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Expectations, network centrality, and public good contributions: Experimental evidence from India

Abstract:

Do individuals in a position of social influence contribute more to public goods than their less connected partners? Can we motivate these influential individuals by disclosing how others expect them to act? To answer these questions, we play a public good game on a star network. The experimental design is such that efficiency and equality considerations should motivate central players to contribute more than others. Using a subject population familiar with contributions to public goods on so...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.024

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
International Development
Oxford college:
St Antony's College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Elsevier Publisher's website
Journal:
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Journal website
Publication date:
2017-08-12
Acceptance date:
2017-07-18
DOI:
ISSN:
0167-2681
Source identifiers:
807685
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:807685
UUID:
uuid:cccacd47-3d5d-415e-8f3e-e736371f1878
Local pid:
pubs:807685
Deposit date:
2018-04-20

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