Authoritarian Regimes and the Co-optation of Islam: Kazakhstan and Russia

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In Memory of Professor Karen Dawisha.

Abstract

National and subnational authoritarian regimes with Muslim majorities prefer to co-opt rather than repress Islam in order to bolster their legitimacy, limit bargaining partners, deter mobilization, and gather information. Authoritarian regimes also elect to co-opt other potential sources of opposition besides religion due to similar incentives. Religion, however, is a unique source of potential opposition given its high salience relative to other forms of identity. Repression or overt co-optation of the majority religious identity holds a higher potential to foster an opposition movement based on religious identity. In order to deter this threat, national and subnational regimes frequently create a separate religious institution for Islam. Kazakhstan, a national authoritarian regime, and Tatarstan, Russia, a subnational authoritarian regime, both attempt to co-opt the majority religious group, Islam, through quasi-governmental agencies. Quasi-governmental agencies reduce transparency and provide a semblance of official distance between co-optation efforts and the regime. However, the different layer of institutional structures between national and subnational authoritarian regimes spurs each type of regime to pursue different strategies. Given the regime juxtaposition between Tatarstan and Russia, Tatarstan more frequently pursues co-optation through unofficial and extra-legal means. Alternatively, a higher level of institutions does not exist in Kazakhstan. Thus, there is a higher degree of harmony between the law and policies on religion. In addition to using a quasi-governmental agency, both regimes attempt to securitize Islam by framing regime associated religious sources as the panacea to extremism and other negative influences. Muslims in Kazakhstan were more likely than Muslims in Tatarstan to report using religious sources approved by the regime. This is likely because Kazakhstan had a wider array of tools at hand to co-opt Islam. However, a majority of Muslims in neither case cited securitization narratives to justify why they chose to use governmental religious sources.

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Chapter One Authoritarian Regimes and Religion

Introduction

Religion is often a source of concern for authoritarian regimes. Religion provides people with an alternate perspective that is capable of determining their worldview and its associated practices within wider society. Moreover, amongst the various identities that people hold, religious identity often has a particularly high relative salience.[1] Many accounts of religion-state interactions characterize an authoritarian regime as oppressing a religious group or present a narrative of religious resistance against an oppressive regime. Indeed, many cases provide empirical support for these dynamics. In Poland, for instance, a successful anti-communist independence movement was promoted by the alliance of a religious institution, the Catholic Church, and a trade union, Solidarity. By utilizing networks of Catholic parishes and Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia and through framing the Catholic Church as an upholder of national traditions, the Solidarity movement was positioned to both legitimize its efforts and create places of discussion and a network of activists.[2]

Beyond Poland, national religious identities and the tide of nationalism also aided in contributing towards the collapse of the Soviet Union.[3] Religious groups often have

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[1] See for example Curtis and Olson, "Explaining Variation in Strength of Identification with Religion."

[2] Concordantly, efforts to harness the Catholic Church to increase voter turnout were successful, as established by Kosela. Kosela puts forth that that the co-variance between the number of clergy in a district and the proportion of votes won by Solidary is sufficient to support a relationship. Kosela, "The Polish Catholic Church and the Elections of 1989," 135.

[3] Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*; Treisman, "Russia's Ethnic Revival: The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order"; Bunce, "Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State."

dedicated members, charismatic leaders, mobilizing capacities, and sometimes transnational networks from which they can draw resources.[4] These properties can be a mobilizing resource for opposition groups and thus are causes of unease for authoritarian regimes. Such assets are why in China, for example, the Catholic Church is at times viewed with suspicion.

Given these properties, there is a high incentive for authoritarian regimes to co-opt religious groups. Drawing on O'Donnell, co-optation is defined here as the "encapsulation" of potential sources of opposition through institutions via the distribution of benefits, such as money or positions of power, or policy concessions.[5] Co-optation is widely acknowledged as a tool employed by authoritarian regimes.[6] Co-optation occurs at both the national and subnational level. Subnational regimes seek to preserve their autonomy vis à vis the national regime. Co-optation at the subnational level therefore seeks to construct an independent reservoir of legitimacy and power. There is a rich literature examining the co-optation of potential political opponents into ruling parties and parliaments in authoritarian regimes as well as the relationship between national and subnational regimes. As the academy once again recognizes the poignancy of religion throughout time and space, this dissertation, *Authoritarian Regimes and the Co-optation of Islam: Kazakhstan and Russia*, begins to incorporate religion into our body of knowledge on national and subnational

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[4] Philpott, "Explaining The Political Ambivalence Of Religion"; Wald, Silverman, and Fridy, "Making Sense Of Religion In Political Life"; Koesel, *Religion and Authoritarianism Cooperation, Conflict, And The Consequences*.
[5] O'Donnell, "Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics."
[6] See for example Gandhi, "Political Institutions under Dictatorship"; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, "Elections Under Authoritarianism"; Lust-Okar, "Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition"; Blaydes, *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*; Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*.

authoritarian regimes and co-optation. To begin to shed light on these interactions and to further our understanding of authoritarian regimes' resilience and how they learn, this thesis examines:

Research Question A: Why do authoritarian regimes prefer to co-opt religious groups (rather than other utilize other available tools, such as repression)? More specifically, *why do authoritarian regimes in Muslim majority countries elect to co-opt Islam through separate institutions* (rather than through political parties or parliaments)?

Research Question B: *How does an authoritarian regime at the national level co-opt religion compared to an authoritarian regime at the sub-national* level? *What are the mechanisms employed in this process*?

Research Question C: *How does the effectiveness of co-optation efforts differ in national and subnational authoritarian regimes?*

In regards to the first research question, I argue that authoritarian regimes in Muslim majority regions co-opt Islam through the creation (or repurposing) of religious institutions because local practices of Sunni Islam often do not have a built in hierarchy.[7] Authoritarian regimes seek to rectify this and create a religious institution in order to (1) limit potential bargaining partners the regime needs to engage with; (2) gather information about the majority religious group; (3) avoid

[7] Sunni Islam rarely has a built-in hierarchy; however, Shi'i Islam is often very hierarchical. There are four countries with Shi'i Muslim majorities: Iran; Iraq; Azerbaijan; and Bahrain. Within Shi'i Islam where a hierarchical structure is already in place, I argue that authoritarian regimes will attempt to use this structure to their advantage and co-opt the religious institutions already in place (repurposing). While it is important to take into account structure and space with organizations, in terms of identity, the distinction between Sunni and Shi'i Islam may be overemphasized, particularly outside of North Africa and the Middle East. In response to a Pew Survey asking respondents whether they identified as Sunni, Shi'i or, "just a Muslim," the majority of respondents in Central Asia, and Southern and Eastern Europe responded, "just a Muslim". In Kazakhstan for example, 74 percent of respondents identified as "just Muslim." "The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity," 9. This matched my own experience during fieldwork, where many respondents strongly identified as Muslim and saw it as a core part of their identity, but were unaware of whether they identified as Sunni or Shi'i and/or did not view the distinction as noteworthy.

mobilizing the majority religious group; and (4) elicit the support of the majority religious group and increase regime legitimacy.

Secondly, I argue that sub-national authoritarian regimes will seek to formally comply with national laws on religion but will pursue de facto policies to bolster the legitimacy of the subnational regime (at times at the expense of the national regime). On the other hand, national authoritarian regimes in Muslim majority states do not contend with an additional layer of government in the religious sphere. Free of this constraint, there will be more symmetry between formal and informal policies on religion. Additionally, in a post 9/11 international context where rhetoric emphasizing the danger of religious extremism and in particular the "inherent" danger of Islam and Muslims, one would assume that a sub-national regime in a Muslim minority-majority region would be less likely to employ securitizing rhetoric about Islam. Such rhetoric could weaken the boundary control between the national and sub-national regimes and invite the encroachment of the national government into the region, weakening both the resiliency and legitimacy of the subnational regime.

However, both national and sub-national regimes will seek to avoid repression, which risks mobilizing religion into an oppositional identity. Moreover, a religious institution is likely to be used by both national and subnational authoritarian regimes to co-opt Islam. National and sub-national authoritarian regimes both abide by the logic that overt interference in the religious sphere, including repression, is likely to politicize religion and come at the cost of regime legitimacy. Alternatively, encapsulation via an institution outside of the typical arena of politics lessens the likelihood of empowering religious leaders to gain a political base.

Turning to the effectiveness of national and sub-national authoritarian regime efforts to co-opt religion, one would expect a higher degree of effectiveness in a

national authoritarian context. With less constraints on its authority and no alternative state authority, national authoritarian regimes are more likely to be able to effectively co-opt both the majority religious identity as well as religious outlets (such as mosques or churches) than sub-national authoritarian regimes. Effectiveness here refers to the proportion of Muslims who (1) report using religious sources associated with regime; (2) perceive the religious institution created be each regime to be authoritative; (3) and reflect securitization narratives deployed by the regime.

I explore these questions using the cases of Kazakhstan, a Muslim majority state, and Tatarstan Russia, a Muslim majority republic in Russia. I found that there is more overlap between official policies (including law) on religion in Kazakhstan (a national authoritarian regime) and which policies are actually deployed. Additionally, Tatarstan (a subnational authoritarian regime) has averted policy decisions that directly contravene national (Russian) law as originally laid out in my second hypothesis. Despite this distinction, the co-optation process in both cases is remarkably similar.

Interestingly, despite more religious policies being on the books in Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan also engaged in extra-legal measures to co-opt Islam. These extra-legal measures were undertaken even in the absence of an alternative source of state authority with potentially different policy outcome goals (as is the case in Tatarstan). Additionally, unexpectedly, I found that the government and religious elites in Tatarstan also engaged in securitizing rhetoric about Islam, despite the potential risk of such discourse being used as an excuse by the national Russian regime to reduce the independence of the subnational regime.

As expected, I found that the Kazakhstani efforts to co-opt Islam were more effective than in Tatarstan as measured by the proportion of Muslims who reported

using governmental sources. At mosques (where the most intensive co-optation efforts are undertaken in both cases) the majority of Muslims reported using governmental sources. However, only in Kazakhstan did a majority of Muslims among the general population also report using governmental sources. Despite this disparity, only a small proportion of Muslims reported using non-governmental sources at mosques or in the general population in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan. Success as measured by the proportion of Muslims who perceived the religious institution in either case to be authoritative was more tempered. More Muslims in Kazakhstan than in Tatarstan perceived the religious institution for Islam as authoritative, but in neither did a majority cite these institutions as authoritative. Lastly, neither regime successfully securitized Islam as measured by the proportion of Muslims who utilized securitization narratives to justify why they use religious sources associated with the regime.

This chapter examines why and how institutions are employed for co-optation in national and subnational authoritarian regimes. Through extensive fieldwork in 2013 and 2015 I identified how quasi-governmental institutions are a particularly effective tool in the co-optation of Islam and how religious institutions created during the Soviet Union have been repurposed for the new aims of each regime. This chapter contextualizes these decisions within the wider literature. I then present the cases of Kazakhstan and Tatarstan and examine policies in each case to increase the proportion of ethnic Tatars and Kazakhs since independence as well as center-periphery relations from the Soviet Union to the present. The latter half of the chapter subsequently examines why authoritarian regimes in Muslim majority states and regions co-opt instead of repress Islam as well as why authoritarian regimes create separate institutions to co-opt Islam.

Chapters Two and Three examine and compare how institutions are employed by the Kazakhstani and Tatar regimes respectively to co-opt Islam. Chapters Four and Five assess and compare the narratives used by each regime to justify these co-optation measures to domestic audiences. Chapters Six and Seven examine the effectiveness of these efforts. Chapter Six assesses the degree to which Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan rely on regime sources for religious advice. Additionally, Chapter Six employs network analysis of mosque attendance to understand the relationship between different types of mosques (government constructed and co-opted mosques). Chapter Seven examines the types of governmental sources people report using and their relationship to the religious institution in each case. Secondly, Chapter Seven examines the narratives Muslim citizens use to justify why they consult governmental or non-governmental sources of religious advice and compares these narratives to those employed by each regime.

Co-optation and Institutions

There is growing acknowledgement that institutions such as parliaments, parties, and elections—the very trappings of democracy—often operate to the benefit of authoritarian ruling regimes rather than contribute towards democratization and can be important tools for co-optation.[8] This is referred to by Pepinsky as the "institutional turn" in authoritarian comparativism.[9] Much of the literature on co-

[8] See for example Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?," 115–44; Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," 1279–1301; Gandhi, "Political Institutions under Dictatorship," 256; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, "Elections Under Authoritarianism," 403–22; Gandhi and Przeworski, "Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships," 1–26; Magaloni, "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule," 715–41; Boix and Svolik, "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships," 300–316; Pepinsky, "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism," 631–53; Bellin, "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders," 21–41.

[9] Pepinsky, "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism."

optation focuses on the co-optation of political opponents, civil society, businesses, and classes into the ruling party and/or parliament. The longevity of authoritarian regimes is likely bolstered through the co-optation of political and economic elites into hegemonic parties.[10] Through the selective co-optation of opposition groups and manipulation of elections, authoritarian leaders can divide the opposition and increase the coordination costs for the opposition.[11] Counter to intuition, multiparty elections can even contribute towards the stability of an authoritarian regime, serving as a co-optation mechanism.[12]

Parties are used not only to co-opt political and economic elites, but also to co-opt general citizens and to catalyze mass involvement and support. This can take the form of providing benefits to citizens involved with the political party, such as the provision of better employment.[13] Furthermore, a larger base combined with popular support may contribute towards both the perceived legitimacy of the regime and allow it to gather more information.[14] In Malaysia, the co-optation of Malay associations allowed the ruling coalition to obtain support from the majority Muslim population.[15]

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[10] Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization; Magaloni and Kricheli, "Political Order and One-Party Rule," 126.
[11] Magaloni and Kricheli, Political Order and One-Party Rule," 126; Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents and Institutions*; Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast, "Democratization and the Economy in Mexico: Equilibrium (PRI) Hegemony and Its Demise."
[11] Lust-Okar, "Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan," 456–71.
[12] Lust-Okar, "Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan," 456–71.
[13] Magaloni and Kricheli, "Political Order and One-Party Rule," 128.
[14] Geddes, "Stages of Development in Authoritarian Regimes," 5; Bader, "Hegemonic Political Parties in Post-Soviet Eurasia: Towards Party-Based Authoritarianism?," 190.
[15] Saliha, "Islamic Non-governmental Organisations," 98.

Authoritarian regimes can also embark upon satellite party building in which regimes seek to control "targeted social milieu" highlighted in Russia by Gel'man.[16] Other examples of such efforts include the establishment of peasant or Christian parties in Poland and East Germany.[17] A similar tactic was employed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico during 1980s and 1990s. Thus, the presence of such institutions in authoritarian regimes is not merely "window-dressing." Rather, these institutions are often strategically created and employed.[18]

National and Subnational Authoritarian Regimes

At the subnational level, nominally democratic institutions are also used to bolster authoritarian regimes. For example, Golosov, in examining subnational elections in September 2017 in Russia, demonstrates how the national government utilizes subnational institutions (including gubernatorial, mayoral, and subnational legislative elections) to ensure a monopoly of power for the dominant party, United Russia.[19] Moreover, there is growing recognition about the variation in subnational regime types.

Gibson's seminal work on subnational authoritarian regimes within national democracies brought to the fore the relationship between regime type and territorial politics, particularly boundary control, the institutional strategies employed at both the national and subnational level to either encourage regime stability or change.[20] Subnational authoritarian elites attempt to shield against national intrusions that could lead to democratization. For example, the American South during 19th century

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[16] Gel'man, "Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy."
[17] Gel'man, "Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy," 924.
[18] Gandhi and Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," 1280.
[19] Golosov, "Co-optation in the Process of Dominant Party System Building: The Case of Russia."
[20] Gibson, *Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies*.

consolidated its authoritarian rule and eventually harmonized state law and constitutions with national law and the U.S. constitution, legalizing the deprivation of citizenship of African Americans and the existence of the subnational authoritarian regimes themselves.[21]

These competing interests (between national and subnational regimes) arise due to regime juxtaposition, which Gibson defines as, "Two levels of government with jurisdiction over the same territory operate under different regimes, understood as the set of norms, rules, and practices that govern the selection and behavior of state leaders."[22] Other scholars have contributed to this literature and broadened the approach to include national authoritarian and subnational authoritarian regimes.

In the first systemic attempt to examine subnational regime types in Russia, McMann and Petrov relied on surveys of regional experts to rank regions in Russia by the level of democracy (using an operationalized definition based on Dahl).[23] Gel'man expanded the concept of regime juxtaposition by using Russia to examine subnational authoritarian regimes within national authoritarian regimes. Gel'man identified three types of subnational authoritarian regimes: centralized subnational party authoritarianism, decentralized subnational authoritarianism, and centralized subnational bureaucratic authoritarianism.[24] In examining center-periphery relations

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[21] Gibson, "Subnational Authoritarianism in the United States."
[22] Ibid., 103.
[23] However, they only included oblasts, krais, and federal cities—excluding republics, autonomous okrugs, and autonomous oblasts given these territories are ethno-territorial. Although among the survey experts who did include all regions in Russia in their responses, republics were clustered along the least democratic end of the spectrum. McMann and Petrov, "A Survey of Democracy in Russia's Regions," 155–82.
[24] Gel'man understands centralized subnational party authoritarianism to be the subnational version of (national) one party authoritarianism as examined by Geddes. Gel'man argues that this region type is the most stable given the party in power is dominant at both the subnational and national level. Gel'man, "Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy."

in Russia, Gel'man identified Russia under Putin as a centralized subnational party authoritarian system.[25]

Rather than classifying the entire center-periphery relationship, Ross and Panov examine variation in the regime types of subnational authoritarian regimes in Russia. They employ the typology hegemonic authoritarian, inter-elite bargain authoritarian, clearly-competitive authoritarian, and moderately-competitive authoritarian regimes.[26] They classify Tatarstan as a hegemonic authoritarian regime.[27] Saikkonen's typology for subnational regimes in Russia includes electoral democratic, competitive, and hegemonic authoritarian regimes.[28] Despite operationalizing hegemonic authoritarian regimes differently, Saikkonen likewise classified Tatarstan as a hegemonic authoritarian regime.[29] Russia as a whole as well as Kazakhstan have also been identified as hegemonic authoritarian regimes. LaPorte identified both Kazakhstan under President Nazarbayev and Russia under President Putin as hegemonic regimes, wherein the incumbent is elected with 70 percent or more of the vote at least once, despite the existence of opposition parties and elections.[30]

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[25] Gel'man identified Russia in the 1990s as a decentralized subnational authoritarian regime, a centralized subnational party authoritarian system in mid-2000s to present (article written in 2010), and Russia before 1917 as a centralized subnational bureaucratic authoritarian system. Gel'man also notes that he would classify Central Asia under the last category. Gel'man, "The Dynamics of Subnational Authoritarianism," 9, 20.
[26] Ross and Panov, "The Range and Limitation of Sub-National Regime Variations under Electoral Authoritarianism: The Case of Russia."
[27] Ross and Panov, "The Range and Limitation of Sub-National Regime Variations," 16.
[28] Saikkonen, "Variation in Subnational Electoral Authoritarianism: Evidence from the Russian Federation."
[29] Saikkonen, "Variation in Subnational Electoral Authoritarianism," 442.
[30] LaPorte, "Hidden in Plain Sight: Political Opposition and Hegemonic Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan," 20.

President Nazarbayev, the only leader since independence until 2019, was elected as president in 1991 in an uncontested election. In 1995, a referendum was approved to extend Nazarbayev's presidential term until 2000. Despite this, an election was held in 1999, where he received over 80 percent of the vote share, and subsequently 90 percent of the vote in 2005 and over 95 percent in 2001. In his last election, Nazarbayev obtained almost 98 percent of the vote. The current president of Kazakhstan, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, assumed office with about 71 percent of votes cast.[31]

In the early 1990s, Russia seemed to be on a different path to many observers. The vote share of the party of power in presidential and Duma (parliamentary) elections consistently declined in the early 1990s.[32] Until 2008 all national elections fielded multiple candidates.[33] However, starting in the late 1990s the vote share for the party of power markedly increased each year, reaching over 70 percent in the presidential election in 2004. In Duma elections, support for liberal reform parties fell from 34 percent in 1993 to less than four percent in 1997.[34] Putin first came to power in 2000, winning almost 53 percent of the vote. In the subsequent election, Putin's vote share shot up to over 71 percent in 2004. He was followed by Medvedev winning 71 percent of the presidential vote in 2008, with Putin returning to the presidential office in 2012 (after serving as prime minister in the interim) with about 64 percent of the vote. The last presidential election in 2018 resulted in Putin winning with over 76 percent of the vote share. The leading opposition candidate, Alexei Navalny, was barred from running for office.

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[31] Zhussupov, "Kassym-Jomart Tokayev Elected Kazakhstan's President with 70.96 percent of the Vote."
[32] Treisman, "Elections in Russia, 1991-2008."
[33] Treisman, "Elections in Russia," 3.
[34] Treisman, "Elections in Russia."

Thus, while Russia may have met the minimal standards for the existence of an electoral democracy[35] under Yeltsin, Russia has increasingly become a further consolidated authoritarian regime under Putin. On the other hand, Putin has not inflated his vote share into the regions of Nazarbayev and the major opposition candidate in Russia at least has some name recognition. In both uncompetitive authoritarian regimes, however, elections are not viewed by opponents as an opportunity to potentially assume power. Rather they serve to reinforce the regime's legitimacy, generate information for the regime, or distribute patronage.[36]

President Shaimiev, the first president of Tatarstan, was elected in 1991 and 1996 in uncontested elections.[37] In each election, his name was already written in the ballot. In order to vote against him, a voter would have to cross his name off the ballot in front of the election committee (the same manner in which elections were conducted during the Soviet Union).[38] In the second election, Shaimiev won 78 percent of the vote with a 78 percent turnout.[39] Shaimiev then subsequently changed the constitution to run for a third term in 2001 and won 80 percent of the vote in an election with four other nominal candidates.[40] In 2004, Putin did not permit gubernatorial elections, which were replaced with appointments. Shaimiev was subsequently appointed in 2005 and then retired from office in 2010, with his chosen successor, President Minnikhanov, taking up the post as the second president of the republic. Minnikhanov is still presently in office.

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[35] Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," 21–35.
[36] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 7.
[37] The leader of Tatarstan's title is president, not governor.
[38] Ross, "Federalism and Democratization in Russia," 161.
[39] Orttung, Lussier, and Paretskaya, *The Republics and Regions of the Russian Federation: A Guide to Politics, Policies, and Leaders*, 539.
[40] Faroukshin, "Civil Servants on Edge as Shaimiev Starts Third Term."

The ability of governors to secure votes for the Kremlin has been identified as an important factor in whether a governor was allowed to remain in office via appointment or allowed to influence the process to select his/her predecessor.[41] Sharafutdinova, in comparing Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, also demonstrates the role privatization plays in whether governors are allowed to maintain continuity in leadership. President Shaimiev of Tatarstan and President Rakhimov of Bashkortostan both delivered votes for the Kremlin and maintained economic and social stability, but Rakhimov was replaced with a political outsider while Shaimiev's close political associate was appointed after Shaimiev reached his two-term limit. Bashkortostan engaged in a rapid process of privatization. On the other hand, Tatarstan underwent a gradual process of privatization, which drew less public attention and allowed the regime to maintain greater legitimacy amongst its citizens. Moreover, this gradual process also drew less attention from the Kremlin.[42] Elections for governors were reintroduced in 2012, however, this finding highlights how regional elites in Tatarstan pursue strategies to reinforce boundary control.

In both national and subnational authoritarian regimes, political actors have sought to co-opt potential sources of opposition through institutions such as elections, parties, or parliaments. However, Tatarstan must contend with enforcing boundary controls to prevent central intrusions. This dissertation explores how regime juxtaposition manifests in the religious sphere. Tatarstan seeks to avoid national intrusion into religious policy. No similar parallel exits in Kazakhstan. Local political institutions (below the national level in Kazakhstan and republican level in Tatarstan)

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[41] Reuter and Robertson, "Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments."
[42] Sharafutdinova, "Elite Management in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: A View From Bashkortostan and Tatarstan."

do not set policy in either Kazakhstan or Tatarstan. Moreover, local political actors do not have any direct access to alter religious policy.

Co-optation and Religious Institutions

Thus, at the national and subnational level authoritarian regimes co-opt through institutions that form the bedrock of democracy in other regime types. Some efforts to co-opt religious groups into a dominant party have been evidenced, such as the process outlined by Hamladji in the co-optation of Hamas in Algeria.[43] However, most Muslim majority countries and regions do not have religious parties. On the contrary, where religious parties are not already present, authoritarian regimes often seek to restrict the inclusion of religion into political parties. In Kazakhstan and Russia, efforts to co-opt religious leaders into the ruling party, Nur Otan and United Russia, respectively, have not been observed. Instead, religious parties have been banned.[44] On the other hand, authoritarian regimes commonly elect to create separate institution for Islam. Why do regimes elect to establish separate institutions for religion, and in particular, Islam?

The existence of separate institutions for Islam is remarkably common. Of the 48 Muslim majority countries, where more than 50 percent of the population self-identifies as Muslim,[45] it is notable that only six countries do not have a national level

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[43] Hamladji, "Co-optation, Repression and Authoritarian Regime's Survival: The Case of the Islamist MSP-Hamas in Algeria."

[44] "The "Law on Political Parties," was passed in Russia in 2001 and bans parties based on religious or ethnic identity. This law further strengthened previous restrictions laid out in the 1997 Law on," Freedom of Conscious and Religious Associations," which stated that religious organizations could not participate in any electoral activities or any activities associated with a political party or movement. In Kazakhstan, "The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan: About Religious Activities and Religious Associations," formally banned all religious parties and built off previous ad-hoc policies that individually banned different Islamic parties and movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Revival Party, or Tablighi Jama'at.

[45] "The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections from 2010-2030."

religious institution for Islam.[46] One of these countries, Yemen, no longer has such an institution as of 2015 due to the government being forced into exile in March of 2015, which was preceded by a rebel takeover of the government institutions in January.[47]

Religious institutions for Islam are also commonly found at the sub-national level in Muslim majority regions. In Nigeria, just under 50 percent of the population identifies as Muslim, and the rest of the population mostly identifies as Christian, according to Pew.[48] However, religious groups are not distributed evenly across the country. The Muslim population is more highly concentrated in the North, while the Christian population is concentrated in the South.[49] In the Zamfare state, a region in Northern Nigeria, a religious institution, the Hisbah Board, was set up in 2003. The Hisbah Board has the authority to regulate Islam and appoint imams among other powers. In Russia, 71 percent of the population identifies as Orthodox Christian, 15 percent as unaffiliated, 10 percent as Muslim, less than one percent as Catholic, and four percent with another religious tradition.[50] However, like Nigeria the Muslim population is clustered within certain regions of the country— in the Caucasus and Volga-Urals— and in these regions religious institutions have also been established for Islam.

Cases: Tatarstan, Russia and Kazakhstan

Religious Institutions for Islam in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Union

Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, Russia provide a good set of comparable cases to better elucidate the differences in the co-optation via institutions of Islam by national

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[46] The presence of a national religious institution was identified via the United States Department of State International Religious Freedom Report for each country in 2015.
[47] "Yemen 2015 International Religious Freedom Report."
[48] "The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Sub-Saharan Africa."
[49] "The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Sub-Saharan Africa."
[50] "Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe," 20.

authoritarian regimes in Muslim majorities states and by subnational authoritarian regimes in Muslim majority regions. The Soviet Union governed and interacted with Islam in the former autonomous republics of Kazakhstan and Tatarstan in a similar fashion. Moreover, these cases present a similar regime type and have pursued policies to ensure the majority of the titular ethnic group.

The Spiritual Association of Muslims in Kazakhstan and the Spiritual Association of Muslims in Tatarstan find their predecessor in the Soviet Union. The relationship between the Soviet authorities and Islam was not monolithic in nature. Soviet policy oscillated between outright repression and efforts to co-opt and control religious expression, with Moscow eventually acquiescing defeat in its efforts to stamp out religious identification and practice. As part of a process of acknowledging that Islam had not been successfully removed from the social fabric, a limited degree of religious expression was allowed, which effectively introduced an official/unofficial paradigm (unofficial Islam is also referred to as popular or parallel Islam).[51]

This arose from the establishment of two institutions, the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Central Asia (SADUM) and the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of the European Part of the USSR and Siberia.[52] These two parallel government agencies were created to regulate Islam via government-sanctioned mosques and affiliated

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[51] Gunn, "Shaping an Islamic Identity: Religion, Islamism, and the State in Central Asia," 398-399.

[52] There were four institutions for Islam during the Soviet Union: the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Central Asia (headquartered in Tashkent, Uzbekistan); the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of European Part of the USSR and Siberia (Ufa, Bashkortostan); the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of the Northern Caucasus (Buynaksk, Dagestan), and the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of the Caucasus (Baku, Azerbaijan). Lieven, *The Cambridge History of Russia: Russia, 1689–1917*, 207. Kazakhstan was under the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Central Asia, while Tatarstan was situated under the authority of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of the European Part of the USSR and Siberia.

imams. The Spiritual Directorates of Muslims in the Soviet Union are the predecessors of the current religious institutions for Islam in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, the Spiritual Association of Muslims in Kazakhstan (SAMK) and the Spiritual Association of Muslims in the Republic of Tatarstan (SAM RT). In Kazakhstan, SAMK is a national level institution.

Table 1. Spiritual Association of Muslims in the Muslim Republics of Russia

Republic	Spiritual Association of Muslims (SAM)
Tatarstan	Spiritual Association of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan
Bashkortostan	Spiritual Association of Muslims of the Republic of Bashkortostan
Chechnya	Spiritual Association of Muslims of the Republic of Chechnya
Ingushetia	Spiritual Association of Muslims of the Republic of Ingushetia
Dagestan	Spiritual Association of Muslims of the Republic of Dagestan
Kabardino-Balkaria	Spiritual Association of Muslims of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria
Karachay-Cherkessia	Spiritual Association of Muslims of the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia
Adygeya	Spiritual Association of Muslims of the Republic of Adygeya and Krasnodar Krai

There are eight Muslims republics in Russia: Tatarstan; Bashkortostan; Chechnya; Ingushetia; Dagestan; Kabardino-Balkaria; Karachay-Cherkessia; and Adygeya. Muslim republic refers to the designation of the republic being named after the titular ethnicity, where most members of the titular ethnicity identify as Muslim. The titular ethnicity[53] is the ethnic group the republic is named after, for example, Tatars in Tatarstan, Udmurts in Udmurtia, or Chechens in Chechnya. Adygeya and Bashkortostan are the only Muslim republics where the majority of the population

[53] In English, the word “nationality” is often translated directly from Russian and frequently conflated with ethnicity. For clarity, I use ethnicity.

does not identify as Muslim nor with the titular ethnicity.[54] Each respective Muslim republic has a Spiritual Association of Muslims as illustrated in Table 1 above—in the case of Tatarstan, the Spiritual Association of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan (SAM RT). In addition to Tatarstan and Kazakhstan, all of the other Muslim republics in the former Soviet Union, including those presently within Russia and independent states,[55] currently have a Spiritual Association of Muslims (for example Kyrgyzstan set up a Spiritual Association of Muslims in 1993 and Uzbekistan in 1992).

Muslim and Titular Ethnic Majority

In addition to being hegemonic regimes, both Tatarstan and Kazakhstan since 1991 have pursued policies to increase the proportion of the titular ethnic majority. Tatarstan is a Muslim majority republic situated in the Volga-Urals. In Russia there are 39 significant ethnic minorities and 21 regions named after titular ethnic groups.[56] In Tatarstan, according to the last census in 2010, just over 53 percent of the population identifies as ethnically Tatar.[57] Almost 40 percent of the population identifies as ethnically Russian. The third largest ethnic group is the Chuvashes (about three percent of the population), with less than one percent of the population identifying as Udmurt, Mordovian, Maris, Ukrainian, or Bashkir.[58] The share of ethnic Tatars has increased since independence, while the representation of Russians has decreased (from 43 to 53 percent and 43 to 40 percent, respectively).[59] According to the 2002 Russian census, Tatars became the majority ethnic group in 2002.[60]

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[54] "Report on the Results of the All-Russian Population Census 2010."
[55] The Soviet Union had 15 republics, of which six were Muslim republics.
[56] Hughes, "Managing Secession Potential in the Russian Federation," 40.
[57] "All-Russian Population Census 2010."
[58] "All-Russian Population Census 2010."
[59] Ibid.
[60] The 2002 census included 40 types of ethnicities that are included under Tatar such as Siberian Tatar, Crimean Tatar, and Kriashen (Christian Orthodox Tatars). For more details on the ethnic identities both created by the Russian regime, local understating

Kazakhstan is a Muslim-majority country situated in Central Asia and became an independent country in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. According to the last census (conducted in 2009), over 63 percent of the population self-identifies as ethnically Kazakh, while over 23 percent identified as ethnically Russian, with ethnic Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Uyghurs, Tatars and Germans constituting more than one percent each of the population. Additionally, over 70 percent of the population self-identified as Muslim and over 98 percent of self-identified Kazakhs identified as Muslim.[61] The presence of over 125 ethnicities in present day Kazakhstan[62] is due in part to the forced deportations of Chechens, Ingushians and Koreans as well as Kazakhstan serving as the site for many political prisoners under Stalin. Kazakhs did not constitute a majority of the population after receiving independence in 1991 and only starting in 1989 did Kazakhs constitute the largest ethnic group (40 percent).[63] Prior to its incorporation into the Soviet Union, Kazakhs likely formed the majority ethnic group in the territory that came to be Kazakhstan. The Soviet census of 1926, while plagued with methodological issues due in part to many respondents in present day Kazakhstan practicing a nomadic lifestyle, listed Kazakhs as forming over 57 percent of population.[64]

Forging a national identity predicated on the majority ethnic group is a common strategy employed by leaders of authoritarian and non-authoritarian regimes alike (and indeed in many currently democratic countries prior to the establishment of

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of ethnicity, and how Tatar elites responded see Gorenberg, "Tatar Identity: A United, Indivisible Nation?"

[61] "Results of the 2009 National Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Analytical Report,"; See Demographics Section in Chapter Six for a comparison to reported demographics in my data from Kazakhstan and Tatarstan.

[62] "Results of the 2009 National Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan."

[63] Dave, "Minorities and Participation in Public Life: Kazakhstan."

[64] Dave, "Minorities and Participation in Public Life: Kazakhstan."

democracy). While the ethnic composition has shifted more in Kazakhstan, maintaining the ethnic majority of the titular population in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan has been an important priority to the leaders of each. Kazakhstan and Tatarstan have gradually deployed nationalizing strategies. Through language and citizenship policies as well as policies aimed at lessening the demographic representation of Russians, Kazakhstan has seen a return of Kazakhs constituting the majority ethnic group with increasing numbers of non-ethnic Kazakhs choosing to, "exit," and the return of ethnic Kazakhs from abroad (Oralmans).[65] In Tatarstan, the increase in ethnic Tatars is due in part to the return of Tatars from Central Asia, whose families had fled the Soviet Union during 1920s and 1930s.[66]

Soviet Experience and Center Periphery Relations

While similar policies have been pursued regarding ethnicity in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, at the advent of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Tatarstan and Kazakhstan followed different paths vis à vis Moscow. There was not an active movement for independence in Central Asia, while several predominantly Muslim republics in Russia, such as Tatarstan, made claims of sovereignty.

The states within Central Asia were the last to declare independence. Kazakhstan even officially declared its independence a week after the Soviet Union officially split up.[67] A number of factors likely contributed to Kazakhstan's lack of push for independence. The ethnic diversity and its potential problems for nation building were of concern. Concordantly, prior to the establishment of the Soviet Union the identities of peoples in Central Asia were more fluid and the five

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[65] Commercio, "The 'Pugachev Rebellion' in the Context of Post-Soviet Kazakh Nationalism."
[66] Faller, *Nation, Language, Islam: Tatarstan's Sovereignty Movement*, 29.
[67] Olcott, "Central Asia: Confronting Independence," 4

distinctive nationalities of the current region did not exist until a Soviet nation building campaign was embarked upon. Additionally, while Kazakhstan has vast oil preserves, at the outset of independence (and until 2005) all pipelines were routed through Russia.

Tatarstan on the other hand initiated a secessionist movement. The ethno-structure passed on from the Soviet Union provided greater institutional resources to some republics in Russia, such as Tatarstan. Local elites in Tatarstan projected credible claims of mobilization based in part on nationalism. Kazan's ability to credibly harness religious and ethnic grievances complimented by its natural resources allowed it to make bolder claims of sovereignty. The Russian Federation contained such movements by entering into bilateral treaties. A selective asymmetrical process of federalism was embarked upon when a power-sharing treaty was signed with Tatarstan in February of 1994—essentially an executive agreement between Yeltsin and Shaimiev.[68] Subsequent treaties were then signed with other resource rich regions, including Bashkortostan (a neighboring republic) and Sakha (a republic in northeastern Siberia).[69] These treaties afforded regions with natural resources varying degree of autonomy in budgetary and tax powers.[70] However, despite the bargaining power gained in Tatarstan due to its significant wealth in gas, it was constrained by several factors. Namely, Tatarstan is landlocked and lacks international borders, which severely limited its potential ability to independently export its resource wealth.[71]

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[68] Hughes, "Managing Secession Potential in the Russian Federation," 50.
[69] Hughes, "Managing Secession," 50.
[70] Ibid, 52.
[71] Ibid.

Under Putin, regional leaders have become further constrained. Under the guise of deterring future attacks akin to Beslan (where a school was held hostage by heavily armed attackers with explosives who demanded Russia withdraw from Chechnya) a series of reforms were initiated in 2004 that consolidated power in Russia and away from the regions. Putin dissolved direct gubernatorial elections, despite there being no apparent link between the terrorist act of Beslan in 2004 and gubernatorial elections. Secondly, the membership requirement for political parties was raised from 10,000 (the minimum required by the, "Law on Political Parties," passed in July of 2001) to 50,000 in late 2004.[72] In regards to the former, in explaining why there was so little resistance by governors, Goode argues that governors likely calculated that they were more likely to retain their status via appointment rather than via election.[73] Additionally, regions of, "strategic importance," (such as Tatarstan) were most likely to see large federal programs enacted (e.g., development programs) in order to both secure political support as well as implement centralizing reforms.[74]

Since independence, Kazakhstan and Russia differ in their official relationship between the center and periphery. Despite both having hegemonic national regimes, Russia is a federation according to its constitution, while Kazakhstan is a unitary state. Russia has a unique asymmetrical federal system. Russia has various sub-federal units with varying degrees of autonomy (including republics, oblasts, krais, cities of federal importance, autonomous oblasts, and autonomous okrugs). The most autonomous unit is the republic. Tatarstan is officially The Republic of Tatarstan.

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[72] Chebankova, "Putin's Struggle for Federalism: Structures, Operation, and the Commitment Problem," 286.
[73] Goode, "The Puzzle of Putin's Gubernatorial Appointments," 395.
[74] Chebankova, "Putin's Struggle for Federalism," 289.

Given the lack of national democracy in Russia, whether Russia can be classified as a federalist system is a matter of contention.[75] With the removal of gubernatorial elections in much of Russia, the relationship between the regions and Moscow has been altered. Sharafutdinova, employing a principal-agent framework, argues that the elimination of gubernatorial elections did not result in a high turnover in governors, but rather transferred competition outside of the public sphere, increasing the region's dependence on the center.[76]

Kazakhstan on the other hand has never held elections for akims, heads of local government. Rather akims are appointed by the president. Politicians serving in regional capacities are often rotated between national and regional positions in order to prevent them from forming reliable political bases or obtaining economic clout through relationships with local business interests.[77] Jones has critiqued the notion of a unitary state as at times over encompassing, which fails to take into account de facto economic decentralization.[78]

Decentralization to the municipal level has not, however, been a force in the religious sphere either in Kazakhstan or Tatarstan. Despite increasing party control of

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[75] Bermeo argues that federalism exists, "Where there is a layer of institutions between a state's center and its localities, when this layer of institutions features its own leaders and representative bodies, and when those leaders and bodies share decision-making power with the center." Bermeo, "The Import of Institutions," 98. Alternatively, Stepan argues that only democracies hold the potential for the rule of law to uphold the independence of a federation's subunits. Stepan, "Towards a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism," 31. Given subnational authoritarian regimes can work to the benefit of national democratic regimes, I believe the framework of a layer of institutions is more helpful to understand the relationship between regions and the center.

[76] Sharafutdinova, "Subnational Governance in Russia: How Putin Changed the Contract with His Agents and the Problems It Created for Medvedev."

[77] Junisbai, "A Tale of Two Kazakhstans: Sources of Political Cleavage and Conflict in the Post-Soviet Period," 255-259.

[78] Jones Luong, *Economic Decentralization in Kazakhstan: Causes and Consequences*.

the regions and co-optation of governors, Muslim majority regions in Russia have a high degree of independence in setting policy towards religion, which is explored in the following empirical chapters. Moreover, both cases demonstrate increasing centralization over policies on Islam—both of which are overtly referenced in a positive light by governmental and religious elites in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan.

Given Tatarstan and Kazakhstan's institutional similarity, hegemonic regime type, emphasis on maintaining a titular ethnic and religious majority, I utilize these cases to explore why and how authoritarian regimes co-opt Islam through institutions, why and how national and subnational regimes differ in their approaches, and how effective these approaches are.

Authoritarian Regimes and Hierarchical Religious Institutions

Sunni Islam does not commonly have an inherent hierarchy, in comparison to Christianity, and the Catholic and Orthodox Church for example.[79] There is not an equivalent to a Pope or Ecumenical Patriarch[80] nor a specified hierarchy equivalent to bishops or archbishops, nor a nationalized structure similar to the Orthodox Church. Despite this, the establishment of a religious institution for Islam can be used as a tool by actors in order to consolidate support from religious adherents. For example, in Indonesia a national level institution, the Indonesia Ulamas Council (MUI), was set up in 1975, in order to elicit support for the regime from Islamic groups.[81] Its predecessor can first be found in the Council of Ulamas based in the province of West Java, which was set up under the Sukarno administration, who was previously a

[79] See footnote 7 on the distinction between Sunni and Shi'i religious hierarchies.
[80] The leader of the Orthodox Church.
[81] Noer, *Administration of Islam in Indonesia*.

leader of the Indonesia nationalist movement and the struggle for independence, in order to bolster support from Muslims in the region.[82]

There is a high incentive across regime types to obtain the support of a majority religious group or for the religious group to at least not challenge the regime's power. This rationale, that majority religious groups are of particular concern to the regime, was articulated by several senior governmental officials in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan in response to questions about why a religious institution for Islam was created and why an equivalent organization did not exist for other religious groups. For example, a senior governmental official in Kazakhstan involved in setting policy towards religion stated that similar institutions were not created for other religious groups, "Because more than 70 percent of the population is Muslim," and thus, "…more work," is put into setting policies for Islam.[83] Similarly, a senior government official in Astana, Kazakhstan[84] asserted that these steps were enacted because Islam was the, "…majority religion".[85] As with other potential sources of opposition, authoritarian regimes avoid repression when the costs are assumed to be high.[86] Attempting to repress the majority group would be highly labor intensive and be highly likely to provoke social unrest, as well as cost the regime in terms of its legitimacy vis-à-vis the public. Alternatively, co-option through a non-politicized institution is less likely to incur these risks.

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[82] Salim, *The Transnational and the Local in the Politics of Islam*, 35.
[83] Interview with Senior Government Official A, Astana, 2013.
[84] The capital of Kazakhstan's name was changed in 2019 from Astana to Nur-Sultan in honor of President Nursultan Nazarbayev after the resignation. As Astana was the name of the city when I conducted fieldwork, I refer to the capital as Astana throughout the dissertation.
[85] Interview with Deputy Director of Religious Affairs Committee Astana Office, Astana, 2015.
[86] Gandhi, *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*; Smith, "Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule."

This rationale can be observed in other Muslim majority states. The more authoritarian a state is, the more likely the state is to have a national level Muslim organization. The violin plot below illustrates the relationship between whether a Muslim majority country has a national level Muslim organization and its Freedom House score.[87] Of the 48 Muslim majority countries, 27 are evaluated by Freedom House as, "Not Free," 19 as, "Partly Free," and only two are identified as, "Free."[88] While the data is not normally distributed, a clear trend can be observed that religious institutions for Islam are more common in more authoritarian regimes.[89] Unfortunately, comparable data on subnational authoritarian regimes in Muslim majority regions is not available.

Figure 1. Presence of National Muslim Institutions and Freedom Ratings



[87] Countries are rated on a one to seven scale where seven corresponds to the least free and one to the most free. See "Methodology: Freedom in the World 2016."
[88] Tunisia and Senegal are evaluated as "Free." "Freedom in the World 2016."
[89] Unfortunately, no large-scale effort to date has been undertaken to evaluate the level of democracy in subnational regimes. A potentially fruitful endeavor for future study would be to examine the establishment of national religious institutions across countries with different majority religious groups and/or regime types.

Clearly Islam is a concern for authoritarian regimes in Muslim majority states. Moreover, most Muslim majority authoritarian regimes have elected to create or repurpose a pre-existing institution for Islam. Indeed, the more authoritarian a state is, the more likely the state is to have an institution for Islam. Having established the prevalence of such institutions, the link between authoritarianism and religious institutions, as well as the generalizability of the cases of Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, I turn to *why* authoritarian regimes utilize religious institutions to co-opt Islam. I argue that these efforts are undertaken in order to limit bargaining partners and gather information, avoid mobilization, and to enhance the legitimacy of the regime.

Limit Bargaining Partners

The creation of an institution for a religious group can serve to limit the bargaining partners with whom an authoritarian regime needs to engage. Other types of institutions have proven useful to limit bargaining partners in other arenas. For example, Gandhi argues that parliaments are an ideal venue to control bargaining as a dictator can select which groups to grant access. Furthermore, encapsulating these groups within institutions also allows for negotiations to take place without reassembling different bargaining partners each time.[90] In the case of Tatarstan, multiple competing religious institutions, both local and national, were competing for prominence after the fall of the Soviet Union. The President of Tatarstan directly and overtly selected his bargaining partner, the Spiritual Association of Muslims in Tatarstan, as the sole legitimate religious institution.[91]

In another scenario, if a regime reaches an agreement on one hand with the leaders of a religious institution to provide funding for a certain number of mosques,

[90] Gandhi, "Political Institutions under Dictatorship," 78.
[91] This is covered in more depth in Chapter Three.

and on the other hand that Friday messages not criticize the government, the regime does not have to engage in this set of bargaining again in other regions or cities in the country. Thus, the quid pro quo agreement remains steady and the regime receives stability across the country. In a large country such as Kazakhstan, this is highly advantageous given the potential difficulties in governing such large territories.[92] To the religious leaders of the institution, there is also the advantage that they can rely on a set amount of funding.

Financial support provided by a government is often referred to as a subsidy within the literature on politics and religion. Subsidies can take various forms such as tax-free status, interest free loans, funds for the maintenance or preservation of buildings, or funding for the religious schooling of students. In Kazakhstan, the education of imams in madrasahs is now covered by the Spiritual Association of Muslims. In Tatarstan, the most prominent source of Islamic education, the Russian Islamic University, also received government funding. Another option is to declare a place of worship of historical or cultural importance, thus necessitating government support and or protection.[93] For example, in Kazan, Tatarstan the Marjani mosque in the city center, originally commissioned by Catherine the Great, has been labeled a site of historical significance and therefore receives subsidies from the government. These subsidies are often part of the negotiations that take place between religious leaders and the regime.

Despite the large disparities in leverage between the state and religious leaders, the co-optation taking place can also provide benefits to the co-opted leaders

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[92] See for example Herbst, "States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control."
[93] Koesel, *Religion and Authoritarianism Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences*, 23.

as well as benefits more broadly to the religious group (such as funds to purchase books or maintain mosques).[94] A monopoly is often granted to this religious institution, as in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan. Thus, potential rivals for religious authority are also eliminated. Additionally, religious institutions for Islam are also often granted policy concessions. In both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, the Spiritual Association of Muslims has a monopoly to set dictates on acceptable Islamic practice, including how to pray. In Kazakhstan, this monopoly has also been introduced into the legal realm. According to human rights organization Forum 18, in 2018 20 administrative prosecutorial cases were opened against Muslims because they prayed differently in mosques than the guidelines set out by SAMK.[95] For example, one man is charged with verbally saying the word, "Amen," at the end of a prayer.[96] Creating a religious institution can create stability in bargaining partners and this stability is certainly advantageous for the regime and can also provide benefits to the co-opted religious groups. However, there is often a stark loss of independence for the religious group in this transaction.

It is also important to note that subsidies are provided to various religious groups across regime types, notably including democracies. Moreover, many democracies even have state churches such as the Anglican Church in England. However, in most authoritarian states, there are very few avenues to practice religion outside of the religious institution established by the regime and thus a monopoly is

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[94] Koesel in examining Russia and China conceptualizes this as cooperation. Given the power differentials and control by the Tatar regime laid out in Chapter 2, I argue that this is co-optation. However, I am in agreement that benefits can be provided to the religious group in this arrangement. Koesel, *Religion and Authoritarianism.*

[95] Corley, "Kazakhstan: 165 Administrative Prosecutions in 2018 - List." These cases were taken to court despite there being no law in Kazakhstan that dictates how anyone must pray.

[96] Corley, "Kazakhstan: 165 Known Administrative Prosecutions in 2018."

often instituted. In authoritarian Muslim majority countries, this monopoly is maintained by the religious institution for Islam.

Gather Information

The creation of a religious institution also serves as a source for gathering information. Similarly, one motivation for allowing political parties is to create a larger base of support as well gather more information about the preferences and views of citizens. In Kazakhstan for example, all imams and mosques in the entire country must be part of SAMK. Every imam within a respective city or village reports to a regional head imam, whom then reports to a higher official in SAMK.[97] Imams are encharged with engaging with people who go to the mosque to pray or hold rituals for life events (such as weddings and funerals). Additionally, people can consult directly with imams regarding religious advice. Thus, information can flow from low level imams in SAMK who are embedded within the local communities to senior officials within SAMK and subsequently to government officials. This can serve as an authoritarian monitoring mechanism as well as a means to deliver religious goods that are demanded by citizens.

For example, some mosque attendees in Kazakhstan complained to me during interviews in 2013 about their perception that local imams had low levels of religious knowledge. This was one impetus to find sources of religious guidance outside of SAMK or regime affiliated sources. Starting in 2011, Kazakhstan began deterring imams and religious students from seeking out religious education abroad (students and imams often attended madrasahs in Turkey and Saudi Arabia). However, this has created a vacuum of places where those wishing to pursue religious education can seek out sources. Senior level SAMK officials were aware of the need for more

[97] See Chapter Two.

sources of education, and a madrasah in Astana has been further funded by the government. However, this is a partial measure as only so many spots are available at the madrasah in Astana. Moreover, there is a lack of madrasahs in general in other cities and regions of the country. Similarly, SAM RT officials in Tatarstan have also discouraged foreign education, however, there is a more robust effort in Tatarstan to provide religious education within the region. The Russian Islamic University was set up in Kazan, Tatarstan in 1998 and seeks to be the preeminent source of Islamic education in Russia.

On the more nefarious side, several imams in both cases reported to me that they identified Muslims who came to the mosque as differing theologically from SAMK and SAM RT, and that these attendees either self-identified as Salafi or the imams presumed that these attendees were Salafi. Some of these imams also stated that they would attempt to engage with these people and to convince them to change their religious views. These imams stated that if these attendees didn't comply, they would refer them to more senior members in SAMK or SAM RT, or even report them to security services. Chapters Two and Three discuss the role of Salafism in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan in more detail.

Avoid Mobilization

Authoritarian regimes also co-opt religious groups into separate institutions rather than into political parties or parliaments in order to avoid directly politically mobilizing an identity of the majority of the population and to deter religious leaders from directly competing for political power. Ninety-three percent of ordinary citizens I interviewed in Kazakhstan identified as Muslim and 97 percent of ethnic Kazakhs

identified as Muslims.[98] In Tatarstan, 66 percent of ordinary citizens I interviewed identified as Muslim and 91 percent of ethnic Tatars identified as Muslim. Moreover, authoritarian regimes are highly unlikely to attempt to repress the majority religious group, particularly when it is highly associated with the majority ethnic group. If the national religious identity were to be activated into an oppositional identity, there would be a large and significant base.

Religion is unique in its ability to determine citizens' worldviews and has historically served as an incubator for activism and revolution. Religion can provide a unique environment and space for activists to form networks, such as within the space of a mosque or church.[99] For example, the role of the Black church in the civil rights movement in the United States is well documented.[100] Similarly, in Hong Kong many activists pushing for democracy identify as Evangelical or Catholic Christians.[101]

Many people find more salience in their religious identity as opposed to other identities, such as ethnic or national identity. Curtis and Olson in an original cross-national study established that many people attribute more importance to their religious identity[102] and in the context of the United States, Leal finds that survey respondents rank their religious identity above others.[103] This high saliency makes it a

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[98] An additional one percent of ethnic Kazakhs stated that their religious identity included Muslim, e.g., Muslim and Orthodox.
[99] For a discussion of space within social movements see Zhao, "Ecologies of Social Movements: Student Mobilization during the 1989 Prodemocracy Movement in Beijing."
[100] See for example Calhoun-Brown, "Upon This Rock: The Black Church, Nonviolence, and the Civil Rights Movement."
[101] See for example Chan, "The Protestant Community and the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong," and "Ecologies of Social Movements," for an analysis on the role of space in social movements.
[102] Curtis and Olson, "Explaining Variation in Strength of Identification with Religion."
[103] Leal, "Multiple Religious Identities and the Implications for American Politics," Working Paper.

potentially potent mix in the context of a social movement, providing norms within tight knit communities and social reinforcements and encouragement to endure the coercive apparatuses of authoritarian regimes. Religion can also alter the cost benefit analysis of joining such a social movement, given believers can believe that the benefits afforded to them will be in an afterlife. In light of these attributes of religion, most authoritarian regimes make the calculation that it is preferable for a religious identity to remain latent (or at least within the official political realm).

A third of Muslim majority countries have had an Islamic political party at some point in time between 1968 and 2008.[104] Kurzman and Naqvi find that Islamic parties are more common in more democratic states.[105] Complementing my finding that religious institutions for Islam are more common in more authoritarian regimes, Kurzman and Naqvi find that Islamic parties are more likely to be present in more democratic countries.[106] Islamic parties participated in 48 percent of elections in democratic regimes compared to 28 percent of elections in non-democratic regimes.[107] Thus, more authoritarian regimes are more likely to have religious institutions for Islam and less likely to have political parties for Islam.

Of the 48 Muslim majority countries, 20 states are officially secular. Of these 20 countries, only five[108] have had a political Islamic party at some point during this

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[104] Kurzman and Naqvi, "Islamic Political Parties and Parliamentary Elections," 5.
[105] They find that there is a positive correlation between democracy and freedom and Islamic party participations in parliamentary elections when conflict is included in their models, but not when terrorism is included. Kurzman and Naqvi, "Islamic Political Parties and Parliamentary Elections," 7-8.
[106] Kurzman and Naqvi found that democracy was positively correlated with the presence of an Islamic political party when conflict was included in their model, but not when terrorism was included. Ibid., 7.
[107] Democratic is defined here as a Polity score between 6 and 10. Ibid., 5-6.
[108] Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Senegal, Tajikistan, and Turkey.

time period.[109] Rather, in Muslim majority countries that are officially secular, many outright ban Islamic political parties, as in Kazakhstan. In Kazakhstan, religious political parties are banned. In Russia parties based on religion as well as ethnicity were banned in 2001.[110]

Where Islamic parties have formed, regimes have increasingly sought to remove the party from power. For example, The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT), an Islamic political party in Tajikistan, was previously the only registered Islamic political party in the former Soviet Union. Its ability to potentially mobilize citizens is evidenced by the fact that it was the second largest political party in the country and held seats in parliament for 15 years until 2015 (the party's lower percentage of the vote share in 2015 was attributed by leaders of the party to voter fraud). The leaders of IRPT were also clearly seen as a threat to the regime. In a trial not open to the public, the leaders of the party were given life sentences. The party was subsequently labeled a terrorist organization by the Tajik government. The labeling of the IRPT as a terrorist organization is not in line with human rights organizations or regional experts and is widely viewed as a politically motivated action.

On the other hand, co-optation through a religious institution does not directly provide a platform for religious leaders to enter to political arena. Moreover, leaders of authoritarian regimes seek to avoid the perception of partisanship in relationship to religion. Co-opting a religious group through an institution is not likely to engender protest or the perception of a regime meddling in religious affairs. The establishment

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[109] I identified whether a country was officially secular by examining the U.S. Religious Freedom Report for each Muslim majority country. "International Religious Freedom Report for 2016."

[110] Akhmetkarimov and Parrott, "The Surprising Future of the Religious Party in Russia." 59. An appeal was made in 2004 to the Russian Constitutional Court to overturn the law banning religious and ethnic parties, however, this appeal was rejected.

of a religious institution is usually associated with little fanfare. In cases where a religious institution was created by a colonial power, the resurrection of the institution in independence, even when used for different means, is also rarely noteworthy. In all of Central Asia where various Spiritual Associations were set up, the conversation about such institutions was limited among the religious elite.

Concurrently, it is also often not in the interests of religious leaders to be perceived as partisan. In examining why the Catholic Church and some Protestant denominations in democracies have been able to wield a striking amount of political power and influence over policy outcomes, while others have not, Grzymala Busse identifies how churches more effectively affect policy outcomes when they eschew public lobbying of the government.[111] Such public displays of involvement of politics alienates voters and the church can subsequently lose moral prestige. Rather, it is more effective for churches to be involved in behind closed-door meetings, where bargains are agreed upon between religious and political leaders. For example, in Ireland after independence in 1922, new leaders of the state set up committees on matters of future legislation. Representatives of the Catholic Church, preapproved by Church hierarchy, were invited to these committees, and legislation was passed based on the agreements arrived at during committees with religious leaders.[112] While the balance of power between religious groups and hegemonic regimes is different than churches in democracies, a similar calculus applies to all religious leaders—that by overtly and publicly seeking to alter policies or entering the political arena as a candidate, the price paid is an associated loss in perceived moral prestige.

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[111] Ireland, Italy, Poland, Croatia, United States, and Canada.
[112] Grzymala-Busse, *Nations under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy*, 73.

In both interviews that I conducted as well as in public statements, religious leaders in both SAMK and SAM RT broadly supported the president. Notably, I did not directly elicit any opinions about either regime or its political leaders. One imam of a mosque that primarily serves an ethnic minority community also repeatedly emphasized to me that he had met President Nazarbayev and had a photo of himself with the president. However, no imams or SAM officials commented on any particular policy issue and spoke in generalities, and thus avoided potentially partisan issues and risks of losing moral prestige.

Legitimacy

While majority religious groups must be taken into account by all regime types, the need to obtain perceived legitimacy is often particularly acute in authoritarian regimes. Even in authoritarian regimes political leaders must be at least partially accountable to their citizens.[113] Without democratic elections, authoritarian regimes need to obtain legitimacy through other mechanisms. Thus, authoritarian regimes, which often lack official mechanisms to ensure the accountability of the regime, frequently seek religious endorsements and associations as one avenue to increase their legitimacy. In Russia and China Koesel argues that a lack of perceived legitimacy is particularly pressing as both regimes have undergone dramatic political transitions, which has given rise to an "ideological vacuum".[114] Repressing a majority religious group would likely endanger the survival of a regime. In Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, both regimes' legitimacy is staked in large part on the framing of each

[113] Tsai, *Accountability without Democracy Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China*; Koesel, *Religion and Authoritarianism Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences*, 18.
[114] Koesel, *Religion and Authoritarianism Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences*, 118.

regime as a protector of national religious identity. On the other hand, co-optation provides an avenue to garner legitimacy

In order to obtain legitimacy from a religious group, an authoritarian regime may grant a religious monopoly.[115] This monopoly is often granted through a religious institution. In Morocco, as part of a process of further tightening control of Islam, the High Council of Ulema was granted the exclusive right to issue fatwas in 2005.[116] Mosques perceived to have deviated from this interpretation were subsequently closed in the following years. In return, the monarch is attempting to benefit from the legitimacy conferred by religious authorities. The regime has begun calling the interpretation of Islam conferred by the High Council as "Moroccan official Islam" and one of the titles of the monarch is "Commander of the Faithful".[117]

Allowing for a monopoly differentiates religion from other potential sources of co-opted opposition. The religious institution often claims sole authority for this constituency. For example, the Spiritual Association of Muslims in Kazakhstan (SAMK) portrays itself as *the* representative for all of Islam in Kazakhstan. On the other hand, co-opted business elites in parliaments are often not portrayed as the sole representatives of all businesses. Moreover, it's crucial to note that by creating such an institution, the regime is attempting to not only co-opt religious elites, through the avenues of direct spoils, provision of better resources (e.g., funds for constructing mosques), or limited policy concessions (such as a role in deciding the content of Friday messages). Rather, the regime is also attempting to co-opt, "ordinary," citizens who identify as Muslim and thus the majority religious group. Thus, creating an

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[115] Stark and Bainbridge, *The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival, and Cult Formation*.
[116] El-Katiri, "The Institutionalisation of Religious Affairs: Religious Reform in Morocco," 60.
[117] Ibid, 53.

institution that is portrayed as the sole authority for the religious group, if accepted by ordinary citizens, would be a highly effective method of co-optation.

Authoritarian regimes engage in concerted efforts to co-opt religious leaders. For example, Mussolini made a concentrated effort to co-opt the Pope of the Catholic Church, Pope Pius XI. In the bargaining pact arranged, Mussolini arranged for funds to restore churches and allowed religious symbols in public buildings such as court houses and schools. The Pope also won other concessions including the banning of various Protestant religious literature. In return, the Church was supportive of the fascist policies enacted by Mussolini. Mussolini benefited greatly from the moral and cultural prestige of the Catholic Church, often invoking the support of the Church when encountering pushback for policies the public considered controversial. As detailed by Kerzer, the Pope slowly began to have doubts after Mussolini entered into an alliance with Hitler, and while his doubts increased later in his life, the Catholic Church did not speak out against the atrocities, even as concentration camps were set up in Italy.[118] Nor did the Catholic Church speak out about the Addis Ababa Massacre waged by Italy in Ethiopia, where 30,000 Ethiopians were killed. While the Pope and the Catholic Church benefited from this arrangement, the Catholic Church and its leadership became sources of legitimacy for gross abuse of human rights. The Catholic Church, given its hierarchy, presented easily identifiable targets of co-optation.

However, where there are a limited number of clearly identifiable leaders or where a religious group is less hierarchical in nature (as in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan), efforts to co-opt religious groups often focus on places of worship, an often much

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[118] Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*.

more laborious process. Following on the previous example in Morocco, the king made calculated efforts to prevent any one religious leader from obtaining too much prestige or capital and promoted leaders in different parts of the country.[119] Efforts to co-opt mosques include efforts to co-opt imams and control religious literature and the content of Friday messages. Given the intensive nature of this process, setting up a religious institution with dedicated departments has high utility. In Tatarstan for example, all Friday messages are determined a year in advance by a department within SAM RT and are available in book form to imams and mosque attendees. The Friday messages in Kazakhstan are also pre-determined by SAMK and printed in a book. In Kazakhstan, these messages were faxed to all imams starting in 2012. As of 2015, this system has been modernized and the Friday messages are now sent in advance to all imams in the country via email. By co-opting imams and controlling available religious information, a regime is able to limit available religious information. In Astana, Kazakhstan an intensive effort has been made to promote SAMK affiliated websites, which are prominently displayed on the walls of most mosques in the city.

In addition to controlling the flow of religious information, authoritarian regimes often seek to appropriate religious symbols in order to shore up their base and improve the perceived legitimacy of the regime.[120] Political leaders frequently seek blessings from religious leaders. After Putin was inaugurated in 2000, the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church blessed him at the Kremlin cathedral. Such imagery is pursued

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[119] El-Katiri, "The Institutionalisation of Religious Affairs: Religious Reform in Morocco," 55.

[120] Toft, Philpott, and Shah, *God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics*; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe;* Johnston and Figa, "The Church and Political Opposition: Comparative Perspectives on Mobilization against Authoritarian Regimes."

by various political leaders. In June of 2017 a widely disseminated photo showed Evangelical leaders in the United States surrounding Trump and placing their hands on him as they prayed.[121] The prominence of religious symbols in capital cities is also a common strategy to garner legitimacy from religious symbolism. In Kazan, Tatarstan the construction of the Kul Sharif mosque in the kremlin[122] was noted for its representation of religious revival and national consciousness. The largest mosque in Kazakhstan was opened in July 6, 2012, the birthday of President Nazarbayev.[123] It is widely claimed within Kazakhstan to be the largest mosque in Central Asia. The mosque's location is prominent within the capital. Bissenova describes it as part of a process of rapprochement between the state and Islam in contrast to the Soviet Union (particularly the religious establishment).[124] The mosque also associates President Nazarbayev as the protector of Islam and allowing it to flourish in independence.

Repurposed Institutions

Having established *why* authoritarian regimes create religious institutions to co-opt Islam, it is also important to take into account that why institutions were *initially* created may not be the same reasons that entail their continued use as well as *how* authoritarian regimes co-opt religious groups. Regimes face decisions about which institutions to repurpose or discontinue after regime transitions. Similar to almost 90 percent of countries that today have Muslim majorities, Kazakhstan and Tatarstan were previously part of a colonial empire. Many institutions created for Islam were in their first iteration created by a colonial power, and subsequently

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[121] See for example Pulliam Bailey, "Photo Surfaces of Evangelical Pastors Laying Hands on Trump in the Oval Office."
[122] Kremlin refers to a city citadel (and are found in cities outside of Moscow).
[123] Bissenova, "Building a Muslim Nation: The Role of the Central Mosque of Astana," 211.
[124] Bissenova, "Building a Muslim Nation: The Role of the Central Mosque of Astana," 211, 212-217.

repurposed after independence. In what is now Malaysia, the first religious council for Islam, Majlis Agama Islam, was established by the British, which provided the current framework for religious bureaucracy in every Malay state and bolstered the power of sultans, regional leaders.[125] Today, sultans in each state of Malaysia are known as "Heads of Islam".[126]

Other types of institutions in post-colonial authoritarian states have also been employed for new purposes. Gandhi and Lust-Okar note that many newly independent authoritarian regimes "inherited" elections and parliaments during colonization. As with elections, the continued use of a religious institution initially created by a colonial power should be examined to understand its current usage. In this context it is critical to take into account the framework provided by Thelen and colleagues on how institutions are repurposed or "converted" for the current political goals of the regimes.[127] The concept of institutional "conversion "was first proposed by Thelen. Drawing upon an analysis of Germany's system for vocational labor, Thelen assesses how a law passed in 1897 by an authoritarian government aiming to hinder the social democratic labor movement, resulted in the creation a system that is now a resource for organized labor.[128] Conversion occurs when an institution is used to pursue outcomes that are often drastically different than the initially intended outcomes pursued by actors whom created the original institution.[129]

Conversion often occurs when a new set of actors is introduced to the political stage. Conversion also frequently occurs over time and can positively or negatively

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[125] Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*, 35.
[126] "Malaysia 2015 International Religious Freedom Report."
[127] Thelen, "How Institutions Evolve"; Streeck and Thelen, "Introduction : Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies"; Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen, "Drift and Conversion: Hidden Faces of Institutional Change."
[128] Thelen, "How Institutions Evolve."
[129] Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen, "Drift and Conversion," 23.

affect democratic outcomes. Asserting that institutions change over time and are rarely static is a vital contribution to the literature and this framework allows us to understand how structural context and actors interact to produce changes in institutions.[130] Conversion has been conceptualized within the framework of industrialized advanced democracies.

Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen state that in highly democratized countries formal institutional rules are typically observed and enforced.[131] Despite this, conversion occurs when these formal rules remain constant, but nonetheless policy changes. The lack of formal change allows for a change in policy to occur that bypasses the typical democratic process, namely it largely avoids the electoral process. Conversion can allow for politicians to cater to organized interests or pursue policies that may be at odds with their constituents, while limiting the electoral risk of doing so.[132] Voters are at an inherent information disadvantage when policy changes occur via conversion, as changes that occur outside of the legislature are not as easily identified and would incur a much higher cost in time and resources to be able to track. Conversion often occurs within bureaucracies and the courts, venues of more opaque political processes.

Authoritarian regimes do not have to abide by formal institutional rules. Putin can abolish gubernatorial elections and Nazarbayev can alter the constitutional term limits to retain power. Both leaders suffered relatively little collateral in these changes and are both presently leaders without viable political opposition. However, while many citizens in authoritarian regimes remain disengaged from the political realm, religion is often a central part of their identity. I argue that the repurposing of

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[130] Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen, “Drift and Conversion," 24.
[131] Ibid, 183.
[132] Ibid, 199.

institutions is a convenient tool to alter policy without invoking scrutiny. In the religious realm, it is a highly valuable tool appropriated by authoritarian regimes to co-opt religion. Given religion's potential to foster mobilization, and ability to either bolster or detract from regime legitimacy, authoritarian regimes are more likely to utilize preexisting institutions to achieve new political ends in order to avoid the harsh glare of public scrutiny.

Institutional change often occurs during critical junctures, where a time of uncertainty allows for actors to express agency and alter the path of an institution, which will perpetuate over a period of time.[133] The Soviet Union largely sought to remove religion from the social fabric of society and the institutional predecessors for SAMK and SAM RT were instrumental in the process to co-opt Islam. As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, the Kazakhstani and Tatar regimes are not seeking to remove religion from within their respective borders, rather through the Spiritual Association of Muslims they are seeking to construct a national religious identity that is complimentary to each regime. Both successor institutions are used for co-optation, but for drastically different political aims. While critical junctures must be taken into account, Thelen also highlights how our developing understanding of institutional conversion and drift includes the fact that institutional change also occurs in the absence of abrupt exogenous changes in the political landscape.

In Tatarstan, the Spiritual Association of Muslims was granted a monopoly in 1998. During the 1990s, Tatarstan was projecting its power, and ability to harness ethnic and religious mobilization, towards the center. Moreover, some of the competing religious organizations had links to Moscow and Bashkortostan (a neighboring republic). Thus, creating a single religious monopoly contributed towards

[133] Capoccia, "Critical Junctures and Institutional Change," 147–48.

the consolidation of religious authority and identity being associated with the *Tatar* regime.

Alternatively, only one Muslim institution has existed in Kazakhstan since independence. However, this religious institution did not hold a monopoly on religious expression until 2012. Kazakhstan did not have competing higher political or religious authorities, or pressures from below, and thus there was not as much incentive or urgency to grant a religious monopoly in the years following independence. Kazakhstan also did not need to harness an active independence movement into institutions complementary to the regime. Kazakhstani elites did not seek to repress Islam initially, but as part of the previous Soviet nomenklatura, maintained distance from religion. However, regime elites in Kazakhstan are increasingly recognizing the saliency of religious identity.

One high level advisor to the Kazakhstani lower house of Parliament, the Mazhilis, reacted strongly when I asked him why he thought younger people in Kazakhstan were increasingly going to mosques, as evidenced by my own observations. He became increasingly animated and stated that this was impossible, and that young people were preoccupied with going to bars and movies.[134] I hadn't anticipated that this would be a provocative question, but the topic matter was clearly sensitive. However, this statement conflicts both with my own data, and statements acknowledging this fact by SAMK and other government officials. Thus, somewhat belatedly, the Kazakhstani regime is grappling with an increasing identification with the identity of Muslim, particularly among the youth, and how to construct a national religious identity that is complimentary to the regime. Demographic data about the age of people going to mosques and shifts in religious practice were likely relayed to

[134] Interview with High Level Government Official Y, Astana, Kazakhstan, 2013.

the regime through SAMK (an important role it plays for the regime in gathering information). How SAMK and SAM RT have been repurposed since independence towards this goal is more closely examined in Chapters Two and Three. This repurposing has included converting SAMK and SAM RT into de facto quasi-governmental agencies.

Quasi-Governmental Agencies

Utilizing a quasi-government agency allows for the perception of legitimacy and for a narrative of upholding the separation of the state from religion. Moreover, because these institutions are not officially part of the government—it reduces the accountability of the government—an advantageous trait in an authoritarian regime.

When the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Central Asia and the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of the European Part of the USSR and Siberia were established, they functioned as government agencies during the Soviet Union. However, as the shift to co-opt Islam changed in focus from eliminating religion to crafting a national religious identity complimentary to the regime, SAMK in Kazakhstan and SAM RT in Tatarstan were officially converted to non-governmental agencies. This official status, however, eclipses the role both institutions hold in crafting religious policy in conjunction with each respective regime.

In the endeavor to co-opt religious elites, but also perhaps more critically, ordinary citizens of the majority religious group, SAMK and SAM RT have been repurposed not as a government agency or an independent agency, but rather as a de facto quasi-governmental agency. Van Thiel defines quasi-governmental agencies as:

> Organizations which as their main task, are charged with the implementation of one or more public policies, and which are funded publicly but operate at arm's length from the central government, without an immediate hierarchical relationship existing with a minister or a parent department.[135]

[135] Van Thiel, *Quangos: Trends, Causes and Consequences*, 5.

Quasi-governmental agencies or quasi-autonomous government agencies (quangos) are agencies along the continuum between government agencies and the private sector. Flinder and Smith refer to these agencies as quasi-public and quasi-private as well as quasi-independent, quasi-accountable, and quasi-legitimate.[136] Wolch, in discussing the role of the voluntary sector in the United States and Britain, argues that voluntary agencies constitute a, "shadow government," which provide public services typically understood to be the responsibility of the state, are closely monitored by the state, and operate outside the realm of democratic politics.[137]

Quasi-governmental agencies are increasingly commonly found in democracies such as the United Kingdom. In 2012, the UK government identified 901 quangos.[138] The distance provided by quangos to ministers between themselves and policy implementation and decision making can be advantageous to reduce accountability. This lack of accountability can work to the advantage of authoritarian regimes—allowing for the perception of legitimacy and a degree of separation between the state and policies enacted. In the case of religion, the quasi-governmental status of a religious institution simultaneously works in the interests of the regime and a select group of religious leaders. The regime obtains the ability to co-opt the majority religious group while avoiding mobilizing the group and maintaining the claim that the policies are not officially directly implemented. On the other hand, the religious leaders selected to head up SAMK and SAM RT, while co-opted and restrained by the

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[136] Flinders and Smith, *Quangos: Accountability and Reform: The Politics of Quasi-Government*.
[137] Wolch, *The Shadow State: Government and Voluntary Sector in Transition*.
[138] Flinders and Skelcher, "Shrinking the Quango State: Five Challenges in Reforming Quangos," 328.

regime, also obtain official leadership of their respective religious group and avoid the perception of partisanship.

Conclusion

Authoritarian regimes commonly use institutions to co-opt various potential sources of opposition. The most frequently used institutions are political parties and parliaments. However, authoritarian regimes increasingly decline to utilize political parties or parliaments when trying to co-opt religion. Of the 48 Muslim majority countries, 20 are officially secular, many of which outright ban religious parties. On the other hand, about 88 percent of Muslim majority states have a religious institution for Islam. In sub-national regions of states with Muslim majorities, religious institutions for Islam are also commonly found.

In investigating why authoritarian regimes co-opt religious groups through religious institutions rather than through other types of institutions, this chapter puts forth that religious institutions allow authoritarian regimes to limit bargaining partners and gather information, avoid oppositional mobilization based on a religious identity, and bolster their legitimacy. Establishing one authoritative religious institution allows the regime to limit its bargaining partners among the religious elite. A pact between the regime and religious leaders (for example entailing a quid pro quo to fund the construction of mosques in return for religious support for regime policies), allows the regime to avoid having to reconstitute a new set of bargaining partners for each round of negotiation. Constructing a hierarchical religious institution also facilitates the diffusion of information from citizens and local imams to religious leaders and the regime.

Crucially, authoritarian regimes seek to limit and ideally eliminate mobilization against the regime. Religion, is of particular concern, given its centrality

in many citizens' identities, and its ability to alter the risk analysis made by practitioners by deferring potential gains to an afterlife and/or transforming these gains into nonmaterial ones. Leaders of authoritarian regimes also seek to deny religious leaders political platforms. By co-opting both religious leaders and citizens through religious institutions, regimes seek to avoid providing a launching pad for political careers or allowing the majority religious identity to become an oppositional identity. Lastly, authoritarian regimes, like other types of regimes, are not completely immune from the demands of its citizens. Thus, authoritarian regimes seek legitimacy through means outside the electoral democratic process, including frequently seeking religious endorsements and associations. In Muslim majority states and sub-national regions, a religious monopoly is often granted to the religious institution. In this pact, regimes gain moral prestige, while religious leaders are granted a monopoly of official outlets where the majority of citizens can practice their religion.

While this addresses why authoritarian regimes initially establish institutions, we must also take into account that different reasons may entail the continued use of the institution by a regime, particularly after different actors are introduced to the political scene. Moreover, how regimes actually use institutions to co-opt Islam must be examined. Ninety percent of Muslim majority states were previously colonized. Indeed, colonizing powers often set up the initial religious institutions for Islam. Repurposing religious institutions for Islam for the new political aims of the regime allows for changes in policies to slip outside the radar of more visible politics, thus avoiding mobilization or invoking a backlash for making religious matters partisan. Repurposing religious institutions as quasi-governmental agencies can be particularly effective tool for authoritarian regimes, as it even further removes accountability

between the regime and the policy decision making process and implementation as it relates to religion.

Institutions often undergo change during critical junctures, such as regime changes. The Soviet Union created the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Central Asia (SADUM) and the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of European Russia and Siberia. Since independence both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, along with all the independent states of Central Asia and Muslim republic within Russia have repurposed these institutions into Spiritual Association of Muslims, de facto quasi-governmental agencies. Tatarstan in the 1990s experience such a critical juncture, as it negotiated its relationship with Moscow and flirted with independence. However, as noted by Thelen, Hacker, and Pierson, institutional change does not occur only at critical junctures. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, did not have pressures from above to consolidate its relationship with Islam, and demonstrates a slower learning curve by the regime to co-opt Islam through a religious institution.

This chapter introduced the cases of Kazakhstan and Tatarstan and established why authoritarian regimes co-opt religious groups as well as why they employ separate institutions for this purpose. Chapters Two through Five will examine the similarities in how this process of co-optation occurs at the national and subnational level, as well as where the logics of authoritarian national and subnational co-optation efforts diverge. Chapters Six and Seven will evaluate the effectiveness of the co-optation efforts at the national level in Kazakhstan and subnational in Tatarstan.

