

**Impacts of Development-Induced Displacement on
Urban Locality and Settlers: A Case-Study of the
Railway Upgrading Project in Metro Manila**

by

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Abstract

Population displacement has long been a controversial companion of development. The central tension has been between the position challenging the kind of development that removes people from their homes, livelihoods and communities, and a managerial position that the impoverishment risks of displacement can be mitigated through an effective intervention. Whereas recent research has been devoted to unpacking a rather unsuccessful performance of involuntary resettlement as a mitigation measure, this study aims to question the assumption of mitigation itself by expanding the concept of development impacts beyond the realm of displacement. Through an empirical study of a railway project in Metro Manila, the Philippines, I examine how urban residents are affected by a large-scale demolition and displacement that took place in their locality. Semi-structured interviews were conducted along the railway tracks after the land was cleared of informal settlements since the study placed particular focus on residents who were *not* physically displaced. They are identified in my research as non-displaced people. Few studies have addressed the possibility that other people might have been adversely affected *in situ* and this is particularly so in urban areas.

Empirical findings reveal that the physical environment and socio-economic relationships in the locality were significantly transformed through the clearance; impacting the tenure status, livelihoods and social milieu of non-displaced people. Tenure security was important for avoiding displacement but was not a definitive factor as a number of people are still informal settlers who continue to be faced with other eviction threats. For the non-displaced, the physical change of the locality became relevant when their productive capital, notably, a second house or business space, was affected. The loss or erosion of physical capital had a secondary impact on livelihoods, which was compounded by the rupture in the local livelihood network following a mass population outflow. Whereas the income of locally-based businesses decreased substantially, livelihoods that operate beyond the locality remain relatively resilient. Differentiated experiences of a local change are also reflected in a range of evaluations that describe local social ambience before and after the event. Diverse ways in which non-displaced people were affected underline that the current conceptualisation of impacts is limited to one dimension of displacement. This raises the need to adopt a more holistic and disaggregated approach to understanding the complexities of development impacts. A discussion on whether and how they can be mitigated would benefit further from such a comprehensive study.

Acknowledgement

Seven years ago, by joining the master's programme in Development Studies at the Department of International Development, I entered the arena as a complete novice. Like many young people who are so passionate about the ideal of "making the world a better place", my mind was also occupied by practical action questions such as "how can we solve the problems?" Since then, it has been a long journey to transform my mind-set into that of a researcher until I produce a doctoral thesis criticising that a simplistic, managerial approach to the complexities of problems is a problem in itself.

Development-induced displacement is a topic that I almost stumbled on, while looking for a research case for my master's thesis. I was told from the outset, and was reminded constantly, that DID is a decades-old problem and is not fancy anymore in the international development arena where a drive for finding a new problem (or redefining an old problem in a new style), applying a new methodology and implementing a new project, is so strong. However, that such an old and well-known problem still continues and, even worse, is losing attention is the reason why it is even more problematic and also why I feel strongly about engaging with it more critically. I hope this thesis would contribute to adding that critical edge to the current discussion of DID.

In this journey to grow into a trained researcher from a novice, I have been guided, inspired, supported and loved by so many people. First of all, I am very grateful to Professor Roger Zetter, my supervisor, for raising me in the past seven years with his firm faith, endless encouragement and constant support. I benefited greatly from his academic enthusiasm, conceptual rigour and fresh ideas. Thank you very much, Roger, for guiding me to this point.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AB	Asset Building
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AVF	Asset and Vulnerability Framework
BPO	Business Processing Outsourcing
CBA	Cost-Benefit Analysis
CBD	Central Business District
CHL	Complete Housing Loss
CID	Conflict-Induced Displacement
CMP	Community Mortgage Programme
DFID	Department for International Development
DID	Development-Induced Displacement
DIDR	Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government
DOLE	Department of Labour and Employment
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
EDCF	Economic Development Cooperation Fund
EXIM Bank	Export-Import Bank
HOA	Home Owners' Association
HUDCC	Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IRR	Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction
LGU	Local Government Unit
LIs	Livelihood Impacts
LLN	Local Livelihood Network
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MMDA	Metro Manila Development Authority
NCR	National Capital Region
NHA	National Housing Authority
NHL	No Housing Loss
NID	Natural Disaster-Induced Displacement
NLIs	No Livelihood Impacts
NSCB	National Statistical Coordination Board
NWPC	National Wages and Productivity Commission
OFWs	Overseas Filipino Workers
PAPs	Project-affected persons
PCSO	Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
PHL	Partial Housing Loss
PHP	Philippine Peso
PNR	Philippine National Railways
PPC	Physical Productive Capital
RA	Republic Act
SLF	Sustainable Livelihood Framework
UDHA	Urban Development and Housing Act

UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
USD	US Dollar
USLF	Urban Sustainable Livelihood Framework
WCD	World Commission on Dams

***Exchange rate between Philippine Peso (PHP) and US Dollar (USD)**

1 USD = PHP 45.22 or 1 PHP = 0.22 USD

(<http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=USD&To=PHP> checked on 28 January 2014)

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1. Development-induced displacement: the same old problem?

Population displacement has long been a controversial companion of development, particularly of the kind geared towards economic growth and profit maximisation. Large-scale infrastructure projects have been in the forefront of this drive, involving significant spatial restructuring (Oliver-Smith 2010). As a result, in past decades millions of people have been forcefully removed from their homes, livelihoods and communities (Cernea et al. 1996). Rigorous sociological and anthropological studies over this time period have enhanced our knowledge on the processes and consequences of displacement; they confirm that, almost without exception, affected people have become more impoverished and disempowered (Cernea 2000; World Commission on Dams 2000). This problematic situation whereby those making way for development projects lose out further is acutely captured by the term ‘development-induced displacement’ (DID).¹

Through active resistance and advocacy against DID, affected people and civil society organisations challenged the inequity by which the costs of development are disproportionately borne by displaced people (Mathur and Marsden 1998; Oliver-Smith 1996). In response, involuntary resettlement policies were adopted by major development agencies as a measure to mitigate the negative impacts of displacement (Muggah 2008). However, even with the provision of resettlement, the plight of the

¹ In this study, DID is distinguished from development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR), as displacement of people is not naturally followed by their resettlement unless a resettlement programme is provided. Given this, I use DID for describing a broader situation where displacement takes place and DIDR for referring to a specific condition where a resettlement programme is in place.

displaced has not changed substantially in the more than three decades that have passed since the first resettlement policy was drafted by the World Bank in 1980 (de Wet 2006). Accordingly, recent research has focused on understanding why forced resettlement continues to be ineffective in mitigating the harm caused by displacement (de Wet 2006) or proposing how resettlement can be reformed to be a developmental opportunity in its own right (Cernea and Mathur 2007).

Despite the reality wherein the deleterious impacts of displacement have not yet been effectively addressed, incidents of DID have persisted as a silent companion of land-based development projects. Quantifying the magnitude of DID has always been a challenge and even the few available statistics are now outdated (Oliver-Smith 2010). In the 1990s, the number of persons involuntarily displaced and resettled as a result of infrastructure projects was estimated to be around 10 million annually (McDowell 1996:2). This figure came from the World Bank's review of its projects involving involuntary resettlement between 1986 and 1993, from which global figures were extrapolated (World Bank 1994).² While this remained the single most cited number for a long time, a more recent estimation suggests that about 15 million people are annually displaced, although this in itself is actually likely to be a conservative figure (Oliver-Smith 2010).³

I argue that the seriousness of the problem is *qualitatively* underlined by the spread and persistence of DID itself, in its ever diversifying forms. A UN-HABITAT report on forced eviction⁴ notes that "forced eviction is a global problem", taking place almost everywhere in rich and poor countries alike and in urban as well as rural areas (UN-HABITAT 2011a:1). It also reiterates that "the most prevalent causes of forced eviction are those that arise as a result of *development*" (UN-HABITAT 2011a:34; emphasis added). The sources of DID can be as diverse as the definition of 'development' from infrastructure projects that are conventionally perceived to be the main cause of

² The World Bank-financed programmes accounted for (only) 3 per cent and 1 per cent of involuntary resettlement caused by dam construction and by urban and transportation projects worldwide respectively. Based on this, the global figure was estimated that the construction of the 300 large dams that enter into construction every year, on average, displaced above 4 million people. Furthermore, urban development and transportation programmes are estimated to displace some additional 6 million people every year.

³ With caveats in place regarding the absence of direct statistics, Cernea (2013) projects a conservative estimate that the number of development-displaced people annually will reach between 20 and 25 million people by 2020. He bases his estimation on three indicators: the scale of investments in infrastructure, urbanisation and demographic growth.

⁴ *Forced eviction* has been mainly used by the actors concerned with housing rights and tenure security, particularly in urban contexts. In Chapter 2, I explain the different terminologies pertaining to DID in more detail.

displacement to more macro, structural processes involving more indirect and subtle types of displacement (Penz et al. 2011; C. Robinson 2003; Vandergeest et al. 2007).⁵ Recent DID cases have been propelled by developments in large countries like China and also by the increasing influence of the private sector (Bennett and McDowell 2012; Ferris 2012). Other noticeable drivers include rapid urbanisation and resource extraction such as logging and mining, all of which pose new challenges (Cernea 2013).

The contextual diversity of DID reflects the reality wherein displacement is a central but problematic part of any initiatives with spatial implications. Whereas DID remains a widespread but yet unresolved problem, the discussion on DID is losing traction within the larger international development arena, where it seems to be somewhat dismissed as the same old problem.⁶ Compared to other types of displacement induced by conflicts, natural disasters or climate change, which provoke a sense of crisis and trigger immediate action, DID often takes place in a context where public and private entities with power and resources are driving socio-spatial changes (de Wet 2013). Such initiatives often take place in the name of 'development' and displacement harms tend to be overshadowed by the strong orientation towards generating positive effects. Notably, a public good perception of development has been the main discourse through which people brush off the conflicting interests and rights involved in the situation of DID (Vandergeest et al. 2007).

The positive promises of development projected into the future have long been under scrutiny from a range of perspectives, challenging everything from their ineffective delivery to the narrowness of prevailing conceptions of development itself (Rapley 2007; Rist 2008). The most fundamental critique comes from post-development thinking that rejects a social-engineering view that suggests socio-economic structures can be transformed through planned 'intervention' (Sumner and Tribe 2008). In particular, the modernist ideal of increasing the production of commodities, although originating from the specific tradition of Western history, has gained the character of a myth by drawing its legitimacy from a number of widely shared and seemingly indisputable truths such as economic theories and models (Rist 2008). 'Development'

⁵ Examples of this kind include displacement induced by neoliberal water policies in Thailand (Kooy 2007) and the European Union's preferential trade policy to Cambodia, which has resulted in land grabs for sugar production and population displacement (Pred and Nuijen 2013).

⁶ The need for promoting the significance of the issue and reviving the discussion was the prime motivation behind the International Conference on DIDR that I co-organised at the Refugee Studies Centre on 22–23 March 2013 (Website: <http://www.didrconference.org/>). The sentiment that the stake of DIDR in international development is weakening was widely shared by over 100 participants at the conference.

has then become a series of practices to be applied to different contexts regardless of the contradictions and conflicts that might arise, thereby creating a powerful depoliticising effect (Rist 2008; Ferguson 1994).

Displacement is a sharp rebuttal in itself to the belief in manufacturing 'good' development, as it demonstrates clearly that development is not beneficial to all concerned and there are losers in the process of development; indeed, displaced people are notably adversely affected. In this regard, DID has opened an important window for discussing the contradictions in development, in particular the skewed distribution of its costs and benefits. For a long time, the priority has been firmly on the side of the initiatives that are claimed to be 'developmental' to the marginalisation of displacement. There have been ongoing struggles by affected people to challenge such decisions but the conventional mode of operation has not yet been transformed to the extent that development without displacement becomes a norm rather than an exception. That is, critical thinking is losing its ground in the field of DIDR where the necessity of population displacement is increasingly unquestioned and instead taken as given.

This points to an inherent imbalance in the power to define and implement the idea of 'development'. The issue of power becomes more acute when the source of displacement can only arguably be labelled as 'development'. Privately-led land grabs or clearances are often aimed at for-profit, commercial developments and thus are far less 'developmental' in the conventional sense of generating public good (Bennett and McDowell 2012; Cernea 2013; Price 2007). It is also harder to make private developers accountable for displacement within the current DID governance system, which very much revolves around the state (Price 2007). On the other hand, underlying the repetition of the situation where projects proceed regardless of a displacement outcome is an assumption that displacement harms can be mitigated through intervention. I argue that this is simply another extension of the aforementioned belief in the capacity of rational planning to manage development effects, either positive or negative.

The continuous resorting to forced resettlement despite its unsuccessful track record is a poignant illustration of how strongly the high hopes for intervention have survived the frustration with its poor performance in reality. Where the discussion has narrowed down to the issue of "getting resettlement right", the main concern has been decoupled from broader development discourses that allow the space for critically

rethinking a displacement-inducing project itself, which has become more and more limited. Although involuntary resettlement policy came into existence with the best intention to prevent or minimise displacement harms and is extremely valuable in cases of displacement (Cernea 2000; McDowell 1996), its position that displacement harms can be avoided through effective mitigation is nevertheless fundamentally different from the position that displacement itself can be avoided.

In view of the core tension around development, I raise the need to move the current discussion on displacement beyond the realm of resettlement and elevate it to a level at which the main focus is more on 'development' than on 'displacement'. I attempt to achieve this by making a conceptual departure from the longstanding squabble in which the managerial view that development harms can be mitigated has practically prevailed. Noting that the presence of involuntary resettlement policy might have served the function of paving the way for a project, I focus deliberately on what is being missed by the current intervention and investigate the possibility that other people may have been affected in the process of DID *without* experiencing physical displacement. They are identified in this research as 'non-displaced' people. Their presence, if confirmed, expands the conceptual boundary of 'development' impacts beyond 'displacement' impacts and challenges the underlying assumptions of the current operation that resettlement policy can mitigate the adverse impacts of development. To this end, the focal point of the theoretical discussion and the empirical investigation of my study will thus be on identifying and understanding these non-displacement impacts.

1.2. Research aims and questions: the 'hidden' impacts of urban DID

Through a study of non-displacement impacts, my research aims to demonstrate that a developmental change has broader and more diverse impacts than simple displacement. As compared to the immediate hardship of displaced people, which have been rigorously analysed and has been the focus of interventions so far, the impacts on non-displaced people are largely unknown. Other affected people in a DID context have remained 'invisible' in the discussion, because their losses have been less obviously and readily identifiable. Given the predominantly negative experiences of displaced people, which have been empirically demonstrated, I start my research by hypothesising that non-displaced people may similarly qualify as 'losers' adversely affected by the changes

wrought by DID. Moreover, they become 'hidden' losers as their losses are not likely to be recognised and compensated by mitigating measures such as resettlement policy, which naturally pertains mainly to displaced people by definition.

Identifying non-displacement impacts necessitates two interrelated re-conceptualisations. One is the shift in analytical focus from mobility to immobility, which further requires exploring a broad geographical 'area' where other affected people may be found instead of following the movement of a certain group of 'people' like displaced people. Depending on how we understand 'displacement', the conceptual boundary of DID can also be expanded beyond forced population movement. As an illustration, people from outside the DID circle who are relatively new to the terminology interpret DID creatively in reference to the wider experiences of socio-economic disruptions that are prevalent in development contexts.⁷ The conceptual appeal and expandability of DID indicates how often 'development' is accompanied by dislocation and dispossession, thereby being experienced by people as a violent process that alters existing livelihoods and social relations (Vandergeest et al. 2007). My research into non-displacement impacts is also an attempt to comprehensively understand the transformative nature of development, which can be often disruptive or destabilising.

This leads to the other type of analytical re-conceptualisation. From the perspective of non-displaced people, DID needs to be understood as an event that generates changes *in situ* rather than a central experience in the way that it is for displaced people, who are forced to change their place of living. In this regard, the use of the term 'DID' rather than 'DIDR' is more appropriate for this study since resettlement is neither the direct experience of non-displaced people nor a contextual change in their locality. Furthermore, I specify the source of non-displacement impacts as land clearance and consequent population displacement in order to be more precise.

Studies are lacking at the crossroads where both research needs meet, meaning there has been little effort to understand the broad impacts of a socio-spatial change from the perspective of people who stay put rather than being forced to move. This is not to say that the DIDR literature is free of concern for the population other than displaced people; different categories of 'affected people' have certainly been identified. For instance, it is noted that 'hidden' losers may emerge in cases of dam construction when

⁷ Sources: comments from the 2nd Asia-Pacific Regional Conference on Community Development (Los Banos, Philippines, 20–22 October 2010) and from Royal Geography Society (RGS) Annual Conference (London, United Kingdom, 31 August–2 September 2011).

priorities are given to upstream over downstream communities, or current over future generations, or rural over urban areas, or human over nature, etc. (World Commission on Dams 2000). However, little has been investigated on the actual experience of non-displaced people and even the existing few are confined to rural areas (Mahapatra 1998; Scudder 1996). On the other hand, despite the similarities it has to other contexts of stress or shock initiated by macroeconomic programmes (e.g. Moser 1998), natural disasters (Zoleta-Nantes 2002) or other socio-spatial changes such as gentrification, DID is rarely conceptualised as a contingency or a source of challenge, therefore remaining disconnected from this body of literature.

I attempt to fill this important knowledge gap by examining non-displacement impacts in the context of an urban infrastructure project. Urban areas provide an interesting site for investigation as the contested nature of development is visually epitomised in the way that urban spaces are transformed by dominant socio-economic priorities. A strong drive has shaped cities as sites of growth and profit maximisation, which has been propelled further by the neoliberal model of development (Beall and Fox 2009; Zetter 2004). Infrastructure projects occupy an interesting position in urban changes as they are promoted as being necessary for addressing a range of urban challenges from providing public services to enhancing urban productivity, while, almost certainly, they require some degree of land clearance and impact the existing patterns of land use.

With the increasing numbers of urban displacement following rapid urbanisation and intensifying competition over urban spaces (Mathur 2006; C. Robinson 2003), it is useful to reconceptualise urban displacement as part of the urban change processes within which exclusion and marginalisation may take place. The analytical lens of non-displacement impacts is unique as it requires a contextualised understanding of urban areas prior to a change, in particular, the complex ways in which urban residents organise their socio-economic well-being, which is an understanding hitherto limited in the DIDR literature. Simultaneously, it offers an opportunity to examine the effects of urban changes across time and different modes of living because non-displaced people have remained in the same locality throughout the urban change, whereas for displaced people it is the change of their living environment that constitutes the most important factor in their struggle. That is, when seen as an external shock, the event of displacement reveals existing vulnerabilities as well as coping strategies more clearly. For better understanding of both the pre-contexts and the impacts of urban changes, I draw on a range of urban literature that provides insights into the structural

constraints and multiple contingencies within which urban residents make their living, in particular those specific to the Philippines, the context of the research.

Using an empirical case study of the North Rail–South Rail Linkage Project in Metro Manila, I examine how settlers remaining in the urban locality are affected by the consequence of land clearance and population displacement. The long overdue renewal of the rail tracks that finally took place in the period between 2007 and 2010 required the demolition of informal settlements⁸ along the railway, which resulted in the displacement of over 35,000 families. Despite the provision of a relocation programme, the railway project turned out to be a stereotypical DIDR case in which displaced people have become impoverished (Choi 2008).

With even the obvious problem of displacement not being effectively addressed, unsurprisingly the issue of non-displacement impacts was largely overshadowed at the time of displacement and relocation. Once the ‘messiness’ of DIDR is settled, however, it becomes clear that people who have stayed behind were also affected by the local changes. A striking degree of physical transformation in the local landscape is vividly captured by a set of two photos taken at the same location along the railway tracks, one in 2007 and the other in 2010. They not only provide a real ‘feel’ for the change but also suggest that there remain more settlements and urban residents in the locality, for whom the underlying socio-economic significance can go far beyond the visible changes.

⁸ I define informal settlements by the concept of land invasion and refer to those settlements established on land occupied by people who do not have a legal ownership or right. For further details on the definition of informal settlements, see Section 3.3.1 on informal settlements.

Figure 1: The railway area in 2007



Photo by Beom-chan Choi

Figure 2: The railway area in 2010



Photo by Beom-chan Choi

For identifying and understanding the impacts of DID on the locality and its non-displaced settlers, I explore three sets of questions:

- a) Who remained along the railway tracks and how did they manage to stay on while others were displaced by land clearance?
- b) How did the physical and socio-economic environment of the area change?
- c) How were the remaining residents affected by the local changes? Who became more vulnerable and who remained resilient?

The main source of local change was land clearance as a prerequisite component of the railway project to secure the right of way for train services; thus, the demolition of informal houses and the displacement of informal settlers constitute the direct consequence of the railway project. The clearance transformed the physical and socio-economic environments of the area, which further affected the lives of the remaining residents. That is, non-displacement impacts were mediated by the socio-spatial change of the locality, instead of coming directly from the railway project, and thereby made local residents indirectly affected people of the railway project.

In order to examine the indirect impacts of the change, it is necessary to understand the ways in which urban residents organised their life within and around the informal settlements along the railway prior to the clearance. For delineating the features of an urban life, I use livelihoods as the main lens through which to analyse various modes of arranging resources, notably land for housing, managing livelihoods, and forming social relationships. Livelihoods remain one of the understudied aspects of urban DIDR as compared to conventional concern with the issues of shelter needs and tenure security (Koenig 2009). Focusing on livelihoods is particularly relevant for studying the experiences of non-displaced people as they did not move from their homes but might nonetheless have been otherwise impacted *in situ*.

First of all, I flesh out who became vulnerable to local changes and identify the sources of their vulnerability. The main hypothesis is that urban residents were differentially affected depending on the degree to which they relied on the local economy and social networks formed around informal settlements. Furthermore, I investigate whether the magnitude and the implication of impact varied for people who were differently positioned in terms of resource arrangement, livelihood security and social relationships prior to the event. Given that it was hard to foresee and even harder to prepare for local changes by non-displaced residents, who also were not recognised by the policy interventions as legitimate concerns, living conditions prior to the event are considered to be an important factor determining the capacity to cope with and recover from any adverse impacts. Particular attention is paid to those living on the margin and

how their precarious mode of managing their livelihoods was affected. Lastly, it is important to note that, although being built upon an anticipation of negative experiences by non-displaced affected people, this research is open to the possibility of *non-impacts* whereby urban residents stay intact and furthermore to the potentially positive effects of local changes following DID.

1.3. Thesis structure

The current chapter is an introduction to the thesis wherein the research problem is stated and in view of which the research aims and questions are formulated. The overall aim of this study is to conceptually engage with the manner in which development impacts are addressed in the context of DID. By demonstrating that development impacts can be broader than just displacement, I intend to challenge the managerial proposition that displacement harms can be mitigated through an intervention like involuntary resettlement policy. For this purpose, I investigate whether and how non-displaced settlers might have been affected by the clearance of informal settlements for the railway-upgrading project in Metro Manila. Considering the diversity within urban settlements, the main focus of analysis is on discerning the differential impacts of changes.

In Chapter 2, I situate the study of non-displacement impacts within the DIDR literature, particularly within its core debate on how we distribute the costs and the benefits of a developmental change that involves population displacement. Resettlement policy as a main measure to address the negative impacts of displacement has proved to be ineffective, which has been conventionally explained in terms of the insufficient resource inputs into, and inherent complexities of, DIDR. By means of impacts other than displacement or non-displacement impacts, I point out the conceptual limitation of the current distributional discussion that is centred very much on displacement and assumes the efficacy of distributional justice with a relatively crude measure like resettlement. Based on this critique, I suggest that we broaden the discursive platform by accommodating a range of impacts in a developmental change.

Chapter 3 contextualises the research within the specifics of urban areas by drawing insights from urban-focused studies. Here I aim to clarify the concepts and theories I will use for empirical analyses in the coming chapters. First, I argue that urban displacement has long been marginalised as a research topic and not recognised as a significant problem in urban development. This is in part explained by the lack of

communication between relevant areas of study (such as urban studies, development studies and forced migration studies), which in turn necessitates more cross-fertilisation. Second, by foregrounding non-displaced residents, urban displacement is presented as one of many contexts wherein their socio-economic environments are reconfigured, through which they may experience countless challenges. In particular, the complex interrelationships between urban poverty and informality are explored as main sources of vulnerability in a DID context, while livelihoods are presented as an arena where the agency and the resilience of people stand out.

In Chapter 4, the research methodology is discussed. The process of data collection from the design of an interview instrument to sampling and through to interviewing is elaborated, together with the timeline and the geographical scope of the field research. The focal point of analysis is to reconstruct the life preconditions of urban residents who were included in my study, using the data collected at a point when their locality was altered by land clearance and population displacement. Grounded theory is deployed as an analytical method for the purpose of conceptualising the abstract features of an urban life within and around informal settlements. They are organised in three main domains – housing, livelihoods and social relationships – and I present an analytical outline for examining the impacts across these life domains. *Informal arrangements* of resources are identified both as a mode of living in a normal context and a major vulnerability in the event of a socio-spatial change. I conclude the chapter by discussing methodological reflections.

Empirical findings are presented in the following four chapters (from Chapter 5 to Chapter 8). In Chapter 5, the research context is explained, i.e. the railway-upgrading project in Metro Manila and its resettlement programme. Against this background, I demarcate the research scope by categorising affected people, differentiated by means of types of housing impact and the places where people stay after the event. I provide an overview of collective changes in the locality whereby land clearance compounded by the mass-scale displacement of informal settlers has changed the physical and socio-economic environment of the area significantly, which further impacts on the livelihoods and the social relations of individual households.

In Chapter 6, I analyse the housing impacts of land clearance against detailed background explanations of the different modes by which people arranged land and housing in the locality. The formality of tenure becomes particularly important in the event of displacement for determining not only people's capacity to avoid displacement

but also the security of their remaining housing status. In this regard, the tenure formalisation process initiated by some residents along the railway was crucial for them in order to be able to stay in the city. On the contrary, remaining informal settlers suffered from increased tenure insecurity after the clearance. More importantly, for non-displaced people housing as an asset turned out to be more important than as a residential space, meaning they experienced further impacts on their resource pool and livelihoods.

Broader impacts on local livelihoods are comprehensively examined in Chapter 7. Livelihood impacts come through two main channels: when physical capital for livelihoods was arranged in the demolished informal settlements and livelihoods relied on the local network. It turns out that urban settlers, whether poor or non-poor, engaged widely with the local economy around the informal settlements and thus were adversely affected when the physical platform and the social network was disrupted by land clearance and displacement. However, the magnitude of impacts and the capacity to cope varied vastly depending on the security of the overall household portfolio. In addition, over half of the research participants did not experience adverse livelihood impacts, thereby functioning as a comparison group that contributes to teasing out the features of livelihood vulnerability and resilience more clearly.

In Chapter 8, I discuss the social implications of local changes. First, I explore the impacts on social relationships in view of the ways in which local residents interacted before displacement. The most evident change was found within family ties that emerged as one of the most important forms of social capital, with the people involved having a strong culture of *helping each other*. On the other hand, multiple divisions were also identified along which only limited relationships appear to have been formed. In such cases, the social impacts of a large-scale displacement were relatively minimal. It should be noted, however, that the complex patterns of social interaction are explained less by the experience of displacement (i.e. whether or not one has been displaced) than by other factors such as the formality of tenure status or socio-economic status. Second, I also explore collective changes in the local ambiance. The decrease in the number and the dynamism of community organisation was noticeable while the evaluations of local changes were remarkably different between non-displaced residents with limited relationships to displaced people and others closer to them.

The overarching implications of the research findings across life domains are synthesised in the concluding chapter (Chapter 9). The overall trend is that those who were more insecure in terms of tenure and livelihoods tend to have become vulnerable as a result of large-scale demolition and displacement. The source of vulnerability arises from the informal ways in which people arranged their resources and managed livelihoods. On the other hand, the capacity to cope with impacts or remain resilient varied greatly depending on the size and the diversity of a household resource pool. Likewise, people who had more meaningful relationships with informal settlers felt considerable changes in their social life, whereas most non-displaced people tend to evaluate the change in the local ambiance more positively. We can see, then, that displacement provides an acute lens through which to examine the existing divisions and vulnerabilities in urban settlements.

Complex and differential impacts experienced by non-displaced people make it difficult to label them collectively as 'losers', in contrast to the initial assumption that non-displacement impacts may be less visible than displacement impacts but may also be adverse. Nonetheless, non-displacement impacts yet remain 'hidden', thereby giving rise to the proposal that development impacts must be understood and discussed in their diversity, encompassing both the most obvious impacts (such as physical displacement) and more subtle, but significant, non-displacement impacts (such as the impoverishment of remaining settlers *in situ*). Furthermore, this underlines the importance of deploying a disaggregated approach to unpacking the complexity of impacts, although it is questionable to what extent such diverse effects can be incorporated into, and addressed by, policy interventions.

Chapter 2

Development and Displacement: A Review of the Literature

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I situate the aim and the questions of my research within the existing debates on development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR). At the core of the controversy around the situation where a development project takes place at the cost of population displacement is the question of how we distribute the costs and benefits of development. I introduce one main line of discussion that is concerned with whether and how the impacts of displacement can be mitigated. In particular, resettlement policy is an intervention measure explicitly designed for that purpose. However, its effectiveness in addressing displacement harms has already been empirically interrogated and questioned. In line with the critique raised by social movements, I argue that this undermines the premise of the current development decision-making that development effects can be managed through effective intervention. More importantly, I point out the conceptual limitations in the distributional discussion to encompass other cases in which people are not displaced but may have been affected in the process of DIDR. My research is an attempt to engage with this critical questioning by expanding the concept of development impacts through the study of non-displaced yet still affected people, thus addressing one of the major gaps in the DIDR literature.

2.2. Displacement as development cost

Displacement induced by a planned change has provoked moral and political debates because the necessity of displacement is intrinsically debatable, unlike is the case for other types of forced migration such as conflict-induced displacement and

environmentally induced displacement. For the former, displacement takes place within a complicated political situation where it is difficult to foresee the coming displacement in advance and also to pinpoint the parties accountable for preventing it. For displacement arising from natural disasters, the urgency of coping with the calamity takes precedence over the quest to establish its causes and in the case of slower-onset climate change, the causality of impact is hard to establish. On the contrary, development-induced displacement (DID) has a clearly defined cause – i.e. a development project – and also takes place within the relatively confined boundary of a given project where it is easier to identify relevant stakeholders and where it is possible, at least in principle, to have debates about the course of displacement as well as its accountability.⁹

That population movement is considered and included as part of a planned change raises a series of critical questions such as whether DID is inevitable in the first place, under what conditions DID can be justified (Penz 2002a) and who has the power to make such decision (Oliver-Smith 2002). First of all, the detrimental effects of displacement have made the distribution of the costs and the benefits of development a central issue in DID (McDowell 1996; Serra 1993). In particular, I introduce a managerial approach that endorses displacement-inducing projects with a conviction that the balance between the costs and the benefits of development can be maintained through effective interventions. While the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a tool that prioritises positive effects, resettlement policy is a measure primarily concerned with addressing the harms of displacement as one of the most obvious costs of development. More broadly, however, answers to the fundamental questions rest upon value systems within which different priorities are given to a range of values (Oliver-Smith 2010; Penz 2002a). As long as such changes come in the name of ‘development’, DID becomes a critical arena wherein the meanings and the practices of ‘development’ are highly contested. In view of this, I discuss in the next section how the challenge of achieving distributional justice or an equitable share of costs and benefits lies in an imbalance in the power to define and implement one’s view of ‘development.’

⁹ Depending on how we define ‘development’, however, the strength of causality between development and displacement may vary. For instance, displacement may occur in the process of macroeconomic structural programmes but it will be difficult to attribute displacement only to such broad and multifaceted changes.

2.2.1. Distribution of development impacts

The distribution of development effects revolves around three main issues: (a) whether the benefits of the project outweigh the costs; (b) the way in which they are distributed between people; and (c) whether such distribution is equitable (Adams 2000). The first question forms a minimal ground on which to justify a project as ‘developmental’, given the positive connotation that development conveys. Development is a clearly value-ridden and contested concept, which requires a detailed discussion of its own. For the purpose of moving the discussion forward, however, I adopt the ‘descriptive’ definition suggested by Penz et al. (2011: 40-42)¹⁰: “enhanced production or distribution of perceived public or private goods”. In view of this, they point out correctly that there are projects and policies that are ethically problematic or do more harm than good, which may be regarded as ‘mal-development’ and not as development.

Giving priority to positive impacts: CBA

In terms of examining the developmental nature of an intervention, there has been an active discussion in international development, particularly in the aid industry, on the evaluation of development ‘effectiveness’. At its core has been the issue of whether development has actually achieved its own goals or whether the anticipated benefits have been realised (e.g. Easterly and Center for Global Development. 2008).¹¹ While impact evaluation is focused on the affirmation of positive impact-generation, the pre-project version of promoting positive effects is a ‘balance sheet’ approach that endorses a project when its benefits exceed the costs. The CBA is a noteworthy operational tool within this balance sheet approach, which derives from the economic theory of ‘Pareto improvement’ (Kanbur 2007; Pearce and Swanson 2007). Pareto improvement takes place when, compared to the *status quo ex ante*, at least one individual is made better off and no individual is made worse off. Thus, in principle, it can be a measure for evaluating improvements in terms of the personal wellbeing of each and every

¹⁰ They distinguish between the normative definition and descriptive definition of ‘development’, whereby the latter means a definition before normative judgements such as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ development are made.

¹¹ *Ex-post* monitoring and evaluation is widely known as ‘impact evaluation’, whereas environmental and/or social impact assessment is an *ex-ante* activity aimed at scoping the potential impacts of a project (Morgan 1998). For clarification, my research differs from both exercises. First, it is a study of the unintended or indirect impacts of a project as compared to the examination of the project effectiveness in delivering its intended outcomes (i.e. impact evaluation). Second, my study explores broad impacts of a project *after* the effect and thus its temporality is different from an impact assessment.

individual (Pearce and Swanson 2007). However, in practice, a Pareto improvement is almost non-existent and a CBA has been proposed as a compromise alternative, which aggregates the gains of the gainers and the losses of the losers for comparison (Kanbur 2007).

The CBA is premised on an idea that, if compensation could be paid *in principle* so as to leave everyone better off, the project should go ahead (Pearce and Swanson 2007). If compensation is actually paid, the Pareto criterion is satisfied and there is no further problem. Even though compensation is not paid, however, as long as the gains are of a great enough magnitude to allow the gainers to be able *hypothetically* to compensate the losers and still to have gains left over, a project is deemed socially beneficial and justifiable. Since an actual act of compensation is not required, it is logically the same as giving everyone an equal weight in the CBA, instead of an egalitarian weight that gives a much larger weight to the gains and losses of the poor than those of the rich (Kanbur 2007). Aggregation without weighting makes CBA insensitive to individual differences in sharing both costs and benefits, leaving unanswered distributional questions such as who enjoys the benefits and who bears the costs or to what extent. Projects tend to proceed when interrogated using a CBA since the project benefits are likely to exceed the aggregated costs given that cost-bearers in a DID context are likely to be poor and their purchasing power is too low to 'buy-off' and prevent the project (Pearce and Swanson 2007).

In its emphasis on positive effects, the actual distribution of benefits and costs is not discussed and the adverse effects of development are left to the law of large numbers, whereby the assumption is that, over a large number of projects, the distributional effects would cancel out if the benefits and losses are distributed at random among the population (Kanbur 2007). The technical idea behind the CBA is translated in well-known utilitarian discourses such as the Benthamite maxim of 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number'. Likewise, a project or policy, supposedly serving public purposes or creating greater good, is justified on the assumption that its benefits will 'trickle down' to compensate the costs – including of course the sufferings of displaced people (Mehta 2008; Vandergeest et al. 2007).

However, when the concern for cost-bearers is not considered within a project evaluation such as the internal rate of return, which measures the financial feasibility of a project, such costs in reality are often externalised and borne disproportionately by displaced people (Cernea 2003, 2007). Even in regard to benefit-sharing, Sen (1984)

makes the criticism that utilitarian aggregation is only concerned with the increase in utilities in sum, which is independent of distribution and insensitive to inequalities in individual utilities (Sen and Foster 1997). CBA is also criticised for its narrow conceptualisation of costs and benefits, which is primarily focused on material kinds that can be quantifiable or measured in monetary terms (Cernea 1999; Morvaridi 2008; Oliver-Smith 2002). This leaves out most social, cultural and environmental costs from its equation, which, when combined together, would undermine the overall benefits of a project to the extent that it becomes undesirable were they to be given due consideration. Indeed, the cost of compensating displaced people in monetary terms alone may have made a project financially unfeasible, had it been taken into account as part of the project costs.

Even if a project has positive effects and these benefits are equally shared among relevant stakeholders, a problem remains when there are harms that cannot be restored by benefit-sharing. One perspective that is specifically concerned with irreparable harms is the one valuing self-determination, i.e. the freedom and control (in the libertarian sense) either of an individual (a libertarian approach) or of a community (a communitarian approach) (Penz 2002a). In this view, the forced nature of displacement can never be justified for it allows people no choice but to leave their home. Although self-determination is an important value, it is still debatable whether or not to support the ethical position based on it, which gives affected people the right to veto a project (de Wet 2006). Penz (2002b: 4) disapproves of the veto power on the grounds that the libertarian definition of self-determination pertains only to the freedom of property-owners and neglects the rights of those without legal ownership to occupy land. More broadly, it is argued that we need to consider a range of conflicting rights including the rights of others to the benefits of development (Penz 2002a; Penz et al. 2011).

This brings in questions regarding the actual method of factoring the costs together with the benefits in the distribution of development effects and examining the equity of its share. In view of a specific concern with displacement harms, involuntary resettlement is presented as a measure targeted at compensating cost-bearers, although its actual effectiveness is largely shaped by whether and to what extent relevant stakeholders can participate in development planning and decision-making. I discuss the challenge of creating a deliberative and democratic space for distributional discussion in Section 2.3.

Concerns with negative impacts: Involuntary resettlement policy

Spearheaded by pioneering studies conducted back in the 1950s (Colson 1971; Scudder 1991), a large body of illuminating research has collated devastating experiences of DID all over the world for over half a century since the modernisation ideal became a global agenda after World War Two. Unlike the conventional assumption that the benefits would offset development costs, these studies suggest that adversely affected people do not necessarily benefit from the projects¹² and often do not recover from the harms caused in the end (Bennett and McDowell 2012; McDowell 1996; World Commission on Dams 2000). Their sufferings have given rise to an ethical and practical need to address development costs by specifically compensating cost-bearers. Without compensation *in practice*, people forcibly displaced to make way for projects remain losers, not only because they have been unable to maintain their *status quo* but also because they have become worse off relative to the gainers (Kanbur 2007). From a pragmatic stand point, moreover, it has been increasingly noted that resistance to displacement delays a project and thereby tends to increase the project cost (Cernea 2000).

Based on the accumulated knowledge, a proposition emerged that the impacts of displacement, although deleterious, are not unavoidable as long as effective intervention can be designed to prevent the well-known harms of displacement (Cernea 2000; McDowell 1996). In order to channel the existing knowledge on the processes and consequences of displacement into the operational mechanisms of development agencies, Cernea – in his role as the first in-house sociologist at the World Bank – proposed the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model. Through an extensive surveying of past research, he discovered a basic pattern of impoverishment in the majority of cases and identified eight main risks that are closely interlinked: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of common property resources, and community disarticulation (Cernea 2000).¹³ In addition to predicting impoverishment risks, the primary function of the IRR model is to map out the ways to prevent them and furthermore to turn them into reconstruction opportunities. Hence, the model suggests

¹² For example, in my research, former informal settlers displaced for the railway project were resettled in remote sites far away from the railway tracks; they therefore cannot benefit from the upgraded train services.

¹³ Studies that have applied the IRR model to various contexts propose other risk factors be added, such as loss of access to community services (not just common property resources), a disruption to education and a violation of human rights (Robinson 2003).

a policy action that turns each risk on its head, for example by addressing landlessness through land-based resettlement, joblessness through reemployment, and homelessness through house reconstruction.

Attempts to realise the core idea of risk prevention and reconstruction as represented in the IRR model resulted in “the generation of resettlement guidelines and resettlement policies” over the last three decades (de Wet 2006: 1). This documentation was also largely a result of active international advocacy by affected people, civil society organisations, concerned academics and development practitioners (Muggah 2008). Starting from the World Bank in 1980, regional development banks adopted their own resettlement policy such as the Asian Development Bank (1995), African Development Bank (1995) and Inter-American Development Bank (1998). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also proposed policy guidelines regarding population displacement and relocation to all the member countries’ international aid agencies (Cernea and Guggenheim 1993). More recently, in 2007, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on adequate housing presented to the Human Rights Council a set of “Basic principles and guidelines on development-based evictions and displacement”.¹⁴

In terms of the way in which problems are framed and intervention goals are stated, there are interesting differences between the policies of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) and the guidelines of the UN agencies, with the former focused on safeguarding the livelihoods of affected people and the latter concerned with upholding human rights throughout the process (UN-HABITAT 2011a). Implementation guidelines also vary in their details, particularly between national and international policies; examples in this vein include the varying levels of recognition of informal or customary land rights and compensation for affected livelihoods. Nonetheless, the shared baseline is that a case of displacement should be prevented to the best of people’s ability or at least be minimised; then, in cases where displacement is inevitable, the common goal is to mitigate its negative impacts on affected people. A proposal has been taken further to promote involuntary resettlement as a developmental opportunity through which the living standards of those displaced are not only

¹⁴ This is contained in Annex I of the report of the Special Rapporteur (A/HRC/4/18) (<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Housing/Pages/ForcedEvictions.aspx>; accessed 19 December 2012). This is a development of the previous guidelines such as United Nations Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines on Development-based Displacement (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/7, annex).

restored but improved (Cernea 2003; Price 2007).¹⁵ In sum, involuntary resettlement policy has been an intervention embodying an explicit concern for displaced people with the potential to balance the benefits and the costs of development projects.

However, whether or not resettlement policy has mitigated the adverse impacts of displacement is an empirical question. Doubtless, it is important to have a legal framework protecting the rights of displaced people and compensating them for the harm inflicted on them. Nonetheless, it turns out that having a safeguard policy is not in itself sufficient for delivering its said goals. Unfortunately, the reality has not been so close to the ideal envisioned in policy whereby “resettled people are both economically better off and socially stable in their new settlements in a manner that has shown itself to be sustainable over time” (de Wet 2006: 180). The gap repeatedly emerging between policy and implementation has led to an acute question: “why policy guidelines designed to prevent impoverishment are not achieving stated objectives” (Rew et al. 2000: 5). Two kinds of explanation are identified: one focuses on the ‘insufficient inputs’ into resettlement projects and the other is concerned with the ‘inherent complexities’ of forced resettlement (de Wet 2006: 2).

The first approach attributes the poor performance of resettlement policy to insufficiencies in necessary inputs. Many governments lack a legal and policy framework for resettlement at the national level and tend to employ project-based resettlement action plans (if any attempt is made at all), although situations without any plans are known to be much worse (Price 2007).¹⁶ Not only is the political will of the state to seriously implement resettlement policy weak, its institutional capacity is also limited as resettlement teams are short of expertise or staff (Parasuraman 1999; Tamondong-Helin 1996). The cost of resettlement is often underestimated in the project evaluation and thus resettlement suffers from poor financing (Cernea 2003).

The second approach proposes that forced resettlement is an inherently complex process that is often beyond the control of rational planning (de Wet 2006). The

¹⁵ In this light, the policy of resettlement with development in regard to China’s Three Gorges Dam is widely cited as a representative case of its application (Cernea 2007; 2013), although the evaluation of its actual outcome is actually too complex to allow it to be labelled a benchmark case (McDonald et al. 2008; Wilmsen et al. 2011; Xi 2013).

¹⁶ There are interesting studies examining the possibility of safeguarding the rights of displaced people in the near absence of state protection or intervention. Price (2013) discusses whether negotiated resettlement with the private sector developers may open an opportunity for enhanced agency and empowerment of displacement people. Kavanagh (2013) presents multiple cases of community action to negotiate unofficial remedies to DIDR in the context of Burma, where the state fails to implement meaningful norms.

institution of resettlement policy is comprised of multiple actors from policymakers to 'street-level' officers, who recreate policy as a document by reinterpreting it and making decisions at their discretion as the implementation process unfolds (Rew et al. 2000). While administrators struggle with practical challenges of their own, responsibilities are easily lost amidst poor communication and coordination, leading to implementation deficits (Rew 1996; Rew et al. 2000). Meanwhile, the resettled people themselves have to develop new sets of socio-economic relationships in unfamiliar sites amidst fierce competition for resources. The challenge of adjustment is further exacerbated by the agenda and timetable of an outside agency, which accelerates the pace of changes and undermines the control of people over their daily life (de Wet 2006).

Focusing on different aspects of DIDR, the two approaches raise different sets of questions, from which distinctive proposals emerge. Central to the notion of insufficient inputs is the question of what is missing *in* resettlement policy, which naturally leads to a discussion on the provision of more inputs for making resettlement work. While valuable, such discussion needs to be situated within the political economy of DIDR since improving the quality and quantity of necessary inputs for resettlement depends on political decisions that do not easily materialise without pressure from affected people and civil society (Cernea 2007; de Wet 2001). An accountability gap thus prevails, where the less powerful do not have the means to hold those responsible for addressing the harms of displacement to their mandates (Mehta 2008), a discrepancy which can be further exacerbated by administrative distortion and corruption (Cernea 2003). In this regard, the view of resettlement as a complex process broadens the discussion by questioning what is missed *by* policy practice, the answers to which would shed light on the nature and limitations of policy-making and planning. At the core of the complexities are the conflicting interests and rights of multiple stakeholders, among whom power imbalances are paramount (Koenig 2002). In the next section, I discuss this power dynamic that goes beyond the realm of resettlement policy-making and planning, whereby 'development' is contested, conceived and practiced.

2.3. Displacement as a development critique

Cases of DID have continued even though the outcomes of impoverishment have not been sufficiently addressed by resettlement policy. Beyond indicating the ineffectiveness of policy implementation, the persistence of DID demonstrates more

broadly that development decision-making is geared toward the generation of positive effects. As long as the priority is given to building infrastructure and generating revenue cases of DID will continue, while the uncomfortable coexistence of development and displacement will be overshadowed by the persistent and strong emphasis on the positive effects of development. Notably, the promotion of large-scale infrastructure projects as symbols of 'modernisation', heralding national development, has had the discursive effect of silencing their adverse effects, including mass-scale displacement (Leopoldo Jose Bartolomé et al. 2000; Mehta 2008; Muggah 2008). Driven by the need to fit mega-projects to the political or nationalist objectives of the state, the wellbeing of displaced people often get degraded to a secondary concern (de Wet 2006). Accordingly, compared to 'main' projects, resettlement is also sidelined (Cernea and Mathur 2007) and is implemented in complete separation from the main project (Rew et al. 2000). Given the marginal status of displacement then, a resettlement programme, if implemented at all, is likely to serve the function of simply moving people out of the area required for such projects (de Wet 2006: 187).

Within the broader international development arena, the narrow conceptualisation of positive effects centred on economic growth has been increasingly challenged as the view of development itself has expanded to incorporate new and alternative agendas, including poverty reduction, environmental protection, social justice and an expansion of the social, cultural and political freedom of the people (Rapley 2007; Rist 2008; Sen 1999). When situated within the diverse sets of values that are held by different actors such as the authorities, other organisations and communities affected (or even neglected) in the process of development (Penz 2002b), displacement reveals a paradox whereby 'development' undermines the livelihood entitlements, basic needs and human rights of people (Leopoldo Jose Bartolomé et al. 2000). As such, displacement thus becomes a more acute pointer to the contested nature of development. For instance, transposed against the global agenda of poverty reduction, notably represented by the Millennium Development Goals, the impoverishment risks of displacement points to a development dilemma wherein poverty-creation processes coexist with efforts toward poverty reduction under the same name of 'development' (Bose et al. 2003; Cernea 1997; Downing 2002). However, despite being one of the main mechanisms by which poverty is reproduced or deepened, displacement remains outside the concerns grouped under the theme of 'poverty reduction', which are more oriented towards 'getting the poor out of poverty' than preventing the poor from 'slipping deeper into poverty' (Berner et al. 2008; Moser 1998). This once again

demonstrates the prevalent myth of creating 'good' development, which marginalises its potential harms such as population displacement.¹⁷

Following from this, a more comprehensive definition of development revealing its contested nature therefore allows more room for identifying the adverse effects of development:

'Development' consists of a set of practices, sometimes appearing to conflict with one another, which require – for the reproduction of society – the general transformation and destruction of the natural environment and of social relations. Its aim is to increase the production of commodities (goods and services) geared, by way of exchange, to effective demand. (Rist 2008:13)

Reading this from the perspective of population displacement, it becomes clear where the risks of impoverishment arise (e.g. transformation of the natural environment and social relations) and in exchange of what values. On the other hand, without a concern for displacement or any other potential harms, it is far easier to focus on the 'good' that development promises (e.g. to increase the production of commodities). In this vein then, development is a selective process by which certain values are spotlighted while others are brushed into the background; it is thus fundamentally related to the power to set priorities. In view of this, the marginalisation of the sufferings and the voices of displaced people indicate that decision-making power resides with the state or the private sector as project proprietors (Cernea 2007; Oliver-Smith 2002).

Political challenges to the power imbalance have taken place mostly outside the policy arena, which has been predominantly led by states, donors and private-sector actors (Mathur and Marsden 1998; Oliver-Smith 2002). DIDR movements often start from a specific project in a confined local context, thus reflecting the most immediate concerns of local people, and represent a range of positions from advocating avoidance of involuntary resettlement at all costs (thus often resisting a project itself) to having better-quality resettlement; however, in terms of a common thread they tend to be connected with broader movements or other groups sharing their values and experiences (Oliver-Smith 2002; Penz et al. 2011). In particular, in the era of globally dynamic activism, DIDR resistance movements often scale up to become connected to global movements promoting an alternative view of development that is people-

¹⁷ One indicator of the marginalisation of displacement within international development is that there is no specific international agency mandated to address the issue of DIDR, although there has been an attempt. In 2004, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) established the Advisory Group on Forced Eviction (AGFE) with a mandate to monitor forced eviction and to promote alternative solutions such as *in situ* upgrading. However, UN-HABITAT (2011a:14–15) notes that the visibility of the work by AGFE has been yet limited.

centred, culturally sensitive and environmentally sustainable (Muggah 2008). Even though community-level mobilisation may not convey a strong alternative development agenda, displaced people's engagement with the developmental process, either through resistance, negotiation, or asserted participation, is valuable in itself as an act of voicing their views on the development process and attempting to enlarge the participatory space (Bennett and McDowell 2012; Choi 2008). Through such engagement, people can restore some control over their life and thus overcome the feeling of powerlessness (Oliver-Smith 1996).

In the actual process of engagement, the gulf between different perspectives of development is apparent in the ways different actors engage with the issue of DIDR. For instance, in his analysis of various cases of indigenous people's resistance to dam projects, Gray (1996) finds that resistance movements question the viability of dams in view of the environmental degradation and social disruption, whereas the promoters of hydro-electric schemes are focused on ameliorating the adverse effects without contesting the very idea of dam construction itself. Such attempts of amelioration to the goal of moving the projects forward then end up creating a 'resettlement industry' Rather than treating the complex issue as a developmental concern in itself.

So, it seems there is an irreconcilable chasm or inherent incompatibility between the complexity of DIDR and the clarity of criteria required for planning and decision-making (de Wet 2006: 199). Led by an economic and operational perspective, the industry resorts to 'blueprints' and 'checkboxes' (Ferguson 1994; Hoover 2001), an approach which falls far short of a holistic treatment of the economic, political, historical and religious aspects of affected people's lives (Gray 1996). Local knowledge and experiences are neither sufficiently understood nor incorporated by the 'experts' in the top-down implementation processes favoured by governments and development agencies (Bennett and McDowell 2012; Koenig 2002). Consequently, even with the best intentions and sufficient resources, the outcome is often against affected people's rights and wellbeing.

Narrowing the gap between the outsider view and the local view means that a significant shifting and sharing of the power is required on the part of the agencies in charge (de Wet 2006: 190). The case of people-managed resettlement in Mumbai illustrates the importance of power-sharing. In face of an eviction threat arising from the railway project in Mumbai, slum dwellers actively negotiated their way into the resettlement planning and implementation process, thereby making it one of the few

cases that prevented the impoverishment of resettlers (Patel et al. 2002). Strong mobilisation of people's organisations and a willingness to let go of power and engage people from the planning stage onwards on the part of state agencies and the World Bank are noted as contributing factors to a relatively successful outcome.

However, cases like this one are by no means the majority and it remains a great challenge to open up the development apparatus and its decision-making process despite the increasing adoption of discourses of participation. Penz et al. (2011; emphasis added) note the reluctance on the part of agencies:

Taking a rights-based approach, the World Commission on Dams called for much more robust stakeholder participation in decision-making, with full public accountability and free negotiation for stakeholders in all phases of dam development, from needs assessment to the operation of completed dams. *Governments and development banks have so far not accepted these participation rights for displaced people*; instead, they have limited their policy concerns to minimizing displacement and mitigating its effects.

My MPhil research illustrated the political complexities of DIDR by explaining the gap between resettlement policy and implementation through the lens of stakeholder relationships between the state, the donor and affected people, by which the problem of a resource shortage for resettlement remained unresolved and ended up being borne by affected people (Choi 2008). The concern with resettlement was addressed in the negotiation between the state and the donor over the railway-upgrading project in the fact that the development loan was conditioned on the provision of adequate resettlement. However, the actual cost of resettlement was a politically sensitive issue and eventually was not included in the loan programme. With regards to the resettlement programme carried out using the national government budget, the bilateral donor proved to be limited in influencing its actual implementation process. Although the donor initiated monitoring and evaluation activities to assess compliance with the conditionality, further interventions would have been diplomatically sensitive. The pressure to ensure effective implementation of resettlement policy came from affected people who, initially, resisted the project but could not reverse the decision made at the state-donor level. Afterwards, affected people negotiated for better resettlement by actively engaging with various government agencies, but the serious problem of remote resettlement whereby the residents of the urban centre were moved to the urban periphery or the suburbs was not resolved within an institutional environment built around inter-agency coordination and supported with limited financial resources.

Underlined by the case study of the railway-upgrading project, around which the current research is shaped, is the inherently political nature of displacement and resettlement, which relates to the broader issue of the knowledge and power involved in development decision-making. Without acknowledging and addressing the power imbalance existing in the development arena, the discussion on the distribution of costs and benefits can easily be reduced to a technical exercise, exemplified by the CBA, the outcome of which favours the positive effects of development over its harms. Compared to an aggregate evaluation of development effects that does not distinguish who gains and who loses in a development project, resettlement policy represents an improved position that aims to address one of the major costs of development, namely human displacement and its consequent impacts. However, as resettlement policy has been practically ineffective in relieving displaced people of hardship, the issue of balancing the costs and the benefits of development has similarly remained unresolved. Moreover, with resettlement policy in place, it is rarely questioned whether displacement itself is inevitable since ironically its existence is premised on an implicit assumption of displacement as granted. Its capacity to prevent displacement incidents itself is fundamentally weak when its main function is minimising and mitigating displacement harms (at least in theory). Consequently, it often ends up serving the role of reinforcing the *status quo* without questioning the necessity of development itself. Through my research, I attempt to conceptually expand the critique of such managerial thinking.

2.4. Non-displacement impacts: conceptual expansion of the DIDR debate

Over decades, the controversy surrounding whether and how the impacts of DID can (ever) be mitigated seems to have reached an impasse between markedly different positions (Penz et al. 2011; Rew 1996). On the one hand, a high hope has survived the continuous ‘tragedy’ of impoverishment and proposals for reforming resettlement policy have been made, while tangible outcomes or ‘successful’ cases have not yet been widely known.¹⁸ On the other hand, movements challenging displacement-inducing projects that do not allow people to safeguard and exercise their rights have not yet reversed the development decision-making in favour of displacement and moreover the power imbalance in the conventional mode of operation to the extent that the

¹⁸ Increasingly, however, the importance of studying ‘successful’ cases and moreover defining successful resettlement has been noted (Cernea 2007; Tamondong 2007).

sufferings of displaced people have been eased and they have become a meaningful part of the development process. In reality, the managerial approach has prevailed despite the movementist challenge, meaning that projects that require displacement have continued as if the provision of resettlement policy itself is sufficient, regardless of whether it has actually mitigated the harms of displacement. This situation is not much different from the assumption of compensation in principle that is embodied in the CBA, except there has been an attempt to compensate the costs.

Furthermore, I argue that a specific measure like resettlement policy seems to have the effect of decoupling displacement from a broader discussion on 'development' itself without engaging with critical questions such as whether displacement is inevitable or conversely if development precipitated on displacement is necessary; or, more boldly, whether development without displacement is possible. Informed by the movementist approach, I attempt to elevate the current discussion on DIDR to a level where the meanings and impacts of development are rigorously examined. First, I underline the conceptual limitation of the current debate that is focused on 'displacement' and introduce some of the existing suggestions for a more comprehensive discussion on development impacts. Second, more specifically I explore various ways in which attempts to expand the concept of impact have been made although only a few studies have actually examined non-displacement impacts or indirect impacts in a DID context.

2.4.1. Conceptual critique of the DIDR discussion

Displaced people have been the central concern of DID research as they bear the most obvious social costs of development in the form of forced migration. However, a strong focus on displacement has ended up confining recent debates to resettlement issues, thus losing sight of the broader impacts of development. For instance, conceptually, the CBA tends to understand the costs and the benefits of development in narrow economic and financial terms; moreover, the concern of resettlement policy is confined to one specific cost of development –displacement. Notably, the IRR model is primarily concerned with displaced people and is not fit for understanding the experiences of those who are outside the current policy consideration, i.e. non-displaced people. Accordingly, the reconstruction scenario suggested by the model becomes largely irrelevant for non-displaced affected people.

The range of terminologies that have been employed in this field, although each with subtle differences in their emphasis, also demonstrates that the focus of discussion is

clearly on resettlement. 'Development-induced displacement and resettlement' is the most widely recognised term but de Wet (2006) criticises it for being optimistic in tenor by assuming there is a provision of resettlement. More recently, development-*forced* displacement and resettlement has been suggested with a particular emphasis on its forced nature (Cernea 2007; Oliver-Smith 2009, 2010).¹⁹ Oliver-Smith (2010:2) notes that 'induced' has a connotation that people may be convinced by arguments or rewards that they would be resettled and thus is not appropriate for a process that is decided and planned in advance by fiat.²⁰

'Involuntary resettlement', which was initially used by Colson and Scudder as a counterpart to voluntary resettlement such as a planned settlement programme (Partridge 1989), has been widely used within the policy circle, particularly in reference to the involuntary resettlement policies of the MDBs. While 'involuntary' implies the forced nature of resettlement, its focus has moved to 'resettlement' with an implicit assumption of displacement as being given. On the other hand, agencies primarily concerned with human rights issues such as United Nations Human Settlement Programme (hereafter UN-HABITAT) and Amnesty International use 'forced eviction' to underline the systematic violation of human rights in such forceful movement. Furthermore, they point out that the term 'forced eviction' has been seldom used in the DIDR literature, which has preferred more 'neutral' terms such as 'population displacement' and the aforementioned 'involuntary resettlement' (UN-HABITAT 2011b:29).

'Resettlement and rehabilitation', which appears predominantly in the Indian context,²¹ has faced a similar critique. Although conveying the importance of rehabilitation that goes beyond mere physical relocation, the term also disguises the problematic nature of the situation by avoiding negatively connoted terms such as 'displacement' or 'involuntary'. In the Philippines, as compared to 'resettlement', which conveys the policy ideal of reconstructing the lives of displaced people, 'relocation' is more widely used and seems to capture the reality on the ground whereby displaced people are

¹⁹ It is Cernea (2008) who uses the term 'development-*caused* forced displacement and resettlement'. de Wet (2013) cautions that the use of 'caused' can present development as if it is the single necessary and sufficient condition of displacement and resettlement.

²⁰ Whilst objecting to the use of 'induced' for the same reason, de Wet (2013) proposes 'initiated' instead of 'forced' on the grounds that the idea of initiation allows us to stay open to the mix of both voluntary and involuntary aspects present in the process.

²¹ India is a country with abundant cases of DID and also strong resistance movements against DID, which have resulted in a body of India-specific DIDR literature. See, for example, Somayaji and Talwar (2011), Mathur (2006), and Parasuraman (1999).

rarely resettled by being merely transferred from one place to another (i.e. relocation) to be faced with myriad challenges in the new sites.

In all these approaches, there is limited room for considering impacts other than displacement and furthermore critically engaging with development in that broader perspective. Vandergeest et al. (2007) point this out acutely by stating that the development literature rarely situates the 'obviousness' of displacement in the development process, while the DIDR literature is 'oblivious' to the wider debates on development. On the other hand, if we take the view that development is a fundamentally transformative process and experience, whether being deemed negative or positive, the impacts of displacement-inducing projects can be much wider in scope and more diverse in kind. The need to have a comprehensive understanding of development impacts and a democratic discussion on its distribution has been promoted alongside efforts to address some of the detrimental effects such as displacement. The World Commission on Dams (WCD), an independent, international body created in the late 1990s to investigate issues related to dam construction, suggests a framework to evaluate the overall 'development effectiveness' (of dams)²² and proposes that both the risks and rights of all relevant actors be discussed in a democratic way, thereby addressing both procedural and distributional justice (Hoover 2001; C. Robinson 2003; Sneddon and Fox 2008). It also recognises a series of new entitlements generated by development and seeks mechanisms through which to share the benefits.

