

'Mercenary' contracts as Fiscal-Military Instruments

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Introduction

Subsidies are widely acknowledged as an important manifestation of European interstate relations between the fifteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and they are beginning to attract serious attention from scholars. To date, research has largely focused on individual agreements or sets of agreements as part of wider diplomatic relations between two states. It is recognized that such relations were invariably asymmetrical, with the stronger party paying the weaker one in return for some kind of support or co-operation, usually in military or political terms. Subsidies are seen as an extension of a states system, like a financial lubricant smoothing and strengthening alliances between sovereign governments. Most research draws heavily on official records and concentrates on quantifying how much was paid and what kind of support was purchased.¹ Ancillary to this are studies examining the public discussion of such arrangements, especially in the eighteenth century when they drew criticism as akin to 'mercenary' service and unworthy of civilized governments.² Finally, there are works on the soldiers who served under 'subsidy treaties'. Like the other two approaches, this

1 For example, P.C. Hartmann, *Geld als Instrument europäischer Machtpolitik im Zeitalter des Merkantilismus 1715–1740* (Munich: Kommission für Bayerische Landesgeschichte, 1978).

2 C.W. Eldon, *England's Subsidy Policy towards the Continent during the Seven Years War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1938); H.D. Schmidt, 'The Hessian Mercenaries: The Career of a Political Cliché', *History* 43 (1958), 207–212.

third category usually focuses narrowly on individual cases and views these from a variety of hostile perspectives, such as subaltern studies, often echoing early modern critiques of the 'soldier trade'.³

This chapter argues that we need to set subsidies in their wider context as just one of many ways of transferring war-making resources across political jurisdictions. Subsidies belong to the contractual forms which emerged during early modernity and which this chapter will term Fiscal-Military Instruments. These were contractual forms and specific recognized practices which evolved to facilitate the procurement and exchange of a wide variety of war-making resources supplied not only by states but also by a host of non-state actors. This exchange of resources was sufficiently complex and extensive to warrant the term European Fiscal-Military System which is deliberately used here to extend, rather than replace, the existing term Fiscal-Military State by supplementing the study of war's impact on domestic development with an examination of how it affected interaction with other states and non-state actors. Taking this broader perspective removes subsidies from the narrow, and partly anachronistic, confines of diplomatic and conventional political history anchored on the study of sovereign states, which tends to reduce research to a cost-benefit analysis of objectives and outcomes in military, economic, and political terms.

The primary goal of this chapter is to disentangle subsidies from other Fiscal-Military Instruments, notably the various forms of contract to supply troops with which subsidy treaties were often combined. The first part will sketch the wider context by briefly outlining the emergence, scope, and eventual demise of the European Fiscal-Military System, before defining Fiscal-Military Instruments and identifying the most common forms. The third, more substantial, section will examine the different kinds of troop contracts and indicate the extent to which they were combined with subsidies.

3 This is particularly true of works on the so-called 'Hessians' fighting for Britain during the American Revolutionary War, much of which is stuck in 'for and against' arguments already articulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: Peter Keir Taylor, *Indentured to Liberty: Peasant Life and the Hessian Military State, 1688–1815* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Charles W. Ingrao, *The Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions, and Reform under Frederick II 1760–1785* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); *Die 'Hessen' im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg (1776–1783)*, ed. by Holger Th. Gräf, Andreas Hedwig, and Annegret Wenz-Haubfleisch (Marburg: Historische Kommission für Hessen, 2014).

The European Fiscal-Military System

European political geography is the product of violent competition which has left the continent divided into distinct states. This process is often described as a Darwinian struggle for survival, with only the ‘fittest’ states achieving full sovereignty. Leopold von Ranke, one of the founders of modern historical method, argued that ‘primacy of foreign policy’ dictated how each state developed internally. Each state strove for autarky, modifying its own institutions, economy, and society so as to compete more aggressively and efficiently with its neighbours.⁴

More recently, John Brewer coined the term ‘Fiscal-Military State’ to describe the institutionalization of permanent taxation and armed forces during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His study is part of a wider debate on whether authoritarian or constitutional states are more efficient at mobilizing resources for warfare.⁵ This

4 Leopold von Ranke, *Das Politische Gespräch und andere Schriftchen zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1925; first published in 1836), pp. 10–35, available in English as ‘A Dialogue on Politics’, in Theodore H. von Laue (ed.), *Leopold von Ranke: The Formative Years* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 152–180, esp. pp. 167–168. The concept was developed further by Ranke’s colleague Wilhelm Dilthey, ‘Friedrich der Große und die deutsche Aufklärung’, in Dilthey, *Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Geistes* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1959; first published in 1927), pp. 176–205, and propagated further by Otto Hintze, ‘Military Organisation and the Organisation of the State’, in *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, ed. by Felix Gilbert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 180–215, esp. p. 180.

5 John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State 1688–1783* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989). The subsequent debate has spawned an extensive literature, of which the following offer good introductions: *The British Fiscal Military States 1660–c.1783*, ed. by Aaron Graham and Patrick Walsh (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016); *War, State and Development: Fiscal-Military States in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. by Rafael Torres Sánchez (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 2007); *The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-century Europe*, ed. by Christopher Storrs (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). There are important, though often unacknowledged, connections with the earlier discussions of Joseph Schumpeter’s historical sociology of the emergence of the ‘tax state’, especially in his classic ‘The Crisis of the Tax State’, *International Economic Papers* 4 (1954), 5–38, which was written in 1918. See also Richard Abel Musgrave, ‘Schumpeter’s Crisis of the Tax State’, *Journal of Evolutionary Economics* 2 (1992), 89–113; E. Ladewig Petersen, ‘From Domain State to Tax State: Synthesis and Interpretation’, *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 23 (1975), 116–134.

research has greatly extended our understanding of the relationships among political institutions, economies, and societies; but it has largely overlooked the fact that virtually no European state has waged war without external assistance.

This is the paradox of European history. Competition was possible only through co-operation with allies, neutrals, and even enemies, since states have rarely obtained all they needed for warfare from their own populations, while governments have generally been unable to prevent their own subjects from aiding other powers. The 'success' of each state has depended not only on its ability to assert itself militarily but also on its being recognized as a 'state' by its neighbours. The emergence of diplomatic conventions and international law is only one aspect of this process. Europe contained a host of semi-sovereign entities, like the German and Italian principalities and city-states, which not only struggled to preserve or enhance their autonomy but also provided war-making resources to other, larger states.

