Accepted Manuscript

Title: Landing a job, sinking a career? The trade-off between occupational downgrading and quick reemployment according to unemployed jobseekers' career stage and job prospects

Authors: Helen Buchs, Emily Murphy, Marlis Buchmann

PII: S0276-5624(16)30204-9
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2017.10.001
Reference: RSSM 339

To appear in: *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*

Received date: 1-12-2016
Revised date: 28-7-2017
Accepted date: 7-10-2017

Please cite this article as: Buchs, Helen., Murphy, Emily., & Buchmann, Marlis., Landing a job, sinking a career? The trade-off between occupational downgrading and quick reemployment according to unemployed jobseekers' career stage and job prospects.*Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2017.10.001

Landing a job, sinking a career? The trade-off between occupational downgrading and quick reemployment according to unemployed jobseekers' career stage and job prospects

Helen Buchs[1*], Emily Murphy[2], Marlis Buchmann[1]

[1]University of Zurich
[2] University of Oxford, SKOPE

Keywords: unemployment, search and matching, occupational status mobility, labor demand, occupational labor market

Highlights:

- Involuntary occupational downgrading at reemployment after unemployment
- Trade-off between quality and speed of reemployment in an occupational labor market
- Impact of relative availability of best fit vacancies (job prospects) on trade-off
- Importance of job prospects for job search subject to career stage
- Joint impact of composition of labor demand and career stage on trade-off

Funding: This paper was funded by the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs as part of the project `Labor Market Mismatch and Unemployment Duration'.

Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and helpful suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the RC28 in Bern 2016, and we would like to thank participants for their valuable comments. The authors are grateful to Debra Hevenstone for her collaboration on the project `Labor Market Mismatch and Unemployment Duration'.

*First and corresponding author
Helen Buchs
University of Zurich
Institute of Sociology
Andreasstr. 15
8050 Zurich
Switzerland
buchs@soziologie.uzh.ch
+41 44 6352332

Abstract: A critical aspect of individual careers is the quality of jobs the unemployed match to at reemployment. The present study examines a trade-off the unemployed face in occupationally segmented labor markets: quickly exiting unemployment via downgraded reemployment or holding out for a skill adequate job while remaining unemployed. We analyze how the likelihood of involuntary status downgrading relates to the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies at particular stages of a career. This study thus contributes to the broader literature on scar effects incurred from the experience of unemployment. Another contribution is the construction of refined measures of accessible vacancies at the micro level. Proportional hazard rate models are estimated using an inflow sample (2006-2014) of unemployed men with vocational education in Switzerland. Our results show that a higher relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies lowers jobseekers' risk of taking up a lower prestige job than the one sought. Career stage also matters for the trade-off between the quality and speed of reemployment, with trial stage unemployed being most responsive to job prospects.

1. Introduction

Unemployment is costly for individuals and hampers labor market efficiency. In addition to a loss of income and the stigma of being unemployed, what matters to the unemployed is the quality of the job found upon reemployment. Since a downgrading of occupational prestige bestows jobseekers with lower 'social standing' relative to their position prior to unemployment, it implies a poor quality match (Treiman, 1977; Zhou, 2005). A bad post-unemployment job match has also been shown to turn an unemployment spell into a lasting disadvantage on the labor market (Gangl, 2006).

This is particularly the case for matches in labor markets which are occupationally segmented. In countries with strong dual-education systems, such as Germany and Switzerland, jobseekers mainly invest in occupation-specific skills, and skill-to-job matching is a necessity to reap benefits. For example, a certified electrician forced to work as a salesperson loses out on occupation-specific skills accumulated and on honor derived from work. Jobseekers' attachment to their occupation and accompanying prestige should be markedly higher than in labor markets with less defined vocational qualification barriers, such as in the US or the UK (Blossfeld & Mayer, 1988).

The job search process is not just driven by the *quality* of the job to accept, but also *when* to accept a job. The trade-off the unemployed face is between exiting unemployment as quickly as possible with the risk of involuntary occupational downgrading, or waiting for a 'best fit' job offer while remaining unemployed. This trade-off is influenced by two key factors: the relative availability of 'best fit' job vacancies and career stage. Job vacancies condition externally given opportunities and career stage depicts an individual's own unalterable situation. We argue that the combination of the relative availability of 'best fit'

job vacancies and career stage determines jobseekers' assessment of the trade-off between quality and speed of reemployment.

A large body of empirical research in economics and sociology has analyzed unemployment duration, rates of job uptake, and the pecuniary consequences of job loss and unemployment (Arulampalam, 2001; Brand, 2015; Gangl, 2006). However, the search trade-off between the matching of occupational prestige post-unemployment relative to pre-unemployment and speed of reemployment, particularly important in occupational labor markets, has received little attention (Kircher, 2015). Evidence from the few recent studies examining the direction of jobseekers' mobility following unemployment or displacement across several OECD countries points to job-quality scars inflicted by unemployment, ranging from lower job authority to status (Bethmann, 2013; Brand, 2006; Dieckhoff, 2011; Lippmann & Rosenthal, 2008).

Our paper advances this sparse literature by addressing three open questions, particularly salient ones for an occupational labor market and crucial to understanding the role of unemployment for social stratification. First, we examine how job prospects affect occupationally certified jobseekers' trade-off of holding out for a 'best fit' job against accepting an involuntary loss in occupational prestige to exit unemployment. Second, we analyze the career stage at which jobseekers are most at risk of downgraded reemployment upon exiting unemployment. Third, we ask how responsive jobseekers in different career stages are to variation in the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies. Do changing job prospects act as a critical determinant of involuntary occupational downgrading for the unemployed at the beginning, middle or end of their careers?

The aim of this study is to better understand what constitutes optimal reemployment - a 'best-fit' job - for the unemployed to avoid post-unemployment scars. To our knowledge, this is one of the first studies to measure jobseekers' *involuntary* downgrading in occupational

prestige at reemployment, where individuals begin an unemployment spell searching for a higher status job than the one they ultimately take up. Analyzing reemployment risks in involuntary terms allows us to infer a trade-off between quality and speed of matching during job search.