Chapter Two Regime Co-optation of Islam: Kazakhstan

Introduction

This chapter analyzes how Kazakhstan co-opts Islam through a national level religious institution, the Spiritual Association of Muslims (SAMK). It assesses the relationship between this religious institution and the government and how SAMK benefits from its status as a quasi-governmental agency. This co-optation process includes both efforts to co-opt mosques as well as Islamic knowledge production more broadly. The next chapter examines and compares the process of co-opting Islam in Tatarstan. Chapter Four examines the broader efforts by the Kazakhstani regime to co-opt Islam by constructing and delineating the boundaries of the national religious identity

The process of co-opting religious outlets and knowledge production for Islam in Kazakhstan is traced in this chapter via: laws on religion; the role of government agencies; the Spiritual Association of Muslims; the co-optation and construction of mosques; a government sponsored anti-sect center; and how a religious monopoly over religious appointments, the Friday message in mosques, literature and websites, and education has been established and maintained. The data in this chapter is from 29 interviews I conducted that took place in 2013 and 2015. Interviews from 2013 include: a highly ranked government official involved with passing the legislation on religion in Kazakhstan; the head of a government sponsored NGO anti-sect center; the SAMK Head of Staff; the Spokesperson of SAMK; five imams in Astana (at five of the six mosques present in 2013); and two mosque employees in Astana. In 2015, I interviewed the: Director of the national Religious Affairs Council; Director of the Religious Affairs Council in Astana; Director of the Religious Affairs Council in

Almaty; SAMK Head of Staff; and three imams in Astana. Additionally, I interviewed nine imams in Almaty in 2015. I also interviewed the head of Tony Blair Associates in Kazakhstan in 2013 and 2015, which consulted and advised the Kazakhstani government on the potential international ramifications of passing the law, as well as the U.S. Foreign Service Officer at the U.S. State Department responsible for human rights and religion in 2015.

While the Kazakhstani regime has selectively repressed imams and several religious leaders as well as mosques for ethnic minorities, it overwhelming has chosen to engage in a large-scale co-optation process as of 2011. As identified in the previous chapter, 2011 was a point of divergence in the Kazakhstani regime's relationship with Islam. Despite only having one religious institution for Islam since independence, a monopoly was not (unofficially) awarded until 2012. This shift occurred as the regime (belatedly) recognized the poignancy of Islam in people's daily lives and sought to adjust its efforts to co-opt the national identity by incorporating religion. This policy shift was initiated with a new law passed in 2011, which regulates all religious practice in Kazakhstan.

Institutions

Law: The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan about Religious Activities and Religious Associations

The first article of the constitution of Kazakhstan, written in 1995, declares that Kazakhstan is a secular state and later elaborates that no person should be subjected to discrimination due to their religious identity.[139] Various laws on religion were proposed and even passed by Parliament starting in the early 2000s. However,

[139] The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan: About Religious Activities and Religious Associations, Article 1 and Article 14.

the first law to come to fruition is the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan about Religious Activities and Religious Associations.

The law requires all places of worship to register with the Religious Affairs Committee. Failure to register makes any religious activity unlawful. Additionally, the law also stipulates that: all religious literature must obtain prior approval before distribution; [140] the distribution of religious literature or literature with religious content outside of officially designated facilities is prohibited;[141] importing religious literature is prohibited except if it is used for only personal purposes;[142] and all places of worship must have a minimum number of congregants for a place of worship to be established, which vary with the level of registration at the local, regional or national level.[143] Additionally, it requires that representatives of oblasts, cities, and of Astana[144] coordinate with an unspecified, "authorized body," to make decisions regarding constructing buildings for places of worship or converting existing buildings into places of worship.[145] Furthermore, it prohibits religious associations from participating in political parties or supporting a political party financially.[146] The text of the law is often vaguely written with many terms not defined or broadly defined, and thus in practice, often open to interpretation in its implementation.

The law went into effect in 2012 and all places of worship were required to register with the government by October 25, 2012. The law designates the Hanafi School of Islam and Orthodox Christianity as the traditional religions of Kazakhstan

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[140] About Religious Activities and Religious Associations, Article 9, Clause 3.
[141] Ibid., Article 9, Clause 2.
[142] Ibid., Article 9, Clause 3.
[143] Ibid., Article 12.
[144] The law specifically cites Astana in addition to cities in general.
[145] About Religious Activities and Religious Associations, Article 5, Clause 5.
[146]About Religious Activities and Religious Associations, Article 3, Clause 9, Sub-Clause 2; Article 3, Clause 10.

and notes their cultural and spiritual contributions to Kazakhstan.[147] It also states that the law, "Respects other religions that blend with the spiritual heritage of the people of Kazakhstan, recognizes the importance of inter-confessional harmony, religious tolerance and respect for the religious convictions of citizens."[148] However, groups outside of the aforementioned as well as some groups and mosques that identify with the Hanafi School of Islam have failed to be successfully registered. While not included in the law, only mosques that have successfully affiliated with the Spiritual Association of Muslims in Kazakhstan have been able to register with the RAC and are therefore legally able to practice.

The RAC has been charged with enforcing the religion law, although the Ministry of Justice is denoted in the law as the state agency responsible for actually registering groups at the national and regional level, while at the local level, the law states that, "local judiciary authorities," are responsible, which weren't defined or identified in the text of the law. Officials in the RAC stated that this referred to local RACs (the RAC exists at the national, regional, and local level).[149]

The extensive restrictions on religious literature explicitly laid out in the law is notable. All religious literature must be officially approved by a government agency (the RAC) and can only be sold at pre-approved stores. Rather than relying on an ad-hoc and/or unofficial process, the Kazakhstani regime has codified the role of the government in determining whether any and all religious literature is legal in Kazakhstan. Numerous court cases have been prosecuted for the possession or selling

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[147] Ibid., Introduction.
[148] Ibid.
[149] Interview with RAA Official, August 2015; Foreign Service Officer A, U.S. State Department, 2013; Foreign Service Officer B, U.S. State Department, 2015.

of non-approved religious books or other literature.[150] These cases are often justified as a measure to deter extremism, covered in Chapter Four. The RAC has asserted that it convenes expert panels to determine which books and other religious sources are permitted as well as those deemed to have extremist content. In an interview with a senior advisor at Tony Blair Associates, my contact described his efforts to encourage the government to at least publish the names of the, "experts," on these panels and to include representatives of different religious communities on these panels.[151] Moreover, he made the case to high level government officials that Kazakhstan's international reputation could be harmed by the passage of the law.[152] However, the Kazakhstani government ultimately decided that the international repercussions would be minimal, which has been borne out. Kazakhstan does not need to harmonize its laws with a higher governmental authority, and thus its decision to institutionalize this policy is expected.

On the other hand, requiring places of worship to register with the government is not unique to authoritarian regimes.[153] In Kazakhstan as of 2012, all mosques must also be registered and a part of SAMK. However, notably, despite not having to harmonize laws with a higher power, the Kazakhstani regime decided to rely on informal mechanisms to co-opt mosques. While regulating religious literature is ostensibly applied to all religious groups, only Islam is subjected to co-optation by a religious institution. As outlined in Chapter One, directly co-opting Islam, and particularly mosques, could risk oppositional mobilization and endanger the

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[150] For example, Corley, "Kazakhstan: Fines for Offering Religious Literature."
[151] Interview with Tony Blair Associates Advisor, Astana, August 2013; Tony Blair Associates Advisor, Oxford, England, June 2015.
[152] Interview with Tony Blair Associates Advisor, Oxford, England, June 2015.
[153] Although, creating a regulatory landscape that deters minority religious groups (or groups deemed theologically unacceptable) from being able to successfully register is within an authoritarian framework.

legitimacy of the regime. The collaboration between an official government agency and a quasi-government agency has been at the cornerstone of efforts to co-opt Islam through institutions in Kazakhstan.

Government Institution: Ministry of Religious and Civil Society Affairs

Policies on religion in Kazakhstan since 2011 are developed and implemented by a government agency, currently named the Ministry of Religious and Civil Society Affairs (MRCSA). The MRCSA was created in September of 2016.[154] Prior to this, the Religious Affairs Agency (RAA) was established in 2011 after the reorganization of the Ministry of Culture and Sports of the Republic of Kazakhstan.[155] By creating a separate government agency for religion, the importance of policies on religion was elevated.[156] The creation of the RAA in 2011 coincided with the law on religion, which passed in the same year. In 2014, after registering all places of worship and, in particular, after co-opting of all open mosques into SAMK, the Religious Affairs Agency was then downgraded to the Religious Affairs Council and situated within the Ministry of Culture and Sport.[157] This decision was reversed in 2016 to grant the institution more power once again. For clarity, as I completed my last round of fieldwork in 2015, I often refer this government institution as the Religious Affairs Committee (RAC), the most recent title at the time. The MRCSA is a government institution responsible for regulating all religions in Kazakhstan. However, policies on Islam are tightly coordinated between the MRCSA and SAMK.

The MRCSA's predecessor can be found in the Soviet institution, the Council for Religious Affairs. In 1943 and 1944, respectively, two institutions were created—

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[154] "Kazakhstan 2016 International Religious Freedom Report."
[155] "Report on the Situation with Religious Freedom in the Republic of Kazakhstan."
[156] Interview with U.S. Foreign Service Officer A, 2013.
[157] "About the Religious Affairs Council."

the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (CAROC) and the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC).[158] Their official purpose was to provide an avenue for communication between religious authorities and the government, though they were often utilized by security services to gather information and place infiltrators within religious organizations, particularly under Khrushchev.[159] These two councils were subsumed into Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) in 1965.[160] Versions of the Religious Affairs Council in Kazakhstan can be found in many post-Soviet states. These councils, much like their Soviet predecessors, implement policies on religion. However, these institutions have been repurposed to serve the interests of the current regimes.

The MRCSA in Kazakhstan, is encharged with enforcing the religion law, although the Ministry of Justice is denoted in the law as the state agency responsible for actually registering groups at the national and regional level, while at the local level, the law states that "local judiciary authorities" are responsible. Officials in the RAC stated that, "at the local level," referred to local RACs. The RAC has a national level office as well as regional and local offices.[161] While there seemed to be confusion amongst government officials about the proper roles of these agencies in 2012 and 2013 (within the first year of implementation), there was a general consensus that the RAC was responsible for registering all religious groups, and approving religious literature for all religious groups in Kazakhstan.[162] By 2015, the

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[158] Walters, "A Survey of Soviet Religious Policy," 5.
[159] Walters, "A Survey of Soviet Religious Policy," 5.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Interview with RAA Official, 2015; U.S Foreign Service Officer A, 2013; U.S Foreign Service Officer B, 2015.
[162] Interview with Director of RAC Astana, 2013; High Level Government Official Involved in Passage of Religion Law, 2013; SAMK Official G, 2013; SAMK Official F, 2013; Imam A, 2013; Imam H, 2013; Imam I, 2013.

role of these agencies was solidified, according to numerous sources, including government officials in the RAC, officials in SAMK, and imams.[163]

After twenty years of independence, Kazakhstan both recreated and repurposed a government institution for religion. The Council for Religious Affairs during the Soviet Union sought to control religion for the purposes of minimizing its importance in society and to avoid the establishment of an alternative source of legitimacy that could compete with the state ideology of atheism. The Religious Affairs Agency in independent Kazakhstan seeks also to control religion broadly, with a particular emphasis on Islam. It seeks to bolster regime legitimacy not by eliminating the presence of Islam, but rather by defining the bounds of how it is acceptable to practice Islam in Kazakhstan. Towards this, unofficially, the repurposed institutions of the RAC and SAMK have pursued coordinated policies towards Islam. The collaboration between an official government agency and a quasi-government agency has been at the cornerstone of efforts to co-opt Islam through institutions in Kazakhstan as well as Tatarstan. However, among citizens, as covered in Chapter 6, there is little awareness of the relationship between the RAC and the SAMK, despite such as coordinated relationship. This tight coordination outside of public light avoids the risk of the regime invoking protest or the perception of SAMK and SAMK leaders as being overly partisan.

[163] Interview with High Level Government Official Involved in Passage of Religion Law, 2013; Director of National RAC, Astana, 2015; Director of RAC Astana, 2015; Director of RAC Almaty, 2015; Deputy Director of RAC Almaty, 2015; SAMK Spokesperson, Astana, 2013; SAMK Senior Official, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.

Quasi-Governmental Agency: The Spiritual Association of Muslims in Kazakhstan (SAMK)

Unlike in Tatarstan, an institution for Islam was repurposed at the outset of independence in Kazakhstan. The Soviet institution for Islam, the Soviet Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Central Asia (SADUM), was headquartered in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. Thus, the only Muslim institution for Islam in Kazakhstan during the Soviet Union was headquartered in another republic. The push to create a nationalized version of SADUM for Kazakhstan was spearheaded by a nationalist party, Alash.[164] The initial creation of SAMK was in part to quell the demands of Alash and to attempt to co-opt this nationalist movement, and in turn, limit mobilization that could turn oppositional.

SADUM was nationalized as the Spiritual Association of Muslims in 1990 and its first mufti, Ratbek Nyssbayev, served in this position until 2000.[165] In contrast to Tatarstan, there was not an initial period of competing Muslim institutions followed by a regime led consolidation. Rather, this consolidation occurred from the outset. A split emerged about whom should be appointed the first mufti of SAMK, with Alash opposing President Nazarbayev's selection of Ratbek Nyssbayev.[166] Subsequently, leaders of Alash were arrested and the founder of the party was forced into exile, with the party eventually being disbanded in 1994.[167]

Thus, the regime initially sought to co-opt the nascent national religious movement of Alash by conceding to its policy demands. When this tactic failed, the regime resorted to repression. However, the regime maintained the religious

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[164] Polonskaya and Malashenko, *Islam in Central Asia: National Specificities and Post-Soviet Globalisation,* 136; Achilov, "Islamic Revival and Civil Society in Kazakhstan," 100.
[165] Interview with SAMK Spokesperson, Astana 2015.
[166] Achilov, "Islamic Revival and Civil Society in Kazakhstan," 101.
[167] Achilov, "Islamic Revival and Civil Society in Kazakhstan," 101.

institution even after repressing the Alash movement—indicative of its wider utility. Notably, both the Kazakhstani and Tatar regimes sought to repurpose an institution that was created by a colonial power, rather than create an alternative institution, retaining even similar names. In Kazakhstan, this repurposing allowed the regime to reduce the threat of a competing source of legitimacy from below.

Returning to Van Thiel's definition, an institution is a quasi-governmental agency if it :(1) implements government policies; (2) is not officially under the jurisdiction of the government; and (3) is publicly funded.[168] While SAMK and SAM RT were created by each respective regime, neither institution is officially a government agency. In both cases, policies on Islam are implemented through a Spiritual Association of Muslims despite each institution's formal independent status. Regarding the third criterion, it is not currently possible to access SAMK's budget to assess how its operating budget is funded. Interviewees gave conflicting answers—several contacts stated that SAMK was funded by the government,[169] while others indicated that it was funded via donations made to mosques throughout Kazakhstan.[170] This lack of transparency is unsurprising in authoritarian regimes.

Through fieldwork, I examined the de facto relationship between RAC SAMK, as well as how the RAC and SAMK interacted with SAMK— not just the official framework amongst these entities. The extent of the monopoly granted to SAMK can be observed in President Nazarbayev's statement in 2013 in a meeting with the Chief Mufti of SAMK, "The only recognized structure of traditional Islam in

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[168] Van Thiel, *Quangos: Trends, Causes and Consequences*, 5.
[169] Interview with Imam of Mosque A5, Astana, 2013; Interview with Imam of Mosque B3, Almaty, 2015
[170] SAMK Senior Official Almaty, 2015; Interview with Imam of Mosque B2, 2015; Interview with Imam of Mosque B3, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque of B4, Almaty, 2015.

our country is the Spiritual Association of Muslims of Kazakhstan."[171] Despite the directness (and accurateness in the sense that there is only one institution for Islam in Kazakhstan), high level officials have repeatedly walked this statement back.

The Director of the RAC Astana Office, Deputy Director of the RAC Astana Office, two senior SAMK officials, and a senior advisor to parliament all asserted that SAMK is not a part of the government.[172] Moreover, officials in SAMK and the RAC also asserted that SAMK actually underwent the registration process laid out in the religion law as any other religious organizations.[173] For example, the director of the RAC declared that, "We are a governmental organization. The muftiate, SAMK, is registered officially as a religious body," while following up that, "Because there are so many Muslims, this is why we work so closely."[174]

However, while regional level officials in the RAC maintained the narrative that there is separation between the government and religion, they also openly discussed actions taken by the RAC that would violate this principal. For example, after the aforementioned statement by the Director of the RAC Astana Office, the Deputy Director of the RAC Office pointedly stated that, "We have only one muftiate. This is government policy. The president may give a decision— then this is spread by the muftiate."[175] While the Director and Deputy Director of the RAC Astana Office continued to intersperse statements about the independence of SAMK, the Deputy

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[171] Felix Corley, "Kazakhstan: "If They Continue to Pray, They'll be Brought to Legal Responsibility."
[172] Interview with High Level Government Official Involved in Passage of Religion Law, 2013; Director of RAA Astana, 2015; Deputy Director of RAC Astana, 2015; SAMK Official F; SAMK Official G.
[173] Interview with High Level Government Official Involved in Passage of Religion Law, 2013; RAA Official, 2013; Director of RAC Almaty, 2015; SAMK Official G, 2013.
[174] Interview with Director of RAC, Astana 2015.
[175] Interview with Deputy Director of RAC Astana, 2015.

Director of the Astana RAC Office also described the role of the RAC Astana Office in ensuring that the Friday messages are sent out by SAMK in a timely manner, "In regards to Astana, we ensure that messages are sent every Friday and are within the same parameters as across the entire country."[176]

Imams directly acknowledged the role the RAC played in the religious sphere; however, none employed narratives about the separation of religion and the state. One imam in Astana stated the following after being asked about his relationship with the RAC and how frequency he interacted with the council:

> The RAA has different levels. For the mosques in the city, there is the city RAA. The RAA do not work directly with mosques, they give orders through SAMK. Ideologically they are related, the RAA and SAMK.[177]

Another imam in Almaty discussed how, "Theologians in the RAC…commission topics," for the Friday message as well as, "…Check for whether there are any controversial topics in the message."[178] Other interviewees echoed this and further elaborated that both institutions worked in such close consultation that they perceived little substantive difference between the institutions. An imam in Almaty when describing the relationship between SAMK and the RAC asserted that, "They are one. They all work for one goal—to maintain peace in Kazakhstan."[179] On the other hand, one imam in Almaty stated that the RAC does, "…Not work directly with mosques, it gives orders through SAMK. Ideologically they are related, the Religious Affairs Agency and SAMK," when asked to characterize the relationship between SAMK and the RAC stated [180] Thus, some imams cited the direct involvement of RAC in religious matters, while others believed that RAC directed orders to the top of SAMK,

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[176] Interview with Deputy Director of RAC Astana, 2015.
[177] Interview with Imam of Mosque A4, Astana 2013.
[178] Interview with Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty 2015.
[179] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty 2015.
[180] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty 2015.

which were then cycled through SAMK. All agreed that the RAC and SAMK worked in close concert.

Overall, the most senior interviewees insisted that there was a complete separation between the government and SAMK and religious practice. During interviews when I raised various examples of potential violations of this norm, they were outright denied. Mid-level officials maintained similar narratives, but openly disclosed examples that would violate this norm. These admissions did not seem to stem from a particularly close rapport that I was able to establish with these interviewees. Rather, regional level RAC officials seemed aware that they needed to uphold the narrative about "separation" of church and state, but they were not aware that these examples would normatively violate this principal. Moreover, it was clear that they did not believe that these statements would contradict with statements made by national RAC officials or other high-level government officials. Imams seemed to be unaware of the pretense of the separation of the government from Islam and most openly discussed the relationship between the RAC and SAMK without reservation, despite not often being directly involved in this interaction.

However, despite the frankness of many mid-level officials and imams in describing the relationship between SAMK and the RAC, crucially, there is at least a semblance of *official* distance (between SAMK and the government). This disconnect allows for the government to pursue two discordant narratives, that it does not interfere with religious matters, while at the same time portraying itself as the upholder of the national religious identity and security (explored in Chapter Four). Simultaneously, enacting policies via a quasi-governmental agency, SAMK, allows the regime to pursue its objective of co-opting all mosques and only sanctioning religious expression in public that is affiliated with SAMK. Using a quasi-

governmental agency, rather than the RAC directly, is likely more effective as it reduces the transparency and linkage to the regime. Notably, similar tools are also utilized by democracies; thus, employing institutions that increase policy effectiveness and promote regime stability while reducing transparency are not solely the purview of authoritarian regimes. This process is, however, reflective of the learning curve of an authoritarian regime in how to better appropriate institutions to co-opt religious expression and practice.

Encapsulation of Mosques and Knowledge Production

The co-optation of Islam occurs via the encapsulation of mosques as well as the encapsulation of religious knowledge production. Starting in 2012, all mosques throughout Kazakhstan must be a part of SAMK. There have been several instances of repression. Mosques that resisted incorporation into SAMK were subsequently closed by the RAC. These mosques were closed under the premise of building code violations or because the imam of the mosque was portrayed as Salafi (at times regardless of theology) and/or as an extremist (which was often not defined by interviewees as someone who commits acts of violence).[181] How these narratives are deployed is discussed in Chapter Four; however, in the first instance and in most instances, the Kazakhstani regime has chosen to co-opt Islam, particularly mosques.

Encapsulation of Mosques

The number of mosques has grown drastically in Kazakhstan since independence. According to SAMK, in 1991 there were less than 70 mosques. At the start of the next decade, the number of mosques reached over 1650. As of 2015, the

[181] Interview with Deputy Director of RAC Astana, 2015; Director of RAC Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015; U.S. Foreign Service Officer A, 2013.

number of mosques now reaches almost 2,500.[182] While SAMK was the only institution for Islam in Kazakhstan since independence from the Soviet Union, mosques that were independent of SAMK were present in the country. However, this changed with the policy shift implemented 2012. It is important to take into account how SAMK has been employed in light of this shift.

As of 2012, all mosques in Kazakhstan have either joined SAMK and subsequently been registered by the government (officially by the Ministry of Justine) or they have been closed by the RAC.[183] Currently there are no known mosques in all of Kazakhstan that are not registered with SAMK. Few mosques resisted co-optation. One imam in Astana who self-identified as Salafi was removed from his mosque and a new imam was appointed.[184] The mosque itself remains open. Another imam I had previously interviewed expressed fear that he would be removed because he self-identified as Sufi (Naqshbandi) and disagreed theologically with SAMK. When I returned to the mosque, a new imam was in place. I attempted to contact both imams who were removed, but my other contacts stated that they did not know either where the imam was or how to get in touch. While the Kazakhstani regime has attempted to primarily use co-optation, efforts to resist co-optation into SAMK were met by swift repression, and at the minimum, a loss of employment. It is important to note that these acts of repression were targeted and against individuals (and smaller groups) and not repression of the entire majority religious identity.

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[182] Interview with SAMK Spokesperson, Astana 2015.
[183] Interview with Deputy Director of RAC Astana, 2015; Director of RAC Almaty, 2015; Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015; Interview with Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.
[184] Interview with Previous Mosque Attendee, Astana, 2013; Interview with Senior SAMK Official, Astana, 2013.

There are two types of mosques in Kazakhstan, government constructed mosques and co-opted mosques. I define government-constructed mosques as mosques, which are constructed with funds from the government or are commissioned by high level government officials, including President Nazarbayev. Co-opted mosques, which are not constructed by the government or commissioned by high level government officials, do not receive funding from the government either in terms of funds for the maintenance of the mosque or for the salaries of imam(s) and employee(s).[185] At co-opted mosques, funding for salaries and maintenance are derived through donations to the mosque (typically small donations by people who come to the mosque) and/or local wealthy benefactors.[186]

In Astana, there are currently eight mosques. The newest mosque was constructed in 2015. There are over 50 mosques in Almaty distributed throughout 11 rayons or neighborhoods. I conducted interviews with imams and employees at each mosque in Astana, representing the entire population of mosques in Astana (Table 1). I also conducted interviews with imams and employees at one randomly selected mosque[187] in seven of the rayons in Almaty as well as the Central Mosque in Almaty (Table 2). The Central Mosque in Almaty is a government constructed mosque, which shares its location with the current headquarters of SAMK.[188]

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[185] Interview with Employee of Mosque A5, Astana, 2013

[186] Interview with Employee at Mosque A5, Astana, 2013; Employee at Mosque A6, Astana, 2013; Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B3, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B5; Imam of Mosque B8, Almaty, 2015.

[187] Mosques were identified using Google Maps, 2GIS (a platform that provides maps, business listings, and directions) and several other websites. “Google Maps,”; “Map of Almaty.” Mosques were randomly selected using a random number generator. “Random.Org: True Random Number Service.”

[188] Mosques in the other 4 rayons were excluded due to feasibility as the commute time from where I was based was over three hours.

Table 1. Mosques in Astana			
Mosque	**Mosque Classification**	**Constructed**	**Co-opted into SAMK**
Mosque A1 (Nur Astana)	Government Constructed	2002	2002
Mosque A2 (Hazret Sultan)	Government Constructed	2012	2012
Mosque A3	Co-opted	Unknown[1]	Unknown
Mosque A4	Co-opted	Unknown[2]	2009-2010[3]
Mosque A5	Co-opted	2010	Unknown[4]
Mosque A6	Co-opted	2004	2010
Mosque A7	Co-opted	2010	2010
Mosque A8	Government Constructed	2015	2015
1 Interview was ended by head imam before questions about when the mosque was constructed or incorporated into SAMK could be asked. 2 The head imam of Mosque A4 in 2013 was only imam in Astana that year to refuse an interview. The imam of the mosque in 2015 was not sure when the mosque was constructed or incorporated into SAMK. 3 Senior member of SAMK stated in 2013 that this mosque was co-opted four or five years ago into SAMK. 4 Imam did not recall the year of incorporation into SAMK.			

Table 2. Mosques in Almaty			
Mosque	**Mosque Classification**	**Constructed**	**Co-opted into SAMK**
Mosque B1 (Central Mosque)	Government Constructed	2014	2014
Mosque B2	Co-opted	2008	2008
Mosque B3	Co-opted	1999	2001
Mosque B4	Co-opted	1992	2008
Mosque B5	Co-opted	2003	2003
Mosque B6	Co-opted	2007	Unknown[1]
Mosque B7	Co-opted	1991	Unknown[2]
Mosque B8	Government Constructed	1999	1999
1 There were discrepancies between the date given by the current imam of the mosque and the founder of the mosque. 2 The imam of Mosque B6 avoided answering questions about when the mosque was incorporated into SAMK.			

The head and deputy imams of the two government-constructed mosques in Astana (which are also the largest mosques in Astana) and the Central Mosque in Almaty (which is also the largest in the city) concurrently hold senior appointments in SAMK—indicative of the high degree of intertwinement between SAMK and government constructed mosques. For example, the head imam of the Hazret Sultan Mosque in Astana (Mosque A2) is a deputy mufti in SAMK (the head of SAMK is the mufti). Hazret Sultan Mosque is popularly claimed in Kazakhstan to be the largest mosque in Central Asia and was built in honor of President Nazarbayev. Additionally, the head imam of the other government constructed mosque in Astana, Nur Astana (Mosque A1), is the other deputy mufti of Kazakhstan.[189] Additionally, the Central Mosque (Mosque B1) in Almaty is located next door to SAMK's national

[189] Interview with SAMK Chief of Staff, Almaty 2015; SAMK Representative C, 2013; SAMK Spokesperson, Astana, 2013; SAMK Senior Official, Almaty, 2015; Senior Imam at Nur Astana Mosque, Astana 2013.

headquarters, and SAMK and imams at the mosque share office space at SAMK's headquarters. The co-optation of mosques is extensive as evident in the overlap between the leaders of government constructed mosques in Astana and Almaty and SAMK. These mosques serve as the most senior administrative mosques in each city. In addition to these direct co-optation efforts, there is a disparity in resources and access (particularly for women) between government constructed and co-opted mosques.

Resource and Access Disparities

The co-opted mosques in Astana (Mosques A3, A4, A5, A6, and A7) pale in size in comparison to government constructed mosques (Mosques A1, A2, and A8), as well as in their attendee capacity. In Almaty, one of the seven mosques I randomly selected (I selected one mosque per rayon), Mosque B1, is a government constructed mosque. This mosque was commissioned by President Nazarbayev, but its construction was privately funded.[190] The other government-constructed mosque in Almaty is the Central Mosque. Co-opted mosques in Almaty range in size. More centrally located mosques were generally better attended. Mosques located on the periphery of Almaty were more sparsely attended in line with a lower level of population in the surrounding area.

In addition to differences in capacity and attendance numbers, Mosques A1 and A2 in Astana were more recently constructed and better maintained. Similarly, in Almaty, government constructed Mosques B1 and B8 were both endowed with better resources— in terms of building maintenance and available literature. Mosque B1 was recently constructed and its architecture is ornate and elaborate. Relatedly, there

[190] Interview with Imam of B1, Almaty, 2015; Observation by author of number of attendees during prayer times.

is a disparity in salaries paid to imams and employees between government constructed and co-opted mosques. One employee at a co-opted mosque expressed resentment that he and other employees and imams at this mosque and other non-government constructed mosques were not paid by the state (their salaries came from private sources).[191] Another mosque employee in Astana lamented that co-opted mosques are not even afforded utility discounts, in contrast to the two government constructed mosques in Astana.[192]

Gender: Accessibility and Resources for Women

For women, resource availability and accessibility also differ between government constructed and co-opted mosques. In Astana, Nur Astana Mosque contains a second floor for women that includes numerous books to peruse. Co-opted Mosque A4 had classes for women. However, when the mosque was incorporated into SAMK (and the previous imam removed), classes for women were ceased. [193] Since 2012, there have been no classes for women at this mosque, or any other in Astana. [194]

None of the mosques I randomly selected in rayons further on the periphery of Almaty had a room for women to pray. Thus, in practice these mosques were completely inaccessible for women to pray.[195] On the other hand, both government constructed mosques in Astana and the Central Mosque in Almaty (government constructed) had abayas[196] readily available for women at the entrance of the mosque and therefore, more accessible to women. Alternatively, none of the co-opted

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[191] Interview with Imam T, Astana, 2013.
[192] Interview with Imam of Mosque A5, Astana, 2013.
[193] Interview with Former Attendee of Mosque A4, August 2013.
[194] Based on observation and interviews with imams.
[195] Based on observation and interviews with imams.
[196] An abaya is a robe like dress.

mosques had abayas or had them readily available. The only women I observed entering co-opted mosques were those whose attire already consisted of more conservative clothing— in contrast to the majority of women observed in Mosques A1, A2, and B8 who elected to wear abayas in order to enter the mosques. Notably, most women in Kazakhstan do not wear clothes in their daily lives that they could wear inside a mosque without changing. Having clothing readily available at mosques allows women the ability to not have to bring additional clothes from home or to go to a mosque spontaneously. Overall, government mosques are both more accessible and have more resources for women.

Co-optation entails the distribution of policy concessions and/or benefits. In Kazakhstan, officials in SAMK are granted religious policy concessions, ranging from discretion in prayer time and how prayers should be performed to various theological matters. In terms of benefits, imams at government constructed mosques receive higher salaries and better working conditions. The discrepancy in resources and access between government and co-opted mosques also creates potential benefits for people who go (or are able to go to) government constructed mosques. This discrepancy serves both as a co-optation mechanism to incentivize people to go to government constructed mosques, which given their closer association with SAMK, are relatively more tightly controlled and monitored. On the other hand, the difference between government constructed and co-opted mosques is a potential weakness in the regime's co-optation efforts.

Whether the better maintenance of mosques and accessibility for women is a compelling reason for Muslims in Kazakhstan to go to government constructed mosques (over co-opted mosques) is examined in Chapter 6. In regard to the latter,

benefits are not extended to co-opted mosques or imams at co-opted mosques, who neither have influence over religious policy, nor a guaranteed salary. Secondly, not all Muslims live in the vicinity of government constructed mosques. The lack of funding is clearly a source of resentment among imams at many co-opted mosques. However, mobilization to challenge this status quo, or to create a new center of religious authority, is likely to be difficult given imams are intentionally rotated (starting in 2012) every five years. Additionally, appointments at government constructed mosques are perceived by some imams as a reward for good job performance, including obtaining more donations at a mosque. This may incentivize imams to remain with the current institution and attempt to improve their status.

Through both directly co-opting all presently open mosques in Kazakhstan as well as creating disparities in resources and access between government constructed and co-opted mosques, the Kazakhstani regime has consolidated its control over places of worship for Islam. The Kazakhstani regime efforts to encapsulate mosques are accompanied by extensive efforts to attempt to fully encapsulate the production of religious knowledge in Kazakhstan.

Encapsulation of Knowledge Production

A monopoly on the right to produce knowledge related to Islam is enforced in a two-part process. The first includes controlling access to religious appointments (including high level religious leaders and imams) as well as repressing Muslim religious leaders with public profiles who previously existed outside of the SAMK framework. Restrictions are also placed on religious literature, as outlined in the religion law. Secondly, these efforts are complimented by attempts to fill the vacuum created by such restrictions via the production and dissemination of the Friday

message, SAMK affiliated websites and a publishing house. Religious knowledge has been comprehensively encapsulated into the framework of SAMK.

Religious Appointments

In addition to co-opting mosques, SAMK has been utilized to co-opt religious leaders. Co-opting religious leaders through an institution lessens the likelihood of these individuals to gain a political base. In addition to co-optation, the regime has resorted to repressing religious leaders who already had a source of legitimacy separate from the regime. Concerted efforts have been made to both discredit potential religious leaders who are not associated with SAMK as well as control the appointments of all imams in Kazakhstan. Elite interviewees who were affiliated with the National Kazakhstani Academy of Sciences, members of SAMK, and human rights activists were only able to identify five religious leaders that are not associated with SAMK.[197]

One of the most frequently cited influential leaders, Ismatullah Sheikh, a Sufi leader, was imprisoned in 2011. He was charged with violating the rights of patients in a drug abuse recovery clinic, including forcibly restraining patients. A prominent human rights activist believed that the actions Ismatullah Sheikh was charged with actually occurred, but that the charges were politically motivated as the tactics used with patients did not differ from state-run clinics.[198]

Another prominent religious leader Qurban-Ali, a Naqshbandi leader (an order within Sufism) fled the country in 2010, and while his current location has not been confirmed, he is believed to be living in Cyprus.[199] Additionally, Hazret Ibrahaim, a

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[197] Interview with Member of Kazakhstani Academy of Sciences, 2013; Human Rights Activist, 2013.
[198] Interview with Human Rights Activist, 2013.
[199] Interview with Member of Kazakhstani Academy of Sciences, 2013.

regional leader of the sub-order Mujaaddidiyya of the Naqsbhandiyya, who was based out of Uzbekistan, died in 2010. Only two remaining leaders are based out of Kazakhstan, the Naqshbandi leader Nasiruddin Ishan and the Salafi leader Zynunah, both of whose theology is poorly understood.[200] Neither of these leaders has made public statements over the last several years.

Increasing efforts have been made to bolster the perceived religious legitimacy of SAMK. The head of SAMK's official title is the Supreme Mufti of Kazakhstan and SAMK is colloquially referred to as the muftiate. The title of mufti refers to a religious jurist who can provide an authoritative opinion on Islamic law (a fatwa).[201] The term muftiate is often perceived to be religious in nature, and devoid of political connotations. One senior imam in Astana at a government constructed mosque, whom simultaneously held a senior position in SAMK, even asserted in an interview that I should refer to SAMK as the "muftiate" after I referred to SAMK by its official title in Russian. The latter he implied conferred more religious authority.[202] Imams most frequently cited the Supreme Mufti when I asked whom they would identify as an authoritative source of religious knowledge in Kazakhstan.[203]

SAMK has successfully co-opted all imams in Kazakhstan since 2012. Every imam must be certified by SAMK. The appointments of imams are also no longer a local decision. Every imam throughout Kazakhstan receives a mosque placement from SAMK.[204] Moreover, after each mosque joined SAMK, the current imam was removed at all co-opted mosques in Astana and Almaty. The new imam was

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[200] Interview with Member of Kazakhstani Academy of Sciences, 2013.
[201] See Islamic Dictionary Appendix.
[202] Interview with Imam at Government Constructed Mosque, Astana, 2015.
[203] Interview with Imam of Mosque A5, Astana, 2013; Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015; and Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.
[204] Interview with Deputy Director of RAC Astana, 2015

appointed by SAMK in 2012. Since 2012, imams are rotated every five years.[205] The rotation of imams prevents imams from forming lasting relations with communities, and thus, a potential political base.

Officials from the RAC gave varying answers about the RAC's involvement in the placement of imams. The deputy director of the RAC Astana office stated that, "SAMK appoints all imam and then SAMK informs us about these appointments. We collect documents and communicate with the imam. We don't have the final say about who gets appointed, but we'll give suggestions."[206] He later stated that, "The muftiate, SAMK, decides and appoints imams. It is a mutual decision between SAMK and the RAC local Astana office— we work together."[207] Other RAC officials denied any involvement, including the national director of the RAC.[208]

Imams themselves found the appointment process to be opaque. Prior to becoming an imam, all prospective imams must take an exam.[209] There was a lack of consensus amongst imams I interviewed on how these results are used, or whether they are used at all, in terms of placement. Several imams stated that they thought imams who did poorly on the exam or who were educated in less prestigious institutions were more likely to be appointed to mosques in rural areas.[210] Other imams didn't believe there was any correlation.[211] On the other hand, one imam

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[205] Interview with Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015; Imam A, 2013; Imam H, 2013; Mosque Employee D, 2013; Mosque Employee B, 2013.
[206] Interview with Deputy Director of RAC Astana, 2015.
[207] Interview with Deputy Director of RAC Astana, 2015.
[208] Ibid.
[209] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty 2015; Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty 2015.
[210] Interview with Imam of Mosque B3, Almaty, 2015; Deputy Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015.
[211] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.

thought imams were given appointments in locations with a lack of imams, and suggested more imams were being appointed in Eastern Kazakhstan as there was a shortage of imams in the region.[212] Other imams believed their ability to be appointed at mosques that are more prestigious (more central and have more resources) was dependent on their ability to obtain more donations at the mosque they are currently residing over.[213] The appointment process of imams via SAMK institutionalizes a system to reward loyalty and compliance with more prestigious and/or comfortable appointments – in essence a system to dole out benefits.

The appointment of religious leaders at a high-level as well as down to the local level of every single mosque throughout Kazakhstan is directly controlled through SAMK, sometimes in consultation with the RAC. Religious leaders who are not associated with SAMK are no longer publicly visible, due to imprisonment, exile, or likely coercive pressure to remain out of the public eye. Simultaneously, SAMK is attempting to bolster its religious legitimacy—employing religiously laden terms such as muftiate and mufti, that are not associated with politics or government. Moreover, SAMK employs every single imam in all of Kazakhstan—using an appointment system to incentive loyalty through doling out benefits and deterring mobilization by rotating imams.

Friday Messages

The monopoly on knowledge production, is enforced both via restrictions (on access to religious appointments and religious literature) as well as an increased output of government sponsored sources for religious information about Islam since 2012, including the Friday message. Through fieldwork I identified how SAMK

[212] Interview with Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty, 2015.
[213] Interview with Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty, 2015.

distributes the Friday message, the degree to which imams comply with SAMK's dictates, how the Friday message theme is selected (including the role of the RAC), and how language politics plays out in mosques in relation to the Friday message.

Starting in 2012 SAMK began sending themes for the Friday messages accompanied by literature references for each Friday message via fax. The medium to send Friday messages was then updated to email.[214] Prior to 2012, messages were only sent to mosques for holidays.[215] As of 2013, SAMK not only sends the theme for every Friday message, but the entire text of the message to every mosque throughout all of Kazakhstan.[216] Additionally, a book is now provided to every mosque with the Friday messages prepared a year in advance and the messages for imams are now available on SAMK's website, muftiate.kz.[217] For ordinary citizens, a book of the Friday messages is now available to buy at pre-approved kiosks near mosques, the only locations where religious literature may be sold.

Over the time I conducted fieldwork, I observed SAMK's growing consolidation over the Friday message. In interviews, imams engaged in more self-censorship and indicated less willingness to add anything to the message prepared by SAMK. In 2013, interviewees indicated that there was a degree of latitude. One contact stated that he, "…speaks within the topic given," though this is likely also subject to self-censorship. However, in 2015 this was no longer the consensus.

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[214] Interview with Imam A, 2013; SAMK Representative F, 2013; SAMK Senior Level Official Almaty, 2015; and Imam I, 2013.
[215] Interview with Imam of Mosque B7.
[216] Interview with SAMK Senior Level Official, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B3, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty 2015; Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B7; Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015; Interview with Deputy Director of RAC , Astana, 2015.
[217] Interview with Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015.

Several interviewees spoke about the ability to add examples but did not feel at liberty to deviate at all from the topic.[218] Most interviewees in 2015 said they read the message in full for the Friday message without any deviations or additions.[219]

In order to cross-reference whether the Friday message topic was the same in each mosque every Friday in practice, I followed the advice of Lust-Okar to try to elicit stores from interviewees.[220] I asked imams to describe how they selected the topic for last Friday's message. By asking for an example, I allowed for interviewees to tell a story—a scenario in which the interview subject is more likely to identify the key actors. Additionally, asking the question in this was avoids framing the question in a way that directly invite an opinion on the role of the government in this process and its likely to be viewed as less threatening. For example, during one week in the summer of 2013 work ethic was cited at several mosques in Astana as the Friday message topic.[221] In 2015, other topics confirmed by multiple interviewees included the importance of the Kazakhstani constitution and how it supports Islam rather than being against Islam, [222] hajj,[223] Ramadan,[224] ethics,[225] Qurban Eid,[226] and preventing

[218] Interview with Imam of Mosque A4, Astana, 2015; Imam of Mosque A5, Astana, 2013.
[219] Interview with Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.
[220] Conversation with Ellen Lust-Okar, April 4, 2013, Oxford.
[221] Interview with Imam of Mosque A7, Astana, 2013.
[222] Interview with Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque A5, Astana, 2013.
[223] Interview with Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty 2015; Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015.
[224] Interview with Imam of Mosque A1, Astana, 2013; Imam of Mosque A5, Astana, 2013.
[225] Interview with Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque A4, Astana, 2015.
[226] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015. Qurban Eid refers to Eid al-Adha, an important Muslim holiday.

religious extremism.[227] I also confirmed the topics of the message in Astana in 2013 and 2015 and in Almaty in 2015 by listening to Friday messages in person.

I also investigated how SAMK selects the Friday message. The most frequent answer was that there is an office within SAMK that selects the topic, while other interviewees described how the RAC occasionally commissions topics for the Friday message.[228] For example, a senior imam at one of the government constructed mosques in Almaty described "theologians" in the Religious Affairs Committee commissioning topics. Moreover, the Deputy Director of the Astana Religious Affairs Committee asserted that:

> In regard to Astana, we ensure that messages are sent every Friday and are within the same parameters as across the entire country. This is to ensure unity and equality. I may interpret that Qur'an in one way, another person in another way— this can create chaos. All must be part of SAMK.[229]

This statement reveals the degree to which an official government agency coordinates with SAMK to ensure that the production of the Friday message is consistent with the regime's aims to construct a complimentary national religious identity and that this is the only version distributed throughout the country.

How the regime has navigated co-opting Muslim ethnic minorities has varied. In 2013, several senior SAMK officials as well as an imam at a mosque where the majority of people are not ethnically Kazakh confirmed that all Friday messages must be in Kazakh. Moreover, they said that mosques were not allowed be explicitly designated as serving non-ethnic Kazakh communities

Among mosques that were closed in 2012, many were mosques for ethnic minority communities, sometimes colloquially called "ethnic mosques." For example,

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[227] Interview with SAMK Spokesperson, Astana, 2013.
[228] Interview with Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B3, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B4; Interview with Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015.
[229] Deputy Director of RAC Astana, 2015.

Fatimai Shi'i Muslim Mosque in Almaty was closed by the RAC in 2012 as well as the Din-Muhammad Sunni Mosque, a mosque for the Tatar-Bashkir community.[230] However, starting in 2015 some accommodations for Muslim ethnic minority communities have been made. Mosques are still not allowed to advertise themselves as for non-ethnic communities, nor can their names reflect this. However, SAMK now grants exceptions for Friday messages to be in Russian, rather than in Kazakh. The Friday message is still not allowed to be in other languages, such as Tatar, Chechen, or Uzbek. Imams at several mosques in Almaty and Astana with majority non-ethnic Kazakh attendees confirmed this shift in policy as well as the accommodations allowed at the mosques.[231]

A highly centralized process to create and disseminate Friday messages has been in effect in Kazakhstan since 2013. As of 2015, there is close to uniform compliance. The regime also slowly made language accommodations for ethnic minorities—reducing the chance for mobilization along ethnic lines. In addition to the Friday message, SAMK also produces religious literature and websites.

Religious Literature and Websites

The encapsulation of religious knowledge also extends to religious literature and websites. A two-pronged approach is taken in Kazakhstan. First, the importation of religious literature is severely restricted. Secondly, the regime started producing religious literature and websites in 2012 and increased its output through 2015. Unlike the monopoly on the Friday message or religious appointments, the restrictions on religious literature are expressly laid out in the law. The religion law

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[230] Bayram, "Kazakhstan: Prison Mosques, Churches, and Prayer Rooms Closed down."
[231] Interview with three imams and one employee at two different mosques built to serve needs of ethnic minority communities.

does not however, address the production of government sponsored religious literature or websites. Additionally, as with the Friday message and religious appointments, the RAC unofficially coordinates with SAMK regarding restrictions on religious sources and the production of religious sources.

Religious literature is only allowed to be brought into the country by private citizens if it is for their personal use. Every book publicly available in Kazakhstan must be pre-approved by the RAC. Moreover, religious literature may only be sold at kiosks pre-approved by the RAC. The enforcement of this set of policies was widely acknowledged by numerous sources including several imams and officials at the RAC.[232] Confirming this, Felix Corley, the editor of Forum 18[233] stated that several sources had contacted him regarding the arrest of their colleagues and family members for selling religious literature at markets (non-approved sites).[234] The restrictions, in particular on foreign religious literature, serve to both reduce competition over religious authority for SAMK as well as further secure the Kazakhstani regime's monopoly on the religious realm.

The lack of literature present in Kazakhstan due to these restrictions has created a vacuum. This vacuum is partially filled by efforts by SAMK to produce religious literature. Chiefly, SAMK has created an in-house publishing arm. The publishing house is responsible for creating a book with the Friday messages.[235] Additionally, the press produces various other religious books, journals, as well as

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[232] Interview with Director of RAC Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015.
[233] Forum 18 is a news service based in Norway that reports on issues related to religious freedom, primarily in the Post-Soviet region.
[234] Interview with Felix Corley, 2015.
[235] Interview with Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty 2015; Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty 2015.

magazines.[236] This is complemented with an in-house recording studio, which SAMK utilizes to record and distribute CDs and videos.[237]

In addition to the efforts of the SAMK publishing house, there has been a concerted effort to promote websites associated with SAMK. The website addresses for SAMK affiliated websites are advertised on the walls of most co-opted mosques in Astana, such as islam.kz and sunna.kz.[238] Additionally, imams in Astana and Almaty recounted to me about recommending these sites to mosque attendees. According to a senior SAMK official, SAMK is currently involved in the production of content for ten websites on Islam in Kazakhstan.[239] One SAMK website along with websites for a handful of individual mosques in Astana and Almaty also provide an online advice service for religious matters. A senior level official in SAMK stated that because of these websites, "There is enough information provided to be informed," and that each city in Kazakhstan can, "…be informed through the website."[240]

The RAC is unofficially involved with the content for SAMK websites .When I asked the Head of Staff of SAMK in 2015 how he would describe the relationship between SAMK and the RAC, he stated that the RAC and SAMK, "Cooperate in the media sphere," which includes coordinating the content for the website, islam.kz.[241] This is indicative of how SAMK must not just seek permission to produce a website for Islam, but that also that these efforts are directly coordinated with a government agency.

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[236] Interview with SAMK Senior Level Official, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015.
[237] Interview with SAMK Senior Level Official, Almaty, 2015
[238] Observed by author in 2013 and 2015.
[239] Interview with SAMK Senior Official, Almaty, 2015.
[240] Interview with SAMK Senior Official, Almaty, 2015.
[241] Ibid.

There are highly robust efforts to limit access to religious literature, which is one of the religious policies in Kazakhstan that is explicitly laid out in the law. Not specified in the law are efforts to produce Islamic literature and websites as well the government's involvement in their production. The Kazakhstani regime as of 2012 only allows for religious education to be through SAMK, though its efforts to compliment this restriction by providing religious educational opportunities have been less than robust.

Religious Education

The only available opportunity for higher Islamic education in Kazakhstan is through a single SAMK affiliated institution. The only available secondary Islamic education is through madrasahs, schools, that are afflicted with SAMK.[242]

The Egyptian University of Islamic Culture Nur- Mubarak (commonly referred to as Nur- Mubarak) in Almaty, was founded in 2011 by SAMK in conjunction with the Egyptian Ministry of Waqf.[243] Notably, the relationship between the university and SAMK is not obscured. President Nazarbayev personally sponsored the creation of the university along with the president of Egypt, Mubarak. Nur-Mubarak University is affiliated with Al-Azhar University in Egypt, a highly prestigious Islamic university. On the one hand, it's surprising that the only higher educational institution for Islam is affiliated with a foreign entity—particularly in light of the intensive efforts to ban foreign religious books, including books from Egypt, as well as efforts to deter and prevent foreign Muslim missionaries (including from Egypt). Alternatively, given Al-Azhar's international prestige, the regime is likely trying to portray Nur- Mubarak as a legitimate religious educational option and

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[242] See Islamic Dictionary Appendix.
[243] Nurmanova and Izbairov, "Islamic Education in Soviet and Post-Soviet Kazakhstan," 298.

deter Kazakhs from seeking foreign religious education. The mission of the university includes training personnel for SAMK, mosques, and other religious institutes.[244] Nur-Mubarak is only one institute for higher Islamic learning in Kazakhstan. Nur-Mubarak has trained approximately 800 students according to its own estimates.[245]

Given there are about 2,500 mosques in Kazakhstan, with more mosques being built, and most mosques require more than one imam, this number does not come close to staffing all the mosques in Kazakhstan. Shortages of imams remains a problem in Kazakhstan. Moreover, given the size of Kazakhstan, it is remarkable that there is only one institution for higher religious learning.

There are also several madrasahs in Kazakhstan. In Astana there is one madrasah, named Astana, which is located within the Nur Astana Mosque. The first madrasah in Almaty, named Abu Hanifa, was opened in 2009 by SAMK.[246] The Mufti of SAMK stated that he was opposed to students studying at any foreign madrasah (particularly those located in Pakistan), except for Al-Azhar.[247] While madrasahs are not mentioned in the religion law, along with the general policy shift in 2012, all independent madrasahs were closed. There are now only five madrasas in the entire country—the aforementioned in Astana and Almaty, Abu Bakr Sydyr in Pavlodar (northern Kazakhstan), a madrasah named Aktobe in Aktobe, (western Kazakhstan) and another in Shymkent (southern Kazakhstan).[248] Given the vastness of Kazakhstan, relatively few citizens are in proximity to a religious educational institution. Additionally, the madrasahs in Astana and Almaty are only open for boys.

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[244] "University Mission."
[245] "University Mission."
[246] Mavloni, "The First Madrasah Was Opened in Almaty, Where Only Young Men Will Study."
[247] Mavloni, "The First Madrasah Was Opened in Almaty."
[248] Yemelianova, "Islam, National Identity and Politics in Contemporary Kazakhstan," 294.

There are currently no secondary religious educational opportunities for girls in Kazakhstan.

This lack of opportunities for religious learning is a widely acknowledged problem in Kazakhstan and was mentioned by government officials, imams, and mosque attendees alike. There are numerous restrictions on Islam, particularly literature. There are also bans on missionary activities. In the past, missionaries came to Kazakhstan primarily from Turkey and Saudi Arabia— both streams have been ceased. Combined with the lack of higher or lower religious educational opportunities provided by SAMK, the vacuum for available religious sources, particularly educational sources, has not been adequately filled.

Government Sponsored NGOS: Anti-Sect Center

In addition to first creating a religious vacuum, and then attempting to fill this vacuum with SAMK produced religious sources, Kazakhstan has uniquely pursued an additional and innovative method of encapsulating Islam through government sponsored NGOs, commonly called “anti-sect centers”. These anti-sect centers also operate as quasi-governmental agencies. These centers identify themselves as NGOs and also acknowledge receiving government funding. However, I classify these institutions as quasi-governmental agencies because they implement the Kazakhstani government’s policies, are not officially part of the government, and are publicly funded. While using an institution that is officially an NGO is an innovative tool increasingly employed by authoritarian regimes, anti-sect centers are not unique to authoritarian regimes or the post-Soviet region.

A growing dialogue about the danger of "sects" in Kazakhstan has been accompanied by a proliferation of "anti-sect" centers.[249] While utilizing an anti-sect center as a quasi-governmental agency is new method, the narratives around "sects" is not particular to Kazakhstan or the post-Soviet Union, nor is it particular to authoritarian regimes. In Western Europe and in the United States, fear about new religious movements proliferated in the 1990s. The presence of new religious movements prompted the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe to advocate for the creation of European, "observatory," and information centers in 1999 to monitor what the Council referred to as groups of a, "religious, esoteric or spiritual nature." [250] In Belgium the Justice Commission of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives created a commission in 1996 that publicly identified 189 new religious movements as harmful cults, while declining to publicly disclose the criteria used to arrive at this determination nor providing the identified groups with the accusations made against them.[251] Two years later a law was passed that set up an Information and Advisory Center, essentially an anti-sect center.[252] The anti-sect movement started even earlier in the Netherlands, with the first anti-sect center set up in 1979, the SOS (Samenwerende Ouders Sekteleden), or the Associated Parents of Cult Members.[253] These sentiments spread to Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, particularly as groups previously not present in the region began to proselytize within Russia. The first anti-sect center within Russia was created within the Russian

[249] Interview with U.S. Foreign Service Officer A, 2013; "United States Commission on International Religious Freedom."
[250] Fautre, "Belgium's Anti-Sect Policy," 113.
[251] Fautre, "Belgium's Anti-Sect Policy," 113.
[252] Ibid, 119.
[253] Singelenberg, "Foredoomed to Failure: The Anti-Cult Movement in the Netherlands," 214.

Orthodox Church, the majority religious group within Russia.[254] This anti-sect center was created in 1993 by Alexander Dvorkin within the Moscow Patriarchate,[255] who was a U.S. citizen and had established links with anti-sect movements in the U.S., Germany and Denmark.[256] Close co-operation between governmental entities and anti-sect centers is clearly not only a phenomena that occurs in authoritarian regimes.

In Kazakhstan, anti-sect centers are not housed within religious groups. Rather they receive government funding, but operate at an arm's length from the government, while pursuing the objectives of the regime. This is in line with Matveeva's observation concerning a growing learning curve of post-communist regimes in terms of "civil society know-how".[257] Matveeva notes the increasing ability of Russia to "provide parallel forms of assistance" including establishing NGOs.[258] She also cites the statement of Pyotr Svoik, an NGO activist in Kazakhstan and opposition politician in 2006, that, " 'If in previous years NGOs were financed almost entirely from abroad, now the government is planning to organize an alternative civil field [paid for] with budget money.' "[259]

Anti-sect centers seek to change the norms of what is considered acceptable religious practices. In Kazakhstan, these centers, as others in Western Europe and within the post-Soviet space, focus on minority religious groups, particularly new religious movements. In Karaganda, Kazakhstan, a city several hours to the west of Astana, several pastors of Christian groups described related instances about being

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[254] Shterin, "New Religious Movements in Changing Russia: Opportunities and Challenges," 295–96.
[255] Shterin, "New Religious Movements," 295–96.
[256] Ibid.
[257] Matveeva, "Exporting Civil Society: The Post-Communist Experience," 3-13.
[258] Matveeva, "Exporting Civil Society," 9.
[254]"Comments by Pyotr Svoik, Kazakhstan: NGOs Fear Losing Independence."
[167] Ibid.

harassed as well as publicly maligned in a local newspaper by the government funded anti-sect center, Viktoria Center.[260]

However, the anti-sect centers in Kazakhstan do not focus only on minority religious groups. They have also focused on minority groups within Islam such as Ahmadism[261] and Tablighi Jamaat[262] as well as more broadly on establishing the boundaries of what is considered "traditional" Islam within Kazakhstan.[263] An interview I conducted with the head of anti-sect center based in Astana, which received funding from the RAA,[264] reflected this point. [265] The anti-sect center set up a hotline in 2010. The interviewee described callers as, "Alarmed parents of young people," who are concerned about their children, "…joining Islam."[266] The director then identified practices that these children took part in as, "untraditional," including not celebrating birthdays and not drinking or dancing.[267] Drinking alcohol is considered forbidden within mainstream Islam. This also contradicts SAMK, which does not support Muslims drinking alcohol. Policies on Islam at times contact one another, and this statement reflects the staying power of Soviet apparatchiks. Increasingly, however, Kazakhstan's approach has increasingly acknowledged the saliency of religious identity and shifted towards crafting that identity.

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[260] Glushkova, "Kazakhstan, Not Practicing What It Preaches, Puts Minority Religions Under Pressure."
[261] In contrast to most Muslim groups, the Ahmadiyya recognize another prophet after Muhammad and reject Jesus' role on the Day of Judgment (groups considered to be more, "mainstream," believe that Jesus will return to Earth during the Day of Judgement). See Islamic Dictionary Appendix.
[262] Tablighi Jamaat is a Sufi group that emphasizes proselytizing. It is banned in all of Central Asia except Kyrgyzstan and is often labelled as "extremist" by Central Asian governments. However, this group is not considered "extremist" by most scholars. See Islamic Dictionary Appendix.
[263] These boundaries are examined in Chapter Four in more detail.
[264] Interview with Director of Anti-Sect Center, Astana, 2013.
[265] Interview with Director of Anti-Sect Center, Astana, 2013.
[266] Ibid.
[267] Ibid.

To this point, the interviewee mentioned that the center was especially concerned about "Salafism" and "Wahhabism" as it posed a threat to children, stating, "These children stop watching TV, don't serve in the army… they reject tradition, and don't accept healthcare."[268] The interviewee expressed their belief that some groups that claimed to be Sufi were only, "disguising," themselves as such.[269] Moreover, the interviewee expressed a belief that Sufism is, "…not supposed to be widely spread," a view in line with that expressed by several interviewed imams.[270] Extreme discomfort was expressed concerning, "sheikhs," and leaders of, "dhikr groups," (dhikr is a form of prayer, either vocal or silent, practiced by Sufis) who the interviewee believed followers thought were God or Gods and had followers, "under their control".[271] The regime's relationship with Sufism as well as Salafism in conjunction with the national religious identity being constructed is discussed in further detail in Chapter Four. The learning curve of the regime in has entailed creating a robust institutional landscape, which has included repurposing formerly Soviet institutions such as the RAC and the Spiritual Association of Muslims in order to co-opt Islam. Kazakhstan has also been at the forefront of this curve by utilizing quasi-governmental anti-sect centers to define the boundaries of the national religious identity.

Conclusion

The culmination of efforts to both restrict alternative religious viewpoints and centers of authority as well as to produce religious content in Kazakhstan is a large-scale effort to co-opt Islam via the establishment of a monopoly on religious interpretation. When I asked which people or groups should interpret the Qur'an, the

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[268] Ibid.
[269] Ibid.
[270] Ibid.
[271] Ibid.

national director of the RAC replied, "Our scholars, because today there is radicalization. So there is not conflict in the ummah, religious scholars (are the) only group who should interpret. Many problems— like radicalism—are due to different interpretations."[272] "Our scholars," refers to scholars associated with SAMK. The Director of the RAC Astana office similarly echoed this statement stating that only SAMK and associated faculty could interpret the Qur'an. The head of the Almaty SAMK office also echoed this message stating that experts within SAMK "…Who are knowledgeable and who have studied," are the only acceptable people to interpret the Qur'an. Thus, in addition to co-opting every mosque, government officials are also asserting that a quasi-governmental agency is the only entity that should interpret the religious book of the majority religion in Kazakhstan.

This chapter has traced how the construction of a robust institutional landscape has provided the foundation for the Kazakhstani regime to engage in this process of co-optation. This landscape includes repurposing institutions created during the Soviet Union and employing them for current political aims of the regimes. The utilization of the quasi-governmental agency SAMK to enact policy changes for Islam has provided a veneer of distance from the government, while maintaining the appearance of separation between the state and religion. The co-optation of Islam, a process initiated in 2011 and enacted in 2012, has been sweeping in its extent as well as implementation— as of 2012, every mosque throughout Kazakhstan has joined SAMK or has subsequently been closed by the RAC. Several additional instruments have been employed to co-opt Islam, including a disparity in resources between government constructed and co-opted mosques. Moreover, there has been an expansive effort to create a monopoly on religious authority in which only people and

[272] Interview with Director of RAC, Astana, 2015.

groups associated with SAMK are endowed with the authority to produce religious knowledge. This monopoly has been enforced by controlling access to religious appointments and literature as well as the production and dissemination of Friday messages, the creation of multiple SAMK affiliated websites, and an in-house publishing house that produces books, magazines, CDs, and videos. Moreover, Kazakhstan has introduced a new mechanism with the proliferation of quasi-governmental anti-sect agencies.

The Kazakhstani regime has rarely relied upon repression in its relationship to Islam. Notable exceptions are Muslim leaders independent of SAMK as well as mosques dedicated for ethnic minorities. Rather, the regime initially relied upon a law on religion and increasingly a quasi-governmental agency. The religion law of passed in 2011 set into motion the shift to construct a monopoly on Muslim identity and Islamic knowledge in Kazakhstan. Restrictions on religious literature are canonized in law in Kazakhstan. However, other measures to implement and enforce a religious monopoly—such as religious appointments and education— are pursued outside of the legal and official realm. The latter measures are attributed by the government to internal SAMK policies and are officially denied as being part of government policy. This dually allows the government to avoid the appearance of unduly influencing religious policies and for SAMK to avoid the perception of political partisanship—allowing both actors to maintain perceived legitimacy. The following chapter will examine and compare the co-optation of Islam in Tatarstan and the mechanisms utilized by a regional authoritarian regime. Chapters Four and Five will then examine and compare the narratives utilized by each regime to justify these policies.

Chapter Three Regime Co-optation of Islam: Tatarstan

Introduction

This chapter assesses the top-down process of co-opting Islam in Tatarstan and compares regime efforts to co-opt Islam in a national and sub-national authoritarian regime. Furthermore, this chapter elucidates similarities in the mechanisms utilized as well as differences in how a subnational and national regime employ the law to pursue co-optation. As in Kazakhstan, this process is traced from legislation on religion, the role of government agencies and the Spiritual Association of Muslims in the Republic in Tatarstan (SAM RT), and how narratives are deployed to co-opt ordinary citizens.

This chapter draws on 20 interviews I conducted in 2015, including interviews with the: former Director of the Religious Affairs Council in Tatarstan; rector of the Russian Islamic University (the Islamic university associated with SAM RT); Director of Islam Today and the Director of Islam Review (news services on Islam associated with SAM RT; Chief of Staff of SAM RT; Head of the Department for Propaganda at SAM RT (whom I interviewed five times); and 12 imams and two mosque employees in Kazan at seven randomly selected mosques.

Unlike Kazakhstan, Russia allowed a greater initial degree of openness for religious groups after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, further restrictions began to be placed on religious groups starting in 1997 at the national level and then at the republican level in 1998. These national laws have been applied unevenly in regard to which religious groups in practice are forced to comply with the laws, and they are applied differently in different regions throughout Russia. In Tatarstan, this allowed for greater local latitude for the Tatar regime in determining which outlets for Islam

were permissible, which was complimented by an even more restrictive republican[273] law in 1999.

Institutions

Laws on Religion in Russia and Tatarstan

While Russia was the first in the region to pass legislation on religion with The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, Kazakhstan now has a more restrictive law on religion. Additionally, since the 2000s Tatarstan has been forced to comply with federal law, and primarily enforces policies on religion outside of the legal realm. The collaboration between an official government agency and a quasi-government agency has been central to the efforts to co-opt Islam through institutions in Kazakhstan. Alternatively, in Tatarstan the presence of an official government agency for religion was largely unfelt in the 2000s. Despite these official differences, there is a great deal of similarity in how the Spiritual Association of Muslims in each case pursues coordinated policies towards Islam.

According to Article 14 of the 1993 constitution, Russia is a secular state. Moreover, "No religion may be established as a state or obligatory one," and "Religious associations shall be separated from the State and shall be equal before the law."[274] Despite the common assertion— and unlike in Kazakhstan—no religion is identified as "traditional" to Russia legally.[275] However, starting in 1997 various federal regulations and laws have placed further restrictions on religion.[276] The most significant legislative efforts were the 1997 law on religion and the extremism law of

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[273] Referring to the Republic of Tatarstan.
[274] The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 14. See Maggs, Schwartz, and Burnham, *Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation*, 879.
[275] The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 14.
[276] There were some regional predecessors to the 1997 Law on Religion. See Shterin, "Legislative on Religion in the Face of Uncertainty."

2002. Sections of the 2006 NGO law[277] also apply to religious organizations and in 2016 (after I completed my fieldwork) the Yarovaya Package[278] was passed. The text of the 1997 law was written to apply to all regions in all of Russia. Despite this, the 1997 law was applied unevenly on a regional basis as well as unequally across different religious groups. In practice, laws on religion in Russia have been primarily employed to target new religious movements, advantaging the Orthodox Church.[279] In

[277] In the summer of 2013 penalties came into force for any public action, which can be deemed as, "…insulting the feelings of believers." This code, the Criminal Code Article 148, was passed after the arrest of several members of the punk-rock collective Pussy Riot in 2012 after they performed in the Moscow Patriarchate Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow. Roudik, "Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism: Russia,"; Maida, "Online and On All Fronts: Russia's Assault on Freedom of Expression." According to SOVA, an NGO focusing on nationalism, religion, and radicalization in Russia, this Criminal Code has been applied more frequently in cases starting in 2015, including against citizens who post on social media sites such as Kontakte, a Russian version of Facebook. Sibireva, "Freedom of Conscience in Russia: Restrictions and Challenges in 2015."

[278] In 2016 as part of the Yarovaya Package, a set of proposed laws on "anti-terrorism," further restrictions were placed on missionary activities and proselytization. The Yarovaya Package, and its emphasis on "anti-terrorism" as it pertains to religion, has been openly discussed by government officials as a law aimed primarily at Islam in Russia (though it has also been applied against "non-traditional" religions). Sibireva, "Freedom of Conscience in Russia: Restrictions and Challenges in 2015,"; "Russia 2016 International Religious Freedom Report." The package adds a definition (for the first time) of missionary activity to the law on religion in Russia and defines it as, "The activity of a religious association, aimed at disseminating information about its beliefs among people who are not participants (members, followers) in that religious association, with the purpose of involving these people as participants (members, followers). It is carried out directly by religious associations or by citizens and/or legal entities authorized by them, publicly, with the help of the media, the Internet or other lawful means. Missionary activity may only be carried out by the director of a religious organization, the governing body members, or clergy of a religious organization. Arnold, " 'Extremism' Religious Freedom Survey." If a person is not of the forenamed, they need to obtain written authorization from a registered religious organization and carry a letter authorizing them to do so with them while they carry out missionary activity and notify local authorities that they will carry out missionary activity. Arnold, " 'Extremism' religious freedom survey,"; "Russia 2016 International Religious Freedom Report." Any foreign citizens or stateless person can only carry out missionary activity for an organization that is registered in the region that they carry out the missionary activity. Arnold, " 'Extremism' Religious Freedom Survey."

[279] See for example Shterin, "New Religious Movements in Changing Russia: Opportunities and Challenges."

Muslim majority republics, these laws have been used by regional leaders as justification to co-opt Islam through their respective Spiritual Association of Muslims. In Tatarstan, along with its push for greater autonomy in the 1990s, a republican law was passed in 1999 that attempted to legalize the monopoly held by SAM RT. However, under Putin this provision was thwarted at the federal level.

Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations

In 1997, the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Association was passed and signed by President Yeltsin. The preamble of the 1997 law reiterates that Russia is a secular state, however, the law also notes the, "…Special role of Orthodoxy in the history of Russia and in the establishment and development of its spirituality and culture."[280] Moreover, the preamble also notes the, "historical heritage," of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism (commonly referred to as the "four traditional religions"), and "other religions".[281] Orthodox Christianity is the only denomination of a religion mentioned, and the naming of Islam, Buddhism and Judaism (while different religions are grouped together as "other") also creates at least an implicit first, second and third tier system.[282] While Orthodox Christianity has a closer relationship to the state, Islam is the second most popular religion in Russia and is also carefully included in the construction of the national Russian religious landscape.

The 1997 law also created a distinction between a religious organization and a religious group, with more advantages afforded to the former. Religious groups are limited to performing religious services and rituals and providing religious education

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[280] "The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations," Preamble.
[281] "The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations," Preamble.
[282] Knox, *Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism*, 3. The first tier is Orthodoxy, the second is the other named religions, while the unnamed religions constitute the third tier.

within their community.[283] On the other hand, religious organizations can perform religious services in private as well as public spaces (e.g., hospitals),[284] own or use buildings,[285] or invite foreign citizens to Russia.[286] In order to be considered an "organization" the religious entity was required to have been registered for fifteen years. At the time the law was passed, fifteen years ago was during the Soviet Union, during which only a handful of religious organizations were officially recognized. During the Soviet Union, the only recognized organizations for Islam in Russia were the four Spiritual Directorates of Muslims. [287] The Soviet institution that covered Tatarstan, the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of European and Siberia regions, was renamed the Central Spiritual Association of Muslims in Russia. In light of the 15 year requirement, the Spiritual Associations of Muslims in Russia were the only Muslim institutions that were allowed to conduct religious activities in public or own or use buildings for religious purposes. No other Muslim groups therefore could have or use mosques.

In July of 2015 an amendment was added to the 1997 law on religion. Similar to the 2011 law on religion in Kazakhstan, this amendment requires all places of worship to notify authorities of their existence. However, registration is only required for a religious entity to be considered a religious organization. Moreover, it requires each place of worship to provide both the names and personal addresses of its members and the address of the place of worship.[288]

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[283] "The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations," Article 7.3.
[284] "The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations," Article 17.1
[285] Ibid., Article 16.1.
[286] Ibid., Article 20.
[287] The Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Central Asia, Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of the European Part of the USSR and Siberia, Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of the Northern Caucasus, and the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of the Caucasus.
[288] Arnold, " 'Extremism' religious freedom survey, September 2016."

The July 2015 amendment, however, did remove the 15-year registration requirement for a religious entity to be considered a religious organization. This requirement was changed because the 15-year requirement was ruled to be in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights in 2009 by the European Court of Human Rights in a case brought to the court by a group Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia. Other restrictions remain in place. Notably, the stricture that religious organizations that are not associated with a central religious organization are prohibited from providing religious education or conducting religious ceremonies is still in place.[289] Similar to Kazakhstan, there are varying levels of registration based on the location and number of members of a religious entity.[290] The registration requirement prioritizes the Russian Orthodox Church, which is among the few religious organizations able to obtain national registration. Registration for the Spiritual Association of Muslims serves a dual purpose—it prevents independent Muslim institutions from developing in each Muslim republics, but also prevents regional Spiritual Association of Muslims like SAM RT from gaining a national following and increasing their base (for example, it prevents SAM RT from becoming a national actor and gaining registration outside of Tatarstan). Two Muslim institutions are allowed to operate at the national level—the Central Spiritual Association of Muslims of Russia and the Council of Muftis (created in 1996). The latter's power base, however, is primary in Moscow.

In November of 2015, another amendment was added to the 1997 law, which requires religious organizations to declare any foreign sources of funding to the

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[289] Arnold, " 'Extremism' Religious Freedom Survey."
[290] "The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations," Article 8, Subsections 2- 5; "The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan: About Religious Activities and Religious Associations," Article 12.

Ministry of Justice. The reports provided must be made publicly available and include the activities of the religious organizations, identify the leaders of the religious organizations, as well as how the foreign funding will be utilized.[291] The amendments also grant the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutor General's Office the right to inspect the financial and business activities of religious organizations if there is any suspicion of extremism.[292] This deters any Spiritual Association of Muslims from receiving foreign financial support, particularly Turkey, which had previously provided support for religious activities, particularly education, in Central Asia and Muslim republics in Russia. While SAM RT officials and Tatar government officials frequently employ narratives about protecting Tatar national identity from foreign intrusion (see Chapter Five), SAM RT previously accepted foreign funding. The mufti made several statements in 2006 acknowledging receiving over $3 million in "from various Arab funds".[293] These alterative revenue streams allowed SAM RT a degree of leverage vis-à-vis the Tatar regime in negotiations, which has subsequently been reduced.

The Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity

The next major federal piece of legislation on religion, the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity, was adopted in 2002. This law did not purport to be evenly applied to all religious groups. The law is aimed and, in practice, almost exclusively applied to Muslims and members of new religious movements. The definition of "extremism" in the law was changed via amendments in 2006 and 2007. The definition is a paragraph of imprecise clauses, including:

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[291] Arnold, " 'Extremism' Religious Freedom Survey."
[292] Sibireva, "Freedom of Conscience in Russia: Restrictions and Challenges in 2015."
[293] Mukhametshin, "Islamic Discourses in the Volga-Urals," 57.

> Forcible change of the foundations of the constitutional system and violation of integrity of the Russian Federation;… incitement to social; racial, national [ethnic] or religious discord; …propaganda of exclusiveness, superiority or inferiority of an individual based on his/her social, racial, national [ethnic], religious or linguistic identity, or his/her attitude to religion.[294]

The vagueness of these clauses has been leveraged at the federal and regional level to officially define the boundaries of acceptable religious identity and practice. In Tatarstan, this law has been used to prosecute people from minority Muslim groups.[295] In 2004, four members of Hizb ut-Tahrir were prosecuted under this law and charged with inciting ethnic and religious hatred as well as belonging to an extremist organization.[296] Additionally this law is used to repress opposition. Fauziya Bairamova, a Tatar nationalist activist, was also charged with inciting ethnic hatred under the extremism law in 2014 for opposing the Russian invasion of Crimea and expressing her support for Crimean Tatars who opposed annexation.[297] Bairamova's activism stood in contrast to Tatarstan's paradiplomacy[298] efforts towards Crimea—attempting to portray an image of religious freedom for Tatar Muslims. More broadly, the law is part of a federal push to securitize Islam. This holds the potential danger for Tatarstan—if Kazan is unable to project control to the center, extremism could be used as a pretense for central intrusion.

The Law on Freedom of Confession and Religious Organizations

Tatarstan has attempted to centralize its control over the religious sphere within its territory. In 1999, the year after SAM RT was established in Tatarstan, a

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[294] Sibireva, "Freedom of Conscience in Russia."
[295] I am not using the word group here in the context of the 1997 law distinction between religious groups and religious organizations.
[296] Fraser, "Tolerant Islam Should Be Protected."
[297] Fraser, "Tolerant Islam Should Be Protected"; "Tatarstan's Outspoken Activist Gets One-Year-In-Prison Suspended Sentence."
[298] Sharafutdinova, "Paradiplomacy in the Russian Regions: Tatarstan's Search for Statehood."

republican law, the Law on Freedom on Confession and Religious Organizations, was passed that legally and officially awarded a monopoly to SAMK. Any other Muslim institutions were deemed illegal. Article 10 of the Law on Freedom on Confession and Religious Organizations directly states that Muslim organizations in Tatarstan must be, "…Directed by one centralized religious organization, SAM RT."[299] Reportedly, SAM RT lobbied the Tatar government to model this law off of the national 1997 law. According to this logic, just as the 1997 law benefited the Orthodox Church and encouraged its primacy in Russia, the republican law should encourage not just the primacy of Islam, but of SAM RT, in Tatarstan.[300] While in Kazakhstan, policies on Islam are enforced so that SAMK is the only Muslim institution, this is not actually laid out in any law.

Article 10 was repealed in 2004 by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.[301] In an interesting case of boundary control, the case was brought before the Supreme Court by a group of imams who opposed SAM RT's monopoly.[302] Ensuring regional laws, particularly in Tatarstan, which had a vibrant nationalist movement in the 1990s, comply with federal law has been a priority under Putin. This type of violation of Tatarstan's boundary control indicates that Moscow will not allow Tatarstan, or other Muslim republics, to construct an *official* monopoly on Islam. Since 2004 Tatarstan has ensured it complies with federal law and that there is

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[299] *Zakon Respubliki Tatarstan "O sovesti i o religioznykh ob"edineniiakh,"* Kazan 1999, 25; Ponarin, "The Potential of Radical Islam in Tatarstan," 11; Mukhametshin, *Islam v obshchestvennoi i politicheskoi zhizni tatar i Tatarstana v XX veke;* Nabiyev, "Islam in Soviet and Post-Soviet Spaces: Forms of Survival and Existence," 112-114; Gallyamov, "Islamic Revival in Volga Ural-Macro Region: A Comparative Analysis of the Bashkortostan and Tatarstan Models," 88. *Islam from the Caspian to the Urals: Macro-regional Approach*, 88.

[300] Mukhametshin, "Islamic Discourses in the Volga-Urals."

[301] Ponarin, "The Potential of Radical Islam in Tatarstan," 13.

[302] Ponarin, "The Potential of Radical Islam in Tatarstan," 13.

regional symmetry with federal law. Despite this power shift, the Tatar regime has continued to use SAM RT to co-opt Islam and employed the same mechanisms.

Tatarstan has been unable to establish a legal monopoly on Islam, though the Tatar regime has employed federal laws, particularly laws on extremism, to repress potential challenges to its authority within the religious realm. While Kazakhstan has in place more legal restrictions and barriers to register for all religious groups, Kazakhstan has not granted a legal monopoly to SAMK. Both regimes have ultimately benefited from their respective official distance from SAMK and SAM RT. Tatarstan's compliance with federal law and lack of legislative independence leaves its government agency with less official duties.

Government Institution: Tatarstan Presidential Inter-ethnic and Inter-faith Relations Council

As in Kazakhstan, the government agency responsible for religion in Tatarstan was repurposed from the same Soviet predecessors, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (CAROC) and the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC), which were later subsumed into the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA). In contrast to Kazakhstan, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a Council for Religious Affairs at the national level was not repurposed. At the federal level, the Ministry of Justice is responsible with ensuring compliance with the religion law.[303] Most regions in Russia (particularly republics) have repurposed this institution and have religious affairs councils.

