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# A Battlefield of Memory

## The Nakba and the Holocaust as Exclusive Victimhood Narratives




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# Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| ADRID | Association for the Defense of the Rights of the Internally Displaced |
| CMIP | Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace |
| CPJ | Committee to Protect Journalists |
| IDF | Israeli Defense Forces |
| IDP | Internally-Displaced Palestinian |
| JNF | Jewish National Fund |
| MDHH | Memorial Day to the Holocaust and Heroism |
| MEMRI | Middle East Media Research Institute |
| MK | Member of Knesset |
| MOE | Ministry of Education |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| NSC | Nakba and Steadfastness Committee |
| PA | Palestinian Authority |
| PCBS | Palestinian Central Bureau for Statics |
| PCDC | Palestinian Curriculum Development Center |
| PDFLP | Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine |
| PFLP | Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine |
| PLC | Palestinian Legislative Council |
| PLO | Palestinian Liberation Organization |
| PMW | Palestinian Media Watch |
| PNA | Palestinian National Authority |
| POW | Prisoner of War |
| PPP | Palestinian People's Party |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UNRWA | United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East |

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# Thesis Abstract

A Battlefield of Memory
The Nakba and the Holocaust as Exclusive Victimhood Narratives

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Situated in the post-Oslo era, this work constitutes a parallel analysis of the collective transmission of the foundational pasts in Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian society, respectively the Holocaust and the Nakba. Through the application of postmodern criticism to Maurice Halbwachs' unitary understanding of group memory transmission, this thesis exposes the existence and perpetuation of exclusive and ethnocentric victimhood narratives that provide the theoretical foundations for an ensuing minimization of the out-group's past. Divided into three sections, which correspond to the examined realms of memory transmission, a range of qualitative research methods are used to analyze the conveyed narrative across the established realms of collective memory transmission: official state education, commemorative acts and mass mediation. Beyond an analysis of the depiction of the primary history events in the societies' curricula, mass media and commemorative institutes, semi-structured interviews with (former) memory agents and participant observation testify to the interplay between elites' historical conceptions and the transmitted narrative.

While illustrating the universal plasticity of memory construction in coherence with contemporary political and societal needs, this work emphasizes the effects of the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the contemporary contextualization of the primary historical events and the ensuing subversion of the other's past. Much like the original scenes of the watersheds

and the principal actors, this thesis demonstrates that the exclusionary bases of Palestinian and Israeli victimhood narratives differ. The invocation of an exclusive Jewish Holocaust suffering thus is not unique to Israeli society; nevertheless, a consistent framing of a particularistic Zionist Holocaust victimhood narrative in the context of the Middle East conflict has stymied acknowledgement of the Palestinian catastrophe, deemed an inherent challenge to the ongoing redemptive nature of the Israeli state. An exclusive Palestinian victimhood narrative, conversely, has materialized in direct response to the opponent's foundational memory. Rather than solely underlining an understanding of Israeli-Jewish political usage of the Holocaust, this thesis reveals that the retaliatory nature that characterizes the exclusive Palestinian narrative derives from its application as an interpretative framework — an 'ongoing Nakba' — which sheds light on the Palestinians' marginalization and, consequently, demands a screening out of any past suffering of those held responsible.

# A Note on Transliteration

For transliteration of Modern Standard Arabic and Hebrew, this work follows the American Library Association-Library of Congress System[1] with two exceptions: where established English names of people, places and institutions exist, English-language spelling is applied and, secondly, this work uses "tz" rather than "ts" for the Hebrew letter tzadi. For the list of characters for Modern Standard Arabic and Hebrew, see below.

## Arabic

| *Consonants* | *Romanization* | *Consonants* | *Romanization* |
|---|---|---|---|
| ا | omit | ض | ḍ |
| ب | b | ط | ṭ |
| ت | t | ظ | ẓ |
| ث | th | ع | ‘ (ayn) |
| ج | j | غ | gh |
| ح | ḥ | ف | f |
| خ | kh | ق | q |
| د | d | ك | k |
| ذ | dh | ل | l |
| ر | r | م | m |
| ز | z | ن | n |
| س | s | ه ، ة | h |
| ش | sh | و | w |
| ص | ṣ | ي | y |

### *Vowels and Diphthongs*

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ◌َ | a | ◌َا | ā | ◌ِ ى | ī |
| ◌ُ | u | ◌َ ى | á | ◌َ وْ | aw |
| ◌ِ | i | ◌ُ و | ū | ◌َ ىْ | ay |

[1] Randall K. Barry, *ALA-LX Romanization Tables: Transliteration Schemes for Non-Roman Scripts* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, 1991), 4, 52.

## Hebrew

| *Consonants* | *Romanization* | *Consonants* | *Romanization* |
|---|---|---|---|
| א | ’ (alif) or disregarded | ל | l |
| בּ | b | מ (final ם) | m |
| ב | v | נ (final ן) | n |
| ג | g | ס | s |
| ד | d | ע | ‘ (ayn) |
| ה | h | פּ (final ף) | p |
| ו | v (only if a consonant) | פ (final ף) | f |
| וו | v (only if a consonant) | צ (final ץ) | tz |
| ז | z | ק | k |
| ח | ḥ | ר | r |
| ט | ṭ | שׁ | sh |
| י | y (only if a consonant) | שׂ | ś |
| כּ (final ךּ) | k | תּ | t |
| כ (final ך) | kh | ת | t |

| *Vowels* | *Romanization* |
|---|---|
| ַ | a |
| ָ | a or o |
| ֶ | e |
| ֵ | e |
| ִ | i |
| ֹ | o |
| ֻ | u |
| ֱ | e |
| ֲ | ai |
| ֵי | e |
| ִי | i |
| וֹ | o |
| וּ | u |
| ְ | e or disregarded |
| ֲ | a |
| ֱ | e |
| ֳ | o |

A world that can be explained even with bad reason is a familiar world. But, on the other hand, in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land.

– Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*

And, of course, people are interested only in themselves. If a story is not about the hearer he will not listen. And I here make a rule — a great and lasting story is about everyone or it will not last. The strange and the foreign is not interesting — only the deeply personal and familiar.

– John Steinbeck, *East of Eden*

# Introduction: A Battlefield of Memory

"The oversaturation of an age with history," wrote a young German philosopher, "is harmful to the living man."[2] While challenging the 19th century positivist understanding of history inherent in this statement, this thesis exposes the social taming of societies' pasts to become tales of empowerment which demonstrate the justness of today's cause and culminate in a rejection of the opponent's foundational narrative.[3] The pasts inferred here are the Holocaust and the Nakba [Ar. grievous catastrophe][4] which although certainly not identical — one cannot equate mass extermination by an external, third party with mass displacement[5] — have turned into primary formative events among the two groups engaged in an intractable conflict.

## The Holocaust and the Nakba as Foundational Pasts

Scholarly application of (post)memory theory has convincingly demonstrated that both Palestinians and Israeli-Jews are shaped by traumatic events that preceded their birth, leading the Nakba and the Holocaust to respectively become the major component of the contemporary identity of Palestinians and Israeli-Jews despite the (more than) seventy years that have passed

[2] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Nietzsche: Untimely Mediations,* ed. Daniel Breazale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 67, 83.
[3] Robert Rotberg, "Building legitimacy through narrative," in *Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History's Double Helix*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 1.
[4] Throughout this work, the term Holocaust will be adopted to refer to the systematic murder of approximately six million Jews at the hands of the Nazis and their collaborators between 1939 and 1945. Application of the neutral designation 'the 1948 War' will be used in this work to infer the period between the outbreak of the unofficial civil war in November 1947 and the signing of the final armistice agreement with Syria at the close of the official war in July 1949. The Palestinian conception of the war as a catastrophe will be applied when invoking Palestinian collective memory of the war and its aftermath.
[5] A work published by Amos Goldberg and Bashir Bashir in 2015, dedicated to "examining the possibility of a joint engagement with the Holocaust and the Nakba as [the] two traumatic national identities of Palestinians and Jews in Israel and Palestine," fell subject to public scrutiny because it was wrongly deemed to compare both events. Amos Goldberg and Bashir Bashir, *The Holocaust and the Nakba: memory, national identity and Jewish-Arab partnership* (Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and Hakibbutz Hameuchad), 2015, 7 [in Hebrew].

since the events took place.[6] Surveys and studies conducted among the Israeli-Jewish population since the early 1990s consistently show that the early dialectical process of exclusion and appropriation has given way to an entire third generation which, irrespective of family heritage and origin, has had the Holocaust narrative etched into its consciousness. This narrative dictates, as indicated in a 2009 survey, that remembering the Holocaust's particularistic and ethnocentric meaning — emblematic of the slogan *ha-'olam kulo negdenu* [Heb. the entire world is against us][7] — constitutes the most important guiding principle for the adult population, far outweighing the committal to Jewish solidarity and Jewish existence in Israel.[8] Most people in Israel, as a result, do not identify with Yehuda Elkana's universalistic appeal that a Holocaust should "never happen again."[9] Instead, they identify with the Zionist lesson of the Holocaust, which dictates "it should never happen to us again."[10]

Much like the Holocaust in Israeli-Jewish collective memory and, according to some, in response to Israeli memory discourse,[11] the Nakba constitutes a foundational event for the Palestinians.[12] Although Palestinians had various forms of identity before 1948, the Nakba has become "a key narrative"[13] not only for those directly affected, but for subsequent generations as

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[6] Lila Abu-Lughod and Ahmad H. Sa'di, "Introduction: The Claims of Memory," in *Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory,* ed. Lila Abu Lughod and Ahmad H. Sa'di, *Nakba* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 21; Yair Auron, *Israeli Identities: Jews and Arabs Facing the Self and the Other* (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012), 145.
[7] Auron, *Israeli,* xviii.
[8] 98.1 percent of the respondents in 2009 stated that the Holocaust is a guiding principle in their life. Yechiel Klar, Noa Schori-Eyal, Yonat Klar, "The "never again" state of Israel: The emergence of the Holocaust as a core feature of Israeli identity and its four incongruent voices," *Journal of Social Issues* 69 (2013): 126.
[9] Yehuda Elkana, "A Plea For Forgetting," *Haaretz,* March 2, 1988, 13.
[10] Auron, *Israeli,* xviii. Emphasis added.
[11] Adoption of Israeli-Jewish Holocaust mnemonic rituals include the sounding of a siren and the observance of a two-minute silence on Nakba Day.
[12] Gilbert Achcar, Ahmad Sa'di, Lila Abu-Lughod, Meir Litvak and Esther Webman are among the few who have noted symmetries between the role of the Holocaust and the Nakba among Israelis and Palestinians, including similarities in terminology. Thus, as Achcar notes, symmetries between the various terms include: "Shoah/Nakba, displaced person/refugee, Law of Return/Right of Return […]." Gilbert Achcar, *The Arabs and the Holocaust* (New York: Metropolitan, 2010), 23.
[13] Saloul Ihab, *Catastrophe and exile in the modern Palestinian imagination: Telling memories* (New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 3.

well, leading the "loss of Palestine"[14] to become "a shared national identity."[15] Both inside the 1948 borders and in the West Bank — the principal geographical focus areas in this work — the 1948 War left its imprint on the two emerging categories of Palestinians: *Filasṭiniu al-dākhil* [Ar. the internal Palestinians][16] and *Filasṭiniu al-shatāt or al-khārij* [Ar. the Palestinian refugees of the diaspora], as they are known in the national discourse. Inside the 1948 borders, the Haifa Declaration of 2007 issued by the "sons and daughters of the Palestinian Arab people who remained in our homeland despite the Nakba," thus casts the Nakba as a "formative event" which defines "our citizenship and our relationship to the state of Israel [in view of] the setback to our national project."[17] In a similar fashion, the Palestinian Declaration of Independence issued in 1988 by the Palestinian Liberation Organization positions the Nakba as the lens through which to view the Palestinian people's struggle for nationhood, who in spite of "the willed dispossession and expulsion from their ancestral homes […] never faltered and never abandoned its conviction in its rights of Return and independence."[18] As is evident from these documents, the Nakba among these communities represents an "eternal present,"[19] for, as Lila Abu-Lughod and Ahmad Sa'di state, "the past is neither distant nor over [and] exile is neither transitional nor transitory; it is an inherited state."[20]

[14] The Nakba not only represents the loss of "the homeland," but also "the disintegration of society, the frustration of national aspirations, and the beginning of a hasty process of destruction of Palestinian culture." Ahmad H. Sa'di, "Catastrophe, memory and identity: Al-Nakbah as a component of Palestinian identity," *Israel Studies* 7:2 (2002): 175.
[15] Ibid., 177.
[16] According to a survey conducted in 2008, the 1948 War consisted the most formative event for contemporary Palestinian identity inside Israel, with 33 percent of respondents self-identifying with reference to the war. Tamir Sorek, *Palestinian commemoration in Israel: Calendars, monuments and martyrs* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 206, 207.
[17] Mada al-Carmel*, The Haifa Declaration* (Haifa: Mada al-Carmel, 2007), 7, 8, 14.
[18] Yehuda Lukacs, ed., *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A documentary record 1967-1990* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1992), 412.
[19] Sa'di, "Catastrophe," 177.
[20] Abu Lughod and Sa'di, "Introduction," 10, 19.

## Theorizing Collective Memory

While this thesis does not purport to challenge the historical duration of the Nakba, it is evident that its 'presentness', similarly to the Holocaust, is an outcome of intergenerational familial and cultural transmission. In the context of the aforementioned postmemory theory, this 'present continuous' can be related to the adjective 'post' which does not necessarily indicate an "adopt[ion] of [an]other's [memories] as one's own,"[21] but rather, as Ernst van Alphen argues, the transmission of the emotional and personal effects related to the original memories.[22] Crucially, family, even in its most intimate moments, is entrenched in the society that surrounds it, where it is shaped by public structures and shared stories and images that inflect the transmission of familial remembrance. Moreover, while communicative memory is dependent on original exposure to the historical event, cultural or collective memory transmission allows for a conveyance of narratives to individuals based on group membership rather than familial heritage or generational belonging.[23] Indeed, with regard to the group memories at hand, this thesis will demonstrate that the contemporary prominence of the Nakba and the Holocaust, which exists among both the descendants of affected and unaffected families, has relied on what Maurice Halbwachs in his landmark study of 1925 defined as *cadres sociaux*. Halbwachs, evidencing the influence of his teacher, the social theorist Émile Durkheim,[24] argued that group membership —

[21] Marianne Hirsch, "The Generation of Post-Memory," *Poetics Today* 29:1 (2008): 114.
[22] Ernst van Alphen, "Second-generation testimony, transmission of trauma, and postmemory," *Poetics Today* 27:2 (2006): 473-88.
[23] In his book *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis,* Jan Assman differentiates between two kinds of collective memory: communicative memory and cultural memory. Communicative memory is biographical and factual and is located within a generation of contemporaries who witness an event as adults and who can pass on their bodily and affective connection to that event to their descendants. Cultural memory views individuals as part of social groups with shared belief systems that frame memories and shape them into narratives and scenarios. Jan Assmann, *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis* (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1992), 36, 37 [in German].
[24] Émile Durkheim, "The Elementary Forms of Religious Life," in *The Collective Memory Reader*, ed. Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 136.

as a social milieu — provides the materials for memory and prods individuals into recalling certain events, including those that have never been experienced in a direct sense.[25]

The dual role ascribed to individuals, as members of social groups that draw strength from individuals' behavior and, simultaneously, as individuals that constitute social groups, means that, contra Jeffrey Olick, Halbwachs acknowledged the relationship between the individual and the social group.[26] Yet, Halbwachs' apt analysis of a practical construction of group memories in line with contemporary societal needs is underpinned by the less-than-adequate conception of the formation of these memories, as passive materializations of the group's present concerns based on an unambiguous consensus which does not require any active mobilization.[27] Far from a spontaneous retrieval by individual group members, however, recollection of the past is an active, constructive process which is mostly orchestrated from above.[28] Thus, this thesis conceives of collective narratives as those which, while reflecting the social group and affirmed by its members, are actively constructed and imparted on behalf of elite societal institutions.[29] The resulting hegemonic narrative therefore can be deemed a compromise, unifying the political and societal outlook and designs of the elite and the subjective reality of the 'community of memory'.[30] The adoption of this relativist understanding

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[25] Jeffrey Olick, "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures," *Sociological Theory*, 17:3 (1999): 335.
[26] As Halbwachs stated: "One may say that the individual remembers by placing himself in the perspective of the group, but one may also affirm that the memory of the group realizes and manifests itself in individual memories." Maurice Halbwachs, "The Collective Memory," in *The Collective Memory Reader*, ed. Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 139-142; Olick, "Collective," 342.
[27] Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992), 40.
[28] Barry Schwartz, "The social context of communication: a study in collective memory," *Social Forces* 61:2 (1982): 374.
[29] Daniel Bar-Tal and Gavriel Salomon, "Israeli-Jewish Narratives of the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict: Evolvement, Contents, Functions and Consequences," in *Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History's Double Helix*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 19, 20.
[30] Julie Ne'eman Arad, "The Shoah as Israel's Political Trope," in *Divergent Jewish Cultures: Israel and America*, ed. Deborah Dash Moore and S. Ilan Troen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 193.

allows this work to address postmodern criticism of the Durkheimian approach which attributes one collective memory or set of memories to an entire schismless society.

The incorporation of postmodern individualist theory requires an important revision of the unitary Durkheimian approach, namely the transformation of Halbwachs' schema to schemata as a means of indicating an individual's simultaneous belonging to numerous societal groups. Moreover, the pluralist conception of collective memory allows for the coexistence of alternative memories and, of most relevance to this thesis, rival memories among a social group bound in a cultural schema.[31] The materialization of the former in this work is evidenced with reference to diverging in-group narratives. In the case study on Israeli-Jewish collective memory, deviant narratives can be found among individual Israeli-Jews who seek to challenge the normative Israeli usage of the Holocaust and, as Elkana put it, "eradicate the domination of this historical memory over our life."[32] Rather than amending the collective memory of the in-group, rival memories in existence among Palestinians living within the 1948 borders and Israeli-Jews – – constituting a social group defined based on geographical perimeters, citizenship and, to a large extent, the Hebrew language — challenge the very historical foundations of the other's collective memory; thereby indicating that an ethnic in-group alliance defines the community of Nakba and Holocaust memory.

## Silencing the Other's Past

Collective memory, as indicated above, is by definition subjective, as historical narratives in the service of the collective must facilitate the crystallization of a common consciousness through

[31] Peter Burke, "History as social memory," in *The Collective Memory Reader*, ed. Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Daniel Levy (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 191.
[32] Elkana, "Plea."

the creation of an orderly metanarrative of the past constructed in the service of the present.[33] It follows that mnemonic narratives need not reflect the historical truth, and instead they favor a narrative that is functional for a group's existence.[34] This thesis, as a result, is not so much concerned with the historical particularities of the Holocaust and the 1948 War and, rather, is principally interested in the memories of these events and their endurance to this day. Part and parcel of selecting functional collective narratives worth remembering is its antithetical process, because, as Ernest Renan contended, "forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation."[35] By emphasizing the plasticity of memory construction, Renan, of course, alluded to cultural demarcation practices within national groups in Europe; yet, in conflicts 'social silencing' does not only denote forgoing incompatible in-group memories, but also the opponent's master narrative(s).[36] Typically, the delegitimization and dehumanization of the out-group center on the simultaneous de-emphasis and erasure of the other's suffering to justify the in-group's own moral standing and provide a coping mechanism in a situation of interminable strife.[37] As in other national conflicts, in which the opposing sides are members of different ethnic groups, the psychological dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict manifests in a subversion of the other's narrative of suffering and a lack of recognition of the most fundamental traumas framing the conflict.[38]

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[33] Adil Manna and Moti Golani, *Two Sides of the Coin: Independence and Nakba 1948* (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2011), 5.
[34] Rotberg, "Building," 4.
[35] Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation," in *The Collective Memory Reader*, ed. Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi and Daniel Levy (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 80.
[36] Efrat Ben-Ze'ev, "Social Silence: Transference, De-sensitization and de-focusing among Israeli Students," in *Zoom In: Palestinian Refugees of 1948, Remembrances*, ed. Sami Adwan et al. (Dordrecht: Institute of Historical Justice and Reconciliation and Republic of Letters Publishers, 2011), 165-175,
[37] Bar-Tal and Salomon, "Israeli-Jewish," 24.
[38] Sagy, Kaplan and Adwan, "Interpretations," 27.

In addition to polls conducted among Palestinians living inside the 1948 borders and Israeli-Jews on attitudes towards the other's foundational trauma, reconciliatory attempts by individual civilians on both sides and the ensuing societal responses shed light on the materialization of mnemonic delegitimization efforts. In May 2009, Sammy Smooha published his index of Jewish-Palestinian relations which found that, despite public exposure to the Holocaust, 40.5 percent of Palestinian citizens in Israel claimed that the Holocaust never occurred, a 12.5 percentile rise from Smooha's 2006 polling.[39] Attempts to expose Palestinians to the Holocaust have largely been met with rejection,[40] as evidenced in the reactions to Khalid Mahameed's homemade Holocaust museum. Founded in 2005 in his law office in Nazareth, Mahameed sought to "help Palestinians understand the source of Israeli behavior" which, according to the lawyer, "is grounded on a Holocaust victimhood memory." Mahameed's personal initiative, however, fell on deaf ears, as, in his own words, the Palestinian community engaged in "a total boycott" of his exhibition.[41] In a similar fashion, an educational trip organized to Auschwitz in 2014 by a former professor of Al-Quds University, Mohammed Dajani, resulted in a public dismissal of his "normalization efforts." As part of a history program, Dajani took 28 students from East Jerusalem and the West Bank to Auschwitz in order to "challenge the denial of the Holocaust which is both historically and morally wrong and, through a failure to understand the other's psychic, impedes the peace process."[42] While implicit threats

[39] According to Smooha, Holocaust denial cuts across sectors within the Palestinian population and is espoused by 37.1 percent of those with high-school education and 56.4 percent of Negev Bedouin. Smooha's research question regarding the Holocaust reads as follows: "I believe that there was a Holocaust in which the Nazis murdered millions of Jews." Possible responses included: disagree; inclined to disagree; inclined to agree; agree. 40.5 percent of the respondents disagreed or were inclined to disagree. Auron, *Israeli*, 139.
[40] Not all exposure attempts are met with rejection. See, for instance, a 1997 *Maariv* article for a discussion of workshops for Palestinian students and teachers at Kibbutz Lohamei Hagetaot. Karni Am-Ad, "Saour and Ibrahim," *Maariv*, May 5, 1997, (page number unknown).
[41] Interview conducted with Khalid Mahameed on August 3, 2016.
[42] Interview conducted with Mohammed Dajani on March 17, 2016.

had been conveyed to Dajani and the participants prior to the trip which sought to prevent its occurrence, upon the return from Poland, Dajani came under particular scrutiny from the Palestinian Authority and the university's faculty who demanded his resignation. The accusation levelled at him was treason and "selling out to the Jews" as he and his students had chosen to study the Holocaust rather than the Palestinian tragedy: the Nakba.[43]

Left-wing Israeli organizations dedicated to exposing their fellow citizens to the Nakba find themselves accused of the same perfidious conduct. Zochrot [Heb. remembering], an Israeli NGO established in 2002 amidst the ongoing turmoil of the Second Intifada to raise awareness of the Nakba among the broad Israeli-Jewish public, has been accused of conducting "anti-Israeli" and "traitorous activities" equal to "commemorating [the] pain of Nazi casualties."[44] Objections to the dissemination of the Palestinian narrative have not remained confined to the public (media) sphere; rather, as will be discussed in chapter one and three of this thesis, appointed officials have attempted to thwart the Nakba's invocation among Israeli-Jews and Palestinians living inside Israel. In 2001, the Minister of Education, Limor Livnat, declared that she was considering awarding extra funding to "Arab schools" that were considered "loyal to the state." One of the ways in which schools could exhibit disloyalty, according to Livnat, was by commemorating Nakba Day.[45] In the same year, the newly appointed Minister of National Infrastructure, Avigdor Lieberman, instructed the ministry's functionaries to avoid any contact

[43] William Booth, "Palestinian university students' trip to Auschwitz causes uproar," *The Washington Post,* April 12, 2014, accessed March 10, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/palestinian-university-students-trip-to-auschwitz-causes-uproar/2014/04/12/c162ba42-c27d-11e3-9ee7-02c1e10a03f0_story.html?hpid=z5.
[44] Jo Roberts, *Contested Land, Contested Memory: Israel's Jews and Arabs and the Ghosts of Catastrophe* (Toronto, Ontario: Dundurn Press, 2013), 227. Also see: Itamar Inbari, "The Palestinian Nakba is coming to the streets of Israel," *NRG/Maariv,* May 14, 2007, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/581/574.html; Eitan Bronstein, "Im Tirtzu targets Zochrot for promoting the return of Palestinian refugees," *Zochrot*, accessed September 6, 2017, http://zochrot.org/en/article/53843
[45] Tamar Trabelsi, "Livnat to Arab schools: Give loyalty - Get money," *Ynet/Yedioth Ahronot,* August 19, 2001, accessed August 22, 2017, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-1029929,00.html.

with public figures who participated in Nakba commemorations. Lieberman justified his decision by a need to "punish public figures who turn Independence Day into a day of Holocaust."[46] Although there is no evidence that either policy was officially implemented, these statements provided fertile ground for the most extreme materialization of a mnemonic determent: the 2011 Nakba Law. With the introduction of this law, which constituted the culmination of a ten-year legal struggle to prevent Nakba commemoration, it became illegal for state-sponsored groups in Israel to engage in the promotion and commemoration of the Palestinian Nakba. In defense of his party's bill (Yisrael Beiteinu) [Heb. Israel our home], Knesset Member David Rotem claimed that the law[47] was necessary because, as he stated, "When we are at war against a harsh enemy, we will legislate laws that will prevent him from hurting us."[48] It is wholly unsurprising that official societal marginalization of the Nakba has led to a situation in which, in spite of the emergence of revisionist historiography, 40.8 percent of Israelis continue to uphold the traditional Zionist account of the 1948 War which dictates that "the Palestinians fled willingly because of fear and pressure from Arab leaders," and 30 percent express resentment when faced with the Palestinian narrative of the same events.[49]

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[46] Analogies between Nakba commemoration and Nazism also were made in 2012, when Education Minister Gideon Saar and Knesset Member Alex Miller sought to prevent a Nakba assembly from being held at Tel Aviv University, because, as the latter proclaimed, "today there is 'Yizkor' for Nakba casualties and tomorrow there will be 'Yizkor' for Nazi soldiers." Sorek, *Palestinian,* 156, 157.

[47] According to the amended law, the Minister of Finance is authorized to halt funding for organizations that support the commemoration the Nakba. Officially termed the Budget Foundations Law, it is more commonly known as the Nakba Law. Israeli state-funded organizations found guilty of violating the Nakba Bill can be fined up to three times the sponsorship they previously received, with further penalties imposed for consistent breaches. Brendan Ciaran Browne, "Transitional Justice and the case of Palestine," in *Research Handbook on Transitional Justice*, ed. Cheryl Lawther, Luke Moffett and Dov Jacobs (Cheltenham; Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 503.

[48] Ilan Peleg and Dov Waxman, *Israel's Palestinians: The Conflict Within* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 128.

[49] Rafi Nets-Zehngut and Daniel Bar-Tal, *The Israeli-Jewish Collective Memory of the Israeli-Arab/ Palestinian Conflict*, (Rep. N.p.: International Peace Research Association, 2008), 222; Shibley Telhami, *The World Through Arab Eyes: Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East* (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 63.

## Victimhood Narratives and their Exclusionary Manifestations

The subversion of the other's foundational narrative, while sustained and reinforced by the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is premised on the existence of exclusive victimhood identities. The exclusionary bases of Palestinian and Israeli victimhood narratives, much like the original scenes of the watersheds and the principal actors, differ. Thus, in the case of the Israeli-Jewish narrative, the invocation of an exclusive Jewish victimhood is not unique to Israeli society; instead, as Jean-Michel Chaumont pointed out, "the absolute singularity of the Shoah" has been proclaimed by Jews and non-Jews alike to be "incomparable and incommensurable to every other event, both past, present and future."[50] Consequently, the supremacy of Jewish victimhood in the Holocaust and the ensuing minimization of other's suffering does not only materialize in relation to historical events affecting the contemporary opponent, but also, as will be evidenced in chapter one and four, with regard to other groups affected by Nazi racial and genocidal policies.

Chaumont's claim that a "concurrence des victimes" is founded on the banalization of other's suffering as, in the case of the Palestinians, "[merely] the victims of the greatest act of horror," to a certain degree elucidates the materialization of an exclusive Palestinian victimhood.[51] Part and parcel of the basis for this exclusionary narrative is what Azmi Bishara termed "the Zionist instrumentalization [and appropriation] of the Holocaust,"[52] creating the notion of a 'package deal' whereby "accepting the Jewish Holocaust mean[s] accepting Israel's

[50] Jean-Michel Chaumont, *La concurrence des victimes: Génocide, identité, reconnaissance* (La Découverte: Paris, 2010), 1, 2 [in French].
[51] Meir Litvak and Esther Webman, "Perceptions of the Holocaust in Palestinian Public Discourse," *Israel Studies* 8:3 (2003): 131.
[52] Azmi Bishara, "The Arabs and the Holocaust. The Analysis of a Problematic Conjunctive Letter," *Zmanim* 53 (1995): 54 [in Hebrew]

right to be a colonial-settler state."[53] Yet, rather than solely emphasizing an understanding of Israeli-Jewish usage and conceptions of the Holocaust as the foundation for an exclusive Palestinian victimhood, this thesis will argue that the existence of a Palestinian exclusionary narrative primarily derives from the group's perceived ongoing marginalization at the hands of the Israelis, leading to a "screen[ing] out [of] the suffering of [the] enemy."[54] In other words, the minimization of Israeli-Jewish victimhood as a result of the persistent conflict informs the creation of an exclusive Nakba victimhood rather than vice versa, because, as the Palestinian journalist Jamil Hamad noted, "When the Palestinians talk about the Holocaust, they can't take the Holocaust as an isolated issue and talk about it — it's impossible. They have to link it [to] the political developments and military developments […] in Palestine."[55]

Conversely, it is the primary conception of an exclusive Jewish victimhood that dictates an ensuing subversion of the Palestinian narrative, further demonstrated in several socio-psychological studies executed among the Israeli-Jewish population. Studies conducted by Alon Lazar and Tal Litvak Hirsch (2009) and Johanna Ray Vollhardt (2013) evidence that hostile attitudes towards Palestinians and, through an inhibition of empathy, a disregard of their suffering derive from a Zionist understanding of the Holocaust. This Zionist understanding of the Holocaust is characterized by two dialectical themes.[56] Within this narrative, a unique Jewish victimhood status based on the perception of the diaspora as an inherently hostile environment for Jews coexists with a defensive in-group narrative which demands "never to be a victim

[53] Joseph Massad, "Palestinians and Jewish History: Recognition or Submission?," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30 (2000): 53.
[54] David K. Shipler, *Arab and Jew: wounded spirits in a promised land* (London: Bloomsbury, 1989), 343.
[55] Cited in ibid., 344.
[56] Johanna Ray Vollhardt, "'Crime against humanity' or 'crime against Jews'? Acknowledgment in construals of the Holocaust and its importance for intergroup relations," *Journal of Social Issues* 69:1 (2013): 144-161; Alon Lazar and Tal Litvak Hirsch, "Cultural Trauma as a Potential Symbolic Boundary," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society IJPS* 22:2 (2009): 183-190.

again."[57] The existence of these victimhoods elucidates the repudiation of the Palestinian narrative. In their 2008 work, Julia Chaitin and Shoshana Steinberg thus asserted that the transgenerational experience of being a (unique) victim stymies connecting to "the suffering of others, especially if those others continue to be defined as 'the enemy'."[58]

Consistent framing of the violent confrontations in the Middle East in the context of the European watershed means that any self-acknowledgement as a victimizer is impeded by the perseverance and invocation of the radically incompatible Zionist Holocaust victimhood narrative. Accordingly, the 1948 War and its outcome are viewed as pure and untainted and an act of historical justice that changed the historical course of the Jewish people.[59] Through past and present invocation of the Holocaust and its implications for Israeli-Jewish self-understanding, this thesis also sheds light on the perceived threat of another Holocaust, this time at the hands of their neighbors. In his memoir, entitled 'A Tale of Love and Darkness', Amos Oz identified the potential sociological effects of viewing today's Palestinians as "Nazis in disguise" by noting that: "When we look at them, we do not see fellow victims either; we see not brothers in adversity but pogrom-making Cossacks, bloodthirsty anti-Semites […] as though our European persecutors have reappeared here in the Land of Israel, put keffiyehs on their heads, and grown moustaches, but they are still our old murderers."[60]

While the persistence of Israeli and Palestinian exclusionary narratives provides a solid explanatory cognitive schema in interminable conflict, the "battle of memories," as the acclaimed Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish termed it,[61] also actively contributes to the

[57] Klar, Schori-Eyal, Klar, "Never," 139.
[58] Julia Chaitin and Shoshana Steinberg, "You should know better: Expressions of empathy and disregard among victims of massive social trauma," *Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment, and Trauma* 17:2 (2008): 197–226.
[59] Manna and Golani, *Two*, 14.
[60] Amos Oz, *A Tale of Love and Darkness* (London: Vintage Books, 2005), 330.
[61] Gil Hochberg, *In spite of partition: Jews, Arabs, and the limits of separatist imagination* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) 119.

conflict's continuation. The reciprocal relationship between collective narratives and intractable conflicts means that group members, inculcated by their own in-group narrative, anticipate the worst from the adversary and react accordingly, leading to a prolonging of the actual conflict.[62] As a result, although certainly not the only condition for reconciliation, changes in the collective narratives are a necessary precondition to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; one part of this process is learning about the rival group's collective narrative.[63] The required "unequivocal acknowledgment of the suffering of the Jews and recognition of the suffering of the Palestinians on the part of the Israelis,"[64] importantly, does not necessitate a utopian-style adoption of the other's narrative by the in-group, but rather acknowledging the validity of the other's narrative as a legitimate position not to be rejected solely based on its belonging to the out-group. Crucially, the propagation of Israeli and Palestinian collective narratives "free of ethnocentrism,"[65] which would allow for exposure to the other's narrative, depends on changes in the in-group's narrative; consequently, a thorough comprehension of its perseverance. Though previous scholarship has convincingly identified exclusive victimhood identities[66] among Palestinians and Israeli-Jews as a root cause for the ensuing 'battle of memories' or 'battle of victimhoods',[67] a solid understanding of the inter- and transgenerational conveyance of these

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[62] Rotberg, "Building," 5.
[63] Bar-Tal and Salomon, "Israeli-Jewish," 31, 40.
[64] Litvak and Webman, *From,*17. For similar appeals see: Achcar, *Arabs,* 275, 279; Edward W. Said, "Invention, Memory, and Place," *Critical Inquiry* 26 (2000): 183; Ilan Pappé, "Fear, Victimhood, Self and Other: On the Road to Reconciliation," in *Across the Wall: Narratives of Israeli-Palestinian History*, ed. Ilan Pappé and Jamil Hilal (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 167; Yair Auron, "Letter to a Palestinian Reader: Holocaust, Resurrection and Nakba," *Haaretz,* May 8, 2014, accessed October 15, 2015, http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.589454.
[65] Litvak and Webman, "Perceptions," 133.
[66] See: Shipler, *Arab;* Massad, "Palestinians," 52-67; Edna Shoham, Neomi Shiloah and Raya Kalisman, "Arab teachers and Holocaust education: Arab teachers study Holocaust education in Israel," *Teaching and Teacher Education* 19:6 (2003): 609-625; Ilan Pappé, *The ethnic cleansing of Palestine* (Oneworld Publications, 2006); Ronit Lentin, Co-*memory and Melancholia: Israelis memorialising the Palestinian Nakba* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010).
[67] For works invoking this battle of memory, see: Hochberg, *In*, 119; Edward Said, *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After* (London: Granta, 2000); Said, "Invention," 175-192; Ilan Gur-Ze'ev, *Destroying the Other's Collective Memory* (New York: Peter Lang, 2003); Litvak and Webman, *From,* Achcar, *Arabs,* Ilan Pappé and Jamil

exclusionary narratives, to date, is lacking. By conducting a parallel analysis of the collective transmission of these exclusive narratives, this thesis therefore addresses a scholarly void while safeguarding against any claims of comparisons between the historical events themselves.

## Research Structure and Methodology

Attempts to institutionalize group narratives are characterized by two important features, which in this work inform the examined collective societal realms. A successful institutionalization process — meaning that the beliefs of the narrative are widely held by society members who acquire and store this repertoire as part of their socialization from an early age — depends on a wide societal application and expression in cultural products and the narrative's appearance in educational materials.[68] The former, which can include exposure to and, of particular importance, active engagement in media products and commemoration activities governs the parallel examination of collective mnemonic activities and mass mediation dedicated to the Nakba and the Holocaust in, respectively, section two and three of this work. Educational socialization efforts, a significant element of narrative institutionalization due to the narrative's dissemination to a society's younger generation, the perceived authority of textbooks and compulsory school attendance, will constitute the first examined collective realm of exclusive Nakba and Holocaust transmission.

In addition to presenting archival source material and participant observation, the three case studies include semi-structured interviews with representatives of the realm under examination which shed light on the societal relevance of the transmitted narrative. Crucially, individuals' candid participation in this study should not be equated to a (passive) sanctioning of

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Hilal, ed., *Across the Wall. Narratives of Israeli-Palestinian History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010); Yair Auron, *The Holocaust, the Resurrection and the Nakba* (Madar Press: Ramallah, 2013).

[68] Adopted from Bar-Tal and Salomon, "Israeli-Jewish," 33, 34.

victimhood narratives and their exclusionary manifestations. Thus, memory agents involved in the creation of collective mnemonics do not necessarily seek the emergence of an ensuing marginalization of the out-group's foundational narrative. Nevertheless, part and parcel of this thesis is to reveal, in Foucauldian terms, the framework of hidden mechanisms that shape the emergence of exclusive victimhoods and, consequently, the actions and outlooks of those influenced by these narratives. Moreover, interviews conducted with memory agents testify to the contemporary dominance of the second-generation — as the custodians of the first generation — in vertical (transgenerational) and, to a lesser extent, intergenerational (horizontal) memory transmission.[69]

The analyses of the three identified societal realms will be divided into an equal amount of sections, each dedicated to charting the collected data on the societal realm under examination. While each of the three above-mentioned sections testifies to the development and maintenance of exclusionary collective narratives mirroring contemporary societal concerns, diverse realm-specific literature and its theoretical applicability to the ensuing case studies will be discussed in extensive introductions preceding the individual sections. In addition to outlining the chapters' content, an overview of the consulted sources and any research limitations deriving from limited source availability or research concentration are also embedded within the section-specific introductions. The parallel nature of this research will be illustrated through the dual division of each section into separate chapters on, alternately, Israeli-Jewish society and

[69] Since the early 2000s, memory scholars have paid attention to this horizontal characteristic of collective memory. For example, Lila Abu-Lughod and Ahmed Sa'di's 2007 work argued that individuals' memories adjust to each other, what Lilliane Hammer (2005) termed the 'canonization' of stories. A similar argument was made by Eva Hoffman in 2004. Hoffman draws a line between "the postgeneration as a whole and the literal second generation in particular" and argues that while intergenerational vertical identification of a child and a parent occurs within the family, intergenerational horizontal identification makes the child's position more broadly available to other contemporaries in society. Abu-Lughod and Sa'di, "Introduction," 7; Eva Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge: Memory, History, and the Legacy of the Holocaust* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 187.

Palestinian society and the transmission of the respective group narrative. Section two of this work, conversely, will offer a diverging sequence through commencing with a chapter on the usage of mnemonics in Palestinian society in order to avoid the semblance of an imposed hierarchy on the case studies. The six chapters of this thesis serve to answer the main research question: *How does collective transmission of the Nakba and the Holocaust propagate exclusive victimhood narratives in the post-Oslo era?* In the process of explicating the emergence and perpetuation of exclusionary narratives, additional sub-questions will be subject to examination, including: *To what extent does societal transmission of these foundational events mirror a heightening in conflict-related tension?* and, relatedly, *Does the exclusionary marginalization of the out-group's victimhood narrative coincide with a political deterioration in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process?*.

As indicated in the formulation of the main research questions, this thesis is accompanied by research limitations which have principally been dictated by temporal and geographical constraints, which resulted from restrictions on travel to the Gaza Strip and limited availability of Palestinian sources pre-1994 of relevance to this specific work. Following Hamas' armed takeover of Gaza in June 2007 and Israel's subsequent isolation of the strip, passage into (and out of) Gaza through the main Erez crossing has been sharply limited and requires obtaining an entry permit from the Israeli authorities, an intricate and lengthy bureaucratic procedure.[70] In view of these restrictions on personal travel, the geographical focus within the Palestinian case studies lies on the territories occupied in 1967 (East Jerusalem and the West Bank) and the Palestinian community inside the 1948 border. Yet, rather than amalgamating these areas into one uniform study, this work differentiates between the respective Palestinian communities through revealing

[70] Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2008: Events of 2007* (Human Rights Watch, 2008), 484.

the particularities of Nakba discourse as a reflection of the community's historic mnemonic traditions and, of particular relevance, the community's past and present political interaction with the Israeli state. Consequently, while not challenging the existence of a uniform Palestinian perception of the Nakba as a foundational event, this study does distinguish between the communities' instrumentalization of the event, highlighting the varying societal and political circumstances and aspirations since 1948.

Changes in the political organization in the Palestinian communities and the consequential exposure to authoritative collective narratives equally inform this work's temporal focus on the post-Oslo period which, in this thesis, designates the twenty-two years between 4 May 1994 and 15 May 2016. The latter date constitutes the 68th anniversary of the Nakba and the 18th annual staging of the 'March of Return', described at length based on participant observation in chapter three, while the former date represents the signing of the 1994 Cairo Agreement, officially called the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. The 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement, a follow-up treaty to the Oslo I Accord, facilitated, for the first time, the establishment of a Palestinian Ministry of Education and, through the right of administrative self-government, an independent Palestinian media in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, free from Israeli (military) censorship. Furthermore, the Oslo Accords had a profound effect on mnemonic practices, this time not resulting from the (interim) state-building process, but as a consequence of what the Syrian poet Nizar Qabbani in 1995 referred to as: "[stealing] from us the memory of the orange trees [and leaving] a sardine can called Gaza and a dry bone called Jericho."[71] The "capitulation of Oslo" invoked in Qabbani's poem,[72] meaning the PA's postponement of the

[71] Cited in Meron Benvenisti, *Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land Since 1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) 267.
[72] Ibid., 267.

refugee issue to final status negotiations,[73] not only influenced Nakba mnemonics within the 1967 areas, but also, as this thesis will demonstrate, inside Israel under the organized leadership of *al-muhajjarīn fī al-dākhil* [Ar. the refugees inside (the 1948 borders)].

The Oslo Peace Accords, conversely, did not impact domestic governance in Israel and the three collective mnemonic spheres under review — the realms of Israeli state education, official state(-like) commemoration and mass media — have existed since the establishment of the state. Therefore, while safeguarding the parallel nature of this work, original and secondary research material beyond the confined periodization is presented in order to establish a necessary historical framework and, with reference to the time period under examination, to illustrate the perpetuation and/or modification of mnemonic trends. The final section of this work thus evidences a materialization of a Holocaust ritual in Israeli mass media on *Yom ha-Shoah* [Heb. Holocaust Memorial Day] since the mid-90s, characterized by traditional Holocaust symbolism and prescriptive commemorative reminders.

As mentioned above, extensive section introductions, in addition to outlining realm-specific secondary literature applicable to the case studies, shed light on the theoretical framework and primary research sources examined in the section's two chapters. Section one, entitled 'The Textbook of Memory', concentrates on the exclusive educational transmission of the Nakba and the Holocaust through an analysis of history and, in chapter two, Palestinian national education textbooks published between 1994 and 2014. The simultaneous incorporation of modern European and Middle East history in textbooks means that both chapters not only include an analysis of the transmission of their own foundational narratives, but also, in contrast to subsequent sections, a comprehensive examination of the presentation — or indeed lack of —

[73] These were to begin no later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period. Ghassan Khatib, *Palestinian Politics and the Middle East Peace Process* (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 95.

the other's foundational history. Interviews conducted with education officials, including former ministers of education, and a review of educational policies and historiographical and political developments in the time period under examination are used to contextualize the textbooks' content.

Section two, bearing the title 'The Landscape of Memory', similarly to section one, emphasizes the vertical transmission of exclusionary victimhoods through its emphasis on (semi-)official mnemonic practices. Differentiating between physical and non-physical mnemonics, this section offers an examination of abstract mnemonic acts, namely the annual observation of official memorial days, and non-abstract year-round visits to dedicated memory sites, which include mnemonic institutions and, in the Palestinian case study, collective return visits to former Palestinian localities. This section's distinction between abstract and non-abstract mnemonic practices is a testimony to the physical disparity that has arisen due to the difference in governance within the two communities under review. For the Palestinian community inside the 1948 borders, the minority's inability to construct a Nakba memory site has transformed the historical act of familial visitations to destroyed localities into a collective mnemonic ritual, which, through the perception of a contemporary manifestation of an ongoing Nakba, aims to confront Israeli palimpsest practices — what Sari Hanafi terms 'spaciocide'[74] — and expose the political and cultural marginalization by the hegemony.

Finally, section three, entitled 'Scoop on the Past', constitutes an in-depth examination of anniversary journalism. Through offering an overview of annual media output dedicated to the commemoration of the Holocaust and the Nakba in the largest Israeli and Palestinian media outlets, the two chapters incorporated in this section reveal how both societies have shaped their

[74] Sari Hanafi, "Spacio-cide: colonial politics, invisibility and rezoning in Palestinian territory," *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 2:1 (2009): 106-121.

worldview over the last two decades. Indeed, mass media's reflection of readers' interests — and by extension society's pulse — provides insight into the analogical instrumentalization of the Nakba and the Holocaust, whereby the invocation of the past contextualizes the present and forms a yardstick in the interpretation of present-day concerns. The interpretation of mass media as a reflection of society's ideological framing also testifies to the complexity of 'agenda-setting', as producer and consumer can, at times, be one. Media professionals' conveyance of received mnemonic narratives to their readers, particularly among the second and third generation, thus demonstrates that it is not solely media consumers who are exposed to a horizontal and vertical mediated transmission, but equally the very agents behind the news.

## Section One: The Textbook of Memory

Following the 1993 Declaration of Principles which maintained that Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) should seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and, accordingly, abstain from incitement, a series of studies was conducted to examine the Palestinian and Israeli education system.[75] On both sides, the Israeli curriculum and, following its inception in 1994, the Palestinian curriculum were deemed lacking. The curricula were criticized for their lack of recognition of the other, preservation of a culture of hatred and the creation of historical narratives that overlook and exclude the other's perspective.[76] While the espoused critique at times was premature, unwarranted and politically-motivated, section one of this thesis reveals the existence of incompatible narratives in Israeli and Palestinian history textbooks based on a negation or minimization of the other's seminal history.

In addition to examining the presentation of the other's historical narrative in the Israeli and Palestinian curricula, the following two chapters' principal focus lies on the exclusive and ethnocentric presentation of both societies' own history. Through the analyses of the presentation of the in-group's own history and (the existence of) the out-group's historical narrative, part one of this study seeks to identify the ways in which schooling contributes to and justifies the above-mentioned conflict narratives and illuminates what Riad Nasser in Foucauldian terms referred to as: "the mechanisms that stay hidden from those socialized and indoctrinated by it."[77] The

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[75] Ayman K. Agbaria, "On Enmity and Acceptance: The Case of the Israeli and Palestinian Civic Education," *Al-Majmuah* 2 (2010): 4, 6.

[76] For studies which have become subject to academic scrutiny based on perceived political agendas, see: Arnon Groiss, "De-legitimization of Israel in Palestinian Authority schoolbooks," *Israel Affairs* 18 (2012): 455-484; Arnon Groiss, *Jews, Israel and Peace in Palestinian School Textbooks: A Survey of the Textbooks Published by the Palestinian National Authority in the years 2000-2001* (CMIP, 2001); Nurit Peled-Elhanan, "Legitimation of massacres in Israeli school history books," *Discourse & Society* 21 (2010): 377–404.

[77] Riad M. Nasser, *Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel: The Necessary other in Making a Nation* (New York; London: Routledge, 2005), 44; Michel Foucault, *Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison* (London: Allan Lane, 1977), 100.

chapters' dual analyses demonstrate that while the theoretical foundations for denial of the other's victimhood can be found in the presentation of the group's own victimhood, its manifestation occurs in the narrative exclusion or minimization of the other's history.

## The Post-Oslo Palestinian and Israeli Educational Systems

It is important to note that the ensuing chapters do not provide a complete overview of the Palestinian and Israeli educational systems — both past and present — due to the existence of numerous educational sectors. The Israeli education system is divided into four sectors which are subject to the authority of the Ministry of Education: a general state system, a religious state system, state schools for Israeli-Palestinian and Druze students — the so-called 'Arab sector'— and independent state-funded schools of agricultural communities. In addition to these sectors, which all have separate curricula, ultra-orthodox schools and, to some degree, private schools and Christian institutions have autonomous statuses and, consequently, they do not fall within the state educational framework.[78] As an analysis of the educational content of all the sectors would be too vast for the purposes of this thesis, the focus will lie on state education, which forms the largest of all the sectors and accounts for approximately 56 percent of all Israeli pupils.[79]

While the Palestinian educational system since 1994 has become more centralized in East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, diverging school systems do exist.[80] In the Gaza

[78] Sami Adwan and Ruth Firer, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in History and Civics Textbooks of Both Nations* (Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 2004), 22, 23.
[79] In the 2011/12 school year, around 56 percent of the pupils in the Hebrew education system attended state schools, about 19 percent attended state-religious schools, and some 25 percent were enrolled in ultra-Orthodox schools. "Facts and Figures in the Education System," State of Israel: Ministry of Education, accessed November 15, 2016, http://meyda.education.gov.il/files/minhalcalcala/facts.pdf.
[80] While the Palestinian Ministry of Education claims that it has had full control over the curriculum in East-Jerusalem since 1994, analyses of the East-Jerusalem educational system have found a diverging system with authority in many schools remaining with the Israelis. See: Samira Alayan, "History Curricula and Textbooks in Palestine: Between Nation Building and Quality Education," in *The Politics of Education Reform in the Middle*

Strip and the West Bank, for instance, UNRWA schools are responsible for the education of about 22 percent of the Palestinian refugee population. Both public (governmental) and private schools can be found in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Jerusalem and respectively account for 71 percent and 7 percent of Palestinian pupils. The same textbooks are used in the three types of schools, with only slight differences.[81] Unlike the examination in the other two societal realms, Palestinian society within the 1948 borders will not constitute a primary focus in this chapter. Education of Palestinian pupils living within the 1948 borders is included in the above-mentioned 'Arab sector' and is controlled by the Israeli Ministry of Education. While references will be made to the content of Arabic textbooks used in this sector, this educational framework is not a solid representation of Palestinian society inside the 1948 borders due to a lack of Palestinian influence over the development of educational materials and discriminatory Israeli educational policies, which include insufficient teacher training and a lack of financial resources to replace outdated infrastructure and tackle high student drop-out rates.[82] As a result, Ismael Abu-Saad, a Palestinian professor of education at Ben-Gurion University, argues that despite attempts by Palestinian educators to create a more inclusive curriculum, the curriculum is designed to "'de-educate', or dispossess, indigenous Palestinian pupils of the knowledge of their own people and history. It gives them only carefully screened and censored exposure to their

*East: Self and Other in Textbooks and Curricula*, ed. Samira Alayan et al. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012); Shir Hever, *The Political Economy of Israel's Occupation: Repression Beyond Exploitation* (London: Pluto Press, 2010).

[81] Adwan and Firer, *Israeli-Palestinian,* 101.

[82] Hever, *Political,* 7-15; Nurit Peled-Elhanan, *Palestine in Israeli School Books: Ideology and Propaganda in Education* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012); Najah Al-Ramahi and Brian Davies, "Changing primary education in Palestine: Pulling in several directions at once," *International Studies in Sociology of Education* 12 (2002): 59-76; Riad Nasser and Irene Nasser, "Textbooks as a vehicle for segregation and domination: state efforts to shape Palestinian Israelis' identities as citizens," *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 40 (2008): 626-650.

history, culture and identity; and suppresses any aspects that challenge or contradict the Zionist narrative and mission."[83]

The lack of an all-encompassing analysis is also informed by the decision to concentrate on formal Palestinian and Israeli education as conveyed through the official curricula and in educational policies. The emphasis on formal education derives from the authoritative nature of the Palestinian and Israeli educational establishment and the educational content produced. Indeed, although one cannot assume "that what is in the text is actually taught [or] that what is taught is actually learned [as] teachers mediate classroom materials and students selectively accept, reinterpret, and reject what counts as legitimate knowledge,"[84] previous studies conducted on Israeli and Palestinian textbook interpretation and dissemination testify to the transmission of 'approved knowledge'. With reference to the Palestinian curriculum, Fouad Moughrabi, a Palestinian educationalist and scholar, notes that educational adherence derives from the highly-centralized system of education produced by the PA. Under this system, an army of supervisors and inspectors monitor the compliance with the textbooks' content, leaving "history teachers [with] little leeway to introduce additional material or to stray from the words of the textbook [while] students memorize a lousy text and answer questions on exams based on recall."[85] The results of classroom participant observation in Israeli-Jewish society similarly indicate a strong correlation between that which is presented in textbooks and the knowledge imparted by the teacher. Joyce Dalsheim discovered an unwillingness among teachers to stray from questions directly pertaining to the subject under examination. Moreover, according to

[83] Ismael Abu-Saad, "Present Absentees: The Arab School Curriculum in Israel as a Tool for De-Educating Indigenous Palestinians," *Holy Land Studies* 7 (2009): 18, 19.
[84] Michael W. Apple and Linda K. Christian-Smith, ed., *The Politics of the Textbook* (New York; London: Routledge, 1991), 9, 14.
[85] Fouad Moughrabi, "Palestine Now and Then: Notes on Oral History," *Journal of Educational Visions* 48/49 (2015): 30 [in Arabic].

Dalsheim, individual student efforts to acquire extra-curricular knowledge are stymied through textbooks' lack of footnotes, leading students to be left "with the authoritative text, presumed to be speaking the only truth."[86] In spite of constant exposure to electronic media, official textbooks in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, "as the modern version of village storytellers," therefore constitute one of the primary ways in which the state — or a state-like apparatus — continue to shape attachment to the nation and individual's understanding of the past and the present.[87]

Despite the authoritative nature of official education, it should be noted that non-formal educational activities have constituted a formative method of conveying the importance of the Holocaust for Israeli society since the late 80s, including through conducting memorial services in schools on Holocaust Memorial Day and organizing field trips to Holocaust museums in Israel and visits to concentration and extermination camps in Poland. Although less common in the Palestinian educational realm, extra-curricular activities run by local and regional organizations since the late 1990s and early 2000s incorporate Palestinian students, including those living inside the 1948 borders, in activities that seek to offer historical knowledge on the Nakba. While these non-formal educational activities will not be discussed in the following two chapters, the second part of this thesis, through its discussion of memory sites and commemorative acts, will offer an overview of the historical narrative transmitted through these extra-curricular educational activities.

The content presented in the following chapters is primarily based on archival material that was collected in Israel and the Palestinian Territories over a six-month period, between

[86] Joyce Dalsheim, "Settler nationalism, collective memories of violence and the 'uncanny other'," *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture* 10:2 (2004): 158, 159, 164.
[87] Deborah S. Hutton and Howard D. Mehlinger, "International Textbooks Revision. Examples from the Unites States," in *Perceptions of History. International Textbook Research on Britain, Germany and the United States*, ed. Volker R Berghahn and Hanna Schissler (Oxford: Berg 1987), 141.

March and September 2016. During this time, the educational collections of various institutes were consulted, including the Truman Institute's archive at Hebrew University, the Hebrew University's Education Library and the Al-Qattan Library in Ramallah. Although the primary focus in this section will lie on the content of the curricula used in Palestinian and Israeli society between 1994 and 2016, administrative documents and semi-structured interviews conducted with former education ministers, educational policy makers and textbook writers will also be discussed. It is through combining these various sources that this thesis will be able to show the effect of educational policies on the content of textbooks. Furthermore, by demonstrating the interplay between educational policies and the content of textbooks, this thesis also demonstrates the intergenerational exchange taking place in the educational realm, "from the adult society [to] their youngsters." [88]

## The History Curriculum: An Approved Version of History

While references to the Holocaust and the Nakba are made throughout the Israeli and Palestinian curriculum, respectively, the principal focus in this section will lie on the history curricula, which provide both a mirror into a society's view of its own past and, through their conception of that past, present-day concerns. Ever since the rise of the nation-state in Europe, history textbooks have been used as an instrument for glorifying the nation, consolidating its national identity and justifying particular forms of social and political systems.[89] In his influential study on nations and nationalism in Europe, Eric Hobsbawm pointed out that "states....use [their] increasingly powerful machinery for communicating with their inhabitants, above all in […]

[88] Ruth Firer, "Israel: The Holocaust in history textbooks," in *The Treatment of the Holocaust in Textbooks: The Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, The United States of America*, ed. Randolph L. Braham (Boulder; New York: Social Science Monographs and the Institute for Holocaust Studies of the City University of New York, 1987), 156.
[89] Elie Podeh, *The Arab-Israeli conflict in Israeli history textbooks*, 1948-2000 (Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 2000), 3.

schools, to spread the image and heritage of the nation and to inculcate attachment to it."[90] Although constituting the "approved, even official version [of history]," the knowledge included in textbooks therefore cannot be considered neutral or unbiased.[91] Rather, textbooks must be treated as ideological tools to promote a certain belief system and legitimize an established political and social order.[92] Accordingly, textbooks will be considered to play a dual role: on the one hand, they provide a sense of continuity between the past and the present by transmitting accepted historical narratives; on the other hand, they alter — or rewrite — the past to suit cultural or social contemporary needs.[93]

On the Israeli side, a total of 16 history textbooks for middle- and high school were analyzed that were published in the time period under review. The analysis of these books — presented in chapter one — includes two books which following their publication were revoked and, in one case, rewritten by the Israeli Ministry of Education due to controversial content. On the Palestinian side, in addition to history books written by the Jordanian Ministry of Education, the entire Palestinian modern history curriculum was examined. Furthermore, it was decided to include national education textbooks in the analysis. The necessity of this inclusion reflects the historical development of the Palestinian curriculum and the relevance of the content in these books for this research. Between 1994 and 2000, educational development plans were written and rewritten and, following the parliamentary acceptance of the second curriculum plan in

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[90] Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990), 91.
[91] Howard D. Mehlinger, "International Textbook Revision: Examples from the United States," *Internationale Schulbuchforschung* 7 (1985): 287.
[92] Elie Podeh, "History and Memory in the Israeli Educational System: The Portrayal of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in History Textbooks (1948-2000)," *History and Memory* 12 (2000): 66.
[93] In his study of Russian history books, James Wertsch showed that following the dismantlement of the USSR, history books were rewritten to reflect the demands of the new Russian reality, thereby demonstrating that the 'usable past' changes according to a society's present demands. James Wertsch, *Voices of collective Remembering* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), 87-117.

1998, the first textbooks were developed and introduced from 2000 onwards. In the interim period (1994-2000), Jordanian books, which had been in use since 1948, were reprinted by the Palestinian Authority. Yet, as these books failed to educate Palestinian children on their own history and culture, national education textbooks were immediately written and introduced in 1995. It is in these books that an initial departure can be seen from the Palestinian history presented in Jordanian textbooks. Thus, rather than confining the 1948 War to a sub-clause, reflecting no more than an inconspicuous event, Palestinian national education books consistently allude to the war and its everlasting effects on the Palestinian people.

### The Creation of a Useable Past: Deligitimizing the Other's Narrative

In addition to discussing Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian presentation of their histories in their respective societies, a secondary focus, as mentioned above, will lie on the presentation of the other's history within the curricula. Previous studies on educational content in East Asia[94] and the former Yugoslav Republics[95] have shown that the creation of a 'useable past' to enable national identification affects historical writings on another group or society, particularly when constituting a (former) opponent. Part of the process of justifying a conflict, both past and present, entails a negative characterization of the opponent while describing the in-group in positive terms.[96] The description of the self in positive terminology in conflicts, inadvertently,

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[94] Studies conducted on the presentation of the other's narrative in the Asia-Pacific War include: Alexander Bukh, "Japan's History Textbooks Debate: National Identity in Narratives of Victimhood and Victimization," *Asian Survey* 47:5 (2007): 683-704; Zheng Wang, "Old Wounds, New Narratives: *Joint History Textbook Writing and Peacebuilding in East Asia," History and Memory* 21:1 (2009): 101-126.

[95] For an analysis of the curricula in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and the minimization of the other's suffering during the Bosnian War, see: Sirkka Ahonen, "Post-Conflict History Education in Finland, South Africa and Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Journal of Humanities and Social Science Education* 1 (2013): 90-103; Wolfgang Hoepken, "Between Civic Identity and Nationalism: History Textbooks in East-Central and Southeastern Europe," in *Democratic Transition in Croatia Value Transformation, Education, and Media Political Science*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorka Matic (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 163-192.

[96] Zvi Bekerman and Michalinos Zembylas, *Teaching contested narrative: identity, memory, and reconciliation in peace education and beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 111

leads to ethnocentric views of the other. Michael Apple therefore concludes that most history textbooks present a biased and simplistic view of conflicts, which seeks to reinforce "our side is good; their side is bad. We are peace-loving and want an end to strife; they are warlike and aim to dominate."[97] Accordingly, as will become clear in this section, 'the enemy's' narrative of the outbreak or development of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is devaluated and presented as morally inferior.

Delegitimization of the other in textbooks of societies in conflict does not only rely on negative or stereotypical descriptions of historical encounters between the two societies in conflict. The other's history, religion and culture, which are not directly related to the conflict, can also fall subject to negative descriptions or simply be omitted. Historical events that led to suffering or bereavement are among those narratives that might humanize and legitimize the other, potentially giving rise to a sense of 'a common humanity' and, with this, political entitlement.[98] Thus, in times of conflict, students are usually commanded to forget what Paul Ricoeur called 'the other drama' and, instead, "look ahead of catastrophes."[99] One of the ways in which this is achieved is by determining what knowledge is to be imparted in schoolbooks, i.e. what is to be included and excluded from the curriculum. It is in this context that Jacques Derrida's 1967 statement *Il n'y a pas dehors-texte* [Fr. There is no outside-text] finds relevance. While widely debated, the assertion has come to mean that our conception of reality is contextually-driven.[100] As such, in the analysis of Israeli and Palestinian textbooks, the

[97] Michael Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 80.
[98] The utilization of victimhood to claim political entitlement has been termed *le capital victimaire* [Fr. victim capital] by Daniel Bensaid. Cited in Laleh Khalili, *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 35.
[99] Cited in Nurit Peled-Elhanan, "Legitimation of massacres in Israeli school history books," *Discourse & Society* 21 (2010): 400.
[100] Mark Dooley and Liam Kavanagh, *The Philosophy of Derrida* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 55, 56.

assumption will be followed that that which is *dehors* has been intentionally omitted in the attempt to shape the narrative of schoolbooks in line with the author's and/or society's views.

While the notion of *dehors* insinuates a lack of information, this research will argue that extra-textual information, at times, is implicitly present. Examples of implicit knowledge include the evaluation of events or concepts by the author by adding qualifying terminology or normative language, such as 'unique' or 'unprecedented'. Conversely, hidden knowledge or the 'missing text' can indicate a lack of factual accuracy, completeness, errors and/or omissions. In addition to examining the inclusion and exclusion of text through a qualitative analysis, a quantitative analysis of illustrations, numbers and structure — which also concerns the amount of space devoted to a topic — will be applied to identify textbooks' goals.

# Chapter One: The Israeli Educational System

Using Jean-François Lyotard's post-modern moral philosophy, Ilan Gur Ze'ev argues that as a result of Palestinian denial of the Holocaust, Israelis understand and present the Holocaust solely from an ethnocentric point of view, leading to a refusal to acknowledge other genocides and the suffering of others.[101] While this research questions whether Palestinian denial stands at the basis of an ethnocentric presentation of the Holocaust, refusal to acknowledge others' suffering is evident in the Israeli educational system in the teaching of the Holocaust and the 1948 War. In the context of Holocaust education, this does not necessarily mean that other victims of the Second World War are completely neglected but, rather, their fate and suffering is de-emphasized. The extent of minimization in the Israeli curriculum takes on varying forms and degrees and depends on the textbook author(s) and the year of publication. Nevertheless, throughout the textbooks examined it was found that de-emphasizing exists through a minimal discussion of the persecution of other victims by the Nazis. Simultaneously, the unique Jewish nature of the Holocaust and its particularistic current meaning for Israeli-Jews are reinforced, generating the perpetuation of what former Minister of Education Shai Piron (2013-2014) termed "a victimhood culture."[102]

The years under examination in this case study can be divided into three separate periods which correlate with the various formal educational plans put into place by the Ministry of

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[101] Ilan Gur-Ze'ev, "The Morality of Acknowledging/Not-acknowledging the Other's Holocaust/Genocide," *Journal of Moral Education* 27 (1998): 170.

[102] It is worth noting that Piron introduced a program entitled 'On the Paths of Memory' in 2014 which dictated that the Holocaust would be taught in the kindergarten "to give teachers the tools to teach a subject that kids are exposed to anyway." Critics of the program, including Holocaust researcher Nili Keren, argued that the program would "raise a generation imbued with the anxiety of victimhood." Interview conducted with Rabbi Shai Piron on May 30, 2016. Yarden Skop, "Israel Unveils New Holocaust Studies Program Starting in Kindergarten," *Haaretz,* April 24, 2014, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.587252; Nili Keren, "The answers are not in the camps," *Haaretz,* October 10, 2013, accessed September 27, 2017, https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/letters/1.2145706.

Education (1995; 1999; 2002; 2015). Yet, as the above-mentioned methods of de-emphasizing were found in textbooks published across these years, the presentation of the Holocaust in the Israeli educational system will be discussed according to various themes that illustrate an exclusive presentation of the Holocaust in the educational sector. In this context, explicit focus will lie on the presentation of non-Jewish victims of the Nazi regime and their collaborators. While it is recognized that a scholarly consensus concerning the likeness of the fate of non-Jewish victims to that of the Jews is lacking, this research will follow historical data offered by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum on the numbers of non-Jewish victims (see Appendix 1).[103] In consideration of this research's principal focus and aims, this chapter will not delve into an extensive historical discussion of the fate of these victims. Nevertheless, where relevant, historiographical references will be made to studies on non-Jewish victims of the Nazi regime that illuminate historical inconsistencies and errors found in Israeli textbooks.

Apart from revealing the narrative and presentational methods aimed at minimizing the fate of Palestinians during the 1948 War, this chapter's secondary analysis on the presentation of the 1948 War in ten Israeli textbooks published between the period 1994 and 2014 emphasizes political, historiographical and societal developments, which largely inform the presented narrative. Differentiating between Zionist, Zionist-critical and revisionist narratives of the war, this study demonstrates that new historiographical writings have made their way into textbooks, albeit solely those by the self-proclaimed dean of the New Historians: Benny Morris. Nevertheless, under the influence of right-wing educational policies, particularly since the mid-2000s, any acknowledgement of individual instances of expulsion is downplayed; instead, the

[103] For discussions on the uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust, see: Yehuda Bauer, *Rethinking the Holocaust* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2002), 45, 62, 63 78; Henry Friedlander, *The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), xiii.

beneficial and practical effects of the mass Palestinian exodus are stressed. Consequently, formal and non-formal educational attempts to expose Israeli-Jews and Palestinians living inside the 1948 borders to the Palestinian narrative of the war — encompassed in the Arabic designation *al-Nakba* — have repeatedly been thwarted, forming the antithesis of *Milḥemet ha-'Atsma'ut* [Heb. the War of Independence] and its classification as a miraculous revival.

## The Holocaust in Israeli education: An Historical Overview

Although the Holocaust is now taught intensively in Israel's Hebrew-language state school system, this is a situation that has evolved gradually and has undergone many changes in presentation, frequently reflecting Israeli society and its collective memory of the Holocaust.[104] Scholars discussing the developments in Holocaust education in Israel have divided Holocaust education into three distinct periods: an early 'Zionist period', a second 'foundational period' and a third 'construction period'.[105] The first period is generally considered to have commenced with the establishment of the Israeli state or in the latter years of the British Mandate.[106] History books in this early period tended to focus on Jewish resistance and rebellion rather than victimhood and annihilation. This emphasis reflected societal attitudes towards the Holocaust, which considered self-defense in sharp contrast to passivity — those who went 'as sheep to the slaughter'. Moreover, the passivity and consequential victimhood of the Jews was regarded as shameful behavior while instances of religious self-sacrifice or armed resistance were considered honorable. Accordingly, though textbooks did mention the physical suffering of the Jews, these accounts tended to be shorter, particularly when compared to the description of armed resistance. Thus, in 1987, Firer pointed out that during the Zionist period, nine out of 14 textbooks on the Holocaust devoted at least twice as much space to the description of armed resistance as to "suffering and destruction" and the "maintenance of humanity."[107] In more recent research, Idit

[104] Erik H. Cohen, "Teacher autonomy within a flexible national curriculum: development of Shoah education in Israeli state schools," *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 48 (2016): 168.
[105] Dalia Ofer, "History, memory and identity: Perceptions of the Holocaust in Israel," in *Jews in Israel: Contemporary social and cultural patterns*, ed. U. Rebhun and C. Waxman (Hanover; London: Brandeis University Press, 2004): 394-417; Ruth Firer, *Agents of the Holocaust lesson* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1989) [in Hebrew]; Yuval Dror, "National denial, splitting, and narcissism: Group defence mechanisms of teachers and students in Palestinian in response to the Holocaust," *Mediterranean Journal of Educational Studies* 1 (1996): 107-137; Chaim Schatzker, "Teaching the Holocaust in changing times," *Moreshet* 52 (1992): 165-171.
[106] Idit Gil, "Teaching the Shoah in History Classes in Israeli High Schools," *Israel Studies* 14 (2009): 3; Zehavit Gross, "Holocaust education in Jewish schools in Israel: Goals, dilemmas, challenges," *Prospects* 40 (2010): 94/95.
[107] Firer, "Israel," 180/1.

