From J.G. Fichte's "The Closed Commercial State" to "Socialism in One Country": Intellectual Origins of Stalinism and Stalinist Utopia

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A thesis submitted for the degree of
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This thesis examines the intellectual origins of the ideological system underlying the political practices of the Stalinist state. The Stalinist state is understood here as the regime which had superseded the earlier, transitional, Bolshevist state born as a result of the 1917 October revolution. The latter lasted for slightly over ten years. Its successor emerged in the course of a second transitional period which started sometime around late 1927 — early 1928 and came to a close four years later. Each of these two phases of the Soviet project had its own set of distinctive features, and the differences between the two can be observed in all areas of life. While the transition from the Bolshevist to the Stalinist state is well researched, it is, at the same time, insufficiently conceptualized, except in the field of cultural studies, within which this work was done, first and foremost, by Vladimir Paperny and Boris Groys. However, the change was all-embracing and was not limited to matters of culture. It was also sweeping: the revolutionary Marxist ideology, the very ideological foundation of the Bolshevist state, was replaced by something far different. The cornerstone of Stalinist state ideology was the concept of "socialism in one country", which is known to have been first proposed by the German social democrat Georg von Vollmar in 1878. This thesis argues that this core Stalinist idea goes back to more remote times and originates in the political economy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, as found in his 1800 treatise "The Closed Commercial State". The thesis traces the route Fichte's ideas travelled through the 19th century: first, from Fichte to Ferdinand Lassalle, then along the perplexed trajectory of the German Social-Democratic Party's ideological evolution, to the Second International and finally, to post-revolutionary Russia. It was established in the course of research that, contrary to what was previously thought, Stalin was familiar with the abridged

Russian translation of Georg von Vollmar’s 1880 pamphlet on the “Isolated Socialist State”: the copy of this text with numerous marks was found in Stalin’s archive. The copy dates from December 1926, when the concept of “Socialism in one country” was already being widely discussed. However, close reading of Vollmar’s treatise and Lenin’s 1915 article “On the Slogan for a United States of Europe” suggests that while Stalin was drawing upon the sole relevant paragraph from Lenin’s article, this paragraph in turn, originates directly from Vollmar. Moreover, close scrutiny of Stalin’s marks points to the serious possibility that Vollmar’s ideas had a long-term impact on the principles of the Soviet pre-war foreign policy and the relationship between the USSR and the Comintern.

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I. Project Summary

This thesis is concerned with the succession of the early transitional Bolshevist regime by the Stalinist State in the course of the "Great Leap". More precisely, it asks how exactly the core Stalinist concept of "socialism in one country" came into being and what allowed this idea, at the very least contradictory in terms of Russian Marxism and particularly, in terms of Lenin's vision, to be adopted so quickly — and how it could be adopted at all. This ideological development had an enormous, profound effect on the Soviet regime, policies and state as well as deeply influencing the whole political thinking of the global Left. The results of the research suggest that the concept of the isolated socialist state can be traced as far back as 1800, to the treatise "The Closed Commercial State" authored by Johann Gottlieb Fichte. While the striking similarity between the Fichtean "rational state" and the historical Stalinist Soviet Union has been noted by various authors since the late 1930s, this thesis puts forward a hypothesis in regards to the particular path travelled by the Fichtean vision of socialism from early-19th century Germany to the post-revolutionary USSR. This path runs from Fichte to Ferdinand Lassalle, a German non-Marxist revolutionary and founder of the first legal socialist party in Europe. Then it almost secretly follows the perplexed trajectory of the ideological evolution within German social democracy, which unexpectedly comes to light in the 1870 pamphlet "The Isolated Socialist State" by Georg von Vollmar, then seemingly disappearing again to surface as an intrinsic, though not openly advertised part of the "orthodox Marxism" of Karl Kautsky and the Second International, apparent even in the supposedly Marxist Erfurt Programme, praised by Lenin. The immediate source of the concept of "socialism in one country" was Lenin's 1915

article “On the Slogan for a United States of Europe” or, to be exact, one paragraph from this article. Close reading of this text reveals Vollmar’s 1870 pamphlet as its immediate source. Also, contrary from what was previously believed, Stalin himself was familiar with the abridged translation of Vollmar’s text, made specifically for him in December 1926 by his childhood friend Aleksandr (Alësha) Svanidze. While in late 1926 Stalin had already been advancing the concept of “socialism in one country” for some time, his annotations suggest that Vollmar’s text reinforced him in his views. This newly discovered document also appears to be one of the very significant sources of the pre-war foreign policy of the Stalinist state which had a particularly profound and lasting influence on the Soviet vision of the relationship between the USSR and the Comintern.

II. Chapter outline

The Introduction posits and elaborates upon the main research question: what in the nature and history of the Stalinist ideological system made the enormous ideological shift of the Great Leap possible? It also dwells on the historiographical problem of “rupture” between the Bolshevist and the Stalinist regimes and offers a survey of how this issue was approached within Soviet studies. Particular attention is paid to the field of cultural studies and the conceptual frame of Culture One and Culture Two, introduced by Vladimir Paperny and developed later by Boris Groys. A draft hypothesis is set forward that the tectonic shift from the temporal to the spatial mode of Soviet utopian thinking lies at the core of the transition from Culture One to Culture Two and more broadly, from the Bolshevist to the Stalinist state. “The Closed Commercial State” by Johann Gottlieb Fichte is introduced as by far the most probable source of the spatial utopianism within Soviet thought. **Chapter One** will elaborate on the differences between spatial and temporal utopias. The corresponding ideological shift will be

observed through the dynamics of the two Grand Metaphors of Soviet discourse, used to comprehend the project of the future: the Path metaphor (as in "path to socialism") and the Building or Construction metaphor (as in "building/construction of socialism"). These two metaphors correlate with the two utopian modes and dynamics of their usage are remarkably consistent with the dynamics between temporal and spatial utopianisms. **Chapter Two** will deal with the analysis of Fichte's treatise "The Closed Commercial State". Firstly, Fichtean elements in Marxism will be briefly analyzed, then it will be demonstrated that Fichte's political economy originates from his philosophy of Right. From here we'll proceed to the detailed analysis of "The Closed Commercial State", followed by a reflection on the origins of Fichte's commitment to autarky (in relation to Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace") as well as on the origins and meaning of his statism. Finally, the last part of this chapter will present a detailed discussion of Fichtean traits in German social democracy and especially "The Isolated Socialist State" by Georg von Vollmar. **Chapter Three** will start with an inquiry into Russian and Soviet readership of Fichte, continuing with a reflection upon the images of the future and logic of purposes of the Fichtean model state on the one hand and and the historical Soviet Union on the other. This will be followed by an in-depth analysis of the similarities and differences between the project of the Closed Commercial State and the official discourse in the Stalinist USSR to show the close affinity of the latter with Fichte, especially on foreign trade monopoly and, even more importantly, monetary policy. Finally, a brief comparison of the Stalinist USSR with the ideal vision of Isolated Socialist State as expressed by Vollmar as well as with two other models, centered on the notion of closedness will be presented. **Chapter Four** features firstly, the analysis of the copy of Vollmar's treatise abridged translation with annotations found in Stalin's archive and secondly, the possible ramifications of this document for the understanding of Stalinist foreign policy and the relationship between the USSR and the Comintern. This is followed by a short summarizing **Conclusion**.

III. Note on methodology

The theoretical frame used by the author is multifaceted. Talking about metaphors, I draw on the insights derived from cultural and cognitive linguistics, including the theory of conceptual metaphor. In the course of further inquiry, this research builds upon the set of ideas and approaches of conceptual history, complemented by the perspectives of intellectual history or, more precisely, the history of ideas, as much as the border is blurred between the two. These theoretical advances are specifically important when it comes to one of the main themes of the research, that of "socialism in one country", which possesses a set of features, making it a legitimate subject of *Begriffsgeschichte*. I focus on the historical contexts characteristic of conceptual as well as in intellectual history as it is consistent with another part of the theoretical frame, namely the broader semiotic approach to culture, found in Clifford Geertz. In regards to space and spatialities, this research is based upon the ideas expounded by Henri Lefebvre in his famous "Production of Space" (1991). These ideas were further advanced by the scholars of human geography and, particularly, by David Harvey, whose concept of utopianism is crucial for this study.

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Note on sources, translations and transliteration

This thesis is concerned with the public discourse, language (including visual) of politics and propaganda. In the widest sense, the subject of interest here is culture and ideology, particularly in relation to politics. As much as the notion of “public” is generally problematic in case of the Bolshevist, and to an even greater degree, the Stalinist state, it still can be safely used to define the nature of the sources for this research. Almost all of those are texts or visual artifacts (posters, movies, photographs, etc.) which were in public circulation in Soviet Russia and the USSR in 1917-1940 — with the significant exception of Vollmar's pamphlet translation. German sources used, namely texts authored by Kant, Fichte, Lassalle, Kautsky and others were also, Vollmar's "Isolated Socialist State" apart, translated and published in Russian before and/or after the Revolution. They were available to a wide Russian audience. Those not translated or published were, nevertheless, available and certainly known to the large majority of those in the Party who were in position to determine or, at least, influence its ideological agenda. Finally, this thesis features one more group of sources, namely texts published at the time only outside the Soviet state, e.g. articles by Lev Trotsky.

In cases, when there are no published English translations for the texts cited, quotations were translated by the author. Sources of existing translations are cited in the customary way, Russian originals being quoted in the footnotes. In terms of transliteration I sought to follow BS 2979:1958 standard (British Standards 1958). It is used everywhere in the references and in the text itself, except for proper names, widely used in other conventional transliteration.

Introduction

It was a genuinely rare occasion, when a utopian, sci-fi, or just an adventurous Soviet novel, written in the 1920s and describing, at some point, the world of the future, could avoid the imagery of absent or transcended borders. In Yakov Okunev's "The Coming world 1923-2123" (1923), for one, two writer's contemporaries are welcomed in 2123 by the "citizens of the World City, World Commune", who "know neither states, nor borders, nor nations" (Okunev 1923: 49). Future communards take protagonists for a sightseeing tour, in which they find out that the world has become the World City, — continuous, transcending not only former political borders but also natural hindrances, be they oceans, across which chains of artificial islands connected to each other by hanging bridges are built, — or mountains, crossed by continuous, unbroken chains of artificial Mountain Terraces. Everything in the future world moves fast as if friction has also somehow vanished from this borderless realm. Not only do spatial borders not exist here, but personal borders are also transcended by means of new communication technology, making the human mind (and soul) open for others, — if only during a communication session. Moreover, this technology works for animals as well, allowing one of the protagonists from 1923 to emotionally communicate with a dog. This world, in which all borders are transcended, is just a very radical version of the vision, characteristic of communist utopias on small and large scales alike. American workers walk through the walls in Marietta Shaginyan's novel "Mess-Mend: Yankees in Petrograd" (1924); a World Union of Brotherly Republics emerges in Vadim Nikol'skiĭ's novel "In a thousand years" (1927). Nikol'skiĭ's vision also includes people of the future using wings to fly. Gravitation is defeated in Vivian Itin's "The land of Gongury" (1922). The "World Republic of the Soviets" faces the ultimate challenge in Vladimir Gadzinskiĭ's "The End" (1927). The world revolution, leading to the emergence of a single world state and this world state as such are among the most common

themes for Soviet science fiction and adventure literature of the 1920s. And not necessarily conventional literature. On 7 November 1920 "Pravda" published a satirical fantasy about 1940, authored by Yuriï Larin, Soviet economist and politician, who belonged to the Menshevist faction prior to July 1917, but who later joined Bolsheviks and became, among other things, one of the first heads of Gosplan, which was established just several months later, in February, 1921. The text, published under the title "The Fantastic Journey of L. A. Rin to our future" (Rin 1920), has all the characteristic features of 1920s utopian fiction, — and is, at the same time, reminiscent of some kinds of student party humour, more appropriate to a close circle of friends, than to the country's major daily newspaper. For the most part, Larin describes ceremonial meeting to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the "October takeover"[1]. Political borders still exist, though only in the part of the world which these days would be called "Global South;" thanks to series of revolutions and revolutionary wars, borders have already been rendered obsolete in other parts of the world, and Russia has become a part of "European-American Socialist federation". It's clear that Asia and Africa will soon also join the Federation, — nobody present at the celebration seriously challenges this assumption. Unlike Okunev, Larin also conceives gender borders transcended; in the future, Nikolai Bukharin takes the shape of a beautiful young girl, Nina Bukharina. In the past the Federation has also cleverly used freedom of trans-border capital movement to gain victory over its rivals; Soviet concessions proved safer and much more profitable than any capitalist investment opportunities.

There's one strange detail; while Larin describes the 20th anniversary of the October revolution, meaning, presumably, 1937, in the last fragment of the text he mentions, — quite remarkably, twice, — another date, three years later, that is to say, 1940. Moreover, Larin concludes his fantasy with the claim that "people in 1940 will be able to develop better and

[1] Октябрьский переворот

more substantial knowledge about 1960”[2] (Ibid). This can easily be just a slip, a mistake with no meaningful reason behind it; Larin was a busy administrator and, it would seem, free of writer's ambitions, so he probably just never got a chance to think about the proper finale for his little literary divertimento. However, in 1940, indeed, someone was trying to make out the landscape of the early Soviet 1960s through the heavy fog of uncertain times to come. In 1939 Evgeniĭ Petrov started working on a utopian novel, which he preferred to call “social-political” or “journalistic” (публицистический[3]); utopia or, for that matter, any literary depictions of the future had long fallen out of favour in 1939. What was one of the most popular genres just fifteen years earlier turned out to be not just unfashionable, but sometimes outright dangerous. The novel, under the working title “A journey to the land of communism”, was never completed. Petrov, who joined Sovinformburo as a war correspondent as soon as the war broke out, was killed in a plane crash on 2 July 1942, returning from besieged Sevastopol. Petrov’s utopia is built on the premise that after the Munich Agreement, the USSR managed to completely isolate itself from the Western world: “In the course of just one year the Soviet government has built along its Western borders — from the Baltic to the Black sea — a triple line of defence, so robust that it made the Maginot line look like a plaything.” The protagonist, American journalist Eugene Peters, visits the USSR in 1963, long after the war is over. The western world still lies in ruins, while the USSR is reaping the rewards of its “splendid isolation”; the great prophecy was fulfilled, and a better society was built, albeit “in one, separate country” only.

This study is concerned with what happened roughly between the publication of Larin’s fantasy about the year 1940 — and the real 1940 when the major part of Petrov’s unfinished novel was supposedly written. In terms of cultural history, it means that the subject of inquiry

[2] Люди 1940 года смогут зато о 1960 годе узнать гораздо солидней и больше (ibid)
[3] This word somehow came to be a substitute for “utopian”. A futuristic utopian novel “Land of the happy” by Yan Larry (1931) also has the words “публицистическая повесть” in its subtitle.

here is the underlying process, which manifested itself in the succession of Culture One by Culture Two, — as these terms are understood in Vladimir Paperny's famous book (Paperny 2002b). In terms of ideology, it means that this study's subject of inquiry is the abolition of the Marxist universalist vision of the borderless global communist society in favour of quite a different goal, one of building "socialism in one country". It's stunning how fast the transition was in both culture and ideology. Such a velocity makes one think that from the very beginning there was some part of Marxism — at least in its Soviet variety, — which made this, in historical terms, momentous transition possible.

I will argue that there was, indeed, such a tendency, which was noticeable in Leninism and then actualised in full by Stalinism. I will also argue that this tendency was inherited by Bolshevism from German social democracy and that in the end it can be traced to Johann Gottlieb Fichte or, more precisely, to his teachings on Right and State and particularly to his 1801 treatise "The Closed Commercial State." Finally, while it was definitely Ferdinand Lassalle who has implanted Fichtean thought into the very heart of German social democracy, the most important intermediate link between Fichte's post-Kantian political philosophy and Bolshevism is, arguably, "The Isolated Socialist State," another treatise, published in 1878 by Georg von Vollmar, then just a socialist neophyte, but later the most prominent figure of the reformist faction within SPD, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*. It was Trotsky who first cited "The Isolated Socialist State" as a source of the concept of "socialism in one country" in his 1937 book "The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union and Where Is It Going?" Ten years before making this claim public, in 1927, he had, in fact, personally confronted the Stalinist Politburo with the question of whether the author of the idea was known to them (Trotskiĭ 1988: 101). The question was, of course, purely rhetorical: Trotsky was certain that not a single Politburo member was even aware of the existence of Vollmar's article on "the isolated socialist state" he had in mind, let alone read it. So, he just dismissed the immediate positive answer

(“Yes, we know, we’ve read" (Ibid)), all the more since it came from Sergo Ordzhonikidze, who was never exactly known for his interest in the history of the socialist thought. Trotsky, as well as generally the later scholarship on the subject, has always assumed that neither Stalin, nor any other member of the Party leadership, has ever read Vollmar’s text. Moreover, it was until now thought to be translated into Russian only as late as the beginning of the 1990s. It emerged, in the course of the research for this study, that this was not the case. Not only was Stalin aware of Vollmar’s text’s existence, but he was also familiar with the abridged translation, made for him and at least one more member of Politburo personally in late November — early December 1926. This translation, with Stalin’s remarks, was found in his archive. While in December 1926 the concept of “socialism in one country,” extrapolated from just one paragraph in Lenin’s 1915 article, was already developed and *de facto* adopted by the party leadership, the analysis of Stalin’s remarks on his copy of the translation suggests that Vollmar's text had a fundamental impact on Soviet policies of the late 1920s and 1930s, a detail previously never factored in.

Continuity and rupture: a closer look at one old debate

The term “utopian” is commonly used to describe the Soviet project. Nevertheless, its meaning is far from certain. It is clear that from 1917 to 1940, the regime underwent a significant transformation, which had its own dynamic. It seems obvious that, for instance, the utopianism of the revolutionary avant-garde with its radical formal innovations and basic assumption of a close and reciprocal affinity between culture and politics, and Stalinist utopianism of socialist realism, transformation of natural landscapes and biological species are as far from each other as (in more political terms) utopianism of the still universalist Bolshevist variety of Marxism is from the Stalinist utopianism of the socially and culturally homogeneous community, regulated by violence, and at the same time, “naturally” united[4]. At the same time, these two utopian projects are somewhat deeply interwoven and share a number of features. The perplexity of this disposition is captured, first and foremost, in the works of Vladimir Paperny and Boris Groys, conceptualising the transformative transition between the two in terms of culture.

Vladimir Paperny, in his classic *Architecture in the Age of Stalin: Culture Two* (Paperny 2002a) distinguishes between two Soviet cultures – a culture of the revolutionary avant-garde (Culture One) and a Stalinist culture (Culture Two). The first one is a culture of “running around,” a culture that has its eyes on the future, overflowing borders, for which it has no respect, an anti-hierarchic culture of discontent and motion. Culture Two, on the contrary, is very much past-oriented and hierarchical; it is a culture of consolidation, stoppage, enclosure, immobility, and of locking up. This scheme is described by two antonymous sets of qualities,

[4] This unity was of a rather peculiar nature since it was based upon common aspirations (i.e. shared image of the future) rather than national or national-like identity. The latter was considered to be little more than a by-product of the capitalist order, still inescapable in the early stages of socialist development, but destined “to be passed through before a mature international socialist world can come into being” (Martin 2001: 8).

which form the structure of Paperny's narrative: spreading-solidifying, moving-immoveable, horizontal-vertical, uniform-hierarchic, collective-individual, and finally, destruction-making. In the Russian text, destruction (разрушение) is coupled with "созидание"[5], the word that immediately conjures up "building" or "construction." Paperny understands the two principles as rather a structuralist binary opposition; their dialectical synthesis being out of the question. These opposites are locked in a constant fight within Russian culture and, as his recent essay suggests, politics (Paperny 2012). This strictly structuralist approach was elaborated and at the same time challenged by Boris Groys in his no less classic *Total Art of Stalinism* (1992). He argues that "the Communist party leadership was transformed into a kind of artist whose material was the entire world and whose goal was to 'overcome the resistance' of this material and make it pliant, malleable, capable of assuming any desired form" (Groys 1992: 3).

Groys dispels the myth of the innocent revolutionary avant-garde that fell victim to Stalinism: in his view, Stalinist art "was not created by the masses but was formulated in their name by well-educated and experienced elites who had assimilated the experience of the avant-garde; and been brought to socialist realism by the internal logic of the avant-garde method itself, which had nothing to do with the actual tastes and demands of the masses." (Groys 1992: 9). Generally, both authors agree on the concept of the "two cultures" and to a large extent on what their constitutive features are. Moreover, there's no disagreement when it comes to recognition of Culture Two as a sui generis reaction to Culture One. The point of controversy between the two can be located, tentatively speaking, within the domain of historicization. Paperny treats Stalinist culture, though probably not quite explicitly, as a case of more or less pure archaization, — at least this is logically entailed by his vision of Culture One and Culture Two as a dyad of opposing principles, which take turns in acting throughout Russian

[5] "Sozidanie" has the same root as "zdanie", since both derive from "зьдати" ("to create, to build"), common for Slavic languages and preserved in prefixal verbs "vozdat'" and "sozdat'". Another word of the same origin is "zodchiĭ", now an archaism for "architect", but earlier, in Old Russian ("зъдъчии"), – also "potter", "builder", and "mason". "Зьдати", in turn, derives from "зьдъ" (clay). (Shanskiĭ 1975: 81, 104)

history, conceived within this framework as recursive. Groys on the contrary, asserts that Stalinist culture possesses a number of somewhat “postmodern” features and therefore should be understood in historical context as a much more complex condition: “beginning with the Stalin years, at least, official Soviet culture, Soviet art, and Soviet ideology become eclectic, citational, ‘postmodern.’” (Groys 1992: 108). Moreover, he perceives Paperny’s view as totally unhistorical; presenting his ambition to bring Stalinism back into historical time, he claims superiority of his view over that of Paperny[6] on this basis specifically, arguing that he, among others, fails to acknowledge that specific characteristics of Stalinist culture exist. He argues that it’s impossible to consider Stalinist culture as an isolated phenomenon since in fact, “striking analogies” to it can be found in the cultures of other countries in the same period. Groys makes an assumption that those adhering to the views he sees as unhistorical have been subconsciously “transfixed by its [Stalinist culture] claim to have transcended history” (Groys 1992: 64).

Some argue that Paperny’s view of the subject has undergone significant transformation in recent years[7]. While in the introduction to “Culture 2” he specifically emphasises the difference between the postmodern and Stalinist cultures[8], his later interview indeed can be seen as evidence of a change in views. Answering the interviewer’s question concerning one of the post-Soviet high-rises[9] during his 2005 interview, Paperny cites the American architect and achitectural theoretician Robert Venturi, more precisely, his book “Learning from Las Vegas” (1972), in which Venturi attempts to break from the “form-follows-function doctrine”,

[6] Groys’s criticism of the unhistorical perception of the Stalinist culture goes, in fact, beyond Paperny with Katerina Clark being its other significant target (in relation to Clark (1981)).
[7] See, for example, Wolfe (2013)
[8] Postmodern culture destroys the Pruitt–Igoe housing complex in St. Louis, Missouri in 1972 because this creation of the previous (modernist) epoch “failed to meet the requirements of the new epoch”; the Stalinist culture in 1934 destroys those creations of the previous epoch (Sukharev tower, Iberian Gate and Kitay-gorod wall), that are “most congruent with it” (Paperny̆ 1996: 28).
[9] The building at issue is Triumph Palace (Триумф-Палас), the tallest apartment building in Europe, designed by Andreĭ Trofimov (Architectural-design bureau TROMOS), which is sometimes referred to as the “Eighth Sister” due to its’ striking similarity to the Seven Sisters, Moscow skyscrapers of the Stalin era, built between 1947 and 1957.

advocating what he terms "decorated shades."[10] Paperny argues that Stalinist culture made that move forty years earlier: "constructivist buildings, and later steel structures of skyscrapers, were decorated with Greek, Renaissance, Gothic, Russian folk, elements. Stalin's vysotki were in fact decorated sheds, prestigious but uncomfortable, with huge halls and staircases but small and poorly lit bedrooms." (Fiks 2005). Considering that in architectural terms the production of "decorated sheds" is characteristically postmodern, Paperny's remark can be understood as recognition of the Soviet high-rises as such. In the essay "Modernism and destruction in architecture"[11] he, among other things, keeps track of the postmodern reactions to the "modernist excesses" in architecture, and one can't help noticing the similarity between these reactions and the reactions of the Stalinist culture to the revolutionary avant-garde. Paperny observes that modernists, particularly within the Russian avant-garde, strove to clean their new buildings of everyday routine, including cooking and laundry, let alone "'the family photographs, the dirty socks, the cocktail shakers and the grapefruit rinds'—everything that is signified by the almost untranslatable Russian word byt." He points out specifically that Venturi's postmodern offensive against modernism starts with the call "for messy vitality over obvious unity." (Paperny 2010: 44) Paperny draws no straight lines, but the implications here are fairly obvious. In Paperny's view, a certain similarity exists between Venturi's postmodern reaction to the restrictions of modernism and the reasons for the abolition of the avant-garde architectural experiments centred on communal living[12]. Such a similarity logically leads to the conclusion that Stalinism is in a way, "postmodern".

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[10] "Learning from Las-Vegas" (in fact, written by Venturi in co-authorship with two other authors, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour) features a famous classification of buildings into "ducks" and "decorated sheds". While the former force structure and function into a recognizable symbolic form, the latter use conventional form to which symbolic decorations are applied independently (for details see Venturi et al. (1977: 87-103)).

[11] First published in 2006.

[12] Consider, for example, the following passage from the speech delivered by Lazar Kaganovich as early as in June 1931, at the VKP (b) Central Committee plenum: "we have to stand up firmly against various attempts to impose […] communes top-down as well as against various undue and destructive attempts to run ahead of time. Here's a particular example of such absurd and unacceptable proposals, put forward by comrade Sabsovich a year ago: "We can build upon the apartment buildings, accommodating 2-3 thousand people. There should be no individual

Nevertheless, Paperny's most recent full-fledged reflection on the subject, the essay "Culture Three: How to stop the pendulum" (Papernyĭ 2012) gives a fairly detailed account of the two periods in the history of the post-soviet Russia — before and after Putin's ascent to power — as another illustrations of the Culture One *vs* Culture Two paradigm. Ultimately, this essay sums up the same argument of Russian history as recursive and the alteration of Culture One *vs* Culture two as a fundamental mechanism of its development. Paperny acknowledges, though, that such recursiveness is not specific for Russia: "while recursive changes exist throughout almost all cultures, civilization is exactly what keeps these changes from running to extremes."[13]

Boris Groys not only maintains his view of the aforementioned Soviet culture developments, presented in the "Total art of Stalinism", but elaborates on it, reinforces and advances it in several texts, and most importantly in "The Communist Postscript"[14] (Groys 2009). This treatise on the role of language in Stalinist culture and on the nature of the "real socialism" experience is quite a showcase of Groys's provocative and paradoxical views. Here Stalinist version of communism (or, more precisely, the Stalinist USSR experience) turns out to be "the only possible way of actualising the idea of bringing communism into being.[15] In "The

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kitchens or laundries in such a building, no apartments, no common rooms, no family rooms. Every worker should have a small room where he could sleep and probably have a rest sometimes. There should be absolutely no rooms to share [between sexes]. History left us no time for the transformational period, for experiments or prolonged research... This is why we have to proceed immediately." Such "leftist" phrases can only do irreparable damage to the cause of the reconstruction of the daily life according to the socialist principles." (...нужно давать решительный отпор всяким попыткам навязывания этих коммун сверху, как и всяким попыткам вредного и ненужного забегания вперед. Вот например одно из таких абсурдных и неприемлемых положений, с которыми выступал т. Сабсович год тому назад. «Размер жилых домов может быть определен на 2—3 тыс. человек. В таком доме не должно быть никаких индивидуальных кухонь, прачечных, в нем не должно быть квартир, должно быть никаких комнат-общежитий, никаких семейных комнат. Каждый трудящийся в таком доме должен иметь отдельную небольшую комнату для спанья, и иногда может быть и для отдыха. Никаких комнат для общего проживания в них мужа и жены быть не должно. Времени для переходного периода у нас нет, история не отпустила нам времени для опытов, для продолжительного изучения... поэтому мы должны к этому делу приступить сразу». Эти «левые» фразы ничего кроме вреда делу коренной перестройки быта на социалистической основе принести не могут. (Kaganovich 1931b: 63-64)).

[13] Хотя циклические изменения существуют практически во всех культурах, цивилизация как раз в том и состоит, что не позволяет этим изменениям скатываться в крайности и той, и другой фазы.

[14] First published in German three years earlier (Groïs 2006)

[15] See detailed discussion in Penzin (2016).

Communist Postscript" Stalin is portrayed as the creator and Pantokrator-Judge of the *diamat*, understood in turn as the mode of thought, distinct from both the formal logic (which rejects controversy) and "conventional" dialectics (which resolves it). Stalin's dialectical materialism, on the contrary, has a constant focus on the controversy and embraces it within the seemingly absurd paradoxes in its very centre. Within this logic, say, deviations from the Party line were intolerable simply because each instance of deviation presented a part of the whole and each of them was, therefore, at odds with the praxis of retaining the self-contradictory totality. Groys presents the Stalinist "dialectical materialism", *diamat* as the apogee of the European speculative thought and Stalin himself not only as of the artist-demiurge of "The total art of Stalinism", shaping reality as he sees fit, but also as profound thinker and practitioner of philosophy. The main advancement of the earlier concept in "The Communist Postscript" stems from the aforesaid; not only has Socialist realism fulfilled (though at the same time transcended) the revolutionary avant-garde impulse, but in addition Stalinist dialectical materialism has fulfilled (though, once again, transcended) the promise of classic Marxism. Stalin, thereby, turns out to be a Marxist, or even, probably, *the* Marxist[16].

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Paperny and Groys investigate cultural dynamic, and — with all their disagreements and differences being taken into account — both acknowledge, one way or another, that the two distinguishable cultural modes exist and that some kind of rupture exists between these two modes. In Paperny this rupture is conditioned by somewhat direct negation of the

[16] Quite a broad consensus exists among scholars about Stalin's genuinely Marxist mindset, — though this argument is rarely (if ever) taken to such extremes, as in Groys. Particularly, Steven Kotkin, for example, claims in his recent biography of Stalin, that "The fundamental fact about him was that he viewed the world through Marxism" (Kotkin 2014: 462). Detailed and balanced consideration of Stalin's Marxism is also found in Van Ree (2000).

revolutionary avant-garde by the Stalinist culture. In Groys this rupture appears to have more of a dialectical nature: the disruption point (or, to be more precise, interval) both connects *and* disconnects Culture One and Culture Two. Both Groys and Paperny proceeded from the same premise: in course of 1927-1932 in the USSR one cultural mode superseded the other, albeit, of course, not completely. For already some time now this assumption has been a significant part of the common ground within the domain of Soviet cultural history. However, the presence of this rupture, well-established in cultural history, is less pronounced and/or more problematic elsewhere. Staying to a large extent unresolved, this issue presents an apparent problem: if the rupture doesn't exist, then largely the same framework of categories and concepts can be used within Soviet studies in regards to Bolshevist and Stalinist periods. If, on the contrary, the rupture is tangible, these periods need to be examined with different sets of instruments and optical devices; there are two subjects of inquiry considerably different in nature.

Concurrent, if not simultaneous attempts have been made to conceptualise the dynamic nature of the Soviet interwar order along the lines of economic, social and political history. Was the cultural change conditioned by either economical or political evolution of the regime (or both)? And if yes, then to what extent, — and how in particular? It's clear that the years of transformation, implied by Paperny's model[17], namely between 1927-1928 and 1931-1932 cover the so-called "Great Break", i.e. the abandonment of the NEP and the turn to accelerated collectivisation and industrialisation. The cultural shift fits within the time frame of the First Five-Year Plan (1928—1932). This is also a period of "cultural revolution" and what Sheila Fitzpatrick describes (1978a) as the time when this term meant "class war" as opposed to the earlier, Leninist understanding of that concept.[18] With the economy, as well as political and

[17] He specifically has reservations on the chronological boundaries between the two being blurred (see Papernyĭ (1996: 18-19)). However, Culture Two as a model is applied in his book to the period between 1932 and 1954 with the lower boundary of this chronological frame being set by the adoption of the Resolution of the TsK VKP(b) Politburo "On restructuring literary and arts organizations" (23 April 1931).
[18] See David-Fox (1999) for an in-depth reflection on the term and the subject.

social systems in focus, the transformation of the regime at the turn of the decade is, of course, also quite obvious. It is also commonly explained in idiosyncratical terms: such theories cite a wide range of particular historical conditions and circumstances, starting with the backwardness of the Russian/Soviet economy combined with tragic shortcomings of the interwar global economy and international order — in some cases all the way through to Stalin’s personality. At the same time, there is this ambiguity, surrounding the impliable rupture itself in terms of ideological transfigurations and metamorphoses of the Soviet doctrine. Understandably, such an ambiguity results in a noticeable lack of conceptualizations. The big issue at hand, underlying all inquiries into the Soviet pre-war history of ideas, was and still is quite political. It can be phrased as a series of questions, for instance: is there a continuity or a rupture between the early revolutionary Soviet regime (Bolshevist or Leninist) and the Stalinist regime which has emerged in the course of, and gained stability after, the First five-year plan? Was there any continuance in ideology? Finally, — and probably, most significantly, — what is the place of Marxism in all this?

This issue (alongside corresponding questions) is almost as old as the Stalinist state itself. Many politicians, political theorists, economists and political economists have been addressing it at least since the late 1920s. As of the late 1930s several dozen texts were either published or merely written (to be published only later — if ever) in which their authors were trying to conceptualize the path of development, followed by the Soviet regime. Among those authors were workers and former revolutionaries like Gavriil Myasnikov (Myasnikov 2008); European social democrats, like Friedrich Adler (Adler 1932) and Helmut Wagner (Wagner 1934) ; Trotskyites, like Victor Serge (Serge 1937), Raya Dunayevskaya (Dunayevskaya 1992) and Ryan Worrall (Worrall 1939); Trotsky himself and Simone Weil (Weil 2001: 1-23). Unsurprisingly, authors who took a specific interest in this issue predominantly associated themselves with the Left. The need and urge to solve this problem became even more

compelling with the start of the de-Stalinization, however incomplete, inconsistent and insufficient it was, in the USSR. The version, suggested by Nikita Khrushchev in his speech to the delegates of the XXth Party Congress, could be essentially boiled down to the following provisions: pure Leninism /Bolshevism existed; this pure Leninism, in turn, was the lineal heir of the original, intact Marxism, as conceived by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (hence "Marxism-Leninism"). After Lenin's death, it was twisted and corrupted — personally and almost single-handedly by Stalin. However, true Marxism-Leninism was preserved by the collective conscience of the Party, which is now healing and returning to the "Leninist norms". Stalinist practices (e.g. "cult of the personality" or mass terror) were not directly linked to any theoretical developments (e.g. "socialism in one country" or "intensification of class struggle in course of the socialist construction") within the Party, let alone to the politics of industrialisation and collectivisation, and could be therefore, just swiftly cast away. Khrushchev's version was —seemingly smoothly and certainly quickly — adopted by the Party. Apparently, "Marxism-Leninism" in this version in no small part consisted of Stalin's theoretical developments and policy playbooks. This fact didn't make dealing with the old problem of continuity vs rapture any easier for those who still wanted to deal with it.

During the Cold war years quite a significant number of historians, political scientists, economists and public intellectuals came to think that the Stalinist regime was, indeed, little more than just a logical extension of the early Soviet statehood, associated with Lenin and, consequently, with the untouched Marxism. As Stephen Cohen observes in the opening introductory essay of the 1977 collection "Stalinism: Essays in historical interpretation", "between the late 1940's and 1960's, a remarkable consensus of interpretation, formed on the subject of Bolshevism and Stalinism […] posited an uncomplicated conclusion: no meaningful difference or discontinuity was seen between Bolshevism and Stalinism, which were viewed as being fundamentally the same, politically and ideologically. […] Stalinism, according to the

consensus, was the logical, rightful, triumphant, and even inevitable continuation, or outcome, of Bolshevism." (Cohen 1977: 3) Cohen attacks what he calls the "continuity thesis" alongside the following lines. First, claims of the existence of the Stalinist "seeds" in Bolshevism has little heuristic value, since seeds of any historical period may be found in the preceding period. Second, the undeniable authoritarianism of Bolshevism doesn't, in fact, explain why Stalinism was as excessive and extreme as it was: not just "coercive peasant policies, but a virtual civil war against the peasantry; not merely police repression, […] but a holocaust by terror that victimized tens of millions of people for twenty-five years; not merely a Thermidorian revival of nationalist tradition, but an almost fascist-like chauvinism" (Cohen 1977: 12). Third, Bolshevism itself was too diverse in many aspects to treat it as merely "embryonic Stalinism". In his own works Cohen holds that Stalinism was principally avoidable or even to some extent the illegitimate result of the Revolution and of Leninism as such. In other word, Cohen gives the affirmative answer to the question of whether the rupture between Bolshevik and Stalinist regimes exists[19].

In early 1970s came the "revisionist" shift in Soviet studies, connected to the new generation of historians, which has switched the focus of scholarship from political to social history and tended to accentuate the social support for the 1917 revolution and later for the cultural revolution of the late 1920s — early 1930s as well as the complexity of the nature of Stalinist terror.[20] It would be an exaggeration to claim that the revisionist historians agree with each other on the issue in question, but authors associated with this line of scholarship recognize Stalinism as a specific object of research, which is deeply linked with the preceding

[19] He claims, for instance, that "when Stalin had abandoned the program of industrialization, inspired by Bukharin's views and adopted by the XV Party Congress in favour of the more intensive and fast development, he abandoned mainstream Bolshevik thinking about economic and social change" (Cohen 1977: 23). See also the epilogue to Cohen's biography of Bukharin with the prefixed epigraph from R. Medvedev, claiming that: "Stalinism cannot be regarded as the Marxism-Leninism or, the Communism of three decades. It is the perversions — that Stalin introduced into the theory and practice of the Communist movement. It is a phenomenon profoundly alien to Marxism-Leninism." (Cohen 1975: 382)

[20] See, among others: Rabinowich (1976), Fitzpatrick (1978b) and (1979), Koenker (1981), Viola (1987), Getty (1985).

period, especially when it comes to the ways Party leaders envisioned the future and their specific roadmaps. The later "anthropological turn" has once again shifted the emphasis, this time from social to cultural history, which led first to the rise in the study of the marginalized groups within somewhat a Foucauldian paradigm,[21] then to cultural studies as such, drawing upon a variety of poststructuralist approaches from deconstructivist or Bourdieusian to literary analysis[22] and finally to the research in the problematic field of "Soviet subjectivity." The last is thought to originate from Stephen Kotkin's study of the workers' life in Magnitogorsk, the iconic "socialist city" of the Stalinist industrialisation (Kotkin 1995) and to develop in the works of Igal Halfin and Johan Hellbeck[23].

The problem of continuity vs rupture lost its significance in the later lines of development taken by of Soviet studies. The collapse of the Soviet Union seemingly made this debate obsolete: prior to 1991 the USSR was perceived by many on the Left as a *viable* alternative. That made the question of whether Stalinism was unavoidable and inscripted into this model from the very beginning, highly significant. When the "Soviet alternative" turned out to be unsustainable and collapsed, the very point of the debate was somewhat lost. While the issue has probably lost its topicality, it persists. Unlike the cultural history of the period, approaches primarily focusing on politics and economy do not provide a definite answer to the question of continuity/discontinuity in the nature of the Soviet state before and after the Great Break of 1928-1932. Politically, abandonment of the NEP entailed a fast transition from collective to personalist dictatorship, which was made possible after the successful campaign against the so-called "right opposition" and Bukharin's removal from power. Consequently, a presumed restitution of the pre-NEP policies was thereby, accompanied by the change in the political model. However, the system of collective dictatorship had been gradually deteriorating

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[21] See, for example, Ball (1994) and Goldman (2002)

[22] See, for example, Dobrenko (2007), Rȳklin (2002) and (2009)

[23] See, for example, Halfin (2003), Hellbeck (2006)

since Lenin's de-facto withdrawal from governance in March 1923. One may say that this process led to the personalistic dictatorship "naturally", so it had not necessarily been established as a result of a political rupture.

In economic terms, the answer to the question of continuity/discontinuity is also complex. Indeed, the NEP since the time of its adoption in 1921 was an improvisation and Lenin had to threaten his colleagues with resignation in order to proceed with it (Valentinov 1991: 68). Moreover, it was never fully accepted by the Party rank and file as or by a huge part of the leadership. In 1923 Molotov, in his article on the state of affairs in the Party before the XII Congress, writes that "we have no intention to say that all the Party members have immediately understood and duly appreciated NEP. Unfortunately, it's still not the case, even today."[24] Nikolaĭ Valentinov (Vol'skiĭ)[25] writes in his memoir, with reference to Alekseĭ Sviderskiĭ, at the time deputy Commissar of Agriculture, that in 1923-1924 only Aleksandr Tsuryupa and Leonid Krasin of all Party leaders agreed with the NEP policies, introduced by Lenin (Valentinov 1991: 68). Many workers, even those without formal party commitment, and particularly old-time Bolsheviks, perceived NEP as a deviation from the real communism of the Civil War years. We don't know exactly Lenin's thoughts on the subject. The phrase about NEP being "serious and here to stay" was and still is extensively quoted, though it doesn't, in fact, belong to Lenin.[26] Obviously, he had no objections, — unless "here to stay" wasn't followed by "forever".

Complications arise from the fact that the policies of 1917-1921 were largely improvised by the Party in quite extreme circumstances. Stalinist economic policies of the First five-year plan period were also reactive — at least to the same degree to which they were pro-active.

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[24] Мы не хотим сказать, что для всех членов партии НЭП стал сразу и вполне понятен и правильно оценен. К сожалению, этого и сейчас сказать еще нельзя (Molotov 1923)
[25] He worked as an editor of the "Industry and trade" newspaper, published by VSNkH at the time.
[26] The author is Valerian Osinskiĭ, whom Lenin quotes twice speaking to the Xth Party Conference (Protokolȳ Desyatoĭ partkonferentsii 1933: 68, 91). However, some parts of the transcript, including Osinskiĭ's speech, quoted by Lenin, were lost.

Thereby, any clear verdict on the continuity of the Stalinist economic policy is barely possible. Sure enough, some basic provisions of the transitional economic policies, as described in Marx's Manifesto, were in place during the pre-NEP years. However, a closer look at such measures reveals a lot of subtle (or sometimes not so subtle) legalistic intricacies. For example, the "Decree on the abolishment of inheritance"[27] adopted by VTsIK from 27 April 1918 indeed forbade the inheritance of the "bourgeois property", but established the inheritance of the "earned property."[28] Also formally the Soviet state adhered to the second provision of the Manifesto, which required the introduction of a heavy progressive or graduated income tax. Moreover, personal income tax in the early 1930s was *both* graduated and progressive[29], but in fact it had little impact. Government almost completely relied on various indirect taxes, largely on turnover tax, which was applied to a limited group of agricultural products and raw materials. Complex structuring of the turnover tax allowed for the retrieval of the surplus produce throughout the whole economy, including not only agriculture and consumer goods production, but also heavy industries and construction. Thus the real tax burden was only to a very limited extent defined by the personal income tax rates.[30] These and other intricacies of the Soviet economic policies of the early 1920s and early 1930s together with their largely reactive nature, make it quite difficult to give a definitive answer to the question of whether the Great Break policies take over from those of the pre-NEP period.

A shift on such a scale, which, as we know, has completely changed the cultural landscape, had to entail also a noticeable ideological shift. Existing accounts of the transition

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[27] Об отмене наследования

[28] Wording was pretty careful: the "earned property" of the deceased changed its status, since legatees could exercise "direct management and control" (непосредственное управление и распоряжение) over it, which was formally not the same as inheritance of the property rights. But in practice the Soviet judicial system treated this provision exactly as the inheritance of the property rights. The right of inheritance itself was reinstated within the Soviet law by the Civil Code, adopted in 1923.

[29] Taxation was (among other things) instrumental in social engineering. Taxpayers were divided into groups, depending on type of occupation and of income, so different rates were applied at identical levels of income in different groups (Holzman 1950). On details of earlier taxation policies see Kotsonis (2016)

[30] See, for example, Pashkovskiĭ et al. (1929) and Karavaeva (2009)

from Leninism to Stalinism don't generally provide integral explanations of the ideological transformation that was followed by the carnage of collectivisation and terror. What particular change in the vision of the future served as the underlying reason for that shift? This new vision was presumably conceived by Stalin (and, arguably, other people in the Party elite), but it was barely openly manifested within the Party doctrine, — aside from two exceptions - the adoption of the idea that it's possible to accomplish the construction of socialism in one country and the theory of class struggle aggravation contributing to the development of socialism. Instead a lot of effort was invested in covering up an actual ideological shift. The legitimacy of the Soviet government during the second half of the 1920s and through the whole 1930s was heavily dependent, at least from the Party elite's perspective, on preserving the appearance of continuity of ideological principles and propaganda vocabulary of the preceding period. Thereby, it was impermissible to openly articulate any substantial diversion from the Leninist paradigm, not to mention one on the scale of the turn which was brought into action during 1927-1932. Consequently, the diversion from the previous ideology was consciously and extensively disguised and covered up with the Marxist vocabulary. Simultaneously those party leaders who were actually challenging this shift were be dealt with — alongside with those who could hypothetically pose such a challenge and particularly those, who were in a position to understand. This long-term decoy operation had profound consequences not only for the historiography of the Soviet period but also for the fate of the Soviet state as such.

In the next part, I will try to define the two conditions of the Soviet state — before and after the rupture of 1927-1932 in terms of the two different modes of utopian thinking. In doing so, I proceed from the understanding of ideology, as formulated by Clifford Geertz, who suggests that it is an instrument, which renders "otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them" (Geertz 1973: 220). The word "purposefully" is not accidental here: it implies that ideology includes a

more or less clear image of the future, where the purpose of activity is found. Whether this image of the future is utopian and to what degree, depends on the particular ideological system. The utopian nature of the Soviet project as such is hardly doubtful: utopianism is at the core of the Soviet image of the future, which, in turn, looms large within the ideology of the Soviet regime. It is, presumably, the change in the mode of the utopian thinking that can help us to reveal the radical nature of the Soviet regime ideological transformation in late 1920s—early 1930s.

Culture One vs Culture Two, Utopia One vs Utopia Two

What is Utopia

Utopian studies constitute a huge realm of research in their own right. Nevertheless, even though definitions of the subject are numerous, no common definition of utopia exists. Such vagueness stems from the very book, which gave utopia its name; it was built into the foundation of the idea by Sir Thomas More: Ou-topia (from Greek: οὐ ("not") and τόπος ("place")) is the homophone of Eu-topia (derived from Greek εὖ ("good") and τόπος ("place")). Latin editions of the "Utopia" (see for example More (1518: 11) featured a short poem, Hexastichon, or, "Six lines on the Island of Utopia", attributed to "Anemolius, Poet Laureate, Nephew of Hythlodaeus by his Sister." In this poem, the island itself speaks, asserting its superiority over Plato's Republic: "The ancients called me Utopia or Nowhere because of my isolation. At present, however, I am a rival of Plato's republic, perhaps even a victory over it. The reason is that what he has delineated in words I alone have exhibited in men and resources and laws of surpassing excellence. Deservedly ought I to be called by the name of Eutopia or Happy Land." (More et al. 1965: 21).

More's wordplay, made explicit in this epigraph, became a point of departure for many authors of the abundant literature on the subject since it makes evident the basic contradiction of utopia, between desirability and the impossibility. While the utopian condition is desirable (εὖ-τόπος), it's always separated from the present condition by the infinite distance which is set by the impossibility to reach it (οὐ-τόπος). However, this contradiction is common for all forms of utopianism, but for operational purposes, we obviously need the definition to be stricter.

Karl Mannheim in his "Ideology and Utopia" defines the utopian state of mind as one showing evidence of being "incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs", or which is, in its thoughts and actions, "oriented towards objects which do not exist in the actual situation." Moreover, since not just any incongruity is utopian, "only those orientations, transcending reality will be referred to by us as utopian which, when they pass over into conduct, tend to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the time." (Mannheim 1972: 173). This definition is operational in sociological terms, but it becomes more problematic when applied to the literary genre of utopia and generally to the utopian texts since fictional literature itself transcends reality and it is not always clear whether any particular text is programmatic in nature. Utopianism can be defined as something manifested in the texts, belonging to the literary genre of utopia, generally being the accounts of travel to exotic destinations first in space and later in time.

According to Frederic Jameson, this genre is uniquely characterised by its explicit intertextuality. "Few other literary forms," writes Jameson, "have so brazenly affirmed themselves as argument and counterargument. Few others have so openly required cross-reference and debate within each new variant […] So it is that the individual text carries with it a whole tradition, reconstructed and modified with each new addition…" (Jameson 2005: 2) Yet, such a formal approach leaves out other forms of utopian thinking, which often are, in fact,

far more important in terms of influence and ramifications. As Jameson himself recognises, "…utopia is a good deal more than the sum of its individual texts." (Ibid).

A very different, exemplarily broad understanding of the term is commonly associated[31] with Ernst Bloch's *opus magnum*, the three-volume "Principle of Hope." Bloch, while paying specific attention to the primacy of the antinomy between the individual and the communal, conceives a notion of the utopian impulse, which can be found in everyday life including advertisements, travel guides, celebrations, fairy tales, cinema and antiques as well as in the enormously broad corpus of texts on technological advances, architectural theories (and practice), medicine, geography, philosophy (including, among others, Plato, Spinoza and Kant), politics and religion.

Somewhat along the lines of Mannheim's understanding, Bloch introduces a distinction between those visions of the future that involve new possibilities and those that merely serve purposes of psychological compensation for suffering, caused by the evils and flaws of the present condition, designating those visions as abstract and concrete utopias (Bloch 1995: 146). This concept proved itself quite fruitful revealing the unmanifest, hidden or just subtle elements of the utopian thinking, but as Ruth Levitas observes in "The Concept of Utopia", for Bloch the criteria by which one makes a judgement on the presence of the utopia or distinguishes between its abstract and concrete forms, are quite ambiguous if not obscure. She also points out that on many occasions, Bloch seems to read his own concerns into the past in a subjective and even teleological[32] manner. (Levitas 2011: 105-07).

Levitas herself advocates structural pluralism as the leading principle, emphasising that attempts to define utopian terms of either form, function or content, result in artificial

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[31] See, for example, Roberts (1987), Levitas (1989) and (2007).

[32] Teleology can be found in the "Principle of Hope" in quite an explicit form. Concluding his research, Bloch writes for instance (regarding to his analysis of Marx), that "*True genesis is not at the beginning but at the end*, and it starts to begin only when society and existence become radical, i.e. grasp their roots" [emphasis in the original] (Bloch 1995: 1375).

limitations put on the field of study and lead to erroneous judgments. Essentially, her view is that utopia is not a product of some innate impulse, but a social construct which emerges as a response to the "scarcity gap" between "needs and wants" (Levitas 2011: 209). She defines a basic precondition for utopia as "disparity between socially constructed experienced need and socially prescribed and actually available means of satisfaction." (Levitas 2011: 210-11). Finally, Levitas introduces the distinction between "hope" and "desire", arguing, that by limiting utopia to the possible, we conflate these categories and reduce utopia to hope at the expense of the dream. In her opinion, the fact that early utopias are located somewhere far away reflects the fact that they express social/political criticism or dream, pure desire — but not something to hope for, — and it is desire, not hope, which constitutes the main subject of the utopian inquiry (Levitas 2011: 221).

Finally, Frederic Jameson distinguishes "two distinct lines of descendency from More's inaugural text: the one intent on the realisation of the Utopian program, the other an obscure yet omnipresent Utopian impulse finding its way to the surface in a variety of covert expressions and practices" (Jameson 2005: 3). For us Jameson's "systemic" or programmatic line is of primary interest, since alongside the numerous texts, belonging to the genre, it also includes political practice, aiming to found a new society (by means of revolution), "self-conscious Utopian secessions from the social order which are the so-called intentional communities" and last, but not least, "the attempts to project new spatial totalities, in the aesthetic of the city itself". Jameson illustrates this argument with the following scheme:



Figure 1. Two lines of descendency from More's "Utopia" (Jameson 2005: 4)

He specifically addresses what he calls "closure," that is, the necessity to isolate the utopian locus spatially to accomplish the totality of the project, and assigns such a design exclusively to the "Program" line of the above diagram. According to Jameson, totality is "precisely this combination of closure and <Utopian social> system, in the name of autonomy and self-sufficiency" (Jameson 2005: 5), and this particular characteristic of utopia generates the feeling of otherness, radical distance, which constitutes the subject itself, since (at least in terms of genre) "utopian form is […] a representational meditation on radical difference, radical otherness, and on the systemic nature of the social totality" (Jameson 2005: xii).

Another aspect of the utopian thinking and visions, defined in terms of content. This definition follows J.C. Davis, who, in conclusion to his "Utopia and the Ideal Society" devoted to the English utopias of 16th-17th centuries, suggests the definition of utopia, which emphasises the importance of social or communal. He holds that utopia is a mode of visualizing social perfection. What makes it distinguishable from other such modes is that utopia acknowledges deficiencies in both human nature and in the surrounding world and aims "to contain and condition them through organisational controls and sanctions" (Davis 1981: 370). Within this

frame, mythic Arcadia, for instance, is not utopian: deficiencies in people or nature are absent and therefore absent is the need to contain and condition them. This, in turn, means that there's no moral community to strive after perfection. However, such a community with its moral heroics is what utopian authors aim to imagine and depict. Only deficiencies make the perfectibility of human nature visible, — and precondition the possibility of the successful moral community, which is built upon the sacrifice, be it absolute or partial, of the individual to the communal in order to achieve social harmony. Thus, utopia necessarily acknowledges the primacy of the antinomy between the individual and the communal.

This research is almost exclusively concerned with the aspect of utopia found along the "Program" line of Jameson's diagram. Though we'll probably have to locate the utopian features in texts not explicitly utopian, the term itself is hereinafter used almost exclusively to designate the social/political, more "practical" utopianism, which, however, often extends far beyond the limits of the political praxis or even programs. Utopia, therefore is considered here not just as a literary genre or "social dreaming," not to mention "impulse" or "desire" but as a complex vision of the desired future condition, which is vastly different from the present one. This vision may be rather concrete, providing details or, on the contrary, quite vague, but there are two aspects always present in such a vision. The first integral element of utopian thinking, as understood in this research, is defined in terms of function: it includes either the intention to implement the utopian vision (in the future or starting today), or at least, recognition of the utopian vision — by the author and/or, for lack of a better word, his "readers" — as one of the possible worlds.

Disparate natures of the "Soviet": Temporal Utopian Imagination and Its Spatial Rival

Theoretical frameworks of utopian imagery are numerous, and so are approaches to the systematisation of utopias. For the purpose of this research, though, one of the most basic and old-established lines of thought within the utopian studies is of primary interest. Arguably, it was German social and art historian Alfred Doren, who was the first to set a clear distinction between the spatial and the temporal modes of utopian imagery in his 1927 essay "Desired place and desired time" (Doren 1968). In fact, this distinction is even more rigorous: according to Doren, only accounts of the "desired place" (Wunschraum) can be perceived as utopias, while those of the desired time (Wunschzeiten) fall into the category of eschatology. According to Doren, while utopia, the desired place, can be essentially characterised as immanent/worldly (*Weltnähe*), eschatology, the desired time, is on the contrary transcendent/other-worldly (*Weltferne*). Doren's approach was at the same time elaborated and contested by Frederick Polak in his "Image of the Future". Polak observes that many texts, largely referred to as utopian "are implicitly set in time, and many explicitly so" (Polak 1973: 163), but then he makes one critical caveat, namely that "from the beginning, there is a paradoxical and tragic conflict between temporal and spatial images of progress. Possibly the spatial forms have had a more destructive influence on man's destiny than the hubristic philosophy of endless evolution in time. […] when spatial images begin to dominate, the regression of the image of the future as a category of human thought becomes an accomplished fact" (Polak 1973: 129)." According to this view, placing utopian societies elsewhere, in isolated places like islands, has more to it than being merely a handy literary device. The relation to spatiality is of crucial importance for the outcome of the utopian thought. Polak considers that it's not, of course, spatial awareness as such, that leads to the "degeneration" of utopia, — but gives no certain answer to the question of what causes such degeneration.

Indeed authors of texts on envisioned ideal societies have been placing them *elsewhere* from the very beginning. Not only utopias as such were located in space: long before More, widespread Christian narratives of Medieval times describing societies of the righteous also made use of the spatial frame, — most famously the legend of Prester John's kingdom. The first known utopian text whose author resorted to the temporal frame only emerged in the late Enlightenment, namely in 1770, when Louis-Sébastien Mercier's "L'An 2440" was first published. In the course of the next century the number of utopian texts, set at some point in the future, grew steadily. On the opposite, authors, who preferred far away islands or inaccessible mountain valleys, became scarce. That doesn't mean, such texts ceased to exist: "The Voyage to Icaria" by Étienne Cabet (1842), who places his imaginary country on an island, separated from the continent "by an arm of the sea that takes six hours to cross" (Cabet 2003: 6); Samuel Butler's "Erewhon: or, Over the Range," set in the "Southern Alps" in New Zealand (1872) and, to a lesser extent, Edward Bulwer Lytton's "The Coming Race" (1871), being the account of a superior, but subterranean civilization, prove otherwise, — though the utopian nature of the last two texts is debatable. Nevertheless, many influential utopias, such as Edward Bellamy's "Looking backwards" (1888), "Freeland" by Teodor Hertzka (1890), and most famously, H.G. Wells's "The modern Utopia" (1905) are all set in the future.

Reinhart Koselleck, one of the most prominent figures of modern historiography, who has also worked in the field of linguistics, observes in his essay "The Temporalization of Utopia" that before Mercier, not only was the space of experience in traditional utopia primarily spatial, but its mode of representation as well. And though "a great number of utopias related to the past already existed, what was fundamentally missing was the temporal dimension of the future as the site of utopia" (Koselleck 2002: 86). Koselleck connects this process with the fact that by 1770 the understanding of the finiteness of the Earth's surface was already in place, so "spatial possibilities for establishing a utopia" had been exhausted. Sure enough, there's always

outer space with its infinite number of planets, giving plenty of room for any possible imaginary society, which is demonstrated by a wide variety of texts from the “Comical History of the States and Empires of the Moon” by Cyrano de Bergerac (1657) to Alexandr Bogdanov’s “Red Star” (1908). However, the “temporalization of utopia” was not a path taken by the utopian imagination involuntarily, due to the lack of mysterious untraveled lands.

On the contrary, one may say that authors have embarked on their journey to the future as soon as the opportunity presented itself. The possibility of the temporalization of utopia was conditional on several other important developments. Firstly, the definitive break with the concept of cyclical time and its replacement by the idea of Progress, meant that history is directional and at least in general, its direction is one from the worse to the better. Secondly there was the application of this idea to the social and political, made by Turgot in his 1750 “Philosophical Chart of the Progressive Advance of the Human Mind,” and the later final break with the theological view of history, found arguably in the “Outlines of an Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind” by Marquis de Condorcet (1793), whose claim was that “no bounds have been fixed to the improvement of the human faculties; that the perfectibility of man is absolutely indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth above the control of every power that would impede it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us.” (Condorcet 1795: 4) The third development, which made the temporalization of utopia possible, was the abandonment of the religious *perfectio* doctrine, within which absolute perfection was inaccessible in this world, and pursuit of the relative, worldly perfection, was, in Koselleck’s words, a “timeless imperative”. This pursuit lasted until the death of the particular person, — and every new person born had to start from the beginning. The term “perfectibilité,” or perfectibility, was coined, once again, by Turgot and elaborated upon by Rousseau. Adoption of this lexical novelty meant that a person now could become perfect, and the goal was “completely temporalised and incorporated into the human

agents themselves, without an end point.” (Koselleck 2002: 89) After that, a goal (perfection) became less significant than movement towards one. Condorcet made an attempt to resolve this inner contradiction: in his understanding improvement was, at once, the goal and the process. Finally, temporalization of utopia entailed the idea of human agency or vision, according to which progress was not just a natural order of things, but a potentiality, which required conscious “exercise of reason” and generally human effort to be fulfilled, — though in Condorcet, human beings are certainly benign, inclined to make such an effort, so progress is also natural for them.

More than once since Thomas More wrote his treatise has the idea of utopia laid claims to more than just literary merit, aiming to at least provoke discussion, — whether public or not, — or even to guide conscious social and political transformation. This is the kind of utopianism this research is concerned with: the “programmatic” utopia, speaking the language of social philosophy rather than fine literature and, one even may say, inclined more to talk policies than politics. Reflecting on this programmatic variety of utopian thinking, David Harvey suggests in his “Spaces of Hope” that it can work in two fundamentally different modes. Harvey distinguishes these two modes building upon the notions of temporal vs spatial. Utopias of social process “usually get expressed in purely temporal terms. They are literally bound to no place whatsoever and are typically specified outside of the constraints of spatiality altogether. The qualities of space and place are totally ignored” (Harvey 2000: 174). Harvey’s examples of this kind of utopianism are Hegelianism and Marxism. In the first case, “things in themselves move history as they become things for themselves”, while in the second “it is not the World Spirit but active class struggle that assumed the guiding role”. Classes in themselves have to become “classes for themselves” in order for history to move towards the perfect classless and stateless social condition (Harvey 2000: 174). The other kind of utopia, usually associated with the term, is the “utopia of the spatial form”, which resembles Thomas More’s prototypical

Utopia, “an artificially created island which functions as an isolated, coherently organized, and largely closed-space economy (though closely monitored relations with the outside world are posited). The internal spatial ordering of the island strictly regulates a stabilised and unchanging social process”. Almost all forms of temporality (except for recurrent rituals) here are eliminated or, in other words, “spatial form controls temporality, an imagined geography controls the possibility of social change and history.” (Harvey 2000: 160). Spatialities are extremely important in such utopias since rigid spatial forms presumably secure social changelessness.

None of these two modes of utopian thinking exists in pure form. In real life, they are found in constant rivalry and/or interplay. In what follows we’ll see on multiple occasions that spatial and temporal utopianisms coexist and compete, demonstrating complex dynamics. Temporal and spatial utopias are not principles in the essentialist sense, but descriptive categories, helping to foster better understanding of historical processes.

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The very acceptance of the possibility of “building socialism in one country” may be understood as a turning point, where revolutionary, avant-garde, explicitly deterritorialized utopia of the social process, with its hopes for the World Revolution, began to transform into an autarkic Stalinist utopia of the spatial form. In fact, More’s Utopia itself was not always an island and had to go through a similar transformation:

> Utopus, that conquered it <…>, brought the rude and uncivilised inhabitants into such a good government, and to that measure of politeness, that they now far excel all the rest of mankind. Having soon subdued them, he designed to separate them from the continent, and to bring the sea quite round them: to accomplish this he ordered a deep channel to be dug, fifteen miles long; and, that the natives might not think he

> treated them like slaves, he not only forced the inhabitants but also his own soldiers to labour in carrying it on. (More and Burnet 1808: 69-70)

Hegelianism and Marxism, Harvey's exemplary "utopias of the social process", emerged as late results of the temporalization of Utopia, hence their obvious neglect of spatialities. Classical Marxism does not expect the revolution to happen (or at least to succeed) within the borders of any particular state. Though Marx himself never explicitly wrote on the subject, Engels did. In his late revolutionary catechism "Principles of Revolution" he rejects the possibility of revolution being "accomplished in one country alone": "Big industry, by creating a world market, has all the peoples of the earth, especially the civilized ones, brought into such close connection with each other that each nation is dependent upon what happens in the other [...] the communist revolution, therefore, will not be a national one only but will be carried on simultaneously in all civilised countries <…>. In each of these countries it will develop either faster or slower, depending upon whether one country or the other has better developed industries, bigger wealth or a greater mass of productive force". Finally, Engels claims that, in spite of the differences in development, revolution will be universal and "therefore, will claim universal territory" (Engels 1925: 19-20). Proletarian poet Vladimir Kirillov made a very similar claim, using more poetic language in his programmatic "We" (1917): «We are innumerable thundering legions of labour. / We are those who overpowered the space of the sea, the ocean and the land…"[33]

Critical distancing from customarily structured space in visual representations is probably best instantiated by the Soviet propaganda posters from 1917-1925. In the posters on the world revolution, the destruction of borders, i.e. the very basic instruments of spatial structuring is proclaimed both visually and verbally. See an anonymous poster created in at the

[33] Мы несметные, грозные легионы Труда. / Мы победители пространства морей, океанов и суши (Krementsov and Losev 2002: 46)

Print and graphic design department of VKhUTEMAS in 1921 (Fig. 2a) or in the May 1st poster from 1919 by Alexandr Apsit (Fig. 2b)

Figure 2. **a**: *We destroy borders between countries. Vkhutemas Print and Graphic design department, 1921.* **b**: *May 1st. Workers have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Aleksandr Apsit. Vtsik, 1919.*

The structure of space in posters on other themes is also often unconventional: details of the images are disproportionate in size, perspective is distorted. The representational plane, surface of the material image, ceases to be "that transparent plane through which we are meant to believe that we are looking into a space, even if that space is still bounded on all sides", but becomes the "wall or the panel bearing the forms of individual things and figures", i.e. works similar to the way it did within the medieval representational principle (Panofsky 1991: 54) 54. The poster by Victor Deni and Mikhail Cheremnȳkh from 1920 is not communicating the idea of world revolution directly, but space here is abstract and symbolic with grotesque proportions (Fig.3a). The globe as the image of universalism and totality of the revolutionary ambition is very common in 1920s posters until the turn of the decade, when it is usually succeeded by the map of the USSR. It can be seen not only in Bolshevik party propaganda posters. Alexandr Rodchenko depicts the globe to illustrate the notion of "Europe", used by Vladimir Mayakovskiĭ in the advertising for galoshes or rubber boots (Fig. 3b). Space is

less radically structured in the Socialist–Revolutionary election poster from 1917, but even so, proportions and setting remain unrealistic (Fig. 3c). It's important that other Marxist political parties also used the globe as the symbol, communicating universalism and totality[34].

a b c

Figure 3. **a**: *Comrade Lenin Cleanses the Earth of Filth. V. Deni, M. Cheremnȳkh. 1920*. **b**: *Rezinotrest protects from rain and slush. With no galoshes, Europe would sit and cry (advertising). A.Rodchenko, V. Mayakovskiĭ, 1923*. **c**: *Through struggle, you will attain your rights (on the red banner). Land and freedom (on the globe). Unknown artist. Socialist–Revolutionary election poster, 1917.*

One may argue that the visual language of the poster is by nature symbolic, and that accurate depiction of spatial structures is beyond its scope. However, this is not the case for the majority of the propaganda posters from the Stalinist era. On the other hand, the most prominent paintings of the earlier period, including, for instance, Pavel Filonov's "Formula of the Petrograd Proletariat" (1920-1921) and Konstantin Youn's "Symphony of Action" (1922) provide similar images. The trend is even more pronounced in architecture and monumental art.

[34] The tradition of using the globe symbol in relation to May 1st was born in the 19th century. Arguably, the globe, surrounded by working people from different walks of life first appeared in Walter Crane's illustration of the May 1st proclamation as Labour Day in 1889. The same image was published a year later on the frontispiece of the 1890 edition of "News from Nowhere" by William Morris (Morris 1890).

Paperny describes what he calls “Culture One’s battle with the hierarchy of space” which is on the most basic level expressed as “striving towards uniform dispersal” (Paperny 2002a: 71). Arguably, “uniform dispersal” is the closest thing to “unnoticeable” borderless space. Space makes itself perceptible via distances and aside from distances, via its structural elements, i.e. different sorts of boundaries. The technological advances of the epoch seemed likely to deliver on the promise to do away with distances. When it comes to hindrances and consequently, perceived discontinuity, however, “uniform dispersal” is just another way of saying “homogeneous”, “borderless”, free of internal (and probably even external) boundaries. This is not to say that Culture One had no spatial awareness at all. On the contrary, some spatial structural elements were purposefully dealt with.