The Swiss labor market offers an interesting case study with which to analyze the trade-off between fast and 'best fit' reemployment after unemployment. First, it is strongly segmented on an occupation-specific basis. As prestige is linked to occupations, it is ideally suited to study occupational downgrading at reemployment. In the Swiss labor market, the vocationally trained constitute over two thirds of the workforce while the tertiary educated are a much smaller group (around 25 percent of the workforce) (Buchmann, Kriesi, & Sachi, 2003). These two dominant groups differ in their search trade-off and status retention at reemployment. The tertiary educated are more prone to voluntary re-careering towards the end of their careers (Johnson, Kawachi, & Lewis, 2009) and fare better in job quality upon reemployment (Lippmann & Rosenthal, 2007) than the vocationally trained. Further, the social positioning of the vocationally certified is well captured in prestige scales at all stages of their careers. In order to not confound the salient differences between these two groups of occupationally certified jobseekers, we restrict our analyses to the large group of vocationally trained unemployed. Second, given the promising reemployment prospects in Switzerland, with the unemployment ratio being around three percent during the period under study (SECO, 2015), unemployed jobseekers should sooner or later be able to find employment and thus can decide between speed and quality of job uptake. Third, the Swiss unemployment insurance belongs to the more generous ones across OECD countries, exerting little financial pressure on the unemployed to find a job for a period of up to 24 months (Stutzer & Lalive, 2004). Lack of financial pressure has been shown to allow for skill-based matching at reemployment (Gangl, 2004). The unemployed in Switzerland should therefore tend to opt more readily for quality of

job uptake, while jobseekers in countries characterized by higher pressures upon the unemployed to swiftly exit unemployment may accept any job in comparatively higher numbers and at greater speed.

Central to labor market theories is how to specify the effects of the composition of labor demand on job mobility (Rosenfeld, 1992). Job vacancies nested within occupations affect a search trade-off dependent upon how closely they match jobseekers' skills and therefore render opportunities for utilizing these skills at reemployment. Moreover, the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies to overall demand determines how promising the search for a 'best fit' vacancy is compared to quickly accepting downgraded reemployment. To take the composition of labor demand into account, unique job advertisement data on vacancies in Switzerland, the Swiss Job Market Monitor data (SJMM), are combined with national register data from the Swiss unemployment insurance (AVAM). Linking vacancy to unemployment data at the micro-level, our study overcomes a serious shortcoming of prior research, which has largely relied on aggregate indicators of labor demand.

2. Theory and hypotheses

A wide range of theories explain a jobseeker's search trade-off between occupational downgrading and fast reemployment. In this study, we mainly draw on theories of search and matching during unemployment (Rogerson, Shimer, & Wright, 2005), theories of human capital (Becker, 1964), and theories of labor market segmentation (Blossfeld & Mayer, 1988). We use these theories to conceptualize the role of job prospects and career stage for the trade-off in the context of an occupational labor market and link the discussion to the wider literature on scarring effects. Below we first outline three basic assumptions regarding job search during unemployment.

First, search and matching theories assume that jobseekers attempt to maximize their utility when facing a trade-off between the quality of the job taken up, i.e. maintaining occupational prestige, and a lower probability of getting a job in the first place (Rogerson et al., 2005). They thus opt for the alternative that, based on the external and individual situation, promises the most rewarding outcome. Second, extending any search period is constrained by the exhaustion of unemployment benefits. Ultimately, the unemployed must accept a job. Third, being unemployed is accompanied by negative associations. Social norms pressure the unemployed to work (Jahoda, 1982; Stavrova, Schloesser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011) and unemployment may negatively impact psychological well-being (Wanberg, 2012). Jobseekers may thus prefer taking up a job as soon as possible even in the absence of economic constrains.

2.1. Job prospects and job uptake

Unemployment is a situation that forces individuals to search for a job. Job search is, however, constrained by the availability of job vacancies. We outline the ways in which the number and the composition of vacancies may drive the unemployed to quickly accept a job entailing a downgrading in occupational prestige or to hold out searching for an adequate job.

Adequate reemployment in an occupational labor market, such as the Swiss one, is usually bound to the availability of skill appropriate vacancies (Blossfeld & Mayer, 1988). Access to vacancies is generally limited to jobseekers holding the requisite occupational credential or having acquired enough experience in that occupation (Kriesi, Buchmann, & Sacchi, 2010). We maintain that 'best fit' vacancies are jobs which match the occupational skills an individual has accumulated through training and work experience as expressed in the position achieved prior to unemployment. 'Best fit' vacancies are therefore readily accessible on the basis of the occupation held prior to unemployment. Hereby, 'best fit' or 'adequate' vacancies offer employment matching the prestige of the occupation an unemployed person held prior to unemployment. Reemployment through a 'best fit' vacancy therefore usually means maintaining

or increasing occupational prestige (or also earnings) as it amounts to skill-appropriate reemployment.

Occupational labor markets are, despite their vocational segmentation, somewhat permeable (Witte & Kalleberg, 1995). Under certain circumstances, jobseekers may access jobs in occupations drawing on skills they have not acquired. Particularly when difficulties arise in finding suitable candidates, firms may be more willing to employ jobseekers from different occupations. When vacancies in relation to the unemployed are numerous (i.e., a tight labor market from the employer's perspective), jobseekers may receive more offers for jobs requiring skills that do not correspond to their prior occupation compared to times of lower labor demand. Accepting skill-inappropriate jobs at exit from unemployment in an occupationally segmented labor market means, however, that jobseekers are only partially able to utilize the occupation-specific skills they have accumulated (Mueller & Schweri, 2015). Jobseekers changing occupations have been shown to forfeit part of the economic returns to their skills and risk scar effects in that these losses persist over time (Gangl, 2006). Likewise, the underutilization of accumulated skills at downgraded reemployment should tend to translate into a loss of occupational prestige.

The relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies affects jobseekers' search trade-off as this availability defines job prospects. It refers to the relation of 'best fit' vacancies to vacancies in the overall labor market. This relation forms expectations about the chances of getting adequate job offers in the foreseeable future compared to the likelihood of having to accept downgraded reemployment (Mortensen, 1986; Halaby, 1988). The higher the relative availability of 'best fit' job vacancies, the better the chances that further search faciliates adequate reemployment. Jobseekers will then be more likely to hold out in unemployment, avoiding a downgrading in occupational prestige. Conversely, the lower the relative availability of 'best fit' job vacancies, the smaller are jobseekers' chances of landing a

prestige-adequate job while still receiving unemployment benefits. Despite the risk of losing out on occupation-specific skills, downgraded reemployment may then be the best option as it quickly ends a negatively associated spell of unemployment. Particularly when the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies is low, the respective occupation held prior to unemployment is, compared to other occupations, likely to no longer offer good career opportunities. Unemployed jobseekers moving out of such declining occupations for downgraded reemployment may try to enter occupations where they could launch a new career (DiPrete & Nonnemaker, 1997; Murphy, 2014).