Gil argues that during this stage, about two-thirds of the textbooks were dedicated to the subject of revolt. In these textbooks, revolt was not always carried out by European Jews, but rather by "Hebrews" and "Zionists" in order to link the exilic Jews and the recently established Jewish state through the insinuation that Zionism had fought against the Nazi regime and won by creating the Jewish state.[108] While it is clear that the above-mentioned educational framework echoes research findings on early Israeli society, contrary to later periods, it is doubtful that societal trends were heavily influenced by the educational system because, as Erik Cohen points out, Holocaust education at this time was voluntary and sporadic.[109]

The stirrings of a new framework for Holocaust education are generally traced back to the late 1960s, becoming more noticeable in the following decade: the 1970s. In her analysis of one hundred textbooks in the first 40 years of the country's existence, Firer discovered a shift in the educational approach to the Holocaust in textbooks published in the early 1970s. In these books, a departure was identified from the previous intentionalist approach to a more functionalist approach.[110] Similarly to the earlier Zionist period, educational changes were deemed to reflect societal developments; two events in the 1960s are considered to have influenced the educational system in particular: the 1961 Eichmann trial and the tension-ridden three-week 'waiting period' preceding the 1967 War. While the former revealed widespread ignorance of the Holocaust, the latter ominously reminded Israeli-Jews of the fear of annihilation 'here' in Israel, this time emanating from their Arab neighbors who, according to a *Haaretz*

[108] Segev also notes that Jewish resistance fighters were referred to as "Israelites, defenders of Masada." Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 480.
[109] Cohen, "Teacher," 173.
[110] Whereas the intentionalist approach presented the Holocaust as a manifestation of Jewish exilic life and therefore considered an independent Israel as the only way to guarantee the future safety of all Jews, the functionalist approach attributed the extermination of the Jews to historical developments and societal and political circumstances over time. Segev, *Seventh*, 479, 480.

columnist, posed as "the new Hitler."[111] In the educational sector, these events spurred on the creation of special material and introductory programs for teachers and students.[112] Yet, despite attempts to further knowledge on the Holocaust, there were no remarkable changes in the official curriculum in the late 1960s.[113] Segev points out that in a 60-hour unit dealing with the history of the struggle to establish the state, only ten hours were devoted to the Holocaust.[114] Moreover, as was the case in the early Zionist period, the focus in educational material did not lie on Jewish victims, evidenced by the Ministry of Education's demand that teachers should avoid referring to victims numerically.[115]

It is during the 1970s that concrete educational policies were put into place that led to a formal educational framework in the 1980s. The effects of the two pivotal events of the 1960s, mentioned above, in addition to the 1973 War, further contributed to the erosion of the dichotomy between 'there' and 'here',[116] causing deep fear and anxiety and nullifying the disdain, alienation and shame which some had felt towards Holocaust victims.[117] These experiences, coupled with the anachronistic content provided in former history books, led to appeals being made to the Ministry of Education (MOE) to create changes in educational policy and the curriculum; following Menachem Begin's rise to power in 1977, these calls were answered.[118] Both for the Likud leader and the Minister of Education he nominated, Zevulun

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[111] Arad, "Shoah," 201.
[112] Dalia Ofer, "Israel," in *The World reacts to the Holocaust*, ed. David Wyman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996), 891.
[113] Keren, "Ideologies," 1031.
[114] Segev, *Seventh,* 479.
[115] Ibid.
[116] The Yom Kippur War or October War of 1973, with its thousands of casualties, created a manifest crisis in the national ethos of the *Sabra*. The surprise of the attack and initial success of the Egyptian and Syrian armies found many young soldiers in the position of having to beg for their lives from their captors, rather than dying heroically for the common cause. This, in retrospect, suggested that survival, in contrast to fighting, may have also been legitimate within the context of the Holocaust. Dan Bar-On, "The Israeli society between the culture of death and the culture of life," *Israel Studies* 2 (1998): 94.
[117] Porat, "Scandal," 627.
[118] Ofer, "Israel," 891.

Hammer, the leader of the National Religious Party, the Holocaust was a defining event. The Holocaust, according to Hammer, could serve to strengthen the Zionist cause, as he explained: "How to bring the Jewish nation to immigrate to [the land of Israel], and how to convince Israeli students, those born here, raised here, and educated here, not to emigrate from here. I see this as a central topic of Israeli education .... [the Holocaust] has an important part in our physical struggle, and no less significant, in our spiritual struggle, the desire to live in the State of Israel."[119] Under Hammer's leadership, the MOE announced in 1979 that the Holocaust would be a standard requirement for senior high-school students and that no less than 30 school hours should be dedicated to teaching the Holocaust.[120] A year later, on 25 March 1980, the Knesset's Committee of Education and Culture convened to discuss a modification of the 1953 Compulsory State Educational Law. This law stated that education should be based on "the cultural values of the people of Israel and their scientific achievements; love of the homeland and loyalty to the state and the Jewish people […]."[121] The bill under discussion demanded that, in addition to these educational principles, all students educated in Israeli schools should have "awareness of the Holocaust and heroism."[122] The initiator of the law was Knesset Member (MK) Sarah Stern-Katan, a survivor of the Holocaust and a former member of a Zionist underground group during the Second World War. She argued that the Holocaust was an event "in which our nation was the primary victim […] we the victims have a national testament, a holy obligation to learn, teach and transmit to future generations the events of the Holocaust of our nation."[123] The following day, the Holocaust joined the ranks of the history of the Jewish

[119] Cited in Porat, "Scandal," 632, 633.
[120] Gil, "Teaching," 4.
[121] Segev, *Seventh,* 482.
[122] Porat, "Scandal," 630, 631.
[123] Ibid., 631.

diaspora, Zionism and the Israeli-Arab conflict as the only three mandatory topics (out of 26) in the high-school curriculum.[124] Another change initiated by the MOE in the 1981-2 school year was to incorporate the Holocaust in the matriculation exams to ensure that Israeli students would not graduate from high school without having been tested on their knowledge of the Holocaust.[125] The effects of this introduction on the content of examinations were palpable. In his review of high-school examinations from the early 1980s, Segev noted that knowledge of the Holocaust and, in particular, the fate of the Jews was crucial to passing exams, as Holocaust-related questions accounted for 20 percent of the overall score in the final examination in history.[126]

Together with the historian and Holocaust survivor Yisrael Gutman, Chaim Schatzker was responsible for the first MOE-approved textbook for all high schools, entitled 'The Holocaust and its Meaning' (1982).[127] The 200-page textbook, which would become a standard textbook on the Holocaust for over a decade in the state educational system, presented the Holocaust as a unique event in history, isolated from both world and Jewish history. Accordingly, the Holocaust was described as detached from the events of the Second World War, and Jewish history that preceded the Holocaust was almost completely disregarded.[128] In a 1979 interview, Schatzker explained the reasoning behind the need to present the Holocaust in this fashion: "I do not want to obscure the Holocaust by placing it within [the context of] Jewish history [as this] would dwarf the Holocaust and remove its unique value."[129] Similar statements can be found in his 1980 article, entitled 'The Teaching of the Holocaust: Dilemmas and

[124] Ibid., 630, 631; Segev, *Seventh,* 482.
[125] Porat, "Scandal," 630.
[126] Segev, *Seventh,* 482.
[127] Firer, "Israel," 182, 183.
[128] Porat, "Scandal," 633.
[129] Cited in ibid., 634.

Considerations', in which Schatzker argued that while the Holocaust had a universal moral message "to coming generations," this universal human element should not detract from the Jewish uniqueness of the Holocaust in Israeli society. Furthermore, he noted that "an oversimplification of the term universal" by applying the term Holocaust to any other tragic event or by including all the atrocities by the Nazi regime would lead "the real, historic Holocaust [to be] emptied of all its inherent, unique meaning."[130] The uniqueness of the Holocaust was not only communicated by the structure of Schatzker and Gutman's textbook, but also in the text itself. In a subchapter entitled 'Holocaust deniers and those who reduce its image in Holocaust literature', Schatzker and Gutman included a group of historians "who negate the uniqueness of the Holocaust by locating it within wider contexts of time and space and [compare it to the suffering of] other nations."[131]

The book's first edition was severely criticized, especially by Firer (1983) and Nili Keren (1984) for, among other things, exclusion of the controversial topic of the *Judenrat*. In response, the second edition, published in 1987, added a chapter on the Jewish councils and, of more importance to the research at hand, a new chapter addressing the Final Solution for "the entire Jewish people."[132] This chapter explicitly noted that the Nazis applied the Final Solution to all Jews, including the Sephardic Jews of North Africa, in order to bolster identification with the Holocaust among Jews from Arab and African countries who with the rise to power of Menachem Begin in 1977 had begun to demand legitimation of their non-Western culture and

[130] Chaim Schatzker, "The Teaching of the Holocaust: Dilemmas and Considerations," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 450 (1980), 223.
[131] This statement hinted at neo-conservative German historians such as Ernst Nolte who from the early 1980s had attempted to contextualize the Holocaust by comparing it with other murderous acts such as Stalin's Gulag, leading to the infamous 'Historikerstreit'. Porat, "Scandal," 634; Yisrael Gutman and Chaim Schatzker*, The Holocaust and its Meaning* (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1987), 219.
[132] Gross, "Holocaust," 100, 101.

heritage previously denied during the period of *mamlakhtiyut* [Heb. 'statism'].[133] The book's accomplishment in this regard was remarkable, as two years after the publication of the second edition Uri Farago found that Sephardic students identified more with the Holocaust than they had previously.[134] Moreover, as will become evident below, the relevance of the Holocaust for both Ashkenazi and Sephardic students was to become a central focus in history books in subsequent years, forming a continual reminder of a communal fate despite diverging experiences.

## The Holocaust in Contemporary Israeli Textbooks

In order to examine the discussion of Jewish and non-Jewish victimhood in contemporary Israeli history books and, consequently, their evolution from the first official textbook on the Holocaust, 15 textbooks were examined (see Appendix 2). Of these books, five solely discussed the Holocaust and the Second World War, seven focused on the Holocaust and the establishment of the Israeli state and three dealt with the establishment of the Israeli state. All the reviewed books were written for students between the ages of 13 and 18, with the vast majority being for students aged between 16 and 18 (13 books). Two of the books were specifically written for final-year students and, as such, are relied upon for the preparation of final examinations (the *Bagrut*). Save two, all of the books examined here received approval from the MOE and therefore were able to be taught in classrooms. While the MOE does not collect data on the popularity of approved

[133] See p. 222 for a discussion of 'statism' and its role in Holocaust discourse. Hanna Yablonka, "Oriental Jewry and the Holocaust: A Tri-Generational Perspective," *Israeli Studies* 14:1 (2009): 95; Elizier Don-Yehiya, "Memory and Political Culture: Israeli Society and the Holocaust," *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* 9 (1993): 144.
[134] Twenty years later, Erik Cohen confirmed this result, finding no major difference between Ashkenazi and Sephardic students in their perceptions on the Holocaust. Cohen found that the Holocaust constituted a common denominator among students of various backgrounds with 77 percent of Israeli students responding that the Holocaust affected their worldview. Erik Cohen, *Shoah education in Israeli state schools: An educational research 2007–2009* (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University, 2009), 1; Uri Farago, "Jewish Identity of Israeli Youth 1965-1985," *Yahadut Zmaneinu* 5 (1989): 259-285 [in Hebrew].

textbooks, an inquiry among Israeli teachers found that Eli Bar-Navi's 1998 textbook and Eyal Naveh's 1999 textbook were among the most widely used, indicating that despite the publication of new textbooks, teachers may prefer to teach textbooks they are familiar with.[135] In the books that included the Second World War and the Holocaust, three different methods were identified which minimized the suffering and persecution of non-Jewish victims: the aggregation of non-Jewish victims, a dearth in historical information concerning the persecution of non-Jewish victims and an absence of witness testimonies. The exposure to non-Jewish victims stands in direct opposition to the presentation of Jewish victimhood which, in addition to being conceived of as a unique fate with a particularistic Zionist meaning, offers students an in-depth analysis of the effects of Nazi genocidal policies on individual Jewish communities, further bolstered by extensive witness testimonies and photographic evidence.

## The presentation of non-Jewish victims

### *Aggregation*

The grouping together of non-Jewish victims occurs across all the textbooks that have been reviewed for this study, albeit predominantly in the period 1994-2001. In the earliest book examined in this study, Naveh's 1994 textbook 'The 20th Century: The Century that changed the World Order', examples of this aggregation can be found.[136] In a paragraph under the heading 'The Shoah is a unique event in the history of mankind',[137] Naveh writes: "The Nazi killing machine did not only exterminate members of unwanted races, hundreds of thousands of

[135] Adwan and Firer, *Israeli-Palestinian,* 37.
[136] Theo van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 38.
[137] The biblical word Shoah, meaning destruction or ruin, is the standard word in Hebrew for the murder of European Jewry. While the English word Holocaust has sometimes raised objections due to its sacrificial connotation, it remains the most widely used term in the English-speaking word to denote the genocide of Europe's Jewish population.

government opponents, disabled and mentally ill, homosexuals and other people deemed 'unworthy of life' were killed too […] also among some groups of Gypsies, sentenced to extermination as an inferior race, many were sent to Auschwitz, and similarly millions of communists from Russia, criminals, homosexuals, those refusing to work, prostitutes and political opponents from all over the Reich [were sentenced to death]."[138] Four years later, an almost identical statement can be found in Bar-Navi's 'The 20th Century, Contemporary History of the Jewish People', which states: "The industry of death did not only exterminate members of unwanted races, hundreds of thousands of government opponents, disabled and mentally ill, homosexuals and other people deemed 'unworthy of life' were killed too. This reached its peak in the death camps and gas chambers and incinerators."[139] Through presenting several persecuted groups together in one sentence, Naveh and Bar-Navi minimize the victimization of non-Jews in two distinct manners. Firstly, by lumping together various individuals, Naveh and Bar-Navi suggest that both the reasons for their persecution and their fates were similar; and secondly, by naming one number ("hundreds of thousands") the number of victims among the individual groups remains unclear, adding to the generalization of their fate.

In 1999, two important changes took place in the history curriculum which offered a modification of the presentation of non-Jewish victims, albeit confined to merely a few textbooks. Firstly, the MOE recommended that of the 85 history teaching hours to 11th and 12th graders, 45 should be assigned to the Holocaust, Nazism, and the Second World War, making them the most important subjects in the high-school curriculum. Secondly, Jewish history (in which the Holocaust was taught) was integrated with general history which, according to Gil,

[138] Eyal Naveh, *The 20th Century: The Century that changed the World Order* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1994), 134, 141.
[139] Eli Bar-Navi, *The 20th Century: Contemporary History of the Jewish People* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1998), 133.

was meant to lead to the incorporation of others' fate in the Second World War.[140] As a result of the new curriculum, a departure from previous content can be identified in the textbook produced by the historian and educator Keren. Thus, 'Shoah: A Journey into Memory' is the first among the textbooks examined to argue that a close reading of the Nuremberg Laws demonstrates that the race laws also applied to Gypsies.[141] Furthermore, Keren offers a more detailed discussion of the systematic persecution of Gypsies and even notes that a comprehensive plan of persecution "existed for members of the Roma tribe, just like it did for Jews," indicating that Jews were not the only group that was systematically targeted.[142] A further shift from previous textbooks can be noted in Keren's discussion of the euthanasia program that was introduced in 1939-1940. In addition to mentioning the policy itself, Keren discusses its implementation in purpose-built centers and the execution of the program by doctors, midwives and nurses.[143]

Conversely, Gutman's and Naveh's books, published in the same year, echo the content of earlier textbooks concerning non-Jewish victims. Gutman, at times, does not even name the various groups of non-Jewish victims. For instance, in his discussion of the treatment of Jews and non-Jews at Auschwitz, Gutman writes the following: "Most [of those that were] sent to Birkenau transported from all over Nazi-occupied Europe were Jews, and on their arrival, most [Jews] were directly exterminated [...] The fate of the Jews deported to the camp was different from the fate of non-Jews. Immediately upon their arrival in the camp, non-Jews became prisoners."[144] Through juxtaposing the fate of Jews against that of all non-Jews, Gutman fails to differentiate between the various divisions and accompanying treatment of prisoners at a camp

[140] Gil, "Teaching," 5.
[141] Nili Keren, *Shoah: A Journey into Memory* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1999), 72.
[142] Keren, *Shoah,* 73.
[143] Ibid., 56/7.
[144] Israel Gutman, *Shoah and Memory* (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1999), 130.

like Auschwitz-Birkenau.[145] Using a similar method of aggregation, Naveh refers to scores of non-Jewish victims as "other people" [Heb. *bnei adam nosafim*]: "The Shoah, during which close to six million Jews were killed, is one of the most dreadful events in the history of mankind […] in the duration of the war the Nazis also killed other people who they defined as 'unworthy of life' and among them were tens of thousands of Gypsies."[146] A few pages later, the same practice of aggregation is repeated in Naveh's discussion of death camps: "In some death camps, tens of thousands of Gypsies were also killed [along with] hundreds of thousands of Poles and other people."[147]

Although the grouping together of non-Jewish victims has occurred less frequently since 1999, this does not mean that the practice has been completely forsaken. Ketzi'a Avieli-Tabibian's 2001 book 'Era of Fear and Hope' notes that approximately "three quarters of a million people, a third of them Jews, died" on death marches, while Naveh's 2009 book, entitled 'Totalitarianism and the Holocaust', points out that "about a 1.1 million people were killed in Auschwitz Birkenau of which about a million were Jews."[148] Here, it is interesting to mention that while both Naveh and Tabibian have accorded exact numbers to Jewish victims, the other victims remain nameless. On the whole, however, Tabibian's 'Era of Fear and Hope' (2001) and 'Travel in Time' (2008) do place more emphasis on the persecution of individual groups under the Nazi regime. This is evident from the fact that separate content is offered on the fate of

[145] Hermann Langbein notes that prisoners in Auschwitz were forced to wear a triangle that indicated the type of imprisonment and, in the case of non-Germans, nationality, which determined the type of work given in the camp and, consequently, the quality of life and survival chances in the camp, creating a "hierarchy among prisoners" and a "camp elite." Hermann Langbein, *People in Auschwitz* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 11-15; 63-240.
[146] Eyal Naveh, *The 20th Century on the Verge of Tomorrow* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1999), 110.
[147] Ibid., 112.
[148] Ketzi'a Avieli-Tabibian, *Era of Fear and Hope 1870-1970* (Tel Aviv: Matach Publishing, 2001), 230; Eyal Naveh, *Totalitarianism and Shoah, Europe, the Mediterranean and the Jews in the First Half of the 20th Century* (Tel Aviv: Reches, 2009), 272, 275.

Gypsies, homosexuals and victims of religious and political persecution.[149] Similarly, Naveh's 2009 book allows for further differentiation among the groups of non-Jewish victims. Concerning Gypsies, Naveh thus notes that not all Gypsies were persecuted, but especially the Roma.[150] Nevertheless, similarly to his predecessor Keren, Naveh fails to explain to his readers why the Nazis differentiated between Gypsy tribes and, perhaps more crucially, whether this differentiation was upheld.[151]

### *Historical paucity*

Further practices leading to a minimized understanding of non-Jewish victimhood are based on inadequate historical information resulting from inaccurate and anachronistic material. An example of the first practice occurs in Naveh's 1994 book during his discussion of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Naveh notes that in addition to suffering great losses, "more than two million soldiers fell into captivity and were sent as forced laborers to German concentration camps." Beyond presenting an inaccurate number of Soviet prisoners of war (POWs), 3.5 million below existing estimates, the fate of these soldiers, of whom 3.3 million died from starvation, exposure and mistreatment in German camps,[152] remains unclear and it is up to the reader to speculate whether the soldiers were freed after the war or died in these camps.[153] An almost identical statement appears in Naveh's 1999 book which is followed by a sentence that requires

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[149] Avieli-Tabibian, *Era*, 215; Ketzi'a Avieli-Tabibian, *Travel in Time: From Peace to War and Shoah: Europe, the Mediterranean Sea and the Jews in the First Half of the 20th Century* (Ramat Aviv: Matach Publishing, 2008), 118, 134; 424.
[150] Naveh, *Totalitarianism,* 284.
[151] For historical works on Gypsy persecution, see: Donald Kenrick and Grattan Puxon*, Gypsies under the Swastika* (Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2009); Guenter Lewy, *The Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Ian Hancock*,* "Gypsy history in Germany and neighboring lands: A chronology to the holocaust and beyond," *Nationalities Papers* 19 (1991): 395-412.
[152] Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and John Pritchard, *Total War: The Western* Hemisphere (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 278. For a later work confirming these numbers see: Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (London: Pimlico, 2007), 19.
[153] Naveh, *Order*, 118.

further historical illumination. Naveh states: "More than two million [Russian] soldiers fell into captivity and were sent as forced laborers to German concentration camps. The Russian Air Force ceased to function. In the areas that were conquered by the Germans many massacres were committed on the population and the Nazis continued [undertaking] extermination policies against the Jews."[154] In this context, it remains ambiguous how "the massacres" were executed and how many Russians died as a result of them. In his discussion of the fate of Gypsies, Gutman's 1999 textbook 'Shoah and Memory' also withholds crucial historical information. Gutman relays to his readers that there was no systematic policy that led to the *Porrajmos*;[155] "[rather] most of them remained prisoners in the camp [Auschwitz-Birkenau], although many of them died of the living conditions that existed in the family camps from which they were deported."[156] However, without having mentioned the persecution process of Gypsies, which included concentrated incarceration in established Gypsy family camps, the notion of a family camp remains unfamiliar to Gutman's readers.[157]

While the failure to mention historical developments or concepts can be considered historically problematic, it does not constitute misinformation. Despite being rare, as indicated above with regard to the number of Soviet POWs, historically incorrect material has been identified, as well as in another textbook published by Naveh. In his discussion of the euthanasia program, Naveh (1994) informs students of the following: "Furthermore, in the 1930s, they [German Nazis] conducted experiments [on the level of] industrialized extermination: more than

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[154] Naveh, *Tomorrow*, 103/104.
[155] *Porrajmos* — Romani for devouring — is a term used to designate the Nazi genocide of the Roma which came into wide usage in the 1990s, including as a result of its scholarly use by the Romani scholar Ian Hancock. See: Ian Hancock, "On the interpretation of a word: Porrajmos as Holocaust," *Radoc*, 2006, accessed August 30, 2017, http://www.radoc.net/radoc.php?doc=art_e_holocaust_interpretation&lang=ry&articles=true.
[156] Gutman, *Shoah*, 130.
[157] On the subject of Gypsy family camps, see: Michael Berenbaum, *The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed, and the Reexamined* (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), 394; Friedlander, *Origins* 292.

100,000 disabled and mentally ill Germans were suffocated in death trucks using gas in the engine exhaust. These experiments reduced in the wake of public protests, but the experience gained was used in the killing of Jews."[158] Crucially, the euthanasia program did not constitute experiments [Heb. *nisuyim*] that were used as a prequel to the genocide of the Jews. Rather, the program was a self-contained policy installed in 1939-1945 to systematically rid German society of "undesired elements."[159] On the same subject, a further historical inaccuracy appears in several textbooks, including in Keren (1999), Tabibian (2001; 2008) and Naveh (2009). According to these authors, the euthanasia program was halted in 1941, as a result of protest by the Catholic Church and/or on Hitler's orders. Nevertheless, while both did exist, Henry Friedlander already in 1995 pointed out that the belief that they led to the end of killings was based "on a post-war myth;" instead, the euthanasia program continued until 1945.[160]

### *Witness testimony*

Thus far, the focus in this chapter has been on the selection of historical information by the textbook author. The ramifications of this selection are demonstrated further in the choice of original source material, particularly through the use of witness testimony. According to Firer, primary source analysis is one of the favorite methods of teaching in Israel, as it gives the class "the opportunity to act as the historian or political scientist."[161] Nevertheless, the inclusion of source material in history books is not simply meant as a pedagogical incentive, but also considered a means to authenticate the historical narrative. Indeed, Rosanne Kennedy notes that following the Holocaust and especially after the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, witness testimony

[158] Naveh, *Order*, 140.
[159] See: Friedlander, *Origins,* xii, xiii; Aly Götz, "Medicine against the Useless," in *Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi Medicine and Racial Hygiene*, ed. Aly Götz et al. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 22-99.
[160] Friedlander, *Origins*, 151.
[161] Adwan and Firer, *Israeli-Palestinian,* 86.

became "a truth telling of the past."[162] A further reasoning for the inclusion of testimony is pointed out by Kennedy and Meg McLagan who argue that identification with the victims is enforced through its usage because testimony shows that "pain is universal [as it] crosses social, economic, and geographic boundaries."[163] The centrality of Holocaust testimony in Israeli textbooks was confirmed in Segev's 1993 work which demonstrated that testimony is used to describe the horrors of individuals in order to reinforce the credibility of the information and intensify the students' identification with the victims.[164] On an official level, the practical effects of testimony were also noted. Michael Yaron, the Superintendent of History at the MOE between 1993 and 2011, maintained that when students are exposed to stories by Holocaust survivors "it is only natural that they have empathy with the survivors. They identify with the victim's story."[165]

In the 12 history textbooks treating the subject of the Second World War, extensive Jewish witness testimony is used concerning, inter alia, the execution of medical experiments in Auschwitz, mass shootings in the Soviet Union, Kristallnacht and the infamous death marches. Naveh's 1999 textbook explains the importance of using testimony in a paragraph entitled 'Survivors' testimony perpetuates the memory of the Shoah' by noting that "Their [survivors'] stories play an important role in the battle against Holocaust deniers, who claim that the Holocaust did not happen and that the death camps and gas chambers were a Zionist Jewish invention."[166] Yet, it appears that the battle for credibility and identification does not apply to the fate of non-Jewish victims, as witness accounts throughout the textbooks analyzed are written

[162] Kennedy, "Moving," 51.
[163] Ibid., 54; Meg McLagan, "Principles, Publicity, and Politics: Notes on Human Rights Media," *American Anthropologist* 105 (2003): 607.
[164] Segev, *Seventh*, 480.
[165] Interview conducted with Michael Yaron on April 14, 2016.
[166] Naveh, *Tomorrow*, 118/119.

exclusively by Jewish survivors and victims. While the use of extensive witness accounts to elucidate the fate of those named in a few sentences might appear superfluous, three books dedicate entire pages to the fate of the Gypsies: Keren (1999), Tabibian (2008) and Naveh (2009). Of these books, only Keren presents testimony. However, instead of using Gypsy testimony available at the time, including by Hans Braun and Ina Friedman, Keren uses testimony by five Israeli-Jews and an extract from Hermann Rauschning's *Hitler Speaks*, which had previously been debunked as a fraud.[167]

## Textbook censorship

Textbook writers in the period under examination were not necessarily encouraged to include the suffering of others under the Nazi regime, as the fate of a book published by Yair Auron in 1994 demonstrates. Following the 1992 elections, Meretz, the Israeli leftist Zionist party, was given ministerial responsibility for education. Shulamit Aloni, the Minister of Education at the time, approached genocide scholar Auron to develop a new history course on the Holocaust and genocides that befell other people in the 20th century since a 1993 study by the ministry found that "young people are both ignorant of and indifferent to disasters and acts of genocide committed in the 20th century [….] Such ignorance has marked and long-term effects on the understanding and conclusions of the young Israeli regarding the Holocaust that the Jewish people suffered."[168] Subsequently, Auron developed a textbook entitled 'Sensitivity to Human Suffering: Genocide in the 20th Century' which, as the title indicates, discusses the phenomenon

[167] Keren, *Shoah,* 72, 72. Ian Kershaw wrote in his 1998 work on Hitler that he had not used Rauschning's book because it is "now regarded to have so little authenticity that it is best to disregard it all together." Ian Kershaw, *Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris* (London: Penguin Press, 1998), xiv. For Gypsy testimony see: Hans Braun, "*A Sinto Survivor Speaks,*" in *Papers from the Sixth and Seventh Annual Meetings, Gypsy Lore Society, North American Chapter*, ed. Joanne Grumet (New York: The Society, 1986), 165-171; Ina Friedman, *The Other Victims: First-Person Stories of Non-Jews Persecuted by the Nazis* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 7-24.
[168] Gur-Ze'ev, "Morality," 167, 8; interview conducted with Yair Auron on May 29, 2016.

of genocide in the 20th century and contained a partial list of genocides committed in the 20th century, including the Armenian genocide, the Stalinist regime's murder of political opponents, the genocide of the Gypsies in the Second World War and the Cambodian genocide.[169]

Auron's educational program was officially cancelled some days before its formal introduction as a trial. The official statement was that "from a professional point of view" the program was unsuitable as it was based on literary rather than historical research and, as such, needed to immediately be abolished.[170] In an interview conducted in May 2016, however, Auron argued that the book was rejected for political reasons, as it was deemed that a discussion of the Armenian genocide in textbooks would affect political relations with Turkey.[171] This argument was corroborated by Yaron who was in charge of the history curriculum at the time. According to Yaron, who prefers to refer to the Armenian genocide as an 'issue', the ministry was asked by the government not to develop the textbook, because it was deemed harmful to the diplomatic relationship between Israel and Turkey.[172] Further statements by Yaron indicate that Auron's in-depth discussion of the systematic persecution of Gypsies prior to and during the Second World War also did not fit Yaron's own historical views.[173] According to Yaron, the suffering of non-Jewish victims should not be considered equal to that of Jewish victims in the Holocaust: "Homosexuals and communists also suffered, but they were not systematically persecuted. At the Wannsee Conference it was decided that every Jew would be persecuted. It is important to note that others did suffer, but it is not the same. Russians did die, but as a result of the war [while] six million [Jews] didn't die in battle."[174] As such, despite the fact that Auron had no intention of

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[169] Yair Auron, *Sensitivity to Human Suffering: Genocide in the 20th Century* (Tel Aviv: Teacher's College, 1994), 17.
[170] Gur-Ze'ev, "Morality," 168.
[171] Interview conducted with Yair Auron on May 29, 2016.
[172] Interview conducted with Michael Yaron on April 14, 2016.
[173] Auron, *Sensitivity,* 118-129.
[174] Ibid.

questioning the uniqueness of the Holocaust or presenting the Holocaust as simply one example of 20th century genocide, Gur-Ze'ev argued that the textbook's rejection occurred as a result of its implicit questioning of the justification for the state of Israel or, in post-modern discourse, "the hegemonic Zionist metanarrative."[175]

Even though the rejection of Auron's textbook took place more than twenty years ago, Or Kashti, a senior education reporter at *Haaretz*, notes that the incorporation of genocide studies and non-Jewish victims has largely failed in Israeli textbooks on the Second World War. As Kashti states: "The only inclusive aspect in Holocaust teaching is that the murder of Gypsies is acknowledged and, on a good day, leftists [political opponents] and victims of euthanasia will also be mentioned."[176] According to Naveh, the author of several of the aforementioned textbooks, the exclusion of non-Jewish victims does not necessarily represent the authors' own historical views, but constitutes a compromise which enables authors like himself to gain approval from the textbook approval body: "If I were free to write what I wanted, I would take a much more universal approach, because the Holocaust is a crisis of civilization in which Jews were victims just as the Gypsies and homosexuals [were]. I am critical of way the Holocaust is taught in Israel which represents the Holocaust as our victimhood [as if] the whole world is against us and [therefore] is very ethnocentric, Zionist and simplistic. As an historian and educator, I am critical of this trend. It is ahistorical."[177]

[175] Gur-Ze'ev, "Morality," 171.
[176] Interview conducted with Or Kashti on April 6, 2016.
[177] Interview conducted with Eyal Naveh on March 16 and May 15, 2016.

### The uniqueness of the Holocaust

The exclusive nature of Jewish victimhood during the Second World War is not only emphasized through a minimization of non-Jewish victimhood, but also through a concentration on the uniqueness of the Holocaust and its continued importance for Israeli-Jewish society. The singularity of the Holocaust is mentioned in all the books analyzed in this case study save three: Tabibian (2001; 2008) and Dani Yaakovi (1999). For instance, Naveh in his 1994 book notes under the heading 'The Shoah is a unique event in history of mankind' that "The Shoah of the Jews that took place during the Second World War was a unique event and without historical precedent in human history in terms of its nature, scope and intensity."[178] Naveh's conception and presentation of the Holocaust remains constant throughout his textbooks. In his 1999 book, Naveh reminds his readers that "The Shoah was a unique event in history, which was not executed by animals, but by human beings and the highest price for their crimes was paid by Jews."[179] Ten years later, despite placing more emphasis on non-Jewish victimhood in the Second World War, Naveh ends his chapter on the Final Solution in a summary of the chapter's most important content which reads: "The Jewish genocide is unique in human history and there is no equal in the civilized world."[180] In the same year that Naveh's second book (1999) was published, a new trend can be identified in describing the uniqueness of the Holocaust in the books of Keren and Gutman. This trend, introduced in Bar-Navi's 1998 work, describes the Holocaust's uniqueness in comparison to other massacres and genocides, thereby reflecting the new history curriculum which sought to situate Jewish history within world history. However, it is through noting the similarities between other acts of mass murder that authors such as Bar-

[178] Naveh, *Order*, 134.
[179] Ibid., 111.
[180] Ibid., 287.

Navi, Gutman and Keren argue that the Holocaust should be considered a singular event based on its unique characteristics, as Bar-Navi writes:

> *Massacres have accompanied the history of mankind forever. People have slaughtered each other for a piece of land, a water well, the right way to worship the creator and other reasons. With that, the systematic murder of the Jewish people in the Second World War was a unique event in the history of mankind, unprecedented in nature, scope and intensity. The Jews were not merely an enemy, but an inferior foe. He [the Jew] was perceived as a virus and his elimination [was considered] a way to purify the body of mankind […].*[181]

Similar statements appear in textbooks published the following year, including by Keren and Gutman who note that while "instances of hideous genocide have occurred,"[182] the Holocaust must be considered an "extraordinary event of genocide"[183] and "an unprecedented event."[184]

As mentioned above, three of the fifteen books did not mention the singularity of the Holocaust. Of these, Yaakovi's 1999 book is of particular interest. While Yaakovi, in similar fashion to Gutman, Keren and Bar-Navi, mentions other genocides in the 20th century, unlike his predecessors, Yaakovi questions the uniqueness of the Holocaust. Under the heading 'The Shoah was not the only genocide in the 20th century', Yaakovi writes the following:

> *The Shoah was not the only genocide that took place in the 20th century. Before it, there was the genocide of the Armenians at the hands of the Turks during the First World War. After the Second World War, there were other cases of genocide, many of them took place in the Third World, for instance in Biafra and Bangladesh and Cambodia and Rwanda. Also, during the war in former Yugoslavia there were instances of genocide. In this light, should we see the Holocaust of the Jews as a unique event in history?*[185]

[181] Bar-Navi, *20th*, 132.
[182] Keren, *Shoah,* Introduction.
[183] Ibid.
[184] Gutman, *Shoah*, 216.
[185] Dani Yaakovi, *World of Changes* (Tel Aviv: Maalot Publishing, 1999), 140.

Yaakovi's explicit questioning of the uniqueness of the Holocaust meant that the book never made it to the classrooms. After its publication, the book aroused a huge public debate and it was even discussed in the Knesset. Eventually, the textbook was rejected "because it didn't draw the appropriate historical lessons from the Holocaust."[186]

### The Holocaust and its meaning for the entire Jewish nation

While the Holocaust predominantly took place in mainland Europe, the unique nature of the Holocaust does not refer exclusively to the fate of Ashkenazi Jews. Gil notes that the educational aims set out in 1980, which stipulated that "the student should identify with the victims of the Shoah," led to a textual inclusion of North African Jewry.[187] This research, however, found that whereas textbooks before 1999 stressed the extermination of the entire Jewish nation without regard for origin as one of the main goals of Nazi ideology, later textbooks made a concrete effort to describe the fate of Jews in North Africa in-depth. Accordingly, Gutman and Keren devote several pages to North African countries affected by Nazi rule: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.[188] Furthermore, both authors argue that while the fate of the Jews in North Africa differed from their brethren in Europe, this was a result of the war rather than Nazi policy. As Keren stipulates:

> *At the Wannsee Conference, [Reinhard] Heydrich was in control of the list of countries with Jews which were included in the Final Solution. Next to the name of France (the non-occupied part) appears the number 700,000, and there is no doubt that this number also referred to the areas under French rule in North Africa, which*

[186] Gross, "Holocaust," 101.
[187] Gil, "Teaching," 4/5.
[188] Gutman, *Shoah*, 151-157; Keren, *Shoah,* 50-51, 138.

> *included Tunisia. The Jews of Tunisia were therefore included in the plan to murder the Jewish people.*[189]

Under the heading 'At a geographical distance [but] a shared fate', Gutman also emphasizes the need to consider the fate of the Jews of North Africa in the framework of the Holocaust and as Holocaust victims, rather than in the context of World War II, as civilians caught between the Allies and Axis' armies.[190] Therefore, he notes:

> *Despite their distance from the war in Europe and the centers of extermination, the Jews of North Africa were not spared persecution and death in the period of the Shoah. The political stance of indifference and the government structure meant that the fate of the Jews of the Maghreb was not the same as the fate of the Jews in Europe. And yet, despite differences […] the events of the Holocaust did not pass over the Jews of North Africa altogether.*[191]

The continuation of this trend in subsequent years can be seen in the presentation of North African Jewry's fate as part and parcel of the Holocaust. Tabibian (2008) explains that the suffering of the North African Jews was part of the Holocaust since "the racial Nazi ideology referred to all Jews," as deemed indicated in "a telegram by ambassador [Joachim von] Ribbentrop in Rome on 13 January 1943 [which] reiterated that the architects of German Nazi policies considered Jews in all places enemies."[192] Interestingly, it is Naveh's (2009) extensive discussion of the fate of Jews in North Africa in 2009 that shows the effect of other textbooks' content on textbook writers and the incorporation of endorsed historiography. In contrast to his 1994 book, Naveh dedicates five pages to Jewish life during the Second World War in North

[189] Keren, *Shoah,* 138.
[190] According to Hanna Yablonka, this latter interpretation had been dominant in the first decades following the war. Yablonka, "Oriental," 98.
[191] The inclusion of North African Jews in the Holocaust is further reinforced by Gutman in the questions that follow this text, which ask the students to discuss the relationship between European rule and the fate of the Jews in North Africa during the Holocaust. Gutman, *Shoah*, 157.
[192] Avieli-Tabibian, *Travel,* 238-240.

Africa. Furthermore, on the last two pages, Naveh not only presents his readers with a historiographical reasoning for its inclusion in this book, but also offers arguments for the incorporation of the events in North Africa in the framework of the Holocaust:

> *For many years historians of the Shoah did not treat the fate of the Jews in North Africa in the period of the Second World War as part of the Shoah of the Jewish people. Today, most historians think that the events that were experienced by Jews in North Africa are part of the Shoah because of the similarities [in the adopted policies]. In Chapter 16, you will find that the Germans included the Jews of North Africa in the comprehensive plan of the Final Solution, which was discussed at the Wannsee Conference, and therefore it is possible to surmise that if their control had continued, the fate of the Jews in Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco would have been the same [as that] of the murdered Jews in Europe.*[193]

While the content of the above paragraph uses other historians' arguments as a basis for the inclusion of Sephardic Jews in the Holocaust, the justification for this practice is reinforced in the chapter summary in which Naveh resolutely concludes: "The fate of the Jews of Western Europe, Central Europe and Southern Europe and Northern Africa was no different in principle from the fate of the Eastern European Jews."[194]

### The Holocaust and Israel

It is clear that an emphasis on the uniqueness of the Holocaust for the entire Jewish nation in an Israeli-Jewish classroom bolsters its relevance for that group; and a clear articulation of this particular pertinence also exists in several of the examined textbooks. Various methods have been discerned, which include discussing the central role of the Holocaust for all Israeli-Jews — indicated by usage of "we" — and drawing a direct link between the Holocaust and the establishment of the state of Israel. The first method can be found in Naveh's 1994 book in

[193] Naveh, *Totalitarianism,* 2401/1.
[194] Ibid., 241.

which Naveh refers to the unique relation that Israeli-Jews have with the Holocaust and, at the same time, reinforces the continuation of this connection by including himself: "As Jews, we have, of course, a unique connection to the Holocaust, and therefore it takes up extensive place in the curriculum and culture of the state of Israel […] The following chapter tries to lay out central dilemmas of the Shoah — which continue — for us as human beings, as Jews and as Israelis, and examines the possibility of attributing meaning to it."[195] A similar practice can be discerned in textbooks written by Keren and Gutman who, like Naveh, situate themselves among the students in order to relay the importance of the Holocaust and its teaching. Keren thus argues: "For good or for bad, the Shoah is part of the human experience and it is up to us to learn it first and foremost as human beings. But not only in this manner, we learn it as Jews."[196] In this context, usage of "we" or "us" is meant to further legitimize the Holocaust's importance for Israeli-Jewish society because, as Theo van Leeuwen explained, when the "I" is someone in whom authority is vested, such as a textbook writer, the content is deemed credible.[197] The relevance of the Holocaust is also underscored by referring to the students' own assumed (familial) dealings with the Holocaust. Based on his understanding of the students' preoccupations, Naveh therefore promises in his introduction that his book "will create an understanding among you of your parents and grandparents [in order] to shape your own world views and deal in a better way with that [which] is presented each day and each hour on television, on the radio and in the newspapers."[198] Using similar argumentation, Keren intends that "the book that is in front of you will open paths up for you to deal with the events of the Shoah and will give you the means to understand, even if only partially, one of the

[195] Naveh, *Order*, 134.
[196] Keren, *Shoah,* Introduction.
[197] Theo van Leeuwen, "Legitimation in discourse and communication," *Discourse & Communication* 1 (2007): 94.
[198] Naveh, *Tomorrow*, Introduction.

unprecedented events that occurred in the 20th century and of which the Jews were the main victims."[199]

The connection between the Holocaust and the state of Israel is also signaled in the books' structural makeup. Of the examined books, seven books discussed the Holocaust and, subsequently, the establishment of the state of Israel, thereby drawing a direct connection between the two (see Appendix 2). More explicit connections between the Holocaust and the establishment of Israel can be seen in the textbooks' content, including in Keren's 1999 book in which she maintains:

> *Between the years 1948-1949, close to 200,000 Jewish survivors of the Shoah came to Israel. The most substantial number of immigrants (75 percent) came in these years. More than 60 percent of them were of the age between 15 and 29 and 16 percent of them were between 30 and 44. This fact was crucial for the involvement of survivors of the Shoah in the battle for independence and the building of the new state. Many of them immediately became fighters in the War of Independence and were involved in the development of the state of Israel in the years that followed.*[200]

A few pages further, Keren even notes, somewhat controversially, that without the Holocaust, it is doubtful that Zionism would have been realized: "As such, the Holocaust is, in the deepest sense, one of the reasons and justifications of the Zionist enterprise, as is reflected in the state of Israel."[201] The connection between the Holocaust and the establishment of Israel is not only emphasized in books that principally deal with the Holocaust. Elizier Domke's 2009 book 'Nationality: Building a State in the Middle East' describes itself as "the successor to [the textbook] 'Totalitarianism and Shoah'" and Yigal Msaol's 2014 book 'Creating a Democratic Jewish State in the Middle East' is introduced with the following sentences: "It is impossible to

[199] Ibid., Introduction.
[200] Ibid., 167.
[201] Ibid., 171.

ignore the difference between the depth of the crisis and the extent of Zionist achievement and the rapid transition 'from Shoah to revival'."[202] The presentation of this battle for revival will be the subject of the remainder of this chapter.

## The 1948 War in Israeli Textbooks

Similarly to textbooks dealing with the Holocaust, Israeli history books on the 1948 War and the mass displacement of Palestinians have been divided into various periods. Perhaps the most prolific historian to discuss the portrayal of the 1948 War and its aftermath is Elie Podeh. In two works published in 2000, Podeh examines the evolution of the presentation of the 1948 War in Israeli textbooks from the 1950s until the late 1990s based on the identification of three generations of textbooks. Podeh notes that the historical narrative in the first generation of textbooks was laden with pathos, while having simplistic, one-sided and often blatantly distorted content. These distortions included a number of "Zionist myths," one of which was the depiction of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a battle of "the few against the many," a contemporary paradigm of the biblical David and Goliath, which was invoked to prove how the Jews, as throughout their history, were a persecuted minority.[203] Since early textbooks described the 1948 War exclusively from an Israeli-Jewish point of view, the fact that the Palestinians and other Arabs considered the war a catastrophe was not mentioned.[204] Rather, textbooks written in the 1950s and 1960s argued that Israel had played no part in creating "the refugee problem," and that Palestinians, in line with traditional Zionist scholarship,[205] had simply fled the country as a result of calls by their

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[202] Elizier Domke, *Nationality: Building a State in the Middle East* (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 2009), Introduction; Yigal Msaol, *Creating a Democratic Jewish state in the Middle East – The Establishment of the State of Israel* (Ma'ale Adumim: Hi-School Books, 2014), Introduction.
[203] Podeh, "History," 76/77. Also see: Rafi Nets-Zehngut, "Israeli Approved Textbooks and the 1948 Palestinian Exodus," *Israel Studies* 18 (2013): 49.
[204] Podeh, *Arab-Israeli,* 102.
[205] See, for instance, Netanel Lorch, *The edge of the sword: Israel's War of Independence, 1947-1949* (New York: Putnam, 1961), 286.

leaders despite Israeli attempts to persuade them to stay. As such, a textbook published in 1954 noted that "it was the Arab leadership's promise that the victorious Arab armies would return the refugees to their homes which, in fact, animated and fueled the mass flight."[206] While Podeh identifies a middle phase or a second generation of textbooks concerning the 1948 War, lasting from 1967-1984/5, the content appears very similar to the earlier phase as blame was firmly placed with the refugees themselves and the Arab leadership, indicated through the use of words such as "flight," "abandon," "exit," "desert," "vacate," and so on.[207] One notable departure that does occur in the content of second-generation textbooks is the inclusion of Plan D [Heb. *Tokhnit Dalet*],[208] albeit in a heavily censored format, as parts of the plan which might evidence expulsion practices were omitted in a bid to not damage Israel's image.[209]

According to various Israeli scholars, including Podeh, Rafi Nets-Zehngut and Firer, a more critical and informed historical narrative on the 1948 War has been presented in Israeli textbooks since the 1990s as a result of the changes in Israeli society, the peace process and the emergence of a new historiography, which debunked earlier Zionist myths concerning the establishment of the Israeli state.[210] The analysis below, however, will show that while a more critical narrative of the 1948 War is indeed present in textbooks since 1994, remnants of old myths and historiography remain.

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[206] Podeh, *Arab-Israeli*, 105, 6.
[207] Ibid., 105, 107.
[208] In March 1948, following several military failures, the Haganah recognized the need for a strategic plan to defend the Jewish state in the event of an Arab invasion once the British finally evacuated the country. The result was Plan D, which called for a series of offensive operations to establish a Jewish territorial continuum from Metullah in the north to Revivim in the south. It stipulated that Arab villages — principally those that could not be permanently controlled — were to be destroyed. The villages were to be encircled and searched for both weapons and irregular forces. In cases where opposition was encountered, the enemy forces were to be annihilated and the villagers expelled across the border. Plan D was put into operation much earlier than expected, as part of Operation Nachshon. One of its objectives was "to clear a whole area, permanently, of Arab villages and hostile or potentially hostile villagers." Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 236; Elie Podeh, "History", 99.
[209] Podeh, *Arab-Israeli*, 108.
[210] Elie Podeh, "History", 84; Nets-Zehngut, "Israeli," 48-54.

Ten history books, published between the period 1994 and 2014, were examined as part of this case study. In these textbooks, 'The War of Independence', as it is called in Israeli textbooks, is discussed at length across dozens of pages which note the various stages of the war (civil and international; Yishuv forces and state forces), the involvement of different armed (Jewish) factions and the establishment of the Israeli state, among other themes. The analysis below will focus primarily on the presentation of what Morris in 1987 termed 'the birth of the refugee problem'.[211] In order to determine whether the narrative in the textbooks has become more critical, two main topics will be examined. Firstly, attention will center on the explanations given for the mass displacement of Palestinians. Textbooks stating that Palestinians left willingly for various reasons, e.g., due to fear, societal collapse or as a result of calls by their own or other Arab leaders, will be considered to contain a Zionist narrative. Textbooks claiming that some Palestinians left voluntarily while a significant number were expelled will be considered revisionist. A narrative will be labelled Zionist-critical if it maintains that most Palestinians left willingly while an insignificant number were expelled.[212] Secondly, this case study will examine whether the suffering of Palestinians and the war's effects on Palestinian society are included in the narrative. Here, emphasis will be placed on the incorporation of the Palestinian narrative of the war, including usage of the Palestinian designation of the war — *al-Nakba* — and recognition of the loss, both material and personal, that occurred as a consequence of mass displacement.

[211] Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
[212] Adopted from Nets-Zehngut. Nets-Zehngut, "Israeli," 47.

## The origins of mass displacement in the 1948 War

The first book examined as part of this case study, Naveh's 1994 textbook, clearly embodies the old Zionist narrative with regard to the description of Palestinian displacement in 1948 because, as Naveh explained, "the Zionist narrative at that time was the official narrative of the state of Israel, as presented in the various publications that were available."[213] In accordance with this narrative, Naveh writes: "the Arab inhabitants of *ha-aretz* [Heb. the land (of Israel)] started to flee en masse and the Arab settlements in *Eretz* Israel were defeated [and] more than 600,000 Arab inhabitants were uprooted from their homes and settlements and fled the country, especially to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which fell under the control of the Jordanian Legion."[214] Emblematic of Education Minister Amnon Rubinstein's anti-New Historian stance,[215] any responsibility of the Jewish forces in the displacement of these "Arab inhabitants" or the Plan Dalet initiative is omitted. Rather, Naveh notes somewhat cryptically that "when it became clear that the Arab initiative caused the great powers to reconsider their support for the [UN] partition plan, the leaders of the Yishuv decided to reach a decision in the battlefield and take control […]."[216]

In the years following the publication of Naveh's book, a new generation of textbooks was written in accordance with the new history curriculum (adopted in 1995)[217] and, at times, revisionist historiography. The books published in this period indicate a transition point as both Zionist-critical and revisionist narratives can be identified. The inclusion of a revisionist

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[213] Ibid., 56.
[214] Naveh, *Order*, 203/4.
[215] In 1995, Rubinstein, the Minister of Education, Culture and Sport (1993-1996), attacked the New Historians, arguing that they aimed to "bury" Zionism by "presenting it as an essentially colonialist and racist movement, attributing to it all the evils of darkened nationalism, without displaying towards it the slightest sympathy that the left-wing usually elicits towards national liberation movements; and above all, by considering the very establishment of Israel as an act of villainy and plunder." Uri Ram, "Postnationalist Pasts: The Case of Israel," *Social Science History* 22: 4 (1998): 536.
[216] Naveh, *Order*, 203.
[217] Elie Podeh, "History", 74.

narrative, however, does not necessarily imply that it has been adopted; instead, two further books written in this period firmly reject the revisionist stance, creating a revisionist-critical narrative. The presence of such a revisionist-critical account can be seen in Bar-Navi's 1998 textbook which asserts that "Both sides have conflicting accounts. The Israelis accuse Arabs of propaganda which, according to their claims, encouraged the Arabs of Israel to temporarily leave their homeland until the Arab armies had freed it from the hands of the Zionists. The Arabs, from their side, declare that the Arab citizens were ousted from their land and that the expulsion from *ha-aretz* was part of the Zionist plan — meaning that they had planned it from the start."[218] According to Bar-Navi, both these explanations are false and, instead, he points out that the reasons for the flight are complex and can be summed up in one word: "war."[219] Domke's 1999 book 'The World and the Jews in Past Generations' also acknowledges the existence of revisionist historiography by remarking in the introduction that "The new historians caused - and still arouse - controversy and are often accused of being extremely anti-Zionist."[220] Accordingly, Domke steers clear from new historiography and contends that following the war "there were Arab cities that had been occupied and those that had become empty [and] approximately 400 Arab villages [that] were abandoned." Usage of the words "abandoned" and "empty" clearly aim to place responsibility in the hands of the Palestinians. Nevertheless, it is in this book that a new trend can be identified which rejects the notion of an expulsion order or systematic expulsions, but which acknowledges individual cases of expulsion in line with a Zionist-critical narrative. Thus, Domke alleges in one sentence that "there were those who fled and those who

[218] Bar-Navi, *20th*, 195.
[219] Ibid., 195.
[220] Elizier Domke, *The World and the Jews in Past Generations, Part 2, 1920-1970* (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1999), 284.

were expelled."[221] A similar practice can be found in Tabibian's 2001 and 2003 textbook in which it is pointed out that although there were individual cases of expulsion that were authorized by the political echelon, they did not constitute "a premediated plan on behalf of the Jews or the Arabs [because] there was no consistent national policy."[222]

The inclusion of a revisionist narrative in Naveh's 1999 textbook reinforces the notion that historiography can influence textbook authors. In contrast to the Zionist narrative used in his 1994 textbook, Naveh argues that "during the battles many of the country's Arabs were expelled. Some ran away before the arrival of the Jews in the village or in the Arab neighborhood of the city and some were expelled by the occupying force."[223] The teacher's guide is even more explicit and instructs the teacher to emphasize that "in this war for a home and land, acts of expulsion were committed at the hand of the winners. When Yishuv forces conquered mixed cities and Arab communities, they expelled Arab Palestinian inhabitants on more than one occasion. Therefore, this period is called the Nakba (catastrophe or Shoah) by Arabs."[224] In a recent interview, Naveh maintained that the inclusion of the word Nakba in the seldomly-used teacher's guide was a calculated move "to avoid scrutiny from the textbook approval body."[225]

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[221] Ibid., 284.
[222] Avieli-Tabibian, *Era*, 314; Ketzi'a Avieli-Tabibian, *Travel in Time: Building a State in the Middle East* (Ramat Aviv: Matach Publishing, 2003), 119.
[223] Naveh, *Tomorrow*, 138, 143, 146.
[224] Eyal Naveh, *The 20th Century on the Verge of Tomorrow, Teacher's Guide* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1999), 108.
[225] Interviews conducted with Eyal Naveh on March 16 and May 15, 2016.

## Censoring the revisionist narrative

Naveh's above-mentioned trepidation to include the term Nakba in a textbook was not unfounded, as the fate of two textbooks published in the following years shows.[226] 'World of Changes', a history textbook written by Yaakovi (1999), was rejected by the textbook approval committee after initially having been attacked by the Shalem Center Research Institute. In a report published in 2000 entitled 'The Quiet Revolution in the Teaching of Zionist History', the institute found that Yaakovi's book had reduced coverage of the "classic Zionist narrative."[227] Indeed, on its publication, Yaakovi's book presented the most critical account of the 1948 War. While Yaakovi, similarly to Domke and Tabibian, identified "acts of expulsion," 'World of Changes' was the only book that presented a map depicting the departure routes Palestinians had taken in 1948 and, unlike its predecessors, provided exact numbers of those who settled in surrounding Arab countries.[228] Moreover, Yaakovi gave the names of destroyed Palestinian villages. Thus, 1948 Eilat is called by its Arabic name (Um Rash-Rash) and, finally, Yaakovi repeatedly uses the word 'Palestinians' rather than 'Arabs', thereby identifying those who suffered as a result of the war.[229] 'World of Changes', however, never made it to the classroom.[230] Following its publication, the book was removed from the list of approved textbooks by Likud's Minister of Education Limor Livnat at the recommendation of the Knesset Education Committee.[231] While the exact reasoning for the rejection of this textbook remains

[226] Naveh's book did become subject to international and national criticism for its discussion of Jewish and Israeli history, particularly by an entity called the 'Group of Professors for Political and Social Strength'. Nets-Zehngut, "Israeli," 56, 57.
[227] Yoram Hazony, Michael B. Oren, Daniel Polisar, *The Quiet Revolution in the Teaching of Zionist History: A Comparative Study of Education Ministry Textbooks on the 20th Century* (Shalem Press, 2000), 2.
[228] Yaakovi, *World,* 162/3.
[229] Ibid., 163.
[230] Peled-Elhanan, *Palestine*, 57.
[231] Lisa Strömbom, "Identity Shifts and Conflict Transformation – Probing the Israeli History Debates," *Mediterranean Politics* 18 (2013): 90; Eva Etzioni-Halevy, *The Divided People: Can Israel's Breakup be Stopped?* (Lanham; Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002), 135.

ambiguous, Naveh argues that this decision was in line with existent political efforts, particularly by politicians such as Ariel Sharon and Livnat, to rid educational textbooks and Israeli society of revisionist history and instead emphasize Zionist values.[232]

The rejection of the original version of the second book, entitled 'Nationality: Building a State in the Middle East' (2009), is less shrouded in ambiguity. The book, which was written by Domke in accordance with the Bartal Committee's curriculum plan, presented a Zionist-critical narrative of the 1948 War.[233] In coherence with this narrative, Domke notes that Palestinians were encouraged to leave "with the help of propaganda and psychological warfare and, in some cases, like Ramla and Lod, [the Jews] even expelled them."[234] The uproar that followed the publication of the book, however, did not focus on Domke's adherence to a Zionist-critical narrative; rather, Domke's book fell subject to scrutiny due to its exposure of the Palestinian narrative of the war. Domke's book initially included Palestinian and Israeli sources that discussed the reasons for Palestinians leaving their homes during the war under the heading 'What caused the departure of the Palestinian refugees from the territory of Israel, flight or expulsion?'. The first interpretation represented the stance of Yohanan Cohen in line with the arguments presented in his 1962 book 'The Key is in the Hands of the Arabs', in which Cohen asserts that Arab leaders already at the beginning of 1948 called on Arab civilians to temporarily move to neighboring countries in order to escape being hit by the war and in order to secure a fast victory.[235] Presenting a vastly different position to Cohen's, the Palestinian historian Walid

[232] Eyal Naveh, *Travel into the Past: Disputes on historical issues in Israel* (Forthcoming, 2016), 117 [in Hebrew].
[233] Between 1995 and 2003, Yisrael Bartal chaired the Israeli high-school curriculum committee which issued recommendations for pedagogical methodologies that would survey Zionist issues in the broad context of Jewish history and world history. Mark Avrum Ehrlich, *Encyclopedia of the Jewish Diaspora: Origins, Experiences, and Culture, Volume 1* (Santa Barbara; Denver; Oxford; ABC-CLIO, 2009), 348.
[234] Domke, *Nationality*, 107.
[235] Ibid., 107, 108; Eyal Naveh, *Travel*, 117.

Khalidi, echoing his 1959 article,[236] argued that ethnic cleansing by Jewish forces took place even before the establishment of the state, specifying that:

> *13 operations were carried out within the framework of Plan Dalet […] it was an historic opportunity [for Jews] to cleanse ha-aretz Israel of Arabs […] on the military level, the method [used] consisted of massive surprise attacks on Palestinian civilians [who were] weakened by ongoing shelling. On the psychological level, loudspeakers reran broadcasts and speeches, warning of diseases and punishments and offering escape routes from death. This was accompanied by calculated acts of cruelty against small villages, which encouraged flight from villages and […] cities.*[237]

Following its publication, the MOE received a complaint from a history teacher at Tel-Hay Teacher College regarding the inclusion of Khalidi's stance and his reference to "ethnic cleansing."[238] Subsequently, the MOE requested to remove all Palestinian sources and to substitute them either with Palestinian texts that were "more faithful to reality" or with Israeli sources.[239] The reason given was that the author had not considered the power of Khalidi's text and the effect if might have on students. Another argument, presented in a *Haaretz* article by a history teacher, opined that it was impossible to teach this book to students because they had no tools to differentiate between an Arab propagandist and an impartial researcher. In the teacher's view, presenting Israeli-held arguments as being equal to the claims of an Arab propagandist was similar to presenting the claims of the Nazis and the counter-claims of the Jews, as the teacher noted: "according to this logic, the next step will be to present the Protocols of the Elders of Zion or Holocaust denial and leave the students with the question: Did it happen or not?."[240] In order to have the book republished, the authors replaced the Palestinian source with the most

[236] Walid Khalidi, "Why Did the Palestinians Leave, Revisited," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 34:2 (2005): 42-54.
[237] Domke, *Nationality*, 108-109.
[238] Peled-Elhanan, *Palestine*, 23.
[239] Ibid., 216.
[240] Eyal Naveh, *Travel*, 117, 118.

acceptable revisionist historian in Israel: Morris. Using Morris' influential book, 'The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem', the new citation pointed out that there was no political decision by the Jews to expel the Arabs and there was also no evidence to suggest that Arabs leaders called [on] them to leave; rather, the flight was due to circumstances on the ground, the result of direct deportation by *Tzahal* [Heb. army] forces and the psychological warfare that accompanied it.[241]

The treatment of Domke's book further highlights the influence ministers can have on the content of textbooks in Israel. At the beginning of 2009, the government was replaced, and Gideon Saar was appointed Minister of Education in Benjamin Netanyahu's government. According to the former superintendent for history, Saar was approached by the former head of the Mossad, Efraim Halevy, and asked to remove the Khalidi quote as "he had done terrible things to us."[242] While Saar does not corroborate this story, in a recent interview he noted his criticism of the inclusion of Khalidi's position and the need to rectify the mistakes of his Labor predecessor, Yuli Tamir.[243] The current superintendent of history, Orna Katz, elaborated further on Saar's response to Domke's book. According to her, two different arguments came up following the book's publication. Firstly, she noted that Khalidi's reference to ethnic cleansing was unacceptable in an Israeli book, as it constituted a "fundamentally false claim" and created an "unprofessional bias towards the Palestinian narrative."[244] Secondly, the fact that Khalidi is a professor meant that Israeli educators were fearful that students would believe him due to his authoritative position.[245]

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[241] Domke, *World,* 109.
[242] Interview conducted with Michael Yaron on April 14, 2016.
[243] Interview conducted with Gideon Saar on May 1, 2016.
[244] Orna Katz, "Response to Professor Nurit Peled-Elhanan," *Ministry of Education* (Undated), 3.
[245] Interview conducted with Orna Katz on 31 March 2016.

Following the exclusion of Khalidi's stance, the Palestinian narrative of a systematic policy of expulsion in 1948 does not reappear. Instead, the final book analyzed in this case study, Msaol's 2014 book, concludes that "It is important to emphasize that these [expulsion] actions did not stem from a desire for ethnic cleansing […] and did not stem from an order by the political echelon […] Acts of expulsion were not consistent and were affected by the disorder that prevailed in the war."[246] Furthermore, the sources included in this final work consist solely of Israeli political and army officials which seek to reinforce Msaol's Zionist-critical thesis. Accordingly, former Foreign Minister Moshe Sharet is cited saying that Arabs left on their own accord: "the enemy attacker had created this […] and he has to bear the consequences of this and all the remaining land and houses that remained […] All this war booty, we deserved it as compensation for the bloodshed, for the destruction […] it is a natural compensation [...]."[247] An almost identical stance is presented by the former Minister of Agriculture, Aharon Zisling, who notes that while hundreds of thousands of Arabs were expelled from *ha-aretz*, this was "due to their own fault" which will lead them to "cause the entire Middle East to wage war against us [and] they will carry in them an aspiration for revenge."[248]

### The presentation of Palestinian suffering in the 1948 War

Despite a continual emphasis on Palestinian culpability for the war and its outcome, the immediate suffering endured by Palestinians during and in the wake of the 1948 War is acknowledged in Israeli textbooks by mentioning the vast number of Palestinian refugees. The textbooks examined in this case study place the number at between 540,000 and 750,000,

[246] Msaol, *Creating,* 150.
[247] Ibid., 153.
[248] Ibid., 153.

roughly similar to the estimates offered by Morris in his 2004 book 'The Birth Revisited'.[249] The analysis showed that whereas textbooks published between 1994 and 1999 offer broader ranges based on different Israeli estimates, textbooks published since 2003 stipulate a number of 650,000. Only one book, 'Modern Times II' published in 1999 by Bar-Navi and Naveh, includes the higher number of Palestinian refugees (one million) purported by "the Arabs."[250] The establishment of refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and other neighboring Arab countries to temporarily house these refugees is also noted across the textbooks examined. Yet, the trying living conditions in these camps as a result of poverty, disease and hunger are only described in Msaol's 2014 book and Domke's edited 2009 textbook.[251] Still, it is unlikely that any discussion of the hardship refugees faced following the war will elicit empathetic identification by the students. While the books acknowledge that Israel refused to absorb the refugees after the war, leading to a de facto expulsion of all refugees regardless of earlier circumstances, this act is justified through presenting the refugees as a security issue and a demographic threat to the newly-established Jewish state. Domke (1999), for example, notes that at the end of the war, Israel was faced with three main threats. One of these constituted the presence of "hundreds of thousands of refugees near the Israeli borders [whose return] Israel saw as a threat to its existence." On the following page, the author notes that this threat was due to the "infiltration of refugees into Israel which later became a war of terrorism."[252] The existence of a security threat also appears in Tabibian's 2003 textbook and Msaol's 2014 history book, as

[249] Benny Morris concludes that the number of Palestinian refugees displaced was between 600,000 and 760,000. Morris, *Birth,* 602-4.
[250] Eli Bar-Navi and Eyal Naveh, *Modern Times, Part II 1920-2000* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Books, 1999), 238.
[251] Msaol, *Creating,* 148, 151; Domke, *Nationality*, 107.
[252] Domke, *World,* 284, 285.

illustrated in the usage of normative language, including "infiltration" [Heb. *histan'nut*][253] and "hostile refugees."[254]

## The Nakba in Israeli textbooks

Further minimization of the refugees' trials occurs in the discussion of the positive and practical effects of the mass Palestinian exodus. Yaakovi (1999) writes that the housing problem that developed in the 1950s as a result of mass immigration from European and Arab countries to an extent was solved by housing new Jewish immigrants in former Palestinian villages and cities, as occurred in '*Ayn Hawd*, which was later changed to *Ein Hod*.[255] In a similar vein, Naveh and Bar-Navi argue that, while in Palestinian collective memory the 1948 War is a disaster, a Nakba, due to the "loss of land, and also [as a result of] becoming a nation of refugees […] in the eyes of the Israelis, the fleeing of the Palestinians solved, in part, a formidable demographic problem. And even a moderate person like Chaim Weizmann spoke in this context of a miracle."[256]

The inclusion of the term 'Nakba' and its current role in Palestinian identity represents an anomalous phenomenon in Israeli textbooks. In addition to Naveh and Bar-Navi's 1999 textbook, the term can only be found in Tabibian's 2001 and 2003 textbooks which point out that "the Arabs call the 1948 War, what we call the War of Independence, al-Nakba, which in Arabic means catastrophe."[257] According to Nurit Peled-Elhanan, one of the staunchest critics of Israeli textbooks, the reason for the lack of a standard discussion of the Nakba in Israeli textbooks is due to fear of 'empathic unsettlement'. This term, coined by Dominick LaCapra in 2001, refers to the response of secondary witnesses — including historians — to traumatic events which

[253] Avieli-Tabibian, *Building*, 171; Msaol, *Creating*, 151.
[254] Bar-Navi, *20th*, 195.
[255] Yaakovi, *World,* 175/6.
[256] Bar-Navi and Naveh, *Modern*, 239.
[257] Avieli-Tabibian, *Era*, 314. Also see: Avieli-Tabibian, *Building*, 126, 127.

should involve empathic unsettlement, entailing, in LaCapra's words, "being responsive to the traumatic experience of others."[258] In the Israeli context, Peled-Elhanan notes, such empathic unsettlement regarding Palestinian victimhood during the Nakba or in the following years would risk de-legitimizing the Israeli-Zionist narrative.[259] The validity of this argument is evidenced by events that took place in the summer of 2007, when Education Minister Tamir approved adding the term Nakba to textbooks for the 'Israeli-Arab' educational sector. In the wake of this decision, a political and media storm erupted and Tamir's approval of the term was described as propaganda, and calls were made for her removal by the opposition leader at the time, Netanyahu.[260] Particular focus lay on the Arabic version of one Hebrew textbook for primary school children, entitled 'Living together in Israel'. In this book, the 1948 War was elaborated on and included the term Nakba: "The Arabs call the war 'Nakba' which means war of disaster and loss […] many Arabs and Jews were killed in the war. Some Arabs citizens were forced to leave their homes and others were expelled, and they became refugees in neighboring Arab states. Most of the Arabs who remained in *ha-aretz* continued to live in their communities, but some of them became refugees and were forced to live in other Arab communities in the Israeli state as their villages were destroyed in the war and after it."[261]

Following the publication of the book, the education committee of the Knesset, in which future Minister of Education Saar took part, convened and called for the excision of the Nakba

[258] Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 41.
[259] Peled-Elhanan, *Palestine*, 64. Also see: Ilan Gur-Ze'ev, *Philosophy, politics and education in Israel* (Haifa: Haifa University Press, 1999), 59 [in Hebrew].
[260] MK Ronit Tirosh (Kadima [Heb. forward]), the director general of the Ministry of Education, argued that the decision was similar to propaganda broadcasts by Hamas and that it would fuel hatred between people. On the other hand, Palestinian politicians welcomed the decision and saw it as the beginning of a process of reconciliation. Naveh, *Travel,* 12.
[261] Naveh, *Travel,* 111.

from the textbook.[262] In a recent interview, Saar explained his stance at the time by arguing that any reference to the Nakba is unacceptable as it might give "Arab students the feeling that they are living in a state that was born out of sin [and] one cannot say that the establishment of Israel was a curse or disaster for them. They waged a war. They lost the war and that's it […] When you translate the word Nakba, the word means Holocaust. You need to leave our Holocaust alone. The formation of this state is not a Holocaust to its Arab citizens. It is a blessing to our Arab citizens."[263]

Upon assuming the role of Minister of Education in 2009, Saar's quest to erase the Nakba from the Israeli educational system was fueled by the introduction of the Nakba Law. This law did not exclude the mentioning of the Nakba, but it did forbid governmental agencies or those that received governmental funding from organizing or financing activities concerning the Palestinian Nakba.[264] Although educational officials, such as Katz, are quick to point out that the Nakba Bill does not have any effect on textbooks, in reality, the law has made it more problematic to deal with the Nakba in any societal sphere. According to Kashti, any apprehension is further reinforced as a result of the bill's ambiguity, which has meant that teachers and textbook writers steer clear of any mention of the Nakba.[265]

While the above-mentioned initiatives to curb the discussion of the Nakba took place in a public sphere, a more implicit rejection of the Palestinian narrative occurred prior to the introduction of the Nakba Law and the 2007 textbook controversy. In 2000, two Israeli historians and educators, Naveh and Dan Bar-On, and a Palestinian professor of education, Sami Adwan,

[262] The ministry rejected the committee's recommendations and the book was used in the Arab sector. Naveh, *Travel,* 112/3.
[263] Interview conducted with Gideon Saar on May 1, 2016.
[264] Naveh, *Travel,* 114.
[265] Peled-Elhanan, *Palestine*, 15.

embarked on an educational project with the aim of enabling Palestinian and Israeli high-school pupils to understand the other's historical perception.[266] By undertaking workshops with Palestinians and Israeli teachers, Bar-On, Naveh and Adwan put together a textbook entitled *Side by Side* which encompassed Israeli and Palestinian narratives of key historical milestones in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the 1948 War. While the Israeli narrative largely follows the content of Naveh's 1999 textbook mentioned above, the Palestinian narrative is more descriptive, as several Palestinian eyewitness accounts are incorporated in the narrative. The narrative offers first-hand testimony of the Deir Yassin massacre and of the suffering that accompanied the years after the mass exodus, including in photographs of former Palestinian villages and houses which show the destruction and conversion of former Arab villages into Israeli-Jewish ones.[267] The aim of the project, according to Naveh and Adwan, was to provide an additional means for teachers in Palestinian and Israeli schools to educate their pupils on the other's narrative. Nevertheless, both in Palestinian and Israeli society, the project became subject to scrutiny.[268] In the Israeli context, this occurred at the state level. Following usage of the booklet in six schools, several teachers were summoned to the MOE and received letters from the former superintendent, Yaron, informing them that their jobs would be at risk if they continued with the project.[269] Moreover, Livnat, the Minister of Education at the time, forbade usage of the booklet in classrooms, making the project less interesting to donors who desired its practical applicability.[270]

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[266] Sami Adwan, Dan Bar-On, Eyal Naveh, *Side by Side: Parallel Histories of Israeli Palestine* (Prime, 2012), ix, x.
[267] Sami Adwan, Dan Bar-On, Eyal Naveh, *Learning Each Other's Narrative: Palestinians and Israelis* (Beit Jallah: Prime, 2003), 20-36.
[268] Interview conducted with Eyal Naveh on March 16 and May 15, 2016; interview conducted with Sami Adwan May 13, 2016.
[269] Naveh, *Travel,* 122.
[270] Interviews conducted with Eyal Naveh on March 16 and May 15, 2016.