These exchanges have primarily been studied from the perspective of diplomacy, which only identifies formal alliances and arrangements between states. In fact, the connections were far more complex and profound, as they encompassed numerous non-state actors like merchants, entrepreneurs, bankers, experts, and agents of all kinds.⁶ The resources that were transferred ranged from armaments to fully equipped and manned warships, from individual recruits to entire armies, from barrels of cash to sophisticated financial transfers and credit. Additionally, numerous services were provided, such as transportation for men and materials, the right to cross neutral territory or use specialist facilities like ports, as well as the exchange of intelligence and specialist know-how.

These transfers were handled by intermediaries often based in cities which were not necessarily political capitals, but which functioned as 'hubs' or nodal points in the complex Fiscal-Military System that emerged during the 1560s and matured around 1700, when all the essential features were in place.⁷ These included

6 Useful examples of the different kinds of agent in *War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800*, ed. by Jeff Fynn-Paul (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

7 These ideas are elaborated at greater length in Peter H. Wilson, 'The European Fiscal-Military System and the Habsburg Monarchy', in *The Habsburg Monarchy as a Fiscal-Military State c.1648–1815: Contours and Perspectives*, ed. by William Godsey, Petr Mat'á, and Thomas Winkelbauer

recognized ways of interacting, such as specific forms of military conventions, recruitment contracts, and financial exchanges, all of which were as much part of Europe's political development as diplomatic protocol or court rituals. This system allowed governments to access vital additional resources and greatly contributed to the growing scale and intensity of warfare across this period.

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars saw both the peak of the system and the onset of its demise. The revolutionary ideology of the citizen-in-arms, as well as the Revolution's assault on social and geographical privileges, greatly expanded the state's war-making potential by removing many of the legal barriers to the mobilization of human and material resources. Simultaneously, the state's greater reach was legitimated by heightened nationalist ideology (sovereignty of the nation), which expanded the state's power to command 'national' resources whilst discouraging reliance on 'foreigners'.⁸ The nationalization of war-making resources encouraged efforts to prevent their 'export' to potential enemies by curbing extra-territorial violence through bans on privateering or enlisting in foreign armies.⁹ Co-operation continued amidst the competition as states agreed collectively to remove or nationalize the non-state actors, for instance through a more coherent articulation of neutrality after 1815.¹⁰

Meanwhile, the wars between 1792 and 1866 eliminated most of Europe's smaller states, as well as the remaining areas of fuzzy

(Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy, forthcoming); 'Competition through Cooperation: The European Fiscal Military System 1560–1850', inaugural lecture, University of Oxford, 30 January 2017, podcast at www.history.ox.ac.uk/article/peter-h-wilson-inaugural-lecture. The concept of 'hubs' is discussed further by Marianne Klerk, Chapter 9 below.

8 The introduction of more truly universal conscription is one example of this: *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs?*, ed. by Donald J. Stoker, Frederick C. Schneid, and Harold D. Blanton (London: Routledge, 2014).

9 For this process, see Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns: State-building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Jan Martin Lemnitzer, *Power, Law and the End of Privateering* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014); Nir Arielli, Gabriela A. Frei, and Inge van Hulle, 'The Foreign Enlistment Act, International Law, and British Politics 1819–2014', *International History Review* 38 (2016), 636–656.

10 Maartje Abbenhuis, *An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics 1815–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

sovereignty such as the German Confederation. These areas had been the major suppliers of foreign troops together with Switzerland, which progressively curbed its inhabitants from enlisting in foreign armies between 1848 and 1870 as such enlistment was considered increasingly at odds with the country's official neutrality adopted in 1815. The surviving larger states emerged better equipped to wage war independently of outsiders. Industrialization assisted this, partly by boosting domestic arms manufacture (though few states achieved self-sufficiency) but mainly by easing recruiting problems by replacing manual labour by machine production. European imperialism simultaneously opened access to additional military human resources. The recruitment of indigenous soldiers reduced (relatively speaking) the numbers of Europeans required to expand and defend empires, whilst also increasing overall numbers that could be deployed globally.¹¹

The risks of conflict were increased, however, because the presence of nationalism combined with the removal of minor states made it harder to make peace through the traditional means of minor territorial adjustments. Meanwhile, the nationalization of warfare meant that, when conflicts broke out, their impact on each belligerent was even greater than before, leading to what has become known as the age of 'total war' 1914–1945.¹²

Fiscal-Military Instruments

Fiscal-Military Instruments evolved as ways to facilitate the procurement and exchange of war-making resources between state and non-state actors across political jurisdictions. The emergence of these standardized practices contributed greatly to the coherence

11 Examples in *Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, c. 1700–1964*, ed. by David Killingray and David Omissi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); Myron Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960* (London: Heinemann, 1990).

12 *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871*, ed. by Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); *Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871–1914*, ed. by Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger Chickering, and Stig Förster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); *Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918*, ed. by Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

of Europe as a Fiscal-Military System and frequently enabled hostile, or at least mutually suspicious, parties to co-operate in what were high-risk arrangements.

Fiscal-Military Instruments such as troop levies were contracts between two or more parties which could be governments with their own jurisdictions, but were not necessarily so and could include semi-sovereign powers like the German principalities, or non-state actors like agents and contractors. They took a variety of forms, but all gave rise to a fiscal-military asset (i.e. some form of war-making resource) of one entity, and a financial and/or political liability of another entity. One party agreed to provide some kind of assistance in return for material and/or political recompense from another who might be based in a different political jurisdiction. Agreements were framed as contracts, setting out the terms and obligations of each party. These were signed and sealed, and thus formally binding, despite the obvious absence of any supranational framework capable of enforcing them. Their key role was to foster trust between the parties through their appearance in commonly accepted, mutually understood forms.

