The Relationship Between Education and Political Doctrine: The Isocratic Heritage and a Socratic Alternative

James R. Muir
Jesus College
University of Oxford

Thesis submitted to the University of Oxford for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Trinity Term 1995

Note: Page 393 is missing from the Bodleian's hardbound copy from which this scan was made

BODLEIAN LIBRARY OXFORD
DEPOSITED THESIS
22.11.96

The Relationship Between Education and Political Doctrine: The Isocratic Heritage and a Socratic Alternative

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....i

Acknowledgements.....ii

Introduction.....1

PART ONE: THE LOSS AND RECOVERY OF THE ISOCRATIC HERITAGE

Chapter One: The Status of the Isocratic Heritage.

1.0 Introduction.....16
1.1 The Legacy of Isocrates
  1.1.1 Preliminary Remarks.....16
  1.1.2 Politics.....19
  1.1.3 Philosophy.....21
  1.1.4 Literary and Historical Writing.....24
  1.1.5 Art, Architecture and Music.....30
  1.1.6 Religion.....34
  1.1.7 Conclusion.....36
1.2 Isocrates and Education.....36
1.3 The Isocratic Idea of Education Today
  1.3.0 Introduction.....41
  1.3.1 R.S. Peters and the Isocratic Idea of Education..42
  1.3.2 The Isocratic Idea of Education in Educational Literature.....46

Chapter Two: The Present Status of the Question

2.0 Introduction.....54
2.1 Isocrates and the Educationists.....54
2.2 A Disquieting Suggestion: P.H.Hirst and the History of Liberal Education.....57
2.3 Inadequacies of the Conventional View of Isocrates.....62
2.4 Political Philosophy in Educational Studies.....73
2.5 The Straussian Alternative
  2.5.1 The Need for Alternatives in Educational Studies.....79
  2.5.2 Three Proposed Alternatives.....80
  2.5.3 Leo Strauss.....82

PART TWO: THE ORIGIN, TRANSMISSION AND EVOLUTION OF THE ISOCRATIC IDEA OF EDUCATION

Introduction.....85

Chapter Three: Education in the Political Philosophy of Isocrates

3.0 Introduction.....89
3.1 Isocrates' View of Human Nature.....92
3.2 The Isocratic Idea of Education.....99
3.3 The Aims of Isocratic Education.....108
3.4 The Educational Programme of Isocrates.....116
3.5 Isocrates and Plato.....121

Chapter Four: The Isocratic Idea: Rome to the Early Middle Ages

4.0 Introduction.....128
4.1 Rome
4.1.1 Roman Education.....129
4.1.2 Minor Roman Educational Theorists.....131
4.1.3 Cicero.....133
4.1.4 Quintilian.....142
4.2 Early Christian Educational Thought.....151
4.2.1 Clement of Alexandria.....152
4.2.2 Minor Christian Educational Theorists.....155
4.2.3 Augustine.....156

Chapter Five: The Isocratic Idea in the Middle Ages

5.0 Introduction.....164
5.1 Martianus Capella.....166
5.2 Cassiodorus.....170
5.3 The Carolingian Renaissance.....174
5.4 Education and the Twelfth Century Renaissance.....184
5.4.1 Hugh of St. Victor.....187
5.4.2 John of Salisbury.....194

Chapter Six: The Isocratic Idea in Renaissance Humanism

6.0 Introduction.....204
6.1 Isocrates and Renaissance Humanism.....205
6.2 Humanism in the Italian Renaissance.....210
6.3 Erasmus.....216
6.4 Elizabethan Humanism
6.4.1 Sir Thomas Elyot.....224
6.4.2 Roger Ascham.....231

Chapter Seven: Education and Modern Political Philosophy

7.0 Introduction.....239
7.1 Machiavelli's Turn from the Ancients.....241
7.2 Locke, Economics and Education.....239
7.3 Rousseau, Culture and Education.....257
7.4 The Modern Polarity.....266

PART THREE: A SOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE

Introduction.....270

Chapter Eight: The Inadequacy of the Isocratic Heritage

8.0 Introduction.....275
8.1 The Breakdown of the Isocratic Consensus.....276
8.2 The Errors of Isocrates.....283
8.3 The Educational Vices of Democracy.....293
8.3.1 Tocqueville's Warnings.....298
8.3.2 Economics, Freedom and Education.....299
8.3.3 "Culture", Autonomy and Education.....306
8.4 The Need for an Alternative Idea of Education.....316

Chapter Nine: Philosophical Foundations of the Socratic Alternative

9.0 Introduction.....319
9.1 Aristotle's Two Good Lives: Philosophy and Politics...321
9.2 Hypotheses and Dialectical Reasoning in Plato.....328
9.3 Hypotheses, Dialectic and the Question of the Good....334
9.4 The Question of the Good.....338
9.5 The Socratic Idea of Education.....344

Chapter Ten: Socratic Education

10.0 Introduction.....351
10.1 Permanent Questions and Great Books.....352
10.2 Isocratic Approaches to Great Books Education.....357
10.3 The Socratic Approach to Great Books Education.....362
10.4 Dangers and Prerequisites of Dialectic.....376
10.5 Science as Preparation for Dialectic.....380
10.6 Civic Education for Philosophy.....386
10.7 Summary.....392

Conclusion.....394

References and Notes.....404

Bibliography.....453

The Relationship Between Education and Political Doctrine: The Isocratic Heritage and a Socratic Alternative

James R. Muir
Jesus College
University of Oxford

D.Phil., Trinity Term 1995

Abstract

This thesis is a philosophical and historical examination of the question of the nature of education. There are two ideas of the nature of education. The Isocratic idea is defined by the claim that the normative intentions of education are deductively derived from, and therefore relative to, an axiomatic political doctrine. The Socratic idea is defined by the claim that such intentions are constructed on the basis of permanent and universal philosophical questions, and not relative to political belief and aspiration. The thesis is primarily intended to clarify the question of the nature of education by explicating these two alternative ideas in critical contrast with one another.

The argument of the thesis proceeds as follows. Part One (Chapters One and Two) argues that the heritage of Isocrates has influenced virtually every aspect of the historical development of Western civilization, particularly education, and yet does not appear in contemporary educationist literature. Part Two (Chapters Four to Seven) explicates the logical structure of the Isocratic idea of education, as well as the Isocratic tradition of educational thought and practice generally, and shows that both the idea and the tradition provides the unity of Western education from classical antiquity until the present day. Part Three (Chapters Eight to Ten) argues that the Isocratic idea of education may no longer be tenable in contemporary educational thought or practice, and that we ought therefore to reconsider the alternative Socratic idea. The Socratic idea of the nature of education, as well as some aspects of the practical educational programme based upon it, are examined in some detail.

The thesis draws two conclusions. First, for practical, theoretical, and philosophical reasons, we must return to the question of the nature of education in full awareness of the two alternative ideas available to us. Second, and by implication, the future status and credibility of educational philosophy as an academic discipline cannot be improved without a return to careful study of the historical foundations of the discipline.

Acknowledgements

Out of the euphoria that accompanies the completion of a doctoral thesis emerges the giddy temptation to thank virtually everyone I ever met, no matter how remote their association with the thesis itself. I must therefore concentrate my mind on the very real debts I owe to those whose help and support I have valued most.

I first applied to Oxford with the intention of studying with Mr. John Wilson, Fellow of Mansfield College, who seemed to me to offer the best understanding of the difficult relationship between education and philosophy, and the way in which educational philosophy must develop in the future. Although I have benefitted greatly from his scholarly advice and philosophical criticism, I have appreciated most his willingness and ability to encourage my independent exploration of uncharted territory. This thesis has been much improved by Mr. Wilson's willingness to let me wander through the history of the discipline we both value, while never failing at just the right time to draw my attention back to the destination I ultimately wished to reach.

I also wish to express my thanks to Mrs. Patricia White and Dr. Graham Haydon, who served as my examiners for my transfer to doctoral status. I have benefitted from their advice concerning both the general structure of this thesis, and a number of integral points within it.

An award of an Overseas Research Scholarship made it financially possible for me to come to Oxford. I am happy to have this opportunity to record my gratitude to the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals for this award.

I am grateful for the encouragement and support provided by my family and friends. I want especially to record my gratitude to George and Kathleen Eaton for their timely and generous financial support at a crucial time during my stay in Oxford.

I want to make particular mention of my friend Steve Rush. Steve and I met as house painters, trying to earn a little extra cash during summer vacations. As it happened, however, we spent altogether too many summer afternoons sitting on unopened paint cans, dry paint brushes in hand, and talking philosophy. Many of the questions and arguments developed in this thesis had their origin in those conversations, and Steve has helped me to refine them over the ten years of our friendship. Even more important, however, has been his encouragement, and his belief in the value of my work. Steve's example has never failed to confirm to me that the philosophical enterprise is still possible and worthwhile, and that true friendship is the foundation of all that is good in life.

An extra special thanks is due to my daughters, Melissa

and Heather. Melissa, especially, has been very understanding when, all too often, I could not tell her 'a made-up story'. Heather, although only a year old, has perhaps anticipated the reaction of some of my future readers, and slept through most of it. Nevertheless, it was very obliging of her.

For this thesis, and for so much else, I owe everything to my wife, Dawn. Although busy home-educating our daughters and writing her own doctoral thesis, Dawn has always made the time to type, proof-read and discuss every sentence I have written. There is, of course, much more to be said. But she is one of the music makers, and will understand that no words of mine could ever be worthy of all that she brings to me, and to our children.

James R. Muir

The Relationship Between Education and Political Doctrine: The Isocratic Heritage and the Socratic Alternative

Introduction

> 'Sooner or later, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.' Keynes [1]

> '...the fact that democrats do not read books does not prevent books from determining their lives.' Mansfield [2]

This thesis is intended to be an essay in political philosophy and the history of educational ideas from a Straussian perspective [3]. It is primarily concerned with the Socratic question, What is education? The essay focuses on the philosophical question of the nature of education, and leaves the derivative questions of its institutionalization, provision and distribution to others.

The philosophical question of the nature of education is one of the oldest and most persistent in human thought. If we turn to Aristotle, writing in fourth century B.C., we read that the question of

> 'what education is, and how one ought to educate, should not be neglected' [4]

Aristotle goes on to observe the absence of any agreement about the nature of education [5], as well as a neglect of the question itself. More than a thousand years later, Kant could make much the same observation.

> 'There are two human inventions which may be considered more difficult than any others -- the art of government, and the art of education; and people still contend as to their very meaning.' [6]

It must be said that there has been little progress in our understanding of the nature of education since the classical period, now more than two thousand years ago. The persistence of the question or, to say the same thing, the elusiveness of any rational agreement about the nature of education, ought perhaps to give one pause before embarking on another exploration of it. Yet Kant reminds us that we must persist in our attempt to understand the nature of education, in spite of the difficulty of this task.

> 'The prospect of a theory of education is a glorious ideal, and it matters little if we are not able to realize it at once. Only we must not look upon the idea as chimerical, nor decry it as a beautiful dream, notwithstanding the difficulties that stand in the way of its realization.' [7]

Although agreement concerning the nature of education seems likely to remain elusive, there are profound practical, theoretical, and philosophical reasons for recovering a clear understanding of this most fundamental question.

The question of the nature of education is a multi-faceted one. It will therefore be useful to clarify the terminological distinctions between the terms concept, idea, and doctrine. We shall be able to formulate the question at issue in this essay more precisely on the basis of a clear understanding of these distinctions.

Scholars such as Isaiah Berlin are regarded as historians of ideas rather than historians of concepts for reasons which are worth emphasizing. One of these reasons is illustrated in

the differentiation of the idea of education and the concept of education. Conceptual analysis is a logical and non-normative enquiry [8]. Education, however, is a normative enterprise. It follows that conceptual analysis can clarify the concept of education, insofar as it is logical and non-normative. Where conceptual analysis is less useful to us is in the determination of the normative standards by which education is necessarily guided. This limitation of conceptual enquiry has been noted by its practitioners [9].

A non-normative concept of education is at the core of any idea of education. This conceptual core enables us to distinguish educational enterprises from other normative enterprises which contribute to the upbringing of the young, such as parenting, government, medicine or law. The idea of education is a combination of this conceptual core with normative standards. Although it is necessary to be clear about the concept of education itself, in practice we are always concerned with the idea of education as a whole. This raises the question of the origin and status of the normative component of the idea of education.

All educational systems have formal aims such as literacy or numeracy. These two aims, for example, are common to American democratic education no less than to German Nazi education, or to Christian education no less than to Jewish education. What differentiates all of these educational traditions, however, is not the formal aims, but rather the

normative intentions according to which these aims are structured and valued. Literacy in American democratic education is structured and valued with reference to the values of, for example, equality of opportunity and freedom of expression, whereas literacy in German Nazi education was structured and valued as a means for the inculcation of the values of subservience to the leadership of the State, and Aryan or Germanic mythology and nationalism. We are not directly concerned in this essay with the aims of education, but with the normative intentions of education. We are most concerned with the origin and status of such intentions because they determine the way in which aims are understood and, more fundamentally, the way in which the nature of education is understood.

What can be somewhat difficult to recognize is the sense in which an identical idea of the nature of education underlies each and all of these traditions: fascists and democrats,or Christians and Jews, presuppose that the "values" or normative intentions of education ought to be derived from a logically prior political doctrine.

> 'Every educational system has a moral goal that it tries to attain and that informs its curriculum. It wants to produce a certain kind of human being. This intention is more or less explicit, more or less a result of reflection; but even the neutral subjects, like reading and writing and arithmetic, take their place in a vision of the educated person. In some nations the goal was the pious person, in others the warlike, in others the industrious. Always important is the political regime, which needs citizens who are in accord with its fundamental principle. Aristocracies want gentlemen, oligarchies men who respect and pursue money, and democracies lovers of equality. Democratic education, whether it admits it

> or not, wants and needs to produce men and women who have the tastes, knowledge, and character supportive of a democratic regime.' [10]

The differences between these systems of education arise precisely because advocates of all of them presuppose exactly the same idea of the essential nature of education, while differing with respect to the specific political doctrine to which they adhere. Although each of these traditions may have conceptualized education in terms of deliberate and organized learning, and defined such learning in terms of aims such as literacy and numeracy, they regarded such learning and aims as means towards broader normative intentions. In other words, the aims of education are structured and valued in accordance with the political doctrine to which the educator is committed prior to the specific formulation of the aims. Democrats intend to educate numerate and literate lovers of equality, while Nazis intend to educate numerate and literate lovers of the Germanic race alone. Correspondingly, while advocates of these two political doctrines may regard literacy to be an aim of education, the precise formulation of this aim will be determined by the broader normative intentions of education. These broader intentions, in turn, are derived from the prior political doctrine; some books read by democrats are burned by Nazis at political rallies. Underlying the radical differences of educational practice is a shared understanding of the nature of education: each of these groups presupposes that the normative intentions of education are derived from political doctrine. This idea of the essential nature of education was introduced into Western tradition (as well as a number of

"non-Western" traditions) by Isocrates, and so may be referred to as the Isocratic idea of education.

In the Isocratic view, the idea of education is a combination of political doctrine and the concept of education. It follows that this single idea of education will, in practice, give rise to a diversity of educational enterprises. The diversity of educational enterprises will be a consequence of the diversity of particular political doctrines which can be attached to the concept of education. Each of these actual instantiations of the general Isocratic idea of education may be described as a doctrine of education. The Isocratic idea of education does not give rise to a diversity of concepts or ideas of education, but a diversity of doctrines of education all presupposing the same idea of the essential nature of education. As paradoxical as it may initially appear, Isocrates introduced the notion that <u>in practice</u> education was "essentially contested" as a consequence of the idea that the essential nature of education was incontestably political <u>in theory</u>.

In other words, to summarize, the Isocratic idea of education is constructed by combining the concept of education with normative intentions derived from political doctrine. There are , however, a diversity of normative intentions of education as a consequence of the diversity of political doctrines from which they are derived. Consequently, the Isocratic idea of the essential nature of education leads, in

practice, to a diversity of essentially contested doctrines of education, each relative to the axiomatic political doctrine.

Throughout Western history, the only alternative to the Isocratic idea of education has been the Socratic idea, particularly as it was formulated in the writings of Plato and Xenophon. In the Socratic view there are no doctrines of education, because the normative intentions to which the concept of education is attached are not derived from political doctrine. On the contrary, the Socratic idea of education is constructed from a combination of the concept of education and the normative standards implied by the pursuit of philosophical questions of permanent importance. In principle, the Socratic view of the essential nature of education leads, in practice, to an educational enterprise which is universal, uniting people in spite of -- and even because of -- their doctrinal differences.

The fundamental philosophical question naturally arises as to whether it is the Socratic or Isocratic idea which captures the essential nature of education. In examining the relationship between the normative intentions of education and political doctrine, those committed to the Isocratic idea could begin by explicating two rival political doctrines, such as representative and participatory democracy. One would proceed by setting forth each political doctrine in some detail, and then attempting to determine what implications would follow from each of them for educational provision. Yet

even if one were able to determine which of these two doctrines is better justified from the point of view of education, the task would remain to then compare this particular political doctrine with the scores of rival doctrines that exist. The belief that such a task would be of any value, however, rests on a still more fundamental assumption, namely that education ought to be valued relative to political doctrine in the first place. If education ought to be relative to political doctrine then it is indeed necessary to sift through the rival political doctrines available, in an attempt to determine which of them is best justified. On the other hand, however, if education ought not to be relative to political doctrine, as the Socratics argue, then it follows that the examination of the educational implications of any particular political doctrine, or a comparison between any two doctrines, is philosophically irrelevant, and practically misconceived. Yet virtually all contemporary educational research rests on a commitment to a specified political doctrine, and does not examine the fundamental and underlying presupposition concerning the relationship, if any, that there ought to be between education and political doctrine. This thesis is intended to be an examination of this irreducible and educationally fundamental problem.

The central question then, is whether it is the Isocratic idea or the Socratic idea that is closest to the essential nature of education. Disagreements about the essential nature

of education may be reduced to a single question, and it is this question which will be the subject of this thesis. Is there an idea of the essential nature of education which can serve as the foundation for an educational enterprise which is justifiably applicable to all people, everywhere and always, or is there only an idea of education which gives rise to an irreducible plurality of essentially contested doctrines of education, each relative to a political doctrine? This question may be most profitably approached through a historical and philosophical study of the relations between ideas of education and political doctrines.

Intentions and Methods

The approach taken in this thesis to political philosophy and the history of educational ideas is inspired by the work of Leo Strauss, and his many students. This approach is defined in part by the conviction that philosophy, if it is to be more than a sophisticated reformulation of the prevailing opinions of the day, must be firmly grounded in historical study.

> 'Strauss's inquiry into ancient and modern political teaching had to be historically as well as philosophically serious: historically serious by first inquiring into the original understandings of their authors; philosophically serious by then inquiring into their truth.' [11]

Although few philosophers would contest the claim that philosophy consists of enquiry into the truth, there is much disagreement concerning the appropriate method of such enquiry. The Straussian approach to philosophy and the history

of ideas is based in part on the method of philosophical commentary on philosophical writings. This method does not involve any prior commitment to a particular hermeneutical stance or literary theory.

> 'A commentary attempts to bring forth and interpret an author's intent, and so supposes that he has one, that it is worth finding, and that it is not manifest on the surface. A commentary therefore seeks out and adopts the author's viewpoint as its own until the author's intent becomes clear and criticism of it becomes necessary. [...] So the task of commentary leads to the duty of criticism of its own motion and does not need to begin from a critical stance.' [12]

The historical and philosophical arguments presented in this thesis constitute an attempt to first understand, and then to criticize, the ideas of philosophical and political writers in their own terms. It is hoped that this approach will both help us to recover and understand unfamiliar ideas which may be of value to us, and to come to a better understanding of some of the ideas we now presuppose.

The question at issue in this thesis is whether the essential nature of education ought to be understood in terms of the Isocratic or Socratic idea of education. It must be emphasized that it is not the intention of this essay to answer this question, for the simple reason that it can no longer be adequately understood at present. This question can no longer be understood as a consequence of the loss of historical learning that has characterized most educational philosophy of this century. The intention of this thesis is therefore to recover a historical and philosophical understanding of this question, as well as of those answers -- either influential or profound -- which are already available

to us in the history of our discipline.

> 'The contribution is in the nature of a prelude or protreptic. My aim here is not the elaboration of a doctrine but rather the regeneration of buried possibilities and forgotten questions. I mean to suggest an agenda for serious reflection on our fundamental situation, spurred by an awareness that we stand at a historical turning point.' [13]

The intention of this thesis is, in other words, to recover some understanding of the most fundamental alternative ideas of the nature of education, and so to lead us back to the philosophical question of the nature of education with fuller vision, and a renewed sense of urgency.

The intention of the thesis can be divided into three components, though it is unified by a common Straussian approach to the whole.

The thesis is intended, first, to recover some understanding of the logical structure of the Isocratic idea of education, and, second, of its continuing predominance in Western educational thought and practice. An argument in the history of educational philosophy and ideas will explicate the Isocratic idea of education. This historical argument will then proceed by following the transmission and evolution of the Isocratic idea of education throughout the history of Western educational thought and practice, from classical antiquity until the present day. This is not so massive an undertaking as it might first appear, because it is only the progression of the Isocratic idea which is being treated, and not the many doctrinal, curricular and institutional

arrangements which have been constructed upon it. This thesis is a history of educational ideas, not a history of education. Its intention is not to provide a historical survey of educational ideas, but a philosophical reconstruction of an idea of the nature of education during its historical development. The Isocratic idea of education is the single continuous and unifying idea at the foundation of the history of Western educational thought and practice.

Our historical study of the Isocratic heritage will conclude with an argument in political philosophy which suggests that the Isocratic idea of education may be inadequate on philosophical grounds, as well as on practical grounds (within the contingent context of a pluralist and democratic regime). If the Isocratic idea should prove to be no longer tenable, or if the Socratic idea of education is more defensible than the Isocratic, then a great deal of contemporary educational thought and practice must be judged inadequate. This is a radical conclusion but, as Marx says, the point of philosophy is not merely the contemplation of the world [14]. Yet it must be emphasized that such conclusions are consequences of the argument presented here, and very far removed from the experience that animates and defines its immediate goal. The intention of my argument, like the experience of constructing it, is deeply rooted in 'the classical goal of contemplation rather than the modern aspiration to transform' [15]. The goal of contemplation, and the gripping knowledge of one's own ignorance that motivates

the pursuit of it, returns us naturally to Socrates.

This thesis intends, thirdly, to critically examine the alternative Socratic idea of the nature of education. The primary intention of this examination is to recover some understanding of the question of the nature of education, by recovering some understanding of the second of the two most fundamental answers to it. There are, nevertheless, some illustrations of its practical importance. At the very least, the Socratic idea of education can remind us that the claim that education is <u>always</u> relative to "culture", <u>essentially</u> contested, or <u>necessarily</u> political, is wholly unestablished. It is schooling that is "contextualized" in a real and significant sense, not education. In the context of increasing calls for the fragmentation of the provision of schooling and higher education along cultural, religious or political lines, to say nothing of the more enduring considerations, the recovery of real understanding of the Socratic alternative to the Isocratic heritage is of undeniable theoretical and practical importance.

There is a final, although informal, intention which pervades the whole of this essay. Contemporary philosophy of education has been almost entirely divorced from the historical roots of the discipline, and has consequently lost sight of the philosophical problems which are unique to educational philosophy, and of increasing importance in our troubled times. John Dewey, trained in a strange blend of

Hegelianism and American pragmatism rather than educational thought, redefined educational philosophy within the Education departments in terms of a commentary on liberal political theory and activism. Later, R.S. Peters, originally a specialist in analytic philosophical psychology rather than educational thought [16], redefined educational philosophy within the Education departments in terms of "applied" analytic philosophy. Philosophy of education in Education departments remains to this day a narrow mixture of applied analytic philosophy and a commentary on liberal political theory, although attempts are under way to redefine the discipline yet again, this time in terms of economic theory, literary theory, and other more fashionable disciplines. Yet it is not necessary, and it has not been of any obvious benefit, to continue to regard educational philosophy as a sub-topic of the more fashionable or prestigious disciplines. If philosophy of education is to earn the prestige it merits in its own right, and is to become an independent and respected discipline within the university, then we must connect ourselves once again to the history of our discipline. That history reveals to us fundamental philosophical problems which belong uniquely to educational philosophy, along with an enormously rich tradition of philosophical thought of the highest order devoted to these questions. These questions and this tradition belong to no other discipline, and are now rarely encountered anywhere in the university. The tragedy of contemporary philosophy of education is that they are no longer to be found in the Education departments either, and it

is those of us who aspire to be educationists (rather than proxy political theorists or "applied" analytic philosophers) who havelost most as a consequence. This essay is intended, therefore, to recover a little of what we have lost, and so to reveal what we stand to gain by understanding educational philosophy as a discipline in its own right, with its own unique set of questions, and its own noble intellectual lineage.

PART ONE: THE LOSS AND RECOVERY OF THE ISOCRATIC HERITAGE

Chapter One

The Status of the Isocratic Heritage

'Cultural traditions are the more imperious for being the less conscious.' Raymond Aron [1]

1.0 Introduction

The argument of this chapter shall proceed as follows. Section 1.1, "The Status of the Isocratic Heritage", argues that the Isocratic legacy contributed to virtually every aspect of the intellectual history of Western civilization, and has long been recognized as one of the essential sources of its unity. Section 1.2, "Isocrates and Education", will show that the Isocratic legacy contributed particularly to educational thought and practice throughout the history of Western civilization. Finally, Section 1.3, "The Isocratic Idea of Education Today" will provide preliminary evidence to show that the Isocratic idea of the essential nature of education is all but universally presupposed in contemporary educational thought.

1.1 The Legacy of Isocrates

1.1.1 Preliminary Remarks

The legacy of Isocrates (436-338 B.C.) is one of the most

remarkable phenomena of human intellectual experience and accomplishment. European morals and politics, historical writing, poetry, music, literature, religious expression, philosophy, education, architecture and the arts all reveal the clear and continuous influence of Isocrates and 'the versatility of his genius' [2]. The Isocratic heritage is arguably the primary source of the ideas which provide the coherence and integrated continuity of Western civilization [3].

Isocrates placed rhetoric and oratory near the centre of his educational thought and practise. Unfortunately, the meaning of the words rhetoric and oratory have rapidly evolved during the past century. While rhetoric has always referred to the art and science of persuasive speech, the moral sense given to such persuasion has changed. Rhetorical ability, once regarded as a praiseworthy virtue of the good statesman, it is now burdened with 'the implication of insincerity, exaggeration' and mere display [4] .

This understanding of rhetoric as a morally dubious art is comparatively recent, and in no way resembles the historical use of the term. Aristotle, in the Rhetoric, distinguished between rhetoric, a legitimate form of political reasoning, and sophistry, a discreditable imitation of such reasoning. Early in this century, American colleges such as Harvard, Princeton and Yale offered degrees in Rhetoric and Oratory which were regarded as morally sound preparation for

those intending to enter public life [5]. Clerics were also given instruction in rhetoric as preparation for the ecclesiastical form of oratory, preaching. The moral decline of rhetoric, from the science of speech to the alchemy of speech writers, is one of the unwritten chapters of contemporary intellectual history.

To ensure that the connotations of moral dubiousness which are now associated with the word rhetoric do not interfere with an accurate understanding of Isocrates' ideas, it might be useful to offer a summary account of what he understood rhetoric and rhetorical education to be. For Isocrates, and for numerous thinkers in the history of education, rhetoric was understood to be the art of the composition and moral integrity of persuasive speech. In contemporary terms, an Isocratic rhetorical education was a broad liberal education intended to prepare the young men of the ruling class for virtue and oratory in their lives as citizens and statesmen. Rhetorical education concentrated on history, literature and language, and was also regarded as an excellent preparation for those seeking to be scholars and poets. Although this thesis shall argue that one of Isocrates' most central educational ideas may be inadequate, it cannot be denied that Isocratic rhetorical education, understood without the narrow and amoral contemporary connotations, will always offer much of enduring value to anyone who thinks about education.

Isocrates' ideas enter into the history of ideas through two sources, his writings and his school of rhetoric at Athens. His writings, which were widely read well into the nineteenth century, and which have benefited from renewed interest in recent decades, are the sources of a number of literary, educational and political ideas. His school of rhetoric was the origin not only of profoundly influential ideas, but of generations of scholars, poets, historians, military leaders and statesmen who were to introduce Isocrates' ideas throughout the whole of the classical world and beyond. Isocrates' school of rhetoric attracted far more students than Plato's Academy or Aristotle's Lyceum, and, indeed, 'more students than all the other sophists put together' [6]. Isocrates' writings and his school produced a set of ideas, as well as generations of students and followers, which were unified by his moral and political intentions: an integrated Hellenic federation of good regimes, lead by virtuous and learned orators, and sustained by historical and literary writings which portray Isocrates' underlying ideas of human excellence.

1.1.2 Politics

Isocrates' writings and educational activities were explicitly concerned with the principles and practice of politics. The tripartheid nature of Isocrates' teaching is summarized by Plato. In the Euthydemus, Crito describes Isocrates as a 'teacher of rhetoric, partly a philosopher and

partly a statesman' [7]. In these endeavours, Isocrates succeeded to an extent that is difficult to exaggerate. Isocrates' school was the source of 'an entire Who's Who of Greek intellectuals and public figures' [8]. So great was the political influence of Isocrates' pupils that he has been credited with being the single most important source of Athenian cultural hegemony during the classical and Hellenistic periods [9]. As Cicero put it, 'from the school of Isocrates, as from the Trojan Horse, none but true heroes emerged', including such important Greek figures as Theopompi, Ephori, Philisti, Naucratae, Demosthenes [10], Hyperides, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Dinarchus 'and a multitude of others' [11]. In the field of political philosophy, Isocrates was regarded as Plato's equal until well after the Renaissance [12].

The political ideas of Isocrates continue to influence European political thought and institutions today. One of Isocrates' particular concerns was the integration of the economies, civil administrations and militaries of the diverse, yet culturally united Hellenic city-states [13]. Though the idea had only moderate practical results in classical political debate, it nevertheless entered into the stock of European political ideas. Contemporary political theorists have recognized this Isocratic idea at the foundations of contemporary political institutions such as the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the movement toward European integration [14].

1.1.3 Philosophy

Greek philosophy was composed of a mixture of the Protagorean-Socratic tradition, and the Gorgian-Isocratic tradition. As philosophy evolved during the classical period, Platonic ideas about the nature and practice of philosophy were progressively altered as a result of the incorporation of Isocratic ideas. It is too often forgotten that the evidence suggests that Aristotle travelled to Athens with the intention of studying in the rhetorical school of Isocrates, at the time much more famous than Plato's Academy [15]. After leaving Isocrates' school, Aristotle enrolled in Plato's Academy, and later taught rhetoric there. It seems that Aristotle sought to make philosophy more theoretical than Isocrates, but more practical than Plato.

> 'If Isocrates' teaching was for Aristotle uninformed by genuine philosophy, it may be that Aristotle thought the Academy insufficiently concerned with the presentation of political philosophy in a form capable of being assimilated and use by political men.' [16]

Aristotle's conception of the Ideas, and his use of the word that marks them, derive from Isocrates rather than Plato [17]. After Plato's death, the Academy came under the direction of his nephew Speusippus, a pupil of Isocrates [18], and an advocate of his views [19]. In light of the importance of both the Academy and Aristotle for the transmission of the Socratic conception of philosophy, the presence of Isocratic ideas within the prevailing Western understanding of the nature of philosophy would be expected to continue beyond the classical period.

In 155 B.C., an embassy of three philosophers brought this Greek philosophy to Rome. Philosophy was represented by Carneades the Academician, Diogenes the Stoic, and Critolaus the Peripatetic, thus representing the Platonic, the Isocratic and the Aristotelian schools [20]. Although the founder of stoicism, Zeno, held a conception of philosophy similar to Aristotle's, and, like the Socratics, therefore rejected liberal arts education as useless as a preparation for philosophy [21], the Stoicism brought to Rome by Diogenes was something quite different. The Stoicism of Diogenes (two centuries after Zeno), so far from rejecting the liberal arts and advocating a life of contemplation, had adopted a thoroughly Isocratic view, and 'accepted the role of educator for the ruling class, and it therefore accepted the liberal arts as well' [22]. It is an Isocratic/ Socratic conception of philosophy which came to Rome, as we see in the Stoic Panaetius, teacher of Varro and Cicero, as well as in Seneca and the Epicureans [23]. From Rome to the present day, although philosophy is often regarded as a series of footnotes to Plato, much of Western philosophy is at least as much a series of footnotes to Isocrates.

This is especially true in England, where the Isocratic legacy to philosophy (and education) has always been particularly prominent [24], and where it continues to underlie the differences between "Continental" and "Anglo-American" schools of philosophy. Outside of the Anglo-American analytic tradition, for example, Bertrand Russell is

not regarded as a philosopher at all, but as 'a scientist' [25] and a humanist rhetorician in the tradition of Isocrates [26].

The Platonic interest in the nature of Being and its relation to Truth, the Good and the Beautiful, or the Platonic emphasis on political philosophy and education understood in such terms, are characteristic of Heidegger, the Existentialists, Raymond Aron or Leo Strauss rather than J.L. Austin or Bertrand Russell [27]. Socrates was not concerned, as is frequently asserted but rarely argued, with the construction of concepts by means of mapping the range of meaning of the words that mark them, but with discovering the Ideas through the dialectical examination of contradictory opinions. Socrates judges opinions by the principle of contradiction, rather than emphasizing the logical clarity of meaning by reference to a principle of meaning, such as the principle of verification. Indeed, one distinguished classicist has gone so far as to criticize Plato precisely for his <u>disinterest</u> in analytical questions of meaning [28]. The scientific study of grammar, word meaning and the classification of sentences is the defining interest of sophists such as Prodicus [29], ignored by Socrates and slighted by Plato, and transmitted to modern academics through the Isocratic legacy to education in particular [30].

1.1.4 Literary and Historical Writing

Isocrates, 'the greatest master of artistic prose' [31], exerted a powerful influence over virtually every form of literary expression [32]. Isocrates is arguably the inventor of political biography, journalism [33], and literary rhetoric as we know them, and his influence on historical, dramatic and poetic literature to the present day would be difficult to exaggerate [34]. Only one or two typical features of this very extensive component of the Isocratic legacy will be surveyed here.

Like philosophy itself, history as a discipline originates with the pre-Socratic sophists of the fifth century, and took more definite shape through the guidance of contemporaries of Socrates. Thukydides (c. 460-c.400 B.C.), a philosophical historian [35] was, along with Isocrates, a student of Gorgias, and his History of the Peloponnesian War shows the influence of the ideals of rhetorical style [36]. Thukydides' history was continued by Isocrates' student Theopompus, who brought to it a more Isocratic intention and style [37]. Socrates' friend Xenophon also expanded Thukydides' history, providing an alternative Socratic view of intention and style in historical writing. For reasons which we will explore below in Chapter Four, it was Isocrates' conception of history which prevailed.

From the Isocratic perspective, historical writing ought

to provide examples of good regimes and the prudent statesmanship they require, and to portray virtuous men generally [38]. Zeller wrote of 'the emphasis laid on the significance of strong personalities' in 'the historical writings of the fourth century (B.C.) which took their rise from Isocrates' [39]. In light of the fact that 'virtually all the notable orators and historians of the fourth century (B.C.) had been pupils of Isocrates' [40], it is not surprising that subsequent historical writing was characterized by Isocratic ideas of style and intention.

Isocrates' ideas about the intention and style of historical writing were perpetuated first by his students, Ephorus and Theopompus [41].

> 'Both Ephorus and Theopompus had been deeply affected by the political theories and Pan-hellenic outlook of their teacher, Isocrates, [and] in antiquity enjoyed a high reputation as historical writers.' [42]

Ephorus in particular exerted an unequalled influence on later historians such as Diodorus and Strabo, while the great Greek historian Polybius (202-120 B.C.), so often a severe critic of preceding historical writing, held Ephorus in high esteem [43]. Later Roman historians such as Sallust (86-35 B.C.) received an Isocratic rhetorical education, and were greatly influenced by their reading of Isocrates and his students [44]. Libanius (314-393 A.D.) received an Isocratic rhetorical education, and turned from a career in rhetoric to adopt the role of royal historian [45]. The great Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus (330-c393 A.D.) refers to 'the splendid

writer Isocrates' [46], and perpetuates Isocratic ideals of the historian's craft through Edward Gibbon (1737-1794) and beyond [47].

It is through the tradition of historical biography that the Isocratic legacy to historical writing diversifies, touching upon education and literature [48]. From Isocrates, and to a lesser extent from Xenophon, a tradition of biographical histories of eminent men passed into the Roman world. These historical biographies, which 'were once staple diet in schools' [49], were 'designed as philosophical examples, or to commend or condemn patterns of behaviour' [50]. The Isocratic form of historical biography was in turn adopted by Cornelius Nepos (c. 99 -c.25 B.C.), one of the many conduits which brought the Isocratic heritage to Cicero, and whose On Illustrious Men was inspired by Isocrates, and by a number of Isocrates' followers.

It is through Plutarch (46-120 A.D.), however, that Isocratic historical biography is best known and most influential [51]. Plutarch's Lives is virtually a history of the classical world in the form of a series of biographies. Plutarch's biographies were translated into English in 1579 by Sir Thomas North, from an earlier French version by J. Amyot. As is well known, Shakespeare was a most careful student of Plutarch, through North's translation, and used Plutarch's biographies of Julius Caesar, Antony, Coriolanus and others as the basis of his corresponding plays. Later translations by

Dryden and W. and J. Langhorne were much used by later poets. Robert Browning's 'Balaustion's Adventure' follows Plutarch's 'Life of Nicias', while Wordsworth's 'Dion' follows Plutarch' 'Life of Dion'.

Isocrates' literary, educational and political ideas were not only transmitted to the Western traditions directly from the Greek sources, but indirectly through Latin sources. Isocrates'

> 'prose style exerted a profound influence not only on later Greek writers but on Cicero, through whom it was still later to affect the artistic prose of modern times.' [52]

The Isocratic legacy, and in particular its rhetorical and educational ideas, were transmitted 'from Isocrates to Cicero, and from Cicero straight to us' [53]. Isocrates' literary and rhetorical program 'achieved its widest diffusion through Cicero' [54]. It was through Isocrates that literary rhetoric formed the foundation of education and literature in antiquity [55], and

> 'From Rome rhetoric, in education , in public activity, and in all forms of writing, spread through the world, its influence waning only in the nineteenth century.' [56]

In recent years, however, as Vickers and others have observed, there has been a revival of (at least) literary interest in Isocratic rhetorical ideas and their influence [57].

Within Eastern Europe and the near Middle East, the Isocratic literary heritage continued to be transmitted in Greek. During the Macedonian revival of classical scholarship

(c. 867-959 A.D.), for example, the works of Isocrates, Demosthenes, Plato and Aristotle continued to be widely read. These works were not read as philosophical texts, but from the point of view of Isocratic concerns for rhetoric and literary style. Thus Plato and Aristotle, no less than Isocrates or Demosthenes, were read as rhetorical artists whose literary beauty was worthy of imitation [58]. In the Latin West, on the other hand, Isocrates' ideas are largely transmitted through Cicero, Quintilian and the Latin rhetorical schools [59]. As for medieval literature itself, the influence of Isocratic rhetorical theory, by way of Cicero, on Chaucer [60], Dante [61] and Petrarch has long been recognized [62].

Secular medieval literature, such as the French lays of courtly love, were influenced by Isocratic rhetorical ideas [63]. The late medieval Spanish epic, Martorell and de Galba's Tirant lo Blanc (1490), clearly shows the Isocratic influence as transmitted by both Plutarch and Cicero. Martorell thought it desirable

> 'to record in writing the feats of strong and courageous men of old. Such men are the brightest of mirrors, examples and sources of righteous instruction, as we are told but that noble orator Tully.' [64]

While Cicero is actually named here, there could hardly be a clearer statement of the purposes that motivate Plutarch's Lives, nor a plainer echo of Isocrates himself [65].

The Isocratic legacy to European literature was broadened and strengthened as a result of the recovery of Greek

literature which began with the Renaissance. Isocrates was arguably the most important source of the guiding literary and moral ideas of Renaissance poetry [66]. The Elizabethan stylistic movement known as Euphuism was defined by its imitation of Isocrates' rhetorical style, as well as fragments of Gorgias [67]. Shakespeare, particularly in Macbeth, shows the influence of this Isocratic understanding of literary style [68]. English poet-scholar-statesmen such as Sir Philip Sidney and Sir Thomas Elyot, who defined the guiding ideals of the humanist movement in poetry and education, explicitly sought to strengthen the Isocratic emphasis coming from Italy, and to reassert the ideals of Isocrates [69]. Not only in Italy, but in England [70] and in France [71], Isocrates was one of the most widely read authors of the day. It is not surprising, then, that Isocrates is a pervasive influence on subsequent European literature.

Looking to English literature alone, we find Isocratic literary ideas transmitted through Juvenal to Chaucer, Donne, Dryden, Pope and beyond [72]. Swift's The Battle of the Books, an indispensable text in the history of educational ideas, follows the same rhetorical tradition [73]. John Milton's essay 'Of Education' recommends a curriculum derived from the 'famous schools of Pythagoros, Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle'. The works of Plato and Aristotle, along with those of Cicero, were used to teach rhetoric within an Isocratic program [74]. Milton's essay 'Areopagitica' takes its title and its theme directly from Isocrates'

'Areopagiticus', while Milton's sonnet, 'To the Lady Margaret Ley', movingly describes Isocrates' despair and death, soon after reports reach Athens of the outcome of the battle of Chaeronea.

Finally, turning to Germany, the great poet Holderlin, whose subsequent influence on German literature and, particularly through Nietzsche and Heidegger, on Western philosophy, has been enormous, is a direct descendent of Isocrates. At the foundations of Holderlin's poetry

> 'are logical structures firmly in the rhetorical tradition that runs from Isocrates through Quintilian and Martianus Capella, to the Renaissance Humanists and , in English, to Walter Savage Landor.' [75]

The history and development of Western literature reveals the central and perpetual role played by Isocrates and his ideas.

1.1.5 Art, Architecture, Music

The transference of Isocrates' educational and literary ideas pictorial form was effected by allegory. In De nuptiis Mercurii et Philology (c 439), Martianus Capella personified the Isocratic seven liberal arts allegorically as seven bridesmaids attending the wedding of Mercury and Philology. In this way, Martianus provided both an exhaustive survey of the contents, principles and rationale of the seven liberal arts, and an image of each art as a woman suitable for representation in picture or sculpture [76]. The allegorical representation of the seven liberal arts, to which philosophy

is added, is continued in the Philosophiae Consolationis (c 524) of Boethius. Boethius represents philosophy as a woman, who brings with her the liberal arts represented as maidens. These literary representations of philosophy and the liberal arts are given pictorial form in ninth century Carolingian manuscripts of Boethius' work [77] . In a recent exhibition at the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, a late medieval illustrated copy of the Philosophiae Consolationis includes a picture of Boethius in prison, being introduced to the liberal arts Rhetoric and Music by Philosophy.

The pictorial representations of the Liberal Arts, derived from Martianus Capella and Boethius, serve as the basis of a large number of representations during the Carolingian Renaissance and the twelfth century Renaissance. As befits images derived originally from Isocratic ideas, they were used to illustrate the dependence of education on the political doctrines of the medieval rulers. As Katzenellenbogen has shown, the representation of the Liberal Arts on everything from allegorical murals to a candelarm was given its stimulus by Charlemagne's educational reforms, and his desire to make known the role his rule had played in them [78]. The close relationship between liberal arts education and medieval theologico-political doctrine is maintained throughout the eighth to the twelfth century. One thinks, for example, of the Incarnation Tympanum and the Cycle of the Liberal Arts, in the form of decorative carving adorning the Royal Portal of the medieval centre of learning and political

influence, Chartres Cathedral: the liberal arts are the royal portal, leading from the kingdom of the Kings to the Kingdom of God.

The Isocratic legacy to European art was greatly expanded during the Italian Renaissance [79]. Isocratic ideas were transmitted, through Cicero and European Petrarchism, to Renaissance artists such as Michelangelo and Donatello [80]. Donatello's sculptures of the Old Testament prophets represent them in oratorical poses drawn from classical models [81]. Michelangelo's sculptures, Dying Slave and Rebel Slave, completed in 1515, have been interpreted as an allegorical representation of the Isocratic idea of education. Interpreted in this way, the two slaves are understood to be representations of the liberal arts, enslaved by political power and yet fatally vulnerable without its protection [82], one of the permanent problems in educational thought since the execution of Socrates.

Finally, Isocrates exerted a guiding influence on the philosophical debates of the Renaissance artists and aesthetic thinkers. The Renaissance debate concerning the relative merits of purity of form and ornamentation in pictorial composition was based upon the rhetorical works of Cicero and Quintilian. Cristoforo Landino, a lecturer in poetry and rhetoric at the University of Florence, advocated a purity or plainess of pictorial composition on the analogy of unadorned oratory described in Cicero and Quintilian [83]. Landino's

view was revised and augmented by Filippo Lippi, an artist who counted Botticelli among his students. Lippi advocated the moderate ornamentation of pictures, a departure from purity of composition, on the analogy of embellished rhetoric outlined in the eighth book of Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria [84]. Leon Battista Alberti's treatise on art theory, On Painting, published in 1435 or 1436, is not only rhetorically organized on the model of Cicero [85], but also attempts to extend into a theoretical discussion of painting Isocratic rhetorical ideas derived from Cicero, Quintilian, Plutarch and others. Alberti's views on the role of education in the improvement of natural ability, in rhetoric as in art [86], are taken from Cicero's De Oratore [87], which is in turn a statement of the original Isocratic idea [88]. Alberti also reiterates the widely held belief that it is best if a 'painter were as learned as possible in all the liberal arts' [89]. He argues that painters should associate not with philosophers, but 'with poets and orators who have many embellishments in common with painters and who have a broad knowledge of many things' [90], a reference to the breadth of Isocratic rhetorical education.

The Isocratic legacy to Western music is a very technical subject involving, for example, questions of the relationship between metre and rhythm, and the complementarity of reason and sentiment in perception and memory [91]. The legacy of Isocratic rhetorical theory and education to music is also discernible at a more mundane level. Small chapels within

cathedrals are also called oratories, in light of their use by lay preachers for the delivery of sermons or inspirational orations. In turn, the oratorio refers to semi-dramatic musical works so named because they were first performed in the oratory of St. Philip Neri.

1.1.6 Religion

The influence of the Isocratic heritage in the field of Western religion has been enormous. The early Christians were a persecuted minority, without political power or organized ecclesiastical institutions. The survival and spread of Christianity in such adverse circumstances has been described as 'the most spectacular and the most monumentous achievement' of Isocratic education in the Hellenistic period [92].

Quintilian, the leading Roman educator of his day and a follower of Isocrates, was the teacher of Juvenal (65 A.D. - 127 A.D.), a satirical poet who adhered to Isocrates' rhetorical ideas of literary style [93]. Juvenal, in turn, is praised and recommended for inclusion in the curriculum in the early Christian educational manual, the Divine Institutiones (c. 315 A.D.) by Lactantius [94]. The early Christian poets Tertullian (c. 162-220 A.D.), Ausonius of Bordeaux (310-394 A.D.) and, in particular, Prudentius (340-410 A.D.), 'the chief poet of the early church' [95], all turn to Juvenal as an Isocratically educated poet exemplifying Isocratic ideas of poetic form and style worthy of imitation.

So powerful was the oratorical legacy of Isocrates to Christian thought that Erasmus 'once assimilated the orator Cicero to God', while Lawrence Humphrey, in his The Nobles or of Nobilitie. The original nature, duty, right, and Christian institutions thereof (1563), explicitly places 'the most reverend author and orator Jesus Christ' directly in the tradition of Isocrates [96]. Bossuet himself later recommended the 'serenity and dignity' of Isocrates' rhetorical writings as the model for the oratory, that is , the preaching, of the Church [97].

The letters of St. Paul, written to Greek-speaking audiences, are in the form of letters or orations in direct imitation of the form and style of Isocrates, already thoroughly familiar to his readers [98]. The Four Doctors ('doctors' from the Latin, meaning learned teachers), on whom the transmission of Christianity to medieval Europe almost wholly depended, were also products of Isocratic educational and literary ideas. St. Ambrose, St. Jerome (translator of the Vulgate), St. Augustine and Pope Gregory the Great all received an Isocratic rhetorical education, with an emphasis on the liberal arts [99]. St. Jerome and St. Augustine quote from and imitate Juvenal. Both Augustine and Gregory were teachers of rhetoric early in their careers, and all of them advocate an Isocratic education, though based upon a Christian theologico-political doctrine rather than the pagan political doctrine of Isocrates [100]. Similarly, the Four Doctors, like St. Paul, all show clear imitation of Isocratic principles of

literary form and style, and this remains a feature of Papal encyclicals today.

1.1.7 Conclusion

From the very beginning of Western civilization, Isocratic ideas have served as the foundation for our aspirations and achievements, and remain at the centre of current endeavours. It is without exaggeration that Moses Hadas has written,

> 'It was the program of Isocrates which has shaped European education to this day, which has kept humanism alive, and which has given Western civilization such unity as it possesses.' [101]

Hadas not only directs our attention to Isocrates' unequalled contribution to our ideas and ideals, but places this contribution within the context of Isocrates' legacy to education in particular. As we shall see, as 'the second founder of rhetoric and the true father of Humanism, Isocrates exercised an influence that would be hard to overstress on the subsequent development of Higher Education', and , indeed, education generally [102].

1.2 Isocrates and Education.

The history of Western education, and especially liberal education, begins in fourth century B.C. Athens with the rivalry between Isocrates and Plato [103]. 'Isocrates triumphed over Plato' [104], and his ideas emerged as the

dominant educational tradition, in theory and in practice, in fourth century Athens, through the Roman Republic, the Roman Empire, the Carolingian renaissance, the twelfth century renaissance, the Quattrocentro and early humanism, and well into our own time [105]. Nothing could be better established in the history of Western educational ideas than the continuous and overwhelming dominance of the heritage of Isocrates [106].

As long ago as 1926, in a book still regarded as 'the basic work' on Roman education [107], Gwynn argued that Isocrates' theory and rhetorical program of education was far more influential in Greek or Roman education than Plato or Aristotle [108]. Indeed, as Marrou argued on the basis of an extensive and meticulous analysis of the original sources, Isocrates' theory of education overcame the opposing theory offered by Plato and Aristotle.

> 'It was Isocrates, not Plato, who educated fourth-century Greece and subsequently the Hellenistic and Roman worlds.' [109]

It was not a Platonic or an Aristotelian idea of education that came to us from the classical Greek world [110]. It was the Isocratic idea of education and, with it, the Isocratic seven liberal arts.

An interesting confirmation of the dominance of the Isocratic idea of education over the Platonic or Aristotelian may be the place of women in education. Women were not permitted to attend the school of Isocrates, nor were they

taken account of in the formation of its aims and ideas. In contrast, women were permitted to attend Plato's Academy on equal terms, and Diogenes Laertius records descriptions of two of them [111]. As Marrou observed,

> 'though women neither welcomed nor were welcomed by the schools of rhetoric, they were no strangers to philosophy, and such vocations, though not very common, were not exceptional.' [112]

This is, perhaps, as convenient a place as any to mention the vexed problem of sexist language. In Part Two of this thesis, I shall be discussing the education of young men. This is not a lapse into sexist language, but an accurate representation of a feature of the history of educational thought that illustrates the practical importance of my philosophical argument. The Isocratic tradition in education is the education of men for political ends, and as such excluded politically powerless groups, such as women. The Socratic tradition consists of the education of human beings aware of their own ignorance, for the goal of self-understanding and knowledge. As such, it could in principle include all those motivated by such goals, the powerful and the powerless, men and women alike. From this perspective, the argument of this thesis suggests that thorough understanding of the question of gender inequality in education, both in history and in current social policy, is not possible without a renewed appreciation for both the legacy of Isocrates, and the alternative Socratic tradition within which women have been welcomed since the days when Socrates was taught by Diotima, and Lastheneia and Axiothea sat with Plato in the Academy. The exclusion of women from higher education may well be related to the success of

Isocrates at the expense of the Socratics.

The educational ideas and practices of the medieval period, pagan or Christian, derived from Isocrates [113]. In his indispensable work, European Literature in the Latin Middle Ages, Curtius reminds us that the 'basic characteristics of the medieval educational system go back to ancient Greece', and to the sophists and rhetors particularly [114]. Originally, for present purposes, there were two educational traditions in classical Greece, the philosophic and the sophistic (later rhetorical), and the history of educational thought in the West is largely the story of the conflict between them [115]. The philosophical idea of education was represented by Plato and, in diluted form, by Aristotle. The alternative rhetorical idea of education was formulated by Isocrates, to some extent on the basis of the sophist Hippias of Elis's liberal arts. As Curtius observes, Plato's 'contemporary, the orator Isocrates, intervened in the conflict between philosophy and general [i.e. sophistic] education' and,

> 'Despite sporadic theoretical opposition, Isocrates' standpoint remained authorative in practice for the whole of antiquity.' [116]

Or, in the words of medievalist David Knowles,

> 'Great and permanent, even in this field, as was the influence of the two philosophers [Plato and Aristotle], the victory and the future lay with Isocrates.' [117]

It was the Isocratic idea of education, not the Platonic or the Aristotelian, which came to dominate education in the classical world, and hence in medieval Europe. As Finley has

demonstrated, the Isocratic idea of education, and the Isocratic version of the seven liberal arts, 'passed from the ancient Greeks to the Byzantine world, from the Romans to the Latin West' [118], where, in the texts of Hugh of St, Victor, Augustine, Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus and others, it continued to dominate Western education.

As we shall see below in our discussion of Hirst, Dickens and Shepherd, it has been shown that the renewal of humanist education during the Renaissance was in no sense a renewal of a Platonic or Aristotelian idea of education, but a further development of the Isocratic heritage. In practice, Renaissance humanism was an educational program founded on the Isocratic idea of education [119]. The recovery of some knowledge of the Greek texts of Plato and Aristotle initiated a renewal of the classical conflict in educational thought between the Socratic philosophers and the Isocratic rhetors [120]. Once again however, it was the Isocratic idea of education which emerged triumphant over the Socratic, and has been much the more influential idea of education until the present day [121].

There is, when we turn to a careful study of the history of education, no exaggeration in Marrou's conclusion that

> 'Isocrates' ideas and the system of education which put them into practice reigned virtually unchallenged in Western Europe almost to our own generation [i.e. 1984].' [122]

We turn now to what is arguably the most important of Isocrates' educational ideas, namely, his conception of the

very nature of education.

1.3 The Isocratic Idea of Education Today.

1.3.0 Introduction

The Isocratic idea of the essential nature of education may be adumbrated by the following proposition: Formal education is an enterprise which must be and/or ought to be valued relative to a particular political doctrine. The Isocratic idea of education is, then, defined by two presuppositions: the normative intentions of education are external to education itself, and, secondly, they are derived from a political doctrine.

We may now turn to a brief discussion of the sense in which the Isocratic idea is presupposed in contemporary educational thought and practice. Virtually all contemporary educational thought begins from an commitment to a particular political doctrine. Such doctrines include, for example, Marxism, egalitarianism, libertarianism, representative democracy, participatory democracy, or conservatism. Educational thought, beginning from such political commitments, proceeds with a conditional claim of the form, " If one desires a social order guided by political doctrine X, then logically one will require an educational system which is also guided by normative criteria derived from X ". However, before one can be justified in deriving the normative

intentions of education from any particular political doctrine, one must first show that the derivation of the normative intentions of education from political doctrine generally is both coherent and justified. In the absence of an argument demonstrating such coherence and justification, the advocate of the conditional claim is presupposing that the nature of education is such that it must be and/or ought to be in the service of logically prior political intentions, or, in other words, that the normative intentions of education must be and/or ought to be derived from an axiomatic political doctrine.

1.3.1 R.S. Peters and the Isocratic Idea of Education

The educational thought of R.S. Peters is a convenient example of the Isocratic idea in two ways. First, the presupposition of the Isocratic idea is plainly at the foundation of Peters's work. Second, there may at first appear to be some similarity between Peters's concern for "intrinsically worthwhile activities" in education, and my own concern for the good life internal to education. Although I know of no thinker in the history of education, with the possible and temporary exception of Peters, who argued that knowledge for its own sake should be the (primary) aim of education, and it may be worth emphasizing that I will not be advocating it here. An examination of Peters's Isocratic presuppositions may serve to distinguish his ideas from mine, and so avoid an assimilation of my own very different ideas

into his more familiar ones.

Peters presupposed that the normative intentions of education are derived from political doctrine, specifically democratic doctrine. In one of his earliest educational writings, 'Must an Educator have an aim?' [123], Peters observed that

> 'To speak of "education"...is to commit oneself, by implication, to a judgement of value.' [124]

There are , in Peters's view, two components of such a judgement of value, where value is judged according to particular normative standards [125]. The first component concerns the aim or outcome of education, understood as 'a commendable state of mind' [126] or 'a desirable state of mind' [127]. The second component concerns the principles of procedure by which the educational process is guided during the pursuit of a desirable state mind [128]. Education, in Peters's view, is defined less by particular outcomes or procedures than by the normative standards which outcomes and procedures must meet [129]. The crucial question arises, then, concerning the origin and status of these normative standards [130].

Turning to the normative intentions which the aims or outcomes of education must meet, Peters originally claimed that such intentions were given by a notion of what is 'intrinsically worthwhile' [131]. He refers to educational aims, such as 'the development of intellect', which 'would be

intrinsic to what we could consider education to be' [132]. In other words, there are two senses of "intrinsic": there are aims whch are intrinsic to education, while some educational aims are intrinsically valuable. An aim which may be intrinsic to education, however, may or may not be intrinsically valuable. Educational aims had to be shown to be valuable, with reference to criteria of value, and this directs us to the second notion of "intrinsic".

In Peters's view, some or all intrinsic aims of education were also 'intrinsically valuable' [133] or intrinsically worthwhile. The term "intrinsic" then, refers both to the aims which are intrinsic to education, and to the criteria of value which may be intrinsic to those aims. Peters initially believed that he had provided transcendental justifications for intrinsically worthwhile activities in education [134]. As his ideas evolved, however, Peters came to conclude that he had

> 'failed to give a convincing transcendental justification of "worthwhile activities". ' [135]

In the absence of transcendentally justified normative criteria, Peters had to look elsewhere for the normative criteria of educational aims.

Peters eventually concluded that the aims of education, while conceivably intrinsic to the enterprise, must be judged to be valuable relative to extrinsic criteria of value accepted in the wider social order, and specifically political in origin. As Peters wrote, in 1983,

> 'The end or ends towards which processes of learning are seen as developing [...] are aims of education, not part of the concept of "education" itself and will depend on acceptance or rejection of the values of the society in which it takes place. I have recently written a paper trying to work this out in the case of democratic societies...' [136]

The title of the paper to which Peters here refers us, 'Democratic Values and Educational Aims', directs our attention to Peters's presupposition of the external and political origin of the normative criteria of educational aims or outcomes. As Peters tells us in that paper, he has

> 'tried to show the values from which such aims [of education] can be derived. They are, of course, eminently contestable, because, first, I have confined myself to democratic values...' [137]

Peters derives the value of the aims of education from a particularly English interpretation of democratic values which, as he acknowledges, is contestable and without justification [138]. In deriving the normative intentions of education from political doctrine in this way, Peters is presupposing consistently and explicitly what he had always presupposed inconsistently and implicitly. As he had written as early as 1966, in Ethics and Education,

> 'That education should be 'democratic' no one in a democracy would seriously dispute.' [139]

Peters does not show that a democratic regime or society would be best served, or even well served, by democratic education, and, indeed, a number of democrats have argued powerfully that this is not the case [140]. Peters provides no argument attempting to show that the normative intentions of education must necessarily be relative, or ought to be relative, to either democratic political doctrine specifically, or

political doctrine generally [141]. The notion that the normative intentions or "values" of education are external and derived from political doctrine is the defining feature of the Isocratic idea of education, which R.S. Peters presupposed throughout his career.

1.3.2 The Isocratic Idea of Education in Educational Literature

Works by almost all contemporary educationists and educational theorists which are presented as political philosophy of education are better understood as works of political dogmatics. Political dogmatics is an old and -- this must be emphasized -- a respectable form of political discourse, both inevitable and salutary in political life. Political dogmatics may be defined as attempts to outline systems of political belief and prescription, without arguing the more general philosophical questions which underlie such belief and prescription [142]. Contemporary attempts to link education and political doctrine are cases of political dogmatics. The advocate begins with a commitment to a particular political doctrine, and derives particular prescriptions concerning education from the doctrine. Such advocates do not argue the general question of the adequacy of the Isocratic idea underlying such prescription. Having illustrated this in the case of R.S. Peters, we may now move on to more cursory illustrations drawn from other writers.

The Isocratic idea of the nature of education is, as I

have said, all but universally presupposed in contemporary educational thought. It would therefore be impossible to comprehensively survey this literature. We must restrict ourselves to the best or most representative examples within a more comprehensive selection of doctrines.

One may find illustrations of the presupposition of the Isocratic idea with even a cursory glance in virtually any volume of any educational journal. The claim that articles in educationist journals illustrate the presupposition of the Isocratic idea of education is an empirical one, and as such could be fully substantiated only by listing the titles or analysing the content of the hundreds, if not thousands, of articles written over the past few years. Such an analysis would require far more space than is available to me here, and I shall therefore support it in two ways. First, I am confident that a random sampling of educationist journal articles concerned with the normative intentions of education will discuss those intentions in the context of a commitment to a specified political doctrine. These doctrines are most often variations of liberalism or Marxism, although recent government initiatives have brought about a re-introduction of libertarianism. Theologico-political doctrines also continue to appear. Second, other authors have noted that education is discussed as a political enterprise in the educationist journals. For example, as John Wilson observed, when 'asked to reply to the question "Is education necessarily political?", nearly all contributors to the special number of the Oxford

Review of Education (Vol. 2, No. 1, 1976) answered with a resounding affirmative' [143]. Although educationist journals illustrate the almost universal presupposition of the Isocratic idea of the nature of education, it would be more convenient to illustrate this presupposition though the analysis of other educationist writings.

John Dewey derived his educational doctrine from a prior commitment to a democratic political doctrine. In Dewey's view, the 'criterion for educational criticism and construction implies a particular social ideal', which in his case is defined strictly in terms of democratic doctrine [144]. Moving to more recent educationists, John White states,

> 'the only defensible form of national curriculum is one that is genuinely committed to democratic principles, not least equality of political power.' [145]

White's later work, Education and the Good Life, is presented as part of 'a new movement in defense of liberal values in education,' in which the normative intentions of education are derived from liberal political doctrine [146]. Indeed, there could hardly be a clearer presupposition of the Isocratic idea of education than White's statement that his argument proceeds

> 'by taking as read a commitment to liberal democracy and asking what constraints there should be on any national curriculum.' [147]

Patricia White, in Beyond Domination (1983), derives the normative intentions of education from a doctrine of 'participatory democracy' [148]. In her view, education is a means by which we may 'move from a constitutional liberal democracy to a participatory system' [149]. Political

scientist Amy Gutmann presupposes that education is relative to 'a commitment to democratic values' [150], and that 'our concern for democratic education lies at the core of our commitment to democracy' [151], despite the fact that she acknowledges that her conception of democracy remains undefended [152]. Jurist Bruce Ackerman, in his Social Justice and the Liberal State (1980), formulates liberal democratic doctrine in terms of 'constrained power talk' [153], where constrained power talk is defined by Ackerman's principles of rational legitimacy [154] and consistency [155], and derives the normative criteria and intentions of education from this political doctrine [156]. Ackerman advocates

> 'manipulating the educational system to assure a steady flow of citizens of statesmanly virtue, combating undue concentrations of economic power, and so forth.' [157]

Political theorist John Rawls, in his A Theory of Justice (1971), regards education as an instrumental adjunct to his liberal political doctrine, in the sense that education is merely a means by which the normative principles of that doctrine are realized by the regime [158]. For example, Rawls advocates an egalitarian conception of justice, which in turn generates what Rawls calls 'the difference principle', and from which are derived particular educational prescriptions.

> 'In pursuit of this principle [the difference principle] greater resources might be spent on the education of the less rather than the more intelligent, at least over a certain time of life, say in the earlier years of school.' [159]

Political theorist Michael Walzer, in his Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983), constructs a theory of distributive justice founded upon principles of

value plurality and complex equality [160], from which he in turn derives the normative standards and intentions of education [161]. In Walzer's view 'Democratic education begins with simple equality' [162], such that the 'simple equality of students is relative to the simple equality of citizens' [163].

Right-wing liberalism, often called libertarianism, has been periodically influential in educational debate. Probably the first application of this doctrine to education is Bernard Mandeville's essay 'An Essay on Charity, and Charity Schools' (1723) [164]. However, Mandeville's infamous 'private vices, public benefits' was not widely influential until it received a more elaborate, and less brutal, formulation in Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations (1776), to which contemporary libertarians still look for inspiration [165]. It ought to be emphasized, however, that contemporary libertarians derive their educational proposals from Smith's political-economic doctrine, and typically ignore his educational writings [166].

Much contemporary libertarian educational thought derives from Frank Knight [167], by way of Milton Friedman [168]. In Friedman's view, education is clearly relative to a libertarian conception of democratic political-economics.

> 'The education of my child contributes to your welfare by promoting a stable and democratic society.' [169]

As I have elsewhere discussed the presupposition of the Isocratic idea of education underlying attempts to derive a

doctrine of education from libertarianism [170], the reader is directed to other statements of the libertarian view in which the Isocratic idea of education is presupposed [171].

It is difficult to find a clear and explicit derivation of an educational doctrine from political conservatism. This may be a result of a peculiarly conservative reticence. As Roger Scruton has written

> 'Conservatism may rarely announce itself in maxims, formulae or aims. Its essence is inarticulate, and its expression, when compelled, sceptical.' [172]

Nevertheless, we may say, in general, that conservatives stress the autonomy of educational <u>institutions</u> from political or economic <u>institutions</u>, so that education may thereby best serve the normative goals of political conservatism. In other words, although the institutions may be formally autonomous, the normative intentions of education are nevertheless derived from political doctrine. In Scruton's view

> 'the idea of education coexists with that of culture. In the language provided by a culture all ideals and morality may be more finely and more accurately expressed', and thereby allow the individual to 'make sense of himself as a political being.' [173]

In the view of the distinguished American conservative Russell Kirk, as expressed in his essay 'The Conservative Purpose of a Liberal Education' [174],

> 'higher learning is meant to develop order in the commonwealth for the republic's sake.' [175]

Conservatives construct a doctrine of education in which the normative intentions of education are derived externally and from a political doctrine [176].

In recent decades there has been a great deal of educational thought and activism inspired by a cluster of radical political doctrines. These doctrines are generally a variety of Marxism, although anarchism has also played role. The derivation of the normative intentions of education from Marxism is a familiar feature of contemporary educational thought [177]. Anarchism is in comparison perhaps les familiar. It is perhaps not surprising that there are few explicitly doctrinal statements concerning anarchist education, politics or, indeed, anything else. Such statements appear to be regarded as contrary to the anarchist repudiation of all authority. In general, anarchist-libertarians derive an educational doctrine from radical principles of equality and freedom.

> 'Education should liberate <u>from</u>, but it should also liberate <u>to</u>, and what it would be liberating to in this case is to contribute to the building of a better, more equal society, a decentralized society with a great deal of individual and local autonomy, and one structured around the principles of cooperation and mutuality.' [178]

Adherents to various forms of this educational doctrine include such well-known figures as Ivan Illich, the "Deschoolers", John Holt, Paul Goodman, Paulo Freire, and A.S. Neill [179].

In conclusion, educationist writing concerned with the normative intentions of education reveals the wide-spread presupposition of the Isocratic idea of the essential nature of education. Education is assumed to be an inherently political enterprise. More specifically, it is assumed that

the normative intentions of education must be and/or ought to be derived from a political doctrine. This assumption is so wide-spread, and so deeply embedded in our "common-sense" conceptions of the nature of education, that an analysis of it may appear to be either belabouring the obvious, or to be questioning the self-evident and practically inevitable. It is most advisable, therefore, to turn to the history of educational philosophy and ideas. A careful and open-minded engagement with such history reveals that these presuppositions were not always inevitable or obious, but have become a part of the foundations of our thinking as a consequence of historical debates that might well have concluded otherwise.

Chapter Two

The Present Status of the Question

2.0 Introduction

The present chapter is concerned with the status of the Isocratic tradition of education in contemporary Educational Studies. The status of the specific question at issue in this thesis can be adumbrated, with no exaggeration, by saying that the question has had no status whatever in this century. Both the history of educational ideas and political philosophy have been effectively eliminated from contemporary Educational Studies [1], while knowledge even of the existence of Isocrates has vanished. The elimination of political philosophy has made the philosophical question of the relationship between education and political doctrine extremely difficult even to formulate. Similarly, the disappearance of any knowledge of the Isocratic legacy, and of the history of educational ideas generally, has made any questioning of Isocratic ideas literally inconceivable. If we are to recover what has been lost, we must reach outside of Educational Studies, to the educational scholarship of classicists and political philosophers such as Leo Strauss.

2.1 Isocrates and the Educationists

Given the enormity of the influence of Isocrates in Western education, the ample documentary record of this influence, and the extensive discussions of classical

scholars, one would expect educationist histories of education to discuss Isocrates and his ideas at length and with great care. It is therefore remarkable that when we turn to the standard educationist histories of education, Isocrates is barely mentioned, if at all.

E.B. Castle's book on education in Christian times does not mention Isocrates [2]. Yet Augustine was educated, and later taught, within an Isocratic educational programme, while the educational treatises of medieval Christians such as Hugh of St. Victor or Cassiodorus (via Martianus Capella) are clearly within the Isocratic tradition. Similarly, in Castle's book on ancient education, we find only a few brief mentions of Isocrates, all taken from Marrou [3], observing only that the seven liberal arts are derived from Isocrates.

Mehdi Nakosteen, in a history of education published in 1965 and once popular in the U.S.A. and Canada, makes no reference to Isocrates [4]. R.R. Rusk's The Doctrines of the Great Educators (1962), Ulich's Three Thousand Years of Educational Wisdom (1954) and Baskin's Classics in Education (1966) do not mention Isocrates.

The standard reference work by Curtis and Boultwood, A Short History of Educational Ideas, does not mention Isocrates. Thus a text which advertises itself as a history of educational ideas not only fails to discuss, but fails to even mention, one of the most influential educational ideas in

Western history, and the man classicists have described as 'one of the greatest educationalists of history' [5].

The standard educationist history of education, 'a classic of its kind' [6], is W. Boyd's The History of Western Education. The unreliable nature of Boyd's textbook is revealed in his neglect of Isocrates, as we can see in the following example. In 362 A.D. the emperor Julian the Apostate forbade Christians to teach in the schools within his empire, as a part of his wider programme of seeking to return the empire to its pagan heritage. Julian sought to reintroduce the ideals of classical antiquity, and listed the educators which he believed best represented these ideals. This list is quoted by Boyd [7]: the poets Homer and Hesiod, the historians Herodotus and Thukydides, and the rhetoricians Lysias, Demosthenes and, of course, Isocrates. When Julian wishes to offer an example of a pagan who is wiser than the Christian Bible's Solomon, he does not turn to Plato or to Aristotle, but to Isocrates (the son of Theodorus).

> 'Is their "wisest" man Solomon at all comparable with Phocylides or Theognis or Isocrates? Certainly not. At least, if one were to compare the exhortations of Isocrates with Solomon's proverbs, you would, I am very sure, find that the son of Theodorus is superior to their "wisest" king.' [8]

Boyd's own discussion of Julian's educational ideas provides the attentive reader with clear evidence that the rhetoricians, not the philosophers, were understood in classical antiquity to be the educators of importance. Of the rhetoricians listed, only Isocrates operated a school, one

which pre-dated and attracted more students than Plato's Academy [9]. Yet Boyd does not appear to have recognized this reminder of the overwhelming importance of Isocrates in the history of education even within classical antiquity. Of the three remaining mentions of Isocrates, two refer to his name in passing [10], while the third is contained in two short paragraphs noting Isocrates' role as a schoolmaster in classical Athens, with no suggestion of the enormous subsequent importance of his educational ideas.

Finally, in 1972, the first of a three volume history of education by educationist J. Bowen offers a few mentions of Isocrates. Most of these are short, and are concerned with Isocrates' political opinions. Isocrates' educational ideas are briefly discussed, though only with reference to the success of his school of rhetoric in Athens. Bowen acknowledges that Isocrates was 'respected by many in his lifetime' [11], but makes no mention of his victory over Plato or of his subsequent importance. Bowen uncritically continues the habit of all but ignoring Isocrates' massive presence in the history of Western education, in spite of a wealth of historical evidence and several superb texts by classicist historians.

2.2 A Disquieting Suggestion: P.H. Hirst and the History of Liberal Education

As an illustration of this very serious but still unrecognized problem, consider some of the claims of P.H.

Hirst. Hirst's claims about the history of education do not merit particular attention merely because they are typical. Among educationists, Hirst was one of the most famous and influential figures of the 1960's and '70's, and a number of his contributions are still to be found in reference works. His claims are still regarded as authorative, and this fact, combined with his status within Educational Studies, suggests that his work ought particularly to be scrutinized.

In 'Liberal Education' (1971), Hirst asserts that liberal education and the liberal arts -- Hirst appears to be unaware of the crucial distinction between them -- originate with Aristotle, and the Athenian philosophers generally [12]. However, the only evidence offered in support of this assertion is a loosely translated section from Aristotle's Politics (which Hirst extracts not from the Politics, but from a compilation textbook). Yet in the passage quoted (Politics 1337b4-22) Aristotle is plainly not, as Hirst claims, enunciating the principles of liberal education for the first time. On the contrary, Aristotle is discussing the desirability of such an education, the principles of which he clearly regards as having been first enunciated by others [13]. Aristotle knew, as Hirst apparently did not, that

> 'the sophist Hippias of Elis, a contemporary of Socrates, was regarded by Antiquity as the originator of the pedagogical system based upon the liberal arts' [14]

This system was revised by Isocrates. To the limited extent that Aristotle adopts some features of the liberal arts, he was adapting Isocratic (and sophistic) ideas that his teacher

Plato had firmly rejected [15]. Indeed, the liberal arts and liberal education passed into the Western world in Isocrates' formulation of them [16], in opposition to the educational ideas of Aristotle and the Socratic philosophers [17]. As classicist Moses Hadas reiterated,

> 'In view of the towering position which Plato occupies in the history of western thought and the prestige which attaches to the word philosophy, it might be supposed that his was the school which affected subsequent educational theory most powerfully: actually it was Isocrates' programme which prevailed.' [18]

Aristotle was selectively incorporated into the Isocratic liberal arts: it was Aristotle's works on logic and rhetoric which found their way into the late Roman and medieval curriculum, as one would expect where the idea of education is Isocrates' rhetorical idea, and used to further a "concept" of education that Aristotle himself rejected [19].

Hirst asserts that the liberal arts, defined as a trivium comprising grammar, logic and rhetoric, and a quadrivium comprising arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy, were devised by the Greeks and the Romans [20]. Furthermore, he asserts that a liberal arts education defined by the trivium and quadrivium was for centuries 'regarded as the finest possible, and it was not until medieval times that liberal studies suffered any challenge at all' [21]. In fact, the seven liberal arts education was not divided into the trivium and quadrivium by the Greeks or the Romans, nor did such an education survive unchallenged until the medieval period. Far from being first challenged in the medieval period, the

trivium and quadrivium were not even formulated until the medieval period, beginning with Martianus Capella. One standard classicist reference work in fact defines the seven liberal arts as a loose classification of subjects comprising the medieval curriculum, from the fifth century A.D. onwards [22]. The quadrivium, which Hirst attributes to the classical Greeks, was the name given by Boethius to his proposed program of studies in the sixth century A.D. Similarly, the trivium was first so named in the Carolingian period, some two centuries after Boethius [23]. Thus the trivium and quadrivium, which Hirst claims were invented by the Greeks and Romans and first challenged in the medieval period, were in fact first devised in the medieval period and unknown in those terms to the Greeks and Romans.

Professor Hirst's account of the classical origins and medieval development of liberal education is inadequate in most important respects. His discussion of the history of liberal education subsequent to the classical period only perpetuates his original errors. Thus, again without evidence, Hirst asserts that

> 'With Renaissance humanism and the rediscovery of classical literature, the full significance of Aristotelian liberal education was temporarily reaffirmed.' [24]

This is directly the reverse of what the historical record clearly tells us [25]. As the distinguished historian of this period, A.G. Dickens has written -- in a text used for A-level history during the years Hirst was Professor of Education -- the Renaissance humanist educational program was Isocratic,

and opposed to Aristotelianism.

> 'The specific influences at work were neither Plato nor Aristotle, but rather Plutarch's tract on the upbringing of children, Cicero on the training of the orator, above all Quintilian's Education of the Orator...From the work of these men sprang a lasting ideal of liberal education, one which has dominated the schools of the privileged classes in Western countries.' [26]

Plutarch, Cicero and Quintilian all adopt the Isocratic idea of liberal education in conscious opposition to Plato and Aristotle [27]. As Adamson has observed, it is clear in Book One of Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria that

> 'the purposes which Quintilian had in view and the manner in which he thought to attain them, namely by an appropriate training in rhetoric, are in substance the purpose and method of Isocrates.' [28]

Cicero's Republic and Laws are modelled on Plato's dialogues of the same titles, but are intended to provide an Isocratic alternative to them, substituting Isocrates' learned orator for Plato's philosopher-king [29].

If we narrow our focus to the history of England, we see even more clearly how Hirst's assertions are contrary to the historical evidence. Hirst asserts that Renaissance humanism was an affirmation of an Aristotelian liberal education. Yet if we turn to the actual sources, we find that it was the Isocratic rhetorical tradition in education which was reaffirmed, in conscious opposition to the Aristotelian scholasticism that had sterilized so much of medieval philosophy. (The distinction between education and philosophy is crucial here.) As Shepherd has shown,

> 'In seeking to dethrone Aristotle the humanists reasserted the cause of Isocrates and the old

rhetoricians.' [30]

As we shall see below, the educational program of Renaissance humanism in England self-consciously reaffirmed 'the technical instructions and moral insistences from an unbroken line of rhetoricians stretching back through the humanists to Quintilian, Cicero and Isocrates' [31].

In general, we are compelled to remember that the historical record, and the historical texts by classicists are very clear: there has never been an "Aristotelian" liberal education in Hirst's sense. Liberal education as we know it originates with Isocrates, and eventually came to dominate Western educational thought and practice precisely because it so totally defeated the Platonic and Aristotelian alternatives to it.

2.3 Inadequacies of the Conventional View of Isocrates

To say that Isocrates' educational ideas have been more influential than Plato's or Aristotle's or, indeed, anyone else's, in the history and philosophy of education, is to raise questions of the most fundamental kind. In particular, the historical fact of Isocrates' influence tells us little about the nature of that influence, or its value. We shall be in a position to judge the value of Isocrates' educational ideas only after we have some understanding of them.

If we are to understand Isocrates' educational ideas,

then we must turn directly to his writings rather than to the scholarly commentaries. Commentary upon Isocrates has been episodic and selective, at one time focusing on his political thought [32], while at another focusing on his contribution to literary ideas [33]. As we have seen, study of Isocrates' educational ideas specifically has all but disappeared from Educational Studies in our century [34]. In such circumstances we must be especially conscious of the probability that longstanding assumptions concerning the nature of Isocrates' educational ideas are now in need of exposure and re-examination.

Beck on Isocrates

An illustration of the questionable nature of the conventional interpretation of Isocrates may be drawn from F.A.G. Beck's survey of the history of classical Greek education, published in 1964. Beck's survey of Isocrates' educational ideas is a convenient source through which one may evaluate the conventional interpretation of these ideas for two reasons. Beck's book is the last history of education to be published in English which discusses Isocrates' educational ideas at any length, and provides a convenient summary of the conventional pre-World War II interpretation of Isocrates.

In the conventional interpretation it is presupposed that Isocrates is an advocate of aristocracy. Beck perpetuates this presupposition despite his awareness that the textual evidence

provides little support for it. Specifically, it is alleged that Isocrates

> 'clings to the aristocratic belief in the inborn talent that qualifies only the elite for education.' [35]

Contrary to Beck's attribution, however, Isocrates affirms that he accepted students who were 'utterly devoid of natural ability' in the hope that he could nevertheless educate them [36]. While it is true that Isocrates did believe that natural ability was important in education, he did not use such ability as a criterion by which he selected an elite to be educated. One of Isocrates' primary educational aims was virtue, and virtue is 'more serviceable than high birth ' [37]. Similarly, 'education and diligence are in the highest degree potent to improve our nature' [38]. Indeed, Beck was himself aware that the criterion by which Isocrates most often selected his students was not "inborn talent", but rather wealth and leisure. As Beck put it,

> 'Isocrates clearly sees the economic impossibility of providing higher education for all [...] His solution is to set up as the criterion of selection that of wealth.' [39]

Education in classical Athens was understood to be a process which depended for a successful outcome upon intimate personal interaction between teacher and student. Such education required small classes which were, of necessity, expensive if the teacher was to be adequately recompensed. Isocrates' selection of students was determined by the prevailing form of educational practice, and the correlative criterion of wealth [40] rather than an "aristocratic" preference for natural ability.

Isocrates Not A Rhetorician

Isocrates is almost universally classified as a rhetor [41]. There are, however, a number of reasons for doubting the veracity of this classification. Not only does Isocrates never describe himself as a rhetor, but he explicitly denies that title. As Isocrates writes in To Philip,

> 'And do not be surprised (as I said in my letter to Dionysius after he had made himself master of Sicily) that I, who am not a general nor a rhetor nor in any other position of authority, have spoken to you more boldly than the others.' [42]

Similarly, in his seventh epistle, "To the Rulers of Mytilene," Isocrates writes,

> It is true that I have abstained from political activity and from practising rhetoric.' [43]

Isocrates denies that he practises rhetoric, or that he is a rhetor. In these two statements, Isocrates adumbrates his conception of rhetoric by placing it in the context of political authority and power.

For Isocrates, the rhetorikous are those who speak before a crowd [44], which Isocrates refrained from doing. There are two categories of such people, and Isocrates belongs to neither. Some rhetors hold the power to persuade, often unscrupulously, in law courts, and Isocrates both dissociates himself from them and severely criticizes them [45]. Other rhetors are politicians, such as Solon or Pericles, a group to which Isocrates does not belong by his own insistence [46]. "Rhetoric" or "rhetor" are terms with wide semantic ranges in modern English, and no longer possess for us the specific

meanings and associations that they possessed for Isocrates. In light of the fact that he explicitly dissociates himself from that classification, and applies it to others whose intentions and activities differed from his own, we must be cautious in our attempt to understand the role that rhetoric might have in Isocrates' teaching and writing.

The presupposition that Isocrates can be classified with the rhetoricians has even been maintained by those who are aware that the evidence is against it. In his classic study of Greek education, Jaeger asserts categorically that Isocrates

> 'aimed, like Gorgias, at teaching the art or craft of speaking (λσγων τέχνη).'[47]

Yet hidden away in the Notes, Jaeger acknowledges that Isocrates not only does not use the phrase 'λσγων τέχνη' to describe his own educational intentions, but appears to deliberately avoid it [48]. Indeed, Isocrates criticizes those of his educational adversaries who advocate 'τεχναι' [49]. As Jaeger himself observes, Isocrates actually uses such phrases or words as 'ἐπιμελεια' (diligence), 'παιδεια' (education or, more broadly, upbringing) or 'ἡ τῶν λόγων μελέτη' (serious concern for discourse) [50]. Each of these words or phrases are quite different from those Jaeger attributes to Isocrates, and suggest an educational program of wider content and intentions than is allowed by the terms "technai" or "rhetoric" [51].

The Art of Writing

One further illustration of the doubtfulness of the

assumption that Isocrates is a rhetorician also draws our attention to the neglected question of Isocrates' conception of the art of writing. The art of writing was a concern of the classical writers in ways no longer readily appreciated [52]. Indeed, the debate between Isocrates and Alcidamas centred on the question of whether writing was desirable at all [53]. If Isocrates may not be a rhetorician, as is often assumed , then we must be wary of accepting the standard classification of his writings, and therewith his conception of the art of writing, in the rhetorical categories of political forensic, epideictic (display) and educational [54].

One of the editors of the Loeb edition of the complete works of Isocrates, van Hook, claims that the Evagoras, the Encomium of Helen, and the Busiris are to be classified as examples of the epideictic [55]. The epideictic is a rhetorical display piece, used merely to exhibit the author's and/or orator's rhetorical skill. As such, it is distinct from deliberative political writing [56]. Accordingly, van Hook judges the intentions, and therefore the merits, of the Helen and the Busiris relative to his presupposition that they are to be classified as epideictic rhetorical exercises rather than deliberative political discourses and, as such, 'among the least important of the compositions of Isocrates' [57]. In doing so, van Hook, like Jaeger, allows his presupposition to determine his judgement in spite of the contrary evidence.

When we turn to Isocrates' texts without presupposing

that they are epideictic exercises, the evidence that they were intended to be, and are, serious deliberative works is very clear. Van Hook himself recognizes that

> 'The Helen purports to be a serious work and is opposed with care.' [58]

Isocrates himself, in a work of undoubted seriousness, the Panathenaicus, explicitly directs his reader to the Helen as a deliberative political discussion of Theseus [59], one of the very rulers who

> 'taught through the manner of their rule the very truth which I shall be seen to have expressed in words after they had expressed it in their deeds, namely, that the politeia is the soul of the polis, having as much power over it as the mind over the body.' [60]

Thus, while Isocrates clearly directs us to the Helen as a serious political work, and presents it as a discussion of what he argues is a fundamental truth of politics, van Hook declares the Helen to be unimportant solely on the grounds that it has been assumed to be nothing more than an epideictic exercise.

The Question of Translation

As the preceding examples demonstrate, the modern interpreter of Isocrates must squarely confront one of the most fundamental of hermeneutic problems, namely, the question of translation. As we have seen, the presupposition that Isocrates is a rhetorician has lead to the introduction of misleading translations into most readily available editions of Isocrates in English. These translations distort Isocrates at the most important level, concerning both the nature and

the intention of the education Isocrates offers.

Turning finally to the Bursiris, we see again how the assumption that Isocrates is a rhetorician determines the way in which his writings are classified and interpreted. More importantly, insofar as we are concerned with Isocrates' educational ideas, this assumption determines the way in which Isocrates' Greek is translated. As in the case of the Helen, the Bursiris is assumed to be 'an epideictic essay of the "display" type', 'a rhetorical exercise', and therefore 'not a work of particular merit' [61]. Yet in the Bursiris itself Isocrates explicitly tells us that his 'aim in this discourse is not to make a display' [62] or, to transliterate the Greek used by Isocrates, not to offer an epideictic essay. As Isocrates goes on to explain, the aim of the Bursiris is to provide an education in political discourse and judgement through reflection on the biography of a ruler [63]. Unfortunately, this educational aim is suppressed because the translator presupposes that Isocrates is a rhetorician. Isocrates refers to 'τὴν περὶ τους λογους παιδευς' [64], an education in the art of discourse. The translation, however, renders this as 'the teaching of rhetoric' [65], in spite of the fact that the word "rhetoric" does not appear in the text at all, and, as we have seen, is used by Isocrates to refer to his educational adversaries.

The intentions of Isocrates' educational program is similarly obscured by translation. Isocrates defines one of

the intentions or desired outcomes of his educational program in terms of 'σοφίας καὶ φιλοσοφίας', wisdom and philosophy [66]. As Isocrates says, the philosophers produced by the education he offers are wise in the sense that their political judgement is characterized by 'φρόνησιν' or prudence [67]. In other words, Isocrates defines the general educational aim of 'σοφίας' (wisdom) in terms of the specific aim of political prudence (φρόνησιν). The translator of the Loeb edition, however, translates both σοφίας and φρόνησιν as "wisdom" [68]. By translating the two different Greek words used by Isocrates by a single English word, the translator makes it appear as if Isocrates tells us that the philosopher is wise because he possesses wisdom. The translation thus reduces Isocrates' argument to a tautology.

Moderation and Political Activity in Isocrates.

A final illustration of the questionable nature of the standard image of Isocrates, and therefore of the need to tend carefully to his writings, is the common assertion that Isocrates retreated to education as a result of his inability to participate in political oratory. It is suggested that Isocrates' voice was too weak and he himself too shy for public speaking, and as a result was compelled by these personal failings to become an educator [69]. Yet Norlin observes that such disadvantages might easily have been overcome, as they were in the case of Demosthenes, and that the real reasons for Isocrates' retirement from political

activity may have been motivated by his preference for a more tranquil life of study. As Isocrates himself writes,

> 'I consider that this kind of life is more agreeable than that of men who are busy with a multitude of things, and is also more compatible with the intentions to which I have been dedicated from the beginning.' [70]

If Isocrates had indeed intended 'from the beginning' to pursue a life withdrawn from the multitude of things that constitute political activity, then the view that he was driven to such a withdrawal by personal inadequacies needs to be re-examined. Such an examination requires careful attention to Isocrates' language, and particularly to the distortions of translation.

If we pay careful attention to the words actually used by Isocrates, then we see that his avoidance of political activity was motivated by his conception of the nature of democratic politics rather than by shyness [71]. Isocrates thought politics to be the most important concern of wise men [72], and repeatedly presents himself as a wise man [73]. Isocrates also observed, in the spirit of constructive criticism, that democracies tend to choose and to admire leaders and orators who are 'daring', who flatter the citizens more than prudence or moderation would permit. As he says of the "democratic sycophants and depraved orators" [74].

In Isocrates' view, successful political action or oratory in a democracy often requires daring (τολμης) [75], or lack of moderation. The word daring is used in all the

passages cited above to refer to a lack of moderation which tends to undermine democratic politics, leading eventually to oligarchy or tyranny [76], and yet desired by the citizenry. When we turn to those passages where Isocrates is alleged to say that he is too shy for politics, we find in fact that he claims to be lacking in such daring [77].

> 'It is true that I have abstained from political activity and from practising rhetoric (ρηπορεύειν): for my voice was inadequate and I am not daring (τολμαν).' [78]

Isocrates abstained from politics because of his moderation, his principled repudiation of the imprudent daring admired by the Athenian democracy, often contrary to its own interest and law [79]. Indeed, the two great educators of classical Athens, Socrates and Isocrates, both abstained from political activity because they would not succumb to such daring (τολμαν) [80]. Isocrates' turn to education and the composition of political discourses was not motivated by shyness or "a lack of assurance" [81], but by politically prudent moderation. Isocrates was by no means the last prudent citizen of a democracy to withdraw from the arena of immoderate political rhetoric in the hope of contributing to political deliberation and debate by other means.

The secondary literature concerned with Isocrates' educational ideas presents a fairly uniform interpretation of them. Isocrates is presented as an aristocratic rhetorician driven from political activity and oratory by personal inadequacies. This interpretation has been left unchallenged -- indeed, unmodified -- since F.A.G. Beck's survey of Greek

education, published some thirty years ago [82]. Yet when this interpretation is tested against Isocrates' texts, it seems to be a most improbable one, and therefore in need of re-appraisal. An accurate understanding of the educational ideas of Isocrates will be available to us only if we attend carefully to Isocrates' Greek text. We must attempt to determine what Isocrates himself regarded as important and true, rather than attempting to place him within the confines of our own interests and categories of thought.

2.4 Political Philosophy in Educational Studies

As even a cursory glance at the history of educational thought reveals, the greatest educational thinkers, from Isocrates and Plato through Aristotle to Locke, Rousseau and beyond, presented their educational philosophy in intimate association with their political philosophy. Indeed, a fundamental and constant question in the history of political thought concerns the nature of the relationship, if any, between education and politics. This section in intended to show that political philosophy has also been effectively eliminated from the dominant approaches to educational philosophy within Educational Studies. The elimination of political philosophy, particularly in the context of the concurrent elimination of the history of educational philosophy and ideas, has rendered the questions raised by the Isocratic idea of education virtually impossible even to formulate.

The disappearance of political philosophy from Educational Studies has only added to the obstacles preventing any renewed and self-conscious awareness of the question of the relationship between education and politics, and of the nature of education generally. There has been some research dealing with questions of political science, concerned with, for example, empirical questions of the relations between government and state schools. There has been some concern with questions of political theory and dogmatics, seeking to argue that state schooling, in its aims, procedures and distribution, ought to be made most consistent with particular political doctrines, such as Marxism, libertarianism, or democracy [83]. The disappearance of political philosophy, however, has meant that the logically prior philosophical question of whether there is necessarily, or ought to be, any relationship at all between the normative intentions of education and political doctrine has not been raised. Indeed, in the absence of both the history of ideas and political philosophy, it is a question which cannot be raised, or formulated. Having examined the disappearance of the Isocratic heritage and the history of educational ideas from educationist thought, we turn now to the fate of political philosophy.

Pioneering works within the most recent 'new era' of Educational Studies, such as those by Hardie [84] or Nunn [85], helped to determine the research programme of contemporary Educational Studies [86]. These works do not

directly discuss politics or political philosophy at all.

A number of books, most in the form of introductions to the philosophy of education, appeared between the time of the publication of Hardie's work and the establishment of analytic philosophy as the dominant methodological commitment among educationists [87]. In textbooks by O'Connor [88], Scheffler [89], Reid, and Phenix [90], there is no mention of the study of politics as a discipline contributing to educational theory, and no mention of political philosophy.

O'Connor and Scheffler wrote for 'students of education in universities and training colleges who would otherwise have no formal contact with philosophy' [91]. Other philosophers, some of far greater stature even within academic philosophy, had begun to turn to education within the context of political philosophy and non-analytic philosophy [92]. It is of great importance, however, not to overlook the fact that the analytic paradigm of philosophy of education, which was to dominate the study of education only among educationists, was formulated by academics with no background in political philosophy or in the history of educational thought, and intended for students with no formal acquaintance with philosophy. The devastating consequences of this compounded loss of learning has been explored above [93]. For our present purposes, what is most important is the fact that the "new era" of educational philosophy was, and is, defined by the vast territories of history and philosophy which it almost

unknowingly excluded. The Isocratic heritage was, as we have seen, one such exclusion; political philosophy was another.

The continuing absence of political philosophy within the prevailing programme of philosophy of education can perhaps best be illustrated with reference to the two volumes edited by T.W. Tibble for the Students Library of Education series, and a successor to these edited by P.H. Hirst. As Hirst observes in the last of the three books,

> 'The publication in 1966 of a collection of papers under the title The Study of Education, edited by Professor T.W. Tibble, inaugurated a new era in the character of educational studies...' [94]

The subject of the volume was the 'nature of educational theory as such' [95], where educational theory is understood to be 'necessarily dependent on the development of a series of contributory disciplines with recognized academic roots quite outside educational studies' [96]. As Hirst noted, and as the table of contents in the first Tibble volume will confirm, the contributory disciplines included applied analytic philosophy of education, history of education, sociology of education and educational psychology [97]. Evidently, the politics of education did not warrant a separate chapter in the 'new era' of educational studies, nor was political philosophy considered to be one of the recognized academic disciplines on which educational theory was dependent. Later introductory volumes edited by Tibble, Peters and Hirst, and published over the subsequent twenty years, continue to regard psychology, sociology, history and applied analytic philosophy as the four

disciplines which contribute to educational theory [98]. These volumes all exclude political philosophy from the list of contributory disciplines.

It must be emphasized that no argument was ever presented to show that the exclusion of political philosophy was justified. Educationists merely adopted the analytic definition of philosophy [99], along with the belief that political philosophy was a secondary or non-existent subject [100].

The relationship between politics and education later returned as a marginal topic within educationist philosophy of education, though in a much altered and idiosyncratic form. This is especially true of the definition of political philosophy. In 1973, for example, R.S. Peters could assert that the philosophy of education

> 'could not exist apart from the established branches of philosophy such as epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of mind. Rather it draws on such established branches of philosophy and brings them together in ways which are relevant to educational issues. In this respect it is very much like political philosophy'. [101]

As others have observed, this unargued assertion is exceedingly 'parochial' [102], both historically and in the context of contemporary political and educational philosophy [103]. For Plato and Aristotle, it was political philosophy and philosophy of education which were the "established" branches of philosophy [104], while ethics probably was not [105]. Similarly, Peters's definitions of philosophy, its

"established branches", or educational and political philosophy, have no applicability to philosophers of education and politics such as Arendt [106], Strauss [107], the Straussian school as a whole, Gadamer [108], Habermas [109], Oakeshott, Wolin, Lowith or a multitude of others [110]. Peters's definitions are unsubstantiated personal judgments, and untrue as descriptions of virtually all political and educational philosophy, past or present.

The intention of this thesis is to examine the Isocratic idea of education. In order to examine this idea, it is necessary to return to the history of educational ideas. If one is to analyze and determine the justifiability of this idea, one must turn to political philosophy. As we have seen, the evolution of the educationist study of education in the twentieth century is arguably defined above all by the disappearance of any knowledge of even the existence of Isocrates, and the exclusion of political philosophy and the history of educational ideas. Fortunately, an alternative approach to educational philosophy has been exemplified for more than half a century by Leo Strauss and his students. This approach offers a most productive corrective for the educationist abandonment of Isocrates, political philosophy and the history of educational ideas.

2.5 The Straussian Alternative

2.5.1 The Need for Alternatives in Educational Studies

As early in the 'new era' [111] of educationist philosophy of education as 1973, R.S. Peters warned that

> 'philosophy of education is, at the moment, suffering from too little fundamental divergence in points of view.' [112]

This lack of diversity has been a systematically continuous feature of educationist philosophy. Ten years later, in 1983, Peters again warned that

> 'those working in the subject must be more sensitive to contributions coming from outside.' [113]

Yet from the point of view of the wider community of educational scholars, it was arguably Peters himself who was on the 'outside'. Peters's assumption that he was himself the centre of educational philosophy, while others were "outsiders", hints at the 'continuing relative isolation of philosophy of education' [114] that remains a proximate cause of the absence of a fundamental divergence of points of view. Indeed, it was Peters himself, at a 'banquet marking the tenth anniversary of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain', who 'made a slightly sad speech , ruing the narrowness and orthodoxy' of Educational Studies [115]. As Cooper observes, the situation had changed little as of 1986, and Educational Studies continues to be in need of alternative approaches to the philosophy of education.

2.5.2 Three Proposed Alternatives

Three opinions emerged within Educational Studies concerning the perceived need for new approaches to the philosophy of education. The first was to claim that no alternative existed to the analytic approach of R.S. Peters. This 'narrow and orthodox' view was offered by Hirst in 1986.

> 'Richard Peters revolutionized philosophy of education, and as the work of all others now engaged in that area bears witness, there can be no going back on the transformation he has brought about.' [116]

A similar claim was made by Dearden. Dearden asserted that it is

> 'most unlikely that a major alternative to the present broadly analytic style of doing philosophy of education will emerge in the immediate future.' [117]

Yet if we look to contributions coming from "outside", we see that Hirst's and Dearden's assertions could not be more wrong. Restricting ourselves strictly to the 'immediate future', two books [118] on educational philosophy were published which approached the subject from the point of view of the major "alternative" which had emerged no later than 1959 [119]. Contrary to Hirst's unsupported assertion, the work of <u>all</u> others shows that R.S. Peters did not transform the subject much beyond his personal circle. This is a component of what Kevin Harris has described as "The R.S. Peters Myth", or the myth that Peters redefined and dominated educational philosophy [120]. For present purposes, it is sufficient to point out that "alternatives" did indeed exist, and were widely discussed [121]. Throughout the whole of Peters's career, a major alternative to his approach, initiated by Leo Strauss, not merely existed, but had brought about a

transformation of the subject among North American and Continental European classicists and political philosophers.

As Cooper observes, a second alternative approach to the philosophy of education consisted of a turn to Continental philosophers such as Foucault [122], or Bourdieu [123]. Yet it is again the Straussian school which is regarded as the most powerful alternative to Foucault, Bourdieu and others, and which is represented by such leading French political philosophers as Luc Ferry, Oliver Duhamel and Alain Renault [124].

A third alternative approach to the philosophy of education was suggested by R.S. Peters. Peters notes that those wishing to pursue the philosophy of education beyond an introductory level will have to 'return to the classical works' [125], after decades of neglect [126]. Very recently, a prominent educationist has recommended, as a 'radical broadening' of philosophy of education, a return to 'the great educational theorists of the past' [127], apparently unaware that such an approach has defined virtually all educational philosophy (ie. outside of Educational Studies) for more than a century [128]. Once again, it was Leo Strauss who initiated a return to the classical works as a necessary foundation for educational philosophy, and he and his many students and followers have continued in that approach [129].

2.5.3 Leo Strauss

Leo Strauss (1899-1973) is best known for his contributions to Hebrew and Arabic philosophical scholarship, political philosophy, and educational philosophy. We shall briefly examine each of these in turn.

Among scholars of Hebrew and Arabic philosophy, Strauss' early work in this field continues to be very highly regarded. Scholars of Hebrew and Arabic philosophy write of having 'reaped the benefit of the guidance of Leo Strauss, may his memory be a blessing, in his pioneering works in recovering Maimonides' teachings' [130]. Strauss has also made an unequalled contribution to our understanding of classical Arabic philosophers such as Alfarabi [131], and contributed to the translation of their work from the Arabic [132].

Leo Strauss has been described as 'the reviver in the twentieth century of authentic Socratic political philosophy' [133], and as 'the master of a whole generation of classically oriented political philosophers' [134]. After initiating the debate concerning the contemporary status and future prospects of political philosophy [135], Strauss went on to have a determining and world-wide influence on its development [136]. As K.F. Moors observed,

> 'We are now experiencing a renaissance of interest in political philosophy, particularly classical political philosophy, which owes is existence largely to the brilliance of Strauss and his erudite students. [137]

More generally, Strauss has been ranked with Wittgenstein,

Freud, Habermas [138], Popper and Rawls [139], as one of the most deeply influential of contemporary thinkers [140].

Strauss has been consistently identified as the most cogent opponent of, and alternative to, analytic philosophy. In Thorson [141] Leo Strauss is offered as the best alternative to Bertrand Russell. In the realm of political philosophy, Strauss is identified by Anthony Quinton as the most prominent methodological alternative to the analytic view adopted by R.S. Peters himself [142]. Similarly, distinguished Marxists such as C.B. MacPherson or Alexander Kojeve have identified Strauss as their most serious opponent and have engaged in extended and respectful debate with him. At the other end of the continuum of political opinion, conservative Michael Oakeshott wrote that 'it is safe to say that the work of Dr. Leo Strauss is of the first importance' [143]. Strauss and Oakeshott were later co-founders of the influential journal Interpretation: a Journal of Political Philosophy. Advocates of historical relativism, such as Hans-Georg Gadamar and Jurgen Habermas [144], have identified Strauss as the most distinguished and profound opponent of their views, as can be seen, for example, in the recent publication of the Gadamar--Strauss correspondence [145].

In recent years educationist philosophers of education have repeatedly called for new philosophical methods as an alternative to the dominant analytic philosophy, and the relatively less prominent Marxist and existentialist (or

Continental) methods. The fact is, however, that Leo Strauss has for more than forty years been just such an alternative, and this has been widely recognised outside Educational Studies [146]. As a sympathetic critic observed, Leo Strauss

> 'gave more thought to the subject of liberal education than did any other major political thinker of the twentieth century.' [147]

Yet among educationists Strauss's philosophy remains unknown, in spite of his explicit statement, in 1962, 'that education is in a sense the subject matter of my teaching and research' [148]. A number of Strauss's students, and students of his students, including Bloom, Brann, Nicgorski, Horowitz, Rosen, Tarcov, Lord, Mansfield, Pangle, and Schwartz, continue in his approach to philosophy and education, as does this thesis.

In this thesis we shall follow Leo Strauss in returning to the history of philosophy and ideas in order to understand the once controversial philosophical arguments which gave rise to the word meanings and ideas that now seem so familiar and obvious, and in returning to his revitalization of Socratic dialectic as the means by which such ideas may be evaluated. This approach is not concerned with the "practical" task of promulgating yet another policy or ideology, but with the philosophical goal of understanding the nature and limitations of the fundamental alternatives we face, and the permanent questions which liberate the human mind by focusing it on such alternatives.

PART TWO: THE ORIGIN, TRANSMISSION AND EVOLUTION OF THE ISOCRATIC IDEA OF EDUCATION

> 'He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them.'
> Aristotle. [1]

The argument of Part One has shown that while the contribution of the Isocratic legacy to Western education, and to Western civilization as a whole, has been pervasive and unparalleled, knowledge of Isocrates and his ideas has been greatly eroded in recent years within Educational Studies. In particular, there has been a virtually total loss of even an awareness of the existence of Isocrates precisely among those educationist scholars to whom it ought to be most familiar. At the same time, educationists presuppose the Isocratic idea of education. We shall proceed in Part Two of this thesis to make a modest beginning in the task of recovering some knowledge of Isocrates and his influence in education, with a primary emphasis on the Isocratic idea of education.

There may be some scholarly advantages of our loss of awareness of the Isocratic heritage, in the sense that we have an opportunity to study it afresh, without walls of academic interpretation standing between us and the original. The primary intention of Part Two is to recover some understanding of the Isocratic idea of the nature of education. The Isocratic idea is generally presupposed, and never explicitly discussed in the scholarly literature. This is not to say that

there has been no scholarly discussion of Isocrates' educational ideas, broadly understood, or his influence. So far as I am aware, however, scholarly discussions have concentrated on Isocrates' contributions to the curriculum, and specifically to the Seven Liberal Arts, the emphasis on the written word and literature, and rhetoric. The argument presented here is original in at least the sense that it concentrates explicitly on a philosophical reconstruction of what is arguably most fundamental to Isocrates' proposals and influence, namely, his idea of the very nature of education itself.

In the absence of any previous scholarly study of the Isocratic idea itself, it seemed best to trace its origins, historical transmission and evolution by following it indirectly, and extracting it from the philosophical works of each particular historical period. For example, Isocrates gives rhetoric an important place in his educational programme. Plato and Aristotle, on the contrary, either repudiated rhetoric as an inadequate form of political reasoning [2], or treated it as a theoretical subject [3]. If, in later periods, we encounter educational enterprises which emphasize rhetoric as a practical skill and desirable form of political reasoning, it stands to reason that such educational enterprises derive from Isocrates rather than from Plato or Aristotle and, crucially, are most probably constructed upon the Isocratic idea of the nature of education. It should be emphasized that the intention of such a discussion is not to

explore the history of educational practice, but rather to use the occurrence of particular kinds of practice as markers which identify particular instantiations of the Isocratic educational legacy, and the idea of the nature of education underlying them.

There is a second respect in which this part of the thesis presents a philosophical argument in the history of educational ideas which is in an important sense original. In general, histories of education, such as those by Boyd, Curtis and Boultwood, Nakosteen, and Bowen, present the history of education as a sequence of distinctly different educational endeavours [4]. These historians describe education as beginning, for example, with pagan Greek education, which is supplanted by Roman republican education. Roman education in turn is replaced by Christian education throughout the Middle Ages, while Christian education is in turn replaced by the more secular humanism of the Renaissance and, eventually, the secular state schooling of today. This thesis attempts to recover some appreciation for the existence of a single and unified idea of education underlying this sequence of apparently distinct educational enterprises, and providing the unity of the history of education in the West. Underlying all of these otherwise very different educational ideals is the Isocratic idea of the nature of education itself. Each historical period presupposes this idea, and attaches to it the normative intentions of the prevailing political doctrine. The unity of the history of Western education is provided by

the continuous presupposition of the Isocratic idea, while the apparent discontinuity is an artefact of the diversity of political doctrines which are attached to that idea. The educators of the Roman Empire, no less than the Medieval Christians, the Renaissance humanists, or the early advocates of state schooling, believed that the normative intentions of education were derived from the political doctrine to which they themselves were committed. Where they differed, of course, is in what they believed the ideal doctrine to be, rather than in what they believed to be the nature of education. In Part Two of this thesis we will examine the historical sequence of doctrines of education with the intention of revealing the underlying and continuous presupposition of the Isocratic idea of the nature of education in the history of Western education.

Chapter Three

Education in the Political Philosophy of Isocrates

3.0 Introduction

Hellenic, and particularly Athenian, educational thought and practice were made the subject of debate by the early challenges to the Homeric tradition, the rise of pre-Socratic scientific thought, and the Sophistic Enlightenment. This proliferation of competing educational programmes, and the ensuing debate within and between the advocates of each of them, culminated in what has been called The Pedagogical Century of the classical Greek world [1]. The Pedagogical Century, 450 to 350 B.C.E., has been defined as 'perhaps the most important period in the whole history of education' [2]. It is most important to understand at least one of the reasons why the Pedagogical Century has been regarded as so decisive for the subsequent history of educational philosophy, ideas and practice, namely, the origin of the Isocratic and Socratic ideas of the nature of education.

The Pedagogical Century was characterized by an astonishing diversity of educational ideas and debate, widely varying in terms of their seriousness and concern for fundamentals. On the whole, however, mainstream educational debate centred on questions of educational procedures, such as the content of the curriculum or the hierarchical ordering of subjects. There was little serious debate about the question of who was to be educated, or the ends to which they were to

be educated. Education was to prepare the leisured class of the wider population of free citizens for political responsibility and leadership. Isocrates was to articulate and defend his own elaborate version of this view of the political nature of education, while the Socratics were to fundamentally challenge it, arguably for the last time in Western history. This situation is well described by Moses Finley.

> 'The leisure class as a whole accepted the doctrine, no matter how many or how few tried to practice it at any given time, that membership of the class entailed the duty to prepare to rule and then to do so in the light of a proper education. What was debated, at least among the more articulate intellectuals of the dominant strain, was only the means to achieve the accepted end. And there was no prolonged serious debate. Disagreement over details never ceased, but fundamental argument over meaningful alternatives occurred only in the fourth century B.C., centred in Athens, and the debate ended with the total victory of Isocrates over Plato.' [3]

The most fundamental educational debate of this period concerned the idea of the very nature of education, an idea which structures the secondary questions of who is to be educated, by what means, and to what end.

The two fundamental and alternative ideas of the nature of education, and therefore of the origins of its normative intentions, were Isocrates' political idea and the Socratic philosophical idea [4]. As Marrou has argued, a clear understanding of the outcome of the educational rivalry between Plato and Isocrates is crucial for any appreciation of the subsequent history of education.

> 'The importance of this fact must be emphasized from the beginning. On the level of history Plato had been defeated: he had failed to impose his

> educational ideal on posterity. It was Isocrates who defeated him, and who became the educator first of Greece, and subsequently of the whole of the ancient world.' [5]

As Finley and others have reiterated more recently, the educational legacy of Isocratic prevailed over the Socratic (including the Xenophonic, Platonic and Aristotelian), a victory which has persisted throughout Western history and well into our own day [6]. If we are to appreciate the nature and value of the influence of Isocrates, we must first turn to a careful study of his educational ideas as he presented them. It is to this task that the argument of the present chapter is devoted.

The purpose of this chapter is to explicate the Isocratic idea of the essential nature of education, as well as to reconstruct the philosophical argument that Isocrates provided for it. We shall also examine some of the aims and the curriculum through which Isocrates sought to realise his idea of education in practice. Isocrates believed that men are characterised by two traits, speech and a faculty for political life. Human beings deliberate in common about the aspirations of the community as a whole, and about the aspirations of individuals within that community. According to Isocrates, education is the process which unifies and perfects human nature, by unifying speech and the political faculty. In particular, Isocrates believed that the normative intentions of education were derived from a political doctrine. This derivation constitutes the Isocratic idea of education. Isocrates' educational programme sought to instruct

the young men of aristocratic descent in the art of practical political judgement, and in the art of rhetoric through which such judgement might be conveyed to the citizenry. The young men of the nobility, motivated by a desire to earn an honourable political reputation, constitute a class of philosopher-statesmen enabled to guide the regime in accordance with the prevailing political doctrine.

3.1 Isocrates' View of Human Nature

The idea of nature (physis) is fundamental to Greek political and educational thought. Nature was understood by the Greeks in two interrelated senses. On the one hand, nature was understood to refer to the essential property of a thing or person, the characteristics which are the sources of its behaviour [7]. Implied by this first sense is a second sense of nature as the end or perfection of a thing or person. The nature of a seed, for example, is both to grow, and to grow into a tree, understood as the natural end of a seed. As Strauss and Cropsey put it,

> 'It seems that the Greek word for nature (physis) means primarily "growth" and therefore also that into which a thing grows, the character a thing has when its growth is completed, when it can do what only the fully grown thing of the kind in question can do or do well.' [8]

This conception of nature as both the essential property of a thing and the perfection of a thing through the perfection of its properties lies at the foundation of the educational and political thought of Isocrates. Isocrates defines human nature in terms of what he takes to be the two essential properties

of human beings, speech and a political faculty, and we will discuss each of these in turn.

Isocrates famously regards speech as the characteristic which is not only distinctively human, but which distinguishes human beings from animals and, as such, is the source of man's perfection [9]. For Isocrates, speech (logos) is understood in terms of the whole of the art of discourse, and as such includes not only verbal expression but practical reason, imagination, and disciplined sentiment [10].

The second characteristic which is distinctively human is a faculty for political life. Such a life is political rather than merely social in the sense that it is concerned with, and guided by, a particular conception of the common good. Isocrates' belief in the essentially political nature of human beings is perhaps most distant from modern political thought. On the one hand, Isocrates' conception of "politics" encompassed not only government and the administration of the state, but what we would now regard as the somewhat distinguishable fields of the economy, religion and social life. Isocrates believed that what we would now regard as political doctrine largely determined the other components of the life of the regime, and that any attempt to distinguish them misrepresented the nature of political phenomena [11].

While this conception of human nature is no doubt controversial, particularly from the perspective of

contemporary thought, history provides some support for it. In monarchical regimes, for example, the economy, religion and social life reflect the dominant political belief. Religion emphasizes the divine right of kings and the inequalities amongst human beings, social life is characterized by elaborate manners and hierarchies of political status, while the ownership of land, and therefore the distribution of wealth, similarly was defined in terms of the same hierarchy of status. Where democratic political doctrine is dominant, on the other hand, religion emphasizes social justice and the equality of all human beings before God, social life is characterized by an informality of manners, and economics emphasizes distribution according to merit and equality of opportunity. In Isocrates' view, human nature was essentially political, and this was reflected in all human activities.

There is a second sense in which Isocrates' view of human nature differs from that of modern political thought. Hobbes and Locke, for example, defined human nature in terms of the state of nature, in which pre-political men defined by their individual freedom and selfish desire are compelled to enter into political life for mutual protection and advantage. Political life is understood to be conventional rather than natural, and imposed against the natural "possessive individualism" of human nature in the pre-political state of nature [12]. Isocrates adopts the opposite perspective. In his view, human beings are by nature political, and naturally form political associations both as a consequence of this natural

desire and in order to perfect this essential component of human nature. For Isocrates, the true "state of nature" would consist of human beings living in political communities. The notion of individual pre-political men is an impossibility in his view, and the correlative notion that they are driven to political associations against the imperatives of human nature fundamentally mistaken. Isocrates considers human nature to be defined by speech, the ability through which human beings exercise their natural political faculty in order to maintain the political communities in which they naturally live.

Having defined human nature in terms of speech and the political faculty, Isocrates turns to a more comprehensive view of human nature and perfection, in which speech and the political faculty are unified in pursuit of the same ends. Isocrates begins by arguing that we ought to

> 'think of the art of discourse just as we think of the other arts, and not to form opposite judgements about similar things, nor show ourselves intolerant toward that power which, of all the faculties which belong to the nature of man, is the source of most of our blessings. For in the other powers which we possess, as I have already said on a former occasion, we are in no respect superior to other living creatures; indeed, we are inferior to many in swiftness and strength and in other resources; but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish.' [13]

Isocrates argues here that philosophy, or the art of discourse, is rooted in the two characteristics most deeply rooted in human beings, speech and politics.

> 'Speech, Isocrates reminds us (and the idea has become a commonplace of Western thought), is the foundation of human society, the means through which man expresses his wisdom, and without which wisdom is inarticulate and inert.' [14]

For Isocrates, natural human perfection is achieved by developing the natural human faculty of speech in the service of the natural human political faculty, the faculty which elevates human beings above the level of mere animals and provides for the conditions of civilized life. To see this argument more clearly we turn to the 'former occasion' mentioned by Isocrates in this passage.

Isocrates refers us to the Panegyricus, where he claims that the city, and particularly the city of Athens, provides for 'the first necessity of man's nature' [15]. It is through the city that we are able to provide

> 'the fruits of the earth, which have enabled us to rise above the level of the beasts, and the holy rite [ie. the Eleusinian Mysteries] which inspires in those who partake of it sweeter hopes regarding both the end of life and all eternity.' [16]

Isocrates goes on to develop this idea, arguing that the ancestors who first founded the city -- that is, the political regime -- provided for the most essential physical and spiritual needs of human beings, and thereby established the conditions which would allow for the development of man's political faculty [17]. The political regime provided

> 'that sustenance which men must have who are to provide well for their other needs as well; but considering that an existence limited to this alone was not enough to make men desire to live, she [Athens] gave such careful thought to their remaining needs as well that of the good things now at the service of mankind most of them are due to her alone.' [18]

Primary among these good things, which transform human existence into civilized life, are the formulation of law, and the establishment of politeia, or authorative political doctrine, from which law is derived [19]. In Isocrates' view, Athens civilized the Greeks because 'she was the first to lay down laws and establish a politeian' [20]. Isocrates also gives Athens credit for having developed the arts of manufacture, international travel and trade, and religious and civic festivals, all of which bring about and sustain the political unity of the pan-Hellenic world [21]. But the most important contribution was the Athenian politeia.

The question arises as to what allowed the Athenians in particular to have made these decisive contributions to the processes by which human beings are not only raised above the level of mere animal life, but civilized in the political community as well. Isocrates offers an unequivocal answer: philosophy, defined as 'eloquence' or the art of discourse, and 'the one endowment of our nature which singles us out from all living creatures' [22].

> 'Philosophy, which has helped to discover and establish all these institutions, which has educated us for public affairs and made us gentle towards each other, which has distinguished between the misfortunes that are due to ignorance and those which spring from necessity, and taught us to guard against the former and bear the latter nobly -- philosophy, I say, was given to the world by our city.' [23]

Philosophy, which for Isocrates is the art of discourse, exhibits itself above all in eloquent speech in the service of the regime. Philosophy is valued as the means by which

political institutions are constructed and maintained, and as the means by which men are educated for participation in these institutions. Isocrates completes his argument by turning to the question of how men are initiated into such philosophy.

Isocrates again reiterates that those who pursue philosophy will possess eloquence, the 'beautiful and artistic speech' which allows them to influence or direct the political judgements and aspirations of the citizenry. This eloquence is the product of a prudent and learned mind [24]. Practical judgement and learning, and the eloquence that expresses them in a politically effective manner, are in turn the product of 'liberal education' as Isocrates defines it. Isocrates insists

> 'that whether men have been liberally educated from their earliest years is not to be determined by their courage or their wealth or such advantages, but is made manifest most of all by their speech, and that this has proved itself to be the surest sign of education [paideuseos] in every one of us, and that those who are skilled in speech are not only men of power in their own cities but are also held in honour in other regimes.' [25]

Isocrates argues that liberal education contributes decisively to the development of prudence or practical judgement, and eloquence. Practical judgement and eloquence are understood to be the natural perfection of the two most distinctively human traits, the faculties of politics and speech. These outcomes of liberal education are valued for their contributions to political life, and, above all, to the maintenance of politeia and the systems of law and government derived from them [26]. In this way education unites the two definitively human traits, the faculty of speech and the political faculty, for

the collective good of each political community and the whole of mankind.

> 'Through this we educate the ignorant and appraise the wise; for the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul.' [27]

It is the essential nature of education to be derived from politics in the sense that the value of education is wholly a function of its ability to develop the natural human capacity for speech, and thereby contribute to the civilizing forces of political life. This Isocratic view of human nature is the foundation of the Isocratic idea of the nature of education.

3.2 The Isocratic Idea of Education

The educational programme of Isocrates has been discussed by a number of classical and historical scholars, and critically examined by political philosophers [28]. Each of these previous interpretations of Isocrates concentrates, however, on the practical features of his educational ideas which are not directly relevant to the argument developed here. There has been much previous discussion of, for example, Isocrates' teaching methods, educational "humanism", and emphasis on rhetoric and oratory in education. The present argument seeks to recover a broader understanding of the place of education within the political philosophy of Isocrates. Specifically, we seek to recover and evaluate Isocrates' contention that the normative intentions of education are derived from an external and lexically prior political

doctrine. This contention is arguably the central feature of Isocrates' conception of both education and political philosophy and is in practical terms the most enduring of his educational ideas. Yet it has so far received little scholarly attention.

The orations Against the Sophists and Antidosis are commonly regarded as Isocrates' educational writings. This classification is on the whole accurate, although these orations concentrate on practical questions such as the distinction between Isocrates' educational programme and that of the sophists, teaching methods and the relation of his programme to traditional Athenian education. These orations do discuss, albeit in indirect and general terms, the theoretical questions underlying Isocrates' educational practice. Isocrates tells us clearly that education is to be valued for its political consequences, but appears to assume the justifiability of this view of the relationship between education and politics. Rather than relying on an assumption of this kind, however, Isocrates is in fact building upon a more fundamental theoretical argument which he has made elsewhere. We shall follow Mathieu, the important French Isocrates scholar, who directs us to the Areopagiticus as the best discussion of Isocrates' view of the place of education within his broader political philosophy. Although Mathieu himself was not concerned with Isocrates' idea of the nature of education, it is the Areopagiticus which provides the fully articulated Isocratic view of the derivation of the normative

intentions of education from a lexically prior political doctrine.

Isocrates combines philosophy and the liberal studies together in a single system of education [29]. Before proceeding to a detailed description and defence of such education, Isocrates pauses to emphasize both the importance of the educational questions at issue, and the public attitude towards them. Maintaining the dramatic form of Antidosis as his defence speech at a trial, Isocrates writes

> 'It is no minor question which is under discussion and on trial here, but the most important in the world. For you are to determine by your votes, not my fate only, but the fate of a way of life to which many of our youths are devoting their minds.' [30]

Isocrates goes on to specify why he thinks this the most important question in the world.

> 'I suppose that you are not unaware of the fact that the government of the city-state is handed on by the older men to the young men of the coming generation; and that since the succession goes on without end, it follows of necessity that as is the education of our youth so from generation to generation will be the fortune of the city state.' [31]

It is from the point of view of this political function, extending infinitely into the future, that all education is to be valued [32]. Isocrates proceeds to argue that the specific normative intentions of education are derived from political doctrine, or politeia.

According to Isocrates, the politeia is always the most important foundation of political life in the regime. As we read in Areopagiticus,

> 'the soul of the regime is nothing other than its politeia, having as much power over it as does the mind over the body; for it is this which deliberates upon all questions, seeking to preserve what is good and to ward off what is disastrous; and it is this which of necessity assimilates to its own nature the laws, the public orators and the private citizens; and all the members of the state must fare well or ill according to the kind of politeia under which they live.' [33]

Isocrates goes on to argue that, given that the politeia determines political life, Athens' present difficulties stem from the fact that their present politeia is corrupt and that no consideration is given to the question of how to redeem it [34].

To say that the politeia is corrupt raises the question of the standards by which the politeia is to be judged. In other words, Isocrates raises the question of the nature of the good politeia. Isocrates argues that the primary political problem faced by the Athenians of his day is that

> 'we neither possess nor do we seek to obtain a politeian which can properly deal with our affairs.' [35]

The failure to seek or to possess a politeian is not only the most important problem in itself, but underlies all the other problems the Athenians face. In Isocrates' view,the question of the politeia has two interrelated components, one educational and the other political.

Isocrates does not engage in a sustained philosophical examination of the question of the nature and justification of the good politeia. He only asserts that the good politeia is that of the older Athenian democracy of Solon and Cleisthenes

[36]. In his view, the goodness of the old democratic politeia is to be found in the noble deeds of its citizens, the admiration it won, and the hegemony it allowed Athens to establish over the remainder of the Hellenic world. The ancient politeia also served what Isocrates believed to be its natural educative function, in the sense that it fostered the development of the political virtues of moderation and impartiality [37]. It also distinguished between two kinds of equality, that of distributing goods equally to all and that of distributing goods according to merit, and instituted the latter in civil society [38]. Whether or not we agree with Isocrates' judgement as to the goodness of such a politeia is not important for the perspective of our present concerns. What is important is the connection which Isocrates makes between both politeian and education generally, and between the politeia of the older Athenian democracy and Isocrates' educational program specifically.

Isocrates believed that the politeia which was incapable of performing its natural educative function was an undesirable one [39]. His comments on the ancient regime of Solon and Cleisthenes illustrates this belief, as well as anticipating the more formal arguments for the derivation of the normative standards of education from political doctrine. Isocrates' historical account of the ancient regime of Athens argues that Solon and Cleisthenes were natural statesmen who possessed rhetorical and oratorical abilities of the highest order. They were good men, good orators and good statesmen by

nature. Through the politeia which they instituted, and through the education which they were able to provide to the young on the basis of it, statesmen and orators of the older regime were able to educate the citizenry in the virtue of moderation, which Isocrates repeatedly presents as an indispensable political virtue generally. The citizens and statesmen of the regime of Isocrates' day were guided by the opposite politeia [40], and the education which was derived from it produced correspondingly regrettable effects on the citizenry. As Isocrates puts it, education derived from the new politeia

> 'trained the citizens in such a fashion that they looked upon insolence as democracy, lawlessness as liberty, impudence of speech as equality, and license to do whatever they pleased as happiness.' [41]

This section of the Areopagiticus presents Isocrates' belief that the older politeia was conducive to moderation, and that the education derived from it produced citizens in whom moderation is consistently expressed in their civic attitudes, political discourse, and activity [42]. This intimation of the Isocratic idea of the nature of education is developed as the oration proceeds.

After describing and praising the ancient regime of Solon and Cleisthenes in these terms, Isocrates makes the following observation.

> 'Such was the constitution of their politeias, and from this it was easy to see that also in their conduct day by day they never failed to act with propriety and lawfulness (orthos kai nominos); for when people have laid sound foundations for the conduct of the whole regime it follows that in that

> the details of their lives they must reflect the character of their government.' [43]

Isocrates goes on to describe some of the specific details in which the lives of the people reflect the character of their government, and therefore the nature of the politeia. Significantly, education is not merely one such important detail in its own right, but also pervades all the others. The men of the old Athenian regime were pious and regular in their observance of the religious rite and ceremonies devoted to the praise of the gods in which the regime believed. Young people were educated so as to ensure the perpetuation of such observance, and the retention of the religious customs regarded as important for the health of the regime [44]. Similarly, education in the old regime ensured that the young developed the virtues of prudence and justice, particularly in economic affairs which are so crucial for political stability in democratic regimes [45].

In Isocrates' view, the democratic regime of Solon and Cleisthenes was so well governed because it had found a good politeia , and consistently derived the normative intentions of education from it [46]. Isocrates does not describe this education in detail, and we must therefore turn briefly to Plato, who does record what purports to be Protagoras' description of ancient educational practice [47]. Human excellence, defined in terms of justice and piety in accordance with the politeia, is the goal of both formal and informal education. Parents endeavoured to teach, through both example and instruction, the conventional standards of right

and wrong, and of piety. Although children were formally sent to tutors and teachers to learn literacy, music, and poetry, the primary intention at all times was the inculcation of patterns of behaviour in accordance with the conventional standards of the regime. Isocrates was enthusiastic specifically about the strong emphasis on the development of a politically influential class of citizens in whom the virtue of sobriety or temperance (sophrosunen) had been imbued by education [48]. Although Isocrates wishes to substitute his own program of higher education for the older and more traditional one , he sees much of value in the older elementary education, and, as we shall see, adopted a number of components of it. In particular, Isocrates agrees with the derivation of the normative standards of education, elementary and higher, from a logically prior politeia , a derivation which he seeks to make explicit and for which he provides an almost metaphysical justification which it had lacked.

At this point it might be useful to pause and review the essential points of the argument of the preceding two sections. Isocrates believed that human nature was defined by two characteristics, speech (logos) and an inclination toward political life. In accordance with the underlying Greek conception of nature, human perfection was to be sought in the development of human nature, or in the development of speech and the political faculty. The perfection of these two characteristics was understood in terms of the unified development of the two together: men -- and it is useful to

remember that Isocrates excludes women -- sought to define and implement the good regime through common deliberation and political speech. Education is regarded as an essentially political activity in the sense that it is regarded as training in speech from the point of view of the intention to engage in political life. It is on the foundation of this general political conception of the nature of education that Isocrates constructs his more specific idea of the nature of education as an enterprise which derives its normative intentions from a specific political doctrine.

In Isocrates' view, the normative intentions of both formal and informal education are derived from political doctrine. Isocrates argues that it is in the nature of things that

> 'the majority of men tend to assimilate the manners and morals amidst which they have been reared.' [49]

The manners and morals which predominate and are authorative in any given regime are derived from the prevailing politeia. The normative intentions of both upbringing and formal education are derived from the politeia, the dominant political doctrine. Isocrates argues that a politeia will be pervasive in any given regime, and that all enterprises, formal education in particular, will be relative to it [50].

The nature of formal education is such that its normative intentions must be and ought to be deductively derived from a politeia, which serves as the first premise of the deduction. Yet no politeia is given by nature, and its development and

maintenance are therefore to some extent subject to both local variations, and change. Consequently, although education generically understood is relative to a politeia, the practical political question, and therefore the political and educational conflicts, will concern the specific politeia to be instituted in any given regime [51]. This is, of course, the now somewhat vague (and, as we shall see, paradoxical) idea that continues to prevail in Western educational thought in the guise of the "essentially contested concept" thesis [52]. Isocrates himself opted for the mixed democratic politeia of Solon and Cleisthenes on the grounds that the normative intentions of education were best derived from that political doctrine. Underlying this specific derivation, however, is the Isocratic idea of the nature of education as an enterprise relative to political doctrine, and unifying the natural human faculty of speech with the natural human inclination to political life.

3.3 The Aims of Isocratic Education

In this section we turn to an examination of the formal aims of Isocratic education. We will examine these aims for two reasons. First, these aims clarify the Isocratic idea of education, because it is through these aims that Isocrates sought to realize his underlying normative intentions. Second, some knowledge of these aims is necessary if we are to be able to follow the historical evolution of the Isocratic educational tradition, and to distinguish it from the Socratic

tradition.

Isocrates described the programme of education he offered generally, as well as the aims of that education specifically, as "philosophy" [53]. He, as well as the Socratics, defined philosophy as "love of wisdom". Isocrates and the Socratics sharply differed, however, on the question of the nature of "wisdom". The Socratics defined wisdom, and hence the love of wisdom or philosophy, in terms of theoretical contemplation and the pursuit of knowledge and truth. The Socratics regarded the pursuit of knowledge and truth as an activity which inevitably led the philosopher beyond the confines of the Cave , or beyond the confines of the opinions prevailing within the regime. Isocrates, by contrast, defined wisdom in terms of practical political judgement rather than truth, and in terms of the pursuit of the art of discourse rather than scientific and dialectical contemplation [54]. For the Socratics, wisdom was defined as knowledge and regarded as the product of scientific and dialectical study which led the philosopher away from common opinion. For Isocrates wisdom was practical judgement and regarded as the product of study of the art of discourse grounded firmly in common opinion (doxa).

The art of discourse defines the central aim of Isocratic education, and is linked to the peripheral aims in accordance with its political intentions. The peripheral aims are virtue, judgement, and the creation of a class of statesmen. Isocrates refers to the "art" rather than to the science of discourse as

a consequence of his view that discourse is an expression of virtue and judgement, and that no science of virtue and judgement exists. We will examine the relationship between discourse and judgement, and discourse and virtue, respectively.

Isocrates claims that 'the study of philosophy' ensures that men's political speech will be eloquent, and guided by the 'standard of what is best' [55]. As Isocrates emphasizes, Athens was not made great by military power or institutions of government or law, but by

> 'those qualities by which the nature of man rises above the other animals, and the race of the Hellenes above the barbarians, namely, in the fact that you have been educated as have been no other people in practical judgement [phronesis] and discourse [logous].' [56]

Isocrates argues that political success is in large part a consequence of the coordinated development of eloquent speech and practical judgement, in the service of a political doctrine which defined 'what is best'. Such speech and judgement, united in philosophy or the art of discourse, constitute one of the primary aims of Isocratic education. Isocrates goes on to discuss the nature and basis of practical judgement, as it is to be expressed through rhetoric and oratory.

Isocrates defines the formal aims of his educational programme not in terms of knowledge, but in terms of 'wisdom and philosophy' [57]. Wisdom and philosophy, in turn, are defined in terms of practical judgement, especially in

political affairs. Isocrates offers to 'define and explain to you what philosophy, properly conceived, really is' [58].

> 'For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a science by the possession of which we can know positively what we should do or what we should say, in the next resort I hold that man to be wise who is able by his powers of conjecture (doxais) to arrive generally at the best course, and I hold the man to be a philosopher who occupies himself with studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight (phronesin).' [59]

This conception of philosophy is described in greater detail, particularly with a greater focus on the specific character of practical judgement, in Panathenaicus.

> 'Whom, then, do I call educated, since I exclude the arts and sciences and specialities? First,those who manage well the circumstances which they encounter day by day, and who possess practical judgement (doxan) which is accurate in meeting occasions as they arise and rarely misses the expedient course of action; next; those who are decent and honourable in their intercourse with all with whom they associate, tolerating easily and good-naturedly what is unpleasant or offensive in others and being themselves as agreeable and reasonable to their associates as it is possible to be; furthermore, those who hold their pleasures always under control and are not unduly overcome by their misfortunes, bearing up under them bravely and in a manner worthy of our common nature; finally, and most important of all, those who are not spoiled by successes and do not desert their true selves and become arrogant, but hold their ground steadfastly as intelligent men, not rejoicing in the good things which have come to them through chance rather than in those which through their own nature and intelligence are theirs from birth. Those who have a character which is in accord, not with one of the these things but with all of them -- these, content, are prudent (phronimous) and complete men, possessed of all the virtues.' [60]

For Isocrates elementary education in the traditional arts prepares the student for philosophy, a higher level of education which develops in the student a particular kind of practical judgement. Isocrates proceeds to outline the sort of

studies with which a philosopher will occupy himself, and thereby attain such practical judgement [61].

Isocrates also argues that his programme of 'liberal education' makes young men virtuous, particularly in the sense that they will be moderate, honest and just in their private affairs and political activities [62]. Nevertheless, just as Isocrates claims that there is no science of practical judgement, he claims that there is no science of virtue.

> 'I claim that the kind of art which can implant honesty and justice in depraved natures has never existed, and does not exist now.' [63]

Although no science of virtue exists, particularly in the sense that no educational art is guaranteed to produce virtuous men, Isocrates claims that study of the art of discourse can improve virtue.

> 'I do hold that people can become better and worthier if they conceive an ambition to speak well, and if they become possessed by a desire to be able to persuade those that hear them.' [64]

Isocrates does not contradict himself here: he does not claim that no educative science of virtue exists, only to go on to claim that education in the art of discourse is conducive to virtue. Isocrates is careful to claim that education in the art of discourse can improve virtue as a consequence of the combination of such study with what he regards as the proper motives. Isocrates claims that those who have an "ambition" and "desire" to speak eloquently and persuasively are likely to become more virtuous through the study of the art of discourse motivated by such desire and ambition.

In Isocrates' view the motives of education are related to the pursuit of honourable political success, and not the pursuit of knowledge or truth as in the alternative Socratic view. The first motive in education is the ambition to speak well, and in a manner worthy of honour [65]. The man who desires to speak well in these terms will, in Isocrates' view, avoid petty or unjust quarrels, while concentrating on great political causes which concern the welfare of mankind and the common good of the regime. As a consequence of concentrating on such causes, the aspiring philosopher will select only the most edifying and illustrious statesmen as exemplars , since only such men may suitably illustrate the proper ways of successfully engaging in the greatest political causes. Furthermore, the need to speak persuasively through the use of such exemplars habituates the student to the contemplation of them, and to experiencing their example in his own thoughts and actions. In this way, political virtue and the powers of practical thinking and good speaking will be improved in those whose education is motivated by the desire to speak eloquently.

Those whose education is motivated by the desire to be persuasive will develop virtue [66]. The man who desires to be persuasive will endeavour to acquire a secure reputation for virtue, because the political discourse of men of good repute is received more favourably by audiences than the discourse of men whose reputation is poor. In other words, the education which Isocrates offers is conducive to the improvement of

virtue because those who desire to be persuasive know the importance of reputation: 'the devotees of philosophy' know the power of good will [67]. Isocrates' education in the art of discourse improves virtue, because virtue contributes to one's persuasiveness in civic oratory.

Isocrates educates with the intention of producing a class of virtuous men able to discourse wisely and persuasively on the broadest political questions [68]. Such men will be able to use their discursive skills in this way only if their souls have been imbued, through education, with such virtues as moderation and justice (sophrosunen kai ten dikaiosunen), and with practical judgement (areten kai ten phronesin) [69]. Isocrates argues that study of the art of political discourse is conducive to the development of such virtues as practical sobriety and justice [70]. Men who have been educated in this way, and therefore the education itself, are valued as means through which the wider body of citizens may be persuaded to adopt the best political policies for both Athens and all of Hellas [71].

Isocrates observes that laws arise within, and in their application are relative to, particular regimes. At the same time, however, each regime also exists within both a wider context political power and international relations, and a wider context of political ideas. Laws are therefore particular and local for most practical purposes, although they arise within, and are conditioned by, a broader context

than the particular regime itself. In Isocrates' view, men of wisdom ought therefore to concern themselves with both their own regime, and the whole of Hellas [72]. There are many men able to discourse upon and implement the particular laws of their own particular regime. There are very few men, however, able to discourse upon the broader political questions of the original formulation of the law, or its application within the broader context of the regime's place within the Hellenic political community as a whole.

Isocrates intends his educational programme to produce a politically effective class which may or may not be the formal ruling class. He observes that domestic and international political success does not depend on the city's having strong or beautiful walls nor a large population, but on having a stable political class 'who nobly and moderately [arista kai sophronestata] govern their city' [73]. Isocrates intended to educate just such a political class. As he argues in the earlier sections of To Nicocles, although it is desirable for a monarch to be well educated, it is better if the monarch is able to rely on the educated political judgement and virtue of a wider political class [74]. Similarly, in democratic regimes, a class of men whose education has developed their political judgement and moderation will balance the political power of the citizens as a whole, just as that same class balances and moderates the political power of the monarch [75]. Isocrates believes that

> 'those who give most study to the art of words are the best of statesmen who come before you on the

> rostrum, and, furthermore, that among the ancients it was the greatest and most illustrious orators who brought to the city most of her blessings.' [76]

Isocrates intended that the liberal education which he offered would produced a class of statesmen who, while not members of the monarchy or the constitutional ruling class, were nevertheless politically powerful representatives ensuring the stability and continuity of the best politeia [77]. When Isocrates wishes to establish that his educational programme has been successful, he points to the fact that his students have either been members of such a class, or constitute one in themselves [78].

3.4 The Educational Programme of Isocrates

In Isocrates' view, politics and education are related in the broadest practical terms in the sense that education, or upbringing generally, is relative to the political character of the regime. The regime is not only served by education, but provides in itself early experiences which prepare the young for formal education of a politically valuable kind. If young men are to have the dispositions and motives necessary to successful education as Isocrates conceives it, then they will spend their time prior to formal education in a regime characterized by an absence of luxury, particularly in the sense that the citizens must earn their own living. Isocrates also argues that the laws of the regime condition the aptitude of young men for formal education. In particular, education as Isocrates understood it presupposes that freedom of speech,

and a correlative openness to criticism and correction in both individuals and institutions of government, will be encouraged and protected by both law and custom [79]. Finally, Isocrates argues that the regime which best prepares the young for formal education will do so by informally introducing them to the ancient poets, who are the wisest counsellors on moral and political conduct [80]. Public festivals will expose the young to both poetry that will fill their imaginations with exemplars of virtue, and music which tames and civilizes the passions [81]. Those with passions unrefined by the moderate, wise and eloquent heroes of poetry are not prepared for either education in the art of discourse or citizenship. In general, Isocrates argues that the regime as a whole must provide informal educative experiences that are valued insofar as they prepare the young men for both participation in the regime, and formal education valuable to it.

The formal educational program offered by Isocrates builds upon traditional Athenian elementary education. As Marrou explains, traditional Athenian education was

> 'addressed to the complete man, body and soul -- physical training and mental culture proceeding together, as two interlocking and balanced forms of discipline.' [82]

Isocrates affirms the desirability of physical training, but gives no details of it on the grounds that it is the proper concern of others, such as the teachers of gymnastic.

Isocrates argued that advocates of liberal education , such as himself, must 'examine into the nature of each kind of

knowledge' [83]. Isocrates begins from the kinds of knowledge with which Hippias of Elis had originally constructed ancient Greek liberal education, although he modifies them according to his own ideas and purposes. Isocrates lists seven forms of knowledge: politics, involving such human sciences as political science, psychology, sociology and economics [84]; mathematics [85]; physical sciences [86]; literature [87]; religion [88]; and philosophy, including eristics [89]. An important Isocratic addition to the curriculum is history, to which we shall return. Isocrates divides knowledge further into "theoretical" and "practical", and add to these a notion of moral knowledge [90]. Taken together, these literary and scientific disciplines constitute the antecedents of the (seven) liberal arts of the late Roman and medieval periods, and of the more recently re-invented seven forms of knowledge.

From the perspective of our historical examination of the transmission and evolution of the Isocratic heritage, one distinctively Isocratic innovation ought to be emphasized. Isocrates appears to be the first educator in Western history to make specific provision for the study of history, political history above all [91]. As Beck observed,

> 'The analytic study of history as a subject of education really begins with Isocrates. [...] It was Isocrates who first brought history into the curriculum. Plato had made no provision for it in his educational scheme.' [92]

Isocrates advocated the study of history as a means by which the citizens and statesmen of the future could come to

understand the nature of political virtue and judgement, in the context of literary records of political life rather than theoretical contemplation divorced from such life. The study of the biographies of great citizens and statesmen, and of the history of great regimes, were the means of such study. The Isocratic advocacy of political history and biography has been continuously influential to the present day [93].

Isocrates values such elementary education relative to two criteria. First, such education is regarded as mental exercise, analogous to physical exercise, which trains and strengthens the mind. As Isocrates said,

> 'Give careful attention to all that concerns your life, but above all train your own intellect; for the greatest thing in the smallest compass is a sound mind in a human body.' [94]

Second, such elementary education is valued as 'the gymnastics of the mind in preparation for philosophy' [95]. Elementary education is valued as training for the mind, and as preparation for what Isocrates calls "philosophy", namely, the art of discourse.

Isocrates now turns from his discussion of the nature and political power of education, to the relation of education and philosophy to the other arts [96]. He begins his discussion by commending the education handed down by Athen's ancestors, and recommends in particular study of the set of arts first assembled by Hippias of Elis. Isocrates recommends study of eristic dialogue, astronomy, geometry [97], grammar and music [98], though his recommendation is subject to a

number of qualifications. These arts are to be learned by the young. Adults should neither continue learning such subjects nor spend time reviewing them [99], unless they intend to make their living teaching them [100]. These arts

> 'are different in their nature from the other studies which make up our education; for the other branches avail us only after we have gained a knowledge of them, whereas these studies can be of no benefit to us after we have mastered them.' [101]

The other studies referred to are philosophy or the art of discourse [102]. These arts themselves are not beneficial in private or in public affairs [103], and need not be mastered [104] because they do not themselves lead to practical judgement or oratorical skill [105]. The process or experience of learning these arts is beneficial, however, because this involves hard work, practice, exact thought and clear speech [106]. In Isocrates' view

> 'While we are occupied with the subtlety and exactness of astronomy and geometry and are forced to apply our minds to difficult problems, and are, in addition, being habituated to speak and apply ourselves to what is said and shown to us, and not to let our intelligence be dissipated, we gain the power, after being exercised and sharpened on these disciplines, of grasping and learning more easily and more quickly those subjects which are of more importance and of greater value.' [107]

In other words, the nature of the traditional education in the arts is different from the nature of the education Isocrates offers in that the arts do not in themselves foster the development of practical judgement, but serve only to train the mind in preparation for such development. Traditional education is not a part of philosophy but preparation for it. In Isocrates' words,

> 'I do not, however, think it proper to apply the term "philosophy" to a training which is no help to us either in our speech or in our actions, but rather I would call it a gymnastic of the mind and a preparation for philosophy.' [108]

In Isocrates' view, even those who have mastered the arts cannot be called educated because they have not advanced to philosophy, the ultimate goal of education [109]. The argument proceeds, therefore, to define philosophy and to outline the educational program for which it is the goal.

Isocrates carefully distinguishes his own conception of the art of discourse from sophistic rhetoric or forensic oratory. While rhetoric and forensic oratory are necessarily concerned with particular and local questions, philosophy deals with the greatest political questions and is 'honoured and held in high esteem in every society and at all times [110]. It is in this context that we must begin our study of the 'education' and the 'philosophy' offered by Isocrates [111].

3.5 Isocrates and Plato

The argument of this chapter is intended to show that Isocrates derived the normative intentions of education from political doctrine. The remainder of Part Two is intended to show that this Isocratic idea of education was transmitted from him to the European tradition of educational thought as a whole. Within Educational Studies, however, it is sometimes presupposed that Plato thought that the normative component of

the idea of education is derived from political doctrine, and that this view was transmitted from him to the European educational tradition. This objection to the argument developed here may be met by showing that Plato did not advocate this idea of education, or by showing that even if Plato did hold this view, the European tradition nevertheless drew its idea of education from Isocrates rather than Plato.

We turn first to the notion that Plato adhered to the view that the normative intentions of education are derived from political doctrine. The presupposition that Plato held this view continues to be widely accepted within English-language Educational Studies, and was until recently accepted in Anglo-American classical scholarship. Some have gone so far as to assert that Plato sought to devise an education which would produce the ancient equivalent of the British civil service [112]. In general, it has been believed that

> 'philosophers have characteristically regarded education as a kind of addendum to their more general moral and political doctrines. (Plato is no exception, indeed a paradigm; and it is much to be regretted that some of what Aristotle wrote on the subject is lost to us.) Very few have treated education in its own right, or even seen it as much more than a means of implementing their preferred ideology.' [113]

Although this is generally true of modern philosophers, we must question whether it is true of Plato. It shall be argued later in this thesis that Plato did not hold this view. For the purposes of the historical argument developed throughout the remainder of Part II, the following observations will suffice to show that it is doubtful that Plato held this view.

The notion that Plato derived education from political doctrine was most recently introduced into English-language educational scholarship by Victorian classicists. Nettleship, for example, proposed in 1880 that Plato's educational intentions are derived from a political doctrine which prescribes the perfect society [114], a society remarkably like English Victorian society [115]. As I have argued elsewhere [116], however, a peculiar feature of the evolution of Educational Studies has been the isolation of educationists from classical educational scholarship since the Victorian era. One consequence of this isolation is that peculiarly Victorian interpretations of Plato have prevailed in Educational Studies long after they have been found to be inadequate by classicists and political philosophers. As late as the mid-1960's, educationists continued to present the Victorian interpretation of Plato's educational ideas, unaltered and unquestioned. Curtis and Boultwood, although writing in 1965, present the Victorian view of Plato, and refer the reader to Nettleship in particular [117], and to Victorian interpretations of Plato generally. Similarly, the 1966 edition of Boyd's history of education presents the same view of Plato, supported by a similarly Victorian bibliography [118].

The Victorian interpretation of Plato, which suggests that Plato's educational ideas are derived from political doctrine, has been seriously challenged by more recent scholars, who incline to the opposite view. Contemporary

political philosophers argue that Plato, in the Republic ,

> 'discusses politics in the context of things above politics, and politics turns out to have a limited and subordinate place.' [119]

One of the things to which politics was subordinated was education [120]. As early as 1907, classicist Kenneth Freeman had restored the view that Plato's education led

> 'pupils toward the life of retirement and contemplation and away from the strenuous life of political and social activity.' [121]

Later classical scholars and political philosophers, such as Leo Strauss and Jacob Klein in Germany [122], Leon Robin and Luc Ferry in France [123], or Carnes Lord and Thomas Pangle in the United States [124], have also argued that Plato's educational ideas are not derived from a prior political doctrine or intention.

One particular line of reasoning might appear to support the view that Plato derived the normative intentions of education from political doctrine. Educationists have often claimed that Platonic education is political in this sense, on the grounds that it is intended to produce "philosopher-kings" [125]. This interpretation of Plato's educational thought is doubtful, however, because the notion of philosopher-kings is taken out of context, and treated as if it were the conclusion of an educational argument which in fact continues for some time afterwards. The philosopher-kings are proposed in the second of a three stage dialogue, and are rejected in the third stage as both unrealistic and inferior to those leading the philosophical life [126]. In his interpretation of this

section of the dialogue, Allan Bloom has observed that

> 'in the course of founding a city, and, thus, learning the nature of justice, Socrates introduces, as a political necessity, the philosophers. Glaucon learns that to be a ruler in the city he has founded he must be a philosopher. Then, when he is shown what philosophy is, he learns that it is the best life and is essentially independent of political life. From the point of view of philosophy -- which Glaucon had not considered and, thus, had not considered as a good thing -- the city looks like a cave or a prison. The movement from ruler simply to philosophic rulers is a step in Glaucon's liberation from the desire to rule. [...] And there is, at this final stage, no suggestion that Glaucon should work to establish this city or that he should even long for its establishment. Glaucon has moved from the desire to be a ruler to the desire to be a ruler-philosopher to the desire to be a philosopher. The conceit of philosopher-kings was the crucial stage in his conversion.' [127]

As the Platonic Socrates argues at the end of this dialogue, it does not matter whether or not the philosopher-kings exist, except as ideas in the souls of true philosophers. Such philosophers are the citizens of what Socrates calls the city of philosophers, or what the Renaissance thinkers were to call the Republic of Letters, the community of men who share an allegiance to philosophy rather than political doctrine. The normative intentions of Platonic education are correspondingly derived not from politics, but from philosophy. We shall return to this question in Part Three of this thesis.

Even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Plato did present an idea of the nature of education in which education is derived from political doctrine, it would not necessarily follow that this idea was transmitted from Plato to the European educational tradition. The possibility would remain that Isocrates also advocated this idea of education,

and that the idea was transmitted from him, and not from Plato. As we shall see, the historical evidence shows that the European tradition received its idea of education from Isocrates.

As we have already observed, the debate concerning the Platonic and Isocratic conceptions of education was the most fundamental educational debate of the Pedagogical Century. As far as subsequent educational thought and practice are concerned, this debate was brought to a close by the triumph of the Isocratic alternative [128]. Whatever Plato's educational ideas may have been, the Western tradition derives from Isocrates. As Marrou put it,

> 'it was Isocrates, not Plato,who was the educator of fourth-century Greece and subsequently the Hellenistic and Roman worlds...' [129]

Moreover, as Marrou goes on to say, with reference to the ninth century Carolingian Renaissance, the Twelfth Century Renaissance and the fifteenth century Italian renaissance [130], as well to our own century,

> 'insofar as the three Renaissances returned to the classical heritage, insofar as this tradition has been perpetuated in our own methods of education, it is to Isocrates more than any other person that the honour and responsibility belong...' [131]

Isocrates' legacy to education was the dominating inheritance from the debate of the Pedagogical Century, centred on the triumph of the Isocratic idea of education.

Although rhetoric was at most a component of Isocrates' broader educational program, it was this component which was

emphasized by posterity.

> 'Isocrates's influence was to make rhetoric the cornerstone of education for the next several centuries in both Greece and Rome.' [132]

Plato, as is well known, opposed rhetoric, and made no place for it in his educational proposals. In Plato's view,

> 'rhetoric is the craftsman of persuasion which yields conviction but does not teach about the just and the unjust.' [133]

In light of the emphasis on rhetoric deriving from Isocrates, and the contrasting opposition to rhetoric in Plato, subsequent educational thought and practice which places rhetoric at the centre of education will have derived from Isocrates rather than Plato.

As we shall see in the following chapters, rhetoric does indeed come to dominate education. The progression of the Isocratic legacy through the course of the history of Western education may be followed through the emphasis placed on rhetoric, and political education generally, by two great Roman educators, Cicero and Quintilian, by their medieval followers, and by the Renaissance humanists. Underlying this legacy, and providing the unity of Western educational thought and practice, was the Isocratic idea of the essential nature of education. The remaining chapters of Part Two are devoted to a philosophical and historical explication of the Isocratic idea and legacy.

Chapter Four

The Isocratic Idea of Education: Rome to the Middle Ages.

> 'Others are the victims of a more arrogant form of sloth: they assume a stern demeanour and let their beards grow, and, as though despising the precepts of oratory, sit for a while in the schools of the philosophers, so that, by an assumption of a severe mien before the public gaze and by an affected contempt of others they may assert their moral superiority, while leading a dissolute life at home. For philosophy may be counterfeited, but eloquence never.' Quintilian [1]

4.0 Introduction

The Isocratic idea of the nature of education is rarely stated explicitly by educational writers in this period. Rather, our authors outline a programme of education typically consisting of the liberal arts, and culminating in rhetoric and oratory in the Isocratic tradition. The aims of such education, in addition to rhetoric and oratory, typically include wisdom and virtue, united with eloquence.

Our authors turn next to the question of the criteria according to which they value wisdom, virtue and eloquence as the aims of education. They answer this question in two stages. First, they argue that education is an inherently political enterprise valued in terms of its political purposes or functions. They argue, secondly, that their educational programme derives its normative intentions from the specific political doctrine to which they adhere. These arguments constitute the Isocratic idea of education. Such arguments are rarely stated succinctly -- and are often presupposed rather

than stated at all -- and must therefore be reconstructed on the basis of a close philosophical analysis of the texts in which they are presented.

4.1 The Isocratic Idea of Education in Ancient Rome.

4.1.1 Roman Education

Early indigenous Roman education took place largely within the family, and was intended to inculcate those skills and virtues which could be used by the citizens to the benefit of the state [2]. Roman education

> 'was to be an education in the family virtues, thereafter to be turned to account in the service of the state.' [3]

As the political structure of early Roman civilization evolved into the Roman republic, and eventually the Roman empire, education was progressively transformed under the influence of imported Greek ideas [4]. In particular, in spite of some early opposition, Rome soon adopted the Greek tradition of rhetorical education deriving from Isocrates [5].

Prominent Romans, such as Aemilius Paulus, sought to combine Roman upbringing with Isocratic formal education emphasizing grammar, logic and rhetoric [6]. Apuleius provides a convenient summary of the absorption of Greek rhetorical education in Rome, the three stages of which retain their Greek names.

> 'At the banquets of the Muses on the other hand, the more we are given to drink, the more our soul gains in

> wisdom and in reason. The first cup is poured for us by the litterator, who begins to polish the roughness of our mind. Then comes the grammaticus, who adorns us with varied knowledge. Finally it is the turn of the rhetor, who puts the weapon of eloquence into our hands.' [7]

Roman children were first taught elementary literacy and speech at home by nurses and the paedagogus, typically a slave. The elementary education of the ludus litterarius consisted of more advanced reading, writing and speech, often combined with some study of arithmetic. Students then proceeded to the grammarian, who taught language and literature, including poetry, history and literary prose, in both Latin and Greek. These two stages of formal education were regarded as preparation for higher education in rhetoric and oratory.

As in the educational program of Isocrates, Roman higher education consisted of rhetoric and oratory, both of which were valued for their political usefulness [8]. So thoroughly did the Romans adopt the Isocratic tradition of rhetorical education that the educated classes became bilingual, and pursued higher rhetorical education in both Latin and Greek. Moreover, the Roman educators adopted the Isocratic conception of philosophy.

> 'To him [Isocrates], as to the Romans, philosophy was the art of living a practical life.' [9]

As we have seen, philosophy for Isocrates was the art of discourse, and the highest stage of education . Here, too, the Romans followed Isocrates.

> 'The Romans eventually defined Isocrates's Greek ideal in the terse phrase vir bonus dicendi paritus -- a

> good man who knows how to express himself.' [10]

Within a generation following the death of Cicero,

> 'rhetoric had become all powerful over literature and over life. It came to be regarded as the foundation of all education for the statesman no less than for the man of letters.' [11]

To conclude, Roman education was a continuation and an adaptation of the Isocratic tradition in education, and of the Isocratic idea of education.

4.1.2 Minor Roman Educational Theorists

Although the Isocratic idea of education is most clearly observable in the two most important Roman educational thinkers, Cicero and Quintilian, the Isocratic legacy to Roman education is also discernible in other Roman educational writings. Marcus Terentius Varro (116-27 B.C.) is one such writer. Unfortunately, only the De re rustica (On Farming) has survived from the entire corpus of Varro's six hundred or more works. Varro is worth noting, however, because his educational treatise was highly valued by Cicero and Quintilian, and by medieval educational writers such as Martianus Capella, as an account of the liberal arts. Varro's Disciplinarum libri IX, or Nine Books of Disciplines, codified an educational program of nine liberal arts, adding architecture and medicine to the seven derived from Isocrates.

The Isocratic legacy to Roman education, and particularly the emphasis on rhetoric and oratory, is similarly observable in the educational writings of the Greek educator and

rhetorician Dio Chrysostum (c. 40 - 115 A.D.), who settled in Rome. In his eighteenth discourse, On training for Public Speaking, Chrysostum follows Isocrates in defining philosophy as the training in public speaking and eloquence required by statesmen [12], as well as in recommending an educational program of wide learning [13] and the use of teaching methods modelled on gymnastic training [14].

A little known educational writing of the great Roman historian Publius Cornelius Tacitus (c. 55- 117 A.D.), the Dialogus de oratoribus, advocates Isocratic rhetorical education intended to prepare young men of Rome for public oratory and statesmanship. The De grammaticus and the De rhetoribus of Gaius Suetonius Tranquilus (c. 70-160 A.D.) also describe the rhetorical education prevalent in Rome.

Finally, the correspondence of Marcus Cornelius Fronto (c. 100-170 A.D.) provides a fascinating account of the Isocratic rhetorical education which Fronto provided to such students as Marcus Aurelius, and the Roman emperors Marcus Antonius and Lucius Verus. Fronto was categorized with Isocrates, Cicero and Quintilian, as exemplars of oratorical education, and highly valued by educators for some fifteen hundred years [15].

As valuable as all of these writers are for the insights they provide into the practical details of the Isocratic educational legacy in Rome, they tell us little of the

educational thought that provided a philosophical foundation and justification for such education. For that we must turn to Rome's educational philosophers, Cicero and Quintilian [16].

> 'It was the Isocratic tradition rather than the Platonic, then, that Cicero in the first century B.C. and Quintilian in the first century A.D. chose to develop.' [17]

We turn first to an examination of Cicero's educational ideas.

4.1.3 Cicero

The educational writings of Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.) are important from the perspective of the present argument for two reasons . First, Cicero was the first Roman educational thinker to provide a systematic formulation of the Isocratic idea of education in the Roman context. Second, Greek learning, and even the ability to read the Greek language, were lost in medieval Europe. It is important to establish that Cicero's educational ideas are derived from Isocrates because it was through Cicero that the Isocratic legacy is transmitted throughout the Middle Ages prior to the recovery of Isocrates' Greek texts in the early Renaissance. The same applies to Quintilian, as we shall see below.

> 'Isocrates' elevation of rhetoric into general education for the leaders of society was permanently influential. It stands behind Cicero's De Oratore and Quintilian and the whole concept of later classical education.' [18]

In this section we shall consider Cicero's adoption of the Isocratic tradition of educational thought and practice.

It is well established that Cicero was very much

influenced by Isocrates, and in particular that his educational ideas are derived from Isocrates. As early as 1914, Hubbell observed that

> 'it has frequently been pointed out that Isocrates had a strong influence on Cicero.' [19]

Bowen's account of Cicero's most elaborate educational work summarizes the findings of a century of classical scholarship.

> 'De oratore was the first major Roman writing on educational theory and practice; it remained the model for subsequent writers and determined the direction Roman education was to take. In content, De oratore advanced little beyond the ideas of Isocrates three centuries previously. [...] Assumptions similar to those of Isocrates' Antidosis underlie the argument of De oratore.' [20]

Similarly, the distinguished German classical scholar, Bruno Snell, has shown that Cicero's educational thought is derived from Isocrates.

> 'The characteristically human, the power of speech and education: these are the basic elements of Cicero's humanism, and they are taken straight from Isocrates.' [21]

In some ways, modern classical scholarship has confirmed and elaborated what Cicero himself has told us.

In Cicero's view, Isocrates is ' the eminent father of eloquence' [22]. He describes Isocrates as 'the master of all rhetoricians, from whose school, as from the horse of Troy, none but true leaders emerged' [23]. Cicero is very much aware of the essentially political nature of Isocratic education, as the image of political leaders emerging from Isocrates' school suggests. Cicero refers to 'Isocrates, an eminent teacher of eloquence' [24], and is very clear about his admiration for Isocrates' educational endeavours.

> '[Isocrates'] house stood open to all Greece as the school of eloquence. He was an accomplished orator and an excellent teacher. Although he did not display his talent in the splendour of the forum, but cherished and improved within the walls of an academy the glory which, in my opinion, no orator has since acquired.' [25]

Cicero, in other words, regards Isocrates as the greatest rhetorician and educator who ever lived. It is not surprising, then, that Cicero adopts the Isocratic educational legacy, including the Isocratic idea of education, and we turn now to his account of them.

In his political treatise De re publica, Cicero follows Isocrates in arguing that the regime (res publica) is an association resulting from a natural human disposition [26].

> 'The first cause of such an association is not so much the weakness of the individual as a certain social inclination which nature has implanted in man.' [27]

Similarly, Cicero follows Isocrates in regarding speech, rather than reason, as 'a faculty bestowed by nature upon every man' [28]. As in Isocrates, speech differentiates man from the other animals, and is the origin of cities, law, the arts, and civilized life in general [29]. Central to Cicero's Isocratic educational programme is the education of the faculty of speech in the service of the political doctrine which prevails in the regime.

Just as Cicero follows Isocrates in regarding education as an enterprise which links the human faculty of speech to the human disposition toward political life, he also follows Isocrates in the details of the educational programme he

advocates. Cicero's orator will be a wise and virtuous man, able to speak eloquently on a very wide range of topics [30]. Such a learned orator is valued above all as a statesman [31]. Young men can become learned and virtuous orator-statesmen only by receiving a wide education in the liberal arts [32] including philosophy [33]. Cicero argues that

> 'no man can become an orator complete in all points of merit, who has not attained a knowledge of all important subjects and arts.' [34]

In arguing that philosophy in particular ought to be an component of the rhetorical education of an orator, Cicero is opposing rather than following Plato and the Socratic philosophers.

In Cicero's view, the Socratics erred in separating philosophy from oratory, or the pursuit of wisdom from the pursuit of the means for expressing it. Cicero argues that

> 'the older masters down to Socrates used to combine with their theory of rhetoric the whole of the study and the science of everything that concerns morals and conduct and ethics and politics.' [35]

Among these "old masters" of education Cicero admired Isocrates above all, and wished to return to the 'marvellously close alliance between oratory and philosophy' that he exemplified [36]. In <u>De oratore</u> Cicero repeatedly criticizes Socrates and the Socratic philosophers on the grounds that, in theory and in educational practice, they artificially separated the science of wise thinking from the science of eloquent speaking [37]. In order to recover the original ideal of the unity of wide learning in both philosophy and rhetoric, Cicero consciously reaches past the Socratic

philosophers and educators. For Cicero this ideal was represented in education uniquely by Isocrates, for whom philosophy was the art of discourse, the pursuit of both wisdom and eloquence [38]

Having returned to Isocrates' advocacy of an educational programme of wide learning in preparation for oratory and statesmanship, Cicero also adopts the Isocratic curriculum specifically [39]. Cicero's outline of the educational programme he advocates in the first book of De oratore is closely modelled on Isocrates' outline of his own programme in Against the Sophists [40]. As Hubbell has argued,

> 'Each forms the climax of the introduction to the speech in which it stands, each is intended as a complete, though succinct exposition of the training of an orator to which the treatise is devoted.' [41]

Cicero follows Isocrates in dividing education into two components, a programme of wide general learning, followed by specifically rhetorical and oratorical training in the art of discourse. Like Isocrates, Cicero argues that literature, geometry, music and dialectics are valued as training for the mind in preparation for oratorical education and political life [42], and that only those who intend to make their living teaching these arts ought to specialize in them [43]. Following Isocrates, Cicero argues that the education of the orator must provide 'consummate knowledge -- practical as well as theoretical -- of political science' [44].

The aims of Cicero's educational program are also Isocratic in nature and origin. Wide learning in the liberal

arts and in the art of discourse culminate in wisdom and eloquence to be used in the service of the regime . As Cicero concludes,

> 'Our country has not given us life and education without expecting to receive some sustenance from us in return. [...] On the contrary, she has given us these advantages so that she may appropriate to her own use the greater and more important part of our courage, our talents, and our wisdom, leaving to us for our private uses only as much as may be left after her needs have been satisfied.' [45]

The aims of such education constitute Cicero's famous humanitas. Cicero considered his humanitas to be a Roman equivalent of Greek paideia, and consisting of the virtue and eloquence exemplified by the doctus orator in the service of the regime [46]. Cicero's educational ideal of the learned orator, and his assertion that such an orator is superior to the philosopher, further confirms his acceptance of the Isocratic educational legacy over the Socratic [47].

Eloquence itself is unified with wisdom, where wisdom is defined as prudent political judgement exhibited in speech suited to the particular circumstances [48]. As in Isocrates, prudent political judgement is defined as the ability to discover probable answers to political problems, since certain truth in politics is beyond the reach of human beings [49].

Virtue is the second general aim of Cicero's educational programme, and, like Isocrates, he defines this aim in political terms. Cicero begins by arguing that

'Virtue has a twofold meaning, for it is revealed

either in knowledge or in action.' [50]

Once again following Isocrates, Cicero defines virtue in two parts, prudence and moderation [51], in accordance with the two-fold manner in which it is revealed. Although the ideal orator ought to exhibit such virtue in private life, it is most valuably revealed above all in political knowledge and action [52]. Prudence, as a component of virtue, is revealed through probable knowledge and practical judgement. In political affairs, prudence is defined as political wisdom. Hence Cicero's argument that education in eloquentia is conducive to prudentia directly follows Isocrates' argument that to logein eu is conducive to to phronein [53]; Isocrates' phronein kai legein is adopted by Cicero in the form of ratio et oratio [54]. The virtue of moderation exercises its influence in political action, which includes the eloquent expression of political wisdom through rhetoric and oratory [55]. We turn now to Cicero's version of the Isocratic idea of education, or the way in which the virtue and eloquence achieved through education are valued relative to political doctrine.

Cicero sets forth in the clearest possible terms his opinion that education and the pursuit of wisdom culminates in oratory, and is valued relative to political utility.

> 'Reason has led me to believe that wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good of regimes (civitatibus), but that eloquence without wisdom is generally highly disadvantageous and is never advantageous. Therefore, if anyone neglects the rational and moral studies (studiis rationis et office), which is the highest and most honourable of pursuits, and devotes his own energy to the practice

> of oratory, his civic life is nurtured into something useless for himself and harmful to his country; but the man who arms himself with eloquence, not to be able to attack the welfare of his country but to defend it, he will be a citizen most useful and most devoted both to his own interests and those of his regime (civis).' [56]

In Cicero's view there is nothing which is more excellent than the use of oratory to establish and maintain the regime.

> 'To come at length to the highest achievements of eloquence, what other power could have been strong enough either to gather scattered humanity into one place, or to lead it out of its brutish existence out of the wilderness up to our present condition of civilization as men and citizens, or, after the establishment of political communities, to formulate laws, tribunals, and civic rights?' [57]

In Cicero's view, education is valued as the means to eloquence, where eloquence is valued for its political function [58]. Education is not an autonomous enterprise, but rather is in the nature of things a component of politics, and valued in political terms.

Particularly in his political writings, Cicero formulates this Isocratic idea of the nature of education more explicitly. In his Republic, Cicero states that education is valued as an enterprise which provides

> 'knowledge of these arts which can make us useful to the regime (civitati), for I consider this the highest function of wisdom and the highest duty of virtue as well as the best proof of their possession.' [59]

Just as in Isocrates, this general statement of the idea of the essentially political nature of education is followed by an argument for a particular doctrine of education. The specific doctrine of education is a combination of a general, Isocratic, idea of the political nature of education with a

specific political doctrine.

Once again following Isocrates, and quite unlike Plato, Cicero returns to the political history of his regime in search of the ideal political doctrine. Specifically, the political doctrine from which Cicero would derive the normative intentions of education is that of the older Roman regime. In Cicero's Republic, after he has argued that education is political and therefore relative to the regime, Laelis asks what the best regime and form of government ought to be in this context. Scipio, who represents Cicero's views in the dialogue, argues that

> 'that form of government handed down to us by our ancestors is by far the best of all.' [60]

The foundation of this ancestral form of government was the political doctrine embodied in the Twelve Tables, and in the laws derived from them [61].

> 'It is her [Rome's] spirit, customs, and constitution that ought to be the first objects of study, both because our country is the parent of us all, and because we must believe that wisdom was as perfect when establishing our laws as when acquiring our vast and powerful empire.' [62]

Insofar as the idea of the nature of education is concerned, Cicero follows Isocrates: an educational programme emphasizing wide learning in philosophy and the liberal arts, and culminating in political wisdom and eloquence, is valued relative to normative criteria derived from the ancestral political doctrine of the regime. This specific doctrine of education is grounded on the belief that education is an essentially political enterprise, uniting man's natural

faculty of speech with his natural political faculty.

4.1.4 Quintilian

After Cicero, the most important Roman educational theorist is Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (c. 35-c.95 A.D.) [63]. Quintilian was the first to receive an official state salary as a teacher of rhetoric in Rome, and was very famous in this capacity. He testifies to the influence which Isocrates had on his educational ideas, describing Isocrates as

> 'the prince of instructors, whose works proclaim his eloquence no less than his pupils testify to his excellence as a teacher.' [64]

Quintilian aimed to educate the perfect orator [65]. He therefore thought it advisable to follow Isocrates' educational programme because 'it is to the school of Isocrates that we owe the greatest orators' [66].

The pervasive influence of Isocrates, and particularly the Antidosis, on Quintilian's educational ideas is confirmed by modern scholarship. As the literary scholar Peter Dixon has argued,

> 'Quintilian is clearly in the tradition which goes back through Cicero to Isocrates, and which holds that rhetoric provides a training for the whole man, that its end product is the wise and virtuous statesman, and that oratory is a powerful force for good when it is entrusted to responsible hands'. [67]

Similarly, Adamson concluded that

> 'the purposes which Quintilian had in view and the manner by which he thought to attain them, namely by an appropriate training in rhetoric, are in substance the purposes and method of Isocrates.' [68]

Although the Isocratic influence is clear and pervasive throughout the whole of Quintilian's educational programme, we shall mention some of the more prominent features only briefly, in order to concentrate here on the transmission of the Isocratic idea of the essential nature of education.

Quintilian adopts a number of features of the broader Isocratic educational legacy. Following Isocrates directly, Quintilian argues that oratory is the product of natural ability, education and practice [69], and draws an elaborate analogy between rhetorical teaching methods and gymnastics [70]. He adopts the distinctly Isocratic idea that it is speech, rather than reason as the Socratics would have it [71], that distinguishes human beings from animals.

> 'And in truth that god, who was in the beginning, the father of all things and the architect of the universe, distinguished man from all other living creatures that are subject to death, by nothing more than this, that he gave him the gift of speech.' [72]

And, as in Isocrates, Quintilian argues that speech is the distinctively human trait to which we owe the origin of political communities, law, and civilized life in general [73].

Turning to the details of Quintilian's educational programme, we see that in matters of syllabus and curriculum he follows Cicero and Isocrates. Of particular importance is Quintilian's acceptance of the Isocratic ideal of the unity of oratory and philosophy, particularly as recovered by Cicero [74]. In conformity to this ideal he intends to educate men

who unite 'the qualifications of orator and philosopher' [75]. In order to achieve this ideal Quintilian once again clearly follows the Isocratic tradition, and opposes the Socratic tradition, in regarding philosophy as a subordinate component of the general education of the orator [76].

Quintilian is very thorough in his description of the programme of wide general learning in preparation for rhetoric and oratory,

> 'It has been my design to lead my reader from the very cradle of speech through all the stages of education which can be of any service to our aspiring orator.' [77]

The ideal orator's education begins in early childhood [78], the cradle of speech. The young boy's nurse should ideally be 'a philosopher' in the Isocratic sense, a woman of good character and correct speech. Similarly, both of the child's parents, along with his paedagogi (slave tutor), should be highly educated, and well spoken in both Latin and Greek. In this way the child's early informal education ensures that he will be both bilingual and well spoken as a result of imitation of the models around him. These early informal educational experiences are valued as preparation for formal education.

Quintilian's programme of formal education begins with grammar, or elementary literary studies [79]. The young boy learns to speak correct Latin and Greek. Much of his time is spent reading classical poetry, history and literature, in order both to perfect his language and to build up a store

of ideas, precedents and exemplars to be used later in oratory [80]. Students studied natural philosophy through the poetry of Empedocles and Lucretius, as well as some astronomy. Music, or metre and rhythm in speech and poetry, was studied in the hope that it would improve the student's oratory. Quintilian's adoption of the Isocratic rather than the Socratic tradition in education is signalled by his inclusion of philosophy as a subject of elementary education [81]. All of these subjects are not valued in their own right but as 'the foundations of oratory' [82].

The stage of education following grammar but preceding rhetoric is described by Quintilian in terms of the Greek cycle of studies known as enkyklios paideia [83]. This cycle of studies is very broad, in conformity with the view, originating with Isocrates, that the orator will be widely learned in all subjects. As Quintilian puts it,

> 'It is surely the orator who will have the greatest mastery of all such departments of knowledge and the greatest power to express it in words.' [84]

The departments of knowledge comprising this educational program included logic (eristics), instrumental and choral music, poetry, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and gymnastics [85]. Quintilian follows Isocrates in treating scientific subjects as training for the mind in preparation for advanced rhetorical and oratorical study [86]. Similarly, literary subjects are valued primarily in terms of the store of examples, precedents and anecdotes which they provide for use later in oratory. Even gymnastics,

while being valued for its contribution to physical health, is also valued as training in dramatic gestures and "body language" useful in public oratory [87]. Quintilian's inclusion of the study of history is a particularly clear indication of his dependence upon the Isocratic tradition rather than the Socratic [88], as is his treatment of philosophy. Philosophy is not regarded as the highest subject in the educational hierarchy, as it is in Plato, but as a part of a general educational programme in preparation for virtue and the art of discourse [89].

This exhaustive programme of general education is followed by education and training in rhetoric and oratory, an education to be provided by specialized teachers such as Quintilian himself. This third and final stage of education begins with elementary rhetorical training [90], followed by advanced rhetorical training emphasizing such subdivisions of the art as invention and arrangement [91], and completed by advanced training in memory, delivery and eloquence [92].

As in Isocrates, it is the art of discourse, or the art of rhetoric and oratory, which completes the education Quintilian advocates.

> 'The aim of education is postulated as the production of the vir bonus, dicendi peritus -- the good man skilled in speaking .' [93]

In considering the prevailing opinions concerning the nature of rhetoric, Quintilian rejects those offered by Plato and Aristotle [94], settling finally on the view derived from

Isocrates [95]: the orator is a virtuous man skilled in rhetoric and persuasive speech [96].

> 'If our definition of rhetoric as the science of speaking well implies that an orator must be a good man, there can be no doubt about its usefulness.' [97]

The usefulness of oratorical education, which culminates in philosophy understood as the art of discourse, is defined in political terms. Referring to rhetoric, Quintilian observes that

> 'Cicero calls it a department of the science of politics (and science of politics and philosophy are identical terms), while others call it a kind of philosophy, among them Isocrates.' [98]

Following Isocrates, Quintilian emphasizes that "politics" is to be defined in terms of the broadest and most enduring political questions, and not in terms of the political disputes of the day [99].

The orators Quintilian seeks to educate will, like those Isocrates sought to educate, form a political class of men who possess the knowledge, virtues and the skill in speech that will enable them to guide the regime.

> 'The man who can truly play his part as a citizen and is capable of meeting the demands both of public and private business, the man who can guide the state by his counsels, give it a firm basis by his legislation and purge its vices by his decisions as a judge, is assuredly no other than the orator of our quest.' [100]

Quintilian is so far from the Socratic view of philosophy that he argues that the pursuit of the political goals has priority over the pursuit of truth [101]. The oratorical education outlined by Quintilian conceives of education as

an enterprise necessarily subservient to political goals. It remains for us to examine the specific political doctrine from which Quintilian derives the normative intentions of education.

Quintilian is aware that political ideals and aspirations are diverse and variable. He recognizes that if the essential nature of education is political, it will follow that individual educational enterprises will be essentially contested, and relative to prevailing political doctrine. In general terms, Quintilian accepts the essential contestedness of education in the sense that his programme is theoretically able to train orator-statesmen for any regime.

> 'Our orator will also require a knowledge of civil law and of the custom and religion of the regime (rei publicae) in whose life he is to bear his part. For how will he be able to advise either in public or in private if he is ignorant of all the main elements that go to make the regime.' [102]

Quintilian's orators, like those of Isocrates, respect the prevailing political opinions in the regime [103]. Nevertheless, Quintilian is aware that he is educating men for life in a particular regime, characterized by a particular political doctrine.

The good men skilled in speaking whom Quintilian is attempting to produce through education are to be valued in the specific context of Roman political aspiration.

> 'I desire that he, whose character I am seeking to form, should be a wise man in the Roman sense, one who reveals himself as a true statesman , not in the

> discussion of the study, but in the actual practice and experience of life.' [104]

More specifically, Quintilian, like Cicero, follows Isocrates in turning to the political past of his own regime in search of the political doctrine from which the normative intentions of his education would be best derived. He wishes to turn from what he perceived to be the corrupted virtue and arbitrary political power of the Roman empire, to the stern virtues and ordered political life of the Roman republic of Cato, as idealized in Virgil's poetry. As we have seen, a return through literature to an idealized political past is a definitive characteristic of the Isocratic legacy in education [105].

Turning first to the political derivation of virtue, Quintilian evokes the name of Cato, a man known throughout Rome for his uncompromising republican virtue. As Quintilian reiterates, his education is intended to form

> 'a good man skilled in speaking. But above all he must possess that quality which Cato places first and is in the very nature of things the greatest and most important, that is , he must be a good man.' [106]

The good man is defined in terms of virtue, as derived from the older republican political doctrine. Quintilian criticizes the political class of his day for its self-serving tendencies, in contrast to the older republican concern for honour and the pursuit of justice within the regime as a whole [107]. While men of his generation concerned themselves with the deceits and intrigues of imperial court life, Quintilian wishes his orators to have

the reputation for honesty that the republican statesmen had enjoyed. Like Isocrates, he argued that honesty is a virtue which is necessary to credibility in civic discourse and political advice [108]. Quintilian lamented the political imprudence and immoderation of both the royal court and the senatorial class of his day, and followed Isocrates in returning to the statesmen of the older regime for examples of the prudence and moderation which set the standards for his students [109].

Quintilian returned to the ideals of the older regime in statesmanship as well as in virtue, and derived the remaining normative intentions of his educational programme from them. In contrast to the forensic orators of his own day, whose rhetorical skills were limited to the small and temporary questions of the law courts, Quintilian argues that the powers of his orators

> 'will be displayed with brighter splendour in greater matters than these, when he is called upon to direct the counsels of the senate and guide the people from the paths of error to better things -- such a man is Virgil's statesman.' [110]

In addition to possessing the virtues described above, such men will be excellent citizens, concerned with common interests and welfare of the regime as a whole [111]. Quintilian cites the examples of Cicero and Demosthenes, whose political policies were, in his view, the most noble, and whose political goals were the most glorious. Primary among these goals was a continuation of Isocrates' great

political ideal of a system of federated regimes, each retaining its political autonomy within a wider federal structure [112]. This is, of course, in clear contrast with the imperialistic, and ultimate destabilizing, policy of the expanding Roman empire of his own day.

Quintilian perpetuates the Isocratic educational programme in the art of discourse, along with the Isocratic idea of the nature of education. The normative intentions of education are derived from an ancestral political doctrine, where this derivation is founded upon the belief that education is an inherently political enterprise.

4.2 Early Christian Educational Thought

> 'The transition from pagan to Christian is the point at which the ancient world still touches ours directly. We are heirs to its conclusions: on either side, participants shared an education which, until recently, we widely maintained.' [113]

The rise of Christianity, in education and in politics no less than in religion, coincided with the decline of the Roman empire. The educational legacy of Greece and Rome was at its weakest and most fragmentary as the ancient pagan civilizations gave way in the face of barbarian invasion on all sides. Among a few educational theorists the rivalry between Isocratic and Platonic education continued, although in practice the philosophical schools made little contribution to formal education.

> 'Plato's profound inquiries about the nature of the human mind and the best methods of learning had led him to proclaim philosophy the only true paideia; but that did not change the character of the education offered in the public schools. Philosophy remained within the walls of the philosophical schools, and the average person was not affected by it.' [114]

The prevailing, indeed virtually exclusive, educational tradition informing formal education in the late Roman empire derived from Isocrates, by way of Cicero and Quintilian. The early Christians assimilated this Latin tradition of Isocratic education, with its emphasis on the art of discourse (now effectively reduced to rhetoric) in the service of a Christian theologico-political doctrine [115]. Isocrates' idea of a humanity united by a common paideia and a common logos [116] is adopted by Christian educators, for whom fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom for all men, and for whom logos originates not merely in human nature, but in Logos, the Word, the mind of God [117].

4.2.1 Clement of Alexandria

One of the earliest Christian educators whose works have come down to us is Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-c.215 A.D.). Titus Flavius Clemens wrote his Christ the Educator primarily as a descriptive account of the education offered at the catechetical school of Pantaenus. Clement of Alexandria is the first example we shall encounter in this essay of a phenomenon which is comparatively common throughout early and medieval Christianity. In matters of

philosophy, and to some extent of theology as well, Clement was an enthusiastic follower of neo-Platonism. In education, however, Clement was no different than the Christian community as a whole in adopting the Isocratic legacy.

Clement argues that human beings are made up of habits, deeds, and passions, and that all of these ought to be guided by rhetoric in accordance with Christian doctrine [118]. According to Clement, God Himself can be conceived of as an educator, concerned with right living rather than knowledge.

> 'His aim is to improve the soul, not just to instruct it; to guide to a life of virtue, not merely to one of knowledge.' [119]

For Clement, as for Isocrates, a primary virtue to be developed by education is moderation [120]. Similarly, Clement follows Isocrates, and not Plato, in regarding rhetoric and the art of discourse as both the corner stone and highest level of education. His book on education opens with a passage adapted from the Isocratic educational writings of Seneca [121] on the centrality of rhetoric in education.

> 'An indestructible corner stone of knowledge, holy temple of the great God, has been hewn out for us as a foundation for the truth. This corner stone is noble persuasion, or the desire for eternal life aroused by an intelligent response to it, laid in the ground of our minds.' [122]

Rhetoric, the art of noble persuasion, is the corner stone of knowledge and the foundation of truth, and education is concerned above all with its development. For the normative standards relative to which such education in rhetoric is

valued, we must turn to Clement's discussion of the newly emerging Christian theologico-political doctrine.

Modifying the ancient Jewish model of education, Clement argues that Moses was an educator appointed by God the Educator [123]. As Clement observes, Moses educated in accordance with the revealed Law, which was in turn derived from a broader theologico-political doctrine concerned with 'correction, government and sovereignty', and intended to organize human society so as to ensure both justice and salvation for all [124]. More specifically, Clement argues that God loves humanity, and therefore seeks to benefit humanity. God's benefit is defined as the human good, and the axiomatic normative standard to which all others are subordinate. In order to benefit humanity in the greatest possible way, God establishes justice, which is the earthly human good, as embodied in the revealed Law. As authority for his argument, Clement turns to Paul.

> '"The Law has been given ,"says Paul, "as our educator in Christ."' [125]

Education in the Law leads human beings to establish justice, which is defined as the human good in accordance with the will of God. Not only the individual's private religious life and prayer, but the whole of the just regime must be such as to lead men to salvation. As Clement says,

> 'His wisdom is profound in His education of His children; His method of conducting them to salvation is manifold'. [126]

He proceeds to elaborate this argument, and to describe in more explicit terms the dual nature of the doctrine, both

theological and political, which defines the human good and therefore the normative intentions of education. Beginning from the theologico-political doctrine, Clement argues that

> 'In the divine education, it is necessary that duties be imposed upon us, as things commanded by God and provided for our salvation. But, since of the things that are necessary, some are for this life alone, while are others cause the soul to aspire after a good life in the next world, it is but right that some obligations be imposed merely for living, and others for living well.' [127]

The educational programme outlined by Clement of Alexandria is constructed upon the Isocratic educational legacy and idea of education in the sense that the normative intentions of an education in the art of persuasion are derived from an external theologico-political doctrine.

4.2.2 Minor Christian Educational Theorists

The Isocratic legacy and idea of education are perpetuated among the Christian educators who follow Clement of Alexandria. Lucius Caelius Fermanius, better known as Lactantius (b. 250 -260 A.D), held the chair of rhetoric at Nicomedia under the patronage of Diocletian. His educational thought was much influenced by Cicero, and he sought to serve Christianity by bringing 'pagan erudition and rhetoric to its service' [128]. Similarly, the Christian educator John Chrysostom , a former student of the Isocratic rhetorical school of Libanius, published a treatise on Christian education in approximately 388 A.D. Chrysostom's treatise, An Address on Vainglory and the Right Way for Parents to Bring up their Children, was concerned less with

higher education in rhetoric than with ensuring that the formative educational experiences of children ensured that they would posses the virtues and dispositions considered to be valuable from the point of view of Christian doctrine. Both Lactantius and John Chrysostom had some influence on later medieval Christian educators. Cassiodorus, for example, admires the 'studious and eloquent' John Chrysostom [129]

4.2.3 Augustine

Augustine (354-430 A.D.) is another of the many important thinkers in the history of educational thought whose ideas have been inadequately treated by standard educationist works in the subject. In Curtis and Boultwood's A Short History of Educational Ideas, we read that

> 'Augustine's educational ideas, with one exception, are scattered throughout the many volumes of his works. ' [130]

The "one exception" is identified as 'the treatise On the Teacher (De magistro)'. Curtis and Boultwood go on to assert that Augustine's educational writings were influenced by Martianus Capella's De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii [131]. Yet it is well known that Augustine's educational thought is contained in the educational treatise De doctrina christiana (On Christian Learning), a treatise several time larger than the De magistro. Furthermore, Martianus Capella's work is most reliably dated 439 A.D. [132], some fifty years after De magistro (389 A.D.) and at least ten

years after De doctrina christiana (c. 426-7 A.D.). An adequate appreciation for Augustine's educational ideas requires that we revise the interpretations found in the standard educationist reference works. There is no better place to begin this task than with a recovery of some understanding of the influence of the Isocratic educational heritage on Augustine's educational thought.

Augustine himself received the standard Roman education in the liberal arts, culminating in rhetoric [133]. He tells us that after he had completed his rhetorical education, he

> 'began to diligently practice that for which I came to Rome, to teach rhetoric.' [134]

Augustine was introduced to philosophy through the works of Cicero , as one component of an Isocratic educational programme in a school of oratory [135].

As one would expect, given that Augustine's own higher education and first experience of teaching were within the Isocratic rhetorical tradition, contemporary scholars have placed his educational ideas within the rhetorical, classical humanist tradition of Isocrates [136].

> 'It was Augustine who made the most concerted effort to come to terms with the study of rhetoric by a Christian, especially in his treatise On Christian Learning...' [137]

Isocrates had argued that religion ought to have an important role to play in civil society, and tended to be conservative in theological matters. Augustine was attracted to the Isocratic tradition as a consequence of these

features particularly [138]. It is above all in his educational ideas, however, that Augustine continues the Isocratic heritage. We turn now to an account of Augustine's Isocratic educational ideas.

Augustine's educational programme exhibits most of the important features of the Isocratic heritage. De doctrina christiana, for example, is divided into two parts, the first consisting of three books concerned with wide general education, followed by a single longer book concerned with rhetorical and oratorical training [139]. Following Isocrates and Cicero, the results of education depend on 'natural endowment, education, and training' [140]. Augustine would have students progress through a programme of wide learning in the liberal arts , to some extent substituting Christian literature for pagan literature.

> 'The souls of those who have not drunk from the fountains of the liberal arts are, as it were, hungry and famished.' [141]

Following the Isocratic tradition, particularly through Cicero, the liberal arts are valued for the contribution they make to the development of reasoned speech. The scientific disciplines within the liberal arts, such as geometry, astronomy or arithmetic, are valued as training for the mind in preparation for higher study [142]. The literary disciplines within the liberal arts, such as grammar, history, dialectic, and rhetoric are concerned with the development of the art of discourse, rhetoric in particular [143]. The art of discourse is regarded as

essential to both the formation of the political community, and the propagation of the Christian message.

In general, Augustine also accepted the formal aims of education as understood by the pagan rhetoricians who preceded him, although he valued them in terms of a quite new, theologico-political doctrine. In Augustine's view, the development of education throughout human history had been progressive in the sense that each generation came closer to the Christian ideal [144]. The pagan educators rightly understood that education ought to culminate in virtuous men in whom wisdom and eloquence were united. True virtue is understood to be 'the art of living derived from education' [145], and defined specifically by prudence and moderation in the service of justice. Augustine quotes with approval Cicero's belief that eloquence and wisdom must not be separated, although he substitutes Christian doctrine in the place of Cicero's pagan wisdom [146]. Quoting Cicero's Orator, Augustine argues that

> 'an eloquent man must speak so as to teach, to delight, and to persuade.' [147]

Of the three functions of eloquence, teaching is regarded as by far the most important. The Christian orator does not teach about small concerns, but deals with the great matters of justice and salvation [148], for the sake of 'the welfare of the world' [149]. Justice, welfare and salvation define the normative intentions of education, and are derived from a broader theologico-political doctrine.

Augustine perpetuates the central premise of the Isocratic tradition in regarding education as the enterprise which unites humanity's natural capacity for speech with a natural disposition to political life.

> 'Man is by nature a social animal, who alone has been endowed with speech, by means of which he is able to communicate and enter into various relationships with other men. It is only by associating with his fellow men and forming with them a political community that man attains his perfection'. [150]

In his great political treatise, The City of God, Augustine repeatedly returns to his contention that while the Roman regime is impressively powerful, it was also corrupt. Christianity, on the other hand, emerges as the source of a political community which may be equally impressive without being corrupt, a political community in which man may attain his perfection.

The notions of an incorruptible regime and of man's perfection clearly raise the philosophical question of the normative standards relative to which the best regime and the perfect man are to be judged. This question draws our attention to Augustine's well-known conception of the two cities. In De civitate Dei Augustine prepares the reader for this conception with the following observation.

> 'I have already said, in previous Books, that God has two purposes in deriving all men from one man. His first purpose was to give unity to the human race by the likeness of nature. His second purpose was to bind mankind by the bond of peace, through blood relationship, into one harmonious whole.' [151]

As we have seen, the "likeness of nature" refers to the

distinctive human faculty, speech, now linked, as in Isocrates, to the formation of the political community for the sake of the human good. Augustine goes on to conceive of these two purposes of Creation in distinctly political terms. He argues that

> 'for all the difference of the many and great nations throughout the world in religion and morality, language, weapons, and dress, there exist no more than the two kinds of society, which according to our Scriptures, we have rightly called the two cities. One city is that of men who live according to the flesh. The other is of men who live according to the spirit. Each of them chooses its own kind of peace and, when they attain what they desire, each lives in the peace of its own choosing..' [152]

Men who live according to the spirit aspire to live in the City of God. The primary intention of Augustine's theologico-political doctrine is to show what the City of God is, and how human beings may work to establish its earthly manifestation [153].

> 'Worldly society has flowered from a selfish love which dared to despise even God, whereas the communion of saints is rooted in a love of God that is ready to trample on self.' [154]

Trampling on self is defined in terms of the formal aims of education, wisdom and virtue; their normative status derived from the theologico-political doctrine outlined in the City of God.

All citizens are educated in the virtues of moderation and charity, in the service of a theologico-political conception of justice which provides for both the human good and Salvation. Augustine is particularly concerned to establish

> 'formal education, or training in that purposeful art of living which we call virtue, and which is indubitably a matter of learning.'[155]

He goes on to define virtue in three parts. Augustine argues that education ought to foster the virtues of moderation and prudence [156]. Turning to the third virtue, an innovation of Christian theologico-political theory, Augustine argues that

> 'in the City of God all citizens serve one another in charity, whether they serve by the responsibilities of office or by the duties of obedience.' [157]

These virtues are to be unified with a new conception of wisdom which is defined not by philosophy (in the Socratic sense) but by a new unification of politics and theology. In the City of God

> 'there is no merely human wisdom but there is a piety that worships the true God as He should be worshipped and has as its goal that reward of all holiness whether of the society of saints on earth or in that of angels in heaven, which is "that God may be all in all" [I Corinthians 15.28]'. [158]

Pursuit of the normative goals of Augustine's theologico-political doctrine, virtue and wisdom for men and justice and salvation for mankind,

> 'are still within the reach of man himself, if only he will pay the price of toil and trouble, the twin resources of law and education.' [159]

In Augustine's view, law is both theological and political in nature, deriving from the theologico-political doctrine embodied in the Decalogue [160]. Augustine therefore adopts not only the Isocratic tradition of rhetorical education, or education in the art of discourse and the liberal arts, but the Isocratic idea of the nature of education as well.

Education is an enterprise intended to produce a class of men who are wise and virtuous, that is, who possess prudent political judgement, and the virtues of moderation and charity. Such wisdom and virtue are valued as means by which a particular political regime, the City of God and the theologico-political doctrine which defines it, may be realised on earth so as to ensure both justice and salvation for all.

Chapter Five

The Isocratic Idea of Education in the Middle Ages

5.0 Introduction

The Middle Ages witnessed both the virtual disappearance of (particularly Platonic) philosophy, and a flourishing of educational thought [1]. Unfortunately, educationist scholarship since the 1960's has both neglected this period and misrepresented it. Turning first to the neglect of medieval educational thought, the distinguished historian of educational ideas, D. D. McGarry, summarizes the findings of research in this subject by medievalists.

> 'Those who seriously study the history of Western pedagogy come to the inevitable conclusion that the Middle Ages are of fundamental importance.' [2]

In contrast, educationist histories such as Boyd's History of Western Education provides only the most cursory discussion of the period, while Curtis and Boultwood's A Short History of Education Ideas and Ulrich's Three Thousand Years of Educational Wisdom ignore virtually the entire period.

The misrepresentation of medieval educational thought is neatly epitomized by one prominent educationist, who asserted that no one in the Middle Ages would 'seriously dispute' the claim that 'all education should be Christian' [3]. Unfortunately, this assertion is neither elaborated nor supported by evidence or argument. It is therefore impossible to engage with this [illegible], although the assertion

can be shown to represent a popular stereotype of the Middle Ages.

While Christianity was often important in medieval education, it was not the primary and unquestioned component implied by the educationist stereotype. On the contrary, it is widely known that educational thinkers throughout the Middle Ages, from Augustine to Petrarch, very seriously disputed the question of whether, or to what extent, education should be classical, Christian, or a mixture of the two [4], particularly from the perspective of its primarily political goals. Theology was not regarded as "the Queen of the Sciences" until the last quarter of the Middle Ages, beginning in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century. Even during this period, however, the monarchical metaphor of Theology, so often repeated by the ecclesiastical academy, bore little relation to educational thought and practice. Theology was actually studied by very few students, even among the clergy [5]. To mention only one example, of the fifty-one students studying for higher degrees at King's Hall, Cambridge, during the last half of the fourteenth century, twenty-two read for M.A. degrees in the secular liberal arts and twenty-three read Roman civil law. There were, in contrast, only six reading canon law, and none reading theology. These ratios had remained unchanged for over a century [6]. Similarly, civic humanism in education was readily accepted during the Italian Renaissance precisely because there had been 'no significant theological faculties

in Italian universities' [7]. We shall examine this question more thoroughly throughout this chapter, insofar as it clarifies the transmission of the Isocratic idea of education. For now we shall observe only that medieval Christian educators perpetuated 'the typically Roman belief in the supremacy of rhetoric', where 'rhetoric is referred once more to its ancient position as an instrument of government.' [8]. The predominance of rhetorical education, valued relative to specific political doctrines, is a consequence of the predominance of the Isocratic educational tradition throughout the European Middle Ages.

5.1 Martianus Capella

The educational work of Martianus Capella (fl. 410--c.439 A.D.) has been both neglected and misrepresented by recent educational scholarship. Although his educational treatise was one of the most influential and widely read books in Western Europe for nearly a thousand years, and was responsible for the survival of the liberal arts [9], most educationist histories of education ignore it [10]. On the other hand, while medievalists have provided some discussion of this treatise, their interpretations have been undermined by the improbable assumptions from which they begin.

The most extensive analysis of Martianus' educational writing is the collaborative work of three historians of medieval thought, Stahl, Johnson and Burge [11]. Their

analysis is undermined by their assumption that Martianus perpetuates the educational tradition of the Socratic philosophers. Specifically, Stahl and his colleagues assumed that Martianus placed himself in the philosophical tradition, that the liberal arts curriculum advocated by Martianus derived from the Socratics, and that Martianus derived his conception of rhetoric from Aristotle [12]. By critically examining these assumptions we shall be able to demonstrate that the educational ideas of Martianus derive from the Isocratic tradition rather than the Socratic.

The assumption that Martianus placed himself in the philosophical tradition of educational thought is contradicted by three features of his educational text. First, and most decisively, Martianus explicitly dissociates himself from both philosophy, of which he knew little , and philosophers, 'for whom he expressed mild contempt' [13]. Second, the liberal arts curriculum, especially where there is an emphasis on rhetoric, derived from the Isocratic tradition rather than the Socratic, as this thesis has already argued, and as critics of Stahl et al have pointed out [14]. Finally, the assumption that Martianus' ideas on rhetorical education derive from Aristotle is extremely improbable, and Johnson provides no argument in its favour. Indeed, there is little evidence that Martianus even knew of Aristotle's treatise on the theory of rhetoric, which was not re-discovered in Europe until the thirteenth century. If we turn to <u>De nuptiis</u> itself, we find that the chapter devoted to rhetoric does not even mention

Aristotle. On the contrary, Martianus derives his rhetorical ideas explicitly from 'Aeschines, Isocrates, and Lysias', whom he regards as 'the great orators of the past' [15]. Martianus drew his conception of rhetorical education from Isocrates, the only one of the three orators who wrote educational works. Martianus' primary sources for the Isocratic educational tradition are the texts of Cicero and Quintilian, to which he makes frequent reference throughout the chapter on rhetoric, and the book as a whole. The educational writing of Martianus Capella is explicitly placed by him in the Isocratic tradition.

Martianus Capella's De nuptiis Philologia et Mercurii (The Marriage of Philology and Mercury) has been described as 'an allegorical encyclopedia of the Seven Liberal Arts' [16]. Martianus appears to have been the first educational writer in the Latin West to decide that there were seven liberal arts, rather than six, as we sometimes find in Augustine, or nine, as Martianus himself found in Varro. In doing so, he was placing himself within the Isocratic tradition.

> 'Following classical tradition that can be traced back as far as Isocrates in the fourth century B.C., Martianus divides the seven [liberal arts] into groups: the trivium, consisting of grammar, rhetoric, and logic; and the quadrivium, consisting of music, astronomy, arithmetic, and geometry.' [17]

Although Maritanus divided the liberal arts in this way, he did not divise the names for each of the two groups. The name quadrivium originates with Boethius [18], while the name trivium originates with Alcuin, as we shall see. It is unlikely, however, that Martianus intended his work to be

merely an encyclopedia of existing knowledge of the liberal arts. As Kimball has argued, it is too narrowly focused to be an encyclopedia [19]. Martianus narrowed the range of material to be included in his treatise according to the educational aim it was intended to serve, namely, the preparation of citizens and statesmen. He intended to provide only a

> 'description of the artes liberales as the sum total of education necessary for the citizen with leisure to study.' [20]

Wide general learning in the liberal arts in preparation for political life is a definitive feature of the Isocratic tradition. Martianus' place within this tradition is confirmed when we examine his educational programme in greater detail.

Martianus presupposes the Isocratic idea of the nature of education, though he does not offer a distinct doctrine of education. Following Isocrates, Martianus argues that speech, or the verbal art, is distinctively human. Furthermore, speech is the human characteristic 'possessing power over everything' [21]. Speech, not reason, is the origin of government, and of collective civil life generally [22]. From these distinctly Isocratic premises, Martianus follows Isocrates in concluding that education is in the nature of things a political enterprise: education consists of the training of speech so that it may serve its natural political purpose [23].

From the perspectives of its curriculum, motive and desired outomes, Martianus' educational programme is Isocratic rather than Socratic. His higher education does not consist,

as it does in Plato's Republic, of the mathematical sciences, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music, culminating in dialectic [24]. On the contrary, Martianus follows Isocrates in regarding both the mathematical sciences and dialectic as preparatory components of a broader education emphasizing the literary arts, including rhetoric. The end of such education is not the dialectical pursuit of knowledge of the Forms, and especially of the Form of the Good, as it is in Plato. For Martianus, as for Isocrates, general learning in the liberal arts culminates in rhetoric and practical political judgement [25]. Students are motivated to study the liberal arts by their desire for political judgement rather than knowledge [26]; in Martianus' allegory Phronesis, not Truth, is the mother of Philology [27].

5.2 Cassiodorus

Flavius Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus (c. 480-c.583 A.D.) was a Christian Roman, and a very important figure in the history of educational ideas [28]. In addition to his own contribution to educational thought, Cassiodorus ensured that manuscripts of the educational writings of Cicero and Quintilian were copied and distributed [29].

The influence of the Isocratic heritage on Cassiodorus, as transmitted by Cicero and Quintilian, is evident throughout his educational treatise, the Institutiones divinarum et humanarum lectionum (The Divine and Human Readings). The first

of its two books is not so much concerned with education as with describing the interpretive methods and secondary sources to be used by monks in their lifelong task of reading and meditating upon scripture [30]. The second book is directly concerned with education, and was circulated separately throughout the Middle Ages as an educational treatise in its own right [31]. Cassiodorus himself was a rhetorician and orator in the Isocratic tradition, and this is reflected particularly in the second book of his treatise [32].

Although the first book is concerned primarily with the correct methods of reading the Bible, it too shows distinctly Isocratic emphasis on rhetoric. Men who have received a rhetorical education may continue to spend their ecclesiastical lives reflecting on the Bible, and endeavouring to ensure that

> 'the soul might obtain eternal salvation and the tongue of the faithful might be adorned with a holy and completely faultless eloquence. ' [33]

Such eloquence is to be acquired, however, through the rhetorical educational programme outlined in the second book. This book provides a summary of a programme of wide learning in the seven liberal arts [34], culminating in rhetoric. This programme included an emphasis on the Isocratic educational innovation, the study of history [35], as a component of the literary disciplines of grammar, dialectic (discursive logic), and rhetoric. Similarly, he values training in arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy as training for the mind [36].

He depended particularly on the educational writings of Quintilian and Cicero, and on a medieval digest of these writings, Claudius Chirius Fortunatianus's Artis rhetoricae libri III. Cassiodorus arranged for the educational writings of Cicero, Quintilian and Fortunatianus to be copied and bound together in a single codex, to be used as a basic text for rhetorical education [37].

Although it can also be used for preaching, Cassiodorus values the culmination of his educational program, rhetoric, primarily in terms of its political usefulness. As he writes,

> 'we must speak of the art of rhetoric, which is deemed to be very necessary and honourable because of the splendour and fullness of its eloquence, especially in civil questions.' [38]

Cassiodorus follows Quintilian in defining rhetoric not merely as a technical skill, but as 'expertness in discourse on civil questions' [39]. Following Isocrates, as transmitted by Fortunatianus, Cassiodorus defines the orator to be produced by his educational program as

> 'a good man skilled, as has just been said, in discoursing on civil questions.' [40]

Cassiodorus seeks to educate men in 'all the arts and disciplines of noble letters' with the intention of producing learned orators who will serve the political community in accordance with Christian theologico-political doctrine [41].

The value of studying secular disciplines and arts is defined in terms of a particular view of the relationship between the Divinity and human existence. Human beings aspire

to the existence of angels, whose only purpose is 'to celebrate eternally with indefatigable devotion the glory of the Holy Trinity' [42]. The purpose of human beings is to prepare themselves for their transfiguration into such heavenly existence. Failure to transform themselves in this way carries with it the risk of eternal punishment.

> 'The reader will understand how great are the toils and trouble from which the church must be freed before it will rejoice eternally in the Lord and with what justice those who follow the devil's bidding will perish with him.' [43]

Monks spend their lifetimes in such preparation for themselves. As for the remainder of humanity, they are to be subject to a theologico-political doctrine which attempts to establish a correspondence between the political life of the regime and the heavenly City of God, for the sake of both the justice and salvation.

> 'You have been given a city of your own, O pious citizens, and if with the help of the Lord you spend your time concordantly and spiritually, you will already enjoy a prefiguration of the heavenly home.' [44]

The lay clergy in particular are to receive an education in rhetoric which will enable them to be a politically effective class of men able to speak eloquently on civil questions, in accordance with Christian theologico-political doctrine. The lay clergy are a distinctly political class which employs its learning and eloquence for political ends, such as the regulation of taxation and the maintenance of the feudal class structure [45], in order to assure that they are in accordance with theologico-political principle. The normative criteria according to which education is valued -- justice as the

reflection of the heavenly city, the preparation of the human community for the return of Christ and individual souls for salvation -- are derived from a logically prior Christian theologico-political doctrine.

5.3 The Carolingian Renaissance

It is well-established that the Carolingian Renaissance is one of the most important periods in the history of Western educational ideas. The Carolingian educational thinkers recovered the educational tradition of classical antiquity, consolidated and named the trivium, developed the European conception of the school, and made book learning a respectable object of royal and aristocratic patronage [46]. Of particular importance is the educational thinker Alcuin (735-804 A.D.), a Yorkshireman who oversaw the educational reforms of the Frankish monarch Charlemagne (742-814 A.D.) [47]. Carolingian records describe Alcuin as 'a man more skilled in all branches of knowledge than any other person of modern times' [48], and as one of the principal interpreters of the liberal arts in Europe [49]. Once again, however, educationist works in the history of educational ideas ignore both Alcuin and the whole of the Carolingian Renaissance [50]. We must recover some appreciation of the Carolingian educational ideas if we are to understand the historical development of Western European educational thought generally, and the continuity of the Isocratic tradition in particular.

Our primary sources for the Carolingian revival of education are Alcuin's educational works, augmented by the capitularies of Charlemagne. Carolingian biographies of Charlemagne by Einhard and Notker the Stammerer are also valuable for their comments on the monarch's educational ideas. The Isocratic educational legacy was transmitted to the Carolingians by Cicero and Quintilian primarily, as well as by Martianus Capella, Augustine and Cassiodorus, and is the foundation upon which the ideas expressed in these sources are constructed [51]. In particular, these documents reveal that education continues to be regarded as a component of politics. Carolingian education culminated in political rhetoric, as it had in Isocrates' writings. Alcuin's principle educational text, the Disputatio de Rhetorica et de Virtutibus sapientissimi Regis Karli et Albini Magistri (The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne, c.794 A.D.) [52], is both a manual for rhetorical education and a treatise on the theory and practice of monarchy [53]. The book is introduced by a poem, composed by Alcuin, which foreshadows its dual purpose.

> 'Whoever wishes to know well the custom of the state,
> Let him, I urge, take lessons from this book...'

We shall examine the political doctrine in terms of which Alcuin defines "the custom of the state", before turning to the educational programme which constitutes the "lessons" to which he refers, in order to establish that they are derived indirectly from Isocrates.

Charlemagne's respect for liberal education, and for liberal educators, is well attested [54]. As Walafrid Strabo's

Prologue to Einhard's biography of Charlemagne points out, the Frankish monarch sought to desseminate learning throughout his kingdom.

> 'Of all kings Charlemagne was the most eager in his search for wise men and in his determination to provide them with living conditions in which they could pursue knowledge in all reasonable comfort. In this way Charlemagne was able to offer the cultureless and, I might say, almost completely unenlightened territory of the realm which God had entrusted to him, a new enthusiasm for all human knowledge.' [55]

Nevertheless he did not value learning and education in themselves, but relative to normative intentions derived from broader political intentions.

> '...despite Charlemagne's genuine interest in humanist learning, he was not concerned to promote learning or literacy for themselves. The intellectual revival under the Carolingians was a by-product of a definite and radical programme which aimed at nothing less than the total transformation of Frankish society.' [56]

Charlemagne valued education as a means by which Frankish society might be transformed into a revived Roman empire modified by Christian doctrine. We turn now to an explication of the Christian and Roman components of Carolingian political doctrine.

The Carolingian monarchy, and its supporting aristocracy, regarded itself as Christian, though without being sure what Christianity was. The disruptions caused by the nomadic armies of the preceeding three centuries, along with the loss of Latin literacy, rendered much of the Christian legacy inaccessible or confused to the Franks. Charlemagne, for example, made little distinction between Christian writers, such as Jerome and Augustine, and pagan writers such as

Virgil. In Charlemagne's view, they were all 'Roman' [57]. From a specifically political perspective, it must be remembered that

> 'in the eighth century for many men Christianity was a public and social matter, not the deeply personal concern it has become since the Reformation.' [58]

For Charlemagne, Christianity augmented and justified his attempt to revive the Roman ideal of the monarch as a tutor regni [59].

In Roman political thought, the tutor regni was the guardian of the empire and, as such, responsible for protecting the interests and ensuring the education of his subjects.

> 'Since the imperial office is ordained by God, it is seen to have been raised on high for no other reason than to have charge of, and to be of benefit to the people. Accordingly, God gives the chosen one power and wisdom: power, that he may suppress the proud and defend the lowly from the wicked; wisdom, that he may govern and teach his subjects with pious solicitude.' [60]

The Carolingians believed that these responsibilities had been given to the Roman monarchs with the consent of the citizenry, or with the consent of their representatives in the senate. The scattered and illiterate populace of the Carolingian kingdom was unable to grant such consent. Similarly, the monarch himself was the only political institution in the Frankish kingdom. There was no senate to give such consent. In the absence of these Roman mechanisms of consent, Charlemagne turned to 'the idea of divinely sanctioned kingship' as the justification of his powers and responsibilities [61]. The political authority of the monarch was justified by the

consent of God, the Creator of the people, rather than by the consent of the people themselves.

To interpret Carolingian education as "Christian" would be to misinterpret both the Frankish conception of Christianity and Charlemagne's primarily political intentions. Charlemagne believed that he was destined to revive the political power and cultural grandeur of the Roman empire . Alcuin's epistle of 799 records that 'the Roman people' had proclaimed Charlemagne Charles Augustus, successor to the last Roman Emperor, Romulus Augustus, deposed in 486 [62]. Pope Leo III formalized Charlemagne's claim to be emperor of the Western Roman empire a year later, and in 803 a seal was struck 'which bore the inscription renovatio romani empirii (renewal of the Roman empire)' [63]. As Heer observed,

> 'the idea of a revived Roman empire was the key concept in the ideology of Charlemagne's government.' [64]

Although Charlemagne thought of himself as a Christian Roman emperor, the use of the term "Christian" denotes not only theological concerns, but above all political and social involvement. The importance of this conception of Christianity, and particularly of the political role of the clergy, becomes clear when we understand Charlemagne's political intentions.

Charlemagne could not succeed in his intention to revive the Roman empire without a functioning civil service. He had only a small centralized court which could not effectively

rule and administrate a large, widely dispersed and expanding empire. To solve this practical political problem, Charlemagne turned to the one institution which was already widely distributed throughout the Frankish kingdom, namely, the Church, which had priests in every parish of any significant size.

> 'Realistically, Charlemagne's first objective had to be to promote the spread of a competence in written Latin among the clergy. No schemes of social reform could succeed if the mass of the clergy were illiterate and ignorant.' [65]

The standard educationist accounts of this period, rare and brief as they are, claim that education is "Christian" on the grounds that it is directed toward the Clergy [66]. Closer examination reveals that education was not directed to the clergy alone, as we shall see below, and that the clergy are educated in order that they may carry out the political intentions of the monarchy.

> 'The clergy was the only erudite group in medieval society, and it was from this group that the higher political and administrative positions which demanded its skills were apt to be filled.' [67]

The political purpose of educated clergy and laymen, as well as the corresponding political value of education, is explicitly set forth in the Programmatic Capitulary of Charlemagne.

> 'The most serene and most Christian lord emperor Charles has chosen from among his optimates men of the greatest good sense and wisdom, archbishops and other bishops as well as venerable abbots and pious laymen, and sent them out throughout his entire realm and through them confirmed to all his subjects the right to live according to the appropriate body of law,' [68]

The clergy are regarded as a conveniently well-distributed class which may be educated so as to function as a civil service. The political intentions with which the clergy were educated become clearer if we examine Charlemagne's educational institutions and curriculum in greater detail.

In practical terms, Charlemagne's educational reforms were implemented in two stages, each with its own corresponding educational institution. The most elaborate education was provided in the schola palatina, closely associated with Charlemagne's royal court. The normative intentions of the education received by students in this school were clearly derived from Charlemagne's broader political intentions, and the political doctrine they expressed. The students at the schola palatina were to be competent in Latin, rhetoric, and oratory, and

> 'were to have enough of a grounding in liberal arts and scriptures to appreciate the ideological aims of the court.' [69]

Once these students understood Charlemagne's political doctrine and aims, and had received a broad rhetorical education valued relative to them, they were dispersed throughout the Frankish kingdom. They were charged with the tasks of overseeing the civil and ecclesiastical administration of the kingdom [70], and with educating local nobles, priests and lay clergy. As Notker observed,

> 'In this way the most glorious Charlemagne ensured that the study of letters was flourishing throughout the length and breadth of his kingdom.' [71]

The education provided by graduates of the schola palatina to

the local officials constitute the second stage of the Carolingian educational reforms.

Charlemagne and Alcuin recognized that diocesan bishops and parish priests could be employed as a most convenient point of contact between the Frankish people and the Frankish monarch. The bishops and priests received a less elaborate education than students at the palace had, in accordance with their derivative political status and function. Their education emphasized Latin rhetoric and oratory. This education was valued as a means by which priests and bishops could communicate to the king's subjects whatever political instructions were received from the monarch.

> 'Sermons were the only medium through which moral and religious instruction could reach an illiterate population, and to have a rural clergy capable of preaching intelligently and intelligibly was the ultimate aim of Charlemagne's efforts in education.' [72]

"Moral instruction" refers particularly to those virtues deemed to be desirable in royal subjects of the Frankish kingdom, and as such are a component of the broader Carolingian political doctrine. Similarly, the "religious instruction" was valued in distinctly political terms, as Charlemagne himself confirms in his Capitulary on the Liberal Arts [73]. As Fichtenau observes, commenting on this capitulary, Charlemagne's attitude toward religious instruction was grounded in his conception of the political utility of religion.

> 'The justification of this attitude lay, for him, in the fact that it is "our duty to ensure the progress of our churches". He was convinced that a decay of the

> church of Christ through a ruler's negligence meant a disturbance of the universal order, a deviation from law and unity in favour of diabolical arbitrariness and confusion.' [74]

Bishops, priests, and lay clergy received from the graduates of the schola palatina sufficient education to enable them to standardize religious practice for the benefit of the political administration, and to communicate political instructions from the royal court to the Frankish subjects.

We turn now to a more detailed examination of the Carolingian recovery of the Roman rhetorical curriculum. Alcuin hoped to reintroduce an educational programme in the seven liberal arts as a preparation for rhetoric and civic responsibility. He found himself frustrated, however, both by the sparsity of knowledge which remained of the disciplines of the quadrivium, and by the lack of interest students showed in these subjects [75]. The Disputatio records that some students briefly pursued elementary study in arithmetic and astronomy [76], while Charlemagne's capitulary of 787 records that instruction in some of the monasteries included musical notation, chant and arithmetic [77]. These disciplines were not studied in any depth or with any enthusiasm, however, as students found that they were of little practical value in the lives of lay clergy and civil administrators which most of them were destined to live [78]. Consequently, Carolingian education concentrated almost exclusively on literary subjects, to which Alcuin gave the name trivium [79].

The trivium had originally consisted of grammar (including literature), dialectic and rhetoric. The Carolingian educators generally omitted dialectic, and concentrated on learning and teaching grammar and rhetoric [80]. Preliminary study of grammar and literature culminated in a more intensive study of rhetoric, which was regarded as the most important part of education. As in Isocrates, rhetorical education is intended to produce a politically effective class of men who speak well, and who possess the virtues of moderation and prudence in public and private life [81]. The high value placed on rhetoric, and its intimate relationship to statesmanship and political action, is clear in Charlemagne's opening speech in the Disputatio.

> '...Venerable Master Alcuin, I pray that a short time be allowed me in which to question you about the precepts of the art of rhetoric; for I remember you once said that the strength of this art lay wholly in dealing with civic questions. As you know, in the course of the duties of government and the cares of state, we are constantly occupied with questions of this kind; and it seems absurd not to know the rules of an art when the necessity of using it confronts us daily.' [82]

We have here the distinctly Isocratic educational programme of wide learning in the liberal arts, culminating in rhetorical skill to be used in the service of the regime.

The educational revival of the Carolingian Renaissance is clearly within the Isocratic tradition generally, and perpetuates the Isocratic idea of the nature of education specifically. The Carolingians regarded education as an enterprise in which the normative intentions were derived from a political doctrine. The Carolingian doctrine of education

was derived from the political ideal of a revived Roman empire, modified by a conception of Christianity which was itself political in emphasis. In order to transform Frankish society in accordance with this doctrine, Charlemagne turned to the Church, the only medieval European institution which was distributed sufficiently widely to carry out these political reforms. The priests and lay clergy, along with a smaller group of aristocratic youth, pursued a wide curriculum in the literary liberal arts which was derived from Roman Isocratic sources, and which culminated in rhetoric. Such an education was valued as a means which ensured that the new civil service understood the political goals and capitularies of the monarch, and could communicate them to the people at large. The education of a small political class through literary and rhetorical study of this kind is a distinctive feature of the Isocratic heritage. The Carolingians consolidated the remnants of the Isocratic educational tradition, and ensured its tenuous survival until the Renaissance of the twelfth century.

5.4 Education and the Twelfth Century Renaissance

The educational institutions of the Carolingian Renaissance began their slow decline shortly after the collapse of the Carolingian empires in the late ninth and early tenth centuries. It was not until the Twelfth Century Renaissance that the disintegration of European intellectual life was first halted, and then slowly reversed. This is

particularly true of educational thought. As Paetow has observed, at the centre of the Renaissance of the twelfth century was

> 'one of the greatest intellectual and educational revolutions in history.' [83]

It is during this period that the classical tradition of educational thought begins its evolution toward more modern conceptions and ideals. In McGarry's words,

> 'if we wish precisely to fix the birth of modern Western pedagogy, it may well be placed in the twelfth century.' [84]

Once again, however, educationist histories of education simply omit any reference to this period [85]. We shall concentrate on the two most innovative and influential educational thinkers of this period, Hugh of St. Victor and John of Salisbury.

One must interpret the educational thought of this period with some care, in order to ensure that it is not confused with contemporaneous intellectual developments, particularly in philosophy. During the twelfth century a number of Aristotle's works on logic were recovered in Europe. Aristotelian logic briefly challenged the long-standing literary emphasis within the seven liberal arts tradition [86], although this challenge has been both exaggerated and misrepresented. Kimball exaggerates the seriousness of this challenge to the Isocratic tradition when he asserts that it constitutes the beginning of 'the rise of the philosophical tradition' in education, inspired by the Socratics [87]. Yet as Kimball himself observes, and as we shall see in the

subsequent section, the Isocratic tradition, with its literary and rhetorical rather than logical emphasis, was once again to dominate education almost exclusively within two centuries of this period [88]. Although the Isocratic tradition may have been briefly challenged by an Aristotelian alternative, it remained the dominant conception of education.

The misrepresentation of the role of Aristotelian logic in education, and the consequent neglect of the continuity of the Isocratic heritage, is clear in the specific cases of John of Salisbury and Hugh of St. Victor. Turning first to the case of John of Salisbury, the analytic historian of philosophy, D.W. Hamlyn, has observed that during the twelfth century

> 'there was greater interest in logic. For example, both Abelard and John of Salisbury wrote works with titles deriving from logic or dialectic.' [89]

Despite a superficial verbal resemblance, however, the title of John of Salisbury's educational treatise, the Metalogicon, does not derive from "logic". First of all, John's two texts were completed before the European recovery of Aristotle's texts was completed, and his references to Aristotle reveal little influence in his educational ideas [90]. Moreover, the title of the work is in fact a compound of the Greek words meta and logikoon, where logikoon refers to the art of discourse rather than to logic specifically [91]. The purpose of this text, which corresponds directly to its title, was 'to defend the arts of verbal expression and reasoning comprised in the Trivium', rhetoric and literature no less than logic

[92].

Similarly, Hugh of St. Victor was unacquainted with the New Logic derived from Aristotle, and therefore he could not have been influenced by it [93]. While he does employ quasi-Aristotelian classifications to describe some of the components of philosophy, these were derived from Boethius [94]. In education, on the other hand, Hugh retains and emphasizes the seven liberal arts of the Isocratic tradition of rhetorical education, and asserts that these are the foundation of all education [95]. Similarly, he retains the Isocratic view that education is a servant of prior political ends. Kimball, however, makes no mention of the continuity of this feature of the Isocratic tradition, apparently as a consequence of his decision to ignore one of Hugh of St. Victor's two educational treatises.

5.4.1 Hugh of St. Victor.

The Saxony-born cleric Hugh of St. Victor (c. 1096-1141 A.D.) has been widely recognized for many years as one of the most influential educational thinkers of this most important period in the history of educational ideas [96]. Unfortunately, educationist historians such as Ulrich, Curtis and Boultwood, Boyd, Nakosteen, and others, make no mention of Hugh of St. Victor.

Our sources for Hugh of St. Victor's educational ideas

are two treatises he published in 1125. These treatises provide a comprehensive statement of Victorine humanism, a programme of wide general learning based on the Isocratic idea of education. The Didascalicon outlines a literary curriculum in some detail, while De institutione novitiorum outlines both the normative intentions of the educational programme, and the political doctrine from which they are derived. Both works were widely read and very influential for generations afterwards [97]. The seventeenth century philosopher G.W. von Leibniz (1646-1717), for example, wrote appreciatively of Hugh of St. Victor [98]. In general, Victorine humanism in education consists of a reformulated programme of Ciceronian liberal learning, culminating in the Isocratic ideal of rhetoric and oratory in the service of the ruling aristocracy.

Hugh of St. Victor is one of the first educational thinkers subsequent to the classical period to show some direct knowledge of Isocrates, unmediated by Cicero and Quintilian. It must be emphasized, however, that Hugh himself was not aware of this. This apparent paradox is a consequence of the accidents of manuscript transmission in the Middle Ages: manuscripts which are clearly discussing Isocrates often record the name "Socrates". In paraphrasing a passage from the writings of St. Jerome, he writes as follows.

> 'Plato died writing in his eighty-first year. Socrates filled ninety-nine with the pain and labour of teaching and writing.' [99]

This passage confuses Socrates, who died at the age of seventy

and did not commit his thought to writing, with Isocrates, who lived to ninety-eight, and wrote extensively. If we turn to the original epistle of St. Jerome which Hugh believed he was quoting, we find that "Socrates" is indeed Isocrates [100]. Although Hugh of St. Victor may have considered himself a follower of "Socrates", his educational ideas are derived from a tradition extending through Alcuin and Cassiodorus, Cicero and Quintilian, and finally to Isocrates [101].

The normative intentions of Victorine humanistic education, as well as the political doctrine from which they are derived, is presented most fully in De institutione novitiorum, although they are also briefly discussed in the Didascalicon. Before turning to his principal educational ideas, however, Hugh briefly mentions the question of monastic learning. In his view, monks who were neither inclined nor able to pursue higher learning were to receive suitable training in accordance with the normative intentions defined by the Rule of their monastic order. Victorine humanism, however, like most medieval Christian educational thought, was not primarily concerned with the education of cloistered monks, but rather followed the Carolingian emphasis on the education of a more prestigious class of clergy destined for ecclesiastical and political administration. It is with this class that Hugh of St. Victor is concerned in his educational writings [102].

The normative intentions of Victorine humanism were

derived from a broadly aristocratic political doctrine augmented by an appeal to divine sanction. The tropology which Hugh of St. Victor articulates in the Didascalicon sets out his argument that political justice, as well as private virtue and morality, is a reflection of the natural justice established by God [103]. Hugh, himself a Saxon noble, believed that political justice understood in this way was embodied in the aristocracy in the wider St. Victor community, and the French monarchy from which they derived their political authority [104]. The establishment and maintenance of political justice in this sense is the particular concern of the rhetoricians to be educated [105]. The St. Victor aristocracy required a political class of educated clerics able to oversee the political administration of the region on behalf of the rulers themselves. The education to be received by these clerics was valued in terms of wisdom, virtue, and literary skills as defined by the aristocratic political doctrine from which they were derived.

The derivative normative intentions of Victorine education, as specified in the De institutione novitiorum, are bonitatem (goodness), scientia (practical wisdom), and disciplina , defined as virtue [106]. Unfortunately, goodness is merely mentioned in the last line of the treatise, and discussion must therefore concentrate on scientia and disciplina. Scientia, which is also only briefly discussed, is defined as the learning of practical wisdom. Such wisdom consists, as in Isocrates, in knowing how to speak and act

with propriety, in accordance with prevailing opinion and custom [107]. In Hugh of St. Victor's view, this meant, above all, speaking and acting in accordance with the prevailing aristocratic political doctrine.

Hugh of St. Victor's conception of disciplina, or virtue, was not grounded in either theology or the monastic tradition. On the contrary, Victorine education sought to instill particular ideals of personal deportment and manners, the disciplinae of aristocratic life. According to the political doctrine of the aristocratic class of St. Victor, aristocrats were entitled to rule because they were a distinctive and superior class of human beings. It follows that the distinctiveness and superiority of such a class will be manifest in some way, namely, in their refined and elaborate manners and code of personal conduct. Accordingly, Hugh's De institutione novitiurum provides lengthy instruction in proper dress and deportment, table etiquette, the art of conversation (including a surprisingly detailed art of gesture and facial expression), and the apparently difficult art of walking in a properly aristocratic manner [108]. Even this component of Victorine humanism derives from the Isocratic tradition, transmitted especially through Cicero. As Jaeger has shown,

> 'Gesture and carriage as serious pedagogic concerns come from the classical tradition of an orator's education.' [109]

These goals of Victorine education are valued in terms of ideals of gesture, carriage, and personal deportment generally, which are derived from political doctrine. The same

is true of the remaining component of Victorine humanism, the broad literary curriculum described in the Didascalicon.

Hugh of St. Victor composed his Didascalicon with three purposes in mind. The first three books of this treatise describe the Victorine curriculum. The second three books are concerned with the contemplative life of monks, although all six books are unified by the intention to argue that knowledge is an integrated whole. Hugh argues that knowledge can be divided into four categories: theoretical, practical, mechanical, and logical. The mechanical arts are concerned with the knowledge required for the basic necessities of life, and as such are not a component of Hugh's educational programme. Theoretical knowledge includes theology and the contemplation of Divine Truth by cloistered monks, and these are not a component of Hugh's educational programme [110]. Victorine education is concerned with the arts derived from a subdivision of theoretical knowledge, and from logical and practical knowledge.

Hugh's description of the Victorine curriculum begins with an elaborate division of knowledge. Knowledge is divided first into logic and mathematics. Logic is intimately related to practical knowledge, which involves virtue and politics. Mathematics is a component of theoretical knowledge. Hugh of St. Victor uses the term Logic to designate the three arts of the trivium: grammar, the art of discourse (or dialectic), and rhetoric. Likewise, the term Mathematics designates the four

disciplines of the quadrivium: arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy. Taken together, logic and mathematics account for the seven forms of knowledge and the seven liberal arts [111]. The curriculum advocated in the Didiscalicon, however, emphasizes the literary arts of the trivium [112], and integrates them with practical knowledge. Although Hugh distinguishes logic and practical knowledge, his educational programme seeks to bring about what he also regards as their natural integration.

Practical knowledge is that knowledge which is useful in ordering and directing human activity. As such, it may be divided into three components, the solitary, the domestic and the political. Only solitary and political practical knowledge enter into Victorine education, where they are regarded as the products of study in the logical arts, or the trivium. The emphasis is on study of the logical arts, that is, the literary arts of the trivium, as a means to logical and practical knowledge. Political practical knowledge

> 'teaches how a whole people and nation ought to be governed by their rulers.' [113]

As such, political practical knowledge, and the arts of the trivium associated with it, are the proper concern of 'the governors of states,' or a politically influential class generally [114]. Hugh of St. Victor divides what he calls the "logical" arts into two components, grammar and the art of discourse. The student begins with an intensive study of grammar, comprised of poetry, literature and history. These are regarded as preparation for rhetoric, the art of

persuasion [115]. History in particular is valued for the contribution that it makes to both probable political judgement, and rhetoric and oratory [116]. The study of grammar is followed by study in the art of discourse. The art of discourse is further divided into probable argument and rhetoric [117]. Finally, Hugh of Ct. Victor follows Cicero, and hence Isocrates, in defining philosophy as a political activity, or the study which 'teaches the right way of living' [118]. He regards philosophy defined in this way as the proper study of 'a cleric in the service of the emperor' [119].

Through the tangle of Hugh of St. Victor's classifications of knowledge and divisions of the arts, the essential features of the Isocratic tradition are clearly discernible. A curriculum emphasizing the study of literature and history culminates not in a search for the truth, but in a search for probable knowledge and practical political judgement which find their expression through the rhetoric and oratory of a governing class. This conception of the political value of education presupposes the Isocratic idea of the essential nature of education.

5.4.2 John of Salisbury.

The English educational and political philosopher John of Salisbury (1120-1180 A.D.) is the most important educational thinker of the Twelfth Century Renaissance, as well as one of the most important thinkers in the history of educational

philosophy generally [120]. Not only is John of Salisbury's Metalogicon 'the cardinal treatise of medieval pedagogy,' but it also 'constitutes a classic in the history of educational theory.' [121]. The Metalogicon has rightly been described as

> 'a treasure-trove of information concerning twelfth century pedagogy, as well as an enduring classic by its own right in the field of educational theory.' [122]

In spite of John of Salisbury's well-established and enduring importance in educational thought, however, neither he nor the Metalogicon is even mentioned in the historical texts by Boyd, Ulrich, Curtis and Boultwood, and Nakosteen.

John of Salisbury's educational programme, and the political doctrine from which its normative intentions are derived, are set forth in two treatises he published together in 1159.

> 'John's Policraticus is ranked as a mediaeval classic on political theory. His Metalogicon occupies a similar position in the history of educational theory' [123]

The relationship between the two books is defined by the Isocratic idea of education. John argues in the Metalogicon that students who have completed their elementary education ought to proceed to the 'serious studies.' Through such studies, they will learn wisdom, prudence, and the means of expressing them eloquently. The reader wanting to know what is meant by wisdom and prudence is directed to the Policraticus, and to the political doctrine which defines them [124]. As for the curriculum itself, the Metalogicon follows Cicero and Quintilian rather than Plato or Aristotle, and advocates the

Isocratic programme of rhetorical education [125].

> 'The type of culture he consciously desired to have revived was the eloquentia of Cicero and Quintilian, that is to say, the complete intellectual and moral formation of an upright man, but a man capable of expressing himself well.' [126]

As Gilson observes, John does not 'distinguish wisdom from eloquence' [127], and his educational ideas reflect this distinctly Isocratic view.

The Policraticus is in the tradition of "mirror of princes" literature intended for the political education of rulers, and derived from Isocrates' To Nicocles [128]. John presents himself as an educator of rulers rather than a courtier in the prologue to the Policraticus, with explicit reference to Isocrates. He echoes the distinction made by Isocrates between the experiences of those who educate rulers, and those who merely advise them.

> 'I do not plunge into the great affairs of court; let the response to you be the words of Isocrates, who when questioned by his friends about why he did not become engaged in political affairs, responded, "Of the experiences of this place I know not; of my experiences this place knows nothing".' [129]

John's educational ideas are also derived from Isocrates indirectly, through the works of his favourite authors, Cicero and Quintilian [130], as well as through the texts of Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, Alcuin, and Hugh of St. Victor [131]. While some of his epistemological and logical ideas can be traced to medieval texts inspired by neo-Platonism and Aristotle, his educational ideas derive from the Isocratic heritage [132]. The Metalogicon uses Cicero's works to confirm the value of rhetorical education [133], although John turns

above all to Quintilian for the details of his curriculum. As McGarry observed, referring to Metalogicon,

> 'Quintilian's Education of the Orator is probably a more fundamental source than any other single work concerning pedagogical method and the rich content of "grammar".' [134]

John of Salisbury's educational prescriptions and political doctrine are unified by his presupposition of the Isocratic idea of the nature of education. We turn now to a brief analysis of the political doctrine set forth in the Policraticus, followed by a discussion of the derivative educational programme for which John argues in the Metalogicon.

The essential features of John of Salisbury's political doctrine are neatly epitomized in two images. First, the prince is the image of the will of God in worldly affairs. At the apex of government is the prince, where

> 'the prince is the public power and a certain image on earth of the divine majesty.' [135]

Beneath the prince in this hierarchical conception of the regime is a political class of advisors and, beneath them, the people. The relationships between these three divisions of legitimate political authority are described by the second image, in which the regime is presented in the form of a human body. The prince is the head, the economy is the abdomen, the military are the hands, the senate is the heart, and the peasants are the feet, permanently bound to the soil [136]. A class of political advisors, the priests, lay clergy and others for whom the educational programme of the Metalogicon

is intended, constitute the soul of the body [137].

The political theory of the Policraticus consists of a description of the ways in which the component classes of the regime ought to interact. The interaction of these classes is structured by two political ideas, the division of political authority and law. Turning first to the division of authority, John's political ideal is not strictly theocratic and hierarchical, in the sense that he does not believe that political authority is derived directly from God and embodied in the prince alone [138]. Rather, John advocates a balance of power, in the sense that the Church and the prince each have distinct, though integrated, political purposes and authority. John of Salisbury's

> 'ideal was rather that of the commonwealth, the res publica, conceived after the manner of Cicero as a society "united by a common agreement about laws and rights".' [139]

The prince of the republic must act so that he may

> 'bring about the utility of each and all, and that he may arrange the optimal condition of the human republic.' [140]

Responsibility for defining the "optimal condition" to be sought by the regime was shared by both ecclesiastical and secular authority. The church acted within its authority in defining salvation, and the ecclesiastical and political conditions for its pursuit. The prince also acted within his authority in defining the material good and justice, within the limits of law.

The limitation of political and ecclesiastical authority

by law consitutes one of John's most important innovations in medieval political thought. The prince, unlike the tyrant, obeys the law and exerts his authority only within the limits defined by it [141]. So strongly did John believe that the authority of the prince was circumscribed by adherence to the law that he broke with medieval convention, and advocated tyrannicide for those who exceeded these limits. In John's view, 'law has power over all divine and human affairs' and, therefore, 'it is proper for all who dwell in the community of political affairs to live according to it' [142].

The law is derived from two sources, the Bible and Roman contractual jurisprudence. The basic principles on which the law was founded were ideally derived from the medieval interpretation of the Decalogue, as it is given in Deuteronomy [143]. In practical terms, however, law was based on two Roman ideas, lex or contractual statute, and libertas or political liberty [144]. The Decalogue provides human beings with laws which they may freely choose, and which define the ideal human existence in accordance with both nature and the will of God. True freedom, libertas, is achieved when life is freely lived in accordance with such law, rather than in accordance with the fluctuations of animal desire. Hence, in an ideal world, libertas, or true freedom, would constitute perfect justice in the sense that each individual freely choose his ordained place within the divine order [145]. In order for such a sophisticated political doctrine and body of contractual law to be understood by both prince and people,

there must be an educated political class able to instruct both in the limits of their authority, and the responsibilities of their station.

The sources of John of Salisbury's conception of law, the Bible and Roman jurisprudence, are each in turn the source of an important part of John's educational humanism. The prince, of course, must have some understanding of the most fundamental sources of law. When the prince

> 'sits upon the throne of his kingdom, he will write for himself a copy of this law of Deuteronomy in a book.' [146]

In order to understand the details of Roman jurisprudence and statesmanship, through which the law of Deuteronomy was interpreted and implemented, it was necessary that the prince also be broadly educated in 'the liberal disciplines' [147]. As in Isocrates, the good prince is moderate and wise, and achieves his political moderation and wisdom through 'the virtue of letters' [148]. Nevertheless, John of Salisbury, no less than Isocrates, is aware that it is politically imprudent to place the fate of the regime in the hands of a single man, whose virtue and wisdom are both fallible and unpredictable. Consequently John adheres to the Isocratic tradition still further in regarding the rhetorical education of a political class to be more important than the education of the prince alone [149].