According to Katz, who was involved in the evaluation of the *Side by Side* project for the MOE, the book's rejection did not occur on political grounds, but rather as a result of historical and pedagogical reasons. In direct contrast to research findings on adolescent pedagogy,[271] she contends that the presentation of two narratives is problematic, as "young pupils without the historical knowledge cannot decide who is right and who is wrong. You need to first teach them the story and what happened." Moreover, Katz questioned the historical veracity of the content: "There were total lies in the content and it just was not good. When you are teaching that for the Palestinians the War of Independence was a Nakba, that for them it was a disaster, that is wrong." Echoing Golda Meir's infamous 1969 statement, Katz argues that the falsity of the project also lay in the usage of the word 'Palestinians'.[272] As she notes: "They weren't called Palestinians then. They didn't accept the UN Resolution, and they started the war, with killing and terror. When you read the Palestinian narrative, this is not mentioned at all. It is like Jews came out of nowhere and took their houses. This is not a narrative."[273] Despite these comments, Katz vehemently opposes any mention of censorship in Israeli textbooks. Instead, she maintains that attention should be rendered to the Palestinian education system which, according to her, is guilty of indoctrination, stimulating hatred and the exclusion of others.[274]

[271] Conflict researchers have identified adolescence as an appropriate stage to create opportunities for open dialogue among representatives of conflicted groups, as adolescents have been found to be open to new attitudes and ideologies. See: John Wallach and Michael Wallach, *The enemy has a face: The seeds of peace experience* (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace, 2000); Sagy, Kaplan and Adwan, "Interpretations," 26-38.
[272] In an interview with *The Sunday Times* published on the June 15, 1969, Meir stated that "There is no such thing as a Palestinian people... They did not exist." Cited in Charles Tripp, *The Power and the People: Paths of Resistance in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 29.
[273] Interview conducted with Orna Katz on 31 March 2016.
[274] In her paper on Peled-Elhanan's work, Katz also mentions militarism and glorification of death as part of Palestinian education. Katz, "Response," 3.

## Concluding Remarks

Reflecting on his tenure as Minister of Education, Piron noted that it was only when he retired from political life that he realized that the Holocaust was being manipulated into a "national message," which emphasizes the Holocaust's unique relevance to Jews and presents "the state as the answer to the Holocaust."[275] Piron's delayed recognition of an exclusive Israeli-Jewish victimhood narrative means that this chapter identified its manifestations, both implicitly and explicitly, throughout the period under review. Transmitted as 'approved knowledge' to the descendants of the second and third generation, this narrative relies on the explicit portrayal of the Holocaust as a uniquely Jewish tragedy with universal relevance to the entire Jewish nation and, therefore, pertinent to every Israeli-Jewish youth. Simultaneously, the overt minimization of other groups' suffering as a result of Nazi (genocidal) policies is de-emphasized both qualitatively — indicated through the conveyance of incomplete and anachronistic historical information — and quantitatively — as illustrated in numerical aggregation practices. The existence of what Gur-Ze'ev termed the "Zionist metanarrative,"[276] moreover, dictates that educational content deemed to challenge the uniqueness of the Holocaust or the singular fate of the Jews has been discredited, as demonstrated by the fate of Auron's 1994 work with the telling title 'Sensitivity to Human Suffering'.

Beyond informing the de-emphasizing of non-Jewish victims in Israeli textbooks, the identified Zionist metanarrative lays the foundations for further exclusionary manifestations, namely the minimization of the Palestinians' fate in the 1948 War. Textbooks that illustrate a teleological movement from the center(s) of Jewish destruction, 'there' in the *galut* [Heb. exile], to revival, 'here' in Israel — as conveyed implicitly through the narrative structure of seven

[275] Interview conducted with Rabbi Shai Piron on May 30, 2016.
[276] Gur-Ze'ev, "Morality," 171.

analyzed textbooks — advocate a post-Holocaust justification for the Zionist enterprise and, consequently, necessitate an untainted recovery from the preceding crisis. Indeed, despite the textual incorporation of new historiography from the late 90s onwards, the sole emphasis on Morris' work has facilitated the creation of a Zionist-critical narrative in which a systematic policy of expulsion is firmly cast aside; instead, overt reminders of traditional Zionist historiography formulating a miraculous rebirth remain. Yet, official attempts to erase the Palestinian narrative of the war, including its designation as a catastrophe, from the Israeli curriculum should not only be viewed as an outcome of its incompatibility with a Zionist redemption. Rather, as the following chapters will illustrate, post-Oslo Palestinian mnemonics conceive of the Nakba as 'ongoing present' and, as a result, dictate that Israeli recognition of the Palestinian watershed entails an awareness of its contemporary usage as a public confrontation by the downtrodden.

## Chapter Two: The New Palestinian Curriculum

The inauguration of the Palestinian Ministry of Education in 1994 represented a watershed moment for Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. For the first time in history, Palestinians became in charge of their own educational system. The chapter below aims to examine the educational changes pertaining to the representation of the Nakba that followed this historic moment. Through an extensive examination of the various curriculum plans put forward by the Ministry of Education in the wake of the 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement and personal interviews with former ministers and educational officials involved in the curriculum's creation, it becomes apparent that Palestinian history and culture were deemed an integral component of the new Palestinian curriculum. Furthermore, a close reading of the plans' content and the elucidation provided by educational officials reveals that the incorporation of the 1948 War and its catastrophic effects on Palestinian society — highlighted in the continual usage of the term *al-Nakba* — were considered crucial to furthering national identification and a historical consciousness.

Facilitated by the educational self-determination attained through the Oslo Accords, inclusion of the ramifications of the 1948 War should also be viewed as a rectification of the hitherto exclusion of the Nakba and, to a large extent, the 1948 War in Palestinian education under the Jordanian regime (1948-1967) and, following the occupation of the West Bank, under Israeli rule (1967-1994). Yet, while the incorporation of *al-Nakba* formed an historical and political milestone, this chapter demonstrates that the conservative educational outlooks favored by the Palestinian Ministry of Education coupled with the influence of Israeli lobbying efforts led to the production of educational content which lacks a rigorous and in-depth historical analysis of the 1948 War and the mass displacement that ensued, leaving a more formative inter-

and transgenerational transmission of *al-Nakba* to the extra-curricular realms discussed in subsequent sections.

Notwithstanding the existence of a tepid Nakba narrative, the latter part of this chapter argues that its significance can be found implicitly in the overt omission of the Holocaust in the Palestinian curriculum. Thus, reactionary educational policies in the domestic sphere are considered a materialization of a *quid pro quo* which, as a result of Israeli educational and societal treatment of the Nakba, bring about a retributive omission of 'their narrative'. An application of Zygmunt Bauman's theoretical understanding of a victimhood competition amongst groups in conflict together with the conflation of Jews and Israelis underlies this analysis which, in the Palestinian educational context, dictates that the malevolent ethnical epithets used to reference Israeli (i.e., Jewish) participation in the 1948 War legitimize the silencing of Nazi racial policies and their culmination in the Holocaust.

## A Brief History of the Palestinian Educational system

From the days of the Ottoman Empire, when formal schooling first emerged, foreigners administered the education system in the areas now commonly referred to as the Palestinian Territories.[277] According to Denise Asaad, neither the Turks nor their successors, the British, had any interest in developing a genuine Palestinian curriculum and instead designed an educational system that was intended to serve colonial rule.[278] Following the 1948 War, for the first time, Palestinian education came under control of Arab states: the Gaza Strip fell under the Egyptian Administration and Jordan governed the West Bank. Within these territories, the United Nations set up its Relief and Works Agency, UNRWA, in 1950 to, among other things, provide education to Palestinian refugees of the 1948 War. The curriculum in these refugee camps followed the national curriculum of the host countries. Accordingly, the West Bank followed the Jordanian curriculum and Gazan schools adhered to the Egyptian education system.[279] Nathan Brown notes that as these education systems focused on developing Egyptian and Jordanian children and building their national identities, Palestinian identity, culture and history were largely absent from the curriculum. Rather, Palestinian students devoted attention to "pharaonic Egypt and the Hashemite leadership."[280] The Jordanian education system in particular was seen to do nothing to enhance Palestinian identity.[281] Iris Fruchter-Ronen, who performed an analysis of Jordanian history and civics textbooks between 1964 and 1994, demonstrates that Jordanian textbooks up to 1967 made use of three techniques to impede identification with Palestine and, in turn,

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[277] Susan Nicolai, *Fragmented foundations: education and chronic crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory* (UNESCO, 2007), 311.
[278] Denise Assad, "Palestinian Educational Philosophy between Past and Present," *Studies in Philosophy and* Education 19 (2000); 390.
[279] Agustín Velloso de Santisteban, "Palestinian." *International Journal of Educational Developmen*t 22 (2002): 148.
[280] Nathan Brown, *Palestinian politics after the Oslo Accords: resuming Arab Palestine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 198.
[281] Nicolai, *Fragmented*, 33, 34.

stimulate integration into Jordanian society.[282] Firstly, the presence of Palestinians was almost completely ignored; secondly, attempts were made to assimilate Palestinians into the Jordanian state through 'Jordanization'; and thirdly, Palestinians were excluded or perceived as an external factor.[283] A clear example of the first method can be found in the 1966 textbook 'My Little Homeland' [Ar. *Waṭanī al-Saghīr*]. In this book, the nation is divided and defined according to the various groups of residents that comprise it, namely "urban residents, villagers and Bedouins;" and, as a result, ignoring the inhabitants of Palestinian refugee camps, constituting almost a quarter of the total population.[284]

## Education in the wake of the 1967 War

The shortcomings of the Jordanian curriculum were recognized at the time by Palestinians. A study by the planning office of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) conducted in 1972, entitled 'The Palestinian Liberation Organization: An analysis of the (social) educational curriculum in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria', was particularly critical of Jordanian education.[285] The study showed that only 1.3 percent of all geography books and about 1.9 percent of all history books in Jordan referred to Palestine/Palestinian. Furthermore, according to the study, textbooks also failed to mention the 1948 exodus of Palestinians from their homes, their suffering as a result of *al-Nakba* and their aspirations.[286] In his 1973 analysis of the study,

[282] According to Eugene Rogan, this trend in schoolbooks mirrors Jordanian historiography after the 1948 War which attempted to write a narrative that would build consensus between Palestinians and Jordanians around a common national project of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Eugene L. Rogan, "Jordan and 1948: the persistence of an official history," in *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948*, ed. Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 120.
[283] Iris Fruchter-Ronen, "The Palestinian Issue as Constructed in Jordanian School Textbooks, 1964–94: Changes in the National Narrative," *Middle Eastern Studies* 49 (2013): 285.
[284] Y'aqub al-Dajani et al., *My little country* (Amman: Ministry of Education, 1966), 21.
[285] Centre for Planning, *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, An analysis of the educational curriculum in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria* (Beirut, 1972), 14-26, 55-56 [in Arabic].
[286] Ghassan Shabaneh, "Education and Identity: The Role of UNRWA's Education Programmes in the Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 25 (2012): 506.

Ibrahim Abu-Lughod therefore concluded that both the social and science curriculum would leave the Palestinian student:

> *…in no position to identify the major outlines of Palestinian history prior to or during the Mandate Period; he would not be able to identify the specific importance of Palestine to Palestinians or to the Arab people in general; he would remain ignorant of the social and economic life of the Palestinians prior to 1948; and he would remain unaware of the type and nature of the struggle which the Palestinian people waged to prevent the usurpation of Palestine.*[287]

Abu-Lughod's damning appraisal of the Jordanian curriculum was not only a result of disinterest on the Jordanians' part in developing a Palestinian educational system.[288] Rather, the possibility of creating an affinity for Palestinian land and history was further thwarted following the 1967 War, with the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. For the first 12 years of the occupation, the education system fell under the direct authority of the Israeli military governor; after the 1979 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, a separate administration was established: 'The Office of Education for Judea and Samaria'.[289] Although considered a civil administration in nature, the office continued to report to the military and was staffed entirely by military personnel in uniform.[290] Under the control of this office, the quality of the Palestinian education system further declined due to a lack of funding designated by the Israeli government, insufficient educational supplies and facilities and restricted access to schools.[291] Restrictions imposed on freedom of movement were particularly aimed at the West Bank and, in the latter

[287] Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "Educating a community in exile: the Palestinian experience," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 11 (1973): 96.
[288] Shabaneh, "Education," 506.
[289] Samira Alayan, "History Curricula and Textbooks in Palestine: Between Nation Building and Quality Education," in *The Politics of Education Reform in the Middle East: Self and Other in Textbooks and Curricula*, ed. Samira Alayan et al. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 3.
[290] Nicolai, *Fragmented*, 34/35.
[291] Ismael Abu-Saad, "Introduction: A Historical Context of Palestinian Arab Education," *The American Behavioral Scientist* 8 (2006): 1043.

part of the 1978/9 academic year, nearly paralyzed the educational system there, as village students were forbidden to attend schools in the cities and numerous schools were shut shown.[292]

The decline in educational quality was reinforced as a result of what Ismael Abu-Saad terms "an inappropriate curriculum."[293] While the previous Egyptian and Jordanian curricula were kept in place, the Israeli administration censored textbooks with the aim of removing information it considered to be against its interests.[294] As a result of this censorship, the word Palestine was removed, maps were changed to show Israel and its borders inclusive of occupied territory, and anything Israeli censors deemed nationalist was excised and replaced.[295] In addition to changing the content of textbooks, Military Order 107 from August 27, 1967 listed 55 textbooks, including Arabic language books, history, geography, sociology and philosophy books, which were prohibited outright based on their content.[296] Israeli censorship did not only manifest itself in the content of the curriculum, but also in interference in the conveyance of the material. Nicolai notes that the Israeli government paid teachers' salaries and, consequently, was able to select teachers with 'acceptable' political views, and those that were deemed controversial "were dismissed and transferred to distant locations."[297] Still, several studies have

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[292] Muhammad Hallaj, "The Mission of Palestinian Higher Education," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 9 (1980): 94. In February 1988, all schools and universities in the West Bank were closed by the authorities to curb the Intifada. The closure affected 1,174 educational institutions, 303,000 primary and secondary school pupils and 22,000 university and college students. The authorities justified the closures on security ground, describing the schools as "centres of unrest" and "centres of violent protest" and higher education institutions as "traditionally a hot-bed of anti-Israeli protest." Jacqueline Sfeir and Susan Bertoni assert that the disruptions of the First Intifada "led to a long-lasting drop in academic standards at all levels of education." Article 19, *Cry for Change: Israeli Censorship in the Occupied Territories* (London: Library Association Publishing, 1992), 18, 19; Jacqueline Sfeir and Susan Bertoni, *The challenge of education in Palestine: The second Intifada* (Bethlehem University: Faculty of Education, 2003), 11.

[293] Abu-Saad, "Introduction," 1043.

[294] Alayan, "History," 3; Sami Adwan, "A curriculum for peace and coexistence," in *The Psychology of Peace and Conflict: The Israeli–Palestinian Experience* (Jerusalem: Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, 1996), 86.

[295] Salah Alzaroo and Gillian Hunt, "Education in the context of Conflict and Instability: The Palestinian Case. Social Policy and Administration," *Social Policy & Administration* 37 (2003): 170.

[296] Nicolai, *Fragmented*, 55; Neve Gordan, *Israel's Occupation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 253.

[297] Nicolai, *Fragmented*, 25, 35.

confirmed that despite the fact that the curriculum was unrelated to students' reality and aspirations, Palestinian teachers were able to transmit a national consciousness. Velloso de Santisteban, for instance, argues that behind closed doors teachers put forth their own messages which were different and even opposite to the official messages, making them "significant socializing agents," including on the topic of *al-Nakba*.[298] The history of the 1948 War was taught in an extra-curricular fashion, as indicated by one UNRWA teacher who noted: "We strived to give our students elements of their history, so that they would not forget about their homes. We explained to them where they came from, why they were there, and what the right of return meant. All of that technically was prohibited. But that could not be prevented [as] nobody could control what the teacher could tell the student inside the classroom."[299]

## The Stirrings of a New Educational System

Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, on May 4, 1994, the Gaza-Jericho Autonomy agreement was signed. While this agreement did not create a Palestinian state, it did produce the PA, which for the purposes of administration and services acts as a government. The next step in the process, the Agreement on the Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, which was signed on the 29th of August 1994, led to the transfer of power from Israel to the PA in primary social services.[300] In the same month that the agreement was signed, the transfer of authority in the sphere of education from the Israeli Civil Administration to the PA led to the establishment of the first Palestinian Ministry of Education under the direction of the Education Minister, Yasser Amr, the Deputy Minister, Naim Abu-Hummos, and just four other people.[301] As the PA took

[298] Velloso de Santisteban, "Palestinian," 148, 149.
[299] Shabaneh, "Education," 509.
[300] Nicolai, *Fragmented*, 24, 40.
[301] Naim Abu-Hummos was considered a strong educationalist with a PhD in Education from San Francisco State University. Interview conducted with Naim Abu-Hummos on July 19, 2016; Nicolai, *Fragmented*, 44.

control of education, the educational system in place was seen as "an outdated, second-hand amalgam from other cultures;" therefore, Abu-Hummos stated that the first aim of the ministry was to develop a new curriculum.[302]

### The first curriculum development plan

With the financial aid and support from UNESCO and the Italian Ministry of International Cooperation, The Palestinian Curriculum Development Center (PCDC)[303] began its work in 1995.[304] Under the leadership of the contemporary vice-president of Birzeit University, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, a team of educational specialists and intellectuals set out to analyze the previous Jordanian and Egyptian curricula and offer educational principles that would be incorporated in a unified Palestinian curriculum.[305] The results of these analyses and educational recommendations were offered to the Ministry of Education and UNESCO in September 1996 in two volumes entitled 'The Comprehensive Plan for the Development of the First Palestinian Curriculum for General Education'.[306] The former curricula's failure to adequately address the Palestinian people, culture and history is one of the most consistent themes in the entire report which, according to Brown, constituted "perhaps the most stinging and detailed indictment of existing

[302] In 1994, when the MOE was established, it catered to the whole education sector from pre-primary to higher education. In 1996, the MOE was divided into two separate ministries: The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education. In 2002, these two ministries merged again. According to Abu-Hummos, the division in 1996 was a political decision: "Arafat wanted to add certain people to the cabinet, in this case Hanan Daoud Khalil Ashrawi. The consolidation in 2002 might have had something to do with the fact that I had been in charge of higher education and general education before. So it was clear I would be able to do so as a minister." Interview conducted with Naim Abu-Hummos on July 19, 2016; Nicolai, *Fragmented*, 41.
[303] A symposium convened by the PLO and UNESCO on the future of Palestinian education held in August 1990 in Jerusalem recommended the establishment of an institution charged with the creation of a new educational system. In 1993, this led to the founding of the PCDC. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod et al., *The Comprehensive Plan for the Development of the First Palestinian Curriculum for General Education* (Ramallah: Curriculum Development Center, 1996), 5 [in Arabic].
[304] Ibid., 3.
[305] Ibid., 5.
[306] Abu-Lughod et al., *Comprehensive,* 3.

education in Arab countries and the most radical reform proposed by an official body since universal education was introduced."[307] The report repeatedly notes that the Egyptian and Jordanian curricula "are not sufficiently attuned to the national identity [and] do not promote national and patriotic affiliation and do not reflect Palestinian history and reality or Palestinian culture and heritage."[308] Furthermore, the report, similarly to the PLO's 1972 report, concludes that "the curriculum in the Gaza strip is focused on Egyptian identity and on the history and geography of Egypt […] and in the West Bank, the curriculum is focused on Jordanian identity and on Jordanian history and geography."[309] Consequently, the basic philosophy of the proposed curriculum, according to the committee, had to be "rooted in a Palestinian consciousness of its national heritage, its long and significant history and its national affiliation with the land of Palestine and with Arab national culture."[310]

While no concrete method is offered on how national affiliation and Palestinian consciousness could be attained, Ali Jarbawi (2012-2013; 2009-2012), the future Education Minister and Minister of Planning who was in charge of analyzing past history curricula, formulated some fundamental questions that related to the general philosophy of a future history curriculum.[311] The last question that needed to be addressed prior to the creation of the curriculum concerned the teaching of Palestine and was appropriately entitled: 'What Palestine

[307] Brown argues that one of the most radical aspects of the committee's work lay in the fact that it stimulated creative and critical thinking among students. Nathan Brown, *Democracy, History, and the Contest over the Palestinian Curriculum* (London: Adam Institute, 2001), 21; Nathan Brown, "Contesting National Identity in Palestinian Education," in *Israeli and Palestinian narratives of conflict: history's double helix*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 238.
[308] Abu-Lughod et al., *Comprehensive,* 413, 444, 447, 449.
[309] Ibid., 447.
[310] Ibid., 7. For similar statements see: 6, 55, 454.
[311] Other questions included: "Will the new Palestinian curriculum, similarly to the Jordanian one, focus on teaching social studies only (history and geography). Or will it follow the Egyptian curriculum and be more general, which means teaching different subjects that are part of the field of social science, such as economy, sociology and philosophy?." Ibid., 451, 452.

do we teach?'. According to Jarbawi, this question "was of extreme importance, sensitivity and pain […];" yet, Jarbawi points out that in the attempt to determine the answer, further questions needed to be addressed first: "Is it the historical Palestine with all its geography or the Palestine which is a product of the signed political agreements with Israel? And how should Israel be dealt with? Is it merely a neighbor or a state that is founded on the destruction of most of Palestine?."[312] Jarbawi concluded that the curriculum "must acknowledge the realities of the situation without falsifying historical truths and their repercussions in various dimensions in the context of social science instruction."[313] In an interview, Jarbawi reflected on this rather ambiguous conclusion. Firstly, he noted the importance of the geographical representation of Palestine at the time of the report, as its publication coincided with a phase of transition during ongoing peace talks which were supposed to lead to the creation of a Palestinian state in 1999 and, consequently, a final border agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, however, the Abu-Lughod committee was faced with the difficult task of determining what type of maps to use which, according to Jarbawi, led to the decision to use historic pre-1948 maps in the interim.[314] Furthermore, Jarbawi stated that acknowledgement of the historical truth meant the incorporation of the realities of the 1948 War and its effects on the Palestinian people: "We should tell the historical narrative as it is. I have to write that in 1948 we lost 80 percent of our homeland and in 1967 the remaining 20 percent was lost, and we have continued to be under occupation since then." The importance of including the 1948 War in the new curriculum was not only meant to lead to historical accuracy, but also to create a Palestinian consciousness, as

[312] Ibid., 454-55.
[313] Ibid.
[314] Interview conducted with Ali Jarbawi on May 16, 2016. For evidence of the adoption of this practice, see: *Principles of Human Geography for the 6th grade* (Al-Bireh; Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2000), 53.

Jarbawi explained: "The Nakba is part of who we are, it is part of Palestinian nationalism. There are also other important historical moments in Palestinian history, including 1917, 1936 and the Mandate Period. But of these events, the Nakba is most important in Palestinian history. By putting this in the curriculum, it will shape people as Palestinians."[315]

The report's explicit and implicit recommendations were met with apprehension by the Ministry of Education and the report was not offered to the government for approval.[316] Members of the Abu-Lughod committee point to the report's progressive nature as the primary reason for its rejection. Moughrabi, a member of the Abu-Lughod Committee, contends that the report's recommendations were considered too radical and ambitious.[317] Similar comments were made by Jarbawi, who also notes that some of the committee's recommendations were deemed too costly by the ministry.[318] On the other side, Abu-Hummos, who reviewed the report on behalf of the ministry, argued that the report was too esoteric in nature, due to the fact that the committee was mainly made up of professors rather than political decision-makers. As such, Abu-Hummos notes that while the report proved a good starting point, it needed more work; subsequently, another committee was appointed, made up of ministry employees and led by a more conservative figure, Saleh Yassin.[319]

### The second curriculum plan

Under the direction of Yassin, another curriculum plan was drafted and approved by the cabinet and the Palestinian Legislative Council in 1998. As such, this plan can be considered to be the

[315] Interview conducted with Ali Jarbawi on May 16, 2016.
[316] Interview conducted with Naim Abu-Hummos on July 19, 2016.
[317] Interview conducted with Fouad Moughrabi on April 26, 2016.
[318] Interview conducted with Ali Jarbawi on May 16, 2016.
[319] Interview conducted with Naim Abu-Hummos on July 19, 2016; interview conducted with Fouad Moughrabi on April 26, 2016.

official statement of the foundations and aims of the Palestinian educational system.[320] The plan, entitled 'The First Palestinian Curriculum Plan', similarly to the plan put forward by the Abu-Lughod committee, was funded by the Italian Ministry of Education and supported in its execution by UNESCO.[321] In addition to using the 1996 educational plan, the new curriculum plan was based on PLO documents, including the 1988 National Independence Document, and analyses of different educational models in the Arab world and elsewhere.[322] In contrast to the plan presented by the Abu-Lughod committee, the new plan focused more on practical administrative matters relating to the future educational system which included creating a blueprint for the introduction of 250 textbooks to different grades between 2000 and 2004.[323]

*Figure 2.1. The Palestinian textbook production plan*[324]

| *Phase* | Target Grade | Amount of Books | Planned Introduction | Actual Introduction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Phase 1*** | Grades 1 and 6 | 15 books for Grade 1; 17 books for Grade 6 | 2000 | 2000 |
| ***Phase 2*** | Grades 2 and 7 | 15 books for Grade 2; 25 books for Grade 7 | 2001 | 2001 |
| ***Phase 3*** | Grades 3, 8, and 10 | 15 books for Grade 3; 25 books for Grade 8 and 37 books for Grade 10 | 2002 | 2002 Grades 3 and 8<br>2004 Grade 10 |
| ***Phase 4*** | Grades 4, 9, and 11 | 15 books for Grade 4; 25 books for Grade 9 and 23 books for Grade 11 | 2003 | 2003 Grades 4 and 9<br>2005 Grade 11 |
| ***Phase 5*** | Grades 5 and 12 | 17 books for Grade 5; 21 books for Grade 12 | 2004 | 2004 Grades 5 and 10<br>2006 Grade 12 |

[320] Velloso de Santisteban, "Palestinian," 150.
[321] For further information on the funding of the Palestinian MOE and the new curriculum, see: Fouad Moughrabi, "Palestinian Education for the Twenty First Century" (paper presented at 2016 Hisham Sharabi Memorial Lecture, May 6, 2016); Nicolai, *Fragmented*, 67.
[322] Ministry of Education, General Administration of Curricula (Palestinian Curriculum Development Center), *First Palestinian Curriculum Plan* (Jerusalem: al-Ma'ārif, 1998), 2 [in Arabic].
[323] The total estimated costs for the new education system were 9,927,929 dollars. Ministry of Education, *First,* 52.
[324] Adopted from Ministry of Education, *First,* 51, 48.

While several of the Abu-Lughod committee's recommendations were unambiguously rejected by the ministry, including the committee's intention to do away with the matriculation exam — the *Tawjīhī* — and to seek for a more subdued role for Islamic religion in education, the committee's influence can be perceived in the new plan. Thus, the 1998 plan emphasized the importance of the curriculum for the creation of a Palestinian consciousness and the introduction of a Palestinian perspective on Palestinian history and society.[325] In the attempt to create a Palestinian curriculum that meets the aspirations of the community, various educational foundations were introduced. The writers note that the intellectual and national foundations of the curriculum, in addition to strengthening faith in Allah, are meant to reinforce belonging to the Palestinian homeland.[326] These foundations, according to the authors of the plan, were to be applied across the four dimensions of the curriculum: the domestic [Ar. *waṭanī*], the religious, the national [Ar. *qawmī*] and the international dimension. It is in the national and domestic dimension that Palestinian heritage, culture and history find the most expression.[327] The bolstering of a Palestinian identity was not only meant to create more unity among the Palestinian people in the face of a fragmented reality, but also was intended to serve future political goals of the PA, namely the establishment of a Palestinian state. The centrality of this goal is highlighted in the preface to the plan, where it states: "And we — we the Ministry of Education — must create a new curriculum which is to be characterized by inclusiveness, clear definitions and [which must prepare] the Palestinian people to restore all their national rights on their national soil and establish their independent state with its capital in Jerusalem under the leadership of our brother, Yasser Arafat."[328]

[325] Ibid., 5, 6, 9, 10, 17, 32.
[326] Ibid., 6.
[327] Ibid., 32.
[328] Ministry of Education, *First,* Introduction.

The importance of the creation of a Palestinian societal, political and historical consciousness was emphasized throughout the creation of the curriculum.[329] In a position paper written by the Ministry of Education in 2002 it was noted that "Besides portraying a national identity and legitimatizing its National Authority, the curriculum traces the cultural development of the Palestinian people throughout history and celebrates its livelihood, aiming at empowering a people who missed developmental opportunities as a result of occupation." The paper further contended that both in textbooks already produced and future textbooks, the content aims to "account for the political complexities," which included the presentation of crucial historic events.[330] One of the events that, according to the ministry, would receive due notice was the 1948 War, as specified in a publication on the curriculum by the ministry in 2001. In this publication, entitled 'The Palestinian Curriculum and Textbooks: A Clarification', the ministry argued that 'the Palestinian problem' did not start with the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, but with the dispossession and eviction of the Palestinians from their homeland in historic Palestine and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Since, according to the ministry, this fact is alive in the individual and collective memories of the Palestinians, textbooks would not be credible if they did not address this fact, as the authors noted: "We will not brainwash our children and miseducate them about the past."[331]

[329] The plan does not provide a solid overview of the amount of time spent on history and national education. Thus, while stipulating that national and civic education should make up between 5.6 and 8.43 percent of the curriculum, history education, according to the plan, only takes place in grades 11 and 12 (5.7 percent), while in reality the subject is taught in grades 5-12. Ibid., 22-29.
[330] Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, *Report I: Analysis and Evaluation of the New Palestinian Curriculum Reviewing Palestinian Textbooks and Tolerance Education Program* (IPCRI, 2003), 15; Ministry of Education, *Palestinian Curriculum: Position Paper* (Ramallah: Ministry of Education, 2002).
[331] "The Palestinian Curriculum and Textbooks: A Clarification," Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, accessed 14 April 2016, http://www.pac-usa.org/palestinian_curriculum_and_text.htm.

## The Jordanian Curriculum and the 1948 War

While the PCDC was working on the new curriculum, as an interim measure, the Palestinian MOE made an agreement with the Jordanian and the Egyptian ministries in 1996 which enabled it to reprint both curricula in their entirety and use these textbooks in classrooms.[332] In her analysis of the contemporary Jordanian history and civics textbooks, Fruchter-Ronen argues that from 1990 onwards, in contrast to previous periods, Palestinians received detailed recognition in Jordanian textbooks. In an attempt to reinforce her argument, Fruchter-Roner points to a 1994 national and civic textbook which states that Palestinian refugees were banished from Palestine by force.[333] The Jordanian books that were examined as part of this case study, similarly to Fruchter-Ronen's findings, did not ignore the uprooting of Palestinians as a result of the 1948 War. Nonetheless, solely noting that Palestinians were uprooted in the 1948 War does not constitute a detailed discussion or recognition of the significance of this event. Rather, this research found that Jordanian history textbooks that were used in the West Bank failed to offer any detailed description of the mass displacement in 1948 and its immediate and long-term effects on Palestinian society.

In the execution of the analysis of Jordanian textbooks between 1994-2000, two textual methods were identified which led to a reduced discussion and recognition of the effects of the 1948 War on Palestinian society. Firstly, it was found that the 1948 War, if mentioned at all, was given as a fill-in type of bracketed information and, secondly, the analysis of the textbooks' content revealed that the causes, development and outcome of the war were introduced without providing the necessary contextual framework. A clear example of the first practice can be

[332] Adwan and Firer, *Israeli-Palestinian*, 103.
[333] Fruchter-Ronen, "Palestinian," 291, 292; S.I. Al-Hababa, *National and Civic Education* (Amman: Ministry of Education, 1994), 17.

discovered in two textbooks: 'History of the Modern World' for the 8th grade and 'History of Western Civilization and the Modern World' for the 11th grade. In the former textbook, students were informed on the 1948 War in a total of three sentences: "The UN decided on 29 October 1947 to divide Palestine into two states: one Jewish and one Palestinian. The Arabs rejected the partition plan and a war occurred between the Jews and the Arabs and Britain withdrew from Palestine. The war between the two parties led to the Jewish occupation of most of Palestine, except for the West Bank and Gaza."[334] In the questions to the chapter, the lack of emphasis on the 1948 War was further reinforced. In the only question that referred to Palestine, students were asked to describe the reasons behind the national revolt among Palestinians. While not explicitly stated, it is clear that the question alluded to the 1936-1939 Palestinian revolt discussed earlier in the chapter rather than the protests that erupted in wake of the adoption of the UN Partition Plan.[335] In the second textbook for the 11th grade, bearing the title 'History of Western civilization and the Modern World', even less attention was rendered to the 1948 War; and the war is framed in the context of a consolidation of Hashemite dominion and national objectives. In the sixth chapter on the rise of various political independence movements in the 20th century, the student was thus told that: "As for Palestine and the east of Jordan, the presence of the British Mandate continued to exist until Abdallah bin al-Hussein was able to pave the way for independence, which was achieved on 25 May 1946. Concerning Palestine, its land was taken over by Israel in 1948. The remainder of the land was incorporated in the Hashemite Kingdom in 1950."[336]

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
[334] *History of the Modern World, Part II for the 8th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 1999), 60, 61.
[335] Ibid., 62.
[336] *History of Western Civilization and the Modern World for the 11th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2001/2), 178, 179, 180.

In addition to demonstrating that the Palestinian experience of the 1948 War is wholly ignored, both passages cited above clearly indicate a lack of sufficient historical context regarding the outbreak of the war and its development. Thus, 'History of Western civilization and the Modern World' used the discussion of the war as means of furthering identification with Jordanian history, leading to factual inaccuracies and omissions. In the passage above, the end of the British Mandate was described as a sole result of the Jordanian struggle for independence, thereby failing to mention the effects of the strife and the subsequent civil war between the Palestinians and the inhabitants of the Yishuv and the UN Partition Plan. An incomplete historical narrative was also presented in the 1994 history textbook, entitled 'The History of the Arabs and the Modern World' for the 12th grade. Here, Zionism, considered "a racist doctrine equal to Nazism," was presented as an immediate nuclear threat to the entire Arab world.[337] This threat, according to the book, characterized Zionism from its establishment and spurred on a pan-Arab military involvement in the 1948 War. As a result, this textbook forwent any critical examination of the disparate war aims and the (inadequate) military preparation among the various Arab states.[338] Moreover, rather than discussing the consequences of this war with attention to the Palestinians' plight, emphasis lay on the effects of military participation for the internal development of Arab countries as a result of "the establishment of the Zionist entity." As such, while "the aggressive [Zionist] expansionist spirit [threatened] the land of Palestine and the Arab communities in various Arab countries," 'The History of the Arabs and the Modern World' (1994) contends that the "confrontation of the aggression […] exhausted the budget of some

[337] To this day, Israel has not acknowledged possession of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, scholars argue that since 1966, Israel has had nuclear-weapons capability. See: Avner Cohen, "And then there was one," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 54:5 (1998): 51-55; Ari Shavit, *My Promised Land* (Melbourne: Scribe, 2014), 188.
[338] See: Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992); Avi Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist movement and the partition of Palestine* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).

Arab countries, and the money came from development projects and investment accounts and this caused a delay in the revival [Ar. *al-nahḍah*] of the Arabs and their progress."[339]

*Figure 2.2. Adopting the Jordanian curriculum*




The 1995 teacher's guide to this 8th grade history textbook 'World History in Modern Times' indicates the origin of the book by stating: "The Jordanian Ministry of Education agreed with the request of the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education to use this book in its [Palestinian] schools […]."

## The New Palestinian Textbooks: The 1948 War in national education textbooks between 1995-2000

While it was decided to restore the Jordanian and Egyptian curricula in full until the introduction of the new textbooks, the MOE was conscious of the fact that the Egyptian and Jordanian textbooks failed to deal with issues concerning Palestinian identity and society in a comprehensive manner. As Andre Mazawi noted: "In spite of their differences, both [the Jordanian curriculum and the Egyptian curriculum were] similar in terms of their conceptual fragmentation and lack of systematic and Palestinian-oriented approach."[340] In order to make the interim curriculum more Palestinian in nature, it was decided to add national education textbooks so that, as Abu-Hummos put it, "students could learn about Palestinian history and society since

[339] *The History of the Arabs and the Modern World for the 12th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 1994), 123/124.
[340] Andre Elias Mazawi, "The reconstruction of Palestinian education: between history, policy politics and policy-making," *Journal of Education Policy* 15 (2000): 373.

the whole curriculum was Jordanian [and Egyptian]."[341] It is in these books, which were published from 1995 onwards, that an initial departure can be seen from the content of the Jordanian textbooks through a more substantial discussion of the Palestinian experience of the 1948 War and its effects on Palestinian society.

The primary goals of the national education textbooks were to further identification among students with Palestinian history and society and to prepare the students to contribute to their society, further indicated in the introduction of the books which address the students as follows: "Dear student, the chief goal of national education is to raise an upright citizen and to strengthen one's sense of belonging to the *ummah* [Ar. nation] and the homeland."[342] One of the ways in which these goals are meant to be achieved is through an emphasis on the events of the 1948 War. References to the 1948 War can be found in the Palestinian national education textbooks for grades 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8.

The content presented in these books on the war differ in two important ways from the narrative in the above-mentioned Jordanian textbooks. Firstly, even though the events of the war are not discussed in any detail, the textbooks do point out that as a result of the war large numbers of Palestinians became refugees. The national education textbook for grade 5, for instance, speaks of "large numbers of Palestinians [refugees]," while the textbook for grade 8 specifies "millions of refugees."[343] Blame for this mass displacement is defined with reference to the ethnicity of those held responsible. Thus, rather than invoking the Yishuv community prior to May 1948 and the Israeli state or army in the wake of the establishment of the state, the

[341] Interview conducted with Naim Abu-Hummos on July 19, 2016; Brown, *Democracy,* 2.
[342] *Palestinian National Education for the 5th Grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 1998), Introduction.
[343] *Palestinian National Education for the 5th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 1996), 36; *Palestinian National Education for the 8th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 1996), 20, 21.

examined textbooks uniformly place responsibility in the hands of "the Jews [who] took control of most of the Palestinian land" without elucidating how this led "most Palestinian people [to] leave cities and towns."[344] Moreover, even when the concept of a Zionist transfer policy[345] is invoked, as occurs in the 1996 'Palestinian National Education textbook' for grade 8, the ethnical characteristics of the movement stand central, leading the book to unambiguously conclude that "Zionism's goal is the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state by throwing out its Arab inhabitants and by bringing Jews from all over the world to settle in Palestine."[346] A further departure from the content on the 1948 War in Jordanian books can be identified in the discussion of both the immediate and long-term effects of the displacement and "Jewish rule over most of Palestine's land."[347] Several national education books make references to the establishment of refugee camps following the 1948 War. The aforementioned textbook 'Palestinian National Education' for grade 8, for example, states that "Palestinian refugees settled in Europe and North and South America and large numbers of them settled in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria," considered the "diaspora."[348]

The most extensive discussion of the effects of the 1948 War on Palestinian society can be found in the 1998 national education textbook for the 5th grade. Through discussing the period following the 1948 War in a separate chapter entitled 'Palestine after the year 1948', this book not only indicates the importance of the event, but also presents the 1948 War as a watershed

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[344] *5th grade* (1996), 36.
[345] According to historians such as Pappé and Nur Masalha, a Zionist consensus had come into existence during the late 1930s under the leadership of David Ben-Gurion which sought the transfer of the Palestinian population from Palestine to establish a Jewish homeland. See: Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine studies, 1992); Ilan Pappé, ed., *The Israel/Palestine Question* (London; New York: Routledge, 1999), 190.
[346] *8th grade* (1996), 20, 48.
[347] *5th grade* (1998), 34.
[348] *8th grade* (1996), 20. Also see: *5th grade* (1996), 36; *Palestinian National Education for the 4th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 1996), 39.

moment for Palestinian society.[349] Accordingly, the book points out that the era following the 1948 War was characterized by the geographical, political and societal effects of the war, including the displacement of many Palestinians and their emigration to surrounding Arab nations; the loss of Palestinian land and the need to learn new trades; the desire to preserve Palestinian heritage by building popular institutions; and the founding of the PLO.[350] Yet, while presenting the 1948 War as having had a unique effect on Palestinian society, the latter textbook argues that the mass uprooting of Palestinians was not a one-time event. Rather, in the discussion on the 1967 War, the book proclaims that as a result of "the 1967 June War between Israel and surrounding Arab nations […] thousands of Palestinians were displaced to different countries abroad, as occurred in 1948."[351]

### The 1948 War in national education textbooks since 2000

The theme of 'ongoing displacement' has taken on a more central role in national education books published from 2000 onwards as a means of emphasizing the continuous effects of the Nakba on Palestinian society.[352] In the 5th grade national education textbook published in 2004, the authors point out that "Palestinian society suffered a Nakba in 1948 at the hands of the Zionist movement which led many Palestinians to flee from the land and an Israeli state to be established on part of Palestine. Palestinian society befell a *naksah* [Ar. setback] in 1967 which led Israelis to occupy the rest of Palestine, that is the West Bank and Gaza, in addition to occupying the Egyptian Sinai and the Golan Heights from Syria."[353] While the new textbook is

[349] *5th grade* (1998), 36.
[350] Ibid., 34-36.
[351] Ibid., 37.
[352] For displacement prior to 1948 at the hands of the "Zionists" and the British, see: *Palestinian National Education for the 7th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2001), 20, 21.
[353] *Palestinian National Education for the 5th grade* (Al-Bireh; Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2004), 30.

similar to the 1998 textbook in its assertion that displacement for Palestinians was not a one-off occurrence, the new content shows an important change in the discussion of the 1948 War, namely usage of the term *al-Nakba*. In addition to the 2004 book, where the word is used throughout as a reference to the 1948 War, the term can be found in the national education textbook for grade 6 in which Israel is blamed "for the Nakba of the Palestinian people."[354] A further difference that can be identified in the national education books published after 2000 is the explicit conveyance of the significance of the 1948 War. In the 2004 textbook for the 5th grade, for instance, the Nakba is presented as one of the defining moments for Palestinian society, alongside the British occupation, the Israeli occupation, the emergence of the PA and the two Intifadas.[355]

### Refugee life and the effects of the 1948 War

Two further important deviations from the interim national education books and the Jordanian curriculum are the inclusion of Palestinian refugees as part of the internal makeup of Palestinian society and, relatedly, an emphasis on the birth of the refugee problem and its contemporary effects on Palestinian life. With regard to the former, national education textbooks published since 2000, for the first time, consider Palestinian refugees and refugee camps part of the internal makeup of Palestinian society. Consequently, while camps are described as being "[a] place[s] where Palestinian refugees live who were forced to leave their towns and villages in Palestine, to which they are determined to return,"[356] and as "emergency clusters of living where Palestinian

[354] *5th grade* (2004), 29, 30, 31; *Palestinian National Education for the 6th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2000), 16.
[355] *5th grade* (2004), 29.
[356] *Palestinian National Education for the 2nd grade* (Al-Bireh; Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2008), 36. For further references to the desire to return see: *7th grade* (2001), 7; *Palestinian National Education for the 4th grade* (Al-Bireh; Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2004), 43.

citizens fled to from their cities and villages in 1948," the camp has become one of four standard ways of living (the others being city life, Bedouin life and village life).[357] Similar statements appear in the 2004 national education textbook for the 4th grade in which, apart from referring to Palestinian refugees in the diaspora, the authors note that "the inhabitants of Palestine" live in a variety of places and consist of "city residents, residents of villages and the countryside and residents of refugee camps."[358]

The new national education textbooks also emphasize the effects of the 1948 War on Palestinian society and probe the exodus itself through questions and student activities. Questions focus both on the circumstances of the exodus itself and its short- and long-term effects on society. Questions relating to the former include "Was emigration optional or did it occur under force?" and "How did the UNRWA support Palestinian refugees?" while examples of the latter include "What is the name of the group of people who live as Palestinian refugees and who were expelled from their villages?" and "Show the effects of the Nakba that befell Palestinian society in 1948."[359] The majority of the activities that students are asked to partake in center on engaging them in the realities of present-day refugee life. In the 4th grade textbook, students are therefore instructed to consider "the existence of the hundreds of thousands of people that live in Palestinian camps" and "to memorize the names of the Arab countries to which many Palestinians fled after they were expelled from their Palestinian homeland."[360] An activity that can be found in all the books aims to familiarize the students with the names, places and workings of refugee camps. For this purpose, in 'Palestinian National Education' for the 2nd grade, students are asked "to collect pictures from various Palestinians camps and put them on

[357] *5th grade* (2004), 35.
[358] *4th grade* (2004), 42. For similar statements see: *2nd grade* (2008), 36-40.
[359] *5th grade* (2004), 31, 36, 48; *4th grade* (2004), 42, 43.
[360] *4th grade* (2004), 43, 44.

the walls inside the classroom;"[361] and, in the 5th grade, students are told to "search for and write down the names of three camps in Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan" and "write on the activities of UNRWA in your area and discuss your work on the school radio."[362]

### The creation of the curriculum and the Al-Aqsa Intifada

Even though the exact reasoning for the novel concentration on the 1948 War and its present-day ramifications is not mentioned in the books examined, the introductions written by the Ministry of Education do offer insight into the motives behind the change in content. In the introduction to the national education textbooks for the 4th and 5th grade, the ministry notes that it "saw a necessity to develop a curriculum that takes into account particular Palestinian characteristics in order to achieve the ambitions of the Palestinian people [because] the creation of a Palestinian curriculum is an important basis for the creation of well-being among the Palestinian people and for the consolidation of a democracy […]."[363] A further ambition of the national education textbooks is laid out in the second introduction to the 4th grade textbook in which the ministry points out that these national education textbooks constitute "an opportunity to raise awareness among students of their homeland."[364]

A more detailed description of how the introduction of Palestinian history can achieve the above-mentioned goals can be found in the 2008 national education textbook. Here, in contrast to former textbooks, a link is drawn between the usage of Palestinian history and the creation of a Palestinian identity: "The [ministry is] keen to plant a sense of belonging to the land and the heritage in the hearts of the youths […] by supplying them with the history of their grandfathers.

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[361] *2nd grade* (2008), 39.
[362] *5th grade* (2004), 36, 49.
[363] *5th grade* (2004), Introduction; *4th grade* (2004), Introduction.
[364] *4th grade* (2004), Second Introduction.

[Therefore,] in this book […] students are given an overview of Palestinian history."[365] According to Goetz Nordbruch, the reflection of these statements in the content of the textbooks shows an increased emphasis on nationalism by the ministry.[366] However, as the desire to raise Palestinian consciousness was also identified in the earlier national education textbooks, attention should be rendered to the stormy political atmosphere in the early 2000s. Adel El Sayed sees a direct connection between the ministry's increased emphasis on a sense of belonging and the homeland in the new textbooks and the effects of the Second Intifada, also referred to as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which lasted from September 2000 to February 2005. According to El Sayed, the Intifada led to a re-examination of the notion of belonging and homeland, as "the Palestinian National Authority and the teachers would not give away one inch of their 'dream', as long as Israel was 'expanding' its territory."[367] Indeed, the potential effect of the 2000-2005 Al-Aqsa Intifada on the new textbooks' production and content cannot be neglected, as noted in a recent interview by the former Minister of Education, Abu-Hummos. The former minister contended that the Intifada impacted the textbook production process in two important ways. Firstly, Abu-Hummos pointed out that the damage caused to the recently-erected educational infrastructure impeded the curriculum's development.[368] Secondly, due to restrictions on freedom of movement, the individuals involved in the textbook writing and checking committees were

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[365] *2nd grade* (2008), Introduction.
[366] "The New Palestinian Textbooks for National Education – A Review," Goetz Nordbruch, accessed February 2, 2016, http://www.gei.de/fileadmin/gei.de/pdf/abteilungen/schulbuch_und_gesellschaft/israel_palaestina/palest02.pdf.
[367] "Palestinian Geography Textbooks," Adel El Sayed, accessed February 29, 2016, http://www.gei.de/fileadmin/gei.de/pdf/abteilungen/schulbuch_und_gesellschaft/israel_palaestina/palest05.pdf.
[368] Abu-Hummos notes that with the acceleration of violence in the early 2000s, a decision was made to store the new educational material in a safe. Nevertheless, while the educational content was kept safe, the damage caused by the IDF to the ministry, its facilities and individual schools was vast. According to the MOE and UNESCO, the destruction totaled more than five million dollars. Interview conducted with Naim Abu-Hummos on July 19, 2016.

hampered in their work, thereby hinting at the possibility that textbook writers' individual experiences during the Intifada influenced the content.[369]

### The accusation of incitement

The development of the new Palestinian books was also affected by heavy Israeli scrutiny and international lobbying efforts, especially by the Israeli Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace (CMIP), which continues to impact (former) education officials' willingness to speak to foreign researchers.[370] In 1998, CMIP, at the time headed by Itamar Marcus, an Israeli political activist from the West Bank settlement of Efrat,[371] produced a report entitled 'The Palestinian Authority Schoolbooks' in which the center claimed to have found several incendiary statements about Israel and Jews in the new curriculum, including a call for "the liberation of Palestine from its thieving conquerors, an expression used to name Israel and the Jews."[372] Even though Brown pointed out that the cited statements were part of the previous Jordanian and Egyptian textbooks, the findings were used to influence international funding bodies. [373] CMIP encouraged European Union parliament members to pressurize the European Commission on the matter. Despite the fact that the EU had not provided funding for the Palestinian books from the outset, a condition

[369] Nicolai, *Fragmented*, 190.
[370] Yassin, the current director of the Palestinian Development Centre, refused to speak to the author of this work because, as he said, "the curriculum is too sensitive an issue," while former Minister of Education Abu-Hummos was suspicious of the author's interest in the curriculum and queried as to whether the author might have a hidden political agenda.
[371] In 1996, Marcus also founded an organization called Palestinian Media Watch (PMW), which conducts analyses of Palestinian media in order to relay "the messages that the Palestinian leaders, from the Palestinian Authority, Fatah and Hamas, send to the population through the broad range of institutions and infrastructures they control." In reality, most of the work by PMW seeks to bring to light incitement in Palestinian media against Israel and Jews, as indicated by the research center's focus on the "PA's indoctrination of adults and children to seek Shahada (Martyrdom)." "About us," Palestinian Media Watch, accessed December 22, 2016, https://www.palwatch.org/pages/aboutus.aspx.
[372] CMIP, *Newsletter September 1998*, 2.
[373] Brown, *Palestinian*, 237, 299, 301.

was added to the EU budget insisting that support would only be given for textbooks that were in compliance with basic European values.[374]

A second report published by CMIP in 2001 caused similar reactions. The report, entitled 'Jews, Israel, and Peace in Palestinian School Textbooks', found that Palestinian textbooks "foster a multi-faceted rejection of its [Israel's] existence [and the tendency] to reject and delegitimize Israel [has] gained impetus through instilling animosity and the implicit aspiration to replace the State of Israel with the State of Palestine."[375] This time, Hillary Clinton, who was running for the U.S. Senate, criticized the content of Palestinian textbooks and warned that: "All future aid to the Palestinian Authority must be contingent on strict compliance with their obligation to change all the textbooks in all grades […]."[376] CMIP's international lobbying also had more immediate effects. In December 2000, the Italian government, one of the main funders of the new Palestinian curriculum, informed the PA that due to the report's findings it could no longer finance the development of the new Palestinian school curriculum. Simultaneously, the World Bank notified the Palestinian Ministry of Education that the money allocated for the development of school books and teacher training would have to be diverted to other projects.[377] According to Moughrabi, the continued reliance on foreign donors for further development of the Palestinian curriculum meant that the ministry refrained from any content that might create further incitement. With reference to the 1948 War, Moughrabi argues that this has resulted "in a watered-down version of Palestinian history and an incomplete picture of the events that unfolded."[378]

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[374] Ibid.; Herb Keinon, "EU money to be denied for PA schoolbooks," *Jerusalem Post*, November 2, 2001.
[375] The report also sought to argue that Palestinian textbooks glorified martyrdom and terror. Groiss, *Jews,* 3, 4, 6, 50-51.
[376] Brown, *Democracy,* 8.
[377] Fouad Moughrabi, "The Politics of Palestinian Textbooks," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31 (2001): 9.
[378] Interview conducted with Fouad Moughrabi on April 26, 2016.

## The new history textbooks

Despite Moughrabi's appraisal of the effects of self-censorship, references to the 1948 War can be found throughout the new curriculum in Arabic language textbooks, geography books and Islamic education textbooks, indicating that the importance of a (diluted) inclusion of the events in times of political upheaval outweighed the threat of incitement.[379] Similarly, a more detailed account of the 1948 War and its effects on Palestinian society can be found in history textbooks published since 2000. In contrast to the new national education textbooks discussed above, the new history curriculum places more emphasis on the role of Zionism as a foundational policy that led to the takeover of Palestinian land and the displacement of Palestinians in 1948, post-1948 measures to 'Judaize' [Ar. *tahwīd*] the land and Palestinian suffering during and following the 1948 War. With regard to the first-mentioned theme, in three of the books published after 2000 for grades 9 and 10, Zionism is presented as settler-colonial movement, which from its beginning had its eyes set on Palestine and the displacement of its inhabitants. In 'The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arabs' for the 9th grade, Zionism is thus considered "a political settler movement, established by European Jews [at the end] of the 19th century with the goal of having Jews from different nationalities all over the world gather in Palestine [to] displace the Palestinian people in Palestine from their land [to] establish Israel."[380] Nevertheless, this book notes that Zionism alone did not lead to the displacement of Palestinians, but instead was the

[379] See: *Reading and Texts, Part I for the 8th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2009), 67; *The Geography of Palestine for the 7th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2002), 36; *Islamic Education for the 6th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2000), 6. For content on the right and desire to return in the new textbooks, see: *Islamic Education, Part I for the 6th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2011), 69; *History of the Ancient Civilizations for the 5th grade 5* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2005) 7; *Our Beautiful Language, Part I for the 5th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2011), 50; 91; *Reading and Texts, Part I for the 9th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2011), 120*; Our Beautiful Language, Part I for the 7th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2002), 34.

[380] *The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arabs for the 9th grade* (Al-Bireh; Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2003), 72.

result of the synthesis of "colonial British interests and the goals of the Zionist movement."[381] A similar argument is made in the 2003 and the 2010 history textbooks, both entitled 'The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arabs' which point out that British and American support for the Zionist movement facilitated Jewish emigration to Palestine and removed restrictions that prevented Jews from acquiring Palestinian lands.[382] Furthermore, the 2010 textbook argues that the Zionist movement received support from European nations which, without qualifying the support received, according to the book, was bent on "spreading the ideas of Zionism among Jews themselves in order to accelerate the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine […] and, on the other hand, was meant to rid themselves of the Jews."[383]

### Ongoing dispossession of Palestinian land and the 1948 exodus

The history books analyzed as part of this case study maintain that the ambitions of the Zionist movement were not fulfilled with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Instead, the textbooks seek to demonstrate that Israel resorted to the Judaization of Palestinian land and continued dispossession of Palestinian land. The 11th grade textbook 'Contemporary and Modern Palestinian History' (2011) dedicates an entire chapter to these activities. In this chapter, entitled 'Israeli politics after 1948', the authors note that following the 1948 War attempts were made to create a Jewish demographic majority and reject the Arab-Palestinian nature of the land and its people, including through the 1950 Law of Return and the 1952 Nationality Law which "granted Israeli nationality to all Jews immigrating to Palestine."[384] Furthermore, both this book and the

[381] *History of the Modern World for the 10th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2010), 53.
[382] *9th grade* (2003), 74; *The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arabs for the 9th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2010), 56.
[383] Ibid., 54.
[384] *Contemporary and Modern Palestinian History, Part II for the 11th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2011), 36.

12th grade history book (2012) argue that after 1948, continued displacement and dispossession took place at the hands of Israelis. Political efforts aimed at a further dislodging of Palestinians included the transfer of ownership to the Jewish National Fund, the seizure of land for army and security purpose and the building of settlements and the separation wall which "did not stop at the borders of the annexed territories, but continued beyond in order to disrupt Arab communities."[385] For the first time, these books also include the fate of internally-displaced refugees, namely those displaced within the 1948 territories, and Palestinians who were able to remain in their homes and localities. Thus, the 11th grade textbook notes that while Palestinians inside the 1948 borders were given Israeli nationality, they do not enjoy the same rights and privileges as Israeli-Jews due to "restrictions on their rights of ownership, freedom of expression, freedom of organization, freedom of movement and […] schooling."[386] While similar statements appear in the 12th grade textbook, more attention is rendered to the denial of Palestinian national identity inside the 1948 borders emanating from usage of "racist terminology [such as] 'Arab-Israelis' or the 'Arab Sector in Israel'."[387]

The new history books introduce Palestinian students to two further themes, namely the circumstances that accompanied the mass exodus in 1948 and the living conditions in refugee camps. With regard to the former, the 2011 textbook 'Contemporary and Modern Palestinian History' stipulates that "various methods were used to empty Palestinian land of its native inhabitants, among which psychological warfare which [included] the Haganah radio spreading rumors and [the execution of] killing operations [in] cities and villages [such as] Deir Yassin,

[385] *History of the Arabs and the World in the 20th Century for the 12th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2012), 96; *11th grade* (2011), 37.
[386] *11th grade* (2011), 36.
[387] *12th grade* (2012), 95.

Tantura, and Lud."[388] Moreover, both the 12th grade textbooks 'History of the Arabs and the World in the 20th Century' (2012) and the 11th grade 'Contemporary and Modern Palestinian History' (2011) note that despite the fact that the UN specified 'the right of return' and compensation for displaced Palestinians, this decision was not recognized by Israel.[389] As a result of this, the 2011 textbook maintains that refugees live in "difficult political, economic and social circumstances."[390] These trying living conditions are further highlighted by the use of photographs . Under the heading 'Pictures of refugee suffering in 1948', the departure of Palestinians from their homes is shown next to their subsequent life in refugee camps (see illustration below).[391] While not offering any further details of these difficult circumstances, the accompanying questions ask students to explain the situation in which Palestinian refugees lived after the 1948 War.[392] As such, the activity that follows this new information is likely to create a more extensive discussion, albeit one that relies on the teacher and students' own knowledge of refugee life.

*Figure 2.3. Pictures of Palestinian refugees' suffering in 1948*



صور معاناة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين عام ١٩٤٨م.

[388] *11th grade* (2011), 32.
[389] *12th grade* (2012), 95; *11th grade* (2011), 33.
[390] *11th grade* (2011), 33.
[391] Ibid.
[392] Ibid., 35.

## An Exclusive Victimhood Narrative: The Holocaust and the Palestinian Curriculum

Despite the increased emphasis on the Nakba in the new Palestinian curriculum and particularly in history and national education schoolbooks, the analysis above demonstrates that the 1948 War still lacks an in-depth historical analysis. Indeed, although the dearth in historical information pertaining to the war reflects the meagre length of the new Palestinian history and national education textbooks (encompassing between 60 and 80 pages on average), the development of the mass exodus, which incorporates the usage of the Plan D offensive and the stages and effects of departure among various Palestinian societal groups, remains wholly elusive.[393] Furthermore, though it can be assumed that the classroom discussions and activities that accompany the material on the 1948 War will touch on the societal effects of the war through familial stories, identification methods, such as first-hand witness accounts and photographs, were found lacking across all the examined textbooks save one.[394]

The existence of a superficial Nakba narrative, however, should not be considered a statement on its perceived educational significance, since the Nakba's prominence in educational plans and the ensuing curriculum is evident. Moreover, as the final part of the chapter will argue, the historic and contemporary relevance of the Nakba can be found implicitly in Palestinian textbooks' minimization of Nazism and the omission of the Holocaust, deemed an acknowledgement of the other's victimhood.

[393] For an analysis of the various stages of departure among 'elite' Palestinians and villagers, see: Noga Kadman, *Erased from space and consciousness: Israel and the depopulated Palestinian villages of 1948* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 8-13.
[394] Gunther Kress, *Literacy in the new media age* (London: Routledge, 2003), 69.

## The Palestinian history curriculum and the Holocaust

It is evident that, in coherence with the above theory, a tacit acknowledgement of the events underlies the exclusion of the Holocaust; yet, the new Palestinian history books seek to prevent a transgenerational conveyance through a complete omission of the Holocaust. Of the new history textbooks, only two discuss the Second World War: the 12th grade textbook 'History of the Arabs and the World in the 20th Century' and the 10th grade book 'History of the Modern World'. While both books provide detailed information on the various fronts and battles during the Second World War, the authors expend great efforts to avoid any meaningful discussion of the full extent and effects of Nazi ideology. For instance, although the 10th grade textbook 'History of the Modern World' notes that one of the goals of the Nazi party was "the preservation of the Aryan race and blood and forbidding weak people from mixing with them," it remains unclear who these "weak people" were and how the goal was realized.[395] A similar practice can be found in the discussion of the consequences of the Second World War. Among the five outcomes, the authors note that "millions of people were displaced and mass devastation [occurred] as a result of the war." Nevertheless, as the chapter has failed to note the systematic persecution by the Nazis, the student is left with the conclusion that displacement and mass devastation solely refers to those lost in battle.[396] An ahistorical narrative of the Second World War and Nazism can also be found in the 12th grade textbook 'History of the Arabs and the World in the 20th Century'. Despite contending that Nazi ideology was "inconsistent with democratic rule and general freedom," this book, like its predecessor, fails to offer any insight into the application of Nazi ideology and its targets prior to and during the war.[397] Instead, Nazi

[395] *10th grade* (2010), 62.
[396] Ibid., 67.
[397] *12th grade* (2012), 94.


racial theory is presented as an esoteric philosophy which occurred in a vacuum against "those who were backwards."[398] Consequently, the book's discussion of international tribunals trying Nazi leaders as war criminals loses its relevance as their only crime appears to be their alliance with the losing party.[399]

The content on Nazi ideology and its role in the Second World War in the new Palestinian textbooks largely constitutes a continuation of the narrative presented in previous Jordanian history books, which were used from 1994 until 2003. Yet, the Jordanian textbooks differed from the Palestinian history books in two ways. Firstly, without explicitly mentioning the Holocaust, the Jordanian history books did place more emphasis on Nazi discrimination against the Jews; secondly, this racial persecution was perceived in a positive, constructive light, as Adolf Hitler was presented as an exemplary leader who attempted to rescue his people from misery and defeat. The greater emphasis on Jewish discrimination was found in three of the Jordanian textbooks examined as part of this case study: the 11th grade textbook 'History of Western Civilization and the Modern World' and the 12th grade book 'The History of the Arabs and the Modern World' (the 1994 and 1998 edition). In these books, references were made to Nazi ideology and policies concerning Jews. In the 1998 textbook, the authors noted that the Nuremberg Laws "banned all Jewish employees from public office and prohibited Jewish lawyers, reporters, doctors, pharmacists and publishers from practicing their professions and did not allow Jews to inherit property."[400] The 1994 edition of the same book hinted at the genocidal policies of the regime towards the "subversives" by noting that Hitler sought to "cleanse Germany of decadent elements and especially the Jews" and "eliminate any element that might

[398] Ibid.
[399] Ibid., 40.
[400] *The History of the Arabs and the Modern World for the 12th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 1998), 107.

thwart Germany's rule in the world."[401] However, similarly to the new books, there was no mention of Jewish victims; instead, the only textbook that dealt with victims of the war was the 8th grade textbook 'Contemporary World History' (1999). Here, students were presented with a table (see below) that showed the number of killed and injured civilians of some of the countries involved in the war and were asked to explain the large amount of deaths in Germany and the Soviet Union.[402] Nevertheless, without having offered the students any concrete insight into the mass murder committed in and from these countries, the answers would likely have lacked any historical grounding.

*Figure 2.4. Casualties per country in the Second World War*



الجدول (٢) : خسائرُ الدولِ في الحربِ العالميةِ الثانيةِ

| الدولة | القتلى | الجرحى | المفقودون | القتلى من المدنيين | مجموع القتلى |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| أستراليا | ٢٣,٣٦٥ | ٣٩٨٠٣ | ٣٢٣٩٣ | – | ٢٤,٠٠٠ |
| كندا | ٣٧,٤٨٦ | ٥٣١٧٤ | ١٠,٨٨٨ | – | ٣٨,٠٠٠ |
| الهند | ٣٤٣٣٨ | ٦٤٣٥٤ | ٩١٢٤٣ | – | – |
| بريطانيا | ٢٦٤,٤٤٣ | ٢٧٧٠٧٧ | ٢١٣٩١٩ | ٩٢٦٧٣ | ٣٥٧٠٠٠ |
| فرنسا | ٢١٣,٣٢٤ | ٤٠٠,٠٠٠ | – | ٣٥٠,٠٠٠ | ٥٦٣,٠٠٠ |
| بولندا | ١٢٣,١٧٨ | ٢٣٦,٦٠٦ | ٤٢٠,٧٦٠ | ٥,٦٧٥,٠٠٠ | ٥,٨٠٠,٠٠٠ |
| الولايات المتحدة | ٢٩٢,١٣١ | ٦٧١,٨٠١ | ١٣٩,٧٠٩ | ٦٠٠٠ | ٢٩٨,٠٠٠ |
| الاتحاد السوفياتي | ١١,٠٠٠,٠٠٠ | – | – | ٧,٠٠٠,٠٠٠ | ١٨,٠٠٠,٠٠٠ |
| ألمانيا | ٣,٥٠٠,٠٠٠ | ٥,٠٠٠,٠٠٠ | ٣,٤٠٠,٠٠٠ | ٧٨٠,٠٠٠ | ٤,٢٠٠,٠٠٠ |
| إيطاليا | ٢٤٢,٢٣٢ | ٦٦,٠٠٠ | ٣٥٠,٠٠٠ | ١٥٢,٩٤١ | ٢٩٥,٠٠٠ |
| اليابان | ١,٣٠٠,٠٠٠ | ٤,٠٠٠,٠٠٠ | ٨١٠,٠٠٠ | ٦٧٢,٠٠٠ | ١,٩٧٢,٠٠٠ |

يظهرُ من هذا الجدولِ أنَّ الاتحادَ السوفياتيَّ وألمانيا من أكثرِ الدولِ عدداً في القتلى والجرحى .

– ما السببُ الذي أدى إلى ارتفاعِ عددِ القتلى والجرحى في هاتينِ الدولتينِ ؟

[401] *The History of the Arabs and the Modern World for the 12th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2003), 107.
[402] *Contemporary World History, Part II for the 8th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 1998), 46.

The aforementioned ahistorical narrative was reinforced through the presentation of Nazi and Fascist ideology. In the 11th grade textbook 'History of Western Civilization and the Modern World', Nazism and Fascism were presented under the heading 'Contemporary intellectual movements', alongside the philosophical and scientific work of Martin Heidegger, Henri Bergson and Albert Einstein.[403] An even more warped understanding of Nazism was conveyed in one of the questions in the 12th grade history book 'The History of the Arabs and the Modern World' where students were asked to "write about the success factors of the German Nazi government."[404] Similar glorifying content could be found in the 8th grade textbook 'Modern World History' and its teaching guide. In this textbook, Hitler was portrayed as the man who "changed the economic crisis and attempted to rescue the German people from repeated misery and defeat." Furthermore, in the teaching guide to this book, the teacher was told that the answer to the question "Did the Nazis' rise to power contribute to [the outbreak] of the Second World War" was: "No, the Nazis attempted to restore German power and the German army and the economy. They also wanted to restore control of German land and provinces that had been stripped from it in the First World War. This led to fear and discontent from other European countries, like France and Britain, which led to the Second World War."[405] Accordingly, the expansionist aims of Nazi Germany were also considered in a positive light, and the teacher was informed to relay to the students that "Hitler thought that the occupation of the Soviet Union would lead to peace in Europe."[406]

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[403] *History of Western Civilization and the Modern World for the 11th grade* (Ramallah: Palestinian Authority, Ministry of Education, 2001/2), 186, 188.
[404] *12th grade* (2003), 112.
[405] *8th grade* (1998), 35; *Teacher's Guide: Contemporary World History, Part II for the 8th grade* (Amman: Ministry of Education, 1995), 81.
[406] *8th grade* (1995), 81.

Conversations held with educational officials involved in the development of the new curriculum reveal that the inclusion of the Holocaust in the new curriculum was not considered a priority 'between and betwixt', or between conflict and peace. When questioned about the absence of the Holocaust, Jarbawi testified to what David Shipler in 1987 described as a "screen[ing out of] the suffering of your enemy [when] you are being [or have been] victimized by them, even where your suffering has no parallel to theirs."[407] The theoretical framework for this practice was highlighted by Bauman in his 2004 work 'Categorical Murder, or: How to Remember the Holocaust'. In this work Bauman maintained that when dealing with the memory of a catastrophe, it is typical for one group to highlight its own victimhood and suffering and set it against another group, particularly against those who perpetrated the catastrophe.[408]

Demonstrative of a riposte based on conflation, former minister Jarbawi argued that since Palestinian history is not presented adequately in the Israeli curriculum, the Palestinian curriculum does not need to deal with the Holocaust: "If I want to be factually correct, I need to say that the Zionists expelled Palestinians from their country, and I might add that because of the rise of Hitler in 1933, 65,000 emigrants came here […] These are established facts. But if I mention this, I have to say that Israel took our land and ripped us from our country. But at the same time, Israel is not asked how this history is presented there."[409] Other officials, including the former Education Minister Abu-Hummos and the current assistant to the Minister of Education, Tharwat Zaid Keilani, argued that the Holocaust was part of the curriculum, with Keilani contending that the current curriculum does not just focus on Jewish victims, but on all

[407] Cited in Gilbert Achcar, *Arabs and the Holocaust* (London: Saqi Books, 2010), 221.
[408] Zygmunt Bauman, "Categorical Murder, or: How to Remember the Holocaust," in *Re-presenting the Shoah for the 21st Century,* ed. Ronit Lentin (Oxford; New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 24-40; Litvak and Webman, *From,* 14.
[409] Interview conducted with Ali Jarbawi on May 16, 2016.

the Nazis' victims.[410] While evidencing a keen awareness of politically correct approaches when dealing with foreign academics, these statements and the above-mentioned findings of this research do not match.[411] Moreover, excerpts from a symposium held in Cyprus in April 2000 indicate that members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) firmly rejected the inclusion of the Holocaust, as suggested by Anis Al-Qaq, the PA Undersecretary of Planning and International Cooperation.[412] For Musa Al-Zu'but, Chairman of the Education Committee of the Palestinian Legislative Council, this rejection was based on the "exaggeration [of the Holocaust] in order to present the Jews as victims of a great crime, to justify [the claim] that Palestine is necessary as a homeland for them, and to give them the right to demand compensation." Making a similar argument, Hatem Abd Al-Qader, a PLC member and Fatah leader, said that teaching the Holocaust in the Palestinian schools would constitute "a great danger to the [development of a] Palestinian mentality. It would be dangerous to change the Palestinian curriculum in such a direction." First, Abd Al-Qader claimed, "the Jews should learn about our disaster, the massacres, the murder and the exile, because this disaster is still alive."[413]

The firm opposition against the inclusion of the Holocaust was further reflected in the hostile political and societal reactions to the *Side by Side* project, which took place during the disintegration of the Oslo Peace Accords and the subsequent outbreak of the Second Intifada. As

[410] Interview conducted with Tharwat Zaid Keilani on May 26, 2016; Interview conducted with Naim Abu-Hummos on July 19, 2016.
[411] For Hamas' opposition to the inclusion of the Holocaust in the Palestinian (UNRWA) curriculum in Gaza, see: Howard Schneider, "Hamas Objects to Possible Lessons About Holocaust in U.N.-Run Schools in Gaza," *Washington Post,* September 2, 2009, accessed July 26, 2017, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/01/AR2009090102496.html?hpid=sec-world.
[412] Al-Qaq stated at the symposium that he was "interested in teaching the history of the Holocaust in Arab and Palestinian schools... I believe that Palestine and the entire Arab world need to learn about the Holocaust, and therefore this subject should be included in the school curriculum." MEMRI, "Palestinians Debate Including the Holocaust in the Curriculum," *Special Dispatch* 187 (2000), accessed July 26, 2017, https://www.memri.org/reports/palestinians-debate-including-holocaust-curriculum.
[413] Ibid.

mentioned in the previous chapter, *Side by Side* aimed to expose Palestinian and Israeli high-school students to the other's narrative, including the Holocaust. In an interview, Adwan, who was responsible for the Palestinian narrative, stated that the teaching of the Holocaust was met with extreme hostility. In contrast to the official rejection that occurred on the Israeli side, Adwan maintains that pressure came from the community and political parties who in letters accused him and teachers involved in the project of collaboration and teaching the "enemy's narrative." With reference to these reactions, Adwan contends that the absence of the Holocaust in the curriculum does not only derive from the lack of Israeli recognition of the Nakba, but also, as indicated in Abd Al-Qader's statements, due to ongoing Palestinian suffering as a result of the occupation, being the "victims of the victims."[414] As he stated in a personal interview: "If you talk about the trauma of your oppressor does that justify their actions? Does it excuse what they are doing? Does it minimize your own suffering? I think that it can."[415] Indeed, when further pressed, Jarbawi similarly noted that the ongoing occupation constitutes the main obstacle to recognition of the Holocaust and the implementation of projects such as *Side by Side*: "You can't convince any Palestinian under occupation or in the diaspora who comes to Ramallah that we need to talk about the Holocaust and recognize the emergence of state of Israel due to the Holocaust. Why should we learn about the Holocaust? It is not a priority while Palestinians remain under occupation."[416]

[414] Raja Shehadeh, *The Third Way: A journal of life of the West Bank* (London: Quartet Books, 1982), 64.
[415] Interview conducted with Sami Adwan on May 13, 2016.
[416] Interview conducted with Ali Jarbawi on May 16, 2016.

