AGREEMENT THROUGH OPPOSITION

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINT IN THE 'SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS' OF THE UNITED STATES

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INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICS OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Since 1945 the United States (US) has constructed a global web of 'special relationships' with states that share its political values, economic philosophy, and security predicament. Whether we understand these countries as 'clients', 'friends', 'allies' or 'subordinates', these relationships are set apart from others by the high level of cooperation and the remarkable endurance over the decades. One question rarely asked of these relations, however, is what explains variation in the level of cooperation over time. Each of the 'special relationships' of the US has waxed-and-waned over the years, but the sources of this variation have not been fully uncovered. In this thesis I argue that changes in domestic politics within each of the allied states are chiefly responsible for variance in cooperation. I demonstrate how a focus on political parties helps us to understand the effects of both political ideology and legislative constraint in foreign affairs. Though previous works in the discipline have addressed the manner in which ideology and constraint impact upon state behaviour, the approach offered here centres of the *interaction* between these twin-facets of domestic politics. I show how the impact of party ideology on cooperation is contingent upon the degree of legislative constraint facing the governing party. Specifically, I argue that when the governing parties in two states are more ideologically proximate than their respective political oppositions, low levels of legislative constraint promote international cooperation whereas high levels undermine it. Conversely, when the governing parties are less ideologically proximate than the opposition, high levels of legislative constraint serve to *promote* cooperation

and low levels of constraint work *against* it. I label this the 'agreement through opposition' conjecture.

I offer two empirical tests of this conjecture. The first is a comparative case-study of different British governments in the Anglo-American 'special relationship'. I present four 'diverse cases' selected from different configurations of the independent variables of political ideology and legislative constraint. The four cases I consider are: (i) Churchill's Second Administration, 1953-1955 (high ideological proximity, high constraint); (ii) Macmillan's Administration, 1960-1963 (high ideological proximity, low constraint); (iii) Wilson's First Administration, 1966-1968 (low ideological proximity, low constraint); and (iv) the Wilson and Callaghan Administration, 1974-1976 (low ideological proximity, high constraint). This selection allows for an assessment of the relative success of the 'agreement through opposition' conjecture relative to other accounts. The cases by-and-large conform to the predictions offered in my argument. Though ideologically proximate to the US, Churchill's government is constrained by the ideologically disparate opposition, and cooperation accordingly suffers. This is not the case for Macmillan, who is able to maintain high levels of cooperation with the US as he is unconstrained by the opposition and – like Churchill – a staunch 'Atlanticist'. Relations are at a low-ebb during Wilson's government of the late 1960s, but pick-up noticeably in the mid-1970s when Wilson and Callaghan are again in government, though this time with substantial constraints on their ability to steer a leftist course in foreign affairs.

The second test is a quantitative analysis of cooperation between the US' most important allies (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,

Spain and the United Kingdom (UK)) from 1945 to 2000. The aim of the statistical analysis is to generalise the findings beyond the immediate Anglo-American case and to control for potentially confounding variables. I utilise various sources of domestic political and systemic data to construct variables express the theoretical predictions of realism, neoliberalism, constructivism, the 'new liberalism' and the 'agreement through opposition conjecture'. I then regress each of the variables against the level of cooperation between the state and the US for each year using multiple regression techniques. The results indicate that there is a significant and substantive positive relationship between the 'agreement through opposition' conjecture and the level of cooperation. One caveat to this finding is that the relationship is linear rather than curvilinear (as may have been expected), a likely result of a bias in manifesto data which reports US party positions far to the left of their actual position. The linearity of the relationship arises, I claim, because the allies are almost always 'to the left' of the US politically. The results also indicate that the realist and constructivist predictions are partially borne out in the data, but that the liberal and neoliberal predictions are not.

The implications of the results for both the empirical puzzle itself and for the discipline more broadly are important. With regard to the politics of the US' 'special relationships' the results indicate that variance in the level of cooperation is a systematic phenomenon with many of its causes rooted in complex domestic political processes. This finding has practical as well as theoretical significance. It cautions us to recognise the naturally fluctuating pattern of alliance politics and to guard against the tendency to mistake short-term shifts in cooperation for broad structural change. The results also suggest the utility of theoretical and cross-disciplinary combinations

in helping to explain real-world phenomena in international relations. Using concepts from Comparative Politics (CP) in tandem with those from International Relations (IR) increases the theoretical and methodological sophistication of our arguments and opens up new avenues for further study. Moreover, there are implications for the theory-history debate in international studies. IR theorists have monopolised system-level theoretical explanations whilst historians have laboured at describing the politics of alliances over time, meaning the systematic nature of domestic politics in foreign affairs has been lost between theory and history. The results here suggest that much of what historians are studying, and IR theorists are not, is systematic. A full understanding of US alliance politics, then, requires the contribution of both history and theory.

The argument proceeds in three distinct stages. The first section outlines the empirical puzzle and situates the research question of the thesis within the theoretical and historical literature on US-ally relations. Here a distinction is made between two patterns of cooperation – structured relations and nested variance – the latter of which has been neglected in studies of the 'special relationships' of the US. This is partly, I claim, the result of disciplinary 'blinkers', and the difficulty of finding a body of literature which studies the systematic impact of domestic political attributes on state behaviour. The second section of the thesis seeks to remedy this situation by developing a theory of domestic politics and international cooperation. Starting from the necessity of cross-theoretical and cross-disciplinary exchange, I argue that a combination of IR and CP, and (from within IR) liberalism and constructivism, allows us to specify the relationship between political ideology and legislative constraint and to discern the international implications of both. From this theoretical position I

derive the ‘agreement through opposition’ conjecture, which I specify in greater detail in a spatial model based on the ‘two-level games’ approach. The third section conducts two tests of this theoretical model. I argue for a mixed-methods strategy based around a division of labour, whereby qualitative case-study methods allow for detailed process-tracing and help to uncover causal mechanisms, whilst large-n statistical analysis generalises the model beyond the cases and helps to control for confounding variables. At the end of these three sections I conclude by offering some thoughts on the implications of the argument for both theory and policy.

[1] EXPLAINING VARIANCE IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The extent of cooperation or conflict is a crucial issue in contemporary world politics. The 'conflict-cooperation' dimension is one of the most commonly used analytic tools for comprehending interstate relations. Though thinking in terms of cooperation and conflict is useful, it is a somewhat blunt tool for analysing the nature of international interactions. I suggest an alternative approach centred on 'patterns of cooperation', which understands that different types of cooperative or conflictual interactions have distinct causes, varying logics and a distinct relationship towards one another. I distinguish here between two patterns; structured relations and nested variance. These are not the only patterns it may be possible to discern, but they are probably the most important. These 'ideal-types' provide a useful way of summarising complex trends in world politics.[1]

'Structured relations' are long-term embedded relationships of conflict and cooperation. They persist over lengthy periods of time, providing a relatively stable baseline level of cooperation. There are more or less cooperative structured relations; some are marked by conflict or strife, others by a remarkable degree of consensus. Both variants have as their cause predominantly structural or systemic determinants, whether we understand this to refer to the distribution of capabilities, the level of

[1] Weber (1947), p. 118

interdependence or the thickness of inter-subjective norms. In other words, it is broad global factors which are most often invoked to explain shifts in structured relations.[2]

'Nested variance', on the other hand, describes frequent and systematic fluctuations in cooperation. This variation is embedded within the contours of broader structured relations, yet operates in a largely separate manner. The causes of nested variance, unlike structured relations, are less amenable to explanation by systemic factors. This is because global change in capabilities, institutions and norms occurs so infrequently. More important for explaining variance are changes rooted in the domestic political environments of the states themselves, as these vary systematically and in accordance with the appropriate time-frame.

The distinction between structured relations and nested variance highlights an important – and heretofore underappreciated – problem with IR theory; that it has focused overwhelmingly on structured relations at the expense of nested variance. Consider, as an example, explanations of the Cold War. IR theorists understand the Cold War, variously, as the operation of the balance of power,[3] as a 'security dilemma' stemming from misperception,[4] as a mixed-motives game of moderated competition,[5] or as an ideational construct based on 'othering' and inter-subjective fear.[6] Yet none of these accounts are able to explain (or *try* to explain) the varying shifts in intensity which occurred at frequent junctures during the 'conflict' itself.[7] From their broad vantage point IR theorists tended to view these changes as

[2] Where domestic political causes are involved, these tend to be 'revolutionary' and infrequent.
[3] Gaddis (1986); Waltz (1979)
[4] Mearsheimer (2001); Schweller (1994)
[5] Lipson (1984), p. 13
[6] Buzan & Wæver (2009); Weldes (1996), pp. 295-300; Wendt (1992)
[7] Cox (1990); Gaddis (1982); Lebow (1999)

harbingers of the end of the Cold War (or the emergence of a wholly new structure),[8] but in truth they were nothing of the sort. Rather, they are better understood as short-term derivations from a conflictual mean, the sources of which were as much about domestic politics as anything else.

There are several reasons why IR has neglected nested variance. One is the assumption that day-to-day politics is 'not IR'.[9] Another reason is that some view short-term change as random 'noise' somewhat akin to a visual representation of the error term in statistical models. Finally, some see these issues lying at the margins of international affairs within 'low politics'. On closer inspection, however, these reasons do not stand up to scrutiny. Even relatively minor shifts in cooperation can have important consequences. For example, decreasing cooperation may result in lower international standing, the inability to realise mutual-gains, a weakened security position and a lack of moral or electoral support internationally. If variance is random, then it is of course difficult to theorise; but the problem is that in ignoring the empirical issue we have not even begun to look for the systematic causes of variance. What is required is a reformulation of IR's analytical tools in order to account for nested variance; after all, to the extent our theories do not match the world we see, the onus is on us to change them.[10]

[8] Halle (1967); Halliday (1984); Seabury (1967)
[9] Waltz (1986), p. 343; Waltz (1996)
[10] Strange (1994), p. 209

IR's inability to account for nested variance is not limited to a small sub-set of examples. It pervades the discipline. In this thesis I concern myself with a distinct, yet important, empirical example; the 'special relationships' of the US. As is well-known, the US has – since the end of the Second World War – amassed an unprecedented collection of allies within the 'West', states whom the US considers friendly, and with which relations are consistently high. There are several attributes which unite the US' postwar allies; they are almost all democratic, most were firmly on the US' side during the Cold War, they are clustered around Europe and the Americas, and they tend to be culturally similar. These relations are important, particularly given the US' predominant position in the international system since at least 1945,[11] and almost without question from 1990.[12] In particular, the level of cooperation between the US and its allies has important distributional implications, is of prime importance for the security of the allies themselves, confers access to institutional and market-based 'public goods' provided by the US, and – finally – helps to determine the expected behaviour (both domestic and international) of the ally in question. In short, the level of cooperation between the US and its allies is of paramount importance for both the study and conduct of international affairs.

The academic literature on this topic reflects this level of importance. Scholars have provided a myriad number of analytical interpretations of US alliance politics. For some they take the form of 'patron-client' relationships, [13] for others a complex form

[11] Cox (2001), p. 314
[12] Krauthammer (1990)
[13] Sylvan & Majeski (2009)

of 'binding',[14] and for some they are just 'alliances'.[15] Some view the relationships as 'special',[16] whilst others more pejoratively assert that they are 'imperialist'[17] or 'hierarchical'.[18] Recently the idea that these relations are best understood as 'tributaries' has come to the fore.[19] In spite of their differences, these accounts all aim to explain the *nature* of US alliances.[20] They want to account for the remarkably high level of cooperation witnessed. In doing so, they rely on a variety of causal mechanisms, each of which resonates with a particular theoretical tradition in IR. Realist accounts focus on the role of power, stressing the need to balance the Soviet Union[21] and the role of US hegemony in underpinning the institutional bedrock of this cooperative relation.[22] The neoliberal story, in contrast, points to the interest in achieving Pareto-superior gains[23] the role of institutions in promoting the necessary trust and cooperation,[24] and the tendency for democratic regimes to foster cooperation amongst themselves.[25] Constructivists also stress the importance of a mutual liberal-democratic *identity*[26] and the importance of feedback from shared practices[27] and reciprocal interaction[28] in grounding the relationship.

In the parlance of structured relations and nested variance, these explanations fit squarely within the former. They aim at explaining the broad contours of these

[14] Deudney (2007)
[15] Walt (1985)
[16] Dumbrell & Schäfer (2009)
[17] Ferguson (2005); Johnson (2001); Lundestad (1986)
[18] Lake (2007); Sharman (forthcoming)
[19] Khong (2013)
[20] How one labels these relationships is important. Words such as 'empire', 'ally' and 'special' do not carry neutral meaning. Yet for the purposes of this essay I do not wish to become bogged down in the politics of semantics, and I use such terms merely to refer to the relation in question.
[21] Mearsheimer (1990)
[22] Kindleberger (1981); Krasner (1976); Webb & Krasner (1989)
[23] Nye (1988); Powell (1991); Snidal (1991)
[24] Axelrod & Keohane (1985); Fearon (1998); Keohane (1982); Goldstein *et al*. (2000)
[25] Doyle (1986); Dunne (2009), p. 109; Leeds (1999), p. 991; Maoz & Russett (1993)
[26] Buzan (1993); Jackson (2003); Kahl (1998); Risse-Kappen (1995); Wendt (1994)
[27] Adler (2008); Williams & Neumann (2000)
[28] Müller (2004); Risse (1999); Risse (2000); Wendt (1992), Wendt (1999), pp. 170-171

relationships, which essentially constitute a cooperative structured relation; various systemic factors have pushed these particular states into a relation of continued and sustained cooperation. But although these relationships may be 'special', they have never been perfect; indeed, the level of cooperation between the US and its clients has waxed-and-waned over the years. Occurring within the contours of the broader cooperative structural relation in which it is embedded, the nested variance in the relationship has introduced substantial deviations from the baseline over time. Figure 1 below illustrates both the structure and variation in these relations; the high level of cooperation is testament that these interstate relations really are 'special' whilst the variance points to the tendency for the strength of cooperation to oscillate over time.

Yet the question of what explains the ups-and-downs of US-ally cooperation over time has rarely been addressed. Instead, scholarly engagements with changes in the level of cooperation have tended to mistake day-to-day shifts for broad structural changes.[29] This tendency has resulted in near-endless proclamations of major 'schisms' within the West.[30] Needless to say, insofar as they have been based on a misunderstanding, these prophetic claims have not been borne out. The aim of this thesis is to provide an explanation for the nested variance in the level of cooperation between the US and its allies. In doing so, the hope is that we will be better placed to understand why this variation occurs and what this means for our understanding of international politics. It is worth stressing that the aim is not to account for what makes these relationships special in the first place, a task already well-accomplished, but rather to ask what explains cross-temporal variation from the already high cooperative baseline.

[29] Wohlforth (1999), p. 37
[30] E.g. Asmus (2003), p. 20; Chace & Ravenal (1976); Chiozza (2009); Coker (1992); Cox (2005); Dahrendorf *et al*. (1986); Kagan (2003); Schaetzel (1975)



Figure 1 *Level of cooperation between the US and selected allies, 1945-2000, measured as a proportion of UN voting similarity. (Note that the gradual decline in cooperation over time is likely a structural phenomenon. The nested variance is identifiable in the frequent up-and-down movements in each country's line).*

In seeking to explain variance in cooperation it is important that the theoretical tools utilised are suited to the task at hand. There are three elements of any inquiry into nested variance which are required in order to gain a full understanding. The first is explanation. The theoretical framework must be able to do more than simply *describe* variation over time; it must also be able to *explain* it. Though this does not mandate a 'covering law' approach to social inquiry, it does require that any account provides not only narrative, but is also able to account theoretically for variation. The second element concerns politics. There are two reasons to expect changes in domestic political attributes to be particularly important in explaining nested variance: First, historical and journalistic accounts of shifts in cooperation often centre on domestic political change as the proximate cause (but do not seek to theorise it). Second, domestic political change co-varies with frequent chance in structure which is unattributable to infrequent systemic causes. Accordingly, our theoretical account must feature an adequate account of domestic politics. Thirdly, cooperation is itself a necessarily relational dependent variable. Thus we have no explanation in the absence of a corresponding account of the role which domestic politics plays in international affairs, that is, one which is able to 'internationalise' domestic politics.

The reason for outlining the theoretical requirements of explaining variance in cooperation is that it highlights the issues facing existing theoretical and historical accounts of US-ally relations. Here I discuss four distinct literatures allied to the study of international politics; mainstream IR theory, second-image IR, historical accounts, and CP. My claim is that none of these literatures alone is able to fulfil the

requirements listed above for explaining nested variance, and that this goes some way in explaining why it has seldom been studied up to now.

MAINSTREAM IR THEORY

Mainstream IR theories – specifically realism, neoliberalism and constructivism – can explain structured relations remarkably well, offering explanations based on power, interests and identity respectively.

Realists view states as security-seeking actors in an anarchic international environment where the only means of survival is through the adoption of 'self-help' strategies. Relations of enmity are, for realists, the natural state of affairs, as the condition of anarchy prevents any guarantees to underpin trust and cooperation between nations. This leaves states to adopt strategies of balancing[31] and bandwagoning[32] to counter emerging threats, strategies which risk setting off a spiralling race to develop the greater number of offensive capabilities.[33] Though realists are open to the possibility of cooperative strategies emerging out of common threats,[34] these are transient in nature; once the threat disappears, so too does the illusion of cooperation.[35] For realists, then, cooperative structured relations should be brief and transitory, or at least embedded within an international configuration of power which prevents shifting balances or rival coalitions from emerging.[36]

[31] Waltz (1979), p. 117
[32] Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 34-36
[33] Herz (1950)
[34] Glaser (2010), pp. 57-59
[35] Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 51-52
[36] Brooks & Wohlforth (2008); Gilpin (1981)

Neoliberals explain structured relations in terms of the interdependence of preferences and the potential for states to achieve mutual interests through cooperation. When Pareto-superior outcomes are possible, and when unilateral defection is not an issue, cooperation is likely to emerge as the most rational option for states. Long-term cooperative relations generally result from a lengthy 'shadow of the future', the presence of trust, and a degree of certainty as to the intentions of other states.[37] In many cases these functions are provided by regimes, shared-standards, and formal international organizations.[38] More process-oriented scholars writing in this tradition also stress the role of increasing gains in promoting path-dependent outcomes of increasing cooperation, thereby discerning the conditions under which cooperation is likely to 'snowball'.[39] Such accounts help explain how we may move from situations of conflict into more cooperative relations.

Constructivists, in contrast, seek to place identity centre-stage. Overlaps between history, culture and identity buttress cooperative relations, whilst significant divergences tend to promote conflict.[40] In this vein, Wendt claims that power politics does not follow from the assumption of anarchy, but is itself produced by the 'symbolic interaction' of states through a process resembling 'mirroring', which results in the emergence of stable structures of enmity or affinity.[41] Other scholars point to similar processes, but stress the roles played by the embedding of practices and norms of appropriateness[42] and the use of rhetoric, argument and persuasion in

[37] Keohane (1984)
[38] E.g. Abbott & Snidal (1998); Axelrod & Keohane (1985); Krasner (1982)
[39] Pierson (2000)
[40] Checkel (1998); Finnemore & Sikkink (2001), pp. 398-400
[41] Wendt (1992), p. 402
[42] Müller (2004); Neumann (2002), p. 632

transforming the nature of structured relations.[43] Though constructivists sometimes eschew such terminology, the primary explanatory variable in these forms of analysis are the macro inter-subjective structures which cohere around different configurations of identity and distinct patterns of interactions.[44]

Mainstream IR theory is thus able to explain the most enduring patterns of broad competitive and cooperative relations witnessed in contemporary international politics. Yet mainstream approaches struggle to explain nested variance as they are unable to establish variation on the most important independent variables on the same temporal scale that nested variance exhibits. Put simply, the extent of institutionalisation, the distribution of capabilities and overlaps in identity do not change frequently enough.[45] Moreover, when mainstream theories introduce accounts of change into their models, these tend to be long-term and directional, and cannot account for the peaks-and-troughs pattern of nested variance. The 'security dilemma', 'increasing-gains' and 'symbolic interactions' discussed above are cases in point.