The guidelines of the WCD underline the importance of better understanding the broader impacts of a developmental change, including human, environmental, economic, social and cultural impacts, and both direct and indirect impacts. Such an approach requires studies such as project-level impact assessment, distributional analysis, baseline social conditions research and impoverishment risks analysis (World Commission on Dams 2000:278). Furthermore, it is critical to have a deliberative forum wherein the balancing of the rights and risks of all stakeholders can be discussed and all the available options – including alternative development options – explored.²³ For the forum to be truly democratic, it is imperative that relevant actors are able to

²² Source: International Rivers (<http://www.internationalrivers.org/node/5565>; accessed 20 January 2012).

²³ This is different from a call for having measures and procedures in place to increase equity in bearing the burden of loss and in the distribution of benefits (Cernea 2000:12), in the sense that the forum is open to reconsidering the original development plan itself.

participate in key decision points, including needs assessment, selection of alternatives and project preparation, implementation and operation.

As noted in the previous section, whether or not such a forum opens up is ultimately a political issue revolving around the power to define and implement 'development'. On the other hand, my current study engages with conceptual issues of more comprehensively identifying and understanding who is affected and what the impacts are. Non-displacement impacts, if taken into account, may reshape the overall distributional discussion since "[w]here we locate risks and their source will have implications for how we go about attempting to deal with them" (de Wet 2006: 182). Thus, the intention of my study is to provide more comprehensive knowledge of development impacts, based on which an informed decision can be made regarding whether to pursue a project or not and how to find equitable ways to share development effects in the event that development proceeds. Once we consider them all in development decision-making, the anticipation is that it would be harder to make an easy decision that would approve a project that brings with it displacement and other impacts.

2.4.2. Conceptual expansion: non-displacement impacts

There have been attempts to expand the concept of impacts within a DIDR context, although studies directly investigating non-displacement impacts are rare. First of all, the narrow conceptualisation of displacement impacts has long been criticised for neglecting the diverse and complex patterns of impact. There are harms that are difficult or even impossible to recover from, notably certain cultural and psychological impacts of DIDR (Downing and Garcia-Downing 2009). After outlining four main categories of harm emanating from displacement, namely (a) harm to bodily wellbeing, (b) harm to the economic and environmental means to wellbeing, (c) harm to community life, status and participation and (d) harm to leisure, family life and mental wellbeing, Penz et al. (2011: 55-56) correctly question which of these deprivations are irreparable consequences of displacement and which can be remedied or somehow compensated. If considered together, the very idea that development harms can be mitigated through interventions is largely undermined and the instrumental nature of this view of mitigation becomes more obvious (Gray 1996).

In addition to the diversity of impacts, it is increasingly noted that displaced people are also heterogeneous and are differentially affected. In particular, certain groups can be

further marginalised or neglected, often along the existing lines of differentiation and disadvantage such as class, ethnicity or race, and gender. For instance, DIDR cases involving indigenous people or ethnic groups demonstrate how forced resettlement has often been a process of incorporating previously 'non-conforming' citizens into the state system, by which certain (ethnocentric) notions of development and citizenship were imposed, while their existing mode of living was not respected, and then fractured or transformed (Chua 2012; McKay 2013; Yong Ooi Lin 2008). Likewise, through a gender analysis of displacement and resettlement in the infamous case of the Narmada Dam in India, Mehta (2009) underlines how the 'double-bind' against women, that is gender discrimination both in communities and in policy institutions, marginalises them further during the process of resettlement. Unless the specific vulnerabilities of people who are already disadvantaged within the societal and political structures are recognised, existing tensions can be deepened in the resettlement process, although they can also sometimes be resolved in the dramatic change entailed by resettlement (Koenig 2002). By collecting rich oral histories of displaced people in six cases, Bennett and McDowell (2012) capture some of the subtle differences amidst the predominantly difficult experiences of displacement, whereby people belonging to lower caste or class groups felt some liberation from socio-cultural obligations to the upper class, women welcomed the opportunity of education in new sites, and younger generations moved more quickly to adjust to new, modern lifestyles.

The process of impact can also be more complex than outright forced eviction. Gentrification is an interesting arena, illuminating an indirect process of displacement whereby urban (re)development programmes increase the price of land and rent, often propelled or accompanied by socio-economic and cultural changes in the neighbourhood, and crowd out the working class and the poor from the inner city (Lees et al. 2008). Penz et al. (2011) elaborate on direct and indirect types of displacement, first by distinguishing displacement *for* development and (indirect) displacement *by* development; and thereby broaden a room for considering various types of impact. Displacement *for* development is a land-clearance conception defined as "the exclusion of people, for the purpose of development, from one or more current crucial uses of a particular area of land or other territory" (Penz et al. 2011: 44). Displacement *by* development refers to "indirect forms of displacement, which *result from* development or rather, *make room for* development" (Penz et al. 2011:49; emphasis in the original).

Indirect forms of displacement are different from displacement ordered directly for the sake of development on two main accounts. First, for indirect displacement take place

in the process of or as a part of development, its cause-and-effect relationship to development is mediated by ecological, economic or socio-cultural processes. For example, displacement caused by landslides or river flooding, which is primarily attributable to logging, is different from displacement for the purpose of logging. Second, the element of coercion is much more limited in cases of indirect displacement. Although the indirect process of displacement by development may involve actual harm or threat, neither of which is intended since they are rather side-effects. For instance, in the case of 'harm-induced migration', people are not forced but rather choose to move because they are being so damaged (e.g. in terms of their livelihoods) by development processes (Penz 2002b). Furthermore, noting that even resettlement as a form of intervention can lead to displacement, they include displacement by resettlement in their conceptualisation and distinguish between direct displacement *for* resettlement (e.g. displacement needed for clearing land for a resettlement site) and indirect displacement *by* resettlement (i.e. displacement indirectly induced in the process of resettlement).

By recognising the possibility of indirect displacement, Penz et al. (2011) also reveal how development can lead to displacement in diverse ways. In particular, two main features of indirect displacement, namely it being mediated by other processes and being less coerced than direct displacement, constitute a useful conceptual framework for studying non-displacement impacts that are not the direct consequences of a developmental change but more aptly characterised as its secondary or tertiary impacts.²⁴ However, the notion of impact in their conceptualisation is still confined displacement and does not include impacts that do not involve physical movement.²⁵ For example, it is mentioned that dam construction can affect the livelihoods of downstream people or that displacement of people can affect the livelihoods of local traders, but only when such people end up migrating to other places as a result of impairment to their livelihoods (Penz et al. 2011: 51). Similarly, attention is paid to the

²⁴ By taking into account indirect displacement, they also note it becomes more difficult to establish causality between displacement and development (as in climate change-related displacement), and furthermore to discuss the accountability issue as clearly as before. The same issue applies to non-displacement impacts that are mostly unintended. For the time being, I separate the agenda of having an understanding of broader development impacts from discussing whether or how we can (or should) deal with them, focusing purely on the former. The implications of the latter will be discussed in the final chapter based on empirical analyses.

²⁵ On the other hand, the word 'displacement' in DID is often understood much more broadly than physical movement, mostly by those outside the DIDR circle. As an interesting illustration, Doutriaux et al. (2008) apply the concept of DID to examining the impacts of a coffee boom and an expansion of production in Vietnam on different ethnic groups, with an understanding of 'displacement' as *in-situ* disadvantage and security loss without spatial movement, expulsion or flight.

impacts of resettlement on the existing community but it is also discussed only in a particular context, wherein people in the host community end up leaving due to the changes wrought by resettlement.

My research, on the other hand, investigates the broader impacts in a DID context than simple displacement, noting that people can experience exclusion or marginalisation even when physical movement is *not* involved. I identify such a type as ‘non-displacement impacts’ in my research. That is, while being guided by the conceptualisation of indirect ‘displacement’, I move on to uncover certain indirect impacts of ‘development’ as a multifaceted process of a transformative change, which displacement is also a part of and can have impacts of its own. By focusing on the impacts of a developmental change process, the scope of my research stays at the level wherein the rights and risks of multiple stakeholders can be considered beyond those of displaced people, thereby increasing the potential to contribute the kind of comprehensive framework envisioned by the WCD.

In relation to these non-displacement impacts, however, there is a paucity of studies on the population who have not moved in instances where others have been forcefully removed from their homes. In the context of river-basin development, Scudder (1996:49) notes:

Past research on the impacts of river-basin development on local populations has concentrated on those undergoing relocation ... This narrow vision has tended to obscure the fact that often those undergoing relocation and their hosts are a minority of those who subsequently may be impoverished by a particular development intervention. Yet ... project-impacted people who are not relocatees, hosts or immigrants have been largely ignored by academics, planners, donors and non-governmental agencies alike.

Accordingly, Scudder (1996) proposes that the term ‘project-impacted people’ or ‘project-affected persons (PAPs)’ include four major categories: (a) those whose relocation is required (relocatees); (b) those among whom they are resettled (hosts); (c) all other river-basin residents who are neither hosts or relocatees; and (d) immigrants. Immigrants include those responsible for planning, designing and implementing a project, the construction labour force and also those who come at a later date to exploit project-related opportunities. Among these, he notes that other PAPs (i.e. group (c)) have been least analysed and thus tended to be left out of the environmental and socio-economic guidelines, whereas the adverse impacts they face may be as serious for these people over the long term.

In theory, the term 'PAP' can encompass both positively and negatively affected people, although in the DIDR literature there is a strong assumption and anticipation of 'adverse' impacts affecting people. Accordingly, I also start from the position that non-displaced people are likely to be 'losers' of a developmental change although the impacts they experience may not be as visible as those of displaced people and are 'hidden' in that sense. For adverse impacts, it is increasingly recognised that the social repercussions of DID can be broader than the physical removal of people: "in the great majority of cases, things turn out badly for people subjected to forced resettlement as a result of development projects or political programmes – and often also *for others who may not actually have to move*" (de Wet 2006: 180; emphasis added).

The conceptual scope of adversely affected people can still vary depending on how impacts are understood and defined. For example, depending on the type of loss, (Ramaiah 1998) categorises PAPs into three groups: persons who had lost (a) both dwelling and land; (b) either house or land; and (c) employment opportunities. Similarly, Mahapatra (1998) suggests a broader category of 'project-disrupted people', first, by dividing them into 'oustees' (displaced people) and 'project affected persons (PAPs)' (i.e. non-displaced people) and by dividing PAPs into those directly affected and those indirectly affected. Furthermore, he elaborates the category in terms of eight different types of loss:

- (a) People who lose their house, homestead and farming land or other productive assets in full;
- (b) People who lose their house, homestead and farm land or other productive assets in part;
- (c) People who lose their house and homestead only;
- (d) People who lose their homestead only (i.e. loss of land);
- (e) People who lose their base for plying their arts and crafts or selling/bartering their specialised services or skills;
- (f) People who lose their base for earning their livelihood from the local forest or other eco-system, including fishing in the river;
- (g) People who lose wage labour; and
- (h) People who lose their house or land or both for the employees' accommodation or for construction of the canals or ancillary structures for completion or maintenance of the project.

It is noteworthy that different degrees of loss (between (a) and (b)) as well as various kinds of asset were considered, encompassing both tangible ones (from (a) to (d)) and more intangible ones such as skills (e), access to natural resources (f) and income opportunities (g). Also, he indicates that sub-components of a development project (in this case a dam project) can affect people (h) and also notes that people were 'indirectly' affected by diseases brought into the area through the project. Similarly, and echoing the quote above, Mahapatra (1998:221) concludes that "impoverishment risks affect a much larger population than the oustees", which is precisely what my research intends to investigate further.

2.5. Conclusion

In view of the proposition that development impacts need to be discussed more comprehensively and thus addressed in a more equitable manner (World Commission on Dams 2000), I argue that the current debate on DID is conceptually limited in only accommodating a small range of impacts, of which displacement is only part. Furthermore, it appears to have waned down losing a critical perspective, as if the mere existence of resettlement policy itself, regardless of its actual performance, restored a balance in sharing the costs and the benefits of development. By expanding the concepts of 'affected people' or 'development impact' in a DID context, non-displaced affected people can contribute to reshaping the debate as to how we address such impacts and furthermore to strengthening the case for rethinking development itself. As long as such 'hidden' impacts of development remain unattended to (and thus unresolved), distributional injustice would continue even though well-known harms of displacement are addressed in theory. More practically, when non-displacement impacts – which are conceptually outside the current consideration – are added to the unsuccessful track records of forced resettlement so far, serious questions arise regarding the capacity of the current mode of intervention to mitigate the negative impacts. Compared to the predominant 'hope' for creating 'good' in international development, the hope here is that a consideration of such diverse and complex impacts would initiate a more cautious approach to a development project that requires population displacement and also generates many other impacts. In the next chapter, I will explore the main task of identifying and understanding non-displacement impacts within the complexities of urban areas.

Chapter 3

Urban development and displacement

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I situate the investigation of non-displacement impacts within the contexts of urban development and displacement, with the aim being to clarify the concepts and theories I will use for the empirical analyses. Despite increasing numbers of cases, displacement in cities has remained largely 'invisible' in urban planning and has been understudied in both development and displacement studies. I explain this relative neglect of urban displacement through a critical review of the current urban development trends and also in terms of the knowledge gap across different urban-related studies. Given this, the aim of studying non-displacement impacts is to rethink the broad implication of an urban change by reconceptualising urban displacement as a particular context wherein the socio-economic lives of urban residents can be transformed as with other such events. In view of this, the second part of the chapter is focused on understanding the 'urban' as a space and a mode of living in order to establish a pre-context for examining the impacts of a socio-spatial change like land clearance and/or population displacement. The primary contribution of this work comes through its attention to informality as a main feature of an urban life and, in particular, its transition from being a livelihood strategy in a normal context to being a source of vulnerability in a change context.

3.2 Displacement: The forgotten agenda in urban development

The concentration of resources and people in cities generates external economies of scale while facilitating the circulation of goods, labour, knowledge and ideas (Beall and Fox 2009). For their productive potential, cities have been promoted as 'engines of growth' and increasingly as the nodes for integrating local and national economies within the international framework of a globalised world, in turn attracting more resources and people to urban areas, thereby further propelling the expansion of cities (Beall and Fox 2009; United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 2001). As a consequence of rapid urbanisation, in 2005 more than half of the world population was reported to live in cities and towns for the first time in the human history (Satterthwaite 2005). The extent of urbanisation is debatable depending on the definition of 'urban', which varies greatly across different countries, making it difficult to compare urbanisation trends across the globe (Satterthwaite 2005; United Nations 2011). Nonetheless, the long-term trend of an urbanising world is undeniable (United Nations 2012).

Given the population density and land scarcity of most cities, conflicts over the use of land are not new phenomena at all, with land-based initiatives having long been prone to requiring the displacement of existing inhabitants (Penz et al. 2011). Furthermore, rapid urbanisation is anticipated to be one of the primary drivers magnifying the overall scale of development-induced displacement (DID) (Cernea 2013). The causes and contexts of urban displacement are also diversifying and including: those aimed at boosting the urban economy, notably large-scale infrastructure projects or mega-events; urban management such as city 'beautification' and increasingly market-driven development programmes; and even projects aimed at addressing urban problems such as flood management and slum upgrading (Payne et al. 2009; UN-HABITAT 2011a).

Despite the intensifying trend of urban displacement, its complexities have remained largely understudied for some time, even within the decades-old body of development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) research (Leopoldo J. Bartolomé 1993; Cernea and Guggenheim 1993; Cernea 1995; McDowell 1996). Although urban displacement is receiving increasing attention from both the research and practice arenas, as will be discussed shortly, it is noted that the existing policy – being mostly

based on rural DIDR experiences – does not provide an appropriate framework for addressing urban cases. As an illustration, the Impoverishment Risks and Reduction (IRR) model presents landlessness (i.e. losing access to productive land) as one of the biggest impoverishment risks of DID. However, many urban residents are already landless even before displacement in the sense that most of them use urban land informally in the first place. Also, the productive function of land is very low for urban residents (unlike farmers in rural areas), thereby making a policy proposal such as land-based compensation largely irrelevant in the context of urban livelihood reconstruction.

Given the significant implications of a knowledge gap for discussing and addressing urban displacement, I attempt to explain why and how this knowledge gap might have emerged. First, I explain the trend of urban development as a context within which displacement takes place and also how it is marginalised as an urban concern. Second, I identify some deep gaps between the relevant bodies of literature, which raise the need for further cross-communication, and indeed draw insights from urban studies to better understand urban displacement both as a phenomenon in its own right and as a type of urban change useful for studying its impact on the urban locality and its non-displaced settlers.

3.2.1 Urban development: Increasing exclusivity and disparity

In the DIDR literature, it is noted that the understanding of the distinct features of urban DIDR has been limited by an implicit bias towards rural areas (Koenig 2002; Mathur 2006). This appears to be a lingering legacy of the long-term neglect of urban areas in general, partly in relation to a strong emphasis on rural areas in development studies. In the 1970s, looming concerns about ‘over-urbanisation’ with excessive concentration translated into a broader critique in the name of the urban bias thesis (see Lipton 1977), which suggested that governments imposed price distortions in favour of urban residents and implemented counterproductive policies serving the interests of the urban elites such as industrialists and skilled labourers (Rapley 2007; Wratten 1995). It is argued that this skewed emphasis on urban areas slowed down the overall development process and sustained poverty, while uneven development between rural and urban areas was perceived to perpetuate the trend of migration from the former to the latter, thereby exacerbating urban problems.

This proposition of an urban bias led to a significant shift in the development framework from industrialisation strategies to integrated rural development policies, the rationale of which was that improved living in rural areas would discourage migration to cities (Wratten 1995).²⁶ Resultantly, the urban bias thesis paved the way for rural development to become a dominant paradigm in development research, policy and practice, leaving cities as marginal concerns for quite some time (Beall and Fox 2009). As an illustration of this neglect, the 'urban' did not feature very prominently in the Millennium Development Goals that were originally conceived in the early 1990s. Likewise, the sustainable livelihoods framework pioneered by the UK Department for International Development was initially focused on rural areas (e. g. Chambers and Conway 1992) and its urban-specific counterpart came in much later (e.g. Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones 2002).

Cities have reappeared high on development agenda with the continuous growth of urban areas and within the increasingly globalising world (Beall and Fox 2009; Bunnell et al. 2002a). Globalisation has been driven by neoliberal ideals, which value liberalisation of markets and the maximisation of individual capacity and freedom in that domain (Beall and Fox 2009). Amidst an increasing call for the free flow of capital, technology, goods and services, 'global cities' have emerged as the command centres of the global economy, the places where financial institutions and the headquarters of transnational corporations and international organisations cluster (Brenner 1998; Sassen 2000). As a result of the neoliberal emphasis on enhancing the efficiency and the productivity of the market, cities were transformed into spaces that are more attractive places for global capital and professionals (Atkinson and Bridge 2005; Rofe 2003). Accordingly, the nature and the use of urban spaces have been determined by the interests of those who have the wealth to afford a 'global city' life and also the power to influence the urban-restructuring process (Butler and Lees 2006).

Such socio-spatial changes were accompanied by neoliberal policies of market enablement, characterised by privatisation, deregulation and government disengagement, which contributed to intensifying the existing divides, increasing inequality and sustaining poverty amidst the accumulation of wealth and power (Durand-Lasserre 2006; United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2010; Zetter

²⁶ More broadly, the urban bias thesis originates from a neoclassical critique of the statist approach to development in that state intervention had distorted prices in such a way as to discourage the production of potentially lucrative primary goods (Rapley 2007). Consequently, its sequitur was a neoclassical reform aimed at rolling back the state and freeing up the market, which became materialised in the form of the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s.

2004). Although urban socio-spatial division is embedded in historically distinctive and locally specific development experiences (Garrido 2012), globalisation is known to exacerbate the existing pattern of social exclusion (United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2010). The economic globalisation debate also tends to deflect attention from a range of pressing urban issues such as intra-city disparities in terms of access to resources, notably land (Bunnell et al. 2002b).

Furthermore, only a small number of cities have enjoyed international investment, qualifying as 'global cities' that provide management and servicing for the global economy (e.g. PwC and Urban Land Institute 2012). The world's largest or fastest growing cities are located in countries or regions that are (already) economically strong, such as Asia (see United Nations 2012). The economies of other cities and small towns stagnate (if not deteriorate), lagging behind in global competition (Nelson and Jones 1999). Despite the aspiration to become one such 'global city', many city governments have not experienced sufficient economic growth to tackle urban problems and have continued to struggle in meeting the costs of urban expansion with their limited resources (Satterthwaite 2005). The contrast between high-performance and struggling cities implies that the 'global city' discourse disguises the real challenge of many 'ordinary' cities and marginalises them in urban studies by putting the spotlight firmly on the mega-cities (J. Robinson 2006).

Many city governments in developing countries have not been effective in organising the collective actions needed for wealth creation and distribution and in resolving the negative externalities of urban agglomeration (Mattingly 1999). Not only are they disproportionately affected by institutional failures, poor people are also disadvantaged by the prejudice within the institutions of state and society (Venkatesh 2006; World Bank 2001). Urban managers, who are from more or less the same group as the elite, share their perceptions of the urban poor tainted with racism, sexism, and class or caste bias (Brown 2006a; Clarke and Sison 2003; Hamdi 2005). Such perceptions are used "to justify their own relative wealth and the degree to which this depends on the poverty of the poor" (Hurley 1990: 4) and translate into governments' favouring of those already wealthy and powerful in the distribution of public assets (Mattingly 1999). Moreover, when lacking voice and power in those institutions, the poor are also marginalised in terms of their ability to enjoy whatever benefits accrue to the city (Moser 2005: 21), whereas the benefits of urban growth are easily appropriated by those who are already in a better position to access them (Connell 1999). Moreover, in a neoliberal model of urban governance wherein the role of

governments is effectively side-lined by a binary emphasis on individuals and markets, urban agendas tend to be shaped by those with vested interests in markets and marginalising those living in poverty. Against this broad sketch of urban development trends, I use a specific case within Metro Manila to discuss in the next section how displacement becomes a mechanism through which the exclusivity of cities increases and social divides are intensified.

3.2.2 Urban displacement: Exclusion from and within cities

In urban areas, the challenge of maintaining a balance between efficiency and equity has long been pressing and has been commonly translated into the dual agenda of urban growth and poverty reduction (Beall and Fox 2009; McGregor 2008).²⁷ As discussed in Chapter 2, displacement provides a critical lens through which to reveal where the development priority lies in and who has the power to set the agenda. For example, a conflicting coexistence between the clearance of street traders by city beautification projects and the programmes aimed at supporting microenterprises is an acute illustration of the uncoordinated manner in which 'development' is being implemented (Brown 2006b). The paradox underlined by the continuous, if not increasing, cases of forced eviction as a shadow process of urban development, appears to be propelled further by a strong drive towards winning the competition between cities and nation states in the global market.

The imbalance or disjuncture between the emphasis on urban economic growth and the concern about urban poverty is clearly illustrated by the fact that informal settlements are 'forgotten' in urban planning despite their vivid presence and are therefore easily erased from the urban landscape (Shatkin 2004). The conceptualisation of space by urban managers is narrowly centred on aesthetics and public order, reflecting the cultural norms and political-economic desires of the dominant elites (Brown 2006b: 10; Roy 2005). The ensuing attempts to 'tidy' and 'control' public space end up eroding the spaces available for sheltering the poor as well as for sustaining their livelihoods (Brown 2006b; Potts 2006). Similarly neglected are the livelihood activities of the urban poor and their contribution to the urban

²⁷ This dual urban agenda, albeit simplistic, seems to capture what many city governments in developing countries are juggling with and thus has featured repeatedly in many discussions on urban development. For example, the main theme of the book by Burgess et al (1997) is urban productivity and poverty alleviation policies while the title of the volume edited by Hamdi (2005) refers to 'urban growth and poverty reduction'.

economy, by servicing the consumption needs and lifestyles of the middle class and above (Connell 1999). That is, urban displacement epitomises how the concept of social space is missing in urban planning (Roy 2005), which then reproduces and reinforces urban poverty by removing the urban poor from their homes and livelihoods (Brown 2006a).

The consequence is often a stark coexistence between opulence and deprivation within an urban space, vividly depicted in the following caricature of Southeast Asian capital cities: “the rich and powerful drive Mercedes Benz past the impoverished and homeless; people feast on gourmet foods from around the world while others suffer from malnutrition; and massive mega-malls provide sharp gleaming contrasts to the unserviced squatter settlements nearby” (McGregor 2008:130, 136-137). While being economic power houses of the region, these cities are struggling with the costs of urban primacy, both on efficiency and equity grounds (Beall and Fox 2009; McGregor 2008). Metro Manila is one such primate capital city with a population over 11.86 million in 2011 (United Nations 2012) and demonstrates similar trends of urban change to other Asian cities, such as the privatisation of space. In particular, the landscape of Metro Manila is marked by a large socio-economic disparity, on which Connell (Connell 1999, p. 418) quite correctly comments: “Nowhere in Southeast Asia is this juxtaposition of affluence and poverty more evident than in Manila.”

Dual cities in Metro Manila have a historical origin but have also been reinforced by global processes. Urban development in Metro Manila is characterised by an institutional failure and the dominance of the elite. It has been summarised by many authors in a similar manner: “the urban plan for Metro Manila has been grandiose” (Magno-Ballesteros 2000: 14) but “virtually nothing was ever put in place” (Connell 1999: 420). A remarkable deviation is noted from “the plethora of plans and papers prescribing what should be the physical as well as social development of the urban space and population” (van den Muijzenberg and van Naerssen 2005). The serious inefficiency in urban planning is exacerbated by the unprecedented privatisation of planning in Metro Manila (Shatkin 2008), which has been propelled by the concentration of land ownership among a small number of elite families, who inherited a large portion of land during Spanish colonialism (1521–1898) and who have consolidated their ownership over time (Caoili 1988).

When the need for suburban development arose in the reconstruction process after the Second World War, those who had lands in suburbs of the old capital Manila – namely

the Ayalas, the Tuasons, the Ortigas, the Aranetas and other families – had an advantage as the only thing that they needed to do was simply to establish a land-development company of their own (Camba 2011). Since then, they have been leading the real-estate industry in the Philippines. Private-led developments have resulted in the creation of exclusive ‘enclaves’ that are distinguished from the decay and deficiency of the rest of the city (van den Muijzenberg and van Naerssen 2005). A notable case is the development of the central business district (CBD) of Makati City under the long-term planning of the Ayala family, who own more than half of the land in Makati City (Garrido 2012).

Given its exclusive focus on a certain class and the inherent motivation of profit maximisation, the capacity of private-led urban planning to bring broader societal change is questionable and there is little room for public participation to discuss urban development itself (Shatkin 2008). This epitomises the broader political economy of the Philippines, where the influence of private actors has undermined the capacity of the state to address the socio-economic problems faced by the majority of Filipinos, to the extent that it has become an ‘anti-developmental’ state (Bello et al. 2005). Laws and public resource priorities have been shaped by powerful political clans who also have vested interests in safeguarding property ownership and development rights (Llanto 2007). One of the most deleterious consequences is that progressive agrarian and urban land reforms have been resisted and left floating in Congress since their proposal during the democratisation movements in the 1980s (Bello et al. 2005).

In recent years, Metro Manila has seen a boom in its real-estate market, being ranked 12th out of 22 regional markets in terms of investment prospects and ninth in terms of development prospects, based on the opinions of more than 400 international real-estate professionals (PwC and Urban Land Institute 2012). Consequently, the unprecedented amount of construction has continued, especially in the high-rise condominium market, driven by the rise in the condominium selling price, demonstrating as much as a 50 per cent increase in capital values in the districts of Makati CBD, Bonifacio Global City and Ortigas CBD between 2005 and 2011.²⁸ The boom in the high-end housing market has intensified the existing practice of land owners and real-estate developers to change land use from industrial and residential to mostly commercial or mixed use (Magno-Ballesteros 2000) or withhold prime estates

²⁸ Source: Sharon Saclolo, Jones Lang LaSalle Blog (8 May 2012)
<http://www.joneslanglasalleblog.com/APResearch/residential-research/reaping-the-benefits-of-shrinking-living-space-in-manila>

from development for speculation purposes (Caoili 1988; Connell 1999), This all contributes to a significant appreciation in land values while keeping land outside the (mass) residential market.

A body of literature from gentrification research provides a critical insight into unpacking the increasing commodification of urban spaces, whereby market forces have determined their use, by shedding light on the uneven transformation of cities that leads to the exclusion of the poor and low-income households from accessing developed urban spaces. The indirect form of displacement can be particularly relevant and useful for studying the non-displacement impacts of urban changes. The term was originally coined by Glass in 1964 to describe the invasion of the working-class quarters of London by the middle class, who rehabilitated their dwellings and thereby effectively displaced the original working-class occupiers. Since then, gentrification has undergone a significant expansion in its meaning and form, with markedly different positions on its effects such as the one emphasising the positive function of 'social mixing' and the other concerned about the negative outcomes of increased socio-economic dislocation and spatial exclusion (Lees et al. 2008). Meanwhile, the form of gentrification has diversified to include new-build or waterfront developments that do not necessarily involve displacement directly, which was an essential component of the original definition, but nevertheless are a form of gentrification as they end up generating dislocation in situ (or indirect displacement), whereby the original residents experience their sense of place and belonging being undermined by the changes brought into their neighbourhood (Davidson and Lees 2010).

In an apolitical policy climate influenced by neoliberalism, a notable trend is observed in the cities of the Global North whereby 'gentrification', with its negative connotations, has been replaced by more neutral or even positive terms such as urban 'regeneration' or 'renewal' (Lees 2003; Slater 2006). The benefits accrued to gentrifiers have been highlighted by policy makers such as rehabilitated neighbourhoods and rent increases, whereas the detrimental effects of gentrification, namely the displacement of the working class from the inner city, have been 'evicted' from such discussions (Lees et al. 2008) and, some argue, from gentrification research as a whole (e.g. Slater 2006). Missing in the recent policy focus is a critical questioning of who is driving such spatial change, who loses and who gains from this urban transformation (Porter and Shaw 2009). Critics argue that as long as gentrification is understood as the "production of space for progressively more affluent users" (Hackworth 2002, p. 815), then class is an inherent part of the discussion on gentrification.

The theoretical framework of the discussion on gentrification is useful for explaining skewed urban changes in cities like Metro Manila, by which the poor and low-income residents are increasingly marginalised either through outright forced eviction for upmarket developments or through socio-economic exclusion in the metropolis. The forced eviction and DID literatures have started to speak to gentrification research by noting that land market changes brought about by the development of the urban periphery or the inner are one of the forces pushing the urban poor out of their settlements (Penz et al. 2011; Satterthwaite 2009). There can also be interesting and distinctive overlaps as urban renewal is often state-led in many developing countries and is accompanied by the relocation of inner-city slum dwellers to state-sponsored sites on the urban periphery (Roy 2005). Conversely, other urban projects can also have gentrifying effects. For instance, transport infrastructure projects have long been noted as one of the leading causes of displacement in large cities (World Bank, 1994). Discussion has been extended further to question whether transportation improvements have the effects of increasing land value, facilitating land speculation and thereby potentially inducing the displacement of tenants and residents without secure tenure (Pacheco-Raguz 2010; Williams 1997).²⁹

In the common ground of DID and gentrification-induced displacement are urban spaces being restructured based on the interests of those who have the wealth and power to afford a 'global city' lifestyle (Butler and Lees 2006). Simultaneously, certain other functions of cities – notably, as living spaces for local residents and also as public arenas – have been marginalised, directly and indirectly excluding those with limited means. Metro Manila, which is the study site for my research, epitomises the bias and imbalance in urban planning by which upmarket developments by the private sector for the middle and upper class not only crowd out poor and low-income households but more importantly are so out of tune with the reality of shelter deprivation, which a large population in Metro Manila lives with day by day. With increasing competition for limited urban space and rising urban land values, it is noted that the formerly powerful voice of resistance against eviction in Metro Manila is diminishing and the relocation of informal settlers or poor neighbourhoods is chosen in favour of private development (United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2008b). Urban displacement is thus best seen as a part and a consequence of broader changes by which the exclusivity of

²⁹ However, the gentrifying effect of infrastructure projects needs to be examined more rigorously with hard evidence. In this regard, Pacheco-Raguz (2010) presents an exemplary study assessing the impacts of the Light Rail Transit 1 (LRT 1) on urban land use in Metro Manila. He found only a small change in land use because the LRT 1 was introduced to the city's core that was already completely built up and thus offered only limited room for land development.

cities is increasing, although its importance as a phenomenon and an analytical lens has so far not been sufficiently recognised.

3.2.3 Cross-fertilisation: Filling the knowledge gap

Despite the increasing profile of urban areas as sites of social, economic and political changes and as a space for investigation, a call for more urban-focused research continues to echo within different literatures (Wratten 1995; Beall and Fox 2009). This unmet need seems to arise not from the lack of knowledge *per se* but from limited communication between urban-related studies. This is acutely illustrated by urban displacement, which appears to fall through the gaps between different urban concerns and to be 'displaced' from discussions on urban development in general, as has been noted in the gentrification research. In addition to its marginalisation within development research and practice, urban DID is further side-lined within the forced migration sector by its implicit prioritisation of humanitarian concerns over developmental ones.

Among humanitarian actors, urban areas are increasingly recognised as important destinations for refugees or internally displaced persons (IFRC 2012) and, likewise, urban-specific disaster risks including displacement risks have received special attention (IFRC 2010). Many of the challenges faced by displaced people are shared by the host population in cities, including competition over land and resources, limited access to livelihoods, physical safety and the lack of infrastructure (IFRC 2012: 117). These are largely the consequences of poor urban governance and thus designing effective interventions for those who are displaced to urban areas necessitates the understanding of existing urban challenges and also the institutions of urban governance (IFRC 2012: 116). These issues have long been analysed in urban (development) studies, which, ironically, implies the magnitude of disconnection between the two studies so far. Although the need to liaise with urban studies has been acknowledged within forced migration studies (e. g. Forced Migration Review 2010), a general divide appears to persist between the developmental and humanitarian approaches. To begin with, a potential confusion may arise from different definitions of urban displacement in terms of the direction of population movement. In the forced migration literature, urban displacement usually refers to a situation wherein people being displaced by conflicts in rural areas find their refuge in cities. On the other hand,

in the DID or forced eviction literature, it normally refers to a situation in which urban dwellers are displaced from cities, often to be resettled in suburban areas.

Other differences stand out in terms of the scope and the emphasis of research and intervention. For example, whereas community disarticulation and rebuilding has been an important concern in the DID field, the interventions aimed at conflict-induced displacement (CID) have been focused very much on individuals fleeing to urban areas, relatively side-lining the struggles of the existing urban residents in host communities (although it should be noted that, increasingly, a more community-based, integrated approach is being adopted (e.g. IFRC 2012)). Likewise, a strong inclination towards protecting refugees/internally displaced persons (IDPs) from immediate life threats tends to underline the vulnerability of displaced people, to the relative neglect of their agency.³⁰ This is in an interesting contrast to the by-now very widespread emphasis on the agency of the poor in development studies. In comparison, the natural disaster-induced displacement (NID) literature seems to be tied more closely to developmental issues, perhaps because a great interest in disaster prevention, which goes beyond mitigation and reconstruction, may have led to the (rather obvious) conclusion that disaster risks need to be integrated into the existing framework of urban development/planning (IFRC 2010).

In sum, the knowledge gap on urban DID exists at a crossroads where it is marginalised as a secondary development concern and is considered a less urgent form of humanitarian crisis. The limited knowledge on the topic manifests itself in an inaccurate conceptualisation of the problem and inadequate or partial policy responses to DID. Mathur (2006: 93) comments: “Much can be learnt about the coping strategies from the affected people themselves, from the way they grapple with the livelihood issues on their own. Often, resettlement planners tend not to take note of these local initiatives and solutions emanating from the affected people.”

One of the most serious shortfalls of urban resettlement policy is indeed a relative neglect of livelihood issues in favour of its primary concern with the provision of housing (Koenig 2009). In addition, although the shelter needs of displaced people are certainly one of the main concerns in the DIDR literature, they are not very relevant to the study of non-displaced people, who of course did not lose their shelter. For them, livelihood issues become the main focus of investigation but have been largely

³⁰ Gradually, however, the agency of refugees and IDPs are gaining recognition. For example, Evans (2007) notes that in the absence of effective institutional support, urban IDPs help themselves or help each other through their social networks when integrating into urban areas.

understudied in urban DIDR cases and have remained a notable gap in the urban displacement literature in general (e.g. Koenig (2009) for DID and Kulatunga and Lakshman (2010) for CID).

This is in part related to a narrow conceptualisation of 'housing' as simply shelter and the consequent focus on 'homelessness' following displacement (e.g. the IRR model). For instance, in the Philippines, although resettlement is incorporated in a broader framework for urban development, its actual implementation has narrowed down to a housing programme, which is rather obvious in the fact that the National Housing Authority is the main agency in charge of resettlement. While resettlement in suburban sites has been one of the main forms of (public) housing provisions across different administrations (e.g. United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2008a), the lack of a serious consideration of livelihood challenges faced by urban poor residents has repeated a vicious cycle, whereby informal settlers were relocated to sites without basic services and suffered from limited access to livelihoods, only to drift back to other slums in Metro Manila (Caoili 1988). When the nature and the magnitude of urban displacement is reduced to a housing issue, a further distortion is created as interventions are designed as if the problem can be easily resolved by moving people to other areas outside cities. There has been a longstanding tradition of research on urban residents' struggle to safeguard their place within cities against the adverse impacts of urban displacement, originating mostly from the forced eviction literature, but the primary concern still tends to be with housing rights and tenure security (e.g. Bhan 2009; Hasan 2009; Ndezi 2009).

Increasingly, livelihoods have become a key issue in the debate on urban DIDR, the lack of which in remote resettlement sites outside cities has been pointed out as the primary factor increasing the hardship of resettlers and undermining their reconstruction process in a new place (Agrawal 2000). In particular, the livelihoods approach is useful for teasing out broader impacts that non-displaced people might have experienced and thus, conversely, the study of non-displacement impacts contributes to mainstreaming livelihoods in the DIDR literature by enhancing the overall understanding of urban livelihoods. By staying put in the urban locality, non-displaced people can illuminate the structural contexts of urban livelihoods and their locally embedded features, which function as a robust baseline from which to examine the impacts of urban DID.

Also, an unconventional angle of non-displacement impacts necessitates drawing on diverse literature, thereby bringing together that which has existed disparately so far.

In fact, the study of non-displaced urban residents is ideal for this purpose, since they are situated in the common ground where the issues of displacement, poverty, informality and livelihoods overlap. From this standpoint, it is underlined that displacement is part of socio-spatial changes within cities that affect the lives of urban residents. The ways in which they are affected can elaborate the complex effects of urban changes and provides a critical implication for urban development as a whole by demonstrating that the socio-spatial transformation of urban areas is more complicated than simply pushing people outside the city – i.e. the ‘problem’ does not end there as people may also be affected *in situ*. Furthermore, the indirect nature of non-displacement impacts is very similar to aforementioned gentrification cases, while having some commonalities with other contingency contexts as will be discussed in the Section 3.3.

In particular, cross-fertilisation is very much needed in the context where the causes and consequences of different types of displacement are converging within the space of urban areas as a result of natural and man-made disasters and other urban initiatives. This means an increased probability that urban residents experience displacement within cities, either directly or indirectly, and possibly multiple times. In Metro Manila, for instance, flooding caused by the notorious Typhoon Ketsana in 2009, one of the most recent and damaging disasters that hit the National Capital Region, displaced a large population within a city already riven with forced eviction cases by a range of development projects such as those related to urban infrastructure. That is to say, “large-scale forced eviction can also be a cause of intra-city displacement” (IFRC 2012: 114), although urban residents are exposed to eviction threats of all scales, thereby making displacement a central concern in the life of urban residents.

3.3 Displacement: A challenging context for urban residents

From the perspective of urban residents who have stayed in their locality, urban displacement is one of many contexts where their lives are exposed to the systemic and spatial changes of cities, rather than an experience of being mobed from one locality to another. In this regard, it is necessary to reconceptualise urban displacement as a shock or contingency that can make urban residents insecure and vulnerable. For this end, the *World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty* provides a useful benchmark by identifying a range of risks that poor people are living with and are least

capable of coping with as their low income limits their capacity to save and accumulate assets and thereby to deal with crises (World Bank 2001: 135-136). The risks are classified by the level at which they occur (micro, meso, and macro) and also by the nature of the event (natural, economic, political and so on). Micro shocks affect specific individuals or households while meso shocks strike groups of households or an entire community, with shocks also occurring at the national or international level.

The report focuses on micro-level risks or idiosyncratic shocks such as illness and injury, old age, violence, harvest failure, unemployment, and food price risk. Other meso and macro risks are acknowledged such as war and civil strife, macroeconomic crisis, natural disaster and epidemic. A number of studies have been conducted on the impacts of these risks. Notably, macro policies such as the Structural Adjustment Programmes are one of the widely studied contexts wherein the livelihoods of the urban poor are undermined (Beall et al. 1999; Moser 2005; Potts 2006).³¹ Residents living in dangerous environments are vulnerable to forced eviction and also to natural disasters (Meikle 2002; Zoleta-Nantes 2002).

Other factors to consider include the frequency and severity of shocks; with regard to the former, the possibility of one shock leading to another can be detrimental, while severity can range from minor to catastrophic. For instance, making an important distinction between normal and catastrophic contexts, Hurley (1990) outlines a range of catastrophic events that are more specific to and prevalent in urban areas, such as environmental disasters, forced displacement due to conflict, economic catastrophe such as the general decline of an economy, the closure of a big firm, the rapid decline of a major industry, changes in the application of government regulations, and personal economic disasters such as the loss of a job or the failure of a small business.

Although urban DID qualifies as one such event that can be destabilising and significantly change the lives of urban residents *in situ*, it is rarely studied from this perspective, perhaps because the dramatic experiences of people being removed from cities receive most attention in this field. Even in the typology of risks presented in the *World Development Report 2000/2001*, displacement does not appear as a major risk

³¹ For example, Thomas (1995) analyses the impact of economic change in Latin America (notably, the debt crisis and periods of structural adjustment) on labour markets and how the poor survive in the cities. Likewise, Potts (2006) explains the enlargement of the informal economy (less so the informal housing sector) in terms of the poor macroeconomic performance in Zimbabwe. The study conducted by Moser (1996) investigates the impacts of macroeconomic policy change on the urban poor in four urban communities in countries experiencing economic difficulties during the 1980s, including Metro Manila.

(although resettlement is briefly mentioned). As compared to many exogenous events that the report notes as having idiosyncratic impacts on household income and assets, DID has a well-defined cause and a relatively confined boundary of impact at the micro or meso level. In terms of temporality, being in between faster-onset events like disasters and conflicts and slower-onset events like macro changes (e.g. climate change or economic crisis), the pace of DID in general allows room for observing and understanding how people managed their life in a normal context, which serves as essential baseline knowledge for examining the impacts of a change and for discerning longer-term meanings. This also enables us to examine the severity of risks and impacts by factoring in the different life conditions prior to the event.

More specifically, urban DID as a change event has distinctive features and can provide useful insights for the study of other types of urban contingencies. For this, it is necessary to map out the existing geography of poverty and inequality in cities as a broad background explaining how and why people end up living a precarious life that is vulnerable to urban spatial changes such as DID. Informality is recognised as a key source of vulnerability since it is often informal structures and economic activities that are targeted to make room for urban initiatives, resulting in those who are already poor and marginalised becoming more vulnerable and disadvantaged (UN-HABITAT 2011b; World Bank 2001). While informal settlers are subject to displacement after losing their house, non-displaced people – who may or may not be informal settlers themselves – experience changes stemming from the demolition of the informal settlements that used to stand close to their place of living.

In this section, the nature and main features of living within and around informal settlements are delineated, with a particular reference to Metro Manila. First, I introduce the existing discussions on informality, one on the informal economy and the other on informal settlements. I argue that informality has emerged in response to the shortfalls in the formal sector, while underlining the acute vulnerabilities embedded in engaging with the informal sector. Before examining such vulnerabilities, I introduce the livelihoods approach as a main analytical focus of my study so as to empirically explain how urban residents with limited resources manage challenges, notably poverty, in a normal context and how their strategies may be affected by a change like urban DID.

3.3.1 Informality

The growth and expansion of urban informality across different social and economic contexts has created renewed interests in the topic from the angles of both development research and practice (Chen 2006; Portes 2010). As a result of its pervasiveness in the public and private spheres of cities, informality has been conceptualised as an urban way of life or an organising urban logic (Roy and AlSayyad 2004). The concept of informality originated from the informal economy and expanded to other sectors such as housing and service provision (Thomas 1995). Although the literature pertaining to the informal economy and that of informal land and housing have tended to evolve rather disparately, a similar set of questions have guided the research and debate across both domains.

First, the definition and the characterisation of informality have been a main issue. Informality was initially defined via a negative form of 'not being formal', thus possessing contrasting characteristics to the 'formal' (Sindzingre 2006), and thus the nature of its relationship with formality has always been intensely debated. Second, the diversity and differentiation within informality has been recognised over time. The role of the state in sustaining informality (Portes 2010) and moreover its power to legitimate certain forms of informality (Roy 2005) have been particularly crucial. Third, given that the boundary of informality has been constantly negotiated within the regulatory regime, there has been a variety of approaches to informality with markedly different policy implications, among which formalisation has been one of the most contested issues.

Informal economy

The term the 'informal sector' was first coined by Hart (1973), an anthropologist, and was then enthusiastically taken up by the International Labour Organisation, which has led the debates in terms of empirical studies and conceptual discussions since then. Following the two-sector model of economic development that was predominant at the time (Wratten 1995), the informal sector was assumed to be a temporary phenomenon in the course of capitalist development and to be eventually incorporated into the formal economy. However, the dualist view was challenged over time as a result of the persistence and the growth of the informal economy (Chen 2006). The two sectors were noted for being intertwined as part of the same capitalist system, whereby the informal economy contributed to the profitability of capital by reducing the costs of

production (Portes et al. 1989). A more nuanced continuum approach was proposed in the 1970s (e.g. Bromley 1978), pulling out the characteristics that were found to be shared by both sectors (Sindzingre 2006).

Among many features defining the continuum of formality and informality, the extent of the reach by official regulation and protection is essential (Guha-Khasnobis et al. 2006). The absence of institutional regulation in the informal economy affects various elements of the work process, including the status of labour, the conditions of work and the form of management of some firms (Portes et al. 1989). There are genuine concerns about the exploitation of informal enterprises by formal enterprises (e.g. in the form of sub-contracting) and moreover about unprotected workers receiving few benefits or lower-than-minimum wages, as well as experiencing inappropriate working conditions in both formal and informal enterprises (Chen 2006; Portes et al. 1989). Focusing on the negative aspects of the informal economy, a legalist approach has promoted 'formalisation' in the sense of enhancing law enforcement or increased conformity to regulations.

However, the notion of legality is a contested concept, as is aptly illustrated by a range of unregistered and/or unregulated activities demonstrating varying degrees of illegality, from tax evasion to non-compliance with labour regulations, financial transactions unreported to the state or banks, and smuggling (Sindzingre 2006). Given the range, many emphasise the importance of distinguishing informal economic activities from illegal or criminal activities (Chen 2006; Portes et al. 1989; Thomas 1995). Underlining that normal (versus abnormal) and legal (versus criminal) are social categories that are subject to change, Castells and Portes (1989) clarify that the basic distinction between formal and informal activities 'proper' hinges not upon the character of the final product but on the manner in which it is produced and exchanged. That is, the informality of activities arises from the unregulated production of otherwise licit goods and services, whereas criminal activities are specialised in the production of goods and services that are socially defined as illicit.

At this point, it is important to distinguish the informal 'sector' from the informal 'economy'. The conceptual boundary of the informal 'sector' was thought to be rather narrow since it refers to a particular industry (e.g. manufacturing or services) or certain firm features (e.g. being small scale or labour intensive) (Sindzingre 2006). Hence, there was a shift towards the use of the informal 'economy' as a broader term denoting a whole range of aspects that matter to economic activities and to the

relationships of production and distribution (Chen 2006; Portes et al. 1989).³² Hart (1992) notes that the scope of the informal economy is far beyond rule infringement on the streets of cities like Accra (where he identified a lively 'informal sector' in the 1970s); it includes the broader informalisation of economy such as international drug trafficking, embezzlement and offshore banking.

On the contrary, de Soto (1989) interprets informality as a creative response (on the part of the poor) to the inefficient and excessive regulations of governments. Accordingly, he suggests that deregulation would unlock suppressed entrepreneurial capacities and thus resolve the resource shortages of developing countries. Although his idea became very popular in the neoliberal, free-market climate burgeoning at the time, it has also been criticised on many grounds. He defines the informal economy using one single criterion of legality without engaging with the previous debate and thereby confines the discussion to the issue of official regulations and bureaucratic rules (Thomas 1995). Chen (2006) contends that the nature of the regulatory environment itself needs to be examined before discussing the 'legality' of an economic activity since, depending on whether it is too punitive, too cumbersome or even non-existent, regulation can lead informal enterprises to operate semi-legally or illegally. For instance, deregulation is known for having led to the 'informalisation' of labour markets by rapidly increasing the flexibility of the employment relationship while the liberalisation of labour mobility is far slower (Chen 2006). Disenfranchisement of a large sector of the working class is also noted as a form of control by business to undermine organised labour (Portes et al. 1989). On the other hand, in many developing countries where social security is largely absent or inefficient and thus unemployment benefits cannot be claimed, poor people cannot afford unemployment and have to find ways to make their living in the informal economy (Thomas 1995; World Bank 2001).

A more profound critique comes from the 'paradox' of state control whereby increased official regulation of economic activity does not necessarily reduce the informal economy but instead may expand it by potentially creating profitable opportunities upon violation of the rules (Portes 2010). That is, the essence of the paradox is that the informal economy, supposedly the 'object' of state regulation, is in fact created by such regulations, since the informal economy would not exist without a universe of formal,

³² For example, the informal economy covers a range of characteristics such as non-observed, irregular, unofficial, second, hidden, shadow, underground, parallel, black market, unrecorded, untaxed, non-structured and petty production (Venkatesh 2006).

controlled activities. Furthermore, it has utilities for the state such as the 'cushioning' effect of maintaining political stability and economic viability, which is part of the reason why the informal economy develops under the auspices of government tolerance (Portes et al. 1989; Portes 2010; Thomas 1995). Given this, de Soto's proposal of formalisation through deregulation is largely oblivious to the multitudinous vested interests with a stake in the preservation of informality (Bromley 2004).

Furthermore, as long as the boundaries of the informal economy are drawn by an institutional framework defining legitimate economic activity, state intervention becomes a central issue since any changes in the institutional regulation would produce a parallel realignment of the formal-informal relationship (Portes et al. 1989). Hence, the relationship is not a clear-cut duality but rather represents a series of complex interactions between the economy and the state. Hart (1992) takes this dynamic between the market and the state further to argue that if 'informal' refers to the absence of a form and the lack of established regularity, 'informal economy' expresses the cumulative failure of bureaucracy to contain the untamed market forces.

Given the complex relationship between the formal and the informal economies and the diversity within the informal economy, it is important to clarify which aspect of the informal economy my study accounts for in order to avoid creating any conceptual confusion or being sidetracked by discussions that may be less relevant. Portes (2010) classifies informal activities according to their goals, namely survival, dependent exploitation and growth. Survival is a goal of an individual or household engaged with subsistence production or the simple sale of goods and services. Dependent exploitation refers to the relationship between formal and informal firms, intertwined through practices such as off-the-books hiring and sub-contracting. On the other hand, maximising the advantages of informality, small (informal) firms can accumulate capital to the end of the third goal: growth. He notes that this functional typology (which is not mutually exclusive) reflects the successively more complex levels of social organisation required for achieving a given goal. In addition, I point out that the main actors in focus shift from an individual/household to enterprises/firms.

This indicates that, depending on the specific focus of a study, researchers may end up working with a completely different set of actors in the informal economy, who demonstrate different logics of organisation and are faced with different challenges as well as opportunities. To the extent that the informal economy is socially embedded in particular structural and institutional contexts, there appears to be a general difference

in the main features of the informal economy between developing countries and developed countries. For instance, a tendency in development studies to present the informal economy as social marginality has been criticised for representing Western, middle-class views, particularly by the Latin American literature on informality (Portes et al. 1989; Rocha et al. 2004).

While acknowledging that informal economic processes cut across the whole social structure, beyond the poor segment of society (Castells and Portes 1989; Hart 1992), I focus on the segment of the informal economy where survival is the most predominant motivation and mode of operation and where there is a large overlap with poverty. For many operating in the informal economy of developing countries, the prevailing reality still means working and earning their living “on the margins of rules and organisational arrangements” (Portes et al. 1989). Many of these survival enterprises are too petty and precarious to be exploited by formal ones (Berner et al. 2008) and thus have been left out of the informal economy literature, which has very much focused on identifying the nature of the relationship between formal and informal firms. The informal economy literature is useful in order to delineate the different terms and conditions through which urban residents are being incorporated into the informal economy and thereby to capture their different levels of vulnerability.

Informal settlement

The basic frame of discussion on the informal economy also applies to the issue of informal land and housing. The term ‘informality’ raises the same definitional problem for human settlements whereby its main characteristics are defined negatively in relation to formality, despite the borderline between formal and informal being blurred (Durand-Lasserve 2006). A distinctive feature of informal land and housing markets is that affordability accrues through the absence of formal planning and regulations (Roy 2005). Squatter settlements (or self-help housing) formed through land invasion illustrate this point clearly as they are seen to emerge when land prices in the formal market are too high for low-income and poor households while the public provision of affordable housing is not efficient enough to meet the housing needs of cities’ expanding populations (Berner 2000; Satterthwaite 2009; Thomas 1995).

Various experiments have been carried out in terms of the provision of affordable housing for poor households but they have been off the target in many developing countries’ cities (Satterthwaite 2009). A general trend in housing provision has shifted from slum clearance and resettlement to slum upgrading and site-and-service

provision. Resettlement of slum dwellers to public-subsidised sites in urban peripheries has proved to be ineffective in addressing the dilemma of most urban poor people, who need to remain close to income-generating opportunities within accessible parts of the city but can afford only precarious sites with insecure tenure (Agrawal 2000; Payne et al. 2009). Sites on the far periphery may be more affordable with more secure tenure but involve high costs with regard to commuting (Williams 1997). Given this, slum upgrading is a welcome change that allows low-income families to stay in the settlements they have already made investments in (Budds et al. 2005), although the primary concern of urban-planning regimes with aesthetics has tended to result in improving the physical look of slums rather than more concrete upgrading of livelihoods, wages and the political capacities of slum dwellers (Roy 2005).

However, informality is not only the domain of the poor but is also important for the middle class and the elite, as is illustrated by an increasing emergence of informal subdivisions that are formed through legal ownership but are in violation of land use regulations (Roy 2005). There are also different categories of settlements that are commonly designated as 'slums' with varying degrees of tenure security. UN-HABITAT defines a slum household in terms of its lack of one or more of five conditions: access to improved water, access to sanitation, durable housing, sufficient living area, and security of tenure (United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2008b). Along the line of informality or illegality, Durand-Lasserve (2006) identifies three main types: (a) squatter settlements on public or private land; (b) illegal commercial suburban land subdivisions on private or customary land; and (c) occupation of overcrowded, dilapidated buildings in city centres or densely urbanised areas. Similarly, Potts (2006) distinguishes 'squatter' settlements from 'informal' settlements with the former characterised by 'illegal' tenure (i.e. residents have no legal rights to the land) and the latter by their being 'unplanned' by the municipal or town authority.³³ Other commonly used terms such as 'shanty' or 'slum' tend to describe physical characteristics of settlements such as overcrowding and poor living conditions (Potts 2006).

Among a range of attributes that characterise informal settlements, I refer to those consisting of structures built without legal tenure security or structures not conforming to building regulations (UN-HABITAT 2012b). A particular focus is on the informality that originates from land invasion, which was the main characteristic of informal

³³ For informal settlers, it is possible to have obtained the right to settle on the land from the owner or the authority controlling access. They are not squatters in that sense but are still in contravention of various urban land/building regulations (e.g. zoning plans) (Potts 2006: 281).

settlements in my research case. In the Philippines, under the New Civil Code of 1950, legal tenure security is defined mainly by land ownership, which is proven by possession of a formally registered title. Given narrow definition of legal tenure, other types of tenure tend to be less recognised and protected by law and, accordingly, the government's approach to providing security of tenure has always focused on formalising the ownership of dwelling structures and home plots, primarily through resettlement, slum upgrading and mortgage financing (Porio and Crisol 2004; Teodoro and Co 2009). Despite the aforementioned limitations of resettlement, escalating land values in Metro Manila makes conventional tenure formalisation measures viable only outside the metropolis such as in relocation sites (Porio and Crisol 2004). In fact, relocation to suburban areas has been the chosen strategy of the government in coping with the housing shortage for poor households, an approach often deployed in various contexts of displacement, particularly those induced by natural disasters (e.g. it was the case for those affected by the infamous Typhoon Ketsana in 2009; IFRC 2012).

The state indeed plays a critical role in creating differentiation in informality by determining which forms of informality to foster and which to annihilate (Roy and AlSaiyad 2004). That is, the state exercises its power by ensuring a constant negotiability regarding rights, property titles and land use and such ambiguity allows it to construct and reconstruct categories of legitimacy. For informal settlements, their emergence and persistence are largely due to the institutional inefficiency and bias in distributing resources, notably land for housing, which is one of the most contested resources in many societies (Kelly 2003; Mattingly 1999).

Tenure insecurity is known to be a factor that undermines development since the lack of secure land tenure³⁴ exposes residents to multiple disadvantages (Angel et al. 1983; Roy 2005; Satterthwaite 2009). They often become 'delegitimised' by the state as 'illegal', a view conveying the clearly repressive intention of government authorities, the most visible and common expression of which is clearance and eviction (Durand-Lasserve 2006). The possibility of eviction is one of the key reasons why both the urban poor and the government do not invest in improving the life conditions of informal settlements such as infrastructure and services (Baruah 2004; Budds et al 2005). In the case of land clearance and forced eviction, the scarce resources of the poor are used up simply to cope with constant uprooting and rebuilding (Teodoro and Co 2009:415), to which displaced/resettled people respond with common informal mechanisms such as

³⁴ Land tenure refers to the rights of individuals or groups in relation to land and thus tenure security is recognised as an important right in itself (Duran-Lasserve 2006; UN-HABITAT 2011b).

transfers from networks of mutual support, loans from money-lenders and reduction in household expenditure on essentials such as education and food (Agrawal 2000: 17-18; World Bank 2001: 141).

The importance of tenure security has given rise to myriad proposals of tenure formalisation including the aforementioned proposition by de Soto, which has been enthusiastically embraced by many urban managers (Satterthwaite 2009).³⁵ De Soto argued that the formalisation of the properties occupied by the urban poor (this is the only regulation that he approves) would realise their 'true' economic value and thus facilitate the active participation of the poor in the (property) market. However, the effectiveness of such titling programmes has been questioned in terms of their ability to deliver the benefits claimed by their proponents, such as investment in land and housing, access to formal credit, and improved provision of infrastructure and services (Payne et al. 2009). In a critical and comprehensive review of the issue, Payne et al. (2009) found that tenure regularisation provides increased tenure but many alternative forms of tenure (including those in many informal and unauthorised settlements) also provide a high level of tenure security. In many nations, land titles do not necessarily protect people from eviction and even after tenure regularisation, the residents of informal settlements are seen as slum dwellers and discriminated against in the labour market and in regard to service provision (Payne et al. 2009). This underlines the acute issue of social exclusion, which cuts across poverty and is associated with living/working in the informal sector (Rocha et al. 2004).

Furthermore, the process of tenure formalisation is complicated by the well-known diversity within informal land and housing. Those who suffer from inadequate housing are not a homogeneous group or a clearly defined social class (Angel et al. 1983: 4). Hence, formalisation can generate conflicts among existing property interests, whereby inequalities within informal settlements can be exacerbated (Roy 2005). An acute illustration of this is the phenomenon called 'downward-raiding' (e.g. Lemanski 2013), whereby people with limited (financial) resources are left out while more affluent segments of the population 'raid' regularised settlements (Berner and Phillips 2005; Porio and Crisol 2004). Fundamentally, the challenge lies in a mismatch between the irregularity of income and the regularity of payments whereby those with unstable income sources cannot meet the commitment of regular mortgage payment that is required for tenure formalisation (Roy 2005). Regularised settlements can also be

³⁵ Satterthwaite (2009) supposes that the reason for such acclaim may lie, ironically, in the apparent simplicity of its solution.

vulnerable further to the speculative pressure and gentrification processes, which may displace residents who became 'formal' in the long run.