John of Salisbury's plan for the education of an advisory and administrative political class is founded on the

distinctively Isocratic idea that it is speech rather than reason which distinguishes human beings from other animals [150]. Just as Isocrates regards speech as the soul of the regime, John describes his political class, distinguished by their educated speech, as the soul of the regime, as represented in the image of the body [151]. Educated speech, eloquence, constitutes both human excellence and the aim with which this class is educated [152]. Such education is valued as a means by which men acquire the knowledge and eloquence which will enable them to act as the soul of the regime, advising the prince as to his political responsibilities and persuading the people to adhere to their duties [153]. John emphasizes

> 'the necessity of a good philosophical education for men who are going to influence society by eloquence.' [154]

Education is "philosophical" in the Isocratic rather than the Platonic sense. By way of Cicero, John follows Isocrates in defining philosophy as a combination of wisdom and eloquence, and repeats Cicero's belief that anyone who follows the Socratics in attempting to separate the two 'assaults in reality the foundations of society' [155]. A philosophical education in John of Salisbury's Isocratic sense is valued as a means by which an effective political class may be produced, and not as a means for a Platonically inspired pursuit of truth.

> 'The great orator and man of affairs, he [John of Salisbury] maintains, must be a philosopher, but not in order to promote or find ultimate truth in macrocosm or microcosm; rather he needs this wisdom as the power which alone can give perfection to his eloquence.' [156]

It is through the wisdom and eloquence of a class of orators that the prince may be politically advised and the people encouraged in their obedience to the law [157]. The Policraticus directs us to the Metalogicon, in which the educational program designed to meet these political needs is described.

The Metalogicon was intended to be both an explication and a defence of a programme of education based on the arts of discourse, the arts of language and reasoning which comprised the trivium. Such an education was valued as preparation for 'an active and dutiful life within the political arena' [158]. John recognizes that, ideally, broad learning in the liberal arts of both the trivium and the quadrivium could prepare the mind for the pursuit of wisdom and eloquence [159]. As with most educated men of his day, however, his own educational experience, as well as his educational prescriptions, concentrate almost exclusively on the trivium, culminating in eloquence [160].

The student will begin his education with what John calls "logic", which consists of elementary grammar, literature, and rhetoric, 'the science of speaking and writing correctly' [161]. This is followed by dialectic, which includes what we would now call formal logic. John is careful to emphasize that ' by itself, logic is practically useless,' and is valued as preparation for eloquence [162]. In other words, John rejects the Platonic view in favour of the Isocratic, regarding

dialectic as a preparation for philosophy rather than its culmination. In doing so, he repeats the Isocratic metaphor, transmitted through Cicero, in which logic and dialectic are gymnastics for the mind.

> 'Our tolerance for these exercises of the schools, which are, so to speak, games in the gymnasium of philosophy, indulged in for the purpose of developing proficiency in the young, should not, however, be extended into more mature years and more serious studies' [163]

The "serious studies" specified by John are history and the arts of eloquence, the two educational disciplines emphasized by Isocrates. As in Isocrates, though once again drawn from Cicero, the study of history is valued particularly as a means for acquiring probable knowledge and prudent political judgement [164]. Eloquence is valued as the means by which probable knowledge and prudent judgement may be expressed, whether orally or in writing, for the benefit of the regime [165].

John of Salisbury's educational ideas are a part of a medieval transmission of the Isocratic idea of education, and of the Isocratic legacy generally. An educational programme in the liberal arts culminating in political judgement and eloquence is valued in accordance with intentions derived from a specific political doctrine. This view presupposes that the normative intentions of education are derived from political doctrine, the Isocratic idea of education.

Chapter Six

The Isocratic Idea and Renaissance Humanism

Tranio:
Mi perdonato, gentle master mine,
I am in all affected as yourself,
Glad that you thus continue your resolve
To suck the sweets of sweet philosophy.
Only, good master, while we do admire
This virtue and this moral discipline,
Let's be no stoics nor no stocks, I pray,
Or so devote to Aristotle's checks
As Ovid be an outcast quite abjur'd.
Balk logic with acquaintance that you have,
And practise rhetoric in your common talk,
Music and poesy use to quicken you,
The mathematics and the metaphysics
Fall to them as you find your stomach serves you.
No profit grows where is no pleasure ta'en.
In brief, sir, study what you most affect.

Lucentio:
Gramercies, Tranio, well dost thou advise.

Shakespeare [1]

6.0 Introduction.

The rediscovery of classical Greek literature, and the revival of classically inspired science, art, philosophy, literature and education that followed from it, has become so intimately associated with the Italian renaissance of the 15th century that the very term "renaissance" is popularly associated with this period alone. Although the Renaissance is associated with the recovery of some interest in Socratic philosophy, this had little effect on education or educational thought, which continued to be derived from the heritage of Cicero, Quintilian and Isocrates [2]. Ernst Cassirer observed that,

> '...though Renaissance thinkers (including some humanists) sometimes disputed the relative merits of Plato and Aristotle, this rather academic debate was

> not a major or regular concern of humanism; hence it can hardly be expected to illuminate its central concerns.' [3]

In this chapter we shall concentrate only on the rediscovery of classical educational thought that constitutes Isocratic Renaissance humanism [4].

6.1 Isocrates and Renaissance Humanism

Since the turn of the century, French and German classicist historians of education have been fully aware of the centrality of both the Isocratic heritage in the development of Renaissance humanism [5]. English-language Renaissance scholarship, however, showed little appreciation of Isocrates' contribution to Renaissance educational ideas until the late 1950' or early 1960's [6], while English-language educationists to this day show no awareness of even the existence of an Isocratic influence in Renaissance educational thought [7]. We shall examine some of the older scholarship in order to argue, in general terms, that the evidence establishes the continuity of the Isocratic heritage throughout the Renaissance.

Fritz Caspari's Humanism and the Social Order in Tudor England, first published in 1954, was for many years regarded as the classic account of the educational ideas of late Renaissance humanism [8]. Although Caspari's work has retained much of its value, it also illustrates, in an instructive manner, the failure of English-language educational

scholarship to recognize the role of Isocrates in humanist education. In general, Caspari assumes that the humanists are Platonists, though his reasons for doing so are both weak in themselves, and in fact suggestive of the importance of Isocrates.

Caspari relies on very general or even vague resemblances between Platonism and humanism as the basis for his assumption that Renaissance humanism was derived from Platonism. In the course of his discussion of Renaissance humanism generally, Caspari asserts, but does not argue,

> 'that English humanists were deeply affected by the Platonic ideal of a good and just state which is ruled by an elite of guardians and philosophers.' [9]

This assertion is undermined by two considerations. First, as Caspari himself notes, the English humanists did not adopt many of the most important Platonic political and educational ideals. He therefore modifies his original assertion by observing that the humanists 'omitted or modified these important features of the Platonic system' [10]. Second, Caspari overlooks the fact that Plato was not the only classical writer who sought to produce a class of philosopher-statesmen to rule the state. Isocrates also argues that the state ought also to be ruled by philosopher-statesmen. While it is true that humanists argued for government by a special class of philosopher-statesman, such arguments could have been derived from either Plato or Isocrates. If we look at the evidence more carefully, we see that it suggests that the humanists were Isocratic, and adopting Isocrates' ideas

directly, rather than Platonists who rejected many of Plato's ideas, and adopted only a modified selection of those remaining.

We will consider two ideas which Caspari presents as humanist "modifications" of Platonism, in order to show that they are both more likely derived from Isocrates. As Caspari observes, the humanists argued that it would be best to select those who were to receive the humanistic education by two criteria, wealth and the political class of their parents [11]. He describes these criteria as modifications of those advocated by Plato. Yet as Caspari himself also observes, Plato favours a complex system of eugenic selection of those best able to be educated for political leadership, regardless of their social class and wealth. In contrast, as we have seen, Isocrates argues explicitly for the use of social class and wealth as the criteria by which students are best selected for education. The impression that the humanists derived their ideas from Isocrates rather than Plato is strengthened if we look in more detail at the education to be received by these students.

Once again relying on a vague resemblance between humanism and Platonism, Caspari asserted that the humanists were following Plato when they

> 'demanded that future "governors" partake of a rigorous education in the intellectual disciplines, and then stated that only such training would qualify them for leading positions in the state.' [12]

Yet we must remember that Isocrates, no less than Plato,

argued that leading positions in the state ought to be held by those educated in "the intellectual disciplines". We may determine which of the two the humanists are actually following only by examining the nature of these discipline. The Platonic system of education for political leadership is a rigorous scientific education based on astronomy, mathematics and other diciplines later included in the quadrivium. Isocrates, of course, emphasizes the importance of history and rhetoric, and gives the scientific disciplines a minor and subordinate role. Two of the humanists mentioned by Caspari in this context are Erasmus and Thomas Elyot, and he devotes an entire chapter to each. As we shall see, both of them translated Isocrates' works, prescribed an education which emphasizes the distinctively Isocratic disciplines of history and rhetoric, and derive their educational ideas explicitly from Isocrates. When we closely examine the aspects of humanism described by Caspari as "modified" Platonism, the evidence reveals that they are unmodified aspects of the Isocratic heritage. More recent scholarship has strengthened this conclusion.

Although no previous scholarship to my knowledge has dealt with the Isocratic idea of the nature of education specifically, it is now well established that the educational thought of the Renaissance is both an extension and revitalization of the Isocratic heritage.

> 'During the Renaissance, the search for a fully-rounded secular personality by the layman was bound to lead to a revival of the Isocratean ideal.' [13]

The Isocratic ideal continued to be defined, in part, by both its curriculum and its distinctive educational aims. A literary curriculum culminating in rhetoric and oratory was intended to prepare the sons of the nobility for virtue and participation in political life [14].

> 'The Isocratean ideal of the philosopher-statesman, embodying logos or eloquent wisdom, was transmitted via Cicero to the Renaissance.' [15].

The Isocratic tradition of rhetoric and rhetorical education unified Renaissance humanism [16].

Although the revival of the Isocratic educational tradition by the early Italian humanists was mediated through Cicero and Quintilian, it was increasingly derived directly from the writings of Isocrates as the Renaissance was consolidated, and began its northern migration through Europe to Elizabethan England. Early Renaissace educational thinkers in Italy, such as Bruni, Guarino and Vittorino, were dependent on Cicero and Quintilian, while later educational thinkers, such as Erasmus, Sir Thomas Elyot and Roger Ascham, used the original Greek writings of Isocrates [17]. In practical terms, the most famous grammar schools in England, and subsequenly the development of grammar school education generally, were consciously founded on the Isocratic tradition. The Isocratic tradition of educational thought and practice was

> 'passed on through the Greek schools to the Roman and Christian, to Cicero, Quintilian, Livanius, and even to Augustine, Basil and Chrysostum, to Guarino and Vittorino and to St. Paul's, Winchester, Eton and Harrow.' [18]

The phrase "If you love learning, you will attain much

learning" , taken from Isocrates' To Demonicus, was inscribed in golden letters over the portal of Shrewsbury School. The Elizabethan humanist, Roger Ascham, was later to quote the same phrase with approval [19]. We turn now to an examination of the transmission of the Isocratic idea of education by the Renaissance educators, and particularly by Erasmus, and the English educational thinkers Sir Thomas Elyot and Roger Ascham.

6.2 Humanism in the Italian Renaissance.

The humanism of the Italian Renaissance was an educational movement which grew directly from the Isocratic thought and practice of the medieval rhetoricians [20]. Specifically, humanist education emphasized first Ciceronian, and later explicitly Isocratic, rhetoric. Furthermore, humanism consciously opposed attempts sponsored by the universities to extend Aristotelian scholasticism into education. This consolidation of the Isocratic tradition in education at the expense of any influence by the Socratic philosophers is discernible as early as Petrarch's treatise On His Own Ignorance (1367) [21].

Petrarch is another example of a late medieval thinker who believed himself to be a follower of Socrates, rather than Isocrates, as a result of errors in the classical manuscripts. In the treatise On His Own Ignorance, he asserts that Plato and Aristotle are not 'true philosophers', and that

'Aristotle must be most carefully avoided' [22]. As Petrarch suggests in his criticism of Aristotle, the 'true philosophers' are the Isocratic rhetoricians, who seek virtue and knowledge in practice rather than in theory, and who emphasize the rhetorical and oratorical arts necessary to make virtue compelling. As he goes on to argue,

> 'He [Aristotle] teaches what virtue is, I do not deny that; but his lessons lack the words that sting and set fire and urge toward love of virtue and hatred of vice or, at any rate, does not have enough of such power. He who looks for that will find it in our Latin writers, especially in Cicero and Seneca.' [23].

Cicero and Seneca are both within the Isocratic tradition of educational thought [24]. In defending this Isocratic, rhetorical conception of philosophy and education against Aristotelian scholasticism, Petrarch attempts to undermine the authority of Aristotle with an appeal to the more ancient authority of "Socrates". Petrarch attempted to undermine the credibility of Aristotle by pointing out that his judgement was so poor as to lead him to ridicule a figure as authorative as "Socrates".

> 'Aristotle was a man who ridiculed Socrates, the father of this kind of philosophy.' [25]

It is essential to observe that Petrarch's belief that "Socrates" originated the rhetorical conception of philosophy derives from his reading of a corrupt manuscript of Cicero's De officiis, and that Cicero's text does not refer to "Socrates" but to Isocrates [26]. In defending "Socrates" against Aristotle, Petrarch was in fact defending Isocrates, and thus preparing the way for the humanist revitalization of the Isocratic heritage.

The early years of the Italian Renaissance witnessed widespread political instability as fledgling experiments in republican government struggled with the advocates of monarchy for political supremacy. In spite of their fundamental differences of political doctrine, both monarchists and republicans agreed that the highest human aspirations were to be found in political action. Not surprisingly therefore, both adopted the Isocratic heritage, as mediated through Cicero and Quintilian, as a practicable set of educational ideas which could be turned to the preparation of a political class in accordance with the prefered political doctrine. Humanist education emphasizing the development of political virtue, rhetoric and oratory could serve both monarchical and republican political doctrines, and therefore soon assumed a vital importance throughout Renaissance Italy [27]. The particular political virtues to be sought differed, the monarchists stressed loyalty to the ruler, for example, while the republicans stressed loyalty to the constitution. Nevertheless, adherents to both political doctrines favoured a humanist educational programme of grammar, history and poetry culminating in, and unified by, rhetoric [28].

The early humanists who provided this education presupposed the Isocratic idea of the nature of education, although the doctrines of education which they formed on the basis of it differed in accordance with the axiomatic political doctrine to which they were committed. These educators, caught as they were in the winds of rapid and often

chaotic political change, concentrated on practicalities rather than educational philosophy. While their contributions to the history of education are important, they made little contribution to the history of educational philosophy and ideas. We shall briefly discuss them here only in order to establish that they perpetuated the Isocratic idea and heritage until both could once again receive, at the hands of Erasmus, a renewed philosophical defence and elaboration.

The Italian educator Petrus Paulus Vergerius (1349-1420) has been described as

> 'the first man to give expression to the educational ideals of the renaissance.' [29]

Vergerius composed two educational works, a commentary on Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria, and De ingenuis moribus, which closely follows Quintilian. Vergerius found his educational ideal embodied in the orator-stateman of Cicero's De Oratore [30]. He regarded education as a means by which the class of men trained in rhetoric might be enabled to bring about and maintain a new republican government. He pursued this ideal through a curriculum consisting of the Isocratic disciplines of history and rhetoric, along with moral philosophy [31]. It is important to emphasize that moral philosophy, despite its name, consisted of the study of literary examplars of political virtue rather than the philosophical study of morality [32]. Vergerius presupposed the Isocratic idea of education, and adopted the distinctly Isocratic curriculum intended to prepare a political class for service to the regime in accordance with republican political

doctrine.

Vergerius' perpetuation of the Isocratic tradition established the framework within which later Renaissance educators were to work. The great humanist Leonardo Bruni (1369-1444) argued for wide learning in poetry, history and oratory, valued for its civic utility in accordance with normative intentions derived from a democratic republican political doctrine [33]. Guarino Guarini (1374-1460) has been described as 'the greatest teacher in the century of great teachers' and, as such, a modern equivalent to Isocrates in the eyes of his contemporaries [34]. Guarino found in Isocrates, particularly as mediated through Cicero and Quintilian, a programme for the education of a class of men in political virtue and eloquence in the service of a republican regime [35]. Finally, the Italian educator Vittorino da Feltre (1378-1446), placing himself in the tradition of Vergerius [36], both perpetuated the humanist adherence to the Isocratic tradition, and returned to the original texts of Isocrates. Vittorino included Guarino's translations of Isocrates's Evagoras and Nicocles among the texts to be studied at his school, in preparation for rhetoric and active political life [37].

Early Renaissance educators had adopted the Isocratic heritage as it had been transmitted by Cicero, and with a corresponding emphasis on Latin language and literature. As the Renaissance progressed, and as humanism came to dominate

European educational thought and practice, the recovery of Greek philology and scholarship led to a return to the original texts of Isocrates. As a result, Isocrates was very soon one of the most widely read authors in Europe, a distinction he maintained well into the seventeenth century. In particular, Isocrates was an important part of the humanist curriculum, which continued to emphasize classical rhetoric, literature and history, while only occasionally finding a place for Plato [38].

The one individual most responsible for both the spread of humanism throughout Europe, and its consolidation on the basis of Isocrates' texts, was Erasmus. It was through the influence of Erasmus that 'the sixteenth century saw the triumph of the Italian Renaissance in northern Europe' [39]. He translated a number of Isocrates' works into Latin, and based his own educational treatises on those of Isocrates [40]. Finally, Erasmus himself was responsible for making Tudor and Elizabethan humanists in England familiar with the Greek writings of Isocrates, and for helping them to implement the Isocratic educational heritage in important schools of the period, such as St. Paul's, Winchester, Eton and Harrow [41]. We must therefore turn to the educational thought of Erasmus if we are to understand the development of European educational thought, and its continuing dependence on the legacy of Isocrates.

6.3 Erasmus

Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536) produced a very large number of writings, many of which mention or are indirectly concerned with education. His educational thought is presented most succinctly in three treatises specifically concerned with the subject: De pueris statim ac liberaliter instituendis declamatio (A Declamation on the Subject of Early Liberal Education for Children), 1509; Institutio principis christiani (The Education of a Christian Prince), 1516; De ratione studii (On the Right Method of Instruction), 1511. The De pueris is an appendix to the De copia verborum ac rerum, and intended to illustrate the principles of rhetoric outlined in that treatise; the De pueris is a treatise in both educational and rhetorical theory in the tradition of Isocrates. Erasmus' early educational treatises, such as De pueris, were written at a time when 'Quintilian is a complete authority for Erasmus' in matters of education [42], while the later Institutio is explicitly modelled on the Greek works of Isocrates. Yet despite the clear and often explicit dependence of these treatises on Isocrates, it is sometimes claimed that Erasmus's educational ideas are derived from Plato. An examination of this claim will not only confirm that Erasmus is within the Isocratic tradition, but also provides a useful reminder of how marginal the Socratic tradition has been in the history of educational thought.

Educationist historians such as Curtis and Boultwood have

asserted that Erasmus adopted 'the concept of Plato's liberal education' [43]. The only support which they provide for this assertion is a reference to an earlier text by Woodward. Remarkably, in the very text to which they refer, Woodward is at pains to repudiate the idea that Plato had any substantial influence on Erasmus's educational ideas, and in fact stresses Erasmus's opposition to Platonism [44]. Erasmus, like Isocrates, rejected what he describes as ' the riddles and labyrinths of Socratic subtlety' , in which he includes Plato and Aristotle [45].

A number of scholars, such as Quentin Skinner and Fritz Caspari, have also repeated the assertion that Erasmus's educational ideas derive from Plato [46]. Skinner, for example, claims that Erasmus is developing a Platonic conception of education, and supports this claim solely with the observation that Erasmus argues, in the Institutio principiis christiani, that 'you cannot be a prince if you are not a philosopher' [47]. This quotation would support the view that Erasmus is a Platonist only if we attribute to him our own conception of "philosophy" as a discipline derived from the Socratics. As we have seen, however, Isocrates also argued, particularly in To Nicocles, that the best prince will be a philosopher [48]. We must therefore look to Erasmus's texts more carefully if we are to be able to determine whether his advocacy of philosopher-statesman signifies a continuation of the Isocratic or the Platonic view.

If we turn to Erasmus's Institutio principis christiani we see that he could not be more clearly adopting the Isocratic rather than the Platonic educational tradition. In the Dedicatory Epistle to this treatise, Erasmus writes

> 'I have taken Isocrates's work [To Nicocles] on the principles of government and translated it into Latin, and in competition with him, I have added my own, arranged as it were in aphorisms for the reader's convenience but with considerable differences from what he laid down.'

Erasmus emphasizes that the "considerable difference" between himself and Isocrates is that Isocrates was a pagan while he was a Christian. Erasmus regards the difference between Isocrates and himself as theological rather than educational. Thus the very treatise which is taken to be an example of Erasmus's Platonism is explicitly presented by Erasmus himself as a development of the Isocratic tradition. Erasmus published this treatise together with his own Latin translation of the To Nicocles, the Isocratic treatise of which it is an imitation [49].

In transmitting and developing the Isocratic tradition in this way, Erasmus was both following historical precedent and acting upon his recognition of the compatibility between his own ideas and those of Isocrates. Erasmus

> 'chose his classical model not only following a historical precedent but also conceiving Isocrates's epistle [To Nicocles] to be an appropriate background for presenting his own pedagogical ideals.' [50]

Similarly, Major has shown that Erasmus's philosophy and educational ideas are closer to those of Isocrates than to any other classical writer [51]. We turn now from Erasmus's

explicit reliance on the Isocratic tradition generally to a more specific examination of the question of the Isocratic idea of education.

Interpreters of Erasmus have sometimes complained of the generality, or even vagueness, of the political doctrine he espouses [52]. This complaint may be somewhat unfair to Erasmus, who prefaces his treatise by saying that he is concerned with general political principles rather than the details of their realization.

> 'This treatise is not concerned to provide a long list of examples, but merely to point out the principles and the general direction.' [53]

In spite of the general nature of Erasmus's discussion of the political doctrine he advocates, however, there is sufficient detail to enable us to recognize its fundamentally Isocratic character.

As we have seen, Isocrates' political and educational ideas are based on his conception of human nature. In his view, human nature is most distinctively characterized by rational speech and political activity. These two human traits are perfected together through education, and expressed in practical living. Erasmus grounds his political doctrine on a very similar conception of human nature. In <u>De pueris</u>, for example, Erasmus follows Isocrates in defining human reason in terms of its practical contribution to everyday life, and so does not follow the Socratics in defining it in terms of the pursuit of truth [54]. For Erasmus, as for Isocrates, human

excellence consists of the attainment of wisdom, where political wisdom is the most excellent kind of wisdom [55]. Once again following Isocrates, Erasmus conceives of education as the means by which one links reason, as expressed in speech, to politics, and thereby transforms animal man into human being. As Erasmus says, 'a man without education has no humanity at all' [56]. Although an education which both perfects and unifies reasoned speech and political activity is the source of men's humanity, it is not necessarily the source of their goodness. In order to ensure that education is a means to human goodness, its normative intentions must, as in Isocrates, be derived from the right political doctrine.

Erasmus bases his political doctrine on the premise that all men are endowed by their Creator with freedom of will. A corollary of his belief in free will is his belief that men can be neither good nor evil by nature. In Erasmus's view, it follows from these two premises that the moral condition of men is a consequence of the political doctrine which prevails in the regime in which they live, and which is the source of the normative intentions of their formal education. Formal education reflects the nature of the regime. He intends, therefore, to argue for a particular conception of the good regime, and for the humanist education that will lead men to maintain such a regime [57]. Erasmus presupposes that the normative intentions of education will be derived from the political doctrine of the regime, and his primary task must therefore be to find a good regime. In his search for a

conception of the good regime appropriate to the circumstances of Renaissance Europe, Erasmus turned to the practical modification of Isocrates' political ideas found in Cicero.

Erasmus develops his political argument, in imitation of the To Nicocles, with a general description of the political doctrine of the mixed regime which his education is intended to serve. Like Isocrates, Erasmus bases his educational prescriptions on a constitutional republican-monarchical political doctrine in which an aristocratic political class both serves and moderates a monarch within the limitations of political authority defined by a constitution [58]. Erasmus rejects both monarchy and democracy on the grounds that the people no less than princes are susceptible to imprudent political judgement and action when they are without the moderating influence of an educated aristocracy [59]. In Erasmus's view, the mixed regime defined by the political doctrine of the Roman aristocracy , particularly in the form of Cicero's humanitas, represented the best conception of such a good regime, from which the normative intentions of education would be best derived [60]. As we have seen above, Cicero derived his ideal of humanitas from Isocrates.

In conformity with the political views offered by Isocrates in To Nicocles, Erasmus regards education as the means by which the regime is maintained in accordance with his political doctrine. In accordance with the logical structure of the Isocratic idea of education, he describes

> 'the perfect state, the kind of man that was to embody that perfection and, to make it a living reality, the education necessary to create this ideal type.' [61]

Following the structure of To Nicocles specifically, Erasmus first mentions the education of the monarch, before moving on to the more important question of the education of the aristocratic class. Beginning with the prince, Erasmus observes that

> 'A country owes everything to a good prince; but it owes the prince himself to the one whose right counsel has made him what he is.'[62]

Nevertheless, he follows Isocrates in arguing that the education of the aristocracy, 'the order of the learned' [63], is more important from the point of view of the good of the regime. Consequently, Erasmus outlines a programme of education which will transform the young sons of the aristocracy into a political class of exemplary citizens able to serve the prince [64]. The normative intentions of the education to be received by this class are derived deductively from the political doctrine to which that class is committed.

Once again conforming to the structure of Isocrates' To Nicocles, Erasmus argues that education ought to be intended to produce a class of philosopher-statesmen, possessing both political moderation and practical political judgement. Erasmus uses the term "philosophy" in the Isocratic rather than the Socratic sense, referring to practical judgement rooted in 'the principles of right government', and developed through literary and rhetorical study [65]. This class of philosopher-statesmen is a moderating one in the sense that it

will counterbalance the potential political extremism of both monarchs and citizenry [66]. If this political class is to successfully serve its moderating purpose, then it must be both moderate itself and able to communicate its political judgements effectively. Accordingly, Erasmus sets forth a programme of wide general learning intended to produce both eloquence and prudent political judgement in accordance with the intentions of his political doctrine [67].

Erasmus returned to the Greek writings of Isocrates for his general conception of the nature and purpose of education. The language of European politics continued to be Latin, however, and he therefore turned to the educational writings of Quintilian for many of the details of his curriculum. Following Quintilian's advice on early education Erasmus argued that

> 'The first task of education should be to teach children to speak clearly and accurately.' [68]

Such education is valued as the foundation of eloquence and higher rhetorical learning [69]. This early informal education is followed, first, by training in Greek and Latin language [70]. Building on this foundation, Erasmus outlines a curriculum consisting of

> 'the liberal arts and the sciences such as poetry, rhetoric, ancient and contemporary history, mathematics, geography, ethics, politics and natural science.' [71]

As his more detailed description of this curriculum confirms [72], each of these disciplines is valued as an aid to literary study and rhetorical accomplishment. Logic, for

example, is subservient to rhetoric, while Socratic dialectic is rejected altogether. Geography is valued as an aid to understanding ancient literature and history. Following Isocrates, Erasmus places particular emphasis on historical learning, and values it as a means by which young men may learn both prudent political judgement and the value of political moderation [73]. Erasmus believed, as Isocrates did, that study of political history would impress upon the student the tendency of political extremism to fail both rulers and people, and the corresponding desirability of moderate political judgement within the limits of prevailing political doctrine. Finally, in a clear continuation of the Isocratic rather than the Socratic tradition, this programme of wide and primarily literary learning culminates in Latin rhetoric and oratory [74]. Rhetoric and oratory are the accomplishments of the philosopher-statesmen which Erasmus, like Isocrates, regarded as the natural outcome of education.

6.4 Elizabethan Humanism

6.4.1 Sir Thomas Elyot

The Tudor political and educational philosopher, Sir Thomas Elyot (1490-1546), is one of the pivotal figures in the history of educational ideas. The educational ideas of Renaissance humanism generally, and of Erasmus and Isocrates in particular, were given their first expression in English by Elyot. As Laurie observed,

> 'Elyot's work may be accepted as the first full exposition of the Humanistic point of view, not only in English but also in England.' [75]

Elyot's treatise on political and educational philosophy, The Boke named the Governor (1531) was the first of its kind to be published in English, and the most widely read and influential educational work of its time [76].

Elyot's educational and political thought was very much influenced by Isocrates. His translation of Isocrates' To Nicocles, under the title The Doctrinal of Princes, was the first Greek work to be translated from the original into English [77]. The influence of both Isocrates and the Latin tradition of Isocratic educational thought, Cicero, Quintilian and Erasmus in particular, is well-established [78]. As Major observed,

> 'few ancient authors are closer in spirit to the author of The Governor than is Isocrates. It is indeed striking to discover in Isocrates' orations, expressed in original freshness, so many of the prominent ideas of Elyot and the other Renaissance humanists on morality, on education and eloquence, and on the relations between princes and subjects.' [79]

In contrast, while some educationist histories of education do not mention Elyot at all [80], even those that do mention him make no reference to his knowledge of Isocrates or to his place within the Isocratic tradition [81]. We shall focus here on Elyot's role in transmitting the Isocratic idea of education.

Our primary source for Elyot's educational ideas is The Boke Named the Governor. As we would expect from Elyot's life-

long interest in Isocrates, both the structure and the content of this work are indicative of his commitment to the Isocratic heritage. Elyot's translation of Isocrates' To Nicocles was intended as a companion piece to, if not the completion of, the Governor, and the two works are correspondingly similar in structure.

Elyot's presupposition of the Isocratic idea of education is clear in the structure of the Governor. Like the early sections of To Nicocles, the first three chapters of Book One of the Governor outline a monarchical political doctrine [82]. The remaining twenty-three chapters of Book One are devoted to a description of the proper education of an aristocratic class in accordance with Elyot's political doctrine [83]. The remainder of the work, Books Two and Three, provides an extended historical argument describing the social graces and political virtues repectively of this aristocratic class. These descriptions are illustrated, in the Isocratic tradition of historical biography extending from Plutarch, with examples drawn from the political history of classical antiquity [84]. Although the Governor has a plainly political intention, its emphasis throughout is on education in the service of this political intention [85]. As Major observed,

> 'The beginning chapters on the ideal public weal, the government of which is in the hands of a monarch and his officers, are included by Elyot simply in order to establish the setting in which the education of these governors is to take place -- in other words, to fix clearly in the minds of parents and tutor, at the start, that the one all-important goal toward which the child's instruction should lead is good government.' [86]

If we turn from the structure of the Governor to its content, we find still clearer evidence of Elyot's presupposition of the Isocratic idea of education, and of his transmission of the Isocratic legacy of rhetorical education generally.

Elyot sets forth the inter-related political and educational intentions of the Governor in the Proem. On the basis of his study of Greek and Latin literature and politics, Elyot tells us that

> 'I have now enterprised to describe in our vulgar tongue the form of a just public weal...'

and that

> 'this present book treateth of the education of them that hereafter may be deemed worthy to be governors of the public weal under your highness.' [87]

Elyot turns first to the hierarchical and monarchical political doctrine signified by the words "public weal".

> ' A public weal is a body living, compact or made of sundry estates or degrees of men, which is disposed by the order of equity and governed by the rule and moderation of reason.' [88]

A hierarchical "public weal" , in which a monarch is the apex of the political hierarchy, is distinguished from both aristocracy and democracy. In Elyot's view, political power is held by a single class in aristocratic regimes, and by the people as a whole in democratic regimes. In contrast, he advocates a republican monarchy in which political power is distributed to both the monarch and an aristocratic class, within a constitutional framework [89]. While the greater share of political power rests with the monarch, Elyot emphasizes that the real political power of the aristocracy

nevertheless serves to moderate the monarch, and mediates between the political judgements of the monarch, and the people. In a hereditary monarchy, the political character of the monarch will often be a product of chance. The political responsibility and influence of the class of magistrates is therefore clearly very great, and Elyot is primarily concerned with their political education.

Elyot points out that he has entitled his work the book "of the Governor" rather than "of the Monarch " because he seeks to educate a class of governors, or "magistrates" as he often describes them, rather than the king or the prince [90]. The class of magistrates will be appointed by the monarch in order to assist him in 'the distribution of justice' [91]. The magistrates are to be selected from the wider class of propertied and leisured gentlemen because this class is, in Elyot's view, best suited to political administration. They can be expected to be good magistrates because their livelihood depends on the security of their property, and therefore on the political stability of the regime. Elyot argues that such dependence is conducive to moderate and prudent political judgement. Furthermore, such judgement can be refined by the liberal education which this class is able to provide to its children, thus ensuring the perpetuation of a moderate governing class with a material interest in political stability [92]. Elyot explicitly emphasizes that he prepared the Governor with the intention of describing the broad rhetorical education required by such a class of

magistrates in the light of its political function [93].

Elyot was much distressed by what he regarded as the decline of learning among the aristocratic class from which his magistrates were to be drawn. He defines this decline in Isocratic terms, emphasizing in particular the decline of wide general learning culminating in oratorical eloquence.

> 'Wherefore inasmuch as an orator is required to be a heap of all manner of learning, which of some is called the world of science, of other the circle of doctrine, which is one word Greek Encyclopedia; therefore at this day may be found but very few orators.' [94]

In Elyot's view, the once exalted title "orator" had been reduced to an honorary appellation used by anyone of high birth who happened to advise the monarch [95]. His educational programme was intended to rectify this decline.

Elyot would have early education proceed in accordance with 'the counsel of Quintilian' [96]. The young magistrate is to be nurtured by a nurse who is of good character and well spoken, and who therefore provides a foundation for both virtue and good speech [97]. The nurse is replaced by a tutor who is to be 'excellently learned both in Greek and Latin', and suited to the task of ' instructing an orator' [98]. The formal instruction provided by the tutor emphasizes the study of written and spoken Greek and Latin, as well as political history. Elyot includes the distinctively Isocratic discipline of political history with the intention of both educating political judgement and inspiring the young to imitate classical exemplars of political virtue. The specific virtue

of political moderation is further encouraged through musical instruction. Other accomplishments, including painting and carving, are taught as preparations for geometry, astronomy and cosmography (geography) [99]. This programme of elementary education, ending at the age of fourteen, concludes with the study of a wide range of classical authors, including Aesop, Lucien, Aristophanes, Homer, Virgil and Erasmus. Study of these authors is valued as a means by which both political judgement and oratorical eloquence may be developed [100].

The next stage of Elyot's educational programme, 'the most commodius and necessary studies', are centred on rhetoric and oratory, and therefore the responsibility of a teacher 'studiously exercised in the art of an orator' [101]. This teacher instructs the young magistrates in logic, rhetoric, and such cosmography as is required for an understanding of political history. Political history itself is taught in accordance with the example of 'the sweet Isocrates', as well as Cicero and Quintilian [102]. Although the orations of Cicero and Demosthenes are regarded as most compatible with contemporary oratorical tastes, it is Isocrates who is regarded as presenting the best system of oratorical education.

> 'Isocrates, concerning the lesson of orators, is everywhere wonderful profitable, having almost as many wise sentences [judgements] as he hath words, and with that is so sweet and delectable to read that, after him, almost all others seem unsavoury and tedius; and in persuading as well a prince as a private person to virtue, in two very little and commendius works, whereof he made the one to King Nicocles, and the other to his friend Demonicus, would be perfectly conned and had in continual memory.' [103]

Elyot adopts in particular Isocrates' view of the political value of oratorical education.

> 'The utility that a nobleman shall have by reading these orators [Isocrates, Demosthenes, Cicero] is that when he shall hap to reason in counsel, or shall speak in a great audience or to strange ambassadors of great princes, he shall not be constrained to speak words sudden and disordered, but shall bestow them aptly and in their places.' [104]

Finally, Elyot's Isocratically trained and widely learned orators turn to study of 'that part of philosophy named moral, which instructeth men in virtue and politic governance' [105]. Although Elyot does not recommend it, he does acknowledge that the study of law may also be profitable on the grounds that it was a component of ancient rhetorical education [106].

Elyot closes his treatise with a reiteration of the political value of the education he prescribes, and of the presupposition of the Isocratic idea of education on which it is founded.

> 'Now all ye readers that desire to have your children to be governors, or in any other authority in the public weal of your country, if ye bring them up and instruct them in such form as in this book is declared, they shall then seem to all men worthy to be in authority, honour and noblesse, and all that is under their governance shall prosper and come to perfection.'[107]

Sir Thomas Elyot, translator and student of Isocrates, transmitted both the Isocratic tradition of oratorical education and the Isocratic idea of education in England.

6.4.2 Roger Ascham

The Elizabethan humanist, Roger Ascham (c. 1515 - 1568),

continued the Isocratic tradition of educational thought generally, and followed the humanism of Erasmus and Elyot specifically [108]. Ascham was perhaps the most highly regarded educator of his day, and served as tutor to Lady Jane Grey and Queen Elizabeth I. Ascham was also highly regarded as an educational thinker. His The Scholemaster, begun in 1563 and published posthumously in 1568, was 'one of the most acclaimed books on education in Renaissance England' [109]. Renaissance scholars in our own day continue to regard The Scholemaster as one of the great works of educational philosophy and ideas [110]. Once again, however, educationist historians either ignore Ascham [111], or merely mention in passing Ascham's advocacy of double translation and his opposition to corporal punishment in education [112]. The present argument shall recover a fuller appreciation of Ascham's educational thought, and of his place within the Isocratic tradition.

Ascham was greatly influenced by Isocrates throughout his life. He began his academic career at the University of Cambridge with a course of lectures on Isocrates [113]. In a letter to Stephen Gardiner, Ascham explains that he 'will follow rather Isocrates' counsel' in deciding to abandon the increasingly politicized world of Cambridge in favour of a position as tutor to the Princess Elizabeth. Ascham constructed an Isocratic curriculum for the Princess consisting of the Isocratic historian Livy, and the rhetorical works of Isocrates, Demosthenes and Cicero, as well as the

Greek New Testament [114]. Contemporary records describe the Princess Elizabeth pursuing classical studies under Ascham's direction, translating the orators Isocrates and Demosthenes in the morning, and Cicero in the afternoon.

The Scholemaster also shows influence of Isocrates. As Ryan has shown,

> 'it is clear that Ascham was an admirer, despite Plato's warnings against their pitfalls, of the so-called "Gorgianic figures", and that his main classical model was not Cicero but rather the Athenian orator and rhetorician Isocrates.' [115]

Ascham's treatise includes his own translations of passages from Isocrates, setting forth Isocrates' educational ideas as the model to be imitated in English education [116]. Isocrates was popularized throughout English education as a result of the influence of Ascham's treatise.

> 'Isocrates himself was admired by the humanist Ascham, and at the end of the sixteenth century his works were a regular part of the English grammar school curriculum.' [117]

We turn now from the well-established influence of Isocrates on Ascham to an examination of the transmission of the Isocratic idea of education.

Ascham presupposes the Isocratic idea of education. In his view, the duty of 'scholars and learners', that is, teachers and students, is to serve their monarch [118]. Ascham regarded monarchy as the surest means to 'quiet government', by which he means a regime as free as possible from external enemies and internal strife. He also thought a monarchy the most likely to support an established church, which is itself

a contributor to political stability [119]. Although Elizabethan England was, of course, a monarchy, Ascham believed that the regime was being corrupted. In his view English gentlemen were brought up and educated with too much liberty. Excessive liberty, particularly among young men, undermines the self-discipline and moderation which are required for both learning and statesmanship. Ascham's educational solution to this corruption consisted of a return to what he considered the stricter standards of the monarchies of classical antiquity, and to the education associated with them [120]. It must be emphasized that Ascham bases both his criticism of the Elizabethan nobility and his proposed solution explicitly on Isocrates. Ascham begins by observing that

> 'Isocrates, doth leave in memory of writing, concerning the care that the noble city of Athens had to bring up their youth in honest company and virtuous discipline.' [121]

He follows this remark with a long quotation from Isocrates' Areopagiticus, which he translated himself, arguing that a return to an older form of the prevailing political doctrine, and the education that supported it, is the best solution to the corruption of the regime [122]. Ascham argues, following Isocrates, that the corruption of the regime may be reversed by renewed emphasis on education intended to moderate liberty and train minds of the young for prudent statesmanship. He goes on provide a list of Greek orator statesmen who exemplify the intentions of such education. This list is drawn largely from Isocrates, although it is supplemented by the addition of two of Isocrates' students, Timotheus and Theopompus [123].

Ascham's advocacy of a monarchical political doctrine, strengthened by a return to the standards and education of its more noble past, is derived from Isocrates.

Ascham follows the Isocratic tradition in setting out to educate a class of statesmen, drawn from the young men of the nobility [124], in accordance with a specific political doctrine. His educational ideal is 'the bonus orator of Quintilian', augmented by a recovery of the original ideas of Isocrates [125], although the intention of his educational programme is only to prepare young men for the pursuit of this ideal in their university studies [126].

> 'In his correspondence, as in The Scholemaster, Ascham stressed the need for eloquence in the practical world, ideally in the person of a wise and good statesman...' [127]

Ascham intended to prescribe the elementary and secondary education required by a politically effective class of 'wise orators', defined as men of 'deep judgement, either for good counsel or wise writing' [128]. Ascham's notion of 'good counsel' refers to the ability to provide eloquent political advice, while 'wise writing' refers to the ability to compose eloquent advice in the form of diplomatic and administrative correspondence. Both notions place his educational ideas within the Isocratic rhetorical tradition.

As we might expect, the curriculum prescribed by Ascham is literary and rhetorical, in the Isocratic tradition. Even his initial discussion of the place of Scripture in his syllabus is political in emphasis. Old Testament books such as

Judges and Ecclesiastes are presented as suitable reading for 'civil governors', while 'the image of the two princes [Saul and David], the one good, the other bad,' is similarly valued for the political lessons it contains [129]. The first stage of Ascham's curriculum consists of detailed study of spoken and written Latin, primarily through study of Cicero's De Oratore and Epistles, with the intention of developing eloquence and practical judgement [130]. Following Isocrates, and contrary to the recommendations of Plato, subsequent education emphasizes the study of literature and rhetoric, with only a most cursory exposure to the sciences of the quadrivium [131]. Building upon the linguistic and literary foundations provided by this early education, Ascham's recommendations for advanced study are increasingly limited to rhetoric and oratory. Students continue their study of the oratorical works of Cicero, augmented by the Isocratic historian Titus Livius, the political histories of Caesar, and the dramatical works of writers such as Terence and Plautus [132]. Once again such study is valued as a means to the 'eloquence and true judgement' of statesmen [133].

Ascham helped to consolidate Elyot's broadening of Latin education by including the study of Greek language and literature in his curriculum, again with the clear emphasis on literature, history and rhetoric derived from the Isocratic heritage [134]. He included some study of Plato and Aristotle, though from the Isocratic perspective in which speculative philosophy is a preparatory component of a broader programme

of rhetorical and oratorical learning [135]. Indeed, Ascham followed Cicero in regarding Aristotle as an imitator of Isocrates, particularly in his conception of rhetoric [136]. Similarly, Ascham recommends that Plato be studied not as a philosopher, but as a Greek stylist whose literary artistry merits imitation by Elizabethan rhetoricians and orators [137]. Finally, Ascham lists seven characteristics of those young men most likely to be best suited to education: natural ability, good memory, love of learning, eagerness to work, eagerness to listen to others, an enquiring mind, and desire for praise. Although he attributes this list to Socrates, he in fact compiled it himself [138]. The specific descriptions of four of these characteristics are provided by Ascham himself, while the remaining three -- natural ability, love of learning, and eagerness to work -- are explicitly taken from Isocrates. Ascham's discussion of the importance of natural ability, for example, refers to rhetorical ability rather than philosophical, while he illustrates the love of learning with a quotation taken from Isocrates' To Demonicus.

Tudor and Elizabethan educational ideas derive from the Isocratic tradition rather than from the Socratic philosophers. As Lathrop observed, after Erasmus

> 'There is, properly speaking, no Greek philosophy -- nothing but moral essays. The English reader was not ready -- and I suppose never has been ready -- for the tough labour of thought on fundamentals. It is small wonder that Plato and Aristotle were not made known to the Elizabethans [, and that] the only classical Greek writer who really made an impression on sixteenth century England was the excellent Isocrates.' [139]

The next generation of educational thinkers, while continuing

to think within Isocratic educational cncepts and categories, bring about a radical change in the conception of politics which entails a revision of the practical implications of the Isocratic idea of the nature of education.

Chapter Seven

Education and Modern Political Philosophy

7.0 Introduction

The evolution of the Isocratic tradition subsequent to the Renaissance continues to be characterized by the Isocratic idea of education, but is also characterized by a fundamental re-conception of the nature of politics.

> '...what is most profound and interesting about Enlightenment is its radical and self-conscious break with the philosophical tradition in the mode and degree of its political activity.' [1]

The intention of this chapter is to examine this change in the Western understanding of the nature of politics and political thought, and to relate it to the unchanged presupposition of the Isocratic idea of the essential nature of education.

Political philosophers have long recognized the unparalleled importance of Machiavelli in the development of post-Classical political thought. As Leo Strauss put it, 'The founder of modern political philosophy is Machiavelli' [2]. While classical political philosophers believed that the task of political philosophy is to define the good regime in terms of its ability to develop human excellence according to nature, Machiavelli observed that no agreement concerning the political good and human excellence existed or was likely to be obtained. It was better, in his view, to allow individuals to formulate their own conception of the good, and to construct a regime which would allow them to acquire the means necessary for the

pursuit of the good as they understood it. In this view, the normative intentions of education continued to be derived from political doctrine, though in the sense that it provides the individual with the means to choose and pursue his own conception of the good, rather than in the sense of forming the individual in accordance with a conception of the good believed to be inherent in human nature.

Post-Machiavellian political philosophers disagreed about which kinds of means were most important for free individuals desiring to formulate and pursue their own conception of the good. Machiavelli's political thought was revised in England by Hobbes and, in particular, by Locke, who placed economics at the center of political thought and practice. He argued that politics is best understood as the lawful distribution of the material resources which any individual will require for the pursuit of whatever conception of the good they prefer. In contrast, Continental political thinkers, Rousseau in particular, took issue with Locke, while attempting to retain the fundamental ideas of Machiavelli. Rousseau argued that economic resources would be pursued and utilized within the parameters of prior conceptions of the good. Such conceptions are not the product of economic reflection, but of the historically conditioned milieu of ideas within which individuals come to maturity. Explicitly adopting Rousseau's political perspective, Kant gave this general milieu of ideas the name "culture", and regarded it as the most important condition for the formulation of one's conception of the good

[3]. In other words, Rousseau argued that politics consisted primarily of the protection of culture, particularly through education, on the grounds that culture is the necessary substrata of ideas without which the individual's formulation of his own conception of the good is not possible in any more than an animal sense.

The division of Machiavelli's original rejection of classical political rationalism into two traditions of political thought, one emphasizing economics and the other emphasizing culture, constitutes the modern polarity of political and educational thought. The Isocratic idea of the nature of education is retained in modern political thought, though its prescriptive implications are now divided in a manner corresponding to this polarity: the normative intentions of education are derived from a broadly Machiavellian political doctrine, and yet divided between the provision of economic resources and culture, understood as the means required by individuals in the formulation and pursuit of their own conception of the good. In the context of the Machiavellian understanding of the nature of politics, however, the Isocratic idea of education becomes increasingly untenable as a consequence of the increasing diversity within the economic and cultural polarity of modern political aspirations.

7.1 Machiavelli's Turn from the Ancients.

If we are to understand both the radical break with

classical political philosophy and the commonality underlying the diversity of modern political ideas, then we must turn to the political philosopher who was conscious of bringing about this transformation. That thinker was not Hobbes, Descartes,or Bacon, but the man whose thought each of them explicitly sought to refine and develop, namely, Nicolo Machiavelli (1459-1517) [4].

The importance of a clear understanding of Machiavelli's position as the originator of modern political thought, as well as of the continuing dominance of his fundamental political ideas, can hardly be exaggerated. As one Machiavelli scholar argued, modernity itself originates with Machiavelli.

> 'Man is indebted to Machiavelli for modernity, for Machiavelli was the founder of the modern political orientation.' [5]

If the importance of Machiavelli is clear, however, the nature of that importance is not. From this perspective we must especially avoid the popular stereotype which presents Machiavelli as a ruthless political thinker, and an amoral advocate of real-politik. As the distinguished Machiavelli scholar, Harvey J. Mansfield Jr., put it,

> '...it must be reported that the prevailing view among scholars of Machiavelli is that he was not an evil man who taught evil doctrines and that he does not deserve his infamy.' [6]

In other words, 'Machiavelli was not "Machiavellian"' [7]. Our concern with Machiavelli is limited to his transformation of our conception of the nature of politics, and the relationship between that transformation and the modern transmission of the Isocratic idea of education.

Although Machiavelli's treatises on the art of war and the history of Florence can contribute to an understanding of his political thought, his conception of the nature of politics and political philosophy is presented in his two most famous books, The Prince and, above all, The Discourses on Livy. Livy's interpretation of Roman history provides a direct link between Machiavelli and Isocrates.

> 'It was not to Aquinas's abstract principles but to the Isocratean historian, Livy, that Machiavelli turned for information about the conduct of affairs.' [8]

Machiavelli radicalized Isocrates' critique of Socrates and Plato, in the sense that he accepted Isocrates' critique of the 'imagined principalities' which he believed were advocated in the Republic, but extended that critique to include a rejection of Isocrates' own teleological conception of nature in political life and thought. Machiavelli leaves the Isocratic conception of the nature of education unchanged, while at the same time radically revising the broader classical conception of the nature of politics.

Machiavelli's break with classical political thought is grounded in his rejection of the classical conception of nature. As we have seen, classical political thinkers, and their medieval followers, regarded nature as both the essential characteristics of a thing, and as the inherent perfection of a thing. According to this view, human beings could discover both the natural human telos and the procedural natural right which defined the proper means to it. As Isaiah Berlin observed, however, when we come to the political thought of

Machiavelli,

> '...there is no trace of Platonic or Aristotelian teleology, no reference to any ideal order, to any doctrine of man's place in nature in the great chain of being...' [9]

Accompanying his rejection of the classical notion of natural human perfection is a rejection of the classical and medieval conception of natural right [10]. Although Machiavelli rejected the classical conception of nature, he retained the classical view that political thought must be grounded in an understanding of nature and human nature.

We may formulate the Machiavellian conception of nature in more explicitly political terms by adumbrating Machiavelli's political reasoning. Machiavelli understood that the classics defined human excellence in terms of virtue, and defined the good regime in terms of its ability to provide for the development of such virtue. In other words, the polis brings about the common good when it acts to make all men virtuous. In Machiavelli's view, however, the common good can not be defined in this way for two reasons, one practical and one theoretical.

In practical terms, political history tells us that few can achieve virtue and human excellence, and that those who fail to achieve it may easily become a disenfranchised and therefore destabilizing political class. More fundamentallly, in theoretical terms, Machiavelli observed that no agreement existed or was likely to be obtained concerning natural human excellence and virtue. On the contrary, the history of individual regimes and international relations is the story of

the wars and conflicts between different groups adhering to different conception of virtue and the political good. The tragic consequences of the classical understanding of the relationship between nature and politics was that the disenfranchized political classes and international war brought about by it destroyed the peace and prosperity which are the actual goals sought by the vast majority of political men. Machiavelli concluded that it would therefore be better to reject the classical emphasis on unrealizable political regimes in favour of a new emphasis on realizable regimes based on the factual nature of politics. Machiavelli rejects the political aspirations of the many who have

> 'imagined republics and principalities which were never seen or known truly to exist. The reason is that those many have taken their bearing by how one ought to live; Machiavelli will take his bearings by how men do live.' [11]

In order to take our bearings from how men do live, we must lower our conception of the political good, from the natural human perfection which we do not know to the peace and prosperity which we do know, and which is commonly sought through political life. Machiavelli's political reasoning is grounded in this re-definition of nature. Nature is no longer understood as the end or goal of political life.

Machiavelli's rejection of both the classical conception of nature and of the relationship between nature and political aspiration is developed in terms of a new conception of the ends of political life. The good regime is no longer understood in terms of its ability to provide for the development of

virtue in accordance with natural human excellence. Machiavelli substitutes freedom and the provision of resources in the place of human excellence as the proper goal of the regime, and correspondingly redefines virtue in terms of the pursuit of resources and freedom rather than human excellence. We will examine each of these in turn.

Machiavelli sees nature not as the end of political life to be perfected, but as the original condition of men which is to be overcome for the sake of material prosperity, understood as one of the primary goals of political life. Human beings are no longer integral parts of a perfectable cosmos, as in classical thought, or masters of nature, as in biblical thought. Machiavelli separates human beings from the rest of nature, and sets them against it. Human beings must struggle with nature in order to extract from it the material resources they need for physical survival, and eventually for prosperity defined as availability of resources adequate for more than mere survival. In Machiavelli's terms, political thought ought not to take its bearings from what is high and rare, but from what is low and commonplace. In formulating the goals of political life the classics looked to what is very rare, to human excellence and virtuousness to which few aspire and which perhaps even fewer can attain. Machiavelli looks instead to what is common in nature and political experience: material need rather than perfection, and selfishness in the pursuit of one's own conception of the good rather than virtuous pursuit of the common good.

Machiavelli justifies the pursuit of material resources and prosperity as a political goal with reference to his revision of the classical conception of the good life. As we have seen, Machiavelli argued that the good, whether of individuals or of the regime, was unknown and subject to sometimes violent disagreement. He responds to this observation by making the formulation and pursuit of the good a matter for individual judgement rather than authorative imposition by the regime [12]. Each individual formulates his own conception of the good life he wishes to pursue. Correspondingly, the regime is a good one to the extent that it provides each individual with the necessary conditions for the pursuit of their own conceptions of the good. These conditions are, in Machiavelli's view, material resources and the maximum degree of political freedom compatible with the freedom of all.

Machiavelli reconceptualizes virtue in accordance with his view that the good life ought to be a matter of individual judgement, and that the regime is a good one to the extent that it provides the conditions which allow individuals to pursue the good life as they concieve it. As we have seen, Machiavelli rejected the classical view that virtue was an end in itself, a component of human excellence as defined by the regime. In its place he substitutes a conception of virtue regarded as the powers of the individual, or the means required by the individual, for the pursuit of his conception of the good life. Specifically, the virtues are whichever human attributes conducive to securing one's material well-being and freedom.

Honesty, for example, is no longer good in itself, but is "the best policy", a condition for the reputation necessary for secure dealing in business.

Machiavelli was well aware of the philosophical and political implications of his break with classical political thought. If human perfection or the good life are not given by nature, and are therefore not justifiably imposed by the regime, then they are ideals freely formed by man. If a man's goals or perfection are not inherent in human nature, then he is free to define them and pursue them [13]. Correspondingly, freedom is no longer defined in the classical sense as the ability to pursue one's natural good, but in the modern sense of the ability to choose one's conception of the good. The political and educational emphasis shifts to an emphasis on "rational autonomy", to freedom uncircumscribed by a definitive conception of the good common to all citizens. The common good sought by the regime is no longer human excellence according to nature, but human freedom according to the indeterminacy of human nature. The correlative goal of education is no longer to enable men to know and understand the good inherent in their human nature, but to provide them with the means to define their own conception of the good life, and then to pursue it in a manner consistent with the same pursuit by their fellow citizens.

7.2 Locke, Economics and Education

John Locke (1632-1704) made fundamental contributions to epistemology, political philosophy, educational philosophy, and economics, and we still live very much under the influence of his ideas. As I hope to show at greater length at another time, the educational thought of Locke has been misinterpreted by educationists over the past century. I shall do no more here than to adumbrate some of the misrepresentations which, if presupposed, may make the argument I seek to develop seem idiosyncratic and improbable. It should be emphasized that I will not engage with the "arguments" which these interpreters of Locke have put forward for their views because their views are not supported by either argument or textual reference.

The relationship between Locke's philosophical and educational ideas has given rise to the most serious misreprentations of his work. Educationist opinion concerning this relationship is divided. There are those, such as R.F. Dearden, who assert that some philosophers

> 'who have indeed written on education, such as Locke, have not done so on the basis of their philosophical views but just as intelligent and sensible men.' [14]

On the other hand, there are those who categorize Locke as a "British Empiricist" [15], and assert that his educational ideas are based on his epistemology [16]. Both of these interpretations appear to be the consequence of an attempt to interpret Locke on the basis of a prior commitment to the epistemological emphasis of analytic philosophy, and an attempt

to attribute this commitment to philosophers, such as Locke, who held quite different conceptions of philosophy.

Locke himself links his educational ideas to his political philosophy. In 'Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman' (1703; published 1720), Locke divides political thought into two components, one concerned with the foundations of a regime, and the other concerned with the maintenance of a regime. His Two Treatises of Government is concerned with the foundations, while his Thoughts Concerning Education is derivatively concerned with the maintenance of the regime [17]. Locke's educational ideas are based on his philosophy, though on his political philosophy rather than his epistemology.

Locke develops the ideas of Machiavelli rather than "British Empiricism". Despite his originality, Locke was consciously developing Machiavelli's break with the ancients in both education and politics [18]. He was a careful student of Machiavelli, and his personal library contained Machiavelli's complete works as well as individual editions of Machiavelli's works in political philosophy [19]. As Peter Laslett observed, in the introduction to his scholarly edition of Locke's Two Treatises of Government,

> 'He [Locke], and not Hobbes, could perhaps be looked upon as Machiavelli's philosopher, but most certainly not because the content of his philosophy entailed the content of Machiavellian political doctrine.' [20]

Laslett goes on to argue that Locke is Machiavelli's philosopher in the sense that his work is grounded on

Machiavelli's break with the classical tradition. The specific political doctrines advocated by Locke and Machiavelli are both grounded in Machiavelli's original rejection of the classical conception of nature and its use in political thought, though they derive different political prescriptions from this common foundation [21].

The connection between Locke's thought and Machiavelli, and through Machiavelli to Isocrates, provides the context within which we shall interpret the relationship between his political and educational ideas. We will develop two aspects of this relationship in particular. First, Locke accepts and develops the Machiavellian rather than the classical conception of political philosophy. Locke accepts Machiavelli's view that nature provides the starting point of political action, understood as a state of affairs to be overcome, through political life, for the sake of human freedom. Second, Locke links politics to education through the Isocratic idea, in the sense that the normative intentions of education are derived from a political doctrine formulated by Locke on the basis of the Machiavellian conception of politics. More broadly, the Roman Isocratean educational thought of Cicero and Quintilian also connect Locke to the Isocratic tradition. We turn now to an explication of the relationship between Locke's Roman Isocratean educational thought and his Machiavellian politics.

Explicitly following the example of Roman education [22], Locke distinguishes parental power from political power, and

places education under the power of parents rather than political institutions [23]. His reasons for doing so are derived directly from his political doctrine. In Locke's view, the exercise of political authority and power is legimate only with the consent of the citizenry. Such consent must not be merely formal, but must also be freely given. Locke argues that free consent is endangered whenever the precursors of such consent, such as education, are under the control of government itself. Correspondingly, the duty to educate children belongs to parents rather than to the state, while the child's right to education is claimed from parents rather than government [24]. As Locke argues,

> 'The Nourishment and Education of their Children, is a Charge so incumbent on Parents for their Childrens Good, that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it.' [25]

In Locke's view, neither the parent's authority over, nor their duty to provide, education can be absolved, particularly by government. Yet Locke is equally insistent that the normative intentions of education are derived from political doctrine. In his view, parents have fulfilled their duty, and the rights of children have been satisfied, when education has prepared the children for citizenship specifically. Parents have power over their children's education until the children

> 'may be supposed capable to understand that Rule, whether it be the Law of Nature, or the municipal Law of the Country they are to govern themselves by: Capable, I say, to know it, as well as several others, who live, as Free-men, under that Law.' [26]

It is the responsibility of parents rather than of government to ensure that children are educated so as to be willing and

able to govern themselves in accordance with law, and in common with the other citizens of the regime. Underlying these normative intentions of education is Locke's commercial republicanism.