It would take too much time to consider in any reasonable detail the theories of space within the Russian revolutionary avant-garde, but as El Lisitskiĭ’s 1925 article “A. and Pangeometry” demonstrates, the ambitions of Culture One in relation to spatialities were far from limited to uniform dispersal. Lisitskiĭ draws the line of succession from planimetric (two-dimensional) space to perspectival (three-dimensional) space and then, referring to the works of Gauss, Lobachevsky and Riemann, suggests a further evolution to “irrational” and then “imaginary” spaces. According to Lisitskiĭ, perspective has made space closed, finite, so it was destroyed by cubists, who “pulled the space-confining horizon into the foreground and identified it with the surface of the painting”. Then suprematism “has swept away the illusion of three-dimensional space on a plane, replacing it by the ultimate illusion of irrational space with attributes of infinite extensibility in depth and foreground”. Lisitskiĭ is not only speaking about the representations of space in A. (as art is designated in this text). His next step implies that “...a number of modern artists [..] believe that they can build up multidimensional real spaces that may be entered without an umbrella, where space and time have been combined into mutually interchangeable single whole” (Lissitsky 1999: 304-05). Though Lisitskiĭ does not

fully subscribe to this idea, as soon as it comes to the somewhat vaguely described "imaginary space" his own ambitions also turn out to stretch far beyond the scope of mere representation: the ultimate goal is the creation of "imaginary space by means of material objects" (Ibid: 306). As is evident from the adjective "imaginary" the ultimate goal is to create a malleable, unresisting space, which, together with the technological disposal of distances, amounts to something more resembling no space at all.

While temporal utopias invest hopes and efforts into the future, utopias of the spatial order, on the contrary, need specific territories on which to unfold. Their goal is to produce perfection now, in the present, but since the world as a whole is imperfect, the territory claimed by a utopia of the spatial order should be isolated from it. A channel should be dug or, in other words, a border, as strict as possible, should be established to secure splendid isolation. One can say that utopia of the spatial order places itself under a kind of timeless quarantine to avoid corruption. Indeed, such quarantine is not necessarily guaranteed by a water boundary: Tommaso Campanella's "City of the Sun" is not on an island, but "is built upon a high hill", standing on a large plain; nonetheless, its isolation is maintained by other means: "it is so built that if the first circle were stormed, it would of necessity entail a double amount of energy to storm the second; still more to storm the third; and in each succeeding case the strength and energy would have to be doubled; so that he who wishes to capture that city must, as it were, storm it seven times. For my own part, however, I think that not even the first wall could be occupied, so thick are the earthworks and so well fortified is it with breastworks, towers, guns, and ditches." (Claeys and Sargent 1999: 107).

Soviet border policies were, in fact, restrictive from the very beginning. As early as in April 1917 at the VII RSDRP(b) Conference, Lenin claimed the necessity of border control as

such: “We maintain that the state is necessary, and a state presupposes frontiers.”[35] (Lenin 1974g: 299) At the beginning of November 1917 the Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet adopted the remarkably short resolution on closing the border.[36] In December Trotsky signed the order, which forbade entrance of foreign citizens without a Soviet visa, while in May 1918 Lenin signed the resolution, which established the Border Guards, in 1919 mobility of foreign citizens within the Soviet borders was restricted, and in 1921 limitations were put on all foreign commercial vehicles entering Russian ports to mention a few of the measures taken. Border policies of 1917-1927 were on the one hand, restrictive, but on the other hand, during early 1920s, Soviet citizenship was granted rather easily, and cross-border migration was quite intensive. Until late 1921 the Soviet government encouraged migration of a foreign labour force into the country, including German industrial workers and American farmers. At least two dormitories were built in Kyiv and Kharkiv for such migrants: each could host up to 1000 persons (Fel'shtinskiĭ 1988: 31). In 1922, same year, when hundreds of Russian intellectuals were expelled from the country by the “philosophers’ ships”, the resolution “On Soviet citizens and non-residents foreign travel” was adopted, which marked the formation of a significantly restrictive system, which required exit permits, two warrantors, letters from work, etc. (O vȳezde za granitsu... 1922). There’s little reliable statistics on international migration in the 1920s and virtually none for the 1930s,[37] but until at least 1927 this restrictive machinery was

[35] Мы стоим за необходимость государства, а государство предполагает границы (Sed'maya (Aprel'skaya) Vserossiĭskaya konferentsiya RSDRP 1958: 218). This claim is, in fact, part of the very interesting and largely overlooked dispute, sparked by Stalin, who has delivered the main speech on the national question and Pyatakov, who was his official opponent (контрдокладчик). While Stalin supported the right for secession, Pyatakov argued, that the only possible slogan was “Down with the borders” with reference to the nation state being a leftover of the previous epoch, mostly already overcome by the process which we would now call the “globalization”. Lenin sided with Stalin, arguing that “In Western Europe most countries settled their national questions long ago. [...] Comrade Pyatakov, however, puts this where it does not belong — to Eastern Europe, and we find ourselves in a ridiculous position.” (Lenin 1974g)

[36] “Border is temporarily closed, nobody should be let through without the specific order from the Military-Revolutionary committee” (Граница временно закрыта, без особого распоряжения Военно-революционного комитета никто пропущен быть не может (Zȳryanov 1973: 265))

[37] Official data published in 1928-1929 states, that migration was steadily increasing between 1924 and 1928. Specifically, in 1924 the numbers of incoming and outcoming border crossings were 85,231 and 65,586

put to action selectively, — and the USSR was not a completely closed country, especially by the standards of the time. 1927 saw a significant increase in exit visa denials due to political reasons. A passport was quite expensive, but until 1929 discounts were in place for various groups. However, after the abandonment of this practice, crossing the Soviet border became an unaffordable luxury for the largest part of the population. Also, less and less foreign currency was allowed to be exchanged. In 1931 new guidelines prescribed issuance of exit permits for private travel in exceptional cases only, and around 1934-1935 any private foreign travel was effectively clamped down upon.

The situation concerning international mobility in the 1920s and 1930s respectively was worlds apart. It should be noted as well that, after the Great War, international mobility was also severely restricted across all of Europe. During the period between the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 and the outbreak of World War I 99 years later "only minimal state intervention touched migration practices. Working people wanted to cross borders, and they were usually free to do so" and governmental interventions in migration "usually took the form of encouragement" (Moch 2003). 1914, however, brought various practices of human mobility regulation, — from the requirements of visas and identification of foreigners to passports, which were first made mandatory by France, Germany, and Italy, and later by the vast majority of European countries, including neutral ones. Despite nominal commitment to "secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit," expressed in the "Treaty of Versailles" (Bevans 1969: 57), passport control, visas and other restrictive practices in Europe stayed in place in the decades to follow. To be sure, exit visas were considered extraordinary measures and were abolished after the war by the majority of countries. Starting from mid-twenties, however, some countries, including Poland, Spain, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia reverted to this instrument to restrict emigration and achieve a better position to bargain with the

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accordingly, while in 1928 these rates almost doubled, being 144,442 and 131,429 accordingly (Moiseenko 2016: 74)

importers of the labour force. Exit visas were introduced in Italy in the early 1930s, being the implementation of the 1927 declaration of the new policy, according to which the Italian state claimed it “will cease to encourage emigration” so that Italian mothers wouldn’t “bring into the world children who […] grow up into soldiers for other nations” and more generally in order to stop the process, that “saps the vital forces of race and State” (Oblath 1931: 808). In the 1925 survey of League of Nations International Labor Office 20 countries (of 41 total) “mentioned an obligation to possess an exit visa” (Migration laws and treaties 1928: 82), though the requirement was more or less a formality. In this context, the situation before and after 1928-1929 in the USSR looks very different. The limitations of the first period look standard for the period. Since late 1920s however, the Soviet government certainly acted against the global and European trend on easing travel restrictions.

The situation of the foreign trade monopoly was similar to that of human mobility. The monopoly was not formally abolished during the NEP period, but the early and mid-twenties saw constant expansion in the number of actors in the Soviet economy, who could contract with foreign counter-agents relatively freely (though approval of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade[38] was necessary). Moreover, a number of state-owned enterprises gained the right to have their own representative as an employee in one, and sometimes several Soviet Trade agencies (Torgpredstva) abroad. In reality, these representatives negotiated and made the deals by themselves, though formally contracts were signed by the particular senior official. Another remarkable exception was made for Tsentrosoyuz,[39] the Central Union of Consumer Co-Operatives, which under NEP sat atop the cooperative hierarchy built upon the territorial principle: a regional union (raysoyuz) was the elementary unit of the structure, then came a

[38] Народный Комиссариат Внешней торговли, НКВТ.

[39] Центросоюз. This organization was quite powerful in mid-twenties, since it provided a significant share of Soviet exports — 12.5% in 1924-1925, and somewhat less, 10,4% in 1925-1926 according to the official data. This was the heyday of cooperation, after which its export share started to shrink, being only 7,8% in 1926-1927 (Lyubimov 1957: 286)

provincial union (gubsoyuz) and finally the central union Tsentrosoyuz. The last could trade with foreign cooperatives directly, without the state approval. Moreover, it could also trade with other entities, including private companies, in cases where it could prove that such a deal was more profitable. This dispersion of foreign trade monopoly ended in March 1928, when the resolution “On export, import, transfer and remittance of currency assets and equities to and from foreign countries” was adopted[40].

The same dynamics are in place with access to independent information sources. In 1926 the Joint State Political Directorate,[41] in a letter to Vyacheslav Molotov, informed him that 1134 subscriptions to the émigré press were processed regularly via Peoples Commissariat of Foreign affairs alone. "Socialist reporter"[42], for instance, had 240-300 subscribers among various Soviet organisations. The letter also states that those travelling abroad also brought into the country around 500 copies a year (Golubev 2008: 36-37). Of course, there were other newspapers and magazines as well. The following year this practice was abolished altogether, and special reports, compiled by the Information Department of the Central Committee were introduced instead.

There are more examples, some of which we’ll touch upon later, but the point is clear: the Soviet state of 1917-1927 was, of course, in no way an open society even by the rather low post-war international standard. However, in many aspects, most notably when it came to the economy, total isolation was considered neither possible nor desirable. Then, later, everything changed.

In **Chapter One** I will argue that this change, previously referred to as “rupture” or “ideological shift”, is better described as a the shift from the temporal to the spatial mode of utopian thinking. I will also observe this shift through the dynamics of the two Grand

[40] For details see Markovskiĭ (2015)
[41] Объединённое государственное политическое управление (OGPU)
[42] “Социалистический вестник”, official Menshevist periodical, published since 1921 first in Berlin, then in Paris and New York under the editorship of Yuliĭ Martov.

Metaphors of the Soviet discourse, used to comprehend the project of the future: The Path metaphor (as in "path to socialism") and the Building or Construction metaphor (as in "building/construction of socialism"). These two metaphors correlate with the two utopian modes, and the dynamics of their usage is remarkably consistent with the dynamics between temporal and spatial utopianisms. I will use the data available from Google Ngram Viewer (GNV) to observe changes in frequency of occurrence for the two linguistic expressions of the above metaphors. The highly ritualized ideological language of Soviet publications during the 1920s and 1930s quickly and accurately reflects changes in ideology, and thus allows for use of instrument, with all its limitations and flaws, to assess relative dynamics of trends. (For detailed information on the work of GNV as well as some considerations and reservations in relation to this method see: **Appendix I)**.

Socialism in One Country and Where to Find It

Carving out a place for the concept of socialism in one country within the Soviet orthodoxy wasn't easy. The only text authored by either Marx or Engels which categorically states that the future socialist revolution can only occur simultaneously in all developed countries, namely Engel's short piece under the title "Principles of communism", was only published in 1914 (Van Ree 2010b: 64). That doesn't mean that this idea dwelt somewhere in the periphery of Marxist thought. Quite the opposite, it was an inseparable part of it, perceived as common sense by the vast majority of European socialists. Hopes for the global revolutionary tide, resembling that of 1848-1849 were particularly high in the Soviet Russia: Bolsheviks themselves, let alone other Russian socialists, had little confidence in the possibility of retaining power in the underdeveloped country, where industrial workers were by far outnumbered by peasants. The first years of the Bolshevik rule were fraught with the anticipation of the all-embracing revolutionary wave, of which the Russian October was

presumably just a beginning. Up to the failure of the “German October” in autumn 1923[43], news on trade unions, strikes and communist rallies in various European countries was routinely published on the first pages of “Pravda”, followed by the news from Soviet Russia, including the reports from the battlefields of the Civil war. Later adoption of the concept of “socialism in one country” was vigorously opposed by the whole “Left opposition”, that is not only by Trotsky and his supporters, but also by those who previously associated themselves with the “Workers’s opposition”, “Group of Democratic Centralism” (Decists) and other varieties of the Left Communism. The idea was also rather popular not only among the Party leadership and activists, but in much broader circles, — though, of course, in great measure thanks to extensive propagandistic effort. As of 1925, even peasants openly questioned the ability of the USSR “to build socialism without foreign countries.” Some of them also wondered if the Soviet Union could “endure for decades in case there will be no revolution in other countries; can socialism be achieved in one country, such as the Soviet Union with its underdeveloped technology…”[44]

This concept could only be adopted on the condition that not only VKP(b) rank and file (as well as, to some extent, common public), but also the Party's prominent figures and theoreticians recognized it as “Marxist”. While the Party leadership could probably dismiss (or silence) doubtful members of the public, Party rank and file still mattered, as did, more importantly, opinion- and decision-makers at the local level. The foundation for the new

[43] “German October” was the term for the unsuccessful uprising in Germany in October 1923. The idea was favoured and advanced by Lev Trotsky, Grigory Zinovyev and several other figures in the Soviet leadership. The plan was largely conceived and planned in Moscow by the group within the Comintern Executive Committee, led by Karl Radek. The plan was developed in somewhat reluctant collaboration with the Communist party of Germany (KPD): Heinrich Brandler, leader of the party, was never convinced that the time was ripe for the takeover. In Saxony and Thuringia the KPD entered the governing coalitions, but failed to take control over the Internal Affairs Office (and consequently, Sicherheitspolizei, the security police), as planned. In these states the KPD eventually called off the uprising, while the armed revolt in Hamburg was put down by the army. See Thalheimer (2004).

[44]…Сможет ли СССР строить социализм без иностранных государств. [...] Может ли Советский Союз существовать на протяжении десятков лет, если не будет революции в других странах, может ли быть осуществим социализм в одной стране, как Советский Союз с его отсталой техникой… (Bryantsev 2016: 186). The same article cites many more examples of the kind.

theoretical development was found in Lenin's 1915 Article "On the Slogan for a United States of Europe" (Lenin 1974k), the only acceptable text, mentioning the possibility of a successful socialist revolution in "one, single country." The relevant paragraph was cited by Stalin, other Party leaders and authors of propaganda books countless times. Stalin claimed that Lenin "discovered the truth that the victory of socialism in one country is possible" and "was the first to settle the question of the victory of socialism in one country" (Stalin 1954c). Nevertheless, this is the only occasion on which Lenin openly argues for the possibility of socialism in one country. Arguably, the reason can be found in the historical context of the article at issue. It was a part of a very emotional discussion, which followed what Lenin termed the "collapse of the Second International" (Lenin 1974j). After all major socialist and social democratic parties voted in favour of the war loans for their governments, Bolsheviks broke ties with the Second International. In this and other texts of the period Lenin's style betrays both bitterness and fury: his lone mention of socialism in one country expresses the former.

Even more interestingly, Lenin's paragraph turns out to be the compressed and slightly reworded translation of several fragments from the 1879 pamphlet "The isolated socialist state" by the prominent member of the German Social Democratic party (SPD) Georg von Vollmar, who, notably, held in 1914 that the SPD should not oppose the German government in its war effort. This pamphlet will be analysed in detail in **Section 4** of **Chapter Two** . The aforementioned Trotsky was, of course, not the only prominent party figure who was aware of this text: Vollmar was one of the leaders of the largest and the most influential socialist parties in Europe. The central place of the SPD within the Second International and more broadly, in the global socialist movement, was also supported by the general perception of Karl Kautsky, its leading ideologist as the safekeeper of "original" Marxism. He met both Marx and Engels in London in 1881, and befriended Engels, who later chose Kautsky to be the editor of Marx's three-volume work "Theories of Surplus Value" and a number of Marx's unpublished and

sometimes unfinished manuscripts. The two were working closely together throughout 1880s. In a way, Kautsky helped Engels to create “Marxism” from what was a huge compendium of heterogeneous and sometimes self-contradictory texts.

In 1891 Kautsky, wrote the “Erfurt Programme”, the first Marxist program of the German Social Democratic party. However, the Erfurt Programme and generally, the variety of Marxism widely accepted in the SPD, is, in some aspects significally different from what is found in the body of Marxist theory, expounded by Marx and Engels themselves, — especially when it comes to Marx’s later works, including, for instance “The Civil war in France” (written in 1870-1871) and “Critique of the Gotha Program” (written in 1875)[45]. In what follows I will use different terms for these “varieties” of Marxism. The former, that is, the Marxism of the SPD and the Second International, in no small part shaped by Karl Kautsky, will be termed “orthodox Marxism”, while the latter, meaning the theory found in Marx's and Engels’s work, will be called “classical Marxism”. Speaking about the variety of Marxism,consolidated by official Soviet theorists, which is sometimes designated as “Marxism-Leninism”, I will use the term “Soviet Marxism”.

It is, of course difficult and sometimes impossible to draw clear boundaries between the three. Firstly, classical Marxism is in no way homogeneous in itself. There are sometimes significant contradictions (more notably in Marx’s works) between texts written at various times. Moreover, the positions of Marx and Engels, particularly after late 1860s — early 1870s can also differ substantially. Secondly, it was Engels who determined at least the initial impulse of orthodox Marxism, so the border between “orthodox” and “classic” is quite blurred. Thirdly, the “Marxist-Leninist” rendition of Marxism certainly has some very distinctive features, — most noticeably, the Jacobinist doctrine of the party as the ultimate driving and guiding force of

[45] Some of these works’ key ideas can be found, albeit unexpanded and sometimes not quite thought through, in *Grundrisse* (Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie; Fundamentals of Political Economy Criticism), unfinished Marx’s manuscript from 1857-1858.

revolution. At the same time, other features, traditionally associated with Soviet Marxism, such as excessive statism and organizational centralism at the expense of democratic deliberation, were already quite pronounced in the orthodox Marxism of the SPD and the Second International. At some point, namely in 1914-1916, Lenin even uses (in regards to the orthodox Marxism) the strategy described by Lars T. Lih as "aggressive unoriginality" (Lih 2009). After SPD voted to grant war credits to the German government in 1914, it could no longer serve as a model party for RSDLP(b). Starting from the break-up of the Second international and almost until the October revolution, Lenin insisted on the Bolsheviks' continuity with pre-war German social democracy, which had, in his opinion, later betrayed its own ideas and commitments. Yet, even if these terms are conventional, they are necessary to avoid confusion.

Orthodox Marxism was more than just a result of the efforts made by Engels and then Kautsky and other SPD theoreticians to make classical Marxism more consistent. It was also a product of compromise or, one may even say, a blending of the two lines of German socialist thought. The first is classical Marxism, while the other is associated primarily with the name of Ferdinand Lassalle, an extremely popular socialist politician with a distinctive set of ideas, which enjoyed greater success than Marxism in Germany at least in the period 1850-1860. Lassalle was also the first European socialist to succeed in creating a mass legal socialist party, the General German Workers' Association (ADAV)[46] in 1863. SPD was born in 1875 as a result of the merger between ADAv and the much smaller Marxist Social Democratic Workers' Party of Germany, founded in 1860 by Wilhem Liebknecht and August Bebel. For years, the ideology of the new party was a mixture of Lassalleanism and Marxism with the noticeable prevalence of the former. This is quite clear from the Gotha programme, adopted at the unification congress, which, as it is well known, drew vigorous criticism from Marx. Even after the adoption of the Marxist Erfurt programme, the ideology of the SPD preserved some obvious Lassallean traits.

[46] Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein

The main differences between Lassalle and classical Marxism are found in two areas: attitude to the institution of the state, and internationalism. Lassalle was a firm believer in state socialism and held that it was only possible to achieve the new social and political condition with the extensive support of the state. The state was expected to take a lead in socialist transformation and the socialist economy, which would emerge as a result. Also, Lassalle was in no way an internationalist. He took almost no interest in socialism outside Germany, which only emerged as an integrated nation state seven years after his death in 1864. Moreover, he saw socialism as a competitive advantage that would presumably help Germany to take the appropriate place among the great nations which it was previously deprived of. Lassalle also praised the republican form of government and categorically refuted violence. This very distinct set of ideas can be traced to the political philosophy (and, to some extent, political economy) of Johann Gottlieb Fichte.

The striking similarity between the model, developed in Fichte's 1801 treatise "The closed Commercial State" (Der Geschlossene Handelsstaat) and the Stalinist state have been noticed by more than one scholar since early 1930s. Yet, until recently, this issue was never discussed in any detail. Fichte's model of the rational state has its deep roots in his lifelong project of elaborating the Science of Knowledge, *Wissenschaftslehre*, juridical and political implications of which are discussed in **Sections 1-3** of **Chapter Two**. In this dissertation I consider the "The Closed Commercial State" as a programmatic "utopia of the spatial form", which, thanks to Lassalle and later SPD theoreticians, especially Vollmar, survived within orthodox Marxism and eventually became reality in the form of the Stalinist state. The question of whether Stalin himself had read "The Closed Commercial State" remains open: while the treatise was published in Russian twice, first in 1898, then in 1923 and was familiar to a significant number of Russian intellectuals before 1917, there is no direct evidence that either Stalin or anybody else in the Bolshevist leadership except Bukharin had read the treatise. At the

same time, it has been established that, contrary to what was previously believed, Stalin had read the “Isolated socialist state” by Georg von Vollmar, which bears not only Lassallean, but distinctly Fichtean traits. The abridged translation of this text was made for Stalin and Mikhail Kalinin (if there were other copies, they have been lost) by Alexandr Svanidze in late 1926, that is, after the concept of “socialism in one country” was adopted by the regime. This translation from the Stalin Archive at RGASPI (Fond 558), containing Stalin’s remarks on the typewritten copy will be discussed in detail in **Chapter Four.** The analysis of this document shows that Vollmar’s ideas had a noticeable impact on Stalin’s thought in regards to international affairs. A table, demonstrating which fragments were marked by Stalin, and in what manner, is found in **Appendix II**.

The whole text is arranged as follows: in **Chapter One** (“From Leninism To Stalinism: Metaphors and Historical Rupture”) **Sections 1-2** contain the detailed analysis of the dynamics between the temporal and spatial modes of utopian thinking through the usage of the linguistic expressions, corresponding to the Path and Building metaphors. **Section 3** explains how architecture and the notion of building are linked to closedness/autarky. **Sections 1-3** of **Chapter Two** (“Bolshevism and Stalinism: shared origins, different lineages”) deal with the analysis of Fichte’s treatise “The Closed Commercial State” project. **Section One** first briefly analyses Fichtean elements in Marxism and then demonstrates that Fichte’s political economy originates from his philosophy of Right. **Section 2** presents a detailed analysis of “The Closed Commercial State.” **Section 3** reflects on the origins of Fichte’s commitment to autarky (in relation to Immanuel Kant’s “Perpetual Peace”) as well as the origins and meaning of his statism. **Section 4** presents a detailed discussion of Fichtean traits in German social democracy and especially “The Isolated Socialist State” by Georg von Vollmar. **Chapter Three** (“Stalinist state: Fichtean Utopia and Soviet Reality”) starts from the inquiry into Russian and Soviet readership of Fichte (**Section 1**) and continues with the reflection upon the images of the future

and logic of purposes of the Fichtean model state on the one hand and and historical Soviet Union on the other. **Section 3** is largely devoted to an in-depth analysis of the similarities and differences between the project of the Closed Commercial State and the official discourse in the Stalinist USSR that shows a close affinity with Fichte especially on foreign trade monopoly and, even more importantly, monetary policy. Finally, a brief comparison of the Stalinist USSR with the ideal vision of the Isolated Socialist State as expressed by Vollmar as well as with two other models, centered on the notion of closedness, is presented. **Chapter Four** ("The only fatherland of the international proletariat, hostile encirclement and war") features firstly, the analysis of the copy of Vollmar's treatise abridged translation with marks, found in Stalin archive and secondly, possible ramifications of this document.

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The theoretical frame used by the author is inevitably multicomponent. This research starts with the analysis of the two fundamental conceptual metaphors of Soviet discourse — both spatial in nature; both determining, directly or indirectly, certain modes of temporality, — and continues with the close exploration of the Soviet pre-war ideological terrain. Ideology itself, being a kind of social metaphor, always has a conceptual metaphor at its core. Consequently, the theoretical frame in question is partly constituted by the insights derived from cultural and cognitive linguistics, including the theory of conceptual metaphor, elaborated most significantly in the works of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson and Zoltán Kövecses.[47] In the course of further inquiry into the concepts and forces, which had been shaping the ideological terrain of broadly construed Russian/Soviet Marxism, including Stalinism as its significant and inalienable part, this research draws upon the set of ideas and approaches of conceptual

[47] See Lakoff and Johnson (1980); Johnson (1987) and (2008); Kövecses and Csábi (2002).

history elaborated particularly by Reinhart Koselleck.[48] The last are complemented by the perspectives of intellectual history or, rather, the history of ideas, in asmuch as the border is blurred between the two.

This part of the theoretical framework is specifically important when it comes to one of the main themes of the research, namely “socialism in one country”, which turns out to be much more than a rhetorical figure opportunistically used by the party leadership at the moment when expectations of world (or at least European) revolution went unmet. On the contrary, not only has this idea a history within the German socialist thought of the late 19th century, but, even more significantly, its origins can be traced to much earlier debates in the late 18th century. This makes the idea of “socialism in one country” a *concept* in Koselleck’s sense of word, a legitimate subject of *Begriffsgeschichte*. Focus on the historical contexts in Koselleck’s conceptual history as well as in the intellectual history as it is conceived by the Cambridge school is consistent with another party of the theoretical frame, namely the broader semiotic approach to culture, aiming, as Clifford Geertz puts it, to “aid us in gaining access to the conceptual world in which our subjects Jive so that we can, in some extended sense of the term, converse with them” (Geertz 1973: 24).

Being a part of a long intellectual tradition, the idea of “socialism in one country,” is, amongst other ideas, one of the most significant parts of the Stalinist state’s ideology. This term itself is very problematic: Terry Eagleton starts his “Ideology: an introduction” with a list of sixteen definitions for this concept, largely incompatible with one another (Eagleton 1991: 1-2). Since the author has no intention of going deep into the details of the still ongoing debate on the epistemology of ideological systems and the nature of their relation to social reality, it only remains to mention that, within this thesis, ideology is understood in accordance with the views of Clifford Geertz, as developed in his essay “Ideology as a cultural system” (Geertz 1973:

[48] See Koselleck (1989) and (2002).

193-233). Geertz distinguishes between interest and strain theories of ideology. While the former conceives ideology as a weapon in the struggle for power, the latter sees it as a remedy, allowing for correction of the “sociopsychological disequilibrium” (Geertz 1973: 202). Geertz himself suggests a different understanding of ideology as something of a social/cultural metaphor, an instrument, which renders “otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them [...].As metaphor extends language […], enabling it to express meanings it cannot or at least cannot yet express literally, so the head-on clash of literal meanings in ideology […] provides novel symbolic frames against which to match the myriad "unfamiliar somethings" that […] are produced by a transformation in political life” (Geertz 1973: 220).

The concept underlying spatial conceptual metaphors, that is, space itself, is understood here as a complex dialectical entity, first expounded by Henri Lefebvre in his famous “Production of Space” (1991). It was later elaborated in the works of other scholars, most importantly Edward Soja and David Harvey, whose concept of utopianism, suggested in “Spaces of Hope” (Harvey 2000), is crucial for this study: its theoretical frame rests, among other things, upon the ideas of the contemporary utopian studies. Such studies, in turn, involve concepts and practices, mostly inextricably linked to the notion of space. This connection is, however, multi-dimensional and goes deeper than the mere fact that utopias commonly used spatial forms before Louis-Sébastien Mercier in “L'An 2440”[49] first set a utopia in some point in the future, not in some place in space. In fact, even temporal utopias, commonly having little interest in spatialities, use spatial vocabulary: since we can’t experience time directly, it’s spatialized both in language and in thought (Moore 2014). Perhaps even more importantly, utopia, as Louis Marin points out, is not located somewhere, it’s not just “another place”, but rather a “no-place”: “Outopos, Outopia is a paradoxical, even giddy toponym since as a term it negates with

[49]"The Year 2440: A Dream If Ever There Was One". Only the second volume was published in English — under the title “Memoirs of the Year Two Thousand Five Hundred” (Mercier 1772)

its name the very place it is naming. […] the term as the name of a place designates a no-place; it designates another referent, the "other" of any place" (Marin 1993: 411)[50]. The term "Utopia" in this research is used in a rather broad sense, which on the one hand cannot be reduced to the designation of the literary genre, but on the other hand excludes, in order to preserve operability, the all-embracing notion of "utopian impulse", suggested by Ernst Bloch in his "Principle of hope" (Bloch 1986). The first essential aspect of utopian thinking as understood in this thesis is defined in terms of function: it includes either the intention to implement the utopian vision (either in the future or starting today), or at least, recognition of the utopian vision, by its author(s) and audience as one of the possible worlds. The second aspect is defined in terms of content. Here I follow J.C. Davis, who, in the conclusion to his "Utopia and the Ideal Society", suggests that the utopian mode "is one which accepts deficiencies in men and nature and strives to contain and condition them through organizational controls and sanctions" (Davis 1981: 370). While Harvey's concept of "temporal" and "spatial" utopias, being one of this study's load-bearing elements, is neither very common within the area of utopian studies, nor elaborated in fine detail, it proves significant for a considerable amount of scholarship, including some groundbreaking works[51].

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[50] Consistently, the name of the river in Utopia is Anydrus (*no water*), the title of the governor is "Ademus" (*with no people*) and the capital city is Amaurotum (''dark or dimly seen'').
[51] See, among others, Polak (1973), Manuel and Manuel (1979), Foucault (1984) and Harvey (2000).

Chapter One. From Leninism To Stalinism: Metaphors and Historical Rupture

1. World revolution, isolation anxiety and socialism in one country

Lenin, along with many others in the RSDRP(b) leadership was committed to the idea of the World Revolution, originating from classic Marxism. Engels's "Principles of communism" (Grundsätze des Kommunismus), a brief catechism of 25 questions and 25 answers features the most categoric wording of this idea, stating that the revolution can only be victorious if it happens simultaneously in all developed countries: "world" in this context should be understood as "European and North American". While it was only published in 1914, there was a rather broad consensus among those who considered themselves Marxists that the future revolution would start in several countries, which would lead to an all-European war, in the course of which revolution would prevail everywhere. This vision can be deduced from the programmatic claims of the "Communist Manifesto" and was shaped by the European events of 1848-1949. That revolutionary wave receded, but it was only natural to assume that next time, similar events would lead to the victory of the oppressed. Significantly, the proletarian internationalism in classic Marxism is not pro-active, but reactive. Capitalism was transcending the borders of the national states, making their ruling classes less and less rooted in their own states: this process, currently commonly referred to as "globalisation", can also be termed, "deterritorialization" (Deleuze and Guattari 2004). The opposition to this ruling international class was also supposed to deterritorialize. This development can be described as gradual deterritorialization, where the class was losing spatial characteristics.

Of all the parties and groups of the Second International, the Leninist faction of the RSDRP put the greatest emphasis on internationalism. It was one of the few parties having no parliamentary group and generally preaching, at least after 1902, a somewhat Jacobin

approach. The Basel Manifesto of the Second International (1912) claimed that in the revolutionary struggle of the Russian proletariat "Congress sees […] the strongest guarantee against the criminal intrigues of Tsarism.... For Tsarism is the hope of all the reactionary powers of Europe and the bitterest foe of the democracy of the peoples whom it dominates; to bring about the destruction of Tsarism must, therefore, be viewed by the entire International as one of its foremost tasks" (quoted after Page 1951: 10). The Bolshevist leadership understood this statement as a firm promise of internationalist solidarity. However when, two years later, the war broke out, Lenin found himself in almost complete isolation: all the leading parties of the Second International voted for war credits for their Governments. This was a very significant blow to the internationalism of Russian communists. At that moment Lenin first turned to the possibility of socialism in one country. However, even after the Bolshevist party broke with the Second International, neither Lenin nor other figures in the Party made any attempts to develop this concept. Moreover, the October revolution revived their hopes for the world, — or, at least, European, — revolution. The Communist International was founded on the assumption that the proletariat itself was more internationalist and radical than the "renegade" socialists of the Second International.

European socialist revolutions of the early 1920s turned out to be unsuccessful, and the Soviet Union found itself being the only socialist state in the world. By the time of Lenin's death it became clear to the Bolsheviks that this situation was not going to change in the near future. The condition of the "isolated socialist state" was considered to be extremely dangerous, because it meant such a state has to defend itself from all other countries in the world. It was assumed that capitalist governments would do everything they could to wipe the socialist alternative off the face of the Earth. The situation was even more precarious in Russia, which, as Bolsheviks fully understood, was as far as possible from the conditions Marxist doctrine deemed necessary for the socialist revolution: a heavy concentration of industry and industrial

proletariat in the economy, high levels of urbanisation and, consequently, concentration of the proletariat, high level of industrial monopolism, etc. That, in turn, made it difficult for Bolshevist government to survive in the country, where its social base was next to none. The intervention of the Allies during the Civil war only enforced the fear of external threat, which resulted eventually in the full-scale Soviet-Polish war, intended to pave the way for military support to the "revolutionary German proletariat." The anxiety, related to the situation of the only socialist state, is noticeable in the words and actions of the Soviet government until at least mid-1930. It manifests itself very clearly in the Soviet discourse of "Thermidor" — anticipated reactionary takeover, inspired by the "capitalist elements" inside the country, financed by the foreign governments and carried into effect by the peasant masses. Stalin's concept of the possibility of socialism in one country can be interpreted as a set of principles, which, whether it contradicts Marxist tradition substantially or not, was designed to deal with the totality of real and perceived threats.

However, in a broader sense, "socialism in one country" appears to reshape the Marxist vision of social and historical processes in a much more profound way. The emergence of the single socialist state reterritorializes class war: socialism becomes territorial, assumes spatial characteristics, of which "isolated" or even "besieged" is the most intense. "Uniform dispersal" becomes the thing of the past. Within such reterritorialised socialism all things spatial understandably gain significance, while temporal categories and imagery shrinks. In other words, one may say, the famous Stalin's slogan "USSR is the fatherland of the working class of the whole world" is somewhat true. In the USSR, socialism has acquired the territory, i.e. space, it desired. However, while previously this desired space was by default, imagined as limitless, the reality proved different.

This profound transformation, acquirement of space very vividly manifests itself in the change of the basic metaphor used to describe the attainment of socialism.

2. State of metaphors

2.1. Brief overview

For decades, two powerful metaphors prevailed in the Soviet discourse – whether in propagandist texts and images, political communication, censored (and partly uncensored) fiction, or poetry: the Path metaphor (PM) and the Building metaphor (BM). According to Lakoff and Johnson, both mediate our understanding of one conceptual domain in terms of another; both have a long history within philosophy, politics, and everyday language;[52] both belong to the "language of the future" – that is to say, the temporal dimension is essential to both. Nevertheless, they have, of course, their particularities and specific features. The Path metaphor is a particular case of the spatialization of time (Casasanto and Boroditsky 2008), implying that the future is found at some point, usually located (*metaphorically*) "in front of us". Examples of this trope (or, in other words, metaphorical linguistic expressions drawing on the Path metaphor) in the language of Soviet propaganda include, among others, the slogans "Forward – to Communism"[53] or, more implicitly, "The Party is our steersman".[54] One of Stalin's grandiloquent titles, "The great helmsman"[55] comes from the same conceptual metaphor, which appears to be so significant to Soviet discourse that some scholars, for example, Lars Lih, argue that "the inner history of Soviet ideology is <…> the story of a metaphor – a history of the changing perceptions of the road to communism" (Lih 2006: 706). The process of journey, "folded up" inside PM, implies movement (characterized, in turn, by direction, velocity, straightness/curvature), expenditure of effort, various obstacles, the presence or absence of forks in the road, and so on, — as well as a number of specific terms derived from a broad understanding of a journey as a social situation: leaders, fellow travellers, those falling behind,

[52] See for example: Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 44-46); Rigotti (1995); Cowling (1998); La Marche (2003: 99-116).
[53] Вперед — к коммунизму
[54] Партия — наш рулевой
[55] Великий кормчий

free-riders, workhorses, etc. PM can be reduced to a pair of simpler conceptual metaphors: *Purposes* are *Destinations* and *Means* are *Paths*. The Building metaphor is seemingly more complex, but in fact, as we will see later, BM presents fewer complications for this analysis than its counterpart. The building, alongside the human body[56], is one of the most common source domains in the conceptualisation of abstract complex systems. In both Russian and English, one can "build" a career, a relationship, or a theory; theoretical models or knowledge can be "constructed"; economies can "lie in ruins," which in turn may cause political turmoil and rock the "foundations" of society. Kövecses argues that the "meaning focus" of the Building metaphor appears to be the creation of a complex, structured and stable system. Also, generally, linguistic expressions related to BM mostly have to do with one of the three components of the building as a concept: the process of construction, the building's structure, and its solidity/frailty. BM, therefore, may be summarized in the following overarching formula: "Creating a well-structured and lasting abstract complex system is making a well-structured, strong building" (Kövecses and Csábi 2002: 131). Like PM, the Building metaphor may also be reduced to simpler subcomponents: *Creating an Abstract Complex System* is *a Process of Construction* and the *Structure of a Complex Abstract System* is the *Physical Structure of a Building*[57]. The use of both metaphors inevitably entails the mapping of the source domain onto the target domain. In other words, when PM is invoked, the appearance of trains, cross-roads, fellow-travellers, steersmen, and those who "put spokes in wheels"[58] becomes quite feasible. Similarly, the Building metaphor entails foundations, cement, strong walls, floors, and, in case of misfortune, ruins or wreckage.

[56] The human body is apparently one of the primary source domains, see e.g. Heine (1997). More significantly, the metaphor of the "body politic", employing the human body as a source domain for understanding the more abstract domain of state, can be traced back at least to Classical antiquity (Harvey 2007).
[57] Arguably PM rather commonly implies that the *Creation of a Complex Abstract System is a Journey* (cf. "road to peaceful coexistence", "roadmap to democracy", etc.)
[58] Вставляет палки в колеса

Both metaphors are, of course, anything but specific to the context of the Soviet state. However, both were very successfully incorporated into its propaganda discourse and became essential to it, albeit at different point of time. The Path metaphor in regards to progress has been familiar since at least John Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress," a religious allegory centred around the journey of its main character, Christian, from the "City of Destruction" to the "Celestial City" on top of Mount Zion. The very word "progress", in fact, originates from the Latin "progressus", "going forward" (Skeat 2005: 478). The Journey metaphor, as applied to historical progress, spread more and more widely during the 18th century, as the concept of progress was gradually taking shape. As early as in 1755, Denis Diderot, referring to Bacon, wrote that "the progress of human knowledge is a route marked out, from which it is almost impossible for the human mind to stray." (*Éclectisme*, 1755; quoted from Delon (2013: 1103)). It grew especially popular in the 19th century, with new developments in transportation, especially railroads (Fig. 1). The railroad version of the Path metaphor, in all likelihood, was transferred to Russian progressivist discourse from Marx's *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* (Marx 1978: 122) and later became one of the most popular versions of the Path metaphor in the Soviet language.



Figure 4. *The "Tom Thumb Locomotive", embodying progress, races against a horse-drawn car. From "The History of the First Locomotives in America", by William H. Brown 1830 (litho)*[59]

[59] "Tom Thumb" was the first steam locomotive built in the US in 1830 by Peter Cooper. The race in the picture actually took place in the summer of 1830, though, interestingly, it was won by the horse due to a safety-valve failure with "Tom Thumb" (Brown 1871: 120-22).

The Building metaphor as applied to a spiritually bound group of people (this target domain later took the shape of the state, society, or nation) can be arguably traced to the late Roman times. The Apostle Paul uses it more than once to refer to all Christians, but the following quotation is particularly remarkable: “So you are no longer outsiders or aliens, but fellow-citizens with every other Christian – you belong now to the household of God. Firmly beneath you is the foundation, God’s messengers and prophets, the corner-stone being Christ Jesus himself. In him, each separate piece of building, properly fitting into its neighbour, grows together into a temple consecrated to the Lord. You are all part of this building in which God himself lives by his Spirit” (Ephesians 2:19-22; J.B. Phillips New Testament). The Russian translation of this fragment comes very close to the English text quoted above. Similarly, in both languages, the word “church” is used for a building as well as for the whole community of Christians[60] . This homonymy, dating back to the Apostle Paul, is probably even more noticeable in Russian since it has no immediate equivalent of “Christendom”.

The late 18th century saw a revival in the use of BM: as Rigotti points out, “it was not until the French Revolution <...> that the state was expected to take on the task of the demolisher of ancient structures and the builder of the new.” (Rigotti 1995: 434). Abbé Sieyès (Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès) uses the Building metaphor extensively. Writing on the applicability of the two-chamber parliament structure in *What is the Third Estate?* (1789), the de-facto manifesto of the French Revolution, he asks, “How, with such dissimilar materials, can it be possible to conceive of building the same political edifice in France as in England?” (Sieyès 2003: 128). In the same text, he mentions “social architecture, the most important art of all” (Sieyès 2003: 133). In another text, *Views of the Executive Means*, written in the same year, he

[60] The wording here (“the whole community”) is a translation of the Russian dictionary definition, since English dictionaries most commonly use “the whole body of Christian believers”, introducing another metaphor and creating unnecessary complications. In modern Russian, the body metaphor is also present, but to a much lesser extent: it is only used in theological or liturgical contexts, usually when defining the Church as “Christ’s mystical body”.

calls for “national representation that will bear all the characteristics of having a genuinely popular mandate and a legislature that will always express the general will”. As he goes on to say, only “on this unshakeable foundation, it will then be possible to see the gradual elevation of the edifice of a human society designed at last for the utility and well-being of the members who compose it” (Sieyès 2003: 89). There are more examples like this. The Apostle Paul’s spiritual divine building and the seemingly secular metaphors of state in Sieyès’ pamphlets come together, though, in the quasi-religious narrative of Freemasonry, for which the construction domain is essential. This is how Jonathan Scot begins his account of the history of Freemasonry: “The first piece of masonry we know of immediately after the divine direction was the Ark, wherein Noah and his three Sons <…> were preserved from destruction. They brought with them over the Flood, and afterwards communicated to their Children, Geometry, and the Art of Building: And from these Masons or four grand Officers, all the present Race of Mankind are descended” (Scot 1754: 8-9). The rituals of Freemasonry, though varying from one Lodge to another, were largely centred around the story of the construction of King Solomon’s Temple (Second Temple) and its mythical architect, Hiram Abiff, – since it was presumed that it was during the construction of the Second Temple that masons first organized themselves as a group of craftsmen[61]. The divine personality is remarkably referred to as the *Great Architect of the Universe* throughout Masonic texts, whose authors, at the same time, understand creation as a process and consider it their mission to continue the work started by the Great Architect. Elements of Masonic ritual also largely belong to the domain of construction and architecture. Rigotti suggests that this symbolism influenced Marx and his metaphors of the base and the superstructure – the latter term more or less directly related to Latin “superaedificare” (to build

[61] Early Masonic narratives told a different story, rooted in the legend of the Tower of Babel and honouring King Solomon’s Temple only in the second instance. Even as late as 1756, the anonymous author of the “Thistle” manuscript stated that it was King Nimrod who created Masons and who "gave them their signs and terms so that they could distinguish themselves from other people." This Promethean view was arguably inconvenient in the sense of alienating Christianity, so it was mostly abandoned by the beginning of the 18th century. (Beresniak 2003: 26)

upon), present in the Latin text of the Vulgate. The above quoted fragment (Ephesians 2:20): “superaedificati super fundamentum apostolorum et prophetarum” is translated in the English Standard Version as “built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets”. Architectural imagery was very important for a number of European political philosophers, including, among others, Locke, Burke, and Gibbon.



Figure 5. *The GNV relative frequency graph for “building socialism” (stroitel'stvo sotsializma) and “path to socialism” (put' k sotsializmu) ngrams, 1910-1940 (case sensitive; smoothing: 1)*

In Russian political philosophy, the Building metaphor appeared rather late and did not enjoy much popularity until the mid-twenties of the twentieth century. In the following sections, the Building Metaphor and the Path metaphor will be investigated in relation to Soviet pre-war propaganda and political discourse. As the graph in Figure 5, which compares two linguistic expressions of the two metaphors, demonstrates, the Building metaphor’s expression exhibited a more “dynamic” behaviour than the one connected to the Path metaphor. So let us start with the former.

2.2. The Building metaphor and the “luxurious building of socialism”

The Building metaphor is a significant part of the language we use to speak about the future, but in this case, the trope lacks a direct indication of movement, which was arguably one of the reasons for the co-existence of the Building metaphor with the Path metaphor: to some extent they were complementary. Nevertheless, the future is an essential element of

construction, since it involves design, which “projects far into the future” (Schumacher 2011: 201). St Mark's Basilica was under construction for more than 400 years, while the construction of the Basilica and Expiatory Church of the Holy Family in Barcelona (Sagrada Familia) was started in 1882 and is still underway (the anticipated completion date is 2026). Finally, modern urban planners operate in terms of decades. It is safe to say that construction was among the earliest practices to require long-term thinking. Building, construction, and edifice – all these terms feature prominently in Soviet and especially Stalinist discourse. Suffice it to say that the Russian translation of the “The Internationale” is the only one to feature the lines “we will destroy the world of violence / wholly, down to its foundation, and then / we will build our own, new world”[62].

As mentioned above, BM is largely employed in the process of complex abstract systems cognition. In her comparative research on the Building metaphor and its role in Russian and English in particular, Dilyara Murtazina came to the conclusion that in both languages “the building metaphor appears to be a reference or prototype for the categorisation, conceptualisation, and naming of abstract ideas and categories” (Murtazina 2011: 189). We have already discussed the Building metaphor as an element of Western European political thought. In Russia it was used by historians and political writers from the end of the 18th century, simultaneously with its European revival in the course of the French Revolution. Even the term “mirozdanie” (universe) begins to see wider use, according to Viktor Vinogradov (Vinogradov 1961: 302-03),[63] approximately at the same time. Vinogradov points out the term’s use in Nikolaĭ Karamzin’s works and suggests that it originates from the works of Russian freemasons. In fact Karamzin resorted not only to the word “mirozdanie”, but the building

[62] Весь мир насилья мы разрушим / До основанья, а затем / Мы наш, мы новый мир построим. “Dig up”, which featured in the first version of this translation by Arkadiĭ Kots (Drobinskiĭ 1930), was replaced by “destroy” later. A literal English translation of the French verses reads: “Let’s make a clean slate of the past, / Enslaved mass, arise, arise! / The world’s foundation will change, / We are nothing, now let us be all!” (Abidor 2013)
[63] See also Vinogradov (1966: 17)

metaphor itself in reference to the target domain of the state in his *Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia* (1811) : "Having raised throughout her realm the moral value of man, Catherine re-examined all the inner parts *of our state's edifice*, and left none unimproved. She amended the statutes of the Senate, the governorates, the courts, as well as those of the economy, army, and commerce."[64] (Translation by Richard Pipes (Karamzin and Pipes 2005: 131), except for the words in italic). The same Building metaphor and again in reference to the state (and sometimes its laws) was used by Mikhail Speranskiï (Speranskiï 2015: 128, 39, 65) and later by various authors including, among others, Khomyakov, Danilevskiï, Chicherin, and others.[65] However, it would be an exaggeration to say that the building metaphor was eminent in pre-revolutionary Russian political discourse. Moreover, even after 1917, it was years before it began to enjoy considerable popularity. Following Nina Arutyunova (1990), many Russian authors trace the popularity of the building metaphor in Soviet discourse to Marx, and specifically to his "architectural" metaphor of society, which was used for the first time in his 1859 preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. The passage in question reads as follows:

> In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society —the real foundation, on which

[64] Возвысив нравственную цену человека в своей державе, она пересмотрела все внутренние части нашего здания государственного и не оставила ни единой без поправления; Устав Сената, губерний, судебные, хохяйственные, военные, торговые усовершенствовались ею (Karamzin 1861: 44). Pipes translates "все внутренние части нашего здания государственного" (literally: all the parts of our state's edifice) as "all the inner parts of our body politic", following a well-established Western tradition, according to which the "body politic" is defined as "the people of a nation, state, or society considered collectively as an organized group of citizens" (Jewell 2002). Both Body and Building metaphors are known to have been used in relation to State and society, though the former is usually associated with earlier, absolutist thought. Interestingly, the functional proximity of the two metaphors may be illustrated by one fragment from Marx's *The Materialist Conception of History 1844–1847*, featuring a vivid example of metaphor blending, an effect mentioned by Kövecses (Kövecses 2005: 128-30). Marx uses both metaphors in one sentence comparing ideological systems to a building and social systems – to a body: "In constructing the edifice of an ideological system by means of the categories of political economy, the limbs of the social system are dislocated." (Marx 2000: 220). The same blending is observed in Montaigne (see Clark (1995: 206)).

[65] See Chizhkov (2013: 84, 256, 467, 549).

rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness (Marx 1904: 11) [66].

The extensive use of the building metaphor in Soviet language originates from these words (in Russian, the link to construction is probably even more pronounced because it uses the word “надстройка”). Still, this hypothesis does not explain all the peculiarities of its metaphorical usage. Indeed, Marx imagined society as a building or an architectural structure, but at the same time, this building is static. He describes an entity that already exists and, moreover, can be mapped on to any society. In a sense, Marx’s structure has no use for architects or construction workers – quite the opposite: it emerges as a result of people entering “into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will”. This kind of building metaphor has no temporal dimension; it is intended to describe any society and therefore is presumably timeless. Leaving radical assumptions of Marx being “a genuine organicist” (Wacquant 1985: 27) aside, interpretation of his metaphor by Soviet Marxism can somewhat justifiably incite certain suspicions[67]. Katerina Clark concurs with Arutyunova and observes that “architecture’s central role in Stalinist culture has its own logic in that building and spatial organisation lie at the heart of Marx’s account of society: the base-and-superstructure model.” She states further that “this potential <in particular> was picked up in Bolshevik Party rhetoric about ‘building communism.’” (Clark 2003: 4). Clark also traces the roots of the extensive use of architectural metaphors to the 1931 VKP(b) Central Committee plenum, namely to a speech delivered by Lazar Kaganovich (1931a) and to the resolution “On Moscow's Urban Services and the Development of Urban Services in the USSR” (Egorov and Bogolyubov 1984: 313-26). According to Clark, it was after this that “architectural schemes and

[66] This fragment is still a matter of considerable debate among contemporary Marxists and beyond. See for example Althusser (1971: 121-76) and Rigby (1998: 175-298).

[67] Joseph Needham in “Moulds of Understanding” suggests, for example, that “dialectical organicism” would be a better term for what we call “dialectical materialism” (Needham 1976: 278). Toby Clark lays special emphasis on this peculiarity of Soviet Marxism: “In Lenin’s distinction between the Party’s consciousness and the peoples’ spontaneity it is difficult to ignore the shadow of that classical construct of the government as head and the people as body, which draws attention to the related anthropomorphic ghost lurking in Marx’s base-superstructure model” (Clark 1993: 48)

tropes became dominant sources for political rhetoric throughout this most formative decade in the history of socialist realism." I think this understanding may be refined and elaborated.

In order to understand why the building metaphor gained such great significance during this period, which was constitutive for the Soviet regime, we have to turn to the history of its usage. It is worth mentioning that Stalin himself was often called "the great architect" or "the great architect of communism". Interestingly, of all his numerous sonorous titles,[68] this is one of the very few referring to particular professions or specialised skills. This epithet was given to Stalin for the first time (at least prominently) at the 2nd Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union address to V. M. Molotov. This text concludes with the following phrase: "Long live the great architect of socialism, a giant of Bolshevik thought and action, comrade Stalin" (Lomidze and Khitrova 1935: 468, 508). Remarkably, the Plenum took place in 1935, the year when the General Plan for the Reconstruction of Moscow was adopted (Molotov and Stalin 1935). In his 1939 article "The great architect" (Velikiĭ Zodchiĭ), Andreĭ Stramentov[69] begins a story about his encounter with Stalin with the very same words: "The speed of the Bolshevik reconstruction of the ancient Moscow is incredible. Labyrinths of narrow, crooked side-streets are being wiped from the face of the city, old streets are being widened, new shining asphalt avenues emerge, monumental buildings arise, and beautiful bridges appear over the river, encased in granite. All this ambitious work is directed by the great architect of our age – I. Stalin."[70] In the post-war period, these words sometimes lose their direct connection to architecture and urban planning, their meaning shifting to the area of the country's transformation in general, as with the 1951 poster by Boris Belopol'skiĭ:

[68] See for example Antonov-Ovseenko (1980: 283)

[69] Andreĭ Stramentov, engineer. Specialized in the construction of bridges and embankments in 1924-1941, later served as a demolitionist in the Soviet army during the war. In 1943-1948, Stramentov was in charge of the post-war reconstruction of Kiev. After 1948, he took up an appointment as a professor at the Moscow Civil Engineering Institute (Khrushchev 2014: 56).

[70] Со сказочной быстротой перестраивают большевики древнюю Москву. Сметаются с лица города лабиринты узких, кривых переулочков, расширяются старые улицы, возникают новые, блещущие асфальтом проспекты, вырастают монументальные дома, красавцы-мосты повисают над закованной в гранит рекой... Всей этой грандиозной работой руководит великий зодчий нашей эпохи — И. Сталин. (Stramentov 1939: 23)

Figure 6. *Glory to Stalin, the great architect of communism. Poster by Boris Belopol'skiĭ, 1951*

Stalin has a roll of paper in his right hand, but it is unclear whether it is a map (transformation of the territory) or blueprints (architecture and construction). In the background of this next poster, however, we can see a panoramic view of Moscow (with the recognisable high-rise on Kotel'nicheskaya embankment).

Figure 7. *Glory to Stalin, the great architect of communism. Poster by Konstantin Ivanov, 1952*

On December 21, 1949, Anastas Mikoyan (who had earlier, in March of that year, been removed from the Minister for Foreign Trade office) chose "The great architect" as the title for his article in *Pravda* praising Stalin on his 70th birthday (Mikoyan 1949: 6). Beriya used the same words in his speech at Stalin's funeral in March 1953: "The great architect of communism, the brilliant leader, our own Stalin, armed our party and people with the majestic programme of building communism." (Beriya et al. 1953: 8-10). More examples can be provided here, but the point is clear: not only was the building metaphor essential for Stalinist culture, but also Stalin himself was referred to as an "architect," while the very meaning of the Soviet state's existence was very often defined in architectural terms as the building/construction of socialism/communism.



Figure 8. *The GNV relative frequency graph for expressions "stroitel'stvo sotsializma", "postroenie sotsializma" "fundament sotsializma", "zdanie sotsializma" bigrams, 1910-1940 (case sensitive; smoothing: 0)*

One can clearly see from the graph in Figure 8 that at least two of the four expressions in question were in rather frequent use from as early as 1920. The first peak around 1920 is, to a certain extent the result of a technical quirk: it is observed in GNV for all n-grams with words affected by the spelling reform of 1918[71]. It should be noted, however, that Lenin's speech at

[71] Before 1918 ngrams in question were spelled as "строительство соціализма", "построеніе соціализма", "зданіе соціализма", and "фундаментъ соціализма". The modifying factor, which would allow one to estimate the real relative frequency here and verify the existence of a local maximum, cannot be determined at the moment.

the 2nd All-Russian Trade Union Congress (April 7, 1920) included this passage: “Soviet power is now passing through a phase of outstanding importance […]. And it is the specific nature of the period that provides the trade unions with special tasks and special responsibilities in the work of building socialism.”[72] (Lenin 1973c: 502). It is also interesting to note that the expressions “building communism” and “building socialism” (unlike “socialist construction”, or “economic construction”, or “peaceful construction”) are virtually absent from Lenin’s works written between December 1919 and April 1920 (except for the speech quoted above). They appear in the works written from May to November 1920, mostly in *The Tasks of the Youth Leagues: Speech Delivered At The Third All-Russia Congress of The Russian Young Communist League on October 2, 1920* (Lenin 1981: 298-318) and then disappear again. Special mention must be made of the book by N. Osinskiĭ[73], which was published in 1918 under the title “Building of socialism: general tasks and manufacturing process management”[74] (Osinskiĭ 1918a). The book was, in fact, the elaborated version of the article, published in April 1918 by the “Communist,” the theoretical organ of the communist left group within RKP(b) under the same title (Osinskiĭ 1918b). In 1918, though, the expression failed to attract much attention and was never used extensively until seven years later.

A sharp increase in the usage of “stroitel'stvo sotsializma” in 1925 followed by a local peak around 1927 is accompanied by a moderate increase in the use of the expression “построение социализма” which reaches its local peak in 1926, a year earlier. Both local peaks correspond with discussions around the possibility of “building socialism in one country”. The discussion itself was started by Stalin with an article first published in the *Bolshevik* journal on

[72] This year the same expression appears also for the first time in an official party document, namely in the 11th RKP(b) Congress Resolution on Trade Unions and their Organization (March, 29 — April 5, 1920). See: (1953: 461)

[73] A.k.a. Valerian Osinskiĭ (N. Osinskiĭ was Valerian Obolenskiĭ’s party pseudonym). Osinskiĭ was an economist, chairman of The Supreme Council of National Economy in 1917-1918, one of the leaders of the Democratic centralist’s opposition in 1920-1921. Later he broke his ties to the opposition and held senior positions within Gosplan (State planning committee) and the Central Bureau of Statistics in 1926-1937. He was arrested and executed in 1938 during the Great Purge in connection with Bukharin-Rykov trial (Case of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites").

[74] Строительство социализма: Общие задачи и организация производства

December 17, 1924, and then republished twice, in January and May 1925 as a foreword to both editions of his book *On the Paths to October* (*Na putyakh k oktyabryu*) (Stalin 1925: I-XLVI). The expression in question cannot be found in this particular text or in the second edition of the 1924 brochure *On Lenin and Leninism* (Stalin 1924), which discussed the same issue. Stalin extensively used Lenin's term "socialist construction" ("sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo") and even "building a socialist economic foundation", but not "building socialism." Edward Carr observes that the idea's "original appearance in the article of December 1924 was followed by a three months' silence, during which the theory of socialism in one country seems to have been ignored by party leaders and publicists, including its author." (Carr 1960: 103). It's hardly possible to determine who was the first to coin the expression "stroitel'stvo sotsializma". One of the likely candidates is Grigory Zinovyev. However the expression is almost absent from his book "Leninism" (1925), featuring a special chapter on the problem of socialism in one country.[75] Some authors suggest that Bukharin should probably be considered the author of the expression,[76]which was soon, however, appropriated by Stalin: he used it eight times in his 1926 pamphlet *On Questions of Leninism* (Stalin 1948: 13-90). One way or another by the end of 1925 the expression really gains momentum: it is widely used by the participants of the XIV Congress of VKP(b) (December 1925) — 31 times in verbal metaphorical expressions (stroit' / postroit' sotsializm) and 22 times in nominal metaphorical expressions (stroitel'stvo / postroenie sotsializma). Fifteen times out of the overall 53 these expressions are used in immediate relation to "socialism in one country".[77] To put this in perspective, for the XIII Party Congress (May 1924) the same verbal and nominal metaphorical expressions were used 3 and 2

[75] It is fair to mention, though, that Zinovyev uses "postroenie sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva" (three times) (Zinov'ev 1925: 279, 328, 41).

[76] If not the author, Bukharin was certainly one of those responsible for bringing it into wider circulation. See also: Bukharin (1926). Interestingly Lih observes that the extensive use of the path metaphor began after the publication of Bukharin's book *Road to Communism* (Lih 2006: 706).

[77] Based on the published transcript (*XIV S"ezd Vsesoyuznoĭ kommunisticheskoĭ partii (b) 18—31 dekabrya 1925 g. Stenograficheskiĭ otchet* 1926).

times respectively accordingly and “socialism in one country” is never mentioned.[78] The global peak in usage of both synonymous expressions is found (in accordance with Clark’s observations) around 1931. The emergence of these expressions, however, does not seem to be linked to real-life construction or building activities. The metaphorical vision of socialism as a building was conceived much earlier than Soviet architecture’s preeminent moment – and when this moment came, tropes were already there waiting to be used.

From that point onwards, almost everything that happens in the USSR is a part of a “construction” or “building” process, and every participant in public life is a participant of this process too. Contributors to *Pravda* used the expression “active builder” 91 times during 1930-1940. Generally, they refer to “active builders” of “socialism”, “socialist society”, “classless society”, or “classless socialist society”, but variations are plentiful. Ivan Kharchenko, chairman of the All-union Committee for physical education and sports, concluded his speech at the sports parade in the Red Square on July 12, 1937, with the slogan: “Long live Lenin’s Komsomol, – the active builder of Soviet physical education”[79] (Kharchenko 1937: 3). The most common substitute for “socialism” or “socialist society” is “new life”[80], another frequent expression in this decade. Generally, words and expressions from the construction domain are far more often used metaphorically than literally. For instance, in 1932 a page in *Pravda* featuring a number of articles under the collective title “Meetings of the Moscow and Saint-Petersburg districts’ active party members unanimously approve the decisions of the <17th All-union Party> Conference” (1932b), mentions “builders” and “buildings” nine times, of which only one instance is in a literal sense. What kind of building was socialism expected to be?

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[78] Based on published transcript (*Trinadtsatyĭ S"ezd RKP /b/. Maĭ 1924 Goda. Stenograficheskiĭ otchet* 1963)
[79] Да здравствует ленинский комсомол — активный строитель советской физкультуры!
[80] Новая жизнь



Figure 9. *The most common words immediately preceding "building/edifice of socialism" (zdanie sotsializma) and "building/edifice of socialist society" (zdanie sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva) ngrams, 1917-1940 (case sensitive; smoothing:1)*

The graph in Figure 9 shows that most commonly the future building of socialism was described as majestic (*величественное*), light-filled (*светлое*), luxurious (*роскошное*), grand (*грандиозное*), and great (*великое*). One cannot fail to notice that all these words (except one) belong to what Martin Joos (1967) termed the "frozen register", or, in other words, to the language of the sublime. "Luxurious" is arguably the most interesting adjective here, since it certainly shows up as a colloquialism. The answer to why this happens is found in Lenin's speech at the 8th All-Russia conference of the R.C.P.(B.). Insisting that the requisitioning of grain from the peasantry be carried out in full, he argues in relation to the problem of grain supplies that "only when we have solved that problem shall we have a socialist foundation, and on that socialist foundation we shall be able to erect the splendid edifice of socialism that we have so often begun to build from the top and which has so often collapsed."[81] The above list of adjectives is quite indicative of utopian thinking: on the one hand all of them are positive characteristics, connoting religious or at least sublime feelings, while on the other hand, perceived as a single set, they present an extremely vague description. The only specific quality of the "magnificent building of socialism" is "light-filled".

[81] И только тогда, мы решим эту задачу, и у нас будет социалистический фундамент, мы сможем строить на этом социалистическом фундаменте все то роскошное здание социализма, которое мы не раз начинали строить сверху и которое не раз разваливалось (Lenin 1974e: 184).

2.3. Time, forward! The Path metaphor and spatialization of time

Time, Forward! is the title of Valentin Kataev's novel, published in 1933. Like many other novels, novellas, and short stories of the time, it describes (and praises) the Soviet "labour front" of the first Five-Year Plan. In this case, the action is set on a construction site in the Urals, where a group of shock-workers is establishing a new record for the biggest number of concrete batches mixed in one day, which is described in the book: its whole action takes only 24 hours. This is, in a way, the prototypical Soviet production novel, or at least one of the most famous examples of the genre. While it is a novel about construction, conceived during Kataev's two-week trip to Magnitogorsk, it is at least in one way connected to the second metaphor we are going to discuss: as well as the Path metaphor as such, the title of Kataev's novel presents an example of spatial thinking about time, — though the text itself fully belongs, in fact, to the period when the idea of rapid movement towards future was already to a large extent out of favour. The Path metaphor emerged earlier than the Building metaphor, and with its counterpart, it has successfully outlasted the Soviet project and the USSR itself and now holds a less prominent but still noticeable place within contemporary Russian political discourse[82].

The source domain of the idea of "journey" is, according to the theory of conceptual metaphor, one of the very few basic concepts (Kövecses and Csábi (2002), Lakoff and Johnson (1980)) used to understand complex abstract entities, but that is not the whole story. Spatial

[82] As was demonstrated by Koteyko and Ryazanova-Clarke in their research into the usage of the Path and Building metaphors in the speeches of Vladimir Putin, not only is the path metaphor the most common in the corpus of his public speeches with a total word count of 210 000, but also the context of usage is often borrowed "from a historically <…> distant, Soviet discourse <…>. In particular, he (Putin) frequently uses the path metaphor (this time using the metaphor keyword 'move forward'[82]) to talk about the country's progress towards 'a better future' and about achieving stability and prosperity". (Koteyko and Ryazanova-Clarke 2009: 118). One can capitalise on the combination of the path metaphor with the invocation of the Soviet period in a different way: "…path metaphors can be powerful intertextual references to the more 'stable' past and/or they can be combined with lexical elements signalling the positive aspects of the historical past <…>. Thus, the associations of the road/movement forward are linked to the Communist past, which in turn is associated with economic stability and regular wages. This provides a powerful emotional link between the 'stable' Soviet past and the present" (Koteyko: 137-38).

metaphors in general and the path/journey metaphor, in particular, are commonly used to talk about time (Traugott (1978), Boroditsky (2011)). Therefore, the identification of particular sources of the path metaphor in Soviet political language is problematic or even perhaps impossible. However, it should be noted that Nikolaĭ Chernȳshevskiĭ in his review of Henry Carey's *Principle of Social Science*[83] states that "the road of history is not the pavement of the Nevsky prospect; it goes all the way through fields, now dusty, then muddy; through swamps and wilderness. If one is afraid to be covered with dust and get one's boots dirty, one should not enter public life."[84] These words, in turn, can be traced to Alexandr Herzen's foreword to Alexandr Radishchev's *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow* and to Prince Mikhail Shcherbatov's *On the Corruption of Morals in Russia*. In the foreword, Herzen writes: "That on the road ahead there will be times not only of weariness but also of cruel reaction, – of that there can be no doubt, it is enough to know the main actors to be certain of it. Well, the path of history is not a promenade along the Nevsky after all!"[85] While Radishchev's text is structured by his journey "from Saint Petersburg to Moscow", that journey is used in his book not as a metaphor of history and/or time, but as a narrative device, which can be traced, among other texts, to Laurence Sterne's "Sentimental Journey through France and Italy" and Jean-Jacques Barthélemy's "Voyage du jeune Anarcharsis en Grèce." Shcherbatov, however, uses the path metaphor to talk about Russian history at the very beginning of his book: "I can truly say that if, after entering later than other nations upon the path of enlightenment, nothing more remained for us than to follow prudently in the steps of nations previously enlightened, then indeed, in

[83] Carey himself, at least in this particular work, uses the path metaphor very moderately and never in relation to history.

[84] Исторический путь — не тротуар Невского проспекта; он идет целиком через поля, то пыльные, то грязные то через болота, то через дебри. Кто боится быть покрыт пылью и выпачкать сапоги, тот не принимайся за общественную деятельность (Chernȳshevskiĭ 1950: 923).

[85] Что по дороге будут не только времена устали, но и безумной реакции — в этом нет сомнения, для этого достаточно знать главных актеров. Да ведь исторический путь и не есть прогулка по Невскому! (Gertsen 1958: 277)

sociability and in various other things, it may be said that we have made wonderful progress and have taken gigantic steps to correct our outward appearance."[86] (Shcherbatov 2009: 113).

