due to their propensity for duplicity.

[4] Cf. *Strom.* 2.19.98.4, where Adam is described as having exchanged an immortal life for a mortal one.

[5] *Prot.* 10.100.2-3. The image of φυτὸν οὐράνιον is from Plato, *Tim.* 90a.

[6] *Prot.* 2.25.3: ἦν δέ τίς ἔμφυτος ἀρχαία πρὸς οὐρανὸν ἀνθρώποις κοινωνία, [...]. Tatian had also spoken of an ἀρχαία συγγένεια, which it is now possible to restore, cf. *Oratio ad Graecos*, 20.3.

dear to God as, unlike the other works of creation, the human is the work of His own hands.[7] More than this, however, God breathed into the human what was peculiar to Himself, and this works as a 'love charm'.[8]

Although perfect as regards his formation, as a child Adam still needed to grow in order to become an adult:

> We say that Adam was perfect as regards his formation, for he lacked none of the things characterizing the idea and the form of the human; coming into being he received perfection and he was justified by obedience, and this was becoming an adult, which depended on him.[9]

Thus Clement can answer the predicament posed by the Gnostics, when they ask whether God created Adam perfect or imperfect:

> They shall hear from us that he was not perfect in his creation, but adapted for the acquisition of virtue, for it is of great importance in regard to virtue to be made fit for its attainment, and it is intended that we should be saved of ourselves.[10]

This stress on the 'perfect imperfection' of the child Adam, the created human, and the need for growth as an active obedience in freedom to realize the fullness of the human potential, the human's 'salvation', is Clement's response to the Gnostic's ontological differentiation of the human race into two distinct groups. Whilst the human, considered generically, is perfectly formed for the acquisition of virtue and full perfection, the responsibility

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[7] Cf. *Paed.* 1.3.7.1; *Strom.* 2.2.5.4-6.3, 16.74.1-75.3.

[8] *Paed.* 1.3.7.3: τὸ φίλτρον. Cf. *Strom.* 5.13.87.4, 88.3.

[9] *Strom.* 4.23.150.3-4: ἢ καὶ τὸν Ἀδὰμ τέλειον μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὴν πλάσιν γεγονέναι φαμέν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν χαρακτηριζόντων τὴν ἀνθρώπου ἰδέαν τε καὶ μορφὴν ἐνεδέησεν αὐτῷ. ὃ δὲ ἐν τῷ γίνεσθαι τὴν τελείωσιν ἐλάμβανεν καὶ δι' ὑπακοῆς ἐδικαιοῦτο, τοῦτο ἦν ἀπανδρούμενον τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῷ κείμενον·

[10] *Strom.* 6.12.96.2: ἀκούσονται γὰρ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ὅτι τέλειος κατὰ τὴν κατασκευὴν οὐκ ἐγένετο, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἀναδέξασθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτήδειος· διαφέρει γὰρ δή που ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν γεγονέναι ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτῆς· ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βούλεται σῴζεσθαι. For the human as created for the acquisition of virtue, see *Strom.* 1.6.34.1-4; 6.11.95.5, 12.96.3; 7.3.19.3.

for this fulfillment lies with each person individually: their individual character being determined by the impression that their choices make on their soul.[11]

In his descriptions of the constitution of the human, Clement's statements vary considerably, using different schemas, Biblical, Platonic and Stoic, in different contexts.[12] In one of the most important descriptions, Clement, allegorizing the Decalogue, begins in a Stoic fashion, perhaps following Philo, by differentiating the twofold spirit in the human, the ἡγεμονικόν and the ὑποκείμενον, corresponding to the two tablets of the law.[13] Clement then goes on to analyze the human in terms of a decad corresponding to the Decalogue:

> And there is a ten in humans themselves: the five senses, and the power of speech, and that of reproduction, and the eighth is the spiritual principle received at their creation and the ninth is the ἡγεμονικόν of their soul; and tenth, there is the distinctive characteristic of the Holy Spirit, which comes to them through faith.[14]

Clement goes on to specify that the rational and ruling power is the cause of the constitution of the human, animating and incorporating the irrational.[15] The vital energy (ἡ ζωτική δύναμις), the power of nutrition,

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[11] Cf. *Strom.* 4.23.150.2: Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄνθρωπος ἁπλῶς οὕτως κατ᾽ ἰδέαν πλάσσεται τοῦ συμφυοῦς πνεύματος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνείδος οὐδ᾽ ἀσχημάτιστος ἐν τῷ τῆς φύσεως ἐργαστηρίῳ δημιουργεῖται, ἔνθα μυστικῶς ἀνθρώπου ἐκτελεῖται γένεσις, κοινῆς οὔσης καὶ τῆς τέχνης καὶ τῆς οὐσίας, ὁ δέ τις ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τύπωσιν τὴν ἐγγινομένην τῇ ψυχῇ ὧν ἂν αἱρήσηται χαρακτηρίζεται.

[12] Cf. M. Spanneut, *Le Stoïcisme et les Pères de l'Église de Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie*, pp.166-176.

[13] *Strom.* 6.16.134.1-2. Cf. Philo, *Quis rer. div. her.* 25.167.

[14] *Strom.* 6.16.134.2: ἔστι δὲ καὶ δεκάς τις περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτόν, τά τε αἰσθητήρια πέντε καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ σπερματικὸν καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ὄγδοον τὸ κατὰ τὴν πλάσιν πνευματικόν, ἔνατον δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ δέκατον τὸ διὰ τῆς πίστεως προσγινόμενον ἁγίου πνεύματος χαρακτηριστικὸν ἰδίωμα.

[15] *Strom.* 6.16.135.2: τὸ λογιστικὸν τοίνυν καὶ ἡγεμονικὸν αἴτιον εἶναί

growth and motion, is assigned to the carnal spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ σαρκικόν), while the power of choice (ἡ προαιρετική δύναμις), the ability to investigate, to study and to know, belongs to the ἡγεμονικόν.[16] All the faculties are, in the final analysis, placed in a Platonic hierarchical relation to the ἡγεμονικόν, and it is through this that the human lives, and has, moreover, the ability to live in a particular way.[17] This close affinity between the ἡγεμονικόν and the power of choice is emphasized by Clement in a different passage, where he maintains that the determining element in man's constitution is volition.[18] Echoing Christ's recurring question, Clement writes:

> Volition takes precedence over all, for the intellectual powers are the servants of the will. 'Will' it is said, 'and thou shalt be able.'[19]

The emphasis on freedom as the determinative aspect in the constitution of the human is distinctive to Clement and it determines, as we shall see, his discussion of Christian life and asceticism.

The specific manner of life that Clement has in mind is living in obedience to the divine Logos, which, for Clement, is identical to living according to

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φαμεν τῆς συστάσεως τῷ ζῷῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ τὸ ἄλογον μέρος ἐψυχῶσθαι τε καὶ μόριον αὐτῆς εἶναι.

[16] *Strom.* 6.16.135.3-4: αὐτίκα τὴν μὲν ζωτικὴν δύναμιν, ᾗ ἐμπεριέχεται τὸ θρεπτικόν τε καὶ αὐξητικὸν καὶ καθ' ὅλου κινητικόν, τὸ πνεῦμα εἴληχεν τὸ σαρκικόν, ὀξυκίνητον ὂν καὶ πάντῃ διά τε τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τοῦ λοιποῦ σώματος πορευόμενόν τε καὶ πρωτοπαθοῦν διὰ σώματος· τὴν προαιρετικὴν δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχει δύναμιν, περὶ ἣν ἡ ζήτησις καὶ ἡ μάθησις καὶ ἡ γνῶσις.

[17] *Strom.* 6.16.135.4: ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ πάντων ἀναφορὰ εἰς ἓν συντέτακται τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνο ζῇ τε ὁ ἄνθρωπος καί πῶς ζῇ.

[18] Cf. M. Müller: 'Clemens fordert mit neuer, bisher unerhörter Schärfe den alten Sinn der Willensfreiheit.' 'Freiheit: Uber Autonomie und Gnade von Paulus bis Clemens von Alexandrien', p.218.

[19] *Strom.* 2.17.77.5: προηγεῖται τοίνυν πάντων τὸ βούλεσθαι· αἱ γὰρ λογικαὶ δυνάμεις τοῦ βούλεσθαι διάκονοι πεφύκασι· >θέλε< φησί, >καὶ δυνήσῃ<. Stählin suggests the reference is to John 5.6.

nature. Clement explicitly points to the similarity of his position to that of the Stoic doctrine of living according to nature, in which the term 'nature' has been impiously substituted for the term 'God'.[20] He describes an anthropocentric universe, in which 'whatever in human actions is right and regular is the result of the inspiration of its rectitude and order', a description similar to that of Philo.[21]

In *Strom.* 6.16.134.2 the Holy Spirit is counted as an element in the constitution of the human. Elsewhere, similarly analyzing the human into a decad, Clement enumerates the body, the soul, the five senses, the power of speech, the reproductive and the intellectual or spiritual faculties: the body has replaced the Holy Spirit as a constitutive element of the human.[22] This emphasizes the fact, mentioned in *Strom.* 6.16.134.2, that the Holy Spirit is an addition *by faith* to the created, 'natural' human.[23] This is further stressed by Clement when he distinguishes the possession of the Spirit from the divine breath breathed into humans at their creation. According to Clement, 'the human is far from destitute of a divine idea, who, it is written in Genesis, received of the inspiration, partaking of a

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[20] *Strom.* 2.19.101.1: ἐντεῦθεν καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν τέλος εἶναι ἐδογμάτισαν, τὸν Θεὸν εἰς φύσιν μετονομάσαντες ἀπρεπῶς, [...]. For the Stoic background of Clement's thought on this point, cf. M. Pohlenz, 'Klemens von Alexandrien und sein hellenisches Christentum'. However, the more direct influence is likely to be Philo, who, in *De Migr. Abr.* 23.128, for example, identifies the philosophical definition of 'living according to nature' with following after God (referring to Gen. 12.4). Cf. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, pp.92-94.

[21] *Paed.* 1.2.6.6: [...] περὶ δὲ τὰς πράξεις τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος τό τε ἐν αὐταῖς κατορθοῦν καὶ τὸ εὔτακτον ἐνέπνευσεν τὸ αὐτῆς. Cf. Philo, *Opif. Mund.* 1.3.

[22] *Strom.* 2.11.50.4.

[23] For an extensive discussion on role of 'S/spirit' in Clement's anthropology, see, L. F. Ladaria, *El espíritu en Clemente Alejandrino: Estudio teológico-antropológico*, pp.113-247.

substance purer than that of other creatures.'[24] The 'breath' here refers to the λογικὴ ψυχή or the ἡγεμονικόν breathed by God into the human's earthly formation, which differentiates the human from other creatures.[25] Clement then continues, distancing himself from the Greek philoshopical tradition, by distinguishing this divine portion from the gift of the Holy Spirit granted to believers:

> Hence the Pythagoreans say that the mind comes to the human as a divine portion, as Plato and Aristotle also agree; but we say that Holy Spirit is additionally breathed into the believer.[26]

Clement asserts that the Spirit is not present in us as a 'part' of God, but does not specify the mode of this relationship, promising instead to develop this theme in other works.[27] For Clement, therefore, unlike Irenaeus, the human does not 'possess' the Holy Spirit from the beginning; this belongs, rather, to the mature believers, perfected, 'justified by obedience' (*Strom.* 4.23.150.4) and 'saved of themselves' (*Strom.* 6.12.96.2). Such a gift is different from the νοῦς breathed into the human by God at the creation, a possession common to all human beings and itself divine. It seems from the passages cited above, that possession of the Spirit would follow, in due course, for humans on their attainment of full perfection or maturity.

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[24] *Strom.* 5.13.87.4: πολλοῦ γε δεῖ ἄμοιρον εἶναι θείας ἐννοίας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὅς γε καὶ τοῦ ἐμφυσήματος ἐν τῇ γενέσει μεταλαβεῖν ἀναγέγραπται, καθαρωτέρας οὐσίας παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετασχών.

[25] Cf. *Strom.* 5.14.94.3-4: εἰκότως ἄρα ἐκ γῆς μὲν τὸ σῶμα διαπλάττεσθαι λέγει ὁ Μωυσῆς, ὃ γήινόν φησιν ὁ Πλάτων σκῆνος, ψυχὴν δὲ τὴν λογικὴν ἄνωθεν ἐμπνευσθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς πρόσωπον. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἱδρῦσθαι λέγουσι, [...].

[26] *Strom.* 5.13.88.1-2: ἐντεῦθεν οἱ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν θείᾳ μοίρᾳ τὸν νοῦν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἥκειν φασί, καθάπερ Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὁμολογοῦσιν. ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς μὲν τῷ πεπιστευκότι προσεπιπνεῖσθαι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμά φαμεν, [...].

[27] *Strom.* 5.13.88.3-4: ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς μέρος Θεοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα. The other works are *On prophecy* and *On the Soul*, of which only fragments remain.

Although Clement does not refer to the words of Genesis, that the human was made in the image and likeness of God (1.26-27), in connection with his comments on Adam, it is this declaration that is the guiding motif for Clement's anthropology , and it is in his use of these words, εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις, that Clement's vocabulary is especially unstable.[28] Clement uses these terms with different meanings on different occasions. For instance, εἰκών by itself may denote humans in their perfection, their complete assimilation to God: thus, 'the perfect inheritance belongs to those who attain to a "perfect man", according to the image of the Lord.'[29] When it is used by itself, however, εἰκών most frequently has a strongly Philonic sense. In a polemic against the pagan cult of images in chapter 10 of the *Protrepticus*, Clement carefully defines what he means by εἰκών:

> The image of God is His Word, the genuine Son of Mind, the Divine Word, the archetypal light of light; and the image of the Word is the true human, the mind which is in the human, who is therefore said to have been made 'in the image and likeness of God', assimilated to the Divine Word in the affections of the heart and therefore rational.[30]

Here εἰκών specifically refers to the humans' resemblance to God by virtue of their rational character, the νοῦς, which is then conversely used as the definition of the essential nature of the human.[31] Here Clement is especially close to Philo, for whom the Logos is the true image of God and

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[28] Cf. A. Mayer, *Das Gottesbild im Menschen nach Clemens von Alexandrien*, which remains the best treatment of this subject.

[29] *Strom.* 6.14.114.4.

[30] *Prot.* 10.98.4: >εἰκὼν< μὲν γὰρ >τοῦ Θεοῦ< ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ (καὶ υἱὸς τοῦ νοῦ γνήσιος ὁ θεῖος λόγος, φωτὸς ἀρχέτυπον φῶς), εἰκὼν δὲ τοῦ λόγου ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἀληθινός, ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁ >κατ' εἰκόνα< τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ >καθ' ὁμοίωσιν< διὰ τοῦτο γεγενῆσθαι λεγόμενος, τῇ κατὰ καρδίαν φρονήσει τῷ θείῳ παρεικαζόμενος λόγῳ καὶ ταύτῃ λογικός.

[31] Cf. *Strom.* 6.9.72.2: νοερὸς γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ, καθ' ὃ ὁ τοῦ νοῦ εἰκονισμὸς ὁρᾶται ἐν μόνῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ᾗ καὶ θεοειδὴς καὶ θεοείκελος ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὅ τε αὖ Θεὸς ἀνθρωποειδής· τὸ γὰρ εἶδος ἑκάστου ὁ νοῦς, ᾧ χαρακτηριζόμεθα.

also the archetype for the true man, the νοῦς, which is thus the image of the image.[32] Clement also speaks quite distinctly of the Christian Gnostic as being a 'third image made as far as possible like the second cause'[33], and on one occasion he even extends the Platonic-Philonic perspective of the earthly reflecting its intellectual archetype to include the whole of creation.[34] It is important to note, however, that Clement's use of the word εἰκών in this sense does not denote a static, ontological given which itself makes the human the image of God, it refers rather to a way of viewing the human, which at the same time requires assimilation to the Divine Word 'in the affections of the heart' (τῇ κατὰ καρδίαν φρονήσει). This essentially modifies the meaning of the word νοῦς: rather than being the rational faculty of the human, as in the Platonic tradition, νοῦς, at least in this context, is now used as a term to describe the whole human, considered in his or her relation to the Divine Word. Hence Clement can explain the Scriptural saying that the human was made 'in the image and likeness' thus: 'For the image of God is the divine and royal Word, the impassible Human; and the image of the image is the human νοῦς.'[35] As the human νοῦς has for its archetype the ἄνθρωπος ἀπαθής, the word νοῦς refers to the whole human, rather than just their intellectual capacities, whilst the image relation has an ethical dimension, demanding ἀπάθεια, a divine

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[32] Cf. *Quis rer. div. her.* 48.231: ὥστε τὸν καθ' ἕκαστον ἡμῶν νοῦν, ὅς δὴ κυρίως καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, τρίτον εἶναι τύπον ἀπὸ τοῦ πεποιηκότος, τὸν δὲ μέσον παράδειγμα μὲν τούτου, ἀπεικόνισμα δὲ ἐκείνου.

[33] *Strom.* 7.3.16.6: [...] ὡς εἶναι τρίτην ἤδη τὴν θείαν εἰκόνα τὴν ὅση δύναμις ἔξομοιουμένην πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον αἴτιον, [...]. Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 10.597e.

[34] Cf. *Strom.* 5.14.93.4-94.4.

[35] *Strom.* 5.14.94.5: εἰκὼν μὲν γὰρ Θεοῦ λόγος θεῖος καὶ βασιλικός, ἄνθρωπος ἀπαθής, εἰκὼν δ' εἰκόνος ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς.

property, for the human to be fully the image of God.[36]

Whilst the term νοῦς is used to refer to the whole human in their existence as the image, Clement is nevertheless quite definite that the scope of the image does not extend to the body: 'For conformity with the image and likeness is not meant of the body (for it were wrong for what is mortal to be made like what is immortal), [...]'.[37] As the debate with Cassian in the third book of the *Stromateis* shows, Clement by no means disparages the body. He often speaks of the body and the flesh as being sanctified, clothed in immortality, and even itself receiving the Holy Spirit.[38] Yet, whilst the body, by virtue of the Incarnation, becomes σύμμορφον τοῦ κυρίου, it essentially remains outside Clement's theology of the image.[39]

It is, however, the use of the term εἰκών in conjunction with ὁμοίωσις that reveals the dynamic of Clement's anthropology. When they are so used, εἰκών refers either to the final state of likeness to God, as described above, or to the basic starting point for humans, their created nature, whilst ὁμοίωσις refers to the final perfected likeness of the Christians to God and

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[36] Cf. A. Mayer, 'Geist (νοῦς) besagt nämlich für Clemens nicht nur das Denkvermögen als solches, sondern begreift auch "ethische" Vollkommenheit in sich, sofern er seiner Idee nach frei von jeder Leidenshaft (ἀπαθής) ist, und diese Freiheit (ἀπάθεια) gilt ja als eigentlich göttliche Eigenschaft.' *Op. cit.* p.25.

[37] *Strom.* 2.19.102.6. Cf. *Strom.* 6.14.114.4, 16.136.3.

[38] Cf. *Paed.* 1.9.84.3; 2.2.20.1; 3.1.2.3; *Strom.* 4.26.163.2: ὅθεν ἐπιδεκτικὸν γίνεται τῆς τιμιωτάτης τῷ θεῷ ψυχῆς τὸ οἰκητήριον τοῦτο καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου κατὰ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος ἁγιασμὸν καταξιοῦται τῷ τοῦ σωτῆρος καταρτιστμῷ τελειούμενον.

[39] *Paed.* 3.3.20.5. Marrou, 'Introduction' to the *Sources Chrétiennes* edition of the *Paedagogus*, pp.37-38, enthusiastically overvalues this passage; the reference is probably to Rom. 8.29, and not Gen. 1.26. Cf. Mayer, *op. cit.* p.22.

includes the dynamic process by which they attain this end.[40] Clement explicitly identifies the Biblical basis of this dynamic process, that of 'following God' (eg. Deut. 13.4), with the Platonic idea of assimilation (*Theat.*176ab) and the Stoic idea of living according to nature.[41] Clement's clearest statement of the relation between εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις is given in the first book of the *Paedagogus*:

> It seems to me that He Himself formed the humans of the dust, and regenerated them by water; and made them grow by His Spirit; and trained them by His Word to adoption and salvation, directing them by sacred precepts; in order that, progressively transforming the earth-born human into a holy and heavenly being, He might fulfil to the utmost that divine utterance 'Let us make the human in our own image and likeness'. And in truth Christ became the perfect realization of what God spoke, and the other human is only in the image.[42]

Christ is thus the first and perfect realization of Gen.1.26, and opens the way, through rebirth and adoption, by the gift of the Spirit, and training under sacred precepts for all humans to acquire perfection and full likeness to God. Here, as we saw earlier when discussing the constitution of the

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[40]Clement refers this distinction between εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις to an earlier unnamed Christian writer: 'For is it not thus understood that some of our writers have understood that man straightway on his creation received what is 'according to the image', but that what is 'according to the likeness' he will receive afterwards on his perfection?' *Strom.* 2.22.131.6. Irenaeus also distinguished between the two terms, although in a very different manner to Clement, so that if there is a relationship between them, it would seem to be grounded in their common struggle against the Gnostics and the distinction they made between the 'image' and the 'likeness'. Cf. Irenaeus *AH* 1.5.5 (referring to the Valentinians); Clement *Exc. Th.* 54.2.

[41]Cf. esp. *Strom.* 2.19.100.3, 22.131.2-136.6; 5.14.94.5-96.3. For a discussion of the Platonic background of Clement's thought on this point, see H. Merki, Ὁμοίωσις θεῷ : *Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa*, pp.45-60.

[42]*Paed.* 1.12.98.2-3: καί μοι δοκεῖ αὐτὸς οὗτος πλάσαι μὲν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ χοός, ἀναγεννῆσαι δὲ ὕδατι, αὐξῆσαι δὲ πνεύματι, παιδαγωγῆσαι δὲ ῥήματι, εἰς υἱοθεσίαν καὶ σωτηρίαν ἁγίαις ἐντολαῖς κατευθύνων, ἵνα δὴ τὸν γηγενῆ εἰς ἅγιον καὶ ἐπουράνιον μεταπλάσας ἐκ προσβάσεως ἄνθρωπον, ἐκείνην τὴν θεϊκὴν μάλιστα πληρώσῃ φωνήν· >ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν ἡμῶν.< καὶ δὴ γέγονεν ὁ Χριστὸς τοῦτο πλῆρες, ὅπερ εἴρηκεν ὁ Θεός, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μόνην νοεῖται τὴν εἰκόνα.

human, possession of the Spirit is the fulfillment and perfection of the human as human. But rather than being considered as a possession which follows naturally when the human reaches maturity, possession of the Spirit is now clearly seen as a gift consequent upon the Incarnation of Christ and the human's subsequent rebirth and adoption.[43] Clement now also speaks of this maturation as a transformation of the 'earth-born human' into a 'holy and heavenly being.'

As we have seen, although he describes Adam as perfectly created for growth towards full perfection, Clement does not connect this dynamic to the process of developing the image into the likeness. Clement does not speculate whether Adam was only 'in the image', nor whether he had the capability, of himself, to become the likeness. It is important, however, to note that in *Paed.* 1.12.98.2-3 there are two aspects at work: the gift of the Spirit and the regeneration by water, and, corresponding to both of these, the reciprocal action of the human, guided and trained by the Word. Whilst in his original state Adam was perfectly adapted for the increase of virtue and the acquisition of the Holy Spirit, the misuse of his freedom made this impossible. The Fall thus intervenes in what should have been the natural development of the human from his original created state to his perfection in the possession of the Spirit, making the historical economy of Christ a necessity. The gift of the Spirit is now intimately connected with regeneration in Christ, but whilst it is not to be separated from such regeneration, it is, in itself, distinct from it, in that possession of the Spirit was within the scope of Adam as he was first created. Thus, it would seem, that 'likeness' is granted to the human only through rebirth, made

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[43] Cf. Mayer, *op. cit.* pp.18-21; Ladaria, *op. cit.* pp.167-221.

possible by the economy of Christ, whether Adam had fallen or not. This suggests that, for Clement, Christ's Incarnation is not solely determined by the Fall.

Although Clement seldom discusses the Fall, his work is dominated by the problems caused as a result of the Fall: human weakness in the exercise of virtue and their ignorance of truth, and the corresponding demand for education and training. It is, however, in his discussion of the Fall, that Clement describes the relationship between Adam and Eve prior to the Fall. In the third book of the *Stromateis* Clement is concerned to counter the Gnostic views which would connect the institution of marriage to the Fall. Clement is quite unambiguous about the prelapsarian state of Adam and Eve and the scope of their relationship:

> And if the serpent took the use of intercourse from the irrational animals and persuaded Adam to agree to have sexual union with Eve, as though the couple first created did not have such union by nature, as some think, this again is blasphemy against creation; for it makes human nature weaker than that of brute beasts if in this matter those who were first created by God copied them.[44]

Such union was, therefore, natural to Adam and Eve. However, the sexual interpretation of the Fall common to both his Gnostic opponents and to Philo also had its influence on Clement.[45] All action is prompted by knowledge and impulse, and contrary to these are weakness and ignorance.[46] Adam, as a child, was vulnerable on both accounts:

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[44] *Strom.* 3.17.102.4: κἂν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν τῆς συνουσίας ὁ ὄφις εἰληφὼς καὶ παραπείσας τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τῆς Εὔας συγκαταθέσθαι τὸν Ἀδὰμ τύχῃ, ὡς ἂν μὴ φύσει ταύτῃ κεχρημένων τῶν πρωτοπλάστων, ὡς ἀξιοῦσί τινες, ἡ κτίσις πάλιν βλασφημεῖται [...].

[45] For Philo, see *Opif. Mund.* 53.151-2.

[46] Cf. esp. *Strom.* 6.8.69; 7.16.101.6-7. The idea of weakness and ignorance as the root of sin has a diverse background: it is found in Plato (*Laws* 9.863cd); Aristotle (*Nich. Eth.* 5.8.6-7, 1135b.12-19); Chrysippus (*SVF* 3.256, p.60.28-33); and Philo (*Ebr.* 2.6).

> But if nature led them, like the irrational animals, to procreation, yet they were impelled to do it earlier than was proper because they were still young and had been led away by deceit.[47]

Clement thus pictures the fall of Adam as consisting in an immature exercise of sexual activity. The idea of the 'right time', the proper καίρος, for sexual activity, both on the horizon of the individual's life and within that of the day, was a dominating determinant in the cultural mores of the time and also appears in Clement's own description of the right place and time for sexual activity.[48] It seems that Clement was convinced that the Fall must have had some connection with sexual activity, but, not wanting to locate the misdeed in sexual activity itself, he had recourse to current assumptions about the 'right time' for an explanation which would safeguard both the naturalness of sexual activity and the link between such activity and the Fall.

Clement occasionally describes Eve as being tempted by the serpent, but does not suggest that it was Eve who led Adam into sexual activity.[49] Clement describes the incentive for the transgression in this way:

> [...] the first formed of our [race] anticipated the time, and desiring the favour of marriage before the proper hour fell into sin [...] not waiting for the time of God's will.[50]

It was the desire for the χάρις τοῦ γάμου that tempted Adam to anticipate the proper time ordained by God. Clement does not explain what he means by this χάρις. It seems doubtful, given Clement's strong insistence that

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[47] *Strom.* 3.17.103.1: εἰ δὲ ἡ μὲν φύσις ἦγεν αὐτοὺς ὡς καὶ τὰ ἄλογα πρὸς παιδοποιίαν, ἐκινήθησαν δὲ θᾶττον ἢ προσῆκον ἦν ἔτι νέοι πεφυκότες ἀπάτῃ παραχθέντες, [...].

[48] For a discussion of the idea of the 'right time' for sexual activity, see M. Foucault, *Le Souci de soi*, esp. pp.147-156 (Eng. trans. pp.124-132).

[49] Cf. *Prot.* 1.7.6, 2.12.2; *Paed.* 2.12.123.3.

[50] *Strom.* 3.14.94.3: [...] προλαβόντος ἡμῶν τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ πρωτοπλάστου καὶ πρὸ ὥρας τῆς τοῦ γάμου χάριτος ὀρεχθέντος καὶ διαμαρτόντος, [...] οὐκ ἀναμείνας τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ θελήματος.

sexual union should take place only for the sake of procreation,[51] to conclude from this passage, as Floyd does, that Adam and Eve were already enjoying sexual activity and that the serpent tempted the first parents with the joys of having a family.[52] It would appear more likely that this χάρις τοῦ γάμου is a euphemistic expression for Clement's opinion which we have already seen, that is, that it was the immature desire for sexual activity which both prompted and, in its enactment, constituted the Fall (*Strom.* 3.17.103.1).

This act effected a radical transformation both in the relation between the human and God and also in the human's own existence. As obedience had characterized Adam's original state of fellowship with God, so disobedience meant estrangement from God.[53] Consequent upon this is death, the mortal life which Adam exchanged for his immortal one.[54] For Clement, the overriding meaning of death is the state of the soul separated from the truth and its communion with the body in a state of sin and ignorance.[55]

It is, however, in his interpretation of the Lord's answer to Salome's question, given in the Gospel according to the Egyptians, 'Until when shall

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[51] Eg. *Paed.* 2.10.83.1.

[52] W. E. G. Floyd, *Clement of Alexandria's Treatment of the Problem of Evil*, p.52.

[53] *Strom.* 4.13.94.1.

[54] *Strom.* 2.19.98.4.

[55] Cf. *Strom.* 2.7.34.2: [...] θάνατον, οὐ τὸν διαλύοντα ψυχὴν ἀπὸ σώματος, ἀλλὰ τὸν διαλύοντα ψυχὴν ἀπὸ ἀληθείας·
Strom. 4.3.12.1: Κινδυνεύει τοίνυν δεδεῖχθαι θάνατος μὲν εἶναι ἡ ἐν σώματι κοινωνία τῆς ψυχῆς ἁμαρτητικῆς οὔσης, ζωὴ δὲ ὁ χωρισμὸς τῆς ἁμαρτίας. Cf. *Paed.* 2.1.8.2; *Strom.* 2.7.35.4; *QDS* 7.3. Clement probably derives the distinction between the death of the soul and the death of man as the separation of soul and body (Cf. Plato *Phaedo*, 64c, 67d), from Philo, Cf. *Leg. Alleg.* 1.33.105-108.

men die?', that Clement makes his most interesting comments about death.[56] The aim of these passages is to counter the radical eschatology of the Encratites, who took the Lord's answer, 'As long as women bear children', as grounds for the rejection of marriage and procreation. Clement attempts to counter their argument by spiritualizing the words involved: woman, man, birth, corruption and death. Clement points out that the word 'man' has two meanings: the outward man and the soul. It is of the death of the latter that the Lord replied 'As long as women bear children,' allegorizing 'women' as desire and the children as the various vices that spring from desire.[57] In this sense sin is the death of the soul. But Clement goes on to speak of how death applies to the outward man: 'By natural necessity in the divine plan death follows birth, and the coming together of soul and body is followed by their dissolution.'[58] Clement thus accepts the Encratites' premise, that the connection between γένεσις, and hence marriage, and φθορά or θάνατος is natural and necessary, but, contrary to the Encratites, Clement believes that this connection is ordained by God and there is, therefore, no necessary reason to halt the process. Thus, there is a

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[56] *Strom.* 3.6.45,3, 9.63-67. For an analysis of these passages, and the same theme as it was developed by other writers from Plato to Gregory of Nyssa, see. T. H. C. van Eijk, 'Marriage and Virginity, Death and Immortality'.

[57] Cf. *Strom.* 3.9.63-64. Clement in fact adopts the Encratite interpretation of 'female' and 'woman' as desire (cf. *Strom.* 3.9.63.2), but extends the scope of the 'works' or 'children' that spring from desire to include, for example, love of money and gluttony, so modifying the Encratites exclusively sexual understanding of 'desire'. Cf. D. G. Hunter, 'The Language of Desire: Clement of Alexandria's Transformation of Ascetic Discourse', pp.98-99.