2.2.Career stages and jobseekers' search trade-off

A key point of our analysis is to explore the heterogeneity in the trade-off between quality and speed among the unemployed. Prior career investments in occupation-specific skills, crucial in occupational labor markets, and expectations about future career developments may be decisive in how important finding any job is versus finding an equivalent job to the one held prior to unemployment (Becker, 1964; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Drawing on Super's (1957) career stage model we define three crucial 'stages' that may differ in expectations of loss associated with being unemployed and in career investments; these are the 'trial', the 'establishment', and the 'maintenance' stage. The trial stage encompasses the young unemployed at the beginning of their career, the establishment stage includes the core of mid-career unemployed, and the maintenance stage groups the older unemployed towards the end of their career. Of main interest to our study is comparing jobseekers in the trial or maintenance stage to unemployed in an establishment stage, as both their search trade-off should differ from the 'standard' situation.

Trial stage jobseekers are new to the labor market and have limited work experience. Lack of experience is their most damaging disadvantage in competing for jobs. Each month unemployed is costly, since it is a month during which they learn less on-the-job

(Papageorgiou, 2013). The trial stage unemployed are also those who have so far invested the least time and effort in acquiring occupation-specific skills. Remaining unemployed is therefore the greater cost, given they have the least to lose in terms of career investments (Becker, 1964). This might facilitate switching occupations and accepting downgrading in prestige at reemployment.

Additionally, with the many years left on the labor market, accepting downgraded reemployment within a new occupational field may provide trial stage jobseekers with the chance to start a career within an occupation offering better opportunities than the field they were forced out of. In segmented labor markets, it can be crucial, however, to work in the occupation in which a jobseeker has been trained for during the first years of a career in order not to nullify the investments in occupation-specific human capital (Mueller & Schweri, 2015; Buchs, Mueller & Buchmann, 2015). Nevertheless, the loss in experience and a prolonged unemployment spell are risks immediately relevant to trial stage jobseekers, while scar effects of switching occupations are abstract, long-term consequences of search decisions (Wolbers, 2016). The young unemployed may therefore attribute greater weight to the prospect that occupational downgrading offers a step out of unemployment and towards the accumulation of on-the-job experience compared to the prospect that downgrading may inflict negative path-dependent employment.

Swiss policy also tends to reinforce a quick acceptance of downgraded reemployment among the young unemployed. Swiss law urges the unemployed aged under 30 to accept any job, even if it does not match their skills. Trial stage jobseekers, in contrast to older unemployed, receive benefits for approximately 10 months only, thus increasing the financial pressure to exit unemployment quicker.

Job prospects are, as outlined above, crucial for exiting unemployment. When ‘best fit’ vacancies are relatively scarce, young unemployed at the trial stage might not risk holding out

for an adequate prestige job, increasing the likelihood of involuntary occupation downgrading among the young unemployed.

The unemployed in the establishment stage have invested considerably in occupational skills that they may wish to preserve. Gathering work experience and learning on-the-job is less of a priority compared to the trial stage of a career. Launching a new career may be more difficult as years remaining in the labor market are fewer. Establishment stage jobseekers' search trade-off thus tends to favor maintaining occupational prestige over downgraded reemployment. When the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies is low, the prospect of finding an adequate job before benefits end may be slim. Under these circumstances, quickly taking up any job and risking a downgrade in occupational prestige may be establishment stage jobseekers' best option despite the fact that they cannot use part of the acquired skills. As such, job prospects should influence establishment stage jobseekers' search trade-off. However, we expect that this influence is much smaller than for the trial stage unemployed.

For older maintenance stage jobseekers in occupational labor markets, the negative prospect of losing out on occupational prestige may become more acute over the course of their working lives. Having accumulated the most occupation-specific skills, a loss of what they have invested during their career may weight more heavily than the potential gain of taking up any new job (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This should especially hold as the older unemployed have little need to gather further work experience and have slim chances of restarting a rewarding alternative career within the short time period remaining on the labor market.

Another factor for the older unemployed is their lower chances of reemployment. In recent years, workers aged 55 plus who are displaced or unemployed have become a group vulnerable to discrimination, and the ones least likely to be reemployed post-displacement (Oesch & Baumann, 2015). It may be that older workers are finally forced to accept downgraded reemployment, but according to their search trade-off we expect them to hold out much longer

in unemployment than establishment stage jobseekers. Policy for this group also reinforces the outlined search trade-off as unemployed aged 55 or older in Switzerland receive about 4 additional months of unemployment benefits and if they are aged 60 or more they can also enter early retirement instead of accepting a downgraded reemployment.[1]

The search trade-off between speed and quality of reemployment at the maintenance stage is less influenced by the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies than it is for younger trial or establishment stage jobseekers. Older jobseekers in occupational labor markets have only very limited incentives to downgrade in occupational prestige even when skill adequate vacancies are few.

2.3. Hypotheses

From the preceding theoretical discussion we derive the following hypotheses to test:

H1 The higher the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies is, the less likely jobseekers are to accept occupational downgrading to exit unemployment and vice versa.

H2 Jobseekers in the trial stage of their career are more likely, and those in the maintenance stage are less likely, to accept occupational downgrading at reemployment than unemployed at mid-career.

H3 Jobseekers in the trial stage of their career will hold out longer before accepting downgraded reemployment when the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies is higher, and maintenance stage jobseekers will be least affected by the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies.

3. Data and Methods

3.1.Unemployment spell data

[1] The normal retirement age in Switzerland is 65 years for men.

