Journal article
Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté
- Abstract:
-
Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable strategies, applications commonly use refinements to obtain sharp predictions. In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz [2007] show that no refinement is robust to perturbations of high-order beliefs. We show that robust refinements do exist if we relax the assumption that all players are unlimited in their reasoning ability. In particular, for a class of models, every strict Bayesian-Nash equili...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Econometric Society Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Theoretical Economics Journal website
- Volume:
- 13
- Issue:
- 1
- Pages:
- 415–465
- Publication date:
- 2018-01-01
- Acceptance date:
- 2017-03-10
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1555-7561
- ISSN:
-
1933-6837
- Source identifiers:
-
728175
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:728175
- UUID:
-
uuid:ccf3626e-d93f-49ad-b827-7431acdf6292
- Local pid:
- pubs:728175
- Deposit date:
- 2017-11-21
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Heifetz and Kets
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2018 The Authors. Theoretical Economics. The Econometric Society. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License 4.0.
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