Locke's political philosophy is famously grounded in "the state of nature", understood as follows [27]. All men are created equal, in the sense that all are endowed with natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of property, or of the resources required for the pursuit of the good as they understand it. Government is instituted to secure these rights through powers and authority legitimated by the consent of the governed [28]. The economic emphasis of Locke's commercial liberalism is discernible in his conception of the relationship between freedom and prosperity.

As a component of his acceptance of Machiavelli's break with the classics, Locke carefully distinguishes between axiological and deontological neutrality in political thought. The human good is not given by nature, and remains unknown and contested. Government is therefore to be neutral with respect to the axiological good, and to seek instead to secure the conditions within which individuals can freely formulate and pursue their own conception of the good. The pursuit of the good by individuals requires supportive procedural and material conditions, liberty rights and material resources. Accordingly, government in commercial republics are not deontologically neutral, in the sense that they are to prescribe, through law,

the right way of life . In other words, government is neutral with respect to the good life, but not the right life; government is neutral with regard to ends rather than procedures. Governments are justified in securing rights to liberty and property insofar as these rights are the conditions for the pursuit of the good as conceived by individuals, and for the equal enjoyment of such conditions by all citizens.

It is on the basis of this theoretical view of politics that Locke advocates the commercial and republican regime. In Locke's Machiavellian view, the goal of political institutions is to make men free and prosperous rather than excellent according to nature, as the classics would have it. The supreme end of government is liberty, and the primary function of government is 'to make secure private property as a means to personal freedom' [29]. Correspondingly, virtue is redefined in Machiavellian terms. Virtue is no longer regarded in axiological terms as human excellence, but in deontological terms as effective skills and dispositions suitable to the maintenance of liberty and the pursuit of property [30]. Locke regards education as a political enterprise in the sense that it is intended to inculcate virtue understood in these terms, for the sake of the maintenance of the commercial republican regime.

Locke explicitly presents his major educational treatise, Thoughts Concerning Education, as a text intended to serve prior political intentions. In the Dedicatory Epistle, Locke

claims that he published his educational writings as an act of political duty, and goes on to derive the normative intentions of education from political doctrine. As we have seen, Locke's commercial republicanism prescribes a government which protects individual liberty and the pursuit of property for the sake of the welfare of the regime as a whole. In the Thoughts, Locke explicitly links education to this economic conception of the good regime.

> 'The well Educating of their Children is so much the Duty and Concern of Parents, and the Welfare and Prosperity of the Nation so much depends on it, that I would have every one lay it [the Thoughts] seriously to heart...' [31]

The emphasis on the economic benefits of education, valued in the context of commercial republicanism, is clear in this passage, in which Locke sets out the normative intentions of education as he understands it. As Nathan Tarcov observed,

> '...the gentleman's education Locke advocates is supportive of the politics he taught. It forms men of business and affairs.' [32]

More specifically, education is intended to produce men of business and political affairs in the sense that

> 'They are well-formed to further the public interest by attending to private property while being at the same time vigilant observers of government...' [33]

The normative intentions of Lockean education are economic in emphasis in accordance with the broader political doctrine he advocates. Men who are educated for the free pursuit of property, and who regard government as legitimate to the extent that it fairly regulates such pursuit, will ensure 'the Welfare and Prosperity of the Nation,' and to that extent embody the normative intentions of Lockean education. These intentions are

derived from Locke's commercial republicanism.

A brief examination of the practical features of Lockean education will help us to understand more clearly the political origins of its intentions, as well as its place within the Isocratic tradition. Locke defines the aims of education in four components, virtue, wisdom, breeding and learning [34]. Virtue, and particularly wisdom and learning, are explicated in Isocratic terms, though Locke's educational thought is connected to the Isocratic tradition indirecly through the oratorical works of Cicero and Quintilian.

Locke values spoken and written eloquence very highly as aims of education, with direct reference to the Roman Isocratean educators [35]. Locke, like Isocrates, regards the virtues as moral dispositions founded on common opinion within the regime [36]. Similarly, Locke discusses wisdom in the following terms.

> 'Wisdom I take, in the popular exceptation, for a Man's managing his business ably, and with foresight in this world.' [37]

This definition of wisdom emphasizes the management of one's economic affairs, and echoes Isocrates' claim that education should facilitate the development of probable knowledge and judgement in practical affairs, and in accordance with doxa or opinion [38].

Locke values learning as an educational aim in distinctly Isocratic terms. He tells his readers that

> 'You will wonder, perhaps, that I put Learning last, especially if I tell you I think it the least part. [...] Reading and Writing and Learning I allow to be necessary, but yet not the chief Business. I imagine you would think him a very foolish Fellow that should not value a virtuous, or a wise man, infinitely before a great Scholar.' [39]

Locke values political knowledge above all, and, again like Isocrates, regards other knowledge as unecessary, or as mental exercise in preparation for higher education. In Locke's words,

> '...he who would be universally known must acquaint himself with the objects of all sciences. But this is not necessary to a gentleman, whose proper calling is the service of his country, and so is most properly concerned in moral and political knowledge. And thus the studies which more immediately belong to his calling are those which treat of virtues and vices, of civil society and the arts of government, and so will take in also law and history.' [40]

The secondary status of knowledge as an educational aim, and the emphasis on eloquence, virtue and wisdom understood in terms of practical political judgement and adherence to common opinion, place Locke within the Isocratic rather than the Socratic tradition, a placement which is directly supported by Locke's reference to Roman Isocratean educators. Furthermore, wisdom, virtue and learning are valued as preparation for the free pursuit of property within a republican regime. In other words, Locke also presupposes the Isocratic idea of the nature of education in the sense that the normative intentions of Lockean education are derived from a prior political doctrine.

7.3 Rousseau, Culture and Education

The educational thought of Rousseau has been misrepresented by educationists in this century. A highly

selective familiarity with Rousseau's writings is the root cause of these misinterpretations, as non-educationist scholars have observed.

> 'Of Rousseau's major works it [the Emile] is the one least studied or commented on. It is as though the book's force had been entirely spent on the impact with men like Kant and Schiller, leaving only the somewhat cranky residue for which the books retains its fame in teacher training schools...' [41]

Of particular importance to the present argument is an appreciation of Rousseau's place in the history of philosophy and educational ideas, and a corresponding understanding of the nature of Rousseau's educational writings.

Educationists assume that Rousseau was an unsystematic thinker whose works are not strictly "philosophical". R.S. Peters, for example, could assert that

> 'no one who knows any philosophy would rate Rousseau's Emile very highly as a piece of philosophical analysis or argument.' [42]

This assertion is not supported by any reference to Rousseau's text, but by an appeal to the authority of "those who know philosophy". Such an appeal does not constitute an argument, and, moreover, betrays an ignorance of Rousseau's status in the history of philosophical thought. To say nothing of contemporary scholars who are unquestionably among "those who know philosophy", philosophers such as Hume and Kant regarded Rousseau's works, the Emile in particular, to be among the greatest works of philosophical argument and analysis in Western history [43]. Contrary to the educationist image, Rousseau was a man of immense and detailed classical learning, who engaged with some of the most difficult problems of Western

philosophy in a manner recognized by virtually all "those who know philosophy" to be of the highest order.

Another reason for the educationist misrepresentation of Rousseau is a failure to understand Rousseau's conception of the art of philosophic writing, along with a failure to take account of the entire corpus of such writings. (A dependence on Foxley's unreliable translation of the Emile has also contributed.) These failures are epitomized by R.F. Dearden, who asserted that Rousseau, in the Emile,

> 'assumes a one-to-one pupil-teacher relationship which is economic nonsense now.' [44]

This assertion would be valid only if the Emile was intended by Rousseau to be a treatise, and intended to prescribe educational practice. Yet in his other educational writings, such as The Government of Poland and the fifth of the Letters Written from the Mountain, Rousseau explicitly insists that the Emile is intended to present some of the fundamental questions of educational philosophy, and is not intended to be a practical treatise. On the contrary, Rousseau regarded his two principle educational writings, the Emile and the Government of Poland, as imitations of Plato's Republic and Laws respectively [45]. Rousseau's dramatic representation of the relationship between Jean-Jacques and Emile corresponds to the dramatic dialogue form of Plato's philosophical writing, and is intended in part to represent the philosophical problem of the nature of relationships in education rather than to literally recommend a "pupil-teacher relationship". It is from the perspective of such considerations that we shall concentrate here on the

Government of Poland, in which the relationship between education, "culture", and politics is directly discussed.

The educational and political thought of Rousseau was a response to the Enlightenment, and specifically to John Locke. Rousseau adopted the view, derived from Machiavelli through Locke, that nature defined the starting point of political thought rather than its end. He disagreed sharply, however, with Locke in particular, concerning the identity of nature and human nature. As we have seen, Locke argued that human beings were, by nature, free and acquisitive individuals, and that government ought therefore to protect individual rights to property as a means to securing their liberty as citizens. Rousseau supplemented, and, he believed, corrected, Locke by adding history to the list of essential features of human nature. Rousseau observed that human beings are the only animals conscious of their ancestry, and formed by the ideas and aspirations of their ancestors. Specifically, Rousseau observed that, contrary to Locke, men did not pursue property and liberty from the point of view of their individual preferences alone, but within the context of preferences informed by the history of their political community. Rousseau argued that men were not by nature possessive individualists, but individuals formed by the political community to which they belong.

Rousseau observed that men and women belonging to different regimes or political communities differ from one

another in terms of what they value as individuals, and that these differences cannot be accounted for by Locke's conception of human nature. If, as Locke argues, all human beings are motivated by the same desires for property and liberty, then it is difficult to account for the enormous differences that actually exist between individuals belonging to different political communities. Rousseau accounted for these differences by invoking history, understood as the formation and development through time of ideas and ideals which constitute the shared intellectual inheritance of the community, and which forms individual members of such communities. Although Kant was the first philosopher to use the term "culture" to refer to such a historically conditioned inheritance, he was explicitly following Rousseau's thought in doing so.

Kant, like Rousseau, turned to history and culture as a supplement and corrective to what they believed to be the narrow and incomplete Lockean conception of human nature and politics.

> 'The notion of "culture" was formed in response to the rise of commercial society.' [46]

They argued that human beings could not be completely fulfilled as possessive individualists in commercial society, but required in addition to be members of a community. Moreover, as Rousseau argued, historically conditioned preferences and ideals largely determined what individuals would seek: while individuals may, as Locke claimed, pursue property, they pursued property as a means to the fulfillment of logically prior goals. These goals were not the product of either commercial society or economic

calculation, but of culture, or the historically conditioned milieu of ideas within which each individual comes to maturity and relative to which his mind is formed. "Culture" is logically and practically prior to economics. Political and educational thought must therefore take its bearings from the perspective of culture rather than economics if it is to be adequate to the whole of human nature, and to the sources of the ideas and aspirations which motivate men's commercial activity.

Rousseau's conception of cultural politics is developed most succinctly in his Discours sur les sciences et les arts. In the fifth paragraph of the second book of this work, Rousseau condemns the Enlightenment intellectuals, on the grounds that they

> 'smile contemptuously at such old-fashioned words as fatherland and religion, and dedicate their talents and their philosophy to destroying all that is sacred among men.'

Rousseau argues that the concentration on economics, and the correlative limitation of political and educational thought and action to the commercial context, neglects indispensable components of both political life specifically, and humam fulfillment generally. Men who are free and prosperous, but lacking the consolations and aspirations of religion or the self-transcendance of community life are not necessarily happy. If happiness constitutes the good sought by commercial society, and if, as Rousseau argues, such society may not be conducive to happiness, then it is inadequate in its own political terms. Political and educational thought, therefore, must not focus

on the economic means to the pursuit of happiness, but on the moral content and status of happiness itself.

Rousseau proceeds in the Discours to argue that an appreciation of the moral conditions of human happiness can be best discovered by returning to the ancient republicanism, understood as the historical source of Western European political culture. In his view, the limitations of modern commercial republicans could be revealed and corrected by a return to the political thought of the ancient republicans. In Rousseau's words,

> 'Ancient statemen spoke incessantly about moeurs and virtue, ours speak only of commerce and money.' [47]

Rousseau's usage of moeurs is equivalent to the contemporary usage of the word "culture", and refers not only to morals, but also to the broader customs, manners, traditions and ideals that define a political community. Rousseau advocated a return to ancient Roman constitutional republicanism in the belief that this political doctrine was most conducive to the development of moeurs and virtue, and therefore best able to correct the narrowness of modern commercial republicanism.

Rousseau's political alternative to modern commercial republicanism, and the normative intentions of education derived from it, are both developed most fully in Considerations sur le gouvernment de Pologne. In this book, Rousseau rejects the growing cosmopolitanism of Europe in favour of a return to the ancient view that men and women were

above all members of a particular regime and nationality. Affirming this ideal in the context of the political conditions of Poland, Rousseau argued that his political and educational prescriptions would ensure that

> 'When the Pole reaches the age of twenty, he must be a Pole, not some other kind of man.' [48]

The political doctrine of ancient constitutional republicanism served to form a regime in which the citizens were united not by commerce and competition, but by the moeurs or culture which bound them together as a cohesive and cooperative community. The cohesive nature of Rousseau's republic is well described by Horowitz.

> 'The requisite homogeneity of the populace with respect to wealth, education, and status -- reinforced by the bonds of a common national religion -- would give rise to the same hopes in the hearts of all the citizens, while their heads would be filled with virtually identical opinions.' [49]

As Horowitz's observation suggests, a central component to the maintenance of a national culture and regime is a suitable education. Rousseau himself emphasizes that it is above all education which leads

> 'to the paths -- unknown to us moderns -- along which the ancients led men up to that level of spiritual vigour, of patriotic zeal, of high esteem for the qualities that are truly personal and not foreign to the nature of man, of which we have no contemporary examples.' [50]

Rousseau regards education as an essentially political enterprise, which consolidates and transmits the cultural history and aspirations of the regime. The precise derivation of the normative intentions of education from political doctrine become clearer as Rousseau develops his argument in the context of his discussions of Poland.

Rousseau presents education as the most important component of political thought and action on the grounds that the moeurs of the regime will be maintained only if the normative intentions of education are derived from an appropriate political doctrine.

> 'Here we have the important topic: it is education that you must count on to shape the souls of the citizens in a national pattern, and so to direct their opinions, their likes, and dislikes, that they shall be patriotic by inclination, passionately, of necessity.' [51]

Rousseau proceeds to argue that education ought to be provided by the state, in part so that there will be no differentiation of educational provision on the basis of wealth. This argument is not based on an objection to economic inequality. Rather, Rousseau argues that education differentiated by economic status, or by any other consideration, ought to be avoided because such differentiation destroys the social homogeneity and cultural coherence which is a prerequisite for the maintenance of democratic government generally, and ancient republicanism specifically [52]. Similarly, the curriculum itself reflects educational intentions derived from prior political aspirations. Students are first immersed in the literature of their own country, and proceed through a programme emphasizing the geography, history -- political history especially -- and laws of their country. Teachers must also be citizens of the same country, and never foreigners [53]. The selection of teachers, the construction of the curriculum, and the distributions of schools are all components of the normative intentions of education which are derived from Rousseau's commitment to the political doctrine of ancient

republicanism, and to the underlying conception of cultural politics.

7.4 The Modern Polarity

The period between the consolidation of Renaissance humanism and the beginnings of state schooling witnessed a radical transformation of the Isocratic tradition of educational thought. Although the Enlightenment thinkers perpetuated Isocrates' claim that the normative intentions of education are derived from political doctrine, they formulated a conception of politics, and a series of political doctrines, quite unlike those accepted by the tradition of classical political thought of which even Isocrates was a part.

Machiavelli rejected the classical belief that the political good could be known and constructed on the basis of an understanding of the natural perfection of human nature. In contrast, he grounded political thought in the belief that the political good was indeterminate because human nature was not defined by potential natural perfection, but by freedom. In his view, human nature was defined above all by our freedom to formulate our own conception of the political good. Correspondingly, although Machiavelli continues to presuppose the Isocratic idea, the normative intentions of education come to be derived from political doctrines grounded in human freedom rather than the natural human good. Education in this view is an enterprise which seeks to develop rational autonomy,

understood as the ability and disposition to rationally formulate one's own conception of the good and the appropriate means to its realization.

From the point of view of education, modern political thought deriving from Machiavelli divides into two branches. This division is predicated on a difference of opinion concerning the most important means to human freedom. Following Machiavelli's example most closely, Locke emphasizes the importance of material resources as a precondition for both political liberty and rational autonomy. When material resources within the regime are distributed relatively widely amongst the (by contemporary standards small) citizenry, the means by which government may circumscribe their political liberties is correspondingly reduced. Similarly, those who possess sufficient material resources to secure life and personal liberty are in a position to formulate and pursue their own conception of the good in a rationally autonomous manner consistent with the rights to life, liberty and similar pursuits among the citizenry in general. Lockean education is intended to produce a rational and autonomous citizenry supportive of a commercial republic; the normative intentions of the economic pole of modern education are derived from a commercial republican political doctrine.

The second and opposing pole of modern educational thought derives from Rousseau. Rousseau argues that Locke's purely economic man does not and cannot exist in actual political

life. Human nature is such that it rises above mere animal desire not through economic acquisition but through history, and specifically through the development of the rich diversity of "cultures". It is only when the human mind is formed by the ideals of a specific culture that it can have a context in which the formulation of a conception of the good is possible. The human good is not formulated in terms of possession, but in terms of belonging. The normative intentions of education are therefore derived from a cultural conception of the nature of politics, and from a political doctrine formulated within the cultural parameters of the political community specifically.

Modern political thought, and therefore educational thought, is divided by the modern political polarity of economics and culture. Both sides of this polarity share the Machiavellian belief that the human good is indeterminate, and that human beings ought therefore to be free to formulate conceptions of their own. Derived from this new conception of politics, though on the basis of the Isocratic idea of education, is the view that the normative intentions of education are defined in terms of rational autonomy, and yet circumscribed by the necessities of economics and the contingencies of culture. It is not at all clear, however, that rational autonomy understood in these terms is possible; education derived from any of the increasingly diverse political doctrines grounded in this polarity, and the Machiavellian conception of politics underlying it, may be both incoherent and unjustified. It may be that the combination of

modern economic and cultural politics with the presuppostion of the Isocratic idea of education is untenable, and that for the first time in the history of Western political and educational thought it may be necessary not only to question the Isocratic idea, but to reject it.

PART THREE

A SOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE TO THE ISOCRATIC IDEA

'The Platonic dialogues do not present a doctrine; they prepare the way for philosophizing.' Allan Bloom. [1]

In Part Three we begin to formulate the Socratic alternative to the Isocratic idea of education. The Socratic, or classical political rationalist, approach to education incorporates a wide range of arguments, ideas and prescriptions. The present argument is limited to the Socratic view of the origins and status of the normative intentions of education. The argument of the following three chapters, which comprise Part Three, are intended to provide a unified Socratic argument. It may be useful to briefly outline this argument, and to explain the sense in which it is Socratic.

Contemporary political thought is often grounded in an abstract set of ideas in terms of which political prescriptions are justified. These ideas are abstract in the sense that they are formulated prior to any engagement in political life, and often with the intention of finding an "objective" perspective outside the often irrational passions and contingent objectives of political action. Just as older modern political thinkers, such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, ground their political arguments in "the state of nature", contemporary political thinkers such as John Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, or Jurgen Habermas, begin with the Original Position, Constrained Power Talk, or the Ideal Speech

Situation, respectively. To mention only a single contemporary example, John Rawls grounds political reason and prescription in "the Original Position", a situation which does not and can never actually exist in political life. From a Socratic perspective, attempts to ground political thought in pre-political abstractions of this kind are theoretically inadequate, not to say practically unworkable, in part because they attempt to attribute more reasonableness and rationality to political life than is actually there.

The Socratic method, by contrast, does not begin with abstractions formulated in isolation from actual political life, but with a direct engagement with the political speech of statesmen and citizens. Socrates is portrayed by both Plato and Xenophon, as well as by Diogenes Laertius, engaging in critical conversation with Athenian citizens concerning the internal consistency and relative merits of their political opinions. He does not evaluate these opinions in terms of ideas constructed through pre-political reflection, but by the standard of the principle of contradiction. A political description or prescription which contradicts itself is both formally flawed and likely to lead to undesirable practical consequences. Similarly, the fact that two (perhaps internally consistent) political opinions are inconsistent with one another suggests that at least one, and perhaps both, are inadequate in both formal and practical terms. In other words, modern and contemporary political thought is structured by deductive logic, in which political opinions are derived from

axioms constructed prior to an engagement with political life. In the classical political rationalist view, the political thinker reasons dialectically, and attempts to construct political axioms or principles on the basis of logical refinement , as defined by the principle of contradiction, of the political opinions of political agents. Rather than reasoning from a conception of the good regime deductively to the specific political opinions ideally held by citizens, a classical political rationalist reasons from the political opinions of citizens toward a more consistent conception of the political good. The argument of the following three chapters is structured in accordance with this method of reasoning.

The first chapter of Part Three, Chapter Nine, applies this Socratic methodology to the presupposition of the Isocratic idea of education in contemporary educational and political thought. In section 9.1 it is argued that the homogeneity of origin, aspiration, and politically derived normative intentions among students that Isocrates presupposed no longer obtains. Section 9.2 follows the Socratic methodology in arguing that such practical inadequacies are the consequences of theoretical inadequacies which are a permanent feature of the Isocratic idea, though perhaps more readily apparent in contemporary educational thought and practice. Section 9.3 provides a specific illustration of some of the points argued in the preceding two sections of Chapter Nine. Advocates of (liberal) democracy believe that there is

an intimate and desirable compatibility between education and democratic political doctrine. This belief , which is of very recent origin in the history of educational thought, is shown to be dubitable. Section 9.4 suggests that the practical and philosophical inadequacies of the Isocratic idea of education direct our attention toward the need for a recovery of the alternative Socratic idea of education.

Chapter Ten extends and refines the Socratic argument of the previous chapter by examining the Isocratic idea in critical contrast with the Socratic alternative, and by providing an argued synopsis of the Socratic idea of education. The attempt to derive the normative intentions of education from political doctrine presupposes, and therefore potentially raises the question of, the conception of the political good. The conception of the political good, or of the ultimate ends and standards of the regime, is not one which is raised by citizens and statesmen qua citizens and statesmen. The question of the nature and status of the good regime is a question of political philosophy, and one which is raised fully only when one reasons from the presuppositions of political life to the questions of political philosophy. The normative intentions of Socratic education are not derived deductively from axiomatic political doctrines, but are constructed dialectically from the philosophical questions which such axioms point toward and are, indeed, intended to answer. The attempt to address such questions requires an appreciation of dialectical reasoning, as well as knowledge of

the most fundamental alternatives. Without such knowledge, reasoning may be formally sound, but without substance.

Chapter 11 examines the arguments provided by Socrates for the curriculum of higher and preparatory education derived from the Socratic idea of education. A dialectical confrontation with the fundamental alternatives requires both an appreciation of the possibility of rational truth beyond one's own experiences, and a corresponding moderation of one's intellectual and political life. Socrates argues that a scientific and civic education provides for such appreciation and moderation, valued in terms of the philosophic life rather than adherence to questionable political doctrine. While such education may prepare the young for useful and responsible political and economic life, it does so only as a contingent consequence of the philosophical life which defines the normative intentions of education. In the Socratic view, education is no longer merely a servant of political opinion and aspiration, but an enterprise separate from, and almost always antagonistic to, political life.

The Socratic idea of education challenges the prevailing Isocratic idea. The response to this challenge most consistent with the Socratic view is not necessarily an acceptance of the philosophical idea of education, but an attempt to appreciate the dialectical antagonism between the Isocratic and Socratic heritage, and hence to return with renewed vision to the philosophical question of the nature of education.

Chapter Eight

The Inadequacy of the Isocratic Heritage.

> 'If the absolute power of majority were to be substituted by democratic nations for all the different powers that checked or retarded excessively the energy of individual minds, the evil would only have changed character. Men would not have found the means of independent life; they would simply have discovered (no easy task) a new physiognomy of servitude. There is, and I cannot repeat it too often, there is here matter for profound reflection to those who look on freedom of thought as a holy thing and who hate not only the despot, but despotism. For myself, when I feel the hand of power lie heavy on my brow, I care but little to know who oppresses me; and I am not the more disposed to stand beneath the yoke because it is held out to me by the arms o f a m i l l i o n m e n . '
>
> Tocqueville [1]

8.0 Introduction

The intention of this chapter is to show that the Isocratic heritage may no longer be practically tenable, and that this reveals some of its philosophical inadequacies. Isocrates presupposed not only a general consensus of political opinion, but also a homogeneity of origin and aspiration among those most likely to be educated. In the context of the expansion of education, particularly over the past century, none of these presuppositions remain valid. This practical situation helps us to more clearly perceive the underlying philosophical inadequacies of the Isocratic idea specifically. Although it is widely presupposed that the normative intentions of education can be derived from democratic political doctrine, even this specific instance of

the Isocratic idea is problematic.

8.1 The Breakdown of the Isocratic Consensus

The Isocratic tradition of educational thought and practice is founded on a number of ideas and presuppositions. Some of the presuppositions are artifacts of the social and political conditions within which Isocrates lived. As Moses Finley observed, using the term "pedagogy" to denote formal education,

> 'Isocrates' programme was pedagogical, and it was designed for members of the ruling elite, a socially and culturally homogeneous group, whose common values were formed and repeatedly reinforced by their continuous association and shared experience, at first within the family and then outside, in the army, in the dining clubs, in their political activity. Higher education continued to be so based until the end of the nineteenth century; the structure and needs of society may have changed radically from one era to another, but not the fact that it was a homogeneous elite who received the pedagogy as a part of a larger common education.' [2]

Isocrates could assume that students entering higher education adhered to essentially the same political doctrine, shared a comparatively uniform cultural background, including a system of religious belief and practice, and were to be educated for the same goals in life. As we have seen, the young of the aristocratic class were destined to constitute the ruling class of the regime, and to define its broader cultural standards and aspirations. In the context of contemporary liberal democracies, none of these conditions obtain, especially to the degree assumed by Isocrates, or by educators in the Isocratic tradition prior to the nineteenth century.

The breakdown of the consensus presupposed within the Isocratic tradition is intimately linked to the rise of state schooling, and especially to the increasingly direct control of education by political institutions. This is by no means to suggest that state schooling is faulty, but rather that its implementation accentuated the political debates surrounding education. As James Bowen observed,

> 'It is of the highest significance that since the entry of the state into education the controversies and conflicts on the nature, purpose and practices of education have become much greater. This is not to be taken to imply causation; rather the conditions which allowed the emergence of the organized political state have also promoted those changes which make it very difficult to make both theoretical and practical decisions in respect to education.' [3]

As Bowen suggests, the direct control of educational institutions by the state brought about an increase in the number and severity of debates concerning the normative intentions of education.

The earliest systems of modern state schooling, particularly those in eighteenth century Prussia and Austria, were designed and implemented in political conditions of the kind assumed by Isocrates. A small ruling class constructed a system of state schooling intended to serve the political aspirations of that class, and of the state as a whole as they conceived it [4]. The traditional ruling classes saw the control of compulsory state schooling as a natural prerogative of the ruling class, and as a means for providing a subordinate class of industrial labour and soldiers [5]. The

details of the specific intentions of early state schooling are less important, however, than the fact that they were controlled by a relatively small and powerful ruling class in accordance with a general consensus of political opinion. As the states in Western Europe developed over the subsequent two centuries, however, the gradual democratization of political life meant that an increasing number of previously powerless social, economic, religious and other groups within the regime sought to ensure that their own political aspirations were served by education, and by the provision of state schooling in particular.

It would take us too far from the intentions of this chapter to reiterate the now familiar historical development of state schooling, and the political disputes concerning its ultimate purposes. What is most relevant from the perspective of our present intentions is the gradual breakdown of the political consensus presupposed within the Isocratic tradition or, in other words, the increasingly diverse range of political doctrines from which the normative intentions of education were to be derived. Indeed, so little of the historical consensus remains in contemporary political and educational life that some educationists have begun to talk of a "fragmentation of values" [6]. It is debatable whether the present diversity of political doctrine stems from the "fragmentation" of a previously integrated consensus, or from the addition of a wider range of opinion to a previously single and comparatively unified political doctrine. What is

important is the contemporary sociological situation, in which the normative intentions of education are derived from an increasing diversity of political opinion in a manner incompatible with the presuppositions of the Isocratic heritage.

The breakdown of the political consensus presupposed within the Isocratic tradition can perhaps be understood most clearly in terms of what I have called "the modern polarity". On the one hand, deriving ultimately from the axiological neutrality of Machiavelli and Locke, and in practice from the extension of the suffrage to women and the working class, there has been an increasing diversity of economic aspiration grounded in a corresponding diversity of political doctrine. To mention only a few of the more prominent examples, Marxist educational thinkers have argued that education ought to be a means to bring about an equal distribution of material resources, in accordance with the view, central to Marxist political doctrine, that economic distribution ought to be a function of the material relations of production rather than the ownership of capital. Egalitarian liberal democrats, on the other hand, have in general regarded education as a means to ensure equality of opportunity, in the sense that education ought to ensure that all students have equal access through education to the same range of resources and employment opportunities, regardless of the economic status of their parents. Neo-liberal democrats adhere to still another political doctrine in which the normative intentions and

distributive principles of education are relative to the belief that education itself is a commodity which ought to be distributed in accordance with the principle of freedom, regardless of any consequent inequalities of economic distribution, on the economic grounds that this will bring about the highest overall standard of living for all. In contemporary educational debate, and particularly in the struggle between advocates of state versus market provision of education throughout Europe and North America, this diversity of economically defined political doctrine underlies the increasing diversity of educational provision not only between the state and private sectors, but also between advocates of egalitarianism and libertarianism within the private sector [7]. In these conditions the Isocratic presupposition of a general consensus of political belief and aspiration no longer obtains, and the presupposition of the Isocratic idea of education is correspondingly questionable.

The second component of the modernist polarity, "culture", is now regarded as a source of the normative intentions of education. Although it is arguably an incoherent view, some contemporary political and educational thought includes "religion" as a component of one's "primary culture" [8]. A familiar feature of contemporary educational debate and practice throughout the West is the advocacy of educational provision in accordance with the normative standards of a variety of "cultural" traditions. Muslim, Christian and Jews, orthodox as well as fundamentalist, are arguing for the

incorporation of their not always easily compatible traditions within secular state schooling, or for the provision of separate education in which the normative intentions are derived from the (theologico-) political doctrine to which they are committed [9]. Other groups define their "culture" in terms of nationalistic, linguistic, or even racial characteristics, and are also demanding separate educational provision in accordance with the broader political doctrines which define the educational importance of these characteristics. Once again, this diversity of political doctrine, expressed in terms of "culture", is another indication that the consensus presupposed by the Isocratic tradition no longer exists. The philosophical implications of the disappearance of such consensus for the coherence and justifiability of the Isocratic idea itself will likewise be explored in the subsequent section.

In addition to assuming that the normative intentions would be derived from a political doctrine more or less universally held within the regime, Isocrates also presupposed that the students to be educated would be similarly homogeneous. Specifically, Isocrates, and those adhering to the Isocratic tradition prior to the nineteenth century, could assume that their students came from the same social class, shared the same social and political beliefs, and shared much the same aspirations, namely political leadership. The increasing democratization and pluralism of contemporary political life has also meant that this uniformity is no

longer (or is at least much less) a feature of education. Although the philosophical argument of this thesis is narrowly focused on the question of the origin of the normative intentions of education, it might be useful to briefly examine some of these other characteristics of the Isocratic tradition in order to better understand the contemporary breakdown of consensus which may be rendering it untenable in practice.

The Isocratic tradition both presupposed and helped to consolidate a homogeneity of cultural experience, as well as a consensus of political doctrine. A student population defined in terms of a comparatively narrow homogeneity of origins and of aspirations certainly no longer obtains. As early as 1948 classicist historians of education were acutely aware that this homogeneity had effectively disappeared, with unclear implications for the viability of the Isocratic tradition in European education. As Marrou pointed out, whatever its faults, the Isocratic tradition ensured that

> 'all the minds of one generation, and those of a whole period of history, had a fundamental homogeneity which makes communication and communion easier. [...] In a classical culture all men share the same treasury of admiration and emulation: the same rules, metaphors, examples and words -- a common idiom. Who, among the moderns, can recall all of this without nostalgia?' [10]

More recent educational scholars have refined and developed Marrou's original insight. Pierre Bourdieu, for example, has argued in a series of influential publications that the inclusion of previously excluded groups, such as women, religious minorities and the working class, means that teachers can no longer assume that all students share the same

"cultural capital", or the same expectations of education [11]. For example, whereas students of previous generations came from ruling class and expected to be educated in preparation for life of political leadership, contemporary working class students in general see education as a means of improving their standard of living without any assumption that they have a natural place in government.

8.2 The Errors of Isocrates

Isocrates, and those who presuppose his idea of education, must distinguish between the logical consistency of deriving the normative intentions of education from political doctrine, and the philosophical justifiability of that derivation. It is certainly possible to begin with a commitment to any given political doctrine, and to derive from it a set of normative educational intentions in accordance with the canons of logical consistency. Adherents to Stalinism, for example, who believed that the transition from capitalism to communism in accordance with the Marxist laws of history must be guided by the political vanguard of the proletariat in the form of the Party, constructed a system of education intended to bring about an acceptance of the collective ownership of the means of production, and a citizenry inclined to obey the edicts of the Party. If one begins from an adherence to the doctrine of National Socialism (Nazism), then one may consistently construct a system of

education intended to inculcate the submersion of the individual in the historical spirit of the Germanic peoples, as represented in the authority of the Leader. Finally, if one begins with a commitment to liberal democracy, one may consistently construct a system of education intended to encourage rational autonomy within the normative parameters of the regime. It must be emphasized that in each of these three educational doctrines the formal aims of education -- literacy, numeracy, or scientific learning -- are all pursued in essentially the same way, and with comparable success, but are valued according to radically different normative intentions. The differences between the normative intentions are consequences of the difference between the political doctrines from which they are derived. If one accepts any one of these political doctrines, then the respective normative intentions of education within each regime may be derived from it without logical inconsistency. The fact that formal derivations are logically consistent, however, does not establish that either the axiomatic political doctrine or the normative intentions of education derived from them are justified.

In order for the derivation of the normative intentions of education from political doctrine to be justified, one would have to establish at least three claims. First, one would have to establish that the political doctrine itself was philosophically justified. Second, one would have to establish that the derivation of the normative intentions from that

specific doctrine was also justified. Finally, and most fundamentally, one would have to establish that the Isocratic idea of education itself was either justified, or necessary in the sense that education was in the nature of things a political enterprise. Such justificatory arguments would be quite different from those establishing logical consistency. Unfortunately, neither Isocrates nor the Isocratic tradition provides such arguments.

We turn first to the claim that the derivation of the normative intentions of education from political doctrine can be in part justified on the grounds that the political doctrine in question is itself justified. It can safely be said that no political doctrine can claim to be justified in a manner acceptable to all those who examine it rationally. On the one hand, there are internal variations within any one political doctrine, none of which are regarded as fully justified even by those who in general adhere to the doctrine in question. Advocates of liberal democracy, for example, can be divided into egalitarians and libertarians, partisans of participatory and representative mechanisms and procedures, and so on. Similarly, advocates of Islamic theologico-political doctrine can be divided into Sunni and Shi'ite, in accordance with the jurisprudential tradition of shari'ah interpretation to which they are committed. Comparable divisions exist within all other political doctrines with which we are familiar. If no single interpretation of any given political doctrine can claim to be conclusively

justified even to those who accept it in broad terms, then the claim that the derivation of the normative intentions of education is justified in part because the axiomatic political doctrine is justified remains unestablished, and therefore dubitable.

Even if we were to accept, however, that there was common agreement amongst advocates of any particular political doctrine concerning its detailed components and justifiability, it would not follow that such a doctrine was justified. The contemporary political world presents us with an almost bewildering variety of political doctrines. The justifiability of Western liberal democracy is challenged by advocates of Albanian and Korean communism, socialism, neo-fascism, a variety of theologico-political doctrines, and resurgent nationalism, both within and outside Europe. Even if we leave to one side those whose rationality is undermined by fanaticism or the cumulative hatreds of war, none of these political doctrines can claim to be fully justified, or uncontested by its rational opponents. Once again, if no political doctrine can claim to be fully justified, then the corresponding justifiability of the derivation of the normative intentions of education from axiomatic political doctrine is unestablished.

The unjustifiability, and the consequent contestability, of any given political doctrine from which the normative intentions of education are to be derived, provides us with a

new perspective on some common presuppositions within contemporary educational thought. R.S. Peters, for example, accepted the Isocratic assumption

> 'that "education" is an essentially contested concept, and will be used in different ways according to people's ideologies.' [12]

Peters goes on to define "ideologies" as 'ethical and social philosophies' [13]. Yet if we look more carefully at the logical structure of arguments defining the relationship between education and politics, we see that Peters's assertion that the idea (or concept) of education is essentially contested is untrue. The essential nature of education is not contested in any way in this context. On the contrary, advocates of all ideologies presuppose precisely the same idea of education: they presuppose that education is an enterprise which derives its normative intentions from political doctrine. There is no disagreement about the idea that the normative intentions of education should be derived from political doctrine. Disagreement concerns the nature of the political doctrine from which the normative intentions of education are to be derived. This directs us to still more fundamental Isocratic presuppositions which remain unestablished, and therefore questionable.

Even if we assume that a political doctrine could be identified which was justifiable to a degree satisfactory to all rational individuals, the presupposition of the Isocratic idea of education would remain unjustified. An analogy may help to clarify this claim. If a particular political doctrine

is known to be justified, it does not follow that the normative intentions of personal relationships ought to be derived from it. Personal relationships, particularly those defined by love or friendship, not only sometimes transcend differences of political doctrine, but can be valued in terms which are quite distinct from those of political life. The assertion that one ought to love only other liberal democrats is not unjustified because liberal democracy is unjustified, but because the coherence and justifiability of subjecting love and friendship to political standards is unestablished. Similarly, the Isocratic idea of education rests in part on the presupposition that education, unlike such goods as love and friendship, is an essentially political enterprise. If this presupposition is unestablished, then the derivation of the normative intentions of education from political doctrine is unjustified, regardless of the status of the political doctrine in question. We will briefly examine two arguments which suggest that this presupposition is unestablished.

As we have seen, Isocrates assumed that education is in the nature of things an inherently political enterprise. In his view, the normative intentions of education were derived from political doctrine, and the provision of education properly under political control, in part because he assumed that education effectively determined the nature of the society in which one was to live. The Isocratic assumption of the essentially political nature of education is shared by contemporary educationists, two of whom recently argued as

follows.

> 'The main argument for shifting from professional to political control of the broad framework of the curriculum is that questions about the aims and content of the curriculum are intimately connected with views about the kind of society we wish to live in. They are as much political questions as issues of taxation policy or defense.' [14]

As the broader context of the discussion from which this quote is taken makes clear, "education" refers to state schooling. While state schooling, essentially by definition, is a political enterprise, education need not be. Education, even if broadly defined as the pursuit of such aims as knowledge and understanding, can be pursued for the sake of the satisfactions internal to them and without reference to the kind of regime in which we live. Indeed, the history of education abounds with individuals such as Maimonides, Petrarch or Spinoza, who withdrew from the political society of their day for the sake of their education, and especially for the sake of their rational autonomy and pursuit of knowledge. More recently, some dissidents of the Soviet Union, such as Pasternak, wished to pursue education and intellectual life because they regarded it as good and as freeing their own minds, and these educational intentions had little or nothing to do with the society in which they wanted to live [15]. If we interpret the quotation above as an empirical claim concerning the relationship between education and political life, and if we distinguish education from state schooling, then we have good reasons to conclude that it is false. Education is not necessarily connected to views about the kind of society, or regime, we wish to live in.

Similarly, even if education is intimately related to the kind of society we want to live in, a logically prior question concerns the direction of the relationship. If education is intimately related to the kind of society we want to live in, then we could approach this relationship from the perspective of the Isocratic idea of education. In other words, we could start with a political doctrine which defines the society in which we want to live, and derive the normative intentions of education from it. On the other hand, however, we could start with a conception of education as a good life in itself, and reason in the opposite direction to the kind of political regime that would support autonomous education of this kind. In this case, the normative intentions of politics are in part derived from education, or are justified with reference to a logically prior idea of education. It may be that we want to live in the kind of society which seeks to protect the autonomy of education from politicization generally, and from the derivation of the normative intentions of education from political doctrine specifically. If we understand the direction of the relationship and politics in this way, then it may well follow, as Locke famously argued, that there ought to be no political control of education precisely because of the intimate relationship between education and the kind of society we wish to live in. [16]. If education is understood as an autonomous enterprise then educational institutions would operate autonomously from political institutions. If there is a connection between educational and political institutions at all, it would be defined by the obligation on

political institutions to protect the autonomy of education from political control.

We turn now to the second argument which shows that Isocrates' conception of the political nature of education is unestablished. As we have seen, Isocrates believed that human beings were set apart from animals by virtue of a specifically political faculty. Accordingly, human perfection was sought in the virtues and activities unique to this faculty, and expressed in rhetorical and oratorical ability in the political arena. Human perfection was not understood within the Isocratic tradition in terms of the philosophical search for the truth, and the virtues supportive of that search. Isocrates circumscribed virtue and the exercise of rationality within the presuppositions and intentions of political life. In other words, Isocrates circumscribed the normative intentions of education in accordance with his view that human nature was above all political, and therefore limited by the normative opinions prevailing in the regime. The coherence and justifiability of the claim that education is essentially political in general, and of the Isocratic idea of education in particular, depends on the validity of this view of human nature. Isocrates' idea of education depends on the truth of the claim that human beings really are characterized by a political faculty, and that human virtue and excellence is defined by the development of that faculty in political life. This is itself not a political claim but a philosophical one. Hence the establishment of Isocrates' claim that politics is

the highest category of human achievement depends on a prior philosophical argument. Such an argument presupposes a prior philosophical rather than political education, in the sense that alternative claims made by advocates of philosophical thought and life, theological life and thought, and political life and thought must be understood and evaluated before Isocrates' view could be rationally established. Isocrates' claim that the political life is the highest cannot be established by political argument alone.

The very fact that Isocrates' view that human nature is essentially political is itself a philosophical claim requiring philosophical argument suggests that there may be another kind of human perfection, defined by the philosophical rather than the political life, and that the normative intentions of education are more intimately related to philosophy than to politics. Thus, an evaluation of the claims of Isocrates leads us naturally to philosophy, and to the Socratic view that the normative intentions of education are not derived from the contingencies of political doctrine, but from the permanent questions raised by the philosophic life, some of which are raised by political life. It is from this perspective that we shall return to the Socratic view in the next chapter. For the moment we shall turn first to an examination of the ambiguities of the Isocratic view of the relationship between education and politics in the context of contemporary liberal democracy.

8.3 The Educational Vices of Democracy

Very recent educationists, from Dewey onwards, often presuppose that there is a perhaps uniquely justified relationship between education and democracy, such that the normative intentions of education can be justifiably derived from some form of democratic doctrine. It might be useful, therefore, to examine the justifiability of the Isocratic idea in the case of (liberal) democratic political doctrine specifically. The intention of this section is to argue that the justifiability of deriving the normative intentions of education from democratic political doctrine is unestablished for at least two sets of reasons.

Turning to the first set of reasons, the justifiability of the derivation of the normative intentions of education from democratic political doctrine is unestablished for reasons that are equally applicable to all other political doctrines. First, democratic doctrine is divided into a number of more specific doctrines. Advocates of each of these specific versions of democratic doctrine argue that the derivation of the normative intentions of education from rival versions is unjustified, and these arguments are so far inconclusive. The normative educational intentions advocated by egalitarian social democrats are not justified to a degree acceptable to rational advocates of neo-liberal capitalist democracy, and vice versa. Second, as we have seen in the previous section, neither democratic political doctrine nor

derivative democratic education is believed to be justified by rational adherents to rival political and educational doctrines. In the context of these continuing political controversies, the justifiability of the derivation of the normative intentions of education from any specific version of democratic doctrine, or for from democratic doctrine generally, is unestablished. From the perspective of its status as a normative axiom of educational prescription, liberal democracy is merely one ideology among many. As we have seen, this is not because education is "essentially contested", but precisely because the Isocratic idea of education is not contested.

From the perspective of the broader intentions of this thesis, our second set of reasons for doubting the justifiability of the Isocratic idea in the context of liberal democracy is perhaps more significant. Every political regime encourages the belief that education and the free use of reason are inherently, even uniquely, supported by it. As the European aristocracies and monarchies began to evolve into liberal democracies, it was widely believed that education and the unhindered use of the human mind were uniquely compatible with the older regimes, and would inevitably decline under democratic government. Even supporters of the emerging liberal democracies were fully aware of the danger that such regimes potentially represented to education. In the words of Max Scheler,

> 'The expansion of democracy, once the ally of free scholarship and philosophy against the supremacy of

> the ecclesiastically restricted mind, is slowly becoming the greatest danger to intellectual freedom. The type of democracy which condemned Socrates and Anaxagoras in Athens is slowly reappearing in the West and perhaps in North America too.' [17]

Unfortunately, contemporary educationists appear to have lost sight of the long tradition of democratic educational philosophy, extending from Rousseau and Thomas Jefferson through Tocqueville to Leo Strauss and others, which warned that liberal democratic regimes have at least as much potential to undermine education as they do to support it.

Contemporary democrats, no less than advocates of other political regimes, assume that education and the free use of reason is inherently, even uniquely associated with their own political doctrine. As one educationist recently put it, contemporary educational thought rests on the assumption

> 'that the most justifiable form of society is an open, pluralist, democratic one, where there is maximum toleration of diversity and a commitment to free critical debate as the most rational means of advancing the pursuit of truth in all its forms.' [18]

What is important to observe is that this view is explicitly presented as an assumption that there is an inherent compatibility between free use of reason, the toleration of diversity, the discovery of truth, and the contemporary forms of pluralist democratic political doctrine. Yet as the absence of an argument for this view suggests, this compatibility is by no means obvious. Indeed, the dubitability of the dogmatic belief in such a compatibility -- the dogmatism of which is somewhat disguised rhetorically by being presented as an "assumption" -- is revealed by both commonplace features of

democratic life, and the philosophical arguments of the older, but no less profound, democratic educational thinkers.

Despite the widespread assumption of an inherent or unique compatibility between democracy and education, easily available sociological observations provide compelling reasons to believe that this assumption is unwarranted. For example, the assumption that liberal democracy is particularly supportive of autonomy or the pursuit of truth, although common in contemporary educationist writing, is very doubtful. If this assumption is interpreted as an empirical belief to the effect that liberal democracy is a condition for autonomy and the pursuit of truth [19], then it would appear to be false. As Isaiah Berlin observed,

> 'The evidence of history tends to show (as, indeed, was argued by James Stephen in his formidable attack on Mill in his Liberty, Equality, Fraternity) that integrity, love of truth, and fiery individualism grow at least as often in severely disciplined communities among, for example, the puritan Calvinists of Scotland or New England, or under military discipline, as in more tolerant or indifferent societies; if this is so, Mill's argument for liberty as a necessary condition for the growth of human genius falls to the ground.' [20]

The weaker version of this assumption, namely that democracy is especially supportive of, albeit not necessary to, autonomy and the pursuit of truth, is similarly both unestablished and doubtful. Eastern European intellectuals, for example, having escaped the (reassuringly unsuccessful) suppression of intellectual life within communist regimes, have written of their astonishment at the fact that institutionalized intellectual life in the Western democracies was both shallow

and conformist, unwittingly intolerant of points of view outside a comparatively narrow spectrum [21]. Whether it is the "McCarthyism" of the Right or the "political correctness" of the Left, democratic education can easily limit the pursuit of truth in accordance with political ideas, and rationalized by what appears to be the will of, or best interests of, "the majority". One refugee from Nazi Germany, encountering the peculiar vices of intellectual life in liberal democracy, observed the following.

> 'Nor can we say that democracy has found a solution to the problem of education. [...] there exists a very dangerous tendency to identify the good man with the good sport, the co-operative fellow, the "regular guy", ie., an over-emphasis on a certain part of social virtue and a corresponding neglect to those virtues which mature, if they do not flourish, in privacy, not to say in solitude: by educating people to co-operate with each other in a friendly spirit, one does not yet educate non-conformists, people who are prepared to stand alone, to fight alone, "rugged individualists". Democracy has not yet found a defence against the creeping conformism and the ever-increasing invasion of privacy which it fosters.' [22]

As this writer's broader discussion goes on to imply, the conformism which can undermine intellectual life in democratic regimes is related to what has come to be know as "the tyranny of the majority". Although this phrase, and the phenomenon it names, are perhaps most popularly known through the works of John Stuart Mill, Mill himself adopted the idea from the great French political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville [23]. It is to Tocqueville's Aristotelian arguments that we must turn for the most elaborate, and for us democrats the most disturbing, arguments for the view that liberal democracy poses grave dangers to education [24].

8.3.1 Tocqueville's Warnings

Straussian political philosophers have been instrumental in reviving Tocqueville's unsettling exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary democratic regimes, from the perspective of education and intellectual life especially.

> 'No one likes to believe that what he can see is limited by circumstances, no matter how easily he recognizes this fact in others. Tocqueville shows how a democratic regime causes a particular bent which, if not actively corrected, distorts the mind's vision.' [25]

Tocqueville's discussions may be most fully understood if we begin with the philosophical ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which served as the foundation for them.

In his Preface to the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, Rousseau offers a disturbing insight into the nature of human beings. Although Rousseau's observation may be universally applicable, it is particularly useful for modern democrats.

> 'There will always be men destined to be subjugated by the opinions of their century, their country, their society. A man who plays the freethinker and the philosopher today would, for the same reason, have merely been a fanatic at the time of the League.'

Rousseau refers here to the Holy League of Henri, third Duc de Guise, established in 1576 and dedicated to the suppression of Protestantism in France. Rousseau observed, in other words, that most people are freethinkers in regimes where democratic principles are dominant for precisely the same reason that they are religious bigots in regimes where theological

principles are dominant. The "same reason" is, in Rousseau's view, that most people are conformists, content to adhere to, or slightly radicalize, the dominant opinions of their time and place. As Tocqueville reiterated,

> 'At different periods dogmatic belief is more or less common. It arises in different ways, and it may change its object and its form; but under no circumstances will dogmatic belief cease to exist, or, in other words, men will never cease to entertain some opinions on trust and without discussion.[...] Thus the question is, not to know whether any intellectual authority exists in an age of democracy but simply to know where it resides and by what standard it is to be measured.' [26]

Following Rousseau, Tocqueville argues that dogmatic belief, and belief which is in conformity to prevailing political authority in particular, is a permanent feature of civil society. The important task for democrats is to determine the nature and limitations of this authority, in order to ensure the rational thought and education conforms as little, and as self-consciously, as possible to such authority. I shall limit my illustrations of Tocqueville's arguments in accordance with what I have called the modern polarity, or the educational imperatives of economics and culture within liberal democratic political doctrine. It must be emphasised that the following arguments are not intended to be critiques of current educational opinion, but rather illustrations of Tocqueville's claim that the Isocratic idea of education is unjustified in the specific case of democracy.

8.3.2 Economics, Freedom and Education

Rousseau and Tocqueville argue that what appear to be

radicalizations of the democratic principles of freedom and equality are in fact the forms taken by a deeper and unrecognized conformism. As Thomas Pangle put it,

> 'What we suppose to be "radical" criticisms of the contemporary powers that be are in fact only radicalizations, more extreme versions, of those very powers. For example, within today's American liberal-democratic cave, the most widely persuasive critiques of democracy will be the ultrademocratic, egalitarian, and the ultraliberal, libertarian, critiques. An education that is, in the Socratic sense, truly liberal -- that is, truly liberating--must strive to bring into question these seemingly "necessary givens", these moral chains, that enslave our souls.' [27]

Our intention in this subsection is to examine one of the ways in which the attempt to derive particular normative intentions of education from "radicalized" democratic doctrine can undermine the same educational intentions. Specifically, attempts grounded in economic theory to radicalize political "freedom" in educational provision can undermine freedom in the education so provided.

In extending Tocqueville's Aristotelian analysis of intellectual life in democratic regimes, it would be best to first focus our attention on the distinctions and inter-relationships between freedom in education and freedom in politics, and on the question of which of the two is prior to the other.

We begin to perceive both the distinction between freedom in education and freedom in politics, and the priority of the former, when we consider the pre-requisites of the exercise of freedom of speech. A pre-requisite of such freedom is

awareness that it is protected, as well as some understanding of the political ends for the sake of which it is protected. Such an awareness and understanding is the product of both formal and informal political education, a subject which has received ample discussion in recent years. A second pre-requisite of freedom of speech is freedom of education, and in particular the development of freedom of mind understood as an awareness of the diverse alternative ideas which exist, and the arguments for them.

> 'The most essential of our freedoms, as men and as liberal democrats, the freedom of our mind, consists in the consciousness of the fundamental alternatives. The preservation of that consciousness is as important as any new scheme for society.' [28]

A regime which provided all the formal requirements of freedom of speech, such as freedom from prosecution, freedom of publishing, and freedom of association, but which nevertheless rigidly controlled education and the range of ideas to which students are exposed, could not be said to have true freedom of speech. Freedom of speech requires above all freedom of mind, or the freedom to encounter and evaluate a diversity of ideas, some of which one may later desire to express in public communication. In this sense at least, freedom of education is both distinct from, and prior to, freedom of expression in the political arena. Tocqueville warns that attempts to radicalize political freedom can undermine freedom in education in democratic regimes.

Tocqueville's warning is inadvertently but usefully illustrated by educationist James Tooley, who provides a

convenient reiteration of libertarian educational arguments [29]. In 'Order Without Design?', Tooley argues that the provision of an ordered curriculum in schools need not be designed by political authorities in government. In this context "order" refers to the presence of a core curriculum which is common to all or almost all educational provision, in spite of the wide diversity of providers within the educational market. Following Tocqueville, we must respond to this claim by attempting to ascertain the basis on which such order is achieved, given that it is brought about without the design of government.

Although libertarians claim that the curriculum ought to be constructed without order imposed by the authority of government, they are also careful to claim that some degree of order will nevertheless characterize the curriculum. Such order will arise out of the educational market because educators are

> 'constrained to work within the cultural context, and offer the appropriate curriculum' [30]

In other words, although order will no longer be imposed by government, it will arise through the workings of the educational market because the providers of education will construct curricula considered to be appropriate to their "cultural context". The basic rule of educational provision thus becomes 'nothing too radical, or we would not be offered employment' [31]. From this point of view, the fact that 'order can be divorced from design' is of little significance. The important point is that order in education cannot be

divorced from authority, and, as Tocqueville argues, the essential question concerns where such authority originates. While libertarians may dispense with political authority wielded by government, they have not yet freed education from the equally debilitating conformity to the authority of public opinion, as Tooley's examples of this process illustrate.

Tooley provides a sequence of historical examples intended to illustrate how order can emerge in education without the authority of government. His examples illustrate an unarticulated dependence on the dominant opinions, and the consequent limitations imposed on freedom of mind by the authority of that opinion. Tooley's first example, Henry Peacham's The Compleat Gentleman (1622), is an unfortunate one from the point of view of his attempt to free educational provision from political authority. Peacham's curriculum may have been appropriate to seventeenth century England, though it was not in any sense constructed in response to "market forces". On the contrary, Peacham's curriculum was explicitly within the Isocratic tradition, and modelled on the educational ideas of Sir Thomas Elyot specifically. Peacham's curriculum was not constructed in accordance with the standards of the market place, but in accordance with the authority and standards of the government of the day [32]. In pre-democratic England, education was provided in accordance with the dominant source of authoritative opinion, the aristocracy and monarchy. When political sovereignty is transferred from the monarch to the people (as represented by

Parliament), libertarian educational thought simply alters its historical allegiance, and subjects education to the authority of the new dominant opinions.

Tooley's subsequent example illustrates the libertarian subjection of the curriculum to the prevailing sources of authoritative opinion, irrespective of the nature of either the authority or the opinions. Tooley turns to the question of what the content of the curriculum might be in the year 2022. His answer is that we must

> 'refuse to predict what we would offer. But I suggest that we very easily pick up what was desired by our "customers". There would be a core curriculum clearly apparent in the educational establishments around, and it would be to this that we would relate our curriculum.' [33]

According to the libertarian view, in other words, the curriculum is not constructed and justified by philosophical argument or, indeed, by any argument at all. On the contrary, the curriculum is constructed in conformity with whatever the dominant opinions should happen to be, and its acceptability is established merely by the fact that it is economically viable. Yet, the economic viability of curricula provided in this way does not at all mean that such curricula are justified,as we already know from similar debates surrounding the provision of pornography. Rather than enter in to this highly contested area of political debate, however, it would be more productive to take Tocqueville's warning as our point of departure, and ask whether such curricula are justified by the political principles accepted by libertarians themselves.

As Tocqueville argues, democrats tend to radicalize democratic principles, such as freedom, in ways which in fact constitute a still greater conformity to perhaps the primary source of intellectual authority in democratic regimes, namely, public opinion. Libertarian radicalization of democratic thought illustrates this process. Libertarians begin with an axiomatic commitment to political and economic freedom, and, without distinguishing between such freedoms and freedom of mind in education, derive the normative intentions of education from this commitment in accordance with the logical structure of the Isocratic idea of education. Radicalizing the principle of democratic freedom, libertarians would greatly increase the freedom to supply and purchase education in the market. Yet such freedom merely transfers intellectual and educational authority from government to public opinion, and consequently undermines not political or economic freedom but educational freedom. Thus libertarian educational doctrine, though grounded in an axiomatic commitment to "freedom", expands political freedom at the expense of curtailing educational freedom, or the freedom of mind most intimately related to education and, as we have seen, logically prior to the exercise of political freedom. The ordered curricula to which students are exposed are circumscribed by the dominant opinions of their time and place, and anything that constitutes a too radical departure from these opinions is, as libertarians acknowledge, unlikely to be provided. Seventeenth century students were educated in accordance with the dominant opinions of their day, just as

students in the twenty-first century will have their freedom of mind circumscribed by what ever ideas happen to be "around". The effort to liberate democratic education from the dominance of the state does not liberate the minds of students from the dominance of public opinion. Thus the attempt to derive the normative intentions from radicalized democratic principles is not justified from the point of view of education, or of libertarianism.