[58] *Strom.* 3.9.64.2: φυσικῇ δὲ ἀνάγκῃ θείας οἰκονομίας γενέσει θάνατος ἕπεται, καὶ συνόδῳ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἡ τούτων διάλυσις ἀκολουθεῖ. *Strom.* 3.6.45.3: οὐχ ὡς κακοῦ τοῦ βίου ὄντος καὶ τῆς κτίσεως πονηρᾶς, >μέχρις ἂν< εἶπεν >ὑμεῖς αἱ γυναῖκες τίκτητε,< ἀλλ' ὡς τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τὴν φυσικὴν διδάσκων· γενέσει γὰρ πάντως ἕπεται καὶ φθορά. Cf. *Strom.* 7.4.25.2, where Clement links the naturalness of our death to that of the animals.

disconcerting elision in Clement's thought.[59] We have seen above that Clement described Adam's paradisical state as immortal, and that it encompassed marriage and procreation without, however, any inherent connection to death. Yet Clement now describes the connection between birth, marriage and death as a divine arrangement.[60] Undoubtedly Clement, when speaking of the connection between birth and death, is referring to the fallen condition and God's economical arrangement for our state of mortality. But Clement had no reason to accept the premise itself: for Clement, Adam and Eve's life, before the appearance of death and morality, included the prospect of marriage and procreation.

Alongside death, the Fall caused the disordering of the existential constitution of the human:

> As soon as the first humans fell and disobeyed God, it is said that 'they became likened to the beasts'. As the human sinned against the Word, it is natural that they should be considered as irrational and likened to the beasts.[61]

By asserting that after the Fall the human became ἄλογος, Clement does not mean to imply that they lost all capacity for rational thought. This statement must be understood in terms of Clement's hierarchical picture of the soul, as it was described above. All the lower powers and faculties of the soul should be subordinated to the ἡγεμονικόν or νοῦς for the right or rational functioning of the human. If this order is upset or unbalanced, then the soul is in danger of being dominated by the irrational, animal part, and the human becomes like the animals to whose nature they have

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[59] Cf. O. Prunet: 'La mort est à la fois une nécessité de nature et l'ultime punition de la corruption.' *La Morale de Clément d'Alexandrie et le Nouveau Testament*, p.58.

[60] Cf. *Strom.* 4.25.160.3: γένεσις γὰρ γένεσιν διαδεχομένη κατὰ προκοπὴν ἀπαθανατίζειν βούλεται, [...].

[61] *Paed.* 1.13.101.3. Ps. 48.13, 21 LXX.

succumbed.

No longer following the rule of nature and disobedient to the divine Logos, the passions arise in the human. According to Clement,

> Appetite is the movement of the mind to or from something. Passion is an excessive appetite, exceeding the measures of reason, or appetite unbridled and disobedient to the Word. Passions then are a movement of the soul contrary to nature in disobedience to the Word.[62]

For Clement it is the πνεῦμα σαρκικόν, which is intimately connected with the body and its sensations, and comprehends in itself all the irrational functions of the soul, including the ἐπιθυμεῖν, the ἥδεσθαι and the ὀργίζεσθαι, which is the seat of the corresponding passions in man, ἐπιθυμία, ἡδονή and ὀργή.[63] It would be mistaken to conclude from this, however, that the passions ἐπιθυμία, ἡδονή and ὀργή, are the natural and proper functions of the biological being of man. These passions are the manifestation of the natural appetites (ὁρμαί), which are located in the mind, when they exceed their natural and proper measure. Elsewhere Clement, perhaps following Chrysippus, draws a similar distinction, this time between the impulses necessary for the functioning of the human and desire:

> Those skilled in such matters distinguish impulse from desire and assign the latter, as being irrational, to pleasures and licentiousness; and impulse, as being a rational movement, they assign to the necessities of nature.[64]

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[62] *Strom.* 2.13.59.6: Ὁρμὴ μὲν οὖν φορὰ διανοίας ἐπί τι ἢ ἀπὸ του· πάθος δὲ πλεονάζουσα ὁρμὴ ἢ ὑπερτείνουσα τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον μέτρα, ἢ ὁρμὴ ἐκφερομένη καὶ ἀπειθὴς λόγῳ· παρὰ φύσιν οὖν κίνησις ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀπείθειαν τὰ πάθη. For similar Stoic formulations of the definition of passion, see Diog. Laert. 7.110 (*SVF* 1.205, p.50.22-3).

[63] Cf. *Strom.* 6.16.136.1: διὰ τοῦ σωματικοῦ ἄρα πνεύματος αἰσθάνεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἥδεται, ὀργίζεται, τρέφεται, αὔξεται· Cf. *Strom.* 6.16.135.3. For the similarity of Clement's position to that of Middle Platonism and Philo, see Lilla, *op. cit.* pp.84-92.

[64] *Strom.* 4.18.117.5: ὄρεξιν οὖν ἐπιθυμίας διακρίνουσιν οἱ περὶ ταῦτα

Here the ὄρεξεις of the soul, which, as they relate to the 'necessities of nature', clearly refer to the functions of the πνεῦμα σαρκικόν, are described as being 'rational', whilst ἐπιθυμία is now a purely irrational movement bound up with pleasure. Thus, while they have their origins in the πνεῦμα σαρκικόν and its natural functions and urges, it is their excessive use contrary to reason, brought about by pleasure and disobedience, that characterize the passions.[65]

Due to the role played by pleasure in the rise of the passions, Clement is severely critical of any pleasure attached to an action which is not governed by some natural need.[66] It is by keeping the pleasures under control that we can prevent desire.[67] Clement speaks of the unnecessary 'passion of pleasure' that accompanies certain natural needs, such as eating, drinking and marriage. If it were possible to eat, drink or beget children without it, then Clement is convinced that there would be no need for passion of pleasure.[68] This harsh strain produces an uncomfortable tension in Clement's thought, for he also wants to maintain that pleasure is good, as it was given by God. Whilst pleasure is to be given no admittance, it is nevertheless given by God for the necessity of procreation.[69] It is

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δεινοί, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ τάττουσιν ἄλογον οὖσαν, τὴν δὲ ὄρεξιν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίων λογικὴν ὑπάρχουσαν κίνησιν.

[65]Cf. D. G. Hunter, 'The Language of Desire', pp.99-105.

[66]Eg. *Paed.* 2.1.5.1, 8.68.1, 4; 3.9.46.1; *Strom.* 2.20.106.2.

[67]Cf. *Paed.* 2.1.9.1: ἀλλὰ κρατοῦντες δηλονότι τῶν ἡδονῶν κωλύομεν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας.

[68]*Strom.* 2.20.118.7-119.1: καθόλου γὰρ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς πάθος, ἐπακολούθημα δὲ χρείαις τισὶ φυσικαῖς, πείνῃ, δίψει, ῥίγει, γάμῳ. εἰ γοῦν ταύτης δίχα πιεῖν οἷόν τε ἦν ἢ τροφὴν προσίεσθαι ἢ παιδοποιεῖν, ἐδείχθη ἂν οὐδεμία ἑτέρα χρεία ταύτης.

[69]Cf. *Strom.* 2.20.107.3. [...] ἣν [ἡδονή] οὐ χρὴ προσίεσθαι, κἂν θεὸς λέγηται, τουτέστι κἂν θεόθεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς παιδοποιίας χρείαν

through the senses that the passions have access to the intellect producing evil φαντασία which disturb our peace even in dreams.[70] Such φαντασία affect our capacity for right judgement, and thus demand constant vigilance and discernment. Whilst this idea was common to both the Stoics and Philo, Clement adds a new dimension by seeing behind this disruptive activity the work of the demons.[71]

Having succumbed to the passions and overturned the right ordering of their constitution, humans nevertheless retain their intellectual capacities and their freedom, and are, therefore, still capable of moral effort and of grasping the truth. Clement's warm appreciation of Greek philosophy is well known. He describes the origin of philosophy in various ways, either as plagiarism from the Old Testament[72], or as being transmitted to the human race by an inferior angel[73], or, most importantly, as due to the divine inspiration present or sown in each human.[74] Clement did not feel these to be self-contradictory, for they essentially demonstrated the same fact: the fundamental harmony between philosophy and Scripture.[75] Ultimately, for Clement, philosophy constitutes a gift of God to the Greeks, acting as a preparation for the Christian faith, a προπαιδεία τις.[76] As a covenant equivalent to the Law, Clement can speak of 'those who have been justified

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δεδομένη τυγχάνη.

[70] Cf. *Strom.* 2.20.120.3.

[71] Cf. esp. *Strom.* 2.20.110.1-3. Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker*, pp.127-143.

[72] Cf. *Prot.* 6.70.1; *Paed.* 2.1.18.2; *Strom.* 1.22.150.2-4.

[73] Cf. *Strom.* 1.17.81.4; 5.1.10.2; 7.2.6.4.

[74] Cf. *Prot.* 6.72.5, 7.74.7; *Strom.* 1.7.37.1-2; 5.13.87.2-4.

[75] For the origin of these views of Clement, and the similarity to ideas current in philosophy and Philo, see Lilla, *op. cit.* pp.9-59.

[76] *Strom.* 1.5.28.1-3; Cf. *Strom.* 6.5.41.7-42.3.

(or made righteous) by philosophy.'[77] Both of these covenants lead to the Christian faith; it is faith which is the essential lacking in both the righteous of the Old Testament and of philosophy, although the latter must also learn to abandon idolatry:

> For to those who were righteous according to the Law, faith was wanting. Wherefore the Lord, in healing them, said 'Thy faith has saved thee'. But to those who were righteous according to philosophy, not only faith in the Lord, but also the abandonment of idolatry were necessary.[78]

It is the call to abandon idolatry and to turn to faith in the Lord that is the great theme of the *Protrepticus*. When speaking of faith Clement has three issues to tackle: first, the sceptical attitude of Greek philosophers towards Christian faith; second, the so-called Gnostics, especially the Valentinians, who sharply distinguished the faith of the common believers from the knowledge of the spiritual elect; and third, the unreflective attitude of some Christians towards their own faith.[79] In answer to the first, Clement points out that there is no knowledge of any kind without an acceptance, on faith, of the first principles of knowledge: demonstrations must, ultimately, rest upon undemonstrated principles.[80] Closely connected

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[77] *Strom.* 1.4.27.3: τοῖς γὰρ ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας δεδικαιωμένοις βοήθεια θησαυρίζεται καὶ ἡ εἰς θεοσέβειαν συναίσθησις.
Only once does Clement suggest, in passing, that the righteousness taught by the Greeks is not 'according to truth.' *Strom.* 2.2.7.1. It seems that this comment is determined by the context, in which Clement is trying to explain the meaning of the expression δικαιοσύνη ἀληθῆς in Prov.1.3

[78] *Strom.* 6.6.44.4: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον δικαίοις ἔλειπεν ἡ πίστις, διὸ καὶ τούτους ἰώμενος ὁ κύριος ἔλεγεν >ἡ πίστις σοῦ σέσωκέν σε<· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν δικαίος οὐχ ἡ πίστις μόνον ἡ εἰς τὸν κύριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀποστῆναι τῆς εἰδωλολατρείας ἔδει. Cf. *Strom.* 5.13.87.1, where Clement insists that even those skilled in Greek philosophy must still learn the truth about Christ.

[79] For a good discussion of Clement's ideas on faith, and especially its similarities to Middle Platonism, see Lilla, *op. cit.* pp.118-142, to which the following paragraphs are indebted. T. Camelot, *Foi et Gnose: Introduction a l'étude de la connaissance mystique chez Clément d'Alexandrie*, remains useful.

[80] Cf. *Strom.* 2.4.13.4: εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδειτικὴν

with this understanding of faith is the Stoic epistemological idea of 'assent' (συγκατάθεσις) and the corresponding Epicurean idea of 'preconception' (πρόληψις). For the Stoics, συγκατάθεσις referred to the acceptance by the mind of sense-perception as the first step of knowledge, and had already been associated with the term πίστις by Antiochus.[81] For the Epicureans, faith was a πρόληψις of the mind in its acceptance of sense-perception, an 'anticipation', based on the memory of previous sense experience.[82] Clement combines the two ideas to define faith as 'a voluntary preconception, the assent of piety.'[83] As faith is now a matter of the will, it becomes not only the basis of knowledge, but also of action.[84]

As πίστις refers to the acceptance of the first principles of knowledge, it is also, for Clement, the acceptance of the conclusions arrived at by sure demonstration (that is scientific, ἀπόδειξις ἐπιστημονική, as opposed to

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εἶναι μετὰ λόγου, ἀκουσάτω ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι· Cf. *Strom.* 8.3.6.7-7.2 The idea of the absolute ἀρχή ultimately goes back to Plato (*Rep.* 6.511b6-7), was developed by Aristotle (*An. Post.* 1.2, 71b.20-23, 72a.7-10; 1.3, 72b.19-25; 1.22, 84a.29-84b.3), and became part of the school tradition of Middle Platonism (cf. Alcinoos, *Did.* 5).

[81] Cf. Lilla, *op. cit.* p.128.

[82] *Strom.* 2.4.16.3: [...] ὁ Ἐπίκουρος [...] πρόληψιν εἶναι διανοίας τὴν πίστιν ὑπολαμβάνει· πρόλυψιν δὲ ἀποδίδωσιν ἐπιβολὴν ἐπί τι ἐναργὲς καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναργῆ τοῦ πράγματος ἐπινοιαν·
Clement, who is otherwise severely critical of Epicurus, disagrees with him on the nature of this πρόλψις, which, for Epicurus, was itself knowledge: τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, [...]. *Vita Epic.* 33, Usener, p.372.6-7; but which, for Clement, is made into knowledge by instruction: *Strom.* 2.4.17.1: ὁ μαθὼν δὲ ἤδη κατάληψιν ποιεῖ τὴν πρόληψν.

[83] *Strom.* 2.2.8.4: πίστις δὲ [...] πρόληψις ἑκούσιος ἐστι, θεοσεβείας συγκατάθεσις, [...]. For faith as σύγκατάθεσις, cf. *Strom.* 2.12.54.5-55.1 (which shows that Clement knew the Stoic doctrine), 5.13.86.1; faith as πρόληψις, cf. *Strom.* 2.4.16.3 (referring to Epicurus), 2.6.28.1.

[84] *Strom.* 2.2.9.2: εἰ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσίς ἐστιν, ὀρεκτική τινος οὖσα, ἡ ὄρεξις νῦν διανοητική, ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεως ἀρχὴ ἡ προαίρεσις, πίστις εὑρίσκεται ἀρχὴ [γὰρ] πράξεως, [...].

those of opinion, δοξαστική).[85] And it is with this distinction that Clement responds to the so-called Gnostics and to the simple Christians. Clement connects the two senses of faith, by identifying the principle of demonstration with what is received in Scripture:

> Therefore, as is reasonable, grasping by faith the indemonstrable first principle, and receiving in abundance, from the first principle itself, demonstrations in reference to the first principle, we are by the voice of the Lord trained to the knowledge of truth.[86]

Thus the demonstration that Clement has in mind is the study and interpretation of Scripture. Since πίστις can refer to the conclusions of such demonstration it is essentially γνῶσις.[87] As πίστις now refers both to the acceptance of the principle of demonstration and to the demonstration itself, Clement can speak of πίστις as the foundation of γνῶσις and yet maintain their inseparability.[88] Thus Clement can insist on the intrinsic connection between faith and γνῶσις, to counter the philosophers and so-called Gnostics on the one hand, whilst also insisting on the natural development of faith into γνῶσις, by its own internal dynamic, to encourage the simple Christians on the other. The twofold character of this πίστις, containing within itself the principles of its growth into γνῶσις, which is not essentially different from it, clearly parallels Clement's description

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[85] Cf. *Strom.* 2.11.48.2 for this distinction and the corresponding two kinds of faith: πίστεως δ' οὔσης διττῆς, τῆς μὲν ἐπιστημονικῆς, τῆς δὲ δοξαστικῆς, οὐθὲν κωλύει ἀπόδειξιν ὀνομάζειν διττήν, τὴν μὲν ἐπιστημονικήν, τὴν δὲ δοξαστικήν, [...].

[86] *Strom.* 7.16.95.6: εἰκότως τοίνυν πίστει περιλαβόντες ἀναπόδεικτον τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐκ περιουσίας καὶ τὰς ἀποδείξεις παρ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς λαβόντες, φωνῇ κυρίου παιδευόμεθα πρὸς τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας. Cf. *Strom.* 2.11.48.3; 7.16.93.1, 96.1.

[87] *Strom.* 2.11.49.3: ἡ γὰρ ἀνωτάτω ἀπόδειξις, ἣν ἠνιξάμεθα ἐπιστημονικήν, πίστιν ἐντίθησι διὰ τῆς τῶν γραφῶν παραθέσεώς τε καὶ διοίξεως ταῖς τῶν μανθάνειν ὀρεγομένων ψυχαῖς, ἥτις ἂν εἴη γνῶσις.

[88] For πίστις as θεμέλιος see *Strom.* 5.1.2.5, 4.26.1; 7.10.55.5. For their inseparability, *Strom.* 5.1.1.3. Cf. *infra* pp.224-225.

of Adam whose initial 'imperfect perfection' was intended to be the source of his growth to full perfection.

It is to this faith, the free assent of the will, that Clement calls the pagans in the *Protrepticus*: 'You, then, have God's promise, you have His love, become partakers of His grace.'[89] Clement stresses repeatedly that this only requires the exertion of the will.[90] The motif running throughout the *Protreptikos* is that of the harmony to which the human is called, when, having been tuned by the Holy Spirit, they become an 'instrument of many tones.'[91] Having seen the fundamental characteristics of Clement's anthropology, and the dynamic conception of faith by which the human is led into Christianity, we can now turn to this new harmony in order to investigate the character of Clement's asceticism and its relation to the sexual being of the human.

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[89] *Prot.* 1.6.3.

[90] *Prot.* 9.86.1; 10.106.3–5; esp. 12.118.4.

[91] *Prot.* 1.5.3. Cf. *Paed.* 2.4.41.5.

3: Rebirth and Christian Life

The new life, entered by faith, to which we are called is the subject of the *Paedagogus*. Two great themes stand out in this work: first, the significance of rebirth and the childhood of the new people of God, and second, the divine παιδαγογία or character formation (διάθεσις ἠθοποιίας[1]) consequent upon this. The abundance of images which Clement uses to describe our state of spiritual infancy: children, chicks, infants, colts, lambs, etc.[2] stands in stark contrast to a culture which had no real appreciation for the state of infancy.[3] The work is certainly an anti-Gnostic polemic, emphasizing the perfection of baptism and opposing the Gnostics' division of humans into separate categories. But the exuberance of Clement's words and the depth of his thought testify to much more than polemical zeal; it is a warmth found in the New Testament and, later, in *The Epistle to Barnabas* and *The Shepherd of Hermas*, to mention two works which Clement had to hand.[4]

Clement's predilection in the *Paedagogus* for images of infancy is due to the reality of regeneration: 'This is the one grace of the illumination, that we are no longer the same as we were before the washing.'[5] We have seen earlier how Clement, after Christ's Incarnation, connects the gift of the

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[1] *Paed.* 1.1.2.1.

[2] Cf. *Paed.* 1.5.14.1-16.3.

[3] Cf. H. I. Marrou: '[...] la seule justification de l'enfance est de se dépasser et de conduire à l'homme fait; [...].' *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité*, p.325.

[4] *Barn.* 6.11, 17. Hermas, *Mand.* 2.1; *Sim.* 9.29.1, 31.3.

[5] *Paed.* 1.6.30.1: μία χάρις αὕτη τοῦ φωτίσματος τὸ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ πρὶν ἢ λούσασθαι τὸν τρόπον.

Spirit to baptism.[6] Clement also describes the regeneration as the work of the Father by the Spirit.[7] Being reborn by the Father, the water becomes our mother, or is alternatively described as the 'rational water' which purifies us from the habits of custom.[8]

Clement's description of the effects of baptism is unreservedly categoric. As Christ was made perfect in His baptism and sanctified by the descent of the Spirit, the same happens to those who follow His example:

> Being baptized, we are illuminated, illuminated, we become sons; being made sons, we are made perfect, being made perfect, we are made immortal. 'I have said' He says, 'that you are gods, sons of the Most High.' This work is variously called grace, illumination, perfection and washing: washing, by which we cleanse away our sins; grace, by which the penalties accruing to transgressions are remitted; and illumination, by which that holy light of salvation is beheld, that is, by which we see the divine clearly. We call that perfect which wants nothing. For what is yet wanting to him who knows God?[9]

There are two remarkable features of this vivid description. First, that the newly-baptized is unambiguously attributed with all the characteristics of perfection: illumined, adopted, perfected and immortal. Clement, a little later, also speaks of baptism as granting γνῶσις, the end of which,

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[6] *Paed.* 1.12.98.2-3.

[7] *Paed.* 1.5.21.2: [...] τῶν ὅλων ὁ πατὴρ τοὺς εἰς αὐτὸν καταπεφευγότας προσίεται καὶ ἀναγεννήσας πνεύματι εἰς υἱοθεσίαν [...].

[8] *Strom.* 4.25.160.2: [...] γεγέννηκεν ἐκ μήτρας ὕδατος·
Prot. 10.99.3: λάβετε οὖν ὕδωρ λογικόν, λούσασθε οἱ μεμολυσμένοι, περιρράνατε αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς συνηθείας ταῖς ἀληθιναῖς σταγόσιν·

[9] *Paed.* 1.6.26.1-3: βαπτιζόμενοι φωτιζόμεθα, φωτιζόμενοι υἱοποιούμεθα, υἱοποιούμενοι τελειούμεθα, τελειούμενοι ἀπαθανατιζόμεθα· >ἐγώ<, φησίν, >εἶπα, θεοί ἐστε καὶ υἱοὶ ὑψίστου πάντες.< καλεῖται δὲ πολλαχῶς τὸ ἔργον τοῦτο, χάρισμα καὶ φώτισμα καὶ τέλειον καὶ λουτρόν· λουτρὸν μὲν δι᾽ οὗ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἀπορρυπτόμεθα, χάρισμα δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν ἐπιτίμια ἀνεῖται, φώτισμα δὲ δι᾽ οὗ τὸ ἅγιον ἐκεῖνο φῶς τὸ σωτήριον ἐποπτεύεται, τουτέστιν δι᾽ οὗ τὸ θεῖον ὀξυωποῦμεν, τέλειον δὲ τὸ ἀπροσδεὲς φαμέν. τί γὰρ ἔτι λείπεται τῷ θεὸν ἐγνωκότι;

the final object of aspiration, is rest (ἀνάπαυσις).[10] The second striking point, consequent upon the first, is the immediacy of this perfection: it is a perfection which is granted here and now. Elsewhere in the same chapter, Clement stresses this even more strongly: 'Straightway upon our regeneration we attain that perfection to which we aspired.'[11] Already practising the heavenly life, we are deified.[12]

We have already seen how Clement uses the term 'perfect' to refer to various states of perfection: Adam was created perfectly formed, yet called to grow to perfection; πίστις in itself is perfect, yet develops into γνῶσις. It is in this sense that most scholars have interpreted Clement's comments on the perfection of the newly-baptized: the neophyte possesses perfection in a seminal form and is called to develop this seed into its full perfection which will only be achieved after this life in the resurrection.[13]

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[10] *Paed.* 1.6.29.3-4: ὥστε ἡ μὲν γνῶσις ἐν τῷ φωτίσματι, τὸ δὲ πέρας τῆς γνώσεως ἡ ἀνάπαυσις, ὃ δὴ ἔσχατον νοεῖται ὀρεκτόν. [...] φωτισμὸς ἄρα ἡ γνῶσίς ἐστιν, [...].

[11] *Paed.* 1.6.25.1: ἀναγεννηθέντες γοῦν εὐθέως τὸ τέλειον ἀπειλήφαμεν, οὗ ἕνεκεν ἐσπεύδομεν. Cf. *Paed.* 1.6.27.1, 27.2, 27.3, 28.1-2.

[12] *Paed.* 1.12.98.3: ἐνθένδε ἤδη τὴν ἐπουράνιον μελετῶντες πολιτείαν, καθ' ἣν ἐκθεούμεθα, [...].

[13] Cf. F. Quatember: 'Das übernatürliche Leben des Christen beginnt für ihn zwar mit der Taufe, der Erleuchtung und Wiedergeburt und mündet in ewigen Leben, die ewige Ruhe in Gott ist ihm aber dem Wesen nach ein und dasselbe Leben. Der Anfang enthält schon in Keime das Endstadium, die Vollendung, und diese ist schon zu Beginn dem Wesen nach da.' *Die christliche Lebenshaltung des Klemens von Alexandrinus nach seinem Pädagogus*, p.95. Völker points to the relative nature of all perfection: 'Das ganze Leben des Christen faßt Clemens als einen großen Entwicklungsgang auf, schon auf den unteren Stufen enthält es keimhaft die Vollkommenheit, die sich allmählich bis zur Höhe des γνωστικός steigert, aber auch hier noch eine sehr relative Größe bleibt, verglichen mit der Reinheit der Engelwesen, während vor Gottes Heiligkeit alles verblaßt.' *Der wahre Gnostiker*, p.452. M. Mees points to the correspondence between the seed-like quality of this perfection and its fulfillment after death, and the need to balance Clement's 'present' eschatology with a 'future' eschatology, 'Jetzt und Dann in der Eschatologie Klemens von Alexandrien', pp.132-133.

Alternatively these claims are understood within the framework of a natural/supernatural distinction: the neophyte is granted eternal life here on earth, and thus possesses a twofold life, a natural life and a supernatural life in Christ.[14] Although Clement later, especially in the *Stromateis*, emphasizes the need for development and growth in the Christian life, his stress here on the complete perfection of the baptismal grace cannot, as is usually assumed, be reduced to an anti-gnostic polemic. In these passages Clement does not speak of the perfection of the baptismal grace as seed-like, nor as a supernatural life somehow added to the natural human. He does, however, explain how we are to understand this perfection of the neophyte, in terms which reverse the perspective.

Clement provides an answer specifically for those who do not understand how one can speak of the neophyte as being already perfect:

> But, say they, they have not yet received the perfect gift. I also assent to this: except they are in the light, and the darkness knows them not. There is nothing intermediate between light and darkness. But the end [τέλος] is reserved till the resurrection of those who believe, and it is not the reception of some other thing, but the obtaining of the promise previously made. For we do not say that both take place at the same time - both the arrival at the end and the anticipation [πρόληψις] of that arrival. For eternity and time are not the same, neither is the attempt [ὁρμή] and the final result [τέλος]; but both have reference to the same thing, and one and the same person is concerned in both. Faith, so to speak, is the attempt generated in time; the final result is the attainment of the promise secured for eternity.[15]

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[14] Cf. Quatember: 'Wir *streben* aber nicht nur nach dem ewigen Lebe, wir besitzen es bereits hier auf Erden, dem Wesen nach, durch die heilige Taufe. Der Getaufte besitzt nämlich ein doppeltes Leben: das *natürliche* Leben und das *übernatürliche* Leben in Christus.' *Op. cit.* p.89.

[15] *Paed.* 1.6.28.3-5: ἀλλ' οὐδέπω, φασίν, ἀπείληφεν τὴν τελείαν δωρεάν. σύμφημι κἀγώ, πλὴν ἐν φωτί ἐστιν καὶ τὸ σκότος αὐτὸν οὐ καταλαμβάνει· φωτὸς δὲ ἀνὰ μέσον καὶ τοῦ σκότους οὐδὲ ἕν· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀναστάσει τῶν πιστευόντων ἀπόκειται τὸ τέλος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἄλλου τινός ἐστι μεταλαβεῖν ἀλλ' ἢ τῆς προωμολογημένης ἐπαγγελίας τυχεῖν. μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἅμα ἄμφω συνίστασθαί φαμεν, τήν τε πρὸς τὸ πέρας ἄφιξιν καὶ τῆς ἀφίξεως τὴν

Neophytes have not received the perfect gift, but they have it by anticipation or in prior-reception (πρόληψις). Yet there is nothing intermediary between the light and the darkness, and the neophytes are unambiguously in the light.[16] The most important aspect of this passage is that it considers the neophytes from the point of view of that which they will be, their τέλος.[17] In this eschatological existence, they are fully perfect. However, this state is not yet fully realized as a present reality; but neither is it solely a futural reality: it is in anticipation (πρόληψις) that the neophytes already exist as what they will be after the resurrection. After their regeneration in baptism, this eschatological existence in the light is their true being. It is faith which characterizes this eschatological experience generated or manifested in time. In the *Stromateis*, Clement repeatedly speaks of πρόληψις as the Christian Gnostics' anticipation of their futural reality in the present by γνῶσις, by prayer and by love.[18] In his discussion of baptism in the *Paedagogus*, Clement makes

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πρόληψιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστι ταὐτὸν αἰὼν καὶ χρόνος οὐδὲ μὴν ὁρμὴ καὶ τέλος, οὐκ ἔστιν· περὶ ἓν δὲ ἄμφω καὶ περὶ ἄμφω ὁ εἷς καταγίνεται. ἔστι γοῦν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὁρμὴ μὲν ἡ πίστις ἐν χρόνῳ γεννωμένη, τέλος δὲ τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς ἐπαγγελίας εἰς αἰῶνας βεβαιούμενον.

[16]Cf. *Paed.* 1.6.27.3: καὶ ὁ μόνον ἀναγεννηθείς [...] φωτισθεὶς ἀπήλλακται μὲν παραχρῆμα τοῦ σκότους, ἀπείληφεν δὲ αὐτόθεν τὸ φῶς.

[17]For a profound analysis of the meaning and implications of this eschatological existence of the Christian, see J. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, esp. pp.59-65.

[18]Cf. *Strom.* 6.9.73.4, 75.2, 76.4-77.1; 7.7.43.1, 47.4, 47.5. Cf. *infra* pp.249-254. In *Strom.* 2.22.131.2-136.6, Clement also develops this anticipation through the use of Platonic 'participation': For Plato the end is twofold, the 'Good' which exists first in the ideal form, yet is communicable; and the one who partakes of it, and receives its likeness from it, as is the case in the man who appropriates virtue and true philosophy. In the same way, Clement understands Rom. 6.22 to indicate a twofold hope: 'that which is expected and that which has been received, he [Paul] teaches the end to be the restitution of the hope.' (*Strom.* 2.22.134.4) For an analysis of this passage, see E. F. Osborn, *The Philosophy of Clement of*

two further references to πρόληψις, or rather, to the corresponding verb:

> Being perfect, He consequently bestows perfect gifts. As at His command all things were made, so on His bare wish to bestow grace, ensues the perfecting of His grace. For the future of time is anticipated by the power of His volition.[19]

> If, then, those who have believed have life, what remains beyond the possession of eternal life? For nothing is lacking to faith, which is perfect and complete of itself. If anything were lacking to it, it would not be complete; lame regarding something, it would not even be faith. Nor after the departure from this world is there anything else waiting for the believers, those who have received here without distinction the pledge; but having anticipated already by faith that which is future, after the resurrection we receive it as present.[20]

In the first quotation Clement attributes the effective power of this πρόληψις to God, connecting it to the perfection of His grace. In the second quotation πρόληψις is described as the effect of our faith, by which we receive here and now in faith what essentially belongs to the future, and which we will receive as a present reality after the resurrection. In this way Clement's more abstract definitions of πίστις in *Stromata* 2, which we considered earlier, are given substance as a living reality. Here Clement's understanding of πίστις clearly corresponds with that given in the Epistle to the Hebrews: ἔστιν δὲ πίστις ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις (11.1); faith is a concrete 'substance' and is not simply an intellectual assent. It is also important to note that here the baptismal grace is considered to be the

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Alexandria, pp.84-87; *Ethical Patterns in Early Christian Thought*, pp.67-68.

[19] *Paed.* 1.6.26.3: τέλειος δὲ ὢν τέλεια χαριεῖται δήπουθεν· ὡς δὲ ἅμα τῷ κελεῦσαι αὐτὸν πάντα γίνεται, οὕτως ἕπεται τῷ χαρίσασθαι μόνον βουληθῆναι αὐτὸν [τὸ] πεπληρῶσθαι τὴν χάριν. τὸ γὰρ μέλλον τοῦ χρόνου τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ θελήματος προλαμβάνεται.

[20] *Paed.* 1.6.29.2-3: εἰ τοίνυν οἱ πιστεύσαντες ἔχομεν τὴν ζωήν, τί περαιτέρω τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ζωὴν ἀίδιον ὑπολείπεται; οὐδὲν δὲ ἐνδεῖ τῇ πίστει τελείᾳ οὔσῃ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ πεπληρωμένῃ. εἰ δὲ ἐνδεῖ τι αὐτῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁλοτελής, οὐδε πίστις ἐστί, σκάζουσα περί τι, οὐδὲ μετὰ τὴν ἐνθένδε ἀποδημίαν ἄλλα μένει τοὺς πεπιστευκότας, ἀδιακρίτως ἐνταῦθα ἡρραβωνισμένους, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τῷ πιστεῦσαι ἤδη προειληφότες ἐσόμενον, μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἀπολαμβάνομεν γενόμενον, [...].

bestowal of life, ζωή, ζωὴ ἀίδιος, granted equally to all believers, and to which nothing more can be added. This life as a present reality belongs to the future, but by πρόληψις in πίστις it is already (εὐθέως) lived here and now (ἐνθένδε ἤδη) by the baptized Christian.[21] It is this life which is the true existence of the Christian, and the Christian may therefore be said to live proleptically. Clement thus recasts the term πρόληψις from an epistemological context, where, following Epicurus he used it to define πίστις in terms of preconception, to an eschatological context, in which he uses it to describe the paradoxical state of the Christian whose true existence belongs to the eschaton yet which is already lived in this world.[22] Clement's eschatology is therefore best characterized, at least in these

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[21]Cf. *Paed.* 1.6.27.2: οὕτω τὸ πιστεῦσαι μόνον καὶ ἀναγεννηθῆναι τελείωσίς ἐστιν ἐν ζωῇ· οὐ γάρ ποτε ἀσθενεῖ ὁ Θεός.

