THE NATURE OF SOCIAL INTEGRATION IN
POST-APARTHEID CAPE TOWN

CHARLOTTE LEMANSKI, B.A. (Hons.), MSc

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This research considers the nature of social integration between individuals living in desegregated neighbourhoods in post-apartheid Cape Town. Social integration is understood as a dynamic process between individuals from apartheid's different racial classifications as opposed to the common emphasis in the literature on the static outcome of a neighbourhood being integrated. The research was based on both quantitative and qualitative methods. A quantitative analysis of South Africa's 2001 census results was conducted. From this analysis neighbourhoods in Cape Town with 'multiple population dominance', where no single group comprises more than 50% of the suburb population and at least one other group comprises over 25%, were identified. Qualitative fieldwork (semi-structured interviews and mental maps) was conducted in two of these 'multiple population dominance' suburbs.

Based on research in these neighbourhoods I conclude that labelling a suburb as physically desegregated implies a level of social cohesion that was not found, and masks the reality of division based on length of tenure and socio-economic status. Within the specific South African context of racial inequality, such opposition to desegregation that is not matched by a shared class is likely to restrict the potential for social integration to develop beyond the confines of black middle-classes moving into 'White' areas, and poor Coloureds and Black Africans living in low-cost housing, thus affecting only a handful of the population.
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This thesis is dedicated to Kutala and to the people of Westlake village,

Silvertree Estate, and Muizenberg for sharing their lives with me.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

“The process of integration, when it does occur, takes place not between races, but between people”

Harvey Molotch 1972:222

Cities worldwide are “sleepwalking into apartheid” (The Sunday Times 2005) as multicultural urban populations divide into racially segregated cities composed of distinct ghettos, between which diverse residents eye each other with fear and disdain. This contemporary urban context has severe implications for equal opportunities and access to the city (e.g. post-hurricane New Orleans where wealthy whites escaped the city, leaving the poor behind), and questions over national unity and identity that can erupt into violent clashes (e.g. Bradford and LA riots) rather than peaceful coexistence. Although describing cities worldwide, this context of ‘difference’ residing in proximity (spatially if not socially or culturally) is most compelling in South Africa, where the government is seeking to overcome the damage done by almost half a century of state-enforced apartheid. This system not only determined residential segregation but also enforced systematic social segregation and exclusion, with skin colour determining access to facilities and opportunities, and friendships across the race divide a rarity. This research operates within the context of the post-apartheid drive for integration, compounded by the legacies of apartheid in terms of institutional structures and human mindsets.
BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH

Overall aims

The broad theme of this research is the analysis of spatial and social changes in South African cities since the end of apartheid. More specifically, it considers the nature of integration between people from South Africa’s different population groups living in residential proximity in contemporary Cape Town. This is explored in order to achieve two principal aims; firstly, to consider the nature of integration in post-apartheid South Africa and its implications for urban policy; and secondly, to develop a provisional theory of cross-race social integration in multi-cultural urban settings, relevant for cities worldwide.

Approach of Research

This research addresses integration as micro-level social mixing between individuals living in an environment already hosting a multicultural presence. In other words, neighbourhoods with a demographic (i.e. statistical) mix of residents from different population groups are identified using quantitative statistics (i.e. the national census), and then qualitative research (e.g. semi-structured interviews, participant observation, mental maps) is conducted with a broad cross-section of residents in those suburbs to ascertain the everyday experience of living in a mixed-race area and also the

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1 The official apartheid racial classifications of White (European), Black (African), Coloured (mixed-heritage), and Indian (South Asian descent) are used not only because they continue to reflect general socio-economic inequalities, but because South Africans themselves continue to self-classify within these labels, and also because they provide a benchmark for assessing change since the end of apartheid. However, apartheid’s ‘African’ label is updated to ‘Black African’ in recognition that the other groups are also Africans (‘Black African’ is also the term adopted by the census in 2001), and ‘black’ (lower case) is used to describe all non-Whites (in recognition not of their skin colour but their joint oppression under apartheid – Pieterse 2003b:166 fn8). While recognising that these population groups are not necessarily races (e.g. Coloured), the terms ‘race’ and ‘racial groups’ are used throughout the thesis in reference to these groups for ease of discussion.
perceptions of such residents regarding integration in a broader sense (Chapter Three details the methodology more extensively).

**Key Research Questions**

This research seeks to identify and analyse the *nature* and *form* of integration occurring between South Africans from different racial classifications residing in the same urban neighbourhood, particularly in those areas where ‘integration’ is perceived a demographic success. Essentially, once people from different racial groups are experiencing some level of integration, what form does ‘integration’ take? Thus, the focus is on what defines, demonstrates, encourages and inhibits cross-race integration rather than determining which neighbourhoods are or are not integrated.

Clearly, integration involves a sliding scale of ‘types’, and thus a further question addresses the *sort* of integration favoured by residents of different neighbourhoods. For example, is integration limited merely to a greeting in the street, or does it extend to dinner in each other’s houses, children playing in each other’s homes, and ultimately inter-marriage?

In addition, the question of where integration primarily occurs is asked, not in a spatial sense of different neighbourhoods, but in the social sense of whether people integrate in their neighbourhood or elsewhere. For while geographers traditionally use *neighbourhood* as the site of integration, in the contemporary era neighbourhood is no longer so vital to people’s multi-locational lives and thus *social networks* and *institutions* such as churches, recreational clubs, schools, and the work place, are perhaps a more accurate focus for assessing integration. In this sense, institutions and non-local social networks could be the prime site of cross-race mixing, with the depth
of integration dependent on whether newly acquired ‘other’ race friends are invited to each other’s homes, thus returning to the role of the neighbourhood.

Relevance of Research

This research is relevant both in the South African urban context (for policymakers and researchers), and also in the broader arena of social and urban geography.

The post-apartheid government is heavily promoting integration as a policy goal for urban transformation and also for uniting South Africans into a single nation, in stark contrast to the spatially and socially divided apartheid city and national mentality. However, despite this universal drive for integration, there is little awareness of how to ensure success in achieving this idealistic goal. To combat this deficiency, this research analyses contexts in which demographic integration (i.e. the residential proximity of different races) already exists, so as to consider whether other forms of integration (e.g. socialising, friendship) are subsequently flourishing. From this, the trends and factors that both facilitate and hinder integration are identified, providing timely contributions to policy debates in South Africa.

The relevance of this research to the field of social and urban geography is provided by the contemporary era of increased migration leading to the dominance of multicultural cities throughout the world, with integration between different races/ethnicities often the cause of significant tension (e.g. LA and Bradford riots, Phillips 2003). Thus research on contemporary South Africa is justified as representing trends common to cities worldwide, indeed it has been suggested that South Africa represents a “microcosm” (Lemon 1995:xi) or “caricature” (Parnell 1996:42) of global trends. Trevor Phillips, chairman of Britain’s Commission for Racial Equality, recently described Britain’s cities as “sleepwalking ... to
segregation" with racial ghettos commonplace (quoted in Leppard 2005). Thus, research analysing integration between different races sharing a common environment (e.g. the neighbourhood, the city) has relevance for urban and social geography. Furthermore, while much has been written about the impact of global economic forces on modern cities (e.g. Sassen 2000 and 2001, Castells 2000), the socio-cultural force of difference between urban dwellers is equally powerful but frequently under-analysed. Indeed, given that leading human geographers describe cities as "essentially open; they are the meeting places, the focus of the geography of social relations" (Massey et al 1999:2) an analysis of these very social relations in the context of increasingly multicultural cities seems timely and relevant to the field.

Need for Research

There is a need for this research both in the empirical context of the changing South African urban environment in which policymakers seek to understand the processes shaping integration, and also in the theoretical context of a gap in the academic literature on social integration as a qualitative and dynamic concept and process.

In terms of the South African need for this research, some historical appreciation is necessary. Although Hunter’s (1936) work on ‘contemporary’ European-Bantu relations in South Africa is nearly seventy years old, it provides a foundation for understanding the history of race relations in South Africa, and its impact on modern experience. According to Hunter, ‘Europeans’ consider themselves intrinsically superior to the ‘Bantu’, but both races understand the relationship as inherently master-slave. Although this comment was written to describe the situation more than

\[ \text{2 Although use of ‘Europeans’ and ‘Bantu’ to describe Whites and Black Africans in South Africa respectively is discouraged, it is used here because it was the common label during the era in which Hunter writes.} \]
two generations ago, these cultural norms remained dominant for several decades, and it is helpful to bear in mind this historical master-slave mentality (characterised by the once universal use of “boss” by blacks when speaking to Whites) when analysing modern relations. Furthermore, a psychological perspective reveals the influence of childhood experience on adult racial prejudice. As psychologist MacCrone recognises, South African Whites have been taught from infanthood to perceive blacks as their inferiors and servants, to be treated with contempt and superiority (1937:372). Thus, in the mind of a child, the black man exists purely to undertake ‘dirty’ work for Whites. Given such conditioning it is hardly surprising that as the child matures, any notion of equal friendship with blacks is “out of the question” (MacCrone 1937:376). Although written to explain South Africa of nearly 70 years ago, the children of that era are now the elders of society, and thus are likely to have raised their children with a similar conditioning. With this in mind it is not surprising that Whites who have been brought up ‘knowing’ their superiority over blacks (or those now being raised by adults who experienced such conditioning in childhood), are fearful and uncertain not only of what a future based on ‘equality’ will bring, but also of how to mix socially with those they have been taught to look down on.

More recently, apartheid’s “wholesale reorganisation of space [makes] South African cities especially interesting” to urban scholars (Seekings 2000:832), and in particular the “diverse urban space” of South Africa’s multi-cultural context is an excellent host for analysing cross-race mixing in urban neighbourhoods (Van der Merwe 1996:159). Furthermore, rapid urbanisation ensures a majority of South Africans reside in urban areas (57.5% in 2001, Stats SA 2003g:8), thus indicating that the post-apartheid city represents the majority experience for South Africans. In the post-apartheid era, most
South Africans (citizens and policymakers) claim to be wholeheartedly in favour of ‘integration’, yet the question of what this means for society is rarely addressed, and research tends to focus on quantitative data, often at the city-scale. Indeed, Williams and Van der Merwe’s research on changes in language dominance in Cape Town note the need for “fresh data related to the actual behaviour of speakers as opposed to aggregate census responses” (1996:59).

Cape Town is selected as the specific city for focus because its unique nature in terms of ethnic composition and history of relative “cultural openness and cosmopolitanism” provides an excellent case-study within South Africa (Van der Merwe 1996:159). Cape Town is unique in being dominated by Cape Coloureds (rather than Black Africans), an entire ethnic group created as a consequence of cross-race mixing. In addition, Cape Town is chosen because there has been a plethora of research undertaken on the social dynamics of Johannesburg (e.g. Beall et al, 2000, 2001, 2002; Robinson, 2002), but relatively little recent work of a similar nature in Cape Town. The tendency for South Africa’s urban policies to be based on this Johannesburg-based research, which is assumed relevant for all South Africa’s cities, is clearly problematic given Cape Town’s uniqueness.

In addition to the empirical need for this research, there is also a theoretical need. As will be indicated in the following literature review, there has been insufficient focus in the literature on the personal nature of integration as involving social interaction and mixing across race lines. Despite a plethora of research on residential segregation, and some work on racially integrated neighbourhoods in a statistical demographic sense, “seldom does information on the subject of actual interracial

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3 Although Sophie Oldfield’s work on Cape Town is gradually redressing this balance (e.g. 2000, 2002, 2004).
contact go beyond the anecdotal level” (Molotch 1972:174). As Molotch notes, this lack of attention to personal interaction is serious indeed, for such an omission “inhibits the development of a sound theory of cross-racial interaction and, at a more practical level, precludes rigorous comparative analysis or evaluation of various forms of intervention which have integration as their goal” (1972:175).

Although the interim thirty years have revealed some research on personal interactions, the literature’s tendency to over focus on assimilation and segregation has left integration in the shadows. Where work has addressed integration, it has been grounded in multiple definitions of integration, for example as the opposite of segregation (e.g. Kirschenbaum 1984), interchangeable with assimilation (e.g. Duncan and Lieberson 1959:370), a ‘dimension’ of segregation (e.g. Sin 2002:424; Massey and Denton 1988:287), or as requiring demographic change alone (e.g. Ellen 2000), with only limited research on integration addressing social relations qualitatively (e.g. Suttles 1968; Ley 1974; Clarke 1986; Anderson 1990).

Despite noting the tendency of prior work to exclude qualitative personal interpretations of social integration, that is not to suggest that prior quantitative work on social integration is incorrect or defunct, but rather that it is incomplete. This research advocates the need for both approaches in order to gain a holistic vision of social integration. For example, a micro-scale analysis of qualitative social integration in a neighbourhood would require quantitative demographic statistics on that neighbourhood in order to provide evidence of an expectation of integration (it would be pointless to analyse qualitatively an area for which quantitative data revealed that it did not host a significant level of at least two different races). In addition, an awareness of both quantitative and qualitative approaches might enable
research to reveal a relationship between spatial patterns and social interaction. As John Western concluded in the 1970s, if social geographers wish to decipher human "processes" from spatial "patterns", "they must study the complex web of human activities, not just the configuration of residential areas" (1973:321).

Although this section has focused on the lack of academic analysis regarding integration, the need for research is not solely to fill an academic void, but also to contribute to the workings of society in South Africa and elsewhere, and is particularly relevant now that multiracial neighbourhoods exist throughout the world. Indeed, lack of interaction between members of different 'groups' leads to a lack of understanding amongst society, thus encouraging further prejudices and misconceptions. For example, Britain's chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality recently argued the need for physical, cultural and economic integration in British society that "binds us all together without stifling us" to combat problems of racial ghettos and violent divisiveness (quoted in The Sunday Times 2005). Indeed, "the White Protestant American is rarely conscious of the fact that he inhabits a group at all. He inhabits America. The others live in groups" (Gordon 1964:5).

Outline of doctoral thesis

This thesis follows the 'D. Phil via scientific papers' approach recently introduced to the School of Geography at the University of Oxford. In this approach the thesis comprises four submitted journal papers, in addition to introductory and concluding chapters that unite the journal papers into a doctoral thesis. Therefore, the thesis commences with an introductory chapter outlining the research project and also providing a thorough literature review. The second chapter provides an in-depth introduction to the South African context in which research has been conducted,
including an overview of recent census data and also an introduction to the specific case study neighbourhoods in which qualitative fieldwork was undertaken. The third chapter outlines the methodological approach, in addition to a discussion of the problems encountered, including ethical issues. Chapters four to seven represent the four submitted journal papers.

Chapter Four is entitled ‘The impact of residential desegregation on social integration: Evidence from a South African neighbourhood’ and has been accepted for publication in the journal *Geoforum*. This paper analyses social integration in a low-cost state-assisted housing project (Westlake village) situated in the wealthy southern suburbs of Cape Town in which Coloured and Black African (alongside a handful of White and Indian) residents were awarded state housing in 1999. This housing replaced their previous homes (informal and formal), which were demolished to make way for a mixed land-use development, of which their new homes form a small component. In analysing social mixing in this demographically mixed neighbourhood the paper first identifies residents’ everyday lives as locally-based (rather than returning to distant apartheid group areas for services and socialising), and then considers the extent to which different races interact in the suburb’s physical, economic and social spaces at both an everyday and institutional level. Finally, the paper considers the impact of a distinct Westlake village socio-historic identity that transcends racial difference. Empirical evidence is used to propose a theoretical continuum of social integration experience.

Chapter Five is entitled ‘Desegregation and integration as linked or distinct? Evidence from a previously ‘White’ suburb in post-apartheid Cape Town’ and was submitted to the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* in August
2005. This paper analyses a previously ‘White’ middle-class suburb (Muizenberg) that has undergone significant racial change since the end of apartheid to now host a range of socio-economic and racial groups. Analysis considers whether labelling this suburb as ‘desegregated’ is a superficial term that whilst implying racial mixing actually masks social segregation. The paper first provides sufficient evidence that the suburb is demographically desegregated and then explores social integration by considering the everyday lives of residents in two spheres: everyday movement patterns and commitments, and involvement in local institutions. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for desegregation/integration theory and policy.

Chapter Six is entitled ‘Spaces of exclusivity or connection? Linkages between a gated community and its poorer neighbour in a Cape Town master plan development’ and has been accepted for publication in Urban Studies. It will form part of a special edition in February 2006 on ‘Urban Interventions and diverse cities: culture, politics, development’ largely addressing South African cities and edited by Jenny Robinson and Edgar Pieterse. This paper analyses the relationships between predominantly White and wealthy residents of a gated community (Silvertree) and their neighbouring low-cost housing area, predominantly composed of poor Black Africans and Coloureds (Westlake village). Analysis addresses both the attitudes and perceptions that exist amongst residents of each area towards the ‘other’ neighbourhood, as well as the nature of any direct contact between residents. Analysis considers whether the spatial proximity of a gated community and low-cost housing area can overcome significant socio-economic and racial differences to develop functional integration and increased social understanding, or whether walls and significant demographic difference prevent mixing or tolerance. This paper is
particularly relevant to the South African debate on urban integration given its similarity to South Africa's new housing policy of locating low-cost housing areas in wealthy suburbs (in order to speed up the process of housing delivery and post-apartheid city integration). By implication the research also addresses the role of gated communities and mixed-land developments in supporting or thwarting post-apartheid city goals of desegregation and integration.

Chapter Seven is entitled ‘Discourses and strategies of ‘improving’ a mixed-race area in post-apartheid urban South Africa: improving the streets or removing unwelcome residents?’ and was submitted to *Environment and Planning A* in September 2005. This paper analyses the use of terms related to ‘improving’ a mixed-race area (Muizenberg) to consider firstly their meanings amongst different residents, and secondly their racial, social and economic implications for the area, the post-apartheid city, and urban development in a broader sense. Although ‘improvement’ discourses and strategies in this neighbourhood explicitly focused on *physical* upgrades such as street clean-ups and building renovations, an (intended or unwitting) consequence was *social* upgrading, or rather the eradication of unwelcome behaviour and individuals. Thus, improving Muizenberg meant rejecting and excluding those deemed unacceptable (predominantly black residents), with racial and socio-economic implications for residential demography that are not in harmony with national goals of inclusion and integration.

The thesis concludes with a final (eighth) chapter in which the main research findings are summarised and themes from the four journal papers are brought together. In addition, this concluding chapter considers the theoretical and empirical significance of the findings as well as their implications for current and future research directions.
Cross-race relations and “accommodating a multiethnic society within the territory of a single city” is a key issue for residents, policymakers and academics (Van der Merwe 1996:146; Williams and Van der Merwe 1996:49). Approaches to this multiethnic context emphasise one of two outcomes: (1) the assimilation of minority culture into the majority, or (2) the cultural pluralism of ‘difference’ co-existing in harmony. Although assimilation was historically promoted, recently it has been increasingly usurped by cultural pluralism (or ‘multiculturalism’) as the favoured outcome of multietnicity. In addition, ‘social’ or ‘urban’ integration are increasingly popular alternatives to both pluralism and assimilation (Hiebert and Ley 2003:17), yet not surprisingly given integration’s multiple meanings, the term is frequently misunderstood. In contrast to assimilation and multiculturalism’s emphasis on social outcomes of racial difference, integration offers hope for addressing the social process involved. However, as this literature review demonstrates, such understandings and uses of integration remain limited.

This literature review explores the concept of integration and in doing so reviews assimilation (and to a lesser extent, also pluralism). This is not to imply that historical progression through the concepts of assimilation, pluralism and integration is entirely linear, or that integration replaces either concept (neither is defunct). Rather, this research locates integration’s historical and theoretical roots in ‘assimilation’, and therefore brief analysis of assimilation’s origins and development is necessary, before addressing integration. Despite some interpretations of assimilation as largely social, and integration as predominantly economic (e.g. integrating commercial development zones for economic gain, people mixing only in
the marketplace\textsuperscript{4}), integration is recognised in this research as a social process (whereas assimilation describes the social outcome of a process), as a consequence of a multiethnic context. This differs from most integration literature, which although embracing integration as social and economic, overwhelmingly addresses the outcome rather than process of integration. Although process is implicit in both cases, this research explicitly prioritises the process involved. Given the definitional confusion and ambiguity surrounding integration, this literature review first provides an explanation of the meanings of the key terms used in this research and then analyses the recognised theory of assimilation, before moving on to consider the theoretical and empirical meanings and uses of integration. This provides the foundations for prioritising integration as social 'process' rather than 'outcome', leading to a preliminary consideration of methods for pursuing this focus on process. The empirical existence (or lack thereof) of integration in other Southern African cities is then considered, alongside a brief review of the different meanings intended by ‘integration policies’ worldwide.

\textbf{Conceptual foundations}

Before analysing assimilation and integration, it is necessary to explain this research’s favoured interpretation of integration, alongside foundational definitions of neighbourhood and ethnicity, and also the social context of ‘difference’ (e.g. race, class, ethnicity) residing in proximity. Integration is a dynamic force (i.e. the verb, to integrate), not a static goal, as an outcome focus easily assumes, and thus involves a long term process of change. In social terms\textsuperscript{5} it refers to “the bringing into equal

\textsuperscript{4} For example, Furnivall argues that different ethnicities in colonial India and the Dutch East Indies only interact in the marketplace, and thus social relations do not penetrate beyond economic needs (1939:449-50; 1948).

\textsuperscript{5} As opposed to mathematical integration for example.
membership of a common society those groups or persons previously discriminated against on racial or cultural grounds” (Oxford English Dictionary), thus focusing on the active “bringing into” rather than the static final social outcome. However, this research focuses more on the relationships between individuals from different races rather than bringing group x into the society of group y (as the OED definition implies).

As the literature review will reveal, there is significant definitional ambiguity surrounding ‘integration’. To prevent further confusion, throughout this research ‘social integration’ refers to the process whereby people from different socioeconomic classes/races/ethnicities⁶ integrate via social interactions and relationships (e.g. friendship). Although such integration could be externally imposed (i.e. social engineering), this would be considered ‘perverse integration’, in fact often reinforcing, rather than uniting, differences. In contrast to such ‘managed’ integration, this research uses ‘integration’ (with or without the ‘social’ prefix) in reference to the spontaneous establishment of micro-level relationships between people of difference living in the same geographical neighbourhood.

Sociocultural ‘difference’ between urban dwellers provides the context for integration. Recently termed “multicultural citizenship” (Sandercock 2000:203), this essentially confirms Young’s description of cities as the “being together of strangers” (1990:237). That is, the negotiation of difference for humans residing in close proximity and using shared space (e.g. a neighbourhood or city), or what happens “when peoples meet” (Locke and Stern 1942). The key force of ‘difference’ is the

⁶ Although a broad understanding of integration between people from different classes/races/ethnicities is used as the conceptual framework for research, in the specific research case study (Cape Town, South Africa), the focus is on the integration of people from apartheid’s different racial classifications.
(perceived) role of 'strangers' in disrupting order and continuity by bringing “the outside in” (Bauman 1990; Beck 1998; quoted in Sandercock 2000:205). As sociologist Georg Simmel noted at the turn of the twentieth century, metropolitan residents demonstrate great “reserve” in their daily interactions, tending “not even [to] know by sight those who have been neighbours for years”, which he perceives a consequence of “indifference” and “slight aversion” to those considered ‘different’ (1903:415). The urban avoidance of difference remains prevalent today, manifesting as Simmel’s street or neighbourhood level aversion (see also Jacobs 1961), but also as more formal segregation.\(^7\)

In addition, use of the term ‘neighbourhood’ is problematic, for while sociologists understand it as a cultural entity (e.g. Keller 1968), political scientists identify it as a place of organisation (e.g. Altshuler 1970), while economists address its externalities (e.g. Segal 1979). However, rather than enter this ‘neighbourhood’ debate (thus adding to the already excessive wealth of literature), Ellen’s (2000) interpretation of neighbourhoods as the geographical entities used and defined by census results is favoured as most practical for undertaking empirical research. Clearly this is still somewhat arbitrary given that individuals do not necessarily accept or even recognise the spatial boundaries created by local authorities. However, apartheid’s legacy of stringent boundaries between spatial zones remains dominant in contemporary South Africa and thus this approach does match residents’ experience of neighbourhood. Furthermore, South Africa’s census facilitates such an approach by classifying Cape Town’s suburbs along lines that are already accepted and used by residents (Van der Merwe 1996:148). This research assumes that cross-racial social relations within the

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\(^7\) For discussions surrounding formal residential segregation see Park 1926, Beshers 1962, Peach 1975, and Saff 1993.
neighbourhood are necessarily ‘good’ and desirable. Essentially, that society (or more narrowly, neighbourhood) is more important than ‘individual’. Although the interactions between individuals are analysed, they function as contributors to the neighbourhood (and society) as a whole.

‘Ethnic’ identity is recognised as determined by both personal and external factors (e.g. friendships, residential location and occupation). As a consequence of apartheid’s ‘divide and rule’ mentality, ethnic identity in South Africa is perceived as stronger than national identity, with South Africans identifying themselves first and foremost as a member of their ethnic group rather than nationality. Ethnic identity is thus based on affiliation to an ethnic group, and this term is favoured over category. For while the former describes groups that recognise and accept their identity based on shared culture and history, the latter is given to people displaying similar characteristics who may not be aware of the label and may not themselves express any identity based on this categorisation (Mare 1993:6-7). Milton Gordon accurately defines ethnic groups as “a large subsociety, criss-crossed by social class and containing its own primary groups of families, cliques, and associations” within which individuals usually choose to locate their primary associations (1964:234). It is worth noting the difference between an ethnic group, as defined, and an ethnic minority, referring to ethnic groups exhibiting socio-cultural differences from the majority social group and constituting a ‘minority’ in terms of their numerical and/or socio-economic status (Van der Merwe 1996:146).

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8 Although this is a vast assumption, it is necessary in order that research can proceed. Adequately tackling this assumption would be beyond the confines of this research.

9 Clearly there is a ‘layering’ of identities for an individual, within which both ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ identities play a role. However, the argument here is that South Africans prioritise the ethnic over the national (e.g. perceiving themselves first as ‘Coloured’ and second as ‘South African’) (Gibson and Gouws 1998).
This research also recognises the fluid and non-static nature of ethnic identity (e.g. Anderson 1987), and in fact argues that ethnic identities are shaped at least in part by inter-ethnic relationships. However, the focus remains on the latter, and for the purposes of this research, ethnic groups and identities are defined using apartheid’s racial classifications. While the inaccuracies and limitations of these classifications are recognised, they are necessary to determine changes in cross-group relations since the end of apartheid.

The concept of assimilation

Assimilation refers to the cultural transition of an ethnic minority to become part of the social majority residing in a shared country or city, by describing “the disappearance of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it” (Alba and Nee 1997:863). Its influence and importance as a theory is significant, for “few concepts in ... American sociology have been as all encompassing and consequential as ‘assimilation’” (Rumbaut 1997:924). It is worth noting that the wealth of assimilation literature addresses the USA almost exclusively, seeking to explain relations between ethnic minorities and White Americans, but is equally relevant for relations between citizens of different backgrounds sharing nationality of a multicultural society.

Assimilation theory and historiography

Although not assimilation theory’s creator, Milton Gordon is generally perceived its ‘father’ as his 1964 book clarified prior definitional confusion. As Gordon himself notes, precursors to his work exist principally within sociology (e.g. Redfield et al 1936:149; Berry 1951:217; Rose 1956:557-8; Green 1952:66), exemplified by the work of Robert Park and Ernest Burgess of Chicago School fame, defining
assimilation as the fusion of people from different cultural backgrounds into a common cultural experience and solidarity (1921:735). Although their definition did not necessitate eradicating minority culture, this was implied.

Gordon’s clarification focused on the cultural products of assimilation. At the time, Gordon could not have anticipated the flurry of activity that would result from his study. The late-1960s to early-1970s witnessed successive developments and criticisms of Gordon’s work (e.g. Gans 1973; Glazer and Moynihan 1970), deriding assimilation as arrogant and ethnocentric. Then followed a lengthy period of academic neglect, curtailed by Nathan Glazer’s 1993 paper asking “Is Assimilation Theory Dead?”, provoking new academic interest in assimilation and its relevance today (e.g. Alba and Nee 1997; Gans 1997; Glazer 1997; Nagel 2002; Rumbaut 1997).

**The assimilation process**

Gordon’s theories form the foundations of assimilation, and are therefore addressed as representative. His seven stage process of assimilation outcomes describes immigrants moving from “cultural assimilation” (acculturation) to the final point of “civic assimilation”, where minorities perceive themselves as fully American with no power or value conflict against the host society. The crucial step involves movement from the first stage of ‘acculturation’, where minorities adopt majority cultural practices; to the second stage of ‘structural assimilation’, in which primary relationships between majority and minority groups exist. Despite Gordon’s awareness of the importance of primary relationships he focuses on the outcomes and process of his stages rather than on the process of primary relationships themselves. Gordon interprets structural assimilation as assimilation’s “keystone” (1964:8) which,
once secure, will automatically precipitate the other stages: from marital assimilation (intermarriage and interbreeding), to identificational assimilation (loss of separate identity), then attitude receptional assimilation (minorities encounter no prejudice), and behaviour receptional assimilation (minorities encounter no discrimination), finally culminating in civic assimilation (Gordon 1964:70 71). Although Gordon is usually described as pro-assimilation, he promotes it as an ideal rather than a reality, in practice seeing only acculturation (in a democratic society) as inevitable (Alba and Nee 1997:832).

The key relevance of Gordon’s theory for social integration stems from his distinction between groups incorporating a new culture (acculturation, now termed multiculturalism), and individuals mixing with one another (structural assimilation). While contemporary ethnic minorities could achieve the initial stage merely from observation (e.g. films depicting American culture), structural assimilation requires personal interaction. Furthermore, while the former is one way (i.e. minority culture absorbs majority culture, which remains constant), the latter involves reciprocal relationships. From such an interpretation, one would expect Gordon’s theories to facilitate research on social interactions and integration. However, despite some interim work on this (e.g. Suttles 1968; Ley 1974; Clarke 1986; Anderson 1990), the reliance on quantitative indicators, ensures that qualitative research on social integration in multiethnic contexts remains limited.

**Assimilation outcomes**

In addition to his seven stages, Gordon theorises two alternative outcomes of assimilation for society as a whole, proposing either a homogenous social unit or the peaceful co-existence of difference. While the former could be derived from either
the dominance of one pre-existing culture ("Anglo Conformity"), or the creation of an entirely new culture as a mix of its ingredients ("Melting Pot"), the latter involves ethnic groups retaining individual cultural practices whilst sharing basic nationality and laws ("Cultural Pluralism"). Although Gordon’s seven stages simulate Anglo Conformity, the Melting Pot model proved more popular as a post-World War II American ideal. Moreover, although Gordon (1964:75) was reticent to develop his third model (cultural pluralism), this model (now called ‘multiculturalism’) is dominant amongst contemporary analyses of multiethnicity.

**Criticisms of assimilation**

Criticisms of Gordon’s assimilation theory attack its ethnocentric and patronising approach, assuming that minority ethnicities (‘they’) need to ‘catch up’ with American culture (‘us’). However, Gordon’s definition does not require eradicating one culture for another, but most applications encourage this perception by focusing solely on changes to the minority group rather than considering mutual change. Furthermore, Gordon did not, as commonly assumed, presume assimilation as inevitable. Indeed, he recognised that acculturation can be perpetuated (and thus assimilation thwarted) by either a positive voluntary force (e.g. the Jewish case for cultural and religious survival), or a negative imposed force (e.g. the social exclusion of an ‘undesired’ race). Thus, many of the criticisms of assimilation are directed at its interpreters, rather than Gordon.

However, Gordon does conceptualise culture and ethnic identity as static and homogenous, assuming that immigrant culture can be replaced by American culture, with no recognition of cultures’ diverse and evolving nature. Gordon’s dualistic ethnic model ("Sylvanians" and "Mundovians") encourages such ‘one way transfer’
interpretations, with immigrants providing empty containers to be filled by host culture, rather than recognising a two-way or multiple exchange (rather than transfer) of friendship, experience and culture. This also assumes a uniform and homogenous host society, and although Gordon does recognise America’s social diversity, his model is not rooted in this. His dualistic approach also fails consider a multiple group context.

Gordon describes the seven stages (after ‘structural assimilation’) as “a row of tenpins bowled over in rapid succession by a well placed strike” (1964:81), thus implying linear progression along each step. To combat the inadequacy of this ‘straight line’ assumption, sociologist Herbert Gans (1973) identifies generations rather than time as the catalyst for change. Although adding a dynamic dimension, this can still be interpreted as linear, leading Gans (1992) to clarify his generational definition as a “bumpy line theory of ethnicity”. The recent work of Ruben Rumbaut (1997) further criticises ‘straight line’ approaches by disputing the assumed upward social mobility of progression. Emphasising the negative impact of American culture on immigrants in terms of children’s health, delinquency, and reduced ethnic identity, Rumbaut disputes assumptions that assimilation is positive for ethnic minorities (1997:925), thus challenging its very foundations.

Attacking Gordon’s implicit eradication of difference, political scientist Iris Young criticises assimilation theory for assuming that ‘justice’ and/or ‘liberation’ for minorities requires shedding their difference (1990:157). Rejecting assimilation’s assumption that equality necessitates commonality, Young promotes her “politics of difference” where social equality often requires differential treatment for marginalised groups (Young 1990:158). In contrast, assimilation believes that
‘equal’ societies require difference to be unrecognisable. Richard Wasserstrom (1980) demonstrates this ideal by suggesting that a truly non-racist, non-sexist, non-ageist society will exist when such differences are treated in the same way as different eye colour in today’s society. While physiological differences exist, they would not determine individual identity or access to services/rights. However, assimilation does not require so much the smoothing over of difference as Wasserstrom suggests, but the imperialistic denial of minority culture in favour of majority practices (in practice if not in theory). Furthermore, those excluded from society as ‘other’ will never achieve assimilation because they are patently not the same as the majority group, and thus in assimilation’s terms their exclusion is eternal. In contrast, by focusing on their interactions with the majority group (irrespective of the impact this may have on individual and group cultural practices) as the key indicator of integration, it is hoped that social analytical progress will be more realistically achievable.

**Contemporary development of assimilation**

Despite the barrage of criticisms levelled at Gordon, several recent works have disputed previous derisions of assimilation as antiquated, instead emphasising its “utility” for analysing contemporary immigration to America (e.g. Alba and Nee 1997:826; Glazer 1997:97; Nagel 2002:974). While recognising its many faults, these neo-assimilationists have redeveloped assimilation, arguing it to be a crucial concept in the contemporary era provided it is “properly understood” (Glazer 1997:97) not as a state-imposed normative ideal to eradicate minority culture, but a concept for understanding and explaining the spontaneous social dynamics of ethnicity in America (Alba and Nee 1997:827). In addition, many neo-
assimilationists have adopted 'multiculturalism', as summed by Nathan Glazer's proclamation that "We Are All Multiculturalists Now" (1997).

Although not a 'new' term (e.g. Pitt Rivers 1927:105), 'multiculturalism' has recently been propelled into common discourse in reference to such a vast array of situations that definition is problematic. Its roots are located in 'cultural pluralism' (according to sociologists) or 'egalitarian pluralism' (according to political scientists), whereby boundaries differentiating groups exist, but all groups have equal access and rights to power and resources. Historically describing situations where multiple languages and cultures hold equal national rights (e.g. Canada, Australia), it is now frequently invoked in reference to America’s immigrant-based ethnic diversity. The principal author on pluralism in the mid-twentieth century was John Sydenham Furnivall, who used the concept to describe multiethnic colonialism, though he favoured the term 'polyethnic' to describe the fragmented rather than unified nature of this ethnic heterogeneity (1939 and 1948). Multiculturalism essentially rejects assimilation ideals (although Gans 1997 would disagree) and melting pot models, instead advocating the peaceful coexistence of difference and the celebration, rather than rejection, of diversity (e.g. Young’s 1990 'Politics of difference'). However, multiculturalism need not necessarily lead to integration, as demonstrated by its use in apartheid South Africa to legitimise systemic exclusion based on 'separate development'. Elsewhere, Furnivall’s account of multicultural Burma and Java as a "medley" rather than a 'melting pot' of people who "mix but do not combine" (1948:304-308) reveals pluralism without integration, as interactions between Europeans, Chinese, Indians and natives fail to penetrate beyond economic necessities (cited in Clarke 1986:25). Furthermore, multiculturalism’s tolerance of

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10 As opposed to 'structural pluralism' or 'inegalitarian pluralism' in which groups are differentiated, and membership determines access to resources.
diversity has been criticised in contemporary Britain for legitimising ghettos (residential and social) and inappropriate behaviour (e.g. Afro-Caribbean fathers abandoning children) as acceptable cultural differences (The Sunday Times 2005).

In response to American perceptions that assimilation never occurred, rather, multiculturalism prevails (Glazer 1997:96-7), Hiebert and Ley analyse Canadian census data to identify which term best describes the experiences of immigrants. They measure assimilation according to the level of native culture embraced, and measure multiculturalism with four indicators: residential segregation, occupational segmentation, language use at home, and intermarriage (2003:16). Interestingly, their data disprove general perceptions, revealing that assimilation best describes the experiences of both ‘traditional’ (European and arriving before 1981) and ‘new’ (non-European and arriving after 1981) immigrants, albeit more rapidly for the former (2003:16). However, multiculturalism remains the favoured concept with even its discontents confirming its inevitability in America, perceived a consequence of previous failures to integrate ethnic minorities into society (Glazer 1997:20-1). Although Glazer hopes his expectations of it leading to extreme and violent divisiveness are inaccurate (1997:147), his pessimism seems justified, for multiculturalism essentially rests on the presumption that the majority culture will value the richness of diversity, yet fails to identify incentives for such sympathies. In contrast, integration shifts the focus away from encouraging majorities to accept minorities in order to achieve a predetermined social outcome, towards emphasising the process of interactions between people from different ethnicities, irrespective of their majority/minority status and regardless of the final outcome.
Furthermore, while multicultural states and policies officially promote cultural diversity, this inevitably requires recognising ‘difference’, with the overwhelming likelihood of at least one culture being the dominant ‘judge’ of cultural acceptability. Indeed, certain ethnicities and practices are perceived to be “incompatible with … integration” (Nagel 2002:976), for example, Islamic extremism or female genital mutilation in western society. However, while assimilation perceives difference as a ‘problem’ to be overcome, multiculturalism recognises the inevitability of difference, seeking to harness it as a positive social force. In contrasting both assimilation and multiculturalism to integration, the focus of differentiation is not whether they reject (i.e. assimilation) or accept (i.e. multiculturalism) ‘difference’, but rather, their differing objectives. For while integration aims to understand the process involved in difference (at an individual micro-level) interacting and forming social relations, both assimilation and multiculturalism aim to explain the ideal outcome, yet are ultimately compounded by this desire to design a ready made and ‘total’ macro-level social solution. Although neo-assimilationists have successfully adapted assimilation and multiculturalism to address modern contexts, for example, recent use of ‘transnationalism’ to describe ‘new’ immigrants in comparison with ‘old’ immigrants (e.g. Nagel 2002; Zelinsky 2001), the aims of the two concepts remain unchanged. Thus the dominance of these two concepts has ensured a focus on modernising outcome models, rather than explaining processes.

Limitations of assimilation and the need for ‘integration’

While assimilation theories provide useful insights into the outcome of racial difference, their dominance has unwittingly encouraged a lack of focus on the process involved. Though not disputing assimilation’s primary concern with identifying
change in the minority group’s culture per se,\textsuperscript{1} it appears to have inhibited a focus on the nature of interactions between different cultures. Furthermore, where it could have considered interactions, for example in stages such as ‘acculturation’, the model allows an ethnic group or individual to ‘acculturate’ without actually interacting or developing friendships with members of the host group. Over fifty years ago Park (1950) acknowledged that assimilation failed to comprehend the significant “effects of personal intercourse and … friendships” on social change (cited in Alba and Nee 1997:828), and although there has been subsequent research on integration as comprising social interactions, they remain overshadowed by assimilation.

Integration theory

Definitional confusion

Although the wealth of literature addresses assimilation, perceptions that assimilation has “fallen into disfavour” allowed other terms to appear, though they have “largely given way to the dominant term used today, integration” (Hiebert and Ley 2003:17). Although this implies integration as synonymous with assimilation (as a more acceptable label), the terms are usually perceived as polar opposites. Indeed, Gordon differentiates between assimilation and integration, describing the latter as groups maintaining “cultural differentiation within a framework of social unity [and without] … domination or disunity” (1964:68). However, the similarity with his ‘cultural pluralism’ model indicates his focus on describing outcome models rather than addressing the process (e.g. integration) as a concept in its own right. Similarities between integration and cultural pluralism are common in the literature, and questioned by Abu-Laban (1999) who accepts that although they share similar

\textsuperscript{1} Though it is criticised for failing to consider change in majority group culture, that is not the focus of this research.
principles, their objectives differ, for while multiculturalism advocates a mix of non-dominant cultures, integration aims to unite multiple cultures into one. However, this understanding of integration seems congruent with Gordon’s ‘melting pot’ and assumes a purely outcome approach (i.e. an integrated society), again overlooking the process involved.

In addition, definitions tend to view integration as a ‘dimension’ of another concept, such as assimilation (Duncan and Lieberson 1959) or desegregation (Massey and Denton 1988), or simply the opposite of segregation (Kirschenbaum 1984; Sin 2002; Herbert and Ley 2003:20), rather than a concept in its own right. This has encouraged research on integration based on negative and inactive criteria, such as the “avoidance of contact” and “exposure” to difference respectively (Sin 2002:425), rather than active indicators based on socialising and friendship. Furthermore, although assimilation authors do mention integration, their multiple definitions, such as Glazer’s understanding of integration as a “milder” version of assimilation (1997:149), Duncan and Lieberson’s use of integration as interchangeable with assimilation (1959:370), and Clarke’s dynamic interpretation of “intercommunal relations” (1986:1); reveal the confusion surrounding definition, and highlight the need for clarification.

As mentioned earlier, integration is often confused with assimilation (e.g. Duncan and Lieberson 1959:370; Demaine 1984:40), sometimes perceiving the former as leading to the latter. This implies that if minority groups assimilate majority culture, ‘they’ will henceforth be ‘integrated’ into society, thus failing to appreciate the mutual and reciprocal nature of ‘integration’ between groups, rather than one being ‘integrated into’ the other. This research’s definitional clarification between ‘integration’ rather
than ‘being integrated’ distinguishes between process and outcome respectively. Although the cause of such a lack of research and definitional consensus on cross-racial social integration is unknown, the dominance of other concepts, such as assimilation and segregation, seems a likely culprit (Ellen 2000). A notable exception is located in American urban planner Ingrid Ellen’s work, recognising that racial integration is either a “process” or “result” (2000:15). However, Ellen’s research addresses the latter (i.e. neighbourhoods where black populations constitute 10%-50%), and thus represents the majority of the literature, examining demographically integrated neighbourhoods, rather than the process of integration.

Racially integrated neighbourhoods

Although this research emphasises the need to redress the balance by focusing on integration as a process rather than integrated neighbourhoods as an outcome, as the majority of ‘integration’ work addresses the latter, some awareness of this outcome approach is necessary. As with assimilation, research on ‘racially integrated neighbourhoods’ overwhelmingly addresses America, and is perceived a normative ideal, that is “the time between when the first black moves in and the last white moves out” (Ellen 2000:1). However, Ellen’s research disputes such pessimism, arguing that a fifth of America’s neighbourhoods are racially integrated, over three quarters of which are ‘stable’ (having existed for at least ten years). Furthermore, she disputes assumptions that ‘white flight’ inhibits integrated neighbourhoods, instead arguing that “white avoidance” (i.e. whites choosing not to move into already integrated areas), is the real inhibiter (Ellen 2000:2).

Ellen uses a narrow benchmark of demographic composition (i.e. the mere presence of different races) to assess whether an area is ‘integrated’, aiming to get ‘whites to
move into mixed race areas'. In contrast, this research views such a context as evidence of demographic integration only, and then asks ‘how are people from different races already living in the same neighbourhood interacting on a social everyday level’? In other words, addressing social integration between different groups living in supposedly (according to demographics) ‘integrated’ areas. While Ellen’s approach is crucial for identifying areas that comprise sufficient racial difference to allow an expectation of integration, her interpretation allows neighbourhoods to be labelled ‘integrated’ yet comprise two or more separate racial pockets. Although she recognises this limitation of her work (Ellen 2000:16), the omission is not new, for Glazer and Moynihan’s 1970 research recognised that ‘integrated’ neighbourhoods often comprise pockets of racially homogenous groups rather than social interaction (1970:57 and 62). Although the overwhelming bulk of integration literature favours Ellen-esque demographic indicators, research addressing integration as a qualitative process has been undertaken in the thirty-five years since Glazer and Moynihan’s comment, as outlined below.

Neighbourhood integration

Having addressed the demographic and outcome-focus of ‘racially integrated neighbourhoods’, the process of ‘neighbourhood integration’ is now considered. Although most literature addresses the former, this research is certainly not isolated in interpreting integration as requiring more than demographics. For example, in analysing “social interaction” between East Indians and Creoles in San Fernando, human geographer Colin Clarke uses social indicators such as “clubbing, friendship and intermarriage”, recognising that spatial dynamics such as residential location (e.g. demographics) reveal only economic ability not social integration (1986:129). Clarke
asked respondents to list their friendships (defining friendship as “usually home orientated”) according to race, then analysing the data in ratios. For example, only one in fifteen (1:15) of Creoles’ friends are East Indians, most of whom are based on shared class (1986:133-134). This limited cross-race interaction is confirmed throughout his research, concluding that East Indians and Creoles have avoided integration and favoured group based segmentalism (1986:141). By focusing on friendship (albeit using quantitative analysis) as the indicator of integration, Clarke’s research provides a foundation for further investigation, using more qualitative measures.

At a more theoretical level, sociologist Harvey Molotch recognises integration’s multiple meanings and uses (1972:174). He divides integration into three distinct definitions: “demographic integration” describes the physical presence of different races in a neighbourhood; “biracial interaction” manifests in everyday cordiality and social interaction between races; and “transracial solidarity” functions when different races interact freely and form strong primary relationships in which race is unimportant (Molotch 1972:174). His first definition describes common uses of integration, whilst his latter two indicate a broad dynamic understanding not widely reflected in the literature. Molotch’s recognition of integration as involving both quantitative demographics and qualitative interactions is useful in offering a broad acceptance of integration’s multiple meanings as well as a strategy for clarification rather than a strict alternative to usual ‘outcome’ interpretations. However, the remainder of his work addresses macro-level policies for achieving “managed integration”, and is therefore less relevant.
At a practical level, sociologist Gerald Suttles observes cross-ethnic interactions in an inner-Chicago ‘slum’ neighbourhood (the Addams area), identifying a lack of ‘real’ integration (1968:8). For while most residents claim at least one acquaintance outside their ethnic group, these tend to be largely superficial and rarely extend beyond greeting in the street (1968:61). This is further confirmed by Ley’s 1974 research on the “black inner city”, exploring interaction and integration within a black ‘ghetto’ (Monroe) in Philadelphia, revealing that integration exists only within and not between ethnic and racial groups. In fact, white/black interactions tend to function through intermediaries, largely taking a “political or militant” and/or “reformist or revolutionary” form, rather than a personal or friendship form (1974:114-8).

More recently, Elijah Anderson’s (1990) research on black/white interactions in a racially mixed (but increasingly white and upper-class) area, and an adjacent black (low-income) area observes the dominance of same class and race rather than cross-race friendships (1990:159), leading to clustering within the mixed-race neighbourhood (1990:237). He also notes the age-based differentiation of integration, for while black/white friendships were actively pursued by youths, friendship choices for adults were more determined by occupation and socioeconomic class (1990:12-30). Young people’s active befriending of ‘difference’ was largely a white middle-class phenomenon, seeking to assert their non-racism (as independent from their parents’ perceived attitude), and assimilate the culture (e.g. clothes, music, language) of those perceived ‘real’ victims. Despite this white-initiated idealism, youths did develop cross-race friendships based on equal status, whereas for adults, equal friendships were based on mixing with those sharing similar social outlooks. However, in practice this transpired as virtually no black/white socialising (unless
socioeconomic class is shared), and thus indifference and tolerance, rather than integration or equality, dominate most cross-race interaction (1990:159).

In addition, other research exists that while not principally addressing qualitative integration, demonstrates implied rather than documented social interaction by tackling the quantitative statistics of intermarriage (e.g. Catton and Smirich 1964; Ramsøy 1966; Peach 1980a, 1980b); as well as those indirectly supporting integration as a dynamic process by criticising aggregate segregation ‘indices’ for ignoring contextual variables (e.g. Sin 2002) and failing to capture ethnic clusters within neighbourhoods (e.g. Kirschenbaum 1984). Peach’s research (1980a and 1980b) on intermarriage in New Haven, Connecticut essentially confirms Duncan and Lieberson’s 1959 classic paper demonstrating a negative relationship between residential segregation and assimilation (seen as interchangeable with ‘integration’, 1959:370), taking intermarriage as “one of the most sensitive indicators of ethnic assimilation” (Peach 1980a:372). In other words, where people live (and how segregated it is) determines the likelihood of integrating (indicated by intermarriage) with ‘difference’. Interestingly, Clarke’s San Fernando research revealed that although East Indians and Creoles were residentially desegregated, the dominance of social clustering within desegregated neighbourhoods restricted integration and intermarriage (1986:141). 12

Taking a slightly different approach, Boal assesses the residential movement of people in Belfast, charting their previous and pre-marriage addresses in relation to their current address (1970:159). However, this reveals more about where people move between rather than who they meet and mix with; indeed, Boal’s aim is to

12 Cultural factors also determine intermarriage (e.g. parental pressure to marry within one’s ethnicity), but are beyond the scope of this research (see Beshers 1962).
identify how areas rather than people interact. His approach opens the issue of housing opportunities, which are clearly not neutral, but influenced by structural forces such as labour markets (e.g. affordability), socioeconomic class (e.g. access to loans) and religious groups (e.g. desire to live in an area with those from the same religious grouping). However, although housing clearly plays a role in the availability of friendship circles, this research prioritises analysing micro-level friendship choice rather than macro-level housing choice. In other words, the starting point is contexts in which residents already live in a mixed area, rather than considering the context before they decide to move there. Using a similar approach to Boal, John Western’s 1973 study of the “activity patterns” of three key social groups in Houma, Louisiana, that of blacks (slave descendents), Cajuns (French-speaking Catholics) and ‘newcomers’ (English-speaking white Protestants) does consider friendship choice. However, his conclusions focus on the outcome of black and Cajun groups acculturating towards the ‘newcomers’, rather than on the process of individuals mixing (1973:305-7).

By highlighting the problems of segregation indices, and calling for greater contextualisation of their results rather than “blind application” irrespective of specific social conditions, Sin’s research indirectly highlights the need to consider social integration (2002:422). Furthermore, his case study of segregation in Singapore’s public housing directly tackles social integration by using data from the Housing and Development Board (HDB) whose dual objective is the creation of demographically mixed towns, neighbourhoods and blocks, as well as encouraging inter-ethnic social interaction. Despite this dynamic latter objective, the HDB’s reliance upon ethnic quotas (to ensure public housing allocation reflects ethnic distribution in wider society) fulfils only their first objective, reflecting a belief that
demographic mixing and the absence of cross-ethnic conflict equates to social mixing. Sin's research disputes this belief, revealing social interaction as largely "restricted to superficial social exchanges", rather than the more "intense" relationships reserved for same ethnicity socialising (2002:424).

Aaron Kirschenbaum (1984) also stresses the limitations of segregation indices by attempting to reconcile discrepancies between aggregate segregation measures and real neighbourhood life by measuring the spatial proximity of households occupied by different ethnicities, using this to differentiate between segregation and integration. However, while accurately identifying the limitations of segregation indexes, by assuming that segregation and integration are polar opposites, he embraces a negative interpretation of 'integration' (i.e. integration exists when same ethnicity households do not 'cluster' together, rather than when they do mix), equating integration with 'residing alongside difference' rather than seeking active interaction as a positive indicator. Ironically, he does appear to accept social mixing as crucial to integration but, like Singapore's HDB assumes this will be a product of residential proximity (Kirschenbaum 1984:785). While he may be correct, this requires confirmation, for both Sin's Singapore (2002:424) and Clarke's San Fernando (1986:141) research dispute assumptions that residing together automatically brings interaction.

Furthermore, most research on issues sharing a common background with integration (e.g. desegregation, assimilation) and thus providing inferred references to social integration, focus on quantitative measuring (e.g. Massey and Denton 1993). While early urban scholars (e.g. Park and Burgess 1921) used mapping methods, modern

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13 He awarded each household 'points' depending on the number of adjacent dwellings (i.e. adjacent and opposite house or flat, plus above and below flats in a block) occupied by those of different ethnicity.
research favours statistics, particularly the index of dissimilarity (e.g. Duncan and Duncan 1955; Duncan and Lieberson 1959; Peach 1980a, 1980b)\(^\text{14}\) and the P* index of isolation\(^\text{15}\) (e.g. Lieberson 1981; Sin 2002; Peach 1996a; Robinson 1980) to analyse spatial distance and interaction between ethnic groups. This has facilitated a vacuum of qualitative conceptualisations addressing racial integration. Indeed, segregation researchers merely assume integration as opposite (e.g. the dissimilarity index estimates the number of blacks required to make an area ‘integrated’), and ascribe little or no attention to integration as a concept in its own right. This seems likely to be a consequence of the dilemma that while high levels of segregation demonstrate a lack of social integration, the opposite does not hold true, as low levels of segregation do not necessarily promote social integration. In this context, it is hardly surprising that no conclusive definition of what entails integration appears to exist, and while Ellen’s work (2000) does seek to address this omission, her limited conceptualisation of ‘integrated’ as the demographic presence of racial difference, ultimately restricts her aim to provide a definition encompassing all aspects of integration. Her research succeeds only in determining how to get people from different races to reside in a shared area, and while clearly an important research area, I dispute her focus on two main grounds. Firstly, her use of percentages to ‘prove’ integration adopts the segregationalist understanding of integration which Ellen herself criticises. Secondly, surely research seeking to encourage different races to move into shared areas needs to address the nature of the relationships (or lack

\(^{14}\) The index of dissimilarity measures segregation according to the spatial unevenness of group distribution on a scale from 0 (even distribution) to 100 (complete segregation), with values of 70 or more indicating high levels of segregation (Kantrowitz 1969).

\(^{15}\) The P* index measures the potential for contact and/or degree of isolation between different ethnic groups ranging from 0.00 to 1.00, with values above 0.70 indicating high levels of isolation (Massey and Denton 1989).
thereof) that develop between people in this situation, in order to reveal more about how to deepen the integration process (in both my own and Ellen's terms).

As implied by this review of 'integration' literature, it is necessary to distinguish between desegregation and integration, which are not interchangeable, as often assumed. The definition coined by social activist Kenneth Clark, emphasising the personal nature of integration as "a subjective and individual process [which] involves attitudinal changes and the removal of fears, hatreds, suspicions, stereotypes and superstitions" (1960:16-17), is favoured. In contrast, desegregation describes the removal of formal institutional racial barriers, such as access to public services and equal legal status (Clark 1960:16-17). Integration therefore involves far more than desegregation, and is highly dependent on individual human social behaviour.

**Social distancing**

Social distance describes "the degrees ... of understanding and feeling that persons experience regarding each other" and is crucial in understanding the nature of interaction between races (Bogardus 1925:299). In other words, by identifying people's attitudes to others (particularly towards those of a different race), one can identify the reasons behind people's behaviour towards others (e.g. whether they integrate or not). The classic study on social distance between different ethnic groups is provided by sociologist Emory Bogardus' 1925 experiment, asking 110 young businessmen and schoolteachers to which social distance levels (seven were listed) they would admit each ethnic group (39 were listed) (1925:300-301). The seven levels of his 'social distance scale' were, accepting a race: "to close kinship by marriage; to my club as personal chums; to my street as neighbours; to employment

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16 Whilst desegregation is also residential, Clark’s institutional definition captures the overarching essence of desegregation, of which residential patterns are a component.
in my occupation; to citizenship in my country; as visitors only to my country”; and “would exclude from my country” (Ibid). 17

Bogardus then developed a “social contact range” (SCR) for each race, using their mean admittance rate to the seven social distances (1925:300). For example, Armenians were admitted to an average of one social distancing group (1.00 SCR), whereas English immigrants were admitted to five groups (5.00 SCR), indicating that the latter’s social contacts are five times those available to the former (1925:300). Therefore, the smaller a race’s SCR, the lower their range of potential social contacts and the lower their potential for integration (1925:302). Furthermore, those admitted to a high number of social groups (i.e. high SCR) are admitted to the most intimate social contacts, and vice versa (1925:305). Twenty years later, Bogardus conducted the same experiment (on different respondents), concluding that although people had become more knowledgeable about different races, racial distancing attitudes were virtually unchanged (1947:55-62). Although a useful study into people’s attitudes, Bogardus’ approach reveals the attitudes of respondents to a “race name”, rather than a “real human being”, and responses are thus likely to be determined by stereotyped perceptions rather than real interaction (Katz and Braly 1958:41). This highlights the need to go beyond social distancing attitudes, and examine social integration behaviour.

A more behaviour-focused social distance scale was developed by Beshers almost forty years later. His continuum was based on a range of contacts that parents would try to avoid their child engaging in with an ‘undesirable’ potential marriage partner, and if contact occurred, would seek to avoid it moving deeper along the continuum

17 Bogardus identified these seven ‘social distance scales’ by asking 100 people to divide 60 ‘social distance’ statements into seven graduated categories, and then taking the mean average of each statement appearing in a category to derive each category’s label (1933:265-271).
His continuum ranged from: marriage, eating meals together, living in the same neighbourhood, attending the same school, doing the same job, meeting on the street, and never meeting. This is clearly more behaviour orientated than Bogardus' attitudinal social-distance scale, with Beshers recognising that increased contact facilitates integration, and that progression along his continuum depends on the context (e.g. mixing in the home is further along the integration path than mixing on the street). A more thorough investigation into the factors facilitating integration follows below.

**Factors facilitating integration**

At an empirical level, Oliver Bakewell's (2002) research on Angolan refugees in Zambia identifies their "self integration" into Zambian villages (rather than accepting refugee camps), based on stable mutual friendships and significant social mixing. Although his research is highly context specific, his three factors facilitating integration offer indications and hypotheses for research elsewhere. Firstly, refugees and locals share the same livelihood (subsistence farming), they also share village resources (e.g. children attend the same schools), and both groups benefit from the union (Angolans provide agricultural labour, whilst Zambians offer protection and land). As outlined in Table 1.1, using Bakewell's factors, it is hypothesised that integration is more likely if neighbourhood residents have a common occupational type (e.g. professionals, manual labourers), share neighbourhood resources (e.g. schools, churches, sports clubs), and both perceive benefits from relationships.

Ah Eng's (1995) qualitative ethnographic research in Singapore concludes that diverse ethnic groups can coexist peacefully and interact, in terms of everyday mundane social activities and pleasantries (e.g. "eating, shopping, chatting, playing..."
and neighbouring", 1995:62), provided three basic conditions exist. Firstly, there is a universal appreciation of diversity and peaceful intent by all residents (1995:191); secondly, the maintenance of cultural (rather than physical) ethnic boundaries (1995:61-2 and 194-5); and finally, state promotion of ethnic relations (1995:195). Ah Eng’s first condition is also identified by Suttles in Chicago, where neighbourhood social norms actively discouraged interethnic friendship (for fear of ‘trouble’), thus inhibiting integration (1968:61). Furthermore, if Ah Eng’s awareness of the need for state support for integration is broadened to ‘institutional support’, then both Suttles’ and Ley’s American black ghetto research confirm her third condition, noting the importance of churches (whether neighbourhood based or not) in encouraging integration and providing a key meeting ground for different groups (Ley 1974:155-156; Suttles 1968:229), as outlined in Table 1.1.

Furthermore, a significant number of studies assess the role of propinquity in facilitating social integration. Indeed, almost all take it as assumed by virtue of researching “locality groups [on the basis] ... that their members cannot simply ignore one another” (Suttles 1968:7), alongside indications that intermarriage inversely reflects residential segregation (Duncan and Lieberson 1959; Peach 1980a, 1980b). Though this seems somewhat axiomatic (i.e. people who live nearby are more likely to interact), there is some evidence that social proximity is often a stronger driving force than spatial proximity (Catton and Smirich 1964), although spatial propinquity is not as unrelated as Ramsøy suggests (1966:778-781).¹⁸ This ‘social propinquity’ links to Ah Eng’s second condition, and is also confirmed by Bogardus’ social distancing experiments, revealing that people feel closer to those of similar social/cultural background (1925:300 and 1947:62), as outlined in Table 1.1.

¹⁸ See Peach 1974 for a thorough refutation of Ramsøy’s analysis.
Table 1.1: Perspectives in the literature on key factors facilitating integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTORS FACILITATING INTEGRATION</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal/Individual</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both perceive benefits from the relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakewell 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ah Eng 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarke 1986 and 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suttles 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community/Neighbourhood</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share neighbourhood resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and locals shared village resources - e.g. children attended the same schools (2nd factor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National/Institutional</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of inter-ethnic relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong state promotion of inter-ethnic interaction (3rd factor)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bakewell 2002: Both groups benefit - refugees provide labour, and locals offered protection and land (3rd factor).

Ah Eng 1995: Maintenance of cultural/social rather than physical/spatial boundaries between ethnic groups (2nd factor).

Clarke 1986 and 1993: Weak relationship between spatial proximity and social integration. People are more likely to integrate with those of social rather than spatial propinquity.

Suttles 1968: Those who moved home broadened their social network, by maintaining friendships with neighbours in the old and new area.

Bogardus 1925: People feel less social distance from ethnicities of similar social characteristics.

Simon 1986: Children sharing resources inhibited integration by antagonising residents.