Our analysis of involuntary occupational downgrading following unemployment is based on national administrative data – the placement services and labor market statistics (AVAM). The longitudinal data span the years 2006 to 2014 with monthly records of all registered unemployed in Switzerland. Administrative data provide the advantage of being nationally representative and population-level data. Given that unemployment benefits in Switzerland cover at least 70 percent of a person's former salary for up to two years, the national registration rate is extremely high.[2] The AVAM dataset contains key data on prior employment and search criteria crucial for analyzing involuntary downgrading in occupational prestige. The last job held before unemployment is reported as well as the job sought at the beginning of the unemployment spell, and the job found at reemployment. Each is assigned a detailed five-digit code from the occupational classification of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO). The dataset also contains relevant socio-demographic information, such as jobseekers' sex, age, highest education level, work experience, and nationality.

Our sample is constructed as an inflow of unemployed aged 16 to 64 years. We include only the first unemployment spell per person that begins after January 2006. We censor observation spells at 24 months as unemployment insurance is usually cut at two years at the latest.[3] Our analyses include men only.[4] As discussed in the introduction, we restrict our empirical models

[2] The administrative unemployment counts are very similar to unemployment figures based on survey data, lending further credibility to the claim that our data contain information on almost all unemployed in Switzerland.

[3] But the unemployed can remain registered after its expiration.

[4] Women in Switzerland very often hold small part-time jobs as secondary wage earners. This suggests that women's search trade-off is different from the one described for men in the theory section, thus being beyond the scope of this study.

to jobseekers who have completed vocational education, leaving us with 375,713 unemployed.[5] We can compare them across different career stages without introducing bias, as they are comparable in prestige levels. In sum, the group analyzed in this study is rather homogenous in terms of individual characteristics, minimizing differences in the search trade-off as much as possible.

For 115,950 individuals we are able to identify the occupation of the job they find upon exiting unemployment. Missing information is the main drawback of the AVAM data. However, the number of individuals with information on occupation attained post-unemployment spell is far greater than any survey data could provide. We assume that missing values do not skew the representativeness of our sample. Our comparison of the socio-demographic distributions in the full sample and our analytical sample revealed no significant differences in the composition of jobseekers on key dimensions of our analysis.[6] Missing information is also mostly random as the data is mainly collected by consultants at regional employment offices, some of whom may not document all given information - something we assume occurs independent of mobility direction. In a robustness check, we found no substantial differences in calculating the hazard of taking up any job with the full sample and the analytic sample applied here.

3.2.Vacancy data

A major innovation of the current study is that we use individualized measures of the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies at the micro level to job search upon unemployment. To this

[5] We exclude jobseekers who have completed compulsory education as they have invested little to nothing in occupation-specific skills and the prestige level of the jobs they held prior to unemployment is usually low. Hence, they have almost nothing to lose in terms of occupational prestige.

[6] These are occupation, career stage, seniority, year and amount of unemployment benefits.

end, our individual unemployment data are matched with a large-scale Swiss job vacancy dataset, the Swiss Job Market Monitor data (SJMM).[7] This database, going back to 1950, contains annual representative random samples of more than 4,000 job advertisements published across all relevant media channels (i.e., press, company websites, and online job-portals), covering all types of companies and occupations in Switzerland. As job ads are a sensitive measure of employers' staffing needs, the projected data indicate the annual strength and composition of skill demand.[8] Job ads are also an ideal source of information for perceived job prospects by the unemployed during the search process, as published job ads are visible sources of information about available vacancies.

As we are interested in the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies at the time of entry into unemployment, we impute *monthly* measures of the number of vacancies per occupation. As predictors we use official quarterly statistics of vacancy counts and the number of employed. We additionally draw on the monthly ILO unemployment rate and on a quarterly survey measure of firms' statements of how much they will increase their headcount.

3.3.Measures and model specification

Our dependent variable is the hazard rate of *involuntary occupational downgrade* at exit from unemployment to reemployment. 'Involuntary' means that the job taken up is in an occupation of a lower prestige than the occupation an individual sought to find a job in on becoming unemployed. 'Occupational downgrading' is operationalized as the post-unemployment

[7] For more information on the data see www.stellenmarktmonitor.uzh.ch.. The data is public use and can be ordered via forsbase.unil.ch.

[8] SJMM vacancy counts correlate extremely strongly with national survey estimates of employers' self-reported difficulty in recruiting workers. This provides evidence that the number of vacancies included in the SJMM data depicts actual personnel needs. For more information on the validity of the data and the sophisticated sampling procedure see (Sacchi et al., 2016).

occupation being at least ten percent lower on Treiman's occupational prestige score scale than the job held prior to unemployment. Occupational prestige is matched using 5-digit occupational codes, which are closest to a detailed level of jobs. This definition of the dependent variable ensures that we measure occupational downgrading net of prior prestige levels and excluding voluntary re-careering.

The *relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies* is defined as the ratio of 'best fit' vacancies to overall labor demand. Both sides of the ratio combine our monthly vacancy counts with the respective numbers of unemployed measuring labor market tightness and thus competition over available vacancies.[9] We explain both measures in detail and begin with 'best fit' vacancies.

'Best fit' vacancies take the occupational segmentation of the Swiss labor market into account and are defined as the number of published job ads per unemployed accessible to a jobseeker on the basis of his prior occupation. To generate this indicator, we first add up the number of job ads per occupation in a given month. Second, we apply occupation-specific accessibility weights to the summed numbers of job ads. These weights are constructed using a measure of the number of transitions individuals from jobs in a given occupation make to jobs in any other occupation based on pooled labor force data (the years 2004-2013 of the Swiss Labor Force Survey). Third, for each occupation an unemployed jobseeker comes from, the number of weighted job ads is summed across all occupations. Then, the weighted vacancy counts are divided by the number of unemployed in the respective occupation and month. 'Best fit' vacancies are given as:

$$\frac{Vac_{am}}{U_{am}} = \frac{\sum_{b=1}^{B}(w_{ab} * v_{bm})}{U_{am}}$$

[9] The monthly number of unemployed is generated from the same AVAM data used for our empirical analysis.

where Vac_{am} is the number of 'best fit' vacancies coming from occupation a in month m, U_{am} is the number of unemployed in the respective occupation and month, w_{ab} is the accessibility weight from occupation a to occupation b and v_{bm} is the number of vacancies in occupation b in month m.

