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Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté

Abstract:

Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable strategies, applications commonly use refinements to obtain sharp predictions. In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz [2007] show that no refinement is robust to perturbations of high-order beliefs. We show that robust refinements do exist if we relax the assumption that all players are unlimited in their reasoning ability. In particular, for a class of models, every strict Bayesian-Nash equili...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Publisher's version

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Publisher copy:
10.3982/TE2098

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
Social Sciences Division
Department:
Economics
Oxford college:
Queen's College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Econometric Society Publisher's website
Journal:
Theoretical Economics Journal website
Volume:
13
Issue:
1
Pages:
415–465
Publication date:
2018-01-05
Acceptance date:
2017-03-10
DOI:
EISSN:
1555-7561
ISSN:
1933-6837
Pubs id:
pubs:728175
URN:
uri:ccf3626e-d93f-49ad-b827-7431acdf6292
UUID:
uuid:ccf3626e-d93f-49ad-b827-7431acdf6292
Local pid:
pubs:728175
Paper number:
1

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