The Religious Affairs Council (RAC) in Tatarstan since independence was originally under the Cabinet of Ministers. The RAC was then reorganized into two formally separate offices, the Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations and

[303] "Russia 2016 International Religious Freedom Report."

the Office of State Confessional Relations. Both offices were shifted from the Cabinet of Ministers to the Presidential Administration. The former Director of the Religious Affairs Council, Nabiev Rinat Akhmatgalievich, stated that given the importance in controlling religion to the Tatar regime, the office that regulates religion was transferred from the Cabinet of Ministers to the Presidential Administration because, "…If the office is under the presidential administration, it allows for more strict control."[304] A similar sentiment was echoed by the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, the preeminent institution for Muslim education in Tatarstan (as well as within Russia). When asked why the office was reorganized, he stated:

> Imams were not always giving objective information. SAM RT and this office have discussions about policies on Islam. It's not just a political issue, but also an issue of education. In Arsk[305] for example there are 76 mosques and they need 77 imams. But only 30 of the imams have religious education. This is not only a problem of SAM RT or this university. We[306] wrote to the Office that there are not enough imams and the president ordered that the situation be studied and how to get more young imams.[307]

Thus, both prominent figures referenced the need for further control of Islam, the latter to rectify perceived low levels of religious knowledge amongst imams. Despite these assertions, the office has increasingly had fewer official duties and is no longer a central actor in setting religious policy in Tatarstan.

The Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations and the Office of State Confessional Relations under the Presidential Administration in 2017 was once again reorganized and collapsed into one office, the Tatarstan Presidential Inter-ethnic and Inter-faith Relations Council under the Presidential Administration. This office is still under the Presidential Administration. The Presidential Inter-ethnic and Inter-

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[304] Interview with Former Director of RAC, Kazan, 2015.
[305] A city in northern Tatarstan,
[306] Referring to himself and SAM RT.
[307] Interview with the Rector of Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.

faith Relations Council now describes itself as an advisory board to the President, which proposes policies related to religion and ethnicity

Its remit is broad and its duties are not well specified. Notably, this Council is not as actively involved with implementing existing laws on religion or policies on religion more generally as in Kazakhstan. This is line with the limited ability Tatarstan has to set its legislative agenda on religion. Rather, religious policy is primarily set by SAM RT in conjunction with government actors, including the President and secret security services, informally and from behind the scenes.[308] In Kazakhstan, officials in SAMK as well as imams referenced their interactions with the RAC and were able to identify the role of the RAC in Kazakhstan. On the other hand, interviewees in Tatarstan referenced secret security services, the Tatar government as a general entity, and the President as the government actors involved with setting policy on religion.

While the Council is not as active in Tatarstan in terms of routine interactions with religious groups, it was instrumental in setting up SAM RT in Tatarstan and ensuring all mosques complied with the dictates of SAM RT. The former head of the RAC recounted to me how he wrote to the President of Tatarstan, President Shamil, to make the case for there to be a single institution for Islam, while admitting that he believed that requiring all religious expression to be associated with SAM RT was in violation of federal law.[309]

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[308] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015; Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015; Chief of Staff of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015; Director of Islam Review, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015; Head Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015; Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.

[309] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015. Indeed, it was ruled unconstitutional in 2004.

Despite this initial involvement, compared to Tatarstan the Kazakhstani RAC presently has a more active role and engages more frequently and directly with religious groups, while the RAC in Tatarstan was more actively involved in the 1990s. This stems in large part due to the large role afforded to the RAC in Kazakhstan during the implementation of the law and the requirement starting in 2012 for all religious organizations to register. Alternatively, Tatarstan no longer primarily controls the religious sphere through legislation. Reflecting this, when I asked the Head of Propaganda for SAM RT how he would characterize the relationship between SAM RT and the Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations, he primarily spoke about the President of Tatarstan:

> There is a good relationship. The government, under the President of Tatarstan, helps SAM RT in Tatarstan. He helps to create propaganda about the right relationship between the government and Muslims.[310]

Relatedly, more imams in Kazakhstan were familiar with the RAC than in Tatarstan and cited the close working relationship between the RAC and SAMK.

After the fall of the USSR, Tatarstan along with other republics in Russia continued to utilize a Soviet governmental institution, but for new political aims. Rather than aiming to ultimately suppress Islam in its entirety, the Tatar regime has sought to bolster its legitimacy through its relationship with Islam. Projecting the strength of Tatar national and religious identity towards Moscow had proved, prior to Putin, a powerful tactic when negotiating with Moscow.[311] Hence the previous effort to legalize SAM RT's monopoly and the RAC's involvement in this anointment. Since the 2000s, efforts at identity formation have primarily not occurred in the legislative arena or through a government agency. Both the Tatar and Kazakhstani

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[310] Interview with Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.
[311] See for example Treisman, "Russia's Ethnic Revival: The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in a Postcommunist Order."

regime distance themselves from religious policy through the quasi-governmental agency of SAM. However, as a subnational regime Tatarstan has had to comply since the early 2000s with federal law and has resorted to more informal measures. Thus, there is even further distance between the official capacity of the government and the religious policies established in Tatarstan.

While imams in Tatarstan were well acquainted with SAM RT, most were largely unaware of the Religious Affairs Council or the Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations and did not recount any interactions with government officials from the Ministry. This lack of awareness further down the hierarchy is indicative of the effectiveness of the co-optation of Islam in Tatarstan through institutions. The lack of knowledge among imams about the RAC or Office for Cooperation with Religious Association's involvement with SAM RT allows for the perception of the Tatar regime being removed from the religious sphere, enhancing the legitimacy of SAM RT.

Quasi-Governmental Agency: The Spiritual Association of Muslims in the Republic of Tatarstan (SAM RT)

In both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, nationalist movements sought to create a national institution for Islam to further foster a religious nationalist consciousness. The push to create a nationalized version of SADUM for Kazakhstan was spearheaded by a nationalist party, Alash.[312] A similar parallel can be found with the Ittifaq party in Tatarstan. The promotion of a national religious identity was at the forefront of creating a national consciousness and supported by both regimes. Unlike

[312] See for example Peyrouse, "Islam in Central Asia: National Specificities and Postsoviet Globalisation," 255; Achilov, "Islamic Revival and Civil Society in Kazakhstan," 100.

Kazakhstan, Tatarstan sought to create a religious monopoly amidst competing central Islamic institutions.

In the early 1990s, Tatarstan had a vibrant nationalist movement that entailed claims of sovereignty. As part of this movement, national religious identity became a potentially potent source of mobilization that President Shaimiev of Tatarstan was able to use as a strong bargaining chip with the center. Shortly after independence there were various competing sources of religious authority in Tatarstan. The All-Tatar Public Center (VTOT), a Tatar nationalist organization, was founded in 1988.[313] A faction of the VTOT then established a party called Ittifaq (Union) in 1990, which was headed by Fauziya Bairamova and Rafael Mukhametdinov.[314] Ittifaq began to agitate against that fact that the (Soviet institution) Spiritual Association of the Muslims of European Russia and Siberia (DUMES) was headquartered in Ufa, the capital of the neighboring republic, Bashkortostan. Ittifaq envisioned DUMES as being headquartered in Kazan in order to promote Tatarstan as the center for Islam in Russia. Meeting resistance from DUMES, Ittifaq created a separate and competing Muslim institution in Tatarstan, the Spiritual Association of Muslims in the Republic of Tatarstan (SAM RT) in 1992.[315] The creation of SAM RT was sanctioned by the Tatar regime, further strengthening the support President Shaimiev initially received from Tatar nationalists.

Like Kazakhstan, the creation of a Spiritual Association of Muslims encapsulated national demands from below. In Tatarstan, the regime also had to contend with competition from above. In response to the creation of SAM RT, a competing local version of a spiritual association of Muslims was created in Tatarstan

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[313] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan: Islam Entwined with Nationalism," 104.
[314] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan: Islam entwined with Nationalism," 104.
[315] Ibid.; Ponarin, "The Potential of Radical Islam in Tatarstan," 10.

in 1992, the Regional Spiritual Association of Muslims of Tatarstan. The Regional Spiritual Association of Muslims of Tatarstan was part of the Central Spiritual Association of Muslims in Russia, the repurposed and renamed version of the Spiritual Association of the Muslims of European Russia and Siberia (DUMES).[316] In response, the Tatar regime sought to maintain its boundary control in the religious sphere by creating barriers for the Central Spiritual Association of Muslims in Russia to operate in Tatarstan and therefore bolster SAM RT.[317]

A Unifying Congress of Islamic Clergy was convened by President Shaimiev in February of 1998.[318] At this conference it was declared that only one single Muslim institution, SAM RT, was allowed in Tatarstan. In exchange for this monopoly, SAM RT traded its relative independence from the regime. Gabdulla Galiulla became the

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[316] The Central Spiritual Association of Muslims in Russia is one of the only Muslim institutions to have statewide registration. Its headquarters are in Ufa, the capital of the neighboring republic, Bashkortostan. The Central Spiritual Association of Muslims in Russia currently includes the Spiritual Association of Muslims in Bashkortostan, Mari El, Mordovia, Chuvashia, Udmurtia, and Astrakhan, Vladimir, Volgograd, Kurgan, Kirov, Omsk and Novosibirsk (Siberia), Orenburg, Penza, Rostov, Samara, Sverdlovsk, Ulyanovsk and Chelyabinsk region, Khanty-Mansi and Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District, North-West (St. Petersburg). "Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Russia." A rivaling central institution, the Council of Muftis of Russia, was created in 1996 by Ravil Gainutdin. The Council of Muftis has support from within Moscow, while other government officials favor the Central Spiritual Association of Muslims in Russia. "Russia Muftis Council: Plans for the Future,"; Hahn, "The All-Russian Ulema Council: A Step Towards a Unified 'Rossiiskyi Islam'?"; Malashenko, "Islam in Russia." Indicative of its relationship to the center, the Council of Muftis allocates the number of spots for each region for hajj. "Russian Council Of Muftis Allocates Quotas For 2013 Hajj." Some steps have been taken to unite these national institutions. In 2016, after I conducted my fieldwork, an attempt to start to reduce this divisions was embarked upon with the creation of the All Russian Ulema Council, which has the broad goal of unifying Islamic teachings in Russia. Hahn, "The All-Russian Ulema Council."

[317] Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan: Islam Entwined with Nationalism," 104; Ponarin, "The Potential of Radical Islam in Tatarstan," 15.

[318] Hunter, *Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security*, 61.

mufti (leader) of SAM RT in 1992, but he was replaced at the behest of the Tatar president with Gusman Iskhakov in 1998.[319]

SAM RT's monopoly was further solidified in 1999 with the passage of the Law on Freedom of Confession and Religious Organizations, which enshrined into law that only one Muslim organization could operate in Tatarstan, SAM RT. The former Head of the RAC recounted to me how he proposed this provision to the President of Tatarstan, despite his personal belief that such a law would be illegal and in violation of federal law. The former Director of the RAC also discussed in our conversation how he personally wrote the provision in Article 10 of the law, which stated that SAM RT would be the only Muslim institution legally allowed in Tatarstan.[320] When I asked the former Director of the RAC which Muslim groups in Tatarstan could be registered he stated:

> All groups are in SAM RT. They have to state which central group they want to be a part of. Random groups cannot be registered because they are not serious. Tatarstan is a subject of Russia, so Muslims communities must declare which organization they belong to. There is only one Spiritual Association of Muslims in Tatarstan. According to federal law, there can be three Spiritual Associations of Muslims in a region, but when we created the charter for SAM RT, this was not a provision. There was a provision that only one Spiritual Association of Muslims can exist in Tatarstan. By putting this provision in, we totally understood that this was illegal and would be canceled in the future. However, it was a way to fight for this unified Spiritual Association of Muslims. We knew that the process to cancel this provision could take two or three years, and in this time, SAM RT would be strong enough and it would be more difficult for other communities to weaken SAM RT.[321]

Article 10 of the Law on Freedom of Confession and Religious Organizations was indeed eventually removed from the law after appeals by several imams to the

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[319] Gabdulla Galiulla became the mufti (leader) of SAM RT in 1992, but he was replaced at the heist of the Tatar president with Gusman Iskhakov in 1998. Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan: Islam Entwined with Nationalism," 108.
[320] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, 2015.
[321] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, 2015.

Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in 2004.[322] At this point, SAM RT's position was entrenched and has subsequently been maintained through informal mechanisms. Having contained pressures from above, President Shaimiev turned to pressures from below. He increasingly viewed parts of the nationalist movement as a liability with the potential to foster alternative sources of legitimacy outside of the republican regime. With the threat from above neutralized, the party offices of Ittifaq were closed subsequently in 2005.[323] As noted above, Fauziya Bairamova, a leader of Ittifaq, was arrested under federal laws on extremism. As in Kazakhstan, while Tatarstan has primarily attempted to pursue co-optation in the religious sphere, it resorts to selective swift repression of religious opposition leaders.

While SAM RT was initiated by Ittifaq, in exchange for a monopoly, SAM RT became a quasi-governmental agency. In returning to the criteria for a quasi-governmental agency, as with SAMK in Kazakhstan it is not possible to access SAM RT's budget and determine how it is funded. Interviewees at SAM RT and imams also asserted (as in Kazakhstan) that it is funded by sadaka, or donations by mosque attendees.[324] Alternatively, the mufti of SAM RT has made statements in the past about receiving foreign funding.[325]Additionally, other sources point to funding from the Tatar government budget itself.[326] As in Kazakhstan, this lack of transparency is unsurprising in an authoritarian regime.

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[322] Ponarin, "The Potential of Radical Islam in Tatarstan," 13.
[323] Ponarin, "The Potential of Radical Islam in Tatarstan," 15.
[324] Interview with Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C3, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C5, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015;
[325] Mukhametshin, "Islamic Discourses in the Volga-Urals," 57.
[326] Gallyamov, "Islamic Revival in Volga Ural-Macro Region: A Comparative Analysis of the Bashkortostan and Tatarstan Models," 88; Mukhametshin, *Islam v obshchestvennoi i politicheskoi zhizni tatar i Tatarstana v XX veke,*194-204.

Both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan resurrected a Spiritual Association of Muslims shortly after independence. In Tatarstan, the impetus to grant a monopoly occurred in shorter succession given Tatarstan's status as a subnational regime required it to also fight often intrusion from above. Under Putin, Tatarstan is no longer allowed to have regional laws that violate federal law, such as Article 10. Despite this, Tatarstan has been able to maintain its religious monopoly— SAM RT remains the only Muslim institution in Tatarstan and an unofficial policy of banning other Muslim organizations continues. Both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan encapsulate Islam in part through the co-optation of mosques—a process which occurs outside a legal framework in both cases.

Encapsulation of Mosques and Knowledge Production

As in Kazakhstan, extensive efforts have been made in Tatarstan to encapsulate Islam. The effort to encapsulate mosques into a Muslim institution began over a decade earlier in Tatarstan. The process to encapsulate mosques and religious knowledge is deconstructed and compared to Kazakhstan in the following section.

Encapsulation of Mosques

SAM RT divides Tatarstan into forty-eight administrative territories, *muhtasibates* to facilitate its control.[327] These units largely align with Tatar's governmental administrative units, including districts and rayons. Each muhtasibate oversees mosques within its jurisdiction. At the outset of 1991, there was only one working mosque in all of Tatarstan. In contrast, as of 2015 there are approximately 1,200 mosques in Tatarstan.[328] There are seven rayons or districts in the city proper of Kazan and over 50 mosques in these seven rayons. I randomly selected one mosque

[327] "Muhtasibates," Spiritual Association of Muslims in the Republic of Tatarstan.
[328] Derrick, "Territoriality and the Muslim Spiritual Boards of Post-Soviet Russia," 3026.

per rayon in Kazan and conducted interviews with imams and mosque attendees at each of these mosques.[329] Additionally, I also conducted interviews at the first mosque constructed in Kazan, Marjani or Mosque C1, which was financed by Catherine the Great and was the only mosque open from the late 1930s until 1991 in Tatarstan.[330]

As in Kazakhstan, Tatarstan has both government constructed and co-opted mosques. Government constructed mosques are either built with funding from the government or commissioned by high level government officials. Co-opted mosques do not receive financial support from the government and were independently constructed. Marjani Mosque (C1) and Mosque C2 are both government constructed mosques. Both mosques received funding from the regime (under Catherine the Great at the time) and both have also received funding from the current Tatar regime for reconstruction and maintenance. This funding has been provided under schemes to protect historical heritage buildings.[331] The other mosques are co-opted mosques and do not receive funding from the government and were co-opted into SAM RT in 1998 (if constructed prior to then) or at the time of construction if built after 1998. Similar to Kazakhstan, there is a high degree of intertwinement between government constructed mosques and SAM RT. Notably, the head imam of Mosque C2 is simultaneously the Head of the Propaganda Department of SAM RT. Table 1 below identifies which mosques are government constructed or co-opted, the date of

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[329] Mosques were identified using Google Maps, 2GIS (a platform that provides maps, business listings, and directions) and several other websites. Mosques were randomly selected using a random number generator provided by random.org. See Methodology Appendix for further details. "Google Maps,"; "Map of Kazan,"; "Random.Org: True Random Number Service,"

[330] Luehrmann, *Religion in Secular Archives: Soviet Atheism and Historical Knowledge*, 55.

[331] Interview with Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015.

construction and when they were co-opted into SAM RT as identified by interviews with imams of each mosque and officials in SAM RT.

Table 1. Mosques in Kazan

Mosque	Mosque Classification	Constructed	Incorporated into SAMK
Mosque C1 (Marjani)	Government Constructed	1770	1998
Mosque C2 (Apanayevskaya)	Government Constructed	1771/2011 (re-opened)[1]	2011
Mosque C3	Co-opted	2000	2000
Mosque C4	Co-opted	1890	1996
Mosque C5	Co-opted	Unknown[2]	1998
Mosque C6	Co-opted	2013	2013
Mosque C7	Co-opted	2015	2015
Mosque C8	Co-opted	2003	2003
Mosque C9	Co-opted	1987	1998

1 Mosque C3 was constructed in 1771, though closed during the Soviet Union and subsequently reopened in 2011 after refurbishment.
2 The imam of this mosque was unsure of the year when the mosque was constructed.

As in Kazakhstan, while the Tatar regime prefers to co-opt mosques, resistance to co-optation has been met with repression. Some mosques in Tatarstan have been closed ostensibly for ideological reasons or under the premise of building code violations. The imam of Al-Ikhlas Mosque in Tatarstan was sentenced to two years in prison for being part of Hizb ut-Tahir.[332] This sentence was later increased to five years for resisting eviction.[333] The imam, Imam Rusten Safin, was charged under federal extremism laws. However, the mosque itself was closed due to a supposed building violation.[334] In interviews with two mosques attendees at a different co-opted mosque, two people independently (and unprompted) described themselves as supporters of Imam Safin and as former attendees at Al-Ikhlas Mosque. They refuted the suggestion that Imam Safin belonged to Hizb ut-Tahir. Instead they asserted that

[332] Interview with Former Attendee A of Al-Ikhlas Mosque, Kazan, 2015; Interview with Former Attendee B of Al-Ikhlas Mosque, Kazan, 2015; "Kazan Court Upholds Sentence Of Closed Mosque Imam."
[333] "Tatarstan Court Upholds Evicted Mosque Members' Sentences."
[334] "Tatarstan Court Upholds Evicted Mosque Members' Sentences."

these charges were brought because Safin differed theologically from SAM RT and he was punished for not conforming.[335]

The process of encapsulating mosques into the Spiritual Association of Muslims began over a decade earlier in Tatarstan than in Kazakhstan. In Tatarstan, there was originally an attempt to formalize this co-optation through the law; however, the republic reverted to informal efforts to co-opt mosques. While Kazakhstan did pass a law on religion, the co-optation of mosques into SAMK was never laid out in the law itself. The informal process to co-opt mosques into each respective Spiritual Association of Muslims is remarkably similar. In both cases, theological deviation as well as attempts to resist co-option or form an independence source of religious legitimacy was met with repression.

Resource and Access Disparities

While the process to encapsulate mosques into the Spiritual Association of Muslims followed the same blueprint in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan, the differences between government constructed and co-opted mosques was not as stark in Tatarstan in terms of resources and accessibility. The government constructed mosques in Tatarstan are by far the oldest mosques. These mosques have been able to successfully appeal to government to be labeled as historically significant sites in order to receive funding.

In Kazakhstan, the government constructed mosques morph co-opted mosques in terms of size and capacity. In Tatarstan, despite not receiving funds from the government, some co-opted mosques rivaled government constructed mosques in terms of capacity. While both government constructed mosques reported over 1,000

[335] Interview with Mosque Attendee C, Kazan, 2015; Mosque Attendee D, Kazan, 2015.

attendees during Friday prayer services, two of the co-opted mosques, Mosque C3 and Mosque C6, also reported attendance close to 1,000.[336] Mosque C6, at the request of SAM RT, kept detailed records of attendance. An employee of the mosque showed me the log where he kept track of attendees as well as the security system with cameras where he observed people arriving at the mosque.[337] All other co-opted mosques reported attendance at 300 or below. Mosque C3 provided extensive social services to attendees with disabilities, filling in a coverage gap that is not adequately addressed by the government.[338]

At other co-opted mosques besides Mosque C3 and C6, the disparity in resources and accessibility was more evident. The government constructed mosques were the most well maintained in terms of upkeep and external appearances and also had more imams. Among co-opted mosques, Mosques C3 and C6 are better maintained and had more resources than other co-opted mosques. All of the mosques in Tatarstan receive funding in part from donations or sadaka from attendees. Some mosques are also funded by wealthy sponsors. Mosque C3 and Mosque C6 were both able to secure foreign funding. The construction of Mosque C3 was funded by a foreign wealthy sponsor and continues to be funded by the same sponsor as well as others, which provides the salaries for imams and for the maintenance of the mosque. The construction of Mosque C6 was similarly funded primarily by wealthy sponsors.

On the other hand, Mosque C5 for example, lacked basic amenities and was merely a several room building in a subdivision of apartment buildings. The facilities

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[336] Interview with Imam of Mosque C3, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015.
[337] Interview with Employee of Mosque of C6, Kazan, 2015.
[338] Interview with Imam of Mosque C3, Kazan, 2015; Employee of Mosque C3, Kazan, 2015. Mosque C3 did receive funding from the government for the provision of social services. I do not categorize Mosque C3 as government constructed given the directed nature of these funds.

were run down—the roof of the mosque had a severe slope, and it was surrounded by unpaved ground that made it difficult to walk through given the deep mud that arose when it was raining or due to melting snow. Chapter Four discusses in more depth how mosque attendees chose which mosques to attend—the maintenance of a mosque and the amenities provided were factors for some people.

Gender: Accessibility and Resources for Women

In general, the government constructed mosques were more accessible for women and had more educational resources available for women. Both government constructed mosques had dedicated prayer rooms for women. On the other hand, only one co-opted mosque in Kazan had a dedicated prayer room for women, Mosque C4. While people came to mosques for various reasons (covered in Chapter 6)—including to pray, for the anniversary of the death of family members, and to read the Qur'an—mosques that provide spaces for women were commonly perceived by women as more welcoming. At co-opted Mosque C5, for example, I was the only woman present at the mosque for the duration of my interviews, which took place over the course of several days. Similarly, while I interviewed women who were attending nikahs, or religious wedding ceremonies, at Mosque C3, I observed no other women at the mosque. Given the mosque closely tracked attendance at each prayer time, I had asked about the number of attendees at each prayer. When asked to clarify the gender breakdown of attendees, the mosque employee replied that he only counted men.

Similarly, only government constructed mosques and Mosque C4 had opportunities for religious education. Marjani mosque (Mosque C1) and Mosque C4 hold regularly scheduled classes for women. The resources for women available at these three mosques are also reflected in the number of women who attend each mosque. At Mosque C1 an older middle age woman held classes for younger women

in their 20s and 30s. The classes covered religious topics and also served as a source of community. During observation, the instructor was teaching her students Arabic script and pronunciation. The classes also covered marital issues. In contrast, the classes at co-opted Mosque C4 primarily served elderly women. The women knew each other well and it was for many students it was their cherished weekly outing from their home. Some of the classes taught Arabic after some of the women expressed a desire to learn more about their religion in their later life. Proportionally, I interviewed the most women at Mosque C4, where women were coming to mosques for life events, notably wedding ceremonies (45 percent of interviewees). At Mosque C4, less than a third of the people interviewed were women (28 percent), which was the second highest proportion. I did not observe any women at Mosques C6, C7, or C8.

The better maintenance and facilities at government constructed mosques in Tatarstan increases incentives for mosque attendees to visit these mosques. However, the disparities between government constructed and co-opted mosques in Tatarstan is not as stark as in Kazakhstan and doesn't pose as great of a long-term problem in terms of generating resentment among imams. For example, the government constructed mosques in Astana are massive, with one of the mosques boasting an attendance capacity of 10,000. Given that the two government constructed mosques are also the oldest mosques in Tatarstan, government funding is more easily justified to maintain these mosques given their historical significance. There is also more variation amongst co-opted mosques in terms of the resources available and maintenance that is directly tied to sponsors each mosque is able to obtain. In both cases, however, co-opted mosques are generally inaccessible for women, with a few exceptions. Government constructed mosques, by providing prayer room and

educational resources, are often the only venues for women to publicly practice their faith as well as learn more about their faith. As in Kazakhstan, this increases the incentive for women to attend government constructed mosques and consume government sponsored religious sources.

Encapsulation of Knowledge Production

In addition to encapsulating all mosques in Tatarstan in SAM RT and providing more resources to government constructed mosques so that they are more attractive for citizens, further efforts are made to create a monopoly on the right to produce knowledge. This has been enforced by restricting the avenues available for religious leaders to develop, controlling the content of the Friday message for all mosques throughout Tatarstan, producing and promoting SAM RT affiliated websites and literature, and only allowing religious educational opportunities associated with SAM RT.

Religious Appointments

The only viable avenue for religious leaders to emerge in Tatarstan is through SAM RT. The head of SAM RT is granted the title of mufti and SAM RT is colloquially called the muftiate (as in Kazakhstan), granting it more legitimacy than a name reminiscent of a Soviet government organization. The mufti is selected at a conference held every four years. When describing the selection process the former Director of the RAC stated:

> In 1998 on February 14th SAM RT was created. Then there was one Spiritual Association of Muslims of Tatarstan in 1998. It was created at a united conference. This conference is held every four years at which a new mufti is elected. Then the mufti proposes his deputy muftis and judges. Before this, the mufti could have changed every month. This was a mess and there was no order. This helps to make it easier, more effective. This is so there isn't conflict. This is so there is no conflict and no problems. Before it was

> different. SAM RT in Ufa and SAM RT in Tatarstan are the most important instrument against extremism like Chechnya.[339]

The current mufti of SAM RT is Kamil Samiigullin, who was selected in 2013.[340] The mufti is the most high-profile religious figure in Tatarstan. As in Kazakhstan, elites I spoke with struggled to identify religious leaders besides the mufti. When asked to identify religious leaders in Tatarstan, elite interviewees were only able to identify the mufti as well as the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute in Kazan (covered later in the Religious Education section below).[341] The Head of Propaganda of SAM RT argued that the mufti of Tatarstan was not only considered a religious leader in Tatarstan, but in Russia as a whole.[342]

Other positions of local leadership are also controlled through SAM RT. In order to become an imam in Tatarstan, each imam's appointment must be approved by SAM RT.[343] The deputy imam of the Marjani mosque (government constructed) stated that, "All mosques must be in SAM RT in order to ensure order, so there won't be extremism or sects. This is necessary for control. SAM edifies imams. SAM controls and appoints all imams." He further elaborated that, "If there were independent mosques, there would be independent imams and they could tell people incorrect things."[344] This was echoed by the rector of the Russian Islamic University, who stated that, "Imams weren't always giving objective information." Imams now

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[339] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, 2015.
[340] "The Mufti of the Republic of Tatarstan."
[341] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, 2015; Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015; Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015; Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015.
[342] Interview with the Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015.
[343] Interview with the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C1, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C3, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C5, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C7, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.
[344] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjnai Mosque, Kazan, 2015.

must be re-approved every three years by SAM RT. One imam described the process of obtaining certification from SAM RT (shakhadatnamaa) as akin to obtaining a license.[345] Additionally, all imams must be part of the Hanafi mazhab.[346] One imam remarked about this criterion:

> Our imams are only Hanafi. In other countries, they have different opinions. Different opinions bring imbalance. A regulation was passed, so there will be balance and all in Tatarstan will be Hanafi. There is democracy, but not for the population.[347]

In addition to ascertaining the approval of SAM RT in order to become an imam, interviewees also discussed the role of the local city administrations and the secret services in the appointment process for imams. When describing who needs to approve the appointment of imams, one imam stated, "The rayon administration, the chair of the rayon needs to approve…The mufti, the narod,[348] and the FSB[349] must also approve."[350] When I asked whether the rayon administration and the FSB were always involvement in the appointment process, he replied, "Yes, there is secret control. Because we work with the community, so the imam needs to be predictable because of the threat of sects."[351] Another imam described how, "…secret agencies," are, "…concerned," about imams, "…because they take care about situations in society. The imam is important to speak with because religion and society are

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[345] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015. Since 2002, imams have had to qualify for a certificate (shakhadatnamaa) in order to participate in religious activities. Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan: Islam Entwined with Nationalism," 110.
[346] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, 2015; Chief of Staff of SAM RT Kazan, 2015; Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015; Deputy Imam of Mosque C1, Kazan; 2015; Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C5, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C7, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.
[347] Interview with Imam of Mosque C7, Kazan, 2015.
[348] Narod (народ) in this context refers to the local community.
[349] The FSB is the successor to the Soviet secret services agency, the KGB.
[350] Interview with the Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.
[351] Interview with the Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015.

important to secret agencies."[352] Not a single imam cited the role of the Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations or the Office of State Confessional Relations under the Presidential Administration in this process.

Despite the clear monopoly SAM RT has on religious authority, there is some push back against the current leadership of SAM RT. When asked about whom he would identify as a religious authority in Tatarstan, one highly ranked official stated that, "There is a problem of religious authority in the Republic of Tatarstan. …There are few religious authorities." He continued to state that, "The mufti is in principle is not necessarily a religious authority. The mufti is like a manager— he does not need deep knowledge or education. The position is like a government official, not a formal leader."[353] Another imam while emphasizing that he respected the current mufti, made a point several times throughout my interview with him to emphasize the young age of the mufti. He further discussed that he was close in age with the mufti and inferring that the relative youth of the mufti is found by some in Tatarstan as problematic.[354] These comments are reflective of internal contention for power within SAM RT, not necessarily challenges to the institution itself.

On the other hand, there have been some attempts to create a sphere of influence outside of SAM RT. The most notable power struggle involved the former imam of Kul Sharif Mosque, Ramil Yunusov, in the Tatar Kremlin and the former mufti of SAM RT, Ildus Faizov. The reconstruction of Kul Sharif Mosque was heralded as a symbol of the resurgence of Islam and Tatar nationalism within Tatarstan. Kul Sharif Mosque was originally destroyed in 1552 during the Russo-Kazan war between the Kazan Khanate and Muscovite Russia that resulted in the

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[352]Interview with the Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015.
[353] Interview with Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.
[354] Interview with Imam W, Kazan, 2015.

conquering of Kazan.[355] The mosque was reconstructed in 2005. However, the mosque was officially a museum, not a place or worship, and thus previously not officially part of SAM RT. One highly ranked official attributed the conflict to the mufti's desire to incorporate Kul Sharif into SAM RT and the imam of the mosque trying to maintain his independence.[356] When asked why the mosque wasn't previously a part of SAM RT he stated:

> You need to remember that it was not a mosque. In the Kremlin there is a mosque and a church, the government wants there to be a certain level of religiosity. It's more like a cultural house and museum. The imam didn't want Kul Sharif to be an official mosque and therefore be in SAM and controlled by SAM. In the same year, there was an attempt to kill the mufti, there was a car bomb. The government now has a university for Islam to improve education because of this danger. Then the government started to actively control Islam.[357]

The imam of Kul Sharif was then accused by authorities of being Salafi and subsequently arrested and removed from his position.[358] Kul Sharif Mosque was then subsumed into SAM RT.[359]

More ominously, in 2012 two leaders of SAM RT were attacked. The mufti of SAM RT was targeted in a car bombing and injured (though he survived). The deputy mufti of SAM RT was shot and killed on the same day. The owner of an independent organization that organized trips for hajj and four other men were arrested.[360] The motivation was attributed by authorities to a financial dispute about SAM RT taking over organizations that organized hajj trips as well as ideological differences.[361]

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[355] Koesel, *Religion and Authoritarianism Cooperation,* 102.
[356] Interview with Official A, Kazan, 2015.
[357] Interview with Official A, Kazan, 2015.
[358] Ibid.
[359] Ibid.
[360] "Five Arrested In Tatar Attacks."
[361] "Five Arrested In Tatar Attacks,"; Pfeifer, "5 Suspects Held in Tatarstan Attacks,"; "In a First, Muslim Leaders Attacked in Tatarstan," Gutterman and Carbonnel, "Russia Detains 5 over Attacks on Muslim Leaders."

While shocking, acts of violence are rare in Tatarstan, and these attacks were widely viewed within Russia as surprising.

SAM RT, like SAMK, exclusively controls religious appointments in Tatarstan from the highest levels to controlling the appointments of imams at small mosques throughout the republic. SAM RT has held a monopoly over religious appointments since 1998. This process was tightened in 2002 when SAM RT decreed that all imams must requalify for a certificate every three years in order to maintain their appointment. SAM RT's monopoly over religious appointments has generated more opposition. The imam of Kul Sharif who attempted to create a separate well of support was arrested. The opposition in Tatarstan turned violent in one instance with the assassination of the deputy mufti. Tatarstan, in complying with federal law, has had less legal tools at its disposal to co-opt mosques. It has relied on federal extremism laws to enforce its monopoly through repression when opposition has arisen. In one high profile instance, the imam of Kul Sharif was denigrated as a "Salafi". A similar playbook of securitization can be observed in Kazakhstan. Likewise, both SAMK and SAM RT create and disseminate the Friday message.

Friday Message

As in Kazakhstan, more concerted efforts were made to control the content of the Friday message over time. These efforts entailed dictating the content of the message and sending it to every single mosque throughout Tatarstan starting in 2012.[362] In both cases, there is a high level of compliance by imams. Some language

[362] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, 2015; Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015; Rector of Russian Islamic University, Kazan, 2015; Director of Islam Today, Kazan, 2015; Imam A of Marjani Mosque (C1), Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C3, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C5, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C7, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C9, Kazan, 2015.

accommodations have also been granted to ethnic minority communities in Tatarstan.

As the case in Kazakhstan in 2015, the Friday messages are pre-printed in a book, the *Shura*, that is sent to imams and available for purchase. This process was confirmed with every imam interviewed as well as with the Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, the Director of the Russian Islamic Institute, the former Director of the Religious Affairs Committee, and the Director of Islam Today (a Muslim news service associated with SAM RT). Tatarstan implemented this mechanism years after SAM RT had a monopoly. This change was likely implemented in response to the opposition from the imam of Kul Sharif in order to prevent the Friday message from becoming a platform for other imams to grow independent bases. When describing the former imam of Kul Sharif, the Director of Islam Review (a news outlet associated with SAM RT)) discussed how he believed the imam used the Friday message to promote theology contrary to SAM RT and that his Friday messages had, "…strong Salafi tendencies messages."[363]

When I asked how the deputy imam of Marjani mosque decided on what to include in the Friday message he stated:

> Now we have SAM RT and they give us a journal, Shura. Every Friday they give us a theme. It is the same in all of Tatarstan. This is good because people do not always go to the same mosque and this way, they don't hear different messages if they go to a different mosque.[364]

When asked the same question, another imam elaborated:

> The muftiate decides; every mosque receives a journal from the muftiate. The muftiate controls what an imam can say. The Shura has the theme and a prepared text for the message. You can change a few small things, but the theme must remain the same… It is the same in all of Tatarstan. There are 1500 mosques in Tatarstan.[365]

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[363] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, 2015
[364] Interview with Imam of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015.
[365] Interview with Imam of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015.

All other imams interviewed reflected the statement that the message provided by SAM RT was considered obligatory. When asked how they prepared for Friday messages, the majority of imams stated that they simply read the message, while a few others stated that they could add some examples, but that the theme could not at all change.

When asked about the topic of the Friday messages, the topic of religious extremism was cited by several interviewees, including the threat of ISIS, as well as the conflict in Syria.[366] Other more innocuous topics included religious and national holidays, including the birthday of the Prophet.[367] Other Friday messages address topics related to morality, including a Friday message about the characteristics that should constitute being Muslim and about how people should help those with physical disabilities.[368]

One imam who conformed to the required message, nonetheless, spoke out against it:

> We don't have a choice in the theme. We receive the theme in the *Shura* journal. There is also an electronic journal. But I don't agree with this, but I am a teacher… I am well read. Jummah,[369] it is good for self-education. When I choose a topic, my knowledge increases. But *Shura*, stops this self-improvement process, prevents imams from learning more… *Shura*, it started when the new mufti started in his position. It is a political question, because imams didn't give good messages during the Friday message. Maybe the FSB told them you need to change, because one imam talks about this and another talks about something else. I say, because we studied at different madrassas, maybe that's why it's different.[370]

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[366] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, 2015; Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015; Rector of the Russian Islamic University, Kazan, 2015; Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.
[367] Interview with the Head of Propaganda for SAM RT, Kazan, 2015; Rector of the Russian Islamic University, Kazan, 2015; Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.
[368] Interview with the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015; Imam of Mosque C9, Kazan, 2015.
[369] The Friday message.
[370] Interview with the Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.

The process of controlling and distributing the Friday message in Kazakhstan follows identical methods—sending the entire message via email to all mosques and pre-printing the message in a book that is distributed to all mosques. In Tatarstan, while there is widespread obedience to SAM RT, there is evidence that some imams disagree with the decision of the current mufti to implement a centralized system for the Friday content. This particular imam believed that investing the time to write his own message would allow for continuous learning. Amongst most interviewees, including the imam who disagreed with the decision of SAM RT to distribute obligatory messages, there was concern about the lack of religious knowledge in Tatarstan among imams.

Lastly, as in Kazakhstan, some language accommodations have been made for ethnic minorities. In Kazakhstan, the Friday message is allowed to be in Russian, subject to approval by SAMK. In Tatarstan, the Friday message must be exclusively in Tatar. [371] However, on a case by case basis, allowances are now made for a short message in Russian to follow the message in Tatar.[372] Moreover, as in Kazakhstan, mosques are not allowed to be explicitly for non-ethnic Tatar communities.[373] None of the mosques I conducted interviews at in Tatarstan were mosques created by ethnic minority communities. I'm also unaware of any ethnic minority mosques that have been closed in Tatarstan. Relative to Kazakhstan, Tatarstan has less ethnic diversity and ethnic minorities are less likely to live in concentrated areas—the case in Kazakhstan. This lack of concentration likely dilutes the demands for mosques serving the needs of ethnic minority communities, and also makes it more difficult for ethnic minorities to mobilize and make demands of SAM RT.

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[371] Interview with Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015.
[372] Interview with Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015.
[373] Ibid.

Religious Websites and Literature

A similar pattern of both co-opting through restrictions on religious sources and supplementing this vacuum through regime supported sources of religious knowledge can be observed in Tatarstan. SAM RT, like SAMK, supports the production of websites and associated publishing houses. The most notable of these outlets is Islam Today and Islam Review, two news service agencies that work closely together and are unofficially associated with SAM RT. These two agencies share offices and I sequentially interviewed the director of each after the Head of Propaganda of SAM RT introduced me personally to the director of Islam Review. When asked when Islam Review was founded, the director replied:

> Islam Review was founded in 2013. It was founded because extremist articles on websites started to appear in parallel with ISIS. I'm not sure about causation between the websites and ISIS. So, the government started to shield people from these websites, and block them— so they went away. Also, starting in 2013 all mosques had to be in SAM (because of this).[374]

When I asked the Director of Islam Review to describe the organization and the goals of the organization he stated, "The main goal of the Islam Review is to try not to make politics. The goal is against Islamic terrorism and Muslim extremism. Both Islam Today and Islam Review are owned by the government." He continued:

> We provide information to both ethnic Muslims and practicing Muslims. We produce articles to help people understand religion. People are also interested in knowing about good things in other Muslim countries. In Islam, in this current situation, we need to explain what is going on. We provide an interpretation of the news. For example, we provide an interpretation that everyone should follow government policy. We also comment on what is in the official news mass media (CMI). For example, what the official media says for example about Russian policy in Syria. The international policy on Syria is poor policy. We follow Putin who says we are against the instability in Syria. There is a radical extremism dialogue in Tatarstan, radical and extremist discussions and attitudes. We try to identify and find those who are extremist. We try to find them and correct them.[375]

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[374] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, 2015.
[375] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, 2015.

Thus, Islam Review was explicitly created to fill an information gap and purportedly to combat religious extremism. When I asked the Director of Islam Today how he would characterize the relationship between Islam Today and Islam Review and the Tatar government and SAM RT he stated that:

> Officially in practice, Islam Today and Islam Review are not officially registered as part of SAM RT. Technically, officially, they are not part of SAM RT… SAM RT and Islam Today, in practice, we work together closely, but we are not officially associated. What mufti says is reflected by us. We are in touch with SAM RT and Islam Review.[376]

In response to this same question, the director of Islam Today replied that, "The muftiate has ten websites. The most important site is Islam Today— that is us. It is not only the most important website for Islam in Tatarstan, but also in Russia as a whole." When discussing how the content of the news provided is selected, the director of Islam Review stated that both organizations, "…Don't have to *officially* ask for approval." He also stated that, "I think the government finances us in practice, but they don't *officially* finance us," when I asked how Islam Today and Islam Review are funded.[377]

Thus, while neither the government nor SAM RT officially control Islam Review and Islam Today and both news services operate semi-autonomously as, "muftiate websites," it is notable that both were created in 2013. The Director of Islam Review explicitly linked the timing of the opening of each organization to the tightening control of SAM RT starting in the same year. Moreover, while both organizations appear to be financed by the government, they are not officially sponsored. Similarly, when asked how the content of the news was decided at each organization, the director of Islam Review stated that, "We don't have to *officially* ask

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[376] Interview with Director of Islam Today, Kazan, 2015.
[377] Interview with Director of Islam Today, Kazan, 2015.

for approval." As with SAM RT, the distance from the Tatar government allows for regime approved information about Islam to be disseminated without the appearance of direct regime involvement with religious affairs.

In contrast to websites, where some efforts are made to distance SAM RT and the regime from news agencies, efforts have also been made to produce literature, though they are explicitly linked to SAM RT. For example, in 2017 plans were executed to re-open a publishing house within SAM RT, Khuzur.[378] The newspaper Nur Islam is published by SAM RT and the newspaper Iman is published by mosque C2.[379]

Additionally, Tatarstan, in line with federal law, does not restrict the importation of religious literature. Moreover, it is unable to implement as stringent measures as in Kazakhstan such as requiring all religious literature to be pre-approved and only sold at pre-approved sites. While the efforts to create online news services are more developed in Tatarstan with Islam Review and Islam Today, the production of religious literature is not as extensive in Tatarstan. The comparative lack of literature produced by SAM RT may be in part due to the fact that Tatarstan has less ability to restrict available books given its status as a republic. As a republic, Tatarstan needs to comply with federal laws under Putin, and varying domestic policies in other republics allow for less control over the republic's borders and what may be imported. Thus, the focus has turned to the online sphere.

Religious Education

In both cases, opportunities for religious education, either at the university or secondary level, are only available through the Spiritual Association of Muslims.

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[378] "The Mufti of RT Met with Diplomats of Countries of The European Union."
[379] Gilmanova et al. , "Development of Religious Muslim Mass Media in Tatar and Russian Languages in Russia."

Relative to Kazakhstan, more robust efforts have been made in Tatarstan to create opportunities for the Islamic education, though there are still limited avenues. There are only six madrasas in five cities that provide secondary education in Tatarstan, located in Buinsk, Almet, Almetyevsk, Nurlat, and Naberezhnie Chelnya.[380] The mainstay of efforts to promote Islamic education in Tatarstan is the Russian Islamic Institute.

The Russian Islamic Institute was founded the first year that SAM RT became the only Muslim institution in Tatarstan, 1998. SAM RT in conjunction with the Tatar Academy of Sciences and Russia's Council of Muftis[381] founded the university.[382] The institute received accreditation from the state in 2007, the first Islamic educational institution in Russia to receive accreditation.[383] It was initially funded by SAM RT and by the Central Muslim Spiritual Association of Russia.[384]

In the 1990s, the Central Muslim Spiritual Association of Russia was a significant threat to the viability of SAM RT. However, by the 2000s, SAM RT's status was solidified, and it lacked the funding to create a university on its own. The Council of Muftis is also a central religious institution for Islam in Russia, and a rival to the Central Muslim Spiritual Association of Russia. Kazan has sought to project Tatarstan as an example of "moderate Islam" (covered in Chapter Five). Securing the

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[380] Two madrasas are in Naberezhnie Chelnya. Khurmatullin, "Tatarstan: Islam Entwined with Nationalism," 110.
[381] "Basic Information."
[382] Mite, "Tatarstan: Russia's Main Islamic University To Offer Secular Curriculum,"; "Basic Information."
[383] "Basic Information."
[384] Ibid. In the 1990s, the Central Muslim Spiritual Association of Russia was a significant threat to the viability of SAM RT. However, by the 2000s, SAM RT's status was solidified, and it lacked the funding to create a university on its own. Moreover, Kazan also has sought to project Tatarstan as an example of "moderate Islam" (covered in Chapter Five). Securing the co-operation of the Central Muslim Spiritual Association likely increased the willingness of Moscow to allow the university's creation.

co-operation of the Central Muslim Spiritual Association and the Council of Muftis likely increased the willingness of Moscow to allow the university's creation and contributed towards this narrative. When asked why the Russian Islamic Institute was founded, the current rector emphasized the need for domestic religious education, stating:

> … Previous institutions were financially supported from abroad. This is the first Russian funded institution. At first it was normal to study aboard, at a madrasah in Saudi Arabia for example. But then there were conflicts when those who studied abroad returned, as Tatarstan is part of the Hanafi mazhab.[385]

The narrative of conflicts and even religious extremism occurring in Russia as due to a foreign influence is common in both Tatarstan and Kazakhstan and covered in the Chapters Four and Five. While the definition of extremism is often expansive and frequently used for political purposes, the lack of Islamic educational opportunities within Russia and Kazakhstan is also an empirical challenge. The Russian Islamic Institute is the largest religious school for Islam in the region. Presently, the Russian Islamic University has 600 students.[386] In comparison, in Kazakhstan the largest and most important religious school, the Egyptian University of Islamic Culture Nur-Mubarak, has trained 800 students since 1993.[387] The graduates of the Russian Islamic Institute graduates go on to serve as imams, work in SAM RT or the Spiritual Association of Muslims in other republics and countries, or work as teachers in other Islamic schools or madrassahs.[388]

While the scale of the Russian Islamic Institute is unprecedented in the republic or Russia, there are over 1,500 mosques in Tatarstan. More mosques are

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[385] Interview with Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.
[386] "Basic Information."
[387] The Egyptian University of Islamic Culture Nur- Mubarak, "University Mission."
[388] Interview with Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.

being built and most mosques require more than one imam in order to adequately perform services and provide religious counseling for local community members. Thus, on one hand shortages in imams, particularly imams that have received formal religious education, will likely continue to remain a problem. On the other hand, the establishment of an Islamic educational institution founded by SAM RT to fill in a vacuum of religious knowledge further cements the monopoly on available religious information.

Conclusion

The encapsulation of Islam in Tatarstan resulted in a monopoly on religious interpretation, the intended goal of the Tatar regime. When I asked the Head of Propaganda who should interpret the Qur'an, he responded:

> Only educated scholars. Not every Muslim can interpret. Therefore, we have our mazhab. In Tatarstan we have the Hanafi mazhab. They understand the Qur'an according to the Hanafi Schools. People ask which scholars; we tell them we look at these scholars.[389]

When I followed up by asking how an ordinary citizen could determine whether someone is a scholar, he replied, "There is a tradition in Islam to follow the chain. Our mufti is part of this chain."[390] When I asked an imam at Marjani mosque who should interpret the Qur'an, he was definitive that citizens should not attempt to interpret the Qur'an, stating, "…People can't interpret the Qur'an, even for themselves, it's not simple. If you translate incorrectly, it's not good. Therefore, people should not interpret the Qur'an in order to avoid conflict." Thus, in both Tatarstan and Kazakhstan, the regime puts forward the argument that only one institution for Islam should make religious interpretations.

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[389] Interview with Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015.
[390] Interview with Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015. The chain refers to the belief that there is a chain of religious leadership that can be traced back to the Prophet Muhammad. See Islamic Dictionary Appendix.

Chapter Two and Three have traced the co-optation of Islam in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan through the repurposing of Soviet institutions at the outset of independence to 2015 in order to examine and compare how national and sub-national regimes in Muslim majority states and regions co-opt Islam. While both regimes have engaged in selective repression of religious and national leaders (including imams) who have resisted incorporation into SAMK and SAM RT, both regimes have chosen to depoliticize religion and encapsulate Islam through an institution.

More actors competed for religious authority in the early 1990s in Tatarstan than in Kazakhstan. Additionally, Tatarstan had to contend with nationalist pressures from below as well as central boundary intrusion in the religious realm. In light of these additional pressures, Tatarstan awarded a monopoly to one Muslim institution in 1998, compared to 2012 in Kazakhstan. Tatarstan initially legalized this monopoly, in line with its efforts in the 1990s for greater independence. However, with the recentralization of power in the center under Putin, the legal monopoly awarded to SAM RT was overturned at the national level in 2004. Since then, Tatarstan has increasingly relied on more unofficial methods outside the realm of the law to co-opt Islam. Importantly, in the 2000s, the monopoly on Islam is not enforced through republican laws. Since the 2000s, the government agency whose official duty includes regulating religion has had a minimal presence. The Tatar regime has, however, shown increased willingness to cite federal laws on extremism to ensure local compliance. Using federal laws on extremism risks future central intrusion, if Tatarstan cannot simultaneously uphold a narrative of being the national standard bearer of “moderate” Islam. These competing narratives, the risk of Islamic extremism in Tatarstan and Tatarstan as the home of “moderate” Islam, are examined in Chapter Five.

In contrast, the RAC was an instrumental actor in 2012 when SAMK was awarded a monopoly in Kazakhstan and continues to be actively engaged in the religious sphere. Kazakhstan passed in 2011 and implemented a crucial piece of legislation in 2012 that has onerous requirements on religious literature and registration for places of worship. Even though Kazakhstan does not have to comply with a higher law, it has never attempted to legalize SAMK's monopoly and the 2012 law does not specifically address SAMK.

Despite Kazakhstan instrumentalizing the law to pursue its monopoly, and the lack of independence Tatarstan has in setting legal policy on religion, SAMK and SAM RT both operate as quasi-governmental agencies. The fact that SAMK and SAM RT are not government agencies but implement each government's policies allows for the perception of legitimacy and for a narrative of upholding the separation of the state from religion. National regimes, despite not having to comply with a higher power, also employ quasi-governmental agencies in order to avoid politicizing the majority national religious ethnic identity.

Moreover, both regimes employed almost all the same mechanisms, including co-opting mosques, and establishing a monopoly on available religious information (including literature, Friday messages, and education) and religious appointments at both the elite level down to every single imam. Some differences do emerge in regard to the allocation of resources as well as Tatarstan's inability to create its own legislation on religion. Kazakhstan has been able to legally restrict religious literature, an option not variable in Tatarstan, given it would contradict national law. To attempt to fill this vacuum, Kazakhstan has invested more in producing religious literature. Alternatively, the Tatar regime has chosen to prioritize investing in two online news outlets, Islam Today and Islam Review. SAMK in 2012 and SAM RT in 2013 have

started to create and disseminate the Friday message. Both institutions have belatedly granted some language accommodations for ethnic minorities. Additionally, both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan have created Islamic universities and have a handful of secondary madrasahs. However, as Islamic education outside of SAMK and SAM RT is not available and foreign religious education is being discouraged, there is a mismatch between demand and religious education slots available. Additionally, all religious appointments from the mufti to imams are allocated by the Spiritual Association of Muslims in both cases. In a point of difference, Kazakhstan has uniquely deployed an innovative method of using anti-sect centers to compliment the efforts of SAMK to erect boundaries on acceptable religious practice and national religious identity—a method that has not been replicated in Tatarstan or Russia. Chapter Two and Three have identified the mechanisms used by each national and subnational regime to co-opt Islam. Chapters Four and Five examine where these lines of national religious identity are drawn.

Chapter Four Narratives Encapsulating Islam: Kazakhstan

Introduction

This chapter examines how the co-optation mechanisms in Kazakhstan identified in Chapter Three are justified to its citizens. Secondly, this chapter examines the national religious identity being constructed by the Kazakhstani regime and where the boundaries of this identity are delineated. Lastly, I examine how the co-optation of Islam in Kazakhstan is justified to an international audience. In both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, I argue that the co-optation of Islam is justified through a process of securitization. According to this logic, the co-optation of Islam in Kazakhstan is undertaken in order to allow for the development of a peaceful and prosperous society. Therefore, straying outside of SAMK approved religious sources threatens this premise. Secondly, violating the bounds set by the regime for acceptable religious practice and identity also risks introducing instability into Kazakhstani society.

The concept of securitization was first outlined by Wæver in 1995, in which he defined securitization as the framing of a particular issue as an existential threat.[391] This definition was expanded upon by Buzan who asserted that the audience or constituencies of such rhetoric must "buy in" to such a framework in order for a process of securitization to occur.[392] Furthermore, as " 'Security' is a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue—not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but rather because the issue is

[391] Wæver "Securitization and Desecuritization," 46-86.
[392] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework Analysis*, 26-33.

presented as such a threat."[393] Wilhelmsen expands and revises Copenhagen School securitization theory[394] utilizing a post-structural approach. In doing so she argues that securitization should not be understood as starting with a single intentional speech act (such as a single statement made by a political leader), but rather it is an intersubjective process involving both "securitizing actors" and the "audience" of securitizing discourse.[395] Secondly, Wilhelmsen puts forth that securitization should be conceptualized as involving both meaning and materiality—in other words involving both discourse and concrete actions, such as emergency measures taken by a state.[396]

In Kazakhstan, the use of securitizing rhetoric has little risk of inviting intrusions on the state's boundary control by international actors. There have been only several instances of violence that have been attributed by the state to extremism.[397] The amorphous definition used by the regime to define extremism, both domestically and abroad, allows actors to project their own understanding of

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[393] Buzan et al., *Security: A New Framework Analysis*, 24.
[394] Wilhelmsen, *Russia's Securitization of Chechnya: How War Became Acceptable*.
[395] Wilhelmsen, "How Does War Become a Legitimate Undertaking? Re-Engaging the Post-Structuralist Foundation of Securitization Theory."
[396] Wilhelmsen, "How Does War Become a Legitimate Undertaking?"; Wilhelmsen, *Russia's Securitization of Chechnya.*
[397] In 2011, six people were killed by a Kazakhstani citizen and another after the suspect detonated a suicide bomb in Taraz. A previously unknown group, Jund al-Khilafah, claimed responsibility for the attack. "Kazakhstan On High Alert After Shooting Spree By Suspected Militant." Another attack in Atyrau in 2011 was attributed to Jund al-Khilafah. "Kazakh Security Committee Admits Terrorist Group Is Threat." Both attacks targeted the government. The first attack targeted the police and in the second attack, bombs were placed near the prosecutor's office in Atyrau. In Almaty, another man killed several police officers in 2016. Putz, "What Did Kazakhstan Learn from the Almaty Shooting?" In another shooting in 2016 in Atyrau, a national guard base was targeted after the suspects robed two gun stores. Putz, "Kazakh Authorities Blame Aktobe Violence on 'Radical, Non-Traditional Religious Movements.'"

"extremism" onto this discourse. This in turn associates the emergency measures taken by the state with necessary precautions to prevent the formation of unrest.

In the context of Kazakhstan, Omelicheva has asserted that by stressing the danger of extremism and terrorism, the regime has been enabled to adopt more restrictive religious policies "…Without establishing a logical or empirical connection between Islam and terrorism".[398] Additionally:

> By securitizing Islam, the fear of 'unofficial' expressions of this religion becomes a political currency that the government can use for not only extending its control over religion, but also for concocting an image of national unity and building national identity without revisiting and reflecting upon on the sources of unity.[399]

While an astute observation, it does not address the mechanism employed by the regime to accomplish these policies (as examined in Chapters Two and Three), nor the type of religious national identity the regime is trying to construct (examined later in this chapter). Furthermore, following the lines of Buzan, it has not been established the degree to which the regime's efforts to co-opt available religious outlets are "bought" by citizens and thus the degree to which they are "successful".

Co-optation through Securitization

To assess how the encapsulation of Islam is framed, I assess the co-occurrence of codes of interviews I conducted with government officials, SAMK officials, and imams. The co-occurrence of codes refers to the application of two or more codes to the same unit of analysis and allows for the identification of patterns.[400] For example, one question I asked about encapsulating mosques included, "It is my understanding that all mosques in Kazakhstan are part of the Spiritual Association of Muslims in

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[398] Omelicheva, "Islam in Kazakhstan: A Survey of Contemporary Trends and Sources of Securitization," 252.
[399] Omelicheva, "Islam in Kazakhstan," 254.
[400] Schreier, *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*, 255.

Kazakhstan (SAMK), why do you think that is?" I segmented interview answer by sentence (the unit of analysis) and then applied the associated codes to each unit. When more than one code is applied to the same unit, a network or map of co-occurrences can be constructed and linkages in the argument for the centralization and control of religion and their associated policies can be identified. Examining the co-occurrence of codes revealed how Islam in Kazakhstan is securitized.

Baker et al., in examining how Islam is portrayed in the British Press, found a high-level co-occurrence between the words "Islam" and "terror."[401] Given "Islam" is the word queried in newspaper articles, one would clearly expect there to be numerous articles that use this word. Alternatively, the word "terror" was not independently queried—its high level of co-occurrence with Islam is therefore investigated.[402] Similarly, my interview questions with government officials, SAMK officials, and imams included questions about SAMK, the RAC, and the government (see Interview Questions Appendix). In the question posed above, I directly reference SAMK. Additionally, I reference a co-optation mechanism in the question and therefore applied the code, "Incorporation into Religious Institution," to an interviewee's answer. However, I did not direct prompt interviewees to discuss topics such as religious extremism, Salafism, or preservation of tradition, for example, in relationship to the co-optation mechanism. The justifications used for the co-optation mechanisms (identified in Chapter 2) are examined in the first part of this chapter.

Narratives Justifying the Co-optation of Islam in Kazakhstan

Code co-occurrence models allow us to visualize the relationship between codes.[403] The co-occurrence models below depict the co-optation mechanisms in

[401] Paul Baker et al., "Sketching Muslims: The Big Picture," 49.
[402] Paul Baker et al., "Sketching Muslims," 49.
[403] "Code Co-Occurrence Model."

Kazakhstan outlined in Chapter Two—the encapsulation of mosques, the encapsulation of knowledge through restrictions on religious sources, and the encapsulation of knowledge through the production of religious sources—and the justifications used by government officials, SAMK officials, and imams to justify these mechanisms.

Encapsulation of Mosques

The encapsulation of mosques includes co-opting mosques in SAMK, disparities in resources and funding between government constructed and co-opted mosques, as well as the construction of government sanctioned mosques. The encapsulation of mosques has been at the fore of efforts to co-opt Islam in Kazakhstan. *Model A* depicts the ten most frequent rationales, or codes, used to justify co-opting mosques into SAMK in Kazakhstan. The lines between codes depict when a code was applied to the same unit (sentence) in interviews.

Some interviewees justified all mosques being in SAMK because it protected against negative foreign influences. According to this narrative, preventing foreign influence prevented the formation of conflict. This is depicted in *Model 1* with the lines between "SAM" and "Foreign (negative)"; "SAM" and "Absence of conflict"; "Foreign (negative)" and "Presence of conflict"; and the lines between "Co-optation of Mosques" and each of these narratives.

Similarly, requiring all mosques to be in SAMK prevents the formation of different interpretations and allows the monopoly on Islam to perpetuate. This narrative is depicted by the lines among "Encapsulation of Mosques," "SAM," and, "Different Interpretations." Interestingly, some interviewees directly reference the importance of, "Control," in the religious sphere in order to avoid conflict and prevent negative foreign influences.

Model 1. Encapsulation of Mosques



Additionally, some interviewees discussed the role of various actors in this process. These officials and imams discussed their perception that this was in accordance with Kazakhstani law, despite there being no reference to SAMK in Kazakhstani law. This does, however, highlight, that religious elites are well aware of government involvement in the religious sphere. Other interviewees identified the RAC and the Kazakhstani government as key actors in implementing and enforcing the co-optation of mosques.

Encapsulation of Knowledge: Restrictions on Religious Sources

As examined in Chapter Two, restrictions on religious sources entail extensive efforts to restrict the importation and/or distribution of religious literature outside of

SAMK. Additionally, there are no avenues to religious appointments outside of SAMK—ranging from an imam at a local mosque to high level appointments.

Model 2. Encapsulation of Knowledge: Restrictions on Religious Advice



Models 2 and 3 illustrate the linkages between the other two mechanisms identified in Chapter Two— (1) restrictions on non-regime associated religious sources and (2) the production of regime associated religious source— and the ten codes that co-occurred most frequently with each co-optation mechanism. Questions I asked about the availability of religious sources (and how interviewees perceived the authority of these sources) included for example, "Which people or groups should interpret the Qur'an?" and, "Why do you think SAMK provides the Friday message for all mosques in Kazakhstan?"[404]

Model 2 above illustrates the narratives used to justify restrictions on non-SAMK religious sources. Officials and imams discussed the threat of Salafism to

[404] See Methodology Appendix for list of interview questions.

tradition as a rationale for these restrictions (depicted in Model 2 by the lines connecting, “Salafism,” with, “Threat to tradition,” and between, “Restrictions on Religious Sources,” and these two codes). Moreover, interviewees linked the presence of, “Unapproved religious interpretations” or vague references to, “Different Religious Interpretations,” in Kazakhstan as a rationale to restrict access to religious sources in order to deter the presence of such opinions.

As with the encapsulation of mosques, interviewees referenced the “Law” as why literature is restricted, an accurate perception. Additionally, the, “RAC,” and, “Kazakhstani government,” broadly were also identified as actors in restrictions on literature and religious appointments. Officially, the RAC and the Kazakhstani government are involved in religious literature restrictions. However, officially the appointment of imams is only the purview of SAMK, not the RAC or the Kazakhstani government.

Encapsulation of Knowledge: Production of Religious Sources

The production of religious sources includes the creation and dissemination of the Friday message, the creation of SAMK affiliated literature and websites, as well as the provision of religious education. The production of religious sources was justified as a means to promote religious knowledge. Additionally, according to the narrative promoted by officials and imams, the production of SAMK associated sources promotes, “Unity,” and, “Peace,” as well as the preservation of Kazakhstani tradition. Likewise, the promotion of what is deemed to be, “correct,” religious knowledge is associated with, “Unity,” “Peace,” and the, “Preservation of Tradition.”[405] Various permutations of this were also cited— for example SAMK

[405] See lines amongst presence/promotion of knowledge, unity (presence), presence/promotion of peace, preservation of tradition, and production of religious sources in Model 3.

sources lead to unity which in turn allows for the preservation of tradition. As with the encapsulation of mosques, people also directly referenced how SAMK and the government's control over the religious sphere promoted these positive attributes.

Model 3. Encapsulation of Knowledge: Production of Religious Sources



Notably the models above only show the co-occurrence between the codes that co-occur with the co-optation method and their co-occurrence with each other (not every code that co-occurs with each code is shown above). Amongst all three co-optation methods, there is a high correlation with the Spiritual Association of Muslims, the RAC, centralization, and control. In discussing these methods interviewees identified SAMK and the RAC as the main actors, whom often used the law to justify policies. The enactment of these policies entailed centralization and control, the aim of these measures. Interestingly, the goal of the regime to consolidate its power in the religious realm was explicitly referenced by interviewees.

The narratives justifying the encapsulation of mosques and the encapsulation of knowledge are assessed in further depth below. These narratives include the importance of centralization and control. Additionally, I further examine what interviewees mean when they reference the threat of religious extremism. Some interviewees referenced acts of violence intended to incite fear, while others referenced broad and vague threats to unity, or even different religious interpretations. Thirdly, a common narrative is that these co-optation mechanisms promote the development of religious knowledge in Kazakhstan. Lastly, according to this narrative, the encapsulation of Islam promotes peace and unity, while deterring conflict.

I draw upon quotes from my interviews with senior government officials, senior SAMK officials, and imams that exemplify how these narratives are woven together. While it was more difficult to procure interviews with imams in Astana in 2015, I was able to successfully interview imams in Astana in 2013 and imams in Almaty in 2015. I interviewed SAMK officials in 2013 and 2015 and government officials in 2015. Only two people I interviewed in Kazakhstan (both RAC officials) declined to answer a question at any point.

Some interviewees provided elusive answers and/or circular logic. In these interviews, I was both trying to ascertain the co-optation mechanisms deployed as well as the narratives used to justify these mechanisms and where the boundaries of acceptable religious identity were being established. If an interviewee did not initially provide a direct answer to questions about co-optation mechanisms, I circled back to this set of questions after establishing more of a rapport with the interviewee. In other questions, I intentionally tried to elicit justifications for these co-optation mechanisms—circular logic is at times part of these narratives. Propaganda efforts to

establish a monopoly on religious knowledge are not necessarily intended to provide a well-structured argument, but rather induce citizens to use regime affiliated religious sources, rather than non-regime affiliated sources. For questions about religious and national identity, I asked numerous follow up questions. I prompted interviewees to define or at least reflect upon what they meant when they employed words like "traditional" or "extremism". These questions met the most resistance. I believe this resistance stemmed both from interviews using these terms unreflexively as well as because the legitimacy of arguments centered around topics, like extremism, that are rarely questioned.

Centralization and Control

A core objective that emerged from interviews with elite government officials as well as with imams in Astana and Almaty is for the regime to control or "streamline"[406] all available religious outlets. Complimentary to this objective, a wariness about the organic development of religion emerged as a common thread among government and SAMK interviewees. To deter this organic development all interviewees cited the importance of centralizing outlets for Islam. To this point, one imam asserted that, "Everything in Kazakhstan should be controlled…as Islam is still developing in Kazakhstan."[407] When I asked a senior government official involved in passing the law on religion about the motivations behind the law and why it was passed he stated, "It is about streamlining and organizing religion," as, "Freedom brings responsibility."[408]

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[406] Interview with High Level Government Official Involved in Passage of Religion Law, Astana, 2013.
[407] Interview with Imam of Mosque B3, Almaty, Kazakhstan 2015.
[408] Interview with High Level Government Official Involved in Passage of Religion Law, Astana, 2013.

When prompted why all mosques were in SAMK, a senior SAMK official stated that senior officials in SAMK and imams went abroad to observe Islam in other countries and that, "When they returned they were glad that we have a centralized organization like SAMK," and inferred that elsewhere chaos ensued. When I asked the Director of the RAC the same question he explained that all mosques are in SAMK:

> …Because SAMK appoints imams and controls everything. They ensure that there are not illegal religious organizations or proselytizing that is prohibited. We have only one muftiate. This is government policy. The president may give a decision— then this is spread by the muftiate.[409]

When discussing how Islam is practiced in Kazakhstan, the imam of a government constructed mosque in Almaty asserted that Islam must be practiced within the framework SAMK and thus centralized and controlled by SAMK, asserting that:

> It is important to know about the hierarchy in Islam. First, there is SAMK. Then there is the Central Mosque, then mosques at the rayon level. Several websites have also been opened…The President takes care about Islam, so people are becoming more knowledgeable. He works with the youth so that there are no terrorist acts, because Islam is peace. People shouldn't be aggressive.[410]

Thus, when interviewees emphasized the need for controlling and centralizing Islam in Kazakhstan as they were describing the co-optation mechanisms of Islam, they are arguing for emergency measures in line with securitization theory. The second part of securitization entails narratives justifying these emergency measures. The threat of religious extremism was often cited as necessitating these measures.

Religious Extremism?

While the refrain of the threat of religious extremism was common among

[409] Interview with Director of RAC, Astana, 2015.
[410] Interview with Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015.

interviewees, what actually constitutes religious extremism according to government officials, SAMK officials, and imams in Kazakhstan? Some interviewees referenced acts of violence. For example, one imam justified the law on religion as a method to deter violence, stating, "In Uzbekistan there was bloodshed… This is why the law was passed."[411] When asked whether Kazakhstan had experienced any problems with religious extremism the director of the RAC responded, "In the past… it was a problem…in 2011 in the West…there was extremism, terrorism in Aktobe and Atyrau…Afterwards those responsible were imprisoned."[412] Similarly, the Director of the RAC Astana Office when asked to describe the role of the RAC Astana Office started by stating that, "Our office is in the akimat. We have a responsibility for ensuring stability in the city. Current issues in regard to ISIS— we take these issues seriously."[413]

However, more commonly, the definition given for what exemplifies religious extremism or how the interviewee would define religious extremism was not limited to acts of violence intended to incite fear. Rather, religious extremism was associated with the destruction of Kazakhstani traditions as well as the degradation of national and religious unity and peace. The Director of the RAC stated the following when asked to define extremism:

> Every country has a different definition— in our country it is religion. Radicalism is when certain religious groups interpret religion in a way that contradicts the law, the law of the country, and ignores tradition…. It's interpreting in a way that would contradict…our norms.[414]

[411] Interview with Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.
[412] Interview with Director of RAC Astana, 2015. Aktau and Aktobe are cities in Western Kazakhstan.
[413] Interview with Director of RAC of Astana, Astana, 2015.
[414] Interview with Director of RAC of Astana, Astana, 2015.

An imam in Almaty answered with the following when asked the same question, "It is using religion to destroy a nation. To destroy traditions, to destroy their ethnic belonging. They have this idea that in religion there is no ethnicity or tradition."[415]

A strong theme that tradition stood in opposition to religious extremism was predominant in many interviews. Religious extremism was also associated with vague notions of disruptions of peace, the presence of conflict, and disjunctures in national and religious unity. One imam asserted religious extremism:

> …Is a big problem in Kazakhstan and around the world. Some parties use it as a tool to destroy peace in a country. This is why the muftiate moves against terrorism and is promoting traditional Islam.[416]

One high level SAMK official defined religious extremism as the following, "It means to create an argument among people, to create arguments. It's actions against people to make them enemies."[417]

Thus, the co-optation of Islam is justified through the presence of extremism as the purview of the state includes a monopoly on violence and the security of its citizens. Following this argument, efforts towards preventing, "extremism," may seem normatively justifiable. However, after prompting interviewees to extrapolate on what they understood to constitute religious extremism, the definition provided is incredibly expansive. Thus, the regime is able to securitize the religious realm through nebulous references to extremism, which the regime generalizes to any deviation from regime produced religious sources for Islam and entails narratives described in further detail below. Among these narratives, are narratives about the

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[415] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.
[416] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.
[417] Interview with SAMK Senior Level Official, Almaty, 2015.

importance of promoting knowledge as a dearth of knowledge leads to religious extremism.

Knowledge

Accordingly, promoting knowledge—explicitly within the framework of SAMK—would deter extremism. When a senior SAMK official was asked whether he believed religious extremism is a problem in Kazakhstan, he stated:

> It is not a problem in Kazakhstan. We have a lot of scholars here who studied in good schools in Kazakhstan and elsewhere. They have good knowledge. All imams have at least a bachelor's degree, so there are no arguments."[418]

One imam asserted that, "Religious extremism is due to lack of knowledge, which results in extreme action and rejection of tradition. Our tradition in Kazakhstan— to make a family, marry– these traditions are Islam," in response to how he defined religious extremism.[419] Another imam stated that SAMK promotes, "…traditional Islam." When I asked how SAMK does this, he replied, "Through actions– they want the youth to be knowledgeable."[420]

This narrative of any deviation from regime sponsored sources being attributed to a lack of knowledge was widespread. In 2015, SAMK declared that the themes for the Friday messages for the year would be knowledge and prohibiting extremism.[421] Another imam put forth that:

> The problem in Islam is that there are different streams—this stems from people not being aware. This situation is due to the Soviet red times. In time, I think Salafism and Wahhabism will disappear. The President is spreading Islam in the people and he is helping the people to return to true Islam.[422]

An imam at one of the government constructed mosques in Almaty similarly stated

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[418] Interview with Senior Level SAMK Official, Almaty, 2015.
[419] Interview with Imam of Mosque B3, Almaty, 2015.
[420] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.
[421] Interview with Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty, 2015.
[422] Interview with Imam of Mosque A5, Astana, 2013.

that, "If people do not have education or have specialized knowledge in Islam, if they do not understand Qur'anic ayats,[423] they can go in an extreme way."[424] Moreover, "The President takes care about Islam so people are becoming more knowledgeable."[425]

When discussing various Muslim groups that one imam believed to be unacceptable in Kazakhstan, he referred to one group as, "…proselytizing without knowledge."[426] Another group was present, "…in the 2000s," when, "Kazakhstan was newly independent and people were not knowledgeable."[427] The groups deemed unacceptable were dually associated with a lack of knowledge and stemming from foreign influence.

As discussed more in the national identity section below, conflicting narratives were presented about, "foreign," influences. On the one hand, many interviewees associate foreign sources as having, "higher," religious knowledge than compared to domestic sources. For example, when discussing why every mosque must be in SAMK, one imam stated that, "Our teachers have been studying in Egypt for ten to twenty years. Now they are working in Kazakhstan. There is now enough (religious) knowledge."[428] On the other hand, another narrative asserts that extremism is only a problem in Kazakhstan due to being imported from abroad (where there is less knowledge).

The conflation of vague notions of "right" knowledge with a lack of extremism is a dominant theme echoed from the upper echelons of the Kazakhstani

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[423] Ayat means verse in the Qur'an. See Islamic Dictionary Appendix.
[424] Interview with Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015
[425] Interview with Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015.
[426] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.
[427] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.
[428] Interview with Imam of Mosque B3, Almaty, 2015.

government to imams in remote areas of outside of Almaty and Astana. The need to promote knowledge, sometimes linked to the repression of religion during the Soviet era, was tied to other narratives of peace, conflict, and unity.

Conflict, Peace, and Unity

The importance of promoting peace and unity while deterring conflict was cited by numerous interviewees. In Kazakhstan, these narratives also frequently contained an ethnic component, stressing the importance of avoiding conflict based on ethnicity. Numerous interviewees also emphasized the importance of avoiding conflict in a broader sense.[429] One imam discussed the existence of independent mosques prior to 2011, stating that these mosques "…Started to give different messages. This resulted in conflict. People were confused as to who to listen to," and that these ideologically different mosques, "…started to segregate people..."[430] Another high-level official in SAMK stated the following when I asked why all mosques must be in SAMK:

> Because the head of SAMK was in different countries, countries where there are mosques and saw different mosques. Because of this experience it was decided to maintain a centralized system so imams won't argue over topics. So people won't get confused and when they listen they won't hear conflicting opinions.[431]

When interviewing an imam about religious extremism, I asked him how one would determine whether or not a person is "extremist", he replied, "They spread conflict; they want to create a caliphate."[432] The Director of the RAC when describing how the RAC determined whether or not a religious group should be prohibited

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[429] Interview with Director of RAC, Astana, 2015; SAMK Senior Official, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015; Interview with Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B3, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.
[430] Interview with Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.
[431] Interview with SAMK Senior Official, Almaty, 2015.
[432] Interview with Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015.

stated, "Basically it's about not spreading discontent, but rather to spread peace—they shouldn't promote religious instability."[433] When I asked him to describe what he meant by, "religious instability," he replied, "We understand this as conflict. Our mosques, (are) not separating or dividing people."[434] Such circular and vague definitions were common amongst high level government officials. Nonetheless, they are revealing as well as tactical—open to wide interpretation by each respective audience of such messages.

According to the narrative constructed, in contrast to the conflict that can occur with a lack of centralization and control, the implementation of a centralized system leads to calm and peace. Explicitly tying together the need for control and peace, an imam asserted that, "Everything in Kazakhstan should be controlled (in order) to ensure peace. Thus, the Friday message is the same in all of Kazakhstan."[435] When asked to explain why the law on religion was passed, another imam said that it was passed, "In order to maintain peace and escape extremism. The law is to preserve the peace for citizens and for the benefit of all citizens."[436] Responding to my question about how he would characterize the relationship between SAMK and the RAC, an imam in Almaty stated, "They are one. They all work for one goal— to maintain peace in Kazakhstan. We receive notice from the government if there is an issue and notify the government if there is an issue."[437] He also asserted that the law on religion, "…is not a limitation— it is just to maintain peace. It may seem like a restriction, but really it is accepted as maintaining peace," when asked why the law

[433] Interview with the Director of the RAC, Astana, 2015.
[434] Interview with the Director of RAC, Astana, 2015.
[435] Interview with Imam of Mosque B3, Almaty, 2015.
[436] Interview with Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.
[437] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.

was passed.[438] A similar narrative was evoked by another imam in response to the same question, he stated, "I think it is to maintain peace and security— so that all is in order. So people don't go down the wrong path."[439]Discussing the involvement of the RAC in the Friday messages, one highly ranked imam stated that, "Theologians in the RAC also commission topics. They sign off on this book.[440] They check for whether there are any controversial topics in the messages. What is most important— maintaining the peace."[441] The same goal was ascribed to SAMK. A SAMK official asserted that the mission of SAMK is to, "Maintain peace in the country."[442]

The narratives of avoiding conflict and preserving peace are intrinsically intertwined with the narrative of unity. The Director of the RAC Astana Office stated that the RAC ensures that SAMK sends out the Friday message to every mosque in Kazakhstan and that the theme was the same throughout all of Kazakhstan in order to ensure unity.[443] Moreover, the director of the entire RAC stated the following when asked why all mosques were required to have the same Friday message:

> Why do all mosques have the same message? To facilitate communication and social stability. We view this in a positive light. It is important for mosques— it unifies them. If everyone would have their own message, they would not be unified."[444]

Another senior level RAC official stated that the RAC ensures that SAMK sends out the Friday message to every mosque in Kazakhstan and that the theme was the same throughout all of Kazakhstan in order to ensure unity.[445] Additionally, the

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[438] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.
[439] Interview with Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty, 2015.
[440] The interviewee physically reference the *Shura* next time him during this comment.
[441] Interview with Imam D, 2015.
[442] Interview with Imam D, 2015.
[443] Interview with RAC Official A, Astana, 2015.
[444] Interview with Director of RAC, Astana, 2015.
[445] Interview with RAC Official A, Astana, 2015.