Tenure-regularisation schemes in the Philippines illustrate some of these key points very well. Within the legal framework of the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA), there are three main methods of land acquisition: direct purchase, the Community Mortgage Programme (CMP) and Usufruct (Teodoro and Co 2009). First, direct purchase is a land-sale contract involving a prospective community association and a landowner, under agreed terms and conditions regarding the price of land and the method of payment. Direct purchase accounts for the tenure formalisation cases identified in my research. Second, CMP is an innovative finance facility that allows low-income communities to purchase the land that they occupy (or land that they have identified) for site and housing development. Organised groups of the urban poor can apply to the Social Housing Finance Corporation for 25-year loans at a flat interest rate of 6 per cent per annum. CMP has received the most attention partly because of its impressive performance (Berner and Phillips 2005), which has reached approximately 138,871 households (belonging to the housing backlog segment and the lowest 30 per cent of the population by income) during the period between 1989 and 2003 (Teodoro and Co 2009).

However, its limitations have been increasingly recognised. Complicated administrative procedures demotivate land owners (Teodoro and Co 2009), while a low repayment rate makes the whole scheme unsustainable without public co-financing (Llanto 2007). More flexible and creative approaches are promoted for enhancing the security of tenure, which allows mid-level rights and claims in an incremental fashion (Porio and Crisol 2004; UN-HABITAT 2012). Usufruct is one such experiment that gives a person called the 'usufructuary' beneficial use of the land, with the obligation to return the land at a specified point in the future. It is different from a lease for being more flexible in terms of use and enforceability (except for the obligation to undertake repairs and pay taxes) and thus becomes an alternative instrument for securing tenure (Teodoro and Co 2009; UN-HABITAT 2012).³⁶

Given that people with low earnings and limited savings are largely barred from participating in the land market from the outset (Angel et al. 1983), a broader question

³⁶ An interview with Attorney Michael "Jing" Gaddi, the former staff member at the Sentro Ng Alternatibong Lingap Panligal (SALIGAN), a legal resource non-governmental organisation doing developmental legal work with women, farmers, workers, the urban poor, indigenous peoples and local communities (5 May 2010)

is whether wealth legalisation in the domain of land ownership is possible without wealth transfer across the society (Berner 2000; Roy 2005). This is well demonstrated by the extent of informal land use in the Philippines, where about 46 per cent of the 24.2 million land parcels are untitled and remain outside the formal land market (Chikiamco and Fabella 2011: 132).³⁷ Among this, an estimated 70 per cent of untitled land or 7.8 million land parcels are residential. Likewise, a chronic housing backlog has been a serious challenge in the Philippines where in 2004, four out of every 10 Filipino families were reported to not own their house and lot, making the cumulative housing need for 2005 to 2010 as 3,756,072 units (United Nations Human Settlements Programme 2008a). In view of this, Angel et al. (1983: 3) note the inherently political and institutional nature of land issues by commenting that “Land fulfils a host of social functions and as such is closely bound up with the exercise of power and influence in society by a large number of competing interest groups.” Roy (2005: 50) chimes in by underlining that “the legalization of informal property systems is not simply a bureaucratic or technical problem but a complex political struggle.” Once again, Metro Manila epitomises this point in the domination and influence of the landed elite over land use and development, as was discussed in Section 3.2.2.

In sum, highlighted by the debates on the informal economy and settlements are the structural conditions within which informality arises as a pervasive mode of living (Roy and AlSayyad 2004). However, the complexity and the diversity of informality have not been sufficiently accommodated by the formal planning regime, which has often emphasised the negative aspects of informality and responded with a crude proposal of formalisation where the promised benefits have limited substantiation, while the increasing influence of private actors on the land and housing market compared to the weakening engagement of governments in urban planning tends to have marginalised the poor and low-income households both physically and socio-economically (Satterthwaite 2009). It is within these structural contexts of urban informality that I examine the impacts of the clearance of informal settlements on the local land and housing arrangements and livelihood networks. The presence of non-displaced people who may still live and operate in the informal sector, if confirmed, would underline clearly that “‘order’ of this sort – tidy, modern, formal-sector-dominated – can never be achieved in the cities of the very poor countries” (Potts 2006: 288).

³⁷ In Metro Manila, informal settlers numbered 2.7 million in 2007, living on privately owned land, government land and in danger areas (UN-HABITAT 2012). In terms of the size of informally used land, about 11.33 per cent of the total 1,549,636 million land parcels in Metro Manila are untitled and remained outside the formal land market in 2004 (La Salle Institute of Governance, undated).

3.3.2 Strategies and vulnerabilities

From the perspective of urban informality as a mode of living, both the insecurity embedded in informality and the opportunities that it offers need to be considered within a given structural and institutional context. Informality encompasses such diversity that it represents both the 'exclusion' of some groups from access to formal resources and the 'exit' strategy of others seeking to maximise the advantages of informally accessed resources (Perry et al 2007). Its dynamic is therefore determined by the relationship between the regulatory power of the state and the capacity of civil society to resist regulations (Portes 2010; Roy 2005).

It is this tension that displacement brings forward between a narrow focus of urban planners on the 'aesthetics' of cities and the resultant physical exclusion of those who need to stay in cities to make their living and who are in fact servicing these cities (Roy and AlSayyad 2004). It is not only informal settlements but also informal economic activities that are targeted by the regulatory activities of the government, with the detrimental effect of reducing the meagre wealth of the urban poor (Beall and Fox 2009; Hurley 1990). When informally accumulated assets are lost or undermined by planned developments like an urban infrastructure project, an acute dilemma emerges regarding whether and how such losses or harms can be recognised by formal interventions. Furthermore, given that the majority of the urban poor live in informal settlements and survive mainly in the informal economy, it is questionable to what extent formal urban planning is even compatible with the pervasive informality.

In view of this, I conceptualise displacement as an event through which informality as a mode of living or a life strategy becomes a critical vulnerability, then investigating this transition from the perspective of non-displaced urban residents. First, I clarify the relationship between informality and poverty where a large overlap exists in the sense that the poor have few choices but to arrange their resources, shelter and livelihoods in the informal sector. At the same time, I also underline the capability of people to make their living in ways that span the formal and informal sectors through the concept of livelihoods. Last, I tease out underlying insecurities in the engagement with informality, which becomes the source of vulnerability in the event of DID.

Informality and poverty

Informality does not necessarily mean poverty, as those living or working in the informal sector are not always poor (Potts 2006; Thomas 1995). The overlaps between

informal economic activities, slum dwelling, and poverty, although certainly existing, need to be grounded within specific local contexts, which my study aims to achieve through empirical analyses. A link between informality and poverty emerges as long as the meagre income of people reduces their access to the formal sector and makes them arrange needed resources informally. This link is most evident in case of housing, where the urban poor and large segments of low-income groups in cities have no choice but to rely on informal housing markets for accessing land and shelter due to their limited financial capital, which simply do not allow them access to formal options (Angel et al. 1983; Durand-Lasserve 2006).

However, there exist diverse forms of informal housing along a complex continuum of legality and illegality and the heterogeneity within an informal settlement has also long been noted, which does not allow it to be simply equated with poverty (Roy 2005). The first round of studies on informal housing and land markets in Latin America during the 1970s and the 1980s dismantled the notion of a 'culture of poverty', which was originally proposed by Oscar Lewis in the late 1950s and the early 1960s as a thesis explaining poverty in terms of individual or group traits such as the lack of a work ethic and a predilection for unruly behaviour (Roy and AlSayyad 2004; Thomas 1995; Wratten 1995). The view of the urban poor living in informal settlements as marginals has been criticised as a 'myth' serving the purpose of controlling the poor based on ethnocentric and class biases (Perlman 1978). Its conceptual validity was also challenged by empirical studies demonstrating that the urban poor were "fully integrated into society but on terms that often caused them to be economically exploited, politically repressed, socially stigmatised, and culturally excluded" (AlSayyad 2004: 9).

Likewise, the informal economy is not an euphemism for poverty since it refers to a specific form of income-generating production relationships whereas poverty is an attribute linked to the process of distribution (Portes et al. 1989). From the point of view of a household, diversification of livelihoods by managing parallel or multiple activities in both formal and informal economies can be a risk-mitigating or reducing strategy (Hurley 1990; World Bank 2001). In the sense that it demonstrates the desperate need of households to obtain means of subsistence, it may represent a dimension of poverty (Sindzingre 2006: 64); however, survival strategies are not only specific to the informal economy because such desperation also make people accept lower wages and unfavourable working conditions in the formal sector (Castells and Portes 1989).

The relationship between informal settlements and the informal economy is not straightforward either, particularly when debates and bodies of literature have developed separately without active attempts at cross-communication. Notably, not all those working in the informal economy live in informal housing and not all squatters work in the informal economy (Thomas 1995). However, to the extent that the urban poor tend to find their work within the immediate neighbourhood, at least for those living in informal settlements, it is likely that their housing and livelihoods are closely intertwined (Beall and Fox 2009). For instance, economic activities in slums are known to be skewed towards trade that involves a narrow range of commodities and operates with a limited customer base, leading to a situation where supply exceeds demand (Berner et al. 2008). Manufacturing is almost absent in informal settlements due to the potentially imminent threat of eviction, which prevents investments in immobile and expensive assets such as machinery and workshops (Berner et al. 2008). This complexity warrants a further examination through a livelihood-centred approach.

Urban livelihoods

For understanding the ways in which urban residents, in particular the urban poor, make their living by managing multiple insecurities, I introduce the livelihoods approach that provides valuable insights into the agency and resilience of people. The livelihood approach emerged together with the shift in the view of poverty, from one focused on measurable deficiencies such as income or basic services (Jones 1999; Wratten 1995) to a view emphasising the strength, initiative and courage of those whose lived experience is poverty (Nelson and Jones 1999). In understanding how poor people actually cope with unfavourable circumstances (Beall et al. 1999), the key question has changed from what they 'need' to what they 'have'. Consequently, livelihoods have come to the centre stage as a concept comprising the capabilities, assets (both material and social), and activities required to make a living (see Chambers and Conway 1992). The basic concept is that, drawing on multiple resources, people survive, cope with risks or recover from shocks and stresses, and also improve their wellbeing (Rakodi 2002).

In the livelihoods approach, a portfolio of assets is identified encompassing human, physical, natural, intellectual, financial and social capital, and poor people are featured as active managers of complex asset portfolios (Moser 2008). Poor people generate incomes from multiple sources, such as wages from labour, profits from the ownership of capital or the use of assets for productive activities (e.g. renting out a vehicle), rents

from (physical) property such as houses and pay-offs from certain power relations (e.g. income through patronage) (Hurley 1990). Diversification is one of the key livelihood strategies on the part of the urban poor, necessary to cope with volatility and the vulnerability arising from a series of crises (Bernier et al. 2008). As Hurley (1990: 11) puts it, “The diverse nature of the urban economy and the inability of most households to survive on one person’s income mean that most households have various sources of income and members tend not to work in the same activity”.

Given this, access to assets and income-generating opportunities is crucial (Beall et al. 1999; Potts 2006), while assets in turn form a source of capacity to influence policies and the organisations that govern access to assets (Bebbington 1999). By defining the entitlements or rights of people to access resources, institutions determine how resources are shared (Meikle 2002), the complexity of which is more pronounced in urban areas (Mejia 1999). As noted already, access to formal resources is limited for some groups by an institutional failure in creating affordable housing or formal employment and also by the favour of the authority towards the rich and powerful in resource distribution, which sustains existing inequalities (Mattingly 1999; Wratten 1995).

Social capital

Social capital has been recognised as a key asset for the resource-poor in making their living. Social networks of reciprocity, exchange and information-sharing often go beyond family and kinship ties, allowing people to access needed resources (Beall et al. 1999). The informal economy itself consists of “a vast, often invisible web”, the boundary of which is blurry (Venkatesh 2006: xix). For survival entrepreneurs who have to cope with short-term shocks and also with predictable hazards, maintaining personalised relations of patronage and reciprocity is an essential coping mechanism (Bernier et al. 2008). More broadly, as centres of socio-economic and political power, cities open a window for urban activism to influence the processes of national and international changes and to negotiate better access to resources (Beall 2002; Koenig 2009; Moser 2007). In this respect, the level of community organisation as a form of collective social capital is an important factor affecting the livelihood strategies of the urban poor (Phillips 2002).

While it is the positive functions of social capital that have received most attention, the costs involved in social capital also need to be recognised (Wratten 1995). Subtle forms of vulnerability can arise from socially fragmented relationships, which can be

demanding, burdensome or exploitative especially during hard times (Beall and Fox 2009). For the informal economy, Portes (2010) points out the acute paradox of its social embeddedness, whereby the more it approaches the model of the 'true market' where regulations are absent in economic exchange, the more it is dependent on social ties (i.e. social capital) for its effective functioning. Focusing on the urban poor, Berner et al. (2008) also make a similar point that the poor have to rely on their social capital for coping with countless forms of uncertainty at the cost of sharing, which can consequently make it difficult to accumulate capital and leaves the poor trapped in the web of shared poverty.

Considering the function and cost of social capital, the proposition of my study is that if urban livelihoods are reliant largely on social capital formed in and around informal settlements, a large-scale demographic change following DID can impact the local, informal socio-economic environment significantly and expose the urban residents to its complex effects.

Vulnerability

Vulnerability and poverty are mutually reinforcing in the sense that key characteristics of urban poverty such as insecure livelihoods, poor housing conditions, lack of access to basic services, social fragmentation, and exposure to crime and violence and environmental hazards and health risks create vulnerabilities for the urban poor, which in turn bind them into a cycle of poverty (Beall and Fox 2009). For instance, as poor people are already susceptible to illness, exposed to physical dangers and suffering great stresses and exhaustion, they become more vulnerable when affected by catastrophic events (World Bank 2001). Such events also have impoverishing effects, mostly through the collapse of a key income-earner's livelihood: "A poor household's resources are stretched to provide for even basic needs and the strategy for survival is tightly planned to take advantage of the best of the meagre opportunities available. This leaves very little flexibility to deal with disruption and very few resources to cope with extra expenditure or needs" (Hurley 1990: 19).

For conceptual clarity, however, it is useful to recognise poverty as a static concept capturing a snapshot in time and insecurity and vulnerability as dynamic concepts describing the response to changes over time (World Bank 2001). For other conceptual definitions, I also follow those that the World Bank report deploys in explaining risks, vulnerability and risk management since they are very relevant to my study examining the impacts of DID as a type of shock for local urban residents. The report defines

insecurity as exposure to risk and *vulnerability* as the resulting possibility of a decline in wellbeing. An event triggering the decline is often referred to as a *shock* while a *risk* arises from such events when they are uncertain in terms of timing or the magnitude. In particular, vulnerability measures the resilience against a shock, i.e. the likelihood that a shock will result in a decline in wellbeing, which is a function of a household's asset endowment and insurance mechanisms and also of the characteristics (severity, frequency, etc.) of the shock.

In the livelihoods literature, vulnerability means a high degree of exposure and susceptibility to long-term stresses or short-term shocks, and little capacity to recover quickly from them (Rakodi 2002). There are common sources of vulnerability in urban areas, among which Meikle (2002) highlights the lack of legal status on the part of the urban poor living in a precarious environment and the high dependency on the cash economy for basic goods and services, which makes them sensitive to economic changes in cities. The well-known impoverishment risks make urban DID certainly one context wherein informal residents become vulnerable. However, for non-displaced people, the impoverishment risks are not so obvious although changes in their living environment may increase uncertainty in managing their life, which constitutes a kind of risk according to the above definition, albeit one that is less known. Thus, while informality can translate into vulnerability in a situation like DID, it needs to be recognised as a differentiated process embodying varying degrees of power and exclusion (Roy 2005).

People living and operating in the informal sector are differently positioned and therefore demonstrate different levels of vulnerability. While inadequate shelter, both in terms of tenure security and living conditions, constitutes a key insecurity exposing urban residents to environmental hazards and eviction threats (Beall and Fox 2009: 104), even within an informal settlement a range of dwelling units exists such as houses, rooms, backyard shacks and bed space (Potts 2006). Crucially, security status differs between owners and tenants and yet the latter are largely neglected in housing or resettlement policies (Beall and Fox 2009; Ndezi 2009).

Resilience is closely linked to asset ownership since the more assets people have, the better they can cope with stresses and shocks (Moser 1998). By the same token, the more people's assets are eroded, the more vulnerable they become to future shocks. The NID literature provides interesting insights into how different security levels of life condition translate into and different experiences of disasters and varying capacities to

cope. For example, Zoleta-Nantes (2002) studies the impacts of flooding across different urban groups – namely street children, urban poor communities and gated communities – and demonstrates how political connections determine the collective capacity of communities to engage the government in preventing and coping with flood risks.

Likewise, people are differently positioned within the informal economy. There are significant variations in earnings between different types of informal jobs and also between an informal business owner and informal wage-workers (Chen 2006). Accordingly, there have been discussions on whether the informal economy might be the basis for productive accumulation (Hart 1992). It is noted that the informal economy can be an intermediate sector where some experience capital accumulation and upward mobility, whereas others are mainly concerned with survival (Hurley 1990). In this regard, Berner et al. (2008) differentiate survival entrepreneurs and growth-oriented entrepreneurs in the informal economy, with the former starting out of a lack of alternatives and the latter being driven by entrepreneurial vision. Survival entrepreneurs face particular barriers to growth as their prioritisation of security and their reciprocal obligation to share prevent them from ‘graduating’ out of poverty. They argue that we need to understand the logics of survival entrepreneurs and support their specific needs: “A first critical step is not about enhancing assistance by government but rather reducing the damage that it does; not about being ‘enabling’ but ‘less disabling’.”

A DID is one such deleterious ‘disabling’ situation for non-displaced people whose income-earning activities might have been adversely affected, undermining their capabilities and increasing the vulnerabilities of those living on the margins. Consequently, unpacking the complex relationship between living in an informal house, working in the informal sector, being vulnerable and being poor through the experiences of non-displaced people will be the focus of coming empirical chapters.

3.4 Conclusion

In urban areas, there is severe competition over resources, with urban space itself being one of the most precious resources. Displacement has long been a companion to urban socio-spatial changes although it has been marginalised among urban development concerns, which makes it a more critical lens through which to examine how current urban agendas are being shaped and implemented. This is partly due to

the limited conversation between different bodies of knowledge in discussing issues pertaining to urban displacement, a gap I attempt to address by bringing them together.

In my research, however, urban DID is reconceptualised as an arena in which we can understand how people living in and around informal settlements become vulnerable or remain resilient by a change in locality induced by land clearance and displacement. Urban poverty studies provide important insights that help us to discern the existing challenges and coping strategies of urban residents. Urban informality is a predominant feature of managing a life within and around informal settlements, providing opportunities to get by while embodying vulnerabilities to the case of planned changes. My study is concerned with the possibility that urban residents may become impoverished *in situ* and more vulnerable to the next round of other adverse events as a result of the multiple contingencies they face.

On the other hand, the livelihoods approach underlines the strength and strategies of people in making their living within challenging environments. Furthermore, by incorporating housing as part of the asset portfolio, the livelihoods approach proves to be useful for studying the experiences of non-displaced people whose livelihoods may have been affected as their informal use of urban space is disrupted. Social capital as an important asset and also in the form of dynamic social relationships is a key concept for analysing the socio-economic networks formed around informal settlements. The focus of coming empirical chapters will be on identifying how the existing challenges of living in and around informal settlements translate into acute vulnerability for non-displaced people in the event of an urban infrastructure project. In the next chapter on research methodology, I will explain how I operationalise the theoretical debates on, and the key concepts of, urban informality, livelihoods and vulnerability in a specific case study of urban DID.

Chapter 4

Methodology

4.1. Introduction

To examine the impacts of a development project on the urban locality and its residents, a complex research design was required to construct and compare the situation before and after the event. Since non-displacement impacts are understudied in the existing development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) literature, an explorative and flexible approach was appropriate, although the actual examination of impacts, once identified, was conducted in a systematic comparative manner. Data were extensively collected on a range of variables that could shed light on key themes such as urban poverty, informality and vulnerability. The urban livelihoods framework was used as an operational guide for data collection, within which semi-structured interviewing was conducted. The overall data collection process including sampling is elaborated in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, I discuss the method and the process of data analysis, the core component of which was the reconstruction of a baseline with the data collected after the event. Aided by grounded theory, I identified key concepts that are relevant to explain the socio-economic lives of residents in and around informal settlements and organised them in three main life domains: housing, livelihoods and social milieu. With the data rearranged to represent pre- and post-life conditions for each household, I examined the impacts of local changes brought in by development-induced displacement (DID) on urban residents remaining in the project area, teasing out variations in their experiences while tracing the collective patterns of a change. I conclude by presenting some of the methodological reflections on the challenges and limitations of my field research (Section 4.4).

4.2. Data collection

With the main aim of the research to examine the impacts of DID on urban livelihoods, data collection was centred on gathering information about a range of resources that urban settlers owned or accessed and the diverse ways in which they were arranged and utilised for their livelihood activities. The livelihoods framework provided a set of useful concepts for taking a comprehensive snap-shot of livelihoods at a given point. However, being built upon an (implicit) assumption of a non-change context, it turned out to be too static to capture the changes in livelihoods over time. Hence, a more dynamic approach had to be adopted for data analysis, which will be discussed in the next section. In this section, I explain how I operationalised the livelihoods framework for my research and provide an overview of the data collection process and the collected data.

4.2.1. Conceptual guide

By adopting a people-centred and contextualised approach, the livelihoods framework enables a holistic and cross-sectional understanding of how people make their living amidst myriad constraints and risks. It has been developed mainly in two kinds, namely the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) and the Asset Vulnerability Framework (AVF). The SLF evolved as part of the poverty elimination strategy of the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) in the 1990s. Starting from a rural livelihoods framework, the SLF was developed into the 'urban livelihoods framework' in order to accommodate the distinctive nature and multiple dimensions of urban poverty (Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones 2002).³⁸ The AVF³⁹ developed out of an empirical study for the World Bank project on urban management and poverty reduction (Moser et al. 1997). The main aim of the study was to measure the adverse impacts of macroeconomic changes induced by structural adjustment programmes on the asset base of the urban poor. The original intention of the AVF to mitigate asset erosion later shifted to the creation of positive opportunities for asset accumulation and the AVF has been reshaped into the more policy-oriented asset-building (AB) framework (Moser 2008).

³⁸ The SLF is for both rural and urban areas but in this thesis the term is used to mean the urban SLF unless specified.

³⁹ Although the assets and vulnerability framework is hardly referred to in abbreviation unlike the SLF, I use the AVF for the convenience of distinguishing the two frameworks clearly.

Apart from minor differences, the SLF and AVF share the same underlying position that emphasises the agency of people in managing a range of assets and propose similar set of capitals or assets. The SLF consists of five types of capital: physical, financial, human, social and natural (Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones 2002). The AVF identifies five asset categories: well-known tangible assets such as labour and human capital; less familiar productive assets such as housing; and largely invisible intangible assets such as household relations and social capital (Moser 1998). Among similar proposals of asset categories, I found the asset index devised by Moser (2007) most appropriate for capturing the changes in urban livelihoods and prepared the initial interview guide by modifying the asset index and the questionnaire used in Moser's study. The interview guide for my study is attached in the Appendix.

Table 1 Asset Index

Capital type	Asset categories	Index components
Physical Capital	Housing	Roof material, walls material, floor material, lighting source, toilet type
	Consumer durables	Television, radio, washing machine, bike, motorcycle, VCR, DVD player, record player, computer, fan
Financial/ Productive Capital	Employment security	State employee, private sector permanent worker, self-employed, contract or temporary worker
	Productive durables	Refrigerator, car, sewing machine
	Transfer-rental income	Remittances, rent, government transfers
	<i>Access to credit</i>	<i>Savings, loan</i>
Human Capital	Education	Level of education: illiterate, some primary school, completed primary school, secondary/technical school, etc.
	<i>Labour and health status</i>	<i>Individual capacity to work, the number of working members, illness (on medication, operated, etc.)</i>
Social Capital	Household	Jointly headed household, other households on plot, 'hidden' female-headed households
	Community	Whether someone on the plot attends church, plays in sports groups, participates in community groups

*Source: Moser (2007)

While drafting an interview guide, I reconciled some differences between the asset index and the urban sustainable livelihoods framework (USLF) so as to make it more relevant to the study of non-displaced urban residents. First, it is noteworthy that both

frameworks recognise the productive capacity of housing, which is a more relevant issue for non-displaced people who do not lose their home but may have experienced housing impacts in other senses. The index distinguishes consumer durables from productive durables that have an income-generating capacity and classifies the latter as financial/productive capital, whereas the USLF perceives productive assets to be part of physical capital. Noting that housing provides both reproductive and productive spaces, I collected data on a range of functions of housing and particularly adopted a hybrid concept of 'physical productive' capital in my analysis of livelihood impacts. Second, the USLF assigns land and security of tenure to the natural capital category, whereas the index combines them with housing and eliminates the natural capital category entirely. This seems more sensible in urban areas, since land is more of a medium through which people access livelihood opportunities and other services rather than a main productive asset in itself.

The USLF sheds light on some other important points which were incorporated into my research (emphasised in italic text in Table 1). Labour being defined as the capacity to work is one of the key assets that the urban poor possess and can offer in exchange for the cash income they are heavily reliant on for meeting their needs in cities. Health status is a vital factor in determining the quality of labour and consequently, both labour and health are included in the human capital category. Not only financial transfers such as remittances and government/NGO assistance but also access to credit are included in the financial capital category. The issue of access to an economic and social infrastructure, such as school and health facilities, is also recognised.

Social capital warrants further discussions. Whereas social capital is known to be crucial for the livelihoods of the urban poor, displacement is a critical context where the existing social fabric is torn apart, compounding other capital losses and thereby becoming a hidden but serious cause of impoverishment (Cernea 1998: 54–55). Premised on this, social capital was included as a legitimate part of the investigation although it was yet to be seen whether non-displaced people also experience a similar societal change through large-scale displacement in their locality. The challenge for data collection was, however, to operationalise the concept of social capital, given its own complex and extensive definition. The USLF defines social capital as the rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity and trust embedded in social relations, social structures, and society's institutional arrangements (Rakodi 2002). It also has a political aspect, since social relations determine how people gain access to resources and relate to the


wider economy, as well as to higher-level social and political institutions (Beall 2002). In my research, I focused on the aspect of social capital that is embedded in, and emerges from, a combination of social relationships, networks and organisations found in a specific locality. Furthermore, I recognised that it not only functions as a form of asset but also constitutes contexts wherein people carry out their socio-economic activities. Accordingly, the data collection guide included questions on the composition of a household, participation in communal activities and membership of community organisations.

4.2.2. Data collection process

Using a detailed interview guide drafted in reference to the urban livelihoods frameworks, semi-structured interviewing was conducted. Interviewing is a useful data-gathering method for various types of qualitative research since it permits an in-depth exploration of a particular topic or experience (Charmaz 2006). Over the course of the fieldwork, the data collection process became progressively more open-ended with spontaneous questions added and less relevant questions dropped. Some concepts from the livelihoods framework turned out to be irrelevant for my specific research context where they were not readily understood or did not interest research participants very much. For example, the concept of ‘assets’, although being central to the livelihoods framework, did not initiate meaningful conversations and thus was omitted along the course.

The process leading up to the fieldwork needs some elaboration since it shaped the direction and the nature of the fieldwork and had methodological ramifications for my research. Preliminary fieldwork (which was initially planned to be the first round of fieldwork at that time) took place from mid-September to mid-October in 2009. With an aim to compare the cases of people who are differentially affected by DID, the original research was designed to encompass the relocation sites and the project area (i.e. the area along the railway tracks). After visiting both sites, however, it became evident that the focus of my research needed to be refined since the mix of two populations – namely, displaced/resettled people and non-displaced people – created considerable confusion. Accordingly, the research design was revised in the following months to the current one, which is focused on identifying and understanding the impacts of DID on the population remaining in the project area. In this process, the nature of the research methodology was also revised from a structured, comparative one to a more open-ended, explorative one.

The main field research was conducted from late January to mid-June 2010 (five and a half months). The timeline of the railway project and its resettlement programme is presented in Figure 3, along which multiple research periods and field trips took place.



The previous Master's research was conducted in 2007 (July and August), with an aim to investigate the process and the outcome of DIDR. At that time, the relocation programme was in the course of implementation and thus people at all stages of the process could be included in the research, including those already resettled, those in transition, and people due to be displaced. In addition to the railway area, three relocation sites were visited: Southville 1, Southville 2 and an 'alternative' relocation site in Montalban (Municipality of Rodriguez in the Province of Rizal). Furthermore, extensive data were collected from interviews with diverse stakeholders ranging from government officials, staff members of the donor agencies, civil society actors and other experts. The insights from my MPhil research, in particular serious livelihood challenges in remote relocation sites and the phenomenon of return as a coping strategy, were instrumental for contextualising the current DPhil research and, furthermore, for shifting its focus beyond displaced people in the relocation sites to non-displaced people in the project area.

Since the geographical unit of the current research is the project site along the railway tracks, the relocation sites were not restudied after the previous MPhil research. Given

this, a caveat in regard to inferring the relocation situations from what is described in this thesis is that they have diversified and changed over the significant time that has passed since the first research. Thus, findings on resettlement may be specific to these sites only and limited in terms of their ability to be generalised. Nonetheless, information on relocation was complemented in part by the observations from informal field visits to Southville 1, the first and largest relocation site and one which I returned to many times over the years, and visits made to other relocation sites (such as Northville 4 & 4A in Marilao, Towerville 5 in San Jose del Monte and Northville 2B in Bagumbong). It was also updated through the accounts of displaced people who were included in the current research, as well as those of non-displaced people who had an indirect experience of having their family members, friends and neighbours being displaced.

For the current study, I revisited the project area after it was all cleared of houses and covered some length along the railway tracks rather than a depth of one particular area with an anticipation of collecting extensive data that would inform whether and how the non-displaced were affected by the changes following the clearance. Map 1 demarcates the geographical scope of my research with the dots on the PNR railway indicating train stations.


Interviewing was conducted with the people remaining in the area between the España station and the Caloocan station. Within the whole project area that stretches from Caloocan in the north to Alabang in the south, this is the section that was visibly most heavily populated prior to the clearance and also an area where houses still remain even after the clearance. Furthermore, it was the area where my previous research was mainly conducted and thus the one that I was most familiar with and where I felt comfortable and safe.

In terms of sampling, I arranged a group of interviews in sections starting from the España station. Interview participants were selected through convenience sampling on the basis of accessibility (Morse 2007). First, I walked along the railway together with an experienced community organiser⁴⁰ and we approached the houses that were accessible (e.g. with open doors or windows or with people sitting outside). An effort

⁴⁰ I conducted my previous MPhil research in partnership with Urban Poor Associates (UPA), a Filipino NGO that has been engaged with the demolition and forced eviction issues for a long time. Before displacement took place, the UPA organised informal settlers along the railway while conducting a household survey and liaising with local leaders. Aling Lina and Aling Luz who kindly volunteered to assist my doctoral field work were the community organisers of the UPA at that time and thus know the area very well.

was made to ensure that in each new case the house was physically separate from the previously approached house. After introducing my research and having a short conversation with residents, I arranged an interview with those who were willing to participate. On a set date, I went back to the area with an interpreter for an actual interview. Most interviews took place inside or in front of a house and this gave me a chance to make some observations on household as well as community dynamics. Apart from a few cases where research participants spoke in English, I asked questions in English and answers were given in Tagalog, with both being translated on the spot by the interpreter. Interviews were recorded upon participants' agreement and a considerable portion was transcribed by the interpreter as part of her job.

Map 1: Research site along the railway - from España to Caloocan



Source: map constructed by Michael Anthanson

Although the interview questionnaire was designed to collect data on households, actual interviews were conducted with an individual household member, leaving a question of whether or to what extent an individual represents a household as a whole. In my research, interview participants were all adults (the youngest participant was 22 years old) and mostly senior members of a household (either the first or the second generation of a household) or self-identified household heads. Thus, it can be assumed that they recited the basic history and life conditions of their household, although I am aware that this might not be a fair or balanced representation.

Households are complex “social structures which can range in size from one individual to a large extended family”, with key characteristics being the economic interdependence of the members and support networks generally based on marriage and blood ties (Hurley 1990: 8). Hence, it turned out to be difficult for an outsider like me to understand household composition and livelihood dynamics clearly and entirely, particularly through one-off interviewing. For instance, questions were asked about the work status of family members but the capacity and willingness of interview participants to elaborate household livelihoods as a whole varied. In part, this seems to be related to the size of a household and the complexity of its composition, which often entailed interview participants taking quite some time to identify all the members or to count the total number of people living together in a house.⁴¹

In terms of selecting an individual interviewee, people tended to voluntarily recommend a household member they thought would be the best candidate for interviewing or to actively participate in an interview themselves. This self-selection process might have been influenced by potential intra-household power dynamics whereby the voices of some members are silenced, while those of other members are overrepresented due to their dominant socio-economic position within a household. Although the livelihoods framework acknowledges the importance of considering these intra-household dynamics (Rakodi 2002), it was not investigated in detail since they were neither the main focus of my research nor emerged very strongly during interviews. In my research, personalities (e.g. being talkative, curious, outgoing, nosy, etc.) appeared to be the determining factor in whether or not one became an active participant. From a practical point of view, it was also easier to conduct an interview with those who were more ‘talkative’.

⁴¹ For example, H11 used to live with about 20 members before the railway clearance. Likewise, F4 was living with eight children in one house, many of whom had their own families (cf. for the logic of numbering interview participants, see the last paragraph of Section 4.3.1).

In other cases, the initially contacted people, who were somewhat arbitrarily selected in the sense that they happened to be at home at the time of the visit, remained as interview participants. On quite a few occasions, other household members (mostly husband/wife or adult children) were present at the interview scene and joined in the conversation at various points or co-participated, complementing the statements of the primary interview participant or clarifying/correcting certain points (e.g. A6; F1; F4). In any case, however, this study was not designed to gather all the information on each household member or to capture an accurate (factual) picture. Instead, the primary aim was to conceptualise the complex and diverse ways in which people make their living in both normal and change contexts, using the data collected on different households.

4.2.3. Data overview

The fieldwork yielded a total of 67 interviews, including 16 displaced people who have stayed on or have returned from the relocation sites, either temporarily or permanently. Although displaced people were not the main focus of this research, their presence was so prevalent that the field research ended up including them in the data collection. The criteria dividing non-displaced people and displaced people is whether they lost their residential house completely and had to move out of their homes. Including the people whose houses were partially demolished by the clearance and who have stayed in the remaining part, research participants are primarily subdivided into three groups according to the type of housing loss: no housing loss, partial housing loss and complete housing loss. Among these three groups, people with no housing loss and with a partial housing loss constitute ‘non-displaced’ people as they have stayed on without being displaced (51 out of 67).

Table 2 Interview participants

Non-displaced people	No housing loss	35 (52.2%)
	Partial housing loss	16 (23.9%)
Displaced people	Complete housing loss	16 (23.9%)
Total		67 (100.0%)

**Gender: Female (48) and Male (27)*

**Age: average (46.8 years old), minimum (22 years old) and maximum (80 years old)*

Initially, all three groups were treated as people ‘remaining’ in the railway area but having displaced people present during the process of data analysis created some confusion since they attracted attention away from my main research focus, i.e. the impacts of a developmental change on those who never moved. Upon realising this, I separated non-displaced people (51 cases) from displaced people (16 cases) and

analysed their experiences of the change first before adding the insights from displaced people. The accounts of displaced people were included primarily for the purpose of understanding life along the railway prior to the clearance. Before they lost their home, they were very much a legitimate part of the locality and their accounts contribute to conceptualising general conditions and key features of living in and around informal settlements. Depending on the arrangement of post-displacement housing, a few displaced people in the sample have integrated back into the socio-economic environment of the railway area (or think they have done so), as if they had never left. That is, despite losing a house, although it is certainly a big loss, some displaced people seem to have resumed their life once they managed to find a relatively secure place of living. Furthermore, their experience of displacement and relocation form the basis on which to distinguish the different trajectories of 'affected people' in a DID context and clarify who has remained along the railway (see Section 5.3 for the comprehensive categorisation of affected people).

This indicates that the experience of displacement alone does not explain the complex ways in which urban residents were or were not affected by changes in their locality. Through data analysis, it is found that both displaced and non-displaced people are heterogeneous in terms of tenure and socio-economics status. In particular, the tenure status of non-displaced people is not all formal, whereas displaced people were at least all informal settlers before the clearance. Hence, it is impossible as well as inaccurate to equate non-displaced people with 'squatters' (or informal settlers). Likewise, socio-economically speaking, informal settlers are not necessarily poor, unlike popular perception would suggest, and many of them perceive themselves as non-poor and differentiate themselves from the group that they think 'poor. Such diversity could not be captured simply by the housing impact type, even though it is a clear-cut line dividing displaced and non-displaced people. In view of this, I describe non-displaced people broadly as those 'living in or around informal settlements' and aim to unpack the multiple divisions and differentiations found across the physical, socio-economic domains.

4.3. Data analysis

Examining the impacts of an event stretches the temporal scope of a study since it requires an understanding of both pre- and post-event situations. Although being aided by the data from my Master's research, I did not have concrete baseline data on the life

conditions of urban residents along the railway prior to the current event, which would have allowed me to conduct a rigorous longitudinal analysis. Instead, therefore, I attempted to reconstruct the pre-impact state retrospectively, by extracting general features of living in and around informal settlements based on a wide range of accounts across time (before and after the change) and also from both displaced and non-displaced people. To begin with, I acknowledge the challenge of reconstructing the 'past' from memories and retrospective accounts. Research participants found it difficult to remember the details of how local changes took place over the years, particularly the exact timeline of events. Also, there is a possibility that people's accounts of the past might have been affected by, or filtered through, their experiences of various changes (both personal and contextual). In this regard, having data on both displaced and non-displaced populations proved to be very useful to balance out the different views of the situation.

For reaching the level of conceptual abstraction at which individual cases of specific time and space could be transcended to some extent, I benefited from grounded theory, a method of analysis that is guided by concepts emerging from data rather than fitting data into a predefined conceptual framework. Although concepts inherited from the livelihoods framework directed data collection, the framework served as a place to start, not a place to end, because the attributes of, and the interrelations between, its key concepts were left open to be configured in the process of data analysis. Using the grounded theory method, I identified diverse manners in which urban residents organised their lives with the resources that the livelihoods framework outlined. Both grounded theory as a method and the analysis of resource arrangement as its product will be explained below before I discuss how the impacts of the local changes following DID were examined against this analytical background.

4.3.1. Grounded theory

While searching for methodological guides, I was introduced to grounded theory, an established sociological method known for its rigour and flexibility (Charmaz 2003). Being aimed at generating a theory from empirical data, grounded theory is particularly useful for studying unknown or understudied phenomenon because it does not bring in many preconceived concepts and thus allows greater room for a theory to emerge from the collected data (Glaser 1978). Given that non-displacement impacts had been rarely studied in the DIDR literature, I found grounded theory a good fit for my research and

attempted to apply it to theorising the dynamics of urban livelihoods in general, against which I sought to examine the impacts of DID on non-displaced urban residents.

Grounded theory was devised by two sociologists, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, based on their shared critique that the mainstream sociological research at that time was guided by the grand theories of great sociologists (or 'theoretical capitalists', to use their term) and was focused very much on verifying such theories, degrading sociologists to 'proletariat testers' (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Instead, they argued that a theory constructed with concepts emerging from a systematic analysis of data would be more relevant for explaining people's real concerns and how they would resolve their concerns than logically deduced theories of social structures. When generating a grounded theory, researchers enter the research domain with an open-ended question (i.e. what is happening here) and progress further to identify the basic social processes or basic social-psychological processes of the phenomenon of interest (Charmaz 2006; Glaser 1978). A distinctive feature of grounded theory is its simultaneous process of data collection and analysis, called *theoretical sampling*, by which concepts emerging from the analysis of the collected data guide the next methodological step (Glaser 1978). That is, emerging analytical categories provide a conceptual handle on the studied experience, enabling us to gather additional data with which to refine our emerging theory (Charmaz 2006).

Analysis starts with line-by-line coding (*open coding*) whereby emerging categories and their properties are identified. Open coding is followed by *selective coding*, which is more focused on making interconnections between categories and leads to *theoretical coding*, by which concepts are integrated around the core category (Glaser 1978). The analytical process is fundamentally comparative as first incidents are compared with incidents, and then with emerging categories, which are compared further with other conceptual categories. Accompanying this iterative process are memo-writing and sorting – methods to facilitate conceptual thinking, which is central to grounded theory. Memo-writing is pivotal in advancing the analysis as it helps researchers to identify relationships between codes by taking them apart or merging them together until they identify the most interesting and significant leads for further data collection and analysis (Charmaz 2003). The data fractured into concepts are put back together when memos are sorted and organised into a theoretical outline (Glaser 1978). This ongoing process by which the core category is identified and other categories are linked to the

core continues until a theory centred on the core category emerges and its interrelationships are fully developed (i.e. saturated).

In sum, grounded theory aims to achieve a conceptual depth not a descriptive coverage (Glaser 2001) through the process of moving back and forth between empirical data and emerging analysis, thereby building an empirical check into the analysis (Bryant and Charmaz 2007). Elevating the analysis to the level of abstract conceptualisation (or theorisation) is more valued than descriptions that are only context specific and lose relevance across time and space. From this original position, grounded theory has diverged into many directions over the decades, with varying degrees of hybridisation. Whereas the Glaserian version promotes the maximum openness and the minimum preconceived influence, Strauss and Corbin (who joined him later) introduce a more structured approach such as a conditional matrix.

Among the variants of grounded theory, I referred mostly to Glaser's work, which made much clearer sense to me of the essence and the whole of grounded theory. As a novice in the method, my experience with grounded theory was a constant learning process and it was not until I attended a grounded theory seminar hosted by Glaser after my fieldwork that I had a better understanding of the method. Hence, I could not implement theoretical sampling during data collection but applied the method to the analysis of the already-collected data by allowing the emergent concepts to guide the next round of analysis. According to Morse (2007), we also sample from our data, purposefully prioritising some or back-staging others, as we craft our analysis. Once the phenomena or the concepts of interest are identified, then the average or less optimal cases can be examined more efficiently (Morse 2007). Accordingly, I started to analyse those (seemingly) rich or high-quality interviews wherein participants shed useful light on the research topic in question and were reflective and articulate.

Interview analysis was conducted in multiple rounds, in between which I took some time for developing and consolidating key concepts through memo-writing and sorting. First, I went through transcripts, coding line by line (or doing 'open coding), writing codes on the margin of the transcript, while writing separate memos on emerging concepts, their properties and interlinks as well as reflections on the whole process of analysis. At the end of one round of analysis, codes were stacked into a list and then sorted while I reviewed memos and wrote more conceptual memos to integrate codes into major categories. The next round of analysis was conducted through the lens of the concepts emerging from the previous ones, which moved the process forward

efficiently and enhanced the level of conceptual saturation. In addition to memo-writing, which facilitated my conceptual thinking, the method of ‘constant comparison’ enabled me to relate different codes systematically, by comparing their properties, separating their dimensions, merging similar concepts and discarding less relevant ones.⁴² Through a constant comparative method, selective coding could be carried out based on the relevance of data to the core categories. In sum, through the grounded theory method I could engage with data at a conceptual level, find linkages between concepts systematically and tie them together tightly.

Lastly, the ways in which interviews are referenced and quoted in this thesis warrants a brief explanation here since the identification number given to interviews reflects the process of analysis in terms of both its phase (noted in Roman alphabet) and order (noted in number). For instance, A3 indicates the third interview of the first round of analysis. An identification number is often followed by a specific code number indicating from where a quote or a concept emerged. Given that one household interview can offer information on other members who were not directly interviewed, an interview identification number in parentheses does not necessarily mean that the relevant information originates from an interviewee’s own experiences. Quotes including *in vivo* words or phrases are in double quotation marks and are followed by a reference number in parentheses. Direct quotes of a few sentences are embedded within a relevant paragraph as supporting evidence. A lengthier quote in the form of narrative is presented separately and in italic for visibility. In some cases, a part of an interview transcript including questions is quoted for clarification when the statements of an interview participant do not stand on their own. Otherwise, questions are taken out and only the answers are combined to form a longer narrative, in which case ‘[...]’ is used to replace the questions. Also, additional explanation or clarification is put in brackets.

4.3.2. Analytical background

In this section, I present the result of grounded theory analysis as a broad background, rather than a framework, against which the impacts of land clearance and population displacement are examined. Patterns of resource arrangement are elaborated with its core category being *informal arrangement*, which is a common strategy in a normal

⁴² Note that the method of constant comparison in grounded theory means comparing indicators of concepts across incidents rather than comparing incidents themselves (Glaser 1978).

context but becomes a source of vulnerability in the event of a formal change like the one induced by the railway project.

Access to resources

A resource pool is known to be composed of assets that people have accumulated and of resources that they can access (Beall 2002; Rakodi 2002). This is also confirmed in my research as a range of resources is inherited or shared within a family or within a broader social network: from tangible assets such as a house or a business space (F6) to more intangible assets such as knowledge, ideas, skills and experiences, i.e. 'know-how' in general (F1; F3; A1; E6; J8). A family business can also be passed on across generations (A4). Social relationships stand out as a channel through which people can access a larger pool of resources such as housing (H6), business space (A5; I1; F6), means of livelihood (A4; H10), employment opportunities (A1), business ideas and relevant information pertaining to arranging all these resources. If resources are not inherited or shared, people either buy or borrow them. For instance, if people do not own a house, they have to 'use' someone else's house (i.e. renting); and if one does not own a sewing machine, s/he has to borrow it from others for making rugs to earn a living. Likewise, in meeting their needs, people may use their own financial capital such as savings but may also have to borrow money.

Accessibility is a critical issue for urban residents who do not own the resources needed for their livelihood and thus have to use those provided by others (Beall 2002). It is demonstrated in my research that accessibility consists of how available a certain resource is (*availability*) and whether one can afford it (*affordability*). *Availability* is determined by whether a needed resource is provided or physically exists in a reachable distance (*physical existence and proximity*). For example, some people lost access to water and electricity after the clearance since the service lines were removed together with the demolition of informal houses (e.g. J8). Proximity to the resource, in terms of physical distance and of transportation, is also an important issue. Having schools or health clinics within walking distance (H4; H5) or being able to use multiple means of transportation for commuting is the merit of living in the urban centre. Another aspect of availability is how complicated the process of accessing the resource is (*procedural complication*). Even though water and electricity lines are in place, it is often the case that the process of having a formal connection involves many requirements and takes a long time, which makes such services less available (e.g. E2; G1).

Affordability can be discussed in terms of price/cost affordability and of qualification affordability. Price affordability matters where people need to pay for the resources provided by the market. In urban areas where most goods and services have to be purchased, having insufficient financial capital limits access to resources. For instance, a few of the research participants experienced being cut off from water or electricity when they could not pay bills (e.g. H11; J6). For certain resources such as government social (protection or welfare) programmes (including a relocation programme), people need to meet the eligibility criteria. Furthermore, it is typical in the formal job market that people have to qualify for a given position, for instance in terms of an education and other skills.

In accessing resources, availability and affordability issues are interlinked. As long as the price or the qualification level is set by resource providers such as the formal market or policy, limited access to resources indicates the lack of affordable options for those who have little financial or human capital at hand. As an illustration, the accounts of people expressing that their capacity to afford goods and services is low (e.g. “I can’t afford it” or “I have no money”) are often related to the cost of accessing resources (“too expensive”). Many people comment that the price of utilities is too high or is increasing: “For the water, it gets higher and also for the electricity. [...] [For electricity] Before, we were paying 1,200, 1,400, 1,600 and alike. 1,700 will be the highest. But the bill now, it’s like 2,600. A lot of people here are crying about it. [...] But, whatever the bill is, people just pay, because it’s really difficult not to have electricity” (I7).

The link between availability and affordability supports the importance of providing assistance or subsidies for enhancing accessibility for those with low purchasing power. For instance, a number of research participants mention that supports to health services are very helpful. Basic health care is free at government hospitals or local health centres, although they have to pay for medicine and for laboratory time (H4; I3; I5). Furthermore, targeted health assistance is provided to poor people by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), a government agency that uses the revenue from sweepstakes for running charity services including medical and health services. I3, who was assisted by the PCSO for his two operations, comments that: “it’s helping less fortunate people to pay their hospital fees, lessen the amount, although not totally. You have to go to the PCSO office and they will interview you and they’ll see if you really pass their criteria of being poor [...] they have to screen first before they grant.”

However, when the market or policy is not effective in providing affordable options for poor and low-income households, resources are often arranged in other ways, notably through informal channels. While being a widespread mode of accessing resources and managing livelihoods among people living in and around informal settlements, informal arrangements become a critical source of vulnerability when formal regulation is imposed or a socio-spatial change takes place by formal initiatives. I analyse the nature and forms of informality found in my research so as to establish a context within which to examine the impacts of DID on the urban locality and residents. A particular concern is with those who do not have many resources at hand and who are likely to informally arrange their resources (including land for housing), thereby becoming vulnerable in the event of changes such as DID.

Informal arrangements: a livelihood strategy vs. a source of vulnerability

Informed by the discussion on informality in Chapter 3, I understand informality from the views of both the regulatory regime (Chen 2006) and people living in and with informality (Thomas 1995) so as to tease out the tension between (a) informality as the target for control or the consequence of official neglect (from the regulatory perspective) and (b) informality as a mode of living. By the definition of the extent to which activities are governed by authorities, informality means an arrangement of resources made outside the formal economy or the formal policy arena, where people do not pay the formal market price or do not go through a formal procedure of qualifying for social entitlements, thereby avoiding policy requirements or market competition. As an opt-out strategy, informal arrangement is influenced by the price and the quality of formal resource provision. For example, people tap into someone else's legal water or electricity line, a phenomenon which is called 'jumping' in the Philippines, when they cannot pay the bills or, in other words, when the price of utilities is too high. They also become 'jumpers' (i.e. people who are 'jumping onto' others' service lines) when the quality of formally provided resources is not good given its price level. For instance, H5 started to use water informally partly because she could not afford the bills and partly because the service was poor quality: "The water flow was too slow and minimal, the legal connection. The illegal connection is faster. Because the legal connection was slow in flow, we also had to pay more. The bill reached up to 3,200 pesos and we couldn't pay such amount. [...] Now, we use a pale of water from a water pump. It's free. It takes only our labour."

However, informal arrangement is not necessarily 'free of charge'. Monetary transactions are involved when trading informally occupied space and structures such as an empty lot, a business space or an informal house, thereby forming the informal market (A7; I1; F6). Likewise, people use water or electricity by paying the owner who has a legal connection (A3; I3). This is different from 'jumping', in which people do not pay the owner of the water or electricity connection. Furthermore, the authorities can make an informal use of resources more 'legitimate' by charging fees or granting an approval. For example, A3 as a sidewalk vendor does not pay anything for using a public space to earn her livelihood but does have an approval from the authority that states she can carry on her business as long as she does not expand it beyond the span of the sidewalk. Legitimate arrangement is often political in nature as in the case of J9 who does not have a legal water connection as an informal settler but is provided with water by the Mayor in exchange for votes during the election.

The degrees of legitimacy in which resources are arranged underlines that informality exists in degrees rather than as a status. Nonetheless, the diversity and differentiation in informal arrangements tend to be summarily 'illegalised' by formal resource providers or by the authority for the reasons that due payment is not made or official acknowledgement is not given. Consequently, informal arrangements become a target for control whenever the regulatory needs arise. For instance, service providers devise methods to detect 'jumpers' as reported by some residents along the railway.⁴³ Informal arrangements are also vulnerable to formal regulations as well as an arbitrary or unexplained imposition of rules by the authority. Informal business holders are often subject to an inspection by government officials such as the police, who sometimes ask for bribes in exchange for allowing them to get away (G2; I2). While this adds costs to running a business informally, one of the most notorious risks come with operations targeted at clearing urban land and space, through which informally arranged resources are lost or confiscated (F6; I2).

Land clearance and population displacement for the current railway project constitute one such situation where a formally initiated socio-spatial change is imposed on the existing resource arrangements, livelihoods and social relationships in the locality. In the case of a formal, regulatory change, informally arranged resources become vulnerable to being lost or suffer from limited protection since they are not officially

⁴³ A commonly mentioned example is the case of Meralco (one of the main electricity companies), which changed the colour of electricity lines from black to orange (A6; G1) and relocated electricity meters from within to outside houses "because of the jumpers" (I10).

recognised. The 'illegalisation' of informal arrangement brings out the risks involved in informal arrangement, which prevail over its merit of better accessibility to resources at a lower price or without an entry barrier in a normal context. That is, a transition takes place whereby informality as a mode of living and a livelihood strategy becomes a primary source of vulnerability.

4.3.3. Examination of impacts: across life domains

In terms of the actual order of analysis, informal arrangement of resources as one of the main features of living in and around informal settlements was clarified only through an attempt to figure out who the remaining people are and whether and how they might have been impacted by the changes in their locality. In the process of analysis, three main life concerns emerged – housing, livelihoods and social relationships – and their interrelations and level of embeddedness within the locality were identified. In my research, the term 'locality' refers to an immediate geographical area where the private and public aspects of life overlap and socio-economic interactions take place. Geographically speaking, it refers to both residential and commercial areas around the railway tracks along which informal settlements used to stand and is often used interchangeably with the term 'neighbourhood'. Locality is important to the extent that resource arrangements and livelihood activities are dependent on it and meaningful social relationships are fostered and a shared living space is formed within an immediate area.

Once the general modes of managing resources, livelihoods and social lives were understood, I reorganised the data collected for each household to reconstruct their preconditions, using the concepts that were identified as relevant for explaining variations in each life domain. Against the preconditions of land and housing arrangements, livelihoods and social relationships, the impacts of local changes were examined. This way of examining impacts is fundamentally different from analysing data collected on predefined variables in the sense that the relevance of variables for evaluation emerged in the process of analysis instead of being determined before data collection. This openness to emergent concepts was largely stimulated by grounded theory. Consequently, only the most relevant ones among the concepts suggested by the livelihoods framework earned a place in the construction of preconditions and impact types, whereas some valuable but less relevant data had to be trimmed off.

Notably, resources known to be important for urban livelihoods were further refined in my research as: physical capital such as a house, productive durables and basic infrastructure (e.g. water and electricity); financial capital, encompassing one's own income, savings, and loans; human capital, which can be maintained and enriched through health care and education; and social capital, which is mainly in the form of various social-economic relationships that form livelihood and support networks.⁴⁴ Among these, only the data that fitted to the emerging patterns of impact were considered for evaluation. For instance, in evaluating livelihood status, human capital is often used as a measure to examine the quality of the workforce, but no strong correlation between the two emerged in my research and thus data collected on educational qualifications or health issues were not included in the analysis. This process of refinement was inevitable for an explorative study aimed at identifying yet unknown phenomenon such as non-displacement impacts, which cannot be examined with a known set of variables and for which the kind of data to be collected cannot be predetermined. In this regard, it was useful to gather an extensive amount of information about households for making categorisation and comparison.

In each life domain, the impacts of local changes could be pinpointed against the existing modes of managing constraints and opportunities and the meanings of specific impacts were delineated in view of them. Most notably, for housing and livelihoods, preconditions were systematically analysed in order to identify differentiations in land and house arrangement and in terms of the diversity and security of a livelihood portfolio. In comparison, reconstructing the social dynamics prior to the clearance was found to be far more complicated and made it challenging to delineate the social impacts of the change. In the first place, data on social impacts are relatively thinner than on other issues, which may be attributable in part to the fact that social implications of the change were not the major component of data collection from the outset as compared to livelihoods, which is the main focus of the study. That is, the initial orientation and the consequent choice of a data collection method such as semi-structured interviewing might have influenced the kind of collected data and what could be analysed from it.

Nonetheless, questions were asked in an open-ended and broad manner with regards to the social changes that people had experienced through the clearance. Thus,

⁴⁴ Notably, this resource categorisation is largely influenced by the use of the livelihoods framework. My research confirms the importance of these 'basic resources while acknowledging that people with different needs are likely to give different priorities to them.

accounts (although not always given) were more spontaneous than guided, making the nature of analysing social impacts different from the evaluation of other types of impact. The main sources of data were the accounts of non-displaced people, which were complemented by the experiences of the remaining displaced people. Although their view does not represent that of the displaced population as a whole, observations during my MPhil research raised the possibility that the evaluations of non-displaced people might have been biased by their different experiences compared to displaced people or might have been retrospectively made to fit after experiencing changes in the locality. Simultaneously, I also acknowledge that the view of displaced people returning to or remaining in the area might have been tainted by their experience of a dramatic change whereby they were forced to leave a familiar environment. That is, there is a possibility that the past might have been painted positively as a result of their nostalgia and also in view of the current harsh reality. Once again, having both displaced and non-displaced people in the sample enabled me to attain both the breadth and the balance of the view.

The external shock of the railway project came from the demolition of informal houses, the collective outcome of which was a profound landscape change in the area. The impact of removing a physical element from the locality was amplified by the displacement of informal settlers, which, combined together, transformed the physical and socio-economic environments that used to be formed around the demolished informal settlements. As the local economy and social networks were significantly reconfigured, the resource arrangements, economic activities and social relationships based on them were subsequently impacted. I intend to explain the complex patterns of impact effectively within the intricacies between life domains that are embedded within the local area. First, impacts can be both direct (through direct losses at a household level) and indirect (through changes in the local area). Second, people can be differentially affected across life domains by being in and out of different impact zones, i.e. remaining intact in one domain while experience changes in other domains. On the other hand, an impact on one life domain may trigger a change in other life domains, thereby underlining that an external shock can upset a mode of living as a whole.

The coming empirical chapters are dedicated to examining the impacts on each life domain: Chapter 6 covers land and housing, Chapter 7 livelihoods and Chapter 8 social relationships. First, I outline how non-displaced people are impacted by, and also cope with, such transformation. Local changes can have different implications for people depending on the extent to which their mode of living prior to the clearance was

embedded in the physical, socio-economic environment formed around informal settlements. Hence, I analyse the impacts in view of the overall life challenges and strategies to manage them in a non-change (or pre-impact) context. The principal concern is with urban dwellers who are living on the margins, and thus whose lives are already circumscribed by many insecurities even without a shock that was brought in by an event of DID. This complex comparative structure across time and life domains is anticipated to explain how non-displaced people are differentially affected by the event. Accordingly, the common analytical focus of each chapter will be on teasing out subtle divisions among research participants in terms of different housing arrangements, livelihood options and social interactions, as well as on examining the extent to which differential experiences of change (i.e. one's vulnerability or resilience level) can be attributed to the different life conditions prior to the event. Before I introduce the case study and research findings in the coming chapters, however, I conclude this chapter by presenting some of the reflections on my research methodology.

4.4. Methodological reflection

A multitude of questions arise from the uncertainty that is inevitably involved in any research situation, such as whether one is able to collect sufficient data (or how much data would make one's research qualify as a doctoral study) and whether the collected data will be relevant and useful in answering one's research questions. I attempted to cope with such uncertainty by securing a certain amount of data by continuously conducting interviews with a tight schedule in order to maximise the limited time in the field. My quest for the quantity of data came at the expense of the time for reflection on the collected data as well as the overall research process. This also did not leave room to complement some of the shortfalls of one-off interviewing with other research methods. Other challenges also emerged along the process, such as forming meaningful relationships with research participants and also with interpreters.

4.4.1. One-off/semi-structured interviewing

Unlike quantitative researchers (who are concerned with 'numbers'), qualitative researchers are interested in discovering social processes or mechanisms (Strauss and Corbin 1998). This requires research skills such as investigator insight and self-awareness in regard to one's research skills, which can be aided by the constant monitoring of the quality of data and the directions and analytic needs of the study

(Charmaz 2006; Morse 2007). In particular, interviewing requires the art of combining flexibility and control in a manner that is open-ended but directed and paced yet unrestricted (Charmaz 2006). That is, having good interviewing skills is crucial for qualitative analysis: “Sound interview strategies help the researcher go beyond common sense tales and subsequent obvious, low-level categories that add nothing new” (Charmaz 2006: 33).⁴⁵

Initially, I thought some interviews produced ‘bad data’ by conventional criteria such as the length of an interview or the richness of description, and could not see their relevance and contribution to the overall analysis. For example, during interviews, I often felt frustrated thinking that people did not talk much or were not very vocal. However, while going through interview transcripts with sufficient time and space, I began to realise that I had not listened to them carefully in the first place, driven by the eagerness (mixed with some anxiety) to get the ‘right’ answer to my questions. I had not realised clearly at the time of fieldwork that the quality of data were largely dependent on my interviewing and analytical skills, not the quality of the story that an interview participant offered. Furthermore, my reflexive capacity was constrained by insufficient time in between interviews for processing information and for resting to regain focus and clarity. I tried to compensate for these shortfalls by meticulously writing a daily field note which included methodological reflections. More importantly, by using grounded theory (at least for data analysis), I paid more attention to what interview participants tried to convey and followed their guide into their own storyline.

Nonetheless, one-off interviewing with a semi-structured questionnaire had its own limitation in making the data collection process more rigid and redundant. It was particularly difficult to understand the social aspect of people’s life or their community culture. Anticipating the socio-cultural impacts of displacement, the initial investigation was planned to explore how community life was affected in the localities. However, questions about ‘community’ such as how they would describe ‘community’, both geographically and culturally, did not interest people very much. Where answers were given, ‘community’ was often understood as almost identical to neighbourhood or *barangay* (the smallest administrative division in the Philippines). After several attempts to try to converse on ‘community’, it became clear that, in addition to a possibility that the idea was lost in translation, the concept of ‘community’ was not a

⁴⁵ To put this in perspective, however, it needs to be mentioned that one’s interviewing skill can be hampered by the language barrier. This is illustrated by a difference in quality between the interviews that I conducted directly in English and those conducted through an interpreter.

useful entry point to the real concerns of people and also that one-off interviewing is not an effective way of capturing the subtlety and nuance of communal dynamics.