8.3.3 "Culture", Autonomy and Education

Tocqueville argues that democratic regimes encourage an intellectual dependence on abstractions at the expense of detail, just as aristocracies can encourage an emphasis on particularities at the expense of commonalities. Turning first to the effect of aristocratic regimes on intellectual life, Tocqueville observes that

> 'When the conditions of men are very unequal, and inequalities are permanent individual men gradually become so dissimilar that each class assumes the character of a distinct race. Only one of these classes is ever in view at the same instant; and, losing sight of that general tie which binds them all within the vast bosom of mankind, observation invariably rests, not on man, but on certain men. Those who live in this aristocratic state of society, never, therefore, conceive very general ideas respecting themselves...' [34]

Aristocracies encourage an emphasis on the particular characteristic of each political class, and thereby mitigate against appreciation of what is common to all human beings, and which might therefore serve as a foundation for political equality. Democrats, on the other hand, presuppose such

equality, and consequently tend to emphasize what all human beings have in common at the expense of a detailed appreciation of differences which divide them.

> 'He, on the contrary, who inhabits a democratic country, sees around him on every hand men differing but little from one another; he cannot turn his mind to any one portion of mankind without expanding and dilating his thought till it embraces the whole. All the truths that are applicable to himself appear to him equally and similarly applicable to each of his fellow citizens and fellow men' [35]

In Tocqueville's view, this peculiarly democratic tendency to concentrate on very generalizable observations and ideas can undermine education, and the rationally autonomous search for truth.

> 'I have already shown in what way the equality of conditions leads every men to investigate truth for himself. It may readily be perceived that a method of this kind must insensibly beget a tendency to general ideas in the human mind. When I repudiate the traditions of rank, professions, and birth, when I escape from the authority of example to seek out, by the single effort of my reason, the path to be followed. I am inclined to derive the motives of my opinions from human nature itself, and this leads me necessarily, and almost unconsciously, to adopt a great number of very general notions.' [36]

Tocqueville argues, in other words, that democratic equality can, in principle, encourage rational autonomy and the pursuit of truth. However, the pursuit of truth is an enormous and multi-faceted endeavour, and democrats tend to engage in it with little interest in those arguments and opinions tainted by the undemocratic privileges of historical tradition. Divorced from history in this way, and depending on their individual reason, they are easily overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task, and hence attempt to simplify it

through dependence on very general ideas. As he observes, 'general ideas are no proof of the strength, but rather of the insufficiency of the human intellect' [37]. In other words, a consequence of the intellectual vices of democracy can be a dependence on abstractions which are initially adopted to simplify the pursuit of truth, but which in the end can replace the pursuit of truth and undermine rational autonomy. The way in which contemporary educationists employ the notion of "culture" illustrates this process in an instructive manner.

The use of "culture" as an abstraction of this kind is illustrated by John White. Professor White derives the normative intentions of education from one particular version of liberal democracy. In his view, the 'leading idea' behind liberal democracy is the equal control of political power by the citizens [38]. This idea rests in turn

> 'on an underlying belief that everyone should be self-determining in the conduct of their lives as a whole, ie. on a commitment to universal personal autonomy.' [39]

As White rightly emphasizes, autonomy requires that the student be aware of a diversity of alternatives, including an awareness of 'what differentiates the life of a religious believer from that of a sceptic.' [40]. Yet in spite of the centrality of rational autonomy to White's prescriptive account of liberal democratic education, and in spite of his specific reference to an understanding of the views of religious believers, such autonomy is undermined by the educational vices of liberal democracy. In particular, White's

engagement with theologically grounded educational thought through the abstraction of "culture", rather than through the theological thought itself, circumscribes rational autonomy.

Elsewhere in his account of the relationship between autonomy, education and liberal democracy, White goes so far as to claim that

> 'autonomy is an ideal of life particularly favoured in our own culture.' [41]

The term "culture" denotes a liberal democratic regime, and is explicitly contrasted with other "cultures" described as 'tradition-directed communities'. These include North American Indians, African tribes and 'Islamic and Christian believers' [42]. For the purposes of the present argument, we will focus on the example of Islam because it is chosen by White himself. His substitution of "Islamic culture" in the place of Islamic ideas and arguments, and in particular his assertion that Islam does not value rational autonomy and can be approached without knowledge of Arabic, illustrates Tocqueville's warning concerning the educational vices of democratic political doctrine, and therewith the unjustifiability of deriving the normative intentions of education from such doctrine.

Although White provides neither evidence nor argument in support of his view, he asserts that Islamic believers are 'tradition-directed', and 'reject autonomy' [43]. According to White, Muslims 'are not encouraged critically to reflect on the basic assumptions of their belief systems' [44]. As Tocqueville would predict, Islam is classified in terms of the

very general idea "culture", without any attempt to argue that Islam does in fact reject autonomy, or to evaluate the arguments that might be put forward for such a rejection. Indeed, later in the book White asserts that, from the liberal political perspective, 'it makes no sense' for students to be required to learn other languages, including Arabic [45].

> 'It makes much more sense that they leave school with a sympathetic understanding of an array of foreign cultures and communities, including what they can glean through foreign literature in translation, than that they leave with the smatterings of one other language.' [46]

Yet if the intention of education is to enable the student to engage with, say, Islam, in a rationally autonomous manner, then it is necessary for them to learn the appropriate foreign language thoroughly rather than to be left dependent on the generalities of "culture" and the contingencies of translation.

An inevitable consequence of the belief that one need not know a foreign language in order to know a foreign "culture" will be a highly selective and vague impression of that "culture". In particular, while it may seem to be possible to learn about Islam within the abstract parameters of "culture", it will not be possible to engage in any sustained or detailed engagement with the fundamental ideas and arguments which define it without knowledge of Arabic. Not only do Muslims insist that the linguistic construction of the Koran renders it untranslatable, into Romance languages especially, but the contingencies of translation easily mitigate against the possibility of authentic engagement with

the related ideas and arguments. To mention only one particularly difficult hermeneutic problem in this context, texts are selected for translation in accordance with the interests of either the translator or, perhaps more importantly, the market of potential readers: dependence on translation is not only dependence on the interprative perspective of the translator, but on the "market forces" operating within Western society. It is instructive to recall that Arabic manuals of sexual instruction, such as The Scented Garden, were translated into English two centuries before similar editions of al-Farabi's interpretations of Plato were available. The works of contemporary Muslim women novelists, such as Zadyeb al-Kali, who advocate the equality of women within an Islamic framework, and who oppose Western feminism, are not available in translation despite their popularity and high reputation in the Middle East. The canon of 'foreign literature in translation' tells us more about the interests of Western translators and readers than about Arab civilization. As others have shown, a 'sympathetic understanding' of the Middle East has remained elusive precisely because students have been dependent on 'what they can glean through foreign literature in translation', a dependence which reflects political rather than educational considerations [47].

These difficulties apply to questions of Islamic philosophical and educational thought in particular. Contrary to White's assertion, for example, the Arabic tradition of

educational thought, very little of which is available in translation and less still in reliable translation, does not 'reject autonomy', but explicitly advocates it. To mention a single, albeit fundamentally important, work of Islamic political and educational philosophy, Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah argues that rational autonomy is essential to the full development of the two highest components of the human intellect, "experimental intellect" and "speculative intellect". These two components of the intellect are concerned with politics, and with philosophy and theology respectively [48]. We shall illustrate this emphasis on autonomy within the context of the relationship between Islamic educational and political thought assumed by Professor White.

There is a strong tradition of republican government within both the Islamic and the European tradition, in the sense that legitimate political authority is prescribed by law and exercised within the limitations of the expressed consensus of the citizenry. In liberal democracy, the will of the people cannot violate certain fundamental rights and laws, typically expressed in constitutional form and adjudicated in public institutions. The persecution of Jews or blacks, for example, exceeds the bounds of legitimate political authority whether or not it is in fact the democratically expressed will of the majority. Similarly, legitimate political authority within Islamic republicanism is prescribed by the shari'ah, or Islamic law. While philosophical arguments were originally

made for both shari'ah and the fundamental human rights which define liberal constitutionalism, both are in a real way "traditional" in two senses: few of those who accept them could reproduce these arguments, and there is little scope through which the citizenry can change them. On the other hand, there is wide scope for the involvement of autonomous citizens in the formulation of derivative political prescriptions within both traditions. Liberal democrats may involve themselves in the formulation of public policy, just as Muslims may involve themselves in the formulation of Ijtehad, though both will do so within the limitations of higher order, and now largely traditional, political concepts and doctrine. Both Muslims and secular Europeans engage in political debate and activity concerning policy formulation, and only very rarely seek to question the traditional foundations -- basic human rights or shari'ah -- on which these rest. Although White can assert that autonomy is rejected in Islamic "culture", Islamic educational philosophers in fact emphasize autonomy in education as much as liberal democrats do, precisely because they value its exercise in politics within principled limitations similar to those to which we in the West adhere.

The intention of the preceding discussion is not to "refute" Professor White's assertions concerning the importance of foreign languages, or the role of autonomy in Islamic educational and political philosophy. It was necessary to establish that some of his assertions are false in order to

illustrate that the derivation of the normative intentions of education from liberal democratic doctrine is unjustified as a consequence of the educational vices inherent in that political doctrine. It must be emphasized that this derivation is not unjustified from the perspective of an alternative political doctrine, but from the perspective of liberal democracy itself. Tocqueville argues that an inclination to depend on abstractions as a substitute for detailed engagement with unfamiliar ideas and arguments is a vice inherent to democratic intellectual life. White categorizes Islam in terms of the abstract notion of "culture". The specific educational prescriptions which White derives from this politically conditioned abstraction involve the acquisition of a general impression of Islam through selected translated sources rather than a detailed engagement with its fundamental ideas and arguments. If rational autonomy in education is acquired in part through the knowledge of alternative ideas, and of opinions fundamentally different from those prevailing in our regime, then the acquisition of general impressions, bereft of detail, mediated through secondary sources, and erroneous in important ways, cannot be said to contribute toward the acquisition of such knowledge, nor the derivative freedom of mind. Consequently, the rational autonomy of students receiving the education derived from liberal democracy, and subject to the educational vices of that political doctrine, will be undermined in terms valued by White on the basis of this same political doctrine.

It might be helpful if we draw the arguments of the components of this section together. The intention of this section is to argue that the justifiability of deriving the normative intentions from education from democratic doctrine is unestablished. This derivation is unestablished, first of all, because no agreement exists concerning the version of democratic doctrine which is most justified. Tooley and White, for example, each adhere to diametrically opposed versions of a broadly liberal political doctrine, and consequently adhere to different conceptions of the proper relationship between educational and political institutions. It must be emphasized that this opposition is not a consequence of the supposedly "essentially contested" nature of education. On the contrary, both adhere to the Isocratic idea of the nature of education, but attach different versions of liberal doctrine to that idea.

In addition to the inconsistencies between rival versions of liberalism, the justifiability of each version considered separately is also unestablished, not from the point of view of rival doctrines but from the point of view of each version itself. The attempt to derive the normative intentions of education from a radicalized conception of liberal economic freedom undermines the freedom of mind central to liberal education by constructing the curriculum in conformity with prevailing opinion. The comparable derivation from an egalitarian version of liberalism falls victim to the democratic vice of dependence on abstraction, and so

undermines rational autonomy by precluding a detailed engagement with very different and unfamiliar systems of belief. In the context of such vices within, and conflicts between the various version of, liberal democratic doctrine, the justifiability of the Isocratic idea is unestablished.

8.4 The Need for an Alternative Idea of Education

The Isocratic tradition is becoming increasingly untenable, particularly in Western liberal democratic regimes. The presupposition that the normative intentions of education are derived from political doctrine cannot serve as a foundation of education at a time when even a broad agreement about the nature of the best political doctrine no longer exists, or is likely to be obtained. Without the homogeneity of aspiration and political belief that characterized the European social order during the time when the Isocratic educational tradition was most powerful, educational provision which is grounded in that tradition will necessarily reflect the disaffection and fragmentation that characterizes the regime as a whole.

The practical difficulties to which educational provision within the Isocratic tradition is now subject are consequences of theoretical weaknesses in the underlying idea of education. Isocrates argued that education was in the service of the regime, and in accordance with the prevailing political doctrine, but provided no argument or criteria by which such

a political doctrine could be selected from the many available. More fundamentally still, Isocrates provided no argument to show that the normative intentions of education must be or ought to be derived from political doctrine. That it is possible in practice to do so establishes only that political doctrines can generate educational doctrines consistent with them, but does not establish that such generation is justified.

The Isocratic idea of education, and the broader Isocratic tradition which supports it, are no longer either serviceable in practice or unambiguously justified in theory. It is in response to this situation that the argument of this thesis takes an unfamiliar, though I hope not peculiar, direction. Rather than attempting to resolve these practical and theoretical difficulties by attempting to construct a new political doctrine, it suggests instead that we consider a new idea of the nature of education. In other words, I wish to suggest that all those who assume that education is relative to political doctrine may be mistaken not because their political commitments are wrong, but because their shared presupposition of the Isocratic idea of the nature of education is inadequate.

As Moses Finley observed, the contemporary untenability of the Isocratic heritage requires a wholesale re-examination of educational thought and practice, and perhaps in particular a reconsideration of the Socratic heritage which has so long

been an alternative available to us.

> 'Ever since Plato there have been voices raised in protest, some of them famous, none efficacious. But in the twentieth century the social ground itself has so altered as to compel a total re-examination of the educational procedures and their rationale.'[49]

This is not in any way to say that we respond to the practical and theoretical inadequacies of the Isocratic heritage by constructing a historical argument, or by advocating some sort of "return to the past" in terms of political consensus or educational practice. On the contrary, it is to suggest that we reconsider neglected philosophical arguments available to us in the history of our discipline, in full appreciation of the fact that the age of an argument has nothing to do with its truth.

Specifically, we might find ourselves compelled to return to the fundamental philosophical question of the idea of education itself, and to revitalize an appreciation for the practical and theoretical strengths of the alternative Socratic idea. It may be that Socrates' contention that the normative intentions of education are internal to it, and in no way derived from or relative to political doctrine, does not suffer the theoretical weaknesses of the Isocratic idea. The remainder of this thesis will explicate the Socratic idea of the nature of education, and some of the philosophical and practical arguments which could make it a justified and realistic alternative in the contemporary world, and always.

Chapter Nine

Philosophical Foundations of the Socratic Alternative

> 'In the present age the human mind must be coerced into theoretical studies; it runs of its own accord to practical applications and, instead of perpetually referring it to the minute examination of secondary effects, it is well to divert it from them sometimes, in order to raise it up to the contemplation of primary causes.'
>
> Tocqueville [1]

9.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter it was argued that the Isocratic heritage has become increasingly difficult to maintain over the past two centuries, and is arguably untenable in contemporary conditions. Among the characteristics of the Isocratic heritage underlying this decline is the Isocratic idea of the nature of education. The dialectical criticism of the Isocratic idea begun in the preceding chapter is progressively replaced in this chapter by a positive formulation of the Socratic view of the nature of education, and its relation to political doctrine. The intention of the following argument is not merely to report the Socratic view, but to reformulate an unfamiliar philosophical interpretation of the educational ideas of the Socratic philosophers.

The intention of this chapter is to explicate the Socratic idea of the nature of education, particularly as it has been reformulated by the political philosopher Leo Strauss, and the many political and educational philosophers

who adhere to his methods and goals. Socrates observed that there are many different regimes, many adhering to radically different political doctrines. Moreover, even within any given regime citizens may adhere to very different versions of any given political doctrine, democracy being perhaps the most familiar example today. This observation led Socrates, as it has led the Straussians, to argue that an idea of the nature of education such as that formulated by Isocrates is problematic, to say the least. In the context of such a diversity of political doctrine, the Socratics ground education in an awareness of the fundamental question of the nature of the good regime. This question provides at least a theoretical unity to political philosophy, if only in the sense that adherents to different political doctrines intend those doctrines to be an answer to this question. On the basis of an awareness of this fundamental question, and others like it, the Straussians turn to those comparatively few great books which provide either the most profound or the most influential answers to them. Taking the philosophical life to be the good life in itself, students read these texts dialectically in their search for knowledge of the good. A particular kind of scientific and civic education prepares them for such dialectical debate and study. In the Socratic view, the normative intentions of education are derived internally from the philosophic life, which constitutes in their view not merely a good life but the best life that human beings can lead.

It must be emphasized that the argument of this chapter is concerned only with the alternative Socratic idea of education, or of the Socratic view of the origins and status of the normative intentions of education. As a consequence of this limited intention, a number of secondary considerations, such as a full list of the books to be read, some of the criteria by which they are selected, and some details of scientific, musical, and civic education will not be discussed here. It should perhaps be emphasized that these secondary considerations have received ample discussion in the works of others [2]. The present argument takes as its point of departure the observation that such a curriculum and its aims, however detailed and thorough, can only be fully understood in terms of, and justified by, a prior conception of the normative intentions of education generally. It is therefore my intention to concentrate exclusively on this question, and to construct the arguments that are often merely alluded to by the Straussians, or presented indirectly and illusively in the dramatic dialogues of Plato.

9.1 Aristotle's Two Good Lives: Philosophy and Politics

We begin our explication of the Socratic distinction between education and politics by turning to a Socratic argument developed by Aristotle in the Eudemian Ethics. In the first book of this work, Aristotle seeks to understand the nature of human happiness, and the kinds of human activity out of which it comes into being [3]. The classical political

rationalist arguments which Aristotle accepts and elaborates distinguish the kinds of human happiness, and ways of life associated with each, with reference to three criteria. Each distinct kind of human life and happiness is characterized by its own telos, virtues, and method of reasoning. To avoid confusion, it should be noted that Aristotle distinguishes between two senses of "virtues", the particular virtues or dispositions required for the pursuit of each distinct way of life, and virtue or human excellence understood as a telos in its own right. We shall leave the question of the dispositional virtues which distinguish the philosophical life from all others to the next chapter, and concentrate here on the distinctions predicated on telos and methods of reasoning.

In Aristotle's view, human happiness can be defined in terms of three distinct normative ends, or the telos of each of three distinct human lives: wisdom, virtue (or human excellence) and pleasure [4]. These ends are regarded as normative, as well as formal, in the sense that they are defined not only in terms of their specific characteristics, but in terms of the value of those characteristics regarded as a whole.

Aristotle proceeds by identifying the distinct ways of life which lead to each of the three normative ends.

> '...the things related to the happy conduct of life being three, the things already mentioned as the greatest possible good for human beings -- virtue, wisdom and pleasure -- we see that there are also three ways of life in which those to whom fortune provides the opportunity choose to live: the life of

> politics, the life of philosophy, and the hedonistic life.' [5]

Aristotle goes on to argue that the hedonistic life need not be given full consideration, for a number of reasons. For example, pleasure is, or can be, a component of the philosophic or political life, and is therefore not uniquely a product of the hedonistic life itself [6]. His argument therefore concentrates on the distinction between the philosophic and the political life [7]. These two ways of life are pursued by those who 'are concerned with the most weighty matters, with the only things which deserve to be taken seriously for their own sake, with the good order of the soul and of the city' [8]. In other words, while both statesmen and philosophers are concerned with things worthy of consideration in their own right, those things are nevertheless very different, and are considered in different ways.

Following Socrates and Plato, Aristotle argues that the very different nature of the philosophic and political lives leads those who adhere to them to understand happiness in different ways.

> 'Of these the philosophic life denotes being concerned with prudence and theoretical contemplation about the truth, while the political life denotes concern with noble actions (and these are the actions that proceed from virtue)... as a result of this, different people use the term happiness to identify different things...' [9]

From the perspective of philosophy, human happiness is to be found in a life devoted to the pursuit of theoretical knowledge and judgement. From the perspective of politics, in contrast, human happiness is to be found in a life devoted to

praiseworthy political action, and the practical virtues which lead to such action. Having distinguished the philosophic and the political life in terms of the normative ends pursued in each, Aristotle goes on to argue that the philosophical life is not only superior to, but is in a sense logically prior to, the political life [10].

Aristotle distinguishes and hierarchically orders the political and philosophical lives from the point of view of the telos and conception of virtue which prevails in each. The way in which the Aristotelian distinction is predicated on telos is well summarized by the Straussian political and educational philosopher Thomas Pangle. As Pangle argues, Aristotle insists that

> 'political deliberation is always about means, not about ends, or at least not about ultimate ends. Statesmen and citizens deliberate over policy with a view to some ultimate ends that are given prior to, and as a foundation for, deliberation.[...] Once the agreed-upon ultimate ends are questioned, the common ground for deliberation disappears; civil health has broken down; revolutionary strife is imminent. Therefore, apart from emergency conditions, such questioning belongs to a sphere other than the political.' [11]

As Aristotle argues, the telos of the philosophical life is rational reflection upon the ultimate ends of human existence and , derivatively, of the regime, insofar as they are to be subsequently realized through political deliberation and action. The telos of political life is the determination of the means best suited to the realization, through political action, of the ultimate ends of the regime as a whole. The telos of the philosophical life is concerned with the

theoretical formulation of ultimate ends, while the telos of the political life is concerned with the practical realization of such ends. From this perspective the telos of the philosophical life precedes, and may largely determine, the telos of the political life.

Aristotle also distinguishes between the virtues of the political and philosophical life, such that this distinction corresponds to that based on telos. He argues that if the political life is life of noble action proceeding from virtue, then those pursuing this life must possess virtue. If those engaging in or evaluating the political life are to know whether virtue is truly the source of political action, then they must know what virtue is. The life devoted to the philosophical enquiry into the nature of the political ends (or telos) and virtue must therefore precede the life devoted to political action, and Aristotle is in no doubt that this order of priority is an indication of the superiority of the philosophical life.

> 'Let ours be theoretical enquiry into virtue and wisdom: what the nature of each is, and whether they themselves or the actions resulting from them are components of the good life, since everyone agrees that they are connected to happiness, or if not everyone, then all those human beings who are worth taking into account.' [12]

Although Aristotle accepts the Socratic distinction between, and relative ordering of, the political and the philosophical life, he goes on to supplement the Socratic account of them.

Referring to the older Socrates, Plato's teacher, in

order to distinguish him from the younger Socrates, Plato's pupil of the same name, Aristotle makes the following observation.

> 'The older Socrates thought that knowing virtue is the telos, and he pursued enquiries into the nature of justice and courage and each of the divisions of virtue. And this was a reasonable procedure, since he thought that all the virtues are scientific knowledge, so that knowing justice and being just must go together. ' [13]

Socrates regarded theoretical examination of the virtues of political life to be a component of the philosophical life. Aristotle, however, reflects more closely on the status of telos within this Socratic view. He agrees that the telos of the philosophical life is theoretical knowledge and reflection, and the virtues conducive to such a life. Aristotle accepts that the telos and virtues of the philosophical life are internal to it, and distinguish it from the political life, but argues that the underlying Socratic argument must be extended.

Aristotle does not disagree with the Socratic interpretation of the relationship between the philosophical and political life, but regards that interpretation to be in need of a more expanded treatment. It is not enough, in his view, to understand the nature of, and distinction between, these two ways of life, or the kinds of knowledge and virtues on which this distinction is based. As he argues in the case of virtue,

> 'he [Socrates] used to enquire what virtue is, but not how and from what things it comes into being.' [14]

The same point is made with respect to knowledge, and its

relationship to virtue.

> 'Although it is noble to obtain knowledge of each of the noble things, all the same nevertheless, and in the case of virtue in particular, it is not the knowledge of its essential nature which is most valuable but knowledge of the sources that produce it.' [15]

Socrates argued that what is most important is knowledge of the telos and virtues distinctive of each way of life. While Aristotle agrees that such knowledge is indispensable, he observes that, in practice, what is equally important is an attempt to enquire into the ways in which some such knowledge and virtue comes into being. Such knowledge and virtues come into being through education, both informal and, especially, formal. The Socratic distinction between the political and philosophic life therefore implies a complementary, and logically prior, distinction between political and philosophic education.

Aristotle supplements the Socratic distinction between the philosophical and political life by enquiring into the consequent distinction between the kinds of education preparatory to each. Correspondingly, Aristotle distinguishes between the kind of education which pursues knowledge and virtues distinctive of the philosophical life, in contrast to another kind of education conducive to the practical knowledge and virtues of political life. In doing so, Aristotle renders more explicit Socrates' cautionary view of the permanent tension between philosophy and political life, and therefore within the enterprise of education itself. In the next section we will refine this Aristotelian distinction between political

education and philosophical education, in terms of the method of reasoning characteristic of each.

9.2 Hypotheses and Dialectical Reasoning in Plato

The Socratic view of the origins and status of the normative intentions of education is intimately linked to the distinction between hypothetical and dialectical reasoning. Unfortunately, Socrates describes such reasoning in indirect and consequently somewhat unclear terms, as other commentators have observed [16]. In order to ensure that the present argument will be as unambiguous as possible, its intention is limited to an explication of the essential features of Socrates' ideas and arguments, insofar as they are relevant to our concern with the idea of the nature of education. Socratic discussions of hypothetical and dialectical reasoning are concerned with a wide variety of theological, mathematical , scientific, logical, and epistemological questions. Nevertheless, all such discussions culminate in distinctly normative questions, and ultimately in the question of the good. The argument of this thesis has been similarly focused on normative questions, and the following discussion naturally converges on the Socratic emphasis on such questions, rather than on Socrates' secondary concerns with epistemology, logic and science.

In perhaps the most famous of his metaphors, the Platonic Socrates describes the Cave as 'an image of our nature in its

education and lack of education' [17]. Those who are in the Cave represent our human nature in its lack of education, while those who are compelled to find a route up and out of the Cave are those in the process of being educated for the philosophic life. The Platonic Socrates employs the metaphor of the Cave to illustrate his argument that all human beings begin their intellectual lives within the context of beliefs, particularly normative beliefs, which happen to prevail within their regime. These beliefs are given the name "hypotheses", and are understood to play a distinctive, two-part role in reasoning.

First, hypotheses are defined as normative propositions which constitute the most fundamental moral and political beliefs of the regime, and as such are either presupposed to be both clear and true, or regarded as clear and true for practical purposes. Second, such hypotheses function as the fundamental premises or axioms from which normative reasoning proceeds. Socrates does not wish to claim or argue that all hypotheses are in fact false, but rather wishes to remind us that they are precisely <u>hypotheses</u>, conditional propositions which are regarded as coherent and true but not in fact known to be coherent and true. Hypotheses are opinions concerning the good which may or may not constitute knowledge , or partial knowledge, of the good.

It might be useful to explicate the notion of a hypothesis, and the notions of hypothetical and dialectical

reasoning, in somewhat greater detail. Hypothetical reasoning consists of induction or deduction from premises or axioms to propositional conclusions. In formal logic, an argument is logically valid if its conclusions follow from a given axiom in accordance with the rules of logic. If the axiom is false, however, then the argument may be logically valid but untrue. For example, if one begins from an axiom such as, "Human beings of the class/race/religion X are inherently evil", then a conclusion such as "Human beings belonging to X ought to be subject to political suppression" may be derived in a logically valid manner from it. The conclusion is nevertheless false, because the axiom from which it is derived is untrue. In other words, all inductive or deductive arguments are formally conditional in the sense that the truth of the conclusion is conditional upon the truth of the axioms from which it is derived. In Socratic terminology, political arguments proceed from hypotheses, typically in the form of a political doctrine believed to embody the political good, and reason deductively to conditional propositions concerning political action, institutions and policies.

Socrates argues that dialectical reasoning, rather than hypothetical reasoning, is the method uniquely appropriate to both educational argument and higher education [18]. Unfortunately, 'dialectic defies accurate description' and Plato 'is seldom very precise about its meaning' [19]. Nevertheless, we can say that dialectical reasoning is not primarily concerned with the logical validity of hypothetical

arguments, but with the status of the hypotheses on which the truth of such arguments depends. Socrates does not presuppose that any given hypothesis is false, and certainly does not succumb to the dogmatic presupposition that no normative hypotheses can be shown to be true. On the contrary, Socrates observes that hypotheses are not known to be either true or false, but are rather conditional propositions. Dialectical argument attempts to determine whether any given hypothesis is true, or whether it is possible to reason dialectically from false, or partially false, hypotheses to either the idea of the good, or to knowledge of the good.

As a method of reasoning, dialectic consists primarily of the application of the principle of contradiction. The principle of contradiction is the standard by which the internal consistency of a hypothesis is tested, and by which the consistency between two apparently incompatible hypotheses is examined. The principle of contradiction, as it is understood in dialectical reasoning, consists in part of two subdivisions. The Socratic elenchus consists primarily of rejecting hypotheses on the basis of their self-contradiction, or on the basis of a contradiction between two propositions logically derived from the same hypothesis. The Socratic epagoge consists of a demonstration that it is self-contradictory to reject a general proposition while accepting specific cases of the same proposition. For example, if one accepts the proposition "human being X is mortal" for any given human being, then one cannot consistently reject the

proposition that "human beings are mortal". In general, if a hypothesis is internally inconsistent, then it is false rather than conditional, and any hypothetical reasoning proceeding from it is correspondingly inadequate. If two hypotheses contradict one another, then at least one, and possibly both, are (perhaps partially) false rather than conditional, and hypothetical reasoning proceeding from either of them individually, or from the two of them in tandem, will lead to false conclusions.

Both hypothetical and dialectical reasoning take hypotheses as their point of departure. Hypothetical reasoning presupposes the truth and coherence of the hypothesis, and reasons either inductively or deductively to conditional propositions. In contrast, dialectical reasoning does not consist of either inductive or deductive reasoning. Dialectic consists of the determination of the truth and coherence of a hypothesis, principally through the application of the principle of contradiction. Equally importantly, dialectical reasoning consists of an attempt to reveal or construct an understanding of the question to which the hypothesis is intended to be an answer, and, where necessary, to search for a more adequate hypothesis.

Socrates regards political doctrines as hypotheses, or conditional propositions. He subjects such hypotheses to dialectical examination from two points of view, their clarity and their truthfulness. He begins by observing that the

political doctrines regarded by most people to be clear and true are better regarded as hypotheses, the clarity and truth of which are in fact unestablished. Advocates of liberal democracy, to mention a contemporary example, presuppose that, or in practice act as if, this political doctrine is clear. Yet we can observe in actual political life that liberal democrats disagree among themselves about the nature and relative importance of the fundamental political principles of this doctrine. For those on what is conventionally termed "the left wing" of liberalism, economic equality as a goal is taken to have precedence over individual freedom in some circumstances. On the "right wing" of liberalism, economic freedom is believed to be desirable even if it should somewhat undermine economic equality. Similar disagreements concerning the relative priority of freedom and equality also underlie political discussion of such issues as abortion, pornography, and the distribution of education. From another perspective, liberal democrats disagree about the procedural mechanisms best suited to the implementation of this political doctrine: some advocate traditional representational democracy, some advocate proportional representation, still others advocate participatory democracy. From a Socratic perspective, it is these kind of disagreements <u>within</u> the liberal democratic regime which begin to reveal the ambiguities of liberal democratic political doctrine. Other ambiguities come to sight, as Plato argues, when democracy is conscientiously contrasted with other political doctrines, such as aristocracy and theocracy [20]. Since it is clear that all of

the parties within liberal democracy cannot all be right, the coherence and truthfulness of liberal democracy as a political hypothesis claimed to embody the political good is therefore unestablished.

In other words, although we as citizens may reason and act within the regime as if the prevailing political doctrine is clear, true, and good, Socrates would remind us that such political doctrines are in fact no more than a hypothesis, an assumption for practical purposes which is dubitable and questionable. Socrates does not dogmatically assume that hypotheses are false, but rather insists that we do not forget that they are opinions concerning the political good. The dubitability of these opinions reveals our ignorance about, and thereby raises the philosophical question of, the nature of the political good.

9.3 Hypotheses, Dialectic and the Question of the Good

Socrates argues that hypothetical reasoning, grounded in hypotheses, is the type of reasoning definitive of human nature in its lack of education. The hypotheses are especially those prevailing opinions, or images, which we first encounter in the Cave as a part of our formative experiences. As Plato says, the soul which is entering the first stages of education

> 'is compelled to use hypotheses, and does not go to the beginning because it is unable to step out above the hypotheses. And it uses as images those very things of which images are made by the things below, and in comparison with which they are opined to be clear and are given honour.' [21]

By nature the human soul begins its intellectual journey within the confines of the Cave, as these are defined by the hypotheses considered to be clear and honourable within the regime. In Plato's view, philosophic education begins when we remember that the axiomatic normative propositions in each and every regime or Cave are hypotheses, and as such neither as clear or as unambiguously true as they are widely presupposed to be.

The nature and limitations of hypotheses and hypothetical reason in education become clearer if we contrast them to dialectic. In the Republic, 534e-535a, Socrates sets down the place of dialectic in education.

> 'Is it your opinion, I said, that we have placed dialectic at the top of the studies like a copping stone, and that no other study could rightly be set higher than this one, but that the treatment of the studies has already reached its end?
>
> Yes, it is my opinion, he said.
>
> Well, then, I said, the distribution is still ahead of you. To whom shall we give these studies, and how shall we do it?'

Dialectic is the copping stone or final stage of education, in the sense that education culminates in, and is unified by, the application of this mode of reasoning.

Dialectic is defined in explicit contrast to hypothetical reasoning. As the discussion proceeds, Socrates defines education more precisely in terms of the knowledge

> 'which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses -- that is, stepping stones and spring boards -- in order to reach what is free from

hypothesis at the beginning of the whole. ' [22]

In other words, Socrates argues that hypotheses are assumptions or prevailing opinions which have come to be treated as if they constitute knowledge. It is important to be aware of the questionable status of the hypotheses because all inductive or deductive reasoning that proceeds from them leads to derivative, and therefore conditional, propositions. Even if reasoning proceeds from the hypotheses to conditional propositions in a logically valid manner, the truth of such propositions can be established only with reference to the truth of the hypotheses. It follows that, while the logical validity of our reasoning is important, a clear understanding of the status of the hypotheses from which such reasoning proceeds is of greater, indeed decisive, importance.

Socratic higher education is therefore grounded in dialectic, understood as the method of reasoning which begins by questioning precisely those hypotheses which are usually taken to be the starting point of reasoning, and which, by questioning them, attempts to reason from them to questions or propositions which may claim the status of knowledge. As Socrates argues, with the exception of dialectic,

> 'all the other arts are directed to human opinions and desires, or to generation and composition or to the care of what is grown or put together. And as for the rest, those that we said do not lay hold of something of what is -- geometry and the arts following on it -- we do observe that they do dream about what <u>is</u>; but they haven't the capacity to see it as in full awakeness so long as they use hypotheses and, leaving them untouched, are unable to give an account of them.' [23]

For Socrates, the most essential part of higher education is

an awareness of the questionable status of the hypotheses, and a correlative willingness to question the hypotheses, and in an attempt to proceed from normative opinion to knowledge.

> '[Socrates:] Then, I said, only the dialectical way of enquiry proceeds in this direction, destroying the hypotheses, to the beginning itself in order to make it secure; and when the eye of the soul is really buried in a barbaric confusion, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up above...' [24]

As Socrates argues, enquiries which begin by questioning and moving beyond the prevailing normative hypotheses draw the soul toward 'the beginning itself'. Socrates refers to "the beginning" in the sense that our reasoning begins with the hypotheses. All hypotheses, however, are intended to be answers to particular, if often unarticulated, questions of a fundamental kind. For example, the statement "the good regime is a democratic one" is both a hypothesis and, implicitly, an answer to the question "what is the good regime?". Dialectic enquiry concerning the truth of any given hypothesis proceeds to the beginning itself in the sense that it proceeds to an awareness of the hypothesis which is the beginning of our conditional reasoning, and, more fundamentally still, of the question which both the hypothesis and the derivative conditional reasoning are ultimately intended to answer. The phrase "the beginning" denotes, in other words, the <u>idea</u> of the good, which is the fundamental normative question at the foundation of all enquiries and action. Socratic education continues until 'a man is able to separate out the <u>idea</u> of the good from all other things and distinguish it in the argument.' [25]

These discussions of the Platonic Socrates direct our attention to two inter-related issues. We must understand more thoroughly what is meant by the notion that education involves the "separating out" of the idea of the good, and what is meant by saying that the idea of the good is the "beginning itself". We will examine each of these in turn.

9.4 The Question of the Good

In discussions of political doctrine it is not difficult to discern what is meant by separating out the idea of the good. The purpose of political doctrine is to describe and prescribe specific normative criteria and intentions which constitute hypothetical conceptions of the good, and therefore implicitly raise the philosophical question of the good. In the Socratic view, the idea of the good can be separated out of any human endeavour, and it is important from the point of view of education to do so. As one Straussian educational thinker observed,

> 'All human thinking is the thinking, not of "pure minds", but of human souls. The human soul is motivated by desire, by love, by need. As Aristotle puts it in his treatise On the Soul (433a15-18): "The object at which desire aims is the cause of motion, and it is on account of this that thought is set in motion, because it is the object at which desire aims that is the original cause of thought."' [26]

As this quotation suggests, the idea of the good can be distinguished in any human activity in two senses. In the first sense, there are normative intentions, either implicit and unrecognized or consciously recognized, embedded in any human activity. Any scientific undertaking, for example,

itself rests on the normative hypothesis that scientific knowledge is good or leads to the good. The actual structure or content given to this presupposition will largely determine the way in which science is pursued. So that, for example, if we believe the classics that science is a contemplation of nature and technology is imitation of nature, there will be a limitation to the ways in which we are willing to manipulate and utilize nature. If, however, we take the post-Enlightenment view that nature is in a sense the enemy of man, that nature withholds its resources from human beings, then science tends to be regarded as the knowledge of nature, and technology comes to be regarded as the triumph over or the use of nature, and this will lead to a very different view of the role of science and technology. In any human activity, science no less than, though often less directly as, politics, it is possible to extract the underlying and guiding conception of the good, and it is necessary to do so for a full understanding of the intentions and processes of the activity.

The second sense in which the <u>idea</u> of the good is to be "separated out" or distinguished from the remainder of any given activity will be discussed more fully in the following section. It is enough to mention here the import of Aristotle's observation that the activities of an individual are guided and motivated by the individual's hypotheses concerning the good. Each of us pursues what we believe to be good. A full understanding of our activities, and of

ourselves, therefore requires knowledge of the normative intentions which set our activities in motion. Separating out and distinguishing our hypotheses concerning the good is therefore also necessary for self-understanding, for self-conscious appreciation of our own nature.

The second feature of the Platonic Socrates' concern with the idea of the good is the sense in which it constitutes the "beginning itself". Once it has been separated out from the thought and action in which it is embedded, Socrates seeks to determine the nature and status of the idea in this context. Recent Anglo-American educationist philosophy of education has presupposed that an idea is to be understood within the context of the epistemological concepts and concerns currently dominant in academic analytic philosophy. One of the very few educationists who have produced a book length interpretation of Plato, Robin Barrow, for example, asserts that Plato presents 'an absolutist ethical theory', on the grounds that Plato's educational prescriptions culminate in the pursuit of knowledge of the idea of the good [27]. Barrow goes on to claim that this view appears to be a consequence of elementary logical errors on Plato's part. Perhaps more importantly, this view implies that the philosophic life culminates in knowledge of the good, which contradicts the view stated by Plato, and confirmed by Aristotle, that philosophy is the unending pursuit of such knowledge. As Leo Strauss has argued, however, the many and manifold difficulties of this analytic and epistemological interpretation of Plato's ideas may be

resolved if we turn to the Socratic texts without first imposing our own ideas and concerns on them. In particular, we must surrender the doubtful presupposition that Plato is concerned with "ethical theory" and "analytic epistemology" at all [28]. As Strauss observed, particularly in the context of both early European and Middle Eastern interpretations of Plato, it is more likely that the ideas are to be understood in a quite different context.

Strauss's arguments concerning the nature and status of the ideas are both philologically and philosophically complex, and have been provided by him and his followers at length elsewhere [29]. For the purposes of the present thesis, we shall accept the conclusions of these arguments rather than either replicating them in detail, and reviewing the wider scholarly debate they provoked. In essence, Strauss agreed that philosophy is the pursuit of knowledge of the ideas, but did not agree that the ideas were either perfect exemplars of the objects imperfectly perceived by sense perception, the thoughts of a divine being, or logical propositions. In Strauss's view, philosophy is pursuit of knowledge of the ideas, where ideas are understood to be the permanent and fundamental questions which result from the dialectical examination of hypotheses [30]. Strauss arrives at this view through the following argument.

An examination of the multitude of mutually inconsistent or even contradictory political doctrines, for example,

reveals that each constitutes a hypothesis concerning the good regime. Yet to say that any particular political doctrine defines or will produce the good regime presupposes knowledge of the nature of the good regime. Since most people presuppose that their own hypotheses are knowledge rather than opinion, and since most people are committed to hypothetical reasoning from "known" premises to conclusions, they assume that dialectic and philosophy must likewise culminate in knowledge of a similar kind. As Strauss observes, however, the Socratics do not define philosophy in terms of its potential epistemological end products, but rather in terms of our ignorance [31]. The Socratics defined philosophy from the perspective of its origins rather than its end. The origin of philosophy is our ignorance of the good, where that ignorance is brought forcefully to our recognition by the dialectical examination of our hypotheses concerning the good. Philosophy, in other words, is defined by a full awareness of the permanent and unchanging ideas of the human condition, those few and fundamental questions which define human experience and aspirations. The idea of the good is the fundamental and permanent question, or set of questions, 'What is human nature?', 'Given that human nature, what is the human good?', 'What is the political good?', 'What is the relationship', as Aristotle asked, ' between the human good and the political good?'. From the Socratic perspective, philosophy is everywhere and always possible if two criteria are met. First, we must be able to recognize the hypothetical status of our opinions concerning the good, and hence to know our own

ignorance. Second, therefore, we must know the idea of the good, the permanent and fundamental question of the nature of the good which defines the limitations and goal of our philosophic life.

Strauss provides a convenient and more specific illustration of the movement from the political presuppositions of hypothetical reasoning to the fundamental educational questions of dialectic, appropriate to our concern with the contrast between the Isocratic and Socratic idea of the nature of education.

> 'All political action aims at either preservation or change. When desiring to preserve, we wish to prevent a change to the worse; when desiring to change, we wish to bring about something better. All political action is then guided by some thought of better or worse. But thought of better or worse implies thought of the good. The awareness of the good which guides all our actions has the character of opinion: it is no longer questioned but, on reflection, it proves to be questionable. The very fact that we can question it directs us towards such a thought of the good as is no longer questionable -- towards a thought which is no longer opinion but knowledge.' [32]

As Strauss implicitly argues, all political action rests upon axiomatic hypotheses which are provisionally accepted without question in political life. In one regime it is presupposed that monarchs are appointed by God, while in another it is presupposed that all men are created equal. Whenever such presuppositions are questioned, the questioner who persists with the questioning is inevitably compelled to raise the ultimate question of the good. The original normative axioms of political life always and everywhere imply, and for a very few citizens actually raise, the philosophical question of the

good regime. Such philosophical questions are raised by, but not within, political life itself. Political life must in the nature of things proceed on the basis of normative hypotheses which are regarded as true for the purposes of practical life, but which are not known to be true. The Socratic idea of the nature of education is based on the this reasoned movement from the political to the philosophical life, and on the dialectical questioning of the axiomatic presuppositions of hypothetical political reasoning. The normative intentions of Socratic education are not derived from hypothetical political doctrines, but from the unique way of life which consists of subjecting such hypotheses to the test of dialectic, and thereby returning once again to the fundamental questions which hypotheses are intended to answer.

9.5 The Socratic Idea of Education

The essential difference between the Socratic and Isocratic ideas of the nature of education is founded on the question of the source of the normative intentions of education. In the context of the differentiation between hypothetical and dialectical reasoning, we are able to explicate the Socratic view of the origins of the normative intentions of education in clearer contrast to the Isocratic alternative. As we have seen, the Isocratic idea consists of the presupposition that the normative intentions of education are derived deductively from the normative hypotheses of an external and distinguishable enterprise, politics. Isocratic

educational reasoning is correspondingly hypothetical in the sense that the truth and validity of propositions defining the normative intentions of education are conditional upon the truth and coherence of the axiomatic political doctrine serving as the hypothesis of such reasoning.

In the contrasting Socratic view the normative intentions of education are not derived from external hypotheses on the basis of hypothetical reasoning, but from the questions which such hypotheses are intended to answer. Such questions are revealed when we proceed in accordance with dialectical rather than hypothetical reasoning. Socratic educational reasoning is grounded in an awareness that many hypotheses exist, and are presupposed to be true and coherent rather than known to be true and coherent. Without in any way beginning from a commitment to any particular hypothesis, or to any particular way of life, such as politics, the Socratic philosopher can attempt to ascertain the internal coherence of any given hypothesis, as well as the comparative strengths and weaknesses of various hypotheses in dialectical contrast with one another. In this view, higher education consists of knowing and examining the hypotheses in this way, and is guided by the normative intention of striving to ascertain the truth and goodness of such hypotheses, or of hitherto unknown hypotheses which may be assembled using the strongest components of a variety of hypotheses. In this way the normative intentions of education are internal to the enterprise itself, and are not constructed on the basis of

either the hypotheses or the hypothetical reasoning constitutive of external enterprises such as politics. All that Socratic education requires is knowledge of the ideas, or, in other words, knowledge of the fundamental questions which hypotheses are intended to answer, along with a willingness and ability to proceed through dialectical reasoning toward a new category of answers which constitute knowledge rather than hypotheses. To be sure, axiomatic knowledge may forever elude us; it may be that human beings will always be ignorant in the most important matters. Yet so long as we possess Socratic knowledge of our ignorance, or so long as knowledge of the ideas is available to us, philosophy and education valued in terms of the pursuit of self-understanding and knowledge will be possible.

We must be clear about what is meant by saying that the normative intentions of education are derived "internally" to the educational enterprise itself. We begin with the observation that any human being at any time may become aware of the diversity of, and incompatibilities between, the many opinions or hypotheses of those around him. By examining these opinions themselves, and without guiding his examination by the priorities and normative ideals of any external enterprise, he may determine the questions, and kinds of questions, that such opinions are intended to answer. On the basis of an awareness of these questions, he may desire to understand the answers as thoroughly as possible, particularly the most profound and comprehensive answers that have been

provided by others in conversations and in great books. He may seek to understand these answers, and to discern the strengths and weaknesses of each in dialectical comparison with the others, with the intention of understanding as thoroughly as possible the most fundamental alternatives as a component of his search for the truth of the matter in question. In other words, beginning from the observation of the diversity of opinion, and of the questions raised by that diversity, education may be guided by the normative intention to pursue knowledge and truth. A life which consists of such a pursuit is the philosophic life, which the Socratics argued was a good life in its own right. From this point of view, the normative intentions of education and the philosophic life are constructed internally, and without reference to the normative ideals of distinct and external human enterprises, such as politics.

This argument is in a sense deceptively simple, and it might be usefully illustrated by an example. If we imagine a student in a school who is attending classes in vocational training, such a student may observe that vocational training is valuable for the skills it imparts, and for the material rewards for which such skills may be exchanged at a later date. These are the aims of vocational education, and they are valued in terms external to the education itself, and defined by political doctrine. In contemporary liberalism, for example, it is assumed that education ought to provide the individual with the resources required to pursue his own

conception of the good.

Such material rewards may themselves be valued as the means which will enable the student to pursue his own view of the good or of the good life. The question then arises as to the nature of the good life the student may wish to pursue using the means provided by his vocational training. At this point the question arises as to what this good life may be. While this question is raised indirectly by his vocational education, it cannot be answered within the limitations of vocational training. In order to answer the question of the good life, he must step beyond or above the parameters of opportunities and resources, and to an understanding of both the variety of good lives available to him , and the philosophical thought through which he may adjudicate the competing claims made by each. He may even find that he is persuaded that life in accordance with religious withdrawal and observation is the best available to him, and that the material resources potentially made available to him through his vocational skills are not a part of the good life and cannot contribute to it. Whatever conclusions concerning the good life his reasoning present to him, such conclusions can be results of a distinct kind of education which is concerned with the pursuit of knowledge of the good life, and which does not derive normative intentions from any external enterprise or the conceptions of the good associated with them. However rarely it may occur, the student may be led to the normative intentions internal to education -- pursuit of knowledge of

the good.

The Socratic idea of the essential nature of education, along with the correlative commitment to dialectical rather than hypothetical reasoning, challenges the Isocratic idea of education. It does not challenge any particular Isocratic doctrine of education from the point of view of an allegedly superior political doctrine, but from the point of view of a radical distinction between the philosophical and political life, and the claim that the philosophical life is both distinct from, and superior to, political life. As Leo Strauss put it,

> 'Being essentially quest and being not able ever to become wisdom, as distinguished from philosophy, the problems are always more evident than the solutions. All solutions are questionable. Now the right way of life cannot be fully established except by an understanding of the nature of man, and the nature of man cannot be fully clarified except by an understanding of the nature of the whole. Therefore, the right way of life cannot be established metaphysically except by a completed metaphysics, and therefore the right way of life remains questionable. But the very uncertainty of all solutions, the very ignorance regarding the most important things, makes quest for knowledge the most important thing, and therefore the life devoted to it, the right way of life.' [33]

The Socratics founded their educational thought on the observation, available to any human being in any regime, of the diversity of political doctrines and aspiration that actually obtains in the human world as we experience it. Such diversity gives us no reason to believe that human beings possess knowledge of the human good generally, or of the political good specifically, and thereby draws our attention to the questionability of the very doctrines to which we would

adhere, and from which those committed to the Isocratic idea would derive the normative intentions of education.

Yet at the same time, the diversity of political opinion, and our ignorance concerning the true political and human good, does not demonstrate that no such knowledge is possible, and that the pursuit of it is therefore futile. From the Socratic perspective, the diversity of political opinion, and the ignorance which it reveals to us, brings to sight some of the enduring and most fundamental questions which define human existence. These questions are the Socratic ideas, those permanent and universal questions which are raised by the human condition, and which unify our unending attempt to discover the good in it. Socratic political philosophy derives the normative intentions of education from the distinct human life which is defined by an attempt to understand these questions in their integrity, and to consider the answers which have been given to them. These answers or hypotheses are examined in dialectical confrontation with one another with the intention of converting some of our ignorance concerning the good into knowledge, or at least into a sober appreciation of the real nature and magnitude of the choices we must face in our struggle to understand and pursue the human good.

Chapter Ten

Socratic Education

'A very popular error: having the courage of one's convictions; rather it is a matter of having the courage for an attack on one's convictions.'
Nietzsche [1]

10.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter we examined the philosophical arguments through which the Socratic idea of education is constructed, particularly in terms of the contrast between hypothetical and dialectical reasoning, and the Socratic idea or question of the good. The intention of this chapter is to explicate the Socratic idea of education in practical rather than theoretical terms, and in particular to outline the essential features of the curriculum through which it is implemented.

The argument of this chapter will proceed as follows. Socratic higher education consists of an awareness of some of the permanent and fundamental questions which arise out of the human situation, and emphasizes careful study of those relatively few great books which address such questions. In reformulating the Socratic idea of education , and linking it to a specific programme of great books education, the Straussians turn to Xenophon, and to his description of Socrates' dialectical study of great books. The Socratic political rationalist curriculum also includes scientific and civic education which is preparatory to dialectical study of

the great books, and which provides students with the experiences and dispositions necessary for their responsible and persistent engagement with such education. In the process, therefore, the student also acquires such literacy, numeracy and other skills, knowledge, and dispositions which will make him a valuable political and economic contributor to the regime, whether or not he or she chooses to proceed through the Socratic educational programme to its culmination in the philosophic life. Although the normative intention of Socratic education is derived from the philosophic life, the normative consequences of such education fulfil the reasonable demands of the regime, without subjecting education to distortion by the prevailing political hypothesis. Underlying the Socratic view, nevertheless, is a renewed appreciation of the permanent and irreconcilable tension which exists between politics and education understood as distinct modes of human life: as Socrates' Apology argues, and as Tocqueville reiterated, it is not possible to subject one to the demands of the other without irrevocable loss.

10.1 Permanent Questions and Great Books

Where the Isocratic idea of education is presupposed, a specific political doctrine constitutes a hypotheses from which the normative intentions of education are derived. The Socratic idea of education is grounded in dialectical rather than hypothetical reason, and defines the normative intentions of education in terms of the process of questioning precisely

these normative hypotheses. The process of questioning the normative presuppositions of ourselves and others raises the question of the good, human and political, and reveals to us our ignorance concerning such questions. Yet as Leo Strauss put it,

> 'Knowledge of ignorance is not ignorance. It is knowledge of the elusive character of the truth, of the whole. Socrates, then, viewed man in the light of the mysterious character of the whole. He held therefore that we are more familiar with the situation of man as man than with the ultimate causes of that situation. We may also say he viewed man in the light of the unchangeable ideas, i.e., of the fundamental and permanent questions.' [2]

Strauss points out that Socrates interpreted the nature of human existence from two points of view, the situation of mankind and the unchangeable ideas. By the "situation of mankind", Socrates and Strauss mean that all people at all times have adhered to hypotheses concerning the political good, and yet have not found knowledge of the political good. In this condition some human beings can be led to discover that our ignorance concerning the political good raises fundamental and permanent questions, the ideas that we can know, and some such people may choose to lead the philosophical life devoted to understanding these questions.

Those who are willing and able to question the normative hypotheses dominant in their own regime, and to subject them to the test of dialectic, will initially encounter two classes of fundamental questions which are permanently available to any human being. On the one hand, there are those questions concerning the internal consistency of their own most

fundamental moral or political beliefs, and the adequacy of those beliefs to satisfy human aspiration. On the other hand, there are the equally unsettling questions concerning the ability of our own normative hypotheses to meet the challenges put forward by those whose normative hypotheses are radically different. Not only must we understand the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments that have been put forward on behalf of the normative hypotheses prevailing in our own regime, but we must also understand the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments which support radically different, not to say antagonistic, hypotheses of the same kind. From the Socratic perspective, an understanding of both kinds of arguments, as well as the philosophic life which consists of sustained engagement with them, is available to us in the most decisive sense through study of those few great books which self-consciously confront the fundamental questions addressed by such arguments. The permanent and fundamental questions raised by dialectic require, primarily though not exclusively, an education based on great books.

The Socratic political rationalist conception of education takes such permanent and universal questions as its point of departure. As the student begins his or her higher learning, such questions will be limited to those which are implied by the prevailing normative hypotheses of his or her regime, or Cave. As great books education proceeds, however, confrontation with alternative hypotheses from different regimes will bring to sight those few and fundamental

questions which are both permanent and universal. These are

> 'the kinds of questions children ask: Is there a God? Is there freedom? Is there punishment for evil deeds? Is there certain knowledge? What is a good society? were once also questions addressed by science and philosophy' [3]

The man or woman coming to maturity in any regime at any time may find himself or herself compelled to address fundamental and permanent questions, in addition to those which are fundamental but peculiar to their own regime. History records both the tragedy and the heroism of those who found themselves compelled to ask

> 'What is the relation and relative rank of, on the one hand, concern for the health and fulfilment of one's own soul, and, on the other hand, dedication to others, especially to fellow citizens in the political community?' [4]

Questions such as this are always available to any human being in any regime.

> 'The questions are all there. They only need to be addressed continuously and seriously for liberal learning to exist; for it does not consist so much in answers as in the permanent dialogue.' [5]

Socratic great books education consists, then, of knowing the fundamental questions, and of the willingness to engage in permanent dialogue with those great books which address them most profoundly and comprehensively.

> 'in our chronic lack of certainty, this comes down to knowing the alternative answers and thinking about them. Liberal education provides access to these alternatives, many of which go against the grain of our natures and our times. The liberally educated person is one who is able to resist the easy and preferred answers, not because he is obstinate but because he knows others worthy of consideration.' [6]

The normative intention of such learning and dialogue constitutes the philosophic life, a life devoted to the

pursuit of truth and knowledge of the good, and the self-understanding that is a corollary of that.

Socratic political and educational philosophers ground their educational ideas in an awareness of the permanent and fundamental questions, and in the study especially -- but by no means solely -- of those great books which contain alternative answers to these questions. Initially, study is focused on those questions and books which have done most to determine the ideas and presuppositions which prevail within the regime within which the student is coming to maturity. The preliminary intention of such study is to ensure that the student will understand both the particularity of, and the original arguments behind, the beliefs prevailing within the regime.

> 'If one's head is crammed with ideas that were once serious but have become cliches, if one does not even know that these ideas are not as natural as the sun and the moon, and if one has no notion that there are alternatives to them, one is doomed to be the puppet of other people's ideas. Only the search back to the origins of one's ideas in order to see the real arguments for them, before people became so certain of them that they ceased thinking about them at all, can liberate us.' [7]

In Socratic terms, this intention might be described as the study of those texts which are the most decisive sources of the hypotheses most influential in our regime and therefore least consciously adopted by us. As we might expect, such studies are supplemented by the study of other books which argue for alternative hypotheses -- alternative answers to the same fundamental questions -- often radically incompatible with our own.

> 'Each age always conspires to make its own way of thinking appear to be the only possible or just way, and our age has the least resistance to the triumph of its own way. There is less real presence of respectable alternatives and less knowledge of the titanic intellectual figures who founded our way.' [8]

In the Straussian reformulation of Socratic educational thought, the study of these two broad classes of books, in the context of an awareness of the questions they purport to answer, is intended to provide the student with self-knowledge, knowledge of the ideas and arguments which have formed him, along with knowledge of the alternative ideas and arguments which will in future enable him to form himself. The following discussion will examine these central Socratic and Straussian ideas in greater detail, though only within the parameters set by our intention to contrast them with those of Isocrates.

10.2 Isocratic Approaches to Great Books Education

Before we proceed, we must distinguish the great books programme derived from Socrates, from two alternative Isocratic versions of a very similar programme. The first version was originally associated with Mortimer J. Adler and R. Hutchins, and more recently with E.D. Hirsch, and is probably the best known Isocratic version of Great Books education. This version is grounded in the Isocratic idea of education, and on the hypothetical reasoning intrinsic to it.

Although the Great Books curriculum advocated by E.D. Hirsch under the general title "cultural literacy" is often

likened to that of Straussian Allan Bloom, Bloom himself repudiates the notion that any commonalities exist between the two approaches to education [9]. Indeed, the very notion of "cultural literacy" is grounded in the idea of "culture", an idea which Bloom rejects, and which a part of his broader argument is intended to undermine [10]. From the point of view of the present argument, however, it is more important to observe that Bloom's contribution to the broader Straussian recovery of the idea of education which derives its normative intentions from 'Socrates' way of life', or 'the theoretical life', is based in part on a rejection of the Isocratic view that the normative intentions of education are derived from political doctrine. Hirsch's Great Books programme, in contrast, derives its normative intentions from American liberal democratic political doctrine.

> 'Putting aside for a moment the practical arguments about the economic uses of literacy, we can contemplate the even more basic principle that underlies our national system of education in the first place -- that people in a democracy can be entrusted to decide all important matters for themselves because they can deliberate and communicate with one another. [...] The civic importance of cultural literacy lies in the fact that true enfranchisement depends upon knowledge, knowledge upon literacy, and literacy upon cultural literacy.' [11]

In a long Appendix, Hirsch defines "cultural literacy" as the possession of knowledge of the characteristic ideas and general content of the Great Books of the European and American tradition. Such knowledge is valued relative to the contribution that it will hopefully make to an understanding of prominent (primarily political) issues of the day, and for the sake of an engagement with these issues within the

limitations of the good life and the good regime hypothetically defined by American liberal democracy.

The familiar Isocratic version of Great Books education associated with Mortimer J. Adler is also distinct from that advocated by the Straussian school of political philosophy. In fact, in the acrimonious debate between the two schools of political and educational philosophy, both sides have been anxious to dissociate themselves from the other [12]. Presupposing the Isocratic idea, Adler sets forth his own programme as ' the ideal of a truly democratic system of education', and explicitly contrasts this with what he believes to be the Straussian position [13]. Although he believes correctly that Allan Bloom's advocacy of higher education based on great books is not a part of a democratic system of education, he concludes wrongly that it is therefore anti-democratic in some way. On the contrary, Bloom's education derives its normative intention from the Socratic philosophical life rather than political doctrine, and is therefore neither democratic nor anti-democratic. However, because Adler presupposes the Isocratic idea, in the sense that he presupposes that the normative intentions of education must be derived from political doctrine, he concludes wrongly that since Bloom is not an active supporter of democracy through democratic education he must be an opponent of both.