[22]Liddell & Scott's *A Greek-English Lexicon* gives πρόληψις as '*preconception, mental picture or scheme* into which experience is fitted', citing Epicurus and Chrysippus; *previous notion* or *conception*; (Rhet.) *anticipation*; or simply *taking beforehand*. The word προλαμβάνω is given a wider range of meanings, esp. '*to take or receive beforehand.*' Lampe's *Patristic Greek Lexicon* gives seven senses of πρόληψις: *preconception; preoccupation; predisposition; prejudice; anticipation;* as a rhetorical figure; *assumption* of humanity by the Son. Clement is the first writer cited who used πρόληψις in the sense of anticipation. 'Anticipation' is perhaps not a satisfactory translation, as it does not necessarily involve a real content: one can dream of spending money one does not have in anticipation of receiving it. Clement's eschatological use of the word πρόληψις is more concrete: we are already given the gift and live the life which itself essentially belongs to the eschaton. Camelot hints at the eschatological dimension of πρόληψις, but does not develop its significance, *Foi et Gnose*, p.45. According to R. P. Casey, 'Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Platonism', pp.67-8: '[...] the future blessedness is contained potentially in the present life, so that it can now be possessed and even enjoyed, though it has not been fully realized.' I would disagree with his description of πρόληψις as implying only a 'potential' possession; it is a concrete possession of the neophyte. Casey continues: 'This power of effective anticipation is a property of faith, which from this point of view may be defined as the perfection of learning, for in it the matter of instruction is transmuted into the living experience of the believer.' I would also have to disagree, as we will see, with his belief that this πρόληψις has an effect in the life of the believer as Clement describes it.

passages, as a proleptic eschatology.[23] To describe this dynamic as the bestowal of a seminal perfection at baptism which must then be developed into full perfection, reverses the perspective of Clement's own explanation, and thereby overlooks the eschatological nature of the Christian's existence.

Although, in connection with baptism, Clement described Christ as being our 'example'[24], our rebirth is not simply a matter of repeating the actions of Christ. Rather, baptism effects a grafting onto the body of Christ, bringing us into union with Him. Clement describes this in a passage in which he brings together the ideas of regeneration, incorporation, and nourishment:

> For if we have been regenerated unto Christ, He who has regenerated us nourishes us with His own milk, the Logos; for it is proper that what has begotten should forthwith supply nourishment to that which has been begotten. And as the regeneration, so analagously the food of the human became spiritual. In all respects, therefore, and in all things, we are brought into union with Christ, and into relationship through His blood, by which we are redeemed; and into sympathy, in consequence of the nourishment which flows from the Word; and into immortality, through His guidance.[25]

Clement was attempting to reconcile the words of St. Paul, that milk is the proper food for children and solid food for the adults (1 Cor.3.2), to the Biblical image of the Promised Land as one running with milk and honey (Ex.3.8). For Clement, childhood in Christ is maturity compared to the

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[23] This must be stressed against Mees, 'Jetzt und Dann in der Eschatologie Klemens von Alexandrien', who interprets Clement's thought within the opposition of a 'present' eschatology as against a 'future' eschatology, and also against Prunet, who claims that, in comparison with St. Paul, Clement's theology lacks all sense of eschatological tension, *La Morale de Clément d'Alexandrie*, pp.234-236.

[24] *Paed.* 1.6.26.1: τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει τοῦτο καὶ περὶ ἡμᾶς, ὧν γέγονεν ὑπογραφὴ ὁ κύριος·

[25] *Paed.* 1.6.49.3-4. Cf. *Paed.* 2.2.19.4-20.1.

Law.[26] As our relationship to God will always be one of childhood, so too, our food, Christ Himself, is milk to us, yet inedible solid food to those outside Christ.[27] Clement's stress on baptism as the beginning of the Christian life, and the nourishment which sustains such life, clearly shows the sacramental dimension this life had for Clement.[28] In this context, Clement also speaks of the Church as the locus of nourishment and life.[29] The Church is a virgin mother, who, before Christ's Incarnation, was alone and not fully a woman, and so had no milk; but now, having brought forth her child, the milk, as virgin and mother she calls all her children to her and nurses them with this holy milk.[30]

Through rebirth in Christ, we become a new race with new blessings and a new, eternally youthful life:

> In contradistinction therefore to the older people, the new people are called young, having learned the new blessings; and for us the exuberance of life's prime is this youth which knows no old age, in which we are always maturing in understanding, are always young, always gentle, always new: for those must necessarily be new, who have become partakers of the new Logos. And that which participates in eternity is wont to be assimilated to the incorruptible: so that to us appertains the designation of the age of childhood, a lifelong spring-time, because the truth that is in us, and our habits saturated with the truth, cannot be touched by old age.[31]

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[26] *Paed.* 1.6.34.2.

[27] Cf. *Paed.* 1.6.32.4-52.3.

[28] It would be tempting to identify the nourishment spoken of in *Paed.* 1.6 with the sacramental nourishment given in the Eucharist. Cf. Marrou, 'Le lecteur catholique appliquera tout naturellement ces formules à la piété eucharistique; il faut prendre garde cependant à ne pas majorer des textes d' interprétation délicate:', *Le Pédagogue, I, SC* 70, p.188, ftn. 2.

[29] *Paed.* 1.5.18.4, 22.2; 6.27.2, 38.2, 42.1; 9.84.3.

[30] *Paed.* 1.6.42.1-2.

[31] *Paed.* 1.5.20.3-4: νέοι τοίνυν ὁ λαὸς ὁ καινὸς πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου λαοῦ, τὰ νέα μαθόντες ἀγαθά. καὶ ἔστιν ἡμῖν τὸ οὖθαρ τῆς ἡλικίας ἡ ἀγήρως αὕτη νεότης, ἐν ᾗ πρὸς νόησιν ἀεὶ ἀκμάζομεν, ἀεὶ νέοι καὶ ἀεὶ ἥπιοι καὶ ἀεὶ καινοί· χρὴ γὰρ εἶναι καινοὺς τοὺς λόγου καινοῦ μετειληφότας. [This 'new Word'

Participating in eternity, partaking of the eternal Logos who has newly appeared, our new existence as children is untouched by time, an eternal spring-time. Although we mature in understanding, we remain eternally young and eternally new; our childlike-state in Christ is an eternal truth, our true existence.[32] In this state we live, as Clement puts it, on the boundaries of this life, already separated from death.[33]

Thus Clement, at least on a theoretical level, recognizes the profound ontological significance of baptism. Yet, as we noticed earlier, despite sharing certain premises with the Encratites, Clement also felt himself obliged to counter their radical conclusions, that such rebirth effectively brings to a halt the course of everyday life and especially marriage, as the means through which this life holds sway. For Clement, although baptism transfers the ground of man's being, his ontology, to the eschaton, it does not imply such instantaneous mutation. Clement is deeply convinced that this eternal life, by which the Christian lives proleptically, is not to be thought of as separate or distinct from his day to day life: this ζωή can only be manifested within a βίος.[34] Clement visualizes this new existence within the terms of an 'art of living' (τέχνη περὶ βίον), an idea common to

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clearly refers to Christ's Incarnation] τὸ δὲ ἀιδιότητος μετειληφὸς ἐξομοιοῦσθαι φιλεῖ τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ, ὡς εἶναι ἡμῖν τῆς παιδικῆς ἡλικίας τὴν προσηγορίαν ἔαρ παντὸς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τὸ ἀγήρω εἶναι τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀνακεχυμένον ἡμῶν τὸν τρόπον.

[32]Cf. *Paed.* 1.5.15.2: [...] τὴν ἐν Χριστῷ νεολαίαν τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος καὶ ἀγήρω μετὰ ἁπλότητος ἀιδιότητα [...].

[33]*Paed.* 1.6.27.1: μόνον δὲ ἄρα οἱ πρῶτον δραξάμενοι τῶν ὅρων τῆς ζωῆς ἤδη τέλειοι, ζῶμεν δὲ ἤδη οἱ θανάτου κεχωρισμένοι.

[34]Marrou's admirable formulation, cf. 'Introduction', p.28; 'Humanisme et christianisme chez Clément d'Alexandrie d'après le *Pédagogue*', pp.193-194; 'Morale et spiritualité chrétienne dans le *Pédagogue* de Clément d'Alexandrie', p.538.

the popular philosophical and medical thought of his day.[35] Casting off the 'old man' and abandoning the old forms of nourishment, we receive in exchange 'another new regimen, that of Christ.'[36] As a regimen, the Christian life is a long and rigorous process of training required of each believer.[37] In this perspective, baptism is now our entry into Christ's training:

> Having now accomplished those things, it is a fitting sequel that our Paedagogue Jesus should sketch out for us the model of the true life, and train humanity in Christ.[38]

It is the painstaking and compendious description of the manner in which the Christian should live that forms the bulk of the *Paedagogus*.

As there are two causes of sin, weakness and ignorance, so the life of the Christian has two aspects, training and instruction. In the *Paedagogus*, Clement is almost solely concerned with the first aspect, the ceaseless exhortation of the Logos-Paedagogue urging us to the 'energetic practice of our duties'.[39] The activity of the Logos as Teacher comes later, instructing those who have already been trained and disciplined.[40]

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[35] *Paed.* 2.2.25.3. Cf. *Paed.* 1.12.99.2. For a discussion on the idea of the 'arts of living' see M. Foucault, *L'Usage des plaisirs*, esp. pp.16-19 (Eng. trans. pp.10-13), and his *Histoire de la sexualité* in general, and more recently M. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*.

[36] *Paed.* 1.6.43.1: [...] καινῆς δὲ ἄλλης τῆς Χριστοῦ διαίτης μεταλαμβάνοντας, [...].

[37] Cf. *Strom.* 2.21.128.4: δεῖ γὰρ καὶ χρόνου τινὸς τῇ ἀρετῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἐν μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ περιγίνεται, [...].

[38] *Paed.* 1.12.98.1: τούτων ἤδη προδιηνυσμένων ἑπόμενον ἂν εἴη τὸν παιδαγωγὸν ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν τὸν βίον ἡμῖν τὸν ἀληθινὸν ὑποτυπώσασθαι καὶ τὸν ἐν Χριστῷ παιδαγωγῆσαι ἄνθρωπον.

[39] *Paed.* 1.1.2.1.

[40] Cf. *Paed.* 3.12.97.3; *Paed.* 1.1.1-2. The question of the relationship between the projected *Didaskalikos Logos* and the *Stromateis* was one of the most contended questions in Clementine scholarship, although the controversy is now abating. As Mondésert points out, the lack of substantial evidence

The essential characteristic of the life of the newly-baptized Christian is obedience to the Logos, the Paedagogue, who uses all His resources to encourage us:

> With all His power then the Paedagogue of humanity, the Divine Logos, using the resources of wisdom, devotes Himself to the saving of the children, admonishing, upbraiding, reproving, censuring, threatening, healing, promising, favouring; and as it were, by many reins, curbing the irrational impulses of humanity. To speak briefly, therefore, the Lord acts towards us as we do towards our children.[41]

As passions took their rise from disobedience to the Logos, so too their defeat takes place through our obedience to the Logos-Paedagogue. Alongside the Platonic image of the charioteer controlling the irrational impulses with reins[42], the Logos-Paedagogue is also represented as a skilful doctor, who, with our co-operation, will heal our passions.[43] Clement also follows Plato in distinguishing two types of fear: one of reverence, which children show towards their parents, and the other of hatred, which slaves show towards cruel masters.[44] It is the first type of fear which should characterize our relationship to the Paedagogue, and prompt us to turn away from sin. Such fear is therefore described as salvific.[45] Closely

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makes a definitive solution impossible, 'Introduction' to the *Sources Chrétiennes* edition of *Stromata* 1, pp.19-22. The question does not have any serious implication for this study.

[41] *Paed.* 1.9.75.1-2, cf. Plato, *Laws* 7.808de. See also the whole of *Paed.* 1.9, and *Paed.* 1.8.74.3; *Strom.* 6.3.28.3.

[42] For the Paedagogue as ἡνίοχος, see also *Paed.* 3.11.53.2; Plato, *Phaedrus*, 247.

[43] Cf. *Paed.* 1.1.1.2, 3.1, 3.3; 2.6.1, 6.2, 6.4; 6.51.1. For an extended comparison of the passions to disease see *Paed.* 1.8.64.4-65.2. For the background of this imagery in Chrysippus, Posidonius and Galen, and for its use by Philo, who also spoke of the necessity of being healed by the Logos, see Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, p.98. On the whole theme of 'therapy' in Hellenistic philosophy, see now, M. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire*.

[44] *Paed.* 1.9.87.1. Cf. Plato, *Laws*, 1.646e-647c.

[45] *Paed.* 1.9.83.2: διὸ καὶ σωτήριος, εἰ καὶ πικρός, ὁ φόβος. Cf.

connected, in Clement's thought, to this fear is the hope inspired by the Paedagogue's promises, which is alternatively described as the reason for obedience, parallel to fear, and as the step succeeding fear.[46]

Due to the multitude of possible meanings of the word λόγος, this life of obedience to the Logos-Paedagogus is extended by Clement to encompass both the correct reason in us and the natural ordering of the universe.[47] The idea of the ὀρθὸς λόγος as the standard for human morality occurs repeatedly throughout the *Paedagogus*.[48] The Stoic background of this thought has been pointed out many times, and it is within a Stoic framework that Clement elaborates the theoretical aspects of his thought.[49] Thus, following the Stoic definition, Clement writes: 'Virtue is a disposition of the soul harmonious with the λόγος throughout the whole of life.'[50] This definition

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Plato, *Laws*, 1.647b. Whilst Clement, following the Stoics, includes fear in general as a passion (eg. *SVF* 3.378, p.92.16), such fear is not to be counted as a passion, cf. *Strom.* 2.8.40.2: ὁ τοῦ ἀπαθοῦς Θεοῦ φόβος ἀπαθής·

[46]Cf. *Strom.* 6.12.98.3: φόβος μὲν γὰρ αἴτιος τοῦ μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἐπαγγελία δὲ ἀφορμὴ τοῦ διώκειν ὑπακοήν, δι' ἧς ἡ σωτηρία. *Strom.* 4.7.53.1: ὁ μὲν οὖν πρῶτος βαθμὸς τῆς σωτηρίας ἡ μετὰ φόβου διδασκαλία, δι' ἣν ἀπεχόμεθα τῆς ἀδικίας, δεύτερος δὲ ἡ ἐλπίς, δι' ἣν ἐφιέμεθα τῶν βελτίστων, τελειοῖ δὲ ἡ ἀγάπη, ὡς προσῆκόν ἐστι, γνωστικῶς ἤδη παιδεύουσα. Cf. Völker, 'Beides zusammen, φόβος und ἐπαγγελία, charakterisieren das Tugendleben des Anfängers und sind weit entfernt von der Höhe gnostischer Vollkommenheit.' *Der wahre Gnostiker*, p.278.

[47]Cf. Marrou, 'Tout le *Pédagogue* joue, page après page, sur l'ambiguité du mot grec ΛΟΓΟΣ [...].' 'Humanisme et christianisme', p.192. For the effect of the right ordering of the universe on human actions, cf. *Paed.* 1.2.6.6.

[48]Not only does the λόγος ὀρθός act as the guide for Clement's descriptions of Christian behaviour, but, in reverse, it becomes the measure of sin, *Paed.* 1.13.101.1: πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν ὀρθὸν τοῦτο ἁμάρτημά ἐστιν.

[49]Cf. esp. M. Pohlenz, 'Klemens von Alexandrien und sein hellenisches Christentum', and M. Spanneut, *Le Stoïcisme et les Pères de l'Église*.

[50]*Paed.* 1.13.101.2: [...] ἡ ἀρετὴ αὐτὴ διάθεσίς ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς σύμφωνος τῷ λόγῳ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον. Cf. *SVF* 3.197, p.48.4; 3.262, p.63.34.

is augmented by a reference in the *Stromateis* to the Platonic idea of virtue as the harmony of the soul, the governing of its irrational parts by the reason, through which it is possible to lead a right life.[51] The need for the rational part of the soul to be dominant, for the whole soul and life to be harmonious, also requires the ability to discern the φαντασία conjured up by the passions. Thus Clement describes Christian conduct as being 'an operation of the rational soul in accordance with a correct judgement and desire for truth which is accomplished through its companion and ally the body.'[52] Considered from this perspective, Clement can characterize the new Christian regimen in the following terms:

> The Christian life, which we are now taught, is a system of rational actions, that is, of those things taught by the Logos, an unfailing energy which we have called faith.[53]

Clement reduces the intellectualist tenor of this σύστημα ... λογικῶν πράξεων by identifying it with the commandments of the Lord, written and adapted for ourselves and for obedience.[54]

In the *Paedagogus* Clement also connects the idea of virtue as harmony with the ὀρθὸς λόγος to the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue as moderation:

> The medium is good in all things [...] since the extremes are dangerous, the middle courses are good. For to be in no want of

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[51] *Strom.* 4.4.18.1; Plato *Rep.* 3.410c; cf. 9.591d. See Lilla, *op. cit.* pp.61-72, for a comprehensive discussion of Clement's doctrine of virtue with regard to the contemporary philosophical background.

[52] *Paed.* 1.13.102.3: καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μὲν πρᾶξις ἡ τοῦ Χριστιανοῦ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια λογικῆς κατὰ κρίσιν ἀστείαν καὶ ὄρεξιν ἀληθείας διὰ τοῦ συμφυοῦς καὶ συναγωνιστοῦ σώματος ἐκτελουμένη·

[53] *Paed.* 1.13.102.4: καὶ γὰρ ὁ βίος ὁ Χριστιανῶν, ὃν παιδαγωγούμεθα νῦν, σύστημά τί ἐστι λογικῶν πράξεων, τουτέστιν τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διδασκομένων ἀδιάπτωτος ἐνέργεια, ἣν δὴ πίστιν κεκλήκαμεν.

[54] *Paed.* 1.13.103.1: τὸ δὲ σύστημα ἐντολαὶ κυριακαί, αἳ δὴ δόξαι οὖσαι θεῖαι καὶ ὑποθῆκαι πνευματικαὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἀναγεγράφαται, πρὸς τε ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας εὔθετοι·

> necessaries is the medium, and the desires which are in accordance with nature are bounded by sufficiency.[55]

Like most of his philosophical statements, this combination of Stoic and Aristotelian ideas is not original to Clement, but has its parallels in Middle Platonism and Philo.[56] The demand for self-sufficiency is also characteristic of the new regimen: Clement interprets the words 'Take no thought for the morrow' to demand that those dedicated to Christ should be self-sufficient, their own store-house, for, requiring as few things as possible, we are assimilated to God, who alone is in need of nothing.[57] In the *Paedagogus*, at least, the goal of asceticism is therefore a moderation and harmony bounded by natural necessity: 'In a word, whatever things are natural to humans we must not eradicate from them, but rather impose on them limits and suitable times.'[58] The most apt term to characterize this state, although Clement does not in fact use it in the *Paedagogus*, is μετριοπάθεια.[59]

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[55] *Paed.* 2.1.16.4: ἀγαθὴ μὲν ἡ μέση κατάστασις ἐν πᾶσι μέν, [...] ἐπεὶ αἱ μὲν ἀκρότητες σφαλεραί, αἱ μεσότητες δὲ ἀγαθαί. μέσον δέ ἐστι πᾶν τὸ ἀνενδεὲς τῶν ἀναγκαίων· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ὀρέξεις αὐταρκείᾳ περιορίζονται. Cf. *Paed.* 3.10.51.3; Aristotle *Nich. Eth.* 2.6.15-17, 1106b.36-1107a.8.

[56] For the Aristotelian influence in Clement's use of the Stoic doctrine of life 'according to nature', see E. A. Clark, *Clement's Use of Aristotle*, pp.42-44, and for similar trends in Middle Platonism and Philo, cf. Lilla, *op. cit.* pp.64-5.

[57] Cf. *Paed.* 1.12.98.4: [...] αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ταμιεῖον εἶναι διδάσκων. [...] χρῆναι [...] τὸν ἀπογεγραμμένον Χριστῷ αὐτάρκη καὶ αὐτοδιάκονον [...]. *Paed.* 3.1.1.1: [...] Θεὸν δὲ εἰδῶς ἐξομοιωθήσεται Θεῷ [...] ἀγαθοεργῶν καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ὀλιγίστων δεόμενος· ἀνενδεὴς δὲ μόνος ὁ Θεὸς [...]. Cf. *Strom.* 2.18.81.2.

[58] *Paed.* 2.5.46.1: ἁπλῶς γὰρ ὁπόσα φυσικὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστίν, ταῦτα οὐκ ἀναιρεῖν ἐξ αὐτῶν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτρον αὐτοῖς καὶ καιρὸν ἐπιτιθέναι πρέποντα.

[59] Clement uses the term in the *Stromateis* to distinguish the ethical state of the simple Christians from that of the Gnostics. μετριοπάθεια was commonly used in Philo and Middle Platonism, see Lilla, *op. cit.* pp.99-103.

Clement elaborates the practical details of this new regimen with an exacting strictness. Each of our acts is governed by a relentless concern for its modality, accordance with the ὀρθὸς λόγος (as the divine Logos, human reason and the natural order), and its finality, the limitation imposed by necessity. Although Clement does not mention Musonius by name, in the *Paedagogus* he treats the same subjects as Musonius and frequently employs the same expressions.[60] At the beginning of the second book of the *Paedagogus*, Clement appropriates the old maxim that, whilst others may live in order to eat, the Paedagogue demands that we eat in order to live.[61] Every aspect of our nourishment is then systematically worked out from this principle, resulting in a clear preference for the most simple and frugal types of food, which are also, on principle, the foods most suitable for the body and which produce the strongest and noblest humans.[62] The same principle is used to deduce what type of clothes the Christians are permitted to wear, what objects they may have in their homes etc. Clement also spares us few details about the manner in which Christians ought to live their lives. For instance, when discussing our behaviour at the table, Clement enjoins us:

> We must abstain from all slavish manners and excess, and touch what is set before us in a decorous way, keeping the hand and the couch and the chin free of stains, preserving the grace of the countenance undisturbed, and commit no indecorum in the act of swallowing [...].[63]

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[60] The parallel texts were established by P. Wendland, *Quaestiones Musonianae: De Musonio Stoico Clementis Alexandrini aliorumque auctore*. Cf. Marrou, 'Introduction', p.52, for a brief comparison.

[61] *Paed.* 2.1.1.4. Cf. Musonius 18b (Hense p.103).

[62] *Paed.* 2.1. *passim*; 2.1.5.2: πᾶν γὰρ τοὐναντίον οἱ ταῖς εὐτελεστάταις χρώμενοι τροφαῖς ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσι καὶ ὑγεινότεροι καὶ γενναιότεροι, [...].
Cf. Musonius 18b (Hense p.104.5-6): πᾶν γὰρ τοὐναντίον οἱ ταῖς εὐτελεστάταις χρώμενοι τροφαῖς ἰσχυρότατοί εἰσιν.

[63] *Paed.* 2.1.13.1.

The *Paedagogus* is full of such advice for every aspect of life, how we should walk, talk, laugh, go to bed, sleep, etc. The overall aim, according to Clement, was to fashion Christians so that they would be characterized by 'composure, tranquillity, calmness and peace.'[64]

P. Brown admirably describes the significance of this comprehensive tableau:

> He drew on the rules for disciplined deportment, commended by philosophers to the Greek elites of his age, in order to wrap the believer in a web of minute, seemingly insignificant patterns of daily living. But every detail of these codes unobtrusively communicated a view of the world, of the human person and of society, that was soundproof to the shrill claims of the 'born again' [ie. the Encratites] [...] Clement's writings communicated a sense of the God-given importance of every moment of daily life, and especially of the life of the household.[65]

This σύστημα ... λογικῶν πράξεων deliberately covers every aspect of the Christian life, awake and asleep, leaving no aspect of life uninfluenced by the new regimen, in order to leave no crack through which newly-baptized Christians could be seduced by those who claimed that entry into the new life necessitated the abandonment rather than the transformation of the fabric of the old life, especially marriage.

It has been rightly stressed that Clement does not simply repeat the cultivated morality of his day, but transforms it by placing it in a Christian persective.[66] The Stoic demand for a life lived 'according to the λόγος' becomes filled with a new meaning, that of obedience to the Logos-Paedagogue, Christ. The Stoic doctrine of the anthropocentric

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[64] *Paed.* 2.7.60.5: καθόλου γὰρ ὁ Χριστιανὸς ἠρεμίας καὶ ἡσυχίας καὶ γαλήνης καὶ εἰρήνης οἰκεῖός ἐστιν.

[65] P. Brown, *The Body and Society*, pp.125-126.

[66] Cf. Marrou: 'Tous les thèmes empruntés par Clément à la tradition morale de la philosophie grecque sont comme transfigurés par leur insertion dans une perspective chrétienne: [...].' 'Introduction', p.58.

structure of the universe, is placed in the context of a personal God who made the universe and all its goods for humans. The enjoyment of the beauty of this world, for example the fragrance and beauty of flowers, leads humans to praise the Creator.[67] The right use of these goods therefore has the form of thanksgiving, whilst the one who continually gives thanks is no longer occupied with pleasures.[68] With regard to the good things of this world, Clement expands the Stoic doctrine of their communal possession into a perspective of love: the principle of κοινωνικόν is replaced by ἀγαπητικόν.[69] Further, whilst the *Paedagogus* was written to teach 'how each of us ought to conduct himself in respect of the body, or rather how to regulate the body itself', this now has as its goal 'to purify the flesh.'[70]

However, whilst Clement certainly places the common themes of Greek philosophical morality within a Christian context, there remain the problems of motivation and modality. When discussing what drink is suitable for Christians, Clement begins with a categorical statement: 'The natural, sober and necessary drink for the thirsty is water.'[71] He expresses his admiration for those who 'have adopted an austere life, and who are fond of water, the medicine of temperance, and flee as far as possible from wine, shunning it

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[67] *Paed.* 2.8.70.5: [...] καὶ χρὴ δι᾽ ὄψεως ἀπολαύοντας τῶν καλῶν δοξάζειν τὸν δημιουργόν.

[68] *Paed.* 2.1.10.3: καὶ ὅ γε ἀεὶ εὐχαριστῶν οὐκ ἀσχολεῖται περὶ ἡδονάς. The need for thanksgiving is stressed continually in the *Paedagogus*, and, at *Paed.* 2.1.10.3, is even described thus: [...] ὡς εἶναι τὴν δικαίαν τροφὴν εὐχαριστίαν [...].

[69] *Paed.* 2.12.120.4: οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον οὐδὲ κοινωνικόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ μᾶλλον ἀγαπητικὸν· Cf. Marrou, 'Introduction', p.58.

[70] *Paed.* 2.1.1.2.

[71] *Paed.* 2.2.19.2: φυσικὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ νηφάλιον ποτὸν ἀναγκαῖον διψῶσιν ἐστιν ὕδωρ.

as they would the danger of fire.'[72] We are to eat our meals without any drink at all; if perchance thirst comes on, we must satisfy it with water, but only in moderation.[73] In addition, Clement then writes several pages describing the dangers of wine. The conclusion of Clement's argument, and one is left in no doubt that this would have been his preference, is complete abstinence from wine. But, as he reminds us, and himself, Christ Himself drank wine.[74] There is, furthermore, the fact that wine was blessed by Christ for the Eucharist, which conversely gives a eucharistic character to each act of drinking wine.[75] Clement is forced to recall this in order to counter the Encratites who would have prohibited the use of wine altogether.[76] Clement is thus compelled to allow the use of wine; which he then restricts to older people who, when they have finished their serious readings, and as the day becomes colder, may use but a little wine to introduce some warmth into the body.[77] A similar dialectic can be seen in Clement's discussion on the eating of meat. Clement quotes with approval Romans 14.20, 'it is good not to eat meat nor to drink wine,' recalling that it is also a Pythagorean principle.[78] Whilst citing Rom. 14 and 1 Cor. 8, Clement does briefly touch upon the Pauline concern that the weaker brethren should not be scandalized by our actions, but his main interest is shown in the following pages where he describes the many virtues of eating only

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[72] *Paed.* 2.2.20.2: ἄγαμαι τοίνυν τοὺς αὐστηρὸν ἐπανῃρημένους βίον καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης τὸ φάρμακον ἐπιποθοῦντας τὸ ὕδωρ, φεύγοντας δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα πορρωτάτω τὸν οἶνον οἷον πυρὸς ἀπειλήν.

[73] *Paed.* 2.2.21.2-3.

[74] *Paed.* 2.2.32.2.

[75] Cf. E. Osborn, *Ethical Patterns in Early Christian Thought*, p.59.

[76] *Paed.* 2.2.33.1.

[77] Cf. *Paed.* 2.2.22.1-2, 29.2.

[78] *Paed.* 2.1.11.1.

vegetables. Moreover, in the context of discussing the character of the Christian perfection, Clement suggests that a Christian Gnostic might abstain from meat both for the sake of his ἄσκησις and to weaken the sexual appetite.[79] However, the fact that Christ ate some fish in front of his disciples, and that Peter was ordered to eat meat in his vision (Acts.10.10-15), leads Clement to emphasize the need to use everything with moderation.[80] As Marrou points out, this dialectic indicates that the asceticism of Clement finds its limit in the Incarnate Christ, and this, for Marrou, is sufficient to preserve its essentially Christian character.[81] But if his asceticism is held in check by Christ, its motivation certainly lies elsewhere, in the ideal he establishes for Christian life, an ideal he found in the popular cultivated morality of his time. Christ's Incarnation is consequently understood by Clement as enabling the exercise of the morality taught by the Greeks, who, despite having received a spark of the divine Word, were unable to practise it due to their own weakness.[82]

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[79] Cf. *Strom.* 7.6.33.6: τάχ' ἄν τις τῶν γνωστικῶν καὶ ἀσκήσεως χάριν σαρκοφαγίας ἀπόσχοιτο καὶ τοῦ μὴ σφριγᾶν περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια τὴν σάρκα. For the ascetic principle of abstaining from meat so as to weaken the sexual appetite, as it was developed in later monasticism, see the study by A. Rousselle, *Porneia*, esp. pp.205-226 (Eng. trans. pp.160-178).

[80] *Paed.* 2.1.10.21-16.4.

[81] Marrou: 'Clément en est une demonstration très remarquable, car soit par tempérament personnel soit pour répondre à la surenchère gnostique, il serait plutòt porté à un ascétisme excessif, mais à chaque pas cette tendance spontanée est contrée par la révélation.' 'Morale et spiritualité chrétienne dans le *Pédagogue* de Clément d'Alexandrie', p.543; 'Cependant cet ascétisme trouve sa limite [...] et cette limite, c'est le Christ, sa croix, et d'abord sa vie: en définitive c'est l'exemple même posé par le Verbe incarné, tel qu'il nous est révélé par l'Evangile, qui freine le développement des tendances ascétiques. [...] Oui, c'est bien là une morale authentiquement chrétienne;'. 'Introduction', pp.60-61.

[82] *Prot.* 7.74.7: εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἐναύσματά τινα τοῦ λόγου τοῦ θείου λαβόντες Ἕλληνες ὀλίγα ἄττα τῆς ἀληθείας ἐφθέγξαντο, προσμαρτυροῦσι μὲν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς οὐκ ἀποκεκρυμμένην, σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐλέγχουσιν ἀσθενεῖς, οὐκ ἐφικόμενοι τοῦ τέλους.