## Concluding Remarks

In the wake of the 1994 Gaza-Jericho Autonomy agreement, the Palestinian Ministry of Education was able to convey the Palestinian past and contemporary grievances spurring from former events with the production of the first Palestinian curriculum. Previously denied the educational imbuing of a national consciousness under Jordanian and, subsequently, Israeli rule, the ministry sought — as indicated both in educational plans and subsequent ministerial clarifications — to foster a collective Palestinian identity, with as its principal watershed: *al-Nakba*. As such, the identified historical dearth in content on the 1948 War in national education and history books published since 1994 should not be considered emblematic of a societal disregard concerning *al-Nakba*; instead, it is representative of the general brevity and superficiality of the new textbooks, produced in a matter of years during the tumult of the Second Intifada. In spite of reliance on foreign donors and the effects of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the final inclusion of the Nakba as a formative past event and, through its perceived contemporary manifestations, a present continuous therefore can be deemed a testament to the role of the Nakba in Palestinian consciousness.

Beyond the novel textual incorporation of the Nakba in new Palestinian textbooks, the latter part of this chapter illustrated that the collective importance ascribed to *al-Nakba* can also be found in the glaring disregard of the Holocaust in the curriculum. A conflation of Jews and Israelis — as evidenced in textbook content pertaining to the 1948 War — forms the foundation for the materialization of Bauman's retaliatory theory which formulates that any official acknowledgement of the Holocaust is perceived as a justification for the establishment of Israeli state and, consequently, a minimization of all ensuing Palestinian suffering. The firm rejection of Al-Qaq's proposal at the April 2000 Cyprus conference to include the Holocaust in the Palestinian curriculum testifies to the very *quid pro quo* principal that lies at the heart of

Bauman's theory, as the marginalization of the Nakba in Israeli-Jewish society is invoked to justify the omission of the Holocaust. In addition to textbooks' identification of ongoing dispossession of Palestinian land and, inside the 1948 borders, the denial of a Palestinian national identity, awareness of continual Israeli cultural and political palimpsest practices also derives from Nakba commemorative activities in the post-Oslo era. The following chapter will thus demonstrate that Nakba mnemonics have been instrumentalized on both sides of the Green Line to present an ongoing Nakba emanating from Israeli legal and cultural restrictions on its invocation by the Palestinian community.

## Section Two: The Landscape of Memory

In his lecture entitled 'What is a nation?', delivered at the Sorbonne in 1882, Renan argued that the most crucial trait of a nation is its members' identification with the collective without actually being acquainted with the members of that collective.[417] This collective identification, according to Renan, could be achieved through conveying and sustaining the memory of social groups in public commemorations. While Renan's observations were made over a hundred years ago, the creation of an "imagined community" through mnemonic practices remains relevant today.[418] Indeed, despite post-modern criticism of notions of 'collectivity' and an increased interest in and acknowledgement of subaltern memory and identity, Hobsbawn notes that there is no indication of the weakening of the usage of neo-traditional symbolic practices associated with enhancing citizenship membership and group belonging.[419]

The continued significance of commemoration practices, in part, derives from contemporary and future political (collective) and social (individual) purposes, which are embedded in the re-enactment of historical moments in the present.[420] With reference to the political goals, Paul Connerton contends that social invocation of a shared past can legitimate a present social order, thereby also indicating that collective mnemonic acts are contemporary educational mediums for transmitting hegemonic narratives or 'master commemorative narratives' to a broader public and from one generation to the next.[421] It follows that this

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[417] Paul Connerton, *How Modernity Forgets* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 48.
[418] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso), 2006, 6.
[419] Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger, ed., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 12.
[420] Brendan Browne, "Commemoration in Conflict," *Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology* 2 (2013): 145; Judith Tydor Baumel, "In everlasting memory: Individual and communal Holocaust commemoration in Israel," *Israel Affairs* 1 (1995): 146.
[421] Connerton, *How*, 3. On the concept of 'master narratives', see: Yael Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 10-12.

politically-motivated invocation of a shared past does not necessarily seek to counter collective amnesia of the historic past, but rather revives and modifies the past to achieve the desired transmission in the present.[422] Yet, as indicated above, commemorative acts do not only serve the interests of groups seeking political legitimization, but also the individuals that together form active participants within the commemorative group.[423] In other words, public acts of remembrance that involve recalling moments in a group's shared history are at once individual and collective.[424] In this context, Simone Weil's Durkheimian-style phrase "a collective has its roots in the past" finds relevance as it indicates that the collective memory acts that stimulate awareness of a group's history enhance communal identity, legitimating individuals in their own eyes and creating social cohesion.[425] The stimulation of social cohesion and the legitimating nature of collective mnemonic acts — both for individual and collective purposes — does not only rely on the invocation of a shared past. Rather, a ritual collective performance, which can include singing the same anthem, defines the boundaries of the group and ensures that the collective act of commemoration "becomes an event in itself that is to be shared and remembered."[426] The fusion of an individual's biography with that of the group also forms an indispensable part in the consolidation of group solidarity.[427] Expanding on the Gramscian top-

[422] It is because of this legitimizing nature of public commemoration that John Jackson notes that every new social order anxious to establish its image and acquire public support produces many commemorative monuments, symbols and public celebrations. John B. Jackson, *The Necessity for Ruins and Other Topics* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), 92.
[423] Émile Durkheim, *Critical Assessments of Leading Sociologists*, ed. W. S. F. Pickering (London; New York: Routledge, 2001), 96.
[424] Emile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1951), 297–325. Also see: Halbwachs, *On,* Chapter six.
[425] Connerton, *How*, 3. 48; James Young, "When a Day Remembers: A Performative History of "Yom ha-Shoah," *History and Memory* 2 (1990): 71.
[426] James Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1993), 6,7; Jackie Feldman, *Above the death pits, beneath the flag: youth voyages to Poland and the performance of Israeli national identity* (New York; Oxford: Berghahn, 2008), 12.
[427] Eviatar Zerubavel, "Calendars and history: A comparative study of the social organization of national memory," in *States of memory: Continuities, conflicts and transformations in national retrospection*, ed. Jeffrey K. Olick (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 316.

down analysis, Carol Kidron and Geoffrey White's ethnographic bottom-up analysis of individual and family memory at memory sites showed that individuals and families negotiate the hegemonically-imposed group discourse and weave it into their personal memories.[428] Consequently, the existence of a pure hegemonic metanarrative or master narrative must be questioned, as the performative nature of commemoration — that it fundamentally requires an audience — means that a commemoration needs to draw on an audience's specific values, experiences, memories, sympathies and beliefs. In short, for commemoration to resonate with the audience, it must say something about their past, make some meaning of their present lives and offer something about their future, thereby necessitating the incorporation of a bottom-up narrative.[429]

## The Commemoration of Watersheds

While the term commemoration refers to all those devices and acts through which a nation or group recalls its past, it is evident that not all historical events are commemorated. Renan, in his lecture, maintained that commemorations of grief are of particular importance to societies, as he argued: "where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort."[430] Exploring the instrumentalization of national griefs, various scholars, including George Mosse and Avner Ben-Amos, have argued that the commemoration of national deaths — cast as a form of a national sacrifice — have been particularly prevalent in numerous states in the modern era in the attempt to mold a holistic

[428] Carol Kidron, "Survivor Family Memory Work at Sites of Holocaust Remembrance: Institutional Enlistment or Family Agency?," *History & Memory* 1 (2015): 40, 49; Geoffrey M. White, "Emotional Remembering: The Pragmatics of National Memory," *Ethos* 27 (1999): 505-529.
[429] Khalili, *Heroes,* 222.
[430] Cited in Homi K. Bhabha, ed., *Nation & Narration* (London; New York: Routledge, 1990), 19.

collective memory and identity.[431] The existence of grief, however, is not imperative to a commemoration of a past. Instead, as Meir Litvak contends, events that are commemorated need to be "invested with extraordinary significance and assigned a qualitatively distinct past in our conception of the past [thus lifting] from an ordinary historical sequence those extraordinary events that embody our deepest and most fundamental values."[432] It is because of this 'lifting' of extraordinary events that Claude Levi Strauss noted that history contains 'hot chronologies', which are those periods that appear replete with historical action and significance for the present, and 'cold chronologies', where it appears nothing of major significance happened.[433] Although hot chronologies or seminal events can occur throughout a society's history, the 'hottest' part of any group or society's past tends to be the beginning because, as Mircea Eliade wrote in 1963, a beginning gives rise to the notion that "it is the first manifestation of a thing that is significant and valid."[434] More recently, Eviatar Zerubavel, building on Eliade's theory, argued that founding moments, as watersheds, are prime examples of historical punctuation marks observed by mnemonic communities.[435] The particular significance of origins or founding moments, importantly, does not solely depend on the existence of a historical break or a new beginning, but on the conception of an "origin [as a] proto-typical event [setting] a pattern which affects subsequent developments."[436]

## The Nakba and the Holocaust as Watersheds

[431] George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Avner Ben-Amos, "War Commemoration and the Formation of Israeli National Identity," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 31(2003): 171-195; Don Handelman and Lea Shamgar-Handelman, "The Presence of Absence: The Memorialism of National Death in Israel," in *Grasping Land*, ed. Eyal Ben-Ari and Yoram Bilu (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 85-128.
[432] Litvak, *Palestinian*, 15.
[433] Claude Levi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 259.
[434] Eliade Mircea, *Myth and Reality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 34.
[435] Zerubavel, "Calendars," 321.
[436] Schwartz, "Social," 376.

The Nakba and the Holocaust, respectively, constitute watersheds in the collective consciousness of Palestinians and Israeli-Jews. As such, they do not merely constitute formative past events, but, rather, seminal moments which continue to affect and guide contemporary life, including through their invocation in commemorative practices. The following two chapters are principally concerned with the rituals and performances that accompany the conveyance of these watersheds in the respective societies. Using Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger's seminal work on invented traditions as a key theoretical framework, this section emphasizes the fabricated nature of mnemonic acts by discussing the evolution, formalization and ritualization of the commemorative acts under review.[437] Part and parcel of this ritualization entails a discussion of the narrative(s) and symbols put forward in commemorative acts, as every commemoration explicitly or implicitly contains a narrative used as a vehicle of transmission. Yet, as commemorative rituals and narratives are not static, but rather develop and are modified according to the contemporary needs of the commemorating group, this section will also seek to reveal the differences found in the mnemonic acts in the time period under review and expound on any political and social motives behind changing practices.

The acts and devices used to invoke a group's past are vast and include monuments, holidays, cemeteries, archives, memorial books, memorial days, memorial festivals, memorial sculptures, re-enactments of events, iconization of places and people and memorial institutions.[438] The majority of these acts and devices, which can be both mournful and celebratory in nature, fall beyond the scope of this research. Instead, the focus will lie on national memorial days — *Yawm al-Nakbah* [Ar. Nakba day] and *Yom ha-Shoah* [Heb. Holocaust day] —

[437] Hobsbawn and Ranger, *Invention*, 4.
[438] Young, *Texture*, 4; John R. Gillis, ed., *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 14.

and on places of commemoration, thereby differentiating between physical and non-physical acts of commemoration, or non-abstract and abstract mnemonics.[439] Physical mnemonic acts, in contrast to non-physical acts, are site-specific and in this research, in addition to physical memorials and institutes, include (former) landscape as "signposts of memory."[440] Crucially, landscape in the context of this study cannot be viewed as an agent of power independent of human intentions in which, in the words of William Mitchell, "we [as] passive figures find — or lose — ourselves."[441] Instead, it is clear that when dealing with contested territory, the commemorative event itself and those partaking in the act can become subject to scrutiny and interference, particularly when the commemorative landscape falls under the control of the non-commemorating hegemonic group. Consequently, as will be discussed in chapter three, commemorative return visits to former Palestinian villages inside the 1948 borders are deemed confrontational mnemonic acts because of their inherent challenge of post-1948 physical erasure policies and the failure to implement the right of return by the dominant Israeli state.

## Commemorating the Past in Physical and Non-Physical Mnemonic Acts

In the discussion on the role of physical memory sites in Israeli and Palestinian commemoration, several scholars have turned to Pierre Nora's work on French post-revolutionary memory sites as a theoretical framework.[442] Nora's 'lieux de mémoire' theory, however, will not be applied in this research for two main reasons. Firstly, while Nora's *lieux* denote both non-physical

[439] While this thesis recognizes that since 2005 International Holocaust Remembrance Day is also commemorated annually on the 27th of January in Israel, the mnemonics of this holiday fall beyond the scope of this research as a result of its late materialization within the time period under review.
[440] Benvenisti, *Sacred,* 8.
[441] William John Thomas Mitchell, ed., *Landscape and Power* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 2.
[442] See: Amos Goldberg, "The 'Jewish narrative' in the Yad Vashem global Holocaust museum," *Journal of Genocide Research* 14: (2012): 187-213; Dalia Ofer, "We Israelis Remember, But How? The Memory of the Holocaust and the Israeli Experience," *Israel Studies* 18 (2013): 70-85; Lentin, Co-*memory*; Sa'di and Abu-Lughod, *Nakba.*

commemorations and physical sites of memory "as anything having to do with […] the presence of the past," Nora's 'lieux de mémoire' have come into existence as a result of a lack of 'milieux de mémoire', settings in which memory is part of everyday experiences.[443] In other words, 'lieux de mémoire', as consecrated memory sites, would not exist if the memories of the past had not been "swept away by history."[444] Yet, as indicated in the introduction to this thesis, the Nakba and Holocaust feature distinctly in the Palestinian and Israeli 'milieux de mémoire'; and they are not fundamental vestiges of a "historical nation" that has ceased to transmit its memory.[445] Secondly, inherent in Nora's argument is the notion of creation of both physical and non-physical sites of memory, in which creation denotes falsification.[446] Crucially, in the case of Palestinian sites of memory, the construction of a former Palestinian landscape is neither intentional nor does it seek to allude to a pre-existing 'milieux de mémoire'.

As a result of mass Palestinian displacement and the Israeli control over territory that followed the 1948 War and the 1967 War, the analysis of physical sites and non-physical mnemonic acts in Israeli and Palestinian society will differ substantially. In the Israeli context, physical and non-physical mnemonic acts will be examined at three main Holocaust memorial institutes in Israel: Yad Vashem, Lohamei Hagetaot (known as the Ghetto Fighters' House in English) and Yad Mordechai, which were established in the 1950s and 1960s. Conversely, Palestinian society — both inside the 1948 borders and the West Bank — has not yet been able to dedicate an official institute to the commemoration of the Nakba; as a consequence, following the 1993 Oslo Accords, organizations independent from the Israeli and Palestinian governments

[443] Pierre Nora, *Realms of memory: rethinking the French past*, trans. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996-1998), 1, 14, 16.
[444] Nora, *Realms*, 2.
[445] Nora, *Realms*, 1, 6-7.
[446] Anderson, *Imagined,* 6; Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), 169.

have played a pivotal role in mnemonic acts dedicated to the Nakba.[447] The fragmented political reality since 1948 and, in particular, the various states of military rule applied by Israel inside the 1948 borders until 1966 and in the West Bank since 1967 have determined that both the execution and organization of Nakba commemoration differ immensely on both sides of the 1948 borders. Within the 1948 borders, since 1966, the access to former Palestinian villages has meant that Nakba commemorations — particularly following the Oslo Accords — have centered on physical mnemonic acts, incorporating traditional village commemorations in the collective realm. However, in the West Bank, restrictions on Palestinian movement into Israel and, particularly since the Second Intifada, inside the West Bank, have meant that non-site-specific commemorative acts dominate. Crucially, these non-physical commemorative acts do not denote a lack of 'physicality' in the traditional sense. Thus, under the leadership of the human rights organization Badil [Ar. alternative], 'return marches' constitute a primary form of commemoration on *Yawm al-Nakbah* and are conducted in cities and refugee camps in the West Bank.

The diverging political reality has created a further disparity in the official nature of the Israeli and Palestinian institutes and organizations involved in commemoration.[448] In the Israeli context, all three Holocaust institutes under examination can be deemed to conform with the official state narrative. As such, while Yad Vashem is the only official state-financed Holocaust institute, the state's involvement in and endorsement of commemorative acts at Yad Mordechai and Lohamei Hagetaot indicate that mnemonic practices at these institute are sanctioned by the

[447] In 2005, the Palestinian writer and academic Masalha pointed out that memory sites dedicated to the Nakba do not exist: "There is no Nakba museum, no Nakba Hall of Names […] no tombstones or monuments for the hundreds of Palestinian villages and towns ethnically cleansed and destroyed in 1948." Nur Masalha, 'Remembering the Palestinian Nakba: Commemoration, Oral History and Narratives of Memory', *Holy Land Studies* 7:2 (2008), 139.
[448] Nora, *Realms*, 19.

state and therefore are representative of the official master narrative. Conversely, the absence of Palestinian governance in Palestinian society inside the 1948 borders and post-Oslo hostility towards the PA has meant that an overt state-sanctioned narrative has largely remained absent in Nakba commemorations. Nevertheless, since both official and unofficial commemorations require an agent or agents, the notion of commemorative agency pertains to both Israeli and Palestinian society. Moreover, in both contexts, both state and non-state actors' involvement in commemorative acts has meant that the forms, contents and referents of commemoration have been those which the actors have considered relevant and legitimate for their target audience. Therefore, in addition to examining the commemorative acts and devices themselves through utilizing historical documents published by the mnemonic institutes and organizations, the following two chapters rely on interviews conducted with the organizational actors to highlight the existence and transformation of commemorative motives.

# Chapter Three: Recreating and Reclaiming the Lost Homeland

In March 1998, a Nakba and Steadfastness Committee (NSC) was set up by Palestinian citizens of Israel. Among the committee's several initiatives, one gained front-page headlines in the media: a call for Palestinian municipalities in Israel to establish memorial monuments for the Palestinian martyrs [Ar. *shuhadā*'] of 1948.[449] The NSC's initiative was emblematic of a change in Nakba commemoration among Palestinians living inside the 1948 borders and those living in the West Bank in the lead-up to the 50th anniversary of the 1948 War. In addition to calls for memorial monuments and the creation of a museum dedicated to the Nakba, a vast proliferation of Palestinian memoirs, oral history projects, films and academic studies concerning the Nakba occurred across the West Bank and inside the 1948 borders from the early 90s onwards.[450] This increased interest in the Nakba should not merely be ascribed to the temporal significance of the year 1998. Rather, both in the West Bank and inside Israel, following the 1993 Oslo Accords, preoccupation with the marginalized refugee community coupled with the rise in civil society organizations created an atmosphere in which Nakba commemoration became at once more organized and cohesive. Moving from the traditional local sphere to the collective realm, new forms of Nakba commemoration also articulated the urgent desire to further awareness of the

[449] Tamir Sorek, "Cautious Commemoration: Localism, Communalism, and Nationalism in Palestinian Memorial Monuments in Israel," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50 (2008): 377; Alexander Bligh, ed., *The Israeli Palestinians: An Arab Minority in the Jewish State* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 170.

[450] In 1997, the Taawon-Welfare organization, whose members include(d) Ibrahim Abu-Lughod and Abdel Al-Qattan, determined that a museum should be created in dedication to the memory of the Nakba on the 50th anniversary of the 1948 War. In the end, the second generation — to which the current chairman Omar Al-Qattan belongs — decided that the museum should celebrate Palestine's culture more broadly. Interview conducted with Omar Al-Qattan on March 11, 2016. Films included: Edward Said's 'In Search of Palestine' and Muhammad Bakri's '1948'. Academic works included: Masalha, *Expulsion*; Ilan Pappé, *The making of the Arab-Israeli conflict 1947-1951* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992); Walid Khalidi, *All that remains: the Palestinian villages occupied and depopulated by Israel in 1948* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine studies, 1992); Elias Sanbar, *Les Palestiniens dans le siècle* (Paris: Gallimard, Paris, 1994); Elias Sanbar, *Palestine, le pays à venir* (Paris: L'Olivier, 1996); and Salman Abu Sitta, *The Palestinian Nakba 1948*: *The register of depopulated localities in Palestine* (London: Palestinian Return Centre, 1998).

Nakba among younger generations with the specific aim of encouraging the continuing political struggle for the right of return [Ar. *haq al-'awdah*] and, more generally, resisting ongoing marginalization of the Palestinian community inside Israel and the West Bank.

The emphasis on the confrontational nature of Nakba mnemonic practices in the following chapter, in addition to reflecting the dynamics of mnemonic community-making which designate clear group lines,[451] is based on the theoretical concept that the subject driving the confrontation leads to an exclusive victimhood transmission. The framework behind this notion derives from a combination of theoretical foundations discussed in the former chapter. The convergence of Bauman's general exclusivity theory and comments made by Adwan inferring blindness to Jewish suffering experienced in the Holocaust in light of current Palestinian suffering leads to the creation of a 'defensive denial theory' in which the perceived ongoing suffering of one group can lead to denial of the victimhood of the out-group, as it is deemed the perpetrator of both the original and continuing suffering. Here, it is not necessarily the experienced discursive denial of the Nakba by Israeli-Jews, but rather the physical and political ramifications of this denial that are key to understanding unfolding trends of exclusivity on the part of their neighbors.

Through an analysis of the activities of three leading civil society organizations, namely Baladna, ADRID and Badil, the chapter below examines two collective mnemonic Nakba practices established in the wake of the Oslo Accords: annual Nakba Day commemoration and collective returns to former Palestinian villages. With reference to the organizations' varying social and geographical focuses, this chapter will attest to fact that, while similar in narrative and political goals, the execution of Nakba mnemonic practices in the West Bank and inside Israel

[451] Chiara De Cesari and Ann Rigney, *Transnational memory, circulation, articulation, scales* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 9.

differs, reflecting historic commemoration practices and the fragmented political reality. Furthermore, the inclusion of Badil, which focuses on the ongoing marginalization of all Palestinian youth in Israeli society rather than solely that of refugees, allows insight to be gained into commemorative Nakba practices among the non-refugee community inside the 1948 borders, thereby revealing the practical usage of Nakba commemoration as a means of political confrontation.

## The Capitulation of Oslo

The rise in civil organizations dedicated to commemorating the Nakba in the 1990s cannot be understood without reference to the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords for which the groundwork had been laid two years earlier, during the 1991 Madrid Conference. The Oslo Accords had far-reaching effects for the self-understanding and political engagement of Palestinians living inside the 1948 borders and Palestinian refugees living inside the West Bank. Since the birth of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, the right of return and the associated refugee issue has been seen as one of the organization's mainstays, as indicated by the inclusion of the right of return in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in 1988.[452] The PLO's commitment to the right of return was deemed such that in 1978 dozens of Palestinians inside Israel demanded recognition of the PLO based on the notion that acceptance of the PLO as the true legitimate representative of the Palestinian people would lead to "the solution of the refugee problem according to the repeated resolutions of the United Nations Organization."[453] Yet, under the leadership of the PLO, the Oslo Accords relegated one of the most central points of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — the question of Palestinian refugees — to later final-status negotiations.[454] The acceptance of the accords by the PLO meant that, in the words of the Palestinian writer Ghada Karmi, "it apparently became acceptable to settle someone else's country, expel its inhabitants and ensure by all means that they never return. By the same token, it became unacceptable — in bad taste even — to mention that these things had actually

[452] The Declaration of Independence was accepted by the Palestinian National Council in Algeria on November 15, 1988. Oren Yiftachel, "Territory as the Kernel of the Nation: Space, Time and Nationalism in Israel/Palestine," *Geopolitics* 7 (2002): 216.
[453] Pamela Ann Smith and Mohammed Kiwan, "'Sons of the Village' Assert Palestinian Identity in Israel," *MERIP Reports* 68 (1978), 18.
[454] Benvenisti, *Sacred,* 266; Ghada Karmi and Eugene Cotran, ed., *The Palestinian exodus 1948-1998* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999), 3; Browne, "Commemoration," 153.

happened."[455] In the eyes of the Palestinian refugee community, however, "the capitulation of Oslo" demanded a response.[456]

Somewhat paradoxically, the 1993 Oslo Accords facilitated the very political and social framework in which criticism against Oslo could be articulated. Under the control of the Jordanians (1948-1967) and, subsequently, the Israelis (1967-1994), Palestinians in the West Bank had been subject to measures preventing Palestinians from commemorating the Nakba in the attempt to quash the formation of Palestinian nationalism.[457] Yet, with the establishment of the PNA as a semi-autonomous entity, an environment was created in which the invocation of the Nakba could take place more freely, as indicated by its inclusion in textbooks.

From the early 90s, a new political framework had also come into existence among Palestinians inside Israel, characterized by a heightened national and political consciousness. In addition to the failure of the Oslo Accords to address the plight of the internal refugees, three inter-connected motives can be identified for the increased politicization: the erosion of Palestinian civil rights, a rise in Israeli right-wing politics and attempts to thwart Nakba commemoration. A convergence of these three motives took place in December 1992 when Gonen Segev, the right-wing Knesset Member of the Tzomet [Heb. crossroads] party, sought to outlaw a student association at the University of Haifa which had referenced the Nakba in a calendar marking key dates in the Palestinian national narrative.[458] While Segev's demand to "bash the head of the snake while it is still young" was rejected, it laid the groundwork for future legislative attempts in 2001, 2009 and 2010 to clip the wings of Palestinian commemoration

[455] Cited in Fouad Ajami, *The Dream Place of the Arabs* (New York: Pantheon, 1998), 268.
[456] Ibid.
[457] Rosemary Sayigh, *Palestinians: from peasants to revolutionaries : a people's history* (London: Zed Press, 1979), 111; Nur Masalha, *The Palestine Nakba: decolonising history, narrating the subaltern, reclaiming memory* (London: Zed Books, 2012), 6.
[458] Masalha, *Palestine,* 244/5.

inside the 1948 borders, which eventually culminated in the 2011 Nakba Law.[459] It is in the context of these political developments and the PNA's evasion of any meaningful discussion on the right of return that Palestinian civil society organizations took advantage of the emergence of the new post-Oslo framework and thrust themselves into the forefront by addressing the political marginalization of the refugee community and, in the process, reconstructing Nakba mnemonic practices.[460]

## The Return Visit: A Negation of the Nakba

In an article written in 1999, Karmi reflects on her parents' mysterious habit of questioning Palestinians visiting them in London on their exact place of origin. According to Karmi, this ritual of establishing a person's origin "became for Palestinians a kind of mapping, a surrogate repopulation of Palestine in negation of the Nakba. It was their way of recreating the lost homeland, as if the families and the villages and the relations they had once known were all still there, waiting to be reclaimed."[461] The recreation and reclaiming of the lost homeland did not only take place among exilic Palestinians. Following displacement, the village of origin became a major symbol for displaced Palestinians living within the 1948 borders (known in Arabic as the

[459] The Nakba Bill prohibits groups financed by the state from sponsoring remembrance activities for the Nakba on "Israel's Independence Day or the day of its establishment as a day of mourning." Note that the law is phrased in such a way that even the commemoration of Nakba day on the 15th of May (rather than Independence Day) would justify punishment. Sorek, *Palestinian,*159. See this thesis' introduction and chapter one for a further discussion of the evolution of the 2011 Nakba Bill.

[460] During the 1990s, an extraordinary large number of new Palestinian civil society associations were established. Some 656 associations were officially registered inside Israel, including Ittijah [Ar. direction] (1995) which represents 55 Israeli-Palestinians associations and offers services to more than 150 Palestinian associations. Palestinian associations inside the Green Line, such as Adalah [Ar. justice] and the Arab Centre for Alternative Planning, support the internally displaced. Nihad Boqai' and Terry Rempel, "Patterns of Internal Displacement, Social Adjustment and the Challenge of Return," in *Catastrophe remembered: Palestine, Israel and the internal refugees: essays in memory of Edward W. Said, (1935-2003)*, ed. Nur Masalha (London: Zed Books, 2005), 101.

[461] Ghada Karmi, "After the Nakba: An Experience of Exile in England," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28 (1999): 55.

internal refugees*, al-muhajjarīn fī al-dākhil*),[462] providing them with a legitimate identity within the host village and shaping their perception of the past and the future.[463] A survey conducted in 1996 by Mustafa Cabaha and Ronit Brazilai showed that the affiliation with the village of origin had continued to be transmitted across generations; in fact, the survey's results revealed that this bond was strongest among members of the third generation of whom seventy percent stated that they belonged to the village of origin.[464] The explicit sense of belonging among internal refugees, in contrast to many Palestinian refugees in the diaspora, has been substantiated through the physical proximity to the villages of origin and the ability to return and experience these villages, albeit under varying restrictions imposed by the Israeli state.

In the wake of the 1948 War, return visits to former Palestinians villages inside the 1948 borders were heavily restricted due to the existence of a military administration. Under this administration, imposed on Palestinians living inside Israel, temporary residence cards were made compulsory not only to obtain work permits but also to secure one's place of residence and travel passes were made necessary to leave that place.[465] As a consequence of this intricate bureaucratic system, return visits were traditionally conducted on the one day of the year that

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[462] Estimates of the total number of internally displaced inside Israel vary. According to ADRID, of the approximately 250,000 Palestinians that remained inside the 1948 borders after the 1948 War, 25 percent were displaced from their homes and became internal refugees. Today, some 250,000 internal refugees live inside Israel in 80 villages and towns. This number, however, does not include those displaced and forcible relocated after the 1948 War, conservatively estimated at 75,000 persons. Nur Masalha, "Introduction," in *Catastrophe remembered: Palestine, Israel and the internal refugees: essays in memory of Edward W. Said, (1935-2003)*, ed. Nur Masalha (London: Zed Books, 2005), 9; ADRID, *The Internally Displaced and the Right of Return* (ADRID, Undated), 1.

[463] Internal refugees' sense of belonging is also dictated by the geographical segregation and rejection by the inhabitants of the host village based on religious discrimination. In addition to family ties, religion was a very important socio-cultural element in choosing places of refuge, especially for the displaced Christian minority. Despite greater interaction with the host village in the past few decades, social differences, geographical segregation and rejection by local people continue to engender a sense of estrangement beyond the first generation. Boqai' and Rempel, "Patterns," 77*,* 89.

[464] Masalha, *Catastrophe,* 88.

[465] Laleh Khalili, *Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 200.

freedom of movement existed: Israel's Independence Day.[466] Upon the lifting of military rule in 1966, return visits by families and individuals became more frequent, marking holidays, religious feasts and, following 1976 Land Day, as an annual observance of *Yawm al-Arḍ* [Ar. Land Day] protests.[467] In the same decade that return visits became a form of protest, 'returns' were also performed as an educational ritual. Summer camps were organized for the children of the original inhabitants of a displaced village which were aimed at transmitting communal memories in a bid to strengthen local Palestinian identity.[468] The first of these 'Roots and belonging camps' took place in the 1970s in Kafr Bir'im and, from the mid-80s, groups of internally-displaced Palestinians (IDPs) from other villages followed suit.[469] During these summer camps, individuals belonging to the first generation were often invited to talk about the village before the 1948 Nakba and village traditions were once again performed in order to "live […] the village 24 hours a day."[470]

## Implementing a Temporary Return

The National Committee for the Rights of the Internally Displaced in Israel, since 2000 known as the Association for the Defense of the Rights of the Internally Displaced (ADRID or *jam'iyyah al-difā' 'an huqūq al-muhajjarīn*), was founded on March 11, 1995 in response to the failure to address the Palestinian community in Israel and, more specifically, the internal refugees in any

[466] Eitan Bronstein, "The Nakba in Hebrew: Israeli-Jewish Awareness of the Palestinian Catastrophe and Internal Refugees," in *Catastrophe Remembered: Palestine, Israel and the Internal Refugees,* ed. Nur Masalha (London: Zed Books, 2005), 217.
[467] After Israeli authorities killed six Palestinians in the Galilee protesting land confiscations on March 30, 1976, Palestinians inside Israel began annual observances of Land Day. Alain Epp Weaver, "Remembering the Nakba in Hebrew: Return Visits as the Performance of a Binational Future," *Holy Land Studies* 6 (2008), 134.
[468] Alain Epp Weaver, *Mapping exile and return: Palestinian dispossession and a political theology for a shared future* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), 102.
[469] Weaver*, Mapping,* 102.
[470] Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, *Returning to Kafr Bir'im* (Badil, 2006), 95/6; Masalha, *Palestine,* 249.

accord or compromise.[471] Internal documents charting the establishment and goals of ADRID note that neither the PA, recognized as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, nor the Israeli government, which considered internally-displaced Palestinians to be Israeli citizens, managed to comprehensively address the fate of the internally displaced and that of the Palestinian minority in the Madrid Conference of 1991 or the 1993 Oslo Accords.[472] As the document on the first popular meeting of the committee explains: "The 1991 Madrid Conference excluded references to UN resolution 194, which emphasizes our right of return and neglected the existence of the Palestinian Arab minority in the homeland."[473] In order to "gather and unify our struggle for the right of return to our villages and towns of origin," on its foundation in Qasr al-Salam/Tamra, the committee presented itself as "the only legitimate representative of the internally displaced in Israel."[474]

Following its establishment in 1995, ADRID focused its attention on four main goals: I) increasing awareness among the public and various groups of the plight of the internally displaced; II) demanding and obtaining full legal rights for internal refugees; III) gaining access to abandoned and/or destroyed towns and villages; and, IV) realizing the right of return for IDPs to their towns and villages.[475] Mohammed Kaial, one of the founders of the original committee and a descendant from the displaced village of al-Birweh, notes that in the attempt to increase awareness among both internally-displaced Palestinians and the non-refugee population inside Israel, activities have centered on depopulated or destroyed Palestinian villages.[476] In

[471] ADRID operated as a public committee for many years and, in May 2000, obtained official registration as an NGO and non-profit organization in Israel. ADRID, *The First Meeting of the Internally Displaced, March 11, 1995*, (The National Committee for the Rights of the Internally Displaced in Israel, 2000); ADRID, *General Organizational Profile* (ADRID, undated).
[472] ADRID, *First*, 5.
[473] Ibid., 5.
[474] ADRID, *First,* 2.
[475] ADRID, *General,* 2.
[476] Ibid; Interview conducted with Mohammed Kaial on April 18, 2016.

collaboration with village committees,[477] which formerly represented the inhabitants of specific destroyed or depopulated villages, ADRID has conducted restorations of historic and religious sites, such as mosques and cemeteries, collected archival material on villages and run summer camps for children and youth in their villages of origin. Through these return visits, awareness is raised among the second, third and fourth generation of the IDPs because, as Kaial points out, "they hear about the history of the village and how people lived and they see their land, where their houses were and trees that still exist, it's their history, it's not too distant, it's recent history."[478] During the 17th annual summer camp held on August 5, 2005, hundreds of children of Kafr Bir'im spending a week in the razed village were visited by the first generation who came to talk to the youth about their lives in the villages before 1948, thereby making the village a fully-fledged educational project for the week. One of these visitors was Sami Zahra, an IDP from Bir'im, who "told them [the participants] about our lives before the Nakba, our habits and traditions, and about the occupation of the village. I also walk with these groups among the houses, half of which still exist, and explain about them and about [sic] the names of their owners."[479]

Since 2001, another organization, Baladna [Ar. our country], has been active in bringing youth to former Palestinian villages in a bid to expose the Nakba to them. Baladna, the largest independent Palestinian youth organization group working in the 1948 area, presents itself a "development and capacity-building agency for Arab-Palestinian youth in Israel" and aims to engage Palestinians youth in discussions and debates concerning "the history, grievances and culture of Palestinians in Israel, the occupied territories and [the] diaspora" which are currently

[477] For an example of how this collaboration is conducted see: Wakim Wakim, "The 'Internally Displaced': Seeking Return within One's Own Land," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31 (2001): 35, 36.
[478] ADRID, *General,* 2. Interview conducted with Mohammed Kaial on April 18, 2016.
[479] Badil, *Returning,* 97.

not provided in the Israeli education system.[480] The Nakba constitutes one of the main historical grievances that has been addressed in the organization's educational, cultural and leadership programs which, according to internal reports, reach "tens of thousands of youths"[481] and consist of visitations to refugee camps in the West Bank and Lebanon, return visits to depopulated Palestinian villages within Israel and discussions and lectures concerning the Nakba and its marginalization in Israeli-Jewish society.[482] According to one of the founders of the organization, Nadim Nashif, the aim of these activities is "to instill a basic narrative and information concerning the Nakba as 25 percent of us [Palestinians inside Israel] are internally displaced, but not all parents tell children the family story […] we think it is important that they [Palestinian youth] have the chance to learn the facts."[483] One of Baladna's educational programs dealing with the Nakba is '*Udnā*[484] [Ar. we returned], which was launched in 2013.[485] In the course of the program, which takes place over a period of one year, third-generation descendants from depopulated villages return to their village of origin and learn about the specific events surrounding their families and the community's displacement.[486] Crucially, the third generation's return to the former village is not solely meant as an educational experience; instead, the project revolves around the returnees' practical visualization of a return, including by creating 3D models of their rebuilt village.[487] As such, the project's coordinator, Jomama Ashqar, argues that

[480] Baladna, *2009 Annual Activities Report* (Association for Arab Youth, Baladna, 2010), 6.
[481] Baladna, *2013-2014 Annual Activities Report* (Association for Arab Youth, Baladna, 2014), 3.
[482] Baladna, *2010-2011 Activities Report* (Association for Arab Youth, Baladna, 2011), 32; Baladna, *2014-2015 Annual Activities Report* (Association for Arab Youth, Baladna, 2015), 16.
[483] Interview conducted with Nadim Nashif on March 29, 2016.
[484] In Arabic, the project's name (عُدْنَا) indicates a past tense verb form (we returned). However, it should be noted that the organisation uses a possessive noun (our return) in their English publications on the project.
[485] According to Baladna's annual activities reports, the number of participants vary. Thus, in 2013, 70 participants were trained to conceptualize a return to their village, 1600 people attended local events concerning the project and 50,000 people received online information about the project. Baladna, *2013-2014*, 29.
[486] The project is conducted in coordination with ADRID, Badil, Zochrot and the Arab Association for Human Rights. Baladna, *Biennial Activities Report 2011-2013* (Association for Arab Youth, Baladna, 2013), 32, 33.
[487] Ibid.

the project "is about moving from theory to action [and implementation of] the right of return."[488] The comments of the group leader in the Qubti project reflect the realization of Ashqar's vision, as the '*Udnā* participant noted: "Like many of Maa'lool's youth, I was not born in the village of my ancestors and I was deprived of my right to return. However, [now] I believe that return is not only a dream, it is a possible reality."[489]

### The return visit as an act of confrontation

While the return visits conducted by ADRID do not necessarily engage in a concrete visualization of a collective future return, the secretary of the organization, Wakim Wakim, contends that return visits to destroyed or depopulated villages emphasize "that the place still exists to which a return is possible."[490] Furthermore, in a booklet published by ADRID on the displaced village of Miske, the ability for a future return is further highlighted based on the execution of temporary return visits: "The committee's objective in the long run is to return to the land. Not only through demands, slogans and struggles, but also through actual implementation of these slogans in the field. Simply to go back to the village. To go back to the future."[491]

As indicated in the above statement, while permanent collective return remains the key political goal, the very practice of returning to a former Palestinian site of residence in the present can be considered a temporary realization of return and, at times, a reimagining of a contemporary village through the congregation of the village's descendants.[492] It is because of

[488] Interview conducted with Jomama Ashqar on April 18, 2016.
[489] Baladna, *2013-2014,* 29.
[490] Wakim, "Internally," 38.
[491] ADRID, *Miske, The Displaced Village, the 13th March of Return* (ADRID, 2010), 18.
[492] For a different conception of the return visit, namely as a pilgrimage that consitutes "a journey to a sacred place [with] the pilgrim, disengaging from daily tasks [to go] through a rite of passage," see: Efrat Ben-Ze'ev, *Remembering Palestine in 1948: beyond national narratives* (New York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 102-4.

this realization of a return in the present that the return visits conducted by ADRID and Baladna centering on the village of origin can also be considered a direct confrontation of Israeli policies aimed at thwarting return through disregarding UN Resolution 194.[493] Indeed, a report published by Baladna in 2013-2014 pointed out that the return by the displaced youth can be considered an act aimed at "actualizing their right of return despite political obstacles imposed by Israel."[494] Similarly, a decade earlier, in 2001, Wakim maintained that ADRID's activities seek "to confront the grandsons of Zionism on the issue of displacement."[495]

The confrontational nature of return visits is evidenced in past responses, both by the Israeli authorities and Israeli-Jewish inhabitants. In April 2005, for instance, a group of Palestinian descendants returned to the destroyed village of Miske to plant olive trees and figs, which in the Israeli-Zionist narrative remains highly symbolically being "freighted with the statist meaning [of] resettling the land."[496] In response, the Israeli authorities uprooted the seedlings, closed the roads leading to the remaining village buildings and blocked their doors. A year later, following the rendition of the play Uncle Matta — which tells the story of the Nakba to small children — the authorities used bulldozers to destroy the remains of the buildings and planted citrus trees in their place.[497] The destruction of the remains of a Palestinian village, as occurred in Miske in 2006, was not a novel phenomenon. In 1951, following a ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court that they did have the right to return to the village, Palestinians from El-Ghabsiya headed back to their homes. On arrival, they were met by Israeli forces who blocked their way and refused to recognize the decision of the court. Moreover, with the aim of

[493] UN General Assembly Resolution 194, adopted on December 11, 1948, proclaimed that all refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practical date and that compensation should be paid for loss or damage to property. Pappé and Hilal, *Across,* 101.
[494] Baladna, *2013-2014,* 28.
[495] Wakim, "Internally," 248.
[496] Young, *Texture,* 219, 220.
[497] ADRID, *Miske*, 19.

dissuading any future return, government bulldozers destroyed all the houses in the village between 1955 and 1956.[498] Similar practices took place in the village of Bir'im and Iqrit, both located near the Lebanese border. Following rulings from the Israeli High Court in, respectively, 1953 and 1951 that the state must allow the internal refugees to return, the army ignored the rulings and razed the villages.[499]

According to Eitan Bronstein, the founder of the Israeli organization Zochrot, widespread ongoing denial and ignorance of the Nakba can lead to overt displays of hostility by Israeli-Jewish citizens when confronted with return visits, as they become unknowing and unwilling participants in a remembrance practice.[500] Founded in 2002, Zochrot conducts return visits to depopulated or destroyed Palestinians towns to further awareness of the Nakba.[501] In a recent interview, Omar Shargawi, an internally-displaced Palestinian working as a guide for Zochrot, further explained the reasoning behind the hostile response to Palestinian return visits, which range from rude remarks to physical attacks. Shargawi contends that the concept of a temporary return by Palestinians supported by an Israeli-Jewish group indicates to current inhabitants of former Palestinian villages that they "are not allowed to sleep comfortably the whole year feeling that nothing was there and no one cares what happens [and as such] the return forces people living in the area to see more than what the state wants them to see."[502] Moreover, the return and the physical retracement of the past, aided by placing signs, remind people that, in Shargawi's

[498] Dahoud Bader, *El-Ghabsiya, We Still Have the Keys: The Story of an Uprooted Palestinian Village* (ADRID, 2002), 17.
[499] Kafr Bir'im was largely flattened by aerial bombardment and artillery shelling after the Supreme Court upheld the appeal of its residents against the prohibition on their return. Despite awareness of the Supreme Court's decision, the army destroyed the previously Christian village on Christmas Day, 1951. Kadman, *Erased*, 26; Masalha, *Palestine,* 108.
[500] Interview conducted with Eitan Bronstein on May 3, 2016. See: Bronstein, "Nakba," 214-41; Ben-Ze'ev, *Remembering*, 5.
[501] While Zochrot's activities are principally aimed at Israeli-Jews, in practice, Palestinians also partake in activities as participants, historical eyewitnesses and guides.
[502] Interview conducted with Omar Shargawi on April 12, 2016.

words, “they are living in a place where a trauma took place,” thereby evoking, in Freudian terminology, the uncanny: something “once well known [which] had long been familiar [and now] concealed, kept from sight, so that others do not get to know about it.”[503]

*Figure 3.1. Reclaiming former landscape: Zochrot’s return to Deir Yassin*



## Challenging Israeli palimpsest practices

Shargawi’s statements indicate that return visits to depopulated or destroyed Palestinian villages also seek to expose the erasure practices of the Israeli state which sought to create a spatial realization of what the Israeli geographer and former mayor of Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti called “white patches.”[504] While these white patches until 1948 existed in the mental consciousness of Hebrew Zionists writers who described the Palestinian landscape as barren and virgin-like, following the 1948 War, this mental map became an empirical fact with the

[503] Ibid; Sigmund Freud, *The Uncanny*, ed. David McLintock (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 124, 129.
[504] Benvenisti, *Sacred,* 69, 70.

eradication of the Palestinian community from the real landscape.[505] In her recently-published book, entitled 'Erased from space and consciousness: Israel and the depopulated Palestinian villages of 1948', the Israeli writer Noga Kadman notes that the erasure of Palestinian landscape following the 1948 War was achieved in phases, through a combination of military and legislative steps which entailed setting up new Jewish communities on the Palestinian land and populating refugee homes with (immigrant) Jews; installing temporary emergency regulations that allowed the state to take hold of any private property without legal or administrative due process; applying laws that retroactively legitimized expropriation of Palestinian property by military units during the war and enabled further expropriations; using British Defense Emergency Regulations that allowed the declaration of closed military zones for security needs; and the enactment of the Absentee Property Law of 1950 which transferred ownership rights of refugee property to the custodian of absentee property.[506] Part and parcel of the execution of these policies was the demolition of former Palestinian landscape, aiming to make the absence of refugees permanent.[507] Thus, of the 418 depopulated villages discussed by Walid Khalidi in his ethnographic study 'All that remains', 293 (70 percent) were totally destroyed and ninety (22 percent) were largely destroyed.[508] The mass destruction of Palestinian landscape, which continued in the decades after the war, led the Palestinian scholar Nur Masalha to conclude that

[505] Ibid., 66, 67.
[506] Kadman, *Erased,* 16. Also see: Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and territory*: *the socio-territorial dimensions of Zionist politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1983), 136.
[507] In August 1957, the Ministry of Labor was asked by then Foreign Minister Golda Meir to ensure the clearing of ruins of Palestinian neighborhoods and villages. Priority was given in the request to "getting rid of ruins" in villages whose inhabitants remained in the country, such as al-Birweh in the western Galilee and Saffuriyya in the lower Galilee. At times, the remains of these villages became subject to forestation efforts by the Jewish National Fund in order to 'conceal' Palestinian existence. Kadman, *Erased,* 26; Boqai' and Rempel, "Patterns," 73.
[508] Khalidi*, All*.

the Nakba was followed by a "memoricide," meaning "the systematic erasure of the expelled Palestinians […] and the excision of their history and deeply rooted heritage in the land […]."[509]

The occurrence of a physical palimpsest in the "Holy Land's landscape" following the 1948 War was, of course, by no means a unique phenomenon. In 1994, William Mitchell contended that the face "of the Holy Landscape" had been so scarred "by war, excavation and displacement that no illusion of innocent, original nature can be sustained for a moment."[510] A similar observation had been made fifty years previously by Halbwachs during his study of Christian pilgrimage sites. Halbwachs noted that various groups had attempted to transform the space to yield and adapt the physical surroundings to their wishes.[511] Yet, as, according to Halbwachs, the group "becomes enclosed within the framework it has built,"[512] by returning to the remains of the depopulated sites, organizations such as ADRID and Baladna seek to counter a mental conversion of the Palestinian landscape into an Israeli one. Moreover, despite the absence caused as a result of demolition and destruction, the return negates the notion that the ruins can only belong to the past; and instead indicates that they can be foundations for a future, as Wakim maintained: "the tradition we started of visiting the destroyed villages […] emphasizes that the sites of these villages, however ruined, are still there [and] a return is possible."[513]

In a similar fashion, booklets published by ADRID on the history of depopulated villages and what remains today aim to lay claim to former Palestinian places of residence through conveying memories of a time that no longer exists, but that is not forgotten. As such, while these booklets introduce the reader to the history of the depopulated village, they should not be

[509] Nur Masalha, "Remembering the Palestinian Nakba: Commemoration, Oral History and Narratives of Memory" *Holy Land Studies* 7 (2008): 130; Masalha, *Palestine*, 10.
[510] Mitchell, *Landscape,* 27.
[511] Halbwachs*, Collective*, 54.
[512] Ibid.
[513] Wakim, "Internally," 38.

considered merely a medium that seeks to expose the past or "a kind of 'in memoriam'."[514] Rather, as one booklet on the depopulated village of Miske notes: "[this is] not a commemoration of a past event […] but a desire to return."[515] Following in the tradition of memorial books published immediately after the 1948 War, which included encyclopedic works by Arif al-Arif[516] and Mustapha Murad al-Dabbagh,[517] the booklets written by ADRID since the early 1990s contain interviews with former inhabitant of the depopulated villages in the attempt to re-create and reclaim the village imaginatively, through knowing it and, as such, "breathe life into a name."[518] For instance, in a booklet published on the village of Khubeizy, former resident Ahmad Khalil Moustafa Muhammed Salit, in addition to recounting memories of idyllic village life pre-1948, visually describes Khubeizy to his readers: "I remember the mosque building that was in the east side of the village, north of the cemetery, and a bit to the south there was the house of the *mukhtār* [Ar. village head] Abdel Kader al-Haj Gasson. The mosque was built of limestone and composed of one room 8x7 wide [and] the mosque had a wooden staircase from its northern side."[519] Whereas Salit's visual recounting invokes buildings that no longer exist in a landscape reclaimed by nature in the case of Khubeizy, the consequences of physical palimpsest

[514] Khalidi*, All*, xvii.
[515] ADRID, *Miske,* 2.
[516] El-Arif wanted "to tell people what had happened and therefore I have sworn to recount only what I have seen with my own eyes [so that] when the day comes that history is made right, future historians will be able to rely on [these] writings [which are] supported, by facts, names, places and figures. Arif el-Arif, *The Nakba: The Nakba of Jerusalem and the Lost Paradise, 1947-1952. Part one: From the Partition Resolution 29/11/1947 to the Beginning of the First Truce 11/6/1948* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2012), lix [in Arabic].
[517] Mustapha Murad al-Dabbagh, *Our Country Palestine* (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1956) [in Arabic].
[518] Khalidi*, All*, xvii. Another physical memorial project was conducted from 1979 by two Birzeit University scholars, Sharif Kanaana and Kamal Abdel Fattah. In 1985, the university's documentation center launched a series of monographs on the destroyed villages. Since 1993, this work has been overseen by Saleh Abdel Jawad. Sherna Berger Gluck, "Oral History and al-Nakbah." *Oral History Review* 35 (2008): 69; Masalha, *Palestine*, 135; Rochelle Davis, "Mapping the Past, Recreating the Homeland: Palestinian Memories of pre-1948 Village Life," in *Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory*, ed. Ahmad Sa'di and Lila Abu-Lughod (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 53,72.
[519] ADRID, Khubeizy, *The Eyes of al-Rawda* (ADRID and the Public Committee for the Preparation of the 16th March of Return, 2013), 6.

practices are exposed in booklets produced on the repurposed villages of Amqa and Kuwaykat/Kweikat. Here, buildings are recalled by former residents that have been reclaimed for other purposes, including former schools that currently function as a night club and an animal feed center.[520]

*Figure 3.2. Lifta — The "long-abandoned village"*[521]



Following an attack on Lifta's coffeehouse on December 28, 1947, the Palestinian historian al-Arif notes that most residents felt compelled to leave. Although Lifta remains one of the best-preserved Palestinian villages, no signs exist to indicate the village's recent history.[522]

## The March of Return

The March of Return, held annually since 1998, is the largest commemoration dedicated to the Nakba with tens of thousands of Palestinians participating every year. According to research

[520] ADRID, *15th Return Rally to Kweikat and Amqa Villages: No Going Back on the Right of Return* (ADRID and The People Committee of Kweikat and Amqa, 2012), 18-21.
[521] In 1987, the Israeli Nature Reserves Authority planned to restore the "long-abandoned village" and to turn it into an open-air natural history and study center that would "stress the Jewish roots of the site." This project had an estimated cost of $10 million. Khalidi, *All*, 303.
[522] Ibid.

conducted by Tamir Sorek, the number of "Arab citizens who reported participation" has been steadily rising since the beginning of the 21st century. Thus, whereas only 12.9 percent took part in the annual march in 2003, this number rose to 47.9 percent in 2012,[523] meaning that over half of those who commemorated Nakba Day in 2012 (90.9 percent of Palestinians inside the 1948 borders) partook in the march.[524] The first March of Return, organized by ADRID in coordination with local committees of IDPs and Palestinian NGOs, was held in 1998 with a march from the host town of Nazareth to the depopulated village of El-Ghabsiya on 28 March 1998, the annual commemoration of Land Day.[525] While 1998, with the Israeli state's jubilee serving as a catalyst, constituted the first time that the return march to El-Ghabsiya was organized as the major annual commemorative event to the Nakba, a historic tradition of villagers marching to their depopulated village to commemorate their expulsion had existed since September 1954 when the displaced of Kafr Bir'im staged an annual march from Jish to the 'hill of tears', from which they had witnessed the destruction of Bir'im the preceding year.[526] The march to El-Ghabsiya conducted in 1998 was also not a novel phenomenon. Upon the establishment of the El-Ghabsiya village committee in 1995, an annual rally was organized in the village, during which the names of dozens of other depopulated villages were hung on the wall of the village's mosques and banners demanded "the implementation of the Supreme Court's decision" and "[restoration of] lands to the internal refugees."[527]

[523] 14.7 percent of those who participated in the 2012 Nakba commemoration reported that they were harassed by Israeli authorities. Sorek, *Palestinian,* 7, 271.
[524] Anonymous, "Result of a survey by the site al-Arab: 90.9% commemorate the Nakba and do not recognize Israel's independence [day]," *Kul al-Arab* 28 April 2012, accessed September 6, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/453971.
[525] Interview conducted with Mohammed Kaial on April 18, 2016; Masalha, *Palestine,* 249/250.
[526] Weaver, *Mapping,* 99.
[527] Boqai' and Rempel, "Patterns," 98; Sorek, *Palestinian*, 74; Rekhess, "Arab," 198.

Following the first March of Return in 1998, it was decided that the march would be held on Israeli's Independence Day — marked according to the Hebrew calendar — because, as Kaial put it, "we wanted to show that Israel's day of independence is our day of catastrophe [and] to attract the attention of Palestinians, Israelis and the international community."[528] Indeed, one of the key slogans of the March of Return, *yawm istiqlālikum — yawm nakbatinā* [Ar. your independence day — our day of catastrophe], is indicative of this approach. Yet, a more practical reasoning behind the decision to conduct the annual March of Return on Israel's Independence Day can also be deduced. Land Day, in Israel, in contrast to Independence Day, is a working day. Consequently, Kaial explains, any activities organized on Land Day would typically attract fewer participants.[529]

Under the leadership of ADRID, the March of Return inside the 1948 borders has turned into an orderly and family-friendly event that exhibits a predominantly secular nature, with ice cream trucks, free supplies of water and a book-selling booth.[530] The composed nature of the event largely derives from the organization's desire to avoid any potential conflicts with local Jewish residents, which has meant that the organizers invest great effort in disciplining expressions to ensure the slogans and signs will not put the march in danger of it being interpreted as a violation of any law. In addition, the mapping of the exact path of every march is partly dictated by the desire to avoid clashes with Jewish residents of the existing locality built on the village's land.[531] Nevertheless, at times, the march does lead to direct confrontation. In 2007, for instance, a group of Israeli-Jewish citizens sought to hamper the march by organizing a counter demonstration. At the invitation of the recently-established Israeli organization called

[528] Interview conducted with Mohammed Kaial on April 18, 2016.
[529] Ibid.
[530] For a discussion of the Islamist movement's lack of influence in this event, see: Sorek, *Palestinian,* 78.
[531] Sorek, *Palestinian,* 155.

Hashomer Hachadash [Heb. the new guard],[532] hundreds of people came to a picnic in Tsipori which had been established on the land of the depopulated village of Safuriye. The route of the march was thereby obstructed because on its way to Safuriye it was meant to go through Tsipori.[533]

The desire for rigid oversight of the event is further fueled by the political aims of the march which, as a result of any violent action, might be jeopardized. The main goals of the march, as expressed by Kaial, are "to demonstrate the desire and right to return and to challenge the notion that we are absentees, as we are designated under Israeli law."[534] Consequently, similarly to the return visits described above, the March of Return seeks to challenge the lack of implementation of UN resolution 194 by the Israeli state through embodying a reversal of the event that is commemorated: expulsion. In addition to chanting slogans on the implementation of the right of return, such as *baqā' wa-'awdah* [Ar. remain and return] and *lā 'awdah 'an haq al-'awdah* [Ar. there is no return on the right of return], the most important manifestation of this challenge occurs in the reciting of the oath of return and the unofficial Palestinian anthem, which in 2016 were recited one after the other.[535] Reminiscent of the tradition of *ṣumūd* — literally steadfastness in hanging on to the land, the place and the homeland — the oath to return [Ar. *qasam al-'awdah*] witnesses a collective swearing "by god almighty" of the participants to "refuse both personally and publicly any compensation or settlement" for "the land of the

[532] Hashomer Hachadash, established in 2007 by Yoel Zilberman, describes itself as a "Zionist movement that connects the Nation, the Land and the People of Israel" and is partly funded by the Jewish National Fund (JNF). Its main mission is to "protect state-administered land from thieves and raiders in the Negev and the Galilee" because, according to the organization, "the legal landowners, who have worked tirelessly to maintain the land over the years, are facing a daily struggle of protecting their farms and ranches from criminals who want to oust them and illegally obtain their land." Hashomer Hachadash, *Five-Year Strategic Plan 2013-2018* (Hashomer Hachadash, undated), 1.
[533] Sorek, *Palestinian,* 153.
[534] Interview conducted with Mohammed Kaial on April 18, 2016.
[535] Participant observation conducted on March 12, 2016.

homeland, the land of my fathers and ancestors."[536] Implicit in this statement is a renunciation of the Acquisition for Public Purposes Ordinance which was enacted by the British in 1943 and later used by the Israeli state to provide compensation for Palestinian land in exchange for the rights to the land. The importance of *ṣumūd*, in defiance of settlement practices, is also emphasized during the singing of *Mawṭanī* [Ar. my homeland].[537] Originally written in the 1930s by the Palestinian poet Ibrahim Abd al-Fattah Touqan as a symbol of the Palestinian struggle against the British, the poem has been considered the unofficial Palestinian national anthem since then.[538] Despite transferring the main cause of the struggle from one actor to another, the answer remains the same: eternal loyalty and faithfulness to the homeland, "an honorable cause [for which] until your independence […] our youth will not tire."[539]

*Figure 3.3. The 2016 March of Return in Wadi Zubalah*






[536] ADRID*, Oath to Return* (ADRID, 2016).
[537] Another campaign invoking the tradition of *ṣumūd* was held by ADRID in 2015. The campaign, entitled 'Do not give up the land of [your] ancestors', challenged an Israeli Supreme Court ruling in 2013 which, in coherence with the Acquisition for Public Purposes Ordinance of 1943, allowed for financial compensation claims to be made up until a certain date "otherwise they [the displaced Palestinians] will lose or waive their rights to the land." According to the campaign, by claiming and potentially being granted compensation, Israel sought to "involve the displaced in her crimes and deny the right of return." ADRID, *Do not surrender the land of [your] parents and grandparents* (ADRID, 2015 [in Arabic].
[538] Sorek, *Palestinian,* 78.
[539] ADRID, *National anthem by the poet Ibrahim Touqan* (ADRID, 2016) [in Arabic].

## Nakba Commemoration in the West Bank

In his 2007 book, entitled 'Son of the cypresses: memories, reflections, and regrets from a political life', Benvenisti claims that it was "the Israeli Arabs who taught the residents of the territories to commemorate Nakba Day."[540] While the concept of a mnemonic imitation cannot be fully disregarded, this statement fails to acknowledge the deeply-rooted historic traditions of Nakba commemoration that took place in the territories. As early as 1949, the 15th of May was marked in several West Bank cities by demonstrations, strikes and visits to the graves of those fallen in the 1948 War. These commemorative events were organized by worker and student associations, cultural and sport clubs, committees of refugees and the Muslim Brotherhood.[541] Nakba commemoration was also adopted by the Palestinian national movement of the late 1950s, and every year on the 15th of May, the Fatah bulletin, *Filasṭinunā* [Ar. our Palestine], dedicated analytical texts dealing with the meaning of the day and the lessons of the Nakba. Following the emergence of the PLO in 1964 and the rise of other commemorations dedicated to the armed struggle and the revolutionary spirit, the 15th of May did become somewhat marginalized.[542] This marginalization, however, did not mean that the Nakba was absent from the PLO's political agenda. Rather, as Brendan Browne points out, since for much of its existence the PLO conducted operations from exiled bases in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, the events of the Nakba significantly shaped the political and national aspirations of the Palestinian leadership. As a result, official or state-sponsored commemorations were deemed unnecessary given the fact that "the entire Palestinian struggle for statehood and liberation was premised on a reversal of events that took place in 1948."[543]

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[540] Meron Benvenisti, *Son of the cypresses: memories, reflections, and regrets from a political life* (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 2007), 164.
[541] Sorek, *Palestinian,* 68.
[542] Ibid.
[543] Browne, "Commemoration," 152.

The continued political preoccupation of the PLO with the Nakba can be seen in two different documents published in the late 1980s. In a communiqué issued during the First Intifada by the PLO and the United National Command of the Uprising on May 13, 1988, the Nakba constitutes the very first line in a document that highlights the "achievements of the Palestinian revolution, the glory of the magnificent uprising."[544] The document reminds its readers that "forty years have passed since the expulsion of our people from its homeland and the attempt to liquidate its existence and its national existence" and calls on Palestinians to commemorate "May 15, which denotes the Nakba, [as] a day of national mourning and a general strike."[545] In addition to commemorating the Nakba, the right of return for Palestinian refugees was also declared one of the mainstays of the PLO's agenda, as indicated by its inclusion in the 1988 Declaration of Independence, which proclaimed: "[Their] willed dispossession and expulsion was achieved by organized terror […] In Palestine and in exile, the Palestinian Arab people never faltered and never abandoned its conviction in its rights of Return and Independence."[546]

Despite the official commitment to the right of return by the PLO, the marginalization of the refugee issue in the 1993 Oslo Accords dictated future political involvement in Nakba mnemonic practices in the West Bank. The political parties' marginal role in commemoration practices, however, cannot solely be attributed to the 1993 peace accords or the subsequent failure to include the refugee issue in the political narrative. In 1998, for instance, Yasser Arafat, President of the PNA and Chairman of the PLO, publically endorsed the right of return by

[544] Shaul Mishal and Re'uven Aharoni, *Speaking Stones: Communiqués from the Intifada Underground* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 93-97.
[545] Ibid.
[546] Institute for Palestine Studies, *The Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement: a documentary record* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994), 268.

invoking the concept of *ṣumūd* [Ar. steadfastness], stipulating that "Palestinians selling Palestinian land deserve death."[547] Governmental support to conduct Nakba commemorations in the West Bank came in 2007 when the High National Committee for Commemoration of the Nakba was set up, which is affiliated with the PLO's Refugee Affairs Department.[548] Officially, this committee was established to ensure a more coordinated and structured commemoration of the Nakba. More important, however, was the committee's implicit aim to ensure political involvement and support for the rights of the refugees which many had considered absent in prior years.[549] The appearance of political support for the right of return was particularly vital following the publication of secret documents concerning Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations by the newspaper *Al Jazeera* in 2011.[550] These documents, which became known as the 'Palestine Papers', revealed the extent to which Palestinian negotiators had been willing to give up on the right of return to merely "a handful….symbolic number of returnees" of 10,000 to satisfy Palestinian public demand.[551] The publication of these documents was deemed further proof of the PA's lack of true engagement with the refugee issue and, according to Khalid Al-Saifi, head of the cultural center *Ibdā*' [Ar. creation] in Bethlehem's Dheisheh refugee camp and a former leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), meant that political parties became further disenfranchised.[552] As a result, the committee's involvement in Nakba

[547] Yiftachel, "Territory," 216.
[548] Khaldun A. M. Bshara, "Space and Memory: The Poetics and Politics of Home in the Palestinian Diaspora," (PhD diss., University of California, Irvine, 2012), 146, 147.
[549] Browne, "Commemoration," 153, 160.
[550] For articles published by *Al Jazeera* on this topic, see: Anonymous, "PA selling sort the refugees," *Al Jazeera*, January 25, 2011, accessed August 1, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepapers/2011/01/2011124123324887267.html. Also see: Amira Howeidy, "PA relinquished right of return," *Al Jazeera*, January 24, 2011, accessed August 1, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepapers/2011/01/2011124121923486877.html.
[551] These accusations, which the Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat refuted as "foundationless," came in the wake of further incendiary reports on the PNA. In 2010, WikiLeaks revealed cooperation between Arab leaders (including the PNA) and Israel during the wars in Gaza (2008), Lebanon (2006) and Iraq (2003) and what Khaldun Bshara refers to as "other 'scandalous' economic and military relations." Bshara, "Space," 162.
[552] Interview conducted with Khalid Al-Saifi on April 3, 2016.

commemoration over the years appears marginal, further indicated by Khaldun Bshara's comment that they only show up "occasionally […] to coordinate and carry out commemorative events."[553]

One civil society organization which as a result of ongoing political wariness concerning the refugee issue has assumed a key organizational role in planning annual Nakba events is the Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights.[554] Badil, established in January 1998 in response to the marginalization of the Palestinian refugees in the peace process, is an "independent, human rights, non-profit organization mandated to defend and promote the rights of Palestinian refugees and internally-displaced persons."[555] In coherence with its mandate, Ahmad Hammash, the current coordinator of Badil's outreach events, notes that Badil's work primarily focuses on advancing the rights of Palestinian refugees, including by organizing Nakba commemorative events.[556] Since its founding, Badil has organized educational and cultural activities on the Nakba throughout the year that seek to engage both (descendants of) refugees and non-refugees, including through public debates on the future of the Palestinian refugee question and implementation of the right of return, 'return summer school programs', camps dedicated to mobilizing youth participation in refugee rights, broadcasting videos on Palestinian TV stations on refugee life in camps across the West Bank, annual poster competitions for the best Nakba commemoration poster and annual Nakba Day commemorations.[557]

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[553] Bshara, "Space," 146, 147.
[554] Browne, "Commemoration," 135.
[555] "About Badil," Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights, accessed July 19, 2016, http://www.badil.org/en/about-badil.
[556] Interview conducted with Ahmad Hammash on March 28 and April 13, 2016.
[557] Badil, *50 Years of Palestinian Exile and Dispossession 1998 Campaign for the Defense of Palestinian Refugee Rights & Development* (Badil, 1998), Badil, *Press Release May 15, 2012* (Badil, 2012); Badil, *Nakba Memorial in Palestine* (Badil, 2001), Badil, *Major Nakba Memorial Events in Palestine* (Badil 2003); Badil, *10 days of successful Badil summer school program* (Badil, 2011).

Under the leadership of Badil, Nakba Day commemorations in the West Bank have been marked by collective return marches on the 15th of May.[558] Since the first 'March of the Millions' in May 1998, annual marches have taken place all over the West Bank, departing both from refugee camps, such as Balata Camp (Nablus), Nur-Shams, Jenin, Tulkarem, al-Far'ah, al-'Ain, the two 'Askar camps, and from major West Bank cities.[559] The symbolism behind the marches conducted in the West Bank is the same as that which underpins those conducted inside the 1948 borders, namely a physical testimony of the desire to return to the displaced villages. This symbolism is evidenced in several Badil reports discussing Nakba marches in the West Bank. In 2000, for instance, a report, entitled '52nd Anniversary of Palestinian Eviction: Symbolic Return Today – A Step Toward Real Return in the Future', discussed a "symbolic return visit" conducted by some 150 Palestinian "eyewitnesses of the 1948 expulsion" and their grandchildren from Dheisheh, 'Aida, and 'Azza refugee camps to their villages of origin in present-day Israel. Divided into several stations, including the destroyed village of Bayt Nattif and the converted villages of Zakaryya and Bayt Jibrin — now known as the Israeli towns of Zekharay and Beit Guvrin — the march sought to challenge the effectiveness of palimpsest through including eyewitnesses of 1948 and their descendants in order to bear "witness of [sic] the [historical] presence of this Palestinian community."[560] A more direct confrontation of the attempted erasure of a Palestinian presence also constituted part of the march. Thus, in Zakaryya/Zekharya, former residents of Zakaryya confronted current Israeli residents of

[558] In 1998, the PNA set up May 15 as the official Nakba Day to mark the date on which the establishment of the state of Israel was proclaimed (it was May 14). Michael Milshtein, "The Memory that Never Dies: The Nakba Memory and the Palestinian National Movement," in *Palestinian Collective Memory and National Identity,* ed. Meir Litvak (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 54, 55.
[559] Badil, *52nd Anniversary of the Palestinian Expulsion (al-Nakba): Violent Clashes with Israeli Occupation Army Public Marches and Rallies for Refugees' Right of Return* (Badil, 2000); Badil, *Major Nakba Memorial Events in Palestine* (Badil, 2003).
[560] Badil, *52nd Anniversary of Palestinian Eviction: Symbolic Return Today-- A Step Toward Real Return in the Future* (Badil, 2000).