RAC Astana Office Director asserted that all Friday messages must be the same throughout Kazakhstan as, "I may interpret that Qur'an in one way, another person in another way— this can create chaos. All must be part of SAMK in order to ensure stability and one understanding of surahs in Qur'an."[446]

The narratives about the importance of peace and conflict also incorporated Kazakhstan's multi-ethnic population. Many interviewees referenced the need to avoid ethnic conflict and have peace amongst the various ethnic groups present in Kazakhstan. Exemplifying this, after the Chief of Staff of SAMK declined my request to be interviewed in 2013, the Chief of Staff of SAMK in 2015 replied in a formal statement to several of my questions. In response to my question about the role of SAMK in Kazakhstan and its mission, he wrote:

> SAMK, taking into account the secular nature of the state, supports the domestic experience of peaceful co-existence of Muslims in Kazakhstan with representatives of other religions and those who are not followers of any religion, to preserve interethnic and inter-confessional stability.[447]

Moreover, the Spokesperson for SAMK in 2013 held that, "Kazakhstan has become a platform for dialogue for representatives of different religions and many countries are interested in borrowing from the experience of Kazakhstan. He further elaborated that the:

> The main purpose of SAMK is to strengthen people's faith, to contribute to the preservation of stability in the society, to interethnic and interfaith agreement, to call upon people for kindness and faithful service to their homeland.[448]

When discussing the purview of the RAC, the national director of the RAC stated that, "We produce an analysis of religious situation and work on the promotion of peace and inter-confessional dialogue."[449] When describing the

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[446] Interview with Director of RAC, Astana, 2015.
[447] Interview with Chief of Staff of SAMK, Astana, 2015.
[448] Interview with the Spokesperson of SAMK, Astana, 2013.
[449] Interview with the RAC Director, Astana, 2015.

relationship between the RAC and SAMK, one imam replied that, "They talk about how to make peace between religious groups."[450] Another imam when discussing the financing of his mosque, emphasized the different ethnicities of the, "businessmen," who funded it and then stated, "We've had Christians in our land— there is peace, no conflict. We live in peace with one another."[451] These narratives about inter-ethnic harmony were vague. When I prompted interviewees to describe how SAMK or the government helped reduce the potential for ethnic conflict, concrete answers were elusive. Nonetheless, senior officials, in particular, were careful to note that the broader notion of Kazakhstani identity included a multi-ethnic component.

In Kazakhstan the co-optation of Islam through the encapsulation of mosques and knowledge was justified through a process of securitizing Islam. This process of securitization is achieved by linking the co-optation mechanisms employed to narratives about the necessity of centralization and control, the importance of knowledge, peace, and unity, and need to deter conflict (including ethnic conflict) in order to preserve tradition and Kazakhstani national religious identity.

National Identity and "Traditional" Islam

While examining how the co-optation of Islam in Kazakhstan is justified, one must also examine where the boundaries of the religious national identity are being delineated and which religious identities are excluded and incorporated. The Head of the RAC Astana Office put forth the following when asked to describe the purview of his office:

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[450] Interview with Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015.
[451] Interview with Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015.

> Our office is in the akimat.[452] We have a responsibility for ensuring stability in the city…. Traditional religions include Islam, the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church. Our main responsibility is to register religions.[453]

When I asked which Muslim groups were registered by his office, he responded, "Only traditional Islam."[454] When I pressed by asking, "What is traditional Islam? How do you define traditional Islam or identify what is traditional Islam?" He replied, "In Kazakhstan it is not different than traditional Islam in the world."[455] When I followed up by asking if he could please describe what traditional Islam in the world is, he replied, "A doctor should what know what traditional Islam."[456] When I followed up once again by asking, "From a governmental perspective, how do you determine which groups to classify as traditional Islam?" he replied, **"**This is open information. There is a list of organizations allowed in our country."[457] After this he refused to answer further questions on the topic. Shortly after, the Director refused to answer further questions and directed me to ask any further questions to his deputy. The Director of the RAC was clearly flustered by this line of inquiry. It was evident that direct questions about how the government determines what is traditional or which criteria are used were not often posed to him. When I asked his deputy who compiled this list of organizations he responded that "It's like the FBI in the United States, it's a similar organization—the Committee of National Security."[458]

Many interviewees were either unwilling, or at times, unable to define, traditional Islam. The vagueness of the definition has tactical value—it allows

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[452] Akimat refers to the government of Astana.
[453] Interview with Director of RAC Astana, 2015.
[454] Interview with Director of RAC Astana, 2015.
[455] Ibid.
[456] Ibid. The interviewee is referring to me as a "doctor" in this quote.
[457] Ibid.
[458] Interview with Deputy Director the RAC Astana, 2015.

members of the audience of such speech to adapt the statement to their own conception of traditional. The most common definition of religious extremism invoked attempts to destroy Kazakhstani culture and portrayed extremism as a rejection of (vague notions of) national tradition. When I asked one imam to define what he meant by religious extremism, he replied by describing it as an effort to breakdown religious ethnic identity and tradition:

> It is using religion to destroy a nation. To destroy traditions, to destroy their ethnic belonging. They have this idea that in religion there is no ethnicity or tradition. In the Qur'an Allah said that he created different ethnic groups.[459]

The RAC Director also asserted the religious extremism entailed ignoring tradition.[460] An imam in Almaty said that he believed that extremism was, "…a big problem in Kazakhstan and around the word… This why the muftiate moves against terrorism and is promoting traditional Islam."[461] To fight these threats of tradition, SAMK is presented as a bulwark of traditional Islam. Describing the mission of SAMK, one imam put forth that, "SAMK perceives its role as strengthening the core Islamic traditions of Kazakhstan."[462]

Upon further questioning, the Director and Deputy Director of the RAC Astana Office and other interviewees cited certain identities and influences as outside the bounds of traditional. The rest of this chapter deconstructs the boundaries of the national religious identity. The most common consensus on what was included within the bounds of "traditional" was the Hanafi mazhab. In contrast, to be portrayed as Salafi, a, "sect," or stemming from, "foreign," influence is deemed as a threat to tradition.

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[459] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.
[460] Interview with Director of RAC, Astana, 2015.
[461] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.
[462] Interview with Senior Government Official, Astana, 2013.

Hanafism

The Hanafi mazhab is the most commonly practiced school of Islamic thought. Mazhab refers to schools of Islamic thought. There are four main Sunni[463] schools—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali[464] An estimated one-third of Muslims worldwide identify as Hanafi.[465] In Kazakhstan, there is across the board consensus that Hanafism is considered to be "traditional" Islam. When asked which mazhabs in Kazakhstan are acceptable to practice, the Deputy Director of the RAC Almaty Office stated that, "The Hanafi mazhab— it is our national tradition. The Hanafi mazhab does not contradict Kazakh traditions— thus, it is the only one that is practiced."[466] Likewise, an imam in Almaty stated his belief that, "For Kazakhs, it is natural to practice the Hanafi mazhab. It is why our religion is called traditional—our traditions and religion are very similar."[467] Another imam put forth that, "We generally follow the Hanafi mazhab and traditional Islam. We are Sunni and more traditional."[468] He further asserted that, "The Hanafi mazhab, it is our national tradition. The Hanafi mazhab does not contradict Kazakh traditions—thus, it is the only one that is practiced."[469]

The National Director of the RAC further stated that:

> According to the constitution, the law… the Hanafi mazhab and Orthodox Church are in the constitution as making contribution to development of culture in Kazakhstan. Our tradition for Kazakhstan, in Islam— mosques and religious people accept ancestors. One of its characteristics is the Hanafi mazhab. The Hanafi mazhab, it's the most liberal mazhab.[470]

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[463] See Islamic Dictionary Appendix for more details on Sunni and Shi'i Islam.
[464] See Islamic Dictionary Appendix for further description of each mazhab. "Mazhab" is most frequently spelled as "madhhab" in English. The spelling "mazhab" here reflects its pronunciation in Russian (мазхаб).
[465] Calder et al., "Law."
[466] Interview with Deputy Director of the RAC Almaty, 2015.
[467] Interview with Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.
[468] Interview with Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015.
[469] Interview with Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015.
[470] Interview with Director of RAC, Astana, 2015.

When I asked what the most salient element about how Islam is practiced in Kazakhstan, he responded that, "The Hanafi mazhab– our followers are both ethnically and religiously Hanafi." An imam further described his viewpoint on Hanafism:

> During the Soviet Union, even when there were actions taken against our religion, our ancestors practiced traditional Islam. It's been practiced by many generations. It is close to our lifestyle and traditions. There are no problems because it is traditional. After independence, a lot of parties started to come to Kazakhstan because there was no law. The law preserves Hanafism.[471]

I asked the Director of the RAC which mazhabs were acceptable to practice in Kazakhstan. He replied that, "I can't say, we are a government agency…everything is equal. I can't say on behalf of the government." He then added, "SAMK, the largest group, is Hanafi, which is why all people are Hanafi," in Kazakhstan.[472] Denying the role of the government and attributing restrictions on religion to a quasi-governmental agency is common amongst high level government officials. However, moving down the ladder in seniority, interviewees became more direct about the prohibition on any other mazhabs outside of the Hanafi mazhab.

When I asked the Deputy Director of the Almaty RAC Office whether other mazhabs outside the Hanafi School of Islam were prohibited given only mosques that are a part of the Hanafi School of Islam are registered and thus open, he provided a contradictory answer, stating "No, the law does not prohibit any mazhabs— just historically the Hanafi mazhab is more developed in Kazakhstan and it is the only mazhab in order to have unity."[473] At another point in the interview he stated that "Only SAMK is registered. SAMK has affiliates, mosques. SAMK coordinates

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[471] Interview with Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.
[472] Interview with the Director of the RAC, Astana, 2015.
[473] Interview with Deputy Director of RAC Almaty, 2015.

charity work and all local mosques must do everything in accordance with SAMK dictates. All must be in the Hanafi mazhab."[474] Other governmental officials, including officials in the RAC Astana Office contradicted this statement and asserted that all other mazhabs are prohibited in Kazakhstan— a view cited by almost all imams in Astana and Almaty. For example, the Director of the RAC Astana Office stated that, "All others are prohibited, SAMK prevents wrong directions," when I asked if other mazhabs were prohibited in Kazakhstan.[475]

There is a consensus among elites in Kazakhstan that the way Islam is practiced should be sanctioned by the regime and that there should be uniformity. The Hanafi mazhab is historic to the region, including most of the former Union outside of Azerbaijan and the Northern Caucasus.[476] Thus, the selection of Hanafism as, "traditional," can be understood in part as a path-dependent process. This selection is highly unlikely to foster opposition—both because relatively few Muslims are part of other mazhabs, and also because of the relatively low levels of religious knowledge at outset of independence due to Soviet policies. Additionally, the regime does grant policy concessions to SAMK and officials in SAMK have clear preferences for Hanafism.

While there is a resounding consensus among elites within the government and SAMK as well as among imams that to identify as "Hanafi" is traditional, most interviewees struggled to describe how they understood Hanafism within the context of Kazakhstan or what practices Hanafism does and does not entail. When asked to describe how Islam in Kazakhstan is practiced, the Chief of Staff responded that:

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[474] Interview with Deputy Director of RAC Almaty, 2015.
[475] Interview with Director of RAC Astana, 2015.
[476] Most Muslims in Azerbaijan identify as Shi'i. Alternatively, the most common mazhab in the Northern Caucasus is the Shafi'i mazhab.

> Historically, Muslims in Kazakhstan have opted for traditional Sunni Islam, which presupposes restraint, moderation, and respect for representatives of other religions. SAMK upholds the Sunni direction of Islam and follows the Abu Khanif mazhab. It preaches what is common among the majority of followers of the Muslim ummah and in shariah law.[477]

Most interviewees employed a circular logic that to be Hanafi is traditional and traditional Islam is Hanafi, or as in the quote above, Hanafism entails religious tolerance. How people in Kazakhstan practice Islam and the degree to which identifying as Hanafi is relevant to people's Muslim identity is examined in Chapter Six. What stood in contrast to most RAC and SAMK officials as well as imams to Hanafism was Salafism.

Salafism

The threat of Salafism, also commonly pejoratively referred to as Wahhabism, was portrayed almost universally as a threat to national traditions and identity in Kazakhstan. Salafi refers to reform movements in Islam that started in the 1900s and emphasizes replicating beliefs and practices that were common during the time of the Prophet.[478] The word Wahhabi comes from the name Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who founded the movement in the 1700s.[479] Theologically the main tenant of Wahhabism is the concept of tawhid, or oneness with God.[480] Wahhabism is one movement within Salafism and is associated with the state of Saudi Arabia.[481]

As with Hanafism, less senior officials were more direct in interviews—stating that Salafism was prohibited completely. On the other hand, more senior

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[477] Interview with Chief of Staff of SAMK, Astana, 2015.
[478] Esposito, "Salafi." See Islamic Dictionary Appendix for more details. The Prophet refers to Prophet Muhammad, who is believed to have founded Islam.
[479] "Wahhabi," *The Islamic World: Past and Present.*
[480] "Wahhabi," *The Islamic World: Past and Present.*
[481] Ibid. See Islamic Dictionary Appendix for more details on Salafism and Wahhabism.

officials attributed instances of religious repression as consequences for the actions of certain individuals or groups

In one interesting scenario, the Director of the RAC temporarily dropped this façade in an interview. His deputy, who sat next to him throughout the interview, quickly interjected to attempt to steer the director back to the narrative that the RAC did not unduly interfere in the religious sphere. When I asked the National Director of the RAC to describe the most salient element about Muslim practice in Kazakhstan, he stated that the Hanafi mazhab was the most salient, but that, "Salafism is different".[482] When I asked why Salafism was different he responded, "Because it's not a mazhab. It is important to not destabilize...." He continued his thought by stating, "They spread propaganda." He started to veer back to the official line by adding, "As long as doesn't contradict law…as long as it doesn't call for message…not about Salafism but about message they have."[483] His assistant then interjected by stating that, "They are not prohibited," but the director, ignoring his assistant, continued to veer off course once again and stated, "They harm social welfare— in many cases they seek to destroy the secular state."

The RAC Astana and Almaty offices were categorical in their assertions that Salafism was prohibited. The Deputy Director of the Almaty RAC stated the following after also being asked whether Salafism was an acceptable way to practice Islam in Kazakhstan:

> Salafism is not traditional in Kazakhstan. It does not have legal status. Some people may have interest in it, but it is not officially recognized, and it is not a registered organization. There are not set canons.[484]

When I asked what criteria were used to determine whether a person or group is

[482] Interview with Director of the RAC, Astana, 2015.
[483] Interview with Director of the RAC, Astana, 2015.
[484] Interview with Deputy Director of RAC Almaty, 2015.

Salafi, he responded that, "Groups should be officially recognized by the state. So they should have a canon and set of rules for the group concerning basic rules and behavior with the state and society."[485] When I asked for clarification about the criteria used, he again vaguely replied that, "Experts examine the documents, and see for example which books are used. There are experts in the RAC, theologians."[486] The Director of the RAC Astana office simply stated that, Salafism, "...is prohibited." When I asked how the government determined whether a person or group is Salafi, he responded:

> Of course, there are external factors. If a person practices by himself, let it be. But if he spreads these beliefs to others, then it is a problem." When I pressed for the criteria used, he refused to answer, stating, "How do you decide whether a person crosses a crosswalk?[487]

A senior SAMK official stated that, "Salafis reject traditions. But in Kazakhstan, traditions are important," when I asked him to define Salafism.[488] When I asked for an example of how Salafis reject tradition he responded that, "They do not think of those who are not Salafi as Muslim."[489] Furthermore, when I asked why he thought that the law on religion was passed in 2011 he stated that,, "Salafis…must be restricted," because, "They go beyond the law."[490] When I asked how they went beyond the law, he asserted that they avoided SAMK sanctioned sources, stating, "They want to go a separate way. They don't go to our mosques or to an imam."[491] Another senior SAMK officials asserted that, "Salafism is not regarded as traditional. It is a sect. This is not only the opinion in Kazakhstan, but the worldwide opinion."[492]

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[485] Interview with Deputy Director of RAC Almaty, 2015.
[486] Ibid.
[487] Ibid.
[488] Interview with Senior SAMK Official E, Almaty, 2015.
[489] Interview with Senior SAMK Official E, Almaty, 2015.
[490] Ibid.
[491] Ibid.
[492] Interview with Senior SAMK Officials F, Astana, 2013.

Only one imam in either Almaty or Astana did not flatly reject the acceptability of Salafism in Kazakhstan.[493] An imam at a co-opted mosque in Astana characterized Salafism as, "aggressive," and believed that the law on religion was a, "…tool to stop Salafism".[494] One imam stated that, "There are no mosques outside of SAMK. This is required to prevent terrorism, Wahhabism, and extremism."[495] He further elaborated:

> There is a lot of Salafism in Kazakhstan, mostly due to Arab influence. It comes from outside. It is coming from outside and causing agitation. It is not acceptable. Hanafism coincides with Kazakhstan and our traditions. Salafism is against our traditions, it rejects traditions. They want to place their Arab traditions in Kazakhstan. They accept only the Qur'an and Sunna and reject our traditions…. Kazakhs… respect their ancestors. They read the Qur'an for their ancestors. They bring food to the mosque for them. But they, Salafis, they reject this.[496]

To draw from the answer from another imam in Almaty about why some mosques were not a part of SAMK prior to 2012:

> Even prayer rooms are registered. Maybe the ones that weren't registered were Salafi. Private mosques were made by Salafis. There were people who built their own mosques. They were showing off— this became popularized. They started to give different messages. This resulted in conflict. People were confused as to whom to listen to. These mosques that didn't join SAMK might be Salafi. They started to study Salafism and started to segregate people. They take knowledge from outside and this conflicts with our traditions. Because of this, SAMK has centralized everything, to prevent this.[497]

When prompted to give examples of how Salafism contradicts with Kazakhstani traditions, several imams referenced national dress, while others were only able to cite traditions for giving charity. One imam stated that, "Kazakhs…respect their ancestors. They read the Qur'an for their ancestors. They bring food to the mosque for them. But

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[493] Interview with Imam of Mosque A4, Astana, 2015.
[494] Interview with Imam H, 2013.
[495] Interview with Imam of Mosque B7 Almaty, 2015.
[496] Interview with Imam of Mosque B7 Almaty, 2015.
[497] Interview with Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.

they, Salafis, they reject this."[498] Similarly, another imam stated the following when talking about Salafism, "Sadaka[499] can be bread. Arabs don't understand this tradition of sadaka, of bread, being given to the poor."[500] Another said that Salafis:

> …wear short trousers. They dress differently. They don't wear Kazakh hats. In Kazakhstan, it is a tradition that you should wear this hat…They have different hand movements for namaz.[501]

Other imams also pointed to attendees who identified as Salafi and consulted religious sources not sanctioned by SAMK. One discussed how Salafis who attended his mosque did not listen to the Friday message he gave. "They read the Qur'an. They listen to their own message. They have their own leaders in Saudi Arabia. They talk to them on the phone and write messages on a website."[502] He further elaborated that during the message, "They put on headphones," or, "They come during namaz, after the message is over, as well."[503]

In Astana, an imam of one of the seven mosques at the time was removed from his post in 2011 after being accused of being Salafi. A high level SAMK official referred to this imam as an, "…Arab scientist," who was part of a sect.[504] I interviewed several former and current attendees at the mosque and confirmed that the imam self-identified as Salafi. However, the label of, "Salafi," has also been used to describe those who do not self-identify as Salafi and merely do not consume SAMK affiliated religious sources and/or dress differently.

Thus, Salafism is equated with those who elect to not utilize SAMK sanctioned religious sources, not wearing traditional Kazakh dress, and performing

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[498] Ibid.
[499] Sadaka means charity, in this context a donation given to a mosque
[500] Interview with Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015.
[501] Interview with Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.
[502] Interview with Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.
[503] Ibid.
[504] Interview with Senior SAMK Official G, Astana, 2013.

religious rituals differently, which in turn is associated with religious extremism and threats to national religious identity. There are no publicly available criteria to determine whether someone is a Salafi. Regardless, as a secular state, theological differences according to the letter of the constitution should have no bearing on whether a person or group is able to practice their faith. Moreover, given the vagueness in the definition, the regime is able to apply the label of, "Salafi," to anyone who does not want to consult regime sanctioned sources of religious knowledge and thus, also associate the accused with "extremism". Therefore, by identifying a person or group as Salafi, (whether or not the person or group self-identifies as Salafi and potentially despite their theology) a process of securitization is enacted and to be, "Salafi" is outside the bounds of the Kazakhstani national religious identity constructed by the regime, which is inherently, "extremist".

I interviewed several people in Kazakhstan who self-identified as Salafi (discussed in Chapter Six). Salafism is not, however, widespread in Kazakhstan. Among this population, how people practice Islam, how this compares to the practices of other Muslims in Kazakhstan, as well as differences between how Salafis in Kazakhstan and elsewhere practice Islam necessitates further study and is outside the scope of this dissertation. I did ask several questions about religious practices —these questions did not reveal a striking difference in practices between people who identified as Salafi and those who did not, although I did not intentionally sample among people who identify as Salafi. Salafism is dually clearly outside the bounds of acceptable identity in Kazakhstan as dictated by the regime and also used pejoratively to label people and groups outside of SAMK as untraditional and under the influence of foreign outsiders and "sects".

Foreign Influence and "Sects"

Those outside these bounds were often referred to as part of, "sects," or due to being led stray by negative foreign influence(s). References to wariness of foreign influences is often inextricably linked to, "Salafism," and, "Wahhabism". Additionally, when I asked for examples of negative foreign influences or sects in Kazakhstan, interviewees also cited Tablighi Jamaat, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and occasionally Sufism. Salafism, Tablighi Jamaat, and Hizb ut-Tahir all have identifiable foreign origin stories. In contrast, Sufism has a long history in the region. Other interviewees cited the threat of sects or the threat of foreign influences but were unable to identify which individuals or groups they were referencing.

In one of my interviews with a senior SAMK official, the official asserted that the appointment of imams was to prevent Salafi imams from assuming positions. [505] He referenced the imam was who Salafi in Astana and then removed from his post.[506] Another senior SAMK official referred to Salafism as:

> ..an Arab strain, a strain from Iran. There are many influences from Arabs, Iran. Islam in Kazakhstan— it is special, our own tradition. Salafism may threaten our traditional ways- (it is) not neutral."[507]

Notably, Salafism is a stream of Islam from Saudi Arabia and is Sunni. On the other hand, Iran, a vehement rival of Saudi Arabia, is Shi'i and thus attributing Salafism to Iran is factually incorrect.

President Nazarbayev expressed his concern about potential foreign influences introduced via missionaries at the Nur Otan council meeting in January 2008:

> …Tens of thousands of different missionary organizations work in Kazakhstan. We don't know their purposes and intentions, and we should not allow such unchecked activity…We are a secular state, religion is separate

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[505] Ibid.
[506] Ibid.
[507] Interview with Senior SAMK Official H, Almaty, 2015.

> from the state, but this does not mean that Kazakhstan should become the dumping ground for religious movements of all kinds.[508]

Moreover, in a speech before the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan on April 18, 2011, President Nazarbayev stated:

> The sphere of scientific research of interethnic and interfaith relations requires the most serious attention. I want to particularly mention religious affairs in our country. Here we should understand it, and our associations of Muslims and Orthodox Christians should play a major role in protecting our religious relations from various sects and organizations which have different views from what we need, entering Kazakhstan.[509]

Nazarbayev, similar to officials I interviewed, often presented Islam in Kazakhstan in contrast to Islam in other Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East, which they equated with conflict and religious extremism. A senior advisor to Parliament stated that all mosques must in SAMK because:

> SAMK is not ready to cope with (religious) variety so it is best under one institution. There are Arab strains. It is also an issue of education— we're not ready to cope with the challenges that could occur. Kazakhs, they're not a big population— we might disappear in this globalized world.[510]

In response to the aforementioned question, another imam stated that all mosques in Kazakhstan are in SAMK so that Kazakhstan, "...it is not like the Arab world, Egypt. Because a lot of people are going to Syria."[511] Another imam presented Kazakhstan as the, "…moderate," model for Islam, asserting, "Don't compare us with Arabs, Turkey or Malaysia. There it is prohibited for women to come to mosques, but not here."[512] As described in the centralization section, a SAMK official justified the registration of all mosques in Kazakhstan with SAMK with the following, "Our imams went to other countries. When they returned, they were glad that we have a

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[508] Bayram and Kinahan, "Kazakhstan: Religious Freedom Survey, September 2009."
[509] Mushfig Bayram, "Kazakhstan: 'Great Political Efforts are Made.' ".
[510] Interview with Senior SAMK Official G, Almaty, 2015.
[511] Interview with Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty, 2015.
[512] Interview with Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015.

centralized organization like SAMK."[513]

Interviewees often cited the development of sects as due to outside influences. When I asked interviewees to identify which sects they believed were present in Kazakhstan, the most common refrains were Salafism and "extremism"—a continuation of this circular logic. A senior SAMK official stated that, "Salafism is not regarded as traditional. It is a sect. This is not only the opinion in Kazakhstan, but the worldwide opinion."[514] To a lesser extent, interviewees also identified Tablighi Jamaat, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Sufism.

Tablighi Jamaat is an Islamic movement that formed in 1926 in Delhi, India that emphasizes proselytizing.[515] It is banned in all of Central Asia except Kyrgyzstan under the premise of extremism.[516] Tablighi Jamaat was banned in Kazakhstan in 2013.[517] Despite this, Tablighi Jamaat is explicitly non-political.[518] Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani and former members of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1953 in Pakistan. It is a self-declared political movement and advocates for the creation of a Pan-Islamic state through non-violent means.[519]

Answering my question about why all mosques are in SAMK, one imam stated that this is, "Because there are different groups and, therefore, there is a need to maintain the peace. A sign of being Muslim is to obey one's leader. Groups come from outside and influence youth."[520] When I asked which groups he was referring to, he replied, "Tablighi Jamaat, Salafism, Wahhabism, and wrong Sufi groups. The head

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[513] Interview with SAMK Official H, Almaty, 2015.
[514] Interview with Senior SAMK Official G, Almaty, 2015.
[515] Ahmad, "Tablīghī Jamāʿat."
[516] See for example Baumgartner, "Muslim Leader's Arrest In Kyrgyzstan Puts Attention On Secretive Islamic Society."
[517] "Kazakhstan Bans Islamic Group."
[518] Ibid.
[519] Ahmad, "Tablīghī Jamāʿat."
[520] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.

of an anti-sect center in Astana was one of the few interviewees to give a concrete answer about why Tablighi Jamaat was considered unacceptable—citing proselytization:

> They are ecstatic, self-contained and identifiable… They call for a peaceful transition to the caliphate. They go door to door. When young people join, they quit their jobs, leave their families. It's in Kazakhstan, going into Kyrgyzstan, it's everywhere…in Russia, in Turkistan…" and thus prohibited by the government.[521]

The head of the RAC stated that Tablighi Jamaat and Hizb ut-Tahrir, "…spread propaganda."[522] An imam stated the both groups are banned, "…Because they are dangerous to society."[523] On my third redirect I asked him why they were dangerous. He finally provided the rationale that Tablighi Jamaat and Hizb ut-Tahrir are banned by the government because both groups proselytize, "Each nation has its own tradition that belongs to them. Islam does not belong only to Pakistanis and Indians. They were proselytizing without knowledge."[524] When I asked an imam to define sects he replied, "Like people who use takbir,[525] Hizb ut-Tahrir — but they're not a big problem."[526]

Some interviewees did reference Sufism (examined in the section below) as a sect. One imam in Almaty stated that Kazakhstan had a Sufi presence in earlier times, but that now they were, "…spreading bad things."[527] When I asked him to elaborate,

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[521] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.
[522] Interview with Director of RAC, Astana, 2015.
[523] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.
[524] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.
[525] Takbir refers to the phrase, "God is greater" or "Allahu Akbar" and part of the call to prayer. See Islamic Dictionary Appendix. This interviewee is referencing this phrase in conjunction with its association to people who commit acts of terror and utter this phrase.
[526] Interview with Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015.
[527] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015. See next section on Sufism.

he referred to Sufis as a, "sect," who are, "…against the state, against independence. They have no nation, no boundaries."[528]

Thus, there is a clear delineation of the bounds of "traditional" in that it does not include Salafism, Tablighi Jamaat or Hizb ut-Tahrir. Salafism, Tablighi Jamaat or Hizb ut-Tahrir each have identifiable foreign roots. Narratives espoused by the government and SAMK officials clearly emphasized that religious authority should emanate from domestic sources and SAMK itself. Additionally, groups that proselytize or are perceived to proselytize are more likely to be repressed.

However, government and SAMK officials and imams struggled to articulate what was theologically inappropriate about Tablighi Jamaat, Hizb ut-Tahir, Salafism, or "sects"—other than their perceived innate foreignness and inherent threat to tradition. The question of whether Sufism will continue to be considered part of Kazakh national identity is still developing. More frequently, the label of, "Salafi," and ,"sect" was applied regardless of theology or even practice. Rather these labels are applied to any person or group who does not seek out religious information from SAMK approved sources. A growing dialogue about sects has been accompanied by a proliferation of government sponsored anti-sect centers. As examined in Chapter Two, government sponsored NGOs present a relatively new avenue for authoritarian regimes. In the religious sphere in Kazakhstan, these centers provided a deft avenue to label people or groups who resist co-optation as outside the boundaries of the majority religious national identity.

[528] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.

Sufism

Sufism is a form of Islamic mysticism that focuses on spiritual development.[529] Sufism can be found within both Sunni and Shi'i Islam and among the schools of jurisprudence. Sufis practice a form of prayer called dhikr, which can either be vocal or silent.[530] Prior to 2012, the Kazakhstani regime did not implement any set policy towards Sufism. Since 2012, the regime has pursued contradicting policies. Unlike Salafism, which was universally condemned by interviewees, officials and imams gave conflicting answers about how the regime views Sufism and its acceptability in Kazakhstan. A portion of elite interviewees asserted that Sufism was acceptable in Kazakhstan, though some caveated this by stating that its practice should not be widespread. Other elite officials and imams affirmed the opposite, that Sufism is not considered by the regime to be acceptable in Kazakhstan. Yet again other interviewees made a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable Sufism, though few interviewees were able to articulate how this distinction could be made.

The Deputy Director of the RAC Astana office stated that Sufism was, "…allowed," according to the RAC. [531] Going further, one imam referred to Sufism as an, "…integral," and, "…inseparable part of Islam".[532] Another imam stated that Sufism is, "…undoubtedly traditional to Kazakhstan...as well as in Tajikistan."[533] A senior SAMK official insisted in 2012 that Sufism is not, "…separate," from Hanafism in Kazakhstan and that they have the same, "…roots".[534] Sufism was often

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[529] Esposito, "Salafi."
[530] See Islamic Dictionary Appendix.
[531] Interview with Deputy Director of RAC Astana, 2015.
[532] Interview with Imam H, 2013.
[533] Interview with Imam A, 2013.
[139] Interview with SAMK Representative P, 2013.

cited as a, "special path" and that it entailed, "extra obligations".[535] Other interviewees identified Sufism as introducing Islam to Kazakhstan.[536]

One prominent imam in Almaty asserted that, "This is according to Yasawi," when justifying why all Friday messages are the same in Kazakhstan.[537] Khawaja Ahmed Yasawi was a prominent Sufi leader based in Turkestan (in present day Kazakhstan), who died in 1166.[538] The most prominent religious site in Kazakhstan is the Mausoleum of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi, which was commissioned by Timur and constructed 1389 and 1405.[539] However, the mausoleum is now controlled by the government rather than the Yasawi Sufi order.[540]

Despite these statements, and the historic importance of Sufism in Kazakhstan, discomfort was simultaneously expressed with Sufism being widely practiced.[541] The director of a government sponsored anti-sect center (discussed in more detail below) asserted that Sufism is, "…not supposed to be widespread."[542] Additionally, a senior SAMK official asserted that Sufism was only for those who have already accumulated significant religious knowledge and that it was not for the average citizen.[543]

Other interviewees sought to distinguish between, "good," and, "bad," Sufi groups, though the articulation between the two was often ambiguous.[544] One imam

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[535] For example, Interview with Member of Kazakhstani Academy of Sciences, 2013.
[536] Interview with SAMK Representative Interview F, Astana, 2013.
[537] Interview with Imam of Mosque B1, Almaty, 2015.
[538] Rizaeddin bin Fakhreddin, "Ibn Taymiyya."
[539] "Mausoleum of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi."
[540] Interview with Member of Kazakhstani Academy of Science, 2013.
[541] Interview with SAMK Official G, 2013.
[542] Interview with Director of Anti-Sect Center, Astana, 2013.
[543] Interview with Senior SAMK Official G, Astana, 2013.
[544] Interview with SAMK Spokesperson, 2013; Senior Imam of Nur Astana Mosque, Astana, 2013; Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B3, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty 2015; Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty, 2015; Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.

commented that, “There are many paths within Sufism. If someone is a true Sufi, they don’t show it.”[545] When I asked how he could determine whether someone is a true Sufi, he responded, “Maybe you can identify him by being very patient and righteous. They don’t do non-Sufi things.” When I asked what qualified as non-Sufi things he stated, “Doing what is not halal or haram. Doing magic.”[546] One SAMK official made a similar distinction between ,“right,” and, “wrong,” Sufism wherein, “Right Sufism, is according to shariah…In order to take up this path, one should learn shariah better.”[547] Some interviewees did make distinctions other than broad notions of being knowledgeable about being according to shariah. One interviewee stated that some Sufis viewed the mausoleums in Kazakhstan as shrines, stating, “It is sinful to derive authority from a place instead of Allah.”[548] The director of the anti-sect center stated that while, “Sufism is considered peaceful and traditional,” some people, “…disguise themselves as Sufi.”[549] The interviewee clarified that unacceptable Sufi practices included mystical practices such as speaking in tongues.[550]

One clear explanation was whether dhikr was practiced silently or vocally.[551] For example, when elaborating on what he meant by, “wrong Sufi,” groups, one imam in Almaty stated that, “They make a lot of noise in the mosque. Right Sufis, they are true and it’s about the cleaning of the heart. But now, these people make noise- this is not ok. It is widespread.”[552] In this line of reasoning, only silent dhikr is acceptable.

Other interviewees asserted a different position, that Sufism was not

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[545] Interview with Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty, 2015.
[546] Interview with Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty, 2015.
[547] Interview with Senior SAMK Official G, Astana, 2013.
[548] Interview with Senior SAMK Official G, Astana, 2013.
[549] Interview with Director of Anti-Sect Center, Astana, 2013.
[550] Interview with Director of Anti-Sect Center, Astana, 2013.
[551] Dhikr is a form of prayer, either vocal or silent, practiced by Sufis.
[552] Interview with Imam of Mosque B4, Almaty, 2015.

acceptable in Kazakhstan in any form. A senior level official in SAMK went as far to say that Sufism is, "…not acceptable," in Kazakhstan and moreover that it is prohibited and that Sufism stems from a, "…lack of knowledge".[553] One prominent human rights activist in Kazakhstan expressed the belief that the government views Sufism negatively.[554] The Deputy Director of the RAC Almaty office stated that, "We don't have an official confession for Sufism. There is not a separate Sufi mosque or branch in Almaty or Kazakhstan," in response to my question about whether Sufism is an acceptable way to practice Islam in Kazakhstan.[555] Similarly, one contact at SAMK stated that there are no Sufi mosques in Kazakhstan.[556] Some programs on Kazakhstani television have also portrayed Sufism in a negative light.[557] Another senior SAMK official flatly stated that Sufism, "…is not acceptable. It is prohibited."[558] When I asked how he defined Sufism, he hesitated, before replying that "You cannot rely on appearance. It is from a lack of knowledge."[559] When I asked how they lacked knowledge he stated that they "...go beyond the law," and equated Sufism with religious extremism.[560] Another imam stated:

> Sufism was popular in the past and now it's not. In the past, after the collapse of the Soviet Union had Sufi community but practiced Sufism in the wrong way. So the government prohibited it…These actions were stopped by the government, because they practiced in the wrong way, in an extreme way.[561]

One Sufi mosque that originally resisted inclusion into SAMK eventually acquiesced and joined SAMK.[562] During an interview prior to the mosque's co-

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[553] Interview with SAMK Almaty Official, 2015.
[140] Interviews with Human Rights Activist, Almaty, 2013.
[555] Interview with Deputy Director of RAC Almaty Office, Almaty, 2015.
[556] Interview with SAMK Representative G, 2013.
[557] Interview with Local Employee of U.S. State Department, 2012.
[558] Interview with Senior SAMK Official I, Almaty, 2015
[559] Interview with Senior SAMK Official I, Almaty, 2015
[560] Interview with Senior SAMK Official J, Almaty, 2015.
[561] Interview with Imam of Mosque B2, Almaty, 2015.
[562] Interview with Imam of Former Sufi Mosque outside of Astana, 2013.

optation in SAMK, the imam expressed his desire to maintain the independence of the mosque and his concern that by joining SAMK the mosque would not be able to maintain its Sufi identity. Alternatively, he was also wary of the mosque being forced to close.[563] The mosque remains open, though after joining SAMK, it is no longer officially a Sufi mosque and the imam whom I previously spoke with was replaced.[564] Several other contacts expressed their belief that designated places of worship for those who identify as Sufi were not allowed by the regime.[565]

Thus, unlike with Salafism, the regime has projected conflicting opinions about Sufism, which is also reflected by imams. On the other hand, designated places of worship have either been co-opted in SAMK such as historic Sufi mausoleums, or mosques, which after co-optation are no longer Sufi. Furthermore, even interviewees who identify Sufism as traditional to Kazakhstan also expressed a wariness about the widespread practice of Sufism. As discussed in Chapter Two, two of the most prominent religious leaders in Kazakhstan are Sufi, and one has been in jail since 2011. Sufism has also been identified as a threat by anti-sect centers. Overall, the regime has not projected clear narratives about Sufism in Kazakhstan, with its position continuing to evolve. Despite this, designated Sufi places of worship and widespread practice are clearly viewed as undesirable. In light of this, it is clear that the regime fears Sufism forming a separate source of religious legitimacy. Sufism has previously been used as a resource in Chechnya in the war against Russia[566]—an event clearly within historical memory in Kazakhstan. However, the Kazakhstani

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[146] Interview with Imam of Former Sufi Mosque outside of Astana, 2013.
[564] Interview with U.S. State Department Diplomat, 2013.
[565] Interview with SAMK Representative C, 2013; Interview with Imam H, 2013.
[566] See for example Zelkina, *In Quest for God and Freedom: The Sufi Response to the Russian Advance in the North Caucasus*.

regime has not settled on a tactic yet to address this concern—either co-opting Sufism by encapsulating it into SAMK or repressing it.

Mosques for Ethnic Minorities

As with Sufism, the Kazakhstani regime's position on mosques for ethnic minority communities is evolving. Contradictory answers were given by imams and government officials regarding questions about mosques primarily attended by non-ethnic Kazakhs, which are often locally referred to as "ethnic mosques." Some interviewees, particularly in 2013, asserted that mosques cannot be designated for certain ethnic communities. Several interviewees stated that ,"ethnic mosques," are prohibited in Kazakhstan, including a highly ranked SAMK official (who made this declaration after the passage of the religion law but before its official enactment).[567] The Spokesperson for SAMK in 2013 echoed this point, stating that mosques can't be, "…separated by ethnicity."[568] Similarly, a senior government official who ushered in the legislation on religion stated that, "Mosques cannot be ethnic. Religion can (only) have streams."[569]

Analogous statements were made to new agency Forum 18. The Head of East Kazakhstan's Regional Administration Internal Policy Department stated to *Forum 18* that, "ethnic mosques," may not be established.[570] A similar sentiment was reflected by the head of the Almaty City Religious Affairs Agency in 2010 who stated that, "…mosques cannot be ethnic," as, "Only Judaism is an ethnic religion, Islam is an international religion."[571] This was echoed by the Chair of the North Kazakhstan

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[567] Interview with SAMK Official C, September 2012.
[568] Interview with Spokesperson of SAMK, Astana, 2013.
[569] Interview with High Level Government Official Involved in Passage of Religion Law, 2013.
[570] Bayram, "Kazakhstan: Ethnic-Based Mosques 'Cannot be Opened."
[571] Bayram, "Kazakhstan: Ethnic-Based Mosques 'Cannot be Opened."

Regional Department of the Religious Affairs Agency, Nurislyam Gabdullin, who stated, "There are no ethnic divisions in Islam based on ethnicity. There can be no Tatar, Chechen, or Tajik mosques."[572] The Kazakhstani regime is dually balancing efforts to avoid allowing mosques to serve as a space for organizing for ethnic minority communities, while not employing so much repression as to stoke opposition.

In some communities, SAMK's policies on theology overlap with its evolving policies on mosques for minority ethnic communities. Almost all interviewees categorically rejected the feasibility as well as acceptability of Shi'ism in Kazakhstan. SAMK is officially a Sunni institution. It should be noted, however, that many of those who identify as Shi'i in Kazakhstan are also Azeri or other ethnic minorities; thus, there is often an interplay of both ideology and ethnicity. In 2010, several Azeri houses of prayers were allowed, though they were barred from maintaining a status as mosques, conducting Friday services, or resembling the structure of a mosque.[573]

SAMK has made some allowances for prayer house, cultural centers, and NGOs for ethnic minority communities. However, these communities frequently have not been allowed to maintain or build mosques. For example, people who go to the Daghestani Cultural Center of the Atyrau are allowed to prayer, although the center is prohibited from having a Friday message. In exchange for being allowed to have a center, members attended services at the central mosques.[574]

Alternatively, two highly ranked contacts at a government mosque unequivocally stated that, "…ethnic mosques," can be part of SAMK[575] and one noted

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[572] Bayram, "Kazakhstan: There Can Be No Tatar, Chechen, or Tajik Mosques."
[573] Bayram, "Kazakhstan: Ethnic-Based Mosques 'Cannot be Opened'."
[574] Bayram, "Kazakhstan: Ethnic-Based Mosques 'Cannot be Opened'."
[575] Interview with SAMK Official F, 2013; SAMK Official G, August 2013.

that such mosques are, "…built on nations,"[576] a commonly used phrase that refers to the multiple nations within Kazakhstan. Another imam at a co-opted mosque in Astana stated that there are, "…fourteen nationalities in Kazakhstan" and, "…each has right to its own religion."[577] An imam in Almaty elaborated that:

> Ethnic mosques provide freedom. The Chechen mosque can have messages in different languages. Their imam is Kazakh. It is the same with the Uyghurs. This is so there will be equality— we work together.[578]

Increasingly, more accommodations since 2015 have been granted to mosques that are primarily attended by non-ethnic Kazakhs, particularly language accommodations. However, mosques for non-ethnic Kazakh communities also have additional restrictions that are not imposed on other mosques. One mosque in Astana, Mosque A5, is a mosque primarily attended by non-ethnic Kazakhs. This mosque, which has been co-opted into SAMK, was constructed based on funds from two non-ethnic Kazakhs and whose families continue to provide funding for the operation of the mosque.[579] It is also attended by ethnic Kazakhs, but includes a higher proportion of non-ethnic Kazakhs.[580] Additionally, two of the mosques randomly selected in Almaty are primarily attended by non-ethnic Kazakhs. These two mosques were in the periphery of Almaty, a considerable distance away from the city center and in more rural settings. As with all mosques, imams at these three mosques are now appointed by SAMK. Notably, at all three mosques the imams appointed are not from the same ethnicity that is in the majority at each respective mosque. This policy seems to be intentional. By appointing an imam from outside the community, the regime is hoping to avoid empowering imams to take up the mantle of the concerns of ethnic

[576] Interview with SAMK Official F, 2013.
[577] Interview with Imam I, 2013.
[578] Interview with Imam of Mosque B7, Almaty, 2015.
[579] Interview with Imam of Mosque A5, 2013.
[580] Interview with Imam of Mosque A5, 2013.

minorities, and channeling this into viable opposition. As these imams are not from the community they serve, many do not aspire to stay long term in the area they were appointed. Their career is dependent on their mobility within SAMK. This framework allows SAMK to collect information about ethnic minority communities through these imams and relay information to the regime.

It is notable that none of these mosques are able to explicitly state that they are serving non-ethnic Kazakh communities, nor are the imams from within their own communities. Despite these disparities, since 2015 language accommodations have been granted to these mosques. The imam of Mosque A5 in Astana and other employees of the mosque believe that non-ethnic Kazakhs as well as ethnic Kazakhs who have low proficiency in Kazakh (especially compared to Russian) may attend this mosque as it is the only mosque in the city to provide Friday messages in Russian.[581] At all three of the non-ethnic Kazakh mosques I conducted interviews at, I observed Russian being used as the lingua franca. One contact described how SAMK recently permits language accommodations for Russian. In light of this policy shift, mosques can apply and request that Russian be used in lieu of Kazakh for the Friday message. Notably, there is considerable variation in Kazakh proficiency in Kazakhstan, even among ethnic Kazakhs.[582]

Thus, prior to 2015, mosques with ethnic minorities were unable to have the Friday message in a language that the majority of the congregation could understand. Mosques with majorities of non-ethnic Kazakhs that resisted these measures were either closed or their status was downgraded to prayer rooms. So-called ethnic mosques that did not resist co-optation and accepted imams from other ethnic groups

[581] Interview with Imam of Mosque A5, 2013.
[582] Interview of Imam of Mosque B6, Almaty, 2015.

have been able to remain open. These mosques are not able to publicly state that they primarily cater to the religious needs of a minority ethnic group. The limited concessions granted to these mosques is reflective of the regime's efforts to balance tying religious legitimacy in SAMK as a protector of Kazakh national identity, while tempering discontent based on ethnicity.

International Image: Religious Diversity and Tradition

Coinciding with the aforementioned narratives projected for a domestic audience, Kazakhstan has also wielded narratives intended for international audiences. The first promotes the image of religious harmony and tolerance. This narrative originated in the early 2000s, as part of a larger emphasis on international image by President Nazarbayev. Since 2012, the narrative has continued to be deployed and is intended to mitigate international criticism and potential repercussions over the 2012 religion law and subsequent policies. The second narrative portrays Kazakhstan as an example for the world of, "moderate Islam," and coincides with the overall shift in religious policy since 2012 in Kazakhstan. This narrative seeks to justify the co-optation of Islam in Kazakhstan by portraying the regime as actively combatting the ever-present threat of Islamic extremism in order to uphold, "moderate," Islam.

A prominent symbol of the religious harmony and peace narrative is the Palace of Peace and Reconciliation (or The Palace of Peace and Accord) in Astana. The Kazakhstani government commissioned the renowned British architect Norman Foster to design the Palace of Peace and Reconciliation in 2004. [583] The pyramidal

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[583] "Palace of Peace and Reconciliation: Astana, Kazakhstan 2004-2006," *Foster and Partners*. The Norman Foster firm was also responsible for designing the Khan Shatyr, an indoor shopping mall that is also believed to the world's largest tent. Elder, "World's Biggest Tent Offers Escape from Kazakhstan's Big Chill,"; "Khan Shatyr Entertainment Centre: Astana, Kazakhstan 2006-2010.".

building was completed in 2006 in order to host the second Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions.[584] There top floor of the building is pyramid within a pyramid with windows from the floor to the top of the pyramid. The interior is white, allowing the light to reflect. The floor is outfitted with a round table specifically constructed for conference participants, and a personal elevator for President Nazarbayev's entrance. The entire building is designed for maximum effect for photoshoots to promote Kazakhstan's export of religious freedom.

The topic of the 2006 conference was, "Religion, Society and International Security."[585] The conference was touted as having the support of an array of foreign leaders and figures including Nelson Mandela, Mikhail Gorbachev, Kofi Annan, Margaret Thatcher, and George W. Bush.[586] In addition to such high-profile leaders, the minutes of the 2018 conference note the attendance of the Sephardi and Ashkenazi Chief Rabbis of Israel, the president of Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Turkish equivalent of Kazakhstan's RAC), and the previous president of the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts in the Catholic Church.[587]

The ability of the Conference to continue to attract high profile guests at the conference as well as the willingness of government officials from other countries to reflect the narrative of Kazakhstan as an upholder of religious freedom, points to the success of this narrative. Ben Chadler, the Representative of Kentucky's sixth congressional district from 2004 to 2013, made a statement before the House praising Kazakhstan after attending the Congress. He stated that the United States' National Prayer Breakfast's purpose is to, "…emphasize the principles and teachings of Jesus

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584 "Palace of Peace and Reconciliation: Astana, Kazakhstan 2004-2006.
585 "Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions."
586 "About Congress of leaders of World and Traditional Religions."
587 "Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Council of Religious Leaders."

of Nazareth as the best means of achieving reconciliation and peace in a troubled world."[588] He then directly tied this to Kazakhstan, first stating:

> That is why I appreciate the example of Kazakhstan, whose president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is making a considerable effort to deal with religious diversity in his country and in the region. In fact, all of the world's great religions—Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Buddhism, are present and thriving in Kazakhstan, thanks to a climate of tolerance and openness in that country. Kazakhstan today is a model of religious diversity.[589]

Chadler further noted that the Speaker of the Senate in Kazakhstan (who was also the chairman of Kazakhstan's National Security Council) was attending the National Prayer Breakfast. He ended his statement with the following, "…I …applaud Kazakhstan's leadership and example in insuring that religious freedom will be a cornerstone of building a freer society in that country."[590] Pope John Paul in 2001 stated in his visit of Astana, that Kazakhstan is, "...an example of a country where men and women of different origin and belief live in peace with each other."[591]

This narrative from the Kazakhstani has continued through 2015. Prior to assuming the chair of the OSCE, the Foreign Minister at the time, Marat Tazhin, stated, "It is commonly recognized that one of the most important achievements of Kazakhstan in the humanitarian sphere is securing the inter-ethnic and inter-religious accord."[592] Domestically, however, there was a shift in dialogue of harmony through the value of religious diversity to harmony through the preservation of "traditional" sources of religion in 2012.

This shift was accompanied by an emphasis on the over looming danger of religious extremism and how Kazakhstan should be viewed as an example of

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[588] Congressional Record, "Kazakhstan Promotes Religious Tolerance."
[589] Congressional Record, "Kazakhstan Promotes Religious Tolerance."
[590] Ibid.
[591] Kazybay, "Pope Welcomes Kazakhstan's Efforts to Promote Inter-Religious Understanding."
[592] Bayram and Kinahan, "Kazakhstan: Religious Freedom Survey, September 2009."

moderate Islam. The threat of religious extremism is parallel to the domestic narratives about the danger of religious extremism examined above. The concept of Kazakhstan as an international model for "moderate Islam" was directly proposed by the former head of the RAC, Lama Sharif, on June 17, 2011:

> Each citizen of Kazakhstan has a right to freedom of conscience and choice, and we have made our own choice. Our choice is objective and based on the principle of 'one nation - one religion', and it is exactly this principle that makes us one nation. In this context, we will prepare a concept on the 'Development of moderate Islam in Kazakhstan'.[593]

In 2011, in order to gauge international reaction to the new law on religion, the Kazakhstani regime contracted Tony Blair Associates. Tony Blair Associates advised the government on how the language of the law as well as its implementation could potentially affect its international image.[594] Ultimately, Tony Blair Associates found little evidence of repercussions in other countries in Central Asia and Eastern Europe that have implemented similar restrictions on religious freedom. [595]

Moreover, these narratives have gained some international traction. In 2014, S. Frederick Starr wrote an opinion article in The New York Times entitled, "Moderate Islam? Look to Central Asia."[596] In this article Starr argues:

> …perhaps it is time for us to listen to our own lectures on the possibilities of a peaceful and intellectually open version of Islam, and to back those societies that are trying most successfully to advance it today.[597]

Giles Fraser wrote an article in the Guardian in 2015 about religion in Kazakhstan, "Tolerant Islam should be protected."[598] In the opening of the article, Fraser described

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[593] Bayram, "Kazakhstan: "One nation—one religion?".
[594] Interview with Tony Blair Associates Advisor, Astana, August 2013; Interview with Tony Blair Associates Advisor, Oxford, England, June 2014.
[595]Interview with Tony Blair Associates Advisor, Astana, August 2013. Interview with Tony Blair Associates Advisor, Oxford, England, June 2014.
[596] Starr, "Moderate Islam? Look to Central Asia."
[597] Starr, "Moderate Islam? Look to Central Asia."
[598] Fraser, "Tolerant Islam Should Be Protected."

his impressions of the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions in 2015, which is accompanied by a photo with President Nazarbayev and United Nations secretary general Ban Ki-moon at the conference. Fraser acknowledged that only religions that are authorized by the state are allowed to practice—citing the belief that less repression could lead to extremism. He then states, "And maybe they are right to do all this. For Kazakhstan has, within its own set limits, developed a properly desired reputation for religious toleration."[599] Fraser directly acknowledged and accepted the securitization discourse produced by the Kazakhstani regime. Articles on Kazakhstan in western newspapers are not a frequent occurrence. However, given most government officials in North America and Western Europe are not familiar with Kazakhstan, prominently placed articles in outlets that serve as newspapers of record may contribute towards shaping these policy makers' limited views on Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstani regime is well aware of this. Thus far, the Congress has proven an effective tactic to promote these narratives.

While encapsulating Islam through a quasi-governmental agency, the regime continues its efforts to portray itself as a secular state that is above the fray of theological disagreements in both official communications as well as in statements to foreign news outlets. Simultaneously, the regime emphasizes the threat of religious extremism in domestic and foreign media, justifying the encapsulation of Islam. Ultimately, the regime has concluded that these methods are effective and that international reactions to its domestic policies will be (and thus far have been) muted. The focus on the international perception on religious policies in Kazakhstan allows the regime to reduce pressure on it to conform to democratic norms on religious freedom and instead shifts the focus to the security realm.

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[599] Fraser, "Tolerant Islam Should Be Protected."

Conclusion

Chapter Two identified the tools utilized by the Kazakhstani government to co-opt Islam in Kazakhstan. This chapter has both examined how the implementation of these policies is framed as well as the boundaries of the national religious identity the regime is attempting to construct. Lastly, this chapter has examined how these policies are justified to an international audience. In Kazakhstan, the co-optation of Islam through institutions as well as what type of national religious identify is deemed acceptable is justified through the tool of securitization domestically. Moreover, narratives about stemming the tide of religious extremism have also been utilized in response to international actors who have raised concerns about religious freedom in Kazakhstan. Securitization narratives are an effective justification because Kazakhstan does not have to contend with boundary control from a higher level of government. Kazakhstan is, however, concerned with its international reputation. By framing the co-optation of Islam as measures that deter religious extremism, there have been limited international repercussions.

Rationales provided for the need to control Islam and why religious knowledge and outlets should be centralized (or what one senior government official involved in passing the legislation on religion referred to as ,"…the need for streamlining"[600], include the need for security and the importance of preserving national identity. This need for security and preservation of national identity entails broad narratives about: the importance of peace and avoiding conflict; preventing and combating religious extremism; promoting unity, harmony and dialogue; and stability.

[600] Fraser, "Tolerant Islam Should Be Protected."

Accordingly, there are unapproved religious groups that somehow deviate from government approved religious groups and thus have different interpretations.

These groups and individuals are often identified as Salafi— regardless of self-identification and often theology. Conflicting narratives emerge regarding whether Sufism is considered to be an approved group. It is widely recognized that Sufis brought Islam to what is present day Kazakhstan, there is still a present historical memory that Sufism allowed for the continuation of practices during the Soviet Union, and there are several prominent Sufi shrines that are popular across Kazakhstan. However, some government and SAMK officials state that Sufism is prohibited, some assert that it is permitted, while others made the distinction between so-called "good" and "bad" Sufi groups.

Additionally, while language accommodations have been made for mosques primarily attended by non-ethnic Kazakhs that have been co-opted into SAMK, mosques that resisted co-optation or were viewed as overly emphasizing their importance as a place of community for non-ethnic Kazakhs have subsequently been closed. Thus, these policies on religious theology and ethnic minorities emphasize the tension between constructing a civic and ethnic nation, though they are more reflective of the construction of an ethnic-nation state.

The narrative provided by the regime to domestic audiences attributes unapproved groups or interpretations to people's lack of religious knowledge. These unapproved groups and alternative interpretations lead to religious extremism. It is important to note that interviewees often did not define religious extremism as acts of violence or solely as acts of violence. Thus, extremism entails threats to tradition, instability, conflict, and a lack of peace. This in turn necessitates the need to centralize and control all religious outlets. This process is enacted by SAMK and the

RAC. It is argued that controlling all available outlets and centralizing these outlets allows for the preservation of tradition, stability, unity, the absence of extremism, absence of conflict, increased religious knowledge, and contributes towards peace. To international audiences, a similar security paradigm is portrayed, with the government dually portrayed as above the religious fray and as implementing policies that deter the development of religious extremism.

The following chapter compares this process in Tatarstan and Chapters Six and Seven evaluates the effectiveness of the policies in Kazakhstan, or how so-called ordinary citizens respond to these policies and the degree to which they consider them legitimate.

Chapter Five Narratives Encapsulating Islam: Tatarstan

Introduction

This chapter first examines how the co-optation mechanisms in Tatarstan identified in Chapter Three are justified to a national audience in Tatarstan and compares these narratives to those employed in Kazakhstan. Secondly, I examine the type of national religious identity that is being constructed in Tatarstan by the regime and compare it to the boundaries constructed in Kazakhstan. Lastly, I compare the narratives constructed by each regime for external audiences as well as the targets of these narratives.

In both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan the narratives justifying the encapsulation of Islam can be understood as a process of securitization. Likewise, the boundaries of acceptable religious identity are also drawn through a process of securitization. Unlike Kazakhstan, however, the securitization of Islam poses a threat to Tatarstan's boundary control—presenting an opportunity for Moscow to reduce Tatarstan's independence. Using the same securitization narratives, Moscow could argue that further central control could reduce the threat of extremism in Tatarstan. I argue that in order to prevent central intrusion, Kazan portrays Tatarstan as a domestic source of "moderate" Islam, that is defending off domestic threats from within Russia as well as foreign threats. Alternatively, in Kazakhstan the threat of extremism is portrayed as stemming solely from aboard. Elites in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan sought to construct similar boundaries for each national religious identity– wherein attempts to practice Islam or create a swell of support outside SAMK and SAM RT were labeled as non-traditional.

Encapsulation through Securitization

Narratives Justifying the Co-optation of Islam in Tatarstan

As in Chapter Four, the co-occurrence models below illustrate the linkages between the co-optation mechanism employed in Tatarstan and the ten codes that co-occurred most frequently with each co-optation mechanism.

These co-optation mechanisms include the encapsulation of mosques, the encapsulation of religious knowledge through restrictions on non-regime associated sources, and encapsulation through the production of regime associated sources. As with the models in Chapter Four, these models only show co-occurrences between the codes that co-occur with the co-optation method and their co-occurrence with each other (not every code that co-occurs with each code is shown above).

Encapsulation of Mosques

As in Kazakhstan, the encapsulation of mosques in Tatarstan includes co-opting mosques into SAM RT and creating disparities in resources and funding between government constructed and co-opted mosques. Model 1 below illustrates the co-occurrence of codes with the of encapsulation of mosques. A dotted line denotes the relationship between a code and sub-code.[601]

As in Kazakhstan, government and SAMK officials and imams directly cited the importance of "Centralization" and "Control" as a justification for why all mosques are in SAM RT. Interviewees also invoked the importance of, "Unity," as why mosques must be in SAM RT (depicted by the line between, "Unity," and, "Encapsulation of Mosques". "Unity," was associated with, "Approved religious interpretations," which were each linked with the, "Encapsulation of Mosques."

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[601] In *Model C* the code "Knowledge" has sub-codes "(Presence of) knowledge" and "Lack of knowledge" with dotted lines between the parent and sub-codes

Additionally, interviewees stated that SAM RT's monopoly prevented the rise of sects.

Model 1. Encapsulation of Mosques



Interviewees also discussed the role of the government in this process— citing the, "Tatar government," and the Russian, "National government." Other interviewees cited the role of the, "Law," in this process in 1999. While the original text of the national 1997 law did outlaw Muslim institutions outside of the Spiritual Associations of Muslims from becoming, "religious organizations," by default of the 15 year requirement, this was repealed. Additionally, the article in the republican law of 1999 that granted SAM RT a legal monopoly was eventually repealed. Officials in government and SAMK and imams did not cite the law as a current (as of 2015) justification for co-opting of mosques.

Encapsulation of Knowledge: Restrictions on Religious Sources

As examined in Chapter Three, restrictions on religious sources entail efforts to restrict the availability of non-SAM RT religious sources including the availability of religious appointments from imams at local mosques to elite roles.

Model 2. Encapsulation of Knowledge: Restrictions on Religious Sources



Narratives about, “Unity,” and ,“Knowledge,” were prominent in Tatarstan as in Kazakhstan. Restrictions on religious sources were justified as due to a present lack of religious knowledge so as people are not led astray. Additionally, it was argued that by restricting access to only SAM RT sources, religious knowledge in Tatarstan would be improved.

Encapsulation of Knowledge: Production of Religious Sources

The encapsulation of knowledge in Tatarstan is also achieved through the production of SAM RT religious sources including the creation and dissemination of the Friday message, the creation of SAMK affiliated literature and websites, as well as the provision of religious education.

Model 3. Encapsulation of Knowledge: Production of Religious Sources



Government and SAMK officials as well as imams emphasized how the production of SAM RT sources prevented the rise of religious extremism. Additionally, the production of SAM RT sources increases religious, "Knowledge," and vice versa— a lack of religious knowledge is addressed by SAM RT sources. Moreover, the production of SAM RT religious sources promotes, "Unity."

As in Kazakhstan, SAM RT was frequently cited by interviewees when describing co-optation mechanisms. Unlike the previous chapter, the Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations (equivalent to the Religious Affairs Council, RAC, in Kazakhstan) was rarely mentioned by interviewees, and not a single interviewee referenced the Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations as a present actor in the co-optation process. Additionally, also in contrast to Kazakhstan, the law was not used as a justification or pretext for encapsulating religious

knowledge and was not cited as a current reason for co-opting mosques.[602] Like Kazakhstan, however, a common thread about the importance of centralization and control is easily identifiable. Interviewees repeatedly emphasized the importance of unity, the threat of extremism and its associated danger, as well as the importance of knowledge.

Centralization and Control

Interviewees from high ranking SAM RT officials to imams in outlying oblasts explicitly emphasized the importance of both centralizing and controlling Islam in Tatarstan. When explaining why SAM RT had a monopoly on Islam, the former Director the RAC attributed this originally to national law, "Tatarstan is a region in Russia… a subject of Russia, so Muslim communities had to declare which organization they belonged to."[603] The Chief of Staff of SAM RT directly acknowledged that Russia is officially a secular state but emphasized the need for Tatarstan to control the religious sphere:

> Religion is separate from the state, but not from the public. The state must regulate and control religion and society. Under the law of the Russian Federation, religion is separated from the state, but religion is connected to society. As the state looks after, watches over society, it means the state is connected to religion.[604]

Using a similar rationale, the deputy imam of the highest-ranking mosque in Tatarstan, Marjani, described SAM RT as:

> It's like a government for religion. It's a system of government control. Like Putin controls Tatarstan and Tatars. Without control, it would be a mess. There would be sects. Without control there would be a fissure, a saiga.[605]

He further elaborated that:

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[602] The law was mentioned by SAMK officials and the former Director of the RAC when discussing the 1999 law.
[603] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, 2015.
[604] Interview with Chief of Staff of SAM RT, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.
[605] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.

> If there were some independent mosques, there would be independent imams and they could tell people incorrect things. People trust more if they think the mosque is part of SAM RT. When SAM RT was created, there was a deadline for all mosques to join.[606]

In response to my question about why other religious groups didn't have an organization equivalent to SAM RT, the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute replied, "It is correct, ok. This is Hanafi territory. Secondly, SAM RT tries to solve problems. Third, it provides workers for mosques," he continued that if there were competing organizations to SAM RT within Islam there, "…would be a mess," …and there would be a, "…lack of order. It is more democratic to limit."[607]

This narrative was also employed to justify the encapsulation of mosques and the encapsulation of knowledge by dictating the Friday message. The Director of Islam Today asserted that, "All mosques are in SAM in order to control all mosques," when I asked why all mosques in Tatarstan have to be in SAM RT."[608] In response to my question about how he decided what to include in the Friday message, the imam of Mosque C6 stated, "The muftiate decides, every mosque receives a journal from the muftiate. The muftiate controls what an imam can say. The Shura has the theme and a prepared text for the message."[609] The Shura refers to the book where all Friday messages are prepared a year in advance, the same tactic as used in Kazakhstan.

Why, however, in Tatarstan, should Islam be controlled and centralized? The most common refrain was to eliminate the threat of terrorism. Alongside narratives about how these measures deter extremism, was a narrative about the ever-looming danger present within Islam. On the other hand, narratives from elite officials and imams put forth that centralizing and controlling religious knowledge allowed for

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[606] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.
[607] Interview with Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.
[608] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, 2015.
[609] Interview with Imam of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015.

unity and the fostering of knowledge. As in Kazakhstan, these narratives also call for emergency measures and are a crucial part of the securitization of Islam in Tatarstan.

Religious Extremism

In Tatarstan the construction of, "religious extremism," more frequently referenced acts of violence than in Kazakhstan. Given the assassination of the deputy mufti of SAM RT in 2013, on one hand this is an unsurprising development. Additionally, using a more limited definition of extremism, is likely intended as a restraint on Moscow. Avoiding using a definition of extremism as expansive as in Kazakhstan, narrows the pretexts readily available for Moscow to justify limiting Tatarstan's independence. Moreover, religious extremism was described by interviewees in Tatarstan as emanating both from foreign influence and from the Northern Caucasus, particularly Chechnya. Narratives about religious extremism were used to dually justify co-opting Islam and to maintain enough boundary control to not provide a pre-made route for Moscow to interfere in Kazan.

Government and SAM RT officials more frequently cited the government in how they defined extremism. When I asked the Director of Islam Review to define extremism he replied, "The definition of extremism is generally, using force to overthrow the government as the main goal. They always declare support for extremism based on shariah, but they don't follow shariah."[610] Similarly, when I asked the Director of Islam Today to define extremism he stated, "Our Islam, is traditional Islam. It is separate from extremism."[611] He further elaborated that he defined terrorism as actions against the government and that Islam Today works to prevent religious extremism by, "…Trying to show them the right and traditional

[610] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, 2015.
[611] Interview with Director of Islam Today, Kazan, 2015.

Islam."[612] These definitions were more specific than those provided by elites in Kazakhstan. Most elites in Tatarstan defined extremism as a threat to the state's monopoly on violence and referenced the use of force in their definition.

This threat of violent extremism was attributed to influences both abroad and domestic. Some interviewees pointedly referenced ISIS and the war in Syria. One imam directly linked the SAM RT monopoly on the Friday message to efforts to prevent religious extremism, stating, "This deters the threat of ISIS and brings harmony to society."[613] The Head of Propaganda discussed how the Friday message is used as an opportunity to discuss and deter ISIS.[614] He described the content of the previous Friday message as being about how, "(ISIS) is not Islam."[615] The former RAC Director defended the dissemination of the Friday message by SAM RT and elaborated that, "When there are important political events this can affect the message, for example, the problems in Syria."[616] The imam of Mosque C4 justified SAM RT's distribution of the Friday message in a similar fashion:

> This deters the threat of ISIS and brings harmony to society. People can read the messages on the Internet and see them on TV. Troubles in the world can be useful topics for the book, for example, why people shouldn't listen to unofficial news.[617]

He further elaborated:

> SAM RT has specialists. There's an assembly, where they discuss and write topics based on problems in society. This deters the threat of ISIS and brings harmony to society. People can read the messages on the Internet and see them on TV. Troubles in the world can be useful topics for the book, for example why people shouldn't listen to unofficial news.[618]

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[612] Interview with Director of Islam Today, Kazan, 2015.
[613] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.
[614] Interview with Head of Propaganda, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.
[615] Interview with Head of Propaganda, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.
[616] Interview with the Former Director of RAC, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.
[617] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.
[618] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.

The Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute also ascribed religious extremism in Tatarstan to ISIS and, "outside influences":

> The root of this problem is also a question. I'm not sure if the statistics are true, but 3,000 or 4,000 of the people in ISIS are from Russia. Three hundred of them are from Tatarstan. We can't guarantee they won't come back to Tatarstan and try to build a caliphate. They killed the mufti in 2013."[619]

Extremism was also attributed as emanating from the Northern Caucasus, most notably Chechnya. The Former Director of the RAC set up a contrast between the Volga-Urals (Tatarstan and neighboring republic, Bashkortostan) and Chechnya, "SAM in Ufa and SAM in RT are the most important instrument against extremism like Chechnya."[620] A similar construct was employed by the Head of Propaganda of SAM RT. When I asked questions about whether he thought there was a problem with religious extremism in Tatarstan presently or in the past he stated:

> There is a problem, but not as in the Caucasus. The Republic of Tatarstan is the example of friendly living of different religions. Recently, we made an agreement about inter-cooperation between Islam and Orthodoxy, an agreement about cooperation.[621]

This statement introduces the notion that Tatarstan, devoid of extremism from the Northern Caucasus, allows an environment for religious tolerance to flourish. In contrast, in Kazakhstan, interviewees asserted their belief that the cause of extremism was solely from foreign sources. While narratives about the definition of extremism differed in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan, as well as the source, both sets of elites frequently referenced the treat of extremism to justify co-optation mechanisms.

This framing was used to justify the existence of SAM RT itself. When asked why other religious groups in Tatarstan did not have an organization akin to SAM RT, the imam of Mosque C8 replied, "…We need a leader because of the extremism

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[619] Interview with the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.
[620] Interview with Former Director of RAC, Kazan, 2015.
[621] Interview with Former Director of RAC, Kazan, 2015.

problem. It is now required to be part of the muftiate."[622] The head of Islam Review went as far as to assert that, "It is advisable for the government to have SAM RT because the Islam factor is more dangerous than other religions."[623] The imam of Mosque C8 further attested:

> The government and SAM RT want all mosques in Tatarstan to be part of SAM RT. Mosques must be part of the muftiate and have all Friday messages the same so imams don't make mistakes. Attendees, when they come, they check whether the mosque is in SAM RT. They check if it is in SAM RT in order to see whether it is radical or not radical.[624]

The encapsulation of knowledge, including Islamic media, in Tatarstan was also justified with this narrative. When I asked the Deputy Imam of Marjani mosque to describe the topic of last Friday's message he replied, "It was about the birthday of the prophet. It was also about how bombings are not good for Muslims. That is extremism and it is not good."[625] The imam of Mosque C4 stated his belief that, "SAM RT has a journal, the Shura. It gives a topic each week. There is risk now because of problems in society," referring to religious extremism, "This allows us to talk about it."[626]

The Director of Islam Review explicitly cited the issue of religious extremism as *the* reason Islam Review was founded. He also stated that, "The Islamic Review was founded in 2013. It was founded because extremist articles on websites started to appear in parallel with ISIS…So the government started to shield people from these websites, and block them— so they went away."[627] He further elaborated that, "The goal (of Islam Review) is to be against Islamic terrorism and Muslim

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[622] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.
[623] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, 2015.
[624] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.
[625] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.
[626] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015.
[627] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, 2015.

extremism…There is radical an extremism dialogue in Tatarstan, radical and extremist discussions and attitudes." He then added, "We try to identify and find those who are extremist. We try to find them and correct them."[628] When I asked how Islam Review identified who was extremist he responded that they monitor social media, particularly Facebook. When I followed up by how they determined whether these people qualified as, "extremist," he stated that SAM RT provided the criteria and a list but would not further elaborate.[629] He also discussed how Islam Review pays for advertisements on social media (primarily on Facebook and to a lesser extent on Kontakte)[630] in order to direct people to find religious resources on their website.[631]

The Director of Islam Today simultaneously juxtaposed the purview of his organization as compensating for the Soviet past in order to spread Islam as well as deter religious extremism, stating, "During the USSR religion was not allowed. Our mufti is now reprinting old books. We are anti-terrorism and anti-extremism."[632]

Both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan used the perceived threat of extremism to justify co-opting Islam. Elites in Tatarstan, however, both cited domestic sources as a cause of this extremism as well as the propensity of danger within Islam, rather than primarily nebulous references to identity and tradition.

Danger

Narratives about danger were used to both justify the co-optation of Islam, as well as justify instances of repression when imams resisted complying with SAM RT. This narrative was not prominent in Kazakhstan.

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[628] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, 2015.
[629] Ibid.
[630] Ibid.
[631] Ibid.
[632] Interview with Director of Islam Today, Kazan, 2015.

The Director of Islam Review recounted an internal power struggle within SAM RT between the former imam of Kul Sharif Mosque, the mosque within the kremlin of Kazan and the mufti of SAM RT. He discussed how originally Kul Sharif was not classified as an official mosque, but rather a site of historical and cultural importance. When I asked why a mosque literally in the kremlin wasn't previously part of SAM RT he responded:

> You need to remember that it was not a mosque. In the kremlin there is a mosque and a church, the government wants there to be a certain level of religiosity. It's more like a cultural house and museum. The imam didn't want Kul Sharif to be an official mosque and, therefore, be in SAM RT and controlled by SAM RT. In the same year, there was an attempt to kill the mufti, there was a car bomb. The government now has university for Islam to improve education because of this danger. Then the government started to actively control Islam.[633]

The mosque was transferred into the auspices of SAM RT. The former imam was then subsequently accused of being Salafi and removed from his position by the mufti.[634] The former imam then reportedly fled Russia.[635] Several interviewees stated that they believed he had been arrested, though this does not align with news reports.

These events occurred a year after the attempted assassination of the mufti and the assassination of the deputy mufti. Thus, according to the Director of Islam Review, this active threat of danger justified why all religious sources have been brought under SAM RT. This interviewee (who self-identifies as Muslim, and is the director of one of the two Muslim media outlets in Tatarstan) also discussed what he believed was a unique threat and danger within Islam. When I asked why he thought there wasn't an equivalent organization to SAM RT for other religions in the region he responded:

Because of the law in Russia. There is a Central SAM in Russia based in Ufa.

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[633] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, 2015.
[634] "Mufti of Tatarstan Dismissed Imam of Kul Sharif Mosque,/"
[635] "Imam of Kul Sharif Mosque Ramil Yunusov Flew to London."

> There are several centers for Islam. There are equivalent SAMs in the Caucasus, Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan…It is advisable for the government to have a SAM because the Islam factor is more dangerous than other religions. There is more risk in Islam.[636]

A similar sentiment was echoed by the Head of Propaganda of SAM RT when discussing the Friday messages. This interviewee described how, "The Friday messages also address, actual questions, because there is a problem with Muslims in Russia."[637] He continued that, "The message will address this problem for example. But it addresses not only problems in Russia, also in the world. It is so we can open a dialogue."[638] A similar rationale for the Friday message was given by the Imam of Mosque C4. When describing the book of Friday messages and emphasizing the importance that all mosques have the same message, he asserted that, "There is risk now because of problems in society. This allows us to talk about it."[639]

The greater emphasis on an ever-looming danger posed by some who identify as Muslim in Tatarstan relative to Kazakhstan, is likely due in part to the attempted assassination of the mufti in 2013. Authorities in Tatarstan are simultaneously trying to construct a national religious identity to bolster their political authority while simultaneously placating national leaders that enough efforts are being made to deter domestic religious extremism. Echoing statements about an "inherent" threat of Islam could undermine this balance act.

While the rhetoric in Kazakhstan also emphasizes a threat from Muslim religious extremism, it stresses that this religious extremism stems solely from foreign influences. In Tatarstan, religious extremism and danger are described as from both foreign sources, other republics like Chechnya, as well as internal dissidents. In

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[636] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.
[637] Interviewee with Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015.
[638] Interviewee with Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015.
[639] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015.

Kazakhstan, frequent references were made to the importance of peace as well as conflict. Most references to conflict in Kazakhstan did not reference acts of violence, but rather circular notions about a lack of religious centralization and control. In both cases, appeals were made stressing the importance of unity. Despite these differences, as in Kazakhstan, the proposed panacea to these threats is the promotion of knowledge linked to SAM RT.

Knowledge

As in Kazakhstan, the promotion of knowledge through regime sanctioned sources to combat religious extremism is a common refrain. The Director of Islam Review discussed how his organization attempts to combat religious extremism by promoting religious knowledge, wherein "correct" religious knowledge entailed loyalty to the Tatar and national Russian government. He stated, "We provide information to both ethnic Muslims and practicing Muslims. We produce articles to help people understand religion. In Islam, in this current situation, we need to explain what is going on."[640] Adherence to the Russian government's positions internationally provided a barrier against the development of domestic terrorism in his view:

> We provide an interpretation of the news. For example, we provide an interpretation that everyone should follow government policy. We also comment on what is in the official mass media. For example, what the official media says for example about Russian policy in Syria. International policy on Syria is poor policy. We follow Putin who says we are against the instability in Syria. There is radical an extremism dialogue in Tatarstan, radical and extremist discussions and attitudes. We try to identify and find those who are extremist. We try to find them and correct them.[641]

The Director of Islam described religious extremists as:

> These people, they take books and information they can't understand and influence others. First, they use the poor, people who have problems and say that the, 'Government doesn't support us.' They use this to influence people

[640] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, 2015.
[641] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, 2015.

> who believe." The religious clergy are always working on this and focusing on this."[642]

To deter such developments, elites argued all religious knowledge should be encapsulated by SAMK, including religious appointments of elite leaders and imams, and the production of religious knowledge, including the Friday message and religious literature. When describing the role of SAM RT, the Head of Propaganda of SAM RT said, "The muftiate has a large role. We are responsible for (religious) education and propaganda. We provide higher education in the madrassahs."[643]

The Director of Islam Today touted how the present mufti of SAM RT is reprinting religious texts.[644] Moreover, he praised the mufti's efforts to make religious education opportunities available:

> He supports the building and reconstruction of mosques and madrassas. Not only in Tatarstan, but he also influences other regions. SAM RT sends out education for Islam. There are three steps in Muslim education. The first is a course at mosque, a night lecture. It covers the basics. The second is at the madrassah, to take a course. The third is at the university level, at the Islamic University…Soon there will be a separate campus and every three years every imam will have to have an attestation and must receive a certification.[645]

He further described now SAM RT offers classes on, "Arabic, Islamic law, faith, history of Islam, and writing, hadith science, Qur'anic science (how to remember the Qur'an)." He also highlighted SAM RT's printing press and the increase in available religious books, as according to him, the press has been able to publish 150 books over the previous three years.[646]

Given the lack of religious knowledge among imams, the Rector also argued that this is why SAM RT determines and distributes the Friday message:

> Why does SAM RT select the Friday topics? Because imams are poorly

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[642] Interview with Director of Islam Today, Kazan, 2015.
[643] Interview with Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015.
[644] Interview with Director of Islam Today, Kazan, 2015.
[645] Interview with Director of Islam Today, Kazan, 2015.
[646] Interview with Director of Islam Today, Kazan, 2015.