A parallel problem can be seen from an analysis of the relation between God and the human in the asceticism that Clement describes. There is a continual oscillation in this relation throughout Clement's work. Corresponding to the emphasis which we have seen that places on freedom as determinative in the constitution of human beings, Clement stresses that the practise of this asceticism, the acquisition of virtue, falls within their own ability. The human is by nature adapted for the acquisition of virtue[83], if it were not so, the possession of virtue would be neither voluntary nor praiseworthy.[84] Clement repeatedly and expressly states that it is within our power to train ourselves and to obey the commandments, for virtue is supremely a matter of our own volition.[85] This significance and scope of human volition and ability is the result of God's plan for the human: God adapted Adam for the acquisition of virtue, for God 'intended him to be saved of himself.'[86] Taken in isolation, the immense role ascribed by Clement to human volition would seem to make him a forerunner of Pelagianism. But it seems to be balanced by a equal stress on the inadequacy of the human's own ascetic labour:

> For humans training and working for ἀπάθεια achieve nothing. But if they plainly show themselves very desirous and earnest about this,

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[83] Cf. *Strom.* 6.9.95.5: [...] ὅτι φύσει μὲν γεγόναμεν πρὸς ἀρετήν, οὐ μὴν ὥστε ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐκ γενετῆς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ κτήσασθαι ἐπιτήδειοι. *Strom.* 1.6.34.2-4, 6.12.96.3.

[84] *Strom.* 7.3.19.3: οὔτε γὰρ φύσει τὴν ἀρετὴν γεννώμεθα ἔχοντες [...] (ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἂν ἦν ἔθ' ἑκούσιον οὐδὲ ἐπαινετόν) [...].

[85] Cf. eg. *Strom.* 2.15.62.4: ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν γε ἥ τε πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν ἡμῶν παράστασις ἥ τε πρὸς τὰς ἐντολὰς ὑπακοή. 4.19.124.1: [...] τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἐπ' ἄλλοις τισὶν εἶναί φαμεν ἢ πάντων μάλιστα ἐφ' ἡμῖν. 4.24.153.2: καὶ δὴ αἱ ἐντολαὶ οἷαί τε γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι ὑφ' ἡμῶν, οἷς εὐλόγως ἔπεται ἔπαινός τε καὶ ψόγος, [...]; 7.7.48.7: ταῦτ' οὖν ἀπαιτεῖται παρ' ἡμῶν, τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, [...]; 7.2.8.6. Cf. Völker, commenting on *QDS* 18.1, 'die Tugen fällt unter die Rubrik des τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.' *Der wahre Gnostiker*, p.457. See also Wytzes, 'The Twofold Way', *passim*, and *supra* pp.158-160.

[86] *Strom.* 6.12.96.2: ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βούλεται σῴζεσθαι. Cf. *Strom.* 7.2.6.3.

> they attain it by the addition of the power of God. For God conspires with willing souls. But if they abandon their eagerness, the Spirit which is bestowed by God is also restrained.[87]

Humans cannot attain to the heights of ἀπάθεια without the aid of this power of God. God and humans thus co-operate, enabling the humans to achieve the state of ἀπάθεια. However, this state of ἀπάθεια is not demanded of the simple Christians, who, for their salvation, are exhorted to remain in a state of moderation and self-sufficiency. As we will see, when looking at the life of the true Christian Gnostic, the goal of ἀπάθεια is for those who do not want simply to be saved, but to be saved in a 'fitting and becoming manner'.[88]

With regard to salvation, it is frequently asserted that the relationship between human asceticism and the grace or power of God, as Clement describes it, is one of 'synergy'.[89] As Jaeger noted, Clement is the first Christian writer to develop a fairly sophisticated vocabulary and theology of 'synergy'.[90] According to Jaeger, Clement's use of this idea differs from St. Gregory of Nyssa and the later Greek patristic tradition, in that

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[87] *QDS.* 21.1-2: ὅτι καθ' αὑτὸν μὲν ἀσκῶν καὶ διαπονούμενος ἀπάθειαν ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐδὲν ἀνύει, ἐὰν δὲ γένηται δῆλος ὑπερεπιθυμῶν τούτου καὶ διεσπουδακῶς, τῇ προσθήκῃ τῆς παρὰ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως περιγίνεται· βουλομέναις μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ Θεὸς συνεπιπνεῖ, εἰ δὲ ἀποσταῖεν τῆς προθυμίας καὶ τὸ δοθὲν ἐκ Θεοῦ πνεῦμα συνεστάλη·

[88] Cf. *Strom.* 6.14.111.3; *infra*, pp.228-230.

[89] Völker: 'Die Frage, wie sich Gnade und freier Wille zueinander verhalten, wird von Clemens im sinne des üblichen Synergismus beantwortet.' *Der wahre Gnostiker*, p.121. Cf. pp.254-256, pp.458-460. Similarly T. Rüther: 'Die ernstliche Bemühung des freien Menschen und die göttliche Gnade gehören also zusammen.' *Die sittliche Forderung der Apatheia in den beiden ersten christliche Jahrhunderten und bei Klemens von Alexandrien*, p.85; and R. B. Tollinton: 'It is a question of man's choice, and of man's love, and not less of the grace of God. And these three are one. The resultant is a single inward force leading ever heavenward.' *Clement of Alexandria*, 2 p.82.

[90] Cf. W. Jaeger, *Two Rediscovered Works of Ancient Christian Literature: Gregory of Nyssa and Macarius*, pp.103-106.

Clement never speaks of God, Christ or the Spirit co-operating with the human; it is, rather, the human who is said to co-operate, 'who, when he feels that the grace of God is given him, seizes the opportunity to yield to it.'[91] In the eighth *Stromata* Clement systematically analyzes the various types of causes and provides a formal definition of what he means by 'synergy', by distinguishing the co-operative cause (τὸ συνεργόν) from the related concept of a 'joint-cause':

> The joint-cause is conceived of in conjunction with another, which is not capable of producing the effect by itself, being a cause along with a cause. The co-operative cause differs from the joint-cause in this particular, that the joint cause produces the effect in that which by itself does not act; but the co-operative cause, while effecting nothing by itself, yet by its accession to that which acts by itself, co-operates with it, towards the production of the effect in the intensest degree.[92]

In this formal schema, the co-operative cause, which by itself is unable to act, co-operates with that which is capable of acting by itself, making the effect better and stronger. If one were to transfer this schema to the relationship between God and the human, it would seem to imply that humans are not able to achieve anything working by themselves, but must accede to the power or grace of God.

However, Clement is less rigid in his application of this definition than Jaeger supposes. According to Clement all causes, even co-operative causes, must effect something, of which they are then 'wholly' the cause, otherwise

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[91] Jaeger, *ibid.* p.103.

[92] *Strom.* 8.9.33.8-9: νοεῖται γὰρ σὺν ἑτέρῳ τὸ συναίτιον οὐδ' αὐτῷ δυναμένῳ κατ' ἰδίαν ποιῆσαι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, αἴτιον ὂν σὺν αἰτίῳ. διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ συναιτίου τὸ συνεργὸν ἐν τῷ τὸ μὲν συναίτιον <μεθ' ἑτέρου> κατ' ἰδίαν μὴ ποιοῦντος τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα παρέχειν, τὸ δὲ συνεργὸν [ἐν τῷ] κατ' ἰδίαν μὴ ποιεῖν, ἑτέρῳ δὲ προσερχόμενον τῳ κατ' ἰδίαν ποιοῦντι συνεργεῖ<ν> αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ σφοδρότερον γίνεσθαι τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, [. . .]. See the whole of *Strom.* 8.9, and also *Strom.* 1.20. esp. 99.

they would not even be called a cause.[93] Clement can also speak of co-operative causes as providing 'power' towards the desired effect.[94]

More specifically, in the context of Clement's descriptions of the relationship between God and humans, it is not correct simply to assert that humans 'co-operate' with the grace or power of God, or the Spirit. Clement is convinced that purity of soul is a prerequisite for the reception of the grace or power of God.[95] For Clement, humans are saved by their co-operation, not with the grace or power of God, but with the paedagogy of the commandments enjoined by God, which are always within their own capacity. In the seventh *Stromata* Clement provides a more detailed description of this relationship:

> Nor shall those who are being saved be saved against their will, for they are not inanimate; but they will above all voluntarily and of free choice hasten to salvation. For humans received the commandments so as to be self-impelled, to whatever they might wish of things to be chosen and things to be avoided. Wherefore God does not do good by necessity, but from His free choice He benefits those who turn to Him of themselves.[96]

We have been given the commandments that we might be self-impelled. Through our free choice we have the possibility of choosing salvation and turning to

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[93] *Strom.* 8.9.33.4: εἰ μὲν οὖν μηδὲν παρέχεται, οὐδὲ συνεργὸν λεχθήσεται, εἰ δὲ παρέχεται, τούτου πάντως γίνεται αἴτιον οὗ καὶ παρέχεται, τουτέστιν τοῦ δι' αὐτοῦ γινομένου. Clement here uses the same verb (παρέχειν) as he used to contrast the συναίτον and συνεργὸν in *Strom.* 8.9.33.8-9.

[94] Cf. *Strom.* 1.20.99.4: ἀλλὰ τῶν συνεργῶν τὰ μὲν πλείονα, τὰ δ' ἐλασσονα προσφέρεται δύναμιν.

[95] *QDS* 16.2: [...] εἰς δὲ ἀκάθαρτον ψυχὴν Θεοῦ χάρις οὐ παραδύεται. Cf. *Strom.* 3.5.42.6: καθαρὸς γὰρ ὢν καὶ πάσης κακίας ἀπηλλαγμένος ὁ νοῦς δεκτικός πως ὑπάρχει τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως, [...].

[96] *Strom.* 7.7.42.4-6: [...] οὔτε μὴν ἄκων σωθήσεται ὁ σῳζόμενος· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄψυχος, ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἑκουσίως καὶ προαιρετικῶς σπεύσει πρὸς σωτηρίαν. διὸ καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς ἔλαβεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὡς ἂν ἐξ αὑτοῦ ὁρμητικὸς πρὸς ὁπότερον ἂν καὶ βούλοιτο τῶν τε αἱρετῶν καὶ τῶν φευκτῶν. οὔκουν ὁ Θεὸς ἀνάγκῃ ἀγαθοποιεῖ, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δὲ εὖ ποιεῖ τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπιστρέφοντας.

God. Our freely chosen application is then matched by God's grace, enabling the perfecting of our choice and the saving of those who by their own choice and application are already being saved. It is thus that Clement understands the Incarnation in terms of paedagogy: Christ 'came to show man what was possible through obedience to the commandments.'[97] In the fifth *Stromata* Clement describes the dynamic of this relationship in a similar fashion: Wisdom, the power of the Father, is given by God, it rouses our free-will and then repays the application of the elect with crowns of fellowship.[98]

This synergetic relationship is seen particularly clearly in the image of the Logos as a physician who, with our co-operation, heals our diseases, the passions.

> As the physician provides health for those who co-operate with him towards health, so also God provides eternal salvation for those who co-operate with Him for knowledge and right action; and the moment that we do any one of the things in our capacity, which are enjoined by the commandments, the promise also receives its fulfilment.[99]

The fulfilment of the commandments, which is within our own capability, is rewarded by bestowal of salvation. It is in this sense that the human is said to co-operate with God, helping to achieve His designs for humanity.

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[97] *Strom.* 7.2.8.6: [...] αἰσθητὴν δὲ ἀναλαβὼν σάρκα τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὴν ὑπακοὴν τῶν ἐντολῶν δείξων ἀφίκετο.
It must be stressed that this paedagogic function does not exhaust Clement's understanding of the Incarnation. Cf. C. Bigg: 'For Clement's idea of the Saviour is larger and nobler - may we say less conventional? - than that of any other doctor of the Church.' *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p.72.

[98] *Strom.* 5.13.83.5: θεόσδοτος τοίνυν ἡ σοφία, δύναμις οὖσα τοῦ πατρός, προτρέπει μὲν ἡμῶν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, ἀποδέχεται δὲ τὴν πίστιν καὶ ἀμείβεται τὴν ἐπίστασιν τῆς ἐκλογῆς ἄκρᾳ κοινωνίᾳ.

[99] *Strom.* 7.7.48.4: ὡς δὲ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὑγείαν παρέχεται τοῖς συνεργοῦσι πρὸς ὑγείαν, οὕτως καὶ ὁ θεὸς τὴν ἀίδιον σωτηρίαν τοῖς συνεργοῦσι πρὸς γνῶσίν τε καὶ εὐπραγίαν, σὺν δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, ὄντων ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἃ προστάττουσιν αἱ ἐντολαί, καὶ ἡ ἐπαγγελία τελειοῦται.

Similarly, Clement refers to Ephesians (2.5), but makes his own characteristic addition: 'By grace we are saved, but not without good works'.[100] Likewise, when Clement reads 'thy faith has saved thee' (Mark 5.34), he specifies that this does not simply mean faith, for it was spoken to the Jews, that is, to those who already kept the Law and lived blamelessly, lacking only faith.[101] These good works, our freely chosen ascetic labours, are thus a prerequisite for the grace of salvation or the gift of ἀπάθεια (as in *QDS* 21.1), rather than being the effect or manifestation of our salvation.[102]

The relationship between human effort and the grace of God is, in Clement's thought, one of synergy. But it is a synergy which remains a purely external collaboration between two distinct actors: humans are created for the acquisition of virtue; they are aroused to this task by the God-given commandments or wisdom, and continually prompted to action by the threats and promises of the Paedagogue; yet the task remains one within the scope of their free will and capacity, and it is their application to this task that is rewarded, when they are suitably purified, by the grace of God. There is no sense, in Clement's descriptions of the asceticism of the Christian, of that asceticism being the application of the newness of life freely granted

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[100] *Strom.* 5.1.7.2: >χάριτι γὰρ σῳζόμεθα<, οὐκ ἄνευ μέντοι τῶν καλῶν ἔργων, [...].

[101] *Strom.* 6.14.108.4-5: ὥστε ὅταν ἀκούσωμεν >ἡ πίστις σου σέσωκέν σε<, οὐχ ἁπλῶς τοὺς ὁπωσοῦν πιστεύσαντας σωθήσεσθαι λέγειν αὐτὸν ἐκδεχόμεθα, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα ἐπακολουθήσῃ. αὐτίκα Ἰουδαίοις μόνοις ταύτην ἔλεγε τὴν φωνὴν τοῖς νομικῶς καὶ ἀνεπιλήπτως βεβιωκόσιν, οἷς μόνον ἡ εἰς τὸν κύριον ὑπελείπετο πίστις.

[102] Cf. Völker: 'Immer verlangt Gott von uns ἔργα, die eine notwendige Voraussetzung für unsere σωτηρία sind, aber [...] τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν δὲ ἑκάστου ἀπαιτεῖ.' (*Strom.* 2.6.26.3) *Der wahre Gnostiker*, p.254. J. Wytzes: 'In Clement the moral effort is a condition of salvation, in St. Paul moral effort proceeds from salvation as a task.' 'The Twofold Way', p.237.

to those who turn to God in faith. The eschatological tension of the Christian living proleptically the life of the resurrection, which Clement described so vividly in the first book of the *Paedagogus*, has not penetrated into his description of the asceticism of Christian life. Clement's 'synergism' describes a relation between God and the believer in which they co-operate to achieve the believer's salvation, rather than to enflesh their freely given eschatological salvation in the present. It is, therefore, a synergy which does not result from our new relationship with God granted in baptism.

By his thorough-going analysis of the Christian life in terms of a system of rational actions, a life in which each act had a God-given importance, Clement, as Brown suggests, defended the value of every aspect of everyday human life from the 'born-again' Encratites. But his method of doing this involved changing the basis of the defence: the style of asceticism which he proposes no longer has its motivation in Christ nor does it live by the new life granted by Him: rather it is an ἄσκησις, undertaken for its own sake[103], which finds its limitation in Christ. Rendered secure, by a self-sufficient, self-assured composure and tranquillity, from attack by the Encratites, Clement's prescribed regimen for Christian life is also impregnable both to the newness of life granted in baptism, and, as we will see in looking at his thought on marriage, to a full engagement with our concrete and inter-personal life.[104] Clement provides a particularly suitable

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[103] Cf. *Strom.* 7.6.33.6: [...] καὶ ἀσκήσεως χάριν σαρκοφαγίας ἀπόσχοιτο [...].

[104] I cannot agree with the conclusion of Marrou, who speaks of 'l'inspiration profondément chrétienne de la spiritualité du *Pédagogue*, ce que j'ai appelé son caractère "extatique": l'irruption de la transcendance divine dans notre vie la plus quotidienne [...].' 'Introduction', pp.39-40. He is referring to his article 'Morale et spiritualité chrétiennes dans le

image for the style of this asceticism: rather than a new life which penetrates every aspect of the Christian's existence and their world, Clement's Christians pursue wisdom by inwardly stretching upwards, separated from the world and from sin, they touch the world on tiptoe only in order to appear in the world.[105]

The effects of this style of asceticism are seen, as I suggested, especially clearly in Clement's discussion of marriage. Clement is frequently praised for his warm appreciation of marriage.[106] He stresses, against the Encratites, that marriage is a matter of choice, for those who are suited for it and who are at the appropriate age.[107] In the final chapter of the second *Stromata*, a prelude to the celebrated third book, Clement presents a brief doxographical survey of the opinions of the philosophers about marriage. He cites Plato, without comment, as maintaining that marriage contrives immortality for the human race through the succession of children.[108] He refers to Democritus and Epicurus, who disparage marriage

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Pédagogue', p.544. Such divine irruption is certainly expressed by Clement in his description of the effects of baptism, but does not extend to his proposed framework of Christian life.

[105] *Paed.* 1.5.16.3: [...] ἀνατεινόμενοι δὲ ἄνω τῇ ἐννοίᾳ, κόσμῳ καὶ ἁμαρτίαις ἀποτεταγμένοι, >ὀλίγῳ ποδὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι τῆς γῆς< (a suggested, but unattributed quotation in Stählin and S.C.) ὅσον ἐν κόσμῳ εἶναι δοκεῖν, σοφίαν μεταδιώκομεν ἁγίαν· Given that Clement believed that people's ideas about God correspond to their own character (*Strom.* 6.17.149.4, 7.4.22.1-2), it is no surprise that Clement on one occasion depicts Christ in somewhat docetic terms (*Strom.* 6.9.71.2): a docetic Saviour is a suitable model for a 'docetic' asceticism.

[106] Most recently J. P. Broudéhoux: *Mariage et famille chez Clément d'Alexandrie*, and M. Mees, 'Clemens von Alexandrien über Ehe und Familie'; see also F. Quatember, *Die christliche Lebenshaltung des Klemens von Alexandrinus nach seinem Pädagogus*.

[107] *Strom.* 2.23.137.3-4; 3.9.66.3.

[108] *Strom.* 2.23.138.2: [...] ἐπισκευάσας τὴν ἀθανασίαν τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν [καὶ] οἱνεὶ διαμονήν τινα παισὶ παίδων μεταλαμπαδευομένην. Cf. Plato, *Laws* 6.773e, *Symp.* 207d.

because of the many troubles that it brings. The Stoics regard marriage and the rearing of children to be indifferent, whilst the Peripatetics believe it is a good.[109] He then refers to Hierocles and Antipatros, again without comment, for whom 'the childless man fails in the perfection which is according to nature, not having substituted his proper successor in his place.'[110] Finally Clement concludes the survey by giving three reasons why we must marry

> Therefore we must by all means marry, both for our country's sake, for the succession of children, and as far as we are able, for the completion of the world.[111]

This reference to the συντελειώσις of the world, does not seem to refer to the eschatological idea of the completion of the number of the elect, but rather to the continuity of the world as it is.[112] Clement then goes on to speak of the necessity of marriage as being especially shown by the diseases of the body, for a wife's care far exceeds that of friends.[113] Likewise marriage is shown to be necessary due to the help that a spouse and children can provide in old age.[114]

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[109] *Strom.* 2.23.138.3-6. See Stählin's footnotes for suggested references.

[110] *Strom.* 2.23.139.5: ἔτι, φασίν, ὁ ἄτεκνος τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τελειότητος ἀπολείπεται ἅτε μὴ ἀντικαταστήσας τῇ χώρᾳ τὸν οἰκεῖον διάδοχον· Stählin identifies these as Hierocles and Antipatros, referring to Stobaeus *Flor.* 67.21.25.

[111] *Strom.* 2.23.140.1: Γαμητέον οὖν πάντως καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων διαδοχῆς καὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου τὸ ὅσον ἐφ' ἡμῖν συντελειώσεως, [...].

[112] Thus Clement refers to Plato's belief that those who do not marry dissolve the states and the world that is constituted by marriage, *Strom.* 2.23.141.5; Plato, *Laws* 6.773e-774c. Cf. *Paed.* 2.10.83.2; van Eijk, 'Marriage and Virginity, Death and Immortality', p.220.

[113] *Strom.* 2.23.140.2: αἱ δὲ σωματικαὶ νόσοι μάλιστα τὸν γάμον ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύουσιν· ἡ γὰρ τῆς γυναικὸς κηδεμονία καὶ τῆς παραμονῆς ἡ ἐκτένεια τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ φίλων ἔοικεν ὑπερτίθεσθαι προσκαρτερήσεις, [...].

[114] *Strom.* 2.23.141.1: βοηθεῖ δὲ ὁ γάμος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προβεβηκότων τῷ χρόνῳ παριστὰς τὴν γαμετὴν ἐπιμελομένην καὶ τοὺς ἐκ ταύτης παῖδας γηροβοσκοὺς ἐκτρέφων.

The emphasis of these stock themes is quite clearly on procreation, and that is, in fact, how Clement defines the goal of marriage:

> The goal for the married is procreation and its end is fair children. Marriage is the first coming together according to law of a man and a women for the procreation of legitimate children.[115]

Every aspect of marital sexual activity is then rigorously deduced from this principle; everything which does not conform to this finality is severely condemned. Even the 'conjugal rights' which St. Paul defended against the Corinthians (1 Cor. 7.3,5), are restricted by Clement to the finality of procreation, something never mentioned by St. Paul.[116] In this context Clement speak extensively about the need to 'follow nature', established as it is by divine providence.[117] Clement even cites with approval Epicurus' maxim that 'sexual intercourse does no one any good; it is desirable if it does no harm', and adds that even lawful intercourse is perilous except insofar as it is undertaken for procreation.[118] Clement also aims to outdo Stoic morality in his rigorism: 'If, as the Stoics believe, reason recommends that the Sage does not even move a finger by 'chance, how much more necessary is it for those who seek wisdom to control the organ of

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[115] *Paed.* 2.10.83.1: [...] τοῖς δὲ γεγαμηκόσι σκοπὸς ἡ παιδοποιία, τέλος δὲ ἡ εὐτεκνία, [...].
Strom. 2.23.137.1: γάμος μὲν οὖν ἐστι σύνοδος ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἡ πρώτη κατὰ νόμον ἐπὶ γνησίων τέκνων σπορᾷ.

[116] Cf. *Strom.* 3.17.107.5: >καὶ μὴ ἀποστερεῖτε<, φησίν, >ἀλλήλους, εἰ μὴ ἐκ συμφώνου πρὸς καιρόν,< διὰ τῆς >ἀποστερεῖτε< λέξεως τὸ ὀφείλημα τοῦ γάμου, τὴν παιδοποιίαν, ἐμφαίνων, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐδήλωσεν εἰπών, >τῇ γυναικὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ τὴν ὀφειλὴν ἀποδιδότω, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ γυνὴ τῷ ἀνδρί,< [...]. Broudéhoux, *op. cit.* 174.

[117] Cf. *Paed.* 2.10. *passim.*, esp. 87.3, 90.3-4, 95.3.

[118] *Paed.* 2.10.98.2: εὖ γοῦν τις εἰρηκέναι φαίνεται· >συνουσία ὤνησεν μὲν οὐδένα, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ εἰ μὴ ἔβλαψεν.< ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον σφαλερά, εἰ μὴ ὅσον αὐτῆς ἐπὶ παιδοποιίᾳ, [...] Cf. Epicurus Frag. 62, Usener p.118.22.

intercourse.'[119]

Contrary to the Encratites, Clement extends the virtues of ἐγκράτεια and σωφροσύνη to marriage.[120] A man who marries for the sake of procreation must abstain from desire for his wife, but love her and practise continence in order to beget with a pure and chaste will.[121] Whereas the Encratites practise continence because of their pessimistic attitude towards the world[122], and athletes have practised continence so as to keep their bodies in training[123], Clement emphasizes that Christian ἐγκράτεια, which sanctifies the shrine of the Spirit, should arise from a love of the Lord.[124] In defining ἐγκράτεια as an 'ignoring of the body in accordance with the confession of faith in God', he also extends the range of ἐγκράτεια, to include every aspect of our relation to the world, limiting our use to the necessary.[125] That the virtue of ἐγκράτεια describes our inward disposition in our use of the world, means that, in contrast to the Encratites, ἐγκράτεια is an

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[119] *Paed.* 2.10.90.2: εἰ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸν δάκτυλον ὡς ἔτυχε σαλεύειν τῷ σοφῷ ὁ λόγος ἐπιτρέπει, ὡς ὁμολογοῦσιν οἱ Στωϊκοί, πῶς οὐχὶ πολὺ πλέον τοῦ συνουσιαστικοῦ ἐπικρατητέον μορίου τοῖς σοφίαν διώκουσιν;

[120] Cf. D. G. Hunter, 'The Language of Desire', pp.105–107.

[121] *Strom.* 3.7.58.2: καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ παιδοποιίᾳ γήμαντα ἐγκράτειαν ἀσκεῖν χρή, ὡς μηδ' ἐπιθυμεῖν τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ, ἣν ἀγαπᾶν ὀφείλει, σεμνῷ καὶ σώφρονι παιδοποιούμενος θελήματι.

[122] Cf. *Strom.* 3. *passim*, esp. 5.40.2, 6.45.1.

[123] *Strom.* 3.6.50.4.

[124] *Strom.* 3.7.59.4: Ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν δι' ἀγάπην τὴν πρὸς τὸν κύριον καὶ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἐγκράτειαν ἀσπαζόμεθα, τὸν νεὼν τοῦ πνεύματος ἁγιάζοντες·

[125] *Strom.* 3.1.4.1: ἐγκράτεια τοίνυν σώματος ὑπεροψία κατὰ τὴν πρὸς Θεὸν ὁμολογίαν. οὐ μόνον γὰρ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἃ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ κακῶς οὐκ ἀρκουμένη τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις, ἡ ἐκράτεια ἀναστρέφεται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν γλῶσσαν καὶ περὶ τὴν κτῆσιν καὶ περὶ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐγκράτεια.

interior virtue, hidden in the soul.[126] For Clement, the virtue of ἐγκράτεια is intimately linked with that of σωφροσύνη, and both are used to describe a 'chaste' use of sexual dealings within marriage. Frequently the two terms are used indistinguishably by Clement, but when they are distinguished σωφροσύνη seems to lack the combative dimension of ἐγκράτεια.[127]

There is the same synergetic ambivalence in Clement's description of the virtues of ἐγκράτεια and σωφροσύνη as we saw in his description of asceticism in general. In the third *Stromata* Clement stresses, against the Encratites and the athletes, that true ἐγκράτεια and σωφροσύνη are divine gifts.[128] Elsewhere, however, he maintains that the virtue of σωφροσύνη is within the capacity of everyone who chooses it, and also compares licentiousness, which is to be thought of as the evil of the one who is licentious, with σωφροσύνη, which is the good of the one capable of practising it.[129] Similarly we are told to cultivate σωφροσύνη that we might receive the grace of God.[130] Likewise ἐγκράτεια is defined as the state which does not overstep the boundaries of the ὀρθὸς λόγος, and the one who

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[126] *Strom.* 3.6.48.3: [...] οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ ἡ οὐκ ἐν φανερῷ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἀποκρύφῳ.

[127] Cf. Broudéhoux: 'Ces deux vertus contrôlent donc l'activité sexuelle à des titres divers: tandis que la tempérance visera à régler positivement l'usage des relations intimes dans le mariage, la continence interviendra surtout en vue de prévenir tout abus sexuel et de "désensualiser" le mariage, de lui enlever tout caractère passionne.' *Op. cit.* pp.122-123. This manner of using these terms seems to go back to Aristotle, *Nich. Eth.* 3.11.8; 1119a (on the temperate person who keeps to the middle course), and 7.7.4; 1150a (on restraint which requires mastery). Cf. M. Foucault, *L'Usage des plaisirs*, pp.74-90 (Eng. trans. pp.63-77).

[128] Cf. *Strom.* 3.1.4.2, cited below; 3.7.57.2: λαβεῖν δὲ ἄλλως οὐκ ἔστι τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ταύτην ἢ χάριτι τοῦ Θεοῦ.

[129] *Strom.* 4.8.58.4: κοινὴ γὰρ ἁπάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν γε ἑλομένων ἡ σωφροσύνη· *Strom.* 4.19.124.3: ὅθεν ἀκολασία μὲν οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἂν δοξάζοιτο εἶναι κακὸν ἢ τοῦ ἀκολασταίνοντας, σωφροσύνη δὲ ἀγαθὸν αὖ τοῦ τὸ σωφρονεῖν δυναμένου.

[130] *Prot.* 11.117.5.

exercises ἐγκράτεια is described as curbing his desires, or curbing themselves, that they might not indulge in desires contrary to the ὀρθὸς λόγος.[131] This ambivalence is clearly expressed in a statement in which he relates the two virtues: ἐγκράτεια 'does not only teach us how to exercise temperance (σωφρονεῖν), rather it supplies σωφροσύνη to us, being a divine power and grace.'[132] Ἐγκράτεια is here described as a divine power, which teaches us how to practise and achieve the virtue of σωφροσύνη: we attain or receive temperance by exercising that which is a divine gift.

Clement bases his restrictive understanding of marriage, something not heard of in the New Testament, on the divine command recorded in Genesis to 'Multiply!' (Gen. 1.28). Thus, for Clement, the identification of marriage with procreation is not a restriction, but the fulfillment of God's designs. Clement even speaks of the human becoming like God through his co-operation in the birth of another human, while marriage is described as 'co-operation with the work of nature.'[133]

Besides enjoining, in passing, the husband to love his wife[134], Clement

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[131] *Strom.* 2.18.80.4: αὐτίκα ἡ ἐγκράτεια διάθεσίς ἐστιν ἀνυπέρβατος τῶν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον φανέντων. ἐγκρατεύεται δὲ ὁ κατέχων τὰς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὁρμὰς ἢ ὁ κατέχων αὐτὸν ὥστε μὴ ὁρμᾶν παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.

[132] *Strom.* 3.1.4.2: οὐ διδάσκει δ' αὕτη [ie. ἐγκράτεια] σωφρονεῖν μόνον, ἤ γε παρέχει σωφροσύνην ἡμῖν, δύναμις οὖσα καὶ θεία χάρις.

[133] *Paed.* 2.10.83.2: >πληθύνεσθε< γὰρ εἴρηκεν, καὶ ὑπακουστέον· καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο εἰκὼν ὁ ἄνθρωπος γίνεται τοῦ Θεοῦ, καθὸ εἰς γένεσιν ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπος συνεργεῖ. This connection is already made by Philo: [...] διὰ τὴν τοῦ γεννᾶν πρὸς Θεὸν τὸν γεννητὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐξομοίωσιν. *Dec.* 22.107. For the description of co-operation, see *Paed.* 2.10.93.1; *Strom.* 3.9.66.3. In *Strom.* 3.12.87.4, Clement considers the relationship to be one of a joint-cause or a servant: [...] μὴ αἴτιον ἡγήσησθε τὸν σπείραντα ὑμᾶς τὴν κατὰ σάρκα σπορὰν τῆς οὐσίας ὑμῶν, ἀλλὰ συναίτιον γενέσεως, μᾶλλον δὲ διάκονον γενέσεως.

[134] *Strom.* 3.7.58.2.

emphasized procreation to such an extent that he very rarely speaks of the mutual relationship between husband and wife. This stands out in sharp contrast to the description of marriage given by Musonius:

> The husband and wife, he used to say, should come together for the purpose of making a life in common and of procreating children, and furthermore of regarding all things in common between them, and nothing peculiar or private to one or the other, not even their own bodies. The birth of a human being which results from such a union is certainly something marvelous, but it is not yet enough for the relation of husband and wife, inasmuch as quite apart from marriage it could result from any other sexual union, just as in the case of animals. But in marriage there must be above all perfect companionship (συμβίωσις) and mutual love of husband and wife [....] Where, then, this love for each other is perfect and the two share it completely, each striving to outdo the other in devotion, the marriage is ideal and worthy of envy, for such a union is beautiful.[135]

There is certainly no equivalent description in Clement.[136] Yet Clement undoubtedly had a high regard for the *style* of marriage he prescribes. He describes marriage as a 'sacred image' which must be kept pure from defilement, in which 'we are to rise from sleep with the Lord and go to sleep with thanksgiving and prayer, confessing the Lord in our whole life.'[137] It is the 'greatest bond of temperance' which breaths pure pleasures.[138] He expresses his admiration for monogamy and proclaims the nobility (σεμνοτής) of the single marriage.[139] Clement has such regard for the holiness of

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[135] Musonius Rufus, 13a. (Hense pp.67-68), trans. by C. Lutz, p.89.