The limitation of interviewing as a technique might have been overcome by me spending more time in one community and carrying out participant observation to obtain better insights into complex social relationships. However, unlike in the previous Master's research that was focused on displaced people and for which the pressing issue was demolition and eviction, it was difficult to engage with any particular communities or to justify my presence there when an investigation was broad and explorative in nature. As my research did not have a defined geographic boundary or a specific issue to focus on, choosing and spending substantial time in a few communities could not be planned ahead. Interviews often took place in an open area (e.g. at an outdoor canteen or on the street in front of houses) and people standing around the interview scene sometimes became curious and wanted to join, for example asking questions about the research or commenting on certain issues. Although I tended to concentrate on an interviewee alone, I could have turned such occasions into improvised, participatory discussions by taking interested people on board, which are known to be useful for providing the missing pieces of the puzzle in the process of saturation (Morse 2007). These techniques can be brought in for future research that aims to collect data on both households and communities.

4.4.2. Hybrid grounded theory

Grounded theory requires a high level of 'theoretical sensitivity' with which to entertain a range of theoretical possibilities and make theoretical comparisons, an acquired skill that is precipitated on knowing something about theory or at least intuitively understanding how to go about theorising (Bryant and Charmaz 2007). This does not come easily and is particularly challenging for novice researchers who have less experience (Bryant and Charmaz 2007). Without a full grasp of the method, the difficulty of applying the method arose from two main sources – i.e. using semi-structured interviewing and not using theoretical sampling. It is suggested that data collected in a more structured way, for example even survey data, can be analysed with the grounded theory method (Glaser 1998). However, during data collection, I found the use of a semi-structured questionnaire to conflict with, if not contradict, the core idea of grounded theory (i.e. remaining flexible) and felt ambivalent about pursuing an emerging line of questioning, leaving the original questionnaire behind. That is, in

practice, there is ample tension between following the lead of emerging data and pursuing our initial interests and this is part of the reasons why I think grounded theory requires training (in staying open) and experience (in finding a balance between the two).

On the other hand, that theoretical sampling was not implemented during fieldwork remains a limitation of my research in terms of it as a grounded theory study. I continued interviewing without thoroughly analysing the data in between the interviews until I saw an 'illusion of saturation' whereby the repetition of similar information, but not necessarily concepts or patterns, was mistaken as a sign of conceptual saturation, which then resulted in 'data overload' whereby more than enough data were collected (Glaser 2001). Given this, I do not seek to categorise my research as a grounded theory study in the pure sense of generating an abstract theory as a final product. Having read extensively on grounded theory, I am well aware of, and agree with, the concern shared by many grounded theorists: "Qualitative researchers often claim to conduct grounded theory studies without fully understanding or adopting its distinctive guidelines" (Charmaz 2003: 441). Many researchers who argue they have applied the grounded theory method often borrow a few slogans or mantras while lacking in-depth use of its key strategies (Bryant and Charmaz 2007; Glaser 2001).

However, as long as a grounded theory was not the initial goal of my research from the outset, it is understandable that it was not the final outcome in the end. More importantly, apart from the limitation in its application, grounded theory contributed to enhancing the conceptual level of my analysis and also to better accommodating the concerns and interests of people. In particular, its open approach to data proved to be very helpful, whereby only the relevant and fit data were allowed to earn their place in the analysis (Glaser 1978), while its basic premise remains that 'all is data' and there is no good or bad data as such (Glaser 1998).

4.4.3. Research relationship and researcher positionality

Researchers are in the position of seeking local knowledge from people, who are the 'knowledge-owners' of their own living environments and activities. Nonetheless, there is an inherent power imbalance between a researcher and research participants in the sense that the researcher initiates a research project and thus has more control over the research relationship. Furthermore, researchers have the power to determine the

extent to which the participants speak their stories in their own ways and to legitimise or de-legitimise given information at their own discretion. By judging what is more valid data in their view, researchers can reinforce their own perceptions, which are strongly influenced by both personal background and academic training. These relative differences in power and status have impacts on the direction and content of interviews (Charmaz 2006).

In my case, my personal background of being more or less 'middle-class' and coming from so-called 'developed' societies and also from different cultures might have limited my capacity to see the world from the perspectives of people in different positions. While research is a constant negotiation with oneself and with research participants, I found it challenging to let go of control over my research idea, design, process and outcome. For instance, prior to data collection, I justified the use of semi-structured interviewing partly as a means to have some 'control' over field research, which was to be conducted in a foreign language that I had only a limited command over. My adherence to the questionnaire during the interviews also indicates that I was still afraid of accommodating the emerging research process and used my questionnaire as a tool for validating interview participants' accounts at times.

However, it was demonstrated (over and over again) that research participants exercised their autonomy and agency over what they wanted to say. While reviewing interview scripts, it was remarkable to realise how firm they were in articulating their real concerns regardless of the questions posed by the researcher. For example, when I asked what they thought about displacement and relocation, the answers given were often not their thoughts on the issue but about something else (e.g. A3). At the time of interviewing, I thought they were not 'answering' my question but, in fact, they were communicating issues that mattered more to them, directing the researcher to the issues of their interest, which needed to be respected and probed further. Likewise, it was evident that the more I tried to impose some control, for example by trying to lead an interview to get a specific answer (e.g. B1 and B2), the less I received the kind of responses I wanted. Questions tended to get longer in such cases while answers became shorter in response. People hardly moved in the direction that I led them to, unless they wanted to do so. That is, they were demonstrating their power to express what questions were relevant to them and worth answering, almost unconsciously, thereby rebalancing the relationship with the researcher. There were also cases where research participants stood up to correct the interpreter or to clarify their statements when they felt that they were not accurately or sufficiently represented.

In sum, it is crucial for researchers to be aware that they are inevitably bound by their own knowledge and experiences, if not certain prejudices or perceptions, and think through methods to minimise their negative influences. Without such reflexivity, their assumptions about the world are likely to be reproduced (Charmaz 2006). In entering the world of research participants, researchers also need to bear and show respect for them by trying to establish *rapport*, which requires concerted effort. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge and appreciate how much such knowledge production relies upon the participation of people and their willingness to share their life stories. There was in fact a reverse imbalance in which I was benefiting from the information provided by people and personally learning greatly from their experiences, whereas there is little way that I could return their favour even to a remotely similar magnitude. This is more so given the hardship that research participants had to go through in reciting their experiences which might have been very personal and emotionally challenging. This connects to some of the ethical issues affecting my research.

Ethical concerns

At the beginning of each interview, I explained about my research and introduced a written consent form (translated in Tagalog). It turned out to be quite challenging to make the purpose of the consent form understood. It often took quite some time to go through it, which made me question whether a written form is an appropriate means to deliver the original intention of obtaining consent. This became more evident when some people expressed their concern over signing a written document, fearing that it might be used as their consent to a potential (or planned) demolition and entail their displacement in future.⁴⁶ For instance, the mother of H6, an informal house owner who did not experience any housing loss in the current clearance, wanted to make sure that my research was not related to the government and was not meant for relocating them. She said that there had been similar cases where a survey like my research was conducted and after some years people were told to sign a document stating they would leave the place. For a similar reason, H5 did not want her interview to be recorded. Those living in or around informal settlements have experienced multiple cases of eviction, either directly or indirectly and, particularly for those who have been included in the census or who have received an eviction notice, the sight of a written document must have triggered a real fear of forced eviction. The potential or perceived risks involved in taking part in the research needed to be minimised in the best possible way although I am aware that, if a demolition takes place in future, there is no

⁴⁶ In such cases, only verbal consent was obtained.

way for me to explain to them that the event of demolition is not related to their signing the consent form or participating in my research.

In view of this, for displaced people who lost their house completely through the railway clearance this time, accounting their experience can be highly distressing in itself. For example, an old lady who returned to the area after displacement ended up crying during the interview. Likewise, it must have been extremely difficult for people like F6 to narrate her life story, which has been marred by a series of forced eviction cases. She looked very sad and distressed all the way through the interview and I could only appreciate her courage in participating in the research (while feeling guilty about making her go through such an emotionally upsetting process). This underlines the acute need to raise the awareness and sensitivity of researchers who are working with people faced with the threat of eviction.⁴⁷

Working in foreign languages

Another dimension to my relationship with research participants was the additional challenge of conducting research in a foreign language, which might have magnified my desire to have control over the research. Also, speaking through an interpreter might have made me overlook the need and the importance of creating a proper *rappport* with research participants (even within the limited domain of one-off interviewing). In some cases, I was talking to an interpreter directly, marginalising the participants (E7CN3), or leading the interview to be more interrogative (investigative) than communicative in style, partly out of frustration with regards to the language barrier (E3CN23).

Furthermore, it also had practical implications for data collection and analysis. In some interviews, it was very hard to follow people's narration (or to understand what they tried to convey) (E8CN7). While this is partly attributable to the limitation of one-off interviewing (such as limited time spent with interview participants), it is more likely that conversations were undermined by the linguistic and cultural differences than by the limited comprehension or articulation on both parties. For example, the subject and/or tense of interpreted sentences were often very unclear and I had to spend quite some time clarifying such (basic) matters, which hindered a smooth flow of interviewing. On the contrary, with a few participants who spoke fluent English and could communicate with me directly, I had an enormous feeling of liberation and

⁴⁷ In addition to the threat of eviction, other issues can be quite sensitive and need to be discussed with care. For example, questions about family or household composition can be very personal, as illustrated by one occasion where an interviewee became very emotional whilst describing her partnership, which seemed to have been difficult and painful.

autonomy (e.g. H13; D3). The constraint of language had further ramifications on data analysis since a high level of abstract thinking and theorisation is closely related to the mastery of languages (or advanced linguistic abilities). For instance, in those interviews where I could engage with interviewees directly in English or where interviewees were very articulate (e.g. E10) major breakthroughs in conceptualisation were made.

Furthermore, forming a working relationship with an interpreter was a challenge in itself. I recruited an interpreter by putting a notice up at a university campus and worked with a few interpreters in the end. Soon after I started fieldwork, I realised that interpretation requires linguistic skills and experiences quite different from those of a research assistant, for whom a relevant disciplinary background and an understanding of research may be essential. By working with an interpreter who excelled at the job, I realised clearly how critical the quality and efficiency of interpretation is in making a difference to the research process and outcome. My experience with interpreters raises a more general point that a potential dynamic with an interpreter, which can complicate the research relationship into a three-fold one (between research participants, interpreter and researcher), need to be thought through in advance for research to be conducted in foreign languages.

Chapter 5

Research Case Study

5.1. Introduction

This chapter introduces the case study of my research, the North Rail–South Rail Linkage Project, with a particular focus on the clearance of informal settlements along the railway tracks as its preceding process. As a result of the clearance, informal settlements that used to be home to over 35,000 households were demolished and their residents were displaced. The National Housing Authority (NHA) implemented a relocation⁴⁸ programme as an attempt to mitigate the impacts of such large-scale displacement. Drawing on previous MPhil research and updating it using the materials from the current project, I analyse the key challenges faced by relocatees and the main shortfalls of the relocation programme. Based on an overview of a broad context within which to discuss the changes experienced by the population remaining in the railway area, first I identify a range of localities where people were affected by development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR), either *in situ* or in forced mobility. Given that displaced people have also stayed in the railway area, the intention is to clarify who the ‘non-displaced’ people are. Second, I shift the discussion to the locality along the railway tracks and outline the physical and socio-economic changes it underwent through land clearance and population displacement.

5.2. The Railway Project and the Relocation Programme

The railway service under the Philippine National Railways (PNR) had deteriorated so seriously over several decades that it had long been in dire need of upgrading. Since the

⁴⁸ In the Philippines, the term ‘relocation’ is more commonly used than ‘resettlement’ and ‘forced eviction’ rather than ‘displacement’. For instance, the official name of the intervention is “Relocation programme for the North Rail–South Rail Linkage Project”.

first rail tracks were laid by the royal fiat of the King of Spain and the colonial train called *Ferrocarril de Manila – Dagupan* had its first commercial run in 1891, the PNR has played an important role in Philippine history through world wars, independence and modernisation.⁴⁹ In the 1970s, government priorities in transportation shifted to automobiles such as buses and trucks, meaning PNR trains and the railroads started to suffer from neglect and mismanagement and were further battered by myriad natural disasters, such as a series of typhoons and the eruption of Mayon Volcano in 1993.

A proposal to revive it as an effective means of transportation was eventually promoted during the Arroyo administration (2001–2010) and it was included in the priority infrastructure projects. Among three major railway projects, the particular concern of this research is the first phase of the North Rail–South Rail Linkage project (hereafter the railway project), which connects the North Rail and the South Rail.⁵⁰ Two other projects pertain to the North Rail going up to San Fernando in Northern Luzon under the management of the North Luzon Railways Corporation and the South Rail going down to Legazpi in the Bicol region, another project of the PNR (see Map 1 for the scope of all three railway projects).

The railway project in focus, that is, the first phase of the North – South Rail Linkage Project, covers the section passing through the most populated area in Metro Manila, between Caloocan in the North and Alabang in the South (see Map 2 for the project scope).⁵¹ Its main aim was to alleviate the vehicular traffic congestion in the South Luzon Expressway, to aid the decongestion of Metro Manila, and to provide a fast, safe, comfortable and affordable mode of mass transportation.⁵² This involved renewing and strengthening tracks, double-tracking, raising or reconstructing bridges, improving stations and flag stops, fencing off station premises, improving depot and maintenance facilities, providing protective devices in road-rail crossings and supplying new diesel multiple units.

⁴⁹ Source: Philippine National Railways web site (<http://www.pnr.gov.ph/history.htm>; accessed on 17 June 2013).

⁵⁰ Initially, it was named the ‘South Manila Commuter Rail Project’ and is cited in earlier documents as such since its main use was for commuting as compared to the long-distance travel services of the other two rails.

⁵¹ The second phase of the North–South Rail project connects Alabang with Calamba in Laguna, thereby extending the train service to the neighbouring municipality (i.e. Laguna) and linking to the South Rail service.

⁵² From the ‘Project Profile’ document (written on 8 June 2006) obtained from the PNR (on 30 August 2007).

Map 2: The scope of North Rail, North Rail - South Rail and South Rail



Source: map constructed by Michael Anthanson

Map 3: The North-South Rail Linkage project



Source: map constructed by Dr Michael Anthanson

The project was financed by a loan from the Korean government through its Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank) and a loan agreement with the Philippine government was signed in 2005.⁵³ From the outset, clearing the right of way for the project was the main concern because a large informal settlement existed alongside the railway tracks. Anticipating the social implications of the settlement clearance that would result in the displacement of its residents, the release of the loan was conditioned on the provision

⁵³ The cost of the project was estimated at US\$50.42 million and the Korea EXIM Bank provided a mixed credit of an Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) loan (US\$35 million) and export credit (US\$15.24 million), repayable in 30 years with an annual interest rate of 2.5% (from the 'Summary of the Philippine South Manila Commuter Rail Project'; obtained on 30 August 2007).

of relocation for displaced people.⁵⁴ Accordingly, the Philippine government took the responsibility of implementing a relocation programme from its national budget. The EXIM Bank as the donor agency monitored the relocation progress by hiring an international expert through the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Evaluation was conducted twice: once at the early stage to ensure whether a reasonable relocation programme was in place and again before the procurement for the railway project.⁵⁵ After visiting people still living alongside the rail route and also in a relocation site (e.g. Southville 1 in Cabuyao), “he [the consultant] was convinced that the resettlement programme was being implemented and persuaded the Korea EXIM Bank to release [the loan].”⁵⁶ Consequently, the railway project started in June 2007 and was to be carried out by a consortium of Korean companies.⁵⁷ At the time of the fieldwork for the current research in 2010, the project was nearing completion with most of the rail tracks being upgraded and new trains already running.

In the Philippines, although there is no resettlement policy at the national level (Tamondong 2007), a specific legal framework exists pertaining to urban areas, namely the Republic Act (RA) 7279 or otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA). As a result of a long and active civil society campaign, the UDHA was adopted in 1992 to provide comprehensive guidelines for urban development, with a particular focus on land use and housing issues such as public land proclamation, social housing, slum upgrading and involuntary resettlement (Teodoro and Co 2009). With regards to DIDR, Section 28 on ‘Eviction and Demolition’ (in Article VII on ‘Urban Renewal and Resettlement’) clearly states that “Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged” except in three cases: first, when persons or entities occupy dangerous areas (e.g. railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, waterways, etc.); second, when government infrastructure projects are about to be implemented with available funding; and third, when the area is ordered to be cleared by the court (NHA, 1997: 14). According to these terms then, people who used to occupy land along the railroad were automatically subject to eviction since it was not only a ‘dangerous’ area but also a government infrastructure project site.

In the case of evictions, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) are assigned

⁵⁴ General Manager of the PNR, Jose Sarasola, in *Business World*, 18 January 2007; Interview with the EXIM Bank employee (GKEXIM-1).

⁵⁵ Interview with an EXIM Bank employee (GKEXIM-1).

⁵⁶ Interview with the NHA officer (PGNHA-2).

⁵⁷ Since the loan was a tied aid, the bidding process was open only to Korean companies.

to draw a framework for “adequate relocation”, with the NHA mandated as an implementing agency. Its guidelines are summarised in the ‘Implementation Rules and Regulations to Ensure the Observance of Proper and Humane Relocation and Resettlement Procedures’, specifying the roles and responsibilities of relevant agencies, the kinds of support and assistance to be provided to affected people and the required documents for the entitlement to such services (NHA, 1997:15).

The actual process of relocating people displaced by the railway project was complicated, involving multiple agencies and taking place over a long period of time. City governments in Metro Manila and the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA), an agency embracing all the cities and the municipality in Metro Manila, were in charge of clearing the railway. The NHA prepared a relocation site and assisted the physical transfer of people who would come under the administration of the relevant Local Government Unit (LGU) at the later stages. The timeframe of relocation stretched from as early as 2003 till 2010. Whereas the official figure notes that the relocation of 34,904 families was completed in May 2009,⁵⁸ my field research revealed that the process continued long after the official completion date, reaffirming that a large-scale relocation programme often takes longer than planned.⁵⁹ Starting from the first and the largest relocation site, Southville 1 (in Cabuyao, Laguna), the relocation programme expanded over the years to a total of 11 sites in different places, mostly outside or on the fringe of Metro Manila.

The centrepiece of the relocation programme was to provide a piece of land and a house (or money to construct a house) in the relocation site through a long-term contract, under which relocated people were supposed to repay the NHA in the next 25 years or 30 years (E10C3; I2).⁶⁰ Relocation houses were not given for free because the demolished house was built on informally occupied PNR land in the first place and thus was regarded “illegal” and not appropriate for compensation. Relocatees were bound by a monthly payment after a one-year ‘grace period’ for adjusting to the new site. If they fail to pay three consecutive times, their award is to be cancelled and their lot and

⁵⁸ Source: NHA Relocation Status as of 31 May 2009 (obtained on 20 July 2009). In the initial census conducted in 2003, the figure was counted as 34,531 families and the data seems to have been updated since then through multiple follow-up censuses. However, the exact number of displaced people is disputable, as can be illustrated by the case of people who are disqualified from relocation.

⁵⁹ For instance, the house that belonged to the family of E8 was partially demolished in early 2010 and her mother and sister were relocated just before my fieldwork began in February 2010 (E8C2).

⁶⁰ Repayment accounts for the 75 per cent of the cost of land (100,000 Philippine Peso, PHP) and the full cost of the house (PHP 60,000), with the interest rate rising by 6 per cent every fifth year.

house made available to another qualified applicant.⁶¹ It was as if they had entered a tenure formalisation process in the relocation site but it was involuntary in nature and people's perception was very different from a voluntary, proactive approach. Although they were notified of the terms and conditions of the relocation package and signed a contract beforehand (E8C2), some still expected that it would be "free" (H12) and felt betrayed once they arrived in the relocation site only to realise that it was as if they were financing their own relocation. The repayment pressure and the feeling of 'indebtedness' left many relocatees thinking they were not benefiting from the programme (Choi 2008).

In addition to the burden of imposed tenure formalisation and house ownership, the relocation programme had many other limitations. The remote and isolated location of the sites turned out to be the most critical problem. In some relocation sites, overall liveability was largely in question as they were exposed to hazardous environments, threatening relocatees with health risks or exposing them to natural disasters such as flooding.⁶² The biggest challenge was to access previous livelihoods in Metro Manila from suburban areas where most sites are located. In general, commuting to Metro Manila from the surrounding cities and towns is very common (E5C1) and the current railway project is part of an attempt to ease the experience. However, the idea of commuting did not fit the reality of most urban poor people, who used to get by without a regular job or a fixed place of work. Long-distance commuting was also economically unfeasible given the very low income of many relocatees.⁶³ Furthermore, due to the lack of efficient transportation, the cost of commuting increased as it required several transits between different modes of transportation. Considering that people often work for long hours (A7; A8; B3; B4), commuting also became physically exhausting, which E10 describes as a double-loss for relocatees who had to commute a long way back to the relocation site, losing time for rest (E10C3).

⁶¹ In reality, however, one NHA official shared his honest opinion that it would be morally difficult to evict relocatees again upon their failure to repay the loan given that they are the poorest of the poor (GPNHA-3).

⁶² As illustrations, Southville 1 is next to a dump site and the relocation site in Marilao is near to a river that is prone to flooding and was badly affected during the typhoon Ondoy in 2009 (E3C10).

⁶³ For instance, for the mother of I8 who sells clothes in Quiapo (a famous low-price market area in Metro Manila), commuting has become really difficult since relocation: "because of the fare from Bagumbong [her relocation site] to Quiapo. It's like 100 pesos just one way, just one ride. But before it was only 14 pesos." Given that their daily income is between 150 and 200 pesos, the increased fare means a significant reduction in their income, which could otherwise have been used for meeting other needs.

The remoteness from Metro Manila was compounded by the isolation of the relocation sites from the town proper in the host area. By being located in the middle of rice fields (Southville1) or on top of mountains (Towerville), many sites were “far from everything” such as local hospitals, schools and markets (A8; B3). They were also disconnected from local economies and more affluent settlements that could have offered some livelihood opportunities. While suburban economies are rarely large and flexible enough to accommodate a sudden and mass influx of people, resettlers were often not in the position to qualify for any jobs that might have been available in industrial regions like Laguna and Cavite,⁶⁴ where a few relocation sites are located (e.g. Southville1 and Southville2 respectively).

On top of these livelihood challenges, the relocation sites also had incomplete basic services and facilities. Health centres at some relocation sites were practically out of service with no resident doctors or nurses, let alone medicines (at least at the time of the previous MPhil research). In earlier relocation sites, schools had not yet been built before people started to move in, causing severe disruptions in children’s education for some time. Not all houses were connected to water and electricity for years after resettlement (A2; B2; E10C3) and, even if services were available, relocatees had to pay an installation fee. The cost of basic services and utilities also became relatively higher than in Metro Manila where the urban poor were largely subsidised by the City government or local politicians (B3) or where they could access water and electricity for ‘free’ by tapping into lines illegally. Thus, relocation had the effect of formalising their access to various resources and – as for housing – the cost of formalisation was borne by formerly informal settlers, which became a double burden given that their income level fell dramatically.

In summary, an overall evaluation is that life in the relocation site was “very difficult” (H12; I1), with its prime challenge being the limited livelihood opportunities. As many relocatees experienced income reduction or loss, collective purchasing power tended to be low and only a limited stock of money circulated within relocation sites, making them rarely self-sufficient. Given this, reconstructing livelihoods after relocation depended largely on individual relocatees’ capacity to draw on their personal resources. In line with the findings from other research (e.g. Bennett and McDowell 2012), anecdotal evidence demonstrates that the level of reconstruction varied greatly. For

⁶⁴ During the Ramos administration (1992–1998), which promoted an explicitly globalised development strategy, the regions of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal and Quezon (namely, CALABARZON) were transformed to accommodate the needs of foreign investors in export-oriented manufacturing sectors (Kelly 2000).

instance, those with relatively secure sources of income such as savings, remittances from family members working overseas and an established business back in Metro Manila were in a better position to settle down in the relocation site (A6; E10C9; B3-M6). They could at least start a small business in the relocation site, most commonly a small store called a *sari-sari* (e.g. E8, H9 and I9), although sustaining a business is another issue given the unfavourable business environment there. On the contrary, resettlers who were less resourceful or those who had not had a secure job even before relocation struggled to cope with the challenges of relocation as their income and resources were already limited (E7C2). Due to the pressing need for cash in the process of readjustment and the high price level in the relocation site, they had to use up their savings, rely on help from other family members (G1CN22; H10) and borrow from money-lenders (I9).

Others made their living by continuing their work in Metro Manila despite the difficulty of commuting from the remote sites, which was slightly easier for those whose work place is relatively nearby (D2; D3; I9; I10). Some long-distance commuters arranged other means of transportation that are more time- and cost-efficient than public transportation. For instance, a group of vendors who were relocated in Bagumbong (Northville 2B) were renting a van together to get to work in the market nearby the Caloocan station and an illegal jeepney route was developed in various relocation sites (e.g. Southville 1 and Northville 2B).⁶⁵ Many had to simply persevere, like the mother of I8 who was commuting a long distance despite a significant increase in cost and time because “if they’re not going to do that, they won’t be able to have something for everyday life, for example for food and electricity bill.” For others who could not sustain their life in the relocation sites, however, they did not have much choice but to return to Metro Manila more permanently. This explains partly why and how displaced people are found in the project area, which will be discussed more in the next section where I elaborate on the categories of affected people across different localities.

5.3. Types of Affected People in Different Localities and the Research Scope

Focusing on displaced people tends to confine an investigation to relocation sites, whereas in reality these people are hardly fixed to one geographical location and

⁶⁵ For legal operation, jeepneys and their routes need to be registered with the government. Those operating without being registered are seen as ‘illegal’ and are locally called “colloreum” (F1CN73).

moreover there may be other affected people in different localities. In this regard, shifting the unit of investigation from a group of people to a geographical area and, in particular, focusing on the locality along the railway tracks (or the project area) proved to be effective in identifying different ways in which people were affected by urban DIDR, whether *in situ* or in forced mobility. The primary factor forcing the existing settlers to move out of the area is whether or not they have lost their residential house – which used to occupy the PNR property informally – completely (housing loss type). Although tenure security functions as a main dividing line between the displaced and the non-displaced populations, the tenure status of non-displaced people is far more diverse than can be captured by the binary of formality and informality. Different implications of the clearance for non-displaced people’s tenure security will be discussed in the next chapter.

Figure 4: Affected people in different localities

Housing loss type	Policy option	People’s Response	Locality
Displaced people (Complete loss)	Relocation (qualified)	Relocated	Relocation sites
		Returned	Project area (or other places)
	Opted out		
	No relocation (disqualified)	Self-arrangement	
Non-displaced people (No/partial loss)	Not considered	Impacts of losing people in the locality through displacement	Project area
		Impacts of gaining people in the locality through resettlement	Host area

For displaced people, the relocation programme was in theory expected to accommodate all of them at the new sites. However, displaced people are found in multiple localities as they made a range of mobility decisions at the juncture of both voluntary and involuntary movements. In particular, their presence in the project area, which is the main unit of investigation in my research, complicates the composition of the remaining population, since it encompasses various categories of differently affected people. This necessitates a further clarification regarding who ‘non-displaced’ people are, and I respond by identifying various trajectories by which displaced people ended up staying in, or moving in and out of, the locality.

5.3.1. Non-Displaced People

'Non-displaced' people did not move but were affected *in situ* by the changes taking place in their locality as a consequence of DIDR. Residents in the host area where displaced people are relocated constitute one such population experiencing changes following the influx of a large population. The main focus of my research, however, is on the place of origin that people were displaced from, i.e. the project area along the railway. Whereas host communities in a DIDR context have started to gain increasing attention after having been understudied for some time, my research is dedicated to non-displaced people remaining in the project area, a population that has certainly been similarly understudied and thus would benefit from original findings from the field. In addition to staying put in the same locality, both populations were affected in analogous ways in the sense that those in the host area are affected by 'gaining' people in their locality while those in the project area go through a change after 'losing' people.

Having noted two potential subgroups of people who were affected by DIDR without being displaced, I save the category of 'non-displaced' people exclusively for those remaining in the project area. Unlike many DIDR cases in rural areas, urban DIDR rarely means a complete clearance of human settlements as in the evacuation of a whole village such as might be the case with dam construction. In my research, the railway passed through the densely populated area of Metro Manila and the demolished informal settlements did not form a neat, isolated, single block. There existed more settlements beyond them and the patchwork of houses and streets formed a large settlement area, which was conveniently grouped together and labelled as an 'urban slum'. By removing parts of such settlements, the clearance opened the door to unpacking the complex socio-economic composition of the area and understanding the different ways in which the remaining residents were impacted by local changes following DIDR. By 'impacts', this study does not assume that they are all 'negative' and remains open to the possibility that people can be affected in multiple ways and to different degrees (e.g. becoming vulnerable or remaining resilient or intact) as well as in different directions (e.g. positively or negatively).

5.3.2. Displaced People

It appears that the majority of displaced people were offered a place in the relocation site and that most relocatees are making their living there despite the aforementioned

structural constraints.⁶⁶ However, others found their post-displacement shelter in diverse locations including their place of origin along the railway tracks. First of all, the relocation programme set the boundary of inclusion by defining who was eligible for relocation and on what terms, which thus excluded a group of people who did not meet the eligibility criteria. Those displaced but disqualified had no option but to arrange their shelter by themselves and many seem to have stayed on in the project area. Second, even those who had a relocation option did not necessarily settle in the relocation site. In the project area, returnees from the relocation sites are commonly observed while some displaced people have opted out of the relocation programme voluntarily by staying on as if they had never moved. Lastly, it should also be noted that displaced people (whether being disqualified, having returned or having opted out) settled down in places other than the relocation site and the project area.

Disqualified

A set of eligibility criteria emerged from the accounts of people that relocation would be offered to a 'family' who had been the 'actual residents' of a demolished house. According to what people understood, the policy defined a 'family' as a unit consisting of a married couple and their children (B3; I9). This seemingly reasonable definition turned out to be too simplistic to capture the complex reality, where far more diverse and flexible forms of household existed. For instance, a marriage certificate was required as proof of marital status (B3; D1), which might have left out couples who were not legally married (e.g. 'live-in' partners) or single parents without a partner. Verifying different family units cohabiting in one house also became an issue (E8; I8). I8 was excluded from the census because the census conductors did not recognise her own family as being independent of her mother's and registered them altogether as one unit. Apart from having to conform to the 'legitimate' form of a family,⁶⁷ people had to prove their residency in the area with supporting documents because absent owners of a rental house living elsewhere were not considered for relocation (B3; E4; I8).

A series of censuses was conducted to identify the households to be relocated and to collect basic information on them. Those enlisted on the census were further requested

⁶⁶ Data is open to further scrutiny as I have not yet accessed the census data collected for the current relocation programme. However, even if available, the census data inevitably misses out those who were displaced but were not surveyed (i.e. disqualified). For those relocated, there are no statistics on how many people have been retained in the relocation sites. An NGO that has worked with the relocatees of the railway project for a long time makes an informal estimation of the 'return' rate at about 10 per cent in Southville 1 (from a conversation with the Urban Poor Associates staff).

⁶⁷ For instance, some argue that couples with a child were regarded by the authority as more legitimate than those without (B3; I9).

to submit relevant documents to prove their qualification, such as birth certificates, voter's registration and utility bills with their addresses on them. Disqualification occurred when people were not enlisted, mostly by being absent from home at the time of the census. There was little consideration of those working outside the neighbourhood (F6; I4; J8), in particular of those who had neither the time nor money to be attentive to non-livelihood activities such as the census. For instance, F6 did not know of the census coming and was not at home because: "I'm always working in Baclaran. I can't assist those things [i.e. the census]" (F6CN5). Her neighbours supplied incorrect information and her family was not included in the census.

Those 'non-qualified' people, locally called the 'non-censused', could appeal to the NHA by submitting documents proving their residency before 2003. However, they were not always successful in getting their case reconsidered (F6; I4; I8). For instance, I4 was born in the railway area but missed the census and could not get a relocation house: "I had a birth certificate and my address was there. Until the demolition, I had the PLDT [landline phone] bills. That's the proof I had but I still missed the census. [...] They [the NHA] were just asking why I was not censused. [Then] I lost hope." Likewise, F6 prepared the necessary documents and appealed to the NHA multiple times but they "wouldn't listen" and she only received a "sorry" with no change in her status and none of her documents being returned. In the end, she gave up – "I just let everything happen" – and ended up staying in a makeshift shanty rebuilt along the railway after the clearance. That is, the ultimate determiner of eligibility was whether or not one's name was on the census, which acted as a master list that proved to have little capacity for self-correction despite its crudity creating omissions in the first place (I8; F6CN13). For those enlisted, it was also quite a demanding task to prepare all the required documents so as to be 'validated' as legitimate recipients of a relocation house. Some people had to stop working in order to prepare the documents (D1) and others could not prepare them all as they were working at that time (J8).

The case of disqualified people reveals how the interest of the authority in preventing an error of including those who were not eligible dominated the real concern of legitimate residents with being excluded from the programme.⁶⁸ The NHA official confirmed that they operated within the boundary of 'qualification' defined in their terms: "Some of these families unfortunately were not able to submit [necessary documents]. Then, the LGU is responsible for these families, mandated to house these

⁶⁸ This contrast is analogous to a type II error (a failure to reject a false null hypothesis) and a type I error (an incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis) in statistics, respectively.

families. We [the NHA] only cater to those who are qualified” (GPNHA-3). On the contrary, disqualified people like F6 felt bitter about their disqualification, especially when even house renters were able to get a relocation house, whereas the demolition of her own house was not recognised. Likewise, H11 expressed her resentment: “I feel bad because I did not get a relocation house. I also feel bad for all the rest who were not given a relocation house.”

Although lacking crucial information on who was truly eligible for relocation, the authority had the power to define who could be ‘legitimately’ entitled. By drawing on this legitimating power, they devised a validation process by which displaced people were in turn required to prove their legitimacy in an officially specified way. Within this static and top-down policy process, there was little room for people to challenge the very definition of legitimacy itself but had to instead conform to the given criteria in order to claim what they were entitled to. Once they had been left out of the policy arena, disqualified people had no other choice but to arrange shelter on their own, either staying in the railway area or moving to other places, often to find themselves in a much more difficult situation without proper shelter and access to basic services, while their job in the locality might have also been adversely affected (e.g. J8).

Returnees

Faced with the myriad structural limitations in the relocation sites, relocatees started to consider leaving the relocation site and returning to the city. Non-displaced residents in the railway area reported that “plenty of them [i.e. relocatees] have come back to Manila” (H9). A substantial difference in the livelihood opportunity sets between Metro Manila and suburban areas is noted as a primary reason for return. Both the relocated and the non-relocated people in my research contend that the relocation site is a place of “no livelihoods” and emphasise that “work is here” along the railway or in Metro Manila, where they could earn “easy” money (D3; F3; G2; H3; H4; H5; H9; H12).

Two types of return are identified: *transit* and *exit*. People maintain a *transitory* life between Metro Manila and the relocation site with the frequency of transit varying from weekly to bi-weekly and to monthly.⁶⁹ A common form of transit is that breadwinners stay in the city during the week and go back to the relocation site at the weekend (B3; G2; H3; H11; I2; I9). In this way, their living space is never completely

⁶⁹ Daily transit refers to a situation where a breadwinner commutes every day while still living in the relocation site. In comparison, transit involves a social cost of family separation during the period when breadwinners are away from their family, who reside in the relocation site.

confined to the relocation site and families are separated between two different places. Others have *exited* the relocation site more permanently, and the whole family has returned to the city without any immediate plan to go back to the relocation site (E4CN2; E6CN13; I2). In the category of returnees, I include both groups of people. However, the line between the two gets blurred as some breadwinners stay in the railway area for a prolonged time and seldom go back to the relocation site.⁷⁰ Also, those who returned on a more permanent basis nevertheless make an occasional or regular visit to the relocation site so as to maintain their ownership of a house there (A6; E5C8; I3), as H12 describes: “We don’t actually stay in the relocation house; we just check the house once in a while.”

Hardly Moved (opt-out)

In addition to disqualified people who did not have the relocation site to move to and returnees who have come back from the relocation site, a third group of displaced people was found in the railway area. A distinctive feature of this group is that they had an alternative place to stay in the locality and thus could opt out of relocation. They never moved to the relocation site or returned to the railway area immediately so it is hard to say they have ever ‘settled’ in the relocation site. The case of I4’s brothers illustrates this situation very well. Working at the Quezon City Hall, they thought they might have an opportunity in future to apply for low-cost housing for government employees, the quality of which is deemed better than relocation housing. Knowing that they would not be eligible for such programmes once they had claimed a relocation house this time, they forewent the relocation option and moved to other places, joining their extended family members.

There are important differences between the three groups – i.e. the disqualified, returnees and those who opted out. People who have hardly moved had an opportunity to move to the relocation site, unlike disqualified people who did not have a choice other than staying around after being displaced. They also differ from returnees in the sense that they were more resourceful and better prepared to respond to displacement ‘proactively’ by arranging a place beforehand, and thus could minimise the disruption to their life. For instance, in order to stay in the area, the mother-in-law of E4 purchased a three-storey building from a private landowner two years before the anticipated demolition (although she could not receive a relocation house as a result).

⁷⁰ For instance, I2 visits his family at the relocation site only once or twice a month once he saves up enough money to do so.

Likewise, I8 had already started to rent a house when she learned that she had not been included in the census and would not have a relocation house. Despite being disqualified, she has stayed in the area as if she had never been displaced. In comparison, returning was a more reactive coping strategy that came only after experiencing resettlement challenges and did not prevent the turmoil of going through serious ruptures in life. However, in view of those disqualified, it is still important to have a relocation option at least as a last resort, even though they may not wish to be relocated once given a choice.

Others with alternative options beyond the railway area settled in various places. Although it is extremely difficult to track down displaced people who neither moved to the relocation site nor stayed in the project area, the accounts of research participants indicate that displaced people might have arranged shelter in other places than those two. Individually, displaced people have joined their family members living further away from the railway area (e.g. I4, I8) or have moved to a house that they have in other cities, towns or even back in the provinces. More collective efforts were made whereby people in the later stage of displacement, who came to learn about the reality of resettlement, started to find an alternative relocation site that was closer to the city and offered better livelihood prospects. As an illustration, a group of residents in the Sampaloc area of Manila City (near to the Laon Laan station) mobilised themselves into a community organisation called SAPAR⁷¹ and appealed to the Mayor of Montalban on the outskirts of Quezon City to accommodate them in his territory, where they eventually settled (Choi 2008).

Furthermore, cash compensation was one of the options offered by the NHA in the form of *Balik Provyncia*, literally meaning 'going back to the province', whereby displaced people received some amount of money instead of a house in the relocation site. This is a general programme run by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) that promotes urbanites' return to their province by providing monetary assistance for their readjustment. However, a few of my research participants stated that displaced people had used the compensation money to rent a house in Metro Manila instead of going back to the province (E10C3; F2), which once again confirms the strong tendency among displaced people to stay in the city.

In sum, displaced people found in different localities demonstrate that the effect of displacement was not 'contained' in the relocation sites as displaced people responded

⁷¹ Samahang Apektadong Pamilya sa Riles, or Association of Families Affected by the Railway.

in more diverse ways than simply accepting a policy offer. While the case of disqualified people underlines the loopholes in the process of verifying who was truly entitled to relocation, the phenomenon of returning implies that the relocation programme has not been completely successful in providing the kind of socio-economic environment in which the urban poor could reconstruct their lives. In response, by arranging alternative options to relocation, displaced people have managed to reclaim their place in the metropolis even after displacement and/or even without relocation, in places where they have better knowledge of, and access to, the resources needed to make their living. This indicates that staying on (or immobility) is one way of coping with the impacts of displacement and remote resettlement. However, the locality along the railway tracks that they returned to, or stayed in, has gone through substantial changes of its own as a result of the clearance. The focus of the coming empirical chapters will be on examining local changes and their impacts on the lives of non-displaced people.

5.4. Clearance and Local Changes

Refocusing on the post-clearance project area, where non-displaced people have stayed on together with displaced people of various trajectories, I outline an overall pattern in which they were impacted by local changes. Unlike displaced people for whom the forceful change of a living environment was the biggest challenge, non-displaced people – who did not move from their homes – experienced physical and socio-economic changes within their locality. Along the railway tracks, the most visually striking change after the clearance was the demolition of informal settlements, which had characterised the area for decades. The landscape was transformed so tremendously that it was hard to believe what I observed during the previous MPhil research in 2007. Two sets of photos taken at the same location between the Bluementritt LRT station and Abad Santos Street in 2007 and in 2010 illustrate this dramatic physical change (Figure 6 and Figure 7).

The clearance of the railway area resulted not only in the demolition of houses but also in the displacement of the people who used to reside in those houses. For a long time prior to the clearance, railway tracks had functioned more as living spaces than as transport infrastructure since the train service started to deteriorate and ceased to be efficient. Settlements had been ‘mushrooming’ on the land, over which PNR had lost a grip, potentially as a result of the overall weakening of its management (D2; I3). In a tunnel-like open space formed by two rows of shanties facing each other (see Figure 6),

informal settlers carried out their mundane activities – women doing laundry in the narrow strip between the rail tracks and their house, food being cooked in the middle of the tracks, children running around and neighbours sitting outside and chatting together. Houses used to stand so close to the rail tracks that even the old train had to slow down when passing through the heavily populated sections, while residents retreated to their houses upon hearing the sound of the train's horn (Choi 2008). Nonetheless, accidents were still common and with the introduction of the new and faster trains, their living space had to give way to create sufficient space for safe operation.⁷² The clearance was also expected to reduce accidents by improving forward vision for train drivers and to enhance the punctuality of train services.⁷³

Before the current project, there had been attempts to clear informal settlements in some sections as well as actual cases where the residents were relocated (F5; B1; F3). However, people returned to the railway area and rebuilt their houses, forming a cycle of eviction, relocation and return, which was also partly repeated in the current project:

They [the PNR] tried to demolish but the first time was in 2007 that we were relocated. There were a lot of attempts to demolish. Some were already demolished but there was no real push because people kept on coming back. (I3)

In view of this, the current railway project is certainly the first time in decades that the area has been completely and comprehensively cleared (I3; J3), as the long overdue rehabilitation of the train service came to materialise.

From the perspective of the remaining population, the clearance meant that the local physical environment was substantially reconfigured and that a large number of people disappeared from their neighbourhood, upsetting the socio-economic fabric formed around the informal settlement. Through a dramatic event, the features of the urban environments were unveiled more clearly in the way that the tenure status, livelihoods and social relationships of local residents were affected. Figure 8 presents an overview of local changes and consequent impacts on individual households.

⁷² New trains can run up to 60 kilometres per hour on average as compared to the maximum speed of old trains being at 40 kilometres per hour (Interview with a PNR manager; 19 April 2010).

⁷³ Interview with a train driver (on 26 March 2010).

Figure 5: Impacts of land clearance and displacement on the urban locality and household life domains

Source	Local changes	Impact channel	Impacted domain	Impacts
Land clearance	<i>Physical environment</i>	Informal land use for housing	<i>Housing</i> (tenure security)	Eviction experience and ongoing threats
		Informal use of space for livelihoods	<i>Livelihoods</i> (asset, activity and income)	Physical-productive capital (only)
		(Combined)		Combination (both)
Displacement	<i>Socio-economic environment</i>	Reliance on the local livelihood network		Local livelihood network (only)
		Relationships with displaced people	<i>Social milieu</i>	Social relationships and ambiance

The demolition of informal houses on the PNR property and the consequent displacement of their occupants are the main sources of the change in the local physical and socio-economic environments respectively. Local changes were translated into the impacts on main life domains, but only to the extent that households had engaged with the physical and socio-economic resources offered by the informal settlements. In terms of housing, informal use of land was the main determinant of whether or not one would be displaced. Whereas tenure security has been the focal point of the discussion surrounding the issue of forced eviction, a detailed post-eviction investigation reveals that it alone did not explain the various tenure statuses in which urban residents experienced land clearance with or without eviction. In Chapter 6, I investigate housing impacts in terms of the complex modes in which non-displaced people have arranged land for housing. I also delineate different implications of the clearance for the tenure security of the remaining non-displaced population, among which the pervasiveness of informal land use and continuing threats of eviction stand out as prominent issues.

For non-displaced people who did not lose their homes completely, a more interesting and relevant aspect of the physical change emerged when their productive assets were affected by the demolition of the informal settlements. Informal settlements were commonly utilised as sites for income generation and thus spatial transformation had livelihood implications, underlining the non-residential and productive function of housing and space in general. Moreover, the livelihood impacts of a physical change are compounded by the socio-economic changes following the displacement of a large population. The local economic activities suffered from the rupture in the livelihood network formed around informal settlements. The livelihoods of a few households were doubly affected by the combined effects of physical and socio-economic changes.

In Chapter 7, I analyse livelihood impacts of various kinds comprehensively, forming the centrepiece of the empirical analysis. The loss of people also had social impacts in terms of changing the personal relationships of the remaining residents, community dynamics and the general social ambience in the locality. I discuss the social implications of local changes in Chapter 8, although they feature far less prominently in people's accounts than their concerns with tenure insecurity and livelihoods.

5.5. Conclusion

In the railway area after the clearance, a range of affected people were identified, including 'non-displaced' people who did not lose their residential house and have never moved as well as displaced people who did not have a relocation site, opted out of the relocation programme, or returned from the relocation site. By studying the impacts of DIDR on the urban locality and its non-displaced residents, I aim to expand the concept of 'project-affected persons' (PAPs) beyond displaced people and furthermore to diversify the criteria by which impacts are examined beyond the most visible one of forced mobility (i.e. whether one was displaced or not).

Through the particular lens of non-displaced people, I explain how local changes impacted the existing modes in which urban residents managed their housing, livelihoods and social relationships. First and foremost, the railway clearance was a process by which the informal settlements, the most visible feature of the area, disappeared from the scene. Remarkable changes in the landscape revealed the hidden components of the physical environment, such as small canals that used to be covered by the later-demolished houses (see Figure 9 and Figure 10).

Figure 6: The railway area in 2007 (before demolition)



Photo by Beom-chan Choi

Figure 7: The railway area in 2010 (with the canals revealed)



Photo by Beom-chan Choi

However, more important features, that is informal settlers, were also erased from the scene, as if their busy and active daily lives had not existed at all. Consequently, what came to be uncovered were the far more subtle and complex ways in which people made their living within and around the informal settlements. The reconfiguration of the local economy and the social milieu turned out to be significant even though such changes might be less obvious than the physical changes in the landscape. These less visible and underexplored changes in the locality and their impacts on the lives of non-displaced people will be analysed throughout the empirical chapters to come.

Chapter 6

Housing impacts

6.1 Introduction


In this chapter, I examine how non-displaced people remained in the project area amidst large-scale land clearance, in relation to different types of land and housing arrangements with varying degrees of tenure security. First, I explain the way in which informal houses were cleared, with a particular focus on the sensitive issue of the clearance scope, since it determined the different types of housing impact, classified as: i) no housing loss; ii) partial housing loss; and iii) complete housing loss. Non-displaced people, the focus of this study, are defined as those who did not lose their house completely and thus have stayed in the project area without having been displaced. Second, I analyse the tenure status of each group and explain their differential experiences of the clearance in view of their tenure. A significant presence of informal settlers was noticeable and their concern with continuing tenure insecurity loomed greatly. I explain the prevalence of informal land use in terms of the costs and vulnerabilities involved in different housing options.

6.2 Land clearance and physical changes

For the railway-upgrading project, informal houses on the land along the railway tracks were demolished in phases, roughly starting from Makati City and moving north (e.g. Manila City and Caloocan City) and south (e.g. Taguig City and Muntlupa City) (see Map 2 in Chapter 5). The size of the land to be cleared was defined by the distance from the centre of the railway tracks and thus was commonly referred to in 'metres' rather than 'square metres'. The measurement varied in different sections along the railway, from as narrow as 5 metres away from the railway tracks (on one side) to as wide as 25 metres away. Based on the data provided by the research participants, Figure 11 depicts the variance in the clearance scope, starting from España Station (Antipolo Street) on the right to Caloocan Station on the left, which is the northern end point of

the current railway project. Although it does not represent the whole sample as not all research participants knew of the clearance scope, the provided data spread over the section that was covered by my field research relatively evenly, covering different areas and major Philippine National Railways (PNR) stations marked with '(S)'.⁷⁴

Figure 8 Clearance scope: varying distances from railway tracks



If we consider the horizontal axis as the railway tracks, the area below the graph was cleared for the current project, whereas houses above the graph have remained. As the shape of the graph shows, the border line of the cleared land was not straight and therefore created considerable confusion amongst the residents, who noticed the variation in the measurement across areas but did not have the reasoning behind this explained to them (E10C16). Although it is not clear how the scale of land clearance was determined, I construct a retrospective explanation from the ways in which residents experienced the clearance. The clearance scope was a function of (a) a technical requirement for a safety zone for upgraded train operation and (b) the size and the shape of the PNR property compared to the adjacent land owned by other private or public entities.


First of all, only the informal settlements on the land owned by the PNR were targeted for demolition. Houses standing on private land or on land belonging to other government agencies (e.g. City Hall) were excluded from demolition, despite their relative proximity to the railway and even if they were informal in their tenure status. For instance, in the area nearby Antipolo Street or Old Antipolo Street houses on private land stayed intact, despite being only 5 metres away from the centre of the

⁷⁴ See the Appendix A1.5 for the data sheet for Figure 11. An estimated value is used for each station, by calculating the mean of the data before and after a station.

railway tracks. That is, in the majority of areas, the clearance stopped at the border between the PNR property and the land of other ownership. Supposedly, this is because the PNR has limited regulatory power over land that it does not own, even though additional land might have been required for technical reasons. On the other hand, not all the informal houses on the PNR land were demolished through this project and houses still remain in some areas, either without any housing impact or with a partial damage (10 cases out of 51 non-displaced people in my sample). That is, the PNR property was not completely reclaimed since the clearance scope did not exactly match the shape of the PNR property at least at the time of fieldwork. As will be elucidated further in the next section, some research participants could avoid the clearance because they were using PNR land formally (four cases out of 10) whereas others could be saved by happenstance as they were living beyond the safety zone that was required for the project.

While the whole area was not cleared using the same measurements then, a given measurement was applied to a specific area so strictly that houses standing on the borderline were demolished only up to the point where they fell within the scope. Consequently, not all the remaining houses survived the clearance intact since some of the remaining houses were literally ‘chopped off’, as local people describe it. Figure 12 is a graphical depiction of how partial demolition took place in one of the most common settlement types along the railway tracks.⁷⁵

Figure 9 Partial demolition



⁷⁵ Note that, although the graphical illustration describes only one side of the railway, mirroring housing formations used to be found on the other side across the tracks. Boxes of different size and shape in the figure indicate housing units.

In this type of settlement, houses were clustered together, being built side-by-side or wall-to-wall from the railway, with the main pathways being perpendicular to the railway. Originally, as far ago as people could remember (mostly in the 1960s and the 1970s), the area used to be a large grass wilderness (B1) or a swamp filled with water and water lilies (E5C6). Over decades, settlements had become interwoven, starting further away from the railway and gradually filling up the land nearer to the railway tracks, which were occupied by latecomers.

When the clearance took place, cutting off the complicated mosaic of houses, the actual outcome did not look as neat as drawing a line on the map. Many houses on the borderline were partially destroyed, as if they had been bombed and cracked open, losing the front wall and part of the rooms. Complete demolition of the neighbouring houses also meant that these houses, which used to be further away from the railway, became the frontline of the settlements along the railway. A vast empty space opened up where some remnants of the demolished houses were still scattered around, providing a glimpse of what things might have been like before the demolition, whilst markers indicating the point up to which demolition had taken place were left on the walls of the houses as old signposts (E2C6; E10; I6). For the residents who used to live next to each other, the dividing line between those to be demolished and those to remain must have felt arbitrary, although it made a huge difference for those houses that were just beyond the clearance scope and thus could be saved from being demolished (e.g. I6).

Partially demolished houses open a grey zone that does not allow the post-clearance railway area to be simply categorised as demolished and non-demolished areas. Accordingly, the housing impact of the clearance is also classified into three aforementioned types – no housing loss, a partial housing loss and a complete housing loss – with the first two cases constituting ‘non-displaced’ people in my research. It should be noted that the categorisation of housing impact is only for residential houses, while investments in non-residential houses were also affected by the clearance. The impacts on the productive functions of housing will be discussed in the next chapter in terms of their livelihood implications. Although housing impact types are simple, more distinctive features emerge between the groups when examined against their tenure status before and after the clearance.

Collective changes in the local physical environment

Before analysing the different housing impacts experienced by individual households, the collective effect of land clearance on transforming the overall physical environment is worth a mention. Informal settlements were described as many houses and people being cramped in a compact area with poor sanitation and drainage systems (E7) or “no flow of air” (H7). The environment was “dirty” with garbage thrown everywhere (H3; E7; H5) and also looked dirty as houses were built with scrap materials such as wooden boards (D3), which increased the risk of fire outbreak together with the overloading of electricity lines by ‘jumpers’ or informal users (D2). Given this, many non-displaced people think that the area has become “cleaner” (H5; H7; J1; J3) or more “beautiful” (D2; D3; J1) with “less garbage” (E1; E7; H3) since the clearance. Other physical changes include the area becoming fresher (H7; I10; J7), more spacious (A6; I10) and brighter (A5; J7).

On the other hand, clearance revealed some of the hidden physical elements of the area, notably canals paralleling the railway tracks (see Figure 10 in Section 5.5). Informal houses were built over these canals, which were then used for disposing of human waste and other garbage (I5). In addition to being exposed to an unclean and unsafe environment, such houses suffered from flooding during the rainy season although blame was commonly put on them for exacerbating the problem by clogging the waterway with garbage (F1CN61; E7). As the canals are more visible after the clearance, the need for effective canal management is raised by remaining residents (e.g. A1; B1). More broadly, remaining settlers request more comprehensive management of the area, including a better use of the cleared land for the development of the area (e.g. building malls), additional beautification (e.g. clearing debris from the demolition), and the provision of fences⁷⁶ along the tracks for resolving the concerns about train accidents and physical security, which have persisted even after a large area was cleared between the tracks and the remaining settlements (e.g. J3).

Physical changes in the locality also impacted the modes in which people accessed other infrastructure. Through the clearance, informal connections to water or electricity lines were exposed and were subsequently cut off from supply. Likewise, free water pumps in the area were removed. In particular, the change impacted those with a partial housing loss when they had not had legal connections themselves. While some are applying for a formal connection (E2; G1; G2), which is a long procedure with

⁷⁶ While fences clearly mark the operational area for trains, they may constrain the right of way for residents who use the tracks as pathways in going across to the other side (F8).

many requirements, others go semi-informal again by buying water from those who have legal lines. On the other hand, for people who moved from an informal rental house to a formal one, their access to basic services also became 'formalised'. For instance, in her previous rental house (now demolished), I8 had a shared electricity metre and bought water by the pail (one peso per pail) whereas now she has her own electricity metre and water from the tap. Although the utility supply might have become more stable than it was before, the price went up considerably; from 500 pesos per month to 2,000 pesos for electricity.

The collective effect of the physical changes on the local land and housing market is yet to be seen but a glimpse of gentrification is detected in a few anecdotal accounts. The indirect beautification effect of the clearance and better regulation of the area afterwards seems to have signalled an opportunity for formal land and/or housing owners in the area. J4 is a caretaker of a housing complex on private land and shares the owner's plan to redevelop it: "The owner is trying to sell the compound [at a higher price] because the area is better now. No bad elements. The owner saw the prospect in better peace and order." Such a redevelopment plan will entail an adverse impact on tenants as they will have to move out. In the building that J4 is looking after, 10 units out of 16 in total are already empty at the moment due to the impending redevelopment plan of the owner. This case demonstrates that a change in land use initiated by a public infrastructure project may generate a gentrifying effect, putting more pressure on formal residents/tenants in the area to move out of the locality. Such a trend has not yet been studied systematically in Metro Manila but deserves further research (Choi 2014).

In sum, land clearance for an urban infrastructure project had the effect of formalising the existing modes of arranging spatially based resources such as land for housing and infrastructure. It is important to recognise the indirect (or unintended) planning function of urban projects, whereby beautification and enhanced regulation might have increased the marketable value of the area, potentially leading to more formal, commercial management of urban space.

6.3 Housing impacts

Non-displaced people are divided into two groups by their housing loss type: the no housing loss group (NHL) and the partial housing loss group (PHL). To discern the different experiences of housing impact, I subdivide each group according to their

tenure status (formal or informal), land ownership and housing status (house owner or renter). An overview of the land and housing status among non-displaced people after the clearance is presented in Table 3 below.

Table 3 Tenure status of non-displaced people after the clearance

Housing loss type	Tenure status	Land ownership	Cases	Housing status	Percentage
No housing loss (NHL)	Formal	PNR	2	Owner (13)	22 (43.14%)
		Private	20	Renter (9)	
	Informal	PNR	3	Owner (12)	13 (25.49%)
		Public	8		
		Private	2	Renter (1)	
	Partial housing loss (PHL)	Formal	PNR	2	Owner (2)
Private			2	Renter (2)	
Informal		PNR	3	Owner (11)	12 (23.53%)
		Public	4		
		Private	2	Renter (1)	
		Unclear	3		
Total			51	51	51 (100%)

For tenure status, those whose house survived the clearance intact (the NHL group) did not experience any changes in their status since formal settlers have stayed formal and informal settlers have continued to use land informally. For those whose house was partially demolished (the PHL group), the lost part used to stand on the PNR land whereas their post-clearance tenure status depends on whether or not the remaining part of their house is formal. The types of land ownership in the locality were identified as: i) PNR property; ii) public land; and iii) private land.

For evaluating the formality of tenure status, it is useful to distinguish land and house as separate entities since multi-layered claims exist over a physical space in an urban settlement like the railway area where land is not necessarily accessed formally. People access a piece of land or a house either by owning a property (*ownership*) or use someone else's (*user-ship* or *use right*). While the informality of housing can be measured by the extent to which land use and building construction have conformed to various regulations, land invasion without paying rent to, or obtaining approval from,

the formal land owner is one clear criterion by which land users become informal. On the other hand, I understand formal land ownership by the simplest criterion of having legal documents such as a land title or a deed of sale for a house,⁷⁷ which makes the document-holder the formal owner of the said property. While narrowing down the window for formally acceptable tenure (as discussed in Section 3.3.1), this may still be the most practical definition given that the land regulatory regime in the Philippines lacks comprehensive data on land ownership and its incomplete land register has been the source of confusion and dispute (Chikiamco and Fabella 2011; Magno-Ballesteros 2000). The formality of tenure is determined by whether one accesses land for housing through formal transactions of ownership or user-ship. By the same token, when people occupy a piece of land and build a house there or when they buy an informally built house, they may claim ownership over the house but it is only informal ownership. If an informally owned house is rented out, the status of a tenant also becomes informal even though rent is paid to the house owner; this is because it does not involve the formal land owner directly.

When housing impacts are examined against tenure status (formal or informal), a noticeable feature emerges that nearly half of non-displaced people (25 out of 51 cases) still remain as informal settlers, experiencing an intensified fear of forced eviction after the clearance. However, a significant difference exists between the two groups whereby the NHL group includes a far higher proportion of formal settlers (62.9 per cent) compared to the PHL group (25 per cent). This is visually depicted in Graph 1 and will be further examined in Section 6.4.

Graph 1 Proportion of informal and formal settlers in NHL and PHL groups



On the other hand, formal settlers in both groups are either formal land owners or users (private land), including a group of former informal settlers (six out of 51 non-displaced people) who are in the process of becoming formal owners of either PNR land

⁷⁷ A deed of sale is proof that the housing transaction was made in the formal market, which indirectly indicates that land for housing is formally accessed.

or private land.⁷⁸ Those in the process of tenure formalisation have a far more secure position than remaining informal settlers, potentially suggesting that it can be one solution to urban land and housing challenges. In the coming sections, I discuss each housing impact group in more detail.

6.3.1 No housing loss (NHL)

Over half of the research participants (35 out of 67) have remained along the railway with their residential house not affected at all mainly because they live on land that does not belong to the PNR. For those who have stayed on the PNR property (five out of 35 cases), they were not included in the clearance scope for one reason or another – i.e. two were formal users of the PNR property whereas three were simply beyond the clearance scope. Furthermore, the NHL group includes those who are only working in the railway area while living away, which underlines that a structure or a space in the locality is also used for productive purposes.