Bristol University study: Children are segregated in the playground.
However, socially similar groups tend to be spatially proximate, largely due to similar jobs, housing opportunities, and access to transport (Clarke 1976:159) and thus spatial propinquity should be not ignored (Peach 1974). Interestingly, Suttles identifies moving house within a neighbourhood as a catalyst for integration, as movers maintain old area friendships and also meet people in their new area, thus broadening their integrating potential (1968:229).

This social (rather than spatial) ‘clustering’ concept confirms Colin Clarke’s (1993) analysis of social distancing between Creoles and East Indians in Trinidad. In his research, evidence that spatial desegregation between Indians and Creoles was occurring (excluding whites, who remained highly segregated) without a corresponding increase in intermarriage rates led Clarke to conclude that the two groups were polarised into “racial enclaves” within desegregated areas, such that while the two groups resided in spatial proximity, there was little social interaction\(^{19}\) (1993:128-133). Social clustering within a desegregated neighbourhood is thus identified as inhibiting integration, and also indicates the need to look beyond physical desegregation in analysing integration.

A significant amount of research emphasises children as catalysts for facilitating integration, with Young and Willmott providing a humorous comparison that while dog ownership was ‘helpful’ in meeting people, children are the “biggest aid” (1960:92). Anderson goes so far as to attribute their social lives as “directly responsible for ... neighbourhood solidarity and friendly involvement” (1990:146). Essentially, as residents become parents, and children form the focus of their lives, they subsequently develop friendships with parents of their child’s playmates

\(^{19}\) It is important to note that in this context the tendency for marriage to be arranged by parents within the East Indian community (overwhelmingly with another family within one’s ethnic group) will have diluted the role of proximity.
This is also identified by Suttles, noting child friendship as a key precipitator of cross-ethnic relations at two levels. Firstly, children respect each others’ parents irrespective of race (ideally facilitating integration in future generations), and secondly, in the present, parents often develop acquaintanceships based on their children’s friendship (1968:229). In other words, children become key “agents for knitting the community together socially” and facilitate integration because parents of children’s friends are accepted as ‘Marvin’s Dad’, rather than a ‘black man’ (Anderson 1990:145-6). Even more recently, Singapore’s 1998 HDB ‘sample household survey’ revealed that ‘non-family’ households (e.g. flat shares, less likely to host children) knew the least number of neighbours and had the most superficial neighbourhood interactions (Sin 2002:434). Addressing slightly older children, Western identified that socialising between blacks and Houma’s other key social groups (Cajuns and whites) only occurred amongst high-school students, thus indicating youths as the future of social integration (1973:314). However, not all research attributes a positive role for children. Indeed, David Simon’s research on the desegregation process in post-colonial Namibia, identified children as having a negative impact on integration, as their playful presence in a neighbourhood not previously accessible to their race antagonised existing residents (1986:303). Furthermore, a recent research study undertaken at the University of Bristol highlighted that children are more segregated in the playground than in the neighbourhood (quoted in Leppard 2005).

While proximity does not facilitate integration per se, the location of interaction is important, as area and social context influence attitudes. For example, although minority groups residing in mixed areas tend to remain socially isolated, research on British working-class families living in middle-class areas reveals they adopt majority
culture/class values and attitudes (Robson 1969; Young and Willmott 1960:73), and also that those living on side roads rather than main roads tend to interact with neighbours more (Young and Willmott 1960:95). In addition, Clarke’s research reveals the process of integration as most likely to thrive if commencing in public settings (e.g. social clubs) before moving into private spheres (e.g. marriage) (1986:141). This indicates a need for integration research to use broader indicators than marriage, typically perceived the ‘ultimate’ example of social integration (e.g. Catton and Smirich 1964; Ramsøy 1966; Peach 1980a, 1980b). However, identifying appropriate qualitative indicators to assess the extent of ‘socialising’ is inherently problematic. The subsequent section therefore examines the concept of social relations, and considers indicators used in previous research.

Social Relations

Historiography of definitions

Social relations form the keystone of integration, existing because humans desire interaction and association (Tönnies 1887). Although Gordon addresses their outcome rather than process, his distinction between primary (e.g. family, marriage) and secondary social relations (e.g. colleagues, neighbours) is useful. For while development of the former between ethnicities leads to assimilation, the latter only “facilitate[s] accommodation” (Gordon 1964:62). According to Gordon, most people (excluding intellectuals) associate primary relationships only within their ethnic group, leaving cross-group relationships largely impersonal and secondary (1964:234). His conceptualisation of primary and secondary social relations alongside his awareness of weak primary cross group relations seem so crucial that it
is surprising to locate them so late in his book that they do not inform his assimilation theories.

Other interpretations of social relations are principally located in sociology, focusing on personal communication based on shared understandings (e.g. Shibutani and Kwan 1965; Duncan 1962; Tarde 1969). In terms of public social relations, ethnographic sociologist Erving Goffman brought to the fore the previously ignored and under valued (at least in academic circles) "realm of activity ... generated by face to face interaction", enabling social relations to be recognised as a subject matter in its own right (1971:13). Goffman links human interaction with broader public life by explaining the former as both governed by, and feeding into, the customs and practices of public life (collectively termed 'social order'). This links to nineteenth century sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies (1887), who understood social relationships as crucial for establishing social order. However, although both Goffman and Tönnies successfully opened 'social interaction' for study, their sociological works tend to focus on social relations purely as the foundation for establishing social groups and preserving social order, rather than addressing the nature of relations themselves.

Moving away from theoretical understanding, to consider practical demonstrations, Anderson observes the changing interpretation of cross-race social interaction over time in his Chicago case-study. For while 1950s/60s white residents actively invited 'Negroes' to eat meals in their homes, modern 1980s 'newcomers' passively demonstrate integration by arguing race as irrelevant and seeking to be colour-blind (1990:143). However, this fails to produce integration both in secondary contexts, where whites refer to black friends as a 'black guy' rather than 'friend' as their colour-blind stance would imply, and also in public places, where those of the same
race “gravitate” together (ibid). This ‘indifference’ seems common, and is demonstrated elsewhere as a characterising feature of mixed race neighbourhoods, and is examined below.

Cross-race social relations

An excellent example of cross-race social mixing is identified in Dutch social scientist Talja Blokland’s (2003) one-year analysis of inter-ethnic relationships between Dutch residents and migrant neighbours in a Rotterdam neighbourhood. Although she focuses primarily on the construction of ethnic identity rather than inter-ethnic relations, her interpretation of the former as a consequence of the latter ensures that her quadruple typology of cross-race interactions has applicability for integration. In other words, she addresses the products of cross-race integration rather than its nature per se, but in doing so, does gain insights into the latter. Her quadruple typology is displayed in Table 1.2, charted against other author’s findings.

Blokland’s first theory of cross-race relations identifies “indifference”, in which “little local contact and little interest in neighbourhood contacts” forms the common response to inter-ethnic proximity. She emphasises this does not reveal an integrated neighbourhood, but rather a lack of community (Blokland 2003:19). Indifference was most prevalent amongst residents with social networks outside the neighbourhood, and those with sufficient material resources (e.g. cars, self-sufficient home, telephone) and private space (e.g. large house and grounds) to have no ‘need’ for neighbours. While they would greet a neighbour irrespective of ethnicity, and exhibit no negative attitude towards ‘difference’, there was no deeper integration and “almost no relationship” (2003:5-6). This seems to be a largely middle-class phenomenon and similar trends exist elsewhere, for example in Belfast’s desegregated middle-class
areas where Catholics and Protestants reside in the same neighbourhood, but social interactions do not penetrate house boundaries and integration is absent (Boal 1982:270); as well as in Trinidad, where middle- and upper-classes are less dependent on neighbours and have greater access to communications than lower-classes, and thus their friendships are less affected by distance (Clark 1976:150); and also in an east London suburb where middle-class residents tend to have as close contact with relatives as their working-class counterparts despite their tendency to live further apart, largely due to having a car, telephone, and spare rooms for guests (Young and Willmott 1960:72-73). This differentiation between the class of residents is crucial, indeed Young and Willmott’s classic study of a ‘London suburb’ identified that while middle-class and working-class residents both form close ties within their neighbourhood, the former mix with friends and the latter with extended kinship (1957:viii and 1960:97-98), while Western’s Houma study identified a positive relationship between one’s class and distance travelled to socialise, implying that the higher classes prioritise non-local friendships (1973:321). Frustratingly, Blokland fails to mention whether those with social ties predominantly outside the neighbourhood (largely middle-class women) have any relationships within the neighbourhood, and if so, whether they reveal an ethnic preference. Despite this omission, Blokland’s indifference theory offers a hypothesis for integration, suggesting that indifference (equated to peaceful coexistence, e.g. Young 1990) does not indicate social mixing or facilitate integration.

Secondly, Blokland’s "contact hypothesis" argues that the greater the frequency of interactions between groups, the greater the understanding and mutual respect (2003:7). In Blokland’s case study, middle aged Dutch women initiated relations with immigrants, on the basis of friendly neighbour relations. However, this one-way
Table 1.2: Outcomes of cross-race social relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Indifference</th>
<th>2. Contact hypothesis</th>
<th>3. Realistic conflicts</th>
<th>4. Non-realistic conflicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Blokland 2003** | • Limited contact and lack of interest in neighbourhood relations  
   • Neighbours greet on street, but no deeper relationship.  
   • Those with non local networks have most ‘indifference’ | • Greater frequency of interactions, ensure greater understanding and mutual respect  
   • In her case-study, contact was one-way (Dutch ‘helping’ immigrants), therefore inhibited increased respect. | • Competition over shared facilities (e.g. schools, park) leads to conflict with each other along ethnic lines.  
   • This was exaggerated by Dutch people’s fear that their inability to control local disputes would ultimately lead to ‘their’ country being run by ‘others’. |
| **Other authors** | 1. Boal 1982  
   In Belfast’s desegregated middle-class areas, Protestants and Catholic reside next door to each other, but social integration does not penetrate house boundaries | 1. Mitchell 1968  
   Over time, if contacts continue, initial frictions subside and give way to increased understanding and respect.  
2. Bakewell 2002 & Ah Eng 1995  
   Ethnic groups are more likely to have contact if they share similar status, social activities and interests | 1. Suttles 1968  
   Although his research revealed conflict to be an integrating force (the opposite of Blokland’s theory), Suttles’ was referring to conflict between neighbours and outsiders, whereas Blokland means conflict between neighbours.  
2. Clarke 1986  
   In Trinidad’s post-colonial era, ethnic groups fear domination by other ethnic groups (as well as desiring the domination of their ethnicity).  
   Unlike Blokland’s case-study, these researchers identified the sharing of neighbourhood resources as a means for achieving integration not antagonising relations (see table one).  
4. Simon 1986  
   Children playing in areas previously forbidden to their race leads to antagonism.  
5. Park 1950  
2nd element in race relations cycle: “competition” | 1. Clarke 1986  
   In Trinidad’s colonial era, cross-race relations were based on hatred of other groups.  
2. Park 1950  
2nd element in race relations cycle: “competition” |
relationship, with Dutch women 'helping' immigrants to become more like 'us' (similar to assimilation), viewed newcomers as incomplete, and involved no reciprocity as Dutch women did not seek help in return. Although contact did enhance cross-ethnic understanding, it did not lead to mutual respect as relationships were inherently unequal, with migrants perceived as 'inappropriate' rather than 'different' (Blokland 2003:9). However, over a longer period, it is anticipated that initial frictions would subside and enable increased understanding, providing contact continues (as indicated by Clyde Mitchell’s 1968 research on cross-tribe social interactions in the Zambian Copperbelt). In addition, as noted earlier by Bakewell and Ah Eng, ethnic groups are more likely to interact if they already share social status, social activities and interests, clearly not the case in Blokland’s Rotterdam case study.

Blokland’s third type of cross-race interaction identifies “realistic conflicts” (2003:11) in which competition over shared facilities (e.g. a communal square or park) leads to conflict along ethnic lines. In her case study, peaceful indifference reigned until the Dutch felt threatened, for example, by youths from a minority ethnicity playing football in the square. While this appears relatively minor, the Dutch’s inability to discipline children from ‘other’ cultures revealed a deeper fear that eventually ‘other’ ethnic groups will dominate ‘their’ country (2003:12-13). Interestingly, Suttles’ 1968 research in black inner city Chicago revealed conflict as force for cross-race unity not division, observing that although ethnic minorities maintained separate socialising, they were prepared to join forces (based on territorial affinity) against an outside enemy (1968:32-33). However, Suttles interprets this spatial affinity not so much as a consequence of positive unity, but a negative and practical desire not to have neighbours as enemies (1968:34-35), and it differs from
Blokland’s example in that her ‘realistic conflict’ is between neighbours not between neighbours and outsiders. In contrast, Blokland’s fourth type, of “non realistic conflicts” describes Dutch people who have virtually no contact with immigrants, and are thus not involved in “realistic” disputes, yet use the ethnicity label to “scapegoat” immigrants as the ‘other’ to be avoided and rejected (2003:19 20).

Blokland’s quadruple typology is expected to be of significant use for analysing cross-race relations beyond the realms of Rotterdam, as displayed in Table 1.2. Her research confirms trends identified by Clarke’s earlier (1986) study of “intercommunal relations” between East and West Indians in postcolonial Trinidad. His qualitative research revealed that whilst colonial cross-race relations demonstrated indifference (Blokland’s first hypothesis) and antipathy (Blokland’s fourth hypothesis), in the postcolonial era they have been replaced by both a desire for domination and a fear of being dominated (similar to Blokland’s third hypothesis), thus fuelling cross-group antipathy rather than interaction (Clarke 1986:1). A forerunner to Blokland’s work is also identified fifty years earlier in Robert Park’s analysis of race relations throughout history, from which he develops a “race relations cycle” of “contacts, competition, accommodation and eventual assimilation” (1950:150). However, although his predictions of cross-race outcomes share similarities with Blokland’s (Table 1.2), his interpretation of them as a “progressive and irreversible” cycle seems somewhat linear and pre-determined compared to Blokland’s presentation of a range of possible outcomes (Park 1950:150).

A provisional integration continuum

As this literature review has indicated, prior research on integration has emphasised quantitative methods and therefore establishing qualitative indicators for assessing
integration are crucial. In order to contribute towards this, a provisional continuum of
integration is offered in Table 1.3. The social context of interaction is correlated to
the depth of integration along a minimum/maximum continuum. For example
'indifference' and socialising in the street might feature as a minimum, with home-
based friendships as a maximum, and mixing in groups (e.g. churches) somewhere in
between.\textsuperscript{20} This is not to suggest that progress through the contexts would
necessarily occur in a linear fashion, but simply to provide a means to plot the level
of interaction. However, it should be noted that different cultures may place different
weightings on bringing friends into the home, for example, Young and Willmott's
comparison of a working-class (Bethnal Green) and middle-class (Woodford) suburb
in London identified that while the latter viewed friendship as 'going into one and
another's houses' (1960:89-91), the former would very rarely invite non-relatives into
their home (1957:107-8). In addition, Western's analysis of the activity patterns of
blacks, Cajuns and whites in Houma discovered that unlike whites, Cajun's do \textit{not}
invite friends to their home for dinner, preferring to socialise at church and on the
street (1973:308); thus the specifics of the continuum would need to be
contextualised.

\textsuperscript{20}As the continuum measures only positive social integration, negative demonstrations (such as violent
conflict) would register off the scale (or perhaps in a separate 'negative' continuum).
Table 1.3: Provisional integration continuum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHOR</th>
<th>FOCUS</th>
<th>METHOD</th>
<th>CONTINUUM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bogardus</td>
<td>ATTITUDE: The social distance invoked towards a person of different ethnicity.</td>
<td>Linear progression along seven stages.</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Social Contact Continuum" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beshers</td>
<td>BEHAVIOUR: Parents avoid children having contact with ‘other’ in each context. CONTEXT: Home-based mixing (5-7) facilitates integration more than school (4) or street (2) mixing.</td>
<td>Increased movement along the scale facilitates integration.</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Social Distance Continuum" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon</td>
<td>BEHAVIOUR: Migrants’ ability to ‘settle’ in new area.</td>
<td>Movement along over time.</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="Social Integration Continuum" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemanski</td>
<td>BEHAVIOUR: How people mix socially with those of a different race in shared contexts. CONTEXT: Impact of social context (e.g. neighbourhood, work-place, social group, children) on integration.</td>
<td>Use continuum to plot findings rather than pre-determine progression.</td>
<td>No pre-determined continuum, but possible example: <img src="image" alt="Neighbourhood Integration Continuum" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although such a ‘continuum’ approach is not entirely new (e.g. Beshers 1962), the focus is new. For example Clarke’s continuum plots the location of ethnic groups
according to their degree of segregation (e.g. segregated whites at one end, with integrated Hindus and Moslems at the other) rather than the process involved (1976:156), while Bogardus’ “gradation” of deepening social contact along his seven ‘social distance’ groups, assumes linear progression (1925:305). Rather, this research advocates a continuum to be used to plot findings rather than determine the placing of races (Clarke) or assume irreversible progression along the line (Beshers, Gordon), as outlined in Table 1.3. Simon’s research on desegregating Namibia (addressing households moving into an area previously forbidden to their race), provides a useful threefold focus: identifying migrant’s ability to interact with new neighbours, develop friendships with, and widen their social circle to include old and new neighbours (1986:303-303). A focus on children would also seem merited given their attributed role as catalysts for integration. However, perhaps the neighbourhood is not the best site for assessing integration, rather the workplace\textsuperscript{21}, non-local church or social group (or even the internet) provide the true location for integration? Whether accurate or not, only further research on the process of integration will reveal.

**Empirical Examples**

To complement the theories already outlined, some empirical awareness of neighbourhood integration (or lack thereof) in contexts similar to South Africa (e.g. Southern Africa) is necessary. Although there is some justification for excluding South Africa from comparative analysis as a ‘unique’ case (in terms of apartheid history and relative political and economic strength within Africa), providing the comparison remains within southern Africa, there are sufficient similarities, such as common colonial history (with racially segregated societies based on white

\textsuperscript{21} For example, Kevin Yelvington’s (1990) research in Trinidad discovered strong workplace racial integration, facilitated by physically sharing workplace space, and wage-work’s level playing field, particularly between blacks and East Indians.
supremacy) and post-independence socio-political and urban trends, to warrant comparison.

Therefore, Harare in Zimbabwe and Windhoek in Namibia are used as possible indicators for South Africa, given that their 1980s experience of urban desegregation is representative of the process in contemporary South Africa. Indeed southern African scholar David Simon describes pre-1970 Windhoek as a “model apartheid city” (1991:174), and as South African urban geographer Neil Dewar commented in reference to Harare, they serve as “windows on the future” for South Africa (1991). However, the vast majority of research on urban change in Harare and Windhoek (e.g. Pickard-Cambridge 1988; Simon 1991; Dewar 1991; Cummings 1990; Davies 1992) address the institutional nature of desegregation (e.g. the property market, schools, health services, local government) with minimal reference to social interactions between people in this process. In addition, racial difference is assessed solely as numerical, for example research on suburbs containing a stable minority of whites (20%) in Harare (Pickard-Cambridge 1988:21), with no mention of the extent of communication and interactions between these statistical ‘percentages’, rather than people. Where social mixing is alluded to, comments rarely stray beyond awareness that whites’ pre-desegregation fears were allayed by the peaceful passage of change (1988:5), yet this implies merely a reduction in tension and fears rather than active social interaction and mixing.

Indeed, both Simon and Dewar note that the overwhelming majority of blacks moving into ‘white’ areas in Windhoek and Harare experienced “virtually no contact with neighbours” (Simon 1991:183), and there is minimal social mixing between races (Dewar 1991:198). Although Simon accurately notes this as common of
middle-class areas worldwide, such a fatalistic acceptance fails to appreciate the non-middle class origin (in terms of spatial residence) of black incomers, who could therefore be reasonably expected to break with traditional middle-class residential practices. Furthermore, there is no mention of the extent of same-race neighbourly relations in such neighbourhoods, which would provide a more complete awareness of neighbourhood attitudes to cross-race mixing. Interestingly, although most blacks in Harare's middle-class areas have not retained social links with their previous township residence, these have not been replaced by friendships and networks in their new 'white' neighbourhood. Indeed, few have joined local sports clubs, where 'real' mixing with whites might occur, and although they use nearby shopping centres and public facilities, no 'real' cross-race mixing is likely to occur in such contexts (Dewar 1991:199). A similar trend is identified by Pickard-Cambridge who notes that white residents in Windhoek and Harare were more opposed to the desegregation of schools and health services than the desegregation of residential areas (1988:34). Although both Dewar and Pickard-Cambridge fail to illuminate the reasons for this, one possibility is that residential desegregation does not require interaction or social mixing with difference, as one can rely on non-local networks and a self-sufficient household. In contrast, desegregation in schools and health services would require socialising with difference (e.g. children playing together) and sharing resources with difference, thus requiring a far deeper commitment to integration than the mere physical proximity of homes. Such trends are evident in Belfast, where segregated schooling has reproduced social divisions irrespective of residential desegregation (Jones 1960:242-3; Poole 1982:281 and 305). Although schools are officially desegregated in South Africa, in reality desegregation has occurred in only one direction, "at the upper end of the traditional racial hierarchy" in previously White
and Indian schools, while Black African schools remain mono-racial (Lemon 2005:69).

The failure of southern African urban research to address social interaction (when mentioned, reference to social mixing is brief and as an after-thought to the substance of research) is recognised by Davies (1992). He admits that his work on desegregation in Harare addresses only the “mechanical elements” and fails to consider the “deeper question” as to whether neighbourhoods in which different races now reside demonstrate any “social interaction or integration” (1992:312). Over a decade since Davies’ comments, the lack of attention to cross-race interaction continues. Indeed, this research could be seen as an answer to Davies’ implied call for further research focusing on “effective neighbouring and friendship networks” in such neighbourhoods, noting that the current lack of research in this area ensures that only negative information, that is the absence of violent cross-race conflict, is available (1992:312).

Although South Africa is significantly larger in terms of population, economy, rate of urbanisation and size of urban areas, the experience of social integration in Windhoek and Harare do provide laboratories or models for South Africa. In all three countries, ‘integration’ has not automatically followed official desegregation; in Windhoek and Harare desegregation has operated along class lines, and a similar trend is already evident in South Africa; and despite initial hostility to the presence of blacks in white areas of Windhoek and Harare, people have soon become accustomed to each other, although ‘indifference’ rather than integration prevails. Whether this final characteristic holds true in South Africa is addressed by this research. The specific
South African historical and contemporary context is discussed in the subsequent chapter.

Integration Policies

Although this research addresses the reality of social integration rather than the role of urban integration policies per se, the latter requires brief consideration. For while urban policymakers are universal in promoting the desirability of 'integration' as an urban ideal, understandings of 'integration' and means for achieving it differ widely. Much of this definitional confusion stems from a lack of debate regarding what is meant by 'integration', what strategies are seeking to integrate (e.g. integration amongst residents themselves, integrating residents into urban strategies or into the city, integrating local government institutions, or even economic structures), as well as the methods and indicators for assessment. To further compound this uncertainty, the term is regularly employed with reference to the policy-making process itself (i.e. integrated planning), rather than as the policy goal. For example, the OECD urge urban policy-makers to adopt an "integrated approach to policy-making" in contrast to the previous single-sector focus (OECD 1996:11 and 22-23). Also, 'integration' is used when encouraging planners to consult the needs of all stakeholders and thus 'integrate' their 'external' opinions with those of the 'internal' locals. This definitional confusion is clarified by classifying 'integration' strategies according to their objective either to integrate people or the planning process. While the latter focuses on policymakers/planners and their relationship

22 Although urban planners refer to integration in both a social and economic capacity, this research addresses social integration (i.e. integrating human difference).

23 Evidence that urban policymakers are universally in favour of 'integration' is revealed from a simply survey of the titles given to modern 'urban development' strategies. For example, the 'Integrated District Development Plan' (IDDP) in Peru (Mathaer and Ng 1997:241-243), the 'Integrated Holistic Approach Urban Development Project' (IHAUDP) in Ethiopia (Jarman 1997:186-188), and the 'Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Programme' (IUIDP) in Indonesia (Mathaer and Ng 1997:243-245).
with the city and citizens, of more relevance to this research are people strategies, which can be further sub-divided into those concerned with integrating relationships between citizens and the city, and those between citizens and citizens (within the city).

As this research addresses the latter, particularly amongst citizens sharing a common neighbourhood within the city, urban strategies concerned with citizen-to-citizen integration at the neighbourhood level are discussed. Such micro-urban policies seek to ‘manage’ human difference within the neighbourhood, and though use of the term ‘manage’ is somewhat irksome, it does highlight the key failing of such policies, in that urban planners/policy-makers ‘dictate’ (or ‘manage’) social change. ‘Integration Management Programmes’ (IMPs) are an example of such strategies, popular in 1970s and 1980s America, seeking to ensure neighbourhoods maintain a racial balance of diversity. In practice this involves simultaneously encouraging blacks\(^{24}\) to move into suburban areas whilst also averting white flight (Saff 1993:60). IMPs are criticised for constraining freedom of choice and enabling white ‘control’ of middle-class suburbs rather than promoting integration. However, it is important to bear in mind that IMP objectives are not synonymous with integration, for while an IMP could be successful in bringing different races into a neighbourhood (i.e. demographic integration), such ‘success’ may fail to achieve ‘integration’ if, for example, blacks and whites do not socialise together and/or pockets of racial groups function in isolation within the ‘integrated’ neighbourhood. Thus the IMP approach is largely unsuccessful, yet there is a dearth of alternative policies for achieving

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\(^{24}\) ‘black’ is used by Saff as a reference to the minority culture, whilst ‘White’ indicates the dominant culture – these labels are somewhat problematic for South Africa (given that blacks are not the minority or dominant culture) but are utilised here as an accepted short-hand given that Saff is referring to racial dynamics in the USA.
integration,\textsuperscript{25} and while frustrating, this vacuum does at least strengthen the need for this research.

The uncertainty surrounding integration, in terms of definition and strategy approach, provides the necessary impetus for this research. The approach favoured does not seek to support social engineering strategies (whether seeking to achieve segregation or integration, such as apartheid or IMPs respectively) but takes the starting point of analysing people’s experience of integration and scaling up from there, rather than starting with a prescriptive policy aim (e.g. IMPs) and/or predetermined vision of the ‘ideal’ neighbourhood outcome (e.g. assimilation, multiculturalism). Such an approach analyses the nature and form of social integration at the micro-level of post-apartheid urban neighbourhoods in South Africa, within the context of existing urban strategies. Thus it is now necessary to explain the South African context of research.

\textsuperscript{25} Although many other countries operate similar mixed housing strategies as a means to achieve social integration (e.g. the Dutch ‘urban restructuring’ policy, Uitermark 2003), they all essentially rely on the (unproven) assumption that spatial proximity equates to social integration.
CHAPTER TWO: SOUTH AFRICA CONTEXT

"The social structure of post-apartheid cities remains a largely neglected subject”
Jeremy Seekings 2000:834

As indicated in the previous chapter, in contrast to the common emphasis on the social outcome of racial difference (e.g. assimilation, cultural pluralism), this research focuses on the social process, using the concept of social integration, and taking the city of Cape Town in South Africa as its case-study. The previous chapter addressed the theoretical aspects of ‘social integration’, enabling this chapter to apply the theory to the South African context. While not assuming that theories and examples from Western capitalist societies necessarily have direct relevance or applicability in the South African (or wider developing country) context, they are useful in providing a starting point from which to commence research, and also for guiding thought towards developing hypotheses relevant to South Africa. Although Robinson (2005) accurately argues the need for an urban theory rooted in both Western and non-Western experiences (rather than just the former), that is not to say that inherently Western urban theories cannot be useful in analysing the complexities of post-apartheid South Africa (e.g. Oßenbrügge 2003).

The previous chapter provided an exploration into assimilation and integration at a theoretical level, arguing the need for empirical work on cross-race ‘integration’ as a dynamic social process of friendships and socialising between individuals from different races living in a shared urban neighbourhood. This is so as to redress the balance from the common emphasis on ‘integrated’ neighbourhoods as a statistical
demographic outcome. In order to build upon the foundations developed in that chapter, the following section contextualises both assimilation and ethnic identity within the South African milieu. The research problem is then contextualised by tracing South Africa's historical progression from the apartheid city with enforced separation, into the post-apartheid era of supposed integration. The role of integration in South Africa's history and contemporary context is then considered before analysing the changing demographics of Cape Town using census 2001 data. Having used the census to identify the neighbourhoods in which to conduct research, background information on these areas is provided.

THEORETICAL TERMINOLOGY IN CONTEXT

Although the terminology and empirical application used in assimilation theory is based on culture transfer between immigrants and hosts rather than a multicultural context such as South Africa, where all races hold equal citizenship rights, many of assimilation's underlying concepts hold relevance. For example, since the 1980s many Black Africans have moved from their rural 'Bantustan' to the edges of apartheid's 'Whites-only' cities, and although not immigrants as such, have migrated to a starkly different geographical and cultural context. Indeed, apartheid encouraged different ethnicities to consider themselves as separate nationalities, with their own 'homeland', and not as corporate South Africans. Recognising this context, the terminology of assimilation could be adapted to interpret the immigrant 'sending' society as Black Africans coming from Bantustans (and/or periphery urban locations).

26 This term refers to the fragmented 13% of the total area of South Africa, divided into ten units (homelands, or 'Bantustans'), and given to Black Africans for 'self-rule' under apartheid.

27 These illegal movements grew in strength and number from the early 1980s onwards, leading to their eventual legal acceptance via a repeal of the influx control legislation in 1986.
with the dominant ‘host’ or ‘receiving’ society comprising Whites and ‘their’ cities (and also Coloureds in the Cape Town context). Furthermore, in the same manner that many immigrants maintain close ties to their country and culture of origin (i.e. ‘transnationalism’ rather than ‘assimilation’\footnote{For further reading on transnationalism see Nagel 2002; Zelinsky 2001.}), many Black African urban dwellers in South Africa retain strong links with their rural family and ethnic culture.\footnote{The term ‘ethnic culture’ is used here in the strict sense of one’s ethnicity as a Zulu/Xhosa/Tswana and not in the sense of one’s race as a Black African.} Although the ending of apartheid signalled an influx of immigrants from elsewhere in Africa to South Africa’s cities, such dwellers are not the prime focus of this research, other than when they engage in cross-race interaction in neighbourhoods (as is the instance in one of the case studies where research was conducted).\footnote{For further reading on African immigration to South Africa see: Kirkman 2001; Crush and MacDonald 2001; and Rogerson 1997.} In order to use assimilation’s terminology, South Africa’s ‘dominant’ group addresses Whites, referring to their cultural and socio-economic status rather than numerical size.

**SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT**

**History of apartheid**

Although South Africa has encountered numerous social engineering projects (e.g. colonialism, apartheid, democratisation), all of which have “profound spatial implications and left significant legacies in the geography” of uneven development, apartheid’s legacy is particularly deep (Christopher 2001c:1). Indeed, overcoming this inherited social and spatial structure is South Africa’s modern challenge. Apartheid literally means ‘apart-ness’, and separate urban spatiality was fundamental to separate social order; lines were drawn on maps, and people re-ordered accordingly.
Apartheid projected racial discrimination onto three levels of spatial structure. 'Grand' apartheid partitioned national space to create ten 'homelands' (or 'Bantustans') for the Black African population, leaving 87% of national land for Whites, Coloureds and Indians/Asians (24% of the population) (Smith 2002:7). This legitimised Black African disenfranchisement as they became citizens of their (supposedly one-day independent) homelands, rather than of South Africa. 'Petty' apartheid segregated public spaces and facilities between Whites and blacks; while 'urban' apartheid established race-based residential segregation. In this apartheid city, the spatial distancing of blacks on urban peripheries reflected and facilitated social distancing from Whites. Indeed, John Western's classic study of apartheid Cape Town concluded that while "space enhances societal distinction; social structure ... mirrors space" (1981:254).

The 'National Party' came to power in 1948, introducing a barrage of legislation to preserve White supremacy. All South Africans were officially classified according to skin colour, history and language by the 1950 Population Registration Act. The Group Areas Acts of 1950 and 1966 then projected these population groups into specific urban spaces, separated by buffer-zones such as railway lines and open land. This urban re-design sought to minimise racial interaction, allocating preferential urban space to mirror socio-political positions. Whites were allocated large central areas, and blacks displaced to distant urban periphery townships. This urban transformation involved the physical destruction of previously black areas (e.g. District Six in Cape Town, Kruger 1992), and by 1984 over 126,000 families had been forcibly relocated (only 2% were White) (Christopher 2001c:112). Day-to-day urban interaction was regulated by the 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act,

31 When a court ruling abolished forced removals.
which prevented personal contact by providing separate facilities. Apartheid thus manipulated cities to ensure the total separation of races and prevent cross-race interaction.

There is some debate regarding the origins of the apartheid city. The directly colonial roots of the apartheid city are stressed by Christopher (1983, 1988a, 1988b, 1990, 1991), Maylam (1995) and Robinson (1996), while others note the significance of an intermediate 'segregation' stage after the colonial period and prior to the apartheid era, lasting from the passage of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act in 1923 until the election of the National Party government in 1948, in which many of the foundations of apartheid were laid in an ad hoc manner, prior to their rigidification under apartheid proper from 1948 onwards (Lemon 1990, 1991; Davies 1981). Empirical evidence confirms both understandings of the history of the apartheid city; in that the 1948 National Party inherited highly segregated cities, and apartheid’s subsequent legislation formalised previously haphazard processes, and the degree of change varied. For example, impact was severe in Cape Town, which had previously hosted some degree of residential integration. Analysing the motivations behind South Africa’s history of urban segregation provokes similar disagreement. Although Swanson’s orthodox ‘sanitation syndrome’ (1977) explains segregation as a measure to curb the spread of disease, new research suggests this health justification a pretext for alternative motives, such as state power (Robinson 1992, 1996), or economic interests (Bond 2000; Mabin 1995; Maylam 1995). However, racist fear of ‘other’ remained the salient motivation, whether disguised as spatial quarantine, political sovereignty, fear of commercial competition, protection of property prices, or securing business land. Indeed, this fear of ‘difference’ formed the crux of popular
phrases used to justify apartheid, such as 'swart gevaar' (Black danger) and 'skolly menace' (Coloured scoundrels).

Christopher assesses the translation of the urban apartheid model (famously depicted by Davies 1981) into reality, using 1991 census data. According to his findings, apartheid achieved almost total urban segregation, and surprisingly (given a relatively integrated past) Cape Town was South Africa’s most segregated metropolis. Nationally, only 8% of the 1991 urban population lived outside designated areas (5.7% in Cape Town), mostly constituting migrant workers resident in hostels, or domestic servants resident in White employer’s homes (Christopher 2001c:123-125). The significance of this for post-apartheid South Africa is immense; for so few of South Africa’s 1990s urbanites had “lived even part of their adult lives in racially and ethnically integrated communities” (ibid:128) that the potential for cross-race integration is severely constrained.

Although urban segregation was achieved, the apartheid city was not a static model translated direct from theory into urban form, but responded to internal (e.g. Black African urbanisation and resistance) and external (e.g. international sanctions and investment) pressures. Ultimately, urban apartheid destroyed itself by striving to enforce a “myth of spatial forms so discordant with reality” (Smith 2002:2). For while Whites considered the city their cultural domain, with Black Africans merely ‘temporary sojourners’ (homelands being their permanent space), Whites also required cheap labour. Black African urban presence was therefore necessary to sustain White hegemony in practice, but apartheid’s principle of cities as White citadels ensured a lack of adequate Black African accommodation. Thus, as the housing of Black African workers in migrant hostels or in distant homelands was insufficient to fulfil
White needs, informal settlements became a common blemish on the white urban utopia, indicating how Black African urbanisation “haunted” (Lemon 1998:2) the apartheid city. In addition, from the late-1980s onwards apartheid cities experienced the ‘greying’ of certain areas, that is residential racial mixing in inner-cities and suburbs as blacks moved into ‘White’ areas (Maharaj and Mpungose 1994; Morris 1994, 1999). In fact, the state was ultimately forced to accept their presence by introducing the Free Settlement Areas Act (FSA) in 1988, officially allowing people from all population groups to reside in certain areas. Although informal settlements and ‘greying’ were both illegal (prior to the FSA), their tacit acceptance, indicating the inevitability of black urbanisation and upward mobility ultimately proved apartheid’s downfall, proving the White urban-ideal as “patently unsustainable” (Smith 1992:7).

In 1990 (in the context of violent uprisings and international pressure) FW de Klerk’s government finally accepted apartheid’s long-term impracticability and entered negotiations with the ANC (African National Congress), pragmatically hoping to preserve White minority interests. De Klerk subsequently repealed the Group Areas Act and Population Registration Act, Nelson Mandela was released after 27 years in captivity, and South Africa’s reconciliation commenced. In April 1994 the country’s first non-racial national elections were held and in May 1994 Nelson Mandela became president of the Government of National Unity.

**History of Cape Town**

Located on Africa’s south-western tip, Cape Town is South Africa’s oldest urban settlement (founded in 1652 by the Dutch East India Company), third largest city (after Johannesburg and Durban), and parliamentary capital. Cape Town is unique in
many ways, in particular its ethnic composition, unusual segregation experience, and
long tradition of relative racial tolerance and integration, which are not found in cities
elsewhere in South Africa.

In terms of ethnic composition, Cape Town’s demographics are radically different
from South Africa in not accommodating a Black African majority (only 32% of Cape
Town’s population), but almost a Coloured majority (48%), and relatively dominant
White minority (19%) compared to national levels (figures from census 2001,
Statistics SA 2003b). Indeed, in South Africa as a whole where Black Africans are in
the overwhelming majority (79%, more than double their standing in Cape Town),
Coloureds are a significant minority (9%, five times less than their Cape Town
presence), and Whites are a similar minority (9.6%, half their proportion in Cape
Town) (figures from census 2001, Statistics SA 2003a). This demographic anomaly
is a consequence of Cape Town’s heritage as the birthplace of the Cape Coloured
“amalgam population” (Western 2002:712) a consequence of mixed unions between
Dutch settlers and Malay slaves, as well as between the Dutch and indigenous people
(Khoikhoi, San, and later Xhosa), and slaves imported from West Africa (Were 1974;
Welsh 1998). However, despite Cape Town’s demographic history as dual-dominated
by Whites and Coloureds rather than Black Africans, recent anecdotal indications that
“Africa is coming to the Cape” (Western 2001) are beginning to alter Cape Town’s
society radically. For example, the proportion of Black Africans in the city of Cape
Town has risen from 25% in 1996, to 32% in 2001, with a corresponding decrease in
White dominance (Stats SA 1998a and 2003a).

This distinct population history significantly affects Cape Town’s segregation history.
Although Cape Town witnessed South Africa’s first Black African segregation (1901,

32 The demographics of Cape Town are explored in more detail later in this chapter.
supposedly to avert spreading bubonic plague), it was the least segregated city inherited by the 1948 National Party. In fact, Cape Town’s relatively liberal municipality initially boycotted implementing the Group Areas Act. However, this is more likely to represent a pragmatic desire to maintain existing social segregation (e.g. separate facilities), and avoid the expense of constructing residential segregation, rather than an altruistic and ideological opposition to apartheid *per se* (Bickford-Smith 1995:65-74; Western 1981:121-125). The subsequent stringent implementation of the Group Areas Act radically re-structured Cape Town and “unscrambled” residents, particularly Coloureds, who had previously enjoyed some residential integration (Bickford-Smith 1995:74). Cape Coloureds were forcibly removed to the unconsolidated Cape Flat scrublands (and subsequently Mitchell’s Plain dunes), with virtually non-existent services and long commutes to employment. Cape Town’s Black Africans remained in already segregated peripheral locations, thus were less affected by apartheid’s initial introduction, but were subsequently restricted from entering Cape Town by the preference given to Coloured labour by the 1955 Coloured Labour Preference Area33 (Saff 1998a:87). By 1983, township over-crowding and squatting (e.g. Crossroads) in defiance of apartheid led to the creation of Khayelitsha Black African township on the distant south-eastern city edge, with minimal water and sanitation facilities (Cook 1991, 1992). Although this township was demarcated for formal housing only, by 1993 there were 50,000 informal shacks and only 16,659 formal homes (Saff 1998a:89). In contrast (both to Capetonian blacks and other South African Whites), Cape Town’s White population enjoyed secluded prosperity throughout apartheid, having spatially and socially distanced itself from all other

33 Black Africans were only admitted to Cape Town for labour purposes provided unemployment was low. If unemployment was high, then labour preference went to Coloureds. This was repealed in 1985.
races. Indeed preserving inner Cape Town was essential to White identity, for Coloured presence served as reminder of the potential outcome of racial mixing.

Despite disagreement regarding the extent of pre-apartheid racial mixing in Cape Town, with many authors accurately disputing romanticised perceptions of pre-apartheid Cape Town as an idyllic site of cross-race integration (e.g. Bickford-Smith 1995), there are clear indicators of Cape Town’s relaxed attitude to segregation in relation to the rest of South Africa. For example, one-third of its population lived in ‘mixed’ areas (Batson 1947, quoted in Western 2002:712), Coloureds were allowed to purchase property in the Cape Province and also had access to certain theatres, cinemas and all libraries (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1989:3), while not all Black Africans resided in segregated periphery locations but many rented housing in poor parts of central town (Western 2002:712). In addition, specific areas in pre-apartheid Cape Town were designated as ‘free from discrimination’, Western Cape municipal counters were not segregated, and Cape Town had no ‘Europeans only’ benches (ibid). Based on this evidence alone it is evident that “mixing between Whites and blacks [in Cape Town] occurred more freely” than in other South African cities (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1989:3). However, this is largely due to Cape Town’s unique ethnic composition, for the ‘Coloured’ population mixed with Whites more easily than Black Africans because of a greater cultural affinity (Ibid.). Although this demonstrates more racial tolerance than most other pre-apartheid cities in South Africa, it is worth noting that despite this relaxed attitude to segregation, pre-apartheid Cape Town was certainly not a haven of integration.
Post-apartheid city

The post-apartheid image of diverse races embracing a single ‘rainbow nation’ (coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu), was used by Nelson Mandela to encourage unity and non-violent transition throughout the 1990s. However, current President Thabo Mbeki has denounced the concept as a myth that glosses over vast economic inequalities and deep racial divides, and instead stresses that South Africa still consists of ‘two nations’ of black poverty amidst White wealth. Although his analysis is grounded in reality, the ‘rainbow nation’ was at least a vision and dream to aspire to in the post-apartheid era.

Re-mapping the apartheid landscape is fraught with conflict, fuelled by identities rooted in the “(very present) ghosts of apartheid spatiality” (Robinson 1998:546). Despite significant political progress, with three open general elections and a progressive constitution, apartheid’s socio-spatial structure remains dominant. For while groups previously perceived as ‘other’, now have the spatial potential to become ‘neighbour’ by moving from the periphery (townships, homelands), to increasingly visible areas (squatting or purchasing property within White areas), in reality this potential is severely constrained (Sandercock 2000:203). In fact the post-apartheid era has witnessed growing disparities between those from different population groups (Beall et al 2002). While it is axiomatic that apartheid’s socio-spatial entrenchment would constrain post-apartheid integration, inherited obstacles have been magnified by post-apartheid changes in urban space, such as the movement of blacks (including immigrants) to inner cities (Khosa and Naidoo 1998; Morris 1994, 1999; Western 2001), and the flight of Whites to secluded enclaves (Robins 2002; Oßenbrügge 2003:8; Lemanski 2004a), both of which have contributed to the continued
fragmentation of South Africa’s cities. In fact, Edgar Pieterse argues that despite a national commitment to ‘integration’, post-apartheid cities are just as “segregated, fragmented and unequal as they were at the dawn of political liberation” (2003a:1).

In contrast, Jeremy Seekings (2000) identifies three main examples of ‘integration’ in the post-apartheid city. Firstly, the residential movement of people according to class rather than race, for example middle-class blacks moving into former White suburbs (Saff 1994, 1998a), while poorer non-Whites move towards inner-cities (Seekings 2000:833). Secondly, the construction of multi-racial ‘new’ residential areas comprising state-funded low-cost housing in which young Coloured families and poor Black Africans tend to be re-located (Seekings 2000:834; Oldfield 2000, 2004); and finally, the eruption of (predominantly Black African) informal settlements adjacent to former White areas (Gigaba and Maharaj 1996; Saff 1994, 1996, 1998a; Seethal 1996). Seekings uses these examples of post-apartheid change to argue that the “pace of racial integration remains slow largely because race and class continue to overlap to a great extent” and because the ending of segregation policies does not mean poor blacks can suddenly afford to move into former ‘White’ areas (2000:834). While true, his subsequent argument that “integration is inevitable given South Africa’s demographics” (Seekings 2000:834) gives the impression that he understands integration as either equal to desegregation, or involving merely the improved wealth of blacks, neither of which are congruent with this research’s understanding of integration.

Despite significant research on residential desegregation in the post-apartheid city, analysis has been largely restricted to quantitative studies (e.g. census data, property transfer data) indicating which residential areas in various cities have or have not
desegregated (e.g. Kotze and Donaldson 1998; Donaldson and van der Merwe 1999; Christopher 2001a, 2001b; Lemon and Clifford 2005), leaving a vacuum of qualitative research addressing the processes occurring in these areas despite Saphire and Beall’s call more than ten years ago for researchers to consider “multiracial traditions in South African cities” (1995:9), and Seeking’s five-year old acknowledgement that “the social structure of post-apartheid cities remains a largely neglected subject” (2000:834). That is not to dispute the necessity of prior quantitative work (in fact, much of it forms the foundation for this research), but rather to indicate the need for this research’s more qualitative approach. Rare exceptions to this trend are identified in Morris’ study on interracial contact in a racially diverse neighbourhood in inner-Johannesburg (1999), and Oldfield’s study of racial integration in a desegregated low-cost housing area on Cape Town’s periphery (2004).

**Post-apartheid Cape Town**

Following the demise of apartheid in the late 1980s and repeal of the Group Areas Act in 1991, Cape Town’s previously stringent segregation policy and practice were open to change. However, such change has been limited and although Cape Town’s White segregation indices have decreased (from 96 in 1991 to 93 in 1996) there are still very close to the 100 of full segregation (Christopher 2001a). However, change has occurred in Cape Town’s middle-class (former White) suburbs and also in Cape Town’s newly-created areas hosting state housing. Addressing the former, Grant Saff’s 1990s research identified a dual process of desegregation and deracialisation of space. The former is characterised by the “in-migration of blacks of an income status equal to or higher than those [Whites] moving out” (Saff 1994:382), in which blacks
are accepted into the suburb by Whites (Saff 1998a:94-97). In contrast, deracialised space describes the invasion of “[black] informal settlements onto the boundaries of, or within, ‘White’ areas” (ibid), in which no cross-race social integration occurs and black residents (squatters) are refused access to the suburb’s ‘White’ facilities (e.g. schools, health clinics).

Although Cape Town has long tolerated land invasions in periphery space, in 1991 three settlements erupted adjacent to White areas (Hout Bay, Noordhoek, Milnerton – i.e. not periphery locations), and were unexpectedly granted legitimate status despite opposition from property owners in neighbouring suburbs. Predominantly White residents couched their opposition to the arrival of (predominantly Black African) squatters in discourses that focused on ‘acceptable’ reasons such as fear of crime, legality of tenure and ecological concerns. Although valid concerns, they have been criticised for masking a true racist fear of ‘other’ (Ballard 2004; Dixon 1997; Lemanski 2004a; Saff 2001). However, an additional reason is likely to be a consequence of the capitalist property market in which homeowners function, promoting exclusion through self-interest (e.g. maintaining property values, especially in affluent areas) and spatial hierarchy (e.g. wealthy areas as distinct from poor areas) (Saff 1998b, f/c). Government acceptance of these land invasions was largely a consequence of the specific era, towards the end of apartheid, at a time when the government did not wish to be seen thwarting the process of unification. However, since 1992, no further informal settlements adjacent to White suburbs have been condoned, and even periphery invasions have become unacceptable.34 Although this tendency to exclude those from another race unless there is a common class severely impacts the potential for widespread social integration, it is found in cities worldwide.

34 For example, in August 2001 flooded Khayelitsha-township residents built shacks on adjacent (periphery) land, but were driven off by police using teargas (Ferreira 2001).
Confirming this class-based view, but addressing poor rather than wealthy sites of residential desegregation, Oldfield indicates that Cape Town’s integration is mostly occurring in newly created low-cost housing projects on the urban periphery, where re-located Coloureds and Black Africans are uniting in their common poverty (Oldfield 2004). In response, John Western questions whether this is the “rough-edged re-beginning of a South African non-racial urban experience”, with the use of ‘re-beginning’ indicating his belief that pre-apartheid Cape Town was non-racial (particularly in grey areas such as Mowbray, Salt River, Woodstock) (Western 2002:715).

Western’s post-apartheid optimism is not supported by Ivan Turok, who describes post-apartheid Cape Town as a “starkly polarised city” dominated by the juxtaposition of centrally-located affluent suburbs and economic centres, alongside poverty-stricken and overcrowded settlements located on the city edges (Turok 2001:2349). Indeed, popular perceptions of Cape Town see it as a “city of exclusions, not inclusions” that is more polarised and segregated today than in the 1980s (Rostron 2001), further confirmed by Cape Town’s Unicity Commission describing the metropolis as “a divided city full of racial, political and social divisions” (Unicity Commission 2000:3). Thus Turok’s observation that despite various ‘integration’ strategies, the apartheid legacy is “embedded” in people’s “institutional and social practices”, appears accurate and is facilitating “broad continuity with the past rather than any transformation” towards integration (Turok 2001:2350).
INTEGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Role of integration in South African history

Given that this research analyses integration in post-apartheid Cape Town, some appreciation of the historical development of the term within South Africa is merited. Despite Western urban theory’s emphasis on urban life as characterised by anomie and isolation (e.g. Park 1926; Tönnies 1887), anthropological research undertaken in the non-Western world (e.g. Lewis 1959, Mitchell 1968, Mayer 1961) disputes this. For example, Clyde Mitchell’s Zambian research interpreted the city as a “network of networks” in which individuals engage in multiple social relationships (1968:310), ranging from very close and personal to remote and transient depending on the context and individuals. Furthermore, research in the Rhodesian Copperbelt’s mining areas (e.g. Mitchell 1960; Epstein 1958; Gluckman 1960) revealed that as members of different tribes mixed together, over time their tribal affiliations were superseded by ‘urban associations’ (e.g. trade unions), thus indicating the potential for cross-race integration in the contemporary era.

Focusing directly on South Africa, Philip Mayer’s 1961 study of the different social groups within Xhosa migrants working in East London (either ‘townsmen’ or ‘countrymen’, with the latter split into the illiterate anti-urban ‘Reds’ and the educated pro-urban ‘Schools’) confirms Mitchell’s 1968 findings, that the degree of cross-group socialising varied according to individual and context (1961:xiv and 283). For example, while ‘Reds’ tended to associate only with other ‘Reds’, ‘School’ migrants developed diverse and “loose” social networks with those from varying social groups, thus indicating the reality of cross-group integration in South Africa over forty years ago (1961:292).
Indeed, the concept of integration is not as new to South Africa as often presumed, in fact as early as 1854 Sir George Gray initiated the ‘amalgamation policy’ in the Cape, seeking to produce a Westernised African elite (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1989:5). However, although ‘amalgamation’ literally means to ‘merge’ or ‘unite’, Grey’s policy actually sought to eradicate African culture by assimilating Africans into Western culture. This is clearly not integration or amalgamation, as Grey’s focus on “individual incorporation” (ibid:6) sought to change the culture of specific and selected Africans. Giliomee and Schlemmer (1989:103) note that even if South Africa had pursued “integration rather than apartheid, the situation with respect to human rights may not have been significantly better”. However, as we know, South Africa did not follow an ‘integration’ route, and by the 1880s, Grey’s policy of amalgamation had waned, lacking the necessary support from both the ‘Europeans’, who favoured racist supremacy, and Africans reluctant to relinquish their culture (ibid:6).

More recently in South Africa’s history, there are indications that integration managed to survive within the apartheid regime. While the classic examples of pre-apartheid integrated communities (e.g. District Six in Cape Town, Cato Manor in Durban, or Sophiatown in Johannesburg) were all ultimately destroyed and forcibly relocated under apartheid, the Warwick Avenue Triangle (WAT) in Durban successfully defied apartheid legislation and remained a “mixed residential area” throughout apartheid (Maharaj 1999:249). Despite being declared a ‘White group area’ by the apartheid government in 1963, demographic figures reveal that in 1970 WAT’s surface area comprised 35% Indian residences and 22% White residences, with the remaining land hosting businesses (Maharaj 1999:252-3). Although these figures reveal only demographic integration, anecdotal evidence suggests that cross-
race socialising was common, not merely in the passive sense of absent racial friction (e.g. “Indians, Coloureds and Whites have lived side by side in this area for many years without any friction” DCRA\textsuperscript{35} representative, quoted in Post 1984), but also active integration with different races mixing socially (e.g. “a lot of them [Indians, Whites and Coloureds] mix freely socially … and their children mix freely”, Daily News 1987), and many Whites were strongly opposed to the forced relocation of their Coloured and Indian neighbours (Maharaj 1999:252-259). Despite successive rulings to the contrary, the residents’ of WAT successfully worked together in defiance of apartheid (in 1989 it was granted ‘Free Settlement’ status), largely possible because most residents had lived there for more than 20 years (Maharaj 1999:260 and 265). Although demographic integration is starting to emerge in a handful of post-apartheid neighbourhoods, few have the residential longevity that helped the WAT.

**Integration policy in post-apartheid South Africa**

Unlike apartheid, when ethnic groupings were encouraged to consider themselves a nationhood with their own ‘bantustan’ rather than as South African, the post-apartheid government stridently asserts a pro-integration message, encouraging all races jointly to build the new South Africa. Phrases such as ‘Rainbow Nation’ and the ‘New South Africa’ are part of the “psyche and everyday language of citizens” (Battersby 2004a:151), and media adverts seeking to emphasise commonality for all South Africans (e.g. Standard Bank’s “There’s more holding us together than keeping us apart”), encourage honour in nationality (e.g. ‘Proudly South African’ campaign), and depict a non-racial society (e.g. Castle beer and Spur restaurant adverts showing blacks and Whites socialising together) are clearly harnessing this pro-integration

\textsuperscript{35} Durban Central Residents’ Association - established by WAT residents to protest against government attempts to relocate non-White families.
sentiment. Furthermore, the slogan used to commemorate South Africa's decade of
democracy in 2004: "Celebrating 10 years of freedom. A people united for a better
South Africa and a better world", clearly emphasises the unification of people. That
is, the individual citizens of South Africa united into a single national identity.
However, the legacies of apartheid's spatial isolation in preventing social
understanding are deep, and evidence indicating that the vast majority (77%) of
blacks feel they do not understand Whites, while almost half (51%) could never
imagine having White friends (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation survey - *Mail
and Guardian* 2001), does not provide much hope for integration. Indeed, many
commentators believe that South Africa's cities are at least as divided as under
apartheid, if not more so (e.g. Harrison et al 2003; Pieterse 2003a:1; Turok

At a policy level, there is widespread agreement that urban integration is not only
desirable, but also necessary. As South Africa lacks an overall urban plan, the
absence of which is criticised for inhibiting coherent urban transformation (Lemon
1998:15; Williams 2000:171), integration policies form part of other national,
regional and local strategies. City integration was a prime goal of the 1994
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which sought to dismantle
apartheid and create a democratic society based on equity, non-racialism and non-
sexism. However, the subsequent shift away from RDP's state-intervention towards
the market-led Growth Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR) in 1996
has reduced the impact of state intervention and instead placed responsibility for
integration amongst citizens (Christopher 2005:248). However, policies addressing
integration (in name if not in practice) continue to abound; for example, in 1998 the
Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development declared the
integration of South Africa’s settlements as “critical”, and the main rationale behind Cape Town’s 2000 ‘Unicity’ reorganisation of local government into a single authority was to promote institutional integration (Turok 2001:2354). However, this consensus on the need for integration is not matched by any agreement regarding the means or goals for achieving this elusive and far-off goal. Indeed, Vanessa Watson notes that despite universal support for ‘integration’, its definition and methodology were “never made clear” (2003:56), and also that the plethora of policies have not been matched by “concrete action” (in reference to Cape Town, 2003:62). By analysing the government policies created as part of the hallowed ‘integration’ vision, it is possible to identify the general way in which ‘integration’ is understood. The overarching approach focuses on the need to unite poor people’s employment opportunities with their access to public transport (e.g. through corridor and node creation). However, for citizens and policymakers alike, integration clearly carries a wider meaning of breaking down spatial barriers between poor and wealthy areas, as well as wider assumptions that spatial integration will lead to social and political integration (Watson 2003:56). However, the concept and policy goal have never been sufficiently clarified.

In terms of specific urban strategies, a pro-integration stance was established early. For example, the 1995 ‘Urban Development Strategy’ (UDS) sought to integrate South Africa’s segregated cities by focusing on rebuilding and upgrading townships, creating employment, reducing commuting distances and developing under-used land (Maharaj 1999:266). The subsequent 1997 ‘Urban Development Framework’ (UDF) expounded a similarly explicit commitment to create cities that are “spatially and socio-economically integrated” (DoH 1997:iii), though its detailed plans to achieve this address only spatial integration (e.g. mixed land use, corridors linking nodes,
using empty areas), in a similar vein to the earlier UDS. The national-level UDF aims and plans were localised via ‘Municipal Spatial Development Frameworks’ (MSDF), for example Cape Town’s ‘Wetton-Lansdowne corridor’. In order to match these urban linkages with institutional ties, the 1998 White paper on local government encouraged local governments to develop ‘Integrated Development Plans’ (IDP) (Huchzermeyer 2003:119, Visser 2001).

If one analyses the common overarching themes of the key strategies invoked to achieve integration, it is clear that they all address citizen-to-city integration based on the compact city model, rather than citizen-to-citizen integration (Robinson 1999:182). However, compact city strategies to construct low-cost housing in central areas and regenerate economic centres in deprived areas (e.g. transforming previously under-used buffer zones into ‘activity corridors’), have been thwarted by residential and business flight away from the CBD and a lack of commercial willingness to invest in poor areas respectively (Turok 2001; Uduku 2002; Visser 2001). The ultimate consequence of such market-based compact city approaches has been to perpetuate rather than alleviate urban segregation and inequality, for example, the construction of new low-income housing developments on distant urban peripheries (Huchzermeyer 2003:115), and White flight to gated citadels in distant suburbs (Robins 2002; Oßenbrügge 2003:8; Lemanski 2004a). Furthermore, few of these policies have “come to terms with the changing social patterns of post-apartheid South African cities” (Bremner 2000a:87).

Edgar Pieterse’s work analyses the gulf that exists between the urban policies of integration and urban reality of fragmentation in South Africa (e.g. 2003a; 2003b; 2003c). The elusiveness of ‘integration’ in South Africa’s cities is at least in part a
consequence of confusion regarding its definition, with Pieterse’s research revealing “considerable disagreement” regarding its practical implementation (2003a:4). In response to this, he seeks to clarify understandings by tracing its conceptual roots, which he believes lie in ‘urban sustainability’ (a facet of the broader developmental agenda for ‘sustainable development’ embodied at the 2002 ‘World Summit on Sustainable Development’ held in South Africa) (2003a:4-5). Based on this, he understands integration as comprising six inter-related facets: sectoral development strategies, multi-sectoral strategies, spatial frameworks, institutional effectiveness, aggregate frameworks (e.g. IDPs), and political accountability systems (2003a:8). Although he provides a vital clarification from a policy perspective, his conceptualisation does not address the human micro-scale, and although his caution that urban integration should not be considered a “magical end-state” is much needed advice within the policy realm, his favoured interpretation of it as both a “teleological endpoint” (2003c:21) and a “horizon that we move towards” (2003a:8) address only the ‘outcome’ of integration (albeit in a dynamic sense), rather than the process involved.

As indicated, South Africa’s ‘integration’ strategies tend to conceptualise integration as purely residential and/or economic, thus failing to also consider the social and personal factor of micro-level human integration. Indeed, urban planners continue to see integration as synonymous with compact city designs (e.g. infill development and high-density mixed land-use) despite the failure of such approaches in non-Western contexts (Pieterse 2003c: 4-5). That is not to suggest that economic and residential integration are not vital, but rather, that lack of focus on the human aspects involved have ultimately restricted their success. Given that the legacies of apartheid in South Africa’s cities ensure very “few opportunities for high and low-income groups to
interact”, and that where “linkages between segregation” do exist, they are highly reliant on private transport, thus restricting access to the wealthy (Huchzermeyer 2003:125), it would seem obvious that all facets of integration (i.e. economic, residential and human) need to be addressed rather than just focusing on economic and/or demographic integration.

Integration policy in post-apartheid Cape Town

Cape Town’s first democratically elected municipality (1996) declared its vision of Cape Town as “a city that works for all”, thus implying some level of integration as a city priority (Nahnsen 2003:137). Indeed, many of the national urban integration strategies have been adapted by municipal-level plans, such as the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework (MSDF) (e.g. Cape Town’s ‘Wetton-Lansdowne corridor’) as well as the ‘City Development Strategy’ (CDS) promoted in Cape Town since 1999 by the Unicity Commission36 (Pieterse 2003b:158).

The foundations of Cape Town’s MSDF are located in the Urban Development Commission’s (part of the Western Cape Economic Development Forum, developed in 1993) urban strategy, which was adopted by the Cape Metropolitan Council in 1996, leading to funding being made available for the specific MSDF strategy of the ‘Wetton-Landsdowne-corridor’ (WLC) (Watson 2003:56). The WLC seeks to link two established ‘nodes’ (Bellville and Wynberg) with a new ‘node’ (Philippi), while also connecting Cape Town’s ‘White’ southern suburbs to Cape Town’s ‘Coloured’ Cape Flats. One of the six MSDF principles is to bring “urban integration” to Cape Town, though as Haferburg notes, “none of the documents is very specific on the

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36 The Unicity Commission was the forerunner to the actual Unicity Council (which was elected in December 2000), mandated with providing recommendations for the future council, to ensure a smooth transfer of power from seven municipalities into the single ‘Unicity’ of ‘Cape Town Metropolitan Council’ (Pieterse 2003b:166).
definition of integration ... let alone how it could be achieved” (2003:75). By reading between the various documents’ lines, he concludes that it means “a balancing of living conditions” and implies a restructuring of neighbourhoods away from race-based divisions (ibid.:76).