Chernӯshevskiĭ's quotation from Herzen (which presumably originates – at least in part – from Shcherbatov) was in turn quoted first by Georgiĭ Plekhanov in his 1890 book on Chernӯshevskiĭ (Plekhanov 1958: 152) and then by Lenin in August 1918 in his *Letter to American Workers* (Lenin 1969a: 57). Whether Lenin and other Bolsheviks were writing with Chernӯshevskiĭ and Herzen in mind or not, Shcherbatov's choice of words draws our attention back to the very roots of the path metaphor as it existed in Soviet political language. Its persistence was noted more than once. Unlike Lars Lih, who sees it as fundamental, Jeffrey Brooks suggests that neither the path nor the building metaphors were constitutive for Soviet political language, but instead the metaphorical use of the word "task" (*zadacha*) played that role, *zadacha* being a word which had "pedagogical connotations, <…> connoted hierarchical authority" and generally "corresponded to a picture of the state as the manager of economy and society". However, he argues that the path metaphor was the most important of the three "additional metaphors" (the other two being the Building metaphor and the metaphor of the "line") used to "emphasize control, purpose and leadership from above" (Brooks 2000: 48). Brooks retraces the roots of the excessive usage of the path metaphor to Lenin. In fact, the collocation "path to" is virtually non-existent in his works of July 1916 – February 1917, where it was only used three times, and is used almost exclusively (except in two cases) in the context of achieving peace in March-April 1917 (5 times altogether) and May-July 1917 (4 times).[87] However, the expression "path to socialism" appears first in the article "From the publicist's

[86] Воистину могу я сказать, что если, вступя позже других народов в путь просвещения, нам ничего не оставалось более, как благоразумно последовать стезям прежде просвещенных народов; мы подлинно в людскости и в некоторых других вещах, можно сказать, удивительные имели успехи и исполинскими шагами шествовали к поправлению наших внешностей… (Shcherbatov and Radishchev 1983: 59)

[87] To be sure, Lenin was not the only one to use the phrase "path to socialism". At least two books published before 1920 have the same expression in their titles: *Path to Socialism* (Bogdanov 1917) by the philosopher Alexandr Bogdanov and *Rural Poor and the Path to Socialism*" (Meshcheryakov 1919) by Vladimir Meshcheryakov, later Narkomzem of the Ukrainian republic, diplomat, and member of VKP(b) Central Committee in the 1930s.

diary. Peasants and workers" (published in *Rabochiĭ* No. 6, September 11/August 29, 1917): "We do not claim that Marx knew or Marxists know the path to socialism in full detail. It would be nonsense. Yet we know the direction of that path, we know the class forces leading us along that path; the specific, practical details will come to light only through the experience of the millions when they take up the matter." (Lenin 1969b: 116). The same expression appears again later, in the article "Can the Bolsheviks retain state power?" (published October 14, 1917 in the magazine *Prosveshchenie* No. 1-2): "Justice alone, the mere anger of the people against exploitation, would never have brought them on to the true path of socialism" (Lenin 1964: 130). This expression is also present in Lenin's later works, but its usage is rather limited: "path to socialism" occurs twice in the works of October 1917 – March 1918[88], twice in March–July 1918, once in March–June 1919[89] and once in March–June 1921.[90] Google's Ngram Viewer allows us to get a rough estimate of the trend data for the usage of the "path to socialism" expression in Soviet political language.



Figure 10. *"Path to socialism" (*put' k sotsializmu*) and "road to socialism" (*doroga k sotsializmu*) trigrams relative frequency, 1910–1940 (case sensitive; smoothing: 1)*

[88] Both occurrences are in fact variations, namely "path to the victory of socialism" and "path to the realization of socialism" (Lenin 1974h: 200, 77)

[89] Significantly, in this case the expression was used in one of the speeches recorded and later distributed on gramophone records specifically for propaganda purposes. Though accurate information on the runs of these records is unavailable, at the very least tens of thousands were produced and distributed all over the country (Skorokhodov 1986: 4-12).

[90] Data obtained from the 5th edition of the complete set of Lenin's works (Lenin 1967-1975), volumes 35, 36, 38 and 43 accordingly.

This graph illustrates changes in relative frequency of the occurrence of two synonymous expressions, “path to socialism” and “road to socialism”, both of which are commonly translated into English as “path to socialism” (though “road to socialism” may also be found, especially in pre-war American translations of Soviet texts). The Y axis shows the percentage share of each particular trigram in the total trigrams count in Google’s Russian corpus. The search was case-sensitive, which is particularly important in this case, since “Путь к социализму” was a very common name for all kinds of Soviet institutions from local newspapers or *agitbrigada*s to collective farms or confectionary plants and could therefore impede interpretation (see Fig. 11). Though the ubiquitous uses of the expression for naming purposes stands on its own, it seems reasonable to consider cases of (presumably) conscious language use. Differences in popularity between the two synonymous expressions are arguably related to differences in common usage. “Дорога” is mostly a part of colloquial language, while “путь’” is more often used in literary and religious texts, including the Bible: “Jesus said to him, “I am the way, the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father except through Me.”[91] (John 14:6, New King James version). Moreover, while “put’” is teleological – it goes one way, – a road is somehow isotropic, as it can be used to go “there and back again.”[92] Considering the above, we are going to focus on the “path to” expression.

[91] Иисус сказал ему: Я есмь путь и истина и жизнь; никто не приходит к Отцу, как только через Меня. (Ин 14:6, Синодальный перевод)

[92] This rather subtle difference in meanings was used by Arkadiĭ and Boris Strugatskiĭ in their famous novel *Hard to Be a God* (1964): in the opening chapter Anton, the leading character, speaks of the “anisotropic highway,” which “only goes one way” (Strugatsky and Strugatsky 2014: 13). In the closing chapter this image of a one-way highway turns out to be intrinsically linked to the notion of human progress: “The highway was anisotropic, like history. You weren’t supposed to go back. But he <Anton> did go back. And stumbled on to a chained skeleton.” (Ibid: 213)



Figure 11. *"Path to socialism" (*Put' k sotsializmu*), "path to socialism" (*put' k sotsializmu*) and "road to socialism" (*doroga k sotsializmu*) trigrams occurrence dynamics according to Google Ngram. 1910-1940 (case sensitive; smoothing: 1)*

The first thing that these graphs demonstrate rather clearly is that the path metaphor in fact persists throughout the period of 1925–1940, though the first peak is observed around 1920. The second one, less pronounced, appears in 1925, while the third (and the lowest) presents itself between 1938 and 1939. As mentioned above, the first peak around 1920 is, to some extent, caused by technical reasons.[93] Though a modifying factor cannot be determined at this time, the peak is still too noticeable to ignore.[94] With no (significant) work of Lenin containing the "path to socialism" expression being published in 1920,[95] the most probable candidate is *Terrorism and Communism* by Lev Trotsky (Trotskiĭ 1920), which contains the following widely cited phrase: "In point of fact, under Socialism there will not exist the apparatus of compulsion itself, namely, the State: for it will have melted away entirely into a producing and consuming commune. None the less, the road to Socialism lies through the period of the highest possible intensification of the principle of the state"[96] (Trotsky 1922: 170-71). It should be noted that Trotsky generally uses the path metaphor much more extensively than Lenin during this period: the headline of his speech at the 7th Congress of The Soviets

[93] Two words of the trigram in question were affected by the reform, since before 1918 it was spelled as "путь **къ** соц**і**ализму".
[94] The same peak for "construction of socialism", which also has two words affected by the spelling reform (построенiе соцiализма), is far less pronounced.
[95] The only plausible candidate, the 1919 text *What is Soviet Power?*, was only recorded that year, but not published until nine years later, in 1928 (Lenin 1928: 3).
[96] Russian "путь к социализму" is translated as "road to socialism" (translator not specified).

(1919) is *The Path to the Integrated Economic Plan;*[97] in the Manifesto of the Communist International Second World Congress (1920) he mentions “the road of Soviet federation – the only road to salvation”[98] (Trotskiĭ 2015: 112) and “social-Democratic blockheads”, who “persist in counterposing the road of democracy to the violent road of dictatorship”[99] (Trotskiĭ 2015: 129), etc. In his *Letter to a French Syndicalist about the Communist Party*, Trotsky uses the path metaphor three times (Trotskiĭ 2015: 304-19), describing the desired role of the party: “Who will give the Soviets, which are elected by workers of differing levels of consciousness, a clear and intelligible programme of action? Who will help them to comprehend the confused international situation and find the correct path?” (Trotskiĭ 2015: 312). Also, Trotsky is the author of the term “fellow-travellers”[100], which is literally translated from Russian as “those following others along the path” and first appears in his work *Literature and Revolution* (Trotskiĭ 1923). There are many more examples of this kind, which makes it safe to assume that it was Trotsky who made the path metaphor such an important part of Soviet political language.

The second peak around 1925 presumably correlates with the publication of Nikolai Bukharin’s booklet “The Path to Socialism and The Worker-Peasant Alliance”[101] (Bukharin 1925) and generally with the discussion around NEP, which was in essence the discussion about the choice of a particular “path to socialism”, evolutionary or revolutionary. After a local minimum around 1927, which marks both the end of this dispute and Trotsky’s expulsion from the party (and exile to Almaty in January 1928), some growth is observed. After that, the frequency graph of the path metaphor (in the form of “path to socialism”) oscillates until 1934. Then, the usage of the expression starts decreasing and reaches another local minimum around

[97] Путь к единому хозяйственному плану
[98] …на дорогу Российской Федерации — единственный путь спасения
[99] …социал-демократические тупицы продолжают противопоставлять путь демократии насильственному пути диктатуры
[100] For detailed account of the “fellow-travellers” concept see *Interpretation of Journeys* by Alexandr Étkind (Étkind 2001).
[101] Путь к социализму и рабоче-крестьянский союз

1936, when Stalin's constitution was introduced. Its first article stated that "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants" (*Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoĭ zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* 1936: 9). Within the official discourse, socialism, which had previously been a point to be reached in the future (*there*), became a line segment being lived through now (*here*). To be sure, that did not mean the total abandonment either of the expression itself or of the path metaphor altogether. The last local maximum on the graph correlates with the publication of the *History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Short Course* in 1938 (*Istoriya Vsesoyuznoĭ Kommunisticheskoĭ Partii (Bol'shevikov): Kratkiĭ Kurs* 1938), where the following quote of Stalin's was used: "The possibility is not excluded that Russia will be the country that will lay the road to Socialism" (*History of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short course* 1939: 197). However, a new path, a "path to communism", was introduced, while the "path to socialism" was left behind to become part of history, – this is demonstrated by the gradual increase in the previously rather stable use of the "path to communism" expression starting from 1937, right after the introduction of the new Constitution (Figure 12).



Figure 12. *"Path to socialism"* (путь к социализму), *and "path to communism"* (путь к коммунизму) *trigrams relative frequency dynamics, 1930-1940 (case sensitive, smoothing: 1)*

3. Spatial Utopianism and Building Metaphor

The “temporal” mode of utopian thinking, characteristically found in Marx and in some of his followers, manifests itself in the prevalence of the Path metaphor. Some time around 1927-1932 it gave gave way, though not entirely, to its ”spatial” counterpart, linked to the Building metaphor. This transition concurs with the turn to isolation, or one may even say, autarky. The questions which logically arise at this point can be put as follows: is the politics of isolation/closure, determinative for spatial utopianism as well as for the period of Soviet history under discussion, related to the to the Building metaphor — and if yes, then how in particular? Or, even more specifically, are autarky and closure related to architecture and construction and how? The nature of such a relation is at least two-folded, so to answer this question, we’ll have first to touch upon the concept itself, defining architecture as a functioning system, and secondly, consider the immediate historical context.

3.1. Architecture/construction as enclosure and division

One of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of art features the following claim on the purposes of the “Beautiful Architecture”:

> Its task consists in working the external inorganic nature into right form […]. Its forms continue to be the forms of inorganic nature, arranged according to the intellectual relations of Symmetry. But in such material and forms, the Ideal cannot be realised as concrete living spirituality. The real object presented by Architecture continues in its externality […] Architecture only paves the way for a more adequate presentation and embodiment of the Divine. […] it clears and levels a place for the Divinity, shapes His external surroundings and builds His temple […]. It bids an enclosure arise for the ingathering of the worshippers, and for their protection from the threatening of the storm, from the rain, the tempests and the wild beasts […] (Hegel et al. 1886: 36-7)

This fragment is interesting to elaborate upon in its own right since one can say that Hegel anticipates Henri Lefebvre's spatial dialectics of conceived, perceived and lived spaces (Lefebvre 1991"38-40). However, what is important for us now is seemingly a less complicated idea, emphasised by Hegel in this fragment: the idea of the two primary functions of architecture. First is *demarcation*, leading to the emergence of place from space and the second is an enclosure, intended for protection.

Simon Unwin begins his book "Analysing Architecture" with the reflection on the question "What is one doing when one is doing architecture?" He notes that, despite seeming simple, an answer to this question is no settled matter. According to Unwin, architecture in its very core is about identification and conceptual organisation of places, or, on other words, once again about demarcation and, — as it immediately follows from the example, Unwin employs to illustrate the concept, — enclosure. In this example, a prehistoric family, wondering the virgin landscape, at some point, decides to make a stop. This, according to Unwin, is the moment when architecture begins: they identify a place for the fire, then a place to sleep, and once they decide to stay for even a short time, "they surround these places with a fence [...]. From their choice of the site onwards they have begun the evolution of the house, they have begun to organise the world around them into places [...]. They have begun to do architecture." (Unwin 2003: 14).

This view of the inside/outside dichotomy as the most basic one, underlying the definition of architecture as the first human and then social activity is developed in the works of Dirk Baecker and Patrik Schumacher. Both bring forth a problem of constitutive principle of architecture as a social system in Luhmann's sense of word, i.e. as self-referential, self-existent and self-reproducing communication system.[102] Baecker was first to suggest in his 1990

[102] The theoretical frame, used by both authors, originates from Niklas Luhmann's concept of social systems being primarily communication systems or, in other words, mass communication networks, which are self-referential, self-existent and can be distinguished from their environment. Such systems are considered "autopoietic." The last

groundbreaking article “The deconstruction of the box: Inside and outside in architecture” that the distinction between the inside and the outside is constitutive for architecture as activity, dealing with material objects and objects of communication: “however architecture may be designed, presented, used and inhabited, one only knows that it is architecture if one can go in and out” (Baecker et al. 1990: 83). Baecker specifically points one more requirement to be necessarily met: the substantial difference between the inside and the outside should be in place. In his understanding, the basic shared knowledge about this difference as well as about the very possibility to go in and out not only makes the coordination between “constructing and communicating architecture” possible but in fact enables the development of architecture as such, as a separate domain. Schumacher explains this point even more clearly, claiming that both architectural design (“construction of architecture” in Baecker’s terms) and architectural communication are concerned with the same category of objects, which he calls “architectural territories.” In fact, these “objects” are “occupiable spaces generated via a framing enclosure” (Schumacher 2011: 168, emphasis in the original). The enclosure is what produces the difference between the inside and the outside, — and it lies at the very core of architecture since there is no architectural design, which doesn’t produce such a difference. Baecker goes even further, claiming that it’s “shielding” that counts, or, in other words, that architecture starts with the fence or, the wall (or floor, or ceiling). Both authors note that “shielding” (Baecker) and “enclosure” are primarily, but not exclusively spatial categories, and as such can be projected onto the reality of the social, — and that enclosures which unite what “might be further divided” (Schumacher 2012: 73) exist on various levels of social organization, including, among others, level of the state. These ideas enable us to give a partial answer to the question,

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term describes the ability of such systems to “reproduce all their necessary, specific communication structures within their own self-referentially closed process” or, to “generate their own components and structures within the ongoing flow of communications” (Schumacher 2011: 2). Luhmann distinguished three types of social systems: societal (closed systems, constituted by different fields of interactions, such as law, religion, art and our subject of interest — architecture); organizations, being networks of decision-making, and interaction systems, characterized by face-to-face interaction, requiring physical presence of the actors.

posed above. Autarkic and isolationist tendencies manifest themselves in the extensive use of the Construction metaphor within the Soviet language because architecture and construction are by definition based on creation of tangible boundaries, on generating *enclosures*, on separating *the place* from space.

3.2 Architecture as a source of propaganda communication technique

The special position of architecture within Stalinist culture doesn't just demonstrate itself in the extensive use of the Construction metaphor. This phenomenon has been observed many times by scholars, but has never, from our point of view, been fully explained. While Vladimir Paperny conceptualizes the transformation of pre-war Soviet culture drawing mostly on evidence from architecture,[103] he asserts that Culture Two was based upon the affirmation of the verbal, which led to the emergence of a hierarchy structured by the verbal possibilities of the arts and the requirement of emulation of literature by other artistic practices: every art form was expected to transform its language in order to be able to express verbal (and ideologically imbued) content as clearly as possible (Paperny 2002a: 173-80). Architecture, with its abstract morphogeny, is arguably the last art that such a verbally oriented culture could be interested in, – or in other words, it would certainly occupy the last position in such a hypothetical hierarchy. In support of his claim of the verbal, literary nature of Stalinist culture, Paperny points out that the first Congress of the Soviet Writers' Union (1934) preceded all others. What is really interesting, though, is that the first Congress of the Soviet Architects' Union was the second to be held in 1937. Composers' and Artists' Unions' congresses were held in 1948 and 1957 respectively (Paperny 2002a: 173-80).

[103]The English title of his book, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin* makes this more obvious than the original Russian *Kul'tura Dva*.

It would seem that this sequence does not correlate with the hierarchy of arts that Paperny's assumption implies. The creation of all these unions in April 1932 was mandated by the Resolution of the VKP(b) Political Bureau "On restructuring of literary and art organisations". The resolution suggested that all writers sharing Soviet ideology and willing to participate in the socialist construction would be united into a single writers' union and that "similar changes" should be made in relation to other arts. Stalin excised the list of the latter from the original text: "musicians, composers, artists, architects, etc." (Artizov and Naumov 1999: 172-73). The chronology of the Congresses does not correspond to this sequence. In terms, once again, of the primacy of the verbal, the deleted sequence makes more sense than that in which the Congresses were held. Musicians and composers had to go first because songs were probably the most powerful of all popular genres at the time. Artists were next because verbal ideological narrative translates more easily into figurative visual images than into the abstract forms of architecture, which occupied (quite reasonably from the point of view of this logic) the last position. This inconsistency deserves an explanation.

Katerina Clark states that "…architecture, as spatial architectonics, could be seen as the quintessential genre of socialist realism. Significantly, perhaps, in the first half of the 1930s, the very decade when the conventions of socialist realism were being established, architecture was the branch of the arts that received the greatest attention from the leadership." (Clark 2003: 4)[104]. Hans Günther in his article "Totalitarian state as total art" compares practices of interwar authoritarian regimes and notes that architecture "has unquestionable primacy in the government-controlled synthesis of arts" (Günther 2000: 11). Boris Groys, describing the rise of socialist realism, says it was a time when "just as the avant-garde had demanded, architecture and monumental art <…> moved to the centre of Stalinist culture." (Groĭs 1992: 71). Prominent contemporary Russian architectural scholar and activist Aleksandra Selivanova states that

[104] See also: Clark (2009)

“architecture in the 1930s came to the fore and became as powerful as cinema in terms of its ‘mythogenic’ influence on the masses” (Selivanova 2009: 24). “The centrality of architecture in socialist realism” (Clark 2003: 5) is by now firmly established but still requires an adequate interpretation.

Hans Günther argues that “monumental architecture can express might and grandeur and suppress the individual like no other art”. He quotes Nietzsche from *Twilight of the Idols*: “In the architectural structure, man’s pride, man’s triumph over gravitation, man’s will to power, assume a visible form. Architecture is a sort of oratory of power by means of forms. Now it is persuasive, even flattering, and at other times merely commanding. The highest sensation of power and security finds expression in the grandeur of style.” (Nietzsche 2007: 54). According to Günther’s argument, to a certain extent following Lefebvre’s understanding (Lefebvre 1991: 220-21), the nature of architecture’s importance for the Stalinist state is similar to that of the Nazi and Fascist regimes — and is therefore generally related to architecture’s particular ability to express the will to power. Consequently, the urge for such expression is seen as characteristic of totalitarian regimes (or their leaders) *per se*. Günther traces the emergence of the aestheticisation of reality within ultimately authoritarian regimes to the fact that “since real life cannot be forced into harmony, main efforts are invested into the creation of concordant unity by means of aesthetics” (Günther 2000: 8).

It is still unclear however why architecture itself is particularly important and why authoritarian regimes do in fact often place more value on architecture than on other arts. According to Günther, the key notion here is monumentality. Once again following Lefebvre, he appeals to the ability of monumental architecture to suppress individuality. But at the same time, he notes that while Nazi monumental architecture was meant to render the viewer awestruck, Stalinist monumentality was intended to reflect the collective wealth of Socialism, fertility, warmth, happiness, and joyfulness of life. That makes “monumentality” a rather blunt

tool when it comes to communicating specific ideological values. It should also be noted, that monumentality is described in Lefebvre as something that presents the ultimate material manifestation of desired social space and transcends death by its imperishability, which in turn, "bears the stamp of the Will to power" (Lefebvre 1991: 221). However, with the exception of the enormous project of the Palace of the Soviets, which had never come into being, Stalinist architecture doesn't exactly answer Lefebvre's criteria. Its vision of social space is not really monumental,[105] unlike the Italian architecture of the Mussolini era, e.g. the famous *Palazzo della Civiltà Italiana* with its stunning resemblance to Viollet-le-Duc's reconstructions of *Gibet de Montfaucon*[106] or *Nuovo Trionfale*, a 1930 social housing project by I.Sabbatini. Arguably, it also doesn't, at least explicitly, communicate "imperishability", let alone sublimity; in this regard, the Stalinist culture never produced anything close to Speer's *Lichtdom*.

Selivanova argues that architecture became a symbol of "prosperity" achieved as the result of the first five-year plan efforts. She notes that during the reconstruction period "everyday life became the most important instrument of social regulation and ideological influence." Therefore, "architecture could not be ignored since it was shaping everyday life and giving it fashion" (Selivanova 2009: 24). Indeed, Soviet architects insisted on the almost demiurgic position of the architect. Ivan Zholtovskiĭ, for example, writing on the teaching of the history of architecture in 1937, stated that "...it is not only space that the architect organises, but also the human mind (*psikhika*), he is a true organiser of life" (Barkhin and Yaralov 1975: 34). Il'ya Golosov asserted that architecture "is not a merely a frame, but the general background of the picture, and not only does its plenitude bear testimony to the plenitude, freedom, and happiness of human life, but it also contributes to this plenitude" (Barkhin and

[105] In the Stalinist USSR this problem was addressed not via architectural representation, but in a much more straightforward manner, namely through housing policy.

[106] Gibbet de Monfaucon, arguably one of the first known "death factories" was a three-storey gallows near the modern Place du Colonel Fabien in Paris, used for public executions until 1629 (it was later dismantled in 1760). At least 45 people could be simultaneously executed there. For details see: Lacroix (1874: 423-25).

Yaralov 1975: 419). At the same time, it is well known that it was the functionalist architecture of the previous epoch that was really serious about shaping social life by means of spatial structuring. In the 1930s, however, things had changed dramatically. Paraphrasing Groys, one can say that in the 30s architecture had to transition from transforming to representing the world, – and, according to his book, that was the only way it could find itself at the “centre of Stalinist culture”.

The architect Boris Markus, who graduated from the Moscow Architectural Institute in 1941, wrote in his memoirs: “Creating a project for a multi-storey apartment building was a serious challenge for everybody. <…> Architectural journals at the time were full of various suggestions for shaping residential sections. We were keeping track of the periodicals <…>. But for some reason, our professors chose to put us on a special track <…> they suggested that we should not concentrate on residential sections’ design so that we would not be distracted from the main challenge: the composition of the facade. And if I have it right, we really had to work on the building frontage, facing the street or the square. Somehow, nobody seemed really concerned about side facades, or rather they were considered to be extensions of the frontage. And the rear façade – that was just out of the picture» (Markus 2006: 71; quoted from Khmel'nitskiĭ (2012)). There are other, similarly illustrative passages in theoretical texts on architecture written in the USSR after 1931, but this artless memoir piece sums them all up: the architecture of socialist realism was much more concerned with beauty, impression and, one can even say, “representation” than with imposing spatial matrices meant to structure previously chaotic (or or merely improper) social order. The “performative” function had to step back and give way to the “representative” one which, in fact, considering the naturally abstract morphogeny of architecture, proved to be mere monumentality, a demonstration of “ability to impress”.

At this point, we have once again, to turn to the Grand Metaphors of the Soviet pre-war discourse. Generally, it is common to use two or more metaphors or source domains to conceptualise the same target domain. While the choice of a particular source domain is influenced by immediate, as well as broader cultural and social circumstances, usually two or more metaphors are used simultaneously, sometimes even within one piece of text, whether an article, speech, novel, or short story. The coexistence of these metaphors is generally unproblematic, though they sometimes enter complicated relations, and "blend" (Kövecses 2005: 128-30). However, that is hardly the case with the Building and Path metaphors within Soviet political language. Let us look again at the GNV graph, showing the relative frequencies of "building socialism" (stroitel'stvo sotsializma) and "path to socialism" (put' k sotsializmu) expressions in 1910-1940 (fig. 2). The two metaphors "peacefully coexist" until around 1924, when the previously less common building metaphor shows increases in usage so that the lines of the two graphs intersect. From that moment onwards, the Building metaphor dramatically prevails, while the relative frequency of the Path metaphor remains fairly stable. Within the suggested reference frame, this can be explained as follows.

The Path metaphor was closely related to the classical Marxist utopia of social process, within which, in Harvey's words, "the qualities of space and place are totally ignored." More specifically, it was manifested in serious hopes for the beginning of the World Revolution. Readers of *Pravda* between 1917 and 1922 could not fail to notice that international affairs (i.e. the revolution in Germany) were considered to be of primary importance: articles on these issues occupied the first and sometimes second pages, while reports from the battlefields of the Civil War often did not appear earlier than the third page. The Building metaphor is linked to the doctrine of the possibility of building "socialism in one country." Its emergence in mass communications marked a turning point in the Soviet spatial-temporal dynamic, where (using Harvey's term) the "utopia of social process" began its transformation into the "utopia of

spatial order". However, as Jeffrey Brooks observes (and GNV data confirms), the building metaphor "also predominated later, when Stalin broke with Bukharin and other supporters of the NEP and enacted the First Five-Year Plan (1928-32) and forced collectivisation." (Brooks 2000: 38).

The autarkic "utopia of the spatial order" may exist only within a temporal stasis, while the "utopia of the social progress" naturally implies temporal dynamics. At the same time, it was impossible to abandon the Path metaphor altogether, since it was an intrinsic part not only of the whole Marxist discourse but, moreover, of the discourse of progress itself. Therefore, "building socialism in one country" was from the very beginning a self-contradictory enterprise, at least in terms of discourse. The utopia of social progress (including its manifestation in the Path metaphor) had to be suppressed, – but not entirely. Trotsky with his idea of the permanent revolution and his faith in the concept of the world revolution, both directly linked to a particular kind of utopian thinking, fell victim to the process of transfer to the utopia of the spatial order — together with "Culture One". According to Paperny, this culture was "spreading", "moving", "horizontal", "future-oriented", unaware of spatialities, and finally "destructive" in quite a literal sense, e.g. hostile to the very idea of "structure". One of the very few aspects remaining of the utopia of the social process was the conceptual metaphor of the journey, stripped of its contents and turned into an abstract or even scholastic scheme. Still, it was a necessary part of the propaganda discourse. The temporally static nature of the utopia of the spatial order did not serve the purpose of forming a positive motivation to participate in the Soviet project, that is, hope for a better future. It is true that the Building metaphor is also future-oriented, but to a lesser extent.

The new Stalinist utopia of the spatial order could not exist in full a) until socialism was declared to be built and b) in the absence of the implied spatial order, that is, some degree of

autarky and the realization of isolation.[107] However, at the end of the First FYP the complex machinery of violence, coercion, and propaganda brought together to achieve these goals proved itself not nearly as efficient as Stalin hoped, and moreover, started to falter. In 1928-1932, productivity reached 41-51%,[108] of the plan's target or following a more conservative estimate, 60% on average at most (Gregory 2004: 118). Violence, coercion, and the drive for control were increasing. In January 1931, a rationing system was introduced; the passport system and *propiska* followed in December 1932. At the beginning of the 1930s, the first experiments in the use of forced labour began, – and in 1931 Dalstroĭ State Trust, the Soviet analogue of early modern colonial charter companies, started operating in the Far East to become the largest and the most deadly part of the Gulag system in 1938. In rural areas, state violence increased dramatically: while initially the authority to order executions was limited to the Central Committee, on April 20, 1931, OGPU and republican courts were given the right to sentence people to death themselves. Then, a Politburo Decree accepted in September 1932 required that such sentences should be carried out immediately, and at finally, in March 1933, the Politburo started authorising specific officials to sentence the accused to death (Khlevnyuk and Kvashonkin 1995: 59, 61, 63-65).

It is also known that Soviet authorities in the course of 1928-1937 sometimes stepped back from the massive accumulation of capital, preferring consumption over investment (Harrison 1994), since they were conscious of the need for carrots to complement the sticks. Nonetheless, the material resources necessary to provide such carrots were scarce. Arguably, the aforementioned necessity of "real" socialism for the very existence of a utopia of the spatial order was the underlying reason for Stalin to announce that the "economic foundation of socialism" was built in 1931, then that "the complete victory of Socialist forms of economy" had

[107] The second point was considerably problematic due to the size of the territory in question, which significantly exceeded any utopian locus of that kind, such as Utopia Island, New Atlantis, or in particular the City of the Sun.
[108] Estimation by actual production gain in volume terms (average for several dozens of the more important goods). See Vishnevskiĭ (1998: 52)

occurred in 1934 (*Istoriya Vsesoyuznoĭ Kommunisticheskoĭ Partii (Bol'shevikov): Kratkiĭ Kurs* 1938: 306), and, finally, that the building of socialism was "essentially completed" as early as in 1936. Article 1 of the new Constitution, accepted by the Eighth Extraordinary Congress of Soviets in December that year, read: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants"[109] (*Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoĭ zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* 1936: 9). After the goal of building socialism was achieved, it would become possible to substitute it with a much more abstract goal of "building communism," thus moving the ultimate fulfillment to an indefinite future. Soviet authorities found themselves squeezed between two utopias, neither of which could function in the way they were intended. Violence, as enormous as it was, could not solve this problem, especially as in terms of economics, violence also came at a price.

There is also the notion of architecture as an area a human activity directly related to the concept of the future. The renowned Polish architect Jan Olaf Chmielewski, a member of CIAM,[110] begins his famous 1934 "Warszawa Funkcjonalna" plan for the reconstruction of Warsaw with the following claim: "The work of architects is based on projecting, that is, the planned conception of the future." (Kohlrausch 2014: 223). Indeed, architecture is largely about the future, though we tend to think otherwise and see it as a multitude of petrified histories. Such a view is, of course, quite justifiable, since "urban fabric is sedimentation of the past that can be richly evocative of memory" (Pratt and San Juan 2014: 105). At the same time, architecture itself, even in the very early stages of the design process, necessarily has to envision its own future condition as a part of the past: Vitruvius designates "durability" one of the fundamental properties of the craft (Vitruvius 2012). Therefore, even if we consider architecture as merely the "built environment" or, even more, generally speaking, manmade spatial structures, it implies a rather sophisticated constellation of temporalities. John Dewey,

[109] See also Stalin (1952a: 552, 54).
[110] Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne.

who had his own history of complicated relationships with the Stalin regime, notes in *Art as Experience* that “every important structure is a treasury of storied memories and a monumental registering of cherished expectancies for the future” (Dewey 1980: 222). Lotman echoes Dewey with an even more straightforward statement: “Architecture is by its nature connected to both history and utopia. These two elements of human culture compose its most general context” (Lotman 2000: 681).

Architecture is, of course, not just the sedimentation of past events or petrified memories. In fact, the term “architecture” goes far beyond designating even specific kinds of artefacts or academic domains/professional practices. Architecture is also art and, once again following Dewey, “our experience of buildings”. But the subject of our particular interest here is architecture as a social institution. Patrik Schumacher in his *Autopoiesis of Architecture,* writes that “the mainstream architect has to face investors, clients as well as users and authorities, and thus acts as the interface of architecture” (Schumacher 2011: 99). This observation is specific to architecture since it is the only art form that requires a project-oriented approach on a really large scale. Cinema is excluded from consideration since screenplays are of course often communicated by the authors to the producers or by the producers to directors, for example, but, except for specific reasons, never leave the professional community network outside the production process. In many other domains, sketches of a future artistic creation precede its embodiment, but only in architecture is a sketch meant not only to publicly communicate the idea but to *persuade* the target audience that the final artefact is worth the investment. This situation as such is determined by a set of factors related to “scale”. While the metaphoric “scale of expenses” requires architects to persuade those who can provide sufficient resources, the less metaphorical “scale of development” involves persuading other possible stakeholders as well and finally the very real “scale of the building” implies collective effort. “Architects are obliged,” says Dewey, “to complete their idea before its translation into a complete object <…>

takes place. Inability to build up simultaneously the idea and its objective embodiment imposes a handicap" (Dewey 1980: 51-52). The presentation of a project in the form of drawings or, even more importantly, maquettes is, therefore, a mode of public communication, specific to architecture as a social system. What is the message which architecture communicates?

Chmielewski's "planned conception of the future" is based on the assumption that, unlike other arts, the "future" here implies much more than just "aesthetic" innovation. The architect has to persuade those in command of the resources (whether money, time, land, or labour force) that the project is worth spending on. It is not always easy to accomplish this, taking into account the fact that "the very concept of a project entails the expectation of projecting into an *unknown* future, a future that is unknown with respect to the context of the project as well as with respect to the shape the project itself takes." (Schumacher 2011: 395, emphasis added).

In 1996, James Throgmorton wrote *Planning as Persuasive Storytelling*, which featured a detailed account of the planning discourse around Commonwealth Edison Company's ambitious nuclear power plant construction programme in northern Illinois during the 1980s. It is only one (though probably the most famous) of dozens of texts examining the adventures of the modernist concept of planning in a changing society. In a sense, "persuasive storytelling" is a product of adaptation of the modernist planning concept to new circumstances. It is usually no longer possible to simply impose the vision of the planning authority (whether the urban planner, the architect or the successfully persuaded official) onto the public. The underlying economics are centred on the notion of time preference, or in other words, the relative valuation placed on resources at an earlier date compared with the valuation of the project's outcome at a later date. The architect or planner has to convince those with a high time preference (focusing on the present and immediate future) of the advantages of a low time

preference (caring more for well-being in the far future)[111], — and this is at least very similar to the message that had to be communicated to the Soviet people by the Stalinist regime. The architectural project-oriented approach, within which the presentation of a sketch or maquette, i.e. scale model, is a vitally important part of the process culminating in the creation of the actual building, had formed the foundation of Soviet cultural production ever since Soviet culture itself became such a scale model. Notwithstanding the extremely aggressive presentation of the latter, however, the actually suggested object – i.e. socialism – was never created. Nonetheless, it was this approach that gave life to Socialist Realism. It was anything but a coincidence that the latter was born in 1932,[112] in the same period as the discourse of construction and architecture had been enthroning itself once and for all as the main language of the future within propaganda and political discourse. This was in full accordance with the meaning of the shift from Culture One to Culture Two or, in our terms, from temporal to spatial utopia.[113] Socialist realism, as a *method of persuasively communicating the project* of the future

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[111] According to the economist George Reisman, "the further away from us things are in space, the smaller do they appear to us in our field of vision. The temporally more remote goods are in our field of valuation, so to speak, the smaller is the value we attach to them". In Reisman's opinion, "the nature of human life implies time preference, because life cannot be interrupted." Accordingly, it is "more important to be alive now," Reisman writes, "than at any other, succeeding time, and more important to be alive in each moment of the nearer future than in each moment of the more remote future." (Reisman 1996: 56)

[112] Arguably, the term was first introduced by Ivan Gronskiĭ, a member of the SR Maximalist party before 1918, executive editor of *Izvestiya* in 1928—1934, editor of *Krasnaya niva* (from 1931) and of *Novȳĭ mir* (1931—1937) literary magazines. In 1938, Gronskiĭ was arrested and convicted. After that, he spent 16 years in concentration camps. On May 20, 1932, Gronskiĭ gave a speech at a meeting of active members of the Moscow literary groups, and, according to an article in *Literaturnaya gazeta* (1932a: 1), said the following: "The question of method should not be posed in an abstract way; we should not approach this issue in a way that a writer first has to complete his course in dialectic materialism and then write. Our main claim about the writers is – write the truth. Truthfully portray our reality, which itself is dialectic. That is why the main method of the Soviet literature is the socialist realism" (Vopros o metode nuzhno stavit' ne abstraktno, ne podkhodit' k étomu delu tak, chto pisatel' dolzhen snachala proĭti kursȳ po dialekticheskomu materializmu, a potom uzhe pisat'. Osnovnoe trebovanie, kotoroe mȳ pred"yavlyaem k pisatelyam — pishite pravdu, pravdivo otobrazhaĭte nashu deĭstvitel'nost', kotoraya sama dialektichna. Poétomu osnovnȳm metodom sovetskoĭ literaturȳ yavlyaetsya metod sotsialisticheskogo realizma). The term, however, according to Gronskiĭ's letter to A. Ovcharenko from October 22, 1972, was sanctioned by Stalin earlier, in late April or early May (Gronskiĭ 1991: 334-44).

[113] By this point (May, 1932) the Party Plenum had already authorized (June, 1931) the three main pre-war Soviet megaprojects, namely, the Moscow Canal, the Moscow Metro and, most significantly, the reconstruction of Moscow itself (thus in May 1932 those projects were already long past the launch period). Major Soviet and later foreign architects had been invited to bid for the Palace of the Soviets design project (February 1931) and the prize for the second competition had been awarded (February, 1932) to Iofan, Zholtovskiĭ, and Hamilton (while none of the modernist projects made it to the further stages of the process). Also, at this point the final decision had

"edifice of socialism," was, arguably, prompted by time-honoured architectural practices. Demand for total control was not the only underlying motive for the adoption of the 1932 Resolution of the VKP(b) Political Bureau "On restructuring literary and art organisations."

Sheila Fitzpatrick, in "Stalin's Peasants," invokes the idiomatic expression "Potemkin village". According to a well-known story, Potemkin built "decorative imitations of villages" to convince Catherine the Great of "his high performance" (Chernyshev 1960: 1595) during her voyage to the Crimea in 1787. Potemkin "in fact decorated towns and settlements; he never tried to keep it a secret" (Panchenko 1983: 97).[114] Fitzpatrick uses this term for the image of the Soviet village, which only existed in the imagination and notes that "the Potemkin village was a preview of the coming attractions of socialism". She also suggests the term "Potemkinism"[115] for a "Stalinist discourse in which the defects and contradictions of the present were overlooked and the world was described not as it was but as it was becoming, as Soviet Marxists believed it necessarily would be in the future." (Fitzpatrick 1994: 262, 16). Significantly, in architectural terms the "Potemkin village" is a full-scale animated maquette, something never evidenced as a matter of actual practice in professional or public communication, but presumably more convincing than any drawing or scale model.

Socialist realism was conceived not as a technology for the creation of "Potemkin villages" but as something even more ambitious, namely "as one of the most significant social institutions of Stalinism—an institution for the production of socialism." "The basic function of Socialist Realism," Evgeny Dobrenko (2007: xii) argues, "is to create Socialism – Soviet reality and not an artefact". He insists on understanding "Socialist Realism not as 'propaganda' (or, at least, a phenomenon whose functions are totally reducible to propagandistic ones) but as a system that engenders a sort of reality" (Dobrenko 2007: 13). "Until it had been processed by

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already been made considering the use of forced labour for the purposes of "socialist construction": 1931 is the birth year of the GULAG system.

[114] See also Zorin (2001: 109-10) and Dobrenko (2007: 48).

[115] "Potemkinism" was meant to distinguish between socialist realism as art practice and its "real-life counterpart".

Socialist Realism," Dobrenko writes, "'Soviet reality' by itself was without value, which is precisely why it was constantly de-realized in Socialist Realism and official propaganda; in 'raw form,' it lacked the qualities of an ideological commodity" (Dobrenko 2007: 9). The production of reality by means of aestheticisation was not meant just to "sell" the project of the future to the people. The problem of transition from the utopia of the social process – which envisions its realisation at some infinitely remote moment in the future, – to the stasis of the spatial utopia demanded the total substitution of reality by the exteriorization of an imaginary future, bringing it to "now." The very idea of the exteriorization of the project was taken from the communication practices of architecture. And in this way architecture, the most intractable art, the one least suitable for the manageable representation of ideology, became the most (or at least the second most) important art of Socialist Realism and Stalinist culture as such despite that culture's preference for the verbal. Stalinism borrowed something very important from architecture: a proven technique of communication meant to sell future development. In socialist realism, this technique was pushed to its very limit, – and eventually failed.

Bringing the future to the present was only possible within an enclosed society, one having no external point of reference. On the one hand, autarky was vitally important for achieving the desired a-temporal condition. On the other hand, the fundamental contradiction between the necessity of bringing the future to the present and the no less insistant necessity to locate the desired state of things at an indefinite far point beyond the present time, is characteristic of numerous known attempts to implement utopian projects in practice. In the Soviet case, this contradiction took the shape of the unfeasible task of erasing temporality in the best interests of the spatial utopia, while keeping the utopia of the social process alive. This issue was resolved – to the extent this was practicable – by means of socialist realism, which was itself born, as it were, of the spirit of architecture.

We can now summarise the above, thus providing an answer — or, more precisely, two mutually complementary answers — to the question, posed in the beginning of this chapter. First, autarkic and isolationist tendencies, defining aspects of spatial utopianism, manifest themselves in the extensive use of the Construction metaphor within the Soviet lexicon because architecture and construction are by definition based on the *creation of tangible boundaries*, on *generating enclosures*, and on *separating* place from space. Second, it is the crucial role of the peculiar communication practices common in architecture in the evolution of the Soviet regime that leads to the manifestation of isolation/autarky in the Building metaphor and to further consolidation of its role in Soviet propaganda and public discourse.

Chapter Two. Bolshevism and Stalinism: shared origins, different lineages

The observably dramatic change of the culture models in the late 1920 to early 1930s is not fuelled directly by the changes of policies but has another underlying cause, namely, a no less dramatic change in the modes of utopian thinking, which appears to be a substitute for the lack of change in ideology. Transformations in the mode of utopian thinking, in turn, manifest themselves in the dynamics of the two grand metaphors — those of the Path and Construction. The reason for such a complex constellation is that any significant change in ideology appeared to carry too high a price in terms of legitimacy. Stalin's "revolution from above" came into being only months after November 1927, when the opposition was defeated. Nevertheless, Trotsky in Alma-Ata and later Turkey, as well as other opposition-leaning party members (not necessarily Trotskyites) continued to contend for Lenin's legacy: authentic "Leninism" accepted as such by the party rank and file, was considered, on the one hand, a *carte blanche* to pursue favoured policies, and on the other, the ultimate weapon to fight political opponents. As of the end of 1927, Stalin has just got a grip on this long-contested prize, so any abrupt movements in the ideological domain were out of the question.

Stalinist mode of Utopian thinking is focused on space rather than time and ultimately produces the imagery which rather belongs to the utopias of the spatial order than to the utopias of the social process. This kind of utopian thinking is not something alien to the Marxist tradition, — though before Stalinism it never played such an important role. Mostly it served as an undercurrent, which could rarely be observed directly. However, it is rooted the Marxian tradition as much as this tradition itself is rooted in classic German philosophy: the most explicit example of this kind of utopian imagery is found in a treatise by Johann Gottlieb Fichte published in 1800 under the title "Der geschlossene Handelstaat," "Closed Commercial State" or, in full "The Closed Commercial State: A Philosophical Sketch as an Appendix to the Doctrine

of Rights and an Example of a Future Politics." This relatively short text was conceived as an illustration of Fichte's doctrine of right and understanding of the law, as well as a rendition of his theory of the state. According to Fichte's son, his father considered this text his "best, most thought-through [*durchdachtestes*] work." (Fichte 1845: XXXVIII; quoted after Fichte (2012: 3)). The "rational state," presented in this treatise, bears a striking resemblance to the Stalinist USSR in more ways than one. In what follows we will discuss the origins of Marxism and its relation to Fichtean thought, and try to reveal those particular parts of the complex and rather heterogeneous Marxist heritage that are related to Fichte, paying specific attention to his understanding of state and his doctrine of rights.

1. Marx, Fichte, Socialism and "Foundations of Natural Right"

Sir Isaiah Berlin had a lifelong complicated relationship with Marxism. In his essay "My intellectual path" he speaks about 1930s when he was "commissioned to write a biography of Karl Marx",

> Marx's philosophical views never appeared to me to be particularly original or interesting, but my study of his views led me to investigate his predecessors, in particular, the French philosophes of the eighteenth century – the first organised adversaries of dogmatism, traditionalism, religion, superstition, ignorance, oppression. I acquired an admiration for the great task which the thinkers of the French Encyclopedia had set themselves, and for the great work which they did to liberate men from darkness – clerical, metaphysical, political and the like. And although I came in due course to oppose some of the bases of their common beliefs, I have never lost my admiration for and sense of solidarity with the Enlightenment of that period. (Berlin 2013: 5)

One may say that Berlin's profound interest in the Enlightenment originates from the work on the aforementioned biography (Berlin 1939). He fully recognized Marxism as a creation of the Enlightenment, and has reserved a place for Marx among those who believed "laws of historical development could be – and by then had been – discovered, that the answers to the questions of how to live and what to do – morality, social life, political organization, personal

relationships – are all capable of being organized in the light of the truths discovered by the correct methods, whatever those may be" (Berlin 2013: 8). It was the extremities of this belief that Berlin "came in due course to oppose": a vision of the mankind as fundamentally uniform, the negation of the individual and excessive reliance upon reason, the super value assigned to rationalism. All this led to the Communist doctrine, which proved to be incompatible with human liberty, — and diversity. Marxism was a route taken by the Enlightenment rationalism to arrive at its logical extreme. Berlin traces the authoritarian excesses of the 20th century to Rousseau and his belief that reason may be imposed on those members of society who disagree and have their own, albeit erroneous vision. Berlin's concept of the Enlightenment, which holds rationalism (or scientific method) as its true and only backbone, lays itself open to the suspicion of oversimplification.[116] At the same time, it's hard to disagree that belief in reason, in the inevitable positive outcome of the rational effort, in the value of this effort, is indeed the constitutive part of the Enlightenment, — though in all probability not the only one.

It's widely acknowledged that Marxism reflects three sources of primary importance: classic German philosophy (most notably Georg Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach), British political economy (Adam Smith and David Ricardo) and French utopian socialism (Saint-Simon and Fourier). This remarkably neat scheme is usually associated with Lenin's short sketch "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism" (Lenin 1977a). In fact, Lenin was not the first to put forward this interpretation. Karl Kautsky, the most prominent theoretician of orthodox Marxism and a very influential figure of the German Social Democratic Party, wrote his essay "The historical accomplishment of Karl Marx" [117] five years earlier, on the occasion of Marx's 90th anniversary. Lenin's sketch, written on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of

[116] Robert Wokler, for one, argues that Berlin's version of Enlightenment is in essence, "uniformitarian, undifferentiated, homogenous, and monolithic". Particularly, Wokler points out that in Montesquieu principles, on more than one occasion cited by Berlin as foundational for the Enlightenment, never gave rise to universalism or cosmopolitanism. On the contrary, Montesquieu war particularly sensitive to the local, the specific and the unique (Wokler 2003: 18-19)

[117] Die historische Leistung von Karl Marx (Kautsky 1908b).

Marx's death, bears a stunning similarity to Kautsky's text. It is indeed little more that new rendition of Kautsky's pamphlet, particularly of its fourth section, "Die Zusammenfassung deutschen, französischen, englischen Denkens" (Synthesis of German, French and English thought). The affinity of the two texts is so striking that in French Kautsky's work is widely known as "Les trois sources du marxisme : l'oeuvre Historique de Marx" (The three sources of Marxism: Marx's historical work)[118].

The most probable immediate source of Kautsky's argument can be found in Engels's work, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific" (Engels 1989a), in which Engels speaks of two sources in question (German philosophy and French socialism), while the third (British political economy) is discussed, though not explicitly named. Engels also speaks of the "Kant-Laplace cosmogony, modern natural science and Darwin" (Engels 1989b) as of areas of knowledge significant for the formation of Marxism[119]. All three texts in question are self-descriptive: authors themselves are affiliated with the doctrine they are describing. This fact gives grounds for considerable suspicion and critique, particularly by modern interpreters, some of whom consider it necessary to include various authors in the list of those who influenced Marx most significantly and whose work had a substantial impact on Marx and Marxism.[120] But let us turn

[118] See Kautsky (1947) as well as the editions of 1969 (foreword by Pierre Guillaume, postscript by Lucien Laurat) and 1977 (foreword by Pierre Guillaume). The Spanish translation was made from the French text and has the same title. In Russian editions (at least three exist, published in 1908 and then in 1918 and 1919 (reprinted in 1923)) the translation of the original title was used: "Karl Marx and his historic importance" (Карл Маркс и его историческое значение); see Kautskiï (1908).

[119] This triad itself probably demonstrates the vitality of the "European triarchy" concept, delineated by Moses Hess, a French-Jewish philosopher, who stood at the origins of Labor Zionism, in his book "Europäische Triarchie" (The European Triarchy) published in 1841. Broadly speaking, Hess's idea was to translate Hegelianism into political action, that is, revolution. In the course of his argument, he elaborates on the idea of three European powers being already on the front line of the struggle for the emancipation of humanity. They are Germany, where the Reformation was born, and which has separated religion from the state; France, where the Great French revolution has shaped the ultimate goals of social justice and political freedom — and Britain, being the motherland of free speech. Subsequently, the final revolution also had to take place in England, since England was expected to be the first country where tensions between "pauperism and the aristocracy of money" would rise to the surface and thus provoke a revolution. Étienne Balibar argues that this concept was, albeit in a very broad sense, "taken up by Marx in his early writings, in which the notion of the proletariat made its appearance" (Balibar 2007: 7). See also Coleman (1992).

[120] For discussion of the origins of Marxism see, for example, Lichtheim (1965), Kauder (1968), Kołakowski (1978) and Thomas (2008)

first to classic German philosophy (the term itself was arguably coined by Engels), which is of primary interest for us here.

It is a well-regarded view that of all authors whose works constitute the post-Kantian debate, Marx was most influenced by Hegel. Indeed, during the four years the young Marx has spent in Berlin University, he was introduced to Hegelianism which was at the time in its heyday as the official philosophy of the Prussian state under the special care of the government. Hegel praised the State as the entity, which "binds together the universal with the full freedom of the particularity, including the welfare of individuals" (Hegel and Dyde 1896: 249) and argued that the state alone, being "the Divine Idea as it exists on Earth," can reconcile freedom and necessity, since "law is the objectivity of Spirit […], only that will which obeys the law, is free; for it obeys itself" (Hegel and Sibree 1900: 39).[121] Both the encounter with "Young Hegelians" and his consequent deep interest in Hegel are formative for Marx and Marxism. Kant's moral philosophy is no less essential for Marx: In particular, the very concept of alienation and, consequently, a significant part of Marx's critique of capitalism has the second formulation of Kant's categorical imperative as its base.[122]

Fichte was never a part of the Marxist heritage in the same sense as Hegel or Feuerbach, in spite of the fact that Engels himself wrote in the foreword to the first German edition of "Socialism: Utopian and scientific" that: "we German Socialists are proud of the fact that we are descended not only from Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen but also from Kant, Fichte and Hegel" (Engels 1989b). Not only did both Marx and Engels rarely refer to Fichte in their works, but

[121] While Hegel's doctrine of state is, in fact, considerably more complicated, quotations like this, eventually leading to justification of any possible actions of the government, sat well with the Prussian kingdom under the rule of Friedrich Wilhelm III and were consistent with the ideas of the Prussian bureaucracy, albeit only up to a certain point. After 1840, a year when Karl vom Stein zum Altenstein, Prussian minister of culture, the main advocate of Hegelianism and generally progressivist (at least in Prussian terms) has passed away, government policies were subjected to the radical change informed by the ideas of neo-Pietist "Awakening".

[122] Estrangement originates from the tendency of the members of the working class to relate to each other as agents of the production process rather than as people as such. This, in turn, is determined by the attitude of the capitalist to the worker as to one of the *means* of production, not as to a human being, precious and unique as an *end* in him- or herself.

Fichte himself had held a rather humble position in classic German philosophy scholarship for quite a long time. However, after several of Fichte's works were translated into English in 1980s and 1990s, the situation started to change.

Fichte was long perceived by scholarship as a proto-socialist if not a socialist as such.[123] One author even claimed at the end of the 19th century that "the modern socialism of Germany may be said to begin" with Fichte (Bonar 1893: 280).[124] Ferdinand Lassalle, one of the founding fathers of German social democracy, admired Fichte and wrote several essays on his philosophy.[125] Finally, Fichte is mentioned as a source of inspiration, on the very first pages of *Die Neue Zeit*, a theoretical journal established in 1883 by Karl Kautsky. Though the philosopher's name is mentioned just once, the whole editorial is overflowing with Fichtean traits — from the mention of "partial knowledge," a notion essential to Fichte's treatise "The Vocation of Man" (1799) to the argument that knowledge is the very core of the human nature. This last, in turn, leads *Die Neue Zeit* to the claim that only someone with an awakened mind, a person at least trying to get to know other human beings and living life with consciousness and understanding, deserves to call him- or herself a human being (Die Redaktion der "Neuen Zeit" 1883). In 1900, Marianne Weber has published a book under the title "Fichte's socialism and its relation to the doctrine of Marx."[126]

After World War II mention of Fichte vanished from both academic and popular books on socialism, since his works, particularly the "Addresses to German nation" and a couple of anti-semitic statements from his early works were actively used in Nazi propaganda. Philosopher Ernst Bergmann claimed that Fichte produced an "outline of a national socialist

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[123] Fichte never uses the term "socialism", referring to the desired future social condition as "rational state".
[124] See also Jaurès (1902), Mering (1929), Aris (1936: 106-35)
[125] See, in particular, his "Fichte's political legacy and the immediate present" (1862) and "Fichte's Philosophy and the Meaning of the German Popular Spirit" (1877)
[126] "Fichte's Sozialismus und sein Verhältnis zur Marx'schen Doktrin". I've consulted the "photo-mechanically reproduced" second edition (Weber 1925). It's worth noting, that Victor Zitta speculates, that Georg Lukács, who befriended the Webers after settling down in Heidelberg in 1911, grew interested in Fichte thanks to his discussions with Marianne Weber in course of his frequent visits (Zitta 1964: 49).

worldview […] which in its basic demands (the coalescing of the nation and the idea of racial improvement) completely agrees" with national socialism and "in its justification for the belief in Germany, even outruns it in fervor and boldness" (1933, quoted after Sluga (1993:29)). This fact was brought to light by Rohan Butler when the war was very far from over: his "Roots of National Socialism" (1941) gave Fichte quite a high profile among many other forerunners of Nazism. Arguably because of this association with Nazi ideology, the analysis of Fichte's, philosophy in the socialist context and of his influence on Marxism, almost ceased for several decades. It revived again after more than thirty years thanks to Tom Rockmore, who suggested a new, less politicised and more philosophically inclined approach to the problem, first in several articles on the subject and then in his "Fichte, Marx, and the German philosophical tradition" (1980).

While Marianne Weber attempts to detect parallels in Marx and Fichte by analysing and comparing the images of socialism produced by them, Rockmore bases his case on revealing the similarities in the ways Fichte and Marx interpret and use certain significant notions, among which Rockmore chooses to emphasise the notion of activity. This is not an arbitrary choice: the notion of activity is central to both authors. In Marx, man is on a long journey of historical development, eventually leading to self-realisation. This development is characterised by the particular dialectics of potentiality being transformed into action precisely by activity. It wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that activity lies at the core of (at the very least) the philosophy of history. As Marx suggests: "History does nothing [...]..." history" is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims" (Marx and Engels 1975: 93). In Fichte, "Ego," the self, moves first to consciousness, then to self-consciousness, and then proceeds to knowledge, and finally, to moral development. All this is possible because Ego interacts with Non-Ego via activity: "The

essence of the self consists in its activity"[127] (Fichte 1982: 240). In both theories, the Self is an agent not only in that it engenders objects, but also because it is the cause of self-change. Rockmore shows quite conclusively that the notion of activity in Fichte and Marx is similar in many ways: to name one, both indicate that the agent's activity is indeed limited within a social context formed by the agent and the object generated by it.

The significance of activity in Fichte is closely related to his understanding of the development process. His grand project, *Wissenschaftslehre*, "system of philosophy," presented, among other texts in the «Science of knowledge»[128] (1794-1795) was intended to vindicate the idea that it is possible to find the eternal unassailable and invulnerable "first principle," synthetic *a priori* knowledge, from which all other possible knowledge could be derived. If it can indeed be found, it proves that the alternative to the extremes of the explanations and justifications of reason itself, — the very alternative, sought by the German philosophers of that age, — is real. The success of such a project would assert human freedom without sacrificing the possibility of knowledge to pure subjectivism. Another significant outcome would be the proof of philosophy being a practical science, which was an especially important point for Fichte, who later based his philosophy of right, ethics, statecraft and history on the principles of *Wissenschaftslehre*.

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According to Fichte, all human beings are self-conscious as well as having consciousness of the outer world and how we interact with it; there can be no direct explanation of this, it is just how it is. From this Fichte deduces the preceding, not self-conscious state and proceeds to

[127] Also in the Lecture 5 from the "Vocation of a scholar" in which Fichte critically examines Rousseau's doctrine, Fichte claims that "humanity can and ought to approach nearer to [ideal state] only by care, toil, and struggle. Nature is rude and savage without the hand of man: and it should be so, that thereby man may be forced to leave his natural state of inactivity, and elaborate her stores; that thereby he himself, instead of a mere product of Nature, may become a free reasonable being" (Fichte 1847: 69).
[128] Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. I consulted Heath-Lachs translation (Fichte 1982).

the explanation of the conditions necessary for the transition to the self-conscious state. Such conditions, according to Fichte, are acts of mind (since, according to Kant, mind alone can provide such conditions). Philosophy, which has self-conscious being as its primary object, should be able to deduce such acts, necessary for the birth of self-consciousness, which can only emerge from the absolute Ego in its own act of distinguishing Ego (conscious self) from non-Ego (the outside world) or, one may say, by the voluntary *delimitation of the border*. In other words, conscious self, the ultimate "first principle" of *Wissenschaftslehre* only emerges by means of establishing a border. This is a very significant provision; all the more so in that it quite clearly echoes Fichte's political philosophy — and one may say even the practical political philosophy of "The Closed Commercial State".

The Ego lays limits for itself, but since in the previous state of the absolute ego, it was infinite, along with this limitation comes the compelling need to overcome it. The Ego then determines the non-Ego, meaning that Ego acts as an active principle, striving for self-realization and thereby changing the resisting non-Ego. From here, Fichte's system aims to deduce the principles shared by all self-consciousness, and then proceed to theoretical and finally, to practical philosophy. Fichte's emphasis on activity comes from his claim that moral freedom constitutes the very core of human subjectivity. We can transcend the world of causally determined things by knowing them, but most significantly, by *acting* to transform these things into what they ought to be from what they are. For his practical philosophy, however, relation to the non-Ego, which creates the feeling of limitation, is less critical than the relation of Ego to other Egos. Fichte elaborates on this subject in his "Foundations of Natural Right, according to the Principles of the *Wissenschaftslehre*"[129], a comprehensive, detailed account of his political philosophy. This book is of course to some extent conditioned by the French and American Revolutions, which induced numerous attempts to find a solid ground for

[129] The word *Recht* is used in German, which means at the same time "right", "law" and "justice". In what follows it is translated mostly as "Right".

the right, — but also is one of the extensions of Fichte's project into the territory of practical philosophy. The "Closed commercial state" to which we'll proceed shortly, is, in fact, an addendum to, or even a second part of this treatise. And for this the reason it's crucial to sum up the most significant provisions of the "Foundations of Natural Right" first.

The point of departure here is Fichte's unconventional approach to the very problem of where the foundation in question is to be found. In his early works, he followed a principle very common for the philosophy of the epoch, namely attempting to find a ground in the moral law, e.g. in Kant's categorical imperative (though Kant himself made no explicit claims on the subject, at least in any considerable detail). As early as in 1795, Fichte already had significant doubts about the common "moral" approach and eventually concluded that the deduction of the concept of right is the only way to establish human entitlement to the concept, both in the social and the political sense.[130] "Foundations of moral right" presents such a deduction, based on the claim that the existing concept of right is a necessary condition for the very existence of the self-conscious self. The type of resistance, necessary for the self-positing of the Ego,[131] argues Fichte, can only be provided by other rational beings:

> Experience can at most teach us that there are phenomena which appear to be the results of rational causes; but it can never teach us that these causes actually exist as reasonable beings in themselves, for being in itself is no object of experience. We ourselves first introduce such a being into experience; —it is only we ourselves who explain our experience by assuming the existence of rational beings around us. (Fichte 1847: 28)

[130] See Wood (2016) for details.

[131] "Positing" (setzen) is one of the most frequent words in Fichte's works. In German in means simultaneously to "set forth", "put forward" or "establish". Dudly points out that in the context of the philosophy of right it's also important, that he German word for "law" is "das Gesetz", meaning that which has been set forth or established. For details see Dudley (2007: 88-90)

Once the Egos become aware of each other's existence, they start “communicating.” The primary act of such communication is, according to Fichte, a “summons.”[132] “Summons” stands here for a call to free action addressed to someone, who can voluntarily choose to perform such action or not. Though “summons” suggests this action, it also assumes a possibility, that it won't happen and thus doesn't oblige, which would be incompatible with the free will (Wood 2016: 82-83). This summons is a call to the other to limit its sphere of freedom so that it didn’t interfere with the calling Ego’s sphere of freedom. Summonses are the way we become aware of the Other or, in Fichte’s words: “I cannot comprehend the summons to self-activity without ascribing it to an actual being outside myself, a being that willed to communicate to me a concept” (Fichte 2005: 209). Moreover, the next argument in the “Foundations of natural right” is that each rational Ego summons other rational Ego to limit its sphere of freedom by merely recognising every one of these other Egos as a rational agent.

All rational Egos summon all other rational Egos so that everyone could exercise their freedom while allowing others to do the same.[133] This the way the relation of right is born, — and this is how Fichte separates right from morals: it is, once again, deduced from the first principle. It’s a very significant divergence from Kant, who understood the autonomy of the individual agent in terms of whether such agent can be an “uncaused cause.” In Fichte freedom turns out to be interdependent. Even the liberation of rational subjects depends upon establishing relationships with others. This has, in turn, purely political consequences. In Kant, freedom is necessary to explain the human experience of the “moral obligation” — and we ought to use it in order to live in accordance with the requirements of the moral law. In terms of politics, it means that its goal is to advantage such conditions that facilitate living up to the moral law. In Fichte, freedom is not a given quality; it’s a condition, which can be exercised (and

[132] The German word used in the original, "Aufforderung" has a very broad meaning, ranging from "beg" (or "request") to “require" "demand". See Wood (2016) for details.
[133] It means, in Fichte’s own words, that “the human being (like all finite beings in general) becomes a human being only among human beings.” (Fichte 2000)

enjoyed) within the social environment, which meets a known set of requirements. Such a social environment can be consciously and rationally established, but this process has no other aim, except for simply establishing the kind of society where freedom is possible. Building such a society is not pursuing the goal of facilitating moral behaviour.

Also, at this point Fichte argues that success in creating the social environment, which makes freedom possible, is an economic problem at least to the same extent as a political one. Fichte claims that without sufficient resources and abundant opportunities, a person is not really free, and thus, economics is put forward as a central subject within the debate on social justice. Both points — the dependence of each rational agent's freedom on the freedom of all other rational agents and the primacy of economics in creating conditions, facilitating freedom, can be obviously found in Marx (and before him — in Hegel). The latter is clear from the fact that of ten measures, proposed in the "Communist Manifesto" as means of "entirely revolutionising the mode of production" (which, in Marx, means revolutionising the way of living) roughly eight are of a purely economic nature. The former can be illustrated with a quotation from the same text: "In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." (Marx and Engels 1976: 506).

Since Fichte understands right as the relationship between people, real rights exist only within a community. Right, therefore, is not a personal category. Fichte describes such a community, within which people can exercise actual rights as a commonwealth under positive laws. His theory of the state derives from this assumption. The state starts from the civil contract, which consists of the three successive stages. The first stage concerns the *property contract*: each subject of the contract should come to an agreement with all other subjects on their mutual property rights. Significantly, Fichte's understanding of property is quite

unconventional. He understands property not as material possessions, but as a certain activity, allowing someone to live with dignity. That's why the object of the contract is activity:

> At first, a sphere for the exercise of his freedom, and nothing more is allocated to him. This sphere contains certain objects, as determined by the freedom that has been granted to him. Thus his right to have a property in these objects extends as far as the freedom granted to him extends, and no further. He acquires such objects only for a particular use; and it is only from this use, and from what might hinder such use, that he has the right to exclude everyone else. The object of the property contract is a particular activity. (Fichte 2000: 183-84)

In other words, the property contract guarantees the right to work, which allows for a decent life. Paradoxically, that means that protection of property can require redistribution of land or other resources since some people don't have them. Entering the contract requires that all persons tell all other persons how in particular they are going to make living: "Each person must expressly declare his occupation, and thus no one becomes a citizen in general, but each enters into a certain class of citizen at the same time that he enters into the state." (Fichte 2000: 187). Aside from the "promise to do everything he can in order to be able to live based on the freedoms and rights granted to him" (Ibid: 187), people on behalf of each person, promise to give the other even more, — in case he's still not able to live from what he has. The contract includes the obligation to assist others in such cases. The contract also entails another condition: "each individual pledges all of his own property as a guarantee that he will not violate any of the others' property." (Ibid: 170), meaning that any violation of other's property, however small, means that the indemnitee can take everything he can from the aggressor. Fichte claims that citizens cannot and should not just rely on the good will of others (as in case of the "moral law"): bounds of each individual freedom should be protected from coercive or physical force. And this is followed by the second, *protective contract*. In order to enter it, each individual promises others to help them protect the property, to which they are entitled from the third party, in case they, in turn, protect his property if needed. However, such a contract,

Fichte argues, lacks the grounds for enforcement. Since the obligation to protect the other's property is mutual, the person whose property was not violated can always tell the person whose property was violated that he or she is not going to protect the other person, since the other person didn't protect him or her. This, once again, means that citizens have to rely on each other's good will. The only way to manage this situation is, according to Fichte, to establish a permanently working protective force. Entering the contract, every citizen will have to contribute to this force, which means consequently, that he or she already does protect the other, who is also under an obligation to reciprocally protect him or her.

At this point, Fichte posits a question: "But who requires that he make such a contribution? With whom does he actually negotiate about this, and who is the second party in this contract?" (Ibid: 175). The answer (long deductions aside) is both easy and complicated: the state, turns persons, "united in just an abstract concept" (*compositum*) into the whole, united in "actuality (as a *totum*)." The state re-unites what nature had previously separated to create a discrete individual. Thereby the state isn't just some technical device. It's "the natural institution" which provisionally cancels the independence of the individuals "and molds individual groups into a whole until morality re-creates the entire species as one" (Ibid: 176). Then Fichte resorts to *organic* metaphors, particularly to that of a tree, which gets injured as a whole, once one of the branches is injured. The state as a *whole* is, therefore, a side in the protective contract. Accordingly, the third contract is the *unification contract*, which secures the two other contracts and in consequence of which "the individual becomes a part of an organized whole, and thus melts into one with the whole." (Ibid: 177) However, this entails amalgamation rather than dissolution. The person must possess something that the state is able to protect, so the protective body is made only of portions of individual possessions. And once again the separation of law and morals becomes important: "Each wills, and has the right to will, that the other undertake only those actions he would undertake if he had a thoroughly

good will; whether or not such a will is actually present is beside the point. Each has a claim only to the other's legality, but by no means to his morality." (Ibid: 125) Therefore, the existence of a state is justified (at least) by its goal. The last is to make sure that one's actions comply with the law even in cases where he or she lacks the moral motivation.