Overall labor demand is defined as the number of published job ads per unemployed, which are regionally accessible to a jobseeker in a given month. We assume that jobseekers have a lower geographical search radius for non-matching jobs than for jobs within their occupation, as jobseekers' perception will be mainly focused on local availability when searching for inadequate positions. To construct this indicator we add up the overall number of job ads per region in a given month and then apply regional accessibility weights to these numbers of job ads. The weights represent regional labor market permeability, where we calculate likely transitions from a person's residential location by region before job change to the location of their new job by region, again using pooled data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey. Finally, the weighted vacancy counts are divided by the number of unemployed in the respective region and month. This equation is given as:

$$\frac{VacOverall_{rm}}{U_{rm}} = \frac{\sum_{s=1}^{S}(w_{rs} * v_{sm})}{U_{rm}}$$

where $VacOverall_{rm}$ is the overall number of vacancies for jobseekers in region *a* in month *m*, U_{rm} is the number of unemployed in the respective region and month, w_{rs} is the accessibility weight from region r to region s and v_{sm} is the number of vacancies in region s in month m**.**

The *relative availability* of best fit vacancies refers then to the *ratio* of 'best fit' vacancies to overall labor demand:

$$\frac{Vac_{am}}{U_{am}} \Big/ \frac{VacOverall_{rm}}{U_{rm}}$$

The measure is assigned to an individual jobseeker based on his former occupation, region and the month he enters unemployment. This ratio allows for assessing how the composition

of available vacancies affects the search trade-off between fast and downgraded reemployment. Individualized and refined measures of labor demand using vacancy data have proved to be very useful in assessing inter-firm mobility and labor market entry in the segmented labor market of Switzerland (Sacchi, Kriesi, & Buchmann, 2016; Buchs et al., 2015).

Another key independent variable is a categorical indicator of *career stage*. The three career stages of trial, establishment and maintenance are constructed using information on work experience and age. A jobseeker is considered to be in a trial career stage when they have less than 7 years of work experience. A jobseeker's maintenance stage of the career is age-based and refers to the unemployed aged 50-64. All remaining unemployed, that have more than 6 years of work experience and are younger than 50 years old, are categorized as being in the establishment stage of their careers. Controls for differences in reemployment hazards by occupation, nationality, year and seniority are also introduced into our estimation models.

Our method of estimation is a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972). A benefit of this popular duration model is its flexibility, and that it is able to handle right-hand censoring. In the cox model, baseline hazard rate is left unspecified. The marginal distribution for the hazard of exiting via involuntary downgraded reemployment is estimated with time in months treated as continuous. We are interested in calculating differences in time to this event between groups of unemployed jobseekers in terms of job prospects and career stage. We therefore specify our event of interest - downgraded reemployment - as representing a failure (coded 1); with all other (unemployment, inactivity, alternative reemployment) states coded as censored (0). As we estimate a sub-hazard function our model is equivalent to a competing risk model, except that the exits to prestige adequate jobs or other exits are not explicitly modeled, but simply treated as right-censored. The equation is formulated as follows:

$$h(t) = h0(t)e^{(\beta_1 RelBestFitVac + \beta_2 CareerStage + \beta_3 (RelBestFitVacxCareerStage) + \beta_i Controls_i)}$$

Our model specification is simplified to include only baseline values of our indicators, without introducing any time-varying covariates. The models meet the global test of proportionality demanded by this type of estimation. In other words, the effects of time and each covariate are multiplicative, but the effect a covariate has on the hazard of involuntary occupational downgrading remains the same over time spent unemployed (Bernardi, 2001).

4. Results

The first issue we address is simply the distribution of unemployed across each career stage. Just fewer than 30 percent are found in the trial stage, nearly 60 percent in the establishment stage, and a little over 10 percent in the maintenance stage of their career.

Table 1: Summary statistics

	Trial stage	Establishment stage	Maintenance stage
Career stage	29.9% (N=34,647)	57.9% (N=67,121)	12.2% (N=14,182)
Prestige downgrade	16.7% (N=5,788)	18.1% (N=12,176)	19.1% (N=2,708)
Best fit vac/unempl (mean(st.dev.))	0.40 (0.33)		
Overall vac/unempl (mean(st.dev.))	0.46 (0.28)		

Source: AVAM; SMM; 2006-2014.

As shown in Table 1, in our sample the trial stage unemployed experience slightly less prestige downgrading at reemployment (17%) than the establishment stage unemployed (18%). Against this, 19 percent of older jobseekers at the maintenance stage of their career have accepted a job with a lower prestige than they held in their last employment. In total, 20,672 of the unemployed, observed over 24 consecutive months, are reemployed on the basis of an *involuntary* downgrading in occupational prestige by the end of this time period.

4.1.Jobseekers' trade-off between remaining unemployed and occupational downgrade

To grasp the heterogeneity among groups of unemployed in downgraded reemployment, Figure 1 plots descriptive cumulative incidence functions (CIF) by career stage, depicting the probability that a downgraded reemployment has occurred by time t.[10] Our main interest in the present study lies in comparing the bookends of jobseekers' careers - the trial and maintenance stages, with the establishment stage as a relevant reference group.

Figure 1 around here: Cumulative incidence functions for downgraded reemployment by career stage

Unemployed jobseekers at the trial stage of their career more readily accept downgraded reemployment than the establishment stage unemployed. Their curve rises faster at the beginning of the unemployment spell than the curves of the other two groups. Compared to these two groups it flattens earlier, resulting in a lower probability that young jobseekers have accepted a downgraded reemployment at 24 months than their older counterparts. In contrast, the unemployed at maintenance stage avoid exiting into downgraded employment longer than the establishment or trial stage unemployed. Nevertheless, they have to accept a job of relatively lower occupational prestige more often towards the end of the 24-month observation period as they may face difficulties to find any job at all. These descriptive results indicate that a loss of prestige weighs more heavily in the search trade-off of jobseekers in the maintenance stage than for those in the establishment stage of their careers. The apparently deferred acceptance of downgraded reemployment by the former indicates that their avoidance of downgraded reemployment does not primarily arise from lower chances of receiving job offers compared to younger jobseekers, but indeed from a different

[10] Figure A1 in the Appendix presents cumulative incidence functions by career stage for adequate reemployment.

search trade-off. Overall, timing of acceptance of downgraded reemployment is notably different across career stages.