According to Watson, the key reason for the ineffectiveness of the MSDF in overcoming Cape Town’s spatial problems is its reliance on oversimplified research data and unsubstantiated assumptions (2003:57). For example, Cape Town was conceptualised as merely a ‘dual city’ (Cape Flats v. southern suburbs), in line with many Western cities, with no recognition of the multiplicities of Cape Town’s diversity. Planners thus assumed that Western planning strategies such as creating an urban edge (based on London’s greenbelt principle) and corridors (based on the finger-plan in Copenhagen and Vienna) would be successful in a non-Western context, as well as encouraging poor parts of the city to function like wealthy areas rather than recognising their different strengths and needs (Watson 2003:57). For example the creation of a ‘node’ (similar to a CBD, but away from the city centre) in Philippi with ‘corridors’ of transport, industry and retail connecting to Wynberg and Bellville (both are already well-established nodes) assumed that this new node and its adjoining corridors were actually desirable (e.g. supporting people’s movement paths) and possible (in terms of encouraging businesses to relocate), both of which have proved problematic. Watson in particular criticises the lack of prior field-level research into these two key factors (it was assumed that approaches already used in Western contexts would be successful) as one of the MSDFs major failings (2003:58). In addition, the lack of willingness amongst investors to target the area has been a major failure, but there has also been some success, notably in providing infrastructure (Haferburg 2003:75). However, Haferburg’s research in several WLC
neighbourhoods reveals the persistence of apartheid trends. For example, with the exception of Kenilworth (a ‘White’ southern suburb), which has witnessed a decline in White dominance from 75% to 60%, racial composition in WLC suburbs has remained constant between 1996 and 2000 (Haferburg 2003:78). One explanation for this is the low residential mobility of Cape Town’s low-income households, especially in relation to the high mobility of wealthier residents.

According to the recent Unicity commission, Cape Town is a “divided city [characterised by] dysfunctional communities and a dual economy” (Unicity Commission 2000:9), leading Pieterse to define Cape Town not as a city, but as a collection of neighbourhoods (2003b:176). In seeking to overcome Cape Town’s divisions, the City Development Strategy (CDS) recognised seven vital transformations, the second of which was the promotion of “social integration and inclusion”, the strategy for which sought to “reorganise service delivery” (Pieterse 2003b:170-1), thus associating ‘integration’ with ‘access to services’ rather than the mixing of people. However, as noted earlier, Cape Town’s persistent social divisions are largely a consequence of the role of market-based approaches based on western city models. These approaches have actually perpetuated apartheid-esque spatial patterns, thus suggesting that proposals to ‘reorganise’ services (likely to mean the market-approach, i.e. ‘privatisation’) will perpetuate rather than alleviate social divisions, thus inhibiting integration. It seems likely that as long as Cape Town (and its policies) are conceptualised within a Western mould, integration at both a spatial and social level will remain elusive and at best, rare (Nahnsen 2003:137-8). The CDS also narrowly proposes transport-based solutions (e.g. safe and affordable public

37 Haferburg conducted interviews in sample households in the WLC seeking to understand how residents are interacting in this new ‘corridor’ environment, in relation to their neighbourhoods and Cape Town as a whole (2003)
transport system) as the key means to overcoming Cape Town’s social division (Pieterse 2003b:179-80). Whilst not an inaccurate strategy per se (Cape Town clearly needs an improved transport system), it fails to consider broader means for addressing social division and thus is unlikely to resolve Cape Town’s fragmentation.

The continuance of Cape Town’s divisions does not solely represent an inability to shed apartheid’s legacies, but also inhibits the potential for different approaches and cultures to fuse together in order to create new identities and approaches that could be vital in pioneering new ideas for South Africa’s development (Pieterse 2003b:177). In this sense, social integration could be argued as a vital contribution to Cape Town’s development as a whole.

Alternative strategies for promoting integration

According to Pieterse, the key challenge faced by South Africa’s cities, is the need to “bridge the chasm that separates citizens” (2002:3). Clearly people’s current responses and interactions are not only determined by their current environment but also by the attitudes developed in earlier environments (i.e. apartheid). Taking this one step further, it is well recognised (e.g. Bourdieu’s 1977 ‘habitus’) that people only reflect deeply on their attitudes and behaviour when placed in an environment different from the one in which their attitudes were acquired, and thus social integration seems vital if South Africa is to progress into a united nation (albeit composed of diverse ethnicities and cultures). However, the means for achieving this elusive ‘integration’ are uncertain, for while South African urban strategies seem to favour ‘corridors’ and ‘nodes’ of integration, these have not succeeded at an everyday local level of human socialising. As Nahnsen recognises, one of the key hurdles to be overcome in achieving social integration is the need for individuals to reconcile their
dream of a non-racial Cape Town with the reality of their everyday (racialised) lifestyle, in terms of both attitudes and behaviour (2003:143).

Both Haferburg and Pieterse advocate building high-density, mixed-income residential developments on vacant centrally-located land, in which different races would live and share resources, with Pieterse also advocating a mix of business-types within the development (Pieterse 2003c:18; Haferburg 2003:68). Pieterse’s vision goes so far as to label them “incubators of hope” in which people of different classes, race and ethnicity will “live contiguously” and share resources such as child-care, and sports facilities surrounded by different types of businesses with which to engage and encounter others (2003c:18). Similarly, in seeking to achieve social integration between races and classes, David Simon advocates the construction of a broad range of housing types, sizes and densities within single residential areas (1999:32). However, this prescription (in terms of social mixing and spatial availability), would not affect those rich enough to move elsewhere (either overseas, or to more secluded parts of the city), or those too poor to afford low-cost housing. Despite this, the approach recently adopted by the South African housing department bears remarkably similarities to Simon’s ideas (and also to Pieterse’s and Haferburg’s). In September 2004 the new housing strategy unveiled by the national Housing Department revealed that the pace of housing delivery would be increased by locating low-cost housing in wealthy areas in order to integrate rich and poor communities (Boyle and Philp, 2004), though homeowners were assured that the utter extremes of wealth would not be mixed (Mail and Guardian 2004). However, experience elsewhere reveals the failure of artificially integrated communities to facilitate social integration (Saff 1993:72), and the situation in South Africa is further compounded by indications that 50% of Whites and 36% of blacks consider the apartheid concept of separate
development as “basically good” (Mail and Guardian 2001), thus revealing a limited desire for integration, let alone a conducive environment.

In Watson’s critique of Cape Town’s failed MSDF she argues that given the heavy reliance of planning approaches on the intricacies of ground-level life, there is an urgent need for ‘good’ research that bridges the two. In unpacking her concept of ‘good’ research, she stresses the need for it to consider the complexities of the ‘real’ world, asking questions based on how and why (rather than how much and how many), and using qualitative approaches (such as interviewing, observation and case studies) to uncover the realities of a range of people’s daily lives, stories and memories (2003:63). It is this sort of ‘real’ and ‘complex’ research that she believes will “prove to be the most fruitful in the future” (2003:63). Similarly, Pieterse argues the need for small-scale research, exploring the nature of “everyday life in relation to ... urban political practice” to inform urban policy (2003b:183).

Pieterse recognises that everyday “contact” between members of different groups (e.g. employer/employee contact) is not synonymous with cultural exchange, and in fact often deepens group divisions, allowing “everyday racism” to flourish (2003c:15). Pieterse believes that this could be overcome by enabling cross-cultural exchange and interactions to occur outside of one’s daily environment, in strategic face-to-face discussions about issues facing all races (e.g. the use of community resources such as schools, public places, public transport, libraries) (2003c:15). However, rather than prescribe the ‘ideal’ means for encouraging cross-race socialising, this research seeks to discover how people are already socialising and/or avoiding those from a different race with whom they share space (e.g. neighbourhood), interests (e.g. church, sports clubs) and resources (e.g. schools).
From this it is hoped that people’s natural instincts for interaction can be ascertained, in order to provide advice for future strategies to encourage integration and/or overcome fragmentation at a micro-level social level of everyday human life.

RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA

This section provides an overview and analysis of the geographical location of South Africa’s different population groups according to the 2001 census, focusing in particular on the state of residential racial mixing in Cape Town. Some comparison is also made with 1996 census data so as to indicate the extent of change from previously segregation-based dynamics (a legacy of apartheid) towards demographically desegregated communities (i.e. post-apartheid policies). Although the focus is primarily on the Cape Town metropolitan municipality, some comparison with other cities in South Africa, as well as with the nation and province within which Cape Town is located are provided, as context for the city data. Essentially this section identifies where different population groups are residing, and is therefore addressing purely quantitative demographics.

Census Information

South Africa’s 2001 census is the second full census undertaken since the end of apartheid and democratic recognition of people from all population groups as equal citizens (the first being the 1996 census). It counted all people residing in South Africa on the night of 9th-10th October 2001, made logistically possible by dividing the country into 80,000 enumeration areas (Stats SA 2003c). Although the census results have been adjusted according to the findings of the November 2001 post-
enumeration survey (PES), the final results are still believed to underestimate the size of the White population (Stats SA 2003b:iv).

This research focuses on the information received from asking enumerators, “how would the person describe him/herself in terms of population group?” (Stats SA 2003e). The population group selected therefore reflects the individual’s own sense of identity, rather than an imposed or estimated identity. However, the census continues to use apartheid’s population group labels, and in 2001 the only available options were: Black African, Coloured, Indian/Asian, White, or Other (however, the ‘other’ response was so rare that its results were ignored). Given that each of these generic apartheid-enforced labels masks a multitude of identities, the data provide only a very simplistic overview of the location of very broad population groups.38

Data from the census 2001 were demarcated at seven geographical scales: Nation (i.e. South Africa), Province, District Council or Metropolitan Municipality, Local Municipality or District Management Area, Main Place, Sub-place, and Enumeration Area (Stats SA 2003d).39 In contrast, the 1996 census demarcated at five scales: Nation, Province, Magisterial District, District Council, and Enumerator Area (Stats SA 1998b). Different scales were used in the two censuses’ to reflect the changes made to South Africa’s political boundaries in 2000.

The 2001 census data are analysed at three levels relevant to studying the city of Cape Town: the Western Cape Province, the Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality, and the neighbourhoods (Sub-places) in this metropolitan area.40 The smallest scale used

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38 The role of population classification systems in reinforcing (rather than merely observing) groups is recognised (Christopher 2002), but beyond the scope of this research.
39 Data at the ward level were also later released.
40 The level of District Council, Local Municipality or District Management Area are not analysed because none exist within the boundaries of the Cape Town metropolitan municipality.
for analysis is the sub-place rather than the ward or enumerator area. This is because
the sub-place represents the neighbourhoods in which residents experience everyday
life as opposed to a politicised ward boundary that often comprises several diverse
suburbs (for electoral purposes), or the arbitrary census-constructed enumerator area
which holds no meaning to residents (Stats SA 2003d).41

Both the 1996 and 2001 census data are drawn directly from the Statistics South
Africa (Stats SA) computerised database and are therefore not repeatedly referenced.
Access to these data was kindly provided by the Data First Research Unit at the
University of Cape Town.42

Province

The Cape Town metropolitan municipality is located within the Western Cape
Province. Figure 2.1 displays the nine provinces of South Africa.

![Provinces of South Africa](image)

Figure 2.1: The Provinces of South Africa (Stats SA 2003b:viii)

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41 In fact, for confidentiality reasons only limited data at the Enumeration Area level has been released.
42 The Data First Resource Unit (DFRU) is a resource unit within the Centre for Social Science
Research (CSSR), at the University of Cape Town (UCT) [http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/cssr/dfru.html]
The Western Cape constitutes just over one-tenth (10.6%) of South Africa’s land area, and is the second largest province after the Northern Cape, which constitutes 29.7% of South Africa’s land area (Stats SA 2003b:3). The Western Cape population has grown significantly in the past five years, from 3.9 million in 1996 to 4.5 million in 2001, and now hosts one-tenth (10.1%) of South Africa’s 44.8 million population (Table 2.1). The Western Cape’s 4.5 million population is composed of 2.45 million Coloured people (54% of the province’s population), 1.2 million Black Africans (27%), 0.8 million Whites (18%), and 0.05 million Indian/Asians (1% of the Western Cape population) (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Provincial Geography by Population Group, 1996 and 2001

Figures are displayed in millions. (Stats SA 1998a and Stats SA 2003a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian or Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1996</strong></td>
<td>31.128</td>
<td>3.600</td>
<td>3.995</td>
<td>1.046</td>
<td>1.115</td>
<td>4.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001</strong></td>
<td>35.416</td>
<td>3.600</td>
<td>3.995</td>
<td>1.115</td>
<td>1.115</td>
<td>4.294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the Western Cape’s population growth (from 3.9 million in 1996, to 4.5 million in 2001) occurred in all population groups (although the absence of the ‘other’ classification in 2001 will have contributed to this ‘growth’ for some
population groups), the growth is most significant amongst Black Africans, whose numbers have increased dramatically from 0.8 million to 1.2 million people in only five years, causing their proportion in the Western Cape to rise from only 21% in 1996, to 27% in 2001 (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Although the number of Whites in the Western Cape has remained relatively stable, rising only very slightly from 0.82 million to 0.83 million, given their decline at the national level (Table 2.1) their continued presence in the Western Cape indicates the attractiveness of this province to Whites (Bekker 2002). However, growth in the numbers of other population groups has caused White dominance in the Western Cape to fall from 21% in 1996, to 18% in 2001 (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). The number of Coloureds in the Western Cape has also risen, from 2.1 million to 2.4 million, although their percentage share of 54% remains unchanged between 1996 and 2001 (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Essentially, the rise of Black Africans (and to lesser extent, Coloureds) has caused a corresponding decline in the proportion (rather than number) of Whites in the Western Cape.

![Figure 2.2: Western Cape population size, 1996 to 2001](image)
From the perspective of South Africa’s population groups, the province of the Western Cape is unique in hosting a Coloured rather than Black African majority. Although the Northern Cape does host fewer Black Africans, and is the only other province not to host a Black African majority, it is by the far the least populated of South Africa’s nine provinces, hosting less than a fifth of the Western Cape’s population (despite more than double the land space), and is therefore not a credible comparison (Table 2.1). The Western Cape’s 54% Coloured majority is particularly striking given that they comprise only 9% of the national population (Figure 2.4). In contrast, the absence of a Black African majority, in fact they comprise only just over a quarter (27%) of the Western Cape population, is also striking considering that they numerically dominate South Africa, comprising 79% of the national population (Figure 2.4). Indeed, the Western Cape hosts the overwhelming majority (61%) of South Africa’s Coloured population, yet only a handful (3.4%) of South Africa’s Black African population.
Although not so vast as the Coloured presence, South Africa’s White population is also disproportionately attracted to the Western Cape, constituting almost a fifth (18%) of the Western Cape, yet less than a tenth (9.6%) of the national population (Figure 2.4). Furthermore, although the Western Cape is by no means the most populous of South Africa’s provinces (fifth out of nine), only Gauteng (hosting Johannesburg and Pretoria) attracts more of South Africa’s White population (41%, compared to the Western Cape’s 19% of the White population) (Table 2.1). The three population groups of Coloured, Black African and White dominate the Western Cape, leaving only 1% as Indian/Asian (Figure 2.4). Hidden in these data are the many immigrants living in the Western Cape. According to the census, only 2.4% of the Western Cape population were born outside of South Africa, of whom half were born in Europe, and half born elsewhere in Africa (Stats SA 2003b:20-21). However, most of these have become South African citizens, leaving only 1.1% of the Western Cape population as non-South African, though this is likely to be an under-count (Stats SA 2003b:24-25).
Metropolitan Municipality

In February 2000, South Africa’s Municipal Demarcation Board established new municipality boundaries as part of local government transformation, first used in the December 2000 municipal elections (MDB 2000a). A total of 284 new municipalities were demarcated (reduced from 843) comprising six metropolitan municipalities (Category A), 47 district municipalities (Category C), and 231 local municipalities (Category B)\(^3\) (MDB 2000b).

Figure 2.5: The Western Cape Municipalities (Westgro 2003)

The province of the Western Cape is now demarcated into five district municipalities of: the West Coast, Boland, Overberg, Central Karoo and Klein Karoo (comprising 24 local municipalities) and the one metropolitan area of Cape Town (MDB 2000b), as displayed in Figure 2.5. Under these new boundaries, Cape Town became one of South Africa’s six new category A metropolitan municipalities (the others being

\(^3\) 25 District Management Areas were also established to cater for desert land, as well as state-managed conservation areas (e.g. Kruger National Park) (MDB 2000b).
Tshwane, Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Ethekwini, and Nelson Mandela), with the December 2000 elections marking the establishment of Cape Town as a 'unicity'. This 'unicity' integrated the seven separate municipalities (one metropolitan council of Cape Town, and six metropolitan local councils), into the new Cape Town metropolitan municipality, as displayed in Figure 2.6. These new municipal boundaries were used to demarcate Enumeration Areas for Census 2001 (Stats SA 2003d).

Figure 2.6: Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality (MDB 2003)
Of the 2.9 million people living in the Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality, just under half are Coloured (48%), who comprise the single largest group, with Black Africans comprising almost a third (31.5%), Whites almost a fifth (19%), and Indian/Asians only a handful (1.5%) (Table 2.2). Unlike both the Western Cape Province and South Africa as a whole, no single population group possesses an absolute majority. Thus according to census terminology (Stats SA 2003f), Cape Town is a “multiple” population region, with no single group possessing over 50% (Coloureds are 48%) and at least one other group possessing over 25% (Black Africans are 31.5%).

Table 2.2: 1996 and 2001 population group composition for Cape Town, the Western Cape and South Africa. Figures are displayed in millions.

(Stats SA 1998a and Stats SA 2003a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>0.614</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>1.240</td>
<td>1.393</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>2.563</td>
<td>2.893</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Cape</td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>1.208</td>
<td>2.146</td>
<td>2.439</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.822</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>3.957</td>
<td>4.524</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>31.128</td>
<td>35.416</td>
<td>3.600</td>
<td>3.995</td>
<td>1.046</td>
<td>1.115</td>
<td>4.435</td>
<td>4.294</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>40.584</td>
<td>44.820</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is hard to compare data for Cape Town between 1996 and 2001 because the official boundaries changed significantly in 2000, when Cape Town became one of South Africa’s new metropolitan municipalities. However, for the purpose of comparison, the 1996 data have been adapted by Stats SA to reflect the boundaries in place by 2001 (Table 2.2). From this adjusted data it is clear that the number of Cape Town

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44 The term “Cape Town” is used as shorthand for the “Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality”

45 1996 data at the Cape Town level has been adjusted to reflect the 2001 boundaries.
residents has grown by 0.3 million between 1996 and 2001, and that although the absolute number of Black Africans, Coloureds and Indians have risen, the absolute number of Whites has fallen very slightly (Figure 2.7). In terms of the proportions and relative dominance of different population groups, the most significant change is in the Black African population, who have grown from only 25% in 1996 to 31.5% in 2001 (Figures 2.7 and 2.8). In contrast, the relative proportions of Coloured and Indians are more or less unchanged from 48.5% and 1.5% respectively in 1996, to 48% and 1.5% respectively in 2001 (Figure 2.8). As expected, the relative size of the White population in Cape Town has fallen, from 21% in 1996, to 19% in 2001 (Figure 2.8), though as noted earlier, the absolute size of the White population in Cape Town has been maintained despite a decline at the national level (Bekker 2002).

Figure 2.7: Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality population size, 1996 to 2001
There are minor differences in the demographics of Cape Town vis-à-vis its provincial host. For example, although Coloureds are the majority population group at the provincial level (54%), they are just short of a majority in Cape Town (48%) (Figure 2.9). In contrast, Black Africans are more dominant at the city level, comprising 31.5% of Cape Town’s population (compared to 27% of the province), while White and Indian population proportions are relatively unchanged by the scale, comprising 19% and 1.5% respectively in Cape Town, and 18% and 1% respectively in the Western Cape province (Figure 2.9).
In comparing Cape Town’s population to South Africa’s five other category A metropolitan municipalities, it is clear that despite boundary changes, Cape Town remains South Africa’s third largest city (in terms of population), after Johannesburg and Tshwane (Table 2.3).
Table 2.3: 1996 and 2001 population group composition for South Africa’s major cities.

Figures are displayed in millions. (Stats SA 1998a and Stats SA 2003a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian or Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>1.240</td>
<td>1.393</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg</td>
<td>1.853</td>
<td>2.370</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane (Pretoria)</td>
<td>1.128</td>
<td>1.442</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethekwini (Durban)</td>
<td>1.734</td>
<td>2.111</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>0.615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekurhuleni (East rand)</td>
<td>1.478</td>
<td>1.891</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Mandela (Port Elizabeth)</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six Cities</td>
<td>7.375</td>
<td>9.324</td>
<td>1.805</td>
<td>2.028</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>0.871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>31.128</td>
<td>35.416</td>
<td>3.600</td>
<td>3.994</td>
<td>1.046</td>
<td>1.115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cape Town is by far the most popular city for South Africa’s urban Coloureds (hosting 69% of all Coloureds living in one of the major six cities), but hosts only 9.8% of Black Africans living in one of the six major cities⁴⁶ (Table 2.3). However, although the number of Black Africans in Cape Town is small compared with the five other major cities, their absolute and relative size in Cape Town is rapidly expanding and although this is the case in all the six major cities (with the exception of Nelson Mandela), in Cape Town it is more significant given their previous restrictions under the Coloured Labour Preference Act (CLPA). As for urban Whites, Cape Town is the most popular choice, accounting for almost a quarter (22%) of all Whites living in one of the major cities, closely followed by Johannesburg (21%) (Table 2.3).

As indicated earlier, Cape Town as a whole exhibits multiple population group dominance. However, data demonstrating significant demographic change and integration at the city-level do not indicate whether such changes are translated into desegregation at the smaller scales in which residents experience everyday life (in

⁴⁶ Although Nelson Mandela hosts only 6.3% of all Black Africans living in one of the major six cities, they nevertheless constitute a majority of its population.
fact, evidence suggests that demographic changes such as the rise of the Black African population are restricted to segregated spaces, Christopher 2005). In order to consider whether residents of post-apartheid Cape Town experience this demographic diversification, 2001 census data are analysed at the suburb level.

**Suburb**

The census 2001 label of ‘sub-place’ is one spatial level larger than the census-constructed EA and one level smaller than the census-constructed ‘main place’. Significantly, ‘sub-place’ boundaries are not a census-construct, but are based on real suburbs,47 of which people consider themselves a part (Stats SA 2003d).

Unfortunately, Haferburg’s gloomy conclusions that “the development of communities in Cape Town still follows the old [apartheid] paths” (2003:83) based on his statistical evidence that most of Cape Town’s population reside in single-race areas (i.e. where a single population group constitutes at least 60% of the population) are confirmed by the evidence of significant single-race neighbourhood dominance in census 2001 data. According to census 2001, there are 683 sub-places, grouped in 46 slightly larger well-known regions in the Cape Town metropolitan municipality. Of these 683 sub-places almost half (340 sub-places, 49.8%) are dominated by Whites, while exactly one-third (225 sub-places, 33%) are dominated by Coloureds, leaving only a tenth (70 sub-places, 10.2%) of Cape Town’s sub-places for Black African dominance, and just 3 sub-places (0.4%) for Indian/Asian dominance. Of the

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47 Although there are some non-suburbs such as nature reserves, hospitals, and universities.
remaining 45 sub-places, 33 host 'multiple' population group dominance and 12 are uninhabited.

The dominance of Whites in Cape Town’s suburbs is particularly striking considering that they comprise only 19% of Cape Town’s population, reflecting the continuance of their apartheid land supremacy. That is not to imply that White dominated suburbs necessarily occupy a greater land mass than other population groups, but rather that almost fifteen years since the official end of apartheid’s stringent group areas, Whites continue to have access to (and dominate) a wider choice of low-density residential areas than other population groups. Conversely, Black Africans comprise 31.5% of the population yet dominate only 10.2% of Cape Town’s suburbs, indicating that large concentrations of their presence are restricted to a handful of high-density areas.

In order to determine the extent to which this concentration of specific population groups in certain suburbs is an apartheid legacy or reflective of other factors it is necessary to consider the history of specific areas.

Table 2.4 shows the population-dominance for a selection of the 46 grouped regions in the Cape Metropolitan Municipality, indicating the number of suburbs in each region dominated by a certain population group (i.e. where one population comprises at least 60%).

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48 As noted earlier, an area hosts multiple population dominance when "the largest population group ... is represented by between 25% and 50% of the total population ..., and one or more other population groups are also represented by more than 25% of the population" (Stats SA 2003f).

49 Though that may be the case, that is not the focus of this research.
Table 2.4: Population Group dominance of suburbs in a selection of the 46 ‘regions’, 2001.

(Stats SA 2003a)

Table 2.4 shows that, with the exception of the “Cape Town” region (which is by far the largest and therefore more likely to host a diversity of population group areas), all regions are overwhelmingly dominated by a single population group (indicated in bold). Furthermore, these are largely based on the continuation of apartheid’s group areas as displayed in Figure 2.10. For example, Atlantis was created in 1975 to be a self-contained city for industrial growth as well as Coloured employment and residence (Cook 1991:33). Although its success in being self-sufficient is questionable (in 1991, 55% of economically active residents worked outside Atlantis, Cook 1991:34), it continues to be a Coloured-dominated area (Table 2.4) as dictated by apartheid thirty years ago. Similarly, Mitchell’s Plain and Blue Downs both came into existence as government creations, in 1974 and 1983 respectively, in response to the shortage of housing for Coloureds (Cook 1991:33 and 36), and both continue to be overwhelmingly populated by the Coloured group (Table 2.4). Most other Coloureds were forced to reside south of main railway line (Figure 2.10) in areas such as

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selection of Regions</th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian/Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Multiple</th>
<th>Un-inhabited</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlantis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellville</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Downs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crossroads</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwood</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guguletu</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khayelitsha</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuilsrivier</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell’s Plain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parow</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL of all 46 regions</strong></td>
<td><strong>70</strong></td>
<td><strong>225</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>340</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>683</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
as Retreat, Grassy Park and Athlone, all of which continue to be Coloured-dominated and represent the Coloured suburbs within the Cape Town region (Table 2.4). For Black Africans, the apartheid government created Guguletu in 1956 and Khayelitsha in 1983 (with Langa having already been established in the 1930s), as well as recognising the squatter camps of Crossroads, KTC and Nyanga in the 1980s as Black African areas (Cook 1991:29-30 and 37-38), and as Table 2.4 shows, these areas are still overwhelmingly populated by Black Africans. In contrast, most of the peninsula was reserved for the White population group, in particular all areas north of the main railway line (e.g. Goodwood, Parow, Bellville, Kuilsrivier) and west of the suburban railway line (e.g. Newlands, Rondebosch, Wynberg) as shown in Figure 2.10, representing the 53 suburbs of White dominance in the Cape Town area (Table 2.4). All areas west of the branch railway line were also demarcated as White group areas (e.g. Sybrand Park, Rondebosch East, Harfield Village), although their proximity to Coloured group areas ensured that their Whiteness was not entirely maintained (further discussed below).
The continuation of population concentration along apartheid lines is not surprising given that group areas so utterly dominated life prior to apartheid’s demise. Indeed, the geography of Cape Town ensures that distant areas (typically Black African or Coloured) are less preferable and therefore less likely to attract newcomers from outside the area’s dominant population group. Yet despite this recognition, it is frustrating to see so little change given the government’s continued call for a new and integrated South Africa composed of people from all population groups working and socialising together as equal citizens. Therefore, instead of focusing on the majority of suburbs which continue to be dominated by a single population group as dictated by apartheid, the handful of suburbs demonstrating multiple population group dominance are considered here in terms of the insights they may offer in relation to official hopes.
Using the census criterion for ‘multiple’ population dominance, 33 sub-places in the Cape Town metropolitan municipality are identified as ‘multiple’. However, further investigation reveals that many of these sub-places are in fact not suburbs in the sense that they do not host domestic life and do not constitute a recognised neighbourhood, for example, hospitals, nature reserves and universities, and thus are excluded from further analysis. Suburbs with a total population of less than 300 residents are also omitted from further analysis as such small numbers distort population proportions. In addition, two Non-Urban (NU) sub-places are excluded for failing to meet the urban focus of this research. Finally, all industrial and/or business-dominated areas are also excluded from analysis. Having removed all non-neighbourhoods from analysis, Cape Town metropolitan is left with 17 suburbs demonstrating multiple population dominance, indicated in Table 2.5.

Table 2.5: Suburbs with multiple population dominance, Cape Town metropolitan municipality 2001. (Stats SA 2003a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grouped Region</th>
<th>Suburb</th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian or Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Africans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellville</td>
<td>Bellrail</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town</td>
<td>Mowbray</td>
<td>2,036</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1,602</td>
<td>4,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muizenberg</td>
<td>3,043</td>
<td>4,109</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>4,106</td>
<td>11,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Royal Cape</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sybrand Park</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thornton</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>2,065</td>
<td>4,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vasco</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>1,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Westlake</td>
<td>1,653</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3,343</td>
<td>6,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wetton</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>2,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youngsfield</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zonnebloem</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>3,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kraaifontein</td>
<td>Belmont Park</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>2,509</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2,761</td>
<td>5,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milnerton</td>
<td>Summer Greens</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>1,657</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>1,542</td>
<td>4,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parow</td>
<td>Beaconvale</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>2,447</td>
<td>5,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parow</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>1,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parrowvallei</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1,814</td>
<td>3,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simonstown</td>
<td>Da Gama Park</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>1,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,815</td>
<td>22,409</td>
<td>1,842</td>
<td>25,277</td>
<td>60,343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ten of these multiple population dominance are located in the Cape Town region (a smaller scale than the Cape Town metropolis), and Table 2.6 compares their population data for 1996 and 2001.

Table 2.6: Suburbs with multiple population dominance in the Cape Town region, population groups 1996 and 2001 census (Stats SA 1998a and Stats SA 2003a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suburb</th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian/Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mowbray</td>
<td>2,078</td>
<td>2,036</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muizenberg</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3,043</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>4,109</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Cape</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sybrand Park</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thornton</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasco</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westlake</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,653</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetton</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngsfield</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zonnebloem (District Six)</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As implied earlier, the geography of Cape Town ensures that areas likely to attract newcomers from outside the population group which historically dominated the suburb, are also likely to be located in proximity to the Cape Town centre and/or good transport links. Several of these suburbs were already displaying signs of mixing, with many considered ‘grey’ and awarded ‘Free Settlement Status’ prior to the official end of apartheid. These are now the areas in which people from different population groups freely interact as neighbours, and thus warrant analysis as possible examples for the future. Figure 2.11 indicates the physical location of the ten ‘multiple population suburbs’ in the Cape Town region (listed in Table 2.6). Interestingly, they are almost all located in close proximity to railway lines (with the exception of District Six, which has a unique history of integration, and Westlake, which is a post-apartheid creation), a consequence not only of newly-moving
residents’ desire to be close to transport links, but also a consequence of apartheid planning in which railway lines demarcated group area boundaries, thus these areas were adjacent to Coloured areas (Figure 2.10). As apartheid’s rule collapsed, so did the strictness of these racial boundaries. For example, Mowbray, Sybrand Park, Youngsfield and Royal Cape all fall in the areas between Cape Town’s suburban railway line and branch railway line, on the western side of which were stringently White upper-class areas, while on the eastern side were Coloured group areas (Figure 2.10). Therefore those suburbs located in between the two lines, although officially White, tended to witness ‘greying’ particularly in apartheid’s latter years, tempting to non-Whites (especially Coloureds) both because of their affordability for middle-class Coloureds and their geographical proximity to apartheid’s Coloured group areas, as well as to prosperous White areas and the city as a whole.

Figure 2.11: The location of ‘multiple population dominance’ areas in Cape Town, 2001
In order to assess the degree of population change in these suburbs, comparison with census 1996 data is provided (Table 2.5). Although the change of boundaries in 2000 makes comparison with the 1996 census data difficult (the 1996 census has not been adapted to reflect the boundaries in place by 2001 at the suburb-level), some comparison is possible in suburbs where boundaries were unaffected. However, for some suburbs, even though their boundaries were unaffected by the 2000 changes, the size of the area analysed by Stats SA has changed from 1996 to 2001, and thus comparison is meaningless (this affects Vasco and Wetton). For the remaining eight suburbs comparison is possible, and histograms for each area are provided in Figure 2.12.
Figure 2.12: Population size of Cape Town’s ‘multiple population dominance’ suburbs, 1996 to 2001

As Figure 2.12 indicates, of the eight suburbs in which comparison with 1996 data is possible, only three (Zonnebloem, Mowbray, Youngsfield) were already hosting
multiple population dominance in 1996, thus indicating significant population changes in the interim years for the remaining five. In fact, all eight of these suburbs have witnessed a significant increase and/or decline in specific population group(s), dramatically affecting the suburb’s population composition by 2001. Of all the suburbs experiencing an increase in specific population groups between 1996 and 2001, only Youngsfield and Westlake witnessed an increase in Whites (from 120 to 385 and 678 to 3,343 respectively), while both Thornton and Royal Cape underwent Coloured-only expansion (from 1,136 to 1,809 and from 168 to 304 respectively) (Figure 2.12). In contrast, other suburbs have seen rises in both Coloured and Black African populations, for example, in Muizenberg (rise in Black Africans from 400 to 3,043 and rise in Coloureds from 941 to 4,109), and Westlake (rise in Black Africans from 6 to 1,653, and Coloureds from 14 to 1,810) (Figure 2.12). Although these dramatic population group changes could be presumed to be a simple consequence of rises in the suburb’s total population between 1996 and 2001, that is in fact only the case for Muizenberg (from 5,726 to 11,418), and Westlake (from 705 to 6,834) (Figure 2.12).

In fact, for most of these suburbs, the rise in Black Africans and Coloureds corresponds with a decline in Whites from 1996 to 2001. For example, Thornton’s rise in its Coloured population matches a significant fall in its White population (from 2,963 to 2,065), and Royal Cape’s increase in the Coloured population corresponds with a decline of the White population (from 372 to 274) (Figure 2.12). Unusually, in both Muizenberg and Westlake the significant growth in both Black African and Coloured population groups has not significantly affected the size of their White population between 1996 and 2001 (Figure 2.12). Furthermore, the decline in Whites is not totally restricted to areas in which other population groups have expanded, for
in both Mowbray and Sybrand Park the number of Whites has fallen significantly (from 2,384 to 1,602 and from 730 to 355 respectively) despite an absence of significant changes in the size of other groups (Figure 2.12). It is therefore not surprising that the total populations of both Mowbray and Sybrand Park have dropped significantly (from 5,452 to 4,367 and from 1,230 to 896 respectively), though a fall in total suburb population has also occurred in Zonnebloem (from 4,217 to 3,446), which experienced a general fall in the size of all population groups except Black Africans (Figure 2.12).

Looking further back in time to the apartheid classification of these suburbs, Table 2.7 shows them all to have been officially classified as White group areas under apartheid, and then gives their population group dominance according to the 1996 and 2001 censuses (when the population dominance is multiple, the two main population groups are listed in order of size, with the largest first).

Table 2.7: Population history of selected suburbs (Cook 1991; Stats SA 1998a, 2003a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suburb</th>
<th>Apartheid classification</th>
<th>1996 population dominance</th>
<th>2001 population dominance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thornton</td>
<td>Zoned White in 1954, but most Coloured residents remained.</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Multiple (White – Coloured)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mowbray</td>
<td>White (adjacent to Coloured areas)</td>
<td>Multiple (White – Black African)</td>
<td>Multiple (Black African – White)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Cape</td>
<td>White (adjacent to Coloured areas). Free Settlement Area in 1990</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Multiple (Coloured – White)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sybrand Park</td>
<td>White (adjacent to Coloured areas)</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Multiple (Coloured – White)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngsfield</td>
<td>White (adjacent to Coloured areas). Free Settlement Area in 1990</td>
<td>Multiple (Coloured – Black African)</td>
<td>Multiple (White – Coloured)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muizenberg</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Multiple (White – Coloured)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westlake</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Multiple (White – Coloured)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although classified as White group areas, four of these suburbs (Zonnebloem, Thornton, Royal Cape and Youngsfield) actually hosted a small Coloured population even during apartheid. Indeed, Zonnebloem was declared a Free Settlement Area in 1989 as were Youngsfield and Royal Cape (or rather, the Wetton/Ottery border on which they lie was declared ‘Free’) in 1990 in recognition of their overwhelmingly non-White population base. As for Thornton, although officially zoned White in 1954, maps of apartheid Cape Town (see Figure 2.10) continued to identify it as a Coloured area (Cook 1991:30-33).

Given this explanation of Coloured group area proximity, alongside Cape Town’s history as a Coloured rather than Black African city, it is not surprising that Black Africans are not the dominant group in Cape Town’s multiple suburbs (with the exception of Mowbray, whose large Black African population is likely to be a consequence of the suburb’s popularity with students and immigrants). However, as indicated earlier, the Black African population group is growing fast in many of these suburbs, and by South Africa’s next census (2006), may be dominating some of these multiple suburbs. This growth is particularly evident in two suburbs: the seaside town of Muizenberg, a popular holiday spot for South Africans, and the small estate of Westlake, a mixed land-use development built in the late-1990s. Despite its apartheid history as a White group area, Muizenberg has undergone a significant increase in the size of its Black African population (from 400 in 1996 to 3,043 in 2001), and although Black Africans are still not one of the two major population groups in Muizenberg, such dramatic transition is remarkable, especially as Whites do not appear to have fled the area. A similar increase has occurred in Westlake, which in 1996 was an under-used tract of state land hosting a small informal settlement that has since undergone a massive upgrading in the creation of a mixed
land-use development comprising housing for both poor (former ‘squatters’) and wealthy South Africans. Although the census records that Westlake’s Black African population has risen from only 6 in 1996 to 1,653 by 2001, a 1997 housing survey of Westlake’s informal settlement indicating the presence of 300 Black African families only one year later (City of Cape Town Housing Department 1997) suggests that the 1996 census did not cover the informal settlement. However, although census figures are questionable, Westlake has experienced a significant increase in its Black African population. Furthermore, as a consequence of separate housing developments Whites have not been deterred from moving to the area despite the presence of Black African and Coloured families in close proximity.

The tendency of these multiple suburbs to have undergone a transition from being first White-dominated, to ‘White–Coloured’ multiple dominance, followed by ‘Coloured–White’ multiple dominance (e.g. Zonnebloem, Royal Cape, Sybrand Park as shown in Table 2.6) leads to the expected projection of Coloured dominance in these suburbs in the next five years (or perhaps ‘Coloured-Black African’ multiple dominance), as a consequence both of Coloured expansion and White flight. In those suburbs one step behind in this process, having moved only from White dominance, to ‘White–Coloured’ multiple dominance (e.g. Thornton, Muizenberg, Westlake as shown in Table 2.6), while it could reasonably be expected that they would ultimately follow the above trend, the experiences in both Muizenberg and Westlake thus far indicate that the White population is not fleeing despite Black African and Coloured expansion, and thus these suburbs might produce a different trend.
Of the ten 'multiple population dominance' suburbs in the Cape Town region (Table 2.5), Westlake and Muizenberg are selected as the multiple suburbs in which to conduct qualitative fieldwork. These suburbs are both similar in having been distinctly 'White' under apartheid (and have thus witnessed significant change in the past ten years), and also in hosting a large Black African and Coloured population alongside a stable White population (whereas most other areas reveal a decline in Whites). In other respects they differ sharply: Muizenberg is a long-established suburb that has witnessed rapid demographic change and physical degradation, whereas Westlake is a relatively new suburb in which demographic change has been brought about by public and private housing developments.

CASE STUDY BACKGROUND

Westlake Estate

The Westlake development offers a particularly interesting case study for conducting qualitative research on integration as it provides an example of an area in which
government planning has sought to encourage mixed-use land development to meet socio-economic objectives (e.g. integration). Furthermore, it has become a blueprint for future developments elsewhere, as indicated by the Western Cape Premier, Ebrahim Rasool, exalting Westlake as “a sign that we can work together to make our vision – a home for all – a lived reality for all” (Rasool 2004).

The R1 billion-plus development at Westlake was launched in March 1999, designed to transform the previously neglected “Cinderella” publicly-owned land into a “model mini-town”, providing housing for a diverse range of socio-economic population groups (Blumenfeld 1999). In the late-1990s the Rabie/Cavcor Property Developers (working in conjunction with Wescape and empowerment group, African Renaissance) gained permission from provincial government (who acquired the previously state-owned land in the mid-1990s) to develop Westlake as part of a public-private partnership, conditional on using profits to cross-subsidise provision of low-cost housing for those currently ‘squatting’ on the land (supplemented by government housing subsidies) (Schoonakker 2002). Approximately 20 hectares of the 95-hectare site were earmarked for state-assisted low-income housing and related community facilities, with the 600+ families already living on the land (in informal and formal housing) selected to take ownership and liable only for water, electricity, rates and taxes in the newly-created Westlake Village (Blumenfeld 1999, Rabie 2003a). Luxurious housing was also part of the Westlake development, with 180 large plots built in the picturesque security village of Silvertree Estate, adjacent to the newly-built exclusive Reddam House private school, thus attracting high-income families. The development also includes non-residential land use in the form of a 15 hectare plush business park, with buildings clustered around a specially-designed

50 The cost of the development varies according to different accounts. For example R1.5 billion (Blumenfeld 1999); R1.4 billion (Sunday Times 1998); R1.1 billion (Duffy 1998)
court yard, in addition to a light-industrial business park component, two separate
office parks, a retail development (*Steenberg Lifestyle Centre*) and the currently
under-construction *US Consulate* (Blumenfeld 1999; Rode 2000b). This
development is depicted in the following aerial maps: Figure 2.14 represents the
developer's map of the area and Figure 2.15 provides a more simplified map of the
same area.

![Figure 2.14: Aerial profile of Westlake Estate (Rabcav 2003)](image-url)
The various components of the Westlake development were conceived and designed as segregated spaces, implementing mechanisms reminiscent of apartheid planning, for example using buffers (i.e. Reddam House School and the business park) to separate Westlake village and Silvertree Estate, and erecting high walls around each section of the development (both Silvertree and sections of the business park further restrict access by erecting gates operated by security guards). Furthermore, the use of only three entrance/exit points in the development, with no shared access between Westlake village and Silvertree Estate further divides the development: the first entrance/exit is on the west giving access to Steenberg Lifestyle Centre, Reddam House School (via a security checkpoint), the US consulate, and pedestrian access to Silvertree; the second, on the south gives access to Silvertree Estate and the office.

Figure 2.15: Simplified aerial map of Westlake development
park (both via security checkpoints); and thirdly, on the east giving access to the business park, office park and Westlake village (see Figure 2.15). None of these three access points meet, and in a fashion reminiscent of apartheid’s township planning, Westlake village has only one access point, which involves passing through the business park. In other words, Westlake village and Silvertree residents have no shared access despite their proximity, and Westlake village residents have no access to other parts of the development (other than the business park), without first exiting, travelling along a major road, and re-entering the development elsewhere. The exclusionary intentions of this apartheid-esque design are confirmed by the developers:

It is a very unique land use geography. It works because there are separate components although in geographical proximity. This country will never have rich and poor mixing. The trick to this development is there are three separate entrances that don’t link. It was intentional ... it was designed to be four separate stand-alone sections [C.G.15/04/04] 51

Westlake is situated in the leafy Constantia valley, bordered by golf estates, a wine farm, nature reserve, and flanked by the busy M3 highway leading directly to Cape Town’s CBD, as indicated by Figures 2.16 and 2.17.

51To protect the identity of interviewees their names are initialled, alongside the date of the interview.
Figure 2.16: Westlake location map (Rabcav 2003)

Figure 2.17: Westlake Ariel Photograph (Rabcav 2003)
Furthermore, as Figure 2.10 (depicting apartheid Cape Town) indicates, Westlake is situated (bottom left of map) in the midst of Cape Town’s former White and wealthy ‘southern suburbs’, close to some former Coloured group areas, but very far from former Black African group areas.

According to both the developers and local property agents, the development has been an enormous success, with estate agents attributing a significant rise in residential property sales in the surrounding regions to the new Westlake mixed-use development (Rode 2000a). Furthermore, by October 2002 there were no available plots remaining in either Silvertree Estate or the Steenberg Lifestyle Centre, and only a few plots left in the business park (Rabie 2002). Indeed, many high-profile big businesses have relocated from Cape Town’s CBD, causing the Westlake business park to become the second office node (after long-established Claremont) in the southern suburbs (Rode 2000b; 2001). In fact, the Westlake business park has proved so successful that it is now providing the model for a new business park in Milnerton (Rabie 2003b).

![Figure 2.18: Westlake Square Business Park (Rabcav 2003)](image)

The retail section of the development, Steenberg Lifestyle Centre, has also become enormously popular, with its *Pick 'n Pay* supermarket and upmarket coffee shops abuzz with residents from Silvertree, parents from Reddam House school and families...
from elsewhere in the region (Figure 2.19). In fact, the retail section is so popular that it is set to expand, with an outlet of the upmarket Woolworths chain\textsuperscript{52} and space for other shops currently under construction. However, this component of the development clearly highlights the segregatory land-planning design of the development as Westlake villagers have no direct access to the retail centre and are officially forced to travel 3km around the major road in order to access the shops despite them lying less than 500m from Westlake village, though residents have forged their own path for unofficial access (indicated by the dotted line in Figure 2.15).

![Figure 2.19: Steenberg Lifestyle Centre (Rabcav 2003)](image)

Reddam House private School (Figure 2.20) has proved equally popular since opening in January 2000, rapidly becoming one of the most sought-after schools in the Cape and has drawn families to Silvertree Estate (where residents have direct

\textsuperscript{52} Woolworths in South Africa does not bear any resemblance to the British shop bearing the same name, and in fact more closely resembles the British Marks & Spencer (to which it was originally linked).
pedestrian access to the school) and the surrounding area. However, with annual fees in the range of R21 165 for the primary school (approximately £1 830) and R28 220 (approximately £2 450) for the senior school (DoE 2003), Reddam House attracts pupils from wealthy families alone (e.g. Earl Spencer’s and Mark Thatcher’s children have attended the school) and is far beyond the financial reach of Westlake villagers despite its physical proximity and joint presence in the same development.

![Reddam House Private School](image)

**Figure 2.20: Reddam House Private School (Rabcav 2003)**

Silvertree Estate has been equally popular, with property prices of up to R5 million (approximately £430 000) far outstripping the developer’s original expectations. Indeed, when the development opened in 2000 initial plots sold for an average of R400 000 (approximately £34 700), yet when the last remaining plots were being re-sold (often by developers) in 2004, prices were reaching over R1 million (approximately £87 000) just for the plot. Houses in the Silvertree Estate are lavish, as depicted in Figure 2.21, with modern houses comprising open plan layouts, grand entrance lobbies and/or entertainment areas, three-plus en-suite bedrooms, swimming pools and gardens despite an average plot size of only 750m² (CEI 2003a). Property adverts use phrases such as: “an exclusive family home”, “exquisite executive
residence”, “for the discerning family”, and an “entertainer’s dream” (Weekend Argus 2004a), all indicating their emphasis on the wealthy family aspect of the property market.

Figure 2.21: A selection of houses in the Silvertree Estate (CEI 2003b)

The secure nature of the estate is also used to attract this type of buyer. As indicated earlier, Silvertree Estate is a gated community, and thus enclosed by an electrified perimeter fence in addition to a gatehouse operated 24-hours a day by security staff. A security pass is required for residents to enter the estate, while visitors must report to the guarded gatehouse (Figure 2.22) so that security guards can take the visitor’s personal information whilst telephoning the resident being visited to confirm the visitor’s credentials.
The economic and commercial success of the development marks a sharp contrast to Westlake’s previous status. Prior to the development, the Westlake area was owned by the Department of Public Works (DoPW), and occupied by three major groups: firstly, those renting dilapidated formal housing (comprised a variety of decaying buildings including garages and ablution blocks) originally let to local hospital and prison staff, but overrun with illegal occupants by the late-1990s; secondly, those squatting in the informal settlement (referred to as ‘the bush’ (*Die Bos* in Afrikaans) or ‘the shacks’ by ex-residents) which grew rapidly from its 1991 origins as a convenient housing location for those working informally at the nearby Westlake golf estate; and thirdly, those living at ‘The Arc City of Refuge’ a Christian welfare organisation that housed and fed homeless people (CMC 1997:18-19). In addition, the DP Marais and Westlake Hospitals as well as the Westlake campus of Cape Town’s False Bay College, a technical and vocational training facility, both lay on the

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53 There is some confusion as to whether occupants in the formal house structures paid rent (while some allege that they did, others admit they lived there for free), and for those that did pay rent, there is further uncertainty as to whether this was paid to a legitimate owner, or an illicit entrepreneurial individual. Space in these houses was made available for additional occupants partly because the prison built new accommodation for their staff and thus vacated the original ‘warden houses’, but also because families occupied empty spaces such as corridors, garages, and kitchens.
land (the college was not part of the land earmarked for development and remains in its position).

Prior to the development approximately 2000 people were occupying this land, comprising 800 people in formal structures, and approximately 1200 people in 318 informal structures in the ‘the bush’, with no figures regarding those residing in the Arc (CMC 1997:19). In 1995, when this land became the responsibility of the Western Cape provincial government, the 2000+ people living there had almost no formal facilities, with no electricity, no sewerage, very few water taps, no schools and only basic medical services (Duffy 1998). Indeed, conditions in the informal settlement were sufficiently dire for the Cape Metropolitan Council to label it a “major health and housing problem” in 1997 (CMC 1997:20) as depicted in Figures 2.23 and 2.24.

Figure 2.23: Westlake squatter area prior to the development (Rabcav 2003)
Although the provincial government soon provided portable toilets and refuse collection, the longer-term aim was to upgrade the area, and as such they entered negotiations with the Southern Peninsula Municipality (SPM), ratepayers’ associations, the local community and commercial developers to undertake a massive upgrading of the area (CMC 1997:19-20; Blumenfeld 1999; Duffy 1998). Ultimately, the consortium of Rabie and Cavcor property developers gained permission to develop the land into offices, a business park and a luxurious housing estate, using cross-subsidisation from profits to provide low-cost housing for the squatters. This cross-subsidisation was expected to meet over half the cost of building each house, with the other half met by the government housing subsidy of R15,000 per household, for which families must be eligible in order to receive housing54 (Sunday Times 1998; Duffy 1998).

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54 This SLAG (Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant) subsidy was later increased to R16 000, and intended to enable beneficiaries to buy or improve land (DLA 1997). Those eligible must be South African citizens, aged over 21, have dependents, have not previously received a housing subsidy, and have a household income of less that R1 500 per month (DoH 2003). For those earning over R1,500 but under R2,500 a subsidy of R10,000 was available, and for those earning over R2,500 but under R3,500 a housing subsidy of R5,500 was available (i.e. both these latter income groups would have to pay Rabie/Cavcor the difference) (DoH 2003).
In 1997 the Housing Department undertook a survey of those living in Westlake, awarding certificates (Figure 2.25) as registration of receipt of housing in the new development. The Housing Survey identified 102 formal structures housing 821 people (comprising approximately 88% Coloured and 12% Black African residents) alongside 327 informal structures housing 1,096 people (comprising approximately 20% Coloured and 80% Black African residents), reaching a total population of 1,917 (City of Cape Town Housing Department 1997) all of whom were to be re-housed in Westlake village. It is worth noting here that pre-development Westlake hosted an almost even mix of the two races, with 49% (941 people) Black African and 51% (976 people) Coloured, thus indicating this area as a relatively long-term example of demographic integration. In November 1997, a meeting was held at the Westlake Technical College to inform Westlake residents and other stakeholders (e.g. residents of local communities and institutions) of the proposed development. However, of the 41 people present at the meeting, only six were Westlake residents (allegedly because residents had been advised to send representatives rather than attend themselves) and thus when the meeting voted to approve the proposed development Westlake residents’ vote was marginal (Rabcav 1997).

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55 Population group figures are based on the surnames of those listed on the 1997 housing survey (it is therefore possible that a minority of White families have been listed as Coloured due to the similarity of surnames between the two groups) (City of Cape Town Housing Department 1997).
In order to provide sufficient space for this development, Rabie/Cavcor were given permission to demolish the formal housing buildings and the squatter camp (the Arc City of Refuge and hospitals were relocated). Prior to construction, hopes amongst squatters were high, with the founder of the Westlake squatter camp, John Taylor, believing that “everyone will get a house and a job on one of the new businesses” (Duffy 1998). Indeed, an article in the *Sunday Times* in May 1998 appears to confirm this belief, reporting that “a light industrial and commercial development will form part of the project and will provide jobs” for those in the squatter community (*Sunday Times* 1998).
The structure of the houses was based on standard government RDP plans providing a one-bedroom semi-detached house with approved permission for the owner to build a three-room extension (indicated by the dotted lines in Figure 2.26).

In late-1999 and early-2000 residents from the informal and formal settlements were required to demolish their shacks (if in the informal settlement) and then provided with the keys and ownership deeds for their new property. Although the final houses built were not quite as large as depicted in the plans (the proposed abutment of the frontal area did not materialise), the houses provide formal living conditions, with cavity walls, tiled roofs, running water, and access to electricity, as depicted in Figure 2.27.
Furthermore, the developer’s idealistic vision of Westlake village as a thriving community with clean pavements, hedges, cars, street lamps and well-dressed residents (see Figure 2.28) does not quite match reality as most residents cannot afford to maintain their home in such an upmarket manner (the hoped-for jobs at the business park are rare), pavements were never built and the street lights were only turned on in 2004. Figure 2.29 depicts some typical streets in contemporary Westlake village, as a comparison with the idealistic developer’s vision.
Figure 2.28: Developer’s vision of typical streets, Westlake Village (Rabie et al 1998)

Figure 2.29:
Typical streets, Westlake village
(taken by author, 11 March 2004)
Despite this slight mismatch between vision and reality, the developers confidently assert that they have transformed Westlake from a “derelict tract of overgrown state-owned land … into a thriving commercial, industrial and residential node … a model of sensitive development taking into consideration all of today’s social and economic factors”, citing as evidence the abundance of housing for previously disadvantaged groups, the popularity of the new Reddam House School, and the recent decision by the American Consulate to re-locate to the development (Rabie 2003a). Indeed, Westlake has been completely transformed, though residents of Westlake village might disagree about the abundance of housing and the ‘sensitivity’ of planning that socio-economically excludes them from the development as a whole (further explored in subsequent chapters). The SA Property Owners’ Association (Sapao) awarded Westlake development the ‘Green Spiral Award’ in June 2003 for its contribution to the upliftment of society (Business Day 2003). According to Sapao the award was provided because the development has successfully transformed a neglected area, previously home to 700 squatter families, into a mixed-use estate with both business and residential areas, the latter ranging from “multimillion rand homes to two- and three-bedroom houses that are part of a social housing project” (Business Day 2003). In addition, the international ‘FIABCI Rene Frank Habitat 2004 Award’ for improving the quality of life for those living in squatter settlements was awarded to the developers for their construction of Westlake village (Weekend Argus 2004b). Thus the development is considered a commercial and social success by developers and planners worldwide.

Although census 2001 data (on the basis of which Westlake was selected for

56 In fact, the vast majority of houses in Westlake village have only one-bedroom.
research) considers Westlake as one entity, with information regarding residents in Silvertree estate and low-cost housing Westlake village as one neighbourhood, this is clearly not the daily reality for residents in either of the two distinct areas. However, 2001 census data are demarcated for Westlake village by the City of Cape Town Department for Social Development (Ngetu 2003). According to these data, Westlake village comprises 2,596 residents, just over half (57%) of whom are Black African, and just under half (42%) are Coloured, in addition to a handful of Indian and White residents (Ngetu 2003). However, the population has grown significantly since 2001, and a recent census conducted by a local NGO indicates a total population of 3,359 (Dawes 2005), with 2,843 people residing in the 600 houses (implying an average of almost 5 people per house, significant given that most structures have only one bedroom), and a further 516 people residing in backyard shacks. Anecdotal evidence suggests that ‘newcomers’ are predominantly Black African in addition to a handful of black foreigners from elsewhere in Africa who rent houses and backyard shacks. Income levels are low in Westlake village, with the majority surviving on an average annual household income of R24 000 (approximately 2 100 GBP), with 15% of households surviving on no income (Ngetu 2003:13). Both Black African and Coloured households are equally poor and many struggle to pay the basic services for which they are now liable (Stats SA 2003a).  

In contrast, Silvertree Estate is predominantly populated by White families, alongside a handful of Black African and Coloured families, as well as some foreign families. Silvertree residents are predominantly young families with children attending Reddam

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57 Those earning below a certain threshold are exempt from council rates and also receive a small measure of free electricity each month.

58 The census 2001 is inadequate for analysing Silvertree’s current population because the majority of residents had not moved into their houses at that stage. However, my research estimates a population of 600, of whom approximately 95% are White (though perhaps only 90% South African White).
House School, and thus the security village is largely empty during the day (with both parents working, and children at school). All houses had to be constructed by the end of 2004, and thus the estate is now complete. Figure 2.30 provides the most recent aerial photograph of the area, taken in January 2002 at which time Westlake Estate, Reddam House School, Steenberg Lifestyle Centre and parts of the business park were complete, but Silvertree Estate homes were still being built and work on the US Consulate site and parts of the business park had not yet begun.
Figure 2.30: Aerial view of Westlake development, January 2002

(provided by Cheslyn van Balla, Senior GIS Operator, City of Cape Town on 6 May 2004)
MUZENBERG

The second case-study neighbourhood is Muizenberg, which like Westlake hosts a diverse mix of racial groups, as identified earlier in this chapter. However, unlike Westlake, Muizenberg is a long-established area, and offers an alternative view of an integration that has evolved rather than been created by housing developments (as in Westlake). In addition, it has witnessed a growth in Black Africans (and also Coloureds, to a lesser degree) without causing the flight of its White residents, indicating the possibility of a more tolerant and liberal White attitude than found in Cape Town's other suburbs. Unlike Westlake, Muizenberg has long been a well-established node, indeed it originated in 1670 as a cattle farm, later becoming a military post under Sergeant Muys in 1743 (from whom it takes its name), and received the railway line in 1882 (Walker 1998:1). In the contemporary era, Muizenberg is one of Cape Town's 'White' southern suburbs, 25km from the city centre, serving as the gateway to the beaches and tourist attractions of the Cape Peninsula. Muizenberg itself hosts much of the Cape's natural beauty, with the beach, mountain and vlei (lake) all within its boundaries. After many years of flagging popularity (amongst potential residents, tourists, businesses and investors) it has recently witnessed a growth in its attractiveness as a residential, tourist, business, and investor location.
Muizenberg is famed for its history rather than present, in particular its hey-day as a premier seaside resort for the rich and famous (and later also for the middle- and working-class) from the 1890s to the mid-1950s, known as “little Brighton”. Indeed, well-known figures such as Cecil Rhodes, Sir Herbert Baker, Sir Abe Bailey, Sammy Marks, and Prince Natale Labia are caught up in the history of Muizenberg as homeowners; and holidaymakers such as Agatha Christie, George Bernard Shaw, T S Eliot and Rudyard Kipling enjoyed Muizenberg’s famous beach and surf sufficiently to give it reference in their literature (Walker 1998).\(^{59}\) Indeed, publicity from the turn of the century described Muizenberg as “the Queen of South African marine resorts” (Cape Peninsula Publicity Association, 191?:7)\(^{60}\)

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\(^{59}\) Rudyard Kipling’s poem “The Flowers” includes the phrase “White as sand of Muizenberg” (Kipling 1912)

\(^{60}\) This pamphlet is referenced in the University of Cape Town library as being published in 191?
More recently, post-apartheid novelists often mention Muizenberg, either in reference to their childhood beach memories (e.g. Blacklaws 2004) or its recent notoriety for refugee-influx (e.g. Nicol 2001). Such literary focus is not surprising given Muizenberg’s reputation for attracting artists, authors and other slightly eccentric
people to its bohemian vibe. Indeed, a local writer described Muizenberg as “the world’s biggest open-air asylum” (Moss 2002), and one resident expressed Muizenberg to me as “very laid back; if you have a limp or a lisp you’ll be fine” (D.S. 07/10/04), demonstrating its reputation as an unconventional and offbeat setting.

Since the 1950s Muizenberg’s popularity as a tourist attraction has waned significantly, a consequence of various factors such as increased mobility (the ability to reach holiday destinations by car reduced the dominance of train-based venues such as Muizenberg), and increased hospitality standards elsewhere (as the hotel industry elsewhere modernised, Muizenberg hotels remained stagnant, for example failing to install en-suite facilities). At the same time a major group of investors in the area, the Jewish community, moved out of Muizenberg, leaving the town bereft of its two major sources of income (tourists and Jewish businessmen). Over the following decades Muizenberg continued to decline as many of its buildings and houses became ramshackle, businesses and tourists deserted the area, and it became an avoided place rather than a sought-after location. Indeed, a 1975 council report described Muizenberg as “a sad semblance of a glorious past” (City of Cape Town 1975:2). However, since the demise of apartheid it has become a popular tourist site for Cape Town’s lower-income groups. Although its desirability as a residential site has remained weak, this is now changing.