Zekharya, claiming to be the rightful occupants of the homes and properties and thereby simultaneously proclaiming their right of return.[561] The importance of the right of return was reiterated in marches organized by Badil in various districts of the West Bank in 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2008 which were meant to "affirm the demand for the right of return, self-determination and the Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital."[562]

### Nakba commemoration as an act of protest

Ever since Yasser Arafat inaugurated Nakba Day on May 15, 1998, the line between Nakba commemoration and protest has become blurred,[563] leading Browne to conclude that the event is as much about the ongoing conflict with Israel as it is about the 1948 Nakba itself.[564] His argument is substantiated by the recurrent physical confrontations between those commemorating and the Israeli army, oftentimes leading to Palestinian deaths.[565] In 1998, for instance, during the aforementioned 'March of the Millions', Palestinian press reported eight killed and over 400 wounded as a result of the violence that accompanied the march.[566] Two years after the symbolic 50th anniversary of the Nakba, on May 15, 2000, large protests and violent confrontations with the Israeli army resulted in five Palestinian deaths and hundreds of injuries. More recently, in 2011, violent confrontations led to the death of 12 Palestinians on Nakba Day; and in 2014, an IDF sniper killed two Palestinians partaking in violent

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[561] Ibid.
[562] Badil, *Our Displacement – Our Return: Palestinians Commemorate the 53rd Anniversary of their Massive Displacement by Israel in 1948* (Badil, 2001).
[563] Michael Milshtein puts forward a different interpretation. Milshtein argues that the violent nature of Nakba mnemonics in the West Bank can be considered a result of the shrewd politics practiced by Arafat who "exploited changes in Nakba memory in 1998 to mobilize the Palestinian public and incite it to violent confrontations with Israel." Milshtein, "Memory," 53.
[564] Browne, "Commemoration," 156.
[565] Barry Rubin and Judith Rubin, *Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 187.
[566] Hillel Frisch, "Ethnicity or Nationalism? Comparing the Nakba Narrative amongst Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza," *Israel Affairs* 9 (2002): 170.

demonstrations.[567] At times, these physical confrontations occur when participants in the commemoration march approach the separation wall or checkpoints to throw stones or burn tires, usually with dire consequences as Palestinians protesters are regularly met by a violent and militarily-dominant Israeli bombardment of tear gas and associated crowd dispersal methods, including rubber-coated steel pellets and, on occasion, live ammunition.[568] Thus, on Nakba Day 2008, when over 1,000 protestors broke off from the main Nakba commemoration in Ramallah and tried to enter Jerusalem through the Qalandia checkpoint, Israeli forces fired teargas and rubber bullets injuring over one hundred. On the same day, Palestinian refugees attempting to enter the part of the West Bank town of Al-Walaja that was displaced in 1948 were forcibly dispersed by Israeli soldiers, leading to the arrest of eight Palestinians.[569] Interestingly, Al-Saifi notes that the tradition of violent confrontation precedes official Nakba Day commemoration and can be dated back to the pre-Intifada years when violent clashes between Palestinians and the Israeli army were meant to instill confidence in the Palestinian people and to give them the feeling that "they were standing up for their rights."[570] These identified pre-Intifada motives remain present today. In an interview, Hammash contended that despite the fact that Badil does not consider violent confrontation a part of Nakba Day commemoration, violence has been and will continue to be a part of mnemonic Nakba activities as many Palestinians in the West Bank deem it "important to remind Israelis that they have displaced us and violated our rights."[571]

[567] Anne Barker, "Violence erupts on Israel's borders," *ABC*, May 16, 2011, accessed February 28, 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-05-15/violence-erupts-on-israels-borders/2694524l; Sorek, Palestinian, 77, 78.
[568] Sorek, *Palestinian,* 159.
[569] Badil, *Nakba Commemoration - 13 May 2008* (Badil, 2008).
[570] Interview conducted with Khalid Al-Saifi on April 3, 2016.
[571] Interview conducted with Ahmad Hammash on March 28 and April 13, 2016.

## The Nakba as an eternal present

These above-mentioned "rights" do not solely refer to the right of return; rather, in the West Bank, similarly to inside the 1948 borders, the Nakba is considered a continuous event, an ongoing Nakba. As Hammash explains: "We don't consider the Nakba an historic event that ended, but rather view it as ongoing [since] civilian displacement started before 1948 and has continued until today based on the Zionist desire 'maximum land, minimum Palestinian people'. [As such], we do not only want to commemorate Nakba on the 15th of May, but throughout the entire year."[572] Implicit in these comments is also the notion that the Nakba does not only belong to the refugees and their descendants, but, through its contemporary manifestations, in the words of Ahmed Sa'di, "connects all Palestinians to a specific point in time."[573] Indeed, speeches by Arafat and other official spokesmen, including the poet Darwish,[574] have invoked the ongoing ramifications of the Nakba for all Palestinians — both (descendants of) refugees and non-refugees — in public speeches by framing the Nakba in the context of contemporary Palestinian political aspirations. In a radio interview conducted on the 50th anniversary of the Nakba, Arafat, faced with the stagnation of peace agreements and ever-mounting tension, tied the continuous suffering as a result of the Nakba to the ongoing national struggle for a Palestinian state by proclaiming that the only way "the page of the Nakba could be turned over forever" was through

[572] Ibid.
[573] Sa'di, "Catastrophe," 177.
[574] The official Palestinian People's Appeal issued on 14 May 1998 and read by Darwish contended that "the past [Nakba] has not entirely departed [for Israel has continued to pursue] a policy of colonization and land confiscation, reneging on signed agreements, negating the terms of reference of the peace process, violating the timetable and denying the agenda of permanent status talks, while continuing the imposition of collective punitive measures on the Palestinian people." In his second speech in May 2003, delivered during the height of the Second Intifada, Darwish reaffirmed the importance of reversing the ongoing Nakba based on "the right of return, complete withdrawal from Palestinian land occupied in 1967, and the right to self-determination and an independent sovereign state with Jerusalem as its capital." Mahmoud Darwish, "Not to begin at the end," *Al-Ahram Online* 533 (May 2001), accessed September 21, 2017, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/Archive/2001/533/op1.htm; "The Palestinian People's Appeal on the 50th Anniversary of the Catastrophe "Al-Nakba," Palestinian Ministry of Information, accessed July 10, 2016, www.pna.org/mininfo/nakba.

"the return of the emigrant to his homeland and the building of our Palestinian state on our land….just like other peoples […] we want to celebrate in our capital, holy Jerusalem."[575]

As indicated in Arafat's comments, invocation of present-day Nakba manifestations in mnemonic discourse, while always emphasizing the Nakba as the original watershed, mirrors the perceived contemporary political and social marginalization as a result of the ongoing occupation — a theme which will be touched on extensively in the final chapter to this work. In 2006, a Badil report published on Nakba Day, for instance, conceptualized the ongoing Nakba in the framework of the construction of the separation wall, which had commenced six years earlier "in the occupied West Bank, including Eastern Jerusalem [and created a] continued forced displacement of Palestinians caused by land confiscation and de facto annexation."[576] In addition to continued land dispossession, the ongoing Nakba is also inferred to demonstrate that the difficult living conditions in the West Bank cannot be separated from the events of 1948. Implicitly invoking the negative economic effects of the Israeli blockade on Gaza imposed in 2007, which placed serious constraints on economic activity in the West Bank and spiked the consumer price index by seven percent,[577] a 2008 report argued that one of the ways in which Palestinians were suffering from the Nakba manifested itself in the rising prices of basic food staples. In order to exhibit "hunger and anger," Badil therefore called on Palestinians to participate in a Nakba march to the government center in Hebron "bringing along empty cooking pots, forks and spoons in a symbolic gesture."[578]

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[575] Cited in Bligh, *The Israeli Palestinians*, 181.
[576] Badil, *The Palestinian Nakba at 58 – the Nakba Continues* (Badil, 2006). A similar statement appears in a 2012 report which states: "The 64th anniversary of the Nakba signals 64 years of ongoing, systematic, forced displacement of the Palestinian people which began ruthlessly in 1948." Badil, *The Nakba-64 Commemoration* May 15, 2012 (Badil, 2012). In 2006, 42 percent of the wall had already been completed. Alina Korn, "The ghettoization of Palestinians," in *Thinking Palestine*, ed. Ronit Lentin (London: Zed Books, 2008), 117.
[577] This constituted a rise of six percent since mid-2007. Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, *Palestinian Economic Prospects: Gaza Recovery and West Bank Revival* (World Bank, June 2009), 9.
[578] Badil, *Nakba Commemoration – 10 May 2008* (Badil, 2008).

The execution of military actions and policies resulting from what Eyal Weizman terms "[Israel's] erratic occupation" are also considered emblematic of an ongoing Nakba.[579] During the height of the Second Intifada, when Israel — for the first time since the 1967 War — used F-16 warplanes to bomb various cities the West Bank,[580] a Badil report stated that commemorations of the ongoing Nakba that year both sought to symbolize Palestinian steadfastness and to challenge the "racist legislation and policies […] and bombing and shelling from F-16 fighters and Apache helicopters in the 1967 occupied territories."[581] It is because of the manifestations of the Nakba in the present — both in times of extreme violence and in times of relative calm — that mnemonic Nakba practices can be considered an opportunity for the downtrodden to (violently) challenge the hegemony. These displays of dissent are common to commemorative rituals which take place in hostile environments because, as Browne demonstrates with reference to 1916 Easter Rising Commemorations in Belfast, they create opportunities for marginalized factions to voice and demonstrate their grievances and reaffirm their position in society.[582] Part and parcel of these ritual performances is the creation of group solidarity as a means of differentiating between the groups in conflict and presenting a unified force in the face of ongoing conflict.[583] Indeed, the public outrage that accompanied the 52nd anniversary of al-Nakba sought to do just that. According to a report published by Badil, the commemoration aimed to challenge Israeli policies in the Palestinian territories occupied in

[579] Eyal Weizman, *Hollow land: Israel's architecture of occupation* (London: Verso, 2007), 11.
[580] These attacks were often conducted in the wake of Palestinian suicide bomb attacks on Israeli civilians; in turn, creating a cycle of violence. Human Rights Watch*, Israel, the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Palestinian Authority Territories* (Human Rights Watch, 2002), 441; John Wright, *The New York Times Almanac* (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 51. Also see Tristan Dunning, *Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy: Reinterpreting Resistance in Palestine* (London: Routledge, 2016), 82.
[581] Badil, *54th Anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba (15 May 2002): Naka Memorial Events Organized by Internally Displaced Palestinians in Israel. Dispossession and Displacement 1948 - 2002: The Root Cause of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Badil, 2002).
[582] Browne, "Commemoration," 143.
[583] Ibid., 144, 146.

1967, including "land confiscation, settlement expansion, house demolitions," and simultaneously express concern for the lives of the approximately 2,000 Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli jails on hunger strike for more than two weeks.[584] A similar demonstration of solidarity occurred during the earlier discussed return march to Zakarrya. Upon their return, participants in the march ended their trip by joining the Palestinian hunger strikers at the Bethlehem Red Cross Center in order to express their demand for the immediate release of all Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails; with this act, offering a deliberate reminder that all contemporary strife must inherently be linked to the Nakba as an "eternal present."[585]

[584] Badil, *52nd Anniversary of the Palestinian Expulsion Nakba Day Activities* (Badil, 2000).
[585] Badil, *52nd Anniversary of Palestinian Eviction: Symbolic Return Today-- A Step Toward Real Return in the Future Activities* (Badil, 2000); Sa'di, "Catastrophe," 177.

## Concluding Remarks

Building on traditional forms of commemoration established in the years following *al-Nakba*, Palestinian mnemonics in the post-Oslo era underwent a distinct shift from the local to the collective sphere, as illustrated by the transformation of individual communities' return visits into the annual March of Return organized by ADRID. While bolstered by the symbolic 50th anniversary of the Nakba, the rise of civil society organizations dedicated to bringing the Nakba into the public realm were primarily driven by the political outcome of the Oslo Accords which, under the leadership of the PLO, postponed the Palestinians refugee issue to permanent status negotiations.

Simultaneously, the post-Oslo political landscape — both in the Palestinian Territories and inside the 1948 borders — galvanized the very emergence of these civil organizations. Thus, whereas the establishment of the PA as a semi-autonomous entity created an environment in which the Nakba could be publically recalled, within the 1948 borders, the heightened Palestinian national consciousness largely arose as a result of political marginalization by the Israeli-Jewish majority, which from 1992 onwards included legislative attempts to thwart Nakba commemoration. As such, beyond raising awareness of the plight of the internal refugees and demanding recognition of UN resolution 194, mnemonic activities organized by ADRID and Baladna seek to address the perceived contemporary manifestations of the Nakba which pertain to (descendants of) refugees and non-refugees alike. While constituting a typical form of commemoration through their "re-enactment of the past" and through their simulacrum of a former scene or situation,[586] return visits conducted to former Palestinian communities primarily symbolize a direct challenge to ongoing physical and cultural palimpsest practices and, at the

[586] Paul Connerton, *How societies remember* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 72.

same time, affirm the persistence of the Palestinian minority's national identity within a converted landscape.

Inside the West Bank, the Palestinian leadership's forsaking of the refugee issue, further demonstrated by the 2011 publication of the Palestine Papers, equally informed the emergence of a non-governmental organization: Badil and, more importantly, its ensuing mnemonic influence. Rather than emphasizing the Nakba as a historic watershed, commemorative activities organized by Badil conceive of the Nakba as a paradigm for the ongoing occupation and its effects on Palestinian life, encompassed in phrase 'ongoing Nakba'. Importantly, through the conception of a continuous Nakba, mnemonic Nakba activities in the West Bank not only implicate the refugee community, but equally form a collective act for the non-refugee community to (violently) protest the Israeli occupation and, instead, call for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Invocation of these so-called 'fixed national goals', as will become evident in the final chapter, can also be identified in 'anniversarial' Nakba media. A prime medium to convey indignation of the perceived enemy's thwarting of national independence and the right of return, mass Palestinian media allow the political elite to express its unconditional adherence to the 'national cause', while omitting any past willingness to relinquish these goals. Moreover, it is in this thesis' final chapter that the exclusionary manifestations of the defensive Nakba narrative come to light, whereby the Holocaust, perceived of as an Israeli justification for the establishment of the state, is not only overtly questioned, but is also seized as an analogy for all ensuing Palestinian suffering.

## Chapter Four: A Past That Does Pass

In 1971, the Israeli author Amos Elon observed that all over Israel countless private and public monuments to the grimmest phase of European history perpetuate a traumatic memory that has become part of the rhythm and ritual of public life.[587] Since Elon's observations, the emphasis on the memory of the Holocaust which lies "in all morbidity at the center of Israel's historical self-image" has remained pronounced through a continual engagement in public commemorations dedicated to the Holocaust.[588] A 2013 survey found that 86 percent of Israelis observe the two-minute siren on Holocaust Memorial Day by turning into "standing monuments."[589] While the collective observance of "the most impressive moment of the day,"[590] has been observed since the early 1980s, the 200 percent rise in annual visitations to Israel's official Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem, Yad Vashem, between 1995 and 2000 is indicative of a heightened preoccupation with the past.[591] A further increase in Holocaust mnemonic practices can be observed in the strong surge in participation of Israeli youngsters in journeys — often referred to as pilgrimages — to death camps and former Jewish localities in Poland.[592] The first two ministry of education-organized tours left in October and November of 1988 with 190 participants. Seventeen years

[587] Amos Elon, *The Israelis: Founders and Sons* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 199.
[588] Elon, *Israelis,* 199; Feldman, *Above*, 61, 62.
[589] This number indicates that almost all non-ultra-orthodox Israelis partake in this ceremony. Young, *Texture*, 277; Kobi Isaiah, "Survey: Young people respect Holocaust Day but avoid exposure," *NRG/Maariv,* April 8, 2013, accessed August 8, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/16/ART2/458/624.html.
[590] Charles S. Liebman and Elizer Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 152.
[591] Between the years 1995-2000, the number of visitors to Yad Vashem doubled, from one million to two. Yad Vashem, "Yad Vashem Masterplan 2001," *Yad Vashem Magazine*, Fall 1997, 10*;* Avner Shalev, "Recalling the past, realizing the future," *Yad Vashem Magazine*, Winter 2001, 4/5.
[592] Alon Lazar et al., "Jewish Israeli teenagers, national identity, and the lessons of the Holocaust," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 18 (2004), 190.

later, in 2005, more than 28,000 Israeli high-school students took part in these journeys, revealingly entitled "It is my brother whom I am seeking."[593]

The heightened engagement with the Holocaust reflects conscious efforts made on the part of custodians of the second generation at Holocaust memorial institutes in Israel to further engage the Israeli public with the events of the past. Highly evocative commemoration ceremonies on Holocaust Remembrance Day, modern interactive exhibits and educational workshops and programs for educators, army staff and students underline the continued importance of the Holocaust for Israeli society. Through a study of the most prominent Holocaust institutes in Israel — Yad Vashem, Lohamei Hagetaot and Yad Mordechai — the chapter below will demonstrate that these mnemonic rituals serve a defined political purpose, namely the justification of the need for a strong and independent Israeli state as the only viable way to hinder a recurrence of the Holocaust.

The need for a strong Jewish state is evidenced in commemorative practices through the transmission of two master narratives. The first master narrative relies on the presentation of the Jewish fighting experience during the Holocaust as a battle for Zionism, thereby not only creating a direct link between the Holocaust and the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948, but also portraying the Holocaust as the first battle aimed to secure a Jewish homeland. Secondly, the particularistic presentation of the Holocaust as a uniquely and exclusively Jewish experience seeks to convey a justification of Zionist efforts, indicated by the telescopic visitor experience at memorial museums such as Yad Vashem and Yad Mordechai where one moves from the darkness and catastrophe of Europe to the light and rebirth in Israel, the former destroyed; the latter victorious.[594]

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[593] This latter number equates to approximately 20 percent of all 11th graders. Feldman, *Above,* 2, 58.
[594] Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman, "Presence," 103.

Crucially, while the state-building efforts were realized, the presentation of the Holocaust as an exclusively Jewish experience evokes a continual need for the protection of the Jewish state as a haven from diasporic persecution and uncertainty, forming a metaphorical testimony to what Martin Jaffee described as "the victim-community" in which "the victim is always both victim and victor."[595] In this context, the overt linkage between the Israeli state and the Holocaust is pertinent, as it indicates the notion that because the Holocaust belongs to the state, the millions of victims — as 'potential Israelis' — represent a national death, leading to what Gulie Ne'eman Arad terms a postmortem 'Zionization' of all victims.[596] It is because of this Zionist representation of Holocaust victims as a national death with the Israelis being the offspring of the survivors that, in the words of Omer Bartov, "all Israelis are potential victims, in the past, the present and the future [creating] a bond that ties all Israelis to each other as survivors of a catastrophe still living on the brink of an abyss."[597]

It is evident that the conveyance of an ongoing existential threat and victimhood identity can create a viable framework in which the suffering of others is overlooked or minimized based on a justified attempt to prevent a recurrence of the Holocaust, as Bartov asserts: "We [Israelis] are the sons and daughters of the murdered, and it is their image that must always shine darkly in our minds as we contemplate our existence, fight our wars [...]."[598] With this statement, Bartov also alludes to the incompatibility between the victim and the victimizer, for, as indicated in the introduction, the existence of a defensive Israeli-Jewish victimhood can impede the negative self-acknowledgement as a culprit in political and military actions. Moreover, with reference to

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[595] Martin Jaffee, "The victim-community in myth and history: Holocaust ritual, the question of Palestine, and the rhetoric of Christian witness," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 28:2 (1991): 231.
[596] Gulie Ne'eman Arad, "The Shoah as Israel's Political Trope," in *Divergent Jewish Cultures: Israel and America*, ed. Deborah Dash Moore and S. Ilan Troen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 198, 199.
[597] Omer Bartov, "Chambers of Horror: Holocaust Museums in Israel and the United States," *Israel Studies* 2 (1997): 66, 67.
[598] Bartov, "Chambers," 67.

the denial of past and present effects of the 1948 War on Palestinian life, Bar-On explains that constantly reliving the role of the victim can form a scapegoat mechanism whereby the victim of the past and the potential victims of the future necessitate the subversion of the Palestinian narrative.[599] Indeed, the final paragraphs of this chapter make clear that the fate of the Palestinians in the 1948 War has not only been ignored physically but actively erased in favor of a transplantation of the Holocaust from Europe to the Middle East, searing the Holocaust into the collective memory as a continual reminder of *le*ʻ*olam lo* ʻ*od* [Heb. never again].

[599] Bar-On, "Israeli," 106.

## Incorporating the Holocaust in Israel's Physical and Mental Consciousness

The current Israeli landscape contains approximately 400 monuments dedicated to the remembrance of Holocaust, including public memorials, such as the Warsaw Ghetto Square at Yad Vashem and the Holocaust memorial flame near the Knesset, and private or communal Holocaust memorials in cemeteries.[600] The construction of these public and private memorials can be dated back to the end of the Second World War. Private memorials, established in memory of members of specific Jewish communities, were set up through the physical erection of tombstones and the production of *Yizkor* [Heb. may (God) remember] memorial books. At the initiative of the *Landsmannschaften* — organizations composed of former Jewish members of a European community — Yizkor books were written as a figurative memorial to the dead.[601] According to Judith Tydor Baumel, hundreds of Yizkor books were published until 1974, when their numbers began to decline drastically, and a rise in survivor memoirs indicated a new interest in individuals' fate during the Holocaust.[602] An additional form of post-war communal commemoration constituted the erection of tombstones in memory of Holocaust victims which were first erected in Tel Aviv in 1947 by members of the former Polish-Jewish community of Zdonska-Wolla.[603] While a few memorial stones were unveiled in 1950 — two in the Nahalat Yitzhak cemetery in Tel-Aviv and one in the old Tel-Aviv cemetery — the height of this type of commemoration occurred between the mid-1960s and late 1980s. During this period, long

[600] Mooli Brog, "Victims and Victors: Holocaust and Military Commemoration in Israel Collective Memory," *Israel Studies* 8:3 (2003): 69.
[601] The books, which were edited by a professional author, historian or editor, typically described the community's pre-war history, its existence in the Second World War and, finally, its destruction at the hands of the Nazis. Most of the *Yizkor* books were written in Yiddish, the mother tongue of the survivors and *Landsmannschaft* members. Baumel, "Everlasting," 146-170.
[602] Baumel, "Everlasting," 152.
[603] Ibid., 155.

boulevards were created in Tel-Aviv cemeteries, lined with all shapes and sizes of communal memorial stones.[604]

In addition to communal memorial acts, collective memorial sites dedicated to the entire Jewish community lost in the Holocaust were established in post-war years. These memorial sites, which sought to embed the Holocaust in the Israeli landscape, constituted the paradigms for the Holocaust institutes which form the crux of this chapter. One of the earliest memorials in Israel, the Holocaust Cellar [Heb. *Martef ha-Shoah*] which stands on Mount Zion near King David's Tomb, was inaugurated on the fast day of Tisha B'av. As part of the cellar's inauguration, Torah scrolls from a number of destroyed European Jewish communities, along with other ritual objects, such as Hanukkah candelabra and Torah crowns, were brought to Jerusalem and placed in the renovated cellar. Apart from these ritual objects, Holocaust victims' ashes were also brought from abroad.[605] The transplantation of Holocaust victims' ashes and objects from "the sites of horrors to the homeland of the people for whom it is most relevant" formed a model for the future official Holocaust institute, Yad Vashem.[606] Thus, in 1957, following a decision that the site should contain a symbolic tomb for the Holocaust, the ashes of tens of thousands of victims were buried in Yad Vashem's *Ohel Yizkor* [Heb. memorial tent] marked by an eternal fire.[607] A further form of the physical insertion of the Holocaust occurred

[604] Ibid.
[605] The cellar was established as part of the Sukkot festival and was inaugurated on the fast day of Tisha B'Av in 1949, which marks the destruction of the First and Second Temples, as well as other tragedies of Jewish history, such as the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492. As such, the cellar can be deemed to commemorate the Holocaust in the framework of other Jewish tragedies. Jennifer Hansen-Glucklich, *Holocaust Memory Reframed: Museums and the Challenges of Representation* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2014), 156.
[606] Shaul Krakover, "Attitudes of Israeli visitors towards the Holocaust remembrance site of Yad Vashem," in *Horror and human tragedy revisited: The management of sites of atrocities for tourism*, ed. Gregory Ashworth and Rudi Hartmann (New York: Cognizant, 2005), 109.
[607] Brog, "Victims," 76, 77; Mooli Brog, "Yad Vashem," in *The Holocaust encyclopaedia,* ed. Walter Laquer and Judith Tydor Baumal (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2001), 697-700.

five years after the dedication of the Holocaust Cellar. B'nai B'rith,[608] in cooperation with the Jewish National Fund, started planting the Martyrs' Forest in the Judean Hills outside Jerusalem as "a living memorial to the six million Jews who perished in the Holocaust."[609] The planting of six million trees was highly symbolic, as it not only literally incorporated the Holocaust in the natural landscape of Israel, but also invoked Israeli's traditional reverence for *yedi'at ha-aretz* [Heb. knowledge of the land], creating a landmark by which Israelis continue to know their relationship to the land and, by extension, to the history of the Holocaust.[610]

### *Yom ha-Shoah*

The incorporation of the Holocaust as part of the natural landscape was soon followed by the inclusion of the Holocaust in the temporal consciousness of Israeli-Jews by its placement on the commemorative calendar as an official memorial day. When the Knesset declared the 27th of Nissan as the official Holocaust and Ghetto Uprising Remembrance Day in 1951, the memorial day had already been the subject of many discussions which primarily focused on its location in the Jewish calendar.[611] In the end, the 27th of Nissan prevailed as it was considered a compromise between the desire to establish a specific date for Holocaust remembrance and the need to separate it from other days of Jewish mourning. During the Knesset debate on the memorial day, Rabbi Mordechai Nurock, who headed the committee dealing with the commemorative day, further declared that the date was chosen to commemorate the redemptive moment of Israel's birth. As Nurock proclaimed: "We have seen a graveyard in front of us, a

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[608] B'nai B'rith, established in 1843, is one of the world's oldest and largest fraternal organizations. "About Us," B'nai B'rith International, accessed August 7, 2017, http://www.bnaibrith.org/about-us.html.
[609] Young, *Texture*, 220.
[610] Ibid.
[611] For an extensive discussion of the evolution of *Yom ha-Shoah*, see: Amos Ben-Amos and Ilana Bet-El, "Holocaust Day and Memorial Day in Israeli schools: Ceremonies, education and history," *Israel Studies* 4 (1999): 258–284; Ofer, "Strength," 24-55.

graveyard for six million of our brothers and sisters, and maybe because of their blood, shed like water, we have been privileged to have our state."[612] With this statement, the first official commemorative practice linking the destruction of European Jewry to the birth of Israel was borne.

The unidirectional narrative proclaimed by Nurock was reinforced through the temporal arrangement of Holocaust Remembrance Day in the Israeli-Jewish calendar, creating a distinct 'before' and 'after' in national time and manifesting a cycle of creation, death and regeneration.[613] The commemoration of the destruction of European Jewry is followed a week later — a deliberate choice that stems from the traditional Jewish seven days of mourning — by Memorial Day for the Fallen Soldiers which is immediately followed by the celebration of Independence Day.[614] The sequencing of the three days replicates and magnifies the cultural code of climactic pulsation, encoding a metanarrative commonly referred to as *me-Shoah le-tḳuma* [Heb. from Holocaust to resurrection]: a movement from the catastrophe of the Holocaust (and Jewish exile in general) through the sacrifices of life made in the struggles for rebuilding and liberating the nation and peaking with the establishment of the state of Israel.[615] As such, the compromise of the 17th of Nissan also reflected the desire to uphold what Don Handelman has

[612] James Young, ed. *The Art of Memory*: *Holocaust Memorials in History* (New York: Jewish Museum; Prestel-Verlag 1994), 152.
[613] Don Handelman, ed., *Nationalism and the Israeli state* (Oxford: Berg, 2004), 95.
[614] In January 1951, the Minister of Defense, Ben-Gurion, established the Public Council for Soldiers' Commemoration, which was made a partner in discussions concerning the commemoration of the fallen. The council recommended that the 4th of Iyar — a day prior to Independence Day — would become the "General Memorial Day for the Heroes of the War of Independence." This suggestion was approved by the Knesset on March 27, 1963. "Memorial Day for Israel's Fallen Soldiers," Knesset, accessed January 19, 2017, http://www.knesset.gov.il/holidays/eng/memorial_day_eng.htm.
[615] Danny Kaplan, "The songs of the siren: engineering national time on Israeli radio," *Cultural Anthropology* 24:2 (2009): 324/5.

referred to as the "Zionist master narrative,"[616] which projected a sequential procession from suffering and loss to triumph and redemption.[617]

While Holocaust Memorial Day was fixed as a national day of mourning in 1951, the lack of any commemorative prescriptions meant that it failed to turn into an event of public importance.[618] Indeed, Segev argues that the ceremonies mainly interested the survivor activists themselves; "for the rest of the country, the 27th of Nissan was a day like any other."[619] Observing this phenomenon with disappointment, eight years later Nurock asked the Knesset to define in detail how the day was to be nationally observed. In response, on April 8, 1959, the Knesset enacted the Holocaust and Heroism Memorial Day Law. The law stated that the memorial day would be devoted to the memory of the Holocaust, acts of heroism and acts of rebellion.[620] In honor of this memory, it was decided that two minutes of silence would be observed, memorial services would be held in army camps and educational institutes and flags on public buildings would be flown at half-mast. Furthermore, a national ceremony was also to be held on the eve of Holocaust Day during which the president of Israel or the chairman of the Knesset would open the formal commemoration, which was to be broadcast on radio and, after 1967, TV.[621]

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[616] Zerubavel, *Recovered,* 12.

[617] According to James Young, this metanarrative can also be seen to start with Passover (the day of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising) as God's deliverance of the Jews and concluding with the Jews' deliverance of themselves in Israel. Young, "When," 6; Don Handelman and Elihu Katz, "Sequencing the national: Opening Remembrance Day and Independence Day," in *Nationalism and the Israeli state: Bureaucratic Logic in Public Events*, ed. Don Handelman (Oxford: Berg, 2004), 138.

[618] In 1953, it was decided to enhance the law and give it a more Jewish character. From then on, observance would begin at sundown the previous day — as is the case for Jewish holy days — and all places of entertainment would be closed. Segev*, Seventh,* 437/8.

[619] Ibid.*,* 437.

[620] Ibid.

[621] The law also mandated the broadcasting of special radio programs and, in 1967, when TV came to Israel, special TV programs. Dalia Ofer, "Israel," in *The World reacts to the Holocaust*, ed. David Wyman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996), 863; Feldman, *Above*, 49; Yad Vashem, "Day of Memorial for Victims of the European Jewish Disaster and Heroism – 27 Nissan, 5719," *Yad Vashem Bulletin* 4/5 (1959), 27.

Commemorative ceremonies, in contrast to collective observations of Holocaust Day, had taken place since 1951 at numerous locations, including at Kibbutz Beit Lohamei Hagetaot, Kibbutz Yad Mordechai and, from 1954, the official state ceremony was held in the Martyrs' Forest. Four years later, in 1958, the first Holocaust Day Ceremony took place on the Mount of Remembrance in Jerusalem, the official site of Yad Vashem. During this ceremony, Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress, reaffirmed the importance of Holocaust remembrance for Israeli society by stating: "we must forbid forgetfulness and renew the feeling amongst the youth that they can be proud of the period of the Holocaust no less than they are proud of the victories and accomplishments of the IDF."[622] The overt linkage between Israel's military accomplishments and the Holocaust was not limited to the 1958 inaugural ceremony. Rather, as will be argued below, commemorative ceremonies on *Yom ha-Shoah* in the period under review have attempted — both in form and in content — to incorporate the military in the commemorative rituals, reinforcing the redemptive nature of the state and, simultaneously, the continual need for a strong Jewish state.

## The IDF and Holocaust Commemoration

In addition to educational institutions, military camps and work places, collective Holocaust commemoration ceremonies take place annually at Yad Vashem, Lohamei Hagetaot and Yad Mordechai.[623] In accordance with the 1959 law, the official opening of *Yom ha-Shoah* occurs on the eve of the memorial day in a ceremony at Yad Vashem in the presence of the prime minister, the president and the official rabbi of Israel. On the day of *Yom ha-Shoah* further official ceremonies take place at the above-mentioned institutes which, since the mid-90s, have been

[622] Ben-Amos and Bet-El, "Holocaust," 258–284.
[623] Memorial ceremonies are also conducted at the Holocaust institute at Tel Yitzhak and in the Knesset.

dedicated to annual themes. In recent years, these themes, which principally manifest themselves in the stories of those lighting the memorial candles and the texts recited during the ceremony, have included "Their Last Voice: Letters and Testaments from Jews in the Holocaust" (2002), "The Anguish of Liberation and the Return to Life" (2005), "Holocaust Survivors in Israel: 60 Years Since the Establishment of the State" (2008) and "Jewish Solidarity During the Holocaust" (2012).[624] Apart from the incorporation of these annual themes, the commemorative rituals at the three institutes tend to be similar and consist of speeches given by politicians and Holocaust survivors, laying wreaths for the Righteous Among the Nations, lighting six memorial candles by (descendants of) Holocaust survivors in memory of "the six million martyrs,"[625] reciting the Yizkor prayer and, since the late 90s, making use of multimedia and artistic performances.[626]

The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have also taken an active role in the execution of Holocaust Day ceremonies over the last eighteen years as a result of their participation in the execution of the commemoration and, through speeches given by high-ranking army officials, in the ceremony's content.[627] On the surface, the presence of armed soldiers and the incorporation of army commands and drills in Holocaust ceremonies can be considered an overt demonstration of the army's physical power and ability to protect the Jewish people, creating a demonstrative juxtaposition between Jewish life in the Israeli state and during the Second World War in Europe. Indeed, the descent of soldiers to the memorial site at Lohamei Hagetaot from two sides, forming a protective blanket enveloping the participants, is a prime example of this symbolic

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[624] See: Mirit Fischler et al., "Holocaust Remembrance Day," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* July 2012, 14; Yad Vashem, "Editor's Remarks," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* Spring 2002, 2; "Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Day," Yad Vashem, accessed 16 November 2017, http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/remembrance/2017/previous_years.asp.
[625] Yehiya, "Memory," 154.
[626] Daphna Galili, "Marking the Days," *Yad Vashem Magazine*, Fall 2003, 28, 29.
[627] For the mnemonic (Zionist) symbolism used during the IDF's annual commemorative delegation to Auschwitz, see: Arad, "Shoah," 192-196.

protection.[628] Nevertheless, more implicitly, the army's presence and participation in commemorate ceremonies in Israel seek to convey the presence of a continuous threat and, consequently, the ever-present need for a strong army to secure the survival of the Jewish state. At Yad Vashem, this message is conveyed, in part, through what Handelman terms "bureaucratic aesthetics."[629]

Under the army's watch, prior to the commencement of the ceremony, the complex is sealed off as a closed military zone under Emergency Defense Regulations and all access and movement within the area is controlled by soldiers, creating a 'ghettoization' of Yad Vashem. Through this ghettoization, Handelman notes that as the participants commemorate the Holocaust, they themselves are set apart as the potential victims of another looming Holocaust, thereby encouraging their self-classification as such and the need for army protection.[630] This necessity is further affirmed in speeches made by army officials during Holocaust Day ceremonies.[631] In his speech at Yad Vashem on April 13, 1999, the Chief of Staff, Shaul Mofez, told the audience that only a strong IDF would be able to ensure that a repeat of the Shoah would not occur: "As we stand here as officers of the IDF, we ask you to give expression to independence, integrity and security of the State of Israel and say publicly that the Shoah cannot occur again."[632] The next day, at Lohamei Hagetaot, the lieutenant general reiterated his

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[628] GFH, *Development of the memorial ceremony on 16 April 1996* (Museum Lohamei Hagetaot, Undated), 1 [in Hebrew]; GFH, *Development of the memorial ceremony on 5 May 1997* (Museum Lohamei Hagetaot, Undated), 1 [in Hebrew]; GFH, *Development of the memorial ceremony on 23 April 1998* (Museum Lohamei Hagetaot, Undated), 1 [in Hebrew].
[629] Handelman, *Nationalism,* 105.
[630] Ibid.
[631] A similar comment was made during an IDF visit to Yad Vashem in preparation of *Yom ha-Shoah*. The Chief of Staff, Amnon Kipkin-Shahak, explained that the message conveyed through the army's visits was aimed to "remember, to see again and to understand […] our task, here in this country, as the descendants of those who all but perished. To understand how important it is to have a secure Jewish national home and to understand the enormous responsibility shouldered by us […]." Anonymous, "Members of the IDF general staff visit Yad Vashem," *Yad Vashem Magazine*, Summer 1998, 4.
[632] Michael Grayevski and Nurit Peltar, "A strong IDF is the assurance that the Holocaust won't return," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 13, 1999, 9.

message, stating that "the Jewish people are united today with one shared goal: to live a secure and peaceful live in the Israeli state and to ensure that a disaster like this will not befall us again. In order to do this, we need strength and power, which will ensure our withstanding any threat and enemy. This power rests on an independent state and a good and strong army which can enable a proper life in the Israeli state and [its] continuation […]."[633]

The importance of military strength is not only conveyed through emphasizing the current and future role of the IDF in Israeli society in commemorative ceremonies. Additionally, speeches and readings glorify Jewish resistance during the Holocaust, focusing in particular on the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and the participation of Jewish fighters from the Yishuv as a source of inspiration for the IDF. In 2013, in his address to the Youth Movement Ceremony on Holocaust Remembrance Day, then Minister of Education Rabbi Piron pointed to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising as "a source of inspiration for the younger generations."[634] Echoing his statements, one delegate from the socialist-Zionist youth group *Hashomer Hatzair* [Heb. the young guard], Eitan Cohen, pledged to "take responsibility for the society in which we live... to act as we learned from the ghetto fighters and others, who battled for their humanity, for their faith and for their culture."[635] In this context, the location of the IDF during the ceremony at Yad Vashem can be deemed highly symbolic. At Yad Vashem, the memorial gathering is set at the Warsaw Ghetto Plaza, dominated by a high brick wall which is divided into two parts. On the right side of the wall, a typical portrayal of ghetto Jews is depicted who sorrowfully 'as sheep to the slaughter' are treading towards their death. On the left side, there is a sculpture of the fighters of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, showing tall and proud men confidently looking towards the

[633] GFH, *Address by Chief of Staff during the Holocaust Day Memorial Ceremony at Kibbutz Lohamei Hagetaot 13 April 1999* (Museum Lohamei Hagetaot, 15 April 1999) [in Hebrew].
[634] Leah Goldstein et al., "Holocaust Remembrance Day," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* July 2013, 10.
[635] Ibid.

horizon.[636] Framed by the Israeli state flag, the ceremony at Yad Vashem sees IDF soldiers standing on the left side of the wall, guarding the tradition of the ghetto fighters.

*Figure 4.1. Guarding the ghetto fighters' legacy*



Yad Vashem, Holocaust Remembrance Day 2013 (Photograph: Isaac Harrari/Yad Vashem)

The Israeli appropriation of the ghetto fighters' legacy further rests on the attribution of Zionist efforts to "partisans and underground fighters" in an attempt to portray the Jewish fight against the Nazis as the antecedent to the establishment of a Jewish state.[637] The convergence of these conceptions can be seen at readings conducted in 1997 at Lohamei Hagetaot, where participants were instructed to "remember, people of Israel, the millions of our brothers and sisters who were slaughtered and burned […] remember our soldiers who fell in Hebrew units in the Second World War […] in order to free our country and to establish our state and in their

[636] Handelman, *Nationalism,* 108, 109.
[637] Segev, *Seventh,* 435.

sacrifice paved the way for the revival of Israel. Remember, remember the[se] people."[638] Two years later, during a reciting of the Yizkor prayer, participants were once again commanded to "remember [the] ghetto fighters [and] the hundreds of dear souls and the nameless of the Jewish underground who rose up in despair and became heroes […] remember the soldiers who fell in the Jewish units in World War II, the messengers behind enemy lines, the pioneers, the qualified, the youth of Israel, dreamers and fighters, the people who fell in the liberation of our country and the establishment of our state and through their sacrifice paved the way for the restoration of Israel. Remember, remember the[se] people! […]."[639]

## The Holocaust as a National Death

The above-cited invocation of Holocaust victims as "the youth of Israel" and "our brothers and sisters who were slaughtered and burned" further denotes that the Holocaust is considered a national Israeli tragedy and, consequently, that all Jewish Holocaust victims belong to the state.[640] Indeed, during a speech given by Prime Minister Netanyahu on Holocaust Memorial Day in 1998, Holocaust victims were referred to "as our sons and brothers" from which "new life" was generated.[641] The portrayal of Holocaust victims as a collective national loss was by no means a novel occurrence. While presenting the Yad Vashem Law before the Knesset, Ben-Zion Dinur, the Minister of Education and Culture (1951-1955) and the first Chairman of Yad Vashem, explained that the goal of the Nazis had been "to obliterate the name of Israel."[642]

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[638] GFH, *Development,* 4.
[639] GFH, *Ceremony in dedication of the memory of the Shoah and Heroism on 13 April 1999* (Museum Lohamei Hagetaot, Undated), 2 [in Hebrew].
[640] Jackie Feldman, "Between Yad Vashem and Mt. Herzl: Changing Inscriptions of Sacrifice on Jerusalem's Mountain of Memory," *Anthropological Quarterly* 80:4 (2007): 1169; Handelman, *Nationalism,* 160.
[641] Feldman, "Between," 1154.
[642] Orna Kenan, *Between Memory and History: The Evolution of Israeli Historiography of the Holocaust, 1945-1961* (New York: Peter Lang, 2003), 44.

Echoing this belief, president Chaim Herzog in his address at the Yad Vashem's children monument's dedication ceremony in 1987 reminded the audience that "these potential citizens of Israel were taken from us and it is our duty to turn their memory into a powerful demand, that the world pledge not to repeat such a crime."[643] Moreover, during the annual memorial day in the same year, in recognition of all "potential citizens" Herzog bestowed collective 'remembrance citizenship' on the Holocaust dead.[644] It is because of the interpretation of the Holocaust as a national tragedy and a national death that the Israeli state is presented as the only viable answer to the Holocaust itself. As such, practices during Holocaust Day intend to contrast sharply with or oppose diasporic existence since "state and diaspora were to go their separate ways, the former victorious, the latter destroyed."[645]

An examination conducted of the Holocaust survivors involved in Holocaust Day ceremonies and the content of speeches given on this day further evidences the desired affirmation of the righteousness of Zionism. At Yad Vashem, the Holocaust survivors selected as annual torchbearers between 1994 and 2016 had all made *Aliyah* [Heb. emigrate (literally to rise up)] to Palestine/Israel following the Holocaust; as such, suggesting that Aliyah was the only and permanent choice made by post-Holocaust European Jewry.[646] Moreover, between 2006 and

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[643] Segev, *Seventh,* 434; Young, *Texture,* 258.

[644] Yad Vashem, on its founding, was charged with the responsibility of "confer[ring] upon the members of the Jewish people who perished in the days of the Disaster and the resistance the commemorative citizenship of the state of Israel, as a token of their having been gathered to their people." In the course of negotiations, the American Jewish committee managed to obtain an undertaking from Yad Vashem that citizenship would only be granted to victims of the Holocaust when a relative or close friend had specifically requested it in writing. Ronald W. Zweig, "Politics of Commemoration," *Jewish Social Studies* 49:2 (1987): 161-2; Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman, "Presence," 107.

[645] Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman, "Presence," 103.

[646] This implication not only forgoes the 'social silencing' of Holocaust victims on their arrival in Palestine/Israel, but also fails to point to other mass emigration destinations for Holocaust victims — principally the US which received approximately 137,450 Jewish refugees between 1945-1952 — and the large subsequent migration from Israel between 1945-1956, when Holocaust survivors made up 55.6 percent of all emigrants (totalling 77,267 individuals). In addition to racial discrimination and unemployment, according to Hanna Yablonka, this emigration resulted from the fact that Israel "was considered a stopover." Hanna Yablonka, *Survivors of the Holocaust: Israel after the War,* trans. Ora Cummings (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 15, 16; "United States Policy Toward Jewish

2012, nine torchbearers were picked who had fought in the 1948 War, creating the semblance of what Handelman called "a single protracted battle," as if "the War of Independence" was a mere extension of "the Jewish fight [for survival] against the Nazis."[647] In his address at the youth movement ceremony on Holocaust Day in 2007, the current chairman of Yad Vashem, Avner Shalev, presented the outcome of this battle — the founding of the Israeli state — as a personal revival for survivors by honoring all those "who chose to start their lives over in *Eretz Yisra'el*. Those who took part in the founding of the state, who fought in Israel's wars and […] who went through hell and emerged victorious."[648] These statements, echoing the traditional Zionist mantra 'from catastrophe to redemption', had also been expressed ten years earlier in 1996 when Premier Shimon Peres stressed the necessity of the establishment of a Jewish homeland as a place of permanent refuge for victims of anti-Semitism and argued that "Zionism [had] restored [the] dignity and national status to the Jewish people. The nation took responsibility for its own destiny, and returned flourishing to [the] stage of history."[649] A year later, the restoration accorded by the realization of Zionism was once again invoked when Zevulun Hammer, the Deputy Prime Minister of Education, Culture and Sport, said: "You, our children, cannot imagine how survivors, as young as yourselves, raised themselves from the cataclysmic abyss, and planted the foundations of faith within the wilderness."[650]

Refugees, 1941-1952," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed August 8, 2017, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007094.

[647] Handelman, *Nationalism,* 99.

[648] Leah Goldstein, "Fulfil obligation to survivors," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* Summer 2007, 3.

[649] Anonymous, "24 hours on the Mount of Remembrance: Yom ha-Shoah," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* June 1996, 2.

[650] Michael Morris Kamil, "Yizkor," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* Summer 1997, 3.

## Holocaust Memory Sites: Invoking the Holocaust, Living the Holocaust

While Holocaust Memorial Day is an official day of remembrance in Israel, Holocaust memorial practices take place throughout the year, including through individual and collective visits to Holocaust memorial institutes and educational programs offered at memory sites. Through an analysis of Yad Mordechai, Lohamei Hagetaot and Yad Vashem, the remainder of this chapter will evidence that these memorial sites, similarly to Holocaust Day commemorations, portray the Israeli state as the only viable response to the Holocaust, creating a linkage between the catastrophe of the Holocaust and the redemptive nature of the Israeli state. The conveyance of this distinctly Zionist message will be demonstrated with reference to the usage of teleological architecture and its reflection in the institutes' narratives, as well as the content of the educational programs offered at the institutes. By invoking the 'framing' of the Holocaust, the analysis below also indicates that memory sites — as official agencies — seek to shape the experience — and consequently the memory — of visitors by encouraging them to engage in certain ritual behaviors and to emerge from their experiences with a transformed identity or consciousness. Therefore, Holocaust mnemonic practices are principally regarded not as illustrations or interpretations of the story being told, but rather as the stories themselves

### *Yad Mordechai*

Kibbutz Yad Mordechai, situated near the border with Gaza, is home to five major memorial spaces: a recreated battlefield on the site of Yad Mordechai's stand against the Egyptians during the 1948 War, a large statue of Mordechai Anielewicz, the leader of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, a cemetery for those fallen in the 1948 War, a site demonstrating the evacuation of children during the war and a museum which links the narrative of the Holocaust to the 1948

War and the establishment of the Israeli state.[651] The kibbutz was initially founded in the 1930s by the *Hashomer Hatzair* movement in the north of Israel, in the vicinity of the city of Netanya. In 1943, the community moved to its current site near Ashkelon. The founders of the kibbutz, who had been members of the same youth movement as Mordechai Anielewicz, decided to name the kibbutz after him as "they knew he wanted to come here and they felt they had fulfilled his dream."[652] The museum, opened in 1968, is housed in a building that is best described as a bunker or fortress and, according to the current director of the museum, Vered Bar-Semech, is an expression of the Brutalist Bauhaus style that was used by the architect, Arieh Sharon.[653] In the contemporary context, however, the bunker takes on a more sinister meaning, particularly as a result of the placement of several rockets at its entrance, which were fired towards the kibbutz in recent years from the nearby Gaza Strip.

*Figure 4.2. The entrance to Yad Mordechai*




[651] Yad Mordechai, *Museum Yad Mordechai "From Shoah to Revival". Background material for the visit of the Museum Council Committee* (Museum Yad Mordechai, 2013), 2 [in Hebrew].
[652] Interview conducted with Vered Bar-Semech on April 21, 2016.
[653] Ibid.

Bearing the explicit name 'Yad Mordechai: From Shoah to Revival', both the narrative presented in the building's architecture and the museum's exhibit are an overt testimony to the concept of destruction and redemption.[654] Upon entering the building, the 25,000 visitors that the museum attracts every year embark on a physical experience of this message with the immediate descent into the bunker, which leads visitors to a dark room where Jewish life before the Holocaust is depicted. Here, in the words of the writer Abba Kovner, one "is requested to see what no longer can be seen, to hear what no longer can be heard, to understand that which can never be understood."[655] Following exposure to the seven pillars of pre-Holocaust Jewish existence, the visitor begins a slow ascent to a large hall dedicated, on one side, to the extermination process and, on the other side, to Jewish resistance where a window overlooking the statue of Mordechai Anielewicz and the kibbutz' landscape floods the room with light.[656] The intended message is clear: death lies in the dark artificially-lit European *galut* [Heb. diaspora]; natural light, life and freedom lie in the Jewish state or, as pointed out in a document written in 1999, "the current message in the museum represents the Zionist [notion that] the state of Israel was the best solution for Jews in the diaspora."[657] The connection between Holocaust and rebirth in one room also testifies to the presentation of the establishment of the Jewish state as a direct result of the Holocaust, as indicated in an internal document written by museum staff which notes that "this approach emphasizes the relationship and the chronological sequence of events that Jews experienced during the first half of the 20th century. It connects the heroism of Mordechai Anielewicz and the resistance fighters in Europe with the fighters of the War of

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[654] Yad Mordechai, *Program to change the character of the museum "From Shoah to Revival" at Kibbutz Yad Mordechai* (Museum Yad Mordechai, 1999), 2 [in Hebrew].
[655] Yad Mordechai, *Museum "From Shoah to Revival" at Kibbutz Yad Mordechai* (Museum Yad Mordechai, 1996), 1-6 [in Hebrew].
[656] Ibid., 3.
[657] Young, *Texture,* 231, 233.

Independence whose heroism has its origins in the Jewish world that existed for many years in exile and was destroyed."[658] Kovner, one of chief designers of the exhibits in the museum and a Jewish partisan fighter during the Second World War, as the living embodiment of this narrative, was the main proponent of this approach. According to Kovner, the museum should be "one open book" and therefore he objected to any segregation of exhibits on the 1948 War and the Holocaust.[659] A curatorship document written in 1996 confirms the continuance of Kovner's vision for the museum's narrative by noting: "the route that starts in the Shoah and the dark period for the Jewish people moves gradually and seemingly unnoticeable […] from the museum of the Shoah to the war and victory museum. All this occurs in the same building."[660]

### *Yad Vashem*

While the architecture employed at Yad Mordechai constitutes the most overt linkage between the Holocaust and the establishment of the Israeli state following the 1948 War, the concept of revival is also illustrated in the location of Yad Vashem on *Har ha-Zikaron* [Heb. the Mount of Remembrance]. Yad Vashem, meaning "a place and a name" taken from Isaiah (56:5), was legislated as the official State Memorial Authority on August 28, 1953 when the Knesset passed the Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Law, also known as the Yad Vashem Law.[661] According to this law, Yad Vashem was mandated to commemorate "the valor and heroism of the soldiers,

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[658] Yad Mordechai, *Program to change the character of the museum "From Shoah to Revival" at Kibbutz Yad Mordechai* (Museum Yad Mordechai, 1999), 2 [in Hebrew]; Yad Mordechai, *Summary of Museum Staff Meeting* (Museum Yad Mordechai, June 1999), 1 [in Hebrew].
[659] Yad Mordechai, *Museum Yad Mordechai: History of the museum from the book "beyond the physical" by Dina Porat* (Museum Yad Mordechai, undated), 2-4 [in Hebrew].
[660] Yad Mordechai, *Museum "From Shoah to Revival" at Kibbutz Yad Mordechai* (Museum Yad Mordechai, 1996), 5 [in Hebrew].
[661] The idea for a memorial institute first appeared in 1942. Mordechai Shenhavi, a member of Kibbutz Mishmar Ha'emek, suggested at a board meeting of the Jewish National Fund that a monument be established called Yad Vashem and which would be dedicated to the destroyed diaspora. Yehudit Shendar and Orly Ohana, "In the Footsteps of Heroes Monuments to Jewish Rebellion and Heroism at Yad Vashem," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* March 2013, 12, 13.

the fighters of the underground and the prisoners in the ghettos, as well as the sons and daughters of the Jewish people who struggled for their human dignity" and to "gather, study and publish the entire testimony concerning Holocaust and heroism and endow the nation with its lessons [to]….foster an atmosphere of unanimity in memory."[662]

Today, the 45-acre site on which Yad Vashem lies contains a Holocaust museum and several memorials which comprise, inter alia, the Valley of Communities and the Children's Memorial.[663] At the top of *Har ha-Zikaron*, the founder of Zionism, Theodor Herzl, and the leaders and founders of the Jewish nation are buried on Mount Herzl and, nearby, the Israeli Military Cemetery commemorates those fallen in the service of the Jewish state.[664] In 2003, a new path, entitled 'The Connecting Path', was built linking Mount Herzl and Yad Vashem. Constructed by members of youth movements, the path was first opened on the April 22, 2003 to mark the 60th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. During the path's festive inauguration, Holocaust survivors, soldiers, high-school students and members of youth movements undertook a march from the valley of the communities, marking the destruction of European Jewry, to the entrance of the Mount Herzl cemetery.[665] The physical ascent up the hill accompanying this march, which is repeated annually, is indicative of the symbolic physical proximity of Yad Vashem to Mount Herzl and, more generally, the Zionist redemptive narrative, as the sign at the entrance of the path notes: "passage along it [the path] is a symbolic voyage in time from catastrophe to rebirth. It represents the journey from the Diaspora to the homeland of the Jewish

[662] The law also empowered Yad Vashem to set up a memorial project, to gather testimony and to "pass its lesson on to the people," to "implant among the nation...the day determined by the Knesset as Memorial Day for the Holocaust and Heroism," to foster "an experience of united memory of its heroes and victims" and to represent Israel in international projects commemorating the victims. Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman, "Presence," 103.
[663] All visiting foreign dignitaries are taken to Yad Vashem along with school children, soldiers, policemen and trade union members. Hansen-Glucklich, *Holocaust*, 200; Bartov, "Chambers," 66.
[664] Feldman, "Between," 1154.
[665] Ibid., 1156.

people, from exile and destruction to a life of endeavor and hope in the State of Israel."[666] The physical bodily struggle of the climb from the valley of death (Yad Vashem) by those partaking in the march recreates the notion of a unified effort, a single body overcoming the tragedy of the Holocaust through national sacrifice, which eventually leads to the establishment of the Jewish state as envisioned by the founder of modern political Zionism, Herzl. As such, Yad Vashem is not "a foreign land within the Israeli landscape," as contended by Handelman and Lea Shamgar-Handelman,[667] but rather embedded in its depths as a watershed consciously reminiscent of the ongoing sacrifice paid in the name of, and for the sake of, the state.

According to Yitzhak Arad, the second Chairman of Yad Vashem (1972-1994), Yad Vashem's first permanent historical exhibit on the Holocaust intended to reinforce the museum's physical setting by creating an overt link between the Holocaust and the establishment of the Israeli state.[668] The chronological narrative first presented in the exhibit of 1973 was divided into three main sections, which focused on the Jewish world before the Holocaust and anti-Jewish Nazi policies between 1933 and 1939, the annihilation process between 1941 and 1945 and, finally, the liberation, illegal immigration to Israel and the redemption in the form of the establishment of the Israeli state.[669] In a recent interview, Arad, who oversaw the establishment of the first main exhibit, noted that the content of the museum largely followed his own life experiences, as he said: "My life's two major events were shown in the museum, the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel. In both I was a first-hand witness and an active participant."[670] Consequently, Segev's observation that resistance of Nazism at Yad Vashem's

[666] Observation conducted at Yad Vashem on May 7, 2016.
[667] Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman, "Presence," 109.
[668] Interview conducted with Yitzhak Arad on June 1, 2016.
[669] Ibid.
[670] Arad, who hails from a Shtetl close to Vilna, organized a group of ghetto youths into an underground cell. Two years later, in 1943, together with a band of Soviet partisans Arad fought against the Germans from the Naroch Forest until the end of the war when he joined the Palmach. Interview conducted with Yitzhak Arad on June 1, 2016.

former museum was described in such a way that the visitor gained the impression that "Jews fought a war with the Nazis" was not necessarily only representative of "the Israeli culture of memory," but, in fact, can be related to Arad's own partisan experience during the war.[671]

Similarly, the presentation of "the state of Israel as both the consequence and the panacea,"[672] matched Arad's own development over the course of the Holocaust, as he states that "the aim of his life in the forest was to fight for a Jewish state [as] I saw my Jewish people without a state during the war and I saw what it means to be people without a state, we were on the fringes of society […] As an historian it is hard to speak in hypotheticals, but I can imagine that if Israel had existed many Jews would have survived."[673] The notion that Zionism constituted the only appropriate answer to Nazism, as it had been for Arad, was further illustrated in the former museum's choreographed passage.[674] Arad points out that the museum was built in such a way that there was only one way to go through it, thereby evidencing Bartov's observation that "in the museum, we walk through an exhibition of photographs and artifacts put together by those who had toured that country and wish to tell us about it."[675] The success of the conveyance of Arad's own Zionistic message was demonstrated in a survey published in 1998, which found that 74 percent of visitors found that the historical museum helped them "understand the need for the state of Israel."[676]

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[671] Segev*, Seventh,* 424, 442.
[672] Bartov, "Chambers," 66.
[673] Interview conducted with Yitzhak Arad on June 1, 2016.
[674] Bartov, "Chambers," 66.
[675] Ibid., 71.
[676] A total of 281 high-school students from 27 groups participated in this study. Leonard Bickman and Karl Hamner, "An Evaluation of the Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum," *Evaluation Review* 22:4 (1998): 443.

## The new Yad Vashem and the Zionist rebirth

Under Arad's direction, it was decided to build a new museum exhibit in the 1990s to, in Arad's words, "accommodate the large amount of visitors and incorporate modern technology using similar methods as the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, which had opened in 1993."[677] The reconstruction of the museum complex which, according to the Director of the Museums Division at Yad Vashem, Yehudit Inbar, also bears the influence of the Holocaust exhibit at the Imperial War Museum[678] was used to further a teleological understanding of the Holocaust through the museum's exterior and interior design, creating both a 'landscape of memory' and a 'landscape as memory'.[679] Plans for the new historical museum were announced in the 'Yad Vashem 2001 Masterplan' which noted that "with the younger generation's increasing desire to have direct, up-to-date access to info on the Holocaust, […] special sensitivity was given to the establishment of the new museum complex."[680] Shalev, who became chairman of Yad Vashem in 1994, maintains that it was decided in advance that the new museum "would not attempt to convey messages, or teach lessons advocating a particular worldview, but would present the events objectively, based on the accrued research findings, testimonies and the

[677] Interview conducted with Yitzhak Arad on June 1, 2016.
[678] Felicity Heywood, "Giving Voice," *Museums Journal* 12 (December 2006): 21-23. For an analysis of the Imperial War Museum's Holocaust exhibit, see: Tony Kushner, "The holocaust and the Museum World in Britain: A Study in Ethnography," *Immigrants & Minorities* 21 (2002): 12-40.
[679] Susanne Kuchler (1993) makes the distinction between landscapes of memory and landscapes as memory. The landscape of memory is a picture of landscape, a static, inscribed surface on which memories are fixed and labeled, and from which the social and cultural referents of these memories can be read off. Landscape as memory indexes the practice of landscape as memory-work that unceasingly reforms the shaping and shapes of its own significance. The landscape as memory produces the landscape of memory and perhaps their relationship is dialectical. Handelman and Shamgar-Handelman, "Presence," 88, 89.
[680] The Yad Vashem 2001 Masterplan, projected to cost 82 million dollars, is comprised of six central elements: the construction of the archives and library building, the computerization of Holocaust victims' names, documentation, and photographs; the establishment of an international school for Holocaust studies; the establishment of a new museum complex; the expansion of scholarly research carried out under the auspices of the International Institute for Holocaust Research and its relocation to a newly renovated premises; and the construction of a new visitors center on *Har ha-Zikaron* to accommodate the millions of visitors. Avner Shalev, "Recalling the past, realizing the future," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* Winter 2001, 4, 5.

Jewish perspective."[681] Nevertheless, both the architecture employed in the construction of the museum's complex and the content offered in the museum's exhibit demonstrate what Erik Cohen calls "a classic Zionist theme regarding the Shoah of 'destruction to redemption'," as exemplified by "perennial persecution in exile rectified by the survival of the Jewish people in an independent state in Israel."[682]

The new historical museum designed by the architect Moshe Safdie was opened to the public in 2005. Occupying a space of 4,445 square meters, the museum is divided into seven thematic exhibits beginning with 'The world that was destroyed 1900-1933' and ending with the post-Holocaust period shown through the usage of authentic photographs, artefacts and documents.[683] The complex consists of a linear pyramid which, according to the architect, cuts into the hillside, "penetrating it from the south, extending under, emerging, indeed exploding, to the north."[684] From the outside, the cut across the hilltop appears to slit open the ground, leaving an "archaeological scar" aimed to symbolize the chasm created by the Holocaust which is symbolically healed by the landscape of the Jewish state.[685] At Yad Vashem, similarly to Yad Mordechai, the redemptive nature of the Jewish state is demonstrated through a full visual bodily experience, namely a teleological journey "from darkness to light, from descent to elevation."[686] Upon leaving the entrance plaza and the visitors' center, providing the "conceptual corridor […] between the mundane and familiar world and the sanctity of the memorial complex," the visitor

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[681] Avner Shalev, "The new Holocaust history museum," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* Fall 2003, 23, 24; Anonymous, "Yad Vashem Masterplan 2001," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* Fall 1997, 10; Avner Shalev, "Recalling the past, realizing the future," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* Winter 2001, 4,5.
[682] Erik H. Cohen, "Educational Dark Tourism at an in Populo Site: The Holocaust Museum in Jerusalem," *Annals of tourism research* 38:1 (2011): 197.
[683] Yvette Nahmia-Messinas, "The new museum complex," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* Summer 2000, 10, 11.
[684] Hansen-Glucklich, *Holocaust,* 37, 69; Ruth Eglas, "The Holocaust From the Inside Out," *Jerusalem Post Online,* January 12, 2009, accessed August 9, 2017, http://www.jpost.com/Features/In-Thespotlight/The-Holocaust-from-the-inside-out.
[685] Hansen-Glucklich, *Holocaust,* 37, 69; "Yad Vashem Masterplan 2001," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* Fall 1997, 10, 11
[686] Hansen-Glucklich, *Holocaust*, 191.

descends into the darkness of the pyramid.[687] During the exposure to "the story of the destruction of European Jewry" rays of light from the opposite end of the building — literally the light at the end of the tunnel — accompany the visitor as (s)he zigzags through the museum's exhibits, forming a constant reminder of the redemption that awaits. This redemption or rebirth, as noted above, is reinforced through the physical experience that accompanies the conclusion of the museum. Leaving the darkness and death of the *galut* [Heb. exile] behind, basking in light, the visitor emerges onto a terrace overlooking the Jerusalem landscape sparking a metamorphosic rebirth and the integration of "a new Zionist identity."[688] The redemptive symbolism behind the dichotomic usage of light in the complex was affirmed in a publication on the Yad Vashem Masterplan, in which it was noted that "upon leaving the partially underground museum complex, the visitor will walk out into the light and green hills of Jerusalem, the symbol of life and continuity, and the capital of the Jewish people."[689]

[687] Anonymous, "Masterplan," 10.
[688] Hansen-Glucklich, *Holocaust*, 191.
[689] Anonymous, "Masterplan," 11.

*Figure 4.3. The architecture of redemption*





In addition to the choreographed passage, symbolic narratives within Yad Vashem's exhibit also contribute to the redemptive enactment. Thus, in pre-Holocaust Jewish Europe, *Hatikvah* [Heb. the hope] is played. *Hatikvah*, today the national anthem of Israel, is based on a text written by the poet Naftali Herz Imbed in 1877 and is considered a reflection of the desire to establish a Jewish state in the land of Israel.[690] While Zionism, undoubtedly was part of pre-Holocaust Jewish life, through the rendition of *Hatikvah*, the museum visitors are not only reminded of the fulfillment of the victims' dream, but also asked to reflect on what was lost due to the lack of an earlier realization of a Jewish state. As a result of this catastrophic loss in Europe, the museum also presents the Jewish state as the only viable and secure place for Jews, indicated through usage of survivor testimonies and the emphasis on the reestablishment of survivors' lives in Israel. Survivor testimonies are used throughout the museum to, in the words of Shalev, "elicit visitors' empathy, understanding, and compassion for victims of the Shoah."[691] Yet, save three, Yad Vashem exclusively reserves witness testimony for Holocaust survivors who emigrated to Israel, thereby not only declaring the Holocaust a solely Israeli phenomenon, but also seeking to indicate that there was a consensus that Zionism presented the only legitimate response to the Holocaust.[692] The link between the Holocaust and the establishment of the state of Israel is further reinforced in the final gallery of the permanent exhibition, which — in the context of Holocaust survivors reestablishing their lives after the Second World War — focuses on the United Nations resolution that led to the founding of Israel, the country's Declaration of Independence, the emigration of survivors to Israel and the history of Zionism.[693] Following the

[690] Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A history* (London: Black Swan, 2008), 7.
[691] Shalev, "Holocaust," 23, 24.
[692] There are two testimonies in German and one in English, the remainder is in Hebrew. Observation conducted on May 7, 2016.
[693] Hansen-Glucklich, *Holocaust*, 191.

reopening of the museum, in an interview conducted with the Israeli newspaper *Yedioth Ahronot* [Heb. latest news], Shalev affirmed the importance of this Zionist message, as he stated that the purpose of the museum could not be disentangled from the beliefs of "the people of Yad Vashem, for whom Zionism flows through our veins and is etched in our consciousness [and the belief] that the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state of Israel after the Shoah is the basis for a continued Jewish existence. This existence is a condition for continuing the creative and spiritual development of the Jewish people […] to prevent another attack against them."[694]

## The Holocaust as a Pedagogical Tool

Visits to Holocaust institutes in Israel often coincide with specialized pedagogic activities for teachers, students and soldiers at 'schools' set up as part of the institutions in the 1990s. While participation in teacher training at these institutes is mostly voluntary, visits by soldiers and security personnel have become a standard practice, in particular at Yad Vashem following the establishment of the Army Education Unit in 2000.[695] Three years prior to this, in June 1997, the Ministry of Education had already decided that the educational benefits of visits to Yad Vashem were of such importance that all Israeli pupils should visit the institute at least once over the course of their schooling; as a result, the number of Israeli participants in study seminars and programs at Yad Vashem has risen immensely over the years, from 60,000 in 1996 to 306,000 in 2013.[696]

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[694] Avner Shalev, "The purpose of the new museum," *Yedioth Ahronot*, March 15, 2005, 24.
[695] Adi Loya, "The army education unit," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* Summer 2000, 7.
[696] "Highlights of Yad Vashem's Activities in 2013," Yad Vashem, accessed December 5, 2016, http://www.yadvashem.org/pressroom/highlights/2013; Anonymous, "Highlights of Yad Vashem activity in 2001," *Yad Vashem Magazine*, Spring 2002, 16; Avner Shalev, "Introducing 'Masterplan 2001' Yad Vashem's Development Project in the age of the communications revolution," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* April 1996, 4, 5.

