Conference item
Complexity of finding equilibria of plurality voting under structured preferences
- Abstract:
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We study the complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in voting games over well-known restricted preference domains, such as the domains of single-peaked and single-crossing preferences. We focus on the Plurality rule, and, following the recent work of Elkind et al. [15], consider three popular tie-breaking rules (lexicographic, random-candidate, and random-voter) and two types of voters' attitude: lazy voters, who prefer to abstain when their vote cannot affect the election outcome, and tr...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Accepted manuscript, 322.4KB)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.5555/2936924.2936982
- Publication website:
- https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2936924.2936982
Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- ACM Publisher's website
- Host title:
- AAMAS'16 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems
- Journal:
- AAMAS '16: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems Journal website
- Pages:
- 394-401
- Publication date:
- 2016-05-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1558-2914
- ISSN:
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1548-8403
- ISBN:
- 9781450342391
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
628505
- Local pid:
- pubs:628505
- Deposit date:
- 2021-04-16
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
- Copyright date:
- 2016
- Rights statement:
- Copyright 2016, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
- Notes:
-
This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available from ACM at https://doi.org/10.5555/2936924.2936982
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