In addition to its status as a place of historic interest (e.g. there are six ‘provincial heritage sites’ such as the Natale Labia museum and Cecil Rhodes’ Cottage), Muizenberg is also an active residential community, with two schools, a police station, a municipal clinic, a library, a highly active theatre, several parks/sports areas, as well as numerous churches of various denominations. Muizenberg was a
'White group area' under apartheid, although a significant collection of Coloured families did reside in Muizenberg during apartheid, often owning property with legal support from White neighbours. However, this Coloured presence was very much the minority and Muizenberg has undergone significant change in the last ten years. It is now home to a wide range of social, economic and racial groups spread between the three main spatial zones ('Marine State', the 'village', and the 'mountainside'), depicted in Figure 2.34.

Figure 2.34: Simplified aerial map of Muizenberg

61 The 1970 census recorded 7 500 Whites, 2 357 Coloureds/Asians, and 220 Bantu living in the broader Clovelly to Lakeside area (City of Cape Town 1975:14); and in the Muizenberg village area: 1,889 Whites, 102 Coloureds, and 36 Bantu (City of Cape Town 1977). Further back, the 1885 population records show 801 Europeans and 655 Coloureds (Walker 1998:5).
The Marine State zone is predominantly composed of White and Coloured (with a handful of Black African) middle-class families housed in free-standing properties with large plots and spacious roads (Figure 2.35).

![Typical suburban homes in Muizenberg’s Marine State](image)

Figure 2.35: Typical suburban homes in Muizenberg’s Marine State
(taken by author, December 2004)

The village area is a highly transient mix of predominantly working and lower-middle class White, Coloured, Black African and immigrant families and individuals (although recently ‘yuppies’ have begun to purchase property in this area) sometimes known as the ‘ghetto’ with its rundown terraced housing and cramped streets (Figure 2.36).
The mountainside hosts predominantly White and wealthy families in large old houses (Figure 2.37) with stunning views of the sea and peninsula (Baumann 2002:8).

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Muizenberg exhibits ‘multiple population dominance’, being equally dominated by Whites and Coloureds (36% each), in addition to Black Africans comprising just over a quarter (26.6%).
Table 2.8: Population Group by Population size in Muizenberg, 1996 and 2001

(Stats SA 1998a and Stats SA 2003a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian or Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>4096</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>5726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>160</td>
<td>4106</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>11418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 2.8 indicates, this modern era of multiple demographics represents a significant change from 1996 particularly in terms of the size of the Black African and Coloured population groups (and hence also the population size of the suburb as a whole). Indeed, there is some dispute regarding total population size for 2001 as the total is perceived as too high relative to the 1999 and 2004 voter rolls for the area (although Stats SA refused to clarify this, there is a general belief that the area considered ‘Muizenberg’ has been expanded to include a nearby informal settlement). Despite concerns regarding the exact census figure, there is consensus that Muizenberg is a mixed race area with a strong representation of Black Africans, Whites and Coloureds. Furthermore, Muizenberg is the only suburb in the Cape Town metropolis with a ‘multiple’ or demographically integrated population mix in which three of South Africa’s major population groups are considered ‘dominant’ (i.e. they comprise over 25% of the suburb’s total population), whereas all other ‘multiple’ suburbs in Cape Town comprise only two dominant population groups. Furthermore, Muizenberg is unusual in that the significant growth in both Black African and Coloured population groups has not significantly affected the size of the White population between 1996 and 2001, whereas in most suburbs an increase in Black African or Coloured population group size led to substantial White flight.

There is a general perception that Muizenberg is dominated by black immigrants from elsewhere in Africa (i.e. not South African). Indeed, according to census 2001
results, one-tenth of Muizenberg’s Black African population are citizens of an alternative African country, compared with only 1% of the White and Coloured population, and 1.8% of Muizenberg’s Indian/Asian population (Table 2.9). Muizenberg is also perceived to host a significant number of African illegal immigrants, and as these people are unlikely to be captured by census data it is inferred that the number of Black African immigrants living in Muizenberg was under-counted by the 2001 census. Furthermore, a 2002 study identified 16% of tenants in the village as refugees, predominantly from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola (Baumann, 2002:3), though the Tenants Association indicate that refugees\textsuperscript{62} comprise at least 30% of Muizenberg’s tenants, alongside 60% Coloureds and 10% Whites [R.L. 04/11/04].

Table 2.9: Citizenship (grouped) by Population Group, Muizenberg, 2001

(Stats SA 2003a)\textsuperscript{63}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian or Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>4081</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>3814</td>
<td>10 803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC countries</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>North America</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South America</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3076</td>
<td>4135</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>4037</td>
<td>11 414</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{62} Although not all immigrants in Muizenberg are necessarily refugees, and whilst recognising the politically charged nature of the title (Garbett 2004), both terms are used throughout the thesis. This is so as to recognise both the accurate description of ‘immigrant’ in addition to the common use amongst interviewees of ‘refugee’ in reference to poor Black Africans who have migrated to South Africa from other African countries.

\textsuperscript{63} The differences in the figures for total population of each population group between Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 are noted, but represent the figures provided by Stats SA, and as the discrepancies are marginal, the data are used.
As mentioned earlier, Muizenberg as a whole has undergone severe urban deterioration over recent decades in terms of physical decline and the demise of its reputation as a premier seaside resort into a haven for illegal activities and low-income residents, in particular refugees. Although this demise has been largely restricted to the village area, this has had a knock-on effect on property values and perceptions for both the Marine State and Mountainside areas. The village area’s recent deterioration is perceived a consequence of the arrival of Cape Flats’ gangsters\(^{64}\) and Black African refugees. As absentee landlords filled dilapidated buildings (former hotels from Muizenberg’s hey-day) with tenants, crime escalated, gangs started using the village as a base for drugs and other illegal activities, and scores of Black African refugees moved to the area, crammed into inadequate rooms.

In contrast, the vast majority of Muizenberg’s homeowners are White (alongside a handful of Coloured homeowners) and these long-term residents have not welcomed the problems associated with Muizenberg’s newer residents:

> In 2000 things were so bad in the village that whatever businesses were left were trying to get out. In July … the Americans gang moved into 13 Frankfort Road: … drug running, prostitution, burglaries, and muggings. A reign of terror began. We all felt extremely unsafe. Nobody walked around at night. At one point 20 shebeens were operating in the area. The police did nothing. It was firmly believed that they were working with the gangsters. In addition, some African refugees clustered in housing … and were sometimes holding all-night parties, screaming vile abuse at anyone who objected to the noise. Nude washing of bodies in public was noted. There were stories of people living in crammed buildings defecating out of windows … The people of Muizenberg village knew that anarchy and lawlessness was not around the corner. It had already arrived. (quoted in King 2003a)

Such sentiments were echoed in the local newspaper *False Bay Echo*, which in the early years of the new millennium was dominated by articles highlighting

\(^{64}\) Whilst gangsterism has long been common in the Cape Flats residential areas ('Coloured' group areas) it has only recently spread into former 'White' suburbs. For more information on gangsterism in Cape Town see: Kinnes, 1995 and 2000; Pinnock, 1985; and White-Hafeele, 1998.
Muizenberg's physical decay (e.g. "Muizenberg's beaches of shame" 18/01/01, "Frustrated residents take on Muizenberg decay" 26/10/00) as indicated by Figure 2.38, alongside articles addressing Muizenberg's violent crimes ("Villagers march against gangs" 14/12/00), and the escalating tenant and refugee populations ("Muizenberg wrestles with refugee problem" 23/05/02), all under a common label of Muizenberg's problem of 'crime and grime'.

![Dilapidated buildings in Muizenberg](image)

Figure 2.38: Dilapidated buildings in Muizenberg (taken by the author, 8 Dec 2004)

However, at the same time (i.e. 2000 onwards) various resident-based groups developed to tackle these problems, finally consolidating in the establishment of the Muizenberg Improvement District in early 2001 (analysed in Chapter 7). As a consequence of these public drives to 'clean up' Muizenberg's decay, the area has undergone significant physical upgrading, with dilapidated buildings demolished or renovated, roads improved (Figure 2.39) and a consequent increase in economic activity in the area.
As businesses have moved back into the area, property prices have risen and the area is now undergoing a renaissance as an attractive place in which to visit, live and invest. This historical progression of change over the past five years is clarified using headlines in the local newspaper: from early-2000 to early-2001 newspaper articles highlighted Muizenberg’s problems, from mid-2001 to early-2003 they began to focus on improvements and reported a level of optimism for the future, and from mid-2003 onwards they gave way to proudly declaring and advertising Muizenberg as a new and exciting area that is unrecognisable from its past era of neglect.

This chapter has provided a thorough overview of the South African context in which research was undertaken. Having identified the historical background to the apartheid city and contemporary context of the post-apartheid city, for South Africa in general and Cape Town specifically, the development of integration concepts and policy in South Africa has been discussed. An analysis of census data for the Cape Town metropolitan municipality were provided, allowing an exploration of suburbs characterised by ‘multiple population dominance’ and the selection of two of them, Westlake and Muizenberg, for further research. The following chapter discusses the methodology used whilst conducting fieldwork in these two areas.
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This chapter explains the methodology used to conduct this research, outlining the broad methodological approach taken and then detailing this approach. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used, though only the latter were primary with the former focusing on national census data. The logistics of analysing quantitative secondary data and conducting qualitative fieldwork are discussed, followed by a description of the methods used to analyse data and a consideration of the limitations of the research, including ethical constraints.

Quantitative and qualitative approaches

This research used both quantitative and qualitative data, with the former functioning as the baseline from which neighbourhoods were selected to conduct qualitative research. Data from the South African national census 2001 (released in December 2003) were analysed to consider the demographic profile of South Africa at various levels ranging from national, provincial, municipal and suburban, focusing primarily on the Western Cape province as well as the Cape Town metropolis and its suburbs (these data were outlined in Chapter Two). At the suburban level, areas comprising a demographic mix of racial groups were identified as possible sites for qualitative fieldwork.

Having identified demographically mixed neighbourhoods using census data, subsequent methods to ascertain individuals’ experience of interaction with racial difference in the neighbourhood were primarily qualitative. As emphasised by
Blokland, it is crucial that research on ethnic interactions is based on empirical fieldwork comprised of in-depth interviews and long-term participatory observation, rather than solely on theoretical discourses, which frequently differ from reality, or solely on focus groups methods, which often fail to reveal what is happening beyond the interview room (2003:2-3). Therefore Cape Town citizens residing in neighbourhoods containing a demographic presence of different races were interviewed in a semi-structured format to ascertain their experience of integration within their social and spatial environment. In addition, respondents completed ‘mental maps’ to indicate their wider understandings of what integration entails. The principal aim of this approach was to determine the nature (e.g. street-level encounters or socialising in homes) and location (i.e. neighbourhood and/or institutions) of cross-race social mixing and integration as well as to generate discussion about integration as a concept, experience and policy, rather than to determine which neighbourhoods are or are not integrated.

Research design

The research for this thesis was split between time spent in Oxford and Cape Town. Different research activities (such as fieldwork, analysis, writing) were not strictly separated and instead a significant amount of overlapping occurred, for example analysing data and writing findings from the first field-site before commencing fieldwork in the second site. In line with the ‘DPhil via scientific papers’ approach adopted by this thesis, I also sought to disseminate my findings at conferences and in journal papers throughout the research process so as to receive critical feedback and ensure the research was of publishable quality.

The fieldwork component of research used four main methods which are considered
in more detail in the subsequent sections:

(a) Collection and analysis of secondary documents (e.g. newspapers, statistics, policies);

(b) Review of Census 2001 data to provide background information and enable selection of the neighbourhoods to be researched;

(c) Key informant interviews, semi-structured interviews, field observation and ‘mental map’ research techniques with primary stakeholders (residents) in selected neighbourhoods;

(d) Structured interviews with secondary stakeholders, such as government officials and policy-makers, community leaders, NGOs, and academics undertaking research in this field.

In addition to these methods I also maintained a fieldwork diary detailing both events and thoughts as they arose.

SECONDARY DATA

The collection and analysis of primary and secondary documents occurred throughout the research process, rather than at a set period. Although the principal focus of this research is qualitative primary fieldwork, it was also necessary to analyse secondary data, such as newspapers and official documents, in order to provide a broader conceptual background to the study. While the limitations of secondary data are recognised in terms of representing the priorities of its creators (typically bureaucrats) which are not necessarily directly relevant to this research (Clark 1997; Hoggart et al
2002:79), their wide availability makes them useful for background material, and provides a context for more detailed primary research. In particular, government reports, policy documents, official statistics, newspapers, and census documents were used to provide an overall context to the arena in which I conducted research.

**Quantitativebaseline**

**Census data**

In order to ensure the fieldwork neighbourhoods comprised a demographic mix of races, data from the South African 2001 census were used. While recognising that censuses are not necessarily fully accurate, they are readily available (although often at a price) and cover such a wide range of issues that they provide an invaluable baseline for subsequent research. Furthermore, conducting my own quantitative baseline survey or questionnaire in the selected neighbourhoods would have provided a sample size too small to identify significant trends, and would also have risked respondent fatigue amongst residents that I might later intend to interview. Instead, census data were critically analysed to provide a quantitative baseline.

As outlined in the previous chapter, census data were used to identify the location of population groups. Although censuses are commonly used for this purpose (Nobles 2000), and the United Kingdom census has used a race/ethnicity question since 1991 (Peach 1996b), some national censuses, such as France, refuse to collect data on ethnic groups on the grounds that this dilutes national unity (Blum 2002). However, in South Africa, data on population grouping are required to fulfil the monitoring of post-apartheid equity goals (e.g. employment) and thus feature in the census.
The data arising from the 2001 census were discussed in the previous chapter. As indicated in that chapter, data from the sub-place level within the Metropolitan Municipality of Cape Town were analysed. Data at this neighbourhood level provide background information for spatial areas that affect the daily lives of residents (Van der Merwe 1996:148), as opposed to the ‘Main Place’ or ‘Enumerator Area’ levels, which are census-constructs with no relevance or meaning for residents (Clarke, 1976:149; Stats SA 2003d).

**Neighbourhood selection**

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the 2001 census was used to identify and select neighbourhoods in Cape Town demonstrating the demographic presence of different races. Census terminology describes a suburb as hosting "multiple population dominance" (i.e. demographically mixed or integrated) when "the largest population group … is represented by between 25% and 50% of the total population …, and one or more other population groups are also represented by more than 25% of the population" (Stats SA 2003f). This criterion for identifying a demographically mixed neighbourhood is adopted here, leading to the selection of Westlake and Muizenberg as neighbourhoods in which to conduct qualitative fieldwork.

**QUALITATIVE FIELDWORK**

**Accessing neighbourhoods and respondents**

Having selected the neighbourhoods in which to conduct qualitative fieldwork, accessing the residents whose behaviours and opinions I wished to ascertain was the crucial next step, and was recognised as a potentially major stumbling block. While
ideally I hoped to interview a broad cross-section of society (e.g. men and women, different ages, classes and races) in order to ensure a broad representation of the community, the choice of interviewees was largely dependent on both my ability to access different types of people, and also their willingness and ability to participate. Although I attempted to ensure a representative sample in each area, this was not always fully successful. A multi-layered approach to accessing potential respondents was favoured, with different methods more effective in different areas and with different people-groups. The key methods used to locate potential respondents were:

(a) Reading community newspapers to identify local activists and leaders

(b) Contacting community institutions to penetrate their leaders and members

(c) Identifying a local resident to act as guide/gatekeeper to the area

(d) Making appointments to interview residents

(e) Snowballing from one respondent to their friends and acquaintances

(a) Community Newspapers

At the outset of fieldwork in both Westlake (January – May 2004) and Muizenberg (September – December 2004), time was spent in the South African national library reading the community newspapers for the past four years in each area (the Constantiaberg Bulletin and False Bay Echo respectively). From reading these newspapers, an awareness of the recent issues in each area was formed, in addition to acquiring the names (and in some cases, telephone numbers) of local activists and leaders. Furthermore, the names of local residents who had written into the
newspaper to air their views were noted. I then contacted those residents and activists identified from the newspaper (in some cases acquiring their telephone number from the Cape Town directory) to introduce myself and the research project, and request an interview. I found this use of community newspapers a particularly effective method for gaining initial access to both areas.

(b) Community institutions

In addition, I contacted local institutions such as schools, churches, community centres, environmental groups, sports clubs, political groups (e.g. ratepayers association, community forums), and NGOs working in the area (especially in Westlake). In all cases, I interviewed the leader(s) of the institution (who themselves were often also local residents) and then received contact details for other members, whom I would subsequently interview. This use of institutions draws on Harvey Molotch’s work (1972) on neighbourhood integration, which used a proxy approach by measuring the number of people from different races participating in neighbourhood contexts such as public places, retail stores, Saturday night social settings, parks, schools and churches. His use of institutions as a means of entry is favoured by this research, though his reliance on quantitative measuring was not repeated. Given the recognition that lack of social mixing is often attributable to a lack of commonalities to bind people residing in the same neighbourhood, institutions such as sports clubs, community centres and churches, which provide a common meeting place and shared interest as well as providing a neutral territory for initial acquaintanceship and friendship, provided a useful starting point for fieldwork discussions.
Although I used a mix of different institutions (recreational centres, community centres, schools, churches) in order to gain access to people, the use of churches perhaps demands some explanation. Unlike most Western societies, South Africa has a strong culture of church attendance (GCIS 2005:5), thus ensuring that this approach (in tandem with other institutions) ‘catches’ a wide proportion of the population. Furthermore, high-profile leaders such as Allan Boesak (President of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches) and Bishop Desmond Tutu (Archbishop of Cape Town) were highly outspoken in their opposition to apartheid, thus providing an institutional context with a pre-disposition towards post-apartheid integration, at least at the leadership level (Tatum 1987:77).

(c) Guide/gatekeeper

The use of a local guide and/or gatekeeper is a recognised method for gaining access to a community, though of course the danger is that the community is only represented through their eyes, and also that the researcher is only exposed to their (carefully selected) local contacts, thus producing a skewed sample. Despite these concerns, I used this method in the Westlake village field-site, though the individual concerned was more an assistant than a gatekeeper.

The Westlake area hosts both a wealthy and a poor area (as described in Chapter Two) and it was in accessing the latter area that I used a local guide. It was almost by accident that I met this individual on one of my first visits to the area, as she was a friend of a friend whose house I visited. She expressed considerable interest in the research, and we developed an arrangement whereby I would telephone her to confirm when I intended to make a fieldwork visit and we would arrange to meet. We would then walk through the area together, identifying people for me to
interview. Although this might imply a 'gatekeeper' role, in fact she was relatively new to the area herself and knew few people in Westlake village, and thus her role was more that of an assistant. Furthermore, she rarely spoke during interviews unless translation was required (she speaks Xhosa as a first-language) and thus did not interfere with respondents' openness. For fear of 'using' her services for my own gain, I repeatedly assured her that she did not have to help me but in turn she repeatedly insisted that she wanted to help because she enjoyed coming on visits with me and "finding out so much about where I live". While she did not 'set-up' meetings for me with 'her' contacts, she did act as a facilitator on a few occasions where for example I knew the name of a local individual that I wished to interview but not their location. She would then ask neighbours where this person lived and arrange a time for me to visit. In addition, when I wished to expand my sample in a specific demographic group (for example, young people) she would introduce me to people in that category if she knew of them, or would ask her neighbours in order to find appropriate people.

As a consequence of repeatedly walking through the area together we became a well-known local sight, with many residents assuming I was her White boyfriend (because I had a very short haircut at the time!), thus facilitating numerous random discussions in the streets. She was also a source of local information, telling me what activities had occurred and what stories were dominating the area that week. Although she was not well-known in the area, in fact when approaching a potential respondent and introducing ourselves they would often say in surprise to her "you live in Westlake? I have never seen you before", I believe that I was better-received in many households because I was with a local, and also because we appeared friendly despite being from different racial groups (of course, at first glance it was not possible to know that we
were also of different nationalities), thus indicating a lack of racism on my part. Furthermore, over the five months of research we became good friends and shared much of our lives together. As a consequence, I came to know her friends and spent time in their houses laughing and joking. Thus I witnessed at least an element of the area through the lives of residents rather than just through the sanitised interview lens. In addition, this closeness enabled me to share my thoughts and ideas about the changes occurring within the area with her, and to gain her honest feedback. Although I also gave her documents that I wrote based on the fieldwork, this did not generate many comments, and it seemed that the ease of everyday conversation was the most fruitful context in which to ask her opinions of my ideas.

(d) Making appointments for interviews

In the poorer area of Westlake I was able to walk through the streets in order to meet people, many of whom were willing to be interviewed there and then. However, in both the wealthy area of Westlake (Silvertree) and also in middle-class Muizenberg, this was not appropriate. Instead, it was necessary to telephone people in order to make an appointment for an interview. Although this method of cold-calling is recognised as a problematic strategy because its intrusive nature leads to a high refusal rates, that was not the experience with this research (only a handful of cold-calls did not lead to an interview), possibly because the method was combined with snowballing. While a pre-interview telephone call provided an excellent opportunity to fully explain the research and interview process in advance, it also meant that when the interview finally occurred, I met people ‘at their best’ rather than in everyday mode. Having set up an appointment the interviews were often much more formal than the relaxed atmosphere of settings in the poorer section of Westlake, where I had knocked on a random door and been invited in and thus saw the respondent ‘as they
are'. On the other hand, having set up a specific appointment time usually meant I had the full attention of the respondent, whereas ad-hoc interviews were often interrupted and/or shared with whoever else happened to be in the house at this time (though often this contributed to the richness of the material). This approach obviously relies heavily on 'snowballing' techniques to provide contact details for potential respondents in order to set up appointments.

(e) Snowballing

Snowballing, in which research commences with one respondent, who provides contacts to their neighbours, who in turn provide further contacts, is a common research tool in the social sciences, though as with using a gatekeeper, risks causing a skewed research sample. However, when used in tandem with other methodological tools (as in this research), as well as the use of multiple initial contact points (to prevent interviewing only a narrow circle of friends), it forms a crucial tool in conducting research amongst a wide variety of people involved in a specific area (social or spatial). Furthermore I remained aware of the demographics of the sample throughout fieldwork, thus enabling me to target any under-represented demographic groups.

At the end of an interview I would ask the respondent if (s)he was able and/or willing to pass on the contact details of friends in the area that might be willing to talk to me, and in most cases respondents were more than happy to pass details on to me. In fact in many cases respondents offered such contact details without need for me to ask. This tool also allowed me to develop an awareness of friendship circles in the neighbourhood, and the depth of cross-race friendships.
Semi-structured interviews and participant observation

Having outlined the methods used to access residential respondents in the two field-sites, the methods used to gain information from these participants are now considered. Semi-structured interviews and participant observation were favoured for allowing people's opinions, ideas and lifestyles to be explained and explored in their own words. The qualitative nature of this research renders standardised questionnaires with their prescribed tick-boxes redundant because of their inability to allow respondents to explain the complexities of their experiences and opinions. In contrast, semi-structured interviews encourage "dialogue rather than ... interrogation" (Valentine 1997:111) and are particularly useful in revealing the everyday activities of respondents (Bryman 1988), a key component of this research. Furthermore, if questions are sufficiently open-ended, semi-structured interviews can allow respondents to reveal thoughts and issues far beyond the original expectation of the research study (Hoggart et al 2002:205-206).

The semi-structured interviews in this research followed a conversational-style, encouraging respondents to explain their experiences, thoughts and feelings in their own words. To ensure the interviews were productive (but not directed by the interviewer) several key themes were identified in advance, with respondents encouraged to meander around these themes so as to explore their own thoughts aloud. As interviewer I found it vital to know thoroughly the key topics to be covered (though I also held a prompt sheet during interviews) so as to be able to maintain a balance between encouraging the respondent to remain focused on the themes whilst also allowing for flexibility in light of issues raised by the respondent. As the interviewer I saw my role as predominantly that of listener and note-taker, and also to explore respondents' answers by asking further open-ended questions that developed
their ideas (even if this detracted temporarily from my themes), rather than by asking closed questions or expressing my opinions. Throughout the interview I would initiate topics rather than dictate the discussion. The broad issues covered in interviews (and also the more detailed information and issues that I sought to encourage from respondents) are shown in Figure 3.1.

Interviews typically lasted 45–60mins, though a handful of interviews were much shorter and some much longer depending on the availability and willingness of the interviewee. Most interviews were conducted in the respondent’s home (allowing me to collect additional information about home environment), though a few were held elsewhere (e.g. at work, a local cafe) where this best suited the participant. At the outset of the interview (and also when making the appointment) the research project was explained, in addition to my role as a student, and an awareness of the role their input would play (including the time commitment). Most interviews were conducted with individuals, but occasionally other family/household members would be present, thus leading to a group (rather than individual) interview. Although these group interviews were not focus groups per se, participants did discuss responses as a group and thus their comments were affected by the presence of others. An electronic recording device was not used for fear of distracting respondents, giving the inaccurate impression that I am a journalist or government worker rather than a student, and exacerbating the technological mismatch between myself and poorer respondents. Instead I noted down respondents’ verbatim comments in a notebook throughout the interview. Given the speed at which people converse these notes were hastily written, thus requiring me to improve their legibility as soon as possible after each interview (and always on the same day as the interview). While improving the legibility of notes, I would also add comments regarding my perceptions of the
interview environment and respondent (e.g. tone of voice, body language) to the interview data. The interview topics follow a natural progression from outlining the basic profile of the respondent to describing their activities and then their perceptions and opinions. In order to prevent respondents from tailoring their early answers, I refrained from using the term ‘integration’ until the interview reached topic four. Prior to this stage in the interview, terms such as ‘change in South Africa’, and ‘demographic change’ were used to explain the research project.
In the first interview topic (see Figure 3.1), respondents were asked to identify themselves in terms of a racial category. Not surprisingly, apartheid’s classifications prevailed, though I also considered the language of the respondent to ascertain my
own perception of a respondent’s ethnic identity. As South African researcher Isaac Van der Merwe notes, people’s mother tongue is a “significant marker of social structuring, cultural diversity and minority grouping” in the context of “accommodating a multiethnic society within the territory of a single state” (1995:513). Furthermore, language is not only an indicator of individual cultural identity but also group-based educational and occupational achievements, for example, Van der Merwe uses socio-economic data to show that South Africa’s languages represent “cultural communities” (1995:522). Three languages dominate Cape Town (Xhosa, Afrikaans and English), though the use of Afrikaans by both well-educated high-income White Afrikaners and poorly-educated low-income Cape Coloureds hinders the usefulness of language as an ethnic identity unless use of Afrikaans is sub-divided along apartheid’s race lines. In addition to language and ethnic identity, other basic socio-economic criteria were established at the start of the interview.

The second interview topic identified the respondent’s history in the neighbourhood, both in terms of their length of residence and reason for moving there, as well as their opinions of the area over time. Given that the research focuses on individuals’ experience of neighbourhood integration it was vital to identify the respondent’s general neighbourhood perceptions and experiences. This topic led naturally into a discussion of the neighbourhood (and also their street) that indicated their perceptions of changes, often resulting in the interviewee naturally leading the discussion into issues of integration and desegregation.

The third interview topic addressed the behaviour of the respondent (or at least, his/her professed behaviour) seeking to identify the respondent’s daily activities and movement patterns so as to ascertain neighbourhood involvement and also friendship
patterns. This section of the interview was very personal in identifying the respondent’s behaviour rather than opinions, and discussion was often difficult to sustain once the basic points had been covered. However, the fourth interview topic provided the necessary discussion by explicitly introducing the topic of integration and asking respondents to complete ‘mental maps’ whilst discussing their reasons for completing the map in a certain way (this is addressed in detail in the subsequent section).

Having identified the respondent’s behaviour and perceptions in relation to integration, the final interview topic channelled this prior discussion by raising the issue of what integration entails and also asking the respondent to place a value judgement on its worth. Having already discussed their perceptions via the mental maps, this topic focused the prior discussion whilst also challenging assumptions (i.e. that integration is necessarily good). The final question sought to personalise the agenda by directly asking the respondent how (s)he would feel if his/her son or daughter married someone of another race. This typically caused a heated response and brought a touch of realism to the previously abstract discussion about integration, forcing respondents to consider their true feelings, rather than ‘politically correct’ ones.

As interviews reveal only why people behave in certain manners (or at least, what they say about their motives) they were complemented by participant observation techniques, revealing what people do. I was unable to reside in either of the selected neighbourhoods, and thus participant observation focused on developing relationships with a selection of respondents, visiting them frequently during the research period and establishing involvement in their activities (e.g. children, committees) in order to fully embrace their perceptions and experiences of life. Despite concerns that this
approach results in the possibility of the researcher influencing the research context (Burgess 1984:80, Cook and Crang 1995:21), it was necessary in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the social interactions and daily activities of respondents. In addition to this engagement with residents, I also frequently conducted transect walks through the neighbourhoods in order to develop a broader understanding of residents’ environments. Unlike the more structured data received from interviews, information garnered from participant observation and transect walks was recorded in my field diary.

**Residents’ mental maps**

As such an interview-based approach addresses only people’s verbal opinions and perceptions, as part of the interview respondents were asked to draw mental maps, thus broadening the analysis to include people’s visual and psychological perceptions. Mental maps\(^\text{65}\) enable the “invisible landscapes that people carry in their heads” to be analysed in order to reveal people’s subconscious perceptions about different areas within the city (Gould and White 1986:ix). Although such maps are often ‘inaccurate’ when compared to ‘reality’,\(^\text{66}\) they provide crucial information regarding people’s deeply engrained attitudes and perceptions, which tend to influence human behaviour more than reality. Indeed, Milgram’s research on people’s “psychological maps” of New York City revealed that people understand and use the city based on the unique ‘picture’ in their mind and not on the physical reality of where places are and how they actually intersect. Given that people make decisions based on their perceptions of the city rather than the physical reality, it is vital to understand these

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\(^{65}\) Their various different names, for example ‘mental maps’ (Gould and White, 1986), ‘psychological maps’ (Milgram et al 1972), ‘cognitive maps’ (Downs and Stea 1977), and ‘psychology of place’ (Canter 1977), all refer to essentially the same concept and method, and thus are seen as interchangeable terms.

\(^{66}\) As demonstrated by Milgram’s research in New York (1972) and Paris (1977)
mental maps. Although such maps have traditionally been used to show people’s preferred choice of residential location (e.g. Downs and Stea 1977, Gould and White 1986), or to explain people’s perception of the location of streets and intersections in the city (e.g. Milgram et al 1972), the conceptual approach can be used to assess people’s perceptions about the level of integration in different areas throughout the city. Clearly there is a methodological problem in ‘teasing’ the mental map from someone’s mind on to paper (Milgram 1977:68), and therefore I asked participants to draw their mental map on top of a very basic cartographic map of Cape Town (i.e. a map including area names and railway lines) that I provided alongside three symbols for them to indicate how integrated they perceived each area that was known to them. A completed mental map is shown in Figure 3.2.

![Completed mental map](image)

Figure 3.2: Completed mental map
Although this approach did yield information about which areas respondents thought were integrated and which areas were not, it was not this sort of quantitative data that the method was used to acquire. Rather, mental maps were used to tease discussion from respondents regarding their opinions of integration. I presumed that coldly asking the question “what is integration” would produce a limited response, whereas using mental maps to ask respondents where in their city they perceive integration is occurring led to a natural discussion along the lines of: “that area is integrated because of X”, leading into an analysis of what X entails. I then directed this into a discussion about how integrated their neighbourhood is, and also about what they understand integration to be, and the indicators for assessing it. As human behaviour is strongly directed by individual perceptions, it is hoped that this increased understanding of these perceptions will lead to a better understanding of why people behave as they do and thus how best to encourage integration.

**Structured interviews with non-residential stakeholders**

In addition to interviewing residents in the selected suburbs, I also interviewed various non-residential stakeholders such as church leaders, school principals, local businessmen and women, council officials, local police, and the local councillor. These interviews were more formal and structured than resident interviews, with the specific questions depending on the official being interviewed and his/her role in the neighbourhood. Examples of the questions asked to a selection of non-residential stakeholders are providing in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Structured interviews with non-residential stakeholders

Local councillor:
1. How long have you been councillor of this area?
2. What did you do before being councillor?
3. Do you live in the local area?
4. What are the main issues you face in this area?
5. Have you seen much race antagonism/integration?

Estate Agent:
1. How have property prices changed in this area over recent years?
2. What types of people (race, age, family/couples) are moving in and out of the area?

Church pastor/vicar:
1. How and when did the church start?
2. How long have you lived/worked in the local area (why move here, where before)?
3. What is the ratio of races (members and leaders) at the church?
4. Do the different races mix well as friends away from church services?
5. How have changes in the area affected your church?

School/college principal:
1. How long have you been principal of this school (where prior, why move here)?
2. What is the ratio of different race (pupils and staff) at the school?
3. How has this changed over time?
4. What are the school fees?
5. Are most of your pupils and staff from the local area?
6. How have changes in the local area affected the school?
7. Do pupils from different races mix well as friends?
8. Is this an ‘integrated school’?
9. What does integration involve?
10. Is integration desirable/achievable
11. Where do your pupils go after leaving this school?
12. Are schools a good training ground for integration?

Although these interviews were principally directed at local stakeholders rather than residents per se, a number of local officials were also residents, and thus where appropriate a semi-structured resident interview was also conducted. The material from non-residential interviews complemented the residents’ data to provide a broader picture of the processes of integration and desegregation occurring in each neighbourhood.
Forty-nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with residents of Westlake village, in addition to thirteen residents from Silvertree (the wealthy gated community section of Westlake Estate), thirty-six officials (ten of whom were also residents), and fourteen businesses (in the business park section of Westlake Estate), giving a total of 102 interviewees in relation to Westlake. In Muizenberg, fifty-eight residents were interviewed in addition to thirty-seven officials (fifteen of whom were also residents), giving a total of 80 interviewees in relation to Muizenberg.

**ANALYSIS OF RESULTS**

**Coding data**

The reliance on qualitative fieldwork methods produced a large volume of data in diverse formats (unlike, for example, the results of a standardised questionnaire). As the fieldwork was qualitative, producing textual data, analysis focuses on words and meanings rather than statistics. All the interview data and fieldwork observations were recorded chronologically in notebooks, and thus it was necessary to "code" the material according to common ideas and trends (Crang 1997:186). These codes were not pre-determined but developed as I worked through the interview material, sorting the data into themes arising from common interviewee remarks (with some remarks representing more than one code). It was crucial at this stage to avoid using the data to prove pre-determined ideas, and to instead explore the data to develop ideas. This 'coding' was not conducted using a qualitative software package as it was felt that such methods remove the human process of sifting through materials, often the stage at which major insights are revealed. Instead, the coding was conducted 'by hand', with interview material re-ordered according to the codes identified, leading to the
discovery of patterns in respondents' experiences and opinions, and subsequent
development of trends to discuss. These trends were then linked back to the original
hypotheses and the literature reviewed, to assess their impact. The findings were
used both to consider the nature of integration in each neighbourhood (with
implications for Cape Town, South Africa and multicultural cities worldwide) as well
as to identify specific trends in each neighbourhood as a consequence of integration,
as revealed in Chapters 4-7. Furthermore, these data have enabled the development
of a broad theory of integration in multi-cultural cities (developed in Chapters 4 and
8).

Almost all of this data analysis (coding) was conducted while in South Africa so as to
ensure physical and emotional proximity to the field-sites, and also to allow me the
opportunity to re-visit respondents.

**Use of verbatim quotations**

Verbatim quotations are used to ground analytical debate in the voices and realities of
respondents, however this method can result in a text that reads as: “he said this and
she said that, therefore”. In order to avoid such a simplistic analytical style,
quotations were only used to highlight an analytical point that had already been made
rather than just as a quotation in their own right. In particular, quotations are used to
demonstrate the specific phrases used by respondents, and also to indicate the
strength of feelings. The use of verbatim quotes in research outputs has become
increasingly popular despite the limited theoretical underpinning to this approach. In
order to counter one aspect of this theoretical deficiency, Corden and Sainsbury
(2005) undertook a research project to test the impact of using verbatim quotations on
participants. Despite participants having been pre-informed that the research outputs
would feature verbatim quotations, most were surprised to see their words in the text (thus indicating the problems of informed consent), and the effectiveness of anonymity tools subsequently became of crucial concern to participants. These concerns were taken into account throughout this research, with anonymity assured.

**Respondent feedback**

So as to ensure the holistic involvement of respondents in the research process, the initial findings from each field-site were disseminated to a selection of respondents (usually by giving them a written document, though in some cases by verbally explaining the conclusions I had come to), inviting them to respond with their opinions and criticisms. Most responses focused on historical points that respondents disagreed with, leading me to add footnotes clarifying the context. Few respondents raised objections to the analysis, thus confirming the reliability of the conclusions and reassuring me that I had accurately represented participants’ voices (though of course any power imbalance between myself and participants may have limited them from criticising the texts).

Researchers elsewhere have recognised that participants dislike references to themselves (even anonymised) in research outputs (e.g. Wiles et al 2005a; Corden and Sainsbury 2005), often expressing concerned about being categorised, for example when texts refer to their comments as being from a ‘single-parent’ or ‘person with mental-health problems’, as such labels have negative implications (Corden and Sainsbury 2005). This was not the case in this research, where respondents expressed no concern regarding the use of quotations or demographic categories. Furthermore, both Corden and Sainsbury (2005) and this research found that returning the output text to respondents yielded further data (rather than criticisms *per se*), as respondents
realised they were not the only ones in this position, and thus subsequently contributed further information.

LIMITATIONS

Limited samples

Although I attempted to ensure the demographics of each sample were representative of the field-site, this was not always possible. For example, the Muizenberg sample is unequally dominated by White responses, representing half of the sample (58%, 34 respondents) but only 36% of Muizenberg’s population (according to the 2001 census). In addition, Black South Africans comprised 14% of the sample (8 respondents), Coloureds were 12% of the sample (7 respondents), and Black African immigrants comprised 16% of the sample (9 respondents). This is a significant under-representation given that the census indicates Black Africans as 36% of Muizenberg’s population (of which approximately 10-15% are immigrants) and Coloureds as 26.6%. This White dominance is thus recognised as a major limitation of the study. The Muizenberg study was also slightly male-dominated, comprising 58% of all respondents, though this is not considered sufficiently biased to render results problematic. A broad range of age groups are represented by the sample, as indicated by Table 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field-site</th>
<th>0-20 yrs</th>
<th>21-30 yrs</th>
<th>31-40 yrs</th>
<th>41-50 yrs</th>
<th>51-60 yrs</th>
<th>61-70 yrs</th>
<th>70+ yrs</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Muizenberg</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westlake Village</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silvertree</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Number of respondents by age category in field-site samples
Although the Westlake village sample adequately represented the different racial groups in the area, with 20 Black African, 22 Coloured, 4 White and 1 Indian respondent, and also the different age ranges in the neighbourhood (see Table 3.1), the sample was dominated by women, comprising 67% of the sample (33 respondents). This is largely a consequence of the abundance of women in the neighbourhood during the day (while many men were out at work) and also the ease of female-female encounters in cross-cultural contexts. Despite facing a similar gender problem in Silvertree I managed to ensure an even balance of male and female respondents (seven men and six women) by offering to interview men away from the neighbourhood, at their workplace (most owned their own business or were CEOs), which was not possible for Westlake village men who were largely manual workers unable to conduct non-work business during working hours and unwilling to spend their limited free time in the evenings and weekends with a researcher. Although the Silvertree sample is dominated by White respondents (85%, 11 respondents, in addition to one Black African and one Coloured respondent) and middle-aged residents (see Table 3.1), this is representative of the neighbourhood. However, the size of the Silvertree sample as a whole is very small.

In general, the urban setting of this research made gaining access to respondents arduous, as most potential respondents were behind doors, out at work and too busy to be interviewed. Silvertree was particularly difficult as it is a gated community, where residents explicitly desire privacy and by virtue of living behind walls and gates have made their houses inaccessible; this is indicated by the small sample size. I attempted to overcome these problems principally by offering to meet respondents at whatever venue suited them. For example, I met several business executives in their workplace, as well as a handful of women at the local café. By interviewing
residents of the gated community in the context of their choosing, I was able to gain access to this closed community, though the sample is still relatively small as residents were reticent to pass on neighbour’s contact details.

**Interview problems**

Semi-structured interviews rely on discussion and dialogue rather than interrogation and thus require some willingness to talk on the part of the interviewee. Despite the use of open-ended questions and the encouragement of discussion, a handful of participants repeatedly offered short answers and were unwilling to participate in a discussion. In an attempt to stimulate discussion in these interviews, I would introduce a slightly bold or controversial issue, asking the respondent how they would feel if their son or daughter married someone of another race (although this was already in the interview agenda, I would move it forward). In most cases this did successfully inject some debate into the interview, though it did not always last, and thus some interview data delve more into the respondent’s thoughts and opinions than others.

Almost all interviews were conducted in English, and although in most cases this was not a problem, a handful of respondents were unable to express themselves fully in English. In those cases I used a translator (Xhosa and French), but one interview with an Afrikaans-only speaking family did fail as a consequence of language (as I did not have access to an Afrikaans interpreter). Although this interview was conducted in a mixture of English and Afrikaans (I speak limited Afrikaans), the respondents were unable fully to express themselves in English, and I was unable fully to understand their Afrikaans responses, leading to an artificial interview that was discounted from the data. All other Afrikaans-speaking respondents were able to speak fluent English
and thus interviews were conducted with ease. However, when analysing the data the fact that the interview was not conducted in their first language was taken into account (and also with interviews translated by someone else from Xhosa or French).

**Ethical considerations**

Throughout the fieldwork I ensured consistent and explicit honesty and transparency in communication with research subjects regarding the objectives, content, methods and intended possible uses of the research. Participation in the research was based on voluntary informed consent, and the confidentiality and anonymity of information and respondents was guaranteed. Informed consent is understood as "providing sufficient information to study participants to enable them to know what participating in research will entail" (Wiles et al 2005a:1). However, informed consent is not simple and involves making value judgements, particularly when dealing with vulnerable groups, such as the poor, and also when conducting qualitative social research in which research aims may change and explaining methods can render them useless. While I clearly explained the research aims to each respondent prior to their interview, and gained their 'consent', there are concerns regarding whether such 'consent' is ever fully 'informed' (Wiles et al 2005a, 2005b). Firstly, there are dangers regarding maximising or minimising the amount of information given to respondents: for example, the amount of pre-interview information I gave was necessarily limited as I did not want to deter people by providing a lengthy (spoken or written) research agenda that would swamp them with information, and also because I did not wish to influence subsequent discussions by explaining the research topics too deeply. Secondly, questions related to assessing whether consent has truly been given are problematic: for example, I did not request written consent as this seemed excessively formal, but perhaps this would have been the only way to ensure that
consent had been genuinely granted (though many respondents may have felt that signing their name diluted the anonymity I offered). Instead I relied on verbal consent though the inequality of status between myself and informants may have influenced their decision (i.e. respondents feeling coerced into participation), although an unwilling participant could then have rebelled by providing limited answers. In fact, several potential respondents did refuse to participate in the research, though this was never face-to-face but rather from potential respondents that I telephoned to request an appointment, and who, upon hearing the research aims felt unable to contribute, often because of time constraints. There are also concerns regarding what exactly respondents have provided consent for, as in social research the project goals can alter and it is not always possible to know in advance what research outputs will comprise. Indeed, in this research I did not expect my findings to be plastered over the national press, and thus when this did occur it was not something for which respondents had explicitly given consent; this media issue is further explained in the subsequent section.

While recognising these problems of informed consent, I was completely honest at all times with participants, and thus feel sufficient consent was provided. Furthermore, I always treated participants as people rather than merely as objects to fulfil my research agenda. In particular, by returning to respondents to provide copies of research outputs and request their criticisms (and also by providing my contact details to all respondents), I offered the opportunity to withdraw consent at any stage, and also provided a long-term level of information regarding the research project (i.e. the research aims and outputs, rather than just the former).

As mentioned earlier a further ethical dilemma was caused by the power imbalance between myself and respondents (particularly poorer and under-educated interviewees
who were awed by my nationality and university affiliation). In South Africa, this is further overlaid by racial complications in that whilst I am White (the skin colour of the historic oppressor), most poor South Africans are black. While this power and racial imbalance can never be fully overcome, I developed a rapport and friendship with respondents (particularly in the poorer field site) that I believe helped to minimise the effects of this. Furthermore, the fact that I was not a White South African benefited me as respondents felt more able to express their feelings (in particular their anger about the apartheid past) to a foreigner who was not involved in (and thus did not benefit from) the apartheid era. However, other researchers indicate that Western research in developing contexts is “embedded in the context of colonialism” (Valentine 1997:114), leading to a sense of obligation (rather than willingness) on the part of respondents, and though I did not explicitly note this during fieldwork, it is recognised as a probable limitation. In addition, a large proportion of interviewees were also White and thus felt able to ‘open up’ with me a fellow White, and also a British national, the heritage of many respondents.

Despite attempts to overcome these power imbalances, I was constantly aware of the positionality of both myself and the interviewees, and thus recognise that narratives from the interview process were negotiated between both parties. Interviewees undoubtedly perceived my position as being a White, wealthy, foreign female, and possibly also an educated expert, though I tried to level the playing field (albeit only a little) by emphasising my role as a student rather than expert. I was fortunate that cultural norms held no barrier to my fieldwork, though in many households my status as a married woman meant that participants were more willing to engage with me as an adult rather than a young single girl (as my youthful looks indicate). Furthermore, in order to restrict the extent to which my positionality affected participants’
responses, I resisted from offering my opinions during interviews, and instead was sympathetic to respondents’ views, seeking to empathise with them even if I actually disagreed (which was particularly difficult when respondents espoused very racist beliefs, assuming that as a fellow White I would agree, against which I offered no indication). Although other researchers argue that interviewers should confront insulting comments (e.g. Troyna and Hatcher 1992), I felt this inappropriate as it would destroy the rapport developed with participants, and also make them unlikely to share their real opinions. When interviewing elites (e.g. politicians, businessmen) the power imbalance was often reversed, as they were the superior in terms of rank and education, and in such contexts I chose to use this imbalance to my advantage by acting as an inferior girl, thus encouraging them to disclose more information than intended (a technique also used by O’Connell Davidson and Layder 1994:146).

Media problems

In March 2005 I presented a selection of my findings from the Westlake field-site at a conference in Pretoria, South Africa. The next day, newspapers across the country printed articles about my research, with inflammatory headlines such as: “SAs “gated” communities slated by UK academic” in the Cape Times (see Figure 3.4), “Tokai wall the “new apartheid”” in the Cape Argus, “Walls lead to woes” in the Johannesburg Star, and “Social apartheid rife” in the Pretoria Citizen. I was also asked to give various radio interviews about the research. However, the crux of the media interest focused on my comment that the rise of gated communities in South Africa causes concerns because of fears that they replicate apartheid planning. This was interpreted by the media as blaming Silvertree residents for the lack of integration in post-apartheid South Africa. In addition, media reports focused solely
on the negative aspects of my research findings (see Figure 3.4), ignoring the positive
glimpses of integration that I also discussed.

SA’s ‘gated’
communities
slated by UK
academic

SA’s ‘gated’ communities slated by UK academic

SAPA

PRETORIA: The upmarket Silvertree Estate in Tokai, Cape Town, has been slammed here by an Oxford University
researcher as a prime example of resident-initiated apartheid that isolates residents of the neighbouring Westlake Village.
Charlotte Lemanski, of Oxford’s School of Geography, was addressing delegates – including real estate developers and
government representatives – from 20 countries at a symposium on “gated” communities.

Her study of the Silvertree Estate found deliberate barring of social mixing in the planning of the development’s roads –
which ensured residents of the luxury estate did not have to use the same routes as their poorer neighbours.

“One of the results of the road plans means residents of Westlake have to travel three kilometres to get to a shopping centre
100 metres from where they live,” Lemanski said. “They could cut a path across some wetlands to get to the shopping centre more quickly.”

The phenomenon was repeated across SA. Lemanski said, with tensions running high between residents of developments like Dainfern in Johannesburg and neighbouring Diep-
sloot, and Sandton and Alexandra, a stone’s throw away from each other.

The term “gated communities” refers to upmarket, enclosed, high-security complexes.

Quoting from a similar study conducted by University of KwaZulu-Natal researcher John Ballard, who had made his presenta-
tion to the symposium on Tuesday, Lemanski said such developments encouraged a form of “social or resident-initiated apartheid”

Lemanski proposed social mixing and a more inclusive road design that would ensure shared access to facilities.

Her research found that residents of the low-cost housing units in Westlake were angry and felt rejected by their affluent
neighbours because Silvertree’s high walls and electrified fences isolated them.

Silvertree residents were largely ignorant and negative about Westlake, calling it a squatter camp full of criminals and its residents lazy.

“The fact is Westlake is not a squatter camp at all – the people are on the land legally,” Lemanski said.

Although it was on their doorsteps, most Silvertree residents had not been to Westlake. Those who had been there had gone only because their voter registration centres for last year’s elections were located there.

“I found some residents who said they did not vote because they would have had to go to Westlake to do so,” Lemanski said.

“This type of situation is to become more common if housing minister Lindiwe Sisulu forges ahead with plans announced last year to build low-cost housing nearer to city centres in affluent areas.”

Figure 3.4: Newspaper article (Cape Times, Thursday 3 March 2005, p6)
Not surprisingly, respondents from the Silvertree community were furious when they saw the media reports and felt betrayed, with many expressing a feeling that I had misrepresented them in addition to ‘using’ their data in a way they had not expected (i.e. in the media). In order to calm the situation, I contacted all respondents to offer my apologies and explain that I had been misquoted. I also contacted the editor of the Cape Times, who agreed to let me write a feature based on my research to be published the following Monday (see Figure 3.5). In addition, I attended a community meeting with representatives from both Silvertree and Westlake village in order to answer questions and clarify my research findings. The outcome was that both communities were very happy with my feature in the Cape Times (Figure 3.5) because they felt it better reflected reality, and also because it had raised the profile of the area. Indeed, letters to the newspaper about my research and about the area continued to be printed up to a month after the feature.
GETTING TO GRIPS WITH HIGH-SECURITY LIVING

Put ‘community’ both sides of gates

CHARLOTTE LEMANSKI

GATED communities are becoming increasingly popular in Cape Town, particularly evident in the new residential developments currently springing up all over the city. One such development is Silvertrees, an estate to be gated by a developer for new developments advertising their complexes as offering a “secure environment” with “24-hour surveillance” and an armed security patrol. This is because closing off roads with barriers is not legal in Cape Town (as opposed to Johannesburg where it is common in suburbs such as Sandton), moving into a “total security village” is not an option for many residents who are afraid of living in the city. Reasons for moving into gated communities vary according to the individual. Four of the main reasons, in addition to the desire to raise children in a secure environment, and of course, properties in such complexes also offer a fantastic economic investment, is of course, that for very similar reasons they are so popular with developers. The term “gated community” refers to a space enclosed by a fence, with access controlled by gates. Such complexes take varieties of “security villages” with 24-hour private security, separate electric gates, boom-down gates and enclosed retail and business parks.

Last week delegates from across the world met at a symposium in Pretoria to discuss the impacts of this relatively new residential trend for cities throughout the world. Issues such as the legal implications of exclusion, their impact on those who live outside the gates and walls, the consequences of privatizing public services (e.g., road maintenance, transportation, refuse collection) and security costs for gated communities (as well as broader issues such as the fragmentation of urban areas were discussed. As you can see, gated communities raise a host of issues such as those that are “within the gate” but also for those outside. Although this phenomenon is by no means restricted to South Africa, the issue is particularly sensitive here because of fears that such exclusionary spaces threaten attempts to integrate people and places in the post-apartheid city, by segmenting spaces and outsiders largely on the basis of economics rather than race.

My research addressed the Silvertrees Estate near Pinelands. This gated community is unusual in being located 500m from the low-cost housing area of Westlake village. Although such proximity of difference is relatively common in other parts of South Africa (as a result of the property market in Sandton and Alex in Johannesburg), this is still relatively rare for Cape Town. This development has been enormously successful, as anyone who has travelled along this section of Saanachem Drive will know, with an attractive business and office park in addition to a thriving retail section (with a Woolworths currently under construction), and popular schools. Houses in Silveroaks are upmarket properties that sell for up to R3 million, far exceeding the original expectations of the developers. In contrast, the majority of houses in Westlake are two-bedroom RDP structures valued at approximately R60,000. At the start of 2001, I spent five months getting to know some people who live in these two neighbouring townships, finding out about their lives and about how these two vastly differing residential areas function in their shared section of the Constantia valley.

My research indicated both negative tensions and positive connections between residents of Silvertrees and Westlake, though unsurprisingly most of this media attention my research has received has focused solely on the negative aspects. I found that people living in Westlake expressed feelings of exclusion largely based on their spatial location. For example, because Westlake Village is almost completely hidden in the centre of this development with its residents excluded from their surroundings by walls and gates, many Westlake villagers expressed feelings of being “unwanted” and “rejected” by their wealthier neighbours. In addition, the absence of any common access roads between the two communities, as well as the limited legal access for Westlake residents to facilities in the area such as the shops (which lie Buiten from Westlake residents are required to travel 5km to reach them) contributes to Westlake villagers’ feelings of both exclusion from the benefits of the area, as well as separation from their neighbours who are perceived as benefiting more from the area. Obviously, some of the Si- lvertrees residents for the feelings of rejection demonstrated by Westlake residents, and although the press have quoted me as saying this was a form of “resident-initiated apartheid”, I said no such thing. I did say that the spatial design of this development discourages interaction between the two areas, for example, the lack of shared access roads for residents of the two communities.

Many of the people that I met in Silvertrees had not even been aware of Westlake’s existence when they bought their properties. A lack of awareness that is understandable given the absence of any mention of Westlake on original adverts for Silver- trees, in addition to a design that not only intentionally prevents any views but from Silveroaks to Westlake but also uses Redhill House School as a buffer zone between the two neighbourhoods. Although many Silveroaks residents were ignorant about Westlake (for example referring to it as a “squatter” area, when in fact, a formal housing area), there are also many Silveroaks residents who are actively involved in the lives of their neighbours.

For example, the “Westlake Neighbourhood Trust” (WENT) organisation is composed of representatives from the near-by ‘exclusive’ development and institutions surrounding Westlake (including Silveroaks) and has been tireless in its campaign for better living conditions for Westlake residents, in particular for the provision of a footbridge that would provide easier access for Westlake residents to the shops in the development. Furthermore, WENT has been active in supporting the development of a community forum in Westlake, something which was finally achieved at the end of last year. Although I personally believe that this area would benefit from the creation of a joint organisation, for example a single body with representatives from both Silveroaks and Westlake that works for bettering both areas as a whole to be the ideal, the current situation of an organisation composed of Westlake’s neighbours supporting the Westlake organisation is clearly better than none.

Although such proximity of difference is still relatively rare in Cape Town, given the housing minister’s announcement towards the end of last year that low-cost housing areas would increasingly be located in wealthy areas in order to speed up the process of housing delivery, such examples of rich and poor communities living side-by-side look set to become more common in South Africa’s cities. Furthermore, given the increase of gated complexes and mixed-use developments throughout Cape Town, this is clearly a trend that likely to dominate the future urban landscape.

On the basis of this, two key urban design recommendations are offered for future mixed-use development first, to ensure a more inclusive design for the housing development as a whole (for example, more accessibility between different areas and secondly, to ensure there is a symbiotic functional integration between residential areas differing income in addition, an obvious social recommendation would be to encourage the creation of a single body that represents both areas. Whether such trends will make place also depends on the approach taken both by the developers design such complexes, as well as by government’s integration of low-cost housing, and of course, also the attitude of residents living in such areas. If successfully planned and implemented, such strategies could represent an opportunity to complement rather than threaten post-apartheid urban plans for integration.

Manski is at School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford.
Although I have presented this as a limitation of my research in fact it ultimately formed a positive contribution to the research process by allowing me the opportunity to express my findings to a wide audience, and also by facilitating additional post-fieldwork meetings with various respondents, thus giving the research a longer-term trajectory (fieldwork was conducted in January-May 2004 while the media interest and subsequent community meetings were in March-April 2005). Furthermore, respondents who had been concerned about the original media reporting were pleased when they read my feature and many offered additional thoughts and comments regarding my findings.

To summarise this chapter, the research for this DPhil comprised quantitative analysis of census results, which provided the criterion for selecting the neighbourhoods in which to conduct qualitative fieldwork. Throughout 2004, semi-structured interviews and participant observation techniques were employed in two different field sites (Westlake and Muizenberg), targeting both residents and local officials. Interview data were analysed by ‘coding’ the material into various themes and the material was subsequently written into the four journal papers that form the core of this thesis. As I hope has been reflected in this chapter, the fieldwork period was a time of great interest and excitement in the research. Having spent over a year engulfed in the theoretical debates while living in Oxford, the opportunity to explore and test my ideas and theories in the South African context was very satisfying. However, it was also a great challenge in terms of gaining access and overcoming various problems. Having now provided the full background to this thesis (i.e. the theory, South African context and methodological approach), the findings of the research are now presented in the form of four journal papers.
CHAPTER FOUR:

THE IMPACT OF RESIDENTIAL DESEGREGATION ON SOCIAL INTEGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM A SOUTH AFRICAN NEIGHBOURHOOD
INTRODUCTION

The wealth of social research addressing post-apartheid urban South Africa highlights the persistence rather than transformation of apartheid geographies, and the absence of urban integration (e.g. Beall et al 2002; Pieterse 2003a; Tomlinson et al 2003; Turok 2001; Watson 2003). Focusing on the milieu of everyday residential life, two key manifestations are identified. Firstly, the continued dominance of residential segregation (Christopher 2001a, 2001b), and secondly the dominance of social segregation in the face of limited residential desegregation (Horn and Ngcobo 2003; Oldfield 2004; Saff 1994, 1998a). Apartheid’s spatial design continues to dictate who lives where, and in those rare situations in which spatial design is overcome and residential desegregation is emerging (a consequence of market forces and/or state intervention); apartheid continues to dictate social relations. Clearly there are exceptions to this, in particular the migration of South Africa’s growing black middle-class into residential areas previously reserved for Whites (Saff 1994, 1998a). However, such trends only allow blacks with sufficient socio-economic credentials into ‘White’ spaces, rather than desegregating society and space for all.

This paper analyses the potential for social integration in post-apartheid urban South Africa by examining the lives of those already living in desegregated spaces. While recognising that residential space is not the sole domain of socio-spatial racial change and that other contexts (e.g. churches, shopping centres, schools – see Battersby 2004b regarding desegregation in South Africa’s schools) provide spaces of integration, by starting with desegregated neighbourhoods, research successfully focuses on the nature of social mixing between those already living in shared physical space. The case study is a low-cost state-assisted housing project situated in the
wealthy southern suburbs of Cape Town. In this social housing project, named Westlake village, Coloured and Black African (alongside a handful of White and Indian) residents were awarded state housing in 1999 as replacement for their previous homes (informal and formal), which were demolished to make way for a mixed land-use development (upmarket housing, business, office and retail space), of which their new homes form a small component.

In its starting point, this research bears remarkable similarities to Sophie Oldfield’s recent *Geoforum* article (2004) analysing racial integration in a desegregated low-income Cape Town neighbourhood that provided state-funded housing for Black Africans and Coloureds. While her research revealed the dominance of race in determining residents’ everyday activities, this research finds the opposite, that Westlake’s desegregation extends beyond mere residential abode, allowing other factors to supersede race in everyday decisions. However, Oldfield’s research also found that despite the dominance of racial identities at the everyday level, other identities bridging racial, cultural and language divides developed around civic involvement. Although localised non-racial identities are also identified in Westlake, Oldfield’s findings demonstrate very active forms of mixing, whereas Westlake’s non-racial identities are more passive, based on who you are rather than what you’re doing. However, in both settings racial identities have been overlaid by other identities, a crucial occurrence in post-apartheid South Africa. This comparison is emphasised not to refute Oldfield’s work but rather to consider the reasons such differences exist despite similar starting points. In fact, such opposing research

67 The apartheid racial classifications of African, Coloured (mixed heritage), Indian (Asian descent) and White (European) are used throughout this paper. However, apartheid’s ‘African’ label is updated to ‘Black African’ in recognition that the other groups are also Africans (‘Black African’ is also the term adopted by the census in 2001), and ‘black’ (lower case) is used to describe all non-Whites. The majority of Black Africans in Cape Town are of isiXhosa descent, and this is the meaning intended by use of ‘Black African’ unless otherwise specified.
outcomes actually confirm Oldfield’s conclusion that “context and situation” determine the role attributed to race in the post-apartheid setting (2004:189).

This research uses social integration in reference to micro-level relations between people of different classes/races/ethnicities\(^{68}\) living in shared physical space. Consequently, research addresses ‘integration’ as a dynamic process, rather than ‘being integrated’ as a static outcome. As inferred, this requires attention at the everyday nature of lived experience. Empirical evidence from Westlake is used to propose a continuum of social integration experience. This continuum addresses the form of integration, for example greeting in the street, visiting homes, inter-marriage; and also the spaces of integration, for example physical space (shared neighbourhood), economic space (common employment-type), social space (cross-race friendship), political space (common involvement in civic organisations) and cultural space (shared sense of belonging). These five definitions indicate the dynamic nature of space, used and understood by different people in different ways at different times. This approach links with international debates on social cohesion and social capital in neighbourhoods, identifying and analysing the decline in ‘community’ between residential neighbours (e.g. Putnam 1995; Castells 1997; Kearns and Forrest 2000). Such research indicates the neighbourhood as providing a “community” of local friendship and everyday life, a “context” usually attached to a specific reputation (e.g. neighbourhoods considered socially poor), and also a “commodity” representing ones lifestyle (Forrest and Kearns 2001:2141-2142). This research primarily considers the “community” function of a neighbourhood, though

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\(^{68}\) Although a broad understanding of integration between people from different classes/races/ethnicities is used as the conceptual framework for research, in the specific research case study (Cape Town, South Africa), the focus is on the integration of people from apartheid’s different racial classifications. While the difference between one’s race (e.g. black or White) and one’s ethnicity (e.g. Zulu or Dutch) is recognised, for ease of discussion, the terms race/racial are used throughout this paper even when referring to an identity that is not strictly racial (e.g. Coloured, Indian).
the “context” of being a low-cost housing area and the role of new homeownership as a “commodity” also play a role.