The most obvious forms of Fiscal-Military Instruments were the various ways in which governments extracted human, financial, and material resources from their own subject populations. These frequently lacked explicit contracts, though all political authority rested on some kind of contractual theory of government in which the state provided protection against internal and external threats in return for subordination and support from the inhabitants. In practice, all states in the parts of Europe that were touched by Roman Catholicism developed some form of representative institution to mediate their demands for taxes, human resources, and materials. These forms of extraction can be labelled 'fiscal' and encompassed a wide variety of direct and indirect taxes paid in cash and kind, as well as forms of compulsory service extending from varieties of feudal levy through types of militia to different forms of conscription. Debt and forced loans were additional forms and played a substantial part in all war finance. These aspects have been widely studied as a dimension of the emergence of sovereign states, but this literature has generally interpreted states as autarkic actors and only examined their efforts to raise resources within their own territories.¹³ Fiscal

13 *The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History, 1500–1914*, ed. by Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, Patrick K. O'Brien, and Francisco Comin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); *The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815*, ed. by Richard Bonney (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

instruments were employed in neutral or hostile territory, notably through the levying of 'contributions' under the threat of violence. These extorted payments in cash and kind and emerged during the later sixteenth century, before being refined during the mid-1620s in the Thirty Years' War. Contrary to their depiction in most secondary literature, contributions were not a form of licensed plundering but generally relied on formal agreements with the authorities of neutral or occupied communities and territories. These authorities employed their own fiscal structures to raise what was demanded, sometimes by introducing new taxes specifically for that purpose.¹⁴

Material Fiscal-Military Instruments were contracts which covered the provision of war-making materials ranging from warships, weaponry, munitions and other equipment to food and fodder, as well as the supply of horses and transport animals. These resources were often purchased, but they could also be hired – notably in the case of warships such as the fleet, complete with weaponry and crews, that was provided by the Dutch arms merchant Louis de Geer (1587–1652) for the Danes in their war against Sweden in 1643–1645.¹⁵ Similar subcategories can be identified for contracts over the use of port facilities, transit for troops or war materials across another party's territory, or for the supply of intelligence or expertise. The recent literature on the 'contractor state' has noted the significance of entrepreneurs, who were often more important in supplying the material needs of armies and navies than procurement from state-owned factories or yards.¹⁶ To date, this literature has

1999). For a detailed example of the role of non-state actors as brokers for international loans, see Aaron Graham, 'The War of the Spanish Succession, the Financial Revolution, and the Imperial Loans of 1706 and 1710', in *The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives*, ed. by Matthias Pohl and Michael Schaich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 299–321.

14 Peter H. Wilson, 'War Finance, Policy and Strategy in the Thirty Years War', in *Dynamik durch Gewalt? Der Dreißigjährige Krieg (1618–1648) als Faktor der Wandlungsprozesse des 17. Jahrhunderts*, ed. by Michael Rohrschneider and Anuschka Tischer (Münster: Aschendorff, 2018), pp. 229–250.

15 R.C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Baltic during the Sailing-ship Epoch 1522–1850* (London: C. Gilbert-Wood, 1910), pp. 47–69.

16 *The Contractor State and Its Implications 1659–1815*, ed. by Richard Harding and Sergio Solbes Ferri (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2012); Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox, *Sustaining the Fleet, 1793–1815: War, the British Navy and the Contractor State* (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 2010); Rafael Torres Sánchez, *Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

largely focused on indigenous contractors supplying their own government; but it is clear that many were engaged in supplying other powers, often through networks of intermediaries.¹⁷

Like fiscal instruments, financial ones could be employed within a state's own jurisdiction or across it to obtain money from other countries. Examples include bills of exchange, bonds, and all manner of loans and debts. Subsidies were another important, specific form, involving the promise of one party to provide financial support to another in return for military and/or political support or co-operation. A major problem in the literature has been confusion between the *purpose* of such agreements and the *form* they took. Subsidies could be paid for a wide variety of reasons, including securing the active support of an ally, enabling such support from a weaker partner which might otherwise be unable to assist, and paying another power to refrain from assisting a hostile third party. Likewise, the party receiving subsidies might have multiple motives of which simple financial gain was rarely the most prominent, despite the frequent characterization by earlier historians of such arrangements as 'mercenary'.¹⁸ The purposes of subsidies varied greatly, but the form was essentially the same. They were agreed in a treaty which specified the amount, timing, duration, and form of payment, as well as the obligations of the recipient. There were often additional, secret articles detailing political co-operation, including political favours that the paying party promised the recipient in addition to the financial transaction.¹⁹

17 One example was de Geer. For others, see Julia Zunckel, *Rüstungsgeschäfte im Dreißigjährigen Krieg: Unternehmerkräfte, Militärgüter und Marktstrategien im Handel zwischen Genua, Amsterdam und Hamburg* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1997); Pepijn Brandon, *War, Capital and the Dutch State (1588–1795)* (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

18 For example, Max Braubach, *Die Bedeutung der Subsidien für die Politik im spanischen Erbfolgekrieg* (Bonn: Schroeder, 1923). Further discussion of the recipients' motivation is found in Peter H. Wilson, 'The German "Soldier Trade" of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Reassessment', *The International History Review* 18 (1996), 757–792. For the debate on the term 'mercenary', see Sarah V. Percy, *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

19 Much of the following is based on an analysis of the treaties signed by the English/British monarchy and numerous continental partners from the 1680s to 1790s (in The National Archive, London, State Papers 103 and 108 series), those signed by the Dutch Republic (in the National Archief, The Hague, 1.01.02 Staten Generaal, VII.A. De ratificaties van tractaten,

Subsidy treaties were arrangements between recognized, established political authorities, even if one or both parties lacked fully modern sovereignty, as in the case of the German princes who were bound within the wider framework of the Holy Roman Empire and who made up the majority of the recipients of such funds. It is important to note that subsidies often required other financial instruments to be delivered, such as bills of exchange or loans. Thus, like Fiscal-Military Instruments generally, though they were agreements between political authorities, they frequently relied on non-state actors for their actual operation.