While the content varies according to the institute and the needs of the participants, an analysis of the pedagogical activities offered at the three institutes demonstrates that throughout the programs offered the emphasis lies on strengthening identification with the Holocaust past. At Yad Mordechai, where educational activities commenced in the late 1980s — the same time that high-school trips to Poland were first organized — these objectives are plainly stated in the curriculum material offered to workshop organizers. Documentation on workshops for high-school students travelling to Poland indicates that one of the aims of these workshops is to "strengthen the relationship of young Israeli-Jews with their kibbutz past in order to deepen their identification with the fate of the Jewish people [and the] doom of the Jews in the Holocaust."[697] Similar rhetoric can be found in the espoused objectives of educational practices at Yad Vashem's International School for Holocaust Studies which was established in 1994. In 2001, Inbal Kvity, the director of the Study Seminar Department at the International School, noted that the two main educational philosophies at the school center on exposing participants to Jewish life before and during the Holocaust because, as Kvity explained, "to become acquainted with the victims and thereby properly mourn and commemorate them, they [participants] must first recognize them as individuals who had names, faces, human emotions and reactions."[698]

Educational programs do not solely seek identification as a means of encouraging proper commemoration, but also stimulate forging a personal commitment to safeguard the continuity of the Jewish state. In fact, in an article written in 1999, Shalev contended that one of the general objectives of the educational efforts at the International School is "to strengthen each individual's personal commitment to a meaningful Jewish continuity, in view of his/her Jewish

[697] Yad Mordechai, *The Journey to Poland* (Museum Yad Mordechai, Undated), 1 [in Hebrew].
[698] Inbal Kvity, "Not just a number, an educational approach to the Holocaust victims," *Yad Vashem Magazine*, Fall 2001, 6,7.

worldview and perception of the Jewish destiny."[699] At Lohamei Hagetaot, the importance of identification is particularly present in educational activities aimed at those tasked with this aim: IDF soldiers, who have been offered educational workshops at the institute since the 1980s. An internal document on educational activities for soldiers and commanders at the house states that the activities include "learning about the relationship between the experiences that Jews went through in the Shoah and the struggle for the existence of the state of Israel [to] deepen the understanding of the uniqueness of the IDF […]."[700] Furthermore, the document stipulates that one of the main goals of this learning experience is "understanding the importance of establishing a strong and moral army […] and the personal commitment of every soldier to strengthening the state [of Israel]."[701]

A continued emphasis on the need for a strong state in the wake of the Holocaust, however, does not necessarily encourage the creation of a "moral army" or "an army based on institutional principles and universal Jewish values."[702] While not acknowledged by the current educational director at Lohamei Hagetaot, a report published by *Haaretz* in July 1989, entitled 'In the battalion they knew that we were a killer company', found that educational programs for the army had been temporarily suspended.[703] Officially, the suspension took place because the army contended that the educational programs were not functioning properly, as the guides meant to accompany the soldiers were not sufficiently trained. Unofficially, however, the article argued that the suspension occurred as a result of the extreme violence used by soldiers, referring to themselves as the Mengele Unit, in the occupied territories in response to the Nazi brutality

[699] Avner Shalev, "Different school," *Yad Vashem Magazine*, Winter 1999, 3.
[700] GFH, *Returning with soldiers. A study day for officers al the Ghetto Fighters House following the journey to Poland as "witnesses in uniform"* (Museum Lohamei Hagetaot, undated), 1 [in Hebrew].
[701] Ibid.
[702] Ibid.
[703] Interview conducted with Rotem Korblitt on April 17, 2016.

they had seen in the museum.[704] Further evidence that the content of Holocaust museums could encourage dubious military action was offered in a report published in 1998 which found that following a visit to the original museum at Yad Vashem, students showed significantly greater agreement with the statement "one of the lessons of the Holocaust is that every action that the Jewish people undertake to ensure their existence is justified."[705] Despite the publication of these findings, which showed the nefarious consequences of the image of Israel "as the defender of the Jewish people" and a continuing "need to prevent another Holocaust," the espousal of these educational messages has continued throughout the years, including in times of extreme violence.[706] In the fall of 2002, during the height of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, an article was published in Yad Vashem's magazine which noted that despite the fact that "the IDF has had to channel the greater part of its energies into defending Israeli citizens, […] data shows an increase of visiting soldiers [from] all military units and all army ranks."[707] While not definitively explaining the rise in visits during the Second Intifada, colonel Elazar Stern maintained that the aim of studying the Holocaust at Yad Vashem during these times would not only strengthen the soldiers' connection to the citizens of Israel, but also would enable IDF soldiers and commanders to apply the moral lessons from the Holocaust to their own conduct and the way in which "they treat their enemies."[708]

### Keeping the Holocaust in a narrow Jewish ghetto

In interviews conducted with high-level employees at the Holocaust institutes under review, consistent importance was placed on the conveyance of the so-called universal and moral lessons

[704] Dan Sagir, "In the battalion they knew that we were a killer company," *Haaretz*, July 31, 1989, 11.
[705] Bickman and Hamner, "Evaluation," 442.
[706] Interview conducted with Rotem Korblitt on April 17, 2016.
[707] Anonymous, "Yad Vashem in the frontlines of IDF education," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* Fall 2002, 2,3.
[708] Ibid.

of the Holocaust in the institutes' exhibits and educational programs. Yet, the unequivocal emphasis on the need for a strong Israeli state and the understanding of the Holocaust as a national tragedy, which stands at the heart of the mnemonic practices at these institutes, questions the very transmission and internalization of "humanitarian values of tolerance and moral courage."[709] Moreover, while the desired conveyance of "humanistic and democratic values" would indicate that the presentation of the Holocaust is "relevant from a human, a universal and a Jewish point of view," the actual presentation of the Holocaust as an exclusively and uniquely Jewish experience at Lohamei Hagetaot, Yad Mordechai and Yad Vashem demonstrates that the Holocaust is, in fact, solely relevant from a Jewish perspective.[710] Consequently, these museums are a physical testament to Charles Maier's 1993 thesis, which opines that despite the "ostensible purpose of Holocaust museums to teach the [universal] lessons of the Holocaust," the real lesson of these museums is that "the group sponsoring the museum has suffered incredibly and wants recognition of the fact."[711]

At Yad Vashem, "the Jewish people's living memorial to the Holocaust," the creation of a "uniquely Jewish narrative" is sought through what Shalev termed "an experiential dimension."[712] This dimension includes "emphasizing the tragically unique Jewish experience of the Holocaust" through the usage of testimony which, as noted above, seeks to elicits visitors' compassion for victims of the Shoah.[713] Here, it is interesting to point out that the only three

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[709] Yad Vashem, *Achievements and Challenges: Annual Report 2002* (Yad Vashem, 2011), 14.
[710] See: Lohamei Hagetaot's statement on the Holocaust which notes that the Holocaust is examined as a historical and universal crisis. Furthermore, the institute claims that dealing with the Holocaust can "lead to understanding the importance of humanistic and democratic values." "The center for humanistic education," Lohamei Hagetaot, accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.gfh.org.il/?CategoryID=222&ArticleID [in Hebrew].
[711] Charles S. Maier, "A Surfeit of Memory? Reflections on History, Melancholy and Denial," *History and Memory* 5:2 (1993): 143, 144.
[712] Shalev, "Holocaust," 23, 24; Leah Goldstein, "Not just a history lesson," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* December 2013, 2-5.
[713] Leah Goldstein, "The Museum Complex: A Source of Inspiration," *Yad Vashem Magazine,* December 2013, 24, 25.

plaques in Yad Vashem on non-Jewish victims of the Nazis do not contain any testimonies of individuals, thereby suggesting that the creation of empathy in the context of non-Jewish victims is unnecessary. Moreover, the historical information contained on the plaques is emblematic of minimization efforts found in schoolbooks (see chapter one), such as victim aggregation and imprecise usage of numbers. A combination of these marginalization efforts can be seen on the first small plaque dedicated to non-Jewish victims in the new museum. Entitled 'Non-Jewish victims of persecution and oppression', the plaque discusses the fate of Roma, Sinti, homosexuals and Jehovah's witnesses during the Second World War in seven sentences without providing any insight into their fate at the hands of the Nazis and failing to offer precise numbers on the amount of deaths suffered by each group.[714] Explicit minimization of the number of non-Jewish victims was also found in Yad Vashem's exhibit. Thus, despite the fact that a symposium held at Yad Vashem in 2001 declared that the "continued euthanasia program" claimed some 250,000 victims by 1945, the plaque used in the new museum four years later, entitled 'The murder of mentally ill and handicapped', asserts that only "some 70,000 German and Austrian children and adults were murdered" as a result of Hitler's euthanasia program.[715]

Invoking Elkana's controversial 1988 article, Holocaust researcher Daniel Blatman argued that the exclusivity of the Holocaust, which disregards the destruction of other populations by the Nazi regime and keeps "the Holocaust in a narrow Jewish ghetto," creates a

[714] The plaque reads: "The Nazi regime persecuted and victimized members of various groups that it considered enemies of the Reich. The Roma and Sinti were defined as racially inferior and antisocial due to their way of life. Thousands of the 44,000 who lived in the Reich were sent to concentration camps. Others were sent to ghettos and extermination camps. Homosexuals were outlawed because the Nazis considered them detrimental to the goal of natural procreation and wholesome family life. Some 15,000 homosexuals were interned in camps where several thousand of them perished due to conditions. Another small minority, Jehovah's witnesses were persecuted because of their pacifist beliefs." Observation conducted on May 7, 2016.
[715] Anonymous, "The Nazi euthanasia program: a symposium," *Yad Vashem Magazine*, Summer 2001, 16. See: Appendix 1.

"readiness to believe that the whole world is against us, and that we are the eternal victims."[716] Livnat, the Minister of Education between 2001 and 2006, reinforced Blatman's thesis by claiming that especially for the children and descendants of the Holocaust Yad Vashem bears the heavy task of conveying the message that "in every generation, each person must see himself as though he were a Holocaust survivor."[717] Yet, this "melancholic exclusive narrative" at Yad Vashem is not only used to perpetuate "a profound existential angst."[718] Rather, Blatman notes that a "victim-centered discourse" is used as a powerful political tool to "whitewash the ongoing crime against the Palestinians" and "maintain the occupation in Palestine."[719] Explaining this phenomenon, the historian Peter Novick contended that while the principal lesson of the Holocaust is that it sensitizes us to oppression and atrocity, making it "*the* benchmark of oppression and atrocity works in precisely the opposite direction" and leads to a trivialization of events deemed of lesser magnitude.[720]

The most apparent physical manifestation of this trifling lies in the fact that displacement of Palestinians on the very land where Holocaust institutes currently lie — creating a physical connection between the Holocaust and the Nakba — is wholly ignored. Kibbutz Lohamei Hagetaot, established on the ruined Arab village of Samaria, for instance, fails to make any reference to the former Palestinian inhabitants of the settlement of Samaria.[721] At Yad

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[716] Elkana called for an end to the "death cult" of Holocaust commemoration and called on his readers to not send kids to Yad Vashem. Elkana, "Plea," 13.
[717] Limor Livnat, "Greetings from Israeli heads of state," *Yad Vashem Magazine*, Fall 2003, 5.
[718] Goldberg, "Jewish," 201.
[719] Daniel Blatman, "Yad Vashem Is Derelict in Its Duty to Free the Shoah From Its Jewish Ghetto," *Haaretz*, May 19, 2016.
[720] Emphasis added. Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston; New York: First Mariner Books, 2000), 14.
[721] The first settlers wanted to preserve the name of the ruined Palestinian village and decided to call the kibbutz Lohamei Hagetaot 'Samaria'. The JNF told them that the conjoining of ghetto fighters and the memory of Samaria was unthinkable and ruled that the kibbutz be named Asher, after the Israelite tribe that had inhabited the area in ancient times. Segev*, Seventh,* 451.

Mordechai, which following the 1948 War expanded on the land of the Palestinian village of Hiribya, the displacement of Palestinians is similarly overlooked, creating an ironic reversal of the museum's concept, namely from (Israeli) revival to (Palestinian) catastrophe.[722] The most overt dissonance between remembrance and forgetting can be found at Yad Vashem, which like Yad Mordechai and Lohamei Hagetaot lies on the vestiges of a Palestinian village. Beyond the disregard of the Palestinian foundations upon which Yad Vashem was built, the redemptive landscape viewed upon exiting the museum does not symbolize a pure rebirth.[723] The current Israeli localities of Givat Shaul Beth and Har Nof, within sight of Yad Vashem and less than two miles away, are situated on the remains of the former Palestinian village of Deir Yassin where on April 9, 1948 between 100 and 120 Palestinians were killed by Irgun and Lehi units.[724] Attempts to expose visitors at Yad Vashem to "look to the north and remember Deir Yassin" have fallen subject to scrutiny by the institute itself.[725] In 2009, Itamar Shapira, a guide at Yad Vashem, was fired after talking to a group "about the massacre at Deir Yassin [in order to indicate] that [while] we talk about the establishment of a refuge for world Jewry here after the Shoah, [there] were people already on this land and there are other traumas that drive other people."[726] Following the

[722] Interestingly, the minutes of a staff meeting in June 1999 on the ideological nature of the museum do indicate awareness of the historical occurrence of a physical palimpsest. Thus, during the meeting, one museum staff member stated: "We also must introduce the topic of the Arabs who were expelled from their land during the War of Independence to the museum." Yad Mordechai, *Summary of Museum Staff Meeting* (Museum Yad Mordechai, June 1999), 1 [in Hebrew]; Khalidi, *All,* 102.
[723] In the case of Yad Vashem, Hirbet Hamama, the Palestinian hamlet destroyed during the 1948 War, upon which Yad Vashem was built, is also ignored and remains unheard of by most Israelis. Further excluded from the narrative at Yad Vashem is the former Palestinian village of Ein Karem, visible directly below the Connecting Path. Feldman, "Between," 1161.
[724] Benny Morris, *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 127. According to Pappé, the number of victims at Deir Yassin stands at 93, which does not include those killed in actual battle. Ilan Pappé, *The ethnic cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), 90-91.
[725] Masalha, "Remembering," 145; Marc H. Ellis and Daniel A. McGowan, ed., *Remembering Deir Yassin: The Future of Israel and Palestine* (New York: Interlink Publishing Group, 1998), 6, 7.
[726] Yoav Stern, "A guide at Yad Vashem is fired after comparing the suffering of the Jews to the suffering of the Palestinians," *Haaretz*, April 23, 2009, accessed April 25, 2014, https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/1.1257108.

tour, complaints were made by a participant claiming that the guide "is not allowed to use his position to transfer personal views [...] especially not interpretations that have far-reaching current political implications." Despite dedicating itself to "building bridges of understanding and tolerance," Yad Vashem saw itself compelled to let Shapira go because, as a spokesperson stated, "the institute is strict in keeping the Holocaust out of any political agenda in its professional work — be it right or left."[727]

[727] Ibid.

## Concluding Remarks

Although presented as the ultimate form of revival, the establishment of Israel following the destruction of the Holocaust did not constitute a complete rehabilitation in Israeli-Jewish consciousness. While maintaining a continual need for a strong Israeli state, the emphasis on a Jewish rebirth in the wake of the Holocaust thus prompts the merging of the dissonant categories of victim and victor. Identified both at Israeli Holocaust institutes and in annual Holocaust commemorative ceremonies, the representation of each category in mnemonic form and in content conceives of an eternal cycle of destruction and resurrection, albeit one in which the latter — a metaphor for the existence of a strong Israeli state and army — is merely a safeguard against the reoccurrence of the former. Consequently, the conscious searing of the Holocaust into the Israeli national calendar and landscape — itself emblematic of a (figurative) 'landscape as memory' — indexes the Holocaust as a constant reminder of a national tragedy through which all contemporary actions must be contemplated.

The Zionization of the Holocaust, importantly, challenges the achievement of the universal pedagogic goals and democratic lessons espoused by mnemonic agents at the three Holocaust institutes reviewed in this chapter: Yad Vashem, Yad Mordechai and Lohamei Hagetaot. The accentuation of a commitment to ensuring the strength of the Israeli state — as revealed in internal documents — highlights the particularistic messages conveyed through educational workshops which center on securing Jewish continuity and the need to prevent another Holocaust. The identification of a uniquely Jewish-Zionist narrative in the new museum of Israel's most important memory site, Yad Vashem, moreover suggests that in the process of appropriating the Holocaust as an Israeli-Jewish tragedy, narratives that do not conform have become marginalized.

Beyond the overt minimization of the fate of non-Jewish victims and post-Holocaust diasporic Jewry, the Zionist panacea channeled at the memory sites also demands a foregoing of the physical Palestinian history of the three sites themselves. Castigated as a political act by Yad Vashem in 2009, visitors to the historic exhibits and participants in annual mnemonic rituals thus continue to (un)consciously take part in a cultural palimpsest as they are propelled to remember the superimposed Jewish watershed rather than the Nakba.

The following chapter illustrates, however, that it is not solely the physical insertion of the Holocaust in the landscape that drives the cultural palimpsest. In contrast to the implicit allusions in Holocaust mnemonics to the actor driving an incessant danger in the wake of resurrection, mass media output on the Holocaust articulates this threat explicitly in the context of the ongoing regional conflict. The effects of mediated equations between Palestinians and Nazis are twofold, namely undermining Israeli peace negotiations and, simultaneously, impeding any recognition of the Nakba, repeatedly ostracized as a false myth propagated by those who seek to eradicate Israel.

## Section Three: Scoop on the Past

"Journalism," argued the American journalist Alan Barth in 1943, "is the first rough draft of history."[728] While Barth, with this statement, sought to demonstrate the media's importance in determining what should be considered in the future as having mattered today, for much if not most of the public, journalism also constitutes a primary source of information about a more distant past and shared understandings of that past.[729] While media's usage of distant historical events is somewhat counterintuitive due the importance of temporal proximity in news, the prevalence of the present in the work of media professionals has been conclusively challenged by revealing the ongoing presence of the past in daily reporting, leading media scholar Carolyn Kitch to conclude that journalism is "full of the past."[730] The application of the past in media, what José van Dijk terms "mediated memories,"[731] is varied and includes the dissemination of public and private histories, historical contextualization of present-day events and anniversary journalism.[732] Of particular importance to this thesis are the latter two applications of the past in which the past is narrated in service of "the beliefs and spiritual needs of the present" and through narration of the present, creating the concept of a 'reversed memory'.[733]

Mediated pasts' contemporary objectives can take the form of a curriculum. Thus, the historical contextualization of the present not only presupposes news consumers as constant students whose previous consumption of the past creates usable knowledge of the present, but

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[728] Cited in Martin Conboy, ed., *How Journalism Uses History* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 33.
[729] Carolyn Kitch, "Placing journalism inside memory – and memory studies," *Memory Studies* 1 (2008): 311.
[730] Ibid., 311, 312.
[731] José van Dijck, *Mediated Memories in the Digital Age* (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2007), 21.
[732] Media's preoccupation with the past stands as evidence against Barbie Zelizer's contention that journalists "neither explicitly speak of the past nor consider the past as part of their obvious purview." Barbie Zelizer, "Why memory's work on journalism does not reflect journalism's work on memory," *Memory Studies* 1 (2008): 80.
[733] Motti Neiger, Eyal Zandberg and Oren Meyers, "On media memory: Collective memory in the new media age," in *Journalism and Memory*, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt (Houndmills; Basingstoke; Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 115.

also seeks to provide meaningful context to the present through importation of the past.[734] A more mission-oriented purpose can also underlie the invocation of the past. In contrast to the 'retrospective memory' characteristic of past usage for analogical purposes, the past, as a 'prospective memory', can be instrumentalized as a lesson to spur on a to-do list and to encourage the execution of an intended action.[735]

The concept of prospective memory constitutes a useful distinction in media's coverage of commemorative rituals, succinctly termed anniversary journalism.[736] Like holidays that halt everyday routines, anniversary journalism is guided by a series of special announcements and preludes that transform daily coverage into something special which, upon the conclusion of the event, is guided back to regular 'mediation'. According to Jill Edy, anniversary journalism does not typically attempt to connect the past to the present in any meaningful way.[737] Yet, while media coverage of commemorative rituals can solely center on invoking the historical event(s) being commemorated, an emphasis on the commemorative act and the commemorative motives involved in restoring the past to the present can shape consumers' prospective concerns and actions. Indeed, ceremonial media events, particularly when enacted and depicted by the same hegemonic group, remind audiences what is worth remembering and simultaneously encourage participation in the mediated commemoration, enabling the members of the group — both the audience and the journalists alike — to manifest and perform their sense of belonging.[738] Kitch's

[734] Neiger, Zandberg and Meyers, "Media," 11; James Carey, *Communications as Culture* (London: Routledge, 1989), 151-2.
[735] Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt, "Journalism as an agent of prospective memory," in *Journalism and Memory*, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt (Houndmills; Basingstoke; Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 213.
[736] Carolyn Kitch, "Anniversary Journalism, Collective Memory, and the Cultural Authority to Tell the Story of the American Past," *Journal of Popular Culture* 36 (2002): 44-67.
[737] Jill A. Edy, "Journalistic Uses of Collective Memory," *Journal of Communication* 49 (1999): 76.
[738] Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, *Media events: The live broadcasting of history* (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 16.

research on anniversary journalism in American magazines in this context can be considered a useful framework, as it revealed that the construction of an orderly mediated American past encouraged a retrospective collective meaning and a communal belonging among both the magazine's staff and its audience.[739]

## The Mediation of a National Identity

Memory scholars have found that through the creation and recreation of a nation's past, media are pivotal to the construction of individual and collective memory.[740] The media's role in the formation of a national consciousness is twofold. Firstly, media shape a common social belonging through the collective and uniform act of media participation, creating what the political scientist Benedict Anderson termed an 'imagined community'.[741] The emergence of a shared national understanding, according to Anderson, principally manifests through a collective engagement, whereby the reading of a paper can take on the form and meaning of a 'state ritual', "performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull [with] each communicant [being] well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion."[742] In addition to enforcing belonging through an imagined connectivity, the media also play a formative role in the construction of a collective history by means of a transmission of 'mediated pasts'. Indeed, because few in a mainstream audience experience the past through a personal connection, media not only constitute one of the primary venues through which the past

[739] See: Kitch, "Anniversary," 44-67 which focused on magazines' anniversaries of their own founding.
[740] Van Dijck, *Mediated*, xiv.
[741] Anderson, *Imagined,* 6.
[742] Ibid., 35, 36.

is exposed, but through their ability to reach huge communities are able to dictate what and how histories need to be conserved.[743]

Far from being external instruments that hold versions of the past, media, like all mnemonic realms, construct a sense of the past. Addressing the role of American journalists in shaping the memory of John F. Kennedy's assassination, Barbie Zelizer thus found that the story of America's past "will remain in part a story of what the media have chosen to remember, a story of how the media's memories have in turn become America's own."[744] It follows that despite the documentary style of journalists' work, media's memories should not be considered an objective or innocent reflection of the past; instead, the media shape the past based on contemporary needs and concerns.[745] One of the most influential and widely used frameworks for understanding the ways in which the press shape present concerns and future actions has been the notion of agenda-setting. The media's agenda, which in turn influences the public agenda and (at times) the policy agenda, is conceptualized based on the amount and prominence of coverage given to particular issues within the media. While the concept of a media agenda has typically referred to contemporary political and societal events, it can also be applied to present-day exposure to historical events. Accordingly, an emphasis on historical events can infer a desire to bring these topics to the center of public attention, as topics targeted and focused on by the mass media will be perceived as important by media consumers.[746] Evidence that journalists' depiction

[743] Edy, "Journalistic," 71.
[744] Edy's 2006 study further revealed the effects of news coverage on the public's interpretation of historic events. Contrasting news coverage of two events spawned by social unrest — the 1968 Democratic National Convention and the 1965 riots in Watts — Edy found that the media's varied interpretations of the causes and outcomes of the events were reflected in the public's mind. Jill Edy, *Troubled Pasts: News and the Collective Memory of Social Unrest* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 191; Barbie Zelizer, *Covering the Body: The Kennedy Assassination, the Media, and the Shaping of Collective Memory* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 214.
[745] Andreas Huyssen, "Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia," *Public Culture* 12:1 (2000): 30.
[746] Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt, "Journalism," 213-225; Donald McCombs and David Shaw, "The Agenda setting Function of Mass Media," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36:2 (1972): 176-187.

of the past have repercussions for the ways in which a community relates to its past was given in a study conducted by Ingrid Volkmer in 2006. Applying Karl Mannheim's theory of 'generational knowledge', Volkmer found that across three different generations individual's memories of major public events varied according to contemporary mass media images and texts relating to those events.[747]

## The Media as an Interpretative Memory Community

Although the media, similarly to other 'interpretative memory communities', are responsible for the creation and dissemination of public and private histories, these mediated memories fall within a larger cultural context. As such, media frames are best understood as organizing themes that are used to place events into an existing package that resonates with the audience. The necessity of the dialogical nature of media is, again, twofold. Firstly, it is clear that in the field of cultural production — both public and commercial — all media are influenced by common themes such as financial considerations and ratings, or simply put "they need to keep their customers, readers, audiences and users happy."[748] In order to fulfill the needs of both media consumers and patrons, the media typically create output that reflects and maintains the cultural hegemony of the societies which they serve.[749] Consequently, in the words of Gadi Wolfsfeld, "news stories are almost always about us about what is happening or could happen to us. When

[747] 'Generational knowledge' defines each generation's 'identity location' within a given society. According to Mannheim, individuals who belong to the same generation are "endowed, to an extent, with a common location in the historical dimension of the social process." Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), 290, 292; Ingrid Volkmer, ed. *News in Public Memory: An International Study of Media Memories across Generations* (New York: Peter Lang, 2006), 307.
[748] Joanne Garde-Hansen, *Media and memory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 50.
[749] In the case of commercial media, the assumption is that mediated messages reach a mass audience or at least are intended to appeal to a mass audience in order to maximize profit and influence. Public service media similarly can be assumed to represent broadly shared social values and understandings, albeit potentially somewhat more elite driven than in commercial systems, and to seek a mass audience as a requirement of their funding with taxpayer or ratepayer support. Jill A. Edy, "Collective Memory in a Post-Broadcast World," in *Journalism and Memory*, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt (Houndmills; Basingstoke; Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 67.

there is news about "others," it centers on how they affect [sic] us," creating what Wolfsfeld termed a mediated "ethnocentric view of the world."[750] As such, even though (individual) media producers are responsible for the creation of culturally resonant narratives as "creators of meaning," [751] the necessary dialogic interaction between journalists and audiences blurs the line between the media producer and the consumer. Indeed, the maintenance of a society and the creation, representation and celebration of shared, even if illusory, beliefs infers an awareness and reception of (changing) communal narratives and traditions and, simultaneously, through the reproduction of these shared narratives and symbols, testifies to an active engagement in the communal and communitive ritual, creating what can be termed a 'producing consumer'. Based on this understanding, mediated pasts are a reciprocal creation of the media and their audiences who based on past and contemporary exposure together construct a collective and shared memory — what David Lowenthal calls "a unifying web of retrospection."[752]

The media's reproduction of shared myths, symbols and traditions means that an analysis of media provides a valuable insight into a society's self-understanding and the construction of this self-image. Moreover, any historical picture constructed without taking the media into consideration would be distorted, as an analysis of media along a time axis can reveal how a society shapes its ideological framing and worldview over time, illuminating "the politics of identity, community, [and] nation as well as the workings of media."[753] With regard to Israeli society, Segev therefore stresses the importance of the press as an historical source by claiming that any historian relying on the Israeli press would know almost everything about the society at

[750] Gadi Wolfsfeld, *Media and the path to peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 22.
[751] Joseph Turow, "The Challenge of Inference in Interinstitutional Research on Mass Communication," *Communication Research* 18:2 (1991): 224.
[752] David Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 198.
[753] Kitch, "Placing," 313; Marita Sturken, "Memory, Consumerism and Media: Reflections on the Emergence of the Field," *Memory Studies* 1 (2008): 73.

any given point in time.[754] In coherence with the conception of the media as a mirror into and a reflection of a society's workings and self-perception, the final part of this thesis will analyze Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian media exposure on, respectively, the Holocaust and the Nakba. In these final chapters, the exclusionary effects of the conveyed narratives are demonstrated with reference to the mediated marginalization of the other's foundational history in the attempt to debunk its contemporary political and cultural usage and, instead, bolster the in-group's claims concerning the prominence of its own narrative.

### Mass traditional mediation as a monument of historical consciousness

The emphasis in this section will lie on one form of traditional mass media: print newspapers. Yet, modern media forms[755] will not be neglected in this work. Instead, taking into account the rapid rise of online journalism in Israeli and Palestinian society over the last decade, this thesis' focus on traditional forms of mass media will be extended to include an analysis of the online representation of printed media content, thereby also laying bare the reconstruction of 'traditional' content on electronic platforms. Both in Israeli-Jewish society and in Palestinian society, (online) newspapers will be analyzed that in the period under analysis have enjoyed the largest readership and circulation and, through forming the most important *cadres sociaux*, offer insight into the dissemination of historical discourses which have been subject to mass exposure.

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[754] Akiba A. Cohen et al., *The Holocaust and the Press: Nazi War Crimes Trials in Germany and Israel* (Cresskill, N.J.: Hampton Press, 2002), 4.

[755] With the rise of electronic forms of communication in the 21st century, the terms 'media' or 'mass media' have been applied to invoke both the dissemination of public and private information and narratives through 'traditional' media channels and 'modern' or 'mass social' platforms. While the application of the term 'media', both in media scholarship and everyday life, often converges with a failure to acknowledge a clear differentiation between traditional and modern forms of mass media, the invocation and study of print media, including newspapers and magazines and (early) broadcast media (such as photography, radio, film and television), typically concerns traditional media forms. Conversely, electronic media, including mass communication platforms on the internet and electronic communication devices, can be defined as contemporary forms of modern mass communication. Garde-Hansen, *Media,* 1; Van Dijck, *Mediated*, xiv xv.

As such, chapter five will provide an examination of the two dominant Israeli daily newspapers throughout the time period under review: *Yedioth Ahronot* and *Maariv*.[756] Similarly, chapter six will concentrate on Palestinian newspapers with the highest circulation, *Kul al-Arab* and *Al-Quds*. Through the inclusion of these papers, the final chapter of this thesis differentiates between media production in Palestinian society within the 1948 borders and Palestinian society outside of the Green Line, namely the West Bank and East Jerusalem.[757] Moreover, the incorporation of an analysis of *al-Hayat al-Jadida*, the official daily newspaper of the Palestinian National Authority established in 1995, will provide an understanding of officially-endorsed and sanctioned media content relating to *al-Nakba* by the PA.[758]

This research' concentration on mass mediation means that this section does not constitute an exhaustive representation of either the Palestinian or the Israeli media landscape. The emphasis on *Yedioth Ahronot* and *Maariv*, through their respective centrist and centrist/right-of-center political leanings,[759] thus forgoes the inclusion of the elite, liberal progressive newspaper *Haaretz*, the only Israeli newspaper which consistently calls for a critical self-examination of the Israeli Holocaust discourse.[760] Similarly, chapter six' concentration on the most important Fatah-affiliated newspapers, i.e., *al-Hayat al-Jadida* and *Al-Quds*, has

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[756] It should be noted that since 2010, *Israel Hayom* [Heb. Israel today], a free daily national newspaper founded in 2007 with financial backing from Sheldon Adelson, has enjoyed more exposure on weekdays than *Yedioth Ahronot*. Margret Müller, *The World According to Israeli Newspapers* (Berlin: Frank & Timme GmbH Verlag, 2017), 97-100.

[757] Readership across these borders does exist. According to a 2002 PCBS report, *Kul al-Arab* is also read frequently in the West Bank, with 68.8 percent of respondents maintaining to read it. Moreover, findings revealed that in Gaza 44.6 percent aged 18 and over read *Al-Quds,* while only 1.9 percent read *Kul al-Arab.* 25.4 percent of Gazan inhabitants claimed to read *al-Hayat al-Jadida*; nevertheless, these numbers cannot be considered indicative of trends following Hamas' takeover of Gaza in 2007. PCBS, *Mass Media Survey 2000 – Main Findings* (PCBS, 2002), 75.

[758] Sariel Birnbaum, "Historical discourse in the media of the Palestinian National Authority," in *Palestinian Collective Memory and National Identity,* ed. Meir Litvak (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 140.

[759] Yoel Cohen, *God, Jews and the Media: Religion and Israel's Media* (London; New York: Routledge, 2012), 35, 74.

[760] Oren Meyers, Motti Neiger and Eyal Zandberg, *Communicating awe: media memory and Holocaust commemoration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 42.

implications for the presented research findings, which reveal a curious lack of criticism of the PA and its handling of the refugee issue. While not offering an in-depth examination of the purge of PA-critical newspapers,[761] this thesis does reveal the PA's carrot and stick approach to Palestinian publications which has encouraged realm-wide self-censorship.[762]

The content put forward in the following two chapters derives from archival research conducted during the summer of 2016 at the National Library of Israel, where physical newspapers, digitalized newspapers and newspapers on microfilm were consulted, and subsequent online research. Prioritizing media content on the role of the respective pasts in each society and the motives of their invocation, the research yielded a body of approximately 600 and 800 articles for the Palestinian and Israeli case study, respectively. In consideration of this work's primary focus, the examination of mediated memories of the Holocaust and the Nakba will concentrate on anniversary journalism, which through its repetition provides a prime framework to illuminate the contemporary preoccupations of a society and the construction of "new images [which] overlay the old."[763] Thus, both in Israeli and Palestinian newspapers, an historical analysis of media content produced on memorial days — *Yom ha-Shoah* and *Yawm al-Nakbah*, respectively — as "monuments of a historical consciousness"[764] will highlight the construction and maintenance of a national collective memory vis-à-vis these historical events. Indeed, Holocaust Memorial Day[765] and Nakba Day editions of Israeli and Palestinian

[761] Two newspapers in particular have paid a heavy price for criticism directed at the PA: *al-Nahār* [Ar. the afternoon] and *al-Ummah* [Ar. the Muslim nation]. Amal Jamal, *Media Politics and Democracy in Palestine: Political Culture, Pluralism, and the Palestinian Authority* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 74, 75, 89.
[762] Hillel Nossek and Khalil Rinnawi, "Censorship and Freedom of the Press Under Changing Political Regimes: Palestinian Media from Israeli Occupation to the Palestinian Authority," *Gazette* 65 (2003): 199.
[763] Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, trans. Francis J. Ditter, Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter (New York: Harper & Row, 1952), 72.
[764] Walter Benjamin cited in Khalili, *Heroes,* 81.
[765] As Holocaust Memorial Day, similar to religious Jewish holidays, commences at sundown, newspaper content will be analysed on both the day preceding the memorial day and on Holocaust Memorial Day itself.

newspapers provide a systematic research corpus through their dealings with the same subject every year on exactly the same day. Each of the articles analyzed fits into one of three categories: news reporting, editorial or column.[766] In addition to analyzing the textual content in these various writing modes, the visual framing of media content will also be taken into account by examining the placement of content within physical newspapers and discussing the existence of culturally-resonant symbols in cartoons and graphics that accompany or reinforce printed and online textual content.

The primary focus in this final section on anniversary journalism will be accompanied by a necessary secondary analysis on the construction of daily Nakba and Holocaust memories. Indeed, although annual anniversaries or commemorations form prime ritual occasions to remind societies of a need to mark "its story, its constitutive narrative,"[767] the incorporation of the past into routine media indicates an ongoing pertinence of the past to the present. As such, while anniversary journalism can be considered a 'realm of memory' in Norian terminology, forming explicit reminders of occasions, the existence of daily mediated memories evidences that the media are not a memory site encompassing remnants of a past "swept away by history."[768] It is in this context that semi-structured interviews conducted with Palestinian and Israeli journalists on their role as memory agents will be illuminating as they testify to the desire and need to include their societies' respective pasts in routine media so as to continually evoke the past and its contemporary meaning. Crucially, however, in line with the dialogical understanding of media

[766] Research on readership response has suggested that editorials are of particular influence on news consumers. See, for instance, a 1998 study which found that newspapers' editorial content was significantly related to candidate preferences in the 1992 elections in the United States. Russell J. Dalton, Paul A. Beck and Robert Huckfeldt, "Partisan Cues and the Media: Information Flows in the 1992 Presidential Election," *The American Political Science Review* 92:1 (1998): 111.
[767] Robert Neelly Bellah et al., *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 153.
[768] Nora, *Realms*, 2.

set out above, media professionals, as "the people behind the text," will not be considered creators of novel mnemonic interpretations, but rather as constructors of cultural-interpretive media frames.[769] Consequently, the media mnemonic output presented in the following two chapters is considered a reflection of the respective societies' *Zeitgeist* and the cultural and political environment which dictate a resounding application of their foundational pasts.

[769] Zandberg, "Right," 6.

# Chapter Five: The Never Forget and Never Again State of Israel

In his seminal book *Zakhor* (1982) [Heb. remember], Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi argued that the traditional response to disaster is collectivization and ritualization — processes that give collective meaning to personal experiences through a collective narrative.[770] In Israel, mass printed and, since the mid-2000s, online media not only reflect and contribute to a collective ongoing engagement with the Holocaust, but also engage in its ritualization by inscribing the past into the present and through the repeated observance of the Holocaust as an annual media event. Nevertheless, few studies have been conducted on the presentation of Holocaust memory in the Israeli press and, to date, none have concentrated on the systematic existence of exclusive narratives in daily mass media and in media output on Memorial Day to the Holocaust and Heroism (MDHH).[771]

Among the few collective spheres of Holocaust transmission in Israel, including those previously discussed in this thesis, media, through its daily presence, can be considered a major realm of mnemonic transmission. Indeed, despite financial constraints and gloomy forecasts as a result of intensifying competition with various other media, Israel's press (print and online) has remained a formative platform to convey collective narratives and to frame the past with contemporary meaning.[772] The influence of the press in the public domain is testified by the sheer numbers of media consumers in Israel.[773] According to research conducted in the mid-2000s, more than 71 percent of the Israeli population read at least one daily paper and nearly 84

[770] Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, *Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989), 15, 44.
[771] Systematic studies conducted on the Holocaust in the Israeli press exist in works by Moshe Zuckermann (1993), Akiva Cohen et al. (2002), Hillel Nossek (1994) and Zandberg, Neiger and Meyers (2008; 2014).
[772] Dan Caspi, "A revised look at online journalism in Israel: entrenching the old hegemony," *Israel Affairs* 17:3 (2011): 344.
[773] Yoram Peri, *Telepopulism. Media and politics in Israel* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 25.

percent read a weekend paper. Of those reading a daily paper, more than one quarter spend over an hour reading the daily news.[774] In their daily readings, consumers of printed media in Israel rely on approximately twenty-two popular commercial daily newspapers of which *Yedioth Ahronot* and *Maariv* are the most influential. Since the founding of *Maariv* in February 1948 by dissidents of *Yedioth Ahronot*, the two newspapers have constantly competed for the largest readership. While *Maariv* took the helm in the first two decades following the establishment of the Israeli state, in the mid-1970s, *Yedioth Ahronot* took over the lead, maintaining its position there ever since.[775] In the period under examination in this study, *Yedioth Ahronot* was read by about two thirds of the Israeli population and enjoyed a circulation of approximately 300,000 on weekdays and 600,000 on the weekend.[776] Targeting a similar mainstream audience through its combination of hard news and softer, tabloid-like coverage, *Maariv* is considered the second most popular newspaper in Israel, with a circulation of about 160,000 on weekdays and 270,000 on weekends.[777] The traditional dominance of *Yedioth Ahronot* and *Maariv* in the Israeli media landscape is also reflected in online usage of their corresponding news websites, titled *ynet.co.il* and *nrg.co.il*, which were set up in 2000 and 2004 respectively.[778] Research published in 2011 by the Israeli media researcher Dan Caspi on the percentage of hits by Israeli internet users showed that 59.6 percent of Israel's online media consumers, constituting two-and-a-quarter million

[774] Peri, *Telepopulism,* 3, 18, 19.
[775] Yoel Cohen, "Yedioth Aharonoth," in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (The University of Michigan: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 293.
[776] Cohen et al., *Holocaust,* 49, 50.
[777] Ibid., 49, 50.
[778] In addition to producing their own online content, in order not to threaten the interests of the printed papers, these websites rely on the printed one for content. Caspi, "Revised," 351, 353; Yoel Cohen, "Maariv," in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (The University of Michigan: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 306-307; Cohen, "Yedioth," 293.

Jewish citizens of Israel, consulted the *Ynet* page, whereas 23.5 percent or about 900,000 people consumed news through *Maariv's* website.[779]

Israel's above-mentioned two leading newspapers will stand central in this chapter's exploration of mass mediated Holocaust memories in Israel's press. Through providing a systematic 'cultural seismograph' of annual media content on MDHH and, subsequently, daily Holocaust output, this chapter not only evidences a heightened centrality of the Holocaust in the wake of the Oslo Peace Accords, but also reveals an increased contextualization of the Holocaust in line with contemporary societal and political concerns, including those emanating from the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Consequently, even outside of MDHH's ritual media event, the Holocaust remains a newsworthy narrative, constituting a historical framework in which to view the present. It is because of this analogical practice of 'Holocaust framing' and the semblance of a never-ceasing diasporic and domestic threat, that this chapter testifies to the mediated existence of a persistent Jewish suffering. The final paragraphs of this chapter illustrate the effects of the presentation of an incessant genocidal threat, including at the hands of the Palestinians, by charting the mediated articulation of a superior Israeli-Jewish victimhood narrative, in which the Holocaust is presented as a 'constructionist narrative'. Castigated as a historical myth, the Palestinians' foundational history, conversely, is portrayed as a form of propaganda used by Mufti al-Haj Amin al-Husseini's successors to spread vengeance and ensure that the Holocaust forms a perpetual reminder of, in the words of a 2002 *Maariv* supplement, "Pain which has no end."[780]

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[779] According to Caspi, *Walla* is the only Hebrew website that attracts more surfers than *Ynet*, largely because the portal offers abundant services, including Web-based e-mail. Caspi, "Revised," 328, 352, 353. Research conducted three years earlier, in 2008, conversely, named *Ynet* the most popular portal in Israel, with about 800,000 unique visitors a day. Nathan Lipson and Maayan Cohen, "Ynet Is the Leading Internet Portal," *Haaretz,* June 23, 2008, accessed September 11, 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/business/ynet-is-the-leading-israeli-internet-portal-1.248301.

[780] *Maariv,* April 9, 2002, 1, 2 (supplement).

## The Israeli Media Landscape and the Holocaust: A Brief Overview

Chapter one of this thesis noted that the trial in Jerusalem in 1961 of Adolf Eichmann has often been considered the beginning of a public Israeli consciousness of the Holocaust. The increased awareness of the Holocaust and the horrors of Nazism, according to scholars who uphold the notion of a turning point in 1961, emanated from the mass media exposure that accompanied the trial, exposing many Israelis for the first time to a multitude of survivors' accounts, including those who did not bear arms during the war.[781] Amit Pinchevski, Tamar Liebes and Ora Herman noted in their 2007 study 'Eichmann on the Air' that the complete and continuous recording of the proceedings, daily reports and live broadcasts by Israel's public radio station, *Kol Yisrael* [Heb. voice of Israel], made the trial a formative event in Israeli history, as "it was through the radio that most Israelis […] encountered personal testimonies of Holocaust survivors for the first time," creating a national affiliation with the pain and stories of the Holocaust victims.[782] The trial did not only take place 'on the air', but also in the newspapers.[783] Noah Klinger, now a veteran journalist at *Yedioth Ahronot* and a Holocaust survivor, recalls that content written on the trial had a visible effect on his surroundings through triggering a willingness to believe the survivors: "I started writing about the Holocaust in the 1950s, but people simply did not trust the survivors' stories in Israel. After the trial that changed. Aviezer Golan, a famous journalist, told me after the Eichmann trial that he didn't believe me before the trial, but following the trial, he said it was even worse than I had made out."[784]

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[781] In his 1993 work, Segev also pointed to the collective didactic nature of the event by noting that "much of the trial was carried live on the radio; everywhere, people listened — in houses and offices, in cafes and stores and buses and factories." Segev, *Seventh*, 350–351.
[782] Amit Pinchevsk, Tamar Liebes, and Ora Herman, "Eichmann on the Air: Radio and the Making of an Historic Trial," *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 27:1 (2007): 10, 13.
[783] Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 105-108.
[784] Interview conducted with Noah Klinger on 24 July 2016. Aviezer Golan, together with David Karasik, can be considered the founders of *Yedioth Ahronot* through their inauguration of a journalistic weekly forum with the same name in 1939. Golan is also known for his 1978 book 'Operation Susannah' which concerns the ill-fated attempt by

While the Eichmann trial might have been the first collective media event dedicated to the Holocaust, as indicated by Klinger's comments, it by no means constituted the first discussion of the Holocaust in Israeli media. Anita Shapira's analysis of the 15-year period between the end of the Second World War and the capture of Eichmann shows that the Holocaust was constantly at the heart of the public media debate; thereby effectively challenging the notion of a public marginalization of the Holocaust.[785] Shapira identified Holocaust rhetoric in the media's coverage of speeches by David Ben-Gurion, particularly those on the 1952 Reparations Agreement with West Germany, and Menachem Begin, with the latter turning to the memory of the Holocaust to renew the popularity of his Herut [Heb. freedom] party. Further coverage of the Holocaust appeared during what became known as the 'Kastner trial' which, Shapira maintains, was the first time the Israeli public was exposed to stories of wartime rescue attempts and the moral dilemmas involved in negotiating with the Nazis through widespread coverage of the trial's proceedings by the recently-founded daily *Maariv*.[786]

The inclusion of Holocaust survivor stories in the media in the 1950s should not infer an unpoliticized coverage of the Holocaust. Indeed, while *Maariv* was not owned by a political party, through its association with Ze'ev Jabotinsky's Revisionist movement, it nevertheless had a distinctly political character and, consequently, published Holocaust stories that served its nationalist ideology.[787] For *Maariv*, this meant the production and publication of media output that fit the Zionist idea because, as Arie Dissenchik, *Maariv's* editor between 1956 and 1974,

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the then nascent Israeli Mossad to destabilize Nasser's Egypt in the early 1950's by using Egyptian-born and other non-Israeli Jews. Oren Soffer, *Mass Communication in Israel: Nationalism, Globalization, and Segmentation* (New York; London: Berghahn Books, 2015), 33; Aviezer Golan, *Operation Susannah* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).

[785] Anita Shapira, "The Holocaust: Private Memories, Public Memory," *Jewish Social Studies* 4:2 (1998), 43.

[786] Ibid., 44, 45.

[787] The evening tabloid *Maariv* was established by a group of journalists associated with Revisionist Zionism, some of whom had worked with the founder, Jabotinsky, and supported the right-wing nationalist camp. Peri, *Telepopulism*, 75.

argued: "journalism [is] the main carrier of the Zionist idea. Newspapers built the land of Israel with letters before the JNF acquired and developed the land."[788] Underlying these efforts, to a considerable extent, was also the ideology of *mamlakhtiyut* [Heb. 'statism']. Those espousing *mamlakhtiyut* not only tended to disregard and reject the diaspora, as a hallmark of passivity and defeat, but also, in line with Ben-Gurion's conception of statism, envisaged Israel as a focus of active allegiance and identification for all members of the Jewish people.[789] In this context, Eyal Zandberg's study into which survivors had the "right to tell the right story" is highly relevant, as it reveals the political Zionist nature of the Holocaust during the first decades of Israel's existence. Zandberg notes that party-affiliated and political newspapers only involved Holocaust survivors who could integrate their own private story with the collective, ideological one. In practice, this led to an emphasis on personal stories of members of the underground movement who played an active role in the ghetto uprisings or fought with the partisans against the Nazis since, as Zandberg maintains, "they fitted in with the Zionist narrative" and, therefore, were deemed the most appropriate group of survivors.[790]

In adherence with the Zionist narrative, interpretations both in party-affiliated and non-affiliated newspapers were put forward that positioned the state of Israel as the dominant factor which, in line with the formulation *me-Shoah le-tḳuma* [Heb. from Holocaust to resurrection], viewed the victims of the Holocaust as convinced Zionists and, as a result, potential Israelis. Golda Meir's commemorative speech during the 1976 Holocaust assembly — cited extensively in *Maariv* — clearly embodied this dominant Zionist narrative. Meir, in her speech, maintained

[788] Cited in Peri, *Telepopulism,* 2.
[789] For an analysis of the role of *mamlakhtiyut* in Israeli Holocaust discourse, see: Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Memory and Political Culture: Israeli Society and the Holocaust," in *Modern Jews and their musical agendas*, ed. Ezra Mendelsohn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 139-162.
[790] Eyal Zandberg, "The right to tell the (right) story: journalism, authority and memory," *Media, Culture & Society* 32:1 (2010): 13.

that the Holocaust had not only been "aimed at the individual Jew," but "[as] a collective Holocaust [had been] directed against the state of Israel."[791] An editorial published in April 1980 in *Davar*, the official journal of the state's General Federation of Labor, the Histadrut, similarly invoked the effects of the Holocaust on Israeli state-building efforts by ascribing Zionist beliefs to those who perished, with the writer claiming that "for us in Israel, who are thirsty for new immigrants, every day presents us with the fateful loss of millions, most of whom would undoubtedly have wanted to take part in building the Jewish state."[792] Five years later, an editorial in the same outlet reinforced the connection between the Holocaust and the resurrection of the state of Israel, this time declaring that the establishment of "the Jewish state [was] due to the sacrifice of six million of its members." Moreover, the article argued that with the founding of the Jewish state "it [the Jewish people] can defend itself and protect itself. The situation has undergone a revolutionary shift."[793]

The emphasis on a distinct shift resulting from the state's establishment and the citizens' ability to defend themselves was also highlighted in publications by the socialist newspaper '*Al ha-Mishmar* [Heb. the guard]. The headline of an editorial on Holocaust Memorial Day in 1987 reminded readers "to remember the magnitude of our victory [over Nazism]" because, as the article explained, while the Third Reich was utterly defeated, "the Jewish people is alive and kicking, has established its own national state, protects itself and is stronger today than ever before…the annihilators lost and the annihilated were victorious."[794] A similar message was presented in *Yedioth Ahronot* in an editorial written as if it were addressed to the victims of the Holocaust: "the furnaces are silent and yet they have a voice, the voice of historical

[791] *Maariv,* April 27, 1976. Cited in Don-Yehiya, "Memory," 151, 2.
[792] Cited in Meyers, Neiger and Zandberg, *Communicating,* 45.
[793] *Davar*, April 18, 1985. Meyers, Neiger and Zandberg, *Communicating,* 45.
[794] '*Al Hamishmar,* April 26, 1987. Cited in Ibid., 53.

justice….look, brothers and sisters: the Third Reich was defeated, eradicated; the word Nazi is a curse in almost every language, and the people of Israel lives and blossoms in its country […] Victory is ours, and yours."[795]

## The Holocaust as a past continuous

Despite the declaration of the Jewish people's victory through the establishment of a state and an army, other publications produced in the mid-80s do not present the Holocaust as a finite event; rather, the memory of the Holocaust is continually evoked as a formative memory for future generations. Indeed, editorials written during this time note that the Holocaust no longer 'belonged' solely to the survivors alone, but constituted "an open wound [for] every Israeli," leading one writer from '*Al ha-Mishmar* to conclude that the Holocaust "does not only belong to the history of our people [but hovers above] the present and future of our people."[796] As such, the "armed camp," which President Ronald Reagan[797] argued had been established by Israel, was justified by *Maariv's* Schmuel Schnitzer who claimed that it was part of a national lesson and "a necessity of life" for Israel since the Holocaust had demonstrated that Jews could not trust other nations' decency and integrity.[798] Commenting on the ramifications of the conveyance of the Holocaust as a 'past continuous', a *Haaretz* editorial aptly concluded in April 1982 that "those of us who were not there….also see ourselves as if we had been saved from the valley of death."[799]

The corresponding representation of the Holocaust in both party and privately-owned commercial newspapers demonstrates that the 1977 takeover of the Likud party did not

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[795] *Yedioth Ahrono*t, April 22, 1990. Cited in Ibid., 54.
[796] '*Al Hamishmar* April 10, 1983. Cited in Ibid., 53.
[797] These comments were made by Reagan with reference to the threat posed by the PLO to Israel from Lebanon. James Reston, "Washington; Reagan and Begin," *New York Times* June 23, 1982, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/23/opinion/washington-reagan-and-begin.html.
[798] Cited in Don-Yehiya, "Memory," 151, 2.
[799] *Haaretz*, April 20, 1982. Cited in Meyers, Neiger, and Zandberg, *Communicating*, 52.

necessarily impact the content of mediated Holocaust memories. The change in the political landscape has typically been conceived of as heralding in a new epoch in Israel's media landscape, resulting from the alienation of Israeli journalists from the political establishment and, concurrently, an increased preference among media consumers for privately-owned commercial newspapers that adhered to the rhetoric of (ideological) objectivity in simple, direct language. With regard to the topic at hand, however, it appears that the privately-owned commercial newspapers exhibited little change. As such, while writers discussing the Holocaust no longer had to identify with and underwrite the newspapers' political leanings, a teleological Zionist understanding of the Holocaust continued to stand central, including through the presentation of a dichotomic interpretation of Israel and the diaspora, the former a necessary safe haven from the continued bulwark of anti-Semitism existent in the latter. Yet, as will become evident below, when coupled with the domestic contextualization of the Holocaust, the ongoing perception of Israel as the panacea in both commemorative and daily journalism creates a paradoxical meaning, albeit with one clear message: Jewish existence is never secure.

## Holocaust Memorial Day: A Ritualized Media Event

In addition to the numerous commemorative ceremonies outlined in the previous chapter, Israeli media partake in their own commemorative ritual on Holocaust Memorial Day. In coherence with the 1959 Holocaust Memorial Law which stipulates that media "will express the uniqueness of the day," the majority of Israeli media outlets dedicate their resources to the construction of Holocaust media output and to conveying the state bereavement ritual.[800] Consequently, MDHH

800 The law stipulated that on "Remembrance Day [….] wireless programmes [radio] shall express the special character of the day." Knesset, *Martyrs' and Heroes Remembrance Day Law, 5719-1959* (Sefer ha-Chukim 280, 1959), 112 [in Hebrew].

has created a unique situation in which on one day a year media are not guided by financial gain, but by 'symbolic profit' through collectively turning their attention to the same past.

According to a study conducted in 2014, the creation of a Holocaust consciousness on MDHH relies on commemorative newspaper supplements which, Oren Meyers maintains, constitute "an Israeli national ritual through breaking the linear continuity of time to recollect the nation's history."[801] An analysis of publications on MDHH between 1994 and 2016 by *Maariv* and *Yedioth Ahronot*, however, indicates that the annual ritualization of the Holocaust also relies on prospective mediation by means of commemorative reminders and through the usage of Holocaust symbolism throughout the newspapers. With regard to the former, in the years under examination, both *Maariv* and *Yedioth Ahronot* provided prescriptive reminders of the Holocaust and its commemoration. On several of its front pages on MDHH, *Maariv* prompted its readers "to remember the six million" (1995), "[To remember] today are ceremonies to remember the six million" (2002), "To bow [your] heads to the six million killed in the Holocaust" (2012) and "To never forget" (2015). *Yedioth Ahronot's* front page on Holocaust Memorial Day also sought to encourage readers to partake in the commemorative ritual, as demonstrated in phrases such as "[We] remember the six million" (2002), "Do not forget" (2003; 2005; 2006), "Remember" (2004; 2012; 2013) and "Never forget" (2007).

In addition to textual reminders of the commemorative nature of the day, from the mid-2000s, *Maariv* and *Yedioth Ahronot* increasingly have employed powerful Holocaust symbolism in their publications on MDHH, which further attest to the existence of a media ritualization. In these MDHH publications, the usage of barbed wire and a Jewish Star with Dutch and German

[801] These supplements are *Maariv's ha-Yom* [Heb. today] and *Yedioth Ahronot's 24 Sha'ot* [Heb. 24 hours]. Oren Meyers, "Still Photographs, Dynamic Memories: A Study of the Visual Presentation of Israel's Past in Commemorative Newspaper Supplements," *The Communication Review* 5:3 (2002): 181, 182.

text throughout the newspapers not only testifies to a radical divergence from 'normal' media, but also, through the invocation of *Jood/Jude* [Dutch/Ger. Jew], seeks to impart the collective meaning of the event for Israeli-Jewish society. Interestingly, this symbolism, has also been adopted online. On Holocaust Memorial Day in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, articles on *Maariv's* and *Yedioth Ahronot's* websites were accompanied by Yizkor candles, barbed wire and Jewish badges, evidencing the adoption of visual print mechanisms in order to convey a continuity of commemorative meaning despite the change of media platform.[802]

[802] For examples, see: Brit Peretz, "Ganz during the March of the Living: Every survivor and soldier is part of the victory," *Ynet/Yedioth Ahronot*, April 8, 2013, accessed May 6, 2017, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4365327,00.html; Noam Dvir, "Remember and do not forget: Israel is one with the six million," *Ynet/Yedioth Ahronot*, April 28, 2014, accessed May 6, 2017, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4513981,00.html; Elkana Shor, "The last generation: Holocaust remembrance must come from home," *NRG/Maariv,* April 28, 2014, accessed April 28, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/575/582.html.

*Figure 5.1. Prospective mediation*




*Maariv*, April 27,1995, "In memory of the six million"




*Maariv*, April 9, 2002, "Today: Memorial ceremonies for the six million"




*Yedioth Ahronot*, April 16, 2007, "[We] will never forget"




*Yedioth Ahronot*, April 15, 2015, "This morning at 10:00am: A siren in memory of those who perished in the Shoah"

*Figure 5.2. Holocaust media symbolism*




'Jude" *Maariv*, May 2, 2000




"Jude." *Maariv*, April 18, 2003




"Jude." *Maariv*, April 4, 2013




"Jude." *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 9, 2002




"Jood." *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 21, 2009




"Jood." *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 8, 2013

## "Our Holocaust:" The Holocaust as a common destiny

The concretizing of Durkheimian notions of social cohesiveness or 'an imagined community' is further realized through content that highlights the Holocaust's relevance for all Israelis, including through Holocaust 'appropriation', as indicated in phrases such as "our Holocaust,"[803] "against us"[804] and "our common destiny."[805] In a 2006 article revealingly entitled 'History chose us', Eshel Gan, for instance, cites an interviewee who notes that the central message conveyed to Israeli youth in order to remember the Holocaust should be "we are all Jews and we have a common destiny, whether we like it or not."[806] In 2016, *Maariv* was even more explicit in 'claiming' the Holocaust, as the entire commemorative supplement was dedicated to *Shoah shelanu* [Heb. our Holocaust].[807] The pertinence of the Holocaust to Israeli-Jews is equally expressed by highlighting the uniquely Jewish nature of the Nazi genocide and, at times, a simultaneous minimization of the 'uniqueness' of other genocides. [808] A convergence of these themes materialized twice in 1995, in a news article and a column by *Maariv's* columnist Ben-Dror Yemini. Yemini, in his column on MDHH, argued that "the uniqueness of the Holocaust" meant that Holocaust commemorative ceremonies should be held separately from ceremonies dedicated to the murder of the Gypsies.[809] A similar message was imparted in a *Yedioth Ahronot* article citing MK Livnat who sought to forbid holding a joint ceremony for the Shoah and the "tragedy" of the Armenians, as "the joint ceremony would deform Jewish history and compare

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[803] Meir Turjeman and Noah Klinger, "Our Holocaust," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 28, 2016, 5.
[804] Noah Klinger, "Not [on] another planet," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 28, 2014, 2. Also see: Assaf Chaim and Avi Shilon, "The Shoah is present in our blood cycle," *Maariv*, April 9, 2002, 10, 11; Meir Lau, "Also today, precisely today," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 9, 2002, 2.
[805] Eshel Gan, "History chose us," *Nrg/Maariv*, April 24, 2006, accessed April 28, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/076/987.html.
[806] Ibid.
[807] "Our Shoah," *Maariv*, May 5, 2016, supplement.
[808] Amos Carmel, "About the sin that was not committed," *Yedioth Ahronot*, May 5, 1997, 5; Meir Stiglitz, "To death there was government," *Maariv,* May 5, 1997, 5; Noah Klinger, "Not [on] another planet," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 28, 2014, 2.
[809] Ben-Dror Yemini, "Between Judaism and universalism," *Maariv*, April 27, 1995, 3.

the murder of six million Jews in the Holocaust to the tragedy of other people […] when such a comparison cannot be made."[810] In 2007, *Yedioth Ahronot's* front page also maintained the uniqueness of the Holocaust in comparison to other 'war crimes' in an article entitled 'Not a genocide, murder of the Jews', in which the author Sever Plozker argued: "There is no other tragedy in the history of mankind or war crime that is similar to the Holocaust of the Jewish people."[811]

In an interview conducted with Klinger, a recurring presence in *Yedioth Ahronot* on MDHH, the focus on Jewish victimhood and the uniqueness of the Holocaust were presented as both a moral and historical responsibility, as he noted: "In Auschwitz there were 1,300,000 people. 1,200,000 were Jews, 75,000 Poles, and 23,000 were Gypsies. What is there to compare? I have nothing to say about the Gypsies."[812] Moreover, invoking the Armenian "killing" as an example, Klinger noted that, unlike the Turks who exploited the war to perpetrate "the killing," the Germans "had a plan, it was predetermined."[813] Yet, media content projecting an exclusive Jewish victimhood and the Holocaust's uniqueness should not merely be considered a reflection of journalists' own historical understandings; and, instead, based on the dialogical relation

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[810] Gabi Baron, "MK Livnat: Forbid holding a joint ceremony for the Shoah and Armenians," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 24, 1995, 14. Also see: Nurit Pelter and Michael Grayevski, "We have an obligation to remember and forget," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 13, 1999, 9.

[811] Sever Plotzker, "Not genocide, [but] murder of Jews," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 16, 2007, front page. Also see a 2014 article by Efraim Zuroff who criticized the comparison between the crimes of the Nazis against the Jews and the "imagined genocide" of the Soviets because, as he maintained, it led to an inclusive commemoration of all victims of totalitarian regimes "as if they […] had committed similar crimes on the same scale." Efraim Zuroff, "Europe is rewriting history and minimizing the Holocaust," *NRG*/*Maariv,* April 27, 2014, accessed 19 April 2016, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/574/844.html.

[812] According to data published by the USHMM, Klinger's figures miss the mark, as around 200,000 non-Jewish victims were deported to Auschwitz, including 140,000–150,000 non-Jewish Poles, 23,000 Roma and Sinti (Gypsies), 15,000 Soviet prisoners of war, and 25,000 others (Soviet civilians, Lithuanians, Czechs, French, Yugoslavs, Germans, Austrians, and Italians). The majority of these victims were killed: 74,000 Poles, 21,000 Roma (Gypsies), and 15,000 Soviet prisoners of war; and 10,000–15,000 members of other nationalities (Soviet civilians, Czechs, Yugoslavs, French, Germans, and Austrians). At least 960,000 Jews were killed in Auschwitz. "Auschwitz," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed September 11, 2017, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005189.

[813] Interview conducted with Noah Klinger on 24 July 2016.

between journalists and media consumers, is indicative of its cultural ubiquity and resonance in Israeli society. Indeed, Motti Neiger, an Israeli media scholar and a long-time media observer, explained that a "focus on other victims of Nazism would lead to less interest among readers. It does not fit the framework people are used to consuming regarding the Holocaust [and] on *Yom ha-Shoah* there is no tolerance for other narratives that do not fit with the narrative of Jewish victimhood."[814]

## A prescriptive and prospective Holocaust memory

In coherence with this 'accepted narrative' of an "unprecedented evilness and brutality,"[815] several articles on MDHH claim that the Holocaust "is inevitable for youth"[816] and "will pass from one generation to another"[817] as "a burden of memory"[818] that is part of "our [Israeli] blood cycle."[819] Nevertheless, on the whole, MDHH publications, stress the need for an active transmission to the next Israeli-Jewish generation, thereby creating a 'prescriptive memory' or a 'prospective memory'. Implicit transmission of a prospective memory is most conclusively demonstrated through the publication of letters written by first-generation Holocaust survivors to their (great-)(grand)children and through the inclusion of their offspring in commemorative ceremonies in Israel and journeys to death camps in Poland.[820] The concept of an 'active' or

[814] Interview conducted with Motti Neiger on 11 April 2016.
[815] Amnon Danker, "Memory," *Maariv*, May 5, 2006, 3.
[816] Sarah Blau, "The Shoah is present," *Maariv,* April 9, 2002, 11.
[817] Sever Plozker, "The memory that does not cease," *Yedioth Ahronot*, May 2, 2000, 2.
[818] Tal Bashan, "A healthier mind," *Maariv*, April 16, 2015, 3.
[819] Assaf Chaim and Avi Shilon, "The Shoah is present in our blood cycle," *Maariv*, April 9, 2002, 10,11. Also see: Sharon Machat, "Effect of the third generation," *Maariv*, April 29, 2003, 6, 7.
[820] Anonymous, "Ceremony at Tel Yizhak: The grandchildren will accompany the torchlighters, *Yedioth Ahronot*, May 5, 2005, 3 (supplement); Itamar Eichner, "The third generation of Holocaust survivors and their grandchildren will accompany Sharon," *Yedioth Ahronot*, May 5, 2005, 4; Dubi Eichenwald, "In the name of the father," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 29, 2003, 16; Nechama Doek, "Flight A986," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 21, 2009, 12,13; Yiftat Menaharedt, "Touching Pain," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 12, 1999, 9; Anonymous, "Personal testimony: Holocaust survivors and members of the second generation write their memories," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 29, 2003, supplement; Abigail Uzi, "When you grow up," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 19, 2012, supplement; Anonymous, "Recounting," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 4, 2012, 8-15.

explicit obligation and duty towards generational transmission has also been identified, albeit almost exclusively from 2000 onwards.[821] *Maariv's* 2000 MDHH edition included a 'commemorative ad' for its special MDHH edition aimed at children, which sought to present the Holocaust through the eyes of the Holocaust's youngest victims in "excerpts from diaries written by children during that awful war."[822] The "responsibility of members of the [second and] third generation" is further laid out in other initiatives that seek to "inspire the youth to take responsibility for Holocaust remembrance," often referring to the ever-diminishing number of survivors.[823] In light of an absence of direct contact with the first generation, an editorial published in 2012, entitled 'Children of the next generation', stipulated the need to shape the image of future generations through the educational system "in the language in which the children speak today,"[824] while another editorial published in 2014 emphasized the preservation of Holocaust Remembrance Day to pass on the Holocaust "to the children, grandchildren, and their offspring […] as a battle for memory."[825]

In addition to pointing to extra-media modes of transmission, on MDHH, *Maariv* and *Yedioth Ahronot* have sought to contribute to the transmission of mediated Holocaust memories.

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[821] The pre-2000 exception is Yedioth Ahronot's 1997 article by Ilyah Avnat. See: Ilyah Avnat, "Mother and daughter in torch race," *Yedioth Ahronot,* May 5, 1997, 17 (supplement). For post-2000 articles conveying an active obligation towards generational transmission, see: Anonymous, "A second generation of pain," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 19, 2004, 4 (supplement); Yair Lapid, Nava Semel, Tzipi Gonigros, Ariana Melamed, Major General Yair Naveh and Dov Eichenwald, "Sons of Holocaust survivors write about the nightmares, hopes and lessons," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 19, 2004, 4 (supplement); David Regev, Zvi Singer and Tamar Trabelsi Hadad, "Saving the Memory," *Yedioth Ahronot*, May 1, 2011, 2; Aya Ben Naftali, "Witnesses to the last witness," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 12, 2012.

[822] Anonymous, "Maariv for kids," *Maariv*, May 2, 2000, advertisement; Miriam Kotz, "How to tell them about this?," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 28, 2014, 7.

[823] Eshel Gan, "History chose us," *Nrg/Maariv*, April 24, 2006, accessed April 28, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/076/987.html. For a further article invoking the diminishing number of the survivors and the need to collect their testimonies, see: David Regev, Zvi Singer and Tamar Trabelsi Hadad, "Saving the Memory," *Yedioth Ahronot*, May 1, 2011, 2.

[824] Yaez Paz-Melamed, "Children of the next generation," *NRG/Maariv*, April 19, 2012, accessed April 28, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/359/511.html.

[825] Elkana Shor, "The last generation: Holocaust remembrance must come from home," *NRG/Maariv,* April 28, 2014, accessed April 28, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/575/582.html.

Principally, these media outlets have in engaged in Holocaust exposure by sharing Holocaust survivors' experiences, thereby reflecting their emergence as the dominant storytellers of the Holocaust 'as direct witnesses' in Israeli society.[826] While survivors' stories are no longer only selected for their representation of the 'ghetto fighter spirit', the metaphoric Zionist narrative of 'catastrophe and redemption' remains, through the creation of a liminal sphere, juxtaposing the 'there' (Europe) and 'then' (1939-1945) with the 'here' (Israel) and the 'now' (present). Consequently, MDHH output stresses the survivors' personal "victory over Nazi Germany"[827] and their contribution to the establishment of a strong Israeli state as "a triumph of light over darkness,"[828] an "overcoming of evil"[829] and a "personal revenge."[830]

### The diasporic threat

The transmission of survivors' past to future generations, crucially, is not solely intended as a means of illuminating the past in a teleological fashion. Speeches cited in 2007 and 2015 by then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Knesset President Reuven Rivlin highlight that "transferring the torch of life" to the younger generation is meant to impart an awareness "of the dangers [and] vigilance against threats."[831] Principally, this threat constitutes the perseverance of anti-Semitism, Nazism and Fascism in the diaspora; and consequently, affirms the need for a strong Jewish state. Since 1994, media output on MDHH has reported an annual growth in anti-

[826] Zandberg, "Right," 11.
[827] Urah Arif, "Postal service issues a special commemoration kit," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 25, 1995, 17.
[828] Golan Yusifon and Rivka Freilich, "Weitzman: there will not be another Auschwitz," *Maariv*, May 2, 2000, 4.
[829] Anonymous, "We are here," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 8, 2013, 10.
[830] Meir Lau, "From generation to generation," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 8, 2013, 1. For further articles describing Holocaust survivors' victory as individuals and a society, see: Dov Eichwald, "We stood on the cursed land of Auschwitz and knew we had won," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 9, 2000, 22; Rivka Freilich, "We are here: The soldiers of Yehuda," *Maariv,* May 2, 2000, 13; Orna Barbibai, "We return to the camp as victors," *Maariv,* April 9, 2013, 2; Danny Adino Abebe, "We won: They survived the horrors of the Holocaust, established glorious families and chose life," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 15, 2015, 2, 3.
[831] Anonymous, "Carry the torch of life," *Maariv*, April 16, 2015, front page; Danny Adino Abebe, Natasha Mozgovia and Yossi Bar, "The pain and the memory," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 16, 2007, 2.

Semitism in the diaspora[832] with reference to the annual reports conducted by the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism and Racism at the University of Tel Aviv.[833] These studies, which concentrate on contemporary manifestations of anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli policies abroad, are released on the eve of MDHH and are widely cited in Holocaust day media, hinting that the attitudes and behaviors that characterized the Nazi regime are still existing phenomena and, therefore, "that the Holocaust is not over yet."[834]

From 1998 onwards, reports conducted by the Stephen Roth Institute have consistently presented a "sharp increase" in violent anti-Semitic incidents in the world executed by "Muslim Arabs [and] extreme right-wingers," with a primary focus on Europe and the United States.[835] An article published on the annual study in 2010 with the telling title '[They] hate us more', for instance, noted that ever since the early 1990s, the report's authors have documented an increase in anti-Semitic incidents worldwide executed by "the extreme right wing [although] in most cases the events' perpetrators were identified as Arabs or Muslims."[836] Interestingly, an analysis of these reports shows that even when "there has been a decline in the total number of [anti-Semitic] incidents," the 'seriousness' of the incidents means that, in the media, the evidence is

[832] Reports provided to the United States Congress also note that since the beginning of the 21st century there has been an "increasing frequency and severity of anti-Semitic incidents [which] have disrupted the sense of safety and well-being of Jewish communities [abroad]." Department of State to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on International Relations*, Anti-Semitism in the United States: Report on Global Anti-Semitism* (Washington D.C.: January 2005).

[833] The studies examine both violent and non-violent forms of anti-Semitism in the diaspora, in addition to the existence of anti-Israeli sentiments, which include imposing "boycott[s] on Israeli academic institutions and those associated with them, as part of the denial of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state." Tamar Triblisi-Chadad, "Less anti-Semitic incidents in the world," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 25, 2006, 9.

[834] Motti Neiger, Eyal Zandberg and Oren Meyers, "Reversed Memory: Commemorating the Past through Coverage of the Present," in *Journalism and Memory*, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt (Houndmills; Basingstoke; Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 123.

[835] Tamar Triblisi-Chadad, "A sharp increase in the number of attacks on Jews," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 9, 2002, 14. For examples of further articles, see: Anonymous, "Hate is increasing. 2004: Sharp increase in anti-Semitism," *Maariv,* May 5, 2006, 3; Michael Shapira, "Maariv report: More serious anti-Semitic attacks in 2007," *NRG/Maariv,* April 30, 2008, accessed 17 April 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/727/972.html; Chaim Asrovitz, "A rise of 40% in violent anti-Semitic incidents in the world," *Maariv,* April 16, 2015, 3.