In addressing Westlake’s everyday social mixing this paper first identifies whether residents’ lives are locally-based. This is in response to research on informal settlements (Haferburg 2002), desegregated housing projects (Oldfield 2004), and desegregated middle-class suburbs (Horn and Ngcobo 2003) identifying residents’ everyday lives as often functioning in apartheid’s segregated spaces, rather than in their desegregated neighbourhood, thereby restricting the potential for social interaction (and thus ultimately for integration). Having established everyday life as localised for all races in Westlake, the extent to which different races interact in Westlake’s physical, economic and social spaces at both an everyday and institutional level is considered. That is not to suggest that people’s lives are so easily compartmentalised, but rather to use patterns of daily movement as well as institutional attachments as indicators of social integration. Finally, the paper contemplates whether a distinct ‘Westlake identity’ that transcends racial difference is emerging and producing a unique cultural space.

SOUTH AFRICA CONTEXT

Social and spatial segregation is deeply entrenched in South Africa’s geography. Overcoming this inherited socio-spatial structure is South Africa’s major challenge. Under apartheid, separate spatiality was fundamental to separate social order; lines were drawn on maps, and people re-ordered accordingly. The city was considered exclusive ‘White’ space, with Black Africans ‘temporary sojourners’ (rural homelands being their permanent space). However, urban Whites required black labour
(Coloureds had ‘labour preference’ over Black Africans in Cape Town) and race-based residential segregation was implemented to ensure both spatial and social distancing of blacks on urban peripheries. Day-to-day urban interaction was prevented by provision of separate facilities (e.g. schools, hospitals, beaches, toilets). While recognising that Cape Town was less segregated than other South African cities and that mixing between Whites and Coloureds was relatively common (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1989:3), it was largely restricted to master-servant relationships and such racial tolerance did not equate to social mixing. Furthermore, towards the end of apartheid, Cape Town was South Africa’s most segregated metropolis (Christopher 2001c:123-125). The significance of this for post-apartheid Cape Town is immense; for so few current urbanites have “lived even part of their adult lives in racially and ethnically integrated communities” (Christopher 2001c:128) that the potential for cross-race integration is severely constrained.

Although the prime objective of apartheid was to separate Whites from other groups, there was also separation between blacks, for example between different Black African tribes (e.g. Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana) and also between Black Africans and Coloureds. This latter conflict was particularly evident in the Western Cape (the province hosting Cape Town) where Coloureds were granted labour preference and thus Black Africans were effectively excluded from the city, with no nearby ‘homeland’ and limited township space. Thus Cape Town is historically perceived as a Coloured rather than Black African city (in addition to Whites, who considered the city their cultural domain), and until 2004 the (Black African dominated) ANC had failed to gain majority support in the Western Cape. However, as the size of Cape Town’s Black African population has grown there have been increased tensions between the two groups. Thus post-apartheid South Africa is seeking to encourage
desegregation between Whites and blacks, and also between Coloureds and Black Africans, and the latter forms the focus of this paper.

Since apartheid’s demise, South Africa’s cities have witnessed a burgeoning black population (Western 2001) with 2001 census data showing that the Black African population comprise almost one-third (31.5%) of Cape Town, from only 25% in 1996. Coloureds remain the single largest group at almost half (48%, similar to 1996), and have also increased in absolute size, with Whites the only group to decline both absolutely and relatively, now comprising less than one-fifth (19% in 2001, 21% in 1996) of Cape Town (Stats SA 1998a, 2003a). Despite this black urban growth, the social and spatial lives of different races function in relative isolation, and many commentators believe South Africa’s cities are as divided now as under apartheid (e.g. Pieterse 2003a:81; Tomlinson et al 2003:x; Turok 2001:2350; Watson 2003:55). Post-apartheid Cape Town exhibits ruthless spatial polarisation, with centrally-located affluent suburbs and economic centres juxtapositioned by poverty-stricken and overcrowded settlements on the periphery. While it is axiomatic that apartheid’s socio-spatial entrenchment would constrain post-apartheid integration, inherited obstacles are magnified by post-apartheid urban changes.

Five major post-apartheid urban changes are identified. Firstly, ‘desegregating’ residential space, i.e. class rather than race determining residential choice; for example middle-class blacks gaining institutional (rather than social, necessarily) acceptance in formerly White suburbs (Horn and Ngcobo 2003:340; Saff 1994:382, 1998a:94-97). Secondly, ‘deracialising’ residential space, i.e. Black African informal

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69 These statistics were generated from the census question: “how would the person describe him/herself in terms of population group?” (Stats SA 2003e:12). Although this enables citizens to select their own population group identity (rather than accept an imposed or estimated identity), it must be noted that choice was limited to: Black African, Coloured, Indian/Asian, White, or Other (however, the ‘other’ response was so rare that its results were ignored) (Stats SA 2003b: viii).
settlements erupting adjacent to 'White' areas but being culturally excluded from the suburb's 'White' facilities despite spatial proximity (Ballard 2004; Saff 1998a:94-97; Seekings 2000:834). Westlake is a reversed example of this phenomenon in that its adjacent upmarket (predominantly White) housing development was established after the informal settlement (albeit after formalisation), and thus Whites have no prior cultural claim to this space. Thirdly, constructing low-income state-assisted housing that is largely multi-racial (Seekings 2000:834, Oldfield 1004), such as Westlake. Fourthly and fifthly, the rapid movement of blacks (including African immigrants) into inner cities (Bremner 2000b:186; Morris 1999), alongside the exodus of Whites, with some fleeing into secluded residential enclaves (Lemanski 2004a).

Despite these socio-spatial urban divisions, the post-apartheid government stridently asserts a pro-integration message, encouraging all races jointly to build the new South Africa. Indeed, phrases such as 'Rainbow Nation' and the 'New South Africa' are part of the "psyche and everyday language of citizens" (Battersby 2004a:151), and media adverts seeking to emphasise commonality for all South Africans (e.g. Standard Bank's "There's more holding us together than keeping us apart") and encourage honour in nationality (e.g. 'Proudly South African' campaign) are clearly harnessing this pro-integration sentiment.

**BACKGROUND TO WESTLAKE**

The R1 billion-plus Westlake development, launched in March 1999, was designed to transform the previously-neglected public land into a "model mini-town", providing housing for a range of socio-economic groups (Blumenfeld 1999). Approximately 20 hectares of the 95 hectare site were earmarked for state-assisted low-income housing,
named Westlake Village (the focus of this research), with the 600+ families already living informally on the land given home-ownership, but liable for water, electricity, rates and taxes. Luxurious housing was also part of the development, with 180 plots built in the picturesque Silvertree Estate (an enclosed security village with 24-hour surveillance),\textsuperscript{70} adjacent to the newly-built Reddam House private school, attracting high-income families. The development also includes non-residential land use with a business park, office park, retail centre (Steenberg Lifestyle Centre) and the (currently under construction) US Consulate office, as demonstrated by Figure 4.1.

\textsuperscript{70} Research analysing integration between Westlake village and Silvertree Estate is addressed elsewhere (Lemanski fc), and this paper considers only integration within Westlake village.
Westlake is situated in the leafy Constantia valley, bordered by golf estates, a wine farm, nature reserve, and flanked by the busy M3 highway leading directly to Cape Town's CBD. As indicated by Figure 4.2, showing apartheid Cape Town, Westlake is situated (bottom left of map) in the midst of former White suburbs, close to some former Coloured group areas, but very far from former Black African group areas.
Figure 4.2: Location of Westlake in apartheid Cape Town
The Westlake development was conceived as a segregated space, implementing mechanisms reminiscent of apartheid planning, for example using buffers (i.e. Reddam House School and the business park) to separate Westlake village and Silvertree Estate, erecting high walls around each section of the development (both Silvertree and sections of the business park further restrict access by erecting gates operated by security guards), and the use of only three entrance/exit points in the development, with no shared access between Westlake village and Silvertree Estate. The exclusionary intentions of this apartheid-esque design are confirmed by the developers.71

It is a very unique land use geography. It works because there are separate components although in geographical proximity. This country will never have rich and poor mixing. The trick to this development is there are three separate entrances that don’t link. It was intentional ... it was designed to be four separate stand-alone sections [C.G.15/04/04] 72

Prior to the development Westlake was virtually derelict but was occupied by three major groups: firstly, those renting dilapidated formal housing originally let to local hospital and prison staff, but overrun with illegal occupants by the late-1990s,73 secondly, those ‘squatting’ in the non-serviced informal settlement (‘Die Bos’ or ‘the bush’) originating in 1991 as a convenient housing location for those working informally at nearby wealthy suburbs, farms and golf estates; and thirdly, those residing at the ‘Ark City of Refuge’, a Christian welfare organisation housing homeless people (CMC 1997:18-19). In 1997 the Cape Metropolitan Council (CMC) estimated approximately 2,000 people living in Westlake, comprising 800 people in

71 For more discussion on the area as a whole see Lemanski fc.
72 In order to protect the identity of interviewees their names are initialled, alongside the date of the interview.
73 There is some confusion as to whether occupants in the formal house structures paid rent (while some allege that they did, others admit they lived there for free), and for those that did pay rent, there is further uncertainty as to whether this was paid to a legitimate owner, or an illicit entrepreneurial individual. Space in these houses was made available for additional occupants partly because the prison built new accommodation for their staff and thus vacated the original ‘warden houses’, but also because families occupied empty spaces such as corridors, garages, and kitchens.
formal structures, and at least 318 structures (approximately 1,200 people) in the informal settlement, with no figures for the Ark (CMC 1997:19). In the mid-1990s RabCav developers won the tender to upgrade the area, with permission to develop conditional on using cross-subsidisation from profits of sales in the business park, office park, retail outlet, and upmarket homes, to provide low-cost housing for the formal and informal ‘squatters’ that would be supplemented by government housing subsidies (the Ark City of Refuge was relocated elsewhere). In 1997 the housing department registered all families and allocated a certificate to ensure home-ownership in the development (houses/shacks accommodating more than one family were intended to receive separate certificates though this was not always the case).\(^{74}\)

According to the 2001 census, Westlake village comprises 2596 residents, just over half (57%) of whom are Black African, and just under half (42%) are Coloured, in addition to a handful of Indian and White residents (Ngetu 2003). However, the population has grown significantly since 2001, and a census conducted throughout 2004 and 2005 by a local NGO indicates a total population of 3359 (Dawes 2005), with anecdotal evidence suggesting ‘newcomers’ are predominantly Black African (in addition to a handful of black foreigners from elsewhere in Africa that rent houses and backyard shacks). Income levels are low in Westlake village, with the majority surviving on an average annual household income of R24 000 (approximately 2 100GBP), although 15% of households receive no income (Ngetu 2003:13). Both Black African and Coloured households are equally poor and many struggle to pay

\(^{74}\) There is some confusion as to whether a ‘one shack one house’ policy (in which multiple families sharing a shack plus lodgers would all move together into one house) prevailed, or whether each ‘family’ unit received a separate house. While the housing department (their staff and housing records) show that each family unit received a separate house, both the developers and residents informed me that a ‘one shack one house’ policy existed, and there is certainly evidence of multiple family units in single houses (though these may have arrived in Westlake post-1997).
the basic services for which they are now liable (Stats SA 2003a). The vast majority of Westlake’s Black African residents moved to the informal settlement from distant rural areas, particularly the Eastern Cape, whereas Westlake’s Coloured residents have a longer Cape Town history, having almost exclusively moved into the formal and informal areas from the Cape Flats (the informal settlement was approximately 20% Coloured, the formal settlement 88% Coloured). However, given the longevity of residence in Westlake (the informal settlement originated in 1991, and some formal settlement inhabitants claim residence since 1980), all races share a common tenure history. Thus, unlike other state-assisted housing projects, such as Oldfield’s Delft South (2004), where residents are awarded housing from a centralised list and are thus plucked from diverse communities across the Cape, Westlake’s Black African and Coloured residents have a history both of living in physical proximity, and of living in Westlake.

In addition, in the five years since Westlake’s creation, new residents who were not part of the original community have arrived. These ‘outsiders’ or ‘newcomers’ comprise four distinct groups. Firstly, relatives joining family who were part of pre-development Westlake (often building backyard shacks on relatives’ plots); secondly, people purchasing houses from original residents, often at very low prices (a consequence of naivety amongst new homeowners); thirdly, people employed in the adjacent business park who moved to Westlake (mostly as tenants, although one company purchased houses from original Westlake residents for employees) to be close to work; and fourthly, farm-workers from nearby farms whose employers built

75 Those earning below a certain threshold are exempt from council rates and also receive a small measure of free electricity each month.
76 These figures are based on the surnames of those listed on the 1997 housing survey (it is therefore possible that a minority of White families have been listed as Coloured due to the similarity of surnames between the two groups) (City of Cape Town Housing Department 1997).
77 22 out of 49 interviewees claimed to have been resident in Westlake for ten years or more, and 34 out of 49 claimed they had lived in Westlake for at least six years.
houses (that are superior to ‘original’ residents’ houses) on spare plots for their employees (who moved in late 2003-early 2004). Although ‘outsiders’ comprise a significant minority in Westlake, their arrival caused much anger amongst ‘original’ residents, particularly towards those who are perceived to have ‘tricked’ original residents into selling for a low price, and also towards farm-workers (or rather, their employers) who are blamed for ‘taking’ the remaining plots that many Westlake residents felt should have been given to those already living in Westlake without a house. Thus Westlake comprises residents with various different backgrounds and identities, all affecting integration.

This paper stems from research undertaken in Westlake from January to May 2004. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with a broad diversity of residents, seeking to understand everyday lives as well as attitudes and perceptions regarding life in Westlake, both as a new housing area and as a demographically-mixed community. Several residents were interviewed more than once in order to gain a long-term holistic view of Westlake life. In addition, time was spent chatting to residents and walking through the streets to ensure an adequate overview of Westlake. Furthermore, I attended several local meetings (organised by internal and external groups) as well as interviewing a broad range of non-residents with an interest and activity in Westlake, for example council officials, political representatives, local businessmen, charity workers and those involved in the development process.

78 Although 10 out of 49 interviewees were outsiders, this proportion is not representative as I actively sought interviews with ‘outsiders’.
EVERYDAY PATTERNS OF MOVEMENT IN WESTLAKE

Research elsewhere reveals the persistence of apartheid geography in the daily lives of Cape Town residents. Both Oldfield and Haferburg found residents in poor settlements (informal and formal) returned to former segregated ‘apartheid’ areas to use facilities (e.g. schools, shops) as well as to socialise, rather than embracing a more localised everyday life in their post-apartheid residential location. For example, Haferburg noted that residents of the overwhelmingly Black African informal settlement of Phola Park, on Cape Town’s outskirts, returned to Black African townships for schooling, leading him to conclude that “social networks in the ‘New South Africa’ still operate along the lines defined by apartheid” (Haferburg 2002:31). Furthermore, Oldfield’s research showed that even in desegregated Delft South, Black African and Coloured residents continued to conduct social (e.g. friends, church) and functional (e.g. shops, school) lives outside of their neighbourhood, in segregated group areas. Based on this research she concluded that the physical proximity of Black African and Coloured households in shared residential space did not affect daily economic, social and spatial practices (although this did not prevent the emergence of other non-racial identities – see section 4.6) (2004:195). In addition, Horn and Ngcobo found that black residents of newly desegregated (former White) middle-class suburbs in Akasia, Tshwane select suburbs because of their proximity to ‘black areas’ and thus “retained strong social and spatial links with the regional black society”, rather than their new immediate locality (2003:338), again emphasising the dominance of apartheid history and geography irrespective of socio-economics.

79 Previously Pretoria.
In contrast, Westlake villagers’ daily lives are highly localised, rarely returning to apartheid’s segregated spaces. However, it must be noted that Westlake differs from Phola Park, Delft South and Akasia in not existing on the urban periphery (close to apartheid’s black group areas), but instead is situated in centrally-located wealthy (predominantly White) suburbs (see Figure 4.2). This non-periphery location restricts ease of movement to distant former segregated areas and also improves local economic opportunities. Furthermore, Westlake differs from other state housing projects (e.g. Delft South) in that residents were not separately relocated from afar, but moved as one community unit from adjacent land. These factors contribute towards the strong sense of local identity revealed in this section.

While recognising that everyday exchanges between members of different groups is not synonymous with integration and that such exchanges can indicate merely day-to-day interaction (that may or may not facilitate integration), and can also deepen divides by facilitating “everyday racism” (Pieterse 2003c:15), this research delves further than simple social exchanges, to consider the overlapping of daily lives. Attention is directed towards whether Black African and Coloured residents are using the same facilities, working in the same areas, and socialising together at an everyday level. The overlapping of everyday lives creates intersections of dialogue and interaction between different races that while not integration in themselves, indicate the potential for everyday activities (as part of normalised life) to produce a more durable integration than artificial mixing in sterile environments.

Although there are White and Indian residents in Westlake, they comprise only a very small minority and thus analysis predominantly addresses mixing between Black African and Coloured residents (as the two major population groups in Westlake), unless otherwise stated. For analysis of community relations between black Westlake and predominantly White adjacent Silvertree see Lemanski fc.
Data collected from semi-structured interviews with 49 residents of Westlake, comprising 41 separate households\textsuperscript{81} are used to identify whether villagers’ everyday lives are locally-based (rather than in segregated spaces, as in Oldfield 2004 and Haferburg 2002) and also, the extent to which residents’ everyday lives and patterns of movement overlap and intersect, irrespective of race.

\textbf{Shared Facilities}

The everyday lives of Westlake residents reveal significant overlapping and sharing of local facilities between different races. Both Black African and Coloured residents demonstrate similar patterns of everyday movement (for example, to school and/or work), and socialising between races is commonplace. This is considered a dual-consequence of Westlakers’ relatively long tenure in the area, as well as Westlake’s isolation from similarly low-income areas. In other words, Black African and Coloured residents are united not only by common local history and ties to the area, but also because their location in Cape Town’s wealthy suburbs ensures that facilities are selected on the basis of affordability and proximity rather than racial history. As residents cannot afford to use local ‘White’ facilities (e.g. schools), and also cannot afford to travel long distances to former ‘black’ areas, both Black African and Coloured residents are similarly forced to use the closest affordable facilities, irrespective of racial preference.

They moved our hospital and our facilities far away. There’s no good public transport in Westlake .... you must travel far to get doctors, clothes, schools and that … all your [affordable] facilities are outside your boundaries [C.L. 01/02/04]

\textsuperscript{81} In most cases only one representative of each household was interviewed, but where a secondary member represented a significantly different viewpoint (e.g. different generation) or identity (e.g. mixed-race couples) within one household, both (or multiple) individual responses were recorded separately, but still grouped as one household. Subsequent analysis of individual opinions assesses the 49 recorded interviews, whereas analysis of household activities (e.g. selection of school for children) assesses only the 41 household interviews.
The location of a relatively poor area in the midst of a wealthy area has united residents in striving to locate the closest affordable facilities rather than the closest facilities *per se*, or even the closest facilities in areas ‘traditional’ for their racial group. Such behaviour is congruent with Saff’s concept of “deracialised space”, where poor blacks successfully reside in close proximity to wealthy ‘White’ areas, dramatically altering the racial dynamics of *space*, but cannot access local ‘White’ facilities and are thus *socially* and “functionally” segregated (Saff 1998a:102-104).

One exception is facilitated by ‘Steenberg Lifestyle’ retail centre, part of the Westlake development and lying adjacent to Westlake village (see Figure 4.1). Its proximity to Westlake, as well as the fact that it hosts a ‘Pick n Pay’ food supermarket ensures that all Westlake residents complete at least basic food shopping in the same centre (also used by local wealthy White families82). However, the land-planning design restricts access from Westlake village to the retail centre, forcing villagers to travel almost 3km around the entire development, to reach shops that lie less than 100m away. Clearly planners sought to encourage deracialised (rather than desegregated) space by discouraging Westlakers from using ‘White’ facilities. However, villagers have created their own access by forging a path through the wetlands (indicated by dotted lines in Figure 4.1) and breaking a hole in the fence that separates Westlake village from the shops. Given the long distances involved in shopping elsewhere, all respondents identified it as their primary place for shopping and are currently campaigning for official access.

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82 Although such mixing in the ‘market place’ would not be unusual in most shopping malls in Cape Town’s southern suburbs, the exclusivity of this wealthy area (hosting two gated communities with houses worth R4 million, as well as one of the most exclusive private schools in Africa) ensures that wealthy (predominantly White) residents do not expect to have their exclusive and protected lifestyles infringed upon.
Although we now have a path to the Pick ‘n Pay ... the owner there doesn’t want us to shop there. If there was another shop [nearby] we would use it, but there isn’t [B.T. 28/01/04]

This shop is one of the few facilities located in proximity to Westlake, and when shopping for other items respondents tended to travel to the Blue Route mall in adjacent Tokai (a White group area, approximately 4km away), and also to Retreat and Wynberg (Coloured group areas, approximately 5km and 10km away respectively), the closest affordable shopping areas, in both cases travelling by taxi. The limited influence of apartheid geography on such movement choices is significant, as economic choices take prevalence over racial history. Again, this is perceived as a consequence of Westlake’s isolation in a wealthy area.

Westlake village hosts no schools and therefore school-going children are forced to attend schools outside their residential boundary. Of those households interviewed, only twelve had school-going children, four of which were Black African families and the rest Coloured. No significant difference in the choice of school between Black African and Coloured families is noted; indeed the prime selection criteria (as with shops) are proximity and cost. Most children attend school in nearby previously Coloured group areas (approximately 5-11km from Westlake), rather than schools in more proximate ‘White’ group areas, for which school fees are too high, or schools in distant ‘Black African’ areas, for which transport costs and travelling time are too high. Both Coloured and Black African households send children to school in previously Coloured areas, indeed children from both population groups attend the same schools (see Table 4.1). Only one household interviewed, a Coloured family, send their children to more expensive previously ‘White’ schools in Bergvliet and

83 Although Reddam House is adjacent to Westlake village it is a private school with fees beyond the reach of Westlake villagers.
84 Many more households had children of pre-school age or high-school age who were not attending school.
Kirstenhof, the latter being by far the closest primary school to Westlake at only 2km away, yet beyond the financial reach of most. In addition, although two further households send children to school in 'White' Constantia (5km away), this school has been 'Coloured' since 1936 and never frequented by local White families. Again, this school was favoured by both Black African and Coloured families.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School area</th>
<th>Apartheid Group Area Classification</th>
<th>Black African Households</th>
<th>Coloured Households</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retreat</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heathfield</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steenberg</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witteboome</td>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirstenhof &amp; Bergvliet</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantia</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Schools attended by households in Westlake Village, 2004

This indicates the limited role of race in school selection, and also that the lives and movement patterns of Westlake’s Black African and Coloured children and families overlap and intersect daily as they travel long-distances together to school (by taxi/car pool or on foot) and then share classrooms. Indeed, several parents mentioned that their children mix with other races in Westlake as a consequence of mixed schooling:

[Black African] My children are in Heathfield [school, a Coloured area] … they have Coloured and Xhosa [friends] … my youngest has a lot of friends – they come sometimes and sleep here, the Coloured ones [P.O. 30/04/04]

[Coloured] So now [because of schooling] my children are bosom friends with black children … we have a wonderful relationship both parents and children [A.V. 30/04/04]

These quotes indicate the impact of mixed schooling both on children and consequently on parent-friendships. Another facility shared by both Black African
and Coloureds is transport. Only a handful of Westlake families possess a car, and most use taxis\textsuperscript{85} as their principal means of transport irrespective of race. Again, the isolation of Westlake in a wealthy area ensures that buses do not operate, and the nearest train station is a 4km walk. Taxis thus create another space of intersection and dialogue. Indeed, a farm-worker that has recently relocated to Westlake, reports:

\begin{quote}
I haven’t made friends [in Westlake] yet, but when I take a taxi I speak to the other Westlake people [S.B. 18/03/04]
\end{quote}

As this section has highlighted, Black Africans and Coloureds residing in Westlake use the same facilities, such as shops, schools and transportation, thus revealing significant overlapping of everyday lives and movement patterns, irrespective of race. Indeed, this common use of facilities creates not only spaces of dialogue and interaction, for example whilst travelling by taxi or walking to the shops, but also creates shared interests from which friendships can develop, for example children attending the same school. Through these shared spaces and identities, the everyday lives of people from different race groups are intersecting in a way that is new to urban South Africa.

\textbf{Working Lives}

Unemployment is a major problem in Westlake. According to the 2001 census, 37\% of Westlake adults are unemployed (Ngetu 2003:13), slightly higher than this research’s findings that 24.5\% of respondents (12 out of 49) are unemployed, equally affecting Black Africans and Coloureds. Many households struggle to survive, dependent on state benefit, the generosity of neighbours, or one person’s income to meet all household needs. Education levels are low, and those employed work in

\textsuperscript{85} In South Africa, a ‘taxi’ is a minibus-type vehicle that travels on set routes throughout the city. Passengers board by hailing from the kerbside and then cram into a usually jam-packed shared vehicle, alighting by shouting at the driver once the destination is reached. Taxis charge a cash fare, and a single journey of 5km costs approximately R4 (0.35 GBP).
low-paid, unskilled and often temporary jobs. However, despite residents' perceptions that local businesses do not employ Westlake residents, the vast majority of employed respondents, irrespective of race, work in their local vicinity. This reveals a marked contrast, not only to the apartheid-era of blacks travelling long distances to work in the CBD or ‘White’ areas, but also to recent research indicating the post-apartheid continuation of apartheid’s spatial employment trends (e.g. Haferburg 2002:31, Oldfield 2004:194). Westlake’s localisation of employment is facilitated by its physical position in close proximity to wealthy (White) suburbs as well as to formal business and retail areas (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). In addition, Westlake’s origins as a convenient residential location for local employees ensure that a significant proportion continue to work nearby, indeed, this was the historical reason for residing there.

Of the 30 employed respondents, the vast majority work in the Westlake area (a trend that covers all races) indicating the localised nature of everyday working lives. In the formal sector, eleven respondents work within the Westlake development (see Table 4.2) – ranging from running the general store, a crèche, and a bicycle repair shop; to those employed in Westlake business/light industrial park and retail centre, the Westlake Technical College, the Westlake United Church Trust, the US consulate construction site, and the Pollsmoor Correctional Facility. A further nine respondents work locally in an informal capacity ranging from running a shebeen, selling drugs, selling soup, a ‘Sangoma’, and letting backyard shacks. Thus, two-thirds (20 out of 30) of employed respondents work in their very immediate vicinity, for which race appears unimportant (see Table 4.2). Furthermore, of those ten employed

86 An informal tavern.
87 Traditional healer.
respondents working elsewhere, only six have a significant distance to travel, the remaining four being employed at nearby farms that provide daily transport.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Work in Westlake (^{88})</th>
<th>Work at nearby farm</th>
<th>Work outside Westlake</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Student/Retired/Housewife</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F(^{89})</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign (Black)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Employment location for Westlake residents, 2004

In other words, those employed seem locally integrated with only a minority forced to travel long distances in an apartheid fashion. This is again a consequence of Westlake’s location in wealthy suburbs, close to economic opportunities, rather than on the distant urban-edge like most Black African and Coloured residential spaces. Furthermore, all of Westlake’s race groups appear to benefit from local employment opportunities, revealing that lives are locally-based, that patterns of everyday movements overlap, and thus implying that lives intersect on a daily basis irrespective of race. As with shared facilities, this again creates spaces of intersection and dialogue across the race divide, whilst also creating shared interests based on a common local identity.

Social Lives

Given high unemployment, the everyday lives of Westlake residents revolve around social lives, with church, family and friendship the main intersections identified.

\(^{88}\) ‘Work in Westlake’ refers to those employed within the Westlake village itself, as well as in the surrounding Westlake development (e.g. the business/light industrial park, retail outlet, construction site) and adjacent Pollsmoor prison.

\(^{89}\) F = formal employment. I = informal employment
Church membership within Westlake is strong; at least six churches function, and of the 20 respondents identifying church as crucial in their lives, exactly half attend church in Westlake though an additional three that attend non-Westlake churches attend mid-week Bible and prayer groups in Westlake (see Table 4.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Church in Westlake</th>
<th>Church in Black African area</th>
<th>Church in Coloured area</th>
<th>Church in White area</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2^92</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4^93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign (Black)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Location of churches attended by Westlake residents, 2004

Of those who attend church in Westlake, all identify other church members as their primary social group, and it consumes a significant portion of daily life.

I have many friends in Westlake – the church members ... We meet Monday and Wednesday night for prayer, and Sunday morning and evening, then Tuesday and Thursday we go to houses to do services and prayer for old people. Most of my friends in Westlake are from the church. [E.T. 11/03/04]

Of course, the fact that all races attend Westlake churches, on which their social groups are based, does not ensure that different races mix within churches, but it does imply strong localisation of daily lives. Although half of church-going respondents attend elsewhere, I would have expected non-local church attendance to be more prevalent, especially amongst Coloured residents who moved to Westlake from elsewhere in the Cape, thus previously attending church in a (relatively) nearby area.

Indeed, it is amazing that such deep church-based friendships have formed within

90 Although the Social Development Department’s report on Westlake identifies nine churches in Westlake (Ngetu 2003:16), I identified only six churches holding regular services in the area (though several others were attempting to establish themselves).
91 Rather than identify all who may have some loose affiliation to a church (which would be almost all residents), only those who identified church as a major part of their lives are considered.
92 These two both attend a Bible study in Westlake that is linked to their church.
93 One of these four attends a Bible study in Westlake that is not linked to their church.
Westlake’s existence. Prior to the development, Westlake hosted two churches (one in the informal settlement, and one in the formal houses), and the speed with which additional church ties have developed indicates the strength of Westlake’s localised lifestyle. Furthermore, it could again be argued that Westlake’s relative isolation forces residents to form internal church groups rather than attend nearby churches where the style of worship and preaching might be culturally alien. In addition, the long tenure of many Westlake residents has undoubtedly helped pre-existing friendships to establish new churches.

Other socialising mentioned by respondents centres on family and friendship circles. Given the relative youth of Westlake, it is noteworthy that many Black African and Coloured residents have non-nuclear family members living in Westlake. Indeed, almost one-third of respondents cited joining other family members as their primary reason for moving to Westlake (see Table 4.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Join family</th>
<th>Join friends</th>
<th>Peaceful area</th>
<th>Cheap housing</th>
<th>Near work</th>
<th>Employer purchased house</th>
<th>The Ark</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White (Black)</td>
<td>2(^{94})</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4: Reason for moving to Westlake, 2004\(^{95}\)

Over half of all Black African and Coloured respondents\(^{96}\) have extended family living in Westlake, thus indicating the extent of local family-based socialising. The

\(^{94}\) The two White respondents who cited ‘join family’ (see Table four) as their primary reason for moving to Westlake were speaking with regard to their non-White partner’s family.

\(^{95}\) The categories in Table 4.4 are based on residents’ answers to an open-ended question about why they had moved to Westlake. In other words, interviewees were not given a category from which to select their answer, but were encouraged to discuss their reasons, which I later categorised.
availability of open land and housing in Westlake prior to the development encouraged many families to relocate, either from distant rural homes (for most Black Africans), or from cramped, dirty and violent conditions in the more proximate Cape Flats (for most Coloureds). Once the development commenced, many more family members arrived, hoping either for a house of their own or a room in a relative’s house. Thus despite having lived in Westlake a relatively short time, for many it has become their family base. Although this does not encourage cross-race mixing, it does again highlight villagers’ strong social attachment to Westlake.

Although only a handful of residents came to Westlake to join existing friends (see Table 4.4), almost all respondents felt their closest friends live in Westlake, indicating the depth of friendship bond that has developed since arrival. Largely as a consequence of longevity in the area all respondents commented on the closeness of Westlake, and also the friendliness between neighbours.

It’s a small community, everyone knows you [H.B. 30/04/04]
The people I’m closest to is my neighbours, like if I go away the neighbours will look after my house [A.T. 11/02/04]
I like it here because you always have friends. If you’re hungry you can go to your neighbour and eat there. You’ll never be lonely in Westlake, but in Kenilworth where I used to stay [a former ‘White’ suburb] everyone is busy minding their own business, you never talk to people [B.T. 01/02/04]
My neighbours are a mix [of races] and we all mix together. We’re quite happy. [E.T. 11/03/04]

While this community closeness does not necessarily ensure peaceful mixing, the majority view and experience is of a friendly day-to-day existence. Indeed, in five

96 Twelve (out of 20) Black African respondents, and twelve (out of 22) Coloured respondents have extended family members living in Westlake.
97 Seventeen (out of 20) Black African respondents, nineteen (out of 22) Coloured respondents, three (out of 4) White, and two (out of 2) Foreign Black respondents identified that their closest friends lived in Westlake.
months of conducting research, residents not only extended friendship towards me, but I also witnessed the depth of friendships that exist between people, with neighbours constantly in-and-out of each others houses, children playing in the streets and an obvious reliance on one another for social and economic support. Furthermore, during research I witnessed numerous friendships between Black African and Coloured residents. Indeed such friendships were not considered unusual but the norm, part of everyday life in Westlake. That is not to romanticise life as perfectly harmonious but rather to emphasise the normality of cross-race friendships. Obviously there are some tensions, as one would expect in any area, even if racially homogenous.

There are issues between black and Coloured in Westlake, but it’s very scarce … there are some issues that need to be resolved even if we’re smiling together [D.B. 30/04/04]

Wherever you go people are mixing, but here and there it doesn’t work because this one makes noise and the other likes quiet [G.H. 13/05/04]

Despite this recognition of minor tensions, in fact it would be concerning if respondents described a community in which there was no tension, the general atmosphere in Westlake is of trust and friendship, with a strong emphasis on ties between neighbours irrespective of race.

To employ the spatial terms used earlier, analysis thus far reveals residents as mixing in shared physical spaces (schools, shops, taxi), economic spaces (work) and social spaces (friendship, family). Two main reasons for this are identified. Firstly, the non-periphery location of Westlake in the midst of wealthy areas but isolated from historic black areas renders it difficult for residents to conduct their everyday lives in apartheid’s segregated spaces, and also forces residents (irrespective of race) to use the same facilities, selected on the basis of proximity and affordability. Secondly, the
relatively long tenure of most residents ensures a sense of local identity and depth of friendship that is not found in social housing projects with residents plucked from all over the city.

This section established the localised nature of Westlake, highlighting residents’ everyday lives as locally-based, with different races’ daily patterns of movement overlapping in shared spaces, thus allowing intersections of dialogue and identity to develop. Furthermore, this section identified the extent of everyday informal friendships between residents irrespective of race. Analysis now considers whether other friendships, based on a common identity or goal, are developing. Institutions in Westlake are used to analyse this, focusing on friendships and divisions between residents active in them.

INSTITUTIONS

While everyday mixing across race appears commonplace in Westlake, particularly amongst neighbours, mixing between residents involved in Westlake’s institutional structures is more complex. By identifying institutions I am not seeking to imply that residents’ lives are easily segmented into ‘everyday’ or ‘institutional’, or that mixing in institutions is an end in itself. Rather, institutions are used as a means to identify whether a different type of friendship based on common identity (e.g. religion, political affinity), hobby (e.g. soccer), or stage in life (e.g. parents sending children to crèche) is emerging between different races in Westlake. As this would seem a more substantive basis for long-term friendship than the random nature of the predominantly neighbour-based friendships identified thus far, analysing institutions serves as a means to consider the current depth and future potential for social
integration not just in Westlake, but for its residents irrespective of their future location. Four Westlake institutions are identified: churches, crèches, sports clubs, and civic organisations. The first three address social and cultural spaces, while the latter considers mixing in political spaces.

**Churches**

As noted earlier, at least six churches function in Westlake, all of which are well supported by local residents. However, while the prior section used churches to reveal the depth of residents’ localisation, it did not mention whether churches offer a neutral place for integration. Despite their role in strengthening residents’ local ties, Westlake’s churches (with some exceptions) tend to be segregated and thus have only a very limited influence on integration.

I’m at ACTS Mission church. It’s all Coloureds ... We’re Afrikaans-speaking church so the Angolans don’t come [E.T. 11/03/04]

I go to the Methodist church … it’s a Xhosa service [C.X. 18/03/04]

It’s the [New] Apostolic church – it’s all Coloured, no it’s mixed, but not White people. There are some black people, Xhosa I think [S.B. 18/03/04]

I’m [at] Assemblies [of God] … it’s mostly Coloured and black. It’s more Coloured – about 80/20 because of the language barrier. [T.F. 07/04/04]

These quotes represent the four churches found to be most prevalent. Although churches are willing to welcome all races, people tend to congregate within racial groups, largely a consequence of language and religious culture. This reveals a contrast to the everyday neighbourhood level where race mixing is common. Possibly a tentative continuum of integration is being identified, that in the context of demographic desegregation, the continuum of social integration commences with overlapping everyday movement patterns, leading to everyday socialising (greeting neighbours, chatting in the streets and visiting each others homes – all of which are
prevalent in Westlake), with deeper manifestations along the continuum involving choosing to attach to the same institutions. This question of choice is further addressed after all institutions have been discussed.

**Crèches**

Although Westlake village does not have a school, several pre-schools (known as crèches) operate. Most are informal\(^{98}\) and run by local residents from their homes, the one exception being the largest crèche (Elephant), run by non-residents from ‘Westlake United Church Trust’. Visits to the four major crèches\(^{99}\) reveal that as with church selection, choice of crèche appears to be race-dictated (Table 4.5). Although no single crèche is completely segregated, each is significantly dominated by one race group, comprising at least 70% of children (Table 4.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crèche(^{100})</th>
<th>Age range</th>
<th>Language of instruction</th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Foreign Black African</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elephant</td>
<td>3-6 years</td>
<td>English, Xhosa, Afrikaans</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frog</td>
<td>6 months-18 months</td>
<td>Xhosa, Afrikaans</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabbit</td>
<td>3 months-4 yrs</td>
<td>English, Afrikaans</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owl</td>
<td>6 months-6 yrs</td>
<td>English, Afrikaans</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>65</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>113</strong></td>
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</table>

Table 4.5: Westlake crèche attendance by race, 2004

Despite the dominance of one racial group in each crèche, there are signs of social mixing. For example, both Elephant and Rabbit, although dominated by Black African and Coloured children respectively, do host a significant minority of other races (almost one-quarter at Rabbit, and over one-fifth at Elephant), and thus some

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\(^{98}\) In terms of being unregistered, though many offer an excellent service.

\(^{99}\) Although the Social Development Department’s report on Westlake identifies six pre-school crèches (Ngetu 2003:9), two of these have subsequently closed down.

\(^{100}\) These are pseudonyms for the crèches in Westlake.
mixing (i.e. playing together) is assured. Furthermore, language differences are being levelled by the use of English as the medium of instruction in most crèches. Although Table 4.5 shows each crèche offering a range of languages, children are instructed in English (even if this is not the teacher or child's mother tongue), largely at the request of parents.

Parents select the crèche and although their choice appears race-determined, there are other considerations such as cost, opening hours, language, perceived quality and age-range offered. Thus it is important not to blindly assume race (or any other single reason) the sole factor. Furthermore, although parents select the crèche, it is the children who play together and experience mixing. Indeed, staff at all four crèches reported that children were unaware of racial differences and played together. This indicates a likelihood not only that childhood friendships will facilitate racial tolerance in adulthood (Moody 2001:710), but also that parents meet each other and form a further intersection for mixing as demonstrated earlier by parents of school-going children.

**Sports clubs**

The development of Westlake village included a sports field on its northern edge, though it is frequently water-logged and also littered with broken glass, refuse, and human excrement. Nevertheless four soccer clubs thrive within Westlake, all overwhelmingly composed of Black Africans.

> We established it [soccer team] in 1999 ... we’ve got three Coloured and the rest is Xhosa. We practise everyday on the field – we share it with other teams ... they’re predominantly Xhosa, the Coloured kids just play family things, they don’t do the teams [L.L. 20/04/04]

101 Although teachers tended to revert to their mother tongue when in a rush or angry with a child.
Again, cultural differences appear to inhibit institutional race mixing, as sport clubs are dominated by Black Africans rather than segregated \textit{per se}. In this sense, residents are not so much choosing to self-segregate, as would be the case if different clubs existed for Black African and Coloured youths, but are simply following cultural norms, in which the desire to play sport within a structured programme differs. However, for the handful of Coloureds who \textit{are} involved in these sports clubs, the closeness of playing together on a team involves significant social integration at a personal level, though it is not indicative of community-wide trends.

In considering why different race groups appear to self-segregate in social and cultural spaces, it is necessary to contemplate whether race is the prevalent factor in deciding to join or reject an institution. The crucial difference between social mixing within institutions and between neighbours is \textit{choice}. Residents had no choice over the race of their neighbour, and social mixing has flourished. In contrast, it is possible to choose with whom one mixes in social and cultural spaces such as churches or sports clubs, or with whom one’s child mixes in selecting a crèche, and the consequence appears to be of restricted cross-race interaction. Rather than simply assume that once given a choice, people retreat into race-based divisions, the overarching factors affecting residents’ decisions to join one church, sports club or crèche over another are considered. Choice is influenced by existing friendship ties in that people are most likely to join an institution where they feel comfortable, and thus as everyday socialising between neighbours of different races expands, greater institutional mixing should follow suit. Secondly, cultural and language factors, for example church services, sports and crèche instructions in an understandable language, as well church worship and crèche discipline in a style that suits one’s cultural heritage. Thus residents are likely to engage with an institution (and
individuals in that institution) that matches their identity. As a ‘Westlake identity’ that transcends (rather than replaces) race develops amongst residents, mixing in institutions should grow.

In contrast to the above-mentioned institutions, relatively few people involve themselves in political spaces, by engaging in Westlake’s civic organisations. However, given that they claim to represent Westlake, all residents have a right to support or reject them, and the influence of race on that loyalty is considered.

**Civic organisations**

Westlake village comes under the authority of the South Peninsular sub-council and is served by a ward councillor whose jurisdiction includes several nearby suburbs. South Africa has a strong history of more localised civic organisation (especially during the 1980s when township civics usurped apartheid-created black local authorities as part of the anti-apartheid struggle), and this political level functions as a medium between official council representatives and the community. Despite the small size and relative youth of Westlake, it has already hosted a significant number of civic organisations, all fighting over resources and a desire to be Westlake’s sole representation. Despite evidence elsewhere that diverse communities unite to achieve a collective goal (Oldfield 2004), in Westlake the desire for power and control (personal and communal) has created friction, leading to chasms between civic organisations, each claiming to be Westlake’s true representative.

Prior to the development there were three functioning community groups, the ‘People of Westlake’ (PoW, representing the formal houses), ‘Masizakhe’ (meaning ‘let us build ourselves’, representing the informal settlement), and ‘The Combined/Concerned Residents of Westlake’ (CROW), which was the strongest
group and claimed to represent all of Westlake, but predominantly represented the formal structures (Dykes 2004b). Masizakhe was not represented in development meetings, and although PoW did send representatives, CROW were favoured by the developers as Westlake’s voice (Rabcav 1997, Dykes 2004b). However, once the development commenced, CROW’s leaders plundered the resources offered by their closeness to the developers, and fled the area (D.B. 30/03/04, T.T. 06/05/04). As people moved into their new houses, the various remaining representatives combined into one body, named WESUCO (Westlake United Civic Organisation) (D.B. 30/03/04). WESUCO became the sole voice representing Westlake and its executive was a mixture of race, gender, as well as those from the formal and informal settlements.

As residents settled into their homes, WESUCO began to lose momentum, leadership structures collapsed, leaving only three members still active, all of whom are Black Africans originally resident in the informal settlement (D.B. 30/03/04). As WESUCO struggled, the Westlake branch of SANCO (South African National Civic Organisation) emerged, predominantly composed of Black African newcomers (i.e. arrived post-1997 housing survey), who therefore did not receive housing. Although SANCO repeatedly claims to have a mandate from Westlake people, numerous residents expressed their dislike of SANCO and its members, although it has superseded WESUCO as Westlake’s representative, causing significant conflict.

102 Several CROW leaders became employed by the developers as ‘community consultants’ or ‘representatives’, for which they received financial payment as well as access to resources and opportunities that enabled plunder. For example, there are allegations that money intended to pay local residents for painting the new houses was pocketed by such leaders, that certificates to guarantee formal housing were ‘sold’ by these leaders, and also that resources provided by charities to alleviate conditions in the informal settlement were stolen by these community ‘representatives’. Although none of these allegations are provable, it is significant that none of these leaders continue to reside in Westlake.

103 SANCO is a national movement, descended from the radical civic organisations established in South African townships in the 1980s as part of the anti-apartheid struggle, and is strongly linked to the ANC (both nationally and in Westlake village).
between the two groups. Thus Westlake’s leadership is again divided; however, whether this is racial is questionable. The prime motivation behind SANCO is their leaders’ personal desire for housing, rather than any desire to serve the community as a whole (the vast majority of which have houses). Thus the schism between SANCO and WESUCO could be identified as a historical claim to Westlake rather than race per se (particularly as both SANCO and WESUCO are predominantly led by Black Africans).

SANCO are all new people, so they claim they want houses when we’ve got people from our own community who don’t have houses … They [SANCO] claim they have the mandate of the people, when the majority of the community doesn’t even support or recognise SANCO [R.M.18/03/04]

SANCO’s second agenda is an implicit desire to be Westlake’s sole leadership and voice, as well as to control (rather than represent) the community. Thus in addition to leadership divisions there is also a schism between SANCO and the community, as even recognised by a SANCO representative:104

[SANCO] want to control everything … but Westlake is not ‘their’ community … SANCO is an ANC body and not everyone in the community even supports us, we’re … also very Xhosa [B.T. 28/01/04]

For example, the City of Cape Town’s social development department attempts to establish a community forum in Westlake have been repeatedly thwarted by SANCO, who wish to either prevent or control such a forum. However, after three years of wrangling, the Westlake Development Forum was finally launched in December 2004. The seven forum members successfully represent Westlake’s various groupings with two members from SANCO (one of whom is ex-WESUCO), one from WESUCO, one from the ANC, one former CROW member, and two from the

104 This quote is from someone who at the time served on the SANCO executive. They have subsequently been removed from SANCO for reasons they choose not to disclose.
local churches’ NGO (Westlake United Church Trust, WUCT). Furthermore, both race (four Black African and three Coloured members) and gender (four men and three women) are fairly represented. However, there are no foreign Black Africans on the forum and three of the board are ‘newcomers’ who were not resident in Westlake prior to the development (of the other four members, three were in the informal settlement, and one in the formal settlement). The extent to which this forum will achieve its goals of developing a common vision and voice for Westlake and bringing social harmony to the community (speech made by new chairman, 04/12/04) are yet to be seen, but for the time being, they present the most representative and unified group Westlake village has experienced since the community was formalised. Furthermore, they provide a single channel for communication with outside agencies. What has so far gone unmentioned by forum members is whether their presence will ease the power struggle between SANCO and other groups, which previously dominated Westlake’s local politics.

Essentially, races appear to mix and socialise freely on a day-to-day basis of neighbourly relations, and although there is less mixing in social institutions, this is often to do with culture and language rather than race per se. However, potential community leaders have sought to ‘use’ race in order to divide the community.

It’s not too much problems between races. But sometimes at the meetings they try to make it something because they don’t want to listen to our leaders and we don’t want to listen to their leaders. But [everyday] in the village there is nothing like that [L.X. 17/03/04]

Similar trends were identified as early as 1999 by a researcher in Westlake prior to the development, noting that while friendships flourished between Black Africans and Coloureds, civic organisations provided an example of “how entrenched racially determined structures [are] … and how difficult it [is] to transcend race group
categories” (Dykes 2004b). While Dykes noted that developers exploited rivalries between community groups in order to divide the community and weaken opposition to the development, in contemporary Westlake it is the groups themselves causing divisions, though this continues to be aggravated by outside organisations. Although developers are no longer involved, numerous NGOs/charities and benevolent individuals now operate in Westlake and given that they tend to channel resources through local organisations, Westlake’s rival community groups are fighting to be the organisation through which all outside finances and support are directed. Whereas previously the spoils that civic groups fought for came from the developers (see footnote 102), now groups seek to gain spoils from outside NGOs/individuals.

A lot of people in Westlake are starting their own NGOs to get money … because they realise that those people want to give something. Those people shouldn’t give money because people here are getting it for themselves. [V.M. 30/04/04]

This outside involvement is inhibiting internal community capacity and exacerbating divisions between existing internal civic groups. Indeed, research elsewhere suggesting that communities with strong internal capacity but weak external support (Oldfield 2000:865), or weak internal capacity (Bénit 2002:61) can successfully unite to champion their cause reveals the double-fault in Westlake. Firstly, that as outside support is stronger than internal capacity, reliance on the external serves only to hinder any internal development; and secondly, the absence of internal community capacity and divided civic organisation are traced to the absence of any community-drive necessary to secure housing for the majority. Unlike other informal settlements, in which residents developed community strength and capacity by fighting against the state for formal housing, Westlake residents were ‘given’ such housing without a struggle through which to build community capacity. For example, in Oldfield’s
Delft South study (2004:197), ‘Door Kickers’ successfully organised themselves across racial, geographical, language and political divides to ensure housing, leading to strong bonds between Black African and Coloured residents involved in the struggle. Although similar tactics are now being employed in Westlake by those ineligible for original housing, securing housing is a minority goal, and therefore such struggles cause division rather than contribute to community capacity. Although this could be perceived a racial division (because the majority of ineligibles are Black African), in fact socio-historic Westlake identity rather than race per se appears to be the dominant cause of division. Thus whereas in Oldfield’s Delft South strong racial identities were overlaid by processes to achieve a collective goal (2004:199), in Westlake, the new form of localised identity that transcends race is far more passive and deterministic. However, this still marks a powerful transformation from apartheid-era identities with race the prime dictator of identity.

**NEW FORMS OF IDENTITY**

Westlake’s divisions fracture around notions of superiority regarding who belongs and who does not belong in Westlake, which are related to (rather than dictated by) racial identity. Localised identities are couched in terms of a personal sense of ‘belonging’, indicating the residential as a cultural space. Obviously Westlake’s homeowners demonstrate a strong sense of belonging that bridges racial divides, thus facilitating some integration in cultural spaces. However, criteria for ‘acceptance’ into Westlake’s cultural space is not homeownership per se, but tenure of residence (i.e. whether one was resident prior to the development) and also possessing a perceived social ‘right’ to housing in Westlake. Obviously there are some tensions
between homeowners and tenants (especially where backyard renters provide the main income for the homeowner and thus have significant leverage) but the overwhelming factor in acceptance is tenure history and a perceived ‘right’ to be there. For example, newcomers that bought houses from original residents do not possess the necessary socio-historic credentials, despite being homeowners, whereas newcomers who have joined family members who lived in Westlake prior to the development are accepted as an extension of their relative’s ‘original’ socio-historic status. Thus, the perception of whether Westlake is your ‘home’ is crucial, and the interpretation of home is not owning a physical structure per se (a common interpretation of ‘home’ amongst middle-classes, Ross 2002), but rather one’s ‘right’ to benefit from the Westlake ideal. Ross’ understanding of ‘home’ as “to do with giving tangible form to social ideals”, based on her research in a Cape informal settlement undergoing formalisation (Ross 2002:26), is clearly manifest in Westlake. However, while Ross’ respondents feared formalisation would destroy community relations (2002:2), in Westlake it has created the criteria for ‘community’, but only for those with the correct social history.

This socio-historic identity has led to divisions between ‘original residents’ and those perceived as ‘outsiders’ or ‘newcomers’ with no tenure or housing ‘right’ who are thus excluded from Westlake’s cultural spaces. Although not defined by race, this identity has racial implications in that socio-historic ‘outsiders’ are overwhelmingly Black African. Such perceptions are rampant, with virtually every respondent expressing socio-historic Westlake identities based on an insider/outsider discourse that is determined by historical tenure and the ‘right’ (i.e. who ‘belongs’ to Westlake and ‘deserves’ a house) to call Westlake ‘home’.
The only problem so far is with outsiders – like people that weren’t in the bush [W.C. 11/03/04]

Outsiders who are opportunists are coming in and getting jobs [at the business park] before our people get a chance ... and then come and stay here in backyard bungalows, they’re not our people [R.M. 18/03/04]

He is occupying two houses but he doesn’t belong here ... he wasn’t in the shacks or the houses ... and we’re still renting. We could have done that but we said no, we’ll abide by the law. [A.F. 05/05/04]

Opposition to ‘outsiders’ is not directed at their informal housing structures per se (indeed, many original residents have informal backyard shacks), as has been identified elsewhere, with new homeowners eager to exhibit “proper living” that excludes shacks (Meintjes 2000). Instead, Westlake’s original residents opposition to newcomers is based on a distrust of their minimal tenure alongside a disapproval of their desire to ‘use’ Westlake for personal (rather than communal) gain. Although such ‘outsiders’ are generally accepted at an everyday social level (as identified in section 4.4), divisions between Westlake’s ‘outsiders’ and ‘original residents’ has a negative impact on mixing in political spaces (i.e. civic organisations), largely based on housing politics rather than an antipathy to individuals per se. Divisions between ‘original residents’ with their own formal housing and ‘outsiders’ fighting for additional formal housing to be built in Westlake bears similarities to partial formalisation processes identified in settlements elsewhere in South Africa (e.g. Oldfield 2002; Bénit 2002). In Oldfield’s case study, one-third of the Green Point informal settlement was formalised, leading to community division between new homeowners and those still ‘squatting’ whilst awaiting formalisation. Although those fighting for housing in Westlake are not housed in a separate section (as in Green Point), but rent backyard shacks from those with houses, the objectives and daily needs of the two groups are polarised. While Westlake has always displayed weak community capacity (Dykes 2004a), the desire of a minority to fight for formal
housing has further divided the community and thus weakened capacity because formal housing is an issue only for ‘newcomers’, not the community as a whole. Similar divisions based on different priorities are noted between those in formal and informal housing in Oldfield’s case study, but in Westlake those fighting for formal housing are weakened by their socio-historic status. Unlike Green Point where residents in the formal and informal sectors had equal ‘rights’ to formalisation, in Westlake those without housing are ‘outsiders’, who were not present prior to the development and are thus perceived by the majority as ‘using’ Westlake for personal gain. In Bénit’s Diepsloot case-study a similar process of internal division based on “date of arrival [and] … place of origin” is identified (2002:57). However, Westlake again differs in that ‘outsiders’ arrived after formalisation (or after the 1997 housing survey), whereas in Diepsloot divisions were pre-formalisation, regarding the type of formal structure different residents would receive.

Although Westlake’s outsider/insider discourses and housing divisions are predominantly couched in socio-historic terms, there is an element of race-based identity. As newcomers have arrived and Westlake has consequently become overcrowded there is a tendency to ‘blame’ the newly-arrived race (predominantly Black African) and a desire to exclude them from Westlake’s cultural space of ‘belonging’.

It was all Coloured in the bush. I don’t know where the blacks came from. They got houses. I’m angry about that because some of our people didn’t get houses. They just came here from nowhere [J.C.26/03/04]

The Coloureds feel the blacks got too many houses seeing as it was mostly Coloured [before the development]. And also the people that came later. [D. vW. 17/03/04]

However, it would be extremely unusual if there had been no mention of race divisions given the history of apartheid, the desire for people to classify others, as
well as Westlake’s tense housing situation. A dynamic interpretation of racial identities is thus favoured, recognising race as a “lived experience” rather than a static label (Pillay 2003). Fluid racial identities now exist alongside a ‘Westlake’ identity that appears to bridge different racial identities and unite residents in their shared socio-historic identity irrespective of racial difference. Consequently this brings unity only to ‘original residents’, thus replacing racial divides with a community-wide division over socio-historic identity, as already identified with housing. This socio-historic identity is incredibly passive and deterministic in that one cannot become a pre-development Westlake resident in the way that Delft South residents could gain non-racial identities by participating in community structures (Oldfield 2004). This severely tempers earlier optimism about mixing in Westlake. Indeed, such a ‘community’ ethos is not unusual as a basis for exclusion (e.g. Afrikaanerdom for apartheid and Aryanism for Nazism) and while evidence from Westlake’s everyday mixing indicates that as more ‘outsiders’ move into various streets (as homeowners, or renting backyard shacks/houses) and thus infiltrate Westlake’s physical spaces, they will experience the neighbourly mixing that is so prevalent, and gradually share in Westlake’s social, economic, political and cultural spaces; such strong exclusion based on an identity that cannot be acquired ultimately restricts Westlake’s integration potential.

While these socio-historic identities are contributing to divisions in Westlake, they are simultaneously contributing to the fostering of a sense of local identity and belonging based on residency in Westlake rather than on racial identity per se. That is not to suggest that Westlake identities are the prime identity in a person’s multiple identities, but rather that Westlake possesses an area-based identity that is not dictated by race (as with apartheid spatiality), though this identity is equally exclusive.
Indeed, unlike other examples of urban desegregation, where blacks penetrate ‘White’ spaces such as middle-class suburbs (Saff 1998a) or Model C schools (Battersby 2004b); in Westlake, Black Africans and Coloureds are sharing a space which neither had a historical claim to under apartheid (when it was within a ‘White’ area), but on which both have a more recent historical claim, based on occupation prior to the development. Furthermore, the similar socio-economic status of most Westlake villagers undoubtedly contributes to the strong sense of community evident (amongst original residents at least). However, as demonstrated, the shared cultural space of belonging to Westlake irrespective of race is overlaid by divisions based on a new criterion of socio-historic identity. Ironically, this returns Westlake to a situation in which one group is trying to ‘belong’ in another’s space (as with blacks moving into ‘White’ middle-class residential areas and schools); the only difference being that the identity on which ‘belonging’ is determined is socio-historic rather than racial. So whilst a socio-historic identity enables Black Africans and Coloureds to live equally in a shared cultural space, it also culturally excludes those without the necessary socio-historic credentials.

**PROVISIONAL INTEGRATION CONTINUUM**

Having analysed the empirical data provided by research in Westlake, this is now used to propose a tentative ‘integration continuum’ on which experiences of desegregation and integration can be plotted. As noted in the introduction, this research understands integration as a dynamic process through which individuals and communities experience life, rather than a static prescribed outcome that can ultimately be achieved; and thus the continuum is to be viewed as a theoretical guide.
rather than a prescribed set of stages. Indeed, an essentialist and static conception of integration is misleading in its assumption that only a single outcome is worthy of the integration banner, especially given that such a final outcome is perhaps impossible to sufficiently measure or even achieve. Rather, integration is plotted as a continuum from minimum to maximum. That is not to suggest it as a dichotomy between maximum or minimum (or even suggest that maximum is the ideal), but rather as a dynamic process of varying intensities in which movement can occur in either direction. Although this implies a one-dimensional approach, in fact community relations are multi-dimensional and thus continuum activity should be interpreted as such. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that once an individual and/or community steps on to the continuum they will progress to maximum levels, indeed such ‘maximum’ integration is unrealistic given the contemporary context of weak social ‘community’ in neighbourhoods (Forrest and Kearns 2001). According to the findings of this empirical research it would seem that minimum manifestations commence with shared physical space, while integration in cultural and political spaces are nearer the maximum end of the scale. To explain this more adequately, a table is provided (Table 4.6).

From the perspective of an ‘integration continuum’ it would be hoped that commencing at the minimum end of the scale with neighbourly mixing in physical spaces might lead to friendships that would enable different races to join each other’s institutions (social spaces), that perhaps over time would develop into shared sense of belonging (cultural spaces). It is also likely that some factors may serve as a stronger catalyst for integration that others, for example, increased economic opportunities would reduce income inequalities between residents and thereby increase opportunities for social and cultural exchange (in fact, the similar socio-economic
status of Westlake residents is a prime factor in facilitating integration). Obviously further research in other neighbourhoods would be needed to reduce the currently speculative nature of this integration continuum, but it serves as a possible guideline for both research and policy in desegregating neighbourhoods across the globe.

Table 4.6: A provisional integration continuum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPACE</th>
<th>Physical</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FORM</td>
<td>• Desegregated neighbourhood</td>
<td>• Greeting each other in the street</td>
<td>• Shared community group</td>
<td>• Home ownership</td>
<td>• Similar type of employment (e.g. formal/informal, agriculture, industry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Overlapping daily movement patterns</td>
<td>• Visiting each others homes</td>
<td>• Single community voice</td>
<td>• Tenure in area.</td>
<td>• Similar level of employment (e.g. manual labourer, professional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Shared use of facilities (e.g. schools, shop, transport)</td>
<td>• Reliance on neighbours irrespective of race.</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Shared sense of belonging</td>
<td>• Similar income of household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Using same sports clubs</td>
<td>• Involved in same church activities</td>
<td>• Both races in leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Home ownership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCLUSION

The case study of Westlake indicates a new experience of social integration and racial desegregation in post-apartheid urban South Africa in that different races are not only living peacefully in shared physical space but also actively mixing in social, economic and to a lesser extent political and cultural spaces. Furthermore, residents have largely overcome apartheid histories and geographies to develop new localised identities. However, such optimism is tempered by the exclusive nature of acceptance into the Westlake ‘community’ as well as the similar socio-economic
status of villagers, thus failing to challenge the post-apartheid tendency for class (rather than race) to determine mixing.