> prepared. For example, imams in the village are poorly prepared… In villages, there is often low levels of religious knowledge. If they were more prepared, they could prepare the Friday message…It is good because they may not know what to talk about.[647]

He continued, "So it is important to cooperate with SAM RT to counteract these low levels of knowledge. Imams must receive a diploma to work in madrassa."[648] The Rector continued to highlight the need for more religious training and imams, stating, "In Arsk, there are 76 mosques, which need 77 imams. Only 30 of these imams have religious education. This is not only a problem of SAM RT or this university...The president ordered that the situation be studied in order to get more young imams.[649]

Interestingly, the Rector also identified a link between a lack of religious knowledge in Tatarstan and an associated lack of authoritative sources on religion in Tatarstan. When I asked which people or groups are religious authorities in Islam in Tatarstan, he replied, "There is a problem of religious authority in the Republic of Tatarstan. There are few religious authorities."[650] He attributed the lack of religious authorities as due to a lack of religious knowledge among the general population, "Among young Muslims, few know history or the Arabic language."[651] He then described internal issues within the University, "We have 40 professors here, but still don't have enough. While the professors here (at the Russian Islamic Institute) have the education, there is an issue (in the next step of) becoming religious authorities."[652] He continued, "Here we have a gap between the older and younger generations. The young generation is not well educated and the older generation has old attitudes."[653]

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[647] Interview with the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.
[648] Interview with the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.
[649] Ibid.
[650] Ibid.
[651] Ibid.
[652] Ibid.
[653] Ibid.

Despite its internal power struggles, SAM RT was routinely cited as the sole institution that should be responsible for Islam. The Deputy Imam of Marjani mosque went so far as to explicitly assert that SAM RT should have an exclusive monopoly on the interpretation of the Qur'an in Tatarstan. When I asked who should interpret the Qur'an, he replied, "Some people can't interpret the Qur'an, even for themselves, it's not simple. If you translate incorrectly, it's not good. Therefore, people should not interpret the Qur'an in order to avoid conflict."[654] Both Kazakhstani and Tatar elites provided the rationale that the co-optation of Islam was needed in order to promote knowledge. Accordingly, the presence of this religious monopoly will promote unity.

Unity

Interviewees in both Tatarstan and Kazakhstan emphasized how the presence of SAM and the co-optation of Islam would promote theological unity within each respective society. Narratives about the importance of unity were used in both cases to consolidate power within SAMK and SAM RT. In Kazakhstan, there was also an emphasis on unity amongst different ethnic groups.

The deputy imam of Marjani mosque stated that, "The mufti wants all Islam to be one, to be in one (the same) direction. For example, people come here to Marjani, if there's not control, there could be a conflict."[655] An employee at Marjani asserted that, "All mosques are part of SAM RT in order to help make policy throughout Tatarstan. Also, so time is not lost discussing."[656] Commenting on the role of SAM RT and why only one institution exists for Islam, one imam stated, "When the sunnah[657] separates into groups, we don't have a union… In Islam we don't need

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[654] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.
[655] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.
[656] Interview with Hazret of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.
[657] Sunnah refers to established norms primarily based on the life of Muhammad. See Islamic Dictionary Appendix.

these groups. This is the role of SAM RT."[658] The imam of Mosque C7 further stated that, "In other countries, they have different opinions. Other opinions bring imbalance. A regulation was passed, so there will be balance. There is democracy, but not for the population."[659]

When describing the role of SAM RT, the former Director of the RAC stated that, "SAM RT was created in 1992 by the first mufti. Previously there were two muftiate in Tatarstan. The mufti wanted all to be united. Why united? Because the muftiate was necessary. I wrote a letter to President Shamil and explained why a single spiritual institution was needed and President Shamil agreed."[660] He further described how:

> In 1998 on February 14th SAM was created. Then there was one SAM of Tatarstan in 1998. It was created at a united conference. This conference is held every four years at which a new mufti is elected. Then the mufti proposes his deputy muftis and judges. Before this, the mufti could have changed every month. This was a mess (without order). This helps to make it easier, more effective. This is so there isn't conflict. This is so there is no conflict and no problems.[661]

A similar account was given by the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, who described how:

> In 1992 there were two SAMs. The President said 'Why are there two SAMs, there should be one SAM.' It was an administrative issue at the time. A political question. It was a mess. There should be one SAM. So the government chose what was needed.[662]

Some imams surmised that the dictate that the Friday message should be the same throughout Tatarstan to encourage unity came from secret security services. One imam stated that, "Maybe the FSB told them you need to change, because one imam

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[658] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.
[659] Interview with Imam of Mosque C7, Kazan, 2015.
[660] Interview with Former Director of RAC, Kazan, 2015.
[661] Interview with Former Director of RAC, Kazan, 2015.
[662] Interview with rector of Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.

talks about this and another talks about something else," when I asked why the Friday message was the same throughout Tatarstan.[663] The imam of Mosque C3, in response to the same question, responded, "The Friday message is the same to create a union for the whole republic."[664] The deputy imam of Marjani mosque suggested that having the same Friday message at each mosque promoted unity because:

> Now we have SAM RT and they give us a journal, Shura. Every Friday they give us a theme. It is the same in all of Tatarstan. This is good because people don't always go to the mosque and this way, they don't hear different messages if they go to a different mosque.[665]

In Tatarstan and Kazakhstan the importance of unity was emphasized by elites. According to this narrative compliance with SAM RT allows for theological unity and cohesive national identity. In Kazakhstan, in addition to narratives about SAMK and theological unity, narratives about unity also entail narratives about how unity prevents ethnic conflict. Given the relatively higher level of ethnic diversity in Kazakhstan, such narratives serve to securitize Islam by associating regime control of Islam with unity and a lack of ethnically based conflict. Both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan sought to further consolidate power in their Spiritual Association of Muslims through narratives about unity. Tatarstan also used this narrative to try to both construct and project a cohesive national religious identity (associated with the Tatar regime) to Moscow in order to bolster its hand in negotiating for greater autonomy.

Domestic Image

In Kazakhstan, extensive efforts have been made to promote Kazakhstan as a beacon of religious freedom. Additionally, the regime has rigorously defended its co-

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[663] Interview with Imam A, Kazan, 2015.
[664] Interview with Imam of Mosque C3, Kazan, 2015.
[665] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.

co-optation of Islam through securitization narratives. According to this framing, such measures by the state are necessary to prevent and deter religious extremism. In Tatarstan, the latter argument is also made. However, the intended external audience for this narrative is not primarily international audiences, but rather Moscow. While elites portrayed Tatarstan as an example of unity for other regions in Russia, this stood in contrast to how Muslim republics outside the Volga-Urals were framed. In both Tatarstan and Kazakhstan, the presence of extremism was presented as due to foreign influences. However, in Tatarstan, such dangers were also presented as stemming from elsewhere within Russia.

As examined in the section above on extremism, extremism in Tatarstan was attributed to other Muslim republics, notably the Caucasus, and particularly Chechnya. In contrast to the Caucasus, Tatarstan, and more broadly the Volga-Urals are framed as the upholder of "moderate" Islam and an example domestically. The framing of Tatarstan as a domestic example stands in contrasts to the framing of Kazakhstan as an international example of "moderate Islam".

While emphasizing the importance of this control and centralization of Islam in Tatarstan, the Chief of Staff of SAM RT sought to distinguish between the Volga-Urals and Caucasus, referring to the former as, "European," and implicitly therefore having less instances of extremism. The former Director of the RAC framed SAM RT and Islam more broadly in the Volga-Urals as standing in opposition to extremism that stems from Chechnya. [666]

Practices or identities that were deemed unacceptable by elites were also attributed to Chechnya or the Caucasus. After I asked the Deputy Imam of Marjani whether Salafism is acceptable in Tatarstan he emphasized that it was not and was

[666] Interview with Former Director of RAC, Kazan, 2015.

prohibited, then added, "In different countries or in Chechnya it is ok." When I asked the Chief of Staff of SAM RT the same question, he replied, "No, of course not. It's in the Caucasus…"[667]

These narratives have picked up traction in national as well as international media. One national newspaper published a conversation amongst Tatar academics and religious and government officials, "Russia Needs a Showcase of the Muslim World, and Tatarstan Accepted This Role."[668] In the article, an official in the Tukayevsky District of Tatarstan stated:

> We need to work with all regions of Russia and avail ourselves of the opportunity of the World Congress of Tatars. Tatarstan must act as a leader of the Islamic world of Russia, and to do this, the republican leadership should build relations with major religious figures on the basis of traditional Islam.[669]

A rector of a regional institute of Kazan Federal University echoed this:

> Tatarstan would be right to claim the role of leader of the Islamic world, because centrist Islam is from us and preached here… We don't have such rigid canons, such as in Chechnya, for example. We have always lived in friendship and haven't fought with anyone. We have a different history. Ancient Bolghar[670] was the first to sign a peace agreement with Kievan Rus.[671]

This narrative has picked up international coverage. An article in the *Christian Science Monitor* published in 2016 was provocatively titled, "In Russia How One

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[667] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani, Kazan, 2015.
[668] "Russia Needs a Showcase of the Muslim World, and Tatarstan Accepted This Role."
[669] Minnikhanov, Chairman of the Association of Farmers and Peasant Farmsteads of Tukaevsky District in "Russia Needs a Showcase of the Muslim World, and Tatarstan Accepted This Role."
[670] Boglhar is a present-day city in Tatarstan. Bolghar was the capital of the state of Volga Bulgaria. Volga Bulgaria is believed to have become a Muslim state in 922. Kievan Rus attacked Volga Bulgaria and this conflict persisted until 985 when a peace treaty was signed between Kievan Rus and Volga Bulgaria (which held for 100 years). Shpakovsky and Nicolle, *Armies of the Volga Bulgars & Khanate of Kazan: 9th-16th Centuries*, 7.
[671] Mustafina, Rector of the Naberezhnye Chelny Institute of Socio-Pedagogical Technologies and Resource, in "Russia Needs a Showcase of the Muslim World, and Tatarstan Accepted This Role."

Mainly Muslim Region Beat Back Radicalism."[672] *ESPN* covered Kazan when the city hosted the World Cup in 2018. The article, "Kazan is an anomaly as Islam, Orthodox Russia coexist in harmony," stated:

> The city is shared by ethnic Tatars and ethnic Russians, by Islam and Orthodoxy, by the Tatar language and the Russian language, by two different sets of traditions. They coexist, without conflict, in a modern, globalized 21st-century city."[673]

Even amongst academic publications, this narrative is often present.

In contrast to Kazakhstan, as a republic Tatarstan also sets itself up as a domestic example of moderation within Islam. Such rhetoric implicitly, and at times explicitly, aligns Tatarstan with Moscow in efforts to regulate Islam. The Kazakh regime has calculated (correctly) that the international repercussions for limiting religious freedom are limited, particularly when justified through the securitization of Islam. The latter narrative is also present in Tatarstan, though aimed domestically and presents Tatarstan in contrast with the Caucasus. While this explains how Islam is securitized in Tatarstan, the following section explores the boundaries of the national religious identity in Tatarstan and compares its construction in Kazakhstan.

National Identity and "Traditional" Islam

As in Kazakhstan the construction of the national religious identity has entailed defining the bounds of what constitutes "traditional" Islam in Tatarstan and linking this identity to support of the Tatar regime. The Chief of Staff of SAM RT explicitly acknowledged the role SAM RT plays in developing and constructing Tatar national religious identity, "Our organization works not only on the religious

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[672] Fred Weir, "In Russia, How One Mainly Muslim Region Beat Back Radicalism."
[673] Rothwell, "Kazan Is an Anomaly as Islam, Orthodox Russia Coexist in Harmony."

component, but also on developing a national Tatar identity…It connects Muslims and the state within the framework of the republic."[674]

In both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, nebulous references are made to "traditional Islam." For example, when I asked the former Director of the Religious Affairs Committee to describe traditional Islam in Tatarstan, he replied, "This is a controversial question. Our understanding of Islam has roots. It is from our past, which has 1000 years of history. We are tolerant. We have Islam and Orthodoxy."[675] When I asked the Director of Islam today what traditional Islam is, he replied:

> It is a religion that has tolerant relations with other religions. In traditional Islam different nationalities and religions live with one another. We have traditional holidays. We not only believe and trust in Islam, but we also try to keep traditions. Extremists don't believe in religious holidays…Traditional Islam works to keep a connection between "traditional Islam" and traditions.[676]

Similarly, when I asked the deputy imam of Marjani mosque what he thought traditional Islam in Tatarstan was, he responded, "It is the Islam of grandmothers and grandfathers. It is now again how Islam is practiced in Tatarstan. The first imam here wrote books about this. It is proven."[677]

Other interviewees when asked to define traditional Islam, framed it as the antithesis of religious extremism as well as equating it with morality. The Director of Islam Today asserted that, "Our Islam, is 'traditional' Islam. It is separate from extremism."[678] On the other hand, the imam of Mosque C5 struggled to define traditional Islam. When prompted he responded, "How to understand traditional Islam…this is a hard question. The main way to understand it is to do good. It is a

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[674] Interview with Chief of Staff of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015.
[675] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, 2015.
[676] Interview with the Director of Islam Today, Kazan, 2015.
[677] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.
[678] Interview with the Director of Islam Today, Kazan, 2015.

good direction."[679]

Outside of general references to morality and deterrence of religious extremism, further questioning found several similar boundaries around the construction of traditional Islam as in Kazakhstan. In both cases, the boundary incorporates Hanafism, while rejecting Salafism and deriding foreign influences. In Tatarstan, Sufism was overall held in higher regard, while Sufism remained more relatively controversial in Kazakhstan. Additionally, both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan hold themselves up as cases of, "moderation," within the wider Muslim world. In contrast, less emphasis is placed upon international image (of either Tatarstan or Russian) within Tatarstan. On the other hand, narratives in Tatarstan promoted by elites also frame Tatarstan as an example within the wider Russian Federation, and in contrast to other Muslim republics, notably republics in the Northern Caucasus.

Hanafism

As in Kazakhstan, Hanafism is considered to be historical to Tatarstan as well as within the current construction of traditional Islam. The former Director of the RAC directly linked the role of SAM RT with efforts to uphold "traditional Islam". When I asked the interviewee to describe SAM RT and the role of the institution, "SAM RT regulates all and it is in the Hanafi mazhab. Other mazhabs can't be here. SAM RT fights against non-traditional Islam in Tatarstan."[680]

The imam of Mosque C4 plainly asserted that, "The Hanafi mazhab is traditional Islam."[681] When I asked him to further elaborate, he reiterated, "Traditional Islam, first of all is Hanafi. It was how Islam was introduced into

[679] Interview with Imam of Mosque C5, Kazan, 2015.
[680] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, 2015.
[681] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015.

Tatarstan… It was the first mazhab."[682] He elaborated, "In other mazhabs, (they) have additional practices, for example they raise their hands when they pray. There are three steps for namaz in the Hanafi mazhab."[683] Upholding traditional Islam, equated with Hanafism, was also given as a rationale for centralizing and controlling Islam in Tatarstan. For example, when I asked the imam of Mosque C8 to describe his process for writing the Friday message he replied that SAM RT dictates the message because, "We follow Abu Hanafi. So therefore, we don't have a choice in the theme."[684]

In practice, as in Kazakhstan, severe restrictions are in place to deter the practice of Islam outside of Hanafism. The former Director of the RAC talked about how he ensured all mosques in Tatarstan would be Hanafi. He recounted a story to me of how he rejected the construction of a new mosque explicitly because it would not be Hanafi:

> An Azerbaijani came to me when I was the head of the Council and asked me for permission to build a Shi'i mosque. But in Tatarstan, only the Abu Hanafi Sunni mazhab is in the charter of SAM RT. Therefore, such mosques cannot exist. Mosques cannot be in other mazhabs. In Tatarstan there are many Sunni mosques, he can choose and walk into any of them. The main purpose of SAM RT is to fight against untraditional streams in Islam."[685]

The imam of Mosque C7 was in alignment with the view that mazhabs outside Hanafism in Tatarstan are unacceptable, simply stating, "They are prohibited." He justified this assertion by describing how other mazhabs have other practices, "Hanafism is how our grandparents practiced Islam. It is the traditional way, the traditional direction. Because when you go to different mosques you can be confused

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[682] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015.
[683] Ibid.
[684] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.
[685] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, 2015.

by different ways. Some mazhabs tell you to pray in a different way."[686] Similarly the Deputy Imam of Marjani stated, "We have traditional Islam in Hanafism. All mosques are Hanafi and all imams must be Hanafi...There are four mazhabs. However, in Tatarstan all must be Hanafi according to SAM RT."[687]

Active efforts are also made to deter the development of public profiles of any potential religious leaders who do not identify as Hanafi. When I asked the Chief of Staff of SAM RT which people or groups are religious authorities in Tatarstan he replied, "…Only Hanafis can be authorities as it is written by scholars and this decision is supported in a historical way."[688] I asked the Head of Propaganda of SAM RT which people or groups should interpret the Qur'an he replied, "Only educated scholars," because, "Not every Muslim can interpret. Therefore, we have our mazhab…the Hanafi mazhab. We understand the Qur'an according to the Hanafi school. People ask which scholars; we tell them we look at these scholars."[689]

Other interviewees stressed the historic presence of Hanafism. In this line of view, while practicing Islam outside of Hanafism would constitute a violation of national traditions, other mazhabs were not officially prohibited in a private capacity. There was universal consensus that all imams must identify as Hanafi and all mosques must be within the Hanafi tradition. Additionally, the Russian Islamic Institute is exclusively Hanafi. The Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute described Islam in Tatarstan along the following lines, "We have Hanafism. Tatarstan, it's always been Hanafi."[690] He further stated, "SAM, all mosques must be in SAM and be Hanafi."[691]

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[686] Interview with Imam of Mosque C7, Kazan, 2015.
[687] Interview with the Deputy Imam of Marjani, Kazan, 2015.
[688] Interview with the Chief of Staff of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015.
[689] Interview with the Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015.
[690] Interview with the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.
[691] Interview with the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.

When I asked the imam of Mosque C4 whether other mazhabs are allowed in Tatarstan he replied, "Of course. But all mosques, according to our charter and SAM, but be Hanafi. Our tradition is Hanafi."[692] Responding to the same question the imam of Mosque C8 stated that, "Hanafi mazhab. In Russia, there are four mazhabs. But the imams must be Hanafi in Tatarstan, because it is in our charter of the muftiate. By law people are free to choose their mazhab."[693] According to the imam of Mosque C7 in order to become an imam, one needs to receive some form of higher religious education within the Hanafi tradition.[694]Another imam put forth that people who would like to practice Islam outside of the Hanafi mazhab, "…Must not show it publicly. They can't do it publicly; they must be discreet."[695]

The framing of Hanafism as equated with traditional Islam was in parallel with the process in Kazakhstan. In both cases, interviewees frequently discussed their concern with Salafism, which they presented as the antithesis of Hanafism.

Salafism

Salafism was set up as a threat to traditional Islam and by extension, Hanafism. Salafism was routinely equated with religious extremism, primarily acts of violence, but also as a threat to national culture, particularly national dress. Salafism was referred to as Wahhabism by some interviewees, which had an exclusively negative connotation (see previous chapter and Islamic Dictionary Appendix for further description of Wahhabism and Salafism).

I asked interviewees to explain what they meant by religious extremism after they represented traditional Islam as the deterrent to religious extremism. Many

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[692] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015.
[693] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.
[694] Interview with Imam of Mosque C7, Kazan, 2015.
[695] Interview with Imam of Mosque C7, Kazan, 2015.

interviewees equated extremism with Salafism, a trend I also examined in Kazakhstan. For example, when I asked the Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque to explain what he meant by religious extremism he replied, "Extremism is prohibited by Islam. It is sects and Wahhabism. If there is a Wahhabi imam, they will give prayers incorrectly, and then people will understand the Qur'an incorrectly."[696] The former Director of the RAC also made the same equation, stating that the, "task," of the present Council, "…is not to let Wahhabism into Russia. Because Wahhabism turns into extremism."[697]

Accordingly, because of this threat, most interviewees were in agreement that Salafism is prohibited in Tatarstan from an official standpoint as well as religiously unacceptable. The Head of Propaganda of SAM RT responded with the following statement after I asked him if Salafism was an acceptable way to practice Islam in Tatarstan, "No, it is not acceptable because Salafism is against traditional Islam. That is why SAM RT tries to spread propaganda about clean and true Islam." This problem cannot be solved quickly but work on this is under way."[698]

The imam of Mosque C6 stated the following when I asked whether Salafism is an acceptable way to practice Islam in Tatarstan, "No, it is something new. It doesn't respect our tradition. It is more strict, more than ours, our Islam." He further reiterated that not only did he believe that Salafism was unacceptable, but that it also is prohibited in Tatarstan, as well as religiously forbidden, or haram.[699] The imam stated that, "…it is haram because Salafism causes problems."[700] When I followed up by asking what kind of problems it causes, replied:

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[696] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.
[697] Interview with Former Director of the RAC, Kazan, 2015.
[698] Interview with Head of Propaganda of SAM RT, Kazan, 2015.
[699] Interview with Imam of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015.
[700] Interview with Imam of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015.

> They have their own schools, they don't listen to our imams or follow our schools. They don't follow the Hanafi mazhab. What is the most important characteristic of Islam in Tatarstan— we have our own traditions from the past and we follow shariah. We don't create conflict with shariah. Religious extremism, extremist are people who live for death and don't follow traditional Islam. They have a different ideology. They create sects and want to create conflict. These sects exist in Tatarstan.[701]

Salafism was also frequently referred to a sect, covered below.

Given the stigma attached to the label "Salafi" it is also a convenient tool to discredit potential religious leaders, regardless of how they self-identify religiously. As discussed in the previous section on, "Danger," the imam of Kul Sharif mosque in the Kremlin was removed on the premise that he was Salafi. The Director of Islam Review cited the imam as a reason why all mosques must be in SAM RT because, the imam, "…took Salafi ideas." When I asked if this imam self-identified as Salafi, he responded, "No, but in his messages, on Friday, he had strong Salafi tendencies." When I asked how then someone could identify whether he was Salafi he responded that he cited Salafi writers in articles he wrote. The Director also conflated the presence of Salafism with the attack on the mufti.[702]

At the senior level, all interviewees were united in their opposition to the acceptability of Salafism in Tatarstan. Further down the hierarchy, a few imams had less firmly negative views about the presence of Salafism in Tatarstan. These imams did not find Salafism to be religious objectionable in their personal view, but they stated that it was not appropriate to practice within Tatarstan because it harmed the national religious culture. The imam of Mosque C8 went on to say, "My own wishes, Salafism should be a secret… In Islam we don't need these groups."[703]Another imam made a distinction between, "two types," of Salafism, "…Radical ones and softer

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[701] Ibid.
[702] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, 2015.
[703] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.

Salafism."[704] He followed up by stating, "I try to give speeches about this and work with them. Everyone can go to the mosque. If (we) know they're Salafi, we try to work with them."[705] When I asked him how he identified who was Salafi he replied with the following "They wear short trousers and have longer beards. They don't wear traditional Tatar hats. They read namaz differently, a little differently, but still different."[706] Tatar hats refers to a tyubeteika.[707]

When I asked interviewees to define Salafism, many interviewees referenced how men who self-identify as Salafi dress, most frequently citing shorter trousers and a beard.[708] At Mosque C8 the imam described how Salafism was opposed to national traditions in Tatarstan and elsewhere, "All nationalities have some kinds of habits, ethnic practices, customs. Salafism don't agree with national customs."[709] The Russian Rector discussed how people who identify as Salafi previously dressed in an identifiable way, "Before when they worse trousers, beards, so now they are adapting. They are in the process of adapting to 'average Muslims' in order to blend in so they are not identifiable. They read namaz like Hanafis."[710] This was echoed by the former RAC Director when I asked him how he determined whether someone was Salafi:

> Firstly, you can identify them by their appearance—beard, short trousers. You can also identify them by how they read namaz. They can make their appearance like everyone else, but … try to adapt (change) basic Islamic rules and traditions… In past, we could identify who was Salafi, but now they tried to hide, so it's hard to identify them.[711]

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[704] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015.
[705] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015.
[706] Ibid.
[707] Ibid.
[708] Interview with the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.
[709] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.
[710] Interview with the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.
[711] Interview with Former Director of RAC, Kazan, 2015.

The distinguishing feature to many interviewees about Salafism was simply a matter of dress. Senior officials and imams, when discussing Salafism, most frequently referred to it as the manifestation of religious extremism, including acts of violence, as well as a violation of national religious dress. Outside of these paradigms, most interviewees struggled to define Salafism. Despite this ambiguity, the label of Salafi was used in a derogatory manner and was used in one high profile case to discredit and eventually arrest a prominent religious leader who strayed from SAM RT. Salafism was frequently derisively referred to as sect as well as stemming from foreign influences.

In contrast to Kazakhstan, officials in the Tatar government and SAM RT were unequivocal that Salafism was not acceptable in Tatarstan. In Kazakhstan, senior national government officials in Kazakhstan upheld the official line that the government did not interfere in the religious realm (and thus took no position on Salafism), while regional government officials and SAMK freely discussed their efforts to impede the spread of Salafism. In Kazakhstan, the denials of government efforts created a public perception of greater distance between policies enacted by the quasi-governmental agency SAMK and the regime. In Tatarstan, the government portrayed itself as the direct protector of the region, which it linked to its efforts to deter Salafism. While both efforts securitize Islam, in Tatarstan these efforts are not masked solely thorough a quasi-governmental agency, but rather through direct repression by the government. This difference in policy is line with Moscow's equation of Salafism with extremism and allows the Tatar regime to be directly perceived as addressing the "problem" of extremism.

How either government identified which people or groups were Salafi were vague and often employed circular logic with references to sects and extremism, as

well as violations of national tradition. In both cases however, SAMK and SAM RT respectively were held up as bolsters against Salafism. While citizens in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan self-identify as Salafi, the label was also applied by each regime to citizens who did not self-identify as Salafi as a means of discrediting independent sources of religious information. This deviation from SAMK and SAM RT was frequently attributed to foreign influence.

Foreign Influence

As examined in the section on religious extremism, extremism in Tatarstan was often conflated with Salafism and attributed to foreign influences. This narrative dovetails with narratives from Moscow about the role of foreign agents in fermenting extremism in Russia. Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, even suggested that the foreign security services in other countries were, "Among the main factors in forming the perquisites for the emergence of extremist manifestations among the youth." [712] Simultaneously, a counter narrative exists that suggests that foreign knowledge is more authoritative. This tension can also be observed in Kazakhstan, where narratives about higher levels of religious knowledge aboard were more prominent. Additionally, mosques and even the Russian Islamic university received some foreign funding.

The Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute bluntly attributed all religious extremism in Tatarstan as stemming solely from foreign sources and influences, asserting, "It is hard to tell who is from outside. It is hard to identify if someone who was born here leaves and becomes an extremist. Extremism doesn't exist within the framework of Tatarstan. It comes from abroad. There is no extremism in Tatars."[713]

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[712] "Patrushev: Foreign Intelligence Agencies Fuel Youth Extremism in Russia."
[713] Interview with the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.

When I asked the former Director of the RAC whether religious extremism is a problem in Tatarstan he replied:

> In general, there is a problem. The main thing is that it is not a large problem generally in Tatarstan. We have good relationship between Islam and Orthodoxy. The problem occurred with two cases. There were some groups, three, four, or five groups where people adopted extremism. These cases came from different countries. Because of them, there are maximalists and have brought a radical mood to society. They tried to create a negative version of Islam in society. Muslims who are not radical, they respect the law. There are only small groups, exceptions. That's why there are these rules. But again, most Muslims respect the laws. These groups, they study in other countries or simply come from other countries.[714]

The imam of Mosque C8 stated that he believed that Salafism was being introduced in Tatarstan by Tatars who studied abroad and that he therefore supported efforts to restrict religious education abroad, **"**Salafism came here when students studied abroad. Then after 2000, students started studying in Kazan."[715] The Rector also discussed how he thought that Tatarstan needed to be protected from other national religious traditions within Islam in other countries. As Tatarstan is:

> …Hanafi territory, we prepared imams in Hanafi mazhab. In all of the world, every country has their mazhab. In Morocco there is the Maliki school In Saudi Arabia there is the Hanbali…If different people were in different mazhabs, they would leave behind their national identities. They will think, I don't need Tatar language, I know Arabic. It would turn into another culture. There is language, civilization, culture. In different mazhabs, they have different language, civilization and culture. These are the things that create culture, and this would create problems.[716]

The imam of Mosque C3 attributed his perception of the moral decline of society as being due to "Arab influences," because, "Morality is down because young people go aboard to study, to Arab countries, and now there are changes. Before everyone helped each other, now everyone is by themselves.[717] The Rector also

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[714] Interview with the Director of the RAC, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.
[715] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.
[716] Interview with Rector of Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.
[717] Interview with Imam of Mosque C3, Kazan, 2015.

attributed these negative foreign influences as the reason why the Islamic Institute was created. When I asked him to describe why the Institute was founded and its purpose he replied:

> The first step is to establish religious education. Previous institutions were financially supported from abroad. This is the first Russian funded institution. At first it was normal to study aboard, at a madrasah in Saudi Arabia for example. But then there were conflicts when those who studied abroad returned…[718]

The Director of Islam Review juxtaposed Islam in Tatarstan as "traditional" as compared to Islam in the Middle East. Interestingly, he framed Islam in Mecca as non-traditional:

> Traditional Islam is not like in Mecca or Medina. That is not our Islam. We celebrate Oraza, Kurban Bayram. This is traditional national Islam. During the holidays the young come to the mosques. We have celebrations for Oraza, Kurban Bayram. The younger generation, they try to understand these traditions. Here, there is a place for children. We have food for the children.[719]

Oraza is Tatar for Ramadan while Kurban Bayram is Eid. Ramadan is considered one of the five pillars of Islam, while pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) is considered another.[720] As exemplified above, references to, "non-traditional," Islam being imported from abroad primarily referred to the Middle East. In this instance, the interviewee even portrayed Islam in Tatarstan as upholding standard bearer traditions, notably Ramadan and Eid.

The former Director of the RAC stated his belief that Wahhabism was acceptable in Saudi Arabia but not in Tatarstan:

> Why does Wahhabism exist in Saudi Arabia, but there aren't any problems with extremism for the government? But in Russia Wahhabism causes extremist sentiments? Because when such a person with the ideas of Salafism, pure/clean Islam, arrives in Russia, a country with many nationalities and confessions, he is faced the phenomena, where he is left behind. He is in a society where people for example can drink alcohol and he cannot. And

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[718] Interview with Rector of Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.
[719] Interview with Director of Islam Review, Kazan, 2015.
[720] See Islamic Dictionary Appendix.

> because he lives in such a society, he cannot enter paradise. Because of this the government is becoming a hindrance. The aim is not to allow Wahhabism to come to Russia, because through Wahhabism extremism occurs.[721]

He continued to comment:

> In Russia, it comes with unpleasant things. These people believe in Salafism. They don't believe that true Islam can be here because there are many nationalities, many people who drink. They think the government is the enemy. This is radicalism. They have different ideas about how to read namaz. The main purpose is not to allow Wahhabism to enter the country.[722]

While simultaneously portraying religious extremism and Salafism as imports from the Middle East, some mosques in Tatarstan and even the Russian Islamic Institute (which was created to generate domestic religious knowledge) received foreign funding. Employees and imams at two of the eight mosques in Kazan that I conducted interviews at openly discussed receiving foreign funding. An employee of Mosque C3 said that the mosque was constructed with financing from a, "sponsor," who is, "Arab," and that current upkeep of the mosque and salaries are financed by, "…different sponsors, including Arabs and people from the community."[723] According to a former imam of Mosque C6 some of the sponsors that funded the construction of the mosque and provided initial funds for the maintenance of the mosque were "…from Turkey and some were from other countries. They helped not only for items related to prayer, but also with social projects."[724]

Even the Russian Islamic Institute received some foreign funding according to the Rector, in tension with his assertion that the Institute was set up to replace foreign religious educational and influences. When I asked him to describe the sources of funding he replied, "The Islamic University does not receive funding from the

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[721] Interview with Former Director of RAC, Kazan, 2015.
[722] Interview with Former Director of RAC, Kazan, 2015.
[723] Interview with Employee at Mosque C3, Kazan, 2015.
[724] Interview with Imam of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015.

government. There's a fund in Moscow and a fund in Tatarstan. There is a little funding from abroad, from Turkey. Most of the funding is from within Russia."[725] Interviewees clearly viewed such funding in a positive light, though they did not widely advertise receiving foreign sources of funding.

A contradicting and concurrent narrative emerged about higher levels of religious knowledge emanating from abroad, though this narrative was more present in Kazakhstan. The Director of Islam Today discussed how those who wanted further Islamic education beyond the Russian Islamic Institute may pursue further education in Saudi Arabia.[726] One imam framed his education in Egypt as superior to domestic options.[727] He described how he was a religious authority because he took a religious course in Egypt and that this facilitated him being a more effective communicator during the Friday message.[728] More frequently however, interviewees discussed the superiority of education at the Russian Islamic Institute and the value of local religious knowledge.

Thus, similar to Kazakhstan, religious extremism was often equated with Salafism and was frequently attributed to foreign influences from the Middle East. In contrast, Islam in Tatarstan and Islam in Kazakhstan were held up as examples of moderate and traditional Islam. On the other hand, Soviet efforts to repress Islam were evident in statements by some interviewees about how higher levels of religious knowledge can be found abroad, particularly Turkey and Egypt. However, this narrative is more prominent in Kazakhstan, rather in Tatarstan. This difference can likely be attributed in part due to more robust efforts to create domestic religious

[725] Interview with Rector of Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.
[726] Interview with Director of Islam Today, Kazan, 2015.
[727] Interview with Imam E, Kazan, 2015.
[728] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015.

education in Tatarstan than in Kazakhstan as well as Tatar elites seeking to harmonize republican narratives with national narratives. On the other hand, foreign funding was more frequently cited in Tatarstan than in Kazakhstan, in tension with narratives about instability and threats emanating from abroad. Despite some mosques and even the preeminent local Islamic university receiving foreign funding, extremism, Salafism, and other ills of society were attributed to foreign influences. Tatarstan's efforts to combat these influences were frequently highlighted and contrasted to elsewhere in Russia.

Sects

References to sects by senior officials and imams were exclusively used in a pejorative way. These references to sects frequently cited Salafism, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and to a lesser extent a handful of other groups. References to sects were often used in a broad sense to denote non-traditional Islam; some interviewees were unable to name specific groups. More broadly, interviewees struggled to identify criteria to determine what was a sect, outside of being "non-traditional" to Tatarstan.

The prevention of sects was one of the rationales for SAM RT distributing the Friday message. "We receive one journal every six months. We started receiving the journal two years ago. Every imam must be controlled so there won't' be sects. So there will be one way, according to SAM RT," This rationale was also provided for the Tatar government's role in approving the appointment of imams as well as for why all mosques must be in SAM RT. The imam of Mosque C8 described the role of the rayon government, SAM RT, as well as the FSB in approving imams for positions. When I followed up by asking if the FSB is regularly involved or always involved in the approval of imams' appointments he replied, "Yes, there is secret control. Because we work with the community, so the imam needs to be predictable

because of the threat of sects."[729] The imam of Mosque C5 described how the mosque, "… had to be registered, according to the law in Russia so there won't' be any sects."[730]

The Head Imam of Marjani mosque also prevented me from conducting further interviews with mosque attendees because he said that I may interview someone who is part of a sect and learn what he perceived to be incorrect information. According to this rationale:

> Someone could tell you to live in another way, which may not be right, may be wrong. For example, today there was someone here, a man, and he was strange. I spoke with him. He has ideas that are strange. He is from a sect. If you ask him for instance after than you will think here in the mosque Marjani that we tell people these kinds of things, which are wrong.[731]

The Deputy Imam of Marjani also justified all mosques being required to be in SAM RT as a method to deter sects, "All mosques must be in SAM in order to ensure order, so there won't be extremism or sects."[732]

Salafism was the most commonly cited example of a sect that is present in Tatarstan. For example, I asked the Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque how he defined Salafism and he replied, "It is a sect."[733] The imam of Mosque C6 argued that, "Extremists…create sects and want to create conflict. These sects exist in Tatarstan."[734] When I asked which groups he would identify as sects are in Tatarstan he replied, "Hizb ut-Tahrir, Salafism, Tablighi Jamaat, and Takfirism."[735] When I

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[729] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.
[730] Interview with Imam of Mosque C5, Kazan, 2015.
[731] Interview with Head Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.
[732] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.
[733] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.
[734] Interview with Imam of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015.
[735] Interview with Imam of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015.

asked whether sects were a current problem in Tatarstan, he responded that sects were responsible for the attack on the mufti, but have since been dealt with.[736]

When I asked the Deputy Imam of Marjani mosque he replied, "It is sects and Wahhabism."[737] When I asked him to define Salafism, he replied that it was a "sect". When I asked for an example of a sect he replied, "Hizb ut-Tahir or fayzrahmanists. But they are not in Tatarstan anymore."[738]

As addressed in the previous chapter, Hizb ut-Tahrir is a Sunni political movement that was formed by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani and former members of the Muslim Brotherhood. It seeks to establish a caliphate, while renouncing violence to do so.[739] Several interviewees cited mosques in the region being forcibly closed after the imams of these mosques were accused of being part of Hizb ut-Tahrir.[740] The imam of one mosque in Kazan described one instance:

> Hizb ut-Tahrir, their main goal, they want to create a caliphate. Hizb ut-Tahrir is prohibited, they are extremists. One year ago, there was a scandal. Some people in Hizb ut-Tahrir moved here and went around to mosques. The imam at this mosque here, before me, I think he was part of Hizb ut-Tahrir. But if you look at shariah, the caliphate is not wrong. The caliphate is not wrong, but all should pray for the president, so he'll do good… We don't have religious schools. There is a lack of access for religion. Their wishes are good, but the way to realize it is wrong. The president is good, on holidays, he prays with us. It is now required to be part of the muftiate.[741]

Imams who cited Hizb ut-Tahrir as a sect did not universally condemn Hizb ut-Tahrir on religious grounds, but they universally believed that the government opposed Hizb

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[736] Ibid.
[737] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.
[738] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015.
[739] Taji-Farouki, "Ḥizb Al-Taḥrīr Al-Islāmī."
[740] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015; Interviews with several mosque attendees, Kazan, 2015.
[741] Interview with Imam D, Kazan, 2015.

ut-Tahrir. Indeed, the Russian national government banned Hizb ut-Tahrir in 2003.[742] Additionally, they cited it as disrupting the unity of Islam in Tatarstan.

Tablighi Jamaat was one group that was referenced as a sect on occasion, though less frequently than Salafism or Hizb ut-Tahir. As discussed in the previous chapter, Tablighi Jamaat is a Sunni reform movement that was formed in 1927 in India and spread elsewhere starting in 1950 and emphasizes proselytizing.[1] It is banned in Russia and all of Central Asia except Kyrgyzstan.

The imam at Mosque C8 described the role of SAM RT as deterring sects, particularly Tablighi Jamaat. While he believed that, "Tablighi Jamaat is not dangerous… But Tablighi Jamaat is a political religion." Moreover, he asserted that the Tatar, "…government doesn't like them. They don't want it to grow or increase. Muslims in Russia have lived well without them."[743] Sects also in this instance referred a group that is perceived as group that challenges the legitimacy of the government.

Two interviewees cited other examples of sects, including Fayzrahmanists and Takfirism."[744] Fayzrahmanists is a group local to Tatarstan named after Fayzrahman Sattarov. According to SOVA, Fayzrahmanists are banned in Tatarstan and was banned by the court as an extremist group. As reported by SOVA, according to a court ruling Fayzrahmanists created, "…a negative perception of other religious groups" and their texts do not, "…correspond to classical notions of Islam."[745] SOVA Center for Information and Analysis notes that the reasons given by the court for identifying Fayzrahmanists as an extremist group do not coincide with legal reasoning

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[742] "Alleged Members Of Banned Islamic Group Detained In Russia."
[743] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015.
[744] Interview with Deputy Imam of Marjani Mosque, Kazan, 2015; Interview with Imam of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015.
[745] "Misuse of Anti-Extremism in August 2013."

in Russia for establishing whether a can be legally classified as extremist.[746] While the theology of such a small group local to Tatarstan is poorly understood, based on the definitions the court provided for its, "extremist," nature, Fayzrahmanists have clearly been targeted for their refusal to conform to SAM RT, and the independence sought by its leader.

The last group identified is, "takfirism." Takfir refers to determining that someone is an unbeliever and thus no longer Muslim. It is sometimes used to refer to other Muslims as insufficiently religious, and thus no longer Muslim.[747] Several interviewees reference people they identified as Salafis as refusing to recognize as Muslims as Muslim because they were not Salafi.[748]

The constant threat of sects was provided as a rationale for co-optation in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan. Additionally, when I asked interviewees to identify which sects they were referring to, the most commonly identified group was Salafism. Salafism in turn was equated with extremism, both in reference to acts of violence and variation from national religious traditions. In both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, some interviewees also identified Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat as sects. Hizb ut-Tahrir was identified by several interviewees as a threat because it questioned the legitimacy of each respective government. On the other hand, the rationales concerning Tablighi Jamaat were more diffuse and broad and solely along the lines of challenging national religious identity. In Kazakhstan, the regime has employed a novel approach to further this rhetoric, government supported NGOS in the form of anti-sect centers. Approaches to Sufism in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan also differed.

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[746] "Misuse of Anti-Extremism in August 2013."
[747] See Islamic Dictionary Appendix.
[748] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, 2015; Interview with Former Director of RAC, Kazan, 2015.

Sufism

Unlike in Kazakhstan, no interviewees in Tatarstan identified Sufism as a sect. All of the religious and government elites I interviewed in Tatarstan stated that they believed Sufism was acceptable and/or traditional to Tatarstan. Some interviewees did make a distinction about practices within Sufism—namely that silent dhikr is acceptable while vocal dhikr is not. Other elites believed that Sufism should be restricted to the private realm.

The imam of Mosque C4 was unequivocal that Sufism was an acceptable way to practice Islam in Tatarstan and asserted that, "Our mufti practices Sufism," and that some imams in Tatarstan did as well.[749] He believed that it was within the Hanafi mazhab.[750] When I asked him to describe which orders (groups within Sufism) are practiced in Sufism he replied, "Naqshbandiyya is in this rayon and in Tatarstan… Our mazhab is the Hanafi mazhab."[751] He made the distinction between a form of silent prayer versus vocal prayer (dhikr). The former he attributed to Naqshbandis in Tatarstan, while the latter had a negative connotation, which he stated was practiced by another Sufi order, the Qadiriyya, in Chechnya.[752] This distinction was also made by the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute.

When I asked the Rector, he was in agreement that Sufism was acceptable. Referring to Sufism he stated that, "Some people believe it is not part of real Islam. What it is, it is true. It is a search to be closer to God… What it is, a way to find, be close to God within the framework of Islam. It's about the soul." He further clarified that "…There is loud dhikr and silent dhikr. We have silent dhikr here. That Sufism—

[749] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015.
[750] Interview with Imam of Mosque C4, Kazan, 2015.
[751] Ibid.
[752] Ibid.

Sufism with silent dhikr— can be part of Islam."[753]

Another imam also was of the view that Sufism was part of traditional Islam in Tatarstan, but also qualified his view. When I asked if Sufism was practiced in Tatarstan, the imam replied, "Yes, but Sufism is not new. It was strong before the USSR."[754] He also stated that he believed the Rector of the Russian Islamic Institute was, "…Knowledgeable about Sufism and likes to support Sufism. Now there is an atmosphere of Sufism there."[755] He was of the view that Sufism should be practiced in private, "There are middle imams, five to six imams, in Kazan, that are active Sufis, but don't show it publicly…What is most important, is that this group is a small group, that you can't see. "[756]

The belief that Sufism should be a private matter and not have high visibility was shared by other interviewees. Another imam also shared his belief that Sufism was sanctioned in Tatarstan, but that it was preferable to be practiced in private, "We have democracy of religion… People can do in private, do what they want."[757] The imam of Mosque C9 also stated that Sufism was acceptable at the personal level, "Sufism is practiced in Tatarstan. All is practiced. It is an individual decision."[758]

Overall opinions in Tatarstan were more positive about Sufism than in Kazakhstan. No interviewees stated outright that they believed that Sufism was a, "sect," or in complete contradiction to national religious identity in Tatarstan. Some interviewees strongly argued that it was inherent in the national religious identity. Other interviewees distinguished between vocal and silent prayer as in Kazakhstan. In

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[753] Interview with Rector of Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.
[754] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, Kazan, Tatarstan, 2015.
[755] Interview with Rector of Russian Islamic Institute, Kazan, 2015.
[756] Interview with Imam D, Kazan, 2015.
[757] Interview with Imam of Mosque C9, Kazan, 2015.
[758] Interview with Imam of Mosque C9, Kazan, 2015.

both cases some interviewees expressed discomfort with Sufism being widely practiced.

Conclusion

In Tatarstan and Kazakhstan Islam is securitized and narratives are espoused that emergency measures are needed to deter religious extremism. In both cases, interviewees referred to extremism as acts of violence. However, in Kazakhstan more interviewees frequently referred to religious extremism as vague deviations from national religious norms, rather than acts of violence. In Tatarstan efforts to co-opt mosques and religious knowledge were more frequently justified as a means to deter violent acts. This limited definition of extremism in Tatarstan was part of an effort to reduce opportunities for central intrusion.

In both cases the promotion of regime sponsored religious information or knowledge is presented as an antidote to extremism and as part of a process to protect each respective national religious identity. On the other hand, present day effects of the Soviet suppression of religion are reflected in countercurrent narratives that vest greater religious knowledge in the Middle East and Turkey.

In Tatarstan, narratives surroundings extremism were coupled with narratives about danger. Moreover, Islam was even framed as a unique threat, distinct, from other religions in terms of its propensity to nurture radicalism. This narrative emanated from interviewees within Tatarstan who also self-identified as Muslim

In Kazakhstan, interviewees more frequently referenced the threat of conflict and its antitheses, peace. The emphasis on avoiding ethnic conflict is notable in Kazakhstan, which despite its relative ethnic diversity, has largely avoided ethnic clashes seen in neighboring countries. However, conflict also referred to vague notions of theological disjunctures or deviating from SAMK. Similarly, peace also

referred to interethnic peace, as well as avoiding violence, and upholding theological uniformity.

In both cases, there was an emphasis on unity, which in both instances referred to the same notion of theological compliance and adherence to the Spiritual Association of Muslims. In Kazakhstan, narratives about unity overlapped with narratives on peace and conflict, emphasizing ethnic unity within Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan, while promoting a Kazakh (ethnic) national identity, is simultaneously attempting to reduce grievances based on ethnicity. In Tatarstan this emphasis on unity (equated with the consolidation of religious authority in SAM RT) is part of an attempt to bolster efforts of the Tatar regime in bargaining with the center.

In Kazakhstan, a similar security paradigm is portrayed to international audiences, with the government dually portrayed as above the religious fray and as implementing policies that deter the development of religious extremism. Kazakhstan upholds itself as an international example of, "moderate," Islam and attributes negative influences as stemming from the Middle East. Kazakhstan, as a state closer to the nation state ideal, is at liberty to only negotiate its image with international audiences.

In Tatarstan, religious extremism is attributed to both foreign influences, as well as the Northern Caucasus, most notably Chechnya. In contrast to Kazakhstan, Tatarstan upholds itself as a domestic example of, "moderate," Islam. This framing is part of Kazan's efforts to improve its leverage vis-à-vis Moscow. The internalization and repetition of the narrative among Tatar elites that there is an, "inherent," problem within Islam that makes it more predisposed towards religious extremism than other religions holds the potential to weaken this boundary control. Despite these two

different external audiences, the regimes in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan are striving to construct similar national tradition identities.

"Traditional Islam," was a vague notion repeatedly mentioned by interviewees. SAMK and SAM RT are both portrayed as upholders of traditional Islam. In both cases the historic role of Hanafism is emphasized and is equated with tradition. Stepping outside the bounds of SAMK and SAM RT sanctioned Hanafism was equated with a violation of national traditions. One of these violations included Salafism. In Tatarstan, government officials, officials at SAM RT, and imams directly discussed how Salafism violated national tradition and that it wrought instability and even religious extremism. In Kazakhstan, senior governmental officials were more circumspect and maintained the official line that the government does not intervene in religious matters. At the regional and local governmental level, as well as in at SAMK, this façade disappeared. Regional and local officials openly discussed their efforts to limit the spread and influence of Salafism. While people who self-identify as Salafi exist in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, it is also critical to note that this label was frequently applied to any religious sources of people who resist incorporation into SAMK and SAM RT. Moreover, officials in neither case were willing or able to provide criteria for how the government determined who was Salafi.

Interviewees in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan also often attributed the presence of Salafism, religious sects, and religious extremism to foreign influences. Salafism was the most frequently identified sect in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan. To a lesser extent, interviewees also identified Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat, both of which are officially banned in Kazakhstan and Russia. These aforementioned groups were attributed primarily to foreign influences. According to this narrative sects and religious extremism stem solely from abroad in Kazakhstan, while SAMK deters such

threats. This narrative was also present in Tatarstan, though such threats were portrayed as also emanating from the Caucasus, particularly Chechnya. Alternatively, the Volga-Urals were presented as the domestic ideal for a Muslim majority region. Kazakhstan also employed a novel approach to sects, the creation of government sponsored NGO anti-sect centers. The creation of such an institution allowed for the appearance of objective information about the harmful nature of the religious groups being examined. This in turn allowed the government to be portrayed as above the fray of religious theology, but rather intervening on behalf of public safety and welfare.

Differences between the regimes emerge on the topic of Sufism. Sufism was regarded more positively in Tatarstan—no interviewees identified it as a sect nor as a threat to national religious identity, in contrast to Kazakhstan. At the other hand, some interviewees in Tatarstan strongly asserted that Sufism was an integral part of Tatar national religious identity. Interestingly, it is Kazakhstan that is the home to several historically important Sufi shrines. In both cases some interviewees expressed discomfort with the hypothetical situation of Sufism being widely practiced. Both regimes are highly concerned with alternative sources of religious authority. These Sufi shrines were previously outside the confines of SAMK. SAMK now controls this sites. However, the prior independence of these sites, is likely a cause of concern to the regime, and why Sufism is viewed with more ambiguity and suspicion in Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan also differs in its strategy to ethnic minorities, as of 2015 the regime provides more accommodations to ethnic minority communities. The regime initially did not allow mosques that serve ethnic minority communities to have the Friday message in their own language in 2012. By 2015, SAMK granted language

exemptions. While Tatarstan is less ethnically diverse, I did not observe the presence of any mosques for non-ethnic Tatar communities. The former head of the RAC related a story to me about how he denied an Azerbaijani Shi'i community permission to construct their own mosque. While Shi'i mosques are not allowed in Kazakhstan either, the regime has allowed most mosques for minority communities to continue to operate. These mosques are not, however, allowed to designate themselves officially as part of any ethnic community and must accept imams appointed by SAMK. In each case I observed, the appointed imam were not of the same ethnicity as the community.

Overall, both Tatarstan and Kazakhstan employ similar narratives to evoke calls for emergency measures and to justify emergency measures to securitize Islam, citing the need for unity, knowledge, and the prevention of either danger or conflict. Externally these narratives are justified to different audiences—domestically in Russia in the case of Tatarstan, and internationally by Kazakhstan. These external audiences are chosen by each regime in order to prevent intrusions from the actor(s) perceived most likely to interfere domestically—the national government in the case of Tatarstan and other states in the case of Kazakhstan. The national religious identity being constructed within the confines of this securitization process is also similar—with vague notions of tradition equated with Hanafism and sources outside of SAMK or SAM RT equated with Salafism, extremism or sects. Chapter Seven compares the effectiveness of these policies by analyzing how citizens perceive these securitization measures as well as how they determine which religious sources are authoritative.

Chapter Six The Effectiveness of the Co-optation of Islam in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan

Introduction

Authoritarian regimes frequently employ institutions to co-opt potential sources of opposition. The vast majority of Muslim majority states maintain religious institutions for Islam. Chapter Two and Four assessed how the institution for Islam in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, SAMK and SAM RT, are employed to co-opt Islam at the national and sub-national level. This chapter analyses how effective this process of co-optation is by measuring the degree to which citizens utilize government sponsored sources of religious information (associated with SAMK and SAM RT) and mosque attendance patterns between government constructed and co-opted mosques. I find that a greater proportion of Muslims in Kazakhstan find governmental sources to be authoritative than in Tatarstan, but that only a minority in either case consults non-governmental sources. This result is in line with my hypothesis that Kazakhstan, as a state unencumbered by trying to maintain its sovereignty from other government actors, can pursue a more intensive co-optation process, which results in a higher proportion of people reporting using government sources.

Unexpectedly, however, there is not a clear correlation between government constructed mosques and governmental sources of information on the one hand, and co-opted mosques and non-governmental sources on the other. A network analysis of reported mosque attendance shows a high degree of attendance linkages between mosques in each city with a high proportion of people who report using non-government sources and government constructed mosques. Moreover, in Almaty and Kazan, a government constructed mosque was the mosque with the highest proportion

of people who reported using non-governmental sources. This deviation is likely largely explained by how people perceive the role of the mosque—a place for personal religious practice—and how people select mosques—primarily based on convenience and location. At the individual level, ethnicity, gender, age, and mosque attendance frequency explain some of the variation in who consults governmental and non-governmental sources of information.

Demographics

I conducted interviews at both mosques and markets. The former site was chosen because mosques are the most intensive site of regime efforts to co-opt Islam and are also the only public space available to practice Islam. Markets are one of the few sites where a cross-section of society from various classes, ethnic groups, and religious groups interact. This interview site was chosen to be reflective of the general population.[759]

This section compares the ethnic, religious, and age structure in my sample of the general population (at markets) in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan to the sample of Muslims I interviewed at mosques.[760] Secondly, it compares the samples from my fieldwork to demographic data from Pew's Research Center, the 2009 Kazakhstan census, the 2010 Russian census, and other sources when available. I conducted 837 interviews with so-called ordinary citizens – 547 interviews in Kazakhstan and 290 in Tatarstan. Overall, the samples of interviewees from mosques and markets in both cases are roughly representative of the general population, with over sampling of Muslims (particularly in Kazakhstan) and under representation of ethnic Russians.

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[759] See Methodology Appendix for more details on how mosques and markets as well as interviewees were randomly selected.
[760] See Methodology Appendix for discussion about gender, regions within Kazakhstan and Russia, and profession.

Ethnic Identity

Each regime is attempting to co-opt and construct the national religious identity. Ethnic identity and its relationship to religious identity is an important component in this process. The titular ethnic group forms the majority ethnic group in each case. Tatarstan and, particularly Kazakhstan, have significant ethnic minorities. Thus, these co-optation efforts hold the potential to alienate these respective communities.

I asked an open-ended question, "Do you identify with an ethnic group?" to ask people about their ethnic identity. Censuses and other studies that use pre-determined categories force respondents to select from among listed choices, which can potentially distort the results. By allowing interviewees to describe their own ethnic identity, this approach revealed more complexity and fluidity in ethnic identities in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan.[761]

Eighty percent of all interviewees in Kazakhstan (at mosques and markets) self-identified as Kazakh. Dungans[762] represented almost four percent of interviewees while Russians and Tajik represented about an additional three percent respectively. Another approximate two percent were Uyghur, Uzbek, and Turkish each Chechens,

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[761] See Methodology Appendix.

[762] The Dungan people are a predominately Muslim ethnic group in Central Asia whose ancestry is traced to the Hui people in China after their forced migration in the nineteenth century to what is now Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. While numerous sources state that the Dungan people usually refer to themselves as Hui, Lao Huihui or Huihui, and those outside of the community refer to them as "Dungan", interviewees I spoke with described themselves as Dungan, which is how I refer to the group here. The Dungan language is a dialect of Mandarin, Gansu, which uses the Cyrillic alphabet. Dungans were recognized as a nationality under the Soviet Union after the October Revolution. Interviews with interviewees who identified as Dungan were conducted in Russian, which all interviewees spoke proficiently. Allès, "The Chinese-Speaking Muslims (Dungans) of Central Asia: A Case of Multiple Identities in a Changing Context," 122, 124.

Karakalpaks,[763] Ukrainians, Koreans, and Kyrgyz represented an additionally one percent respectively. The remaining interviewees self-identified as Kazakh and Russian, Azeri, Mongol, Tatar, Ingush, Arab, Armenian, German, Greek, Moldavian, and Palestinian— each representing less than half a percent.

Table 1. Ethnicity in Kazakhstan	
Ethnicity	**Percent**
Kazakh	80%
Dungan	4%
Russian	3%
Tajik	2%
Turkish	2%
Uyghur	2%
Uzbek	2%
Chechen	1%
Karakalpak	1%
Ukrainian	1%
Korean	1%
Kyrgyz	1%
Ingush	Less than 1%
Mongol	Less than 1%
Azeri	Less than 1%
Tatar	Less than 1%
Arab	Less than 1%
Armenian	Less than 1%
Belarusian	Less than 1%
Moldavian	Less than 1%
German	Less than 1%
Greek	Less than 1%
Japanese	Less than 1%
Palestinian	Less than 1%
Kazakh and Russian	Less than 1%
Total	546

According to the last census in Kazakhstan (conducted in 2009), 63.1 percent of the population is ethically Kazakh, and 23.7 percent is Russian. Sixty-nine percent of interviewees at markets in Kazakhstan self-identified as Kazakh and one interviewee's identity included Kazakh (Kazakh and Russian). In Astana, 13 percent of interviewees at markets identified as Russian, while in Almaty only six percent

[763] Karakalpakstan is officially a semi-autonomous region in northwest Uzbekistan. It borders Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. During the Soviet Union it was the Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). The region presently constitutes 37% of the area of Uzbekistan, though Karakalpaks are an ethnic minority in their titular region. Arabic script was used for Karalpak until 1928, when along with other Turkic languages in the region, the Cyrillic script was instituted under the Soviet Union in 1940. The majority of Karalpaks are Muslim. Hanks, "A Separate Space?: Karakalpak Nationalism and Devolution in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan," 939–940; 943.

identified as Russian. The Kazakhstani census does not provide detailed breakdowns of ethnicity by city. It does state that ethnic Kazakhs, "…do not exceed 50 percent of the population," in the Akmola oblast, which includes Astana.[764] Additionally, it states that in, "South Kazakhstan," the proportion of ethnic Kazakhs is over 70 percent.[765] Thus, it's likely that this sample underrepresented ethnic Russians. The majority of Russians I interviewed identified as Orthodox, and only Muslims are included in the following analysis.[766] The Kazakhstani census also states that Uzbeks constitute about three percent of the population, Ukrainians about two percent, and Uyghurs, Tatars and Germans each one percent.[767] Koreans, Turks, Azerbaijanis, Belarusians, Dungans, Kurds, Tajiks, Poles, Chechens, and Kyrgyz are listed as under one percent respectively. All, "other ethnic groups," collectively represent one percent of the population. Thus, my sample in Kazakhstan is overall reflective of the ethnic diversity in Kazakhstan, while over representing ethnicities that are predominately Muslim, and underrepresenting ethnic Russians.

In Tatarstan, about 60 percent of interviewees self-identified as Tatar and 26 percent as ethnically Russian. Two percent of interviewees were Tajik. About one percent identified as Tatar and Russian, Tatar and Tajik, and Chuvash and Russian. Another one percent self-identified as Uzbek, Arab, Armenian, respectively. Less

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[764] "Results of the 2009 National Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Analytical Report," 19-20.
[765] "Results of the 2009 National Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan," 19-20.
[766] About 65 percent of Russians in Kazakhstan identified as solely Orthodox. About twelve percent identified as atheist, and about six percent as Orthodox and Atheist, Orthodox and Muslim, Jehovah Witness, and Religiously unaffiliated each respectively. In Tatarstan, about 90 percent of ethnic Russians identified as Orthodox. About four percent identified as atheist, while another one percent identified as agnostic. About three percent identified as Muslim and one percent as Muslim and Orthodox. Another one percent identified as Krishna and Orthodox.
[767] Results of the 2009 National Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan," 20.

than one percent identified as Bulghar,[768] Mari,[769] Mordva,[770] Daghestani, Tatar and Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Chadian,[771] Egyptian, and German. One interviewee stated their ethnic identity was, "Siberian, Russian, Ukrainian, and Ural" (under the category of "Something Else" in Table 2 below)."[772]

Table 2. Ethnicity in Tatarstan

Ethnicity	Percent
Tatar	60%
Russian	26%
Tajik	2%
Tatar and Russian	1%
Tatar and Tajik	1%
Chuvash and Russian	1%
Uzbek	1%
Arab	1%
Armenian	1%
Azeri	1%
Bulghar	Less than 1%
Mari	Less than 1%
Mordva	Less than 1%
Daghestani	Less than 1%
Tatar	Less than 1%
Tatar and Kazakh	Less than 1%
Tatar and Uzbek	Less than 1%
Turkmen	Less than 1%
Kazakh	Less than 1%
Ukrainian	Less than 1%
Russian and Ukrainian	Less than 1%
Belarusian	Less than 1%
Chadian	Less than 1%
Egyptian	Less than 1%
German	Less than 1%
Something else	Less than 1%
Total	290

[768] Bulghar refers to Volga Bulghars, an identity tied to the city of Bulghar in present day Tatarstan. Very little scholarship exists on this identity as a present day identity, with the notable exception of Frank, *Islamic Historiography and "Bulghar" Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia*. Frank argues that this identity is constructed not through ethnicity, but rather religious identity (Muslim) and affiliation with the medieval empire of the Volga Bulghars. Bulghar, Tatarstan remains an important religious site within Tatarstan today.

[769] The Mari are a Finno-Ugric ethnic group in Russia. Their titular republic is the Mari El Republic, which is part of the Volga Federal District.

[770] Mordvas (also referred to as Mordvin or Mordvidian) are a Finno-Ugric ethnic group. Their titular republic is the Mordovia Republic, located in the Volga Federal District.

[771] One interviewee described himself as from Chad and self-identified as "Chadian."

[772] This interviewee's identity included two regional identities, "Siberian" and "Ural."

The last census in Russia was conducted in 2010. In Tatarstan, Tatars constitute about 54 percent of the population and Russians about 40 percent.[773] Chuvashes are the third most populous ethnic group at about three percent. The census lists only five other ethnicities as constituting more than 10,000 people (or at least 0.2 percent of the population: Udmurts, Mordovians, Maris, Ukrainians, and Bashkirs.[774]

However, there were several methodological issues with the Russian census. Most pointedly, people who were unaccounted for in the census were listed as Russian, an intentional manipulation of the census data.[775] Censuses do not happen outside of political contexts, for example the 2002 census was viewed by many Tatars as an intentional effort to create divisions within the Tatar nation (notably by listing 45 sub-Tatar identities) in order to ensure that officially Tatars did not constitute the majority population in their titular republic.[776] Thus, some citizens refused to answer the census, and the decision by the Russian government in 2010 to count non-responses towards the Russian proportion of the population provides support to this fear. In Kazakhstan, the government has slowly shifted language and other policies to encourage Kazakhs in other countries (including Oralmans, a category the Kazakhstani government uses to refer to ethnic Kazakhs in non-former Soviet

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[773] Results of the 2010 All-Russian Population Census regarding the Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of individual nationalities, Appendix 2: The National Composition of the Population by Regions of the Russian Federation.
[774] Results of the 2010 All-Russian Population Census regarding the Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of individual nationalities, Appendix 2: The National Composition of the Population by Regions of the Russian Federation; "Republic of Tatarstan: Population."
[775] "People Not Counted In Tatarstan 'To Be Marked As Ethnic Russian' In Census."
[776] Gorenburg, "Tatar Identity: A United, Indivisible Nation?" 1–31,

republics) to immigrate to Kazakhstan and for ethnic Russians to leave Kazakhstan.[777] Thus, there is likely a degree of bias in the Kazakhstani census to over represent ethnic Kazakhs and underrepresent ethnic Russian.

Despite these caveats, overall my samples in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan are approximately reflective of the ethnic diversity in each case, while over representing ethnicities that are predominately Muslim, and underrepresenting ethnic Russians. By allowing interviewees to self-identify, my responses encapsulated more complexity such as people that identified with more than one ethnic group, e.g., Kazakh and Russian, or Tatar and Tajik. In several instances, the question prompting ethnic identity resulted in regional identities, including Ural, Siberian, and Bulghar. It also allowed the identification of ethnic identities that are not included in censuses in Russia and Kazakhstan, such as Karakalpak in Russia.

Religious Identity

As with ethnic identity, I asked an open-ended question about religious identity which revealed more complex religious identities. In Kazakhstan, 93 percent of the people I interviewed identified as Muslim. Several interviewees' identities included Muslim. Over 0.5 percent identified as Muslim and Orthodox, while less than one percent identified as Muslim and Atheist and Muslim and Hindu. About four percent identified as Orthodox, while over half a percent identified as atheist. Over half a percent were religiously unaffiliated.[778] The remaining identities constitutes less than a percent each included: Jehovah's Witnesses; Krishna; Pagan; and Presbyterian.

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[777] Oralman could refer to ethnic Kazakhs in Mongolia or China for example. See Diener, "Kazakhstan's Kin State Diaspora: Settlement Planning and the Oralman Dilemma."

[778] See Methodology Appendix.

About 72 percent of interviewees at markets in Astana identified exclusively as Muslim. An additional approximate three percent of interviewees' identity included Muslim (e.g., Muslim and atheist). Eighty-two percent of interviewees in Almaty self-identified exclusively as Muslim and another three percent stated that their identity included Muslim.

According to the Kazakhstani census 70.2 percent of the population is Muslim. Alternatively, according to Pew, as of the same year (2010) 56.4 percent of the population in Kazakhstan is Muslim (compared to 50.8 percent in 1990).[779] Over seventy percent of people I interviewed at markets in Astana and Almaty identified as Muslim. In the only large-N study that looks at religious affiliation in Kazakhstan over time, Junisbai, Junisbai and Zhussupov found that 93.53 percent of people in Kazakhstan self-identified as Muslim in 2012, compared to 79.97 percent in 2007.[780]

Sixty-six percent of interviewees in Tatarstan identified as Muslim, while 27 percent identified as Orthodox. Less than one percent identified as both Muslim and Orthodox. About three percent described themselves as atheists and about one percent as religious unaffiliated. About two percent identified as Krishna and Orthodox and the remaining interviewees identified as Agnostic, and Catholic. Forty-two percent of interviewees at markets identified exclusively as Muslim. Only one interviewee had a more complex identity that included Muslim— Muslim and Orthodox. According to the 2010 Russian census, 53 percent of the population in Tatarstan is Muslim (compared to the sixty percent of all interviewees I interviewed and forty percent at markets).[781]

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[779] Pew Research Center, "Table: Muslim Population by Country."
[780] Junisbai, Junisbai, and Zhussupov, "Two Countries, Five Years," 10.
[781] Results of the 2010 All-Russian Population Census regarding the Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of individual nationalities, Appendix 2: The National Composition of the Population by Regions of the Russian Federation.

While limited, the data available on religious identity over time in Russia and Central Asia indicates that more people are identifying as Muslim. This growing affiliation has been referred to by others as an, "Islamic revival." While such terminology is problematic, the growing affiliation of ethnic Kazakhs and Tatars to the identity of Muslims, and the contestation over which practices this entails is of acute interest to each respective regime. The oversampling of Muslims in each case is in line with my research goals to evaluate the efforts to co-opt this majority religious identity.[782]

Age and Mosque Attendance

Numerous statements by the Kazakhstani, Tatar, and Russian regimes have asserted that extremism is more common among the youth.[783] Moreover, if young people in an authoritarian regime are forming a religious identity not associated with the regime, this is clearly a cause for concern among elites in and connected to the regime. People who are of military age are a potential risk for the regime. Moreover, the views of younger citizens have the potential to also influence future generations.

Mosque attendance is one indicator of religiosity.[784] It is also a metric of interest to both regimes. In Kazakhstan, cameras are outside all mosque entrances and able to count and potentially identify people who go to mosques. One co-opted mosque in Kazan installed a security system within the mosque, reportedly at the behest of SAM RT. A mosque employee recounted to me how SAM RT requested

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[782] While not directly pertinent to this study, it is interesting to note that eight percent of people at markets in Tatarstan self-identified with more than one ethnic group, compared to half a percent in Kazakhstan. Alternatively, three percent of people at markets in Kazakhstan identified with more than one religious group, compared to about five percent in Tatarstan.

[783] See Chapters Two and Three.

[784] See Methodology Appendix for discussion of indicators of religiosity and the limitations of this metric.

that he provide tallies on the number of people attending each prayer time.[785] According to my data, over three fourths of Muslims in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan (at markets) reported going to mosques. In Tatarstan, younger Muslims were more likely than older Muslims to say they went to mosque. The age of Muslims who said they did and did not go to mosque in Kazakhstan was approximately the same, though the median and mean age of Muslims in Kazakhstan was in the thirties. Furthermore, Muslims who report going to mosques more than once a day were disproportionately young.

I asked interviewees at markets if they went to a place of worship and if so, how frequently. Eighty-six percent of Muslims I interviewed at markets at Kazakhstan said they went to mosques. Pew found in 2011 from field interviews that 69 percent of the population in Kazakhstan attended a mosque.[786]

In my data, the mean age of people who identified as Muslim at markets in Kazakhstan who said they went to mosque was 38.2, while mean age of Muslims at markets who said they did not go to mosque was 37.1 The median age of Muslims at markets who reported going to mosques was 35.5 while the median for Muslims who reported not going to mosques was 36.5. Figure 1 below shows the breakdown in age among Muslims in Kazakhstan in the general population who reported going to mosques.

Given part of my sample is of people at mosques, my data does not only rely on people who report going to mosque.[787] The mean and median age of Muslims I

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[785] Interview with employee of Mosque C6, Kazan, 2015.
[786] "Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life," 47.
[787] It's possible that there is a social desirability bias among Muslims at markets to state that they go to mosque and among Muslims at mosques to state that they go to mosques more frequently. For interviews I conducted at mosques, I can at least verify that they do go to mosques.

interviewed at mosques was younger than Muslims at markets who reported going to mosques. The mean age of people interviewed at mosques was 33.49 and the median 30. The median age at every mosque in Kazakhstan was under 35. According the United Nations' 2015 report on, "World Population Ageing," the median age in Kazakhstan was 29.3.[788]

Figure 1. Kazakhstan: Age of Interviewees at Markets Who Go to Mosques



In Kazakhstan, 50 percent of Muslims at markets cited going to a mosque once or more per week. I found that a higher proportion of Muslims in the general population reported going to mosque than other studies. Pew found that nine percent of the population in Kazakhstan attends mosque once a week for jummah namaz[789] and one percent attends more than once a week (a combined 10 percent attend mosque once or more per week). [790] Junisbai et al. found that in 2007 15.51 percent of Muslims in Kazakhstan, "attend religious services at least once a week," while only 12.72 percent of Muslims attended a religious service once a week in 2012.[791] Among

[788] "World Population Ageing 2015," 123.
[789] Friday prayer.
[790] Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 46.
[791] Junisbai, Junisbai, and Zhussupov, "Two Countries, Five Years: Islam in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan through the Lens of Public Opinion Surveys," 10.

Muslims I interviewed at mosques in Kazakhstan, 46 percent reported going to mosque once or more per week. Moreover, Muslims at markets in Kazakhstan who reported going to mosques frequently were young. The mean age of Muslims at markets who reported going to mosques more than once a day was 33.2. The mean age of Muslim I interviewed at mosques who reported going to mosques more than once a day was 35.5.

In Tatarstan, 75 percent of Muslims at markets responded that they went to mosques. The mean age of people who identified as Muslim at markets in Tatarstan and who stated that they went to mosques was 33.2, while the mean age of Muslims at markets who said they did not go to mosques was 47.3. The median age of Muslim at markets who said they went to mosques was 28, while the median age of Muslims who did not go to mosque was 45. Figure 2 depicts the age distribution among Muslims at markets in Tatarstan who reported going to mosques. The people I interviewed at mosques in Tatarstan skewed older than Muslims at markets who reported going to mosques. The mean age of Muslims interviewed at mosques in Tatarstan was 44.41 and the median was 41. In Russia as a whole, the median age was 38.7 in 2015 according to the United Nations' 2015 report on World Population Ageing.[792] I'm aware of no other data that looks at age and mosque attendance in Tatarstan. Pew's data on Muslims in Russia is not broken down into regions.

In Tatarstan, only 15 percent of Muslims at markets cited going to a mosque once or more per week.[793] In contrast, a very high proportion of Muslims I interviewed at mosques reported going to mosque regularly. Ninety-five percent of Muslims I interviewed at mosques reported going to mosque once or more per week.

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[792] "World Population Ageing 2015," 122.

[793] Among Muslims at markets in Kazan, the most commonly cited attendance frequency was less than once a month, but more than once a year (42%).

The mean age of Muslims at markets who reported going to mosques more than once a day was 27, while the mean age of Muslims at mosques who reported going more than once a day was 41.7. While Pew does not have data specific to Tatarstan, across Russia Pew found that younger Muslims (18-34) are 48 percent more likely than older Muslims to pray more than once a day.[794]

Figure 2. Tatarstan: Age of Interviewees at Markets Who Go to Mosques



Contrary to conventional theories about religious participation and age, younger people in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan are not less likely to go to places of worship, according to my interview data. Moreover, they are not less likely to identify with a religious identity—rather almost all people I interviewed who identified as Kazakh and Tatar also identified as Muslim. The relative youth of people at mosques is a concern for authoritarian regimes. Kazakhstan and Tatarstan are both undergoing growing affiliations with the religious identity of Muslim, nearing one hundred percent among each titular ethnic group. This process has included negotiations amongst which type of practices constitute being Tatar and Kazakh and Muslim. Among the youth, particularly young men, this increasingly entails going to a

[794] Junisbai, Junisbai, and Zhussupov, "Two Countries, Five Years: Islam in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan through the Lens of Public Opinion Surveys," 18.

mosque.[795] This demographic often serves as a base for social movements, enhancing incentives for each regime to encapsulate each identity within the sphere of influence of the regime.

Religious Advice

In order to examine the effectiveness of regime efforts to co-opt Islam among the general population and among Muslims at mosques, I examine whether there is a significant difference in the proportion of Muslims at markets and mosques who consult governmental, non-governmental, and neutral sources of religious advice. Secondly, each regime has invested in constructing and maintaining governmental mosques, while co-opting other mosques. I also examine whether there is a significant difference in the proportion of Muslims between government constructed and co-opted mosques who consult each type of advice. Moreover, I examine differences overtime in Astana where I have data from both 2013 and 2015.

Government efforts to co-opt Islam, as measured by the proportion of Muslims who reported using governmental religious sources, were highly effective in Kazakhstan. In Tatarstan, efforts to co-opt Islam were not as successful, though a relatively small proportion of Muslims in either case reported using non-governmental sources.

I asked ordinary citizens of all religious backgrounds (at both mosques and markets), "Whom or what would you consult for religious advice?" I interviewed 506 Muslims in Kazakhstan[796] and 192 Muslims in Tatarstan.[797] I coded the responses of Muslim interviewees as a governmental, non-governmental, or neutral. This question

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[795] See gendered breakdown on mosque attendance in Methodology Appendix.
[796] Eighty-eight percent of interviewees who were Muslim responded to my question about whom or what they consult for religious guidance.
[797] Ninety-one percent of Muslim interviewees responded to my question about whom or what they consult for religious guidance.

was intentionally worded so as to not seem controversial. I did not frame the question so as to invite direct criticism of the regime, which would have decreased the response rate and the willingness of interviewees to answer the question candidly.

A governmental source is a source that is was created or directly controlled by the regime. For example, citing a SAMK website or a religious leader within SAM RT would be coded as governmental.[798] Neutral sources refer to a source that does not indicate one way or another whether the interviewee perceives government sponsored sources of religion. For example, if an interviewee cited the Qur'an as a source of religious advice, this was coded as neutral. Family members are also included in this category, such as if someone asked her or his mother a question about religion.[799]

Mosques and Markets

Given mosques in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan are the epicenter of efforts to co-opt Islam, one would expect a higher proportion of interviewees at mosques (compared to markets) to consult government sources of religious advice. Government sources of religious advice are the most easily accessible given the monopoly of religious information constructed. Thus, for someone to seek out a non-governmental source is inherently more labor intensive as well as intentional. On the other hand, people who do not go to mosques are less likely to be exposed to government religious sources. Thus, we would expect that people who do not go to mosques would be more likely to consult neutral sources. One would also expect a

[798] Notably, this is a code I applied to interviewees' responses, not a term that respondents used. Most interviewees did not discuss the government in their response. See Chapter Seven for a description of people who did cite the government as a reason they consulted either governmental or non-governmental sources.

[799] Alternatively, if the interviewee consulted a governmental source in Kazakhstan as well as a non-governmental source (e.g., a religious leader in Saudi Arabia, an example of religious advice frequently denigrated by the regime) the results would be excluded. See Methodology Appendix for more details on the coding scheme.

small, but larger proportion than at mosques, to go to non-governmental sources of religious advice. If someone does not find government sources as authoritative, they might be less likely to go to mosques and instead seek out other sources of religious information or practice Islam outside of this framework.

Figure 3. Kazakhstan: Religious Advice at Mosques and Markets



Among all the people in Astana and Almaty I interviewed at mosques in 2013 and 2015, 71 percent consulted governmental sources of religious advice and 21 percent consulted only neutral sources. Eight percent sought out non-governmental sources of religious advice. At markets in Kazakhstan, 59 percent of Muslims consulted government sources of religious advice, while 37 percent consulted neutral sources. Only four percent consulted non-governmental sources.

At mosques in Tatarstan, over half of interviewees said they consulted governmental advice. In contrast, only 23 percent of Muslims at markets in Kazan reported consulting government sources, while 76 percent consulted only neutral

sources. Only two percent of Muslims at markets said they utilized non-governmental sources of religious guidance.