4.2. Risk of downgraded reemployment: effects of job prospects

The risk of downgraded reemployment among jobseekers in an occupationally segmented labor market may largely depend on the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies. Table 2 reports the results of a Cox regression, showing odds ratios for the hazard of a taking up a job which represents involuntary downward mobility in occupational prestige, with standard errors shown in parentheses.

Table 2: Hazard of downgraded reemployment: Cox regression estimates

	Model 1	Model 2
ln (rel availability of 'best fit' vacancies)	-0.093***	-0.089***
	(0.006)	(0.012)
Career stage: trial[a]	0.298***	0.290***
	(0.016)	(0.017)
Career stage: maintenance[a]	-0.199***	-0.189***
	(0.030)	(0.023)
ln (rel availability of 'best fit' vacancies) # trial stage[b]		-0.036***
		(0.014)
ln (rel availability of 'best fit' vacancies) # maintenance stage[b]		0.026
		(0.020)
N	115950	115950
N events	20672	20672
Log likelihood	-218323.57	-165632.4

Source: AVAM; SMM; 2006-2014.
Notes: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 a b Reference category is establishment stage.
Models control for occupations, years, foreign nationality and seniority.

A key observation from our models is the clear relationship between vacancy composition and individual risks of downgraded reemployment. In Model 1 we see that a higher availability of 'best fit' vacancies reduces the likelihood that unemployed jobseekers take up a job of lower occupational prestige than the one they sought. This result confirms hypothesis 1. When unemployed jobseekers expect a higher number of adequate job-offers to arrive before unemployment benefits end, maintaining occupational prestige seems achievable and

they avoid downgraded reemployment. When 'best fit' vacancies are scarce relative to overall demand, the odds of accepting a downgrade in occupational prestige increase sharply. Under these circumstances quickly reentering the labor market to gather further work experience and avoid the negative associations involved with being unemployed seem to outweigh the loss in occupation-specific skills acquired over the career. Moreover, low relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies may trigger jobseekers' unemployment exit for downgraded reemployment to start a new career in an occupation offering better career outlooks than the prior occupation. Given that financial pressures on job search are negligible in Switzerland as argued earlier, accepting occupational downgrading at reemployment may primarily be driven by the search trade-off and not the financial constraints associated with extending unemployment spells. By doing so, they follow the logic of 'any job is better than none'. These result aligns well with a search trade-off in that outcome is optimized whereby the unemployed try and prevent a downgrade in occupational prestige.

In addition to highlighting variance in the search trade-off, the results reveal how matching in occupational labor markets affects social stratification. In this type of labor market, the relative availability of accessible vacancies (i.e., based on the prior occupation) matters for finding adequate reemployment following unemployment and thus for maintaining occupational prestige. Jobseekers facing unfavorable job prospects seem to react by moving out of their occupation. Our findings suggest that the matching process inherent in occupationally segmented labor markets has its downside: changing occupations after unemployment can come at the cost of a downgrade in occupational prestige and may thus leave lasting scars in the careers of formerly unemployed.

4.3. Differences in the search trade-off according to career stage

How the unemployed match to jobs is not a homogeneous process: career stage is important for the risks attached to prolonged unemployment and downgraded reemployment (Becker,

1964; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Model 1 of Table 2 shows the main effects of career stage on the risk of a downgrade in occupational prestige at exit from unemployment.

Our results show that career stage matters for whether the unemployed take up a job of lower prestige than the one held prior to unemployment. Compared to workers who are mid-career, young people at the trial stage of their career more quickly accept involuntary occupational downgrading and older workers in the maintenance stage of their career avoid it more. These findings confirm our expectation that there are major differences in the search trade-off of the unemployed according to their career stage (H2). Trial stage unemployed seem to prefer gathering work experience that may boost their careers over preserving the comparatively few occupation-specific skills acquired so far even at the cost of having to launch a new career by changing occupations. In their search trade-off, a loss of occupational prestige, particularly costly in occupational labor markets, apparently weighs less than search costs. In contrast, unemployed jobseekers at the end of their career face a greater risk of losing what they have built up in terms of occupation-specific skills within the years in the labor market. Gathering further work experience or launching a new career is of little benefit to them. The avoidance of taking up a downgraded job weighs thus more than enduring extended search costs.

Trial stage unemployed quickly accepting downgraded reemployment and older jobseekers holding out longer in unemployment may stem in part from policies which grant longer benefit duration to older unemployed, facilitating their early retirement, and which encourage trial stage individuals to accept any job, even if it is not skill-adequate. Regarding scar effects following a poor quality match at reemployment, policy may have unintended negative consequences for young jobseekers' careers. This does not discredit our conclusions about the varying search trade-off inherent to career stages as censoring unemployment spells at 10

months (i.e., *before* trial-stage jobseekers' entitlement for benefits end)[11] as well as excluding the oldest unemployed aged more than 57 years (i.e., those who would profit from early retirement) does not substantively change the results.[12]

Model 2 in Table 2 introduces an interaction term between the three career stages and our indicator of the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies. Since the differences between the hazards are not directly visible using raw coefficients, we also estimate predicted marginal effects presented in Figure 2. Here we can examine the extent to which jobseekers at different career stages are predicted to hold out in unemployment or to accept downgraded reemployment when they face varying compositions of available vacancies.

Figure 2 around here: Predicted marginal effects of the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies by career stage

The estimates indicate that young unemployed at the trial stage of their career are greatly affected by the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies. Job prospects are thus an important factor in the search trade-off of young jobseekers. Variation in the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies has no effect on establishment and maintenance stage jobseekers' risk of involuntary downgrade in occupational prestige.

In an occupational labor market, quick job uptake *per se* seems less important towards the end of a career compared to preserving what has been built up in terms of occupational prestige. The results thus confirm our third hypothesis. The findings also underscore the point that older jobseekers' avoidance of downgraded reemployment stems from the exigencies of

[11] See Table A1 in the Appendix.

[12] See Table A2 in the Appendix.

their career stage influencing the search trade-off, and cannot be attributed to their lower chances of finding a job.

Overall, our results demonstrate that unemployed jobseekers' search trade-off varies depending on how important it is to maintain occupational prestige as opposed to making a speedy exit from unemployment. Thus, the stage reached in their career matters. Moreover, career stage also determines how strongly the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies influences the search trade-off.