2. From the Foundations of Natural Right to the Closed Commercial State

Activity is in the very centre of Fichte's understanding of human nature. Self is essentially constituted and defined by activity, which turns out to be "the point of union [...] between the absolute, the practical and the intellectual characters of the self" (Fichte 1982: 244). According to F. K. Forberg, who had been teaching in Jena in late 1790s, his colleague was eager "to employ his philosophy to guide the spirit of his age" (Forberg 1796: 71, quoted after Fichte and Breazeale (1988: 21)). "The Closed Commercial State" (Der geschloßne Handelsstaat)[134] was Fichte's first full-scale attempt at turning general political philosophy into particular policy recommendations. The treatise was written after "The Foundation of Natural Right" (1796-1797) and "The System of Ethics" (1798), soon after Fichte had to leave his professorship at the University of Jena after he was accused of atheism in 1799. This text appears to be an attempt to envision the practical applications of his ideas, — including the theory of the state as well as the concepts of right and property, — in terms of political economy.

"The Closed Commercial State" is often referred to as proto-totalitarian. Kohn argues that the order described by the treatise is essentially the "state-directed socialism" and the text itself qualifies probably for "the most extreme" utopian project of the closed society (Kohn 1949: 331), while Butler almost straightforwardly claims that Fichte is the ancestral theoretician

[134] Full title is "The Closed Commercial State: A Philosophical Sketch as an Appendix to the Doctrine of Right and an Example of a Future Politics" ("Der geschlossene Handelsstaat. Ein philosophischer Entwurf als Anhang zur Rechtslehre und Probe einer künftig zu liefernden Politik"). I've consulted two Russian translations (Fikhte (1883) and (1923)) as well as the recent English translation (Fichte 2012).

of national socialism.[135] Merle argues, contrary to Kohn, that the “Closed Commercial State” is not a utopia, since Fichte doesn't “rely on virtue, but only on the authorization held by the state [...] to exert coercion for implementing the legal duties correlative for legal rights”. Another reason for which Merle denies the utopian nature of “The Closed Commercial State” is that it doesn’t end in “stable great happiness”, but merely in “making possible the ethical progress of humankind.” (Merle 2016: 199). Fichte’s text, however, meets the criteria of utopia we use in this research: it turns out to be the complex vision of the desirable future condition, which is vastly different from the present one; it makes clear the author’s intention to implement the presented vision and finally, in this text Fichte deals, albeit in a peculiar way, with the primary antinomy of the personal and the communal.

The text tends to provoke very different, sometimes contradictory evaluations and readings, — Russian and Soviet interpretations of Fichte being no exception. Ideological judgments aside, it's essential to detach Fichte's own intentions from the later, mostly 20th-century readings of this text, which have largely defined its perception up to this day. Quite justifiable in this regards, seems to be the historicizing account of Isaac Nakhimovsky who argues that the "Closed Commercial State" was a "part of Fichte’s attempt to reformulate Rousseau’s theory of popular sovereignty and constitutional government in order to accommodate the changing nature of economic activity in a “commercial society,” or an increasingly post-agrarian society marked by an extensive and expanding division of labor" and "also a response to a problem that had preoccupied both Rousseau and Kant: how to neutralize an unstable system of international relations whose escalating violence threatened to undermine the logic of the social contract and make it impossible to create and maintain a

[135] In "Der geschlossene Handelsstaat" [...] Fichte argued in favour of total national autarky, a planned economy, quota systems, concealed inflation, a blocked currency, state barter agreements, artificial production of substitute materials, intensive armament, living-space, forcible unresisted occupation of territory, complete economic co-ordination of such territory, transfer of populations, and cultivated nationalism. The words are different [...], the ideas are the same. This embryonic German socialism is national-socialism. (Butler 1941: 43-44)

government of laws" (Nakhimovsky 2011: 2). This leads us to another significant point: Fichte's treatise is, among other things, a comprehensive polemical response to Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay “Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project” (Kant 1996). In fact, Fichte wrote a review of Kant’s essay as early as in 1795 (Breazeale 2001). In this review he paid due respect to Kant, whom he never ceased to praise, but at the same time expressed his dissent and sketched the concept of right and theory of the state, a detailed account of which he has been working on for the two successive years to produce the “Foundation of Natural Right”[136].

The “Closed Commercial State” consists of three books, “Philosophy — what is Right with respect to commerce in the rational state”, describing Fichte’s “rational state”; “History of the present time — the condition of commerce in the actual states of the present”, being a survey of international politics and commerce at the time; and finally “Politics — how the commerce of existing state can be brought into the arrangement required by reason; or, on the closure of the commercial state”, — a political program, suggesting concrete measures of implementation. These three books are preceded by a “Preliminary clarification of the title”, “Dedication”, “Dedicatory remarks” and a rather lengthy introduction. The work is dedicated to the “Royal Prussian Acting Privy‐Minister of State and Knight of the Order of the Red Eagle Herr von Struensee.”[137] This dedication is itself unusual. First, Fichte was known as a Jacobin and, some might say, as a stubborn person. None of his other works have any dedications at all. Moreover, in the “Dedicatory remarks” instead of just expressing respect and gratitude to the patron, he asserts also, that the “closed commercial state” is not merely a vision like other

[136] On details of how Fichte and other German public intellectuals reacted to Kant’s essay, see Pizer (2007).

[137] Karl August von Struensee (1735–1804) was a Prussian politician and scholar in the fields of philosophy, mathematics, and theology. He began his political career in Denmark, as a personal physician to King Christian VII and quickly became one of his most trusted advisors. He had a good command of financial policy and was praised for bringing the state budget into balance. As a result of political troubles in Denmark, Struensee moved to Prussia, where he started writing essays in economics and state finance. His career advanced fast. In five years he was holding two powerful positions in the Government. In 1791, Frederick William II appointed him Minister of Excises, Customs, Commercial and Industrial Affairs. Struensee was what we would now call a technocrat: he advocated protectionism, for example, but supported free trade in precious metals; was very suspicious about innovations in economic policy, but sometimes intervened in the economy for the benefit of the deprived social groups. Later he was appointed as Geheimer Staatsminister (Secret minister of State) (Petersdorff 1893).

“Platonic republics”, but a project, seeking its way into practice. In other words, Fichte prescribes to his addressee the way to read the text, thus making a principal point: unlike his other works, the “Closed Commercial State” is a political rather than philosophical text, presuming, — long before Marx — that while “the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” (Marx 1975: 5). He also admits that even weak European states benefited from the colonial system, which makes the chances of seeing his project implemented quite slim. He claims at some point that while his “sketch might [...] remain a mere school-exercise, without consequence in the real world”, he would be, nevertheless, satisfied “if, by making it known to others, he should do nothing more than induce them to reflect more deeply about these matters.” (Fichte 2012: 86). “Preliminary clarification of the title” reads as follows:

> A closed multitude of men, standing under the same laws and the same supreme power of coercion, forms the juridical state. This multitude of men should now be restricted to reciprocal trade and industry with and for one another, and everyone who does not stand under the same legislation and power of coercion should be excluded from participating in this commerce. The multitude would then form a commercial state, and indeed a closed commercial state, just as it now forms a closed juridical state. (Fichte 2012: 79)

Here Fichte makes it quite clear that he sees existing states as transitional forms, which will eventually become “rational states.” For now, the state is closed in terms of (using contemporary language) jurisdiction. It also has to be closed economically. Later he repeats this argument, claiming that people already live in states, which were not organized rationally, but emerged “through chance or providence” (Ibid: 87) and can, therefore “represent the actual state as in the process of gradually instituting the rational state” (Ibid). Then he continues with one of his many arguments against the ideas commonly associated with Adam Smith’s “The Wealth of Nations”, which was published 24 years earlier. The functions of the state, in Fichte's opinion, are not limited to the preservation of rights and property of its citizens. Instead, it has

to "to inquire into the rightful basis of acquisition" (Ibid: 91). Moreover, "it is the vocation of the state to first give each what is his, to first put each in possession of his property, and only then to protect him in this" (Ibid). Fichte's state, therefore, starts with "material property" redistribution, based on his own concept of property as an activity rather than possession of things. This redistribution appears to be, once again in contemporary terms, a clear case of distributive justice: "it is the vocation of the state to give each what is his" (Ibid: 94).

Fichte holds that the two basic kinds of labor are "extracting the products of nature, and then further laboring on these with a view to the final purpose that one posits for oneself with them" (Ibid: 95). The main contract between these two estates[138] is that those who "extract products of nature" (producers)[139] don't "labor on these" after extracting, and vice versa: those, who work on the products of nature (artisans)[140] don't extract raw materials, — the latter also includes agriculture. Since in this case, producers are in a dominant position (they can at least survive on what they extract from nature, while artisans need their products to work and live), this negative contract has to be enhanced with a positive one. According to the latter, producers are under obligation to extract from nature the amount of goods which is enough not only for them to eat but also to provide raw materials to the artisans. They are also under obligation to sell these raw materials to the artisans so that the artisans could enjoy the same standard of living as the producers. Artisans are under obligation to provide their goods to the producers in habitual quantities. The two estates not only *can* exchange the products of their labor but, in fact, *must* do it. Consequently, there exists a third estate, that of the merchants, who carry out the exchange so that the other two estates have enough time to work. They also enter into the twofold contract with the third estate: the negative part of this means that producers and artisans don't exchange products by themselves; the positive part

[138] "Сословие" in Russian translation.
[139] der Stand der Producenten
[140] der Künstler

means that they are under obligation to provide surplus from their goods to the merchants at fixed prices, calculated in such a way that merchants can live from what they do, enjoying the same standards of living as the other two estates.

Students and military and government officials don't constitute a particular estate since they only exist for the three main estates and are considered to belong to one of those. Inside the estates, the civil contract is the same as between them and is based on the rigid division of labor: those who grow vegetables can't grow fruits, etc. Merchants also have guilds, dealing in different goods. What should the state do to enforce these contracts? First of all, it has to make the producers produce more goods than they need for themselves. The quantity of artisans is regulated according to the level of production. In other words, the state can only have as many artisans (and students and military, government officials), as producers can feed. That entails strict quantitative regulation of the labour force belonging to the particular estate — and higher-priority allocation of people to the economic sectors producing vitally important goods. Therefore, "luxury" products may only be produced after basic needs are catered for on a nation-wide scale. The state has to regulate "the number of those who devote themselves to each particular branch of art, always first taking care of bare necessities. Let all be sated and dwell securely before someone decorates his dwelling." (Ibid: 99) A person who intends to engage with a particular kind of labour has to inform the state. If the quota for this kind of labour is not exceeded, the state grants permission. Otherwise, this person has to choose from the activities suffering from labour shortage. The State also carries out performance reviews and forbids those who produce, let's say, furniture of less than average quality, from producing it until they can do better. Limitations are also imposed on merchants: they are under obligation to buy goods from anyone offering them and sell those to anyone in need, — provided the merchant has those goods in possession. In Fichte's opinion, this will allow for stable prices, since merchants won't seek to sell goods where they are needed more. Citizens

themselves ensure that merchants are always under control: every time, when one of the merchants refuses to buy or sell what he has, a citizen files a complaint. Surveillance is outsourced to the population.

Fichte then proceeds to his monetary theory. Long before Marx (though after Adam Smith), he claims that price is determined by time needed to produce particular goods. In the rational state, the value of some object is equal to the value of grain which can be produced within the same time limits. Grain was chosen as the most basic product, necessary for life. Consequently, any new industry aiming to provide anything but basic products should be limited by the state: redistribution of resources between economic sectors in the economy with stable labor force is a zero-sum game. Moreover, time, necessary for the production of some fixed measure of grain provides a solid base for calculating the value of any labor within the closed state. Fixed prices are, therefore, not only rational and desirable but also possible to calculate. These prices are fixed by the law and the state has to punish those who break it. As a number of people work in education, management and defense (Fichte calls all of those "public officials") and neither produce/manufacture goods, nor trade in them, there is a tax system ensuring that they could enjoy the same living standards as everyone else. A sufficient number of public officials and, consequently, the level of taxation is calculated by the state, or, in other words, by these very officials[141] (Fichte 2012: 113-14). The state provides for a sufficient number of public officials, who then calculate the correct level of taxation.

The state also has to accumulate grain stocks to level down fruitful and harvestless years. Generally, in agriculture, Fichte proposes a system characterized by constant efforts to level living standards and, accordingly, by frequent or even regular redistribution of land, which belongs to the commune. Whereas peasants are obliged to sell their surplus of agricultural goods to the merchants, a surplus of land (which emerges, say, in cases of too high productivity

[141] This is one of the cases when Fichte, contrary to the above cited Merle's claim, indeed relies on virtue and straightforwardly so.

of labour) stays within the commune until circumstances change. Marianne Weber specifically points out the similarity this model bears with traditional Russian practices of communal land ownership: "Fichte demands — practically speaking — land use scheme similar to what is observed in the practice of the co-operative villages of the past, with allocation of the land to the individuals as equally as possible, with the common right of all village comrades to use forests and pastures for free, and with compulsive periodic redistribution — just like the scheme used by Russian Mir." (Weber 1925: 44).

Then Fichte proceeds to the key problem of the rational state's economy, namely money. Money should exist because it's inconvenient to measure other goods in grain. However, what he has in mind is not conventional money, used within the market economy, value of which "against goods is variable and subject to a high degree of fluctuation". The value of such money cannot be fixed either by law or by force: "those who possess money will hide their money and those with goods will hide their goods, destroying the trade between them. The former are entirely beyond the reach of the power [of the state], whereas the latter can only be influenced by odious and costly means." (Fichte 2012: 121). The key to the successful monetary system is the closure of the state, since "a closed commercial state, whose citizen engages in no direct commerce with the foreigner, can *make absolutely whatever it wants into money*. All it has to do is declare that it will let itself be paid with this money alone and absolutely none other" (Ibid: 122, italics in the original). Since the state receives much more money in payments from its citizens than any enterprise or individual, the money favored by the State will come in use very quickly. "In this way," — Fichte writes, "a national currency[142] comes into existence." (Ibid)

This is the pivotal moment in Fichte's argument, since his whole proposed political model depends on the introduction of the *Landesgeld,* the currency which has no validity

[142] "Туземные деньги" in 1923 Russian translation (Fikhte 1923: 73); "деньги данной страны" in 1883 (Fikhte 1883: 73)

outside the rational state, or is, in contemporary terms, inconvertible, supplemented by the abolition of all convertible or international currencies, gold and silver in the first instance. “Money, in and for itself, is nothing at all,” – Fichte argues. — “Only through the will of the state does it represent something. […] How rich someone is, depends not on how many pieces of money he has, but how great a part of all circulating money he possesses.” (Ibid: 123) This means that it would be sufficient to calculate the ideal ratio of the monetary aggregates to the amount of the goods produced. Once this is known, the state prints more money according to the increase in the amount and quality of goods.

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The second book, “History of the present time—the condition of commerce in the actual states of the present” provides us with Fichte’s account of the current politics as well as history. There are at least two significant concepts, which can be traced throughout the whole book. The first one is the concept of *Handelsanarchie*, the “commercial anarchy”. In Fichte’s understanding, contemporary Europe is akin to a global state, a single nation. In the ancient world tribes were separated from one another and for them “the foreigner was an enemy or a barbarian” (Ibid: 139). Christianity has consolidated this world, which lived originally “in the state of nature”. Later, when Roman law and the Roman concept of Emperor were introduced to the society of feudal times, the slow development of institutions and political thinking began, which eventually turned the “relation of serfs and vassals to their lords” that could not bind people into a nation, into the “relation of subjects to their authority and judge” (Ibid: 140). Fichte connects the first demerger of different tribes from the state of nature with the

emergence of a “monarchy in the old style”[143] in France. The Reformation destroyed religion, which united the Western European community and thus rang down the curtain for the old order of things. Therefore, present states were not conceived properly, “through the collection and unification of unattached individuals under the unity of the law —but rather through separating and dividing into pieces a large, unitary, though only weakly bound, mass of men. The individual states of Europe are just such pieces torn away from a former whole, with the extension of their boundaries for the most part determined by chance.” (Ibid)

The most important institution, inherited from the old times is an international free trade with silver and gold money as a means of exchange, having roughly the same value in different parts of this “great commercial state”. In Fichte's opinion, free trade was natural for unified Christian Europe but much less so for divided Europe of the late 18th century. In the world of separate states and their colonies, the global market should be ditched in favor of closed commercial states. In Fichte’s opinion, states of his time have adopted “proper” political concepts and closed themselves off juridically as a result. Nevertheless, the work was not finished, since the proper rational state demands not only juridical but, first and foremost, economic closure. For Fichte, rights are primarily of economic nature, but modern states “failed to see that the profounder duty of the state is to put each in possession of what is his due. Yet the latter is only possible by eliminating the anarchy of trade, just as one gradually is eliminating political anarchy.” (Ibid: 141) The second book provides the account of such a one-sided state’s eventual self-destruction. Fichte considers free trade *as such* generally a good thing, since it’s intended for a larger distribution of various goods and could facilitate the maximization of the common good. What stands in the way of such maximization is money. Fichte recognises silver and gold as the commodities having two kinds of value — intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic value in Fichte is defined by real life and originates from the estimate of the

[143] Fichte doesn’t provide any details, but arguably the monarchy in question is the one which emerged in the 14th century, during the Renaissance era

amount of “pleasure”, for which given commodity can be exchanged. Extrinsic value of money is defined by the fact that aside of being a commodity, money is also “an abstract sign for value”. Thus, its total worth (intrinsic plus extrinsic values) is misleading, since the extrinsic part is based solely on opinion, that is, on one’s belief that others also take silver and gold as signs of value. Fichte holds that these “opinions” are conditioned only by their interrelations (what matters is not one’s opinion of money’s value, but our opinion of other people's opinions of such value and so on). Thus the system of infinite reflections emerges, which is essentially unsubstantiated and disconnected from life. Opinion of the value of any traditional commodity, having the intrinsic value only, Fichte sees, quite the opposite, as connected to real life, meaning our expectations regarding possible pleasure this commodity can be exchanged for.

Even more importantly, the unsubstantiated opinion of the value of money, intersubjective and infinitely multiplying, has also a temporal dimension: it extrapolates itself into the future. We believe that others not only have the same opinion of the value of silver and gold in the present but also that this situation is persistent, that it won’t change in the future. This has two very significant implications. First, money allows for accumulation. Regular commodities are, in one way or another, of limited durability, meaning that pleasure is produced in the act of using them. Money, with its value projected into the future, gives one hope that its accumulation will bring infinitely growing control over the goods and services of others. Within the zero sum game model, this amounts to the emergence and amplification of inequality and, eventually, to the never-ending *bellum omnium contra omnes*.

The second implication of the «money temporality”, emerging from the speculative nature of extrinsic value, is its a-historical nature. The historical or “political” future in Fichte holds out the promise of self-realisation through activity for individual human beings and the promise of passage into the “purely moral existence” for humanity as a whole. It is the state that secures this kind of future by relatively equal distribution of common good, produced by

individual activities. Money, on the contrary, holds no promise of a common future, but enables enduring struggle for the individual to better their lot via constant accumulation at the expense of everybody else. Thus the individual is deprived of the “pleasant life” of self-realisation. Moreover, extension of the future promise of money beyond the limits of individual life is problematic, so not only an individual loses his or her opportunities of living a meaningful life, but politics and history also drop out from the teleological process of fulfillment. Money creates temporality within which expectations of the future enable and demand constant self-serving accumulation, leading, in turn, to the “commercial anarchy”, which destroys the balance of supply and demand, thus making citizens unequal. It also causes cruel colonial exploitation and wars, since in the circumstances of a zero-sum game, nobody can be guaranteed decent life: since sometimes life and death are at stakes, violent methods are justified.[144]

The second book of the “Closed Commercial State” gives the strong impression that Fichte is arguing with Adam Smith’s “The Wealth of Nations”. Smith claims free trade to be “more advantageous to the great body of the people, though less so to the merchants than the monopoly.” (Smith 2007: 398). Moreover, he also claims that self-interest is enough to bring prosperity not only to the person, who pursues it, but to the whole society. Fichte’s understanding of freedom is not just incompatible with Smith’s “system of Natural Liberty”, according to which members of the society create common good by pursuing their private interests, — but is in direct contradiction with Smith’s views.

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While the first book of the “Closed Commercial State” addresses the theory behind Fichte's vision of the rational state, the second diagnoses the current state of affairs as

[144] See more detailed account of Fichte’s philosophy of money in Adler (2012)

unbearable and speculates on the historical reasons of present condition, the third book suggests political measures necessary for gradual implementation of the closed state project. The process starts from “the proper point of transition” from any kind of existing political/economic system, when the state closes “itself off entirely to all foreign trade, forming […] an isolated commercial body, just as it had already previously formed an isolated juridical and political body” (Fichte 2012: 163). First Fichte claims that “everything else will follow quite easily” (ibid) and is related to the domain of law and the doctrine of right, rather than to politics. However, the whole third book describes measures which, not being political as such, at the very least entail political ramifications. First of all, citizens of the new state didn’t appear out of nowhere but belonged, before its closure, to the global state. They became accustomed to a certain way of life, including consumption of the products which are very likely to be unavailable in the new state. The last has to make an effort to substitute foreign goods with domestic ones. In cases when it’s definitely impossible, it forewarns the citizens about the planned disappearance of certain goods and eliminates those gradually. “We can quite well suppose, — Fichte writes, — that it would be hard for someone to suddenly do without Chinese tea, or have no fur coat in the winter and no light dress in the summer. Yet it is hardly clear why the coat must be of sable or the dress of silk when the country produces neither sable nor silk. And it is even less clear why it would be so terrible if one day our clothing suddenly lacked all that embroidery through which it is made neither warmer nor more durable” (Ibid: 166). So, the citizens of the closed state will be deprived of luxury (silk, sable furs, embroidery).

However, in the next paragraph Fichte claims, that citizens will be “appropriating vigorously, so far as [they] are able, our share of all that is good and beautiful upon the entire face of the earth. This share is due us, since our nation, through its work and its artistic sense, has without doubt also contributed for centuries to this common possession of humanity” (Ibid: 167). This claim, a bit ambiguous in this context, is clarified in the next part: “certain parts of

the earth's surface, together with their inhabitants, have been visibly determined by nature to form political wholes" or, in other words, "natural boundaries" exist. The present boundaries are arbitrary, irrational and determined by chance (and this is one of the reasons for endless wars). Governments, according to Fichte, often talk of "arrondissement"[145] precisely because their borders are not what they should be. It's rational that to end all wars, "the reason for war must be eliminated. Each state must obtain what it aims to obtain through war, and which, reasonably, is the only thing it can aim at: its natural borders." (Ibid: 170) It's particularly important for Fichte's rational state: "A state that is about to close itself off as a commercial state must first assume its natural borders, advancing toward or restricting itself to these as the case may be" (Ibid) Here for the first time another condition emerges, which is, together with full monetary control, essential for the success Fichte's project. The state should be in possession (although probably not at the very beginning) of the "complete and closed system of the necessary production" (Ibid). Immediately after assuming its natural borders, the state should make an oath that it has entered (and concluded) a war for the last time, since it closes itself and won't need anything from beyond its new borders, because "its entire constitution only takes account of its given circumference" (Ibid: 171).

In the next part, Fichte once again returns to the monetary policy and describes in detail the unavoidable process of withdrawing metal money and the introduction of what he calls *Landsgeld*, and what is nowadays usually termed fiat money.[146] First the state should announce

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[145] Originally "sich zu arrondieren". This expression is derived from the French "arrondir" and means the process of "rounding out" a territory by merging together different pieces of land (Ibid: 214). Russian translations resort to the literal meaning and use "округление" both in Fikhte (1883: 124) and Fikhte (1923: 136).

[146] Fiat money is issued by a government fiat (law), and is, at the same time, "neither a commercial commodity, a consumer, or a producer good, nor title to any such commodity." (Hoppe 1994: 49). Such money "can neither be employed for any industrial purpose nor convey a claim against anybody" (Mises 1998: 426). The last clause distinguishes fiat money from fiduciary money, whose value depends on shared confidence in its acceptability as a medium of exchange (as with a banking bill or, more recently, Bitcoin). Fichte's *Landesgeld* is fiat money in a strict sense, because ultimately it is not redeemable. Since "only through the will of the state" does money "represent something", goods produced by the Fichtean economy do not actually back up its money. What really matters is not the volume of production as such, but production statistics, providing government with an idea, even if rough, of how much cash the economy demands in a given moment.

that all tax payments are accepted in new money only, and then start, within specially erected facilities, to change silver and gold into national currency, "first at equal value, and [...] after some time, at a loss in its value in gold and silver." (Ibid: 174) In due course the whole mass of metal money will accumulate in the hands of the state. After that a detailed discussion of the national currency follows: it should be made of a material absolutely unfamiliar to the citizens and should be beautiful in order to "commend itself to the imagination even more than the old" (Ibid: 175). Counterfeiting should be impossible, since monetary monopoly is the foundation of the new state. Once the exchange is over, the government should make another oath, this time to the citizens, namely not to change the value of money, keeping a balance between the quantity of goods and, once again using a contemporary term, monetary stock. Since governments only very rarely (if ever) deliberately pursue deflation, it's safe to say, that Fichte demands that the state promises not to produce unsupported money, because such actions inevitably lead to the "outrage against a thoroughly unjust government." (Ibid: 176). Significantly, despite writing a manual for the government, Fichte refuses to reveal the sequence of the steps leading to the desired status of national currency as the only legal tender. The reason for that is simple: "there is no need to seek council with the public and inform them in advance before carrying these things out, since doing so would only arouse doubt, questions, and mistrust […]. The actual introduction of the new money must happen all in one stroke." (Ibid)

The same part of the third book features also a remarkable paragraph, which in Russian translation sounds somewhat different from the original. Reminding the reader of the proposed measures' final purpose, Fichte claims once again that "what is demanded is the complete elimination of all direct commerce between the citizen and any foreigner. [...] One can only say that something has been eliminated completely when it has been rendered impossible. The direct commerce between the citizen and any foreigner must be rendered completely

impossible.” (Ibid: 173). Neither Russian translations — the one of 1883 (translator unknown), and the one of 1923 (translator Éduard Éssen[147]), unlike English the translation, mention commerce, using instead two different forms of “interaction”,[148] a term with considerably broad range of meanings, covering not only commercial contacts, but rather all contacts in general. The word “Verkehr”, used in the original[149] allows for either translation (though Fichte more likely had “commerce” in mind), but the word choice of the Russian translators is quite remarkable. In the next section, Fichte discusses the bi-currency system and comes to the conclusion that it is intrinsically unstable and better be avoided. While money should be the “immediate sign of goods” (Ibid: 181), in the case of a bi-currency system, only cash (metal money) meet this requirement. National currency, in this case, is merely a sign of real money (what would be now termed “redeemable representative money”). In the rational state, though, money “stands in a direct relation to goods, and will be realized only in these. It is, it follows, the true, immediate, and only money” (Ibid).

From here Fichte proceeds to further measures necessary to achieve the desired closure. After the state (in one stroke) introduces the *Landesgeld* and accumulates all metal money available, it has to “purchase all the foreign goods available in the country, employing

[147] Éduard Éssen was of noble birth, but broke away from his family at the age of 14 and found a job as a railway worker, joined the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party at the age of 19, as soon as the party itself was formally established in 1898. He graduated the Saint-Petersburg University (Faculty of Law). In 1905 he was a member of the Saint-Petersburg Party committee. During the war he spread party propaganda among the soldiers at the Northern front. In 1917 he was a member of one of district party committees in Petrograd. He then worked as a deputy of the Peoples Comissar of State Control. After the end of the civil war Éssen taught in various military educational institutions. In 1923-1924 he worked as a president of The National Economy Institute, then returned to teaching. Éssen retired in 1929 and in 1931 died of tuberculosis, from which he suffered since prerevolutionary times. See Bol'shaya sovetskaya éntsiklopediya (1978) and Klushin (1971).

[148] Всякое непосредственное сношеніе гражданъ сь иностранцами должно быть прекращено — вотъ въ чемъ состоитъ требованіе. Окончательно-же устранено можетъ быть только то, что сдѣлано невозможнымъ. Непосредственныя сношенія гражданъ съ иностранцами должны быть сдѣланы невозможными. Fikhte (1883: 127). Всякое непосредственное общение гражданина со всяким иностранцем должно быть совершенно уничтожено. Таково требование. Безусловно уничтожено только то, что сделано невозможным. Непосредственное сношение гражданина с любым иностранцем должно быть сделано невозможным. Fikhte (1923: 141)

[149] Aller unmittelbare Verkehr des Bürgers mit irgend einem Ausländer soll durchaus aufgehoben werden: dies ist die Forderung. Durchaus aufgehoben ist nur dasjenige, was unmöglich gemacht worden ist. Der unmittelbare Verkehr des Bürgers mit irgend einem Ausländer müsste unmöglich gemacht werden. Fichte (1885: 96-97)

officials who have been commanded to do this through sealed orders that are all to be opened on the same set day throughout the entire country" (ibid: 184). This should be done in order to get as precise information as possible on the stock of the imported goods in the country, which, together with the information about the demand for particular items, would allow for the establishment of fixed prices. The goods themselves, however, "will remain where they are and will be sold through the same people who would have sold them before. Only, from now on, they will no longer be sold on the account of the one who possessed them previously, but instead on the account of the government" (Ibid). Merchants should neither suffer losses, in which case government compensates them, nor gain profits which would be collected by the governments if gained. Both compensations of the deficiencies and collection of surpluses should be paid or collected in national currency only. The correctness of the information on imported goods stock is of such importance that soundness of the declarations should be enforced at any costs, including inspections[150] ("the very last that will be necessary from now on," —insists Fichte) and the "threats of heavy punishment for incorrect declarations." (Ibid)

Reciprocal claims of the citizens and foreigners should be declared by both so that state could arrange the deals as it finds fit (in case foreigner disagrees, he loses the right to make any claims at all). Then the necessary items of import have to be found out and the volume of trade in such items should be established. Since that time the state alone conducts any foreign trade operations. It can use those merchants who have good connections abroad and, therefore, have expertise in the best possible counter-agents, but nevertheless, their orders from outside are conditioned by the governmental approval, "perhaps through a special trade commission established for this purpose" (Ibid: 185). Significantly, domestic prices don't depend on what the government pays to the foreigners since such prices are determined by the balance of

[150] Pre-revolutionary Russian translation uses the term "ревизия", which is close to "inspection" Fikhte (1883: 140), while in 1923 Éssen's word of choice is "обыск", "search" Fikhte (1923: 155). Original German "Visitation", once again, allows for both translations.

goods and monetary stock only. The government has to keep "a view to its higher purposes, periodically raising the prices of those goods that in the future will disappear, while selling well below the external market price other goods, which "the subjects could be tempted to obtain through smuggling directly with neighboring lands" (Ibid: 186). This point seems to be relatively insignificant against the background of the full-scale revolution, including expropriation of property, and "heavy punishments" for secretion of goods, let alone searches and seizures, which Fichte describes in distanced language and academic manner. However, in contemporary terminology, separation of domestic prices from what government "pays to the foreigners" is effectively separation of the purchasing power of money from its exchange rate. Should the government internal prices be in any way connected to the global market, exchange rate and, subsequently, the external "commercial anarchy" would affect the closed state economy. But the real operational value of total monetary system cut-off, exercising zero-tolerance policy to any external influence, however indirect, is that the government thus secures unlimited control over citizens' consumption.

Exports, according to Fichte, should be organized in a way similar to import: the foreign merchant is allowed to deal with his familiar counter-agents inside the closed state, but he has to send his proposal to the same trade commission with a "bill of exchange for the payment in world currency". Once the deal is approved, the order proceeds to the domestic trade house, which gets its payment from the government in *Landesgeld*, once the goods are delivered to the port. The size of this payment is, once again in no way dependent on the external prices, but is determined solely by the law of the land. The volume of imports decreases year by year, "since, indeed, the domestic production and manufacture, being conducted according to a plan and through calculation […], will continually increase, [and] foreign goods will be replaced by domestic." (Ibid: 186-87). Exports should also decrease, though due to other reasons, of which one of the most important is that government doesn't aim to gain the upper hand in trade with

other countries (which, in Fichte's opinion, would be very dangerous), but aims rather, "to make the nation entirely independent and self‑sufficient" (Ibid: 187).

The next part discusses the ways to substitute imports. In the case of industry, the government should start producing certain goods inside the country, which requires an invitation of skilled foreigners so that they could teach the citizens of the closed state. In the case of agriculture, Fichte suggests that scientific methods allow for growing surrogates of almost anything that was previously imported from the lands with a different climate. Then he proceeds to the indispensable measures in relation to the "natural boundaries". Fichte expresses hope that since the government of the closed state is very rich and can afford any ammunition and any quantity of foreign mercenaries, there will be no need for a full-scale war: nobody is able to say no to such a rich and heavily armed government anyway. So, he writes, "it could attain its intention without bloodshed, and nearly without striking a blow — its operation being more of a march of occupation than a war." (Ibid: 188). The same monetary (and political) regime that is already in place elsewhere within the rational state's old borders should be introduced to the new territories immediately. These innovations will bring the same improvements in industry and agriculture, which have already prevailed in the mother country. Improvements will, in turn, make the new citizens supportive of the government, which has just occupied them. It's at this point, that government of the rational state should swear an oath of non-aggression "to assure that, from this point hence, it will no longer participate in the political affairs of foreign countries, will not enter into any alliance, will not serve as a go-between, and will not overstep its present boundaries under any pretext whatsoever." (Ibid: 189)

Concluding this section, Fichte suggests also that it could prove useful to attract some part of the new citizens to leave their home provinces for the inland regions, while sending part of the regions' inhabitants to the new provinces, "thus amalgamating the old and new citizens,"

— though not for political reasons, but for mutually fruitful exchange of skills: “may these new subjects bring into the motherland those aspects of their methods of agriculture and art that are first-rate, while the old residents of the motherland convey to the provinces what they understand better!” (Ibid: 189) Finally, Fichte suggests a ban on foreign travel except for artists and academics, since, for these two categories, travelling is essential for their activity. At the same time, he claims that the state-funded Academies should introduce “the treasures of foreign literature into the country, with the treasures of domestic literature offered in exchange” (Ibid: 199), thus leaving the possibility of cultural exchange (though state-controlled) open.

3. From the Perpetual Peace to the Perpetuating State

The “Closed Commercial State” was intended to perform more than one task at once. First, the treatise had to give an example of *Wissenschaftslehre's* potential capacity of dealing with the real-world political problems. Fichte, for whom praxis was extremely important, assigned high priority to the mission of popularization of his works (it suffices to say that he wrote two introductions to *Wissenschaftslehre* in order to make it as clear for the public as possible — first in 1794 (Fichte 1982: 3-28) and second in 1797 (Ibid: 29-88) and generally, throughout his whole life, took considerable effort in order to make his philosophy intelligible and, even more importantly, available for immediate use. However, in relation to practice, the “Closed Commercial State” occupies an ambiguous position. On the one hand, it presents a clearly utopian vision. As Marianne Weber points out, the very fact that Fichte’s economic doctrine is presented in the form of a depiction, of an ideal polity reminds us of Plato’s “Republic”, More’s “Utopia” and Campanella’s “City of the Sun” (Weber 1925: 16) and speaks for the utopian nature of the project. On the other hand, the third chapter implies that the “Closed Commercial State” is not just the vision of the ideal society: unlike its predecessors, it

includes a rather detailed manual for putting Fichte's vision into effect. Moreover, in the 1800 letter to his publisher, Fichte is quite straightforward in relation to his hopes for practical applications of the "closed commercial state". He describes his new book as follows:

> The material is of contemporary interest especially for the Prussian state (as well as other countries, e.g. Bavaria). Prussia has long been seeking the right system of trade limits and is yet again deliberating over the introduction of paper money — all matters which I flatter myself to have clarified. It was actually the debates which I often encountered here in Berlin over such matters that provoked me into writing down my ideas on this subject. (Quoted after Nakhimovsky (2011: 104))

However, in the "Dedicatory remarks" Fichte clearly aims to blur the distinction between "Platonian republics" (*sic*) with their "utopian constitutions" (Fichte 2012: 83) and his own treatise. He claims that conventional utopias are incapable of being immediately implemented because they work on a purely theoretical level and that to become applicable to reality they just need "further determination". Such a view suggests certain continuity between the political program as such and pure utopianism. He himself, in other words, offers Struensee neither more nor less than the "more determined" utopian vision, a further determination of which is the task of politics. Politics, being, in Fichte's view, certainly a science but "not, however, itself praxis" (Ibid: 84), also doesn't have the particular existing state as its point of departure, since if it did, it wouldn't be a universal, but particular politics. Fichte chooses the universal politics as lying between the extremities of purely utopian and purely particularist thinking. However, his vision of the future implies the whole world as a set of the closed states. The vision of the "Closed Commercial State" as a manual of sorts, applicable — eventually — to all states, makes Fichte's program no less utopian — and universalist, — than the programs, describing a Marxian stateless global communist society or Kantian peaceful cosmopolitan community of nations. The fact that Fichte goes to great lengths towards "further determination" doesn't, in fact, make the "Closed Commercial State" a matter of politics. The royal, if not the only road into politics is praxis.

Second, Fichte's system of political economy, which he develops in the treatise, was conceived as an alternative to the predominant (though not necessarily in Germany) views of the epoch, namely the concept of free trade as such and the complex of ideas most clearly presented in Adam Smith’s “The Wealth of Nations”, published in 1776. Fichte's unbending stance against the free foreign and domestic trade combined with the negation of “convertible” currencies on the one hand and, equally assertive posture in favour of autarchy, regulated division of labor and statism on the other, make it viable to suggest that the “Closed Commercial State” is openly directed against the “Wealth of Nations”. Indeed, nothing can be more alien to Fichte than Smith’s understanding of self- interest as a necessary and powerful force of common interests and wealth advancement, thanks to which

> The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty [...] for the proper performance of which, no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interests of the society. (Smith 2007: 444)

In the second book of the “Closed Commercial State” Fichte directly contradicts laissez-faire doctrine, demanding that the government perform these exact duties — of superintending the economic life of private people and providing them with directions in regards to their employment in order to maximize the common good. However, there’s no evidence that Fichte read the “Wealth of Nations” before publishing the “Closed Commercial State”. It is in fact quite doubtful: the influence of Smith’s book in the German-speaking world was very limited at the time and a readable translation of the “Wealth of Nations” was only published in 1794-1796.[151] In all likelihood, Fichte is addressing not the “Wealth of Nations” itself, but laissez-faire principles more generally. The last have only found their most influential

[151] The first German translation of the “Wealth of Nations” was made in late 1770s by J.F. Schiller (being, according to some sources, the poet Friedrich Schiller’ cousin) and the second — by Christian Garve (the one published in 1794-1796). Schiller’s translation had numerous mistakes and stylistically was also considered unsatisfactory, so it was as late as the mid-1790s that Smith was read by a considerable number of German academics. See Oz-Salzberger (2016) for details.

expression in Smith's treatise, but originate from the works of French physiocrats, particularly Vincent de Gurnay, Quesnay and Turgot.

Though today Fichte's opposition to the ideas of economic liberalism may seem one of the most observable motifs of the "Closed Commercial State", the treatise was perceived differently at the time of writing, especially in Germany. Ludwig Hestermann wrote a book-length response to Fichte's treatise, published under the title "Open Commercial State. A philosophical sketch",[152] in which he argues that not only physiocrats, but equally cameralists were the targets of Fichte's critique, since, in the first case, his doctrine undermined physiocrats' views of the common good, while in the second — cameralists' views of the good of the state by claiming that in both cases "good could be understood only in terms of individual right." (Nakhimovsky 2011: 135). Fichte doesn't approve of mercantilism or Prussian cameralism (understood as a domestic variety of the mercantilist doctrine).[153] While both these schools of economic thought were not in any way sympathetic to free trade, for Fichte they were not radical enough; both favored not autarchy, but just exports over imports. In Fichte's opinion, clearly expressed in the "Closed Commercial State", following the prescriptions of one or the other meant going half-way, while not only does "the halfways and incomplete restriction of trade" retain "all the disadvantages of completely free trade, but it will bring about new disadvantages." (Fichte 2012: 158)

Last but not least, "The Closed Commercial State" is a part of Fichte's response to Immanuel Kant's essay "Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project"[154], published in 1795. This text was published just after the Peace of Basel *de jure* ended Prussian military

[152] "Der offene Handelsstaat. Ein philosophischer Entwurf" (Hestermann 1802)

[153] This is what Hestermann arguably had in mind when he wrote that cameralism catered for the "money-grubbing princes and governments" (Nakhimovsky 2011: 135). The view of cameralism as a German Sonderweg of mercantilism has a long history, though lately some scholars have started to express doubts about the accuracy of such views as well as in their usefulness (see, for example, Magnusson (2015: 79-80)).

[154] Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf (Kant 1795)

involvement in the First Coalition[155] and formalized French control over the territories west of the Rhine. It can be therefore read as an approval of the peace treaty — and more generally, as the expression of support for the French Republic — and, at the same time, as a reflection on the possible roadmap to a more prolonged, sustainable and, in the end, perpetual peace between European nations. Aside from being a reaction to the immediate events, this treatise is, arguably, the only one of Kant's work that expounds the details of how his philosophical provisions are related to a political agenda.[156] Both immediate circumstances, as well as the rather unique nature of the treatise in the context of Kant's other writings, contributed to its popularity. The project provoked a spirited debate among prominent German intellectuals, including, among others, Herder, Schlegel, and Fichte.

The "Perpetual Peace" starts with the six following "preliminary articles for perpetual peace among states" (Kant 1996: 317):

> 1) no treaty of peace shall be held to be such if it is made with a secret reservation of material for a future war; 2) no independently existing state (whether small or large) shall be acquired by another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation; 3) standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) shall in time be abolished altogether; 4) no national debt shall be contracted with regard to the external affairs of a state; 5) no state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state; 6) no state at war with another shall allow itself such acts of hostility as would have to make mutual trust impossible during a future peace; acts of this kind are employing *assassins (percussores)* or *poisoners (venefici)*, *breach of surrender*, *incitement to treason (perduellio)* within the enemy state, and so forth. (Ibid: 318-20, emphasis in the original)

Kant referred to the above-cited articles as "preliminary", since being the *laws of prohibition* they can only guarantee the "suspension of hostilities". Laws of prohibition can't secure perpetual peace by themselves, being at the same time conditional on the possibility of the next steps. Those are necessary because "a condition of peace among men […] is not a state of

[155] The *De facto* Prussian army hadn't been involved in any considerable military action since late 1794.

[156] There is more to this agenda than the blueprint of an eternally peaceful international order. Kant's republicanism and cautious universalism (underlying his concept of cosmopolitan right) should be also taken in consideration.

nature (status naturalis), which is much rather a condition of war, that is, it involves the constant threat of an outbreak of hostilities" (Ibid: 322). Consequently, a condition of peace is something to be established — by means of the three following *definitive articles*:

> 1) the civil constitution in every state shall be republican; 2) the right of nations shall be based on a federalism of free states; 3) cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. (Ibid: 322, 325, and 328)

In terms of policies, these six preliminary and three definitive articles (with two additional supplements)[157] turn out to be the essence of Kant's project.

"The Closed Commercial State" is to some extent an attempt to broker a compromise between the demands the *Wissenschaftslehre's* logic and the author's idea of Realpolitik. "Perpetual Peace" reveals a similar (though probably less pronounced) set of dynamics between Kant's philosophy at large, including the metaphysics of morals, philosophy of right, etc. — and his idea of Realpolitik. Both texts naturally deal as a matter of course with the issues of right, trade, borders and human nature. Finally, both "Perpetual Peace" and "The Closed Commercial State" reflect their authors' shared intent to support the French Revolution and to help to secure its results, which is intertwined with deep concerns caused by the revolutionary violence[158]. However, the versions of a desired future, as depicted by two treatises, are vastly dissimilar. The main claim underlying "Toward Perpetual Peace" is that relations between states develop in a way similar to relations of individuals. Such relations go all the way from the "natural state" to conflict and suffering through which reason arises, gradually allowing progressive if slow development of political institutions towards a republican form of

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[157] The First supplement, "On the guarantee of perpetual peace" reads as follows: "What affords this guarantee (surety) is nothing less than the great artist nature (*natura daedala rerum*), from whose mechanical course purposiveness shines forth visibly, letting concord arise by means of the discord between human beings even against their will." (Kant 1996: 331). The Second Supplement, "Secret article for perpetual peace" demands that "the maxims of philosophers about the conditions, under which public peace is possible shall be consulted by states armed for war." (Ibid: 337).

[158] When it comes to the revolution in France, such an intermixture of enthusiasm and support on the one hand and profound concerns with the consequent excessive violence, both of revolutionary and martial nature, is characteristic for many German intellectuals of the time. See, for instance, Gailus (2006: 28-73)

government. Such a republic is not ideal, but makes the "infinite perfection" possible. The foundation of Kant's optimism in regards to individual and social human development is based upon the understanding of human beings as *moral persons,* meaning that people are not only capable of moral action implying freedom of choice, but are also universally and unconditionally aware of the existence of good and evil and, even more importantly of the fact that they have a duty to act in accordance with the categorical imperative.

The project of "The perpetual peace" is based upon Kant's view of states as moral persons.[159] Indeed, Kant's own explanation of the second preliminary article openly points in the same direction:

> […] (a) state is not (like the land on which it resides) a belonging (*patrimonium*). It is a society of human beings that no one other than itself can command or dispose of. Like a trunk, it has its own roots; and to annex it to another state as a graft is to do away with its existence as a moral person and to make a moral person into a thing... (Kant 1996: 318, empasis in the original)

Moreover, explaining the concept of the "right of nations", Kant begins his argument as follows: "Here a state, *as a moral person*, is considered as living in relation to another state in the condition of natural freedom and therefore in a condition of constant war." (Ibid: 482, emphasis added). States can subvert themselves to the coercive authority which enforces the international law or resort to a complex system of reciprocal control. But whatever they do, they do so because (just like people) they experience the categorical imperative as a command, and because (just like people) they are bound by duty to comply with the moral law. Whereas states are moral persons, they act like moral persons and consequently, leave the natural condition for the less violent and more humane order[160].

[159] As Howard points out, those three of the six preliminary articles which Kant requires to be introduced immediately (articles 1, 5 and 6) have categorical imperative as their immediate basis (Howard 1993: 266-70).
[160] This fragment from "Perpetual Peace" also points to the source of states' moral personhood: this idea is conditional on the distinction between the state and society or, in other words, recognition of society as "civil", having its own agency, its own means of self-regulation, and its own capability to produce order from within.

Since at least the mid-seventeenth century, European philosophy has been increasingly concerned with finding correct theoretical and/or working practical solutions for the problem, which can be stated in various ways, but ultimately comes down to the question of how the social order and more specifically, political obligation, is possible within the society of "possessive individualism"[161] or, one may say, a "market regime". On the one side, free trade and the market economy tear the social tissue, since they inspire actions based on individual interest in the society, based upon the assumption that there is an "individuality that can be realized fully only in accumulating property, and, therefore, realized only by some at the expense of the individuality of the others." (Macpherson 1954: 20) However, the same market regime makes people interdependent and encourages the development of institutions, necessary for the existence of "civil society" in the first place. The last should be autonomous and strong enough to keep the government in place. Kant sees resolution of this contradiction (which he terms "unsocial sociability") in the broad understanding of self-interest, so that the last included the establishment of *Rechtstaat*, the republican state under the rule of law. Such a state preserves moral autonomy while maintaining and securing the social order.

Kant held that "the theory of right is not complete if it limits itself to the internal organization of the state." (Kant 2006: xix). Together with Kant's understanding of states, discussed above, it leads him to the suggestion that the relations between states are subject to the international right, while the relations between states and foreign nationals should be regulated by cosmopolitan right.[162] Those institutions which are instrumental for the realisation

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[161] Term coined by C.B. Macpherson (1962). Possessive individualism "makes the individual the natural proprietor of his own person and capacities, owing nothing to society for them." (Macpherson 1954: 20)

[162] Two constitutive parts of the integral public right are involved in the project of perpetual peace: constitutional right, concerning the individuals within a republican state, and international right, concerning states themselves. The third, missing part, concerned with the relations of state and foreign individuals, is cosmopolitan right, based on the "right to hospitality" or, in Kant's words, "the right of a stranger not to be treated in a hostile manner by another upon his arrival on the other's territory." (Kant 1996: 329) This provision is based on the fact that all individuals share the surface of the Earth, which is finite, so they "must rather ultimately tolerate one another [...], and originally no one has more of a right to be at a given place on earth than anyone else" (Ibid). It's evident from

of Kant's project — *Rechtstaat* and, ulimately, the World Federation of States, provide the best way to keep a balance between the individual and the social on various levels. What ultimately creates this balanced condition is a broadly conceived self-interest. Just states with just constitutions are its "unintended consequences". These states, acting from the same broadly conceived self-interest, eventually produce the cosmopolitan world of "The perpetual peace". This is the view underlying Kant's claim that the "power of money" is the most reliable means of securing the cosmopolitan right and eventually, the perpetual peace. And the "power of money" refers to the international trade, by which peoples "were first brought into a peaceable relation to each other and so into understanding, community, and peaceable relations with one another, even with the most distant." (Kant 1996: 333). The power of international commerce is the reason why "states find themselves compelled [...] to promote honourable peace and, whenever war threatens to break out anywhere in the world, to prevent it by mediation." (Ibid: 337)

Fichte, who considered himself Kant's disciple, swore allegiance to the very same principle of individual freedom that was grounded in *a priori* moral laws by Kant. However, in his review of the "Perpetual Peace" anonymously published in 1795, he summarizes Kant's arguments in defense of his optimism to interpose quite a weighty objection, appealing to the immediate historical experience:

> The universal insecurity that accompanies every constitution that violates right is surely so striking that one would have to believe that human beings must long since have been moved to establish a state constitution in accordance with right through considerations of their own advantage, which alone can be the motive for establishing such a constitution. This, however, has not yet happened. The advantages of the disorder must therefore still generally outweigh those of order. A considerable portion of humanity must still gain more than they lose from this general disorder, and those who only lose must nevertheless continue to hope that they will win as well. (Breazeale 2001: 320)

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this passage that Kant, unlike Fichte, recognizes neither "natural borders" nor even states as possessive of certain territory, but only as a product of the common will of the members of the civil society.

At this point, Fichte's critique does not result in a complete break from Kant's cosmopolitanism. In what follows he argues that European states "are still young [..], the various classes [Stände] and families [...] still retain the hope of enriching themselves by robbing from the others", while "the commercial oppression of foreign nations and portions of the world opens up a constantly flowing and lucrative source of assistance [to the continuing process of uneven wealth distribution]". Yet, Fichte admits, that with time tolerable "equilibrium of possessions" will be established, when "the riches of the state" will be "discovered and distributed" while "the cultivation of foreign nations and parts of the world" will "permit these people to reach the point where they no longer will allow themselves to be cheated in commerce and led away into slavery."[163] At this point Fichte still follows Kant in the understanding of commerce as the force securing this course of events, — but significantly, as La Vopa points out, not because its engine, self-interest, is unexpectedly benevolent, but because the development of international commerce facilitates such changes in economic conditions and social structure, that present the majority of population with a clear evidence for the advantages of the global legal system[164].

Fichte's review of Kant's treatise is revealing it two aspects. First, it makes rather obvious that the author, while still sincerely willing to adhere to Kant's vision and principles, was haunted by deep and worrying uncertainty in regards to the benevolence of the natural order or, in other words, in the ability of the civil society to achieve as little as the mere containment of the "commercial anarchy" — let alone secure progressive human development. Second, the fact that he lays specific emphasis on the emergence of the United States as well as on the hypothetical emergence of Kant's European "republic of states" is

[163] Two historical developments contribute to Fichte's hope for the better future: establishment of the "blossoming North American free state", from where "enlightenment and freedom will necessarily spread" to the still oppressed parts of the world and "the great European republic of states", which Fichte expected to serve as a "dam before the outbreak of barbarian peoples into the workshop of civilization […] that did not exist in the ancient world." (Ibid: 321-22)
[164] See La Vopa (2001: 313-20) for details.

arguably indicative of his interest in the situation, in which some particular state outperforms others, following the path of progress, and thus becomes, “a city upon a hill”, so that the “eyes of all people” are upon it (Winthrop 1838: 47). It will take five years for Fichte’s doubts to turn into full-blown statism of “The closed commercial state” and then another eight years for his interest in exceptionalism to come of age in the “Addresses to the German Nation”. The scale of Fichte’s statism, obvious from “The Closed Commercial State”, which is in part a later and much more elaborated response to Kant’s treatise, remains striking even today, — and it was at least as striking at the beginning of the 19th century. But probably the most impressive part of this process is the velocity of his transformation from the true and loyal Kantian into something completely different, — namely into the fervent advocate of subverting individual autonomy to the state, recognized as an embodiment of the *common interest*. To be sure, Fichte never recanted his claim that *Wissenschaftslehre* is a “system of freedom”(Fichte 1848: 47) and arguably never ceased to think of himself as of Kant’s disciple, always insisting that his philosophy is “perfectly in accordance with the teaching of Kant, and is nothing other than Kantianism properly understood.” (Fichte 1982: 43) Nevertheless, his doctrine diverges from Kant’s philosophy in a significant number of ways.

First and foremost, Fichte rigorously separates right from morals. Whereas for Kant political philosophy is, very broadly speaking, derivative of the philosophy of morals, Fichte’s approach is, on the other hand, intended to reveal the depth of the gulf between the realms of ethics and right, properly establishing the latter as totally autonomous and having its own agenda. It becomes possible once Fichte develops the understanding of the individual human being as entirely social. Not only does Ego, according to Fichte, becomes self-conscious in juxtaposition with the Other. The very possibility of exercising freedom in activity, which Fichte equates with personhood, is defined by social relations. While a view of human individuals as social by nature is rather common, less common is the absence of moral considerations in the

“relation of right”, which individuals enter by mutually recognizing each other as rational human beings. In Kant moral behaviour (i.e. exercising one’s freedom to the point, where it does not interfere with the Other's right to do the same) is rational, since ultimately only such behaviour allows for prolonged peaceful co-existence and development — the same belief was expressed much later by Marx in his famous formula. Also, Kant seems to reconcile himself to the fact that a peaceful condition is produced by a series of violent wars, — and that the final peace in his scheme can be established only after a war on an enormous scale. Fichte, on the contrary, intends to secure peace from the very moment his rational state becomes possible. In his view, made clear on several occasions in “The Closed Commercial State”, no one should just depend on the good will of others: morals as such are too weak a constraint (or too weak a motivation) to secure “proper” behaviour of individuals. Fichte's “rational state” emerges at the point, where citizens vest coercive powers in the state in order to make it one side of the protective contract. The state is conceived as a force, protecting citizens from each other, a Hobbesian Leviathan.

Ideas of, to use later term, the Police State, preventing *bellum omnium contra omnes* were not particularly new to political philosophy. What adds a new dimension to Fichte’s philosophy of state and makes this state at least very close to totalising, is the positive part of the program, rooted in Fichte’s concept of the property as a universal right (to live pleasantly by one's labor) and not the possession of material objects or values. This entails, of course, the existence of the guarantor of such right, a state. Formally speaking, this state, as well as, say, the Lockean, is vested with the political power of making laws “for the Regulating and Preserving of Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws” (Locke 1982: 2). Yet, the mandate of the state, which is obliged to guarantee permanent full employment, a stable standard of living, allowing for the “free development of all” and a firm measure of relative equality in terms of distributive justice to enable social peace, is

necessarily immeasurably more vast than the one that Lockean state holds. It includes the state's right to allocate and re-allocate resources, including what would be considered "property" in a more traditional sense of word; right to limit the consumption and more generally, define such consumption, for example by imposing ban on imports or on luxuries; the right to limit activities of the citizens, such as selling the fruits of their labour for the price they themselves consider fair, or the right to travel abroad for pleasure. What is at stake is the security of a stable balance within a very complex dynamic system. Securing such a balance is a task of an enormous complexity, which indulges the state's intervention even in the very sphere of activity which this state was created to protect: if there's a surplus of the labor force, for example in agriculture, a citizen can be reassigned to industrial labor even if he or she has chosen otherwise. Thus Fichte's concept of property, entailing the broadest possible mandate of the state, is the second crucial point of his divergence from Kant.

Within the political philosophy of *Wissenschaftslehre,* the state not only protects people from each other and facilitates the implementation of a positive political/economic program, but is also vitally important for the sustentation of the created order, which is unsustainable by itself. A state, so conceived, is essentially a secular twin of the "*allwise Spirit*, that fashions, regulates, and sustains the whole system of being", (Berkeley 1999: 93, emphasis in the original). However, unlike such an "allwise Spirit" or, for that matter, Kant's Nature, Fichte's state dwells not in the extramundane, but in this world and therefore is necessarily spatial, or to be more precise, territorial.

Kant's embrace of cosmopolitanism and Fichte's refutation of it constitute a rupture, which is of particular interest for this research since this rupture eventually divides the two very different modes of utopian thinking, — utopianism of the social process, temporal by nature and utopianism of the spatial order. Both Kant's essay "Toward Perpetual Peace" and "The Closed Commercial state" of Fichte can be seen as utopian, since each of them undoubtedly

presents a complex vision of the desired future condition, which is vastly different from the present one and since both can be described in Jameson's words as a "meditation on radical difference, radical otherness, and on the systemic nature of the social totality". The appearance of these two texts manifests a divergence point in Enlightenment thinking: they are foundational for the two different kinds of utopianism, both of which shaped many political and social practices for more than a century. The cosmopolitan ideal is rooted in the concepts of Natural Law and natural rights, vital for the Enlightenment, particularly in the form of 18th century republicanism, which gave birth to the notion of the "rights of man", inherent in human nature and not liable to the demands of positive law. American and French republics gave this newborn universalism its political form. The developments in France very soon revealed the intrinsic contradiction of this cosmopolitanism, logically derived from universalist philosophy — and the practice of revolutionary wars. Once these wars had started, it was decided very soon that civil rights in particular are as such granted by the nation and that government itself, which is, according to the most radical 1793 alteration of the French revolutionary constitution, "instituted to insure to man the free use of his natural and inalienable rights" (Lieber 1883: 532) is instituted by, once again, the nation. Kant's account of cosmopolitanism was in fact intended to resolve the contradiction between the cosmopolitan nature of universalism and the political framework of a sovereign nation.

Paradoxically, Fichte's ambitious project of autarky pursued the same objective. While Kant understood universalism in accordance with its nature as an all-embracing totality, which had to include the whole of humanity, Fichte, arguably, has made a sophisticated and abrupt move by assuming that this totality is achievable and its parts are no less total than its entirety in cases where these parts are fully separated and isolated from each other. This separate part preserves its totality as the absence of links to anything external, and makes the external virtually non-existent. While the above concept of achievable totality as such can't be found in

Fichte, it appears to be a plausible explication of the logic behind his development of political philosophy. Should one proceed with this logic further, it would be quite justifiable to suggest that the assembly of the isolated states ensures peace more effectively than any federation of states or even a world state: the fewer links exist in the system, the less is its level of complexity and the volume of interactions within it. The less the volume of interactions, the less likely these interactions are to run out of control.

In Fichte the desired universalist future assumes a comprehensible — and territorial — form of a single state, which would hardly emerge in the full-scale cosmopolitan totality any time soon, since states and countries move, — presumably along the path of progress, — at different paces. This last concept was certainly well understood by Fiche, in whose condemnation of sins committed by international trade, special attention is paid to the sin of creating, enabling and even enforcing uneven development, — despite the fact that this particular term was only coined more than a century later. Whereas Kant believes that free trade between states is a powerful motive for peaceful co-existence despite the ambiguous nature of the free market and more generally, “possessive individualism”, thus considering its net effect positive, Fichte rejects free trade. He does so not just in search of the best possible way to secure international peace: negation of free trade comes, in fact, at a much earlier point. Fichte's choice of autarky is to a far greater extent influenced by internal policy issues.

What is really significant for his argument is the immediate threat which free trade poses for the precious stability of the rational state. Accordingly, he believes that the abandonment of foreign trade as such should eliminate the motive for wars. But this development, from which the whole human species would presumably benefit, seems no more than a benign, albeit once again, unintended consequence of the rational order *within* the closed state, — the order, established by and large with other immediate goals in mind. Somehow, if the states could enter the similar sequence of contracts that citizens of Fichte’s

rational state enter, it could as well do eternal global peace a good turn. We can only speculate as to why Fichte never considered such a possibility. Maybe he apprehended the limitations to his model: "The Closed Commercial State" describes a largely pre-industrial, agrarian economy and was probably indeed conceived, as Marianne Weber suggests, with the image of the walled medieval town and its guild system in mind.[165] Another possibility is that Fichte was, at the time of writing "The Closed Commercial State", already considering the idea of a community, even if not yet "national" in the full sense of the word, destined to show the right path to other peoples of the world. His vision of the German nation as such a community would be vigorously put forward and substantiated eight years after the publication of "The Closed Commercial State" in the "Addresses to the German Nation". It would also later develop into a viable and powerful German nationalism, of which Fichte is to this day considered a founding father. But probably most remarkably, this messianic particularism will earn itself a place within a broadly conceived socialist tradition, — and not just in Germany.

4. From the Closed Commercial State to the Isolated Socialist State

Fichte's project of 1800, elaborated upon in "The Closed Commercial State" is still inclusive; it doesn't speak of the German nation or nation as such, though the author's silent implications are evident in some of the footnotes (e.g. when Fichte speaks of the possibility of substituting imported cotton by domestically grown product). It's only during the French occupation that he turns to what we now call nationalism, claiming the superiority of German language and German national spirit.

The preterition, characteristic for "The Closed Commercial State", which never mentions any particular state, though Fichte obviously conceived it having Germany in mind, is observed

[165] The concept of guilds turned out to be of a considerable vitality and managed to gain another lease of life in the 20th century in the form of the "guild socialism" movement and was quite alive (albeit not very successful) for two solid decades after Fabian socialist and architect Arthur Penty has published his "Restoration of the Gild System" (1906).

also in another German text, which was written some eighty years after Fichte's treatise, but unlike it, was for some time almost completely (except for its title) forgotten, notwithstanding the fact that it was destined to play at some point an extremely important role in history. This text was written by Bavarian social democrat Georg von Vollmar in 1878 and published first same year in Zurich under the title "The Isolated Socialist State: A socioeconomic Study"[166]. Next year the text was republished by the socialist "Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik", which helped the "Isolated Socialist State" to achieve considerably wider (though still somewhat limited) readership.

Georg von Vollmar was born in 1850 in Veltheim near Munich into the family of Anton Edler und Ritter von Vollmar auf Veltheim, a registrar, and Karoline (Loibl) von Vollmar. He attended the Catholic Benedictine grammar school of St. Stefan in Augsburg, 1859-65.[167] In 1865 Vollmar enlisted in the Bavarian army as an officer and gained some combat experience in 1866, in course of the Austro-Prussian war, attended the University of Munich as a non-credit student in 1866-1867, and then entered the Papal Guard in Rome in 1868, but once again, not for long. In 1869 Vollmar spent some time as a student at the Polytechnic in Munich, joining the Bavarian civil service only a year later as the transport department officer. In this capacity he took part (this time as a civilian) in the Franco-Prussian war and was severely wounded (or, according to some sources, injured in a railway accident) in 1871: Vollmar could barely walk without crutches and in the later period of his life; particularly after 1896, his mobility was constantly deteriorating. In 1872 he was granted a military pension, and later that same year joined the social democratic movement and moved to Miesbach. In 1877 Vollmar has accepted

[166] "Der isolierte sozialistische Staat: eine sozialökonomische Studie" (Vollmar 1878). No English translation exists at the moment of writing. I've consulted original German text and anonymous (though published) Russian translation (Fol'mar 1995).

[167] Vollmar probably failed to graduate. School certificates demonstrate his grades steadily growing worse in course of six years and there are no certificates dated later than 1865, when he entered the Bavarian army. However, Vollmar is mentioned as a graduate of 1869 in the "St. Stephan in Augsburg schoolfellows' album for 1829-1892" as a "writer" (Hofmann 2018: 14).

the long-awaited offer from the SPD[168] to take over the management of a small party press in Dresden, “Dresdner Volkszeitung”. This was the starting point of his long and remarkable career as a social democrat politician, — and though particularities of his rich biography are mostly out of the scope of this work, it’s probably worth citing basic facts: in 1883 Vollmar was elected to the Saxon Landtag with the Socialist Workers' Party ticket and held the office until 1889. Since 1890, a year when the Socialist Laws, aimed against SPD, were abandoned, Vollmar, who was previously known as a proponent of radical revolutionary tactics, made a U-turn to act as one of the most strong and consistent voices for the reformist wing of the Party. His reformist program was presented in the so-called Eldorado speeches, denouncing the Party’s revolutionary expectations and requiring active involvement in overt parliamentary struggle. In 1884 he married Julia Kjellberg, daughter of a Swedish businessman and student of the Russian mathematician Sofiya Kovalevskaya, Vollmar’s close friend. The second marriage proved to be happy and was only ended by Vollmar’s death in 1922. Julia outlived her husband by one year. In 1893 Vollmar was once again elected with the SPD ticket — this time as a member of Bavarian Landtag and held the office until 1918. In years preceding the World War he was the undisputed SPD leader in Bavaria, where Vollmar strived to implement the reformist agrarian program, supported the local government in 1894 by convincing his party comrades to vote for the budget, and put in place progressive electoral reforms. In 1890-1918 Vollmar also served as SPD member of the Reichstag, supporting democratization of the political system, development of welfare and changes in legislation, suggesting the ministerial responsibility to Reichstag. In 1914 Vollmar supported the war effort and was consequently condemned by the left wing of the Party. He retired from politics after the war to spend the last four years of his life at home,

[168] Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Social-Democratic Party of Germany. In fact, it was known as the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany (SAPD) until 1890, when this name was changed to the SPD. Several other names were also used at different times in course of the party’s history, but I’ll use the abbreviation SPD hereinafter to avoid confusion except once. The last will be explicitly defined.

since at that point he has almost lost mobility. Vollmar died in June 1922 in his country house at the Walchensee lake in Bavaria[169].

The start of Vollmar's political career concurred with the beginning of a particularly hard period in the history of the German left: in 1878 Reichstag had adopted the first of the *Sozialistengesetze* or, Socialist Laws. This legislation, favoured by Otto von Bismarck, Imperial Chancellor of the recently established German Empire, was passed after two failed attempts on the life of Kaiser Wilhelm I. Both assassins were to various degrees affiliated or thought to be affiliated with SPD, and the Socialist Laws were intended to undermine the political power of German social democrats, who were quickly gaining momentum almost everywhere in the country. It was under these laws that Vollmar was convicted for one year of imprisonment for his various activities as a member of the party in 1878, — "The Isolated Socialist State" was written in prison.

After his release, Vollmar was expelled from Dresden and, shortly after, from Germany and headed to Zurich, where he got a job at the University, — and managed to publish his study shortly after arrival. In this text, Vollmar elaborated on the possibility of the successful socialist revolution in only one state as opposed to somewhat more popular assumption that such an event would inevitably spread to all industrialized European countries, the United States and probably, in the best case scenario of "the world revolution", in some of the most developed British dominions. There was no clear answer to the question as to what would happen in the underdeveloped Asian countries as well as in colonies — at least among German socialists, who held various, sometimes even opposite views on the subject. In the case that the events would take a less favorable turn, at least successful revolution in several European countries was expected.

[169] See Lane (1995) for details. Vollmar's full-length biography can be found in Jansen (1958). For details on friendship between Vollmar and Kovalevskaya as well as for English translation of her 1882 letter to Vollmar see Audin (2011); several fragments from Kovalevskaya's letters to Vollmar were published in Shtraïkh (1935).

Vollmar was the first to articulate the possibility of the emergence of the isolated socialist state and to inquire into the possible outcomes of such a scenario. Nevertheless, “The isolated socialist state” failed to spark any noticeable debate within the party. On one level, the almost absence of reaction on the part of his fellow SPD members looks remarkable. On another, it must be kept in mind that the SPD was at the moment understandably busy developing a strategy for its new situation. But the main reason for such indifference was more deep-rooted. Even if the scenario, considered by Vollmar was not the subject of vigorous debates at the *parteitags*, Engels’s claim that the successful socialist revolution would inevitably be the world revolution, wasn’t particularly popular within the SPD. Such a poor response to the text, challenging, one would think, one of the bedrock Marxist principles and as we’ll see shortly, to some extent even internationalism itself, demands an explanation, and this can be found in the peculiar history of the SPD.

