DISSERTATION

Preventive Diplomacy in Afghanistan: UNAMA's Approach Since 2001

Submitted for the Master of Studies in Diplomatic Studies
Lincoln College, Trinity Term 2017

Christopher John OŻGA

16,324 words

Blank

Blank

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Preventive Diplomacy in Afghanistan: UNAMA's Approach Since 2001

Master of Studies in Diplomatic Studies
Lincoln College, Trinity Term 2017

Conflict trends are shifting from inter-state conflict towards intra-state conflict between states and non-state armed groups, or between non-state armed groups, and the world is now entering its most dangerous period in decades. This thesis shows through original research that the UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA)'s Good Offices and integrated Preventive Diplomacy (PD) approach are highly relevant in the mid-intra-state conflict in Afghanistan in supporting the security-humanitarian-development nexus through timely PD and broader programming to stop armed conflict or the escalation of violence and mitigate its effects. Several key push factors are driving the United Nation's use of PD globally – conflict trends, the expensive nature of conflict, national capacities and policy changes - and once conflict has started PD leads into peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Prevention is preferable to reaction and PD is not an option – it is a necessity. Historical antagonisms and regional challenges are potential flashpoints for intra-state and traditional conflict in Afghanistan and Central Asia and, after four decades of intra-state conflict, UNAMA has used its UN Security Council mandated Good Offices and its preeminent status as the neutral and trusted actor in the country, to mediate on governance stability, elections, peace and reconciliation, and regional cooperation to overcome the myriad of national and transnational challenges which threaten national and regional peace. UNAMA's Good Offices have calmed mid-conflict tensions nationally, particularly through effective support to national governance and elections, incremental progress on peace and reconciliation, and preventing regional conflagration through timely mediation and regional cooperation. UNAMA's PD effectiveness showed limitations in the 2014 elections and, despite brokering a nascent peace process with Hibz-i-Islami, peace with the Taliban remains elusive due to a highly complex conflict environment and persistent domestic and regional challenges. The research has shown that UNAMA's PD and broader approach is applicable to other mid-conflict contexts in both UN Special Political Missions and UN Peacekeeping Missions.

Keywords
Afghanistan, Conflict, Preventive Diplomacy, Taliban, UNAMA

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To the Bodleian librarians, I extend my warm acknowledgement. Appreciation is owed to the FSP Director, Kate Jones, for her continuous support. A special recognition is reserved for my thesis supervisor, Dr Annette Idler, Director, Changing Character of War Programme, University of Oxford, who provided excellent academic research advice. My gratitude is warmly conveyed to the research interviewees who provided invaluable insights on Preventive Diplomacy (PD) and Afghanistan including Afghan National Government officials, UNAMA officials, UN officials, NGO staff and academics who willingly provided their time and expertise to this research endeavour.

CONTENTS

Page		
iv	*Abstract*	
v	*Acknowledgements*	
vi	*Contents*	
viii	*Abbreviations*	
1	**CHAPTER 1**:	**Introduction**
2	1.1	UNAMA's Approach
2	1.2	Dissertation Structure
3	1.3	Research Methodology
5	**CHAPTER 2**:	**UN's Preventive Diplomacy (PD)**
5	2.1	The UN's Engagement with PD
7	2.2	PD's Increasing Importance Globally
9	2.3	Key PD Elements
11	**CHAPTER 3**:	**UNAMA's PD Approach in Afghanistan**
13	3.1	UNAMA's Mandate
15	3.2	UNAMA's PD Approach
15	3.2.1	Good Offices
22	3.2.2	Regional Cooperation
25	3.3	UNAMA's Broader Approach
25	3.3.1	Human Rights
28	3.3.2	Development Coherence
30	**CHAPTER 4**:	**Applicability of UNAMA's PD/Broader Approach**
30	4.1	UN Special Political/Peacekeeping Missions with Similar Mandated Activities
32	4.2	Budget-Costed Approach to Determine Applicability in Comparable UN Missions
33	4.3	UNAMA's Progress Benchmarks to other Mid-Conflict Contexts
34	4.4	INFORM Global Index for Risk Management
40	**CONCLUSION / RECOMMENDATIONS**	
45	**APPENDICES**	
46	APPENDIX 1a:	Map of Afghanistan
47	APPENDIX 1b:	Map of Afghanistan Administrative Divisions
48	APPENDIX 2a-f:	Maps of Taliban Control/Activities/Attacks 2009-2017
54	APPENDIX 3:	Map of Central Asia
55	APPENDIX 4:	Chronology of Key Events in Afghanistan
60	APPENDIX 5:	Overview of UNAMA's Mandate by Category
61	APPENDIX 6:	International Conferences on Afghanistan
62	APPENDIX 7:	UN Secretary Generals Reflections on Preventive Diplomacy
65	APPENDIX 8:	Cases of UN Preventive Diplomacy
66	APPENDIX 9:	UN Preventive Diplomacy Actors, Tools, instruments
69	APPENDIX 10:	UNAMA's Progress Benchmarks
71	APPENDIX 11:	List of Anonymous Interviews
72	**REFERENCES**	
85	**BIBLIOGRAPHY**	

	Figures	
6	Figure 1	Phases of International Action to Prevent or Control Conflicts
7	Figure 2	Life History of a Conflict
21	Figure 3	Civilian deaths and injuries in Afghanistan: Jan-Dec 2009-2016
27	Figure 4	Government Control of Afghanistan Declines
35	Figure 5	INFORM Risk Index
35	Figure 6	Afghanistan's Highest Five Risk Indicators
36	Figure 7	Prioritising Risk Levels and Trends

	Tables	
14	Table 1	UNAMA Mandated Tasks (2002-15)
34	Table 2	UNAMA's Benchmarks
38	Table 3	Applicable Missions/Countries for UNAMA's Approach

ABBREVIATIONS

AKDN	Aga Khan Development Network
APRP	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
AU	African Union
CAREC	Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation
CICA	Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DPA	UN Department of Political Affairs
DRC	DR Congo
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAO	Food & Agricultural Organization
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAS	Organisation of American States
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Countries
OSCE	Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe
PD	Preventive Diplomacy
PoA	Programme of Action
RECCA	Regional Economic Cooperation Conference for Afghanistan
SADC	South African Development Community
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SGR	Secretary General Report
SPECA	UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
S/RES	UN Security Council Resolution
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNDPA	UN Department of Political Affairs
UNECE	UN Economic Commission for Europe
UNGA	UN General Assembly
UNHCHR	UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAR	UN Institute for Training and Research
UNODC	UN Office for Drugs and Crime
UNRCCA	UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNSG	UN Secretary-General

CHAPTER 1
Introduction

Global conflict trends are shifting from inter-state conflict towards intra-state conflict (IICA 2015;Rubin 1998) between states and non-state armed groups, or between non-state armed groups (IISS 2017). "Intra-state conflict is now the most important cause of war" (Steiner 2004,p3) and the world is entering its most dangerous chapter in decades (Foreign Policy 2017). This thesis analyses the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan's (UNAMA) Preventive Diplomacy (PD) approach in mid-conflict Afghanistan which has endured four decades of intra-state conflict (see **Appendices 1** and **1a** maps). Despite 14 years of NATO/ISAF engagement (FP 2017), the conflict in Afghanistan is worsening in 2017 (CFR 2017c;SIGAR 2017). The Council on Foreign Relations noted in its Preventive Priorities Survey 2017 that Afghanistan is a Tier 1 conflict and a 'Top 7 Conflict to Watch 'in 2017 meaning that there is a high likelihood of "increased violence and instability in Afghanistan resulting from a continued strengthening of the Taliban insurgency and potential government collapse" (CFR 2017a). Afghanistan is rated by International Institute of Strategic Studies as a high intensity conflict alongside Iraq, Libya, Mexico (cartels) and Central America (Northern Triangle) meaning that there are frequent (daily) armed clashes between governments, government forces and insurgents, or among non-state armed groups that control territory, with conflict fatalities exceeding 3,000 annually (IISS 2017). The number of armed clashes in Afghanistan last year reached the highest level since the United Nations (UN) started recording incidents in 2007 with 11,418 civilian casualties (Foreign Policy 2017).

Preventive Diplomacy (PD) is acknowledged as an essential diplomatic tool to prevent or stop such armed conflicts, or the escalation of violence, and/or mitigate the effects of conflict through timely interventions in pre-conflict or mid-conflict contexts such as Afghanistan (INT1;INT2;INT4;INT5;INT6; INT8;INT9;INT10;INT14). Conflict prevention focuses on longer-term national dialogue and programs to prevent conflicts or relapse into hostilities (UNSG1992;Zyck&Muggah2012). Once conflict has started, PD leads into collective efforts to win peace (peacemaking), maintain peace (peacekeeping), and facilitate stabilisation and reconstruction (peacebuilding) (INT1;INT2;UNSG1992). PD has been embraced by the United Nations (UN) globally and the UN considers that "PD is not an option – it is a necessity" (UNSG 2010).

1.1 UNAMA's Approach

The thesis builds on academic literature and recognised UN thought leadership that prevention is preferable to reaction (UNDPA 2017) and through primary research interviews, extensive UN documentation consultation, and a case study on UNAMA, I demonstrate how UNAMA's PD approach (Good Offices+Regional Integration) plus broader approach (Human Rights+Development coherence) are highly relevant to the security-humanitarian-development nexus in mid-conflict Afghanistan. UNAMA uses its Good Offices/Regional Cooperation PD mandate from the UN Security Council to mitigate the effects of conflict through mediation, as the preeminent neutral and trusted actor in the country (INT4;INT10), to overcome the myriad of national and transnational challenges and historical antagonisms that are potential flashpoints for intra-state and traditional conflict in Central Asia (Starr 2005;Olcott 2009). UNAMA's PD has calmed mid-conflict tensions nationally, particularly through timely and effective mediation support to national governance, elections, human rights, development coherence and incremental progress on peace and reconciliation, and prevented regional conflagration through fostering regional cooperation. UNAMA's PD effectiveness showed limitations, however, in the 2014 elections and, despite brokering a nascent peace process with Hibz-i-Islami, peace with the Taliban remains elusive due to a highly complex conflict environment and persistent domestic and regional challenges. By conducting research interviews with senior UNAMA, UN, NGO and Government officials, the thesis has prepared original research, analysis and conclusions on the effectiveness and applicability of UNAMA's approach to other mid-conflict contexts, the key challenges still facing Afghanistan, and pertinent recommendations for future PD programming.

1.2 Dissertation Structure

This thesis is structured around UNAMA's PD approach and the following key research questions: How has UNAMA approached PD in Afghanistan? How applicable is UNAMA's PD approach to other mid-conflict contexts? **Chapter 1** contextualises PD as a topic, conducts a brief literature review, and details the research methodology used in the thesis. **Chapter 2** analyses the evolution of PD as a concept and its positioning in the conflict cycle, the factors driving the use of PD, and UN lessons learned from global PD application. **Chapter 3** adopts a case study on UNAMA's PD approach in Afghanistan and analyses the effectiveness if its approach. **Chapter 4** considers the applicability of UNAMA's PD approach to other mid-conflict contexts. The **Conclusion** uses the primary research interviews and literary/documentation research to reflect on the effectiveness and applicability of UNAMA's mandated approach to other mid-conflict contexts and UN missions.

1.3 Research Methodology

The research methodology consists of literary reviews of academic material and official UN documentation, focusing on UN Security Council Resolutions (S/Res), SRSG Briefs and UN Secretary-General Reports (SGRs); conducting elite interviews to provide original research material for analysis in the thesis; and the adoption of an original case study on UNAMA's PD approach with the direct embedding of primary research material. The research utilised and expanded on research and interviews conducted for the Diploma thesis in 2016 (INTa-e). To ensure effective coverage of available research material, this thesis reviewed 80+ articles, 45+ books, multiple dozens of pertinent online sources, 43 UNAMA-related S/Resolutions, 70 SGRs on the Situation in Afghanistan, 32 SRSG Briefing reports to the UN Security Council, 14 UN Security Council transcripts, and 18 UNAMA publications.

The literary review included consultation of the following international relations academic literature with multiple authors engaging in research on topics linked to **PD and conflict** including: Baczko& Dorronsoro 2015; Cahill 1996/2000; Garfinkle 2001; Hampton 2002; Jenča 2009; Jentleson 2000; Lund 1996/2001; MacGinty 2006/13; Mancini 2011; Melber 2012; Muggah 2012/2013; Rubin 1998; Sato 2003; Steiner 2004; UNSG 2011; Zartman 1999; Zyck&Muggah 2012. A broader range of material utilised is included in the bibliography. In order to comprehend and reflect on the domestic and regional challenges affecting security in Afghanistan and Central Asia, a literary review of academic research on **Central Asia** was necessary including: Bainazarova 2009; George 2009; Goyal 2004; Gravingholt 2013; Jenča 2009/2013; Libman 2013; Linn 2012; Muni 2004; Olcott 2009; Starr2005; UNRCCA 2009/12/15. More focused authorship on **Afghanistan** provided pertinent analysis of the underlying factors influencing the conflict: Brahimi 2011; Cowper-Coles 2012;Crawford 2016; Cubitt 2011; Dobbins 2008; Dobbins & Shinn 2011; Everts 2009; Gall 2013;Gentilini 2013; Griffiths 2011; Hanasz 2012; Jenča 2012; Jones 2010; Mills&Mclay 2011; Maley 2009; Quie 2012; Rashid 2001/2009/2010; Rotberg 2007; Smith et al 2013; Semple 2009; Steele 2013; and Suhrke 2012). Based on the literary search conducted for this thesis, only a handful of authors have written specifically about the UN and PD (Beker 2014; Gowan 2012; James 1997; Ramcharan 2008). The literary review also included direct consultation of primary core source material from UNAMA and UN to conduct original and distinctive PD research: S/Res2002-2007;UNAMA2017;UNDESA2016;UNDG2017;UNDPA2017;UNGA2015;UNSC2015;UNSG1992;UNSG 2011-12-17;UNSGReports2002-17;SRSG2002-7.

To collect original qualitative research material after receiving CUREC research approval, I identified and shortlisted 25 officials with direct UNAMA experience in Afghanistan, or with a research interest in Afghanistan and/or PD. Of the 25 officials contacted, 17 responded expressing interest although 3 were ultimately unavailable. I conducted 14 **research interviews** between January-April 2017 (via Skype/face-

to-face) with current or former senior UNAMA officials in UNAMA/UNDPA/UNICEF/MONUSCO, the Afghan Government, NGOs in Kabul, Conseil d'Etat (France) and Thai Universities. All interviewees were initially sent an Information Note/Written Consent Form by e-mail detailing the proposed research and were requested to sign and return the consent form prior to interview. An oral reminder explaining the research and methodology was provided at the start of each interview. Except for one interviewee, all interviewees requested anonymity and interviewees were informed that they would be referenced anonymously. The confidential list of interviewees was shared only with my thesis supervisor. The interviews are integrated throughout the thesis and interviewees are referenced as "INT1-14/INTa-e" in the thesis (**Appendix 11**).

The research methodology of literary reviews, targeted elite interviews, and extensive use of UN source material enabled the completion of an original case study and added value by providing first-hand accounts and pertinent analysis and conclusions on the challenging dynamics of a mid-conflict context, leading to the finalisation of an original research contribution on UNAMA's PD approach in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 2
UN's Preventive Diplomacy

> *"PD is not an option – it is a necessity. As we know too well, dealing with the aftermath of violent conflicts is costly. Lives are needlessly lost. Economies are destroyed. Hopes for development are dashed"* (UNSG 2010).
>
> **Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary General**

Introduction to PD


Preventive Diplomacy (PD) refers to timely action taken at the earliest possible stage in vulnerable places and times (Cahill1996;Jentleson2000;Lund2001) to prevent disputes from arising, existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of conflicts when they occur (UNSG 1992). Conflict prevention focuses on longer-term monitoring and national dialogue to prevent "onset, intensification and spread" (Muuggah&White2013). UN Secretary Generals have increasingly embraced prevention since World War II (Hampton2002;UNDPA2017) with the UN reaffirming in 2017 that it "is committed to moving from a culture of 'reaction' to one of 'prevention' (UNDPA 2017). PD is part of broader conflict prevention efforts (INT1;INT2;INT4) and "remains highly relevant along the entire conflict spectrum" (UNSG 2011,p2) with "diplomatic envoys dispatched to crisis areas to encourage dialogue, compromise and the peaceful resolution of tensions" (UNDPA 2015). The UN's establishment of regional PD centres and the use of Good Offices of UN Political Missions, as used by the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), are localised PD initiatives to maintain peace, or end conflict in UNAMA's context, through the application of a coherent and sustained PD approach at the country-level.

2.1 The UN's Engagement with PD

The UN's interpretation and utilisation of PD has evolved continuously during the period 1950-2017 (**Appendix 7**) under successive UN Secretary General's (Mariko2003;Ozga 2016;Ramcharan 2008): From an initial mentioning of PD by Dag Hammarskjöld (Jenča2013;Mariko2003), to extolling its economic benefits in avoiding conflict (U Thant), to stating its important low key approach (Kurt Waldheim), to its prioritisation (Javier Pérez de Cuéllar). In '*Agenda for Peace*' (Boutros Boutros-Ghali), the UN Secretary-General defined four consecutive phases of international action to prevent or control conflicts (Hahnimaki2015;UNSG1992) as illustrated in **Figure 1**. Once conflict has started, PD leads into collective efforts to win peace (peacemaking), maintain peace (peacekeeping), and facilitate stabilisation and reconstruction (peacebuilding) (INT1;UNSG1992). In the Afghanistan mid-conflict context, PD is an essential link to build on longer-term conflict prevention by using Good Offices (PD) to mediate peace and reconciliation (peacemaking) and the transition from a mid-conflict to a post-conflict scenario.

Figure 1: Phases of international action to prevent or control conflicts

Source: Adapted from UNSG(1992);Hahnimaki(2015)




Agenda for Peace was accompanied by increased UN mediation capacity with the establishment of the Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) in 1992, UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) in 2001, and UNDPA's mediation support unit in 2004. The UN 2005 World Summit (Kofi Annan) committed to building a 'culture of prevention' (UNGA 2005) and taking "effective collective security measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace" (UNSG 2011,p3), laying the foundation for the establishment of the UNRCCA in Central Asia in 2007 as the UN's first PD centre (Ban Ki-Moon). During Ban Ki-Moon's second term, the UN published the first ever UNSG report on PD (Jenča 2013), entitled *'Report of the Secretary General on PD: Delivering Results*' (UNSG 2011), stating that PD "remains highly relevant along the entire conflict spectrum" (UNSG 2011,p2). The UN General Assembly's subsequent resolution in 2014 to strengthen the use of mediation in dispute settlement (UNGA 2014) and the UN's establishment of two more regional centres for PD in Central and Western Africa illustrate that the UN's normative policy framework has gradually shifted from reaction to prevention (UNDPA 2017) – and this approach is demonstrated in multiple conflicts (**Appendix 8**). Furthermore, the new UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, in his very first address to the UN Security Council on 10 January 2017, set 'Restoring Trust and Preventing Crises' as a United Nation's Priority (UNSG 2017), suggesting PD application may increase under SG Guterrres. Although **Figure 2** positions PD between routine diplomacy and crisis diplomacy in the conflict life cycle, PD is relevant throughout the conflict cycle (INT1) and I have represented UNAMA's Good Offices role as a red line.

In practicing PD in the 21st century, the UN relies on a broad range of actors, tools and instruments from within the UN System (**Appendix 9**) to support real time efforts to prevent conflict and/or mitigate the effects of conflict once it has started including (UNSG 2011): the General Assembly, UN Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission, Good Offices of the Secretary General, Envoys, UNDPA, Regional Offices, Resident Political Missions, Peacekeeping Operations, and Fact-Finding inquiries and Investigations.

Whilst the UNSG's "Good Offices are employed to help bring warring parties toward peace or to prevent political and armed conflicts from escalating, DPA is typically working behind the scenes to define and plan the mission and to provide guidance and backing to mediators" (UNDPA 2016b). This plethora of actors, tools and instruments remain the cornerstone of the UN's approach to PD. The evolution in importance of PD is reflected in UNAMA's fifteen successive annual mandate renewals since 2002 and the current core role of UNAMA's Good Offices in Afghanistan in supporting humanitarian and development interventions (**see Chapter 3**).

Figure 2: Life History of a Conflict

Source: United States Institute of Peace (USIP 2017a)



2.2 PD's Increasing Importance Globally

On a global level, there are four key push factors driving the use of PD in the 21st century (Ozga 2016): (1) Conflict trends, (2) The expensive nature of conflicts, (3) Increased capacities in PD, and (4) Key policy changes in engaging in PD. The UN only identified 2,3,4 above (UNSG 2011b), omitting 'Conflict trends' identified by Ozga (2016) as a key additional push factor. **Firstly**, conflict trends are shifting from inter-state conflict towards intra-state conflict (IICA2015;Muggah2012;Rubin1998;Steiner2004) and the overall number of conflicts in the world diminished from 70 in 2001 (UNDPA 2015) to 41 in 2016 (IISS 2017) whilst the number of new high-intensity conflicts (onsets and escalations) dropped from 21 to 16 between 2001-11 (UNSG 2011). "Preventive action was an important part" in this decrease (UNSG 2011,p4) showing that UN PD is effectively responding to the shift in conflict trends (Muggah 2012),

particularly in Afghanistan and Central Asia where joint UNAMA/UNRCCA PD programming targets historical antagonisms (UNRCCA 2009,2012,2015) which are ripe ground for intra-state and traditional conflict (Starr2005;Olcott2009). **Secondly,** the "failure to prevent conflicts is extremely costly" (UNSG 2011,p2) in financial and human terms with twenty million dead in 100 conflicts since 1945 (Gray 2014) and, since only 2001, 1.57m people killed in direct/indirect violence in wars involving US forces (USIP 2017a) and 173,000 killed in the Afghanistan/Pakistan conflicts with 183,000 seriously injured (Crawford 2016). Armed conflicts in Africa from 1990-2005 cost cUS$300bn (IICA 2015) and US wars post-2001 have cost US$4.8 trillion (USIP 2017a). The World Bank estimates that on average a civil war costs US$65 billion (UNDP 2013), thirty years of economic growth (UNDPA 2015) and 14 years to return to original growth paths (UNSG 2011). In contrast, prevention is cost effective (INT11) as US1 in preventive action saves US10 in recovery costs (UNDP 2013) and, as UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres noted, prevention saves lives, reduces suffering and gives hope to millions (UNSG 2017) showing the importance of PD in conflicts such as Afghanistan.

Thirdly, increased capacities at national/regional levels are combined with 'collaboration, firebreaks, sticks and carrots, principles and handshakes' (Zartman 1998) and since 2000 PD has increasingly been accepted as a key conflict prevention tool with regional players shifting to (UNDPA 2011): non-indifference (African Union), prioritisation on resolving differences (Organisation of American States), PD engagement (Union of South American Nations), Confidence Building Measures (ASEAN), and charters including: 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter, 2005 Charter of the Francophonie, 2008 Charter of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (UNSG 2011). UNAMA's Good Offices support to regional cooperation (S/Res2344(2017)) is a concrete example of increasing national/regional PD capacity in Afghanistan's region. **Fourthly**, policy changes have led to the development of national and regional early warning systems (Zartman 1998), crisis monitoring (by EU, AU, OSCE), rapid reaction funding mechanisms, a UNDPA Mediation Support Unit (UNDP 2011), new UN Regional PD Centres in Central Asia, West Africa and Central Africa (Ozga 2016), and multiple actors engaging in PD (UN-EU-OSCE-OAS) through c50 missions in the field (UNDPA 2015) who can access UNDPA's expertise in PD, mediation and peacemaking (UNDPA 2016b). The UN is now "committed to moving from a culture of reaction to one of prevention" (UNDPA 2017) and, as noted by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in his first address to the UN Security Council in January 2017, reforms in the UN's peace and security approach - decision-making processes in the Secretariat, a new Executive Committee, and the appointment of a Special Adviser on Policy (UNSG 2017) – suggest that key UN policy changes on PD and prevention can be expected in 2017 and these will ultimately have an impact on the UN's PD approach globally and UNAMA's future PD mandate in Afghanistan.

2.3 Key PD Elements

Building on substantive experience in the field, including severe failings in Yugoslavia (1992-95) and Rwanda (1994-95), the UN identified four key PD elements crucial to its PD approach: early warning systems, partnerships, sustainability, and funding (UNSG 2011b). The UN is refining these elements globally and, as they are highly relevant to the Afghan conflict, **Chapter 3** will analyse the extent to which UNAMA has integrated these elements in its PD approach. Firstly, the UN needs to fine tune its existing **early warning systems** (Zartman 1998) by developing a more flexible and localised approach to gathering timely information both nationally and regionally, to identify signs and symptoms (INT12) and better predict and more rapidly respond to conflict "threshold" moments. Secondly, although the UN is strengthening its **partnerships** with the AU-ECOWAS-SADC-EU-OSCE-ASEAN-OAS-OIC-CARICOM (UNSG 2011), the UN needs to identify key local players (INT12) and further strengthen and deepen its partnerships with regional organizations (INT2;INT3), civil society, local actors (INT4;UNSG 2011b;Zartman 1998), and UNRCCA to prevent regional crises (INT5) through fostering political goodwill (INT5) and regional cooperation (INT5;INT7;INT9).

Thirdly, the UN needs to ensure **sustainability** by running PD in parallel with development/humanitarian interventions (INT1;INT5), by supporting follow-through on political agreements, and by building national capacities and mechanisms to sustain them (UNSG 2011b) in mid-conflict contexts such as in Afghanistan, Syria and DR Congo where peace agreements prove difficult to reach and/or sustain. Fourthly, **flexible funding** for PD (requires member states to finance UNDPA mediation capacity and stand-by teams to ensure rapid deployment at short notice in times of crisis (UNSG 2011b) and adequately fund UN Special Political Missions and Peacekeeping Missions to implement sustainable PD approaches as in Afghanistan. Fifthly, I advocate moving beyond the four elements suggested by the UN and add another vital element to this discussion: **semi-permanent localised PD structures**, as research conducted by Ozga (2016) clearly demonstrated UNRCCA's PD success as a result of its permanent platform in Central Asia (Jenča 2013). In recent years, the UN has adopted and responded to two emerging areas of PD focus, **electoral disputes** and **unconstitutional changes in governments** (**Appendix 9**) which are recognised as key triggers for igniting violence or potential violence (UNSG 2011b) and are supported by the application of the four key PD elements. UNAMA's timely use of Good Offices in the disputed 2014 Afghan Presidential elections (see **Chapter 3**) was a crucial PD intervention to avert violence (INT9;INT10;INT11).

Conclusion

Analysis of the UN's use of PD in this chapter focused on the evolution of the PD concept under successive UN Secretary Generals, the four factors driving demand for PD in the 21st century, and the UN-defined criteria for PD implementation. With increasing prevalence of intra-state conflict, conflict trends are also a key determinant driving the use of PD, rather than only expense, capacities and policies as identified by the UN. The UN has gradually moved from a culture of reaction to one of prevention (Hampton2002;UNDP2013;UNDPA2015). PD is now central to the UN's efforts (INTb;UNSG2011), localised to specific contexts (INT2) and combined with development and humanitarian interventions (INT1;INT2;INT5;INT6;INT9;INT10), through more robust UN Security Council resolutions authorising the use of Good Offices by UN political/peacekeeping missions to support 'political processes' and foster 'regional cooperation' e.g. in MONUSCO, UNAMA, UNAMID, UNRCCA (UNSC 2015). This engagement in prevention has economic and humane benefits as the costs of PD are marginal (INT1;UNDP2013;UNSG2011) when compared to the exorbitant financial costs of actual conflict (INT9;UNDP2013;UNDPA2015;UNSG2011) and the devastating cost in human fatalities and injuries (Brown2017;Crawford2016;USIP2017). PD's embracing by national governments and regional organisations (EU,OIC,SCO) is evidence of a generic and welcome shift towards prevention rather than the historical dogma of reaction.

As UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres stated to the UN Security Council in January 2017, "War is never inevitable, it is always a matter of choice' (UNSG 2017). By the same logic peace is not inevitable either, as "collective great-power-action is often a prerequisite to successful PD and peace" (Steiner 2004,p61). The role of the UN in applying its own four key elements for successful PD is important to prevent or mitigate the effects of conflict or violence, and in Afghanistan PD is a UNAMA core activity (UNAMA 2017d) and its PD approach builds on the four key elements by using its Good Offices to leverage its neutral status (INT10;INT11) to engage with the Government, Non-State Actors (NSAs) and regional actors in political processes and regional cooperation in an attempt to end the long running conflict (see **Chapter 3**). The applicability of UNAMA's approach to other mid-conflict countries is analysed in **Chapter 4.**

CHAPTER 3
UNAMA's PD Approach in Afghanistan

"Preventive Diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur" —**UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali** (UNSG 1992)

Introduction

Afghanistan has long suffered at the hands of the Great Powers as the central pawn in the Great Game of international diplomacy (INT13) which has ultimately forged the country's history. Nestled between British India and the Romanov Empire in the 18th/19th centuries (Cowper-Coles2012;Jones2010), in the 21st century Afghanistan is geographically located near four nuclear powers - China, India, Pakistan and Russia - and shares borders with a powerful and influential Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China, and Pakistan which has long interfered in Afghanistan's internal affairs (Gall2013;Rashid2008). Geography has shaped Afghanistan's destiny as much as it has determined the fate of invading armies as the "graveyard of empires" (Griffiths2011;Jones2010). Afghanistan has endured two Anglo-Afghan Wars, foreign meddling by neighbouring states and global powers, coup d'etat, and the King's exile before the Soviet Invasion (Baczko&Dorronsoro 2015) and occupation from 1979-1989 (Griffiths2011;Jones2010;Rashid2008). Afghanistan's weak governance and weak rule of law allowed it to become a safe haven for terrorists resulting in the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban from 1996-2001 (Rashid 2001) and the planning on Afghan soil of the Al Qaida attack on the USA on 9/11 (Gall2013;Rashid2008), resulting in the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 (Everts 2009) and NATO/ISAF's engagement in running combat operations (Suhrke 2012) under UN Security Council mandate and US command (S/RES/1386(2001)). Afghanistan has now been in conflict for nearly four decades (Karzai 2007) and whether it is a fault line of geography, or a long-term victim of historical antagonisms and domestic and regional competing power interests (Cowper-Coles2012;Gall2013; Griffiths2011;INT4;INT7;INT14), the constant foreign intervention in Afghanistan has exacerbated its ongoing instability (Jones2010;Maley2009;Rashid2008;Rashid2010).

Afghanistan is in mid-conflict and haven to terrorist/criminal groups, Taliban/Hizb-I-Islamii/Tehrik-i-Taliban/Al'Qaida/IS-K (Stanekzai 2013), and a robust and enduring Taliban insurgency since 2006 (Cowper-Coles2012;Gall2013;Mills&Mclay2011;Rashid2008), despite the establishment of UNAMA as a new UN Political Mission in 2002, a "full-blown occupation and counterinsurgency" (Bohannon 2011), the subsequent routing of Al Qaida to the mountains and Pakistan, the troop surge in 2009, and the capture and killing of Osama Bin Laden by US Special Forces in Abbottabad in Pakistan in 2011. In fact,

the 2014 drawdown of international forces (Steele 2013) and the formal end of US/UK/NATO's combat operations and the full transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in 2014 (IISS 2017) has left Afghan security forces exposed (Economist 2017). The number of armed clashes in 2016 reached the highest level since the UN started recording incidents in 2007 (Foreign Policy 2017), resulting in the highest ever annual civilian deaths and injuries in 2016 (UNAMA 2017h), and by March 2017 the Taliban controlled more territory than at any time since the 2001 invasion (CFR 2017c). As "this appalling conflict destroys lives and tears communities apart in every corner of Afghanistan" (SRSG-Tadamichi-Yamamoto-2017), this is further complicating the nascent peace process and Afghanistan's path to sustainable development.

Beyond the insurgency, Afghanistan continues to face significant interrelated national and regional political, economic and security challenges (UNSG:A/71/826-S/2017/189) which are stalling its socio-economic development, impeding peace, and threatening UNAMA's PD gains including: corruption impunity/unaccountability (UNAMA 2017i), a war-based-economy (UNAMAQN 2013c) reliant on military/foreign aid (UNDAF 2015), fiscal deficits, deficient social inclusivity, developmental inequities, criminality, unemployment (ANG 2016a), 31% food insecurity, 54% chronic malnutrition, 36% endemic poverty rate (UNDAF 2015), illicit agricultural production and narcotics trafficking worth US$2bn (UNDAF 2015) which supports the insurgency (Karzai 2008), endemic corruption (UNAMA 2017j), weak governance and rule of law, poor basic services (UNDAF 2015) and restricted access for polio immunisations (INT4;INT11), a humanitarian crisis with a protracted refugee situation (INT5;Loescher 2011), political stalemate (UNSG:A/71/826-S/2017/189), and an urgent need to finalise peace and reconciliation. "Afghanistan's development needs are large and will remain so for decades" and its "prospects for sustaining high rates of economic growth face significant constraints: limited human capital, poor infrastructure, high population growth, a lack of investment, and a fragile operating environment" (ANG 2016,p34).

Key transnational challenges and 'flashpoints' in one of the most volatile regions in the world (Akiner 2014) include extremism and Islamic Fundamentalism (INTb), terrorism (Goyal2004;INT5;Muni2004), narcotics (ANG2016a;INT5), illegal migration (Bainazarova 2009), negative globalisation effects (Jenča 2009), and weak historical inter-state cooperation (Starr2005;Olcott2009) which threaten regional economic prosperity/political stability (Linn2012) and trade (INT5;Starr2005). Joint UNAMA/UNRCCA-led regional cooperation (UNRCCA 2009/2012/2015) is tackling key critically sensitive regional issues including natural resource management of water (INTa;INTb;INT10;Juraev2009;Muni2004) and energy (George2009;ICG2016; Linn2012;Muni2004;Olcott2009), natural disasters, improving Head of State

relations (Gravingholt2013;INTb), and reducing ethnic tensions (George 2009), violence and ongoing insurgencies (Akiner2014;Olcott2009; Starr2005).

UNAMA uses its PD approach (Good Offices, Regional Cooperation) and broader integrated approach (Human Rights, Development Coherence) (UNAMA 2017a) to support the ANG in tackling these challenges to secure peace. Success or failure in any core activity impacts the security-development-humanitarian nexus and UNAMA's overall effectiveness.

3.1 UNAMA'S MANDATE

Replacing the United Nations Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established by UN S/Res1401(2002) on 28 March 2002 at the request of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (UNAMA,2017b;S/Res1401[2002]). UNAMA's structure and mandate was laid out in UN Secretary-General's Report, UNSG:A/56/875-S/2002/278, reflecting the establishment of the Afghan interim authority on 22 December 2001 (S/Res1401(2002)) and the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to it under the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan, known as the Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001, pending the re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (UNSC 2015). UNAMA's mandate is reviewed annually and has been extended fifteen times between March 2002 and March 2017[1]. The most recent mandate extension was on 17 March 2017 when the UN Security Council unanimously adopted S/Res2344(2017) and the current SRSG for Afghanistan/Head of UNAMA, Tadamichi Yamamoto[2] (UNAMA 2017c), briefs the UNSC every three months about the situation in Afghanistan (SRSG 2017).

3.1.1 Overview of UNAMA's Mandated Tasks

In analysing UNAMA's 14 UN Security Council Resolutions[3] during the period 2002-15, UNAMA was authorised 12 mandated tasks on 103 occasions in the form of new tasks, additional elements, or a reiteration of tasks, as reflected in **Table 1**, although none were mandated in every year. This period is specifically selected as it is the most recent review period currently available in the 'Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council' (UNSC 2015). **Appendix 5** provides a full tabulated 'Overview of UNAMA's Mandated Tasks' since its establishment in 2002 (S/Res1401[2002]). For the 2014-15 period, UNAMA's mandates remained largely unchanged as defined in prior resolutions[4] (UNSC 2015), although

[1] S/Res: 1401,1413,1419,1444,1453[2002];1471,1510[2003];1536,1563[2004];1589,1623[2005];1662,1707[2006];1746,1776[2007];1806,1817,1833[2008];1868,1890[2009];1917,1943[2010];1974,2011[2011];2041[2012];2096[2013];2145[2014];2210[2015];2274[2016];2344[2017].

[2] Mr Tadamichi Yamamoto (Japan) was appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Afghanistan and Head of UNAMA in June 2016, replacing Nicholas Haysom (UNAMA 2017c).

[3] S/Res:**1401**[2002];**1471**[2003];**1536**[2004];**1589**[2005];**1662**[2006];**1746**[2007];**1806**[2008];**1868[**2009];**1917**[2010];**1974**[2011];**2041**[2012];**2096**[2013];**2145**[2014];**2210**[2015];**2274**[2016];**2344**[2017].

[4] S/Res: 1662[2006],1746[2007],1806[2008],1868[2009],1917[2010],1974[2011],2041[2012],2096[2013].

elements were added on electoral support and women's participation (S/Res2145[2014],para12), on engagement with international civilians and NATO (S/Res2210[2015],para6f), and UNAMA's mandate to lead international civilian efforts was reiterated in S/Res2344(2017). This mandate analysis is important as it is possible to extrapolate UNAMA's principal mandated tasks, the level of importance placed on these tasks by the UNSC in any given year depending on the security situation on the ground, the basis for UNAMA's holistic approach around four interconnected core activities, and the applicability of UNAMA's PD/broader approach to other UN missions (**Chapter 4**).

Table 1: UNAMA Mandated Tasks 2002-15

	Ranking (R)	#a	#b	#c	Total Tasks
1. Civilian-Military Coordination	6	a1	b2	c4	7
2. Demilitarisation and Arms Management	8	a1	b2	-	3
3. **Electoral Assistance* **	**2**	a2	b6	c3	**11**
4. **Human Rights****; Women, Peace and Security;	**1**	a2	b5	c6	**13**
Children and Armed Conflict	-	-	-	-	-
5. Humanitarian Support	**3**	a2	b1	c7	10
6. International Cooperation and Coordination**	**4**	a2	b5	c2	**9**
7. Military and Police	5	a1	-	c7	8
8. **Political Processes* **	**3**	a2	b3	c5	**10**
9. Rule of Law/Judicial matters	1	a2	b5	c6	**13**
10. Security Sector Reform	8	a1	-	c2	3
11. Support to Sanctions Regimes	7	a1	b1	c4	6
12. Support to State Institutions	3	a2	b5	c3	10
					103

R = Ordinal value assigned based on the frequency of the task authorisation in UNAMA's mandates.
# = Number of: new mandated tasks (a), additional elements (b), or reiteration of tasks (c).
NB: All additional new mandated tasks were added in 2006 except for 'International Cooperation and Coordination' for which a new task was added in 2008.
* UNAMA PD tasks: **Electoral Assistance**, **Political Processes** (Good Offices) & **Regional Cooperation**.
**UNAMA core activities.

Mandated tasks are ranked in order of frequency in **Table 1** and 'Human Rights' and the 'Rule of Law' were the most frequently authorised mandated tasks, 'Electoral Assistance' was second, and 'Humanitarian Support', 'Political processes', and 'Support to State institutions' were joint third. 'Demilitarisation and Arms Management' and 'Security Sector Reform' were the least mandated tasks authorised in only 3 out of 14 resolutions. The analysis ranks Good Offices at #2 (Electoral Assistance) and #3 (Political processes); human rights at #1; Development Coherence at #4 (International Coordination); and Regional Cooperation at #4 (International Cooperation). These top four UN Security Council mandated tasks also had the greatest number of additional elements (b) and reiteration of tasks (c) in UNAMA's successive mandates and reflect UNAMA's four core activities.

3.2 UNAMA's PD Approach in Afghanistan

The analytical ranking of UNAMA's mandated tasks is important as it clearly illustrates why UNAMA's programming in Afghanistan is focused around four core activities: (1) Good Offices, (2) Human Rights, (3) Development Coherence, and (4) Regional Cooperation. UNAMA also provides support and guidance in a wide range of other areas (**Table 1**) including strengthening the rule of law (UNAMA 2017a). In accordance with its successive mandates, "UNAMA provides political good offices in Afghanistan; works with and supports the government; supports the process of peace and reconciliation; monitors and promotes human rights and the protection of civilians in armed conflict; promotes good governance; and encourages regional cooperation" (UNAMA 2017b). As of 2017, UNAMA maintained a permanent field presence in 12 provinces across Afghanistan with liaison offices in Islamabad (Pakistan) and Tehran (Iran) (INT5;INT12;UNAMA 2017b), and employed 376 international staff, 1,163 national staff, and 79 UN Volunteers (UNAMA 2017b). The field offices, liaison offices and human resources support UNAMA's PD approach (INT5). This chapter focuses on the two core activities in UNAMA's PD approach, 'Good Offices' and 'Regional Cooperation', whilst briefly exploring the relevance of 'Human Rights' and 'Development Coherence' as two core activities in UNAMA's broader integrated approach in Afghanistan. The analysis focuses on key milestones supported by UNAMA since 2002 and analyses the effectiveness of its approach.

3.2.1 Good Offices

"Providing Good Offices and outreach is at the forefront of
UNAMA's mandate-driven activities" UNAMA 2017b)

UNAMA's mandated approach to PD in Afghanistan is to use its Good Offices to provide high-level mediation (PD) to support the ANG assume full leadership and ownership in the governance (INT5), security and development areas (UNAMA 2017d). Within this framework, UNAMA supports the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process of peace and reconciliation if requested by the ANG, utilises its Good Offices to support the ANG's regional cooperation (INT5), and supports National Priority Programmes by leading and coordinating international civilian efforts (UNAMA 2017d). UNAMA has had a particularly strong role as an impartial trusted player ((INT4;INT10;INT12;Karzai2007) in supporting the interim government (2002), the subsequent Presidential and Parliamentary elections (2004-5,2009-10,2014) and regional cooperation in Afghanistan (INT9;INT10;INT11;INT12) and for this reason this section focuses on how effectively UNAMA has used its Good Offices in each of these areas.

3.2.1.1 Interim Government Transition to the Permanent Authority: 2001-2

UNAMA used its Good Offices at the outset of its mandate to support the six month transition of power from the Afghan Interim Administration, established on 22 December 2001 and chaired by Hamid Karzai, to the Transitional Authority, established by the Emergency Loya Jirga on 11-19 June 2002, under the provisions of the Bonn Agreement (UNSG:A/56/1000-S/2002/737). The new administration faced significant challenges including a fractured and decentralised disposition of power throughout Afghanistan, numerous armed factions, fragmented regional military rule placing self-interest above national interest, strong opposition to poppy cultivation, and distant and unstructured relationships between the central Government and Provincial governments (UNSG:A/56/1000-S/2002/737). The fact that the Loya Jirga was able to appoint a Head of State, Hamid Karzai, and agree on the Transitional Authority (S/Res1419(2002)) in a very tight timeframe is noteworthy (UNSG:A/56/1000-S/2002/737) and was commended by the UN Security Council (S/Res1419(2002)). The adoption of the new Constitution by the Loya Jirga on 4 January 2004 (S/Res1536(2004) was another peaceful early national milestone and another UNAMA PD-supported behind the scenes success (INT5;INT14). These were early tests in UNAMA's mandate and their successful realisation (Rotberg 2007) is testament to UNAMA's initial PD mediation efforts in discretely engaging with key political actors to support the convening of the Loya Jirga, brokering of a new authority, appointment of a Head of State, and agreement on a new Constitution.

Although UNAMA's 'broader overarching role' in supporting the transition from interim authority to permanent institutions established stability (INT12), a UNAMA electoral officer engaged in this process noted that the newness of the democratic process posed UNAMA minimal PD challenges as it had "greater footsteps" at the outset of its mandate (INT12) and it was only in later mandates that UNAMA's Good Offices were more crucial to timely PD interventions in support of elections and peace and reconciliation (INT5) and these are analysed below. Furthermore, despite these initial PD successes, the highly centralised constitution is unstable (Cowper-Coles2012), and the UNSC noted in November 2002 "that the situation in Afghanistan still constitutes a threat to international peace and security" (S/Res1444(2002)) and stated the same concerns again fifteen years later in March 2017 (S/Res2344(2017)). As the declining security situation and lack of law and order in 2017 illustrates (CFR 2017c), UNAMA has not been able to engender longer-term success in effectively supporting the ANG to build a strong and trusted Government (INT10). Building people's trust in Government remains a top priority in Afghanistan (INT8;INT10) as the trust deficit is a serious concern and a current contributing factor in the ongoing conflict (INT14).

3.2.1.2 Presidential Election: 2014

UNAMA provided significant electoral support to the Afghan Presidential (2004, 2009) and Parliamentary (2005, 2010) elections (Gentilini2013;Neumann2009;Rashid2009). In preparation for credible Presidential elections in April 2014, deemed critical for stability (UNAMAQN2013a; UNAMAQN2013d;UNAMAQN2014a), UNAMA was additionally requested by the UNSC in S/Res2145[2014] "to provide assistance to the relevant Afghan institutions to support the integrity and inclusiveness of the electoral process including, inter alia, measures to enable the full and safe participation of women" (UNSC 2015). This additional task reflects the UN's global PD focus area on election support to prevent election-related violence (**Chapter 2**) and is a direct example of the UNAMA's application of global PD lessons learned in the Afghan conflict. This 'additional element' in its mandate was timely as the 2014 Presidential election denigrated into near violence (INT11;INT12).

UNAMA's use of Good Offices in supporting the disputed Afghan Presidential election was a positive PD activity (INT11) in a make or break moment in Afghanistan's recent political history (INT10). UNAMA advised the ANG on organising the elections and messaging, mapped actors, convened roundtable meetings, (INT10), established the security system (Gentilini 2013), and openly mediated between the Presidential campaigns to identify champions (INT10) and ensure transparency. After the second round of voting resulted in political deadlock over alleged voting irregularities between the two Presidential candidates, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, UNAMA mediated between both Presidential campaigns and organised an international audit of the results, at the request of the ANG, to address allegations of fraud (CFR 2017c;INT12), gradually expanding the audit from low coverage to 100% of votes (INT12). Amidst a security/military/economic/political transition (UNAMAQN2014b), UNAMA's application of timely PD mitigated the real possibility of an outbreak of ethnic violence by Abdullah's Tajik support base in the north versus Ghani's Pashtun supporters in the south (INT11), although a last ditch intervention by John Kerry, US Secretary of State, was necessary to broker a power sharing agreement and the formation of a National Unity Government in September 2014 led by President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah (CFR 2017c;INT9;INT12;INT14). Overall, UNAMA provided strong PD support to the 2014 elections facilitating "the first peaceful transfer of power in Afghanistan by an elected President" (UNSG:A/69/647-S/2014/876,p1), although despite UNAMA's PD activities traditional U.S diplomatic support was required to end the crisis (INT9), suggesting UNAMA's PD reached its effective limits and the lessons learned on voting irregularities need to be applied to future elections to avoid costly mistakes.

3.2.1.3 National Unity Government: 2014-16

The resulting National Unity Government averted violence and President Ghani committed to an Afghan-led peace process (UNSG:A/69/647-S/2014/876,para15), although the two-year agreement has created concerns over potential political instability and Parliamentary elections are postponed since 2015 (INT5;INT12). As of 2017, President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah continue to face political gridlock in jointly governing a country which faced four interrelated challenges during the transition – conflict, corruption, criminality and unemployment (ANG 2016a) – with ongoing disputes over pollicisation of appointments (UNSG:A/71/826-S/2017/189), nepotism and ongoing Taliban-led violence (CFR 2017c). Although the ongoing political discontent does not resonate with effective PD and "many people blame the UN for imposing a two-headed Government" (INT12), the power sharing arrangement led to timely prevention of violence (IN10;INT12) with Abdullah Abdullah, Chief Executive, confirming in 2015 that "the UN has played an important role in facilitating the political process" (UNAMA 2015). The ongoing political disputes are deep rooted in ethnicity and culture and it would be unreasonable to squarely pin blame on UNAMA for national political failings (INT5) but it does mean that these lessons need to be better factored into UNAMA's PD approach.

3.2.1.4 Peace and Reconciliation: 2002-16

> "The UN has been a long-standing, reliable partner of Afghanistan. Even when others looked the other way, the UN was here standing ready to support and assist us".
>
> **Hakmat Karzai** (UNAMA 2015)

UNAMA's PD role in the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan has been less effective than its support to governance and elections (INT9;INT12). Afghanistan remains in mid-conflict, although UNAMA's PD has provided a "critical Afghanistan-based contribution" (Brahimi 2011) to mediating peace and reconciliation through incremental steps since 2002 and the early phases in UNAMA's approach were effectively implemented in a more focused (INT5), less vexing and violent environment than in 2017. An early peace milestone brokered by UNAMA included facilitating the Afghan-Pakistani Peace Jirga convened in August 2007 (S/Res1806(2008)) which aimed to bring sustainable peace to the region by recognising the importance of regional cooperation (INT5;INT7) and the ongoing role played by Pakistan in the Afghan conflict (Brahimi2011;INT5;INT14;Mills&Mclay2011).

3.2.1.4 (1) Brokering Peace

UNAMA has been just one of many actors trying to broker peace. Norway played an important peace role (INT9) and in 2007 a senior Norwegian diplomat, Alf Arne Ramslien, brokered a ANG/Taliban meeting in Oslo in November 2008, although the meeting collapsed before it started after one of the

Taliban representative's house in Quetta was bombed as a warning (NYT 2016). Subsequent meetings between Ramslien and the Taliban's emissaries continued once or twice a month for three years but like many other parallel attempts to broker peace they faltered (NYT 2016) including US, Saudi and Qatari efforts (INT7;Rashid2009). UNAMA's SRSG Eide first met the Taliban in 2008 (INT14) and in 2009 was mediating for three months with President Karzai, UAE, Pakistan, US, UK and France to convene peace discussions in Dubai between the SRSG and the Taliban (INT13). Discussions were fruitful until a joint Pakistani/American round-up of Taliban commanders one week later dealt a blow to peace efforts from the sidelines of the international community (INT 13). In February 2010, the highest-level ANG-Taliban meeting yet was scheduled with the Taliban deputy leader, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, although his arrest in Pakistan spoiled another peace attempt (NYT 2016), revealing Pakistan's complicity in preventing successive peace talks (Gall 2013).

3.2.1.4 (2) High Peace Council and APRP

Looking towards other peace opportunities, when the Consultative Peace Jirga established the High Peace Council in June 2010, as foreseen in UNSG:A/64/705-S/2010/127, "as a bellwether of public opinion" (Brahimi 2011), UNAMA focused on supporting implementation of the new Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Programme (APRP) (UNSG:A/64/911-S/2010/463,para20). The UNSC encouraged the ANG to use UNAMA's Good Offices to support the APRP in 2011 ((S/Res1974(2011,para11) and in 2014 (S/Res2145(2014,para13)) as success could influence peace-buidling (Hanasz2012;Quie2012). In 2011, although the Chairman of the Afghanistan High Peace Council was assassinated, the number of Taliban-returnees joining the APRP was increasing (S/Res2011(2011)) which was a sign of some success in UNAMA's support to the programme.

3.2.1.4 (3) First ANG-Taliban meeting

Continuing UNAMA support to the Afghan-led peace process led to the first 'official' meeting between the Taliban and ANG in 2015 but peace talks were once again halted with the revelation that Taliban leader Mullah Omar had died in 2013; and the killing of his successor, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, in a US UAV strike in Pakistan in 2016 (IISS 2017) failed to advance the peace process. The current leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada has not yet been persuaded to the peace table with the ANG. Concurrently, IS-K emerged as a new threat seizing territory in eastern Afghanistan along with the resurgence of Taliban and Al Qaida (IISS 2017), which was demonstrated by the brief capture of Kunduz in September 2015 (UNSG:A/70/601-S/2015/942) prolonging the //8US troop presence (SIGAR 2017). This suggests the limits of military successes in supporting UNAMA's peace agenda, the limits of UNAMA's PD spillover on the insurgency, the multiple spoilers (Taliban, Al Qaida, IS-k, Pakistan) seeking to derail peace, and the ongoing dangers of unsuccessful UNAMA/ANG peace initiatives.

3.2.1.4 (4) NATO RSM

Amidst this backdrop, UNAMA and NATO had minimal PD discussions (INT12) as NATO was focused on security and UNAMA on diplomacy leading to diluted messages and mixed results (INT5;INT10), although these elements are inextricably connected. However, in S/Res2210[2015], UNAMA and the SRSG were authorised to lead and coordinate the international civilian efforts, based on Afghan leadership, ownership and sovereignty, with a particular focus on engaging with the non-combat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) agreed upon between NATO and Afghanistan, and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (UNSC 2015). The inclusion of this new mandated task is intended to address the past shortfalls in communication and cooperation between NATO/ISAF and UNAMA (INT5) by improving coherence in the security-humanitarian-development nexus. The resulting improved communications on military and civilian issues is one positive aspect in a very difficult environment with minimal peace outcomes.

3.2.1.4 (5) Hizb-i-Islami Peace Agreement

In 2016 whilst the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (Afghanistan/China/Pakistan/USA) "struggled to maintain momentum" in reinvigorating the Taliban peace process (UNSG:A/70/924-S/2016/532,para4), UNAMA continued its mediation support to the ANG and in October 2016 the ANG signed a UNAMA-drafted peace agreement with Hizb-i-Islami (INT9) "paving the way for the armed group's commander, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, to make a political comeback despite allegations of war crimes during the 1990s" (Al Jazeera, 2016a) and Hekmatyar returned to Kabul in May 2017. UNAMA's peace drafting and peripheral discussions are "a classic Good Offices intervention" (INT9) and successful example of high level mediation by UNAMA to bring Hizb-I-Islami to the peace table. However, UNAMA ultimately stood back from the peace deal once it was clear that the ANG was willing to offer blanket amnesty for crimes/human rights violations perpetrated by the group (INT9). UNAMA's PD successes are only small steps and UNAMA must upscale its Quick Impact projects with *Ulema* (religious leaders) (INT14) to foster peace. Signifcant PD success will be when UNAMA's mediation brings the Taliban to the peace table, in accordance with Afghan customs (Rashid 2010) and mutual trust (Dobbins&Shinn2011).


3.2.1.4 (6) Failings of peace and reconciliation: Taliban Territorial Control

Despite these multiple peace initiatives, PD has worked less well on the insurgency (INT9). Although US$17 billion in foreign aid has been dispersed (CFR 2017c) and the US spends cUS$3.8 billion in security assistance in Afghanistan annually (SIGAR 2017), the security situation has deteriorated since the drawdown in 2014 (IISS 2017). Significant challenges remain for Afghan forces with only 8,400 U.S. troops and 12,930 NATO troops based in Afghanistan in 2017 (CFR 2017c) to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces and institutions (NATO 2017), and dwindling close air support from 35,000

combat sorties in 2011 to only 4,500 in 2016 has led to dire consequences (Economist 2017) and a 'deteriorating security situation' (UNSG A/71/826-S/2017/189,para15). The ANDSF struggled to hold territory and secure population centres (CFR 2017c), as the NATO/US/ANG strategic shift abandoned remote outposts to bolster provincial capitals defences following eight insurgent attempts to capture provincial capitals (SIGAR 2017). Consequently, the Taliban controlled more territory in 2016 than at any time since 2001 (CFR 2017c) and **Appendices 2a-f** map the Taliban-controlled areas between 2015-2017. The ANG controlled just 57% of its territory in February 2017 (**Figure 3**) dropping from 72% in 2015 (ISW 2017; SIGAR 2017), losing nearly 5% of its territory between January-February 2017 alone (SIGAR 2017) representing a loss of control of 20/400 governing districts (Al Jazeera 2017). Key provinces with major road links (Helmand, Kunduz and Uruzgan) remain heavily contested and a third of the population, 9.2 million Afghans, live in contested districts (SIGAR 2017).

Figure 3: Government Control of Afghanistan Declines

Source: **SIGAR (2017)**



The American commander in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, warned in Feb 2017 "that current American troop levels are inadequate to prevent the Taliban from continuing to retake territory, especially in Helmand province, the heartland of the insurgency and Kunduz" (Economist 2017) and "further weakening of the Afghan security forces would risk leaving large ungoverned spaces that could be exploited by regional and transnational militant groups" (Foreign Policy (2017). Indeed, the conflict was worsening as of March 2017 (CFR 2017b) with CFR listing Afghanistan as a Top Conflict to Watch in 2017 (CFR 2017a). The increasing territorial acquisition and threat posed by Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) (IISS 2017) in Nanghahar province, east of Kabul, resulted in the US Air force dropping the largest ever non-nuclear bomb (MOAB) on IS-K on 13 April 2017 to destroy their tunnel network in Nangahar

province. Powerful symbolism against IS-K but it will have minimal effect on the Taliban insurgency or territorial control, as '"the Government control by day, the Taliban by night' (INT9;INT14).

The negative security dynamics are eroding trust and preventing peace as "nearly every factor associated with premature death - poverty, malnutrition, poor sanitation, lack of access to health care, environmental degradation - is exacerbated by the current war" (Brown 2017) which in turn enflames the conflict and negatively impacts UNAMA's broader approach to support the security-humanitarian-development nexus, as Pakistan, India, Iran, and Russia vie to influence the ANG and sub-national actors (CFR 2017c;INT5;INT8;INT14). If peace were an indicator of PD success then progress is faltering, as a revitalised Taliban insurgency threatens instability in Afghanistan (INT9) and the country risks once again becoming a terrorist safe haven (CFR 2017c). "The war in Afghanistan has resulted in a grinding stalemate with the government unable to maintain control" (SIGAR 2017). Pugwash INGO convened four peace and security meetings in 2016 (INT8;Pugwash2017) and the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) – Afghanistan/China/Pakistan/USA – convened for the first time in January 2016 (UNSG:A/71/826-S/2017/189), offering overdue recognition that "peace is the only option" (UNAMAQN2015b,p2) and the country's solutions are political not military (SRSG2017a; UNAMAQN2014c).

3.2.2 Regional Cooperation

> "UNAMA works to encourage Afghanistan and neighbouring states to engage and cooperate on mutually beneficial issues" (UNAMA 2017g)

To encourage regional partners to contribute to a stable and prosperous Afghanistan, "as an effective means to promote Afghanistan's security, stability and socio-economic development" (UNAMA 2017g), UNAMA is mandated by the UN Security Council to use its Good Offices to support regional cooperation. This demonstrates the integrated cross-cutting nature of UNAMA's mandates which reference regional cooperation: S/Res1817(2008,para9) reiterated its generic support for regional initiatives such as 'Project Cohesion' whilst S/Res1868(2009,p3) stressed "the crucial importance of advancing regional cooperation as an effective means to promote security, governance and development in Afghanistan", and seven years later this same phrase was repeated by the UNSC in S/RES2274(2016) illustrating the key role of regional cooperation in UNAMA's mandated PD approach (INT13).

3.2.2.1 Early Regional Cooperation

The rationale for UNAMA's first regional cooperation mandate in 2006 (INT13;UNSC2015) is manifest due to the complex nature of domestic and regional challenges facing Afghanistan which are connected

to the Central Asian region (Juraev 2009) in terms of stability, security, natural resource management, trans-boundary issues (crime, drugs, human trafficking), investment, and economic growth (Ozga 2016). As "the economies of Afghanistan and its neighbours will never flourish in isolation" (Starr 2005,p165) Regional Cooperation agreements play a major role in promoting peaceful cooperation. UNAMA's early PD support included '**The Kabul Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations**' signed by the Transitional Administration and China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on 22 December 2002 which was the beginning of Afghanistan's efforts to improve regional cooperation (S/Res1453(2002) and a vital first step. The **Declaration on Trade and Transit and Inward Investment** signed in Dubai in September 2003 aimed to increase trade and Afghanistan's status as future trade hub (S/Res1589(2005). There are many examples, although RECCA and the Afghan-led 'Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process' are at the centre of regional coordination efforts. UNAMA's Good Offices support to Regional Cooperation is an example of success and good PD practice in effectively engaging regional actors in the PD process, using its two liaison offices in Islamabad (Pakistan) and Tehran (Iran), to promote cooperation and stability (UNAMA, 2017g).

3.2.2.2 Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA)

UNAMA's mediation support helped ANG initiate the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) which first convened in 2005 with 11 regional countries to cooperate in water, counter-narcotics, transport, energy transport, trade facilitation and business climate 2005 (RECCA 2016). It was a building block for Afghan-led regional cooperation and has been very useful to promoting economic interests in the region (S/Res1746(2002)) and successive conferences in Delhi (2006), Islamabad (2007) were well received by the UNSC (S/Res1806(2008)). The RECCA Annual Review 2016 notes that Afghans and its regional partners have progressed from negotiating joint infrastructure and commercial deals, to realising construction and trade opportunities including the new rail connection to China, the transport corridor with Pakistan, and the 'Silk Road Through Afghanistan' launched at RECCA-VI (RECCA 2015), connecting Afghanistan to the region for trade, transit, energy and communications (ANG 2017b). RECCA-VII in Turkmenistan in Autumn 2017 (RECCA 2016) takes regional economic cooperation into its second decade which is a big success in a very challenging region (Akiner2014) and UNAMA deserves part of the credit.

3.2.2.3 The Heart of Asia-Istanbul process

The UN-supported, Afghan-led 'Heart of Asia-Istanbul process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan' (S/Res2274(2016)), launched in 2011, is another major milestone in Afghanistan's regional cooperation. The Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process has 25 countries participating/supporting and its three main pillars have a strong preventive element: Political

Consultations, Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), and Cooperation with Regional Organizations (HoA 2017). The cooperation with and between regional organisations - UN, AKDN, CAREC, CICA, CSTO, ECO, NATO, OIC, OSCE, SAARC, SCO - is crucial as Central Asia is representative of overlapping, uncoordinated groupings of regional organisations (INTa), and partnerships (INT2), political consultations and CBMs are needed to build trust in a region with weak political engagement (INTb). The initial role of UNAMA in the process has left a lasting legacy with member states agreeing in 2016 to renew their "commitment to strengthening enhanced cooperation among Member States" (HofA 2017b) with an increase in multilateral engagement/economic cooperation at the regional level in 2017 (UNSG:A/71/826-s/2017/189).

3.2.2.4 State-led cooperation initiatives

Other state-led cooperation initiatives include **Quadrilateral Summits** (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Russia) and **Trilateral Summits** (Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan; and Afghanistan, Pakistan, UK) commended by the UNSC in S/Res2274(2016). The ANG cooperates with Pakistan although Afghanistan/Pakistan's "relations remained strained" (UNSG:A/71/682-S/2016/1049,para23) "due to Islamabad's support for the Taliban and other militant groups...and tensions increased [in Fall 2016] as thousands of Afghan refugees in Pakistan were forced to flee amid increased violence, detentions, and harassment" (Foreign Policy 2017). Complementary Initiatives by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Collective Security Organisation (CSTO) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) were also recognised by the UNSC in S/Res2274(2016) as stabilising initiatives. The ANG's own goals for regional cooperation focus on making Afghanistan an attractive trans-Asia hub, diversifying its export routes for regional trade, and improving security by enhancing confidence and mutual benefit from stable trade (ANG 2016a). The ANG proposes to advance regional integration with India/Iran/Central Asia/Gulf States, join SCO (UNSG:A/71/682-S/2016/1049), and encourage 'One Belt, One Road', private sector infrastructure development, regional energy projects, engagement with regional organisations, and strengthened embassies and trade missions (ANG 2016a).

3.2.2.5 UNAMA/UNRCCA Joint PD collaboration

Joint UN PD collaboration in regional cooperation is of particular note as good practice for replication in a region with serious peace and security challenges (UNRCCA 2012a). In my earlier research in 2016 on the UNRCCA in Central Asia, I showed that UNAMA/UNRCCA's joint PD programming: (1) played a key role in facilitating regional cooperation between the ANG and regional states on stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan and preventing conflict over common water and energy resources (SRSG 2012); (2) UNRCCA/UNAMA's broad PD approach included capacity building training/workshops/ seminars (UNRCCA 2015), high-level political events, and inter-government exchanges (UNRCCA 2009),

resulting in improved regional cooperation on trans-boundary issues and water and energy management (UNRCCA 2012a); (3) targeted CBMs were used to build trust and prevent conflict through multi-stakeholder partnerships with UNAMA, UNHCHR, UNITAR, UNODC and the Institute of Strategic Studies; and (4) UNAMA/UNRCCA exchanged views on the role of Central Asian states in supporting peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan (Jenča 2013), agreeing on supporting the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) and RECCA (Jenča 2013). The UN's PD approach was successful in setting the foundations for future agreements, in raising the importance of PD in the region, and in establishing good practice in joint PD between UNAMA and UNRCCA. Although PD is difficult to measure (INT3;INTa;INTc;INTd), my analysis shows that the absence of conflict between Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbours may partly be due to UNAMA and UNRCCA's PD, UNAMA's support to the ANG in developing regional cooperation bilaterally, trilaterally, quadrilaterally and multilaterally, and UNAMA's partnership with UNRCCA which is good practice and ripe for replication.

3.3 UNAMA's Broader Approach – Human Rights and Development Coherence

Beyond UNAMA's Good Offices activities on governance, elections, peace and reconciliation, and regional cooperation, UNAMA also works to support national priority programmes through 'Human Rights' and 'Development Coherence' activities. Although not strictly PD activities, I argue that these issues are interconnected with multiple research interviewees stating the importance of the security-humanitarian-development triadic nexus (INT1;INT2;INT4) as UNAMA's broader approach supports the effectiveness of its PD approach. The applicability of UNAMA's approach is analysed in **Chapter 4**.

3.3.1 Human Rights

Secretary-General Guterres stated in April 2017 that "under Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has a major role to play in upholding human rights so as to prevent armed conflict" (UNSG 2017c) but he noted in May 2017 that human rights is losing ground with a shift to internal conflicts and 'national sovereignty agendas' (UNNC 2017). For these reasons, UNAMA's mandate emphasizes the relevance of human rights elements in broader peace and reconciliation processes and human rights is a core UNAMA priority activity with an "overall strategy to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights in Afghanistan or 'human rights everywhere all the time for everyone' in support of all Afghan people" (UNAMA 2017e).

UNAMA's broad Human Rights approach uses targeted research, reporting, advocacy and strategic partnerships around five priority areas: protection of civilians in the armed conflict; monitoring and reporting on grave child rights violations in the armed conflict; elimination of Violence Against Women

(VAW) and promotion of gender equality; human rights aspects of peace and reconciliation; and prevention of torture in detention and arbitrary detention (UNAMA 2017e). However, UNAMA acknowledged a deterioration in human rights (UNSG:A/71/826-S/2017/189) and that further progress in 2017 is required to sustain achievements (UNAMAQN 2015b) on VAW, detention practices, reducing civilian casualties/sectarian violence, and transitional justice, as weak performance on these human rights can trigger escalations in tension (INT14;UNAMA 2017e).

3.3.1.1 VAW and Detention Practices

UNAMA acknowledges that further work is required on ending VAW and providing access to justice for women (UNAMA 2017e) and the UN advocates anti-harassment and VAW initiatives (UNSG:A/71/682-S/2016/1049,para35-37), showing that VAW/harassment/empowerment are not cultural taboos that cannot be touched in UNAMA's PD programming. Quite the opposite, it shows that women must play a role in the peace and reconciliation process and that their engagement forms an indirect part of UNAMA's PD approach to governance, elections, and peace and reconciliation. However, the case of one Afghan woman encouraged by a UNAMA's Human Rights Officer to report being beaten by her husband to police resulted in her murder by her own father and brother and a loss of trust in UNAMA (INT13), showings the dangers and limits of UNAMA's human rights approach in a conservative and patriarchal society. UNAMA also recognises that torture (UNAMAQN 2015a) and "poor detention practices partly contribute to fuelling the conflict" (UNAMA 2017e,p1), so human rights cannot be separated from UNAMA's broader PD approach, or the ANG's peace efforts, as poor performance on human rights creates tensions, damages trust, may fuel the conflict and stall the peace process (INT14;UNAMA2017e).


3.3.1.2 Civilian Casualties

Elusive peace in Afghanistan and sharp increases in civilian and ANSF casualties (Foreign Policy 2017) led to a slowdown in the drawdown of remaining US troops and a loosening of their rules of engagement (IISS 2017). From 2001-16, 104,000 people (31,000 civilians) had been killed in Afghanistan with 41,000 civilians injured (BROWN 2017). The number of armed clashes and civilian casualties reached record highs in 2016 (BROWN 2017;CFR 2017c), disproportionately affecting women and children (GovUK 2017b), with 11,418 civilian deaths and injuries (**Figure 4**) by end-2016 (UNSG:A/71/826-S/2017/189;UNAMA2017h) including three sectarian-related attacks by IS-K (SIGAR 2017). In the first quarter of 2017, UNAMA (2017j) documented 2,181 civilian casualties (715 dead and 1,466 injured). Furthermore, the conflict has triggered a humanitarian crisis (SIGAR 2017) with 650,000 IDPs in 2016 (SRSG2017a;UNAMAPMB2016f) and 365,000/1.5million registered Afghan refugees and 200,000/ 1million undocumented Afghans returning from Pakistan in Q3/Q4 2016 alone (HRW 2017) requiring

UNCT humanitarian assistance (UNSG:A/71/826-S/2017/189,para39-47). The Afghan people feel vulnerable, untrusting and demand transitional justice (INT12;INT14).

Figure 4: Civilian deaths and injuries in Afghanistan: Jan-Dec 2009-2016

Source: UNAMA (2017h)



3.3.1.3 Transitional Justice

In recognition of the threat posed to peace and reconciliation by civilian casualties/sectarian violence, UNAMA continues with broader "initiatives to promote accountability and transitional justice, end impunity, and support inclusive participation (including civil society) in processes that promote a just peace and reconciliation" (UNAMA 2017e), as part of the APRP. As multiple research interviews clarify, Afghans consider that transitional justice is inextricably linked to the peace and reconciliation process (INT11), confirming that the security-humanitarian-development nexus demands an integrated approach (INT1;INT2;INT6), and failures on transitional justice/human rights can derail overall progress (INT11;INT14;UNAMA2017e). UNAMA recognises this through its integrated approach, although "the overall poor security situation and the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan continued to limit progress on human rights in Afghanistan" (GovUK 2017b). As this "appalling conflict destroys lives and tears communities apart in every corner of Afghanistan, real protection of civilians requires commitment and demonstrated concrete actions to protect civilians from harm and for parties to the conflict to ensure accountability for indiscriminate and deliberate acts of civilian harm" (SRSG-Tadamichi-Yamamoto-2017).

3.3.2 Development Coherence

Although development coherence at country level is not a PD activity, development is part of the triadic nexus and greater coherence and enhanced coordination of international donors and the UN Country Team by UNAMA supports the ANG's national development and governance priorities (UNAMA 2017f). UNAMA's role is acknowledged by ANG's Chief Executive, Abdullah Abdullah, stating that "the UN has played an important role in facilitating the political process and coordinating efforts supporting humanitarian assistance and development" (UNAMA 2015). The international community has supported Afghanistan through eleven international donor conferences during the period 2002-16 (**Appendix 6**), harmonising development assistance with national priorities (Poole 2014), and confirmed their ongoing support to Afghanistan at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 and the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan in October 2016 (GovUK 2017b). The Brussels conference (75 countries/26 international organisations) endorsed the ANG's ambitious reform agenda (EU 2016a) to achieve Afghanistan's self-reliance in the transformation decade (2015-2024) (GovUK 2017b). It "reaffirmed commitment to a political process towards lasting peace and reconciliation" (EU 2016a), pledging US $15.2billion (+/- €13.6billion) in financial support for the next four years (GovUK2017b;UNSG:A/71/682-S/2016/1049) with Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, declaring the conference a successful investment in international stability and rebuilding the Afghan nation (EU 2016a).

UNAMA's leading role in development coherence to support ANG-led national development is also noted in S/Res2274(2016) which called for UNAMA's SRSG to "continue leading and coordinating international civilian efforts…reinforcing Afghan sovereignty, leadership and ownership...and to promote more coherent support by the international community to the Government of Afghanistan's development and governance priorities" (UNAMA 2017b). Whilst recognising UNAMA's and the international community's commitment to peace, Ashraf Ghani was lucid that the ultimate responsibility, however, for ending the conflict and rebuilding Afghanistan was the Afghan nation itself: "A promise has been made. Redeeming of the promise doesn't depend on the international community but on the Afghan nation" (EU 2016a).

Conclusion

PD is relevant in mid-conflict Afghanistan and more broadly through the conflict cycle (INT2), although PD effectiveness to achieve peace and reconciliation depends on a holistic approach (INT1;INT2) utilising Good Offices, regional cooperation, human rights, and development coherence. In reviewing the UN-identified four key elements (UNSG 2011b) to facilitate successful PD in **Chapter 2**, the extent to which UNAMA meets this yardstick of success is promising albeit with some limitations. Firstly, UNAMA has demonstrated its **early warning systems** are working well through its field offices and timely and flexible response to the electoral "threshold moment" in 2014 when the country was on the cusp of civil unrest (INT14;UNAMA2017e), although the limits of UNAMA's PD approach appear to have been reached and UNAMA needs to better prepare for the next election cycle. Secondly, UNAMA has stronger and deepening **partnerships** with regional organizations (EU,NATO,UNRCCA,RECCA), civil society, and engages indirectly with the OSCE, SCO and CIS through joint UNRCCA/UNAMA cross-border programming (INTa-e). UNAMA's liaison offices in Iran and Pakistan are highly beneficial for peace discussions (INT5) and UNAMA's fostering of regional cooperation has produced results for Afghanistan, although significant transnational challenges remain. Thirdly, UNAMA ensures **sustainability** by mediation and follow-through on political agreements and by building national/local/regional capacities and mechanisms to sustain them which is vital in mid-conflict contexts such as in Afghanistan. However, sustainability of the nascent peace agreement signed in late 2016 with Hizb-i-Islami is uncertain and a future peace with the Taliban depends on the credible sustainability of the peace deal. Fourthly, UNAMA has adequate **funding** as "the United States has a vital interest in preserving the many political, economic, and security gains that have been achieved in Afghanistan since 2001" (CFR 2017c). Fifthly, after 15 years UNAMA is already acting as a semi-permanent PD entity supporting national and regional stability. Finally, UNAMA's PD activities support the UN's global PD focus areas on preventing electoral disputes and using peace and reconciliation to avert unconstitutional government changes.

UNAMA has made a lot of progress through incremental PD steps, localised to the Afghan context. The results have been well integrated and largely effective, although there have been missteps in its carrot and stick approach and peace remains elusive. The real test of UNAMA's PD effectiveness in fostering peace and reconciliation lies ahead: in supporting the rebuilding of public trust in the ANG, the holding of peaceful elections, effective regional cooperation to combat transnational challenges, and the brokering of peace talks between the ANG and the Taliban. Until the Taliban sign a sustainable peace agreement, national development and regional security are at risk, the country remains in conflict, and UNAMA's PD approach cannot be appraised a complete success. The extent to which UNAMA's PD approach is applicable to other mid-conflict contexts is analysed in **Chapter 4**.

CHAPTER 4
Applicability of UNAMA's PD/Broader Approach

UNAMA has adopted an integrated PD/broader approach to peace and reconciliation with core activities focused on Good Offices/Regional Cooperation (PD) and Human Rights/Development Coherence (broader), which I argue has been largely effective through incremental PD steps localised to the Afghan context, and adherence to the UN-identified four key elements for successful PD and the UN's preventive focus area on elections. Yet sustainable peace and reconciliation with the Taliban remains elusive. Through the lens of these considerations, this chapter analyses the applicability of UNAMA's PD/broader approach from several perspectives: (**1**) reviewing current UN Political Missions and Peacekeeping Missions with similar mandated activities as a basis for replication; (**2**) using UNDFS statistics for a budget-costed approach to determine comparable missions; (**3**) applying UNAMA's benchmarks to other mid-conflict contexts using adapted localised baselines; and (**4**) using the INFORM Global Index for Risk Management to determine applicability based on countries with a similar high conflict risk profile as Afghanistan.

4.1 Current UN Special Political Missions/Peacekeeping Missions with Similar Mandated Activities

The UN has 12 Special Political Missions and 16 Peacekeeping Missions (UNDFS 2014) and as UNAMA is a civilian focused political mission its PD approach would appear to be more relevant to the UN's 12 Special Political Missions, rather than the 16 Peacekeeping Missions which have a joint military-civilian component. This does not imply that UNAMA's PD/broader approach, or benchmarks, are not valid in a peacekeeping context, as the research has shown the importance of the security-humanitarian-development nexus (INT1;INT2;INT5;INT6), just that UNAMA's approach would need to be adapted to local contexts with a military component added and greater civilian-military coordination as mandated in S/Res2210[2015]. Furthermore, the salutary military lessons learned from the war (Strachan 2017) **"**whose character rapidly developed in unanticipated directions" (Barry 2017) show that, amidst the changing character of conflict, inadequate military/national leadership "coupled with the failure to expeditiously adapt to unforeseen circumstances can lead to defeat" (Singh 2017). However, the failings of NATO/ISAF's military/security approach to the insurgency in Afghanistan should not impede the application of UNAMA's more effective integrated civilian approach - Good Offices and Regional Cooperation plus human rights and development coherence - to current/future pre-conflict or mid-conflict contexts currently with/without a political or peacekeeping mission.

Whilst Afghanistan's intractable conflict has specific contextual dynamics and the Taliban insurgency has impeded peace and reconciliation (**Chapter 3**) this does not mean that UNAMA's broader PD approach is invalid for application in other contexts with different types and intensity of intra-state conflict. For example, UNAMA's localised PD approach in Afghanistan focused on the politics of building peace as a foundation for statebuilding with Afghan-led processes, whilst peacebuilding operations in Sierra Leone focused on statebuilding rather than the local politics of building peace, resulting in a 'distinct disconnect' between policy rhetoric and practice, and international goals and local aspirations (Cubitt 2013). This implies that UNAMA's approach on building peace to sustain statebuilding through nationally-led processes has greater validity and transferability than the inverse approach. Furthermore, UNAMA's PD Good Offices approach to mediating governance, elections and peace through incremental steps, plus its joint PD approach with UNRCCA on regional cooperation, are good PD practice and are ripe for replication not just in mid-conflict contexts but also in pre-conflict countries, and this PD approach should be actively mandated in future UNSC Resolutions.

In reviewing the UNSC's repertoire of mandated tasks of all **12 UN Political Missions** in Asia, Middle East and Africa (UNSC 2015), 'Political processes' and 'International Cooperation and Coordination' were the most commonly mandated tasks, and UNAMA/Afghanistan and UNSMIL/Liberia have the highest number of mandated tasks overall at 12 (*ibid*). If one considers UNAMA's Good Offices PD approach to include 'electoral assistance', 'political process' and 'regional cooperation', and that the applicability of UNAMA's PD approach is determined by other missions having the same or fewer UNSC mandated tasks to enable full/partial application of UNAMA's PD approach, then **UNAMA's PD approach is fully applicable** to the following **8** Special Political Missions/countries: UNAMI/Iraq, UNOWA/WestAfrica, BINUCA/CAR, UNIOGBIS/Guinea-Bissau, UNOCA/CentralAfrica, BNUB/Burundi, UNSMIL/Libya, UNSOM/ Somalia. Whilst only UNAMA's PD approach to 'International cooperation and coordination' and 'political processes' is applicable to UNRCCA/Central Asia and UNSCOL/Lebanon, as these missions focus only on these two activities - and as they are the only missions with open-ended mandates their PD approach may ultimately outlast UNAMA's. Only UNAMA's approach on 'electoral assistance' is applicable to MENUB/Burundi as that is its only mandated task.

In applying the same logic to all of UNAMA's 12 mandated tasks (**Table 1**), then the vast majority of UNAMA's broader integrated approach (including PD tasks) is applicable to the following **8 Special Political Missions/countries** with the number of transferable tasks in brackets: UNSMIL(12), UNAMI(11), UNSOM(11), UNOWA,BINUCA,UNIOGBIS(10), BNUB(9). Only half of UNAMA's broader approach could be applied to UNOCA(7). Only 'UNAMA's 'civilian-military coordination' task is not transferable, as no other Special Political Mission has this mandated task.

In reviewing the mandated tasks of all **16 UN Peacekeeping Missions** (UNSC 2015), if the same approach for applicability is used in analysing the 16 Peacekeeping Missions, then **UNAMA's PD approach is fully applicable to the following 9 African and 1 Americas Peacekeeping Missions/countries**: MINURSO/WesternSahara, UNMIL/Liberia, UNOCI/Coted'Ivoire, UNAMID/Darfur, MONUSCO/DRC, UNISFA/Abyei, UNMISS/SouthSudan, MINUSMA/Mali, MINUSCA/CAR, and MINUSTAH/Haiti. **UNAMA's PD approach is only partially applicable to 3 Peacekeeping Missions**: UNMIK/Kosovo through 'International cooperation and coordination' and 'political process' tasks, as this mission does not have 'electoral assistance' as a mandated task; only 'International cooperation and coordination' is applicable to UNIFIL/Lebanon, as this mission does not have 'electoral assistance' or 'political process' tasks; and only 'political process' is applicable to UNFICYP/Cyprus.

The **vast majority of UNAMA's broader integrated approach (including PD tasks) is applicable to the following 8 Peacekeeping Missions/countries** with the number of transferable tasks in brackets: UNMIL(12), UNOCI(12), MONUSCO(12), UNMISS(12), MINUSCA(12), MINUSMA(11), UNAMID(10), and MINUSTAH(10). **UNAMA's broader integrated approach is only partially applicable to 4 Peacekeeping Missions**: MINURSO(6), UNISFA(7), and a reduced UNAMA approach (excluding rule of law, security sector reform, sanctions regimes, demilitarisation, and electoral assistance) could be applicable to UNMIK(7) and UNIFIL/Lebanon(5). Only UNAMA's approach to 'Humanitarian support', 'military and police' and political processes' is applicable to UNFICYP/Cyprus; and only UNAMA's approach to 'military and police' is applicable to UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNTSO and UNDOF.

4.2 Budget-Costed Approach to Determine Applicability in Comparable UN Missions/Countries

In consulting UN Department of Field Support (DFS) statistics (UNDFS 2014), UNAMA had the second largest personnel budget (uniform[police,troops]+civilians) of all 12 Special Political Missions in 2014 (2nd-US$191.4m-21uniform-1,690staff) after Ebola funding for UNMEER (1st-US$204.5m-368staff), but the largest budget and number of civilian posts of conflict oriented missions. If one were to extrapolate the applicability of UNAMA's approach on a cost and civilian personnel basis then, under 2014/15 funding levels, only 3 missions - **Iraq** (UNAMI-3rd-US$136.3m-291uniform-951staff), **Somalia** (UNSOM-4th-US$70.2m-6uniform-223staff) and **Libya** (UNSMIL-5th-US$69.4m-384staff) - would have absorption capacity to deliver a reduced version of UNAMA's integrated approach in similar intra-state conflict contexts. Only if funding were substantially increased would these missions be able to match the scope of UNAMA's programming. UNAMA's approach on regional cooperation in Central Asia, however, is directly applicable to **UNRCCA** (18th-US$2.9m-30staff) which delivers focused PD impact with minimal budget and staff, and would benefit from increased joint PD activities on regional cooperation.

The situation is different if one considers the US$8bn annual budgets of the 16 Peacekeeeping Missions (Beker 2014) which are higher due to additional military/uniform costs. UNAMA ranks 12th on budget but 4th on civilian staffing levels and this is crucial as staffing levels have a direct correlation with mission size and programming scope. If one discounts uniform staffing costs at cUS$74k per peacekeeper (UNDFS 2014), as they distort the applicability of UNAMA's non-military costed approach, and rank missions according to civilian personnel levels rather than total budgets, this means that UNAMA's PD approach could have direct budget/staffing scale applicability in 3 missions: **Haiti** (MINUSTAH-4th-US$500m-7,572uniform-1,791staff), **Liberia** (UNMIL-5th-US$427m-6,661uniform-1,621staff), and **Mali** (MINUSMAH-7th-US$831m-2,640uniform-1,609staff). If rankings were based on total budget, however, this means that UNAMA's PD approach could be fully absorbed but would need to be expanded in **DR Congo** (MONUSCO-1st-US$1,397m-19,248uniform-4,011staff), **Darfur** (UNHAMID-2nd-US$1,154m-19,248 uniform-4,011staff) and **South Sudan** (UNMISS-3rd-US$1,097-13,800uniform-3,090staff) with the expectation that the UNSC would authorise and UNDFS fund the requisite additional military component and know-how.

4.3 UNAMA's Progress Benchmarks to other Mid-Conflict Contexts

In the most recent UN Secretary General Report on Afghanistan in March 2017 (UNSG:A/71/826 S/2017/189), the UN reiterated UNAMA's key benchmarks and indicators (**Appendix 10**). As these benchmarks are a reflection of UNAMA's core activities and PD approach, they could be credibly applied to assess any pre-conflict or mid-conflict country to determine the nature and scale of UN PD approach required. UNAMA's broad PD approach could then be individually tailored (reduced/expanded) to specific countries with benchmarks and indicators established/measured under the following key activities (**Table 2**): security; peace, reintegration and reconciliation; governance and institution building; human rights; economic and social development; regional cooperation; and partnerships. The exception is UNAMA's 'Narcotics' benchmark which is not universally applicable to every country context. The transferability of UNAMA's approach using its benchmarks to assess suitability and results is valid if localised benchmarks and indicators are adopted in specific countries in conjunction with the application of PD lessons learned from the UN (**Chapter 2**) and UNAMA's PD approach (**Chapter 3**).

Table 2: UNAMA's Benchmarks Applicable to Other Conflict Countries

Source: Adapted from UNSG Report 2017 (A/71/826 S/2017/189)

* (Afghan/Afghanistan) to be replaced by (National/CountryX) according to country context
** Indicator not universally applicable to every country context

- **Security Benchmark:** Sustainable (Afghan)* security institutions and processes capable of ensuring peace and stability and protecting the people of (Afghanistan)*.
- **Peace, Reintegration and Reconciliation Benchmark:** National dialogue and regional engagement to pursue constructive and inclusive process to foster a political environment conducive to peace.
- **Governance and Institution-Building Benchmark:** Extension of Government authority throughout the country through the establishment of democratic, legitimate, accountable institutions, down to the local level, with the capacity to implement policies and to be increasingly capable of sustaining themselves.
- **Human Rights Benchmark:** Improved respect for human rights of (Afghans)*, in line with the (Afghan)* Constitution and international law, with particular emphasis on the protection of civilians, the situation of women and girls, freedom of expression and accountability based on the rule of law.
- **Economic and Social Development Benchmark:** Government policies supported by the international community that promote sustainable economic growth and contribute to overall stability.
- **Regional Cooperation Benchmark:** Sustained and effective regional coordination in support of prosperity, peace and stability.
- **Partnership between the Government of (Afghanistan)*and the International Community Benchmark:** Coherent support by the international community for (Afghan)* priorities within an Afghan*-led coordination framework.
- **Counter-Narcotics** Benchmark:** Sustained trend in the reduction of poppy cultivation, narcotics production and drug addiction.

4.4 INFORM Global Index for Risk Management

In considering the applicability of UNAMA's PD approach, analysis of countries that have similar risks to Afghanistan using Global Risk Indices provides an indication of which missions/countries may be suitable for a similar UN approach, complementing the applicability analysis used earlier based on mandated activities/budget-costing/benchmarks. Global Risk Indices use varying conceptual frameworks and methodologies and according to INFORM (2017a) primary global risk indicators include: INFORM, World Risk Index (WRI), Disaster Risk Index (DRI), Global Climate Risk Index (GRI), and NO-GAIN. The dimensions utilised vary from hazards (natural and human), vulnerability, coping mechanisms (INFORM); vulnerability and natural hazards (WRI), natural hazards (DRI), losses from extreme weather events (CRI); and climate change vulnerability (NO-GAIN).

INFORM is used for this analysis as it has three broad dimensions – hazard & exposure, vulnerability, lack of coping capacity - which reflect the breadth of UNAMA's approach around the security-humanitarian-development nexus, and its categories (**Figure 5**) are highly relevant to the Afghanistan conflict including a 'human' category ('current conflict intensity' and 'projected conflict risk'), enabling one to assess the potential applicability of UNAMA's approach by grouping countries with similar conflict risk levels and trends. The INFORM Risk value applied to each country is an average of the three dimensions and Afghanistan's INFORM value is a very high 7.8. Its 'highest five risk indictors' (**Figure 6**) focus on conflict intensity, conflict risk, high economic dependency on ODA, and poor access to health services (INFORM 2017b).

Figure 5: INFORM Risk index

Source: INFORM (2017a)




Figure 6: Afghanistan's Highest 5 Risk Indicators


Source: INFORM (2017b)

	Indicator	*Component*	*Index*	*Value*	*Unit*
HIGHEST 5 RISK INDICATORS	Current High Violent Conflict Intensity Score	Current Conflicts Intensity	**10.0**	0.00	Index
	Net ODA received (% of GNI)	Economical Dependency	**10.0**	32.63	% of GNI
	Health expenditure per capita	Access to health care	**10.0**	47.34	current int USD PPP
	GCRI Internal Conflict Score	Projected Conflict Risk	**9.9**	0.96	Index
	Humanitarian & Development Aid	Economical Dependency	**9.7**	14821.30	USD Million
LOWEST 5 RISK INDICATORS	Physical exposure to Cyclone Surge	Tropical Cyclone	**0.0**	0.00	Average annual population exposed per country
	Physical exposure to Cyclone SS3	Tropical Cyclone	**0.0**	0.00	Average annual population exposed per country
	Physical exposure to Cyclone SS1	Tropical Cyclone	**0.0**	0.00	Average annual population exposed per country
	Physical exposure to Tsunami	Tsunami	**0.0**	0.00	Average annual population exposed per country
	Malaria death rate	Other Vulnerable Groups	**0.0**	0.10	per 100,000 people

Using INFORM's analysis (INFORM 2017a) in prioritising countries on the basis of risk level and trends, **Figure 7** shows 12 countries with a similar "very high" risk level as Afghanistan's 7.8 INFORM value, and identifies whether the country's risk is decreasing, stable or increasing. Of these countries, Afghanistan has six "Global Peers" (INFORM 2017b) whose index values mostly closely match with ordinal ranking as follows: Somalia(9.2)-SouthSudan(8.8)-CAR(8.4)-Afghanistan(7.8)-Chad(7.7)-Yemen (7.6)-Niger(7.3). This suggests that if UNAMA's approach were replicated on a like-for-like risk basis then Somalia, South Sudan and CAR are the most applicable candidates followed by Chad, Yemen and Niger. Other very high risk conflict countries including Syria, Iraq, Sudan and Haiti may also benefit from UNAMA's approach due to the similarity of their risk profiling.

Figure 7: Prioritising Risk Levels and Trends

Source: INFORM (2017a)



Conclusion

In conclusion, I surmise that UNAMA's approach is applicable when based on comparable analysis of four criteria: similar mandated activities in other missions, using a budget-costed approach based on mission budget/staffing, adoption/localisation of UNAMA's benchmarks, and country risk profiling. Although the UN's PD approach needs to be localised to specific conflicts as root cause and contexts differ (INT5;INT7;INT9;INT10;INT11), UNAMA's PD approach is fully applicable to **8 Special Political missions/ countries** and partially applicable to 3 missions, and the vast majority of UNAMA's broader integrated approach (including PD tasks) is applicable to 8 Special Political missions/countries. UNAMA's PD approach is fully applicable to **9 African and 1 Americas Peacekeeping missions/countries** and partially applicable to 3 peacekeeping missions, and the vast majority of UNAMA's broader integrated approach (including PD tasks) is applicable to 8 Peacekeeping missions/countries but only partially applicable to 4 peacekeeping missions (**Table 3**).

The **transferability of UNAMA's approach using its benchmarks** to assess suitability and results is valid to all missions, excluding narcotics, if localised benchmarks and indicators are adopted. Using a **budget-costing methodology based on cost and civilian personnel**, only 3 missions would have absorption capacity to deliver a reduced version of UNAMA's integrated approach in similar intra-state conflict contexts, and other missions would require increased funding to do so. **UNAMA's PD approach on regional cooperation** in Central Asia, however, is directly applicable to UNRCCA. If peacekeeping missions are **ranked according to civilian staffing levels**, rather than total budgets, UNAMA's PD approach could have direct budget/staffing scale applicability in 3 missions. If ranking is by budget and uniform staffing costs are discounted, UNAMA's PD approach could be fully absorbed but would need to be expanded in three missions (**Table 3**). Using INFORM's analysis (INFORM 2017a) and **prioritising countries on the basis of risk level and trends**, Afghanistan has six "Global Peers" (INFORM 2017b) and, if UNAMA's approach were replicated on a like-for-like risk basis, then **Somalia, South Sudan** and **CAR** are the most applicable candidates followed by **Chad**, **Yemen** and **Niger**.

In combining the analytical results of the four analytical criteria adopted, **Table 3** illustrates that UNAMA's PD approach is widely applicable in both UN Special Political Missions and UN Peacekeeping Missions and may be most relevant in the following missions/countries in order of ranking: MINUSCA/CAR (6), UNMISS/South Sudan (5) and UNSOM/Somalia (5) which matches INFORM's risk index, followed closely by MINUSMA/Mali, MINUSTAH/Haiti, MONUSCO/DRC, UNAMI/Iraq, UNAMID/Darfur and UNSMIL/Libya (4). On the basis of similar risk profile, it would be prudent to consider the application of UNAMA's PD/broader approach in Chad, Yemen and Niger.

Table 3: Applicable Missions/Countries for UNAMA's Approach

Source: Original data/analysis compiled from UNSC 2015 (4.1), UNDFS 2014 (4.2), UNSG:A/71/826 S/2017/189 (4.3), INFORM 2017b (4.4)
PD Approach only = Good Offices (Electoral Assistance/Political Processes/Regional Cooperation)
Broader Approach = Includes all UNAMA mandated activities P = UNAMA's approach only partially applicable

Chapter Section	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.4	
Mission / Country	Mandated Activities in UN Special Political Missions (PD Approach only) Fully Applicable [3] / Partially Applicable [xP])	Mandated Activities in UN Special Political Missions (Broader Approach) (# of applicable mandated activities] / Partially Applicable [xP])	Mandated Activities in UN Peacekeeping Missions (PD Approach only) Fully Applicable [3] / Partially Applicable [xP])	Mandated Activities in UN Peacekeeping Missions (Broader Approach) (# of applicable mandated activities] / Partially Applicable [xP	Budget-Costed Approach UN Special Political Missions (Civilian Staff levels)	Budget-Costed Approach UN Peacekeeping Missions (Civilian Staff levels)	UNAMA Benchmarks (All are potentially applicable except the Narcotics Benchmark)	INFORM Global Risk Index	Applicability of UNAMA's Approach (# of times Country Referenced Across All Four Methods)
BNUB/Burundi	1 P	9					Yes		3
MINURSO/Western Sahara			3	6 P			Yes		3
MINUSCA/CAR (BINUCA)	3	10	3	12			Yes	**Yes 3rd**	**6**
MINUSMA/Mali			3	11		X	Yes		**4**
MINUSTAH/Haiti			3	10		X	Yes		**4**
MONUSCO/DRC			3	12		X	Yes		**4**
UNAMI/Iraq	3	11			X P		Yes		**4**
UNAMID/Darfur			3	10		X	Yes		**4**
UNDOF/Disengagement Observer Force				1 P			Yes		2
UNFICYP/ Cyprus			1 P	3 P			Yes		3
UNIFIL/Lebanon			1 P	5 P			Yes		3
UNIOGBIS/ Guinea-Bissau							Yes		1
UNISFA/Abyei			3	7 P			Yes		3
UNMIK/Kosovo			2 P	7 P			Yes		3
UNMIL/Liberia			3	12		X	Yes		**4**
UNMISS/South Sudan			3	12		X	Yes	**Yes 2nd**	**5**

UNMOGIP/India &Pakistan				1 P			Yes		2
UNOCA/Central Africa		7 P					Yes		2
UNOCI/Côte d'Ivoire			3	12			Yes		3
UNSCOL/Lebanon	2 P						Yes		2
UNIOGBIS/Guinea-Bissau	3	10					Yes		3
UNOCA/Central Africa	3						Yes		2
UNOWA/West Africa	3	10					Yes		3
UNRCCA/Central Asia	2 P				X P		Yes		3
UNSMIL/Libya	3	12			X P		Yes		**4**
UNSOM/Somalia	3	11			X P		Yes	**Yes 1st**	**5**
UNTSO/Truce Supervision Organisation				1 P			Yes		2
Chad							Yes	**Yes 4th**	2
Niger							Yes	**Yes 6th**	2
Yemen							Yes	**Yes 5th**	2

CONCLUSION

PD is part of broader conflict prevention efforts and is "highly relevant along the entire conflict spectrum" (UNSG 2011, p2). Prevention costs are far less than recovery costs and PD saves human lives and prevents suffering (Cahill 1996), and the UN has now fully embraced PD and is committed to moving from a 'culture of reaction' to one of 'prevention' (UNDP 2017). The principal push factors driving the use of PD include conflict trends, the significant cost of conflict, national capacities, and policy changes. Effective PD requires localisation of the PD approach and regional cooperation (INT14) to achieve peace and stability. I contend that the use of PD in mid-conflict Afghanistan is highly relevant to ending conflict and that UNAMA's PD/broader approach (Good Offices, Human Rights, Development Coherence, Regional Cooperation) to support the security-humanitarian-development nexus is applicable to other UN missions/countries.

PD Effectiveness

Successful PD is difficult to measure (Cahill1996;Garfinkle2001;INTa;INTb;INT10;INT11), although UNAMA has performed well when its PD approach in Afghanistan is measured against the UN-identified four key elements for successful PD (UNSG 2011b): (1) UNAMA's field & liaison offices and HQ are effective early warning systems (INT14;UNAMA 2017e); (2) UNAMA has promoted regional cooperation and established partnerships with regional organizations (EU,NATO,RECCA,UNRCCA, Heart of Asia), civil society and other groups; UNAMA/UNRCCA PD partnership is good practice ripe for replication; and UNAMA is improving cooperation with NATO's non-combat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and Senior Civilian Representative (S/Res2210[2015]), whilst the RSM has improved the capacity of Afghan security forces (NATO 2017); (3) UNAMA has actively mediated engagement with *Ulema (*religious leaders) at provincial level to advocate peace (INT14) which need to be scaled-up nationally with ANG approval (INT14), and UNAMA is actively mediating/sustaining the Hizb-i-Islami peace agreement in late 2016; and (4) UNAMA has adequate PD funding in place to support its UNSC-mandated programming with the 2nd highest budget (US$1.69bn) of the 12 UN Special Political Missions (DFS 2014).

UNAMA Core Activities

UNAMA's support in establishing permanent institutions and a Constitution demonstrated good PD timing, ensuring political ownership and engagement of local actors. Supporting the UN's core PD focus area on electoral disputes, UNAMA successfully prepared multiple elections, mediating between different political actors to maintain transparency, dialogue and peace, and following the disputed 2014 Presidential elections, UNAMA organised a full audit of results and with US support avoided violence by brokering a peaceful solution with the formation of a National Unity Government. UNAMA has also

effectively supported human rights, improved development coherence and a multitude of broader mandates tasks (**Table 1**). The research has shown that this integrated PD approach reflects the interconnected nature of the security-humanitarian-development nexus necessary to end the conflict. In 2015 Hakmat Karzai, Deputy Foreign Minister, noted the critical and enduring role UNAMA has played in recent Afghan history as "the UN has been a long-standing, reliable partner of Afghanistan. Even when others looked the other way, the UN was here standing ready to support and assist us" (UNAMA 2015). At the Brussels Conference in October 2016, participants affirmed the central role played by the UN in Afghanistan including their role in coordinating international support (EU 2016b).

Critique of UNAMA's Approach

2014 Election faltering

Despite UNAMA's acknowledged and evident incremental PD successes, UNAMA's progress has varied across its core activities and still needs to deliver lasting peace agreements and demonstrate further progress on critical issues and challenges. Some commentators note the relative ease with which UNAMA was able to support the interim government, constitution and elections in the early 2002-2008 period when democracy was still new, exciting and non-violent (INT12), Al Qaida and the Taliban were on the run, and civilian casualties were lower (UNAMA2017h). Post-2009, amidst the troop surge to tackle an increasingly violent insurgency, UNAMA appeared to reach the limits of its PD capabilities. The 2014 Presidential elections required the last minute intervention of John Kerry and traditional US diplomacy to form a National Unity Government. It would be incorrect to suggest UNAMA failed, although it would be erudite to infer that it almost faltered at a key electoral moment which could have triggered a civil crisis (INT12). The UN lessons learned on electoral irregularities as potential conflict triggers (UNSG 2011b) need to serve as an early warning (INT12) for UNAMA and ANG to carefully balance electoral modernisation and cultural taboos, as the Electoral Commission's desire to use voting technology/ID cards in the next election (INT12) to prevent fraud and violence clashes with the risk of disenfranchisement (as women are culturally prohibited from obtaining iris scans/photos for ID cards).

Peace and reconciliation

UNAMA brokered an initial peace meeting with the Taliban in Dubai in 2009 and subsequent attempts by UNAMA and other actors did not produce peace dividends due to extraneous factors (INT7;INT13;NYT2016). The signed peace agreement with Hizb-i-Islami is still fresh and untested and there is currently no evidence available on its sustainability. This agreement needs to be sustainable to keep the Hizb-i-Islami group engaged in the peace agreement, to attract additional combatants into the ANG's ARBP, and ultimately to serve as a partial or full model for peace discussions with the Taliban. So, it is not clear if this peace model is viable or transferable and this is a major concern and a serious

challenge for UNAMA. Although UNAMA has made tentative and progressive small steps on the path to peace, it has hitherto failed to deliver on its biggest hurdle: mediating a negotiated peace between the ANG and the Taliban. Until that peace accord is signed, UNAMA's PD approach on peace and reconciliation cannot yet be declared an overall success.

Security-humanitarian-development nexus

UNAMA ought to lead more visibly on harmonising the security-humanitarian-development nexus (INT11) to achieve peace and reconciliation (INT5), using both UNAMA's PD and broader approach, by fostering improved cooperation with NATO's non-combat Resolute Support Mission (RSM) and Senior Civilian Representative in accordance with S/Res2210[2015], improved communication with the EU (Bainazarova 2009), SCO and CIS (INTb), and increased regional PD programming with UNRCCA. Peace and reconciliation depends on security, stability and regional cooperation (Stanekzai 2013) and a holistic and integrated approach (INT11), as faltering progress on the security element of the nexus impedes peace and reconciliation.

National Challenges Impacting UNAMA's PD progress

Beyond the clamour of conflict, the current National unity Government still faces multiple and diverse national challenges which threaten peace and UNAMA's PD gains including: economic growth (INT8), fiscal deficits, deficient social inclusivity, developmental inequities, narcotics, a humanitarian crisis, and an urgent need to finalise peace and reconciliation (ANG 2016a). Uncertain donor assistance has strained the Afghan economy (CFR 2017c) and the economic crisis has increased heavy pressures on a dangerously weak state (Foreign Policy 2017) whilst the "transition to a peacetime economy risks further destabilizing Afghan society by inflating the budget deficit and increasing unemployment rates" (CFR 2017c). The risk of a severe humanitarian crisis is increasing with '1 million [refugees] on the move' mostly returning from Pakistan and Iran (GovUK 2017b;ForeignPolicy 2017). Political disputes continue in the Unity Government, and the ANG's commitment to holding parliamentary and provincial elections in 2017 is not matched by preparations in terms of the constituency delimitation, election budget and voter registration system needed (Gov UK 2017b). As H.E. President Ashraf Ghani recently observed, "Government corruption has driven a three-decades-old conflict" (UNAMA 2017i,pi) and "for the sake of the country's future, corruption in Afghanistan must be addressed and eliminated" (SRSG Yamamoto 2017b). Amidst ongoing violence and increasing loss of territory to the Taliban (SIGAR 2017), further improvement remains essential on women's empowerment (GovUK 2017b), Violence Against Women, human rights, transitional justice (INT11), regional cooperation, and coordination on counter-narcotics. Multiple domestic challenges threaten the effectiveness of UNAMA's PD approach, so UNAMA must

better support the ANG in addressing root causes of tensions at the local level (elections, inequality, security, narcotics) to build and sustain public trust.

Regional Challenges Threatening Peace

In addition, regional threats pose a significant risk to ANG's national policy progress, UNAMA's PD approach and Afghanistan's long-term stability. Transnational challenges threatening regional stability and economic growth include (Ozga 2016): political succession issues (INTa;INTd), the slowest developing region economic growth rate (WorldBank 2016), illicit production and trafficking of Afghan drugs (INT8;S/Res1868(2009)para22), crime, terrorism, returning IS fighters (INT9), extremism and Islamist propaganda (Olcott2009;UNRCCA2013), and increasingly acute water management issues (INTa). A concerted effort by the UN, regional organisations and states will be necessary to better reflect the broader historical framework (Ozga 2016) and better balance immediate PD deliverables with longer-term objectives (INTa). Supporting the ANG to develop improved regional cooperation on trans-boundary issues (crime, narcotics, terrorism, water, energy, trade) is pivotal to promoting regional stability and avoiding transnational conflict (Chung 2004; Starr2005). UNAMA needs to increasingly mediate bilateral, trilateral (Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan / Pakistan, UK, Afghanistan), quadrilateral, and multilateral dialogue, in particular through the Heart of Asia process and RECCA, to foster rail infrastructure development, trade, economic growth, humanitarian assistance and development coherence in support of PD.

Applicability of UNAMA's PD/Broader Approach

As UN Secretary-General Guterres stated in March 2017, "there is a need to address the underlying drivers of terrorism through continuing investments in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, countering violent extremism, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, sustainable and inclusive development, the enhancement and respect of human rights, and timely responses to humanitarian crises" (UNSG 2017). Whilst noting that PD localisation is necessary as root causes of conflict differ (INT11), UNAMA's PD/broader approach is highly relevant for application in other mid-conflict contexts when the following criteria for applicability are utilised: (1) reviewing current UN Special Political/Peacekeeping Missions with similar mandated activities as a basis for replication; (2) using a budget-costed approach to determine comparable missions based on costs and staffing levels; (3) applying UNAMA's benchmarks to other mid-conflict contexts using adapted localised baselines; and (4) using the INFORM Global Index for Risk Management to identify Global Peers based on similar risk levels. In combining the results of these four criteria, **Figure 8** illustrates that UNAMA's PD approach is widely applicable in both UN Special Political Missions and UN Peacekeeping Missions. In combining both UNAMA's PD and broader approach, the applicability of UNAMA's integrated approach is most relevant in the following

missions/countries, in order of ranking: MINUSCA/CAR (6), UNMISS/South Sudan (5) and UNSOM/Somalia (5), followed closely by MINUSMA/Mali, MINUSTAH/Haiti, MONUSCO/DRC, UNAMI/Iraq, UNAMID/Darfur and UNSMIL/Libya (4). Based on risk profiling, the UN should consider the application of UNAMA's PD/broader approach in Chad, Yemen and Niger.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Mandate a localised/broader PD approach (Good Offices/Human Rights/Development Assistance/ Regional Cooperation) in emergency/development/humanitarian/conflict contexts to support the security-humanitarian-development nexus.
2. Mandate intensified PD linkages between UNAMA and UNRCCA to prevent transnational conflict pertaining to terrorism, narcotics, and water/energy management.
3. Apply UNAMA's PD/broader approach in: MINUSCA/CAR, UNMISS/South Sudan, UNSOM/Somalia MINUSMA/Mali, MINUSTAH/Haiti, MONUSCO/DRC, UNAMI/Iraq, UNAMID/Darfur and UNSMIL/Libya.
4. Scale-up PD application (Good Offices, Regional Cooperation) in Chad, Yemen and Niger.
5. Apply the UN's four key PD elements in all future UN PD programming.
6. Apply UN PD lessons learned and continue to support national and regional capacity building to facilitate early warning, timely prevention, localised ownership, partnerships, funding, and sustainability of peace/cooperation agreements.
7. Firewall natural resource management systems from other regional disputes.
8. Establish new permanent PD centres in South Africa (Botswana) and the Middle East (Cairo) with Good Offices mandates to foster dialogue, cooperation and trust to advance regional peace.
9. Increase UN PD engagement with ASEAN to foster dialogue, cooperation and trust over maritime demarcations in the Asia-Pacific region.

END

APPENDICES

Page

46	**APPENDIX 1a**:	**Map of Afghanistan**
47	**APPENDIX 1b:**	**Map of Afghanistan Administrative Divisions**
48	**APPENDIX 2a:**	**Map of Afghanistan – Taliban Control – February 2017**
49	**APPENDIX 2b:**	**Map of Afghanistan – Taliban Control – January 2017**
50	**APPENDIX 2c:**	**Map of Afghanistan – Taliban Territorial Activities – August 2016**
51	**APPENDIX 2d:**	**Map of Afghanistan – Taliban/IS-K Territorial Control & Militant Attacks - 15 October 2015**
52	**APPENDIX 2e:**	**Map of Afghanistan – Taliban/IS-K Territorial Control & Militant Attacks - April-October 2015**
53	**APPENDIX 2f:**	**Map of Afghanistan – Taliban Control & Threat Assessment – 2009/10**
54	**APPENDIX 3:**	**Map of Central Asia**
55	**APPENDIX 4:**	**Chronology of Key Events in Afghanistan**
60	**APPENDIX 5:**	**UNAMA: Overview of Mandate by Category**
61	**APPENDIX 6**:	**International Conferences on Afghanistan**
62	**APPENDIX 7:**	**UN Secretary Generals Reflections on Preventive Diplomacy**
65	**APPENDIX 8:**	**Cases of UN Preventive Diplomacy**
66	**APPENDIX 9:**	**UN Preventive Diplomacy Actors, Tools, instruments**
69	**APPENDIX 10**:	**UNAMA's Progress Benchmarks**
71	**APPENDIX 11**:	**Referencing of Anonymous Interviews**


Appendix 1a: Map of Afghanistan

Source: **Nations Online (2017)**



Appendix 1b: Map of Afghanistan Administrative Divisions

Source: **UNAMA GIS (2017)**




Appendix 2a: Map of Afghanistan – Taliban Control – February 2017

Source: **ISW (2017)**




Appendix 2b: Map of Afghanistan – Taliban Control – January 2017

Source: **Al Jazeera (2017)**



Appendix 2c: Map of Afghanistan – Taliban Territorial Activities – August 2016

Source: **Stratfor (2016)**



Appendix 2d: Map of Afghanistan – Taliban/IS-K Territorial Control & Militant Attacks – 15 October 2015

Source: **ISW (2015)**




Appendix 2e: Map of Afghanistan – Taliban/IS-K Territorial Control & Militant Attacks - April-October 2015

Source: **ISW (2015)**



Appendix 2f: Map of Afghanistan – Taliban Control & Threat Assessment – 2009/10

Source: **Long War Journal (2009):** Map (Reuters); Data (Afghan Ministry of Interior)



Appendix 3: Map of Central Asian States

Source: **UNRCCA (2016)**



Appendix 4: Chronology of Key Events in Afghanistan

Source: **BBC (2017)**

Anglo-Afghan Wars

"1838-42 - British forces invade, install King Shah Shujah. He is assassinated in 1842. British and Indian troops are massacred during retreat from Kabul.
1878-80 - Second Anglo-Afghan War. A treaty gives Britain control of Afghan foreign affairs.
1919 - Emir Amanullah Khan declares independence from British influence.
1926-29 - Amanullah tries to introduce social reforms which however stir civil unrest. He flees.
1933 - Zahir Shah becomes king and Afghanistan remains a monarchy for next four decades.
1953 - General Mohammed Daud becomes prime minister. Turns to Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. Introduces social reforms, such as abolition of purdah (practice of secluding women from public view).
1963 - Mohammed Daud forced to resign as prime minister.
1964 - Constitutional monarchy introduced - but leads to political polarisation and power struggles.
1973 - Mohammed Daud seizes power in a coup and declares a republic. Tries to play off USSR against Western powers.
1978 - General Daud is overthrown and killed in a pro-Soviet coup. The People's Democratic Party comes to power but is paralysed by violent infighting and faces opposition by US-backed mujahideen groups.

Soviet intervention

1979 December - Soviet Army invades and props up communist government.
1980 - Babrak Karmal installed as ruler, backed by Soviet troops. But opposition intensifies with various mujahideen groups fighting Soviet forces. US, Pakistan, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia supply money and arms to the Mujahideen.
1985 - Mujahideen come together in Pakistan to form alliance against Soviet forces. Half of Afghan population now estimated to be displaced by war, with many fleeing to neighbouring Iran or Pakistan.
1986 - US begins supplying mujahideen with Stinger missiles, enabling them to shoot down Soviet helicopter gunships. Babrak Karmal replaced by Najibullah as head of Soviet-backed regime.
1988 - Afghanistan, USSR, the US and Pakistan sign peace accords and Soviet Union begins pulling out troops.

Red Army quits

1989 - Last Soviet troops leave, but civil war continues as Mujahideen push to overthrow Najibullah.
1992 - Najibullah's government toppled, but a devastating civil war follows.
1996 - Taliban seize control of Kabul and introduce hard-line version of Islam, banning women from work, and introducing Islamic punishments, which include stoning to death and amputations.
1997 - Taliban recognised as legitimate rulers by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. They now control about two-thirds of country.
1998 - US launches missile strikes at suspected bases of militant Osama bin Laden, accused of bombing US embassies in Africa.

1999 - UN imposes an air embargo and financial sanctions to force Afghanistan to hand over Osama bin Laden for trial.
2001 September - Ahmad Shah Masood, leader of the main opposition to the Taliban - the Northern Alliance - is assassinated.

US-led invasion

2001 October - US-led bombing of Afghanistan begins following the September 11 attacks on the United States. Anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces enter Kabul shortly afterwards.
2001 December - Afghan groups agree deal in Bonn, Germany for interim government.
Hamid Karzai is sworn in as head of an interim power-sharing government.
2002 January - Deployment of first contingent of foreign peacekeepers - the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - marking the start of a protracted fight against the Taliban.
2002 April - Former king Zahir Shah returns, but makes no claim to the throne and dies in 2007.
2002 June - Loya Jirga, or grand council, elects Hamid Karzai as interim head of state. Karzai picks members of his administration which is to serve until 2004.
2003 August - NATO takes control of security in Kabul, its first-ever operational commitment outside Europe.

Elections

2004 January - Loya Jirga adopts new constitution which provides for strong presidency.
2004 October-November - Presidential elections. Hamid Karzai is declared winner.
2005 September - Afghans vote in first parliamentary elections in more than 30 years.
2005 December - Parliament opens with warlords and strongmen in most of the seats.
2006 October – NATO assumes responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan, taking command in the east from a US-led coalition force.
2007 August - Opium production has soared to a record high, the UN reports.
2008 June - President Karzai warns that Afghanistan will send troops into Pakistan to fight militants if Islamabad fails to take action against them.
2008 July - Suicide bomb attack on Indian embassy in Kabul kills more than 50.
2008 September - US President George Bush sends an extra 4,500 US troops to Afghanistan, in a move he described as a "quiet surge".
2009 January - US Defence Secretary Robert Gates tells Congress that Afghanistan is new US administration's "greatest test".
2009 February - NATO countries pledge to increase military/other commitments in Afghanistan after US announces dispatch of 17,000 extra troops.

New US approach

2009 March - US President Barack Obama unveils new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. An extra 4,000 US personnel will train and bolster the Afghan army and police and there will be support for civilian development.
2009 August - Presidential and provincial elections are marred by widespread Taliban attacks, patchy turnout and claims of serious fraud.
2009 October - Mr Karzai declared winner of August presidential election, after second-placed opponent Abdullah Abdullah pulls out before the second round.
2009 December - US President Obama decides to boost US troop numbers in Afghanistan by 30,000, bringing total to 100,000. He says US will begin withdrawing its forces by 2011.

An Al-Qaeda double agent kills seven CIA agents in a suicide attack on a US base in Khost.
2010 February - NATO-led forces launch major offensive, Operation Moshtarak, in bid to secure government control of southern Helmand province.
2010 July - Whistleblowing website Wikileaks publishes thousands of classified US military documents relating to Afghanistan.
General David Petraeus takes command of US, ISAF forces.
2010 August - Dutch troops quit.
Karzai says private security firms - accused of operating with impunity - must cease operations. He subsequently waters down the decree.
2010 September - Parliamentary polls marred by Taliban violence, widespread fraud and a long delay in announcing results.
2010 November - NATO - at summit in Lisbon - agrees plan to hand control of security to Afghan forces by end of 2014.
2011 January - President Karzai makes first official state visit to Russia by an Afghan leader since the end of the Soviet invasion in 1989.
2011 February - Number of civilians killed since the 2001 invasion hit record levels in 2010, Afghanistan Rights Monitor reports.
2011 April - Burning of Koran by a US pastor prompts country-wide protests in which foreign UN workers and several Afghans are killed.
Some 500 mostly Taliban prisoners break out of prison in Kandahar.
2011 July - President's half-brother and Kandahar governor Ahmad Wali Karzai is killed in Taliban campaign against prominent figures.
2011 September - Ex-president Burhanuddin Rabbani - a go-between in talks with the Taliban - is assassinated.
2011 October - As relations with Pakistan worsen after a series of attacks, Afghanistan and India sign a strategic partnership to expand co-operation in security and development.
Former Taliban fighters in Herat: Insurgents are waging a fierce campaign against the government

Military pact

2011 November - President Karzai wins the endorsement of tribal elders to negotiate a 10-year military partnership with the US at a Loya Jirga traditional assembly. The proposed pact will see US troops remain after 2014, when foreign troops are due to leave the country.
2011 December - At least 58 people are killed in twin attacks at a Shia shrine in Kabul and a Shia mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif.
Pakistan and the Taleban boycott the scheduled Bonn Conference on Afghanistan. Pakistan refuses to attend after a NATO air strike killed Pakistani soldiers on the Afghan border.
2012 January - Taliban agree to open office in Dubai as a move towards peace talks with the US and the Afghan government.
2012 February - At least 30 people are killed in protests about the burning of copies of the Koran at the US Bagram airbase. US officials believed Taliban prisoners were using the books to pass messages, and that they were extremist texts not Korans. 2 soldiers are also killed in reprisal attacks.
2012 March - US Army Sgt Robert Bales is accused of killing 16 civilians in an armed rampage in the Panjwai district of Kandahar.
2012 April - Taliban announce "spring offensive" with audacious attack on the diplomatic quarter of Kabul. The government blamed the Haqqani Network. Security forces kill 38 militants.

NATO withdrawal plan

2012 May - NATO summit endorses the plan to withdraw foreign combat troops by the end of 2014.
New French President Francois Hollande says France will withdraw its combat mission by the end of 2012 - a year earlier than planned.

Arsala Rahmani of the High Peace Council is shot dead in Kabul. A former Taliban minister, he was crucial in reaching out to rebel commanders. The Taliban deny responsibility.

2012 July - Tokyo donor conference pledges $16bn in civilian aid to Afghanistan up to 2016, with US, Japan, Germany and UK supplying bulk of funds. Afghanistan agrees to new conditions to counter corruption.

2012 August - The US military discipline six soldiers for accidentally burning copies of the Koran and other religious texts in Afghanistan. They will not face criminal prosecution. Three US Marines are also disciplined for a video in which the bodies of dead Taliban fighters were urinated on.

2012 September - US hands over Bagram high-security jail to the Afghan government, although it retains control over some foreign prisoners until March 2013.

The US also suspends training new police recruits in order to carry out checks on possible ties to Taliban following a series of attacks on foreign troops by apparent police and Afghan soldiers.

2013 February - President Karzai and Pakistan's Asif Ali Zardari agree to work for an Afghan peace deal within six months after talks hosted by Britain's Prime Minister David Cameron. They back opening an Afghan office in Doha and urge the Taliban to do the same for talks to take place.

2013 March - Two former Kabul Bank chiefs, Sherkhan Farnood and Khalilullah Ferozi, are jailed for the multi-million dollar fraud that almost led to its collapse and that of the entire Afghan banking system in 2010.

2013 June - Afghan army takes command of all military and security operations from NATO forces.

President Karzai suspends security talks with the US after Washington announces it plans to hold direct talks with the Taliban. Afghanistan insists on conducting the talks with the Taliban in Qatar itself.

