

# Tracing Diplomatic Tutelage: (Post)colonial Pedagogies and the Training of African Diplomats

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Throughout the twentieth century, colonies emerged from the so-called tutelage of European imperial powers to represent themselves as sovereign states. One consequence of this change was an expansion in overseas diplomatic training, aimed at inducting into international life the hundreds of diplomats required to staff new foreign services. This paper interrogates the pedagogical and (geo)political practice of tutelage—where guardianship and instruction are held in tension—in order to shine a critical spotlight on programs training African diplomats, hosted in Britain, France, and Switzerland, and later in Cameroon and Kenya. In exploring practices of tutelage both within the classroom and at the international scale, we bring to the fore hitherto overlooked relational and temporal dimensions of tutelage that provide new insights into enduring paternalistic power relations as well as possibilities for agency and resistance. We trace the legacies of colonialism within these training programs but are also attentive to the ways trainers problematized the generalizability of their knowledge and pedagogy, and how African diplomats-in-training resisted relations of tutelage. In dialogue with scholarship on socialization and international education, we develop an enhanced conceptualization of tutelage that provides analytical purchase on inter-scalar relationships in world politics during and beyond formal decolonization.

Tout au long du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle, les colonies ont émergé de la soi-disant tutelle des puissances impériales européennes pour se présenter comme des États souverains. L'une des conséquences de ce changement a été l'expansion de la formation diplomatique à l'étranger, qui vise à intégrer dans la vie internationale les centaines de diplomates nécessaires à l'administration des nouveaux services étrangers. Cet article interroge la pratique pédagogique et (géo)politique de la tutelle (en confrontant la tutelle et l'instruction) afin de porter un regard critique sur les programmes de formation des diplomates africains, accueillis en Grande-Bretagne, en France et en Suisse, et plus tard au Cameroun et au Kenya. En étudiant les pratiques de tutelle à la fois dans les salles de classe et à l'échelle internationale, nous mettons en évidence les dimensions relationnelles et temporelles de la tutelle qui ont été négligées jusqu'à présent. Ces dernières reflètent un nouvel aspect des relations de pouvoir paternalistes durables ainsi que des possibilités d'action et de résistance. Nous retraçons les héritages du colonialisme dans les programmes de formation africains, mais nous prêtons également attention à la façon dont les formateurs ont problématisé la généralisation de leurs connaissances et de leur pédagogie, ainsi qu'à la façon dont les diplomates africains en formation ont résisté aux relations de tutelle. En dialogue avec les études sur la socialisation et l'éducation internationale, nous développons une conceptualisation améliorée de la

tutelle. Cette dernière offre un outil analytique sur les relations inter-scalaires dans la politique mondiale pendant et après la décolonisation formelle.

A lo largo del siglo XX, las colonias fueron saliendo de lo que llamamos tutela de las potencias imperiales europeas, para presentarse a sí mismas como Estados soberanos. Una de las consecuencias que tuvo este cambio fue la expansión de la formación a nivel diplomático en el extranjero, la cual tenía el propósito de incorporar a la vida internacional a los cientos de diplomáticos que eran necesarios para poder dotar de personal a los nuevos servicios en el extranjero. Este artículo cuestiona la práctica pedagógica y (geo)política de la tutela, en la cual la tutela y la instrucción se mantienen en tensión entre ellas, con el fin de ofrecer una mirada crítica sobre los programas de formación de diplomáticos africanos en Gran Bretaña, Francia y Suiza, y más tarde en Camerún y Kenia. Estudiamos las prácticas de tutela, tanto dentro del aula como a escala internacional, y, en consecuencia, ponemos el foco en algunas dimensiones relacionales y temporales de la tutela, que hasta ahora se habían pasado por alto, y las cuales proporcionan nuevas perspectivas en materia de las relaciones de poder paternalistas duraderas, así como en lo referente a las posibilidades de agencia y resistencia. Observamos los legados del colonialismo existentes dentro de estos programas de formación, pero también prestamos atención a las formas que usaron los formadores para problematizar la generalización de sus conocimientos y su pedagogía, y a cómo los diplomáticos africanos que estaban en formación se resistieron a las relaciones de tutela. Desarrollamos, teniendo en cuenta los estudios en materia de socialización y educación internacional, una conceptualización mejorada de la tutela, la cual proporciona una comprensión analítica de las relaciones interescales en la política mundial, tanto durante como después de la descolonización formal.

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### Introduction

When the student protests of May 1968 engulfed Paris, the following graffiti appeared at the *Institut International d'Administration Publique* (IIAP), which provided training for, among others, diplomats from former French colonies:

- No to the inappropriate and colonial teaching methods of the IIAP.
- No to alienation.
- No to the cut-rate training of the IIAP.
- No to the favoritism of this House's management.
- Students of the IIAP are accomplices of French imperialism in black Africa. Let that sink in; it endangers the whole continent.
- Down with French neo-colonialism in Africa.<sup>1</sup>

It is hard to ascertain who exactly was responsible for these graffiti, but they suggest that some African students at the IIAP were critical not only of French neo-colonialism and interventionism, but specifically identified the IIAP's role in perpetuating French imperialism, partly through "colonial teaching methods." That records of these graffiti were kept indicates that the school's management was taking these criticisms seriously; after all, the French Government's key rationale for funding the institute was to "earn inestimable friendship capital" by fostering ties

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<sup>1</sup>Archives Nationales de France (ANF), 20030470/2: *Graffiti relevés le 6.6.1968 dans les toilettes près de la cafeteria* (author's translation)

with and between its students.<sup>2</sup> It perhaps did not help the IIAP's reputation that it was physically housed in the former *École coloniale on rue de l'observatoire*, a building in the heart of Paris that retained much of its colonial character.

This incident of contestation highlights the messy entanglements of colonialism, diplomacy, and training, bringing to the fore both the role of educational institutions in perpetuating colonial relations through their curricular and pedagogical approaches, and student resistance to such modes of instruction. In order to interrogate the international *and* interpersonal dynamics of these (post)colonial entanglements, we turn to and develop an enhanced conceptualization of tutelage. We argue that its double meaning (which holds for the French equivalent, *tutelle* (see Grelley 2007)) as both “The office or function of a guardian; protection, care, guardianship, patronage” and “Instruction, tuition; state of being under the supervision or guardianship of a tutor” (Oxford English Dictionary) offers a conceptual lens to bring to bear on pedagogical and (geo)political practices where guardianship and instruction are held in tension (Schick 2016). In international legal terms, the former colonies of Africa were breaking away from the tutelage of European imperial powers, and on training courses, tutors attempted to impart the knowledge and skills required for independence. In this paper, we analyze the rationale for these courses and the relations between tutors and tutees they engendered in order to theorize particular spatial and temporal dimensions of tutelage.

From the late 1950s, African polities emerged from colonial status to represent themselves internationally as sovereign states, triggering an expansion in overseas diplomatic training. Through the 1960s, hundreds of African diplomats-in-training traveled both to the Global North—often but not always to former colonial powers—and, from the 1970s, to African training centers to attend bespoke programs. In this paper, we primarily draw on research undertaken on diplomatic training programs in the UK (at the University of Oxford and London School of Economics (LSE)), France (IIAP), and Switzerland (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (hereafter Carnegie) and United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) programs at the Graduate Institute, Geneva), as well as programs in Cameroon (International Relations Institute of Cameroon) and Kenya (Nairobi Diplomatic Training Program). These programs fulfilled the following criteria: they were longstanding institutions operating over several years and cohorts; they were focused on training diplomats of newly independent states, the majority of whom were African; and they were multinational in terms of student recruitment. We engage with a wide range of state, university, and private archives, sourcing course student lists, curricula, examination papers, and correspondence between trainers, directors, and trainees. We also draw on 15 in-depth interviews with seven trainees, five trainers, two program directors, and an administrator from these training programs.<sup>3</sup> Data collection, including interviews, was undertaken in both in English and French.<sup>4</sup> As white British researchers, we are mindful of what Bob-Milliar terms “‘capture’... the predominant involvement of non-Africans in studying the continent” (2022: 56), and the over-representation of Western scholars in research about Africa, although this project focuses precisely on the overlapping networks and flows between the West and Africa. Inter-personal dynamics within interviews were largely those of a more senior, experienced professional narrating past experiences to a more junior researcher, and African and Western trainers and trainees alike were keen to explore both positive and negative experiences of training, including issues of colonialism and racism. In our analysis, we focused on evidence of

<sup>2</sup>ANF, 20050323/18: *Note relative à l'aide aux écoles d'administration des pays en voie de développement* (author's translation)

<sup>3</sup>Following ethical approval from King's College London, interviewees gave consent to be recorded and quoted. They were offered the choice of whether or not to be anonymised.

<sup>4</sup>When a quotation has been translated by a member of the project team, this is recorded in the footnotes.

the power dynamics, interpersonal relations, and ideological assumptions present in the course materials and personal reflections.

In what follows, we discuss how tutelage has been examined both in relation to colonialism and geopolitics in the fields of history, development studies, and International Relations (IR) and in relation to pedagogy in the field of education studies. We seek to both forge a dialogue between these bodies of literature and to develop a more conceptually productive framework of tutelage. In meeting this aim, we also engage with work in IR on the practice of socialization, noting that pedagogy remains an underexplored aspect of socialization that is nevertheless important for understanding agency in (post)colonial contexts. We thereby frame tutelage as inherently relational at both international and interpersonal scales, as implying a transitory and teleological arrangement, and as being underpinned by paternalistic power hierarchies but also open to possibilities of resistance. In applying these ideas to the case of diplomatic training in the context of African decolonization, we focus on three aspects: diplomatic training during decolonization as a mode of “guardianship geopolitics”; how training as tutelage was justified by practices of problematizing and “rendering pedagogical”; and acts of resistance to “colonial teaching methods.” We conclude by outlining how the lens of tutelage, and an empirical focus on diplomatic training, offer insights into the potentially disruptive role of pedagogy in negotiating the politics of postcolonial relations, and how our framing of tutelage has relevance to wider analyses of international education and development in world politics.

### Conceptualizing Tutelage: A Colonial and Pedagogical Relationship

Given the definition of tutelage as both guardianship and instruction, it is not surprising that it has been discussed in two distinct academic literatures: scholarship on colonial IR and on education. The term “tutelage” is closely related to concept of “trusteeship,” and in our reading, the two terms are interchangeable; indeed, they both translate as one word in French: *tutelle*. The development of trusteeship as a powerful concept in international affairs has spanned centuries, from moral debates concerning the misrule of the East India Company, to its internationalization in colonial Africa, and institutionalization under the League of Nations and the UN (Bain 2003). While scholars use the terms tutelage and trusteeship to describe relations of guardianship in a range of colonial contexts, including the imperial presence of the United States in its relationship with the Philippines (Go and Foster 2003; Kramer 2006) and relations between Manchus and Mongols in the 1600s (Di Cosmo 2012), they are most prevalent in the context of late European colonialism in Africa. Tutelage and trusteeship were used by colonizers to describe what they did and their role vis-à-vis the colonized, and the terms are used—largely descriptively—in literature on colonial history (e.g. Robinson 1965; Hyam 1999). Tutelage is thus premised on a form of paternalism where protection and guidance are granted in exchange for a degree of dependency, and was particularly relevant to the ways colonialism in Africa was legitimized, from the Conference of Berlin to the system of UN trust territories.

While always necessarily unequal, the colonized could, under tutelage, be “educated into self-government, or at least the native elites could be” (Gopal 2019, 26). Although often discursively framed as benevolent and peaceful, in practice many cases of such tutelage have been coercive and violent, as Paine (1977) and Dyck (1991, 1997) persuasively argue in the case of the “welfare colonialism” of settler colonial states in their relationship with and governance of indigenous communities. Intertwined with this paternalism are distinct temporalities and relationalities underpinning tutelage. What is often undertheorized in this literature is how tutelage is an intrinsically relational practice: categories of actors at various scales (from colonial/post-colonial states to trainers and trainees) are actively produced and re-

produced through practices of tutelage. With regards to temporalities, two dynamics are important to tease out. First, there is an implied teleology—that under the tutelage of a more advanced power, an underdeveloped society will eventually graduate from an inferior state subordination to become an equal partner. As Slater puts it, “The will to tutelage often flows out of a belief in a kind of geopolitical predestination, a sense of imperial mission” (1997, 638). Second, tutelage was a practice framed as a temporary arrangement, as encapsulated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Yet despite this transitory nature, there was often debate about how and whether this status of tutelage should and could be brought to an end: could any colony ever be *made* truly ready for independence, at least by the definitions of the colonial powers?

Despite its legitimacy being undermined in the mid-twentieth century due to decolonization and the rise of self-determination, the dynamics of tutelage remain pertinent through the fraught politics of trade and international development into the twenty-first century. Cowen and Shenton’s *Doctrines of Development* provide perhaps the most detailed genealogy of these dynamics and their enduring legacy. They define trusteeship as “the intent which is expressed, by one source of agency, to develop the capacities of another” (1996: x), tracing it through both British imperial practices and the writings of political philosophers including JS Mill, Henri de Saint-Simon, and Auguste Comte. Cowen and Shenton argue that trusteeship was a doctrine invoked to resolve the so-called “development problem,” whereby “Those who took themselves to be developed could act to determine the process of development for those who were deemed to be less-developed” (1996: 4). In the field of international law, Rawls writes of a “duty of assistance” towards “burdened societies” who, through “moral learning” might enter the “society of well-ordered peoples” (1999: 99). Again, trusteeship and tutelage are underpinned by a teleology whereby states and peoples can “graduate” from a position of dependency to economic independence (Slater 1997). As many have highlighted, this teleology also included assumptions about the forms of (Western, capitalist) economic independence that should be sought, as much as they defined a “problem” or “deficit” in the peoples and places they sought to develop.

Scholars have traced the continuation of colonial tutelage under the guise of neoliberal globalization in the role of aid donors, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and NGOs in chastising recipient governments in the Global South (Bell and Slater 2002; Mercer 2003). Mkandawire has understood structural adjustment and the denationalization of African countries, and their development through this lens. As he put it, in the 1980s and 1990s, the “policy tutelage” of the IFIs resulted in “the intensive care of neocolonial tutelage under which the continent was to be most dependent on foreign institutions,” undermining the briefly won political and economic gains of decolonization (1999: 83, 102; see also 2014).

Moreover, as Li (2007) has powerfully argued, the desire to enhance capacity for action underpins the extensive range of programs aiming to improve the conditions of populations in the Global South—what she describes as the promotion of the “will to improve.” Following Ferguson (1994) in interrogating the rationale of improvement schemes, and in particular the role of experts and expertise, Li identifies two inter-linked practices that translate the will to improve into programs on the ground: problematization—the identification of deficiencies that need to be rectified—and “rendering technical,” whereby the domain to be governed is made visible and intelligible (2007: 7). While training in diplomacy is less instrumental than the development programs that Li, Ferguson, and Cowen and Shenton examine, as we discuss below, there are revealing resonances, particularly with how the technical rendering of training is in turn rendered non-political.

In recent years, scholars have pointed to the return of “international tutelage” in what they term the “new protectorates,” including, at various periods, Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan (Mayall and Soares de Oliveira 2011). International

presence in these territories was established to maintain order and foster self-government, and Mayall and Soares de Oliveira point to a resurgence of “the language of tutelage—the assumption that some people need to be protected from themselves by a benign civilizing entity” (2011: 13). As Clapham notes, in the same volume:

At the heart of that idea lies the belief that states that are more “modern,” more “developed” or at the crudest more “civilized” have both the obligation and the capacity to extend the benefits of stable and accountable governance to other parts of the world, in the interests both of the international system as a whole and, most important, of the peoples who are thus for their own good brought within the global project of modernity. Nowhere does that project have deeper roots than in Africa, and nowhere is this conceptual, practical and (not least) moral ambivalence more evident (2011: 69).

This work on international tutelage adds an analysis of relations of power to complementary work on socialization within IR. Socialization refers to the processes and mechanisms whereby individuals and groups learn and adopt the languages, mores, and values of a particular community, and scholars in IR have applied the notion to nation-states in order to examine how international society absorbs new members (e.g. Checkel 2005; Gheciu 2005). Written, in the main, from sociological institutionalist and social constructivist perspectives, these interpretations of socialization provide nuanced insights into the mechanisms through which norms are internalized by political actors and are thereby diffused in the international sphere (Alderson 2001; Flockhart 2004). As with trusteeship and tutelage, much existing scholarship on socialization is, as Epstein (2017) notes, based on an implied and normative teleology: that the end goal—novices’ internalization of particular hegemonic (often Western liberal) mindsets and entry to the “society” in question—is inevitable and a change for the better.

Such an underlying Eurocentric view of world history is identifiable in the foundational ideas of the English School on socialization. Emblematic of this body of scholarship is Bull and Watson’s *The Expansion of International Society*. Watson writes:

Westernized élites played the same role and voiced the same aspiration as the settlers, and were the essential element that brought the non-European states formed by Europeans to their logical climax of independent membership of the international society that had been elaborated in Europe and had become world-wide (1984: 32).

Though Bull and Watson argue that “it is not our perspective but the historical record itself that can be called Eurocentric” (1984: 2), this scholarship certainly overlooked alternative, non-Western liberal paradigms both within and outside “international society,” and, in recent years, has received postcolonial critique. For example, Getachew has sought to foreground the perspectives of black anti-colonialists throughout the twentieth century, for whom colonization was not “experienced as exclusion from but as unequal integration into international society” (2019: 18), and in the post-colonial period they continued to seek a recasting of the international order to abolish domination and dependence.

This critique echoes Epstein’s identification of “forms of silencing” (2017: 135) in the way that socialization has been used in IR, and specifically in the context of decolonization: namely that colonial entanglements are not accounted for, that social behaviors and interpersonal relationships are overlooked, and that its implied teleology neglects key examples and impacts of resistance. In training spaces, we argue that the concept of tutelage, as a form of socialization, helps us to account for the colonial, paternalistic power dynamics of trainer/trainee relations, and also highlights spaces of agency and resistance. We contend that socialization cannot be understood merely as an unchanging and apolitical phenomenon, but as a contested and adaptable one shaped by the interactions of the actors involved. Finally,

we problematize the implied teleology of novices internalizing particular Western liberal mindsets and unpack some of the political and pedagogical implications of this process.

The final element required to complete this conceptual picture of tutelage comes from the field of education. In his essay responding to the question ‘What is Enlightenment?’, Kant begins: “Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage” ([1784] 1991: 54). He goes on to expound the political and pedagogical imperative for both individuals and societies to reach a point of maturity defined by independent judgment and action. The enlightened subject, according to Kant, must “dare to know,” take a “step to competence,” and overthrow their tutelage. The thematic parallels with national self-determination are clear: to leave tutelage is to achieve personhood through independent thought and action (Luik 1992). In the mid-twentieth century, Adorno and Becker returned to this theme in their discussions of “Education for Autonomy” (1983; see also Adorno and Becker 1999; Heins 2012), to warn against forms of education that train students not to use their own judgment but to repeat the “correct answers” as required by their instructor, a test, or society at large. In so doing, they ascribed a clearer pedagogical aspect to the concept of tutelage than Kant’s more philosophical writing.

Postcolonial critiques of education have long highlighted the implicit power relationships involved in the creation and transmission of knowledge, as well as its role in upholding colonialism (Freire 1970; Ngũgĩ 1986). Late colonial state-building, underpinned by the ideology of Europe’s “civilizing mission,” involved education and training across all sectors of society, which consciously prioritized western forms of knowledge (Gerits 2023). Such cultural assistance was understood as key to cementing long-standing geopolitical influence by colonizers and colonized alike (Nkrumah 1964; Livsey 2017), but also as a way of reducing the perceived weight of “The White Man’s Burden” (Coloma 2009: 496). Unger points out that the education programs of the US philanthropic foundations “supported the concept of trusteeship” (2011: 247) under European empires in the post-war period, tailoring their interventions accordingly. Imposed from above and reliant on colonial power, pedagogical approaches thereby followed the lines of tutelage outlined above, and disregarded or “misrecognized” non-western knowledge (Ngũgĩ 1986; Schick 2016).

While primary and secondary education were rapidly rolled out across Africa in the late colonial period, advanced studies, eventually including diplomatic training, necessitated study in the cities and universities of the imperial metropole (Unger 2011). A well-developed literature in international history has considered the politics of this educational migration, from efforts at “elite capture” (Blum 2022; Tarradellas 2022) to Cold War competition (Katsakioris 2019; Burton 2020) and more utopian efforts to establish world peace through international education (Hofstetter et al. 2020). Programs of diplomatic training remain almost entirely overlooked in this literature (though see Bugnon 2019), and, on the whole, such historical scholarship has eschewed a focus on pedagogy and curriculum in favor of the wider context of student politics and international networks.

In seeking to address these gaps, we place the discourses and practices of tutelage within diplomatic training programs center stage. In turn, we use our analysis of diplomatic training programs to set out a more developed conceptualization of tutelage with analytical purchase across a range of international training contexts. In most of the scholarship reviewed above, tutelage is understood descriptively rather than analyzed in detail. While the overarching colonial power dynamics of tutelage are critiqued, what is overlooked are the pedagogical spaces and practices that cement it and the underpinning temporalities and scalar dynamics. In what follows, we draw out and theorize tutelage as a practice. First, we interrogate its inherently relational nature as it operates at and bridges across different scales. We ask how tutelage plays out in colonial/post-colonial relations and between trainers and trainees, and how these scales of analysis are intertwined through practices of

guardianship and instruction. This relational understanding of tutelage, we suggest, begins to address critiques of existing literature in history and IR on decolonization that have focused primarily on the scale of the state and on national leaders (e.g. [Ochwada 2005](#); [Collins 2017](#)). Second, by attending to how tutelage is justified in the context of diplomatic training, we offer new insights into the assumed teleology of decolonization as viewed through the lens of liberal internationalism. Finally, the structural logic of tutelage—that there is an instructor and a trainee and a power imbalance between them—enables us to make explicit the link between politics and pedagogy in the context of diplomacy training. However, in examining agency in this context, we also ask what the norms and ambivalences of these relationships are and where possibilities for resistance lie. It is to these complexities of diplomatic tutelage that we now turn.

### Guardianship Geopolitics: Diplomatic Training During Decolonization

During the second half of the twentieth century, the growth of international organizations and the independent statehood of a large group of former colonies heralded an important development in diplomatic training. For the first time, professional training was required to equip large numbers of diplomats globally ([Navari 2000](#); [Constantinou et al. 2016](#)). As Dietrich Kappeler, a former Swiss diplomat whose career in diplomatic training spanned Asia, Africa, and Latin America from the early 1960s, put it:

For centuries diplomacy was considered as an art for which one had to be born. The idea that one could and should be trained for the profession was considered laughable. The increasing complexity of international relations and of the problems [diplomats] have to cope with has changed this (1990, 7).

Today, most states have established diplomatic academies or institutes that train their own diplomatic staff in technical skills and in specialized knowledge on international law. However, in the periods leading up to independent statehood, and in the first years after, many new states lacked the perceived expertise or capacity to provide their own training. Indeed, across Africa, diplomatic training quickly became part of wide-ranging packages of technical assistance and later development aid, which former imperial powers and the new Cold War superpowers competed to provide.

Underpinning this training during late colonialism were relations of guardianship, with yet-to-be diplomats getting exposure to “international life” under the guidance of colonial authorities. This is illustrated by an exchange between officials at the British Colonial Office in 1956 regarding training in UN diplomacy for officials from the not-yet-independent Gold Coast (later Ghana). For the purpose of “making political gestures” of support to the Gold Coast Government, R.L.D. Jasper suggested inviting a Gold Coast delegate to attend Commonwealth meetings and UN General Assembly for

the rest of the Session, so that he could pick up the background and, under our tutelage, get the right ideas. This should make it very much easier for the Gold Coast Delegation to start running its own affairs in 1957 and may even keep them more nearly on the right lines on Fourth Committee and other matters, where the temptation may be to get a bit out of hand.<sup>5</sup>

This is a classic case of colonial paternalism, with the African delegates being chaperoned and guided by British officials deemed to be more experienced and responsible. The area in which the Gold Coast diplomats were least trusted to act,

<sup>5</sup>British National Archives (BNA), DO 35/6946: Gold Coast observers at UN, Jasper to Marnham, 11th October 1956. Emphasis added.

tellingly, is in the UN Fourth Committee, which deals with the issue of decolonization. There were, however, examples of resistance to such colonial tutelage. Gold Coast diplomats were also dispatched to Britain for training prior to independence, though Nkrumah was wary; his distrust of the British civil service is well documented (Nkrumah 1957, 1964). As soon as independence was achieved, Ghanaian diplomats became conspicuously absent from British training, and as the Commonwealth Relations Office's most senior civil servant remarked, "This is partly political (Ghana tends to turn rather deliberately away from a good many of the activities she pursued in her Colonial days)."<sup>6</sup> Instead, Nkrumah solicited Nehru's India for the training of various personnel, including setting up Ghana's external intelligence agency (Paliwal 2022). Anti-colonial refusal was also evident in the case of the training of Algerian diplomats. Under the terms of the 1962 Évian Accords, newly independent Algeria was to send a small cohort of trainee diplomats to Paris, the former colonial metropole, for training. However, only one cohort of students were ever sent, as the training moved to Algeria after just one year at the behest of the Algerian government (Harris et al. 2023).

However, despite such cases of anti-colonial resistance, the continuation of colonial guardianship underpinned the majority of diplomatic training programs that catered for African diplomats during and after formal decolonization. Where training was offered by former colonial powers, programs for diplomats often evolved directly out of courses training colonial officers. In the UK, the foreign service officers of (soon-to-be-) independent African states were initially enrolled into the very same course at the University of Oxford that had long trained British colonial administrators (Stockwell 2018). In France, there were similar practices. The former *Ecole coloniale* became the *Institut des hautes études d'outre-mer* (IHEOM) in 1960, with the mission of training the civil servants, including diplomats, from across France's former colonies. In 1967, it transformed again to become the IIAP, mentioned in the introduction to this article, expanding to offer training globally. Lecture notes from the IHEOM director, Professor François Luchaire, show him in 1963 to be a staunch apologist for the French colonial project. He characterized mid-twentieth-century French colonial rule as "no longer simply support for metropolitan private interests, established in the colonies," but instead representing government in the colonies' best interests.<sup>7</sup> Despite formal independence, the IHEOM would therefore continue until it had "completed its task of direct training of African magistrates, administrators and diplomats" (Luchaire 1965: 15).

The training of diplomats from former colonies was also a site for rivalries between former colonial powers and perceived encroachment on training by the United States. In the early 1960s, with the independence of most of their colonies in Africa, British and French governments were protective of their own spheres of influence through the medium of professional training. Both worried about the intrusion of the American Carnegie Endowment and others in the training of diplomats. The French were particularly preoccupied by this "Anglo-Saxon influence" and in the early 1960s repeatedly petitioned the US Government to restrict its offer for francophone African states to advanced training courses for diplomats and other cadres, and leave basic training of the kind offered by IHEOM to France.<sup>8</sup> There is evidence that the British were similarly concerned to protect their tutelage of diplomats from former colonies. As early as the mid-1950s, the archives record their concern that Germany or the United States might try to "capture the Gold Coast intelligentsia."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup>BNA CO1017/638: Alec Clutterbuck to Sydney Caine, letter, 6th May 1960.

<sup>7</sup>ANF 20050323/22: "Sociologies politique des rapports entre l'Europe et le Tiers-Monde: colonisation et décolonisation, par M. François Luchaire" Centre Européen Universitaire Session 1963-1964 (author's translation).

<sup>8</sup>Archives Diplomatiques de France, 1089INVA/133: *Deuxième entretien franco-américain sur l'Afrique*, 11–12th July 1960 (author's translation).

<sup>9</sup>BNA, FO 371/10812: JGW, Training of Future Gold Coast Foreign Service, 7th September 1954.

Even when there is no history of formal colonialism between training providers and recruits, discourses of tutelage remain, particularly in the context of Cold War geopolitics. The Carnegie courses are an important case in point. Its one-year fellowship program, based in New York (anglophone) and Geneva (francophone) would train over 350 junior diplomats from newly independent states from 1960 to 1973. The vast majority of these trainees were from African states. Before launching the program, however, Professor Norman Palmer, an American political scientist, was commissioned to undertake a consultation exercise to inform the shape and scope of the training. Palmer traveled to Europe, Africa, and Asia for three months in 1959, consulting with over a hundred officials in newly- or soon-to-be-independent states. Despite the context for this study being the process of decolonization, it is striking that Palmer's study carefully avoids any mentions of the colonial context, or the use of words like "decolonization," "colony," "imperial," or "empire." Instead, Palmer writes in terms of "newer countries" or "newer nations" gaining independence. This deliberate choice of words does geopolitical work, removing the troubling colonial past from view and setting up a discourse of socialization where the "newer nations" can be welcomed into the "free world" led by the United States and its allies in the Cold War context. Palmer noted:

This is a sensitive period in the relations of the United States and the "free world" generally with the newer nations of Africa and Asia. It is also a time of great opportunity, a time to give the peoples and leaders of these nations concrete evidence that the "free world" is interested in them and is willing to help them deal with their many problems. [...] a program of supplementary training abroad for their young diplomats, would be a significant contribution to their "progress, in freedom."<sup>10</sup>

Palmer's discourse of newness articulates with the Carnegie program's focus on young diplomats, specifically those under thirty-five, thereby reinforcing the sense of paternalism through tutelage. This example highlights the wider geographies and geopolitics of tutelage—beyond formal (de)colonization but within the context of Cold War international politics underpinned by coloniality—that diplomatic training offers insights into.

### **Justifying Training as Tutelage: Problematizing and Rendering Pedagogical**

In 1961, the director of the Oxford course, which had begun to train African diplomats, wrote about the "Change in the Men" that he had witnessed as decolonization began to take place:

[This change] has inevitably brought with it great psychological changes. Formerly, the membership of the courses was very much all of a piece, and reactions were more predictable. Now there is a much wider variety, not only in racial background, but also in age, temperament, capacity, experience and attitudes towards problems of the day [...] some have arrived with a "chip on their shoulder."<sup>11</sup>

Although the report does not elaborate on what "problems of the day" are, it is likely that the conditions of decolonization were salient issues across the course, as a series of British colonies declared independence in the 1960s. Throughout this report and others included in the British Government's review of "Training in Public Administration for Overseas Countries" ([Department of Technical Cooperation 1963](#)), there is no evidence of recognition of the reasons for a lack of non-White civil servants capable of administering the functions of state, namely that colonial and racist structures of power had long kept colonized populations uneducated and politically disenfranchised. In Britain and elsewhere, the training offered was

<sup>10</sup>Graduate Institute Archive, HEI 2259: Report by Professor Norman D. Palmer, Prepared for the Meeting on January 26th, 1960 of the Advisory Committee on the Young Diplomats Program, p.35.

<sup>11</sup>University of London Archive ICS85: Oxford University Memorandum: 31st December 1961.

framed by a continuation of colonial, racialized thinking through the process of formal decolonization. What is particularly important here, though, is how the trainees themselves—who were in almost all cases elites—were racialized and thereby “problematized” within these courses. This echoes Coloma’s findings from their study of the racialized curriculum in the Philippines under US rule: “the material effects of the discursive construction of Filipino/as manifested in educational policy and curriculum... structured what teachers taught, what students learned, and what kinds of lived trajectories were made possible” (2009, 497).

Even when not couched in racial terms, there was frustration from some trainers as to the youth and poor academic standards of the trainees, and, echoing Li’s notion of the “will to improve,” these “deficiencies” were framed as individual failings in need of rectification through training. Palmer’s report for Carnegie, for example, noted that “Many high officials of the Foreign Offices of newer countries, based on age and experience and other qualifications, are comparable with Third Secretaries in the Foreign Services of more experienced countries”,<sup>12</sup> while LSE professor Michael Banks would recall the challenge of “teaching people who aren’t necessarily very well educated... I simply resorted to slowing down and sort of hand holding, explaining things as simply as I could” (interview, July 29th, 2022). Recollections of trainers and their writing from the time reveal far more concern about *how* to teach than *what* to teach: the archives contain few detailed curricula records, but there is evidence that different courses typically took a similar shape, covering (Eurocentric) aspects of international law, politics, economics, history and diplomatic practice. Pedagogy receives more attention: Banks’ contemporary in Geneva, the economist Gilbert Etienne, wrote of his frustration in failing to tackle the problem of both Carnegie and UNITAR trainees who were too “lazy or incompetent.” Unless this “problem” could be addressed, the course might “indirectly contribute to the many evils that are ruining Black Africa” by sending insufficiently prepared diplomats to “take on tasks that their Western colleagues will only take on after long years of practical experience.” In an act of “rendering technical” (Ake 1982; Li 2007), he suggested that “the only way of ‘damage limitation’ is to put in place extremely severe training programmes,” including introducing mid-semester exams to get all trainees working “seriously” from the start.<sup>13</sup>

While presenting particular pedagogies as a “solution” to training such diplomats is an act of rendering the issue non-political (Ake 1982; Ferguson 1994: 270), what emerges from looking across a range of contemporaneous training programs are distinct pedagogical models that directly reflect the courses’ wider political contexts and strategies. While international in their outlook and ambition, each course contained a particular focus on their host country’s foreign policy and diplomatic philosophy. One key division was between French and Anglo-Saxon teaching styles. In 1963, J.R. Symonds of the UN Technical Assistance Board wondered:

whether there may be a particular field of cooperation in the training of diplomats ... The divergence between ex-French and ex-British practice is striking ... much more needs to be done to familiarise Nigerians and Ghanaians etc. with Latin logic, and Ivoirians and Senegalese with Anglo-Saxon pragmatism.<sup>14</sup>

At the core of the juxtaposition of “Latin Logic” and “Anglo-Saxon pragmatism” were opposing pedagogical styles. Perhaps prompting the frustration expressed in the graffiti cited at the start of this article, the teaching at the Paris courses was formal and didactic. Students had to pass competitive entrance exams and were

<sup>12</sup>Graduate Institute Archive, HEI 2259: Report by Professor Norman D. Palmer, Prepared for the Meeting on January 26th, 1960 of the Advisory Committee on the Young Diplomats Program, p.9.

<sup>13</sup>HEI 1969, Carnegie 1960–72: Gilbert Etienne, *Programme Carnegie de formation diplomatique*, 22nd February 1967 (author’s translation). Such an approach was structurally unacceptable, however: firstly there was such a lack of qualified personnel to staff new foreign ministries across the Global South that students could not be allowed to fail.

<sup>14</sup>OUA QE52: J.R. Symonds to T. Soper, handwritten note, undated (March 1963).

subject to summative written assessments throughout the course. Unlike with the Geneva courses, if their average grade fell below the cut-off mark, they would fail the course. This training also involved extensive use of placements in French consulates and embassies, where students learned the job by observing and imitating French diplomatic staff.<sup>15</sup>

In comparison, “Anglo-Saxon” courses tended to be less focused on bureaucratic processes, had more flexible admissions policies, and placed emphasis on formative assessment and continuous feedback. Students needed to be active participants in seminars, simulations, and excursions, to gain what Oxford’s Ralph Feltham called “the intangibles of diplomacy,” namely: intellectual curiosity, political awareness, and personality.<sup>16</sup> The Foreign Service Program (FSP) in Oxford, in particular, focused on the development of soft skills and networking. Its trainees were called “members,” placed within Oxford colleges, and given as much as possible of the “Oxford experience.”

However, while there was a convivial, sociable atmosphere underpinning the relationship between trainers and trainees, there was also a paternalism that maintained dependency and tutelage. In his memoirs, Carnegie fellow Reginald Dumas of Trinidad and Tobago, who trained in Geneva (1960–61) alongside students from Cameroon, Morocco, and Togo, recalled:

the European well-meaners, those who felt strongly that this new and coming world of political independence needed sympathy and flexibility of approach, even lowered standards. They did not see this as racist or condescending; they genuinely believed that they were doing the correct thing (2015, 184–5).

He further quotes from his written feedback, submitted to the Carnegie program in 1961:

I think, looking back, that one major gap in some of the courses and seminars was the lack of a feeling of *immediacy*. We are young countries in a hurry; we want to be, we *have* to be, up-to-date. We have to learn in a few years what took other countries 50 and 100 years (2015: 187).

For Dumas, the training courses designed specifically for decolonization’s diplomats may have been well-meaning, but by making allowances for lower standards, they held back not only the diplomats themselves, but the newly independent states they were to represent. Pointing to the temporal paradox of tutelage and trusteeship, Dumas frames himself and his classmates as personifying their young states, drawing a clear inter-scalar connection between relations of tutelage in the classroom and in international society.

Such paternalistic approaches, where particularly African diplomatic training was treated as a special case, endured well past formal decolonization. Several decades later, Kappeler, who had years of experience delivering diplomatic training in Switzerland, Cameroon, and Kenya, among other places would argue:

In addition to deficiencies in education, the social background of many [African] candidates for diplomacy does not prepare them for moving convincingly in cosmopolitan circles. They should therefore be provided with proper knowledge of the social habits and courtesies expected of them (1990: 17).

The mention of “cosmopolitan circles” signals the implicit understanding of diplomacy being underpinned by an internationalism that was liberal and inherently Western, with the perceived challenge therefore that African trainees were too rooted in their place-specific cultures. In order to prepare African diplomats to “move convincingly,” or in Feltham’s

<sup>15</sup>ANF 20050323/15 Brochure: l’Institut des hautes études d’Outre-Mer, 1964.

<sup>16</sup>FSP Publicity: Feltham, R. *Training for diplomacy: the problem of the intangibles*, 20th May 1975.

words “put themselves across,”<sup>17</sup> European trainers developed a distinct pedagogy of simulation and roleplay that was at once highly technical and deeply subjective. Simulations included set-piece negotiations over multiple days, set-up in formal spaces with microphones, audio and video recording, and, for bilingual courses, simultaneous interpretation with headphones.<sup>18</sup> The experience of handling such unfamiliar technology in a formal environment was intended to prepare trainees for multilateral diplomacy but also to socialize them in certain ways. Role-play extended to the integration of social situations with assessment, with the Oxford course using the format of a cocktail party at the *Maison Française* for the French oral exam, complete with select French foods: “Dubonet, Noilly-Prat ... various canapes and a very good pâté.”<sup>19</sup> Feltham was credited with pioneering the use of technology and technical pedagogy in Oxford, but articulated the view that such approaches, while beneficial, were not sufficient:

Can anything be done in the training process to ensure that the intangibles of diplomacy are acquired definitely and quickly? Is it a question of the curriculum and of adding simulation exercises and topical case studies; or does it rest with the members of the teaching staff who, by their personal qualities, inspire such intangibles as intellectual curiosity, political awareness and ease of communication and enable their students to benefit, at an early stage, from their attitude, example and behaviour?<sup>20</sup>

Therefore, in the minds of European educators, a technical pedagogy was coupled with a subjective, interpersonal, and ultimately Eurocentric approach to diplomatic practice outside the classroom. Students were prepared for international life through “exposure” to Western cultural norms through their (mostly European) teachers, both in terms of informal socialization and learning formal protocol.

Indeed, how knowledge was produced, transferred, and circulated through these programs also offers insights in the dynamics of tutelage that underpin them. The Paris and Oxford courses essentially taught what the French and British thought new diplomats needed to know, and particular hierarchies of knowledge were naturalized through the programs. France’s *Ecole nationale d’administration* (ENA), an elite institution for training public servants for high office, served as the point of reference for the Paris courses. Former IHEOM diplomatic trainees recalled following “exactly the same courses given at the time at the level of the French ENA” (Interview, Rafik Bensaci (of Algeria), May 10th, 2022), though there was a sense of being in a second-class institution implied in the contemporary archive.<sup>21</sup> Meanwhile, although the Oxford FSP repeatedly emphasized its independence from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, until 2015, its directors were all former British diplomats. Feltham’s *Diplomatic Handbook* (first published in 1970) informed much of the curriculum and was described by a former trainee as “written by a British diplomat for British diplomats” (Interview, Yolanda Kemp Spies (of South Africa, FSP 1995–96), December 7th 2022). The same trainee, studying there as late as 1995, recounted:

[diplomatic practice] comprised solely of the recently retired British ambassador doing tutorials, and getting us to write certain things in a British template. Those could be political reports, or economic reports or things like that. I found them quaint—some of them reminded me of what we did back home [in South Africa], because we were a British colony [...] But in other ways, I found it to be deficient because it was completely Eurocentric (Interview, Kemp Spies).

<sup>17</sup> Oxford University Archives CW39/1: Foreign Service Course Practical Exercise, 13th–17th March 1967.

<sup>18</sup> United Nations Archives Geneva, G.IIB 4/78: Dollinger to Wilmot, 8th February 1966.

<sup>19</sup> FSP Examinations File - French Oral exam arrangements, 11th May 1984.

<sup>20</sup> FSP Publicity: Feltham, R. *Training for diplomacy: the problem of the intangibles*, 20th May 1975.

<sup>21</sup> ANF, 20050323/27: *Note relative à la formation des Administrateurs et Magistrats algériens* (author’s translation).

Trainees also recalled how classes on diplomatic practice in particular were aimed at cultivating a Western sensibility in trainees from the Global South. This included teaching Western etiquette; learning to behave like a European, which was deemed to be synonymous with performing as an international diplomat:

Every Wednesday, we had a session where we interacted with high level guests. I remember Margaret Thatcher was on one occasion with us, for a dinner, for the guests. And the idea is, to see how these things are set up, to see the tableware and so on because essentially, my ministers agreed, that we are in a fully Western culture for protocol (Interview, Sylvester Parker-Allotey (of Ghana, FSP 1994-5), April 27th 2023).

Indeed, Eurocentrism permeated all these programs. Formal diplomatic training in an international environment was a new phenomenon, but one that remained firmly within the hegemonic Western liberal framework. The common rationale and format of these courses point towards a broadly liberal internationalism: new states needed help, but were joining a community of sovereign states within a world system, working together for mutual benefit. Each functioning state within the world system would be a benefit to all others by facilitating trade, development, and peace. Underlying this thinking was an understanding of the soft power value of training the diplomats from newly independent countries, maintaining friendly relations with former colonies, and especially the pressing concerns of the Cold War. It also highlights the assumption that the world system was a settled one, which countries in the Global North would continue to dominate. As such, unequal structures of international society, inherited from colonialism, continued to shape processes of socialization through diplomatic training.

### Resisting “Colonial teaching methods”

Having demonstrated how relations of tutelage can be used to make sense of both the political framing of diplomatic training following constitutional decolonization, and the pedagogical approaches of various programs and trainers, we now turn to consider acts and practices of resistance. In examining tutelage in the context of anti-colonialism, Gopal coined the term “reverse tutelage” to describe a pedagogical process whereby “metropolitan dissidents came to learn something from their anticolonial interlocutors and the movements they represented” (2019, 18; see also Milford and McCann 2022 on the “reverse tutelage” of Joseph Murumbi). Given the tendency of official archives to silence histories of contestation and dissent, and the diplomatic and mostly conformist nature of the courses and their participants, we have scant examples of “reverse tutelage” or indeed of direct resistance or subversion. However, following Sou’s assertion that while “theories of resistance often presume acts are explicit, collective, and spectacular,” they can also be “individual, relatively safe and seemingly invisible acts of opposition to power” (2021, 2-3), we trace practices of resistance that lie between passive acceptance of tutelage and overt rejection. We do so by turning attention primarily to the agency of individual trainees, but also to attempts by states and their representatives to transform training programs into vehicles of emancipation. As a result, there are connections here with Freirean liberatory education (1970, 2005) and the frame of pedagogies of resistance (Bajaj 2015) in terms of anticolonial and emancipatory empowerment through democratic and dialogic pedagogy.

Rather than training being based on a presumption of a deficit on the part of trainees, some African elites and their supporters framed the training—including the acquisition of Western knowledge—as a tool for emancipation. For example, Ruth Jett, an African-American New Yorker closely involved with the operation, if not the teaching, of the Carnegie programs throughout the 1960s, wrote that trained diplomatic personnel were needed for “true psychological indepen-

dence”,<sup>22</sup> a framing that resonates closely with Kant’s understanding of the “enlightened subject” overthrowing tutelage through independent judgment and action.

We can also see this play out in other, more subtle ways. While some African trainees framed their engagement in their studies in the Global North within a broader framework of anticolonial and antiracist struggle, this was often mediated through and tempered by diplomacy itself. A Cameroonian IHEOM student, for instance, recounted how his anticolonial “attitude of contestation” had initially meant that, before independence, he was refused a scholarship to study in Paris despite having achieved his *baccalauréat*. However, by the time he entered IHEOM as a diplomatic trainee, he would

relativize the idea that I had of the affirmation of the Negro personality. [...] above all if I want to be in diplomacy, I will be in contact with the other and maybe we will fight, but we will fight with arguments. So I have to know him, I understand him. I was no longer the high school anti-white; I had become rather a negroid who wants to assert himself, who must assert himself (Interview, Elieh-Elle Etian (IHEOM 1963-5) September 23rd 2022).

A similar kind of resistance marked the experience of Algerian trainees in Paris, in which the radical anti-colonialism of diplomats-in-training who had fought in the Algerian liberation war was cognitively separated from the task of learning valuable technical knowledge from the French trainers. Such efforts were often caught in the tension between universal principles and local circumstances, as Schick notes in her radical critique of tutelage in the context of cosmopolitan international education’s “outward-looking adoption of particular values deemed universal and emancipatory [but failure] to interrogate those aspects of ourselves and our relations to others that work against emancipation” (2016, 27).

That said, there are fleeting examples of more overt resistance. For example, when the mid-semester tests were introduced in Geneva in 1965 to address the “problem” of “lazy or incompetent” trainees discussed in the previous section, the trainees pointedly refused to sit them and called their tutors’ bluff.<sup>23</sup> In response, instead of making the courses more difficult, the Graduate Institute put in place an individual tutoring system, hoping that “the human contact thus established between the professors and the trainees will lead to an improvement in the quality of their work.”<sup>24</sup> Here, the trainees’ refusal to sit for a test points to a rejection of the unequal power relations between teacher and student, and indeed, the students’ ability to organize themselves and negotiate effectively points to a certain level of skill in diplomacy. In other cases, trainees rejected special treatment and challenged their tutors to hold them to higher standards. As an unnamed African student protested to Oxford’s Margery Perham at the onset of decolonization: “We do not wish for any special treatment. We do not wish to be protected; we want to be allowed to make our own mistakes, and to work out our own salvation, as you did” (quoted in Perham 1967, 103). Thirty years later, another African Oxford student—on the FSP diplomatic training program—went to see their director to complain:

“I’m not satisfied with this grade.” And he said, “Why not? It’s a good grade.” I said, “Precisely. I did not do a proper essay. I had a late night and just scrambled together something. How can you give me a good grade for this? Is this because I’m from Africa?” I said “Don’t pity me. I want the Oxford treatment.” He looked me up and down and said, “fine.” The next time he gave it back, and it was full of red comments (Interview, Kemp Spies, December 7th 2022).

<sup>22</sup>AAA Ruth Jett Papers, Box 3: “Programs in Diplomacy” c.1972, p1.

<sup>23</sup>HEI 2260, Carnegie 1963-72: Carnegie Group 1965/66 Mid-semestrial Test, December 1965 (author’s translation).

<sup>24</sup>HEI 2250, Carnegie 1963-72: Jacques Freymond, *Programme de formation diplomatique Rapport sur l’année 1965-1966*, 30th September 1966 (author’s translation).

As Ahmed (2021) has argued, complaints offer important insights not only into the dynamics of institutions but also relations of power, in this case subverting tutelage by the trainee instructing the trainer on how they should be taught and treated. In addition to resisting paternalistic attitudes of trainers, some trainees also exercised the intellectual freedom and skills in debate inculcated during their training to challenge the status quo in IR, particularly on excursions to visit international institutions. In 1979, Kenyan economist Michael Chege led a group of his African diplomatic trainees on a tour of Europe organized by the Graduate Institute and the German Foundation for International Development (DSE). He recalled:

Sometimes it became quite confrontational... there were some issues: unequal trade, debt (even then), multinational corporations... I remember, Brussels, one of the directors of Africa was outlining [...] the architecture of EU development assistance to Africa... And, of course, he saw it as a not just benevolent, but mutual gain. He hit the wrong chord, even the most silent students in the group said they thought the ACP and the trade framework reproduced the colonial pattern of trade. I saw the guy's face go ashen. Because it's like he had actually expected "Thank you." He got the reverse (Interview, May 18th 2023).

The Carnegie program in Geneva also appears to have made space in its curriculum for questioning international society's Western-dominated structures of socialization, including seminars on neo-colonialism, non-alignment, and socialism. While not a full embrace of dialogic pedagogy, this was a more democratic approach to curriculum content, as Georges Abi Saab, an Egyptian international legal scholar who taught in Geneva throughout the 1960s and 70s told us:

I spoke always and taught about Third World, and the positions the Third World should take [...] [at the Graduate Institute] the concerns of the Third World, dictated the teaching agenda and development of the law at that time, at least in my view ... the ones who created the programs, tried to make them relevant to the participants (Interview, November 10th 2021).

As well as the various examples of kinds of individual agency given above, we can also point to larger scale shifts in the geography and focus of training programs for African diplomats in the years following decolonization. In terms of geography, African states quickly made clear that they wanted training to take place in Africa itself, but remained committed to a multinational training model. They organized through the UN to invest in and hold an outsized influence in determining the mission of UNITAR, and they lobbied the Carnegie Endowment to site increasing numbers of "diplomatic institutes"—shorter courses for junior diplomats—in African universities (the first, in Makerere, was held a few weeks after Uganda's independence in 1962). Eventually, these institutes became the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC), based in Yaoundé, and the University of Nairobi Diplomatic Training Program (DTP), both of which were underpinned by long-term investments by the Cameroon and Kenyan governments.

These shifts were accompanied by an African focus in the curriculum. Led by African directors and diplomatic staff, the IRIC and Nairobi DTP courses were tailored to the backgrounds and needs of African diplomats. Both courses promoted a Pan-African approach to diplomacy and had a remit of training *development* diplomats. Directors at both institutes made a concerted effort to both include African scholarship and trainers in the programs, and to offer courses on topics directly relevant to the political and economic context within which African diplomats were seeking to carve out space. The question of how this Pan-African perspective would be provided returns us to the problem of pedagogy. A month before the start of the first academic year in 1972, IRIC director Adamou Ndam Njoya wrote to professors that the institute would follow a seminar system that "should create a climate of collaboration and ongoing consultation" and allow them to emphasize "at the level of

each subject on the aspects and particularities that Africa presents—in order to be able to identify and deepen African issues, a method for their approach, and get out of the generalities that currently preside over African studies.”<sup>25</sup> Echoing Freire’s dialectic movement in which “teaching and learning become knowing and reknowing. The learners gradually know what they did not yet know and the educators re-know what they knew before” (2005: 98), former trainees recalled extensive time for often heated discussions with teachers and among their peers during weekly Friday seminars, where a diversity of political, ideological, and philosophical perspectives facilitated a learner-driven style of pedagogy. IRIC and the Nairobi DTP, in their early years, were thus remembered as spaces of intellectual freedom and genuine progress in advancing African diplomacy. Indeed, the diplomats trained at through these programs went on to play formative roles in multilateral institutions such as the African Union. It thus appears to make a difference where the training took place in terms of undoing some of the relations of tutelage—reflected in regional, national, institutional, and ultimately individual intellectual independence.

### Conclusion

Postcolonial diplomatic training represented an important site for the enactment and embodiment of international society and values. Competing visions of internationalism, shaped by national interests, the uneven process of decolonization, and the context of the Cold War, were reflected in the content and pedagogy of the programs. As the decades of the mid-twentieth century unfolded, diplomatic training programs and their attendant internationalisms slowly shifted from a Eurocentric model to be more centered on an African diplomacy that was asserting itself internationally. Through analyzing course curricula, behind-the-scenes discussions between directors and administrators, and reflections of trainees and trainees of their experiences of programs across the UK, France, Switzerland, Cameroon, and Kenya, we have sought to examine diplomatic training as a site of knowledge production and socialization. In doing so, we have used the lens of tutelage—understood as pedagogical and (geo)political practices where guardianship and instruction are held in tension—to seek to make sense of the messy entanglements of colonialism, diplomacy, and training. By drawing out the relationality and temporalities of tutelage, we suggest that, while not exclusively a practice tied to formal colonialism, it nevertheless brings to the fore historic and contemporary relations and legacies of coloniality in ways that, as Epstein (2017) notes, much literature on socialization does not. We also suggest that the framing of tutelage offers a potential lens for more critical interrogation of contemporary diplomatic education. Although now a global phenomenon on which vast amounts of time and funding are expended annually, diplomatic training has received scant academic attention. Focusing on the tutelage-infused pedagogies of diplomacy has the potential to shine a spotlight on relations of power—paternalistic but also resistance—underpinning diplomatic practice, and offer insights into how diplomacy as a profession is actively (re)constructed and negotiated (Adler-Nissen and Eggeling 2022; Constantinou et al. 2016). Areas of focus might include national diplomatic academies where expectations and experienced of socialization are underpinned by oft-overlooked class, gender, and race dynamics, or summer schools where experienced diplomats offer advice to diplomats from “emerging” states (Wille 2019), or the practices of Western-based consultants like Independent Diplomat that advise would-be states in developing diplomatic strategies and techniques (Ross 2007; Bouris Fernández-Molina 2018).

Approaching tutelage through archival research and interviews also brings into frame the voices and experiences of both trainers and trainees, opening up fruitful

<sup>25</sup>Swiss Federal Archives E2005A#1983/18#177\*: Adamou Ndam Njoya, *Note circulaire à l'attention des professeurs*, p2.

dialogue with critical scholarship on education. While literature on tutelage and trusteeship—focusing both on colonial contexts and contemporary geopolitics—attends primarily to the scale of the polity, in education studies work on tutelage focuses on the individual. By examining postcolonial diplomatic training programs, we are able to bridge these scales. For, just as diplomacy makes and unmakes IR at different scales ([Sending et al. 2015](#)), so the practice of tutelage is intrinsically relational and enables us to consider both international and interpersonal relations, and the dynamics between them. Examining how programs were envisaged, framed, and justified offers insights into tutelage operating through international dependencies proceeding from the European empires and the Cold War, and underpinned by an enduring ideological commitment to foster liberal internationalism. Meanwhile, considering the role of individual diplomats as embodied representatives of the state turns attention to the relations of tutelage between trainer and trainee within the classroom and articulated through paternalist modes of pedagogy. This brings to the fore not only competing expressions of agency but also how programs were justified as solutions to the “problems” of “immature and irresponsible” trainees in need of enlightenment ([Adorno and Becker 1999](#)).

Indeed, we suggest that diplomatic training offers a distinctive take on the coupled practices of problematization and rendering technical ([Ferguson 1994](#); [Li 2007](#)) by foregrounding the intertwining of geopolitical framings and individual expert/novice relationships, and by bringing the politics of pedagogy to the fore ([Ake 1982](#)). In international education policy (and often in its study), overseas training is uncritically expected to operate as a one-way street for values, knowledge, and political influence. However, as with all educational encounters, the reality in each of our examples was much more complex. We have traced various different approaches to (and reactions to) the provision of training, and demonstrated how questions of “how to teach” and “what to teach” are far from apolitical, especially as knowledge and practice are always situated and relational. Read through the lens of postcolonial tutelage, the programs we have discussed indicate that the diplomatic trainees of newly independent states were not mere passive participants in their course, but ready to contest and resist the use of arbitrary power by their trainers. For their part, the trainers appear to grapple with the problem of fostering genuine intellectual and professional independence on the part of their trainees. With a power imbalance underpinning the structural logic of tutelage, this practice thereby offers a useful lens onto the power relations, norms, and ambivalences of trainer/trainee relations, which might be used in wider analyses of international education and development in world politics. It also opens up the possibilities of resistance to include educational settings and programs that are not normally considered to be spaces of international contestation or solidarity, in a world of proliferating international exchange and scholarship programs ([Tournès and Scott-Smith 2018](#)).

Intertwined with individual independence is, of course, the wider context of decolonization. The training programs we have focused on fall in the period between imperial tutelage and the emergence of “new protectorates” ([Mayall and Soares de Oliveira 2011](#)) but, in many ways, epitomize the transitory nature and teleology of tutelage, offering insights into both the anticipation and the limbo of late colonialism. Program directors and trainers assumed that there were essential diplomatic skills to be acquired—including Western diplomatic etiquette—and that the programs were readying trainees for representing their states within a liberal international world order, albeit one where Western states would continue to dominate. However, an important tension emerged: as African diplomats sought diplomatic knowledge and socialization into the international community as a source of empowerment, they also began to change the system ([Getachew 2019](#)), partly as a result of putting into practice what they had been taught, and partly in reaction to it. The lens of tutelage and empirical focus on diplomatic training therefore offer

insights into the potentially disruptive role of pedagogy in negotiating the politics of postcolonial relations.

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