[136] Cf. Broudéhoux: 'On note donc chez Clément une tendance, sinon exclusive, du moins très prononcée, à ramener au plan des réalités spirituelles ou des directives morales ses considérations relatives à la communauté conjugale [...]. Et il nous faut bien reconnaître que cette attitude marque, au plan strictement humain, un recul sensible par rapport aux positions des moralistes païens.' *Op. cit.* p.174.

[137] *Strom.* 2.23.145.1: Καθαρὸν οὖν τὸν γάμον ὥσπερ τι ἱερὸν ἄγαλμα τῶν μιαινόντων φυλακτέον, ἀνεγειρομένοις μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων μετὰ κυρίου, ἀπιοῦσι δὲ εἰς ὕπνον μετ' εὐχαριστίας καὶ εὐχομένοις [...] μαρτυρομένοις τὸν κύριον παρ' ὅλον ἡμῶν τὸν βίον, [...].

[138] *Paed.* 3.12.84.1: μεγίστη γὰρ ἡ σωφροσύνης συζυγία καθαρᾶς ἡδονῆς ἀποπνέουσα.

[139] *Strom.* 3.1.4.3; 4.20.126.1.

marriage, that on the rare occasions when he speaks of the espousal of Christ and the Church (cf. Eph. 5.23-33) the value of this image arises, for him, from the given sanctity of marriage, the reversal of the usual perspective.[140] By the three gathered in the Lord's name (Mat.18.20), Clement understands the husband, wife and child, the Christian household, for, as he explains, the wife is 'joined' to her husband by the Lord.[141] Furthermore, a marriage which is not given over to pleasure, leads to a harmony according to the Logos.[142]

Such marriage does not, according to Clement, hinder one from later attaining the heights of the true Christian Gnostic. Indeed the discipline of marriage, of procreation, and care for the household, enables the married man to prove himself superior to the single man:

> True manhood is not shown in the choice of a celibate life; rather the prize in the contest of men is won by him who has trained himself by the discharge of the duties of marriage and procreation and by the supervision of a household, regardless of pleasure and pain, by him who in the midst of his solicitude for his family shows himself inseparable from the love of God and rises superior to every temptation which assails him through children and wife and servants and possessions.[143]

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[140] Cf. *Strom.* 3.12.84.2: ἁγίου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ νόμου ἅγιος ὁ γάμος. τὸ μυστήριον τοίνυν τοῦτο εἰς τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἄγει ὁ ἀπόστολος. Cf. Broudéhoux, *op. cit.* pp.86-87.

[141] *Strom.* 3.10.68.1: Τίνες δὲ οἱ δύο καὶ τρεῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ συναγόμενοι, παρ' οἷς μέσος ἐστὶν ὁ κύριος; ἢ οὐχὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ τέκνον τοὺς τρεῖς λέγει, ὅτι ἀνδρὶ γυνὴ διὰ Θεοῦ ἁρμόζεται; Broudéhoux sees in this passage 'une sorte de pressentiment de ce que la théologie postérieure appellera la grâce sacramentelle du mariage.' *Op. cit.* p.84.

[142] *Strom.* 2.23.143.1: [...] ἐπὶ τὴν κατὰ λόγον ὁμόνοιαν ἄγει, [...].

[143] *Strom.* 7.12.70.7: καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἐν τῷ μονήρη ἐπανελέσθαι δείκνυται βίον, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος >ἄνδρας νικᾷ< ὁ γάμῳ καὶ παιδοποιίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοῦ οἴκου προνοίᾳ ἀνηδόνως τε καὶ ἀλυπήτως ἐγγυμνασάμενος, μετὰ τῆς τοῦ οἴκου κηδεμονίας ἀδιάστατος τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ γενόμενος ἀγάπης, καὶ πάσης κατεξανιστάμενος πείρας τῆς διὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικὸς οἰκετῶν τε καὶ κτημάτων προσφερομένης.

However, Clement's thought about the relative merits of marriage and the single life are not straightforward. For he continues by asserting that:

> One the other hand, he who has no family is in most respects untried. Taking care for himself alone, he is inferior to the one who falls short of him as regards his own salvation, but who has the advantage in the conduct of life, as he truly preserves a faint image of providence.[144]

For Clement, the married man cannot dedicate himself to the service of God to the same extent as the single man, and so is inferior to the celibate 'as regards his own salvation.' But on a purely human level, through his married state, the husband can develop possibilities which are not open to the bachelor: his oversight of the family and household reflects, however faintly, God's providence within creation.[145]

As for the wife, Clement speaks her as 'an aid in the faith.'[146] If she is married to an intemperate man, she must, according to Clement, persuade him to become 'her companion in virtue'. If such persuasion fails, she should then strive for virtue by herself, not doing anything against his will except for what contributes to virtue and salvation.[147] Commenting on the words of St. Paul, that the single woman is free to care for the things of the Lord, while the married woman is burdened by her care for her husband (1

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[144] *Strom.* 7.12.70.8: τῷ δὲ ἀοίκῳ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι συμβέβηκεν ἀπειράστῳ. μόνου γοῦν ἑαυτοῦ κηδόμενος ἡττᾶται πρὸς τοῦ ἀπολειπομένου μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίαν, περιττεύοντος δὲ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸν βίον οἰκονομίᾳ, εἰκόνα ἀτεχνῶς σῴζοντος ὀλίγην τῆς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ προνοίας.

[145] So Broudéhoux, speaking of the 'superiority' of the married man: 'Elle est incontestable au plan humain: le mariage permet de réaliser toutes les possibilités qui sont dans l'homme, [...]'. But: 'Il ne fait pas de doute qu'à ses yeux la prééminence revient à la virginité, mais cette supériorité est exprimée en terms prudents et mesurés.' *Op. cit.* p.112 & p.113. Clement here echoes the philosophical position that he mentioned in his doxographical survey, *Strom.* 2.23.139.5.: ἔτι, φασίν, ὁ ἄτεκνος τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τελειότητος ἀπολείπεται [...].

[146] *Strom.* 3.18.108.1: [...] τὴν ἐν Χριστῷ πίστιν βοηθός, [...].

[147] *Strom.* 4.19.123.2; cf. 4.20.126.1-2.

Cor.7.34), Clement rejects the Encratite interpretation, which would use this as grounds for the rejection of marriage:

> Is it not permissible for both the married man and his wife to care for the things of the Lord together? But just as 'the unmarried woman cares in the Lord for the things of the Lord, that she may be holy in body and spirit, so also the married woman cares for both the things of her husband and the things of the Lord in the Lord, that she may be holy in body and spirit; both are holy in the Lord, the one as a wife, the other as a virgin.[148]

Thus, although Clement does not value the conjugal bond itself as highly as Musonius, he does see marriage as a mode of life which serves the Lord. This religious dimension of marriage indicates a certain originality in Clement's thought compared with his pagan contemporaries.[149] However, Clement does not really integrate this religious dimension into his description of marriage; it is as a manner of each spouse serving the Lord that marriage is valued, rather than the conjugal bond itself.[150] This is seen particularly clearly in *Strom.* 7.12.70.7, where the married man is described as training himself in the duties pertaining to marriage, procreation and management of a household, and *Strom.* 4.19.123.2, 20.127.1-2, where the woman married to

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[148] *Strom.* 3.12.88.2-3: οὐχὶ δὲ ἐφεῖται καὶ τῷ γεγαμηκότι σὺν καὶ τῇ συζύγῳ μεριμνᾶν τὰ τοῦ κυρίου; ἀλλὰ καθάπερ >ἡ ἄγαμος μεριμνᾷ τὰ τοῦ κυρίου, ἵνα ᾖ ἁγία καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ πνεύματι<, οὕτω καὶ ἡ γεγαμημένη τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὰ τοῦ κυρίου μεριμνᾷ ἐν κυρίῳ, ἵνα ᾖ ἁγία καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ πνεύματι· ἄμφω γὰρ ἅγιαι ἐν κυρίῳ, ἥ μὲν ὡς γύνη, ἡ δὲ ὡς παρθένος. Cf. *Strom.* 3.12.79.5, where celibacy and marriage, both as service to the Lord, are described from the husband's perspective.

[149] Cf. Broudéhoux: 'Si, sur l'amour conjugal et l'intimité du couple, la position réservée de Clément contrastait défavorablement avec l'attitude enthousiaste des moralistes païens, ses aperçus discrets sur la communion religieuse unissant les époux chrétiens lui permettent de reprendre quelque avantage et témoignent, en tout cas, d'une originalité certaine: à l'exception de Plutarque qui mentionne en passant que "la femme doit adorer les mêmes dieux que son mari" (*Prec. Cong.* 140d), les moralistes ne semblent guère avoir pris en considération cet aspect du mariage.' *Op. cit.* p.177.

[150] The most that even Broudéhoux can speak of is 'une communion au même idéal spirituel', *op. cit.* p.154, or 'une communauté religieuse', *ibid.* p.197. Broudéhoux laments, on the other hand, that 'ni l'amour, ni la sexualité ne sont réellement intégrés à sa vision du mariage.' *Ibid.* p.198.

an intemperate husband is exhorted to strive after virtue and her own salvation. Similarly, in the first book of the *Paedagogus*, Clement maintains that as virtue belongs equally to men and women, so marriage is a 'common yoke' (συζύγιος), and those who have a common (κοινὸς) life, have a common grace and a common salvation.[151] The common grace and salvation is not a result of a common, conjugal life, but is the result of each spouse separately attaining virtue. The adjective 'common' does not denote any mutual relation between the two within the grace of God, rather, it denotes their simultaneous, yet individual, participation in the gifts of God.[152] The *style* of marriage Clement proposes is, despite, or rather, by virtue of his praise, one in which the conjugal bond is consistently subordinated to the finality of procreation.[153]

This emphasis in Clement's thought on the finality of marriage as procreation leads inexorably to the same attitude with regard to the sexual

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[151] *Paed.* 1.4.10.1-2: [...] τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς εἶναι νενοηκότες. εἰ γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ Θεὸς εἷς, εἷς δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδαγωγὸς ἀμφοῖν. μία ἐκκλησία, μία σωφροσύνη, αἰδὼς μία, ἡ τροφὴ κοινή, γάμος συζύγιος, ἀναπνοή, ὄψις, ἀκοή, γνῶσις, ἐλπίς, ὑπακοή, ἀγάπη, ὅμοια πάντα· ὧν δὲ κοινὸς μὲν ὁ βίος, κοινὴ δὲ ἡ χάρις, κοινὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ σωτηρία, κοινὴ τούτων καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ ἀγωγή. The identity of virtue between men and women was a Stoic theme, *SVF* I.481, p.107.36.

[152] Given the overall discussion in *Strom.* 4.19.123.2-20.129.5, it is difficult to see how, from *Strom.* 4.20.126.1-127.1, Mees can justly conclude: 'Daher sind Übereinstimmung und Leibe zu einander nicht nur Notwendigkeiten für ein glückliches Leben, sondern Gabe des Schöpfers und Gnade des Erlösers.' 'Clemens von Alexandrien über Ehe und Familie', p.121. Broudéhoux, more realistically, speaks of 'une sorte de "sublimation" capable de compenser largement ses lacunes.' *Op. cit.* p.153.

[153] Cf. P. Brown: 'As for the *charis*, the "graciousness" created by intercourse - that indefinable quality of mutual trust and affection gained through the pleasure of the bed itself - which even the dignified Plutarch took for granted: Clement's stark insistence that intercourse should take place only for the begetting of children caused the delicate bloom of such a notion to vanish forever from late antique Christian thought.' *The Body and Society*, p.133. Clement only once speaks of a χάρις τοῦ γάμου, *Strom.* 3.14.94.3.

nature of the human being. Although Clement criticizes the Encratites for their use of Mat. 22.30 and Luke 20.34-5[154], it is not so much their interpretation of this passage that he objects to, but its setting within an eschatology that sharply divides this world from the next.[155] In fact, Clement shares their interpretation:

> 'For in this world' he says 'they marry and are given in marriage', in which alone the female is distinguished from the male; 'but in that world it is so no more.' There the rewards of this social and holy life, which is based on conjugal union are laid up, not for male and female, but for the human, the desire which divides the human being removed.[156]

It is desire (ἐπιθυμία) that divides humans into male and female, a division which is limited to this present world.

It is again within a discussion about virtue being identical for men and women, that Clement further expounds his thought on sexual difference:

> As far as respects human nature, the woman does not possess one nature and the man another, but the same; so also with virtue. If, perhaps, σωφροσύνη and righteousness, and whatever qualities are regarded as following them, are the virtue of the man, does it belong to the man alone to be virtuous, and to the woman to be licentious and unjust? But it is indecent even to say this. Accordingly the woman is to practise σωφροσύνη and righteousness, and every other virtue, as well as the man, both free and bond, since it follows that one and the same virtue be of the same nature.[157]

As the same virtue is to be expected of the woman as of the man, due to the identity of the human nature of each, the difference between the two must be located elsewhere. Clement continues:

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[154] Cf. *Strom.* 3.6.47-48.

[155] Cf. Broudéhoux, *op. cit.* p.50.

[156] *Paed.* 1.4.10.3: >ἐν γὰρ τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ<, φησίν, >γαμοῦσι καὶ γαμίσκονται<, ἐν ᾧ δὴ μόνῳ τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος διακρίνεται, >ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ οὐκέτι<, ἔνθα τοῦ κοινωνικοῦ καὶ ἁγίου τούτου βίου τοῦ ἐκ συζυγίας τὰ ἔπαθλα οὐκ ἄρρενι καὶ θηλείᾳ, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ἀπόκειται ἐπιθυμίας διχαζούσης αὐτὸν κεχωρισμένῳ. Cf. *Paed.* 2.10.100.3.

[157] *Strom.* 4.8.59.1-3.

> Therefore, we do not say that the same nature is of the female as [compared] to the male, inasmuch as she is female. For it is certainly fitting that some difference exist between each of them, by which one of them is female and the other male. Pregnancy and parturition, accordingly, we say, belong to the woman, as she is female, and not as a human being. For if there were no difference between the man and the woman, both of them would do and suffer the same things.[158]

The identity of their human nature in men and women requires of them the acquisition of identical virtue, whilst the bodily difference between the male and the female destines women to child-bearing and housekeeping:

> As, then, there is the same as regards the soul, by this sameness she will attain to the same virtue; but the difference with regard to the particularities of the body is towards childbearing and housekeeping.[159]

Although Clement continually stresses the equality of virtue between men and women, he is ambiguous about a similar equality of gender. A few lines later he states that while women are 'to philosophize', that is, practise virtue, alongside men, males are nevertheless superior at everything, unless the men have become effeminate.[160] Here Clement is clearly using the idea of the masculine character of virtue. That virtue, by its virile character, produces both male men and male women, while its absence results in effeminate men and women, was a standard theme of Greek philosophical morality, which was to exert a considerable influence in early Christian

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[158] *Strom.* 4.8.59.4-5: τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φύσιν τοῦ θήλεος πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν, καθὸ θῆλύ ἐστιν, οὐ φαμέν· πάντως γάρ τινα καὶ διαφορὰν ὑπάρχειν προσῆκεν ἑκατέρῳ τούτων, δι᾽ ἣν τὸ μὲν θῆλυ αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν γέγονεν· τὸ γοῦν κυοφορεῖν καὶ τὸ τίκτειν τῇ γυναικί προσεῖναί φαμεν, καθὸ θήλεια τυγχάνει, οὐ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἦν τὸ διάφορον ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν ἔδρα τε καὶ ἔπασχεν.

[159] *Strom.* 4.8.60.1: ᾗ μὲν τοίνην ταὐτόν ἐστι, καθὸ ψυχή, ταύτῃ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀφίξεται ἀρετήν· ᾗ δὲ διάφορον, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἰδιότητα, ἐπὶ τὰς κυήσεις καὶ τὴν οἰκουρίαν.

[160] Cf. *Strom.* 4.8.62.4: φιλοσοφητέον οὖν καὶ ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἐμφερῶς τοῖς ἀνδράσι, κἂν βελτίους οἱ ἄρρενες τά <τε> πρῶτα ἐν πᾶσι φερόμενοι τυγχάνωσιν, ἐκτος εἰ μὴ καταμαλακισθεῖν.
For Clement's ambiguous attitude towards women, see D. Kindler, 'Clement of Alexandria: Conflicting Views on Women.'

thought.[161] However, Clement goes further to state that, despite the fact that souls are neither male nor female and that the sexual difference is removed in the resurrection, the woman, when perfected in virtue, becomes a man:

> For souls, by themselves equally souls, are not different, neither male nor female, when they no longer marry nor are given in marriage. And is not the woman translated into man when she is become equally unfeminine, and manly, and perfect?[162]

The important point, for our purposes, about these comments on the sexual nature of men and women, is that the finality of procreation, under which marriage is understood, is, along with housekeeping, unreservedly applied by Clement to sexual difference itself.

As mentioned above, Clement shares the Encratite interpretation of Luke 20.34-5, but, in the *Paedagogus* and *Stromata* 3, he refers the redundancy of marriage to the life hereafter. There is, however, one passage in *Stromata* 6 where he describes the married Christian Gnostic as already anticipating that state:

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[161] For the virile character of virtue, see M. Foucault, *L'Usage des plaisirs*, esp. pp.96-99 (Eng. trans. pp.82-86). For the second century, including Clement, see: M. W. Gleason, 'The Semiotics of Gender: Physiognomy and Self-fashioning in the Second Century C.E.' The influence of this idea on early Christian thought has been discussed extensively in recent years; see, most recently, the posthumous book of K. Aspegren, *The Male Woman: A Feminine Ideal in the Early Church*. Clement, nevertheless, valorizes femininity in his somewhat unusual attribution of femininity to God in *QDS* 37.2: καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρρητον αὐτοῦ πατήρ, τὸ δὲ εἰς ἡμᾶς συμπαθὲς γέγονε μήτηρ. ἀγαπήσας ὁ πατὴρ ἐθηλύνθη, [...]. Here femininity is associated with 'compassion', which was not counted amongst the virile virtues to be attained through asceticism. This dimension of God's dealings towards us does not seem to have any noticeable effect on the asceticism proposed by Clement, not, at least, as regards human sexuality.

[162] *Strom.* 6.12.100.3: αὐταὶ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὰς ἐπ' ἴσης εἰσὶ ψυχαὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ οὐθέτεραι, οὔτε ἄρρενες οὔτε θήλειαι, ἐπὰν μήτε γαμῶσι μήτε γαμίσκωνται· καὶ μή τι οὕτως μετατίθεται εἰς τὸν ἄνδρα ἡ γύνη, ἀθήλυντος ἐπ' ἴσης καὶ ἀνδρικὴ καὶ τελεία γενομένη. Cf. *Exc. Th.* 21.3.

> To such an one, his wife, after childbearing, is as a sister, and is judged as if of the same father, calling to mind her husband only when she looks on the children, as she will be a sister in reality after putting off the flesh, which separates and limits the knowledge of those who are spiritual by the particularity of the forms (of the sexes).[163]

This passage is reminiscent of the proleptic character of Christian existence which Clement describes in the context of baptism: after childbearing, husband and wife should be as brother and sister, for that is what they will be in reality after shedding the flesh with its sexual characteristics. It is clear, however, that this 'prolepsis' is experienced only after child-bearing, and not, as earlier, after baptism. Thus we see the same problem as we saw in the discussion of his asceticism: the proleptic characteristic of baptismal life does not actually influence Clement's description of Christian marriage. The newness of life granted in baptism does not have any effect on marriage, while the spouses are engaged in the pursuit of their own individual virtue.

Clement's description of Christian marriage is not, in fact, different to that which was prescribed by the Law, as Clement himself understood it. Countering those who, following Marcion, would separate the Old from the New Revelation and reject what belongs to the Old, he repeatedly emphasizes that 'the Law intended husbands to cohabit with their wives with self-control and only for the purpose of begetting children.'[164] Likewise, Clement explains

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[163] *Strom.* 6.12.100.3: ἀδελφὴ δὲ τούτῳ ἡ γυνὴ μετὰ τὴν παιδοποιίαν, ὡς καὶ ὁμοπατρία, κρίνεται, τότε μόνον τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀναμιμνῃσκομένη, ὁπηνίκα ἂν τοῖς τέκνοις προσβλέπῃ, ὡς ἂν ἀδελφὴ τῷ ὄντι ἐσομένη καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀπόθεσιν τῆς σαρκὸς τῆς διαχωριζούσης καὶ διοριζούσης τὴν γνῶσιν τῶν πνευματικῶν τῇ ἰδιότητι τῶν σχημάτων. The context makes it clear that the forms in question are those of the male and the female. That Clement still refers to the woman as a 'sister' is probably to be taken as a necessity of style (it would have been unreal to call 'her' a 'brother'), rather than as an indication of a continuing sexual differentiation.

[164] *Strom.* 3.11.71.4: ὅτι γὰρ σωφρόνως ἐβούλετο ταῖς γαμεταῖς χρῆσθαι

the fact that we are no longer ordered to wash after sexual intercourse, by pointing to baptism which encompasses the many washings of the Law. Clement is at pains to point out that it was not the emission of the generative seed that dictated the need to wash, for the seed of the holy is itself sanctified, but rather that the washings demanded by the Law prophesied our future regeneration.[165] Clement wanted to maintain a continuity of revelation between the New Covenant and the Old, and also with the ideals of Greek paideia. However, in doing so, he severely limited the effect of our regeneration in Christ. It is only to the extent that Clement defended the necessity of procreation, that he defends marriage and differs from the Encratites.

Moreover, not even the necessity of procreation is absolute for Clement. In the *Protreptikos* he states: humans 'would not make love, nor beget children, nor sleep, if they were immortal and had no wants and never grew old.'[166] Similarly, amongst the reasons that Christ did not marry was that, being immortal, He did not need to beget children.[167] Granted immortality in baptism, humans should have no need for marriage and procreation; they would be in Adam's prelapsarian state, which encompassed both marriage and procreation, without any inherent connection between these activities and death. The elision between Clement's descriptions of the prelapsarian and postlapsarian states of Adam, and his tacit acceptance of the Encratite connection between birth, marriage and death, thus result in a view of

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τοὺς ἄνδρας ὁ νόμος καὶ ἐπὶ μόνῃ παιδοποιίᾳ, [...].
Cf. *Strom.* 3.6.52.1.

[165] Cf. *Strom.* 3.12.82.6-83.1; 3.6.46.5: τῶν δὲ ἁγιασθέντων ἅγιον οἶμαι καὶ τὸ σπέρμα. Cf. Broudéhoux, *op. cit.* p.47.

[166] *Prot.* 2.36.4: [...] οὐκ ἂν ἀφροδισίοις χρωμένων ἀνθρωπίνοις οὐδὲ παιδοποιουμένων οὐδὲ μὴν ὑπνωσσόντων, εἰ ἀθάνατοι καὶ ἀνενδεεῖς καὶ ἀγήρῳ ὑπῆρχον.

[167] Cf. *Strom.* 3.6.49.3.

marriage governed by the finality of death and the need for procreation, in which the conjugal bond itself plays no significant role.

Clement's characterization of the Christian life as 'tiptoeing on the earth' thus extends into his treatment of marriage and the relation between the sexes. Wanting, at all costs, to maintain the cultivated ideal he establishes for the Christian, Clement advises:

> Above all, it seems necessary that we turn away from the sight of women. [...] For it is possible for one who looks to slip; but it is impossible for one who looks not, to lust.[168]

It is this self-imposed restraint, motivated by the desire for a life in accord with the ideal which he establises for himself, that dominates the asceticism that Clement prescribes for those who have newly entered the Christian life. This 'style' of asceticism, in its articulation, especially in the ambivalent theology of synergy which it describes, severely curtails the effective power of the new life granted in baptism which he nevertheless felt so keenly and described so vividly.[169] The problematics inherent in Clement's theology of 'synergetic' asceticism inevitably lead towards the idealization of a 'style' of asceticism as a form of *self*-control, in which the virtues of continence and chastity are reduced to self-fashioning techniques, and which ultimately results in the positing of a sexless (or exclusively male) existence, definitively in the age to come, and, by anticipation through this 'style' of asceticism, in this present world - unexpectedly, perhaps, given the unaffected warmth of Clement's warm praise for marriage.

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[168] *Paed.* 3.11.82.5-83.1.

[169] A similar attitude can be seen in the assumptions of Clement's rhetorical question to the Gnostics, who understood Christianity as permitting a licentious life, any act being morally indifferent: 'If it is lawful to live any sort of life one likes, obviously one may live in continence; or if any kind of life has no dangers for the elect, obviously one of virtue and self-control is far less dangerous.' *Strom.* 3.5.40.3.

4: The Higher Christian Life: Gnosis, Apatheia, Agape

We have already seen how Clement defined the relation between πίστις and γνῶσις in such a way that he could maintain their close dependence on one another whilst also insisting on the need to develop the κοινὴ πίστις into a fully mature γνῶσις. The motivation for this twofold emphasis is usually seen in Clement's desire, on the one hand, to defend the integrity of faith against the scornful attitude of the philosophers, and the perfection of baptism and the sufficiency of faith against the disparagement, by so-called Gnosticism, of faith as an inferior form of Christianity, whilst on the other hand maintaining the need for growth and development in theological understanding and the ethical life.[1] So far we have considered the ambiguities and tensions between Clement's defence of the perfection of baptism and the corresponding style of asceticism he prescribes for the neophyte, as described especially in the *Paedagogus*, together with the *Protreptikos* and various passages from the *Stromateis* (especially in Book 3). It is in the *Stromateis* that Clement develops his thought about γνῶσις and describes the character of the Gnostic's life, and it is there that we must now turn to complete our study of Clement.

Whereas the primary contrast in the *Paedagogus* was between the maturity of the new children of God and the immaturity of those outside Christ, one of the main themes of the *Stromateis* is the maturity of the true Gnostic compared to the immaturity of the simple believer. The milk of faith, which appeared as inedible meat to those outside the Church, is now seen to be only milk compared to the Gnostic 'meat': 'The apostle, in contradistinction

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[1] For a clear summary of the various tacks in Clement's thought see H. Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition*, pp.51-54.

to gnostic perfection, calls the common faith at times "the foundation" and other times "milk".'[2] Clement interprets St. Paul's words that 'the righteousness of God is revealed from faith to faith' (ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν Rom.1.17) as admitting a 'twofold faith, or rather one which admits of growth and perfection', in which 'the common faith lies beneath as a foundation.'[3] It is as a 'superstructure' that γνῶσις is built upon faith.[4] Whilst Christians must progress in faith towards γνῶσις, they never really leave faith behind: although faith is more elementary than γνῶσις, it is as necessary to the Gnostic as respiration.[5] Despite giving many passing definitions of γνῶσις, Clement never really defines the content of γνῶσις in a systematic and clear fashion[6]; what is more important for him, and us, is the style of the Gnostic's life, the ideal of the true Gnostic, and the means whereby this zenith is attained.

There are, fundamentally, two aspects of the ascent to γνῶσις: ἄσκησις and μάθησις or ζήτησις:

> As, then, the virtues follow one another, [...] faith hopes on repentance, and fear on faith; and patience and training in these

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[2] *Strom.* 5.4.26.1: αὐτίκα ὁ ἀπόστολος πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν γνωστικῆς τελειότητος τὴν κοινὴν πίστιν πῇ μὲν θεμέλιον λέγει, πῇ δὲ γάλα, [...]. Referring to 1 Cor.3.10-13 and 1-3.

[3] *Strom.* 5.1.2.4-5: φαίνεται οὖν ὁ ἀπόστολος διττὴν καταγγέλλων πίστιν, μᾶλλον δὲ μίαν, αὔξησιν καὶ τελείωσιν ἐπιδεχομένην· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κοινὴ πίστις καθάπερ θεμέλιος ὑπόκειται [...].

[4] *Strom.* 5.4.26.4: ταῦτα γνωστικὰ ἐποικοδομήματα τῇ κρηπῖδι τῆς πίστεως τῆς εἰς Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, [...]. Cf. *Strom.* 7.3.20.2: [...] πίστεως, ἐφ' ᾗ τὴν γνῶσιν ἐποικοδομεῖ ἡ ἀλήθεια.

[5] *Strom.* 2.6.31.3: [...] στοιχειωδεστέραν εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὴν πίστιν, οὕτως ἀναγκαίαν τῷ γνωστικῷ ὑπάρχουσαν, ὡς τῷ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε βιοῦντι πρὸς τὸ ζῆν τὸ ἀναπνεῖν·

[6] Cf. Camelot, 'Il ne faut pas s'attendre à trouver chez Clément une définition ferme et précise de la gnose orthodoxe; ici plus que jamais, il est extrêmement difficile d'étreindre cette pensée et de l'exprimer en formules rigoureuses et définitives; [...]', *Foi et Gnose*, p.96. Cf. Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker*, pp.303-314; A. Méhat, *Étude sur les Stromates de Clément d'Alexandrie*, pp.421-427.

along with learning culminate in love which is perfected by γνῶσις.[7] This emphasis on the need for ἄσκησις in the attainment of virtue was a common theme in both Stoicism and Philo.[8] We have already seen how Clement regards ἄσκησις, following the commandments and the acquisition of virtue as within our own capacity, and the ambivalent synergetic relationship between God and the human inherent in this.[9] This problematic continues into Clement's description of the acquisition of γνῶσις in the *Stromateis*. In the above quotation γνῶσις is considered to be the final perfecting of our labours in ἄσκησις and μάθησις. Clement is convinced that the perfection bestowed in γνῶσις is a gift, but maintains that it is given only to those who have made themselves worthy of it: after their departure from this life, Gnostics hasten, by reason of their good conscience, to give thanks; and there with Christ, show themselves worthy, through their own purity, to have the power of God communicated by Christ.[10] A good conscience and purity are requisite for the dying if they are to depart with hope and confidence.[11]

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[7] *Strom.* 2.9.45.1: Ὡς μὲν οὖν ἀντακολουθοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρεταί, [...] ἤδη ὡς πίστις μὲν ἐπὶ μετανοίᾳ ἐλπίδι τε, εὐλάβεια δὲ ἐπὶ πίστει, καὶ ἡ ἐν τούτοις ἐπιμονή τε καὶ ἄσκησις ἅμα μαθήσει συμπεραιοῦται εἰς ἀγάπην, ἣ δὲ τῇ γνώσει τελειοῦται; Cf. *Strom.* 5.1.5.2, 12.2; 6.7.57.2.

[8] Cf. *SVF* 3.278, p.68.25: ἐκ τῆς ἀσκήσεως περιγιγνομένας, See Philo's description of Jacob as the ἀσκητική quality, which together with Abraham (teaching) and Isaac (nature) produce virtue, *De Abr.* 11.52. and *De Somn.* 1.27.167: τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ φύσει ἢ ἀσκέσει ἢ μαθήσει περιγίνεσθαι. Cf. *Strom.* 1.5.31.5: [...] ἐκ φύσεως καὶ μαθήσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως συνεστῶσαν.

[9] Cf. *Supra* pp.200–207.

[10] *Strom.* 7.12.79.4: οὕτως ὀξέως ἑπόμενος τῷ καλοῦντι κατὰ τὴν ἔξοδον ὡς ἐκεῖνος καλεῖ, προάγων ὡς εἰπεῖν διὰ τὴν ἀγαθὴν συνείδησιν, σπεύδων ἐπὶ τὸ εὐχαριστῆσαι κἀκεῖ, σὺν Χριστῷ γενόμενος, ἄξιον ἑαυτὸν παρασχὼν διὰ καθαρότητα, κατὰ ἀνάκρασιν ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ χορηγουμένην.