SECOND-IMAGE IR APPROACHES

Unlike their state-centric counterparts, second-image research in IR begins from the assumption that state behaviour is (at least in part) determined by factors emanating from the domestic political environment of the state itself.[46] This means that, in theory at least, the second-image is better placed to provide explanations of shorter-term changes in cooperation. Yet, as I shall demonstrate, second-image accounts have struggled to develop an accurate understanding of domestic politics, undermining

[43] Checkel (2001), p. 562; Risse (2000)
[44] E.g. Buzan & Wæver (2009); Reus-Smit (1997); Wendt (1992)
[45] Milner (1992), p. 481
[46] Singer (1961); Waltz (1954), pp. 80-81

their ability to provide a fully-fledged account of nested variance. I consider four examples here; neoclassical realism, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), the 'new liberalism' and 'political' constructivism.

Neoclassical realists argue that structural causes are mediated by such domestic political variables as ideology, perception and legislative constraints.[47] They ask traditional realist questions but find the root-cause in a combination of structural pressures and domestic politics. But there are numerous problems with the understanding of domestic politics offered. For one thing domestic politics is given a very narrow scope; viewing political processes as intervening variables between structure and outcome serves to undermine their causal power. An unintended consequence of this is that these processes are not theorised in any great detail. Thus, explanations treat domestic politics as a residual category, useful for rescuing realist explanations of international politics, but essentially *ad hoc* when considered as accounts of domestic processes.

FPA work addresses the 'ground' of international relations, focusing on the inputs behind individual state behaviour, be they political, bureaucratic, societal or economic.[48] In this manner the approach would appear particularly well-suited to the analysis of the domestic political determinants of state behaviour. But here again there are problems. Some – predominantly British[49] – approaches stress the specificity of individual countries and accordingly shy away from theoretical generalisation.[50] These accounts give us little more than a focused historical overview of the politics

[47] Copeland (2000); Rathbun (2008); Snyder (1991); Snyder (1996); Walt (1987); Zakaria (1992)
[48] Hudson (2005), p. 2
[49] Smith (1983)
[50] E.g. Adomeit *et al*. (1979); Northedge (1976); p.561; Wallace (1975); Waltz (1967)

underpinning a particular nation's foreign policy. Other FPA accounts have prioritised theory development from the beginning.[51] Yet few of these are 'political' in nature. A focus on the immediate decision-making context, rather than the slightly broader political environment, has kept FPA rather disconnected from the study of domestic politics.[52] Those works which have discussed parties and politics have been heavily based around the political institutions and actors in the US and therefore somewhat bereft of generalisable theoretical claims.[53]

The new liberalism asserts that the state acts as a cypher for sub-state interests, the sum-total of which constitute the level of 'policy interdependence' in international politics and set the boundaries within which interstate bargaining occurs.[54] Success in the bargaining arena depends on the combination of power and preferences, with international outcomes largely endogenous to these patterns.[55] From an initial focus on sub-state interest groups, new liberalism has been extended to consider more explicitly *political* determinants of state behaviour, where the focus has been concerned with the impact of domestic political constraint.[56] But the new liberalism's preoccupation with domestic constraints and formal ratification procedures comes at the expense of the more informal party politics of foreign policy. The theory's 'thick'-rationalist ontology obscures the role played by ideology and party politics in foreign policy decisions.[57] Where ideology and parties do appear, it is often in a functional sense as 'organizing devices' and 'social agents' respectively.[58]

[51] Allison (1971); Hill (2003), pp. 224-230
[52] Schuster & Maier (2006), p. 237
[53] Dueck (2010); Khong (2008); Schmidt (2008); Trubowitz (1998); Trubowitz (2011); Zelizer (2010a)
[54] Moravcsik (1997), pp. 517-521; Moravcsik (2008), p. 234
[55] Moravcsik (1993a), pp. 496-507
[56] E.g. Milner (1997); McGillivray (1998); Putnam (1988); Stein (1993)
[57] Müller & Risse-Kappen (1993), p. 48; Pechová (2012), p. 781
[58] E.g. Bearce (2003); Goldstein (1988); Rogowski (1987)

The constructivist variant of the second-image has emerged far more recently. Though the emphasis has been on political ideology,[59] parties have been brought into the picture largely as a result of the ideological focus. Work in this tradition stresses the importance of ideology in determining foreign policy positions and the role of political parties as carriers of these ideas.[60] Yet the constructivist account of politics is also incomplete in a fundamental way. In postulating direct links between ideology, party preference, and government policy, constructivist scholars miss the important constraints on political action which inhibit the instantiation of preferred policies. Governments appear as relatively free agents regardless of their domestic political situation. Not only do opposition policies not matter (as they are not included in the analysis) but there is also no attempt to establish the degree of opposition influence. By neglecting the political context and downplaying the role of legislative constraint constructivist scholars cannot account for the ability of governments to implement their ideological programme.

HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS

Over the decades a substantial historical literature has emerged on the US alliance politics. In particular, much has been written on the most important 'special relationships', particularly in regard to US relations with Australia,[61] Britain,[62] Canada,[63] France,[64] Germany,[65] and Japan.[66] Whilst impossible to summarise each

[59] E.g. Cassels (1996); Carlsnaes (1986)
[60] Calin (2010); Haas (2005); Rathbun (2004); Rathbun (2011b); Rathbun (2012a); Rathbun (2012b)
[61] Bridge (1991); Harper (1987); Phillips (1988)
[62] Baylis (1981); Dumbrell (2001)
[63] Craig (1968); Martin (1982); McDougall (2006)
[64] Creswell (2006); Duroselle (1978)
[65] Gatzke (1980); Junker (2004); Mauch & Patel (2010); Muller & Schweigler (1992); Smyser (1993); Trommler & Shore (2001)
[66] Emmerson & Holland (1988); Frost (1987); Krauss & Nyblade (2004)

distinct literature, there are notable commonalities shared by each of these historical accounts. The first is the explicit attention to the variance in the relationship(s) over time. Even the broad historical accounts have charted the waxing-and-waning of the various interstate relations over time. Second, there is a shared focus on the importance of domestic political attributes as (at the very least) a partial explanation for the divergent levels of cooperation evidenced over time. Though in some accounts this is supplemented by structural or individualistic explanations, most historical accounts explicitly foreground the importance of domestic politics. Indeed, in at least half of the referenced works above, it is explicitly political variables – changes in party, ideology or government – which provide the periodization strategies for the structuring of the chapters. Third, and finally, the historical accounts eschew explicit theorising; they present US-ally relations in the form of a descriptive narrative, one which seeks to explain particular occurrences but not their theoretical underpinnings. When theoretical claims *are* made, they tend to be inductive and post-hoc, following on from the facts and the narrative.

These works have much in common, predominantly the result of the historical mode of inquiry itself, but this also results in common problems when the explanation of nested variance is concerned. First, in tracing the proximate causes of shifts in cooperation inductively historians tend to conflate both *systematic* and *unsystematic* variables. This prevents the emergence of a general theory of variance, because not all factors transpose well to other cases. Second, historical accounts operate in the absence of an explicit theoretical vocabulary; but with theory 'lurking in the background' the risk is that certain factors are overlooked or that incompatible

assumptions become melded together.[67] Third, the laudable historical attention to detail places natural constraints on the duration and number of cases that can be studied, thereby hindering the identification of patterns across time and across countries.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

CP scholars study precisely the independent variables necessary for explaining nested variance. They seek to infer the causal impact of political institutions and behaviour on various political, economic and social outcomes.[68] Yet by and large they have been unwilling to engage with the explanation of international issues, and there have been remarkably few 'cross-border' studies seeking to engage CP and IR. Comparative Politics scholars who have extended their discipline's insights into the international realm have tended to suffer from an 'institutionalist' bias by focusing on the politics of statecraft *within* formal intergovernmental organisations.[69]

One field where much cross-border research between IR and CP has taken place is within the field of European Studies, where the blend of intergovernmental bargaining and the dense institutional framework create fertile ground for theoretical exchange.[70] The debate which brought CP firmly into European studies was a contest between the recognition of the EU's increasingly *sui generis* institutional architecture on the one hand, versus acknowledging the power of the member states to determine and control the agenda on the other.[71] Yet this debate relied on the dubious premise that explaining the foreign policy behaviour of states under anarchy required the adoption

[67] Trachtenberg (2006), p. 30
[68] Rodden (2009), p. 334
[69] E.g. Boockmann (2006); Hix (1999); Hix *et al*. (2006); Wittkopf (1973)
[70] Pollack (2005)
[71] Hix (1994); Hix (1996); Hurrell & Menon (1996)

of a third-image theoretical lens. But because the introduction of CP into European studies occurred in the manner it did, it has been assumed that CP approaches to IR only work within dense institutional structures. This is despite the fact that many European studies scholars are developing, whether they realise it or not, models of state behaviour that are more sophisticated that many of those presently on offer in IR.[72] Yet so entrenched has the myth of 'European exceptionalism' become that attempts to build bridges between European studies and IR have made this engagement contingent upon the emergence of a 'post-national' IR.[73]

The point worth stressing is that although CP scholars have developed a sophisticated body of literature devoted to explaining the systematic determinants of different domestic political conditions, structures and behaviours, these have seldom been applied to the question of interstate behaviour. Though there are some notable examples of cross-paradigm exchange, particularly within rationalist theories,[74] the extent to which convergence has occurred has been overplayed. As such, though CP works hold a comparative advantage in explaining the operation of domestic politics, they are unsuitable for explaining variance in US alliance politics.

SUMMARY

To conclude this section, it is worth briefly restating the issues with the different historical and theoretical accounts of US-ally cooperation discussed above. To put it bluntly, but clearly; historical accounts show variance but do not explain general patterns across cases, mainstream IR theories cannot address frequent instances of change in cooperation, second-image IR accounts do not have an adequate

[72] E.g. Pahre (2001); Slapin (2006)
[73] Warleigh (2006)
[74] Caporaso (1997); Milner (1998)

conceptualisation of domestic politics, and CP scholars have not addressed questions of international cooperation and state behaviour. This point is summarised in Figure 2 below. In their current form neither discipline stands ready to provide us with a systematic account of the domestic political determinants of variance in international cooperation.

	Mainstream IR	**Second-Image IR**	**History**	**CP**	**Ideal**
Theoretical explanation?	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Cooperation as dependent variable?	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Realistic account of domestic politics?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Figure 2 *Properties of existing literatures allied to international studies compared with those of the 'ideal' account required for the study of nested variance.*

[2] THEORISING THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF COOPERATION

THEORETICAL AND DISCIPLINARY COMBINATIONS

The existing theoretical tools from both IR and allied disciplines have been found wanting in their ability to explain variance in cooperation between the US and its allies. For each discipline the problem was different and related to missing elements which other disciplines possessed. This holds out the possibility that a combination of disciplinary assumptions, methods and theories may help us to adequately explain nested variance in cooperation. I argue that a two-fold combination of IR and CP, and (within IR) of liberalism and constructivism, can provide the most appropriate theoretical backdrop. Only this set of theoretical combinations can help us to adequately conceptualise the detailed workings of the domestic realm and the impact this has on interstate relations. Figure 3 details the contribution of each element in this combination.

Literature	**Explains**
CP	Relation between ideology and constraint
Liberalism (IR)	Internationalising of legislative constraint
Constructivism (IR)	Internationalising of political ideology

Figure 3 *Contribution of the different theoretical approaches used*

Before we proceed to outline the theory itself, it is worth addressing the potential for incompatibility between these approaches. Although it is well-known that disciplines and contending research programmes are not bounded by incommensurable philosophical and ontological barriers,[1] this does not mean that any combination of disciplinary assumptions makes sense. In the following section I offer a rationale for each of the combinations in turn, arguing that they make sense, and do not introduce any incoherence into the analysis.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The intuitive distinction between IR and CP is that the former studies the interactions of states (as actors) whilst the latter studies the operation of politics within states (as units of analysis). There has been demand for more CP influence in IR for many decades. In 1988 Putnam argued that a "more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy and international relations must stress *politics*…not simply executive officials and institutional arrangements".[2] Almost a decade later Eberwein claimed **t**he discipline needed "greater attention [to] structures and processes of foreign policy decision-making". Top of his list for greater attention was 'parties and foreign policy', on which, he noted, "practically nothing has been published on…over the last 10-15 years".[3] Ten years later still, Cantir and Kaarbo have decried the fact there is such "little research on partisanship and political ideology in foreign policy".[4]

[1] Jackson & Nexon (2009)
[2] Putnam (1988), p. 432
[3] Personal correspondence with Professor William Wallace, 23 January, Halliday Papers
[4] Cantir & Kaarbo (2012), p. 14

There are four ways an engagement with CP can help to improve our understanding of the domestic political determinants of state behaviour. First, CP can provide new variables and concepts linked to domestic political processes which have been overlooked in IR. This can help us overcome IR's preoccupation with regime types and interest group politics. Second, the theoretical tools necessary to understand domestic structures and political behaviour are the preserve of CP. Theories of partisan politics in particular can help to overcome IR's antiquated preoccupation with pluralist accounts of the state. A third contribution is the introduction of greater rigour into the discipline's methodological foundations. Statistical tools and spatial modelling techniques from CP can help us to account for the complex relations which constitute the domestic politics of foreign policy. Fourth, CP scholars have developed many important and far-reaching datasets which allow for the exploration and testing of many interesting hypotheses concerning political regime-type, party-systems, political ideologies, and a host of other important explanatory variables. These are seldom cited in IR works despite the potential to highlight broad trends in the politics of international relations. The four examples above give reason to suggest that a renewed engagement between CP and IR would be highly fruitful.

There are three reasons to believe that this particular combination evades incoherence. First, the trend in IR has been away from realist accounts of 'the international' as a bounded realm of distinct (and pessimistic) logics, and closer to an understanding of international relations as themselves constituted by the interdependence of state preferences (so-called 'policy interdependence').[5] This understanding creates room for domestic politics as one potential input into those preferences which ultimately

[5] Moravcsik (1997), p. 520

constitute the international arena. Second, though much is made of the distinction between 'inside' and 'outside' the state, it is not clear that there is any incompatibility between viewing the state as *actor* and the state as *unit*. If CP scholars overwhelmingly treat the state as a bounded domain of policy, why should this position entail a disregard for how this 'bounded domain' conducts its foreign affairs? In this manner, though the assumptions appear to be at odds, the statism of both IR and CP may actually end up doing more to unite them than previously thought. Third, unlike historical and normative accounts, the mainstream of both IR and CP is located firmly within explanatory social science, meaning both approaches are ultimately united by their approach to social research, even if their specific research questions differ.

SECOND-IMAGE LIBERALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

Although both liberal and constructivist accounts were found wanting in the first chapter, their second-image variants – though problematic in isolation – hold the potential for furthering our understanding of the manner in which domestic politics impacts upon international cooperation. This is because each account, though restricted by its own paradigm's assumptions, encapsulates the logic behind different elements of domestic politics and their effects on international politics. To summarise the claims that have been made above in more detail, liberals focus on constraints and their interaction which misses the importance of ideology and the role of political parties, and constructivists prioritise parties and ideology whilst lacking a conception of domestic constraint. It is worth noting three things here: First, what is missing from each is precisely what the other possesses. Second these lacunas are the product of the different philosophical traditions the two theories are working out of – rationalism and

constructivism. Third, at stake is the interaction between political ideology and legislative constraint – a fundamental element of domestic politics – which is missed by both approaches.

As with the disciplinary combination of IR and CP, there has been much demand for combining liberalism and constructivism. For example, Checkel has recommended that theorists from both camps engage with one another in order to better understand the manner in which domestic politics impacted upon the transposition of international norms to the domestic political environment.[6] This led to the emergence of a highly fruitful combined research agenda in the politics of norms from an international-to-domestic perspective.[7] That this unification took place almost exclusively within the 'second-image reversed' perspective, however, is important. For reasons relating to the nature and timing of the turn to the second-image by both liberals and constructivists, the call to promote cross-paradigm exchange from the second-image perspective never emerged. Thus, perhaps somewhat ironically, in an era where acceptance of the virtues of cross-paradigm exchange has never been greater, there is still very little work from a domestic-to-international perspective which engages with both liberal and constructivist claims.

Combining liberal and constructivist second-image works is not only overdue; it is also philosophically unproblematic. There are three reasons why the discipline has come to view exchange between these two bodies of thought as a possibility. First, scholars have sought to down play the epistemological divide between the two approaches, arguing that both may be logically subsumed within a scientific realist

[6] Checkel (1997)
[7] E.g. Checkel (1999); Herrera (2010); Lutz & Sikkink (2000); Schimmelfennig (2000); Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier (2005)

worldview that views a theory's predictive success as a partial determinant of its underlying validity,[8] or within a pragmatist position that centres on the practical utility of combining (ultimately irreconcilable) theoretical claims.[9] Second, the methodological divide between the theories has come under attack from positivist incursions into the 'scientific' study of such constructivist topics as norms, identity, ideology, and other ideational phenomena.[10] Third, at the ontological level, the distinction between rationalism's 'logic of consequences' and constructivism's 'logic of appropriateness'[11] has been undermined by the according of greater conceptual attention to the notion of strategic action. Although there have been 'imperialist' attempts to subordinate each of these positions to one of the other, by claiming either that rationality is a social norm[12] or that conformity to standards of appropriateness are 'rational',[13] a more nuanced claim distinguishes between *beliefs* and *preferences*, arguing that rationalism is compatible with the strategic pursuit of non-egoistic motivations.[14]

It is clear from the discussion above that the following three conditions hold for combinations of both IR and CP and liberalism and constructivism: there exists unfulfilled demand from within the discipline, there is considerable theoretical promise, and there exists a compatibility of fundamental assumptions. In the section that follows I develop specific propositions from this cross-disciplinary backdrop with the aim of presenting a theoretical construct that will allow us to gain leverage on nested variance in international cooperation.

[8] MacDonald (2003); Wendt (1991), pp. 390-392; Wendt (1998); Wight (2007)
[9] Houghton (2008); Katzenstein & Sil (2010); Moravcsik (2003); Reus-Smit & Snidal (2008)
[10] Abdelal *et al.* (2006); Wiener (2009)
[11] March & Olsen (1998), p. 949
[12] Müller (2004)
[13] Checkel & Moravcsik (2001), pp. 232-234
[14] Fearon & Wendt (2002), pp. 62-64; Keohane (1984), pp. 110-111; Keohane (1988)

PARTIES AND STATES

Political parties have – in one form or another – dominated the state since the 19th century. In Western Europe and America parties grew naturally out of voting blocs within the emerging legislative bodies.[15] The concept travelled, however, outside of the West, supervening onto foreign systems, whether democratic, non-democratic, or becoming associated with warring factions in conflicts. Yet few approaches in IR take parties seriously.[16] The dominant assumption has been that of the 'state as actor'. I argue, in contrast, that the actions of the state are best understood as undertaken in the interests of the party.