5. Discussion and conclusion

The focus of this paper has been *involuntary downward mobility in occupational prestige* upon exit from unemployment, indicating a poor quality match in occupational labor markets. These labor markets encourage long-term attachment to an occupation that is much higher than in more permeable labor markets such as the US. Our aim has been to advance a developing avenue of research in the search and matching literature which can be combined with the literature on scar effects from unemployment questioning the 'value' of post-unemployment jobs (Kircher 2015). We contribute to this literature by assessing a trade-off inherent in jobseekers' search between quality of the job found upon reemployment and speed of reemployment. We have argued that the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies and its varied significance for the search trade-off of jobseekers' situated in different career stages is particularly informative. To our knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to capture the effects of the composition of available vacancies at the *micro-level* and to evaluate *involuntary* downgrading according to individual resources at exit from unemployment.

A key finding of our study is that status downgrading at reemployment depends to a large extent on job prospects. What matters for the quality of reemployment in an occupationally segmented labor market is the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies. These are the

vacancies jobseekers can readily access coming from a previously held occupation. We find strong evidence to suggest that a higher relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies lowers the risk of involuntary occupational downgrading upon reemployment. In contrast, when skill demand in the labor market is higher overall relative to the 'best fit' labor market, the unemployed are pulled into downgraded forms of reemployment. Under these circumstances, finding any job and gathering further work experience seems more important than preserving occupational prestige. This squares with research showing that jobseekers will tend to move out of declining occupations or industries and risk, to this end, a downgrade in occupational prestige (DiPrete & Nonnemaker, 1997; Murphy, 2014).

Nevertheless, our finding is somewhat surprising as the loss of occupation-specific skills weighs heavily in occupational labor markets. Even more so as the Swiss unemployment insurance is comparatively generous over a relatively long period of time, thus exerting little financial pressure on jobseekers and potentially allowing them to hold out longer in unemployment. Nonetheless, when job prospects are comparatively poor in the occupation individuals come from they seem to prioritize leaving unemployment as soon as possible. The results thus offer good news for policymakers concerned about a lengthening of unemployment spells. In line with previous findings and under conditions of poor job prospects, the old axiom that 'any job is better than none' receives some support herein (Gruen, Hauser, & Rhein, 2010).

In countries with higher unemployment rates than in Switzerland and, hence, generally poorer job prospects, we suspect that jobseekers accept a downgrading in occupational prestige at reemployment more readily. The same is likely to hold for countries with a less generous unemployment insurance system (e.g., US), which curtails the search for 'best fit' jobs in order to avoid scarring effects following unemployment (Gangl, 2004). The axiom

that ‘any job is better than none’ will further pertain more to labor markets that focus less on occupations and where the costs of taking up a lower prestige job are considerably smaller.

This paper also contributes to a central question of labor market theories: how the *composition* of labor demand affects job mobility. Assessing the relation between the number of ‘best fit’ vacancies and overall demand at the micro level in an occupational labor market, we demonstrate that variations in the vocational composition of available vacancies strongly impact the search trade-off during unemployment. It becomes clear that further expanding our knowledge of how demand-side forces operate at the micro-level to determine job outcomes requires detailed measurements of available vacancies. The development of accurate and refined measures of labor demand as demonstrated in this study is a promising avenue for future research on unemployment and occupational mobility in occupational, but also in more permeable labor markets.

Another important insight gleaned from the present analysis is that career stage matters for the trade-off between exiting unemployment quickly and maintaining occupational prestige. Our conjecture was that in an occupational labor market trial and maintenance stage differ from establishment jobseekers notably in the amount of occupation-specific skills they have gathered and in their gains from quickly reentering the labor market where they can collect further work experience and launch a career in a new occupation. Our research underscores the idea that in the search trade-off of younger jobseekers, having relatively little to lose on occupational skills and being in need of work experience, the quick take-up of any job, even when it means downgrading, may be the best reemployment decision. In contrast, maintenance stage jobseekers have the most to lose on occupation-specific skills and they thus need to avoid the risk that an occupational downgrade on unemployment exit is not recovered in the shorter span of their remaining career. Holding out longer for adequate reemployment is hence their best search option.

Most importantly, we have shown that the relative availability of 'best fit' vacancies differs in its effect on the search trade-off of unemployed jobseekers according to their career stage. This has implications for understanding links between downward mobility and unemployment spells. Younger unemployed respond to a relatively low availability of 'best fit' vacancies by more readily accepting downgraded reemployment. These circumstances likely imply a longer search period for a prestige adequate job - something they want to avoid in light of their limited work experience. Status downgrading as a strategy to quickly exit unemployment due to few 'best fit' vacancies may, however, scar young peoples' employment careers in occupational labor markets. In contrast, jobseekers towards the end of their career are not as responsive to demand side forces. In an occupational labor market their search trade-off is much less affected by external constraints than by the stage of the career reached. Overall, our study supports the idea that the search trade-off at exit from unemployment is simultaneously framed by external demand structures and individuals' situation as defined by their career stage.

References

Arulampalam, W. (2001). Is unemployment really scarring? Effects of unemployment experiences on wages. *The Economic Journal*, 111, 585–606.

Becker, G. (1964). Human capital. A theoretical and empirical analysis, with special reference to education. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Bernardi, F. (2001). Is it a timing or a probability effect? Four simulations and an application of transition rate models to the analysis of unemployment exit. *Quality and Quantity*, 35, 231– 252.

Bethmann, A. (2013). Occupational change and status mobility. *Journal for Labor Market Research*, 46, 307–319.

Blossfeld, H-P., & Mayer, H.-U. (1988). Labor Market Segmentation in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Empirical Study of Segmentation Theories from a Life Course Perspective. *European Sociological Review*, 4, 123–140.

Brand, J. E. (2006). The effects of job displacement on job quality: Findings from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, 24, 275–298.

Brand, J. E. (2015). The Far-Reaching Impact of Job Loss and Unemployment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 41, 359–375.

Buchmann, M, Kriesi, I., & Sacchi, S. (2003). Labor-Market Structure's and Women's Paid Work: Opportunities and Constraints in the Swiss Labor Market. *Advances in Life Course Research*, 8, 165–188.

