Journal article
Learning by doing, precommitment and infant industry promotion
- Abstract:
-
We examine the implications for strategic trade policy of different assumptions about precommitment in a two-period Cournot oligopoly game with learning by doing. The inability of firms and governments to precommit to future actions encourages strategic behaviour which justifies an optimal first-period export tax relative to the profit-shifting benchmark of an export subsidy. In the linear case the optimal subsidy is increasing in the rate of learning with government precommitment but decreas...
Expand abstract
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Funding
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Blackwell Publishing Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Review of Economic Studies Journal website
- Volume:
- 66
- Issue:
- 2
- Pages:
- 447-474
- Publication date:
- 1999-04-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1467-937X
- ISSN:
-
0034-6527
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:cbc675b5-4bbc-4c19-92e5-f9d9940788ce
- Local pid:
- ora:2138
- Deposit date:
- 2008-06-27
Related Items
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- The Review of Economic Studies Ltd
- Copyright date:
- 1999
- Notes:
- N.B. Professor Neary was based at University College Dublin when this article was first published. The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA. Citation: Leahy, D. & Neary, J. P. (1999). 'Learning by doing, precommitment and infant-industry promotion', Review of Economic Studies, 66(2), 447-474. [The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com].
Metrics
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record