Historians have sometimes used the term 'subsidy treaty' for what should, for the sake of analytical clarity, be classed as one of the other three types of troop convention discussed below.²⁰ Another common confusion arises from the fact that subsidy agreements shared a common origin in the 'pensions' paid by powerful states like France to individuals, such as members of the various Swiss cantonal governments. 'Public' and 'private' were not distinguished in the modern sense; indeed such distinctions emerged as part of the wider delineation of political power in sovereign states which included an internal as well as international dimension and was not completed until the early nineteenth century, and in some respects even later.²¹ Some princes, such as Wilhelm V of Hesse-Cassel,

1700–1797), and those of numerous German principalities including Hesse-Darmstadt (Staatsarchiv Darmstadt, A6 series, as well as negotiations in the E8 B259–B266 series, and papers on foreign enlistment E8 B10/10–16), Münster (Landesarchiv Münster, A58 Nr. 218, 253); Paderborn (Landesarchiv Münster, A267 I Kriegsrechnungen 1694–1798); Württemberg (Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart [HStAS], treaties and papers relating to recruitment for other powers, chiefly A5 Bü.62, 63, 65, 66; A6 Bü.33, 56–60; A7 Bü.10; A8 Bü.5, 8, 59; A74 Bü.189, 190, 197; A19a Bd.1382; A202 Bü.737, 1157, 1159, 1206, 1358, 1361, 1362, 2109–2114, 2118, 2219, 2236, 2241, 2254–2256, 2263, 2265, 2282, 2290, 2294, 2462–2471; Landesbibliothek Stuttgart, Cod.Hist.647). I am very grateful to Tom Nora for supplying digital copies of the material from the Dutch National Archives.

20 A common example is the agreement made between France and Bernhard von Sachsen-Weimar in 1635 in which France subsidised what had been till then, and what was still in Sweden's eyes, the army of the Heilbronn League.

21 Giorgio Chittolini, 'The "Private", the "Public", the State', *Journal of Modern History* 67, supplement (1995), 34–61. For pensions and military recruitment, see Christian Windler, "'Ohne Geld keine Schweizer": Pensionen und Söldnerrekrutierung auf den eidgenössischen Patronagemärkten', in *Nähe in der Ferne: Personale Verflechtungen in den Außenbeziehungen*

received both pensions and subsidies from the same power.²² Moreover, pensions and subsidies could both take the form of a retainer, paid by a government to secure the services of an individual or a prince, should they be required, similar to the ‘retainers’ (*Wartgelder*) paid to experienced officers and soldiers by many German princes from the end of the fourteenth to the mid-seventeenth century.²³ The development of permanent ‘standing’ armies around the middle of the seventeenth century transformed retainers into ‘half-pay’, whereby surplus officers were placed on waiting lists with reduced pay at the termination of each conflict, ready to be recalled should the need arise. France paid several German princes to hold troops in readiness during the early 1750s in anticipation of renewed war in Europe following the unsatisfactory outcome of the War of the Austrian Succession.²⁴ However, for the sake of analytical clarity it is helpful to distinguish ‘subsidies’ as transactions between sovereign or at least semi-sovereign authorities and in some way binding on their jurisdictions, and to use ‘pensions’ to denote payments made to individuals, even if these also had a direct political or military purpose.

Arrangements to pay subsidies were often included in formal alliances, but that did not mean that every subsidy treaty entailed an alliance, or that every alliance involved the transfer of financial or other assistance between the signatories. Neither the provider nor the recipient necessarily agreed to become involved in wars in which the other was engaged. For example, France paid subsidies to the Dutch Republic, Denmark, and Spain during the 1620s without being regarded as a belligerent in the Eighty Years’ War (1568–1648) or the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) by either these three recipients or by their Spanish and Austrian Habsburg opponents.

der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. by Hillard von Thiesen and Christian Windler (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 2005), pp. 105–133; Friedrich Edelmayer, *Söldner und Pensionäre: Das Netzwerk Philipps II. im Heiligen Römischen Reich*, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur der iberischen und iberoamerikanischen Länder, 7 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002).

- 22 For an example, see Jörg Ulbert, ‘Französische Subsidienzahlungen an Hessen-Kassel während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges’, in *Frankreich und Hessen-Kassel zur Zeit des Dreißigjährigen Krieges und des Westfälischen Friedens*, ed. by Klaus Malettke (Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 1999), pp. 159–174.
- 23 Reinhard Baumann, *Landsknechte* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1994), pp. 19, 87, 214.
- 24 Peter H. Wilson, *War, State and Society in Württemberg, 1677–1793* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 203–209.

Likewise, the German principalities supplied troops to numerous European monarchies and republics between the 1560s and the early nineteenth century, without necessarily formally becoming official belligerents. Indeed, most princes ensured that their agreements allowed them to remain neutral and to honour their commitments to the Holy Roman Empire, even if the latter was actually at war with their subsidy partner. Treaties could include safeguards for troop providers who were attacked as a consequence of fulfilling their agreements.²⁵ The latter certainly approached the character of an alliance, as did the terms which were often also included to cover political co-operation for specific purposes. However, the alliance elements were not indispensable to the arrangements to transfer war-making resources.

Troop conventions and 'mercenary' contracts as Fiscal-Military Instruments

These preliminary remarks lead us directly to the questions of troop conventions as Fiscal-Military Instruments, and their relationship to subsidies. A major reason for the confusion in much of the literature is that it focuses on subsidy treaties, generally regarding them as asymmetrical *alliances* between major and minor powers, and failing to treat troop conventions as distinct instruments since they were often made entirely independently of any agreements over subsidies. Further problems stem from an often uncritical use of the term 'mercenary' to cover all forms of military recruitment and service before the age of the citizen-in-arms which is widely believed to have begun around 1789.²⁶ The only serious attempt to date to classify troop conventions is limited to those made by France, with the result that it creates categories which are not fully applicable elsewhere.²⁷

It is difficult to design watertight categories for the different forms of foreign troop contracts, as actual practice was so varied

25 For instance, all these provisions are included in Württemberg's treaty with France of 4 February 1752, HStAS, A202 Bü. 2219.

26 Alan Forrest, *The Legacy of the French Revolutionary Wars: The Nation-in-Arms in French Republican Memory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); *The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution*, edited by Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

27 Guy Rowlands, 'Foreign Service in the Age of Absolute Monarchy: Louis XIV and His *Forces Étrangères*', *War in History* 17 (2010), 141–165.

and could slip from one form to another, or even combine several different aspects in one arrangement. Contemporaries were also not consistent in their use of terms like 'auxiliary', 'foreign', 'hired', or 'subsidy'. Variations in motivation and purpose further cloud the distinctions, notably as providers of troops did not necessarily have to be full belligerents or allies of those they were assisting militarily. Broadly, contemporaries used the term 'treaty' (e.g. *Tractat*) for all kinds of agreement, but generally restricted 'capitulation' to contracts covering 'foreign' regiments and 'convention' to the hire of auxiliaries.

Some clarity is obtained when we tease out the different aspects of these arrangements which included how soldiers were recruited and by whom, how they were paid and maintained, and how they related to military command and political authority. It is possible to delineate four main forms, within each of which a number of important variations existed. The four forms co-evolved with the wider Fiscal-Military System, emerging by the mid- to late sixteenth century, and persisting in most cases into the mid-nineteenth century. None of these forms was static, but space precludes exploration of how each changed, and the priority here is to identify their distinguishing characteristics to assist further research in the field.

Direct recruitment

The first form to consider is that of the direct recruitment of individual soldiers who were subjects of one political jurisdiction into the service of another. Many men enlisted individually, often travelling considerable distances to do so, or because they were overtaken by some personal misfortune or economic necessity while away from their own homeland. However, it is almost certain that many more men were recruited by an agent of the hirer sent for that purpose, or by an autonomous intermediary (an entrepreneur or contractor) acting on their own account for financial gain, for career advancement, or to curry favour with the government for which they were recruiting.²⁸ A key distinguishing feature of this form was that such

28 Fritz Redlich's classic study of these intermediaries still provides useful detail: *The German Military Enterpriser and His Workforce*, Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beihefte 47/48, 2 vols (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1964–1965). The best and most recent reappraisal of these activities is David Parrott, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

agents and intermediaries lacked jurisdiction over the area where they were recruited and thus did not have any legal authority to compel men to enlist. They also had no direct call on the support of the authorities in the area where they were recruiting, frequently because those authorities did not want their neutrality compromised. Often, agents and intermediaries secured formal permission to recruit. If granted, permission was usually restricted according to the time and place where recruiters could operate and whether they were allowed to act publicly, accompanied by military musicians in order to attract potential recruits. However, such permission was also frequently refused, or not even sought in the almost certain knowledge that a request would be declined. In such circumstances, recruiters operated clandestinely and could be subject to fines or imprisonment if caught.²⁹

The chances of formal permission varied depending on the political circumstances and often also religion of the area where recruitment was to take place, as well as its relationship to the power in whose name the request was being made. For example, the Swiss cantonal authorities declined 133 of the 494 requests from the Prussian army to recruit and postponed at least 30 more between 1717 and 1740, but Catholic authorities were significantly less likely to co-operate than Protestant ones.³⁰ Many German principalities were reluctant to allow Prussia to recruit, because they rightly feared that Prussian officers and agents would try to induce their own soldiers to desert rather than pick untrained men. Yet, they often agreed for fear of antagonizing such a powerful monarchy.

Sometimes, authorities granted permission even to hostile powers, if the men being recruited were considered politically or economically undesirable. For example, the English monarchy allowed Spain to send officers to recruit Irishmen during years of peace in the seventeenth century, as well as allowing Irishmen to seek appointment as captains in the Spanish service in return for recruiting a company of soldiers.³¹ In other cases, the authorities permitted recruitment

29 There is a further discussion with examples in Peter H. Wilson, 'The Politics of Military Recruitment in Eighteenth-century Germany', *English Historical Review* 117 (2002), 536–568.

30 Rudolf Guger, *Preußische Werbungen in der Eidgenossenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1997), pp. 254–262.

31 Eduardo de Mesa, *The Irish in the Spanish Armies in the Seventeenth Century* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2014), esp. pp. 39–66; R.A. Stradling, *The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries: The Wild Geese in Spain, 1618–68* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1994).

as a form of indirect support for the power that was recruiting, notably in the case of the English monarchy's permission to the Palatinate, Denmark, and Sweden to recruit Scottish, Welsh, and English soldiers between 1618 and 1638. In some cases, recruits were even conscripted to supply armies organized by autonomous contractors, notably Count Ernst von Mansfeld (1580–1626).³² In the latter case, the authorities' formal co-operation pushed this form of recruitment close to the second category, as we shall see.

The primary contractual elements in this form encompassed a written agreement between the power commissioning the recruitment and the officer or agent conducting it, as well as between that agent and the men enlisting. Agents' contracts specified the number of men they should recruit by a specific date, as well as how they would be recompensed for this service. Frequently, there were stipulations as to what kind of recruit was considered acceptable, with the commissioning power reserving the right to reject men considered unfit for its service. Such stipulations were broadly similar to those employed by that power in its own territory to recruit directly into its army. Recruits were generally signed up on 'capitulations', or time-limited service contracts that were often shorter and on better terms than those offered to native recruits. Additionally, agents and sometimes the commissioning power might sign agreements with the authorities within whose jurisdiction recruitment was to take place. These agreements bound the agents to observe local laws, not to take men by force, and to pay for all goods and services they received. Sometimes they had to provide a 'caution' or deposit as a safeguard for their good behaviour.

Men recruited under this form of troop convention were collected in small groups and then travelled to join specific regiments. Austria and Prussia recruited Germans from across the Holy Roman Empire into their infantry and cavalry regiments to supplement native

32 Walter Krüssmann, *Ernst von Mansfeld (1580–1626): Grafensohn, Söldnerführer, Kriegsunternehmer gegen Habsburg im Dreißigjährigen Krieg* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 2010), pp. 544–555; Adam Marks, 'England, the English and the Thirty Years War (1618–1648)' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of St Andrews, 2012); Steve Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603–1660* (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2000), pp. 187–252; *Scotland and the Thirty Years War, 1618–1648*, ed. by Steve Murdoch (Leiden: Brill, 2001); J.V. Polisensky, 'Gallants to Bohemia', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 25 (1947), 391–404; Steven J. Stearns, 'Conscription and English Society in the 1620s', *Journal of British Studies* 11 (1971), 1–24.

conscripts and volunteers. Other states generally segregated foreign recruits by nationality into separate regiments. France maintained regiments of Germans, Swiss, Irish, Scots, Poles, and Italians, while Germans, Swiss, Irish, and Italians also served Spain. The Dutch had German, Swiss, English, and Scottish units. Sweden recruited widely during the 1620s and 1640s, and then maintained permanent German regiments stationed in its possessions in the Holy Roman Empire. Savoy-Piedmont recruited German and Swiss units after 1690 and the kingdom of Naples did the same after its independence from Austria in 1735.