Figure 4. Tatarstan: Religious Advice at Mosques and Markets



As expected, the majority of Muslims at mosques in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan consulted governmental religious sources. Likewise, Muslims at markets in both cases were more likely to say they consulted neutral sources than Muslims at mosques. However, contrary to our priors, Muslims at mosques in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan were more likely than Muslims at markets to report using non-governmental sources. In Kazakhstan, Muslims at mosques were twice as likely to use non-governmental sources, and Muslims at mosques in Tatarstan were more than three times as likely to report using non-governmental sources. Despite this, the overall proportion of citizens who reported using non-governmental sources remained a minority.

Co-opted and Government Constructed Mosques

In both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan there are two types of mosques as outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, co-opted and government constructed. One would expect

people that who went to government constructed mosques would be more likely to seek out government sources of religious guidance. On the other hand, co-opted mosques were previously independent. One would expect that people who went to co-opted mosques would be more likely to consult non-governmental sources of religious advice than people at government constructed mosques.

Co-opted and Government Constructed Mosques in Kazakhstan

I conducted 364 interviews at mosques in Kazakhstan.[800] One hundred and fifty-four interviews at government constructed mosques and 210 at co-opted mosques. The proportion of Muslims in Kazakhstan at government constructed mosques and co-opted mosques who consulted governmental, non-governmental, and neutral sources were virtually identical.

[800] I excluded three interviews in Kazakhstan from the following analysis due to the sensitivity of the interviews. Two interviews at co-opted and seven at government constructed mosques were excluded as they sought out Russian and/or Tatar sources of religious advice. Twenty-three interviewees at co-opted mosques and seven at government constructed mosques either declined to answer the question, didn't answer the question, or the interview was ended before I could ask the question about religious advice in the interview.

Figure 5. Kazakhstan: Religious Advice at Government Constructed and Co-opted Mosques



Examining each city individually, a similar proportion of people at government constructed and co-opted mosques in Astana consulted governmental, non-governmental, and neutral sources of religious advice. Additionally, a similar proportion of people at government constructed and co-opted mosques in Almaty consulted governmental, non-governmental, and neutral sources of religious advice.[801] I also examined the proportion of people at each mosque in Astana and Almaty who reported using each type of religious advice The mosque with the highest proportion of people that sought out non-governmental sources in Almaty was surprisingly a government constructed mosques.[802]

[801] See Tables for proportion of people at government constructed and co-opted mosques in Astana and Almaty who consult governmental, non-governmental, and neutral religious sources.
[802] See Tables for the proportion at each mosque in Astana, Almaty, and Kazan.

Astana

The Kazakhstani regime shifted its policies on Islam in October of 2012 with the implementation of the law on religion in a bid to co-opt Islam. My first round of fieldwork was in the summer of 2013. Thus, the first set of data I collected about the effectiveness of these efforts was less than a year of implementation. The second round of fieldwork in Kazakhstan occurred in the summer of 2015, after two additional years of implementation. While there is no available data prior to the implementation of the law, this time series does provide some data to examine effectiveness over time.

Given the intensive efforts by the Kazakhstani regime, one would expect an increase in the proportion of people who consulted governmental religious sources at both government constructed and co-opted mosques between 2013 and 2015. Additionally, one would expect the proportion of people who consulted non-governmental sources to decrease at both types of mosques. As above, one would also anticipate that more people at government constructed mosques would consult governmental sources than people at co-opted mosques. Similarly, one would expect more people at co-opted mosques to consult non-governmental sources than people at government constructed mosques.

There was a gradual increase in the proportion of people who reported consulting governmental sources at government constructed mosques between 2013 and 2015 (by 5 percent). There was also almost a three-fold increase in the proportion of people at government constructed mosques who consulted non-governmental religious sources between 2013 and 2015. Inversely, the proportion of people at co-opted mosques who reported consulting both governmental and non-governmental sources reduced between 2013 and 2015.

Figure 6. Astana: Religious Advice at Government Constructed Mosques in 2013 & 2015



In favor of null: $\log_e(BF_{01}) = -0.46$, sampling = independent multinomial, $a = 1.00$

Figure 7. Astana: Religious Advice at Co-opted Mosques in 2013 & 2015



In favor of null: $\log_e(BF_{01}) = -1.20$, sampling = independent multinomial, $a = 1.00$

Zooming in further to each of the four mosques in Astana I was able to conduct interviews at in both 2013 and 2015,[803] cross cutting trends are also observed.

[803] Mosque A8 did not exist in 2013

At one government constructed Mosque A1, the proportion of people who reported consulting non-governmental sources more than doubled. One in four people at Mosque A3 (a co-opted mosque) reported using non-governmental sources in 2013. In 2015, only five percent stated that they consulted non-governmental sources.

***Table* 3. Mosques in Astana: Religious Advice in 2013 & 2015**

	Religious Advice 2013				**Religious Advice 2015**			
Mosque	Gov.	Non-Gov.	Neutral	**Total 2013**	Gov.	Non-Gov.	Neutral	**Total 2015**
Mosque A1	55%	7%	38%	29	65%	15%	19%	26
Mosque A2	71%	7%	21%	14[1]	69%	8%	23%	13
Mosque A3	58%	25%	17%	12	58%	5%	37%	19
Mosque A6	60%	20%	20%	5	50%	13%	38%	8

Overall, while there was a steady increase in the proportion of people who reported consulting governmental sources, a higher proportion of people in Astana reported using non-governmental sources at government constructed mosques in 2015 than in 2013 and less people at co-opted mosques reported using governmental sources and non-governmental sources in 2015 than in 2013.

Co-opted and Government Constructed Mosques in Tatarstan

In Tatarstan I conducted 121 interviews—29 were at government constructed mosques and 92 were at co-opted mosques.[804] As in Kazakhstan, given co-opted mosques were previously independent and then co-opted into SAMK, while government constructed mosques were always under the direct control of SAMK, one would anticipate that co-opted mosques would have a higher proportion of people who did not consult government religious sources.

In Tatarstan, a higher proportion of people at governmental constructed mosques reported consulting governmental religious sources as expected. However, more people at government constructed mosques also consulted reported using non-

[804] Ten interviews are excluded from this analysis, as the interviewees declined to continue answering questions or the response given could not be categorized.

governmental sources. As with Kazakhstan, some initially unexpected patterns showed up. The imam of Mosque C2 is the Head of Propaganda for SAM RT. Despite this, Mosque C2 also had the second most people say they used non-governmental sources— a fourth of people at Mosque C2 stated they consulted non-governmental resources (Table 4). At both governmentally constructed mosques, Mosques C1 and C2, the least amount of people consulted neutral sources. Notably, Mosque C5 was an outlier mosque, where only 18 percent of people reported consulting governmental resources—the lowest proportion of any mosque in either Tatarstan or Kazakhstan.

Figure 8. Tatarstan: Religious Advice at Government Constructed and Co-opted Mosques



Table 4. Mosques in Kazan

		Religious Advice			
Mosque	**Mosque Type**	**Governmental**	**Non-Governmental**	**Neutral**	**Total**
Mosque C1	Government Constructed	87%	7%	7%	15
Mosque C2	Government Constructed	67%	25%	8%	12
Mosque C3	Co-opted	59%	7%	33%	27
Mosque C4	Co-opted	57%	7%	*37%*	*30*
Mosque C5	Co-opted	18%	18%	64%	11
Mosque C6	Co-opted	71%	14%	14%	7
Mosque C7	Co-opted	50%	25%	25%	4
Mosque C8	Co-opted	43%	0%	57%	7
Total					113

These results can be partially explained by the ethnic and gender identity of the interviewee as well as whether they go to mosque and how often. These results also point to a different understanding of the role of the mosque in religious practice. This is examined in the Mosque Network and Role of Mosque sections below.

Religious Resources and the Effects of Ethnicity, Age, Attendance Frequency, and Gender

To further to explore why some Muslims consult governmental and non-governmental sources, I examine whether a relationship can be established between the type of religious advice a person uses and their ethnic identity, age, how frequently they go to a mosque, gender, profession, and region where they were born.[805]

Ethnicity

The nation building efforts in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan prioritize ethnic Tatars and Kazakhs. In Kazakhstan, mosques that were founded by ethnic minority communities have not been allowed to retain their own imams. At the three mosques founded by ethnic minority communities that I conducted interviews at, each had an imam appointed by SAMK that was not from the majority ethnic group of that particular mosque. Some limited language concessions have been made at these mosques— the messages as of 2015 are allowed to be in Russian (instead of only Kazakh), though not in other languages. In Kazan, no mosques were founded by ethnic minority communities. Additionally, all Friday messages must be in Tatar.

In Tatarstan, about a third of ethnic minorities reported consulting governmental sources compared to about half of ethnic Tatars. Moreover, ethnic

[805] Profession and region where someone was born (within Kazakhstan and Russia) as well as foreign countries did not significantly affect which type of religious source someone used. These two variables are examined in the Methodology Appendix.

minorities were six times more likely to report using non-governmental sources in Tatarstan. In Kazakhstan there was little difference between ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic minorities in the proportion of people who reported using governmental, non-governmental, or neutral sources. However, when breaking down the results by year, we find that 68 percent of ethnic Kazakhs in both in 2013 and 2015 reported consulting governmental sources. On the other hand, in 2013 half of ethnic minorities reported using governmental sources and a fourth reported using non-governmental sources. In 2015, the proportion of ethnic minorities who reported using governmental sources increased to 68 percent, and only 8 percent reported using non-governmental sources. These changes in Kazakhstan are likely due to the language accommodations in 2015 (that were not present in 2013).

Figure 9. Kazakhstan: Ethnicity and Religious Advice



Figure 10. Tatarstan: Ethnicity and Religious Advice



Thus, the co-optation efforts of the titular ethnicity in Tatarstan were more effective relative to non-titular ethnic groups, as expected. In both cases, ethnic Kazakh and Tatar interviewees frequently invoked their nationality as a rationale for using governmental sources. These narratives are examined in Chapter Seven. On the other hand, non-ethnic Kazakhs and Tatars did not frequently invoke their nationality or ethnicity for why they consulted the religious sources they cited, likely due to the sensitivity of the topic. The emphasis on the Kazakh and Tatar part of the national religious identity being constructed may lead to further alienation among ethnic minorities. Thus far, Kazakhstan has mitigated this by course correcting and granting limited language concessions. If Tatarstan does not learn from its neighbor, this may pose a problem for the regime's legitimacy as a lack of accommodations appears to lead to resentment as the data from Kazakhstan in 2013 suggests. However, this will likely be mitigated by the use of a quasi-governmental agency—wherein the lack of accommodations is attributed to the "muftiate" rather than either regime directly.

Age

Young people are a source of concern for any regime, and in particular authoritarian regimes, given the potential for young people to both provide potential force to overthrow a regime as well as influence future generations. Thus, the proportion that rely on governmental or non-governmental advice is of interest to the regime. Young people frequently to mosques in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan. As part of a generation born during the end of or after the Soviet Union, their religious identity has been and is being shaped in a different environment. Given this limited direct experience with the Soviet Union, younger people in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan may not inherently perceive governmental sources of religious advice as authoritative.

In Kazakhstan, the median age of Muslims at mosques who reported using each type of religious advice (governmental, non-governmental, and neutral) was exactly 30. At markets, Muslims who cited consulting non-governmental sources were older than Muslims who cited consulting governmental sources. (Table 6). In Tatarstan, the median age of Muslims of Muslims at mosques who reported consulting non-governmental sources was more than 10 years younger than those who reported consulting governmental sources (Table 5).

Table 5. Kazakhstan and Tatarstan: Mean and Median Age and Religious Advice at Mosques

	Kazakhstan		Tatarstan	
Religious Source	**Mean**	**Median**	**Mean**	**Median**
Governmental Religious Source	33.7	30	44.7	40
Non-governmental Religious Source	32.9	30	31.9	28
Neutral Religious Source	32.6	30	49.1	48

Table 6. Kazakhstan and Tatarstan: Mean and Median Age and Religious Advice at Markets

	Kazakhstan		Tatarstan	
Religious Source	**Mean**	**Median**	**Mean**	**Median**
Governmental Religious Source	38.2	36.5	44.8	42.5
Non-governmental Religious Source	44.8	50	NA	NA
Neutral Religious Source	366	29.5	31.6	27

Overall, there was a greater disparity in age in Tatarstan than in Kazakhstan.[806] Contrary to our expectation, Kazakhstani youth were not more likely to report using non-governmental sources. The ability in the 2000s of Astana to engage in more intensive co-optation relative to Kazan may be responsible for the association of religious authority and governmental sources among younger people in Kazakhstan.

Attendance Frequency

Among those who go to mosques more frequently, one would expect a lower proportion of people to consult neutral sources. These people, due to their attendance frequency, would be more likely to know if mosques have been co-opted and have also been more likely to exposed to government sources and therefore developed views on how authoritative these sources are. I would also expect people who go to mosques more frequently to rely more on governmental resources given they are more likely to be exposed to co-optation efforts. Likewise, one would expect people who do not go to mosque to be the most likely to use non-governmental sources, given the lack of exposure as well as the possibility that this segment perceives mosques and imams associated with SAMK or SAM RT to be unauthoritative.

[806] The length of time a person went to a mosque was not substantially different among people who consulted governmental, non-governmental or neutral sources. In Kazakhstan, the mean length of time for each advice category was: 9.84, 10.9, and 10.6 respectively. In Tatarstan, the mean length of time was 18.8, 11.4, and 14.5

Figure 11. Kazakhstan: Attendance Frequency and Religious Advice

$\chi^2_{Pearson}(4) = 16.97$, $p = 0.002$, $V_{Cramer} = 0.15$, $CI_{95\%}$ [0.06, 0.20], $n_{obs} = 395$



In favor of null: $\log_e(BF_{01}) = -0.31$, sampling = independent multinomial, $a = 1.00$

In line with this expectation, people who reported not going to mosques in Kazakhstan were more than twice as likely to report using non-governmental religious sources than people who reported never going to mosques or going less than once a week. A plurality of each attendance category in Kazakhstan reporting using governmental sources, though people who said that they went to mosques once a week or more were about 20 percent more likely to report using governmental sources. Only a third of people who said they never go to mosques reported using neutral sources, which is less than expected.

Figure 12. Tatarstan: Attendance Frequency and Religious Advice

$\chi^2_{Pearson}(4) = 26.02$, $p = < 0.001$, $V_{Cramer} = 0.28$, $CI_{95\%}$ [0.19, 0.36], $n_{obs} = 166$



In favor of null: $\log_e(BF_{01}) = -6.78$, sampling = independent multinomial, $a = 1.00$

In Tatarstan, a majority of people who reported going to mosque once a week or more also reported using governmental source as anticipated. Additionally, most people who reported never going to mosques also said they consulted neutral sources. This population, as expected, likely had less concrete views on religious sources given they are not as personally invested in religious matters. Overall, the data supports my initial hypothesis that increased mosque attendance would be associated with an increased likelihood to report using governmental sources of religious guidance.

Gender

Given women are less likely to go to mosques, one would expect that they would be less likely to be exposed to co-optation efforts, and therefore less likely than men to consult governmental sources. Among men and women interviewed at mosques, one would not expect to see a significant difference in the type of religious source consulted.

At mosques in Kazakhstan, there were not significant differences based on gender in the proportion of people who cited using each type of religious source as anticipated. Among the general population (at markets) men were more likely than women to say they consulted governmental sources in Kazakhstan, though a majority of both men and women reported consulting governmental sources of religious information.

Figure 13. Mosques in Kazakhstan: Gender and Religious Advice



In favor of null: $\log_e(BF_{01}) = 3.10$, sampling = independent multinomial, $a = 1.00$

Figure 14. Markets in Kazakhstan: Gender and Religious Advice



In favor of null: $\log_e(BF_{01}) = 0.53$, sampling = independent multinomial, $a = 1.00$

Figure 15. Mosques in Tatarstan: Gender and Religious Advice

$\chi^2_{Pearson}(2) = 4.31$, $p = 0.116$, $V_{Cramer} = 0.20$, $CI_{95\%}$ [0.10, 0.26], $n_{obs} = 113$



In favor of null: $\log_e(BF_{01}) = 0.41$, sampling = independent multinomial, $a = 1.00$

Figure 16. Markets in Tatarstan: Gender and Religious Advice

$\chi^2_{Pearson}(2) = 0.91$, $p = 0.636$, $V_{Cramer} = 0.12$, $CI_{95\%}$ [-0.07, 0.23], $n_{obs} = 62$



In favor of null: $\log_e(BF_{01}) = 1.07$, sampling = independent multinomial, $a = 1.00$

Similar proportions of men and women at markets in Tatarstan reported consulting each type of religious source. At mosques in Tatarstan, no women cited using non-governmental sources, compared to 14 percent of men. The dearth of

women at mosques who cited using non-governmental sources is likely due to more educational resources, particularly classes, being available for women at mosques in Tatarstan. Religious classes for women were more readily available in Kazan. Classes inherently involve more contact with imams and/or other employees at the mosque. The reasons for why people, including why women, come to mosques is examined in the next chapter.

Network Analysis of Reported Mosque Attendance

I asked interviewees at mosques which mosques they attended. I also asked people at markets if they went to a place of worship, and if so, which ones. Reported attendance at mosques is assessed in order to determine the degree of attendance linkages between co-opted and government constructed in each city. My initial theory was that a higher degree of attendance linkages between co-opted mosques and government constructed mosques is indicative of more effective co-optation. Along this line of thought, if people at co-opted mosque also reported going to government constructed mosques, they would be more likely to be exposed to government sources of religion. Senior members of government constructed mosques in each city held dual positions at SAMK and SAMRT. While all co-opted mosques are in SAM, no imams at any co-opted mosques hold positions in SAM. Alternatively, I initially posited that a lower degree of linkage between a co-opted mosque and government constructed mosques would be indicative of less successful co-optation at co-opted mosque.

Below is a network visual of reported mosque attendance among interviewees at mosques in each city. Mosques A represents Astana, Mosques B depicts mosques in Almaty, and Mosques C are in Kazan. These network visuals were generated with

R.[807] A node or actor is a social entity, such as a person, organization or city.[808] In the network graph of Astana, there are 7 nodes or mosques (Mosque A1 and A2 are government constructed and Mosques A3, A4, A5 and A6 , A7 and A8 are co-opted mosques). An edge (tie, link or line) is the relationship among nodes.[809] Edges in the case presented here are the attendance links between the mosques (or lines drawn between mosques). For example, if I interviewed someone at Mosque A1 who said that they also went to Mosque A2 and Mosque A3 each mosque would be a node. The edges would be between Mosque A1 and Mosque A2, Mosque A1 and Mosque A3.[810]

In the network displayed below, the links (in this case links between mosques in terms of attendance) are weighted. For example, if one were analyzing a mobile phone network, the network would be weighted by the number of calls between two users.[811] In the case presented here, the links (or lines) between mosques are proportional in size to the number of linkages between the mosques.

Astana

In Astana, Mosques A1, A2 and A8 are government constructed. Mosques A3, A4, A5, A6, A7 are co-opted mosques. This represents the universe of mosques in Astana. There was a high level of co-attendance between the two largest government constructed mosques, Mosques A1 and Mosque A2 as expected. There was also a high level of co-attendance between co-opted Mosque A5 and government

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[807] Using the developer version of tidy. "Tidyr."
[808] Wasserman and Faust, *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*, 17-18.
[809] Wasserman and Faust, *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*, 18.
[810] One interviewee reported attending mosques in more than one city, hence the edge between mosques in Almaty and Kazan.
[811] Vincent D. Blondel et al, Fast Unfolding of Communities in Large Networks," 2.

constructed Mosque A1 and between Mosque B5 and government constructed Mosque A2.[812]

Attendees at Mosques A4 also frequently reported going to government constructed Mosques A1 and A2. However, Mosque A4 had the highest proportion of people among co-opted mosques who reported using non-governmental sources.[813] This was the mosque that also previously had an imam who self-identified as Salafi. If we still assumed that a high level of attendance linkages between co-opted mosques and government constructed mosques indicated more effective co-optation, these data pointes are contradictory. One would expect a co-opted mosque where a higher proportion of people report using non-government sources to have lower attendance linkages with government mosques.

Almaty

In Almaty, Mosques B1 and B8 are the only government constructed mosques. I conducted interviews at Mosques B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, and B8. Mosques B1 through B7 were randomly selected from different rayons. Mosque B8 is the Central Mosque of Almaty and was intentionally included in the sample. There are over 50 mosques in Almaty. Not all mosques in Almaty are depicted in the graph because I only asked people at Mosques B1 through B8 which mosques they attended, and their responses are represented in the graph.

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[812] Co-opted Mosque A7 was the only mosque that did not have reported attendance linkages at other mosques (and hence is not depicted in the network graph). Mosque A7 as discussed in Chapter 2 was very sparsely attended—the imam said that only a handful of people came during the evening prayer, which was in line with my own observations. I did not obtain enough interviews to determine the proportion of people who reported using governmental., non-governmental, or neutral sources.

[813] Twenty-one percent of Muslims at Mosque A4 reported using non-governmental sources. See Methodology Appendix.

Mosques B1 and B8 were highly linked with co-opted mosques in Almaty. However, government constructed Mosque B1 was tied with Mosque B7 for the mosque with the highest proportion of people who reported using non-governmental sources (7 percent). Additionally, no one at Mosque B6 reported attending other mosques, which I initially thought would be indicative of a low level of co-optation. However, no one at Mosque B6 reported using non-governmental sources. Eighty-two percent of people at Mosque B6 reported using governmental sources, while 18 percent reported using neutral sources.[814]

Kazan

In Kazan, there are over 50 mosques and I conducted interviews at Mosques C1 through C9. Mosques C1 and C2 are government constructed, while the rest of the mosques are co-opted. Mosques C2 through C9 were randomly selected, each from a separate rayon. Marjani mosque, Mosque C1, is the main mosque of Kazan and was intentionally include in the sample.

There is a high proportion of reported linkages between the government constructed mosques. Mosque C5 was an outlier mosque where almost a fifth of Muslims reported using non-governmental sources and only about a fifth reported using governmental sources.[815] However, people at this mosque also reported attending Mosque C1 and Mosque C2.

[814] See Methodology Appendix for a breakdown of each mosque in Almaty.
[815] See Methodology Appendix for a breakdown of each mosque in Kazan.

Figure 17. Shared Attendance between Mosques



Overall, there is a high level of attendance linkages among government constructed and co-opted mosques. At first glance this supports my initial assumption that a higher degree of linkages between co-opted mosques and government constructed mosque is indicative of more effective co-optation. This finding would align with the high proportion of people in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan who reported using governmental sources.

However, there are also high degrees of attendance linkages between co-opted mosques where a higher proportion of people reported using non-governmental sources and governmental mosques. Moreover, in some cites the mosques with the highest reported proportion of people who used non-governmental sources were government mosques themselves. In order to explain this phenomenon, this chapter also investigates how people perceive the role of the mosque in by examining how people decide on which mosque to go to as well as why they go to a mosque.

The Role of the Mosque

Mosque Selection

I asked all Muslim respondents if they went to a mosque, and if they went to mosques, which mosques they went to and how they choose mosques. This open question allowed for interviewees to cite more than one reason. I also compared the reasons people I interviewed at government constructed mosques and co-opted mosques provided when discussing how they chose mosques. Most people in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan chose mosques for mundane reasons, particularly the convenience of the mosque location. In Tatarstan, the availability of educational opportunities also played a role.

Government Constructed or Co-opted Mosques

Among all Muslims I interviewed (both at mosques and markets) in Kazakhstan, 76 percent said the location of a mosque was the most important factor in how they decided on a mosque. The second most common reason people selected a mosque in Kazakhstan was because of the maintenance or aesthetics of the mosque (seven percent) including the upkeep of the mosque, cleanliness, and architecture.

At both government constructed and co-opted mosques in Kazakhstan, the location of the mosque was cited by about three quarters of interviewees as how they decided between mosques (Table 7). The second most frequently cited reason at government constructed mosques was the maintenance and upkeep of the mosque, compared to one percent of people at co-opted mosque.

Table 7. Kazakhstan: Reasons for Selecting Mosque

Mosque Selection	Government Constructed	Co-opted
Location	73%	83%
Maintenance/Amenities	15%	3%
Language	0%	2%
Religious Leader	3%	2%
Safety	2%	2%
SAM	3%	1%
Education	2%	1%
Community	0%	4%
Accessibility	1%	0%
Friday Message	0%	1%
Historical Importance	0%	0%
Sound of Azan	1%	0%
Sunni	1%	0%
Total	107	137
This question was not included in 2013 interviews.		

About the same proportion of interviewees at government constructed and co-opted mosques selected which mosque to go to because of the religious leader at the mosque (the imam, or the mullah in Kazakhstan and hazret in Tatarstan). A mosque's relationship to SAMK was rarely cited. Three percent of people at government constructed mosques were aware that the mosque was affiliated with SAMK and specifically went to that mosque because of it (compared to one percent at co-opted mosques).

About two percent Muslims at government constructed and co-opted mosques went to certain mosques because they cited fearing for their safety at other mosques. Two percent of people went to co-opted mosques because of language accommodations (no one cited this as a reason at government constructed mosques, where there are no language accommodations).

In Tatarstan, 63 percent of all Muslims (at mosques and markets) said that they selected a mosque based on its location. A majority of Muslims interviewed at both government constructed and co-opted mosques cited the location of the mosque (Table 8). At government constructed mosques the second most frequently cited reason was a religious leader of the mosque, most frequently the imam, but also the hazret. Only four percent of people at government constructed mosques cited the mosque's association with SAM RT as a reason to go to this mosque. No one at co-opted mosques specially referenced SAM RT. No interviewees at any mosques in Tatarstan cited safety as a reason to go to some mosques but not others, despite the higher prevalence of narratives about the "danger" inherent in Islam in Tatarstan spread by elites.

Table 8. Tatarstan: Reasons for Selecting Mosque

Mosque Selection	Government Constructed	Co-opted
Location	68%	64%
Maintenance/Amenities	8%	8%
Language	0%	0%
Religious leader	8%	1%
Safety	0%	0%
SAM	0%	1%
Education	4%	19%
Community	4%	5%
Accessibility	0%	1%
Friday Message	0%	0%
Historical Importance	8%	1%
Sound of Azan	0%	0%
Sunni	0%	0%
Total	26	80

Gender and Mosque Selection

Women in Tatarstan most frequently cited the availability of educational opportunities as how they selected mosques. Forty-four percent of women in Kazan

selected which mosque to go to because of the educational opportunities available to them. No men in Tatarstan cited educational opportunities as a factor in how they decided on mosques. At co-opted mosques, almost a quarter of interviewees in Tatarstan cited the availability of religious classes as how they select mosques. There was not a significant difference in the proportion of men and women who cited educational opportunities in Kazakhstan.[816]

Religious classes, particularly for women, were more readily available in Tatarstan than in Kazakhstan. Additionally, the disparity in educational resources wasn't as stark between government constructed and co-opted mosques in Tatarstan. Fifty-six percent of people who cited this reason were women at Mosque C3 and thirteen percent were women at Mosque C4, who specifically went to these mosques for its women's classes.[817] One government constructed mosque, Mosque C2, had classes for women. This class was aimed for young women who were not married and who wanted to be married. It covered gender relations, purification and hygiene rituals, and family relations. Mosque C4 had a more robust educational opportunities, including more classes and a greater emphasis on language skills, particularly Arabic. It was also attended by a different demographic, older women who had retired. In contrast, no women in in either Astana or Almaty cited educational opportunities as a reason to go to a particular mosque (and only one percent of men).

Previous Mosque Selection

I also asked people if they had previously attended other mosques (in the city where the interview took place), and if so, why they no longer went to those mosque(s). Fifty-nine percent of Muslims in Kazakhstan said that they had previously

[816] See Gender and Mosque Selection in Methodology Appendix.
[817] Sixteen percent of people in Tatarstan cited educational opportunities. Nine were women at Mosque C3, two were women at Mosque C4.

gone to other mosques.[818] Eighty-percent of people who acknowledged switching mosques said they switched due to the location.[819]

Sixty-two percent of Muslims in Tatarstan said they previously went to other mosques.[820] Of those who previously went to other mosques, about the same proportion as in Kazakhstan changed mosques because of the location (55 percent). Eleven percent said they previously went the mosque that was closed by the government in Kazan (whose imam was accused of being in Hizb ut-Tahir). These interviewees specifically named the mosque and elaborated that the government had closed the mosque.[821]

When looking at co-optation through the lens of mosque attendance networks and how people select which mosque to go, effective co-optation is not a laborious propaganda endeavor—but rather a large administrative project. The vast majority of Muslims in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan did not select mosques for theological reasons or due to differences between government constructed or co-opted mosques.[822] In both cases, men were most likely to select mosques based on location; this was the same for women in Kazakhstan. At the margins in Kazakhstan how well a mosque

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[818] Out of 129 people in Kazakhstan who stated that they had previously attended other mosques.
[819] See Methodology Appendix for breakdown of reasons why people switched mosques.
[820] One hundred of thirty-two people responded to the question about whether they had previously gone to other mosques. Thirty-eight people provided a reason for why they used to go to another mosque. Two interviews were ended by the interviewees before I could ask this question and one person's response couldn't be categorized because they were too vague. The low response rate to this question suggests that people declined due to the sensitivity of the question.
[821] See Hizb ut-Tahir section below for further discussion.
[822] This question was introduced during the second round of fieldwork in 2015. I also asked people how long they had been going to mosques. There was also not a difference between the reasons provided by people who said they had gone to mosques prior to SAMK's monopoly being established (2012), and those who said they had started going to mosques after 2012. See Methodology Appendix for breakdown.

was maintained was a factor in this decision process. The most common reason women in Tatarstan cited selecting a mosque was due to the availability of religious classes. In Tatarstan there was also some resentment of the government for closing a mosque among a minority segment of the population.

Reasons to go to Mosques

In order to understand the role of mosques in religious practice, it is pertinent to understand why people go to mosques. These reasons have implications for how effective the co-optation processes are in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan.[823] I asked people, "When you go to a mosque, why do you go?"[824]

In Kazakhstan, 65 percent of people went to a mosque to pray—35 percent to pray to God, 26 percent to read namaz, and 4 percent to pray with others in a group.[825] Fourteen percent went to a mosque because they believed it was their religious obligation.[826] Ten percent went to a mosque to read the Qur'an, which was frequently associated with a death in the family. Six percent of people went to a mosque after a death (less than one percent went for a birth). The same proportion went to mosque during a holiday, particularly Eid, and to a lesser extent for Ramadan. Ten percent of people sought to fulfill emotional needs—comfort (three percent), forgiveness for past wrongdoing (three percent) to, "feel clean," (two percent), and for their soul (two percent). Five percent went explicitly to hear the Friday message and one percent to speak with the imam.

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[823] This question was open ended and I allowed interviewees to cite more than one reason. See Tables for full breakdown total to more than 100 due to this overlap.
[824] Many interviewees cited more reason, hence the percentage totals to more than one hundred percent.
[825] Twenty-four percent of women and 30% of men.
[826] More men stated that they went to mosque because it was their obligation (19% of men compared to six percent of women).

In Tatarstan, 35 percent said they went to mosque to pray to God and 26 percent went to mosque to read namaz.[827] Twenty-four percent of people came for emotional and psychologic needs, including to find comfort (15 percent) and for their soul (nine percent). Eleven percent said they went to mosque because they understood it to be a religious obligation[828] and 10 percent went to mosques on holidays. Thirteen percent went to mosques to seek out knowledge, a theme also frequently employed the Kazakhstani regime. Obtaining knowledge, including learning Arabic, taking a course, or more broad efforts to obtain religious knowledge was more frequently cited by women—27 percent compared to four percent of men.

Chapters Two and There outlined how each regime attempted to co-opt Islam through the encapsulation of mosques. The encapsulation of mosques includes constructing governmental mosques, co-opting previously independent mosques, and creating a disparity in resources between governmental constructed and co-opted mosques. In Kazakhstan, this lack of funding for co-opted mosques, both for the maintenance of the mosque as well as for imams and employees' salaries, serves as a co-optation mechanism. This disparity is intended to incentivize people to go to government constructed mosques. However, most people in Kazakhstan, including both women and men, selected mosques based on the convenience of the mosque location. Mosque maintenance was only a factor at the margins. In Tatarstan, the availability of religious classes for women was the most common reason for selecting a specific mosque.

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[827] About 24 percent of women and 30 percent of men in Tatarstan went to a mosque to read namaz or to pray.

[828] Twelve percent of men and 7 percent of women cited "obligation" as a reason they went to mosque.

When examining the effectiveness of the encapsulation of mosques, it is also prudent to take into account why people go to mosques. In both cases, the plurality of people who did go to mosques, went to pray. People viewed mosques as a site to find solace for psychological and emotional needs and others came to the mosque to fulfil perceived religious obligations. In Tatarstan, seeking religious knowledge, particularly among women, was a motivation to go to mosques. In Tatarstan, about one in ten interviewees cited switching mosques because their mosque was closed by the government. This does point to the possibility some interviewees chose not to directly answer my question about mosque selection, and thus actual proportion may be higher.

Overall however, most people do not select mosques or go to mosques for theological or ideological reasons. This likely explains why there was not a clear pattern of a higher proportion of people at governmental constructed mosques consulting governmental religious sources, and people at co-opted mosques consulting non-governmental sources as highlighted in Chapter Six. Despite the lack of a relationship between mosque and religious source type, the majority of Muslims in Kazakhstan reported using governmental sources of religious advice and only a small minority reported using non-governmental sources in either case.

Conclusion

Chapters Two and Four examined how each regime co-opted Islam through a religious institution by trying to construct a religious monopoly enforced both by restrictions on other available religious sources and the creation of SAM religious sources. In order to examine the effectiveness of these monopolies, this chapter examined whether Muslims consulted governmental sources of religious advice or made the effort to reach outside of this monopoly (or alternatively consulted just

neutral sources like family members or religious texts). It compared the effectiveness of these efforts between the general population (at markets) and at mosques and then been government constructed and co-opted mosques. Additionally, this chapter triangulated measuring effectiveness by examining a network analysis of reported mosque attendance. The proportion of Muslims at mosques and markets who reported using governmental or non-governmental sources of religious information and reported mosque attendance was then contextualized by examining why people say they go to mosques and how they select mosques.

This chapter first outlined how my samples compared to other available data on Kazakhstan and Tatarstan in regard to ethnic identity, religious identity, age, mosque attendance and attendance frequency, gender, region of birth, and profession.[829] It then compared the demographic makeup of samples at markets (the sample meant to approximate the general population) to the population of people who go to mosques. The data presented is the thus far the only data set to examine the demographics of people at mosques in either Kazakhstan and Tatarstan and one of the few studies to examine the religious practices of people in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan.

Overall, the majority of Muslims in Kazakhstan (at mosques and markets) reported consulting governmental sources of religious advice, while only the majority at mosques in Tatarstan reported consulting governmental sources of religious advice. The majority of Muslims at markets in Tatarstan stated that they consulted neutral sources. Overall, co-optation efforts in Kazakhstan are more effective relative to Tatarstan. Among the general population less than a third of Muslims reported using religious sources associated with the Tatar regime. Given Tatarstan's previously

[829] The latter two are examined in the Methodology Appendix and were not significant.

robust nationalist movement, particularly in comparison to Kazakhstan, the fact that less than a third of Muslims in the general population in Tatarstan report using government sources points to a weakening relationship between the regime and perceived religious authority. As originally hypothesized and examined in Chapter 3, this is likely due to Tatarstan's limited authoritarian toolbox as it must formally comply with national law. On the other hand, Kazakhstan is a state that was granted independence without any revolution or initial nationalist movement. Despite this initial inertia, Kazakhstan does not have to contend with enforcing boundary control and thus its ability to implement cooption mechanisms is not impeded, as outlined in Chapter Two.

In neither case did a significant majority seek out non-governmental sources. This may due in part due to the lack of religious alternatives, not just the persuasiveness of each regime to portray SAMK and SAM RT as the religious authority in each case. Similarly, while Putin and Nazarbayev have had high approval ratings (despite election and polling manipulation), this is likely due in part due to a lack of perceived viable alternatives.

Unexpected relationships were unveiled between mosque type and type of religious guidance. In Kazakhstan, there was not a significant difference in the proportion of Muslims at co-opted and government constructed mosques who consulted each type of religious source. In Tatarstan, people at government constructed mosques consulted both more governmental sources and non-governmental. In Astana, overall there was not a significant difference in the proportion of advice type people consulted over time. However, when narrowing the analysis, more people at government constructed mosques in 2015 consulted non-

governmental sources than in 2013, and less people at co-opted mosques reported using both governmental and non-governmental sources.

Unexpected patterns were also revealed by a network analysis of reported mosque attendance. There was a high degree of reported linkages between government constructed and co-opted mosques. This was in line with my original assumption that a high degree of reported linkages between mosque types was indicative of a high level of co-optation. However, co-opted mosques with a high proportion of people who reported using non-governmental sources also had a high degree of linkage with government constructed mosques.

These results raise questions about the premise that there would be a difference in who goes to government constructed and co-opted mosques. I had assumed that people at government constructed mosques would be more likely to consult governmental sources, while people at non-governmental mosques would be more likely to consult non-governmental sources.

In order to understand these patterns, one of my interview questions asked people how they selected mosques. Chapters Two and Three detailed the intensive process to co-opt mosques in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan. In Kazakhstan this particularly manifested in a greater resource disparity between governmental and non-governmental mosques. However, the majority of people in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan chose a mosque based on convenience— where it was located. In instances where people had switched which mosques(s) they went to, the majority also cited the location of the mosque as a reason to change.

In Tatarstan, educational opportunities for women did make a difference for a sector of the population in how they decided on which mosque. Kazakhstan has not offered similar level of educational opportunities, notably religious classes. On the

other hand, there was a larger disparity in the upkeep and maintenance between government constructed and co-opted mosques in Kazakhstan than in Tatarstan, which was also reflected by a small proportion of interviewees who cited choosing better maintained government-constructed mosques. When people did decide to go to a mosque, the overwhelming majority in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan went to a mosque in order to pray or read namaz.

Moreover, I examined whether ethnicity, gender, age, mosque attendance and attendance frequency, region of birth, and profession influence whether someone consult governmental, non-governmental, or neutral sources of religious advice.[830] The titular ethnic group in in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan was much more likely to consult governmental sources than people outside of either majority ethnic group. Thus, while the co-optation efforts for the titular ethnic group were successful in both cases, in line with efforts to construct a national religious identity that is supportive of the regime, this may have also resulted in alienating ethnic minority communities.

How future generations perceive the relationship between Islam and the Kazakhstani and Tatar regime will have significant ramifications for each regime's legitimacy. Contrary to conventional theories, younger people are not less likely than older cohorts to go to mosques contrast to other regions of the world. In Tatarstan, younger Muslims were more likely to use non-governmental sources, but this was not significant in Kazakhstan. The Muslims I interviewed at mosques in Kazakhstan were also younger than in Tatarstan. Efforts to co-opt the youth have been more successful in Kazakhstan.

In both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan reporting going to a mosque more frequently is associated with a higher likelihood of reporting consulting governmental

[830] See Methodology Appendix for a discussion about region of birth and profession.

religious sources. In Kazakhstan, there was not a gendered difference in the proportion of men and women who reported using each type of religious source, while women are more likely at mosques in Tatarstan to report using governmental sources. There are also more incentives for women to go to mosques in Tatarstan, including educational resources.

Overall, co-optation efforts were more successful in Kazakhstan relative to Tatarstan as measured by the proportion of people who consulted governmental sources at mosques and markets. In the most targeted population, people at mosques, both regimes achieved a high level of success in that the majority of Muslims at mosques reported using governmental sources. Chapter Seven examines more closely the types of governmental sources people reported using, including whether a religious source's relationship to SAMK or SAM RT is readily apparently. Chapter Three and Five examined the narratives deployed by each regime to securitize Islam and link the protection of a national religious identity to the regime. Chapter Seven also examines the effectiveness of these efforts by assessing why people report choosing governmental or non-governmental sources of information. It analyzes the degree to which the narratives deployed by each regime are reflected by citizens.

Chapter Seven Narratives and Religious Authority in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan

Introduction

The previous chapter established that the majority of Muslims at mosques in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan and the majority of Muslims in general in Kazakhstan relied on governmental religious sources. Only a minority used non-governmental sources. Thus, most Muslims imbue SAMK and SAM RT sources with religious authority. Chapter Seven investigates individual level perceptions about religious authority in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan. It investigates where individual Muslims vest religious authority and the narratives used by ordinary Muslims to justify why the religious sources they use are authoritative.

More specially, this chapter first examines in more detail whom or what people consult for religious advice. It identifies what types of governmental, non-governmental, and neutral sources people use, such as seeking advice from people, the Internet, books, or other sources. It also examines changes over time in Astana in the types of sources people consulted in 2013 and 2015. Moreover, I examine how readily apparent SAM's relationship is to governmental sources and compare the proportion of people who use governmental sources explicitly linked to SAM to the proportion of people who use governmental sources whose relationship to SAM is more concealed. Lastly, this chapter further triangulates the effectiveness of the regime's efforts to co-opt Islam by assessing the narratives used by individuals in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan to justify why they found the religious sources they used authoritative, and the degree to which they reflect to narratives used by each regime to link Islam to the state.

Given Kazakhstan's lack of constraints from a higher governmental power, we could expect more people to rely upon governmental sources in Kazakhstan, including governmental sources that are explicitly linked to SAM, than in Tatarstan. Additionally, given the inherent danger of deploying securitization narratives in Tatarstan—as this may impede Kazan's boundary control efforts—we would also expect a higher proportion of Muslims in Kazakhstan to use securitization narratives to justify their selection in religious advice when compared to Tatarstan. As expected, a higher proportion of Muslims in Kazakhstan reported using both governmental sources and governmental sources explicitly linked to SAMK. However, in neither Kazakhstan nor Tatarstan did a majority of Muslims utilize securitization narratives to justify the religious sources they reported using. Additionally, there was not a significant difference between the proportion of Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan who used narratives about securitization and identity to justify using governmental sources.

Religious Authority

Sources of Religious Advice

When people consulted governmental and non-governmental sources, whom or what did they consult? I first examine whether people reported consulting other people, books, Internet websites, or other sources. Secondly, I examine what kinds of governmental sources people reported using and their relationship to SAMK and SAM RT. Lastly, changes over time in the types of religious sources people reported using in Astana are examined.

Given the restrictions on religious sources, one would expect that there would be a relatively high level of reliance on the Internet (compared to people, books, or other sources) among people who report using non-governmental sources. Searching

for answers from non-governmental sources on the Internet would also be the least time intensive. It wouldn't entail creating a network of people to consult underground domestically or aboard or trying to find literature that is either banned in the case of Kazakhstan or difficult to access in the case of Tatarstan. For context, the Internet penetration rate is relatively high in both countries—76.8 percent in Kazakhstan and 76.4 percent in Russia according to Freedom House.[831] Despite this, most people who reported consulting governmental, non-governmental, and neutral sources, reported consulting other people [832]

As discussed in Chapter Three and Five, both SAMK and SAM RT have sought to encapsulate Islam through the production of religious sources and restrictions on other sources. Among governmental sources, some sources are explicitly tied to SAM, such as the head of SAM, the mufti. Additionally, for example, books produced and books approved by SAM in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan bear a SAM stamp of approval. Notably, interviewees in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan who referenced SAMK and SAM RT referred to these institutions as the, "muftiate," and rarely referred to either institution by their official names. As previously discussed, the use of the term, "muftiate," has a broader religious connotation and is devoid of the Soviet connotations of SAMK and SAM RT's

[831] "Freedom on the Net 2017: Kazakhstan Country Profile," 2; "Freedom on the Net 2017: Russia Country Report," 3. I have not found an Internet penetration rate specific to Tatarstan.

[832] In 2017 Kazakhstan passed a law mandating that all comments on websites be identifiable via text message verification or digital signature. Additionally in 2017, a government regulation allowed for the National Security Committee to control Kazakhstan's telecommunications network (including the Internet). Baidildayeva, "Internet Censorship in Kazakhstan: More Pervasive than You May Think." In 2019, the Duma adopted legislation that includes a new censorship program that includes banning "disloyal VPNs". "Russian Lawmakers Have Adopted the Final Version of New 'Internet Isolation' Legislation. Here's How It's Supposed to Work."

predecessor institution. While these sources are explicitly tied to SAM, they are not explicitly linked to either the Kazakhstani or Tatar government.

Alternatively, the co-optation of other religious sources by SAM is not explicit or as readily apparent to the public. For example, it is not publicly advertised that the appointments of all imams in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan are determined by SAM or that madrasahs are also under the control of SAM. Similarly, there is no public announcement or reporting about how SAM produces and disseminates the Friday message at every single mosque within Tatarstan and Kazakhstan. The majority of Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan reported consulting SAM sources that are not explicitly associated with SAM. In Kazakhstan, over a third of Muslims interviewed reported using explicit SAMK sources. On the other hand, only 10 percent of Muslims in Tatarstan reported using explicit SAM RT sources.

Types of Religious Sources

As discussed in Chapter Six, I asked people whom or what they consulted for religious advice. [833] Similar proportions of Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan reported consulting people, books, the Internet, and/or other sources.[834] Around three fourths of interviewees stated that they consulted people and about half said that they read books.[835] About a third of interviewees in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan reported consulting websites.[836]

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[833] Unlike the previous chapter, the responses here are not weighted. For example, if a person consulted a governmental website and a neutral book, in the previous chapter I coded the response as Governmental. In this chapter each source cited is examined. See Methodology Appendix for more details

[834] See Methodology Appendix.

[835] Eighty percent of Muslims interviewed in Kazakhstan reported consulting other people and 74 percent of Muslims interviewed in Tatarstan reported consulting other people. This data is from interviews at both mosques and markets.

[836] See Tables for exact proportion of people in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan who said they consulted people, books, Internet websites, and other sources.

In both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan Muslims who reported consulting either governmental or non-governmental religious sources most frequently reported consulting other people. Among people in Kazakhstan who reported using non-governmental sources, only six percent reported going online for advice—all of whom specifically cited Salafi websites that are in Russian. In Tatarstan, 15 percent of people who consulted non-governmental websites said they used websites. Half of the interviewees in Tatarstan that reported using non-governmental websites reported using a Salafi website, while the other half reported using a website, "…from Dagestan."[837] Thus, the sub-section of people using online non-governmental sources in both cases differed ideologically from SAM and sought out other religious authorities.

Table 1. Kazakhstan: Religious Sources and Type of Religious Advice					
Religious Source	Person	Books	Internet	Other	Total
Governmental	77%	22%	31%	31%	301
Non-governmental	68%	4%	6%	4%	34

Table 2. Tatarstan: Religious Sources and Type of Religious Advice					
Religious Source	Person	Books	Internet	Other	Total
Governmental	84%	23%	13%	35%	80
Non-governmental	46%	15%	15%	8%	13

As non-governmental sources are intentionally harder to access, it's interesting that a higher proportion of people did not seek out non-governmental sources on the Internet, particularly in Kazakhstan where the co-optation mechanisms are more extensive. Despite this, people who cited using non-governmental sources often discussed specific people they contacted, most frequently in Saudi Arabia. They further described directly speaking to these contacts and fostering a personal relationship. Similarly, other interviewees viewed religious authority to be vested in Saudi Arabia, and thus consulted people who received religious education there but

[837] Interviewee 254, Tatarstan. The interviewee numbers in this chapter are randomized and do not correlate with the interview numbers assigned in the Bibliography.

whom no longer lived there. Thus, they did not simply view non-SAM sources as more authoritative, but also engaged in the time and effort to foster a personal relationship independent of this religious institution that holds a domestic monopoly. The narratives used by interviewees to justify why they used these sources is examined in the narratives section below.

Types of Governmental Religious Sources

Among the governmental sources people reported using, some were explicitly linked to SAM, while other sources' relationship to SAMK or SAM RT was not as readily evident. In Kazakhstan, among people who reported using government sources, 67 percent reported using a source that was not explicitly associated with SAMK. Among this type of SAMK source, consulting an imam was the most common. Ten percent read and bought books or other literature that was sold in the mosque or in a kiosk next to the mosque. By buying a book at a mosque, a person would be demonstrating they vested religious authority in a mosque, but it wouldn't be clear from this statement alone that the person realized the mosque's relationship to SAM.

Table 3. Governmental Sources and Relationship to SAM in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan

Types of Governmental Sources	Kazakhstan	Tatarstan
Religious Sources Explicitly Associated with SAM	35%	10%
SAM	5%	2%
SAM Book/magazine	3%	0%
SAM website	21%	7%
Books approved by SAM	3%	0%
Approved by SAM	1%	0%
SAM TV	2%	1%
SAM Religious Leaders	1%	0%
SAM Publishing House	Less than 1%	0
Sub total	*160*	*17*
Religious Sources Not Explicitly Associated with SAM	67%	57%
Imam	47%	20%
Mullah/hazret	2%	15%
Friday message	4%	1%
Books/brochures in/next to mosque	9%	7%
Class at mosque	Less than 1%	5%
Collective	0%	1%
Domestic religious university	1%	2%
Madrasah	1%	6%
Sub total	303	100
Total	452	176

Alternatively, 35 percent of people who cited governmental sources of religion in Kazakhstan cited a source that was excitedly linked to SAMK. Some interviewees specially named SAMK (five percent) or stated that they only use sources that were approved by SAM (one percent). Others specifically named books produced by SAM (three percent) or stated that they used a book because they knew it was approved by SAMK (three percent). Among religious sources with a readily evident relationship to SAMK, SAMK websites were the most commonly used source (21 percent).

In Tatarstan, over half of people who cited using governmental sources cited a source whose relationship be SAM RT is not readily apparent. Consulting imam was also the most common source among potential sources whose relationship with SAM RT is not explicit. Consulting a hazret/mullah was the second most common reported choice (15 percent), which was cited more frequently than in Kazakhstan.

Only 10 percent of people who reported using governmental sources in Tatarstan, used a source that was explicitly linked to SAM RT. Seven percent of whom cited using SAM RT websites, notably *Islam Today* and *Islam Review*. Three times as many Muslims reported using used governmental websites in Kazakhstan than in Tatarstan. While *Islam Today* and *Islam Review* have more robust funding than SAMK websites in Kazakhstan, they are not as well promoted compared to SAMK websites in Kazakhstan, where most mosques in Astana have the website addresses painted on the walls. The difference in the proportion of people who consult governmental websites is likely reflective of this.

Among all Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, most people reported relying on other people for religious advice. A surprisingly low percentage of people who report using non-governmental sources reported using the Internet to find answers to religious questions. Most who did cite using a non-governmental website

discussed using Salafi websites. This indicates that a minority of people do not use SAMK or SAM RT sources for theological reasons. Overall, this indicative of an outcome that is desirable to each regime—a likely small percentage use non-governmental sources, while most people use governmental sources. In Kazakhstan, the regime has been more successful in building a religious institution that is perceived as authoritative— a third of Muslims in Kazakhstan reported using an explicit SAMK source, indicating that more people in Kazakhstan likely view SAMK as a religious authoritative compared to SAM RT in Tatarstan.

Types of Governmental and Non-Governmental Religious Sources in Astana Over Time

I conducted interviews at mosques in Astana in 2013 and mosques and markets in Astana in 2015.[838] To examine changes over time in the type of governmental sources people reported using (sources explicitly linked to SAMK and not explicitly linked to SAMK), I compare the answers given by interviewees at mosques in Astana in 2013 and 2015. I also examine changes in the proportion of people who reported consulting other people, books, the Internet, or other sources for religious advice over time.

As examined in Chapter Six, there was not a significant increase in the proportion of people in Astana who reported consulting governmental religious sources between 2013 and 2015. There was, however, a steady increase in the proportion of people who reported consulting explicit SAMK religious sources. Additionally, among people who reported using non-governmental sources, there was a significant decrease in the proportion of people who reported using websites.

[838] The demographics of people I interviewed at mosques in Astana in 2013 and 2015 were similar. See Methodology Appendix for more details.

In Astana the proportion of the proportion of people who reported utilizing explicit SAMK resources between 2013 and 2015 rose from 17 percent to 28 percent . This indicates that Muslims in Kazakhstan were increasingly aware of SAMK and/or increasingly viewed SAMK as authoritative. There was not a significant change in the proportion of Muslims who reported using governmental sources that were not explicitly linked to SAMK, but this was the most common governmental source in both 2013 and 2015.

Table 4. **Mosques in Astana: Governmental Sources and Relationship to SAMK Over Time**		
Types of Governmental Sources	**2013**	**2015**
Religious Sources Explicitly Associated with SAM	**17%**	**28%**
SAM	1%	5%
SAM Book/magazine/brochure	2%	3%
SAM website	14%	18%
Books approved by SAM	0%	0%
Approved by SAM	0%	1%
SAM TV	0%	0%
SAM Religious Leaders	0%	0%
SAM Publishing House	0%	1%
Subtotal	*18*	*22*
Religious Sources Not Explicitly Associated with SAM	**57%**	**59%**
Imam	43%	37 46%
Mullah/hazret	2%	1%
Friday message	2%	1%
Books/brochures in/next to mosque	7%	10%
Class at mosque	1%	0%
Collective (mahala)	NA	NA
Domestic religious university	0%	0 %
Madrasah	2%	0%
Subtotal	62	47
Total	109	80

Among Muslims at mosques in Astana who reported using non-governmental sources, the proportion who reported consulting non-governmental websites dropped from 15 percent to zero. Alternatively, while no one reported using non-governmental books in 2013, among Muslims at mosques in Astana who reported using non-governmental sources in 2015, 15 percent reported using books. This is an initially surprising result given the numerous restrictions on religious literature in Kazakhstan, which are laid out in the law and not solely enforced by SAMK. It is possible that Muslims who do not want to use governmental sources believe that using books is

less conspicuous—it doesn't leave an Internet trail, nor does it have to involve sustained contact with others.

Table 5. **Mosques in Astana: Types of Religious Advice Over Time**										
	Person		**Books**		**Internet**		**Other**		**Total**	
Religious Advice	2013	2015	2013	2015	2013	2015	2013	2015	2013	2015
Governmental	58%	51%	14%	15%	17%	19%	11%	15%	88	68
Non-governmental	69%	69%	0%	15%	15%	0%	13%	15%	13	13

The continued promotion of SAMK resources in Kazakhstan resulted in an increase in reported use of sources explicitly connected to SAMK. There was also a reduction in reported Internet usage to find non-governmental sources. This is reflective of the effectiveness of the Kazakhstani regime's efforts over time.

Most people in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan vested authority in other people. Among people who reported using governmental and non-governmental sources, most people reported consulting other people for religious advice. The reliance on other people remained steady overtime in Astana between 2013 and 2015. Among Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan who reported using non-governmental sources, a surprisingly low percentage reported using the Internet to seek religious advice given the high level of Internet penetration. In Astana, among Muslims who reported using non-governmental sources, there was a significant drop in the proportion of people who reported using the Internet. Among Muslims in both cases who did report using non-governmental websites, the majority reported visiting Salafi websites. While only a minority in either Kazakhstan or Tatarstan reported using non-governmental sources, the majority did so for theological reasons. The rationales provided to justify this deviation from SAMK and SAM RT is explored in the Narratives section below.

Among Muslims who reported consulting governmental sources of religious advice, a majority of Muslims in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan reported using SAM

sources that are not explicitly linked back to SAM. Thus, the majority of Muslims in both cases used sources that are from SAM, wherein this relationship is obscured.

In Kazakhstan, more Muslims reported using explicit SAMK resources than in Tatarstan—over a third compared to only 10 percent in Tatarstan. In Astana, there was a steady increase over time in the proportion of people who reported using explicit SAMK sources, while the proportion of people who reported using non-explicit SAMK sources remained about the same.

Thus, there are two competing principles operating. The first is to conceal SAM's relationship to the regime. Secondly, SAM's relationship to some religious sources is also concealed. In regard to the former, there are two levels of obfuscation. Firstly, the quasi-governmental agency of SAM or the, "muftiate," provides distance between the government and the policies enacted on behalf of the government (and/or at its direction) through these agencies. Secondly, most of the co-optation efforts through these religious institutions are not overtly within the public eye. The two levels of distance between the sources people report using and the regime avoids politicizing the religious realm. Both regimes have achieved, "success," in terms of a low proportion of people using non-governmental sources. In Kazakhstan, a higher level of success has been achieved given that a majority of Muslims reported using governmental sources.

Simultaneously, both regimes are attempting to construct a religious institution that is perceived as authoritative. Each regime has engaged in an intensive effort to create a religious institution and imbue this institution with exclusive religious authority. Reflecting this, a growing proportion of Muslims in Kazakhstan cite SAMK as a religious authority, another indicator of success.

Narratives: Why Governmental and Non-governmental Religious Sources are Authoritative

The proportion of Muslims in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan who reported using governmental and non-governmental sources, as well as the proportion of people who reported using explicit SAM and non-explicit SAM sources are measures of how well each regime has established a monopoly on religious authority. In addition to encapsulating Islam through the creation of religious sources and restrictions on others, both regimes have deployed narratives that justify these measures and construct a national religious identity through a process of securitization as examined in Chapters Four and Five.

To measure the degree to which these narratives are reflected by ordinary citizens, the narratives used by Muslims in each case to justify why they consulted governmental or non-governmental sources are first compared. After asking Muslims at mosques at markets, "Whom or what do you consult for religious advice," I then asked how do you decide which sources are authoritative?"

Most interviewees employed tautological arguments to justify their choices of religious sources. For example, after an interviewee in Kazakhstan stated that he consulted books published by SAMK in response to my first question (above) I asked how he determined whether a religious source was authoritative. He responded that having a seal from SAMK endowed the book with authority.[839] This section does not examine the proportion of people who use SAM or foreign religious sources (as in the previous section). Rather it examines if, for example, the foreignness of a source or the fact that the source is from SAM is invoked in order to justify using the religious source.

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[839] Interviewee 788, Kazakhstan.

As detailed in Chapter Two, securitization entails the framing of an issue as an existential threat. In order for a process of securitization to be successful, there needs to be a, "buy in," from the targeted population.[840] Neither regime has achieved a high level of "buy in" as measured by the proportion of ordinary Muslims Additionally, there is not a significant difference between the regimes in the proportion of ordinary Muslims who buy in to these narratives.

Most Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan do not reflect the securitization narratives espoused by both sets of elites. Securitization narratives include narratives about how the threat of extremism, Salafism, negative foreign influence, danger, violence, and conflict are ameliorated by using governmental sources.[841] In Kazakhstan, only 10 percent of Muslims and 8 percent of Muslims in Tatarstan espouse securitization narratives as rationales to consult governmental sources (*Table F*).

Additionally, most Muslims did not employ narratives about their identity to justify using a governmental source. Identity narratives refers to narratives used to justify how using governmental sources protects national and religious identity as understood by the interviewee. This includes references to tradition, Kazakh or Tatar ethnicity or nationality, Hanafism, Salafism, and Sufism. Nine percent of Muslims in Tatarstan and six percent in Tatarstan invoked aspects of their national, ethnic, or religious identity to justify using a governmental source (Table 6).

Table 6. Narratives and Governmental Sources

Narratives for Using Governmental Sources	Kazakhstan	Tatarstan
Securitization Narratives	10%	8%
Identity Narratives	9%	6%

[840] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 26–33.
[841] To a lesser extent ordinary Muslims referenced the threat of sects and the importance of peace and tolerance when discussing using governmental sources.

Table 7 below depicts the proportion of Muslims interviewed in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan who invoked each actor or principal as a justification for why they consulted governmental, non-governmental or neutral sources. While neither regime succeeded in securitizing Islam among a majority of Muslims in either case, it is important to note that there were no reported countervailing narratives that sought to justify using non-governmental sources by linking non-governmental sources to Kazakh or Tatar national religious identity. Rather Muslims who used non-governmental sources most frequently asserted that foreign knowledge was more authoritative than domestic and/or that Salafi sources were more authoritative than domestic sources. While overall the securitization of Islam is not successful, it is notable that each regime maintains a limited monopoly in its ability to invoke narratives about religion and tradition, identity and nationality.

Table 7. Religious Authority in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan

Why Authoritative	Kazakhstan	Tatarstan
SAM/SAM sources	59%	20%
SAM	17%	4%
Government	5%	2%
Tradition	6%	1%
Kazakh/Tatar	2%	1%
Hanafism	9%	5%
Salafism	3%	3%
Sufism	1%	0%
Extremism	5%	4%
Inability to Discern	2%	1%
Danger	2%	3%
Violence	1%	1%
Sects	2%	0%
Foreign	9%	11%
ISIS	Less than 1%	1%
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham	Less than 1%	0%
Peace	Less than 1%	0%
Tolerance	0%	1%
Conflict	Less than 1%	0%
Total	288	115

Government

Chapters Two and Three outlined the extensive efforts taken by each regime to encapsulate Islam. However, most co-optation mechanisms were actually enacted

by SAMK and SAM RT. As laid out in Chapter One, the use of a quasi-governmental agency allows a regime to implement its polices, while maintaining official distance. In line with this, the government itself was rarely invoked as an arbitrator of religious authority in either Kazakhstan or Tatarstan. Importantly, when discussing governmental sources, this is a code I have applied to religious sources interviewees described using, not necessarily how the source was described by interviewees. Only a small proportion of interviewees discussed the government in relation to the religious sources they reported using in either a positive or negative manner.

In Kazakhstan, Interviewee 485 said that in order to determine whether a religious source was authoritative he would, "Go to the rayon imam and he will tell me if it is certified by the government. Only the government can certify."[842] Another interviewee believed that imams were approved by the government, stating that he knew advice from imams was good because, "…imams…are appointed and approved by the government."[843] These interviewees were among the few to directly connect the relationship between SAM and the government and they viewed this relationship in a positive light. Another person said that in order to ensure he received correct religious information, he would use, "Official sources only. The Ministry of Justice has a list of prohibited books."[844] This person was among the few who could name a governmental agency and its role in the religious sphere.

One person identified himself as a member of the Kazakh Foreign Intelligence Service after I had already asked him several interview questions. I proceeded to finish asking my standard interview questions (which were again intentionally worded to not be controversial). In response to my question about whom or what he consulted

[842] Interviewee 485, Kazakhstan.
[843] Interviewee 59, Kazakhstan.
[844] Interviewee 480, Kazakhstan.

for religious advice he cited the Kazakh Foreign Intelligence Service. I viewed this incident as an indication that my fieldwork was likely being surveilled. Another interviewee stated that he previously worked for the Religious Affairs Agency in Kazakhstan, which he cited as his religious authority of choice. It is telling that among the few people who identified a government agency as a religious authority, two reported working for these state agencies.

On the other hand, less than one percent of Muslim interviews in Kazakhstan directly stated that they did not view the government as a legitimate actor in the religious sphere. One interviewee stated that they thought, "The state is collecting data against us. I wouldn't trust the government for religious advice."[845] While the proportion of people who did not find SAMK religious sources to be authoritative is likely underrepresented, it is notable that few people are able to identify the government's role in this co-optation process, either positively or negatively. Directly identifying the government as an authoritative religious source would not be an inherently controversial statement. It is therefore also likely that few interviewees associate religious polices directly with the regime.

In Tatarstan, only several interviewees named the government as the arbitrator of religious authority. One believed that SAM RT was part of the government and that, "(Religious) sources need to be checked by the religious government, authorities."[846] The other interviewee associated SAM RT as the, "official," governmental religious sources, stating, "… I only look at official sources."[847] Again, only a handful interviewees made this connection between the government and SAM.

[845] Interviewee 272, Kazakhstan.
[846] Interviewee 489, Tatarstan.
[847] Interviewee 748, Tatarstan.

In Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, only several interviewees perceived a direct relationship between the government and SAM and took the government into account when deciding on which religious sources to consult. Clearly the government was not foremost in the mind of most people, nor even associated with how to determine whether religious views or opinions were correct. Somewhat paradoxically, this is evidence of how effective the efforts to co-opt Islam are in both cases. Interviewees are largely unaware of either governments' involvement in the religious sphere, yet most frequently cite the religious institution used by each regime to co-opt Islam.

SAM

SAM was the most commonly invoked authority on Islam in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan. Only in in Kazakhstan, however, did this response constitute a majority. Alternatively, one percent of interviewees explicitly cited SAM sources as unauthoritative in Kazakhstan, compared to none in Tatarstan

In Kazakhstan, over half of Muslims interviewed named SAMK or a SAMK source as how they would determine whether a religious source was authoritative. Seventeen percent specially named SAMK (the institution, rather than a SAMK source e.g., SAMK website, or an imam) as the arbitrator of how they decided a source was authoritative. As a prime example, Interviewee 799 stated, "I only accept muftiate sources."[848] Another contact described why he visited SAMK websites:

> I accept only SAMK sources. Things are wrong with society. To fight this, the muftiate has a list of websites. The muftiate is enough for me, the muftiate sources and mosques. I have no need to search out other sources.[849]

Interviewee 503 stated that he decided a religious source was authoritative if, "…It's mentioned clearly whether it's allowed by the muftiate. If it's published or allowed by

[848] Interviewee 799, Kazakhstan.
[849] Interviewee 189, Kazakhstan.

the muftiate. If it's written that it's from the muftiate publishing house…"[850] One mosque attendee described his approval of the requirement that all mosques must belong to SAMK:

> The muftiate system makes it free to go to any mosque. Because of the muftiate there is a controlled, strict system. There is a lack of information about Islam, so can get correct information from muftiate.[851]

Approval by the SAMK was the criteria another interviewee employed:

> The muftiate. It's hard to tell who is saying truth, so I just use muftiate sources. I ask imams. There is a lot of unofficial information out there. You need to know if it's approved by the muftiate.[852]

On the other side, one percent of Muslims in Kazakhstan explicitly stated that they viewed imams or mullahs as unauthoritative. One person said that they previously asked for advice from imams at Mosques A1 and A2 in Astana (both government constructed mosques) but that she, "…wasn't satisfied with their answers," and did not find them to be religiously knowledgeable.[853] One man related a story that he himself described as strange. He recounted that he became, "…acquainted with a mullah," and that they formed a relationship and became friends. During this period, he consulted this mullah for religious advice. Then according to the interviewee, the mullah, "…then said we could kill non-Muslims."[854] The interviewee then threw his hands up in the air in exasperation and indicated that after such advice he didn't know who he could trust for religious advice anymore, but didn't rely upon mosques or employees at mosques anymore[855]

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[850] Interviewee 71, Kazakhstan.
[851] Interviewee 713, Kazakhstan.
[852] Interviewee 819, Kazakhstan.
[853] Interviewee 639, Kazakhstan
[854] Interviewee 194, Kazakhstan.
[855] Interviewee 194, Kazakhstan.

In Tatarstan, SAM RT or SAM RT sources were also the most frequently invoked reason a source was authoritative. However, only a fifth of Muslims in Tatarstan invoked this reason compared to over half in Kazakhstan. Only four percent specifically cited SAM RT itself as how they assess religious sources.

One woman stated that she used, "…books from Central Book Store," about, "…what women should do," to answer her religious questions. [856] When I asked her how she determined whether the religious advice is reliable she responded, "The muftiate is who you to ask questions to. I can't ask directly, but a man could. I could ask my husband to go and ask in person."[857] Interviewee 416 asserted that, "I follow the golden chain of Muslims and that is what is approved of by SAMRT. So that's what we can believe."[858] Interviewee 59 stated, "…in religious knowledge, the mufti is most knowledgeable, then imams."[859] Yet another person related that ," "I believe you should ask imams about books."[860] No interviewees in Tatarstan identified a SAM RT source as unauthoritative.

In Kazakhstan, not only a majority of Muslims reported consulting governmental sources of religious advice as identified in Chapter Six (67 percent), but a majority also justified using a religious source specifically because it was from SAMK or a SAMK source. In Tatarstan, this justification was also the most common narrative for why a religious source was authoritative, but this narrative was not employed by a majority. A small minority stated that they viewed SAMK sources in Kazakhstan as unauthoritative compared to no one in Tatarstan.

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[856] Referring to the bookstore at Marjani mosque.
[857] Interviewee 375, Tatarstan.
[858] Interviewee 416, Kazakhstan.
[859] Interviewee 59, Tatarstan.
[860] Interviewee 18, Tatarstan.

Identity

Both regimes deployed narratives to portray co-optation efforts as efforts to protect the national religious identity, which was examined in Chapters Four and Five. These narratives included associating the national religious identity with the regimes and delineated the bounds of protecting Kazakh and Tatar identity by incorporating a Hanafi identity and rejecting Salafism and negative foreign influences, which were associated with extremism, danger, and sects (the latter is more present in Kazakhstan). Neither regime, particularly the Kazakhstani regime, has clearly articulated its relationship with Sufism.

Only about one in five Muslims in Kazakhstan and one in ten Muslims in Tatarstan referenced ethnic, national or religious identity as a rationale for why they consulted religious sources. Despite this, references to tradition and nationality were only made by people who reported consulting governmental and neutral sources, not non-governmental sources. This indicates that each regime has created a successful monopoly over narratives about tradition and national religious identity.

Tradition and Ethnic, National, and Religious Identity

Whether citizens view the regime as a protector of their national religious identity could have large ramifications for the legitimacy of each regime.[861] Grzymala Busse, examining cases of Poland, Croatia, the United States, and Poland, argues convincingly that the ability of the Catholic Church to frame itself as a protector of the national religious identity affects its ability to influence domestic politics.[862] Grzymala Busse examines how a religious group attempts to co-opt the government in specific policy realms. The direction of co-optation works in the opposite direction

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[861] Grzymala-Busse, *Nations under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy*.
[862] Grzymala-Busse, *Nations under God.*

in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan—where each government is attempting to co-opt a religious group. However, the legitimacy of the co-opting institution (in this case the regime) is at stake in both. In Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, each regime is attempting to portray itself as the protector of the national religious identity. Despite these extensive efforts, ethnic and national identity was not frequently invoked as to why a religious source was perceived as authoritative by average Muslims in either Tatarstan or Kazakhstan. In both cases these narratives were used to justify governmental and neutral sources—no interviewees invoked national identity and tradition to justify using non-governmental sources.

Some Muslims in Kazakhstan who used governmental sources invoked the fact that the source they consulted was Kazakh, rather than from another nation. One interviewee discussed the importance of preserving Kazakh, "roots".[863] Another cited using a SAMK website, azan.kz, "…because it's accepted in Kazakhstan. You should only use Kazakh websites."[864] Others invoked the importance of Kazakh traditions to justify why they consulted governmental sources. For example, one man stated that, "Traditional Islam is in this mosque. All mosques are in SAMK and therefore traditional."[865] Another stated that Kazakhs, "…keep our traditions through the muftiate."[866]An additional interviewee justified using governmental sources of information with the following, "We go to mosque, (because) we're Kazakh. Since we were children our parents taught us. We know our traditions from childhood."[867]

Those who emphasized the Kazakh and traditional nature of governmental sources of religion often used possessive pronouns to describe these sources. For

[863] Interviewee 345, Kazakhstan.
[864] Interviewee 267, Kazakhstan.
[865] Interviewee 394, Kazakhstan.
[866] Interviewee 727, Kazakhstan.
[867] Interviewee 472, Kazakhstan.

example, while pointing to a sign with the website, "sunna.kz" written on it, one interviewee said, "It's our website. Muhammad left us his message and we follow it through this website. Our website is sunna.kz."[868] This portion of interviewees did not simply view the, "muftiate," as *a* religious option but as the *only* authoritative religious source.

An even smaller proportion in Tatarstan asserted that they consulted government because they were Tatar. One interviewee stated that, "I try to trust all books in our republic. There are many Tatars in our republic."[869] A smaller proportion associated government sources with nationality. One contact stated that, "I try to trust all books in our republic," and, "…not something from outside."[870]

In both cases a small proportion of people invoked their national or ethnic identity or traditions to justify their religious source selection, though the proportion was smaller in Tatarstan. No interviewees connected the use of non-governmental sources to national identity or traditions.

Hanafism, Sufism, and Salafism

Some interviewees invoked more specific aspects of religious identity to justify using governmental and non-governmental sources. However, narratives about the role of Hanafism, Sufism, and Salafism were not as prominent among ordinary Muslims compared to elites.

Hanafism

While Islam in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan is predominately Hanafi and was emphasized by elites, this identity was not foremost in the minds of Muslims in either case. Hanafism was invoked by nine percent of Muslims in Kazakhstan and

[868] Interviewee 646, Kazakhstan.
[869] Interviewee 818, Tatarstan.
[870] Interviewee 771, Tatarstan.

five percent in Tatarstan to justify consulting government sources. This rationale was not used by any interviewees to justify using non-governmental sources.

One person in Kazakhstan stated, "Our national traditional stick. We should stick to our own mazhab, Hanafi."[871] Similarly, "Everything must be accredited by SAMK and in the Hanafi mazhab. My religion is Islam."[872] Another contact described why he trusted SAMK, "… because it's according to tradition and mazhab, Abu Hanafi mazhab. The muftiate only."[873]

In Tatarstan, similar rationales were employed. One person in Tatarstan said that he determined whether religious advice was by, "…comparing sources, choose according to our life, our mazhab. If it is not our ummah, I don't read."[874] Another stated, "It's a new world, the Islamic movement is in different directions. The Hanafi one has lots of people. The non-Hanafi direction is not true…"[875] An additional respondent said that, "I compare sources, choose according to our life, our mazhab. If it is not our ummah, I don't read."[876]

While a small proportion overall, Hanafism was the most frequently invoked narrative to justify using governmental sources in both cases. No interviewees described using non-governmental Hanafi sources.

Sufism

Conflicting narratives were present in Kazakhstan from the regime about the legitimacy and acceptability of Sufism in Kazakhstan with some elites asserting that it was acceptable if not widespread, while others believed that it was prohibited by the

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[871] Interviewee 552, Kazakhstan.
[872] Interviewee 199, Kazakhstan.
[873] Interviewee 152, Kazakhstan.
[874] Interviewee 118, Tatarstan. Mazhab in this context refers to the Hanafi mazhab.
[875] Interviewee 727, Tatarstan.
[876] Interviewee 118, Tatarstan.

government. In Tatarstan, no elites stated that Sufism was prohibited, some identified it as traditional, while others asserted that is should be practiced in private. However, Sufism was not a topic that was raised by most Muslims in Kazakhstan. When interviewees did discuss Sufism or Sufi sites in Kazakhstan as a rationale for why they consulted the sources they did, they did so in reference to both governmental and non-governmental sources. No interviewees in Tatarstan discussed Sufism.

One interviewee in Kazakhstan openly discussed that he identified as Sufi and specifically Naqshbandi. He further stated that he believed being Sufi was prohibited by the government because, "They're a challenge to the mufti" and that he met with others to worship in secret gatherings.[877] Instead of governmental sources, he relied upon the religious advice from a Sufi leader exiled in Cyprus from Kazakhstan. Two interviewees referenced the importance of domestic religious sites that are well known and are associated with Sufism, the Mausoleum of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi in Turkestan and Beket-Ata near Atyrau.[878] No interviewees at mosques or markets discussed Sufism in negative light in Kazakhstan and no one I interviewed in Tatarstan raised Sufism in any regard.

Salafism

Both regimes sought to highly stigmatize Salafism and frequently used the term pejoratively, often regardless of ideology. When I prompted Muslims in Tatarstan and Kazakhstan to discuss why they used the religious sources they reported using, only a small proportion referenced Salafism—both as a reason to use governmental sources in order to avoid Salafism as well as a reason to use Salafi non-governmental sources.

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[877] Interviewee 60, Kazakhstan.
[878] Interviewee 229; Interviewee 370, Kazakhstan.

In line with the Kazakhstani regime narratives about Salafism, one person strongly asserted that, "Salafism is not part of our culture,"[879] while another stated that, "…it's recommended not to listen to them."[880] Other interviewees described how they believed Salafis dressed differently (in a pejorative way). For example, one person said that he didn't listen to, "Not Salafis with beards and short trousers."[881]

Among people who said they sought out religious sources specifically because they were Salafi, Interviewee 304 stated the he consulted with:

> Wise people who are Salafi. Wise people who have studied in Saudi Arabia. True law is Salafi. I would go to [website redacted][882] for general questions. People in Turkey and here (Kazakhstan) do not know the right way. I wouldn't go to a madrasah here. about how he determined whether a religious source was authoritative.[883]

One interviewee stated that he used foreign sources because they were Salafi and that the government was opposed to Salafism, "It's illegal according to the muftiate to study in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. Because our government only supports Hanafi mazhab, because it's Salafi there."[884] Another person pushed back against the negative connotation Salafism often has in Kazakhstan, "Salafis are not harmful, we're perceived sometimes negatively. It's just a more orthodox Islam."[885]

As in Kazakhstan, Muslims who discussed Salafism negatively reported consulting governmental sources. For example, one person discussed using a governmental source, "...because there is dangerous information out there, there is

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[879] Interviewee 803, Kazakhstan.
[880] Interviewee 57, Kazakhstan.
[881] Interviewee 644, Kazakhstan.
[882] I have chosen not to include the website in order to not identify the website for censorship, or potentially endanger the person/ people who run the website.
[883] Interviewee 304, Kazakhstan.
[884] Interviewee 483, Kazakhstan.
[885] Interviewee 105, Kazakhstan.

Wahhabism... Sources in our mazhabs are all authoritative.:" In light of this danger, he stated that SAM RT sources are, "...now pre-printed."[886]

On the other side, one interviewee stated, "We don't have many scholars in Tatarstan. We go to scholars on the Internet that we trust like [website redacted]. We tend to obtain information via ace to face, but also on [website redacted]."[887] He refenced as Salafi website. Two other interviewees said that they sought out and relied on the teachings of noted Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani.[888]

Given the heavy emphasis in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan on equating extremism with Salafism or Wahhabism, it is notable how few people reflected these narratives unprompted. Alternatively, among the minority of people who reported using non-governmental sources, vesting authority in Salafi and/or foreign sources were the most common narratives.

Securitization

Foreign

At the most elite level in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, foreignness in general was portrayed in a negative light. In contrast, both regimes upheld each state as an exemplar of, "moderate," Islam—with Kazakhstan framing this narrative to more international audiences, while this narrative had a domestic audience in Russia. These narratives were also reflected by imams, whom simultaneously frequently presented a conflicting narrative about there being greater levels religious knowledge abroad. This conflict was also evident among the population— foreign religious

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[886] Interviewee 646, Tatarstan.
[887] Interviewee 26, Tatarstan. I have chosen not to include the website in order to not identify the website for censorship, or potentially endanger the person/ people who run the website.
[888] Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani was an influential Salafi scholar who died in 1999. He rejected the concept of mazhabs. See Brown, "Albānī, Muḥammad Nāṣir Al-Dīn Al-."

sources were alternating a negative influence and source of fear (and thus a reason to avoid and seek out governmental sources) or imbued with religious knowledge, which is outside the bounds of the government. Narratives about "foreign" sources of religious knowledge were referenced in about equal proportions by ordinary Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan. While only about one in ten Muslims in either case imbued foreign sources with authority or viewed foreign sources as potential sources of religious extremism, this was the second most common reason people cited using governmental or non-governmental source.