A marked feature of this group is the formality of tenure as people are either formal land owners (13 out of 35 cases) or formal land users who are renting a formal house (nine out of 35 cases).⁷⁹ In particular, the majority of private land owners benefited from the inheritance within their family. For H5, formal land ownership has been passed down along generations: “I have [a document supporting] transfer of title. When my grandfather died, they subdivided the land into three among my mother, uncle and another sibling of my mother. So, the families of my uncle and others are living next door.” An interesting sub-group is those who are in the process of becoming formal land owners through a collective initiative.⁸⁰ In a few cases, people organised their neighbourhood as a group and pursued a deal of ‘direct purchase’ with the owner of land that they have occupied for a long time (B2; E7; E9; D3). The most notable case is where former informal settlers on the PNR property have managed to purchase a portion of land, thereby effectively avoiding displacement (B2; E7).

⁷⁸ There was no case in my research where occupants of other public land were going through a tenure formalisation process.

⁷⁹ Among formal house owners, there are cases where they own only the house and not land, which then makes them as formal land users. By formal land users, I mean those who are living in a house that is built on a formally accessed land.

⁸⁰ People also formalise their tenure status by individually purchasing a formal house (e.g. A3) or land (e.g. E1).

Tenure formalisation: A proactive strategy for some

The process of tenure formalisation usually started with the forming of Home Owners' Associations (HOAs) so as to initiate a collective negotiation with a land owner (F5CN45; G1CN10; B1; B2). When a private land owner was not willing to engage, residents resorted to a government agency that would negotiate on their behalf. It was the case in the area of the research participant D3⁸¹ where formal users of private land made a petition to the National Housing Authority (NHA), which mediated the direct purchase process. After the deal was successfully sealed, the NHA paid compensation for the expropriation of land to the private owner, which would then be repaid by the residents over a long period of time:

“Before, my mother-in-law was paying for the land [as a land user]. But, then, there was a kind of fight between the government and the owner whereby the government wanted to buy this land from the owner. The tenants who are living on this land will pay the government. I’m talking of that kind of programme whereby the government buys land from a private owner and people who are occupying the land will pay the government. The government already won on that case [...] because I heard the government has already paid a partial payment to the owner. [...] Actually, there was a petition from the tenants or from the group of people who are living on this land. They were requesting the government to buy the land. Then, the tenants, the people will pay the government or the NHA... [...] It was an expropriation.

The subsequent technical process of tenure formalisation involved several stages that are similar to land clearance and resettlement. Land was measured and beneficiaries were identified and verified upon the provision of necessary documentation (D3). Payment for land was made in two main modes: incremental payments where people pay for the land ‘little by little’ (e.g. every month) for 25 or 30 years; or full payment in a shorter period of time (F3; E7C5). The choice of payment method appears to be related to one’s income security and overall resource pool. For instance, people with a low but stable income may find incremental payment more feasible, while those with a relatively large resource pool but without a stable job or regular income may prefer full payment since it does not involve the burden of regular payment. The final stage would be the transfer of land title, without which new owners cannot be completely assured of their land ownership, although it seems to take quite some time (E1; E7) and incurs additional administrative fees (E1C8).

Formalisation was important not just in itself but subsequently with the railway project. Thanks to the tenure formalisation process, even residents who had lived on PNR property were saved from displacement (B2; E7). In the vicinity of E7, the process was

⁸¹ D3 represents the only case of tenure formalisation in the PHL group so is discussed together with other cases in the NHL group.

at the stage where the negotiations had already been concluded and the residents started to pay for their portion of land. Consequently, the family of E7 could remain in the area, unaffected, whereas her brothers-in-law, who were not part of this collective negotiation, are now living at the relocation site after displacement. In the area of B2, only the informal settlers who had already lived beyond the clearance scope (i.e. 15 metres away from the railway tracks) could join a HOA and those who lived within the 15-metre span were not included in the membership. The position of HOA members is far superior to that of non-members, such that the factors facilitating the process of tenure formalisation warrant some explanation.

First, the timing of action is critical for land acquisition to be a preventive measure in the face of displacement because once a final eviction decision is made it is no longer a negotiable option. For example, H12 wanted to obtain the title for the PNR land that she had occupied but could not even start a negotiation with the City Hall because the clearance plan was already in place. In this regard, having information about land-use change is crucial for initiating the process well in advance. Believing in the reality of eviction is another issue since it is common for informal settlers, who have lived with the threat of eviction for a long time, to dismiss the eviction news even when it is actually materialising. Along the railway tracks, rumours of forced eviction had always loomed and, thus, the current clearance came as a surprise for those who had not believed them: “I was surprised and shocked. I didn’t expect it would happen” (I2). It was only when they saw people in the neighbouring area being actually evicted that they accepted it (e.g. E3C1), by which time it was already too late to take any action.

Second, an organisation needs to be set up in the first place for initiating tenure formalisation and pushing it through the long and rather tedious bureaucratic processes. A HOA or a community organisation plays a crucial role, working as a main channel of negotiation with the land owner, preparing the necessary documents, and imposing some discipline through meetings wherein the importance of regular payment is emphasised (E7C5). Different areas along the railway demonstrated varying capacities of community organising, which may explain in part why some people were less successful in avoiding the clearance through collective initiatives. In the area of E10, for instance, they did not have any HOA, which E10 attributes to there being “no unity” between house owners and renters over the issue of resettlement. Being a house owner himself, albeit informal, E10 argues that house owners wanted to organise a HOA for purchasing land and keeping their house intact. On the contrary, house renters welcomed the idea of resettlement because they would have a chance to become a


formal land and house owner in the relocation sites (A1; E1; F3CN61; E10C3), whereas tenure formalisation along the railway would bring them little benefit.

In sum, direct purchase of land turned out to be a proactive strategy that protected former informal settlers from the current clearance and furthermore allowed them to stay in the area without a threat of eviction anymore. In this regard, tenure formalisation is presented as one powerful mechanism for informal residents to intervene in the eviction process and to secure their right to stay in the city, for which having relevant and timely information combined with a strong community-organising capacity is critical. However, tenure formalisation should not be overly romanticised given its limited coverage, by which some people are excluded from the formalisation process in the first place. Furthermore, its effectiveness needs to be kept in balance by the fact that a large number of non-displaced people, including 13 people in the NHL group, are still informal settlers. In Section 6.4, I will elaborate on the continuing tenure insecurity, which indicates the pervasiveness of informal access to land in the area and thereby puts the importance of tenure security into perspective.

6.3.2 Partial housing loss (PHL)

A quarter of the research participants (16 out of 67) lost the part of their house that had stood on PNR land and have stayed in the remaining part that stands on land owned by different entities. Only a few of them are formal settlers (four out of 16 cases), two of whom are renters at the public housing project on PNR land (H1; H2) and two living on private land (H11; D3).

Figure 10 Partial loss of housing extension



These formal houses (except D3) had been informally extended into the PNR property without official approval, or under the neglect of the authority, and were partially affected when the residents of such houses were requested to demolish the extended part for the railway project. A notable example is BLISS (Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services) housing, a public housing project of Imelda Marcos, the first lady during the Marcos administration (1972–1986), by which formal houses were built on the PNR property along the railway tracks and were awarded to government employees whilst the land still belonged to the PNR. The tenants of the BLISS housing contend: “There were extension units before; they had to remove them to cut it down to their original house” (H1); and “The extension of the original house was demolished. It used to be our kitchen.” (H2). Since the long-term housing contract had not yet ended, the PNR land on which the BLISS housing stands was not reclaimed by the current project. Nonetheless, the formal residents there do not feel completely secure:

“This [BLISS] project has a contract. So, until now, the contract is still going on so they [the PNR] cannot remove us. But, it depends on the government” (H1).

“They’re not yet settled between the PNR and the owner of the house[about the land]. Only the house, the owner pays the NHA. It is the same with all the BLISS housing. It might be demolished within the next 12 years” (H2).

This case underlines that land users, whether formal or informal, are vulnerable to the decisions of land owners, who can opt to change the land use. The sense of tenure insecurity intensified further among informal settlers who lost part of their house and are still exposed to forced eviction. In addition to the enhanced sense of vulnerability, which will be discussed further in the next section, partial demolition incurred a tangible loss and also generated other material and non-material effects. By losing part of a house, people were left with reduced space for daily activities such as cooking (e.g. H13; J6) and for home-based productive activities. Families who used to live in one house could no longer be accommodated together, which caused the separation of family as some had to move out and find another place to live (e.g. H11). These socio-economic impacts of a physical change will be explored further in the coming chapters.

The resettlement programme did not recognise partial damage for compensation for the same reason as for completely demolished houses in that they were built informally on the PNR property without legal land-use rights. Instead, they could opt to move to the relocation site provided that they would demolish the whole house (E2C7; A6; B4; H2; H10; I7) because, otherwise, it would be as if they were being provided with the

opportunity to own a second house at the relocation site in addition to their partially demolished one along the railway. If they refused this, they were allowed to stay along the railway but at the cost of bearing the financial burden of repairing the damage on their own.

This binary choice between a partial demolition and staying on and a complete demolition and relocation revealed myriad loopholes in the relocation programme. For instance, conceptually it left out formal house owners with a partial loss who would not demolish a formal house in exchange for a relocation house. Tenants of partially demolished houses must not have had much say but to move out in case the owner decided to demolish the whole house. More importantly, partially affected people tended to stay in the remaining part of their house rather than being relocated, which reflects a general preference among informal settlers in my study, whether having been displaced or being faced with a threat of future eviction.⁸² For instance, I5, who is an informal settler herself in a neighbourhood to be affected by an upcoming clearance plan by the city government, thinks that relocation was beneficial for informal settlers who were displaced by the railway project as they could become a land owner. However, when asked about her situation, she recognises the challenges of relocation more acutely and argues that she prefers staying in the locality where her family makes a living and her children can continue their education.

Once deciding to stay on, however, partially affected people had to use their personal resources to rebuild their house since no assistance was provided. The capacity to reconstruct varied greatly. Resourceful households demonstrated resilience in turning the adverse event into an opportunity. The family of D3 is a rather exceptional case where all the family members are working and thus could draw on a large pool of resources to completely renovate the house after the clearance: “First, the little savings from my husband, 90,000 pesos, and I got a loan from the office, for about 200,000 pesos, and the rest of the amount we helped each other; we shared. [...] we used to have a grocery shop so we sold all the products. We had debt here and there” (D3).⁸³

⁸² Note: I am wary of a potential bias in my sample, which was collected exclusively along the railway tracks. Consequently, it may over-represent the voices of those who opted to stay in the railway area whilst relatively neglecting those who might have preferred a relocation option and have indeed stayed in the relocation site. However, the preference for staying on over relocation is so strong among informal settlers who are faced with other eviction threats that I argue this corrects the potential bias to some extent.

⁸³ Although housing reconstruction incurred borrowing, the amount of financial capital they could draw on was far greater than the majority of other research participants, which is also evident when compared against the annual poverty threshold of 19,802 pesos (for a family of five with a single

Likewise, using her savings G1 is now reconstructing her house, which was first partially demolished by the railway project and then was affected by the typhoon *Ondoy* in 2009, to make it a two-storey building in preparation for future flooding. On the contrary, for resource-constrained people, housing reconstruction may have undermined their meagre resource pool further as they had to use their savings (A6) or take out loans to reconstruct their house (J6). Differentially affected people underline that when a policy intervention fell short of recognising and addressing actual impacts, post-clearance recovery was left to an individual's capacity to draw on their own resources, which was also the case for displaced people who had to cope with the challenges in the relocation sites largely on their own (see Chapter 5).

6.3.3 Complete housing loss and housing rearrangement

In the face of the acute risk of displacement, non-displaced people have strived to stay on, either by proactively enhancing their tenure security through direct purchase, or by choosing to live in a partially demolished house instead of being relocated. This is because their life is nested in the locality, where they have already established ways of accessing needed resources, work opportunities and basic services and facilities: "The concern is a loss of the house, if you have your life here but have to be relocated there. You have to change your life [but] you are accustomed to here" (H9). The importance of maintaining the localised mode of living is also confirmed by displaced people who have stayed on or have returned to the railway area, fighting for their place in the city by rearranging their shelter in various ways (16 out of 67 cases).

Three distinct types of post-displacement housing arrangement are identified in the railway area – merging (with other families), renting and re-squatting. First, people moved into the house of other immediate or extended family members still living along the railway (E4; F5; I4; J11). Interestingly, family houses in all four cases (out of 16) are formal, including one case undergoing tenure formalisation, indicating that informal settlers also have families living in formal settlements. This connection between formal and informal settlers within a family makes the formality of tenure less definitive a factor in categorising different socio-economic groups (see Chapter 8 for further elaboration of diverse social relationships).

breadwinner) for the National Capital Region in 2012 (source: Department of Labour and Employment).

Second, displaced people are also renting a house, a room or even a bed space (five cases out of 16: A2; A8; B3; I3; I8). Whilst previous informal house owners are now bearing the additional expense of rent payments (e.g. I3), there are previous renters who are renting again but on a reduced scale; an example is B3, who used to rent a house but is now renting only a room. More interestingly, renters provide a fresh insight into the local housing rental market, which appears to have contracted since many rental houses in the informal settlements were demolished. The shortage of supply in the area appears to have made it more difficult to rent and to have increased the price of a rental house. I8 has been renting since she was disqualified for relocation and summarises the situation very clearly:

“It [the rent] was just 1,000. But now, it’s 1,500 – that will be the lowest. In other places, maybe, it can go up to 2,000 or 2,500. [...] Before, it was more ok for small rooms. Now those small rooms are lost, now gone. And also the people were relocated. Before, there were rental houses, just for 1,000, for one room. [...] It’s really difficult to find [rental] houses now, especially for those people who were not relocated. So, even though it’s expensive, you’ll take it.”

Likewise, J8 explains that renting has become very competitive as the demand for rental houses has increased, partly because many displaced people (both disqualified and returnees) have stayed in the area. Her father-in-law was living in a makeshift tent for a while after being disqualified for relocation until he moved into the current rental house:

“For this house, a lot of people wanted to rent it because they were living in tents. We won [the competition]. [...] My father-in-law was just staying at the front of this house and Ate Jo also talked to the persons who lived here before. They had some arrangements so this house would be rented by my father-in-law” (J8).

Her father-in-law was able to ‘win’ the competition only because he acted first by obtaining information from an acquaintance (i.e. Ate Jo) that the previous renter would move out soon. J8 also notes that rent has gone up: “There was a change because before we were just paying 500 pesos for rent of the house; now we’re paying 1,500. 1,000 is really big money. Also, before we were connected to the water but now we have to pay for the water [by pail].”

Third, people whose capacity to rent is very low – e.g. “we have no money to rent a room” (F6) – have stayed on the cleared land, technically re-squatting. After the clearance, efforts have been made to prevent the cleared land from being invaded again. Shanties or makeshift business spaces are no longer tolerated and are demolished again by the PNR police or the *barangay* office (F6; J1; J8). Despite intensified

regulation, however, some have managed to rebuild a temporary shelter (H12; E3; F6; I9), while others have stayed in an open space such as on the street (I2), under the cover of a tent (E6) or a vehicle like a tricycle. For the majority of displaced people who used to be informal house owners (14 out of 16 cases), the post-displacement housing conditions tend to be worse than before, and certainly re-squatting is the worst arrangement as it means they have also lost access to electricity and water (H12; I9). Furthermore, like the remaining informal settlers among non-displaced people, displaced people who have lingered on suffer from uncertainty about the temporary nature of their stay: “I hope they will finish this [project] so we can start anew and polish everything.” (I3). This continuing tenure insecurity is discussed further in the next section.

6.4 Pervasiveness of informality: Continuing tenure insecurity

Although the formality of tenure was a primary safeguard against a complete loss of one’s residential house, it alone was not a sufficient explanation for non-displaced people avoiding displacement. They survived the clearance in a range of tenure positions and, notably, nearly half of non-displaced people in my research are still informal settlers, either without a housing loss (13 cases) or with a partial loss (12 cases). They could be saved from displacement chiefly because they were either occupying other public or private land than PNR land or simply because they were living beyond the clearance scope even if they were on PNR property. What this means is that informal use of land was pervasive in the railway area and has persisted even after the large-scale land clearance.


Although there had always been the threat of forced eviction along the railway tracks, it has become ever more real for the remaining informal settlers in both NHL and PHL groups since they saw their family members and neighbours displaced (D1C12; B1) or lost part of their house themselves. The fear of forced eviction is so strongly engrained in the psychology of people who have lived around informal settlements that even formal land owners – including those in the process of tenure formalisation – dread the possibility of additional eviction (E7C7; H5). The fear is fanned by the variance in the measurement for clearance across different areas. For instance, the house of B1 stands on private land and thus her house remains unaffected by the clearance. However, after

seeing the houses in the neighbouring area being partially demolished, she has become concerned about the security of her stay:

“Some people are saying how many metres they [the PNR] would need [to clear] because they think they may be included [in the clearance]. But others are also saying this is a private property. [...] Because in that part [one block away], some houses were cut [partially demolished]. But if you look at this place, we are asking why it was not included [even though it stands the same distance away from the railway tracks]” (B1).

Lacking crucial information about the project such as the precise scope for clearance, residents could only speculate about what would happen to their house. A few research participants did ask me about the project during the interview. Furthermore, in some areas, the clearance scope changed over the course of project implementation, whereby it either narrowed or widened, thereby aggravating the confusion among residents. Figure 14 summarises the seven cases reported in my research.

Figure 11: Clearance scope change



The widening of the clearance scope meant that additional evictions would ensue and people who had up to that point lost only part of their house could come to lose it all. In the graph, this means that residents in the area above the darker line and below the lighter line would no longer be able to stay in the locality (A7; F5; B2; E8; F7). On the other hand, narrowing of the scope made a huge difference for those who could stay only with a partial demolition of their house: “it’s more favourable to us because it’s only 9 metres, unlike before when they told us 15 metres. [...] if the whole house is demolished, you will be relocated, but if some part of the house remains, you will stay here and you will not get a house in the relocation site” (A6). In addition to the change in the project scope, the fact that the project was ongoing added extra layers of uncertainty. To make matters worse, rumours circulated about additional evictions, concerning non-displaced residents (J6; J9): “I heard that this [her partially affected

house] is going to be demolished. News is around, like gossip. That's why people are panicking" (J6).

The psychological and practical effects evoked by a change in the size of land clearance demonstrate that project scope is a sensitive issue for urban transportation projects as well as for other well-known contexts like dam construction, for which the height of dam has been controversially debated, as it determines the scale of socio-environmental impacts as well as the size of economic output. Without being adequately informed of the clearance process, remaining informal settlers cannot do anything but wait rather helplessly for the completion of the railway project, hoping that it would mark the end of demolition (e.g. B1; D3; J6). Thus, fearing additional evictions, partially affected residents have refrained from rebuilding their house as they might lose their investment again (D3; E10; J6). Likewise, many people have requested that fences be put up along the railway tracks, which they take as a proxy indicator of the exact project boundary (J6). However, it is certain that the tenure insecurity arising from their informal land use will not change even after the project is completed. Having to rely on external entities who determine the boundary within which they can manage their life is a more vulnerable position than that of the aforementioned groups who organised themselves early enough to become land owners themselves. In the coming sections, I discuss the vulnerability of the remaining informal settlers through a conceptual analysis of the relationship between land owners and users, and also through empirical cases of ongoing forced eviction cases in the railway area.

6.4.1 Vulnerability of informal land users

In general, users of a property – be it a piece of land or a structure – are vulnerable to the power of owners who can decide the ways in which their property is put to use and thus the fate of property users. Users often experience a forceful or unfavourable change in their land or housing arrangement, an extreme case of which is land clearance or forced eviction. To analyse the inherent vulnerability of land users, I present six possibilities of arranging land and housing that are identified from the collected data in Table 4. It provides a useful insight into the costs and the risks involved in different housing options and thus helps to explain the different ways in which non-displaced people arranged their shelter prior to the clearance and experienced the clearance according to their different tenure statuses. Options are divided, first, by whether land is formally accessed and, second, by whether a house is

owned or rented by an end-user. It is useful to read the table from the end-users' point of view (i.e. from right to left) for identifying their tenure status.

Table 4 Land and housing arrangement types

Formality	Land	House	Occupant (end-user)
Formal	Owner	Owner built	Type 1: Owner-occupant
		Owner built > Rented out	Type 2: Renter [1]
	User (leasing land)	User built	Type 3: User-occupant
		User built > Rented out	Type 4: Renter [2]
Informal	User (occupying land)	User built	Type 5: User-occupant
		User built > Rented out	Type 6: Renter [2]

**The number in the bracket means the number of owners that an end-user of a house has in theory.*

In five out of six types from Type 2 to Type 6, people are land users, either formal or informal, and this indicates that user vulnerability is an acute problem for most people who are not land owners themselves. In other words, tenure insecurity can be completely resolved only when people become a formal land owner themselves, after which they would also be relieved of the burden of rent payment. However, the degree of vulnerability varies among different types of land-use arrangements, i.e. formal, legitimate and informal land uses. First, I explain the origin of the vulnerability experienced by the remaining informal land users. Second, I discuss a case of 'legitimate' land users who seem to be more secure than informal land users in a normal context but who become similarly vulnerable in the event of a formal land-use change.

For informal land users, their acute vulnerability to forced eviction revolves around the fact that they do not have a direct relationship with the land owner, unlike formal land users who have at least some form of minimal contact with the owner through their rent payment obligation. Furthermore, formal land users appear to know their legally protected rights better and be firmer in asserting them even though they ultimately become subject to forced eviction.⁸⁴ Informal land users are more vulnerable than their formal counterparts because they lack legally protected user rights and have less

⁸⁴ A5 illustrates this point. He used to rent a flat in an apartment complex that was built on private land next to the PNR property. The owner of the building had a plan to reconstruct it and ordered the tenants to vacate their house. However, the tenants united and resisted the eviction plan by actively seeking legal assistance and by filing a court case. The court case had been pending for almost a decade and the building was demolished in the end, shortly after I conducted an interview with him. Nonetheless, his case implies that formal tenants may have more scope for taking action to protect their user rights in a case of forced eviction.

'formal' means to resort to in an eviction context, which is exacerbated by their general information deficit.

In the first place, it may not be always clear to informal land users who the formal land owner is. This is much more so for informal tenants who are only renting a house and thus may know their house owner at best. When a piece of land is left empty to be occupied, B1 contends, it looks as if the owner had abandoned it without any intention to use or manage it.⁸⁵ Land ownership gets clarified only in the process of land-use change. For example, people in the neighbouring area of E5 had not known their land owner until part of the area was converted into road and the owner came out to deal with the matter. Likewise, the exact size of the PNR property (i.e. how far it stretches from the railway tracks) was revealed only when the PNR decided to finally upgrade the railways, after having abandoned the management of its property for decades.

Moreover, the actual transfer of land-use rights or housing ownership usually takes place between individuals at a micro level, often within their social circle, without involving the formal land owner at all (F4; H8; I1; J1; J4; I6; E5). For instance, I1 came to know about the current business spot through his sister (A3), who was already vending in the area along the railway. The previous owner of the canteen was about to go abroad and thus sold it to I1 for a small fee. Likewise, when the family of I6 came to the railway area, they started to rent a house which was owned by the family whose son was the *compadre*⁸⁶ of I6's father: "We're not paying [rent] anymore. When we transferred here, it was an old and rotten house but we reconstructed it. [...] [We could own the house because] the owner asked my husband to pay for it and also because we reconstructed the house. [...] because we were living here for a long time; it's like a reward for us." By living there for a long time and having invested in the house, the family of I6 could thus obtain the house and practically own it now.

Even if informal settlers know something regarding land ownership – i.e. who the owner is (D3; E10; I5; I7) and their vulnerability as a "squatter" (G1; I5) – it is still common that they are not aware of the owner's decision regarding land-use change until the very moment it actually comes to take place (D1C6). Unless land owners take the responsibility of information dissemination seriously, informal settlers are unlikely

⁸⁵ Her statement resonates with a sentiment observed among Filipinos who believe that a space or land belongs to the occupant until someone with a great legitimacy displaces him/her (Porio and Crisol 2004: 206).

⁸⁶ *Compadre* and *Comadre* are a Godfather and a Godmother (Ninong or Ninang) to a child when s/he is baptised and they enter a brother/sister-like relationship to the parents of the child.

to know the timing and the mode of eviction, without which it is difficult to respond in a timely and proactive manner. Given this, the remaining informal settlers must have suffered more from the near absence of information and the consequent inability to prepare for an external change than displaced people, who at least realised at some point that they had to move out of their house. Non-displaced people in their liminal state could not foresee clearly how the changes in the locality might affect their lives. An interesting illustration is a contrast between some of the displaced people who prepared an alternative house to move in to and partially affected people who could not do much beforehand and had to deal with the consequences of the clearance only afterwards.

Legitimate land-use rights

Among the remaining informal settlers, an interesting type of land-use arrangement emerged as an intermediary between informal and formal land user-ship, which I label 'legitimate' user-ship. Land-use rights become 'legitimate' when awarded by the authority or by the land owner, mostly in the form of 'informal' approval that is mediated within social relationships (E5; H11; F4). For instance, H11 built a house in a garage space owned by his former boss: "I asked for permission from my boss. [...] There was no payment, no rent. [...] [But] it was not given to us. It was only a verbal agreement." In particular, local politicians play an important role in legitimising people's access to available land. When the family of F4 was evicted by the rental house owner at a short notice without being given monetary assistance for finding a new house, they brought the case to the *barangay* chairman who granted them permission to use an empty lot in the community.

Notably, some settlers on the PNR land had been legitimate users approved by the PNR for some time before the clearance (five cases: D1; J9; E2; G2; B4). A long time ago, the PNR allowed people to construct houses on its land on condition that they would stay 15 metres or further from the railway tracks (B2; D1) or based on an understanding that "if there will be a project, automatically, they have to leave the place" (F7CN31). Part of the land along the railway tracks was also leased out to the residents of nearby formal settlements in return for rent payments (D2). In some areas, the PNR allowed its employees to build a house on its property (E2; JX).⁸⁷ Legitimate users of the PNR land appeared to have paid a kind of tax called *amiliar* (D2; F7; G2; I4; I7):

⁸⁷ Some of these 'legitimate' land users who were initially given land-use rights by the PNR are going through a court case with the PNR and their houses have not yet been demolished (F1).

“The land was awarded by the PNR to my grandfather because my grandfather was an employee of the PNR. [...] It was built by my grandfather, the house. [...] All the people who were living there were PNR employees. [...] We were just paying amiliar for the land we really occupy. [...] It’s like an annual tax for land. To the government, City government. [...] but there is no land title” (I4).

Although people’s accounts on *amiliar* differ and it is unclear whether it is an annual tax for land use (e.g. J3) or for house ownership, rent (or tax) collection stopped at some point. Some residents understood it as preparation in anticipation of the railway-upgrading project, which would require clearing the PNR property of previously permitted houses, although there appears to have been a considerable time lag until the plan materialised:

“When my father started to live here, he paid rental to the PNR. Until now, I’m keeping the receipt. [...] Then the payment stopped around the 1990s because of some ongoing projects by which this place would be demolished and cleaned. It’s a PNR project. [...] There was a notice that there would be a railway project and the squatter area would be removed or demolished. [...] I think it started in the 1990s. There was the first attempt then [...] the project was pursued only in 2007” (G2).

“The land belongs to the PNR. We just paid amiliar [...] to the PNR through the City Hall. [...] [Amiliar is] rental for the rights of houses. For land use, just for the use of land. [...] For a long time, we were paying. But, I am not sure, maybe from around 1951 until ... maybe the 70s because after the 70s the PNR didn’t collect anything. [...] I don’t know why [they stopped collection]” (I7).

On the other hand, F7 suggests that rent collection might have been illegitimate in the first place, recalling that the PNR collected fees as a source of revenue but that it was stopped by the national government at one point in the 1970s due to the corruption involved in such a practice (F7CN33). In any case, legitimate users of the PNR land experienced a shift in their status from semi-formal to informal over the years during which the PNR changed their land management practice by stopping the collection of the fee that used to provide security of land use. However, once the PNR decided to pursue the railway-upgrading project, the previous informal approval was nullified and the security of legitimate land users was no longer guaranteed, leaving them in an ambiguous state of “just staying” without clearly knowing their land status (E2).⁸⁸

The case of legitimate land users demonstrates that access to land is a politically negotiable issue but is still subject to formal regulations in the end. A mutual understanding with the land owner (or with the authority), although not as legally

⁸⁸ On land other than the PNR property, there are many similar cases of uncertainty around land-use arrangements. For instance, the area of J7 nearby Dagupan Road was known to be bought by the authority from the private owner and to be given to the residents. People had paid for land thinking they might own it in the end but when the road expansion project came along, it turned out to be still a ‘squatter’ area and they had to evacuate.

binding as formal land-use rights, allowed legitimate users to enjoy a more secure tenure status than informal settlers whose land occupation was not approved by the owner or is not officially backed up. However, like informal land users, they also became vulnerable in the event of a formal change in land use, which is based on a limited conception of *de jure* land rights that is essentially supported by a legal land title and thus delegitimises various modes of *de facto* land-use arrangements.

6.4.2 Ongoing forced eviction cases

After the clearance, it is not only perceived insecurity of tenure that has increased; the remaining informal settlers are indeed faced with other eviction threats and are still locked in a continuous struggle to safeguard their place in the city. The family history of B4 is a poignant illustration of such a struggle, marked by constant resistance to multiple eviction plans and a serious assertion of their land-use rights through political negotiations.

Case-study: *Generational struggle against multiple eviction threats*

After the Second World War, the father-in-law of B4 moved to Manila and occupied a vast area across the PNR land and the City Government land (NB: this is also the area of E8 and E10). The family paid rent to the PNR from 1952 till 1983, based on which B4 claims that they had obtained a legal entitlement to the land. In the early 1980s, the City Government planned to construct a school which would require a portion of the land that the family of B4 had used. They organised the residents in the area to resist the plan and also stopped paying rent for land as part of their fight. The Mayor at that time offered a deal that he would protect residents against future eviction if they withdrew from their fight against school construction. In the end, B4 contends that “we had to leave the place because it’s really government property.” Subsequently, the political promise of the Mayor was honoured for two decades until the current railway project arose, which would affect the houses in between the railway tracks and the school. This time, the City Government was unable to protect people because it was a national government project.

Foreseeing the upcoming eviction possibility of the railway project, residents in the area of B4 formed a group as early as the 1990s to resist the plan. However, as in the school construction case, “nothing happened” since it was government (PNR) property, and the area was cleared despite their fight. After the railway clearance, several houses still remain on a small portion of school land that has not yet been used but is soon to be reclaimed by the school, motivated by the railway clearance. In response, B4 who still has a number of structures remaining on the said school land formed a new organisation to fight the upcoming eviction. As part of their

fight, she was planning to negotiate with a local politician who was running in an election that was imminent at the time of the interview (in May 2010). The idea was that members of the organisation would offer their votes to a candidate who would promise the security of their stay. However, from past experience, people also knew that they were unlikely to win the fight and the power of the land owner would eventually prove decisive.

Other groups of people under eviction threats have also appealed to the authority or are planning to negotiate with politicians, which is a common strategy for seeking for legitimate land-use rights. For example, the remaining houses of F3, F4 and I5 in Laguna Extension are on public land and they have been threatened by a Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) project to clear the waterway next to their houses. An eviction notice was sent not long after the land clearance for the railway project, for instance, in November 2009 (I5), and the residents led by the *barangay* chairman started to seek political support from a congressman by writing a petition letter (F3CN34). While there is a dispute over land ownership itself, with some claiming that the land does not belong to the government (F2CN53),⁸⁹ the main contestation surrounds the lack of resettlement provision: “This is a squatter area. We should be included in the eviction but then we cannot be transferred to any other places [i.e. there is no relocation site for them]. So, we are not evicted yet” (I5).

It remains to be seen how the ongoing cases of eviction threats unfold. Although resisting forced eviction is valuable in itself because informal settlers can raise their voice and claim their right to a place of living, the power of property owners or the regulatory effect of urban planning is likely to prevail in the end. Initially, the current land clearance for the railway project was resisted in various forms, from a passive, individual expression of discontent to an active, organised action of “uniting” their neighbourhood (A8; B3; B4). Nonetheless, the course of the event was not reversed, leaving displaced people with a feeling of helplessness. B4 shares the pain and difficulty of having to give in to the eviction decision of the land owner despite their decades of fighting to safeguard their home. Even non-displaced people observed: “At first, people resisted being relocated. But they couldn’t do anything about it” (H6); “People protested but nothing happened” (H12); “There were negotiations but they could not

⁸⁹ The owner of the land is not known to the residents in the area but the land is assumed to be public, given that their houses were threatened by a government project. This shows once again that informal settlers are uncertain about their land status until the very moment when forced eviction materialises.

do anything. Nothing happened with negotiations” (I5). I5 who is facing an eviction threat echoes such sentiment:

“It’s sad, of course. We’ve been here. It’s closer here – to jobs. It’s hard. [...] Even though it’s very hard for us, of course, they are going to demolish the house... It’s really painful. The house has been part of our life. We have been part of this house. But, if someone is going to demolish this, if that happens, we cannot do anything” (I5).

In comparison, some informal settlers, who are still living on the PNR property, seem relatively willing to embrace the potential of eviction provided that they would be resettled. J9 comments: “For us, it’s OK to be removed from here as long as we are transferred or we have relocation. We were able to get benefits from this place fully.” Likewise, D1 desires relocation if her house along a small river that cuts across the railway tracks is demolished as a result of a planned river clearance. Although she is aware of the challenges in the relocation sites, she thinks it is better to have a tangible house to move into after eviction than having no place to go or being left with just monetary compensation.

In sum, the railway area is still riven with multiple eviction cases even after the current land clearance and informal residents who were *not* displaced this time continue to suffer from the lack of tenure security and the risk of experiencing a traumatic process of displacement at any point, which is likely to be very similar to that which displaced people are currently undergoing. Whilst this makes tenure security all the more important, the pervasiveness of informality in accessing land for housing and the scale of informal settlements in my research raise critical questions such as whether tenure formalisation is a feasible solution or whether there may be other realistic ways to enhance tenure security.

6.4.3 Investment in informal housing: Costs and risks

In this regard, it is worth examining the structural conditions that have given rise to informal settlements in the first place, which I frame in terms of a trade-off between the costs and risks of housing options along the line of tenure security. People invest in a house both as a residential space and as a physical asset. For a residential space, housing ownership is preferred because it does not involve the burden of rent payment while allowing house owners to make improvements to a house, either to its quality (e.g. changing housing materials from wood to concrete) or its quantity (e.g. expanding the housing size). A house also has productive functions when it becomes a site for livelihoods such as a home-based business or a source of income like a rental house (A8;

H5).⁹⁰ For these purposes, people build or buy an extra house other than their own residential one, which increases the stock of physical capital within a household as a whole because as it can be inherited, either horizontally, for example, among siblings (A4; E5; E7; H5; I5) or vertically throughout generations (E3C7; E5C7; J3). As an embodiment of investment, a house also becomes a source of financial capital as well, when it is sold.

The sustainability of such investments varies depending on the formality of tenure because investment in an informal house is often not adequately recognised or compensated when land use is formally changed as was the case for the current land clearance. On the contrary, as seen in the NHL group, investment in formal properties has not only safeguarded owners from the threat of eviction (or the loss of asset) but furthermore can be sustained for a long time. Precisely for this reason, the grandfather-in-law of F2 bought a large piece of land as an investment for future generations: “[He] was really hard-working; so, when the time came that he had a lot of grandchildren, he could give a lot of land to them” (F2CN10). The aforementioned case of the BLISS housing (Section 6.3.2) also underlines that formal land ownership is an ultimate guarantor of tenure security because even formal land users can become vulnerable to the decisions of the land owner. The vulnerability of land users are clearly recognised by people who tend to make serious improvements to a house only when they have secured formal land ownership. For instance, the family of E7 bought a piece of land formally which they used to occupy and then embarked on the process of elevating the ground level of the house to protect it from flooding. In comparison, informal house owners are reticent about housing improvement due to their fear of demolition.

Given the inherent vulnerability of land users, people may ideally wish to become a formal land owner themselves. However, it is not necessarily the formality of tenure that determines whether people are willing or able to invest in a house, particularly when varying degrees of tenure security translate into different price levels of housing options. The choice of an option becomes contingent on the amount of financial capital people can access, and a trade-off takes place between the cost and the risk of a housing option along the continuum of formality. This explains why urban residents may live or invest in an informal house and thus become disadvantaged in the context of land clearance, either by being subject to forced eviction or by losing their investment in a physical asset.

⁹⁰ Rental house owners can earn an income even when they reside outside the country. For example, the owners of the BLISS housing that H1 and H2 are renting live in the US and in UK respectively.

The cost factor in choosing an informal housing option can be explained by the accessibility of formal options, which is a function of the affordability and availability issues that were discussed in Chapter 4. In principle, a formal housing option is more expensive than an informal option because the price of land is taken into account, whereas an informal house is built through land invasion, thus being initially free of charge. An interesting aspect of informal land user-ship, however, is that even though a piece of land was occupied 'for free' by the first settler, payment is required in later transactions, thereby creating an active informal housing market. For example, A7 bought the land-use rights from the original occupant knowing that it was not formal ownership (or land title) that she paid for (A7).⁹¹ This is incomparable, however, to the formal price of land in a city like Metro Manila where private land is predominantly owned by a few elite families and their speculative motivations compounded by inefficient regulation result in exorbitant land prices (see Chapter 3).

It is also important to recognise different positions among informal settlers. There is a strong preference for house ownership among informal housing options (F3; I5), which appears to be an economically attractive option since owners do not pay rent for both land 'and' house compared to informal tenants who still bear the burden of regular payment of rent. The merit of informal house ownership is also confirmed in my research sample, where all but two out of 25 non-displaced informal settlers are house owners. Although the rent for an informal house is likely to be cheaper than that for a formal house (F3CN33), it is still a challenge for those whose work is unstable and income is irregular (D1; F3; J1): "It's really hard to rent because if you don't have a job you can't afford to pay rent" (F3CN20). The challenge of renting underlines the link between shelter insecurity and livelihood insecurity, a link which is not always recognised by housing interventions (Bernier 1997; Roy 2005). Renters are also vulnerable to house owners' decisions such as a rent increase or even forced eviction (F4; A6). Consequently, they tend to move around in search of better options, such as a cheaper rental house (J1), and their ability to stay in one locality appears to be lower than that of house owners: "we've been doing that for a few years – transferring from one house to another" (J5).

Building an informal house also resonates with the well-known mode in which the urban poor accumulate assets and improve their living conditions, namely

⁹¹ Likewise, F1 was told that 'land-use rights' would cost 15,000 pesos (F1CN56) and in fact F3 bought a house on the PNR land at the same rate, being aware that land ownership was with the PNR (F3CN13).

incrementalism or “little by little” in their own words, by which they spread out the cost of developing a house over time in relation to their other needs (Baruah 2004; Roy 2005). That is, once a piece of land is secured, they can build a house at their own pace, i.e. whenever they can afford to, instead of being bound by a fixed payment as renters are. When it comes to a house that they have invested in, people demonstrate a strong sense of ownership regardless of its tenure status (I2; I9; G1CN8; E2C3; A7): “We are the ones who built the house; that’s why we own the house” (H11). This ‘perceived’ ownership seems to be reinforced when they have maintained the house for a long time despite its informality.

Whilst informal house ownership is a relatively accessible option for those without significant resources, it is a strategic option for others who intend to maximise the benefit of housing investment at a lower cost. For instance, by purchasing an informal house and renting it out, a rental house owner can earn income at a cheaper rate than investing in a formal house, thereby increasing the chance of accumulation. F1 reports cases where people could save the cost of housing by living in the informal settlement along the railway tracks and buying a house in a formal subdivision later on. He himself was once advised that he could make a profit by building a rental house on the PNR land across the street from his formal house.

In sum, the modes of, and the motivations behind, an investment in housing are diverse, and it is not necessarily ‘formal’ houses that people invest in. In a normal context, informal house owners may enjoy a range of merits, including relief from the burden of rent payment, the feeling of stability, the income-generating capacity of a house as productive capital, and generational endowment. However, in the event of planned changes like the railway project and the consequent land clearance, the vulnerability of an informal housing option dominates its cost-effectiveness. Despite the trade-off, investment in informal houses was so widespread in the locality that the clearance had significant impacts on the physical capital stock of non-displaced people with further implications for their livelihoods, even though they avoided losing their residential house completely. These issues will be examined in the next chapter.

Maintaining ownership of a relocation house

The importance of a house as a physical asset is also underlined by how non-displaced people have managed to get hold of a house in the relocation site. In the first place, these cases illustrate the loopholes in the relocation programme, which in principle did not allow non-resident owners to claim a house in the relocation site (see Section 5.3.2

in Chapter 5 for more discussion): “The priority of those who conducted the census was people who were living in the house [i.e. actual residents], not those who were not living in the house” (I8). The logic behind the actual residency rule was to relocate only those who had no other housing option and thus were deemed most in need of assistance, whereas non-resident owners were assumed to have another place of living. The actual residency rule was also aimed at preventing people from accumulating a physical asset by building or owning an informal house and then claiming a relocation house upon its demolition. Those who invade land for that purpose are legally called ‘professional squatters’ or ‘squattening syndicates’.⁹² Certainly, the authority is keen on identifying and excluding them, as one *barangay* chairman contends strongly:

“We know our people, we know the community; so, we can tell foreigners or strangers to the community. [...] We prevented professional squatters. We were trying to look at who was really a resident here in this area. [...] They [professional squatters] were just transient in the area. So, we tried to differentiate them from those who were permanent in the area. We already kicked out professional squatters and tried to minimise those people building shanties there” (H4).

Running contrary to the regulatory intentions, non-displaced people were interested in receiving a relocation house precisely because they saw it as an opportunity to accumulate a physical asset. Despite the actual residency rule, some could get a relocation house by losing their rental house or a second house. For example, D2 who used to have a small rental house on the PNR land next to her private house was included in the census together with her renters. A similar exception is noted by E6, who used to rent before the clearance. Both his family and their rental house owner who did not live along the railway received a relocation house. In the case of F4, her rental house owner took advantage of the rule by forcefully evicting her family and moving into the house at the last minute so as to claim a relocation house. A few *barangay* chairpersons who did not lose a house at all were found to have houses in the relocation sites (e.g. H4).⁹³

Likewise, there are cases where people who have stayed in a partially demolished house had a house at the relocation site (e.g. J6; A6), for which they were supposed to have demolished their house completely. For instance, D3 was included in the census

⁹² Accordingly to the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) Section 3, *professional squatters* are “individuals or groups who occupy lands without the express consent of the landowner and who have sufficient income for legitimate housing” and *squattening syndicates* are “groups of persons engaged in the business of squatter housing for profit or gain” (NHA 1997: 3–4).

⁹³ During my MPhil research, I also encountered a case where a *barangay* chairwoman had a relocation house even though her house was not affected. Ironically, she was very strict about ‘professional squatters’ or ‘syndicates’ who came into her *barangay*.

even though she had stayed on in a partially demolished house along the railway. In fact, when many families used to live together in one house, each family was listed separately on the census and could make a separate choice between staying on and relocation (E1C22; E8; H4; J6). With regard to the household of F4, after it was partially demolished by the clearance, a few families were relocated while the rest stayed in the remaining house in the railway area. This looked confusing from outside because it was not clear how families were separated across two sites and also because they kept moving between the two family houses, which gave the whole extended family access to a relocation house in a sense. This indicates how the line between different categories of affected people can be blurred by social relationships in the locality, notably by a mix of displaced and non-displaced people within a family, an issue that will be discussed further in Chapter 8.

In contrast to a rigid policy conception of a house as a residential space, a perception of a house as an asset was evident in people's attempts to maintain their ownership over a relocation house from far away. They asked their family members (A2; A6; A7; B2C1; E10), relatives (B3; B4; D3), friends (D2) or neighbours (E8), who were living in the relocation site, to look after their house. Cases were also reported where the house was rented out to outsiders unrelated to the railway project, thus going against the resettlement rules. Those who had a better alternative place of living articulated their intention of accumulation through the relocation scheme by expressing a wish that the relocation site would be developed in the future (D2) to make their house there a proper 'asset' that could be inherited by their children (E10C12; E3C7; E5C8).⁹⁴ In view of this, F3 renovated his relocation house even though he was not living there at the moment (F3CN62). By being able to claim a house in the relocation site, non-displaced people who lost a house other than their residential one could recover part of their loss, although, as for a residential house, its replacement value is questionable given the problematic location and conditions of the relocation site as outlined in Chapter 5.

6.5 Conclusion

After the land clearance, non-displaced residents in the railway area have stayed on land owned by different entities (PNR, public and private), without a housing loss (NHL group) or with a partial loss (PHL group). Tenure security was an important factor in

⁹⁴ With regard to this accumulation of a physical asset through relocation, E9 criticises the relocated for being 'selfish'. In comparison, some returnees tend to keep a relocation house as a safeguard or as a last resort they can turn to in the event of further eviction (e.g. A2; F8CN27).

saving formal land owners and users from displacement, which is particularly underlined by a group of people undergoing tenure formalisation. However, informal use of land has persisted and a significant portion of non-displaced people in my sample have remained as informal settlers with an increased sense of vulnerability, uncertainty in their tenure status (e.g. former legitimate land users) and actual cases of eviction threats.

That is, by demolishing informal settlements along the railway tracks, land clearance had the indirect effect of formalising urban space to some extent, together with an increased regulation on the part of the authority. Nonetheless, this does not mean that informal access to land was eliminated. Apart from a residential house, the remaining population also experienced a tangible impact on their physical capital as it was common to invest in a structure or a space for productive purposes. The pervasiveness of informality, which was underlined by the presence of informal settlers among non-displaced people, puts the importance of tenure formalisation into a relative and realistic perspective, whereby it may not necessarily be an affordable or priority consideration in people's investment in housing. In the next chapter, I focus more on the productive function of housing and space, discerning the livelihood implications of a physical change in the locality.

Chapter 7

Livelihood impacts

7.1. Introduction

Although non-displaced people avoided the experience of having to leave a familiar environment, the railway area has also gone through significant changes of its own. In this chapter, I investigate whether and how large-scale demolition and displacement had any impacts on the livelihoods of the remaining population. First, I identify the main patterns in which livelihoods were affected by physical and socio-economic changes in the locality. There is also a group of people whose livelihoods remained intact, against which I tease out and refine the characteristics of affected livelihoods. Second, I analyse the implications of livelihood impacts in view of livelihood security prior to the change. Residents in the railway area did not form a homogeneous group, being differently positioned in terms of a resource pool and livelihood options. Hence, I investigate whether livelihood preconditions translated into different levels of vulnerability and resilience to local changes. Likewise, the coping strategies of affected people are examined in view of the ways in which they have been grappling with livelihood challenges in a normal context. A particular concern is with those who have made their living on the margins and therefore are likely to be less able to cope with, and recover from, adverse livelihood impacts. I also delineate the meanings of such impacts for long-term livelihood management and security.

7.2. Livelihood impacts (LIs)

The livelihoods of the remaining residents were affected (a) when demolition undermined physical productive capital (PPC) – i.e. physical capital being used for livelihoods – that they had arranged in the informal settlements or (b) when displacement of informal settlers reconfigured the local livelihood network (LLN) that

they were part of. Some were affected by a combination of both. Table 5 summarises the number of research participants in each livelihood impact category.

Table 5 Overview of livelihood impacts

Physical change	Livelihood impact (LI)	Physical productive capital only	7
Combined		Mixed impacts	12
Socio-econ change		Livelihood network only	9
	Total		28

In addition to the impacts on income-generating activities, changes in terms of expenses were considered, notably increased expenses related to displacement and relocation. There are three cases where household livelihoods were affected only in terms of increased expenses (I2; I8; J8), which makes the total number of the livelihood impact (LI) group 31 cases. In comparison, 36 households did not experience livelihood impacts in their estimation and constitute the No Livelihood Impact (NLI) group.

From an analytical standpoint of examining the livelihood impacts, the experience of displacement becomes less relevant. Displaced people in the locality were not so different from non-displaced people in experiencing livelihood impacts, as long as they resumed or continued their livelihoods. It is evident in Table 6 where livelihood impacts are transposed across housing impact types.


Table 6 Livelihood impacts across housing impact types

	No housing loss (NHL)	Partial housing loss (PHL)	Complete housing loss (CHL)	Total
Livelihood impact	13 (37.15%)	9 (56.25%)	9 (56.25%)	31 (46.27%)
No livelihood impact	22 (62.85%)	7 (43.75%)	7 (43.75%)	36 (53.73%)
Total	35 (100%)	16 (100%)	16 (100%)	67 (100%)

No significant difference appears between non-displaced people and displaced people in terms of livelihood impact patterns (in particular, between PHL and CHL groups). In view of this, displaced people are included as a legitimate part of the analysis of livelihood impacts. Nonetheless, a major difference must be acknowledged in that displaced people lost their residential house completely, which was a significant loss in itself. Displaced people staying in the locality also had to bear the additional cost of rearranging or reconstructing their shelter. As noted in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3.3), rent payment becomes a substantial expense for previous informal house owners, while previous renters experienced a rent increase after the clearance (I8; J8). For others who have rebuilt a structure of varying quality, from a shack to a temporary house, the cost of reconstruction also needs to be counted as an increased expense even though it

may not be as obvious as rent. More broadly, there were other newly added expenses related to displacement and relocation (12), part of which were shouldered by non-displaced people who had displaced family members. The issue of increased expenses will be considered in Chapter 8 when discussing the social implications of displacement.

Graph 2 Tenure status and livelihood impacts in each housing impact type



A notable feature in Table 6 is that the proportion of people avoiding livelihood impacts is higher in the no housing loss (NHL) group: 62.9 per cent compared to 43.8 per cent in the PHL and CHL groups. This seems to suggest that those whose house remained intact might have engaged less with the informal settlement as a site for livelihoods. The formality of tenure may be one plausible explanation for such limited engagement. In Graph 2, where the tenure status of each livelihood group (LI and NLI) is specified (formal and informal, expressed as F and IF), the proportion of formal settlers whose livelihoods were not affected (NLI-F) is far greater in the NHL group, whereas in other housing impact groups the informality of tenure stands out among those whose livelihoods were affected (LI-IF).

In the coming sections, I focus on examining different types of livelihood impact, first through the impacts on physical productive capital (Section 7.2.1.) and, second, through the transformation of the local livelihood network (Section 7.2.2). Cases of livelihood impacts are then compared to the group who did not experience any changes in their livelihoods (Section 7.2.3), from which the sources of impact and characteristics of affected livelihoods are discerned (Section 7.2.4).

7.2.1. Physical productive capital (PPC)

Land clearance impacted the local housing stock and access to open spaces along the railway tracks. In Chapter 6, the main focus of examination was residential houses and the implication of their demolition for the tenure security of the remaining population.

However, even without losing their residential house completely, a quarter of non-displaced people (13 out of 51 non-displaced people) experienced a tangible impact on the physical capital they used for livelihoods. The livelihoods of displaced people (six cases) were also affected as they lost their residential house or other spaces for productive activities.

It is revealed that both formal and informal residents used an informally accessed house or space widely as a site for livelihood activities or as a source of income. Across different housing impact groups, people had owned a shop or a rental house in the informal settlement other than their residential one and thus lost it completely through the clearance (B4; F3; D2; F8). A notable case is B4 who occupied a large portion of the Philippine National Railways (PNR) land where she had rental houses and a few businesses such as a small store and a handicraft shop (see Section 6.4.2 for the full case study of B4). The loss of an inter-generational accumulation that had started from her father-in-law evokes mental stress as she feels depressed whenever she thinks about it. Similarly, F3 bought a house on the PNR land with his savings from working abroad and turned it into a computer shop. Following the demolition of the house, he lost his shop and also had to sell his computer stock, which represented long years of hard work as a migrant worker. Formal residents who did not live in the informal settlement also ran a business in an informal structure (I1; B2; F7) or owned an informal rental house on the PNR property (D2).

In the case of home-based businesses, partial demolition meant a reduction in their operational space, which led to a decline in or even closure of some businesses (E10; D3; F4). For example, after losing approximately 70 per cent of the house, F4 could no longer afford a space for the junkshop that her family used to run at home. Likewise, D3's grocery store had to go when her house was partially demolished, although the money from selling off groceries was used for reconstructing the house. In the case of E10, he managed to carry on his home-based business manufacturing fibreglass products on the cleared land after his house was partially demolished. Nevertheless, losing his concrete place for business was detrimental to the performance of his business as his clients now find it difficult to identify his location and he is not attracting as many clients as before. Furthermore, displaced people lost their home-

based eatery (*carrenderria*) or a *sari-sari* store, when their house was completely demolished (I3; F5; I4).⁹⁵

The livelihood impact of housing demolition underlines that a structure is an important physical asset, whether its arrangement is formal or informal or its purpose residential or non-residential. Given that a structure also embodies past investment and endeavour in its purchase, construction and improvement over time, its demolition was a significant loss of a tangible asset in itself. However, as noted in the last chapter, partially demolished houses were not recognised for compensation on the premise that they were not 'formal' in the first place and the cost of reconstructing the damaged house was left to be borne by affected people. Likewise, an important difference between informal house owners and renters was not recognised by the current relocation programme as its conceptualisation of housing is limited to its residential function, thus ignoring its productive capacity. Accordingly, a relocation house is *not* provided to non-resident house owners (e.g. rental house owners) since they did not lose their 'home', even though the lost house was part of their tangible assets. On the contrary, for renters who did not own a house to lose in the first place, relocation is seen as a chance to become formal house owners, although it is dependent on their repayment capacity (A1; E1; F3CN61; E10C3).

As compared to people who *owned* physical productive capital in the informal settlement and consequently lost related livelihoods with its demolition, those who *rented* a business space in the informal settlement did not experience a tangible loss and have managed to rebuild their business (I1; B2; G1; F7). For instance, B2 had an eatery on the ground floor of her brother's house that was demolished and is now running a snack stall in an open space. Likewise, G1 transferred a store to her partially demolished house after the demolition of her family house across the railway tracks where she used to run it.

However, even if a business has continued, it remains vulnerable as long as it uses an informally arranged space, which has become subject to enhanced regulation since the clearance. A section near the Bluementritt station and the Bluementritt Market where a group of sidewalk vendors are operating is a notable case (e.g. A3, I1, I2 and I3). I1 does not live in the railway area but had run a canteen next to the railway tracks, until it was then demolished. The authority cleared informal businesses that reappeared

⁹⁵ Note that a housing loss had impacts on livelihoods only when a household had a productive activity at home. Likewise, a space reduction or loss following demolition did not affect all the home-based businesses adversely, only the presented cases.

immediately after the event so he had to wait for five months before he could rebuild his canteen. Likewise, I3 and her husband had their canteen along the railway demolished in 2007 due to the railway clearance. They built a small store space again where they are now selling coffee:

“After the demolition, the next day, we built it [i.e. the canteen] again. They [the government] destroyed it again and we reconstructed [it.] Before, the City Government tried to destroy this because we didn’t have a permit. The government didn’t know this was still part of the market area. But, now, they already know so they’re giving us a ticket to pay every day for this area. So, now it’s not demolished any more. We are allowed to operate here.”

Furthermore, she rents out part of her business space in the evening at the cost of 50 pesos per day, recovering the cost of the daily ‘permission ticket’ (30 pesos) for using the space. Her case demonstrates that access to a business space is a critical issue for traders operating in the informal economy, which involves a constant negotiation to obtain legitimate recognition from the authority while always being vulnerable to urban planning or regulatory activities. However, stricter management of space after the clearance is certainly a new phenomenon according to J6, who sells drinks and snacks under a shade outside her house and has had her business affected by such increased regulation:

“When we have a tent outside for business, sometimes the PNR will take it away and the business will be affected by that. [...] Before the demolition took place, we didn’t experience that. The PNR did not take away the tent. But after the demolition, the PNR forced us to take away the tent and [this confiscation] already happened.”

A7 started to run a small store after land was cleared to open up some space to build a makeshift shop, whereas in her neighbourhood, several blocks away from the railway tracks, she hardly found sufficient space as the houses stood so close to each other. However, she soon experienced the confiscation of her products by the PNR Police as part of their regulatory activity to prevent the reinvasion of the cleared land. In the end, she bought a small house for her business, which is still informally built but is at least not on the PNR property.

In sum, a physical change following the demolition of informal settlements impacted local livelihoods that used informally arranged physical capital. On the one hand, the livelihood impacts of demolition expand the conception of housing beyond a shelter to further underline its productive function as a source of income (e.g. a rental house) and a space for other livelihood activities. Likewise, the impact of housing loss needs to be understood in livelihood terms, whereby past investment was foregone and surviving

home-based livelihoods were weakened. On the other hand, land clearance as a form of urban planning had the effect of formalising livelihood activities in the locality, not only by undermining their physical basis, but also through the subsequent regulation of informal access to urban space. That is, informality became a key vulnerability for livelihoods as well as for housing when the terms and conditions of using physical capital in the locality were changed by urban planning.

7.2.2. Local livelihood network (LLN)

In addition to the livelihood impacts of a physical change, mass population displacement affected livelihoods by reconfiguring the existing socio-economic relationships in the locality. The local economy before the clearance is commonly characterised by “a lot of people, a lot of children, especially when there were people along the railway” (F2CN18), where residents saw business potential in “selling” (J8; F2; F3). F2 thought of starting a small *sari-sari* store outside her house once she moved to the railway area and, likewise, F3 opened a computer shop after seeing the same business opportunity in the large number of residents: “Because there were a lot of people before, the business was really good. That’s why I decided to put up a business” (F3CN14). Provision of various services also flourished: “Before when there were a lot of people along the railway, we could get many customers for the tricycle service” (F4CN3). All in all, the local economy before the clearance is remembered as being very favourable to making a living:

“Before the demolition, there were really many people, so good sales, higher sales. [...] Before, I could sell all the time. It was really easy” (F7CN37)

“My store before was a really good business. It’s like you get, you pick money – just picking money. Then, for example, if my grandchildren needed something, I could give it to them easily. It was also easy to save money because there were many people at that time” (G1CN29).

Hence, the biggest change after the clearance is a drastic drop in the number of people who previously formed a large pool of customers and furthermore a broader livelihood network. Consequently, many small business owners, vendors, and petty service providers who operated locally were adversely affected. In my research, a total of 21 households was adversely affected by the change in the local livelihood network. For example, A3 as a vendor selling slippers on the sideway running parallel to the railway experienced a significant decrease in sales after the displacement of informal settlers, which reduced her profit by two-thirds. Those providing petty services in the area such as transportation, massage, hair cutting and manicures were also hard hit.

One of the most commonly mentioned examples is a tricycle or jeepney driver. A tricycle is a motorcycle with a covered cart attached that is used for transporting people around the small alleys of particular neighbourhoods. A jeepney is a long vehicle made out of a used jeep, a unique feature of the Philippines. Jeepneys normally serve much wider areas than tricycles but can also be confined to a certain neighbourhood. Both tricycle and jeepney drivers are bound by a fixed daily payment for hiring a vehicle, locally called 'boundary.' Thus, their daily income becomes fares collected from passengers subtracting the rental fee to the owner (H10CN8). For example, the son of H12 is a jeepney driver and his daily income after paying *boundary* (400 pesos for eight hours from 1pm to 9pm) varies as widely as from 100 pesos to 500 pesos, depending on the number of passengers that he serves. Therefore, when the total profit was reduced because of the customer loss after the displacement, it was the drivers who bore the consequence of this reduced profit.

The change in the local economic environment is so evident that even those whose livelihoods were not affected also noted the weakening of the customer base and the consequent income reduction for local goods and service providers (A7; H5; H6; J5). With fewer customers, J4 also states that the business environment has become more competitive. The magnitude of profit reduction varies but most affected people reported at least a 50 per cent reduction in their daily earnings. For instance, F8 who is a fish vendor calculated the volume of daily sales as reduced from 80kg per day to 40kg. Based on quantitative data provided by the research participants, the evidence of estimated income effect is summarised in Table 7.

Table 7 Change in the daily earning (income) before and after the clearance

Case	Affected livelihood	Income level (before)	Income level (after)
A3	Sidewalk vendor (selling slippers)	3,000 pesos/day	1,000 pesos/day
G1	<i>Sari-sari</i> store	3,000 pesos/day	1,500 – 1,600 pesos/day
J4	Home-based <i>sari-sari</i> store	1,000 pesos/day	300 – 500 pesos/day
F2	Store (in an open space outside home)	1,000 pesos/day	500 – 650 pesos/day
E2	Selling food	500 pesos/day	300 pesos/day
F4	Tricycle driver	500 pesos/day	100 – 200 pesos/day
B2	Snack stall	300 pesos/day	150 pesos/day
F7	Selling drinks in the market	250 pesos/day	120 pesos/day

Displacement affected not only the customer base but also a broader livelihood network that was formed around the informal settlement. For example, the aforementioned *junkshop* of F4 had to be discontinued partly because her house was

partially demolished but also because a web of relationships involved in its operation was dismantled. They obtained 'junk' (garbage) from the middlemen who collected plastic bottles, cardboard, newspapers and so on in the neighbourhood. When this 'junk' was sold to a processing factory for melting and grinding, F4 as the *junkshop* owner paid their middlemen who then could pay back the junk providers in the area. After the displacement of people, the family of F4 lost their junk providers and collectors as well as their friends who used to lend them a truck for free for delivering junk to the factory. The business run by the wife of G2 was affected in a similar manner. She used to make various food products such as peanut butter, coconut jam and processed meat (*tosino*) and had a few people selling them on the streets. Through the railway clearance, her sellers were displaced and she also lost a large number of customers, which compelled her to suspend her business for a while. On the other hand, D2 at the customer's end of the livelihood network reports that she lost the people who used to do her laundry and thus now has to do it herself. These cases illustrate how the whole livelihood network could be dismantled by a drastic population change such as that entailed in a development-induced displacement (DID) context.