2014 January - Taliban suicide squad hits a restaurant in Kabul's diplomatic quarter, the worst attack on foreign civilians since 2001. The 13 foreign victims include the IMF country head.

Presidential Election 2014

2014 April - The presidential election produces an inconclusive result and goes on to a second round between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani.

2014 June - Second round of presidential election is held, with more than 50 reported killed in various incidents during the vote.

2014 July - Election officials begin recount of all votes cast in June's presidential run-off, as part of a US-mediated deal to end the dispute between candidates over widespread claims of fraud.

Election deal

2014 September - The two rivals for the Afghan presidency, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, sign a power-sharing agreement, following a two-month audit of disputed election results. Ashraf Ghani is sworn in as President and Abdullah Abdullah as Chief Executive.

2014 October - The US and Britain end their combat operations in Afghanistan.

Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan reaches an all-time high, according to a US report.

2014 December - NATO formally ends its 13-year combat mission in Afghanistan, handing over to Afghan forces. Despite the official end to ISAF's combat role, violence persists across much of the country, with 2014 said to be the bloodiest year in Afghanistan since 2001.

2015 January - NATO-led follow-on mission "Resolute Support" gets underway, with some 12,000 personnel to provide further training and support for Afghan security forces.

2015 March - US President Barack Obama announces that his country will delay its troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, following a request from President Ashraf Ghani.
The lynching of a woman wrongly accused of burning a Koran in Kabul provokes widespread revulsion and criticism of hard-line clerics. Police face accusations of doing little to save her. The incident leads to widespread protests against women's treatment. Four men are convicted of murder.

Taliban offensives

2015 May - Taliban representatives and Afghan officials hold informal peace talks in Qatar. Both sides agree to continue the talks at a later date, though the Taliban insist they will not stop fighting until all foreign troops leave the country.
2015 September - Taliban briefly capture major northern city of Kunduz in their most significant advance since being forced from power in 2001.
2015 October - Powerful earthquake kills more than 80 people in northeast of country.
2015 October - US President Barack Obama announces that 9,800 US troops will remain in Afghanistan until the end of 2016, backtracking on an earlier pledge to pull all but 1,000 troops from the country.
2015 December - Taliban make bid to capture Sangin, a town and district in Helmand Province. US warplanes deploy in support of Afghan security forces' attempt to repel insurgents.
2015 December - NATO extends its "Resolute Support" follow-on mission by 12 months to the end of 2016.
2016 July - US President Barack Obama says 8,400 US troops will remain in Afghanistan into 2017 in light of the "precarious security situation". NATO also agrees to maintain troop numbers and reiterates a funding pledge for local security forces until 2020.
2016 August to October - Taliban advance to the outskirts of Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand, and to the northern city of Kunduz. The group has brought much of the two provinces under its control since the bulk of NATO forces withdrew by end of 2014.

Hizb-e-Islami Peace Agreement

2016 September - The Afghan government signs a peace agreement with the militant group Hizb-e-Islami which grants immunity to the group's leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
2016 October - Islamic State (IS) group emerges as growing security threat. Apart from what appears to be its first major attack on Kabul in July 2016, IS claims several other deadly assaults.
2017 January - A bomb attack in Kandahar kills six UAE diplomats.
2017 February - Rise in Islamic State activities reported in a number of northern and southern provinces.
2017 March - Thirty people are killed and more than 50 wounded in an attack by so-called Islamic State on a military hospital in Kabul".
2017 April – The US drops the MOAB, the largest ever non-Nuclear bomb, on an IS terrorist tunnel network in Nanghahar province.
2017 May - Gulbuddin Hekmatyar returns to Kabul with immunity following the ANG/Hizb-e-Islami peace agreement.

Appendix 5: Overview of UNAMA's Mandate by Category

Source: **UNSC (2015)**

UNAMA: overview of mandate by category

	Decisions													
													Adopted during 2014-2015 (paragraph)	
Category and mandated task	*1401 (2002)*	*1471 (2003)*	*1536 (2004)*	*1589 (2005)*	*1662 (2006)*	*1746 (2007)*	*1806 (2008)*	*1868 (2009)*	*1917 (2010)*	*1974 (2011)*	*2041 (2012)*	*2096 (2013)*	*2145 (2014)*	*2210 (2015)*
Civilian-military coordination							X[a]	X[c]	X[b]	X[b]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	
Demilitarization and arms management					X[a]				X[b]	X[b]				
Electoral assistance		X[a]		X[b]	X[a]		X[b]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]	X[c]	X[c]	12[b]	X[c]
Human rights; women and peace and security; children and armed conflict	X[a]	X[b]	X[b]		X[a]	X[c]	X[b]	X[c]	X[b]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	12[b]	X[c]
Humanitarian support	X[a]				X[a]		X[b]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]
International cooperation and coordination					X[a]		X[a]	X[c]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]	X[c]	6(f)[b]
Military and police Protection of civilians, including refugees and internally displaced persons							X[a]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]
Political process	X[a]				X[a]		X[b]	X[c]	X[b]	X[b]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]
Rule of law\Judicial matters	X[a]	X[b]		X[b]	X[a]	X[c]	X[b]	X[c]	X[b]	X[b]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]
Security sector reform										X[a]	X[c]	X[c]		
Support to sanctions regimes						X[a]	X[b]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]	X[c]			
Support to State institutions	X[a]				X[a]		X[b]	X[c]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]	X[b]	X[c]	X[c]

[a] Newly mandated task.
[b] Additional element.
[c] Reiteration.

Appendix 6: International Conferences on Afghanistan

Source: **ANG (2017b)**

Bonn Conference on Afghanistan - December2001

Berlin Conference on Afghanistan – April 2004

London Conference on Afghanistan – January 2006

Paris Conference on Afghanistan - June 2008

London Conference on Afghanistan - January 2010

Kabul Conference on Afghanistan - July 2010

Bonn Conference on Afghanistan – December 2011

Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan – July 2012

London Conference on Afghanistan – December 2014

Brussels Conference on Afghanistan – October 2016

Appendix 7: UN Secretary Generals Reflections on Preventive Diplomacy

Source: **Ramcharan (2008)**

The following text from UN Secretary Generals illustrate the evolution of UN thought on preventive diplomacy and its utilisation (Ramcharan 2008, ppxxv-xxvii):

"A comparatively small United Nations Guard Force, as distinct from a striking force could be recruited by the Secretary-General and placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Such a force would have been extremely valuable to us in the past and it would undoubtedly be very valuable in the future.

—Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Commencement Address at Harvard University (June 1948)

Experience indicates that the preventive diplomacy, to which the efforts of the United Nations must to a large extent be directed, is of special significance in cases where the original conflict may be said either to be the result of, or to imply risks for, the creation of a power vacuum between the main blocs. Preventive action in such cases must in the first place aim at filling the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major parties, the initiative for which might be taken for preventive purposes but might in turn lead to counteraction from the other side. The ways in which a vacuum can be filled by the United Nations so as to forestall such initiatives differ from case to case, but they have this in common: Temporarily, and pending the filling of a vacuum by normal means, the United Nations enters the picture on the basis of its non-commitment to any power bloc, so as to provide to the extent possible a guarantee in relation to all parties against initiatives from others. The special need and the special possibilities for what I call preventive United Nations diplomacy have been demonstrated in several recent cases, such as Suez and Gaza, Lebanon and Jordan, Laos and the Congo. The responsibilities and possibilities of the Organization in the exercise of preventive diplomacy apply also to the economic sphere. Far less dramatic in their impact as the economic activities must be, they are of decisive long-term significance for the welfare of the international community. In the end, the United Nations is likely to be judged not so much by the criterion of how successfully it has overcome this or that crisis as by the significance of its total contribution towards building the kind of world community in which such crises will no longer be inevitable.

—Dag Hammarskjöld, Annual Report (1960)

I believed at that time, and I still believe in retrospect, that preventive diplomacy is far more effective—and incidentally much cheaper— than attempting to resolve a conflict that has been allowed to reach an acute stage. It of course requires total discretion on the part of the Secretary-General, and the cooperation, restraint, and good will of the parties concerned.

—U Thant, View from the UN (1978)

I myself advocate what some call “preventive diplomacy” which has to be conducted calmly, without fanfare. One runs the risk, of course, of acquiring a reputation for passivity, since the substance of direct, intensive talks with heads of state and foreign ministers can never be heedlessly disclosed—but the strength of such diplomacy lies in that very feature. If it goes well, the crisis is averted, and no one is the wiser. If it goes badly, it is merely dubbed another UN failure. The ground rule here is: the Secretary-General should negotiate only at the request of the parties to the dispute. Nothing is worse, and nothing would be less wise, than for him to force himself upon a situation. Successful mediation stands a chance only if it is wanted and worked for by all involved. During such negotiations, I always find it wise to refrain from making too many public statements. These can be easily distorted, sometimes intentionally, and only complicate matters. On the other hand, reticence poses another kind of dilemma, since a sensible public reaction to the initiatives of the United Nations can be elicited only if all aspects of a problem are openly and objectively presented. As you can see, it is a path strewn with booby-traps. If too much is said, the negotiations are in danger of being scuttled; silence, on the other hand, gives rise to all sorts of speculation in the mass media, which can lead to a hardening of the negotiating process. Diplomatic skill consists in steering precisely the right middle course.

—Kurt Waldheim, Memoirs (1980)

Nowhere is the saying that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure more true than in the field of international security, especially since the cure for conflict has proven so elusive. The United Nations must therefore give very high priority...to monitoring potential causes of conflict and to communicating warning signs to those in a position to alleviate the situation. First responsibility should lie with the Security Council and with the Secretary-General who will need to have the means to mount a global watch. Given the strong economic and social factors in regional violence, economic and social developments will have to be followed and assessed in terms of their relevance to international security.

—Javier Pérez de Cuéllar(1987)

Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

—Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (1992)

No task is more fundamental to the United Nations than the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. Prevention, in particular, must be central to all our efforts.

—Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom (March 2005)

Today, war continues to threaten countless men, women and children across the globe. It is the source of untold suffering and loss. And the majority of the UN's work still focuses on preventing and ending conflict. But, the danger posed by war to all of humanity—and to our planet —is at least matched by the climate crisis and global warming. Global warming has profound implications for jobs, growth and poverty. It affects agricultural output, the spread of disease and migration problems. It determines the ferocity and frequency of natural disasters. It can prompt water shortages, degrade land and lead to the loss of biodiversity. And, in coming decades, changes in our environment and the resulting upheavals—from droughts to inundated coastal areas to loss of arable lands—are likely to become a major driver of war and conflict".

—Ban Ki-moon (2007)

In the UN Secretary General's report "Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results" (2011a), Ban Ki-Moon stated:

Preventive diplomacy has been an enduring idea at the United Nations for many decades. Since Dag Hammarskjöld first articulated the concept over half a century ago, it has continued to evolve in response to new challenges. An integral part of broader conflict prevention efforts, preventive diplomacy refers specifically to diplomatic action taken, at the earliest possible stage, "to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Preventive diplomacy remains highly relevant along the entire conflict spectrum.

—Ban Ki-moon (2011)

In an address to the UN Security Council in January 2017, SG Guterres stated:

"There is a need to address the underlying drivers of terrorism through continuing investments in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, countering violent extremism, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, sustainable and inclusive development, the enhancement and respect of human rights, and timely responses to humanitarian crises" (UNSG 2017).

— Antonio Guterres (2017)

Appendix 8: Cases of UN Preventive Diplomacy

Source: **UNSG (2011b)**

"In **Sudan**, preventive diplomacy was a major focus of international efforts - led for the United Nations by its peacekeeping mission - to ensure the successful holding of the January 2011 **independence referendum** for Southern Sudan. The Security Council was actively engaged, including through its statements and visits to the country. The Secretary-General appointed a high-level panel that also encouraged actions and agreements to permit the smooth holding of the referendum.

In **Guinea**, from 2009-2010 the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) worked energetically to keep on track a **political transition** from a military coup to the country's first democratic elections since independence.

In **Sierra Leone**, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNIPSIL) helped prevent the potential escalation of violence following **political tensions** between the governing and opposition parties in 2009.

In **Iraq**, the United Nations political mission (UNAMI) has facilitated peaceful dialogue over Kirkuk and other **disputed internal territories**, and assisted in smoothing the path to elections in 2009 and 2010.

In **Kenya**, following the outbreak of **post-electoral violence** in 2008, the United Nations quietly provided strong support to the African Union-led mediation efforts that succeeded in stopping the violence and resolving the political-electoral conflict through negotiations.

In **Kyrgyzstan**, the United Nations Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) worked closely with key governments and regional organizations such as the OSCE to encourage an end to the 2010 **inter-ethnic violence** and a return to constitutional order. The office is also encouraging agreements on the peaceful sharing of water resources in the region. [The Kyrgyzstan case is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3].

In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)**, the timely dispatch of an envoy of the Secretary-General in autumn 2008 helped to quell **unrest** and ease **tensions** between Rwanda and the DRC that might have deteriorated into renewed regional war".

Appendix 9: UN Preventive Diplomacy Actors, Tools, instruments

Source**: UNSG (2011)**

The UN Secretary General identified the following actors/tools/instruments key to its PD efforts (UNSG 2011):

- The **General Assembly (GA)** is the main deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the UN. It has a broad mandate for conflict prevention (Art 10, Art 11, UN Charter), makes recommendations, and brings issues to the attention of the UN Security Council. It also approves budgets for political missions and other conflict prevention efforts including funding DPA's increased prevention capacity in 2008. Security Council Resolution S/RES 65/283[5] in June 2011 positioned the GA as a standard setter in mediation and a key partner in prevention.

- The **UN Security Council (UNSC)** plays a primary role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Previously reactive to conflicts and emergencies, the UNSC has been increasingly proactive in engaging in preventive diplomacy by convening "informal interactive dialogues", requesting DPA to prepare horizon scanning briefings, and adopting formal agenda items such as 'peace and security in Africa' (UNSC 2016). The UNSC has supported preventive diplomacy through key Presidential statements (S/PRST/2007/31; S/PRST/2010/14; S/PRST/2011/18). The UNSC often allows space for the Good Offices of the Secretary General to engage in quiet diplomacy, has increasingly supported meditation, engaged with regional actors in addressing constitutional crises (Guinea) and electoral issues (South Sudan, DR Congo), authorises political and peacekeeping missions to deescalate conflicts, and uses sanctions as diplomatic leverage in cases of state transgressions (UNSC 2016).

- The **Peacebuilding Commission (PC)** is an intergovernmental advisory body that supports peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict to focus on recovery through reconstruction and institution building, and country-specific configurations of the Commission (UNPC 2017). As of March 2016 the same six countries since 2011 are still on the PC's agenda: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Central African Republic.

- The **Good Offices of the Secretary-General (UNSG)**: The UNSG uses his/her mandate for conflict prevention and may "bring to the attention of the UNSC any matter that in his opinion may threaten international peace or security" (Charter, Art 99[6]) and "shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him [by the UN] organs" (UN Charter, Art 98[7]) such as prevention and the peaceful settlement of disputes (UNSG 2016). The UNSG may speak-out on issues, use his good offices to conduct quiet diplomacy to resolve problems at the earliest stage to avoid conflict, use DPA to implement actions on behalf of the good offices (UNSG 2011,p8) and engage in mediation, facilitation, dialogue processes and even arbitration (UNSG 2016). Crucially, the UNSG released a report on Preventive Diplomacy in 2011 (S/2011/552) placing the concept at the heart of UN preventive action (UNSG 2011).

[5] S/Res65/283 (22 June 2011): Aimed to strengthen the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention and resolution.
[6] UN Charter, Chapter XV, Art 99 : http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-xv/index.html
[7] UN Charter, Chapter XV, Art 98 : http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-xv/index.html

- **Envoys** are appointed by the UNSG to cover a wide variety of issues from regional concerns to human rights[8]. Envoys play a vital role on the ground in preventing or resolving conflict and can instil confidence in a process. The impact of preventive diplomacy is increased by the UN's investment in instruments such as rapid funding mechanisms and technical expertise which support envoys in their efforts in countries such as Libya, the Great Lakes Region or Syria (UNSG 2011). In addition, "DPA provides guidance and support to travelling envoys and special advisers of the Secretary-General bringing to bear his 'good offices' for the resolution of conflicts or the implementation of other UN mandates. These currently include UN envoys or special advisers for Cyprus, Yemen, Myanmar, Sahel, Syria, Western Sahara, and the FYROM-Greece name dispute" (UNDPA 2016b).

- The **Department of Political Affairs (DPA)** currently manages field-based political missions "engaged in conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East" (UNDPA 2016b) that serve as key platforms for preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy is also carried out in peacekeeping missions. The UN Security Council supports preventive action through UN Security Council Resolutions (S/Res) which have increasingly become more flexible in addressing emerging threats before they arrive on the formal agenda. DPA also mediates inter-state and intra-State conflicts at all stages: before escalation into armed conflict, after the outbreak of violence, and during implementation of peace agreements (DPA 2015). Good offices and mediation are also carried out by the UN Secretary-General and his representatives and envoys. The UN also engages extensively in cooperative preventive diplomacy with regional and sub-regional organizations which include a broad range of non-UN actors (Ramcharan 2008)[9].

- **Regional Offices** can also facilitate and support regional efforts to prevent conflict or resolve a crisis and work with/or defer to UN Country Teams who may be better placed to intervene and engage with relevant local actors. The UN Office for West Africa prevented tensions in Guinea from spiralling into a conflict and resulted in democratic elections. The UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), established in 2007 as the UN's first, was crucial in using its good offices in 2010 to stem the crisis in Kyrgyzstan following the ouster of the President (UNSG 2011) – see case study in Chapter 4. Following the success of UNRCCA, new UN Regional Centres for Preventive Diplomacy were established in West Africa and Central Africa. These three "regional offices covering Central Africa, West Africa and Central Asia have explicit mandates for preventive diplomacy and strengthening the capacity of states and regional actors to manage sources of tension peacefully" (UNDPA 2016b).

- **Resident Political Missions** are managed by DPA and "engage in conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East" (UNDPA 2016b). DPA currently manages 11 field-based political missions (UNDPA 2013): UNOWA, UNSMIL, UNSCO, UNSCOL, UNRCCA, UNIOGBIS, UNOCA, MENUB, UNSOM, UNAMI, UNAMA. The missions are mostly utilised by the UN in crisis management rather than only for preventive diplomacy and vary in mandate and scope although include a good offices role (UNSG, 2011). The missions work with the government and other actors to ease tensions and prevent violence through dialogue and capacity building (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, South Sudan, Haiti, Somalia).

[8] For an up-to-date full list of current special and personal representatives, envoys and advisors of the UN Secretary General, please see the UNSG's website at: http://www.un.org/sg/srsg/africa.shtml

[9] Non-UN regional players in prevention include: OSCE, EU, AU, ECOWAS, GCC, UNASUR, Pacific Island Forum, CSTO, CIS, and SCO (Ramcharan 2008).

In addition, the UNSG report also identified the following actors/tools/instruments which support the UN's preventive diplomacy efforts (UNSG 2011):

- **Peacekeeping Operations** are also vital tools in crisis response and preventive diplomacy across the conflict spectrum providing high-level good offices to work with the government and other actors (e.g. South Sudan referendum).

- **Groups of Friends and Other Diplomatic missions** often serve as contact groups and can provide support to envoys or political missions on key issues e.g. Guinea, Libya, Mauritania, and Western Sahara (*ibid*).

- Impartial **Fact-Finding inquiries and Investigations** are also useful preventive diplomacy mechanisms – instigated by the UNSG, UNSC or Human Rights Council (HRC) – to investigate serious crimes or human rights violations. Examples include investigating dead Ghanaian migrants in Gambia, Impunity in Guatemala, violence in Conakry, and the Gaza flotilla incident (*ibid*). Crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes though are investigated by the International Criminal Court (ICC)[10] in the Hague which is a non-UN entity (ICC 2017).

- Finally, there are 136 **United Nations Country Teams** (UNCTs) who coordinate and implement development programming and operations at country level and work directly with governments and local actors, led by the UN Resident Coordinator (RC) – appointed by the UN Secretary General – who is also head of a UN agency (normally UNDP) and the Designated Security Official in-country. When a political or peacekeeping mission is not present, the UN RC may request HQ support in mediation (Fiji), elections (Comoros), reconciliation (Honduras), national dialogue (Tunisia), or dispute resolution (South Sudan) to peacefully resolve emerging issues (UNSG 2011).

[10] The ICC was established by the Rome Statute which entered into force on 1 July 2002

Appendix 10: UNAMA Benchmarks for Progress

Source: Adapted from: **UNSG Report (2017): A/71/826 S/2017/189**: 10 March 2017

I. Security

Benchmark: Sustainable Afghan security institutions and processes capable of ensuring peace and stability and protecting the people of Afghanistan.
Indicator 1.1: Increase in the number of national police and national army personnel mentored, trained and operational according to an agreed structure.

II. Peace, Reintegration and Reconciliation

Benchmark: National dialogue and regional engagement to pursue constructive and inclusive process to foster a political environment conducive to peace.
Indicator 2.1: Development and implementation of inclusive national and regional processes to enhance peace, reintegration and reconciliation efforts.
Indicator 2.2: Increased ability by Afghan authorities to gather and provide substantiated, updated and accurate information to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988. (2011)
Indicator 2.3: Increased public support for the peace process through engagement at the community level and with civil society.

III. Governance and Institution-Building:

Benchmark: Extension of Government authority throughout the country through the establishment of democratic, legitimate, accountable institutions, down to the local level, with the capacity to implement policies and to be increasingly capable of sustaining themselves.
Indicator 3.1: Increased ability by Afghan authorities and independent electoral institutions to manage and conduct genuine and periodic elections, with due regard to women's participation and constitutionally guaranteed quotas.
Indicator3.2: Establishment of a Monitoring and Evaluation Committee and development of anti-corruption benchmarks.
Indicator 3.3: Empowerment of anti-corruption institutions to oversee a whole of Government approach to anti-corruption
Indicator 3.4: Annual publication of asset declarations of public official.
Indicator 3.5: Increased capacity of civil servants at the central, provincial and district levels to discharge functions and deliver services.
Indicator 3.6: Increased transparency and effectiveness of civil service appointments.
Indicator 3.7: Strengthened civil service reform supported by a comprehensive approach to capacity-building and donor-funded technical assistance.
Indicator 3.8: Implementation of the sub-national governance policy and development of sub-national regulatory, financing and budgetary frameworks.
Indicator 3.9: Development and publication of criteria for administrative boundaries.
Indicator 3.10: Establishment of adequate infrastructure for functioning Government institutions, especially at the sub-national level.
Indicator 3.11: Establishment of credible and accessible judicial and penal systems that respect and uphold the human rights of all citizens.

IV. Human Rights

Benchmark: Improved respect for human rights of Afghans, in line with the Afghan Constitution and international law, with particular emphasis on the protection of civilians, the situation of women and girls, freedom of expression and accountability based on the rule of law.

Indicator 4.1: Reduction in the number of incidents of unlawful use of force and intimidation of civilians, through compliance by relevant actors with international law.
Indicator 4.2: Improved awareness by Afghans of their rights and by the Government of its obligations.
Indicator 4.3: Improved impact of, and support for, legal and policy measures to combat violence against women and girls.
Indicator 4.4: Improved awareness of, and support for, legal and policy measures related to combating impunity and furthering transitional justice.
Indicator 4.5: Government fulfilment of reporting requirements on international human rights covenants and conventions and implementation of the recommendations from the Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review of Afghanistan.
Indicator 4.6: Increased capacity and commitment of the Government of Afghanistan and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, as the Afghan national human rights institution, to respect, protect, fulfil and promote human rights.

V. Economic and Social Development

Benchmark: Government policies supported by the international community that promote sustainable economic growth and contribute to overall stability.
Indicator 5.1: National priority programmes are designed and implemented with international support and endorsement.
Indicator 5.2: More equitable distribution of development assistance and Government expenditure throughout Afghanistan.
Indicator 5.3: Increased revenue collection and sustainable growth based on Afghan resources.

VI. Regional Cooperation

Benchmark: Sustained and effective regional coordination in support of prosperity, peace and stability.
Indicator 6.1: Improved coordination of regional bodies and increased regional investments.