Why is this so? There are several reasons. First, competition over policies – including issues of foreign policy – is often structured along party lines. Second, parties act as cross-cutting institutions, coordinating action in various branches and institutions of the state.[17] Third, parties are in the 'political game'; unlike interest groups, their very function and motivation are intertwined with the broad political context. Fourth, from the analyst's perspective, parties occupy the optimal position 'above' the state, keeping both domestic and international politics in sight. Even within non-democratic regimes it is often more helpful to focus on the interests of the party rather than the state, a lens which is often used implicitly by analysts addressing the motivations of such 'rogue states' as Iran and North Korea.

[15] Scarrow (2006), p. 16
[16] Rare examples that do include Rathbun (2004), Roberts (2013) and Schultz (1998).
[17] Aldrich (2009), p. 197

I advocate a position on party behaviour which may be broadly labelled 'partisan politics'. The defining feature of this approach is that it offers a non-reductionist account of parties and their place within society and the political system. It does not view parties as channels for sub-state class, factor or economic interests, but rather stresses the importance of both political ideology and legislative constraint as the key determinants of party behaviour. Within CP, in the immediate aftermath of the 'Behavioural revolution', there were few scholars in CP who gave much room to parties or ideology. The majority of work was pluralist in the sense that it viewed the state as the arbiter between contending social factions and interest groups rather than a domain of a distinctly 'political' enterprise.[18] More recently, however, the tendency has been towards a rediscovery of the importance of political parties[19] and of their respective ideological positions.[20] The next sections fill out in greater detail what is entailed by a twin-focus on ideology and constraint, and how we may think of these concepts in relation to one another, and in an international context.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Acknowledging the importance of political parties in foreign policymaking does not tell us *how* they matter. One important way they do matter is by functioning as 'vehicles of ideology': "Political parties package and promote ideas for the political system. Their platforms serve as repositories for ideologies. There is considerable continuity in party ideologies and programs".[21] Ideology is, of course, a complex

[18] Munck (2007)
[19] Capoccia & Ziblatt (2010); Webb (2002), pp. 1-5
[20] Grynaviski (2010); Zelizer (2010b), p. 26
[21] Vassallo & Wilcox (2006), p. 413

concept with a multitude of different dimensions.[22] Here I adopt a broad definition of ideology as "a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of conduct…which its proponents seek to promote".[23] Though this definition of ideology is fairly broad, I consider here only the traditional left-right dimension, both because of its simplicity and its continuing salience in our common understanding of politics.

I claim that political actors seek election and office in order to implement their preferred policies.[24] On this account, preferences are not *derived* from utility-calculations, but political actors are assumed to act rationally in *pursuing* them.[25] This understanding of strategic behaviour is to be contrasted with that of office-seeking accounts, where the dictates of success *determine* party policy.[26] Conversely, this account understands ideas and ideology to be central to the constitution of an actor's interests, and therefore to any account of politics in general. Importantly, this approach is compatible with a 'thin' variant of rationalism and strategic action, but it is not a slave to the rationality assumption.

LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINT

But parties are never wholly free to enact their preferred policies. The political power and influence a party has – even in government – is determined by the level of legislative constraint a party is confronted by. I define legislative constraint as the inhibitors placed upon a governing party's actions by the level of support it is able to wield in the legislature. Although seat-share is not everything, it is perhaps the single-

[22] Gerring (1997), p. 957
[23] Hamilton (1987), p. 38
[24] Hansson & Stuart (1984); Petry (1982); Wittman (1983)
[25] Budge & Laver (1986), p. 486
[26] Schmidt (1996), p. 156

most important indicator of how much a legislative body is able to tame the government's power. If the party has few seats in the legislature, it is in a constrained position. Notwithstanding the importance of a state's formal institutional structure in determining the manner in which legislative constraint plays out and the threshold at which it matters, I contend that this form of constraint operates relatively consistently across democratic systems. Although electoral systems and executive-legislative relations differ, there is no doubting that governing parties remain concerned by the magnitude of their support in the legislature and the ability of low-levels of support to stymie policy.

High levels of legislative constraint have two important effects on the link between party and ideology. First, legislative constraint empowers the political opposition, as governing parties find themselves unable to enact policies without support from the opposition party. In this manner, the ideological position of the opposition is relevant during periods of high legislative constraint.[27] Though this is particularly true in situations of minority government,[28] recent analyses argue the importance of the opposition accords *directly* to the share of seats in the legislature, meaning that legislative constraints impact upon parties even when they retain control of the 'reins of government'.[29] Second, legislative constraint disempowers the governing party's ideological fringe.[30] Party leaders are able to maintain discipline because any threat to vote against the party line would collapse the government. In this manner a small majority works in a similar manner to a vote of 'no confidence', creating "an incentive for all those who profit from the current government to vote for the

[27] Keeler (1993), p. 438; Laver & Hunt (1992); Schmidt (1996), p. 156
[28] Mattila & Raunio (2004)
[29] Blau (2008), p. 173; Powell (2000), pp. 103-106
[30] Dewan & Spirling (2011), p. 346; Huber (1996), p. 272

government's proposals".[31] This is backed up by data showing that party cohesion increases as a party's legislative support dwindles.[32]

INTERNATIONALISING PARTISAN POLITICS

LEADERS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Let us now consider the international implications of political ideology and legislative constraint and their predicted impact on international cooperation. To begin with it is worth briefly revisiting the reason states have a potential interest in cooperation. One reason is that international problems may be solved more readily through the coordination of behaviour, allowing states to act in concert rather than pursuing incompatible strategies.[33] Second, cooperation can result in Pareto-superior outcomes, where mutual gains outweigh those to be made through the initially-preferred unilateral policy.[34] Third, states may wish to cooperate in order to realise gains from economies of scale or the pooling of transactions costs.[35]

Because state (and party) leaders and foreign ministers are the only actors explicitly involved in playing the international politics 'game', it is assumed that they have a direct interest in cooperative outcomes above and beyond their party counterparts in the legislature.[36] This assumption helps explain party leaders' sometime desire for cooperation against party wishes. Put simply, insofar as the governing parties of two states rarely see entirely eye-to-eye on ideological matters, accruing the benefits of

[31] Diermeier & Feddersen (1998), p. 611
[32] Volden & Bergman (2006), p. 81
[33] Snidal (1985), p. 931; Stein (1982), p. 309
[34] Hopmann (1995), pp. 33-35; Oye (1985), p. 1
[35] Garrett (1992), p. 534; Hartley (2003); Rogerson (1994), pp. 65-66
[36] Mo (1994), p. 404; Moravcsik (1993b), p. 15

cooperation almost always requires some form of compromise, both with the other state and the party at large. Those leading the government must therefore remain somewhat elastic in their conformity to party ideology in order to reap the benefits from international exchange. This does not mean, of course, that 'anything goes', that state leaders act wholly instrumentally, or that parties do not exercise constraint on their leaders. The elasticity of leaders' tolerance to compromise is not without its limits.

INTERNATIONALISING POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

There are two mechanisms through which political ideology is able to exert an impact on the level of cooperation; *directly* through policy interdependence and *indirectly* through international trust.

First, different ideologies matter because of the interdependence of state policies. The left tend to favour higher government spending and greater redistribution, whereas the right favour lower levels of redistributive taxation and a low level of intervention in the economy. These contending models of economic organisation become mutually implicated through the interdependence which characterises contemporary international economic relations. Interdependence matters in many respects. For example, domestic economic policies may implicate foreign commercial investments, budgetary allocations can directly influence security policy, and international agreements tend to embody compromise between differing conceptions of state-and-economy relations.

A second linkage is through trust. Recent research has argued that there is a probabilistic relationship between left-right ideological positions and generalised trust, with the left being more trusting in general.[37] The variant of this argument adopted here is more specific. Following Haas, I argue that that the perception of threats by states is largely a function of ideological *proximity*; that is, leaders are more likely to view states with similar ideological leanings as less of a threat than states which are more distant ideologically.[38] The argument lies at the intersection of two distinct causal mechanisms: the first is that leaders will likely ally with their ideological brethren in other states (the proximity mechanism); the second is that states will ally with those states that are enemies of other states whose ideological worldviews are very distant from the state in question (the relative proximity mechanism).[39] Both leftist and rightist governments are thus more likely to trust one another than discordant pairs of these two categories would be, because ideological dissimilarity is a crucial component of 'threat'.[40]

INTERNATIONALISING LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINT

How are we to understand the international implications of legislative constraint? Previous approaches have focused on the issue of ratification, yet this concept is too formalistic and restrictive to capture the operation of legislative constraint in full.[41] In many areas of foreign affairs governments hold extensive executive prerogatives which reduce the formal role of legislatures. Hence, formal ratification is rare, and tends to occur in issue-areas which were once deemed separate from foreign affairs (e.g. trade and commerce).

[37] Brewer *et al*. (2004), pp. 100-101; Rathbun (2009), p. 354; Rathbun (2011a), p. 3
[38] Haas (2003), p. 42; Haas (2007)
[39] Haas (2005), p. 15
[40] Walt (1987), pp. 35-36
[41] Kriner (2010), p. 12; Lindsay (1992), p. 626; Milner & Rosendorff (1996), p. 152

There are five reasons to believe that formal ratification procedures are not required to observe the operation of legislative constraint. First, issue-linkage is ubiquitous in politics. Parties link the outcomes of agreement in one policy area to success in others. In this manner, although executive prerogatives may *formally* shield the executive in one domain, it risks losing agreement in others, thereby collapsing policy areas into a single politicised domain.[42] Second, *ex post facto* sanctions threaten to dethrone or harm the executive if they make decisions against the will of powerful actors. These may take the form of elections or alternative 'veto' opportunities.[43] The 'shadow of the future' thus looms as large in domestic politics as it does in the international arena. Third, where the assent of other actors is necessary, the executive may anticipate this and develop proposals accordingly.[44] This means that where formal ratification does exist, it is difficult to discern the impact it has. Fourthly, members of the executive are not free from the influence of the party organisation, which cuts across the different institutions of government.[45] Although the executive may be constitutionally 'free' to determine the course of foreign policy, it risks losing the support of the party organisation, which is itself responsive to demands from both the executive *and* the legislature. Finally, there is a normative element to seat-share in that a party's claim to legitimately 'speak for the nation' is a function of its level of legislative support.[46] Low legislative seat-share can thereby serve to delegitimise the actions of the governing party.

[42] Haas (1980), p. 371; Lacy & Niou (2004), p. 26
[43] Calvert *et al*. (1989), p. 600; Palmer (1995), p. 170
[44] Shepsle & Weingast (1987), pp. 88-89
[45] Hopkin & Bradbury (2006), p. 136; Levinson & Pildes (2006), p. 2329
[46] Hamann & Kelly (2007), p. 987; Swayze (1996), p. 564

The relationship between high levels of legislative constraint and international cooperation is, broadly speaking, an inverse one. Liberal scholars argue that high levels of constraint limit the freedom of state leaders and undermine the potential for cooperation. This is because constraint prevents the necessary 'elasticity' of preferences which allows for the reconciliation of national differences in the pursuit of international gains. The higher the level of constraint is, the lower the predicted level of cooperation.[47] The relationship between constraint and *cooperation* is to be distinguished from that between constraint and *bargaining outcomes*. For the latter, as Schelling has noted, the level of constraint may actually empower the weaker party.[48] This logic, however, does not apply to the level of cooperation, where we are concerned not with the distributional output of cooperation, but rather the frequency of its occurrence.

THE 'AGREEMENT THROUGH OPPOSITION' CONJECTURE

Having established the international relevance and efficacy of domestic political ideology and legislative constraint it is necessary to spell out the interaction between these terms in the clearest possible manner. I argue that a party's ability to implement its favoured policies is tempered by the level of legislative constraint. When this constraint is low, parties will be free to implement policies; when constraint is high, policies will be tempered by the position of the political opposition. This interaction between ideology and constraint has a predictable impact on the level of international cooperation, depicted here relative to the 'baseline' of cooperation established by the contours of the particular structural relation.

[47] McGillivray (1998); Milner (1993); Putnam (1988); Stein (1993)
[48] Schelling (1958), p. 244

Consider a situation where the governing parties in two states are *more* ideologically proximate than their respective political opposition. When legislative constraint is low, the predicted level of cooperation will be high relative to the baseline, because the parties will be free to implement their favoured, more ideologically-similar policies. When constraint is high, the parties will find their positions moderated by the less-proximate political opposition, undermining cooperation. Now consider the alternative situation where the governing parties are *less* ideologically-proximate than the opposition. Here the predicted levels of cooperation are inverse to the level of legislative constraint. When constraint is low, cooperation relative to the baseline should also be low, as the parties are free to pursue their disparate policies. When constraint is high, however, the predicted level of cooperation *increases*, as the parties are pushed into adopting more conciliatory positions.

The latter claim in particular highlights the most important aspect of the approach developed here. For this reason I term the argument the 'agreement through opposition' conjecture. The conjecture is differentiated from liberal and constructivist approaches; by focusing on the *interaction* between ideology and constraint it views the impact of each as necessarily contingent. In the liberal argument, constraint undermines the potential for cooperation. In my account, however, this relationship is contingent upon the ideological position of the opposition parties. In the constructivist argument, as the ideological proximity of the governing parties increases, so too does the potential for international cooperation. Again, my approach suggests that this is a contingent relationship; ideological proximity matters only in relation to the level of legislative constraint that the governing party faces and the ideological position of the political opposition.

In this section I illustrate in greater detail the conjecture outlined above by developing a spatial model of the impact of partisan politics on cooperation. The two-level games approach in IR has popularised the use of spatial models as a means of representing interstate relations.[49] It imagines statesmen as constrained by both international and domestic political constraints which they must manage simultaneously: "At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies… [a]t the international level, national governments seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures".[50] Yet unlike the spatial models used in CP,[51] and in spite of attempts to extend the two-level games metaphor,[52] there have been no explicit attempt to model political parties in an international context. Nor have CP approaches, for their part, introduced an international element into their models.

I rectify this lacuna by presenting a model of the strategic interaction of policy-seeking parties in an international game where the party leaders have an interest in securing the gains of international cooperation. The model makes several important assumptions that are worth stressing at the outset. First, it embodies a 'thin' form of rationalism, eschewing the 'thick' account based around utility-maximisation and the concentration of costs and benefits alone.[53] The actors are motivated by a desire to instantiate their core ideological beliefs, but act strategically in attempting to do so.

[49] Boyer (2000); Daugbjerg (2008); Iida (1996); Krustev & Morgan (2011); Putnam (1988)
[50] Putnam (1988), p. 434
[51] Budge (1994); Chappell & Keech (1986); Downs (1957); Stokes (1963)
[52] Carment & James (1996); Knopf (1993); Larsén (2007); Lehman & McCoy (1992); Mitchell (2001)
[53] Evans (1993), pp. 412-414

Second, unlike approaches to international bargaining,[54] the model does not predict a single equilibrium outcome, but rather points us towards the 'win-set; the total range of outcomes possible given the interplay of restrictions imposed.[55] The extent of the win-set models the aforementioned elasticity of state (and party) leaders' willingness to compromise on party positions and ideological predilections. Third, parties are here conceived of as unitary actors, and consideration is not paid to their component factions or their institutional rules. This is a common simplifying assumption used in similar models of this kind.[56]

Let us begin with the international effects of political ideology. Diagrams (a) and (b) in Figure 4 below represent high and low levels of ideological polarisation between two states. The two diagrams model, in effect, the constraints placed upon leaders by their own parties' ideological disposition. The semi-circles represent the 'win-sets' that constrain the leaders of each governing party. These are the outer bounds of acceptable outcomes for those in the party whose support is necessary for any agreement. The win-set extends beyond the party's ideal position because legislators and party members will desire outcomes close – but not necessarily equal – to their ideological predispositions. To the extent that the win-sets overlap the potential for agreement exists; when they overlap substantially, the predicted chances of cooperation are higher than if they just meet. Note that the win-sets overlap in diagram (a) but not in diagram (b).[57]

[54] E.g. Odell (1985)
[55] Tsebelis (2002), p. 9
[56] Benoit & Laver (2006), p. 41
[57] The win-sets are intended as heuristic devices to represent spatially the possibility of cooperation. When the win-sets are closer together the probability of cooperation increases and vice versa, but an overlap does not *guarantee* cooperation will occur.

Now let us consider the international effects of legislative constraint alongside those of political ideology. Recall above that in periods of high legislative constraint the ideological position of the political opposition becomes crucial. Suppose we have two parties in one state dealing with a governing party in another state. One party is closer ideologically to the second state's governing party than the other party is. The two figures below illustrate the predicted effect on the win-set of high legislative constraint for combinations of each of these two parties. In diagram (d) the win-sets are now overlapping where they previously were not. In diagram (c) the win-sets still overlap, but to a lesser extent than previously. In this manner the introduction of the opposition party under conditions of high legislative constraint alters the expected level of cooperation in accordance with the location of the opposition on the ideological spectrum.

The next stage is to test the predictions of this model against the empirical record of international cooperation between the US and its allies. The conjecture to be tested is that the extent of cooperation will depend on the interaction between the degree of legislative constraint and the relative ideological proximity of governing and opposition parties in each state. Specifically, the theory contends that cooperation will be high when governing parties are ideologically proximate and unconstrained, cooperation will be low when governing parties are ideologically disparate and unconstrained, and medium levels of cooperation will be evidenced when both ideologically proximate and disparate parties are highly constrained.



Figure 4 *Spatial models of the four possible configurations of high/low constraint and proximate/disparate ideological positions of two states.*

[3] METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL TESTING

A MIXED-METHODS RESEARCH STRATEGY

Methodological debates are traditionally structured around the division between qualitative and quantitative approaches. Qualitative approaches are interpretive in nature, utilising in-depth case studies and small-n cross-case comparisons to generate a detailed understanding of the operation of social processes. The quantitative approach, on the other hand, prioritises large-n studies and the application of statistical techniques to control for confounding variables, the focus being on breadth rather than depth. Ultimately, however, neither the qualitative or quantitative approaches are sufficient by themselves. Quantitative approaches struggle to uncover the causal *mechanisms* underlying causal effects,[1] evidence considerable 'conceptual stretching',[2] and have problems dealing with 'causal complexity'.[3] Qualitative approaches, on the other hand, have difficulty ensuring rigorous standards of research, struggle to control for confounding explanations, and are unable to generalise outside of the cases studied.[4]

I propose to rely on a dual-track research strategy based around a division of labour between qualitative and quantitative methodologies. The research strategy involves two distinct elements: a small-n comparative case study and a large-n statistical analysis. Each has a distinct purpose. The small-n comparative study allows for the

[1] McKeown (2004), pp. 152-153; Tarrow (1995), p. 472
[2] Brady *et al*. (2004), p. 8; Sartori (1970); Thomas (2005), pp. 858-859
[3] Tarrow (1995), p. 472; Thomas (2005), pp. 861-863
[4] King *et al*. (1994), pp. 23-31

detailed process-tracing of causal mechanisms and for an estimate of the relative empirical leverage of different theories on the problem at hand. The large-n statistical analysis helps us to generalise the theory beyond the immediate case and allows us to control for potentially confounding variables.[5] Figure 5 below summarises the functions of each element.

Order	Methodology	First Function	Second Function
First	Comparative case-study	Establish leverage of different theories	Trace causal mechanisms
Second	Statistical analysis	Control for confounding variables	Generalise theory

Figure 5 *Functions of each element of the research design*

The division of labour approach is one of a number of ways of combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies, the other main alternatives being triangulation and nested analysis. Yet there are problems associated with both of these techniques which serve to favour the adoption of the division of labour approach. With triangulation the researcher utilises various different methodologies to study the same problem from different angles. To the extent that each of these different approaches confirms the theory, the researcher may be more certain that the result is the correct

[5] Mahoney & Goertz (2006), p. 232, have argued that qualitative and quantitative methodologies each rely on different conceptions of causation; deterministic and probabilistic respectively. But this argument does not undermine the division of labour approach adopted here. This is because the function of the qualitative case studies is not itself to establish causation, but rather to trace the operation of the causal mechanisms. In this manner, the qualitative element of the study is making no assumptions as to the ontology of 'causation'.

one, having conducted multiple tests on the same proposition from different 'viewpoints'.[6] But this approach is problematic. First, it is not clear what the relation is between the different methodologies, how they fit together, and what role each is playing in the overall explanation.[7] Second, to the extent that observations are dependent upon the unspoken theoretical and philosophical assumptions underpinning their observance, finding the same evidence from competing epistemological positions does not help to 'verify' the favoured theory, but rather adds to the list of unanswered questions.[8] The nested analysis, on the other hand, rests on a sequence whereby the researcher first conducts a large-n statistical analysis before selecting cases determined by the residuals on the regression line.[9] There are particular problems, however, with such sequenced approaches. First, there is no room in the model for addressing 'deviant' cases which lie off the line, which may tell us more about the issues faced by the model than directly confirming cases.[10] Second, the sequential nature of the model means that any error which occurs in the first (statistical) stage is amplified throughout the model and risks skewing the overall result.[11]

These problems with both triangulation and nested analysis explain the decision here to adopt a mixed-methods strategy based around a discernible division of labour. Moreover the combination of statistical techniques and case studies has many adherents in IR and CP. Authors agree that statistical techniques are necessary to establish the significance and magnitude of causal effects whilst in-depth case studies

[6] Hammersley (2008), pp. 28-29
[7] Flick (1992)
[8] Blaikie (1991), pp. 115-116
[9] Lieberman (2005), pp. 436-438
[10] Wolf (2010), p. 152
[11] Rohlfing (2008), pp. 1509-1510

provide the only means of uncovering plausible causal mechanisms.[12] The utility of the combination is also underscored by the recent move towards a unified conception of causality, where previously disparate conceptions from contending methodologies are combined into a singular, more demanding approach that requires each methodology to be brought to bear on establishing causality.[13]

In the following two sections each of the elements of the dual-track research strategy is presented in turn. I begin by outlining a comparative case-study of US-ally relations based on the particular empirical referent of the Anglo-American relationship. I then turn to the specification of a large-n statistical study of US alliance politics from nine states between 1945 and 2000.

COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY: ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

WHY ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS?

There are two reasons for studying nested variance through an examination of the Anglo-American 'special relationship'. First, it is itself an important example; one cannot explain the history of international relations without accounting for the role of this 'special relationship' and its consequences at various historical junctures. In many ways the Anglo-American relationship may be considered the foundational bedrock of the current international order. Second, the problematic relation between different bodies of theory involved in explaining Anglo-American relations mirrors the overall problems in studying US-client relations. That is, historical accounts describe the

[12] Bates *et al.* (1998), p.p. 10-12; Brady *et al*. (2006), pp. 355-356; Bueno de Mesquita (2002), p. 1; Mahoney (2010)
[13] Gerring (2005); Mahoney (2008)

political situation and the intricacies of the relationship, but do not provide a theoretical explanation to link the two; IR approaches provide general theories as to the causes underlying high Anglo-American cooperation, but do not account for the role played by domestic politics; and CP works on British politics provide general explanations of the party-system and politics, but do not apply these insights to the conduct of foreign policy.

It is worth briefly responding to two potential issues with the choice of Anglo-American relations as the subject of the case study. (1) First, one may claim that the very fact the relationship is so 'special' means that the UK case provides us with a biased example of US-ally relations. Yet this claim is difficult to substantiate. First, as this is a study of 'special relationships', *any* case selected will necessarily exhibit high levels of cooperation. Second, the aim is to explain not the level of cooperation, but rather deviation from the *baseline*, making the magnitude of the baseline itself relatively unimportant. (2) Second, it may be argued that the specificity of the UK's political system makes it an inappropriate choice. Again there are problems with this claim. First, though institutions differ across countries, the operation of many core political science concepts transpose from case-to-case fairly well. It is this underlying similarity which facilitates the comparative endeavour in the first place. Second, as there are multiple different ways of dividing political systems, even if another example were to be chosen it would likely deviate in some respect from the norm, however we defined this.

STRUCTURE AND VARIANCE IN THE 'SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP'

The level of cooperation within the Anglo-American relationship has been remarkably high over the years. The allied victory at the endgame of World War II set the stage for the nature of postwar Anglo-American relations in two fundamental respects. First, as the winners of the war and the peace, Britain and the US were in a prime position to instigate their shared ideal of an integrated, multilateral international economic and political order. Second, the looming menace of the 'Soviet threat' would provide the basis of US-UK security policy (and security cooperation) until the end of the Cold War. Whether viewed as a function of cultural similarity,[14] the common security threat,[15] economic interests,[16] or the underlying institutional framework,[17] powerful factors maintain the high level of coordination, consultation, and mutual respect between the two countries. We may consider this the structural element of the Anglo-American relationship.

Whilst necessary to bear this overarching structure in mind, the focus of this study is on the *variance* in the relationship, and on the reasons for deviation (either upwards or downwards) from the cooperative baseline. Postwar Anglo-American relations have waxed and waned to a considerable extent, as demonstrated in the work of those historians who have documented the relationship over time.[18] Although not common to all these works, a majority differentiate periods of higher and lower cooperation by such political variables as the party and leader in power, or by distinct electoral periods. This is more than analytical shorthand; it reflects the fact that domestic

[14] Allen (1954); Deighton (1996), pp. 84-86
[15] Andreopoulos (1991), p. 212
[16] Reynolds (1985b), p. 5
[17] Deudney & Ikenberry (1999), p. 183; Ikenberry (2009), p. 74
[18] E.g. Bartlett (1992); Baylis (1981); Dimbleby & Reynolds (1988); Dumbrell (2001); McDonald (1974); Priest (2006); Renwick (1996)

politics is important for understanding the ups-and-downs of Anglo-American cooperation. In order to explain the pattern of cooperation, and the extent to which domestic political factors are responsible for changes over time, these bounded histories of successive British administrations are here reconceptualised as 'cases'. Treating these periods as cases, bounded by elections, allows us to distinguish distinct time-frames during which different configurations of political ideology, legislative constraint and international cooperation were evidenced, thereby affording us leverage on the theoretical debate at hand.

CASE SELECTION

The case study has two functions; demonstrating comparative theoretical leverage and tracing the specified causal mechanisms. The first function is to establish a framework by which we can establish the relative success of our contending theories in explaining Anglo-American relations. By selecting cases on values of the independent variables utilised by both our model and by rival liberal and constructivist explanations (a 'diverse case' strategy) we will be able to demonstrate the relative analytical leverage of each approach.[19] A case is defined as "an instance of a class of events",[20] with that class here understood as the cooperative propensity of administrations in the UK. These cases are bounded by elections, as they are primarily responsible for inducing change in the primary explanatory variables of political ideology and domestic constraint. Figure 6 lists each of the cases of postwar British administrations.

[19] Seawright & Gerring (2008), pp. 300-301
[20] George & Bennett (2005), p. 17

Election Date	Prime Minister	Party in Government	Majority	US President
5/7/45	Attlee	Labour	145	Truman (D)
23/2/50	Attlee	Labour	5	Truman (D)
25/10/51	Churchill	Conservative	16	Truman (D) Eisenhower (R)
26/5/55	Eden Macmillan	Conservative	60	Eisenhower (R)
8/10/59	Macmillan Home	Conservative	100	Kennedy (D)
15/10/64	Wilson	Labour	4	Johnson (D)
31/3/66	Wilson	Labour	96	Johnson (D)
18/6/70	Heath	Conservative	15	Nixon (R)
28/2/74	Wilson	Labour	-17	Nixon (R)
10/10/74	Wilson Callaghan	Labour	3	Ford (R) Carter (D)
3/5/79	Thatcher	Conservative	43	Carter (D) Reagan (R)
9/6/83	Thatcher	Conservative	144	Reagan (R)
11/6/87	Thatcher Major	Conservative	102	Reagan (R) Bush (R)
9/4/92	Major	Conservative	21	Bush (R) Clinton (D)
1/5/97	Blair	Labour	179	Clinton (D)

Figure 6 *Universe of cases drawn from postwar British administrations, 1945-2000*

Distinguishing between high and low values of legislative constraint and left and right political ideological positions gives us four potential combinations on the explanatory variables. Figure 7 summarises the four cases chosen from these and displays their values on the independent variables.[21] One benefit of this approach is that it allows us to distinguish between the predicted outcomes of each of the rival approaches, as depicted in Figure 8. Figure 9 displays these attributes in the same form as the spatial model developed in the theory section, helping to show how the case selection links with the theory. The logic of the spatial model depicted here relies on the (uncontroversial) assumption that the 'political right' in Britain has been further left of the 'political left' in the United States. Or, as Dean Acheson put it: "Even the Conservatives would be socialists".[22]

	Ideologically Proximate	**Ideologically Disparate**
High Legislative Constraint	Churchill, 1953-1955	Wilson & Callaghan, 1974-1976
Low Legislative Constraint	Macmillan, 1960-1963	Wilson, 1966-1968

Figure 7 *Cases selected and their values on the independent variables*

[21] Although bounded by electoral periods, the cases themselves do not extend for the entire duration. This helps to control for the confounding influence of different US administrations and parties by focusing only on relations between the two administrations which overlapped the most during the period.
[22] Darden (2011), p. 98

	Liberalism	Constructivism	Agreement through Opposition
Churchill 1953-1955	Low	High	Medium
Macmillan 1960-1963	High	High	High
Wilson 1966-1968	High	Low	Low
Wilson & Callaghan 1974-1976	Low	Low	Medium

Figure 8 *Predicted level of cooperation in each case by theory*



Figure 9 *The four cases represented as spatial models*

The second function of the case study is to trace the causal mechanisms specified above. These are (1) that highly constrained governments will need to take into account the preferences of the political opposition when it comes to foreign policymaking, and (2) that constraints disempower the ideological fringe of a party by means of a credible threat of governmental collapse. The depth of analysis afforded by case studies makes them perfectly adapted for the tracing of interaction effects such as those predicted by the argument above.[23] Each individual case takes the form of a detailed historical narrative based on both primary and secondary sources. This prevents the implicit endorsement of previous narratives which have not addressed the domestic politics of the 'special relationship'. Figure 10 below lists the sources consulted for each of the cases.

Sources
Personal papers of Heads of State and Foreign Ministers
Political party manifestos
Newspaper sources (through ProQuest and Lexis Nexis)
Public papers of the Presidency
Committee minutes
Cabinet papers
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)
Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO)
Pamphlets and party publications
Biographies of Heads of State and Foreign Ministers
Secondary historical sources

Figure 10 *Sources utilised in researching the case studies. (Archival resources consulted are listed separately in the bibliography).*

[23] Bennett & Elman (2006), p. 263

OVERCOMING THREATS TO VALIDITY

It is worth briefly noting two potential issues affecting the validity of case study research before we continue. The first concerns 'selection bias'. Although by selecting cases on the independent variable our approach does not suffer from problems associated with 'selection on the dependent variable',[24] there is always a risk that one is inadvertently selecting upon both the independent *and* dependent variables, thereby selecting only 'confirming cases'.[25] Accordingly, two reassurances are given. First, as it is not the function of the case study section to *establish causation*, the issue does not apply with as much force as in those studies relying on cases alone. Second, full details of the political values are given for each case in Figure 6 above. The reader can therefore see for themselves the dearth of cases available for some combinations of the independent variables and understand the reasons why the chosen cases were selected.

A second issue concerns the independence of cases. Selecting temporally bounded cases from the same country during a relatively similar time period can risk disguising cross-temporal historical processes. This is clearly an issue for this inquiry, as some of the cases follow directly from others. Yet there are reasons to believe that the partial dependence of the cases does not undermine the approach in its entirety. First, it is not always clear what the subsequent impact of important events (such as Suez) should be. We know they enter into the public discourse, but once there it is not clear how much of an independent effect they exert. Second, we would expect the political variables under study to be sufficiently powerful that they are not wholly overwhelmed by longer-term effects. Third, the potential for endogeneity runs both

[24] Collier *et al*. (2004), pp. 94-96; Shively (2006), p. 345
[25] George & Bennett (2005), p. 24

ways. In other words, just as domestic politics is sometimes conditioned by past events and historical processes, so too are these phenomena in part affected by domestic political processes. It is likely a focus on domestic politics will allow us to 'endogenise' many purportedly exogenous events and processes.[26]

THE CASES

Each of the cases is presented below in the following format: First the case is introduced and its values on the independent variables of political ideology and legislative constraint made clear; second, the historical narrative of the case is presented; third, the outcome of the case is discussed alongside the implications it generates for the 'agreement through opposition' conjecture.

[1] CHURCHILL'S SECOND ADMINISTRATION, 1953-1955

The successful Conservative election victory of 25 October 1951 marked the beginning of Churchill's second administration. Churchill, by now an old man, would hang on in government until May 1955, when his Foreign Secretary Eden replaced him at Prime Minister. Whilst in office Churchill dealt with two US administrations – Truman's and Eisenhower's – Democrat and Republican respectively. Despite following a minority Labour government under Attlee, Churchill's parliamentary situation was not much stronger in comparison. The Conservatives had a majority of only 16, enough seats to pass uncontroversial legislation comfortably, but not high enough to discount the views of the Parliamentary opposition. During this period the slim legislative majority and the leftward leanings of the opposition Labour party were to exert an influence on the Conservative government which would impact upon

[26] Bueno de Mesquita (1996), pp. 54-56; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith (2009)

relations with the US. As a result, despite the enthusiasm with which Churchill took on the task of 'repairing' the Anglo-American relationship, his election ultimately made little difference to the strength of the 'special relationship'.

One of the most important rifts between the US and UK during the period was the issue of embargoed trade to China. Following the victory of the Chinese Communists over Chiang Kai-Shek's forces in 1949, the US sponsored the 'China Committee' body to oversee the implementation of an embargo on trade with the Communist government.[27] This was similar in form to the trade controls already established to regulate commercial links to the Soviet Union.[28] Particularly contentious were the embargoes of copper and rubber, both of which the US deemed necessary for the construction of military hardware. Churchill was keen to avoid a schism in Anglo-American relations, remarking at the end of 1952: "Don't let us fall out with the United States for the sake of China".[29] But politically the Conservatives found themselves caught in the middle between the zealous anti-Communism of both parties in the US and the Labour party's scepticism of the distrust displayed towards Communist governments.[30] The muted suspicions of Communist governments in the Labour party, coupled with the realisation that trade embargoes would impact disproportionately upon working-class and northern constituencies in the UK, induced Labour to pressure the government for a relaxation of the embargo. The Labour MP Desmond Donnelly argued in the House of Commons that: "The surest way of digging our own graves in the Far East is to follow a policy which drives Communist China inwards towards Soviet Russia, cuts her off from the West, and makes her

[27] Cain (1995), pp. 33-35
[28] Mastanduno (1988), p. 122
[29] Kaufman (2000), p. 357
[30] Buchanan (2012), p. 147

embittered".[31] Other Labour members were more concerned with the social impact of the controls, as witnessed in the debate below between Harold Davies and Peter Thorneycroft, President of the Board of Trade:

> Davies: "Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the position in the tinplate industry, and of the fact that there is some doubt whether the demand at the moment for the products of the hand mills will revive sufficiently to stop the permanent closing of the remaining 114 hand mills in South Wales? I beg the right hon. Gentleman, if he is in a position to do so, to send the orders to China, even if he has to obtain permission of Senator Battle or somebody else. Otherwise we shall have to shoulder the difficulties of unemployment in the South Wales tinplate industry."[32]

> Thorneycroft: "The hon. Gentleman is raising rather wider issues. The Question refers to the export of tinplate to China, and I said that, although these orders have been offered for the export of tinplate, they would, as the hon. Gentleman knows, be contrary to the existing control."[33]

The Labour Party was sincere and united in its opposition to the trade controls. The Attlee government had refused to participate in any sanctions which were non-military in nature when the China Committee list was drawn up and had gone further in subsequent years, side-stepping the controls by trading materials through Hong Kong. This provoked a furious reaction in Parliament by Churchill and the Conservatives whilst in opposition, accusing Attlee of indirectly arming the Communists.[34] In opposition, Labour met with delegates from China to discuss the

[31] Desmond Donnelly (Labour), Hansard, 5 February 1953
[32] Harold Davies (Labour), Hansard, 2 April 1953
[33] Peter Thorneycroft (Conservative), Hansard, 2 April 1953
[34] Cain (1995), pp. 38, 47

potential for increasing East-West trade,[35] and their Conference adopted resolution after resolution calling for increased Sino-British trade and Chinese membership of the UN.[36] This was in addition to the frequent and continued opposition in Parliament. Labour repeatedly pressed the weak Conservative government on its foreign policy,[37] Macmillan recalling in his diary that: "The [government] only just scraped through. The Opposition saw their advantage and pressed it. With no PM; no [Foreign Secretary]; and most other ministers in the House of Lords, they demanded discussions on Foreign Affairs, Defence and similar topics in order to embarrass the Front Bench in the Commons".[38]

The problem of East-West trade was to have a substantial impact on Anglo-American relations during the period,[39] and the government was well aware of the impending clash of policies.[40] MacArthur was informed prior to the meetings in Bermuda that: "The conference will be held against a background of repeated public expressions in the UK of concern over the present state of the Anglo-American relationship". It was felt that Britain would likely "push for relaxation of East-West trade controls, and may raise the possibility of trade with China".[41] Whilst the US pressed for maximum pressure against China, Eden pushed for a more conciliatory line. Dulles was angered, fearing that the rest of the world would see a "love for communist China" emanating from the UK.[42] Churchill and Eisenhower also argued (in private) over China, with

[35] Labour International Committee Minutes, 24 June 1953
[36] Labour International Committee Minutes, 1 October 1953
[37] 'Consultation with America: British Views Clear', The Manchester Guardian, 17 February 1953
[38] Macmillan (2004), p. 254
[39] Sebastian Haffner, 'Britain and America', The Observer, 15 February 1953
[40] Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting, 26 February 1953
[41] United States Department of State (1979), p. 1715
[42] Record of a meeting between Dulles and Eden, 7 December 1953, Declassified Documents Reference System

Churchill downplaying the threat but Eisenhower fearing much potential for trouble.[43] Though British efforts at diplomatic wrangling led to a partial relaxation of the trade controls in 1954,[44] this was viewed by Britain as a poor compromise, and the issue was to continue in relevance until the Suez Crisis gave the UK 'bigger fish to fry'.

The alternative argument to the domestic constraints one adopted here - that trade with China was in the UK's best economic interests and would have been pursued by *any* government[45] – cannot account for three important aspects of the trade controls case. First, it cannot explain the opposition of the Conservatives, whilst out of government in the late 1940s, to the Labour government's attempts to reduce the China Committee list and circumvent its requirements. Second, it cannot explain why Churchill's shift from supporting the China Committee list to vigorously opposing it occurred almost *three years* after acquiring the reins of government.[46] Third, the national interest perspective cannot explain the repeated links made between the issue of trade with China and the need to ensure electoral success in Lancashire and the industrial heartlands of the UK.[47]

It was not only trade with China which instilled the fear of low domestic political support, but also the admission of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Though a multilateral project, GATT was promoted actively by the US, which sought to include as much of the non-Communist world as possible in a free-trade area. Accordingly, the US came out strongly in favour of Japanese

[43] United States Department of State (1979), p. 1498
[44] Bar-Noi (2012); Jackson (2000)
[45] E.g. Kaufman (2001), p. 105
[46] Young (1996), pp. 132-133
[47] E.g. Macmillan (2004), p. 209

membership, and pushed the British to do the same.[48] But Japanese membership threatened British textile production and in doing so resulted in domestic political opposition. The Labour MP Samuel Silverman cautioned against Japanese accession, warning; "whatever may be the truth about Japan, will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that it is even more important to guarantee a prosperous future to Lancashire".[49] Balancing the 'special relationship' with Conservative support in Lancashire was to thus become a continuing issue for the government. At the beginning of 1953 Macmillan noted on the question of Japan's admission: "So far, we have managed to 'stall' on this, but it does not seem possible to go on 'stalling' indefinitely. What between US and Lancashire, HMG are in a difficulty!"[50] Two years later the Cabinet was confronting the same problem, Macmillan despairing that: "On the one hand we risk turning Japan towards China and the Communists. On the other we risk losing Lancashire and the election."[51] Here again the Conservative government found its ability to coordinate with the US undermined by domestic political constraints.

A final disagreement worthy of discussion during this period was Churchill's personal 'summit diplomacy' and the rift that this caused with the US. Churchill, missing his wartime role as international mediator, made several attempts to instigate East-West negotiations.[52] On 11 May 1953 he made a speech offering three-power talks according to the wartime 'Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill' model. This was the exact opposite of the policy the US was pursuing at the time, and Churchill informed Lord

[48] McKenzie (2008), p. 94
[49] Samuel Silverman (Labour), Hansard, 10 March 1953
[50] Macmillan (2004), p. 209
[51] Macmillan (2004), p. 384
[52] Williamson (2006), p. 7

Salisbury that he intended to meet with the Soviets even without US support.[53] As Macmillan recorded in his diary, "the highlight of Churchill's speech was the offer of a 3 power talk…This excited the enthusiastic support of the opposition, the less vociferous approval of the Conservatives … [and] of course, the alarm of Washington...This now means that on questions of finance, trade, economics, and foreign policy we and the Americans are now in total disagreement".[54] The Americans were displeased with this unilateral approach, and Bedell-Smith warned Eden in May 1954 that the US was losing patience with Britain's negotiations with Communist states.[55] Within two months of this meeting Churchill invited US anger once more by sending secret telegrams to the Russians asking for two-power talks. Eden had not wanted the telegram sent, but he acknowledged that the public would undoubtedly fall behind Churchill.[56]

What is noteworthy about Churchill's summit diplomacy – which so irked US policymakers – is the manner in which it highlights inter-party ideological differences over East-West security policy. There is no evidence that Churchill's position was influenced by lobbying from the Labour party; indeed, it is most likely that personal and not political factors influenced his decision. What is interesting is that the move itself was viewed as a left-wing one. Herbert Morrison, Foreign Secretary under Attlee, was said to have remarked that "one has to run jolly fast to keep to the left of Churchill nowadays".[57] The extent of parliamentary support and disapproval also followed party lines. The move dismayed the Conservatives but immensely pleased

[53] Macmillan (2004), p. 236
[54] Macmillan (2004), p. 231
[55] Eden (1960), p. 127
[56] Macmillan (2004), p. 322
[57] Macmillan (2004), p. 345

the Labour members, highlighting ideological differences in the level of trust accorded to the Soviet Union.

The examples above highlight the extent to which Churchill's second administration found itself caught between domestic political pressures and the maintenance of the 'special relationship'. This perspective helps us to understand how the US-UK relations remained so cool despite Churchill's professed aim to repair the damage inflicted by the previous Labour government. Although the government's moves risked undermining Anglo-American cooperation, from a domestic perspective they were remarkably successful. The Conservatives were returned to power on the 26th May 1955 with a majority of 60 seats under Eden's leadership. The party was particularly impressed with their success in the northern textile-producing constituencies. "The towns, esp[ecially] the industrial towns, have done splendidly. Lancashire solid. We even kept Oldham", wrote Macmillan.[58] The importance with which the Conservatives viewed their hold in these towns partially explains why the issues of East-West trade and Japanese GATT membership were to maintain their salience during Eden's premiership. Even though the immediate constraint no-longer haunted the party, they would have been well aware that electoral success was won in part by the commitment to these constituencies, and that the price of staving off future Labour encroachment would be continuing support industry in the north. As a concluding remark, Aldrich's response to the results of the 1955 election provide a concise summary of the mechanisms identified above, and are worth repeating in full.

> As of 5pm today Conservatives have lead in UK general election of 63 seats with 10 returns still to come in, thus assuring them substantial

[58] Macmillan (2004), p. 432

> majority, probably 60 or 70 seats over Labor [sic], in new Parliament…From Conservative Party viewpoint election has presented unparalleled and perhaps unique opportunity to achieve decisive victory. Genuinely good record of government, prosperity, relatively calm and improved international situation, harmonious allies relations, party unity and organization in contrast to Labor [sic] Party disunity...On other hand size of majority may reduce sense of obligation of Conservative backbenchers to support government and make preservation party unity more difficult in future...Substantially increased majority in new Parliament should also permit government much greater freedom of action to take possibly distasteful measures in economic or foreign policy fields...Possible result may be even firmer British position in great power talks with Russians.[59]

[2] MACMILLAN'S ADMINISTRATION, 1960-1963

Macmillan's conservatives achieved victory by a substantial margin in the General Election of 8 October 1959, returning to power with a majority of 100 seats. This case begins a year later in 1960 with the coming to power of Kennedy's Democratic administration in the US. The years of Kennedy and Macmillan are viewed as a time of renewal in the Anglo-American partnership. This is often attributed to Macmillan's 'Atlanticism'; but this is to confuse preference with performance. After all, Churchill was a devout Atlanticist, but his administration's precarious position in Parliament ensured that Atlanticism came at a political cost. For Macmillan this was not a worry. The position of his government was secure, and the threat from the left non-existent, affording Macmillan the opportunity to build bridges with America. There was a remarkable level of coordination between the two countries during this period. These

[59] United States Department of State (1985), p. 601

cordial relations are explored in detail through Anglo-American nuclear cooperation and the shocks of the Cuban missile crisis and the 'Skybolt' cancellation.

The level of coordination between Macmillan and Kennedy was unprecedented in the postwar years. The two leaders consulted frequently, particularly on issues of nuclear cooperation and East-West security, coordinating policy to the greatest extent possible. Macmillan proposed a meeting with Kennedy within weeks of the President's inauguration,[60] and the State Department advised Kennedy to offer declarations of US support, noting that Macmillan was a staunch 'Atlanticist' and that his goal would be to harmonize the Anglo-American relationship.[61] The first meeting took place in June 1961, where the two leaders discussed positions on Laos and Berlin.[62] Later that year Kennedy relaxed his position on East-West negotiations, a policy long supported by Macmillan and the Conservatives.[63] A month later both leaders issued a joint declaration calling on the USSR to cease all atmospheric tests.[64] The USSR ignored this plea, detonating a 30-megaton nuclear device on 24 October 1961. Macmillan immediately arranged a telephone conversation with Kennedy; during this call common statements were agreed and ambassadorial discussions sanctioned.[65] Further joint positions were agreed in the coming weeks before responses were sent to Adenauer and de Gaulle.[66] Both leaders met again in Bermuda at the end of 1961, where agreement was reached on Berlin, the Common Market and Atomic testing, issues upon which both were 'absolutely agreed'.[67] Regarding the

[60] United States Department of State (1994), p. 1030
[61] United States Department of State (1994), p. 1031
[62] Minutes of meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan, 8 June 1961, Digital National Security Archive
[63] Macmillan (2012), p. 405
[64] Macmillan (2012), p. 408
[65] Macmillan (2012), p. 422
[66] Macmillan (2012), pp. 427-429
[67] Macmillan (2012), p. 436

latter, the UK offered Christmas Island available for tests, and Kennedy agreed to Macmillan's initiative to eventually outlaw nuclear testing.[68] The Americans also got theirs; Macmillan agreed to contribute towards building up the British Army of the Rhine for German defence without compromising its defence commitments elsewhere.[69]

Upon visiting the US in May 1962, Macmillan summarised the state of Anglo-American relations as follows:

> The most striking thing seems to be a greater friendliness to UK than I remember before, pervading every aspect of our relations…The President went out of his way to do me honour….On future policy - Nuclear tests, disarmament, detente with Russia etc., the President is in agreement with us.[70]

Nowhere was the renewed cooperation between the two countries more noticeable than in the negotiations over the Partial Test Ban Treaty, Macmillan's 'pet project',[71] and a resounding success for both administrations. Macmillan and Kennedy coordinated positions right through the negotiations, and when Kennedy finally agreed to soften the American position and accept the compromise words devised by Lord Hailsham, the treaty could proceed.[72] After signing, Macmillan was received by the backbench '1922 Committee' with "great applause and banging of desks", and aside from *The Times*, all British newspapers gave him favourable coverage.[73] Deputy

[68] Macmillan (2012), p. 443
[69] United States Department of State (1994), p. 1070
[70] Macmillan (2012), p. 467
[71] 'The Next Five Years', Conservative Party General Election Manifesto, 1959
[72] Home (1976), p. 155
[73] Macmillan (2012), p. 581

Prime Minister Butler, addressing the annual Conservative Party Conference, wished that "the Prime Minister could have been here to tell you himself of his own untiring efforts in the long story of the complex negotiations that led up to the Test Ban Treaty".[74]

The close ties between Macmillan and Kennedy were particularly noticeable during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Kennedy notified Macmillan of the crisis on 21 October 1962, the day before he informed Congress and the public.[75] Macmillan responded by promising full support in the Security Council and asking for the US' legal position in order to help coordinate the UK's stance. The response also warned Kennedy to avoid trading off anything of undue importance with the Soviets.[76] Macmillan and Home worked out a response to Kennedy's public proclamation. 'EXCOM' minutes from the 22nd demonstrate US approval of Macmillan's supportive position.[77] On the evening of the 24th, Kennedy bluntly asked Macmillan the '64 thousand dollar question'; "Should he take out Cuba?"[78] Macmillan's advice to the President was relatively 'hawkish' for a European perspective; he accepted the possibility of the US taking over Cuba by military action and suggested European opposition would be overcome by the 'prompt success' which would follow. More generally Macmillan was chiefly concerned with maintaining alliance unity during the crisis.[79] It was in this spirit that he sent a personal message to Khrushchev on the 28th demanding the removal of the missiles, a few hours before the Soviet decision came

[74] Conservative Party Conference Speech, 1963, British Political Speech Archive
[75] Rusk (1990), p. 206
[76] Telegram from Macmillan to the Kennedy, 22 October 1962, National Security Archive
[77] Minutes of the 507th Meeting of the National Security Council, 22 October 1962, National Security Archive
[78] Macmillan (2012), p. 511
[79] Message from Lauris Norstad (USAF) to Kennedy, 24 October 1962, National Security Archive

over the radio.[80] Once the crisis had subsided, Kennedy telegrammed Macmillan, stating: "I am grateful for your warm and generous words. Your generous support publicly expressed and our daily conversations have been of inestimable value in these past days".[81] Perhaps because the correspondence had been conducted secretly, press coverage of the missile crisis was not positive for Macmillan, though Ambassador Bruce, Permanent US Representative to the North Atlantic Council, blamed this on 'communist infiltration' and smearing from the Labour benches.[82]

Immediately after the Cuba crisis was defused, the Skybolt cancellation forced itself onto the Anglo-American agenda. Appearing as a snub in relation to Macmillan's support during the missile crisis, the Skybolt affair – though sometimes cited as an example of poor US-UK relations[83] – is in actual fact a textbook example of cooperative relations. The 'crisis' emerged after the US decided to cancel development of the Skybolt ballistic missile system under-development since the late 1950s. The decision had major consequences for British defence as the UK had based its entire deterrent capability on the Skybolt programme. Right from the beginning the US realised the political importance the cancellation of Skybolt would have. The problem was summarised in a Department of State memo circulated in late October 1962:

> Two of the Conservative Party's talking points (which may or may not be valid) are that they have special and superior qualifications, as compared with Labour, for dealing with 1) defence and 2) the Americans. As British

[80] Macmillan (2012), p. 514
[81] Telegram from Kennedy to Macmillan, 28 October 1962, National Security Archive
[82] Memorandum of Conversation between Robert Estabrook and Ambassador Bruce, November 1962, National Security Archive
[83] E.g. Brinkley (1990), pp. 606-607

> defence depends to a unique degree on Skybolt to be manufactured by the Americans its cancellation would be a serious blow to the prestige, both public and private, of Tory competence in these two fields...Whatever our own feelings about the efficacy of the British deterrent, the British could hardly regard our cancelling Skybolt as a friendly gesture.[84]

Though the British were certain the cancellation of Skybolt was a political move, Dean Rusk recalls that the decision was taken primarily on technical grounds, claiming Skybolt "was too expensive, was redundant as a weapons system because of the development of new Polaris and Minuteman missiles, and had failed its test flights". Both Rusk and McNamara accordingly "felt it was primarily a military matter with only incidental political overtones...".[85] McNamara informed the British Ambassador Ormsby-Gore that the cost of Skybolt had risen from $1.4bn to over $1.75bn,[86] but the UK remained somewhat sceptical of US motives. Following the cancellation the British and Americans agreed to a series of meetings at Nassau in the Bahamas to discuss the future of Anglo-American nuclear cooperation. Background papers prepared by the State Department prior to the meetings stressed the importance of considering the domestic politics of agreement, tying Macmillan's survival – and with him the renewed Anglo-American partnership – to success at Nassau:

> The alternative is a Labor [sic] government which would be equivocal on the subject of EEC, would persist in dangerous illusions regarding East-West relations, would wish to spend more on social welfare and less on defence and would allow the British ship of state either by design or indifference to draft toward the Scandinavian position of part-participant,

[84] United States Department of State (1994), p. 1083
[85] Rusk (1990), p. 238
[86] United States Department of State (1994), p. 1087

> part-spectator with regard to the Atlantic community. The Prime Minister needs a successful meeting for an immediate reason: political survival. The President needs the meeting as a step toward a distant objective: the creation of the American grand design of an Atlantic partnership.[87]

Whether or not the survival of the Conservative government hung in the balance,[88] Macmillan went to Nassau intending to obtain concessions from the US. The UK has eagerly asserted its desire to get its hands on US-made Polaris missiles on previous occasions. These were submarine-based nuclear missiles, far superior to Skybolt, and early predecessors to the Trident system in use today. The UK had not been successful in convincing the US to sell them Polaris missiles, and Kennedy was reluctant to do so for fear of upsetting the US' other allies, particularly France. Despite caution from advisors, Kennedy agreed at Nassau to offer "appropriate components of Polaris missiles to [the] British on condition that they commit their eventual [Polaris] force to a multinational force through NATO".[89] Although Kennedy attempted to fully integrate the Polaris sale into the NATO framework, Macmillan insisted that the UK must possess its own 'independent' deterrent, and succeeded in persuading Kennedy to afford Britain the absolute right to utilise the weapons outside of the multilateral framework.[90] This was a victory for Macmillan, although for all intents and purposes the weapons were not truly 'independent'.[91] The presence of disagreements over the Skybolt 'crisis' has led commentators to see it as a breakdown in cooperation, but in fact the converse was true. As Keohane argues, cooperation is not synonymous with a harmony of interests, but requires rather than

[87] Background Paper, Kennedy-Macmillan Nassau Meeting, 19 December 1962, National Security Archive
[88] Rusk (1990), p. 238, is adamant that it did not.
[89] United States Department of State (1994), p. 1088
[90] United States Department of State (1994), p. 1091
[91] Priest (2005)

behaviour is modified and brought into line with that of others so as to reach mutually beneficial outcomes.[92] This is precisely what occurred at Nassau: the US gave concessions to buttress the Conservative government whilst Macmillan accepted the compromise of a semi-independent nuclear deterrent.

What are we to make of the numerous examples of cooperation between Macmillan and Kennedy from the point of view of our argument? What is most important, but conspicuous only by its absence, is the degree of legislative constraint. Macmillan's position in Parliament was powerful and Labour's feeble. Though some have claimed Macmillan was weak, this weakness never extended to the threat of losing office. Rather, as McGeorge Bundy argued, it related simply to fears of declining popularity and authority at a time when important domestic decisions needed to be made.[93] The crucial questions to ask of the period are whether or not a Labour government, or a severely constrained Conservative administration, would have been able to achieve the same level of cooperation as did Macmillan. Certainly one would have difficulty seeing Labour's cooperation in the nuclear sphere being as close. The broader party voted at frequent intervals for 'pacifist' and 'extreme left' policies – such as unilateral nuclear disarmament – that alarmed the US government.[94] It is also unlikely that Labour sympathy for Cuba could have been accommodated with such close solidarity as witnessed during the missile crisis. A day after being informed of the missiles, and before the public announcement at 7pm, Macmillan showed Gaitskell the documents, reporting that: "He did not take a very robust attitude. He thought his party 'would not

[92] Keohane (1984), pp. 51-53
[93] Memo on British cabinet changes by McGeorge Bundy, 20 July 1962, Declassified Documents Reference System
[94] Macmillan (2012), p. 417

like it'".[95] Overall, then, it is unlikely that Macmillan would have been able to accomplish such a thorough renewal of the 'special relationship' were it not for the strong legislative support buttressing his administration.

[3] WILSON'S FIRST ADMINISTRATION, 1966-1968

Harold Wilson was elected leader of the Labour party in February 1963 following the death of Hugh Gaitskell. Wilson took the reins of power from the Conservatives in 1964 at the 15 October General Election, receiving a slim majority of four seats. Though this small majority "constrained Wilson both in party political and policy issues" it also "provided [him] with an excuse for not undertaking radical initiatives in foreign affairs".[96] Wilson's luck changed at the 31 March General Election of 1966 when his party was returned with a substantial majority of 96. This signalled a marked deterioration in Wilsons' fortunes in foreign policy, which Vickers finds 'slightly ironic',[97] yet makes perfect sense from the point of view of our theory. Without a slim majority to quell dissent within the ranks and induce cooperation with the more 'Atlanticist' Conservatives, Wilson was caught between a 'rock and a hard place' after 1966 in attempting to reconcile the views of the Labour party with the demands of Johnson's Democrats in the US. There were four main areas of disagreement during this period, each of which was serious enough to temporarily undermine the Anglo-American relationship. These four issues each had three things in common: First, they had at their base ideological motivations. Second, they worsened following Wilson's electoral 'success' in 1966. Third, they impacted negatively on relations with the US.

