Book section icon

Book section

Personal autonomy and change of mind in promise and in contract

Abstract:

Is it possible that, in a world without promise, people would be just as likely, or perhaps even more likely, to be autonomous? The chapter takes issue with a mainstream view in contemporary literature on promise (and, similarly, contract)—a view by which the capacity to promise enhances personal autonomy, and can thus be explained and justified by reference to its value. The challenge to the mainstream view is animated by way of noting the possible autonomy-related value of a change of mind,...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713012.003.0006

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Law
Sub department:
Law Faculty
Role:
Author

Contributors

Role:
Editor
Role:
Editor
Role:
Editor
Publisher:
Oxford Univeristy Press
Host title:
Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law
Chapter number:
6
Publication date:
2014-12-18
DOI:
ISBN:
9780198713012
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:618038
UUID:
uuid:cd60171b-c692-4d4b-83b7-d3e95c08f09a
Local pid:
pubs:618038
Source identifiers:
618038
Deposit date:
2016-04-27

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP