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Moral luck and moral equality of opportunity

Abstract:
This paper concerns the problem of moral luck—the fact that our moral judgements appear to depend, perhaps unjustifiably, on matters of luck. The history and scope of the problem are discussed. It is suggested that our result-sensitive sentiments have their origin in views about moral pollution we might now wish to reject in favour of a volitionalist ethics.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1093/arisup/akx002

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Oxford college:
St Anne's College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Oxford University Press Publisher's website
Journal:
Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volumes Journal website
Volume:
91
Issue:
1
Pages:
1–20
Host title:
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
Publication date:
2017-06-28
Acceptance date:
2017-04-20
DOI:
EISSN:
1467-8349
ISSN:
0309-7013
Source identifiers:
701441
Pubs id:
pubs:701441
UUID:
uuid:ccadbaf4-421f-4943-9c6b-a9c994a1dfab
Local pid:
pubs:701441
Deposit date:
2017-06-21

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