[95] Macmillan (2012), p. 509
[96] Vickers (2011), p. 58
[97] Vickers (2011), p. 76

The first example of relatively poor relations is the British position on the Vietnam War, a conflict which escalated during Johnson's tenure. Johnson wanted two things from the British; public support and troops on the ground. Wilson agreed to the first, but never to the second. The predominant reason for Wilson's refusal was opposition from within the Labour party, which was angry enough at Wilson's 'endorsement' of the war, and would have entered open rebellion had British troops been committed.[98] Indeed, Labour party opposition to Wilson's Vietnam policy was "the cause of more anger amongst [his] usual supporters than any other issue".[99] This was neatly demonstrated when, in both 1966 and 1967, the party rejected the government's policy (on Vietnam) for the first time in history. The issue intensified in May 1966 when the US began bombing Hanoi, a policy which clashed with a threshold set by Wilson in the House of Commons years before, and which – under pressure from telegrams sent by prominent Labour MPs – forced him to publicly admonish the US for the first time.[100] Wilson's refusal to share 'responsibility' for Vietnam angered Johnson, who went as far as to reject Wilson's request for a meeting in Washington over the issue, arguing Attlee had only been welcome because there were British troops in Korea at the time.[101] According to Colman: "Contact with the White House confirmed that Johnson was, as Bruce put it politely, 'entirely disdainful of the idea of receiving the Prime Minister'".[102] Yet Johnson was well aware himself that Wilson's stance on Vietnam was not entirely of his own making, and criticised the attitudes of the Labour backbenchers for precluding British involvement in the conflict.[103]

[98] Jones (1997), p. 149
[99] Phythian (2007), p. 59
[100] Colman (2003), p. 138
[101] Phythian (2007), p. 64
[102] Colman (2003), p. 140
[103] Phythian (2007), p. 66

A second example of the poor state of relations may be found in the attempts at 'peace diplomacy' conducted by Wilson during the period. Not only did Wilson believe he had a 'special relationship' with both the Soviet Union *and* the US, but he also sought to reap political capital from a potential diplomatic solution to the East-West conflict.[104] This had also been the policy of the Labour party since the emergence of the 'third force' argument in the 1950s, and a Fabian Society publication of the period argued that the best policy for the West was that of "patient negotiation with the Soviet Union in search of genuine détente".[105] Indeed, it is clear that Wilson also thought his diplomatic efforts a useful means of pleasing his critics within the Labour party.[106] Though visits to the USSR took place in 1965, the most substantive attempt at negotiation followed Kosygin's visit to the UK in February 1967.[107] Wilson saw the visit, and the talks, as a breakthrough because of the Soviets' prior unwillingness to engage in bilateral negotiations.[108] Yet not only were these efforts unsuccessful, they also incurred the anger of the US, which was displeased at Wilson's unilateral signalling towards their prime adversary, and his attempts to speak on their behalf. Washington regarded these diplomatic efforts with irritation and Johnson personally attempted to dampen Wilson's enthusiasm for any further moves.[109]

Third, relations during the period were exacerbated by the Labour government's cuts to defence spending, and its eventual withdrawal from positions 'East of Suez'. Britain still retained considerable military bases around the globe in the 1960s, yet these were proving costly for the British economy. Politically, too, the bases were

[104] Vickers (2011), p. 72
[105] Barnaby (1969), p. 58
[106] Callaghan (2007), p. 276
[107] Hughes (2009), p. 112
[108] Hughes (2003), p. 119
[109] Colman (2004), p. 121

problematic; the Labour party disapproved of these 'remnants of empire' for ideological reasons, and indirectly disapproved at the seeming waste of national economic resources which could instead fund education and welfare provision.[110] Wilson announced his intention to initiate a review of defence spending in December 1964 and the completed review was presented to the Commons by Secretary of State for Defence Denis Healey on 22 February 1966. The review recommended cuts of over 30% to Britain's defence expenditures, a position which was "condemned by many within the Labour Party who had hoped for a more far-reaching review that abandoned Britain's residual imperial role".[111] The threat of British withdrawal from East of Suez displeased the US, whose embattled position in Vietnam had reminded them of the value of a global British military presence.[112] Washington feared that abandoned British positions could become vacuums waiting to be filled by Communist infiltration. They were accordingly disappointed when, in July 1967, Healey presented a supplementary paper on defence cuts which would not only cut defence expenditures further, but insist upon full withdrawal from East of Suez. Though the US urged in the strongest terms for the UK to retain these positions, their lobbying was unsuccessful. Washington accused the British of 'betrayal',[113] but this and other outbursts achieved nothing. Dumbrell argues that: "By February 1968, Rusk was unable to advise [Johnson] to do anything more than 'reiterate our distress at the UK's accelerated withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf'".[114]

Finally, the British decision to devalue the pound sterling – taken in 1967 – was to have a distinctly negative impact on Anglo-American relations during the period. The

[110] Fielding (1999), p. 638
[111] Vickers (2011), pp. 74-75
[112] Dockrill (2002), p. 220
[113] Crossman (1976), p. 646
[114] Dumbrell (1996), p. 230

government realised soon after its accession to power in 1964 that the state of the British economy was in dire-straits and that it would be costly to retain sterling as the international reserve currency. The US, however, was relying on Britain not to devalue sterling in order to protect the dollar during a time of acute balance-of-payments problems in the US.[115] Wilson's initial decision to keep the value of the pound at $2.80 proved beneficial for the US. Yet the decision proved too difficult for the Labour government to manage. The refusal to revalue sterling was costing millions of pounds (at end this figure was just over £1 billion). This proved politically disastrous for a government elected on the promise of increasing welfare spending and improving the economic fortunes of the British working classes.[116] Eventually, this combination of economic drainage and political repercussions forced Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan to announce the devaluation of the pound by 14.3 per cent on 18 November 1967. The Americans protested but, ultimately, there was little they could do, and they were forced to accept the new reality of increased risks of speculative attacks on the dollar.[117]

What are we to make of the state of Anglo-American relations during this period? It is clear that there were many (interlinked) troubles in relations between the Labour party and the US. With regards to the Vietnam War, Wilson's East-West diplomacy, the withdrawal from East of Suez, and the devaluation of the pound, significant ideological disagreements arose between the two countries. In many ways this account reinforces the standard narrative of the late 1960s as a troubled time for Anglo-American relations; scholarly assessments have referred to the 'antagonism

[115] Vickers (2011), p. 62
[116] Kunz (1999), p. 215
[117] Kunz (1999), pp. 228-229

and animosity', 'deterioration', and 'weakening relationship' of the period.[118] Yet two caveats to this position must be noted. First is the extent to which the analysis of this case demonstrates the partial elasticity of leaders' preferences when arbitrating between domestic and international objectives. Wilson's rhetorical support for the Vietnam War, and his initial position on partial defence cuts East of Suez, illustrate the extent to which he was prepared to go a certain distance towards meeting US demands, but that he did not have complete freedom from his party. Second, one success for Anglo-American relations during Wilson's tenure not mentioned above is the decision by the Labour government to keep the Polaris nuclear defence system. This was surprising because Wilson had actively promoted unilateral nuclear disarmament whilst in opposition. The reason for this volte-face, Gill argues, was not a sudden change of mind, but rather the manner in which Wilson used the issue of nuclear disarmament instrumentally whilst in opposition to garner leftist support, with ultimately no intention of surrendering Britain's hard-won deterrent.[119]

[4] WILSON AND CALLAGHAN ADMINISTRATION, 1974-1976

Wilson's Labour party acceded to power for a second time at the 28 February General Election in 1974, although the term power is rather misleading in this context. The government was 17 seats short of a majority in Parliament and was concerned most immediately with its political survival. Wilson's government managed to secure a slim majority of just 3 seats in a General Election called for this single purpose on 11 October 1974, though a series of subsequent by-election losses reduced this slim majority over time. The relations between Wilson – and Callaghan, to whom Wilson handed over power on 5 April 1976 – and Gerald Ford's Republicans in the US were

[118] Bartlett (1992), p. 107; Baylis (1997), p. 146; Ellis (2001), p. 181; Dobson (1995), pp. 131-138; Ovendale (1998), pp. 136-139
[119] Gill (2011), pp. 267-268

remarkably cordial, despite US distrust of Labour party ideology. One of the primary determinants of the level of cooperation during the period was the high level of constraint applied to the Labour government, which served to make the government more responsive to opposition demands, and to disempower the more ideological fringe of the party. This case presents this claim in greater detail, focusing on the period from Ford's inauguration to his defeat at the hands of Carter's Democrats at the end of 1976.

It was clear throughout the period that the Republicans were not keen of the Labour government's socialist credentials. Henry Kissinger – the President's closest advisor – described Callaghan as 'cowardly',[120] and Wilson as 'a greasy sort of man'.[121] Ambassador to the UK Anne Armstrong did not feel "any natural inclination towards Wilson and his political views".[122] Despite animosity towards socialist ideology, however, the Ford administration was well aware that domestic constraints prevented Wilson (who was himself on the left of the party)[123] from showing his true colours. Worrying about the potential impact of decreasing constraint, Kissinger argued that: "They [Labour] are better right now, but over the long pull the Conservatives are better. If Labour gets a hefty majority, we will have more trouble. He'll have a wild left wing..."[124] He also pointed out to the President that "there is always a fight at the Labour Party Conference for Wilson to keep control and prevent disastrous programs".[125] This was part of a broader mistrust of the political left in Europe. Kissinger stated to Ford in September 1974 that he believed "[we] are best off

[120] Memorandum of conversation between Ford and Kissinger, 29 September 1974, Gerald Ford Papers
[121] Minutes of meeting between Ford, Kissinger and Scowcroft, 14 August 1974, Gerald Ford Papers
[122] Minutes of meeting between Ford, Scowcroft and Armstrong, 14 January 1976, Gerald Ford Papers
[123] Heppell (2010), p. 152
[124] Minutes of meeting between Ford, Kissinger and Scowcroft, 14 August 1974, Gerald Ford Papers
[125] Memorandum of conversation between Ford, Kissinger and Richardson, 27 February 1975, Gerald Ford Papers

keeping the Europeans to the right of us".[126] For the Republicans, a weak Labour government was acceptable, but not as preferable as a Conservative government. Though confidence in the pro-American credentials of the Conservative party had been shaken by the perceived indifference with which the previous Heath government had acted towards the US, the President and Kissinger thought the Conservatives better in general. Ford approved of Thatcher in particular after meeting her in 1976, agreeing with her economic prognosis and describing her as a 'tough competitor'.[127]

Despite admiration for the European right and a distrust of socialist ideology, the relationship between Britain and America during the period was cordial; not, perhaps, as 'special' as it had been under Macmillan and Kennedy, but certainly these represented positive times for Anglo-American relations.[128] Scowcroft went so far as to say in January 1976 that "our relations couldn't be better".[129] President Ford also stated in the same year that: "Overall support for NATO is healthier than for some time. I think that is a reflection of our relationships and our own bilateral relations with Germany and Great Britain."[130] There were disagreements from time to time, but these did not serve to damage the foundations of the 'special relationship' and were overcome by both sides through negotiation and persuasion. There were three areas in particular where this trend may be observed; International Monetary Fund (IMF) negotiations, defence expenditures and the threat of Communist infiltration in Europe.

[126] Memorandum of conversation between Ford and Kissinger, 10 September 1974, Gerald Ford Papers
[127] Minutes of meeting between Ford, Scowcroft and Armstrong, 14 January 1976, Gerald Ford Papers
[128] Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting, 24 July 1975
[129] Minutes of meeting between Ford, Scowcroft and Armstrong, 14 January 1976, Gerald Ford Papers
[130] Memorandum of conversation between Ford, Kissinger and Giscard d'Estaing, 17 May 1976, Gerald Ford Papers

The first area is that of IMF negotiations. At issue here was the poor state of the UK's economy and the eventual need for the IMF to act as 'lender of last resort' and bail out the bankrupt British government. There is no doubting that part of the problem here was the tendency of Labour governments to run up large budget deficits by increasing the level of social spending. More broadly, the financial crises of the 1970s began to challenge the Keynesian consensus of macro-economic management. Unlike the Conservatives, who were beginning during this time to embrace a form of fiscal conservatism which would later become Thatcher's policy of 'monetarism', Labour clung hard and fast to Keynesian economic theory. There was, therefore, something of an ideological rift between the UK and the US in this regard, as the Ford administration were less preoccupied with employment and more concerned about balancing the budget in the US. Kissinger recognised the implications of the British need for the IMF loan, even if he disagreed with the policies of the Wilson government:

> Britain wants to get producer money and participation. It is easy and doesn't require new facilities or national legislation. It would demoralize the West and automatically start a consumer/producer dialogue within the IMF on terms of trade. If we don't get the West together now, the disintegration of the West will be too far gone. The Brits want a quick fix until North Sea oil comes in. Wilson has no long-run vision and is totally unreliable.[131]

It was necessary to gain US approval because America effectively controlled the purse-strings of the IMF. Yet in the end US support for the Labour government's appeal to the IMF owed more to their understanding of the political imperatives of a

[131] Memorandum of conversation between Ford and Kissinger, 5 November 1974, Gerald Ford Papers

deal than it did to a perceived sense of recession-busting solidarity. Although the US realised it was in their interest to impose as harsh economic terms as possible, they worried about going so far as to effectively overthrow Wilson's government. These feelings were expressed in a telephone conversation between Schmidt and Ford:[132]

> Schmidt: "It is in the economic interest that we impose strong conditions on the British. We should not go so far as to overthrow this government. There is no one else to take the reins and there may be a period of disorder which could affect us all deeply"
>
> Ford: "That is exactly what I told my people"
>
> Schmidt: "So we need to find a point which will do the job but not be politically unacceptable"
>
> Ford: "That is what I think"
>
> Schmidt "If Callaghan had to resign, that would set us back"

Having both the opportunity to remove the Labour government and an economic incentive to do so, the US realised not only that there were more disruptive forces in British politics for Anglo-American relations that Wilson and Callaghan, but also that relations with the Labour government were working well for both sides.

A second area of characterised by ideological difference concerned the defence expenditures of the European allies towards the US-led effort to combat the Soviet

[132] Transcript of telephone conversation between Ford and Schmidt, 23 November 1976, Gerald Ford Papers

Union. There are three reasons why the left have traditionally favoured lower defence budgets. First, they tend to be more trusting in general and less prone to the use force to settle international issues.[133] Second, they are less concerned with the more particular threat emanating from the Soviet Union; whilst not *unconcerned*, they have never attached as much significance to the ideological component of the Cold War as have the political right.[134] Third, by endorsing higher social spending, socialist governments allocate a greater amount of government expenditure to domestic affairs, leaving 'less of the pie' available for defence.[135] In practice just as in theory, the Wilson government engaged in substantial cuts to British defence expenditure. But although the defence cuts did not please the US, they did not allow the reduced British contribution to undermine the relationship.[136] It is likely not only that the US felt this would be 'too rich' given the issues they were having preventing Congress from withdrawing aid to European countries, but that also they realised the political and economic situation in Britain was pushing for defence cuts, and that Wilson and Callaghan were offering the most that they could. The British were heartened by the supportive and understanding reception of the US to their situation. Speaking directly to Ford, Wilson stated: "we are grateful for the way you accepted our defence review. I know you are feeling lonely in many parts of the world". The President responded by saying that, despite defence cuts, the US was happy to continue the Mildenhall Agreement, and the meeting ended by mutual agreement as to the closeness of Anglo-American relations.[137] Throughout the rest of 1975 the British tried their best to limit the impact of spending cuts on their contribution to NATO, fiddling around with

[133] Nincic (2008); Rathbun (2004)
[134] Callaghan (2001)
[135] Fordham (2002), p. 84
[136] Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting, 20 November 1974
[137] Memorandum of conversation between Ford, Kissinger, Wilson and Callaghan, 31 January 1975, Gerald Ford Papers

rotations in the Mediterranean to help meet their commitments. In the main this strategy was successful; Haig reported to the President in October that year that Europe was moving in the right direction and that in particular "the Brits are good".[138] In this manner there was to be no crisis over defence cuts and the 'special relationship' withstood what could have otherwise been a nasty storm.

Thirdly, there were distinct ideological differences concerning the level of threat accorded to the emergence of communist (or communist supported) regimes and factions in several regions of the world. The Americans were particularly concerned about the rise of communist dominated governments in Portugal and Italy. For the US, the spectre of the 'red menace' arising within its sphere of influence was almost too much to bear. Predictably, the Labour government in the UK took a more pragmatic approach; they were, after all, used to both socialist governments and to the frequent battles within these between communist and moderate-left factions.[139] The difference of opinion was highlighted in a meeting between Wilson, Callaghan, Ford and Kissinger in May 1975:[140]

> Ford: "How about Portugal? We are disturbed. Yesterday I was told that there is no communist influence in the armed forces movement. This is nonsense of course. I also got a long Constitutional lecture."
>
> Kissinger: "It was an extraordinary and novel theory, which is that the armed forces movement is the only democratic force and represents all

[138] Memorandum of conversation between Ford and Haig, 14 October 1975, Gerald Ford Papers
[139] Callaghan (1987), p. 360
[140] Minutes of a meeting between Wilson, Callaghan, Ford and Kissinger, 30 May 1975, Gerald Ford Papers

> the people. The parties on the other hand are by definition not democratic because they represent only a part of the people"
>
> Callaghan: "We haven't seen eye to eye with you. The AFM is a microcosm of all kinds of opinion and we don't regard them as beyond redemption, although we too think that things are going badly, as you do. But we don't want to give up yet. We are still trying to elevate the parties and don't want to write them off yet…I want to go on struggling and not yet give up."

These same differences were to emerge with the US' worry of both Spain and Italy 'going communist'. Ford and Kissinger, having no-doubt realised the difference of sentiment in the Portugal discussions, concentrated on convincing the British that the spectre of a communist-dominated government in Italy was a distinct threat. In response to questioning from Ford as to the US approach, Kissinger responded:[141]

> There was a meeting this week, and we agreed on a common approach. Each country will send people to talk to different groups in Italy. We are sending Bill Scranton, Cabot Lodge, and George Meany. The instructions are: we are opposed to having Communists in the government, and we are opposed to a common programme because we are afraid the Communists will get credit for any success. I think there is a reluctance in Great Britain – [Foreign Secretary] Crosland at least seems reluctant.

Ultimately, however, these disagreements were not to prove troubling for the alliance. The Labour government was sceptical enough of communism to allow for the US to gain the impression both governments were on the same side. Had the more radical

[141] Memorandum of conversation between Schmidt, Ford and Kissinger, 15 July 1976, Gerald Ford Papers

elements of the party been afforded greater voice it is likely the outcome would have been very different. This is highlighted by Wilson's concern over another issue of foreign relations – the Middle East peace process. The US, staunchly pro-Israel, was demonstrably keen to have Britain adopt a similar position in favour of the Jewish state.[142] Kissinger requested that Wilson not give moral or economic support to the Arab states, but this was politically difficult for the Labour government. As Wilson put it: "A lot of our left-wing is pro-Arab. It is extraordinary, because they – the Arabs – hardly represent a radical revolution or social revolution".[143] As with other such differences of opinion, however, the left wing of the party was not sufficiently powerful enough to exert influence over Wilson and Callaghan. By July 1976 the US and UK were actively working together to draft resolutions on the Israel-Palestine situation,[144] and the different perspectives of both parties never loomed large enough to damage the level of rapport built up between the two administrations.

SUMMARY

The four cases demonstrate, in part, the important role of political ideology and legislative constraint. I say 'in part' because it is clear from the discussions that there was a lot more to each case than domestic politics. Other factors, be they economic, geopolitical, bureaucratic, or personal, played a discernible role in each case. I do not claim to subsume every element of each case under the domestic political framework. That would be inaccurate and reductionist. What I *do* wish to claim, however, is that one cannot understand the outcomes involved without reference to the theoretical logics I have delineated above. In other words, domestic politics wasn't everything,

[142] Memorandum of conversation between Ford and Kissinger, 31 January 1975, Gerald Ford Papers
[143] Memorandum of conversation between Wilson, Callaghan, Ford and Kissinger, 31 January 1975, Gerald Ford Papers
[144] Memorandum of conversation between Ford and Kissinger, 9 July 1976, Gerald Ford Papers

but it was *something*, and that something was important. Applying the 'agreement through opposition' conjecture to the Anglo-American case helps to explain how and why politics matters in a case where previous studies – focused primarily on the impact of ideology – have found only weak linkages.[145] Once we account for the interaction with constraint, the pattern of ideological influence becomes much clearer. By tracing domestic political processes the cases have shown us how ideology and constraint mattered and how they helped bring about more or less cooperative outcomes. They have shown in particular how the interaction between political ideology and legislative constraint undermined cooperation during Wilson's first government and Churchill's tenure, and augmented it during the administrations of Macmillan and Wilson & Callaghan.