Evincing this conflict, eight Muslims in Kazakhstan cited both governmental sources as authoritative and simultaneously consulted foreign religious sources, compared to a single interviewee in Tatarstan.[889] For example, one person in Kazakhstan stated that he decided if a source was authoritative both by consulting, "…muftiate books in Kazakhstan," and also would call, "Students who study in Saudi Arabia or Egypt."[890] Another explicitly stated that he would ask for religious advice from, "Representatives of the muftiate or people who have studied in Saudi Arabia and then compared, "…information from the muftiate with those who study in Saudi Arabia."[891] Similarly in Tatarstan, one interviewee discussed consulting with an imam if he had a question as well as using a religious source if it was approved by, "…a scholar in Saudi Arabia."[892] He was unable to identify any particular scholars—what was most important to this interviewee was that it was a person in Saudi Arabia. The place itself connoted religious authority.

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[889] In the previous chapter, people who utilized both governmental and non-governmental were excluded and not coded as either governmental, non-governmental (or neutral). Eight Muslims in Kazakhstan consulted both governmental and non- governmental sources, while none consulted both types in Tatarstan.
[890] Interviewee 483, Kazakhstan.
[891] Interviewee 26, Kazakhstan.
[892] Interviewee 164, Tatarstan.

Among Muslims in Kazakhstan who reported using non-governmental sources, about half reported using these sources because they were foreign.[893] Saudi Arabia held a prominent place in how people constructed what constitutes religious authority. Saudi Arabia was the most commonly cited country (cited by 24 percent of Muslims who reported using non-governmental sources), followed by Turkey, Egypt, Syria, and broad refences to "Arab" countries.[894] For example, when answering the question about religious authority, one person said he would, "Ask scholars. It depends on where they studied." When I prompted him on where a good place to study would be, he responded, "Saudi Arabia and Egypt."[895] Along similar lines one person expressed that authoritative sources are from, "Kazakh people who go to learn in Saudi Arabia, where they teach what is haram. Only Kazakhstani people who have studied at mosques in Saudi Arabia."[896] Another contact contrasted Islam within the "Turkic world" and "Arab", stating, "People in Turkey and here (Kazakhstan) do not know the right way. I wouldn't first go to a madrasah here."[897] Another interviewee reported meeting with a dissident Salafi leader in Kazakhstan.

In Tatarstan, among people who reported using non-governmental sources about half also reported using these sources because they thought foreign sources were more authoritative than domestic sources..[898] Saudi Arabia was also the most

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[893] Sixteen out of 29 people who reported using non-governmental sources stated that they used these sources because they believed foreign sources of religious information were authoritative.
[894] Interviewee 26; Interviewee 164; Interviewee 169; Interviewee 211; Interviewee 223; Interviewee 290; Interviewee 304; Interviewee 318; Interviewee 483; Interviewee 525; Interviewee 555; Interviewee 819; Interviewee 825; Kazakhstan.
[895] Interviewee 88, Tatarstan.
[896] Interviewee 819, Kazakhstan.
[897] Interviewee 304, Kazakhstan.
[898] Seven out of 15 people who reported using non-governmental sources stated that they used these sources because of their foreign nature.

commonly cited country with religious authority, followed by Egypt.[899] One person said he would, "Ask scholars if..," he didn't know the answer to a religious question, "…ask those in Mecca, Egypt."[900] Another stated that he would consult with those who had studied abroad, specifically naming Saudi Arabia and Egypt as ideal places to study religion.[901]

In contrast, other Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan discussed how they intentionally avoided foreign sources, which they often linked to narratives about violence, danger, and extremism. Rather these interviewees viewed religious authority to lie within governmental sources, which was also linked with tradition. An interviewee in Kazakhstan stated the he decided which sources to use based on whether, "It's traditional Islam." When I asked what traditional Islam was, he answered:

> I ask the mullah. Traditional Islam is in this mosque. All mosques are in SAMK and therefore traditional. The first mufti is a religious authority. Arabs, Damascus, that's not traditional Islam. Traditional Islam spreads love and friendship and we help each other."[902]

Another person stated, "Arab Islam it is not ours, Kazakh Islam it is ours. I don't believe in fanaticism, like in other countries. That's why question should go to the imam or mullah."[903] Interviewee 486 held a similar view of the Middle East, asserting that he consulted "Only Islam that is very traditional, that is not fanatical like Islam in Middle East."[904] In Tatarstan, one interviewee stated threat the Qur'an stood in contrast to what is happening in Syria and attributed it to different (and incorrect)

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[899] Interviewee 88; Interviewee 119; Interviewee 164; Interviewee 216; Interviewee 392; Interviewee 797; Interviewee 878, Tatarstan.
[900] Interviewee 797, Tatarstan.
[901] Interviewee 88, Tatarstan.
[902] Interviewee 388, Kazakhstan.
[903] Interviewee 879, Kazakhstan.
[904] Interviewee 486, Kazakhstan.

religious interpretations.[905] While a small subset, these interviewees commonly linked foreign religious sources to extremism.[906]

Extremism

In both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan a small subset (of about the same proportion) of respondents expressed worry that straying outside of governmental resources could lead to radicalization. In Kazakhstan, one person expressed weariness of going outside governmental sources saying:

> There's some extreme information out there. It tells people to make jihad. I reject this. Or it proposes throwing stones at women, beheading, or amputation. We have this propaganda here.[907]

Another juxtaposed governments sources to extremism, "Terrorist, they might be coming other sources. We're a young country…Now people are all wrapped up in jihad…like in Syria. Our government, the president is against this."[908] This framework was also employed by Interviewee 671, "I've received invitations, but I do not go with those who are radical Islam. They believe too much."[909] Interviewee 743 said that they used government sources and avoided this Internet because, "There is terrorism if you learn about Islam on the internet. You might get into terrorism. Almost all the internet is like this."[910]

In Tatarstan, some Muslims also stated they relied upon governmental sources to avoid radicalization and the same proportion. One woman lamented the dangers of terrorism:

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[905] Interviewee 771, Tatarstan.
[906] A smaller proportion of interviewees referenced the treat of danger, violence, sects, or the importance of peace and tolerance when discussing why they used governmental sources. These narratives are examined in the Methodology Appendix.
[907] Interviewee 57, Kazakhstan.
[908] Interviewee 877, Kazakhstan.
[909] Interviewee 671, Kazakhstan.
[910] Interviewee 743, Kazakhstan.

> There is terrorism in the world, I don't believe in terrorism. Muslims, real Muslims, don't do this, terrorism… We're scared to go on planes. I'm afraid to fly. Now there are kids from Syria who don't have a house. There are refugees from Syria.[911]

Another discussed how he relied upon a hazret to avoid what he perceived as extremism, "You need to check them and ask for a recommendation from the hazret for books without radicalism."[912] Interviewee 818 discussed the risk of radicalization online, "I don't often use the internet. There is danger on YouTube, that's why I don't use it. It changes people."[913]

Inability to discern

Some contacts even asserted that they consulted government sources because they said they were unable to discern for themselves whether a religious source was authoritative and worried about self-radicalization. In turn, they relied upon government sources to prevent radicalization. Interviewee 398 in Kazakhstan directly commented, "I'm anxious about getting into the wrong stream of Islam."[914] Similarly, another put forth at that, "…I can't decide for myself, I'm not knowledgeable."[915] Another respondent even believed that reading religious texts without supervision could lead to extremism, "Books, reading on your own can be dangerous. You can misinterpret. You should read together with the imam."[916] In Tatarstan, Interviewee 891 stated, "I don't look at anything, I'm scared. I go to mosque and ask there."[917]

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[911] Interviewee 737, Tatarstan.
[912] Interviewee 99, Tatarstan.
[913] Interviewee 818, Tatarstan.
[914] Interviewee 398, Kazakhstan.
[915] Interviewee 505, Kazakhstan.
[916] Interviewee 552, Kazakhstan.
[917] Interviewee 891, Tatarstan.

ISIS and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham

In Kazakhstan, no interviewees discussed ISIS in a negative light, while one interviewee expressed his support for ISIS. In Tatarstan, one person discussed their fear of flying due to ISIS[918] and no one expressed any support for ISIS. Additionally, one person in Kazakhstan discussed his support for Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. No one in Tatarstan mentioned this organization.

In Kazakhstan, one interviewee pointedly expressed his support for ISIS stating, "The Islamic Government, IGIL, is good". This answer was the response given after I asked whom he consulted for answers to religious questions. He declined to further elaborate about his support of ISIS. When I asked him the question, "Please complete this sentence, 'Because I am Muslim, I (do)….'" he replied, "I don't drink, it's haram. I sometimes smoke." Smoking is also generally considered to be haram within Islam and is not indicative of a high level of observance. Otherwise his interview responses were unremarkable. He also stated that he went to a mosque in order to pray and read the Qur'an and went alone. He was 50 years old, born in Eastern Kazakhstan and worked as a driver. I interviewed him at a co-opted mosque, though he also said that he regularly went to the Central Mosque in Almaty, suggesting (as outlined in Chapter Six) that the mosque itself and its relationship to SAM was not important to him, rather he reviewed it as a place to engage in personal religious practice.

Another interviewee cited Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham as how he decided answers to religious questions, stating that any source emanating from Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham was authoritative. Tahrir al-Sham is a militant group in Syria that was formed after the merger of several groups, including a branch of al-Qaeda, al-Nursa Front. It is

[918] Interviewee 737, Tatarstan.

widely considered to be a terrorist organization. The United States Department of State issued an amendment in May of 2018 to include Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other, "aliases," as part of its original designation of al-Nursrah Front, as a terrorist organization, which is directly referred to as an al-Qai'da affiliate in Syria.[919] This interviewee declined to answer biographical questions. His answer to the question about what he does as a Muslim was simply, "To be happy." Neither interviewee seemed to have well developed theologically justifications for these views nor for how they understood their personal relationship to Islam.

Both interviews took place in Almaty at (different) co-opted mosques. No interviewees in Tatarstan openly discussed seeking answers from or supporting terrorist organizations, which I use here in the normative sense of a group that seeks to create fear through the use of violence. Two people out of 505 Muslims in Kazakhstan (and 508 whose religious identity included Muslim) interviewed is a sixth of a percent. However, given the obvious stigma to admitting this—and to a foreign researcher in a public place, in the span of a relatively short fifteen-minute interview with no previous efforts to establish a relationship— the actual support is probably somewhat higher. Thus, there is evidence that there is support among a very small sub-set of the population in Kazakhstan for violent terrorist organizations. However, the relationship between expressing such views and acting upon them is not at all clear nor linear. No interviewees in Tatarstan expressed any similar sentiments.

Conclusion

Both regimes were highly effective at co-opting the most targeted population, Muslims who go to mosques, as measured by the proportion of Muslims who

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[919] Office of the Spokesperson, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, "Amendments to the Terrorist Designations of Al-Nusrah Front."

reported using governmental sources. Among the general population, Kazakhstan has also achieved a high level of success. Kazan's efforts have met more tempered success among the general population. In Tatarstan, the majority of Muslims in the general population do not use governmental sources, but neutral sources. As expected, a higher proportion of Muslims at mosques and in the general population reported using governmental sources in Kazakhstan than in Tatarstan. There is also evidence of a gradual increase over time in the proportion of Muslims at mosques in Kazakhstan who report using governmental sources.

The higher proportion Muslims in Kazakhstan who consulted explicit SAMK sources is also evidence of a higher level of success in co-opting Islam in Kazakhstan on one hand. Additionally, a higher proportion of Muslims in Astana in 2015 reported using explicit SAMK sources in 2015 than in 2013—indicating that these efforts have been successful over time. On the other hand, the lower level of explicit SAM RT sources used by Muslims in Tatarstan (while non-explicit SAM RT sources were the most commonly cited source of religious advice) may bode better for the regime in the longtime. The further distance perceived between religious sources (even if produced by a quasi-governmental agency of the regime) and the regime, the less likelihood that the religious source will be politicized and thus become polarizing. When a direct relationship is perceived between the regime and religion, people are more likely to view it as an infringement in the religious sphere. On the other hand, Kazakhstan has thus far had more success in creating a religious institution, which is perceived as a religious authority.

Muslims who reported using non-governmental sources remained a small proportion in both cases. Among those who did report using non-governmental sources, the majority stated that they did so for theological reasons. Most stated that

they consulted foreign sources, including Salafi sources. Only two interviewees—both of whom were in Kazakhstan—expressed any sympathies with organizations that commit acts of violence— ISIS and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. I conducted interviews with five hundred and forty-seven people in Kazakhstan—thus, these two individuals represent a very small proportion of the population. Nonetheless, given the obvious stigma to admitting such a fact, the actual support for such organizations is likely somewhat higher. The national Security Committee in Kazakhstan publicly stated in 2014 that it estimates that there are 300 Kazakhs in ISIS.[920] For context, there are also estimates that there are over 500 people from Belgium in ISIS.[921] Thus, while clearly a legitimate security concern of the state, the flow of Kazakhs to ISIS and Syria should be taken into broader context.

Many ordinary people in both cases employed circular reasoning to justify why the source they used was authoritative—for example "I consult the imam because he's an imam and is knowledgeable," and were unable to elaborate on this reasoning. The most commonly cited rationale for why a source was authoritative was because it was part of SAM– evidence of successful levels of co-optation. However, securitization narratives were not well reflected by Muslims in Astana, Almaty, or Kazan. In this regard, the broader and more ambitious effort to construct a national religious identity centered around governmental sources was not highly successful in either Kazakhstan or Tatarstan. Both regimes did, however, succeed in framing the discourse about national and religious ethnic identity. Among Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan who reported using non-governmental sources, none deployed narratives linking these non-governmental sources to the protection of a national

[920] Urazova, "300 Kazakhstanis Joined Islamic State, Half of Them - Women."
[921] See for example Graham, "What's the Matter With Belgium?"

religious identity or tradition. Rather this subset justified their religious source selection based on its authority as a foreign and/or Salafi source.

However, I would caveat that much of this success is based on the successful public separation between the government and religious policies enacted by SAMK. Given the large production of religious sources by SAMK, there is a relatively higher risk that religious policies in Kazakhstan may be increasingly associated with SAMK and then the government. If the co-optation of Islam is linked back to the regime, this holds the potential to politicize the religious sphere, which could lead to an opposition that employs religious narratives, challenging the regime's monopoly.

Very few interviewees directly invoked the government itself in relationship to the religious sources they used or how they decided whether a source was authoritative. Likewise, most people viewed the religious sphere to be a personal manner. Using a quasi-governmental agency maintains the illusion that the government is separate from Islam in both cases. The falling of this façade could endanger the legitimacy of this institution, and thus both governmental and religious authority.

Chapter Eight Conclusion

Why Authoritarian Regimes in Muslim Majorities Co-opt Islam through Religious Institutions

Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, as with other Muslim majority states and regions, prefer co-optation to repression when dealing with the majority religious group. Islam is intertwined with Kazakh and Tatar identity. Attempts to repress the majority religious group, particularly when it is highly associated with the majority ethnic group, holds the potential to activate the national religious identity into an oppositional identity. Efforts to repress the majority religious group would also be highly resource intensive. Alternatively, co-opting the majority religious group provides opportunities for a regime to bolster its legitimacy vis-à-vis citizens. The need for legitimacy in authoritarian regimes is particularly acute. Without elections, or competitive elections, authoritarian regimes seek to find other sources of legitimacy, including from religion.

Similar rationales undergird authoritarian regimes' decisions to co-opt other potential sources of opposition through institutions rather than deploy repression. Authoritarian regimes co-opt potential sources of opposition in order to gain this legitimacy and also limit bargaining partners, gather information, and avoid mobilization. In the religious realm, both Astana and Kazan have attempted to obtain legitimacy from religious symbols and prestige. President Nazarbayev commissioned a grand mosque in the center of the capital, which was opened on his birthday in 2012. A mosque that was built on the Kazan kremlin grounds was destroyed under Ivan the Terrible. As a sign of resurgent national pride, a new mosque was erected on the same grounds in 2005. Creating an institution allows a regime a sustained

relationship to build up this legitimacy. A religious institution also allows an authoritarian regime to avoid reconstituting the same agreement with different religious leaders or Islamic groups. In Tatarstan, several Muslim institutions initially were competing at both the local and national level for prominence in the early 1990s. President Shaimiev openly selected his bargaining partner, SAM RT. Kazakhstan limited its bargaining power to a single institution from independence.

Religious institutions allow regimes to gather information about the majority religious group. All mosques in Astana had visible security cameras. An employee at a mosque in Kazan showed me the security system installed in the mosque, an elaborate set up with a dedicated viewing room. He said that for each prayer time he counted the number of men (he only counted men) who came to each prayer time and reported this back to SAM RT. Imams in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan described to me how they would report people at mosques who differed theologically from SAMK or SAM RT to officials within these institutions or even to security services. Less nefariously, this information also allows the regime to try to achieve an equilibrium between religious demands and its ability to meet the market demand of for example religious education. Additionally, in order to limit mobilization, both Astana and Kazan attempted to encapsulate a nationalist movement by placating these movements with the creation a national religious institution.

While these similar logics compel authoritarian regimes to attempt to co-opt religious groups, the co-optation of religion differs in important ways from the co-optation of other potential sources of opposition. Religion is different than other sources of opposition. Religion is often a highly salient identity and can influence and alter world views. Relatedly, it can alter the risk-benefit calculus people make, if one believes that benefits are reaped in an afterlife. People may be willing to alter their

political views or change their preferences about a political candidate because this does not risk a shift in their world view. Switching religious affiliation often incurs much higher social costs. Moreover, in the religious realm, people often believe in one truth. When a regime co-opts a business sector, it does not have to anoint one business interest as the authority on all business interests in the state. Authoritarian regimes do not often have the luxury of co-opting and elevating multiple religious groups. Additionally, if multiple religious players vie for power, inevitably groups that are not as favored may try to agitate against the regime. Thus, authoritarian regimes in Muslim majorities attempt to co-opt Islam through a single religious institution and are highly incentivized for this co-optation to be perceived as legitimate.

Most authoritarian regimes do not use political institutions, the very trappings of democracy such as parliaments or parties, to attempt to co-opt Islam. These political institutions are frequently employed to co-opt other sources of opposition, including business interests. Rather, I identified a clear pattern in how authoritarian regimes in Muslim majorities attempt to co-opt Islam—through religious institutions. Eighty-eight percent of Muslim majorities states have religious institutions for Islam. A similar parallel does not exist for other religions. I argue that this is because Sunni Islam does not have an inherent hierarchy, such as the structure of the Orthodox Church or Catholic Church. As demonstrated in Chapter One, more authoritarian regimes are more likely to have religious institutions for Islam.

There are a different and higher set of risks in overtly co-opting a religious group. As Grzymala-Busse demonstrated in the Catholic Church's attempts to co-opt the state, blatant overtures to change policy diminished the legitimacy of the Church because the Church was not able to portray itself as above the political fray.

Alternatively, when the Catholic Church negotiated with the state behind closed doors, it was able to portray itself as the protector of the national religious identity. In Tatarstan and Kazakhstan, the state is attempting to co-opt the majority religious group. Similarly, however, overt measures are also likely due to diminish the legitimacy of the state because it risks portraying the regime as unduly interfering in religious affairs, which could in turn adversely affect the regime's legitimacy, rather than bolstering it.

The stakes are also higher for attempting to co-opt a religious group by creating a religious institution. Creating a novel institution is likely to draw more attention. An authoritarian regime in a majority Catholic or Orthodox state does not need to create an institution in order to co-opt, a hierarchal institution is already in place. In order to mitigate this risk, both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan have elected to co-opt Islam through a quasi-governmental agency.

Quasi-governmental agencies are frequently used in various domains by democratic and authoritarian regimes to alter policy without invoking scrutiny. This lack of transparency has high utility for authoritarian regimes. As SAMK and SAM RT are not officially government agencies, senior government officials in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan can claim that religious policies for Islam are set by these institutions and therefore not under their jurisdiction. This allows for the maintenance of the narrative of the separation of the state and religion.

Furthermore, these institution are frequently repurposed. Religious institutions for Islam were initially created by colonial powers in many Muslim majority countries. For example, the British created the Majlis Agama Islam in Malaysia, which is the basis of the current institution, Heads of Sultan. These institutions are repurposed by regimes in independent states because of their high utility, but they are

employed for the new aims of the regime. In Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, rather than using the Spiritual Association of Muslims to try to control Islam in order to eliminate religion from society as in the Soviet Union, each regime is simultaneously attempting to bolster is legitimacy from drawing upon the majority religious group as well as construct the bounds of the national religious identity so that it is complimentary to each regime.

How National and Subnational Authoritarian Regimes in Muslim Majorities Co-opt Islam

A growing body of research has examined the types of incentive structures that arise under regime juxtaposition. Authoritarian subnational regimes under national democracies can use the institutions of democracy to subvert democratic regional rule. In cases with subnational authoritarian and national authoritarian regimes, subnational regimes also engage in strategizes to enforce boundary control. This dissertation extends this analysis to the religious realm.

Similar logics incentivize both national and subnational regimes to attempt to co-opt Islam. Accordingly, there is a striking level of similarity in how the Kazakh and Tatar regimes attempt to encapsulate Islam—through the encapsulation of mosques, encapsulation of religious knowledge, and justifying this encapsulation through securitization. All these processes of encapsulation are enacted through the quasi-government, religious institutions of SAMK and SAM RT. These institutions are referred to colloquially as the, “muftiate”—further sanitizing the image of these institutions and distancing them from their repurposed Soviet past.

The encapsulation of mosques in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan entailed the construction of government mosques (including reconstruction in the case of Kazan) and the co-optation of previously independent mosques. Secondly, the co-optation of mosques included instituting resource disparities between government constructed

and co-opted mosques in order to encourage attendance at government constructed mosques. In both cases, while all mosques in all of Tatarstan and Kazakhstan are under the auspices of SAM RT and SAMK respectively, elite government officials in both regimes deny that this is an official requirement or enforced by the government.

The encapsulation of knowledge was executed through restrictions on religious sources and the production of religious sources by both regimes. These efforts included restricting access to appointments and education while producing religious literature, the Friday message, and websites. All religious appointments from the mufti to imams at local mosques in remote areas are dictated by SAMK. Religious educational institutions outside of SAMK or SAM RT have been closed and foreign education has been increasingly stigmatized and discouraged. In lieu, in Almaty and Kazan an Islamic university has been open and a limited number of madrasahs have been maintained. SAMK and SAM RT produce a full script for the Friday message for every mosque and also produce other religious literature including books and brochures. SAMK maintains several websites, which are well advertised and SAM RT has two prominent online news outlets.

As part of a process of securitization, both regimes attempted to gain legitimacy from Islam and portrayed the encapsulation of mosques and knowledge as efforts to protect traditional and national identity. Moreover, a broader and ambitious efforts was undertaken to use securitization to delineate the boundaries of acceptable religious identity. Hanafism is incorporated into the boundaries of acceptable identity, while Salafism, in particular, is excluded.

However, there are also a different set of incentives and institutional structures that compel national and subnational authoritarian regimes in Muslim majorities to co-opt Islam differently. Regime juxtaposition in subnational regimes induces

subnational regimes to formally comply with national law. Subnational regimes will instead resort to using more informal and at times extra-legal measures to co-opt the majority religious group. In Tatarstan, the 1990s were characterized by an independence movement. Thus, there was an initial effort to legally contradict national laws as part of this assertion of sovereignty. This included legally instituting a monopoly on Islam to SAM RT in order to enforce boundary control in the religious sphere and fend off alternative Islamic institutions at both the national and local level. However, the autonomy of Tatarstan was reigned in under Putin. Tatarstan then had to resort to informal measures. The legal monopoly granted to SAM RT was repealed at the national level. Despite the lack of legal enforcement, SAM RT's monopoly was maintained. The RAC, the government agency officially responsible for regulating religion, was involved in creating SAM RT in 1998. However, the RAC's status was repeatedly devolved and it is rarely used to implement Kazan's policies on religion. In contrast, Kazakhstan does not have to comply with a higher layer of government. In this institutional context, policies on religion are more frequently conducted under official cover. Kazakhstan passed a law in 2011, which officially tightly regulated all religious groups, and in practice was the initial start of co-opting Islam. The RAC was officially encharged with implementing the 2011 law on religion.

Additionally, we would also expect a difference in how Islam is securitized by national and sub-national regimes. Securitization rhetoric in a subnational regime that presents a current threat existing *within* the (subnational) region could weaken the boundary control between the national and sub-national regimes. Such framing could provide a pretext for the national regime to reduce the autonomy of the subnational regime.

An initially surprising result is the similarity in which both regimes frame co-optation efforts as measures to deter extremism and Salafism. Both regimes frame extremism as a pressing and current threat within Kazakhstan and Tatarstan. In order to deter national intrusion, elites in Tatarstan portray the threat of extremism as emanating from other Muslim republics in Russia, most notably Chechnya, in addition to outside sources. Alternatively, in Kazakhstan, the threat of extremism is attributed almost exclusively to foreign outsiders. In both cases, elites put forward a construct Kazakh and Tatar Islam, as "moderate" Islam. Notably, the refences to tradition, external threats, extremism, Hanafism, and Salafism are broad and frequently nebulous. These ill-defined threats intentionally allow audiences to attach their own meanings to this framing.

Effectiveness of Co-opting Islam in National and Sub-National Muslim Majorities

As a national authoritarian regime, Kazakhstan has at its disposal both a quasi-governmental agency that provides distance between religious policy implemented and the government. Additionally, a national authoritarian regimes has the unfettered ability to deploy the institutions of the government, including governmental agencies and the law. Given this dually pronged approach, we would expect the regime's efforts to co-opt Islam to be more effective compared to Tatarstan. Alternatively, as a subnational regime, Tatarstan, is hampered by national law and must pursue co-optation primarily in the unofficial sphere. While Moscow does have a legitimate security interest in deterring violence, it is also not in Moscow's interest for a strong nationalist movement underpinned by religious identity to foster in Tatarstan.

Effectiveness in this dissertation has been operationalized in several ways. The first set of measures examine whether people report using government or non-governmental sources (or neutral) of information. This measure reflects how well a

monopoly has been instituted among the sources of religious information people report using. The second set of measures examines where people vest religious authority. First, among governmental sources, do Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan report using sources that are readily identified as from SAMK or SAM RT? Secondly, how do people justify using the religious sources they cite? More specifically, do citizens in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan use securitization narratives deployed by either regime to justify using governmental sources of religion?

Overall, Kazakhstan was better able to maintain a monopoly on religious sources as expected. Interviews at mosques were conducted in order to measure whether the most targeted population, people at mosques, reported using governmental or non-governmental sources. Interviews at markets were conducted in order to approximate the general population and measure the proportion of Muslims who reported using governmental or non-governmental sources. In Kazakhstan, the majority of Muslims at mosques and markets reported using governmental sources. Alternatively, only a majority of Muslims at mosques in Tatarstan reported using governmental sources. Among the general population in Tatarstan, most Muslims reported using neutral sources.

Some unexpected patterns did show up. While still a minority, contrary to our expectation, more people at mosques in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan reported consulting non-governmental sources than people at markets. Additionally, the proportion of people at mosques in Astana in 2013 and 2015 who reported consulting governmental and non-governmental sources did not significantly change. However, between 2013 and 2015 an increased proportion of Muslims at government constructed mosques reported consulting both governmental and non-governmental sources, while less people at co-opted mosques reported consulting both

governmental and non-governmental sources. Moreover, a network analysis of mosque attendance in Astana, Almaty, and Kazan showed that mosques with a high proportion of Muslims who reported using non-governmental sources also had a high level of attendance linkages with government constructed mosques.

These unexpected patterns can only be partially explained by individual demographic variables. The titular ethnic group in Tatarstan and the titular ethnic group in Kazakhstan in 2013 were more likely than ethnic minorities to report using governmental sources. However, the Kazakhstani regime learned that repressing ethnic minority rights in the religious realm incurred resentment and granted some language concessions in 2015. In response, in 2015 ethnic minorities in Astana, Kazakhstan were almost as likely to report using governmental sources as the titular ethnicity.

More frequent mosques attendance was correlated with reporting using governmental sources of religious information. Less women reported using non-government sources in Tatarstan relative to Kazakhstan. More resoundingly, these unexpected patterns pointed to a different understanding of the role the mosque in religious practice than I initially anticipated. Neither Muslims in Kazakhstan nor Tatarstan reported selecting mosques for ideological reasons, hence the lack of a relationship between government constructed mosques and governmental sources of information on the one hand, and non-governmental sources and co-opted mosques on the other. The most common reason people cited for selecting mosques was the location. For women in Tatarstan, the availability of educational opportunities was also a deciding factor, and likely explains why a higher proportion of women reported using governmental sources of information relative to men in Tatarstan. Overall,

people viewed mosques as sites of personal religious practice, unrelated to the government or ideology.

While mosque selection was not an ideological choice, most people reported using government sources in Kazakhstan, and only a minority in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan reported using non-governmental sources. In order to investigate more directly whether people perceived governmental sources as authoritative, I examined the types of governmental sources people reported using. As expected, a higher proportion of Muslims in Kazakhstan reported using religious source explicitly associated with SAM than Muslims in Tatarstan. About one in three Muslims who reported using governmental sources in Kazakhstan reported using explicit SAMK sources, compared to one in ten in Tatarstan who reported using explicit SAM RT sources. Thus, more Muslims in Kazakhstan perceived sources directly associated with the Muslim institution constructed by the regime to be authoritative, though this relationship to the regime is concealed. Moreover, there was evidence that Astana's efforts have been more effective over time— the proportion of Muslims in Astana who reported using governmental source explicitly linked to SAMK increased between 2013 and 2015.

Both regimes had limited success, however, in co-opting Islam through securitization. There was also not a significant difference between Kazakhstan and Tatarstan in the proportion of Muslims who cited securitization or identity in narratives to justify their reported selection of religious sources. Only about one in ten Muslims in either Kazakhstan or Tatarstan referenced securitization narratives as a justification for using government sources of information such as the threat of extremism or negative foreign influences. Less than one in ten Muslim in either Kazakhstan or Tatarstan who reported using governmental sources cited the

importance of protecting national Tatar or Kazakh nationhood, religious identity, or tradition to justify using a governmental source.

Among the minority of Muslims who reported using non-governmental sources, almost all justified their selection of religious advice because they stated that the source was foreign and/or Salafi. While Salafism was most frequently used as a pejorative word by elites, a minority in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan do self-identify as Salafi. Moreover, when interviewees discussed non-governmental sources, they often stated that foreign sources, most particularly sources from Saudi Arabia, had inherent religious authority that they believed sources originating from Kazakhstan or Tatarstan lacked.

While most Muslims did not both cite using governmental sources and justify this selection using narratives about security or identity, both regimes did have success in framing the discussion about authority and foreignness. Not a single interviewee in Tatarstan or Kazakhstan justified their selection of a non-governmental source using narratives about tradition or Kazakh or Tatar identity. Rather these narratives were only used by respondents to justify using governmental (and neutral sources). Thus, narratives about traditional and national religious identity were solely under the purview of the regime, even if only cited by a minority.

A minority of Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan cited using governmental sources because of security or identity and only a minority report using non-governmental sources. Despite this, most Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan used religious sources that were readily available—governmental sources in Kazakhstan and neutral sources in Tatarstan. After decades of religiously based propaganda under the Soviet Union, it appears that most people continue to view religion through the lens of personal practice, not broader theological or ideological concerns. Thus, the

success of co-opting Islam is likely based on the scale of an administrative project to provide governmental religious sources and restrict other sources of religious information. Pointedly, the success of this endeavor does not rest primarily on propaganda. A national regime is better disposed to carry out an unfettered large-scale administrative project than a sub-national regime.

Implications

The perceived relationship among governmental sources, the religious institution for Islam, and the regime, or lack thereof, likely allows for the co-optation of Islam to remain an administrative project. On the one hand, more Muslims cite using overt SAM sources in Kazakhstan, which is indicative of a higher level of success—more people elect to consult sources linked to the religious institution created by the regime and view SAMK as an authoritative body. On the other, if Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan use SAMK or SAM RT sources but do not connect these sources back (1) to the regime or (2) even to SAMK or SAM RT itself, there is less potential for religiously based opposition to arise and agitate against the construction of a religious monopoly. If the perceived authority in governmental sources is attributed to numerous individual actors or sources, it would be more difficult to harness a religious movement based on resistance to the regime's co-optation of Islam. For example, if a person uses a book at a mosque (from SAM RT) and states that they use the book because the imam at the mosque recommended it, they are inherently imbuing the imam with authority, not necessarily because it is a SAM RT approved book or because the imam belongs to SAM RT.

Both regimes intentionally repurposed a Soviet institution as a quasi-governmental agency. While Kazakhstan was able to use the tools of official government agencies and the law, it is important to note that Kazakhstan also elected

to use a quasi-governmental agency to co-opt Islam, even in the absence of a higher level of government preventing the use of more overt measures. If this façade is not maintained, a depreciable decline in the proportion of Muslims who cite using governmental sources would likely be observed. The lack of transparency in the relationship between the regime, religious institutions, and available religious sources is the crux of co-optation efforts by sub-national and national authoritarian regimes of Islam. While national authoritarian regimes have more tools (official and unofficial) at their disposal and hence are more likely to be able to successfully co-opt Islam, overplaying a more resourced toolset also holds the potential to incur more backlash.

Authoritarian Learning and Generalizability

This thesis has contributed towards our understanding of how authoritarian regimes learn. When engaging with *majority* religious groups, authoritarian regimes are learning that it is more cost effective to co-opt rather than repress in the first instance. Expanding our analysis to all Muslims republics in Russia, the republics in the Northern Caucasus have transitioned from attempting to repress Islam to the model of the Volga-Urals, co-optation. The Northern Caucasus engaged in heavy handed efforts to repress Islam in the 1990s and early 2000s. These efforts were largely ineffective—endangering the legitimacy of the republican regimes.

For example, in 2003 Kabardino-Balkaria closed every mosque in the republic.[922] This act repressed not only leaders of Muslim groups not associated with SAM, but the wider Muslim community, including all Muslims who wanted to practice their faith in public. In response, some citizens even

[922] Shterin and Yarlykapov, "Reconsidering Radicalisation and Terrorism: The New Muslims Movement in Kabardino-Balkaria and Its Path to Violence," 319.

petitioned Putin to be able to move to another republic within Russia or aboard in order to have the right of religious freedom.[923] Moreover, these actions in conjunction with state violence may have contributed towards legitimizing terrorism and the radicalization of the Kabardino-Balkarian Jammat (some of whose members went on to join the Caucasian Emirate.[924] The republican government has since recalibrated. Mosques are once again open in Kabardino-Balkaria. As part of this détente, independent communities, or jamaats, and some mosques, continue to have a presence in Kabardino-Balkaria. The effects of such widespread repression are still felt, however. In Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria, some Muslims continue to refuse to go to the central mosque (that is affiliated with SAM) in protest.[925]

Similar trends can observed in other Northern Caucasus republics such as Dagestan and Ingushetia. In response, most Muslim republics now primarily co-opt Islam through their respective Spiritual Association of Muslims. Moreover, this process is enacted through a familiar playbook—co-optation of mosques, co-optation of religious knowledge, and co-optation through securitization. Regional authoritarian regimes in Muslim majority republics in Russia have engaged in a relatively rapid process of learning how to engage with the majority religious group.

Expanding our scope of analysis again to the former Soviet Union, a range of approaches can be identified since the 1990s. Overall, like the subnational regimes in Russia, most national regimes in Central Asia have

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[923] Peuch, "Russia: Kabardino-Balkaria's Young Muslims Want to Emigrate To Avoid Harassment."
[924] Shterin and Yarlykapov, "Reconsidering Radicalisation and Terrorism."
[925] Hahn, *Russia's Islamic Threat*, 150.

likewise found co-optation to be the most effective method. Kyrgyzstan, like Kazakhstan, has primarily pursued co-optation and typically only resorted to repression to target specific individuals or groups. Kyrgyzstan also employs some formal institutions such as a governmental agency (The State Commission for Religious Affairs) and a law on religion (the law "On Freedom of Religion and Religious Organizations in the Kyrgyz Republic" was passed in 2008).[926] Similar to Kazakhstan, the law contains onerous registration requirements. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan has allowed for slightly more religious freedom than Kazakhstan—it has allowed 68 Muslims organizations (besides SAM) to register, including some Shi'i, Ahmadiyya, and Tablighi Jamaat communities.[927]

Uzbekistan presents an intermediate case. There have been some efforts at the local level to prevent children from going to mosques or receiving (official) religious education (through SAM).[928] The Mufti of SAM in Uzbekistan was dismissed in 2018, reportedly for pushing back against regime policies on Islam. However, starting in 2017, the Uzbek regime has allowed for public celebrations for Ramadan.[929] The regime has also started to complement its restrictions on religious education (prohibiting all religious education opportunities outside of SAM) by opening the International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan.[930] Overall, it appears that Uzbekistan is in the midst of shifting its polices on Islam to more closely align with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and prioritize co-optation.

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[926] "Kabak, "Freedom of Religion or Belief in the Kyrgyz Republic," 8.
[927] Kabak, "Freedom of Religion or Belief in the Kyrgyz Republic,"6-7
[928] "Uzbekistan 2018 International Religious Freedom Report," 18, 23
[929] Uzbekistan 2018 International Religious Freedom Report," 19.
[930] Uzbekistan 2018 International Religious Freedom Report," 23.

Azerbaijan also employs a similar institutional framework, using one major piece of legislation on religion (the 1992 law "On Freedom of Religious Beliefs) and a state agency (the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations). As with each of the aforementioned Central Asian cases, Azerbaijan also requires all religious groups to register. Muslims groups must seek approval from the Caucasus Muslims Board in order to request registration.[931] Repression has been primarily limited to the leaders of Muslim groups not associated with the Caucasus Muslims Board, particularly the Muslim Unity Movement.[932]

Tajikistan remains an exception in the region. Tajikistan still primary engages in repression. In 2019, the regime closed over 2,000 mosques.[933] To understand the scale of closures, the Committee for Religious Affairs claimed that 3,900 mosques were still operating.[934] However, in light of widespread criticism by citizens, the regime is apparently considering reopening some of the closed mosques.[935] In 2011, Tajikistan banned children from mosques, with an exemption carved out for children who study at SAM associated religious schools.[936] This ban remains in place.

Thus, across the post-Soviet space, national and subnational regimes are learning from one another. Most national and subnational regimes in Muslim majority states and regions recognize the high utility in co-opting Islam rather than repressing it. While the religious institutions for Islam in the Soviet Union were officially part of

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[931] "Azerbaijan 2018 International Religious Freedom Report," 3.
[932] "Azerbaijan 2018 International Religious Freedom Report," 6-7.
[933] Tajikistan Converts 2,000 Mosques Into Public Facilities."
[934] Tajikistan Converts 2,000 Mosques Into Public Facilities."
[935] "Tajikistan Mulls Reopening, Building New Mosques."
[936] "Tajik Mosque Ban For Kids Takes Effect."

the state, Muslim majority independent states and republics within independent states have elected to repurpose these institutions as quasi-governmental institutions.

While most Muslim majority states have also chosen to create a separate religious institution for Islam, there is variation in the type of religious institution selected and its relationship to the state. For example, the muftiate in Brunei is officially a government agency, the State Mufti Department. This arrangement is more common in the Middle East. In Iraq, the state religious institution for Islam was the Ministry of Endowments, which was split into three separate institutions—for Sunni, Shi'i, and minorities—in 2003 by the Iraqi Governing Council (which was backed by the United States).[937] Jordan has the Ministry of Awqaf Islamic Affairs and Holy Places[938] and Kuwait, the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs.[939]

While this dissertation has established the utility of a quasi-governmental agencies in the religious realm, this institutional setup is clearly not always selected. Future research should endeavor to answer why some regimes in Muslim majorities elect to create religious institutions within the government, while others use quasi-governmental agencies. Is this selection a process of policy diffusion with strong neighbor effects? Under what conditions are actors more likely to select a quasi-governmental or state agency? Additionally, we need more local data in order to establish the relationship between the government and religious agencies in other cases.

Studying Authoritarian Regimes

There are inherent issues in conducting research on authoritarian regimes. It is often not feasible (or safe) to directly ask citizens about their opinions on the regime,

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[937] Rabkin, "The Sunni Religious Leadership in Iraq."
[938] Ministry of Awqaf Islamic Affairs and Holy Places."
[939] Ministry of Awqaf & Islamic Affairs, State of Kuwait."

or in this case, about a quasi-governmental agency. In order to better measure and enhance our understanding of co-optation in authoritarian regimes and how people perceive these efforts, I used indirect interview questions to assess the types of religious sources people report using and their perceptions about religious authority and the regime. I subsequently coded interview responses based on knowledge I gained through fieldwork. I also examined religion at the local level, where it is often easier for researchers to gain access to data, in addition to the national level.[940] These types of methodological choices allow us to better examine sensitive topics in authoritarian regimes.

This research is the first study to identify the prevalence of religious institutions for Islam in Muslim majority authoritarian regimes and to examine why these authoritarian regimes select this institutional structure. It has contributed to our understanding of co-optation of religion in authoritarian regimes and the ways the co-optation of religion is both similar and different than the co-optation of other sources of potential opposition. Furthermore, this dissertation has contributed to our understanding of boundary control between subnational and national regimes and examined how these dynamics paly out in the religious sphere. Understandably, given the top down nature of authoritarian regimes, most research on authoritarianism examines the behavior of elites, as also examined in this dissertation. This study is unique in its disinterment of the voices of ordinary citizens in authoritarian regimes. This research sheds light on how ordinary people perceive authority and its implications for the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes.

[940] Reny, "Authoritarianism as a Research Constraint."

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Interviews

Kazakhstan and Tatarstan: Interviews with Government Officials

Astana

Director of Religious Affairs Agency, 2015.

Director of Astana Religious Affairs Agency, 2015.

Deputy Director of Astana Religious Affairs Agency, 2015.

Advisor A to Parliament, 2013.

Almaty

Director of Almaty Religious Affairs Agency, 2015.

Kazan

Former Director of Religious Affairs Agency, 2015.

Kazakhstan and Tatarstan: Interviews with SAM Officials

Astana

Spokesperson A of the Spiritual Association of Muslims in Kazakhstan, 2013.

Chief of Staff A of the Spiritual Association of Muslims in Kazakhstan, 2013.

Spokesperson B of the Spiritual Association of Muslims in Kazakhstan, 2015.

Almaty

Chief of Staff B of the Spiritual Association of Muslims in Kazakhstan, 2015.

Head of Spiritual Association of Muslims Printing Press, 2015.

Kazan

Chief of Staff of the Spiritual Association of Muslims in the Republic of Tatarstan, 2015.

Head of Propaganda of the Spiritual Association of Muslims in the Republic of Tatarstan, 2015.

Head of Propaganda of the Spiritual Association of Muslims in the Republic of Tatarstan, 2015.

Head of Propaganda of the Spiritual Association of Muslims in the Republic of Tatarstan, 2015.

Head of Propaganda the Spiritual Association of Muslims in the Republic of Tatarstan, 2015.

Kazakhstan and Tatarstan: Interviews with Imams and Mosque Employees

Astana

Imam of Mosque A1, 2013.

Imam of Mosque A1, 2013.

Imam of Mosque A2, 2013.

Imam of Mosque A3, 2013.

Imam of Mosque A3, 2013.

Imam of Mosque A5, 2013

Employee of Mosque A5, 2013.

Imam of Mosque A6, 2013.

Imam of Mosques A7, 2013.

Imam of Mosque A4, 2015.

Imam of Mosque A8, 2015.

Employee of Mosque A5, 2015.

Almaty

Imam of Mosque B1, 2015.

Imam of Mosque B1, 2015.

Imam of Mosque B2, 2015.

Imam of Mosque B2, 2015.

Imam of Mosque B3, 2015.

Imam of Mosque B4, 2015.

Imam of Mosque B5, 2015.

Imam of Mosque B5, 2015.

Imam of Mosque B6, 2015

Imam of Mosque B6, 2015.

Founder of Mosque B6, 2015.

Imam of Mosque B7, 2015.

Kazan

Head Imam of Mosque C1, 2015.

Deputy Imam of Mosque C1, 2015.

Head Hazret of Mosque C1, 2015.

Imam of Mosque C2, 2015.

Imam of Mosque C2, 2015.

Imam of Mosque C2, 2015.

Imam of Mosque C2, 2015.

Imam of Mosque C3, 2015.

Employee of Mosque C3, 2015.

Imam of Mosque C4, 2015.

Imam of Mosque C5, 2015.

Imam of Mosque C6, 2015.

Imam of Mosque C6, 2015.

Employee of Mosque C6, 2015.

Imam of Mosque B7, 2015.

Employee of Mosque B7, 2015.

Imam of Mosque C8, 2015.

Imam of Mosque C9, 2015.

Other Elite Interviews

Astana

Tony Blair Associates Advisor, 2013.

Foreign Service Officer, U.S. State Department, 2013.

Director of Anti-Sect Center, 2013.

Human Rights Activist, 2013.

Foreign Service Officer, U.S. State Department, 2015.

Almaty

Member of Kazakhstani Academy of Sciences, 2013.

Kazan

Rector of Russian Islamic University, 2015.

Director of Islam Today, 2015.

Director of Islam Review, 2015.

Oxford

Tony Blair Associates Advisor, 2015.

Kazakhstan and Tatarstan: Interviews with Ordinary Citizens at Mosques and Markets

ID	Case	Location	Type of Mosque	City	Year
1	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
2	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
3	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
4	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
5	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
6	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
7	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
8	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
9	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
10	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
11	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
12	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
13	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
14	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
15	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
16	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
17	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
18	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
19	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
20	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
21	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
22	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
23	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
24	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
25	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
26	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
27	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
28	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
29	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
30	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
31	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
32	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
33	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
34	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
35	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
36	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
37	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
38	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
39	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
40	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
41	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015

42	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
43	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
44	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
45	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
46	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
47	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
48	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
49	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
50	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
51	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
52	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
53	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
54	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
55	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
56	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
57	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
58	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
59	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
60	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
61	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
62	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
63	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
64	Kazakhstan	Mosque B1	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
65	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
66	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
67	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
68	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
69	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
70	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
71	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
72	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
73	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
74	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
75	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
76	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
77	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
78	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
79	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
80	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
81	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
82	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
83	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
84	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015

85	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
86	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
87	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
88	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
89	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
90	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
91	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
92	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
93	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
94	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
95	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
96	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
97	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
98	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
99	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
100	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
101	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
102	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
103	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
104	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
105	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
106	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
107	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
108	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
109	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
110	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
111	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
112	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
113	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
114	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
115	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
116	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
117	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
118	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
119	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
120	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
121	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
122	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
123	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
124	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
125	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
126	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
127	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015

128	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
129	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
130	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
131	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
132	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
133	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
134	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
135	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
136	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
137	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
138	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
139	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
140	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
141	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
142	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
143	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
144	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
145	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
146	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
147	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
148	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
149	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
150	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
151	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
152	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
153	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
154	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
155	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
156	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
157	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
158	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
159	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
160	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
161	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
162	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
163	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
164	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
165	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
166	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
167	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
168	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
169	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
170	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015

171	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
172	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
173	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
174	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
175	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
176	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
177	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
178	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
179	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
180	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
181	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
182	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
183	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
184	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
185	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
186	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
187	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
188	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
189	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
190	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
191	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
192	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
193	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
194	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
195	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
196	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
197	Kazakhstan	Market B4	NA	Almaty	2015
198	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
199	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
200	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
201	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
202	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
203	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
204	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
205	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
206	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
207	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
208	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
209	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
210	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
211	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
212	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
213	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015

214	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
215	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
216	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
217	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
218	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
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221	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
222	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
223	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
224	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
225	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
226	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
227	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
228	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
229	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
230	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
231	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
232	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
233	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
234	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
235	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
236	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
237	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
238	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
239	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
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241	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
242	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
243	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
244	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
245	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
246	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
247	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
248	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
249	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
250	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
251	Kazakhstan	Market B2	NA	Almaty	2015
252	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2015
253	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2015
254	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2015
255	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2015
256	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2015

257	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2015
258	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2015
259	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2015
260	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2015
261	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2015
262	Kazakhstan	Mosque A9	NA	Astana	2015
263	Kazakhstan	Mosque A9	NA	Astana	2015
264	Kazakhstan	Mosque A9	NA	Astana	2015
265	Kazakhstan	Mosque A8	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
266	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2015
267	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2015
268	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2015
269	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2015
270	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
271	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
272	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
273	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
274	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
275	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
276	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
277	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
278	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
279	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
280	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
281	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
282	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
283	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
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286	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
287	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
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290	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
291	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
292	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2015
293	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
294	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
295	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
296	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2015
297	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
298	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
299	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013

300	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
301	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
302	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
303	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
304	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
305	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
306	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
307	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
308	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
309	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
310	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
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312	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
313	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
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315	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
316	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
317	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
318	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
319	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
320	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
321	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
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324	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
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328	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
329	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
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333	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
334	Kazakhstan	Mosque A1	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
335	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2013
336	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2013
337	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2013
338	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2013
339	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2013
340	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2013
341	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2013
342	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2013

343	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2013
344	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2013
345	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2013
346	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2013
347	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2013
348	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2013
349	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2013
350	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2013
351	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2013
352	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2013
353	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2013
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357	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2013
358	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2013
359	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2013
360	Kazakhstan	Mosque A3	Co-opted	Astana	2013
361	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2013
362	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2013
363	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
364	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
365	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
366	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
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368	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
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370	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
371	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
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374	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
375	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
376	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
377	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
378	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
379	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
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381	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
382	Kazakhstan	Mosque A5	Co-opted	Astana	2013
383	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2013
384	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2013
385	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2013

386	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2013
387	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2013
388	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2013
389	Kazakhstan	Mosque A6	Co-opted	Astana	2013
390	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
391	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
392	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
393	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
394	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
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404	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
405	Kazakhstan	Mosque A2	Government Constructed	Astana	2013
406	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
407	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
408	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
409	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
410	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
411	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
412	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
413	Kazakhstan	Market A1	NA	Astana	2015
414	Kazakhstan	Mosque A4	Co-opted	Astana	2015
415	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
416	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
417	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
418	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
419	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
420	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
421	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
422	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
423	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
424	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
425	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
426	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
427	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015
428	Kazakhstan	Market B5	NA	Almaty	2015

429	Kazakhstan	Mosque B3	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
430	Kazakhstan	Mosque B3	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
431	Kazakhstan	Mosque B3	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
432	Kazakhstan	Mosque B3	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
433	Kazakhstan	Mosque B3	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
434	Kazakhstan	Mosque B3	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
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442	Kazakhstan	Mosque B3	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
443	Kazakhstan	Mosque B3	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
444	Kazakhstan	Mosque B3	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
445	Kazakhstan	Mosque B3	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
446	Kazakhstan	Mosque B3	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
447	Kazakhstan	Mosque B2	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
448	Kazakhstan	Mosque B2	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
449	Kazakhstan	Mosque B2	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
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456	Kazakhstan	Mosque B2	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
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461	Kazakhstan	Mosque B2	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
462	Kazakhstan	Mosque B2	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
463	Kazakhstan	Mosque B2	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
464	Kazakhstan	Mosque B6	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
465	Kazakhstan	Mosque B6	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
466	Kazakhstan	Mosque B6	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
467	Kazakhstan	Mosque B6	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
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482	Kazakhstan	Mosque B6	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
483	Kazakhstan	Mosque B6	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
484	Kazakhstan	Mosque B4	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
485	Kazakhstan	Mosque B4	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
486	Kazakhstan	Mosque B4	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
487	Kazakhstan	Mosque B4	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
488	Kazakhstan	Mosque B4	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
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490	Kazakhstan	Mosque B4	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
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492	Kazakhstan	Mosque B4	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
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495	Kazakhstan	Mosque B4	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
496	Kazakhstan	Mosque B4	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
497	Kazakhstan	Mosque B4	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
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502	Kazakhstan	Mosque B4	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
503	Kazakhstan	Mosque B4	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
504	Kazakhstan	Mosque B4	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
505	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
506	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
507	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
508	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
509	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
510	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
511	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
512	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
513	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
514	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015

515	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
516	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
517	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
518	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
519	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
520	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
521	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
522	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
523	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
524	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
525	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
526	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
527	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
528	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
529	Kazakhstan	Mosque B5	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
530	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
531	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
532	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
533	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
534	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
535	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
536	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
537	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
538	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
539	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
540	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
541	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
542	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
543	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
544	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
545	Kazakhstan	Mosque B7	Co-opted	Almaty	2015
546	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
547	Kazakhstan	Mosque B8	Government Constructed	Almaty	2015
548	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
549	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
550	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
551	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
552	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
553	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
554	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
555	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
556	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
557	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015

558	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
559	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
560	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
561	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
562	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
563	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
564	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
565	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
566	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
567	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
568	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
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571	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
572	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
573	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
574	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
575	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
576	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
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578	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
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580	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
581	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
582	Tatarstan	Market C1	NA	Kazan	2015
583	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
584	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
585	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
586	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
587	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
588	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
589	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
590	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
591	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
592	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
593	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
594	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
595	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
596	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
597	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
598	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
599	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
600	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015

601	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
602	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
603	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
604	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
605	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
606	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
607	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
608	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
609	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
610	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
611	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
612	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
613	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
614	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
615	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
616	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
617	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
618	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
619	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
620	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
621	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
622	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
623	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
624	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
625	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
626	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
627	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
628	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
629	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
630	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
631	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
632	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
633	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
634	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
635	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
636	Tatarstan	Mosque C7	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
637	Tatarstan	Mosque C7	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
638	Tatarstan	Mosque C8	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
639	Tatarstan	Mosque C7	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
640	Tatarstan	Mosque C8	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
641	Tatarstan	Mosque C8	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
642	Tatarstan	Mosque C8	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
643	Tatarstan	Mosque C8	Co-opted	Kazan	2015

644	Tatarstan	Market C7	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
645	Tatarstan	Mosque C5	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
646	Tatarstan	Mosque C5	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
647	Tatarstan	Mosque C5	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
648	Tatarstan	Mosque C5	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
649	Tatarstan	Mosque C7	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
650	Tatarstan	Mosque C8	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
651	Tatarstan	Mosque C8	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
652	Tatarstan	Mosque C5	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
653	Tatarstan	Mosque C5	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
654	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
655	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
656	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
657	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
658	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
659	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
660	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
661	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
662	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
663	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
664	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
665	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
666	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
667	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
668	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
669	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
670	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
671	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
672	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
673	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
674	Tatarstan	Market C5	NA	Kazan	2015
675	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
676	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
677	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
678	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
679	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
680	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
681	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
682	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
683	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
684	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
685	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
686	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015

687	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
688	Tatarstan	Mosque C6	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
689	Tatarstan	Mosque C6	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
690	Tatarstan	Mosque C6	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
691	Tatarstan	Mosque C6	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
692	Tatarstan	Mosque C6	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
693	Tatarstan	Mosque C6	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
694	Tatarstan	Mosque C6	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
695	Tatarstan	Mosque C5	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
696	Tatarstan	Mosque C5	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
697	Tatarstan	Mosque C5	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
698	Tatarstan	Mosque C5	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
699	Tatarstan	Mosque C5	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
700	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
701	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
702	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
703	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
704	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
705	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
706	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
707	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
708	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
709	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
710	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
711	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
712	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
713	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
714	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
715	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
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717	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
718	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
719	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
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721	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
722	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
723	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
724	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
725	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
726	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
727	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
728	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
729	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015

730	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
731	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
732	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
733	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
734	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
735	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
736	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
737	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
738	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
739	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
740	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
741	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
742	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
743	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
744	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
745	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
746	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
747	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
748	Tatarstan	Mosque C3	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
749	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
750	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
751	Tatarstan	Mosque C2	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
752	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	
753	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
754	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
755	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
756	Tatarstan	Mosque C1	Government Constructed	Kazan	2015
757	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
758	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
759	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
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761	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
762	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
763	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
764	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
765	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
766	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
767	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
768	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
769	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
770	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
771	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
772	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015

773	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
774	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
775	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
776	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
777	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
778	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
779	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
780	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
781	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
782	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
783	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
784	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
785	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
786	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
787	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
788	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
789	Tatarstan	Market C2	NA	Kazan	2015
790	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
791	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
792	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
793	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
794	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
795	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
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797	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
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802	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
803	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
804	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
805	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
806	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
807	Tatarstan	Market C4	NA	Kazan	2015
808	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
809	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
810	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
811	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
812	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
813	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
814	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
815	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015

816	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
817	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
818	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
819	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
820	Tatarstan	Market C3	NA	Kazan	2015
821	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
822	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
823	Tatarstan	Mosque C4	Co-opted	Kazan	2015
824	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
825	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
826	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
827	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
828	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
829	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
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831	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
832	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
833	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
834	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
835	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
836	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015
837	Tatarstan	Market C6	NA	Kazan	2015

Tables

Demographics: Age at Mosques

Table 1. Age at Mosques in Astana			
Mosque	**Mosque Classification**	**Mean**	**Median**
Mosque A1	Government Constructed	33.77	*32.5*
Mosque A2	Government Constructed	*35.20*	*34*
Mosque A3	Co-opted	*33.17*	*28*
Mosque A4	Co-opted	*29.38*	*29*
Mosque A5	Co-opted	*35.56*	*31.5*
Mosque A6	Co-opted	*34.17*	*31.5*
Mosque A7	Co-opted	-	-
Mosque A8	Government Constructed	-	-

Table 2. Age at Mosques in Almaty			
Mosque	**Mosque Classification**	**Mean**	**Median**
Mosque B1	Government Constructed	28.33	25.5
Mosque B2	Co-opted	34.53	30
Mosque B3	Co-opted	33.08	30
Mosque B4	Co-opted	34.5	34.5
Mosque B5	Co-opted	37.96	34.5
Mosque B6	Co-opted	42.79	47.5
Mosque B7	Co-opted	31.4	33
Mosque B8	Government Constructed (Central)	28.4	25

Table 3. Mosques in Kazan			
Mosque	**Mosque Classification**	**Mean**	**Median**
Mosque C1	Government Constructed	45.77	40
Mosque C2	Government Constructed	36.92	27
Mosque C3	Co-opted	47.76	51
Mosque C4	Co-opted	48.03	*45*
Mosque C5	Co-opted	31.5	30
Mosque C6	Co-opted	46.57	43
Mosque C7	Co-opted	39.5	45
Mosque C8	Co-opted	45	47
Mosque C9	Co-opted	-	-
1 Mosque C3 was constructed in 1771, though closed during the Soviet Union and subsequently reopened in 2011 after refurbishment. 2 The imam of this mosque was unsure of the year when the mosque was constructed.			

Demographics: Gender at Mosques

Table 4. Gender and Mosques in Astana in 2013 and 2015							
	Men		**Women**		**Total**		
Mosques	**2013**	**2015**	**2013**	**2015**	**2013**	**2015**	**Overall**
Mosque A1	89%	96%	11%	4%	38	27	65
Mosque A2	69%	79%	31%	21%	16	14	30
Mosque A3	80%	75%	20%	25%	15	20	35
Mosque A4	92%	100%	8%	0%	13	3	16
Mosque A5	80%	100%	20%	0%	20	2	22
Mosque A6	100%	80%	0%	20%	7	10	17
Mosque A7	-	100%	-	0%	-	1	1
Mosque A8	NA	2	NA	1	NA	3	3

Table 5. Gender and Mosques in Almaty			
Mosque	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**
Mosque B1	47%	53%	30
Mosque B2	88%	12%	17
Mosque B3	56%	44%	18
Mosque B4	95%	5%	21
Mosque B5	88%	12%	25
Mosque B6	100%	0%	20
Mosque B7	100%	0%	16
Mosque B8	93%	7%	28
Total			175

Table 6. Gender and Mosques in Kazan			
Mosque	**Men**	**Women**	**Total**
Mosque C1	93%	7%	15
Mosque C2	79%	21%	14
Mosque C3	55%	45%	31
Mosque C4	72%	28%	32
Mosque C5	73%	27%	11
Mosque C6	100%	0%	7
Mosque C7	100%	0%	4
Mosque C8	100%	0%	7
Total			121

Demographics: Gender and Attendance Frequency

Table 7. Kazakhstan: Gender and Attendance Frequency Among Interviewees at Mosques		
Attendance Frequency	**Men**	**Women**
Never	NA	NA
First time	1%	2%
Once a year	1%	0%
Less than once a year, more than once a year	2%	6%
Once a month	4%	9%
Less than once a week, more than once a month	5%	11%
Once a week	16%	37%
Less than once a day, more than once a week	8%	20%
Once a day	23%	4%
More than once a day	41%	11%
Total	249	54

Table 8. Kazakhstan: Gender and Attendance Frequency Among Interviewees at Markets		
Attendance Frequency	**Men**	**Women**
Never	11%	11%
First time	0%	0%
Once a year	6%	13%
Less than once a year, more than once a year	11%	17%
Once a month	8%	11%
Less than once a week, more than once a month	1%	13%
Once a week	43%	23%
Less than once a day, more than once a week	7%	9%
Once a day	4%	0%
More than once a day	8%	3%
Total	72	64

Table 9. Tatarstan: Gender and Attendance Frequency among Interviewees at Mosques		
Attendance Frequency	**Men**	**Women**
Never	NA	NA
First time	0%	0%
Once a year	1%	2%
Less than once a year, more than once a year	0%	3%
Once a month	0%	2%
Less than once a week, more than once a month	6%	14%
Once a week	9%	28%
Less than once a day, more than once a week	11%	0
Once a day	21%	0%
More than once a day	51%	52%
Total	178	58

Table 10. *Tatarstan*: Gender and Attendance Frequency among Interviewees at Markets		
Attendance Frequency	**Men**	**Women**
Never	3%	18%
First time	0%	0%
Once a year	7%	29%
Less than once a year, more than once a year	52%	34%
Once a month	14%	3%
Less than once a week, more than once a month	3%	5%
Once a week	10%	8%
Less than once a day, more than once a week	3%	3%
Once a day	3%	0%
More than once a day	3%	0%
Total	29	38

Demographics: Profession and Attendance Frequency

Table 11. Profession of People at Mosques in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan		
Class	**Kazakhstan**	**Tatarstan**
Working Class	43%	46%
Intermediate	13%	9%
Salariat	25%	32%
Student	10%	7%
Unemployed	9%	7%
Total	201	114

Table 12. Household Profession of People at Mosques in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan		
Class	**Kazakhstan**	**Tatarstan**
Working Class	42%	42%
Intermediate	15%	12%
Salariat	31%	41%
Student	5%	2%
Unemployed	8%	3%
Total	200	114

Table 13. Kazakhstan: Proportion of Each Class that Does or Does Not Go to Mosque			
Class	**Go to Mosque**	**Don't Go to Mosque**	**Total**
Working Class	98%	2%	50
Intermediate	78%	22%	9
Salariat	95%	5%	37
Unemployed	100%	0%	10
Student	100%	0%	2
Total	95%	5%	108

Table 14. Tatarstan: Proportion of Each Class that Does or Does Not Go to Mosque			
Class	*Go to Mosque*	*Don't Go to Mosque*	*Total*
Working Class	91%	9%	22
Intermediate	20%	80%	5
Salariat	95%	5%	22
Unemployed	60%	40%	5
Student	80%	20%	5
Total	83%	17%	59

Religious Advice

Table 15. Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan: Sources of Religious Advice		
	Kazakhstan	**Tatarstan**
Governmental	67%	46%
Non-governmental	7%	7%
Neutral	26%	47%
Total	447	175

Table 16. Type of Religious Source in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan		
Source	Kazakhstan	Tatarstan
People	80%	74%
Books	48%	54%
Internet	34%	28%
Other	29%	25%
Total	452	176
Note: Results include all religious sources cited by interviewees		

Religious Advice: Astana and Almaty

Table 17. Astana and Almaty: Mosque Type and Religious Advice				
	Government Constructed Mosque		**Co-opted Mosque**	
Religious Advice	**Astana**	**Almaty**	**Astana**	**Almaty**
Governmental Religious Source	64%	79%	66%	75%
Non-governmental Religious Source	12%	5%	13%	3%
Neutral Religious Source	24%	16%	21%	22%
Total	82	57	77	106

Religious Advice: Mosques in Kazakhstan

Table 18. Religious Advice at Mosques in Astana				
	Source of Religious Advice			
Mosque	**Governmental**	**Non-Governmental**	**Neutral**	**Total**
Mosque A1	60%	11%	29%	55
Mosque A2	67%	19%	15%	27
Mosque A3	58%	13%	29%	31
Mosque A4	71%	21%	7%	14
Mosque A5	84%	5%	11%	19
Mosque A6	54%	15%	31%	13
Mosque A7	--	--	--	--
Mosque A8	--	--	--	--
Total				159

Table 19. Sources of Religious Advice at Mosques in Almaty				
Mosque	**Source of Religious Advice**			**Total**
	Governmental	**Non-governmental**	**Neutral**	
Mosque B1	80%	7%	13%	30
Mosque B2	73%	0%	27%	15
Mosque B3	59%	6%	35%	17
Mosque B4	72%	0%	28%	18
Mosque B5	79%	4%	17%	24
Mosque B6	82%	0%	18%	17
Mosque B7	87%	7%	7%	15
Mosque B8* Central	78%	4%	18%	27
Total				163

Religious Advice: Mosques in Kazan

Table 20. Mosques in Kazan					
		Sources of Religious Advice			
Mosque	**Mosque Type**	**Governmental**	**Non-Governmental**	**Neutral**	**Total**
Mosque C1	Government Constructed	*87%*	7%	7%	15
Mosque C2	Government Constructed	*67%*	25%	8%	12
Mosque C3	Co-opted	*59%*	7%	33%	27
Mosque C4	Co-opted	*57%*	7%	*37%*	*30*
Mosque C5	Co-opted	*18%*	18%	64%	11
Mosque C6	Co-opted	*71%*	14%	14%	7
Mosque C7	Co-opted	*50%*	25%	25%	4
Mosque C8	Co-opted	*43%*	0%	57%	7
Total					113

Religious Advice: Ethnicity in Kazakhstan

Table 21. Kazakhstan: Ethnic Kazakhs and Religious Advice				
Mosque	**Governmental**	**Non-governmental**	**Neutral**	**Total**
Mosque A1	60%	9%	30%	53
Mosque A2	75%	13%	13%	24
Mosque A3	55%	14%	31%	29
Mosque A4	71%	21%	7%	14
Mosque A5	88%	0%	13%	16
Mosque A6	46%	18%	36%	11
Mosque A7	-	-	-	-
Mosque A8	100%	0%	0%	1
Mosque B1	79%	7%	14%	29
Mosque B2	71%	0%	29%	14
Mosque B3	63%	6%	31%	16
Mosque B4	83%	0%	17%	6
Mosque B5	74%	9%	17%	23
Mosque B6	75%	0%	25%	4
Mosque B7	92%	0%	8%	12
Mosque B8	88%	0%	13%	24

Religious Advice: Attendance Frequency

Table 23. Kazakhstan: Attendance Frequency and Religious Advice				
Attendance Frequency	**Governmental**	**Non-governmental**	**Neutral**	**Total**
Never	50%	19%	31%	16
First time	50%	50%	0%	2
Once a year	45%	0%	55%	11
Less than once a month, more than once a year	32%	14%	55%	22
Once a month	63%	4%	33%	24
Less than once a week, more than once a month	58%	8%	33%	24
Once a week	73%	1%	27%	95
Less than once a day, more than once a week	68%	8%	24%	38
Once a day	73%	16%	11%	56
More than once a day	71%	8%	21%	109
Total				397
No interviewees at mosques in Tatarstan cited going less than once a week, but more than once a month.				

Table 24. Tatarstan: Attendance Frequency and Religious Advice				
Attendance Frequency	**Governmental**	**Non-governmental**	**Neutral**	**Total**
Never	29%	0%	71%	7
First time	0%	0%	0%	0
Once a year	8%	0%	92%	13
Less than once a month, more than once a year	29%	4%	68%	28
Once a month	50%	0%	50%	6
Less than once a week, more than once a month	0%	0%	100%	3
Once a week	35%	22%	44%	23
Less than once a day, more than once a week	53%	13%	34%	32
Once a day	61%	11%	28%	18
More than once a day	51%	20%	29%	35
Total				165
No interviewees at mosques in Tatarstan cited going less than once a week, but more than once a month.				

Religious Advice: Region in Kazakhstan

Table 28. Kazakhstan: Region and Religious Advice				
Mosque	**Governmental**	**Non-governmental**	**Neutral**	**Total**
Astana	64%	8%	28%	25
Almaty	76%	7%	17%	58
Northern Kazakhstan	59%	3%	38%	34
Eastern Kazakhstan	61%	12%	27%	33
Southern Kazakhstan	71% (including Almaty 73%)	5% (including Almaty 5%)	24% (including Almaty 22%)	137
Western Kazakhstan	57%	25%	19%	16
Central Kazakhstan	45% (including Astana 54%)	16% (including 13%)	39% (including Astana 34$)	31
North Caucasian Federal District, Russia	100%	0%	0%	2
Far Eastern Federal District, Russia	0%	100%	0%	2
Siberian Federal District, Russia	100%	0%	0%	1
Ural Federal District, Russia	50%	0%	50%	2
Uzbekistan	62%	0%	38%	13
Kyrgyzstan	100%	0%	0%	3
Tajikistan	40%	0%	60%	5
Mongolia	67%	0%	33%	3
Karakalpakstan	100%	0%	0%	4
Turkmenistan	100%	0%	0%	1
China	100%	0%	0%	3
Azerbaijan	100%	0%	0%	1
Afghanistan	100%	0%	0%	2
Turkey	67%	0%	33%	3
Indonesia	-	100%	-	1
Saudi Arabia	0%	100%	0%	1
Total				381

Mosque Selection

Table 29. Kazakhstan: Mosque Selection among Muslims Who went to Mosque Before and After the Establishment of Monopoly of Islam in 2012		
Mosque Selection	Prior to 2012	2012 and after
Location	85%	81%
Maintenance/Amenities	6%	8%
SAM	3%	2%
Crowd/Mosque Size	3%	2%
Safety	1%	2%
Accessibility	1%	0%
Religious Leaders	1%	1%
Community	0%	2%
Unaware of Other Mosques	0%	1%
Rejects Premise of Question	0%	2%
Family	0%	1%
Total	73	174

Table 30. Mosque Selection Among Muslims in Tatarstan Who Went to Mosque Before and After the Establishment of Monopoly of Islam in 1998		
Mosque Selection	**Prior to 1998**	**1998 and after**
Location	65%	70%
Maintenance/Amenities	6%	6%
SAM	1%	0%
Crowd/Mosque Size	1%	2%
Religious Leaders	2%	4%
Educational Opportunities	12%	6%
Friends	3%	2%
Family	0%	4%
Habit	2%	2%
Historical Importance	5%	2%
Language	1%	0%
Accessibility	0%	2%
Rejects Premise of Question	1%	0%
Total	**89**	**52 50**

Gender and Mosque Selection

Table 31. Gender and Mosque Selection in Kazakhstan		
Mosque Selection	**Women**	**Men**
Location	776%	83%
Maintenance/Amenities	15%	4%
SAM	1%	2%
Crowd/Mosque Size	0%	3%
Religious Leaders	6%	2%
Educational Opportunities	1%	1%
Friends	0%	Less than 1%
Family	0%	Less than 1%
Habit	0%	0%
Historical Importance	0%	Less than 1%
Language	0%	1%
Accessibility	0%	Less than 1%
Rejects Premise of Question	0%	2%
Community	1%	1%
Total	**86**	**256**

Table 32. Gender and Mosque Selection in Tatarstan		
Mosque Selection	**Women**	**Men**
Location	19%	78%
Maintenance/Aesthetics	15%	3%
SAM	0%	1%
Crowd/Mosque Size	4%	1%
Religious Leaders	0%	3%
Educational Opportunities	44%	0%
Friends	4%	3%
Family	0%	2%
Habit	4%	3%
Historical Importance	4%	4%
Language	0%	1%
Accessibility	4%	0%
Rejects Premise of Question	0%	1%
Community	4%	0%
Total	**50**	**101**

Reasons for Changing Mosques

Table 33. Reasons for Changing Mosques		
Reasons for Changing	**Kazakhstan**	**Tatarstan**
Location	80%	58%
Maintenance/Aesthetics	3%	8%
SAM	0%	0%
Crowd/Mosque Size	4%	0%
Religious Leaders	3%	11%
Educational Opportunities	0%	3%
Friends	1%	3%
Family	0%	0%
Habit	0%	0%
Historical Importance	0%	0%
Language	0%	0%
Accessibility	3%	3%
Rejects Premise of Question	0%	0%
Community	0%	0%
Closed	1%	11%
Guest	1%	0%
Safety	1%	0%
Unaware of other mosques	1%	0%
Weather	1%	0%
Dispute	1%	3%
Tour	0%	3%
Total	**76**	**38**

Reasons to go to Mosques

Table 34. Reasons to Go to Mosque		
Reasons to go to Mosques	**Kazakhstan**	**Tatarstan**
Life Events (birth, death, naming of child, wedding)	6%	6%
Find Comfort	13%	15%
Religious Leader	2%	2%
Better to Pray in Group	4%	3%
Forgiveness	3%	0%
Tourism	1%	1%
Feel Clean	2%	1%
Men	1%	0%
Soul	2%	9%
Family	Less than 1%	2%
Proselytize	Less than 1%	0%
Social justice	Less than 1%	0%
Tradition	1%	1%
Community	1%	2%
Dua	Less than 1%	0%
Fear of God	1%	0%
Dhikr	Less than 1%	0%
Religious Class	1%	2%
Language	Less than 1%	0%
Friends	2%	3%
Older	Less than 1%	0%
Advice	1%	3%
Dream	31%	0%
Habit	1%	1%
SAM	Less than 1%	0%
Obtain knowledge	4%	13%
Difficulties	7%	6%
Prevent terrorism	1%	0%
Read Qur'an	10%	6%
Holiday	6%	10%
Morality	1%	0%
Peace	3%	3%
Obligation	14%	11%
Receive reward	4%	10%
Pray	35%	15%
Read namaz	26%	12%
Friday message	5%	5%
Charity (give)	6%	7%
Charity (receive)	1%	0%
Culture	0%	1%
Ethnic diversity	0%	1%
Forgiveness	0%	2%
Repression of Islam under USSR	0%	1%
Avoid voodoo	0%	0%
Learn Arabic	0%	1%
Sacrifice animal	0%	0%
Total	299	151
Results include all reasons provided by interviewees		

Social Networks at Mosques

Table 35. Kazakhstan and Tatarstan: Social Networks at Mosques		
Go to Mosque with…	**Kazakhstan**	**Tatarstan**
Alone	45%	51%
Family	26%	30%
Parent(s)	2%	4%
Spouse	5%	7%
Partner (unmarried)	Less than 1%	1%
Child/Children	8%	8%
Grandparent(s)	1%	2%
Grandchild	Less than 1%	0%
Niece/Nephew	1%	1%
Family (general)	4%	6%
Friend(s)	26%	15%
Community	2%	1%
Colleague	1%	1%
Neighbor(s)	1%	2%
Total	**424**	**208**
Results include all reasons provided by interviewees		

Table 36. Kazakhstan: Gender and Social Networks at Mosques		
Go to Mosque with…	**Women**	**Men**
Alone	40%	51%
Family	36%	15%
Parent(s)	4%	1%
Spouse	10%	3%
Partner (unmarried)	0%	3%
Child/Children	18%	4%
Grandparent(s)	0%	1%
Grandchild	1%	0%
Niece/Nephew	1%	Less than 1%
Family (general)	2%	4%
Friend(s)	24%	29%
Community	0%	3%
Colleague	1%	1%
Neighbor(s)	0%	2%
Total	**126**	**271**
Results include all reasons provided by interviewees		

Table 37. Tatarstan: Gender and Social Networks at Mosques		
Go to Mosque with…	**Women**	**Men**
Alone	42%	57%
Family	33%	25%
Parent(s)	5%	4%
Spouse	11%	5%
Partner (unmarried)	0%	1%
Child/Children	10%	7%
Grandparent(s)	2%	2%
Grandchild	0%	0%
Niece/Nephew	0%	1%
Family (general)	6%	6%
Friend(s)	22%	13%
Community	2%	1%
Colleague	0%	2%
Neighbor(s)	2%	2%
Total	**64**	**138**
Results include all reasons provided by interviewees		

Appendices

Methodology Appendix

Case Selection

Case studies were utilized in order to examine the mechanisms deployed by national and subnational authoritarian regimes in Muslim majority states and regions to co-opt Islam and the effectiveness of these efforts. Obtaining access to data is an obstacle faced by all researchers conducting fieldwork in authoritarian settings. One strategy, employed here, is to collect data at the local level, which typically entails less surveillance.[941] Additionally, it allows for an increase in the number of observations.[942]

The cases of Kazakhstan and Russia provide a good set of comparable cases to better elucidate the similarities and differences between how national and subnational authoritarian regimes co-opt Islam. See Chapter One for a discussion of: regime type in Tatarstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia; the history of religious institutions for Islam in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet space; the proportion of religious and ethnic groups in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan; as well the shared Soviet experience and center periphery relations in each case.

Fieldwork was conducted in Astana and Kazan as capital cities are often emblems of the intended nation religious identity being constructed by a regime. Further fieldwork was conducted in the former capital of Kazakhstan, Almaty, to increase the generalizability of the study. Additionally, Almaty was selected due to its feasibility as conducting fieldwork required extensive networking. Adding an additional city in Tatarstan was not feasible at this time given the extensive

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[941] Markowitz, "Scientific Closure and Research Strategies in Uzbekistan*," 900.
[942] Snyder, "Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method."

networking required to effectively and safely conduct fieldwork. An additional city was feasible in Kazakhstan due to previous fieldwork and a preexisting network.

Mixed Methods

Top-Down Methods of Co-opting Islam: Data Collection and Analysis

I also sought to overcome the inherent obstacles to conducting research on authoritarian regimes by using a mixed methods approach. To deconstruct how each regime attempts to co-opt Islam, I first examined the mechanisms employed by each regime to encapsulate mosques and knowledge. Secondly, I examined the narratives used to justify co-opting Islam as well as the narratives about where the bounds of acceptable religious identity are drawn be each regime.