Furthermore, where the transformation of the local livelihood network was combined with the impairment of physical productive capital, people were doubly impacted (12 households out of the total 28 households whose income-generating activities were adversely affected). For instance, in the aforementioned case of F3 who lost his computer shop, his home-based *sari-sari* store was also affected by the loss of customers, the combined impacts adding up to a serious reduction in daily profit from 3,000 pesos to 100 pesos. Likewise, in addition to the loss of the junkshop, tricycle drivers in the family of F4 were adversely affected. In the case of A8, whose residential house was demolished completely, he also lost his rental house and rental income, while his income as a street vendor was also reduced due to the reduction in customers. Moreover, people who continued their business even after losing their original business space have also found the business environment more challenging and have suffered from the loss of customers (I1; I3, F7; B2; F5; G1; I4). Some home-based business owners who lost part of their house are wondering whether they should continue their business, which is now barely profitable and has fewer customers (E1; E8; H7).

A collective example of combined livelihood impacts is a market in Caloocan that was based on the rail tracks at the northern end-point of the current railway project, where the train service had been stopped for a long time. At the time of the field research, the work on the rail tracks was still going on and vendors kept moving their stalls

according to the construction schedule. Many vendors had already given up doing business in the area partly because of the stress involved in moving from place to place without guarantee about the future sustainability of the market and also because of the reduced sales after the displacement of people (F7; F8). The market lost further dynamism as vendors stopped operating, decreasing from over 200 to around 150, according to F8, and those who used to provide goods and services to the vendors as well as customers of the market have also been adversely affected (F7).

Among those whose livelihoods were affected, either through the erosion of physical productive capital or through the reconfiguration of the livelihood network, or as a result of both, the outcome varied as some discontinued a livelihood activity while others managed to reconstruct it. Furthermore, the implication of impacts was different depending on the overall livelihood security of a household. Differentiated experience within the LI group will be analysed further in view of livelihood preconditions in Section 7.3.2. Prior to that, however, I explore the main features of affected livelihoods by comparing them with the cases where livelihoods were *not* affected.

7.2.3. No Livelihood Impacts (NLIs)

Cases of adverse livelihood impacts need to be balanced by the fact that over half of the remaining population (36 out of 67 cases) experienced few or relatively minimal changes in their livelihoods. Given that the sources of impacts are the demolition of informal settlements and the reduction in the local population, those whose physical capital stayed untouched or those whose livelihood network extended beyond the locality remained unaffected. With regards to physical productive capital, the majority of this group neither lost their residential house nor used a structure or a space informally (22 cases). For instance, H5 who rents out two rooms in her house and earns a total of 3,000 pesos monthly has remained unaffected since her house is formally owned. Those whose house was partially demolished either did not have home-based livelihoods or, even if they did, the partial loss of housing did not affect the business space (seven cases). Interestingly, nearly half of *displaced* people did not experience livelihood impacts apart from a complete loss of their residential house (seven among 16 displaced people).

The distinctive features of unaffected livelihoods include their operational boundary that extends beyond the locality and their engagement with a more secure livelihood network. First of all, in 12 households (out of 36 unaffected households), all the

working members were employees whose work and income were unrelated to local changes. Work opportunities were often arranged within locally based relationships, being offered by the *barangay* chairman or more affluent families in the neighbourhood. For instance, H3 works as a street sweeper in his *barangay* and also gets referred to other casual work by the *barangay* chairman. Similarly, the husband of H9 works for the daughter-in-law of the chairman of another *barangay*, who has a car-body painting business along the railway. Although being locally employed, their livelihoods remained intact because their employer was not reliant on the local economy for their business.

Among the households that include at least one or more self-employed members, three factors are identified for explaining their resilience. First of all, unaffected businesses did not have customer relationships with informal settlers. Some are more established businesses than the rest in the sense that they are formally registered (A4) or using a formally arranged space for operation (A5; D3), and also that their performance is good enough to attract clients from outside the locality. For others, their customer base differed from informal settlements in terms of their tenure status (H1; F1; I5; E9) or socio-economic status (H1). E9 sells *lugaw* (rice porridge) at a mobile shop along the railway but is unaffected by the clearance since his customers are formal residents in his own neighbourhood. The case of E9 also illustrates that mobile vendors or on-call service providers can have an unexpected advantage in the event of demolition, as long as their customer base stays the same (E3; J7). For instance, the work of J7 as a car-body builder is not locally bound since he provides the service upon request. On the other hand, H1, who provides a laundry service at home, explains different customer bases in the locality in class terms, describing his customers as “middle class” and not “squatters”, implying that subtle divisions crisscrossed the densely populated urban settlement, creating different ‘kinds’ of customers.

Second, for some goods and service providers, the locality is only a site of production while their targeted market is not necessarily locally bound (J1; I7; D1). Moreover, some of them have a few regular clients for their service, who stayed through local changes and guaranteed at least stable income. For example, laundry service providers often have ‘patrons’ who come to them for their service (A2; E8; F1; H2; J1), although all of them have only a few patrons and the service charge is often very minimal. Given that an urban neighbourhood economy where residents move in and out frequently can be unreliable with anonymous and reliant customers (H1; H2), having a pool of regular clients can enhance the income security of small business owners to some extent.

Finally, self-employed people who operated outside the locality were not affected by local changes (H8; A6; J8; J9).

Research participants whose livelihoods were not affected also present different perspectives of livelihood prospects in the local economy. On the contrary to the overwhelming accounts of customer loss after displacement, a small number of people contend that the customer pool has bounced back in the end. J2, who runs a *sari-sari* store at home, states that her sales stabilised as previous customers from informal settlements have now been replaced by people from other neighbourhoods. Furthermore, physical changes in the locality opened a very small window of livelihood opportunities for those involved in housing construction (F5; E6). E6 is a self-employed construction worker doing housing repair work together with people with other skills, like a mason and a plumber. He has seen an increasing demand for house repair since the clearance left many houses partially destroyed, leading to an increase in income (although he cannot give a precise estimate as his income always fluctuates). However, newly generated livelihood opportunities are limited in their nature and magnitude and may not be sustainable in the long run.

Interestingly, those who did not have customer relationships with informal settlers saw them more as competitors doing similar businesses. In general, the business environment in a compact (residential) area can get competitive as residents see similar business opportunities. For example, H1 states that “there are so many [home-based, informal] laundry shops” around his house and he has seen customers bringing their laundry to other service providers. Accordingly, he tries to attract customers by offering a lower price: “The other laundry shops, they charge 25 pesos per kilogram. But, here, it’s only 20 pesos. So, there’s a difference of 5 pesos” (H1CN17). Given this, the displacement of informal settlers meant a loss of ‘competitors’ and less competition for those who are still operating in the area but are not relying on informal settlers as their customers (e.g. A7; F1). For instance, A7, who started her business after the clearance, found that the local economy has become more favourable, since a lot of people who used to run similar stores were displaced. Likewise, F1, who had been running a small tailoring shop in the area for a long time, finds the current environment much less competitive.

Regarding the possibility that the influx of the project-related workers might have created demands for local goods and services, the evidence is weak, with mixed accounts. I1 as a canteen owner notes that construction workers brought their own

food and did not necessarily buy from local eateries. On the other hand, I4 was informally invited by a warehouse man at the construction site to build and run a temporary canteen for construction workers, although he could not take it up because he had no start-up capital. Others have expressed hopes for more livelihood opportunities. A general anticipation is that vendors around the train station may have better sales prospects if more passengers are using improved train services (G2; J9). In fact, H8 observed that passengers getting off at the Laon Laan station had bought small products from the nearby *sari-sari* store. Some even hope that they may be able to get a spot at the station when the construction is completed (J3), although others doubt that they will be allowed to sell there (J9).

In summary, the cases of no livelihood impacts underline that people were affected to the extent that they relied on the local physical and socio-economic environments for managing their livelihoods. As for housing impacts, however, not experiencing livelihood impacts does not necessarily indicate that their livelihoods were secure, since some people are living at the subsistence level even without such changes. That is, whether or not one's livelihoods were adversely affected in a DID context is a function of livelihood characteristics, namely the extent to which resources for livelihoods including livelihood networks are locally arranged, rather than a result of livelihood insecurity. On the other hand, the implications of livelihood impacts and the capacity to cope turn out to vary depending on the security of a household's livelihood portfolio. Before I examine the impact patterns against livelihood preconditions, in the next section I explain the origins of impact, particularly why and how people end up engaging with localised livelihoods and thereby become vulnerable to local changes.

7.2.4. Source of impact: Spatiality of livelihoods

It is noteworthy that livelihood impacts of a local change accrued exclusively to those who previously engaged with the local informal economy, either through self-employment or through informal investment in physical productive capital. I explain the source of impacts by contextualising the prevalence of self-employment as a common livelihood option within the Philippine formal labour market, where limited employment opportunities have been a chronic problem. Furthermore, I analyse the particular features of self-employment or other sources of income that became vulnerable as a result of an external change like DID.

Constraints of the labour market

The challenge of finding work in the (formal) labour market stands out in many accounts, with comments such as “it is really hard to find a job” or “there are no jobs” (A1; F3; I5; I10).⁹⁶ Limited employment opportunities translate into two types of problem. First, for skilled labour, a gap between education and employment emerges, whereby completing higher education does not necessarily guarantee better job prospects (F5; I5): “Even for those people who already graduated, it’s really difficult to find a job” (I10). For instance, the eldest daughter of F5 is a college graduate in human resources management but is now working in a franchise fast food restaurant, sometimes as a cashier and other times in the kitchen. She is a contractual employee with flexible working hours varying from four to 11 hours. Her income is only 382 pesos per day even when she works for eight hours. The reality wherein young people have to take up any available job regardless of their educational qualification or skills training (H7; I3) indicates that the Philippine labour market is short of ‘decent’ jobs that allow people to meet their needs while maximising their human capital.

In addition to the underemployment of the educated workforce, a large income difference across skilled jobs creates a mismatch between educational qualifications and employment, by attracting people to better-paying jobs. Working at the call centres of multinational companies has arisen as a popular option that promises a high income as the Philippines’ business processing outsourcing (BPO) sector has remained globally competitive in recent years (PwC and Urban Land Institute 2012). A call centre job is known to be demanding since the shifts are unstable and fluctuate greatly depending on the time zone that a company serves. That is partly why call centre agents are rewarded with a high salary, which can easily be double the wage of other white-collar jobs (F1CN15):

“For example, bank employees would be earning 8,000 a month and call centre agents would earn 16,000 plus. There are a lot of bonuses being given to call centre employees” (F1CN35).

Others who are trained to take up a skilled profession such as nursing and teaching do not receive a reward that matches their qualifications and thus often diverge into the call centre industry. The daughter of A1 is a nurse but her income is so low that she is also considering other options:

⁹⁶ It is also supported by statistics that, in Metro Manila, 25 per cent of young women (aged between 15 and 24) are neither working nor attending school, and among those who are working 45 per cent are employed in the informal sector (UN-HABITAT 2008).

“She’s a registered nurse. She’s employed by a medical centre in Manila. She’s a staff nurse but her income is still very small. So, I tell her maybe it’s better to apply for another hospital. But, you see, there’s a large volume of nurses who pass the exams and are still unemployed. Some, most of them in fact, are working at call centres because of the small income from hospital work, mostly private hospitals. It’s better to work in government hospitals [as they offer a] bigger salary, more benefits. [...] [Still,] their salary is only 7,000 a month. People at a call centre, maybe, they’re earning 15,000 pesos” (A1CN36; A1CN40).

Likewise, H13, who used to be an English teacher at a high school, has been working at a call centre for a few years because it has paid double the amount of his previous salary as a teacher and thus has enabled him to send his sisters to college. That is, a distortion in the incentive structure of the labour market drives people to choose livelihood options that pay no regard to their qualifications or leave them underemployed or even unemployed.

Second, the employment opportunities that are available for the low-skilled and low-income group are often characterised by job insecurity and unfavourable working conditions, which make it hard to stay in work. In the first place, the employability in the formal labour market is low for those with limited human capital: “it was hard for people to be employed if they had not finished education” (J8). One relatively accessible option is contractual employment, whereby workers are hired only for a short term after which there is no guarantee of re-employment. Among contractual employment, one of the most insecure but also the most common types is a five-month contract and large shopping mall chains are particularly notorious for hiring employees on such terms. For instance, the daughter of H2 started to work as a supermarket cashier at SM North in November 2009 and her contract was terminated by March 2010. F1 makes a poignant critique that the labour law allowing such short-term contractual employment serves the interest of employers by sacrificing employees’ benefits.

“Contractual employment is legalised here in the Philippines, just like in the US, because one of our senators, Senator Hererra, adopted the policy from the US, so the state can legalise contractual employment. That’s why many workers got mad at him [i.e. Senator Hererra]. The contractual policy was formed for the companies in order for them to make more profits with less expense on employees. The contractual workers have fewer benefits, no security programme, no bonuses, no PhilHealth [health insurance scheme]” (F1CN13).

This is precisely why and how such a mode of employment has come into existence through employers’ campaigns. It is further known that contractual employment is aimed at preventing workers from initiating collective action (H6).

Such short-term contracts also make the life of workers extremely unstable since they have to continually search and apply for jobs, which is a challenge in itself, particularly when there are not many job opportunities. It does not necessarily guarantee continuous employment either (A1; F1; H12). The son of H6 is a typical example: “He’s not working now but used to work at SM Department store, also at Chowking, and at a coffee shop. [...] He keeps applying for jobs, restaurants and others. But it is difficult to get a job. The last one was at Pure Gold, a supermarket chain” (H6CN19). Likewise, the son-in-law of F1 has hopped from one employer to another, starting from Times Trading, to SM Mall and to Asian Brewery, working as a contractual employee all the way through. During an intervening period of unemployment, workers often take up a casual or part-time job to fill this gap, like the son of F7 who has worked with several employers on a short-term contract and drives a tricycle whenever he has no job.

In sum, the constraints in the formal labour market explain part of the broader context wherein both skilled and unskilled workers are pushed to diverge into the informal economy, mostly through self-employment. In particular, precarious working conditions and an income lower than minimum wage propel workers to consider other options and self-employment features as a common alternative, either as a main source of income for some (G1; H1) or as a strategy to earn additional income, which is deemed relatively more accessible and may offer a potentially higher income level (E9). However, some self-employment became vulnerable to local changes, whereas not all self-employment modes were impacted by the current event. This necessitates a further examination of the particular characteristics that made self-employment more vulnerable to circumstances like DID.

The nature of affected livelihoods: locally bounded

The most notable feature of the livelihoods affected by the project is the depth of localisation by which physical capital for livelihoods is locally arranged and the livelihood network is confined to the immediate area around the informal settlement. This is corroborated by the fact that unaffected livelihoods are characterised by the opposite features, namely locally unbounded operation or less reliance on the pool of people in the locality. More precisely, the vulnerability of affected livelihoods to the clearance arose from the informal arrangement of needed resources, notably physical productive capital and the social capital in the form of the various relationships that form the livelihood network.

As for residential housing, people seem to think of investing in physical productive capital or starting a business when they have a stock of capital at hands such as savings, retirement package and pension. For example, A8 started street vending with the compensation money that he received when he was laid off from his previous work. Early retirees who receive their pension in a lump sum instead of regular imbursement (A3; E1; H11) or Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) who can accumulate financial capital intensively in a relatively short period invest either in physical capital, notably housing and a business space, or in a business itself by starting a new one or expanding their existing one (E6; I1). Investment is also made in other productive durables or means of production such as a washing machine for a home-based laundry service (H1), a sewing machine for a tailoring business (A5; E1; F1) or rug-making (J4), a refrigerator or a freezer for a *sari-sari* store (F3), a computer for computer shops (A6; F3), and even a tricycle, a jeepney or a taxi (E4; F2; G2; H11). The ownership of productive durables eliminates the cost of borrowing them from others, thereby increasing the chance of yielding more profit.

Furthermore, the owners of productive durables were not affected by an external shock since the rental fee they collected remains the same (E2; E4). For instance, E4 does not work herself but owns two jeepneys purchased with the remittances sent by her husband who is working abroad. She collects the 'boundary' of between 500 and 600 pesos daily (for each jeepney). Her case underlines the merit of owning productive durables that are not spatially fixed, unlike physically bound physical capital such as a structure or a business space. That is, the owner of such moveable assets could earn secure income in a normal context and could be safeguarded against adverse events. On the contrary, those who had to borrow means of livelihoods were disadvantaged in general as their productivity or profitability is constrained, becoming more vulnerable in case of contingencies (as already illustrated by jeepney or tricycle drivers).

However, the sustainability of investment is largely contingent on whether it has been made in formally accessed resources. One proxy measure of the formality of a business is whether a business owner uses a business space officially, for instance by buying or renting a store formally (which is likely to require a business to be officially registered). Likewise, the tenure security of a house determines the formality of home-based businesses. As for a house, in a normal context where the formality of a business is not questioned, people may arrange physical capital needed for livelihoods considering the cost and the perceived return on their investment. Those with low-level or irregular income can hardly afford formally provided physical resources and may resort to

informal options, without paying the formal price or going through a formal procedure to access them. For some others, informal arrangement of space can also be a strategic consideration in starting and running a business in a cost-effective manner.

However, even though informally arranged resources may be cheaper or readily available, thereby making it less costly or more profitable to run a business, they make a business inherently vulnerable to regulatory activities like land clearance. Given the resources invested in the business, albeit informally arranged, impacts on productive capital or businesses are doubled in the sense that past savings and the current source of income are either foregone or undermined. For those who are resource-constrained, the cost of losing investment can be much higher than for those who have a rich resource pool or other alternative livelihood options. This may initiate a negative cycle whereby the meagre resource pool that only allowed the person to start a business informally was further eroded.

In sum, in the event of a socio-spatial change like DID, the spatial aspect of livelihoods, i.e. its spatial boundary of operation, becomes a relevant feature that exposes livelihoods to vulnerability. Likewise, only productive capital with a spatial dimension was affected by the clearance whereas other productive durables that are not necessarily spatially bound and can be transferrable remained unaffected. As discussed above, mobile vendors who did not have a fixed place of operation illustrate this point very well. That is, revealed and underlined in this DID event are the spatiality of livelihoods – i.e. how much some livelihoods were embedded in the locality – and the critical importance of location. In this regard, examining livelihood impacts also enhances the understanding of the kind and the nature of urban livelihoods found in and around informal settlements.

7.3. Implications of impacts and coping strategies

The livelihood impacts have varying implications for different households depending on the security of their livelihood portfolio. In order to examine whether a variation in the experience of livelihood impacts is associated with livelihood preconditions, first I construct a livelihood portfolio consisting of (a) income-earning activities that household members are engaged with, (b) other sources of income and (c) safeguards such as savings and pension. Second, using the livelihood status score before and after

the event, I analyse the features of both LI and NLI groups and evaluate the implication of livelihood impacts for different sub-categories.

7.3.1. Preconditions: Livelihood portfolio

Livelihood security is measured by the number and the diversity of options in a household livelihood portfolio. A livelihood portfolio is constructed from the data collected on a range of variables pertaining to livelihoods (see Chapter 4 and Appendix for data collection instruments), by selecting those that are relevant for measuring the livelihood security of a household. First, for livelihood preconditions, I counted the number of options in each category and added them to obtain a total score. The score is revised to reflect the security of a livelihood portfolio, which is subjectively assessed in consideration of factors such as work security (e.g. sustainability of a given work), income security (e.g. the amount or the regularity of income), household size, and formality of tenure. Final adjustment is made based on my observations in the field of living conditions and through a relative rating of a household as compared to others.

Second, the livelihood status after the event is measured by subtracting the number of affected livelihoods from the previous livelihood score. The magnitude of impact is reflected by subtracting one point for the livelihoods that were discontinued after the event and half a point for those that have continued with some adverse impacts. Increased living expenses related to land clearance and population displacement were considered an additional minus half a point, whereas increased livelihood opportunities were given plus half a point. Subjective adjustment is also made for *ex post* livelihood status in consideration of whether or not an affected livelihood was the main source of income.

Table 8 summarises the construction of a household livelihood portfolio measured in terms of a score. The score for each household with sub-scores of each category and subjective weighting is presented in Appendix A1.4. Here I elaborate further on subcomponents of the portfolio.

Table 8 Livelihood status score

Portfolio	Subcomponents	Score (before)	Score (after)
Work portfolio	Employment	Number of working members	Minus the number of affected members*
	Self-employment		
Other sources of income	Remittances	Regular (1 point) Occasional (0.5 point)	-
	Physical productive capital	Rental income from asset ownership	Minus the number of affected physical productive capital
	Saving	1 point	-

	Pension	1 point	-
Income security	Income level Income stability	Subjective adjustment: Cost of work; Household expenses	Increased expenses (-0.5 point)

**Discontinued (-1 point); Continued (-0.5 point); Opportunity (+0.5 point)*

Work portfolio

The number of employed and self-employed members of a household is counted to measure the size of a household work portfolio. There is a tendency among many research participants to regard formal employment or having a ‘job’ as a more ‘proper’ type of work, perhaps because employment offers a relatively regular income while it is difficult to get and stay employed. However, the quality of work depends less on the type of work (i.e. whether employment or self-employment) than on how long one can sustain the work and whether it earns sufficient and stable income. For work security, type of employment arrangement (e.g. regular or contractual) and resource input in self-employment were found to be primary determinants and were considered in subjective adjustment of a livelihood score.

Other sources of income

In addition to work, other sources of income are included as part of a household livelihood portfolio. Three types of other income sources are identified: (a) transfer of remittances or other assistance from family members (who are not living together); (b) ownership of PPC and rental income from lending it out; and (c) safeguards such as personal savings and pension. The first two types of income tend to be used for current consumption, while the last one contributes to enhancing long-term income security or functioning as protection against contingencies.

(a) Remittances. The Philippines is one of the largest labour-exporting countries and the sheer number of Filipinos working abroad is reflected in my research. In 31 out of 67 households, interviewees either have worked abroad themselves or have family members who are currently abroad. Regular remittances sent from migrant workers abroad constitute a substantial part of a household income given the large wage difference between the Philippines and abroad. For instance, H7 receives monthly remittances of between 3,000 and 8,000 pesos from her son who has been working abroad for 10 years as a construction worker. Considering that her son-in-law earns about 10,000 pesos per month by working in a delivery team for a company, remittances make a significant contribution to the household income. Although remittances are not sent regularly, people can turn to migrant family members in hard

times when they need a large amount of financial capital, as for E5 who was able to have surgery thanks to the support of her daughter who is working abroad. Among seven households reporting that they receive remittances every month (cf. five others that receive occasional remittances), the amount varies from 3,000 pesos (e.g. H5) to as high as 30,000 pesos (e.g. E4), and tends to increase for special occasions such as Christmas (H1).

(b) Physical productive capital (PPC). That a number of people experienced an impact on their PPC through land clearance suggests that asset ownership is a common livelihood strategy. Apart from affected PPC, however, only a few are found to make income out of physical capital (6 cases). For instance, F3 and J4 are renting out an informally accessed store space; H5 and E1 are renting out part of their formal house; and E4 and J2 own jeepneys and a motorcycle respectively and have continued to earn rental income by lending out those productive durables. This, in turn, indicates the magnitude of which locally arranged physical capital was undermined by the current event.

(c) Savings and pension. The capacity to save is closely tied to income security since people cannot save with stable but low income because their income will be used up for meeting their daily needs, whereas high but unstable income makes it difficult to plan ahead and commit to saving. For balancing out the two, having stable work for a long time or managing multiple income sources appear to be useful, for which work security is a relevant issue. Furthermore, a trade-off needs to be considered between current consumption needs and contribution to savings for long-term income security or as a safeguard against contingencies: “if I do not save and hold the money, I will spend it and cannot save” (A3). For instance, when H11 was working as a driver for a school superintendent, his salary was ‘basic’ (6,000 pesos) but after a number of payments were taken off such as payment to pension, advanced loan from salary and contribution to a cooperative that he was a member of, the cash income was as low as 2,000 or 3,000 pesos. Likewise, the son-in-law of H7 is working in a delivery team of Home Appliances with a ‘minimal’ salary of “5000 pesos every 15 days. That’s with overtime.” Once payments to pension (SSS), savings (Pag-Ibig) and insurance (PhilHealth) is further deducted, the take-home income becomes less than 5,000 pesos. Hence, for people whose income is tight, it is important to see the value of saving and to be willing to sacrifice current consumption for future income security (A1).

More specifically, for pension, the chances of an individual being registered for a scheme are higher for the employed than the self-employed, for regular employees than contractual employees, and for formal workers than informal workers. In theory, formal (regular) employees are entitled to benefits⁹⁷ such as a pension, insurance and access to financial capital (J3; H2) and, in fact, all the long-term employees have a pension, which increases their future income security. In comparison, worker benefits are systematically removed for contractual employment and their job insecurity makes it difficult to plan and make any regular commitments like savings or insurance. Informal employees are almost certainly excluded from legally protected worker rights, given that informal employers are even less likely to be bound by labour regulations. Likewise, those making their living through informal self-employment are rarely registered with formal social protection measures as they have to make a voluntary, instead of mandatory, contribution. Where those who are currently self-employed are registered for a pension, this is the result (or an indicator) of their work history, which involved formal employment at some point, confirming once again the importance of formal (regular) employment for enhancing the long-term livelihood security.

Income security

Income security is one of the most important measures of livelihood status and is a function of two variables: (i) *income level*, which pertains to the amount of one's income in a given period; and (ii) *income stability*, which relates to how regularly one receives a given income. It is important to consider both issues together because some may have a stable but low income (e.g. A7), while others can have a relatively good income but it may not be constant over time (e.g. H12). Despite its importance, income security is considered only for subjective adjustment of livelihood score because it is generally difficult to collect accurate data on income and also because the income data in my research were not comprehensive. Given the sensitivity of the issue, I collected the data only when research participants were willing to talk about their income and even when numeric data were available it was hard to verify whether it represented the income of all the household's working members. Moreover, it is more difficult to know the exact amount of income for the self-employed since it fluctuates greatly. Also, the difference between net and gross income was not always clearly recognised, with the income data

⁹⁷ Employees can also take out loans from their work place (A7; D3; F2CN52). Other examples of more uncommon employee benefits are a car plan where one can own a car through an incremental contribution over time while being given a petrol allowance (D3). There are cases where a retirement package was provided for employees who were laid off (A8; D3).

given by research participants tending to refer to their gross income including the cost, unless specified as net income (or pure profit).

Nonetheless, the given income data functioned as a useful yardstick for evaluating and adjusting a household livelihood status in comparative terms. In my research, income categories are constructed as below and official statistics such as a minimum wage and a poverty line were also considered in situating a household along the scale. The minimum wage in the National Capital Region (NCR) in 2012 was 456 pesos for non-agricultural workers and 419 pesos for agricultural workers (per day).⁹⁸ When transposed against the poverty threshold for the NCR, which was estimated at 8,251 pesos per month in 2009 for a sole breadwinner with a family of five to keep out of poverty (i.e. annual per capita poverty threshold of 19,802 pesos), the minimum wage seems to allow people to stay out of poverty.⁹⁹ However, as examples from my research demonstrate (see Table 9), many employees on the margin get paid far less than 8,000 pesos per month and even skilled workers such as bank staff, nurses and high school teachers barely earn that much.

Table 9 Income categories in the sample

Livelihood status	Income level (gross)	Relevant occupation (examples)
Better off	Above 16,000 pesos	Professionals
Moderate security	12,000 – 16,000 pesos	Call centre agents
Subsistence	8,000 – 12,000 pesos	White-collar/skilled workers
Subsistence/Survival	5,000 – 8,000 pesos	Contractual workers
Survival	Below 5,000 pesos	Casual labourers

Income security needs to be examined in relation to other factors, notably the cost of work (including work conditions) and household needs. The value of a given income depreciates with harsh work conditions such as long hours or little leisure time. For example, A7 who worked at Metro Manila Transit Corporation for 31 years as a regular employee had a very demanding schedule in which she worked for three days in a row to take one day off:

“I started at 4 in the morning and then finished at midnight. [...] then I just slept to around 1 in the morning... so when I had a day off, I used all that time to sleep, sleep only. [...] But then, if there were no conductresses or conductors [at the company], we used our day off in order to replace that position” (A7CN42).

⁹⁸ Effective of 1 November 2012 according to the National Wages and Productivity Commission (NWPC) of the Department of Labour and Employment (DOLE) (http://www.nwpc.dole.gov.ph/pages/statistics/stat_current_regional.html)

⁹⁹ 2009 Philippine Poverty Statistics by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) (http://www.nscb.gov.ph/pressreleases/2011/PR-22011-SS2-01_pov2009.asp#f4)


Likewise, the husband of B1 does not have enough time for rest. He has been working for 30 years as a regular employee of a private security company that provides security guards to places like banks. Although his working hours are the standard eight hours from 7am till 4pm, he works seven days a week without a day off and still receives only 10,000 pesos. Many others work for extremely long hours every day for minimum wage (F7; H2; E9). For instance, the daughter-in-law of F7 who is selling “e-load” (top-up credit for pay-as-you-go mobile phones) at Victory Mall from 7am till 7pm. For the self-employed, the costs of running a business needs to be considered when calculating their actual income, such as procurement of products, payment of rent or bills and one’s own labour. Like employees, self-employed people work for long hours primarily to compensate for their low and irregular income, and when the cost of their labour is also considered, their income level can be even lower.

For examining income security, expenditure needs to be considered since the same amount of income may or may not be sufficient to meet the needs of different households, depending on their household size and expenditure level. The primary livelihood goal or a “family responsibility” in people’s own words is to meet basic needs such as food, housing (e.g. rent), utilities (e.g. water and electricity), education and health care. The most commonly mentioned barometer of sufficient income is whether they can meet their food needs every day (B3; H1; H10). For people with health problems, an income level that allows them to buy necessary medicine is deemed “ok” (e.g. A5; B2). Given that a large household generates greater expenses, the size of a household is taken into account in balancing out the number of livelihood options. Many options in a big household does not necessarily mean that its living standard is high and thus we would be likely to overrate the livelihood score of a household if household expenses are not considered. In comparison, having many working members in a smaller household helps to enhance household livelihood security and notably, in better-off families (A4, F1, D3 and D2, D3), all the adult members of a nuclear family unit are working and they also happen to be smaller in size than most other families (e.g. four members or fewer).

Livelihood security before the event

Based on the livelihood score, eight categories of livelihood status were identified as a baseline for livelihood preconditions. Grouping of the scores into categories is guided by a subjective judgement on where the line should be drawn to capture subtle differences in living standards. Graph 3 shows the distribution of the cases across livelihood status categories with the mean score of 3.17 points.

Graph 3 Livelihood status before the event




In reference to already known three types of livelihood security, namely survival, security and growth (Beall et al. 1999), I re-group these eight categories into (a) survival (0.5 – 1.5 points); (b) subsistence (2 – 3.5 points); (c) moderate security (4 – 4.5 points); and (d) better off (5 – 7.5 points). *Survival* is a level of living where people barely meet their basic needs and thus have little resources at hand. Many people live on a border line between survival and *subsistence* (34 cases), whereby they earn just enough income to meet their ends. In comparison, *moderate security* is a state where the balance is achieved in the dynamic between income level and income stability and thus leaves extra for saving even after meeting their daily needs. When livelihood security is maintained over some time, accumulation takes place whereby people can enrich or enlarge their resource pool and move up to the *better off* position.

7.3.2. Preconditions and LI


In view of livelihood preconditions, I analyse the implications of livelihood impacts further. First, I discuss the overall change in livelihood status for the whole sample and then move on to examine the variation within the LI group and the NLI group across different livelihood statuses. As compared to Graph 3 depicting the livelihood status before the event, Graph 4 shows that after the event the distribution shifted to the left, which is reflected in the reduced mean value to 2.81 points. This indicates an overall degradation of livelihood status in my sample and is mainly explained by a large increase in the number of people belonging to categories 1 (score 0.5-1), 3 (score 2-2.5) and 4 (score 3).

Graph 4 Livelihood status after the event



Graph 5 demonstrates the changes in livelihood status for all households. All the 67 households in the sample are lined up by the pre-event livelihood status score in an ascending order (on the X axis) and their livelihood status after the event is presented together to visually depict a status change.

Graph 5 Livelihood status change



It is noticeable that those with a status score between 1.5 points and four points experienced the most drastic drop in their status, whereas the status change was relatively minimal for those living at the survival level (far left) or those better off (far right). This trend is repeated in the later analyses, raising the possibility that those living on subsistence (the middle range) might have engaged with the physical and socio-economic environment around informal settlements most actively. At the same time, it should be noted that households with a range of livelihood statuses experienced


livelihood impacts, which demonstrate that it is not only the resource-poor who invested in informally arranged physical capital or relied on the local livelihood network. In order to delineate the patterns in which households of different status scores were engaged with localised livelihoods, I transpose the livelihood score (X axis) and the impact score (Y axis) in Graph 6. Impact score is given by the categorisation presented in Table 10. It represents a nominal value for different types of impact rather than reflecting the severity of impact. For instance, point 2 and 2.5 refer to different types of double impact and point 2.5 does not mean that it is a more serious impact. An impact score beyond two points means that household livelihoods were doubly or triply affected.

Table 10 Impact score categories

Impact type	Description	Impact score
NLI*	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	0
Expenses	Increased expenses only	0.5
Impact on PPC	Impact on PPC only	1
Impact on LLN	Impact on LLN only	1.5
Double impact 1	Impact on PPC and LLN	2
Double impact 2	Impact on PPC or LLN and expenses	2.5
Triple impact	Impact on PPC, LLN and expenses	3

*Not included in the graph

Graph 6 Impact score across livelihood status categories




In Graph 6, impacts are gathered in the middle-range group with a status score between two and 4.5 (subsistence and moderate security). Whereas investment in PPC is observed as relatively evenly distributed across different status groups (reading the horizontal lines for impact scores 1 and 2), engagement with LLN tends to be more prevalent among mid-range livelihood status groups (reading the horizontal lines for impact scores 1.5 and 2). The estimated linear line shows a moderate tendency for a

negative correlation between livelihood and impact scores, indicating that households with a higher livelihood score are likely to be less affected by local physical and socio-economic changes. Based on the overview of livelihood status and impact trends for the LI group, I analyse the impacts on PPC and LLN separately in the coming sections.

Impacts on PPC

For the total of 19 households whose PPC was affected, an interesting feature is that the mean of the status scores before the event (3.63 points) is much higher than that of the whole sample (3.17 points) or that of the non-affected group (3.08 points). Graph 7 (a) and 7 (b) below compare the distribution of livelihood status for the PPC group and the NLI group.

Graph 7 (a) Livelihood status in the PPC group; (b) Livelihood status in the NLI group




Compared to the NLI group that did not arrange PPC in the demolished informal settlements, the noticeable feature of the PPC group is that the middle category (livelihood score: 3.5 points) and the high-end category (score above five points) stand out. The high probability of arranging PPC informally may be explained by the fact that nearly two-thirds of the group are informal settlers (12 out of 19 households, although the number goes up to 15 out of 19 households if considering former informal settlers who are becoming land owners). Interestingly, over half of the better-off group (four out of seven) also invested in informal PPC, which underlines that they are generally in a better position to invest but also suggests that investment is not always made in formal asset options. However, the implication of a physical asset loss varies for different livelihood status groups. For the survival/subsistence group, it has a greater impact since rent income was previously a significant and secure part of household livelihoods (A8; I9) or physical asset ownership was one of very few options that they had (F8). In comparison, for D2 (status score 7.5), her informal rental house might have

been a stable but only minor source of income and thus her status changed by the margin of 0.5 points (and still scores 7).

Impacts on LLN

For self-employed people who were affected by the reconfiguration of the LLN, their mean value of 3.14 points is nearly identical to the 3.15 points of the unaffected self-employed group (NLI-SE group), which is a sub-group of unaffected people, consisting of households with at least one self-employed member (see Graph 8 (a) and 8 (b)). In terms of the actual distribution, the NLI-SE group tends to have more households in lower status categories (points 2 and 3) and more households in higher categories (points 4 and 6.5), thereby balancing out the mean value. The similarity between the two groups or rather no apparent difference between the two confirms that the reliance on the LLN was not specific to any particular status group and that livelihood impacts in this regard was not a factor of livelihood status but was a matter of whether or not a household has engaged with the LLN. A noticeable point for the LLN group as compared to the PPC group is the relatively little involvement of the better-off group in the local economy, illustrated by the absence of those households with a livelihood status score of six points and above.

Graph 8. Livelihood status in (a) the LLN group; (b) the NLI-SE group



Like other groups, for the LLN group, the drop in the livelihood status tends to be greater for those in the lower strata (survival and subsistence group) than the upper strata (moderate security and better-off group), for whom the status change is relatively marginal and who stay better off than average even after the change. Thus, changes in the LLN were most detrimental to small shop-owners, vendors, and petty service providers whose affected livelihoods were major contributors to the household income and who had few other options. As an illustration, for both F5 and H7, the lost

income from a small business was originally complementary in nature but its implication was different. F5 used to have a small store where she sold breakfast and lunch, making a profit that was only good for daily cash needs: “It was like getting daily capital. The important thing is that we could have free food, a free meal [from the store]. Sometimes, I could get a daily allowance for my children and also the fare for going to school” (F5CN61). She had to close it after the clearance but her family has survived thanks to her adult children who are working at franchise shops, albeit on a contract. In comparison, for H7 who had to give up a small business of selling food for the same reason, the effect of an income loss was not minimal given that her household does not have many other secure options. For instance, her son-in-law gained employment after her business discontinued and her husband is working only part time. These cases demonstrate that not only the implications of livelihood impacts but also the capacity to cope with them are related to preconditions. In the next section, I elaborate on different modes in which, and strategies by which, affected people have coped with the impacts.

Recovery from impacts


The effect of income reduction can also be analysed further in view of livelihood preconditions. Income instability is a predominant feature of self-employment regardless of the average income level, with people describing having ‘good days’ and ‘bad days’ in their business depending on the demand for their goods and services. As long as fluctuation repeats evenly, that is without too great a profit difference between ups and downs or without too large a time gap between them, a business seems to be sustainable and furthermore can grow if an up-phase is maintained. A struggle starts once a down-phase is prolonged, which can lead to a point where getting back onto a normal fluctuation curve becomes difficult. In view of this, the dissolution of the local livelihood network following large-scale displacement is considered to be one such downturn that can destabilise local businesses.

Given the anticipated fluctuation in business performance, business sustainability is contingent on having a solid resource base to start with and a constant flow of sufficient resources later on that can compensate for profit fluctuation. Likewise, the capacity to recover from the impacts of a contingency depends on the security of a business in a normal context. In this regard, businesses of the lower status category and thus already rather precarious may not recover from a downturn very easily. For instance, F2 had run her *sari-sari* store only when she secured the capital to buy products to sell and otherwise had to stop it occasionally. In view of this, the impact of

the reduction in the local customer pool must have made her business even more precarious. Furthermore, businesses set up with borrowed capital were already burdened by debt repayments and often ended up borrowing more or going bankrupt due to the lack of a constant cash flow. Given this, adverse livelihood impacts did not leave people many options but to stop their business altogether. For instance, although a money lender still visits and offers her a daily loan, H7 already closed her small business and thus cannot borrow any more “because I no more have a business and I can’t pay them.”

In addition to the security of an affected business itself, the overall security of a household portfolio is important for recovering from adverse impacts. In this regard, diversification of livelihoods paid off during hard times since a household with multiple sources of income could rely on the ones that remain unaffected even though a few livelihood activities were affected by the changes in the locality. It is also a well-known livelihood strategy to enhance income security in a normal context as it is often the case that “if there is only one job, the income is not enough” (D1). After the event, other working members have sustained a household and, in particular, employed ones earning regular income were in a position to support their family (F3). Employment is seen as a more secure livelihood option in general and there is a broad tendency in the sample that the number of employed members in a household is positively associated with household livelihood status. This is more pronounced in the LI group where households with more than two employed members are found among moderate security and better-off groups (see Graph 9). In contrast, there are no employed members at all for over half of the LI group (16 out of 31 households), suggesting that many affected households might have had to resort to other livelihood options rather than employed members.

Graph 9 Employed household members in the LLN group



Apart from working members, a household as a whole may stay relatively resilient when it has secure sources of income that are not locally dependent. In case of E1, her small business suffered from the loss of customers but she is coping thanks to other limited sources of income such as rent from a room and a pension. Her case also underlines the importance of social protection in coping with adverse events, although it should be noted that entitlement to pension is only available to those who have been formally employed for a long time or who have earned regular and sufficient income. Others had to use up their savings in coping with income reduction or reconstructing their damaged house or business space (A8; G1; I4; D3).

In sum, diversifying a household's livelihood portfolio is proven to enhance resilience against external changes like land clearance and population displacement since it is unlikely that different livelihood activities are affected in the same way or at the same time. This is why people strive to diversify their types of work or income sources, in the hope of compensating for the vulnerabilities involved in each activity, thereby trying to avoid a situation where their livelihoods are summarily affected by unfavourable changes beyond their control.

Coping strategies

In addition to focusing on unaffected options in the livelihood portfolio, strategies to address livelihood challenges in a normal context were extended to cope with adverse livelihood impacts. Hard work was a distinctive feature of coping strategies as many have already worked continuously amidst frequent changes of work or have managed multiple livelihood activities (A2; E5; E1).

Working hard/Persevering

In response to income reduction or loss, affected people are "trying to do a double-job" or "to work harder" (J5). In an extension of the usual hard work ethic, they have increased their hours of work (e.g. G2) or have expanded a service area of tricycle to attract more passengers (e.g. H10). Nonetheless, G2 contends that he still earns less than before, which indicates the extent of the reduction in the local customer base. Furthermore, while demonstrating the strong will and resilience of people, working hard is physically and mentally challenging and comes at the cost of rest or leisure. Given this, even though people cope with adverse livelihood impacts by persevering and working hard as they have done in a normal context, it may have long-term implications for their wellbeing and capacity to work.

Faced with the need to compensate the income loss or reduction, the pressure to earn extra income is paramount on household members who are relatively more employable in principle. For instance, the son-in-law of H7 who stayed unemployed for two years had to find work urgently when H7's small business that had supported the family could not survive any longer due to loss of customers. Likewise, in searching for work after their parents' businesses were adversely affected by local changes, adult children are thinking of going abroad (F3; F5). The family of F3 demonstrates a kind of path dependency in international labour migration whereby migrant workers tend to keep going abroad and their children also follow. Both F3 and his wife worked abroad before and his daughter is considering the option because "here you cannot get a good job these days. Jobs are not enough. [...] Before, our youngest daughter worked as a saleslady but she was receiving a below minimum wage so she decided to resign. Now, she's planning to go abroad" (F3CN75). However, international labour migration is an option that is only available to those who can afford the high cost of processing the necessary documents. According to F3, the processing fee can be as high as 300,000 pesos and he himself had to start with debt when he went abroad. Given this, international labour migration remained a hard-to-realise option and most people took other paths within the Philippines.

Notably, frequent change of work was another mode of coping with livelihood challenges in a normal context (F4; G2; H8). Changing jobs frequently may have kept workers low-skilled but it also equipped them with various experiences and skills, which may be more useful than being specialised within a context where the income of highly skilled people is low and the turnover rate of low-skilled people is generally high (see Section 7.2.4). Important forms of human capital such as a diverse skill set and adeptness that had been obtained from past work experiences enabled some people to adjust to a new environment after the clearance. As an illustration, G2 coped with livelihood impacts in the way that he had managed livelihoods by changing work constantly and managing multiple income sources at the same time. After working in Saudi Arabia for 12 years, he bought a FX taxi for himself with the savings, which he drove for around five years before he sold it and started a few businesses at home. However, through the railway clearance his house was partially demolished and his businesses were also adversely affected by the displacement of people. In the process of reconstructing the house, G2 converted the front part into a small *sari-sari* store that is now run by his wife. To earn extra income, G2 himself is working as a service electrician using the skills that he learned in vocational school, responding whenever

his customers 'text' (i.e. send a message via a mobile phone) him about repairing a television, washing machine, electric fan and other electronics.

Similarly, in a normal context, starting a business was a common livelihood strategy to meet increased expenses like sending children to school. In particular, running a small business at home or in the neighbourhood such as a *sari-sari* store (H9; J2), laundry service and rug-making (D1; J1; J4) was regarded as being suitable for women since they could take care of children while working (F7; J4). The same strategy was applied in terms of coping with livelihood impacts after the clearance. J4 started to make and sell rugs in order to compensate for the reduced income from her *sari-sari* store that was adversely affected by a customer loss. Initially, she had set up a *sari-sari* store in order to support her children's education and furthermore rented out a small space next to the store for extra rent income. She also looks after a housing complex that is owned by the godmother ('*ninang*') of her daughter and is living in one unit of the complex for free, thereby saving the significant expense of rent payments for housing. Thus, as she explains herself, starting a new business was an act of "perseverance", with which she has managed multiple activities throughout her life. Likewise, the case of E1 illustrates very well how she coped with the adverse livelihood impacts in the same manner that she had persevered all her life.

Case-study: Coping through perseverance

In 1963, E1 moved from a province to Manila, following her cousin who arrived before her and arranged a job for her. Since then, she has worked hard and constantly at three different factories for 30 years and abroad for 10 years. At the cigarette manufacturing factory that was her first work place, she worked diligently to meet the quota required for earning income: "For example, the factory tells you to make 1,500 packs of cigarettes and you need to accomplish it. If not, the owner will get mad and call you into his office. [...] If you do many packs, your salary is good. If you're lazy, no salary. I was working hard. Every time, I made my quota" (E1CN25). In 1993, she went to Hong Kong and worked as a domestic helper for 10 years, during which time she remitted "everything" and could send one of her children to college and the other two to high school. With the savings, she also bought her current house on private land.

Since she came back to the Philippines in 2003, she has been carrying out multiple livelihood activities: sewing, hair-cutting, and manicure and pedicure services. She learned all these skills while she was working at factories by attending evening vocational classes: "I was working and also studying at that time. During the day time, I went to work at the factory. I came home around 5pm. And from 6pm till 9pm, I was studying" (E1CN23). However, through the railway clearance, she lost her customers and her livelihood activities were significantly affected. E1 is

now living on her pension (3,000 pesos per month) that she receives thanks to working at factories for 30 years and a monthly income from renting out one part of the house (3,500 pesos per month). She emphasises that insufficient income means “you must know how to budget and tighten your belt a bit” (E1CN41). As she has been doing so far, she will “just persevere in life.” (E1CN34).

Budgeting: expenditure control and borrowing

As E1 emphasised at the end, budgeting appeared as a common strategy to cope with hard times when income is scarce. In particular, for those people who had managed a precarious balance in their survival, adverse impacts on their livelihood activities left few means to make their living but to reduce their consumption or to find other ways to source extra cash, mainly by borrowing. First, “tightening the belt” in people’s own words was a common way to reduce the costs of both consumption and production in a normal context (e.g. H2; A2) and furthermore to cope with income loss or reduction following local economic changes (G1; E1). Some affected people ‘tightened up’ even more (B4), by cutting down some less essential consumption (I4) or by spreading out their expenditure.

Notably, spending on education was curtailed in some households since it was one of the largest costs. Despite being highly valued by parents (H5; F2; I2), it was already difficult to support their children’s education even without a contingency, mainly because of limited funds (H2; I3; I5; F3; J2). The case of F3 illustrates how livelihood impacts spill over to other domains of life to further undermine the education of his daughter. Through the clearance, F3 lost his computer shop completely and his remaining *sari-sari* store suffered from the loss of customers. He had to sell the computers as well as a refrigerator and a freezer that he used for running a *sari-sari* store at home:

“The business gets lower and lower because of the loss of the people from the railway. [...] Before, our income was around 2,000–3,000 pesos from the sari-sari store and computer shop. There were still people in the railway area. [...] These days, maybe 100 pesos a day. We’re staying here for a long time [today] but cannot see that many customers. We can’t really see people, unlike before.”

With the amount of income that he earned prior to the clearance together with the savings from working abroad, he could send his daughter to a nursing school. Even after his businesses were adversely affected, he tried to support his daughter’s education for some time with the money raised from selling the productive durables.

However, household income reduction was such that she had to stop her education in the end:

“Before, we were able to send our children, at that time when we had that kind of income. We had no choice but to stop the study of our youngest daughter. [...] She stopped in 2008. In 2005, she started college. The allowance is not enough, the daily allowance. For example, 100 pesos, we’re getting 100 pesos as income and also for allowance, so it is not enough. That’s why she stopped” (F3CN28; CN29).

In addition to cutting expenses, borrowing was another widespread method of addressing an income shortage (H5; J2; J6). Despite the well-known burden of debt repayment,¹⁰⁰ borrowing was almost a daily practice for those with income insecurity, thereby trapping them in a permanently indebted state. People borrowed from a range of sources such as their family or relatives, friends or former work partners (F4), a workplace (D3; H2; H5) and formal and informal lending institutions. The most widely mentioned institution is a daily lending service called “five-six (5/6 or 5-6)” (H1; H7; H8). With five-six, people can borrow a relatively small amount of money at a daily interest rate of 20 per cent. For example, if one borrows 5 pesos, the repayment due next day is 6 pesos (i.e. the original 5 pesos plus 1 peso as interest). A money collector comes every day and debtors can usually repay only the interest, thereby still remaining indebted for the original capital.

In order to reconstruct livelihoods after the change, people had to borrow money, bearing a long-term burden of repayment. After losing a small canteen along the railway road to the clearance, I3 started to sell coffee by borrowing money from five-six. Given her profit level, she has a long way to go until she repays the original capital: “we have good income today, so we can pay a good amount. But if we don’t have good income or any income, we cannot pay. [...] For the capital needed for coffee, there is no money. So, there is no choice but to borrow money. [...] We borrowed 3,000 pesos and have to pay 100 every day.” Even worse, those who were living on debt and thus were least capable of recovering from impacts had to borrow more than before (I3; A2; J8; H10).

In sum, perseverance summarises an overall mode of coping with the livelihood challenges caused by a situation like DID, with which affected people worked harder and shifted into or started a new livelihood activity. Underlying this, there is also a


¹⁰⁰ People are well aware of the risk of indebtedness: “I can borrow but I don’t like it because if I am not able to sell a lot, then I will not be able to pay the loan. It will be more difficult. [...] I don’t really want to borrow. I’m afraid of debt.” (A3CN39); “It’s hard if we cannot repay. If we do not earn day by day, how can we pay that?” (A5CN36).

sentiment of ‘acceptance’, with which affected people grappled with a situation (A3; A8; 14). In the process, a few people with some resources managed to turn a challenge into an opportunity to rebuild their livelihoods. On the contrary, those living on the margins had to tighten their budget or to borrow even more, thereby becoming impoverished. In the many different outcomes of livelihood impacts, what is underlined is the importance of livelihood security prior to the contingency. A similar point emerges from those whose livelihoods were not affected this time but who demonstrated varying levels of livelihood security.

7.3.3. Preconditions and NLI

As with the LI group, the livelihood status in the NLI group varies, which implies once again that the experience of livelihood impacts was associated less with the security of livelihoods than with their characteristics. The shape of distribution across different status categories resembles that of the whole sample (compare Graph 3 and Graph 7 (b)). The representation of different status categories is also very similar between the whole sample and the NLI group (compare Graph 10 (a) and (b)), underlining that the NLI group is not so different from the whole sample in their characteristics and were not affected by local changes mainly because they did not engage with the physical and socio-economic environments around the informal settlement. To reiterate the point, I examine the different livelihood statuses of the employed and self-employed people in the NLI group.

Graph 10 Livelihood status categories in proportion (a) the sample; (b) the NLI group



Unaffected self-employment

Self-employed people in the NLI group avoided the impacts of local changes mainly because their spatial boundary of operation extended beyond the locality. However, business performance varies greatly within this group. For instance, D1 makes rugs at

home, earning an income at the subsistent level (e.g. the maximum estimate of gross income for rug-making is 3,600 pesos per month). She was not affected by the clearance because her clients are established businesses in the nearby area. Her son, who works as a carpenter, was also unaffected but his income is very irregular because “a carpenter’s job is not stable. Sometimes there’s work and sometimes there’s no work because he is not in a company. So, it’s like a client just calls him from his house” (D1). The cases of lower livelihood status indicate that the locally bounded nature of a business is not necessarily attributable to the business performance or, conversely, that operating beyond the locality does not necessarily mean that a business is sound and yields large profit. In other words, the security of a business is not so much correlated to its probability of (not) being affected by local changes.

In comparison, A4 is one outstanding case whereby resource endowment allowed her to start a business in a far better-off position and further to run it successfully, which in turn reinforced her position. Growing up in a family that had run a bike shop for a long time, she became a bike shop owner herself: “I’ve been in this [i.e. the bike shop trade] for 10 years. But before I worked with my mum, [as] we are in this kind of family business, on my side. On his side [her husband’s side], it’s an auto supply. They’re an auto-supply family and we’re a bicycle family” (A4CN15). Hence, she could benefit from various inputs from both families when she started her own business. For a shop space, she is using a building that is owned by her mother-in-law. She procured the initial products from her brother on favourable lending terms and prepared the store with the money received from selling her husband’s car:

N: When you opened this business, where did you get the funds or the initial capital?

A4: The initial capital... Because my brother is already in this kind of business, he supplied me with the parts [bike parts] in terms, like 60 days. I didn’t pay right away. So, he supplied the parts on 60-day terms. I just spent like 200,000 [pesos] for remodelling this store. I had to make this, what do you call, glass stand, shelves... It cost me 200,000 pesos. Painting all these shelves...

N: And then, where did you get that 200,000?

A4: ... He [my husband] had a car before and I sold it for 190,000. Then I added... 10,000.

Thanks to the various resources provided within her family then, her bike shop attracts customers widely and is on a stable path towards growth. She attributes her business’s success to its price competitiveness:

“I started ... 10 years ago. We were slow (at that time) because I just started. But, because of word of mouth from customers saying I give them a reasonable price, low price, they come from everywhere. I had a customer just before lunch; he was here from Olangapo. That is a place very far from here. [...] Because of the word of

mouth: "Ah, if you go there, it's cheap there!" Reasonable price. We have ... they call it, Quiapo, Quezon Boulevard, [there] they have a lot of this kind of stores. A lot of this kind of business. But, of course, they are expensive... they sell at a higher price. They have to pay rent and they have to pay those maintenances. So, you have to sell your parts at a higher price for you to accommodate your rent" (A4CN22).

As a consequence, A4 enjoys a markedly different lifestyle from most other research participants, for instance owning a car and travelling abroad. Furthermore, even though her bike shop is located just one street away from the railway tracks, she was not affected by local changes at all. Informal settlers were not part of her customers, for whom she thinks owning a bicycle is a 'luxury'. Her shop was already distinguished from the informal settlement for being a formal business in both senses, in that she owns it formally and also pays the taxes for the profit generated by her business.

However, among research participants, only a few own or rent a shop formally (e.g. A4 and A5) and the majority of unaffected people are still vulnerable to the potentially detrimental effect of informality, by running a business at home, building a makeshift store on empty land, using a public space such as the sidewalk or staying mobile. For instance, J5 sells flowers near Quiapo Church, using a business space that he informally negotiated with the *barangay* chairman in that area. Hence, he remains vulnerable to future occasions where urban physical space is reconfigured. In fact, people who were not affected by the current event had already been subjected to regulations targeted at informal businesses. Notably, F6 used to be a vendor in Baclaran but lost her business following the Metro Manila Development Agency (MMDA) operation to clear the sidewalk, whereby store spaces were demolished and products were destroyed.

In view of this, those running a business at an informal house (e.g. I5; A6; D1; E8; I7) are very likely to be affected in a similar manner to displaced people who lost their residential and business space altogether if their informal houses are subject to another clearance attempt. That is, when a house is used as a site for livelihoods, its informal status can make home-based livelihoods vulnerable, which, once again, confirms the link between housing and livelihoods (see Section 6.4.3). Displacement would also remove the remaining informal settlers from the locality where they have established a livelihood network, even when they are not relying on a fixed physical space for their livelihoods, for instance by providing on-call services (J7) or being mobile (J9). In view of the hidden link through which the impact of housing demolition and a spatial change spreads over to livelihoods, the increased feeling of tenure insecurity among the informal settlers, which was discussed in Chapter 6, thus carries an additional weight.

Unaffected employment

Similarly, although employees were not affected by local economic changes, many of them in my sample are at the bottom of the labour market, suffering from job insecurity and/or earning less than minimum wage even when working for long hours or without sufficient time for rest. First of all, job security depends heavily on whether employers are willing or able to keep hiring employees, which is primarily related to their business performance. A number of research participants lost their job when a factory or a company went out of business (e.g. H2; H3; I5; J3; J6) or were laid off when businesses tried to cut down the cost (e.g. H1; H5). Job insecurity is systematically embedded in contractual employment (see Section 7.2.4) whereas casual employees like construction workers are on and off work depending on demands (H8; J8).

In terms of income security, employees tend to earn a stable income as long as their wage is paid. It is this trait of employment that kept households as a whole resilient even though other livelihoods were affected by local changes. However, income can be minimal for unskilled or low-skilled employees and, in particular, contractual workers suffer doubly from both a low income and income instability due to frequent discontinuation of work. As an illustration, the income of H5's husband was not always enough for a family of five to meet their food needs. He has been working as a security guard at a bank (UCPB) for 10 years but his salary is 4,700 pesos for every 15 days, before contributions to pension and savings are deducted, which amounts to about 1,000 pesos. This leaves him a monthly income of 8,400 pesos, which is slightly over the aforementioned minimum wage for Metro Manila (i.e. 8,251 pesos in 2009 for a family of five). Hence, H5 sometimes had to borrow money from a pawnshop: "I used to have jewels but took them to a pawnshop. [...] For food. But, I have a plan to get them back although some of them were already sold by the pawnshop" (H5CN13).

The income of those employed in a sales-based job also fluctuates because their salary depends on how much they sell. For example, H8 is working as a sales agent of the PLDT (Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company) with a contract arrangement that she calls "allowance and commission". She is given an allowance (e.g. 150 pesos per day on the weekend) to sell PLDT products either through telemarketing at the office or through house-to-house visits. She gets commission from her sales, depending on which her salary varies.¹⁰¹ Due to such income instability, the husband of J8 changed

¹⁰¹ At the time of the interview, she had only joined the company recently so had not received her salary yet. She said that others could get as high as 8,000 pesos per month.

his job from an allowance and commission type of employment to a contractual one, even though it is for a short duration and offers only a minimum wage.

The formality of employment appears to have an inconclusive influence on job and income security in my research. Some of the unaffected people who are informal employees have been vulnerable to the arbitrary decisions of an employer. For instance, D1 who had worked as a housemaid since around 1989 lost her work when her employer replaced her with his two nephews who came from the province of Negros, where life is deemed difficult (D1). Similarly, the wife of H3 is a house cook but her work is irregular and dependent on the needs of her employer (H3). Work conditions can also change in an unfavourable way, as for the father of F5 whose employer reduced his work hours as a private driver, reducing his employment from full to part time. Others found a more secure job in the informal economy, like the husband of H9 who has been working for an informal employer in his neighbourhood for four years since his six-month contract at a factory terminated. With regard to their income security, it is very likely that informal employees hardly receive any benefits like salary increases, bonuses, pensions and insurance. As an illustration, the husband of A1 has not experienced any salary increase so far: "His income is minimal. Because his company, I think it's a family business, they don't pay very much because they don't follow the department of labour rules for salary increases" (A1CN34). Furthermore, his employer is not enrolled in a pension scheme such as the SSS (Social Security Service), for which: "he'll be sued for his neglect because he's deducting the payment but is not remitting it to the SSS. So, I think it is a very big problem for the employer" (A1CN49). This illustrates how informal practices that entail violating the labour law can also result in even 'formal' employees being unprotected.

A few unaffected people have been just 'getting by' through menial work and thus earning a meagre cash income. For example, H3 works as a street sweeper but it pays him only 1,000 pesos per month, which he strives to supplement by occasionally doing carpentry, housing repair and painting jobs whenever there is a demand. H6, who has no work at the moment, contends: "Once I worked for a Congressman. A former Congressman was my boss. I bet on horse racing on behalf of him and got a commission from it." Similarly, his father is a part-time bet collector at a betting shop for TV-broadcast horse racing, earning about 100 pesos per day (working from 1pm to 6pm). A small urban garden on the side of a house provides food for a family or sometimes earns limited income for meeting other needs: "When we don't have money we just get food from that garden. Sometimes people buy, sometimes people ask - then we sell

vegetables for 3 pesos or 5 pesos, using the money to buy a pail of water [3 pesos]" (F6CN43). Notably, some remained unemployed or without work and thus were not even in a position to be affected by local changes (e.g. H6). The family of B3 has the lowest livelihood score (0.5 points), since both she and her husband have no work at the moment. Their life was already so restricted that they had nothing much to lose in the first place and remained unaffected.

