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Moral luck and moral equality of opportunity

Abstract:
This paper concerns the problem of moral luck—the fact that our moral judgements appear to depend, perhaps unjustifiably, on matters of luck. The history and scope of the problem are discussed. It is suggested that our result-sensitive sentiments have their origin in views about moral pollution we might now wish to reject in favour of a volitionalist ethics.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted Manuscript

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Publisher copy:
10.1093/arisup/akx002

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Department:
St Annes College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Oxford University Press Publisher's website
Volume:
91
Issue:
1
Pages:
1–20
Publication date:
2017-06-28
Acceptance date:
2017-04-20
DOI:
EISSN:
1467-8349
ISSN:
0309-7013
Pubs id:
pubs:701441
URN:
uri:ccadbaf4-421f-4943-9c6b-a9c994a1dfab
UUID:
uuid:ccadbaf4-421f-4943-9c6b-a9c994a1dfab
Local pid:
pubs:701441

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