VII. Partnership between the Government of Afghanistan and the International Community

Benchmark: Coherent support by the international community for Afghan priorities within an Afghan-led coordination framework.
Indicator 7.1: Increased percentage of aid aligned with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and Government priorities.
Indicator 7.2: Improved accountability of procurement and contracting on behalf of the Government and the international community.
Indicator 7.3: Strengthening of the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board in support of the Kabul process and as a means of regular review of progress on Afghan priorities and mutual commitments.

VIII. Counter-Narcotics

Benchmark: Sustained trend in the reduction of poppy cultivation, narcotics production and drug addiction.
Indicator 8.1: Decrease in poppy cultivation, narcotics production and addiction rates.
Indicator 8.2: Increase in effective interdiction and counter-trafficking efforts.
Indicator 8.3: Increase in licit agriculture and related private capital investment in areas previously used for poppy cultivation.

Appendix 11: List of Anonymous Interviews for Primary Research

* Interviewees are referenced in the thesis as INT1-14 (2017) and INTa-e (2016).

List of Anonymous Research Interviewees 2017: INT1-14 (2017)

1. (INT1): INTERVIEW 1
2. (INT2): INTERVIEW 2
3. (INT3): INTERVIEW 3
4. (INT4): INTERVIEW 4
5. (INT5): INTERVIEW 5
6. (INT6): INTERVIEW 6
7. (INT7): INTERVIEW 7
8. (INT8): INTERVIEW 8
9. (INT9): INTERVIEW 9
10. (INT10): INTERVIEW 10
11. (INT11): INTERVIEW 11
12. (INT12): INTERVIEW 12
13. (INT13): INTERVIEW 13
14. (INT14): INTERVIEW 14

List of Anonymous Research Interviewees 2016: INTa-e (2016)

1. (INTa): INTERVIEW a
2. (INTb): INTERVIEW b
3. (INTc): INTERVIEW c
4. (INTd): INTERVIEW d
5. (INTe): INTERVIEW e

REFERENCES

Akiner, S (2014): *Turkmenistan: Strategies of Power, Dilemmas of Development*, Europe-Asia Studies, 66:1, 2014, pp 146-148

Al Jazeera (2017): *Afghanistan – Who Controls What?,* January 2017; Accessed at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/afghanistan-controls-160823083528213.html

Al Jazeera (2016a): *Afghanistan: Hizb-i-Islami Armed Group signs Peace Deal*, Al Jazeera; Accessed on the internet on 8 April 2017, at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/gulbuddin-hekmatyar-group-signs-afghan-peace-deal-160922093420326.html

Al Jazeera (2017): *Afghanistan – Who Controls What*, January 2017; Accessed on the internet on 9 April 2017, at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/afghanistan-controls-160823083528213.html

ANG (2016a): *Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) 2017 to 2021,* Afghan National Government (ANG), Kabul, October 2016; Accessed on the internet on 1 November 2016, at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/search/?q=anpdf&search=search

ANG (2016b): *Brussels Conference on Afghanistan Summary*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Afghan National Government, Afghanistan, 4-5 October 2016; Accessed on the internet on 25 February 2017, at**:** http://mfa.gov.af/en/page/the-brussels-conference-on-afghanistan

ANG (2017): *RECCA Annual Review 2016*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Afghanistan; Accessed on the internet on 8 April 2017, at: http://recca.af/

ANG (2017b): *Conferences on Afghanistan*, Office of the Deputy Minister for Policy, Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; Accessed on the internet on 24 May 2017, at: http://policymof.gov.af/category/conferences/

Baczko, A and Dorronsoro, G (2015): *United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP),* The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Oxford Handbook Online, January 2015

Bainazarova, E (2009). *Central Asia Faces New Security Challenge: Illegal Migration Flows*, International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Issue 2, pp41-54, 2009.

Barry, B (2017): *Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing Character of War*, Volume: 2016, Edition number: 461, 25 January 2017, in IISS website, 2017, accessed on 19 April 2017, at: http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/by%20year/2017-cd3c/harsh-lessons-b53e

BBC (2017): *Afghanistan Profile – Timeline*, BBC, UK, 21 November 2016/8 March 2017; Accessed on the internet on 24 December 2016/29 April 2017, at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12024253

Beker, A (2014): *UN Peacekeeping Forces: Preventive Diplomacy and Its Limitations*, Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 6, No. 2, August 2014

Bohannon, J (2011): *Counting the Dead in Afghanistan,* Science, New Series, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Vol 331, No. 6022 (11 March 2011), pp1256-1260

Brahimi, L (2011): *Afghanistan: Negotiating Peace*, The Report of The Century Foundation International Task Force on Afghanistan in Its Regional and Multilateral Dimensions, The Century Foundation Press, USA

Cahill, KM (1996): *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start* (Editor), A Joint Publication by Basic Books (Harper-Collins Publishers) and The Center for International Health and Cooperation, New York, USA.

Cahill, Kevin M (2000): *Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start,* New York: Routledge and the Center for International Health and Cooperation, New York, USA

CFR (2017a): *Preventive Priorities Survey 2017*, Council for Foreign Relations (CFR), 2017; Accessed on the internet on 19 April 2017, at: **http://www.cfr.org/conflict-assessment/preventive-priorities-survey-2017/p38562**

CFR (2017b): Conflict Tracker, Council for Foreign Relations, USA; Accessed on the internet on 12 March 2017, at: http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/

CFR (2017c): Taliban in Afghanistan, Council for Foreign Relations, USA; Accessed on the internet on 12 March 2017, at: http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/taliban-in-afghanistan

Chung, C (2004): *The Shanghai Cooperation organization: China's Changing Influence in Central Asia*, The China Quarterly, No.180 (Dec2004), pp989-1009

Cowper-Coles, S (2012): *Cables from Kabul*, Harper Press, UK.

CPD 2016: *Defining Public Diplomacy/a Brief History of Public Diplomacy*, Center on Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California, USA; Accessed on the internet on 18 December 2016, at: http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/page/what-pd

Crawford, N (2016): *Update on the Human Costs of War for Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001 to Mid-2016*, Boston University; Accessed on the internet on 27 March 2017, at: http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2016/War%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan%20UPDATE_FINAL_corrected%20date.pdf

Cubitt, C (2013): *Responsible Reconstruction After War: Meeting Local Needs For Building Peace*, Review of International Studies (2013), 39, pp91–112

Dobbins, JF (2008): *After the Taliban: Nation-building in Afghanistan*, Potomac Books Inc, USA

Dobbins, J & Shinn, J (2011): *Afghanistan: Guidelines for a Peace Process*, Survival, 53:4, pp5-12, 1 August 2011

Economist (2017): *A Biiter Stalemate*, Economist, UK, 2 March 2017; Accessed at: http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21717835-will-he-pull-out-or-double-down-donald-trump-holds-afghanistans-future-his-hands?zid=312&ah=da4ed4425e74339883d473adf5773841

EU (2016a): *Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, 04-05/10/2016*, EU; Accessed on the internet on 1 November 2016, at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2016/10/05/

EU (2016b): Press Release: '*Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, partnership for prosperity and peace: communiqué of the participants'*, EU website, Accessed on the internet on 1 November 2016, at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/10/05-afghanistan-conference-joint-communique/

EU (2016c): Press Release: *Brussels Conference on Afghanistan: Main Results*, EU website, Accessed on the internet on 1 November 2016, at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/10/05-bca-main-results/

EU (2016d): *Self-reliance through mutual accountability framework*; EU website, Accessed on the internet on 1 November 2016, at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2016/10/05/

Everts, D (2009): *Afghanistan: The Right Mission on the Wrong Footing*, Security and Human Rights, No:1, 2009

Foreign policy (2017): 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2017, Foreign Policy, USA; Accessed on the internet on 19 April 2017, at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/05/10-conflicts-to-watch-in-2017/

Gall, S (2012): *War Against the Taliban: Why it All Went Wrong in Afghanistan***,** Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, London, UK.

Garfinkle, A (2001): *Humanitarian Intervention Strategy and Preventive Diplomacy*, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fall 2001, pp503-517

Gentilini, F (2013): *Afghan Lessons: Culture, Diplomacy, and Counterinsurgency*; Brookings Institution Press, SSPA Series on Public Administration, Washington DC, USA, 2013

George, J (2009): *Expecting Ethnic Conflict: the Soviet legacy and Ethnic Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, in: Wooden, Amanda E and Stefes, Christoph H (2009): *The Politics of Transition in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Enduring Legacies and Emerging Challenges*, Routledge, London

Gov UK (2017b): *Corporate Report: Human Rights Priority Country Update Report: July to December 2016*, Gov.UK, First published on 21 April 2016, Updated 8 February 2017; Accessed on the internet, at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/afghanistan-human-rights-priority-country/human-rights-priority-country-update-report-july-to-december-2016

Gowan, R (2011): *Multilateral Political Missions and Preventive Diplomacy*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, December

Goyal, DR (2004): *International Terrorism: Challenge and Response*, in: Singh, Mahavir (ed) (2004**):** *International Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges to Central and South* Asia, International Seminar on Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges, Anamika Publishers & Distributors, New Delhi

Gravingholt, J (2013): *The Political Economy of Governance Reform in Central Asia*, in: Ahrens, Joachim and Hoen, Herman W (2013): Institutional reform in Central Asia: Politico-Economic Challenges, Routledge, New York, USA

Gray, C (2014): *The Use of Force and the International Legal Order*, in Evans MD: *International law*, 4th ed, Ch21, p618, Oxford University Press, UK

Griffiths, JC (2011): *Afghanistan: Land of Conflict and Beauty*, Andre Deutsche (Carlton Publishing Group), London, UK

Hampton, F (2002): *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System*, International Peace Academy, Boulder, Colorado, USA; Lynne Rienner Publishers, London

Hanasz, P (2012): *Appeasing 'upset brothers': an introduction to the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program*, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 66:2, 15 March 2012, 155-168,

Hanhimaki, JM (2015): *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction*, 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, UK

Hideo, S (2003): *Containing Conflict: Cases in Preventive Diplomacy* (Editor), Japan Centre for International Exchange, Tokyo, Japan.

HofA (2017): *Heart of Asia Istanbul Process*, Kabul Afghanistan, 2017; Accessed on the internet on 26 April 2017, at: http://hoa.gov.af/293/pillars

Hof A (2017b): *Ministerial Declaration: December 4th 2016*, Heart of Asia Istanbul Process, Kabul Afghanistan; Accessed on the internet on 26 April 2017, at: http://hoa.gov.af/335/declarations

HRW (2017): *Pakistan Coercion, UN Complicity*: *The Mass Forced Return of Afghan Refugees*, Human Rights Watch (HRW), NY, USA, 13 February 2017; Accessed on the internet on 23 April 2017, at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/02/13/pakistan-coercion-un-complicity/mass-forced-return-afghan-refugees

ICC (2017): *International Criminal Court*, ICC, The Hague, Holland; Accessed on 24 May 2017, at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx

IICA (2015): *Armed Conflict Survey*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, UK: Accessed internet on 11 November 2015 at: https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/acs/by%20year/armed-conflict-survey-2015-46e5/acs-2015-02-introduction-e398

IISS (2016): *The Armed Conflict Survey 2015,* International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2015; Accessed on the internet on 9 May 2016, at: https://www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press%20releases/archive/2015-4fe9/may-6219/armed-conflict-survey-2015-press-statement-a0be

IISS (2017): *Afghanistan*, Armed Conflict Database, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2017; Accessed on the internet, by private membership, on 19 April 2017, at: https://acd.iiss.org/en/conflicts/afghanistan-933d

INFORM (2017a): *Index for Risk Management Results 2017*, INFORM, IASC/European Commission 2017; Accessed on the internet on 22 April 2017, at: www.inform-index.org

INFORM (2017b): *INFORM Country Risk Profile Southern Asia – Low Income - Afghanistan*, Version 2017, INFORM, IASC/European Commission 2017; Accessed on the internet on 29 April 2017, at: www.inform-index.org

INT a-e (2016): *Original Research interviews* conducted by the author for an academic thesis for the award of a Diploma in Diplomatic Studies, University of Oxford, 2016.

INT 1-14 (2017): *Original Research interviews* conducted by the author for this thesis towards the award of a Masters of Studies (MSt) in Diplomatic Studies, University of Oxford, 2017.

ISW (2015): '*This map explains why Obama decided to leave thousands of troops in Afghanistan',* Institute of the Study of War, in the Washington Post, USA, 15 October 2015; Accessed on the internet on 9 April 2017, at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/15/this-map-explains-why-obama-decided-to-leave-thousands-of-troops-in-afghanistan/?utm_term=.1fc8e194ec2f

ISW (2017): Institute for the Study of War map in article: '*Afghan government controls just 57 percent of its territory, U.S watchdog says'*, Washington Post, 2 February 2017; Accessed on the internet on 7April2017, at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/02/afghan-government-controls-just-57-percent-of-its-territory-says-u-s-watchdog/?utm_term=.16c101e61625

James, A (1997): *UN Preventive Diplomacy in Historical Perspective*, DSP Discussion Paper, No. 21, Leicester: Centre for the study of Diplomacy.

Jenča, M (2009): *Developments in Central Asia and the role of the UNRCCA*, International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Issue No.2, 2009, pp30-40

Jenča, M (2013): *The Concept of Preventive Diplomacy and its Application by the United Nations in Central Asia*, Security and Human Rights, 24 (2013), pp183-194, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Jentleson, BW (2000): *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World* (Editor), Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, Maryland, USA.

Jones, SG (2010): *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan*, WW Norton & Company, New York, USA.

Juraev, S (2009): *Uzbekistan's Role in Central Asia*, International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Issue No.2, 2009, pp55-69

Kalha, RD (2014): *The Dynamics of Preventive Diplomacy*, KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, India.

Karzai, H (2007): *Strengthening Security in Contemporary Afghanistan: Coping with the Taliban*, in: *Building a New Afghanistan*, (Ed), World Peace Foundation / Brookings Institution Press, USA

Libman, A (2013): *Central Asia and Russia: Two Alternative perspectives*, in: Ahrens, Joachim and Hoen, Herman W (2013): Institutional reform in Central Asia: Politico-Economic Challenges, Routledge, New York, USA

Linn, J (2012): *Central Asian Regional Integration and Cooperation: Reality or Mirage?*, EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012, pp96-117

Long War Journal (2009): *Afghan forces and Taliban clash in Kunduz*, FDD's Long War Journal, 3 September 2009; Accessed on the internet on 15 March 2017, at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/09/afghan_forces_and_ta.php

Lund, M (1996): *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, USIP Press, USA.

Lund, M (2001): *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, 4th edition, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C, USA.

Lund, M (2008): *Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice*; In: Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and William Zartman (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, SAGE Publications (Thousand Oaks, CA, USA)

Maley, W (2009): *The Afghanistan Wars,* Second Edition (Twentieth Century Wars), Second Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK

Mancini, F (ed) (2011): *Preventive Diplomacy: Regions in Focus*, New York: International Peace Institute, December 2011

Mariko,S (2003): *Preventive Diplomacy and Reform of the United Nations*, pp165-206, in: **Hideo, S (2003):** Containing Conflict: Cases in Preventive Diplomacy (Editor), Japan Centre for International Exchange, Tokyo, Japan.

Mills, G & Mclay, E (2011): *A Path to Peace in Afghanistan: Revitalizing Linkage in Development, Diplomacy and Security*, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fall 2011, pp600-612

Muggah, R (2012): *Conflict Prevention and Preventive Diplomacy: What Works and what Doesn't?*, Forum International Peace Institute (IPI), March 2012, NY, USA.

Muggah, R & **Sisk, T (2012b):** *Governance for Peace: Securing the Social Contract*, United Nations Development Programme, New York, USA

Muggah, R & White, N (2013*):* *Is There A Preventive Action Renaissance? The Policy And Practice Of Preventive Diplomacy And Conflict Prevention*, NOREF (Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, Report, February 2013

Muni,SD (2004): *Terrorism, Tectonic Plates and Strategic Equations in Asia*, in: Singh, Mahavir (ed) (2004): *International Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges to Central and South* Asia, International Seminar on Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges, Anamika Publishers & Distributors, New Delhi

Nations Online (2017): *Map of Afghanistan,* (Appendix 1a); Accessed on the internet at: http://www.nationsonline.org/maps/afghanistan_map.jpg

NATO (2017): *NATO and Afghanistan*, NATO; Accessed on 15 April 2017, at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm

Neumann, RE (2009): *The Other War: Winning and Losing in Afghanistan,* (ADST-DACOR Diplomats and Diplomacy),Potomac Books Inc, USA

NYT (2016): *How Peace Between Afghanistan and the Taliban Foundered*, New York Times, 26 December 2016; Accessed on the internet on 24 April 2017, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/26/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-peace-talks.html?_r=0

Olcott, M (2009): *Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Improving the Western Track Record,* International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, Issue No.2, 2009, pp21-19

Ożga (2016): *UNRRCA and Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia*, Research Dissertation (Distinction) submitted for the award of a Diploma in Diplomatic Studies, Foreign Service Programme, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.

Poole, L (2014): *Afghanistan Beyond 2014: Aid and the Transformation Decade*, GHA Report, November 2014

Quie, M (2012): *Peace-Building And Democracy Promotion In Afghanistan: The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme and Reconciliation with the Taliban*, Democratization Journal, 19:3, pp553-574

Ramcharan, BG (2008): *Preventive Diplomacy at the UN*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press

Rashid, A (2001): *Taliban: Story of the Afghan Warlords*, Pan Books, UK.

Rashid, A (2009): *Descent into Chaos: Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Threat to Global Security*, Penguin Books (Penguin Group), London, UK.

Rashid, A (2010) *Prospects For Peace In Afghanistan*, Asian Affairs, 41:3, pp355-366

RECCA (2015): *Towards Regional Economic Growth & Stability: The Silk Road Through Afghanistan*, RECCA-VI, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

RECCA (2016): *RECCA Annual Review 2016*, Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kabul, Afghanistan; Accessed on the internet on 8 April 2017, at: http://recca.af/

Richards, D (2017): General (Retd) Lord David Richards, former UK Chief of the Defence Staff, in Barry, B (2017): *Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing Character of War*, IISS website, 2017, accessed on 19 April 2017, at: http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/by%20year/2017-cd3c/harsh-lessons-b53e

Roberts, Ivor (2009): *Satow's Diplomatic Practice* (Ed), Sixth Edition, Oxford University Press.

Roberts, Ivor (2010): *Digital Age Diplomacy: Time To Text*, The World Today, Vol. 66, No. 1 (January 2010), pp. 23-24, Published by: Royal Institute of International Affairs; Accessed on 5 October 2016, at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41962436

Rotberg, RI (2007): *Building a New Afghanistan*, (Ed), World Peace Foundation / Brookings Institution Press, USA

Rubin, B (1998): *Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action*, The Century Foundation Press (Sponsored by Council on Foreign Relations/Twentieth Century Fund), New York, USA.

Semple, MR (2009): *Reconciliation in Afghanistan (Perspectives)*, United States Institute of Peace Press, USA

SIGAR (2017): *'Afghan government controls just 57 percent of its territory, U.S. watchdog says'*, Washington Post, 2 Feb 2017; Accessed on the internet on 7April2017, at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/02/afghan-government-controls-just-57-percent-of-its-territory-says-u-s-watchdog/?utm_term=.16c101e61625

Singh, PK (2017): Lieutenant-General (Retd) P.K. Singh, former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, South Western Command, Indian Army, in Barry, B (2017): *Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing Character of War*, IISS website, 2017, accessed on 19 April 2017, at: http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/by%20year/2017-cd3c/harsh-lessons-b53e

Smith, S et al (2013): *Getting It Right in Afghanistan*, United States Institute of Peace Press, USA

SRSG (2012): Statement by Ambassador Miroslav Jenča, SRSG, Head of UNRCCA at Recca V Conference, Dushanbe, 24-28 March 2012

SRSG (2017a): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **10 March 2017**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG Yamamoto (2017a): *Afghanistan Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict Annual Report 2016*, United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan (SRSG) Tadamichi Yamamoto, UNAMA, Kabul, Afghanistan, February 2017.

SRSG Yamamoto (2017b): *Press Release: UN Welcomes Afghanistan's Progress In Fight Against Corruption*, United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan (SRSG) Tadamichi Yamamoto, UNAMA, 27 April 2017; Accessed on the internet on 29 April 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/

Stanekzai (2013): *Thwarting Afghanistan's Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach Towards Peace and Reconciliation*, pp191-213, in: Getting It Right in Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace Press, USA

Starr, SF (2005): *A Partnership for Central Asia*, Foreign Affairs, Vol.84, No.4 (Jul-Aug2005), pp164-178

Steele, J (2013): *A Tale of Two Retreats: Afghan Transition In Historical Perspective*, Central Asian Survey, 32:3, pp306-317

Steiner, B (2004): *Collective Preventive Diplomacy: A Study in International Conflict Management*, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, USA.

Strachan, H (2017): Professor Sir Hew Strachan, Emeritus Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford University, and Professor of International Relations, University of St Andrews, in Barry, B (2017): *Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing Character of War*, IISS website, 2017, accessed on 19 April 2017, at: http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/by%20year/2017-cd3c/harsh-lessons-b53e

Stratfor (2016): *Insurgency in Afghanistan: August 2016*, Stratfor.com; Accessed on the internet on 9 April 2017, at: http://i1.wp.com/cinemarasik.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Stratfor-Afghanistan-Aug-2016-map.jpg

S/RES/1386 (2001): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 20 December 2001, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1401 (2002): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 28 March 2002, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1419 (2002): UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan), 26 June 2002, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1444 (2002): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 27 November 2002, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1453 (2002): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 24 December 2002, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1746 (2007): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 23 March 2007, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1536 (2004): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 26 March 2004, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1589 (2005): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 24 March 2005, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1806 (2008): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 20 March 2008, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1817 (2008): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 11 June 2008, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1868 (2009): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 23 March 2009, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/
S/RES/1974 (2011): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 22 March 2011, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/2011 (2011): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 12 October 2011, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/2145 (2014): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 17 March 2014, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/2210 (2015): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 16 March 2015, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/2274 (2016): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 15 March 2016, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/2344 (2017): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 17 March 2017, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 14 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

Suhrke, A (2012): *Waging War and Building Peace in Afghanistan*, International Peacekeeping, 19:4, pp478-491

UNAMA (2015): *Hundreds gather in Kabul for special UN70 exhibit*, Afghanistan Quarterly, Volume 5, Issue 3 | Autumn 2015; Accessed on the internet on 26 March 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama-quarterly_newspaper_autumn_2015.pdf

UNAMA (2017a): *UNAMA Activities*, UNAMA; Accessed on the internet on 9 April 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/activities

UNAMA (2017b): *UNAMA mandate*, UNAMA; Accessed on the internet on 25 March 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/mandate

UNAMA (2017c): *UNAMA leadership*, UNAMA; Accessed on the internet on 12 April 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/leadership

UNAMA (2017d): *UNAMA Activity – Good Offices*, UNAMA; Accessed on the internet on 12 April 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/good-offices

UNAMA (2017e): *UNAMA Activity – Human Rights*, UNAMA; Accessed on the internet on 12 April 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/human-rights

UNAMA (2017f): *UNAMA Activity - Development Coherence*, UNAMA; Accessed on the internet on 14 April 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/development-coherence

UNAMA (2017g): *UNAMA Activity - Regional Cooperation*, UNAMA; Accessed on the internet on 16 April 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/regional-cooperation

UNAMA (2017h): *Afghanistan Protection of Civilians In Armed Conflict Annual Report 2016*, UNAMA, Kabul, Afghanistan, February 2017.