[836] Tamar Triblisi-Chadad and Itamar Eichner, "[They] hate us more," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 12, 2010, 4, 5.

presented so as to indicate that there is a "worrying escalation [in anti-Semitism]."[837] In addition to the annual report on anti-Semitism, other news items published on MDHH seek to evidence diasporic anti-Semitic virulence across borders, on the internet and in individual countries. A news article published on MDHH 2008 thus discussed the desecration of dozens of Jewish graves in Germany as "an awful reminder" of "hateful anti-Semitism."[838] In 2014, readers were offered a more thorough introduction into the tenets of anti-Semitism across Europe or, as the article put it, "a journey through the strongholds of anti-Semitism on the continent."[839]

The findings of the reports and other news items are reinforced through reciting commemorative speeches conducted on MDHH by politicians and in editorials published on MDHH. Materializations of the first occur in the coverage of speeches conducted by Ezar Weizman, Ariel Sharon, Moshe Katsav, Benjamin Netanyahu and Shimon Peres. In 2004, an article entitled 'We won't forget' referred to President Katsav's speech at Yad Vashem's commemorative opening ceremony. Katsav noted that a "wave of anti-Semitism [is] sweeping through Europe today […] We are witnessing the burning of synagogues, the desecration of Jewish orphanages, and hate speech. Again, Jews are afraid to wear a skullcap and wear a Star of David when walking in the street. Once again […] Jewish children are being beaten and cursed."[840] Editorials written on MDHH further evoke the threat of anti-Semitism in the diaspora

[837] Tamar Triblisi-Chadad, "Less anti-Semitic incidents in the world," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 25, 2006, 9. Also see: Michael Shapira, "Maariv report: More serious anti-Semitic attacks in 2007," *NRG/Maariv,* April 30, 2008, accessed 17 April 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/727/972.html.
[838] Anonymous, "Berlin mayor: This is hateful anti-Semitism," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 30, 2008, 4; Anonymous, "Dozens of graves desecrated in Germany on the eve of Holocaust Day," *Maariv*, April 30, 2008, front page; AP, "More than 30 graves desecrated in Berlin," *NRG/Maariv,* April 29, 2008, accessed 18 April 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/727/764.html; Yarden Michaeli, "An awful reminder," *Maariv*, April 30, 2008, 2.
[839] Nissan Tzur, "An extreme right-wing view: Anti-Semitism is once again conquering Europe," *NRG/Maariv*, April 20, 2014, accessed April 18, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/573/804.html.
[840] Zvi Singer and Natasha Mozgovia, "We won't forget," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 19, 2004, 12, 13. See also: Ora Ariv, "It is up to Israel to spearhead the fight against followers of Nazism," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 27, 1995, 14; Edna Adato and Zvi Singer, "Remember," *Maariv,* April 29, 2003, 2.

by expressing the inherent nature of diasporic anti-Semitism; thereby presenting anti-Semitism as something endemic to gentiles in line with Eastern European Zionist thinkers like Leon Pinsker, Moses Lilienblum and Nachum Sokolow.[841] Accordingly, an editorial published in 1994 by Plozker in *Yedioth Ahronot* noted that the rise of neo-Fascism indicated that "the immunity against the virus is starting to weaken and possibly will stop working."[842] Editorials written by Klinger and the former author Aharon Megged also point to the intrinsic existence of anti-Semitism, with Megged discussing "the disease of hatred of Jews spreading from country to country at a much faster rate than AIDS or SARS" and Klinger identifying anti-Semitism as "a disease and a tradition that has been handed down from generation to generation, to this very day [resulting] in abysmal and irrational hatred against us."[843]

*Maariv* and *Yedioth Ahronot's* emphasis on anti-Semitic manifestations on the same day as Holocaust commemoration ceremonies aims to evidence the need to "learn a lesson from the Holocaust,"[844] with the knowledge that "there is a chance of another Holocaust."[845] Moreover, as President Weizman proclaimed in 1995, the perseverance of Nazism "in the middle of Western culture" should "ring a warning bell to the diaspora Jews and force them to have a serious discussion concerning Jewish existence in the diaspora."[846] It is against this ongoing threat of a

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[841] Shulamit Volkov, *Germans, Jews, and Antisemites: Trials in Emancipation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17; Robert Wistrich, *Between redemption and perdition: Modern anti-Semitism and Jewish identity* (London: Routledge, 1990), 190-195.
[842] Sever Plozker, "If this is man," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 7, 1994, 6.
[843] Aharon Megged, "A new incarnation of old hatred," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 29, 2003, 11 (supplement); Noah Klinger, "Not [on] another planet," *Yedioth Ahronot* April 28, 2014, 2. For further examples, see: Meir Lau, "What will be when we are no longer here," *Yedioth Ahronot*, May 5, 2016, 2 (supplement), in which Israel's former Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi (1993-2003) noted that "anti-Semitism exists from generation to generation."
[844] Noah Klinger and Zvi Singer, "Don't forget," *Yedioth Ahronot*, May 5, 2005, 4.
[845] Tamar Trabelsi Hadad, Zvi Singer, Joel Beno and Oron Meiri, "A third of the youth: It is possible that a second Shoah will happen," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 13, 2015, 4.
[846] Ora Ariv, "It is up to Israel to spearhead the fight against followers of Nazism," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 27, 1995, 14. A similar argument was put forward in 2002 in an editorial published by Lau who noted that the fact that "the whole world is against us" and the existence of "a national home, a state and an army with power and ability" means that diaspora Jews' "way must be one and only, in one direction and now — to the Land of Israel." Meir Lau, "Also today, precisely today," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 9, 2002, 2.

second Holocaust that the Israeli state is presented as a refuge through the existence of a strong IDF; and, with this, simultaneously reinforcing the dichotomy between Israel as a safe haven and the diaspora as a universal "land of the evil."[847] In articles and cartoons published on MDHH "the state of Israel and a strong and secure IDF"[848] are thus not only conceived "as a triumph of light over darkness and righteousness over evil,"[849] but also as "the only guarantee to our safety and to ensure a Holocaust won't happen a second time,"[850] or as *Maariv's* front page promised in 2006 "Never will they find us not ready, never." [851]

*Figure 5.3. Israel as the redemptive answer to the Holocaust*



A Jewish victim of Nazism salutes an IDF soldier from the afterlife.
*Yedioth Ahronot*, April 9, 2002


[847] Ami Ben David, "Unprecedented heavy security during the March of the Living," *Maariv,* April 9, 2002, 11.
[848] Nurit Pelter and Michael Grayevski, "A strong IDF is the assurance that the Holocaust won't return," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 13, 1999, 9.
[849] Golan Yusifon and Rivka Freilich, "Weitzman: there will not be another Auschwitz," *Maariv*, May 2, 2000, 4.
[850] Michael Grayevski, "Israel is the assurance that the Holocaust will not return," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 23, 1998, 3.
[851] Anonymous, "The Prime Minister is going to lead the march of the living today in Auschwitz. "Never will they find us not ready, never," Sharon promised." *Maariv,* May 5, 2006, front page. For further examples of articles on the existence of the IDF and the Israeli state as an insurance against the return of a Holocaust, see: Yehuda Golan and Uri Arzi, "Oy to a people that doesn't have a national home and oy to a people that doesn't have a defensive force, said Prime Minister Shimon Peres yesterday during the ceremony at Yad Vashem," *Maariv,* April 25, 1996, 2; Anonymous, "A safe haven for future generations," *Maariv*, April 9, 2002, 10; Dalia Mazori, "Netanyahu: We will never reach the situation where it is too late," *Maariv,* April 9, 2013, 2; Anonymous, "Netanyahu: The West has not learned a lesson, but this time we will defend ourselves," *NRG/Maariv,* April 27, 2014, accessed May 8, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/575/352.html.





"Dad, we beat them." *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 8, 2013




"60 [years] of Israel. From Shoah to resurrection." *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 30, 2008




*Yedioth Ahronot*, April 4, 2010




"Never again." *Maariv*, April 8, 2013

## The domestic threat

Despite the presentation of Israel as a bulwark against diasporic anti-Semitism, somewhat paradoxically, Jewish life in Israel is not perceived as free from similar threats. Studies conducted among the Israeli public in 2007 found that a third of Israelis feared a second Holocaust.[852] By 2015, these numbers had risen, with 47 percent of the second and third generation and 46 percent of the general public being fearful of another Holocaust.[853] While the reports do not indicate the source of this fear, an examination of media output on MDHH indicates that in addition to the invocation of a diasporic threat, the possibility of a reoccurrence of a Holocaust against the Jewish people in Israel is represented as a consequence of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, since the mid-2000s, 'the Iranian threat'. The threat of further extermination is conveyed both implicitly, through the framing of the Holocaust, and explicitly in news items and editorials. An editorial published by Geula Cohen in *Maariv* in 2000, for instance, maintained that "We should not fall asleep on duty [as] what happened there can happen here." According to Cohen, the threat of a Holocaust occurring "tomorrow, [here] in the land of Israel" was compounded by the ongoing negotiations between Ehud Barak and Arafat which, Cohen argued, "deprived us from the sources of our strength."[854] With reference to the PA's 'true intentions' of "a map of the world in which Israel does not exist," Uri Elizier on MDHH 2006 also noted in an article with the telling name 'It's still possible' that the "main lesson [is] that the Holocaust can take place [again]."[855]

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[852] Tamar Trabelsi Hadad, Zvi Singer, Goel Beno and Oron Meiri, "A third of the youth: It is possible that a second Shoah will happen," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 13, 2015, 4.
[853] Dalia Mazori, "About half of the Israeli public fears a second Shoah," *NRG/Maariv,* April 13, 2015, accessed May 8, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/688/669.html. For a non-MDHH article on this, see: Mohammed S. Watad, "The duty to scream," *NRG/Maariv*, April 15, 2015, accessed May 8, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/689/240.html.
[854] Geula Cohen, "My Holocaust Syndrome," *Maariv,* May 2, 2000, 5 (supplement).
[855] Uri Elizier, "It's still possible," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 21, 2006, 22. Also see: Gabi Keshler, "Palestinian suicide bombers are just as bad as the Nazis," *Maariv*, April 9, 2002, 11.

The suggestion of an ongoing threat is further imbued by framing Holocaust commemoration on MDHH in the context of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. *Yedioth Ahronot's* and *Maariv's* front pages on MDHH in 1999 and 2002 were, for example, dominated by the death of soldier(s) in respectively Jenin and Lebanon, as well as Holocaust commemorative acts in Israel. The placement of the announcements of the soldiers' death directly next to images of soldiers at commemoration ceremonies at Yad Vashem not only creates a direct link between the Holocaust and ongoing Jewish suffering, but also blurs the line between Jewish victims of Nazism and victims of the conflict as, in the words of *Maariv's* 2002 special supplement, "pain which doesn't have an end."[856] The insinuation of a direct interconnection between the Holocaust and the continual suffering as a result of the regional and domestic political strife is reinforced through survivors' stories. In 2002, *Maariv* readers were introduced to David Polanski, known as Jork, who smuggled arms to the Warsaw Ghetto during the Second World War. After having "survived those horrible years," Jork presents what he calls "his personal [second] Holocaust," namely the loss of his son Eitan in the Yom Kippur War.[857] In 2014, Holocaust survivor Judith Shilo also recounted the occurrence of "another Holocaust in Israel," this time alluding to the death of her granddaughter and her son in attacks perpetrated by Palestinians, leading the author to conclude that "even here disasters [after the Holocaust] continue to follow her."[858]

[856] *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 13, 1999, front page; *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 9, 20002, front page. Also see: *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 7, 1994, front page; Eliel Sachar, "She survived the Shoah [but] was killed in an attack," *Maariv*, April 9, 2002, 9.
[857] Amir Gilat, "This is me, Jork, at the square of the three crosses," *Maariv,* April 9, 2002, 1, 2 (supplement).
[858] Smadar Shir, "I didn't think that in Israel another Shoah would happen to me," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 28, 2014, 4.

*Figure 5.4. Pain which has no end*


ידיעות אחרונות

מלכודת של הדיבאללה: בדרך לממשרפיתין חיכה המטען הקטלני

חייל נהרג בלבנון כשניגש לפרק מטען

הבוקר ב־10:00 תישמע ברחבי הארץ צפירת יום השואה

מקווים לטוב – ומתגעגעים: הפליטים נחתו בישראל

ההורים התגעגו לניתוח, שנפסח הושעקה, התינוק ניצל

במפלגת המרכז מתייחסים לעימות הערב כגורלי

המשטרה חוקרת תלונת מרדכי שצותחו לטלפון שלו

"A soldier is killed in Lebanon during the dismantling of a bomb."
*Maariv*, April 13, 1999


ידיעות אחרונות

בעקבות דרישת בוש לסגת מייד

צה"ל יוצא מ־2 ערים

זוכרים את ששת המיליונים

הוכפל הביקוש לדגלים

נהרג אתמול בגינין

לא למשרת הזה

"Killed yesterday in Jenin,"
*Maariv*, April 9, 2002

The most explicit and consistent conveyance of an ongoing threat to Israeli-Jews on MDHH has taken place since 2006, following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's ascendance to the presidency in Iran in 2005 and subsequent calls by him to "wipe Israel off the map."[859] As such, in the same article that Elizier discussed the PA's intention to rid itself of Israel, Ahmadinejad is compared to Hitler who "also first spoke only [meaning that] anyone who talks about destroying Israel intends to do so."[860] As a result of this intention by "one of the most extreme leaders since Hitler," an article published in *Yedioth Ahronot* on the same day went so far as to argue that "the threat posed by Iran today is even more serious than the threat posed by the Nazis because the Iranians are closer to nuclear weapons than Hitler was."[861] In the wake of Netanyahu's rise to power in 2009, the mention of the Iranian threat has largely moved from editorials and news articles citing the Iranian leadership to articles recounting speeches conducted by the Prime Minister and, until 2014, President Shimon Peres.[862] Thus, on MDHH 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2014, speeches by Netanyahu and Peres were cited to warn against "the possibility of another Holocaust against the Jewish people" as Iranian leaders "are rushing to develop nuclear weapons and openly declare their desire to destroy Israel."[863]

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[859] Fathi Nazeela, "Iran's new president says Israel 'must be wiped off the map," *The New York Times*, October 27, 2005, accessed April 18, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/27/world/middleeast/irans-new-president-says-israel-must-be-wiped-off-the-map.html?_r=0.
[860] Uri Elizier, "It's still possible," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 21, 2006, 22.
[861] Smadar Perry and Itamar Eichner, "Denying the Shoah on Holocaust Memorial Day," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 25, 2006, 6.
[862] Anonymous, "Never again: The lesson of the Holocaust is to fight evil, the prime minister said last night at Yad Vashem. However, facing the Iranian threat, the world acts as it always had," *Maariv*, April 12, 2010, front page; Zvi Singer and Noah Klinger, "Six million tears," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 12, 2010, 2.
[863] Dalia Mazori, "Netanyahu: We must not remain silent in the face of Iran's threats," *Maariv,* April 11, 2010, Akiva Novick, "Never again," *Yedioth Ahronot*, May 2, 2011, 2. Also see: Dany Adino Abebe and Geul Banu, "Remember the dead," *Yedioth Ahronot*, April 8, 2013, 4; Dalia Mazori, "Netanyahu: We will never reach the situation where it will be too late," *Maariv,* April 9, 2013, 2.

## Addressing the Holocaust at Every Chance: Daily Holocaust Mediation

Interviews conducted with Israeli journalists responsible for Holocaust media output indicate that the production of Holocaust-related content is considered vital throughout the year. As such, even without a legal requirement, day-to-day media discourse is saturated with direct and indirect references to the Holocaust because, as Neiger argued, Israeli journalists address the Holocaust "every time they have a chance."[864] When asked about the reasoning for the daily allusions to the Holocaust, media professionals showed awareness of their role as media agents by claiming a responsibly in transmitting the Holocaust to the next generation. Eldad Beck, a correspondent for *Yedioth Ahronot* based in Germany, pointed out that as a representative of the second-generation he considers it his task to keep the memory of the Holocaust alive in Israel, since, as he noted, "my generation might become the missing link in the chain of memory. We are between those who experienced the Holocaust and those who won't know those who experienced it. So, my generation has been given the mission to keep the memory of the Holocaust alive."[865]

Unlike MDHH, daily news content on the Holocaust cannot solely depend on its commemorative relevance and, instead, news articles need to fulfill standards of 'newsworthiness'.[866] Interestingly, while producing content of contemporary cultural significance or, in Joan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge's news value terminology, 'meaningfulness' and 'cultural proximity', mediated day-to-day Holocaust output largely mirrors

[864] Interview conducted with Motti Neiger on 11 April 2016.
[865] Interview conducted with Eldad Beck on 8 August 2016.
[866] Joan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge (1965) provided a comprehensive systematic definition of newsworthiness or 'news values' based on 12 dimensions of events which make them likely to be represented in news media: frequency; threshold; unambiguity; cultural proximity or meaningfulness; consonance; unexpectedness; continuity; composition; reference to elite nations; actions of the elite; personification; and negativity. John Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, "The structure of foreign news: the presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crises in four Norwegian newspapers," *Journal of International Peace Research* 1 (1965): 64–91. For a (more) contemporary interpretation of what 'makes news', including the contemporary interest in celebrity news, see: Tony Harcup and Deirdre O'Neill, "What Is News? Galtung and Ruge revisited," *Journalism Studies* 2:2 (2001): 261-280.

themes discussed on MDHH, including through the portrayal of the Holocaust as an ongoing threat emanating from domestic and international conflict and diasporic anti-Semitism. Consequently, similarly to MDHH output, daily Holocaust content presents a paradox, as an emphasis on diasporic anti-Semitism presents "the state of Israel as the sole answer."[867]

### A daily reliving of the national trauma

In contrast to MDHH output on anti-Semitism, daily invocation of anti-Semitism has mainly taken place since the early 2000s following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in publications concerning (violent) anti-Semitic acts, anti-Semitic political manifestations and Holocaust denial which reinforce the image of a wholly anti-Semitic and unsafe diaspora.[868] Thus, a 2014 article on anti-Semitic incidents in Germany claimed that "as Germans are no longer afraid to hate Jews, in the streets you can hear things like 'Jews should be put in the gas chambers' or 'the Jews should be burned' [making] these the worst times since the Nazi era."[869] A similarly dismal picture of Jewish life in Europe was presented in an article published two years prior, this time pertaining to France, which claimed that "just a little over five hours away, 400,000 Jews [are] forced to deal almost daily with an atmosphere of hatred, attacks and expressions of extreme hostility on the part of their neighbors. The authorities, for their own reasons, close their eyes and the media contributes their share to the intensification of hatred."[870] A report published by

[867] Interview conducted with Motti Neiger on 11 April 2016.
[868] Aran Tipenbron, "500 new members in the neo-Nazi party," *Yedioth Ahronot,* August 14, 2000, 2,3; Maya Mahler, "Holocaust denial? In Spain it's okay," *Yedioth Ahronot,* January 27, 2008, 10; Eldad Beck, Natasha Mozgovia and Itamar Eichner, "Munich: Carnival on International Holocaust Day," *Yedioth Ahronot,* January 27, 2008, 10.
[869] Channel 2 news, "Government report states: 40% of European residents is anti-Semitic," *NRG/Maariv*, January 24, 2016, accessed April 18, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/16/ART2/750/278.html; Benjamin Weinthal, "German citizens are no longer afraid to hate Jews," *NRG/Maariv*, October 8, 2014, accessed April 18, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/631/117.html.
[870] Alex Doron, "Is Paris burning? The plague of anti-Semitism in France," *NRG/Maariv*, January 8, 2012, accessed April 18, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/324/215.html. Also see: Michael Tuchfeld, "In Australia, there are fears: Anti-Semitism is coming here as well," *NRG/Maariv,* October 27, 2014, accessed April 18, 2017,

*Maariv* in 2016, accompanied by the symbolic Yizkor candle, indicated that these anti-Semitic manifestations should not be considered an aberration, as the article claimed that almost half of European residents, 40 percent, are anti-Semitic. While the report was not published on MDHH, the Yizkor candle placed the report in the traditional framework of MDHH media output, while simultaneously forming an overt reminder to readers to remember the continuation of anti-Semitism as a perpetual threat and an inherent phenomenon in the diaspora.[871]

During interviews, both first- and second-generation Israeli journalists expressed a desire to discuss anti-Semitic trends in the diaspora as a means of continually reaffirming the relevance of the past for the present and to stress a continued threat. Beck, who has published work on the heightened level of anti-Semitism in Europe, including by discussing the desecration of German Jewish cemeteries and revealing Holocaust denial, maintained that it is was his "duty to discuss new manifestations of anti-Semitism."[872] According to Beck, this responsibility spurred from a detection of a desire among Israelis and Germans "to put the past behind them [which] is extremely dangerous."[873] Similarly, Klinger, noted that he had an obligation to "warn future generations [as] anti-Semitism is a tradition that is alive and growing from day to day."[874] Moreover, coverage of anti-Semitism, Klinger said, was meant to inform his readers of "the need for a strong Jewish state [as] the Holocaust is a reason to have a strong army."[875]

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http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/651/001.html; Asaf Golan, "Expert: There is a clear rise in anti-Semitism in Turkey," *NRG/Maariv*, January 8, 2014, accessed April 18, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/538/183.html.

[871] Channel 2 news, "Government report states: 40% of European residents is anti-Semitic," *NRG/Maariv*, January 24, 2016, accessed April 18, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/16/ART2/750/278.html; Zvika Klein, "Escaping from France: A peak in the immigration of Jews from Western Europe in 2015," *NRG/Maariv*, accessed April 18, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/748/600.html.

[872] Eldad Beck, Natasha Mozgovia and Itamar Eichner, "Munich: Carnival on International Holocaust Day," *Yedioth Ahronot,* January 27, 2008, 10; Eldad Beck, "The righteous in Sodom," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 21, 2009, 4; Eldad Beck, "10% of Jewish cemeteries in Germany were desecrated in 5 years," *Yedioth Ahronot,* January 27, 2008, 10.

[873] Interview conducted with Eldad Beck on 8 August 2016.

[874] Interview conducted with Noah Klinger on 24 July 2016

[875] Ibid.

### The Holocaust as a conceptual paradigm for the present: Evoking the ongoing threat

In coherence with the conception of the Israeli state as a deterrent to a second Holocaust, a June 2013 article written by Beck cited Netanyahu as saying "we will do everything we can to prevent another Holocaust."[876] When asked about the reasoning behind the uncritical inclusion of this statement and its potential effects on readership, Beck indicated that he, like Netanyahu, believed that the potential of another Holocaust should not be excluded in light of the current situation in the Middle East: "When you live in Israel you cannot ignore this threat [and] the thought that another Holocaust might happen to the Jewish people is not something you can exclude."[877] Yet, the Holocaust has not only recently become a paradigm to view the present and to underline the continual threat of another genocide. An analysis of references to the Holocaust in daily media content in the time period under review indicates that particularly in times of violence and political tension the Holocaust has been utilized as a frame of reference because, as Neiger notes, it is understood as a "national trauma" and a "collective fear [as] is not just something that occurred, but something that will occur again."[878] Importantly, the identified mediated instrumentalization of the Holocaust as an analogy and, simultaneously, as a warning, spurring on the need of preventative action, indicates that retrospective and prospective memory need not constitute separate analytical categories.

During the 2005 military disengagement from Gaza, in addition to the destruction of the Second Temple, the Holocaust was therefore instrumentalized as an interpretive framework for

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[876] Eldad Beck, "Netanyahu at Auschwitz: We will do everything to prevent another Holocaust," *Ynet/Yedioth Ahronot,* June 13, 2013, accessed April 18, 2017, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4392024,00.html.
[877] Interview conducted with Eldad Beck on 8 August 2016. Also see: Noah Klinger, "82%: The Shoah will return," *Yedioth Ahronot,* January 25, 2008, 8.
[878] Interview conducted with Motti Neiger on 11 April 2016. Research executed by Moshe Zuckermann also demonstrated that the Holocaust infiltrated media coverage during the First Gulf War. See Moshe Zuckermann, *Shoah in the Sealed Room: The Holocaust in Israeli Press during the Gulf War* (Tel Aviv: Author's Publication, 1992).

the events by Israeli settlers and, at times, the media.[879] An editorial published by Elihu Schultz in *Maariv* argued that forcible eviction of settlers from their homes was reminiscent of the expulsion of German Jews. Consequently, Schulz maintained "no one should delude him/herself [of the fact that] after the disengagement [with] the help of the government and all parties, the Arabs will win and establish concentration camps in the Negev or Sinai. I already know the list of names of the 'Kapos' that will serve them. You have been warned!."[880]

An examination of media during the peace negotiations in the 1990s reveals that the Holocaust was also used as a prospective memory to appeal to political leaders and demand preventative action. Vehemently and unconditionally opposing the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords, former MK Elyakim Haetzni, a fervent ideologue in favor of Israeli settlement of the occupied territories, conjured up the Holocaust to convey his objection to the 'land for peace' doctrine.[881] In his 1999 *Yedioth Ahronot* article published on the commemoration of the massacre of Hebron's Jews during the 1929 Palestine riots, Haetzni not only described the "horrible cruelty" and the "flaming hatred" of the Palestinians towards the Jews in Hebron, but also noted that the 1929 "pogrom [in] the Land of Israel" is sufficient "proof that a Holocaust is also possible."[882] From the same end of the political spectrum, a political appeal was launched against

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[879] Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt, "We will get through this together': journalism, trauma and the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip," *Media, Culture & Society* 30:4 (2008): 505.
[880] Elihu Schultz, "The Holocaust is here," *NRG/Maariv,* August 3, 2005, accessed April 19, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART/966/578.html.
[881] This doctrine was first successfully executed in the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty which saw a complete withdrawal by Israel of its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai Peninsula. The land for peace formula was also ostensibly adopted by Israel when it embarked on peace talks with the PLO in 1993. The article cited here follows the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron (1997), which called for an Israeli withdrawal from 80 percent of Hebron, and the Wye River Memorandum, signed on October 23, 1998 by Arafat and Netanyahu, which called for the transfer of land to Palestinians and the shifting of parts of Area B to Area A. A few months after the Wye River agreement, Netanyahu withdrew from further implementation of the agreement, ostensibly because of the failure of the PA to fulfil its security-related obligations towards Israel. Christine Bell, *Peace Agreements and Human Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 90.
[882] Elyakim Haetzni, "Who is a good Jew," *Yedioth Ahronot*, August 3, 1999. Cited in Arye Naor, "Lessons of the Holocaust versus Territories for Peace, 1967-2001," *Israel Studies* 8:1 (2003): 131, 2.

Prime Minister Ehud Barak in 1998 following his intention to negotiate land for a peace agreement, this time by Yehuda Ariel. Ariel, who was not a Holocaust survivor but "lived with the Holocaust through marriage," argued that the Holocaust meant that "all the people, and especially Holocaust survivors and their children, should object to any attempt to give up our fathers' land."[883] Presenting the most radical form of ideological opposition to the Oslo Accords, *Yedioth Ahronot* offered a platform to the assassin of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Yigal Amir. In a letter published two years after the murder, Amir, using the popular discourse emblematic of right-wing opposition to Rabin and the 1993 Oslo Accords,[884] compared the assassination of Rabin with the possible killing of Hitler that might have prevented the Holocaust. "Had someone killed Hitler before the Holocaust," Amir argued, "he probably would have been cursed, jailed and tortured by the Jews, for they would not have wanted to know what he had prevented."[885]

### The Holocaust and the Nakba: Two parallel lines which will never meet

The conscious coupling of anti-Zionism/anti-Israeli sentiments and Holocaust denial has equally led the Holocaust to be introduced into daily media content, fulfilling various criteria of newsworthiness simultaneously, as a topic of cultural meaningfulness, continuity and negativity. Directing attention to the so-called 'Iranian threat', an article published by *Yedioth Ahronot* in 2006 cited Israel's representative to the UN, Dan Gillerman, as saying that while Iran was denying the Holocaust, it was preparing a second one.[886] In addition to Iran, which has been

[883] Yehuda Ariel cited in Zandberg, "Right," 15.
[884] According to Dan Ephron, it became standard to compare Rabin to Hitler or his government to the Judenrat, including by his political opponents. Ariel Sharon, for instance, stated after the signing of Oslo: "What's the difference between the Jewish leadership in the ghetto and this government. There, they were forced to collaborate. Here they do it willingly." Dan Ephron, *Killing a King: The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the Remaking of Israel* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2016), 143.
[885] Cited in Naor, "Lessons," 143, 144.
[886] Israel News, "Gillerman at the UN ceremony: Iran is preparing the next Holocaust," *Ynet/Yedioth Ahronot,* January 2, 2006, accessed 19 April 2017, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3207235,00.html.

presented as a bastion of anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial, particularly following the organization of an 'International Holocaust Cartoon Competition' in 2016, Holocaust denial or its minimization by Palestinians has also been considered emblematic of anti-Zionism and, therefore, a threat to the existence of Israel.[887] Relying on polls conducted at the University of Haifa, articles written in *Maariv* have presented Holocaust denial among the approximately 40 percent of 'Israeli Arabs' and 'Arabs' in the same sentence as Palestinians' rejection of "Israel's right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state."[888] Interestingly, it is in this context that the Nakba has also been classified a myth which is used by Palestinians to counter or minimize the historical truth of the Holocaust.[889] For instance, a 1998 article entitled 'Nakba, Shoah and more' noted that "myths are myths and historical truths are historical truths and these are two parallel lines which will never meet." Relying on traditional Zionist-Israeli historiography of the 1948 War, Amos Kinan reminded his readers in this article that "the Palestinians of *Eretz* Israel" rejected the partition plan and that the Arab world was uniform in its desire to "attack it [Israel] and to destroy it." Moreover, according to the author, any comparison between the Holocaust and the Nakba, as had been attempted by "Arab-Israeli demagogues," constituted a danger to their people, leading Kinan to conclude that "until the Arabs deal themselves courageously with

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[887] Itamar Eichner, "Holocaust denial competition: 50,000 dollars to the winner," *Ynet/Yedioth Ahronot*, January 12, 2016, accessed 19 April 2017, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4752001,00.html; Itamar Eichner, "Khomeini's Holocaust denial video: Zionists kill children," *Ynet/Yedioth Ahronot,* January 28, 2016, accessed 19 April 2017, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4759216,00.html; AP, "They do not deny, but just compare the [Holocaust] to the [plight of the] Palestinians: Holocaust painting competition in Iran," *Ynet/Yedioth Ahronot,* May 14, 2016, accessed 19 April 2017, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4802860,00.html; News agencies, "Iran presents: An exhibition of caricatures on the Holocaust," *NRG/Maariv,* May 13, 2016, accessed 19 April 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/777/717.html.

[888] Jonathan Halley, "More than 40% of the Arabs in Israel are Holocaust deniers," *NRG/Maariv,* May 18, 2009, accessed 21 April 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/892/038.html.

[889] Jonathan Halley, "Survey: 66% of Israeli Arabs reject its existence," *NRG/Maariv,* May 18, 2011, accessed 21 April 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/242/096.html.2011. This article noted "that almost 30 percent of Israeli Arabs reject the existence of the Jewish state and almost 38 percent do not believe that a Holocaust was committed" while also pointing out that 71 percent believe that "the Jews are the main culprits for the Nakba that befell the Palestinians in 1948."

their own history, until they hold a dialogue with themselves, a true dialogue with people like myself will not take place."[890]

Additional articles denouncing the "inconceivable comparison" between the Nakba "as a fruit of historical writing of Palestinian propaganda" and the Holocaust aim to reveal the Palestinians' formative role in designing and executing the Holocaust with reference to the Palestinian leader and Grand Mufti of Jerusalem at the time, al-Haj Amin al-Husseini, a theory previously espoused in Netanyahu's 1993 book 'A place among the nations'.[891] According to one article published in 2011 and written by a director of Im Tirtzu[892] at Bar-Ilan University, al-Husseini not only prevented Jews from finding refuge from the Nazis in Palestine as a result of the 1936-1939 Palestinian revolt, but also "tried to organize the extermination of Jews in Palestine […] and did not conceal his desire to establish a concentration camp in Jenin."[893] It is because of the failure to acknowledge the Mufti's encouragement of the extermination of the Jews and, simultaneously, an unwillingness among Palestinians to recognize "their responsibility [for the Nakba]," that columnist Yemini posits that the Nakba, like the Holocaust, served to build a national memory. Yet, in contrast to the Jews, for whom the memory of the Holocaust was

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[890] Amos Kinan, "Nakba, Shoah and more," *Yedioth Ahronot,* April 3, 1998, 25.

[891] In this book, Netanyahu, similarly to his predecessor, Ben-Gurion, argued that the former Mufti of Jerusalem had been at least a catalyst in persuading Hitler to carry out the extermination of the Jews. Moreover, Netanyahu claimed that relations between the Arabs and Nazis continued after World War II and were most recently resumed by the PLO. Benjamin Netanyahu, *A place among the nations: Israel and the World* (London: Bantam Books, 1993), 193, 194. Also see: Eldad Beck and Itamar Eichner, "In Germany too, Netanyahu again blamed Mufti for his responsibility," *Ynet*, October 21, 2015, accessed August 16, 2017, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4714608,00.html.

[892] Im Tirtzu [Heb. if you will], invoking Herzl's famous statement "If you will, it is not a dream," indicates in its mission statement that it works "on behalf of Zionism and Jewish democratic values," while seeking to unmask and expose "various threats to Zionism and Israel." In May 2011, Im Tirtzu launched a campaigned entitled 'Nakba Nonsense' which conceived of the Nakba as a "lie that threatens to drown us like a tsunami." Ben Hartman and Lahav Harkov, "Im Tirtzu launches campaign against 'myths' of the Nakba," *Jerusalem Post,* May 13, 2011, accessed July 10, 2017, http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Im-Tirtzu-launches-campaign-against-myths-of-the-Nakba; "About us," Im Tirtzu, accessed July 10, 2017, https://imti.org.il/en/about-us/movement/.

[893] Nati Avnery, "About the Holocaust and the Nakba," *NRG/Maariv,* May 16, 2011, accessed 21 April 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/241/319.html. For historical articles in *Maariv* making a similar argument, see: Zertal, *Israel's,* 101.

"used for construction," Yemini argues, for the Arabs, the Nakba encouraged "a victimhood discourse" and strengthened "feelings of hatred and vengeance, remaining the main engine of the terror industry and [fueling] the perpetuation of the refugee status."[894]

[894] Ben-Dror Yemini, "The disgrace of the Shoah and the Nakba," *Yedioth* Ahronot, August 28, 2015. Also see: Ben-Dror Yemini, "The Holocaust and the Nakba: The Jews turned to construction; the Palestinians turned to incitement," *NRG/Maariv*, April 27, 2014, accessed June 1, 2017, http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/575/324.html.

## Concluding Remarks

The temporal inclusion[895] of the Holocaust in Israeli mass media highlights its location at the core of the nation's cultural activity and awareness.[896] The explicit conveyance of the Holocaust to future generations on MDHH, as sought through mnemonic prompts in printed mass media and, since 2012, online media, therefore does not solely aim to demonstrate an explicit duty to remember an appropriated Holocaust as a historical event, but also seeks to impart a prospective or a prescriptive memory. Characterized by the reiteration of the 'never again' slogan, the significance of this prospective memory lies in its antithetical message, which dictates it *can* happen again.

While the mediated portrayal of the diaspora as a continual bastion of anti-Semitism can be interpreted as a reinforcement of the Zionist dichotomy between the 'here' and the 'there', the discussion of a domestic threat paradoxically demonstrates that Jewish continuity is never guaranteed. Analogical usage of the Holocaust in the post-Oslo era on mass media platforms reveals that, both on MDHH and in daily mediation, the Holocaust is continually evoked as an impending threat to oppose the perceived political complacence and compromise and demand preventative action.

Bolstered by the framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the context of an ongoing threat and an ascribed historical (and contemporary) desire to eradicate Jewry, part and parcel of this prescriptive memory constitutes a mediated marginalization of the Palestinian Nakba. Portrayed as a historical myth used to spur on a false victimhood narrative among the perceived

[895] Temporal here follows the term's usage by Robert Wistrich, as a means of indicating the past's contemporary application. Robert S. Wistrich, "Israel and the Holocaust Trauma," *Jewish History* 11:2 (1997): 18.
[896] Dina Porat, *Israeli society, the Holocaust and its survivors* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2008), 5.

enemy, the Nakba is denounced as a symptom of a general unwillingness among Palestinians to take historical responsibility, including for their participation in the Final Solution.

Crucially, the explicit allusion to the Nakba within Holocaust media output testifies to an awareness of its formative role within contemporary Palestinian consciousness and, simultaneously, reveals that a minimization of the other's history is not solely based on its active physical erasure. Usage of the Arabic term, including in article titles, instead, demonstrates a practice of social repression which hinges on debunking the credibility of those adhering to the narrative and, thereby, pouring scorn on the term's usage.

The final chapter of this thesis, in a similar fashion, demonstrates that Holocaust minimization does not solely rely on its societal preclusion. In addition to the overt questioning of the historical veracity of the Jewish genocide, the Holocaust, somewhat incongruously, has thus been conjured within Nakba media output as a means of highlighting the depths of Palestinian suffering at the hands of the Israelis.

# Chapter Six: Preserving the Past, Mobilizing the Past

The 1993 Oslo Accords not only had far-reaching effects for Palestinian education and commemoration, but in 1995 also led to the establishment of an official Palestinian press sanctioned by the newly established authority and free from Israeli censorship, with the telling name *al-Hayat al-Jadida* [Ar. the new life]. In the same year, following the establishment of the Ministry of Information, the Palestinian Authority issued the Palestinian Press Law, which replaced Israeli military regulations in the occupied territories and cancelled all Israeli military orders.[897] Consequently, for the first time, articles on Palestinian displacement in 1948 and its implications for Palestinian self-understanding, including word usage such as *'awdah* [Ar. return] and *ṣumūd* [Ar. steadfastness], were able to appear freely in Palestinian news content.[898]

In contrast to the West Bank, the accords did not provide a new political or legislative framework for media inside the 1948 borders and East Jerusalem; nevertheless, the Oslo Accords did have a direct impact on media content concerning the 1948 displacement. Notwithstanding the continued formal existence of Israeli censorship in East Jerusalem, in coherence with the 1993 Declaration of Principles which called for "co-ordination and co-operation in the field of communications and media,"[899] East Jerusalem media, as the chapter below will testify, was able

[897] The Press Law was adopted by the Palestinian Council of Ministries on July 17 and signed by Arafat on July 25, 1995. The Press Law contains 51 articles that most closely resemble many of the articles in the 1993 Jordanian Press Law. The Palestinian law sets conditions for licensing, publishing, running printing presses or research centers and printing books and describes the role of the authority and the legal system. The law also regulates advertising and the distribution and importation of publications. Orayb Najjar, "The 1995 Palestinian press law: A comparative study," Communication Law and Policy 2:1 (1997): 46; Amal Jamal, "The Palestinian Media: An Obedient Servant or a Vanguard of Democracy?," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29:3 (2000): 50.
[898] Robert I. Friedman, "Israeli Censorship of the Palestinian Press," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13:1 (1983): 98.
[899] See: *Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements*, September 13, 1993. The text can be found on the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website. "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements September 13, 1993," http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Declaration%20of%20Principles.aspx, accessed June 20, 2017.

to address the Nakba as a collective historical grievance with contemporary relevance following the peace negotiations. Inside the 1948 borders, privately-owned Arabic daily and weekly newspapers had already started appearing in Nazareth in the 1980s, including *Kul al-Arab* [Ar. all the Arabs] in 1987 and *al-Sinnārah* [Ar. the fishing hook] in 1983 and, consequently, were able to address the minority's concerns.[900] Yet, the Oslo Accords, termed "a Palestinian Versailles,"[901] did constitute an important break in media production, as the marginalization of (internal) refugees in the peace process and the lead-up to the symbolic 50th anniversary of the Nakba prompted recurring media production on the Nakba in the years following the accords.

The ensuing chapter offers an examination of mediated Nakba output in two Palestinian newspapers that in the time period under review have enjoyed the largest readership and circulation — *Kul al-Arab* and *Al-Quds* [Ar. Jerusalem] — and in one newspaper that represents the official stance of the PA, the above-mentioned *al-Hayat al-Jadida*.[902] Although few academic studies have been conducted on reading habits and consumption patterns of (online) Arabic newspapers in Israel, East Jerusalem and the West Bank, readership surveys have been held by various polling institutes, including the I'lam Centre for Research of Arabic Media and the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statics (PCBS). Studies conducted inside the 1948 borders

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[900] Hanna Adoni, Dan Caspi and Akiva Cohen, *Media, minorities and hybrid identities: The Arab and Russian communities in Israel* (Cresskill, N.J.: Hampton Press, 2006), 61, 63.
[901] Edward Said, "The Morning After," *London Review of Books* 15:20 (1993): 3-5.
[902] There is a lack of reliable figures on online news consumption by the Palestinian community inside the 1948 borders, East Jerusalem and the West Bank and electronic media consumption's evolvement in the period under review. Nevertheless, an article published by *Haaretz* in 2008 noted that 45,000 people a day visit the *Kul al-Arab* website, making it the second most popular site after panet.com, which is linked to the Arabic newspaper *Panorama*. While concrete insight into electronic media consumption in the Palestinian Territories and East Jerusalem does not exist, statistics published by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics in 2014 indicate that 35.7 percent of persons (10 years and over) use the internet (54.5 percent in the West Bank) to read online newspapers, magazines or electronic books. Nathan Lipson and Maayan Cohen, "Google Trends presents a very different picture of the popularity of Israeli Websites," *Haaretz*, June 23, 2008, accessed August 16, 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/business/ynet-is-the-leading-israeli-internet-portal-1.248301; PCBS, *Percentage Distribution of Persons (10 Years and Over) Who Use Computer by Internet Use and Selected Background Characteristics* (PCBS, 2014); PCBS, *Percentage of Persons (10 Years and Over) in the Palestine Who Use the Internet by Purpose of Use* (PCBS, 2014).

indicate that members of the Palestinian community are avid media consumers, albeit on an irregular basis. A survey conducted in 2005 by the I'lam Centre revealed that 80 percent read Arabic newspapers infrequently, with 45 percent consuming newspapers on the weekends and sometimes during the week and only nine percent of the respondents reading Arabic news on a daily basis.[903] A year later, however, a study found that the number of media consumers was higher, with 72.7 percent reading weekly Arabic publications.[904] Emblematic of this latter-mentioned trend, polls conducted inside Israel consistently have found that the commercial weekly newspaper *Kul al-Arab* has remained the most popular newspapers since its founding, with 29.5 percent of the respondents in a 2011 survey preferring it over the other two major weekly newspapers, *al-Sinnārah* and *Panorama*.[905]

Surveys conducted on readership habits in the West Bank (inclusive of East Jerusalem) reveal similar consumer patterns to those existing inside the 1948 borders. According to the last major survey published by PCBS in 2002, only 12.5 percent read newspapers on a daily basis and 39.7 "sometimes" read daily publications.[906] Figures on newspaper circulation in East Jerusalem and Ramallah are more difficult to verify, as polling among media consumers is infrequent and estimates by newspaper staff are notoriously high. Thus, *Al-Quds*, founded in 1951, according to its publishers distributes 50,000 copies daily; however, media observers and polls conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau for Statistics have called this claim into

[903] Dan Caspi and Mustafa Kabaha, *The Palestinian Arab in/outsiders : media and conflict in Israel* (London; Portland: Vallentine Mitchell, 2011), 202.
[904] According to a survey conducted by Hanna Adoni, Dan Caspi and Akiva Cohen, members of the Palestinian community in Israel also consume Hebrew media outlets and, according to their research, 54.4 percent read Hebrew newspapers. Adoni, Caspi and Cohen, *Media,* 79, 82.
[905] *al-Sinnārah* ranked second with 26.1 percent, while *Panorama* occupied a third place with 13.5 percent. One in six interviewees, 15.8 percent, ranked *al-Ittiḥād* [Ar. the union] as the most important newspaper. Caspi and Kabaha, *Palestinian,* 64, 202; Amal Jamal, *The Arab public sphere in Israel: media space and cultural resistance* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 83.
[906] PCBS, *Mass Media Survey 2000 – Main Findings* (PCBS, 2002), 66.

question, claiming that the level does not exceed 30,000 copies. Despite this discrepancy, since the late 1980s, *Al-Quds*, which is distributed widely in Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem, has been the paper with the highest circulation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.[907] The aforementioned 2002 survey held in the Palestinian Territories found that 81.1 of respondents preferred *Al-Quds*, far outnumbering *al-Hayat al-Jadida* (4.8 percent).[908] Indeed, *al-Hayat al-Jadida*, which is wholly owned and funded by the PA and since 1997 has kept most of the staff on its payroll, is the least popular 'major' newspaper.[909] Research conducted by Nibal Thawabteh puts the circulation numbers at approximately 7,000 copies, 3,000 less than the publishers claim. Despite these low numbers, *al-Hayat al-Jadida* does enjoy a remarkable reception in certain areas of the West Bank, including in the governorates of Hebron, Jenin, and Tulkarem and in the ministries and government organizations in Ramallah.[910]

Similarly to chapter five, the analysis that follows forms a systematic examination of anniversary journalism, i.e. annual mediation on Nakba Day. Yet, reflecting historical commemoration practices discussed in chapter three, in the years under examination anniversarial Nakba invocation has occurred on various important historical dates. Prior to the official inauguration of Nakba Day on the 15th of May by the Chairman of the PLO, Arafat, mediated Nakba output, like annual Nakba commemorations, mainly took place on the 14th of May in *Al-Quds* and *al-Hayat al-Jadida*, marking the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948. Moreover, in coherence with local commemorative practices representative of the pre-1994 era,

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[907] Nibal Thawabteh, "Palestinian Media Map: Production Congestion and Consumption Dispersion," in *Journalism Education in Countries with Limited Media*, ed. Beate Josephi (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2010), 74; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, *Mass Media Survey 2000 – Main Findings* (PCBS, 2000), 22.
[908] PCBS, *Mass,* 74.
[909] Hillel Nossek and Khalil Rinnawi, "Censorship and Freedom of the Press Under Changing Political Regimes: Palestinian Media from Israeli Occupation to the Palestinian Authority," *Gazette* 65 (2003): 188; Layla al-Zubaidi, *Walking a tightrope. News media and freedom expression in the Arab Middle East* (Ramallah: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2004), 70.
[910] Thawabteh, "Palestinian," 75.

massacres and displacements of individual communities, such as Deir Yassin, are mentioned in Palestinian newspapers on their respective historical dates, forming a reminder of a shared fate despite diverging communal experiences. Consequently, the term 'anniversary journalism' will be applied in this chapter in a broad sense, as a means of referring to both anniversarial and daily media Nakba output that seeks to highlight the historical events that have collectively become known as *al-Nakba*. Crucially, the broad application of anniversary journalism should not infer the amalgamation of commemorative and daily mediated Nakba memories. Rather, this chapter will testify that the Nakba, as a persistent symbol of daily Palestinian marginalization, particularly in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, has transformed the media into a 'counterhegemonic public space', which propagates a Palestinian national awareness and active mobilization against the Israeli presence.

Indeed, although the Oslo Accords on both sides of the Green Line transformed Nakba mediated output, the divergent historic media landscapes in these areas meant that the creation of a media *for* and *by* Palestinians constituted different degrees of change.[911] Reflecting the disparate historical and political circumstances, the emergence of an independent Palestinian media in the West Bank and East Jerusalem has meant that the Palestinian press, in coherence with what Denis McQuail defines as the developmental media model, has become a means of expressing "national problems" and "nationalist goals."[912] As such, while Nakba media output primarily constitutes an interpretative framework for contemporary grievances held by the Palestinian minority inside the 1948 borders, which include a failure to teach the Palestinian

[911] Dan Caspi and Nelly Elias, "Don't patronize me: media-*by* and media *for* minorities," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 34:1 (2011): 62-82.

[912] The developmental model is found chiefly in developing countries, particularly in new states in Africa, South America and Southeast Asia created after the Second World War. According to this model, the media are expected to facilitate the advancement of declared national goals, with most emphasis being placed on unifying the nation and promoting social integration. Denis McQuail, *Mass communication theory* (London: Sage Publications, 2000), 155.

narrative of the 1948 War in schoolbooks and, since 2011, legalized efforts by the Israeli majority to thwart Nakba commemoration, it is in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that the Nakba has become an all-encompassing metaphor. Representative of the Nakba as a present continuous, mediated Nakba output here urges for the undoing of the Nakba by calling for the implementation of the right of return and, simultaneously, demanding the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. Moreover, the Nakba, emblematic of a collective watershed, has been instrumentalized as a rallying point in times of inter-territorial political tensions between Hamas and Fatah in order to demonstrate societal and political unity, all the while pointing at the same common culprit: Israel.

The concentration on the mediated presentation of an ongoing Nakba as a direct result of Israeli actions rests on the theoretical concept of a defensive victimhood narrative, previously laid out in chapter three. As such, rather than simply being emblematic of a retaliatory *quid pro quo* based on Israeli attempts to prevent invocation of the Nakba, the subversion of the Holocaust — identified in the mediated convergence of the Holocaust and the Nakba — occurs as a result of its discursive incompatibility with the Palestinian narrative. Portrayed as the enemy's foundational past that has been continuously instrumentalized to drive the Zionist project and, in the process, inflict persistent Palestinian suffering, any full acknowledgement of the Holocaust is thus repudiated as it is deemed to inherently entail a negation of the Palestinian watershed and its contemporary manifestations.[913]

## The Historic Palestinian Media Landscape

Palestinian press' development following the 1948 War, to a large extent, has been dictated by the vicissitudes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, shifting from a wholly repressed medium

[913] Rotberg, "Building," 3.

under the various ruling authorities to a mobilized mode of expression for and on behalf of the Palestinians in the wake of the First Intifada and the Oslo Accords. Yet, the liberation of the Palestinian press "from the shackles of the [Israeli] establishment"[914] came forth from vastly different media environments on both sides of the Green Line, reflecting the disparate political circumstances and the dynamics of the relationship between the Israeli state and the respective Palestinian communities. As the chapter below will illustrate, the media models installed by the Israeli state and the Israeli military government subsequent to the 1948 War inside Israel and the Six-Day War in the West Bank were to be formative frameworks for post-1994 Palestinian media, this time, however, mirroring Palestinian communities' own engagement with the Israeli hegemony.

Demonstrative of the societal and political aftermath of the 1948 War, inside the 1948 borders an integrationist media model was developed by the Israeli victorious majority for the Palestinian vanquished minority of approximately 156,000, creating what Dan Caspi and Mustafa Kabaha succinctly term a 'media-for' model. The production of Arabic media by the Israeli establishment, which included the Israeli government, various Zionist political parties and the Israeli communist party in its various reincarnations, was meant to serve as a medium through which the Jewish majority could communicate with the minority, while simultaneously reducing the objections of the minority to the national goals of the majority and diminishing the realization of Palestinian national ambitions.[915] In *al-Yawm* [Ar. the day] (1948-1966), a newspaper affiliated with the ruling party Mapai and its satellites in return for generous

[914] Caspi and Kabaha, *Palestinian,* 15.
[915] This media was also designed for Jewish immigrants from Muslim countries. Thus, *al-Waṭan* [Ar. the homeland], appeared on behalf of Mapai (1952-3) and was directed mainly at new immigrants from Arabic-speaking countries. Arabic newspapers such as *al-Waṭan* suffered from a short lifespan if only because they were perceived as an exigency, stemming from the need to communicate with new immigrants from Arabic-speaking countries in their own language, "the language of the enemy." Adoni, Caspi and Cohen, *Media,* 60.

(financial) support, the Israeli state was therefore presented in a positive light, as indicated in the writings of Wafi'a Iqdays. In June 1950, Iqdays informed his readers that "the benefits and the fruits of Israeli democracy" meant that "anyone who claims that the situation has not taken a turn for the good since the end of the fighting probably suffers from the 'malady of exaggeration'."[916]

Although the termination of the military government in 1966 led to increased freedom of movement among Palestinian journalists and, consequently, access to their target population, the amalgamation of previously installed legalized modes of censorship and the incorporation of the newly occupied territories meant that a media *for* and *by* Palestinians remained elusive. Fueled by a heightened climate of suspicion resulting from exposure to East Jerusalem and West Bank newspapers, previous adoption of the British Ordinance of 1933 and the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 by the Ministry of Interior in 1948 enabled close surveillance of Arabic press produced by Palestinians.[917] Content related to the conflict, the coverage of settlements, land expropriation and discrimination towards the Palestinian population, both in the occupied territories and inside Israel, were particularly subject to scrutiny by censors, leading Palestinian journalists to engage in self-censorship to avoid attracting warnings or suspensions. Moreover, notwithstanding the emergence of a (censored) Palestinian media-by model, including in communist outlets such as *al-Jadīd* [Ar. the new], the continued dependence on political funding and the partisan nature of Arabic newspapers led to a dearth in Palestinian readership. As a result, between 1967 and 1983, circulation numbers remained largely similar to the first period, with the most popular daily newspaper, *al-Ānbā'* [Ar. the news], a mouthpiece for Israeli government policies, only reaching a circulation of approximately 4-6,000 despite distribution on

[916] Caspi and Kabaha, *Palestinian,* 79/80.
[917] The 1933 Ordinance empowered the Israeli government to shut down a newspaper if it was deemed detrimental to public interest, while Regulation 95 of the Defense Regulations enabled the administration to refuse to grant a license for the publication of a newspaper without giving any reason for its decision. Soffer, *Mass*, 40, 41.

both sides of the Green Line and a rising literacy rate.[918]

In contrast to the media landscape inside the 1948 borders, a popular Palestinian press did emerge in East Jerusalem and the West Bank in the wake of the 1967 War, albeit under heavy restrictions imposed by the Israeli state. In addition to the media-for model, namely a media wholly owned and managed by the Israeli military regime, a Palestinian press came forth out of the merger of West Bank newspapers and the forced move to Amman in March 1967 under King Hussein bin Talal. *Al-Quds*, representing the merging of *al-Difā*' [Ar. the defense] and *al-Jihād* [Ar. the (inner) struggle or holy war], became the first 'independent' daily to obtain publication rights from the Israeli military government and, despite its initial pro-Jordanian stance, became the most popular publication in the territories.[919] Yet, as was the case for Palestinian media in Israel, a fully independent press in the newly occupied territories remained absent. Similarly to their predecessors, the Jordanians and the British, the Israelis applied legal means to subdue any mediated Palestinian (and Arab) nationalism in annexed East Jerusalem and the occupied West Bank, including by censoring any criticism of the Israeli occupation and thwarting usage of the media as a medium for political mobilization. The issuing of military orders together with the adoption of the above-mentioned British press regulations meant that Palestinian publications in the territories operated under more severe constraints than those published inside the 1948 borders.[920] As such, the system of external prior censorship in coherence with the 1945 Emergency Regulations was bolstered by military orders issued from 1967 onwards which forbid the publication of anything that according to the military court was deemed of "political

[918] Amal Jamal, "Mechanisms of Governmentality and Constructing Hollow Citizenship: Arab Palestinians in Israel," in *Israel and its Palestinian Citizens: Ethnic Privileges in the Jewish State*, ed. Nadim N. Rouhana and Sahar S. Huneidi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 176, 177; Caspi and Kabaha, *Palestinian*, 145.
[919] Orayb Najjar, "Power and the Palestinian Press: Israeli Censorship on the West Bank, 1967-1991," (PhD diss., Indiana University, 1992), 95, 96; Article 19, *Journalism under occupation Israel's regulation of the Palestinian press* (New York: Committee to Protect Journalists, 1988), 24, 25.
[920] Wael Abdelal, *Hamas and the Media: Politics and Strategy* (London: Routledge, 2016), 34; Najjar, "Power," 87.

significance" and "prejudicial to the defense of [the state] or to the public safety or to public order."[921]

News items of political significance were not limited to material that incited violence or hatred or civil disorder, as claimed by the Israeli authorities. Instead, in his 1983 work Benvenisti noted that censors' primary concern was "to eradicate expression that could foster Palestinian nationalist feelings, or that suggest[ed] that Palestinians are a nation with a national heritage," including by excluding text containing the word 'Palestine'.[922] Moreover, it was because of Israeli authorities' tendency to view Palestinian publications as propaganda organs rather than vehicles of news that one Palestinian journalist concluded in 1986 that Israel's censorship measures were designed to "censor our heritage, our history, and our culture, in order to deprive us of our Palestinian consciousness."[923] Indeed, contemporary reports on censored content by human rights organizations indicate that, in addition to words such as suffering, colonialism, Jewish gangs, and Zionism, words that had taken on a symbolically-loaded meaning were targeted for censorship, such as *kifāḥ* [Ar. struggle], *ṣumūd* [Ar. steadfastness] and '*awdah* [Ar. return].[924]

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[921] Khalil Rinnawi and Hillel Nossek differentiate between three different modes of censorship: I) the external mode, which refers to censorship implemented through written laws, regulations or other legal and formal tools; II) the consensual mode, which concerns various permanent or ad hoc agreements and arrangements between government or other bodies and the media, and whose aim is to prevent the publication of damaging material without needing to resort to legal means and without imposing the burden of responsibility solely on the media, and III) the self-internal mode, referring to the form of voluntarily applied censorship that the media impose on themselves. It is clear that in this case the external mode was applied. Hillel Nossek and Khalil Rinnawi, "Censorship and Freedom of the Press Under Changing Political Regimes: Palestinian Media from Israeli Occupation to the Palestinian Authority," *Gazette* 65 (2003): 184.

[922] After the 1967 War, the Israeli military government in Nablus informed all printers in the city that it was forbidden to print any text containing the word 'Palestine', regardless of the text's content. Najjar, "Power," 274/5; Meron Benvenisti, *Israeli Censorship on Arab Publication* (New York: Fund for Free Expression, 1983), 1.

[923] Benvenisti, *Israeli,* 44; Radwan Abu Ayyash, Head of the Arab Journalists' Association in the occupied territories, quoted by Ori Nir in *Haaretz*, August 29, 1986.

[924] Najjar, "Power," 170. For further information on censorship in action, see: Article 19, *Cry for Change: Israeli Censorship in the Occupied Territories* (London: Library Association Publishing, 1992); B'Tselem, *Censorship of the Palestinian press in East Jerusalem* (B'Tselem, 1990), 17-26; Article 19, *Journalism*.

## The Emergence of a Mobilized Palestinian Press

The existence of censorship practices in the post-1967 era in East Jerusalem and the West Bank proved formative for the conception of media as a potential mobilization medium on behalf of the Palestinians, which was to be practically realized following the Oslo Accords. Palestinian journalists living under previous Israeli censorship noted that, in theory, it was the task of journalists "to mobilize the masses against the occupation and the escalation of national activities in that struggle."[925] Yet, it was not merely the systematic prevention of a mediated resistance under Israel's military government that informed the emergence of a mobilized media under the PA. With the 1980 amendment of the Tamir Law, any material deemed to support terrorist organizations was made punishable by a prison term of up to three years or a fine or both; consequently, any mediated mention of the PLO, considered a terrorist organization under Israeli law until 1993, was curtailed.[926] For *Al-Quds,* a newspaper located in annexed East Jerusalem and therefore jurisdictionally part of the state of Israel, the Tamir Law meant that the publication's pro-PLO stance following the cessation of talks between Arafat and King Hussein in February 1986 and Israeli officials' accusation of *Al-Quds* accepting money from the PLO went hand in hand with a mass clampdown on the newspaper,[927] only to be aggravated during the First Intifada, when any material that could be interpreted as implicitly supporting the PLO became subject to censorship. As such, the newspaper's explicit support of the PA following the

[925] Amahl Bishara, "New Media and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Assembling Media Worlds and Cultivating Networks of Care," *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication* 3:1 (2010): 67; Benvenisti, *Israeli,* 38-9.

[926] The 1980 amendment of the 1948 'Prevention of Terrorism Act', known as the Tamir Law, made it a criminal offense for anyone to "publish, in writing or orally, words of praise or sympathy for, or an appeal for aid or support of, a terrorist organization." While not explicitly defined, the amendment, Orayb Najjar contends, was aimed at the PLO and any publication using PLO discourse. In 1986, the Israeli government passed another amendment, making it illegal to contact officials of "terrorist organizations." Najjar, "Power," 146.

[927] In addition to censoring texts written by authority figures and the periodical suspension of distribution permits, *Al-Quds'* editors were placed under administrative detention or given deportation orders. Najjar, "Power," 163.

Oslo Accords,[928] part and parcel of Nakba media output, formed the realization of a mediated collective political engagement and consciousness which had previously been thwarted.

Research conducted on the emergence of an independent Palestinian press inside the 1948 borders in the mid-80s suggests that financial motivations proved decisive in the development of a media *for* and *by* the Palestinian minority. Hanna Adoni, Dan Caspi and Akiva Cohen argue that the rise of privately-owned newspapers resulted from the uncovering of substantial advertising potential among Palestinians, thereby immunizing newspapers from the effects of political subsidies and pressure.[929] Yet, while the discovery of new economic opportunities might have enabled the establishment of Palestinian commercial newspapers, including *Kul al-Arab* in 1987, their resonance among readers should be considered in the contemporary political climate and in the context of what Margaret Gibson and John Ogbu term "an involuntary minority."[930] Thus, the Palestinian public's withdrawal from the Israeli public sphere in the late 1980s, resulting from the experienced marginalization of Palestinian affairs, bolstered cultural autonomy, because as the poet Samih al-Qasim and editor of *Kul al-Arab* stated in 1993: "We don't want a Berlin wall between Arabs and Jews. But it is natural that we would want to feel more comfortable with our language, with our culture, with our spiritual needs. We want our own theater, which doesn't exist now. We need to rebuild ourselves. We have been in a siege since 1948. We are unknown. For decades, nobody has heard about us."[931]

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[928] In this context, it is worth noting that Saeb Erekat, a key Fatah leader and deputy head of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid conference, served on the editorial board of *Al-Quds* from 1982-1994.

[929] Readers' appreciation of the newly founded commercial press was clearly articulated. Thus, while the organ of the communist party al-Ittiḥād retained its four-digit circulation, weekly circulation of *Kul al-Arab* in the late 1980s ranged from 30,000 to 35,000 copies. Adoni, Caspi and Cohen, *Media,* 62.

[930] Margaret Gibson and John U. Ogbu, *Minority status and schooling; a comparative study of immigrant and involuntary minorities* (New York; London: Garland Publishing, 1991).

[931] Samih al-Qasim cited in the New York Times. Clyde Haberman, "Israeli Arabs Say P.L.O. Pact Is a Path to First-Class Status," *New York Times,* November 24, 1993, accessed August 16, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/24/world/israeli-arabs-say-plo-pact-is-a-path-to-first-class-status.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1.

The need for a creation of what Amal Jamal describes as "a counterhegemonic public space" was reinforced in the wake of the outbreak of the First Intifada which brought about a surge in Palestinian identity at the expense of a hybrid identity, in part, Jamal claims, as a result of new Arabic publications demonstrating unsurprising empathy with the Palestinian side.[932] Despite a continued dependence on (Israeli-Jewish) advertising firms, for the first time, Palestinian media, located in the eye of the storm of the Arab-Israeli conflict, could express the unique circumstances of the Palestinian population in Israel and respond to cultural and political events in relation to their past, including, as will become evident below, by portraying the Nakba as an ongoing event that contextualizes relations with the dominant majority.[933]

## Exposing the Nakba as a Historical Event: A Land With a People

Five years after the Declaration of Principles and two years prior to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Palestinians in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Israel commemorated the 50th anniversary of the Nakba. Mirroring the collective preoccupation with the past, Palestinian media partook in what can be identified as the first mediated Nakba 'anniversarial event', with Nakba output surfacing in the weeks and months preceding what was to become Nakba Day.

Wadiah Awadah, a former journalist at *Kul al-Arab* responsible for the consistent publication of refugees' narratives in the lead-up to the 50th anniversary, maintains that the increased media output prior to the anniversary was indicative of the heightened interest among readers in the Nakba on its upcoming 50th anniversary.[934] Nevertheless, the absence of a formal Nakba Memorial Day prior to Arafat's inauguration of Nakba Day on May 15, 1998, discussed in

[932] Jamal, *Arab*, 1, 4, 5; Adoni, Caspi and Cohen, Media, 62, 163.
[933] Jamal, *Arab*, 1.
[934] Interview conducted with Wadiah Awadah on July 13 and 15, 2016. The collection of these narratives was published in the following book: Wadiah Awadah, *Memory that does not die: Eyewitness open their hearts to talk about what happened to them in 1948 – the year of the Nakba* (Haifa: ADRID, 2000) [in Arabic].

chapter three, should not be discounted, both in the mediated run-up to the anniversary and on the designated anniversary itself. As such, while 'official' coverage of Nakba Day took place in *Al-Quds* and *Kul al-Arab* on May 15 in line with historic commemoration practices, *al-Hayat al-Jadida*, in anticipation of Arafat's decision, offered Nakba Day mediation on May 14, the anniversary of Israel's founding in 1948.

The novelty of Nakba media output on the occasion of the 50th anniversary is evidenced by both the placement of Nakba media output and the sheer amount of articles dedicated to the topic. In contrast to previous years, the examined newspapers' front pages on Nakba Day reminded readers of the momentous commemorative events taking place, creating, in the words of Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, a 'suspended mediation'.[935] Moreover, in weeks preceding the 1998 anniversary and on the anniversary itself, Palestinian media on both sides of the Green Line provided readers with an historical overview of the displacement that took place in 1948 with the aim of revealing Israel's "complete web of lies and rumors and historical falsities of a land without a people for a people without a land"[936] and, perhaps most importantly, exposing "the forgery of the Zionist claim that the Palestinian refugees left willingly following calls by their own leaders."[937] Individual refugee stories deemed representative of the expulsion of the "more than 750,000"[938] Palestinians and of the 40,000 internally-displaced "present absentees" at the hands of the "Zionist gangs" thus not only laid claim to the pre-1948 cultural and physical landscape, but also testified to the ongoing ramifications of a forced displacement in line with the political landscape created in the aftermath of the 1948 War.[939] Demonstrative of the

[935] Dayan and Katz, *Media,* 5.
[936] Ahmad Qariya, "Lessons of the 50th anniversary and options for the future," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 12, 1998, 5.
[937] Hussein Suweitee, "The expellees," *Kul al-Arab,* May 15, 1998, 2,3.
[938] Mohammed al-Rahmihi, "The main challenges after 50 years of Nakba," *Al-Quds,* May 2, 1998, 15.
[939] Suweitee, "Expellees," 2,3.

readership's *cadres sociaux*, *Kul al-Arab* disclosed internal refugees' stories while *Al-Quds* concentrated on the plight of those living in refugee camps in the West Bank.[940]

The 50th anniversary of the Nakba in 1998, as the first mass mediated anniversarial event, also constituted a formative framework for Nakba Day mediation in subsequent years, during which newspapers have simultaneously acted as active participants in Nakba mnemonics and as 'commemorative mobilization agents'.[941] In addition to giving prominence to the anniversary of the Nakba on their front pages, since 1998, the newspapers under review have offered what can be termed 'commemorative prompts', reminding their readers in content and in graphics of the year of the anniversary and calling upon them to participate in commemorative marches and festivals or, as *Kul al-Arab* put it in 1998, to "answer the call of the national and humanistic obligation to commemorate the Nakba memory and to revive the national memory and to assure the continuation of the struggle in a popular rally."[942]

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[940] For the adoption of this model in ensuing years, see: Samih al-Qasim, "1948...The storm talks...basil hushes," *Kul al-Arab,* May 15, 1998, 4, 5; Wadiah Awadah, "Jaffa that was," *Kul al-Arab,* May 15, 1998, 10, 11 (on internal refugees' fate). For examples of stories invoking West Bank refugees, see: Anonymous, "The march and the meaning," *Al-Quds,* May 14, 1998, 13; Rumur Sharur, "Abu al-Adeen al-Damouni refuses [giving up] the name of [his original] village," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2000, 7; AFP, "Dheisheh refugees commemorate the Nakba in the villages from which they were expelled," *Al-Quds,* May 18. 2000, 7; Anonymous, "The 66th anniversary of the Nakba and the bitterness of genocide and displacement," *al-Hayat al-Jadida*, May 14, 2014, 14; Abdul Rahman Yunis, "The refugee Mrs. al-Lahham: If we had known we would become refugees, we would not have left our villages," *Al-Quds Online,* May 18, 2016, accessed April 19, 2017, http://www.alquds.com/articles/146355753444634 /0200/.


[941] The pre-1998 commemorative mediated exceptions include: Anonymous, "Today the anniversary of the 15th of May," *Al-Quds,* May 15, 1996, front page; Hafez al-Barghouti, "Our life," *Al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 14, 1997, 20; Hassan al-Kashif, "Remembering," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 14, 1997, 20.

[942] See: Anonymous, "On the 50th anniversary of the Nakba," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 14, 1998, front page; Hussein Suweitee, "50 years since the Nakba, 50 years of struggle," *Kul al-Arab*, May 15, 1998, front page; Wafa, "In order for our people and the world not to forget the Palestinian Nakba," *Al-Quds,* May 15, 1998, front page.

*Figure 6.1. The Nakba as a mediated commemoration*




"50 years of the Palestinian Nakba,"
*Kul al-Arab*, May 15, 1998



*Al-Quds,* May 15, 1998

"Let's participate in the March of the Millions," *Al-Hayat al-Jadida*, May 13, 1998






On the 60th anniversary of the Nakba. General strikes among Arab student groups create high tensions in the country's universities. *Kul al-Arab*, May 16, 2008




"68 years of the Nakba," *Al-Quds Online,* May 15, 2016



مواطنون يتجمعون حول «64 عاما» كتبت بالشموع في رام الله استعدادا لاحياء ذكرى النكبة. (رويترز)

"Citizens gather around the '64 years' candles in Ramallah in preparation for the commemoration of the Nakba." *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2012

A further textual commemorative reminder which finds its origin in 1998 is the placement of official political statements in Nakba anniversary issues, which in 1998 not only set out the legislative council's roadmap for the reversal of the Nakba "in spite of entering the peace process," but also called on the "masses to commemorate the anniversary of the Nakba extensively and […] to participate in the Palestinian March of the Millions."[943] In coherence with the political landscape in the West Bank (and indeed Gaza), these official statements, typically only published in *Al-Quds* and *al-Hayat al-Jadida*,[944] have moved from representing the legislative council, virtually defunct since 2006, to incorporating the announcements of various political parties and semi-political commemorative agencies.[945] Following the split between Hamas and Fatah, official announcements by the Fatah-backed PLO, the Higher Committee for Nakba Commemoration and the PLO's Refugee Department, calling upon "you in the homeland to take part as participants with us in a central rally and return festival today," were firmly situated within the political framework approved by the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.[946] Juxtaposing Hamas' "prolonging of division and preservation of

[943] Anonymous, "Announcement by the legislative council on the 50th anniversary of the Nakba" *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 13, 1998, 2.
[944] It is worth noting that *Kul al-Arab* has placed commemorative reminders by the High Follow-Up Committee, an extra-parliamentary organization that represents Palestinian citizens of Israel. For an example, see: Anonymous, "The High Follow-up Committee calls for wide participation in Nakba commemoration activities and the March of Return," *Kul al-Arab Online,* May 10, 2016, accessed August 17, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/746379.
[945] These include political parties which are part of the PLO's umbrella organization, such as the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP*)*, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP*),* and the Palestinian People's Party (PPP), in addition to the Palestinian Prisoners Club, the Union of Farmers and Agricultural Collectives, and the National Committee for the Commemoration of the Nakba. For examples, see: Anonymous, "Call upon our people to commemorate the 52nd Nakba anniversary," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 13, 2000, front page; Lama Qandeel, "The national commemoration committee for the commemoration of the Nakba of 60th anniversary announces its program in the country and the diaspora," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* April 14, 2008, 9; Anonymous, "On the 62nd anniversary of the Nakba we stick to the land and there is no alternative to return. Announcement by the PLO, the Higher Committee for Nakba Commemoration, Refugee Affairs Department," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 14, 2010, 12; Anonymous, "The president on the anniversary of the Nakba: Palestinians do not forget….and will not forget," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2016, front page. Anonymous, "The national committee for the commemoration of the Nakba calls for broad participation in Nakba activities," *Al-Quds Online,* May 14, 2016, accessed April 19, 2017, http://www.alquds.com/articles/1463231183412484000/.
[946] Jonathan Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 26.

partisan interests [at] the expense of the supreme interests of our people and their national cause" with the PLO's commitment to "national unity," the anniversary of the Nakba thus became a political opportunity to garner support among those who believed in "the rights of our Palestinian people."[947]

## Preserving the Past for Future Generations: The Media as a Prospective Memory Realm

Although the above-mentioned commemorative prompts might point to a contemporary mnemonic preoccupation, media exposure to the anniversarial events of the Nakba is also considered a means of conveying the past to present and future generations in order to ensure knowledge of the past. Calls to transmit the Nakba to future generations have been identified from 1995 onwards, which emphasize external familial transmission alongside the media as a 'prospective' memory realm. The earliest materialization of the first can be found in *Al-Quds*' issue of 10 April 1995. Here, readers are not only exposed to a reportage of the commemorative festival conducted on the 48th anniversary of the Deir Yassin massacre (9 April), but also to an explicit call by the contemporary governor of Ramallah and al-Bireh, Mustafa Aysha Abu Firaz, addressed to a "group of Deir Yassin scouts," the "grandchildren of the strugglers" to become "the soldiers of the homeland [and] to remember with utmost emotion several of the homeland's martyrs who with their blood gave water to the soil."[948] Two years later, in 1997, *al-Hayat al-Jadida* dedicated two editorials to the media's role as a formative realm of transmission. Criticizing the media's own previous neglect of the Nakba and its anniversary, editorials by Hassan al-Kashif and Hafez al-Barghouti maintained the media's responsibility to address the

[947] Anonymous, "The PLO on the anniversary of the Nakba: The struggle for freedom and independence continues," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2012, 6.
[948] Khalid Amar, "A festival in Ramallah commemorates the anniversary of the Deir Yassin massacre," *Al-Quds*, April 10, 1995, 2.