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It is widely assumed that though the positions of German social democrats were not always congruent with those of Marx and Engels, their overall influence on the party was far greater than any other. That said, the party ideology often deviated from classical Marxism to varying degrees, depending on the particular historical period. The key figure here is Ferdinand Lassalle, one of the prominent German Socialist thinkers, who had a particularly powerful and sustained impact on the ideological positions of the party and thus on its policies. Lassalle stood at the origins of the German Social Democracy itself. Moreover, due to his ideological and political heritage the party had not only survived 12 years under the Socialist Laws but enjoyed

steady growth in numbers and political influence.[170] Breslau-born son of a German-Jewish silk merchant, Lassalle rejected the business career his father wanted him to pursue. Having begun his education at the age of 15 at the business school in Leipzig, he left it a year later to continue his studies in the Universities of Breslau and then Berlin (Brandes 1911: 13). In Berlin Lassalle first grew interested in Hegel to become later a devoted adept of Hegelianism, which remained one of the main influences on his political and philosophical views until the end of his short, — he died at the age of 39 — but eventful life.[171]

While Hegel was Lassalle's first love in philosophy and Hegelianism never ceased to provide a theoretical frame for his political thought, his last and most passionate philosophical love relationship was the one with Fichte. It's not possible here discuss Lassalle's ideological evolution and political activities in detail, but it is important to mention that at the early stages of his political career he was a proponent of radical revolutionary tactics and after the Prussian government had dissolved the National Assembly in November 1848, published the address to its members authored by him on behalf of the Düsseldorf militiamen. The address led to Lassalle's imprisonment and later conviction on charges of "calling for resistance to the officials". He served only six months (Dawson 1888: 120-21), but kept clear of political activities ever since, though maintaining contacts with prominent figures of the German socialist movement, including Marx and Karl Rodbertus-Jagetzow, political economist and remarkable proponent of the "state socialism". In 1862 Lassalle wrote a pamphlet, known as the "Workers Program". The whole run was arrested by the police and Lassalle was once again indicted, this time for "jeopardizing public peace". After paying a fine, he embarked on a career as a political

[170]The SPD has won 19.7% of the votes in the 1890 federal election, which made it the strongest party in the country. Since the legislation was specifically tailored to limit the party's influence, it took another 22 years for it to win 35% in the federal election of 1912 and subsequently form the majority in the Reichstag (Reschke et al. 2013: 37-39)

[171] A rather detailed popular account of Lassalle's life can be found in Klassen (1896) and Footman (1946). For Lassalle's political biography in the context of the history of German socialism, see Dawson (1888) and Suvorov (1997)

agitator, traveling about the country. It was during one of his tours, when he gave his famous speech, praising Fichte and particularly his “Addresses to the German Nation”.[172] The text glorifies the greatness of the German national spirit, which, unlike those of other nations, including the French and English, gives birth to at least one ingenious thinker in each and every generation: it’s these thinkers who “keep alive the sacred fire of Vesta — or metaphysics, — which, despite its metaphysical, numinous nature, is inextricably entwined with the earthly destiny of our nation” (Lassal' 1906: 23). In his other pamphlet on Fichte, “Fichte’s Political Legacy and the Immediate Present”[173] written a year earlier, Lassalle invokes both the ardent republicanism of young Fichte and his later passionate praise of the Germans as *Urvolk*, true nation and weaponises this highly flammable mixture to agitate for his vision of German Unification, which is, according to Lassalle, a vital necessity, — but can only become possible, meaningful and successful if Germany adopts republican government as a result. The arguments he used to substantiate his claim once again do not sound particularly socialist, or, for that matter, leftist. To cite just one example, it’s the Germans, who, “in the eternal plan of the Universe, are called upon to represent a true kingdom of right, a kingdom of freedom, founded upon the equality of all that bear the face of man.’” (quoted after Bernstein 1893: 65).

Lassalle's vision of socialism was different from that of Marx and Engels. The first of the pillars of Lassalle’s later doctrine was the outright refusal of violence. His dramatic turn from earlier positive attitudes to the armed revolutionary struggle resulted from the deeply traumatizing experience of 1848 and was met with almost universal public approval. The other pillar was statism, — in the words of Carlton Hayes, “under the spell of Fichte and Hegel,

[172] The speech was published under the title “Die Philosophie Fichte's und die Bedeutung des deutschen Volksgeistes” (Lassalle 1862) (Fichte’s philosophy and the significance of the German national spirit) and was, among Lassalle’s other works, published in a Russian translation in the three-volume set of Lassalle’s collected works (Lassal' 1906: 5-73). Quite remarkably, as of 2018 this set still remains the most representative corpus of Lassalle’s Russian translations: his post-revolutionary bibliography includes hardly six titles, two of them published abroad.

[173] Fichte's politisches Vermächtniß und die neueste Gegenwart (Lassalle 1877)

[Lassalle] held in common with Marx and Engels that historical evolution (Entwicklung) is gradual and is determined by changing economic conditions, but, truer to Hegel and Fichte than Marx and Engels had been, he extolled the State as an eternal, unchanging concept, an end in itself" (Hayes 1917: 66). Lassalle was a staunch proponent of state socialism and clearly disapproved of laissez-faire and market competition. These views are quite straightforwardly expressed, for example, in the treatise "Herr Bastiat-Schulze von Delich, the Economic Julian or, Capital and Labour". In this text Lassalle claims, among other things, that the state that imposes limits on the freedom of competition is the only institution standing between the worker and the bourgeoisie, who strives for the complete elimination of the state. Once there's no state, workers will be completely deprived of any human attributes and reduced to the status of mere production force (Lassal' 1906: 178-81).

Moreover, in the "Workers' Program", a speech, given in 1861 and later published as a pamphlet, which became a foundational document of Lassalle's General German Workers Association, he expresses his views of state, quoting philosopher and Hellenist August Böckh: "the concept of State should be enlarged to the extent practicable, since the State shall be the institution in which the whole virtue of mankind shall realize itself" (Lassal' 1921: 46). In the same text, Lassalle describes the role of the State very much in the spirit (if not letter) of Fichte, claiming that purpose of the State is a far cry from merely protecting the personal freedom and property of the individual. The State's duty "is a positive development and gradual perfection of mankind or, in other words — the fulfilment of human purpose, being culture […]. The State exists in order to cultivate mankind and upbring it to freedom" (Ibid: 47-8). This claim is at least as much Hegelian as it is Fichtean: the ultimate purpose of Fichte's "rational state" is also to provide conditions for the self-realization of individuals and, eventually, humankind as such.

Finally, the third pillar of Lassalle's teaching is his firm commitment to democracy. For Lassalle, any kind of social change (for example productive cooperative societies, of which he

was a fervent advocate) was possible only via state assistance, including financial aid. This, in turn, could give a fair chance to the sole condition: that the proletariat should become a tangible political force, exercising direct influence on the decision-making process. Refusal of revolutionary violence meant that the only way to achieve sufficient influence on state policies lay through elections. Consequently, the General German Workers Association had one of the shortest political programs in history, namely, demand for universal (male) suffrage. This third pillar — a commitment to the political democracy, albeit driven by tactical concerns, — is essential, since its presence makes the Lassallean program Fichtean, rather than Hegelian. Indeed, Hegel favours some sort of hereditary constitutional monarchy, within which one elected body exists, but with the lion's share of power and authority still belonging to the sovereign and unelected government (Hegel and Dyde 1896: 277-82). Fichte, on the contrary, never ceases to be a republican, though sometimes by self-definition only and despite his rejection of the separation of powers principle in Montesquieu's sense.[174] Refusal of violence and republicanism, unreserved quasi-religious statism and strict disapproval of the free trade accompanied by German exceptionalism, — combined, these beliefs take on a very distinct Fichtean form.

Lassalle was one of many German economists, government officials and politicians from the various parts of the political spectrum to see the state as a preferable agency of the future transfer to a more just society.[175] However, Lassalle's state socialism turned out to be much

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[174] Instead, Fichte suggests establishment of the "Ephorate", a political institution which exists for the sole purpose of exercising control over other parts of the body politic, formed via election process from the "most trusted" citizens. Such an ephorate is, according to Fichte, an essential part of any political system. He doesn't go into much detail but notes that it "is completely different from the ephorate in the Spartan constitution, from the state inquisition of Venice, and the like. The *people's tribunes* in the Roman republic bear the closest resemblance to the ephorate discussed here." (Fichte 2000: 151)

[175] Leaving social democrats with a party affiliation aside, at least one remarkable figure on the left should be mentioned, namely Karl Rodbertus-Jagetzow, popular economist and socialist of the conservative (organicist) school. In terms of later followers, Lassalean ideas lay behind the foundation of the so-called *Kathedersozialismus,* a movement rather conservative than revolutionary in nature, institutionalised in the form of the Social Policy Association *(Der Verein für Socialpolitik)*, with which Verner Sombart, Adolph Wagner, Gustav von Schmoller, Lujo

more than just a theory. In May 1863 Lassalle initiated the creation of the General German Workers Association[176] which became the very first German socialist party.[177] Soon after the establishment of the Association, a secret message was delivered to Lassalle from Bismarck, who was seeking direct contact with the most influential socialist in the country — in fact, he had already been doing so for some time at this point. However, Bismarck wanted Lassalle to make the first move. Finally, in 1863 Bismarck gave up and wrote a letter, delivered by his secretary. The two politicians managed to cut a deal: Lassalle agreed to consult Bismarck on social and economic policies in exchange for a promise to implement universal suffrage. Since then Lassalle became Bismarck's informal secret advisor[178] and the two met on a regular basis (Klassen 1896: 134-40). This cooperation was interrupted by Lassalle's death in August 1864. Nevertheless, the set of policies, which later became known as Bismarck's *Staatssozialismus* was based largely on measures suggested by Lassalle in 1863-1864.[179] Those included active social welfare policies, particularly the introduction of a progressive insurance system, which, among other types of insurance, featured a prototypical pension system. Legislation aimed to protect labour, was also introduced. In some sense, the Socialist Laws initiated by Bismarck, were meant more to secure the state monopoly over socialist policies than to suppress socialism as such. The Imperial Chancellor also kept to his end of the deal: universal suffrage for the male section of the nation, first introduced in 1867 by the North German Federation, was sustained in the constitution of its successor, the German Empire, inaugurated in 1871.

Brentano as well as other prominent German economists and political theoreticians were affiliated at different times.

[176] Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein (ADAV)

[177] Formally, the ADAV's only openly stated political goal (universal suffrage) hardly amounts to a socialist political program ("universal" is of course not quite a precise word here since it refers to male suffrage). Nevertheless, it was the 150th anniversary of the ADAV that was celebrated in Germany in 2013 as 150th anniversary of SPD: it is recognized officially that the party was born not when Liebknecht, Bebel and other "Eisenachers" founded the Marxist Social Democratic Workers' Party of Germany and not at the moment of the unification, but in 1863, year of the ADAV's foundation

[178] Though many German socialists, including Marx and Engels who never endorsed ADAV, developed hunches about this unlikely alliance, Lassalle's connections to Bismarck were proved only in 1878 by August Bebel.

[179] See Dawson (1890) for the detailed account of the socialist elements in Bismarck policies.

The German SPD was created in 1875 by the unification of the Lassallean ADAV and predominantly Marxist SDAP, founded by August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht in 1869, five years after Lassalle's death. Remarkably, the unification of the SDAP and ADAV, which happened at the Gotha Congress, which thus was the first Congress of SPD, involved 15 000 Lassalleans merging into one political entity with just 9 000 Marxists. Moreover, the SDAP at that moment has already accommodated quite a number of former ADAV members, who had left the Lassallean party due to their disagreement in relation to the former ADAV leadership's policies towards trade unions. All told, differences in the attitudes towards the perspective of "small Germany" were, at the point of merger, probably more pronounced, than any ideological disagreement: Marx had a good reason to be furious about the Gotha Program. As a result, given the ADAV's longer history and tangible political achievements and thanks in no small part to Lassalle's posthumous cult among German social democrats,[180]Lassalleans were destined to remain by far the most influential, albeit informal, faction of the SPD for decades to come.

In terms of ideology the most noticeable differences between the two constituent parts of the German social democracy were to be found in relation to cosmopolitanism/nationalism and in attitudes to the state. The "Marxist" part of the party was distinctly less statist and more cosmopolitan. Significantly, Lassallians as well as on various occasions Karl Rodbertus, Eugen Dühring, and later Eduard Bernstein, were never scared of the isolated socialist state perspective. Moreover, while many prominent figures within SPD were, to various degrees, in favour of the isolated socialist state, only August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht were firmly opposed to it from the very beginning. The existence of a whole range of different positions within the party never blocked the decision-making process, though at times it certainly

[180] See Bonnell (2008) and Dawson (1888: 219-33). Bonnell, particularly, shows that what he calls "Lassalle's cult" outlived unification of the ADAV and SAPD, Socialist Laws period from 1878 to 1890 and even the adoption of the definitive Marxist stand of the Erfurt Programme in 1891.

obstructed it. Yet, every time some kind of compromise formula could be worked out and some common stand taken.[181]

We can summarise our discussion of the attitudes to the isolated socialist state concept within German Social Democracy as follows: a peculiar dynamics is present in the overall evolutionary process through which German Social Democracy was going during the last quarter of the 19th century and later in 1900-1914. Particularly, as van Ree points out (Van Ree 2010a: 145), early texts, considering the idea of the isolated socialist state, written in 1860s-1870s treated such a development as an honourable and courageous choice on the part of the country which would make it (preferably Germany). Later, in 1890s-1900s this concept was integrated into the vision of Germany as a colonial empire.[182]

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In late 1870s, when the "Isolated Socialist State" was conceived and written, Vollmar was equally influenced by Marx and Engels on the one side and by Lassalle and Dühring on the other[183] (van Ree 2015: 88). After the abolition of the Socialist Laws in 1890, he adopted a reformist stand, which naturally entailed a much more positive attitude towards state socialism: gradual reformist tactics suggested a relatively high level of cooperation with the existing state. In fact, his inclination to the more statist positions already shows in the "Isolated Socialist State", and in four years this tendency would become even more obvious in course of the discussion, triggered by the Tobacco Monopoly, suggested by Bismarck. In 1880 "Der

[181] This is already very obvious in the Gotha program, adopted by the newborn SPD as the first document of the unified party. Its Lassallean provisions infuriated Marx: ten years later, Engels had to edit the text of Marx's letter, known as the "Critique of the Gotha program"; he had to omit "a few sharp personal expressions and judgments" and replace them by dots or, in those cases when it was impossible, he had to choose "milder expressions" Marx and Engels (1970: 13-14).
[182] Besides Van Ree (2010a), see also Armstrong (1942) and Maehl (1952).
[183] Though formally he was initially engaged with Eisenachers, particularly with Bebel.

Sozialdemokrat", coming as close as possible to the status of the official party press, and edited by Vollmar, fully endorsed the proposed Tobacco monopoly on the grounds that it was a threat to the bourgeoisie. It's not clear if Vollmar wrote these articles, but they couldn't have been published without his direct authorization. A year later, after the legislation on the Industrial Accidents Insurance was proposed, Liebknecht himself claimed that socialists must not interfere with Bismarck, who "may move further toward our goals — on this course we march together." (quoted after Lidtke 2008: 213). All this is to say that even for the presumably "Marxist" wing of the party Bismarck's social and even economic policies presented a considerable theoretical problem. The Party's inclination towards statism was noticeable even under the Socialist laws and only grew stronger after 1890. This crisis had probably a higher impact on Vollmar who was not really a Marxist, than on other Eisenachers. As a result, he put some effort into framing what he presumably saw as a centrist position on the subject of the isolated socialist state. At the same time, his text demonstrates the author's awareness not only of the Lassallean approaches but most likely also of Fichte's "The Closed Commercial State". On more than one occasion, Vollmar draws on Fichte's ideas, though never refers to his writings openly.

The titles of the two texts are structurally similar. In both cases the (first) title starts with nearly synonymic "geschlossene"/"isoliert",[184], and ends with "staat", which is in both cases defined by an adjective. The second title (subtitle) in both cases defines the genre of what follows, namely "a philosophical sketch" in Fichte and "an economic study" in Vollmar's case. "The Isolated Socialist State" starts with a question: "has socialism necessarily to come to power in the whole civilized world, in all developed nations in order to effectuate its

[184] The difference is rather subtle, but significant. Fichte's first choice of word implies absence of the external subject, meaning that his commercial state closed itself. On the contrary, the adjective, chosen by Vollmar, points to the condition imposed by external action. Isolation is involuntary, i.e. it's not a condition adopted by choice.

economical intents or, a separate socialist state is possible and viable?"[185] (Fol'mar 1995: 63). Vollmar's preliminary answer is that the emergence of the separate socialist state or socialist transformation in just a few states is entirely possible, and moreover, he believes that "the existence and proliferation" of such states won't be in any serious jeopardy. Then Vollmar invokes the complexity of the historical process, manifested particularly in the fact that the theory predicts the most developed economy to be the one most ripe for socialism, while in reality, a rather long way lies ahead for the more developed England, while in the less developed Germany socialism has already gained significant political power and become a threat to "the old society". In Vollmar's opinion, although economy largely defines history, other factors, including political, legal and religious as well as racial and personal are also in play. Personal differences are particularly important, since the role of the individual in history is often overlooked.

Vollmar argues that in some backward countries socialism is such a remote prospect that it's unreasonable to wait until they catch up with the rest. It's better for them to wait than to try to implement socialism under inappropriate conditions, while others have to proceed. Consequently, chances for a simultaneous socialist transformation all over the world are negligible, while a successful revolution in just two or three countries is more likely. According to Vollmar, the best case scenario would be simultaneous revolutionary victories in two developed countries, "for example in France and Germany (including German parts of Austria)" (ibid: 65). However, while such a turn of events is preferable, it's less likely than the emergence of a single socialist state. Assuming such a state has already appeared on the world map, it has now to develop in accordance with socialist principles and at the same time it has to find such a position within the international system that would eventually allow its antagonism towards the rest of the world to be resolved in its favour. Vollmar warns against giving in to temptation,

[185] Since I've mainly used the translation, only occasionally consulting German text, the Russian 1995 publication is mostly cited in this section.

of total abolition and confiscation of private property followed by a replacement of the "private production anarchy by the systematically planned collective production" (Ibid). Instead of this "easiest and the most natural immediate step", he argues for gradual development and suggests a package of measures in many aspects similar to the later Bolsheviks practices, though in most part less radical.

According to Vollmar, only where the concentration of production is high should private property should be confiscated immediately. As agriculture, due to the possibility of the commercial blockade, is a priority for the isolated socialist state, Vollmar suggests that, at least in the countries where lands are distributed among multiple small households (i.e. concentration is low), as in France and Germany, the state only should confiscate land which are public property anyway, namely state, crown, and church lands as well as the commons and some other minor plots. The property of the households should remain with them since confiscation can only turn the peasantry into the enemy of socialism. At the same time, strict rules in regards to cultures to be grown, seeds to be used and techniques of processing the harvest will be imposed on private as well as state producers. Agricultural districts are to be established for the purposes of management and control. If particular land-owners fail to comply with the limitations and rules, private property has to be confiscated (as well as the property of the traitors and émigré land-owners). The state should sell its production on a firm-price basis and since it is the largest producer, market prices would be defined by whatever prices are established by the state. Therefore Introduction of a price-tag economy becomes unnecessary. As a result of such measures private property will lose its attractiveness, and land-owners by and large will voluntarily waive their land property rights, all the more so as the state will pay these former land-owners a considerable, though fair lifetime rent, enough for a decent living. Only one generation of immediate former owners are entitled to such compensation. A few will choose the life of rentier, while the majority of others, resentful of

the very idea of the income not earned and willing to continue working, will be able to do so as state employees. Vollmar is reluctant to provide too many details but suggests that the transitional period will look similar in terms of industrial property as well.

Capital in any form, however, should be confiscated immediately. Vollmar insists that "the abolition of the metal money, the world money, to which the trade, or rather the exploitation of labour through trade is inseparably linked, is an indispensable prerequisite of the socialist organization of our state; the present money of our state from now on becomes merely a metal, of which the owner can make tools or objects of art, and will cease to be a legal tender with which the owner can at any moment acquire any pleasure". Apparently, Vollmar doesn't suggest confiscation of silver and gold. Such leniency towards those displeased by the new order is in full compliance with Fichte's view of the subject:

> We would at most have cause to fear a considerable amount of emigration in the beginning, from people to whom the new order, which alone is true order, appears burdensome, oppressive, and pedantic. The state will lose nothing with the loss of their persons. The money withdrawn from the government through their emigration would not be considerable in relation to the whole. They will only be able to collect as much money as they had available as cash at the moment of the conversion of the currency. The government, however, collects what is in everyone's hands, and since the émigrés are in the minority, their money is by far the least part of what is available.—They will be limited, as I have said, to the cash that they actually had at hand, since they should not be allowed, after the conversion of the currency, to sell their produce or their lands and then withdraw from the government its value in world currency. The government will know if something of this sort has happened from its trade books, and the yield from such a sale will not be exchanged. At most they could have the interest on this sent abroad for the duration of their lives. (Fichte 2012: 192-93)

Earlier Vollmar suggests the confiscation of all property as well as all traded securities, including obligatory bills and promissory notes, in which case émigrés can potentially only take precious metals and jewellery, which is equivalent to Fichte's "cash": even if there was some amount of money, issued by the new government, in one's possession, it couldn't be spent abroad.

Vollmar's verdict echoes the above fragment from Fichte, though his word choice is a bit more straightforward:

> Those who have metal money in their possession can turn it into goods or services following one of the two paths: they can either give up their money to the state which has to make payments to the foreign countries — and get their compensatory rent in exchange or, they can just get out of the country with their money-bags. Our state has no reason to hinder them from doing so: the fewer layabouts, the better. It remains to be seen, by the way, for how long they will manage to linger on there. (Fol'mar 1995: 68)

Not only Vollmar does reformulate (and simplify) Fichte but he also uses — more than once — a very distinct word, revealing the same underlying textual source. It's the term *Weltgeld(es)*, the same that Fichte used to designate precious metals, used in foreign trade. In Fichte's work this word is justified by the juxtaposition of *Weltgeld* and *Landesgeld,* — but the second term is absent from Vollmar's text. This word is very rare in Marx and literally non-existent in the 12 volumes of Lassalle's "Collected Speeches and Writings". Tellingly, the very "indispensable prerequisite"[186] of the socialist organization of the state, namely the abolishment of metal money, emerges somewhat unexpectedly — and soon disappears back into thin air. No provisions are made for the exchange of valuables for fiat currency, which is present here in the form of "compensatory rent"[187] only. That said, both Vollmar's favourable candidates for the position of the isolated socialist state, Germany, and France have already introduced fiat money in 1871 and 1874 accordingly. Arguably, this makes Vollmar's knowledge, even if not particularly keen understanding of "The Closed Commercial State", quite clear. Fichte's invisible presence becomes even more evident if one takes into consideration the link between metal money and "exploitation of labour through trade", specifically emphasised by Vollmar. It would be an exaggeration to call this claim essentially non-Marxist, but it's still worth noting that Marx rather favoured than refuted free trade and on

[186] "Notwendige Voraussetzung" Vollmar (1878)

[187] Entschädigungsrente (Vollmar 1878: 19). Interestingly this prolonged form of compensation also appears in the above cited fragment from «The closed Commmercial State", though in the form of interest on the capital given up to the new state.

several occasions even defended it from protectionism. In his view, while free trade was indeed the instrument of exploitation, it was still better for the working class than its rival. In the foreword to the 1888 English edition of Marx's speech on free trade, Engels summarises Marx's position on the subject in the following words:

> While recognizing that protection may still, under certain circumstances, for instance in the Germany of 1847, be of advantage to the manufacturing capitalists; while proving that Free Trade was not the panacea for all the evils under which the working class suffered, and might even aggravate them; he pronounces, ultimately and on principle, in favour of Free Trade. To him, Free Trade is the normal condition of modern capitalistic production. Only under Free Trade can the immense productive powers of steam, of electricity, of machinery, be fully developed; and the quicker the pace of this development, the sooner and the more fully will be realised its inevitable results [...]: a social revolution... (Marx and Engels 1888: 6-7)

Taking this into account, Vollmar's sudden attack on metal money in connection with the refutation of free trade looks much more Fichtean (or, for that matter, Lassallean), than Marxist.

Then Vollmar proceeds to the new economic order, claiming first that socialist transformations will free a "colossal amount of workforce"; all those, who previously were, "against their own wish, either inactive or acted in detriment of the society including full-time servicemen, part of the bureaucracy, temporarily unemployed, etc." (Fol'mar 1995: 69) This additional workforce ensures that no shortages of necessary goods will follow the socialist transition. Apparently, Vollmar envisions some problems with foreign trade, but those are more likely to emerge in the long run. Particularly, he claims that "Germany [...] would very soon work off the necessity to import yearly the amount of grain, flour and meat worth 100 million[188] marks, since it would rationally cultivate vast areas, either cultivated improperly or not cultivated at all at the moment [...] and would very soon become capable of producing these commodities by itself." (Ibid) However, full warranty could only be provided by the

[188] 10 million in Russian translation.

combination of the workforce growth with the regulation of consumption: the state should eliminate “absolute anarchy, profiteering, and fraud […] incompatible with socialist principles” and establish its own trade facilities and thus drive private competitors from the market, specifically by “selling goods both domestic and imported by [state] alone, at cost of production”. This is only possible if private traders are completely deprived of the possibility of buying goods at prices lower than those fixed by the state. Consequently, that requires the socialist transformation of foreign trade.

The state should do the same for this industry as was already done for production and consumption — to release foreign trade from the burden of arbitrariness, imposed on it by private property. In Vollmar’s view, foreign trade is specific for two reasons. Firstly, the “old exploitative economic system won't make way for the new one till trade provides it with opportunities for profiteering” and secondly, the “nature of the foreign trade makes it impossible to deprive it of the capabilities to damage common good, provided by private ownership” (Ibid: 70). Therefore, just as with capital, foreign trade including the entire commercial fleet, should be confiscated immediately and transferred to collective ownership. Vollmar argues that thanks to rational planning foreign trade monopoly will make the socialist state the most wanted trade partner. Therefore it will be able soon to lay down its own terms of trade, and moreover, to affect the whole world market significantly almost without being affected by it in return. Doing business in foreign trade on one's own terms commonly implies significant growth in profits, but Vollmar specifically points out that the socialist state, unlike private entities, doesn’t pursue high profits.

Apparently, Vollmar, unlike Fichte’s does not envisage complete closure, but his intentions to make the socialist state as self-sufficient as possible are evident. In his treatise, Fichte considers three other model behaviours in relation to the world market apart from closure. One of these options, condemned in “The Closed Commercial State” as immoral, is the

behaviour of a rich nation, which "produces, manufactures, and works far more, and far more advantageously, to satisfy the accustomed needs of foreign countries than these work in return to satisfy its needs, selling the results of its work for more money than the latter receive for their work" (Fichte 2012: 148-49). According to Fichte, a "rich nation exchanges [its] surplus for goods that it could do without, and compels the foreigner, who can scarcely pay for the bare necessities, to work for its pleasure. The rich nation, in other words, unceasingly increases the state of its intrinsic prosperity at the expense of the foreigner, whose condition becomes ever more miserable" (Ibid: 149). Vollmar describes a situation in a similar way. He argues that costs of production in the socialist state will be lower than anywhere, and others would be only able of competing by supplying goods of the same quality at lower prices. To be able to do that, capitalist producers can take one of the three paths. First, they can slash capital gain. Second, they can reduce the costs of production and third, they can slash wages. Slashing capital gain is, according to Vollmar, not an option, since it doesn't make sense for the capital. Reduction of costs is "impossible since today's technology doesn't allow for the reduction of the material component". Hence, it is wages that should be slashed. However, this option is also problematic, since due to the capitalist mode of production, workers are already pressed very hard and "it's very doubtful […] that they will easily accept the further deterioration of their condition, particularly with their brethren's favourable position within the socialist society constantly in sight. Besides, *it's unlikely that the socialist state will just passively watch such a situation as it unfolds*" (Fol'mar 1995: 71, empasis added). This can be rearticulated in a slightly more straightforward manner: Vollmar consciously chooses the behaviour, condemned by Fichte, because he sees an opportunity to weaponise it and bring the socialist transition in other countries closer, even though at the expense of his own proletarian "brethren". It's this approach that Bismarck has upbraided SPD for in his Reichstag speech on the Industrial

Insurance in March 1884.[189] Marx, to be fair, implies much the same by his above mentioned speech in defence of free trade.

Having dealt with export issues, Vollmar proceeds to imports. He observes that introduction of the foreign trade monopoly makes state the only importer, and from this deduces that the main economic debate of the time, namely that between the proponents of protectionism and supporters of free trade, is irrelevant when it comes to the commercial relations between the progressive socialist state and its underperforming capitalist rivals: it makes no sense for the state to impose tariffs on itself. In case any particular goods are sold at low prices and therefore are worth importing even when the transportation costs are taken into account, the socialist state can either stop producing such goods and relocate the labour force to those economic sectors where it's much needed or, if prices are low due to predatory pricing or, say, use of slave labour, it can just ban imports. Another option is to sell domestic and imported produce at the same price, — i.e. in this case, at the price of cheaper, imported goods, — and compensate socialist producers from the state budget. This argument can be boiled down to unlimited opportunities for the state to maintain whatever trade balance it pleases.

Finally, the last and, in some sense, probably most impressive part of the "Isolated Socialist State" reflects political, rather than economic issues. Vollmar offers a concise treatment of his view on the challenges the only socialist state in the world is expected to face in terms of international relations. Starting with the economy, Vollmar foresees, first and foremost, extensive inward labour migration. "It's obvious to any reasonable person," —

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[189] In the first part of this speech, promoting the Accident Insurance Bill, the next piece of legislation within the broad "state socialist" agenda, Bismarck specifically addressed Vollmar, who came down from the rostrum just before that, having suggested that the proposed bill was intended to help the Government pass the anti-SPD Socialist Law and condemn the Bill as insufficient and inadequate. Bismarck, in turn, argued that "the Social Democratic leaders wish no advantage for this law, that I understand; dissatisfied workers are just what they need. Their mission is to lead, to rule, and the necessary prerequisite for that is numerous dissatisfied classes. They must naturally oppose any attempt of the government, however well intentioned it may be, to remedy this situation, if they do not wish to lose control over the masses [...]" (Bismarck 1884).

Vollmar argues, — “that our state will become an irresistible attractor for all nations, since […] it will assure for all its citizens both equal political and social rights and living standards, in other countries still the privilege of the few. It will deliver on a promise of emancipation from slavery and exploitation, and bring about human dignity and joy of life for one and all as a result.” (Fol'mar 1995: 72). The socialist state “doesn't discriminate between people of different races or nations” and principally won’t have anything against new settlers. However, limitations will necessarily be imposed on the migratory influx, so that, say, in case of some extraordinary situation abroad, the socialist state wouldn’t end up with a population it fails to feed.

Also, in the spirit of the already familiar approach, control of migration will enforce the oppressed and the exploited all over the world to consider the possibility of achieving victory in their own countries. Every day of such a state’s very existence brings global transformation closer since people of the whole world have a living showcase of the better life right before their eyes. Citizens of the first socialist state are, at the same time, on a great emancipatory mission and they won’t rest until the whole world is liberated. Subsequently, such a state “will, by any means appropriate in such a situation, facilitate the victory of socialism in all other countries at the earliest possible moment” (Ibid: 72). Vollmar argues that while such a stance is predestined to induce hatred on the part of other states, it is highly unlikely that economic sanctions would be imposed or a war would be launched. In terms of the former, capitalist states still require the socialist state’s produce as well as its market to sell their own goods. As for the latter, even the broadest possible coalition is bound to be defeated once it launches a war on the socialist state, — firstly, because its people will defend it vigorously as their true and only fatherland, and secondly, oppressed nations of hostile states will, of course, refuse to fight with their own kind. They are much more likely to turn weapons against their own oppressors instead. “One way or the other,” — Vollmar concludes, — “it won’t be long before our socialist state will cease to be *isolated*” (Ibid: 73).

Despite the ambiguity in relation to the role of the state, Bismarck's social policies and other issues, mentioned earlier, at the moment of writing the "Isolated socialist state" and until the abolition of the Socialist laws, Vollmar was somehow still more inclined to revolutionary Marxism. In 1882 he wrote in the article published by the *Sozialdemokrat:*

> The alienation of the Social Democrats from today's state and today's society becomes stronger and stronger, the gulf between us and our enemies steadily deeper and unbridgeable. And that is a good thing; for in that way the spirit of comradeship, the esprit de corps of the excommunicated and outlaws, our party spirit is mightily strengthened (quoted after Carsten 2016: 318)

Everything changed, however, after Bismarck failed to secure the prolongation of the Socialist Laws in 1890. The SPD had won almost 20% of the votes — and though it didn't mean 20% of seats in the Reichstag, the success was huge and undeniable, since the rise in popularity was somewhat miraculous for the almost banned party: from 7.6% in 1878, when the first Socialist Law was passed by the Reichstag to 19.7%% in 1890. The same year the young Kaiser Wilhelm II had removed Bismarck from the position of the Chancellor of the German Empire. Soon after that Vollmar presented his new view of the party strategy in two "Eldorado speeches"[190]. He has criticized the SPD's revolutionary attitudes, welcomed the "New Course" proposed by Chancellor Caprivi and called for cooperation with the existing German state. This stance was vigorously opposed by the "new orthodoxy" of the party — first and foremost by Karl Kautsky, but also by August Bebel and Eduard Bernstein.

These polemics continued at the Erfurt party congress of 1891 and after that in "Die Neue Zeit", where two articles by Kautsky and one by Vollmar were published in 1892-1893. Kautsky himself had become socialist around 1880 under the influence of Bernstein. In 1891 he visited Marx and Engels in London. While the former disliked him and described as decent, but small-minded,[191] the latter seemed to appreciate at least Kautsky's fidelity and meticulous

[190] Speeches were given in the Eldorado beer hall in Munich
[191] See Blackledge (2006) for details.

approach. Later, when Kautsky moved to London in 1885, the two became friends. Three years later Engels assigned Kautsky to edit the three volumes of Marx's "Theories of Surplus Value". In 1890 Kautsky returned to Germany as a prominent Marxist theoretician. Soon after Engels's death in 1895, Kautsky became the editor of Marx's literary legacy, which sealed his leading position. He was considered *the* orthodox Marxist and wrote the theoretical part of the Erfurt programme, adopted at the *parteitag* in 1891 (practical part was authored by Bernstein). For two decades Kautsky held the informal position of the leading European Marxist and was acknowledged in this capacity not only by the SPD but also by other European socialist and Social-Democratic parties, of the Second International.

As a Marxist, Kautsky was strictly opposed to Vollmar's program. Vollmar, for example, claimed that the working class alone would never secure the party's leading position and suggested the inclusion of small farmers in the party base. This and other provisions, sometimes rather loosely reconsidering important aspects of Marxist theory were to various extents unacceptable to anyone, who, like Kautsky, adhered to the ideas of "Das Kapital". State socialism remained, however, — at least formally — the main issue of disagreement. At the Erfurt Congress, Bebel argued that Vollmar forgot the purpose of reforms, namely to prepare the proletariat to seize power and that his program of cooperation with the existing German state was pointless since this state would eventually collapse. Vollmar challenged Bebel with the suggestion that the Reich would become a democracy in time. Subsequently, collapse would not be imminent and capitalism could be transformed into socialism by parliamentary work and legal means. SPD was a pluralistic party by any standard and in the decades to come Vollmar's reformism, revolutionary Marxism of Kautsky and Bebel and Bernstein's revisionism, co-existed within the party. Kautsky's "Orthodox Marxism", which was intended to consolidate and strengthen the platform of "Classic Marxism" with its numerous omissions and ambiguities,

became the leading ideological current in the party and to a large extent, in the Second International.

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The Erfurt programme was a very important moment in the history of the European Left: a definitive (supposedly) Marxist stand taken by the largest and most influential socialist party of the continent. In 1899 Lenin, who was much more inclined to revolutionary tactics and strategy than almost anyone in the SPD at that point, wrote in the “Draft program of our party”:

> We are not in the least afraid to say that we want to imitate the Erfurt Programme: there is nothing bad in imitating what is good, and precisely today, when we so often hear opportunist and equivocal criticism of that programme, we consider it our duty to speak openly in its favor. Imitating, however, must under no circumstances be simply copying. Imitation and borrowing are quite legitimate insofar as in Russia we see the same basic processes of the development of capitalism, the same basic tasks for the socialists and the working class; but they must not, under any circumstances, lead to our forgetting the specific features of Russia which must find full expression in the specific features of our programme (Lenin 1977b: 235)

In other words, Lenin acknowledged Kautsky's authority though he wanted to keep options open on the ground of national peculiarities. Kautsky wrote a commentary to the program, which was published under the title “The class struggle” in 1892. It was translated into at least 16 languages prior to 1914 and was considered the best popular and at the same time accurate rendition of Marxism[192]. The Erfurt programme with Kautsky's commentary turned young Felix Dzerzhinsky into a Marxist (Kredov 2013). Osip Mandelstam in “Noise of

[192] In Russia the Program was never published without Kautsky’s commentary, at least prior to 1917: text of the program as such was barely 7-8 pages in length. The commentary was in some cases abridged, but still even so, the words “Erfurt programme” meant, for the vast majority of readers, not just a work of several pages, but a book of roughly 180-220 pages, depending on the particular edition. Here these words are used in the same sense.

Time" remembers reading the "Erfurt program" — and once again, for him it served precisely as the text, comprehensible in comparison with "Das Kapital":

> So I got it, got burnt by it, and threw it away: back again to the pamphlets. Och. . . wasn't my splendid Tenishev mentor playing a trick on me? Marx's Capital is the same as Kraevich's Physics. Surely no one can think that Kraevich leads to any new ideas. But a pamphlet plants a little larva — that is just its function. And the larva gives birth to thought. [...] Early, O Erfurt Program, you Marxist propylaea, too early did you train our spirits to a sense of harmoniousness, but to me and to many others you gave a sense of life in those prehistoric years when thought hungered after unity and harmoniousness, when the backbone of the age was becoming erect, when the heart needed more than anything the red blood of the aorta! Is Kautsky Tyutchev?" (Mandelstam 1986: 99-100).

The influence, projected by Kautsky and SPD through the Erfurt programme was enormous.

However, the truth is that the Erfurt programme combined Marxism with substantial Lassallean (and consequently, Fichtean) elements. The text bears obvious traits of the old ideological divisions inside the SPD as well as traits of the compromises reached in course of the party's development. Kautsky's reflections on the "future socialist state" are of primary significance. Remarkably, there's not a single word about the world revolution in either the program itself (endorsed by Engels) or in the commentary. There is one mention of proletarian internationalism, though the wording is careful and doesn't exactly imply the dissolution of states and nations:

> With the extension of the world's commerce, and of production for the world-market, the position of the worker in every country grows ever more dependent on the position of the worker in other countries. The liberation of the working class, accordingly, is a work in which the workmen of all civilized countries are equally involved. In recognition of this, the Social Democratic Party of Germany feels and declares itself to be one with the class-conscious workmen of all other countries. (Russell 1896: 139)

From Kautsky's commentary we also find that unlike Marx, Kautsky shares Fichte's view on the connection between wars and foreign trade:

> Foreign trade has from the beginning played an important part in our industrial system […]. But in the world-market, the capitalists of one nation meet those of another as competitors. In order to oppose these competitors, they call upon their government to maintain their rights, or, better yet, to drive out their foreign competitors altogether. […] Wars are no more dynastic, but commercial, and finally national; they result from economic competition between the capitalists of different nations. (Kautsky 1910: 57)

However, the most interesting part of the commentary deals with the state as such and the international system. On the one hand, there's a chapter on state socialism, in which Kautsky raises direct objections to the concept, which enjoyed a remarkable popularity within the party. The author, however, claims that one shouldn't expect dissolution of the state after the socialist transformation. On the contrary,

> among the social organizations in existence today there is but one that has the requisite dimensions, that can be used as the requisite field, for the establishment and development of the Socialist or Co-operative Commonwealth, and that is the modern state. Indeed, so great is the development that production has reached in some industries and so intimate have become the connections between the several capitalist nations that one might almost question whether the limits of the state are sufficiently inclusive to contain the Co-operative Commonwealth. (Ibid: 101)

As to the nature of the international system, which would presumably emerge from the multitude of the Co-operative Commonwealths (sozialistische Genossenschaft), each within the limits of the former capitalist state, Kautsky's view is strikingly Fichtean. While Vollmar expects his "isolated socialist state" to conduct rather active foreign trade and specifically notes that the situation of self-sufficiency is anything but natural, Kautsky claims that

> The present expansion of international intercourse is due, not so much to the existing conditions of production as to the existing condition of exploitation. The greater the extension of capitalist production in a country and the intenser the exploitation of the working class, the larger also, as a rule, is the surplus of products that cannot be consumed in the country itself and that, consequently, must be sent abroad. [...] The capitalists are after purchasers, not after consumers. [...] When exploitation shall have ceased, and production for use shall have taken the place of production for

> sale, exportation, and importation of products from one state to another will fall off greatly. (Ibid: 101-102)

He refers to Ireland and Russian Empire that export grain while suffering from famine and adds that "the existing commerce between the several nations will not entirely disappear" due to both the size of some industries, necessarily demanding international markets, and existence of a whole range of products, which can't be grown domestically, like coffee. At this point, Kautsky offers his readers one more familiar insight: new states will be able to maintain relative self-sufficiency since the existing capitalist states tend to "expand in response to the demands of economic development"[193] and at the time of the socialist transformation they will be presumably, large enough. One way or another, what may be expected to be left of foreign trade (which is at this point termed rather "exchange of products", than trade), "will not […] endanger the economic independence and safety of the several nations so long as they produce all that is actually necessary and exchange with one another superfluities only. A Co-operative Commonwealth co-extensive with the nation could produce all that it requires for its own preservation" (Ibid: 102-103). As Marx and Engels never addressed the question of foreign trade between the socialist states, no one can accuse Kautsky of deviation from the Marxist orthodoxy in regard to this issue. Nevertheless, his almost direct invocation of the distinctly Fichtean image of the future, in which economic exchange dies out and self-sufficient (if not autarkic) states constitute some kind of "non-communal multitude", is quite remarkable.

In Kautsky and more generally in the SPD ideology the complex dynamics of the two modes of utopian thinking, — temporal and spatial, — is already very obvious. While formally Kautsky adheres to Marxism or, in other words, to the programmatic utopia of the social process, the utopia of the spatial form is still present in his texts. It forms something of an

[193] Which is easy, as Kautsky observes, for the US, Russian Empire and Britain "enabled by its sea power", while the nations of continental Europe are "worst off […] in this respect; they, as well as others, require territorial expansion, but they are so closely hemmed in by one another that none can grow except at the expense of some other." (Ibid: 104)

undercurrent. These two utopian models had been coexisting in German socialist thought for decades. The peace ceased to exist on 28 July 1914, the very same moment Europe went to war. German social democracy was confronted with a choice, and made this choice — in favor of Fichte and Lassalle, at the expense of Marx.

Chapter Three. Stalinist state: Fichtean Utopia and Soviet Reality

1. From writers to readers

The concept of the Stalinist state has a complex nature, in which ideological principles, are closely intertwined with various claims, caused by immediate political and economical agenda, some of which turned out to be instrumental for various purposes — and persisted, having been eventually transformed into somewhat doctrinal positions. As we'll see from the following discussion, even in its early phase, when structures and practices were constantly changing, the Soviet project bears a significant resemblance to Fichte's Closed Commercial State. There are at least two possible ways to address this similarity, which can, for the purposes of discussion, be denoted as "utilitarian" and "ideological".

In the first case, the reason for the emergence of the Fichtean scheme can explained by immediate necessity, while in the second it follows on the pursuit some objective, not necessarily rational or pragmatic, but ideologically important. In terms of the "utilitarian" approach, the resemblance of the Stalinist state and the Closed Commercial State could be explained, by what Evgeniĭ Preobrazhenskiĭ termed "socialist accumulation". Indeed, the economy built in the pre-war USSR seems to be very much fit for the purpose of maximum capital accumulation, being effectively a machine, extracting rent from natural resources through foreign trade and foreign currency monopolies. Additional capital is accumulated by extensive exploitation of prison labour. The latter allows for obtaining, so to say, "direct" profits— by using low-cost labour generally and particularly by allocating this low-cost labour in the areas, where otherwise labour costs would be immeasurably higher. "Indirect" profits, on the other hand, are obtained by consumption and wages regulation — also in order to decrease labour costs, but throughout the parts of economy outside the GULAG. All this results in the maximization of natural resources, rent as well as the profitability of exports in general. As for the second, "ideological" approach, one can hypothesize, that the emergence of the Stalinist

state was the result of consistent and unfailing pursuit of “planned development”. Indeed, once centralized planning becomes indisputable, minimization of spontaneous activity becomes crucial. In these circumstances, the Fichtean scheme, originally designed to minimize contingencies, originating from *Handelsanarchie*, the “commercial anarchy”, is a very natural choice.

Whatever the case, it seems necessary to explore the possible ways in which ideas were transferred. It’s clear from the previous discussion that such a transfer was indeed happening, — and that it’s main route lay through the orthodox Marxism of German social democracy, which has never parted with its Lassallean inheritance and thus leaned towards state socialism and statism in general with universalist, “cosmopolitan” aspects of classical Marxism being much less pronounced than, for instance, in the French social democratic tradition. After the defeat of the Paris Commune, however, the last couldn’t compete with German socialists for influence and at least since the abolition of Bismarck’s Socialist laws in March 1890, the global socialist agenda was to a great measure defined by SPD. It appears that Kautsky, who undoubtedly wielded the major influence on Lenin (and not on Lenin alone), left a particularly deep imprint on the late developments in Russian Marxism. Kautsky himself never belonged to the Lassallean part of the SPD, on the contrary, since Engels chose him be the editor of Marx's "Theories of Surplus Value" in 1888, his position as the most prominent leaving Marxist theoretician became more or less incontestable. However, as we saw, at this point Lassallean influence managed to melt into the SPD ideology and turned into an influential undercurrent within the Party’s ideology. This is vividly illustrated, for instance, by the fate of the Erfurt Programme, which is itself quite Marxist, unlike, on many occasions, Kautsky’s elaborated commentary, which has achieved spectacularly wide readership.

However, we have to deal with the question of the possibility of direct influence or, in other words, the evidence of Stalin or other leading figures in the Party being familiar with

either Fichte's treatise or Vollmar's "Isolated Socialist State". Fichte in general was widely read by Russian intellectuals, mostly, but not necessarily left-leaning, both before and after Russian translations were published: Mikhail Bakunin, a loyal and involved reader of Fichte is just one example.[194] It's hard to say if the first, 1883 edition of "The Closed Commercial State" had any considerable impact on the broad audience, but the treatise was known to those who had a particular interest in the philosophy of law, social philosophy and similar fields. Petr Struve paid significant attention to Fichte's political writings, both during his Marxist period and after that[195]. Revolutionary, journalist and writer German Lopatin, philosophy historian Alexandr Kubitskiĭ, philosophers Semen Frank and Ivan Il'in all wrote on Fichte on more than one occasion. Philosopher (and Master of Law) Boris Vȳsheslavtsev published an article "Rationale for socialism in Fichte" (Vȳsheslavtsev 1908), in which he reflects upon "The Closed Commercial State" at length. Vȳsheslavtsev refers to "The Closed Commercial State" as "the first word of the idealist philosophy on socialism" [196] and writes quite sympathetically about the principles, upon which the Fichtean state is based. However, Vȳsheslavtsev argues, "this whole project must be recognized as disastrous even for its time,"[197] because Fichte "restores the antique idea of the self-sufficient state […], absolutely inapplicable to the new world"[198]. Vȳsheslavtsev recognizes closedness as the unconditional basis of the project and comes to a conclusion as naïve as it is incisive: Fichte's state is unviable because "constant police supervision, creation of a police state will be necessary for all these measures to be accomplished."[199]

Another prominent thinker who particular interest in Fichte was Boris Chicherin, founder of Russian constitutional law, author of the "History of political doctrines" in five

[194] See, for example, Nettlau (1920: 7-13)
[195] See Struve (1997: 307-13) and (1902 84-120). Struve also wrote two articles on Lassalle, one including an inquiry into Lassalle's connection to Fichte (Ibid 259-278).
[196] …первое слово идеалистической философии о социализме. (Vȳsheslavtsev 1908: 586)
[197] … необходимо признать весь этот проект крайне неудачным, даже для своего времени. (Ibid 585)
[198] …реставрирует античную идею самодостаточности государства, [...] совершенно неприложимую к новому миру. (Ibid 585)
[199] Для осуществления всех этих мер требуется непрерывный полицейский надзор, организация полицейского государства (Ibid)

volumes and uncle of Georgiĭ Chicherin, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1918-1930. His views on Fichte as a political thinker and philosopher of law in general and on the "The Closed Commercial State" are found in the third volume of "History of political doctrines" (Chicherin 1874). Chicherin argues that while Rousseau was Fichte's point of departure, in "The Closed Commercial State" he has moved over "to the levellers' theory"[200] or, as he further clarifies, to socialism. Chicherin claims that Fichte completely breaks off with the Kantian political doctrine and, almost in the same way as Vȳsheslavtsev, points out that in this system "police should be aware of any citizen's whereabouts and of what he's doing at the moment" and to make their task easier citizens "should have passports on them for purposes of identification" (Ibid 434). Approaching Fichte from the perspective of legal theory, Chicherin argues that he has come to the erroneous conclusions due to his fallacious understanding of right: the notion of right only includes the "formal principle, freedom of action", while Fichte's *Recht* includes also "the very content of action, achievement of the goals", meaning that in Fichte someone has not only just right to life, but "right to a pleasant life", which consequently has to be delivered by the state, since the state ensures rights (Ibid 435). Significantly, neither Vȳsheslavtsev nor Chicherin cast any doubts upon the socialist nature of Fichte's project.

After the revolution, "The Closed Commercial State" was published once more, in 1923 by the "Krasnaya Nov'" publishing house of Glavpolitprosvet, which was at the time part of Glavpolitprosvet[201], which, in turn, operated under Narkompros.[202] Just a year earlier, in 1922 both agencies were set up to direct and supervise "propaganda of communism" (Eimermacher 2004: 9) — apparently the publication of "The Closed Commercial State" was understood in terms of such. In 1924, with yet another effort to centralise book publishing, "Krasnaya Nov'"

[200] ...к теории уравнителей. (Chicherin 1874: 432)
[201] Chief Administration for Political Education (Главный Политико-Просветительный Комитет)
[202] People's Commisariate of Education (Народный Комиссариат Просвещения)

was transferred under Gosizdat[203]. Within both structures "Krasnaya Nov'" was publishing the larger part of propagandist and more generally, ideological literature, including verbatim reports from the party congresses, historical accounts of revolutionary movements, translated works by prominent foreign Marxists including, among others, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky; utopian texts from the past and more up-to-date brochures by Lenin, Bukharin, Lunacharskiĭ and other prominent party leaders. "Krasnaya Nov'" was also the publisher of the literary magazine of the same-name, where many texts by Babel, Platonov, Pilnyak, Gladkov and others had appeared. The publication of "The Closed Commercial State" might very well have been initiated by Lunacharskiĭ, who was the People's Commissar for education within which "Krasnaya Nov'" operated at the time. Lunacharskiĭ is known for his interest in Fichte[204], though he never wrote on his political philosophy, concerning himself more with Fichte's educational ideas. It is also significant that the foreword to the book was written by Vladimir Nevskiĭ, R.S.D.R.P. member since 1898, one of the founders of Istpart[205] and generally speaking, one of the first historians of the revolution and of post-revolutionary Russia. For the most part Nevskiĭ's foreword explains the historical context, describing Germany at the turn of 18th and 19th centuries. Nevskiĭ also comes to the conclusion that "The Closed Commercial State" is not progressive enough, — but mostly because the only state that Fichte experienced first-hand was Friedrich's Germany. This means, he had no access to the facts that could make his project less utopian and more revolutionary. However, Nevskiĭ comes to the conclusion that Fichte's treatise has an extremely valuable point, namely, consistent "emphasis put on the fundamental, paramount aspect of any future rational state, specifically, public, state

[203] State Publishing House (Государственное издательство)
[204] See, for example, Lunacharskiĭ (1925: 38-46)
[205] Commission on the History of the October Revolution and the Russian Communist Party (Комиссия по истории Октябрьской революции и РКП (б))

regulation of production, essential condition of an overleap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom"[206]

At least from 1923 Fichte is routinely referred to as the earliest forerunner of German socialism, if not actually socialist himself. This view was also facilitated in the numerous works of the German Marxist historian Frantz Mehring, published in a Russian translation both before the revolution and throughout the 1920s[207]. Mehring generally approves of Fichte, but one fragment from his "On guard for Marxism" may arouse suspicion in a reader that the author probably has his reservations: "one is tempted to call [Fichte] real and true founder of German socialism. […] the "Closed Commercial state", however, proves to be the kind of utopia whose embodiment today even the most furious reactionary would repudiate any connection with aghast."[208] Lyubov' Aksel'rod, revolutionary and prominent Marxist philosopher, seems to be, on the contrary, in agreement with the "Closed Commercial State": "Fichte has developed his plan [...] of the future state in the social philosophy project under the title "Der geschlossene Handelstaat". This project, upon which we have no possibility to reflect in detail here, is, of course, utopian. This fact, however, in no way diminishes Fichte's significance in the history of the socialist ideas and the brilliant philosopher is in fact the first socialist in Germany, albeit a utopian socialist, for sure."[209] Finally, Abram Deborin, another prominent Soviet Marxist philosopher, head of Philosophy at the Institute of Red Professorship since 1921 then deputy dean for research at Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels Institute in 1924-1931 and contributing

[206] …подчеркивание коренной, главнейшей черты всякого будущего государства разума, именно, государственного, общественного регулирования производства, условия, без которого нельзя перескочить из царства необходимости в царство свободы. (Fikhte 1923: 15)
[207] See Mering (1906) and (1924)
[208]… [Фихте] хочется назвать «настоящим и действительным основателем немецкого социализма [...]. Однако "замкнутое торговое государство" […] представляет собою утопию, от практического осуществления которой, в настоящее время, с ужасом стал бы открещиваться даже самый яростный реакционер. (Mering 1927: 98)
[209] План создания [...] государства будущего Фихте развил в философско-социальном проекте, носящем заглавие: «Der geschlossene Handelstaat». Этот проект, в рассмотрение которого мы конечно здесь входить не можем, представляет собою утопию. Но это обстоятельство нисколько не умаляет значение Фихте в истории развития социалистических идей, и гениальный философ является первым социалистом в Германии, конечно утопическим. (Aksel'rod 1933: 49)

editor of the leading Soviet theoretical publication “Under the Banner of Marxism” (Под знаменем марксизма) since 1922, published his detailed study of Fichte’s political philosophy in three issues of the above mentioned journal[210] under the title “Fichte and the Great French Revolution”, which touches upon “The Closed Commercial State”, though Deborin doesn't reflect on the project in any detail[211].

The last reading of Fichte to be mentioned here is the unfinished and unpublished article by Iosif Lapidus, “J. G. Fichte’s place in the history of German economic thought”, written in 1939-1941[212]. This text is arguably the draft of the thesis in the history of economic thought, which was never written: the author was reported missing in action some time in autumn 1941, during the Battle of Moscow. Lapidus takes particular interest in “The Closed Commercial State”, which he analyses from the point of view best of all described as Soviet Marxist. He considers Fichte's ideas “socialist”, acknowledges his “bourgeois” progressism and refutation of feudal economic and political practices. Lapidus also specifically emphasises Fichte’s “critique of capitalism”, rare in the economic thought of the period. This critique is apparently insufficient: as Lapidus points out, Fichte has chosen one separate part of the capitalist machinery, — means of exchange, — for his attacks. Generally, Lapidus performs quite an orderly and thorough analysis, even if doing so within an enormously tight and rigid ideological frame. What makes this text really interesting is two things. First is the choice of the subject: Fichte’s political economy as such was never or almost never addressed by the Soviet

[210] See Deborin (1924) and (1925)

[211] “Under the Banner of Marxism” returns to Fichte at least twice during the 1930s. In June 1937 Valentin Asmus reviews the Russian translation of Fichte’s “The vocation of the scholar”, published same year (Asmus 1937). In 1938 Sergeĭ Pichugin, then head of the Philosophy department at V. I. Lenin Military-Political Academy, reviewed the “Sun-Clear Report to the Public at Large concerning the Actual Character of the latest Philosophy: An Attempt to Force the Reader to Understand”, published in Russian, once again in 1937 (Pichugin 1938). Finally, in 1942 Valentin Asmus drew his pen against the “fascist myth of Fichte”. His lengthy article “The actual Fichte and the fascist myth of Fichte” (Asmus 1942) is quite an elaborated and vigorous argument against the selective use of Fichte by Nazi propaganda. The last has indeed invested — and to some purpose — considerable effort into censoring and reassembling Fichte’s political philosophy as proto-Nazi.

[212] This text (with rather extensive commentary) was published in 2004 by the Bashkir State University in an edition of 150 copies (Lapidus 2004).

scientists after Deborin's 1925 article, mentioned above. "J. G. Fichte's place in the history of German economic thought" is the only known text ever written by a Soviet scientist dealing specifically with this part of Fichte's work. Second is the status of the author. Iosif Lapidus was a quite prominent political economist, who had authored (together with Konstantin Ostrovityanov) the very first Soviet textbook of political economy, "An outline of political economy: political economy and Soviet economics"[213], published in 1928. This book has gone through at least seven editions and was translated into almost twenty languages.

2. From the Riddle of History Solved to the World Communist State

In this section we shall discuss similarities, — and, to some extent dissimilarities, between the conceptual visions suggested by Fichte and Vollmar and the realities of the Stalinist State. Drawing parallels — or distinctions — between the governmental practices and either utopian (as in Fichte) or somewhat erratic and essentially hypothetical (as in Vollmar) ideas is not an easy task. Yet, it's necessary, since the language of policy decisions is exactly the medium through which utopia comes into being.

The Stalinist vision of the future is a natural starting point for such discussion. Stalin's (rather scarce) suggestions on his idea of the future society will be juxtaposed below not only with Fichte's and Vollmar's projects but also with equally scarce (and permitting for quite broad interpretations) evidence found in Marx and Engels. In this part, we'll also touch upon the issue of centralized planning. Then we'll review two particular policy domains, largely defining the interrelation between the Stalinist State and its imaginary counterparts, namely monetary and foreign trade. Finally, the concluding part of the chapter presents the overview of the ideas

[213] Политическая экономия в связи с теорией советского хозяйства (Lapidus and Ostrovityanov 1928)

transfer as well as the detailed account of Stalin’s previously unknown encounter with Vollmar’s treatise.

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Almost all varieties of Marxism, as multiple and sometimes irreconcilable as they are — from the reformism of Vollmar or Austro-Marxism to Stalinism or post-war militant Trotskyism, have at least one distinctive feature in common. All of them adhere to the long and deeply rooted tradition of avoiding comprehensive depictions of future society. Not only subsequent Marxists but even Marx and Engels themselves were thoroughly convinced that it was not their task, as Kautsky once wrote, “to invent recipes for the kitchens of the future” (Kautsky 1908a: 103). According to George Sorel, German economist Lujo Brentano recalled that Marx in his 1869 letter to his friend, the historian Edward Spencer Beesly, who had published an article on the future of the working class,[214] wrote that while previously “he had looked upon [Beesly] as the sole revolutionary Englishman”, he started to regard him as a reactionary after the publication – for, as Marx wrote, “whoever draws up a programme for the future is a reactionary” (Sorel and Jennings 1999: 128). The reasons for such assessment shouldn't be reduced to the commonly encountered claim that Marxist parties, in general, tended to prioritize strategies and tactics of a power struggle over comprehensive conceptual visions of the future.[215] Reluctance to speculate about a future society was supported by at least two arguments. It was, in the first instance, impossible to think oneself out of the present condition and foresee not only future challenges, but also ways to address them; there are too many indeterminates in the equation. Secondly, there was a focal concern about idealism, somewhat

[214] Brentano presumably refers to the “The social future of the working class: a lecture delivered at a meeting of the Trades' Unionists, May 7, 1868” (Beesly 1869)
[215] See, for example, Kuz'minov (1994: 3-4)

inherent in any blueprint of the future society. This argument was closely linked to the antagonism between Marxism as “scientific socialism” and the “utopian” socialism of its predecessors, who assumed that once a consistent plan for the better society is conceived and properly promoted, reason will make this plan come into being.[216]

Sure enough, there were a number of authors, both Marxists like Josef Dietzgen[217] or near-Marxists like Karl Ballod (Atlanticus),[218] who did describe their visions of the future in relatively fine detail. Eventually, August Bebel and even Kautsky himself found themselves bowing to the pressure from SPD supporters and rivals and started writing and publishing texts which were little more than future-oriented reflections on what future society might look like[219]. However, elaborated concepts of the future are scarce in Russian Marxism. The voluminous collection “Images of the future in Russian socio-economic thought of late 19th — early 20th century” (Kuz'minov 1994) represents Marxism only by the works of the so called “legal Marxists” like Mikhail Tugan-Baranovskiĭ, Petr Struve, Nikolaĭ Berdyaev and Sergeĭ Bulgakov and a significant part of their texts, chosen for the collection, was written well after their authors have broken off their ties with the Marxist tradition altogether. Stalin himself was no exception in this regard, and this makes the reconstruction of a coherent vision of the future which could be recognised as distinctly Stalinist a highly difficult task. As Geroid Robinson observed, Stalin appears to be “a rather irresponsive witness” in regards to the question of the future (Robinson 1955: 12). However, some particularities of the desired state of things can still be found in his works.

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[216] For further discussion see, for example, Levitas (1989).

[217] Dietzgen held that “socialists must not, in much the same way that pastor does, separate this world from that world, the future from the present” (Dietzgen 1907: 11). For Russian translation see Ditsgen (1906)

[218] See Ballod (1920)

[219] Bebel elaborated on the socialist future in the last chapter of his “Woman and Socialism”, originally published in 1879. This chapter was later published separately in Russian and English under the title “Society of the Future” (Bebel 1971). We have already discussed some of Kautsky’s predictions from the “Erfurt programme”. Those from the “Social revolution” and “Labour revolution” will be discussed in relation to the Soviet monetary policies. Kautsky, however, remains reluctant to make future-oriented inquiries: his forecasts and visions of things to come routinely come ripe with full-length disclaimers and warnings against predictions as such and to an even greater extent, their literal interpretation.

In classic Marxism or, more specifically, in Engels' "Anti-Dühring", in communist society the state "is dying out" (Engels 1987: 268) or, in other, more often cited translation, "is withering away". Communism, therefore, is not only classless but also a stateless society. Stalin never openly disputed this idea — unlike many other provisions found in Marx and especially Engels, — but rather, in his usual way, "took it further". Withering of the state, according to Stalin, had to come not by the way of gradual weakening of state power, but on the contrary, "as a result of strengthening it to the utmost, which is necessary for finally crushing the remnants of the dying classes and for organising defence against the capitalist encirclement that is far from having been done away with as yet, and will not soon be done away with." (Stalin 1954g: 215)

Stalin's views on the future in relation to international politics have undergone considerable transformations. In 1922, before the Treaty on the Creation of the USSR was signed on 29 December 1922, Stalin expressed the hope that "the new Union State will be another decisive step towards the union of the working people of the whole world into a World Soviet Socialist Republic" (Stalin 1953: 158). Such a republic was for him a precondition for the emergence of the global communist society. Moreover, the "Program of the Communist International", adopted in 1928, claims that the united World Socialist Republic is a prerequisite for the transition to socialism, since the establishment of the world proletarian dictatorship, essential for this transition, will only become possible after previously formed large socialist "federations of republics have finally grown into a World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics uniting the whole of mankind under the hegemony of the international proletariat organized as a State" (Program of the Communist International 1929: 36). Thus, even the worldwide victory of the socialist revolution here does not result in the state "withering away". In 1939 Stalin once claimed that the state will persist "in the period of Communism also [...], unless the capitalist encirclement is liquidated, and unless the danger of foreign military attack has

disappeared". Still, the state "will atrophy if the capitalist encirclement is liquidated and a Socialist encirclement takes its place." (Stalin 1978: 422) In 1950, Stalin altered the thesis once more, positing this time that, "Engels' formula has in view the victory of socialism in all, or in most, countries." (Stalin 1972a: 48). Moreover, in the "Economic problems of socialism", published just two years later, he returns to Engels once again, to confirm this new theoretical development: "with the extension of the sphere of operation of socialism in the majority of the countries of the world the state will die away." (Stalin 1972b: 91). This theoretical trajectory amounts to the gradual abolition of the concepts of world revolution and global communist society. That change opens the way to (or even demands) the next step, the acknowledgement of the possibility of building not only socialism but "communism in one country."[220] Of course, ideological fluctuations were partially determined by the immediate political situation, but it would be too simplistic to explain Stalin's theory of the state dying by "strengthening to the utmost" as designed solely to justify the escalation of terror and oppression.

While this idea gave the theoretical basis for an unprecedented level of violence, it also reveals the basic conflict between classic Marxism, inclined (in Kantian spirit) to favour society over state — and the Fichtean/Hegelian worldview subordinating society to the organizing principle of state sovereignty. While Marx has never fully committed himself to either side of this debate, his later works, including, but not limited to *Grundrisse* (1859, unfinished) and in "The Civil War in France" (1871), suggest that he has distanced himself from the Hegelian position in relation to state and civil society.[221] Instead, in "The Civil War in France", for

[220] Arguably, this step was made just nine years after the publication of the "Economic problems of socialism in the USSR", in 1961, by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU which has adopted the Third Program of the CPSU. The last was roughly a plan to attain communism in course of the two decades to follow. The Program's famous concluding line, "The Party solemnly proclaims: the present generation of Soviet people shall live in communism!" (Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1963: 143) is still commonly invoked by the Russian media on the occasion of any unsubstantiated optimistic claim about the country's future coming from one of the high-ranking government officials.

[221] The same preference of society over state is quite pronounced in Marx's "Critique of the Gotha Program" (1875), which amounts to a vigorous attack on the Lassallean trends within German social democracy. See Levine (2018: 174-77) for more detailed analysis.

instance, he makes a clear argument for decentralization, praisingng substitution of the regular army and police forces by militia and local accordingly (Marx 1986: 331-32). He also suggests substitution of the centralized government by local communes, arguing that national unity has "to be organized by the Communal constitution, and to become a reality by the destruction of the State power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excrescence" (Ibid: 332-333). Consequently, public servants, including magistrates and judges are to be "elective, responsible, and revocable" (Ibid: 332). Finally, Marx claims that "while the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority usurping pre-eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible agents of society" (Ibid: 333). With that in mind, it's safe to say that in the conflict between Fichtean/Hegelian statism and the Kantian view of civil society as taking precedence over the state, Stalin and Marx were certainly on the opposite sides of the barricades.[222] While the noticeable inconsistency of Stalin's thinking about the fate awaiting the state is surely determined by immediate political and economic agenda, it reveals at the same time, the simmering theoretical conflict or, to be more precise, one of the aspects of the overarching conflict, constitutive for the whole Soviet period, — the one, interpreted within this study in terms of two scarcely reconcilable modes of utopian thinking.

This unresolved conflict is probably even more evidently revealed by one more striking uncertainty relevant for the understanding of the similarity between the Stalinist state and Fichte's project. This uncertainty pertains to the question of the way governmental power is institutionalized, if at all, in communist society. The positions of both Fichte and Marx are consistent. Political institutions originate from the necessity to resolve conflicts, and that's the precise reason why Marx's conflictless communist society does not envisage them. As it is often

[222] The same is true in relation to Lenin, whose understanding of Marx and Marxism was "filtered mainly through his reading of Engels" (Rockmore 2018: 8). Engels's statism will be shortly discussed below.

acknowledged, communism in Marx is politically much closer to self-regulating anarchy than to democracy of any kind.[223] Indeed, communism "is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man, [..] between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species." (Marx 1987: 296). Being not only "the riddle of history solved" but also a solution itself, communism does not need means for conflict resolution, including governing authority.

