- Abstract:
-
Do individuals in a position of social influence contribute more to public goods than their less connected partners? Can we motivate these influential individuals by disclosing how others expect them to act? To answer these questions, we play a public good game on a star network. The experimental design is such that efficiency and equality considerations should motivate central players to contribute more than others. Using a subject population familiar with contributions to public goods on so...
Expand abstract - Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
- Version:
- Accepted Manuscript
- Publisher:
- Elsevier Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Journal website
- Publication date:
- 2017-08-12
- Acceptance date:
- 2017-07-18
- DOI:
- ISSN:
-
0167-2681
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:807685
- URN:
-
uri:cccacd47-3d5d-415e-8f3e-e736371f1878
- UUID:
-
uuid:cccacd47-3d5d-415e-8f3e-e736371f1878
- Local pid:
- pubs:807685
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier B.V.
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
-
Copyright © 2017 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Elsevier at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.024
Journal article
Expectations, network centrality, and public good contributions: Experimental evidence from India
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