[11] For the demand for a good conscience see *Strom.* 7.12.78.3, 13.83.1. Clement also cites Socrates (*Phaedo* 67bc) on the hope entertained by a man who dies with a purified mind, *Strom.* 4.22.144.2. The idea of purification after death, an important theme in Clement, does not fall within the scope of this work. The most recent treatment is K. Schmöle, *Läuterung nach dem*

They are also essential, within the present life, for the reception of the power of God.[12] Such asceticism makes the Gnostic 'worthy' (ἄξιος) of receiving the titles 'son' and 'friend'.[13] This stance is clearly revealed when Clement relates an old story with evident approval:

> And what follows seems to me to be excellently said by the Greeks. An athlete of no mean reputation among those of old, having for a long time subjected his body to thorough training in order to [achieve] the attainment of manly strength, on going up to the Olympic games, cast his eye of the statue of the Pisaean Zeus, and said: 'O Zeus, if all the requisite preparations for the contest have been made by me, come, give me the victory, as is right.'
> For so in the case of the Gnostics, who have unblameably and with a good conscience fulfilled all that depends on them, in the direction of learning and training and well-doing, and pleasing to God, the whole contributes to the most perfect salvation.[14]

In this line of Clement's thought, then, the ἄσκησις of the Gnostics produces a boldness, a παρρησία, with which they can approach God and demand their due, for by themselves they have made themselves worthy of receiving.[15]

Tode und pneumatische Auferstehung bei Klemens von Alexandrien.

[12] Most explicitly stated in *QDS* 16.2: [...] εἰς δὲ ἀκάθαρτον ψυχὴν Θεοῦ χάρις οὐ παραδύεται· and *Strom.* 3.5.42.6: καθαρὸς γὰρ ὢν καὶ πάσης κακίας ἀπηλλαγμένος ὁ νοῦς δεκτικός πως ὑπάρχει τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως, [...].

[13] Cf. *Strom.* 3.10.69.3–4: describing the person who has risen above passion and desire, who lives a gnostic life, [...] ἄξιος ἤδη τοῦ ἀδελφὸς πρὸς τοῦ κυρίου ὀνομάζεσθαι, φίλος ἅμα οὗτος καὶ υἱός [ἐστιν]. *Strom.* 7.11.68.1: διὰ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ εξοχωτάτου θεραπείαν, [...], φίλον ὁμοῦ καὶ υἱὸν τὸν γνωστικὸν ἀπεργάζεται, [...]. Cf. *Strom.* 6.14.114.6.

[14] *Strom.* 7.7.48.5–6: καὶ μοι δοκεῖ κἀκεῖνο καλῶς παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι λέγεσθαι [...] Ὧιδε γὰρ καὶ τῷ γνωστικῷ, ἀνεπιλήπτως καὶ εὐσυνειδήτος τὰ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ πάντα ἐκπεπληρωκότι εἴς τε τὴν μάθησιν εἴς τε τὴν συνάσκησιν εἴς τε τὴν εὐποιίαν καὶ εἰς τὴν εὐαρέστησιν τῷ θεῷ, τὸ πᾶν συναίρεται πρὸς τὴν τελειοτάτην σωτηρίαν.

[15] Cf. *Strom.* 7.12.72.6: The wise gnostic souls, like the virgins of Mat.25.1–13, can address Christ thus: [...] ἀκολούθως οἷς ἐνετείλω ἐζήσαμεν, μηδὲν τῶν παρηγγελμένων παραβεβηκυῖαι· διὸ καὶ τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀπαιτοῦμεν [...].
Strom. 7.12.71.1–3: Ἀλλ' ἡμῖν γε ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα προγυμναστέον ποικίλως τὴν ψυχήν, ἵνα εὐεργὸς γένηται πρὸς τὴν τῆς γνώσεως παραδοχήν. [...] οὕτως ἡ γνῶσις οἷον [ὁ] λογικὸς θάνατος, ἀπὸ τῶν παθῶν ἀπάγων καὶ χωρίζων τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ προάγων εἰς τὴν τῆς εὐποιίας ζωήν, ἵνα τότε εἴπῃ μετὰ παρρησίας πρὸς τὸν Θεόν· ὡς

It is important to note, however, that this merit does not effect a compulsion on God:

> For, universally, God knows those who are and those who are not worthy of good things; whence He gives to each what is suitable. Thus to those that are unworthy, though they ask often, He will not give; but He will give to those who are worthy. And even if good things are given without claim, petition is not superfluous.[16]

The Gnostic's merit is therefore not sufficient for the gifts of God, but it is, nonetheless, necessary.

The framework behind this line of thought is indicated by the concluding remark of the comparison between the Gnostic and the Olympian athlete: this ἄσκησις culminates in the most perfect salvation. The implications of this are clearly stated by Clement in a passage in which he distinguishes the salvation of the common believer from the more perfect salvation effected by the Gnostic's asceticism:

> Now to know is more than to believe, just as to be dignified with the highest honour after being saved is a greater thing than being saved.[17]

These two different levels of merit are dependent upon two ways or styles of life. In a hypothetical speculation, Clement even suggests that if the γνῶσις of God were distinguishable from eternal salvation, the Gnostic would prefer γνῶσις above salvation itself.[18]

θέλεις ζῶ.
*Strom.*7.13.81.4: ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀπαιτεῖ παρὰ κυρίου, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ αἰτεῖ.
Strom. 7.13.81.3: [...] παρ' ἑαυτοῦ δὲ ἄξιον γενόμενον λαμβάνειν, [...].

[16] *Strom.* 7.7.41.5-6: καθόλου γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οἶδεν τούς τε ἀξίους τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μή· ὅθεν τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστοις δίδωιν. διὸ πολλάκις μὲν αἰτήσασιν ἀναξίοις οὐκ ἂν δοίη, δοίη δε ἀξίοις δηλονότι ὑπάρχουσιν. οὐ μὴν παρέλκει ἡ αἴτησις, κἂν χωρὶς ἀξιώσεως διδῶται τὰ ἀγαθά.

[17] *Strom.* 6.14.109.2: πλέον δέ ἐστι τοῦ πιστεῦσαι τὸ γνῶναι, καθάπερ ἀμέλει τοῦ σωθῆναι τὸ καὶ μετὰ τὸ σωθῆναι τιμῆς τῆς ἀνωτάτω ἀξιωθῆναι. Cf. *Strom.* 4.18.113.6-114.1.

[18] Cf. *Strom.* 4.22.136.5.

Whilst St. Paul had classified everything that does not proceed from faith as sin (Rom. 14.23), Clement refines the classification by dividing the actions of the faithful into two levels:

> As, then, to be simply saved is the result of medium actions, but to be saved rightly and becomingly is of right action, so also all action of the Gnostic may be called right action; that of the simple believer, intermediate action, not yet performed according to reason, nor yet made right according to knowledge; whilst every action of the heathen is sinful.[19]

To be saved, the result of medium actions, is not enough for the Gnostics; they desire to perfect their lives 'rightly and becomingly.' Whilst God has called all equally, He has nevertheless, according to Clement, assigned special honours to those who have believed in a specially excellent manner.[20] Thus Clement understands the perfection offered in Christ's question 'If thou will be perfect' (Mat. 19.21) to demand an 'exceeding eagerness', which in turn makes the gift of salvation the property of the individual.[21] This zeal shows itself in an 'intensification of the righteousness according to the Law'[22] According to Clement, all things which are created for our use, such as marriage and procreation, are good, when used with moderation; yet it is 'better than good' to become free from passion, ἀπαθής. So the Gnostic does not reject such things as bad, but aims 'to do things that are

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[19] *Strom.* 6.14.111.3: ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ μὲν ἁπλῶς σῴζειν τῶν μέσων ἐστίν, τὸ δ' ὀρθῶς καὶ δεόντως κατόρθωμα, οὕτως καὶ πᾶσα πρᾶξις γνωστικοῦ μὲν κατόρθωμα, τοῦ δὲ ἁπλῶς πιστοῦ μέση πρᾶξις λέγουτ' ἄν, μηδέπω κατὰ λόγον ἐπιτελουμένη μηδὲ μὴν κατ' ἐπίστασιν κατορθουμένη, πᾶσα δὲ ἔμπαλιν τοῦ ἐθνικοῦ ἁμαρτητική. For the Stoic background of the term κατόρθωμα and a similar definition see *SVF* 3.501, p.136.18-26. See also Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire*, p.339.

[20] *Strom.* 7.2.7.1: [...] ὁ πάντας μὲν ἐπ' ἴσης κεκληκώς, ἐξαιρέτους δὲ τοῖς ἐξαιρέτως πεπιστευκόσιν ἀπονείμας τιμάς, [...].

[21] *QDS* 10.2: δίδωσι δὲ βουλομένοις καὶ ὑπερεσπουδακόσι καὶ δεομένοις, ἵν' οὕτως ἴδιον αὐτῶν ἡ σωτηρία γένηται.

[22] *Strom.* 6.18.164.3: ἡ ἐπίτασις γὰρ τῆς κατὰ τὸν νόμον δικαιοσύνης τὸν γνωστικὸν δείκνυσιν. Cf. *Strom.* 6.7.60.3.

better than good', which not being essential are also more difficult.[23]

Before examining further the state attained by this intensified ἄσκησις, we must consider the parallel demand for μάθησις required of those who would ascend to γνῶσις. The learning that Clement has in mind is primarily instruction into the inner, veiled meaning of the Scriptures. It is a knowledge which is naturally esoteric, limiting itself to those who show themselves worthy of it through their manner of life and diligence in study.[24] Clement refers to a number of philosophical schools to show how they also kept the most important aspects of their teachings hidden from the uninstructed.[25] Although Clement had, from evangelical motives, portrayed Christianity as a mystery religion in the *Protreptikos*, he now uses the same vocabulary in the *Stromateis* to heighten the sense of secrecy surrounding γνῶσις.[26] Such hidden teaching is most appropriately transmitted through oral teaching, and Clement makes several references to such secret gnostic traditions.[27] However, as Völker notes, it is important not to misinterpret the idea of the γνωστικὴ παράδοσις by contrasting it with the

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[23]Cf. *Strom.* 4.23.147-149.8.

[24]Cf. *Strom.* 1.12.55.1; 5.4.19.2-4, 6.35.5, 12.80.3; 6.8.70.1-2, 15.116.1-2, esp. 15.126.1-3.

[25]Cf. *Strom.* 5.9.58.1-5.

[26]Cf. *Prot.* 12.118.4, 120.1, and eg. *Strom.* 4.1.3.1; 6.12.102.2. These two applications cannot be conflated to 'excuse' the use of mystery terminology in the *Stromata.* Cf. H. G. Marsh, '[...] we must not forget that there are two Clements - the Alexandrine philosopher and the Christian evangelist. The former defended the restriction of esoteric truth, the latter knew that the gospel for the salvation of mankind must be proclaimed to all.' 'The Use of μυστήριον in the Writings of Clement of Alexandria with Special Reference to his Sacramental Doctrine', p.70.

[27]Cf. *Strom.* 6.7.61.3: ἡ γνῶσις δὲ αὕτη [ἡ] κατὰ διαδοχὰς εἰς ὀλίγους ἐκ τῶν ἀποστόλων ἀγράφως παραδοθεῖσα κατελήλυθεν. Cf. *Strom.* 1.12.55.1-2; 5.10.63.1-2; 6.7.61.1-2, 15.131.5.

'ecclesiastical canon' or tradition of which Clement also speaks[28], for the essential content of both is the same.[29] Clement is emphatic that all true γνῶσις originates from the Incarnate Christ; 'Christ is both the beginning and the end, the foundation and the superstructure.'[30]

The content of this γνωστικὴ παράδοσις is essentially the allegorical method of understanding the true sense of the Scripture, as was taught by Christ and transmitted by the apostles.[31] Through it the Gnostic is able to understand the Scriptures in the same manner as Christ who gave it to the apostles.[32] In contrast to the Gnostic, the simple believer has insufficient understanding to comprehend the Scriptures; not admitted into the secrets of the γνωστικὴ παράδοσις, they have as little chance of understanding as an ass has of playing a lyre.[33] Furthermore, their possible misunderstanding of the true meaning of Scripture is potentially harmful, and must, therefore, be avoided by veiling the 'salvific content' with allegory.[34]

Whilst the Logos was the inspiration for both Greek philosophy and the Old Testament prophecies, both of which prepared the way for Christianity, it is

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[28] Eg. *Strom.* 7.7.41.3: [...] τὸν τῷ ὄντι κατὰ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικὸν κανόνα γνωστικόν, [...]. Cf. *Strom.* 7.15.90.2, 16.95.1.

[29] Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker*, pp.363-364. For the similar stress on the esoteric character of their higher teaching by Jewish-Alexandrine philosophy, Middle Platonism, Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, especially in their use of mystery terms, see Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, pp.148-154; he concludes that this usage reflects a literary dependence, rather than Clement's personal knowledge of the ancient Greek mysteries.

[30] *Strom.* 7.10.55.5.

[31] Cf. *Supra* pp.177-178.

[32] Cf. *Strom.* 4.21.130.4: [...] ὁ γνωστικός [...] νοήσας ὡς παρέδωκε τοῖς ἀποστόλοις ὁ τὰς διαθήκας δεδωκὼς κύριος.

[33] Cf. *Strom.* 1.1.2.2.; 6.14.112.1.

[34] Cf. *Strom.* 6.15.126.1-3, cited *infra* p.232.

the full comprehension of the Scriptures as taught by Christ that enables true γνῶσις. Clement's high appreciation of Greek philosophy, as a preparation for Christianity, in a historical perspective, has already been noted. In the *Stromateis* Clement transfers the propaedeutic function of Greek philosophy, or more exactly the encyclical disciplines of the period (especially geometry, astronomy and dialectics), to the instruction, which, if not absolutely necessary, is nevertheless very useful in achieving the necessary separation and abstraction from the material world required of the Christians before they can pass to true γνῶσις.[35] Thus, for example, humans are led to contemplate the heavens by their upright formation, and, through the contemplation of the harmony of the heavens, they raise their minds above the earth and approach the power of the Creator.[36]

All these aspects are summed up in the following passage:

> For many reasons the Scriptures keep their meaning hidden; firstly so that we may become inquisitive and ever on the watch for the discovery of the words of salvation; then, because it was not suitable for all to understand, so that they might not be harmed by taking in another sense the things declared for salvation by the Holy Spirit. Thus the holy mysteries of the prophecies are veiled in parables and preserved for the selected humans, those admitted from πίστις to γνῶσις; the character of the Scriptures is parabolic, whence the Lord came to humans not as belonging to the world, but as of the world; He was clothed in all virtue, so as to lead the human, the foster-child of the world, by γνῶσις to the noetic and authentic realm, from one world to another.[37]

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[35] Cf. esp. *Strom.* 6.10.80.1-83.3. For a comparison of the use made of the encyclical disciplines by Clement and his pagan contemporaries see Lilla, *op. cit.* pp.169-173.

[36] *Strom.* 4.26.163.1: [...] τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὀρθὴν πρὸς τὴν οὐρανοῦ θέαν γενομένην [...].
Strom. 6.10.80.3: ἔκ τε αὖ τῆς ἀστρονομίας γῆθεν αἰωρούμενος [τε] τῷ νῷ συνυψωθήσεται οὐρανῷ καὶ τῇ περιφορᾷ συμπεριπολήσει, ἱστορῶν ἀεὶ τὰ θεῖα καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνίαν, [...].
Strom. 6.11.90.3: αὕτη [ἀστρονομία] γάρ, μετὰ τὴν τῶν μεταρσίων ἱστορίαν περί τε σχήματος τοῦ παντὸς καὶ φορᾶς οὐρανοῦ τῆς τε τῶν ἄστρων κινήσεως πλησιαίτερον τῇ κτιζούσῃ δυνάμει προσάγουσα τὴν ψυχήν, [...].

[37] *Strom.* 6.15,126.1-3: Διὰ πολλὰς τοίνυν αἰτίας ἐπικρύπτονται τὸν

The purpose of the Incarnation was to impart to those humans capable of γνῶσις the correct manner of interpreting the symbolic nature of the Scriptures, and thereby to lead them from this material world to the noetic realm. It was for this reason that the Logos was incarnate in a similarly 'symbolic' manner (οὐκ ὢν κοσμικὸς, ὡς κοσμικὸς).

It would, nevertheless, be wrong to restrict the Gnostic's ascent simply to the noetic level and the contemplation of noetic realities, understood in a Platonic fashion. In many passages Clement certainly follows Plato in insisting that the contemplation of noetic realities corresponds to the separation of the soul from the senses and the purification of the intellect.[38] This is linked, in Clement's thought, with the Socratic μελέτη θανάτου, the discipline of severing the soul from the body, enabling clear vision.[39] In the fourth *Stromata* Clement develops this idea of detachment or μελέτη θανάτου through the idea of a spirtualized or 'gnostic martyrdom':

νοῦν αἱ γραφαὶ, πρῶτον μὲν ἵνα ζητητικοὶ ὑπάρχωμεν καὶ προσαγρυπνῶμεν ἀεὶ τῇ τῶν σωτηρίων λόγων εὑρέσει, ἔπειτα [ὅτι] μηδὲ τοῖς ἅπασι προσῆκον ἦν νοεῖν, ὡς μὴ βλαβεῖεν ἑτέρως ἐκδεξάμενοι τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος σωτηρίως εἰρημένα. διὸ δὴ τοῖς εκλεκτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῖς τε ἐκ πίστεως εἰς γνῶσιν ἐγκρίτοις τηρούμενα τὰ ἅγια τῶν προφητειῶν μυστήρια ταῖς παραβολαῖς ἐγκαλύπτεται· παραβολικὸς γὰρ ὁ χαρακτὴρ ὑπάρχει τῶν γραφῶν, διότι καὶ ὁ κύριος, οὐκ ὢν κοσμικὸς, ὡς κοσμικὸς εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἦλθεν· καὶ γὰρ ἐφόρεσεν τὴν πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔμελλέν τε τὸν σύντροφον τοῦ κόσμου ἄνθρωπον ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ κύρια διὰ τῆς γνώσεως ἀνάγειν ἐκ κόσμου εἰς κόσμον.

[38]Cf. *Strom.* 4.23.148.1: [...] ἡ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ οἰκείωσις κατὰ φύσιν περιαγωγὴ τῷ γνωστικῷ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν γίνεται [...]. *Strom.* 6.11.86.1; 5.2.14.2, referring to Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246-249, as also *Strom.* 7.7.40.1-2.

[39]Cf. *Strom.* 5.11.67.1-2: Θυσία δὲ ἡ τῷ θεῷ δεκτὴ σώματός τε καὶ τῶν τούτου παθῶν ἀμετανόητος χωρισμός. ἡ ἀληθὴς τῷ ὄντι θεοσέβια αὕτη. καὶ μὴ τι εἰκότως μελέτη θανάτου διὰ τοῦτο εἴρηται τῷ Σωκράτει ἡ φιλοσοφία· ὁ γὰρ μήτε τὴν ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἐφελκόμενος, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ καθαρῷ τῷ νῷ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐντυγχάνων τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν μέτεισιν. The reference is to Plato, *Phaedo*, 67d. Cf. *Strom.* 4.3.12.5.

true martyrs bear their witness through their detachment in all aspects of their daily life.[40]

However, for Clement, Gnostics, in their ascent, do not stop at the κόσμος νοητός. Rather they penetrate beyond this realm to the spiritual realities, of which humans had no idea until they were revealed to us by Christ.[41] The idea of a realm transcending the noetic level was a developing theme in Middle Platonism, which would ultimately culminate in the absolute transcendence of the One of Plotinus.[42] In Clement the aim of this transcendence is, in the last analysis, knowledge and contemplation of God.[43]

Thus Clement writes of the aim of Scripture:

> Scripture [...] gently admonishes us to seek God and to know Him as far as possible; which is the highest contemplation, vision, and true knowledge, which is unshakable by reason. This alone is the γνῶσις of wisdom, from which the right conduct can never be separated.[44]

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[40] Cf. *Strom.* 4.1-14. For Clement's ideas on martyrdom, see W. H. C. Frend's discussion in his *Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church*, pp.355-358, who points out that Clement 'is the first Christian writer who placed the ascetic ideal on the same level as that of the martyr.' *Ibid.* p.356.

[41] Cf. *Strom.* 6.8.68.1: διὸ καὶ στοιχειωτική τίς ἐστιν ἡ μερικὴ αὕτη φιλοσοφία [ie. Greek philosophy], τῆς τελείας ὄντως ἐπιστήμης ἐπέκεινα κόσμου περὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ ἔτι τούτων τὰ πνευματικώτερα ἀναστρεφομένης, >ἃ ὀφθαλμὸς οὐκ εἶδεν καὶ οὖς οὐκ ἤκουσεν οὐδὲ ἐπὶ καρδίαν ἀνέβη ἀνθρώπων<, πρὶν ἢ διασαφῆσαι τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον ἡμῖν τὸν διδάσκαλον, [...]. Referring to 1 Cor. 2.9.

[42] Cf. Alcinoos, *Did.* 10, for the ambivalent relation between the πρωτὸς θεός or πατήρ, and his relation to the κόσμος νοητός.

[43] Cf. Camelot, 'Et nous savons par ailleurs que la connaissance des réalités créées, du monde sensible et du monde intelligible, n'est pour notre penseur qu'un moyen de s'élever jusqu'à la connaissance de Dieu.' *Op. cit.* p.97. This aspect seems to be completely overlooked by Lilla, for whom 'The higher knowledge which the γνωστικός possesses is nothing but a contemplation of the intelligible world.' *Op. cit.* p.163.

[44] *Strom.* 2.10.47.4: ... ἡ γραφὴ ... ὑπομιμνήσκει δὲ ἠρέμα ζητεῖν τὸν Θεὸν καὶ ὡς οἷόν τε γινώσκειν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἥτις ἂν εἴη θεωρία μεγίστη, ἡ ἐποπτική, ἡ τῷ ὄντι ἐπιστήμη, ἡ ἀμετάπτωτος λόγῳ γινομένη. αὕτη ἂν εἴη μόνη ἡ τῆς σοφίας γνῶσις, ἧς οὐδέποτε χωρίζεται ἡ δικαιοπραγία.

As this passage illustrates, Clement develops his treatment of the Gnostic's contemplation through a free use of such mystery terms as ἐποπτεία[45], and combines this term with more Biblical expressions such as γιγνώσκειν τὸν θεὸν or ὁρᾶν τὸν θεὸν.[46] As it was the Incarnate Christ who taught the apostles how to interpret the Scriptures correctly, so also it is Christ who makes known to us the knowledge of God.[47] The entry into the hidden mysteries is an 'illumination'[48], entering into which the Gnostic desires to become 'wholly light', rather than luminous by participation.[49] Thus Clement describes the human as reaching full contemplation of God and rest in Him, through the purification involved in γνῶσις and as a result of the inner light:

> γνῶσις is therefore quick in purifying, and fit for that acceptable transformation to the better. Whence also with ease it removes [the soul] to what is akin to the soul, divine and holy, and by its own light conveys the human through the mystic stages of advancement, until it restores [them] to the crowning place of rest; teaching the pure in heart to contemplate God, face to face, with knowledge and comprehension.[50]

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[45] Cf. *Strom.* 7.11.68.4. This term is also used in the baptismal context of the *Paedagogus*, eg. 1.6.28.1, 7.54.1. Cf. Plato *Phaedrus* 250c.

[46] Cf. *Strom.* 7.7.47.3: μέγιστον ἄρα ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ Θεοῦ. [...] ὁ δὲ ἐγνωκὼς τὸν θεὸν ὅσιος καὶ εὐσεβής. In *Strom.* 7.11.68.4, Clement, referring to St Paul's description of vision 'face to face' (1 Cor.13.12), describes the Gnostic as ὁρᾶν ἀιδίως. For a complete listing of Clement's use of such terms Stählin's index is indispensable. Cf. Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker*, pp.403-406.

[47] Cf. *Strom.* 5.1.12.3: [...] ὅτι δι' υἱοῦ ὁ πατὴρ γνωρίζεται. *Strom.* 1.20. 97.2; 4.25.156.1; 7.1.2.2-3, 3.16.6.

[48] Cf. *Strom.* 5.10.64.4-5.

[49] *Strom.* 7.12.79.5: οὐ γὰρ μετουσίᾳ θερμότητος θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρὸς φωτεινός, ἄλλ' εἶναι ὅλος φῶς βούλεται.

[50] *Strom.* 7.10.56.7-57.1: ταχεῖα τοίνυν εἰς κάθαρσιν ἡ γνῶσις καὶ ἐπιτήδειος εἰς τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον εὐπρόσδεκτον μεταβολήν. ὅθεν καὶ ῥᾳδίως εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς τῆς ψυχῆς θεῖόν τε καὶ ἅγιον μετοικίζει καὶ διά τινος οἰκείου φωτὸς διαβιβάζει τὰς προκοπὰς τὰς μυστικὰς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἄχρις ἂν εἰς τὸν κορυφαῖον ἀποκαταστήσῃ τῆς ἀναπαύσεως τόπον, τὸν καθαρὸν τῇ καρδίᾳ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον ἐπιστημονικῶς καὶ καταληπτικῶς τὸν Θεὸν ἐποπτεύειν διδάξασα.

The description of the final vision of God in γνωσις, the culmination of piety and the fulfilment of the promise granted in faith, as rest (ἀνάπαυσις) recurs throughout Clement's work.[51]

In the same way that the Gnostic's abstraction from the material and sensible world is not limited to an ascent to the noetic realm, but ascends to personal, 'face to face', vision of God, so too the abstraction involved is not simply intellectual. In *Stromata* 7 Clement portrays this ascent as consisting essentially of prayer. For Clement, prayer is essentially 'converse with God.'[52] Whilst some (ie. the simple believers) may pray at the set hours, Clement's Gnostics 'pray throughout their whole life, endeavouring by prayer to have fellowship with God.'[53] It is essentially an interior prayer that Clement describes, speaking in silence yet crying inwardly.[54] Such prayer has a similar effect to the abstraction involved in the allegorical interpretation of Scripture and that effected by the disciplines of philosophy. Thus Clement writes:

> So also we raise the head and lift the hands to heaven, and stand on tiptoe at the closing utterance of the prayer, following the eagerness of the spirit towards the intellectual essence; and, endeavouring to detach the body from the earth, along with the uttered words, constraining the soul, winged with the desire of better things, to ascend into the holy place, magnanimously despising the fetters of the flesh. For we know well that the Gnostic willing departs from the whole world, just as the Jews did from Egypt, showing clearly, above all, that they will be as near as

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[51] Cf. eg. *Paed.* 1.6.29.3, 12.102.2; *Strom.* 6.16.138.3; 7.12.68.5.

[52] *Strom.* 7.7.39.6: ἔστιν οὖν, ὡς εἰπεῖν τολμηρότερον, ὁμιλία πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἡ εὐχή· From this Völker concludes that 'aller Verkehr der Gläubigen mit Gott vollzieht sich nur in der Form des Gebetes.' *Der wahre Gnostiker*, p.411.

[53] *Strom.* 7.7.40.3: [...] ὁ γνωστικὸς παρὰ ὅλον εὔχεται τὸν βίον, δι᾽ εὐχῆς συνεῖναι μὲν σπεύδων Θεῷ, [...]. Cf. *Strom.* 7.12.73.1: εὐχὴ γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ βίος ἅπας καὶ ὁμιλία πρὸς Θεὸν, [...].

[54] *Strom.* 7.7.39.6: κἂν ψιθυρίζοντες ἄρα μηδὲ τὰ χείλη ἀνοίγοντες μετὰ σιγῆς προσλαλῶμεν, ἔνδοθεν κεκράγαμεν· πᾶσαν γὰρ τὴν ἐνδιάθετον ὁμιλίαν ὁ θεὸς ἀδιαλείπτως ἐπαΐει. Cf. *Strom.* 7.7.36.5.

possible to God.[55]

The abstraction effected in prayer is not simply that of an intellectual ascent or purification, but an endeavour to loosen the body itself from the earth, 'magnanimously despising' (καταμεγαλοφρονοῦντες) the fetters of the flesh and the world, in an attempt to be as close to God as possible. It is in this sense that Clement interprets the words of Christ, 'Unless you hate your father and mother and your own life [...]' (Luke 14.26), to mean a 'hatred of the inordinate affections of the flesh, which possess the powerful spell of pleasure' and a 'magnanimous contempt for all that belongs to the creation and nutriment of the flesh.'[56]

This function of prayer, abstracting the soul from the world, and its consequent 'magnanimous contempt' for the flesh, is paralleled by the demand for a detached but nonetheless thankful use of the world. Prayer encompasses our whole life, making it into a continual 'festival', whilst the need for detachment is balanced by a serious or noble enjoyment:

> Holding festival, then, in our whole life, persuaded that God is altogether on every side present, we cultivate our fields praising; we sail the sea, hymning; in all of the rest of our conversation we conduct ourselves according to the rule. The Gnostics are then very closely allied to God, being at once serious and cheerful in all things - serious, on account of the bent of their soul towards the Divinity, and cheerful on account of their consideration of the blessings of humanity which God has given us.[57]

Clement stresses throughout the *Stromateis* that the Gnostics are characterized by their giving thanks to God for all things, for 'such

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[55] *Strom.* 7.7.40.1-2, referring to Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246bc.

[56] *Strom.* 7.12.79.6: τάς τε γὰρ προσπαθείας τὰς σαρκικὰς πολὺ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ φίλτρον ἐχούσας μεμίσηκεν καὶ καταμεγαλοφρονεῖ πάντων τῶν εἰς δημιουργίαν καὶ τροφὴν τῆς σαρκὸς οἰκείων, [...].

[57] *Strom.* 7.7.35.6-7. Cf. *Strom.* 7.7.49.3: ἅπας δὲ ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ πανήγυρις ἁγία. For life as a continual festival see Epictetus, *Disc.*, 4.1.99-110: esp. 108: τῶν συνεορταζόντων δεῖται, τῶν συγχορευόντων, ἵν' ἐπικροτῶσι μᾶλλον, ἐπιθειάζωσιν, ὑμνῶσι δὲ τὴν πανήγυριν.

(eucharistic) souls can never be separated from God.'[58] This cheerfulness is in fact the reverse side of the serious detachment of the Gnostics; it is their detachment from the gifts that enables the Gnostics to give thanks to God in their use of them. Thus Clement combines these two descriptions and writes that the Gnostics offer to God 'a serious enjoyment of all things [...] acknowledging their thanks in the gift and in the use of them by the Word given to them.'[59] Ultimately, however, the 'magnanimous contempt' which Clement ascribes to the Gnostics extends beyond the 'chains of the flesh,' to typify their attitude to all the good things of the world.[60] Their true pleasure does not consist in the 'serious enjoyment of all things', for γνῶσις itself supplies 'harmless pleasures and exaltation,' and therefore γνῶσις is worth pursuing for its own sake.[61]

Such γνῶσις not only effects a detachment and a 'noble contempt', but its aquisition by μάθησις corresponds to an ethical effort, for from it 'right

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[58] Thus the Gnostic martyr thankfully sheds blood, *Strom.* 4.21.130.5; the body of the Gnostic, as one on a distant pilgrimage, gives thanks for its sojourn on its departure, *Strom.* 4.26.166.1, for thanksgiving is not only for the soul but for the body, *Strom.* 5.10.61.5; 6.14.113.3: [...] ἀεὶ δὲ εὐχαριστοῦσα ἐπὶ πᾶσι τῷ Θεῷ δι᾽ ἀκοῆς δικαίας καὶ ἀναγνώσεως θείας, διὰ ζητήσεως ἀληθοῦς, διὰ προσφορᾶς ἁγίας, δι᾽ εὐχῆς μακαρίας, αἰνοῦσα, ὑμνοῦσα, εὐλογοῦσα, ψάλλουσα· οὐ διορίζεταί ποτε τοῦ Θεοῦ κατ᾽ οὐδένα καιρὸν ἡ τοιάδε ψυχή. A similar emphasis on joy is found in the Stoics, but, again, the more direct influence is likely to be Philo, see Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker*, p.518.

[59] *Strom.* 7.7.36.4: πάντων δὲ τὴν σεμνὴν ἀπόλαυσιν ἐπὶ τὸν Θεὸν ἀναγαγὼν ἀεὶ καὶ τῆς βρώσεως καὶ τοῦ πόματος καὶ τοῦ χρίσματος τῷ δοτῆρι τῶν ὅλων ἀπάρχεται, χάριν ὁμολογῶν καὶ [διὰ] τῆς δωρεᾶς καὶ τῆς χρήσεως διὰ λόγου τοῦ δοθέντος αὐτῷ, [...].