However, even if political governance is superfluous, the management of the economy of the communist society poses a real problem. Under communism economic activities are presumably rationally planned in advance, allowing for the most efficient use of resources and satisfaction of people's needs, while "constant anarchy and periodical convulsions which are the fatality of capitalist production" (Marx 1986: 335) cease to exist. Nevertheless, while scarce and very general comments on the concept of planning exist in Marx and Engels, all of those relate to the transitional phase. The previously cited 1871 address of the General Council of the First International, "The Civil War in France," authored by Marx, is one of the rare articles which mentions planning: in this instance in relation to the takeover of the factories, closed by their owners when the Paris Commune came to power or earlier, in course of the German siege of Paris in the autumn of 1870. Marx claims that "if united co-operative societies are to regulate national production upon a common plan, thus taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy," etc., it's nothing else but communism.[224] The "Communist Manifesto" mentions planning only once and not in connection with the industrial production, but with "the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally" which should happen "in accordance with a common plan" (Marx and Engels 1976: 505).

[223] See, among others, Levine (2018); Chattopadhyay (2018); Ollman (2007) and Burkett (2005).
[224] "Socialism" according to the terminology used elsewhere in this thesis.

Unlike Marx, Engels never prioritized society over state and generally was closer to the Fichtean/Hegelian view of the subject than his colleague.[225] Understandably, he also puts more emphasis on planning. A Historical retrospective, suggested in "Anti-Dühring" describes progressive development from chaos to order through the extension of planning scope: during the Middle ages only "spontaneous division of labour" existed, "grown up spontaneously and upon no definite plan". At the dawn of the industrial age, that is, with the emergence of the factory, spontaneous division of labour was superseded with more advanced division, organized "upon a definitive plan" (Engels 1987: 256). Consequently, with the next stage of development Engels expects the emergence of the "society, organised for co-operative work on a planned basis to ensure to all members of society the means of existence and of the free development of their capacities, and indeed in constantly increasing measure." (Ibid 139) Apparently, Engels assumes that planning on a growing scale will propel productivity of labour to new highs. Even more significantly, he asserts that "only conscious organisation of social production, in which production and distribution are carried on in a planned way, can lift mankind above the rest of the animal world as regards the social aspect, in the same way that production in general, has done this for mankind in the specifically biological aspect." (Ibid 331). Thus, economic planning becomes an anthropological feature finding its place side by side with religion and culture, widely acknowledged as such by his contemporaries. However, Engels neither cites any particularities of future planning, nor elaborates at any time on these ambitious visions.

Some scholars argue that centralized planning is implied in the concept of alienation, central to young Marx. The viewpoint of Paul Roberts, whose book "Alienation and Soviet Economy" presents this argument in full length, is that, according to Marx, alienation can only be overcome when the principle of autonomous producers organized into a network of market

[225] For details see Sekelj (1988: 506-09) and Mor (2017).

relationships is superseded by another type of organization, being a single factory embracing the whole society. Alienation will be transcended by the transformation of the economic system, which results in the transformation of relations between people. Apparently, the principle of "single factory" can be implemented by means of centralized planning only — or at least, it's the most effective way to do so. Thus "inevitable change from autonomous commodity production to conscious planning frees man from an illusory and false consciousness and ends his alienation." (Roberts and Wildavsky 2017: 42). Roberts also argues that this was exactly Lenin's understanding of what constitutes the core of centralized planning, and that war communism as such was inspired by this interpretation of Marx (Ibid 54-84).

However, if the rational goal-oriented planning as a principle can be deduced from the provisions of either classic or, at least, orthodox Marxism, — and mostly from Engels's works, — the central planning of the Soviet variety is barely compatible with such provisions. The Soviet model of planning comes, in fact, from an entirely different source, having little in common with Marxism or, for that matter, even socialism. It took shape during the war under the heavy influence of Walther Rathenau, German industrialist (and also banker, thinker, minister of Reconstruction and later Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic) who had effectively turned the rather clumsy imperial economy into a smoothly running war machine in the course of a few months. Rathenau in turn, is thought to be indirectly influenced by Friedrich List, whose "National System of Political Economy" planted seeds of the idea of centralized planning in the minds of German economists[226] several decades earlier. These seeds came up well and in due time yielded the fruit of Rathenau's *Kriegssozialismus,* military socialism.

It comes as little surprise that Bolsheviks, including Lenin, were very impressed with the processes in the German economy that started to unfold right before their eyes as soon as the war broke out. Edward Carr (Carr 1952: 361-65) cites enthusiastic articles on German war

[226] See, among others, Carr (1947: 20-32) and Clairmonte (1959). We'll return to List's "National system of Political Economy" later.

economy by Yuriĭ Larin, member of the Menshevist faction during the war years, who would convert in 1917 to become a devoted Bolshevik, one of the key figures behind the emergence of Gosplan, and vociferous proponent of fast-track industrialization. Larin, a man of letters, as we know, had authored a book on the subject, “War-time state capitalism in Germany” (Larin 1928) tellingly published in the first year of the First Five-Year Plan. In early October 1917, Lenin himself wrote that “compulsory syndication […] in associations under state control — this is what […] has been carried out in Germany by the Junkers’ state, this is what can be easily carried out in Russia by the Soviets, by the proletarian dictatorship, and this is what will provide us with a state apparatus that will be universal, up-to-date, and non-bureaucratic.” (Lenin 1964: 108)

As soon as the war broke out, Rathenau published several articles, which can be easily regarded as alarmist: unlike many others, he felt no enthusiasm about the war and was more than concerned about the German economy being incapable of reorganizing itself quickly enough to function in the new circumstances.[227] His concerns were duly noted and in August 1914 the War Materials Department (*Kriegs-Rohstoff Abteilung*) was established. The overall headcount of the department was five people. As of December the same year a whole range of technical departments, charged with tasks involving various raw materials, - metals, wool, timber, food products, - were in operation. Moreover, as of in November 1916 all parts and branches of the authority were centralised under single coordinating Supreme War Office, and finally, in December same year a National Service Law was passed, under which every man between ages 17 and 60 became liable to be sent either to the army or to the factory. (Briggs 1968: 49). As a result, the whole economy or even the whole country worked as a whole under centralised management.

[227] For detailed account of the events see Kessler (1930: 169-221)

This enterprise, highly successful despite the lost war, was very much a particular implication of Rathenau's more broad view of the economic order to come, elaborated upon in his books, two of which were published not long before the war was over and others even later. Rathenau quickly became one of the most prominent political authors of period from the 1900s to the 1920s. German readers, especially after the war, seemed to be in favour of his ideas, notwithstanding his superfluous and obscure style. The popularity of his two most important books — "In Days to Come" and "The New Society" — was considerable[228]. Thanks to Rathenau's style, one doesn,t find his system of ideas presented in a clear and condensed form in any of the above-mentioned books but it is quite clear from the scattered fragments found in various texts that Rathenau was no socialist.

Still he was sure that the time of capitalism was over. Rathenau claimed that "economic affairs are no longer the responsibility of the individual but of society" (Henderson 1951: 104). His main concern was the quest for the most effective utilization of the resources available. To that end, the state had to control not only production (meaning individual output) but also consumption of luxury (cars, private grounds) and unnecessary (tobacco and alcohol) items by the introduction of a 50% tax on any revenue exceeding a certain minimal level, as well as comparable taxes on import, production and even use of of the above. Direct control over the monopolies (which Rathenau considered the only entities capable of producing considerable wealth) had to be established and inherited income eliminated. Rathenau routinely complained about the chaos in foreign trade, which had to be restricted in accordance with the common

[228] "Von kommenden dingen" (Rathenau 1917), published later in English as "In Days to Come" (Rathenau et al. 1921) and "Die neue Wirtschaft" (Rathenau 1918). As far as I know, no English translation of the latter exists. However, at least one more of his books, "Die Neue Gesellschaft" was published in English (The New Society" (1921). Three books by Rathenau were published in Russian, namely "Der Neue Staat" (Новое государство (1922)), "Die neue Wirtschaft" (Новое хозяйство (1923a)) and one pre-war text from 1913, "Zur Mechanik des Geistes" (translated as "Механизация жизни" (1923b)). Rathenau's colleague and financial partner for many years, banker Carl Furstenberg maintained that Rathenau was a brilliant industrialist "whose writings were by no means his greatest achievement." (Henderson 1951: 99). While "In Days to Come", published in February 1917, sold 65 000 copies in little more than a year, as many as 30 000 copies of the next title, "The New Economy" were disposed of in the first month after publication only (January, 1918), effectively having made the author the "most widely read and most passionately discussed of German writers." (Kessler 1930 212-213).

good. Finally, first-hand knowledge of the war-time shortages, caused by the blockade, was used to substantiate Rathenau's post-war argument in favour of rebuilding the German economy according to the principle of *Binnenwirtschaft*, national self-sufficiency. There are more policy items on this prescription, but the overall similarity of his approach to some of those discussed above is strikingly clear. In the end, Yakov Bukshpan[229], the author of the foreword to the “Die Neue Staat” in Russian translation, probably had a point, claiming Rathenau’s ideas socialist, though “not in a common, but rather in a Prussian state way” (Ratenau 1922: 6).

Of course, what was implemented in war-time Germany, was far from socialism even in Lenin’s terms, but he saw the compulsory syndication underlying the whole of Rathenau’s project as indicative of the approaching end of capitalism, which was,— unknowingly, of course — making arrangements for the benefit of its grave-digger before breathing it’s last. While capitalism turned out to possess much more vital force than either Lenin or Rathenau could expect, the playbook, authored by the latter turned into the principal framework of Soviet life for decades. Viktor Chernov, socialist moderate, one of the main figures of the Socialist Revolutionary party made a claim years later, which can be perceived as an ultimate verdict on the role, German “war socialism” played in the fate of the Russian revolution. Mensheviks, Right SRs and other moderate and reformist socialists always opposed Lenin’s militant revolutionary tactics on the grounds that the revolution would be premature in such underdeveloped, largely agrarian country as Russia was. Rathenau’s success empowered Bolsheviks and provided them with a weighty, convincing objection to non-believers:

[229] Economist Yakov Bukshpan was an army supply and logistics specialist before the revolution. In 1920-1922 he was employed by the Commission for study and utilization of the World war and Civil war experience" (Комиссия по исследованию и использованию опыта мировой и гражданской войны). He had also authored an exhaustive volume on war-time economic regulation (Bukshpan 1929), published just a year before his first arrest in connection to the "Case of the Labour Peasant Party" (Трудовая крестьянская партия). The date of publication is, once again, telling — as it is in cases of the aforementioned Larin’s volume (Larin 1928) and the book “The German military economy in 1914-1919” (Khmel'nitskaya 1929).

> The Bolsheviks perfectly understood all the force of this argument, which even they had often repeated, during the epoch of the unity of “Classical” Russian Marxism. But they first found a way out of the contradiction only during the war. The spectacle of highly developed German *Kriegssozialismus*, armed with universal labour conscription, with food, coal, and other dictatorships, with control over industry, up to its compulsory syndicalization, with price-fixing and food-rationing, struck their imagination. It seemed to them that if a similar economic system were put in the hands, not of a bourgeois-junker state, as in Germany, but "the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry," and instead of serving military needs were turned over to the service of peaceful development, then the desired socialist Elysium would have been attained[230]. (Getzler 1973: 111)

While Elysium appeared to be out of reach, the similarity in methods was so obvious that authors of Soviet books on planning felt obliged either to justify them or more often to offer excuses. Vladimir Kantorovich, liberal (in Soviet terms) economist, author of the book on the industrial planning, aiming to support the significance of large syndicates for effective state control over industry, considered it necessary to point out specifically that “a whole range of regulative measures, introduced after the October revolution by the proletarian dictatorship government in terms of both direct and indirect regulation, is similar in appearance with the measures, introduced by the capitalist states in course of the imperialist world war.” The latter was described in considerable detail by Kantorovich, who also wrote well of Rathenau. Sure enough, the necessary caveat read that the “resemblance between the industrial regulation in the capitalist countries during the world war and the Soviet regulation during the Civil War is strictly formal.” As it was the case with Soviet money, discussed below, despite the resemblance, the basic framework used by the two “social systems” were said to be “fundamentally different” (Kantorovich 1925: 51).

[230] Большевики прекрасно понимали силу этого аргумента, который сами часто повторяли во времена верности «классическому» марксизму. Впервые это противоречие было преодолено во время мировой войны. Зрелище высокоразвитого немецкого «военного социализма» со всеобщей воинской повинностью, диктаторским распределением продуктов питания, угля и прочего, контролем над промышленностью (включая обязательное объединение в синдикаты с фиксированием цен и введением продуктовых карточек) подстегнуло воображение большевиков. Если подобная экономическая система окажется в руках не буржуазно-милитаристского государства типа Германии, а в руках «рабоче-крестьянской диктатуры», будет служить не военным нуждам, а мирному развитию, то с помощью такого способа страна достигнет желанного социалистического рая. (Chernov 2007: 111)

Arguably, if classic Marxism ever expected planning to play any significant part during the transition to the new society, it was not quite the hyper-centralized planning that Lenin and others embraced from the war-time economy structures, designed by Rathenau in Germany: communist society in Marx's terms seems to be much closer to some kind of anarcho-syndicalist utopia. Planning is, on the contrary, absolutely essential within the Fichtean framework of statehood. A task of sustaining economy and society in an equable if not static condition required not only complete closure of borders and creation of strategic reserves but also regulated and planned production, consumption, distribution and prices. Extrapolation of the Soviet economy's path of development into the future was very unlikely to result in the state "withering away", but rather in the emergence of a hyper-centralised state.

This obvious contradiction was never really reflected upon within Soviet Marxism. It could be argued that the state with a hyper-centralized planned economy would reach its heyday at the point of transition to communism and *then* wither away. This was, however, not the case. In 1952 Stalin claimed that "With the extension of the sphere of operation of socialism in the majority of the countries of the world the state will die away [...] but society will remain. Hence, the heir of the public property will then be not the state […] but society itself, in the shape of a central, directing economic body." (Stalin 1972b: 91). Apparently, a question arises of how a directing (meaning "governing") body of any kind can be reconciled with statelessness if it has any authority at all. However, it's quite clear that this body is fully empowered — but in what particular sense? Much earlier, in course of the meeting with the American Labour Delegation in September 1927, Stalin, answering the question about the "the characteristics of the future society that communism is trying to create", claimed, among other things that in this society "there will be […] the national economy, organised according to plan" (Stalin 1954j: 139), which apparently meant that in the communist society planning will persist. Thus, it would be in need of a body planning the economic output and therefore, controlling

production. Furthermore, in the "Economic problems of socialism" Stalin discusses the fate of "commodity production", meaning collective farms. While in practice they were, of course, state-owned (or, in official terms, "publicly owned"), in theory, collective farms were not considered as such, which justified persistence of money in the socialist state. So, in theory, collective farms enjoyed some kind of group autonomy. Unlike classic Marxism, the Stalinist variety condemns any kind of socialism based on group autonomy or communal structures (Stalin 1954f: 321-42). Stalin was being very consistent when he hypothesized in 1952 that sooner or later "a single and united sector" would be formed by turning collective farms into "publicly owned" ones. Though Stalin once again said that there was no way to know how exactly this united sector would be formed, he claimed it more likely that "a single national economic body" would be formed "with the right at first to keep account of all consumer product in the country, and eventually also to distribute it." (Stalin 1972b: 16).

Accounting plus distribution amounts to the control of consumption; therefore, in Stalin's Marxism the "single economic body" of the communist society controls production, distribution and consumption, — thus possessing the same powers and performing the same functions as the hypothetical government of the Closed Commercial State. Also, in the same text, an assumption is put forward that within the "system of products-exchange, under which the central government, or some other social-economic centre, might control the whole product of social production in the interests of society" (Ibid 69). While the political system remains a blank spot in this discussion, such a concentration of authority suggests the existence of the state in all-embracing form. This contradiction between the stateless nature of communism, decisively claimed by Marx on the one hand, and the intrinsic logic of the Stalinist project, was never resolved[231].

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[231] This issue, in fact, is even more complex. Stalin, apparently thought that Engels adhered to less statist views than Marx (Ree 2002: 136). As we've already mentioned, in reality he was more statist. This is quite obvious from another fragment from "Anti-Dühring". Just twenty pages before claiming that state is going to "wither away"

3. The Closed Commercial State *vs* Socialism in One Country

Similarities between Fichte's project and the realities of the USSR after the decisive abandonment of NEP are very much in evidence. Scholars had noted such similarities since at least early 1930s. Carlton Hayes in his "Evolution of Modern Nationalism" was arguably the first to write on the subject, even if he confined himself to one very cautious remark at the end of the paragraph on the posthumous influence of "The Closed Commercial State", different aspects of which manifest themselves in Louis Blanc (right to work), Lassalle (praise for the national state), Rodbertus (submission of the citizens' economic activities to state control) and, finally, in the policies of the Bolshevist regime: "… some of the most peculiar economic experiments of the contemporary Bolshevist government in Russia are curiously reminiscent of the counsels of Fichte in the year 1800." (Hayes 1931: 265-66).

The next scholar to reflect on the subject, albeit also very briefly, was Benoy Kumar Sarkar, a prominent Indian sociologist with a very wide range of research interests.[232] In the chapter on the "economic riddle of the Communistic Socialism" in his "Equations of the World Economy", Sarkar points out that the Bolshevist government follows Fichte's recommendations in regards to the state monopoly on foreign trade, as well as to monetary policies. Though "variation from Fichte's programme must not be ignored", Sarkar finds it worth mentioning that

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Engels writes that in the future society the work of the "administrative body" will be dramatically simplified, because in this society it "would have to manage not merely individual aspects of social life, but the whole of social life, in all its various activities, in all its aspects" (Engels 1987: 248). Communism eliminates "the contradiction between the individual man and all others" and counterposes "social peace to social war" and thereby renders "the greatest, by far the greatest, part of the present activity of the administrative and judicial bodies superfluous" (ibid). Janet Campbell points out that a language problem arises here, since notions of "political" and "juridical" turn out to be inapplicable to the communist society, while arbitration (in contradiction to Marx's belief in the final resolution of all conflicts) and administration, albeit of things, not people, in Engels's opinion, persist. (Campbell 1997: 35-40). These either contradictory or, as it is sometimes assumed, just implicit claims, present a vivid example of the overall haziness found in the socialist thought in regards to the future human condition. However, in this case the uncertainty can be probably traced to the perpetual and unavoidable tension between freedom and rationality in Enlightenment thinking. Indeed, if rationally," scientifically" conceived ideal society and a society allowing for the perfect realization of human freedom are one and the same, can state (that is, political power) become obsolescent enough to be reduced to the "administration of things"? Persistence of this tension is, arguably, the actual underlying reason of socialists' reluctance to elaborate on the future state of things.

[232] For details of Sarkar's life and legacy, see Sinha (2017)

"the currency of Soviet Russia is not in any way connected with that of foreign countries. It serves its own internal purpose and is regulated without reference to the international money (gold and silver)." Sarkar rightfully considers this measure "the most decisive factor" in Fichte's system. His conclusion is only slightly more definitive than Hayes's remark: "I am not trying to establish an equation between the ideologies and institutions of the Bolshevik economists and the speculative abstractions of Fichtean idealism. But that the idealistic Utopia of 1800 threw out certain suggestions which it has been possible to work out in the practical Utopia of Soviet communists may not be doubted" (Sarkar 1943: 148-49).

Michael Heilperin reflects on the subject in some detail, at least in comparison with Hayes and Sarkar. In his "Studies in economic nationalism" he dedicates a separate chapter "Fichte's Blueprint for Autarky" to "The Closed Commercial State". Heilperin believes that the economic nationalism of the 20th century draws upon two main sources in the theoretical legacy of the past. The first is mercantilism, and the second, termed "the doctrine of national isolation", can be, in Heilperin's opinion, traced back to Fichte's 1800 treatise. Moreover, he argues that this second source, though much less known,[233] is in fact more important. Heilperin makes an exhaustive review of Fichte's project and proceeds to the specific features of the Fichtean autarkic utopia, noticeable, in his opinion, in the economic policies of both Nazi Germany and USSR.

In relation to the first, the author cites the program of Dr Hjalmar Schacht, a German economist who served as a President of the Reichsbank in 1933–1939 and Minister of Economics in 1934–1937. Heilperin describes Schacht as a proponent of the economic nationalism and the mastermind behind the ""peaceful conquests" of several neighbours of Germany in the Danubian basin, a necessary prelude to military march into Austria (1938) and Prague (Spring 1939) and to the "wars of aggression started on September 1, 1939." (Heilperin

[233] At least in the English-speaking world: first complete English translation was published in 2012.

1960: 63). This is questionable. Schacht indeed proclaimed the course for “autarky” and self-sufficiency in 1934, but he didn’t invent these policies and in course of the following two years opposed this program as well as Hitler’s strive for the broadest possible state control over the economy (Peterson 1954: 242-71). However, this doesn’t make Heilperin’s observation of the similarity between Hitler’s pre-1939 conquests and territorial acquisitions and the process of expansion to the “natural borders”, described by Fichte as a necessary preliminary step to the closure of the “rational state”, any less accurate.

The USSR presents, in Heilperin’s opinion, the most radical variety of Fichtean economic nationalism. Particularly, he argues that while economic nationalism still prevailed after World War II in many countries exercising strict protectionist controls, the “most extreme forms” of it, “those which hark back to Fichte, were limited to the Soviet bloc” (Heilperin 1960: 63). Heilperin also points to Fichte’s suggestion from the sixth chapter of the third part of the “Closed Commercial State” in regards to the “foreign specialists”, or in Fichte’s own words “great minds in the practical sciences, inventive chemists, physicists and mechanics, artisans, and manufacturers, “whom the government should “lure away from foreign countries” to enter into a treaty with them, according to which “they will bring their science and art into the country and instruct the residents in these, receiving on their departure compensation in world currency in exchange for the national currency that was previously paid to them.” Also, the government “will also buy foreign machinery and imitate it at home” (Fichte 2012: 187). Heilperin finds the above passage stunningly “reminiscent of the practices of the Soviet Union in the 1920's and 1930's” (Heilperin 1960: 94) and uses this observation to bring out, albeit somewhat indirectly, his opinion on the nature of the affinity between Fichtean and Soviet state, which comes to being because “the logic of a system, once its fundamental assumptions are adopted, carries one, step by step, relentlessly, to almost fully foreseeable conclusions.” (Ibid). As far as one can judge by couple of phrases, a similar point of view is upheld by at least

one more author, Gilles Campagnolo, who claims that while “it would be a retrospective excessive simplification to say that Fichtean plans pre-described Soviet real policies, […] Fichte's work is obviously more explicit about aspects of a planned system than most of Marx's assessments [...]. One important fact remains about the comparison of national closure of the state proposed by Fichte with the Soviet experiment: a realistic implementation is not a priori a non-sense.” (Campagnolo 2012: 64)

Finally, the most recent development in the field is represented by two books by Modest Kolerov, a scholar of Russian idealist philosophy, founder and editor-in-chief of the Regnum Federal Information Agency. One of these books, “Stalin: from Fichte to Beriya”, includes a chapter, considering “socialism in one country” concept and more broadly, the influence of protectionist (Friedrich List) and isolationist (Fichte) ideas on the policies of the Soviet state (Kolerov 2017a: 109-311). The other was published same year under the title “Socialism in one country: Isolated state, protectionism and primary socialist accumulation” (Kolerov 2017b). The last is in fact, a chapter from “Stalin: from Fichte to Beriya”, though somewhat augmented. Kolerov’s book is largely based upon his intuition of Fichte’s “Closed Commercial State” being in some way connected to the Stalinist state. However, the conceptual framework chosen by the author led him to rather questionable implications. Particularly, Kolerov argues that the idea of the creation of the nation-state was conceived within the Bolshevik party long before the revolution. It only became popular much later, thanks almost solely to Stalin, who was one of the very few key figures in the leadership who had never placed any faith in the world revolution. Unfortunately, this claim does not prove to have a solid factual basis in the book. Kolerov also describes Trotsky and other opposition leaders as the proponents of the open economy, too short-sighted to see that only isolationism could save Russia from the “colonial economical perspectives” or from destruction “in the course of the political and military competition of world powers” (Kolerov 2017b: 19).

Kolerov argues that Fichte's project and Stalin's "socialism in one country" were linked by Friedrich List's "The National System of Political Economy", which was indeed held in high regard by Sergeĭ Witte and a number of other prominent figures of imperial Russia. Still, as we'll see later, List's protectionist policies have little in common with Fichte's autarky as well as with both Vollmar's "Isolated socialist state", still less with the intentions and demands of the Stalinist state. Kolerov also suggests another link, which, as the argument goes, connects Fichte to List, namely "The Isolated state" (Der isolierte Staat), a 1826 treatise by Johann Heinrich von Thünen, German economist or, one may say, one of the first economic geographers. Kolerov somehow perceives von Thünen's book as advocating the isolationist or protectionist cause. However, while von Thünen's "Isolated state" is certainly a very significant text, its value lies within the field of economic geography, which was itself yet to be born at the time[234]. Besides, since Kolerov considers List more or less the direct predecessor of the "socialism in one country" concept, he never addresses parallels between the Stalinist state and Fichte's "rational" state directly, — and altogether ignores Fichte's enormous impact on German social democracy. Nevertheless, his book is a valuable source of information on the reception of Fichte's political-economical writings in the late 19th — early 20th centuries, particularly by such early Russian socialists as Petr Struve, Pavel Aksel'rod and others, including figures as different as, for example, Anatoliĭ Lunacharskiĭ and Boris Vȳsheslavtsev[235].

One might suggest that once a number of given fundamental assumptions are adopted, the consistent logical development of the system inevitably leads to foreseeable results. Still, it can be argued that this explanation is insufficient. Some of the similarities can bring one to the

[234] "The isolated state" is one of the first serious attempts to develop a spatial economy model and link it to the Ricardian theory of rent. Thunen's state is, in his own words, "a device, facilitating enquiry into the forces behind the economy, similar to empty space, being a device to explore physical forces" (Tyunen 1926: 8), that is to say, mathematical abstraction. Thunen's attempt to reinforce Ricardo's theory of rent by means of this spatial model has drawn strong criticism from Karl Rodbertus, outspoken supporter of nationally oriented "state socialism" (see Rodbertus (1936: 353-57) for details). Valuable insights into Tuhnen's work can be found in Portugali (1984) and Fujita (2012).

[235] For more details on Kolerov's concept see Aleksandrov (2017).

conclusion that the Soviet government was following Fichte’s recommendations not only in regards to what Fichte considers crucial for the closure of his rational state, — namely foreign trade monopoly and monetary policies, — but sometimes also in regards to other, less significant parts of his manual. For example, Fichte suggests the creation of a national stockpile in order to avoid food shortages caused by crop failures. Such a measure requires partial yearly extraction of grain. According to Fichte's considerations, “the necessary yield of the extraction of produce […] must be estimated not according to one single year, but according to a series of years long enough for abundance to make up for the crop failure” (Fichte 2012: 118). Somewhat unsurprisingly, it’s the average of yield five-years’ produce that, according to Fichte’s idea, should “enter into commerce”[236].

Another parallel to Fichte’s ideas is found in the import substitution domain. Fichte claims, — in full accordance with his principles, — that he “would certainly demand that a northern state that is closed forbid the import of [...] cotton, yet without depriving us of cotton fabric. Don’t many kinds of grass, shrubs, and trees in our climate yield wool that is just as pure, and that can be refined even further through cultivation?” (Fichte 2012: 202). This fragment is quite reminiscent of what Johanna Conterio terms the “invention of the subtropics” (Conterio 2015), that is, of the targeted efforts to create a subtropical landscape on the Soviet Black sea cost, particularly in Sochi. Other examples that come to mind are the pre-war citrus cultivation projects in Uzbekistan and Sochi, and the later introduction of tea as a cultivated crop to the Krasnodar region.[237] Even Fichte’s rhetorical question “Is there anything man could not make, with cultivation [Kultur], from even the most insignificant plants?” (Fichte 2012: 202) has an

[236] It's probably worth mentioning that first Soviet nation-wide state agency, supervising strategic reserves, namely the Committee for Reserves and Commodities at the Council of Labour and Defence, was established as late as in October 1931.

[237] Another project, more significant in symbolic than in economic terms, was palm-trees cultivation, also started in 1930’s. The landscapes of the Crimea and Sochi region were completely transformed by the introduction of various decorative *Palmáceae* species, while in Central Asia significant effort was put in more economically viable cultures: date palms set in Turkmenistan in 1939, were still in good condition and supposedly yielding fruits 15 years later, in 1954 (Saakov 1954: 6).

unexpected echo in Ivan Michurin's well-known words: "A plant as such can be almost useless. Only under human's care and influence it becomes a powerful actor of life."[238]

One may also suggest that Stalin's government follows, among others, Fichte's recommendations on much more significant issues, i.e. on partial resettlement, — by "friendly means", of course — of the newly occupied provinces' residents "into the motherland" and sending others "from the motherland into the new provinces to take their place, thus amalgamating the old and new citizens." (Fichte 2012: 189). No "friendly means", though were used by the Soviet authorities either in the Baltic countries or in those parts of Poland which became Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia overnight in September 1939, and that new Soviet citizens weren't allowed to "bring into the motherland those aspects of their methods of agriculture and art that are first-rate", — but Fichte's idyllic depictions of pre-closure occupation (which would, of course, be inevitably violent in reality) don't seem credible enough even to the author himself: "I will refrain from certain investigations touching this point that could easily become odious and that philosophers have almost always conducted one-sidedly…" (Ibid: 188).

Yet, despite all the commonalities, the question remains: to what extent was the pre-war Soviet State similar to Fichte's Closed Commercial State? The crucial interconnected structural elements of Fichte's autarkic utopia are foreign trade monopoly and inconvertibility of the state currency or, currency exchange monopoly. A closer look at these key economic policies, to a various extent persistent throughout rather different periods of early Soviet history, may help to find the answer.

[238] Растение само по себе может быть почти бесполезным. Оно становится могущественным фактором жизни только тогда, когда находится на воспитании у человека и под его воздействием (Michurin 1935)

3. 1. "…direct commerce between the citizen and any foreigner must be rendered completely impossible."

While monetary policies were subjected to relatively significant change first at the beginning of NEP and then in the early 1930s, the foreign trade monopoly seems to be indeed the cornerstone of Soviet socialism: it was introduced at the very early stage of post-revolutionary state-building and persisted not only during the "war communism" period, NEP and throughout the whole Stalinist period, but made it all the way to 1987, when state industrial enterprises were allowed to transact in export-import operations and foreign trade monopoly was thus de-facto abolished. Moreover, it was never abolished in the USSR *de-jure*: the decree "On liberalisation of foreign trade"[239] was signed by Boris Eltsin, president of RSFSR at the time, on 15 November 1991 and came into effect on 1 January 1992, when the USSR was already a thing of the past.

The state foreign monopoly was introduced as early as 22 April 1918 by the decree entitled "On the Nationalization of Foreign Trade," (Valk 1959: 158-60) stipulating that private individuals will no longer be allowed to carry out export or import operations which become exclusive prerogative of the state or, to be more precise, of the single state agency, People's Commissariat of Trade and Industry. In fact, even earlier that year, in January, this Commissariat was granted the exclusive power to licence all export and import (Valk 1957: 300). Licensing, however, meant control without (or with lower) gains, while full-scale monopoly made it possible for the state not only to control foreign trade but also to benefit from it. Nationalization of foreign trade preceded not only similar measures in regards to domestic commerce, but also nationalization of the key industries of the national economy. The decree itself was, like the one, which introduced closure of the borders, very straightforward: "All foreign trade is nationalized. Trade transactions for the purchase or sale of any type of

[239] Full title "On liberalisation of foreign trade on the territory of RSFSR" ("О либерализации внешней торговли на территории РСФСР")

product (of the extracting and processing industry, of agriculture, etc.) with foreign states or individual trading enterprises abroad shall be carried out in the name of the Russian Republic by specially authorized agencies. Apart from these agencies, all trade transactions with foreign countries for import or export are prohibited."[240] (Quigley 1974: 202).

The total monopoly of the state in foreign trade was unprecedented. To be sure, states (including Russia, France and even the United States) intervened extensively in this field during the First World War. Even when state intervention wasn't directly a part of the war effort, as in the case of the United States Shipping Board, it was war which made large-scale interventions possible. Also, even during the war, state foreign trade enterprises still functioned as the market actors, albeit enormously large. Soon after the war was over, in full accordance with a popular slogan of the time, "Back to normalcy", states mostly returned to relying on private enterprise in export and import. Soviet Russia was an exception. By 1918, when the monopoly was introduced, the war-torn economy was in ruins.

In his article "The immediate tasks of the Soviet Government", written also in April 1918, Lenin suggests that proper administration of the industries already nationalized and controlled by the Bolshevik government is a primary task of the moment. Explaining the difference between the bourgeois and the socialist revolution, Lenin writes that in the former "the principal task of the mass of working people was to fulfil the negative or destructive work [...] of abolishing feudalism, monarchy and medievalism," while constructive work is done "by the property-owning bourgeois minority of the population", facilitated by the "spontaneously growing and expanding national and *international* market." (Lenin 1965: 238, emphasis added). In the socialist revolution proletariat (and "the poor peasantry which it leads") does the

[240] Торговые сделки по покупке и продаже всякого рода продуктов (добывающей, обрабатывающей промышленности, сельского хозяйства и пр.) с иностранными государствами и отдельными торговыми предприятиями за границей производятся от лица Российской Республики специально на то уполномоченными органами. Помимо этих органов всякие торговые сделки с заграницей для ввоза и вывоза воспрещаются (quoted after Tsedilin (2014: 73)).

constructive work, the principal difficulty of which is "the introduction of the strictest and universal accounting and control of the production and distribution of goods, raising the productivity of labour and socialising production in practice." (Ibid: 241). Several paragraphs later Lenin once again points out that while "the decisive thing is the organisation of the strictest and country-wide accounting and control of production and distribution of goods," neither accounting nor control was yet implemented in the nationalized industries (Ibid: 245). The only way to fulfil this task is to

> consolidate and improve the state monopolies (in grain, leather, etc.) which have already been introduced, and by doing so prepare for the state monopoly of foreign trade. Without this monopoly we shall not be able to "free ourselves" from foreign capital […]. And the possibility of building up socialism depends entirely upon whether we shall be able, by paying a certain tribute to foreign capital during a certain transitional period, to safeguard our internal economic independence. (Ibid: 252)

At this point, foreign trade monopoly seems to be little more than just an extreme variety of protectionism. However, essentially, Lenin uses a very Fichtean argument, since proposed monopoly not only protects the socialist economy, but serves the ultimate goal of keeping this economy socialist: the degree of the accounting and control necessary for "socialising production in practice" are only possible if undisturbed by the market in general and foreign market in particular, since markets facilitates (as it happened in bourgeois revolutions) the emergence of the bourgeois order. This view of the foreign trade monopoly as not only protectionist but first and foremost a defensive — in rather a military than an economic sense — instrument, is much more pronounced four years later in his polemic with Bukharin, who believed that the NKVT (The People's Commissariat of Foreign trade), which he called "Glavzapor", was "dysfunctional" and advocated the more traditional protectionist instrument namely the tariff system. Lenin argues that

> any of the wealthy industrial countries can completely break down such tariff barriers. To do this it will be sufficient for it to introduce an export bounty to encourage the export to Russia of goods upon which we have imposed high import duties. All of the industrial countries have more than enough money for this purpose, and by means of such a measure any of them could easily ruin our home industry. (Ibid: 457)

But there's another thing beyond the well-being of the home industry, which is of particular concern to Lenin:

> I will add that the partial opening of the frontiers would be fraught with grave currency dangers, for in practice we should be reduced to the position of Germany; there would be the grave danger that the petty-bourgeoisie and all sorts of agents of émigré Russia would penetrate into Russia, without our having the slightest possibility of exercising control over them. (Ibid: 458)

On early stages, the strict monopoly was also expected to result in limiting imports to the items of "primary necessity" or, as Fichte puts it in the second chapter of "The Closed Commercial State",

> A State where agricultural techniques have not advanced far and require many hands for their perfect application and that lacks even ordinary mechanical craftsmen, cannot enjoy any luxury. It does not matter if someone says: "But I can pay for it." It would not be right if someone could pay for something he can do without while his fellow citizen finds that goods that are absolutely necessary are either unavailable or unaffordable. And moreover, what the former would use to pay for these goods is not even, by Right and in a rational state, his own. (Fichte 2012: 99)

Interestingly, while the Soviet government was, in fact, becoming interested in increasing the volumes of exports during the 1920s and 1930s, not everybody agreed with this thesis in 1918. Mechislav Bronskiĭ, deputy of the People's Commissar for Trade and Industries and member of the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy (VSNKh)[241], wrote in his article, published in Izvestiya right after the introduction of the foreign trade monopoly:

> The nationalization of foreign trade means that no purchase or sale with other countries takes place outside the regulating apparatus of the state […]. In so doing we not only protect ourselves from the importation of comparatively unnecessary items, but also get a chance to use more

[241] Высший Совет Народного Хозяйства, ВСНХ.

> wisely for the needs of the national economy our export, to some extent involuntary, because it is necessary due to our indebtedness abroad and our passive balance of payments[242].

This attitude to export was, in fact, a widespread belief at the time, shared, for one, by the prominent Soviet economist Vladimir Milyutin, who wrote in 1918 that for years to come Russia

> will deliver onto the world market basic products, raw materials and semi-processed materials [...]. But this character of […] foreign trade facilitates and renders necessary its concentration in the hands of the state and its removal from the hands of private traders. [...] The necessity, the economic necessity of exporting basic products and raw materials […] makes the nationalization of export inevitable. In order that this export not be carried out to the damage of the population, as was done formerly [...] it is necessary that the export of these products and items of prime necessity be taken over by the state, and only in exceptional cases will it have the right to export a necessary quantity of these goods. [...] Thus, with regard to export we have come to the conclusion that, despite the extreme weakness of the country, we will have to export raw materials and basic products on the condition of the strictest concentration of the export of these products in the hands of the state[243]. (qouted after Quigley 1974: 8)

Later this attitude changed. But first, the proponents of the foreign trade monopoly, most notably Lenin himself and Leonid Krasin,[244] had successfully withstood the attack on it,

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[242] Национализация внешней торговли означает, что никакая купля или продажа с другими странами не происходит вне этого регулирующего аппарата. [...] Этим мы не только обеспечиваем себя от привоза сравнительно ненужных вещей, но и наш до некоторой степени невольный, - невольный потому что обусловленный нашей задолженностью за границей и нашим пассивным расчетным балансом - сумеем более экономно использовать для нужд народного хозяйства. (Bronskiї 1918)

[243] Россия будет поставлять на мировой рынок жизненные припасы, сырье и полуобработанные материалы [...]. Но этим характером нашей внешней торговли облегчается необходимое сосредоточение её в руках государства и изъятие из рук частных торговцев. [...] Необходимость, экономическая необходимость вывозить жизненные припасы и сырье, чтобы получить взамен действительно нужные для страны машины, материалы и предметы, сделала неизбежной национализацию вывоза. Дабы этот вывози не совершался в ущерб населению, как это были прежде [...] необходимо было вывоз этих продуктов и предметов первой необходимости немедленно взять в руки государства и 'наделить то исключительным правом вывозить необходимое количество этих товаров. [...] Таким образом, в отношении вывоза мы пришли к выводу, что, несмотря на крайнее истощение страны, нам придется вывозить сырье и жизненные припасы, при условии самого строгого сосредоточения вывоза этих продуктов в руках государства. (Milyutin 1918: 77-78)

[244] Leonid Krasin, member of the VSNKh presidium and the Defence Council, worked as the People's Comissar of Trade and Industries (Народный комиссар торговли и промышленности) in 1918-1920 and was at the head of the People’s Commissariat of Transport (Народный Комиссариат Путей сообщения) in 1919-1920. Krasin was a firm supporter of the monopoly. In 1923 he was appointed as the first head of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign trade (Народный Комиссариат Внешней торговли, НКВТ). Johann Hausler argues that the principle of the foreign trade monopoly originates, to some extent, from Krasin's own strategy for the international company, establishing a unified position to work throughout various markets, which Krasin has created, at least partly, as a result of his work experience with Siemens-Schuckertwerke GmbH first as Berlin and Moscow branches director in

launched by those who sought to expand the scope of the NEP policies, and believed the whole approach to be too rigid, slowing down the restoration of the national economy. This group included a considerable amount of heavyweight figures from the Party leadership, specifically Grigory Zinov'ev, Nikolai Bukharin and Grigoriĭ Sokol'nikov. After the plan to de-monopolize Soviet foreign trade was presented (formally, the initiative was taken by Vladimir Milyutin) in October 1921 (Lenin 1970b: 562-63), Lenin's suggested that Politburo should denounce Milyutin's plan as "totally worthless and absolutely unsubstantiated".[245] Yet, the discussion continued — at the Eleventh All-Russian Party Conference in December Lev Kamenev in his closing speech even said that in the future probably not only cooperatives but even private enterprises will be permitted to operate on the international market directly.[246] According to the final resolution of the conference, the monopoly was principally upheld, but serious concessions were made to its opponents.[247] In late December that year IX Congress of the Soviets reiterated the resolution of the Party Conference rather close to the original text (IX Vserossiĭskiĭ s"ezd Sovetov 1921: 41). Adoption of the resolution by the Congress of the Soviets made it law, — but the dissent persisted.

The next round of the debate followed shortly, in February 1922.[248] At the end of February Sokol'nikov circulated his project of de-facto abolishment of the monopoly among the Politburo members. Almost at the same time news started to come from Soviet Russia's key trade partners, particularly from Germany, about foreign businessmen holding back suppliers'

1911-1912 and then as the company's general representative in Russia (appointed in 1913). For details see Haeusler (2014)

[245] ...отклонить весь план Милютина, как никуда не годный, совершенно неосновательный. (Lenin 1970b: 240)

[246] …казалось бы, все вопросы уперлись в один вопрос о денационализации внешней торговли. (Ibid: 54)

[247] State trusts, provincial cooperatives' unions, Tsentrosoyuz itself and some other large enterprises were allowed to operate on the international market directly, though operations had to be approved by NKVT.

[248] Remarkably, Stalin at this point was among the dissenters, since he disapproved of the Krasin's NKVT on the grounds of small volumes of trade, — this fact was recognized even by the Soviet historiography, albeit not before the XX Party Congress For details on Stalin's exchange with Krasin on the monopoly see Kukin (1963). After a few quite persuasive letters from Lenin (one of which was cited above) later that year, Stalin changed his views and remained an adamant supporter of the foreign trade monopoly ever after.

credits due to the anticipation of the monopoly abolishment (Bogomolov 1961: 121-25). This was the last straw. Lenin aggressively pressed Politburo to adopt quite a different document, prepared by Andreĭ Lezhava, Krasin's deputy. On the base of Lezhava's "Theses on foreign trade" VTsIK[249] has passed on 13 March 1922 the resolution №266 "On foreign trade", which reaffirmed the monopoly, incorporating amendments, made by the Congress of the Soviets.

Thus the NEP foreign trade monopoly operational regime was established, which was reluctantly accepted by Lenin, who wrote that this regime is "the "absolute" monopoly of foreign trade replaced by liberal monopoly, but certainly monopoly anyhow".[250] Yet, the group of Politburo dissenters including Kamenev, Zinoviev and Bukharin, believed that only private trade could be the answer to the inefficiency of NKVT (which was readily acknowledged by all the participants of the debate except — quite understandably — Krasin). In May 1922 Lenin suffered a stroke, which made it possible for those opposed to the monopoly to make preparations for the decisive attack in autumn. Lenin's stand in the Party made open rebellion impossible and the ultimate decision was put on hold until the Central Committee plenum in December. In late November Lenin was still virtually alone: almost all prominent party figures to varying degrees opposed the monopoly.

The situation was saved by Lev Trotsky who removed himself from the public debate, but privately criticized the Central Committee and leant towards upholding the monopoly. After exchanging several letters with Lenin (Trotsky 2004: 82-86), Trotsky agreed to defend the monopoly at the plenum and the balance was shifted. After Stalin,[251] Zinovyev and Kamenev

[249] All-Russian Central Executive Committee (Всесоюзный Центральный Исполнительный Комитет, ВЦИК)

[250] …"абсолютная" монополия внешней торговли, замененная теперь либеральной монополией, но безусловно и во всяком случае монополией. (Lenin 1975: 213)

[251] Stalin was the first to change his stand on 15 December in his letter to the Central Committee: "Considering new materials on the foreign trade issue that have accumulated over the past two months . . . bespeaking for the preservation of the foreign trade monopoly, I consider it a matter of conscience to pronounce that I am retracting my objections against the foreign trade monopoly that were communicated by me in writing to the Central Committee members two months ago." (Ввиду накопившихся за последние два месяца новых материалов.., говорящих в пользу сохранения монополии внешней торговли, считаю своим долгом заявить, что снимаю

changed sides, the decision of the October plenum was repealed without any substantial resistance. The Central Committee reasserted "the unconditional necessity to retain and organizationally strengthen" the monopoly.[252] Two and a half months later the XII Congress of the Party reaffirmed this stand. Since then monopoly was never questioned until the last days of the Soviet state.

During the NEP period, however, no single state agent performing export and import transactions existed. In accordance with the resolution of the IX Congress of the Soviets, multiple state agencies, to a lesser extent domestic and sometimes even foreign private enterprises and citizens, and cooperatives and cooperative societies conducted foreign trade throughout the NEP period. All of those were required to seek approval of the transactions by NKVT, but in practice, it was hardly possible, given that volumes of foreign trade were quite substantial and that the NKVT was a bureaucratic and rather chaotic institution. On top of this, the NKVT was much more inclined to conduct foreign trade by itself than to use resources on control and regulation of other agencies and enterprises. A Special organization, Gostorg, was created within the NKVT to immediately conduct foreign trade operations. However, the monopoly was never abolished and volume of state trade far outweighed the volume of trade by all non-state agents combined.[253]

The foreign trade monopoly, unlike many other provisions of the first post-revolutionary years, proved extraordinarily resilient, even during the most successful years of NEP reforms. However, constraints were significantly looser during those years. However, the First Five-year plan (1928-1932) brought new challenges: collectivization made agricultural production plunge

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свои возражения против монополии внешней торговли, письменно сообщенные мною членам Цека два месяца назад. (Trush 1965: 10))

[252] …безусловную необходимость сохранения и организационного укрепления монополии внешней торговли. (Lenin 1970a: 589)

[253] Cooperatives and cooperative associations, joint ventures, foreign companies, private persons and others accounted, according to the official statistics, for 21% of total export turnover in 1924-1925 and for 17.2% in 1925-1926. In terms of import, non-state agents accounted for 7% of total turnover in 1924-1925 and for 12.2% in 1925-1926 (Berlin 1928: 68). It stands to mention that 1925 was the heyday for Tsentrosoyuz and cooperative sector of the economy in general.

in some sectors and regions and virtually collapse in others.[254] Due to Great Depression prices of both Soviet exports (mostly low-added value products) and imports (largely industrial goods) declined dramatically, but even so, prices of primary goods fell more sharply than those of industrial machinery (Dobb 1966: 238). Besides, Western governments grew more and more concerned about the pricing policies of the Soviet government based upon the growing use of forced labour, — most visibly in relation to timber exports. Consequently, in the course of 1930 US, French and British governments adopted protectionist legislative acts, which in a number of ways limited the ability of the Soviet government to pursue leading positions in primary goods export by means of dumping. On the other hand, the end of NEP, followed by rapid movement towards even more centralised and more strictly controlled economy, implied by the policies of the Great Turn, meant that in any case, "soft-constrained" monopoly had to give way to something more aligned with the new *zeitgeist*.

The Stalinist variety of the foreign trade monopoly was born as a result of large-scale reform, largely introduced in the late 1920s so that in 1930 the new Soviet foreign trade machinery was largely up and running. The reform consisted of four basic measures: firstly, the NKVT became the sole holder of the mandate. From now on no private citizens, no mixed companies and joint ventures and no state organizations except those owned by NKVT could export or import any goods at all. Secondly, functions of domestic and foreign trade, previously overlapping to a considerable degree, were separated. During the NEP period exporters were relying on supply networks and purchased goods on the market, while importers could sell imported goods by themselves or through various agents. Starting November 1930, when two separate Commissariats — of foreign and domestic trade were established, exported and imported goods were purchased from or transferred to domestic trade agencies or state

[254] Statistical data on the extent of agricultural decline vary, but according to rather conservative estimates, production of agriculture as a whole in 1932 was 27% lower than in 1928, while in the livestock sector, 1932 production was 53% lower than in 1928. Decrease in grain production for the same period was around 15%. See, for example, Wheatcroft et al. (1986)

enterprises. Thirdly, in accordance with the general directive of the Sixteenth Party Conference (23-29 April 1929) that while planning should be centralized, operational work should be, on the other hand, decentralized, NKVT operational agencies were granted considerable autonomy from the commissariat's regulatory bodies. Finally, the transaction of purchases and sales abroad, a routine practice in the 1920s, was now cancelled: all the deals had to be transacted within the USSR only. These four measures shaped the "hard-constrained" version of foreign trade monopoly which not only persisted — largely intact — until the end of the Soviet era but was also extended in the post-WWII period to the countries of the Soviet bloc.[255]

Let's look now at the propaganda discourse around the foreign trade monopoly. Earlier we've already cited Lenin, talking about the necessity to "free ourselves" from foreign capital. Generally, Soviet economists and propagandists, writing about the foreign trade monopoly never treat it as just an effective defence against foreign competitors, as it would be the case if it was conceived as something, functionally close to high tariffs in Friedrich List's "National system of political economy". The 1940 book "Development of the Soviet Economy",[256] authored by the collective of specialists from the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences and approved for use as a textbook for economics students, claims for example, de-facto summarizing the experience of the pre-war period, that "seizure of the commanding heights in the economy, i.e. nationalization of land, banks, industry, transport, foreign trade and communications was the necessary condition for organizing production on socialist principles."[257] Also, "establishment of the foreign trade monopoly eliminated a threat of economic intervention"[258] and "ruled out the possibility of exploitation of workers in our

[255] On foreign trade after 1945 see, for example, Pryor (1963), Spulber and Gehrels (1958) and Spulber (1959)
[256] The book was authored by the collective of specialists from the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences and was approved for use as a textbook for economics students.
[257] Завоевание командных экономических высот, т. е. национализация земли, банков, промышленности, транспорта, внешней торговли, средств связи, являлось необходимым условием организации производства на социалистических началах.(Markus and Arutinyan 1940: 78)
[258] Установлением монополии внешней торговли была преодолена опасность иностранной экономической интервенции (Ibid 89)

country by the foreign imperialism".[259] One of the most detailed observations on the monopoly is found in the book by professor Dmitriĭ Mishustin, member of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade Collegium, "Foreign trade and industrialization of the USSR" (1938), published under the sponsorship of the Foreign Trade Monopoly Research Institute.[260] Firstly the author claims that the monopoly "has played an outstanding role in fulfilling the ingenious Stalin's plan of the industrialization of USSR."[261] He further cites Stalin, who said in 1935, that if export foreign currency earnings weren't spent on heavy industry "we wouldn't have [...] aviation and tanks. We would find ourselves unarmed against external enemies. We would undermine the foundations of socialism in our country. We would come to be beleaguered by the bourgeoisie internal and external."[262] Thus monopoly is not just placed on a par with heavy weaponry but becomes its source or, in other words, an indispensable prerequisite for the country's survival. This idea appears in the text on more that one occasion, being sometimes reframed in a more rhetorical manner: "At each stage of the socialist construction the monopoly served as a combat weapon in the hands of the proletarian dictatorship. It's going to remain so significant a weapon in times to come."[263] The goals, and even more significantly, priorities of the foreign trade monopoly are set very explicitly:

> 1) elimination of both any possibility of economic intervention by the world capitalism and possibility of any nexus between internal capitalist elements and the international capital; 2) development of Soviet foreign trade in accordance with our country's socialist construction plan; 3) concentration of the entire foreign trade in one powerful centre, conferring tremendous

[259] ... исключала возможность эксплоатации трудящихся нашей страны иностранным империализмом (Ibid)
[260] Научно-исследовательский институт внешней торговли. This research institute was established in 1929 as a subdivision of the People's Commisariate of Foreign Trade mainly for the purposes of gathering statistics on Soviet foreign trade and research changing international markets conditions. In 1939 it was renamed the Market environment Institute (Конъюнктурный институт) and was closed in 1941 due to wartime conditions, to be opened again in 1947.
[261] …сыграла в выполнении гениального сталинского плана индустриализации СССР выдающуюся роль. (Mishustin 1938: 4)
[262] ...мы не имели бы [...] авиации и танков. Мы оказались бы безоружными перед внешними врагами. Мы подорвали бы основы социализма в нашей стране. Мы оказались бы в плену у буржуазии внутренней и внешней. (Stalin 2015: 136-37)
[263] Монополия была боевым орудием в руках пролетарской диктатуры на всех этапах социалистического строительства. Она останется таким же важным орудием и в будущем. (Mishustin 1938: 5)

> advantage to Soviet foreign trade for its operations on the markets of the hostile capitalist world; 4) defence of our industry, at one time weak and technologically underdeveloped from the technologically advanced industry of the capitalist countries[264].

Let's look at this list a bit more closely. The first thing to strike the eye is the low priority accorded to protectionist arguments. This could be of course largely a chronological issue: it had been already two years since the claim was made by the new Constitution that the task of the socialist construction had been already accomplished. However, it's also quite possible that the order here reflects the fact that protectionism was always a rather low priority for the proponents of the monopoly, — at least as compared to its other functions. Indeed, the most important function of the monopoly according to this list is "defensive isolation": first and foremost the monopoly secures not the economic prosperity, but the very existence of the Soviet order of things. Monopoly is the ultimate security measure, a fortification, which prevents interference from the outside in the form of either direct aggression or support for any potential insurgents inside. The real economic function of the monopoly is found largely in the second provision. As compared to the overall straightforwardness of the document, the wording here seems notoriously oblique: "development of Soviet foreign trade in accordance with […] socialist construction plan" stands of course for the "socialist accumulation" of foreign currency, essential to industrialization. It's not quite clear why the author, who already did some plain talking on the subject several pages earlier, resorts to circumlocution, fully compensated however with the frankness of the third provision: it was rarely acknowledged officially that the foreign trade monopoly (in combination with the foreign exchange monopoly, which is discussed in more detail later) was, in fact, a weapon of offence at least as much as of

[264] 1) исключение всякой возможности экономической интервенции мирового капитализма и какой-либо экономической смычки капиталистических элементов внутри страны с международным капиталом; 2) развитие советской внешней торговли в соответствии с планом построения социализма в нашей стране; 3) сосредоточение всей торговли в одном мощном торговом центре, что представляет для советской внешней торговли огромное преимущество в ее выступлениях на рынках враждебного нам капиталистического мира; 4) защиту нашей, в свое время слабой, технически отсталой промышленности от технически передовой промышленности капиталистических стран. (Ibid: 7)

defence. As we'll see a bit later, a combination of the foreign currency and foreign trade monopolies (complemented by several other conditions), provided the Soviet state with the excellent opportunity to engage in predatory pricing. Following 1928, when *chervonets* convertibility was annulled and foreign trade monopoly reinforced, resulting in a dramatic decrease of labour costs, the opportunity for cost dumping emerged for the first time — and was seized by the Soviet government immediately[265] — some authors argue that this opportunity was in fact intentionally created[266].

Mishustin's book is not unique in its straightforwardness, but a more cautious approach is no less common. The author of the book on patent protection of the Soviet exports, particularly, provides us with an example of quite ambiguous rhetoric: "Unlike the foreign trade policy of contemporary imperialism which consists of hyper-protectionism and price dumping for purposes of profit extraction by the monopolistic enterprises, Soviet foreign trade monopoly is a part of the socialist state's planned economy, allowing us to subject our foreign trade relations to the interests of the socialist construction."[267] Another author emphasizes one particular overlooked salutary effect of the monopoly: "Under the conditions of Soviet economy, [...] under the conditions of the foreign trade monopoly and liberation from exploitation by foreign capital, obstacles to the most rational territorial distribution of various

[265] Beginning in 1930 a public campaign was started in the US by the Pulitzer-winning series of articles on the "red trade menace" and more generally on the Soviet Five-year plan by Hubert Knickerbocker, published mostly in the "New York Evening Post" (see Knickerbocker (1931b) and (1931a)). The campaign eventually resulted in the adoption of a number of customs and administrative regulations directed against cheap Soviet exports, including, for example, industrial wood from several regions, where forced labour was used. France introduced licensing of Soviet exports in 1930 and classified all Soviet exports as coming from a "country with collapsing currency", which meant an additional 25% tariff. Britain imposed an embargo on roughly 80% of Soviet exports in 1933. However, as Soviet authors later claimed, "using foreign trade monopoly as a leverage, the Soviet Union met every attempt to discriminate against our trade with a counterpunch so powerful that our adversaries regained consciousness quickly." (Aleksandrov and Dmitriev 1949: 18). Indeed, the Great Depression in particular left Western governments limited room for maneuver.

[266] See, for example, Tsedilin (2014: 83-86)

[267] В отличие от внешнеторговой политики современного империализма, выражающейся в сверхпротекционизме и демпинге в целях извлечения прибылей монополистическими организациями, монополия внешней торговли Советского Союза является частью планового хозяйства социалистического государства, позволяющей подчинить наши внешнеторговые связи интересам социалистического строительства. (Kheĭfets 1935: 5)

industries are eliminated in order to secure maximum possible efficiency of such distribution to the benefit of the socialist construction...”[268]

These fragments barely demonstrate a drive for full autarky. On the contrary, various authors tend to favour increase of Soviet foreign trade in both volume and diversity. Even the author of the pamphlet “Foreign trade within the Five-year plan”, otherwise notoriously, — and, considering the subject, somewhat inexplicably, — bellicose, lowers his tone by a whisker to make the case that “...we remain committed to further extension of the foreign trade turnover, to introducing technological advances from the capitalist countries to our industry. We still believe trade ties to be a matter of mutual interest. Trade ties between the two antagonistic systems — capitalism and socialism — are possible and indispensable over the whole period of their “peaceful” co-existence.”[269] Such a stance originates apparently from the 1925 resolution of the RKP(b) Central Committee “On foreign trade”, claiming that “organisation of the proletarian state's foreign trade should be subordinated to the two principal goals: a) maximum facilitation and stimulation of the country's production forces development and b) defence of the socialist economy under construction from the economic offensive of the capitalist countries.”[270]

Moreover, the very term “autarky” was practically anathema throughout the 1920s and 30s[271] since it was understandably associated with the political vocabulary and practices of the Italian corporative state, ruled by Mussolini’s National Fascist Party (PNF). Autarky was

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[268] В условиях советского хозяйства, [...] в условиях монополии внешней торговли и освобождения от эксплоатации иностранного капитала и т. д. уничтожаются преграды для наиболее рационального размещения отдельных отраслей хозяйства, чтобы достигнуть от этого размещения максимально возможной эффективности в интересах социалистической реконструкции... (Alkin 1931: 117)

[269] ...мы сохраняем установку на необходимость дальнейшего расширения внешнего оборота, на внедрение в нашу промышленность высокого технического уровня капиталистических стран. Мы попрежнему стоим на той точке зрения, что торговые связи есть дело обоюдной заинтересованности. На весь период «мирного» существования двух антагонистических систем — капитализма и социализма— между ними возможны и неизбежны торговые связи. (Shatkhan 1930: 6)

[270] ...организация внешней торговли пролетарского государства в капиталистическом окружении должна быть подчинена двум основным задачам: а) максимальное содействие и стимулирование развития производительных сил страны и б) защита строящегося социалистического хозяйства от экономического наступления капиталистических стран. (quoted after Mendel'son 1932: 17)

[271] See, for example, Bulat (1935: 41-42), Tanin and Iogan (1933: 14) and Otval't (1933: 22-23).

proclaimed as one of the PNF's long-term economic policy cornerstones as soon as the fascist movement was institutionalized: a year before the March on Rome, Mussolini insisted that "...foreign policy is [...] entirely defined by the greater or lesser development of [...] internal productive forces. Independent foreign policy is impossible for those who are forced to suffer a fundamental economic dependence such as on [foreign] coal and wheat."[272]

However, Soviet authors, writing on the subject of the foreign trade monopoly rarely fall short of terms and phraseology like "fend" (ограждать) and "protect" (защищать) or, "independence", "economic self-reliance/autonomy" (хозяйственная самостоятельность), "tenable and economically self-sufficient country" (обороноспособная и экономически самодостаточная страна) and finally, "struggle for liberation from foreign dependency" (борьба за освобождение от иностранной зависимости). This language is more or less entirely congruent with the one, used in Italy by PNF, which was rather far from the straightforward interpretation of autarky as complete isolation. The author of the article in the short-lived economy and statistic journal "Economy of the USSR"[273] (Народное хозяйство СССР) starts with a rather bold claim that "The whole development path of the USSR's trade with capitalist countries since the recommencement of Soviet foreign trade up to the present day is a path of struggle for the liberation of the Soviet Union from the capitalist world."[274] The article itself, however, reveals more of the author's struggle with the necessity to reconcile the irreconcilable (since the principal goal of Soviet foreign trade, according to the author, is "to reduce dependency on the world market while broadening the scope of trade relations with

[272] La [...] politica estera è, tuttavia, in dipendenza assoluta dal maggiore o minore sviluppo delle [...] forze produttive interne. Non è possibile l'autonomia nella politica estera, se si è costretti a subire un vassallaggio di natura economica fondamentale come quello del carbone e del grano. (Mussolini 1955: 102-03) For a specific case see, for example, Benni (1939). Numerous similarities between the Soviet and Fascist views of "economic independence" were discussed, albeit in brief, in the "Italian fascism and developmental dictatorship" (Gregor 1979)

[273] Народное хозяйство СССР. Eight issues were published by Partgiz in 1932.

[274] Весь путь развития внешней торговли СССР с капиталистическими странами, с момента возобновления советской внешней торговли и до последних дней, — это путь борьбы за независимость Советского союза от капиталистического мира. (Sovalov 1932: 175)

it"[275] as well as with the necessity to sound persuasive while juggling with facts and figures to make a case for radical transformation of the Soviet export structure.[276] However, in this 1932 article the language of self-sufficiency, autonomy, independence and tenability persists throughout the text, — and by the look of things, the less consistent and believable the argument is, the more persistent is the language of "independence"[277]. There's probably no need to elaborate on the obvious fact that the Stalinist state was not autarkic in the sense of Fichte's "Closed commercial state" — despite the very Fichtean and isolationist discourse around the foreign trade monopoly. However, its striving for a cautiously crafted kind of self-isolation is still remarkable and the extent of this self-isolation is unparalleled, even considering those states which, as Fascist Italy, consciously pursued "autarky". This situation can't be understood without considering the second of the two monopolies at the very core of both the imaginary Closed Commercial State and the real USSR.

3. 2. "Only through the will of the state…"

Unlike foreign trade monopoly, introduced in 1918 and upheld consistently, albeit to varying degrees, thereafter, foreign exchange monopoly came up for consideration rather late, in 1921, with the SNK resolution "On transactions of foreign currency and precious metals" from 18 November, i.e. after the start of NEP reforms. The State Bank (Gosbank) was granted monopoly privilege to sell and buy foreign currency and precious metals "within the territory of the R.S.F.S.R." Gosbank was also assigned obligation to fix official rates for the same assets, which could vary in "different regions of the Republic" (O sdelkakh s inostrannoĭ valyutoĭ... 1944). However, on 15 February 1923 another resolution, "On foreign exchange transactions",

[275] ...основная задача […] заключается в расширении торговых связей с мировым рынком при одновременном сокращении зависимости от него. (Ibid: 179)

[276] According to the official statistics, even as of 1938 machinery and equipment accounted for only 5% of Soviet exports and industrial consumer goods — for another 7.9%. (Alkhimov 1977: 254)

[277] Despite the questionable persuasiveness of the text, large fragments of the article were reproduced by the author five years later, in the pamphlet "What USSR exports and imports" (Sovalov 1937) with next to no modification.

made "sale and purchase transactions in bar gold and silver, foreign exchange as well as in currency bills and cheques" legal (O valyutnӯkh operatsiyakh 1923: 292). Nevertheless, strict governmental control was at least formally preserved. This de-monopolization of the precious metals and foreign exchange trade was confirmed in April 1925 and had, taking circumstances into account, a surprisingly long, though in a considerable measure ghostly, life.[278] It was as late as January 1937 that absolute monopoly returned with the SNK resolution "On transactions in foreign exchange assets and payments in foreign currency" (Kalinin et al. 1937). This resolution re-established the monopoly of Gosbank, which became the exclusive agent of all transactions in precious metals and foreign currency. Payments in these assets were only allowed for the purpose of foreign trade and through the agency of Gosbank (Bochkov 1942: 101). Also, while the resolution made any *transactions* in foreign currency and precious metals illegal, possession of these was not forbidden. Apparently, the question here is: why did the introduction of the foreign exchange monopoly take so long as compared to foreign trade? The most plausible answer can be arguably found in the following table, showing Torgsin's acquisition of valuables by year.

Table 1. *Torgsin's acquisition of valuables by year* (Osokina 2009: 543)

[278] After 1926 the Soviet Government and GPU (Joint State Political Directorate) in particular relied on a broad range of expropriation measures to obtain precious metals and foreign currency from the population. As popular as direct violence (arrest, followed by confiscation) was, other means often were more successful. State-wide "lawful" confiscation of silver from the Russian Orthodox Church in 1928 is quite remarkable in this context as well as the opening, of the "Torgsin" system to Soviet citizens in 1931. The last decision was made much to the displeasure of OGPU, which saw the full-scale system of legal coercion as a dangerous rival to its own full-scale system of direct violence. In the rush to obtain as much convertible currency and gold as possible, both OGPU and governmental agencies resorted occasionally to the methods in direct contradiction with policies and interests of other agencies or just were sometimes strangely "non-governmental" in nature. In May 1926 OGPU in particular, instructed People's Commissariat for Posts and Telegraphs to make money transfers abroad, legal at the time, as *technically* difficult as possible. In 1928 Georgiĭ Pyatakov, deputy director of Gosbank at the time, organized a network of buying-up centres, encouraging artisan miners to sell gold bypassing the "Lena Goldfields" company which held a valid tender. This step has infuriated the People's Commissariat of Finance which supported the official contract with the company. The latter was forced to leave the country next year which resulted in the arbitration proceedings of Lena Goldfields Ltd. against the Soviet Government in 1930: these proceedings were the only international law case in which the Soviet Government was a party during the pre-war period. See Chudnov (2011) and Nussbaum (1950) for details.

Years	By buying-in price, mil gold. Roubles.*	By gol tonnage, tons of solid gold**	By international gold prices, mil USD ***
1931	6,9	5,4	3,6
1932	49.3	38,2	25,4
1933	115,2	89,3	59,4
1934	65,9	51,1	57,5
1935	47,7	37,0	41,6
January 1936 г.	2,3	1-8	2.0
Total:	287,3****	222,8	189,5

* Before foreign currency import expenses deduction
** 1,29 rub for 1 g of solid gold. Since Torgsin transacted not in gold only, “1 g of solid gold” is an abstract, analytical measure
*** 0,665 USD prior to 1934; 1,125 USD after 1934. These figures can serve as a rough indicator of the government’s earnings from the sales of Torgsin gold on the international market.
**** This figure slightly exceeds the official 287 249 thousand roubles as a result of the rounding of data.