Buchs, H., Mueller, B., & Buchmann, M. (2015). Qualifikationsnachfrage und Arbeitsmarkteintritt in der Schweiz. *KZfSS Koelner Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 67, 709–736.

Cox, D. (1972). Models and Life-Tables Regression. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 34, 187–220.

Dieckhoff, M. (2011). The effect of unemployment on subsequent job quality in Europe: A comparative study of four countries. *Acta Sociologica*, 54, 233–249.

DiPrete, T. A, & Nonnemaker, L. (1997). Structural Change, Labor Market Turbulence, and Labor Market Outcomes. *American Sociological Review*, 62, 386–404.

Gangl, M. (2004). Institutions and the Structure of Labour Market Matching in the United States and West Germany. *European Sociological Review*, 20, 171–187.

Gangl, M. (2006). Scar Effects of Unemployment: An Assessment of Institutional Complementarities. *American Sociological Review,* 71, 986–1013.

Gruen, C., Hauser, W., & Rhein, T. (2010). Is Any Job Better than No Job? Life Satisfaction and Re-employment. *Journal of Labor Research*, 31, 285–306.

Halaby, C. N. (1988). Action and Information in the Job Mobility Process: The Search Decision. *American Sociological Review,* 53, 9-25.

Jahoda, M. (1982). *Employment and Unemployment. A Social Psychological Analysis.* London: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Johnson, W. R., Kawachi, J., & Lewis, E. K. (2009). *Older Workers on the Move: Recareering in Later Life.* Washington: AARP Public Policy Institute.

Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. *Econometrica,* 47, 263–292.

Kircher, P. (2015). Search and Learning in Markets. In R. A. Scott, & S. M. Kosslyn (Eds.), *Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource,* Hoboken N.J.: Wiley Online Library.

Kriesi, I, Buchmann, M., & Sacchi, S. (2010). Variation in Job Opportunities for Men and Women in the Swiss Labor Market 1962–1989. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, 28, 309–323.

Lippmann, S., & Rosenthal, J. E. (2008). Do Displaced Workers Lose Occupational Prestige? *Social Science Research*, 37, 642–656.

Mortensen, D. T. (1986). *Job Search and Labor Market Analysis.* Washington, D.C: The National Academic Press.

Mueller, B., & Schweri, J. (2015). How Specific is Apprenticeship Training? Evidence from Inter-Firm and Occupational Mobility after Graduation. *Oxford Economic Paper,* 64, 1057–1077.

Murphy, E. C. (2014). Workers' Movement Out of Declining Occupations in Great Britain, Germany and Switzerland. *European Sociological Review*, 30, 685–701.

Oesch, D., & Baumann, I. (2015). Smooth Transition or Permanent Exit? Evidence on Job Prospects of Displaced Industrial Workers. *Socio-Economic Review*, 13, 101–123.

Papageorgiou, T. (2013). Learning Your Comparative Advantages. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 81, 1263–1295.

Rogerson, R., Shimer, R., & Wright, R. (2005). Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 43, 959–988.

Rosenfeld, R. (1992). Job Mobility and Career Processes. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 18, 39–61.

Sacchi, S., Kriesi, I., & Buchmann, M. (2016). Occupational Mobility Chains and the Role of Job Opportunities for Upward, Lateral and Downward Mobility in Switzerland. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, 44, 10-21.

SECO (2015). *Die Lage auf dem Arbeitsmarkt. Dezember 2014*. Bern: Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft SECO.

Stavrova, O., Schloesser, T., & Fetchenhauer, D. (2011). Are the Unemployed Equally Unhappy All Around the World? The Role of the Social Norms to Work and Welfare State Provision in 28 OECD Countries. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 32, 159–171.

Stutzer, A., & Lalive, R. (2004). The Role of Social Work Norms in Job Searching and Subjective Well-Being. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2, 696–719.

Super, D. (1957). *The Psychology of Careers.* New York: Harper.

Treiman, D. (1977). *Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Academic Press.

Wanberg, C. R. (2012). The Individual Experience of Unemployment. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 63, 369–396.

Witte, J. C., & Kalleberg, A.L. (1995). Matching Training and Jobs: The Fit between Vocational Education and Employment in the German Labour Market. *European Sociological Review*, 11, 293–317.

Wolbers, M. H. J. (2016). A Generation Lost? Prolonged Effects of Labour Market Entry in Times of High Unemployment in the Netherlands. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 46*, 51-59.

Zhou, X. (2005). The Institutional Logic of occupational Prestige Ranking: Reconceptualization and Reanalyzes. *American Journal of Sociology*, 111, 90–140.

Appendix

Table A1: Hazard of downgraded reemployment within 10 months: Cox regression estimates

	Model 1	Model 2
ln (rel availability of 'best fit' vacancies)	-0.096***	-0.092***
	(0.006)	(0.012)
Career stage: trial[a]	0.291***	0.285***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
Career stage: maintenance[a]	-0.182***	-0.175***
	(0.023)	(0.025)
ln (rel availability of 'best fit' vacancies) # Trial stage[b]		-0.021*
		(0.011)
ln (rel availability of 'best fit' vacancies) # Maintenance stage[b]		0.017
		(0.021)
N	115950	115950
N events	18233	18233
Log Likelihood	-197854.75	-165632.4

Source: AVAM; SMM; 2006-2014.

Notes: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 a b Reference category is establishment stage.

Models control for occupations, years, foreign nationality and seniority.

Table A2: Hazard of downgraded reemployment for jobseekers younger than 58 years: Cox regression estimates

	Model 1	Model 2
ln (rel availability of 'best fit' vacancies)	-0.098***	-0.090***
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Career Stage: trial[a]	0.301***	0.294***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Career Stage: maintenance[a]	-0.190***	-0.191***
	(0.024)	(0.025)
ln (rel availability of 'best fit' vacancies) # Trial stage[b]		-0.023*
		(0.017)
ln (rel availability of 'best fit' vacancies) # Maintenance stage[b]		-0.005
		(0.021)
N	112863	112863
N events	20233	20233
Log Likelihood	-212394.53	-212393

Source: AVAM; SMM; 2006-2014.

Notes: ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 a b Reference category is establishment stage.

Models control for occupations, years, foreign nationality and seniority.

Figure A1: CIF for finding an adequate job by career stage