[60] Cf. *Strom.* 7.12.78.3: οὗτος περισπώμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐλπίδος οὐ γεύεται τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ καλῶν, πάντων τῶν ἐνταῦθα καταμεγαλοφρονῶν·

[61] *Strom.* 6.12.99.3: δεξώμεθα οὖν τὴν γνῶσιν οὐ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐφιέμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ γινώσκειν ἀσπαζόμενοι. πρώτη γὰρ ὠφέλεια ἡ ἕξις ἡ γνωστική, ἡδονὰς ἀβλαβεῖς παρεχομένη καὶ ἀγαλλίασιν καὶ νῦν καὶ εἰς ὕστερον.

conduct can never be separated'.[62] Clement repeatedly stresses the two aspects or 'paths', ἔργα or ἄσκησις and μάθησις, which lead to the 'perfection of salvation'.[63] These two paths are not unrelated, for γνῶσις itself is an activity, a 'purification of the ἡγεμονικόν.'[64] Their interrelation becomes more apparent in Clement's descriptions of the ideal state in which both ἄσκησις and μάθησις culminate. The intensification of ἄσκησις, which we considered earlier, corresponds to the surpassing of the aim of μετριοπάθεια, demanded of the Christian in the *Paedagogus*, by the ideal of ἀπάθεια which dominates the *Stromateis*.[65] Clement is unambiguous that the cessation of all desire, rather than its moderation, is required in order to reach perfection, and this is achieved through both γνῶσις and ἄσκησις:

> We must therefore raise the gnostic and perfect man from all passion of soul; for γνῶσις produces practice (συνάσκησις), and practice habit or disposition, and such a state as this produces ἀπάθεια, not μετριοπάθεια. And complete eradication of desire reaps as its fruit ἀπάθεια.[66]

Here γνῶσις is described as producing ἄσκησις, whilst, as we saw earlier,

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[62] *Strom.* 2.10.47.4.

[63] Cf. *Strom.* 4.6.39.1: Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπαγόντων εἰς τὴν τελείωσιν τῆς σωτηρίας ὁδοὶ εὑρίσκονται δύο, ἔργα καὶ γνῶσις [...]. Cf. Völker: Die Zusammengehörigkeit von ἄσκησις und μάθησις, von Glaube und Tun, von Glaube und Gnosis wird von Clemens unermüdlich betont und verleiht seiner Konzeption des geistlichen Lebens eine große innere Geschlossenheit.' *Der wahre Gnostiker*, p.254. Cf. Wytzes, 'The Twofold Way', *passim*.

[64] *Strom.* 4.6.39.2: κἂν τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἀληθὲς σκοπῶμεν, ἡ γνῶσις, <ἧ> τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς κάθαρσίς ἐστι, καὶ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν ἀγαθή.

[65] Cf. *Strom.* 6.13.105.1: Ὁ τοίνυν μετριοπαθήσας τὰ πρῶτα καὶ εἰς ἀπάθειαν μελετήσας [...].

[66] *Strom.* 6.9.74.1: ἐξαιρετέον ἄρα τὸν γνωστικὸν ἡμῖν καὶ τέλειον ἀπὸ παντὸς ψυχικοῦ πάθους· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γνῶσις συνάσκησιν, ἡ δὲ συνάσκησις δὲ ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν, ἡ κατάστασις δὲ ἡ τοιάδε ἀπάθειαν ἐργάζεται, οὐ μετριοπάθειαν· ἀπάθειαν γὰρ καρποῦται παντελῆς τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐκκοπή.

Clement also regards γνῶσις as the perfection of ἄσκησις.[67] This ambivalence simply reinforces the fact that both are interrelated and lead to perfection in ἀπάθεια. It must be noted that, on one occasion, Clement categorically asserts that ἄσκησις alone will not produce ἀπάθεια; this is only attained by the addition of the power of God.[68] Following Clement's own intimation, most scholars have pointed to the Stoic provenance of the term ἀπάθεια, whilst widely disagreeing on the extent of the influence of this Stoic ideal on Clement's thought.[69] Clement sometimes suggests that the Gnostic remains subject to those passions that are necessary for the maintenance of the body.[70] A little later, however, we are given as an example the apostles, who 'gnostically mastered' even those passible movements which seem to be good, such as courage, zeal and joy.[71] The Gnostics will no longer even need

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[67] *Strom.* 2.9.45.1. Cf. *Strom.* 6.8.68.3, 9.78.4.

[68] *QDS* 21.1, see *supra* pp.200-201 for the quotation and discussion.

[69] In *Strom.* 7.14.84.2 Clement suggests that he could find many other more biblical testimonies for the ἀπάθεια of the Gnostic, but for brevity will leave the task to others. Similarly at *Strom.* 7.1.1.4, Clement acknowledges that his expressions may seem to differ from that of Scripture, but, he asserts, they have the same source and same meaning. For de Faye, the identification was absolute: 'l'*apathie* de Clément est absolument identique à l'*apathie* des stoïcens', *Clément d'Alexandrie*, p.295. So also Guilloux, 'L'Ascétisme de Clément d'Alexandrie', p.296. Völker points, on the contrary, to the integral position of ἀπάθεια within Clement's Christian asceticism, and asserts 'eine Umdeutung der stoischen Konzeption der Apathie', *Der wahre Gnostiker*, p.530. Lilla suggests that the more direct influence was the distinction between a lower (μετριοπάθεια) and higher (ἀπάθεια) ethical stage in Neoplatonism and more particularly Philo, *op. cit.* pp.103-106.

[70] Cf. *Strom.* 6.9.71.1: Τοιοῦτος γὰρ ὁ γνωστικός, ὡς μόνοις τοῖς διὰ τὴν <δια>μονὴν τοῦ σώματος γινομένοις πάθεσι περιπίπτειν, [...].

[71] *Strom.* 6.9.71.3: οἱ δὲ ἀπόστολοι ὀργῆς καὶ φόβου καὶ ἐπιθυμίας διὰ τῆς κυριακῆς διδασκαλίας γνωστικώτερον κρατήσαντες καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀγαθὰ τῶν παθητικῶν κινημάτων, οἷον θάρσος, ζῆλον, χαράν, εὐθυμίαν, οὐδὲ αὐτὰ ἀνεδέξαντο, [...]. *Strom.* 6.9.71.4: κἂν γὰρ μετὰ λόγου γινόμενα τὰ προειρημένα ἀγαθά τις ἐκδέχηται, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν γε ἐπὶ τοῦ τελείου οὐ παραδεκτέον, ὃς οὔτε θαρσεῖν ἔχει [...]. On what feelings and movements are left to the Stoics in their state of ἀπάθεια, see Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire*, pp.398-401.

such virtues as σωφροσύνη, as they will no longer need to control their desire.[72]

The ambivalence in Clement's descriptions of ἀπάθεια points to the fact that ἀπάθεια is not to be equated simply with a deadened insensitivity. As we have seen, Clement thinks of the passions as 'movements of the soul contrary to nature in disobedience to the λόγος.'[73] As such, ἄσκησις does not so much aim to remove the natural movements of the human but to subject them to a strict obedience to the λόγος and to disassociate them from pleasure (ἡδονή); whilst the Gnostic who has intensified such ἄσκησις, and no longer has to struggle with the passions, the disobedient movements of the soul under the sway of pleasure, has attained ἀπάθεια, a state in which the body can function naturally without interfering with the Gnostic's true desires. For this reason, the Gnostic is in a state of immutability or peace.[74] For Clement, the struggle for ἀπάθεια is, moreover, connected to the desire to perfect the image with the likeness, for as God is ἀπαθής, so too must humans be if they are to be fully assimilated to God.[75] Removing themselves

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[72]Cf. *Strom.* 6.9.76.2: τίς δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνης ἀνάγκη μὴ χρήζοντι αὐτῆς;

[73] *Strom.* 2.13.59.6. Cf. *Supra* pp.173-174.

[74]For Clement's connection between ἀπάθεια and ἀταραξία see eg. *Strom.* 4.7.55.4; for ἄτρεπτον, esp. *Strom.* 2.11.51.6-52.3: ἀτρέπτῳ πρὸς τὸ ἄτρεπτον ἡ προσαγωγή, cf. Philo, *De Post. Cain*, 9.27: ὄντως γὰρ ἀτρέπτῳ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὸν ἄτρέπτον θεὸν μόνη πρόσοδος ἐστι, [...]. And for εἰρήνη, esp. *Strom.* 4.6.40.3 (commenting on Mt. 5.9): εἴη δ' ἄν ἡ τελεία εἰρηνοποίησας ἡ ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ συμβαίνοντι ἄτρεπτον φυλάσσουσα τὸ εἰρηνικόν, [...].

[75]Cf. *Strom.* 7.12.72.1: Εἷς μὲν οὖν μόνος ὁ ἀνεπιθύμητος ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὁ κύριος ὁ φιλάνθρωπος ὁ καὶ δι' ἡμᾶς ἄνθρωπος· ὅσοι δὲ ἐξομοιοῦσθαι σπεύδουσι τῷ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δεδομένῳ χαρακτῆρι ἀνεπιθύμητοι ἐξ ἀσκήσεως γενέσθαι βιάζοντι. *Strom.* 7.3.13.3: [...] ἐξομοιούμενος Θεῷ ὁ γνωστικός, τῷ φύσει τὸ ἀπαθὲς κεκτημένῳ τὸ ἐξ ἀσκήσεως εἰς ἀπάθειαν συνεσταλμένον [...]. Cf. *Strom.* 2.18.81.1.

from the influence of the passions, the Gnostics become ἄσαρκος and live 'above the world.'[76]

As a consequence of divesting themselves of the passions, true Gnostics become sinless.[77] However, as we have noted, the most important characteristic of Clement's description of ἀπάθεια is that it is not simply a negative state; abstention from evil or sin is not enough.[78] Both γνῶσις and ἀπάθεια culminate, and find their completion, in beneficence or doing-good, εὐποιία. Thus Clement writes, that whilst the first purification, the perfection of the common believer, is abstention (ἀποχή) from evil things,

> In the case of the Gnostics, after that which is reckoned perfection in others, their righteousness advances to activity in εὐποιία. And in whoever the intensification of righteousness advances to the doing of good, in their case perfection abides in the unchanging habit of εὐποιία after the likeness of God.[79]

Those who have passed from μετριοπάθεια to ἀπάθεια and are then perfected by εὐποιία become, according to Clement, 'equal to the angels' and radiate in their exercise of beneficence, hastening, by γνῶσις, to the abode of the apostles.[80] They also become true presbyters and deacons of the Church, not

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[76] *Strom.* 7.14.86.7: [...] μηδενί τῶν παθῶν κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον περιπίπτοντι, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον ἀσάρκῳ ἤδη καὶ ἄνω τῆσδε τῆς γῆς [ἁγίῳ] γεγονότι. Cf. *Strom.* 7.12.79.3: [...] ὡς γνωστικός, ὡς ἄσαρκος, [...]. *Strom.* 7.3.18.2: [...] γενόμενος κόσμιος καὶ ὑπερκόσμιος, [...].

[77] Cf. *Strom.* 7.3.14.2: [...] τὰ μὲν πάθη ἀποτιθεμένους, ἀναμαρτήτους δὲ γινομένους. See also *Strom.* 7.12.80.2.

[78] Cf. *Strom.* 4.6.29.2; 6.12.103.2-4.

[79] *Strom.* 6.7.60.3: τοῦ δὲ γνωστικοῦ μετὰ τὴν ἄλλοις νομιζομένην τελείωσιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη εἰς ἐνέργειαν εὐποιίας προβαίνει· καὶ ὅτῳ δὴ ἡ ἐπίτασις τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἰς ἀγαθοποιίαν ἐπιδέδωκεν, τούτῳ ἡ τελείωσις ἐν ἀμεταβόλῳ ἕξει εὐποιίας καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ διαμένει·

[80] *Strom.* 6.13.105.1: Ὁ τοίνυν μετριοπαθήσας τὰ πρῶτα καὶ εἰς ἀπάθειαν μελετήσας αὐξήσας τε εἰς εὐποιίαν γνωστικῆς τελειότητος

by being ordained, but by being truly righteous.[81] True Gnostics can never, according to Clement, be totally withdrawn from the world and from concern for others; rather their perfection lies in εὐποιία or as he once terms it, κυριακῆ εὐποιία.[82] In the same way, an essential aspect of the Gnostic's prayer is prayer for the salvation of others, and this makes the Gnostic a 'saviour', assimilating them to the Saviour.[83] Likewise an important task of the Gnostic is the instruction of others, even if there is only one listener.[84] The characteristics of ἀπάθεια, εὐποιία and assimilation are brought together by Clement in a striking passage:

> This is the energy of perfected Gnostics, to have converse with the great High Priest, being made like the Lord, as far as they are able, in the whole service of God, which tends to the salvation of humans, through care of the beneficence which is aimed at us, and on the other side, through liturgy, through teaching and through εὐποιία in deeds. The Gnostics even form and create themselves adorning those who hear them like God, assimilating as far as possible, by ἄσκησις which tends to ἀπάθεια, to Him who is by nature ἀπαθής, and this is uninterrupted converse and communion with the Lord.[85]

>ἰσάγγελος< μὲν ἐνταῦθα· φωτεινὸς δὲ ἤδη καὶ ὡς ὁ ἥλιος λάμπων κατὰ τὴν εὐεργεσίαν σπεύδει τῇ γνώσει τῇ δικαίᾳ δι᾽ ἀγάπης Θεοῦ ἐπὶ τὴν ἁγίαν μονὴν καθάπερ οἱ ἀπόστολοι, [...]. The idea of becoming ἰσάγγελος, taken from Luke 20.36, is also found in: *Paed.* 2.9.79.2, 82.3, 10.100.3. *Strom.* 7. 10.57.5, 14.84.2. Cf. [K.] S. Frank, **ΑΓΓΕΛΙΚΟΣ ΒΙΟΣ**, pp.130–135.

[81] Cf. *Strom.* 6.13.106.1–2.

[82] *Strom.* 4.6.29.2.

[83] *Strom.* 6.9.77.5: σωτηρίος γάρ τις ὁ τῷ σωτῆρι ἐξομοιούμενος[...]. On prayer for others see also *Strom.* 7.7.41.6.

[84] Cf. *Strom.* 1.10.49.1; 2.10.46.1; 7.1.4.2, 9.52.1.

[85] *Strom.* 7.2.13.2–3: αὕτη τοίνυν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ τελειωθέντος γνωστικοῦ, προσομιλεῖν τῷ Θεῷ διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου ἀρχιερέως, ἐξομοιούμενον εἰς δύναμιν τῷ κυρίῳ διὰ πασῆς τῆς εἰς τὸν Θεὸν θεραπείας, ἥτις εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διατείνει σωτηρίαν κατὰ κηδεμονίαν τῆς εἰς ἡμᾶς εὐεργεσίας κατὰ τε αὖ τὴν λειτουργίαν κατά τε τὴν διδασκαλίαν κατὰ τε τὴν δι᾽ ἔργων εὐποιίαν. ναὶ μὴν ἑαυτὸν κτίζει καὶ δημιουργεῖ, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τοῦς ἐπαΐοντας αὐτοῦ κοσμεῖ ἐξομοιούμενος Θεῷ ὁ γνωστικός, τῷ φύσει τὸ ἀπαθὲς κεκτημένῳ τὸ ἐξ ἀσκήσεως εἰς ἀπάθειαν συνεσταλμένον ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα ἐξομοιῶν, καὶ ταῦτα >ἀπερισπάστως< προσομιλῶν τε καὶ συνὼν τῷ κυρίῳ.

Clement's strong language in this passage (the Gnostics 'form and create themselves') is balanced by emphasis on the service of God, on prayer, on teaching, on the culmination of ἄσκησις in an ἀπάθεια characterized by εὐποιία, all of which assimilate us to God.

Alongside these themes of γνῶσις, ἀπάθεια and εὐποιία, lies the dynamic of love, ἀγάπη. Although Clement describes ἀγάπη as the culmination of the process beginning with fear and progressing through faith[86], in the life of the perfect Gnostic ἀγάπη functions as both cause and effect. Thus in describing the relationship between ἀγάπη and γνῶσις, Clement maintains both that γνῶσις culminates in ἀγάπη[87], and also that ἀγάπη is perfected by γνῶσις.[88] This ambivalence again reinforces the fact that for Clement ἀγάπη and γνῶσις can never be separated, and are ultimately one and the same.[89] Likewise, ἀγάπη is portrayed as 'blossoming into εὐποιία', while it is through ἀγάπη that the Gnostic does good, for love is the only true motive.[90] Similarly, 'the perfect one ought therefore to practise love, and thence to hasten to the divine friendship, fulfilling the commandments from love.'[91]

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[86] *Strom.* 2.12.53.3: [...] ὁ φόβος τῆς ἀγάπης ἀρχὴ, κατὰ παραύξησιν πίστις γινόμενος, εἶτα ἀγάπη· Cf. *Strom.* 4.7.53.1.

[87] Eg. *Strom.* 7.10.57.4: [γνῶσις] εἰς ἀγάπην περαιουμένην. Camelot understands this to imply a surpassing: 'La gnose s'achève en se dépassant elle-même pour aboutir à la charité: tel est le sens de περαιοῦται.' *Foi et Gnose*, p.125.

[88] Eg. *Strom.* 2.9.45.1.

[89] Admirably demonstrated by Méhat: '[...] c'est que pour Clément, il n'y a pas *réellement* dualité, que l'amour de charité et la gnose sont, au terme, une seule et même chose.' *Étude sur les Stromates*, p.476.

[90] Cf. *QDS* 28.4: [...] ὡς τῆς ἀγάπης βλαστανούσης εὐποιίαν. *Strom.* 4.22.135.4: [...] μόνη δ' ἡ δι' ἀγάπην εὐποιία ἡ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν αἱρετὴ τῷ γνωστικῷ.

[91] *Strom.* 4.13.93.2: ἀγάπην οὖν ἀσκεῖν τὸν τέλειον χρή, κἀνθένδε ἐπὶ τὴν θείαν φιλίαν σπεύδειν, δι' ἀγάπην ἐκτελοῦντα τὰς ἐντολάς.

Love, the cause and form of the particular form of the Gnostics' life, renders them sons and friends of God.[92] Possessed by this love, the Gnostic no longer loves anyone with a common affection, but loves the Creator through the creatures.[93] For Clement, our love for God is a reciprocating love (ἀνταγαπᾶν), as is the holiness and the benevolence of the Gnostic a 'kind of corresponding movement of providence'.[94] Finally, by loving God to the utmost of one's abilities, one acquires incorruptibility, for the more one loves, the more one enters into God.[95]

There is a particularly striking feature of Clement's portrayal of the ideal Gnostic state that must be noted. Clement frequently utilizes the Aristotelian-Stoic term ἕξις to describe the Gnostic's ἀπάθεια or εὐποιία.[96] Again using Stoic terminology, Clement specifies that this 'habit' or 'disposition' is unchangeable or unshakeable (ἀναπόβλητος, ἀμετάβολος, ἀμετάπτωτος): 'the Gnostic's perfection lies in the unchanging habit of

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[92] *Strom.* 7.11.68.1: [ἀγάπη] [...] φίλον ὁμοῦ καὶ υἱὸν τὸν γνωστικὸν ἀπεργάζεται, [...].

[93] *Strom.* 6.9.71.5: οὐδὲ ἄρα φιλεῖ τινα τὴν κοινὴν ταύτην φιλίαν, ἀλλ' ἀγαπᾷ τὸν κτίστην διὰ τῶν κτισμάτων.

[94] *Paed.* 1.3.9.1: καθήκει δ' ἡμῖν ἀνταγαπᾶν μὲν τὸν καθηγούμενον ἀγαπητικῶς ἀρίστου βίου, [...]. This word ἀνταγαπᾶν had previously been used by Philo, *De Abr.* 10.50. *Strom.* 7.7.42.3: οἱονεὶ γὰρ ἀντεπιστροφή τίς ἐστι τῆς προνοίας ἡ τοῦ γνωστικοῦ ὁσιότης καὶ ἀντίστροφος εὔνοια τοῦ φίλου τοῦ Θεοῦ.

[95] *QDS* 27.5: [...] αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ἀγαπᾶν τὸν πατέρα εἰς οἰκείαν ἰσχὺν καὶ δύναμιν ἀφθαρσίαν κομιζομένους. ὅσον γὰρ ἀγαπᾷ τις Θεόν, τοσούτῳ καὶ πλέον ἐνδοτέρω τοῦ Θεοῦ παραδύεται.

[96] Cf. *Strom.* 4.22.138.1: οὐκ ἐγκρατὴς οὗτος ἔτι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἕξει γέγονεν ἀπαθείας [...].; alternatively *Strom.* 3.10.69.3: [...] γνωστικῶς βιώσεται, ἕξιν ἐγρατείας ἄπονον περιποιημένος [...].; *Strom.* 4.12.137.1: [...] ἐν ἕξει εὐποιίας καταστᾶσα [...]. ; *Strom.* 7.7.38.4: [...] εἰς ἕξιν ἀγαθότητος ἐλθεῖν, [...]. For the Aristotelian background of the description of virtue as an ἕξις see *Nich. Eth.* 2.5, 1105b.19–1106a.13. Chryssipus had described ἐγκράτεια as an ἕξεις ἀκολουθητικὰς τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ. *SVF* 3.384, p.93.28. Cf. *SVF* 3.272, p.66.40: ἐγκράτεια δὲ ἕξις ἀήττητος ὑφ' ἡδονῶν.

εὐποιία, according to the likeness of the Lord.'[97] Christ set the pattern for us, for He assumed passible flesh, and trained it to a habit of ἀπάθεια.[98] It is, for Clement, through ἀγάπη and γνῶσις, which perfect our ἄσκησις, that our 'disposition' is rendered infallible. This is clearly expressed in the following passage:

> As γνῶσις is not born with humans, but is acquired, and the learning of it in its elements demands application, training and growth; and then from incessant practice it passes into a habit; so, when perfected in the mystic habit, it abides, being made infallible through love.[99]

Clement even suggests that in the one who has acquired unshakeable virtue by 'gnostic ἄσκησις', habit 'becomes nature.'[100] It is from this position that we can understand Clement's assertion that every action of the Gnostic is a 'right action' compared to the 'medium actions' of the simple believers and the sinful activity of pagans.[101] It is not simply that each particular action of the Gnostics is good, but rather that all their activity stems from a good disposition.[102] In this disposition there is no conflict between

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[97] *Strom.* 6.7.60.3: [...] τούτῳ [ie. the Gnostic] ἡ τελείωσις ἐν ἀμεταβόλῳ ἕξει εὐποιίας καθ' ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ διαμένει· Cf. *Strom.* 6.9.73.5: [...] ἐν τῇ μιᾷ ἕξει μένει τῇ ἀμεταβόλῳ γνωστικῶς ἀγαπῶν, [...]; *Strom.* 7.7.46.7: [...] ἀμεταπτώτως βιοῦν, [...]; 46.9: [...] ἀναπόβλητον τὴν ἀρετὴν [...]. For the Stoic doctrine of ἀρετή as ἀναπόβλητος *SVF* 1.569, p.129.28; ἀμετάπτωτον, *SVF* 1.202, p.50.4.

[98] *Strom.* 7.2.7.5: [...] ὃς γε καὶ τὴν σάρκα τὴν ἐμπαθῆ φύσει γενομένην ἀναλαβὼν εἰς ἕξιν ἀπαθείας ἐπαίδευσεν.

[99] *Strom.* 6.9.78.4: ὡς δὲ οὐ συγγεννᾶται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἐπίκτητός ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις καὶ προσοχῆς μὲν δεῖται κατὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ μάθησις αὐτῆς ἐκθρέψεώς τε καὶ αὐξήσεως, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀδιαλείπτου μελέτης εἰς ἕξιν ἔρχεται, οὕτως ἐν ἕξει τελειωθεῖσα τῇ μυστικῇ ἀμετάπτωτος δι' ἀγάπην μένει·

[100] *Strom.* 7.7.46.9: τῷ ἄρα ἀναπόβλητον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσκήσει γνωστικῇ πεποιημένῳ φυσιοῦται ἡ ἕξις, [...].
Cf. *Strom.* 4.22.138.3: ἐπὰν δὲ ἐν ἕξει ποιήσῃ τὸ εὐεργετητικόν, φύσιν ἀγαθοῦ μιμήσεται· ἡ δὲ διάθεσις καὶ φύσις ἔσται καὶ συνάσκησις.

[101] Cf. *Strom.* 6.14.111.3. Cited *supra* p.229.

[102] Such an attitude is characteristic of Platonic philosophy in general. Cf. W. Jaeger, δικαιοσύνη for Plato 'does not lie in separate actions, but in

the will, the judgement, and the corresponding activity.[103] Thus Clement can describe the Gnostic imitating God by 'performing good actions by the faculty of reason.'[104] More specifically, it is the Gnostic's disposition of εὐποιία that makes the energy exerted in every act 'good', so that the Gnostic passes his life as the 'image and likeness' of God.[105]

We have noted in passing how Clement associates each of the characteristics of the Gnostic with assimilation to God, perfecting the image by the likeness.[106] This theme runs throughout Clement's work, determining his asceticism.[107] For Clement this is ultimately a process of deification. As those who devote themselves to Isomachus become farmers, and the disciples of Plato become philosophers, so too those 'who listen to the Lord, and follow the prophecy given by Him, will be formed perfectly in the image of the teacher, and made a god walking about in the flesh.'[108] This was the

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the ἕξις, the permanent state of having a *good will.' Greek Paideia*, 2, p.242.

[103]Cf. *Strom.* 2.17.77.5: τοῦ γνωστικοῦ δὲ καὶ ἡ βούλησις καὶ ἡ κρίσις καὶ ἡ ἄσκησις ἡ αὐτή.

[104]*Strom.* 6.16.136.3: [...] ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὁ γνωστικὸς γενόμενος τῷ λογικῷ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις ἐπιτελεῖ.

[105]*Strom.* 4.22.137.1: αὕτη τοίνυν ἡ πρώτη ἀγαθοποιία τοῦ τελείου, ὅταν μὴ διά τι χρειῶδες τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν συντεινόντων γίνηται, κρίναντος δ' ὅτι καλὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖν, ἐκτενῶς ἡ ἐνέργεια φερομένη ἐν παάῃ πράξει ἀγαθύνηται, οὐκ ἐφ' ὧν μέν, ἐφ' ὧν δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἕξει εὐποιίας καταστᾶσα [...] >κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν< τοῦ κυρίου τὸν βίον ἐκτελοίη.

[106]For assimilation through ἀπάθεια, *Strom.* 7.2.13.3; through worship, teaching and εὐποιία, *Strom.* 7.3.13.2; by ἄσκησις aimed at ἀνεπιθύμητος, *Strom.* 7.12.72.1; through ἀγαθοποιία, *Strom.* 4.22.137.1; through εὐποιία *Strom.* 6.7.60.3; through ἀγάπη, *Strom.* 6.9.73.6; through prayer for others, *Strom.* 6.9.77.4-5. That the Gnostic is both in the image and likeness, esp. *Strom.* 2.19.97.1.

[107]Cf.Völker, 'Die ganze Clementinische Ethik ist daher nichts anderes als eine immer reinere Ausprägung des Ebenbildes', *Der wahre Gnostiker*, p.580; Mayer, *Das Gottesbild*, p.19.

[108]*Strom.* 7.16.101.4: [...] οὕτως ὁ τῷ κυρίῳ πειθόμενος καὶ τῇ

reason for the Incarnation, that God having become human, we might 'learn from a human how to become god.'[109] The life of the Gnostic finds its completion in this goal, and therefore they 'study to be a god.'[110]

Clement's vivid descriptions of the Gnostic as having achieved, through ἄσκησις and μάθησις, a permanent and unshakeable state of ἀπάθεια and εὐποιία perfected in ἀγάπη, have received varied evaluations by recent scholars. Some are tempted to see in them an attainable mystical condition[111], whilst others, including Völker, consider it to be an idealized picture, which tries to surpass the Stoic descriptions of their own sages.[112] Despite his more categoric claims, which we have considered above, there is nevertheless an ambivalence in Clement's thought. The infallible state of the Gnostics is one which must be maintained by prayer and co-operation:

δοθείσῃ δι' αὐτοῦ κατακολουθήσας προφητείᾳ τελέως ἐκτελεῖται κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ διδασκάλου ἐν σαρκὶ περιπολῶν θεός.

[109] *Prot.* 1.8.4: [...] ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος, ἵνα δὴ καὶ σὺ παρὰ ἀνθρώπου μάθῃς, πῇ ποτε ἄρα ἄνθρωπος γένηται θεός.

[110] *Strom.* 6.14.113.3: [...] ἡ ψυχὴ μελετᾷ εἶναι θεός, [...].

[111] So F. Buri, who considers it to be an attainable '[...] unverrückbaren und unverlierbaren, mystischen Dauerzustand [...]' *Clemens Alexandrinus und der paulinische Freiheitsbegriff*, p.47. The adjective 'mystical' is based on *Strom.* 6.9.78.4.

[112] Cf. Völker: '[...] wenn Clemens so stark das ἀναπόβλητος betont, so übersehe man nicht, daß er eine Idealschilderung beabsichtigt und sich der philosophischen Redeweise angepaßt hat.' *Der wahre Gnostiker*, p.455. ftn.2, cf. pp.541-546; so also T. Rüther, 'Es scheint mir, daß es sich um eine rhetorische Hyperbel handelt, wenn er von der Unverlierbarkeit der gnostischen Agape spricht.' *Das sittliche Forderung der Apatheia in den beiden ersten christlichen Jahrhunderten und bei Klemens von Alexandrien*, p.81; similarly Pohlenz, 'Klemens von Alexandrien und sein hellenisches Christentum', p.167; Camelot, *Foi et Gnose*, p.133; Wytzes, 'The Twofold Way', p.238. Casey mediates between the two positions: 'For Clement the sage [unlike Stoic teaching] was not only an ever present possibility, but an accomplished fact in the life of Jesus Christ, and this fact guaranteed to all Christians the practicability of the ideal. [...] That complete sinlessness was a prerogative of the godhead Clement admits, but he says that the Christian sage can at least avoid all conscious misdemeanors.' 'Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Platonism', p.63.

'They will pray that they may never fall from virtue, giving it their most strenuous co-operation in order that they may continue infallible.'[113] The infallible disposition of the perfect Gnostic is, therefore, one which they have and simultaneously pray for: ἔχων ἅμα καὶ εὐχόμενος.[114] The life of the Gnostic can perhaps be described, in Völker's words, as 'eine Doppelstimmung.'[115]

However, the most fundamental tension in the Gnostic's life, is not simply that of maintaining an ideal state, of having and praying for its permanence, within the same horizon of the present. It is, rather, the eschatological tension of 'already but not yet' that produces the ambivalence in Clement's portrait of the perfect Gnostic. His bold assertions about the Gnostic's perfected state find their place within equally striking statements describing a vivid proleptic eschatology. For Clement, one of the principal functions of γνῶσις and ἀγάπη is to render the future already present. That this is so is because, ultimately, both γνῶσις and ἀγάπη are eschatological realities.[116] Thus he writes that the Gnostic, 'being persuaded by γνῶσις how each future thing shall be, already possesses

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[113] *Strom.* 7.7.46.5: ναὶ μὴν μηδὲ ἀποπεσεῖν ποτε τῆς ἀρετῆς αἰτήσεται, συνεργῶν μάλιστα πρὸς τὸ ἄπτωτος διαγενέσθαι.

[114] *Strom.* 7.7.44.5.

[115] Völker, *Der wahre Gnostiker*, p.504.

[116] Cf. Méhat, after a diligent examination of many texts in the *Stromateis* which indicate the eschatological nature of γνῶσις concludes, 'que la gnose, connaissance des réalités eschatologiques, est elle-même une réalité eschatologique, ou plutôt une réalisation de l'eschatologie.' *Étude sur les Stromates*, p.475. Our consideration of the eschatological nature of γνῶσις is limited to an examination of its effects within the life of the Gnostic, the influence it has on his asceticism.

it.'[117] Similarly: 'through ἀγάπη the future is already present for them.'[118] This is possible because of the trustworthiness of the One in whom they believe. Thus he continues:

> For they have believed, through prophecy and the parousia, on God who lies not. And what they believe they possess, and keep hold of the promise (for He who has promised is Truth). And through the trustworthiness of Him who has promised, they have firmly received the end of the promise by knowledge.[119]

This anticipation is also effected through prayer[120], and is closely associated with the joy that makes the Gnostic's life a continual 'holy festival': 'the Gnostic rejoices in things present and is glad on account of those things promised as if they were present,' for they know them by anticipation.[121] Finally, bringing γνῶσις and ἀγάπη together, Clement specifically connects this proleptic anticipation with the Gnostic's unchangeable state:

> But the one who by love is already in the midst of that which they are destined to be, and has anticipated hope by γνῶσις, does not desire anything, having as far as possible, the very thing desired. Accordingly, then, they continue in the exercise of gnostic love in the one unvarying state.[122]

It is in their anticipation of their true eschatological state that the

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[117] *Strom.* 7.7.47.5: τῇ γνώσει οὖν πεπεισμένος [καὶ] ὡς ἔστιν ἕκαστον τῶν μελλόντων κέκτηται τοῦτο.