UNAMA (2017i): *Afghanistan's Fight Against Corruption: The Other Battlefield (Report),* Press Conference Transcript, UNAMA, Kabul, Afghanistan, 25 April 2017; Accessed on the internet on 26 April 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/release-unamas-report-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-fight-against-corruption-other-battlefield%E2%80%99

UNAMA (2017j): *UNAMA First Quarter 2017 Civilian Casualty Data*, UNAMA Press Release, UNAMA, Kabul, Afghanistan, 25 April 2017

UNAMA GIS (2017): Map of Afghanistan Administrative Divisions, in: Afghanistan Protection of Civilians In Armed Conflict Annual Report 2016, UNAMA, Kabul, Afghanistan, February 2017

UNAMA PMB (2016f): *UN Afghanistan Population Movement Bulletin*, UNAMA, Issue 6, Oct 2016; Accessed on the internet on 25 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA QN (2013a): *Quarterly Newsletter*, UNAMA, Volume 3, Issue 1, Spring, March 2013; Accessed on the internet on 15 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA QN (2013c): *Quarterly Newsletter*, UNAMA, Volume 3, Issue 3, Autumn, Oct2013; Accessed on the internet on 15 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA QN (2013d): *Quarterly Newsletter*, UNAMA, Volume 3, Issue 4, Winter, Dec2013; Accessed on the internet on 15February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA QN (2014a): *Quarterly Newsletter*, UNAMA, Volume 4, Issue 1, Spring 2014; Accessed on the internet on 22 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA QN (2014b): *Quarterly Newsletter*, UNAMA, Volume 4, Issue 2, Summer-Fall 2014; Accessed on the internet on 22 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA QN (2014c): *Quarterly Newsletter*, UNAMA, Volume 4, Issue 3, Winter 2014; Accessed on the internet on 22 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA QN (2015a): *Quarterly Newsletter*, UNAMA, Volume5, Issue 1, Spring 2015; Accessed on the internet on 22 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA QN (2015b): *Quarterly Newsletter*, UNAMA, Volume 5, Issue 2, Summer 2015; Accessed on the internet on 22 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UN Charter (1945): *United Nations Charter, Chapter VII*, UN, USA

UN Charter (1945b): *United Nations Charter*, UN, New York, USA

UNDAF (2015): *United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Afghanistan (UNDAF) 2015-2019*, UN Country Team (UNCT) Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan.

UNDFS (2014): *Field Support Facts*, UN Department of Field Support, United Nations, New York, USA, 31 Dec 2014.

UNDP (2013): *UNDP Fast Facts on Conflict Prevention Factsheet*, UNDP, NY, USA, February 2013

UNDPA (2013): *UNDPA Factsheet*, UNDPA, United Nations, New York, USA, 30 Nov 2015; Accessed on the internet on 24 May 2017, at: http://www.un.org/undpa/sites/www.un.org.undpa/files/ppbm_November_2015.pdf),

UNDPA (2015): *Diplomacy and Mediation*, UN DPA website; Accessed on the internet on 8 Nov 2015, at: http://www.un.org/undpa/diplomacy-mediation

UNDPA (2016): *Peacemaking and Preventive Diplomacy*, UNDPA, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 4 Dec 2016, at: http://www.un.org/undpa/en/overview

UNDPA (2016b): *Political Missions and Good Offices Engagements*; Accessed on the internet on 28 March 2016 at: http://www.un.org/undpa/in-the-field/overview

UNDPA (2017): *Preventive Diplomacy*, DPA, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 11 March 2017, at: http://www.un.org/undpa/en/diplomacy-mediation

UNGA (2005): *60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome*, UN, USA, 24 October 2005

UNGA (2014): *68/303. Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution,* UN, USA, 13 August 2014

UNNC (2017): *In London, Secretary-General Guterres Spotlights UN Reform Initiatives to Rescue Multilateralism*, UN News Centre, United Nations, NY, USA: Accessed on the internet on 12 May 2017, at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56726#.WRVjgnlMQiQ

UNPC (2017): T*he Peacebuilding Commission (PBC),* UN Peacebuilding Commission, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed on the internet on 22 May 2017, at**:** http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding

UNRCCA (2009): *UNRCCA Programme of Action 2009-11*, UNRCCA, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan.

UNRCCA (2012a): *UNRCCA Programme of Action 2012-14,* UNRCCA, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan.

UNRCCA (2012b): *The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia: Five Years*, UNRCCA, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan.

UNRCCA (2015): *UNRCCA Programme of Action 2015-17,* UNRCCA, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan.

UNRCCA (2016): *UNRRCA Mission Statement*, UNRCCA website, Accessed on 28 February 2016, at: http://unrcca.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=9303&language=en-US)
UNSC (2016a), *UN Security Council*, UN USA; Accessed on 9 January 2016, at: http://www.un.org/undpa

UNSC (2015): *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council,* Advance Version, 19th Supplement (2014–2015), United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNDP; Accessed on the internet on 28 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2014-2015/Part_X/2014-2015_Part_X.pdf#page=84

UNSC (2015): *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council:* United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Advance Version, 19th Supplement (2014 – 2015)
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2014-2015/Part_X/2014-2015_Part_X.pdf#page=84

UNSC (2016): *The Security Council*, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed on the internet on 31 March 2016, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc

UNSC (2016b): *UN Security Council*, UN, USA; Accessed on 8 January 2016, at: http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc

UNSG (1992): Boutros Boutros-Ghali: *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping*, Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, (A/47/277 – S/24111), p13, UN, New York, USA

UNSG (2011a): Ban, KI-Moon: *Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results, Report of the United Nations Secretary Genera*l, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSG (2011b): Ban, KI-Moon (2011): *Factsheet - Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results on the* Report of the United Nations Secretary General, pp1-2, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSG (2016): United Nations Peacemaker, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed on the internet on 31 March 2016 at: http://peacemaker.un.org/peacemaking-mandate/secretary-general

UNSG (2017) Antonio Guterres: *Secretary-General, in First Address to Security Council Since Taking Office, Sets Restoring Trust, Preventing Crises as United Nations Priorities*, UN Press, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 12 March 2017, at:
https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12673.doc.htm

UNSG (2017b): Antonio Guterres: *Guterres grateful for US support as largest UN contributor, Will work with Member States on reform*, UN Secretary General Statement, UN News Centre, United Nations, NY, USA, 16 March 2017; Accessed on the internet on 19 April 2017, at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56364#.WPcdmOawfIU

UNSG (2017c): *Security Council Must Take Human Rights into Account in All Deliberations*, *Secretary-General Stresses during Thematic Debate*, UN Security Council, SC/12797, 7926th Meeting (PM), 18 April 2017, United Nations, NY, USA: Accessed on the internet on 12 May 2017, at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12797.doc.htm

UNSG (A/56/1000–S/2002/737): 11 July 2002: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/56/875–S/2002/278): 18 March 2002: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/64/705–S/2010/127): 10 March 2010: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/64/911–S/2010/463): 14 September 2010: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/69/647–S/2014/876): 9 December 2014: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/70/601–S/2015/942: 10 December 2015**:** *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/70/924–S/2016/532):10 June 2016: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/70/1033–S/2016/768): 7 September 2016: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/71/682–S/2016/1049): 13 December 2016: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/71/826–S/2017/189): 3 March 2017: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

USFOR-A (2017): '*Afghan government controls just 57 percent of its territory, U.S. watchdog says'*, Washington Post, 2 February 2017; Accessed on the internet on 7April2017, at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/02/afghan-government-controls-just-57-percent-of-its-territory-says-u-s-watchdog/?utm_term=.16c101e61625

USIP (2017a): *US Afghanistan Veterans Recall the Costs of War*, USIP; Accessed on the internet on 27 March 2017, at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/03/us-afghanistan-veterans-recall-costs-war

WP (2015): '*This map explains why Obama decided to leave thousands of troops in Afghanistan'*, Washington Post, USA, 15 October 2015; Accessed on the internet on 9 April 2017,at:https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/15/this-map-explains-why-obama-decided-to-leave-thousands-of-troops-in-afghanistan/?utm_term=.1fc8e194ec2f

WP (2017): '*Afghan government controls just 57 percent of its territory, U.S. watchdog says'*, Washington Post, 2 February 2017; Accessed on the internet on 7April2017, at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/02/afghan-government-controls-just-57-percent-of-its-territory-says-u-s-watchdog/?utm_term=.16c101e61625

Zartman, IW (1998): *Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution*, Ditchley Conference Report No. D98/15, 4-6 December 1998

Zyck, SA and Muggah, R (2012): *Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention: Obstacles and Opportunities*, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development , 1(1), pp68-75

Bibliography

Ahmadzai, A (2015): *Securing Stability in Afghanistan*, The Diplomat, 2 Dec 2015

Chesterman, S (2013): *Peace-Building and State-Building*, Edited by Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur, The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, Oxford Handbook Online, March 2013

Chetail, V (2009): Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon (Editor), Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

Gaer, F (1994): *Ethnic Conflict And Preventive Diplomacy: New Challenges For International Organizations, Nation-States And Nongovernmental Organizations,* ASIL Proceedings, 88 Am. Society International Law Proc, pp146- 154 , 1994

Gowan, R (2011): *Floating Down the River of History: Ban Ki-moon and Peacekeeping, 2007-201,* Global Governance 17 (2011), pp399-416

Gowan, R (2012): *Less Bound to the Desk: Ban Ki-moon, the UN, and Preventive Diplomacy,* Global Governance 18 (2012), pp387-404

MacGinty, R (2006): *No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords*, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies Series, Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire, UK.

MacGinty, R & Richmond, O (2013): *The Local Turn In Peace Building: A Critical Agenda For Peace*, Third World Quarterly, 34:5, 24 June 2013, pp763-783

Malik, H (1981): *Editorial Note: The Failure of Three Track Negotiations on Afghanistan*, Journal of Southeast Asian and Middle East Studies, Vol IV, No.3, Spring 1981, pp3-6

Melber, H (2012): *In a Time of Peace Which Is No Peace: Security and Development Fifty Years After Dag Hammarskjold*, Global Governance 18 (2012), pp267-272

Mukhopadhyay, M (2012): *The Slide from Withdrawal to War: The UN Secretary General's Failed Effort in Afghanistan*, International Negotiation 17 (2012), pp485-517

Newman, E (2011): *A Human Security Peace-Building Agenda,* Third World Quarterly, 32:10, pp1737-1756, 17 November 2011

Putz, C (2015): *Afghanistan's 32-Year Refugee Crisis*, The Diplomat, 9 September 2015; Accessed on the internet, at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/afghanistans-32-year-refugee-crisis/

RECCA (2012): *Overview of the Fifth Regional Economic Cooperation Conference for Afghanistan*, RECCA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 26-27 March 2012.

Roberts, Ivor (2009): *Satow's Diplomatic Practice* (Ed), Sixth Edition, Oxford University Press

Roberts, Ivor (2010): *Digital Age Diplomacy: Time To Text*, The World Today, Vol. 66, No. 1 (January 2010), pp. 23-24, Published by: Royal Institute of International Affairs; Accessed on 5 October 2016, at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41962436

Scanlon, S (2015): *We Don't Know What We Don't Know—But We Can Learn: Lessons Learned From Afghanistan On Women, Peace And Security,* 6th International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics (AHFE 2015) and the Affiliated Conferences, AHFE 2015, Science Direct, 3 (2015), pp4106 – 4114

Sokalski, HJ (2003): *An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, USA.

Solomon, H (2003): *Towards Sustainable Peace: Reflection on Preventive Diplomacy in Africa* (Editor), Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa.

S/RES/647 [**1996**]**:** *The Situation Relating to Afghanistan*, 11 January 1990, UN Security Council Resolution, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1076 (1996): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 22 October 1996, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1077 (1996): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 22 October 1996, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1193 (1998): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 28 August 1998, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at:

S/RES/1214 (1998): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 8 December 1998, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1267 (1999): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 15 October 1999, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1333 (2000): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 19 December 2000, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1363 (2001): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 30 July 2001, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1378 (2001): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 14 November 2001, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1383 (2001): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 6 December 2001, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1388 (2002): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 15 January 2002, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1390 (2002): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 28 January 2002, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1413 (2002): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 23 May 2002, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1471 (2003): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 28 March 2003, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1510 (2003): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 13 October 2003, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1563 (2004): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 17 September 2004, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1623 (2005): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 13 September 2005, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1707 (2006): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 12 September 2006, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1776 (2007): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 19 September 2007, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1833 (2008): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 22 September 2008, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1890 (2009): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 8 October 2009, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1917 (2010): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 22 March 2010, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/1943 (2010): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 13 October 2010, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/2041 (2012): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 22 March 2012, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/2082 (2012): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 14 December 2012, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/2083 (2012): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 14 December 2012, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

S/RES/2096 (2013): *UN Security Council Resolutions (on Afghanistan),* 19 March 2013, UN Security Council, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 5 February 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

SRSG (2008a): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **10 July 2008**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2008b): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **14 October 2008**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2009a): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **19 March 2009**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2009b): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **9 June 2009**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2009c): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **29 September 2009**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2010a): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **6 January 2010**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2010b): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **18 March 2010**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2010c): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **30 June 2010**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2010d): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **29 September 2010**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2010e): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **22 December 2010**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2011a): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **17 March 2011**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2011b): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **6 July 2011**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2011c): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **20 September 2011**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2012a): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **20 March 2012**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2012b): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **20 September 2012**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2012c): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **19 December 2012**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2013a): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **20 June 2013**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2013b): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **19 September 2013**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2013c): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **17 December 2013**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2014): *Regional Economic Cooperation in Central Asia: Challenges and Perspectives,* published in "Afghanistan Reconnected: Regional Economic Security Beyond 2014" Report on the Abu Dhabi Consultations 2013-2014, East West Institute, May 2014

SRSG (2014a): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **17 March 2014**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2014b): SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan, **25 June 2014**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2014c): SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan, **18 September 2014**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2014d): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **18 December2014**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2015a): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **16 March 2015**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2015b): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **22 June 2015**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2015c): SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan, **17 September 2015**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2015d): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **21 December 2015**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2016a): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **15 March 2016**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2016b): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **21 June 2016**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2016c): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **14 September 2016**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

SRSG (2016d): *SRSG Briefing to the UN Security Council by the SRSG for Afghanistan*, **19 December 2016**, UN Security Council, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed at UNAMA website, SRSG Briefings to Security Council, on 2 March 2017 at: https://unama.unmissions.org/srsg-briefings-security-council

UN (2004): *High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,* UN, USA, 2 December 2004

UN (2006): *United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (A/RES/60/288), UN, USA, 8 Sep 2006

UN (2015): *Factsheet - United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Missions*, UN, New York, 30 Nov 2015

UNAMA PMB (2016a): *UN Afghanistan Population Movement Bulletin*, UNAMA, Issue 1, March 2016; Accessed on the internet on 25 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA PMB (2016b): *UN Afghanistan Population Movement Bulletin*, UNAMA, Issue 2, April 2016; Accessed on the internet on 25 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA PMB (2016c): *UN Afghanistan Population Movement Bulletin*, UNAMA, Issue 3, May 2016; Accessed on the internet on 25 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA PMB (2016d): *UN Afghanistan Population Movement Bulletin*, UNAMA, Issue 4, June 2016; Accessed on the internet on 25 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA PMB (2016e): *UN Afghanistan Population Movement Bulletin*, UNAMA, Issue 5, Sep 2016; Accessed on the internet on 25 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA QN (2013b): *Quarterly Newsletter*, UNAMA, Volume 3, Issue 2, Summer, June2013; Accessed on the internet on 15 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

UNAMA QN (2015c): *Quarterly Newsletter*, UNAMA, Volume 5, Issue 3, Autumn 2015; Accessed on the internet on 22 February 2017, at: https://unama.unmissions.org/publications

United Nations Peacekeeping Reports (2011-15): United Nations Reports, United Nations, New York, USA; Accessed on the internet on 4 November 2015: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/reports.shtml

UNRCCA (2010): *United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia: Factsheet*, UNRCCA, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan.

UNRCCA (2013): "Challenges in Addressing the Illicit Drugs Problems in the Context of Withdrawal of International Forces from Afghanistan in 2014", November 2013.

UNSC Transcript (S/PV.7403): *UN Security Council, 7403rd meeting,* Monday, 16 March 2015, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSC Meeting Coverage (SC/11817): *UN Security Council, 7403rd meeting*, Monday, 16 March 2015, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSC Transcript (S/PV.7467): *UN Security Council, 7467th meeting*, Monday 22 June 2015, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSC Meeting Coverage (SC/11936): *UN Security Council, 7467th meeting*, Monday 22 June 2015, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSC Transcript (S/PV.7526): *UN Security Council, 7526th meeting*, Thursday 17 September 2015, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSC Meeting Coverage (SC/12050): *UN Security Council, 7526th meeting*, Thursday 17 September 2015, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSC Transcript (S/PV.7591): *UN Security Council, 7591st meeting*, Monday 21 December 2015, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSC Meeting Coverage (SC/12175): *UN Security Council, 7591st meeting*, Monday 21 December 2015, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSC Transcript (S/PV.7645): *UN Security Council, 7645th meeting*, Tuesday 15 March 2016, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSC Meeting Coverage (SC/12283): *UN Security Council, 7645th meeting*, Tuesday 15 March 2016, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSC Transcript (S/PV.7722): *UN Security Council, 7772nd meeting*, Tuesday 21 June 2016, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSC Meeting Coverage (SC/12412): *UN Security Council, 7772nd meeting*, Tuesday 21 June 2016, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSC Transcript (S/PV.7771): *UN Security Council, 7771st meeting*, Wednesday 14 September 2016, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSC Meeting Coverage (SC/12518): *UN Security Council, 7771st meeting*, Wednesday 14 September 2016, United Nations, New York, USA

UNSG (1997): Annan, Kofi: *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform*, Secretary General's Report (A/51/950), United Nations, New York, USA, 14 July 1997

UNSG (2000): Annan, Kofi: *We the Peoples - The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, United Nations, New York, USA, 3 April 2000

UNSG (2002): Annan, Kofi: *Strengthening the UN: An Agenda for Further Change*, United Nations, New York, USA, 9 September 2002

UNSG (2005): Annan, Kofi: *United We Stand,* Wall Street Journal, New York, USA, 24 June 2005

UNSG (2005): Annan, Kofi*: In Larger Freedom: A Challenge to the United Nations and to the South*, United Nations, New York, USA, 2005

UNSG (2007): Ban, KI-Moon: *Secretary General's Report on UN System-Wide Coherence*, United Nations, New York, USA, 3 April 2007

UNSG (A/51/929-S/1997/482): 16 June 1997: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/52/358-S/1997/719): 17 September 1997: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/52/682-S/1997/894): 14 November 1997: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/52/826- S/1998/222): 17 March 1998: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/52/957-S/1998/532): 19 June 1998: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/53/455-S/1998/913): 2 October 1998: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/53/889-S/1999/362): 31 March 1999: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/53/1002-S/1999/698): 21 June 1999: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/54/378-S/1999/994): 21 September 1999: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/54/918–S/2000/581): 16 June 2000**:** *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/55/393–S/2000/875): 18 September 2000: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/55/633–S/2000/1106): 20 November 2000: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (S/2001/241): 20 March 2001: Report of the Secretary-General on the humanitarian implications of the measures imposed by Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/55/907–S/2001/384): 19 April 2001: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/55/1028–S/2001/789): 17 August 2001: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (S/2001/1086): 19 November 2001: *Report of the Secretary-General on the Humanitarian Implications of the Measures Imposed by Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) on the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control*, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/56/681–S/2001/1157): 6 December 2001: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (S/2001/1215): 18 December 2001: *Report of the Secretary-General on the Humanitarian Implications of the Measures Imposed by Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) on the Territory of Afghanistan under Taliban Control*, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/57/487–S/2002/1173): 21 October 2002**:** *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/57/762–S/2003/333): 18 March 2003: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/57/850–S/2003/754): 23 July 2003: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (S/2003/1212): 30 December 2003: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/58/742–S/2004/230): 19 March 2004: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/58/868–S/2004/634): 12 August 2004: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/59/581–S/2004/925): 26 November 2004: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/59/744–S/2005/183): 18 March 2005: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/60/224–S/2005/525): 12 August 2005: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/60/712–S/2006/145): 7 March 2006: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/61/326–S/2006/727): 11 September 2006**:** *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/61/799–S/2007/152): 15 March 2007: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/62/345–S/2007/555): 21 September 2007: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/62/722–S/2008/159): 6 March 2008: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (S/2008/434): 3 July 2008: *Special report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1806 (2008) on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan*, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017,at:http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/63/372–S/2008/617): 23 September 2008: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/63/751–S/2009/135): 10 March 2009: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/63/892–S/2009/323): 23 June 2009: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/64/364–S/2009/475): 22 September 2009: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/64/613–S/2009/674): 28 December 2009: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (S/2010/318): 16 June 2010: *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 40 of Resolution 1917 (2010)*, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/65/612–S/2010/630): 10 December 2010: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (S/2011/55): 3 February 2011**:** *Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Afghanistan*, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (S/2011/120): 9 March 2011: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/65/873–S/2011/381): 23 June 2011: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/66/369–S/2011/590): 21 September 2011: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/66/604–S/2011/772): 13 December 2011: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/66/728–S/2012/133*): 5 March 2012: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/66/855–S/2012/462): 20 June 2012: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/67/354–S/2012/703): 13 September 2012: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/67/619–S/2012/907): 6 December 2012: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/67/778–S/2013/133): 5 March 2013: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/67/889*–S/2013/350*): 13 June 2013: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/67/981–S/2013/535): 6 September 2013: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/68/645–S/2013/721): 6 December 2013: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/68/789–S/2014/163): 7 March 2014: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/68/910–S/2014/420*): 18 June 2014: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/69/540–S/2014/656): 9 September 2014: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/69/929–S/2015/422): 10 June 2015: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/70/359–S/2015/684): 1 September 2015: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

UNSG (A/70/775–S/2016/218*): 7 March 2016: *The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security*, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations, NY, USA; Accessed on the internet on 23 Feb 2017, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/

USIP (2017b): *United States Institute of Peace: Conflict Management Module*, US Online Training on OSCE, United States Institute of Peace: USA; Accessed on the internet on 12 March 2017, at: http://react.usip.org/pub/m3/p4.html

Recommended Bibliography: International Relations Theories

Adams, KR (2013): *Structural Realism: The Consequences of Great Power Politics*, in: Sterling Folker, Jennifer: *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, 2nd ed, Lynne Rienner Publishers

Alderson, K and Hurrell, A (2000): *Hedley Bull on International Society*, London: Palgrave

Axelrod, R and Keohane, R (1984): *Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions*, *World Politics*, Vol. 37, 1984

Boyer, Mark A and Butler, MJ (2013): *Public Good Liberalism: The Problems of Collective Action*, in: Sterling Folker, Jennifer: *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, 2nd ed, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Brown, C (1995*): *International Theory and International Society: The Viability of the Middle Way?*, Review of International Studies, Vol. 21, 1995

Bull, H (2002): *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London: Palgrave

Brown, C (2009): *Structural Realism, Classical Realism & Human Nature*, International Relations, Vol. 23

Deudney, D and Ikenberry, G (1999): *The Nature and Sources of the Liberal International Order*, Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, 1999

Doyle, M (1986): *Liberalism and World Politics,* American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No.4, 1986

Dunne, Tim (2010): *The English School*, in: Dunne et al: *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Freyberg-Inan, A (2013): *World System Theory: A Bird's-Eye View of the World Capitalist Order*, in: Sterling Folker, Jennifer: Making Sense of International Relations Theory, 2nd ed, Lynne Rienner Publishers

Guzzini, S (1993): *Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis*, International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3

Harrison, E (2002): *Waltz, Kant and Systemic Approaches to International Relations*, Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, No.1

Hoffmann, MJ (2013): *Social (De)Construction: The Failure of a Multinational State*, in: Sterling Folker, Jennifer: *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, 2nd ed, Lynne Rienner Publishers

Ikenberry, J (2009): *Liberal Internationalism 3.0*, Perspectives on Politics, 7(1), March 2009

Mearsheimer, J (1994): *The False Promise of International Institutions*, International Security, Vol. 19 (3), pp. 5-49

Mearsheimer, J (2007): *Structural Realism* in Dunne, T. et al (eds): International Relations Theories: Discipline & Diversity, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Taliaferro, JW (2013): *Neoclassical Realism: The Psychology of Great Power Intervention*, in: Sterling Folker, Jennifer: Making Sense of International Relations Theory, 2nd ed, Lynne Rienner Publishers

Waltz, K (1979): *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw-Hill

Waltz, K (1986): *Reductionist and Systemic Theories*, in: R. Keohane (ed): *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press

Waltz, K (1993): '*The Emerging Structure of International Politics*', International Security, Vol. 18

Wendt, A (1992): *Anarchy is What States Make of It,* International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2

Williams, A (2012): *Conflict Prevention in Practice: From Rhetoric to Reality*, Canberra: Australian Civil-Military Centre

END