In sum, employment as a livelihood option needs to be evaluated in view of different degrees of job and income security. Although employees were not affected by the current event and thus could access alternative sources of income, having an employed member does not automatically indicate that a given household is better off than others. In the last section in this chapter, I examine further how livelihood insecurity may translate into vulnerability to an event like DID, by comparing the resilience of the better-off group with the vulnerability of the survival/subsistence group.

Building resilience against structural challenges

If people whose livelihoods were adversely affected demonstrate a negative cycle of asset erosion and impoverishment, some of the outstanding cases among the unaffected people demonstrate how a livelihood portfolio could be improved so as to remain resilient and safeguard a household against local changes. The husband of D3 is an illuminating case where perseverance through multiple contingencies eventually resulted in a stable and successful business selling cooked horse meat, which survived the changes in the local economy after the current clearance.

Case-study: Stable business as an outcome of constant trial and error

The husband of D3 struggled for quite some time undergoing many trials and errors and changing from one form of livelihood to another. He started working as a manager at his sister's carpentry shop until she decided to run the shop by herself. He opened a small store at a horse-racing track in the nearby area, selling snacks on weekends. However, he did not make much profit there and moved the business to his house along the railway when the racing track closed. He opened a small *sari-sari* store at home and also started to sell horse meat dishes on the side. Initially, he cooked 3 kilograms of meat but the amount increased gradually, to 6 kilograms and later to 9 kilograms. However, the house was burned down by a fire that broke out in the neighbour's house so his family moved to the current house, which was originally owned and lived in by his parents.

Since then (in 1994), he has focused on selling horse meat dishes only and the business is now well established. He cooks about 20 kilograms of horse meat on week days and 30 kilograms

on Saturdays (Sunday is his day off). The daily income is around 5,000 pesos on average and the actual profit is between 700 and 800 pesos. About the successful performance of the business, D3 comments: "I'm thankful to God, really thankful to God, because the food is appreciated by people. So, my husband was able to be saved despite the fire [that broke out in the previous house]" (D3CN27). His business is still doing well even after losing people in the immediate neighbourhood mainly because his customers are from all over the place as it has gained a good reputation through word of mouth.

Those who have to change work frequently because of job and/or income insecurity still tend to get similarly precarious jobs and thereby are in the lowest strata of the economy. In comparison, people with moderate security could change work to enhance their income security and become better off. The case of F1 is a good example showing how changing work and managing multiple activities have enhanced livelihood security.

Case-study: Livelihood diversification and improvement of security

F1 started to work as a helper when he was in high school and financed his own college education as a working student. After graduation, he started to work as a contractual worker at a paper company in Mindanao but moved to Manila in 1978, searching for better opportunities. He got a job as an office worker at a brick-manufacturing company and was assigned to a team in charge of credit collection. However, he did not settle there and continued to look for a better job:

"Sometimes I went out to the field if the credit collectors were absent. One day when I was out for collections, I passed by Binondo. I looked for a better job in Binondo because the salary at the manufacturing company was very low. That was around the time when Allied Bank just started. Gem Bank had already started to collapse so Lucio Tan¹ bought Gem Bank and transformed it into Allied Bank. I was lucky that I was accepted at Allied Bank" (F1CN32).

He worked at the bank for 30 years, during which he also learned tailoring skills and opened a tailoring business at home so as to earn extra income. After retirement, he is now managing multiple livelihood activities. He came up with an idea to combine a tailoring business with a small second-hand clothing shop:

"The tailoring business and the ukay-ukay [second-hand clothing shop] go hand in hand. If a pair of trousers being bought is quite large, customers can take it to a tailor [i.e. F1 himself] and a tailor will cut it to fit them. I charge 25 pesos just for cutting the edges of the pants in order to adjust the length. I charge 40 pesos for changing the zippers of the pants. [...] I'm getting income even by just sitting down here" (F1CN46).

He is also taking care of a small garden on a patch of cleared land and selling plants from the garden. In sum, the case of F1 demonstrates that by diversifying livelihoods, people can generate additional income and enhance their capacity to save. Investment in an existing business that is formally registered or using formally accessed space can increase their income security further, thereby potentially kicking off a positive cycle of accumulation.

In the above cases of a moderately secure or better-off life, stability is an important factor for continuing endeavours towards improving livelihood security. On the other hand, experiencing dramatic changes can undermine livelihood security and exhaust the existing resource pool, as clearly illustrated by those whose livelihoods were adversely affected by land clearance and population displacement for the railway project. The detrimental effects of a contingency are underlined further by those who did not experience livelihood impacts this time but have already been destabilised by myriad shocks or stresses such as illness, loss of work, an economic downturn and adverse events like flooding or a fire.

Moreover, the overall livelihood challenge in the larger economy is pressing even without localised changes like DID. This is poignantly captured in the critical commentary of I10 on the interconnection between the increasing price level and continuing work and income insecurity:

“Making a living is really difficult now because of higher commodity prices but lower income, while the family gets bigger and bigger. [...] When it comes to that, there are many reasons. A lot of things can be said and the first would be about the government, about corruption, by which people are really affected. [...] Our salary doesn’t get higher but the prices get higher and higher. That affects the workers. For example, in a company, they don’t give any salary increase. The salary doesn’t get higher but commodity prices get higher, the needs of the people. [...] Livelihoods never get better, they get worse; the income is not getting higher. There are no jobs coming, for example, no help from others to have work and livelihoods. [...] Most of the people who live here don’t really have work. Even those people who already graduated, it’s really difficult for them to find a job. Well, it’s like, here in the Philippines, it’s really like that. It’s really hard to find a job.”

Given this, exposure to multiple shocks means that urban residents can become impoverished in the long run as their assets are lost and livelihoods are undermined. Even those whose livelihoods were not affected this time may be subject to the next round of events. For affected people, even if they remained resilient this time, they may become vulnerable next time. That is, micro-level impacts and adaptation may look subtle or almost invisible and minor in one snapshot but frequent exposure to multiple

shocks over time, which the current event is only part of, can mean those who are already struggling with their meagre resources become trapped with, or fall into, deeper poverty and vulnerability.

In particular, the employees in the sample raise a critical point that the residents living in and around the informal settlements are the ones working in the service sector, such as in restaurants, shops and malls. Although they are everywhere servicing the lifestyle of the middle and upper classes, it is rarely questioned where they return to after work and in fact it is almost forgotten that they also need shelter in the city, as if they could disappear from the city after work. By being structurally kept in precarious positions in the job market where they receive little income even after working for long hours, only to be quickly replaced, they can only afford less secure housing options such as an informal house or a house in such a neighbourhood, thereby being vulnerable to changes such as land clearance and population displacement.

Few make a link between service-sector employees and so-called slum dwellers because in the limited imagination of urban areas, such poor settlements are treated as distinctive (almost separate) components of the city. Falling through a chasm between urban shelter and livelihood issues, those who are struggling on both sides are either objectified as low-income employees or stigmatised as urban eyesores living in shanties. This fragmented view may be useful for the middle class to remain oblivious to the striking contrast between the poverty and opulence coexisting within the same urban space. On the other hand, there is an acute dilemma for urban planners who are eager to remove urban slums while needing to maintain the low-income workforce.

7.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I demonstrate how the transformation of the local economy initiated by land clearance and population displacement generates different livelihood impacts. Land clearance undermined the physical productive capital that was arranged within informal settlements and subsequent population displacement reconfigured the local livelihood network, thereby impacting goods and service providers whose operation was locally embedded. Investment in an informal house was lost, either as a source of income or as a site of business, while income reduction was significant for local business owners who lost a large pool of customers and other business-related personnel.

The experience of livelihood impacts was more the function of the livelihood characteristics than a result of livelihood insecurity, since local changes affected the remaining residents of different livelihood statuses. The main features of affected livelihoods were their informal arrangement of productive capital and their reliance on the local social capital, with which non-displaced people were widely engaged. On the other hand, over half the sample was not affected by local changes, primarily because their livelihoods were not locally bounded. However, this does not mean that unaffected households were more secure or better off since they include many who struggled to survive even without adverse impacts.

In comparison, the implication of impacts and the capacity to recover varied depending on the security level of a household livelihood portfolio. Having multiple, secure sources of income turned out to be crucial for a household as a whole to stay relatively resilient. On the other hand, those who had fewer options in their portfolio were likely to be less capable of recovering from impacts. In view of this, adverse impacts on local small businesses were particularly significant for those who struggled on the margins of the formal labour market and chose self-employment in their immediate neighbourhood as a main livelihood option. Affected people coped with local changes in the same manner that they have managed myriad challenges to their livelihoods so far: many would 'persevere' by working hard or harder, with some starting a new livelihood activity, while others 'living on debt' had to borrow more or rely on others for help. Even though they 'get by' after the clearance, the underlying implication of livelihood impacts is more profound as they lost their past investment in affected livelihoods or had to use it up in the process of coping. For those living on the margins, this can lead to impoverishment *in situ* while for those with considerable establishments such as other livelihoods and assets, local DID constitutes a change that undermines what they have managed to accumulate over the years.

The diverse meanings of impacts were neither easily visible nor tangible and could not be fully captured by a snapshot without considering the overall livelihood portfolio and the life history of hard work behind the affected livelihoods. The link between poverty, informality and vulnerability was revealed through the current event whereby informal arrangement of resources, which is in large part the result of poverty, is vulnerable to local changes, which often leads to the loss of assets and adverse impacts on livelihoods, thereby perpetuating poverty. This explains in part why and how contingencies like DID are detrimental to building livelihood security, in particular for poor people who are kept in a poverty trap through recurrent instances of such events.

Chapter 8

Impacts on social relationships

8.1. Introduction

Displacement did not only mean that economic actors like customers, goods and service providers disappeared from the locality; more broadly, social relationships were dismantled as families and neighbours were separated from each other through displacement, changing the ways in which they shared resources and helped each other. Displacement also revealed subtle divisions among the residents in the railway area, across which only limited interaction had existed. Many non-displaced people did not have particular relationships with displaced informal settlers even though their houses stood close to each other. Consequently, they experienced few changes in their social domain after the clearance. In this chapter, I first elaborate how different types of social relationship with displaced people, including the lack of relationship, were transformed through forced population movement. I also attempt to identify multiple lines that might have differentiated people and thereby might have kept them apart in their social interactions. Second, I demonstrate the complexity of social dynamics in the locality by presenting different evaluations of the change in the local ambiance. Last, I draw attention to the significant decrease in community organisations in the locality, in terms of their presence and activism.

8.2. Impacts on social relationships

Social relationships in the railway area had been formed between diverse actors such as family members, relatives, friends, neighbours, co-residents of a house (e.g. house owner and renters), co-workers or employers, other acquaintances (e.g. people from the same province), or members of an organisation or institution (e.g. a church-based organisation). Whilst functioning as channels through which needed resources are arranged, social relationships provided a platform on which the reciprocal culture of

bayanihan (helping each other) grew, whereby both material and mental supports were shared. In particular, the strongest relationship revolved around a family or an extended family, which has remained the main focus of social life both before and after displacement. Displacement, however, did create a rupture in the wider social fabric. Other relationships fostered beyond the family boundary were also reconfigured, although the magnitude of social impact varied depending on the degrees of closeness. Notably, those who had distant or no particular relationships with displaced people experienced only limited changes in their social domain.

8.2.1. Close relationships

First of all, displacement separated families from each other who had lived together in a compact space. The separation of families was widespread and nearly half of non-displaced households had members who were displaced (20 out of 51). The cohabitation type, whereby families previously lived in one house or close to each other, explains the prevalence of the phenomenon. Although a couple in partnership¹⁰² and their children seemed to form a basic unit of cohabitation, its boundary was easily expanded with the growing of a family. It was common for siblings to stay in one house after they formed their own family or newly partnered couples to stay at their parents' house when they could not afford a place of their own or if they tried to save on rent (A1; I5). This explains in part why the majority of the houses found in and around the informal settlement along the railway had one big room without built-in partitions. In view of the anticipated family expansion, housing structures are best built in the most flexible form, so they can be transformed or expanded according to emerging needs. The basic family unit was also reshaped as couples separated, new partners were introduced and children were sometimes adopted (B4; E1C1; E1; E5; J1). Members of an extended family such as a cousin, an aunt and a nephew joined a household living under the same roof, the boundary of which was constantly redrawn as members moved in and out of a house frequently.

This complex and flexible composition of a household made it difficult to configure its economic dynamic. In general, a basic family unit was deemed economically independent as in the household of H5 where her and her siblings' families managed income separately for their own expenses. Family members beyond the basic unit

¹⁰² Partnership is not necessarily based on a legal marriage, in which case people call it a 'live-in' partnership. For example, H9 clarifies her partnership status as: "we're not married but are living together".

usually did not know each other's income level (H1; E7). Nonetheless, combining the incomes of cohabiting families increased the overall household income pool (e.g. J7), whilst sharing expenses such as food and utility bills mitigated against resource constraints or income insecurity (A7C22; B2; J3). In addition to economic benefits, living together or nearby promoted the culture of helping each other (*bayanihan*) that is common in the Philippines.

Given this background, demolition and displacement impacted the exiting cohabitation pattern of families. When houses were partially demolished, not all the families who previously lived together could be accommodated in a reduced housing space. Families were already living in a very crowded house with little privacy (A1; G1CN33; I5).¹⁰³ It is commonly observed (before and now) that people carry on their daily activities outside their house due to limited indoor space (D1; H8). After the demolition, some families had to move out, either finding an alternative place to live or moving to the relocation site (10 cases: H9; H10; H11; F4; J6; A6; E2; E8; G1; D3; G2). The decision of who would stay along the railway seemed to be independently made by each family unit (H11), with a general tendency being that those working and going to school remain in the metropolis (F4). Non-displaced people without any housing loss were also separated from extended families after their houses that had stood wall-to-wall or close to each other in the neighbourhood were demolished (nine cases: A1; H3; H6; I5; B2; E7; D1; I10; F7).

Close relationships were also fostered beyond the family boundary and across residential and socio-economic divisions. Some non-displaced people had 'good' relationships with their neighbours, who had lived next door or across the street but are now displaced (B2; D2; F7).¹⁰⁴ Some felt "like relatives" (I6) or were good friends (F2; J7) with displaced people, sharing daily routines and helping each other (J1; D3). D3 recalls: "It was ok, our interaction was ok. We were helping each other. For example, if we cooked, we were going to share it with other people. We had good relationships because we were neighbours." In such cases, they were also socially affected by

¹⁰³ For instance, in the house of H1, ten family members and five renters are living in four rooms across three floors. The family of H5 lives with the families of her two siblings as well as two tenant families in six small rooms across two floors.

¹⁰⁴ An interesting phenomenon which indicates the overlap between social and physical proximities is marriage within the locality. A number of people found their partners in their neighbourhood (E2; F1; F5CN54; F6CN33; G1; I9), including people with all types of housing loss (i.e. no, partial and complete loss), which means that displaced and non-displaced people might have been tied through marriage.

displacement (10 cases: J1; J2; J4; J5; F2; J7; J8; I6; I7; D3). I7 elaborates the social impact below:

N: What was your relationship with those people who are now relocated?

I7: It was ok, it was good, all of the people were just good. Relocated people, they were kind.

N: What did you think or feel when they were relocated?

I7: Of course, very sad, because for a long time we talked to each other. But they were relocated.

N: What other things did you do together when they were here?

I7: Before, of course, we chatted with each other; talked about stories and sometimes drank alcohol together. For example, when there were celebrations, occasions, we shared pancit [Filipino noodle dish] with each other. We didn't treat each other differently. We were like relatives.

Thus, the experience of being taken away from families as well as from friends and neighbours was “painful” and people felt “hurt” or “sad” about it (E2; E7; F2; F4; F7; J4; J5; J7). They miss their family (E7; H9) or feel lonely as they have lost people they are used to spending time with or talking to (E2; H9; J4). Separated families and neighbours have tried to maintain their relationships across different geographical spaces, mostly by communicating via mobile phone or by visiting each other (E7; H9; J5). However, mobile communication tended to be confined to the closest personal relationships and, obviously, not all previous social relationships could be restored in that way (F5CN26). In view of this, the returning of displaced people from the relocation site was one way of overcoming this physical distance and social disconnection, which was particularly important for those who were living in an extremely constrained state and thus needed to stay close to their support network. Notably, both B3 and her husband who have no work at the moment (their livelihood score of 0.5 points is the lowest in the sample) had no choice but to return from the relocation site to the railway area where they could get help from their parents, siblings, neighbours and sometimes from *barangay* officers. The attempts of the families to cope with separation by staying close, physically or socially, need to be understood within the broader context of high mobility, tight family ties and extended care, which are prevalent in the Philippines and will be elaborated further in the next section.

Mobility and family separation

The Philippines is renowned for the magnitude of internal and international migration and high mobility is also seen in my research. A number of the research participants

originally moved from the provinces to Metro Manila, which they perceived would offer better or more work opportunities than their province where “it’s difficult” (especially farming) or “there are no jobs” (J9). Some came to visit their family or relatives in the city and ended up settling down as they got a job (e.g. J6; J9):

“I’ve been around the Philippines because of my job. [...] I came to Manila in 1978 to find greener pastures, a better job. I came here because, back in Mindanao¹⁰⁵, the salary is very low. So, I decided to come here to Manila in order to get a better job with better pay, for better opportunities. Just like other families who are going abroad to get better salaries” (F1CN27).

Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 7, many others have direct or indirect experiences of having gone abroad for work. Population movements separate family members across geographical spaces and thereby undermine the strong Filipino culture centred on families. In particular, with overseas Filipino worker (OFW) family members, the separation becomes prolonged as the contract normally runs for a few years and many also try to stay abroad either by renewing the contract or by starting another one. OFWs visit home at most once a year when they have to renew their contract, visa or passport. For example, the second daughter of H1 has been abroad for five years, starting with a five-month contract in Dubai, which was followed by a two-year contract in Jordan. After taking a three-month break, she returned to Dubai to work in the laundry room of a hotel. The son of H7 has been abroad for almost ten years, starting as a member of a restaurant crew, and is now working in Saudi Arabia as a construction worker. He visits home every two years since he is on a two-year contract. Others settle in the host country, forming their own family there or bringing their immediate family members abroad later (J4).

The temporal interval of separation is widened by the geographical scale whereby family members are spread all over the world. I1 has one son studying in Spain (for three years), one daughter in New Zealand working as a nurse (for two years) and another daughter in Saipan who has been working as a civil engineer since 1984 and has her own family there. Likewise, two out of three siblings of H4 are working in Italy as OFWs. Moving in and out of the country carries on throughout one’s life cycle, as illustrated by the brother-in-law of I9 who started his first contract as a seaman when he was a teenager, signed the second one after he got married and went abroad on a third contract recently. In my research, OFW family members are discussed mainly as contributors to household livelihoods (in Chapter 7) but I also take note of the social

¹⁰⁵ This is one of the three main regions in the Philippines together with Luzon (where Metro Manila is located) and Visayas.

cost of family separation. Likewise, the remittances sent by OFW family members need to be discussed beyond their economic function and to be regarded as part of an extended form of care that is common in Filipino families.

In addition to separation across borders, separation of families is common in the Philippines where the capacity to live together is constrained by limited work opportunities in the provinces and high living costs in the cities. Consequently, family members also live apart within the Philippines. H3 has five children in total but three of them live in Negros Occidental (his wife's province) with their grandmother because his income is not enough to accommodate them all in the city. He wants to be reunited with his children but has "no idea yet how to do it" and at the moment is supporting them from far away by sending some money to the province. Likewise, the brother-in-law of J8 earns 180 pesos per day, which is far below the minimum wage and thus separates him from his child who is in their home province and his wife who is working as a maid and based at her employer's house. In the case of F2, she sent her eldest child to her sister-in-law's house in Cavite, hoping that her daughter would focus on study more if separated from her close group of friends (*barkada*) in Manila, with whom she used to spend a lot of time instead of studying. Thus, in-country family separation is often a way of coping with an income shortage and the high cost of living in urban areas or is a consequence of work-related mobility, whilst it can also be a strategy for providing a better environment for family members, especially for children.

In view of the high mobility between the province and the city and between the Philippines and abroad, a flexible household boundary seems to be a natural consequence, which is accompanied and further reinforced by frequent or protracted family separation. The mobility level of urban residents is also high as they have to commute a long distance within the metropolis. Thus, they resort to extended care provided within a larger family network and become a quasi-member of many households, while those who have migrated abroad for work become 'visiting' members of a household. Displacement took place within this context whereby families try to stay close to each other but are often separated. The experience of family separation among the residents in the railway area needs to be understood against this backdrop.

Whether together or apart, there is nevertheless a strong family-oriented culture whereby family members are the most important source of social capital in people's managing their livelihoods and meeting their needs. However, unlike a more voluntary

choice of mobility seeking potential benefits albeit at the cost of family separation, development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) forces separation upon families and thus brings unwanted and unforeseen hardship to the whole family. Whereas return or staying-on was a natural way for displaced people to recover the previous support network, it had an impact on the existing reciprocal relationship, mostly in the way that non-displaced people carry out the role of assisting displaced people. The dynamic created by the increased challenge of coping with displacement and relocation is discussed further in the next section in relation to the culture of *helping each other*.

Bayanihan: Helping each other

Born out of a tight family relationship and long cohabitation with neighbours, a culture of helping each other arises, known as *bayanihan* in the Philippines. Notably, financial support is shared within an extended family or inter-generationally, particularly for education, which is high on the list of family priorities (D3; I1; J3). I1 finances his grandchildren's education because his daughter cannot support their studies. His other son and daughters are also 'helping out' by sending monthly remittances (6,000 pesos in total) from abroad for the school allowances of their nieces and nephews. Family members also provide labour by giving a helping hand to those who run a business (D1; E8; J1) or by running a business together (A8; F2). For instance, J6 is helping her cousin, Nilda, occasionally, who takes care of an old lady in the neighbourhood:

"I'm just helping – for example, when Nilda cannot do all the jobs or Nilda is away, she will ask me to stay here. It's like volunteering. [...] the money is not really enough [for Nilda] because Nilda sends money to her family. But if there's an excess, Nilda sometimes gives me 300 [pesos] but sometimes 500 [pesos]. For me, it doesn't matter because it's help."

Non-material care and support in daily lives are also very common within an extended family. The children of H7, although not living in the same house, eat together at the house of H7 and bring their children to be taken care of by other family members while they are working. People often stay over at the house of extended family members (I1; I4).

The culture of helping goes beyond the family boundary. Neighbours help and comfort each other in hard times (B2), in addition to mundane sharing of ingredients for food, cooked food and other small goods (B2; B3). Residents with different socio-economic backgrounds also help each other in emergencies. For example, D2 as a private land

and house owner has experience of providing a shelter for informal settlers next to her house, when their houses were burnt down by fire. Similarly, people help each other within a functional relationship such as the one between an employer and employees. For instance A3 has two assistants at her small store who are also living in her house: “They’re living in my house because they have to help me as I am already 67. I can’t do all the house chores alone. It’s like I’m also helping them because they didn’t have work, jobs. I felt pity for them [because one of them] doesn’t have any parents.”

The case of D3 who was helped with her studies when she was young illustrates how helping left a positive imprint on her mind and motivated her to transmit the spirit by helping others:

“I was a postal child.¹⁰⁶ I had a postal parent from Alaska, in the USA, who supported my studies. His name is Captain Donald Brid. So, I really want to help those children who can’t be supported by their parents and I am now a postal parent myself, supporting a child from a province. I do not really know much about the child because the support does not really involve personal communications. I do not know exactly where she is from. But her name is Mary Grace Lettada. It is a World Vision programme and I am one of their sponsors”.

In addition, D3 and her husband tried to support the study of her nieces because they knew that their own parents would not be able to do so. With the help of D3, her nieces finished their studies and are now working and living with their own family, about which she is happy.

It is this complex relationship of helping each other that was impacted by displacement and relocation. First of all, helping stood out as a strategy to cope with the adverse impacts of the local change. Notably, families helped each other to address the income reduction or the increased cost of living after the clearance by sharing more (B2; J8). The family of J8 coped by “Just sharing with each other. For example, my husband and I are assigned for food; and my mother-in-law will be the one paying for the rent. If there are other payments, we will share.” Furthermore, J8 notes that the remaining people in the area, in particular disqualified displaced people, are now helping and sharing more in order to cope with the increased hardship after displacement.

However, having displaced family members often created bigger challenges than the usual level of extended care could manage. Displaced people have strived to stay close to their existing families or within the established social network in the area, often by

¹⁰⁶ She is referring to a child sponsorship programme in which an individual sponsors or funds a child’s education, health or wellbeing.

moving into the house of the remaining families, thereby saving the cost of rearranging a shelter after the clearance (see Chapter 5.3.2). The implications of merging with non-displaced family members can vary depending on their house size and tenure security. When their family has a big house, this may not crowd the existing space and can be seen rather as part of the usual custom of accommodating extended family. For instance, when the family house of I4 (on his father's side) was demolished, he moved to a compound formally owned by his aunt (on his mother's side) across the street from the railway tracks. Since his childhood, I4 had moved between the two houses frequently, sometimes staying here and sometimes staying there. Given this, moving to his mother's family house after displacement must have been a natural transition and he appears to be comfortably (re)settled in the area even after losing his house.

However, when the remaining families were already struggling with their own problems, the squeezing of displaced people into their house might have put further strains on them, including overcrowding. The merger of displaced families also reconfigured the living space. For instance, after the clearance, F5 moved into her mother-in-law's house that was expanded to another floor from an originally two-storey building, using housing materials reclaimed from the demolished house. In the case of resource-constrained families then, it is as if non-displaced people shouldered or subsidised the cost of readjustment on behalf of displaced family members (F2; F7).

More broadly, non-displaced people are expected to extend their support to assist displaced family members who are going through hardship. This might have tipped the balance between two positions in the relationship of helping, namely help-giver and help-receiver, or have exacerbated the existing imbalance. Those who are working and self-sustaining often have a greater capacity to help and become help-givers to those who struggle in meeting their ends (G1; D1). In this regard, OFW family members tend to become major help-givers by sending either occasional or regular remittances. On the other hand, their economic capacity often puts help-givers in a decision-making position, creating a power relation within a family (E7; E9). For instance, E9 is now living in the house of his parents-in-law who are also providing him with financial support to buy land. He feels deprived of economic control on the one hand and yet pressurised to become independent on the other.

The complex dynamic of helping, which involves reciprocity, power, dependency and burden, was reconfigured through the displacement, which made helping more one-way than reciprocal as it raised the social expectation of help on the part of non-

displaced people. H10 illustrates the increased burden acutely as his income is shared with his father who is now living in a relocation site, which has the effect of financing two households using the same level of income (A1; E7; H10). Being a tricycle driver, he earns about 200 pesos every day excluding expenses for food and the 'boundary' (rental fee) of 120 pesos. Although he is still single and does not have his own family, his income is not sufficient for supporting his father and, consequently, he has to borrow from five-six to meet the increased expenses:

"The debt has increased because of the transportation cost. Relocation means more expenses because we have to bring money to my father who is not really living here but is in Bulacan [relocation site]. [...] It's like I get income to pay the loan. So, every day, my income of 200 pesos is used for repaying the loan. [...] we're the ones paying expenses for our father, electricity, water and so on" (H10CN17; H10CN24).

As noted by H10, visiting the relocation site itself adds the transportation cost to the existing household expenses, which makes it difficult to travel to and from the relocation site with any degree of frequency (A1, F2). In order to visit her siblings at the relocation site, H9 has to save the fare for a round trip (200 pesos), which is also time-consuming as the one-way trip takes two hours. Furthermore, the remaining families feel obliged to bring something whenever they visit the relocation site, a social responsibility that they cannot always meet as they are constrained in their own lives themselves (A1).

Furthermore, the overall capacity to help on the part of non-displaced people was undermined as their livelihoods were also adversely affected by the clearance (as discussed in Chapter 7). Before the change, G1 could save from running a *sari-sari* store and help her children: "when my children asked for help, it was not just hundreds of pesos but thousands of pesos [that I could give]." She was paying for her daughter's pension and also helped her son who was a construction worker, earning a daily income of 300 pesos for a family of six, which is not enough to send his four children to school. She states "it's just that I'm the parent, I'm the mother, so it's expected that my son sometimes asks for some help from me" (G1CN3). However, the profit was halved (from around 3,000 pesos to 1,500 pesos daily) after her customers were displaced and "Now, my son cannot ask for help from me anymore. He feels shy because he can see my store is not in good business. So, he's not depending a lot now although he still asks for help sometimes." Her case illustrates how adverse livelihood impacts spilled over to the social domain of helping each other, undermining people's ability to carry out their social roles and responsibilities.

Running contrary to the accounts of the increased burden and difficulty of helping, interestingly, G2 finds the situation of family separation as burden-relieving. When his sisters lived next to his house before the clearance, they did not have work and often borrowed money from him. His wife made cooked food and he asked his sisters to sell it on street, trying to give them some income-earning opportunities. After his sisters were relocated, G2 states that he feels less burdened: “They were giving me problems when they were here because they always borrowed money from me. Now that they are far away, I don’t have any problems.” The imbalance in the relationship of helping was already such that his siblings “are not asking [for help] anymore because they still owe me a big debt. They are too shy to ask for help.” The case of G2 demonstrates that the nature of a relationship determined the way in which the social domain of non-displaced people was actually affected by displacement. Displacement of families, relatives, friends and neighbours does not necessarily create a significant social effect unless such relationship labels represented the actual depth of the relationship in question. In this regard, emotional responses to the rupture in their personal relationships varied and some remained indifferent (I9; I10). For instance, even when his buddies (*compare*), godparents (*ninong* and *ninang*) and cousins were relocated, I10 contends that “I was not really affected. Nothing changed. It’s just that they were gone.” That is, the social life of non-displaced people was affected only when they had ‘meaningful’ relationships with displaced people, which is also confirmed by the cases of people who had limited relationships with them and thus remained intact.

8.2.2. Limited relationships

A range of relationships had existed in the locality but their differences became clarified through the event of displacement, by which the social milieu of the remaining population was differentially affected depending on the type of their previous relationship with the displaced. Four main types of relationship were identified with varying degrees of social distance: (a) a close, personal relationship; (b) a functional, business-like relationship; (c) a civil relationship with a respectful distance and; (d) non-engagement through active distancing. The case of close and personal relationships was discussed in the previous section and the focus here is more on the other types of relationship, within which displacement had relatively minimal social implications.

It turned out that non-displaced people remained unaffected in their social domain when they had only limited or superficial relationships with the displaced in the first

place (H5; H7; H8; H11; I5; E9; D2). Some relationships were mainly functional, as non-displaced people had engaged with the social network formed around the informal settlement for their livelihoods. Unless the livelihood network overlapped with personal relationships, those whose livelihoods were adversely affected tend to describe the changes mainly in livelihood terms rather than in social terms. That is, for this group displaced people were merely their customers (A3) or service providers (D2; J3) and the local population change mattered only in those senses. In the case of unaffected self-employed people, in particular for more established or formal businesses, displaced people were not even part of their customer pool (A4, A5).

In comparison, for smaller businesses embedded in the neighbourhood, functional relationships were mixed with more personal ones, whereby they became friends with their customers (F2CN32) or their neighbours were also their customers (F3CN53). For example, one of I1's helpers at his canteen is a former neighbour who was displaced but returned from the relocation site. Nonetheless, when asked about his thoughts on the displacement of informal settlers, I1 said candidly that he did not care much about it because he only cared about his family. That is, in a functional relationship with displaced people, non-displaced people seem to be uninterested in the issues surrounding displacement and relocation as long as they can continue their livelihoods.

Others describe their relationship with displaced people primarily as being "civil" and respectful without having problems (D2; H5; J3). They knew each other, greeted each other and made casual conversation but were not really intimate (I1). Displaced people also verify such a distant relationship: "We minded our own business. It was civil" (H12). The social distance could be just as wide, as there were "no relationships" and they did not know informal settlers very well (H5) or had no friends in informal settlements despite the physical proximity (B1; H8).¹⁰⁷ This explains why and how some non-displaced people's social circles could remain intact despite the large-scale population change in the locality.

The origin of the limited relationships warrants further explanation. First, limited socialising in the neighbourhood emerged as a common feature in the accounts of social life among research participants. Many state that they are busy working and have no time for socialising or participating in community activities, thus demonstrating the

¹⁰⁷ With regard to the degree of intimacy, H8 makes an interesting distinction between "close friends" with whom she shares personal secrets or problems and "just friends" with whom she makes only mundane conversation. As an example of "just friends", she pointed to the security guard at the PNR train station near to her house.

social cost of working hard as discussed in Chapter 7 (A2; A3; A7; D1; E2; F1; F6; H8; H10; I5; J3). In particular, the low-income group seems to be occupied by work with demanding conditions or by multiple livelihood activities. “We don’t get involved [in any activities] because we’re busy with our work. We have to spend more time working” says H10, a tricycle driver who is always “on-call” to provide a service (H10CN18). Likewise, I5 contends that she does not like joining community or *barangay* activities because “It’s hard. I have a lot of work here, too busy.” Those who are moderately secure or better off like F1 also experience this trade-off between work and leisure:

“I’m envious of other people because they are not thinking about anything else and they’re just drinking all day. But I’m doing my work... for the family. [My wife] thought she was lucky because she was able to marry an industrious person. But the thing was that being too industrious made us so busy that we didn’t have any time to go out and do some bonding [...] as a family. I was able to realise that I need time for the family. [Also] I ran as a barangay officer. [...] But, I didn’t win the election because I was not that popular. I was not well known because I focused on my work at the bank and only a few people knew me. I had no other time to roam around and campaign” (F1CN49; F1CN52).

Limited interaction with people in the neighbourhood is contrasted by the aforementioned strong emphasis on the importance of family life. Some state explicitly that they do not mingle with other people and prefer to keep their life to themselves or limited to their family (E2; F4; G1; I1; H11). For example, upon being asked about the definition of community, H11 states: “I don’t recognise any community except for my immediate family. This is my own definition [of community] actually.” Likewise, H8 says that “[Every day] I will do my regular routine for my family and I don’t care much [about my neighbours].” To some extent, social interaction is also a matter of a personal preference and choice. For instance, H12 identifies herself as a “home person” who prefers to interact only with those whom she wants to. Some find it difficult to get along with people in the locality, contending that they do not enjoy or want to “gossip” with others (H7; F4), whereas it seems to be one of the favourite pastimes of others.

Furthermore, the social distance from displaced people seem to suggest the additional potential for there to be some underlying divides. The previous chapters demonstrate that urban residents experienced local changes differently depending on the kind of socio-economic life that they established in and around the informal settlement. This could have also worked as multiple dividing lines, along or across which social relationships were or were not formed. Such divides were not readily visible to me when residents were mixed together in a seemingly homogeneous settlement and emerged more clearly after people were torn apart through displacement. Throughout this chapter, I attempt to tease out potential dividing lines in terms of land and housing

arrangement type and livelihood status as discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, whenever they are relevant.

In particular, land and housing arrangement type turns out to form the most obvious basis on which differentiations are made. D2 argues that the line between formal and informal settlers was known to, and respected by, both parties:

“everybody beyond this line [sic] are the legitimate residents. Everybody, these houses that are left behind [after the clearance], these are on private lots. [...] There was a certain unwritten rule. They [informal settlers] knew who the legitimate residents in this area are, so they sort of respected us. They didn’t touch us” (D2).

Displaced people also confirm that a social divide existed along the formality of tenure, by contending that they were not interested in interacting with formal settlers either. E4 moved into a building formally owned by her mother-in-law after her own house was demolished but still keeps her distance from formal residents: “I don’t like them, they are not really good. I’m not close to them. They are not really my friends. [...] We are very different from each other. They have their own friends and I have my own” (E4). Other non-displaced ‘informal’ settlers maintain the same position vis-à-vis formal settlers: “We don’t mingle [with people across the street]. We don’t want to. They are air-headed [arrogant] people” (H9). There was a similar divide among business owners, notably between formal shop owners or renters (A4; A5) and street or sidewalk vendors, one of whom expresses the distance in class terms: “Those ones from the other side [of the street] have big stores and I think they are already rich. We are not close because we are at different levels, coming from different classes” (I2).

However, a simple categorisation of formal and informal settlers does not explain certain fine differences in the way people accessed land and housing (as discussed in Section 6.4.1). Notably, legitimate land users differentiate themselves from informal users whom they see as “illegitimate” for not having the official approval for using a piece of land in the first place (B2; J9). For instance, families of former Philippine National Railways (PNR) employees were allowed to build a house on PNR land decades ago. Having enjoyed greater security of stay, both psychologically and perhaps practically, until they were affected by the current clearance, they differentiate themselves from other informal land users. For instance, I4 makes it clear when talking about a delta area nearby the Tutuban Station that was given to previous PNR employees and where his by-now demolished house used to stand: “It’s really residential, not a squatter area. [...] it was really good because it was not a squatter area.” The sense of legitimacy also increased when land users had paid the land owner.


For example, D1 identifies herself and her neighbours as “original” people in the area who paid the PNR for using its land, unlike those who came later and did not pay anything. Likewise, those who are in transition to become formal land owners stand out as a distinctive group, whose status is often expressed in terms of Home Owners’ Association (HOA) membership (J8; E10). By definition, HOA membership was not extended to tenants, indicating another divide between house owners and renters. For instance, H2, renting within BLISS housing (public housing for government employees; see Section 6.3.2), comments: “There are BLISS associations but we are not [house] owners. That’s why we are not involved in them.”

Apart from tenure security, the quality of housing or living environment also seems to generate different senses of security even among informal settlers. A1 owns an informal house on land that belongs to the City Government and is aware of her land status: “You can consider us as squatters also. Because we, all the houses here, we have no land titles.” Nonetheless, she thinks that the living environment was worse, particularly more dangerous, along the railway where her sisters lived prior to the clearance:

“In my opinion, I think it is better now [for displaced people]. Because I always told them: “it’s not very decent to live on the side of the railroad because you’re like rats, just staying in little houses; until now you don’t own your house [and are squatting].” So, when I accompanied my sisters to San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, I felt rather happy for them because when they got there, there was already a house for them. Unlike here, you couldn’t sleep very well because of the accidents; you might think that sometimes the train would crush your house because, you know, the railway before, they’re not really connected. [...] sometimes a train would come off the rails and hit some houses in Simon. So, it’s very dangerous to live along the railroad.”

The physical layout of settlements also affected the way in which communal spaces were organised, thereby influencing the formation of relationships. In some areas, informal settlements along the railway tracks were previously neighboured with another set of settlements, with a street at the centre running parallel to the railway and separating the two (Figure 15). In many cases, informal houses had two doors, one facing the street side and the other the railway side, thus allowing the residents to access and utilise both open spaces on the railway tracks and on the street.

Figure 12: Land clearance in a mixed settlement of formal and informal residences



The demolition of informal houses opened up a vast area in front of the remaining houses. This seemingly clear physical divide between those to be displaced and those to remain was not so obvious before the clearance since residents on both sides often formed a common neighbourhood centred on the street in the middle. For example, in the area nearby Laon Laan Station, where the previous Master's research was mainly conducted, the residents of both settlements mingled together so closely that it was difficult to tell who came from which side and who was going to lose a house through the clearance. They used to share everything in daily life and established a strong community organisation. The difference in their tenure status became clear to me only after the community was torn apart by the clearance. On the contrary, elsewhere (e.g. nearby Dimasalang Bridge), not much interaction existed between the two sides, with the street in the middle symbolising a dividing line (H9). Other physical elements might have also influenced the way in which people formed or did not form relationships. For instance, a creek passing through informal settlements seems to have divided non-displaced people living on the City Government land from those on the PNR land who are now displaced. I5 recalls: "We were not really close [to displaced people] because we had to take another road to reach that part." On the contrary, others developed close relationships despite the creek separating them from each other (J5).

In sum, through forced population movement, fine divisions emerged among the residents in the railway area, across which only limited relationships existed. While it might have reflected a broader tendency of limited socialising in some urban settlements or simply a personal preference, the spatial aspects of social interaction

such as land and housing arrangement and the physical layout of settlements turned out to be relevant in affecting the way in which people differentiated themselves from others, in particular displaced informal settlers. However, a cautionary reminder needs to be made that the formality of land and housing status does not neatly divide displaced and non-displaced people. Likewise, I do not intend to indicate that displaced people formed a socially distinctive group or that the pattern of social interaction in the area could be retrospectively analysed by the mere factor of whether or not one was displaced. As discussed in Chapter 6, the divide between displaced and non-displaced people was artificially created by a cut-off line for demolition that went through the existing settlements where two groups might not have been so different. As much as there can be differences between non-displaced and displaced people, it should also be noted that both groups are heterogeneous in themselves. Despite the caveat, in the post-displacement evaluations, the possibility has arisen that non-engagement with displaced people might have been an active choice driven by certain negative perceptions about them. In the next section, I discuss how the collective change in the living environment and social ambience is differently perceived.

8.3. Changes in the local ambience

In addition to the diverse patterns in which individual relationships were transformed *in situ* or remained intact by the large-scale displacement, displacement had the collective effect of transforming the social composition of the area, thereby changing the overall ambience of the locality. The most obvious change following displacement is a significant population reduction, which is noted by both non-displaced and displaced people. The magnitude of the demographic change was dramatic, as illustrated by the *barangay* of J5 where the number of registered voters decreased from around 2,800 people to 800 people through displacement. Likewise, in the *barangay* of H4 the total of around 1,400 people was displaced in two batches, leaving around 1,000 residents behind. Evaluations of a collective change differed depending on people's assessment of what the living environment was like before, which appeared to be further influenced by the kind of relationships they had with, and their perceptions about, the displaced population. At the same time, some people, both displaced and non-displaced, demonstrate the capacity to evaluate the societal change in a less subjective and more balanced way.

8.3.1. “Better environment” after the clearance

It is commonly recalled that the area was very “noisy” before the clearance as many people stayed till late, singing, talking and drinking – and often fighting (I6; I8; J7; D2; F6; A7; E7; H3; I4). Accordingly, the dominant description of the area after the clearance is that it is now much quieter with “fewer people” (E1; E5; E7; E9; E10; H3; H5; H8; I4; I5; I8; J3). The evaluation of a local change remains more or less a neutral observation so long as it is primarily about the ‘number’ of people. However, when the focus is on the ‘kind’ of people who disappeared from the locality after the clearance, evaluations tends to reflect certain perceptions about displaced people. For instance, some people think that displaced people were noisy and “unruly” (J2; J4). A *barangay* street sweeper explains that the area is “less noisy and quieter because of fewer community fights. It is because there are fewer people now. Before, there was fighting almost every day in the squatter area” (H3). Likewise, H5 compares the area before and after the clearance, suggesting that the displacement of informal settlers was the biggest factor: “Before, it was crowded. It was dirty with a lot of garbage. Now, it’s quieter and cleaner. [...] Now, we have fewer people, fewer noisy and unruly people; no drunkards.” There was also a popular stereotyping of them as being lazy (A4) or being idle, with H8 calling them “bystanders”: “It was noisy [before] because of bystanders, people who stayed along the street, doing nothing.”

Negative perceptions about displaced people became more obvious in the evaluation of the societal impacts of the clearance, which is seen as having ‘removed’ the previous problems in the area that commentators associate with displaced informal settlers, either implicitly or explicitly. Many ‘problematic’ behaviours are identified, including drinking (A1, B1), gambling (A1, B1; I8), fighting, minor offences such as “hold-upping” or snatching (A4; D2; I8; J1; J3), and major offences such as drug dealing (D2, E5, E9) and murder (E5). Some non-displaced people contend that they refrained from interacting with displaced people, rather actively, as an attempt to keep away from perceived or real problems:

“You cannot trust them completely. It’s hard to explain... (but) some of them are into drugs, gambling... and they are hold-uppers, they steal things. That’s the way they live. That’s why I stay here in my canteen and don’t like to go out. I don’t really mingle with them.” (I1)

In particular, fighting is the most mentioned problem, ranging from a quarrel to group fighting, which is locally called a “riot” (A5; A7; D2; H4; G2; I5; I4; He; I8; J5; J7). It is

understood to have taken place under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or over gambling, and they tend to be mentioned together as if coming in a package:

“Before, it was disorderly and very populated; too many children, too much fighting, troubles. [...] Children always made trouble and when they were fighting, their parents were also fighting. They were connected!” (G2)

“There were different kinds of people; it was not good. [...] They had riots, fights, big riots – a lot of people were fighting (like) gang wars. [...] Some of them were drug addicts. Some were killed” (I5).

Furthermore, there is a popular perception that informal settlers were deeply involved in drug dealing,¹⁰⁸ either as sellers (called “drug-pushers”) or users (described as “drug addicts”), or sometimes both (J3). Some state that informal settlers were only sellers and that users came from outside (I7), whereas others say it was the other way around (I6). In many places, however, drug dealing is now regarded as a thing of the past, partly due to the displacement of informal settlers and partly as a consequence of the *barangay* regulations (e.g. H4):

“[There were] drugs, yes, along the railway. People in the railway settlement were like mixed, mixed people. And there were people selling drugs along the railway but now there’re no drugs anymore. Also, because of the barangay captain, the barangay captain really caught those people. I’m not sure about other places. But, here, none. [...] People who bought drugs came from other places” (I7).

For embodying these traits, displaced informal settlers were seen as problems in themselves, i.e. as being “not good” or “having vices” (A5; H11; I4; I5; B1): “They [the displaced] are not decent people because they have vices. Drinking alcohol and gambling. They really want fight” (D2). For the same reason of drug dealing and heavy drinking, E9 thought the displaced were “really bad people” and actively distanced himself from such “bad influences”:

“I really didn’t go outside of my house. I just went to buy beer and cigarettes. I saw people there [in the informal settlement or along the railway] but really didn’t stay outside. I stayed outside only when I was selling lugaw [rice porridge]. They were bad influences [...] because if you stayed outside, maybe before a long time, you might be attracted too. It’s like a communicable thing. So, I didn’t stay out”.

Likewise, B1 did not interact with informal settlers on the same ground that: “They are not decent people. Although we are also poor people, they are not decent people, because they sometimes have vices. So, we don’t want to be close with them. [...] Drinking alcohol and gambling. It was not really good before. They really wanted to fight.” Reflecting who they identify with or differentiate themselves from, these negative perceptions about others in general or informal settlers along the railway in

¹⁰⁸ When the type of drug was specified, it was usually marijuana but sometimes cocaine (which is locally called *shabu*) (E9; I6).

particular appear to have marked out the boundary of social interaction, thereby providing a basis for having little or no relationships with displaced people (A5; B1; E9; I5).

Negative perceptions seem to be more pronounced among the better-off group whose livelihood score is higher than others, although such perceptions are shared across different livelihood status categories. As an acute illustration, D2 (whose livelihood score I rate as one of the highest (7.5 points) in the sample by virtue of being a private land and housing owner and having worked in big companies for a long time) articulates how different her and her neighbours (“legitimate” residents) are from informal settlers (“squatters”) on all grounds. In terms of livelihoods: “most of them are like ambulant vendors, food vendors, selling goods like slippers or T-shirts on the sidewalk. Things like those. Or peddy cab drivers. Compared to the legitimate residents, [who] are professionals.” In her family, her siblings are an accountant, a teacher and an engineer.¹⁰⁹ She also comments on socio-cultural differences in terms of norms, values and lifestyles, with a particular emphasis on the behavioural and perceptual differences in terms of attitudes, morals, beliefs, life goals and aspirations:

“... the sense of value is so different. Like their norms and morals are... how do I say it? It’s so different. Like a scale one to ten, legit residents are like on seven, eight to nine, theirs is like five below. Like they value luxurious things even if they cannot afford it, they will spurge on it. A lot of young ladies there before went to Japan as entertainers. And then, when they came back, they had so much money, I think, so they spurge on this and a few months after, zero, back to their old ways again. So, it’s like they didn’t have any plans in the future. And the time-honoured Filipino values, from what I see, they totally ignored it or ... They forgot it. I don’t know what happened. For example, they cursed all the time. They cursed. That’s the punctuation mark of the sentences. And their children were bare-footed, even half-naked running under the heat of the sun. ... it’s so different..!”

The accounts of D2 suggest a potential link between the distance in terms of livelihood status and unfavourable perceptions about differently positioned others. Those holding negative perceptions about informal settlers were not only socially unaffected but moreover tend to welcome the changes in the local social ambiance after the clearance. Their comments about the post-clearance railway area are exactly opposite to what they described regarding how it was before. The overall opinion is that the area has become a better living environment compared to before since “bad elements” (D2) or people with “vices” (E5) are gone. Even those people who lost the whole or part of their house, which also affected their home-based business, frame the removal of “squatters” positively as they thought such people had created problems in the locality (H11; I4).

¹⁰⁹ In the Philippines engineers or architects are perceived as highly specialised professionals and have a respectful position in society.

H11 changed his view of the clearance over time, in particular, after he saw actual changes in the locality himself:

N: What did you think about the project at that time, three years ago?

H11: It's not good because our house, our extension would be removed.

N: Now that the railway is upgraded and there is a new train, what do you think about that?

H11: Good. Good environment.

N: Why do you think it's a good environment now?

H11: Because bad elements were removed. Many people here were very bad. Hold-uppers, snatchers; now they are gone.

Others chime in by contending that it is more orderly (D3) or offers better peace and order (H3; H8; D2; J3), with fewer crimes (A4). Barangay officers find it easier to manage the area (H3; H4; H8). After losing about 1,500 people through relocation, H4 as a *barangay* chairman thinks that his work is easier now because he has fewer unruly people (or “hard-headed” people in his own words) to deal with. Consequently, he says that there are fewer problems such as snatching, street fights, family issues and drugs. Accordingly, some are quite “happy” about this new and better environment and feel that previous problems have disappeared (E9; J3; J9). However, these positive evaluations of a social change grounded on negative perceptions of displaced people need to be examined against the accounts of other people who demonstrate a more balanced approach to the situation.

8.3.2. “Happier before” with many people

Running contrary to the predominantly negative description of the social ambiance along the railway before the clearance, others suggest different accounts, thereby putting the view of non-displaced people in perspective. During the previous research along the railway, a lively communal space was observed within and around the informal settlement. Displaced people included in the current research also verify that there used to be a tight-knit community wherein people shared their daily lives as well as eventful moments (E3; E4). Displaced people tend to describe their ‘community’ or social life in the informal settlement in a positive way, being more lively and “happier” before when a lot of people lived all together (A8; E6). They used to throw big birthday parties which were enjoyed by extended families and neighbours (A8). Communal events such as fiesta were celebrated grandiosely by a large number of residents in the area (E6). For example, a returnee recalls:

“Before, we had a good relationship with neighbours because most people living here [informal settlements along the railway] came from my province... I already knew some of them from Mindanao and met others here... We shared rice, food... and drank to get relaxed before we went to sleep – just enough for sleeping well. [...] There was not a problem before because it’s one way of mingling with them. You have to be patient and consider others as well” (I2).

Accordingly, their response to a social change in the area is markedly different from the welcoming remarks on social changes by non-displaced people. The predominant sentiment is that even though they have returned to, or have stayed in, the same area, their social relationships have been dismantled and they feel lonely and sad (I9; E4), missing the time when they socialised with neighbours (E4):

“It has become a sad place because there are no houses and people any more. [...] It was happier before. For example, in the afternoon, there used to be a lot of chica or chismiss [talking or gossiping]. [...] Before, we were like relatives because we were living here for a long time. And then, instantly, they (my neighbours) were removed. [...] I’m sad” (I6).

“It was better before when there were more people. [...] We used to have parties in this area. There were more activities. Now we have fewer activities as there are no people anymore” (H12).

As was shown in the case of close relationships, depending on the social proximity to displaced people, non-displaced people also think that the social ambiance was better before when there were more people and many activities (J6).¹¹⁰

However, it is not that displaced people always paint a rosy picture of the pre-clearance railway area; they were well aware of the problems that existed in the informal settlement prior to the clearance and presented an impersonal evaluation of the situation without imbuing it with their personal experience of displacement and hardship. For instance, I3 – whose house and canteen were demolished – explains that there were a lot of drug “pushers” selling “shabu” (cocaine), drug addicts and snatchers in the area. In this regard, I8, who stayed in the area after her rental house was demolished, does think of the change positively: “It’s quieter unlike before when it was noisy. [...] it’s better compared to before. It was noisy. You saw people fighting with each other and doing a lot of *chismiss* [gossiping].”

More importantly, some research participants demonstrate broader perspectives by relating the problems that are often described as individual traits of informal settlers to the structural issues of poverty and the lack of livelihoods. For instance, A3 comments

¹¹⁰ Note that it is not always the case that emotional responses reflect the social proximity. For instance, F4 found it difficult to engage with her neighbours due to different religious views but still felt “sad” about their displacement.

on the changes after the clearance: “Problems will not disappear as long as poverty continues. Sometimes, people who don’t have anything to eat think of hold-upping [snatching]. Hold-upping is a normal thing [but] it happens only sometimes, not all the time.” Likewise, although mentioning that “squatters” were not really good people, I4 notes that the deeper problem is the lack of work: “Because of poverty, that’s why they [squatters] were like that [snatching]. They did not have work.” Similarly, J9 also notes that displaced people along the railway tended to go into illicit businesses because they did not have jobs.

Others provide insights into the complexity of the social problems surrounding the informal settlement without making a wholesale judgement such as “all informal settlers were bad” by noting that there are “mixed” or “different” people in the railway area, including both “good” and “bad” people (J4; I10):

“Before and until now, there’re a lot of squatters and mixed people. There are good people and bad people. ... [By bad people] I don’t really mean that they are totally bad. It’s just that [they become bad when] they are on liquor or drugs” (I10).

In regard to drug dealing, H10 elaborates how it was carried out ‘within’ informal settlements, not necessarily ‘by’ residents there. He argues that drug dealing has increased in his area where the remaining informal houses still stand close to the railway tracks (about 5 metres away from the centre of the tracks). Such houses function as walls protecting any activities taking place on the railway tracks from being seen by outsiders. In comparison, neighbouring areas were cleared to as wide as more than 15 metres away from the rail tracks, making it difficult to do any illicit transactions there. Hence, drug dealers come to his area where they can hide away:

“More people are drug dealers now. In my view, more people are selling drugs [...] because fewer people are observing them, their business. So, they’re free to move (around). [...] It’s because other areas have no houses and this is the only area with houses [along the railway]. That’s why there are more drug-deals here. Other areas are cleared now so they [drug dealers] can’t stay there. [...] Transactions are done by people not from this area. They just transact here.”

The account of H10 demonstrates that informal settlements might have been used as a venue for illicit businesses rather than as shelter for those involved in such businesses. Similarly, A4 reports that thieves or snatchers used to run away into informal settlements, the structures of which were too complicated for the police to track them down easily. These accounts of the living conditions in and around the informal settlements are valuable for balancing out the predominantly negative evaluations of informal settlers. They also function as an important guide for avoiding stereotyping of

informal settlers or reinforcing the popular perception, whilst enhancing our understanding of social problems beyond the simple labelling of the 'squatter' phenomenon.

8.4. Communal activities

Independently of different evaluations, a noticeable feature of the social change in the locality is a near absence of community organisations, which had proliferated prior to the event. On the one hand, the dearth of accounts on 'community' may have methodological bearings as discussed in Chapter 4, whereby the concept or the label of 'community' did not appeal to people very much during the interviews, who found it difficult to define what 'community' means for them. A few general features of community emerge in the way that people draw a mental boundary around what they think makes up a 'community' or 'neighbourhood', mainly by identifying with certain people and differentiating themselves from others.

A sense of community tends to develop among people in the immediate residential perimeter where they are better known to each other and thus personal relationships are likely to develop over time. Acquaintance as opposed to anonymity – such as knowing one's neighbours by name or at least by face – is a proxy indicator for one's neighbourhood (E1C8). In this regard, the length of residency may contribute to a stronger sense of community. Within long-established settlements along the railway tracks, families have lived for generations, making it a natal place for some research participants (e.g. B3; H8; I4; I9). For instance, H8 was born on Algeciras Street where her families have been living since her father moved 36 years ago in 1974; she thus identifies herself as an "Algeciranian." In comparison, in transient communities where urban residents are highly mobile, they may remain anonymous to each other and the sense of community may therefore be relatively low. H2 contends along this line: "I am not close to my neighbours here. Everything is transient and people have no time to get to know each other, unlike in the province."

Social proximity is often expressed in terms of physical distance such as 'here' and 'there', i.e. an immediate neighbourhood versus an area a few blocks or streets away (B1; J4; H8). For instance, I7 makes such comparison between here and there (emphasis added): "in *this* area people were really kind and were not abusive. So, if there were people who built houses, they just let them. [By 'not abusive' I mean] not arrogant, unlike people from *other* places. For example, [in other places] if people build

a house in front of you then you'll threaten them out." It seems that people describe unknown 'others' in a more negative manner and associate problems such as drug dealing with them (J4). In view of this, it may be difficult to develop a strong sense of community when members are more heterogeneous than homogeneous (E2; I4). For example, E2 explains that the social composition of her area has changed over time from mostly PNR employees to a mixed group of people including many market vendors who are not at home very much. With a mixed group, people see both 'good' and 'bad' elements and find it difficult to identify themselves with such a neighbourhood.

Heterogeneity is central to understanding urban communities, as social dynamics vary from one urban settlement to another and thus it would be difficult to draw an overarching picture of social changes. Nonetheless, the weakening of community organisations seems to characterise the collective change across different areas along the railway. During the Master's research when land clearance and displacement were still ongoing, it was evident that such organisations were central to people's daily lives in preparing for, or even resisting, relocation. Both non-governmental organisations and people's organisations were so active in the area that local people could choose an organisation that they wanted to join. A common aim of the organisations was to secure a place to move to after displacement and residents joined them, taking it as a kind of assurance that they would get a relocation house (A1; F5; F8; J6): "There were many organisations [before the clearance] ... helping people ensure that their name would be listed and they would get a house [in the relocation site]. Because if you did not belong to an association, it would be very hard to get a house" (G2CN19). There was even a rivalry between organisations as they tried to become the leading organisation in the relocation site or "wanted to have the power" there (F5CN18).

In the process of relocation, however, most community organisations went through fundamental changes as their leaders as well as members were dispersed to different relocation sites. Once the acute issue of relocation was somehow resolved, organisations practically dissolved (A1C30; D1; F5C30). Even the persistent ones, such as the vendors' association in Caloocan, watered down their activism with the sharp decrease in membership they experienced (for example, from more than 100 vendors to 50 vendors), while both its president and vice-president were displaced (F7). Some organisations transferred to the relocation sites (Choi 2008) or people started their

own organisations in their relocation areas (A1).¹¹¹ However, from the perspective of non-displaced people, the dissolution or the transfer of organisations means that the presence of organisations has substantially weakened in the railway area.

To some extent, this needs to be understood as part of the natural rise and fall that any organisation undergoes. For example, a community organisation that B1 was an active member of when she was younger faded as its members aged and even passed away. When community organising is centred on a few strong leaders, organisations can be more easily destabilised by changes in the leadership while transient members remain passive or less committed (D1; F5). That is, factors other than the population loss through displacement might also explain the weak presence of community organisations in the post-displacement railway area. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the dramatic population change caused by displacement gave rise to an intensive emergence of organisations and accelerated the typically observed cyclical changes affecting them.

After the clearance, there are still ongoing threats of eviction and the like and collective attempts are still being made to address the issue through community organising and political negotiations (see Section 6.4.2). Also, it is noted that help was stretched beyond personal relationships and was collectively organised to reach out to the former neighbours or residents of a *barangay*. When Metro Manila and its surrounding areas were flooded by the notorious typhoon Ondoy (internationally known as Ketsana) in 2009, the *barangay* of F2 organised a visit to assist former residents who are now living in Marilao, one of the relocation sites that was badly affected by the typhoon (F2CN32). Such extended support is often political in nature, as well as being philanthropic. For instance, one *barangay* chairman takes the opportunity to help his former constituents even three years after their relocation because: “I consider them [relocated people] as part of the *barangay*, as part of my responsibility. [...] I visit them. I also have a house there. I go there myself and provide those [needed] services. ... [Although] they’re already registered with a *barangay* there, I visit them out of my own good will” (H4).

¹¹¹ Organisations transferred to the relocation sites were often completely restructured in the process of configuring their identity and role in a new environment. When previous organisations from the railway area lost control and power with their presidents becoming ‘ordinary people’ in a relocation site, new organisations emerged, particularly those officially promoted and organised by the National Housing Authority (NHA): “the president [of a new organisation] would be the assistant, the right hand, of the NHA and would manage the place” (F5CN21).

However, the previously strong presence of community organisations in the railway area is not felt any more. Only a handful of people talk about a collective entity such as a ‘community’ or a communal life and social life in the post-clearance locality now seems to be rather more loosely organised. Talking is a common pastime depicted in a range of ways such as greeting, chatting, having a conversation and gossiping. Some play cards, bingo or other games like “tongit” (H12). Basketball, the most popular sports in the Philippines, is played in the neighbourhood and a tournament is organised by the *barangay* office. The *barangay* appears to be at the centre of communal life, while a few mention religious organisations¹¹² and HOAs as examples of organisations in the locality. Some research participants have served in a *barangay* position, mostly as an elected councillor called a “*kagawad*” (e.g. A1; H7), or are currently working as part of the *barangay* (e.g. H4 as a chairman, H8 as a *kagawad*, and H3 as *tanod* or *barangay* security guard).¹¹³ *Barangays* run livelihood programmes making stuffed toys, processed food, sweets and soap, or organise community activities like “green revolution” or cleaning the neighbourhood (H7; H4). However, such activities are common to other *barangays* too and this underlines that the community ambience is now certainly much less dynamic than before when there were many people and more pressing issues.