Nakba in the public sphere to "commemorate it and educate the youth on what happened and its significance,"[949] even if "the burden of memories abolishes the pleasures of life."[950] When questioned about the timing of these editorials in the PA's mouthpiece, Omar Hilmi al-Ghoul, a columnist for *al-Hayat al-Jadida* and former chief political advisor to the Prime Minister of Palestine, Salam Fayyad (2007-2013), emphasized the political transition in the wake of the Oslo Accords. Al-Ghoul contended that following the establishment of an independent Palestinian media, the duty to transmit the Nakba was amplified, because, as Al-Ghoul stated, "I, like other officials, am responsible for expressing the interests of my people […] our heritage, culture and national identity cannot be forgotten."[951]

Beyond the effects of the Oslo Accords on media's role as a 'prospective memory agent', the lingering mortality of first-generation Nakba eyewitnesses, inferred in al-Kashif's article, should not to be neglected.[952] Indeed, for Awadah, the increased attention given to the Nakba from the mid-90s onwards also spurred from the realization that transferring stories of the Nakba to future generations was pertinent, as "eyewitnesses of the Nakba might die without sharing their stories."[953] In order to "forge a Palestinian identity and record history," Awadah "started collecting stories about the Nakba and the time before the Nakba so that our narrative will

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[949] Hassan al-Kashif, "Remembering," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 14, 1997, 20.
[950] Hafez al-Barghouti, "Our life," *Al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 14, 1997, 20. For calls on the media to expose the public to the Nakba see: Nanal Musa, "The committee for commemoration of the Nakba calls on the international community to take responsibility," *Al-Hayat al-Jadida*, May 14, 2005, 4; Ibrahim Alama, "The memory of the pride of the past….celebration of the future: A conversation with Samih al-Qasim," *Al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2008, 8 (supplement on the Nakba); Nufud al-Bakri, "Sticking to the right of return based on international resolutions and activating diplomatic, media and academic works to address the refugee issue," *Al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2012, 6; Anonymous, "Extensive preparations in all of the governorates of the homeland for the commemoration of the Nakba tomorrow," *Al-Quds,* May 14, 2001, 5.
[951] Interview conducted with Omar Hilmi al-Ghoul on August 15 and 16, 2016 via email.
[952] Al-Kashif wrote that the passing of "grandparents [as] the best, most honest and most convincing storytellers [who] etched the entire story in the memory of the descendants" meant that "it is the duty of all media devices [including] newspapers" to "evoke [the Nakba] until its memory becomes a collective and unified one of the people." Hassan al-Kashif, "Remembering," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 14, 1997, 20.
[953] Interview conducted with Wadiah Awadah on July 13 and 15, 2016. Awadah, in his own words, belongs to a family where the Nakba had a profound impact as his grandfather was displaced to Jordan.

remain alive [and] so that the new generation would know what happened during the Nakba."[954] Yet, while the media's self-proclaimed role as an agent of Nakba transmission can be found explicitly in editorials in the lead-up to the 50th anniversary and implicitly in reportages on the 50th anniversary itself, calls for Nakba generational transmission have most consistently appeared from the mid-2000s onwards, in editorials calling for extra-media educational and commemorative initiatives and through the collection and transmission of refugees' testimonies.[955] Indicative of the decreased life expectancy of the remaining first-generation Nakba eyewitnesses,[956] refugees representing the *jīl al-Nakbah* [Ar. the Nakba generation][957] have thus been commanded to pass on the stories to "the grandchildren," the *jīl Awslū* [Ar. the Oslo generation], "[to] refute the statement made by the founders of the Jewish state that the adults will die and the children will forget."[958]

[954] The ability to focus on the Nakba extensively, as Awadah admits, also resulted from the interests of the contemporary editor, al-Qasim, for whom the Nakba constituted his "first images," and, perhaps most importantly, the positive feedback from readers "who seemed to really appreciate writings on the Nakba, as until then they had only encountered the Israeli narrative of the 1948 War in public settings." Interview conducted with Wadiah Awadah on July 13 and 15, 2016; Mahmoud Darwish, Samih al-Qasim and Abdullah Udhari, *Victims of a map: A bilingual anthology of Arabic poetry* (London: Saqi, 2005), 50; Caspi and Kabaha, *Palestinian*, 119.
[955] For editorials calling for educational transmission of the Nakba see: Anonymous, "Towards a better awareness on the anniversary of the Nakba," *Al-Quds Online,* April 21, 2015, accessed April 19, 2017, http://www.alquds.com/articles/1429595927270852900/. For commemorative activities for children, see: Anonymous, "The cultural forum center in Bidu village organizes a massive rally in commemoration of the Nakba," *Al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 10, 2008, 5. For calls on Arab and international media sources to participate in efforts to collect testimonies of Palestinian refugees, see: Al-Quds Online, "Ministry of Information: The suffering of our refugees gives evidence of the biggest political crime by Britain and the occupation [Israel]," *Al-Quds Online,* May 15, 2016, accessed April 19, 2017, http://www.alquds.com/articles/1463302629997788600/.
[956] Life expectancy at birth for Palestinians born between 1939-1941 was approximately 47 years. Jacob Metzer, *The Divided Economy for Mandatory Palestine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 45.
[957] Ben-Ze'ev, *Remembering,* 2.
[958] Nader al-Qasir, "Generations that lived through the Nakba are departing and the new generations are holding more firmly to the right of return and the national principles," *Al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2012, 7. For other refugees calling for transgenerational transmission, see: Supplement, *Al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2007, 16; Abdul Rahman Yunis, "The refugee Mrs. al-Lahham: If we had known we would become refugees, we would not have left our villages," *Al-Quds Online,* May 18, 2016, accessed April 19, 2017, http://www.alquds.com/articles/146355753444634 /0200; Muhasin Nassar, Mohammed Wattad and Rallib Qiwan, "General strikes among student groups create high tensions in the country's universities," *Kul al-Arab,* May 16, 2008, 8; Supplement, *Al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2007, 16.

## The Nakba as a present continuous: Nakba mediation inside the 1948 borders

Mediated calls for engagement with Nakba mnemonics reflect the Palestinian communities' particularistic relation with the Israeli state, thereby testifying to the notion that mass media do not act in a vacuum, but rather interact within the historical, cultural and political circumstances of each society, as well as its contemporary interactions with other (dominant) groups.[959] Inside the 1948 borders, Nakba mediated output has consequently simultaneously constituted an interpretative framework, reflecting the Palestinians' minority status, and an analogical tool, exposing the ongoing manifestations of the Nakba resulting from their minority status. Israel's marginalization of the Palestinian narrative in the educational system and attempts to prevent Palestinian commemoration of the Nakba are clear examples of the former, albeit with different temporal manifestations. Whereas the failure to convey the Palestinian conception of the 1948 War to Israeli and Palestinian students can first be identified in 1998, implicitly inferring the contemporary Zionist-critical content of textbooks which largely failed to convey the Palestinian conception of the 1948 War (see chapter one), right-wing organizational thwarting of Nakba commemoration on Israel's Independence Day surfaced ten years later, in 2008.[960] Following the 60th anniversary of the Nakba, *Kul al-Arab*'s front page informed its readers of the clashes that had taken place the previous day at Haifa University when Palestinian students sought to commemorate the Nakba and were confronted by members of Hatikvah [Heb. the hope], a far-right political party established the previous year under the leadership of Ayre Eldad in order to counter Likud's implementation of "the policies of Peace Now" and to expose the Palestinian

[959] Adoni, Caspi and Cohen, *Media,* 5.
[960] Hussein Suweitee, "The expellees," *Kul al-Arab,* May 15, 1998, 2,3. More explicit criticism of the education in the so-called 'Israeli-Arab sector' followed the removal of the word Nakba from textbooks in 2009 which, according to one editorial, was indicative of the "discrimination" suffered by "Israeli Arabs." Anonymous, "Nakba removed from textbooks," *Kul al-Arab*, July 23, 2009, accessed July 10, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/154553.

narrative as "a lie."[961] In addition to exposing attempts by recently-established far-right groups such as Hatikvah and Im Tirtzu (2006) to prevent commemoration, in the wake of the Knesset's 2009 approval of a preliminary Nakba Bill and the subsequent ratification of its amendment in 2011 (see chapter one), Nakba mediated output has emphasized collective mnemonics in spite of the "racist and dangerous law"[962] which seeks to "ban the commemoration of the Nakba,"[963] leading to "a worsening of [Israeli] denial of the Palestinian Nakba."[964]

Contemporary marginalization is not solely deemed emblematic of Palestinians' present-day status in Israel; rather, it is the foundational event creating this involuntary minority that spawns the conception of the Nakba as an analogy for subsequent marginalization, or a present continuous Nakba. Indeed, anniversarial Nakba mediation in *Kul al-Arab* does not conceive of the Nakba as a past event, but rather as "an ongoing Nakba," since, as one article put it in 2010, *al-Nakbah mā zālāt mustamirah* [Ar. the Nakba does not stop continuing].[965] Apart from emphasizing "racist discrimination and apartheid,"[966] and "the [geopolitical] division of the

[961] Gil Stern Hoffman, "Ayre Eldad to head new secular right party," *Jerusalem Post*, November 20, 2007, accessed July 10, 2017, http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Arye-Eldad-to-head-new-secular-Right-party; Shay Fogelman, "Port in a storm," *Haaretz*, June 3, 2011, accessed July 10, 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/port-in-a-storm-1.365729.
[962] Anonymous, "El-Sanah: Knesset's decision on the first reading of the Nakba law reflects the failure of the Zionist movement," *Kul al-Arab,* March 18, 2010, accessed March 7, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/265751.
[963] Anonymous, "Lieberman proposes to prevent Nakba commemoration," *Kul al-Arab,* May 15, 2009, accessed March 7, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/137997.
[964] Anonymous, "Netanyahu: The revival of what they call the Nakba leads to incitement against Israel," *Kul al-Arab Online,* May 18, 2014, accessed July 11, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/612265.
[965] Anonymous, "Zahalka in a protest rally in occupied Jerusalem: The Judaization of Jerusalem is the biggest Nakba," *Kul al-Arab Online*, May 16, 2010, accessed July 11, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/300474. It should be noted that *Kul al-Arab* also mentions the ongoing hardship of refugee life in Gaza and the West Bank. For recent examples, see: Anonymous, "Archbishop Hanna in Ramallah: The Nakba is the reality in which we live and we will not give up a grain of soil of Palestinian soil," *Kul al-Arab Online,* May 14, 2013, accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/534462; Mustafa Ibrahim, "The children of al-Shati and the Palestinian Nakba," *Kul al-Arab Online,* May 12, 2016, accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/746643.
[966] Walid Thahir, "The Nakba and the dream of return," *Kul al-Arab Online*, May 26, 2013, accessed August 16, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/537058.

Palestinian people into five groups,"[967] materialization of the continuous Nakba is principally found in Israeli land confiscation policies and contemporary Palestinian displacement inside the 1948 borders. Although media dedicated to present-day Palestinian displacement at the hands of the Israelis can be identified from the late 90s onwards,[968] it is only a decade later that it is explicitly placed in the context of an ongoing Nakba, itself an outcome of what is termed the "ongoing Zionist project."[969] Following the concept of a Zionist transfer policy, this project, which is equated with the "Judaization of the land" and "the ethnic cleansing [of Palestinians]," is deemed perceivable in contemporaneous house demolitions "under the pretext of illegal construction," the Judaization of East Jerusalem and the failure to implement UN resolution 194.[970] Indicative of the historical implementation of policies which enable these practices, including the designation of "open landscape areas"[971] in East Jerusalem following the adoption of the 1980 Basic Law,[972] materializations of the ongoing Nakba are identified year-on-year, albeit in a contemporary context.[973] In 2012, a *Kul al-Arab* article invoking a speech by the party

[967] These five groups are: The Palestinians of Jerusalem, the Palestinians inside Israel, the Palestinians in the West Bank, the Palestinians in Gaza, and the Palestinians in the diaspora. Ali Heidar, "Ongoing Nakba," *Kul al-Arab Online,* May 14, 2013, accessed July 11, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/534410.
[968] Suweitee, "Expellees."
[969] Abdul Anbatawi, "On the anniversary of the Nakba: The disaster continues in [our] existence and awareness," *Kul al-Arab Online,* May 18, 2013, accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/535363. Also see: Farid Hassan, "67 years of the Nakba," *Kul al-Arab Online,* May 16, 2015, accessed July 11, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/680650.
[970] Ahmed Natour, "The Nakba continues," *Kul al-Arab Online,* May 2, 2015, accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/677910.
[971] In these open landscape areas, which constitute 40 percent of East Jerusalem, building is forbidden. According to B'Tselem, a human rights organization, the Jerusalem Municipality enforces the building laws on Palestinians much more stringently than on the Jewish population, even though the number of violations is much higher in the Jewish neighborhoods. B'Tselem, *Discrimination in Planning, Building, and Land Expropriation* (B'Tselem, 2011); Eyal Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 205.
[972] In 1980, the Knesset adopted the Basic Law, declaring Jerusalem the capital of Israel and merged East Jerusalem with West Jerusalem. The UN Security Council declared the law a violation of international law. John B. Quigley, *The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective* (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2005), 172.
[973] For examples of articles discussing contemporary Nakba manifestations, see: Abu Wahib, "The Nakba continues," *Kul al-Arab Online,* April 18, 2013, accessed July 11, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/528196; Anonymous, "The Naqab foundation: The crime of demolition in Atir, a new Nakba on the anniversary of the Nakba," *Kul al-Arab Online,* May 16, 2013, accessed July 11, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/534910 (on Palestinian Bedouin displacement in the Negev).

leader of Balad [Ar. country or land], MK Jamal Zahalka, noted that "Israel continues the war it began in 1948 [which sought] to plunder the land of the homeland" with reference to a "series of racist confiscation laws [recently] passed by the Knesset under the Netanyahu government,"[974] while a year later a report on the displacement of 14,000 (Bedouin) Palestinians and the destruction of 2,000 homes in the Negev was considered an indication of "ongoing Israeli policies [aimed] at uprooting Palestinians from their land to this day."[975]

## Mobilizing the Past: Nakba Mediation in East Jerusalem and the West Bank

Beyond conceiving of the Nakba as an interpretative framework, emblematic of today's occupied and annexed state, Nakba anniversarial mediation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem has taken on a retrospective analogical role to illustrate the occupied/annexed fate of the Palestinian majority in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.[976] Analogies in the West Bank and East Jerusalem concerning present manifestations of the Nakba pertain both to the present and the past. With regard to the latter, this means that, at times, the other's past has been employed as a comparative means to denote the depths of Palestinian suffering and to reveal the Israeli state

[974] Anonymous, "Zahalka: During the Nakba Israel occupied the land with weapons and today [Israel does it] by legal measures," *Kul al-Arab Online,* May 27, 2012, accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/461097. These laws include the Admissions Committee Law (2011) and the Israel Land Administration Law (2009). The latter allows land owned by the Palestinian refugees and internally-displaced persons to be sold off to private investors and placed beyond future restitution claims. The former requires anyone seeking to move to any community in the Negev and Galilee regions with fewer than 400 families to obtain approval from committees consisting of town residents, a member of the Jewish Agency or the World Zionist Organization, and several others. The law empowers these committees to reject candidates who, among other things, "are not suitable to the community's way of life" or "might harm the community's fabric." Adalah, *New Discriminatory Laws and Bills in Israel* (June 2011), 3-5.

[975] Anonymous, "From al-Araqib to Susiya: A short documentary on the anniversary of the Nakba calls for justice," *Kul al-Arab Online*, May 15, 2013, accessed March 7, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/534646.

[976] In 2009, while the Palestinian population was estimated to be 275,900, the Israeli settler population of East Jerusalem was approximately 198,000. A year earlier, the West Bank settler population stood at 285,800 settlers, making up 14 percent of the Palestinian population (2,016,786 in 2008 in the West Bank). Michael Dumper, *Jerusalem Unbound: Geography, History, and the Future of the Holy City* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014),143; PCBS, *Estimated Population in the Palestinian Territory Mid-Year by Governorate,1997-2016* (PCBS, 2016); PCBS, *Localities in Jerusalem Governorate by Type of Locality and Population Estimates, 2007-2016* (PCBS, 2016).

as the contemporary embodiment of evil.[977] Al-Ghoul, who continually writes on the "racist Nazism in Israel"[978] and the "fascist existence on Israeli streets"[979] in his columns, has argued that the "Hebrew state regrettably conjures the Holocaust [to install] a more brutal and scummy Holocaust, through occupation, racism and Fascism"[980] which "surpasses Italian Fascism and German Nazism."[981] When questioned about the content of these publications, Al-Ghoul reaffirmed his belief in these statements, maintaining that not only has "the Holocaust been one of the most important levers of the Zionist colonial project [which] was the motive or cover for the creation of an Israeli state [at] the expense of the Arab Palestinians," but Israel has since its establishment been "practicing the Holocaust and the methods of Nazi Germany [as] is reflected in the long series of massacres, killings, wars and murder." Moreover, according to al-Ghoul, "the continued ethnic cleansing of Palestinians and the looting and confiscation of their land [and] the lack of freedom of movement to and from the West Bank" are all "manifestations of the Holocaust."[982]

Yet, while this type of inflammatory material does exist which, while not denying the Holocaust, through the equation of Nazi crimes and Israeli actions is nonetheless aimed at undermining the Holocaust,[983] the Nakba has most often been instrumentalized as a mobilization

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[977] Faisal Abu Khadra, "The Palestinian people will not kneel," *Al-Quds Online,* December 18, 2015, accessed April 19, 2017, http://www.alquds.com/articles/1450420728492938700/.
[978] Omar Hilmi al-Ghoul, "No change to the initiative," *al-Hayat al-Jadida Online,* May 29, 2016, accessed April 20, 2017, http://www.alhaya.ps/ar_page.php?id=15bcd60y22793568Y15bcd60.
[979] Omar Hilmi al-Ghoul, "The circle of Fascism is complete," *al-Hayat al-Jadida Online*, March 31, 2016, accessed April 21, 2017, http://www.alhaya.ps/ar_page.php?id=125e4bby19260603Y125e4bb.
[980] Omar Hilmi al-Ghoul, "Evoking the lessons of the Holocaust," *al-Hayat al-Jadida Online,* May 8, 2015, accessed April 19, 2017, http://www.alhaya.ps/ar_page.php?id=1496aaby21588651Y1496aab.
[981] Omar Hilmi al-Ghoul, "Dancing to the drums of racism," *al-Hayat al-Jadida Online.* December 26, 2015, accessed April 19, 2017, http://www.alhaya.ps/ar_page.php?id=c87891y13138065Yc87891
[982] Interview conducted with Omar Hilmi al-Ghoul on August 15th and 16th, 2016 via email.
[983] Holocaust denial does exist in Palestinian media and has been identified in several articles. Chari Mansour, in a 2001 editorial, questions "the myth of the Holocaust and its exaggeration" by arguing that the number six million "is a deceitful number and a sensational number because the widest of the [gas] chambers would not have been to process even one percent of these numbers." In 1998, various articles denying the Holocaust appeared, including one citing the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Sheikh Ekrima Sa'id Sabri, who maintained that the Holocaust had been

medium. Symbolizing both the emergence of nationalist goals and, through the Nakba's continued presence, a necessary adherence to their objectives in mnemonic activities, Nakba mediation thus has become a primary means of expressing Palestinian national concerns and goals. Chief among these nationalist aims are implementing the right of return, challenging the ongoing Israeli occupation and the illegal dispossession of land earmarked for the Palestinian state in the Oslo Accords and, in addition to this, advancing the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.[984] Contemporary politics seek to contextualize the need for these nationalist objectives — a necessity which is further exemplified by recurrent employment of the symbolically-charged terminology of *tamassuk* [Ar. holding on] and *ṣumū*d [Ar. steadfastness]. As such, amid the Oslo Accords, adherence to the right of return is stressed by opposition parties, as seen in an April 1994 *Al-Quds* interview with the general director of the DFLP, Nayef Hawatmeh. In line with the party's perception of the Oslo Accords as a surrendering of Palestinian rights, the article criticizes the absence of any meaningful discussion concerning the "sacred right of return [which] is fixed according to UN Resolution 194 [1948] and in Resolution 237 [1967]." In order to "restart negotiations and rebuild the [peace] process,"

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exaggerated by Israel to gain international support. In another article, Seif Ali al-Jarwan, noted that "The persecution of the Jews is a deceitful myth [which] they still use and still benefit from." The equation of Zionism and Nazism, as undertaken by al-Ghoul, also was not a novel theme. In 1997, *al-Hayat al-Jadida* claimed that the emergence of Zionism "encouraged the rise of terrorist and racist ideologies such as Nazism," and then pointed to the "great similarity" between the two movements as both espouse a belief in their racial superiority. For references to a 'Gaza Strip Holocaust', insinuating the 2008 Cast Lead Operation, see: Anonymous, "On the 62nd Nakba, declarations of the factions assure determination on the right of return," *Al-Quds,* May 15, 2010, 3. Seif Ali al-Jarwan, "The Jews and [their] control of the media," *Al-Hayat al-Jadida*, July 2, 1998; Sheikh Ekrima Sa'id Sabri*, Al-Hayat al-Jadida*, July 2, 1998; Chari Mansour, "Marketing Ashes," *Al-Hayat al-Jadida*, April, 13, 2001, 10; Ahmad Dachbur, "Jew against Jew," *Al-Hayat al-Jadida*, June 24, 2003 (page number unknown). Meir Litvak and Esther Webman, "Perceptions of the Holocaust in Palestinian Public Discourse," *Israel Studies* 8:3 (2003): 129, 131, 136.

[984] For examples, see: Wafa, "In order for our people and the world not to forget the Palestinian Nakba," *Al-Quds,* May 14, 1998, 1, 14; Anonymous, "Extensive preparations in all of the governorates of the homeland for the commemoration of the Nakba tomorrow," *Al-Quds*, May 15, 2001, 5; Anonymous, "On the 62nd anniversary of the Nakba we stick to the land and there is no alternative to return. Announcement by the PLO, the Higher Committee for Nakba Commemoration, Refugee Affairs Department," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 14, 2010, 12; Anonymous, "The national committee for the commemoration of the Nakba calls for broad participation in Nakba activities," *Al-Quds Online,* May 14, 2016, accessed April 19, 2017, http://www.alquds.com/articles/1463231183412484000/.

Hawatmeh therefore calls for a safeguarding of "the return of the displaced without pre-conditions."[985]

While what the Palestinian historian Abdul Latif Tibawi termed an "Arab Zionism,"[986] can be identified in subsequent years, including in pictures of keys as an ever-present reminder of *sana'ūd* [Ar. we will return],[987] explicit criticism of the PLO and, subsequently, the PA's handling of the refugee problem is practically non-existent.[988] Studies conducted on freedom of expression in Palestinian press, including (semi-)independent and wholly-owned outlets by the PA, demonstrate that despite the absence of censorship regulations as existed until 1994, the PA has exercised its own form of control over media institutions.[989] The encouragement of self-censorship through a carrot and stick policy and the existence of overt, external censorship through detaining journalists and withdrawing publication licenses even led a 2000 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) report to claim that the "censorship, intimidation, and arbitrary arrests of Palestinian journalists that marked full-fledged Israeli occupation are now practiced by Palestinian president Yasser Arafat and his coterie."[990] The existence of censorship practices is

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[985] Rashid Hilal, "Nayif Hawatmeh: We move toward holding a national popular conference, return is a sacred right to Palestinians, we reject inter-Palestinian fighting," *Al-Quds,* April 8, 1994, 4. For the DFLP's conception of Oslo, see: Michael Bröning, *Political Parties in Palestine: Leadership and Thought* (New York; Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 177.

[986] Tibawi realized that there is "a striking similarity between present Arab [Palestinian] aspirations and emotions concerning 'the return' and those from which Zionism was born." He called this feeling "New Zionism" that is, "Arab Zionism with the aim of returning to the [Palestinian] homeland." Abdul Latif Tibawi, "The Palestine Arab Refugees in Arabic Poetry and Art." *Middle East Journal* 17:5 (1963): 508, 509.

[987] Sa'di noted that the house key is also considered the last symbol of home and a reminder that before *al-Nakba*, Palestinians had a different life. Sa'di, "Catastrophe," 181.

[988] For an exception, see: Tahir Taseer al-Masri, "The refugees and the right of return," *Al-Quds*, April 10, 1996, 13. Al-Masri argues that the PA should introduce a 'Right of Return' law, which would allow refugees to return to a future Palestinian state.

[989] Bishara, "New," 63-81; Najjar, "1995," 41-103.

[990] Cited in CPJ, *Attacks on the Press 1999: Israel and the Occupied Territories* (CPJ, 2000). In the aftermath of the PA's closing of the PA-critical daily *al-Nahār* [Ar. the afternoon], known for its pro-Jordanian sympathies, on 28 July 1994, just three months after the authority was established, other newspapers, including *Al-Quds*, reduced coverage of opposition parties and dissenting viewpoints in its op-ed pages, leading Nigel Parsons to claim that it "was intimidated into taking a very pro-Arafat, if not pro-Fatah view." When self-censorship has not been successfully implemented, as occurred in 1995, when Mahir al-Alami, an *Al-Quds* editor, failed to comply with a PA request to publish a flattering story and photo of Arafat, the PA resorted to externally-imposed censorship, by

evident in Nakba meditation on the right of return. Although articles published in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords firmly reject "all solutions that do not provide the right of return to four million refugees"[991] and any negotiations and wavering of this "sacred right"[992] based on any "statute of limitations,"[993] the PA's own negotiations on this right are not mentioned. Even in the wake of Al Jazeera's publication of the Palestine Papers (see chapter three), responsibility for "the perpetuating of the Nakba"[994] through the existence of the refugee problem, according to the PA's chief negotiator Saeb Erekat, needs to be firmly placed with Israel and the international community, and his claim of a sole "solution to the refugee issue based on UN resolution 194"[995] goes wholly unchallenged.

detaining al-Alami and temporarily withdrawing *Al-Quds'* publishing license. Nigel Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa* (New York; London: Routledge, 2005), 174, 175.

[991] Wafa, "In order for our people and the world not to forget the Palestinian Nakba," *Al-Quds,* May 14, 1998, 1, 14.


[992] Rashid Hilal, "Nayif Hawatmeh: We move toward holding a national popular conference, return is a sacred right to Palestinians, we reject inter-Palestinian fighting," *Al-Quds,* April 8, 1994, 4.

[993] Atif Abu al-Rab, "Jenin, activities and marches stress the right of return," *Hayat al-Jadida,* May 16, 2001, 6. Also see: Anonymous, "Announcement by the legislative council on the 50th anniversary of the Nakba," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 13, 1998.


[994] Anonymous, "The masses commemorate the 62nd anniversary of the Nakba," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2010, front page.

[995] Anonymous, "On the 62nd Nakba, declarations of the factions assure determination on the right of return," *Al-Quds,* May 15, 2010, 3.


*Figure 6.2. The key and the dream of a return*




*Al-Quds*, May 14, 2001



*al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 14, 2005



*al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 16, 2008



الحاج احمد صافي وزوجته يحملان مفاتيح منزلهما في قرية بيت نبالا التي هجروا منها الى مخيم الجلزون قرب رام اللّه. (تصوير: عصام الريماوي)

*al-Hayat al-Jadida*, May 15, 2012




"Returning to Haifa." *Al-Quds Online,* May 15, 2016




"We will return." *Al-Quds Online,* May 14, 2016

The allusion to the international community alongside Israel, as seen above, should not infer that the international community is deemed equally accountable for the existence and perpetuation of Palestinians' national problems. Indeed, while articles published on Nakba Day note that the anniversary is welcomed as a means of reminding the world "of the historical injustice inflicted upon our people"[996] and to demand "the world's commitment to international law,"[997] it is Israel that is chiefly held responsible for "challenging international laws, regulations, treaties and the will of the international community."[998] Beyond the "continuous occupation" which, according to President Mahmoud Abbas in 2008, characterizes "the

[996] Wafa, "A torchlit march to commemorate the 66th anniversary of the Nakba in Ramallah," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2014, 11.
[997] Anonymous, "On the 62nd Nakba [anniversary], declaration of the factions assures determination on the right of return," *Al-Quds,* May 15, 2010, 3; Anonymous, "The masses commemorate the 62nd anniversary of the Nakba," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2010, front page.
[998] Lama Qandeel, "The national commemoration committee for the commemoration of the Nakba of 60th anniversary announces its program in the country and the diaspora," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* April 14, 2008, 9.

permanent Nakba,"[999] land confiscation is deemed the principal defiance of international law and of "individual and collective [Palestinian] rights."[1000] In response to the maintenance of settlement activity in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in line with Netanyahu's 1997 'Allon Plus Plan'[1001] and the concurrent implementation of a secret plan by the Israeli Civil Administration to dedicate ten percent of the West Bank to further settlements,[1002] annual Nakba mediation since the mid-90s has consistently proclaimed "the destruction of the two-state solution."[1003] Deriving from "Zionist colonial aggression,"[1004] the destruction of the peace process is principally characterized by the "continuation of the settlement policy,"[1005] "the Judaization of East Jerusalem"[1006] and, since 2003, "the racist separation wall."[1007]

In order to confront "these serious challenges [to] our national project and the goals of people [to live] in freedom and independence,"[1008] Nakba mediated output has sought

[999] Anonymous, "The president: It is time for the calamity called the Nakba of the Palestinian people to end," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 18, 2008, front page.
[1000] Atif Abu al-Rab, "Jenin, activities and marches stress the right of return," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 16, 2001, 6.
[1001] Netanyahu's plan, bearing a similar title to the 1967 Allon Plan proposed by former Labor politician Yigal Allon, sought the annexation of 60 percent of the West Bank to Israel "for security reasons" and offered to hand over the remaining 40 percent to the PA. It should be noted that some scholars, such as Dov Waxman, considered this plan evidence of Netanyahu's continuation of the peace process, as "he became the first Likud leader to publicly present a plan that called for an Israeli withdrawal from over half of the West Bank." Dov Waxman, *The Pursuit of Peace and the Crisis of Israeli Identity: Defending/Defining the Nation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 131.
[1002] In the plan, uncovered in 2012, a total of 569 parcels of land were marked out, encompassing around 155,000 acres. Since the late 1990s, 23 unauthorised outposts had been built on land included on the maps. The maps also mark 81 sites in areas A and B — under Palestinian civil control — which indicates that the Civil Administration began identifying available land before the Oslo Accords. Akiva Eldar, "Israel Defense Ministry Plan Earmarks 10 Percent of West Bank for Settlement Expansion, *Haaretz*, March 30, 2012, accessed August 21, 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-defense-ministry-plan-earmarks-10-percent-of-west-bank-for-settlement-expansion-1.421589.
[1003] Anonymous, "The president on the anniversary of the Nakba: Palestinians do not forget….and will not forget," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2016, front page.
[1004] Natif Hawatmeh, "Nakba, Intifadah and resistance," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 16, 2001, 8.
[1005] Anonymous, "The president on the anniversary of the Nakba: Palestinians do not forget….and will not forget," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2016, front page.
[1006] Anonymous, "The PLO on the anniversary of the Nakba: The struggle for freedom and independence continues," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2012, 6;
[1007] Anonymous, "The director of the Palestinian bureau of statistics," *Al-Quds,* May 15, 2005, 12.
[1008] Anonymous, "The PLO on the anniversary of the Nakba: The struggle for freedom and independence continues," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2012, 6.

reinforcement of, and adherence to, the so-called "fixed national principles,"[1009] which dictate "no peace or security or stability unless the Palestinian refugee issue is resolved based on resolution 194; return, self-determination and establishment of the [Palestinian] state."[1010] In addition to participation in mnemonic activities to "show national anger,"[1011] loyalty to these principles is advocated through *tamassuk* [Ar. holding on] to the land in spite of "incursions into Palestinian territories"[1012] and, at times, hailing violent confrontations with "occupation forces."[1013] In the latter context, it is worth noting that in *al-Hayat al-Jadida*'s 2000 Nakba Day black and white edition, the blood of a "martyr who died in [Nakba Day] clashes at Qalqilya" did appear in color on the front page; thereby suggesting that the "confrontation with occupation soldiers to stress their commitment to the right of return and refuse nationalization projects" validates an interruption in the commemorative mediation.[1014] Importantly, glorification of violent confrontations prior and subsequent to the Al-Aqsa Intifada — deemed a renewal of the "people's allegiance [to the land] with blood"[1015] — also indicates that existent mobilization efforts in Nakba meditation do not necessarily only coincide with times of increased violence or heightened political strife.[1016]

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[1009] Anonymous, "The president: It is time for the calamity called the Nakba of the Palestinian people to end," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 18, 2008, front page.
[1010] Anonymous, "The masses in our homeland and the diaspora commemorate the 57th anniversary of the Nakba," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2005, front page.
[1011] Anonymous, "The two committees, the national and the subcommittee affirm the final program for the 60th Nakba [anniversary]," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* April 5, 2008, 9.
[1012] Staff editorial, "After 53 years, the features of the Nakba are present once again," *Al-Quds,* May 15, 2001, 13; Anonymous, "Between the Nakba and the dawn of a new birth," *Al-Quds,* May 14, 2001, 13.
[1013] Anonymous, "National forces call to commemorate the Nakba with a large participation," *Al-Quds Online,* April 23, 2016, accessed March 16, 2017, http://www.alquds.com/articles/146142750087623 /5500.
[1014] Anonymous, "A martyr in Qalqilya and hundreds injured in a fire in Magidu [prison] and dozens of civilians injured in confrontations with occupation soldiers in Gaza, Qalqilya, Nablus and Ramallah," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2000, front page.
[1015] For Munir Abu Razaq, "The people renew their allegiance with blood and the leader confirms the inevitability of victory," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 16, 2001, 6.
[1016] Anonymous, "Our people commemorating the Nakba [led to] three martyrs and hundreds of injured," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 16, 2000, front page; Anonymous, "More than 70 injured in clashes in Bethlehem," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 16, 2000, 5; Anonymous, "Dozens injured in clashes in Qalqilya," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 16, 2000,

*Figure 6.3. Holding on to the 'national goals'*




"The remaining Palestinian people [held captive by] settlements." *al-Hayat al-Jadida*, May 14, 1998



*al-Hayat al-Jadida*, May 15, 2000

5; Anonymous, "Confrontations in Hebron and dozens of injured," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 16, 2000, 5; Anonymous, "260 protesters were injured in confrontations in the Palestinian territories during Nakba marches," *Kul al-Arab Online*, May 15, 2012, accessed May 5, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/458419.

Crucially, the achievement of the "fixed national interests" is not solely dependent on a demonstrative social mobilization on Nakba Day, but also on the existence of national political unity.[1017] Repeated calls in Nakba media output seeking "unity among all political factions" can be traced to two distinct periods: in the wake of the 1993 Oslo I Accord and, more consistently, following the outbreak of what Joel S. Migdal termed "a Palestinian civil war" between Hamas and Fatah in 2006/7.[1018] In the period under examination, the advancement of a "national unity" and "true solidarity" in Nakba mediation forms a mirror into the domestic Palestinian political landscape.[1019] As such, while in the period following the 1993 Oslo Accords, editorials and news articles stress the creation of "unity among all Palestinian factions [in] the ongoing negotiations"[1020] and the "solidification of the work of the PLO to strengthen the unity of our people,"[1021] the rift between Fatah and Hamas prompted calls for "national unity [through] political reconciliation."[1022] Yet, despite the difference in timing and in political objectives, both in the aftermath of Oslo and subsequent to the various reconciliatory attempts between Hamas and Fatah,[1023] advancement of domestic political unity within Nakba mediation must be

[1017] Nufud al-Bakri, "The DFLP calls for social mobilization on the anniversary of the Nakba to defend the land," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 14, 2000, 5.
[1018] Joel S. Migdal, *Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 351.
[1019] Anonymous, "Announcement by the legislative council on the 50th anniversary of the Nakba" *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 13, 1998, 2.
[1020] Mustafa al-Rimawi, "Return is a sacred right to every expellee, there is a need for a Palestinian initiative to regain unity," *Al-Quds,* April 6, 1994, 6. Also see Rashid Hilaal, "Nayif Hawatmeh: We move toward holding a national popular conference, return is a sacred right to Palestinians, we reject inter-Palestinian fighting," *Al-Quds,* April 8 1994, 4.
[1021] Anonymous, "General national body calls for broad participation in Nakba commemoration activities," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 13, 2000, 8.
[1022] Anonymous, "The president: It is time for the calamity called the Nakba of the Palestinian people to end," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 18, 2008, front page.
[1023] Instrumentalization of the Nakba's anniversary to endow recent reconciliatory attempts, including the March 2008 Sana'a Declaration, the February 2012 Doha Agreement and the April 2014 Gaza Agreement, are principally voiced in *al-Hayat al-Jadida* by Fatah affiliates, including President Abbas and, from prison, by the political figure Marwan al-Barghouti. For examples, see: Anonymous, "The PLO on the anniversary of the Nakba: The struggle for freedom and independence continues," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2012, 6; Anonymous, "In a statement on the occasion of the Nakba anniversary the captive leader Al-Barghouti [says]: We bless the reconciliation agreement and there is no partner in Israel," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2014, 6; Nufud al-Bakri, "A meeting in Gaza

understood as a clear engagement with its neighbors. Moving from the political consolidation of the PLO in the 1990s to the pursuit of a new Palestinian unity government from the late 2000s onwards, Nakba mediation in East Jerusalem and the West Bank thus forms a continual explicit negation of Israel's "no partner for peace narrative,"[1024] all the while holding on to "the supreme interests of our people and their national cause."[1025]

demanding support for the right of return and the speedy completion of the reconciliation agreement," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2014, 4.

[1024] Raffaella A. Del Sarto, *Israel Under Siege: The Politics of Insecurity and the Rise of the Israeli Neo-Revisionist Right* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 2, 35.

[1025] Anonymous, "The PLO on the anniversary of the Nakba: The struggle for freedom and independence continues," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 15, 2012, 6.

## Concluding Remarks

In the build-up to the 50th anniversary to the Nakba, Palestinian media on both sides of the Green Line collectively turned their attention to the past. Bolstered by the post-Oslo media landscape in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and, inside the 1948 borders, the perceived capitulation of Oslo, Nakba anniversarial mediation became a means of expressing the communities' concerns in coherence with the readerships' *cadres sociaux*. The commemorative prompts identified within Palestinian media, which originated during the 1998 anniversary, moreover, both testify to the media's heightened role as an agent of transgenerational transmission and equally reveal usage of Nakba mediation as a form of 'commemorative mobilization'.

Forming the inverse of Israeli-dictated mediation in the wake of the 1948 and 1967 War, post-Oslo media *for* and *by* Palestinians reflects the communities' relations with the Israeli hegemony. Demonstrative of its readership's principal concerns, *Kul al-Arab* has presented the Nakba as an interpretative framework for contemporary grievances resulting from Palestinians' status as an involuntary minority in Israel. As such, within anniversarial mediation, the Nakba as a present continuous does not simply signify the historical fate of internal refugees, but furthermore is considered the foundational event which generated the marginalization experienced at the hands of the majority. In addition to legislative attempts by far-right Israeli groups to thwart Nakba commemoration, which culminated in the 2009 Nakba Bill, the ongoing Nakba is presented in the framework of a continuous Judaization of Palestinian land. Considered symptomatic of the Zionist transfer policy, Nakba media output thus presents "the ethnic cleansing" [1026] of Palestine both as an outcome of the continued implementation of pre-Oslo legislation and the introduction of new laws, including the 2009 Land Administration Law

[1026] Ahmed Natour, "The Nakba continues," *Kul al-Arab Online,* May 2, 2015, accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.alarab.com/Article/677910.

which allows refugees' land to be sold off to private investors and placed beyond future restitution claims.

Nakba anniversarial mediation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, similarly to inside the 1948 borders, illustrates the Palestinians' particularistic relations with the Israeli hegemony, shedding light on the majority's occupied/annexed fate. Application of the Nakba as an interpretative framework and, simultaneously, an analogical tool testifies to the mediated expression of what McQuail defined as national goals. Through repeated usage of previously censored symbolic terminology, the readership of the semi-independent *Al-Quds* and the PA's mouthpiece, *Al-Hayat al-Jadida,* is admonished to adhere to these national objectives, which call for an end to "the permanent Nakba"[1027] through a resolution to the refugee problem, the right of self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Yet, invocation of the so-called fixed national principles, as expressed in the publication of (semi-)political mnemonic reminders, is not only meant to advance collective adherence to national objectives but, importantly, seeks to challenge the main actor deemed responsible for their suspension: Israel. Charged with the destruction of the two-state solution through repeated and, as revealed in 2012, clandestine settlement incursion into the Palestinian state to-be, Nakba mediated output has consequently become a realm of collective social mobilization against 'the Zionist entity', albeit one that does not deviate from the politically-accepted discourse of the PA. A comprehensive metaphor for the effects of 'Zionist colonial aggression' and its ongoing implications for daily Palestinian life, Nakba media output has come to embody all Palestinian suffering at the hands of the Israelis — by refugees and non-refugees alike — which, at times,

[1027] Anonymous, "The president: It is time for the calamity called the Nakba of the Palestinian people to end," *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* May 18, 2008, front page.

makes use of the most powerful charge to debunk the Israeli aggressor: the execution of a Palestinian Holocaust.

# Conclusion

"The nation's biography," writes Anderson at the closure of his book *Imagined Communities*, "snatches wars and holocausts." But to serve the narrative purpose, Anderson continues, "these events must be remembered/forgotten as 'our own'."[1028] This thesis' examination of societal transmission of Nakba and Holocaust narratives in, respectively, Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish society has not only testified to the mnemonic plasticity engrained in this statement, but also exposed the societal usages of exclusionary narratives. Through charting the interdependence between mnemonic agents and the intended recipients, this work has highlighted the formation and preservation of these narratives — what Anderson implies with remembering — which, like all collective narratives, illustrate contemporary concerns and societal understandings and, consequently, are characterized by their malleability.

## The Ongoing Nakba

The ability to articulate collective needs and attitudes in official mnemonic realms, which determines the scope and validity of the conveyed narrative, is, as this thesis has demonstrated, closely interlinked with the existing political landscape. In East Jerusalem and the West Bank, the post-Oslo political landscape proved formative to the transformation of commemorative traditions and previously-thwarted educational and media content into group narratives that, under the auspices of the PA, could be voiced outside the local and familial sphere. Yet, while the PA's authority in social realms allowed for mass exposure to the historical events of *al-Nakba* in the wake of the Oslo Peace Accords, it was to a large extent the PA's own "capitulation

[1028] Anderson, *Imagined,* 206.

at Oslo"[1029] that dictated the Nakba's contemporary relevance, albeit significantly bolstered by the temporal importance of the Nakba's 50th anniversary in 1998.

The PA's postponement of the refugee problem to final status negotiations also was integral to Nakba mnemonics and mediation inside the 1948 borders. While Oslo did not provide a new political order for the Palestinian minority in Israel, the collective response to the Oslo Accords spurred from the emergence of an (semi-)independent cultural realm in the mid-80s which, after the First Intifada, became a political platform to express the social concerns of 'the Palestinians inside' — *Filasṭiniu al-dākhil.* Emboldened by continued Israeli attempts to remove their narrative from public consciousness and the PA's negligence of their fate, the Palestinian minority used its cultural autonomy to address grievances resulting from its post-Nakba status as an involuntary minority.

Across the three mnemonic realms explored in the Palestinian case study, the pervasive concept of an ongoing Nakba has largely depended on relations with and conceptions of the Israeli majority and, in the case of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the ongoing Israeli occupation/annexation. Notwithstanding the differences that have arisen as a result of the PA's influence in the mnemonic realm and, in the educational sphere, reliance on international donors, the narratives demonstrate the perceived marginalization suffered at the hands of the Israeli hegemony. For the Palestinians inside, the Nakba as a present continuous is principally characterized by contemporary political marginalization and as an outcome of what Ilan Pappé succinctly termed a cultural memoricide.[1030] Consequently, the Nakba, as the watershed from which the vanquished minority spawned, has been conceived of as both an interpretative

[1029] Moshé Machover, *Israelis and Palestinians: Conflict and Resolution* (Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books, 2012), 178.
[1030] Pappé, *Ethnic*, 225-234.

historical framework and, simultaneously, through its perceived continuity, a retrospective analogy. Public demonstrations aimed at exposing cultural and physical palimpsest practices deemed emblematic of the ongoing Nakba therefore not only seek a transmission of the past, but also constitute a demand for social equality.

Analogical usage of the Nakba in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, principally identified in mnemonic activities and Palestinian media, conversely, is not meant to further civil rights, a paradoxical undertaking in view of Palestinians' current demographic majority status in these areas. Rather, the Nakba has been instrumentalized as a common rallying point for all Palestinians, refugees and non-refugees alike, to bolster mobilization in favor of the so-called fixed national principles, including through violent means. Providing a coherent response to all perceived Israeli trespasses, these national aims have continuously demanded the return of refugees alongside the establishment of an independent Palestinian state both during the implementation of the Oslo Peace Accords and in the wake of the political deadlock created with the failure of Oslo at the dawn of the 21st century. Importantly, while the articulation of national goals in Nakba mnemonics is first and foremost directed at Israel, it also allows the PA to show its ostensible support for their realization and, perhaps most importantly, prevent criticism against the authority's own role in the perpetuation of the refugee problem. Successful implementation of the carrot and stick policy thus meant that in the wake of the Oslo Accords and the 2011 publication of the Palestine Papers, the PA could prevent exposure of a political willingness to negotiate a refugee settlement in the PA's political mouthpiece, *al-Hayat al-Jadida*, and the semi-independent *Al-Quds* and, instead, claim an uncompromising dedication to the 'national cause'.

## The Never Again State of Israel

In contrast to Palestinian mnemonics, the post-Oslo era in Israeli-Jewish society was not characterized by the dissemination of a novel Holocaust consciousness resulting from a new-found mnemonic agency; yet, the particularistic Holocaust narrative discerned in the post-Oslo era cannot be considered disconnected from the existing political landscape. The mediated identification of contemporary manifestations of Nazism and Fascism, including among the Palestinian leadership, itself a decade-old phenomenon,[1031] thus suggests a continual threat and, therefore, the need for a strong Jewish state to assure commitment to the idiom 'never again'; that is, never again to be a Jewish victim in Israel.

Indeed, the redemptive nature of the Israeli state, as the antithesis of exilic destruction and death, did not constitute an immaculate rebirth; instead, the onset of an interminable conflict spurred on the conception of Holocaust as a present continuous. Crucially, this understanding of the Holocaust is not founded on the contemporary execution of genocidal policies, but rather, as indicated in chapter four and five, the persistence of a threat against Jewry, which in Israel is perceived in continued suffering of Jews, including at the hands of their neighbors. Although explicitly conveyed in Israeli mass media and the ritual commemorative performance of the security apparatus, implicit invocation of an incessant danger to Jewish existence also relies on the transmission of what this study has described as an ethnocentric Holocaust narrative. Across the three collective realms under examination, a specific inclusive victimhood has been identified, which proscribes that regardless of the familial background all Israeli-Jews must perceive of themselves as Holocaust survivors and, as such, as the singled-out victims of Nazism. The unique nature of Jews' fate in the Second World War is further stressed through the

[1031] See: Amir Eshel, *Futurity: Contemporary Literature and the Quest for the Past* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 141; Zertal, *Israel's*, 173.

de-emphasis of non-Jewish victims of Nazism, which not only relies on a minimization of their fate but also, at times, conveyance of ahistorical and anachronistic information.

## The Victims of the Victims

Remembering and forgetting are, as Anderson's formulation above illustrates, two sides of the same coin. The act of collective remembering requires (individual) experiences that do not fit the group's contemporary aims or an easily-digestible schema to fall to the wayside of history, destined to become a counter-narrative. It follows that, with reference to Nazi persecution, a complete acknowledgment of racially-inspired suffering of non-Jewish ethnic groups, which, among other devastation to human life, culminated in the *Porrajmos* of Roma gypsies, questions the singular fate of the Jews. A universally-defined conception of suffering under Nazism also proves incompatible with the articulation of a continued threat against Jewry based on a metaphoric instrumentalization of the Holocaust and exemplified by the slogan *ha-'olam kulo negdenu* [Heb. the entire world is against us].[1032] Moreover, just as recognition of non-Jewish victimhood would question the singularity of Jewish suffering, admission of Palestinian suffering resulting from mass displacement in what Israelis call the 'War of Independence' would shed doubt on the purity of the revival that followed the destruction and the related military concepts of *ṭohar ha-neshek* [Heb. purity of arms] and *ein brira* [Heb. no choice/alternative].[1033] An awareness of the Palestinian conception of the Nakba, which draws a vertical line from the European Holocaust to the Palestinian catastrophe and, as a result, portrays the Palestinians as, in

[1032] Auron, Israeli, xviii; Sagy, Kaplan and Adwan, "Interpretations," 28.
[1033] The concepts of "no alternative" and a "purity of arms" were not only meant to present the 1948 War (and indeed subsequent wars) as a just cause, but also as an Israeli act of defense against annihilation, whereby any violence against adversaries was justified as a last resort and necessity. Mira M. Sucahrov, *The International Self: Psychoanalysis and the Search for Israeli-Palestinian Peace* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 45, 46.

the words of the Palestinian writer Raja Shehadeh, "the victims of the victims of the Nazis,"[1034] therefore can be considered foundational to Israeli minimization of the Nakba. Crucially, full recognition of the Palestinian narrative which perceives of the Nakba as 'a Palestinian Shoah'[1035] would also entail engagement with the discourse's contemporary usage, as both an interpretative framework and an analogy for ongoing Israeli marginalization of 'the other'. Israeli-Jewish memory agents responsible for pitting the Holocaust as a constructionist memory against a vengeful subversive Palestinian victimhood consequently would be forced to re-evaluate the source of the other's trauma and "[embark on] the most terrifying ghost train."[1036]

## A Hidden Memory

Through examining the emergence and perpetuation of exclusionary narratives, this work has sought to shed light on the origins of existing trends of denial. While denial can imply a complete rebuttal of the occurrence of an event, the above invocation of 'awareness' — similarly to the consistent usage of 'minimization' and 'de-emphasizing' throughout this thesis — illustrates that inherent to the Israeli practice of the social silencing of the Palestinian Nakba is the Freudian notion of repression, creating a 'hidden memory'. Application of individual psychic processes of remembering, repression and forgetting to the public phenomenon demonstrates that marginalization of the Palestinian narratives does not testify to a historical lacuna of knowledge of the out-group's narrative, but rather the existence of an uncanny memory, in need of repression or forgetting.[1037] Indeed, Israeli police's recent prevention of the 2017 Palestinian March of Return for the first time in its history is the latest example of an organized repression

[1034] Shehadeh, *Third*, 64.
[1035] Eli Senyor, "Nakba Day: 'It is as important to us as the Holocaust is to Jews'," *Ynet*, May 16, 2016, accessed May 18, 2016, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3251361,00.html.
[1036] Pappé, "Fear," 159.
[1037] Huyssen, "Present," 27.

based on a cognizance of Palestinians' political usage of the Nakba to "express their collective identity as a national minority."[1038] Thus, rather than spawning from an unfamiliarity or *unheimlichkeit,*[1039] the social silencing of the Nakba "as a threat"[1040] results precisely from its familiarity and the knowledge of its radical incompatibility with that which is deemed *heimlich* for Israeli-Jews. In this context, *heimlich* not only denotes a mental state of comfort, but, through denying or minimizing a historical Palestinian presence and the mass displacement in 1948, bolsters the notion of an original Jewish *heim* [Ger. home] in present-day Israel.

The uncanny, as something familiar and simultaneously irreconcilable, also finds relevance in the interpretation of Palestinian repudiation of the Holocaust. Thus, the high percentage of Palestinians inside Israel who deny the Holocaust, as noted in the introduction, should not be equated to a lack of knowledge of the Jewish genocide based on an historical deficiency. Israeli-Jewish collective rituals dedicated to the Holocaust and the increased educational exposure to the genocide in the Palestinian educational sector[1041] dictate that the rejection of the majority's narrative is premised on the concept of a tit-for-tat, whereby the increased Israeli (legal) thwarting of the Nakba prompts a similar response in Palestinian public consciousness. Echoing Smooha's 2009 findings,[1042] this study found that the relegation of the Nakba to a subversive narrative, emblematic of the wider societal and political marginalization

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[1038] Pappé cited in Jonathan Cook, "Why is Israel afraid of the Nakba's March of Return?," *Al Jazeera*, April 10, 2017, accessed August 29, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/israeli-police-block-palestinian-march-return-170409055747446.html.
[1039] Freud*, Uncanny*, 124, 125.
[1040] Pappé cited in Cook, "Why."
[1041] In 2015, under the direction of then Education Minister Piron, a program entitled 'In Memory's Lanes' was launched. The program, which highlights Jewish suffering in the Holocaust, for the first time, was also included in the curricula of 'the Arab sector' because, as Piron noted, "The Holocaust is a fundamental issue for Israeli society, they need to learn about this country. And if it's not mandatory, they might not learn about it." Interview conducted with Shai Piron on May 30, 2016.
[1042] Smooha does not interpret the survey responses as "overt Holocaust denial" in the western sense of the phenomenon but rather as a form of opposition or protest. Auron, *Israeli*, 139. Also see: Fadi Eyadat, "Survey Finds Nearly Half of Israeli Arabs Deny Holocaust," *Haaretz,* May 18, 2009, accessed August 30, 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/survey-finds-nearly-half-of-israeli-arabs-deny-holocaust-1.276206.

of the Palestinian minority, has spawned the minority's invocation of their foundational history as a form of opposition or protest against the Israeli-Jewish majority. Substantiated by the increase in Holocaust denial practices following the eruption of the Second Intifada, the existence of a contemporary 'protest narrative' forms the theoretical framework for the emergence of a context-specific exclusive Palestinian victimhood.[1043] Rather than proclaiming a universally-exclusive victimhood from the outset, this exclusionary narrative does not materialize in Nakba mnemonics inside the 1948 borders, but solely manifests in direct response to the Holocaust, based on an understanding of its importance among those held responsible for ongoing Palestinian suffering.

A similar retaliatory silencing of Israeli-Jews' foundational past was found to be the source of the glaring absence of Jewish suffering at the hands of the Nazis from the new Palestinian curriculum and, in contrast to Nakba mnemonics inside the 1948 borders, the overt minimization of the Jewish genocide in mass Palestinian media output dedicated to the Nakba. Implicitly and, to a lesser extent, explicitly, mnemonic agents revealed that an acknowledgement of Jewish suffering, deemed representative of the trauma of the Israeli 'enemy', not only equated to a justification of Israel's establishment in 1948 and its repercussions for Palestinians, but also would minimize all ensuing Palestinian suffering. With the outbreak of the violence of the Second Intifada, attempts to include the Holocaust in Palestinian textbooks — characteristic of the so-called people-to-people initiatives in post-Oslo years[1044] — were thus met with extreme hostility, as they signified advancement of the enemy's narrative. Yet, as this thesis relayed in its final chapter, Holocaust minimization does not only rely on its absence. Instead, the perception

[1043] Shipler, *Arab*, 344; Litvak and Webman, "Perceptions," 137.
[1044] Iftat Maoz, "Peace Building in Violent Conflict: Israeli-Palestinian Post-Oslo People-to-People Activities," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 17:3 (2004): 563-574.

of successful Israeli political instrumentalization of the Holocaust means that part and parcel of the marginalization of the Holocaust is also, somewhat ironically, its conjuring by Palestinians as the ultimate yardstick of evil; this time, measuring the gravity of Israeli actions.

## The Research Findings and Their Practical Application

Although the identified agents responsible for transgenerational and, in the case of media output, intergenerational transmission testify to a retaliative renunciation of the Holocaust, consistent omission of the out-group's narrative in collective realms can, both among Palestinians and Israelis, boost denial practices among future generations. An unsettling narrative no longer, the out-group's foundational narrative would thus become an uncanny memory resulting from a dearth of historical exposure, albeit one based on unfamiliarity. While recognizing the possibility of a relentless continuation and exacerbation of the refutation of the other's past, this thesis does not propose a method of fusing the two foundational narratives; nor does this work suggest ways in which the identified exclusionary narratives can be challenged and modified. These people-to-people initiatives depend not only on a mutual willingness, but — as indicated by the fate of the *Side by Side* project discussed extensively in section one of this work — the existing political atmosphere within and between the two societies.

Determining the degree at which contemporary conceptions of past events should be modified if they are not to become the "gravedigger of the present"[1045] is a task to be undertaken under the supervision of committed experts and, eventually, if deemed (politically) worthy of dissemination across official societal realms, the mnemonic elite. Nevertheless, it is evident that in the execution of the initial "people-to-people diplomacy,"[1046] this thesis finds practical

[1045] Nietzsche, *Nietzsche,* 62.
[1046] Sapir Handelman, ed., *People-to-People Diplomacy in Israel and Palestine: The Minds of Peace Experiment* (London; New York: Routledge, 2014), 2.

applicability through its comprehensive review of the instrumentalization of the past in both Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian society and, concurrently, its exposure of the mnemonic motives that inform the denial of the out-group's foundational history. Moreover, this study's reinforcement of the notion that conceptions of the past are equally determined by that which is textually present or (ritually) portrayed and consciously excluded dictates that any transformation of officially ratified narratives will depend on 'forgetting' that which "demonstrates the justness of today's cause" and "the perfidy of today's opponent."[1047]

The universality of collective narratives and their societal instrumentalization, including as tales of empowerment in times of (low-level) conflict, also means that this work's findings allow for a global applicability beyond the Israeli-Palestinian arena. As noted in section one, studies conducted on official textbooks used in (post-conflict) nations indicate that foregoing a former opponent's suffering or collective narrative pertaining to the outbreak of conflict while highlighting the in-group's mnemonic discourse are not unique to Israel-Palestine. This study's identification of a retaliatory minimization of the out-group's foundational narrative study, as discovered in the Palestinian case study, can be applied as a theoretical framework in future studies on the societal materialization of exclusive narratives in, for example, Bosnia-Herzegovina, where past studies have observed that Muslims, Croats and Serbs "each attribute victimhood to oneself and guilt to the two others."[1048] Similarly, the minimization of Palestinian suffering in the 1948 War in Israeli textbooks and the societal objection it has aroused in Palestinian society can be comparatively administered in examinations of Japanese educational content on the Asia-Pacific War which have been found to downplay the suffering inflicted by the Japanese on the Chinese and Koreans, a practice which, according to a recent study,

[1047] Rotberg, "Building," 1.
[1048] Ahonen, "Post-Conflict," 95.

contributes to the existence of continued negative perceptions of Japan among the Chinese population.[1049]

In addition to offering a practical applicability to non-regional scholarship and cross-cultural initiatives, it is the intent of this thesis to provide fertile ground for future scholarship on Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian mnemonic discourse, which challenge the idealization of the past's invocation and, instead, expose its neurasthenic and disabling effects in "service of the nation."[1050] Constrictions on personal movement and a sharpened concentration within the three societal realms resulting from theses' defined length ensure that the last word has not yet been written on the inter- and transgenerational transmission of the respective foundational narratives.

A scholarly void in need of future consideration is the lack of an extensive analysis of Nakba mnemonic discourse in Gaza in the post-Oslo era resulting from the fragile political situation and its effects on Gazan citizens and foreigners' freedom and safety of movement. While the dissemination of PNA-authorized Nakba narratives, including in textbooks and in the PA's official newspaper, will have been those identified in this study in the decade following the Oslo accords, in the wake of the 2006 Hamas-Fatah rift, Nakba discourse in Gaza cannot be assumed to mirror the mnemonics found in the territories under the authority of the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority. The final chapter's exposure of the instrumentalization of Nakba mnemonics as a powerful political tool to boost the credibility of Fatah officials and, simultaneously, cast doubt on Hamas' dedication to the 'national cause' thus begs further study into popular usage of Nakba mnemonics inside the Gaza Strip and its reflection of the most recent Palestinian civil war.[1051] The diverging legal status of East Jerusalemites and their post-

[1049] Daniel Sneider, "Textbooks and Patriotic Education: Wartime Memory Formation in China and Japan," *Asia-Pacific Review* 20:1 (2013): 49.
[1050] Zertal, *Israel's,* 9; Maier, "Surfeit," 141.
[1051] Schanzer, *Hamas*, 9.

Oslo transformation into others among the rest of the Palestinian people similarly demands further analysis into the usage and application of Nakba mnemonics. Beyond examining participation in established mnemonics on both sides of the Green Line and its reflection of identity politics,[1052] in line with this research's findings, the concept of a singular East Jerusalemite Nakba mnemonic narrative that characterizes a separate Jerusalem-based identity[1053] and reflects current societal and political grievances should not be disregarded.

Finally, it is envisaged that forthcoming academic works on mnemonic discourse in Palestinian and Israeli media realm, particularly those concentrating on the post-2010 era, will be able to take a more comprehensive scholarly approach to the role of Nakba and Holocaust mnemonics in mass digital media. As such, beyond the online conversion of traditional media discussed in this work's final section, mass online social platforms, including Facebook and Twitter — both extensively used in the respective communities over the last decade[1054] — will also need to be probed to determine the digital mnemonic narrative and, in the process, establish its theoretical resemblance to more traditional collective realms of memory.[1055] Offered here,

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[1052] According to a 2012 study, approximately 82 percent of Palestinian youth in East Jerusalem deemed it "important" or "extremely important" to foster ties with West Bank residents, whereas only approximately 52 percent gave similar responses when questioned about forging ties with Palestinians inside Israel. Badil, *One People United: A Deterritorialized Palestinian Identity* (Badil, 2012), 24, 25.

[1053] Dumper, *Jerusalem*, 78.

[1054] According to a survey by the PCBS, internet usage among Palestinians above the age of ten increased by 27.5 percent between 2004-2011 to 39.4 percent. A further survey indicated that at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, social network usage among Palestinians was high, with 21 percent using Facebook and Twitter extensively, predominantly those ages between 18 and 24. Israel, according to a study conducted in 2012, has one of the highest household internet penetration rates in the world; internet usage was estimated at 82 percent among the adult Jewish population (constituting a 23-percent increase from 2005) and 70 percent of internet users claim to have at least one social network account. Sharon Haleva-Amir, "Online Israeli politics: the current state of the art," *Israel Affairs*, 17:3 (2011): 467; Philip Seib, ed., *New Media and the New Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 163; Near East Consulting, *Survey of Palestinian Media* (Ramallah: Near East Consulting for Fondation Hirondelle, 2010); PCBS, *Access and Use of ICT by Households and Individuals by Year* (PCBS, undated), accessed September 2, 2017, http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/ICT2_E.htm.

[1055] The potential of memory transmission through digital media was acknowledged in 2011 by media theorists Andrew Hoskins and Jose van Dijck. Nevertheless, Hoskins argues that digital memory is not collective, but rather connective. Andrew Hoskins, "7/7 and connective memory: Interactional trajectories of remembering in post-scarcity culture," *Memory Studies* 4:3 (2011): 272; José van Dijck, "Flickr and the culture of connectivity: Sharing views, experiences, memories," *Memory Studies* 4:4 (2011): 401-415.

therefore, is a first attempt to develop an interpretive perspective of the hermeneutical centrality that permits one voice to nurture "its own torment"[1056] to overcome or drown out the other and, as a result, sentences Palestinians and Israeli-Jews to remain "wounded spirits in a promised land."[1057]

[1056] Jaffee, "Victim-community," 225, 238.
[1057] Shipler, *Arab*.

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## Interviews

*All interviews were conducted in person by the author unless stated otherwise.*

Interview 1. Omar Al-Qattan. March 11, 2016.

Interviews 2. Eyal Naveh. March 16 and May 15, 2016.

Interview 3. Mohammed Dajani. March 17, 2016.

Interview 4. Ahmad Hammash. March 28 and April 13, 2016.

Interview 4. Nadim Nashif. March 29, 2016.

Interview 5. Orna Katz. 31 March 2016.

Interview 6. Khalid Al-Saifi. April 3, 2016.

Interview 7. Or Kashti. April 6, 2016.

Interview 8. Motti Neiger. 11 April 2016.

Interview 9. Omar Shargawi. April 12, 2016.

Interview 10. Michael Yaron. April 14, 2016.

Interview 11. Rotem Korblitt. April 17, 2016.

Interview 12. Mohammed Kaial. April 18, 2016

Interview 13. Jomama Ashqar. April 18, 2016.

Interview 14. Vered Bar-Semech. April 21, 2016.

Interview 15. Fouad Moughrabi. April 26, 2016.

Interview 16. Gideon Saar. May 1, 2016.

Interview 17. Eitan Bronstein. May 3, 2016

Interview 18. Sami Adwan. May 13, 2016.

Interview 19. Ali Jarbawi. May 16, 2016.

Interview 20. Tharwat Zaid Keilani. May 26, 2016.

Interview 21. Yair Auron. May 29, 2016.

Interview 22. Rabbi Shai Piron. May 30, 2016.

Interview 23. Yitzhak Arad. June 1, 2016.

Interview 24. Wadiah Awadah. July 13 and 15, 2016.

Interview 25. Naim Abu-Hummos. July 19, 2016.

Interview 26. Noah Klinger. July 24, 2016.

Interview 27. Khalid Mahameed. August 3, 2016.

Interview 28. Eldad Beck. August 8, 2016.

Interview 29. Omar Hilmi al-Ghoul. August 15 and 16, 2016 by email.

# Appendix

## Appendix 1: Non-Jewish Victims of Nazi Persecution

| Victims of the Holocaust and Nazi Persecution | Documented Numbers |
|---|---|
| **Soviet Civilians** | Around seven million (including 1.3 Soviet Jewish civilians, who are included in the six million figure for Jews) |
| **Soviet prisoners of war** | Around three million (including about 50,000 Jewish soldiers) |
| **Non-Jewish Polish civilians** | Around 1.8 million (including between 50,000 and 100,000 members of the Polish elites) |
| **Serb civilians (on the territory of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina)** | 312,000 |
| **People with disabilities living in institutions** | Up to 250,000 |
| **Roma (Gypsies)** | 196,000–220,000 |
| **Jehovah's Witnesses** | Around 1,900 |
| **Repeat criminal offenders and so-called a-socials** | At least 70,000 |
| **Homosexuals** | Hundreds, potentionally thousands (possibly also counted in part under the 70,000 repeat criminal offenders and so-called a-socials) |
| **German political opponents and resistance activists in Axis-occupied territory** | Undetermined |

Source: "Documenting Numbers of Victims of the Holocaust and Nazi Persecution," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed October 16, 2016, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10008193.

## Appendix 2: Analyzed Textbooks in the Israeli School System

| Title | Author | Year of Publication | Grade | Content Analyzed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **The 20th Century: The Century that Changed the World Order** | Eyal Naveh | 1994 | Bagrut (final year) | Second World War; 1948 War |
| **Sensitivity to Human Suffering: Genocide in the 20th Century** | Yair Auron | 1994 | High School | Second World War |
| **The 20th Century: Contemporary History of the Jewish People** | Eli Bar-Navi | 1998 | Bagrut | Second World War; 1948 War |
| **The World and the Jews in Past Generations, Part 2, 1920-1970** | Elizier Domke | 1999 | High School | Second World War; 1948 War |
| **The 20th Century: On the Verge of Tomorrow** | Eyal Naveh | 1999 | High School | Second World War; 1948 War |
| **Modern Times, Part II 1920-2000,** | Eyal Naveh and Eli Bar-Navi | 1999 | High School | Second World War; 1948 War |
| **Shoah and Memory** | Israel Gutman | 1999 | High School | Second World War |
| **Shoah: A Journey into Memory** | Nili Keren | 1999 | High School | Second World War |
| **World of Changes** | Dani Yaakovi | 1999 | High School | Second World War; 1948 War |
| **Era of Fear and Hope 1870-1970** | Ketzi'a Avieli-Tabibian | 2001 | High School | Second World War; 1948 War |
| **Travel in Time: Building a State in the Middle East** | Ketzi'a Avieli-Tabibian | 2003 | High School | 1948 War |
| **Travel in Time: From Peace to War and Shoah: Europe, the Mediterranean Sea and the Jews in the First Half of the 20th Century** | Ketzi'a Avieli-Tabibian | 2008 | High School | Second World War |
| **Totalitarianism and Shoah, Europe, the Mediterranean and the Jews in the First Half of the 20th Century** | Eyal Naveh | 2009 | High School | Second World War |
| **Nationality: Building a State in the Middle East** | Elizier Domke | 2009 | High School | 1948 War |
| **Creating a Democratic Jewish state in the Middle East – The Establishment of the State of Israel** | Yigal Msaol | 2014 | High School | 1948 War |

## Appendix 3: Examined Palestinian Textbooks in the Palestinian School System

3.1 – National Education Textbooks

| Title | Year of Publication | Grade | Content Analyzed |
|---|---|---|---|
| **National and Civic Education** | 1994 | 5th Grade | 1948 War |
| **Palestinian National Education** | 1996 | 4th Grade | 1948 War |
| **Palestinian National Education** | 1996 | 5th Grade | 1948 War |
| **Palestinian National Education** | 1996 | 8th Grade | 1948 War |
| **Palestinian National Education** | 1998 | 5th Grade | 1948 War |
| **National Education** | 2001 | 7th Grade | 1948 War |
| **National Education** | 2001/2002 (Edition 2008) | 2nd Grade | 1948 War |
| **National Education** | 2004/2005 (Edition 2004) | 5th Grade | 1948 War |
| **National Education** | 2003/2004 (Edition 2004) | 4th Grade | 1948 War |
| **National Education** | 2011 | 4th Grade | 1948 War |

3.2 –Jordanian History Textbooks

| Title | Year of Publication | Grade | Content Analyzed |
|---|---|---|---|
| **History of the Modern World, Part II** | 1994 (Edition 1999) | 8th Grade | 1948 War |
| **Teacher's guide, History of the Modern World, Part II** | 1995 | 8th Grade | 1948 War |
| **The History of the Arabs and the Modern World** | 1994 (Edition 2003) | 12h Grade | 1948 War; Second World War |
| **The History of the Arabs and the Modern World** | 1996 | 12th Grade | 1948 War |
| **The History of the Arabs and the Modern World** | 1998 | 12th Grade | 1948 War; Second World War |
| **Contemporary World History, Part II** | 1994 (Edition 1999) | 8th Grade | Second World War |
| **Teacher's Guide: Contemporary World History, Part II** | 1995 | 8th Grade | Second World War |
| **History of Western Civilization and the Modern World** | 1994 (Edition 2001/2002) | 11th Grade | 1948 War; Second World War |

3.3 –Palestinian History Textbooks

| Title | Year of Publication | Grade | Content Analyzed |
|---|---|---|---|
| **The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arabs** | 2002/2003 (Edition 2003) | 9th grade | 1948 War |
| **The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arabs** | 2003/2004 (Edition 2010) | 9th grade | 1948 War |
| **History of the Modern World** | 2004/2005 (Edition 2010) | 10th grade | Second World War; 1948 War |
| **Contemporary and Modern Palestinian History, Part II** | 2005/2006 (Edition 2011) | 11th grade | 1948 War |
| **History of the Arabs and the World in the 20th Century** | 2006/2007 (Edition 2012) | 12th grade | Second World War; 1948 War |