[118] *Strom.* 6.9.77.1: κἄστιν αὐτῷ δι᾽ ἀγάπην ἐνεστὸς ἤδη τὸ μέλλον.

[119] *Strom.* 6.9.77.1: πεπίστευκεν γὰρ διά τε τῆς προφητείας διά τε τῆς παρουσίας τῷ μὴ ψευδομένῳ Θεῷ καί, ὃ πεπίστευκεν, ἔχει καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας (ἀλήθεια δὲ ὁ ἐπαγγειλάμενος) καὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπαγγελίας διὰ τῆς ἀξιοπιστίας τοῦ ἐπαγγειλαμένου κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμην βεβαίως ἀπείληφεν.

[120] Cf. *Strom.* 7.7.43.1, 12.79.2.

[121] *Strom.* 7.7.47.4: οὗτος χαίρει μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν ἀγαθοῖς, γέγηθεν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπηγγελμένοις, ὡς ἤδη παροῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ λέληθεν αὐτὸν ὡς ἀπόντα ἔτι, δι᾽ ὧν ἔγνω φθάσας οἷά ἐστιν.

[122] *Strom.* 6.9.73.4-5: ὃ δ᾽ ἐν οἷς ἔσται, δι᾽ ἀγάπης ἤδη γενόμενος, τὴν ἐλπίδα προειληφὼς διὰ τῆς γνώσεως, οὐδὲ ὀρέγεταί τινος, ἔχων ὡς οἷόν τε αὐτὸ τὸ ὀρεκτόν. εἰκότως τοίνυν ἐν τῇ μιᾷ ἕξει μένει τῇ ἀμεταβόλῳ γνωστικῶς ἀγαπῶν, [...].

Gnostic remains, after a long ascent through ἄσκησις and μάθησις, in an unvarying state of ἀγάπη and γνῶσις. The Gnostic's true existence, their perfected state in ἀγάπη and γνῶσις, is therefore a proleptic realization of what *is already* their final existence.

This dynamic proleptic tension in which the Gnostic lives certainly parallels Clement's descriptions of the proleptic existence of the neophyte which we considered earlier. However, it is of the utmost importance to note that this proleptic existence of the Gnostic is not the result of baptism, but is the culmination of a long process of ἄσκησις and μάθησις, the result of a thorough paedeia. Despite the fact that in the *Stromateis* Clement very rarely refers to the sacramental life or to the Church, Mayer and Völker are no doubt right when they claim that for Clement the ascent to gnostic perfection is dependent upon the grace bestowed in baptism.[123] This is true to the extent that Clement only speaks of this gnostic perfection as being achieved by Christians. But it is not correct to infer from this that it is the grace of baptism, the eschatological life bestowed proleptically therein, that determines the form of the Gnostic's perfection and the particular modality of his ἄσκησις.[124] With regard to the Gnostic's experience of προλῆψις, Clement not only ascribes it to the effect of

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[123] Cf. Mayer, '[...] die Erziehung durch den Logos, die Umbildung des Menschen zur vollen Gottähnlichkeit in der sakramentalen Ordnung beginnt, oder dass sie auf dem neuen Leben beruht, das durch Taufe und Geistmitteilung geschenkt wurde.' *Das Gottesbild*, p.8, cf. pp.47-49. Völker, 'Die Grundlage für alles ethische Streben bildet die Taufgnade, der Aufsteig zur Vollkommenheit ruht auf diesem Fundamente.' *Der wahre Gnostiker*, p.147, cf. p.601.

[124] I therefore do not agree with Mees, who states: 'Diese "präsentische" Eschatologie [referring to the *Paedagogus*] klingt noch in einer Reihe von Stellen in den *Stromateis* an. Nur handelt es sich hier nicht um das vollkommene Geschenk der Taufgnade sondern um die Entfaltung derselben in einem echt christlichen Leben.' 'Jetzt und Dann in der Eschatologie Klemens von Alexandrien', p.134.

ἄσκησις rather than baptism, but, in distinction to baptism, he characterizes it as a 'second saving change':

> And, in my view, the first saving change is that from heathenism to faith, as I have said before; and the second, that from faith to γνῶσις. And the latter culminating in ἀγάπη, here and now gives the loving to the loved, that which knows to that which is known.[125]

Clement likewise speaks of initiation into 'greater mysteries' after passing through the 'lesser mysteries.'[126] Clement also describes the instruction into these hidden mysteries as an 'illumination', φωτισμός, transposing a word which was closely associated with the sacrament of baptism into the context of mystical, gnostic initiation and the imparting of a 'spiritual grace'.[127] This aspect is further demonstrated in the passage we have already considered, where Clement distinguishes the salvation of the common believer, and the 'fitting and becoming salvation' of the Gnostic.[128]

We have noted throughout this study of Clement's theology the deeply ambivalent nature of his synergism. The ἄσκησις that Clement demands from the Christian, and the intensification of this ἄσκησις for those who would achieve gnostic perfection, is within the human's own capacity, and, at least on the lower ethical level, determined by their own ideas and ideals.[129]

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[125] *Strom.* 7.10.57.4: καί μοι δοκεῖ πρώτη τις εἶναι μεταβολὴ σωτήριος ἡ ἐξ ἐθνῶν εἰς πίστιν, ὡς προεῖπον, δευτέρα δὲ ἡ ἐκ πίστεως εἰς γνῶσιν· ἡ δέ, εἰς ἀγάπην περαιουμένη, ἐνθένδε ἤδη φίλον φίλῳ τὸ γιγνῶσκον τῷ γιγνωσκομένῳ παρίστησιν.

[126] Cf. *Strom.* 1.1.15.3; 4.1.3.1; 5.11.71.1. Cf. Marsh, 'The Use of μυστήριον in the Writings of Clement of Alexandria with Special Reference to his Sacramental Doctrine'.

[127] Cf. *Strom.* 5.10.64.4-5: διὰ τοῦτο >φωτισμὸς< ἡ μαθητεία κέκληται ἡ τὰ κεκρυμμένα φανερώσασα, [...] τὸ >πνευματικὸν χάρισμα< καὶ τὴν γνωστικὴν παράδοσιν, [...]. Referring to Rom. 1.11. Cf. Camelot, *Foi et Gnose*, p.99.

[128] *Strom.* 6.14.111.3.

[129] It is an ἄσκησις that finds its limits in Christ, rather than its motivation, see the discussion on pp.197-199.

The Gnostic's intensified ἄσκησις is perfected by the dynamic experience of πρόληψις, culminating in ἀπάθεια and εὐποιία permeated by γνῶσις and ἀγάπη. But, coming at the end of the process of ἄσκησις and μάθησις, it is already determined by the form imposed by that process. Thus, for example, as we have already noted when considering the place of marriage in the Gnostic's life, Clement specifies that the experience of πρόληψις takes place once the married Christian Gnostics have already borne children and become as brother and sister, which they will be 'in reality after putting off the flesh.'[130] Similarly, we have noted Clement's ambivalent descriptions of the Gnostic's attitude to the good things of this world. Whilst the Gnostics will use everything thankfully, their attitude towards them is predominantly one of 'magnanimous contempt', for their joys and 'harmless pleasures' lie elsewhere. For Clement the 'magnanimous contempt' of the Gnostics is, finally, a result of their 'proleptic experience'. Thus he writes:

> For it is impossible that the one who has been once made perfect by love, and feasts eternally and insatiably on the boundless joys of contemplation should delight in small and grovelling things. For what rational cause remains any more to the one who has gained 'the light inaccessible,' for reverting to the good things of the world? Although not yet according to time and place, but by that gnostic love through which the inheritance and perfect restitution follow, the giver of the reward confirms through deeds what the Gnostic, by choosing gnostically, has anticipated beforehand.[131]

Clement's ambivalence on the status, for the Gnostic, the true Christian, of the good things of this world is thus grounded in his experience of

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[130] *Strom.* 6.12.100.3, cited *supra* p.221.

[131] *Strom.* 6.9.75.1-2: ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν ἅπαξ τελειωθέντα δι' ἀγάπης καὶ τὴν ἀπλήρωτον τῆς θεωρίας εὐφροσύνην ἀιδίως καὶ ἀκορέστως ἐστιώμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς μικροῖς καὶ χαμαιζήλοις ἔτι τέρπεσθαι· τίς γὰρ ὑπολείπεται ἔτι τούτῳ εὔλογος αἰτία ἐπὶ τὰ κοσμικὰ παλινδρομεῖν ἀγαθὰ τῷ τὸ >ἀπρόσιτον< ἀπειληφότι >φῶς<, κἂν μηδέπω κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸν τόπον, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῃ γε τῇ γνωστικῇ ἀγάπῃ, δι' ἣν καὶ ἡ κληρονομία καὶ ἡ παντελὴς ἔπεται ἀποκατάστασις, βεβαιοῦντος δι' ἔργων τοῦ μισθαποδότου, ὃ διὰ τοῦ ἐλέσθαι γνωστικῶς διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης φθάσας προείληφεν ὁ γνωστικός; Referring to 1 Tim. 6.16.

πρόληψις, which, in turn, is not founded upon baptism, but on the intensified ἄσκησις demanded of those seeking perfection. It is because of the attraction of their own hope, as Clement asserts elsewhere, that the Gnostic 'magnanimously despises' all the good things of this world and our life in it.[132]

The asceticism proposed by Clement produces a Christian who is characterized by 'composure, tranquillity, calmness and peace'.[133] The asceticism required of the newly-converted Christians, who hope for salvation through μετριοπάθεια, is dominated by the demand of living according to the λόγος and the suspicious abstention from pleasures. The intensified asceticism of the true Gnostics, who desire to be saved 'rightly and becomingly' and, beyond salvation itself, to be dignified with the highest honours, culminates in a state of ἀπάθεια. No longer subject to the disordered movements of the passions, the Gnostics exercise beneficience and work for the salvation of others. However, with the passibile movements set in rational order, and dissociated from pleasure, the Gnostics themselves have no need of even those movements which might seem to be good, such as courage, zeal and joy. The Gnostics 'magnanimously despise' the good things of this world, whilst enjoying their own 'harmless pleasures and exaltation'.

On both levels, the proposed asceticism attempts to protect the rational dimension of the Christian, the νοῦς, that which is distinctively human and

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[132] Cf. *Strom.* 7.12.78.3: οὗτος περισπώμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐλπίδος οὐ γεύεται τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ καλῶν, πάντων τῶν ἐνταῦθα καταμεγαλοφρονῶν.

[133] *Paed.* 2.7.60.5.

in the image of God, in a secure self-sufficiency, against any possible threats that might arise both through pleasures, especially those of the body, even the God-given pleasures that accompany the body's natural functions, and from the uncertainty that is a corollary of dependency. The only pleasures to be enjoyed are those that are non-threatening. Other forms of joy, for instance, that experienced in the vulnerability of love, are too dangerous. Hence, the style of asceticism which Clement advocates leads to the praise of a marriage in which there is no significance or value ascribed to its inter-personal dimensions, nor, consequently, to human sexuality. More fundamentally, the self-sufficiency created by this asceticism, which, it is claimed, imitates the self-suficiency of God, does not even depend on God. Although it is stated that we cannot achieve ἀπάθεια without the help of God, the asceticism by which we make ourselves worthy to receive this gift is an asceticism which is within the human's own capacity, and an asceticism whose ideal, and every detail, is established by Clement himself, attempting to surpass the cultivated ideal of his day. In this style of asceticism there is no real engagement with our bodily reality, as created by God, our concrete, societal existence, nor, ultimately, with our dependency upon God. Clement directs the Christians' attention inwards, to focus on what is most properly their own, under their own control.[134] Whilst inwardly aspiring to their own ideals, Christians remain, for Clement, tiptoeing on the world.

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[134] Cf. Nussbaum's characterization of the changes involved in reaching the Stoic state of ἀπάθεια: 'It is the change from suspense and elation to solid self-absorption; from surprise and spontaneity to measured watchfulnes; from wonder at the separate and external to security in that which is oneself and one's own. To follow Seneca's sexual metaphors, it is the change from passionate intercourse, giving birth, and child-rearing to parthenogenic conception, followed by the retention of the conceived child forever inside the womb.' *The Therapy of Desire*, p.401.

Conclusion

From a close reading, within their own terms, of the texts of St. Irenaeus of Lyons and St. Clement of Alexandria, this study has delineated two very different theologies of the existence and nature of the human being, two contrasting styles of asceticism and anthropology: for Irenaeus, asceticism is the expression of the human living the life of God in all dimensions of the body, that which is most characteristically human and in the image of God; for Clement, it is the human attempt at a divine, godlike life, protecting the rational element, that which is peculiarly human and in the image of God, from any possible disturbance or threat coming from without, especially from or through the body, or from the vulnerability of dependency. These two perspectives have significant implications for our appreciation of human sexuality: for Irenaeus, human sexuality is a fundamental characteristic of our existence as fleshly beings, it forms a permanent part of the framework within which we grow towards God; Clement, on the other hand, is led by the internal dynamics of his style of asceticism to limit human sexuality strictly by the finality of procreation, and from thence to postulate its redundancy in the resurrection, and, proleptically, for all married Christians after having had children.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of Irenaeus' theology is the intimate link between theology proper and anthropology: the truth of the human being is revealed in the Incarnation, which at the same time is the primary, if not the sole, revelation of God. Adam was created as the type of the One to come, and the manifestations of God in the Old Testament were always prophetic revelations of the Incarnate Son. Adam was animated by the breath of life, which prefigured the future vivification of the sons of God by the Spirit: initially, of the Incarnate Son, and, subsequently, through the

grace of baptism, of those adopted as sons. Christ revealed the full truth of the human being, vivified by the Spirit; in the present, adopted sons possess a pledge or 'part' of the Spirit, preparing them for their full vivification in the resurrection. Thus the truth of the human being still 'lies hidden with Christ in God' (Col. 3.3): it is an eschatological reality, which is anticipated in Christian life here and now, and revealed most fully in the confession of martyrdom. Irenaeus does not 'spiritualize' the reality of martyrdom. The fact of death itself, in all its dimensions (paedagogical and remedial), is too important for him, as is the reality, and paedagogical value, of our apostasy. We learn, and thereby become truly human, by experiencing both our own weakness and the power of God. Thus to become fully human demands our engagement with the concrete situations in which we find ourselves in life: there is no room, as Berthouzoz put it, for 'l'éthique de l'abstention préventive'.[1]

The second striking aspect of Irenaeus' theology is that it emphasizes the body, fashioned in the image of God, almost to the extent of ignoring human interiority. Whilst the importance of the body was a key feature in Irenaeus' anti-Gnostic polemic, the body's importance is derived from the whole matrix of Irenaeus' theology: it is that in which God has chosen to reveal to us both Himself and the truth of the human being, and so it may, perhaps, be considered to be the most essential characteristic of the human being. Without denying the Pauline notion of 'the flesh', the human body, for Irenaeus, is primarily flesh. It is, furthermore, a flesh which is either male or female, that is, sexual, and this is the basis and framework for human growth towards God.

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[1]R. Berthouzoz, *Liberté et grâce*, p.236.

A third important dimension of Irenaeus' theology is the human's basic dependence on God, a dependency in which lies our true freedom. The Spirit, bestowed on Adam and Eve in a manner befitting the created state, as a breath of life, and bestowed on those adopted as sons in a manner befitting such dignity, as the Spirit from the Father, is an essential component of the human constitution. However, whilst being 'our Spirit', it is, nevertheless, not a 'part' of the human, since the Spirit is of God. Irenaeus also elaborates this same interplay in terms of life: God is the source of life; and when He provides life, we live. Our freedom is never impaired by this dependency. Indeed, as we have seen, an increasing dependency or subjection is the mark of a greater measure of true freedom: an increasing subjection implies an increasing receptivity, enabling us to partake of the life, our only life, of God to an ever greater degree.

It is the complex woven by these three dimensions that forms Irenaeus' characteristic understanding of asceticism and anthropology: humans living the life of God in their flesh. It is the Spirit that absorbs the weakness of the flesh and manifests living human beings: living, because of the Spirit, 'their' Spirit; and human, because of the flesh. Christians do not so much develop and exercise virtues, as manifest the virtue of God in their body. In this asceticism, the relationship between God and the human cannot strictly be called 'synergy', not, at least, as Clement employs the term. Irenaeus himself variously attempts to explain this relationship in terms of participation or vision. It can, perhaps, using a term of later theology, be called 'enhypostatic': the life of God does not exist independently, it is not itself an hypostasis, but only exists or is manifested in an hypostasis; receiving life from God, human beings enhypostatize this life,

they personalize it or make it their own.[2]

Finally, with his insistence on the reality of the flesh, and his articulation of asceticism in terms of the strength of the Spirit overcoming the weakness of our flesh, rather than as the development of virile virtues, Irenaeus is never tempted to suggest that both men and women become male in the exercise of such virtues, or that we outgrow or shed our sexual existence. Whilst procreation is proper to humans at the appropriate age, it does not exhaust the significance of our existence as male and female. As the truth of our human nature still lies for us in the eschaton, when we will be fully vivified by the Spirit, so too the full significance of our sexuality is eschatological. For Irenaeus, Christ's words, 'He who made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said: "For this reason shall a man leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall be one flesh"' (Mat. 14. 4-6), expresses a truth about human existence which, because of our weakness and incontinence, we are still being prepared to attain by salvific concessions. Such concessions (like those also given by Paul in 1 Cor. 7) are not expressions of the true liberty of the sons of God. The fulness of such liberty is characterized instead by Irenaeus' descriptions of Adam and Eve 'kissing and embracing each other in holiness' (*Dem.* 14), which, I have suggested, is not a

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[2] I have borrowed the term 'enhypostatic' from the theology of St. Gregory Palamas, who uses the term to describe the manner in which the life of God is enhypostatized by the human, cf. *The Triads*, 3.1.9. The term itself had been used in a Christological context, since Leontius of Byzantium in the sixth century, to describe the manner of existence of Christ's human nature 'enhypostatized' by the hypostasis of the Logos. Irenaeus' theology of the vision of God and participation in God as the means of human life is strikingly similar to that of Palamas. It is arguable, however, that for Palamas the 'life' in question was not the 'physical' life of the human being, but a distinct 'divine and heavenly life', cf. *ibid.*

mythical picture of protological innocence, but a description of true, eschatological, human existence.[3]

The asceticism and anthropology of Clement, on the other hand, is governed by the fact that for him it is not the body which is in the image of God, but the human mind, the νοῦς, and the scope and capability he ascribes to free will. He by no means disparages the body; his polemic against the Gnostics would not have permitted him to do so. He, in fact, praises the body as capable, when suitably purified, of being a shrine of the Spirit. Clement also develops a very interesting analysis of the nature of the baptized's new existence in terms of a proleptic eschatology: the anticipatory possession of the new eschatological life, here and now, in which the baptized is already perfect, sanctified, and illumined. Moreover, Clement is genuinely concerned to maintain, at length, the dignity and the sanctity of marriage; something which sets him apart from the more usual patristic concern to defend the loftiness of virginity.

However, as we have seen, the manner in which Clement develops a theology of asceticism makes the picture much more problematic. The numerous precepts and ideals, advising a life lived according to the λόγος, which Clement borrowed from contemporary philosophy, were indeed transformed by being placed within the context of the Λόγος having become incarnate. But the

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[3]Having begun this thesis with a quotation from L. Irigaray, I would also like to draw attention to the parallels between Irenaeus' position and her attempts to explain sexual difference within the terms of a *parousia* of God who, rather than remaining in an inaccessible transcendence, is present here and now, in and through the body. From this perspective, the horizon of sexual difference offers the possibility of an enduring transfiguration of the world. Irigaray also describes this horizon as the 'third era', the time of the Spirit and the Bride. Cf. *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*, esp. pp.147-150.

example of the Incarnate Logos actually curtails, rather than inspires, Clement's ascetic tendencies. Clement clung to an ideal of inner tranquillity and serenity which was to be attained and maintained by buttressing the mind, through the exercise of virtue (understood in terms of self-control and self-restaint), against anything which might disturb or ensnare it, in particular the (God-given) pleasures which are associated with the body's natural needs. Thus, not only are Christians to limit their activity to whatever is strictly 'natural and necessary', but they are to dissociate themselves from whatever natural pleasures might accompany their actions. Clement's proposed asceticism is characterized by a suspicious abstention. Christians are to 'tiptoe on the earth', inwardly aspiring to higher things, rather than being fully engaged in their bodily lives.

With regard to the higher Christian life of the true Gnostic, the picture becomes even more disturbing. True Gnostics 'form and create themselves' by desiring not only to be saved, but also to perfect their lives through an intensified asceticism and learning, that they might be saved 'rightly and becomingly'. Achieving this state, the Gnostics attain to an angelic, fleshless condition, in which they live above the world, 'magnanimously despising' the good things of the world, enjoying, rather, their own 'harmless pleasures', whilst practising unceasing interior prayer and holding a continual festival. Although the infallible, mystical habit of γνῶσις, ἀπάθεια, ἀγάπη and εὐποιία is a proleptic anticipation, it is a πρόληψις based upon the Gnostic's intensified asceticism rather than on the grace of baptism. Indeed, Clement characterizes it as a 'second saving change' beyond that of baptism.

The influence of Clement's proposed style of asceticism upon his

appreciation of human sexuality is immense. His attitude towards the dynamics of human sexuality is summed up in his advice, to men, that it is better not to look at women, because it is possible to fall into desire if we do so: our existence as male and female is a danger and threat to his ideal of inner tranquillity, rather than a possible horizon for manifesting the life and love of God. Indeed, whilst discussing marriage, he very seldom speaks of love between the spouses. As sexual intercourse is natural, but necessary only to the extent that it enables the continuation of the race, Clement's overriding concern is that marriage should be governed by the finality of procreation, which Clement nevertheless praises as a co-operation with the work of creation. As this is the only function he concedes to human sexuality, he is inevitably led to suggest that in the resurrection, when we no longer need to marry or procreate, we will shed the sexual character of our flesh. This state is to be anticipated, once married couples have ceased having children, through the practice of continence understood as self-control. Again it is an anticipation by a particular style of asceticism rather than the grace of baptism.

It is especially interesting to note how Clement articulates his theology of asceticism in terms of 'synergy'. Within the context of an abstract definition of synergy, Clement asserts that a co-operative cause offers nothing from itself, but merely intensifies the activity of that which acts by itself. However, as we have also seen, Clement, in an equally formal context, specifies that a co-operative cause does contribute some power of its own. But, more importantly, when it comes to speaking of Christian asceticism, the style that Clement proposes is definitely one in which two agents work from themselves towards the same goal, a goal which is not so much that of salvation as the desire to maintain Clement's cultivated ideal.

The Christian is to acquire and practise the virtues by following the paedagogy of Christ, the practice of the commandments as expounded and expanded by Clement, and through this exercise they will be prepared for the reception of grace. The synergy which Clement proposes is merely external; it is the paedagogy of the commandments of Christ (or rather, of Clement's ascetic ideals), which we fulfil, thus achieving the desired goal of being saved in a 'right and becoming' fashion.

By exploring the topics of asceticism and anthropology within the broader context and interpretative frameworks of the theologies of Irenaeus and Clement, my analyses have challenged many aspects of the traditional, theological interpretation of their work, sometimes, especially in the case of Irenaeus, with surprising results. Beyond individual details of interpretation, my analyses have presented the beginnings of a history of asceticism and anthropology written from the properly theological perspective of the texts under consideration. The theological dimensions, at least of Irenaeus' asceticism and anthropology - humans living, or incarnating, the life and strength of God in their body -, cannot adequately be comprehended either by Foucault's horizontal analysis of different styles of subjectivity, or by Brown's socio-historical analysis, in their projects of tracing the genealogy of the modern sexual subject. Patristic scholarship must be able to benefit from work done within other disciplines, to respond to the challenge of looking afresh and in new ways at history, whilst remaining faithful to their texts themselves.

The contrast between the styles of asceticism, and their corresponding anthropologies, proposed by Irenaeus and Clement, raise some very basic and important issues. The first concerns the influence of Irenaeus and Clement

on later theology. As I pointed out, the state of Irenaeus' text indicates that his work was primarily used by later heresiologists and never as the inspiration for later Patristic writers.[4] Irenaeus' emphasis on the flesh, and his teaching that the body was in the image of God was soon marginalized by the pervasive influence of Origen's theology, and was never regained after the Origenist controversy.[5] On the other hand, it is clear that Clement's ideal of ἀπάθεια, tranquility, detachment, and perpetual interior prayer prefigure, at least in their outward aspect, much of what was to emerge as the monastic ideal. It would be interesting to investigate to what extent Clement's works actually influenced the development of this ideal within monasticism.[6]

However, besides the question of a possible influence of Clement's works in early monasticism, his elaboration of a theology of asceticism in terms of synergy, and the internal coherence that this has with the ideal of self-control and the suggestion that we will shed our sexual characteristics in the resurrection, begs comparison with the later theorist of the ascetic life, St. Gregory of Nyssa. The Greek Fathers, outside the parameters of the debate between St. Augustine and Pelagius, have typically been represented as having taught a 'synergy' between God and the human. This is

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[4] For a full analysis see J. Fantino, *L'Homme, image de Dieu*, pp.188-190.

[5] Florovsky argues that the so-called 'anthropomorphites' retained the same primitive theology as Irenaeus, but were persuaded otherwise by Origenist/ Evagrian monks, causing much distress - Abba Serapion is reported to have said, whilst weeping and groaning on the ground: 'They have taken my God from me, and I have now none to behold, and whom to worship and address I know not.' (Cassian, *Conf.* 10.3). Cf. 'The Anthropomorphites in the Egyptian Desert'.

[6] A certain female desert dweller, Collythus, is mentioned as possessing works of Clement. Cf. Palladius, *Lausiac History* 60.2. Given the paucity of such references, this statement is significant.

especially true of St. Gregory of Nyssa.[7] Moreover, St. Gregory of Nyssa, it is suggested, taught the protological and eschatological sexless existence of human beings, elaborated through the idea of a double creation, in which sexuality was added in foresight of the Fall.[8] In this representation, sexuality, for St. Gregory, is basically remedial, permitting the increase of the human race to the number originally foreseen by God. Within this framework, marriage has an important role to play in increasing the human race to the foreordained number, but it is essentially secondary, an 'economic' state conditioned by the fallen world, to be transcended in the higher states of virtue, fully realized in virginity and celibacy, which reestablish the human's original paradisical state in anticipation of the resurrection.[9] However, the question needs to be raised whether the style of the synergy proposed by Gregory is the same as that of the synergy developed by Clement.[10] If so, is there an absolutely necessary coherence between a synergetic asceticism, with the emphasis on self-control, and the exaltation of a sexless state of virginity or continence? Alternatively, should Gregory's 'synergy' be explained within

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[7] Cf. E. Mühlenberg, 'Synergism in Gregory of Nyssa'; and, most recently, V. Harrison, *Grace and Human Freedom according to St. Gregory of Nyssa*.

[8] Cf. esp. *De hominis opificio*, 16-17, 22.

[9] This is a simplified and composite account of Gregory's anthropology and asceticism as it has been interpreted since H. Urs von Balthasar, *Présence et pensée*, and J. Daniélou, *Platonisme et théologie mystique*. See also F. Floëri, 'Le Sens de la "division des sexes" chez Grégoire de Nysse'; G. Ladner, 'The Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa'; P. Pisi, *Genesis e Phthorá: Le motivazioni protologica della virginita in Gregorio di Nissa e nella tradizione dell'enkrateia*; V. Harrison, 'Male and Female in Cappadocian Theology'.

[10] Jaeger suggests a sharp contrast between the two: Gregory speaks of the 'co-operation of the the Spirit' (or of God or Christ), while Clement describes the human as the one who co-operates, cf. *Two Rediscovered Works of Ancient Christian Literature: Gregory of Nyssa and Macarius*, p.103. My analysis of 'synergy' in Clement, however, has led to different conclusions: two agents, acting individually, towards the same goal.

the framework of participation, perhaps along the lines of those developed by Irenaeus?[11] If so, is there then room for a more positive appreciation of human sexuality in Gregory of Nyssa's writings, such as the reading of *De virginitate* proposed by Mark D. Hart, who argues that for Gregory the highest embodiement of virtue is to be found in the life which combines λειτουργία and contemplation either in marriage or celibacy?[12]

A second issue arising from this thesis is, if the style of asceticism as self-control, ultimately culminating in the exaltation of abstinence and virginity, is indeed a more universal phenomenon, as the work of Foucault and Nussbaum suggests, either as the stylization of one's life as an *oeuvre*, or as the attempt to protect the dignity of reason against the vicissitudes of fate and nature, or, more generally, as the human attempt at a divine, godlike life, can this be given a theological explanation in terms of Irenaeus' interpretation of the fig-leaves used by Adam? According to Irenaeus, Adam's response to his fallen situation was to impose upon himself, and Eve, a state of continence, which 'gnaws and frets the body'. It was a confused, adolescent reaction to his new, fallen situation, in which he felt unworthy to approach God. It is as if Adam wanted to make amends, to cover up the mistake he made and to conform himself, by his self-imposed continence, to what he considered to be divine. Although Adam expressed repentance through this action, this style of continence, as with

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[11] Cf. D. L. Balás, ΜΕΤΟΥΣΙΑ ΘΕΟΥ: *Man's participation in God's perfections according to Saint Gregory of Nyssa*, who notes, in passing, the similarity of Gregory's and Irenaeus' description of life in terms of participation, cf. *ibid.*, pp.8-9; p.94, ftn.136; p.95, ftn.139

[12] Cf. M. D. Hart, *Marriage, Celibacy and the Life of Virtue: An interpretation of Gregory of Nyssa's* De virginitate; 'Reconciliation of Body and Soul: Gregory of Nyssa's Deeper Theology of Marriage'; 'Gregory of Nyssa's Ironic Praise of the Celibate Life'.

any self-imposed state or attitude, limits human openness towards God, thereby perpetuating the Fall.

Finally, returning to the issue of sexual difference with which this thesis began, I hope to have shown the necessity of carefully considering our presuppositions concerning asceticism and anthropology. If we think of asceticism as the arts whereby we stylize our lives, or as the means through which we acquire the virtues which buttress our inner peace against the fates and the snares arising from the body, as a human attempt at a godlike life, does not the internal logic of this style of asceticism lead inexorably towards the exaltation of a sexless state of virginity or continence? And if so, are we not already committed to a horizon in which it makes no sense to ask about a possible meaning of sexual difference beyond that of procreation? However, as we have also seen, this is not the only possible way of thinking about asceticism and anthropology. The Christian revelation, as expounded by Irenaeus, contains an alternative approach to these issues, in terms of the fleshly, sexual human living the life of God in a full engagement with their particular circumstances. Irenaeus himself never thought through the question of the meaning of sexual difference. That is the question for today. Nevertheless, he does give us a possible horizon within which we can raise the question in a meaningful manner.

Bibliography

For convenience the Bibliography has been divided into three sections: the Bibliographies for Sts. Irenaeus and Clement include only material that is specifically concerned with the study of their work; the remaining material has been assembled in the General Bibliography.

Abbreviations

The Following abbreviations are used in the Bibliographies:

ACW	*Ancient Christian Writers.*
BKV	*Bibliothek der Kirchenvater.*
CSCO	*Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium.*
ETL	*Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses.*
GCS	*Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte.*
GOTR	*Greek Orthodox Theological Review.*
Greg.	*Gregorianum.*
HJ	*The Heythrop Journal.*
HTR	*Harvard Theological Review.*
JAAR	*Journal of the American Academy of Religion.*
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature.*
JEH	*Journal of Ecclesiastical History.*
JRS	*Journal of Roman Studies.*
JTS	*Journal of Theological Studies.*
LCL	*Loeb Classical Library.*
LV	*Lumière et Vie.*
NRT	*Nouvelle Revue Théologique.*
OCP	*Orientalia Christiana Periodica.*
OECT	*Oxford Early Christian Texts.*
PG	*Patrologia Graeca.*
PO	*Patrologia Orientalis.*
RAM	*Revue d'Ascetique et de Mystique.*
REG	*Revue des Études Grecques.*
RSPhTh	*Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques.*
RSR	*Recherches de Science Religieuse.*

SC	*Sources Chrétiennes.*
SJT	*Scottish Journal of Theology.*
SM	*Studia Moralia.*
St. Patr.	*Studia Patristica.*
SVTQ	*Saint Vladimir's Theological Quarterly.*
TSK	*Theologische Studien und Kritiken.*
TZ	*Theologische Zeitschrift.*
TU	*Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literaur.*
VC	*Vigiliae Christianae.*
ZKG	*Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.*
ZKT	*Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie.*
ZTK	*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.*
ZNTW	*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenshaft und die Kunde der Urchristentums.*

St. Irenaeus of Lyons : Bibliography

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