There was neither need, nor any possibility, to return to the absolute monopoly, because until at least early 1936, the state could appropriate a substantial part of personal savings in precious metals and foreign currency without recourse to massive violence. Significantly, violence alone could not provide the required volumes of expropriation: the very decision to open Torgsin system for the Soviet citizens was induced by the decrease in the volume of valuables, expropriated by OGPU (Chudnov 2011: 172). Taking in consideration that accompanying costs of nation-wide expropriation by brute force tend to be high enough for the effect to be felt even by the Soviet economy at the turn of the decade it’s also highly probable that the Torgsin model was not just more effective, but cheaper. In 1936-1937, when the country returned to the absolute monopoly, massive external deficit, caused by enormous volumes of industrial import in 1927-1931, was already in the past, while gold mining industry enjoyed stable growth. All in all, the Government became less desperate for precious metals and foreign currency. Considering the chaos of the full-scale state terror, which was approaching its heyday in 1936, there’s little surprise in the fact that it took a year to bring law into compliance with the practice: the state became less in need of people’s personal savings

(let alone unquestionable exhaustion of those) and could now call off entirely what little was left of the gold and currency market.

However, this answer to the above question comes within a more general framework: financial questions troubled both Bolshevist and Stalinist Governments less than many other economic matters. Government attempts to address financial problems, while sometimes persistent, were often also unsuccessful. Government's failure to bring inflation under control in 1925-1928 is just one vivid example (Johnson and Temin 1993). It is particularly evident within the theoretical domain. The Bolshevik government and Lenin himself had neither a comprehensive plan, nor even a very basic outline of the socialist monetary policies. The term "socialist monetary policies" itself sounds like an oxymoron, since money as such should have been abolished. The Bolshevist government was, probably, the first government in history reluctant to issue its own currency. Within the Party, the view, according to which money was to be abolished altogether after just a few years of the transitional period, was close to being common sense. Establishment of the new national currency within this frame of mind indeed seemed pointless. The first Soviet paper money (Sovznaki) came to being in 1919, almost two years after the revolution. In the foreword to the 1925 "Concise Course in Financial Science", the first basic Marxist college textbook of finance, its author, Soviet economist Dmitriĭ Bogolepov[279], pointed out that it was "notoriously difficult to present the Marxist analysis of financial phenomena at the time. It was only relatively very recently, that Marxists and communists started engaging in financial science. Quite a number of very important problems still haven't been approached from the Marxist perspective."[280]

[279] In 1918 Bogolepov was appointed deputy of the People's Commissar of Finance. Later, in 1919-1920 he was in charge of building Soviet regional bank systems in Ukraine and Turkestan.

[280] В настоящее время чрезвычайно трудно дать марксистский анализ финансовых явлений. Сравнительно очень недавно марксисты и коммунисты стали заниматься финансовой наукой. Многие проблемы, очень важные, до сих пор еще не разработаны с марксистской точки зрения. (Bogolepov 1925: 3)

The monetary system of the USSR designed through trial and error until late 1930s, turned out to be outside the frameworks of both classic and orthodox Marxism. It was something completely different — though probably not quite as novel. Marx and Engels were rather indeterminate, when it came to the depiction of the future society. However, some details on the issue at hand can be found — this time in the “Communist manifesto”, written by both founding fathers, as well as in Marx’s “Critique of the Gotha Programme” and, once again, in “Anti-Dühring” and “Dialectics of Nature” by Engels. “Critique of the Gotha Programme” features the most absolute claim in relation to money:

> …the individual producer receives back from society — after the deductions have been made — exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it is his individual quantum of labour. For example, the social working day consists of the sum of the individual hours of work; the individual labour time of the individual producer is the part of the social working day contributed by him, his share in it. He receives a certificate from society that he has furnished such and such an amount of labour (after deducting his labour for the common funds), and with this certificate he draws from the social stock of means of consumption as much as the same amount of labour costs. The same amount of labour which he has given to society in one form he receives back in another. (Marx 1989: 86)

Apparently, producers get their compensation not in the form of legal tender, but in the form of consumer goods. The “Certificate” mentioned in the above quotation is of an individual nature, and therefore, it’s not money. Marx himself makes important clarification on the subject in the second volume of the “Capital”:

> In the case of socialised production the money-capital is eliminated. Society distributes labour-power and means of production to the different branches of production. The producers may, for all it matters, receive papers vouchers entitling them to withdraw from the social supplies of consumer goods a quantity corresponding to their labour-time. These vouchers are not money. They do not circulate. (Marx 1997: 356)

It is very important that in this fragment Marx, in fact, cites an essentially Lassallean idea. Further he admits (with regret) that the principle of equal exchange underlying the certificate

system is one of the "defects", only "inevitable in the first phase of communist society" (the one, commonly termed "socialism"), but which will be completely abolished in the second phase ("communism"). The whole "Critique of the Gotha Programme" is a critique of the SPD Lassalleanism, and what follows after this fragment is Marx's ultimate refutation of the described certificate scheme. Even the idea of certificates, which are very far from being money, is alien to Marx. He perceived certificates as little more than a temporary instrument, and they were only acceptable for him as such.

Lenin, on the contrary, readily embraces the idea in his 1917 "The State and Revolution":

> Every member of society, performing a certain part of the socially-necessary work, receives a certificate from society to the effect that he has done a certain amount of work. And with this certificate he receives from the public store of consumer goods a corresponding quantity of products. After a deduction is made of the amount of labour which goes to the public fund, every worker, therefore, receives from society as much as he has given to it. (Lenin 1974i: 470)

This way or another, money couldn't be abolished immediately. The monetary system had to be maintained at least during the first phase of the transitional period. However, a non-monetary economy was not a long way in the future, rather a matter of several years. The RKP(b) programme, adopted by the VIII Party Congress (18-23 March 1919) made claims on the present state of affairs as well as some provisions for the near future:

> During the first phase of transition from capitalism to communism, while communist production and distribution of products is not yet fully organized, abolishment of money appears infeasible. In these circumstances bourgeois elements in the population continue using currency notes still remaining in private possession for purposes of speculation, profiteering and plundering of workers. Building upon nationalization of banks, RKP looks to take a number of measures, broadening the scope of non-cash settlements and leading up to the abolishment of money: obligatory deposit of cash in the banks, introduction of budget cheque-books, replacement of money by cheques, short-term ration tickets, etc.[281]

[281] В первое время перехода от капитализма к коммунизму, пока еще не организовано полностью коммунистическое производство и распределение продуктов, уничтожение денег представляется

Measures intended to stimulate commodity exchange were indeed introduced. Circulation of gold and silver coin was prohibited: those in possession of such assets had to exchange them for fiat money in the state banks. Needless to say, gold and silver were hidden by those who had any, but it still meant withdrawal from circulation. Uncontrollable emission (in September 1921 one million roubles bank note was issued with SNK approval) made paper money almost obsolete. However, rationing was only functioning in several big cities, and with even basic supplies available predominantly on the black market, monetary exchange eventually gained the upper hand despite being dangerous in case of prohibited coinage or inconvenient and unreliable in case of paper money. In April 1921 Lenin made a puzzling claim in his pamphlet "The tax in kind" of money being "a certificate entitling the possessor to receive social wealth" (Lenin 1973a: 332), hereby mixing money with Marx's "certificates", — presumably to make introduction of the tax in kind more acceptable for those in the Party leadership, who were in opposition to the "tactical retreat". As became clear only several months later, the said retreat turned out to be quite substantial. Speaking on 29 October 1921 at the Seventh Moscow Gubernial Conference of RKP, Lenin had to admit that the

> ...system of commodity exchange has broken down; it has broken down in the sense that it has assumed the form of buying and selling. [...] We must admit that we have not retreated far enough, that we must make a further retreat, a further retreat from state capitalism to the creation of state-regulated buying and selling, to the money system. Nothing came of commodity exchange [...]. Take the trouble to adapt yourselves to this; otherwise, you will be overwhelmed by the wave of spontaneous buying and selling... (Lenin 1973e: 96)

Finally, as early as November, 1921 Lenin proclaimed the urgent necessity "to make every effort to secure the speediest reduction of the issue of paper money, eventually put a

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невозможным. При таком положении буржуазные элементы населения продолжают использовать остающиеся в частной собственности денежные знаки в целях спекуляции, наживы и ограбления трудящихся. Опираясь на национализацию банков, РКП стремится к проведению ряда мер, расширяющих область безденежного расчета и подготовляющих уничтожение денег: обязательное держание денег в народном банке; введение бюджетных книжек, замена денег чеками, краткосрочными билетами на право получения продуктов и т. п. (Yaroslavskiĭ 1933: 397)

stop to it and establish a sound currency backed by gold" (Lenin 1973d: 179) and in November 1922 argued in no uncertain terms for stabilization of the rouble being the top priority: "But what is really important is the problem of stabilising the rouble. [...] If we succeed in stabilising the rouble for a long period, and then for all time, it will prove that we have won." (Lenin 1973b: 422). Thus, abolition of money proved impossible.

However, in a more comprehensive sense, there's little to no evidence that Lenin considered this impossibility fundamental. His writings don't provide any evidence, backing the view, according to which he reconsidered his position from the times of "war communism" in favour of establishing at least a mixed-type economy as a goal. Taking Lenin's reiterated claims of NEP as being tactical retreat rather than strategical shift for their face value seems more plausible. It means, among other things, that he has neither created, nor even intended to create any sort of socialist monetary theory. Indeed, in as late as 1932 an anonymous author of the editorial in the "Finance and the Socialist economy"[282], an official publication of the People's Comissariat of Finance and Gosbank, wrote that "not a single fundamental Marxist-Leninist work in this field exists", while the "exceptionally meaningful [...] legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin in the field of finance, money and credit as well as comrade's Stalin directives, decisive and classic in their precision, [..] are only starting to get through" to the "consciousness of our theoreticians".[283] It was of course, impossible to admit that "exceptionally meaningful legacy" barely existed. Still, complaints about the lack of theoretical developments and unwillingness of those responsible to invoke Marx and Engels seem revealing enough, especially considering the date: in 1932 the Soviet monetary system has already acquired its more or less

[282] Финансы и социалистическое хозяйство

[283] ...в этой области нет ни одной фундаментальной марксистско-ленинской теоретической работы", в то время как "исключительно большое по своему значению [...] наследие Маркса, Энгельса и Ленина по вопросам финансов, денег и кредита, решающие классические по своей точности указания т. Сталина [...] только начинают доходить до сознания наших теоретиков (rabotu... 1932: 3-4)

final shape. Apparently, Stalin's monetary reforms of the early 1930s had little to draw upon in either Lenin's heritage or Marxist tradition.

Born in 1919, sovznak was almost completely destroyed only two years later by uncontrolled emission and consequent hyperinflation. Since in late 1921 the Party leadership has already embraced the infeasibility of the instant shift to the new society and set itself a goal to stabilize the rouble, planning of the monetary reform was initiated by Grigoriĭ Sokol'nikov, who was appointed acting People's Commissar of Finance in early 1922. He managed to engage an energetic team of specialists,[284] who put in action a dual currency system, within which old sovznak was circulating along with the new chervonets, hard currency, though contrary to popular belief, not fully gold-backed.[285] Gradually the stable currency superseded the hyperinflated sovznak, and in February-March new rouble was introduced, equivalent to 1/10 of chervonets. While the last was from the very beginning intended for external transactions and had very little domestic circulation,[286] convertible currency, listed by the currency exchanges abroad, was indeed for some time in circulation on Soviet territory. Still, after 1926 chervonets disappeared from the listings since its export was prohibited and then, just two years later, an import ban followed. Chervonets was never conceived of as a "normal" convertible currency, but only served the purposes of the monetary stabilization. The system, which took shape after 1924 was somewhat unprecedented in its complexity:[287] Yurovskiĭ, who elaborates on this system in his book "Monetary policy of the Soviet Power (1917-1927)", terms

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[284] The main figures behind the ideas, which formed the basis for the successful monetary reform of 1922-1924, were Nikolaĭ Kutler, former deputy minister of Finance in the Government of Sergeĭ Vitte; ; Vladimir Tarnovskiĭ, one of the most prominent bankers of the Empire, former director of the Siberian Commercial Bank in Saint Petersburg (for more about him see Sokoloff (2008)) and their younger colleague Leonid Yurovskiĭ.

[285] Of it's value 25% was backed with gold or foreign exchange reserves and the other 75% with short-term commodity bills (Baykov 1946: 89)

[286] It was demonetarized in 1947.

[287] While chervonets remained the official currency (Gosbank return statements were published in chervonets *and* rouble), it was not a legal tender by law. Emission was connected to chervonets, while rouble was, in fact, convertible paper money. No gold par was established for rouble, but it was established for chervonets. However, relation of rouble to chervonets was fixed, meaning that gold par for rouble was in fact established, though indirectly.

it “closed fiat circulation system with [...] official gold par”[288] and specifically points out significance of its closedness, using notoriously cautious wording:

> …any fiat circulation system is of course, closed, but differences in the magnitude exist, which lead us to distinguish our fiat circulation system as particularly closed. Soviet currency listings abroad don’t change this assessment because closedness arises from the provisions for currency transfers out of the country as well as from the organizational forms of foreign trade.[289]

He also clearly explains the function of the system’s closedness:

> Currency regulation is effective in the [Soviet] Union because it rests upon the foreign trade regulation, upon industry being state property, upon a centralized (and almost solely state-owned) bank system, upon the procedure for planned distribution of foreign currency between the group industrial enterprises granted admittance to such distribution, and upon the ban on foreign currency acquisition for those outside this group. Whereas the state owns the foreign exchange market, it owns its currency rate. Thuswise it can maintain a rate not corresponding with the currency's purchasing power parity. [...] Soviet currency exchange rate can be fixed irrespective of its purchasing power[290].

While these policies served the purpose of disconnecting the purchasing power of money from its exchange rate fairly well, it was the very monetary system against which Fichte warned quite passionately in the fifth chapter of his treatise, arguing that it can only be intrinsically unstable, since within it money is “not an immediate sign of goods, but rather only a sign of money”, while “false presupposition — that only gold and silver can be proper, true

[288] [система] замкнутого бумажно-денежного обращения с […] официальным золотым паритетом (Yurovskiĭ 1996: 289)

[289] ...всякая бумажно-денежная система является, конечно, замкнутой, но [...] существуют различия в степени, которые заставляют выделить как специфически замкнутую систему нашу разновидность бумажно-денежных систем. Котировки советской валюты за границей не меняют этой характеристики потому, что замкнутость создается условиями передвижения валюты за пределы страны и организационными формами внешней торговли. (Yurovskiĭ 1996: 290)

[290] Валютное регулирование действительно в Союзе потому, что оно опирается на регулирование внешней торговли, на принадлежность государству промышленности, на централизованную (и притом почти целиком государственную) банковскую систему, на порядок планового распределения валюты между той группой предприятий, которая допущена к этому распределению, и на запрещение приобретать иностранную валюту тем, кто находится вне этой группы. Если государство владеет валютным рынком, то оно владеет и курсом своей валюты. Следовательно, оно может поддерживать такой курс валюты, который не совпадает с ее паритетом покупательной силы. [...] курс советской валюты может быть установлен независимо от ее покупательной силы. (Yurovskiĭ 1996: 279-80)

money — remains standing", which leads subsequently, to the situation Fichte considers very dangerous, namely when the value of the money depends "on the general belief in the possibility and ease of its realization in cash" (Fichte 2012: 181). Indeed, in the end of 1925 financial crisis has broken out, caused, albeit indirectly, by the inability of the state to fully back the "sign-money" by precious metals, that is to say, by inflation which ran rampant with the first attempts of forced industrialization.[291] At the end of the year the crisis was to some extent overcome — mostly due to decrease in emission — but the legal foreign exchange market ceased to exist. In the following years government limited and then prohibited use of foreign currency by enterprises, including state-owned; limited and then prohibited any transactions in foreign currency or precious metals within the country's borders; first severely limiting the amount of foreign currency allowed for those travelling outside the country and then de-facto banning travelling abroad altogether. Also, starting 1927, breaking the rules of transaction in foreign currency (and breaking the provision on the monopoly of foreign trade) were designated as "high-threat crimes against the order of government".[292]

What emerged in the first half of 1930s as a "socialist" monetary system was barely tested in practice, the "closed fiat circulation system" of the NEP period being its first real-life approximation. That said, in 1927 the *idea* of what was later termed the "two-currency system", based on monetary nominalism, was almost 130 years old. Fichte is widely thought to be its author[293] and the "Closed Commercial State" — to be its first relatively detailed

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[291] Capital investments were financed by emission of roubles, which led to a significant decrease of chervonets price. Narkomfin conducted massive foreign exchange interventions to support the rate, but the budget was limited. In January 1926 Stalin spoke in favour of stripping foreign exchange profiteers of the opportunity to use foreign exchange interventions against the state, which meant a green light for repression. (Goland 1993 120, 125-127).

[292] Особо опасные преступления против порядка управления (Gertsenzon 1938: 116-17). This judicial novelty had very limited impact, since the definition of "transaction" itself was notoriously absent from the Soviet law, so that the exact meaning of the 1937 resolution had to be refined through a number of decisions by the Supreme court of the USSR judicial division for criminal cases in 1942-1943 and even during the post-war period

[293] See, among others: Daastøl (2015) and Gray (2018: 96-99).

outline.[294] Its elements, even if not the system in its entirety, can be found in the works of quite a few later economists, including Friedrich List's "The National System of Political Economy" (1909) (Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie (1841)), Gustav Cohn's "Science of Finance" (1895) (System der Finanzwissenschaft (1889), Otto Heyn's "Paper Standard with a Gold Reserve for Foreign Trade" (Papierwahrung mit Goldreserve für den Auslandsverkeh (1894)) and in Georg Knapp's "The State Theory of Money" (1924) (Staatliche Theorie des Geldes (1905)). Since the idea originates with Fichte, it's hardly surprising that all the above listed economists, commonly associated[295] with monetary nominalism, were German. This list is, however, incomplete.

In 1895-1897 Sergeĭ Vitte, who favoured an approach to the economic development very close to that of Friedrich List,[296] initiated implementation of the gold standard to attract foreign investments. One of the most vociferous opponents of this move was Sergeĭ Sharapov, self-termed "Slavophile economist", who is certainly entitled to a place in the above cited list of the monetary nominalism proponents. Sharapov advocated implementation of the "absolute money" (which he, in a very nominalistic manner, occasionally terms "absolute symbols"),[297] that is, paper rouble, "intrinsic value [and] purchasing power" of which "is based upon the moral principle of the whole nation's confidence in the unified, strong and free supreme authority, bearing sway over the monetary circulation."[298] In Sharapov, paper rouble is preferrable to the gold standard not only for immediate economic, but also for political, moral

[294] In fact, a century before Fichte the distinct combination of monetary nominalism with economic isolationism was anticipated by Scottish-English economist John Law of Lauriston in his treatise "Money and Trade Considered, with a Proposal for Supplying the Nation with Money" (1705), in which Law argued that introduction of paper money instead of gold could "insulate […] economy from the vicissitudes of foreign trade, thereby reducing the need to run a positive balance of trade and payments." (Hudson 2009: 43). See also Rothbard (2006: 328-31)

[295] With the sole exception of List.

[296] Vitte has published brochure "National Economy and Friedrich List" (Национальная экономия и Фридрих Лист (1889)) three years prior to his appointment as a Minister of Finance. See also revised and enlarged second edition under the title "On Nationalism: National Economy and Friedrich List" (1912).

[297] "Абсолютные знаки" as in Russian "денежные знаки", currency symbols.

[298] Внутренняя стоимость, покупная сила бумажного рубля основывается на нравственномъ начале всенародного доверия к единой, сильной и свободной верховной власти, в руках коей находится управление денежным обращением. (Sharapov (Talitskiĭ) 1895: 29)

and, one may say, religious reasons[299]. In order to do away with utilitarianism and individualism, Russia has to turn to turn to the “higher immortal moral principle”, which should be “established as a supreme power”, namely, the moral principle of trust.[300] In terms of more tangible policies Sharapov holds that the gold standard is the earthly incarnation of utilitarianism and that instead Russia should start issuing its own paper money, backed by limitless trust in the Sovereign[301]. His naïve economic programme was never taken seriously even by Sharapov’s friends from the conservative circles, — and by his enemies on left alike — but he was very persistent in advocating it.[302]

Sharapov’s views do not mix well with Fichte's ideas: unlike Fichte, Sharapov was a monarchist, very religious and genuinely condemned progress. Besides, Sharapov’s views were not isolationist in any way; his project is rather merely a peasant retro-utopia than a full-scale intellectually substantiated utopian project. Sharapov was also, in all likelihood, unaware of the “Closed Commercial State”: he never mentioned Fichte in his works and probably read none of his books, since Fichte was considered a socialist or at least proto-socialist thinker at the time. However, Fichtean influence, albeit indirect, can be traced in Sharapov. On the opening pages of the “Paper Rouble” he bemoans the marginality of the paper money concept in financial science, mentioning, however, three economists as his predecessors.[303] One of them is Karl

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[299] He holds that a dreadful decay “is eating away Western science, art, religion, philosophy, law, statehood, or, in a word, Western civilization in full measure and in all aspects (…съедает западную науку, искусство, религию, философию, право, государственность, словом, всю западную цивилизацию во всем ее объеме и проявлениях. (Ibid: III-IV))

[300] …начало пользы […] становится творческим орудием и послушной силой в руках государства, построенного не на эгоистическом начале договора, а на нравственном — доверия. (Ibid: VI)

[301] To avoid inflation all the banks should be united into one centralized institution with a wide network of local branches. These branches will credit people, securing loans in a usual way. Government will sure have to print money for these loans, but since managers of the local branches will be professional, well-intent and versed in local affairs, all credits will be paid off with a small interest, meaning that value will be created, and thus the threat of inflation will be eliminated.

[302] Three periodicals, at different times published (and to a large extent authored) by Sharapov were closed by the censorship office, — something out of the ordinary for the conservative writer at the time, — and he was commonly thought to be intransigent if not stubborn.

[303] One of them is the above-mentioned John Law of Lauriston; the other — Friedrich List, who “was the first to acknowledge the great role of moral principle in the world of economics” (...впервые признавший великую роль нравственного начала в экономическом мире. (Sharapov (Talitskiĭ) 1895: 3).

Rodbertus, whom Germanophobe and monarchist Sharapov absolves of two otherwise serious if not mortal sins — being socialist *and* German — for embracing and developing the idea of "state money".

Rodbertus, proponent of state socialism was significantly influenced by Fichte and shared some of his basic beliefs, especially in terms of extreme statism. Rodbertus also shared Lassalle's views on the possibility and even desirability of socialist developments in one country upon condition of significant support of such developments from the state institutions.[304] He was a very important figure for Sharapov, who apparently felt that his theory needs to be more substantiated to be taken seriously, — and is praised in the "Slavophile economist's" pamphlets on more than one occasion. Interestingly, it's not just the whole idea of "absolute money", backed by the limitless trust in the sovereign, that sounds quite Stalinist. Sharapov's discourse on gold as "impure" and his plea to separate the state and the people's economies (Sharapov (Talitskiĭ) 1895: 94), so that gold had no influence on the latter, resonates with later Stalinist discourse on Soviet money (as opposed to any other, non-socialist money), which had to be necessarily separated from capital and, consequently "world money". Yet, while Sharapov was rather well known among politically engaged intellectuals, at least Bolsheviks never considered him more than a maverick[305]

Stalinist monetary management, which took its final shape around 1934, was based upon four basic principles: firstly, capital investments were financed by state budget, which demanded neither interest payments nor even repayment of the principal. Secondly, establishment of a mono-bank system with Gosbank as *de facto* monopolist, which provided means for close monitoring and control of all Soviet enterprises' money transactions (though the hyper-centralized control proved difficult in practice). Thirdly, money flows were divided into cash (households/retail) and non-cash (everything else). Finally, government fully

[304] See, for example, Van Ree (2010a) and Hoselitz (1945).
[305] See, for example, Trotsky's 1901 article "S. F. Sharapov and German agrarians" (Trotskiĭ 1926)

monopolized foreign exchange. These principles were only determined *post factum*: Soviet monetary management, as we've already mentioned, originated almost entirely from practice and was not substantiated by any theory, which was, albeit in very broad terms, formulated only in late 1940s — early 1950s. However, textbooks on political economy and propaganda books, praising the victorious Soviet economy were quite abundant and though the former mostly considered political economy of capitalism and the latter were rarely concerned with theory, neither could avoid the issue in question altogether. But let's start with the author of the Soviet monetary management system himself.

Contrary to the numerous claims by later Soviet economists, Stalin never developed anything close to a comprehensive theory of money, let alone during the pre-war years, but his public statements on the subject provide some insights on his ideas in monetary theory. In November 1927, answering the question on "the main difficulties under war communism, when attempts were made to abolish money" during the interview with the foreign workers delegations, Stalin explained the enduring presence of money in the Soviet economy, claiming that much yet had to be done to build socialist (that is, non-monetary) economy:

> We must now re-equip our industry and build new factories on a new technical basis. We must raise the level of efficiency in agriculture, […]reorganise the individual peasant farms in a wide network of agricultural collective associations. We must set up an intermediary distributive apparatus between town and country that will be capable of calculating and satisfying the requirements of the towns and villages throughout the country […]. When we have achieved all this, it can be presumed that the time will have come when money is no longer needed. But that is still a long way off.[306] (Stalin 1954h: 233)

[306] Нам нужно теперь переоборудовать нашу индустрию и построить новые заводы на новой технической базе. Нам нужно поднять сельско-хозяйственную культуру, [...] переорганизовать индивидуальные крестьянские хозяйства в широкую сеть сельско-хозяйственных товариществ. Нам нужно наладить такой передаточный распределительный аппарат между городом и деревней, который был бы способен учесть и удовлетворить потребности города и деревни всей страны [...]. И когда мы добьемся всего этого, надо полагать, что наступит время, когда не будет уже нужды в деньгах. Но до этого еще далеко. (Stalin 1930: 237-38)

It's fairly obvious from the tone that in 1927 Stalin already had limited confidence in a non-monetary future arriving any time soon. His speeches from July 1928 (at VKP(b) Central Committee plenum) demonstrate some evolution. On July 5 Stalin suggested that raising objections against NEP (and therefore money economy)

> …means, in the first place, to hold that immediately after the proletariat has come to power we shall have ready to function 100 per cent a machinery of distribution and supply between town and country, between industry and small-scale production, which will make it possible to establish at once direct products-exchange, without a market, without commodity circulation, and without a money economy. The matter has only to be raised to realise how utterly absurd such an assumption is.[307] (Stalin 1954i: 151)

He even went far enough to claim that the NEP "is an inevitable phase of the socialist revolution in all countries" (Ibid: 152). Several days later, on July 9, Stalin reinforced this claim, positing that "mistaken is the assertion of some comrades that it was only after war communism that the Party realised the necessity for building socialism in the conditions of a market and a money economy, that is, in the conditions of the New Economic Policy"[308] (Stalin 1954a: 173-74). So not only is NEP with its capitalist elements "an inevitable phase", but it was also planned far in advance and thus is no retreat, but on the contrary, "a victorious and systematic socialist offensive on the capitalist elements in our economy" (Ibid: 174). More straightforward wording, intended, as it seems, among other things, to compensate for the dubiousness of this dialectics was found several years later, when in his Report to the XVII Party Congress (1934) Stalin turned on

> prejudices of another kind. I have in mind the Leftist chatter current among a section of our functionaries to the effect that Soviet trade is a superseded

[307] ...значит, во-первых, исходить из того, что сразу же по приходу к власти пролетариата у нас будут налицо уже готовые наста процентов распределительные и снабженческие аппараты между городом и деревней, между индустрией и мелким производством, дающие возможность установить сразу прямой продуктообмен, без рынка, без товарооборота, без денежного хозяйства. Стоит только поставить этот вопрос, чтобы понять всю нелепость такого предположения. (Stalin 1949b: 145)

[308] ...не правы некоторые товарищи, утверждающие, что партия осознала необходимость строительства социализма в условиях рынка и денежного хозяйства, то есть и в условиях новой экономической политики будто бы лишь после военного коммунизма. (Stalin 1949a: 165)

stage; that it is necessary to organise the direct exchange of products; that money will soon be abolished, because it has become mere tokens; that it is unnecessary to develop trade, since the direct exchange of products is knocking at the door. [This] Leftist petty-bourgeois chatter, which plays into the hands of the capitalist elements who are striving to sabotage the expansion of Soviet trade, [comes from] people who are as far removed from Marxism as the sky from the earth, evidently do not realise that we shall use money for a long time to come, right up to the time when the first stage of communism, i.e., the socialist stage of development, has been completed. They do not realise that money is the instrument of bourgeois economy which the Soviet Government has taken over and adapted to the interests of socialism for the purpose of expanding Soviet trade to the utmost, and so preparing the conditions necessary for the direct exchange of products[309]. (Stalin 1954b: 349)

The official textbook "Financial Policy of the USSR", written by the group of specialists from the People's Commissariat of Finance (Narkomfin) and Moscow Institute of Finance and Economics and published the same year, claimed that money was necessary in the Soviet economy since first, there was still commodity circulation, and thereby, elements of market existed, essential for "establishing proper interrelations with peasantry" (D'yachenko 1934: 23). Second, the Soviet economy couldn't operate without money because the "intermediary distributive apparatus between town and country that will be capable of calculating and satisfying the requirements of the towns and villages throughout the country" (Stalin 1954h: 233), of which Stalin spoke seven years prior, in 1927, was still not set up. In 1934 this explanation is obviously problematic: the private sector in the Soviet economy is (at least officially) nearly eliminated. The individual peasant, who was selling products on the market

[309] ...предрассудки другого рода. Речь идёт о левацкой болтовне, имеющей хождение среди одной части наших работников, о том, что советская торговля является якобы пройденной стадией, что нам надо наладить прямой продуктообмен, что деньги будут скоро отменены, так как они превратились, якобы, в простые расчётные знаки, что незачем развивать торговлю, ежели стучится в дверь прямой продуктообмен. [...] эта левацко-мелкобуржуазная болтовня, играющая на руку капиталистическим элементам, стремящимся сорвать развертывание советской торговли, [исходит от людей], которые так же далеки от марксизма, как небо от земли, очевидно, не понимают, что деньги останутся у нас еще долго, вплоть до завершения первой стадии коммунизма, – социалистической стадии развития. Они не понимают, что деньги являются тем инструментом буржуазной экономики, который взяла в свои руки Советская власть и приспособила к интересам социализма для того, чтобы развернуть вовсю советскую торговлю и подготовить тем самым условия для прямого продуктообмена. (Stalin 1951: 342-43)

during the NEP years and stood, thereby in the way of non-monetary economy, also (once again, officially) almost ceased to exist. Why was money still necessary?

In 1941 the existence of money still put Soviet economists out of countenance. During Stalin's meeting with the authors of the future textbook of political economy[310] on 29 January, one of the participants said, that "the commission was perplexed, there was a discussion if commodities exist in Soviet economy. The author, contrary to the commission majority opinion, refers to product rather than commodity."[311] Stalin's answers that "as long as we have monetary economy, we have commodities as well. All categories are in place, it's their nature what changed. Money doesn't work as an instrument of exploitation for us, it acquires other meaning."[312] The concept of Soviet money was formulated after the war in Stalin's 1951 "Economic problems of socialism in the USSR", where the author justified the still monetary nature of the Soviet economy by the presence of

> two basic forms of socialist production in our country: state, or publicly-owned production and collective-farm production, which cannot be said to be publicly owned. In the state enterprises, the means of production and the product of production are national property. In the collective farm, although the means of production (land, machines) do belong to the state, the product of production is the property of the different collective farms since the labour, as well as the seed, is their own [...]. The effect of this is that the state disposes only of the product of the state enterprises, while the product of the collective farms, being their property, is disposed of only by them. [...] At present the collective farms will not recognize any other economic relation with the town except the commodity relation - exchange through purchase

[310] The creation of the official political economy textbook was a very long project which was started around 1936 to be completed only after Stalin's death, in 1954. While initially the development of the textbook was led by Soviet economist Lev Leont'ev, a number of other experts, including economists Konstantin Ostrovityanov and Anatoliĭ Pashkov, agrarian Ivan Laptev, Institute of Philosophy director Pavel Yudin, Gosplan official Grigoriĭ Kosyachenko, economist and party official Dmitriĭ Shelepin, got involved in the process in the course of 18 years. Stalin met the authoring team on several occasions. In 1941 discussion was quite notorious: Stalin made a shocking claim on the value law being not yet overcome in the USSR. Later Anatoliĭ Pashkov in his book wrote: "As is known, prior to 1941, we Soviet economists insisted over and over again that our commodity is not a commodity, that our money is not money and that socialism makes the law of value void. We were put straight." (Pashkov 1970: 211). For details of the later discussions in regards to the same textbook, see Zhuravlev (2015).

[311] В комиссии были недоумения, была дискуссия, есть ли товар в советском хозяйстве. Автор вопреки мнению большинства комиссии говорит всюду не о товаре, а о продукте. (Bukhert 2012: 11)

[312] Раз у нас есть денежное хозяйство, то есть и товар. Все категории остались, но другой характер приобрели. Деньги не служат у нас орудием эксплуатации, а они у нас приобретают другое содержание. (Ibid)

and sale. Because of this, commodity production and trade are as much a necessity with us today as they were, say, thirty years ago, when Lenin spoke of the necessity of developing trade to the utmost[313]. (Stalin 1972b: 15-16)

Classic Marxism can be barely used to substantiate this argument. But once again, orthodox Marxism, that of Kautsky and SPD, while also being unable to substantiate Stalin's claim, can still provide us with some insights.

Kautsky, for one, in the chapter under the title "One day after the Revolution" of his "Social Revolution"[314] (1902) poses the question as to whether there will be wage-labour in the new society: "Shall we not have abolished wage-labor and money? How then can one speak of the wages of labor? These objections would be sound if the social revolution proposed to immediately abolish money." (Kautsky 1908a: 129). The author maintains that "this would be impossible" since "money is the simplest means [...] to secure the circulation of products and their distribution to the individual members of society" within a "complicated mechanism [...] of the modern productive process." (Ibid) Consequently, new property and social relations will render some of its functions obsolete, — Kautsky specifically points out that in the future society money won't measure value, "*at least in internal commerce*" (Ibid, emphasis added) — but still, as a means of the above mentioned circulation "money will be found indispensable until something better is discovered". However, wages under socialism will be different from that under capitalism, since they will stop to be "the price of the commodity — labour power", which is largely determined "by the cost of subsistence of the labourer" with its minor

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[313] [В настоящее время у нас существуют] две основные формы социалистического производства: государственная — общенародная, и колхозная, которую нельзя назвать общенародной. В государственных предприятиях средства производства и продукция производства составляют всенародную собственность. В колхозных же предприятиях, хотя средства производства (земля, машины) и принадлежат государству, однако продукция производства составляет собственность отдельных колхозов, так как труд в колхозах, как и семена, — свой собственный [...]. Это обстоятельство ведёт к тому, что государство может распоряжаться лишь продукцией государственных предприятий, тогда как колхозной продукцией, как своей собственностью, распоряжаются лишь колхозы. [...] Других экономических связей с городом, кроме товарных, кроме обмена через куплю-продажу, в настоящее время колхозы не приемлют. Поэтому товарное производство и товарооборот являются у нас в настоящее время такой же необходимостью, какой они были, скажем, лет тридцать тому назад, когда Ленин провозгласил необходимость всемерного разворота товарооборота. (Stalin 1952b: 16-17)

[314] Die soziale Revolution (1902)

variations depending “upon the operation of supply and demand”. Since under socialism people won’t have to sell their labour power, it will cease to be a commodity and “and its price would become independent of the relation between supply and demand.” (Ibid: 134) Later on, in 1922, Kautsky goes much further, claiming in “The Labour Revolution”[315] that “socialist society would not be able to exist without a system for the exchange of products.” (Kautsky 1925: 259) . Kautsky most definitely has his reservations about the possibility of non-monetary economics, claiming that the one can be imagined as either a whole state with all its industry and agriculture transformed into a “single factory under single central control”[316] (Ibid: 260) or as "the Leninite (sic — *Y.S.*) interpretation of what Marx described as the second phase of communism: each to produce on one’s own accord as much as one can, the productivity of labour being so high that everyone may be trusted to take what one needs.” (Ibid: 261). He doubts the very possibility of the second option, let alone its short-term perspectives: “as the measure of value and means of circulation of products money will continue to exist in a socialist society until the dawn of that blessed second phase of communism which we do not yet know whether will ever be more than a pious wish, similar to the Millennial Kingdom.” (Ibid: 262).

Unlike “Leninite interpretation of Marx”, such a view is in a way similar to Stalin’s claims: like Kautsky, Stalin claimed that money will persist and that it could be abolished in principle but this is “a long way off”. Stalin also insisted that under socialism money “acquires other meaning”, which is very similar to Kautsky’s claim on the distinct nature of money under socialism, appearing from the fact that “there would of course no longer be any opportunity for individuals to employ money for the purchase of means of production, that is, to transform it into industrial capital. […] Thus in a complete socialist society all the conditions would be lacking for the transformation of money into capital.” (Ibid: 262). Both claims were on many occasions repeated in numerous Soviet books on the socialist development as well as in

[315] Die Proletarische Revolution und ihr Programm (1922)
[316] "The ideal of such a condition is the prison or the barrack," — adds Kautsky (1925: 260)

textbooks of political economy. Particularly, Soviet economist David Chernomordik in his "Economic policy of the USSR" writes that "money still persists during the first stage of the communist society's development. [...] However, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the Soviet economy, functions and purpose of such bourgeois economic instruments as money and trade change essentially. They work for the proletariat which employs them for winning the victory of socialism over capitalism."[317] The author explains the difference along the lines of Kautsky's argument:

> money still doesn't disappear [...] when individual commodity production becomes socialist production of the collective farms [...]. But this money plays a completely different role when compared to the capitalist society. [...] There money becomes capital. [...] Money under socialism is the necessary means to control socialist efficiency (profitability) of our enterprises. [...] Money provides economic policy of the proletarian dictatorship with the instrument, allowing it to permeate to the areas where the state itself cannot take charge. Money is an instrument of the plan performance control in the state-owned sector itself. [318]

On the next page the author once again claims that the "purpose and use of our money is completely different from those under capitalism. We use bourgeois instrument for a socialist purpose."[319] It is necessary to mention that Kautsky's book was translated into Russian (authorized translation from manuscript) and published, albeit only in Berlin, a year after the original publication (Kautskiĭ 1923). It was well known, at least among the party leadership: it's cited by Nikolaĭ Krylenko in his "Talks on Law and State" (Krȳlenko 1924), by Bukharin in his

[317] На первой стадии развития коммунистического общества еще сохраняются деньги. [...] Но в условиях диктатуры пролетариата, в советской экономике, функции и назначение таких инструментов буржуазной экономики, как торговля и деньги, принципиально меняются. Они работают на пролетариат, который использует их для победы социализма над капитализмом. (Chernomordik 1936: 307)

[318] деньги еще не исчезают [...] с переходом индивидуального товарного хозяйства в коллективное социалистическое производство колхозов [...]. Но эти деньги играют совершенно другую роль, чем в капиталистическом обществе. [...] Деньги там превращаются в капитал. [...] Деньги при социализме являются необходимым средством контроля социалистической рентабельности (выгодности) наших предприятий [...] Деньги служат инструментом, при помощи которого экономическая политика пролетарской диктатуры проникает туда, где непосредственно государство распоряжаться не может. Деньги служат средством проверки, выполнения плана в самом государственном секторе. (Ibid: 308-309)

[319] …Назначение и применение наших денег принципиально совершенно иное, чем при капитализме. Мы пользуемся буржуазным инструментом для социалистических целей. (Ibid: 310)

important 1926 article "On the character of our revolution and possibility of the victorious socialist construction in the USSR" (Bukharin 1926) and by a large number of other authors[320].

This whole nominalist and "Kautskian" discourse on money is far from being Marxist: indeed, it is essentially Lassallean, — and, eventually, Fichtean. It is this discourse that Marx specifically refutes in the "Critique of the Gotha Programme". What underlies Kautsky's — and Stalin's — Fichtean concept of money, is the attempt to maintain equality between the production and distribution with labour time being a measure of production. In his formula "from each according to his ability to each according to his needs" Marx, on the contrary, acknowledges the inequality of both abilities and needs. Stalinist or Kautskian money is merely an even more openly Lassallean instrument of maintaining balance, based on equal exchange, than labour certificates. Their controlling functionality, emphasized in both Kautsky and Stalinist economists, serves exactly this purpose, — and this is the same purpose, money serves in the Closed Commercial State. Finally, unlike labour certificates (ultimately issued locally, for instance by the council, managing the factory) money, — and in particular, socialist money which cannot be turned into capital, — is under complete control of the highly centralised financial authority or, in other words, of the state.

One last text on the subject should be mentioned, namely an article by Evgeniĭ Preobrazhenskiĭ published in April 1930 by the foremost Soviet Marxist theoretical journal, "Under the Banner of Marxism". Preobrazhenskiĭ, whose party membership was reinstated only in January[321], that is to say, four months prior to the publication, has embraced for the time

[320] Apparently, official attitudes to Kautsky's understanding of Marxism as applied to money theory was quite hostile. Bernard Berkovsky, who authored one of the very few Soviet pre-revolutionary books on the subject (1930b), elaborated upon the unacceptability of Kautsky's reactionary and revisionist theory of money in the lengthy article published by the "Financial issues of planned economy" magazine (Berkovskiĭ 1930a).

[321] In July 1929 "Pravda" published an open letter, signed by Karl Radek, Ivar Smilga and Preobrazhenskiĭ, declaring their break with the opposition and embracement of the Stalinist Politburo policies. Preobrazhenskiĭ was then allowed to return to Moscow from his year and a half exile in Uralsk (Kazakhstan). In 1930-1932 Preobrazhenskiĭ worked as a deputy chairman of Nizhny Novgorod planning committee, then held a minor position in the the People's Commissariat of Grain and Animal Husbandry State Farm (separated from the People's Commissariat of

being Stalin's policy of accelerated industrialization, which was considered by many former members of the Left opposition as the implementation of their program under slightly different slogans. The article in question, "Economic nature of the Soviet money and perspectives of the chervonets" is, however, for the most part, cautiously theoretical. In 1930 Preobrazhenskiï still envisions the emergence of non-monetary economy in the foreseeable future and strives to discern its features in the post-NEP Soviet economy. The following fragment presents his vision of the difference between the Soviet and the capitalist money:

> (the) connection of our currency to gold as world money is to a large extent or, one may say, overwhelmingly, severed; thanks to the creation of the state-controlled economy and to foreign trade monopoly, we hold sway over the passage, through which all the laws of the world economy monetary regulation break through under the conditions of regular commodity production. This brings us to the conclusion that even under the conditions of very broad commodity-money circulation of the NEP, not only is the nature of our money different, but also the laws of money circulation evolve in a way fundamentally different from those in the capitalist countries.[322]

To illustrate this point, Preobrazhenskiï analyses the situation in the state-controlled sector: on the one hand, the state pays wages to "its workers" in the monetary form and then supplies, albeit partly, the demand, "originating in this very wages" with the products "of its own making". According to Preobrazhenskiï in this case money circulation "is of a very peculiar nature" so that it can't be in fact considered "circulation" in Marx's sense. "This part of money,'' — claims Preobrazhenskiï, — "is by its inner nature very close to the coupons *of the unitary closed economic organism."*[323] This distinctly Fichtean/Lassallean word choice could be

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Agriculture in 1932) in 1932-1933. In 1933 he was expelled from the party for the second time, arrested and sentenced to exile, — once again in Kazakhstan, — in January 1933.

[322] ...связь нашей валюты с золотом, как мировыми деньгами, является в значительной мере, если не сказать в основном, уже порванной; путем организации государственного хозяйства и благодаря монополии внешней торговли мы контролируем тот проход, через который в нормальных условиях товарного хозяйства пробиваются наружу все законы стоимостного регулирования мирового хозяйства. Этим самым мы приходим к выводу, что в условиях даже очень широкого товарно-денежного обращения, которое существует в период нэпа, и природа наших денег иная, чем при капитализме, и законы нашего денежного обращения складываются совсем иначе, чем в капиталистических странах. (Preobrazhenskiї 1930: 70)

[323] ...эта часть денег по своей внутренней природе приближается к талонам *единого замкнутого хозяйственного организма*. (Ibid, emphasis added).

still disregarded as a mere coincidence, — but Preobrazhenskiĭ proceeds to the currency issuing formula for the state economic sector, which sounds just as familiar:

> the part of wages, defrayed this way, should always correspond to the particular tangible volume of the state produce meant for the state consumption. In other words, the demand from the industrial and office workers should be regulated by a certain level of wages, which should be in turn conform to the quantity of produce, allotted for distribution[324].

It is to be recalled at this point that in Fichte "the entire sum of circulating money represents the entire sum of goods found in public commerce." (Fichte 2012: 123) Following the financial reforms of early 1930s, which defined the country's monetary system, Soviet government took some effort to observe this rule. Vladimir Sitnikov, senior consultant for the Gosbank executive board in 1928-1931,[325] describes this effort as in his memoirs as follows:

> following the credit reform of 1930-1931 quarterly approval of the Gosbank cash department receipts and withdrawals by the Council of Ministers was put into practice. Cash flow was treated as a compulsory emission directive that is either the right to issue additional cash or the responsibility to retire a certain sum from circulation. Approval was usually based on the assumption of as high volumes of trade cash receipts as possible, so fulfilling this directive was a highly demanding task[326].

[324] ...та часть зарплаты, которая покрывается таким образом, должна всегда корреспондировать определенному материальному об'ему той государственной продукции, которая предназначается для государственного же потребления. Иными словами, спрос рабочих и служащих должен здесь регулироваться определенным уровнем зарплаты, а уровень зарплаты должен приспособляться к размерам материальной продукции, идущей здесь на распределение (Ibid).

[325] Later deputy director of the Statistics and Accountancy department and director of the Short-term Credit department at Narkomfin (1932-1937).

[326] После кредитной реформы 1930–1931 годов в практику финансового планирования было введено ежеквартальное утверждение Советом Министров СССР плана поступлений в кассы Госбанка и выдач из них денежной наличности. Сальдо выдач и поступлений представляло для Госбанка обязательную эмиссионную директиву, т. е. право дополнительного выпуска денег в обращение или обязанность изъятия их определенной суммы из оборота. При утверждении кассового плана обычно исходили из возможно большей суммы поступлений торговой выручки, поэтому выполнение эмиссионной директивы проходило с большим напряжением. (Sitnin 2007: 34-35)

3. 3. Following the spirit — and sometimes the letter. Some half-way conclusions

Let us now summarize these considerations in order to assess the level of similarity between Fichte's Closed Commercial State and the historical Stalinist state of 1930s. Distinctions between various kinds of "closed" are crucial for this assessment, and therefore, we have to consider differences in logic of the purposes. Such logic is relatively clear in Fichte's project, especially in the broader context of his *staatslehre*, doctrine of state. Frederick Coplestone observes that Fichte's philosophy comes ultimately to "the vision of a multiplicity of moral vocations converging towards a common ideal end, the establishment of a moral world-order." Considering this, the state "is a necessary instrument to preserve the system of rights as long as man has not attained his full moral development." (Coplestone 1994: 27-28) The project of "The Closed Commercial State" is one of several attempts by Fichte to figure out the best possible form of such instrument. The next — and last — of these attempts was his vision of state as an educational institution in its core, espoused in his last finished lecture course from 1813, published posthumously, in 1820, under the title "Die staatslehre" (Doctrine of the State). The Closed Commercial State exists to facilitate human self-development and self-realization to the ends of the moral world-order, coming of which means also dissolution of state. Until that moment it has to provide its citizens with ways to live, and not just to survive, but to "live pleasantly". In the broader context of Fichte's philosophy it means less time dedicated to work and more leisure time: in his later "Doctrine of Right" (1812) he openly proclaims the human right to leisure, which is an indispensable prerequisite for the contemplative life, self-perfection and self-realization.

Since moral world-order is to emerge from people following individual vocations, the Closed Commercial State does not represent any kind of developmental regime. The fact that whatever surplus is invested not in yield enhancement, industrial growth or technological

advances, but instead in leisure time and the contemplative life of the citizens, makes it rather a "developmental homeostasis", where development is more of a *Bildung,* than *Building* kind. Isolation serves the purpose of making homeostasis possible in the first place. In full accordance with the a-temporal character of spatial utopias, real-world dynamics only exist on the first stages of state-building, from the establishment of the rational state to the moment when it closes. As soon as Fichte's state achieves homeostasis, it enters Harvey's "recurrent time of the ritual" or, one may say, the temporality of the agrarian cycle. Changes are (presumably) safely contained within the domains of spiritual life and self-development practices, while the domains of labour, economy, politics and public life are principally static. The forecast horizon in the case of the Closed Commercial State is, therefore, as good as eternity.

Logic of purpose in the case of the Stalinist state is in fact, much less clear, partly because the history of this state was largely defined by the fact that predictions made on the basis of its governing theory failed time and again: policies of the Stalinist state were reactive at least as much as proactive. However, it's safe to say that Stalinist USSR of the pre-war period is, unlike the Closed Commercial State, very much a developmental regime. This basic difference in purposes determines a large part of the overall differences between the two models. We'll return to the discussion of the two models' dissimilarities shortly, but let's consider similarities first.

In terms of the foreign trade monopoly, the system introduced by the Soviet government only partly corresponds with the principles of the Closed Commercial State during the NEP years. While the monopoly was formally preserved, de-facto various entities and enterprises of a partly or entirely non-governmental nature had access to foreign trade. However, the monopoly after 1930, when NKVT became the sole government agency, authorized for export and import transactions, which were also entirely transferred into the

country from abroad, fully corresponds to Fichte's scheme. Both in the Closed Commercial State and in the USSR plans "determined which kinds of goods, how much of each for every year and for how long in total, and how much in each district and for each trading house, will still be imported from abroad or exported to there." Both in the Closed Commercial State and in the USSR foreign trade was not "conducted by private individuals but by the state." (Fichte 2012: 185) Private businesses were preserved in Fichte's state, so according to his idea merchants could use state as a proxy for the foreign trade unless and until their intentions don't come into the collision with the state plan. This provision, which rather describes the NEP situation, proved unnecessary in the Stalinist USSR, since the state became indeed the only agent representing the country on the world markets. However, while Fichte's state is set for a gradual withdrawal from the world markets altogether, this was not probably the intention of the Stalinist state in the long term — and certainly not during the pre-war period. On the contrary, steep decrease in the volumes of foreign trade due to the Great Depression presented a vital threat for the Stalinist state. As was mentioned earlier, the reason for this lies in the fact that the logic of purpose in the case of the Stalinist USSR was very different from that for the Closed Commercial State.

The resemblance between the two systems in terms of foreign exchange monopoly is initially, once again, limited, at least judging by the formal regulations, found in the code of law. As we saw, full foreign exchange monopoly was only established in 1937. However, the real practices of the Stalinist USSR monetary system had met the requirements of Fichte's system much earlier, after the 1930-1931 credit reform. Moreover, such requirements were met over and above. Setting more complex aspects aside, Fichte's monetary ideas can be boiled down to disconnecting the purchasing power of the *Landesgeld* from it's exchange rate: "However much or little the government pays the foreigner for the goods, it is not this price that will set the measure for what the resident must pay, but rather the selling price dictated by the law of

the land" (Ibid). The combination of the fiat money solely issued and controlled by state, foreign trade and foreign exchange monopolies (plus fixed prices) mean that state is in full control of consumption within its borders. Fichte's state is benevolent and doesn't "think of enriching itself, but always keeps a view to its higher purposes" (Ibid), which was exactly how the Stalinist regime described itself. However, the Soviet monetary system was more advanced than the one described by Fichte, who never addressed, among others, the issues of credit and capital investment.

The credit reform of the 1930, largely overlooked by the scholarship of the Soviet economy, secured, in fact, absolute control of the monetary system and foreign exchange monopoly was only one of its parts, though certainly not insignificant. The provision which had probably even greater and overall decisive impact on the economic order of the Stalinist state, is found in the TsIK and SNK resolution from 30 January 1930 "On credit reform", in the paragraph "On supersedence of commodity credit by bank credit in the socialized sector of the economy", stating that "it is prohibited for the state institutions, cooperative organizations and mixed-sector companies with participation of foreign capital to supply goods or provide services on credit. This credit is superseded by bank credit exclusively."[327] Considering the negligible size of the private sector at the time, it's safe to say that the resolution applied to the whole Soviet economy. Formally, commercial credit was superseded by direct bank credit, but in fact this wording was just a disguise, since bank credit is based upon mutual credit between people and enterprises, which was prohibited. A de-facto ban on mutual credit imposed by the reform denied the monetary part of the economy the opportunity to influence the economy as a whole. Normally bank credit allows the economy to react quickly to changes in monetary demand without additional emission. In other words, it makes it possible for banks to create

[327] О замене в обобществленном секторе народного хозяйства товарного кредитования банковским... Государственным органам, кооперативным организациям и смешанным акционерным обществам без участия иностранного капитала воспрещается отпускать товары и оказывать услуги друг другу в кредит. Этот кредит заменяется исключительно банковским кредитованием. (O kreditnoї reforme 1930: 175)

money. Starting from 1930, the Soviet economy was deprived of this instrument, commonly referred to as "credit multiplier". Without it the economy became significantly more controllable and significantly less flexible. Economist Zakhariĭ Atlas, principal Soviet theorist of the monetary system, wrote at the time that "a whole range of credit intermediaries wedged in between Gosbank and its borrower tightened credit and complicated its flow on the one hand and on the other deprived Gosbank of the opportunity to find out who is the ultimate user of its credit."[328] Indeed, a working credit multiplier makes other measures of state control over the monetary sector to a considerable extent obsolete. It can be argued that, though credit issues are passed over in the project of the Closed Commercial State, Soviet government here follows the spirit, if not the letter of Fichte's project quite closely.

Consequently, the 1930 credit reform emerged not from theory, but from practice, since modernization turned out to be much more expensive than anticipated, while the circumstances (e.g. in the form of the Great Depression and crop failures) cut down export income significantly. Therefore, it was considered necessary "to disrupt unplanned distribution of financial resources, their spontaneous transfer from one industry to another through the channels of paper credit and secure strict systematic use of the resources at hand."[329] Moreover, separation of cash and non-cash money provided even more control over the economy for the state at the expense of the society. Yasushi Nakamura argues that these two categories amount to the "means of settlement used by households" and "means of settlement used by enterprises" accordingly (Nakamura 2017: 23). He also observes that once these two "moneys" are separated, wage payments become the only source of cash money supply, which is then controlled by the total amount of (planned) wage. The last imposes, in turn, the limit on

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[328] Между Госбанком и его конечным должником вклинивалась целая серия кредитных посредников, что, с одной стороны, удорожало кредит, осложняло его движение, а с другой стороны, лишало Госбанк возможности знать, кто же в конечном счете пользуется ею кредитом. (Atlas 1930: 425)

[329] ...ликвидировать внеплановое распределение средств, их стихийный перелив из одной отрасли в другую по каналам вексельного кредита и обеспечить строгое планомерное использование имеющихся ресурсов. (Gladkov 1977: 64)

the total amount of cash, the supply of which is independent of bank loan supply. However, Nakamura ignores another important consequence of such separation: in absence of the investment instruments, i.e. in the situation when cash money can only be spent on consumer goods or put into Gosbank deposits with fixed low rates, the state is the only economic agent, capable of determining or even affecting the direction of economic development, being at the same time, as we've already mentioned, in control of the population's consumption via defining the amount of wages.

Three measures — commercial credit ban, separation of cash and non-cash money supplies and foreign exchange monopoly together assured the almost absolute control of the Stalinist state over economic development. Such a monetary policy combined with the foreign trade monopoly provided the Stalinist state with the ideal instrument of extracting profits from all sectors of the economy. These profits were maximized by consumption regulation, which amounted to the maximum possible reduction of the labour costs through the extensive use of forced labour due to virtual absence of institutional limitations on the use of violence. No less significant is another, direct outcome of the Fichtean monetary system being brought into operation. Mutual credit is based on trust: bills of credit are only to a very limited degree guaranteed by bank reserves. Ultimately, it's not just a monetary instrument, providing economy with additional flexibility, but also a reason to regularly "exercise" trust within the society. It was abolished. Money, having intrinsic value (golden chervonets or pre-revolutionary golden coins) was legal only as an instrument of savings, while transactions in it were prohibited. Aside from purely economic reasons ("socialist accumulation"), transactions were prohibited because people, possessing and transacting in precious metals enjoy, even in absence of private property, considerable independence from the state. If one can keep such money, but not use it for transactions, it means that in case of need, one can only exchange it for goods or services through the medium of the state. By banning transactions in *Weltgeld*,

state deprives its citizens of autonomy. Fiat money becomes the only legal means of transaction. It is, however, by definition created by state, which has unrestricted monopoly right to define its value: “only through the will of the state does it represent something” (Fichte 2012: 123). Or, in other words, fiat money of either the Fichtean or Stalinist state is backed, using Sergeĭ Sharapov’s words, solely by the “limitless trust in the Sovereign”. This demand of limitless trust, coming from the state, is, arguably, what lies at the heart of both the Stalinist and Fichtean state.

3. 4. Other models

The Stalinist state indeed bears a striking similarity to the Closed Commercial State. However, it can be argued that this similarity is largely limited to means. When it comes to ends, the USSR of the 1930s is reminiscent a different category of closed states, namely of the 17th and 18th century mercantilist empires. One can also argue that it was Friedrich List’s National System of Political Economy which served as an intermediate link between the Fichtean and the Stalinist Model. Finally, Vollmar’s Isolated Socialist State should also be taken in consideration. The unlikely blend of homeostatic Fichtean isolationism with its opportunistic attitudes to accumulation of wealth by the government on the one hand and mercantilism, focused, by contrast, on stockpiling precious metals (or, in other words, *Weltgeld*), on the other, turns out to lie at the heart of the Stalinist state concept.

The similarity of the Stalinist state to the mercantilist empires of the 17th and 18th century requires somewhat more detailed consideration: parallels of the kind were drawn by more than one scholar of Soviet Union and mercantilist empires alike. Alexander Gerschenkron in his 1970 book “Europe in the Russian Mirror”, argues that “the Soviet experience displays clear elements of Russian mercantilism, and by the same token, of mercantilism in general; and any talk about that experience representing the last word of human progress [...] must

perforce try to gloss over this crucial aspect of Soviet economic development." (Gerschenkron 1970: 117). Gerschenkron also distinguishes five principal characteristics of the Stalinist state: "1) maintenance of a permanent condition of stress and strain […]; 2) incessant exercise of dictatorial power; 3) creation of an image of the dictator as the incarnation of supreme wisdom and indomitable will-power; 4) reference to an allegedly unchanged and unchangeable value system, by which the actions of the dictatorship are justified; 5) proscription of any deviating values and beliefs coupled with threats and acts of repression." (Ibid: 118) In his opinion, these principles "are still related to the mercantilists period because they are essentially based on power and the urge to maintain and to increase the power of the regime" (Ibid). Furthermore, he argues that the distinctive feature of the Soviet industrialization as compared to the general European pattern of this process is the primacy of the political factor, which makes it impossible to understand the Stalinist state in purely economic terms. Bert Hoselitz observes the similarity between Soviet Union and the mercantilist states in noting the fact that both operated systems of what he calls "horizontal planning", characterized by numerous and excessive specific rules for minute transactions and everyday forms of economic behaviour. Hoselitz compares Stalinist planning to mercantilist regulations, represented by industrial codes. (Hoselitz 1959) Siegel and Weinberg specifically point out that while mercantilist policies could vary, they almost always included increase in regulation and protectionism, but most importantly, that all measures were intended to secure the government's ability to mobilize resources, be it labour force or recruits, capital, commercial connections or managerial skills for various purposes, from agricultural reconstruction to war. (Siegel and Weinberg 1977: 155-56)

There are several more authors who compare various aspects of the Stalinist state to the mercantilist model,[330] but the most recent and compelling case was made by Peter Boettke who argues that the Soviet economy "can be usefully modelled as a modern example of a

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[330] See, among others, Wheeler (1957) and Anderson (1988).

mercantilist economy" and suggests such a model, focusing, however, on the post-war and largely post-Stalinist period. (Boettke 2001: 140-53). Generally, Boettke argues that the main feature of mercantilism is rent-seeking[331] in its various forms, but most importantly, in the form of raising revenue by sale of monopoly privileges rather then by taxation — due to high administrative costs associated with the latter. Boettke points out that the level of state intervention in mercantilist economies was very high: prices and wages were subject to state control; restrictions were imposed on movements, capital and labour force, numerous markets were monopolized; export and import tariffs were imposed, while individual rights were not institutionally protected. Another key feature of the mercantilist model, according to Boettke, is expansion of standing armies which resulted in enormous military expenditure. That very wealth accumulation (usually in the form of precious metals) which was the ultimate goal of the mercantilist policies, required that the Monarchy secure itself from internal and external threats, even if at the expense of economic development. Indeed, this description in many ways resembles the Stalinist state.

What also makes the Stalinist state similar to the mercantilist empires is excessive state accumulation of capital. Also, like as mercantilist states, the Stalinist state never relied upon direct taxation as a source of revenue. In late 1920s 79,8% of total taxation, imposed on the entire population, consisted of indirect taxes, associated with much lower administrative costs (Pashkovskiĭ et al. 1929: 70). Tax reform of 1930 imposed so-called "turnover tax" on state enterprises, which only simplified the task of tax revenue accumulation. Turnover tax was once again indirect, but even more collectible since, as we already know, state enterprises could only use non-cash money, fully controlled by the state via Gosbank. In 1937 for example, turnover tax revenue exceeded the revenue from direct taxation, including obligatory state loans, by a

[331] According to the public choice theory, "an individual who invests in something that will not actually improve productivity, or will actually lower it, but that does raise his income because it gives him some special position or monopoly power, is "rent seeking," and the "rent" is the income derived." (Tullock 2005: 104)

factor of nine. (Karavaeva 2009: 38-39). The same excessive accumulation is the reason for strict control of exports and imports. On a deeper level, of course, one decisive feature common for mercantilist, Stalinist and Fichtean model determines the mode of government operation for all three. It's the primacy of the political factor over economic reasons, pointed out by Gerschenkron. Nevertheless, while the USSR of the 1930s shares numerous features with the mercantilist model, it doesn't exactly fit this model. Mercantilist empires, while being highly interventionist, were not in any way developmental states: the very idea of modernization, constitutive for the latter, emerged later. The Closed Commercial State has other significant dissimilarities with the historical mercantilist empires: unlike in the latter, constant accumulation of capital in monetary form is of no particular concern for its government.

Kolerov, in his book on socialism in one country, argues that it was the "National System of Political Economy" by Friedrich List which served as a direct link between the "Closed Commercial State" and the practices of Stalinist USSR. Indeed, some case for this claim could be built. Sergeĭ Vitte was a firm follower of List, as were a number of other prominent figures, including, among others, Dmitriĭ Mendeleev.[332] The continuity of Imperial policies in those of the Bolshevist government is a well-known phenomenon: the plan of electrification (GOELRO) is just one striking example. The "National System of Political Economy" was widely read in Russia both in original and in Russian translation (List 1891). In fact, List's National System of Political Economy shares only one significant feature with the Stalinist state, namely, very high developmental impulse. Not only does it imply only a very moderate (especially in our context) degree of closure, secured by protectionist tariffs, but also it has a very short forecast horizon. The System of National Economy seeks to protect the economy only while it's weak, intending equalization rather than isolation. List provides states with a temporary instrument, which

[332] See, for example, Mendeleev (1892).

becomes obsolete once the economy grows strong enough to enter and navigate the high seas of the global market or, in his own words, “it is the task of national economy to accomplish the economical development of the nation and to prepare it for admission into the universal society of the future.” (List 1909: 142).

List doesn’t consider isolationism or even protectionism a norm and has no doubts about the effectiveness of market competition. Moreover, he sets a extremely high value on property rights protection and openness of society: “Where it is not possible to raise oneself by honest exertions and by prosperity from one class of society to another, from the lowest to the highest; where the possessor necessarily hesitates to show his property publicly or to enjoy the fruits of it because it would expose his property to risk... there the most important motives for consumption as well as for production are wanting.” (List 1909: 246). What List suggests is not a political philosophy but more of a necessary but temporary self-protective measure, securing equal opportunities for late developers. Sure enough, Sergeĭ Vitte was so much in favour of List’s system precisely because Russia was indeed a clear case of late developer. And moreover Stalinist policies demonstrate, in considerable part, obvious continuity with those of Russian Empire: significant part of the Soviet industrial construction was based upon pre-revolutionary expertise, visions and sometimes blueprints. Also, in terms of the national economy “nurturing period” List was as much an interventionist as his age permitted. However, both the means and the ends differed widely in List and in Stalinist developmental efforts. Whatever Stalinism envisioned in the future, be it eventual autarky or the World Revolution, the Soviet economy was never expected to participate as an equal in a global competition. Abandonment of both foreign trade and foreign currency monopolies was never in sight. Neither were competitive internal market and protected property rights or, for that matter, any market and any property rights at all. The nation seen as a community of economically and politically free creative individuals, whose liberties and, albeit indirectly, well-being are protected by the state is at the

heart of the List's system. Stalinism, on the contrary, is centred on the understanding that the "first socialist *state*" itself possesses the highest value possible, being the almost achieved "solution to the riddle of history" which, consequently, has to be preserved by any means necessary. Individual people, their liberties and well being are little more than means to this end. These two developmental models can be perceived as irreconcilable, alternative sets of blueprints for modernization, and List's model was exactly the one *not chosen* by the USSR.

Another model indeed contributed to the range of the Stalinist state's features — namely the Isolated Socialist State, as described by Vollmar. Its most significant contribution to the Stalinist model is the rationale for the isolationist stance and the necessity of militarisation. It also had direct influence on both foreign policy and broadly conceived military doctrine of the pre-war USSR. While in Fichte closure defends the economy from the chaos of global trade and thus makes state planning and control possible, isolation in Vollmar is simply imposed upon the state by default, since it's by default surrounded not just by enemies, but by mortal foes. Vollmar fails to notice, it seems, the contradiction between this claim and his belief that trade relations will persist. For the Isolated Socialist State, however, foreign trade is optional. Thanks to the socialist mode of production, productivity of labour is so high that the lucky nation just naturally becomes self-sufficient, — except for irreplaceable agricultural items. However, a not insignificant portion of German social democrats held that even those items did not necessarily have to be a problem. Eduard Bernstein, for one, openly invoked the concept of the isolated socialist state while elaborating on his understanding of German colonialism. After denying the colonial question any importance in terms of domestic affairs, he starts treating it in hypothetical or even theoretical sense:

> If we take into account the fact that Germany now annually imports a considerable amount of colonial produce, we must note that the time may come when it might be desirable to procure at least a part of these products from our own colonies. However fast we may think that Germany is

> developing, we can not be blind to the fact that it will be a long time before a large number of other countries go over to socialism. However, if there is nothing wrong with enjoying the produce of tropical plantations, there can be nothing wrong with cultivating such plantations ourselves. The decisive question is not whether but how? It is not inevitable that the occupation of tropical countries by Europeans should harm the natives in their enjoyment of life, nor has it usually been the case up till now. Moreover, we can recognise only a conditional right of savages to the land they occupy. Higher civilisation has ultimately a higher right. It is not conquest but the cultivation of the land that confers an historical right to its use. (Bernstein and Tudor 1993: 169-70)

Given that the Isolated Socialist State keeps its colonies (if only in a new way, less harmful "for the natives in their enjoyment of life"), foreign trade becomes, in fact, definitely obsolete. War, however, is here to stay. That's what a reader would understand from Vollmar's a bit rambling and often incoherent text — and that's what, in all likelihood, turns out to be the most important of Vollmar's contributions to the Stalinist model.

Chapter Four. The only fatherland of the international proletariat, hostile encirclement and war

Apparently, Fichte had quite a wide readership in Russia both before and after the revolution. "The Closed Commercial State" was also in all likelihood known to at least part of the leadership. However, no direct evidence of that exists except one; in the very beginning of Nikolai Bukharin's "World economy and imperialism", the author claims that none of the "national economy bodies" have been closed entities á la Fichte for already quite some time now".[333] In regards to Vollmar, the situation is much more certain.

