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Journal article

Blockholder voting

Abstract:

Blockholders play a large role in corporate governance. We examine their voting behavior by adding a voter with many votes, i.e., a blockholder, to a standard voting model. A blockholder may not vote with all of her shares. This is efficient because it prevents her from drowning out the information in others’ votes. This effect holds even when shares may be traded. Consequently, regulations prohibiting abstention will harm information aggregation, though such regulations may promote informati...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.11.005

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Oxford college:
St Cross College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Elsevier
Journal:
Journal of Financial Economics More from this journal
Volume:
136
Issue:
3
Pages:
695-717
Publication date:
2019-11-26
Acceptance date:
2019-06-11
DOI:
EISSN:
1879-2774
ISSN:
0304-405X
Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:1011906
UUID:
uuid:cdcce1ab-d410-42d6-b888-d97a19ec78fc
Local pid:
pubs:1011906
Source identifiers:
1011906
Deposit date:
2019-06-12

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