A Quantitative Analysis of Postwar 'Special Relationships'

Demonstrating that these processes were important begs the more fundamental question of *how important* they were. I attempt to answer this crucial question in the statistical analysis below. This fulfils two functions in the overall argument. The first is to generalise beyond the immediate case of Anglo-American relations, thereby establishing the systematic credentials of the postulated relationship. The second is to control for confounding explanations to determine if the theory holds when other factors are taken into account.

In this section I test the 'agreement through opposition' conjecture using multiple linear OLS regression. I utilise dyadic party-level data from 1945 to 2000 for the

[145] Dobson (1990)

following countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. These represent the totality of the US' top three tiers of client states (with the notable exception of South Korea for reasons of data availability).[146] For all the countries I regress the interaction between ideological proximity and legislative constraint against the level of cooperation, controlling for confounding domestic political and systemic variables. In the section that follows I discuss the sourcing of data for each of the variables before summarising the results of the model. The variables are summarised in Figure 11 below.

Variable	Type	Related to Theory?	Data Source	Link

[146] Khong (2013), pp. 22, 43-45

Legislative Constraint	Independent (Control)	New Liberalism	Woldendorp *et al.* Inter-Parliamentary Union	http://www.fsw.vu.nl/en/departments/political-science/staff/woldendorp/party-government-data-set/index.asp
Political Ideology	Independent (Control)	Constructivism	Comparative Manifesto Group	https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/
Agreement through Opposition Interaction	Primary Explanatory Variable	n/a	Synthesised from Above Sources	As Above
Trade Dependence	Independent (Control)	Neoliberalism	Correlates of War Trade Data	http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
Security Dependence	Independent (Control)	Realism	Correlates of War National Military Capabilities	As Above
Cooperation	Dependent	n/a	Gartzke's Affinity of Nations	http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/datasets.htm

Figure 11 *Summary of variables used in statistical analysis*

LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINT

'New liberal' theory points us towards the importance of legislative constraint for cooperation. Although an integral component of the 'agreement through opposition' conjecture, legislative constraint is also included in the model individually as a control variable for the claims of new liberalism. It is here understood as the proportion of the total opposition seat-share in the legislature. Although some measures of legislative power incorporate institutional rules, past behaviour and balance-holding potential as additional facets of a party's legislative power,[147] the analysis would become far too complicated were these all to be included. I utilise data on parties in government from Woldendorp *et al.*,[148] and on election results from the International Parliamentary Union,[149] to calculate the total seat-share of both governing and opposition parties for each year. September is used as the cut-off date for interpellation of the government by year. Thus, if a government came to power in September 1956, the figure from 1956 will be from the government formed in September, and not its predecessor.[150]

[147] Tavits (2008), p. 496
[148] Woldendorp *et al*. (2000)
[149] Inter-Parliamentary Union (2013)
[150] This is because of the nature of the dependent variable, which is based on UN votes, which primarily take place in October.



Figure 12 *Percentage of legislative seat-share for governments in nine US-allied states, 1945-2000*

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

I utilise data on ideology from the Comparative Manifesto Project which provides estimates of party positions from manifestos at each election year.[151] This approach relies on a coding-strategy whereby each quasi-sentence in a party's manifesto is classified according to a composite left-right schema. For each governing party or coalition identified, the manifesto score is imputed from the most recent election and carried forward each subsequent year until a new manifesto appears or a change of government occurs. For single-party governments the transposition is straightforward. Where coalition governments are concerned, however, the procedure is slightly more complex, and a collective ideology is estimated according to the formula below, where I^G represents the governing coalition ideology, $I_P{}^n$ indicates the ideology of each individual party in the government and $S_P{}^n$ refers to the proportion of seats held by each party in the legislature.

$$I^G = \frac{\left((I_{p1} \times S_{p1}) + (I_{p2} \times S_{p2}) + (I_{pn} \times S_{pn}) \ldots\right)}{(S_{p1} + S_{p2} + S_{pn} \ldots)}$$

The manifesto coding approach is not perfect. It struggles to account for post-partisan and environmental party positions,[152] occasionally relies on inappropriate proxy documents for 'manifestos',[153] locates fringe parties inaccurately,[154] and requires

[151] Budge *et al*. (2001)
[152] Huber & Inglehart (1995)
[153] Gemenis (2012)
[154] Gabel & Huber (2000)

frequent re-coding for individual cases.[155] But are other approaches any better? Two alternatives exist – 'expert surveys'[156] and 'Wordscores'[157] – both of which lead to somewhat divergent results[158] and exhibit different strengths and weaknesses.[159] Yet the failings of these approaches are arguably worse than those of the manifesto data. Expert surveys offer data only back to 1984,[160] fail to distinguish between party *position* and party *behaviour,*[161] and struggle to account for cross-national differences.[162] The 'Wordscores' approach fares slightly better, although there is little value-add from being able to code greater amounts of party documents unless one wishes to distinguish inter-elite positions[163] (which is beyond the remit of this inquiry).

[155] Dinas & Gemenis (2010)
[156] Hooghe *et al*. (2010)
[157] Laver *et al*. (2003)
[158] Benoit & Laver (2007)
[159] Volkens (2007)
[160] Hooghe *et al*. (2010)
[161] Budge (2001), p. 50
[162] Budge (2000), pp. 103-104
[163] Klemmensen *et al*. (2007)



Figure 13 *Ideological positions of governments in nine US-allied states, 1945-2000, where positive numbers indicate a rightward position and negative numbers a leftist orientation.*

'AGREEMENT THROUGH OPPOSITION' INTERACTION

The primary explanatory variable utilised by the 'agreement through opposition' conjecture is the interaction between legislative constraint and ideological proximity. This variable is worked out by moving the government's ideological position closer to the opposition's ideology score as a function of an index of government constraint. When the percentage of opposition seat-share (S_o) is lower than 35, I assume that there is no legislative constraint operating, and so the formula for cooperation reverts to that for ideological proximity:

$$x = I^G - I^U$$

Where S_o is greater than 35 I use the following formula to model the interaction between ideology and constraint, where x denotes the predicted level of cooperation, I^G denotes the governing party ideology, I^U the ideology of the governing party in the US, and I^O the ideology of the political opposition. S_{oi} denotes the maximal value of S_o.

$$x = \left(I^G - I^U\right) + \left(\left(I^O - I^G\right) \times \left(\frac{S_o}{S_{o^i}}\right)\right)$$

It is worth briefly summarising how this interaction works. I^O is estimated according to a variant of the formula used to derive the ideological position of governing party

seat-share.[164] This does not provide a perfect measure, as it cannot be assumed that a fragmented and ideologically-disparate collection of opposition parties will necessarily cooperate,[165] but does give us an understanding of the overall ideological 'leaning' of the opposition. The first part of the model (I^G - I^U) gives us the ideological distance between the governing parties in the US and the allied state. Negative values indicate that the client is further to the left that the US. Next, ($I^O - I^G$) tells us the ideological distance between the ally's governing party and its political opposition. The final element ($S_o \div S_{oi}$) works out a standardized measure of constraint. It works out the proportion of constraint for where the percentage of constraint falls between 35 and the maximal level attained.

The interaction term essentially gives us the ideological distance of the governing party from the US, taking into account the influence of the opposition in accordance with a standardised measure of seat-share. High positive values of this measure indicate a government which – after taking into account the impact of legislative constraint – is far to the right of the US. High negative numbers indicate the government is further to the left. As the number approaches 0 this indicates conformity between the ideological positions of the governing party and the US. The expectation would be that we would see a curvilinear relationship as represented in Figure 14 below.

[164] Minor parties gaining <5% of the popular vote are excluded.
[165] Hardin (1976)



Figure 14 *Predicted curvilinear relationship between the interaction and the level of cooperation.*

TRADE DEPENDENCE

Neoliberal theories claim that cooperation is high in US-client relations because of the mutual interest in coordinating actions in order not to disturb the high level of economic interdependence which exists between 'Western' states. Cooperation is in the interests of both the US and its clients as the Pareto-superior effects of trade and exchange will have mutually beneficial results. I utilise data on the level of trade independence from the Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set[166] to control for the neoliberal claim that it is economic interdependence which underpins shifts in cooperation.[167] Higher levels of trade dependence would, for neoliberals, predict a greater degree of cooperation.

[166] Barbieri *et al.* (2009)
[167] Stein (1984); Wright (2000)

Security Dependence

Realists claim that whatever cooperation exists between the US and its allies ultimately results from a security dependence on the US.[168] I control for such arguments by including a dyadic measure of the gap between the combined military capabilities (CINC) of each of the countries and the US, taken from the 'National Military Capabilities' dataset of the Correlates of War Project.[169] The higher the gap between the US and its allies in security terms, the higher the probability of cooperation (for realists).

Cooperation (Dependent Variable)

The dependent variable for the study is the level of international cooperation. I utilise Gartzke's 'affinity of nations' data for this purpose.[170] The data are based on the correlation between state voting patterns in the United Nations (UN), given as a simple proportion where 1 indicates a perfect correlation and -1 connotes no conformity at all. Data on UN voting has seen many applications to such areas as geographical divisions,[171] voting issue-areas,[172] and the responses to US hegemony[173]. This data is superior to alternatives based on alliance and treaty commitments[174] which change so infrequently it is difficult to establish adequate variation.[175] Although *strictly* a measure of preference similarity, I argue that the voting data can serve as a proxy for cooperation when two criteria are met: (1) states consider these votes as important political signals, and (2) these states have sufficient bureaucratic

[168] Joffe (1984), p. 175; Mearsheimer (1990)
[169] Singer *et al*. (1972)
[170] Gartzke (2006)
[171] Hurwitz (1975); Newcombe *et al*. (1970); Russett (1966); Voeten (2000)
[172] Alker (1964); Kim & Russett (1996); Rai (1980)
[173] Voeten (2004)
[174] E.g. Bueno de Mesquita (1975); Krause *et al*. (2006); Milewicz *et al*. (2010)
[175] Signorino & Ritter (1999)

capacity to ensure that vote coordination is possible. These conditions are most likely to be met by the US' closest allies; UN votes were crucial tests of the Anglo-American 'special relationship'[176] and this is also likely to be true of other close allies. Accordingly, there are strong reasons to consider UN votes as a proxy for cooperation; these states are aware they are making a commitment by voting together and have the institutional capacity to ensure they have full information of other countries' voting intentions.

[176] Bourantonis & Magliveras (2002); Schweller & Pu (2011), p. 48



Figure 15 *Cooperation measured by affinity scores for selected US-allies, 1945-2000*

REGRESSION RESULTS

The model being tested here takes the following form:

$$\textbf{Cooperation}_i = \alpha + \beta\,\textbf{Security} + \beta\,\textbf{Constraint} + \beta\,\textbf{Ideology} + \beta\textbf{Trade} + \beta\,\textbf{Interaction} + \varepsilon$$

Figure 16 below presents the magnitude and statistical significance of each of the variables regressed against the affinity scores. As we can observe, the 'interaction', 'ideology', 'trade dependence' and 'security dependence' variables are all significant at the 1% level. This means that for these cases we can reasonably reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between the explanatory variable and the level of cooperation. 'Legislative constraint' is the only variable not significant at the 1% level. Note that the R^2 is relatively low for the model as a whole. We should be cautious, however, in interpreting this substantively; the aim is to understand the impact of domestic politics on the level of cooperation, not to derive a perfect model of all the determinants of cooperation itself.

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	P-value
Legislative Constraint	.044	.002	.260
Political Ideology	-.224	.001	.000***
Agreement through Opposition Interaction	.311	.001	.000***
Trade Dependence	-.259	.000	.000***
Security Dependence	.283	.281	.000***
DV = Cooperation	*R^2 = .453*	*n=423*	*N=9*

Figure 16 *Results of the model regressed against the level of cooperation*

The results of the analysis are shown descriptively in the diagrams below. Figure 17 depicts the relationship between the 'agreement through opposition' interaction variable and the affinity score for each state.[177] This demonstrates a strong linear relationship between the interaction and the affinity scores measuring cooperation.



Figure 17 *Relationship between 'Agreement through Opposition' Interaction and Cooperation. (Linear line fitted).*

A linear relationship, however, is not what we expected to observe. How, then, do we explain this curiosity? I argue that flaws in the coding strategy underlying the manifesto data are responsible for this anomaly. Because both the meaning of ideological terms and the political status quo differ from country to country, the same

[177] The affinity score is that calculated by the voting correlation between the US and the ally in question. Inter-ally affinity scores are not included in the data.

political utterance can have very different meanings in different national contexts. This is particularly true of the 'unique' situation in the US, where the status quo is located on the right of the ideological spectrum.[178] In this context the manifesto data are likely to bias estimates towards the left. This is because the rhetoric of social justice and redistribution in the US does not have the same leftist connotations as it would in social democratic European states, but the manifesto data cannot account for this difference. When we consider that each data point in the analysis is represented dyadically against the US, this is likely to have a significant impact on the results; because few (or none) of the countries in the sample have political cultures *further right* than the US, when the data displays what appears to be a rightwards shift of the compromise position, it is more likely that in reality this constitutes a move *to the right, towards the US, but not beyond it*.

This would explain why the level of cooperation increases when the compromise position moves to the right. This argument is summarised in Figure 18 below, where diagram (a) depicts the expected relationship, diagram (b) shows the actual relationship, and diagram (c) considers the hypothetical relationship if the US position has indeed been estimated incorrectly (as is likely). Figure 19 demonstrates the curvilinear relationship beginning to emerge before the data are truncated. It is worth noting that other sources of data estimating party positions – e.g. expert surveys – are even *less* able to account for cross-national differences,[179] although it is conceivable that statistical techniques may help alleviate estimation problems in future research.[180] For the time-being, however, this kind of conjectural reasoning is the only partial solution available.

[178] Archer (2007); Lipset (1996)
[179] McDonald *et al*. (2007)
[180] E.g. Franzmann & Kaiser (2006)



Figure 18 *(A) Predicted relationship (B) Observed relationship (C) Example of relation between predicted and observed relationship assuming estimation problems in manifesto data*



Figure 19 *Relationship between 'Agreement through Opposition' Interaction and Cooperation. (Quadratic line fitted).*

INTERPRETATION

What can we say of the 'agreement through opposition' conjecture at this stage? First, the relationship between the interaction and cooperation is statistically significant, even when controlling for other international and domestic political variables. Second, the directionality of the relationship is as predicted – at least for governments to the left of the US – insofar as increases in constraint and the ideological distance of the opposition party are associated with a decreased probability of cooperation. As demonstrated in Figure 20 it is also clear that the relationship is the same regardless of whether the US is under Republican or Democratic control. Third, the magnitude of the relationship also appears substantively significant; a change in one unit of the interaction exerts a greater impact on the level of cooperation than government ideology does. Fourth, and finally, one finding of interest is that the relationship appears to be somewhat temporally contingent. This is demonstrated in Figure 21, which shows the magnitude of the slope is far greater in the post-1975 period. It is interesting to note that partisanship appears to matter *more* in the 1970s and 1980s when most CP scholars declared partisanship to be on the wane.[181] Though there is only space for brief conjecture here, one possibility is that the increased partisan determinants of cooperation after the 1970s resulted from the decline in US power and the relaxation of East-West tensions, both of which likely introduced greater degrees of freedom into the foreign policy options of US allies.[182] It is unlikely that CP scholars, with their focus on the domestic consequences of partisanship, have considered the possibility that the international dimension of political ideology kept partisanship alive during this period.

[181] Allan & Scruggs (2004), p. 496; Inglehart (1971); Ross (2000)

[182] This would support the recent argument made by Lawson (2011) and Buzan & Lawson (forthcoming), p. 21, for refocusing the periodization of the discipline more firmly around the monumental changes of the 1970s.



Figure 20 *Relationship between 'Agreement through Opposition' Interaction and Cooperation distinguishing between US party in government. (Linear lines fitted).*



Figure 21 *Relationship between 'Agreement through Opposition' Interaction and Cooperation distinguishing between pre- and post-1975. Pre-1975=1, Post-1975=0. (Linear lines fitted).*

The findings also allow us to say something about the contending explanations of cooperation. (1) First, the second-image constructivist claim that a government's ideological proximity is a determinant of cooperation is borne out by the data. There is a negative relationship between ideological proximity and cooperation; as the distance between government ideologies increases, the probability of cooperation decreases. (2) Second, the claim of the new liberalism – that domestic constraint undermines cooperation – is not backed up by the data. There is no significant relationship between increases in the level of a government's legislative constraint and its propensity to cooperate with the US. (3) Third, the neoliberal claim that the level of economic interdependence explains the cooperative behaviour of US clients is not supported by the findings. This is because the direction of the relationship runs counter to that predicted by neoliberal theory, with increasing trade dependence being associated with a *decrease* in the level of cooperation. (4) Fourth, the realist claim that cooperation is the result of security dependence is backed up by the significance of the relationship between increasing security dependence and an increase in cooperation.

Whilst the findings falsify (to the extent that a single finding can) the new liberal and neoliberal predictions, they also demonstrate the complementary of the predictions derived from second-image constructivism, realism and the 'agreement through opposition' conjecture. Rather than attempt to subsume these theoretical accounts within a unified theoretical logic, the findings above suggest we would be wiser to consider the different ways in which they can work together to help explain cooperation.

Country-Level Results

Figure 22 breaks down the observed relationship between the variables by country. Two things are worth noting. First, the direction of the relationship holds for each of the countries in the sample. This is important, as it reassures us that the average was not being 'dragged up' by individual states. Second, the United Kingdom exhibits by far the *lowest* association between the interaction variable and affinity scores. This latter point is somewhat surprising, particularly given that the case studies above highlighted the important role which domestic politics has played in the Anglo-American partnership. Why might this be the case? One possibility is that the 'ceiling effect' imposed by the nature of the voting data is responsible for underestimating the magnitude of the causal relationship. Once the ceiling at a value of 1 is reached, any increase in the explanatory variable *cannot* be matched by a corresponding increase in the dependent variable. This problem is particularly acute for extremely high and low values on the dependent variable, such as the UK, where the high intercept indicates an elevated average level of cooperation.



Figure 22 *Relationship between 'Agreement through Opposition' Interaction and Cooperation by country (Linear lines fitted).*

Solutions for dealing with ceiling effects are hard to come by. Dichotomising the continuous variable into a categorical variable and running logistic regression models does not manage to overcome the underestimation problem, as the problem is not with fitting a curve to the data, but of the data not representing the underlying relationship.[183] Estimating the direction of the curve above the ceiling is also a flawed strategy, as it risks introducing substantial bias into the results.[184] Finally, removing those data points at or above the ceiling serves to overcome the clustering of data, but only at the cost of reducing the number of observations. Despite problems with removing the ceiling effect, it is not entirely clear that it serves to substantively undermine the overall argument. Indeed, the fact that the predicted effects show up clearly in the case studies for the Anglo-American relationship suggests either that the data are not wholly reliable in this instance, or that when the data show weak relationships the effect is stronger in reality.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Several brief points may be made to summarise the findings of the statistical analysis. First, the hypothesised relationship appears to work when the opposition parties are far to the left, but not when they are far to the right. This is most likely the result of a leftist bias in estimates of US government ideology introduced by the manifesto data. Second, this relationship is statistically significant at the 1% level, and holds when we include control variables into the model. Third, relative to such determinants as ideological proximity, the conjecture is associated with a substantively significant impact on the level of cooperation. Fourth, the direction of the relationship holds for each of the countries under consideration, but the magnitude of the association for the

[183] Austin & Brunner (2003), pp. 102-103; Blalock (1970), p. 1105
[184] Austin & Hoch (2004)

UK itself is substantially lower than the other states, most likely the result of the ceiling effect imposed by the data. To summarise, we may legitimately claim that there is general support for the model and its predictions, but that these are not without issues. Importantly, most of these problems can likely be overcome in future studies by utilising different data and more advanced statistical techniques.