'Foreign' regiments

Other examples can be found, but, in most of these cases, the direct recruitment of individual soldiers by agents was to sustain units which were already in existence, thus further distinguishing the first form of troop convention from the second which involved an external authority contracting to provide fully formed units for another army. This form of convention involved direct relations between the power commissioning the recruitment and the authority within whose territory it was conducted, in contrast to the first form where relations were either indirect through an agent, or absent altogether in clandestine recruitment. The power requesting recruitment could send an agent to negotiate permission, or it might be approached by another authority who wished to recruit for it, as in the case of several minor German princes who raised regiments for the Dutch and Venetian republics in the 1680s. Unlike direct recruitment, this second form of convention involved the raising of entire regiments or groups of regiments which were recruited with the express permission and often direct assistance of the local authorities.

Intermediaries could still play an important part, as in the case of the Dutch Republic's agreement with the Grisons (Grey Leagues) to recruit an infantry regiment in March 1693 which was secured thanks to the good offices of Colonel Hercules Capol (1642–1706). Capol, who came from an established Grisons family, was promptly named commander of the new unit and it is clear that he relied on his wider kinship and professional networks to recruit it: the company-grade officers included Capol's nephew, cousin, and son-in-law.³³

33 Martin Bundi, *Bünder Kriegsdienste in Holland um 1700: Eine Studie zu den Beziehungen zwischen Holland und Graubünden von 1693 bis 1730* (Chur: Calven Verlag, 1972), pp. 30–40.

Regardless of how the agreement was reached, it generally followed a standard form which emerged as early as around 1500 and specified how the regiment was to be raised, the kind of men who were acceptable as recruits, their terms and length of service, and how this was to be paid for, including what financial or political benefits the recruiting authority would receive from the commissioning power. Agreements often granted the recruiting authority residual rights over the unit once it had been mustered into the commissioning power's forces. Such rights could include the powers to name or at least suggest candidates to fill the initial officer appointments, as well as to replace any subsequent vacancies. Such rights were an important source of patronage, and they linked the regiment and the two contracting authorities through complex personal relationships. However, it was often difficult to exercise actual control once a unit had left the territory where it had been raised, because it passed under the authority of the commissioning power and became an integral part of its army. This point is important, as it constitutes a significant feature which distinguishes this form of convention from auxiliary and subsidy troops who were intended to be returned once they were no longer needed.

The case of the Grisons regiment in Dutch service exemplifies these difficulties. The Dutch unilaterally disbanded five of the regiment's ten companies as an economy measure in 1717, ignoring protests from the Grisons authorities. The importance of such units as a source of income and patronage often obliged providers to comply with hirers' requests for additional human resources to maintain the unit once it had entered their service. The Grisons readily agreed to find more recruits when the Dutch decided to augment each company from 50 to 150 men in 1726, and the unit remained an integral part of the Dutch army until 1797.³⁴

Often, the men needed to keep such units up to strength were recruited directly, thus blurring the distinction between the first and second forms of convention. However, once the unit had passed into the commissioning power's army, it remained distinctly 'foreign', additional recruits being sought in the area which had originally provided it. This status was more pronounced in some armies than others, and the overall characteristics changed between the mid-sixteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. The Spanish, French, Dutch, and later also Savoyard and Neapolitan armies recruited

34 *Ibid.*, pp. 123–124.

units characterised as German, Swiss, Italian, and in some cases Scottish, Irish, or English, that were explicitly considered separate from 'national' regiments recruited directly from these states' own subjects. Their distinctiveness was marked by particular uniforms, flags, and generally also legal privileges, pay, and conditions. Other armies recruited such regiments from men who were less obviously linguistically or culturally distinct from their own subjects. For example, both Austria and Prussia incorporated regiments provided by German princes within the Holy Roman Empire which retained connections with their original provider, but were not classed as distinctly 'foreign' units.

The actual composition of these units could vary considerably, particularly over time, as other foreigners, deserters, prisoners, and 'native' recruits were often used to keep them up to strength. For example, only a fifth of the 'Swiss' soldiers in Savoyard service in 1721 actually came from Switzerland, with Germans forming the majority along with a few French and some Savoyards.³⁵ Official records are often misleading, because definitions of 'foreign' could vary. The Prussian system of conscription introduced around 1733 classed any recruit from outside a regiment's recruiting 'canton' as 'foreign'.³⁶

Even allowing for these issues, the numbers of men raised by both the first and second types of convention were considerable. Between the early sixteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries an estimated one million Swiss served in other armies, mainly in distinct regiments. Around half of these were in French service, including around 120,000 who served during the reign of Louis XIV.³⁷ To put this further into perspective: the French army expanded dramatically from about 55,000 men in the early 1660s to about 150,000 at the start of the Nine Years' War in 1688. At least 655,000 men were recruited during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), while overall around two million served between 1700 and 1763, of whom about

35 Sabina Loriga, 'Soldaten in Piemont im 18. Jahrhundert', *L'Homme: Zeitschrift für feministische Geschichtswissenschaft* 3 (1992), 64–87 (p. 65).

36 Martin Winter, *Untertanengeist durch Militärpflicht? Das Preußische Kantonsystem in brandenburgischen Städten im 18. Jahrhundert* (Bielefeld: Verlag für Regionalgeschichte, 2005), pp. 262–265.

37 John McCormack, *One Million Mercenaries: Swiss Soldiers in the Armies of the World* (London: Leo Cooper, 1993); Albert Hochheimer, *Verraten und verkauft: Die Geschichte der europäischen Söldner* (Stuttgart: Goverts, 1967), p. 183.

300,000 were recruited from outside France.³⁸ Though distributed throughout the army, foreigners also formed a significant part of the Prussian army, with their proportion rising from about 20 per cent in the 1720s to around 40 per cent by 1740, and thereafter around half the total until the end of the eighteenth century.³⁹ Given that the army not only grew from about 40,000 in 1713 to 195,000 by 1786, but also fought four costly wars between 1740 and 1778, this represented a significant increase in foreign recruitment.

The French and Spanish armies continued to maintain foreign regiments throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, while the Neapolitan and Papal armies also raised Swiss and German units when they reconstituted their armies in 1814.⁴⁰ Britain also recruited such units, notably from Germans, Swiss, and Dutch, during the wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. After 1815 it became a troop provider, when six thousand Britons, mainly discharged soldiers, joined the armies fighting for independence from Spain in South America.⁴¹ Spanish protests prompted Britain to pass the Foreign Enlistment Act (1819) prohibiting its subjects from joining the forces of foreign powers, but suspended this temporarily in 1835 to permit the recruitment of a ten-thousand-man British Auxiliary Legion to assist the liberal Cristino monarchy against its Carlist rivals in the Spanish civil war of 1833–1840.⁴² The progressive nationalisation of war-making, with its ideal of citizens-in-arms, discouraged most states from recruiting foreigners by the 1850s.

That decade was a watershed between premodern Fiscal-Military Instruments and modern forms of military assistance which were more clearly determined by political ideology and by the ideals of the sovereign nation state. Conservative regimes provided foreign units in support of allies facing revolution. Austria and Bavaria

38 André Corvisier, *Les Français et l'armée sous Louis XIV* (Vincennes: Ministère de la défense, Etat Major de l'Armée de terre, Service historique, 1975), p. 133, and the same author's *L'armée française de la fin du 17e siècle au ministère de Choiseul*, 2 vols (Paris: PUF, 1964), vol. II, p. 962.

39 Willerd R. Fann, 'Foreigners in the Prussian army 1713–1756', *Central European History* 23 (1990), 76–85.

40 David Alvarez, *The Pope's Soldiers: A Military History of the Modern Vatican* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2011), esp. pp. 32–40.

41 Ben Hughes, *Conquer or Die! Wellington's Veterans and the Liberation of the New World* (Oxford: Osprey, 2010).

42 Edward M. Brett, *The British Auxiliary Legion in the First Carlist War 1835–1838* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2005).

recruited four 'foreign' carabineer regiments for the Bourbon regime in Naples, which had disbanded its Swiss units after a mutiny in 1858 and now faced Garibaldi's insurgency. Austria and Belgium likewise sent foreign legions to back Archduke Maximilian's ill-fated rule as emperor of Mexico 1864–1867, primarily because both monarchies were linked dynastically to him.⁴³ Meanwhile, a variety of volunteers flocked to fight for various liberal causes across Europe, especially during the 1848 Revolutions and subsequently in Italy, Poland, France, and Greece during the later nineteenth century.⁴⁴

Exile regiments formed a special subcategory of the premodern foreign troops, since they followed their prince into the service of an allied monarch. These examples primarily belong to the era of the Nine Years' War (1688–1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714). Around 25,000 Irish and British troops followed James II into exile after 1691 and became a permanent part of the French army.⁴⁵ Smaller numbers of Bavarian and Cologne troops joined the French army when the emperor punished their rulers for backing Louis XIV during the War of the Spanish Succession; but, unlike James II, their princes were restored in 1714 and they were able to return home. The Hanoverian army broadly fits this subcategory during the Napoleonic Wars, when around thirty thousand former personnel and other Germans escaped their occupied homeland to serve in the King's German Legion which formed part of the British army 1803–1815.⁴⁶

Stateless troops recruited as embodied regiments by colonel-entrepreneurs or groups of officers represented a second subcategory of foreign soldiers. One early example was the former army of the Heilbronn League. It was originally formed to assist Sweden during the Thirty Years' War, but after the League's collapse it acted on its own account under its primary commander, Duke Bernhard of Weimar (1604–1639), in arrangement with Sweden's main ally, France, which subsidised its operations. After Bernhard's death, the

43 Ernst Pitner, *Maximilian's Lieutenant: A Personal History of the Mexican Campaign, 1864–67*, translated and ed. by Gordon Etherington-Smith (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993).

44 For example, see Andrea Viotti, *Garibaldi: The Revolutionary and His Men* (Poole: Blandford, 1979).

45 John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle: The French Army 1610–1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 367.

46 Mark Wishon, *German Forces and the British Army: Interactions and Perceptions, 1742–1815* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), pp. 165–192.

force was absorbed incrementally into the French army.⁴⁷ Other examples include the various units raised after 1685 from and often by Huguenot refugees who served in the armies of Britain, Savoy, the Dutch Republic, Brandenburg-Prussia, Celle and other Protestant German principalities until the early eighteenth century.⁴⁸

Both these subcategories were distinguished by the political circumstances of their formation, but otherwise shared the same features as other foreign troops. Their establishment, organisation, conditions of service, and other matters were all regulated in conventions signed by their leaders with the power whose service they entered. They remained distinct units within their paymaster's army, but were not fully independent and could be discarded when considered no longer needed, as was the case with the four Huguenot regiments in the British army which were disbanded in 1697. Likewise, they sustained themselves through direct recruitment with a similar impact on their actual composition. While almost all of the initial eight thousand men enrolled in the King's German Legion by 1805 were Hanoverians, the force had become cosmopolitan and polyglot by the time it was disbanded in 1815.

Hired auxiliaries

The third major form of troop convention consisted in the hiring of auxiliaries. Like foreign regiments, these were organised by a provider exercising formal jurisdiction over its own territory, notably the German and Italian princes, but also other monarchs such as the rulers of Denmark and Sweden. Units were also provided fully formed, armed, and equipped, and served under their own officers appointed by the provider, who likewise retained some jurisdiction over the units' internal management, such as discipline and promotions. The provider did not have to be an active ally of the power it was assisting, as was the case with the various German principalities supplying troops to Venice in its war against the Ottomans in the 1680s, as well as the better-known example of the Hessians and other Germans serving Britain in America roughly a century later.⁴⁹

47 David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624–1642* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 293–298.

48 *War, Religion and Service: Huguenot Soldiering, 1685–1713*, ed. by Matthew Glozier and David Onnekink (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).

49 For Venetian service, see for example Alexander Schwencke, *Geschichte der Hannoverschen Truppen in Griechenland 1685–1689* (Hanover: Hahn, 1854).