Westlake’s anomaly in revealing strong localisation and social integration is attributed to two major factors. Its central location in the heart of wealthy Cape Town rather than on the urban periphery, and the similar tenure history of both Black African and Coloured residents in the area, both of which are unusual for low-cost and/or desegregated suburbs. Indeed, neither of these factors existed in Oldfield’s (2004) desegregated low-cost housing suburb, which was located on the urban periphery and composed of residents that were all new to the area, thus explaining the dominance of racial identities in determining everyday lives. First, the majority of low-cost housing projects in Cape Town are located on under-used land which tends to be concentrated far from the city. Although Westlake’s non-periphery location successfully challenges apartheid geographies and provides economic opportunities, it does not facilitate macro-scale urban integration (at present there is deracialisation of macro space rather than desegregation or integration), and instead produces micro-scale integration by forcing residents to share local facilities and lifestyles due to the distance of former segregated spaces. Second, the two main residential sites with the most potential for post-apartheid urban desegregation, i.e. low-cost housing projects (e.g. Oldfield 2004) and middle-class suburbs (e.g. Horn and Ngcobo 2003), are usually composed of residents with unequal tenure histories. For while residents of low-cost housing development are drawn from all over the city and thus have no socio-historic affiliation to their new space, black residents moving into middle-class suburbs do not have an equal sense of ‘belonging’ to the cultural space as their ‘White’ neighbours and thus are constantly striving to fit into White spaces rather than experience an equal ‘right’ to shared cultural space. In contrast, Westlake’s
'original' residents have a relatively long attachment to the area and divisions over 'belonging' are not based on race. Furthermore, Westlake villagers have a similar socio-economic status and thus cross-race mixing occurs within the same broad socio-economic class. Similar desegregation and integration based on shared class has been identified in middle-class suburbs (Saff 1994, 1998a). While this does indicate change since the end of apartheid, it also indicates that class has replaced race as the basis of segregation (and indeed also of integration), further implying that desegregation between different types of communities or between different class residents of the same community are less likely, as identified in research on Westlake village and Silvertree Estate (Lemanski fc). Although this indicates that the legacy of apartheid continues to drive urban form (albeit with race replaced by class), a new housing policy addressing both race and class looks set to change this.

Within South Africa, evidence from Westlake leads to a suggestion that future low-cost housing projects be located on vacant state-land in close proximity to the city and/or wealthy suburbs rather than on the distant urban periphery. In fact, such a strategy was recently endorsed by the government, with the Housing Director General Mpumi Nxumalo announcing in September 2004 their intention to develop low-cost housing close to established suburbs in order to challenge apartheid planning and "build successfully integrated non-racial communities"105 ( Nxumalo, quoted in Boyle and Philp 2004), thus rendering Westlake less of an anomaly and more an example of future trends. This announcement provoked outcry amongst wealthy residents, leading the Housing Minister to reassure that such developments will be ‘within reason’ and that the extremes of rich and poor would not be juxtapositioned (Mail and  

105 This proposed housing policy is a radical change from the current policy of creating low-cost housing areas (which award homeownership to previously disadvantaged groups earning below a set income and on the housing waiting list) on vacant land in periphery areas far from city centres and/or economic opportunities.
Urban analyst Edgar Pieterse also advocates such an approach, promoting integration by transforming Cape Town’s vacant publicly-owned land into high-density, mixed-income and mixed-use residential developments. His ‘vision’ goes so far as to describe such developments as “incubators of hope”, in which different races, ethnicities and classes would live harmoniously (Pieterse 2003c:18). Such a development clearly exists in Westlake, and though it has brought integration at a micro-level within Westlake village, residents have limited interaction and virtually no integration in their area as a whole (Lemanski fc), thus indicating the limits of such developments as panaceas for integration. However, given that their presence does successfully alter spatial fragmentation in Cape Town, their potential to gradually enable broad social integration is yet to be seen. Further research is thus needed to determine whether the term ‘incubators of hope’ is reasonable and with the new government housing policies set to commence in April 2005 there should soon be plenty of opportunity to consider the dynamics of such ‘integrated’ neighbourhoods.
Acknowledgments

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CHAPTER FIVE:

DESEGREGATION AND INTEGRATION AS LINKED OR DISTINCT?:

EVIDENCE FROM A PREVIOUSLY ‘WHITE’ SUBURB IN POST-APARtheid

CAPE TOWN
INTRODUCTION

This paper considers whether the physical desegregation of a suburb facilitates social integration amongst its residents. In other words, once a residential neighbourhood has undergone sufficient demographic change that its racial composition is 'desegregated' (using criterion that no racial group comprises more than 50%, and at least one other comprises 25%), does this facilitate social mixing between neighbours of different races? Essentially this research is concerned with whether labelling a suburb 'desegregated' is a superficial term that whilst implying racial mixing actually masks social segregation. This is particularly relevant in South Africa where the legacy of apartheid's spatial and social design continues to dominate. Although recent government strategies and market-led changes have facilitated some desegregation, whether this achieves social integration remains to be seen.

This desegregation/integration nexus is explored by analysing a desegregated neighbourhood, assessing whether residents of different races have experienced social integration as a consequence of residential proximity. Contemporary Cape Town provides a constructive example because mixing between racial groups was severely constrained by apartheid planning and thus any desegregation and consequent integration are relatively new.

This research challenges theoretical and empirical presumptions that physical desegregation ultimately facilitates social integration. This assumption is evident from the common use of desegregation in the literature as synonymous with integration (e.g. Massey and Denton 1988; Ellen 2000), or as the antonym of

106 It is recognised that the composition of a suburb is fluid and thus this criterion is used as an indicative guideline rather than a prescriptive rule.
segregation (e.g. Kirschenbaum 1984; Sin 2002; Herbert and Ley 2003:20), rather than recognising the concepts as separate processes that do not necessarily interlink. At a policy level, it is virtually impossible (within a democracy) to implement policies enforcing ‘social integration’ (in effect a reverse form of apartheid), and thus policies with this goal instead focus on physical desegregation, relying on the theoretical assumption that this facilitates social integration. The validity of this assumption, and also the validity of desegregation policies (at least those with the ultimate goal of social integration) are thus considered. This assumption is certainly prevalent in contemporary South Africa where the government is promoting both social integration and physical desegregation as part of post-apartheid transformation. However, social integration is hampered by the absence of policies guaranteeing this goal, thus forcing reliance on deductive nationality campaigns (e.g. ‘Proudly South African’) and phrases (e.g. ‘Rainbow Nation’ and ‘New South Africa’), in addition to more inductive policies of physical desegregation (e.g. locating low-cost housing in wealthy areas) and the spatial integration of the city (e.g. Cape Town ‘unicity’, activity nodes and corridors), rather than social integration per se.

Throughout this paper the terms ‘race’ and ‘racial groups’ are used to simplify the discussion in reference to ethnicities and/or nationalities rather than race per se. Four such groups are evident in the case study; the three South African ‘races’ of White, Coloured and Black African, in addition to Black Africans who have migrated to South Africa from elsewhere in Africa (‘immigrant’ is used as a generic label for this group).

107 The apartheid racial classifications of African, Coloured (mixed heritage), Indian (Asian descent) and White (European) are used. However, apartheid’s ‘African’ label is updated to ‘Black African’ in recognition that the other groups are also African (‘Black African’ is also the term adopted by the 2001 census), and ‘black’ (lower case) is used to describe all non-Whites. The majority of Black Africans in Cape Town are of isiXhosa descent, and this is the meaning intended by use of ‘Black African’ unless otherwise specified.
‘Desegregation’ is defined as the physical presence of different races in shared residential space (while recognising that residential is not the only sphere of desegregation), and ‘social integration’ in reference to micro-level relations between people of different races. Although neither term is new, there are various definitions abound and thus this clarification confirms the meaning intended throughout this paper.

As cities throughout the world increasingly host diverse populations in terms of culture, ethnicity and socio-economics, this impacts both residents and policy-makers. At a conceptual level, policymakers traditionally emphasised the assimilation of minority culture into the majority (Park and Burgess 1921; Gordon 1964), recently superseded by multiculturalism, the peaceful co-existence of difference (Gans 1997; Glazer 1997), and increasingly labelled integration (Ellen 2000). The focus of this research is narrower than the city scale used for the above concepts, addressing neighbourhood-level interactions. At this scale, both Taljia Blokland’s (2003) analysis of inter-ethnic relationships between Dutch residents and migrants in a middle-class Rotterdam neighbourhood, and Oliver Bakewell’s (2002) research on refugee integration into Zambian villages provide useful indicators for the Cape Town case study. Blokland identified four types of integration: the “indifference” of Dutch residents to migrant neighbours; “contact” between the two groups leading to increased understanding; “realistic conflicts” over shared neighbourhood resources; and “non-realistic conflicts” where migrants were blamed for neighbourhood problems. Bakewell’s research identified three criteria necessary for diverse groups to share a community: firstly, a common livelihood (e.g. professionals or manual
labourers); secondly, sharing neighbourhood resources (e.g. schools); and thirdly, for both groups to perceive benefits from relationships.\textsuperscript{108}

This paper stems from research undertaken in Muizenberg (a desegregating suburb) between September and December 2004. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of residents, seeking to understand everyday lives as well as attitudes and perceptions regarding life in a racially-mixed community. Fifty-eight Muizenberg residents were interviewed (comprising 52 households), with several residents interviewed more than once in order to gain a longer-term holistic view of Muizenberg life. In addition, time was spent chatting to residents and walking through the streets to ensure an adequate overview. Furthermore, a broad range of non-residents with an interest and activity in Muizenberg were interviewed (37 individuals), for example council officials, political representatives, local businessmen, and school principals.

This paper proceeds by providing background to both South Africa and the case-study neighbourhood. Having laid the contextual foundations, analysis of the desegregation/integration nexus in the case-study follows. First, sufficient evidence that the suburb is desegregating is provided, and second, social integration is explored. This exploration considers the everyday lives of residents in two spheres: everyday movement patterns and commitments, and involvement in local institutions. The former indicates whether Muizenberg residents (of all races) share local facilities (e.g. schools, shops) and are thus developing a local identity and ‘community’ that transcends race, and also whether residents’ everyday movement patterns (e.g. walking to school/shops) overlap to a sufficient degree that some mixing is likely.

\textsuperscript{108} Bakewell’s research analyses the factors that facilitate the “self-integration” of Angolan refugees into Zambian villages (rather than residing in refugee camps), based on stable friendships and significant social mixing.
The latter analysis of residents’ involvement in local institutions (e.g. churches, societies, political organisations) indicates whether local institutions provide a neutral space for cross-race friendship based on common identities and/or interests. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for desegregation/integration theory and policy.

**SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT**

Contemporary South Africa provides a fascinating context for analysing the desegregation/integration nexus, for while apartheid manipulated cities to ensure the total separation of races, the post-apartheid era is striving to unite all races in creating the new South Africa. Overcoming the inherited social and spatial structure of apartheid (and colonialism) is South Africa’s modern challenge. Under apartheid separate urban spatiality was fundamental to separate social order; lines were drawn on maps, and people re-ordered accordingly. The significance of this for post-apartheid South Africa is immense; for few contemporary urbanites have “lived even part of their adult lives in racially and ethnically integrated communities” (Christopher 2001c:128).

Despite significant progress since the formal erosion of apartheid, the socio-spatial structure of segregation and exclusion remains dominant (Turok 2001; Beall et al 2002; Tomlinson et al 2003; Watson 2003). While it is axiomatic that apartheid geography would constrain post-apartheid progression, inherited obstacles have been magnified by post-apartheid changes, particularly in urban space. For example, desegregation in middle-class neighbourhoods has affected only a handful and class segregation remains salient (Saff 1998a). Although multi-racial neighbourhoods are
being created, by constructing low-cost housing neighbourhoods to accommodate re-located Coloureds and Blacks Africans (Seekings 2000:834), their periphery location reinforces apartheid geographies (Oldfield 2004). The eruption of Black African informal settlements in proximity to ‘White’ suburbs in the early-1990s did challenge apartheid geographies (Saff 1998a), but such land invasions are no longer tolerated. However, the ‘deracialisation’ experienced by these squatters, of living in desegregated space yet experiencing no cross-group social interaction and being refused access to the suburbs’ facilities and/or community (Saff 1998a) remain prevalent, as demonstrated by this research.

Despite continued segregation, there is widespread policy agreement that urban integration is vital to South Africa’s transformation (Turok 2001). Urban strategies prioritise city-wide desegregation (e.g. compact city designs, activity corridors) rather than suburb or individual-level desegregation or integration. However, in September 2004 the Housing Department announced that the pace of housing delivery would be increased by locating low-cost housing in wealthy areas, seeking to integrate rich and poor (and thus also, White and black) communities and individuals (Boyle and Philp 2004). Although perceived as radical, this policy has long been advocated by urban activists and researchers (e.g. Turok 2001; Simon 2001).

Although desegregation and integration are relatively rare, Sophie Oldfield’s research in a desegregating low-income neighbourhood in Cape Town, accommodating Black Africans and Coloureds in state-funded housing, analyses racial integration in this context (2004). While her research revealed the dominance of race and apartheid group areas in determining residents’ everyday activities; other identities bridging racial, cultural and language divides developed around civic involvement, indicating
some social integration. A similar approach is taken in this research, analysing residents’ everyday activities and institutional involvements in order to assess integration. However, comparison with Oldfield’s research is restricted by context; her low-cost housing case-study analysed artificial (state-enforced) desegregation amongst the poor, whereas this case study is a long-established former White middle-class suburb experiencing desegregation as a consequence of market forces.

**BACKGROUND TO CASE-STUDY**

Muizenberg is located at the southern edge of Cape Town’s ‘White’ southern suburbs, serving as the gateway into the beaches and tourist attractions of the Cape Peninsula and itself a popular recreational area for lower-income groups. Muizenberg is famed for its hey-day as a premier seaside resort, though more recently is reputed for attracting the slightly eccentric to its bohemian vibe (one resident described Muizenberg as: “very laid back; if you have a limp or a lisp you’ll be fine” D.S. 07/10/04\(^{109}\)), as well as a low-income haven, demonstrating its unconventional and cosmopolitan environment.

Although Muizenberg had elements of racial mixing under apartheid (when a number of Coloured families resided there)\(^{110}\), it was essentially a ‘White’ group area and thus has undergone significant changes in the last ten years, now hosting a wide range of social, economic and racial groups spread between its three spatial zones (see Figure 5.1). The ‘Marine State’ zone is predominantly composed of White and Coloured

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\(^{109}\) In order to protect the identity of interviewees their names are initialled, alongside the date of the interview.

\(^{110}\) The 1970 census recorded 7 500 Whites, 2 357 Coloureds/Asians, and 220 Bantu living in the broader Clovelly to Lakeside area (City of Cape Town 1975:14).
(with a handful of Black African) middle-class families housed in free-standing properties with large plots and spacious roads; the ‘village’ area is a transient mix of predominantly working and lower-middle class White, Coloured, Black African and immigrant families and individuals (although recently ‘yuppies’ have begun to
purchase property in this area) sometimes known as the ‘ghetto’ with its rundown terraced housing and cramped streets; and the ‘mountainside’ hosts predominantly White and wealthy families in large old houses with stunning views (Baumann 2002:8).

EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL DESEGREGATION

Since the demise of apartheid in the late-1980s, Cape Town has experienced significant demographic change as its previous ‘Whites-only’ and ‘Coloured labour preference’ policies have given way to desegregation, at least at a city-wide level. According to the census 2001 data, of the 2.9 million people living in the City of Cape Town almost half are Coloured (48%), Black Africans comprise almost a third (31.5%), Whites almost a fifth (19%), and Indian/Asians only a handful (1.5%) (Stats SA 2003a). Thus, unlike South Africa as a whole, no single population group possesses an absolute majority, and Cape Town as a city can be considered desegregated according to the criterion stipulated earlier. However, census data at the suburb level indicates significant racial segregation with only 2.5% (17 suburbs) of Cape Town’s 683 suburbs demonstrating physical desegregation.111 Indeed, Cape Town is widely vilified for continuing to function with stark racial polarisation; with centrally located (White) affluent suburbs and economic centres juxtapositioned by poverty-stricken and overcrowded (black) settlements on the periphery (Turok 2001:2350; Pieterse 2003a:1; Tomlinson et al 2003:x; Watson 2003:55).

111 Although 33 of Cape Town’s suburbs are statistically desegregated, many of these are non-residential areas such as industrial parks, business zones and nature reserves, or host transient populations such as university campuses, or have miniscule populations, and thus have been excluded from analysis.
Muizenberg provides an unusual example of residential desegregation in a former White area, and thus offers a blueprint for future experiences. As Table 5.1 reveals, Muizenberg was still White-dominated in 1996, comprising almost three-quarters (71.5%) of Muizenberg’s population. Rapid change in the interim years is indicated by 2001 data; by which time Muizenberg has become equally dominated by Whites and Coloureds (36% each), in addition to Black Africans comprising just over a quarter (26.6%).

Table 5.1: Population Group by size in Muizenberg, 1996 and 2001 census
(Stats SA 1998a and 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
<th>Indian or Asian</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>4,096</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>5,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3,043</td>
<td>4,109</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>4,106</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>11,418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The major cause of this dramatic population change is a huge increase in the absolute size of both the Black African and Coloured population groups. Although census data indicates that only 10% of this Black African population are from elsewhere in Africa (Stats SA 2003a), anecdotal research suggests that this is likely to be a significant under-count given the dominance of African immigrants in Muizenberg. Indeed, a 2002 study found that 16% of village tenants were immigrants, predominantly from the Democratic Republic of Congo (64%) and Angola (16%) (Baumann 2002:3).

Such figures clearly demonstrate the physical desegregation of Muizenberg, having shifted from a ‘White’ apartheid group area to now accommodating Whites,

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112 Although there is some dispute regarding the 2001 figures (i.e. the absolute total is perceived as too high relative to the 1999 and 2004 voter rolls for the area) there is consensus that Muizenberg is a mixed race area with a strong representation of Black Africans, Whites and Coloureds.

113 A socio-economic study report undertaken for the Muizenberg Revitalisation Area indicated that 12.6% of all residents in the village in 2001 were citizens of other African countries (EDTD 2001).
Coloureds, Black Africans and immigrants, with no single group dominant. However, whether this suburb-level desegregation has facilitated micro-level social integration between people of different races now living in residential proximity remains to be seen.

**EVERYDAY PATTERNS: LOCALISED AND OVERLAPPING LIVES?**

Having established Muizenberg as a desegregating suburb, this section considers the depth of residents’ local ties (and thus the depth of ‘community’), as well as their daily movement patterns. This is demonstrated by analysing whether residents use local facilities (e.g. schools, shops) according to race. This analysis of *individual* activities complements the census’ *suburb*-level data, though of course the trade-off is decreased coverage (of Muizenberg residents) and thus a reduced guarantee of accurate representation.

**Background of Muizenberg residents**

Respondents’ reasons for moving to Muizenberg are analysed, as these affect satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the area (i.e. whether the reason for moving still exists), and thus willingness to participate in the area and mix with neighbours. Both Whites and Coloureds are attracted to Muizenberg for its broad physical, cultural and economic attributes, such as to invest in nice housing, its natural environment (invoking holiday memories), as well as its cosmopolitan and village vibe. In other words they are distinctly attracted to *Muizenberg* rather than just ‘a nice suburb’. In contrast, Black Africans and immigrants are attracted to Muizenberg for more personal reasons such as work/studies, having friends in the area, feeling safe and
being able to afford accommodation. This implies that the attraction is not Muizenberg _per se_ (as for Whites and Coloureds) but rather a safe, friendly and cheap place, wherever that may be (though over time an affiliation to Muizenberg is likely to develop). Thus the reasons for moving to Muizenberg and by implication also, perceptions and experiences of Muizenberg as a suburb, reveal stark racial differences.

Such racial divergence in residents’ basic reasons and approaches to living in a desegregating suburb seem likely to hinder rather than facilitate social integration. Indeed, many residents (especially long-term Whites) did not _choose_ to live in a desegregating suburb but either moved to a mono-racial area that later became mixed, or moved to Muizenberg for reasons that were entirely divorced from its racial demography. Thus the potential for social integration is likely to be constrained by a lack of common interests/perspectives.

Length of residence also differs according to racial group, and is equally likely to affect perceptions, experiences and satisfaction with the area. Most Whites have lived in Muizenberg significantly longer than their Black African, immigrant or Coloured neighbours. Indeed, while most Whites have lived in Muizenberg for over ten years (with new arrivals tailing off in the last three-five years), most Black Africans and immigrants have lived in Muizenberg for five years or less, indicating a much more recent attraction. Coloureds have been attracted to Muizenberg over a longer trajectory than Black Africans and immigrants, indicating ‘greying’ towards the end of apartheid. Given that the vast majority of Whites moved to Muizenberg _before_ it underwent radical demographic change and also that most were attracted by Muizenberg attributes (rather than individual concerns), such a radical change in
some of these attributes (e.g. population composition) is likely to decrease enthusiasm for the area and also discourage new Whites from moving in, as does seem to have been the case. Whether the context of having lived in a Whites-only area (in some cases for decades) inhibits ability to embrace radical demographic (and by implication, cultural) change is yet to be considered, though it seems likely.

Given these racial mismatches in reasons for moving Muizenberg (and by implication, perceptions of Muizenberg) and length of tenure, mixing across race groups is expected to be weak. However, the similarity of experience between immigrants and Black Africans opens a potential window for mixing based on shared identity, and to a lesser extent between Whites and Coloureds.

**Shared use of local facilities?**

Having identified the different histories of Muizenberg’s residents, analysis considers residents’ local ties irrespective of race (implying non-racial ‘community’), and also whether the daily lives of different racial groups overlap (implying the possibility of mixing). This approach provides an indicator of potential mixing as a consequence of sharing local facilities and overlapping daily movement patterns. This is conducted by analysing residents’ use of local facilities such as schools, shops, and places of socialisation.

Muizenberg hosts both a junior (MJS) and senior (MHS) school, yet the majority of Muizenberg children attend school elsewhere, particularly White children. Almost all White and Coloured families educate junior-school aged children at schools along

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114 Although Muizenberg also hosts a tertiary college, theology college, and postgraduate maths institute, the focus of this section is on residents’ use of local facilities rather than non-residents’ use of Muizenberg facilities (as it the case with most of the other educational institutions), and thus the focus is on schools.
the southern peninsula (3-6km away), while Black African and immigrant families are more likely to educate children in Muizenberg. This is a consequence of White and Coloured families’ ability to transport children further afield (e.g. car ownership, non-working mother), afford higher school fees, alongside White perceptions that MJS is too ‘Coloured’.

[We removed our daughter from MJS and] sent her to Fish Hoek middle school ... because it’s Whiter – we thought she’d feel more at home. She was battling at MJS because it was so Coloured and she felt excluded, so at Fish Hoek she was able to assert her identity [P.H. 28/09/04]

My kids are at ... St James [primary school. Why not at MJS?] I was concerned sending my eldest to a school with kids from the Cape Flats [a former Coloured group area]. He’s very sensitive and I didn’t want him with rough and tumble kids from Lavender Hill [a Coloured area notorious for gangsters] [C.A. 01/12/04]

My children go to St James [primary school]. We originally thought we’d send them to MJS but ... there were gangs and big classes, whereas St James seemed quieter [J.H. 30/09/04]

This is not to imply that White families choose non-local schools to avoid racial difference (the southern peninsula schools are mixed race), but rather that White families (and Coloureds to a lesser extent) prefer non-local schools. Such non-local preferences indicate not only an absence of cross-race ‘community’, for example between parents of different races with children at the same school, but also a limited potential for daily movement patterns to overlap (e.g. parents from different racial backgrounds together walking their children to local schools), and thus inhibit the potential for social integration. Although this non-local trend could provide a space of mixing, as White and Coloured families jointly educate children elsewhere (as demonstrated in other desegregating suburbs with weak use of local facilities; Lemanski 2004b), in fact the reliance on non-shared cars for transporting children and tendency for friendships to develop with non-Muizenberg children negates this.
This non-local trend is even more prevalent amongst senior school-age children, particularly amongst White children, almost all of whom are educated at southern suburb (former White) schools (8-20km away from Muizenberg), while all other races choose the local school. Interestingly, all of the White children attending non-local senior schools previously attended MJS (except one family that is new to the area), so are not opposed to local education per se. Clearly there has been a diminution in support for MJS specifically, as well as in local education. This implies that as Muizenberg has desegregated, long-term residents have felt excluded and have therefore sought facilities elsewhere, thus further weakening the development of a non-racial community. In this context, the desegregation of Muizenberg schools has actually inhibited rather than facilitated social integration in the suburb.

In the past MHS and MJS were community schools but not any more. That is sad because before ... Muizenberg was a strong community, everyone knows everyone, but not anymore, now it’s a divided community [L.S. 04/11/04]

Now it’s not a community school, it’s a transient school ... Hardly anyone even knows who the head is – the teachers don’t live here, the pupils don’t live here – it’s not a community school [G.M. 07/10/04]

The tendency for White (and to some extent Coloured) children to attend non-local schools restricts Muizenberg schools from facilitating social integration. Although Muizenberg is a desegregating suburb, its schools do not draw pupils from the locality and thus are not a vehicle for residential social integration. While this pessimism about the potential for local schools to help convert physical desegregation into social integration could be unique, it seems likely to be generally true given that schools desegregate faster that suburbs (Battersby 2004b). Thus as the minority race (in this case, Coloureds from outside Muizenberg) becomes dominant, the previously

115 The specific reasons for this decline in confidence in MJS are beyond the scope of this paper.
dominant racial group leaves (in this case, White Muizenberg residents). This links to tipping point theories that once a certain proportion (or critical mass) of blacks move into a ‘White’ suburb, a ‘tipping point’ is reached causing Whites to flee the area (Wolf 1963; Schelling 1972). Perhaps if Muizenberg as a suburb reaches the same levels of racial transfer as its schools (especially MHS which in 2003 was 89% Coloured, 6.5% White, and 4.5% Black African, D.S. 11/02/04), a similar White exodus will prevail.

The use of local shops is also considered as an indicator for localised everyday lives and common use of local facilities. Muizenberg has two main supermarkets; a medium-sized ‘Shoprite’ in the village, and a large ‘Pick ‘n Pay’ at Capricorn, adjacent to Marine State. Although all races shop at the village ‘Shoprite’ for convenience, indicating overlapping everyday movement patterns of different races, Whites are most likely to shop elsewhere, both at Capricorn ‘Pick ‘n Pay’ as well as to exclusive shopping malls further afield, expressing a dislike of Shoprite, based on its failure to cater for their (White and/or wealthy) needs.

I’ll pop into Shoprite in Muizenberg but I don’t like it … you can’t get upmarket goods there because they cater for the [village, a poor] area [D.D. 28/09/04]

I go to Shoprite if I really have to, but Pick ‘n Pay is first option. Shoprite is filth, you can never find what you want, veg are out of date. [D.S. 02/12/04]

When I feel larny [posh] I go up to Constantia, when I’ve had enough of the riff raff I go up there. I grew up in an area like Constantia [wealthy White area] – I’m still in an apartheid mind and I find it hard to live with all these other colours – like when you go to the shops and you see them. When I grew up we didn’t see other races. [A.L. 28/09/04]

Only the final quote indicates that dislike for Shoprite is racial; however, while the other quotes focus on quality, this is based on perceptions that Shoprite caters for the poorest section of Muizenberg (the village), thus indicating that antipathy for Shoprite

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is linked with antipathy for the presence of poverty. This contributes to feelings amongst wealthier (predominantly White) residents that Muizenberg no longer caters for their needs (also expressed regarding schools) and is no longer ‘their’ suburb as a consequence of desegregation. In contrast, Coloureds, Black Africans and immigrants shop at whichever centre is closest. Thus while Whites’ choice of non-local facilities does not provide a space for mixing with different race neighbours, the tendency for Coloureds, Black Africans and immigrants to use local shops indicates potential for social integration between these groups based on the overlapping of daily movement patterns as well as a common local identity.

Another example of localisation and potential mixing is provided by residents’ use of socialising facilities (e.g. restaurants, socialising at neighbours’ homes). Surprisingly, about half of residents (irrespective of race) socialise in Muizenberg and its neighbouring suburbs. However, there is also a significant minority that do not socialise in Muizenberg (which also transcends race), due to racial ties elsewhere and/or a lack of ‘belonging’ in Muizenberg.

[White respondent] We don’t socialise in the area, I’ve got a spread of long-standing friends all over the place ... friends are people who are likeminded, [whereas I have] only acquaintances in [Muizenberg] [J.G.11/10/04]

[White respondent] I have friends in Tokai [a White area, where we used to live] and my wife would say she has no support in Muizenberg [since we moved here three years ago] [J.C. 19/10/04]

[Coloured respondent] We don’t socialise in Muizenberg ... our good friends are in Mitchells Plain [a Coloured area, where we lived before] ... there is no entertainment in Muizenberg – like on a Saturday night, where can you go? [E.F.04/11/04]

[Coloured respondent] I come from a [Coloured] community ... where I had good friends at each others’ houses – but here in Muizenberg it’s not the same ... the majority of people here are Whites but you don’t see them here socially because they go out of Muizenberg [to socialise] [R.L. 04/11/04]
This absence of ‘acceptance’ or ‘belonging’ in Muizenberg amongst residents confirms similar findings in relation to schools and shops. As residents use Muizenberg merely as a place to reside (rather than a ‘community’ in which to educate children, shop and socialise) this diminishes the likelihood of physical desegregation facilitating social integration. This indicates a lack of local identity and community, particularly amongst newcomers to the area.

Muizenberg thus provides a rather pessimistic model of the potential for shared use of local facilities to facilitate social integration. In general, residents (especially Whites, and to a lesser degree Coloureds) avoid local facilities, perceiving them as inferior to facilities offered prior to desegregation. This represents a perverse form of Saff’s (1998a) deracialised space (in which black squatters resided in, or adjacent to, White areas but were refused access to White facilities), in that it is long-term White residents that no longer use local facilities, perceived as catering for blacks. This not only implies a weak sense of local community, but also the absence of overlapping between residents’ everyday lives. Based on Blokland’s “contact hypothesis” that the greater the frequency of interactions between groups, the greater the understanding and mutual respect (2003:7), this indicates the failure of local facilities to provide a vehicle for social integration. The weak use of local facilities is further confirmed as evidence of weak potential for social integration by Bakewell’s (2002) criterion requiring the shared use of neighbourhood resources for neighbours to integrate.

Although research in other South African desegregating/integrating neighbourhoods indicates similar non-local tendencies, these were a consequence of newcomers continuing to use facilities in previous neighbourhoods (Horn and Ngcobo 2003; Oldfiel, 2004), rather than deliberately terminating use of local facilities because of
desegregation, as in Muizenberg. This shift away from local facilities amongst long-term White residents indicates significant opposition to desegregation (or at least, its consequences for facilities). While most black residents have immersed themselves in local facilities despite Muizenberg’s proximity to former Coloured and Black African areas, most Whites feel they do not belong in Muizenberg, a consequence of perceptions that local facilities do not cater for their needs and instead are serving poor residents (e.g. shops) and non-residents (e.g. schools). Thus, as a consequence of desegregation, long-term residents’ sense of local identity, community and ‘belonging’ to the area has diminished, and thus social integration with new residents (of different race) is restricted.

Mixing in the streets?

Mixing between neighbours within streets is examined to contextualise and complement the above analysis of local facilities. As noted earlier, Muizenberg comprises three spatial zones. Given that the mountainside area has remained relatively mono-racial (i.e. White) because of its expensive houses, attention focuses briefly on the transient and turbulent village, and then uses Marine State as a case study of more stable residential desegregation in a family-based middle-class area.

The village has experienced significant racial tension between neighbours as a consequence of desegregation. For most, living next-door to someone of another race has not facilitated social mixing, and in fact has fuelled fear and opposition.

When I first moved in [to the village, in 1997] ... there was friction between South African Coloureds and black foreigners ... Coloureds throwing stones ... calling names to the refugees ... [the other day] I had a Coloured women coming to me [asking] will I sign [a petition] to get blacks out! [P.C. 15/10/04]
Much of this antipathy is based on cultural differences between long-term residents (White) and new arrivals (Coloured, Black African and immigrant) rather than race per se, and indeed neighbours with a common cultural and socio-economic background (irrespective of race) are mixing.

The people that live ... in the village ... are largely Coloured, lower-income White and refugee ... the Coloureds and the poor Whites mix a lot and the refugees [from the same place] stick together ... because they’re the same culture [B.R. 05/11/04]

This implies that residential desegregation only facilitates social integration between neighbours with common cultural and socio-economic traits, and is also identified in the relatively sedate and suburban Marine State. While the village’s racial change has caused conflict based on cultural differences, racial change in Marine State has occurred peacefully as new residents share (or have adopted) the cultural traits of long-term residents. While these two outcomes differ (i.e. tension in the village and peace in Marine State), they are both a consequence of cultural (rather than racial) differences or similarities, largely based on socio-economics. Of course, the fact that Marine State has desegregated peacefully does not guarantee active mixing between long-term residents (White) and newcomers (predominantly Coloured). In fact, the acceptability of new arrivals based on shared culture actually inhibits active socialising because middle-class suburban culture emphasises friendliness rather than friendship.

[White respondent] In the street ... the six families here, we know each other, we greet, the children play in the street. We’re never in their houses, but we talk at least once or twice a day over the wall ... it’s White and Coloured families [P.H. 28/09/04]

[Coloured respondent] It’s a very friendly street. Just greet in the street, I’ve never been in anyone’s house. [E.F. 04/11/04]
[White respondent] I know the lady over the road – just to greet – we don’t know their lives … it’s all pleasant but it’s not friendship [L.S. 04/11/04]

[Coloured respondent] It’s a middle-class area. I used to be in a lower-class area [where] the neighbours are in and out of their houses, the children play together on the streets – everyone knows everyone. But in a middle-class area everyone is for themselves, into security and keeping to themselves. [A.P. 05/11/04]

Such shallow levels of socialising and friendships are not uncommon for middle-class areas, indeed the British government’s ‘neighbourhood renewal’ strategy is based on awareness that a sense of belonging to, participating in, and socialising within neighbourhoods is most prevalent in deprived areas, while those in affluent areas rely on non-local amenities and social networks (Parkes et al. 2002:2413). This is confirmed by Tönnies’ theory that friendship and neighbourhood are of prime importance to the lower classes (“common people”), whereas the upper classes (“the educated”) are more likely to distance themselves from neighbours (1887:193). This middle-class apathy is identified by Blokland (2003) as the ‘indifference’ shown by middle-class residents to immigrant neighbours. This ‘indifference’ exists when there is “little local contact and little interest in neighbourhood contacts”, and is common in middle-class areas with sufficient material resources (e.g. cars, self-sufficient home) to require no neighbourhood reliance (Blokland 2003:19). This ‘indifference’ is evident in Marine State, and it is interesting that as the area has desegregated, newcomers from different cultural backgrounds (where neighbourhood socialising is prevalent, e.g. A.P. 05/11/04) have adopted the cultural practices of their new area rather than retain original cultural practices. This implies that Marine State requires a (White) cultural standard irrespective of one’s personal cultural (and/or racial) identity. Thus the criterion for acceptance into the community shifts away from race, towards a new cultural criterion that is equally exclusive. Indeed, the handful of
White residents who expressed either explicit support (rather than implicit acceptance) or opposition to Marine State’s desegregation focused exclusively on cultural practices (rather than race per se).

We’ve had people [of colour] come into the area, but the way they behaved. [Well,] what goes around comes around and they left [M.N. 23/09/04]

We had a Muslim chap staying on the corner here … we asked him to cut his lawn and he accused us of racism [D.D. 06/10/04]

There is the Congo family, but they’re so White in their ways. They’re very educated and cultured – I don’t think of them as black [A.L. 28/09/04]

While such quotations indicate racial tensions (or rather, acceptability into the area based on cultural behaviour), in fact this was the minority experience with most residents expressing the area as generally friendly, with newcomers welcomed irrespective of race. However, the experience of different races residing in neighbourhood proximity has not facilitated social integration in anything other than superficial street greeting. While it could be argued that in time this could lead to deeper socialising, that does not seem to be the experience in middle-class suburbs worldwide.

**INSTITUTIONAL INVOLVEMENT: NON-RACIAL MIXING?**

Analysis thus far has considered relatively passive indicators of integration, in addressing activities common to all (e.g. shopping, attending work/school), and analysis now considers more active behavioural choices such as institutional involvement. That is not to imply that residents’ lives are easily segmented into ‘everyday’ or ‘institutional’, or that mixing in institutions is an end in itself. Rather,
institutions are used to identify whether newcomers have been immersed into Muizenberg’s institutions; and also whether a different type of friendship based on common identity (e.g. religion, political affinity), hobby (e.g. history society), or stage in life (e.g. young children) is emerging between different races. As this would seem a more substantive basis for long-term friendship than the random and indicative nature of the overlapping lifestyles approach taken thus far, assessing institutions enables analysis of the current depth and future potential for social integration not just in Muizenberg, but for its residents irrespective of their future location.

Two institutional types are considered: non-political institutions such as churches, pre-schools and interest-based societies; and politicised community groups. Both White and immigrant residents are more active in local institutions than their Black African and Coloured neighbours. However, while Whites favour political organisations (e.g. ratepayers association and improvement district), immigrants favour less political structures such as church. Black Africans in Muizenberg overwhelmingly avoid involvement in local institutions, other than churches, and just under half of Coloureds are involved in community groups, with the rest involved in no local activities.

**Non-political institutions**

Three non-political institutions are considered to assess whether races are mixing in this context and developing friendships based on common identities and interests: churches, pre-schools and interest groups.

Attending church is most popular amongst Muizenberg’s immigrant population, though many Black Africans, Coloureds and Whites also attend church. Of the
Muizenberg churches researched in this study, all boasted mixed race membership. However, the degree of mixing and friendship with people from other races known through church varies according to race. For example, White and Coloured respondents expressed strong levels of friendship with each other through church.

[White respondent] [My] friends in the area are mixed race, mostly Coloureds ... it's a lot of proper friendship – not just greeting in the street – that mixed friendship is from the church. It's a very mixed church [D.D. 28/09/04]

[Coloured respondent] Most of our friends are from church ... we've got quite a good selection of the different races – mainly Whites from the church. [A.L. 28/09/04]

[White respondent] Generally [my friends] are all White – except [from] church ... at the church our congregation is 60% Coloured and 40% White [D.D. 06/10/04]

In contrast, Black Africans and immigrants were more likely to cluster together at church and/or to feel that White members did not extend friendship to them.

There is reasonable integration but if you look for it the black folk do hang together [J.K. 01/12/04]

At church it's no real friendship. The Whites don't always stay for tea because it's black people. [But some] do try as White people. [M.K. 19/10/04]

Despite weak cross-race friendships at church (other than between Whites and Coloureds), it is encouraging that churches in Muizenberg are desegregating (as has not been the case in other desegregating communities, Lemanski 2004b), and thus churches are an institution with the potential for facilitating social integration over time. However, mixed-race membership needs to move towards mixed-race involvement to produce social integration.

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116 The analysis of churches in Muizenberg involved interviewing several church leaders as well as church members, and also attending services at a selection of the churches
Another non-political institution attracting Muizenberg residents irrespective of race are pre-primary schools. ‘Friends’ pre-primary has operated in Marine State for four years, as an offshoot of a ‘southern suburbs’ pre-primary. Both staff and child demographics indicate significant pluralism, with staff almost equally representing Black Africans, Coloureds and Whites [B.W. 04/11/04], and pupil composition being almost half Coloured, over a quarter White, almost one-fifth Black African, alongside a handful of immigrant children [S.C. 04/11/04].

According to both the principal and owner, almost all pupils live in Muizenberg. Many are relatively new to the area, and have established a strong sense of community and friendship that extends beyond the school day and perimeter. Indeed, the principal indicated that parents arrange for other parents to collect their child for play after school, indicating that both children and parents of different races have developed close friendships.

All the parents know each other – different parents take different children home to play irrespective of race. Like one mother will phone and say ‘so and so is taking my child tonight’ – all different races. They play together at the weekend. [S.C. 04/11/04]

Both the principal and owner explain these strong levels of friendship by the strong sense of ‘community’ they perceive in Muizenberg.

[Friends Principal] Muizenberg is a very out of the way area so our children are all from Muizenberg whereas at ... [the other pre-primary] people pass through so the children come from all over ... Muizenberg is very community orientated and [so they] are used to living in a mixed area [S.C. 04/11/04]

[Friends Owner] The Muizenberg school has a completely different personality [from the other pre-primary] ... There’s a more family atmosphere at Friends – every teacher knows background to every child … parents are very involved … if we have a tea parents will all bring [food], they all pull in; but [at the other pre-primary] they just complain [B.W. 04/11/04]
This sense of local community is in stark contrast to the non-local experience identified at the primary and senior school-age, perhaps indicating a new experience of local identity and mixing amongst newer families (with younger children). In this case at least, educational institutions appear to be facilitating integration between parents and children of different races, as well as integrating families into a local community that will perhaps have implications for Muizenberg’s future as a desegregating and integrating suburb. It will be interesting to see whether these children (and parents) retain cross-race friendships and also retain this strong ‘community’ spirit in the decades to come; and if so, this points to the beginning of a new Muizenberg (mixed-race) community. This community is developing through child-based friendships, indicating a common identity based on shared needs (e.g. child-caring), which clearly matches Bakewell’s (2002) integration criterion that cross-race relationships require mutual benefit.

Interest groups are another non-political institution, and analysis addresses the ‘Business and Tourism Association’ and ‘Historical Society’. Although neither is explicitly political or racial, they are perceived as ‘White’, and thus have struggled to embrace Muizenberg’s black residents.

We’ve really been trying to get cross-cultural input [into the Business and Tourism Association] but there aren’t that many [people from other races] that own shops or businesses. [G.M. 07/10/04]

The historical society is perceived to be a White thing, maintaining our cultural heritage. But we’re remembering the Battle of Muizenberg – the Coloured role – we want it to be a fully inclusive history [G.H. 30/09/04]

Despite these comments from White committee members demonstrating their desire to encourage Muizenberg’s black residents, the experience of an immigrant member of the Business and Tourism Association indicates racial problems inherent in institutional desegregation.
I go [to the Business and Tourism Association meetings] when I can make it. For a long-time I was the only non-White. To be under-represented was hard, when it comes to making decisions. [A.G. 04/11/04]

Given that Muizenberg’s interest-groups remain overwhelmingly White, there is clearly limited scope for cross-race mixing between members, thus implying that friendships based on a common interest (across race) are rare simply because Muizenberg’s (black) newcomers do not share the same interests as their (White) long-term neighbours and do not wish to join a group perceived as promoting White interests. However, common interest (e.g. religious affinity) has facilitated desegregation in churches (clearly lacking in interest-groups), though friendships are yet to flourish, except between Whites and Coloureds. Furthermore, pre-primaries have managed both desegregation and friendship based on a common stage in life alongside common daily activities and needs. This shared identity is facilitating social integration and the creation of a non-racial community in a way that both churches and interest groups have not. This suggests that cross-race friendships require more than just common identity (e.g. Christianity), and in fact require shared needs. Indeed, if one expands Bakewell’s (2002) criterion that residents require a common occupation type to the broader criterion of requiring common identity, in conjunction with his criterion that cross-race relationships need to be based on mutual benefit (e.g. a shared need), then his criteria are clearly evident in pre-primaries as local institutions that are facilitating social integration.

**Political institutions**

Three main political organisations operate in Muizenberg: the ‘Muizenberg Improvement District’ (MIDS), the ‘Ratepayers Association’ (RPA) and the ‘Tenants Association’ (TA), with committees comprising local residents. Given that the
previous section identified organisations requiring formal membership and committee involvement (i.e. interest groups), rather than lay-involvement (i.e. church) or service-usage (i.e. pre-primary), as less likely to attract Muizenberg’s new (black) residents, the potential for social integration through Muizenberg’s political institutions seems limited.

In fact, these political organisations have been accused of racism, with the MIDS and RPA perceived as predominantly White groups representing only White interests (as with interest groups), leading to divisions between them and the predominantly Coloured and immigrant TA.

You get tenants association on one hand and ratepayers on the other – ratepayers who are White make the decisions that affect negatively on non-South African and poorer White South Africans. [A.G. 04/11/04]

Although this tension indicates MIDS and RPA as White and the TA as black, in fact the issue is more complex. The TA of course represents only tenants, of which the vast majority are black, although very limited interaction has occurred between the different races (predominantly Coloured and immigrant) involved with this group. In contrast, both MIDS and RPA represent all residents in their designated area, and thus one would expect mixed-race committees.

You try very hard to recruit people across the rainbow [to committees] and sometimes they do arrive, but very often they don’t last the course, they fall by the wayside. [N.V. 14/10/04]

When it comes to civic affairs you only see White faces … On the RPA we’ve got three Coloured people from Muizenberg … we had four or five people of colour on the committee [last year] but they all faded away and I’ve never understood why … I definitely think that this kind of job – community service - is viewed differently in the Coloured community. They don’t want to get involved. [D.D. 06/10/04]

We tried to get [refugees] to come to meetings [but] there was no leader, no one to talk to, or if there was he would be gone the next week, whereas in the White community we have representatives [G.M. 07/10/04]
The impression gained from these quotes is that for cultural reasons blacks are not interested in community issues and are unable to commit to such bodies for significant durations. Such racial divergence implies that local political institutions are not facilitating social integration, largely because of their exclusively White composition and that even if other races do get involved, there is a suspicion of (or inability to understand) the (predominantly Coloured) newcomer. In contrast to Whites’ opinions that Coloureds do not get involved in community organisations because of cultural differences, one of the Coloured RPA representatives outlined his reasons for joining the committee.

In my community – Coloured – I was very involved and did a lot of voluntary work. When I came over to Muizenberg we weren’t involved in anything and I wanted something to do and RPA was all there was. [A.P. 05/11/04]

This implies no significant cultural boundaries to involvement in Muizenberg’s community groups. In fact, a more likely reason for blacks’ lack of desire to participate in these structures is a feeling that such institutions represent White Muizenberg. Indeed, those Coloureds that are on the MIDS or RPA committees demonstrate feelings of exclusion within a group that is promoting White culture and attitudes (albeit perhaps unwittingly).

My husband has been on it [MIDS board] two years. He was a strategic appointment to MIDS [because] … it is perceived as White and racist … MIDS make statements that I find insensitive, but we have to accept that we’re a nation in transition [D.S. 02/12/04]

They [the Ratepayers Association] are White. Besides myself there is only one other Coloured – but she rarely attends … You know South African history, Whites have certain perceptions, they believe certain things didn’t happen and they find it hard to accept – did that really happen? … They come from that point of view – looking at the White side of things and … it’s taking time for them to accept that Muizenberg is not White anymore [A.P. 05/11/04]
Despite a handful of Coloureds on the boards of Muizenberg’s community organisations, this is seen as tokenism within structures that remain staunchly White. Such limited desegregation at the committee level (both in terms of numbers involved and misunderstandings), is therefore unlikely to facilitate social mixing. Evidence that diverse communities unite to achieve a common goal (Oldfield 2004) reveals the Muizenberg problem; the absence of a common goal, need or identity between residents with highly racialised lives. Thus politically-based local institutions have not desegregated, remaining the preserve of long-term residents and their interests.

Evidence indicates that institutions in which neighbours with a common identity or need meet are most likely to facilitate social mixing and friendship between different race neighbours. In contrast, institutions based on interests that are not shared by Muizenberg’s new (black) residents fail to attract newcomers and thus continue to operate in White-dominated spheres, thus restricting social integration. It is interesting that while Whites perceive local facilities as no longer serving their needs and identities, blacks feel the same way about local institutions; indicating that no racial group demonstrates local identity or acceptance into a Muizenberg community.

**CONCLUSION**

This paper has considered whether the physical desegregation of a suburb leads to the social integration of its residents. This has been achieved by analysing the everyday and institutional lives of residents of a desegregating Cape Town neighbourhood in order to assess whether social integration is occurring, and if so in what form.
The findings indicate that residents’ reasons for moving to Muizenberg and their length of tenure are highly racialised. White residents have a long tenure and were attracted specifically to Muizenberg, while Black Africans, Coloureds and immigrants have lived in the area much less time and were attracted to a cheap and accessible area rather than to Muizenberg per se. This racial divergence establishes a context in which developing a non-racial ‘community’ is hindered by opposing perceptions of what this community entails, and also limits the potential for mixing based on a common identity. This pessimism regarding the development of a ‘community’ is confirmed by the reluctance of residents’ (particularly Whites) to use local facilities such as shops and schools, perceiving Muizenberg’s facilities as inferior since desegregation and aimed at non-residents. The desegregation of streets facilitates street-level mixing based on culturally acceptable behaviour, and although Marine State exudes middle-class friendliness (e.g. greeting in the street) rather than friendship per se, Friends pre-primary (situated in Marine State) has facilitated mixed-race friendship and community in this area, a consequence of shared needs and common identities through a local institution rather than mixed streets per se (though residential proximity undoubtedly contributes). However, other local institutions have been less successful in facilitating social integration, with both interest-based societies and community groups dominated by White residents, and perceived as promoting White cultural hegemony rather than embracing Muizenberg’s mixed-race community. Although churches have desegregated, there is mixed success in translating this into social integration between members, though this could change over time. However, with the exception of the pre-primary investigated (and also churches to a lesser extent) Muizenberg’s local institutions have remained racially segregated. Despite this pessimism, there are indications of increased social
integration over time, for example, the development of a significant mixed-race community in Marine State centred on shared need and common identity, and the common use of local shops by village-based Black Africans, immigrants and Coloureds.

In summarising the findings, it appears that on the whole, physical desegregation has not led to social integration in Muizenberg (despite pockets of social integration), thus confirming Turok's observation that the apartheid legacy is "embedded" in people's "institutional and social practices" (Turok, 2001:2350). As identified in the introduction, much of the theory assumes integration as the flipside to segregation and though this could be explained as a consequence of definitional differences, there does seem to be a general perception (particularly evident in policy-making) that integration is a robotic consequence of desegregation (or at least that the two are interdependent). This research disputes that perception and while not claiming this case-study as universally representative, it is sufficient to merit broader theoretical and empirical conceptualisations of the desegregation/integration nexus, as well as the need for a new policy approach.

At a policy level this leads to something of a stalemate, for while policies promoting desegregation do not create social integration, any policy that attempted to enforce the latter (and the methods for achieving this are limited) would restrict human rights. Given this, perhaps desegregation policies are enough, by creating an environment conducive to social integration without forcing people to mix. Indeed, particularly in post-apartheid South Africa it would seem almost a reverse form of apartheid to try and enforce integration by pushing people beyond what they are ready for themselves. Instead, desegregation policies lay the foundations and allow people to
behave as they wish. This implies that a pure focus on desegregation policies (rather than on desegregation as a means to social integration) is sufficient, which is particularly apt given the findings in this research indicating a limited link between the two anyway. More radical proponents of integration may find this approach too inductive, preferring instead to detach integration policies from residential desegregation altogether and focus policies on mixing in non-residential spheres (though the limited evidence from this research on institutions does not bode well for the success of such an approach). Whichever approach is favoured, given the South African government's focus on desegregation and integration alongside the continuing reality of social and spatial segregation, some policy change is clearly needed.
Acknowledgements:

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CHAPTER SIX:

SPACES OF EXCLUSIVITY OR CONNECTION?
LINKAGES BETWEEN A GATED COMMUNITY AND ITS POORER NEIGHBOUR IN A CAPE TOWN MASTER PLAN DEVELOPMENT

Westlake is “a sign that we can work together to make our vision – a home for all – a lived reality for all” (Western Cape Premier, Ebrahim Rasool, 2004)

“It is a very unique land use geography. It works because there are separate components although in geographical proximity. This country will never have rich and poor mixing. The trick to this development is there are three separate entrances that don’t link. It was intentional ... It was designed to be four separate stand-alone sections” (Westlake developer, 15/04/04)
INTRODUCTION

The growth of various forms of gated communities worldwide has sparked an equal growth in literature addressing them, largely focusing on their negative impact on society as a whole. Gated communities are criticised for creating exclusionary spaces, increasing residential segregation, restricting freedom of movement and exacerbating social divides (Blakely and Snyder 1997; Caldeira 1999, 2000; Davis 1992; Low 2003; Marcuse 1997a), and thus creating a “new urban segregation” (Caldeira 1999). Such bounded spaces are typically promoted by emphasising total security, playing on potential residents fear of crime in the ‘outside’ world (Caldeira 1996:55; Judd 1994:162), and thus encouraging a ‘not in my back yard’ (NIMBY) mentality of exclusion and escapism (Ellin 2001:874) that implies the internal space is ‘purified’ from ‘dirty and dangerous outsiders’. Although residents also express choosing to live in a gated community in order to re-create an old-fashioned upbringing for their children, security remains the salient motive (Low 2003:231). However, enclaves are not simply a response to social difference and fear, but actually create and deepen segregation and polarisation, based on excluding difference and reinforcing fear. By separating oneself from those that are ‘different’, fears related to the unknown mass of ‘other’ or ‘them’ are increased, thus social divides widen and tolerance of, or interaction with, diversity becomes increasingly rare. These exclusionary practices are facilitated by the walls, security gates and surveillance existing to varying degrees in all gated communities. Residents tend to be socially similar and are able to function with limited interaction outside their walls (Caldeira 2000; Davis 1992), thus implying a homogenous lifestyle with no (or very limited) contact with the ‘difference’ that exists in the unknown ether of life ‘beyond the gate’. Thus, spatial separation becomes intertwined with social exclusion...
The question addressed by this research is whether this insular attitude alters when ‘difference’ is located right on the doorstep (or rather, on the perimeter of electric walls) of the residents of a gated community, part of the same development, and thus virtually unavoidable?

A gated community is a spatial zone that is separated from its surroundings by a wall or fence, with access controlled by gates. Such fortified enclaves adopt various guises, but the gated community analysed in this research is a ‘total security’ residential zone named Silvertree Estate, which forms part of the Westlake master-plan private development in Cape Town, South Africa. Silvertree is secured by an electrified wall with access controlled by a 24-hour-manned gatehouse. Part of the same development and lying adjacent to the gated community is a low-cost state-assisted housing project named Westlake village. Residents were awarded state housing in 1999 as replacement for their previous homes (informal and formal), which were demolished to make way for the mixed land-use development (residential, business, office and retail space), of which their new homes form a small component.

Although such mixed-use private developments are still relatively new in South Africa (though becoming increasingly popular), such enforced proximity of difference is more common elsewhere. For example, ‘inclusionary zoning laws’ in the United States require some housing developments to make provision for all income levels in an attempt to create more integrated neighbourhoods, with the consequence of assisted housing schemes in proximity to wealthier suburbs (Galster et al 2003). Although not addressing gated communities per se, this provides an example of intentionally designing housing to mix different income groups, as is the
case in the Westlake development. However, the American experience is somewhat negative in that wealthy suburbs have vehemently opposed the arrival of assisted-housing on their doorstep (Ibid). Addressing gated communities but not planned mixed-housing developments, Salcedo and Torres (2004) identify the natural tendency for gated communities in urban Chile to be located adjacent to significantly poorer neighbourhoods. Their empirical research in both gated communities and their poorer neighbours reveals that residents do not identify closely with their neighbours either within or between the two areas, but that residents in poor communities are grateful to gated communities for bringing modernity and improvements to the area, while gated community inhabitants have a positive image of their poorer neighbours and are happy to employ them (Salcedo and Torres 2004:39-40). Thus Salcedo and Torres conclude that not only is functional integration (e.g. employment) facilitated by the proximity of gated communities to poor settlements, but also that such spatial proximity leads to an improved understanding and tolerance of the ‘other’ (Ibid:40). Such findings question the mass of literature indicating that walls preclude social understanding and heighten social tensions between ‘difference’.

In addressing the contemporary urban context of multi-ethnic and diverse socio-economic societies, policy-makers have tended to emphasise the assimilation of minority culture into the majority (Park and Burgess 1921; Gordon 1964), though in recent years this has been superseded by multiculturalism, the peaceful co-existence of difference (Gans 1997; Glazer 1997), increasingly referred to as integration (Ellen 2000). The focus of this research is a little narrower than the city-scale used for the above concepts, addressing neighbourhood-level integration. At this scale, Taljia Blokland’s (2003) analysis of inter-ethnic relationships between Dutch residents and migrant neighbours in a Rotterdam neighbourhood identified four types of
integration: the “indifference” of Dutch residents to their migrant neighbours; “contact” between the two groups leading to increased understanding; “realistic conflicts” over shared neighbourhood resources; and “non-realistic conflicts” whereby migrants were blamed for all neighbourhood problems. This quadruple-typology is useful in analysing the relationships between Silvertree residents and Westlake villagers.

This research considers whether the spatial proximity of a gated community and low-cost housing area can overcome significant socio-economic differences to develop functional integration and increased social understanding (as in Salcedo and Torres), or whether in fact walls do prevent mixing or tolerance (as indicated by most other literature). This paper first provides a background to the South African context, and also to the Westlake master-plan development before analysing whether any connections exist between the two neighbourhoods, focusing firstly on perceptions and then on contact between them. Analysis considers whether the spaces that exist between them are exclusive, in that one fails to “admit the existence or presence of” the other, hindering their ability “to co-exist”; or are connected in that they are interdependently “linked together” in some form (Oxford English Dictionary 2005). The exact form of these interstitial spaces (physical, social and perceptive) are considered, with the weight of hope against identifying them operating as apartheid-esque ‘buffer strips’. Thus by implication the research also addresses the role of gated communities and mixed-land developments in supporting or thwarting post-apartheid city goals of desegregation and integration.

These research goals are analysed using data from research undertaken in Westlake village and Silvertree Estate from January to May 2004. Qualitative semi-structured
interviews were conducted with a broad diversity of residents seeking to understand everyday lives as well as attitudes and perceptions regarding life in both Westlake village and Silvertree independently, as well as in relation to each other. Forty-nine Westlake villagers and thirteen Silvertree residents were interviewed. This sampling disparity is recognised as a limitation of the study (although in fact both samples represent a similar percentage of their respective suburbs), and is a consequence of the ‘snowballing’ sampling strategy used. For while Westlake respondents were relatively easy to locate by walking the streets, knocking on doors and gaining referrals by befriending residents; Silvertree respondents were less willing to pass on their neighbours’ contact details and security measures ensured that all interviews required a pre-arranged (usually by telephone) appointment, and thus it was harder to access Silvertree residents.\(^\text{117}\) Although such ‘snowballing’ could have led to an unrepresentative sample, I took great care to ensure that different demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, race, age) were equally represented. Interviews were semi-structured but discussion topics addressed their background in the area (e.g. tenure, reason for moving), activities involved in, and perceptions of the area as a whole. In particular, the analysis of these discussions addresses the extent of social understanding and social contact between such vastly different socio-economic groups living in spatial proximity within the confines of a single development. Several residents were interviewed more than once in order to gain a long-term holistic view of neighbourhood life. In addition, time was spent simply chatting to residents and walking through the streets (especially in Westlake) and local shops/cafes (in the Steenberg Lifestyle centre, frequented by Silvertree residents) to ensure an adequate overview of each suburb. Furthermore, I attended several local

\(^{117}\) This is probably a limitation of all research undertaken in gated communities as their residents, by virtue of living in a secure complex, are hard to access and wish to remain detached from society.
meetings (organised by internal and external groups) as well as interviewing a broad range of non-residents with an interest and activity in the area, for example council officials, political representatives, local business-people, charity workers and those that had been involved in the development process.

**SOUTH AFRICA CONTEXT**

The wealth of social research addressing post-apartheid urban South Africa highlights the persistence rather than transformation of apartheid geographies, and the absence of urban integration (e.g. Beall et al 2002; Tomlinson et al 2003; Turok 2001; Watson 2003). The phenomenon of gated communities is seen as a factor in this continuation of apartheid-esque geographies. As already witnessed in America (Davis 1992; Massey and Denton 1993) and Brazil (Caldeira 1999, 2000; Scheper-Hughes and Hoffman 1998), where proximity of difference and fear of crime have encouraged residential enclaves, South Africa is now undergoing similar socio-spatial patterns of urban and social fragmentation (Bremner 2004; Hook and Vrdoljak 2002; Jürgens et al 2003; Landman 2000a, 2000b, 2004; McLaughlin and Muncie 1999:117; Saff 2004). According to the 2003 national crime survey (Omar 2004); South Africans now exhibit significantly greater insecurity than in 1998, when the last survey was conducted. Only a quarter of the nation now feel ‘very safe’ in their daytime residential area (compared to almost two-thirds in 1998), and well over half feel ‘very unsafe’ in their night-time residential area (whereas only a quarter felt this way in 1998). Thus it is not surprising that those with the financial means have sought to avoid crime and mitigate fears by moving into newly-created gated communities or enclosing existing neighbourhoods.
Similar to the literature on gated communities elsewhere in the world, South African commentators emphasise their negative impacts, arguing that erecting walls and restricting access facilitates social exclusion, contributing towards urban fragmentation (Landman 2000a, 2000b). In fact, the very rationale for a gated community, that the outside world is uncontrolled and hence dangerous, is used as justification for segregation and exclusion (Hook and Vrdoljak 2002:215). This has an added dimension in South Africa, for such urban trends imitate apartheid’s geography of exclusion rather than the post-apartheid goal of urban integration and inclusion. As crime levels have risen in South Africa, stretching into previously-protected White suburbs, fears have escalated and residents have responded by creating territorial enclosures and employing security staff in a desperate attempt to recreate idyllic suburbia. While urban policies are striving to create an integrated and non-racial city (albeit a somewhat elusive goal, Turok 2001), residents are responding independently, creating boundaries and divisions that oppose such inclusive goals and instead produce “a new apartheid” (Lemanski 2004a). Indeed, Hook and Vrdoljak interpret gated communities not solely as a physical removal from society, but an abstention from civic engagement and responsibility, enabling residents to ignore national goals such as unity and integration (2002:216). By allowing residents to distance themselves from a society they perceive as disinterested in their needs, gated communities create an “alternative representation of reality” (Ibid:216) in which “ones’ right to property and personal privacy [rather than ones’ civic duty] remain sacrosanct” (Ibid:198). Given that homeowners are attracted to gated communities by a desire to escape the insecurity of the ‘difference’ (racial and socio-economic) they encounter in the post-apartheid city, it is ironic that for some secure complexes, such
as the one analysed in this research, such 'difference' is located less than 500m from their perimeter.