CONCLUSION: FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS

FINDINGS AND EXTENSIONS

In light of the evidence above, what conclusions can we reach as to the explanatory power of the argument? In a broad sense we can suggest the results are favourable. The outcomes of the four cases conform to the predictions of the conjecture and a cursory glance illustrates that other cases would likely provide further confirmation. The cases also demonstrate that the outcome is reached for the right reasons; leaders have found themselves constrained by their power position in the legislature and this has impacted upon their ability to support the party's favoured policies. The statistical analysis has attempted to generalise these findings and here again the theory has met with considerable success; the interaction is statistically significant when confounding explanations are controlled for and the direction of the relationship conforms to the theory's predictions. Together, these findings point towards strong internal and external validity for the theory.

Although the findings are on the whole confirmatory, it is worth noting some important caveats. First, there are issues regarding the statistical findings, specifically the presence of ceiling effects and biased estimators of ideology in the data. These issues are relatively easy to overcome; they call for replication of the study utilising different sources of data (for example, 'expert surveys' rather than manifesto data) and the development of more sophisticated techniques of control. Second, there is the presence of cases which do not fit the predicted outcomes and mechanisms. The Eden and Heath cases are somewhat 'disconfirming' in this respect. The problem of deviant cases, however, does not present too many problems, as these periods map onto well-

known periods of 'crisis' and 'exception' respectively.[1] Third, the scope conditions imposed on the application of the theory limit our ability to infer too much from the results. Our endeavour was limited to the impact of domestic constraints after 1945, in democratic nations, in relations with the US, and in a specific period of relative ideological polarisation. Although it is not difficult to claim that ideological differences maintain their salience in the countries under study,[2] considerable theoretical modification will be required to transpose the argument to pre-1945 politics or to states outside the democratic universe.

IMPLICATIONS: ALLIANCE POLITICS, THEORY, AND POLICY

The argument advanced here has important implications for our understanding of international politics. To begin with it highlights the importance of nested variance as a distinct pattern of cooperation which has been subjected to little theoretical scrutiny. Though structured relations of cooperation and conflict may persist in world politics for many decades, there is always a discernible and systematic undercurrent of variance in the relationship. This study has highlighted that both patterns of cooperation are worthy of theorisation and empirical scrutiny, that both are ultimately required to adequately explain interstate relations, and that the study of nested variance, therefore, is very much an 'IR' topic. More broadly it is hoped that the 'ideal-typical' approach to conflict and cooperation will prove of wider utility for the discipline as a whole. Paying greater attention to one of the primary dependent variables in IR will help to uncover new patterns of relations and pose new and interesting questions. It may also force us to think in greater detail about the manner

[1] Kaufman (2007), p. 82
[2] Buckler & Dolowitz (2012); Milkis *et al*. (2012)

in which IR theories currently address the different facets of cooperation, whether these concern its emergence, maintenance, decline or adjustment.

The study also demonstrates the importance of domestic politics in explaining systematic variation over time in the 'special relationships' of the US. It is clear that the politics of US-client relations are related just as much to the domestic politics in the client states as they are to the structural conditions underpinning the overarching structure of US preponderance and Western 'integration'. In considering the impact of ideology and constraint in tandem we are able to help explain the level of cooperation in these relationships. Only by embracing the logic of the 'agreement through opposition' conjecture' can we fully understand this variance. The conjecture argues that when the governing parties in two states are more ideologically proximate than their respective political opposition, low levels of legislative constraint promote international cooperation whereas high levels undermine it, whereas constraint has the inverse results when the governing parties are less ideologically proximate. This finding contradicts those who have maintained that 'politics stops at the water's edge'.[3]

More broadly the study highlights the importance of combining IR and CP accounts in order to more fully understand international cooperation. The study has shown that each brings a unique perspective to the analysis of international politics; in this manner the theoretical synthesis represents more than the sum of its parts, and the combination would appear to take us into new territory for both disciplines. Further engagement promises to bring greater conceptual awareness, theoretical diversity, and

[3] E.g. Gowa (1998)

methodological sophistication to both disciplines, not to mention a host of new problems, questions and empirical referents. On Lakatosian criteria, progressive research programmes are those which are able to generate additional research questions without sacrificing the 'hard-core' of theoretical assumptions that holds them together.[4] This is precisely what the research programme I have outlined allows us to do. This is in contrast to the degenerating nature of such state-centric research programmes as realism, which struggle to develop new avenues of inquiry without undermining the theory's 'hard-core' assumptions.[5] Therefore, not only does the majority of the evidence support the 'agreement through opposition' proposition, but even the missing elements conform to the spirit of the broader approach advocated here. Figure 23 outlines some of the new questions raised by bringing CP more firmly into IR, only some of which have received the attention they deserve in existing studies.

[4] Lakatos (1983)
[5] Legro & Moravcsik (1999); Vasquez (1997)

Well-Developed	Partly-Developed	Underdeveloped
Interest groups[6]	Political ideology[7]	Coalitions
Bureaucratic politics[8]	Issue-linkage[9]	Party organisation
Constitutional structures[10]	Electoral cycles[11]	Authoritarian politics[12]
Divided government[13]	Opposition politics[14]	Quasi-/Emergent-parties

Figure 23 *Avenues of research suggested by the IR-CP synthesis and their level of development within the discipline of international studies.*

The findings of the study also speak to the debate between history and theory in international studies. In particular they demonstrate the areas in which the division of labour may be considered problematic; historians have successfully connected domestic and international politics when discussing cooperation, but this has not been matched by a parallel theoretical focus on the systematic determinants of these relationships. This need not remain the case. Historians have much to gain from understanding the theoretical bases of systematic domestic political processes even as they continue (rightfully) to focus on both the systematic and non-systematic factors in any given case. Whilst the individual-level explanations preferred by historians are important, in many cases individual motivations may be shown to emanate from strategic concerns highlighted by theoretical accounts such as the one offered here.

[6] Hiscox (2011); Mearsheimer & Walt (2006); Milner & Tingley (2011); Moravcsik (1998); Moravcsik (2000)
[7] Clare (2010); Haas (2005); Hildebrandt *et al.* (forthcoming); Milner & Judkins (2004)
[8] Allison (1971); Allison & Halperin (1972); Halperin (1974); Stern *et el*. (1998)
[9] Davis (2004); Haas (1980); Martin (1992); McGinnis (1986)
[10] Farnham (2004), p. 450; Kaarbo (2001); Katzenstein (1976); Risse-Kappen (1991)
[11] Gaubatz (1991); Milner & Rosendorff (1997); Smith (1996)
[12] Levinson (1957)
[13] Lohmann & O'Halloran (1994); Milner (1989); Sherman (2002)
[14] Hagan (1987), pp. 348-349; Hagan (1990), pp. 91-93; Schultz (1998)

On the other hand, IR theorists should appreciate the importance of utilising historical research to rigorously test their hypotheses and to empirically ground their research.[15] For example, it is only the interrogation of historical source materials which allows us to confirm the importance of domestic politics in explaining nested variance. The lesson here is that history and theory should be brought together in order to help us understand complex empirical puzzles in world politics.

The argument also has important implications for policymakers. First, the argument gives us a different set of 'occasions' for policymakers to consider when assessing the state of bilateral relations, highlighting the importance of elections, the issuing of manifestos, and changes in legislative support. Though politicians are well aware of the importance of such events in their own country, those watching foreign countries need to be aware of the importance of these occasions for the target state's foreign policy as well. Second, the argument highlights the need for political parties to develop cognisance not only of their important role in influencing foreign relations *irrespective* of formal executive prerogatives, but also of the ways in which manifesto commitments and policy proclamations are likely to be understood by international audiences, who may be eagerly watching. Finally, the distinction between structured relations and nested variance should caution policymakers that, though shifts in cooperation are important, they do not necessarily spell disaster. The tendency is to make 'mountains out of molehills' by viewing the distinct logic of nested variance as a harbinger of fundamental structural shifts. Yet this is the wrong way of looking at the everyday shifts in cooperation that follow political change. The argument presented here helps mitigate against these frequent, incorrect, proclamations of crisis.

[15] Knapp (1984), p. 36; Kreuzer (2010), p. 370

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Cabinet Papers, National Archives, London

Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge

Halliday Papers, LSE Archives, London

Hansard, Parliamentary Archives, London

Labour Party Papers, LSE Archives, London

UNITED STATES*

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Grand Rapids, Michigan

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APPENDIX: GOVERNMENTS IN US ALLIED STATES, 1945-2000

This appendix gives the details of governments in the nine US allies under study from 1945 to 2000. The data are from Woldendorp *et al*. (2000) and Budge *et al*. (2001). (Positive ideology scores indicate a rightist orientation and negative scores a leftist one).

Three caveats must be noted: (1) Only parties receiving at least 5% of seats are shown (2) Entries are bounded by election, not by changes in leadership or coalition membership (3) Governments which lasted less than a year are not listed.

Australia

ELECTION	GOVERNMENT	LEADER	SEAT-SHARE	IDEOLOGY
28 September 1946	ALP	Chifley	58%	-16.40
28 April 1951	LP	Menzies	57%	53.90
29 May 1954	CP LP CP	Menzies	52%	17.90
10 December 1955	LP CP	Menzies	61%	36.89
22 November 1958	LP CP	Menzies	62%	17.80
9 December 1961	LP CP	Menzies	51%	27.50
30 November 1963	LP CP	Menzies	59%	-6.42
26 November 1966	LP CP	McEwen	66%	-12.75
25 October 1969	LP CP	Gorton	53%	1.78
2 December 1972	ALP	Whitlam	54%	-24.30
13 December 1975	LP NCP	Fraser	72%	31.81
10 December 1977	LP NCP	Fraser	69%	19.98
18 October 1980	LP NCP	Fraser	59%	24.36
5 March 1983	ALP	Hawke	60%	6.90
1 December 1984	ALP	Hawke	55%	8.60
11 July 1987	ALP	Hawke	58%	-4.50
24 March 1990	ALP	Hawke	53%	-14.90
13 March 1993	ALP	Keating	54%	-0.19
2 March 1996	LP NPA	Howard	64%	22.59
3 October 1998	LP NPA	Howard	54%	48.46

LP = Liberal Party of Australia
ALP = Australian Labor Party
CP = Country Party
NCP = National Country Party
NPA = National Party of Australia

Canada

ELECTION	GOVERNMENT	LEADER	SEAT-SHARE	IDEOLOGY
11 June 1945	LP	Mackenzie	51%	7.10
27 June 1949	LP	St Laurent	74%	8.00
10 August 1953	LP	St Laurent	65%	-5.10
10 June 1957	PC	Diefenbaker	42%	1.50
31 March 1958	PC	Diefenbaker	78%	-2.90
18 June 1962	PC	Diefenbaker	44%	-2.90
8 April 1963	LP	Pearson	49%	-3.80
25 June 1968	LP	Trudeau	59%	-6.50
30 October 1972	LP	Trudeau	41%	-6.50
8 July 1974	LP	Trudeau	53%	3.40
22 May 1979	PC	Clark	48%	17.10
18 February 1980	LP	Trudeau	52%	-2.40
4 September 1984	PC	Mulroney	75%	12.30
21 November 1988	PC	Mulroney	58%	18.30
25 October 1993	LP	Chrétien	60%	4.04
2 June 1997	LP	Chrétien	52%	6.34

LP = Liberal Party of Canada
PC = Progressive Conservative Party of Canada

France

ELECTION	GOVERNMENT	LEADER	SEAT-SHARE	IDEOLOGY
2 June 1946	MRP SFIO PCF	Bidault	81%	No Data
10 November 1946	SFIO PCF RSP	Ramadier	68%	28.33
17 June 1951	RSP MRP IND GAUL	Pleven	65%	23.66
2 January 1956	SFIO RSP GAUL	Mollet	33%	-21.32
30 November 1958	UNR CNIP MRP	De Gaulle	88%	12.65
25 November 1962	UNR IND	Pompidou	53%	9.82
30 June 1968	UDR IND	Pompidou	79%	25.41
11 March 1973	UDR CDP IND	Messmer	53%	8.86
19 March 1978	UDF RPR	Barre	56%	15.28
21 June 1981	PS PCF	Mauroy	66%	-28.42
16 March 1986	RPR UDF	Chiraq	49%	26.68
12 June 1988	PS	Rocard	47%	-13.60
28 March 1993	RPR UDF	Balladur	78%	2.51
1 June 1997	PS PCF	Jospin	49%	-15.85

MRP = Popular Republican Movement
PCF = French Communist Party
SFIO = French Section of the Workers' International
UNR = Union for the New Republic
UDR = Union for the Defence of the Republic
UDF = Union for a Democratic France
RPR = Rally for the Republic
PS = Socialist Party
IND = Independent Republicans
CDP = Centre, Democracy and Progress
CNIP = National Centre of Independents and Peasants
GAUL = Gaullist Union

Germany

ELECTION	GOVERNMENT	LEADER	SEAT-SHARE	IDEOLOGY
15 September 1949	CDU FDP DP	Adenauer	51%	-3.76
9 October 1953	CDU FDP DP	Adenauer	80%	-6.19
22 October 1957	CDU DP	Adenauer	55%	-45.85
14 November 1961	CDU FDP	Adenauer	59%	-2.03
26 October 1965	CDU FDP	Erhard	57%	-1.18
22 October 1969	SPD FDP	Brandt	49%	-11.41
15 December 1972	SPD FDP	Brandt	52%	-8.19
15 December 1976	SPD FDP	Schmidt	49%	-18.44
4 November 1980	SPD FDP	Schmidt	52%	-17.77
30 March 1983	CDU FDP	Kohl	53%	26.76
11 March 1987	CDU FDP	Kohl	52%	10.12
4 October 1990	CDU FDP	Kohl	59%	-7.53
17 November 1994	CDU FDP	Kohl	51%	23.79
27 October 1998	SPD B’90	Schroeder	52%	-2.11

CDU = Christian Democratic Union
FDP = Free Democratic Party
DP = German Party
SPD = Social Democratic Party of Germany
B’90 = Bündnis 90

Italy

ELECTION	GOVERNMENT		LEADER	SEAT-SHARE	IDEOLOGY
7 June 1953	DC PSDI PLI		Segni	50%	-13.01
10 July 1958	DC PSDI		Fanfani	46%	-9.65
28 April 1963	DC		Leone	61%	-13.80
19 May 1968	DC		Leone	42%	-10.79
7 May 1972	DC PSDI PLI		Andreotti	59%	-5.08
20 June 1976	DC		Andreotti	42%	-3.17
3 June 1979	DC PSDI PLI		Cossiga	58%	-6.44
26 June 1983	DC PSI PSDI	PLI PRI	Craxi	58%	-3.53
14 June 1987	DC PSI PSDI	PLI PRI	Goria	60%	7.95
5 April 1992	DC PSI PSDI PLI		Amato	54%	10.87
27 March 1994	FI LN AN CCD		Berlusconi	57%	19.69
21 April 1996	PDS PPI VERDI	RI PRC	Prodi	50%	12.54

DC = Christian Democracy
PSDI = Italian Social Democratic Party
PLI = Italian Liberal Party
PRI = Italian Republican Party
PSI = Italian Socialist Party
FI = Forza Italia
LN = Northern League
AN = National Alliance
CCD = Christian Democratic Centre
PDS = Democratic party of the Left
PPI = Italian People's Party
RI = Italian Renewal
VERDI = Federation of the Greens

Japan

ELECTION	GOVERNMENT	LEADER	SEAT-SHARE	IDEOLOGY
20 November 1960	LDP	Ikeda	63%	-6.10
21 November 1963	LDP	Ikeda	61%	10.90
29 January 1967	LDP	Sato	57%	-19.70
27 December 1969	LDP	Sato	59%	-2.10
10 December 1972	LDP	Tanaka	55%	-20.00
5 December 1976	LDP	Fukuda	49%	9.10
5 December 1979	LDP	Ohira	56%	-15.10
18 December 1983	LDP NLC	Nakasone	50%	5.39
6 July 1986	LDP	Nakasone	59%	2.82
18 February 1990	LDP	Kaifu	54%	-16.33
18 July 1993	JRP JNP DPJ CGP DSP NP SDF	Hosokawa	58%	-11.93
20 October 1996	LDP DPJ	Hashimoto	59%	-11.27

LDP = Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
NLC = New Liberal Club
JRP = Japan Restoration Party
JNP = Japan New Party
DPJ = Democratic Party of Japan
CGP = Clean Government Party
DSP = Democratic Socialist Party
NP = New Party Sakigake
SDF = Social Democratic Federation

Netherlands

ELECTION	GOVERNMENT	LEADER	SEAT-SHARE	IDEOLOGY
17 May 1946	KVP PvdA	Beel	61%	-7.37
7 July 1948	KVP VVD PvdA CHU	Drees	76%	2.02
25 June 1952	KVP ARP PvdA CHU	Drees	81%	3.88
13 June 1956	KVP ARP PvdA CHU	Drees	85%	-1.19
12 March 1959	KVP CHU ARP VVD	Quay	63%	3.08
15 May 1963	KVP CHU ARP VVD	Marijnen	61%	-5.54
15 February 1967	KVP CHU ARP VVD	Jong	57%	-18.85
28 March 1971	KVP CHU ARP VVD	Biesheuvel	49%	-2.91
25 May 1977	CDA VVD	Agt	51%	-2.51
26 May 1981	CDA PvdA D66	Agt	43%	-20.03
8 September 1982	CDA D66	Agt	54%	2.83
21 May 1986	CDA VVD	Lubbers	54%	-0.47
6 September 1989	CDA PvdA	Lubbers	69%	-14.41
3 May 1994	PvdA VVD D66	Kok	61%	4.66
6 May 1998	PvdA VVD D66	Kok	65%	-9.97

KVP = Catholic People's Party
PvdA = Social Democratic Party
ARP = Anti-Revolutionary Party
CHU = Christian-Historical Union
VVD = People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Liberals)
CDA = Christian Democratic Appeal
D66 = Democrats 66

Spain

ELECTION	GOVERNMENT	LEADER	SEAT-SHARE	IDEOLOGY
15 June 1977	UCD	González	47%	-0.47
1 March 1979	UCD	González	48%	0.47
28 October 1982	PSOE	Márquez	58%	-10.95
22 June 1986	PSOE	Márquez	53%	-11.65
29 October 1989	PSOE	Márquez	50%	-22.31
6 June 1993	PSOE	Márquez	45%	-23.21
3 March 1996	PP	Aznar López	45%	-8.43

UCD = Union of the Democratic Centre
PSOE = Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
PP = People's Party (Conservatives)

United Kingdom

ELECTION	GOVERNMENT	LEADER	SEAT-SHARE	IDEOLOGY
15 July 1945	LP	Attlee	61%	-31.30
23 February 1950	LP	Attlee	50%	-28.10
25 February 1951	CP	Churchill	51%	-1.40
26 May 1955	CP	Eden/Macmillan	55%	-30.60
8 October 1959	CP	Macmillan	58%	-23.30
15 October 1964	LP	Wilson	50%	-14.80
31 March 1966	LP	Wilson	58%	-14.80
18 June 1970	CP	Heath	52%	8.20
28 February 1974	LP	Wilson	50%	-48.50
10 October 1974	LP	Wilson/Callaghan	50%	-27.50
3 May 1979	CP	Thatcher	53%	24.40
9 June 1983	CP	Thatcher	61%	29.00
11 June 1987	CP	Thatcher/Major	58%	30.47
9 April 1992	CP	Major	52%	27.90
1 May 1997	LP	Blair	63%	8.07

LP = Labour Party
CP = Conservative Party