While many authors, starting from Trotsky in "The Third International After Lenin" (Trotsky 1957: 43-45) cite Vollmar as the author of the "socialism in one country" concept, it was widely accepted that Stalin and other party leaders were not aware of the existence of the "Isolated Socialist State". Neither Trotsky, nor later any scholars[334] appear to assume that Stalin, even if he knew about the existence of the "Isolated Socialist State", had ever read it. Eric van Ree, author of the pioneering studies on the subject, observes that generally "there was surprisingly little awareness among the Bolsheviks of the historical depth of the question of socialism in one country" and that "Stalin seems to have been largely unaware of German and Austrian Marxist thinking over the years" (van Ree 2015: 184). Such an assumption is natural, especially taking into account that Stalin had no knowledge of foreign languages.

However, this is not the case. Doing research for this thesis in the RGASPI Stalin's archive, the author came across a previously unnoticed document, which allows us to say with certainty that Stalin was not only aware of the existence of Vollmar's text, but also read it quite carefully. The document in question is the abridged translation of the "Isolated Socialist State" from 6 December 1926, made with the express purpose to introduce Vollmar's arguments to those concerned. While only two copies with margin notes, belonging to Stalin and Kalinin were

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[333] … "национально-хозяйственные организмы" [...] давно уже не представляют из себя замкнутого целого a la Фихте. (Bukharin 1918: 5)

[334] See Goodman (1960: 4), Deutscher (2003: 430), Knei-Paz (1979: 339)

found, it's almost certain that the text had a wider readership including not only members of Politburo, but also others in position of power. Trotsky, as we'll see shortly, appears to be unaware of this fact, at least as of June 1927.

Both copies have covering note attached. The translation is not attributed, but the note is signed by Alexandr (Alësha) Svanidze, brother of Stalin's first wife, Ekaterina "Kato" Svanidze (she died in 1907) and, thereby, the uncle of Stalin's son Yakov. Both his biography and the note contents make it fairly probable that he made the translation himself. The document[335] consists of two typewritten copies. Each copy includes a short cover note, reading as follows:

> Considering that the issue of the possibility to accomplish socialism in one country is very much of current interest, please bring to your notice the abridged translation of the article, dealing specifically with this issue. Notwithstanding that it's authored by the well-known right-wing social democrat Vollmar, not only does it pose the question in the right way and gives the right answer, but it also features downright prophetic foresight of our actuality, though the author, has of course never imagined Russia as the isolated socialist state, but rather some Western European country, where the conditions of the socialist state's isolated existence are severe beyond measure. It was written roughly 50 years ago, when Vollmar was still regarded as radical. It was first published in 1879 by Richter, in "Social Policy Yearly" (in German, a socialist journal, published in Zurich during the socialist law period). Despite being so old, for most part it looks as if being specifically levelled against our opposition.
>
> With comradely greetings, A. Svanidze[336]

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[335] RGASPI. F. 558, op. 11, d. 821, doc.26. 1926 Dec 4

[336] В виду высокой актуальности вопроса о возможности осуществления социализма в одной стране предлагаю Вашему вниманию сокращенный перевод статьи, посвященый специально этой теме. Несмотря на то, что она принадлежит перу известного правого социал-демократа Г. Фольмара, она содержит не только правильную постановку и решение вопроса, но в некоторых местах прямо таки пророческое предвидение нашей действительности, хотя автору в качестве изолированного социалистического государства мыслилась конечно не Россия, а какая либо западно-европейская страна, где внешние условия изолированного существования социалистического государства безконечно трудны. Написана она около 50 лет назад, когда Вольмар считался еще радикалом. Помещена впервые в ежегоднике социальной полит. Рихтера за 1879 г. (немецком соц. журнале, издававшемся в Цюрихе во время закона против социалистов). Несмотря на такую давность она в основном как будто специально направлена против нашей оппозиции. / С товарищеским приветом, А. Сванидзе. (p. 78). Svanidze's citation is not quite correct: the annual, where the article in question was published under the initials "G.V." (Vollmar 1879), had a different title, "Annual of Social Science and Social Policy" (Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik). Also, Svanidze is apparently unaware of the fact that the text was published as a pamphlet a year before appearing in the annual. "Richter" stands for "Ludwig Richter", the pen-name of Karl Höchberg, economist, social reformist writer and publisher of the "Zukunft" fortnightly review (1877-1878), closed after the adoption of the Socialist laws in October 1878 and succeeded by "Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik", which was also prohibited in Germany weeks after the first volume came off the press. Höchberg, who came from a well to do family, employed Eduard

The table of contents is found on the next page with the words "Personally for St[alin]"[337] in the left upper corner. A correction is made in the title of the first chapter: "Possibility of accomplishing socialism not in the whole civilized world simultaneously, but in one country", where the word "possibility" (возможность) is crossed out, and the word "likelihood" (вероятность) is written above on both copies, presumably by Svanidze himself. The tone of the note can be seen as an argument for him being the author of the translation: Svanidze certainly wants his addressee (or addressees) to read it, but knows that anything coming from Vollmar, of whom Bolshevist press and generally propaganda wrote almost exclusively in terms of contempt, is highly likely to be received with suspicion and hostility, thus making chances for the text being read quite slim. This is why he sides with the assumed suspicious reader ("Notwithstanding that it's authored by the well-known right-wing social democrat Vollmar…") at the beginning of the note and later claims that Vollmar "was still regarded as radical" at the time of writing. The last is true: throughout the Socialist law period Vollmar had much in common with revolutionary wing of the party. Only after the Socialist laws were abolished did he change his stance and join the reformist camp. Mention of the opposition in the last phrase almost openly aims to attract Stalin's attention.

It seems fitting to say a few words about the translator before proceeding to the analysis of the document. Besides being Stalin's relative, Alexandr (Alësha) Svanidze, was probably his oldest friend; they got to know each other at the Tiflis seminary. They were close, — this is quite obvious from the published fragments of his wife's diary (Svanidze 1993). In both Russian and Western historiography only the last years of his life are described in some details,

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Bernstein as his secretary in 1878-1881, after both moved to Zurich because of the Socialist Laws. In 1880 Höchberg invited Karl Kautsky to join him and Bernstein in Zurich and employed him to "enliven" the literary style of Höchberg's publications, which was effectively a form of subsidizing Kautsky's studies in socialist scholarship. For more details on the Zurich circle see Bernstein (1921).

[337] Лично для Ст[алина].

mostly coming from the diary of Maria Svanidze and several fragments from Svetlana Alliluyeva's memoirs. This is the reason why he’s mostly known as Stalin’s victim: from early 1937 they became estranged, and then in April Stalin wrote a letter to Nikolaĭ Ezhov, head of NKVD, urging him to take action against the enemies inside Gosbank (Svanidze worked there as a deputy chairman of the board since 1935). In December 1937 both Alexandr and Maria Svanidze were arrested. On 4 December 1940 the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court found Alexandr Svanidze guilty (high treason, espionage, terrorism, undermining of state industry and economy) and sentenced him to death. In January this sentence was overturned and replaced by 15 years imprisonment in the labour camp. However, on August 1941 sentence was reversed once again and Svanidze was executed. His wife was also sentenced to death and executed in March 1942 together with Alexandr Svanidze’s sister Maria (Mariko). Elena Zhukovskaya, wife of the NKVT high-rank official, arrested in 1934, describes her encounter with Svanidze in one of the camps near Uhta, where he spent several months in 1941. (Zhukovskaya 1991). Some fragmentary information on Svanidze’s early years can be found in Montefiore’s “Young Stalin” (Montefiore 2007). Everything in-between is largely unknown, except for basic facts: he has joined the RSDRP in 1901, was educated in Germany, where he obtained a degree in ancient history from the University of Jena.[338] He returned to Georgia in 1916 and lived in Tiflis until 1919. In 1920 he worked in the People’s Commissariat of Foreign affairs, then in 1921-1922 in Georgia. In 1921 he has been for some time holding two government offices at the same time, being both People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs and People’s Commissar of Finance, — the peace treaty of 1921, establishing common borders between three Soviet socialist Transcaucasian republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) and

[338] This fact is quite remarkable within the context of this study: the person who authored the translation of Vollmar’s “Isolated Socialist State” graduated from Jena, the university where Fichte spent his most fruitful years. However, no information on Svanidze’s student years was found, and unfortunately, the relevant part of the University archives was inaccessible at the time of writing due to technical reasons. It should be noted that according to Montefiore, who cites Mikhail Monoselidze, Stalin’s childhood friend from the seminary, it was the University of Leipzig, not Jena, where Svanidze was educated.

Turkey (Treaty of Kars) was signed by Svanidze in these two capacities. During the rest of 1920s he held various offices in Narkomfin, NKVT and Narkomindel and spent about two years working in the Soviet trade mission in Berlin. Svanidze also was a member of Vneshtorgbank until his assignment to Gosbank in 1935. He has authored a book on ancient societies of the Trans-Caucasian region and a number literary translations from the Georgian. In 1937, just before his arrest, Svanidze began the “Ancient History Journal” and the first issue still listed him as the editor-in-chief.

The translation in general sounds more bold and less nuanced than the anonymous translation from 1995. Several fragments are either underlined or marked off at the margins, marks being made in blue and red pencil. All fragments marked by Stalin are summarized in the table according to the location and color of the marks (see Appendix II). Stalin was mostly interested in the introductory part, providing a rough theoretical rationale for the idea of the isolated socialist states as well as in the chapters dealing with international relations and standing of the socialist state, global trade and security issues. Stalin took no interest in Vollmar’s reflections on internal post-revolutionary actions (proper extent of expropriation, order of priorities in nationalization, etc.) except for two fragments. In the first (p. 85), Vollmar claims that after coming into being, the socialist state will first go through a transitional period, when “the old in the form of the means of production private ownership will still exist, on provisions that it won't be used to damage the new society and that it will be gradually but unequivocally overcome”. In the second (p. 87), Vollmar argues that there's no need to socialize the land immediately, since in this case peasantry “will recognize our state not as a benefactor, but as an enemy” and is likely “to maintain not only passive, but also active resistance”. All other marked fragments belong to the two categories mentioned earlier. On two occasions Stalin underlines Vollmar's words twice. The first is the fragment (p. 103-104), claiming that the isolated socialist state “has the army at its disposal, unmatched in the world

history; over and above, it is a sovereign proprietor of all material means of defence. But what powers can its enemies use as a counterbalance? Their peoples are not on their side; they are, on the contrary, the most loyal allies of the state hostile to their rulers; moreover, they would defend it, should the opportunity arise, with deadly force".[339] The second is the optimistic concluding phrase of Vollmar's treatise (p. 105): "States and nations will attain their goal, socialism, after still existing obstacles shall be demolished, — and they will do so not all at once, but some sooner and others later, in conformity with the preceding development. Whatever the case, our state will soon cease to be the isolated socialist state."[340]

All combined, fragments of the "Isolated socialist state", which drew Stalin's attention and singled out in red colour, can be summarized in the following statement:[341]

I.

> The final victory of socialism is possible and it's more likely to happen in one separate state. No fundamental conditions exist which could prevent such a state from forming and thriving (*p. 80*). Evidently, the transition to socialism is subject to having a highly developed economy, so presumably socialism must be more prevalent in the most developed countries. However, this is not the case (*pp. 81-82*). It's absolutely inconceivable under existing and foreseeable conditions that socialism will simultaneously win in all civilized countries. It's much more likely to happen in two or three economically and culturally developed countries (*p. 82*). It can be speculated that the revolution is going to pervade many countries at once, but since development is uneven and happens at different rates, chances

[339] оно располагает для своей защиты армией, не имеющей себе равной с основания мира; и ко всему этому — оно обладает в неограниченной мере всеми техническими средствами защиты. Какова же в противоположность этому сила его врагов? Их народы не на их стороне; напротив,они являются вернейшими союзниками государства, враждебного их властителям и стали бы его защищать всеми средствами, при случае даже с оружием в руках (underlined words are those underlined twice in the original).

[340] Государства и народы достигнут своей цели - социализма после уничтожения существующих до сих пор препятствий, не одновременно, а раньше или позднее сообразно своему предшествующему развитию; но во всяком случае наше государство вскоре перестанет быть изолированным социалистическим государством (underlined words are those underlined twice in the original). "Обладает в неограниченной мере всеми техническими средствами защиты" is one of the several vague (if not erroneous) places in the translation, which are quite clear in the original: "…what's more," — Vollmar claims, — "the socialist state is the sole proprietor of all the material/tangible means of defence" ("…wozu noch kommt, dass er sich im unbeschränkten Besitz aller dinglichen Vertheidigungsmittel befindet." (Vollmar 1879: 73))

[341] Close paraphrase was consciously used in this summary instead of translation due to the following reasons: firstly, sentences in Svanidze's translation are on many occasions incoherent and excessively long, their syntax in some cases modelled after German, etc. There's no particular need to reproduce these irregularities. Secondly, at times only fragments of sentences, or sentences taken out of context are underlined. Resalting discontinuities in logic are stitched up in this paraphrase with maximum caution.

of a worldwide revolution become only poorer as we' approach the critical point (*p. 83*). So, we can assume that the emergence of the isolated socialist state is the most likely, if not the only possible scenario (*p. 84*). It may take a while for other states to join us, and nevertheless, the isolated condition of the first socialist state is temporary (*p. 105*).

II.

Not only has such a state to secure successful outcome of the struggle between the two systems, but also to facilitate its own prosperity. Private ownership, though limited and strictly supervised, must be allowed during the transitional period (*p. 85*). Some speculate that our industries will be unable to compete on the global market due to the working class' high standards of living (*p. 96*). They are wrong, since the socialist mode of production will enable us to assume the best possible competitive position. Given similar wage levels, productivity of labour in our state is going to be higher by far than in any other state (*p. 97*). So many people will find our working and living conditions attractive, we'll have to limit the inward labour migration [even though it contradicts our internationalist principles] (*p. 100*). The very existence of the isolated socialist state calls the oppressed and the exploited to fight for a better life at home, showing them what can be achieved and the way it can be achieved. Our state will actively help socialism forward in other countries through means appropriate at any given circumstances (*p. 101*). The more people in other countries will admire our state, the more hateful the dominant classes of these countries will become. Our state cannot be friends with any other but that doesn't mean we are going to be constantly at war. As long as it's for us to decide, struggle [between the two systems] will remain non-violent, though still fierce. It's in our nature to encourage other nations for liberation struggle and thus undermine the oppressive systems' foundations (*p. 102*). Dominant classes will rage against the socialist state, albeit to no avail, since they will be occupied by their own problems, resulting from the rise of internal social movements (*p. 102-103*). Direct military offence against our state leads nowhere, because in this case the aggressor faces the most resilient society. [Our citizens have a lot to lose], which is why our army is unmatched in the whole world history. The socialist state is also a sovereign proprietor of all tangible means of defence (*p. 83*). Should the hostile governments declare war on our state, not only will their nations refuse to fight, but they will probably come over to our side instead (*p. 103-104*). Rulers of the capitalist states will be confined to keeping terms with the hated socialist state. Not only does this unvanquishable position ensure our fundamental stability and full autonomy from external forces, it also facilitates its unlimited strength and almost preeminent influence upon both international relations and internal affairs of the bourgeois states (*p. 104*).

The first fragment is well recognizable. Its principal idea is exactly the one underlying Stalin's concept of socialism in one country. The document, however, is dated 6 December 1926, a month after Stalin had delivered his speech “The Social-Democratic Deviation in our Party” to

the delegates of the 15th Party conference. The speech as well as the concept was based upon just two sentences from Lenin's 1915 article "On a slogan for a United States of Europe": "Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country alone." (Lenin 1974k: 342). These sentences amount to what Stalin in November repeatedly claimed to be Lenin's discovery of the law of uneven development (Stalin 1954c: 326-30) and described as the very first Marxist account of the possibility of socialism in one country (Stalin 1954d: 259-77). Compared to Vollmar, who is more loquacious in the original than in Svanidze's translation, Lenin's wording is, of course, much more condensed. However, one detail reveals Lenin's awareness of "The isolated Socialist State" and, thus, the true source of the 1915 passage. It's the formula "in one capitalist country alone" (в одной, отдельно взятой, капиталистической стране), which in all likelihood originates from Vollmar: "…der endliche Sieg des Sozialismus in vorerst nur ***einem einzelnen Staat*** nicht nur historisch wahrscheinlicher sei, sondern dass auch der Existenz und Prosperität des isolirten sozialistischen Staates gar nichts im Wege stehe" (Vollmar 1879: 55, emphasis added)) .

The rest of Lenin's paragraph, starting with almost direct quote from Vollmar, is much more militant:

> After expropriating the capitalists and organising their own socialist production, the victorious proletariat of that country will arise against the rest of the world — the capitalist world — attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, stirring uprisings in those countries against the capitalists, and if need be using even armed force against the exploiting classes and their states. The political form of a society wherein the proletariat is victorious in overthrowing the bourgeoisie will be a democratic republic, which will more and more concentrate the forces of the proletariat of a given nation or nations, in the struggle against states that have not yet gone over to socialism. The abolition of classes is impossible without a dictatorship of the oppressed class, of the proletariat. A free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states. (Lenin 1974k: 342-43)

Political context is important to understand Lenin's warlike attitude here. The article was written and published in August 1915, a year after the outbreak of the war. Parliamentary factions of British, French, German and Belgian social democrats approved war credits upon the requests of their governments. In Britain, France and Belgium socialists also joined the cabinets. All this was in direct conflict with the resolution of the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International, the last two paragraphs of which were added to the overall rather neutral text, authored by August Bebel, at the urging of Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg after a long and tempestuous discussion with the reformists, including, among others, Vollmar. The final wording demanded that, in case of the threat of war, social democrats make "every effort to prevent the war by all means-which seem to them the most appropriate" and that "should war none the less break out, it is their duty to intervene in order to bring it promptly to an end, and with all their strength to make use of the economic and political crisis created by the war to stir up the deepest strata of the people and precipitate the fall of capitalist domination." (Cole 1963: 69).

The Basel Manifesto (1912) made the same demand in even less uncertain terms. Lenin claimed "collapse" as well as the "ideological and political bankruptcy" of the Second International as early as on 24 August 1914, when he wrote "The tasks of revolutionary social-democracy in the European war" (Lenin 1974a), in the manifesto of the group of Russian Social-Democratic Party members. The manifesto furiously condemns the conduct of the SPD as the "sheer betrayal of socialism" (Ibid 16) and suggests "transformation of all the separate states of Europe into a republican United States of Europe" as "an immediate slogan" (Ibid 19). In course of the following year Lenin's position becomes more radical and he abandons the idea of the United States of Europe in favour of the "socialism in one country" which, arguably, reflects his resentment of the European social democracy and SPD in particular as well as his

understanding that even after the war these parties are going nowhere. The fact that he uses the idea, authored by Vollmar, who belonged to the right wing of the SPD, as an alternative, is quite ironic — and explains the absence of references.

Finally, one more fact should be taken into account. The concept of the world revolution, underlying the long-term strategical thinking in classic Marxism was for long widely accepted as a default option. However, the only text, where the inevitability of the world revolution and impossibility of socialism in one country are proclaimed clearly and unequivocally, is Engels's catechism, “Principles of Communism”, which served as a draft for the “Communist Manifesto”. Probably this was the reason why it was never published in Engels's lifetime. In fact, as van Ree points out, it was first published by Eduard Bernstein as late as in 1914 (Van Ree 2010b: 164). There's little doubt that in August 1915 Lenin has already read it — and thereby quite consciously chose a head-on clash with one of the founding fathers of his creed.

Moreover, in September 1916 Lenin came up with the “Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution”, the text which became a primary framework for the Soviet military and foreign policy doctrine for decades. Lenin once again invokes the uneven development and, in effect, repeated Vollmar’s argument, claiming that “the victory of socialism in one country does not at one stroke eliminate all war in general. On the contrary, it presupposes wars”. Due to capitalism proceeding “extremely unevenly” from country to country, “it follows “irrefutably […] that Socialism [...] will achieve victory first in one or several countries, while the others will for some time remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois. This is bound to create not only friction, but a direct attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the socialist state’s victorious proletariat. In such cases a war on our part would be a legitimate and just war. It would be a war for socialism, for the liberation of other nations from the bourgeoisie.” While

the affinity of this fragment to Vollmar's text can be hardly called in question, it's not him whom Lenin calls to witness in the next sentence: "Engels was perfectly right when, in his letter to Kautsky of September 12, 1882, he clearly stated that it was possible for already victorious socialism to wage "defensive wars". What he had in mind was defence of the victorious proletariat against the bourgeoisie of other countries" (Lenin 1974b: 79).

Both Lenin's 1916 article and the relevant part of the summary above can be seen as slightly different renditions of the very basic ideas lying at the heart of the Soviet military doctrine. The real policies of the Soviet state, at least between the end of the Civil War and the mid- 1930s (particularly after the adoption of the concept of "socialism in one country") resemble rather Vollmar's relatively peaceful coexistence, then Lenin's war of the revolutionary nation's proletariat against the whole world. It's not possible to go deeper into the subject of evolution of Lenin's and then Stalin's approach to the military doctrine especially taking into account that neither Soviet foreign policy nor military doctrines ever existed as specific documents. Lenin's idea of the Red Army was unmistakeably Jacobin,[342] and his perplexed relationship with "Vom Krieg" by Clausewitz is well studied.[343] However, it seems appropriate to note that it's Vollmar's "Isolated Socialist State" where we find that utterly distinct set of ideas which persisted in the Soviet imagery of war and international politics until June 1941. One particular noticeable detail is Vollmar's outright, firm and over-optimistic belief in class solidarity. Lenin, who invoked this notion understandably often from 1914 onwards, apparently shared this belief.

[342] See, for example, "War and revolution" (lecture, delivered in May 1917): "Just as within the country the revolutionary people of France had […] displayed revolutionary energy on a scale it had never shown for centuries, so in the war at the close of the eighteenth century it revealed a similar gigantic revolutionary creativeness when it remodelled its whole system of strategy, broke with all the old rules and traditions of warfare, replaced the old troops with a new revolutionary people's army, and created new methods of warfare." (Lenin 1974c: 400)

[343] For Lenin's notes on "Vom Krieg" see Adoratskiĭ et al. (1930). English translation by Donald E. Davis and Walter S.G. Kohn in Jones (1977: 188-229). For an analysis of Lenin's interpretation of Clausewitz see, among others, Hahlweg (2009) and Kipp (1985).

Vollmar constructed his radical variety of class solidarity *a priori*. It is therefore more of an optimistic thought experiment or, one may say, a hope. The assertive tone, which is even more evident at least in the Russian translation from 1995 (Fol'mar 1995: 73), is intended to lend credibility to his claim, presenting it as a statement of fact rather than a hopeful assumption. Lenin avoided such straightforward statements of fact ("their nations will refuse to fight") for obvious reasons. He rather put the same idea as an urgent call to socialists, who "must unfailingly fight for complete unity of the workers of the oppressed and oppressor nationalities." (Lenin 1974d: 316)

It is, however not Lenin's, but Vollmar's approach that is found within the public discourse of the Stalinist state. Stalin, in his "Report to the Seventeenth Party Congress" (January 1934) first made some observations of the global political situation, leading him to the conclusion that "clearly things are heading for a new war" (Stalin 1954b: 298). He then made a prediction, stating, in a familiar assertive manner that, should there be a war on the USSR, it would be "the most dangerous war for the bourgeoisie [...] not only because the peoples of the U.S.S.R. would fight to the death to preserve the gains of the revolution; [...] it would be waged not only at the fronts, but also in the enemy's rear. The bourgeoisie need have no doubt that the numerous friends of the working class of the U.S.S.R. in Europe and Asia will endeavour to strike a blow in the rear at their oppressors who have launched a criminal war against the fatherland of the working class of all countries." (Ibid 303). There are, of course, more examples like this. It is well-known that the pre-war Soviet propaganda was in no small part focused on proletarian internationalism, which, should the war against the USSR break out, would break out in full force and effectively end it. This is how writer Daniil Granin, who has volunteered for

the front duty in July 1941, describes his first encounter with German POW in his book "Beautiful Uta"[344]:

> He was a driver, that is to say, a working class, proletarian. Ready at hand I addressed him with a well-memorized German phrase: "Workers of the world, unite!" From everywhere about me I was prompted about socialism and class solidarity. Boys were spelling names for the German: Marx, Engels, Thälmann, Clara Zetkin, Liebknecht, even Beethoven was cited. These names softened us, we were now ready to forgive, to fraternize. […] According to the movie and to the social science textbook, our German should probably blush, cast down his eyes and say feelingly something like this: "The Bourgeoisie, — I mean Hitlerite, — clique has sent me to fight my brothers in class. I need to turn my bayonet, — I mean, rifle —on my exploiters." We were taught so. We believed that German proletariat would not wage a war on the Country of the Soviets. In good faith we were trying to awake the class consciousness of our first German. (Granin 1974)

The next moment the German tells them they are all going to be extinguished, "all of them who wouldn't bow" (Ibid.) The quotation is probably too long, but quite expository as to the propaganda scope and pervasiveness. Evidently, one cannot insist that the whole broad-scale, sweeping delusion of class solidarity originated specifically from the "Isolated Socialist State". At the same time, both classical Marxism and, for the most part, Lenin's renditions of the doctrine rather prescribe than ascribe ardent internationalism to the proletarian class. The idea behind the propaganda stance on class solidarity, which contributed to the creation of this belief, can be traced, once again, to Vollmar. Though it's most widely known in form of a slogan, — or, probably for this very reason, — its impact on the Soviet society, on the Communist International, on the global left and probably on the course of the XX century history can hardly be overestimated. This refers to the reframing of the Comintern rationale in 1928, put on record in the "Programme of the Communist International" adopted at its Sixth

[344] Прекрасная Ута (1967). "Uta" is Uta von Ballenstedt, a member of Saxonian medieval royalty, whose statue from the Naumberg Cathedral becomes the focal point of Granin's reflections on various encounters between Germans and Russians ten years after the war. These reflections alternate with German travelogue, autobiographical commentary and recollections of episodes of the Second World War.

congress (Moscow, 17 July —1 September), which for the first time referred to the USSR as "the only fatherland of the international proletariat".[345]

This claim, later reproduced in propaganda materials of all sorts, had truly far-reaching implications. First, the text of the "Programme" claims that "the working class of the whole world now has its own State, the only fatherland of the international proletariat" (Degras 1960: 486), then reiterates this point, this time stating as a fact that the world proletariat *is already fighting* for the USSR: The "Soviet Union was bound to become the base of the international movement of all oppressed classes, the centre of the international revolution, the most significant factor in world history. In the Soviet Union, for the first time in history, the proletariat is fighting for its own fatherland." (Ibid 511) and finally, repeating the same thesis for the third time, complements it with the imperative: "The Soviet Union is the true fatherland of the proletariat, the strongest pillar of its achievements, and the principal factor in its emancipation throughout the world. This *obliges* the international proletariat [...] *to defend* the country of proletarian dictatorship *by every means* against the attacks of the capitalist powers." (Ibid 512-513, emphasis added). This development marked the completion of the "bolshevization" process within Comintern, — at least this is term, used in the "Theses on Tactics", document, adopted by the previous, Fifth congress of Comintern in 1925. Not only has this process resulted in the abolition of the relative and limited autonomy of the Comintern member parties and suppression of even the slightest dissent but, more significantly, it has reversed the relationship between "socialism" and "one country".

Previously it was broadly accepted both at home and internationally that "one country", that is to say, the Soviet Union, depends on "socialism", meaning world revolution. Now, when the USSR has become the "only true fatherland" of the whole international proletariat, on the contrary, success of the world revolution depends on the well-being of the Soviet Union. The

[345] …единственное отечество международного пролетариата (VI Kongress 1929: 19)

latter probably still has some obligations in regards to the “workers of the world”, but these are rather limited: the USSR plays its part by taking care of itself, by constructing socialism within its borders. And since now the keys from the global victory of socialism — or, one may say, from the future of the oppressed, — are located in Moscow, in the only socialist state, the oppressed must and will, in Vollmar’s words, “defend it, should the opportunity arise, with deadly force” or, as the Programme mildly puts it, “by every means”. The whole section concerning the USSR, its place in the international communist movement and relation to the strategy and tactics of the latter, was written and incorporated into the Programme at Stalin’s initiative and urging: there's nothing even remotely resembling this chapter in the project of the Comintern programme adopted by the previous Congress in 1924.

In his letter to Rykov, Bukharin and Molotov from 24 March 1928 on the draft of the Programme, Stalin makes the outright demand for this part to be included in the document: “The fourth section must be concerned with the USSR, [...] its global revolutionary importance, the issue of Soviet proletariat's obligations to the proletariat of other countries, the issue of the foreign proletariat's obligations to the USSR. This section, should it turn out to be comprehensive and sufficiently clear, would be the one most important part of the whole Programme.”[346] On 5 July same year, delivering a separate long speech about the Programme of the Comintern at the Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U. (B.), Stalin refers to the section at issue as “the inner substance” (внутреннее содержание) of the Programme (Stalin 1954e: 157), and spends some time elaborating on the details of the new disposition, (this is the first time when the expression “fatherland of the world proletariat”[347] in relation to the USSR was articulated). He then finishes with the rhetorical question: “What would be the value of the programme of

[346] Четвертый раздел следует посвятить СССР [...] его мировому революционному значению, вопросу об обязанностях пролетариата СССР в отношении пролетариата других стран, вопросу об обязанностях пролетариата других стран в отношении к СССР. Этот раздел будет иметь важнейшее значение во всей программе, если удастся разработать его с достаточной полнотой и ясностью. (Adibekov 2004: 516).

[347] The word “отечество” is for some reason translated into English as “motherland” in the Soviet 1954 edition.

the Comintern [...], if it ignored the fundamental question of the [...] proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R., its duties towards the proletarians of all countries, and the duties of the proletarians of all countries towards the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R.?" (Ibid 159).

Neither Marx and Engels, nor Lenin has ever imagined or expected proletarian internationalism going that far. Since at least Stuttgart, that is, since the Seventh Congress of the Second International in 1907, Lenin insisted that, should armed conflict break out, the duty of the proletariat is to transform the imperialist war into the civil war on the exploiting class. Even this was a highly contested claim which, as the events of 1914 demonstrated, has never been accepted by either working class itself, or, for that matter, by any single mass party from the socialist part of the political spectrum. In other words, internationalism could at the very best drive any national proletariat to grab an opportunity to redefine the enemy and, to "defend the fatherland" using, in Lenin's words, "every revolutionary means to combat the monarchy, the landowners and the capitalists of one's own fatherland" (Lenin 1974f: 104) — if nothing else, this was a part of Lenin's own interpretation of the Bolsheviks' success in October 1917. But the idea that the working class of any country would switch sides and fight a war on their own state alongside with this state's foe was never considered to be even remotely within the limits of possibility. This idea can't be found in any text that can be possibly referred to as "Marxist". The "Isolated Socialist state" with its somewhat careless attitude, common to utopian writings, is by far the most likely source of this idea.

At this point a reference to Stalin's remarks on the copy of Vollmar's treatise looks highly significant. Stalin read "The Isolated Socialist State" roughly a month after speaking at the 15th Party Conference. His report, with the title "The Social-Democratic Deviation in our Party", was in fact the first relatively well developed rendition of the concept of "socialism in one country", which was carefully framed so that it could be only conceived of as explication and enhancement of Lenin's idea. For this very reason, Stalin made the highly precarious claim

about uneven development being unknown until “discovered” by Lenin — and was subsequently ridiculed for this by Trotsky. For the same reason, in the course of the discussion following the report, he used the expression “*discovered the truth*" on three occasions in eight consecutive sentences in regards to Lenin’s paragraph in the 1915 article “On the Slogan of the United States of Europe”, a highly emotional and largely contextually determined piece of writing, in which Lenin withdrew his own programmatic slogan of only a few months earlier.

The word “Discover” as applied to “truth” (истина) does not sound quite right in Russian. However, it serves the purpose, — namely to make the whole concept of victorious socialist construction in one country sound far more convincing than it really was. Vollmar's provisions marked with the red pencil are either those of which Stalin is already aware via Lenin, or those he was able, with some considerable help from Bukharin, to extrapolate from one phrase dropped by Lenin ten or so years earlier. Also in red are marked several provisions known to Stalin from other sources. To name just one, there's a paragraph on labour migration to the country with better conditions of labour in Kautsky’s commentary on the Erfurt Programme (Kautsky 1910: 205). Marked by blue pencil are provisions which attract Stalin’s attention, — those, for instance, regarding the advantages of a foreign trade monopoly and perils of blockade, which can be avoided by implementing self-sufficiency, — but require some further deliberations. Vollmar’s comment on the issue of land nationalization, which, in his opinion, is not really a pressing matter, and which can be postponed so as not to alienate the peasantry, who should be kept as a friend of the new state, is also marked in blue. Discussion of this issue is found in Stalin’s speech on the Comintern Programme, cited above in relation to the more global and conceptual matters.

Stalin learned few new things from the “Isolated Socialist State”. However, the very existence of the text, dating to almost forty years previously and being largely in accord with his very recent speech, should have had a great reassuring effect on him. As soon as Stalin started

to read it, he must have understood that he was dealing with the source of Lenin's concise summation of the subject. The fact that Lenin found the treatise useful, and even borrowed from it, should have made Vollmar's reasoning sound more believable and should have incentivized Stalin to be more considerate about something he might otherwise find, — and not without a reason, — at least disputable. As a result of the circumstances and, more importantly, the timing of Stalin's encounter with the "The Isolated Socialist State", not only was the treatise able to make a considerable effect by reassuring Stalin in his choice of policy, but arguably, it had much wider repercussions in terms of the Stalinist state's relations with the outside world than it was previously thought.

Conclusion

American journalist Eugene Peters, protagonist of Evgeniĭ Petrov's unfinished "Journey to the Land of Communism" is genuinely interested in the country, towards which he is quite favourably disposed since he first read Tolstoy in college (Petrov 1965: 581). Names of Russian 19th century writers (besides Tolstoy, Gogol, Chekhov and Dostoevsky are mentioned) and composers (Peters favours Chaikovsky and Musorgsky over Brahms and Wagner) give a flavour to the following description of the reality, encountered by the narrator in the imaginary USSR of 1963. From the first pages (starting, in fact from the name of the protagonist) Petrov deliberately invokes the 1937 travelogue "Little Golden America", authored by him and Il'ya Il'f. Not only do the first ten first pages feature three mentions of "one-storey" houses with attached garages and gardens, but Peters also specifically likens one of the new small Soviet towns to a "comfortable residential area of a small American town" (Ibid 587). The autarkic Soviet world is also on more than one occasion referred to as "comfortable". This comfort is to some extent technological, —Petrov mentions high-speed trains, connecting Moscow to Omsk in just two hours, — but it quickly becomes clear that what attracts the American journalist the most are less tangible advantages of the Soviet world. In particular, this world is inhabited by classic music lovers (Russians attend symphonic concerts at least twice a week) and theatre-goers (cinema became purely an educational enterprise). Soviet citizens are also highly educated, very altruistic and, significantly, while Soviet girls are emancipated and beautiful, none of them would ever give a kiss without love, which stands in stark contrast to the young American girl, travelling in the same group, who tries to seduce Peters while still on the way to the Soviet border.

The Land of Communism is not just a technocratic, post-scarcity utopia, but also a retro-utopia, which combines elements from various epochs. "Lessons of poetry and music at schools" (Ibid: 598) remind the reader of the Classical period; Plato's rule of philosophers

comes to mind with Petrov's definition of USSR as "The state of science, created by the people of science" (Ibid: 599). A passion for classical music, and the "natural" modesty displayed by young women may remind one of the romantic characters from Ivan Turgenev's novels. Such a synchronization of cultural phenomena from various (though carefully selected) times and cultures is rather characteristic of Stalinist culture. Petrov himself explains this along the lines of the official discourse: the new society takes everything valuable from the past. What's interesting here is what happens to these borrowings afterwards. It seems sensible to assume that these valuables from the past of the humankind are somehow reworked and reinterpreted, that they become the material for the new forms and new claims. Yet, some genres become obsolete: particularly, Petrov suggests that cinema is fated to disappear as an art form, though it will retain its educational function. With at least one old genre gone, no new ones are mentioned. In Petrov's notes to the novel, as well as in the Stalinist culture as such, borrowings from different historical periods and various cultures are expected to co-exist, and moreover, to be used, if possible, in the same forms and situations as they were used originally. This synchronization and compression of cultural and historical epochs is a result of the spatial utopia striving to do away with time, particularly the future, completely — or, when that turns out to be impossible, to diminish and hide time, making it look insignificant. The culture of the past epoch cannot be utilized to create — nothing is allowed to be new, to transform radically, though anything can (or sometimes must) be "the next" or "one more".

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The old question, — re-articulated in the Introduction to this text, —was whether a rupture between the pre-Great Leap Soviet Union and the Stalinist state existed and if so, what terms can be used to meaningfully describe it? The same question can just as well be put otherwise: if Paperny's Culture One and Culture Two are more that just optical devices, what are the more fundamental assumptions, theories and visions of state, right, human nature, and society, underlying these notions? There are more questions, related to the above. How could such a radical transition to the new ideological and cultural order happen in almost no time at all, — even considering the amount of violence unleased? Moreover, why has the ideological transition on such a scale produced an incredibly small number of meaningful interpretations by fellow socialists both in and outside the USSR, — even factoring in the closedness of the Stalinist state? Last but not least, how could such a transformation happen at all?

Indeed, the rupture exists between the Soviet state/regime before and after the Great Leap. This expression, itself being a case of the spatialization of time, can be used in regards to change (possibly unprecedented in scale and velocity) in economics and society, political institutions and culture. It also adequately characterises the ideological shift from the Bolshevist to the Stalinist state. Largely, this shift was incompatible with or in direct contradiction with all three “kinds” of Marxism, defined in the Introduction, — namely with Marx’s Marxism, the Orthodox Marxism of Engels, Kautsky and the SPD, and, to a considerable degree even with Soviet Marxism and Leninism, — even though Leninism was never a theoretical development, but rather a paper trail of a particular political praxis. The concept of “socialism in one country” or, to be more precise, the adoption of the idea that a socialist revolution must not necessarily happen across the whole developed world more or less simultaneously and that socialism can be successfully built even in just one single socialist state,

had an enormous, profound effect on the Soviet regime, its policies and state as well as influencing deeply the whole political thinking of the global Left.

The essence of this change can be described as a territorialisation of class struggle. Marxism was indeed a universalist, internationalist and, one may say, even cosmopolitan ideology, but one should never forget that these qualities of Marxist ideology were anything but inherent in the philosophy. Marxist internationalism was conditioned and determined by the late 19th century wave of globalisation. Capital, according to Marx, transcended state borders; free trade was very close to global common sense: radio and telegraph dramatically increased the speed with which information travelled. At the same time labour mobility, which in Europe had anyhow only grown since the end of the Napoleonic wars, was also increasing: it continued to grow until 1914. In this situation it made perfect sense to call for class solidarity across state borders and stress the universalism of Marxism. The famous claim in the "Communist Manifesto" about the workers having no Fatherland came to be interpreted much less as a bitter assertion than as a part of a positive program, thus having acquired ascriptive if not prescriptive meaning.

This global Marxism, which aimed to take on capitalism by means of class struggle everywhere, fitted the early phase of globalisation. It has never invested much effort into the creation of blueprints for future policies, — and has generally been keen to avoid making plans. Yet, the victory of the revolution was somehow perceived by the European Left as global, — even though the single work (by Engels), which openly and quite categorically stated that the successful socialist revolution can only happen in the whole developed world within a short period, months, most likely in a year, was only published by Eduard Bernstein in 1914. This understanding of how the new order of things would be born from the old was arguably adopted by Marx, Engels and probably a number of other socialist thinkers as a result of their closely witnessing the revolutionary wave of 1848-1849. It seemed merely natural to assume

that future revolutions would happen in circumstances more or less similar, that what lay ahead was a series of attempts, — until one of them proved successful, which was simply inevitable. The eventual victory of socialism as such was never in doubt among socialists and not always in doubt among others. The concept of the world revolution was adopted by socialist thought with little awareness of where it came from and without any meticulous inquiry into its essence.

This deterritorialized class struggle, inspired by the Marxist internationalism, was indeed a great political invention, which proved practical in the globalising world at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. It remained effective until globalization started slowing down protectionism as well as political nationalism reemerged — and, finally, the war broke out. The 1848 model, backed by the history of the French revolution of 1789, suggested that local revolutions would start all over Europe, gradually gaining momentum and inciting a big European war, — and then from its flames the new order of things would be born. This plan implied that the result of the socialist revolution would be also global, — and would make a smooth transit from the ideology of the globalised capitalist world to the ideology of a globalised socialist world. But in 1914 things were unfolding differently. That was not a series of revolutions, developing into the European class war, but on the contrary, a World War which socialist parties, — not all of them and not even the biggest section; — could hope to "reverse engineer" into local revolutions and thus put on the "right" course. The start of the First World War and the consequent obligation to vote either for or against granting their governments war credits, became, for the world socialist movement, the first crisis of territorialisation. At this point the global Left of the Second International had to face their new circumstances. It turned out to be almost impossible for the socialist parliamentary party in times of war to adhere to the internationalist, cosmopolitan principles adopted in times of peace. Lenin had anticipated such a course of events, when he insistently tried to bind European parliamentary socialists of the Second

International politically by pushing both the internationalist stance and publicly expressing determination to obstruct the war to its limits, — first in the Stuttgart Congress resolution (1907) and then in the Basel Manifesto (1912). But however unwavering the tone of public declarations was, in the end it was the size of the parliamentary faction that mattered.

Bolsheviks, who held 6 (14 together with Mensheviks) seats in the Fourth Duma, condemned the war, as well as a small faction of the SPD, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg and a number of other minuscule parties. The only influential parliamentary socialist party which didn't hesitate to side with Bolsheviks was the Italian Socialist Party (led by Mussolini at the time) with 52 of 508 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. All others, including two French socialist parliamentary groups, SFIO and the Republican-Socialist Party (PRS) with 126 of 601 seats, Austro-Hungarian social democrats (87 of 516 seats) and finally, SPD with its 110 of 397 total Reichstag seats, — all of them backed the war. For Lenin and other Bolsheviks the anticipated global or at least European revolution was critical. The case of a successful revolution in Russia alone, was barely considered a possibility: the old Empire was a backward underdeveloped country with a small share of industrial production in the overall national product and, consequently, a numerically insignificant urban proletariat. This state of affairs was acknowledged by Russian socialists, — including those, routinely indulging in wishful thinking. Yet, chances for success could improve dramatically in case such a revolution was not an isolated event, but a part of the global wave. Lenin's articles, written in 1914-1915 were ripe with anger, sometimes even despair. He was seeking for a way to reverse the new, territorialized condition of European socialism: the slogan of the Unites States of Europe, which Lenin has first put forward, then reluctantly revoked, makes a good showcase. His article cited above on the subject essentially considers chances to exploit the European integrationist project for the benefit of radical Left as insignificant. And it's in that very same text where Lenin for the first (and the last) time clearly articulates the perspective of a single socialist state. The

respective paragraph is the next to last: it's preceded by a lengthy sequence of arguments, drawing rather upon various current and recent events, than upon some certain idea of the future. It's justified by little more than rhetorical necessity to present some kind of alternative to the idea behind the rejected slogan. The fact that Lenin never returned to this point, let alone further expanded it, clearly speaks for this argument. Neither Lenin, nor anyone else across the socialist part of the Russian political spectrum ever seriously considered the probability of a “victorious” socialist revolution in one single country as high or even measureable. Consequently, Lenin continued seeking for a political (Comintern) or military (Polish-Soviet War of 1920) solution to the problem. After the Moscow-supported 1923 October armed uprising in Germany failed, the Bolsheviks finally realised that there would be no other successful socialist revolutions in the foreseeable future. If the Bolshevik Government in Russia survived at all, it would remain the Government of the only socialist state in the world for years or even decades to come. What was purely a rhetorical argument, put forward in the heat of the moment, became the only possibility left. This territorialisation of socialism and “landing” of the class struggle onto the Soviet soil was, as we’ve already observed above, inevitable with or without the the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War.

The aforementioned territorialisation was decisively accepted and conceptualized as the construction of socialism in one country some time around late 1926. Transformation of the Bolshevist / Leninist into the Stalinist regime started soon after that. At the core of this tectonic transition was a shift in the modes of the utopian thinking. While the revolutionary, Bolshevist state mostly relied on the temporal utopianism of a social process, inherent in Marxism, the new Stalinist regime, facing the task of territorializing “socialism”, relied heavily on the utopianism of the spatial form. It would be an exaggeration to say that there was nothing in Marxism of either variety to facilitate this task. Yet, another strain of socialist thought proved much more practical and effective in this regards. This strain, which in terms of the 19th

century is associated with Ferdinand Lassalle, is deeply rooted in Fichte, — first and foremost, in “The Closed Commercial State”.

Fichte’s philosophy of State and Right is the ultimate source of this largely non-Marxian socialism, which, on Russian soil, evolved eventually into the phenomenon commonly referred to as Stalinism. Particular distinctive features of this doctrine were discussed earlier in rather fine detail, — so the only thing which remains to be emphasized here is that the “Fichtean socialism” was in no way alien to German social democracy, which always recognised it as a vitally important part of its heritage. Even devoted Marxists in the SPD often demonstrated proximity to the talk of “state socialism” or some kind of isolationist or nationalist stance. The “Erfurt programme”, adopted by the SPD as decisively Marxist and published with Karl Kautsky’s elaborated commentary, reveals the deep and unequivocal impact of Fichtean socialism. Works of other socialist theoreticians, to various degree associated with this line of thought, were quite familiar to Russian readers, including those who could only read Russian. Fichte, Lassalle, Rodbertus, to name just the few, were translated and published in Russian. However, the text which turned out to be the crucial element of the transition to socialism was written by Georg von Vollmar, who never expressed any firm beliefs which can be characterised as Fichtean or Lassallean. His treatise “The Isolated Socialist State”, being, as it is obvious from the title, in some kind of dialogue with Fichte’s “Closed Commercial State”, perfectly exemplifies the indecomposeability of Fichtean and Marxian heritage in the “orthodox Marxism” of German social democracy. Bolsheviks, as well as other Russians and the majority of the European socialists were acutely aware of the intellectual debate among German socialists and discussed topical issues among themselves, down to the finest detail. It was not a rare occasion that texts travelled between the languages incognito, thus appearing to be in dangerous proximity to plagiarism — as it is the case, for instance, with Lenin’s “The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism”, which has a surprisingly large debt to

Kautsky. So, it comes as little surprise that one particular short fragment from Lenin’s 1915 article “On the Slogan for a United States of Europe”, which constitutes almost solely, the theoretical basis of Stalin’s “socialism in one country”, is in fact a concise rendition of the primary assumptions of the “Isolated Socialist State”.

This fragment has then undergone rather sophisticated ideological treatment, which had significant consequences in varying depths of detail, explicated by Vollmar in the original text, which was at the moment still unavailable to Stalin and other figures of the Party leadership. It’s quite plausible to hypothesize that the source of Lenin’s paragraph was not recognized by anyone except Trotsky until 6 December 1926, when the abridged Russian version of “The Isolated Socialist State” was sent to Stalin, Mikhail Kalinin and, in all likelihood, to some other politburo members, — at least, the awareness of Vollmar's treatise, revealed by Ordzhonikidze's in his 1927 dialogue with Trotsky, supports this argument. The translation was made and circulated by Aleksandr (Alësha) Svanidze, Stalin’s brother-in-law and, for decades, one of his very few close friends. Svanidze, who graduated in late 1900s from the University of Jena, had a good command of German, — at least good enough to make a rough, but correct translation.

Stalin, who, has read the text meticulously, was thus presented with an unexpected possibility of checking whether Lenin’s short paragraph was interpreted correctly, — and was, as far as one can judge from the pencil marks, — satisfied with the result. Stalin’s previously unknown encounter with the “Isolated Socialist State” happened too late to affect the doctrine of socialism in one country. Yet, it is possible that the 1926 translation was the source for the parts of another significant and far-reaching Stalin’s doctrine, — that of the relationship between the USSR and Comintern. Particularly, the crucial novelty of the Comintern Programme, adopted in 1928, is very likely to originate from Vollmar. In essence the novelty in question amounts to the reframing and reconceptualisation of the relationship between the

USSR and national communist parties, USSR and Comintern, — and finally, between the USSR and workers from all over the word, sympathizing with the first Socialist State. Previously, Comintern official documents, while fully acknowledging the essential role of Russian proletariat and its party in securing the first victory of the first socialist revolution, implied also that the future of the first Socialist State largely depended on "socialism", that is, on world revolution. The new Comintern programme suggested a very different interpretation of this relationship in putting forward the concept of the USSR as the only true fatherland of the international proletariat and the strongest pillar of the global emancipation. From that moment on not only had the USSR been safeguarding the future victory of revolution on a global scale, but it has been also claiming the status of the world proletariat's only fatherland. As a result, the proletariat was placed under the obligation to defend the first socialist state by any means necessary. The boldness of this claim together with its implied assumption that it may in fact, work, follows the logic of Vollmar's treatise in the best way possible. This overly optimistic and unrealistic understanding of the relationship between Stalin's USSR and the working classes of other countries had profound impact on Soviet foreign policy of the late 1930s — and, arguably, on some key political decisions, made by the Soviet leadership in 1939-1941.

The new Comintern programme has also laid bare the process termed here as the "territorialisation of socialism". Previously socialism was everywhere, though at the same time nowhere in particular, constantly moving and never quite here or there, — the famous ghost of the "Manifesto", relentlessly wandering through Europe. But now it has condensed from the thin air and found its way to the USSR. While in the past one could, say, "fight for socialism" in a variety of ways, now, when socialism became located somewhere, the only way to fight for it was to defend the country of its location, that is, the USSR "by any means necessary".

Vollmar's text was, albeit in a complicated way, one of the channels, by which Fichtean socialism was transferred from 18th century Jena to the Stalinist USSR. Other comparable

channels included various works by Kautsky, probably Lassalle's writings, on Fichte and otherwise, — and, of course, "the Closed Commercial State" as such, published in Russian first in 1890s and then once more in 1923. Significantly, it was published by the principal ideological press of the period, the "Krasnaya nov'", being a part of the broader structure of Glavpolitprosvet, the single state agency for propaganda and political education. The discussion around the book was quite lively both before and after revolution, — though, of course, Fichte never attracted as much of the Soviet reader's attention as Hegel. Fichte's status as one of the predecessors of Marxism, was partly secured by Engels himself, who wrote once that Marxists are proud to be the disciples of, among others, Fichte and Darwin. Though Fichte' significance within the Marxist discourse was never remotely anywhere near that of Hegel, he also was considered to stand at the origins of German socialism. This combination of characteristics made him legitimate figure of inquiry for Soviet Marxist philosophers, including, among others, Abram Deborin, Lyubov Aksel'rod and Valentin Asmus. At the same time, Fichte's political economy, elaborated in the "Closed Commercial State", was never the subject of research of any Soviet Marxist scholar (except for Iosif Lapidus, whose text was never finished and was published as late as in 2004).

All the more striking are the similarities between the Fichtean model of the ideal state and a number of features and policies of the historical Stalinist state. There's no direct evidence that Stalin was familiar with Fichte's text. Nevertheless, real-life policies sometimes follow Fichte's programmatic utopia so closely, that one can be really tempted to just assume that Stalin read "The Closed Commercial State", — and maybe even quite carefully. In the absence of evidence, though, the most plausible explanation is that a very limited set of basic assumptions in relation to economics and even more limited set of basic policy measures (which in our case includes Foreign Trade Monopoly, currency exchange monopoly and overall unequivocal state control of finances), necessarily enable a particular logic, so strict that once

processes start unfolding in accordance with this logic, there is only one trajectory of development available for the emerging state to follow. Closer analysis of the above mentioned key policies confirms that the foreign trade monopoly some time in 1928-1929 and a bit later the (mid-1930s) the monetary system both acquire distinctly Fichtean features or, at the very least, become undeniably Fichtean in spirit and sometimes even more radical when it comes to policies.

This extreme Fichtean statism lies arguably at the very core of another fundamental Soviet practice, that of centralized planning. Arguably it becomes obsolete once the second stage of socialism (i. e. communism is achieved) —planning “withers away” together with the state. Closer analysis of Stalin’s claims on the subject in his various works from both pre-war and post-war periods reveals that he never, in fact, expected centralized planning to be abolished. The whole broader debate in regards to the “withering of the state”, predicted by Engels, also reveals Stalin’s logic and overall frame of thinking at least as much “Fichtean” as “Hegelian” — and often in direct contradiction with Marx in his later period.

This work was never intended to justify any particular stage in the development of the Soviet state. Still, the Bolshevist revolutionary, transitional state on the one hand and the Stalinist state on the other are profoundly different; structures of utopian thinking found at the core of either, are vastly dissimilar; finally they belong, ultimately, to often nonconforming intellectual traditions. All this doesn’t mean, for example, that the Leninist state is more humane, less cruel or justifiable — either morally or historically. It just means that the number and scale of differences make the Leninist and the Stalinist states two quite distinct subjects of inquiry, — and that each of them, requires, arguably, its own particular set of investigative techniques — as well as it’s own, more specific, less generalising frame of interpretation.

APPENDICES

Appendix I. A note on Google Books Ngram Viewer

Visualizations of quantitative data from Google's Russian corpora are a significant part of this study, which makes it necessary to clarify the nature of this instrument and briefly review some of the opportunities it provides, as well as its flaws and limitations. First of all, since the use of Google Books Ngram Viewer means to all intents and purposes engaging into a controversy surrounding the field of digital humanities, it feels necessary to address this topic, albeit by perforce very briefly. The author believes that utilizing GNV in the course of cultural history research can be productive and useful, particularly when assessing the trends. At the same time, this research does not fully, let alone exclusively, rely on the GNV graphs. The author is rather far from making common cause with scholars, claiming, for instance, that digital modes of reading allow for attaining "what has almost become taboo in literary studies: objectivity, validity, truth" (Best and Marcus 2009: 17). Instead the author perceives GNV graphs as a means of rough evaluation of trends, which is fairly reliable, when assessing relative change and/or difference, particularly but not exceptionally as in case of assessing the frequency of use for two or more terms in course of given decade or longer period. Such an approach is different from that of Franco Moretti, who argues in his "Graphs, Maps, Trees" that "quantitative research provides a type of data which is ideally independent of interpretations […] it provides data, not interpretation.[…] Quantitative data can tell us when Britain produced one new novel per month, or week, or day, or hour for that matter, but where the significant turning points along the continuum — and why — is something that must be decided on a different basis." (Moretti 2005: 9) Dataset, provided by the GNV is much less detailed or precise than the one, described above and can be, thereby, used mostly to reveal turning points, previously unnoticed due to whatever reasons or, otherwise, to draw additional confirmation of the argument, substantiated otherwise. It suffices to mention that in the first case an inquiry

into a given question posed by statistics may either reasonably likely prove fruitful or, on the opposite, lead up a blind alley.

Google Books Ngram Viewer or Google Ngram Viewer (GNV) is an online service by Google, Inc., released in December 2010. It's a search engine with a fairly easy add-in, allowing for basic data processing and visualization of the results. Data in this case consists of Google text corpora in English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Hebrew and Chinese. We'll skip the details on languages other than Russian (let's mention, however, that there are separate corpora for British and American English and a separate English Fiction corpora). All single language corpora (except for Italian) exist in two versions, from 2009 and 2012. We'll only use 2012 version of Russian corpus, which is referred to as the Russian corpus everywhere in this text. Google Corpora were produced in course of compiling data for the corporation's other service, Google Books, as a result of scanning various books, followed by optical character recognition (OCR). N-gram is a term from computational linguistics meaning contiguous sequence of characters or, as in this case, words – or even more specifically, expressions. As of October 2013, the Russian corpus included data from books published at least since 1800 and consisted of 591 310 books (67 137 666 353 n-grams) significantly surpassing amounts of data available from the Russian National Corpus (85 996 documents and 229 968 798 n-grams). GNV, therefore, provides a way to measure temporal dynamics of certain expressions (n-grams) usage. "N" in the "n-gram" stands for the number of structural elements (words): unigram is one word expression, bigram is two-word expression, trigram is three-word expression, etc. Only n-grams with $n \leq 5$ are taken into consideration by the GNV software. Google Books service itself follows certain rules: not more than 6000 books are scanned for each year. Thus for early years the corpus may include (depending on the availability) all published books, but for later years books are sampled following subject distribution for every particular year (Zakharov and Masevich 2014: 304-05). Though the breakdown of the number of books scanned by year is not

explicitly provided by GNV, an estimation was done,[348] showing that for the period of 1910-1940 the database contains around 1150 books a year on average. However, Google N-gram database is certainly flawed: OCR layers of the scanned books contain a considerable number of mistakes as does metadata (author, length, genre, publication date, etc.), which GNV software adds automatically after finishing OCR. There are more difficulties specific for English corpora (Michel et al. 2011) to be taken in consideration. The Russian corpus has its own problems, mostly in relation to pre-reform alphabetic characters, some of which can't be recognized in Google's OCR process and to accidental incorporation of books in other languages using Cyrillic script (Zakharov and Masevich 2014: 314-26). These problems place certain limitations on Google Ngram practicability (Barrat et al. 2015). Nevertheless, with these limitations in mind it still can be used not only as a tool for rough estimation of changes in n-grams occurrence over time, but also for more sophisticated research in cognitive linguistics (Solov'ev 2015) or even for measuring cultural complexity (Juola 2013), since a huge amount of data straightens individual errors. Using this data, GNV software creates a graph (see, for example, Fig. 1). The X-axis shows years. The Y-axis shows the ratio of the particular n-gram occurrence to the total number of n-grams for the particular year. If we are interested in a particular bigram, say "fifth column", the parameter shown by Y-axis for each year will be the percentage of the "fifth column" bigram in total amount of all bigrams found in all books, published that year and present in the GNV database. All graphs are presented with a smoothing of either 1 or 0. In the first case the data shown for, say, 1935 is calculated as an average of the raw count for 1935 plus 1 value on either side: ("count for 1934" + "count for 1935" + "count for 1936"), divided by 3. In the second case data is shown as is.

Apparently GNV can be used for inquiry into the history of certain concepts (or in this case metaphors). It opens the opportunity to trace fluctuations in importance of those and, last

[348] Author thanks data specialist Vladimir Ermilov for assistance.

but not least, to compare, though roughly, the significance of the particular metaphors/concepts/terms for the chosen chronological periods. As it was mentioned earlier, at least within this research, GNV is much more productive when it comes to posing new questions than answering existing ones. The issue here is not one of statistical data processing in order to get an explanation for the known historical and cultural issues, — this task remains, in a manner of speech, a subject of manual labor. GNV is by all likelihood, more useful as a kind of optical device, helping the researcher to notice phenomena invisible to the naked eye.

Since expressions used by most influential published authors in their books were cited by others, peaks observed on the graphs correlate to certain extent with the years when such books were published. Significantly, in 1918-1921 book publishing in Soviet Russia was almost completely reduced to propaganda brochures and political pamphlets (Govorov and Kupriyanova 2001: 256-75), while only a limited number of books were published in Russian elsewhere. Later, in December 1921 restrictions were loosened following the decree "On private publishing", but a state monopoly on paper was still in place. Later, in 1922, the newly born Glavlit (Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press) started enforcing censorship. Private publishing industry dealt mostly with pulp fiction, poetry and history of literature (in this subject group books, published by private enterprises accounted for more than 40% of the titles). In 1927 the share of state-owned publishing houses in the aggregated amount of new titles was still 75% (Govorov and Kupriyanova 2001: 277-85). That means we are mostly dealing with literature ideologically aligned with the Soviet regime (or at least approved by Glavlit) during the period in question, since amount new of titles published in Russian elsewhere later in the 1930s was once again incomparable with what was produced in the USSR.

Appendix II. Fragments from the Russian translation of the "Isolated Socialist State" by Georg von Vollmar, marked by Stalin[349].

Page numbers as in document.
U = underlined; M = vertical line on the margins.
Blue and red colours used according to colours of the marks.
Text in brown is marked by both blue and red in the original.
Black text is given so that complete sentences were cited.
Underlined words match those underlined with two lines in the original.

Page	Marks	Fragment
78	u	**1878**
79	u	**О возможности осуществления социализма в одной стране**
		1878
80	u	**…необходимо ли чтобы социализм для осуществления своей экономической системы восторжествовал одновременно во всем цивилизованном мире, (во всех экономически развитых странах) или же допустимо и мыслимо существование отдельного социалистически организованного государства.**
		Я полагаю и попытаюсь это доказать, что **окончательная победа социализма возможна и исторически вероятна в одном отдельном государстве и что ничто не стоит на пути существованию и процветанию такого изолированного социалистического государства.**
81	u	**Социализм безусловно предполагает наличие развитых экономических отношений, но если бы это было все, то он был бы наиболее развитым в тех странах, где**
82	u	[*continued from p. 2*] **хозяйственное развитие достигло наивысшей степени. Но это не так. Англия** без сомения,является экономически наиболее развитой страной,однако социализм не играет в ней заметной роли, в то время,как он представляет большую силу в экономически менее развитой Германии.
	u	**При существующих условиях и условиях обозримого будущего, допущение одновременной победы социализма во всех культурных странах нам кажется совершенно невероятным.**
	u	**Более вероятно,что социализм восторжествует,приблизительно в двух или трех экономически и культурно развитых странах.**
83	u	При таком равенстве нищеты (и чем больше мы приближаемся к концу существующего "строя",тем больше эти явления будут иметь место),и всеобщего напряжения, **конечно мыслимо,что движение может охватить одновременно много стран**, в особенности если оно будет обусловлено каким нибудь экстраординарным крупным явлением.

[349] Translation made by Alexandr Svanidze (RGASPI. F. 558, op. 11, d. 821, doc.26). 1926 Dec 4

		Но в виду приведенных соображений относительно различия условий в развитии равных стран, **это будет делаться тем менее вероятным,чем больше мы будем приближаться мысленно к моменту общественного переворота**.
84	u	**Таким образом,мы подходим к изолированному социалистическому государству.** Я доказал,как мне кажется, что **если оно не является единственно возможным, то, во всяком случае, наиболее вероятным.**
	u, m	**Моя цель скорее в том,чтобы фиксировать в самых основных чертах коренные условия существования изолированного социалистического государства**, его экономический строй и его отношения к другим,не социалистическим государствам.
85	u	Какие мероприятия будет проводить наше государство,чтобы с одной стороны переустроить свои внутренние отношения на основе социалистических принципов, а с другой стороны **занять в отношении внешнего мира такое положение, которые гарантировало бы ему при столкновении между старой и новой хозяйственными системами не только успех но и возможность дальнейшего процветания?**
		Поэтому мы думаем, что **первое время существования нашего государства будет представлять собой переходный период, при котором старое в виде частной собственности на средства производства все же будет иметь место при условии, конечно, гарантии недопущения их использования во вред новому обществу и их постепенного и неуклонного изживания.**
86	m	Социалистов, конечно,не приходится убеждать в необходимости общественного владения землей, как и в закономерности его; **необходимо обратить внимание на то, что обеспечение самых насущных жизненных потребностей может сделаться для нашего изолированного социалистического государства особенно настоятельным, временно — прямым вопросом жизни и смерти, в виду возможности, хотя бы и преходящего, полного или частичного отказа в привозе со стороны враждебных капиталистических государств.**
87	u	**Все среднее и мелкое крестьянство**, которое несмотря на затруднения и нужду, цепко держится за свою пядь земли, стало бы видеть в нашем государстве не благодетеля, а злейшего врага, вопреки тому, что отчуждение земли было бы для него только номинальным, и оно получило бы взамен реальные выгоды, оно стало бы оказывать не только пассивное, но и очень сильное активное сопротивление.
95	u	**Ни один торговец не будет отрицать того, что раз наше государство сосредоточило в своих руках ввоз и вывоз целой страны и ведет их по единому плану,его положение на мировом рынке будет максимально благоприятным.**
96	u	Нашему государству не приходится поэтому искать хорошей клиентуры,также, как и хороших поставщиков, все захотят с ним работать, **и оно может ставить свои условия**; более того оно имеет большее влияние на мировой рынок,чем этот последний на него, потому что этот рынок

		является хаотическим сцеплением взнимно притягивающих и отталкивающих друг друга интересов.
	m	**Следуя ходу их мысли,они говорят: цена продуктов в вашем социалистическом государстве будет так повышена в результате значительного улучшения положения рабочих масс, что заграница не сможет их покупать.**
97	m m	**Таким образом социалистическая организация производства приведет наше государство к наилучшим результатам в отношении соревнования на мировом рынке.**
		Никогда не может стать опасным конкурентом для нашего государства несоциалистическое производство, рабочие которого находились в приблизительно тех же материальных условиях - заработная плата и жизненные потребности - с нашими рабочими до перехода страны к социализму [*p. 98, continued*] (выравнивание культурных стран по этой линии идет быстрым темпом).
99	cir.	**Изолированное социалистическое государство и остальной мир**
	u	Мне остается еще кое что **добавить об общих отношениях изолированного социалистического государства к другим государствам** или вернее, так как каждое из них - как уже Платон говорил про греческие государства - состоит из Двух,государства богатых и государства бедных, - [*p. 100, continued*] к народам с одной и привилегированным слоям с другой стороны.
100	u	Первым наименее значительным результатом этой притягательной силы **будет сильный приток в наше государство иностранной рабочей силы.** Социалистическое государство не знает национальных и рассовнх различий: каждый человек имеет равные права,также как и равные обязанности, поэтому принципиально наше государство не может ничего возразить против включения новых граждан в число его членов. И все же оно **будет вынуждено значительно ограничить этот приток.**
101	u	**Изолированное социалистическое государство одним фактом своего существования призывает порабощенные и эксплоатруемые народы всех стран добиваться улучшения условий на своей родине:** ибо оно **показывает им на живом примере, чего они могут достичь**, если они в самом деле серьезно этого захотят и каким путем достигается.
		Наше государство будет поэтому активно содействовать тому,чтобы социализм в ближайшем будущем достиг господства и в остальных странах, прибегая при этом к средствам соответственно месту и времени.
102	u	Нужно ожидать поэтому, что правительства и господ- [from p, 101] ствующие классы всех стран будут относиться к нашему социалистическому государству **с тем большей силой** [смертельной ненависти,] **чем большим восторгом** [будут приветствовать его народы].
		Дружба между социалистическим государством и буржуазными правительствами других стран также мало возможна,как она была невозможной между республикой Дантона и Маррата и правительствами старой реакционной Европы. **Отсюда конечно не следует,чтобы обе**

		стороны находились между собой постоянно в состоянии вооруженного столкновения.
	m	Борьба эта, поскольку это будет зависеть от нашего государства - будет вестись без пролития крови, но из за этого она не будет менее ожесточенной; по существу своему социалистическое государство не может не поощрять народы в их стремлении к политическому и социальному освобождению и этим самым подрывать основы эксплоататорских систем.
	u	Как ни естественна ненависть господствующих классов против нашего государства, она все же будет без-
103	u	сильна. Силы этих классов будут прежде всего полностью поглощены затруднениями,вызванными все возрастающими внутри этих стран социальным движением.
		На что же могли бы расчитывать капиталисты правительства и господствующие классы в этом случае? Перед ними оказалось бы общество с наивысшей силой сопротивления из когда либо существовавших; потому что для граждан нашего государства оно не является отвлеченным "отечеством", а олицетворяет собой их свободную и счастливую жизнь,которая будет расстроена и погублена вместе с ним.
	u, m	Поэтому оно располагает для своей защиты армией, не имеющей себе равной с основания мира; и ко всему этому - оно обладает в неограниченной мере всеми техническими средствами защиты. Какова же в противоположность этому сила его врагов? Их народы не на их стороне;
104	u	напротив, они являются вернейшими союзниками государства, враждебного их властителям и стали бы его защищать всеми средствами, при случае даже с оружием в руках.
		Правители буржуазных государств скрепя сердце должны будут пойти на то, чтобы завязать сношения с ненавистным им социалистическим государством. Эта непобедимость является для нашего государства не только залогом его полной устойчивости и независимости от внешних влияний, но и залогом его неограниченной мощи и почти исключительного влияния,как на международные отношения, так и на внутреннюю жизнь буржуазных государств.
105	u	Государства и народы достигнут своей цели - социализма после уничтожения существующих до сих пор препятствий, не одновременно, а раньше или позднее сообразно своему предшествующему развитию; но во всяком случае наше государство вскоре перестанет быть изолированным социалистическим государством.

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