Although gated communities tend to be located in wealthy areas, there are examples in South Africa of them being located adjacent to poor informal settlements, though this is less common in Cape Town than in Johannesburg. One famous example is the luxurious Dainfern security complex in Johannesburg, part of a golf estate, and incorporating a country club and private school alongside the 1,100 houses ranging in price from R2-8 million (www.dainfern.co.za). Adjacent to Dainfern is the Zevenfontein informal settlement, and although Zevenfontein preceded Dainfern (Zevenfontein originated in 1990, Dainfern in 1992), there is a well-documented history of attempts by Dainfern homeowners and private developer, Johnnic Properties, to displace the squatters (Bénit 2002:52; Mabin 1997). For example, Dainfern homeowners have erected road blocks and barriers to enclose Zevenfontein, and their outrage has focused on fears of increased crime alongside declines in property values as a consequence of such proximity to an informal settlement. In addition, Johnnic Properties, who wish to remove Zevenfontein in order to utilise the land, have taken exclusionary measures such as building a mound to block the view of Zevenfontein from Dainfern and have also enclosed the informal settlement to prevent further growth (Bénit 2002:59).

This NIMBY attitude is common in South Africa (and indeed was previously legislated by apartheid), first identified in the post-apartheid era in responses to the eruption of informal settlements adjacent to middle-class suburbs. Grant Saff’s (1994, 1998a) Cape Town research identified the presence of ‘deracialised’ (rather than desegregated) space in situations where there was an invasion of ‘[black]
informal settlements onto the boundaries of, or within, ‘White’ areas” (1998a:94-97). The space was considered deracialised because no cross-group social integration occurred and black residents (squatters) were refused access to the suburbs ‘White’ facilities (e.g. schools, health clinics), with White residents citing health concerns, fear of crime, property values and environmental degradation (rather than race) as the reasons for rejection. In contrast, desegregated space occurred in middle-class suburbs where there was “in-migration of blacks of an income status equal to or higher than those [Whites] moving out”, and where blacks were accepted into the suburb by Whites (Saff 1994:382). Similar discourses are identified by Richard Ballard’s study on White identity in Durban, where White middle-class residents have vehemently opposed the eruption of informal settlements on land adjacent to their properties, based on its impact on property values and safety, and also on residents’ “self-perception as western, modern, civilised people” (2004:49). Furthermore, David Simons’ analysis of South Africa’s urban future argues that processes of densification ultimately fail to facilitate residential integration and instead serve to institutionalise residential segregation, albeit based on class rather than race (2001:294-295); while Gustav Visser’s research on South African gentrification indicates that different classes displace one another rather than reside together in the post-apartheid city (2002). Thus it is evident that middle-class residential areas in urban South Africa are strongly opposed to the residential proximity of their poorer citizens.

However, the difference in Dainfern and in this research’s case-study is that the middle-class suburb is a gated community and thus barricaded away from any proximity of poverty. While middle-class suburbs traditionally oppose informal settlements because they are perceived as diluting the value of their ‘elite’ area, that is
likely to be less of a problem for those barricaded from poorer neighbours. Furthermore, the ‘poor’ area in this case-study is a formal settlement, officially awarded low-cost housing, and thus not an illegal invasion that wealthier residents can object to. Despite significant research on the hostile reaction of middle-class suburbs to the arrival of squatters in urban South Africa (e.g. Ballard 2004; Dixon 1997; Saff 1994, 1998a, 2001), there is less consideration of the relationship between gated communities (rather than middle-class suburbs *per se*) and adjacent informal settlements (e.g. Bénit 2002) and virtually nothing on the relationship between gated communities and adjacent *formal* (albeit predominantly poor and black) low-cost housing areas, largely because such a phenomenon is still relatively rare. This research is therefore relatively ground-breaking in addressing this trend, though it draws on the large body of literature addressing similar contexts, as demonstrated above.

Although the phenomena of locating low-cost housing adjacent to a wealthy suburb and/or gated community is still relatively rare in South Africa, given the government’s new housing strategy, results here could serve as an example for elsewhere. In September 2004 the new housing strategy unveiled by the national Housing Department revealed that the pace of housing delivery would be increased by locating low-cost housing in wealthy areas in order to integrate rich and poor communities (Boyle and Philp 2004), though homeowners were assured that the utter extremes of wealth would not be mixed (*Mail and Guardian* 2004). Thus there is an obvious need to consider the implications of locating low-cost housing next to wealthy housing (which in South Africa increasingly means ‘gated’ housing), for which the Westlake development provides a rare example. Although perceived as radical, this new policy has long been advocated by urban activists and researchers
(e.g. Turok 2001; Simon 2001). Indeed, it is an issue that the Dainfern gated community will soon face as permission has finally been granted, despite significant protests from local residents, to construct ‘Cosmo City’, comprising 15,000 medium and low-cost housing units (as well as commercial and industrial zones) just west of Dainfern (Abraham 2004). Although this will remove Zevenfontein informal settlement from Dainfern’s immediate borders (Zevenfontein residents will receive priority housing in Cosmo City), it will now place Dainfern permanently close to a low-income (albeit formal) housing area, whereas Zevenfontein was perceived only a temporary blight to Dainfern’s utopia.

A question raised by Salcedo and Torres (2004) considers whether it is preferable for wealthy and poor residents of the same city to be close but separated by walls or in distant but non-gated spaces? In this context gated communities could be perceived as playing a positive role in reducing urban segregation at the macro-level by facilitating the spatial proximity of poor and wealthy. However, this does not necessarily translate into desegregation at the micro-level of social integration between those living in neighbouring suburbs, as explored by this research. Given that South Africa’s post-apartheid urban planning has favoured compact city designs, using the city’s empty spaces rather than expanding city edges (Bremner 2000a), the consequences have been an emphasis on macro-level desegregation that is likely to fuel increased ‘gating’, for example by situating low-cost housing in already-established (and therefore relatively wealthy) residential areas rather than on the city periphery. For low-cost housing residents such strategies offer the advantages of being located in greater proximity to economic opportunities and social facilities, something which is crucial in overcoming the dominance of apartheid’s spatial legacy of dormitory township living, especially evident in Cape Town (Turok 2001).
However, by focusing policy exclusively on preventing urban sprawl and spatial inequality at the city-level, the development of other urban phenomena (e.g. gated communities) that restrict micro-level desegregation and integration have been allowed to flourish. Whether such trends do in fact ultimately thwart the realisation of post-apartheid policy goals of desegregation and integration is addressed through this research.

**BACKGROUND TO WESTLAKE VILLAGE AND SILVERTREE ESTATE**

The Westlake master-plan development provides a particularly interesting case study for considering the linkages between a security village and its poorer neighbour because both residential areas are part of the same development, and also because it represents an example of the new government strategy to encourage mixed-use land development to meet socio-economic objectives (e.g. housing, integration). Furthermore, it has become a blueprint for future developments elsewhere, as indicated by the epigraph from Western Cape Premier, Ebrahim Rasool exalting Westlake as “a sign that we can work together to make our vision – a home for all – a lived reality for all” (Rasool 2004). The Westlake development, launched in March 1999, transformed the previously-neglected public land into a “model mini-town”, providing housing for a range of socio-economic groups (Blumenfeld 1999). In the mid-1990s developers won a tender to upgrade the area, conditional on cross-subsidising profits to provide low-cost housing for those currently ‘squatting’ on the land (supplemented by government housing subsidies). The development therefore comprises two housing areas: Westlake village, a state-assisted low-income housing area providing home-ownership for the 600+ families (a mix of Black African and
Coloured) already living there informally; and also Silvertree Estate, a luxurious security village with 24-hour surveillance. The development also includes non-residential land use with an exclusive private school (thus attracting high-income families to Silvertree), a business park, office park, retail centre (Steenberg lifestyle centre) and the (currently under construction) US Consulate office, as demonstrated by Figure 6.1.

![Figure 6.1: Aerial profile of Westlake development](image)

In late-1999 Westlake villagers moved from their previous informal shacks or formal rented structures, witnessing their destruction, into their new formal and self-owned

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118 The apartheid racial classifications of African, Coloured (mixed heritage), Indian (Asian descent) and White (European) are used. However, apartheid's 'African' label is updated to 'Black African' in recognition that the other groups are also African ('Black African' is also the term adopted by the 2001 census), and 'black' (lower case) is used to describe all non-Whites. The majority of Black Africans in Cape Town are of isiXhosa descent, and this is the meaning intended by use of 'Black African' unless otherwise specified.
houses. Westlake village houses are standard ‘Reconstruction and Development Program’ (RDP) one-bedroomed structures with piped water, electricity, and space on the plot to expand the house if desired. Houses in Westlake village are valued at between R40,000 and R60,000\textsuperscript{119} depending on the size and whether changes have been made. Figure 6.2 shows a typical street with semi-detached one-bedroomed houses in Westlake village.

Figure 6.2: Photograph of typical street in Westlake village
(taken by author, 11 March 2004)

At the same time, land was cleared for the Silvertree Estate, and the first owners/developers began building houses in late-2000, though occupation did not commence until 2002 (with a December 2004 deadline for completing houses). Houses in Silvertree are lavish and modern, with open plan layouts, grand entrance lobbies and/or entertainment areas, 3+ en-suite bedrooms, swimming pools and spacious gardens (CEI 2003a), as shown by Figure 6.3, and sell for between R3 to 5

\textsuperscript{119} Approximately £3,500 - £5,400 UK sterling at November 2004 exchange rates.
A security pass is necessary to enter Silvertree as access is restricted by an electrified gatehouse operated 24-hours-a-day by security guards. Visitors report to this gatehouse and upon informing the security guard of whom they intend to visit, the Silvertree resident is telephoned to confirm the visitor's credentials. In addition, visitors sign an 'entrance sheet' confirming their personal details. Silvertree is therefore a space reserved exclusively for residents and their appointed visitors, with no possibility of uninvited persons straying into their "private citadel" (Marcuse 1997b).

This "privatopia" (McKenzie 1994) is further facilitated by the developments limited access points. There are three entrance/exits: one on the west giving access to Steenberg Lifestyle Centre, Reddam House School (via a security checkpoint), the

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120 Approximately £260,000 - £450,000 UK sterling at November 2004 exchange rates.
US consulate, and pedestrian access to Silvertree; the second, on the south giving access to Silvertree and the office park (via security checkpoints); and thirdly, on the east giving access to the business park and Westlake village (see Figure 6.1). None of these three access points meet, and in a fashion reminiscent of apartheid township planning, Westlake village has only one access point, which involves passing through the business park (see Figure 6.1). In other words, Westlake village and Silvertree residents have no shared access despite their proximity, and Westlake village residents have no access to other parts of the development (other than the business park), without first exiting, travelling along a major road, and re-entering the development elsewhere. The exclusionary intentions of this design are confirmed by the epigraph representing an interview with the developers:

> It is a very unique land use geography. It works because there are separate components although in geographical proximity. This country will never have rich and poor mixing. The trick to this development is there are three separate entrances that don’t link. It was intentional from a land-use point of view and traffic. If they linked, one or more entrances would have dominated, causing traffic blocks. Traffic required it, but it is also a land-issue ... Because of the crime in this country, security estates have become very popular: single entry, electrified walls – a residents-only environment ... It was designed to be four separate stand-alone sections [Westlake village, Silvertree, business and office park, and retail] [C.G.15/04/04]^{121}

Indeed, Westlake development is a very diverse mix, as recognised by a Silvertree resident.

> You’ve got some of the most expensive houses and school, a squatter area, a prison – if you looked from above, from a helicopter it shouldn’t have happened [G.K.28/04/04]

Despite its oddity, the Westlake development has been an enormous commercial success; with a significant rise in property prices in Silvertree and nearby areas (Rode 2000a), as well as the overwhelming popularity of the retail sector (leading to

^{121} In order to protect the identity of interviewees their names are initialled, alongside the date of the interview.
expansion in 2004-2005), office and business space. In terms of social success, the developers have received two prestigious awards in recognition of their housing contribution: the ‘Green Spiral Award’ from the SA Property Owners’ Association (Sapao) for the upliftment of society (Business Day 2003); and the ‘FIABCI Rene Frank Habitat Award’ for improving the quality of life for those living in squatter settlements (Weekend Argus 2004b).

According to the 2001 census, Westlake village comprises 2,596 residents, just over half (57%) of whom are Black African, and just under half (42%) are Coloured, in addition to a handful of Indian and White residents (Ngetu 2003). However, the population has grown significantly since 2001, and a recent census conducted by a local NGO indicates a total population of 3,359 (Dawes 2005), with anecdotal evidence suggesting ‘newcomers’ are predominantly Black African. In contrast, Silvertree is predominantly (but not exclusively) populated by White families, with a handful of Black African and Coloured families, as well as some foreign families.122 Silvertree residents are predominantly young families with children attending Reddam House School, and thus the security village is largely empty during the day (with both parents working, and children at school).123 In contrast, Westlake village has a more even spread of ages, with no age-group dominating the research sample, and severe unemployment124 ensures the village is a hive of activity during the day.

122 The census 2001 is inadequate for analysing Silvertree’s current population because the majority of residents had not moved into their houses at that stage. However, my research estimates a population of 600, of which approximately 95% are White (though perhaps only 90% South African White).
123 The majority of Silvertree respondents were aged 31-40 (62% of respondents), with only a handful over 60 (7%).
124 According to the 2001 census, 37% of Westlake village adults are unemployed (Ngetu 2003:13), which is confirmed by this research’s findings that 39% of respondents (19 out of 49) are unemployed.
ATTITUDES TOWARDS AND PERCEPTIONS OF EACH OTHER

The first level of Silvertree-Westlake linkages considered are the perceptions demonstrated by residents of each neighbourhood towards the other. According to these perceptions, Silvertree is dominant in the area, with Westlake residents feeling rejected by their new neighbours, and in fact, neither suburb feels as though they are ‘neighbours’ with the other.

Westlake village feels unwanted by its ‘superior’ neighbour

Despite Westlake villagers relatively long origins in the area (the informal settlement originated in 1991,\(^{125}\) and the village was finalised in 1999, compared to Silvertree’s 2002 occupation), Westlakers feel ‘unwanted’ in the very area that for many has been ‘home’ for a decade or more. Although the development formalised their previously precarious informal status, it has eroded rather than strengthened residents sense of belonging to the area.

They only gave us houses here because they had to, so they could get the money from this land. [W.C. 11/02/04]

This is a rich mans land ... they regret putting the people here because they can’t get us off the land now, though they want to, because government law says we can be here. [C.L. 01/02/04]

Although these negative feelings are directed at the development as a whole rather than Silvertree residents in particular, these perceptions are rooted in a feeling that Westlake village is considered lesser \textit{in comparison} with its wealthy and more powerful neighbours, and thus antipathy is partly directed towards Silvertree. These perceptions of being unwanted are caused by three major spaces of exclusivity in the

\(^{125}\) 22 out of 49 interviewees in Westlake village claimed to have been resident in Westlake for ten years or more, and 34 out of 49 claimed they had lived in Westlake for at least six years.
spatial design of the master-plan development: firstly, the fact that Westlake is hidden within the development, with few people even aware of its existence.

Did you find my house okay? [Yes, I looked it up on a map]. Really? Someone told me that this place isn’t on the map. It is very isolated here. We’re cut off from things [B.T. 28/01/04]

Some people, when I say I’m from Westlake they say “where is that?” They don’t know that we exist [V.M.14/04/04]

If you come here [to the business park] you would never think that lots of people stay just further down there. But we have to pass through this area in order to get out of Westlake [V.M. 04/02/04]

While Silvertree has become a sought-after address, with property values far exceeding original hopes, Westlake village has become the forgotten part of the development, and is barely visible even from within the development, let alone from surrounding roads and neighbourhoods. Although such anonymity (and hence safety from unwanted interest and persecution) would perhaps have been desirable under apartheid, in the post-apartheid era of democracy and freedom, such inequality is no longer tolerated. In fact, this ‘invisibility’ was intended by the original master-plan design, indicating that such an inequitable and apartheid-esque approach is still considered acceptable by both developers and the city town planners, as shown by Figure 6.4.
As the above (Figure 6.4) extract from the developers’ concept note (approved by the city council) demonstrates, there was always the intention that Silvertree residents (on the left-hand side) would be unable to view the “social housing” (Westlake village, on the right-hand side). However, the division between the two residential areas was not created in such an aesthetically-pleasing or natural fashion. Instead of using trees and landscaping as a division, Reddam House school\textsuperscript{126} serves as a buffer (see Figure 6.1), in addition to a high concrete electrified wall surrounding the school and Silvertree. This ultimately serves to exclude Westlake village from this secure zone, indicating that the development was designed to discourage contact between these neighbouring suburbs.

\textsuperscript{126} Reddam House school was not part of the Westlake master-plan design at the time of this concept note. The school requested entry to the development at a later stage. Once the land was re-zoned it served as a useful buffer-strip, as well as attracting more high-income families to Silvertree.
These **high walls and electric fences** comprise the second space of exclusivity caused by the spatial design and identified by Westlake villagers as contributing to their feelings of rejection within their residential area.

They build high walls like Jericho. They don’t want to see us. [E.T. 11/03/04]

They built a wall between us here ... and Reddam School ... the segregation is like the old days. Not to be race-ical [sic.], but why put a wall between us different groups? That is not development. [P.B. 14/04/04]

There is a large body of empirical literature addressing the role of walls in facilitating exclusion and rejection for those ‘outside’ the privileged space (e.g. Caldeira 1999:115; Massey and Denton 1993:iix), but suffice it to comment that Westlake villagers’ **emotional** perceptions that neighbours are rejecting them are confirmed by the **physical** presence of walls. In addition, these walls facilitate the third space of exclusivity created by the spatial design: Westlake villagers’ **limited access** in and out of their suburb, and in particular the lack of official access to Pick ‘n Pay supermarket (part of the development, housed in the Steenberg Lifestyle Centre). Despite its proximity to Westlake village, the land-planning design restricts access from Westlake village to the retail centre, forcing villagers to travel almost 3km to reach shops that lie less than 100m away (see Figure 6.1). Again, this indicates the inequality and apartheid-esque (e.g. single entrance/exit to townships) nature of this land-use design, albeit devised and approved well into the post-apartheid era of supposed equality and freedom for all. However, villagers have created their own access by forging a path (indicated by the dotted lines in Figure 6.1) through the wetlands and breaking a hole in the fence that separates Westlake village from the shops.

Although we now have a path to the Pick ‘n Pay, they want to close it and the owner there doesn’t want us to shop there. If there was another shop we would use it, but there isn’t [B.T. 28/01/04]
They don’t want us to go to those places. Like when we go to Pick ‘n Pay we had to cut the steel fencing because we were surrounded by fencing and its dirty and wet there - there is no bridge. And the manager at Pick n Pay says he doesn’t care whether there’s a bridge or not, whether we go there or not he doesn’t care [V.X. 14/04/04]

Clearly planners sought to encourage deracialised (rather than desegregated) space by discouraging Westlakers from using facilities that were to be the preserve of those from Silvertree. As noted earlier, deracialised space allows poor blacks to reside in ‘White’ spaces and thus dramatically alter the racial dynamics of space, but refuses them access to local ‘White’ facilities (e.g. schools, shops) thus leaving them socially and “functionally” segregated (Saff 1998a:102-104). Thus, the limited access of Westlake village to its most immediate ‘White’ facilities indicates a lack of desire by the planners (and city council) to encourage any meaningful desegregation.

The negative perceptions expressed by Westlake villagers, based on the three perceived spaces of exclusion: that Westlake village is hidden, surrounded by electric walls, and has limited access; are matched by Silvertree residents’ perceptions of superiority towards Westlake village and its inhabitants.

They [Westlake villagers] got formal houses and sold them for R30,000 – so now they’re all squatting again! It hasn’t really been an upgrade apart from the houses. There’s social decay … People from Westlake are not motivated. [G.K. 28/04/04]

Down there [in Westlake] there’s virtually no attempt to do a garden or make it nice. Within a year it will look like a shanty town. [A.J. 24/03/04]

Silvertree residents frequently described Westlake village to me as an “informal” or “squatter” area that is riddled with crime and unsafe to enter, as well as describing residents as “lazy” people who should be eternally grateful for their free houses, not complaining about lack of jobs or inadequate location. Whilst not directly rejecting Westlake villages’ right to exist in the area, such responses reveal an ignorance and negative perception of their neighbours as well as confirming their own perceptions
of superiority, thus implying almost a rejection of Westlake’s existence from a Silvertree perspective.

Although these spaces of exclusivity are based on the developments spatial design, they are exacerbated by negative perceptions of each other, and in fact are not surprising given that the developers positioned two spaces with different aims adjacent to one another. For while the developers sought to create in Silvertree an exclusive space (i.e. aiming to keep people out), in Westlake village they created a hidden space (i.e. aiming to limit awareness of its existence). Thus it is somewhat axiomatic that the two suburbs perceive themselves as two separate neighbourhoods rather than one development.

“Don’t feel like neighbours”

Having considered Westlake villagers’ perceptions of unwanted-ness, analysis now considers the attitudes of both suburbs in relation to each other as ‘neighbours’. Interestingly, different understandings of what being a ‘neighbour’ entails explains the absence of neighbourly relations.

When asked their opinion of Silvertree, Westlake villagers repeatedly commented very emotively that they do not feel like neighbours with their adjacent neighbourhood.

I have no contact with the people there [in Silvertree] ... I don’t feel like [they’re] my neighbours because I never met them [P.X.30/04/04]

The Silvertree people, their kids go to Reddam School. We don’t feel like neighbours. You’re not allowed to go in there unless you know somebody there. [A.T 11/02/04]

I don’t feel we’re neighbours – they’re the elite, we’re not. [T.F 07/04/04]
These feelings of non-neighbourly relations are based on criticisms that residents of Westlake village and Silvertree do not know each other (partly a consequence of restricted access to Silvertree) and have access to differing quality facilities, and thus their daily lives and movement patterns do not intersect despite residential proximity. Such limited social and spatial intersections are obviously a hindrance to connections between residents, especially in light of research elsewhere indicating that diverse groups are most likely to integrate if three criteria exist: firstly, a common livelihood (e.g. professionals or manual labourers); secondly, sharing neighbourhood resources (e.g. schools); and thirdly, for both groups to perceive benefits from relationships (Bakewell 2002).127 Of these three factors, the first two are clearly not evident in the Silvertree-Westlake interface, for while Silvertree is predominantly composed of professionals whose children attend private Reddam House school, Westlake villagers are either unemployed or manual labourers, sending their children to nearby government schools (Lemanski 2004b).

This non-neighbourly feeling is equally expressed by Silvertree residents, though in less emotive language. Rather than expressing that they “don’t feel like neighbours”, Silvertree residents demonstrate sufficient lack of interest (e.g. believing Westlake village is an informal squatter settlement) and lack of awareness (e.g. being unaware of its existence when purchasing in Silvertree) to demonstrate an absence of neighbourly feeling.

There’s so much wealth here right next to an informal settlement ... it’s totally informal ... I didn’t realise how close Westlake was to us when we bought. Only when we moved in [L.H. 22/04/04]

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127 Bakewell’s research analyses the factors that facilitate the “self-integration” of Angolan refugees into Zambian villages (rather than residing in refugee camps), based on stable friendships and significant social mixing.
You’ve got some of the most expensive houses and school, a squatter area, a prison [G.K. 28/04/04]

As far as we’re concerned they’re not even there [A.K. 28/04/04]

Most of the time I forget it’s there [vnK 05/05/04]

I wasn’t aware of them when we bought. We knew there were squatters but we didn’t know where they’d moved to [M.J. 06/05/04]

Such lack of interest in one’s immediate neighbours is not surprising given that adverts for Silvertree fail to mention Westlake village, and as demonstrated above, many residents were unaware of its existence when purchasing their home or plot. Silvertree has always been marketed as part of nearby Constantia (hosting some of Cape Town’s most sought after residences) rather than Westlake. Thus, the ‘indifference’ shown by Silvertree residents towards Westlake village is understandable, and in fact is a common response to proximity with difference (Blokland 2003:19).

One explanation for this lack of neighbourly relations could be the difference in what being ‘neighbours’ means to a Silvertree resident and what it means to a Westlake villager. In Westlake village, neighbours are constantly in and out of one another’s houses, front doors are permanently open, children play together in the streets, with many households obviously reliant on one another for social and economic support.

The people I’m closest to is my neighbours, like if I go away the neighbours will look after my house [A.T. 11/02/04]

I like it here because you always have friends. If you’re hungry you can go to your neighbour and eat there. You’ll never be lonely in Westlake, but in Kenilworth where I used to stay [a former ‘White’ suburb] everyone is busy minding their own business, you never talk to people [B.T. 01/02/04]

Indeed, in the five months of conducting research, residents extended friendship towards me, and as I walked the streets I would greet and be greeted. In contrast, ‘being neighbours’ within Silvertree involves respecting each other’s privacy,
restricting noise levels and offering a polite greeting in the street when passing one another. Front doors are locked, houses have walls surrounding them, and apart from children walking to and from school I rarely saw people on the streets (other than walking to and from cars). 128

We socialise outside [of Silvertree] almost exclusively ... I think everyone [in Silvertree] is pretty much private because it’s still new and we’ve got high walls. People don’t want to disturb the neighbours; people pretty much keep themselves to themselves. [L.M. 16/04/04]

Most [of our] socialising is [with] old established friends, not in Silvertree. We have acquaintances in Silvertree – chatting over the fence ... We don’t live in each others’ houses because we live in such proximity we don’t socialise much. [GdK 03/05/04]

I’ve never been into anybody’s house here. It’s just that we come and go often that there’s not much time ... I think people here have their own social circles [G.M. 05/05/04]

In the context of these differing styles of ‘being neighbours’ it would appear that Silvertree residents are responding to Westlake village in the passive style that they associate with neighbourly relations; that of quiet lack of interest. In contrast, Westlake villagers are seeking the more active form of neighbourly relations that they experience everyday in their immediate surroundings. Thus any interface is destined to encounter significant cultural differences. This ‘indifference’ based on different cultural norms is also linked to different socio-economics, as well as the prominence of non-local networks for those in Silvertree. Indeed, ‘indifference’ between neighbours in middle-class suburbs has been identified as most prevalent amongst residents with strong social networks and responsibilities outside the neighbourhood (Blokland 2003). And elsewhere, a key foundation of the British governments ‘neighbourhood renewal’ strategy is that a sense of belonging to, participating in, and

128 Although an exception to this limited neighbourhood socialising is facilitated by Reddam House, as many parents of children at the school socialise with other Silvertree residents because their children are in the same class; in general Silvertree exhibits quiet and privacy, with most socialising occurring outside the neighbourhood.
socialising within ones’ neighbourhood is most prevalent in deprived areas, while those in affluent areas rely on non-local amenities and social networks (Parkes et al 2002:2413). This is linked to Tönnies’ theory that friendship and neighbourhood are of prime importance to the lower classes ("common people"), whereas the upper classes ("the educated") are more likely to distance themselves from their neighbours and peers, instead relying on family and non-local contacts and "interest groups" (1887:193). This is clearly evident in Silvertree-Westlake, where the former has limited internal mixing compared to the internal vibrancy of the latter. The consequence of this for linkages between the two neighbourhoods is stalemate – for those with the socio-economic and spatial resources to initiate contact (i.e. Silvertree) prefer to lead their daily lives outside of the residential zone, while those desiring linkages (i.e. Westlake village) have limited resources to initiate this.

NATURE OF CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER

Having identified mutually negative perceptions between Silvertree and Westlake, analysis now considers the nature of any contact between residents of the two neighbouring areas. Although this is expected to be severely restricted by the spatial design and security measures, in fact there are pockets of contact.

One-sided visits and handouts

Any spaces of contact between Silvertree and Westlake village are obviously likely to be one-sided, invariably initiated by Silvertree, if at all. Although the vast majority of Westlake villagers have never visited Silvertree due to the restricted access, Silvertree
residents are free to visit their neighbours. Approximately half of my Silvertree sample had never visited Westlake village despite its proximity.

[I’ve] never been down there. I wouldn’t. I’m not snob, but there’s no reason to go there. [vnK 05/05/04]

Of those Silvertree residents that had visited Westlake village, varying reasons and experiences were registered. Some visited just to browse, others to look for staff, and others in order to register to vote in the 2004 Presidential elections.

[Before we moved here] we first drove around Westlake village to see how it is and what has been done. I want to see the Westlake houses – out of sight out of mind is ridiculous ... So I said we’d get a maid from the village. My kids can have friends there, though they can’t go to school together. [Do your children have friends in Westlake?] My children don’t know anyone at Westlake, but they come in the car with me and Caroline’s [my maid] children come up here to play. They get on fine and play together. [M. J-P 09/03/04]

[Did you go to Westlake to vote?] [Yes, but that was] not the first time [I was] in Westlake, [the] first time was to register, but I don’t know anyone there so wouldn’t visit ... People tend to think if you live near black people it will be bad. But it’s not like that in Westlake ... I have never heard of crime or anything ... it’s not that sort of place. [L.M. 16/04/04]

[Do you have any links with Westlake village?] No. The only contact was to vote and I refused to register there. When we drove into Westlake they told us it was in the business park but then we ended up in the taxis and funny men looking at us and I didn’t feel safe so we just left ...we had the children and I was scared. It’s like chalk and cheese. [M.J. 06/05/04]

There is clearly a divergence in opinion regarding the safety of the area amongst Silvertree residents. Although many of Silvertree residents have paid a visit to Westlake, Westlake villagers are unable to return this, and thus this potential space of contact is very one-sided. Despite Silvertree residents’ reticence in visiting Westlake, most agree that “someone ought to be doing something down there”

I invited people from the Westlake Trust to talk to us [at the Silvertree homeowners association] ... I was embarrassed at that meeting because the [Silvertree] men all sat there and said nothing when he was making his plea. This is an informal settlement that affects all of us, whether good or bad, it’s on our doorstep. I don’t really know what happened since [but] I really do think
that we should get involved [in Westlake] ... [Do you have any involvement in Westlake?] No. But I'm so new here [been here 9 months], also I travel a lot ... it's very difficult to get involved when you're away so much. [L.H. 22/04/04]

I think everyone would like to see more discipline in Westlake. Especially the shebeens, that is not part of a residential area. [G.K. 28/04/04]

I'd like to help my neighbours – but it's not safe to enter the area. [GdK 03/05/04]

Such discourses encourage a one-way relationship, with Silvertree residents 'helping' Westlake villagers to become 'better' (i.e. more like 'us', and therefore more acceptable to Silvertree). This not only fails to view Westlake villagers as equals, but also involves no reciprocity as Silvertree do not seek help in return. This attitude is clearly summarised by a resident of an adjacent gated community.

I feel that [White] people have distanced themselves more. The attitude [of Whites] has definitely changed – we are the great saviours, we hand out to you but don't come into my territory. [D.L.23/04/04]

**Employment and NGOs: of mutual benefit?**

Despite limited contact between Silvertree and Westlake residents, there are spaces of connection between the two suburbs, manifest in two forms: firstly, employment, and secondly, through the local NGOs that work in the area. Although Westlake villagers perceive that their neighbours do not employ from the village;

We have no interaction with our neighbours. Only a few people here work at Westlake Business Park, but they're outsiders. They don't want Westlake people to work there because they think we will steal [W.C. 11/03/04]

in fact, a number of Silvertree residents and businesses in the Westlake business park do employ Westlake villagers. Of those businesses and factories in the Westlake park that are accessible to all (i.e. not those enclosed with access restricted by security check-points), and likely to employ unskilled and semi-skilled workers (i.e. not those in the office space), over half employ staff from Westlake village (nine of the
seventeen accessible and employable businesses). However, of the nine businesses that do employ from Westlake village, only six had actively sought local staff, rather than bringing staff with them who subsequently moved into Westlake village in order to be close to work. Of the five businesses that don't employ Westlake villagers (and that agreed to participate in this research), the two main reasons cited for this were firstly that as a small company they needed few workers, and secondly that original staff had remained when businesses relocated to Westlake. It is worth noting that reasons for not employing Westlakers were not based on negative perceptions of villagers (as perceived by Westlake villagers themselves), but on a lack of need for staff. In addition, a handful of Silvertree residents hire Westlake villagers as labourers or domestic staff. Although this does provide spaces of connection between Westlake village and their neighbours (both the business park and Silvertree Estate) the number of Westlake villagers affected by these connections is very small (as most Silvertree residents brought domestic staff with them from elsewhere), and such connections are also very one-sided, with Westlakers the subordinate.

[Silvertree resident] The only link [between Silvertree and Westlake village] could be master-servant relationships [G.M. 05/05/04]

The second space of Silvertree-Westlake connection is facilitated by the two most prominent NGOs working in Westlake. The ‘Westlake United Church Trust’ (WUCT) is a non-profit organisation established in 2002 by various local churches from the surrounding areas, many of which had already been working in Westlake several years before the development. Although it does not have representation from Silvertree specifically, its members are from other neighbouring non-gated suburbs.

129 These figures are based on telephone interviews with managers in the Westlake business area in May 2004. However, only 14 of the 17 accessible and employable businesses agreed to speak to me, the other three refused to answer my questions and are thus assumed as not having staff from Westlake village.
In addition, the ‘Westlake Neighbourhood Trust’ (WENT) operates as a public-benefit organisation. It was established in 2002 and initiated by a Reddam House School staff member in conjunction with representatives from the American Consulate (who are no longer involved), the Rotary Club in an adjacent non-gated suburb, a resident of the adjacent ‘Steenberg golf estate’, and since early-2004 the trust has also had a Silvertree Estate resident on its board. WENT was established in order to fulfil a clause in Reddam House’s land re-zoning acceptance stating:

The applicant [i.e. Reddam House School] shall undertake an outreach programme (as part of the social upliftment scheme already in place) for the social housing residents [i.e. Westlake village] which shall be to the approval of the Executive Director: Urban and Environmental Services of the SPM. [Document approving the establishment of Reddam School – shown to the author by the City of Cape Town Town-planning Department, 06/05/04]

Although Reddam House was forced to establish outreach to Westlake village, WENT’s vision is far wider, encouraging all ‘neighbours’ of Westlake to support the village, as revealed by the locally-representative nature of its board. Such an attitude encourages linkages between Westlake village and its immediate neighbours, although connections have again suffered from one-sidedness. Although to be expected in the implementation stage, amongst both WUCT and WENT this one-sidedness is also evident in the conceptualisation of ‘helping’ Westlake village rather than working together to improve the area (i.e. Westlake village and Silvertree) as a whole. WUCT operates from a base in the village and runs various community programmes such as a day-care centre, AIDS support group and vegetable garden (in conjunction with WENT). Although WENT’s original ventures into Westlake village were purely liberal handouts that failed due to their naïvety (as subsequently recognised by WENT), it now operates as a bridging organisation, willing to unite Westlake village’s needs with its neighbours resources [S.F. 06/05/04].
The impact of these NGOs on Westlake villagers obviously depends on the individual as some are more involved in such externally-organised activities than others. Historically however, there has been a general antipathy between Westlake villagers and WUCT, and a lack of awareness of WENT. Much of this stems from a feeling that as ‘outsiders’ they have no ‘right’ to function in Westlake. However, towards the end of 2004 such feelings began to change as Westlake village established its own forum (two members of which also work for WUCT) and thus felt sufficiently secure to liaise with WENT and WUCT as a formal body. Indeed, the Westlake forum now attends all WENT meetings (though the favour is not returned) and some level of working relationship with both WENT and WUCT has been established.

Although WUCT does employ two local residents to operate its community office, its board is entirely composed of non-Westlake residents with top-down decisions requiring no input from Westlake villagers. For example, only one of the nine churches comprising its foundation is Westlake-based (despite at least four active churches in the village), WUCT meetings have no participation from Westlake residents, and WUCT staff are accused of “talking down” and being “patronising” towards Westlake residents both in their language and attitude (A.T. 11/02/04; S.D. 18/10/04). In contrast, WENT’s approach is admirable in encouraging neighbourhood involvement, yet despite being a ‘neighbour-based’ group, there is no resident of Westlake village on WENT’s board. That is not to imply Westlake villagers as the innocent and Silvertree, WUCT and WENT as the tyrant, for the attitudes of Westlake villagers also encourage this hand-out mentality as they are reticent to initiate connections or work together to benefit the area as a whole. Although this desire for Silvertree-Westlake connections to be based on ‘working together’ sounds very naïve and idealistic, this does not have be based on altruism,
and is more likely to succeed if based on mutual benefit rather than one-sided (or dual-sided) philanthropy. This ‘mutual benefit’ is confirmed by the third factor that Bakewell identified as facilitating integration between diverse groups, as discussed earlier. While employment-based connections do provide mutual benefit to the employed and employee, the employer is obviously in a position of greater power and few Westlake villagers are affected by this, although such spaces of connection are a good starting point towards Bakewell’s ‘mutual benefit’ criteria. In contrast, WUCT and WENT provide spaces of connection that affect far more people in Westlake, but are not based on mutual benefit. Or are they?

While this may seem a somewhat perverse form of mutual benefit, WENT’s strategy for encouraging Silvertree’s involvement did not focus on benevolence but sought to sell financial participation as a form of communal indemnity.

I went to the Silvertree body corporate ... we tried to sell it to them as social insurance: if you give now you’re less likely to have problems in the future. There were three ways to sell is: one, there’s gonna be a riot next door until you do something; two, buy a favour [to deter crime from people in WL]; and three, because you genuinely want to help [and I went for the former two] [S.F.06/05/04]

In other words, there is a mutual benefit in WENT’s spaces of connection in that Westlake villagers receive some form of social upliftment and Silvertree residents are not concerned that their neighbours are lowering the standard of the area and thus affecting crime and property prices. These Silvertree-Westlake connections therefore meet Bakewell’s criteria of ‘mutual benefit’ but although they involve improving the area as a whole, they are not spaces in which Westlake villagers meet on an equal footing with their wealthier neighbours in order to jointly improve the area. Such symbiotism would require a habitat system whereby both neighbourhoods contribute to each others’ existence, which is clearly the most long-term and sustainable method
for developing relationships between such different communities. Although WENT have admirably avoided acting as the self-appointed spokesperson of Westlake village (instead they speak only for WENT), the trust is hindered by its lack of Westlake participation, for example, there is no Westlake villager on WENT’s board. Furthermore, although WENT’s recent (late-2004) invitation for the ‘Westlake Development Forum’ chairperson to list the needs of Westlake village at one of their meetings is laudable and certainly preferable to WENT “guessing” the communities needs (as was the case prior to the existence of a unified Westlake forum, M. J-P 04/12/04); it is not to be conflated with real neighbourhood participation. By this I mean, all local communities working together to improve the area as a whole (which would necessitate representatives of all communities on WENTs board, i.e. Westlake village), rather than some community representatives seeking to ‘help’ a poorer group, with the implicit assumption that poverty is a problem and wealth is a solution (whereas as Ballard’s (2004:56) research has shown that wealth is also a problem in such contexts). Although it is recognised that selecting an individual to represent Westlake village on WENT’s board would be difficult in terms of offending other groups within Westlake village, and also that working through Westlake village’s local organisations has been hindered by the prior absence of a unified community voice (Lemanski 2004b), WENT’s failure to meet Westlake villagers on an equal footing (e.g. represented on their board) hampers the potentially symbiotic spaces of connection that they provide.

**Impact of racism**

While earlier analysis mentioned the impact of cultural and socio-economic difference in hindering Silvertree-Westlake connections, given the history of South
Africa it is also important to note the impact of racial difference. While Silvertree is predominantly composed of the race considered superior under apartheid, and also the race that has benefited most from education and opportunity, Westlake village is almost entirely composed of Coloured and Black Africans who were considered inferior under apartheid and as a consequence have suffered from a historic lack of education and opportunity. With this in mind it is not surprising that Whites who have experienced such conditioning in childhood find any notion of equal discussion with blacks virtually impossible. The consequence of this for connections is firstly that most Silvertree residents been brought up ‘knowing’ their superiority over Westlake-type people and this is sufficiently engrained that modern connections are affected despite efforts to avoid this; and secondly that any direct Silvertree-Westlake connections would not be between people with equal education or cultural upbringing and thus misunderstandings are likely to arise.

Indeed, even Black Africans residing in Silvertree, who therefore share similar socio-economic and educational background to their White Silvertree counterparts have encountered misunderstandings.

[Have you faced race problems in Silvertree?] People stare, they wonder how can you afford to be here? We have a joke that the Whites think if you’re black and have a nice house you must sell drugs. But mostly people are very friendly and they greet, but still stare, like you’re in the zoo or something. We have no problems with our friends here – in fact, we have no problems at all, the staring is not nasty [L.M. 16/04/04]

Interestingly though, race also opens another Silvertree-Westlake space of connection as this same Black African Silvertree resident\(^\text{130}\) daily greets black

\(^{130}\) This family were the only Black African family living in Silvertree at this time of this research. Although two other Black African families had purchased plots, they had not yet finished building their houses and were thus not resident in Silvertree at that time.
workers that she passes in Silvertree (although very few are likely to be Westlake villagers).

With everyone walking in [to Silvertree, for work], you [me, a White person] can ignore them, but I [a black person] must greet every black person that I pass walking out of here, and so does my daughter. It’s part of our culture. I must greet ... The people come to me when they lose their jobs because they’re no longer needed. Greeting everyday you kind of feel you know each other by the end. [L.M. 16/04/04]

Thus, although race is expected to compound Silvertree-Westlake connections because of cultural differences, in the space of cultural affinity it has allowed a small connection to flourish.

CONCLUSION

The Silvertree-Westlake interface is complex in that it hosts both spaces of exclusivity and connection. The former are manifest spatially in terms of the hidden and inaccessible design of Westlake village in comparison to the visibility and desirability of Silvertree, resulting in Westlake villagers feeling excluded and rejected from the benefits of the much-heralded Westlake development. Furthermore, the walls and inaccessibility of Silvertree produce a space of exclusivity, not just for those in Westlake village, but felt most keenly by them, partly due to their proximity, but also because the high walls erected are a constant reminder of their rejection. Neither Westlake village nor Silvertree residents demonstrate any ‘neighbourly’ feelings towards the other, and although the former indicate a desire for some level of interface, the latter exhibit attitudes of ‘indifference’ and negativity towards their neighbouring village and its inhabitants, perceived as inferior. All these spaces of exclusion are in some part a consequence of the spatial design of the development.
that juxtapositions areas that are focused on exclusivity (e.g. Silvertree, Reddam House) with a housing area that will struggle to survive without local interaction. While it is easy to criticise the spatial design for creating such an Silvertree-Westlake impasse, the depth of social indifference and negativity demonstrated by the former towards the latter suggests that even with a more inclusive spatial design, interactions would have been limited. However, evidence from gated communities adjacent to poor settlements in Chile indicate that both functional integration and positive images of one another are possible (Salcedo and Torres 2004), and thus future mixed land-use developments incorporating low and high income housing in South Africa should be encouraged to design more inclusive spaces.

Despite this exclusive spatial design, small spaces of connection have managed to occur, for example through the marketplace, with a handful of Westlake villagers employed in Silvertree or in the Westlake business park, thus creating functional integration between the two. However, this connection not only affects very few in either Westlake or Silvertree, but is also not symbiotic because neither area provides something necessary for the other’s continued existence, which as discussed earlier, seems the most sustainable method of ensuring long-term integration. Symbiotic functional integration should therefore be a set objective in future mixed-income developments. Methods for achieving this could range from requiring a joint homeowners body for both areas, ensuring opportunities for functional integration (e.g. employment), and encouraging mutual awareness and acceptance prior to moving into such an area.

No friendships exist between Silvertree and Westlake village residents and the spatial inaccessibility of Silvertree renders visiting a one-sided experience, and thus a
potential space of connection is diluted by its lack of reciprocity. Silvertree’s perception of Westlake village as a ‘problem’ requiring solutions offers a very one-dimensional understanding of inequality in the Westlake development, with Silvertree blaming Westlake villager’s poverty for their problems, yet failing to consider their relative wealth as an equal part of the problem. This was also identified by Ballard in Durban where he noticed that White residents problematised only the poverty of squatters, perceiving their relative affluence as “normative and unproblematic” (2004:56). This also hinders the spaces of connection created by WENT, though their aim to encourage Westlake’s neighbours to get involved is noble.

Unlike Salcedo and Torres’ (2004) experience in Chile, in the Westlake development it appears that spatial proximity has not eased social interaction between neighbours of differing socio-economics. Although the spatial design per se has been criticised for its role in hindering this, the fact that Silvertree is a gated community rather than an open middle-class suburb also plays a role. Indeed, the only reason Silvertree residents are willing to reside in proximity to a low-cost housing area is because the walls and gates create a perception of safety and exclusion from their undesirable neighbours.

The low-cost houses [were] not an issue because it [Silvertree] is gated ... I’m not surprised that such wealth is beside such poverty because it’s like east and west Berlin, there’s a wall ... if we take the walls down we can integrate, but then I wouldn’t want to live there. [A.K. 28/04/04]

Thus this research confirms the dominant academic perspective on gated communities as rejecting those outside as unsavoury even in a case in which this ‘difference’ exists less than 500m from the perimeter wall, is part of the same development, and facilitated the creation of Silvertree by demolishing their squatter camp in return for housing. Even with social conditions so conducive to some positive reciprocity.
virtually none exists, leading to dire predictions for urban society and space in the new era of mixed housing plans. Indeed, while such plans successfully alter the spatial dynamics of the apartheid city by mixing race in residential space and overcoming inherited spatial inequalities of the city, by erecting walls and creating exclusionary spatial designs, they serve only to replace spatial apartheid with social apartheid as different groups may live in spatial proximity but continue to operate in separate social and functional spheres.

The implications of this trend for South Africa’s wider socio-political context is severe as they legitimise segregation at a spatial, social and political level. Although such mixed-use developments facilitate desegregation at a city-wide spatial level, their reliance on gated communities and/or creating neighbouring communities with no common access or facilities inhibits the potential for social desegregation at the micro-level of individuals mixing. Unfortunately South Africa’s history further complicates the issue because such developments are not likely to attract the wealthier end of the market (still predominantly White) into proximity with the poorer end (still predominantly black) unless some level of separation (be it walls/gates or access) exists. Thus racial, social and economic (e.g. in the South African context proximity to a poor (non-White) areas lowers property values) segregation in South Africa’s contemporary cities has become more finely-grained rather than more unusual. However, rather than conclude with pessimistic predictions of a future society based on “inscribing a historical structure of privilege into [a] space” that legitimises exclusion (Hook and Vrdoljak 2002:217), the potential for future mixed-land developments to overcome such exclusions and promote integration is emphasised. That is not to blindly ignore the problems of exclusion raised throughout this paper, but rather to indicate that the gated community
considered here was not completely insular and that over time, relations between Silvertree and Westlake organisations did develop (and are still developing), thus allowing a more optimistic conclusion that a more inclusive approach is possible (while recognising and cautioning against the spaces of exclusion so easily created in this development). Indeed, David Simons' (2001) recommendation to implement multi-functional land-use developments in order to overcome the legacies of the past emphasises the need for such developments to be designed with the needs of social diversity in mind, for example requiring “innovation in terms of street layouts and the creation of diversity” (2001:297), clearly lacking in the Westlake development.

Therefore, two key recommendations are offered for future mixed land-use developments, now heavily promoted by the government: firstly, to ensure a more inclusive design for the housing development as a whole, for example, more accessibility between different land uses; and secondly, to strive towards creating symbiotic functional integration between residential zones of differing income, which in South Africa also means differing races.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:

DISCOURSES AND STRATEGIES OF ‘IMPROVING’ A MIXED-RACE AREA IN POST-APARTHEID URBAN SOUTH AFRICA:

IMPROVING THE STREETS OR REMOVING UNWELCOME RESIDENTS?
INTRODUCTION

‘Improving’ an environment or situation can mean something different to each person and institution involved, depending both on their role and the overall context. Although ‘improvement’ comprises a common aim of urban development strategies, the implementation of such abstract ideals does not necessarily bring ‘improvement’ to all stakeholders. Ideally, area-based ‘improvement’ strategies bring improvements both to the area and to all individuals in that area. It is this latter goal which appears problematic, with ‘improvement’ strategies facilitating the exclusion of certain individuals, leading to an ‘improvement’ that does not benefit all.

This research considers discourses of ‘improvement’ in a small-scale urban setting, using this to analyse the different meanings attributed to improvement, as well as their racial, social and economic implications. While area ‘improvement’ discourses explicitly focus on physical upgrades such as street clean-ups and building renovations, an (intended or unwitting) consequence is social upgrading, or rather the eradication of unwelcome behaviour and individuals. Thus, improving spaces can mean rejecting and excluding those deemed unacceptable. Furthermore, the creation of an ‘improved’ new space and the accompanying economic benefits (e.g. higher property values) ultimately restrict the type of resident, inhibiting the presence of groups such as the poor, tenants, and refugees. Such exclusivity resembles American ‘urban renewal’ strategies to promote commercial development in rundown areas irrespective of the impact on those displaced by the process (e.g. Abrams 1965; Jacobs 1961), as opposed to the UK ‘slum clearance’ focus on re-housing residents of run-down areas (e.g. Pooley 1985; Yelling 1986). While the final outcome of both

131 While recognising that tenants can be high-income, the Anglo-Saxon model of property ownership is dominant in South Africa, and thus the vast majority of tenants (particularly long-term tenants) are low-income residents.
approaches is similar (i.e. urban regeneration) the processes differ entirely, with the former focused on commercial development and the latter on social/human development. Whether the exclusivity of ‘improvement’ via the American model can be considered urban development is analysed by this research.

Analysis considers the impact of strategies to ‘improve’ an urban area in South Africa that has experienced rapid racial change in the past ten years, changing from an apartheid ‘White group area’ to a mixed-race suburb (including African refugees), alongside decades of physical degradation. Analysis is based on qualitative research conducted in Muizenberg, a Cape Town suburb, towards the end of 2004. The impact of neighbourhood-based strategies to ‘improve’ Muizenberg (including the creation of an ‘Improvement District’) on residents of the area is considered, in particular the way in which ‘improvements’ did not extend to all demographic groups. In addition, the implications of such an exclusive form of ‘improvement’ for the post-apartheid era of inclusion and integration, as well as for urban development in general are considered.

The paper proceeds by outlining the South African and case study context. Analysis considers the discourses of ‘improvement’ amongst Muizenberg’s long-term residents and Improvement District, followed by investigating the realities of physical and social improvement strategies, and exploring allegations that the Muizenberg Improvement District is anti-refugee and anti-tenant. The paper concludes by considering the implications of these improvement discourses and realities for the poor, for Muizenberg, for post-apartheid South Africa, and for the urban development concept.
SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

Since the demise of apartheid, South Africa’s cities have sought both development and integration. While apartheid’s urban manipulation ensured both the total separation of races and economic under-development of black areas, the post-apartheid era is striving to unite all areas and races to create a new developed South Africa. Despite some progress, apartheid’s socio-spatial structure of segregation and exclusion remains dominant (Beall et al. 2002), with many commentators arguing that South Africa’s cities are as divided now as under apartheid (e.g. Pieterse 2003a:1; Tomlinson et al. 2003:x; Turok 2001:2350; Watson 2003:55). While it is axiomatic that apartheid’s socio-spatial entrenchment would constrain post-apartheid integration, overcoming the inherited social and spatial structure of apartheid (and colonialism) is South Africa’s modern challenge.

Despite some desegregation in middle-class neighbourhoods, the “pace of racial integration remains slow largely because race and class continue to overlap” and because the ending of segregation policies does not mean poor blacks can afford to move into former ‘White’ areas (Seekings 2000:834). While the former is certainly true, the case study in this research does provide an example of poor blacks moving into a former White area, though this is not the dominant trend in South Africa. Instead, desegregation has been largely restricted to middle-class neighbourhoods, where newly-arrived blacks share the socio-economic credentials of their White neighbours (Saff 1994:382), thereby replacing race with class as the basis of

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132 The apartheid racial classifications of African, Coloured (mixed heritage), Indian (Asian descent) and White (European) are used throughout this paper. However, apartheid’s ‘African’ label is updated to ‘Black African’ in recognition that the other groups are also Africans (‘Black African’ is also the term adopted by the census in 2001), and ‘black’ (lower case) is used to describe all non-Whites. The majority of Black Africans in Cape Town are of isiXhosa descent, and this is the meaning intended by use of ‘Black African’ unless otherwise specified.
segregation. In contrast, the arrival of informal settlements (largely accommodating poor Black Africans) in close proximity to White suburbs provoked significant opposition from suburban (White and black) residents (e.g. Ballard 2004; Dixon 1997; Saff 1994, 1998a, 2001), thus indicating that South Africa’s middle-class suburbs are strongly opposed to the residential proximity of poorer citizens (particularly squatters) rather than desegregation per se.

This NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) attitude is common in South Africa (indeed it was previously legislated by apartheid), and has been channelled through various discourses opposing black ‘squatters’ in former White areas, focusing on fear of crime, legality of tenure, and ecological concerns. Although worthwhile reasons, further research indicates these ‘acceptable’ discourses as a code or “pretext” (Judd 1994) for a deeper racist fear of ‘other’ (Ballard 2004; Dixon 1997; Lemanski 2004a; Saff 2001). However, racism does not tell the whole story as such exclusions are also a consequence of capitalist property markets promoting exclusion through self-interest (e.g. maintaining property values, especially in affluent areas) and spatial hierarchy (e.g. wealthy areas as distinct from poor areas) (Saff f/c). Unusually, poor blacks in Muizenberg have successfully moved into formal structures (rather than informal settlements) within a former White area and therefore discourses address ‘improving’ the area rather than opposing squatters.

The Muizenberg context is also slightly unusual in hosting a large Black African immigrant population. Although not all immigrants in Muizenberg are necessarily refugees, and whilst recognising the politically charged nature of the title (Garbett 2004), the term ‘refugee’ is favoured throughout this paper in recognition of its common use amongst interviewees with reference to poor Black Africans who have
migrated to South Africa from other African countries. It has been well documented that refugees face significant opposition and hostility in South African communities (e.g. CASE 2003), based on perceptions that refugees increase crime, as well as steal wives and jobs from South Africans. Although this paper does not consider xenophobia per se, rather it focuses on the role of ‘improvement’ discourses and strategies in excluding specific people-groups (including refugees); this is likely to be both a cause and consequence of xenophobia.

Given the South African government’s emphasis on integrating both people and places in the post-apartheid city, for example the new housing strategy to locate low-cost housing in wealthy areas in order to integrate rich and poor communities (Boyle and Philp 2004), as well as pro-integration phrases such as ‘Rainbow Nation’ and the ‘New South Africa’ that are part of the “psyche and everyday language of citizens” (Battersby 2004a:151), there is an obvious need to consider the implications of locating rich and poor, black and White in close proximity, for which Muizenberg provides a rare example.

**BACKGROUND TO MUIZENBERG**

Muizenberg dates back more than a century and is a noisy and eccentric hub that attracts all sorts of people for long and short visits or residences, and is a haven for Cape Town’s working-class residents. Famed for its heritage as a premier seaside resort at the turn of the last century, Muizenberg is located at the southern edge of Cape Town’s ‘White’ southern suburbs, serving as the gateway into the beaches and tourist attractions of the Cape Peninsula, and itself a popular recreational area for lower-income groups.
Although Muizenberg had elements of racial mixing under apartheid (when a significant number of Coloured families resided there), it was essentially a ‘White’ group area, though it now hosts a wide range of social, economic and racial groups. Muizenberg is a large and diverse residential area, ranging from millionaires living on the mountainside; to White, Coloured and black middle-class families living in Marine State; and a mix of predominantly working-class White, Coloured and refugee families and individuals in ‘the village’, as demonstrated by Figure 7.1. This paper predominantly focuses on the ‘village’ as the site of ‘improvement’ campaigns.
The village area has severely declined over recent decades, with current deterioration perceived a consequence of the arrival of Cape Flats' gangsters\textsuperscript{133} and Black African

\textsuperscript{133} Whilst gangsterism has long been common in the Cape Flats residential areas (‘Coloured’ group areas) it has only recently spread into former ‘White’ suburbs. Whilst not the focus of this paper, for
refugees. As absentee landlords filled dilapidated buildings (former hotels from Muizenberg’s hey-day) with tenants, crime escalated, gangs started using the village as a base for drugs and other illegal activities, and scores of Black African refugees moved to the area, crammed into inadequate rooms. A 2002 study identified 16% of tenants in the village as refugees, predominantly from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola (Baumann 2002:3), though the Tenants Association indicate that refugees comprise at least 30% of Muizenberg’s tenants, alongside 60% Coloureds and 10% Whites [R.L. 04/11/04]. In contrast, the vast majority of Muizenberg’s homeowners are White (alongside a handful of Coloured homeowners) and these long-term residents have not welcomed the problems associated with Muizenberg’s newer residents:

In 2000 things were so bad in the village that whatever businesses were left were trying to get out. In July ... the Americans gang moved into 13 Frankfort Road: ... drug running, prostitution, burglaries, and muggings. A reign of terror began. We all felt extremely unsafe. Nobody walked around at night. At one point 20 shebeens were operating in the area. The police did nothing. It was firmly believed that they were working with the gangsters. In addition, some African refugees clustered in housing ... and were sometimes holding all-night parties, screaming vile abuse at anyone who objected to the noise. Nude washing of bodies in public was noted. There were stories of people living in crammed buildings defecating out of windows ... The people of Muizenberg village knew that anarchy and lawlessness was not around the corner. It had already arrived. (quoted in King 2003a)

From 2000 onwards Muizenberg began to change as the community fought to protect and ‘improve’ their neighbourhood; and the discourses, methods and implications of these improvements are the focus of this paper.

This paper stems from research undertaken in Muizenberg from September to December 2004. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with a broad

range of residents, seeking to understand everyday lives as well as attitudes and perceptions regarding life in Muizenberg. Several residents were interviewed more than once in order to gain a longer-term holistic view of Muizenberg life. In addition, time was spent chatting to residents and walking through the streets to ensure an adequate overview. Furthermore, a broad range of non-residents with an interest and activity in Muizenberg were interviewed, for example council officials, political representatives, local businessmen and school principals.

THE MUIZENBERG IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT (MIDS)

Improvement Districts (IDs) have become increasingly popular in post-apartheid South Africa in response to increased urban degradation, alleged police inadequacies, and the perceived failure of local government to provide adequate services, particularly in (former ‘White’) areas that previously benefited from apartheid’s (uneven) service distribution. IDs were legislated in South Africa by the 1997 City Improvement District Act (Fraser 2003a). Although the initial focus was exclusively on City Improvement Districts (i.e. commercial) rather than Municipal or Neighbourhood Improvement Districts (i.e. residential) (Fraser 2003b), legislation has subsequently been relaxed to allow Municipal and/or Community IDs. An Improvement District is a “geographic area in which property owners and/or tenants agree to pay for certain services which are supplementary to those supplied by local government, and which enhance the physical, economic and social environment of the area” (Cox 2000:2). Although IDs are perceived as beneficial to the area and its residents, benefits are not necessarily equally distributed to all residents, especially non-homeowners.
Improvement Districts originated in 1970s downtown America (Cox 2000:2), and have spawned a small body of literature (e.g. Hochleutner 2003; Hoyt 2004; Mitchell 2001), with the American term ‘Business Improvement Districts’ (BIDS) making the commercial focus more explicit than the ‘City Improvement District’ (CIDS) term favoured in South Africa. Although the constituency differs between BIDS/CIDS and NIDS/MIDS (‘neighbourhood’ and ‘municipal’ IDs) with the former focusing on clients and the latter on residents, there are clear similarities. Indeed, both use private methods to reduce crime and enhance security to provide safe and ‘improved’ public spaces exclusively for their users. This contradiction between using private methods in public spaces, as well as the exclusive focus of Improvement Districts is one of the key criticisms of their operation (Bénit et al 2005).

In November 2001, the Muizenberg Improvement District (MIDS) was officially established, comprising Cape Town’s second ID (West 2001a; Silverman 2005). MIDS’ agenda prioritises physical change (including security), with their unofficial motto of tackling “crime and grime” (Smith 2001a). The MIDS demarcated area encompasses 380 properties (N.V. 14/10/04), the levies from which employ security staff, street cleaners and a part-time manager.

**DISCOURSES OF ‘IMPROVEMENT’ IN MUIZENBERG**

Interviewees persistently used the term ‘improvement’ in reference to changes that they perceived had or had not yet occurred in Muizenberg, and the meanings ascribed by residents to such alleged (or desired) ‘improvements’ are explored. This section first addresses the uses and meanings of ‘improvement’ in the discourses of
Muizenberg’s long-term residents, before considering the official MIDS position on ‘improvement’.

Muizenberg residents: improvement as economic upgrading

As mentioned, comments regarding ‘improvements’ were common in interviews, with residents repeatedly remarking:

There has been a big improvement [B.B. 22/09/04]

It seems to be improving again [M.N. 23/09/04]

Even this area has improved [H.F. 21/10/04]

[When] we bought in Muizenberg ... it was a bit run down and we thought it would improve [N.V. 14/10/04]

Muizenberg village since 1996 has improved a lot [C.A. 01/12/04]

When discussing what such improvements entail there was a strong focus on economic advancement, in particular on improvement as synonymous with property purchases (residential and business) and an increase in property prices.

Muizenberg is in the throes of being revived again ... according to estate agents you can’t get property here ... those small places in the village are very popular [D.D. 06/10/04]

Now things are changing – coffee shops sprung up and now property had been bought up. You couldn’t get a buyer a year ago and now it’s all gone! [G.M. 07/10/04]

Now we’re in an upswing – people are buying up. [D.W. 14/10/04]

We realised [that] ... what we needed was big money and developers [K.S. 14/10/04]

Over the past two years there has been a significant difference ... if you walk through the village you see new businesses opening up [D.Q. 05/10/04]

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134 In order to protect the identity of interviewees their names are initialled, alongside the date of the interview.
Thus improvement for residents is equated with economic prosperity. While there is nothing wrong with this *per se*, given the low economic mobility of many village residents, such economic advancement could be expected to either exclude them, or at the very least unwittingly leave them behind. Although residents’ perceptions of improvement did not refer to the desirability of specific people-groups, the implications of improvements that focus on *economic* upgrading would be to encourage homeowners rather than tenants, as well as wealthy rather than poor people-groups.