I assessed the top-down efforts by each regime to co-opt Islam via interviews with elite governmental officials involved in setting policies on religion at the national level, interviews with regional government officials, interviews with senior SAMK and SAM RT officials, and lastly, interviews with imams in each city. I utilized process tracing, which by connecting the phases of the policy decision process, allows the researcher to identify the various motivations behind the emergence of a policy decision.[943] This process allows for better elucidation of the relationship between each regime (Kazakh, Tatar, and Russian) and the institution for Islam in each case. Furthermore, linking this process to local imams allows for the process of co-optation to be traced to the most immediate level that affects citizens.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with high-level government officials and imams in order to provide an opportunity for detailed responses[944] and unveil information about co-optation that likely would not have been revealed through

[943] Tarrow, "Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide," 173.
[944] Huitt and Peabody, *Congress: Two Decades of Analysis*.

a more structured format. I was able to cross-reference co-optation mechanisms with interviews ranging from national elites to local imams, improving the reliability of my data. Moreover, I was also able to investigate when and why responses about co-optation differed. For example, in Kazakhstan the Director of the RAC claimed that the RAC and SAMK were completely unrelated entities, but regional RAC directors and imams openly discussed how RAC and SAMK coordinated policies on religion.

In order to analyze the narratives deployed by elites, I coded interview responses using Descriptive and Pattern Coding.[945] Descriptive coding is a first round coding method that identifies the basic topic of a text or sub-set of text.[946] Pattern coding allows for more in depth analysis and the identification of themes, causes, and explanations.[947] Pattern Coding was utilized to identify themes provided by government officials as to why the regime was co-opting mosques and more generally religious expression.

Bottom-Up Responses: Data Collection and Analysis

The bottom-up analysis seeks to determine whether the co-optation of Islam is effective. This is first measured by the proportion of Muslims who reported using governmental, non-governmental, or neutral sources of information. I examined whether the most targeted population of co-optation efforts, people at mosques, reported using governmental, non-governmental, or neutral sources of religious advice. I then examined the proportion among the general population (at markets) who reported using each type of religious advice (see Interview Locations and

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[945] Saldana, *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers Third Edition*, 89–91; 209–13; Miles and Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis : An Expanded Sourcebook*.
[946] Saldana, *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers;* Miles and Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis.*
[947] Saldana, *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers*; Miles and Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis.*

Strategy below). Additionally, I compared the proportion of people who stated that they consulted government, non-governmental, and neutral sources at government constructed and co-opted mosques. See Chapter Two for a discussion about the types of mosques. Moreover, I compared the proportion of Muslims who reported using governmental sources that were explicitly linked to SAM to the proportion of people who reported using governmental sources whose relationship to SAM was not readily apparent. I then contextualized this data by examining a network analysis of reported mosque attendance and by examining the role of the mosque in religious practice. Lastly, I assessed degree to which ordinary citizens reflect narratives used by the regime to justify using governmental sources.

Authoritarian regimes are inherently difficult to study, moreover so when the topic at hand is sensitive, such as religion. Studying bias, such as racial or gender bias, is also an inherently sensitive topic to study. In a U.S. context for example, very few people would admit in interviews or surveys to racial or gender bias— an example of social desirability bias. In the study of discrimination within the field of economics, behaviors rather than beliefs are frequently assessed.[948] It is not possible to directly measure which religious sources people actually use. However, along similar lines, I did not directly ask interviewees about their views on the role of the regime in the religious sphere. Rather I asked, "If you have a question about religion, whom or what would you consult for advice?" and, "How do you decide which sources are good sources?" These question were worded intentionally to not be controversial and allowed me to measure reported behavior as a proxy for the perceived authority. In other words, given the infeasibility of directly asking a

[948] See for example Bertrand and Mullainathan, "Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination."

person's views about the government or SAMK/SAM RT, I measured perceived religious authority based on which religious sources people report using. Yusupova, in describing fieldwork on everyday ethnicity, noted that interviewees in Russia would not always choose to answer question directly, but demonstratively.[949] Similarly Goode and Ahram note that a deductive approach is often best when conducting interviews in an authoritarian regime.[950] By asking first which sources people use (and then coding the response), I was better able to capture the proportion of people who use non-governmental sources. Secondly, by asking why people use this source in a neutral manner, I was able to capture more nuance in the responses.

Through fieldwork in 2013 I was able to determine which sources are produced by SAMK or SAM RT and which ones are approved by SAMK or SAM RT. These sources are coded as, "governmental." Non-governmental sources are sources that are either explicitly banned by the regime (sometimes the case in Kazakhstan) or are actively discouraged by the regime (as in Tatarstan). For example, if someone consulted a religious source that theologically differed form SAMK or SAM RT, this would be a non-governmental source. Neutral sources convey no information either way about the source's relationship to the regime. For example, if someone reported consulting a parent, grandparent, or the Qur'an—these sources would be coded as neutral. After asking whom or what an interviewee consults for advice, I would then prompt the interviewee if they consulted people, books, the Internet, or other sources. I coded each interviewee's response to which person, book, Internet, or other source. I then aggregated these to the individual level. For example,

[949] Goode and Ahram, "Special Issue Editors' Introduction," 826.
[950] Goode and Ahram, "Special Issue Editors' Introduction," 826.

if an interviewee utilized SAMK websites and consulted with an imam in Astana, both sources were coded as governmental, and the aggregate was governmental.

I also examined governmental sources' relationship to SAMK or SAM RT. Some governmental sources' relationship to SAM can be easily ascertained. For example, the mufti is the head of SAMK and SAM RT in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan respectively. Additionally, books produced by and approved by SAMK and SAM RT bear a prominent stamp of approval. Alternatively, other sources' relationship to SAM is not as readily discernable. For example, all imams are appointed by SAM, but this relationship is not self-evident. A higher proportion of people who reported using explicit SAM sources would be indicative that more people vesting authority directly in SAM.

In order to assess the narratives people used to justify using the religious sources they reported, I coded responses to the question, "How do you decide which sources are good sources?" using Pattern Coding. Pattern Coding was employed to identify the themes or rationales for why an interviewee did or did not seek religious guidance from government sponsored sources.

Additionally, I asked people at mosques if they attended other mosques and if so, which ones. I also asked people at markets if they went to a place of worship and if so, which ones. I used the data from people who reported going to mosques to create a network of reported mosque network attendance. Network theory understands the social environment as an expression of patterns of relationship among units or actors.[951] These relationships or linkages amongst actors are a central point of inquiry for network analysis and are the mechanism through which actors transfer resources

[951] Wasserman and Faust, *Social Network Analysis*, 3.

or information.[952] Interviewees' reported mosque attendance is assessed in order to determine the degree of linkages among government constructed and co-opted mosques as well as through individual mosques.

When mosque attendees attend more than one mosque their common affiliation creates, "potential conduits of information,"[953] which allows for information from one actor to reach any other actors within the network. In this framework, higher degrees of linkages between government constructed and co-opted mosques is likely indicative of greater effectiveness of co-optation, as there is more potential for information to flow from government-constructed mosques. Alternatively, lower degrees of linkages between co-opted mosques and government-constructed mosques is indicative of a lower success rate of co-optation at the co-opted mosque in question. See Network Analysis of Reported Mosque Attendance in Chapter Six for discussion of unexpected results.

Potential Response Bias

There is a risk that respondents will underreport using non-governmental sources and overreport consulting governmental sources. The latter is mitigated by the fact that it is not always evident which sources are connected to SAMK and SAM RT and moreover the relationship between SAMK SAM RT and the governmental is not readily apparent. By not asking directly about the government or SAMK/SAM RT, my research design was also selected in order to try to reduce both biases.

Additionally, in order to put interviewees at ease and increase the response rate and validity of the responses, I followed the guidance of Rivera, Kozyreva, and Sarovski on conducting interviews in post-Soviet countries to emphasize my

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[952] Wasserman and Faust, 4.
[953] Wasserman and Faust, 317.

institutional affiliation in order to reassure interviewees of the academic purpose of interview.[954] Additionally, I asked biographical questions towards the end of the interview in order to put interviewees at ease, following the experience of Sudman, Seymour and Bradburn, which is echoed by Rivera et al.[955] In contrast to Western Europe, biographical questions are often among the most sensitive interview questions in the post-Soviet space. Interviews were primarily conducted in Russian. I also reassured ordinary citizens that their responses would be anonymous and did not ask for names. This assisted in increasing the response rate and the validity of the responses. Lastly as I did not directly ask about co-optation, and therefore did not directly invite an opinion about the regime, this likely increased the response rate as well as reliability.

Fieldwork

Interview Locations and Strategy

To evaluate how citizens perceive regime efforts to co-opt Islam in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, I conducted 837 interviews with so called, "ordinary citizens," in Astana and Almaty, Kazakhstan, and Kazan, Tatarstan. I conducted interviews at both mosques and markets. The regime efforts to co-opt Islam in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan concentrate on mosques and those who more actively practice Islam in the public space. This focus is reflected in my efforts to assess how Islam is co-opted and how mosque attendees perceive them. Mosques are now the only public space available to publicly practice Islam. However, I also wanted to assess more broadly how the majority ethnic group, including those who do not

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[954] Rivera, Kozyreva, and Sarovskii, "Interviewing Political Elites: Lessons from Russia," 684–85.
[955] Rivera, Kozyreva, and Sarovskii, "Interviewing Political Elites," 684–85; Sudman and Bradburn, *Response Effects in Surveys : A Review and Synthesis*.

regularly go to mosques, perceive the regime efforts. Markets are one of the few sites where a cross-section of society from various classes, ethnic groups, and religious groups interact. I conducted interviews at markets in order to better understand how Muslims in general in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan perceive governmental efforts to co-opt Islam, not just among Muslims who go to mosques.

I conducted 547 interviews in Kazakhstan and 290 in Tatarstan. I first conducted 109 interviews with mosques attendees in Astana in 2013 as part of my MPhil dissertation. I returned to Astana for fieldwork in 2015 for my DPhil and conducted 80 interviews at mosques in Astana and 72 interviews at the main market in Astana. Additionally, I conducted 175 interviews at mosques in Almaty and 111 interviews at markets. I subsequently carried out fieldwork in Kazan where I interviewed 121 people at mosques and 169 people at markets. These interviews averaged about 15 minutes in length.[956]

Table 1. Number of Interviews at Mosques in Astana

Mosque	Mosque Classification	2013	2015	Total
Mosque A1	Government Constructed	38	27	65
Mosque A2	Government Constructed	16	14	30
Mosque A3	Co-opted	15	20	35
Mosque A4	Co-opted	13	3	16
Mosque A5	Co-opted	20	2	22
Mosque A6	Co-opted	7	10	17
Mosque A7	Co-opted	0	1	1
Mosque A8	Government Constructed	NA	3	3
Total		109	80	189

There are eight mosques in Astana. I conducted extensive networking in order to initially gain access to mosques in Astana. This involved multiple meetings with a high-level official in SAMK who granted me informal access to interview imams at one of governmental constructed mosques. This served as my initial opening into mosques in Kazakhstan.

[956] See Interview Questions below.

Prior to interviewing people at mosques in Astana in 2013, I first sought permission from the imam at each mosque during an initial interview with the imam. I then completed my interviews with mosque attendees and circled back around (when possible) to interview the imam again. During second interviews I asked more sensitive interview questions that had I asked prior, might have restricted my access to the mosque. The second interview (and subsequent interviews when possible), also allowed me to develop a rapport with the imams and thus, also the ability to ask more sensitive question and receive more frank answers about the involvement of the regime in determining and influencing content about Islam within mosques and appointments at mosques.

I conducted interviews at all eight mosques in Astana and randomly selected mosques in most rayons in Almaty and Kazan using the random number generator provided by https://www.random.org/.[957] In addition to randomly selecting mosques I randomly selected interviewees by asking the next person who exited the mosque if they would consent to an interview (after completing the previous interview).[958] I randomly selected a market in each rayon in Astana, Almaty, and Kazan. At markets in 2015, I randomly selected potential interviewees by asking the next person who passed by me (either entering or exiting the market).

I attempted to repeat the same process at mosques in 2015 as in 2013, by first interviewing imams, interviewing people coming to the mosques, and then circling back around to the imams again. However, after initially approaching the imam of Mosque A1, I was told that I would need to request permission from SAMK before speaking to the imam of the mosque. I requested to speak to a former senior contact at

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[957] "Random.Org: True Random Number Service."
[958] I chose to request interviews from people at mosques as they were exiting to be respectful and not interfere with why they were coming to the mosque.

the mosque, however, he was out of town. I subsequently tried to interview an imam at another mosque; however, this imam said that he was explicitly told not to talk to me in advance of my arrival. The restricted access to mosques in Kazakhstan is evidence of the further consolidation of the religious sphere in Kazakhstan by the regime.

I then requested an interview with the Head of Staff of SAMK. Ideally, I did not want to interview SAMK officials at the beginning of my fieldwork, given that I knew that it would invite more attention to my project. As in 2012, I had planned to first complete my interviews at mosques, prior to attempting to interview SAMK and governmental officials. This plan previously both allowed me better access as well as the ability to identify the various co-optation mechanisms in place prior to my interviews with senior officials. This prior knowledge allowed me to ask more pertinent (and at times, pointed) questions.

I met with the Head of Staff, described my research project, and requested an interview with him, as well as the ability to interview the imam at the government constructed mosque who requested SAMK approval. While I was able to ask a few questions, the Head of Staff requested that I provide various documents and then return. He subsequently asked that I provide my questions in advance. The Head of Staff then declined my request to an interview but did provide written responses to some of my questions. While our initial meeting was warm and welcoming, there was a shift in tenor when I arrived at our second meeting to learn whether he would consent to an interview. The tone of the second meeting was discernably colder. He also denied my request to interview imams, stating the he would only allow me to interview a pre-selected imam during an interview that was observed. I declined.

While I had existing relationships with several imams still assigned to mosques in Astana, I did not request interviews, not wanting to risk harm to them either professionally or personally. I subsequently conducted interviews with mosque attendees as they were leaving mosques. Notably, I did not conduct these interviews inside the mosques.

After conducting three interviews at Mosque A8, the imam came out and demanded to speak with me and stated that I could not interview mosque attendees without his permission. I conducted three interviews at Mosque A4, before being told that I could not stand on the property that belonged to the mosque. Mosque A5 was founded by a minority ethnic community. After realizing that my interviews were drawing more attention than usual, I decided not to return to conduct interviews with mosque attendees, given the potential for more adverse ramifications for the mosque's leadership. Mosque A7, as in 2013, was very sparsely attended. The imam of Mosque A7 stated that people typically only came during the last prayer time, which was at night. In 2013, I chose not to conduct interviews given the prayer time was after 11 pm at night and in a remote location. In 2015, I attempted to conduct interviews. Only three people came for the prayer time and I was able to conduct an interview with one of the three men (the others left while I was conducting the interview). Given I was unable to conduct interviews inside the mosque and the late hour (as well as a lack of public transportation in the area), I decided not to return for my own safety. Despite these difficulties, I was able to conduct a comparable number of interviews in 2015 and 2013 at Mosques A1, A2, A3, and A6.

In Astana there is only one main market, Market A1, where I conducted 72 interviews. From Astana, I traveled to Almaty to conduct fieldwork. Given my experience in Astana this time around, I was concerned about gaining access to

mosques in Almaty and particularly whether imams would be warned in advance about speaking to me. This did not appear to be the case and I was able to successfully gain access to mosques in Almaty.

Table 2. Number of Interviews at Mosques in Almaty		
Mosque	**Mosque Classification**	**Total**
Mosque B1	Government Constructed	30
Mosque B2	Co-opted	17
Mosque B3	Co-opted	18
Mosque B4	Co-opted	21
Mosque B5	Co-opted	25
Mosque B6	Co-opted	20
Mosque B7	Co-opted	16
Mosque B8	Government Constructed	28
Total		175

Unlike Astana, Almaty has numerous mosques. Thus, it wouldn't have been feasible to attempt to conduct interviews at the universe of cases (mosques) in Almaty. Using official SAMK official websites, http://mecheti.azan.kz/ and http://sunna.kz/, Google Maps and 2GIS (a Russian search engine and map service),[959] I identified over 120 mosques in Almaty. From there I randomly selected one mosque per rayon (neighborhood) that was within an hour driving distance from where I was based in Almaty. (With traffic, in practice commutes to several mosques frequently resulted in a three-hour round trip.) Eight rayons were within this parameter, and I randomly selected one mosque per rayon. The Central Mosque of Almaty, Mosque B8, was randomly selected. As in Astana and Kazan, if it had not been randomly selected, I would have included the Central Mosque in order to sample adequately amongst government constructed and co-opted mosques (co-opted mosques are more numerous in all three cities) and in order to interview imams at each government constructed mosques, whom all had varying roles within SAMK and SAMRT. In total, I conducted 175 interviews with people at mosques, 58 interviews

[959] "Google Maps,"; "Map of Almaty."

between the two government constructed mosques (the only government constructed mosques in Almaty) and 117 among the six co-opted mosques in Almaty.

Conducting interviews at markets in Almaty proved more difficult than I anticipated, due to a rash of fires at markets, several of which were officially deemed to be acts of arson.[960] I randomly selected a market in each of the seven rayons I randomly selected a mosque in Almaty. I excluded markets dedicated to specialty goods, e.g., car parts, as these were unlikely to be representative of the local population. Due to numerous markets being closed down and/or still recovering from fires, I ended up being able to successfully conduct interviews at three markets in Almaty.

Table 3. Number of Interviews in Kazan

Mosque	Mosque Classification	2015
Mosque C1	Government Constructed	15
Mosque C2	Government Constructed	14
Mosque C3	Co-opted	31
Mosque C4	Co-opted	32
Mosque C5	Co-opted	11
Mosque C6	Co-opted	7
Mosque C7	Co-opted	4
Mosque C8	Co-opted	7
Mosque C9	Co-opted	0
Total		**121**

As in Almaty, Kazan has numerous mosques. I identified over 90 mosques using 2GIS for Kazan, http://www.islamtat.ru/, and individual mosque websites. In 2015, Google Maps listed very few mosques in Kazan.[961] I initially randomly selected one mosque in each of the seven rayons in Kazan. One of the mosques I randomly selected was closed. I later learned that the imam of this mosque and some members of the mosque were accused by the Tatar government of being part of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Given this mosque was closed, I randomly selected another mosque within the rayon.

[960] See for example "Another Market Fire Strikes Almaty"; Satayeva, "Arson Declared Cause of Almaty Flea Market Fire"; "Fire in Almaty Shopping Mall."
[961] "Google Maps,"; "Map of Kazan,"; "Islamtat."

I initially interviewed the imam of Mosque C9. Despite only asking general questions (e.g., when the mosque was founded) this interview quickly devolved. The imam of this mosque accused me of being a spy and oscillated between recommending that I contact the FSB directly with my questions as they were better suited to answering demographic questions and threatening to report me to the FSB.[962] I ended the interview and randomly selected another mosque in this rayon.

I interviewed the imam of Mosque C6, which was an informative interview. The imam also facilitated several interviews with mosque employees. That day I conducted several interviews with mosque attendees. Towards the end of the day, two interviewees, unsolicited, began to describe how they used to belong to the mosque that was closed after being accused of being part of Hizb ut-Tahrir. They then described how they believed this to be inaccurate and a politically motivated charge. I didn't observe anyone else overhearing this conversation. However, when I returned the next day, I was approached by a security guard and asked to leave. When I replied that I had received the permission of the imam the previous day to conduct interviews, the guard insisted I leave. I requested if it would be possible to speak to the imam. The imam appeared visibly nervous when I spoke to him and emphasized how the Tatar president supports the mosque and implied that he did not want to jeopardize the mosque's standing with the government.

My initial introductions to Mosques C7 and C8 were also pleasant on the first day. When I attempted to return to Mosque C7 the imam said that he didn't want me to, "…focus on us".[963] The imam at Mosque C8 gave a more emphatic answer stating,

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[962] Acronym for Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, successor agency to the Soviet KGB.
[963] Interview with Imam of Mosque C7, 2015.

"I want you to be finished with our mosque. It is prohibited to come back. Enough with the interviews."[964]

I chose to conduct interviews at Mosque C1, Marjani, the main mosque of Kazan, last given it was likely to draw more attention. As also detailed in Chapter Four, after an initially productive day at Mosque C8, I was told not to return and forbidden by the head imam from conducting interviews at any mosques in Kazan. Given my fieldwork strategy, I had completed interviews at all other mosques in Kazan by then.

Knowing that interviews at mosques attract more attention than at markets, I chose to conduct these interviews at mosques first and as quickly as possible. Despite my efforts in all three cities to wrap these interviews up quickly, it is likely that by the time I arrived at Mosques C6, C7, and C8 (the mosques I visited last among the randomly selected mosques) my interviews had drawn attention.

Given I had anticipated this as a problem, I structured my fieldwork to start interviews in mosques, and then requested interviews with SAMK and then government officials. Directly contacting government officials prior to finishing my interviews at mosques would have likely resulted in being unable to conduct interviews at mosques at all. On the other hand, the process to request an interview with a SAMK or government officials is often a lengthy one. Thus, I finished interviews at mosques and simultaneous started the process of requesting interviews with officials while conducting interviews at markets, given that this is a less sensitive location compared to mosques.

The process of collecting interviews at mosques and markets was physically taxing. I routinely spent over 12 hours a day standing outside or near the entrances of

[964] Interview with Imam of Mosque C8, 2015.

both mosques and markets, seven days a week throughout the course of fieldwork (with weather ranging from over 30 to -20 °C).

Demographics

Ethnic Identity

As discussed in Chapter 6, I asked an open-ended question about ethnic identity, "Do you identify with an ethnic group"? This approach did not force interviewees to fit how they would describe their own ethnic identity into a preconceived list and unveiled more complex ethnic identities. Moreover, it likely captured minority ethnic identities that otherwise would have not been revealed by a more structured format. Several interviewees also used regions to describe their ethnic identity. All ethnic identities were coded as described. Complex identities that included two identifiers in different order were collapsed, e.g., "Tatar and Russian," and, "Russian and Tatar," became one code, "Tatar and Russian." However, the majority of Muslims in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan self-identified solely as Kazakh or Tatar respectively. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of how the ethnic distribution in my data compares to the most recent Kazakhstani and Russian censuses.

Religious Identity

I also asked an opened ended question, "Do you identify with a religious group?" during interviews about religion. This approach also revealed more complex religious identities as outlined in Chapter 6. When interviewees cited a complex religious identity that included two identifiers such as "Muslim and Orthodox" and "Orthodox and Muslim", I collapsed these into one identity, "Muslim and Orthodox." My approach to coding a religious identity as "Religious Unaffiliated" differed from Pew and other studies.

I distinguish between atheist, agnostic, and religiously unaffiliated. If someone self-identified at atheist or agnostic, I used this self-identification. Religiously unaffiliated in my data refers to if an interviewee stated that she not identify with any religion but also did not describe herself as either atheist or agnostic. This differs from Pew's approach to religious identity wherein, agnostic, atheist, and people who do not identify with any religion are collapsed into the category of religiously unaffiliated. [965] Pew also parses out ethnic and religious identity differently. For example, if a person interviewed by Pew identified as culturally or ethnically Jewish, but not religiously, Pew codes the interviewee as religious unaffiliated. When I asked about a person's religious identity, I utilized their self-identification. For example, several interviewees described themselves as Muslims but not religious, or even, Muslim but not a believer. In both cases I coded the interviewee as Muslim. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of how the religious distribution in my data compares to the most recent Kazakhstani and Russian censuses.

Gender

According to the 2009 Kazakhstani census, 48.2 percent of the population are men and 51.8 percent of the population are women.[966] According to the Russian census in 2010, about 46.2 percent of the population is men and 53.8 percent of the population is women (in Kazan the ratio was 44.5 to 55.5).[967]

In general, men are more likely than women to go to mosques as it is considered a religious obligation for men and not women. This dynamic is reflected in

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[965] See Pew Research Center, "The Changing Global Religious Landscape, Appendix E: Description of Groups," 24.
[966] Results of the 2009 National Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Analytical Report," *The Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan;* "The Changing Global Religious Landscape, Appendix E: Description of Groups.", 13.
[967] All-Russian Census 201, Volume 1. Population Size and Location, 645.

my own data. At mosques in Kazakhstan I interviewed 303 men and 61 women. In mosques in Tatarstan I interviewed 91 men and 30 women. Pew found that there was a 20 percent gender gap in Kazakhstan between men and women who report never going to a mosque (21 percent of men report never going to a mosque, while 41 percent of women report never going to a mosque.)[968] Junisbai et al. found that men are more likely to go to a mosque weekly, while women are more likely to pray outside of a mosque.[969] Similar data is not available for Tatarstan from other sources, though Pew lists the gender gap among Muslims in all of Russia as 24 percent (21 percent of men and 45 percent of women stated that they never attend a mosque).[970]

Thus, an inherent bias in my research design is the underrepresentation of Muslim women. I tried to rectify this by interviewing women who went to women's religious classes at mosque. In Astana, there were no classes for women in either 2013 or 2015. One of the co-opted mosques did have a class for women prior to being co-opted into SAMK.[971] I was unable to conduct interviews with mosque attendees inside mosques in Astana in 2015, and thus I wasn't able to stand outside the women's prayer room. In Almaty and Kazan, however, I stood outside the exit to the women's prayer room in order to try to improve the representation of women in my samples.

The proportion of women I interviewed in markets was closer to the population ratio. At markets in Kazakhstan, I interviewed 93 men and 88 women. In Tatarstan, I interviewed 67 men and 102 women. Of the Muslims I interviewed at markets in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan, 53 percent were men and 47 percent were

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[968] Pew Research Center, "The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity," 48.
[969] Junisbai, Junisbai, and Zhussupov, "Two Countries, Five Years: Islam in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan through the Lens of Public Opinion Surveys," 15–16.
[970] Pew Research Center, "The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity," 48.
[971] Interview with Person A, who previously went to mosque.

women in Kazakhstan and 47 percent were men and 53 percent were women in Tatarstan.

Age and Attendance Frequency

I asked interviewees if they went to a mosque and, if so how frequently they went to a mosque. Answers among interviewees at mosques ranged from first time (I actually interviewed three people in Kazakhstan during their first time going to a mosque) to five times a day. I sorted these answers into the following: First time; Once a year; Less than once a month, more than once a year; Once a month; Less than once a week, more than once a month; Once a week; Less than once a day, more than once a week; Once a day; and More than once a day.

Eighty-six percent of Muslims I interviewed at markets at Kazakhstan said they went to mosques. Seventy-five percent of Muslims at markets in Tatarstan cited they went to mosques. Pew found in 2011 from field interviews that 69 percent of the population in Kazakhstan attended a mosque.[972] Pew also found that nine percent of the population in Kazakhstan attends mosque once a week for jummah namaz and one percent attends more than once a week (a combined 10 percent attend mosque once or more per week). [973] Junisbai et al. found that in 2007 15.51 percent of Muslims in Kazakhstan "attend religious services at least once a week," while only 12.72 percent of Muslims attended a religious service once a week in 2012.[974] Junisbai et al. make an important contribution to regional research by replicating questions from the International Social Justice Project (ISJP), the International Social Survey Program

[972] Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 47.
[973] Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 46.
[974] Junisbai, Junisbai, and Zhussupov, "Two Countries, Five Years," 10.

(ISSP), the World Values Survey, and Afrobarometer[975] so that future research in Central Asia can be compared to other regions of the world.

However, there is an inherent bias in the wording of the question towards Judea-Christian terminology— notably the word "service". Interviewees could interpret this as whether they go to the Friday prayer, jummah namaz. Other interviewees may interpret the question as whether they go to a mosque at any time during the week.[976] The same wording of the question in 2007 and 2012 revealed a 2.79 percent decline in attendance. This could be due to varying interpretations of the question. However, given the timing of the second round of surveys, which is after the implementation of the shift in policies surrounding Islam and particularly mosques, this may indicate that a small portion of the population no longer goes to a mosque.

Junisbai et al. found that in 2007 older people in Kazakhstan were more likely to, "…attend mosque weekly," in 2007, but that by 2012, older people were no more likely than any other age group by 2012.[977] I'm aware of no other data that looks at age and mosque attendance in Tatarstan. Pew's data on Muslims in Russia is not broken down into regions. Across Russia, Pew found that younger Muslims (18-34) are 48 percent more likely than older Muslims to pray more than once a day.[978]

Among Muslims I interviewed at markets in Kazan, the most commonly cited attendance frequency was less than once a month, but more than once a year (42

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[975] Junisbai, Junisbai, and Zhussupov, "Two Countries, Five Years," 8.
[976] As a more broad note, the metric of attendance is not valid to measure difference amongst religious groups (rather than within a religious group.) See for example Searcy and Grant, "Denominational Differences in Religious Believing and Behavior." Attendance is a commonly used measurement of religiosity (in part, understandably, because it is the easiest metric to measure). Different religions entail different practices and norms about attendance at places of worship. Attendance frequency could be used to compare different groups within Christianity, but not to compare religiosity between different Christian and Buddhist groups for example.
[977] Junisbai, Junisbai, and Zhussupov, "Two Countries, Five Years," 15.
[978] Junisbai, Junisbai, and Zhussupov, "Two Countries, Five Years,", 18.

percent). Among people interviewed at mosques in Kazakhstan, the most commonly reported attendance frequency was more than once a day at 35 percent. Nineteen percent said they went to a mosque once a day and another 19 percent once a week. About 11 percent report going to mosque less than once a day, but more than once a week and 46 percent went once a week or more to a mosque. Table 4 below displays the mean reported age of Muslims in Kazakhstan by each attendance frequency category and Table 5 the mean age for each frequency attendance in Tatarstan in my data. Tables 6 and 7 show the break down in the mean reported age and attendance frequency between mosques and markets. The mean age in most attendance categories is in the 20s or 30s.

Junisbai et al. found that in 2007 older people in Kazakhstan were more likely to, "…attend mosque weekly," in 2007, but that by 2012, older people were no more likely than any other age group by 2012.[979] In my data, among the general population of Muslims (at markets), the most commonly cited attendance frequency was once a week (34 percent). In my data set from Tatarstan, the greatest proportion of people at mosques went to a mosque more than once a day (33 percent).

Table 4. Mean Age in Kazakhstan by Reported Attendance Frequency	
Never	38
First time	25
Once a year	34.2
Less than once a month, more than once a year	39.9
Once a month	38.5
Less than once a week, more than once a month	37
Once a week	33.6
Less than once a day, more than once a week	33.9
Once a day	31.2
More than once a day	35.3

[979] Junisbai, Junisbai, and Zhussupov, 15.

Table 5. Mean Age in Tatarstan by Reported Attendance Frequency	
Never	47.3
First time	0
Once a year	31.9
Less than once a month, more than once a year	35.2
Once a month	29.7
Less than once a week, more than once a month	24.3
Once a week	44.7
Less than once a day, more than once a week	47.7
Once a day	40.9
More than once a day	40.8

Table 6. Kazakhstan: Mean Age and Reported Attendance Frequency at Mosques and Markets		
Attendance Frequency	**Mosque**	**Market**
Never	NA	37.1
First time	25	0
Once a year	28	33.4
Less than once a month, more than once a year	33	41.3
Once a month	34.8	41.7
Less than once a week, more than once a month	34.9	41.4
Once a week	32.3	35.3
Less than once a day, more than once a week	32.4	40.4
Once a day	30.8	38
More than once a day	35.5	33.2

Table 7. Tatarstan: Mean Age and Reported Attendance Frequency at Mosques and Markets		
Attendance Frequency	**Mosque**	**Market**
Never	NA	47.3
First time	0	0
Once a year	22	32.2
Less than once a month, more than once a year	37	35.8
Once a month	30	30.8
Less than once a week, more than once a month	NA[1]	24.3
Once a week	49.5	26.4
Less than once a day, more than once a week	48.1	42.5
Once a day	39.8	29
More than once a day	41.7	27
1 No interviewees at mosques in Tatarstan cited going less than once a week, but more than once a month.		

Profession

I also asked all interviewees about their profession. Given the sensitivity about questions concerning income or household income, I used occupation as a proxy. I coded each response according to the International Standard classification of Occupations (ISCO) and then grouped these occupation codes according to the European Socio-economic Classification (ESEC) three class model as working class, intermediate, and salariat (professional).[980] I also included student and unemployed as

[980] "The European Socio-Economic Classification - Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER)"; "ISCO - International Standard Classification of Occupations."

separate entries.[981] Household occupation is utilized to better understand a person's general economic circumstances and to take into account that a higher proportion of women often do not work compared to men in heterosexual marriages. Both samples show similar proportions of each class among interviewees at mosques.

Regions in Kazakhstan and Russia

In Kazakhstan, it is often cited as common wisdom that the south of the country is more religious. This notion is also cited in some academic literature, often without empirical backing. Junisbai et al. use "support for shari'a-based law" as a proxy for religious orthodoxy.[982] They found in 2012 that there was no significant difference between southern and northern residents in their support for shari'a based law.[983] In Tatarstan, higher rates of religiosity are also frequently attributed to the Northern Caucasus. I asked interviewees how often they went to mosques and where they were born. I used the proxy of mosque attendance to measure religiosity. Despite these assertions about geography and religiosity, I am aware of no theoretical reason for rates of religiosity to be higher in southern Kazakhstan or the Northern Caucasus in Russia. As such, I did not expect to find a higher reported attendance rate among people from southern Kazakhstan or the Northern Caucasus.

Among Muslim interviewees at markets in Astana, 98 percent reported going to a mosque compared to 85 percent in Almaty. About 55 percent of Muslim interviewees at markets in Astana stated that they went to a mosque once or more per week. About 49 percent of Muslims at markets in Almaty reported going to a mosque

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[981] See for example Rose and Harrison, "The European Socio-Economic Classification: A New Social Class Scheme for Comparative European Research," 464.
[982] This is a common question in international surveys and interviews, though it is not without substantial critique. See Methodology Appendix.
[983] Junisbai, Junisbai, and Zhussupov, "Two Countries, Five Years," 22.

once or more per week. Thus, there is also no evidence in my data of higher levels of religious observance as measured by reported mosque attendance among residents in the largest city in southern Kazakhstan (Almaty) compared to the largest city in central Kazakhstan (Astana).

I asked an open-ended question, "Where were you born?" and subsequently coded the region. In Kazakhstan, I utilized the regions of northern, eastern, southern, western, and central.[984] In Russia I utilized the Federal Districts for regions.[985] Muslim interviewees in Kazakhstan stated they were born in each of those aforementioned regions in Kazakhstan as well as the cities of Astana and Almaty. Interviewees who said they were born in Russia reported the following districts: Central, Far Eastern, Northern Caucasian, Siberian, and Ural. Other interviewees said they were born in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, China, Afghanistan, Karakalpakstan, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Muslim interviewees in Tatarstan reported their place of birth as Kazan, other cities in Tatarstan, and other republics within the Volga Federal District. Interviewees were also reported that their hometowns were in the Ural, Central, Northern Caucasian, and Siberian Federal Districts. Other interviewees stated they were from Western Kazakhstan. The remaining interviewees reported being born in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Germany, Chad, Czech Republic, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.

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[984] Northern Kazakhstan includes the oblasts of Akmola, Kostanay, Pavlodar and North Kazakhstan; Eastern Kazakhstan includes the oblast of East Kazakhstan; Southern Kazakhstan includes the oblasts of Kyzylorda, Turkistan, and Jambyl; Western Kazakhstan includes the oblasts of Aktobe, Atyrau, Mangystau and; Central Kazakhstan includes the Karaganda oblast;

[985] Russia is divided into eight federal districts: Northwest, Central Volga, South, North Caucasus, Ural, Siberia, and Far East.

Among Muslims at markets in Kazakhstan, 88 percent of Muslims who reported being born in southern Kazakhstan also reported going to mosques. All interviewees at markets from who reported being from western Kazakhstan also reported going to mosques. Ninety-one percent of Muslim interviewees at markets who said they were from northern Kazakhstan reported going to mosques. I did not interview anyone at markets in Astana or Almaty who reported eastern Kazakhstani as their place of birth. There is no clear pattern between being from northern, eastern, or southern Kazakhstan and going to a mosque. There was also no relation between the district in Russia Muslim interviewees at markets were born at and whether they went to a mosque.

Religious Advice

Region

I also assessed whether a relationship can be observed between where a person was born and whether they rely on governmental or non-governmental sources of religious advice given similar narratives about the propensity of people from western Kazakhstan and the Northern Caucasus to be more likely to, "radicalize," which is associated with non-governmental sources.

The majority of people born in each region in Kazakhstan consulted governmental sources of information. People who reported being born in southern Kazakhstan were more likely than other regions in Kazakhstan to report consulting governmental sources of information.[986] People who reported western Kazakhstan as their place of birth were the most likely to report consulting non-governmental

[986] People born in Astana are included in Central Kazakhstan and people born in Almaty are included in Southern Kazakhstan in this calculation.

sources of information. All interviewees in Kazakhstan who reported being born in the Northern Caucasus also reported consulting governmental sources of advice.

In Tatarstan, sixty five percent of interviewees reported being born in Tatarstan. Of people born in Tatarstan, 48 percent reported consulting governmental sources of information. A third of people who said they were born in the Northern Caucasus stated that they consulted governmental and two thirds neutral sources. No interviewees in Tatarstan who reported being born in the Northern Caucasus reported consulting non-governmental sources. Only two interviewees in Kazan said they were from western Kazakhstan– one stated they consulted non-governmental sources and the other neutral sources.

Table 8. Tatarstan: Region and Religious Advice

Mosque	Governmental	Non-governmental	Neutral	Total
Kazan	50%	7%	19 43%	44
Tatarstan	44% (including Kazan 48%)	6% (including Kazan 6%)	50% (including Kazan46%)	36
Volga Federal District, Russia	0%	29%	71%	7
Ural Federal District, Russia	100%	0%	0%	1
Central Federal District, Russia	0%	0%	100%	2
Siberian Federal District, Russia	33%	0%	67%	3
Northern Caucasian Federal District, Russia	33%	0%	67%	3
Far Eastern Federal District, Russia	0%	0%	100%	1
Western Kazakhstan	0%	50%	50%	2
Uzbekistan	33%	22%	4 44%	9
Kyrgyzstan	100%	0%	0%	2
Tajikistan	22%	0%	78%	9
Turkmenistan	%%	100%	0%	1
Turkey	67%	0%	33%	3
Total				123

This study does not examine the religious environment in either western Kazakhstan or the Northern Caucasus. Interviewees who reported being born in Chechnya were not more likely to report using non-governmental sources of religious information. It is possible that more people in western Kazakhstan consult non-governmental sources of information— western Kazakhstan has been site to rare protests against the Kazakh regime. That question would be for another study,

however. The majority of people who reported being born in western Kazakhstan still reported consulted governmental sources, as did all other regions in Kazakhstan.

Profession

Kazakhstan and Russia are characterized by large wealth gaps. One might therefore expect that the working class would be more alienated from the regime and less likely to use governmental sources. Profession, however, did not seem to influence whether people consulted governmental or non-governmental sources of religious information.

The salariat (or professionals) in mosques in Kazakhstan were most likely to report consulting governmental sources as expected. However, in the general population, while a majority of the salariat also used governmental sources, more people in the intermediate and working class consulted governmental sources. At mosques, the working class were the least likely to consult governmental sources—as expected—though a majority of the working class at mosques still consulted governmental sources. The working class in the general population was most likely to consult non-governmental sources at 10 percent as expected. At mosques, the intermediate class was most likely to consult non-governmental sources.

Table 9. Kazakhstan: Occupation at Mosques and Religious Guidance

Mosque	**Governmental**		**Non-governmental**		**Neutral**		**Total**
Class	Occupation	Household Occupation	Occupation	Household Occupation	Occupation	Household Occupation	
Salariat	84%	79%	0%	6%	16%	15%	45 | 48
Intermediate	80%	48%	13%	8%	7%	44%	15 | 25
Working Class	72%	72%	6%	6%	22%	22%	83 | 83
Student	83%	95%	4%	5%	13%	0%	23 | 20
Unemployed	71%	71%	7%	7%	21%	21%	14 | 14[1]

Table 10. Kazakhstan: Occupation at Markets and Religious Advice							
Class	**Governmental**		**Non-governmental**		**Neutral**		**Total**
	Occupation	Household Occupation	Occupation	Household Occupation	Occupation	Household Occupation	
Salariat	37%	50%	6%	5%	57%	45%	35 | 42
Intermediate	63%	63%	0%	0%	38%	38%	8 | 8[1]
Working Class	61%	62%	10%	6%	30%	32%	61[1] | 50
Student	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2 | 0
Unemployed	67%	67%	0	0	33%	33%	9 | 3

At mosques in Tatarstan, a majority of all classes consulted governmental sources (as in Kazakhstan), while the intermediate class was most likely to report using governmental sources. The salariat at mosques was most likely to consult non-governmental sources— about a fifth of people in the salariat. This result was also unexpected.

Table 11. Tatarstan: Occupation at Mosques and Religious Advice							
Mosque	**Governmental**		**Non-governmental**		**Neutral**		**Total**
Class	Occupation	Household Occupation	Occupation	Household Occupation	Occupation	Household Occupation	
Salariat	51%	56%	23%	20%	26%	24%	35 | 45
Intermediate	75%	70%	0%	10%	25%	20%	8 | 10
Working Class	58%	55%	8%	11%	33%	34%	48 |44
Student	57%	50%	0%	50%	43%	0%	7 | 2
Unemployed	17%	0%	17%	33%	67%	67%	6 | 3

Table 12. Tatarstan: Occupation at Markets and Religious Guidance							
	Governmental		**Non-governmental**		**Neutral**		**Total**
Class	Occupation	Household Occupation	Occupation	Household Occupation	Occupation	Household Occupation	
Salariat	23%	19%	9%	8%	68%	73%	22 | 26
Intermediate	20%	20%	0%	0%	80%	80%	5 | 5
Working Class	15%	20%	0%	0%	85%	80%	20 | 20
Student	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	1 100%	5 | 1
Unemployed	60%	100%	0%	0%	40%	0%	5 | 1

I also took into account household occupation, which better takes into account a person's position within society (particularly for households where women who are married to men don't have formal employment). The salariat were still the most likely to consult governmental sources. The proportion of individuals in the working class compared to households in the working class who consulted each type of religious advice remained the same. Overall, profession does not seem to be a factor in whether people use governmental or non-governmental sources of information. Potential resentment of the regime among the working class does not seem to transfer to the

religious sphere. A majority of people at mosques in both Kazakhstan and Tatarstan and at markets in Kazakhstan reported using governmental sources.

When looking at the household occupation, which better takes into account a person's position within society (particularly for households where women who don't work are married to men), the salariat were still the most likely to report consulting governmental sources. There was less difference amongst classes on who reported consulting non-governmental sources (six percent of the salariat and working class each and eight percent of the intermediate). The proportion of individuals in the working class compared to households in the working class who reported consulting each type of religious advice remained the same.

Bottom Up Narratives

Danger, Violence, Conflict, Peace, Tolerance, and Sects

Several narratives that were prominent in regime messaging were hardly reflected by interviewees, notably narratives about danger, violence, conflict, peace, tolerance and sects. Very small proportions of ordinary Muslims used securitization with references to these themes to justify using governmental sources.

Despite both regimes emphasizing the value of peace, only one percent of interviewees in Kazakhstan referred to the importance of peace when deciding on which religious sources are authoritative. No interviewees in Tatarstan referenced the importance of peace when determining whether a religious source was authoritative.

In both Tatarstan and Kazakhstan, narratives about avoiding conflict were prominent among the elite— in the former these centered around religious unity and avoiding conflict while in Kazakhstan they prioritized ethnic unity and the vitality of avoiding ethnic conflict. One percent of Muslims in Kazakhstan and none in Tatarstan respectively referenced conflict as a reason to avoid non-governmental sources. No

interviewees in Kazakhstan referenced the importance of tolerance in determining the authority of a religious source, while one percent in Tatarstan referenced tolerance. One woman discussed going to a class at mosque in Kazan in order to learn Arabic and, "…Learn about the importance of religion and tolerance."[987]

Three percent of interviewees in Kazakhstan and four percent of interviewees in Tatarstan referenced the threat of danger and violence as to why they vested authority in a government source. One person worried about the violence in Syria spreading to Kazakhstan, "Terrorist, they might be coming other sources. We're a young country…Now people are all wrapped up in jihad…like in Syria."[988] Another stated that they relied on imams and the muftiate to avoid danger, "There's danger. Ask imams here (Mosque A3) and at madrasah (at Mosque A1). Good sources are from the muftiate."[989] Interviewee 57 stated, "There's some extreme information out there. It tells people to make jihad. I reject this. Or it proposes throwing stones at women, behaving or amputation. We have this propaganda here."[990] In Tatarstan, one contact referenced the danger of Salafism as a reason to rely on a governmental source, "…Because there is dangerous information out there, there is Wahhabism,"[991] while another reference a general environment of danger, "There is now a lot of danger."[992]

About one percent of Muslims in Kazakhstan cited an association between the presence of violence and danger to youth. A respondent stated that the youth were swayed by negative foreign influences, "Young people, who say prayer differently,

[987] Interviewee 276, Tatarstan.
[988] Interviewee 877, Kazakhstan.
[989] Interviewee 381, Kazakhstan.
[990] Interviewee 57, Kazakhstan.
[991] Interviewee 646, Tatarstan.
[992] Interviewee 841, Tatarstan.

they use Arabic, they don't know what they're saying."[993] Similarly, a respondent said, "I'm not extreme. I notice that the youngsters are more extreme."[994] Less than one percent of Muslims in Tatarstan expressed the same sentiment. The only interviewee that discussed the propensity of the youth for extremism or lack of knowledge stated, "I don't go on the internet because now there are many young scholars."[995]

Two percent of interviewees in Kazakhstan expressed fear of sects and thus believed they avoided this threat by using governmental sources. For example, "But there are propaganda sects here... I ask at the mosque, but I'm worried about fanatics and propaganda…. That's why questions should go to the mullah or imam."[996] Similarly, Interviewee 505 stated, "I want to avoid sects, so I get advice from mullah."[997] No interviewees referenced the threat of sects in Tatarstan.

Role of Religion in Society

I also examined more broadly the role religion in society, including how religious knowledge is passed on, how central religion is in people's lives, and what practices people engaged in because of their religious identity.

[993] Interviewee 303, Kazakhstan.
[994] Interviewee 671, Kazakhstan.
[995] Interviewee 889, Tatarstan.
[996] Interviewee 879, Kazakhstan.
[997] Interviewee 344, Kazakhstan.

Learn about Islam

Table 12. Where People Learned about Islam		
Source	**Kazakhstan**	**Tatarstan**
Family	45%	57%
Friend(s)	7%	3%
Spouse	1%	3%
Partner (unmarried)	Less than 1%	0%
God	2%	3%
Mosque	3%	1%
Imam	3%	1%
Mullah/Hazret	0%	1%
Madrasah	Less than 1%	0%
Mufti	0%	0%
Friday message	Less than 1%	0%
Qur'an	1%	2%
Hadith	0%	1%
Prayer	Less than 1%	3%
Read namaz	0%	0%
SAM	Less than 1%	0%
Foreign religious leaders	0%	0%
Elders	4%	1 1%
Myself	1%	7%
Neighbor(s)	0%	0%
Acquaintance	0%	0%
School	3%	1%
Internet	0%	0%
Books	Less than 1%	1%
Foreign Religious Leader	1%	0%
Sheikh	0%	1%
General Environment	13%	5%
Ethnically Muslim	10%	9%
Don't Know	3%	3%
Total	**258**	**152**

Zooming back out to how religious knowledge is transferred and the role of religion among average citizens, I investigated where people learned about Islam. Most Muslim interviewees said that they learned about Islam from a family member—57 percent in Tatarstan and 45 percent in Kazakhstan. Thirteen percent of Muslims in Kazakhstan said that because they grew up in Kazakhstan, they grew up in a Muslim environment (and were unable to further pinpoint where they first learned about Islam). Five percent expressed this sentiment in Tatarstan. Ten percent of interviews in Kazakhstan stated that because they were ethnically Kazakh, they were inherently Muslim—this was echoed by nine percent in Tatarstan. Only six percent said they learned about Islam in the context of a mosque in Kazakhstan—either by going to a mosque (three percent) or from the imam (three percent). In Tatarstan, only three percent said they learned about Islam in the context of a mosque— one percent

from going to a mosque, one percent from an imam, and another one percent from a hazret.

Centrality of Religion in Life

In addition to asking people whom or what they consult for religious advice, I asked interviewees, "In general, whom or what do you consult for advice?" in order to examine how frequently religious sources were cited as the main source of guidance. This metric contributes towards understanding how central religion is in the lives of interviewees.

Table 13. Sources of General Advice

Sources	Kazakhstan	Tatarstan
Family	47%	57%
Friend(s)	13%	9%
Spouse	5%	4%
God	3%	6%
Mosque	5%	1%
Imam	4%	0%
Mullah/Hazret	1%	0%
Madrasah	0%	2%
Mufti	0%	1%
Friday message	0%	1%
Qur'an	1%	2%
Hadith	0%	1%
Prayer	1%	1%
Read namaz	1%	0%
SAM	1%	0%
Foreign religious leader	1%	0%
Elders	6%	1%
Myself	8%	5%
Neighbor(s)	1%	2%
Acquaintance	1%	1%
School	1%	3%
Internet	1%	1%
Books	2%	0%
No one	1%	1%
Don't Know	1%	1%
Total	**222**	**152**

Family was also the most common response to the question about whom or what people consulted for advice in general—47 percent in Kazakhstan and 57 percent in Tatarstan. Fourteen percent of Muslims in Kazakhstan reached into the religious sphere in order to answer general questions in their life (not just pertaining to religious question). Five percent went to a mosques, five percent would speak with an imam or mullah, one percent would read the Qur'an, while one percent would pray

and another one percent would read namaz. One percent of interviews would directly contact SAMK. Slightly less people in Tatarstan would consult religious spheres for answers in their general advice—nine percent. Two percent would read the Qur'an, two percent would go to a madrasah, others would consult the mufti, listen to the Friday message, read hadith, or pray (one percent each). The second most common individual source was friends— 13 percent in Kazakhstan and nine percent in Tatarstan.

Because I am Muslim

I also sought to examine what practices people participated in as part of their religious identity. I asked the following question "Please complete this sentence, 'Because I am Muslim (or other religious identity), I do…'"

In Kazakhstan, 40 percent of Muslims cited praying or performing other religious rituals because they are Muslim. These rituals included including fasting, performing personal hygiene, reciting dhikr,[998] and sacrificing an animal during Ramadan.[999] They also included rituals associated with major life events such as birth (such as ritual naming of a child and/or circumcision), death, and marriage (nikah). Fifteen percent of Muslims in Tatarstan stated that they prayed because they were Muslim and only two percent said they performed any of the aforementioned rituals because they were Muslim.

On the other hand, twice as many Muslims in Tatarstan (10 percent) discussed the importance of celebrating holidays compared to Kazakhstan (five percent). Four percent cited Nauryz, the Persian new year that is also commonly celebrated in Central Asia, as an important holiday because they were Muslim, suggesting the

[998] See Islamic Dictionary Appendix.
[999] See Islamic Dictionary Appendix.

conflation of national and religious practices. Similarly, the importance of national food and dietary restrictions was more commonly cited in Tatarstan (eight percent) as part of religious practice than in Kazakhstan (three percent).

The table below depicts a detailed picture of all the actions people cited performing because they were Muslim in Kazakhstan and Tatarstan. Overall, the actions cited by Muslims in both cases are largely apolitical. In addition to prayer, personal rituals, holiday, and cuisine, other more commonly cited answers related to morality (12 percent in Kazakhstan and 18 percent in Tatarstan) respecting others (four and six percent respectively), and supporting and helping one's family (six percent in each case). Only one interviewee in Kazakhstan cited obeying Kazakhstani laws because of the fact that he was Muslim and only one interviewee in Tatarstan stated that they supported the national (Russian government) because they are Muslim. Additionally, only one interviewee in Tatarstan explicitly cited in following SAM RT because he was Muslim. The interview question was intentionally open-ended, and I did not directly prompt any interviewee to talk about the government and/or SAM. What is foremost in most people's mind when it comes to their daily lived lives and personal practices associated with Islam is not the government, but rather their own intimate lives.

Table 14. Because I am Muslims, I…

Practices	**Kazakhstan**	**Tatarstan**
Help/respect others	4%	6%
Neighbors	1%	1%
Colleagues	0%	Less than 1%
Friends	1%	1%
Elders	2%	3%
Prayer	24%	15%
Pray	8%	4%
Read namaz	16%	10%
Hospitality (Welcome guests)	Less than 1%	1%
Qur'an	4%	
Ask mullah/hazret to read Qur'an	Less than 1%	Less than 1%
Read Qur'an for ancestors	1%	Less than 1%
Read Qur'an	3%	2%
State	Less than 1%	Less than 1%
Obey laws	Less than 1%	0%
Support national government	0%	1 Less than 1%

Family	6%	6%
Raise/teach children	3%	1%
Respect/help family	3%	5%
Religious rituals	16%	2%
Fast	4%	
Recite dhikr	3%	Less than 1%
Perform personal hygiene	2%	0%
Sacrifice an animal	Less than 1%	Less than 1%
Have/had Nikah	Less than 1%	1%
Perform birth rituals	0%	Less than 1%
Perform death rituals	Less than 1%	Less than 1%
(am) Circumcised	1%	0%
Holidays	5%	10%
Celebrate holidays (general)	0%	3 1%
Celebrate Ramadan	3%	4%
Celebrate Eid	1%	1%
Nauryz	1%	4%
Low Religiosity	Less than 1%	Less than 1%
(am) Not too Religious	0%	1 Less than 1%
Don't read namaz too often	1 Less than 1%	0%
Mosque	7%	5%
Call azan	1%	0%
Go to Friday message	2%	Less than 1%
Go to mosque	4%	5%
Build mosque	1%	Less than 1%
Dress	3%	1%
Head covering		
Don't wear headscarf	0%	0%
Wear a headscarf	2%	0%
Wear national dress	Less than 1%	0%
Dress for Women		
Don't dress conservatively	0%	Less than 1%
Dress conservatively	1%	Less than 1%
Seek knowledge	2%	2%
Promote unity	1%	0%
Uphold tradition	Less than 1%	2%
Against violence	0%	1%
Against extremism	Less than 1%	1%
Promote peace	1%	3%
Help youth	1%	Less than 1%
Follow SAM	0%	Less than 1%
Don't consult fortune tellers	Less than 1%	0%
Work	1%	0%
Proselytize	1%	0%
Protect the environment	Less than 1%	0%
Ask imam	0%	Less than 1%
(want to go on) Hajj	1%	Less than 1%
Observe 5 pillars	1%	1%
Consult foreign religious sources	0%	Less than 1%
Go to domestic religious sites	0%	
Language	0%	1%
Learn Arabic	0%	1 Less than 1%
Speak/pray in Kazakh/Tatar	0%	1%
Am tolerant/promote tolerance	0	1%
Try to be/am moral	12%	16%
Food/Drink	3%	8%
Make/eat national food	Less than 1%	Less than 1%
Don't smoke	1%	2%
Observe dietary restrictions	3%	6%
Give charity	12%	8%
Observe sexuality restrictions/gender roles	1%	2%
Nothing	Less than 1%	1%
Total	**391**	**247**

Interview Questions

Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Ordinary Citizens

1. Do you identify with a religious group?
2. Do you identify with an ethnic group?
3. If you have a question about religion, whom or what would you consult for advice?
    a. Prompt if needed: Which people, books, websites, or other sources?
4. How do you decide which sources are good sources?
5. Do you attend a place of worship?
    a. Prompt if needed: For example, a mosque or a church?
6. If so, how often do you go to (place of worship)?
7. If so, how you decide which place of worship (mosque) to go to?
8. Which places of worship (mosques) do you go to?
9. Have you gone to other places of worship (mosques) in the past?
10. If so, which ones?
11. If so, why did you change places of worship (mosque)?
12. How long have you been going to a place of worship (e.g., mosque)?
13. When you go to a mosque, with whom do you go?
14. When you go to a place of worship (e.g., mosque), why do you go?
15. How old are you?
16. What is your occupation?
    a. If applicable: What is the occupation of other people in your household?
17. How long have you lived in (city where interview is taking place)?
18. Where were you born?
19. Where did you learn about Islam?

20. In general, whom or what do you consult for advice?

21. What are some important traditions in Islam in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

22. Please finish this sentence, “Because I am Muslim (or other reported religious identity), I do…”

Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Imams

Mosque

When was the mosque built?

Who financed the construction of the mosque?

Who finances the upkeep of the mosque and salaries?

How many people typically come to a Friday service?

How many people typically come to other prayers?

Have you noticed any changes in attendance in the past three years?[1000]

How do you believe people decide on which mosques to attend?

When people go to a mosque, why do you think they go?

How many mosques are in Astana?[1001]

What are the names of the mosques in Astana?[1002]

Friday Message

How did you decide on the topic of last Friday's message?

How do you decide on what to include in the message last Friday?

Could you describe your writing process for the Friday message?

Why do you think SAM provides the Friday message for all mosques in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

When did SAMK/SAM RT start providing the messages?

How do you receive the message/message topic?[1003]

[1000] This question is for imams in Kazakhstan and intended to indirectly gather data about whether attendance had increased or decreased since the monopoly for Islam was instituted in 2012.
[1001] In 2013 not all mosques were listed online or on Google Maps, Yandex, or 2GIS.
[1002] In 2013 not all mosques were listed online or on Google Maps, Yandex, or 2GIS. I first had to identify and triangulate all of the mosques in order to ensure that I conducted interviews at all mosques.
[1003] Question asked if interviewee responded that the Friday message is from SAMK/SAM RT.

Can you add something to the prepared message?[1004]

Does the internal muftiate website contain only past messages or does it include upcoming messages?

When did SAMK/SAM RT start putting the messages online?

How were the messages distributed before then?

How far in advance are the messages put onto the SAMK/SAM RT website?

Who decides on the language that will be used in the message? / Whether Russian can be used?

Is the message different in other republics in Russia?[1005]

SAMK/SAM RT

Could you please describe SAMK/SAM RT and the role of the organization?

Could you please describe the structure of SAMK/ SAM RT?

How is SAMK financed?

What is the process for the appointment of imams at each mosque?

When did this mosque join SAMK/SAM RT?

What must mosques do in order to join SAMK/ SAM RT?

Why does the imam change at a mosque after a mosque joins SAMK?[1006]

What changes at mosques after they join SAMK?

How often do you interact with SAMK/SAM RT officials?

How often do you I interact with officials from the RAC/Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations?

Why was SAMK/ SAM RT created?

Why do you believe mosques previously did not join SAMK?[1007]

[1004] Question asked if interviewee responded that the Friday message is from SAMK/SAM RT.
[1005] Question for interviewees in Tatarstan.
[1006] Question for interviewees in Kazakhstan
[1007] Question for interviewees in Kazakhstan.

Why do you believe mosques did not join SAMK before the passage of the religion law?[1008]

How would you describe the relationship between SAM in RT and the Central SAM headquartered in Ufa?[1009]

Could you please describe the relationship between SAM (RT) and the RAC/ Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations?

It is my understanding that all mosques in Kazakhstan are in SAMK/ SAM RT, why do you think that is?

Why do you think there isn't an equivalent organization of SAMK/SAM RT for other religious traditions, e.g., Christianity?

Government

Why do you think the law on religion was passed in 2011?[1010]

How would you characterize the relationship between SAMK/SAM RT and the RAC/ Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations?

Which government agencies are involved with the registration of mosques?

Which government agencies regulate religious groups?

It is my understanding that all places of worship must registered with the Ministry of Justice. Are any other government agencies involved in this process?

Identity

How do you define Sufism? How do you determine whether a person or group is Sufi?

Do you believe Sufism is an acceptable way to practice Islam?

If yes: Which order of Sufism are practiced in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

If not: Is Sufism prohibited in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

How do you define Salafism? How do you determine whether a person/group is Salafi?

Do you believe Salafism is an acceptable way to practice Islam?

[1008] Question for interviewees in Kazakhstan.
[1009] Question for interviewees in Tatarstan.
[1010] Question for interviewees in Tatarstan.

If not: Is Salafism prohibited in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

How do you define sects? Could you give me an example?[1011]

Which mazhabs are acceptable in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

If only Hanafi: Are other mazhabs prohibited in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

Could you please describe how Islam in practiced in Kazakhstan?

Are there certain practices in Islam in Kazakhstan that are important?

What are some important religious traditions in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

Are non-ethnic Kazakh/Tatar ("ethnic" mosques) acceptable in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

If yes: Can non-ethnic Kazakh/Tatar ("ethnic" mosques) join SAMK/SAM RT?

If not: Are non-ethnic Kazakh/Tatar mosques prohibited?

What is the most salient element about Muslim practice in Kazakhstan?

What is traditional Islam? How do you define traditional Islam or identify what is traditional Islam?[1012]

Religious Extremism

How do you define religious extremism?

How do you determine whether a person or group is a religious extremist?

Do you believe religious extremism is a problem presently or previously in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

Religious Authority

Which people or groups should interpret the Qur'an?

Which people or groups are religious authorities in Islam in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

Closing Questions

Is there anything else that is important to know about Islam in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

[1011] Question only asked if interviewee independently referenced sects.
[1012] Question only asked if interviewee independently referenced traditional Islam.

Semi-Structured Interview Questions for SAM Officials

SAMK

Could you please describe SAMK/SAM RT and the role of the organization?

Could you please describe the structure of SAMK/ SAM RT?

Why was SAMK/ SAM RT created?

How is SAMK financed?

What must mosques do in order to join SAMK/ SAM RT?

Why do you believe mosques previously did not join SAMK?[1013]

Why do you believe some mosques did not join SAMK before the passage of the religion law?[1014]

What is the process for the appointment of imams at each mosque?

Why does the imam change at a mosque after a mosque joins SAMK?[1015]

How would you describe the relationship between SAM in RT and the Central SAM headquartered in Ufa?[1016]

Could you please describe the relationship between SAMK/ SAM RT and the RAC/ Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations?

It is my understanding that all mosques in Kazakhstan are in SAMK/ SAM RT, why do you think that is?

Why do you think there isn't an equivalent organization of SAMK/SAM RT for other religious traditions, e.g. Christianity?

Mosques

How many mosques are there in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

How many mosques are there in Astana/Almaty/Kazan?

Was the re-opening of the Mosque C1 and/or C2 financially supported by the government or SAM RT?[1017]

[1013] Question for interviewees in Kazakhstan
[1014] Question for interviewees in Kazakhstan.
[1015] Question for interviewees in Kazakhstan
[1016] Question for interviewees in Tatarstan.
[1017] Question interviewees in Tatarstan.

Friday Message

How does the SAMK/SAM RT decide on the topic of the Friday message?

Who writes the message? How is the message prepared?

Are the messages the same in all mosques in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

Why do you think SAM provides the Friday message for all mosques in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

Is the message different in other republics in Russia?[1018]

When did SAMK/SAM RT start providing the Friday message?

When did SAMK/ SAM RT start to put the messages up online?

How far in advance are the messages put onto the SAMK/SAM RT website?

Does the internal muftiate website contain only past messages or does it include upcoming messages?

How were the messages distributed before then?

Who decides on the language that will be used in the message? / Who decides if Russian can be used during the message?

Why don't other religious groups send topics for their messages on their day of worship in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan? For example, for the sermon in a church.

Government

Why do you think the law on religion was passed in 2011?[1019]

Could you please describe the RAC/ Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations and the role the committee/office?[1020]

How would you characterize the relationship between SAMK/SAM RT and the RAC/ Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations?

How often do you interact with RAC officials?

[1018] Question for interviewees in Tatarstan.
[1019] Question for interviewees in Kazakhstan.
[1020] The RAC was still presently the name of the government institution responsible for regulating religion in Kazakhstan when I conducted interviews. The RAC was the previous name of the government institution in Tatarstan. When I conducted fieldwork there were two government institutions that were formally responsible for religion-- Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations and the Office of State Confessional Relations.

Which government agencies are involved with the registration of mosques?

Which government agencies regulate religious groups?

It is my understanding that all places of worship must registered with the Ministry of Justice. Are any other government agencies involved in this process?

Identity

How do you define Sufism? How do you determine whether a person or group is Sufi?

Do you believe Sufism is an acceptable way to practice Islam?

If yes: Which order of Sufism are practiced in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

If not: Is Sufism prohibited in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

How do you define Salafism? How do you determine whether a person/group is Salafi?

Do you believe Salafism is an acceptable way to practice Islam?

If not: Is Salafism prohibited in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

How do you define sects? Could you give me an example?[1021]

Which mazhabs are acceptable in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

If only Hanafi: Are other mazhabs prohibited in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

Could you please describe how Islam in practiced in Kazakhstan?

Are there certain practices in Islam in Kazakhstan that are important?

What are some important religious traditions in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

Are non-ethnic Kazakh/Tatar ("ethnic" mosques) acceptable in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

If yes: Can on-ethnic Kazakh/Tatar ("ethnic" mosques) join SAMK/SAM RT?

If not: Are non-ethnic Kazakh/Tatar mosques prohibited?

What is the most salient element about Muslim practice in Kazakhstan?

[1021] Question only asked if interviewee independently referenced sects.

What is traditional Islam? How do you define traditional Islam or identify what is traditional Islam?[1022]

Extremism

How do you define religious extremism?

How do you determine whether a person or group is a religious extremist?

Do you believe religious extremism is a problem presently or previously in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

Religious Authority

Which people or groups should interpret the Qur'an?

Which people or groups are religious authorities in Islam in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

Closing Questions

Is there anything else important to know about SAMK/SAM RT?

Is there anything else that is important to know about Islam in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

[1022] Question only asked if interviewee independently referenced traditional Islam.

Semi-Structured Interview Guide for RAC Officials

Government

Could you please describe the RAC/ Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations and the role the committee/office?[1023]

Could you please describe the structure of the RAC/ Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations?

Why do you think the decision was made to continue the use of the RAC institution after independence?

Could you please describe why and how The Office on Religion Associations under the Cabinet of Ministers) was formed?[1024]

Could you please describe the structure of The Office on Religion Associations?

When was The Office on Religion Associations created?

Could you please describe why the Office for Religious Affairs (under the Cabinet of Ministers) was reorganized into the Office for State-Confessional relations under the Office of the President?[1025]

Could you please describe how the portfolios (or responsibilities) of the Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations and the Office of State Confessional Relations differ?[1026]

Could you please describe the process for religious groups to register?

In Tatarstan/Kazakhstan, which Muslim groups can register?

Could you please describe the process for religious groups to register?

Which Muslim groups are registered in Astana/Almaty/Kazan?

[1023] The RAC was still presently the name of the government institution responsible for regulating religion in Kazakhstan when I conducted interviews. The RAC was the previous name of the government institution in Tatarstan. When I conducted fieldwork there were two government institutions that were formally responsible for religion— Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations and the Office of State Confessional Relations differ?

[1024] Question for interviewees in Tatarstan.

[1025] Question for interviewees in Tatarstan.

[1026] Question for interviewees in Tatarstan.

Which government agencies/committees at a national level do you think are most important in setting policies for religious organization?

Why do you think the law on religion was passed in 2011?[1027]

How would you characterize the relationship between SAMK/SAM RT and the RAC/ Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations?

Which government agencies are involved with the registration of mosques?

Which government agencies regulate religious groups?

It is my understanding that all places of worship must registered with the Ministry of Justice. Are any other government agencies involved in this process?

SAMK/ SAM RT

Could you please describe SAMK/SAM RT and the role of the organization?

Why was SAMK/ SAM RT created?

How is SAMK financed?

How would you describe the relationship between SAM in RT and the Central SAM headquartered in Ufa?[1028]

What is the process for the appointment of imams at each mosque?

What is the RAC's role in this process?

What must mosques do in order to join SAMK/ SAM RT?

Why do you believe mosques previously did not join SAMK?[1029]

It is my understanding that all mosques in Kazakhstan are in SAMK/ SAM RT, why do you think that is?

Why does the imam change at a mosque after a mosque joins SAMK?[1030]

Why do you think there isn't an equivalent organization of SAMK/SAM RT for other religious traditions, e.g. Christianity?

[1027] Question for interviewees in Kazakhstan.
[1028] Question for interviewees in Tatarstan.
[1029] Question for interviewees in Kazakhstan.
[1030] Question for interviewees in Kazakhstan

Could you please describe the relationship between SAMK/ SAM RT and the RAC/ Office for Cooperation with Religious Associations?

It is my understanding that all mosques in Kazakhstan are in SAMK/ SAM RT, why do you think that is?

Friday message

How does SAMK select topics for the Friday message?

Does SAMK select topics in consultation with the RAC? If so, could you please describe this process?

Why do you think SAM provides the Friday message for all mosques in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

Is the message different in other republics in Russia?[1031]

When did SAMK/SAM RT start providing the Friday message?

Why don't other religious groups send topics for their messages on their day of worship in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan? For example, for the sermon in a church.

Identity

How do you define Sufism? How do you determine whether a person or group is Sufi?

Do you believe Sufism is an acceptable way to practice Islam?

If yes: Which order of Sufism are practiced in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

If not: Is Sufism prohibited in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

How do you define Salafism? How do you determine whether a person or group is Salafi?

How do you define Salafism? How do you determine whether a person/group is Salafi?

Do you believe Salafism is an acceptable way to practice Islam?

If not: Is Salafism prohibited in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

How do you define sects? Could you give me an example?[1032]

Could you please describe how Islam in practiced in Kazakhstan?

[1031] Question for interviewees in Tatarstan.
[1032] Question only asked if interviewee independently referenced sects.

Are there certain practices in Islam in Kazakhstan that are important?

What are some important religious traditions in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

Are non-ethnic Kazakh/Tatar ("ethnic" mosques) acceptable in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

If yes: Can on-ethnic Kazakh/Tatar ("ethnic" mosques) join SAMK/SAM RT?

If not: Are non-ethnic Kazakh/Tatar mosques prohibited?

Which mazhabs are acceptable in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?
If only Hanafi: Are other mazhabs prohibited in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

What is the most salient element about Muslim practice in Kazakhstan?

What is traditional Islam? How do you define traditional Islam or identify what is traditional Islam?[1033]

From a governmental perspective, how do you determine which groups to classify as traditional Islam?

Religious Extremism

How do you define religious extremism?

How do you determine whether a person or group is a religious extremist?

Do you believe religious extremism is a problem presently or previously in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

Religious Authority

Which people or groups should interpret the Qur'an?

Which people or groups are religious authorities in Islam in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

What is the role of an imam in Kazakhstan?

Closing Question

Is there anything else important to know about the RAC's role in Kazakhstan and its efforts to regulate religion in Kazakhstan?

Is there anything else that is important to know about Islam in Kazakhstan/Tatarstan?

[1033] Question only asked if interviewee independently referenced traditional Islam.

Informed Oral Consent

Oral consent is used to avoid leaving a paper record of interviews in order to reassure interviewees of the confidentiality of the interview and to ensure anonymity.

Informed Oral Consent Script

Hello, my name is Rebecca Fradkin and I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford in England. I am studying religion in Kazakhstan. If you agree to participate, I will ask you several questions about religion (for example, how often you attend a mosque) and a few general questions about yourself. You may feel free to end the interview at any time or to not answer any individual question. All answers given will be anonymous and used solely for academic purposes. May I ask you several questions?

Islamic Dictionary Appendix

Ahmadiyya

The Ahmadiyya movement was founded in 1889 in India during colonial rule by Britain and its movement headquarters were moved to Pakistan in 1947. The Ahmadiyya is a messianic movement within Islam. In contrast to most Muslim groups, the Ahmadiyya recognize another prophet after Muhammad.[1034]

Allahu Akbar

Allahu Akbar means, "God is greater." This is referred to as takbir and is part of the call to prayer.[1035]

Ayat

Verse in the Qur'an. Also used as a "sign" of God.[1036]

Ddhikr

Dhikr is a form of meditative prayer commonly practiced by Sufis. Dhikr often involves the repetition of a prayer, which can either be vocal or silent. The Naqshbandiyya order is most commonly associated with silent dhikr.[1037]

Chain

The chain refers to a chain of authority. A part of hadith science, studying the chain attempts to trace how a doctrine has been passed along
. These efforts include attempts to verify how many transmitters a doctrine can be attributed to as well as the continuity of the chain.[1038]

Eid al-Adha

Eid al-Adha, or the Feat of the Sacrifice, is the most important holiday in Islam. It is celebrated in honor of Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son, Ismail. According to the Qur'an, God substituted a ram in lieu of Abraham's son. An animal is traditionally scarified during this holiday in order to have a feast.[1039]

[1034] Friedmann, "Aḥmadīyah."
[1035] Esposito, "Allahu Akbar."
[1036] Esposito, "Ayah/Ayat."
[1037] Michael A. Sells, "Dhikr."
[1038] Esposito, "Isnad"; Esposito, "Hadith."
[1039] Esposito, "Eid Al-Adha."

Eid al-Fitr

Also known as the Feast of the Breaking of the Fast. This major holiday celebrates the end of Ramadan.[1040]

Fatwa

A fatwa is a legal opinion issued by a legal scholar. The dictate is not legally binding and is based off of the issuing scholar's reputation.[1041]

Hajj

Pilgrimage to Mecca during the month of month of Dhu al-Hijjah, the last month in the Islamic lunar calendar. Considered one of the five pillars of Islam.[1042]

Hanafi

The Hanafi mazhab is one of the four main schools of Islamic thought. The Hanafi mazhab is the most commonly practiced school of Islamic thought. The Hanafi school is named after Abu Hanifah (699-767). Muḥammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani wrote down the legal codes of the Hanafi school. This mazhab is the most common throughout much of the former Ottoman empire.[1043]

Hizb ut-Tahrir

Hizb ut-Tahrir is a trans-nationalist movement that was founded by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani and former members of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1953 in Pakistan. It is a self-declared political movement and advocates for the creation of a Pan-Islamic state through non-violent means.[1044]

Kurban Bayram

See Eid al-Adha.

Madrasah

School of Islamic education, ranging from elementary to higher education.[1045]

[1040] Esposito, "Id Al-Fitr."
[1041] Esposito, "Fatwa"; Masud et al., "Fatwā."
[1042] Esposito, "Hajj"; Bianchi, "Ḥajj."
[1043] Calder et al., "Law."
[1044] Ahmad, "Tablīghī Jamāʿat"; Taji-Farouki, "Ḥizb Al-Taḥrīr Al-Islāmī."
[1045] Esposito, "Madrasah."

Madhab

Refers to schools of jurisprudence within Islam. The Hanafi madhab or school is one of the four major schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam.[1046]

Mazhab

See Madhab.

Mufti

A mufti can refer to a jurist capable of issuing a fatwa. The position of mufti has emerged in states after independence from colonial powers. A grand mufti refers to a mufti who serves as an advisor to the state.[1047]

Muftiate

A muftiate is headed by a mufti, from which it derives its name. Muftiate is a colloquial name for SAMK in Kazakhstan and SAM RT in Tatarstan. The first known usage of muftiate was as a colloquial reference to the Orenburg Spiritual Administration created by Catherine the Great in 1788.[1048]

Muhammad

The Prophet is believed to be the founder of Islam. The Qur'an is considered to be a record of Prophet Muhammad's revelations.[1049]

Naqshbandiyya

The Naqshbandiyya is an order, or tariqah, of Sufism Islam, founded by Baha' al-Din Naqshbandi (1318–89) in Bukhara. In the Ferghana Valley, the sub-order Naqshbandiyya Mujaddidiyya was previously active. The Naqshbandiyya traditionally practice silent dhikr. The Naqshbandiyya are associated with resistance to Russian rule in the Northern Caucasus.[1050]

Oraza

See Ramadan.

Qurban Bayram

See Eid al-Adha.

[1046] Calder et al., "Law."
[1047] Esposito, "Grand Mufti"; Esposito, "Mufti."
[1048] Lieven, *The Cambridge History of Russia: Volume 2: Imperial Russia, 1689–1917*, 2:207.
[1049] Moussalli, Newby, and Moussalli, "Muḥammad."
[1050] Papas, "The Islamic Reformism in Xinjiang"; Esposito, "Naqshbandi Tariqah."

Ramadan

Ramadan is the ninth month in the lunar Islamic calendar. It is considered obligatory for Muslims to fast during the month of Ramadan and is one of the five pillars of Islam.[1051]

Salafism

Salafism refers to a reform movement that seeks to return to practices during the time of the Prophet. Salafism is generally opposed to mystical forms of Islam, including Sufism. One modern movement within Salafism is Wahhabism.[1052]

Sufism

A form of Islamic mysticism. Sufis identify as both Sunni and Shi'i. Sufis commonly practice dhikr. Sufism has various orders or tariqahs, including the Naqshbandiyya.[1053]

Sunnah

Sunnah refers to established norms or customs, most frequently based on the life of Muhammad.[1054]

Sunni

Sunni Islam is practiced by most Muslims. Sunni Islam contains within it several schools of jurisprudence. Sunni Islam differs from Shi'i Islam in that Sunnis do not believe that Muhammad chose Ali as the next leader of Islam.[1055]

Surah

A chapter in the Qur'an. There are 114 chapter in the Qur'an.[1056]

Shi'i

Shi'i Muslims believed that Muhammad anointed Ali as the next leader of Islam. Shi'is constitute about 15 percent of the global Muslim population. Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon have significant Shi'i populations.[1057]

[1051] Ahmad, "Ramaḍān."
[1052] Osman, "Salafī Movements."
[1053] Esposito, "Sufism."
[1054] Esposito, "Sunnah."
[1055] Marmura, Waardenburg, and Kéchichian, "Sunnī Islam."
[1056] Esposito, "Surah."
[1057] Esposito, "What Is the Difference between Sunni and Shii Muslims?"

Tablighi Jamaat

Tablighi Jamaat is a Sunni reform movement that was formed in 1926 in India and spread elsewhere starting in 1950 and emphasizes proselytizing. It has an estimated 12 to 15 million followers.[1058] It is banned in Russia and all of Central Asia except Kyrgyzstan.

Takbir

Takbir refers to the phrase, "God is greater" or "Allahu Akbar" and part of the call to prayer.[1059]

Wahhabism

Wahhabism is a reform movement that was founded in the eighteenth century by Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab. This movement took on more political leanings after the alliance between Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and Muḥammad Ibn Saʿud. It is now a Saudi Salafi movement.[1060]

Zhikr

See dhikr.

[1058] Mumtaz Ahmad, "Tablīghī Jamāʿat."
[1059] Tariq al-Jamil, "Takbīr"; Esposito, "Allahu Akbar."
[1060] DeLong-Bas, "Wahhābīyah."