8.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I examine how non-displaced people experienced and evaluated the social changes that occurred as a result of the large-scale displacement in their locality. The main hypothesis is that the implications of a social change vary depending on the kind of social relationships that they had with the displaced, their perceptions about the railway area when informal settlements existed and the extent to which they differentiated or distanced themselves from informal settlers or the urban poor in general. An implicit assumption behind this proposition is that people’s material position in terms of housing and livelihood status may influence their perceptions about self and other, which may further affect their social interaction. Although these

¹¹² For example, D3 is a member of “Couples for Christ” and identifies it as her community organisation. Likewise, F4 belongs to a group called “Born Again” and presents it as her main reference group.

¹¹³ Both *barangay* chairman and *kagawad* are honorary positions rather than job positions, receiving only a nominal salary although the amount varies according to the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) that is in proportion of the population in a given City/Municipality and is also allotted to *barangays* accordingly. For instance, H4 as a *barangay* chairman receives 1,000 pesos per month and *kagawad* receives 600 pesos.

links were not neatly identified, multiple dividing lines are revealed more clearly through the DIDR event.

The most notable finding is that those who had close relationships with displaced people were affected by separation from families and neighbours, either emotionally or practically, whereas those who had distant or limited relationships with them experienced minimal change in their social milieu. Furthermore, people exhibited different responses to a social change depending on their material positions and relationships with the displaced. Some negative perceptions about informal settlers emerged strongly among non-displaced people, who had little interaction with them and welcomed the changes in the local ambiance after the displacement. However, the line between the displaced and the non-displaced should be regarded as arbitrary one rather than as an explanatory variable in relation to the social impacts.

I conclude with another caveat, in that the significance of the social impacts discussed in this chapter needs to be weighed against that of the housing and livelihood impacts. Even for non-displaced people, the housing impact was substantial, especially for those whose house was partially affected, and also when it was translated further into impacts on home-based income-earning activities. People spoke out most strongly about the implications of a change to their assets and livelihoods, some with strong emotions such as feeling 'sad' or 'depressed' about their losses. In comparison, although considerable imprints were left in individual and collective social domains, social impacts were far more subtly expressed and it would be difficult to give equal importance to such impacts. The overall evaluation of the railway clearance and subsequent changes in the locality need to be examined altogether in view of their multidimensional impacts on individual households. This will be presented in the last concluding chapter.

Chapter 9

Discussion and Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

Through a case study of the railway-upgrading project in Metro Manila, this research has examined the impacts of land clearance on the urban locality and the remaining residents who were not physically displaced by the project. The physical environment of the project area was transformed a great deal by the demolition of informal houses, and local socio-economic relationships were reconfigured as a consequence of a large-scale population displacement. For the remaining local residents, such changes in situ functioned as a micro-level shock to the complex manner in which they organised their housing, livelihoods and social milieu. In this concluding chapter, I discuss the combined impacts in order to delineate their interconnected implications for the relevant bodies of knowledge and underline the contribution I hope to have made. First, for the distributional discussion in the field of development-induced displacement (DID), from which my research set out initially, the findings enrich the knowledge basis on which to make an effective critique of a managerial approach to development impacts. Second, the experience of non-displaced urban residents provide a fresh perspective to unpacking the ways in which broader urban changes translate into tangible outcomes, of which DID is one specific kind. I conclude the chapter by briefly making suggestions for policy intervention and future research intend to deepen the understanding of the differential impacts in an urban DID context.

9.2 Discussion of research findings

The research on the in situ impacts of an urban infrastructure project started with three explorative questions (Chapter 1). I answered the first one by identifying who non-displaced people were and explained why and how they remained in the locality

while others were displaced by the railway clearance. Unlike displaced people who were confronted by the challenge of having to reconstruct their life in a new environment, non-displaced people experienced socio-spatial changes in their locality following the DID event and its examination constitutes answers to the second question. Third, I analysed the diverse ways in which non-displaced people were affected by local changes, including non-impacts, paying particular attention to those who became more vulnerable. Based on the reconstructed understandings of their life conditions prior to the event, I could tease out different implications of impacts and varying degrees of coping capacity. In this section, I summarise multiple impacts together, first by discussing informality as a common thread and second by explaining the complex patterns in which one household experiences a change differently across life domains.

9.2.1. The persistence of informality: strategy vs. vulnerability

To secure an operational area for improved train services, a line was drawn on a very compact urban settlement formed along the railway tracks, arbitrarily dividing the residents to be removed and those to stay. Unlike displaced people whose informal houses were targeted for demolition, it was not the case that all of the remaining residents were informal settlers. In many cases, formal settlers' accommodation remained intact thanks to their secure tenure, and this is demonstrated acutely by those who were in the process of tenure formalisation. However, it was found that informal land use is pervasive even after the large informal settlements were demolished and a considerable portion of non-displaced people in my sample are still informal settlers living on public or private land. They survived the clearance not because their tenure was secure or they were given a 'choice' to remain, but mainly because they lived beyond the line marking off the project area. Their informal land use status is an on-going source of instability as the sense of tenure insecurity increased after a round of demolition and some people are indeed suffering from actual threats of eviction.

In addition to directly removing informal settlements from the local landscape, the railway project generated the indirect effect of formalising the use of urban spaces that had long been left unregulated and thus open to spontaneous use for housing and livelihood activities. Through the land clearance for the railway project, the authority regained control over the spaces around the railway tracks and continues to regulate their informal use. Interestingly, with the intensified regulation and the subsequently increased sense of formality, a glimpse of gentrification emerges as the formal owners

of land and buildings in the area see potential in capitalising on 'better' or 'more beautiful' environments where the informal houses are now gone. Although more research needs to be conducted on the gentrifying effect of an urban infrastructure project, if substantiated, this suggests that an urban infrastructure project as a form of urban planning contributes indirectly to a broad formalisation process, which further paves the way for private land development initiatives.

It is not only the informality of tenure (i.e. access to land for housing) that became vulnerable at the time of formal urban change. Informality is found to be a pervasive mode of arranging and investing in resources among the residents living in and around informal settlements, regardless of whether or not they are informal settlers themselves. Hence, even though non-displaced people did not lose their residential house completely, some of them experienced tangible impacts on their physical capital stock by having part of their house demolished or by losing a rental house or a shop that they owned in the informal settlement. This had a secondary impact on livelihoods when the lost space was used for income-earning activities or as a source of income, resulting in a double loss whereby the investment in a physical asset was foregone and the income generated from it was also lost.

Accompanying such physical transformations are less visible and more subtle changes stemming from the displacement of informal settlers, which reconfigured the socio-economic relationships in the local economy. As for the physical capital stock, it turned out that non-displaced people were widely engaged in the local livelihood networks consisting of customers, goods and service providers, middlemen, personnel for delivery and sales people. As long as they were part of these local economic networks, their home- or neighbourhood-based livelihoods were affected by the rupture following the loss of a large population. Consequently, business owners or street traders operating in the local economy experienced a decline in their business and household income to the extent that subsistence businesses making marginal profits were put on the verge of extinction.

Adversely affected livelihoods underline the important role that locally embedded social capital played in providing a pool of people who enabled and offered multiple small income-earning opportunities. In this regard, locality as a function of location and the scale of the economy is critical for those who sustain themselves by selling a number of relatively cheap products or by providing services at a low price. This is one of the prime reasons why urban residents strive to stay in the city, particularly in urban

centres like the densely populated settlements along the railway (location) where they find abundant livelihood opportunities (the scale of the economy) even though the overall purchasing power in the area may not be so high. The importance of locally embedded opportunities is also underlined by displaced people who have stayed on or returned to the area, mainly for the purpose of continuing their livelihoods.

However, informality as a widespread livelihood strategy in urban areas was undermined and became a source of vulnerability in the process of a formal, planned change. A range of resource arrangements that existed previously under the neglect of authorities or even with official approval was delegitimised when the urban planning regime tightened its grip over urban resources (including urban spaces) and did not recognise the value of investment in, or the ownership of, informally accessed resources for compensation. Once again, this demonstrates that urban planning has a formalising effect by which the fluidity between formality and informality is closed down and a rigid notion of legality comes in to regulate the way urban lives are organised. The tension between the informal mode of living and the formal framework for planning raises important questions for urban governance about whether and how 'informality' can be incorporated into formal planning. This issue will be discussed again later and in the next section, I provide an integrated picture of the impacts, the complex patterns of which in fact underline the connectedness between formality and informality.

9.2.2. Selective engagement with informality and differential impacts

Urban residents were affected by local changes to the extent that they organised their resources, livelihoods and social relationships within by-now demolished informal settlements. Such engagement and subsequent impacts were widely observed among people with varying degrees of tenure and livelihood security. For instance, formal settlers managed income-generating activities within the local informal economy and, conversely, many formal contractual workers were also found to be living in informal settlements. That urban residents engage with informality selectively across different life domains leads to two important impact outcomes: (a) a household was affected differently across life domains, with some experiencing multiple adverse impacts; and (b) a substantial proportion of the researched households remained unaffected in any of the domains.

A table in the Appendix (A1.2) substantiates these points by summarising how each household was affected in the domain of housing and livelihoods. When considered together, there are 42 affected households (out of 67), with 11 households experiencing only a housing impact, 13 households only a livelihood impact, and 18 households impacts in both domains.

Table 11 Combined impact patterns across housing and livelihoods

Housing impact only	11 households	42 households
Livelihood impact only	13 households	
Housing and livelihood impacts	18 households	
No impacts	25 households	67 households in total

First, households being affected only in one domain indicate that people can move in and out of formal and informal sectors across life domains. That is, being informal in one domain does not necessarily mean that their status in other domains is also informal. On the other hand, the 18 households that were affected in both housing and livelihood terms demonstrate the pervasiveness of informality across life domains. Non-displaced people whose life was very much embedded in the local environment might have experienced increased tenure insecurity after losing part of their residential house, their shop in the informal settlement was demolished and their livelihood as well as support networks were undermined (e.g. F3). In this regard, displaced people who lost their house completely are likely to have experienced multiple impacts and in fact make up half of the doubly affected group (nine out of 18 households) as the demolition of their whole settlement often meant the dissolution of their socio-economic environment as well. Lastly, it is noteworthy that a substantial number of households (25 out of 67) remained unaffected despite living close to the demolished informal settlements, thereby reinforcing the first point that urban residents engage with informality selectively.

Differentiations and divisions also emerged among urban residents living in a compact area in the ways in which their social milieu was affected by local changes. Whereas quite a few non-displaced people had personally close relationships with displaced people and thus experienced changes in their social life, many others remained socially indifferent as they did not interact very much with displaced people or with people in the locality in general. Such distant or limited relationships are rather strikingly confirmed in the positive evaluations of societal changes by those who tended to

attribute the problems in the locality to displaced informal settlers and consequently welcomed their removal as an improvement in the local living environment.

The complex pattern of impacts underlines that informality coexists with formality, with large overlaps or blurred boundaries, and is a negotiable arena that is selectively engaged with by urban residents. While contributing to the existing debates on formality and informality by empirically substantiating the fluidity of concepts, selective engagement with informality and consequently differential impacts across life domains complicate the existing discussion on the distribution of development impacts as it is difficult to explain how individual households were affected as a whole (or to rate them as losers or gainers) and also to compare the aggregate impacts of different households. Drawing on the main findings, in the next section, I link these main research findings with the body of knowledge and practice pertaining to DID and urban development.

9.3 Contributions to knowledge and practice

By elaborating on the many different ways in which urban residents are impacted by DID even without being physically displaced, this research underlines that an urban infrastructure project has broad, indirect and complex effects beyond the most visible ones. The identification of non-displacement impacts is a contribution in itself to the DID literature which lacks both conceptual and empirical perspectives on the impacts other than those related to displacement. Particularly understudied in urban areas is the complexity of impacts that arises from the issue of informality, which poses a further challenge to the position that development impacts can be managed through interventions, while creating tensions with broader urban planning in general as a process of formalisation. Drawing on the proposition of informality as both strategy and vulnerability, I reconceptualise DID as one of many urban contingencies where the hidden vulnerabilities are realised, which then requires us to look at the situation from a broader perspective of building resilience. In both ways, the lens of non-displacement impacts demonstrates the utility in reinstating urban DID as a critical part of urban development and also enhancing its profile in urban related discussions, which as I argued in Chapter 2 remains a persistent gap.

9.3.1. DID and its 'hidden' impacts in situ

The railway project became controversial due to its broad adverse ramifications, among which the spotlight fell on the most visible problem – i.e. the forced removal of informal settlers along the railway tracks. This triggered an intervention relocating them to new sites, which, however, revealed myriad shortfalls and left displaced people, collectively as the most obvious losers of the project. Beyond this unfortunately stereotypical scenario of DID, I noted the possibility that the project might have had additional impacts on the residents remaining in the urban area. Given the strong assumption of 'negative' impacts in the literature, which is evidenced by the experiences of displaced people, I started the examination with a hypothesis that such in situ impacts were also likely to be negative, thereby making non-displaced people 'hidden' losers whose loss was not even recognised and redressed by a policy intervention.

Empirical findings demonstrated that urban residents who did not move from their locality indeed experienced diverse changes across life domains, although the collective picture of impacts is not so straightforward. The complexity arises from the fact that remaining residents were differentially affected and also had different capacities to recover, which does not make them outright 'losers' as a group. In comparison, displaced people have at least one clear commonality despite within-group heterogeneity, which is that they lost their residential space, and thereby are unambiguously losers in this regard.¹¹⁴ For non-displaced people, however, the significance of adverse impacts is balanced out by those who have stayed indifferent and unaffected. If we are to consider those indirectly affected in a development project, it becomes harder to draw a clear-cut conclusion regarding who is a loser and who is a winner, and by what criteria.

If we elevate the scale of discussion and view the railway project at a metropolitan level, the distributional effect becomes more complicated. From the perspective of urban planning, the primary emphasis is often placed on the positive effects that public infrastructure projects aim to generate. In my case-study, research participants noted the improvements in train services and infrastructure and consequently, the use of PNR train services has visibly increased as envisioned at the outset of the project. This must have contributed to relieving some constraints on the mobility of residents in and

¹¹⁴ Even though a house (or money to build a house themselves) was provided at the relocation site, displaced people were supposed to pay back the government, which was not helping them to recover from being losers (see Chapter 5 for further information on the relocation arrangement).

around Metro Manila, a city that is notorious for traffic and congestion. Furthermore, the micro-level impacts of infrastructure projects sheds light on a potential chain through which land clearance for improved transportation services has the effect of regulating urban space more tightly and opening up room for private initiatives such as gentrification, thereby feeding into broader macro urban transformations. Simultaneously, an extensive documentation of adverse impacts accounts for both the physical exclusion of urban residents through distant resettlement and subtle and indirect socio-economic dislocation in situ. This provides a more comprehensive answer to at what costs public infrastructures are built or upgraded, and shows that, at the urban scale, exclusions take place as a result of projects serving the needs of expanding cities.

The change was also a multifaceted process was qualitatively illustrated by the evaluations of urban residents who acknowledge both positive and negative aspects. For instance, research participant F7 states that even though the livelihoods in the locality were considerably undermined, the railway project is expected to bring better transportation (F7CN62). This brings out mixed responses such as the one shown by F1 who feels “sad” about losing his displaced neighbours and “pity” for them because of the hardships in the relocation sites but simultaneously feels “happy” that the area has become a better environment (F1C70). By demonstrating that the composition of affected people is diverse and the patterns of impacts are complex, my study challenges the conventional method of conceptualising development impacts that is epitomised by the Cost–Benefit Analysis, which reduces the complexity of a developmental change to aggregate numbers that account only for tangible and/or material effects.

Furthermore, my research unveils multiple, interconnected ways in which urban residents managed their lives within and around informal settlements and then examines the impacts against such contextual understandings. In this way, it demonstrates how the baseline knowledge prior to a change, which has been one of the main shortfalls of DID research, can be achieved and utilised. Shifting the main unit of investigation from a particular group of people like the displaced to a locality was instrumental in filling this gap, and was the process by which the locally embedded nature of resource arrangement and livelihoods, and the importance of ‘location’ for that matter were teased out. This is a critique in itself of conventional urban resettlement policy or more broadly any urban initiative involving population movement, which has tended to prioritise the provision of shelter over livelihood

reconstruction and has often ended up relocating urban residents to remote sites in suburban areas.

While the study of non-displaced people calls for a disaggregated and holistic approach to unpacking the complexity surrounding a developmental change, it is questionable to what extent the multi-scale, socio-spatial implications of a developmental change that are informed by the case of non-displaced people can be addressed by current interventions, which operate by reducing them to tangible and itemised losses (e.g. the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model). Notably, non-displaced people remain largely hidden in the conceptual partiality of resettlement policy. To move beyond the limit of a given intervention, I suggest we combine a range of socio-spatial changes at different scales and discuss an urban project and its impacts within a broad framework of urban development where structural causes can be identified and potentially addressed. To this end, I introduce a new angle on DID in the next section by reconceptualising it as a kind of urban contingency.

9.3.2. DID as a change context for urban residents

From the perspective of urban residents who stayed in the same locality, an urban infrastructure project qualifies as a shock – albeit a relatively slow-onset shock – that can be transformative and even destructive. Research participants in and around informal settlements have been exposed to many such disasters including an outbreak of fire and flooding, which have affected their resource pool and livelihoods adversely, to a greater or lesser extent. Notably, Typhoon Ondoy that struck Metro Manila in 2009 appeared as striking an event as the railway clearance in my research, being mentioned a number of times and affecting quite a few people. For many residents, the land clearance and eviction following the current project is not a first, as they already experienced multiple evictions in their life (B3; B4; F6; H6; I1; I6). The pressing threat and the prevalent cases of forced eviction indicate that the income poor who are likely to live in a less secure settlement (both in terms of physical durability and tenure security) can get locked into a vicious circle, being exposed to multiple unfavourable contingencies and having to constantly readjust their life conditions either in situ or in mobility. While destabilising in itself, their meagre resource basis makes it even harder to cope with adverse impacts, thereby often pushing them into a poorer or more vulnerable position.

Placed within a series of contingencies, the meaning of non-displacement impacts presented in this case, which may not be so striking at a given point, can go beyond a one-time loss. To begin with, a snapshot of one DID case does not explain much about their life-long struggle to cope with a frequent exposure to shocks like DID. Even though the livelihoods of urban residents seem to have been sustained throughout the current event particularly because impacts were not so immediately visible as they stayed in the same place, it may be the case that those who managed to survive this time lose their grip on their life and slip into a more vulnerable state when they are hit by another event, as they have already been weakened by the current one. This underlines the importance of understanding development impacts in view of long-term vulnerability and resilience since hidden behind whatever is impacted at the time are accumulations from the past and the prospect of security in the future. In this way, the focus on non-displaced people expands our perspective, both temporally and geographically, beyond the narrow timeframe around displacement and beyond a confinement of resettlement sites.

A broader temporal perspective is also important for examining the preparedness and the coping strategies of urban residents. Although a developmental change does not take place as suddenly or unexpectedly as other contingencies such as conflicts or natural disasters, it can involve ample uncertainties as implementation drifts away from the initial plan. In my research, both displaced and non-displaced people were generally under-informed about the initial project plan and were not subsequently updated on its revisions. One-time information dissemination, for instance, through a census or a demolition notice, turned out to be insufficient for urban residents to make sense of the constantly evolving process of project implementation. Information deficit and uncertainty was more acute for non-displaced people around the project site who were likely to be outside the concern of project proprietors. This means that, prior to the event, they must have been in a liminal state of not knowing the exact kind and manner of changes that they might experience, let alone how to prepare for them.

The impacts of local socio-spatial changes were configured only after being experienced and thus coping capacities depended very much on the security of people's resource pool and livelihoods. Those who had struggled to survive became more vulnerable when external changes destabilised the precarious mode in which they managed their livelihoods, as they were less capable of recovering from adverse impacts. In comparison, those who were in a relatively secure position such as living in a formal house or having a diverse livelihood portfolio remained largely unaffected by

or resilient to the changes in the locality. Likewise, people coped with adverse impacts through similar strategies to which they had managed the multiple insecurities they faced in the pre-project context. For instance, a constant change of housing or work is a common strategy on the part of urban residents to cope with tenure or job insecurities.¹¹⁵ Accordingly, when their livelihoods were undermined by local changes, people thought of initiating another change by getting a new job (even by going abroad) or starting a new business. Others coped with hardship by persevering and working harder (e.g. working for longer hours or doing double-jobs), as they had been doing thus far. Those who often had to borrow money or rely on other family members for meeting their needs then had to borrow more or cut down their consumption. Similarly, social capital played a significant role in the process of adaptation, but the intensified need for help turned out to be burdensome for those in a position in which they were expected to assist adversely affected family members or neighbours.

The limited preparedness on the part of urban residents in contrast to the various and potentially long-lasting effects of a change like DID underlines the importance of building overall resilience, which in turn requires addressing the broader structural challenges that urban residents are faced with. As discussed earlier (in Section 9.2), if vulnerability comes mainly from informality, the focal question in terms of building resilience would be how to approach the issue of informality that is unlikely to fit into the rational frame of formal planning and thus tends to be excluded from its consideration or even to remain unrecognised. The incompatibility between informality as a mode of living and the formality of a planning platform stands out in my research in that the loss of informal houses was not considered for compensation and the indirect impacts on informal livelihoods were not even acknowledged. On the contrary, the utility of formal tenure is underlined by the fact that formal residents have been protected from being uprooted by land-based developments. However, the insurmountable challenge of saving all informal settlers through tenure formalisation is equally well-evidenced by the scale of informal settlements in mega cities – in this instance the demolished informal houses along the railway alone accommodated around 35,000 families.

This brings the discussion back to a more fundamental level then, where the problem is not the lack of formality per se but the wider structural context in which urban

¹¹⁵ In comparison, it is interesting to note that in a forced mobility context people demonstrate a strong tendency/will to stay in the same locality and thus maintain stability in their life. Returnees in my research illustrate this point well.

residents have to informally arrange resources for their shelter and livelihoods in the first place, thereby being exposed to multiple risks and becoming vulnerable. To demonstrate this point, I made extra efforts to unpack why and how urban residents invest in informally arranged resources and livelihood opportunities. Seen as an availability issue, the proliferation of informal housing is a response to the malfunctioning land market, which in the case of Metro Manila is perpetuated by the skewed land ownership patterns and then compounded by the inefficient land and housing regime. Another profound point is that the informal arrangement of resources is a function of work and income insecurities and that, without addressing such underlying issues, it is not feasible to discuss formalisation because as Roy (2005: 153) points out poignantly, the challenge arises from a mismatch between the systemic irregularity of employment and the institutionalised regularity of payment required for 'going legal': "Without formal jobs, such regular mortgage or interest payments are difficult to sustain".

This leads to a natural conclusion that enhancing work and income security is necessary for increasing the overall security of resource arrangement. In terms of livelihoods, the security of an economic activity does not necessarily align with the continuum of formality and informality. Urban residents engage with the informal economy for various reasons such as the lack of opportunities in the formal labour market and the accessibility of potentially promising opportunities in the informal economy. In general, formal employment is seen as more stable and thus more conducive to enhancing income security and possibly accumulating some assets; however, it needs to be restated that the work conditions of low-paid jobs in the formal economy can be so bad that employees drift into the local informal economy (see Chapter 7). Given that, formal sector jobs need to be strengthened, both quantitatively and qualitatively, for instance by enhancing job security, increasing the income level and providing better social protection.

This is a different suggestion to the proposal of formalising the informal economy itself since my ultimate emphasis is on creating more diverse and secure sets of livelihood options, irrespective of whether they are formal or informal. This proposal is in line with people's real concerns, given that the individuals studied here already address their livelihood insecurities by managing multiple activities and diversifying their livelihood portfolio within the current (macro) economic contexts where formal sector jobs are limited in quantity and not decent in quality and where informal work can be precarious. In this regard, people's own endeavours need to receive more attention and

respect from any initiatives aimed at building livelihood resilience and particularly for reducing vulnerabilities in a change context like DID. In my research, it was clearly evidenced that those who had alternatives to the source of income that was affected by the current clearance and who had strengthened long-term income security through safeguards such as savings and pensions stayed resilient. In view of this, it is important to extend and strengthen the provision of safeguards or alternatives, especially for those working in the informal economy.

The empirical findings of my research and their contribution to knowledge and practice are not, however, free of limitations. In the last section of this concluding chapter, I discuss some of the methodological shortfalls of my research, mostly in light of making suggestions for future research that can provide a more comprehensive picture of urban changes accompanied by DID and other impacts.

9.4 Methodological reflections and suggestions for future research

The use of semi-structured interviewing as the main method of data collection had various implications for my research, which was exploratory in nature. First of all, the questionnaire constructed in reference to the livelihoods framework already indicates that the main focus of the research was on examining the impacts on a resource pool and livelihoods. The livelihoods perspective was very useful for uncovering some of the 'hidden' impacts of land clearance and population displacement in urban areas, particularly by underlining the importance of urban land and housing as physical productive assets and the local livelihood networks as the basis of the informal economy. Extensive data collection was also possible through a detailed questionnaire, which became more streamlined throughout the research process. However, it was not the most appropriate method for capturing social dynamics, which is thus a weakness in my research. A deeper understanding of social impacts would have benefited from alternative methods such as a more ethnographic study of a particular community. There was an opportunity to return to the community nearby the Laon Laan station along the railway where I spent a substantial amount of time for my MPhil research and thus had built up a sufficient rapport to conduct in-depth interviews and participant observations. This unutilised opportunity underlines the importance of a pilot study for explorative research, which could have been used for clarifying the relevant issues for further investigation and fine-tuning appropriate methods for them.

The use of grounded theory as a main analytical method also had a mixed impacts on the research process and outcome. In the absence of baseline data on people's life conditions prior to the change, it helped to generate general patterns in which life is organised in and around informal settlements, which functioned as an alternative reference point for delineating the impacts of a change retrospectively. However, due to its strong tendency towards generating an abstract theory as an ultimate product, it also had the effect of distracting the focus of analysis away from constructing a clear comparative structure that is specific to my research case and is more effective for measuring impacts. This represents an important lesson for similar research in terms of its methodological nature and design. Once the insights obtained from qualitative and explorative research on non-displacement impacts accumulate, which may need to grow thicker first, a more systematic evaluation of impacts can be designed for a specific DID case using a quantitative method such as a survey for data collection and a statistical analysis of pre- and post-change life conditions. In part as a response to this, I introduced a few innovative methods of comparison using qualitative data, most notably, the construction of livelihood scores.

Drawing on these lessons from my research, I suggest that more systematic research is conducted to encompass a wide range of potentially affected people in a DID context, particularly using a livelihood framework as an evaluative tool. My research rests upon a simple divide between displaced and non-displaced people but it is questionable if such a divide based on the experience of forced mobility is the most important or relevant variable in explaining the diverse types and magnitudes of impacts experienced in the complex change context of DID. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some 'displaced' people have remained living in the railway area in ways that are more comfortable than multiply impacted non-displaced people such as those whose only house was partially demolished and whose livelihoods were also affected. Upon securing a place of living in the locality, some displaced people resumed their living as long as their livelihoods remained intact. That is, while a complete housing loss is an undisputable loss for displaced people, the capacity for livelihood reconstruction was more a function of livelihood security.

Thus, the magnitude of impacts or their meaning vary greatly between individuals and within each group (i.e. displaced and non-displaced people), making a collective comparison between the two groups too simplistic to capture within- and between-group diversity. Furthermore, considering the other significant socio-economic changes that non-displaced people experienced, the experience of displacement (i.e. a

residential housing loss and a change of living environment) may not necessarily be the most defining factor in discussing the impacts of a DID case on the overall wellbeing of people. In view of this, even the typology of affected people that was suggested in Chapter 5 – with the main criteria being the mobility or the immobility of people (i.e. whether they have lost their shelter and where they end up living) – needs to be revised based on a more comprehensive map of impact patterns prevailing in a DIDR situation.

The starting point of such mapping can be a systematic comparative study of displaced and non-displaced people, which is yet rare in the literature given that not much research has been conducted on the latter. This will allow us to examine the extent to which the experience of ‘displacement’ (and ‘resettlement’) is influential in undermining people’s livelihoods and whether or not staying in the same locality (i.e. immobility) enhances people’s capacity to recover. Ideally, a comparative study can be designed along the timeline (or longitudinally), encompassing at least two phases of the event (e.g. before and after). Furthermore, with a more comprehensive understanding, we would be able to explore whether other dividing lines regardless of a displacement experience emerge as more influential explanatory variables.

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Appendix 1

A1.1. Interview guide

DPhil/PhD Research Project

Impacts of the Railway Project on Urban Livelihoods

Interview Questionnaire

Interview Profile

- Interview ID _____
- Interview date and time ____20__/____/____ Start____:____ End____:____

- Language used by participant __English__/_Tagalog__/_Other:_____
- Interpretation (Y/N) ____
- If Y, name:_____ Level of interpretation: __Full__/_Partial__

- Interview recorded (Y/N) ____
- If Y, transcribed date _20____/____/____

*Questionnaire Information

- Narratives are in italic.
- Further guidance or additional explanation is bracketed.
- Examples of answers are in parentheses for further probing.

I. Personal and Household Information

First, I would like to have some background information about you and your household.

A. Information about the Participant and the Household

Name	Sex	Age	Household Status	Educational Level
# Participant				

1. Name: What is your name? [*It is not necessary to obtain the names of other household members.]
2. Age: How old are you? [* If the participant is not willing to specify her/his age, ask in an age band.]
3. Household status: Who is the household head and what is your relation to the household head?
4. Educational attainment: What is the highest level that you reached in school?
5. How many people are living in your house?

**For each member*

- 5.1 How old is s/he?
- 5.2 What is her/his relation to the household head (or to you)?
- 5.3 What is the highest level that s/he reached in school?
6. Are there more than one family in your house? If so, how many families are living together in your house?

B. Changes in the Household Composition

1. Since the railway project, were there any changes in the composition of your household, for example, in the number of household members?
2. If so, how and why did such a change take place?

II. Changes in the Asset Levels and Livelihood Strategies

In this section, there are questions about your livelihoods now and before. For the past status, I would like to know how things were like five years ago, that is, in 2005. Then, I would like to ask how things have changed between 2005 and 2010.

A. Physical Capital

1. Housing

- 1.1 Do you own this house? (Y/N) [*If Y move to 1.2; if N, move to 1.3.]
- 1.2 *If you own this house:*
 - 1.2.1 How long have you been living in this house?
 - 1.2.2 If you moved to the area at some point, when and why did you move here?
 - 1.2.3 Where did you live before?
 - 1.2.4 How many rooms do you have in your house?
 - 1.2.5 Do you rent out any rooms in this house? If so, how many rooms do you rent out and how much is the rent per room?

- 1.2.6 In the last 5 years, have there been any changes in your house structure or in terms of subletting? If so, why?
- 1.3 *If you are renting:*
- 1.3.1 Who owns this house?
- 1.3.2 How many rooms are there in this house and how many rooms do you rent?
- 1.3.3 How long have you been renting this house/room?
- 1.3.4 Why did you start renting here and how did you find this place?
- 1.3.5 Where did you live before?
- 1.3.6 Do you pay rent? If so, how much do you pay (per day, week, month, or year)?
- 1.3.7 In the last 5 years, have there been any changes in terms of renting? If so, why?
- 1.4 Do you own any house elsewhere? (Y/N) [*If N, move to 2.Land].
- 1.4.1 Where and how many houses do you have?
- 1.4.2 Why are you not living there yourself?
- 1.4.3 Who is living in the house now?
- 1.4.4 If you are renting out the house or a room(s), how much is the rent?
- 1.5 Has either the railway project or eviction of people affected your housing status?

2. Land

- 2.1 Do you own the land on which this house stands? (Y/N) [*If Y, move on to 2.2; if N, move to 2.3. For renters, go to 2.3 directly.]
- 2.2 *If you own this land:*
- 2.2.1 When did you acquire the land?
- 2.2.2 How did you acquire the land?
- 2.2.3 Do you have any document supporting your ownership? If so, what kind of document do you have?
- 2.3 *If you do not own this land:*
- 2.3.1 Who owns the land? (e.g. the PNR or the government; or a private owner)
- 2.3.2 How are you using this land? Are you leasing or just occupying the land?
- 2.3.3 Since the railway project, have there been any changes in land ownership?
- 2.4 When you came here, was there a house already, or did you build one yourself?
- 2.4.1 If a house was already there, how did you get it?
- 2.4.2 If you built one yourself, how did you build it? – Where did you get fund, materials, labour and others for building a house?
- 2.5 Do you know the size of the land?
- 2.6 Has either the railway project or eviction of people affected your land status?

3. Infrastructure/Facilities

Water

- 3.1 Is your house connected to water? If so, can you also drink it? If not, where do you get water?
- 3.2 How much do you pay for water (per week or per month)?
- 3.3 Do you use water for any of your livelihood activities? If so, for what activities?
- 3.4 Since the railway project, have there been any changes in water provision or in water use? If so, why and how?

Electricity

- 3.5 Is your house connected to electricity?
- 3.6 How much do you pay for electricity (per day/week/month)?
- 3.7 Do you use electricity for any of your livelihood activities?

3.8 Since the railway project, have there been any changes in electricity provision or in your electricity use? If so, how and why?

4. Consumer and Productive Durables

4.1 What are the main 'assets' of your household? [*For examples, see the box below.]

4.1.1 Which assets did you gain newly since 2005? Why and how did you get them?

4.1.2 Since the railway project, have you lost any assets that you had owned or had used before? If so, why and how did you lose them? [*Including assets that became out of order]

4.2 Do you use any of these assets for livelihood activities? (Y/N) [*If N, move to B.]

4.3 For productive durables:

4.3.1 How do you use such assets for productive ends?

4.3.2 How much income do you generate from them?

4.3.3 Who is in charge of using or handling such assets?

4.3.4 Has the railway project affected your use of the asset(s)? If so, how?

Examples of Consumer and Productive Durables
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consumer durables: TV, radio, washing machine, bike, motorcycle, telephone or cell phone, VCR or DVD player (in the Philippines, 'videoke' machine), recorder, camera, electric fan, etc. • Productive durables: refrigerator (or freezer), car, tricycle, sewing machine, etc. (*There can be an overlap between consumer and productive durables.)

B. Financial capital

1. Work/Employment Status

1.1 How many people are working in your household? Can you identify who they are?

1.2 How many people were working 5 years ago? Has any of the household members stopped or started working since the railway project?

1.2.1 Who is s/he and why did s/he stop or start working? For those who stopped working, what did they do before?

	Member ID#	Member ID#	Member ID#
1.3 Type of work			
1.3.1 Main work			
1.3.2 Other work			
<i>*For each Work</i>			
1.4 Work length			
1.4 Employer type			
1.5 Work type			
1.6 Work hours (per week)			
1.7 Pay period			
1.8 Pay/Profit			
1.9.1 Travel time			
1.9.2 Travel cost			

**For each member who is working now:*

1.3 What kind of work does s/he do?

1.3.1 What is her/his 'main' work or job

1.3.2 What 'other' work does s/he do that brings in money?

**For each work/activity:*

1.4 How long has s/he been doing the work?

1.5 Who is her/his employer, or is s/he self-employed?

1.6 Is this work permanent/regular, temporary, casual/daily or self-employed?

1.6.1 Since 2005, has her/his work become more regular or more casual? If so, why?

1.7 How many hours per week does s/he work at this, on average?

1.7.1 Have her/his work hours changed in the last 5 years? If so, why?

1.8 How much does s/he take home in pay, on average (per day, week, 2-weeks)?

1.8.1 Has her/his income level changed in the last 5 years? If so, why?

1.9 Does s/he need to use transportation for work (e.g. for commuting or for fetching goods for work)?

1.9.1 If so, what type of transportation does s/he use? Is s/he using the rail service? If so, how does s/he think about it?

1.9.2 How long does the round-trip for work take (in minutes)?

1.9.3 How much does one round-trip for work cost?

1.9.4 Has her/his ways of travelling to work changed in the past 5 years? If so, why?

**For house enterprise, further questions to be raised are:*

1.10 Do you have any house enterprise at this house? (Y/N) [*If N, move to 1.11.]

1.10.1 What type of enterprise is it?

1.10.2 When did you start this enterprise?

1.10.3 Why did you start this enterprise?

1.10.4 Who helps this enterprise?

1.10.5 How much is the cost and profit (per day/week/month)?

1.10.6 Has either the railway project or eviction of people affected your household enterprise? If so, how?

**Changes in the income level*

1.11 How much was the total income level five years ago? Has it increased, remained the same or decreased in the past five years? Why is it so?

1.12 Has the railway project or displacement affected your household income level?

2. Financial Transfer

Remittances

2.1 Do you have any household members who are not living with you, but send money to help maintain this household? (Y/N)

2.2 Did you also have any such members who sent you remittances before the project? (Y/N) [*Note: If N, move to 2.8.]

2.3 What is her/his relationship to you or your household?

2.4 Where is s/he living?

2.5 How often does s/he send you money? (Daily, weekly, 2 weekly, monthly, etc.)

2.6 How much do you receive from her/him on average?

2.7 Since the railway project, have there been any changes in remittances? If so, how and why?

Other transfers

2.8 Do you receive any other kinds of financial transfer, for example, from the government or NGOs?

2.9 In the last 5 years, have there been any changes in such financial transfers? If so, how and why?

3. Savings

3.1 Do you have any savings (cash or in kind)? (Y/N) [*Note: If N, move to 4.]

3.1.1 In what forms are they?

3.1.2 What uses are the savings for?

3.2 Did you have savings 5 years ago? (Y/N) [*Note: If N, move to 4.]

3.2.1 What happened to those savings? Did you rely on savings more or less? Why?

4. Access to Credit and Other Support

Access to credit

4.1 In the last 5 years, have you borrowed money? (Y/N) [*If N, move to 4.2]

4.1.1 If Y, who did you borrow money from?

4.1.2 Why did you have to borrow money?

Other support

4.2 In the last 5 years, have you received or sought for some non-cash assistance? (Y/N) (e.g. food, medicine, clothing, labour, etc.) [*If N, move to 4.3.]

4.2.1 If Y, what did you receive and from whom?

4.2.2 Why did you need such support?

Support group/service

4.3 Are there any support (financial or otherwise) groups or services in your community? [*If N, move to C.]

4.3.1 Who can join such groups or access to such services?

4.3.2 In the last 5 years, have you ever joined any group or used any service?

4.3.3 In the last 5 years, have there been any changes in support groups or services?

C. Human capital

1. Changes in the health status

1.1 Has either the railway project or eviction of people created any health problems or concerns in your house? (Y/N) [*Note: If N, move to 2. Education.]

1.2 What kind of health problem/concern was it?

1.3 How did you deal with it?

1.4 How far is health clinic or hospital from your house?

1.5 How did her/his health problem affect your household? In particular, your household's livelihood activities and otherwise (i.e. non-economic impact)?

2. Education

- 2.1 Do any of your household members need schooling? (Y/N) [*If N, move to D.]
- 2.2 Does s/he go to school? If not, why?
- 2.3 In the last 5 years, has anyone stopped schooling (or dropped out of school)? If so, why and what is s/he doing now?
- 2.4 Where is the school and how far is it from your house?
- 2.5 How much does schooling/education cost per year?
- 2.5.1 Since 2005, have there been any changes in terms of schooling fee?
- 2.6 Since the railway project, have your children reported any changes in their school?
- 2.7 In general, what do you want/expect from education of your children? Or why are you educating your children?

D. Social Capital

1. Changes in the Community

- 1.1 By community, what do you mean? Or how do you define a 'community'?
- 1.2 What were major changes or events in the community in the last 5 years?
- 1.3 Are such changes related either to the railway project or eviction of people? How do you think either the railway project or eviction of people affect your community? If any, what are the notable changes in your community since the project?

2. Community Organisation/Activities

- 2.1 Are there any community activities or organisations that you or other household members participate in? (Y/N) [*If N, move to E.]
- 2.1.1 What kind of activities or organisations do you participate in?
- 2.1.2 Why do you (or others) participate?
- 2.2 Did you participate in the same activity or organisation 5 years ago? (Y/N)
- 2.2.1 If Y, what were the main changes in your organisations in the last 5 years?
- 2.2.2 If different, please elaborate further on any changes over the 5 years.

E. Livelihood Strategies

1. In 2005, what did you want to achieve through your livelihood activities?
2. How much do you think you have achieved your goals and why?
- 2.1 In the last 5 years, what did you do to achieve your goals?
- 2.2 What were the most important activities in achieving your goals?
- 2.3 What issues or problems did you have in achieving your goals?
3. Has either the railway project or displacement of people affected your livelihood goals in the last 5 years? If so, how?

III. Railway Project and Forced Displacement

A. The Railway project

1. When did you hear about the project first? What did you think about it then?
2. What do you think about the railway project now?

- 2.1 (If past and present perceptions are different) What made you think differently about the railway project?
- 2.2 What do you think are the benefits of the railway project, in particular, to you or to your household?
- 2.3 Has the railway project caused any problems or concerns to you or your household?
3. Do you think the railway project has affected your livelihoods? If so, in what ways?

B. Displacement of people

1. Who were displaced in your community? And how many people were displaced?
2. What was your relation to them? Do you know any of relocatees personally?
3. Were there any community actions in relation to forced displacement problems?
 - 3.1 What did people do?
 - 3.2 Did you join them? Or what did you do in the process? Why did you (not) do so?
4. What did you think about the issue of forced displacement at that time?
5. What do you think about the displacement issue now?
 - 5.1 What do you think are the benefits of displacement?
 - 5.2 What do you think are problems of displacement? Does it have any negative impacts on you or your household?
 - 5.3 If your thoughts about displacement have changed in the last 5 years, why is that?
6. What is your relationship with the displaced people now? Do you still keep in touch with people who were displaced?
7. Do you think displacement of people has affected your livelihoods? If so, in what ways?

A1.2. Interview participant list

Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Livelihood Impact Score	Livelihood Impact Description
1	A1	F	49	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
2	H1	M	57	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
3	H2	F	61	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
4	H4	M	-	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
5	A2	F	50	Complete loss	2.5	Impact on PPC or LLN and expenses
6	H3	M	45	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
7	J1	F	52	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
8	J2	F	45	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
9	J3	F	72	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
10	H5	F	39	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
11	H6	M	51	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
12	H7	F	63	No loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only
13	J4	F	55	No loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only
14	H8	F	32	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
15	H9	F	26	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
16	H10	M	28	Partial loss	2.5	Impact on PPC or LLN and expenses
17	H11	M	60	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
18	H12	F	58	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
19	I1	M	74	No loss	2	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
20	I2	M	40	Complete loss	0.5	Increased expenses only
21	I3	F	59	Complete loss	3	Impact on PPC, LLN and expenses
22	A3	F	67	No loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only
23	A4	F	45	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
24	A5	M	75	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
25	F1	M	55	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
26	J5	M	52	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
27	I4	M	38	Complete loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN
28	I5	M	58	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
29	F2	F	40	No loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only
30	F3	M	43	No loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN
31	F4	F	51	Partial loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN
32	B1	F	57	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
33	E1	F	63	No loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only
34	J6	F	39	Partial loss	1	Impact on PPC only
35	A6	M	28	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
36	E2	F	71	Partial loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only
37	A7	F	60	No loss	1	Impact on PPC only
38	E3	F	45	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
39	E4	F	40	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
40	E5	F	55	No loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only
41	A8	M	49	Complete loss	3	Impact on PPC, LLN and expenses
42	F5	F	38	Complete loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN
43	J7	M	60	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
44	B2	F	47	No loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN
45	J8	F	21	No loss	0.5	Increased expenses only

Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Livelihood Impact Score	Livelihood Impact Description
46	F6	F	45	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
47	B3	F	34	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
48	E6	M	34	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
49	E7	F	54	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
50	D1	F	50	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
51	E8	F	37	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
52	B4	F	65	Partial loss	1	Impact on PPC only
53	E9	M	34	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
54	E10	M	38	Partial loss	1	Impact on PPC only
55	G1	F	58	Partial loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN
56	I6	F	44	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
57	D2	F	55	No loss	1	Impact on PPC only
58	I7	M	59	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
59	I8	F	40	Complete loss	0.5	Increased expenses only
60	I9	F	31	Complete loss	1	Impact on PPC only
61	I10	M	44	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
62	D3	F	58	Partial loss	1	Impact on PPC only
63	G2	M	58	Partial loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN
64	J9	F	54	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
65	F7	F	55	No loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN
66	J11	F	56	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses
67	F8	M	47	Complete loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN

A1.3. Tenure status and housing impact

Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Land tenure status			Housing status	
					Land ownership (Before)	Land ownership (After)	Formality of tenure	Housing status (Before)	Housing status (After)
1	A1	F	49	No loss	Public (Manila City)	Same	Informal	Owner	Same
2	H1	M	57	Partial loss	PNR (BLISS)	Same	Formal	Renting (BLISS housing)	Same
3	H2	F	61	Partial loss	PNR (BLISS)	Same	Formal	Renting (BLISS housing)	Same
4	H4	M	-	No loss	Private (owner)	Same	Formal	Owner (family house)	Same
5	A2	F	50	Complete loss	PNR	Not knowing land ownership	Not knowing land ownership	Owner	Renting
6	H3	M	45	No loss	Private	Same	Formal	Renting (His aunt's house)	Same
7	J1	F	52	No loss	Private	Same	Formal	Renting (a unit in a compound)	Same
8	J2	F	45	No loss	Private	Same	Formal	Renting	Same
9	J3	F	72	No loss	Private (owner)	Same	Formal	Owner (family house)	Same
10	H5	F	39	No loss	Private (owner)	Same	Formal	Owner (built by her grandfather)	Same
11	H6	M	51	No loss	Public (Government)	Same	Informal	Owner	Same

Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Land tenure status			Housing status	
					Land ownership (Before)	Land ownership (After)	Formality of tenure	Housing status (Before)	Housing status (After)
12	H7	F	63	No loss	UC (*public)	Same	Informal	Owner	Same
13	J4	F	55	No loss	Private	Same	Formal	Renting (a caretaker)	Same
14	H8	F	32	No loss	Private	Same	Formal	Renting (a daughter of the caretaker)	Same
15	H9	F	26	Partial loss	PNR	Private	Informal	Owner (her father purchased a house)	Same
16	H10	M	28	Partial loss	PNR	Private	Informal	Owner	Same
17	H11	M	60	Partial loss	PNR	Private	Legitimate	Owner (built themselves)	Same
18	H12	F	58	Complete loss	PNR	Private	Informal	Owner (built themselves)	Built again
19	I1	M	74	No loss	Private	Same	Formal	Renting	Same
20	I2	M	40	Complete loss	PNR	N/A	Informal	Owner	Living on street
21	I3	F	59	Complete loss	PNR	Not knowing land ownership	Not knowing land ownership	House ownership unclear	Renting a room
22	A3	F	67	No loss	Private	Same	Transition	Owner (purchased)	Same
23	A4	F	45	No loss	Private (Family land)	Same	Formal	Owner (Family house)	Same
24	A5	M	75	No loss	Private	Same	Formal	Renting	Renting

Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Land tenure status			Housing status	
					Land ownership (Before)	Land ownership (After)	Formality of tenure	Housing status (Before)	Housing status (After)
25	F1	M	55	No loss	Private (Owner)	Same	Formal	Owner	Same
26	J5	M	52	No loss	Private	Same	Formal	Renting	Same
27	I4	M	38	Complete loss	PNR (delta area)	Private	Formal	Owner	His mother's house
28	I5	M	58	No loss	Public (City hall)	Same	Informal	Owner	Same
29	F2	F	40	No loss	Private (Family land)	Same	Formal	Owner (family house)	Same
30	F3	M	43	No loss	Public	Same	Informal	Owner	Same
31	F4	F	51	Partial loss	PNR	Public	Informal	Owner (built in 2004)	Same
32	B1	F	57	No loss	Private	Same	Informal	Owner (Paying amiliar)	Same
33	E1	F	63	No loss	Private	Same	Transition	Owner	Same
34	J6	F	39	Partial loss	PNR	Not knowing land ownership	Not knowing land ownership	Owner	Same
35	A6	M	28	Partial loss	PNR	Land ownership unclear	Not knowing land ownership	Renting	Same
36	E2	F	71	Partial loss	PNR	PNR	Bf: Legitimate	Owner (built themselves)	Same
37	A7	F	60	No loss	Public (City hall)	Same	Informal	Owner (built herself)	Same

Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Land tenure status			Housing status	
					Land ownership (Before)	Land ownership (After)	Formality of tenure	Housing status (Before)	Housing status (After)
38	E3	F	45	Complete loss	PNR	Private (Evangelista)	Informal	Owner (Father-in-law's)	Temporary house
39	E4	F	40	Complete loss	PNR	Private (Evangelista)	Formal	House ownership unclear	Mother-in-law's house
40	E5	F	55	No loss	Private	Same	Informal	Owner (since her parents)	Same
41	A8	M	49	Complete loss	PNR	Not knowing land ownership	Not knowing land ownership	Owner (since his grandmother)	Renting
42	F5	F	38	Complete loss	PNR	Private	Transition	Owner	Mother-in-law's house
43	J7	M	60	No loss	Public	Same	Informal	Owner (In-laws's house)	Same
44	B2	F	47	No loss	PNR	Private (PNR)	Transition	Owner (built an own house)	Same
45	J8	F	21	No loss	UC	Same	Informal	Renting	Same
46	F6	F	45	Complete loss	PNR	Not knowing land ownership	Informal	Owner	Temporary housing
47	B3	F	34	Complete loss	PNR	PNR	Informal	Renting a house	Renting a room
48	E6	M	34	Complete loss	PNR	Not knowing land ownership	Informal	Renting	Tent along the railway
49	E7	F	54	No loss	PNR	Private (PNR)	Transition	Owner (renovated the house)	Same
50	D1	F	50	No loss	PNR	Same	Legitimate	Owner (built by her grandfather)	Same

Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Land tenure status			Housing status	
					Land ownership (Before)	Land ownership (After)	Formality of tenure	Housing status (Before)	Housing status (After)
51	E8	F	37	Partial loss	PNR	Public (School)	Informal	Owner	Same
52	B4	F	65	Partial loss	PNR	Public (School)	Informal	Owner	Her sister's house
53	E9	M	34	No loss	Private	Same	Transition	Owner (Mother-in-law's house)	Same
54	E10	M	38	Partial loss	PNR	Public (School)	Informal	Owner (built by his parents)	Same
55	G1	F	58	Partial loss	PNR	PNR	Informal	Owner (a family house)	Same
56	I6	F	44	No loss	UC (PNR)	Same	Informal	Owner (from a renter)	Same
57	D2	F	55	No loss	Private (owner)	Same	Formal	Owner	Same
58	I7	M	59	Partial loss	PNR	Not knowing land ownership	Not knowing land ownership	Owner	Same
59	I8	F	40	Complete loss	PNR	Not knowing land ownership	Not knowing land ownership	Owner (her mother)	Renting
60	I9	F	31	Complete loss	PNR	Public (Government)	Informal	Owner	Temporary housing
61	I10	M	44	No loss	Private	Same	Formal	Renting (long-term)	Same
62	D3	F	58	Partial loss	PNR	Private	Transition	Owner	Same
63	G2	M	58	Partial loss	PNR	PNR	Informal	Owner (family house)	Same

Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Land tenure status			Housing status	
					Land ownership (Before)	Land ownership (After)	Formality of tenure	Housing status (Before)	Housing status (After)
64	J9	F	54	No loss	PNR	Same	Legitimate	Owner (family house)	Same
65	F7	F	55	No loss	Private (owner)	Same	Formal	Owner (private)	Same
66	J11	F	56	Complete loss	PNR	Private (Family land)	Formal	Owner	Owner (family house)
67	F8	M	47	Complete loss	PNR	Public (Government)	Informal	Owner	Same

A1.4. Livelihood status and impact

OP	Option set
WP	Work Portfolio
RM	Remittances
PP	Physical Productive Capital
SV	Savings
PS	Pension
E	Employment

Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Livelihood Impact Score	Livelihood Impact Description	Livelihood status		Livelihood portfolio						Work Portfolio	
							Before	After	OP	WP	RM	PPC	SV	PS	E	SE
1	A1	F	49	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	3	3	3	2	0	0	SV (Coop)	0	2	0
2	H1	M	57	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	5	5	5	3	P6-7000	0	0	Pension, Philhealth	2	1
3	H2	F	61	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	3	3	4	3	0	0	0	GSIS	2	1
4	H4	M	-	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	4.5	4.5	2.5	2	RMO	0	0	0	0	1
5	A2	F	50	Complete loss	2.5	Impact on PPC or LLN and expenses	1.5	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	1

Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Livelihood Impact Score	Livelihood Impact Description	Livelihood status		Livelihood portfolio							Work Portfolio	
							Before	After	OP	WP	RM	PPC	SV	PS	E	SE	
6	H3	M	45	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	1	1	2.5	2.5	0	0	0	0	2.5	0	
7	J1	F	52	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	1.5	1.5	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
8	J2	F	45	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	4	4	4	2	0	Motor	0	SSS	1	1	
9	J3	F	72	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	4.5	4.5	4	2	P8000	0	0	P4500	2	0	
10	H5	F	39	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	3	3	3	1	0	2 rooms (P3000 total)	0	SSS, Pag-Ibig	1	0	
11	H6	M	51	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	3.5	3.5	3.5	2	P3000/m	0	0	Pension	2	0	
12	H7	F	63	No loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only	3	2.5	2.5	1.5	P3-8000/m	0	0	0	1	0.5	
13	J4	F	55	No loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only	4.5	4	4	1	P12000/m	Store space: P2000/m	SV	0	0	1	
14	H8	F	32	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	3.5	3.5	3.5	3	RMO	0	0	0	2	1	
15	H9	F	26	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	2	2	3	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	
16	H10	M	28	Partial loss	2.5	Impact on PPC or LLN and expenses	2	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

							Livelihood status		Livelihood portfolio						Work Portfolio	
Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Livelihood Impact Score	Livelihood Impact Description	Before	After	OP	WP	RM	PPC	SV	PS	E	SE
17	H11	M	60	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	3	3	4	3	0	0	0	Lumpsum: P86000	3	0
18	H12	F	58	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	2	2	3	3	0	0	0	0	1	2
19	I1	M	74	No loss	2	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	3.5	3	3	1	P6000/m	0	SV	0	1	0
20	I2	M	40	Complete loss	0.5	Increased expenses only	1	0.5	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
21	I3	F	59	Complete loss	3	Impact on PPC, LLN and expenses	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	Selling space (P50/d - permission: P30/d)	0	0	0	0.5
22	A3	F	67	No loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only	3	2	1	0	0	0	SV	0	0	1
23	A4	F	45	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	6.5	6.5	3	1	0	0	SV (Bank)	SSS	0	1
24	A5	M	75	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	3	3	1.5	1	Support (occasional)	0	0	0	0	1
25	F1	M	55	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	6.5	6.5	6.5	5.5	0	0	0	SSS	3	2.5
26	J5	M	52	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	1.5	1.5	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1

Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Livelihood Impact Score	Livelihood Impact Description	Livelihood status		Livelihood portfolio							Work Portfolio	
							Before	After	OP	WP	RM	PPC	SV	PS	E	SE	
27	I4	M	38	Complete loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN	4.5	4	3	2.5	RMO	0	SV (used)	0	0.5	1	
28	I5	M	58	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	3	3	4	3	0	0	0	SSS/GSIS	2	1	
29	F2	F	40	No loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only	3	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
30	F3	M	43	No loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	
31	F4	F	51	Partial loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN	2	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
32	B1	F	57	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	SSS (husband)	1	0	
33	E1	F	63	No loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only	4.5	4	4	1	0	Part of a house: P3500/m	0	P3000	1	0	
34	J6	F	39	Partial loss	1	Impact on PPC only	1	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
35	A6	M	28	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	2	2	3	2.5	Rice from province	0	0	0	0	2.5	
36	E2	F	71	Partial loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only	3	2	2	1	0	0	0	P2900	0	1	
37	A7	F	60	No loss	1	Impact on PPC only	4.5	4	5	3	0	0	0	Lumpsum: P10-15,000	2	1	

Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Livelihood Impact Score	Livelihood Impact Description	Livelihood status		Livelihood portfolio						Work Portfolio	
							Before	After	OP	WP	RM	PPC	SV	PS	E	SE
38	E3	F	45	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
39	E4	F	40	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	4	4	2	0	P12-30000	Boundary (P500-600/d; 2 jeeps)	0	0	0	0
40	E5	F	55	No loss	1.5	Impact on LLN only	3	2.5	2.5	1	RMO	0	0	P2000	1	0
41	A8	M	49	Complete loss	3	Impact on PPC, LLN and expenses	3.5	1.5	2	1	0	0	SV	0	0	1
42	F5	F	38	Complete loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN	3.5	3	3	2	0	0	0	Disability pension: P2400	2	0
43	J7	M	60	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	0	0	0	0	2	1.5
44	B2	F	47	No loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN	3.5	3	3	2	0	0	0	SSS (father)	1	1
45	J8	F	21	No loss	0.5	Increased expenses only	3.5	3	3.5	3	0	0	0	SSS (irregular)	2	1
46	F6	F	45	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	1	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
47	B3	F	34	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	Help from others	0	0	0	0	0

							Livelihood status		Livelihood portfolio							Work Portfolio	
Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Livelihood Impact Score	Livelihood Impact Description	Before	After	OP	WP	RM	PPC	SV	PS	E	SE	
48	E6	M	34	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	2	2.5	2	1.5	RMO	0	0	0	0	1.5	
49	E7	F	54	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	4.5	4.5	3	2	0	0	SV (children)	0	2	0	
50	D1	F	50	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	1	2	
51	E8	F	37	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	2	2	4	3	0	0	0	Pension (father)	2	1	
52	B4	F	65	Partial loss	1	Impact on PPC only	5	4	5	4	0	0	0	Pension (husband)	3	1	
53	E9	M	34	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	4	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
54	E10	M	38	Partial loss	1	Impact on PPC only	2.5	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	
55	G1	F	58	Partial loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN	4	3	2	0	0	0	P40000 (Bank)	Lumpsum: P300000	0	0	
56	I6	F	44	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	
57	D2	F	55	No loss	1	Impact on PPC only	7.5	7	4	3	0	0	0	Pension (she must have one)	3	0	
58	I7	M	59	Partial loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	4	4	4	3	0	0	0	SSS	2	1	

Sequence	ID	Gender	Age	Housing Impact	Livelihood Impact Score	Livelihood Impact Description	Livelihood status		Livelihood portfolio							Work Portfolio	
							Before	After	OP	WP	RM	PPC	SV	PS	E	SE	
59	I8	F	40	Complete loss	0.5	Increased expenses only	1	0.5	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
60	I9	F	31	Complete loss	1	Impact on PPC only	3	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	
61	I10	M	44	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	4	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	
62	D3	F	58	Partial loss	1	Impact on PPC only	7	6.5	7	5	0	0	P90000	Pension and benefits	3	2	
63	G2	M	58	Partial loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN	3.5	3	3	2	0	0	SV	0	0	2	
64	J9	F	54	No loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	4	4	5	5	0	0	0	0	3	2	
65	F7	F	55	No loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN	5	4	4	4	0	0	0	GSIS (husband; maybe)	2	2	
66	J11	F	56	Complete loss	0	No impact on PPC, LLN, expenses	3	3	3	2	0	0	0	Husband: retirement package	2	0	
67	F8	M	47	Complete loss	2	Impact on PPC and LLN	1	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

A1.5. Data for land clearance scope

(Figure 11 in Chapter 6)

ID	Area	Cleared distance
S1	España (S)	5
H11	Antipolo Street	5
S2	Blumentritt (S)	5
F1	Old Antipolo Street	15
J5	Laguna Extension	25
F3	Laguna Extension	15
J6	Immaculad Street	15
A6	Daang Bakal Street	9
E2	Daang Bakal Street	7.5
S2	Solis (S)	12.75
A7	Dagupan Extension	18
E3	Dagupan Extension	15
E5	Dagupan Extension	15
F5	Torres Bulgalion	10
B2	Hermosa Street	15
F6	Hermosa Street	15
B3	Hermosa Street	12
S3	Hermosa (S)	11
E7	Pilar Street	10
D1	Marolas (Marulas) A	15
E8	Marolas A	20
B4	Marolas A	15
E10	Marolas A	15
G1	Bayani Street	15
I6	L Lupa Street	15
I7	Magtanggol Street	20
I9	C-Name (C. Namie) Street	15
D3	4th Avenue	15
G2	4th Avenue	15
S4	5th Avenue (C3 Road) (S)	15
J9	C. Apostol	15
F7	M. Hizon	20
J11	Don Benito	15
F8	Caloocan (S)	15

Appendix 2

Interview ID	Stakeholder Category	Sub Category	Interview Date
GKEXIM-1	Korean Government	EXIM Bank	6 July 2007
GKEXIM-2	Korean Government	EXIM Bank	4 January 2008
GPNHA-1	Philippine Government	NHA	15 August 2007
GPNHA-2	Philippine Government	NHA	30 August 2007
GPNHA-3	Philippine Government	NHA	6 September 2007