**MIDS: improvement as physical or economic upgrading?**

While Muizenberg residents interpret ‘improvement’ as *economic*, the official MIDS mandate is *physical*, for example cleaning the streets and renovating dilapidated buildings, as well as increased security.

However, while MIDS’ official aim addresses *physical* upgrading, their secondary aims all address *economic* upgrading. For example, MIDS’ bulletins express the longer-term vision that “once the area became safe, clean and attractive, it would draw … investment, stimulate homeowners to upgrade [their properties]…, encourage … new businesses and … attract a developer” (www.muizenberg.info), which are clearly economic (rather than physical) goals. This reveals MIDS’ underlying focus on economic upgrading and attracting a ‘developer’ as the Muizenberg panacea, synonymous with resident desires. Furthermore in assessing their successes, the MIDS committee focus on *economic* benefits (rather than physical upgrades) such as an 80% increase in property prices, the difficulty of finding property in Muizenberg, an increase in rental prices, the arrival of 50 new businesses in one year, and a proposed major development (www.muizenberg.info). Indeed, the
only physical upgrades mentioned in the MIDS list of successes are the renovations made by homeowners (largely a consequence of increased *economic* property values) and the closing down of 42 “bad houses” (i.e. removing residents and boarding up properties) where overcrowding and unsanitary conditions prevailed. In addition a number of *social* improvements are also mentioned as successes, for example the large number of arrests made by security personnel, and a reduction in “anti-social behaviour” (ibid).

This section has revealed that both resident and MIDS improvement discourses prioritise economic advancement, despite the MIDS official goal of physical upgrading.

**REALITIES OF ‘IMPROVEMENT’ IN MUIZENBERG: SOCIAL UPGRAADING AS AN ACCIDENTAL BY-PRODUCT OR INTENDED OUTCOME?**

Although resident and MIDS ‘improvement’ discourses focus on *economic* advancement, other forms of upgrading did occur. This section addresses the realities of physical and social ‘improvements’ in post-2000 Muizenberg.

**Physical upgrading**

In the period 2000-2004 Muizenberg underwent significant *physical* change, in particular the upgrading of roads, general cleanliness and buildings.

In early 2000, Muizenberg’s roads were of major concern, indeed one resident complained in the local newspaper that the streets lie in “filth [causing] … a disgusting stink … [that encourages] enormous rats” (*FBE* 2000a). Various
community members joined forces to address Muizenberg’s streets, for example the ‘pothole project’, cataloguing items needing repair and thereby stimulating the council into action (Smith 2000c). In early-2003 the municipality renovated the roads leading into Muizenberg, providing a new paved pedestrian walkway, road reconfiguration and trees to create a “gateway precinct” (West 2003a). An obvious consequence of this has been an increase in economic activity in this area, for example the opening of several trendy cafés and other shops that are attracting people to this previously-avoided area. Thus, physical upgrades are facilitating economic improvements.

In addition to improving Muizenberg’s roads, clearing ‘grime’ has also been achieved by employing private street-cleaners. This has been very successful, particularly as results are immediately effective, facilitating increased enthusiasm for the village, in turn attracting businesses and encouraging residents to clean their houses to match sparkling streets. This again indicates that physical upgrades (i.e. street cleaning) lead to economic improvement (e.g. businesses investments, increased property prices).

Although improving streets and general cleanliness have formed part of Muizenberg’s physical improvement, the principal focus has been renovating dilapidated buildings. Muizenberg’s heritage as a holiday resort has endowed the seaside town with numerous large buildings that used to function as hotels but have become dilapidated, often with minimal sanitation, broken windows and a crumbling façade. At the turn of the millennium, many of these buildings provided basic rental accommodation, with several tenants squeezed into one room in order to meet exorbitant rents charged by absentee landlords. The subsequent physical improvements made to these
buildings are therefore closely linked to the lives of these tenants, indicating the social implications of physical upgrading.

The catalyst for building upgrades was the enforcement of existing municipal by-laws requiring owners to maintain their properties. Several community bodies (including MIDS) identified Muizenberg’s most dilapidated properties and lobbied the municipality to pressure owners to improve their properties. By March 2000, seven properties were identified as “priority one” by the council because of their poor condition and prime location, and thirteen landlords were issued a court summons after failing to respond to initial demands to improve their properties (FBE 2000d; Smith 2000a). In addition to official penalties, property owners also risked unofficial punishment via public pressure and negative publicity. Indeed, the local newspaper published photographs of eight buildings (alongside their owners’ names) in need of repair, applying ‘naming and shaming’ pressure in addition to council demands (FBE 2000e). By October 2000 the first property owner was convicted of contravening health and building regulations (FBE 2000e), and by late-2000 physical change was evident, with buildings being repaired and painted as owners sought to avoid legal penalties (FBE 2000d).

This building revival thrived, and by 2003 previously dilapidated buildings had been improved or emptied of their occupants whilst awaiting upgrading, houses had been painted and renovated, the village was considered a safer place, investors had purchased beachfront property, new businesses had arrived and were thriving, and house prices had escalated; all signs of significant physical and economic ‘improvement’.
While Muizenberg’s improvement campaigns focused primarily on physical constructions, “waging a war, building by building” (M.vL 22/09/04), this ‘war’ severely affected those living in the buildings, indicating the interdependence between physical improvement and social dynamics. The Muizenberg Tenants Association noted in early-2001 that the campaign to improve buildings had a negative impact on tenants as most property owners were either increasing rents to finance upgrades or evicting tenants to sell the property (Smith 2001b). Although many tenants felt these evictions were planned (or at least welcomed) by Muizenberg’s long-term residents as a form of social upgrading, to remove those considered socially undesirable under the pretext of removing that which is physically undesirable, whether the social and demographic exclusionary implications of physical ‘improvements’ were intended or accidental is difficult to establish. However, the extent to which Muizenberg actors (MIDS and residents) were pleased with and/or prioritised this outcome (rather than a physical outcome \textit{per se}) is more quantifiable, and addressed in the subsequent section.

\textbf{Social upgrading}

According to the Muizenberg Tenants Association, in 2003 alone at least 800 tenants were evicted as owners cleared their properties in order to renovate or sell to developers (King 2003b). However, as several of these buildings lie empty and un-renovated more than a year since evictions, many tenants feel that their removal was a class-ist, racist or xenophobic form of social ‘improvement’. Furthermore, according to the Muizenberg Tenants Association many landlords evicted tenants without implementing legally required notice periods, adding to feelings that expulsions were intended to facilitate a social rather than physical ‘improvement’.
There were many issues of people being evicted illegally – tenants have got rights so we [Muizenberg Tenants Association] had to make them aware, we had many workshops [R.L.04/11/04]

People here saw the black people as a threat so people tried to close buildings, now they're empty up to this day ... They close buildings “you must move”, we don’t have a say [I.K. 01/11/04]

They tell us to move, but we have a family so it’s hard for us – where can we go? We have a court decision on 9th [November. This building] is closed already ... They’ve cut the electricity off because it’s all foreigners here [E.C. 04/11/04]

Criticising the social implications of MIDS’ actions is not to suggest an acceptance of the presence of slumlords or dilapidated buildings, but rather to emphasise the lack of concern regarding the negative impact of their actions on (predominantly poor) tenants, and the failure to consider more community-based (rather than homeowner-based) solutions. Of course, not all Muizenberg long-term residents blindly accepted these ‘social upgrades’, indeed many criticised the MIDS approach, although acceptance did seem to be the norm. However, most long-term residents who expressed concern regarding MIDS’ exclusionary practices, were content with the outcomes (e.g. less crime, higher property prices), implying that the end justified the means (presumably only from their ‘homeowner’ perspective rather than from a tenant-perspective given that the ‘end’ required tenants’ removal). While it is difficult to distinguish between improving buildings and affecting occupants, it seems that no attempt was made to mitigate the effects of the former on the latter, as demonstrated by this Muizenberg tenant:

Landlords are trying to get rid of people like me that don’t own [a house]. Everyone is being given notice ... I don’t mind upgrading – paint the houses – but don’t throw the people out [N.X. 01/12/04]

Although it is difficult to identify whether physical improvements were intended to produce social exclusivity, it is possible to analyse whether social or physical
‘improvements’ were prioritised by residents and MIDS activists, and also whether Muizenbergers were pleased with the social outcomes of ‘improvements’.

Prioritising social upgrading or physical upgrading?

Residents expressing the need for building upgrades often focused on social rather than physical reasons. For example, a letter to the community newspaper argued that the Empire building needs “an urgent raid, clean-up and demolishing” because it is occupied by “squatters and gangsters smoking drugs, [and] drinking” (FBE 2000c), indicating that physical upgrading is fuelled by a desire for social improvement. While one would not wish to condone the practices of gangsters, brothels and slum landlords, the absence of measures to protect tenants does indicate a focus on social issues rather than the physical need for upgrading. This is confirmed by numerous interviews where respondents focused on removing certain residents rather than upgrading buildings as crucial to ‘improving’ Muizenberg.

Anti-social behaviour is not desirable or acceptable, and in Muizenberg it was overlaid by the racial element. There are not only refugees living there [village], it’s also a lot of Coloureds, but most of the black people living there were refugees and there were clashes – even street fights [D.Q. 05/10/04]

The problem [now] is less Congolese [perpetrators] because most have been moved on. It will be harder to move the White trash because they buy houses [P.S. 01/11/04]

Both quotes demonstrate an obvious focus on people rather than buildings in identifying Muizenberg’s problems (and therefore the target for improvement). Although implying that residents prioritised social upgrading rather than physical improvements, a number of Muizenberg residents are opposed to what they perceive as an anti-tenant (and anti-refugee) attitude amongst long-term residents.
The Whites ... have been working on campaigns saying these people [tenants and refugees] aren’t welcome – they must go [R.L.04/11/04]

The White community who are very xenophobic united to get what they call “the aliens” out. They felt they were a threat because they’re unhygienic and noisy [M.S. 08/12/04]

Although indicating that not all residents prioritise the removal of social undesirables, there is a prioritisation of social rather than physical improvements amongst a large sector of Muizenberg’s society. While it is unlikely that the physical agenda exists merely to mask a dominant social agenda (more likely, the two operate in tandem), the underlying focus on social exclusion does explain the absence of interim shelter provision for evictees (as would be expected if the improvement was purely physical). Furthermore, resident complaints to the council about overcrowding led the ‘Town Planning Department’ to conduct examinations of building conditions. Although the town planning department’s remit is clearly physical, their building inspections had a strongly social nature as demonstrated by two council town planners.

*Planning Officer A:* A few years ago we got complaints about overcrowding and our inspectors went and did raids [in the village].

*Planning Officer B:* They were inspections, not raids.

*Planning Officer A:* Well, they were at 5am! [A.M. and D.S. 08/11/04]

One would expect a purely physical inspection to occur within normal working hours, whereas the unusual timings of these inspections reveal the ‘shock’ tactic implemented in order to uncover the social dynamics. With regard to the MIDS’ (rather than residents) attitude to social upgrading in Muizenberg, although they officially prioritise physical improvements, they were clearly aware of the social implications necessary to achieve their physical goals and were unconcerned about
this trend, as demonstrated by the following quotes firstly from the MIDS manager and secondly from the local councillor.

We [MIDS] tried to turn it around by improving buildings. Slum landlords would squeeze 30 people into a house and charge a packet ... So we pushed ... and got these people [slum landlords] to sell. We shut down 52 or 54 houses ... But your PC [politically correct] person will say that’s not sustainable development, you’re just displacing the problem, what about low-cost houses? Yes, but that’s not what MIDS is about. [M. vL 22/09/04]

We targeted the worst buildings – it was never directed at the tenants as they were also victims. [But we] made it uncomfortable and many [owners] have cleaned up or gone elsewhere now. [What about the tenants? What has happened to them?] I can’t say, but it’s just not acceptable to have 20-35 people living in premises suited for 5-10 people. [D.Q. 05/10/04]

For MIDS there is clearly a blurring between the physical and social elements of Muizenberg ‘improvements’. Indeed, the 2004 chairman’s annual report focused on addressing “bad buildings”, described as “bad” not because of physical features, but because they house an overcrowded number of tenants, many of whom are believed not to be paying rent (MIDS 2004). Though such overcrowding clearly contributes to physical degradation, it would seem that both social and physical dynamics are fuelling the MIDS ‘improvement’ agenda. Indeed, in correspondence between the Muizenberg MP and City Council regarding the formers criticisms of MIDS as racist and anti-refugee, MIDS reply that they are “just opposed to over-crowding and anti-social behaviour” rather than specific individuals (Turok 2004), which clearly has a physical and social agenda.

Although difficult to separate the physical and social motivations and outcomes of ‘improvements’ in Muizenberg, there does seem to be a general trend of accepting (and prioritising in some cases) the social implications as an inevitable bonus rather than an unfortunate by-product.
**Pleased about social upgrading?**

Much of the discourses amongst Muizenberg residents expressed a strong sense of pleasure regarding the removal of tenants (especially refugees) from Muizenberg.

We had Angolans – most have buggered off home now thank goodness, and Congolese [M. vL 22/09/04]

Quite a few boarding houses have been bought up and closed ... thankfully those people have gone … it has decreased the loitering aspect [and other] anti-social behaviour [G.H. 30/09/04]

In addition, a resident writing into the community newspaper in early 2004 expressed utter amazement that anyone could be upset about the changes that have occurred in Muizenberg, because MIDS has “improved the village” (FBE 2004a). In other words, this resident is so pleased with the ‘new’ Muizenberg that he cannot comprehend displeasure, thereby indicating his understanding of the Muizenberg community as homeowners, and a disregard for those that have not benefited from such ‘improvements’ (who are clearly absent from his conceptualisation of Muizenberg).

Whether taking pleasure in the demographic outcomes of (physical and social) ‘improvements’ denotes approval of active social engineering is disputable. However, it clearly indicates that social ‘improvements’ in Muizenberg were widely accepted, praised, and for many, prioritised alongside physical improvements.

**Criminal crack-down**

A further form of social upgrading in Muizenberg has been the targeting of criminals (rather than criminal activity per se) as a form of improvement. This clearly has a social rather than physical focus and is a key MIDS aim. Criticising MIDS’ focus on potential criminals rather than crime per se is not to suggest an acceptance of criminal
activity but rather to emphasise the negative impact of this ‘suspected perpetrator’
focus on innocent residents fitting the ‘suspicious’ category (i.e. refugees, Coloured
men in the village). Muizenberg’s crime situation in 2000 was serious, with
gangsters operating drug cartels from the village, holding two teenage girls captive
for ten days, murdering a local activist, threatening the lives of policemen, and the
attempted murder of a policeman (FBE 2000b). Indeed, when the Muizenberg police
Superintendent announced in mid-2000 that “Muizenberg is turning into a war zone”
he was not exaggerating (Smith 2000b).

Since 2001, the Mountain Men (employed by MIDS to watch Muizenberg from the
mountainside using binoculars and alert an ‘on-the-ground’ presence to suspicious
behaviour via walkie-talkies) have implemented a “zero tolerance” attitude to crime
in the village, leading to several raids on houses, mostly those inhabited by refugees
(West 2001b). While this crime crack-down was clearly needed in the village, the
emphasis on refugees as suspected criminals because of their non-middle-class
lifestyle (e.g. socialising in the streets) has facilitated an anti-refugee (rather than anti-
crime) atmosphere. As such strategies prioritise suspected criminals and so-called
social deviants (e.g. refugees) rather than crimes per se, this implies a focus on
eradicating diversity from public space rather than attacking crime.\footnote{This is remarkably similar to Rudolph Giuliani’s “zero tolerance” approach to cleaning-up New
York by removing beggars, drunks and vandals so as to clear the streets for ‘respectable’ citizens
(Smith 1999).} Indeed, this
has legitimised the random stopping (and searching) of refugees ‘loitering’ on the
streets (witnessed and commented on by a non-refugee resident, P.C. 15/10/04),
indicating a xenophobic and anti-refugee element to attacking crime (or rather,
cleaning-up public spaces). Police harassment of refugees is not unique to this case
study, as 71% of refugees in Johannesburg report being stopped by the police, as
opposed to 20% of South Africans (Jacobsen 2004). Furthermore, in May 2004 the police raided a refugee hostel in the village and physically attacked three Congolese refugees who subsequently received medical treatment for deep head wounds and other injuries, though the police found no evidence of drugs to support their raid (Greenfield 2004). Such xenophobic behaviour has led to strong claims that MIDS (and the Muizenberg police) are anti-refugee.

CLAIMS THAT MIDS ARE ANTI-REFUGEE AND ANTI-TENANT

Throughout Muizenberg’s ‘improvement’ history there has been a battle between the ANC-appointed MP for Muizenberg\(^{136}\) (a former-MIDS board member) and the current MIDS board, with the former accusing the latter of racism, xenophobia and anti-tenant sentiments. This has not been a private dispute but has played out in the community newspaper as well as at public meetings, and this section considers the weight of such accusations.

The discussion is based on private communications between various MIDS members, which the local MP publicised in 2004 (*FBE* 2003, 2004a). A chronological selection of these communications is provided:\(^{137}\)

Muizenberg and refugees do not go together and until they have all left there is absolutely no future for the village ... this problem ... is not going to go away unless some very radical action is taken. [Email from MIDS chairman to the MIDS board, 13/04/02]

The complaints about refugees have very little to do with race and everything to do with the fact that Muizenberg has become a refugee

\(^{136}\) Although South Africa does not operate a constituency-based electoral system, the ANC government allocates MPs to represent specific areas and the Muizenberg MP is also a local resident.

\(^{137}\) Access to original copies of these communications was provided by the Muizenberg MP and verified by their subsequent publication in the local newspaper (prompting no denials from those involved).
camp … did anyone ask us if we wanted to be a refugee camp?????
[Email from MIDS manager to the MIDS board, 17/04/04]

The influx of refugees who are not OUR people … has caused immense problems … ALL refugees should return to their homes. [Email from MIDS chairman to the MIDS board, 21/04/04]

Such communications express strong anti-refugee sentiments; with language such as “until they have all left” and “ALL refugees should return to their homes” making it clear that MIDS desires the exodus of refugees from Muizenberg. Given that MIDS holds the power to implement measures to achieve this goal, it seems increasingly likely that MIDS’ implementation of ‘improvement’ involved removing refugees just as much as it involved physical upgrading. And it has been successful, as observed by various residents.

The MIDS people have carried out a campaign to get rid of refugees and it’s worked. There’s only about 300 refugees left now [B.T.28/09/04]

The White community who are very xenophobic united to get what they call “the aliens” out. … Now most of the Congolese and Angolans have moved out [M.S. 08/12/04]

Furthermore, in response to the violent police attack on three refugees mentioned earlier, the chairman of the Muizenberg Ratepayers Association wrote to the local newspaper, not to support the injured members of his constituency but to demonstrate his anti-refugee stance, writing that “residents have long grown tired of … the antisocial hostile refugees [and] … will not rest until the last disruptive element has been rooted out” (FBE 2004b). This implies not only that refugees are not “residents” of Muizenberg, but also that there is absolutely no place for refugees in Muizenberg, a sentiment echoed by other local institutions.

In addition, MIDS has been accused by its previous chairman of being anti-tenant, for example by refusing to accommodate a tenant on its board (preferring homeowners)
and treating the Tenants Association (TA) as inferior rather than as a local peer [B.T.
29/09/04].

The MIDS wouldn’t talk to the tenants association, which is a Coloured
group ... There were angry letters between ... [the MIDS chairman] and ... [the TA chairman] all on race [B.T.28/09/04]

MIDS is quite racist ... they’re making it difficult for Coloureds and refugees to stay here ... They’ve never been exposed to other cultures and so I understand they’re scared, but they’re doing nothing to incorporate these people ... they’ve been working on a campaign saying these people aren’t welcome – they must go [R.L. 04/11/04]

Whether the accused anti-tenant and xenophobic behaviour of MIDS is based on racism or other factors such as class, is difficult to quantify. However, a middle-class Coloured resident who was recently appointed to the MIDS board does recognise racism within its structures, though he accepts this as an unwitting consequence of cultural differences rather than race per se [D.S. 02/12/04]. He also perceives his presence as tokenism within structures that promote White culture and attitudes (albeit perhaps unwittingly). Such an exclusive ‘improvement’ attitude and subsequent outcomes have serious implications.

**IMPLICATIONS OF ‘IMPROVEMENT’ IN MUZENBERG AND BEYOND**

‘Improvement’ strategies in Muizenberg have fuelled a process of gentrification, potentially facilitating the systemic replacement of low-income residents with high-income residents. Although gentrification has been slow to occur in South Africa’s cities, the promotion of IDs has quickened the pace, though conflict has developed between gentrification and social justice in terms of access to housing and basic service delivery for those excluded (Visser 2002). The implications of this gentrification (or ‘improvement’) for the poor, for the Muizenberg community as a
whole, for the post-apartheid city, and for broader conceptualisations of development as ‘improvement’ are considered.

**For the poor: Economic exclusion of those deemed socially unacceptable**

As this paper has highlighted, physical improvements in Muizenberg have led to significant economic upgrading, with the (intended or otherwise) consequence of excluding poorer residents not only from the benefits of these improvements, but from the area completely. As buildings have been renovated alongside increased prosperity in the area as a whole, buildings have closed down and rents have risen dramatically, forcing many tenants to move elsewhere. While such exclusions could be an accidental by-product of improvement, there are significant indications that ‘improvements’ were used to exclude those deemed socially unacceptable (i.e. the poor, tenants, and in particular refugees); thus implying the use of physical upgrading discourses and actions to mask a reality of social upgrades (though as indicated earlier, such accusations are hard to prove).

While not opposed to the clean-up of Muizenberg in itself, in particular the attack on criminal activity, the renovation of dilapidated buildings and the challenging of slum landlords; the manner in which such ‘improvements’ have benefited only some residents whilst rejecting others indicates an exclusivity that is not in harmony with post-apartheid goals of inclusion and integration. This is especially evident from the apparent acceptability of this exclusive approach amongst Muizenberg residents and MIDS. As already revealed, there is considerable division between those who consider themselves the permanent residents of Muizenberg (homeowners) and those residents (tenants, particularly refugees) whom the former consider to be a temporary blight, manifest in various implicit and explicit forms. As the poor are deemed
socially unacceptable and a barrier to Muizenberg’s ‘improvement’, they are subsequently excluded, not through socio-political mechanisms (as with apartheid), but through economic exclusion. By raising rents, those at the lower end of the socio-economic scale have been forced out of Muizenberg. Economic means have thus been used to facilitate social outcomes, with devastating consequences for tenants in Muizenberg.

**For Muizenberg: Creating a “cosy middle-class suburb”**

Such economic advancements, alongside the exodus of Muizenberg’s poorer residents (especially refugees), have also radically altered the nature of the suburb. Property values in the village rose by 40% from late-2000 to early-2003, presumed to be a direct consequence of MIDS’ work (West 2003b; Silverman 2005). Although property prices have increased throughout the Cape during this period, this represents a major boost in local confidence. Thus Muizenberg has changed from being a low-income haven for Cape Town’s eccentric artists and misfits, to an exclusive and upmarket middle-class suburb. Indeed, in a letter to the local newspaper a village resident praises MIDS for turning the village into a “cosy middle class suburb” (*FBE* 2004c), assumed to be the aspiration of every homeowner (as opposed to every resident, which would include tenants).

In other words, economic improvement has changed the type of person who lives in Muizenberg: firstly by removing those unable to afford rents except by living in the very overcrowded conditions that have been outlawed, and secondly by increasing house prices to a level that attracts the middle-classes, thus radically altering the nature of Muizenberg. Ironically, the displacement of Muizenberg’s poorer residents destroys the foundation of diversity and eccentricity that contributed to its popular
cosmopolitan vibe (Merrifield 2000). Furthermore, by encouraging village homeowners to further sell their properties (often to developers intending to subdivide the plot and re-sell two properties at a large profit), the sense of bohemian village community is set to diminish. Although this initially affects only residents, in turn it is also expected to alter the type of person welcome as a visitor to Muizenberg.

The kind of people who come here to recreate – they tend to be working class and lower middle-class. Everyday rowdy black schoolboys come here and no-one bats an eyelid like they would at Camps Bay [a stylish tourist beach area]. But as Muizenberg becomes more upmarket, people won’t accept this [T.B. 07/12/04]

Movement towards attracting only middle-class visitors is already evident in the explosion of trendy cafés and restaurants with high priced menus in the village and beachfront area. Thus social and physical improvements in Muizenberg have led to the creation of an entirely new Muizenberg, and while most homeowners are pleased with these changes, many of Muizenberg’s other residents have been excluded in order to make way for this new image.

For post-apartheid South Africa: improvement versus integration?

Muizenberg provides an unusual example of a former White area that has experienced residential desegregation in the ten years since apartheid’s demise. It therefore offers a possible model for achieving national goals of integration and inclusion in the post-apartheid city. Although demographic desegregation masks the reality of significant class differentiation, with most Muizenberg homeowners being White (alongside a handful of Coloureds), while the majority of tenants are Coloured or Black African refugees (with a handful of Whites and South African Black Africans), such economic disparity is to be expected given apartheid’s legacy. Thus the presence of such a racially and socio-economically population in Muizenberg does represent
significant change. However, ‘improvement’ in Muizenberg has been used to dilute such demographic changes by facilitating the exclusion of the (largely black) poor. Rather than harness the diversity of Muizenberg as a model for residential desegregation in line with government targets to unite rich and poor, black and White, and thus ‘improve’ Muizenberg’s multi-racial experience, long-term (predominantly White) residents’ conceptualisation of ‘improvement’ is opposed to integration (or rather, is opposed to non-homeowners, the vast majority of whom are black). This experience is not unique to Muizenberg and in fact the Cape Town municipality recently condemned residential IDs (rather than business IDs), criticising their “elitist” nature, tendency to encourage “urban secession”, and recreation of apartheid-esque forms of local governance, and is reticent to approve future residential IDs (Bénit et al 2005).

The implications of this for wider city processes are significant, for if the rare examples of residential desegregation in South Africa’s cities are seen as the cause of suburban decay and/or as preventing urban development then few residents will wish to live in such neighbourhoods. Obviously there is a difference between overcrowded tenants and the in-movement of families of a similar class causing the desegregation of an area. However, given that the government’s new housing strategy to locate low-cost housing in wealthy areas (Boyle and Philp 2004) is set to create more multi-racial and socio-economically diverse neighbourhoods, it would seem crucial to consider the effects of such changes on both the suburb in question and its residents. The example of Muizenberg indicates that if residents of proposed multi-racial suburbs perceive that desegregation inhibits development, they will ultimately fail.
For ‘Development’: Urban development as economic or social?

Both economic and social upgrading in Muizenberg have evolved as by-products (intended or otherwise) of physical and infrastructural improvements. For example, house prices have increased as a consequence of improved physical buildings, but this has also ensured the removal of certain sections of Muizenberg’s society. Whether economic and physical development necessarily inhibits social development in general is questionable, though this has clearly been the case in Muizenberg. It also raises a deeper question regarding whether development is about prioritising economic advancement even at the expense of human livelihood?

In mid-2003 there were murmurs throughout Muizenberg that developers were quietly buying up properties on the beachfront in preparation for a major development. By late-2003 it was made public that ‘Dormell Properties’ had purchased 70% of beachfront properties, planning a major re-development. Thus the major ‘investor’ and ‘development’ that many Muizenbergers (and MIDS) have long desired has finally arrived. Is this the urban ‘development’ that we conceive of? Glamorous upmarket hotels, apartments, and shopping centres made possible because the poorer segments of society have been pushed away to less opulent areas. Indeed these evictions have been openly promoted by the developers, recognising that “tenants and squatters have been moved out … [to allow for] renovations” (King 2004). Furthermore, it seems that MIDS’ conceptualisation of development focuses exclusively on attracting outside development professionals rather than encouraging the internal generation of development ideas and practices from amongst Muizenberg’s diverse array of residents, which would in turn generate a stronger multi-racial community as part of the ‘new’ South Africa.
If such urban and economic developments necessitate the social demise (rather than social development) of those most in need in our societies then perhaps ‘development’ and ‘improvement’ would be better termed as ‘exclusivity’, or rather ‘improvement for some, deterioration for the rest’.

**CONCLUSION**

This paper has used the example of Muizenberg (its residents and ID) to reveal the role of ‘improvement’ discourses and strategies in upgrading a residential area. This ‘improvement’ has not been restricted to physical upgrades, but has vast economic and social implications, particularly for the poorer segments of society. Although this paper has focused exclusively on Muizenberg, such trends are found elsewhere; indeed from 2004-2005 scores of tenants (many of whom, although deemed ‘squatters’, pay rent to landlords) of dilapidated buildings in central Johannesburg (e.g. Bree Chambers, Stanhope Mansions, Turbine Hall) have been evicted on the premise of ‘physical upgrades’ in the area, with no consideration of their future abode or provision of interim shelter (Eliseev 2005, Robinson 2004). While not condoning dilapidated buildings, poor housing conditions or squatting, the implementation of such strategies without regard for their social implications is a worrying trend. As the post-apartheid South African government strives to integrate previously segregated people and places, the enforcement of policies implying a continued social hierarchy (i.e. homeowners and property developers at the top inflicting power, and tenants of dilapidated buildings powerless at the bottom) does not seem congruent with such national goals. As outlined earlier, the implications of

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138 This approach bears some similarities to Robert Mugabe’s much criticised May-July 2005 urban renewal operation of razing townships in Zimbabwe.
this for the post-apartheid city are severe, indicating development and improvement as synonymous with division and segregation rather than integration and inclusion.

In summarising the main findings of this paper it is evident that whilst discourses of improvement emphasise economic and physical upgrading, the realities of such improvements are not restricted to improved property prices or renovated buildings, but have negative social implications for those residing in the buildings being upgraded, as well as for those renting in the context of escalating property prices. In effect, physical ‘improvements’ created an economically exclusive space, resulting in the economic and social rejection of the poor from Muizenberg’s new middle-class suburbia. Although this research does not identify whether such anti-poor implications were intended or unwitting it is clear that certain MIDS members wished to eradicate refugees and tenants from Muizenberg and that they had the means to achieve this goal through MIDS interventions. That is not to decry MIDS as anti-refugee and/or anti-tenant per se, but rather to indicate the parallels between the xenophobic and pro-homeowners attitudes of its members as well as the consequences of its interventions in causing a tenant (and refugee) exodus from Muizenberg. Though a direct link between these anti-refugee and anti-tenant desires and outcomes has not been identified, both MIDS and the vast majority of Muizenberg homeowners have overwhelmingly embraced the social and demographic implications of physical and economic improvements (i.e. the exclusion of the poor) as a positive outcome for Muizenberg, thus revealing at the very least the absence of pro-poor sentiments.

The implications of these ‘improvements’ for the poor, for Muizenberg, for post-apartheid South Africa, and for development as a whole is a focus on creating an
exclusive residential (and subsequently recreational) area as synonymous with ‘improving’ a neighbourhood. A more inclusive form of improvement could have witnessed all socio-economic and racial groups in the community working together to improve the neighbourhood for *all* residents (homeowners and tenants) rather than excluding those perceived as socially and economically undesirable by the more economically powerful residents (i.e. homeowners). Perhaps such an understanding of ‘improvement’ is naïve and unrealistic, but it does seem more synonymous with post-apartheid goals of integration, inclusion and equality than the outcomes experienced in Muizenberg.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

“We have a vision of a South Africa...
where integrated communities will replace
the residential segregation which characterises the past”
Lindiwe N. Sisulu, Housing Minister, 2005

President Thabo Mbeki has strongly promoted the ideal of South Africa as a non-racial society. His 2005 State of the Nation address listed it as one of the primary goals for the second decade of liberation, encouraging the nation to move “towards the consolidation of national reconciliation, national cohesion and unity, and a shared new patriotism” (Mbeki 2005). Although caution must be exercised in interpreting such political rhetoric as necessarily affecting policy, his words echo the very foundations on which contemporary South Africa is founded, with the 1996 constitution stating that “we, the people of South Africa, believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity” (ibid). Although this idealistic focus on creating a non-racial society has been criticised as rhetoric that is contradicted by policy, the underlying emphasis on national unity and social cohesion matches the focus of this research, addressing social integration between those from apartheid’s different racial classifications in the post-apartheid context of residential desegregation.

This chapter concludes the thesis, firstly by providing a summary of the research’s approach and key findings, followed by a consideration of the theoretical and

139 While non-racialism rejects any ethnic or racial group that seeks to promote ‘their’ interests above those of the (non-racial) state as a whole, the government’s affirmative action policies are patently not non-racial because they promote (at least) one race at the expense of another (Giliomee 1996:96)
Summary of the research approach and findings

This thesis has sought to explore the nature of integration between people from apartheid's different population groups living in residential proximity in the post-apartheid city. Social integration was interpreted as a dynamic process rather than a static outcome (i.e. integration rather than being integrated), occurring between individuals. The academic literature on social integration and other associated terms (e.g. assimilation, multiculturalism) indicated the need for research that addresses integration in a dynamic and qualitative fashion, so as to delve deeper than purely quantitative statistics on segregated and desegregated areas (rather than the integration of people).

South Africa was selected as the site for research as the post-apartheid era provides an ideal environment in which to consider such issues, as demonstrated by the contextual information provided in Chapter Two. South Africa's national census data were analysed so as to identify neighbourhoods in contemporary Cape Town which demonstrated demographic integration (defined as a suburb in which no single population group comprises more than 50% and at least one other comprises over 25%). Two such neighbourhoods were selected in which to conduct qualitative research. This fieldwork comprised semi-structured interviews with a wide range of residents representing the different demographics of the neighbourhood, focusing on residents' experiences of living in a mixed-race area, and also using 'mental maps' to ascertain their perceptions regarding integration. In addition, more structured interviews were held with officials and key stakeholders in each area such as local...
councillors, community leaders, school principals, and church leaders. The methodology used was extensively discussed in Chapter Three. The findings from this research were presented in the form of four journal papers comprising chapters four to seven.

Chapter Four analysed the nature of social integration amongst residents of Westlake village, a racially desegregated low-cost housing area comprising a relatively equal mix of Black African and Coloured residents who were allocated housing in 1999 as replacement for their prior informal occupation of the land. An analysis of everyday movement patterns revealed firstly that residents from the different racial groups use the same local facilities (e.g. schools, shops), and secondly that residents socialise together irrespective of race. This strong localisation indicates the weakness of apartheid geographies in determining residents' functional lives, as Black African and Coloured residents both selected facilities based on their proximity and affordability rather than on the basis of racial identities. In addition, the common experience of everyday socialising between races, with neighbours constantly in and out of each other’s home irrespective of race, again indicated the weak impact of apartheid identities and the strength of social integration in the post-apartheid era. However, social integration did not extend beyond the everyday level, as Westlake’s local institutions (e.g. churches, sports clubs) and political groupings (i.e. community structures) were divided along apartheid’s race lines. In addition, although indications that a sense of ‘belonging’ to the area based on socio-historic identity rather than racial identity (as was the case under apartheid) has emerged, this new criterion for acceptance is equally restrictive, indicating that as race divisions subside, others emerge.
The strong localisation and everyday social integration are explained as a consequence of two major factors that are specific to this case study. Firstly, the non-periphery location of Westlake village in the midst of Cape Town’s wealthy ‘White’ suburbs ensures that both Black African and Coloured residents are unable to afford either the nearest facilities or to travel to facilities in distant apartheid group areas; instead they must travel to the closest affordable options. This central location is unusual because most low-cost housing areas (a common site for demographic integration as they predominantly house poor Black Africans and Coloureds) are located on the urban periphery (e.g. Delft South, Oldfield 2004), though the government’s recently proclaimed intention to locate low-cost housing areas in wealthy suburbs should make this non-periphery location a more common factor. Secondly, the similar tenure and socio-economic status of both Black African and Coloured residents provides a common ground on which to build friendships. Although a shared socio-economic status is common in demographically mixed suburbs, a consequence of a common ability to afford property in the area (as indicated by the tendency of desegregation to occur in either middle-class suburbs, e.g. Saff 1998a, or low-cost housing areas, e.g. Oldfield 2004), it is less common for residents to share similar tenure histories. Indeed, in desegregating middle-class suburbs blacks invariably move into a traditionally ‘White’ residential space and thus have different tenure experience from new neighbours, while residents of desegregated low-cost housing areas are typically plucked from diverse areas throughout the city (a consequence of housing being allocated via a city-wide list) and thus residents have no history of tenure in the area and thus no prior basis for friendship. In contrast, Westlake villagers have a long tenure in the area, having previously lived informally on the land, and thus one race is not seeking to ‘fit into’
another’s space as in middle-class suburbs, and residents have a long-term affinity to
the area, unlike most low-cost housing areas.

Evidence from Westlake village therefore indicates that a degree of social integration
has successfully occurred in a demographically desegregated neighbourhood, with
such integration aided by the suburb’s non-periphery location and the common socio-
economic status and tenure history of residents.

Chapter Five analysed the nature of social integration between residents of
Muizenberg, a former ‘White’ suburb that now hosts a diverse range socio-economic
groups and racial groups, including Black African, White, Coloured and Black
African immigrants. Like Westlake village, Muizenberg is located in a non-periphery
position, however the similarities extend no further and unlike Westlake village,
residents of Muizenberg have unequal tenure histories and do not share a similar
socio-economic status (a consequence of a wide variety of different housing types
located in distinct spatial pockets). Life in Muizenberg was found to be highly
racialised, with residents’ everyday movement patterns, use of local facilities, and
involvement in local institutions dictated by racial identity. In particular, residents
with a long tenure in the area (predominantly White) perceived that the quality of
facilities in the area (e.g. shops and schools) had declined as a consequence of
desegregation, while residents with a short tenure in the area (predominantly black)
perceived local community groups (e.g. historical association, ratepayers association)
as exclusively the preserve of White residents and their interests. The role of unequal
tenure in inhibiting social integration was two-fold. Firstly, residents with a lengthy
tenure (predominantly White) felt a strong sense of ‘ownership’ to the area that they
felt had been infiltrated by newcomers, thus precluding the likelihood of friendship
with those considered interlopers. Secondly, the suburb changed to such an extent over time that residents with different tenure histories were attracted to Muizenberg for diverse reasons and thus had opposing perceptions of what entailed neighbourhood life. For example, the majority of Whites were attracted to a ‘White’ group area with specific cultural and environmental traits, whereas the majority of Black Africans, Coloureds and immigrants were attracted to a cheap and accessible mixed-race area. Thus diverse tenure histories appear to inhibit integration. Although integration was also hindered by the divergent socio-economic status of residents, residents in one spatial pocket did share socio-economic class and thus integration was evident, particularly between those with young families who therefore shared a common identity and need, as well as daily movement pattern. Furthermore, evidence of integration between those residents with an equally short tenure and weak socio-economic status (e.g. Coloureds and Black African immigrants) was found. Research in Muizenberg concluded that labelling a suburb as physically desegregated implies a level of social cohesion that was not found, and masks the reality of division based on length of tenure and socio-economic status.

Chapter Six considered the development of social and functional integration between residents of two communities that form part of the same development and are located less than 500m apart but host very diverse racial and socio-economic communities. While Westlake village (discussed in Chapter Four) is a low-cost housing area accommodating a mix of Black African and Coloured residents mostly in one-bedroom houses, Silvertree Estate is an upmarket gated community predominantly housing wealthy White families in large luxury homes. They are both situated in the ‘Westlake Estate’ development, separated only by walls and a buffer-zone (comprising a school and business park) and thus in theory are part of the same
neighbourhood (indeed, the census considers them a single suburb) though in reality they are clearly two distinct areas. Research in the two areas identified significant levels of spatial and social exclusion experienced by Westlake villagers, alongside ignorance and indifference amongst Silvertree residents. The spatial design of the development is criticised for failing to encourage mixing or unity (for example, the two communities have no shared access points), but the negative attitudes displayed by Silvertree residents are recognised as unlikely to have facilitated integration even if the spatial design had been more inclusive. Although there are some connections between residents of the two areas, they are not equal and often one-sided relationships such as employer-employee and benevolent hand-outs with no reciprocity or equal discussion, for example regarding their common occupation of the same area. However, it is encouraging that some connections between the two areas are developing.

Although this chapter considered integration between residents of two different suburbs (albeit part of the same development) rather than residents of the same community as in the two previous chapters, the same arguments regarding the role of tenure and socio-economic status are employed. Despite Westlake village resident’s longer tenure claim on the area than their Silvertree neighbours, this has not supported any perceptions of cultural dominance in the area (unlike Whites in Muizenberg). However, the diverse socio-economic status of the two areas is clearly a crucial factor in inhibiting integration, suggesting that socio-economics are a more important factor than tenure in affecting integration (as confirmed by the existence of social integration in the middle-class pocket of Muizenberg, and in middle-class suburbs elsewhere, Saff 1998a). The implications of this chapter for South African policy are significant on two counts. Firstly, gated communities are becoming an
increasingly popular urban lifestyle strategy in South Africa’s post-apartheid cities despite criticisms that they encourage segregation and violate human rights. Secondly, this case study provides an example of the prospects of the government’s new approach to speed up housing provision by placing low-cost housing areas in wealthy suburbs.

Chapter Seven analysed the role of improvement discourses and strategies employed in Muizenberg, predominantly used by long-term (i.e. White) residents with the official intention of ‘improving’ the physical traits and security of the area, but with the (intended or otherwise) outcome of socially and economically excluding poor (i.e. black) residents from the area. The ‘Muizenberg Improvement District’ focused on renovating dilapidated buildings, but such physical upgrades were implemented with no provision of interim housing for those tenants (poor Coloured and Black African immigrants) who were consequently evicted, or consideration that the subsequent economic prosperity of the area would increase property and rental prices to levels that would exclude the poor. Given the indication in Chapter Five that desegregation in Muizenberg did not facilitate integration because of the absence of shared socio-economic status, the implications of this chapter’s findings are that desegregation between residents who do not share a similar socio-economic status will not gradually lead to integration, and will instead lead to the exclusion of one group, ultimately returning the community to a less diverse demographic, at least in socio-economic terms.

In the post-apartheid context of racial inequality, such opposition to desegregation that is not matched by a shared class seems likely to restrict the potential for social integration beyond the confines of the black middle-classes moving into ‘White’
areas, and the poor Coloureds and Black Africans living in low-cost housing, thus affecting only a handful of the population. Perhaps it is with this in mind that the government in late-2004 announced its intention to start locating low-cost housing in wealthy suburbs, though evidence from this research suggests that such projects will fail to achieve social integration between the classes.

These summaries of the major research findings indicate that in the post-apartheid era class has to a large extent replaced race as the basis for both exclusion and integration. Though a common trend in cities worldwide, in South Africa the legacy of apartheid ensures that class remains closely intertwined with racial identity and thus class has not so much ‘replaced’ race, rather, the two now operate in tandem. Indeed, acceptance of black newcomers into the middle-class spatial pocket of Muizenberg was not solely based on race or class, but a mixture of the two. Criteria for acceptance, as espoused by long-term White residents, focused on specific cultural practices that are equated with middle-class and White cultures. For example, painting one’s house, maintaining the garden, keeping noise levels down and having only one nuclear family per house were all factors cited as criteria for acceptance into the community. Clearly such criteria are linked to property values (Saff f/c), but they also demonstrate significant value judgements that are based not only on class but also on race, particularly the latter criterion, as indicated by a long-term White resident:

In this house I’m happy to live here with my wife, but with Coloureds they would probably have a family living in every room … which you wouldn’t see in an area that is only White. [B.B. 22/09/04]

Although this respondent indicated race as his prime motivation, this was a somewhat extreme view, and in general desegregation and integration were viewed as acceptable only on condition of embracing both class and racial cultural practices.
(which in this case were middle-class and White respectively). In addition, the history of Muizenberg as a ‘White’ group area will have contributed to the dominance of racially-determined acceptance criteria. Indeed, residents clearly still perceive the area as a ‘White’ cultural space (despite the fifteen years that have passed since the repeal of the Group Areas Act), requiring new residents to adopt ‘White’ cultural practices, and in fact, new black residents were on the whole willing to do so, shedding the cultural practices of their former (usually race-based) residential areas, and thus indicating their common understanding of the area as a ‘White’ space.\textsuperscript{140}

This idea of specific areas as ‘White’ or ‘black’ cultural (rather than physical \textit{per se}) spaces is also found beyond the residential zone, for example in schools (Battersby 2004b) and recreational areas such as beaches (Durrheim and Dixon 2001).

\textbf{T\textsc{heoretical Implications}}

The theoretical implications of the thesis address the development of social integration as a concept. Chapter One revealed that social integration suffers from a wide range of differing definitions and also from an over-focus on other related concepts (such as assimilation, segregation, desegregation, and multiculturalism), for which integration is assumed to be either a synonym or polar opposite, rather than a concept in its own right. Furthermore, research on integration and its related concepts has been dominated by quantitative approaches seeking to measure the extent of segregation, rather than seeking to understand the process of integration taking place between residents living in desegregated space. By conducting qualitative research that understands integration as a social process between individuals, this research has

\textsuperscript{140} The desire of blacks to live in a White space (culturally as well as physically) rather than in desegregated space is undoubtedly linked to property values (Saff f/c).
made a substantive contribution to theoretical debates that consider the qualitative and process-based aspects of multiple population dominance. It has demonstrated that a desegregated community is not necessarily an integrated one.

This research has made two major contributions to the body of literature on integration. Firstly, a continuum of social integration has been developed (Table 8.1); and secondly, findings from Westlake and Muizenberg have been used to highlight the major factors that facilitate integration (Table 8.2). Both of these tables are incorporated into existing literature and expand contemporary debates, while also providing indicators for further research to test, and for empirical policy to consider.

A provisional continuum of social integration was developed and outlined in Chapter Four. This continuum plotted the experiences of desegregation and integration based on research in Westlake village, and is revised here in light of subsequent research in Muizenberg. Table 8.1 provides a copy of the continuum initially developed in Chapter Four, with the changes made in light of research in Muizenberg indicated in red. Rather than create a new continuum the original has been adjusted so as to highlight the Muizenberg changes. Although the continuum remains substantively unchanged by the Muizenberg additions, there are a number of areas in which the emphasis has altered. For example, the shared use of facilities was found to be crucial in facilitating integration between Muizenberg’s Marine State residents using the local crèche, and also in inhibiting integration between Muizenberg’s White residents who rejected local schools and black residents whose choices were more limited. This factor has therefore been moved closer to the ‘maximum’ level of integration in Table 8.1. Furthermore, there were found to be cultural and socio-economic factors that affected the location of socialising. While the original
continuum suggested that greeting in the street indicated a more ‘minimum’ form of integration than socialising in one another’s houses, poor tenants in the Muizenberg village had insufficient ‘home’ space for socialising, and thus mixing on the streets was found to indicate a more ‘maximum’ level of integration than in areas where home ownership prevailed (e.g. Westlake village). Finally, findings from Muizenberg emphasised the role of cultural factors in facilitating integration and thus the role played by ‘shared class’ and ‘similar reasons for moving to the area’ are added to the continuum. In addition, home ownership is recognised as more important in uniting Muizenberg residents, where tenants were excluded from a cultural sense of belonging, than in Westlake where homeownership was ubiquitous despite similar levels of poverty to those displayed by tenants in Muizenberg.
Table 8.1 Continuum of integration experience based on research in Westlake and Muizenberg

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPACE</th>
<th>Physical</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| FORM     | • Desegregated neighbourhood                                               | • Greeting each other in streets **  
** The importance of both these factors are dependent on culture and class: in Muizenberg poor villagers socialised on the streets not because their integration was weak, but because their homes were inadequate to facilitate home-based socialising  
• Visiting each others homes **  
• Reliance on neighbours irrespective of race.  
• Involved in same church activities  
• Using same sports clubs | • Home ownership  
Relative importance increased to indicate the crucial role played by homeownership in affecting one’s ‘acceptance’ into Muizenberg  
• Single community voice  
• Shared community group  
• All races in leadership | • Shared sense of belonging | • Similar type of employment (e.g. formal/ informal, agriculture, industry)  
• Similar level of employment (e.g. manual labourer, professional)  
• Similar income of household  
• Home ownership |
|          | • Overlapping daily movement patterns                                    |                                                                          |                                                                          |                                                                          |                                                                          |
|          | • Shared use of facilities (schools, shops). Relative importance increased to indicate the crucial role played by shared resources in facilitating integration (e.g. Marine State parents use of local crèche) and inhibiting integration (e.g. White Muizenberg parents’ rejection of local schools) in Muizenberg |                                                                          |                                                                          |                                                                          |                                                                          |

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The factors that have been identified by previous researchers as facilitating integration were outlined in Chapter One (see Table 1.1). The findings from this research are now compared with this prior work, to refine analysis of the factors that facilitate integration, and thus contribute to the theoretical development of integration as a qualitative process. Five such factors are identified, as displayed in Table 8.2.

As indicated by the earlier summary of research, a shared socio-economic class and culture proved crucial in facilitating integration between residents from different racial and ethnic backgrounds in both Westlake village and Muizenberg, and its absence is also the crucial reason for the lack of integration between Westlake village and Silvertree Estate. This confirms the findings of earlier researchers, including Bakewell (2002), Clarke (1986, 1993), Pettigrew (1975) and Roof (1979) (Table 8.2).

More innovative is the discovery of the importance of a shared tenure history in encouraging integration. In Westlake village the common tenure experience of both Black African and Coloured residents, having been resident prior to the development, enabled significant integration. Although this also excluded ‘newcomers’ without the necessary tenure history from cultural acceptance into Westlake village, evidence from Muizenberg indicated that the absence of shared tenure histories can be overcome, provided residents share a common socio-economic class and culture, as found in the Marine State. The role of tenure histories in facilitating and/or inhibiting integration appears to be a new contribution to the integration literature (Table 8.2).

The third factor identified here as facilitating integration is the sharing of resources and movement patterns between residents. This was observed in Westlake village between Black Africans and Coloureds sharing the closest affordable schools and shops, between Silvertree residents sharing use of Reddam House School, between
White, Coloured and Black African middle-class residents of Marine State in Muizenberg sharing use of the local crèche, and also between poor Coloured and Black African immigrant Muizenberg village residents sharing use of local shops. Similar findings have been identified elsewhere, particularly by Bakewell’s (2002) awareness that sharing local resources enables integration, as well as Blokland (2002) and Mitchell’s (1968) awareness of the role of everyday ‘contact’ in facilitating integration, provided by use of common resources and movement patterns in this research.

The fourth factor echoes the findings of Suttles (1968) in emphasising the importance of children as catalysts for integration. In Westlake village, Silvertree and Muizenberg as children created their own spaces of mixing and also encouraged parents to do likewise (Table 8.2). Finally, the socio-economic status of the neighbourhood is identified as a crucial factor in facilitating or inhibiting integration. As identified elsewhere (Blokland 2003; Boal 1982) wealthy neighbourhoods are less likely to exhibit integration than their poorer counterparts as residents rely on non-local networks and self-sufficient homes rather than neighbourly relations. Indeed, the poorer areas in this research (Westlake village and Muizenberg village) exhibited far higher levels of mixing than the wealthier areas (Silvertree Estate and Muizenberg Marine State), thus confirming prior research.

These five factors, identified from this research as facilitating integration, are presented in Table 8.2, alongside reference to prior research confirming the identified trends.
Table 8.2 Factors that facilitate integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTORS FACILITATING INTEGRATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shared culture and socio-economic class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemanski</td>
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<td>Other authors</td>
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EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS

The empirical outcomes of this research address the nature of integration in post-apartheid Cape Town and thus its implications for urban policy in South Africa and in multicultural cities worldwide. Research found that the desegregation of a suburb did not automatically lead to social integration between the diverse members of its community and that a common tenure and socio-economic status were important factors in facilitating integration. Although research confirmed prior indications that integration in contemporary Cape Town is scarce (e.g. Turok 2001), as a government priority it is an issue receiving increasing attention, and thus this research is highly relevant to existing South African policy debates.

Post-apartheid policy-making provides an opportunity to witness “an encounter between idealism and reality” (Lemon 2005:69), indicating the complex nature of translating often idealistic intentions into concrete action, particularly within the context of a country so affected by fifty years of state-enforced separation. Strategies to integrate South Africa’s disparate racial communities have been strongly endorsed by President Thabo Mbeki. For example, he highly praised the Johannesburg Housing Company’s provision of rental accommodation for both high- and low-income households (with rents subsidised for the latter) located on prime property in central Johannesburg (Rust 2005a). In addition, the housing department’s announcement in September 2004 to locate low-cost housing in wealthy suburbs in order to speed up the process of both housing delivery and city integration, is clearly based on national goals of social and spatial integration. Although the focus of Mbeki’s integration tends to be on socio-economic groups (rather than racial groups *per se*) and also on space (rather than society *per se*), the legacy of apartheid ensures
that socio-economics and race, as well as society and space are closely intertwined. For example, at the recent opening ceremony of the above mentioned housing project, Mbeki declared that "we must bring a stop to pro-rich housing development strategies where the best located land is always available to the rich ... to create gated communities and golf estates, while the poor can only access dusty semi-developed land far away from modern infrastructure" (Rust 2005a). Such a speech links directly to the new housing strategy referred to above and discussed more explicitly in Chapters 4-7.

Although idealistic, his pro-integration thoughts and ideas are already translating into action, with the South African Property Owners Association (Sapoa) agreeing to work with the government to implement the creation of integrated housing developments, requiring that 20% of all new developments provide housing for low-income residents (Mtshali 2005). While welcoming this commitment to integration, based on the findings of this research, two key criticisms are levelled at the new approach. Firstly, such housing-based strategies address only demographic desegregation, with no mention of additional strategies to encourage social and functional integration between communities of vastly differing socio-economic status. Presumably there is an assumption that physical desegregation will facilitate social integration, but this research shows such assumptions to be largely unfounded. Secondly, such strategies exclusively address integration between different classes, with no mention of the additional need to consider integration between South Africa’s different racial groups. Although the two are intertwined, South Africa’s social dynamics are not so clear cut as to assume that all Whites are rich while all blacks are poor, although Thabo Mbeki’s emphasis on ‘Two Nations’ implies this. Furthermore, this research has indicated that racial integration without a common class is rare,
whereas integration between different races is more achievable, thus indicating the likely failure of such strategies unless additional mechanisms (as discussed in Chapter Six) are implemented. However, despite these criticisms, such an approach does successfully challenge spatial integration by providing housing for low-income households (predominantly black) in central areas rather than on the urban periphery with long distances to employment opportunities, as implemented under apartheid and also in much post-apartheid urban planning which has continued to relegate low-cost housing to the city margins.

Although it cannot be assumed that the findings from such a case study based approach necessarily hold relevance beyond their borders, let alone beyond their nation, in the context of increasingly multicultural cities worldwide it seems likely that these case studies have lessons for urban governance elsewhere. Indeed, the reliance of South African integration policies on housing strategies to enforce mixed-income residence is largely drawn from experience elsewhere, especially America’s integrative housing policies. The reservations emerging from this research concerning the likely success of enforced desegregation between those without a common socio-economic base leads to two recommendations for urban policy in multicultural cities worldwide. Firstly, that housing policies seeking to achieve integration recognise the need for equal status between neighbours, and thus do not seek to enforce mixing between the utter extremes of wealth (such as that in Westlake village and Silvertree Estate, discussed in Chapter Six). Secondly, that integration policies look beyond penetrating the housing market, recognising that the neighbourhood is not the only site for integration and thus instead addressing other contexts such as schools, universities, and sports clubs, something which South Africa is already striving towards.
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study raises several areas in which further research could profitably be conducted in order to build on both its theoretical and empirical findings.

Firstly, this research rests on the need for qualitative research that understands integration as a social and dynamic process and therefore an obvious area for further research is to continue in this trend. Such research is required in multicultural cities throughout the world, as indicated by predictions from Trevor Phillips of the Commission for Racial Equality that Britain is “sleepwalking” into cities composed of ghettos (quoted in Leppard 2005). Amanda Wise's (2005) work in a multicultural suburb of Sydney, Australia, presents an example of such research, with her focus on “hopefully intercultural encounters” that lead to new forms of integration. In addition, South Africa would benefit from further research on qualitative integration in different types of communities from those considered by this research, for example in townhouse developments, a common site for first-time homeowners from a range of racial backgrounds, as well as in areas with a black apartheid history. Indeed “there can be few more important projects that the interweaving of South Africa’s diverse fragmented and unequal population into a unified, responsible, tolerant and proud people” (Chidester et al 2003:295).

Secondly, the findings from this research indicate that integration often occurs in non-neighbourhood institutions, such as churches, schools and the workplace rather than the residential zone, described by Morris as “communit[ies] without propinquity” (1999:223). Thus a further area for research would be to apply this qualitative and process-based understanding of integration to non-residential settings in a more direct fashion (for although research was undertaken in a variety of institutions as part of the
fieldwork for this thesis, they were not the primary focus). Such spaces provide a neutral site of integration that is less affected by apartheid legacies regarding cultural ownership of space.

Thirdly, while this research has focused on the nature of integration amongst those already living in desegregated space, it would seem vital to also consider the opinions and actions of those who choose not to integrate and thus avoid desegregated residential spaces. Although areas of this research have alluded to such attitudes, for example amongst those choosing to live in a gated community (Chapter Six) or create an Improvement District (Chapter Seven) so as to displace either themselves or the ‘other’ away from their residential space, it was not the primary focus of research. In fact, further research in this area suggests that opposition to integration, at least in South Africa, is largely fuelled by fears that although categorised under the label ‘fear of crime’ represent a far wider range of fears (Lemanski 2005). In particular, fear about the future of the nation. Indeed, the 2002 Global Attitudes Survey found that 79% of South Africans are dissatisfied with the progress and future of the nation (Mail and Guardian 2002), which is felt more keenly by Whites and Indians than Black Africans and Coloureds (Forrest 2003). This indicates the need for additional research on those seeking to avoid integration and the reasons fuelling such decisions.

Fourthly, the research has indicated three new urban trends and/or policies in South Africa that provide areas for further empirical research: the new housing policy of locating low-cost housing in wealthy areas (addressed in Chapters 4-7), the rise of gated communities (addressed in Chapter Six), and the eviction of poor residents from dilapidated buildings without consideration for their human rights, and leading to re-segregation (addressed in Chapter Seven). As discussed earlier, in September
2004 the housing minister announced the department’s intention to integrate South Africa’s communities by locating low-cost housing in central areas (Sisulu 2004), facilitated by the creation of mixed-use, mixed-income high density developments on central tracts of public and private land, thus overcoming Cape Town’s history of low-density and urban sprawl (Steenkamp 2004). For example, recent discussions to ensure that new property developments allocate 20% to low-income housing (Mtshali 2005) are an initial step towards achieving this goal. Such radical policies, with the potential to ‘unscramble’ the apartheid legacies of the city, clearly demand further attention, directing research to consider the policy objectives, methods and outcomes of such strategies. In addition, the growing trend of ‘gating’ in South Africa, as wealthy residents choose to distance themselves from the uncertainties of urban life by enclosing themselves into mini-communities or ‘security villages’ is a trend requiring further investigation. Although a plethora of research on the problems of gated communities already exists (see Chapter Six), given the recent opposition to their existence from both Thabo Mbeki, who accuses them of perpetuating apartheid-style separation (Rust 2005a), and the South African Human Rights Commission, which criticises them as a violation of human rights (SAHRC 2005) that lead to dysfunctional cities (Mail and Guardian 2005a), it seems likely that measures to curtail their spread might arise in South Africa. Indeed, even property developers recognise that too many gated communities exist (Business Day 2005), and any preventative measures would provide an interesting parallel for countries worldwide experiencing this phenomenon. Finally, the eviction of poor tenants from dilapidated buildings without consideration of interim housing or social needs identified in Muizenberg is not an isolated incident but represents a common trend in

\[\text{141 Though surprisingly, in August 2005, the City of Johannesburg approved the erection of boom gates in suburbs, despite the SAHRC report describing them as a violation of human rights (Mail and Guardian 2005b).} \]
Johannesburg (Rust 2005b), leading to concerns regarding the human rights implications of such actions.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

To conclude, it has been demonstrated that neighbourhoods can be desegregated but host little or no integration as residents remain in social and spatial enclaves. Despite the absence of neighbourhood-wide integration, cross-race mixing was evident between those sharing equal tenure and socio-economic status: for example poor Black Africans and Coloureds in Westlake village who had previously ‘squatted’ on the land; middle-class White and Black African families in the Marine State cluster of Muizenberg (particularly those that were equally new to the area); and poor Coloureds and Black African immigrants in the Muizenberg village. Such conclusions bear remarkable similarities to Alan Morris’ 1999 study of desegregated Hillbrow in inner-Johannesburg in which he identified that “propinquity, homogeneity and permanence” were the key factors in facilitating cross-race integration (1999:336). Although class has long been recognised as crucial in encouraging deeper integration (e.g. Pettigrew 1975, Roof 1979), the apartheid legacy ensures that race and class continue to be closely linked in South Africa. For example, the importance of residents displaying the ‘correct’ cultural behaviour in order to gain acceptance into Marine State, such as maintaining one’s home and not socialising in the streets, are clearly dictated by both racial (White) and socio-economic (middle-class) identities.

Equal status contact is identified as the crucial factor in encouraging integration at all levels of South Africa’s socio-economic, racial, and spatial hierarchies. Such contact
seems most likely to occur in shared contexts where access is limited to those of a similar status, such as the residential context, the workplace, or university. Although other institutions such as schools, churches and sports clubs provide a context for non-equal status encounters, some level of status-similarity is probable, based on affordability and accessibility of the club, church or school. Obviously, such an emphasis on equal-status mixing is not to suggest that non-equal encounters cannot lead to integration (e.g. based on a common interest or history), but rather to indicate that this is the exception rather than the norm. Furthermore, as South Africans interact at an equal level with those from another race in one context, this should lead to increased willingness to engage in further cross-race relations in other contexts.

Whether the future of South African cities rests in a genuinely non-racial society, or one in which the redistribution of population leads to increased social and spatial ghettoisation, remains to be seen. In so far as the apartheid spatial hierarchy continues to prevail, progress towards social or spatial non-racialism will necessarily be slow.
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