Finally, as in the case of foreign regiments, the conventions stipulated the initial period of service and sometimes imposed restrictions on where the troops could be deployed, such as prohibiting their dispatch overseas. What distinguished hired auxiliaries from foreign troops was that this was always intended to be a two-way exchange, the units being returned once their contract expired or (as was sometimes allowed in the conventions) their provider recalled them.

The timing of the exchange was carefully choreographed to proceed through clearly defined stages. The overall length of the agreement was specified in a signed treaty or convention. Once this had been ratified, the provider had a fixed period within which the troops had to be assembled at the specified strength and at a designated point. Some agreements allowed for the transfer of mobilisation money to cover at least part of the costs of making the units combat-ready, including bringing them up to the required strength and providing them with field equipment such as wagons and tents. In some cases units had to be raised from scratch, notably where providers concealed their actual lack of preparedness from the hirer. Generally, the provider remained responsible for paying, feeding, and housing the troops throughout this first stage, and was also responsible for their command and for all disciplinary matters. The second stage began once the hirer formally mustered the troops who now entered the hirer's service. This ceremony was much like those held to mark the embodiment of newly raised units in any army, except that auxiliaries remained bound by an oath to their provider and did not become a fully integrated part of the hirer's army. In most cases, auxiliaries were already soldiers and had sworn to abide by the articles of war. They had thus already crossed from civilian to martial law. Instead, what changed was that they now went in under the operational command of the hirer who simultaneously assumed at least partial responsibility for their pay and maintenance. The second stage lasted until the auxiliaries were discharged in another muster from the hirer's service back into the command and maintenance of their provider. This stage was also marked by a formal ceremony, as well as an audit of personnel, equipment, and accounts, so that any outstanding moneys could be calculated. In practice, providers then frequently complained that they were still owed substantial sums, leading in some cases to a fourth stage where these claims were settled, usually in some kind of compromise agreement. Some conventions included demobilisation payments to cover the cost of returning the troops and reducing them to their peacetime strength. Where provided, such

payments were usually calculated at between one and three months' pay; but again disagreements could arise when the provider claimed them at the unit's full strength, whereas the hirer paid only according to actual strength.

There were two important subcategories of hired auxiliaries, distinguished by the form and extent of the monetary and material compensation provided. Fully hired auxiliaries became financially independent of the provider and were instead paid, fed, and housed at the hirer's expense. Usually, troop conventions specified that hired auxiliaries were to receive the same rates as the hirer's own forces, to ensure that they were not discriminated against. Subsidised auxiliaries remained partially dependent on their provider for their maintenance. Generally, they received food and fodder in kind, but remained paid by their provider. Additional subsidies might be paid in both cases, but these were not the principal means of maintaining the forces. The lines could blur between hired auxiliaries and foreign regiments if the contracts were extended across many years, including peacetime. Examples include the Anglo-Scottish brigade in Dutch service 1572–1782 and the 3,500 ex-Cromwellian soldiers sent by Charles II to serve Portugal 1662–1668.⁵⁰

Auxiliaries constituted a substantial part of most European armies in wartime between the 1660s and 1790s. The seven thousand Danes hired by William III in 1689 formed 15 per cent of his army at the decisive Battle of the Boyne the following year, and they continued to serve him in campaigns in Flanders until 1697.⁵¹ Between 33,000 and 115,000 German auxiliaries supported the Allied war effort in any given year during the War of the Spanish Succession, dwarfing the British contingent sent to the continent as well as providing a considerable augmentation to the Dutch army, which already contained a large number of German and Swiss foreign regiments.⁵²

50 *Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands*, ed. by James Ferguson, 2 vols (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1899–1901); Jonathon Riley, *The Last Ironsides: The English Expedition to Portugal 1662–1668* (Solihull: Helion, 2014).

51 Kjeld Hald Galster, *Danish Troops in the Williamite Army in Ireland, 1689–91* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2012).

52 Peter H. Wilson, 'Financing the War of the Spanish Succession in the Holy Roman Empire', in *The War of the Spanish Succession: New Perspectives*, ed. by Matthias Pohligh and Michael Schaich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 267–297, and *German Armies: War and German Politics 1648–1806* (London: UCL Press, 1998), pp. 104–112.

Subsidy troops

Subsidy troops can be distinguished from auxiliaries by the much looser relationship between the soldiers provided and the monetary compensation received. Such troops were significant, especially during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, but their numbers were generally fewer than those in the other three forms of troop convention. The inflated importance attached to subsidy troops is largely due to their being confused with auxiliaries and because subsidy payments are generally easier to track than the diverse, but often more substantial, sums paid directly to auxiliaries and foreign troops.⁵³ Unlike auxiliaries, subsidy troops were not paid in full and did not serve so closely under the payer's command. The treaty generally specified a certain number of men to be provided, but did not entitle the payer to stipulate exactly which units or where they served. The subsidy simply 'subsidised' the provider's costs, but the proportion covered could vary.

Subsidies were more clearly 'political' than the other three forms of convention. A more powerful ally subsidised the cost of a weaker partner in a common war effort, and the arrangements often bore more resemblance to an alliance than was usual in the other forms. Subsidy and auxiliary agreements were often combined, one treaty arranging political co-operation and the payment of a subsidy and another specifying the supply of auxiliaries to the stronger partner, who thus had to meet their direct costs as well as provide the subsidy. However, like the provision of foreign regiments and auxiliaries, such arrangements did not automatically make both partners full belligerents in the same way, thus helping to distinguish these Fiscal-Military Instruments from alliances.

Conclusions

Subsidies were closely associated with the transfer of soldiers from the service of one power to another, but the exact relationship between financial payments and troop conventions has been clouded by lack of precision in identifying and defining the different ways in which war-making resources were exchanged. This chapter has suggested that subsidies should be interpreted as one of several

53 An example of this is John M. Sherwig, *Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1793–1815* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969).

Fiscal-Military Instruments which evolved across early modernity as ways of transferring men, money, materials, services, information, and expertise between partners. Such instruments facilitated what were high-risk arrangements between partners who were often justified in mistrusting each other. Whilst scholarly attention has concentrated on subsidies as aspects of interstate diplomacy, this chapter has argued that we also need to consider the ways in which soldiers were recruited, hired, or lent which were themselves often separate from subsidy treaties and which involved non-state as well as state actors.