Adler clearly derives the normative intentions of

education hypothetically from an axiomatic democratic political doctrine. In Adler's view, the philosopher formulates, and the teacher implements, the education we will require if we are to 'live as politically free citizens in a modern democracy.' [14]. Consequently,

> 'Paideia is what we need to know and know how to do in order to enable us to earn a living, to perform the duties of citizenship, to live decent lives, and to improve ourselves and our lives.'

Although Adler identifies vague intentions, such as 'to live decent lives' or 'to improve ourselves', no normative criteria of these are specified. The only normative intention which is given in any detail is 'the duties of citizenship,' and specifically the duties we have as 'politically free citizens in a democracy'. Adler's egalitarian and democratic version of the Isocratic heritage derives its normative intentions from a democratic political doctrine.

The second Isocratic version of the Great Books approach to education is the "great conversation" approach, perhaps most strongly associated with Strauss's colleague and admirer, Michael Oakeshott. In the context of the dialogue which continued between Oakeshott and Strauss during their forty-year friendship, it is not surprising that both sides of this educational debate respectfully recognized the many similarities between their two views [15]. Nevertheless, in Oakeshott's version, the normative intentions of Great Books education are derived from an external and axiomatic political doctrine. Although this Isocratic derivation is discernible throughout his educational writings, and indeed in spite of the fact that Oakeshott at one point places his

educational ideas within the European educational legacy of Isocrates [16], the dependence of his educational intentions on prior political intentions is often overlooked by interpreters of his work [17].

Oakeshott presupposes that the normative intentions of education ought to be derived from a conservative conception of the nature of politics. In his view,

> 'Politics is the activity of attending to the general arrangements of a collection of people who, in respect of their common recognition of a manner of attending to its arrangements, compose a single community.' [18]

Politics, defined as activity of this kind, depends on 'a traditional manner of behaviour' or 'the existing traditions of behaviour' [19]. In the context of this traditionally conservative conception of the nature of politics, Oakeshott argues that the primary aim of education must be

> 'knowledge, as profound as we can make it, of our tradition of political behaviour. Other knowledge, certainly, is desirable in addition; but this is the knowledge without which we cannot make use of whatever else we have learned.' [20]

Consequently, Oakeshott's educational programme is intended to convey such knowledge of the European intellectual tradition as is valued within the European political traditions, principally of constitutional democracy. Education is intended to help the student

> 'to enter a relationship of "conversation" informed by familiarity with the traditional literary, philosophical, artistic and scientific expressions of European civilization.' [21]

The Great Books to be read are selected from within the European tradition, while the content of the books is to be

assimilated for the purpose of participation in political, and broadly cultural, discourse.

10.3 The Socratic Approach to Great Books Education

Strauss's Socratic version of great books education is radically different from the best known Isocratic versions, particularly in the sense that it does not derive its normative intentions from political doctrine. One can see this difference in three ways. First, the great books are read in order to understand both the fundamental questions that are raised by human life as such, rather than by Western European or American liberal democratic life, and the alternative answers that have been provided to those questions. Second, the great books include those from any political or philosophical tradition, rather than being limited to the European or American traditions, as in the case of Oakeshott and Adler respectively. Finally, the students are not educated from Adler's politically egalitarian point of view, with the intention that all will somehow be bettered through exposure to the great books, nor on the conservative grounds that a selected group of such students are likely to be politically influential. Rather, Strauss seeks to educate those students who might engage in the philosophical enterprise as friends in search of knowledge of themselves, and of the good.

The inspiration for the Straussian conception of great books education is taken from Xenophon's comments on Socrates'

'favourite activity'. These comments are now rarely observed because, although Xenophon was regarded as one of the great Socratic philosophers until well after the Renaissance, he is now regarded to be of little or no importance [22]. Strauss was led to once again emphasize the significance of these comments by the following considerations.

Throughout the Platonic dialogues, with the exception of the Laws, Socrates is portrayed engaging his contemporaries in conversation intended to examine the soundness of their opinions. In the course of these examinations, Socrates repeatedly reveals that his interlocutors do not know what they believe they know, and that the arguments which they provide for their opinions are often inadequate. He nevertheless recognizes that their lack of both knowledge and adequate arguments does not in itself demonstrate that knowledge and adequate arguments do not or cannot exist in general, or that their opinions in particular are ultimately unsound. The possibility remains that Socrates' interlocutors imperfectly remember or articulate arguments and opinions which others originally provided more adequately. Socrates therefore repeatedly returns the discussion to the sources of his interlocutors' opinions and arguments, particularly as they are found in the tradition of epic poetry best represented by Homer. Socrates recognizes, in other words, that the arguments provided in the ancient literature are the original sources of many prevailing opinions, and that this literature therefore requires careful examination.

It is for these reasons that Socrates does not only engage in dialectical conversation with those around him, but turns to careful study of the old and great books which decisively form their opinions. In Xenophon's Memorabilia, for example, we encounter the following observation.

> 'Socrates: Now for my part, Antiphon, just as someone else may be pleased by a good horse or dog or bird, so I am pleased even more by good friends; and if I have something to teach, I teach it to them, then I introduce my associates to others, from whom I believe they will get some benefit in their search for virtue. And these treasures of the wise men of old, which they left behind by writing them in books, I open up and explore in common with my friends, and if we see something good, we pick it out and consider it a great gain if we can become beneficial to one another.' [23]

The Socratic or classical political rationalist view of education generally, and of the great books education specifically, takes this statement of the Xenophonic Socrates as the beginning point of dialectical liberation through a great books education [24]

As both Socrates and Straussians emphasize, the books to be studied are selected from the perspective of a particular class of questions, and not as representatives of "traditions", "culture" or "ideology" (political doctrine). These questions are permanent and fundamental, and become increasingly universal as the student's education proceeds.

Corresponding to Plato's image of the Cave, the first set of great books to be studied will be those addressed to a specific class of permanent and fundamental questions, namely those questions most directly accessible to the student. These

questions are not permanent and universal in the sense that they concern the aspirations and limitations of human existence as such, which we will discuss below, but in the sense that all people, everywhere and always, receive their formative experiences and normative opinions within a particular regime, and are potentially able to question the adequacy of such experience and opinions. In other words, regardless of the actual content of the prevailing opinions, the question "What is the nature and adequacy of the opinions which prevail in my regime (society/religion/family)?" is a permanent and universal question in the sense that it is one which may be potentially raised by any human being at any time.

For those coming of age in the Western liberal democracies, such questions will be concerned with the adequacy of precisely those opinions which constitute our most fundamental moral and political commitments. It must once again be emphasized, however, that the Socratic educational intention is grounded in our awareness that such opinions are hypotheses, and that our attempt to understand and evaluate them is not undertaken in the spirit of either dogmatic allegiance or dogmatic scepticism, but rather guided by the normative intention to seek knowledge of the true and the good.

Those coming to maturity in liberal democracies here and now might raise such fundamental questions as "What is the

nature and adequacy of democracy?", "What is the nature and adequacy of the axiological neutralism with regard to the good that underlies liberal democratic thought?", "Is an international free market desirable as a mechanism of wealth creation and distribution (and with regard to which goods)?", "Is free speech desirable?", "Is the "liberation" of sexuality desirable?", "Is toleration, particularly of other "cultures" or religions, justified and desirable?", "Is political secularism better than theocracy?", "Are political freedom or equality themselves desirable in principle?", "Is the equality of the sexes contrary to nature, and so contrary to the political good?". These questions proceed from the general and inoffensive to the more specific and, I suspect, the more distressing to contemporary sensibilities. As the Straussians argue, the moral anger and indignation provoked by such questions reveals that they are fundamental to us, and that serious questioning of them is discouraged within our regime. When we witness this kind of reaction among , for example, the fanatics of the Inquisition, we are quick to condemn it, and yet just as quick to rationalize our own (typically less violent) reaction to those who are heretics from the point of view of our own most cherished convictions. It is above all our response to such moral indignation -- our retrenchment in prevailing belief or our distressing but unflinching engagement with the questions that most disturb us -- that reveals initially who does and who does not have the philosophic dispositions necessary to true philosophic education in the Socratic spirit [25]. As we shall see below,

it is from this perspective that classical political rationalists evaluate the moral seriousness and true openness of civic education.

These questions initially select an identifiable group of books within the modern Western tradition of liberal democratic political thought. It is not enough to depend on what is now effectively the traditional acceptance of the prevailing political ideas. We must also return to the books of those who not only provided the original formulation of the ideas themselves, but those who provided the original arguments for them which we now take for granted, if we think of them seriously at all. We turn to these books with the intention of recreating authentic personal experience of constructing these arguments, followed by the philosophical challenge to engage in an evaluation of their adequacy. We might turn to the works of Machiavelli, for example, in order to understand and evaluate the original and most politically effective arguments for the view that government ought to be neutral with respect to the good, and concerned instead with the provision and distribution of the means which enable the citizenry to pursue their own ends within the parameters of law. Similarly, we might turn to the works of Hobbes and Locke as sources for the original arguments which converted Machiavelli's military constitutional republic into the constitutional commercial republic familiar to us now. Locke's works in particular provide the first, and now largely presupposed [26], arguments for the view that education in a

commercial liberal democratic regime ought to provide the young with the knowledge and dispositions which will allow them to acquire the material means which will allow them to autonomously pursue their own view of the good life. In general, we find in such books the arguments for the political hypotheses that we now take to be obvious, such as the derivation of the normative intentions of education from liberal political doctrine, or the desirability of liberal democracy and the limitations of government by a constitution.

A specific and topical example of the kind of questions which are fundamental within our regime, and in the way in which such questions select the books that we must read as a part of our higher education, might help to clarify the Straussian recovery of the original classical political rationalist idea of education. Some time ago, the popular novelist Salman Rushdie was subjected to a fatwa on the grounds that his novel The Satanic Verses was blasphemous. As Straussian Allan Bloom observed,

> 'writers, whose ox was being gored, rushed before the T.V cameras to denounce this blatant attack on the inviolable principle of freedom of speech. All well and good. But the kicker is that most of these very same writers have for many years been teaching us that we must respect the integrity of other cultures and that it is arrogant ethnocentrism to judge other cultures according to our standards, which are themselves the product of our culture. In this case, however, all such reasonings were forgotten, and freedom of speech was treated as though its claims to transcultural status, its claims to be valid everywhere and always, are true.' [27]

Bloom here raises two of the characteristic concerns of Straussian political philosophy, and the education it seeks to

protect from politicization. Both of these concerns are brought together in the conflict, implicit in Bloom's comments, between two antagonistic traditions of political thought which have been unreflectively incorporated into the academic rhetoric, if not the political practice, of Western liberal democracy. As Bloom observes, we no longer know

> 'from moment to moment what we will do when there are conflicts, which there inevitably will be, between human rights and the imperatives of the culturally sacred.' [28]

In other words, in Socratic terms, Western liberal political thought is composed in part of two hypotheses, one embodied in the idea of "culture", the other embodied in the "right" to free speech, and the contradiction between these two ideas introduces practical dilemmas into political life.

From the Socratic perspective, the difficulties involved in reconciling two of the strands of contemporary political thought, "culture" and human rights, require that we study the original sources of the political hypotheses most familiar to us. Only after we have acquired a detailed understanding of the arguments involved will we be in a position to competently evaluate them in the context of the challenge presented by newer political hypotheses. For those concerned with the justifiability of free speech when challenged by the imperatives of "culture", the implications of this perspective are clear.

> 'The serious arguments that established the right of free speech were made by philosophers -- most notably Locke, Milton and Mill -- and our contemporaries do not return to them to refresh their memories and to see whether the arguments are really good. And this

> is due not only to laziness but also to the current attack on the very idea of such study.' [29]

This specific example illustrates the general principle underlying the Straussian interpretation of Socratic educational thought. Straussian political philosophers, following the example of Socrates, would have us begin our higher formal education with careful and open-minded study of those books which provide the arguments for the political hypotheses we now take for granted. We are to turn, for example, to the works of Locke, Milton and Mill, first to understand the philosophic defence of free speech, and then to determine whether or not that defence is true. By examining these books closely we may see that what are presupposed to have been persuasive or conclusive arguments on behalf of the political hypotheses that we now believe may actually be much weaker than we might like to think, and therefore open to challenge. We may also discover that the arguments are much stronger than we realized, and so provide a compelling justification for free speech against the imperatives of "culture".

As Rousseau and Tocqueville warned , however, we must be aware that the conventional challenges arising out of some contemporary evaluations of these hypotheses are not so much a philosophical critique as an unconscious acceptance and radicalization. As Tocqueville observed, democratic scepticism or relativism are often rhetorical presentations of deeper dogmatism [30]. For example, those who advocate libertarianism or participatory democracy are not engaged in a philosophical

critique of liberal democracy so much as in political advocacy of doctrines which radicalize, precisely because they are grounded in, the principles of liberal democracy, liberty and equality respectively. In other words, many of the apparent critiques of liberal democracy are not grounded in an awareness of, or engagement with, the philosophical questions raised by that political doctrine, but in a deeper and unconscious commitment to the hypotheses on which it is based. If we are to engage in this more fundamental and self-conscious philosophical challenge , then we must turn to those great books which advocate ideas fundamentally unlike our own. There are an additional three classes of great books which provide us with the basis for philosophical engagement of this kind, but which also compel us to an ever more fundamental, and therefore troubling or disorienting, engagement with those arguments or ideas which are most radically unlike, if not antagonistic, to our own.

Socratic great books education begins with a careful reading and evaluation of those great books which are the original sources for the political hypotheses we now take for granted. The normative intentions of such education, however, is the pursuit of the truth rather than intent to confirm our students in the normative hypotheses of their regime of origin. Corresponding to this intention, students turn next to two classes of great books which challenge the prevailing ideas and arguments. These books may be classified as modern and classical, and we will discuss each class in turn.

For liberal democrats here and now, such study might begin with those works within the modern Western tradition which provide the most fundamental challenges to liberal democracy. On the one hand might be the works of Karl Marx, whose arguments for the common ownership of the means of production under the direction of "the dictatorship of the proletariat", constitutes a fundamental alternative to the free competitive markets and parliamentarianism which is essential to liberal democracy as we now understand it. On the other hand, and in a sense coming from the opposite political extreme, are the profound philosophical works of Nietzsche and Heidegger. An important component of the Straussian account of the historical evolution of political philosophy is the view that Nietzsche and Heidegger placed creativity and culture, rather than practical reason and human rights, at the centre of political prescription. This substitution constitutes an unprecedented theoretical and practical challenge not only to liberal political thought, but to the whole tradition of classical political rationalism which has defined Western thought since classical antiquity [31].

The third class of great books are those of classical philosophy which, by arguing that politics ought to aim at making people virtuous in a definitive sense, challenge our belief that politics ought not to impose any normative criteria or goals, but simply provide freedom for people to choose and pursue their own conception of the good, along with

an equal distribution of the opportunities and resources which make such pursuit a practical possibility.

> 'The method of such a re-examination is predetermined by the nature of the modern principles. They were evolved in opposition to, and by way of transformation of, the principles of classical philosophy. Up to the present day no adherent of the modern principles has been able to assert them with any degree of definiteness without explicitly and more or less passionately attacking the classical principles. Therefore a free examination of the modern principles is necessarily based on their conscientious confrontation with those of classical philosophy.' [32]

Whether it is Bloom's "Socrates or Nietzsche?" or Alistair MacIntyre's less substantive but more popular 'Nietzsche or Aristotle?', the only serious philosophical responses to the crisis in education are essentially the same: we must thoroughly study what the greatest classical and modern thinkers have already said if we are to be in any position to embark on a credible and informed search for our own solutions.

We may begin to understand both the nature of the fundamental questions which are the foundation of philosophic education, and the selection of the fourth class of books devoted to them, from the following perspective. The (now Nietzschean) "culture" and "values" jargon which is used almost universally in contemporary political and educational discourse actually precludes engagement with most other "traditions". Middle Eastern scholars have argued for decades that the concept of "culture" is absolutely relative to European thought, and systematically distorts any other tradition to which it is applied. If Moses, Jesus or Mohammed

received a revelation from God, then at least one of Judaism, Christianity or Islam is The Truth, not one "culture" among many. Culture theory presupposes that this most fundamental premise of these "other traditions" is false; the act of defining them as "culture" constitutes a denial of the very belief by which they define themselves. (We reach the ultimate absurdity when "religion" is defined as part of one's "primary culture", a re-wording of the Victorian idea of "natural loyalties".) This presupposition directs us to one of the permanent, fundamental questions: What is the relation between reason and revelation? This question is universal, and not relative to "traditions". The answers that have been given to this question are relative to, and even constitute, "traditions". From the Straussian perspective, it is above all the questions, not the answers (or "traditions") which select the books to be read. The current Western view of reason and revelation derives from the Enlightenment revision of Aquinas. But Aquinas was not the only medieval theist to confront the challenge of pagan rationalism. The Muslim al-Farabi and the Jew Maimonides also confronted Aristotle's rationalist challenge to revelation, but drew different conclusions to Aquinas. The question of the relation between reason and revelation selects (at least) the books of Aquinas, al-Farabi and Maimonides (and therefore requires knowledge of Latin and Arabic), and reading them could commit one to the Socratic theoretical life that has found an uneasy refuge within all three "traditions".

As this discussion suggests, the fourth class of great books are the great books of the medieval period of the Middle East. These books embody ideas, arguments, and conceptions of the good which are outside the Western tradition, and yet which are devoted to the same fundamental questions with which the Western thinkers are concerned. It is instructive, and perhaps humbling to those in the West who wish to believe that "multiculturalism" is a reflection of the peculiar generosity of Western liberalism, that Arabic and Hebraic scholarship and philosophy have been based, in part, on a reasoned confrontation of the great books of the West for nearly a thousand years. The Arabic and Hebraic tradition of Platonic and Aristotelian scholarship, for example, predates that in the West by several hundred years, and continues to thrive today. In contrast, few academics in the West could claim even to be aware of these philosophic traditions, to say nothing of having engaged in reasoned debate with them. The great books of Hebraic thinkers such as Maimonides, Bahya or the author of The Kuzari, and of Arabic thinkers such al-Farabi or al-Razi, are philosophical works of the highest order which challenge our views of the relationship between reason and revelation, of the separation of ecclesiastical and political authority, and of the nature and limitations of rational autonomy. An attempt to engage with and experience the arguments presented in these books will be a necessary part of an education which derives its normative intentions from the philosophic life, a life devoted to an understanding of the fundamental questions, the alternative answers, and the willingness to pursue the truth through dialectical confrontation of such answers.

10.4 Dangers and Pre-requisites of Dialectic

A thorough understanding of the permanent questions, and a dialectical examination of the answers that have been provided to them, constitutes the classical political rationalist conception of higher education. Higher education presupposes lower or preparatory education of some kind. The normative intentions of preparatory education are derived internally from the Socratic conception of higher education and the philosophical life. The philosophical life, and the higher education derived from it, require particular dispositions and experiences. These experiences and dispositions are needed not only for the successful pursuit of dialectical inquiry, but also to ensure that the student does not succumb to the dangers and temptations of such an inquiry.

In the course of the dramatic dialogue with Glaucon, Socrates warns of the dangers of dialectic and the philosophical life, and the corresponding precautions that must be taken in introducing the young to them.

> '[Socrates:] Isn't it one great precaution not to let them taste of arguments while they are young? I suppose you aren't unaware that when boys get their first taste of them they misuse them as though it were play, always using them to contradict; and imitating those men by whom they are refuted, they themselves refute others, like puppies enjoying pulling and tearing at argument with those who happen to be near.
>
> [Glaucon:] They certainly have, he said, a preternatural tendency in that direction.
>
> [Socrates:] Then when they themselves refute many men and are refuted by many, they fall quickly into profound disbelief of what they formerly believed. And as a result of this, you see, they themselves and the whole activity of philosophy become the objects of slander among the rest of men.' [33]

Socrates goes on to argue that both philosophy and the regime will be better served when young men

> 'will imitate the man who's willing to discuss and consider the truth rather than the one who plays and contradicts for the sake of the game. And he himself will be more sensible and will make the practice of discussion more honourable instead of more dishonourable.' [34]

Socrates' first speech draws our attention to the motivations and dispositions necessary for dialectic and philosophy, while the second speech brings to our attention the importance of particular kinds of experience. We will explore each of these in turn.

In the Socratic view, those who engage in the philosophic life must possess two virtues necessary to the pursuit of knowledge and understanding, and the philosophic life generally. On the one hand, such pursuit requires a certain seriousness of disposition, a willingness to dialectically examine the opinions of oneself and others with the intention of understanding the strengths no less than the weaknesses of such opinions, and to move beyond opinion in the direction of knowledge, however tentative. The pursuit of dialectic and the philosophic life requires the virtue of desire for knowledge, understanding, and the pursuit of truth.

On the other hand, dialectic understood as a method of examination and argument can be deeply disturbing, particularly to those whose most fundamental beliefs and aspirations are questioned or even challenged by it. As

Socrates indicates in the close of his second speech, the immoderate pursuit of dialectic can threaten to provoke profound disbelief or nihilism among those who engage in it, as well as those who are subjected to it, and thereby bring philosophy into disrepute. From this point of view the "puppies" who engage in dialectic indiscriminately, and so threaten to publicly undermine even those opinions on which common deliberation and action within the regime depend, lack the virtues of philosophical moderation and political responsibility.

Those lacking these two sets of virtues -- a desire for truth, and moderation and political responsibility -- not only fail to engage in dialectic and philosophy motivated by the search for knowledge, but abuse them in such a way as to potentially undermine the regime, and thereby to provoke politically inspired attacks on "philosophy" thus misrepresented.

In Socrates' second speech, he warns of the potentially undesirable consequences which may arise when the young are introduced to the experience of dialectic and philosophy too early, and without proper preparation. If young men and women lacking the necessary preparatory education subject the beliefs of themselves and others to the stringent tests of dialectical argument, they may simply undermine their own beliefs . On the one hand, their use of sophisticated logical techniques of argumentation, particularly against friends and

citizens unaccustomed to them, can easily appear to destroy the credibility of the most fundamental or even sacred beliefs of the regime. Longstanding and widely held religious beliefs can suddenly appear to be not merely dubitable but arbitrary or even absurd. Similarly, the moral and political opinions which define the aspirations of the political community and its citizens, and provide the moral principles and presuppositions which guide reflection and debate concerning the proper means to the realisation of those aspirations, are only too easily made to appear to be without foundation. The consequent nihilism of such experience, without the balancing experience of the possibility of truth, both threatens to undermine rational and moderate political participation, and to destroy any motivating belief in the realizability of the philosophic life. Young people who believe that no truth exists will not be motivated to engage in a way of life devoted to the search for it.

In order to ensure that those entering into the philosophical life, and its distinctive mode of reasoning, are properly prepared for both, Socrates outlines a two-part programme of preparatory education. From the classical political rationalist perspective, an education in what we would now call mathematics and science is valued as a means by which the young are introduced, through their own intellectual efforts, to an experience of objective truth not dependent on either their own opinions or those prevailing in the regime. Such an experience serves as a dispositional foundation for

later dialectic, one which enables the student to understand that the dubitability of even the most fundamental and sacred opinions need not lead one to the nihilism of extreme scepticism, but to the philosophic pursuit of truth motivated by this zetetic or "erotic" scepticism of Socrates. Similarly, a civic education imbues the young with the virtue of the desire for truth, and the moderate and responsible dispositions which incline them towards the prudent pursuit of it. Plato is quite explicit in the Republic in regarding civic and scientific education as 'the preparatory education required for dialectic and the philosophic life' [35]. We will examine the classical political rationalist conception of scientific and civic education, understood as preparation for dialectic and philosophy, in each of the two following sections respectively.

10.5 Science Education as Preparation for Dialectic

Education in what we would now regard as mathematics and science is incorporated into the Socratic conception of great books education in distinctive terms. In particular, the normative intentions by which such science education is valued are derived from the fundamental questions which define the philosophical life. The classical political rationalists also recognized the utilitarian value of science, and particularly of the technology derived from scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, such utilitarian value is regarded not as an intention, but as a consequence of scientific learning pursued

from the perspective of the philosophical life. Moreover, the utilitarian value of science is itself conditional upon a particular standard of utility which constitutes a normative hypothesis, and as such raises the more fundamental question of the good. The value and intentions of scientific education, in other words, are understood from three perspectives (in addition to utility): dialectical education, the philosophic life, and the question of the good. We will consider each of these in turn.

Turning first to the Socratic view of scientific education as a preparation for dialectic, Plato argues that individuals whose most fundamental beliefs are undermined by dialectic can be too easily driven to either nihilism or fanaticism, both of which threaten philosophy and political life. This experience is compellingly captured by the great German dramatist Heinrich von Kleist's account of his first encounter with the philosophy of Emmanuel Kant .

> 'Not long ago I became acquainted with the Kantian philosophy -- and I now have to tell you of a thought I derived from it, which I feel free to do because I have no reason to believe it will shatter you so profoundly and painfully as it did me. We are unable to decide whether that which we call truth really is truth, or whether it only appears to us to be. If the latter, then the truth we assemble here is nothing after our death, and all endeavour to acquire a possession which will follow us to the grave is in vain. If the point of this thought does not penetrate your heart, do not smile at one who feels wounded by it in the deepest and most sacred part of his being. My one great aim has failed me and I have no other.' [36]

As Plato would predict, and as the remainder of Kleist's tragic life in many ways illustrates, a youthful encounter

with the unsettling doubts and questions raised by dialectical enquiry can too easily have undesirable consequences. This is particularly true of young people who have not yet had an opportunity to carefully study the sciences, and thereby to acquire by direct experience some familiarity with propositions which are reliable and demonstrable. From the Socratic perspective, scientific education is valued above all as a preparation for dialectic which provides the student with preliminary experience of truth and reason, and a moderation of expectation and expression which mitigates against the dangers of the experience of dialectic.

Plato's Socrates argues that sciences such as astronomy, and particularly mathematics and geometry, are a necessary prelude to dialectic and the philosophical life, though they are not parts of philosophy themselves [37]. Mathematics in particular

> 'would be among the studies we are seeking. It's necessary for a warrior to learn them for the sake of his dispositions for the army, and for a philosopher because he must rise up out of becoming and take hold of being or else never become skilled at calculating.' [38]

For the philosopher, mathematics is a means to rise above the world of "becoming", the natural and historical world of particular empirical events and perceptions that are both constantly changing and not always reliably perceived by the senses. While those who are to become philosophers necessarily begin their intellectual life in the world of becoming, mathematics enables them, or even compels them, to look beneath becoming to the more fundamental and permanent laws

which govern becoming. For example, while each particular object falls in its own way, all such falling is governed by the law of gravitation; to know the nature of things is to know the natural laws which govern the particularities of the world. Understood and valued in this way, mathematics

> 'leads the soul powerfully upward and compels it to discuss the numbers themselves. It won't at all permit anyone to propose for discussion numbers that are attached to visible or tangible bodies.' [39]

In other words, and more broadly, the study of mathematics and physical sciences

> 'is for the sake of knowing what is always, and not at all for what is at any time coming into being and passing away.' [40]

Mathematics and the physical sciences draw the soul upward towards an awareness of the permanent natural laws which govern the properties and behaviour of the tangible bodies of the empirical world, natural and historical, so often unreliably perceived by the senses.

Turning, secondly, to the value of scientific study as preparation for the philosophic life, such study is valued from two interrelated perspectives. First, scientific and mathematical study provides the young with real experience of both the pursuit and, to some degree, the attainment of demonstrable and communicable truth.

> '[Socrates:] Do you see, then, my friend, I said, that it is likely that this study is really compulsory for us, since it looks as if it compels the soul to use the intellect itself on the truth itself.' [41]

This is not to say that all claims which purport to be scientific or mathematical are true, but that the truth of at

least some such claims can be demonstrated and communicated to others. The Pythagorean theorem, for example, is a true statement of an essential property of all triangles in Euclidean space, and as such can be both demonstrated to oneself and communicated to others. Socrates values the experience of such truth as a part of philosophic education. When the young later experience the unsettling dialectical challenge to what is most firmly believed to be true in their time and place, they may be tempted to conclude that no truth is available to human beings, and that dialectic and the philosophic life are futile. The earlier experience of the scientific pursuit and demonstration of some enduring truths provides them with knowledge, grounded in their own intellectual experience, confirming that the untruthfulness of so much of what they once believed does not necessitate the nihilistic belief that no truth exists at all. Rather than succumbing to such nihilism, their previous experience would compel them to turn from the untruthfulness or questionability of their former beliefs, not in nihilistic despair, but with a desire to pursue the truth, and to substitute knowledge in the place of their former opinions.

Socrates values scientific study from the third point of view of its directedness toward the idea or question of the good. As Socrates repeatedly acknowledges, one of the consequences -- though not one of the aims -- of scientific education is its practical contribution to political and economic life, and its corresponding utilitarian value. In terms of its utilitarian

value, however,

> 'only a small portion of either geometry or mathematics would suffice. It must be considered whether its greater and more advanced part tends to make it easier to discern the idea of the good. And we say that this tendency is possessed by everything that compels the soul to turn around to the region that is inhabited by the happiest part of what is, which is what the soul must by all means see.' [42]

Elaborating upon the metaphors of the line and the cave, Socrates argues that scientific and mathematical study compels the soul to turn toward the sun, and toward the idea of the good. Socrates recognizes, as most people do, that the results of scientific study may be useful, regardless of the contribution it makes to preparation for dialectic for which it is valued. However, to say that science is useful is to raise the question of what it is useful for; as a criterion of value, "usefulness" implies an end, an end which is regarded as good. The notion of a good end implies the question of the good.

The question of the good implicit in scientific study is important to classical political rationalist education in two ways. On the one hand, it directs reflection to the question of the good, the animating principle of all such study, as well as the primary question from which the Socratic idea of education is derived. On the other hand, reflection on the more fundamental conception of the good underlying one's standard of usefulness contributes to one's self-understanding in the sense that one is compelled to self-consciously reflect on the normative intentions and goals which motivate and direct one's study and learning.

10.6 Civic Education for Philosophy

Science education prepares the student for dialectic education, and for the philosophic life generally, by providing the student with the real experience of the discovery and understanding of some truth, however small. Yet the experience of truth in itself is not necessarily sufficient to counteract the disconcerting dangers of dialectic. If these dangers are to be averted, there must be, in addition to some experience of truth, a particular moral disposition such that the student cares for the truth and desires to pursue it in a responsible manner. An experience of the truth may co-exist with an indifference to it, or with a preference for other things, while the dialectical method may be abused as a mere eristic device employed to confound or persuade one's interlocutors without an intention to pursue the truth. In classical political rationalist educational thought, civic education is valued primarily as a means by which such a disposition may be inculcated in the student, thus preparing them for the philosophical life. The potential political value of such education is recognized, although this is understood as a derivative consequence of its primary intention.

As we have seen, Socratic political rationalism takes an awareness of, and dialectical engagement with, the political opinions prevalent in the regime as a starting point for education and political philosophy. Corresponding to this

awareness is an appreciation of the fact that all actual regimes will make some provision for political education, and that such education will inevitably be a part of the early experience of the citizenry [43]. Any political regime, defined by any political doctrine, will endeavour to ensure that its citizens or subjects have some skill in administering their own affairs, and some knowledge (often infused with religion until recently) of its political history and procedures. Even the most humble subject or citizen is expected to know the law, and to have some respect for the lawgivers, whether they be gods, heroes, monarchs, or ordinary men. The classical political rationalists, from Socrates to Strauss, were less concerned with radically altering the nature of such political, (and, in contemporary practice, typically citizenship), education than with supplementing it in accordance with the normative intentions derived from the philosophical life.

In order to understand the Socratic classical political rationalist idea of civic education, and to distinguish it from the contemporary notion of citizenship education with which it might easily be confused, we must begin with a reminder of the Socratic conception of the relationship between education and political philosophy.

> '..."political philosophy" means primarily not the philosophic treatment of politics, but the political or popular treatment of philosophy, or the political introduction to philosophy -- the attempt to lead qualified citizens ... from the political to the philosophic life.' [44]

Political philosophy, as a component of philosophy as a whole,

requires a particular kind of civic education which will enable some citizens to question the prevailing political hypotheses, and eventually to be lead from the political life circumscribed by these hypotheses to the philosophic life which consists (in part) of the search for knowledge of the political good. The search for knowledge of the political good implies not only that such knowledge is so far unattained, but that the hypotheses which substitute for such knowledge in the regime are dubitable. Philosophy, and the dialectical education which is central to it, must therefore be entered into in a politically responsible manner if its unrelenting questioning is not to undermine the common belief in the political consensus on which the regime depends for its cohesion and stability. The politically irresponsible pursuit of dialectic and the philosophic life not only risks undermining the regime, but thereby also risks bringing philosophy into disrepute, and so subject to political censure. Socrates, after all, was executed on the grounds that the education he provided undermined precisely those beliefs which were regarded to be most politically valuable within the Athenian democracy, and which we would now regard as patently untrue. From this perspective, civic education is "civic" in the sense that its normative intentions are derived from the philosophic life, and the need to ameliorate the potential dangers of dialectic for the individual student, as well as the tensions that exist between political life and dialectical education.

It would take us far beyond the specific intentions of this thesis to enter into a full explication and evaluation of the curricular details of such preparatory education, or the arguments provided by Socrates, Xenophon and Aristotle for its efficacy. From the point of view of the present argument, it is enough to explicate the position of such education within the wider Socratic programme, and the origins of the normative intentions of such education.

Plato is quite clear that 'the first education comes through the muses and Apollo' [45], and as such consists of music and poetry. Such early artistic education is valued as preparation for higher education, and especially for the responsible but unrelenting pursuit of dialectic enquiry. As Plato observes,

> 'if these should elude us and get away from our discussion that should come after -- about correct education, whether Greek or barbarian -- would be in vain.' [46]

The curriculum of such education consists of what the Socratic philosophers called mousike, or music and literature, particularly poetry, and helps us to understand its function in preparing the young for philosophy. As Allan Bloom put it,

> 'education is the taming or domestication of the soul's raw passions -- not suppressing or excising them, which would deprive the soul of its energy --but forming and informing them as art.' [47]

Sublimating the passions through education in music and literature serves the ' goal of harmonizing the enthusiastic part of the soul with what develops later, the rational part' [48] 48. Bloom (1987), p. 71]. Such education is

> 'both for giving the passions their due and for preparing the soul for the unhampered use of reason'. [49]

In contemporary terms, the normative intention of civic education is the development of moral character, or the development of the dispositions required for the unrelenting, but responsible, pursuit of dialectical inquiry.

The normative intentions of Socratic political rationalist civic education are defined in terms of the virtues and the moral disposition required by the philosophic life [50]. The disposition required for the philosophic life can generally be divided into two categories, each corresponding to a particular part of the educational preparation required for such a life. Specifically, a disposition towards moral seriousness can be divided into the two categories, civic responsibility and the love of truth [51]. A musical and poetic education moderates and refines the passions in the direction of this particular kind of moral seriousness.

> 'those who have not acquired in their youth a rich and compelling moral education in artistically and poetically inspired republican virtue will lack the moral seriousness -- the intensity of concern, but also the practical sobriety and realism -- that will strongly incline them to stick with the examination of their opinions, once they have begun to recognize the questionableness of all received moral opinions.' [52]

As we have seen, throughout his discussion of dialectic, education and the philosophic life, Socrates continuously draws the attention of his interlocutors back to the dangers that dialectic can present to both the individual and the regime. All human life, and particularly all political life,

proceeds on the basis of particular beliefs which are regarded as true. Theocratic regimes and citizens presuppose the truth of a particular Revelation, just as secular regimes and citizens believe that particular statements of moral principle or human rights embody at least part of the truth of the human condition. It is therefore deeply disturbing to individuals, and destabilizing to the regime as a whole, to subject such beliefs to the questioning of dialectical reason. If such questioning succeeds in rendering the normative presuppositions of the regime truly dubitable, then the basis for common deliberation and action is undermined, and the regime is correspondingly destabilized and ripe for either anarchy or tyranny.

The second virtue required by the philosophic life is a love of truth, and a corresponding willingness to continue with the dialectic examination of the opinions of oneself and others as a component of the philosophic search for knowledge of the good. The philosophic life also requires political moderation, or an awareness that it is politically unrealistic to believe that the dialectical examination of the most fundamental of the prevailing hypotheses is likely to produce political reform in the short term, and that the attempt to do so is only too likely to bring philosophy into disrepute in the public mind. One of the things which distinguishes politically responsible philosophers in search of the truth from the irresponsible sophists in pursuit of fame and power is the subtle combination of political realism and a concern

for the knowledge of the political good, rather than idealism and a concern to see one's own most cherished hypotheses implemented within the regime.

10.7 Summary

In the Socratic idea of the nature of education, the normative intentions are derived from the philosophic life, the life devoted to pursuit of knowledge of the good. Formal education begins, as it does in the Isocratic heritage, with elementary literacy, numeracy, and civic education. The Socratic view of education radically differs from the Isocratic, however, in that such learning is valued for the contribution it makes preparing the student for the philosophic life. Civic education in particular is valued as a means for the inculcation of specific virtues, the love of truth above all. Students possessing such virtue are then led to scientific and mathematical education, and to some experience of the truth which their earlier education has led them to long for. Taken together, civic and scientific education are valued as a means by which students acquire a love and experience of the truth in preparation for a higher dialectical education.

Higher education consists of careful study of the alternative answers to the permanent and fundamental questions, especially as these answers are available to us in the great books. Such study is valued as a central component

CONCLUSION

'We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.'
T.S. Eliot, Little Giddings

In the beginning of this thesis we set out to understand the philosophical question of the nature of education. In endeavouring to understand this question, the argument of the thesis has sought to fulfil three intentions. A philosophical argument in the history of political philosophy and educational ideas has sought to recover some understanding of the nature and influence of the Isocratic heritage to Western educational thought in general. A second and more specific intention has been to recover and reformulate the logical structure of the Isocratic idea of the essential nature of education. Third, and finally, this thesis is intended to recover some understanding of the alternative Socratic idea of the nature of education, particularly insofar as it can be contrasted with the Isocratic conception of the origins and status of the normative intentions of education. We conclude this thesis with a brief restatement of the extent to which each of these intentions has been fulfilled.

To begin with the recovery of the Isocratic heritage in Western educational thought, this thesis has demonstrated that Isocrates' idea of the nature of education, along with his broader programme of learning, has had an unparalleled

influence in the history of Western educational thought and practice. Educational thinkers of the Roman empire, of early Christianity, of the Carolingian and Twelfth Century renaissances of the Middle Ages, of Renaissance humanism, and of early modern political thought, all explicitly adhered to the Isocratic heritage of rhetorical education. This common adherence is the first component of the legacy of Isocrates which provides both the unity and the continuity of Western educational thought.

The second component of the Isocratic heritage underlying and unifying the history of Western educational thought, and one which is perhaps more difficult to discern, is the Isocratic idea of education itself. At first glance, the history of educational thought appears to be sharply divided between adherents to a variety of radically diverse doctrines of education, each of which derives the normative intentions of education from a different political doctrine. Roman educators sought to construct a system of rhetorical learning in the service of Roman republican and imperial political doctrine, early Christians valued Isocratic rhetorical learning in accordance with Christian theologico-political doctrine, and medieval and Renaissance rhetoricians and humanists derived the normative intentions of education from the gradually re-emerging forms of republican political doctrine. At the foundation of this apparent historical diversity and discontinuity, however, is a more fundamental continuity of educational thought in the form of the

perpetual presupposition of the Isocratic idea of the nature of education: the political diversity of educational thought and intention is a consequence of a continuous and almost universal acceptance of the Isocratic idea by the principal educational thinkers in Western history. Even after the modernist reconception of the nature of politics, the Isocratic idea of education survived as the foundation of the view that the normative intentions of education are relative to political doctrine. It is with little exaggeration that we conclude that the history of Western educational thought is the history of the educational ideas of Isocrates.

This conclusion is not without significance. With few exceptions, the most widely used educationist discussions of the history of education, including particularly those by Curtis and Boultwood, and Hirst, make no mention of Isocrates or the Isocratic heritage. Even those few educationist texts which do mention Isocrates, such as Boyd and Bowen, provide only the most perfunctory discussion of Isocrates as an Athenian educator, and discuss neither his educational ideas nor his influence. Similarly, educationist histories of education generally ignore educational thinkers whose influence on the development of educational thought is well established, and whose role in the transmission of the Isocratic legacy this thesis has sought to recover. At the same time, the educational ideas of some of the better known figures in the history of educational thought are placed without reason in the "Aristotelian" or Platonic tradition, in

spite of the fact that they place themselves in the tradition of Isocrates.

If the historical argument of this thesis is sound, as I believe it is, then the histories of education and educational ideas upon which educationists and training teachers have been dependent for the greater part of this century are wholly inaccurate in almost every important respect. Certainly, anyone turning to them in the hope of acquiring some understanding of the history of educational philosophy and ideas will be thoroughly misled, where they are not left simply uninformed. To state the same point more positively, and more in keeping with the broader intentions of my arguments, this thesis demonstrates that serious study of the almost untapped riches of the history of educational philosophy and ideas must once again become the primary pre-requisite of educational philosophy if we are to understand many of our own presuppositions, and if we are to productively engage in the radical revision of the history of educational thought that is urgently required.

Within the Isocratic heritage, education is grounded in two commitments. The first is a commitment to the Isocratic idea of education, in which it is assumed that the normative intentions of education must be and/or ought to be derived from external political doctrine. A corollary of this idea is a commitment to hypothetical reasoning, in the sense that one's reasoning is grounded in a commitment to a particular

normative hypothesis which is unproven and contested. For Isocrates, and for those who accept or presuppose his idea of the nature of education, the good life is inseparable from political life: the normative intentions of education are derived by hypothetical reasoning from a hypothesis which takes the form of a political doctrine. As a consequence of a commitment to the Isocratic idea of education, education in practice will be "essentially contested" in the sense that its guiding normative intentions are derived from conflicting and contested political doctrines. It must be emphasized again that education is essentially contested in practice as a consequence of the fact that the underlying Isocratic idea of education is not contested, in theory or in practice: when all parties are committed to the presupposition that the normative intentions of education are derived from political doctrine, disagreements concerning education will be a consequence of disagreements concerning political doctrine rather than the nature of education.

While there are clearly a great many practical and theoretical implications of the continued presupposition of the Isocratic idea, there are two which I would emphasize as a consequence of the informal intentions of this thesis. Academic educationists and teachers have been much concerned in recent years with the low status of Educational Studies as an academic discipline, and with the low status (and remuneration) of the teaching profession. Yet it may be that the continuing presupposition of the Isocratic idea, and the

correlative attempt to treat the study of education as a component of political theory, can only exacerbate this regrettable state of affairs. If we accept that education is an inherently political enterprise, and that the most crucial judgements in educational provision -- namely, the formulation of the normative intentions of schooling -- are political, then such judgements would continue to be regarded as the proper prerogative of politicians rather than educators. Educators will continue to be regarded as civil servants whose task is to implement the educational judgements of politicians and political theorists in accordance with what is believed to be the inevitably political nature of education. Teachers and educationists, by presupposing that education is a political enterprise in the most important sense, relegate themselves to a secondary and subordinate position in the formulation and realization of the normative intentions of education. The argument of this thesis could, in a sense, be regarded as a reminder that Plato would reverse this structure of power and authority, and place education in the hands of educators. If we are to convert this reminder into a cohesive and compelling philosophical argument, then the responsibility lies with the academic educationists to lead by example, and to renew the public belief in the autonomy and respectability of education by revitalizing the study of education in its own right. The history of our discipline provides us with both compelling philosophical arguments and inspiring models of autonomous educational thought, and it is only by turning to them that we will be in a position to fill this practical and theoretical

responsibility.

An understanding of the nature and foundations of the differences between the Socratic and Isocratic ideas of education is clearly of enormous, if indirect and eventual, practical importance. Although the philosophical arguments of Part Three have, I think, rendered some of these practical consequences clear enough, it might be useful to mention another one here. Over the past few years a number of educationists have written of what they perceive to be a "legitimation crisis" or a "fragmentation of values", and have argued that these are undermining, in theory and in practice, the ideal of a common and publicly provided education. Although it seems to me that these phrases signify little more than sociological abstraction, the phenomenon which has given rise to them may be in an important sense real: education does not, and probably cannot, be an agent of social cohesion, but rather reflects such cohesion as is already present in the regime. At the present time, in addition to the diversity of political belief and aspiration, the diversity of fundamental normative commitments has also been increased by the introduction of other religions and "cultures" in the Western democracies. In the United Kingdom, as well as in the United States and Canada, an increasing variety of political, religious, cultural and even linguistic communities have been demanding educational provision in accordance with their "ultimate values". Underlying this demand is the presupposition of the Isocratic idea of education, and the

derivation of the normative intention of education from external and ultimately political doctrines. Attempts to incorporate such diversity within a system of public provision is becoming increasingly untenable precisely because the Isocratic idea is presupposed, while a political doctrine which can command the allegiance of people of such diverse origins and commitments is absent and probably unattainable. The diversification, and ultimately fragmentation and privatization, of educational provision is virtually inevitable in such circumstances.

Yet the Socratic idea of education provides an alternative which is as practical in the long run as it appears to be improbable when first encountered. There is, after all, real historical precedent within the Socratic tradition, such as Maimonides' renowned academy at Cordova, where Christians, Muslims and Jews found that they could educate their children together in accordance with their common commitment to the rigours of the philosophic life , and not merely in spite of, but precisely because of, the doctrinal differences that divided them. The elementary stages of education emphasized the theologico-political commitments of each group independently, while moderating and unifying all of the groups in a common commitment to the love of truth and experience of truth available through Socratic civic and scientific education. The students who proceeded to higher learning formed friendships and an enduring community on the basis of their common study of the great books of their

respective religions, as well as those left to them of the great pagan Greek philosophers. Such learning, friendship and community requires not only the courage and the commitment to the pursuit of truth definitive of Socratic education and the philosophic life, but also to an idea of the nature of education which does not presuppose that the normative intentions of our learning must simply mirror those of our lives as citizens. Education grounded in the Socratic idea of the nature of education can unify those groups that now seem so irrevocably "fragmented". It is in the nature of things, however, that we will be unable to pursue the practical potential of these historical exemplars until we recover the Socratic view of the permanent and irreconcilable tension between education and politics, as well as the philosophical arguments for the Socratic idea of the nature of education.

Although the Socratic philosophers went so far as to claim that the philosophical life is <u>the</u> good human life, my intention in this thesis has been limited to the scholarly task of recovering some understanding of the nature of that life, and setting the stage for its dialectical confrontation with the prevailing Isocratic alternative. In other words, my intention has been to present the Socratic and Isocratic ideas of education, and thus to prepare the ground for those who wish to engage the fundamental philosophical questions generated by the conflict between these two alternatives. Among such questions, the question of the essential nature of education will be paramount. If this thesis succeeds in

persuading a few of its readers to return to this question with a broadened perspective and a renewed sense of urgency, then it will have succeeded in the terms most valuable to me. The purposes of scholarship, and the proper goals of the academic life, are to recover and to keep alive those unfamiliar and fundamental alternative ideas most likely to be overlooked or condemned by those living within the narrow intellectual parameters defined by their time and place. Having recovered a clear view of such ideas, of the arguments that make them plausible or even compelling, and of the enduring conflict between them, the scholar must then step away from his study and his university, and leave the fruits of his labours to those in the wider community who might find in them the implicit invitation to the philosophic life, and to the friendship and happiness unique to it.

References and Notes

Introduction

1. Keynes (1935), p. 384

2. Mansfield (1992), p. 26

3. For discussions of the Straussian approach see Miller, Jr. (1976); Deutsch and Soffer (1987); Magid (1955); Magid (1964); Pangle and Tarcov (1987); Pangle (1989); Pangle (1983); Bloom (1990), p. 235-255; Rosen (1987), Ch. 3; Review of Politics (1991); Gourevitch (1968); Revue de metaphysique et de morals (1989); Cropsey (1964); Cropsey (1975); Gourevitch (1968).

4. Politics 13371 34-35.

5. Politics 1337a 34-1337b3.

6. Kant (1960), p. 12.

7. Kant (1960), p. 8. Original emphasis.

8. Flew (1979), p. 260.

9. eg. Wilson (1991), p. 343.

10. Bloom (1987), p. 26.

11. Pangle and Tarcov (1987), p. 910.

12. Mansfield, Jr. (1979), p. 7.

13. Pangle (1992), p. 1.

14. 'Theses on Feuerbach', Thesis 11.

15. Bloom (1993), p. 269.

16. See Cooper (1986), p. 216.

Chapter One

1. Aron (1968), p. 72.

2. Hudson-Williams (1940), p. 167. Cf. Kennedy (1989), p. 97; Vickers (1988), p. vii, p. 14.

3. Hadas (1969), p. 129.

4. Concise Oxford Dictionary (4th ed.), p. 1050.

5. Boorstin (1973), III, Ch. 51; Kennedy (1992), p. 291.

6. Norlin (1980), p. xxviii. Cf. Dobson (1919), p. 128.

7. Sinclair (1962), p. 333. Cf. Dobson (1919), p. 130.

8. Finley (1975), p 198. cf. Kennedy (1980), p. 31.

9. Hadas (1969), p. 129; Dobson (1919), p. 130.

10. Plutarch, Demosthenes, 5.5.

11. De Oratore II.23. Cf. Hadas (1962), p. 37.

12. Sinclair (1962), p. 347; Dickens (1972), p. 24-25;Kennedy (1969), p. 111; Laistner (1957); Kimball (198); Hadas (1962, p. 30; Curtius (1953), ch. 3; Knowles (1962), p. 61; Jaegar (1947), vol. 3.

13. Finley (1983), p. 114; Sinclair (1967), p. 135.

14. Barker (1948), p. 23; Hay (1966a), p. 2, p. 5; Pangle (1992), p. 81.

15. Aristotle (1984), p. 2.

16. Aristotle (1984), p. 11; Kennedy (1969), p. 13.

17. Compare Aristotle, Rhetoric 1396b to Isocrates Epistle 6.8. Cf. Hubbell (1913), pp. 6-7.

18. Jebb (1893) , II, p. 13; Warrington (1961), p. 481.

19. Diogenes Laertius IV.2.

20. See Burton (1926), I, p. 93; Plutarch, Cato, 23; Marrou (1948), I, p. 127.

21. Diogenes Laertius 7.32. Cf. Marrou (1948), I, p. 152; Burk (1923), p. 92.

22. Finley (1975), p. 199.

23. Finley (1975), p. 200; Hadas (1962), p. 38.

24. Hadas (1962), pp. 62-63, p. 103.

25. Bloom (1990), p. 298.

26. Johnson (1976), p. 217; Booth (1974), esp. Ch. 2.

27. Benardete (1984); Strauss (1989c).

28. Gomperz (1901), II, p. 314.

29. Laistner (1957), p. 444; Gomperz (1901), I, pp. 425-430.

30. Finley (1975), pp. 195-198, p. 204; Hadas (1962), p. 76;

Romily (1992), Ch. 3; Rosen (1987), Epilogue.

31. Sinclair (1962), p. 347.

32. Laistner (1971), p. 9; Laistner (1957), p. 428; Harvey (1984), p. 225; p. 104-5.

33. Johnson (1976), p. 225.

34. Wimsatt and Brooks (1957), p. 74.

35. Strauss (1964), ch. 3; Strauss and Cropsey (1987), pp. 7-32.

36. Quintilian, 1.22.

37. D'Alton (1931), pp. 493-496.

38. Laistner (1957), p. 428.

39. Zeller (1955), p. 110.

40. Hadas (1962), p. 37. cf. Hadas (1969), p. 177; Finley (1975), p. 198; Dobson (1919), p. 128, 130.

41. Hadas (1962), p. 36-37; Zeller (1955), p. 110.

42. Laistner (1957), p. 428.

43. Laistner (1957), p. 428.

44. Laistner (1971), p. 47.

45. See Libanius, Oration 12.66 and Isocrates Or. 9.38; Libanius, Oration 12.40 and Isocrates, To Demonicus 32.

46. Ammianus Marcellinus 3.8.6.

47. Ammianus Marcellinus 3.8.6. Cf. Isocrates Panathenaicus 185; Ammianus Marcellinus 3.8.7. Cf. Isocrates, Panathenaicus 185.

48. Barnes (1962), p. 35.

49. Ogilvie (1980), p. 97.

50. Ogilvie (1980), p. 98.

51. Barnes (1962), p. 35.

52. Laistner (1957), p. 433; Harvey (1984), p. 225; Grube (1965).

53. Romilly (1992), p. 56.

54. Vickers (1988), p. 10; Norlin (1980), p. xvi; Croll (1966), p. 55.

55. Vickers (1988), p. 9.

56. Vickers (1988), p. 12. cf. Wimsatt and Brooks (1957), p. 74; Harvey (1984), p. 104-105.

57. Hadas (1962), p. 72, p. 87; Drabble (1985), p. 824.

58. Treadgold (1984), p. 90.

59. Riche (1976); Bark (1958); Jones (1966), Ch. 25; Southern (1967), Ch. 4.

60. Chaucer (1966), pp. 16-22],

61. Dante (1967), pp. xii-xiii. Compare Dante, De vulgari eloquentia (c. 1304/5) to John of Salisbury, Metalogican, I. i-vii, Cicero, De Oratore, I.viii, Isocrates, Antidosis.

62. Spearing (1985), p. 92.

63. Terry (1963), p. xvii; Marie de France (1986), p. 41.

64. Martorell and de Galba (1984), p. xxix, p. 628; cf. Cicero, Pro Achia, 6.

65. Isocrates, Evagoras 6; Isocrates, Panathenaicus 30-32 ; Laistner (1957), p. 428.

66. Greene (1982).

67. Gomperz (1901), I, p. 479; Lathrop (1933), p. 43; Croll (1966), p. 289; Norlin (1980), p. xiii.

68. Norlin (1980),p. xiii - xix.

69. Sidney (1965); Lathrop (1933), pp. 42-43; Highet (1949), p. 122.

70. Simon (1979), p. 112, 142, 204, 253; Kearney (1970), p. 132.

71. Gundersheimer (1969), p. 183.

72. Harvey (1984), pp. 233-234; Pope, An Essay on Criticism, Pt. 3, 110-111; Dryden, Of Dramatick Poesie, 206, 770, 2077, 2353; Dryden (1912), pp. 80-81.

73. Bloom (1990, p. 23, pp. 35-54; Drabble (1985), p. 824.

74. Milton (1927), p. 50.

75. Trask (1965), p. 173.

76. Lutz (1956), pp. 33-34.

77. Clagett et al (1966), p. 41.

78. Clagett et al (1966), p. 41.

79. Clagett et al (1966), p. 54.

80. Michelangelo (1963), p. xxii-xxiii; Forster (1969).

81. Holmes (1969), p. xix.

82. Quoniam (1983), p. 86.

83. Baxandall (1988), p. 114, p. 122-123

84. Baxandall (1988), pp. 131-132. Cf. Baxandall (1971).

85. Alberti (1966), p. 17.

86. Alberti (1966), p. 58.

87. Cicero, De oratore, 3.23.80.

88. Against the Sophists, 14-15.

89. Alberti (1966), p. 90.

90. Alberti (1966), p. 90; cf. Alberti (1966), p. 91; Summers (1987), p. 10.

91. Butler (1977); Butler (1980); Vickers (1984).

92. Hadas (1962), p. 52.

93. Highet (1962), pp. 340-341.

94. Lactantius, Divine Institutiones 3.29.

95. Highet (1962), p. 184.

96. Simon (1979), p. 33.

97. Norlin (1980), p. xvi; Croll (1966), p. 81, p. 144.

98. Laistner (1957), p. 433; Hadas (1962), p. 35.

99. Jaeger (1962), p. 139 n. 18.

100. Stephenson (1943), p. 95-101, pp. 153-156.

101. Hadas (1969), p. 129.

102. Laistner (1957), p. 447. Cf. Power (1962), p. 101-102.

103. Kennedy (1989), p. 99; Highet (1951), p. 164.

104. Marrou (1984), p. 198-199. Cf. Knowles (1988), p. 55.

105. Marrou (1984), p. 200; Kennedy (1980); Finley (1975); Knowles (1988).

106. Jaeger (1947); Finley (1975); Marrou (1984).

107. Marrou (1984), p. 201.

108. Gwynn (1964), p. 46. Cf. Bolgar (1954), p. 28; Kennedy (1980), p. 31; Howatson (1989), p. 203.

109. Marrou (1948), I, p.79; Knowles (1988), p. 53-56; Howatson (1989), p. 203; Johnson (1959), p. 173

110. Marrou (1948), I, p. 79; Diogenes Laertius VII, 32; Knowles (1988), Ch. 5.

111. Diogenes Laertius, Plato 46.

112. Marrou (1948), I, p. 308.Cf. Burk (1923), p. 91.

113. Croll (1966), p. 55; Heer (1961), p. 246; Bolgar (1954), p. 371ff; Clarke (1971), p. 139-151; Marrou (1948), I, p. 196; Curtius (1953), Ch. 3; Knowles (1988).

114. Curtius (1953), pp. 36-37.

115. Kimball (1986); Beck (1964); Vickers (1988); Curtius (1953); Finley (1975).

116. Curtius (1953), p. 37.

117. Knowles (1962), p. 61.

118. Finley (1975), p. 199. Cf. Hadas (1962), p. 172; Clarke (1971), p. 2; Knowles (1988).

119. Clarke (1971), p. 151; Cassirer et al (1948), p. 4-5; Kristeller (1961), p. 12; Bullock (1985), Ch. 1; Kennedy (1980); Vickers (1988).

120. Mirandola (1965), p. xiii; Breen (1952); Curtius (1953); Sydney (1973), p. 20.

121. Jaeger (1943), III, p. 46; Finley (1975), p. 208; Hadas (1962), p. 103; Knowles (1988), p. 55.

122. Marrou (1984), p. 200. Cf. Kimball (1986), p. 11; Power (1962), p. 102; Newman (1975), p. 358

123. Peters (1973a), Ch. 10.

124. Peters (1973a), p. 123.

125. Peters (1973a), p. 125, p. 131.

126. Peters (1973a), p. 123.

127. Peters (1973a), p. 85; Peters in Archambault (1965), p. 90.

128. Peters (1973a), p. 125, p. 126, p. 129, p. 131.

129. Peters in Archambault (1965), p. 92; Peters (1973a), pp. 86-87.

130. Peters recognized that education will have extrinsic value, but argued that it is better to concentrate on what is intrinsically worthwhile. See Peters in Archambault (1965), p. 92.

131. Peters (1966), pp. 25-30, Ch. V; Peters in Hirst (1983), p. 37.

132. Peters (1966), p. 27.

133. Peters (1966), p. 252; Peters in Hirst (1983), p. 37.

134. eg. Peters in Hirst (1983), p. 37; Peters (1966), Pt. II, esp. Ch. V.

135. Peters in Hirst (1983), p. 37.

136. Peters in Hirst (1983), p. 37. Cf. Peters (1989), p. 35.

137. Peters (1981), p. 49.

138. Peters (1981), p. 36, p. 49; Hirst (1986), p. 29.

139. Peters (1966), p. 291.

140. e.g. Jefferson(1943), pp. 1086-1088; Mill (1910), pp. 160-163; Tocqueville (1945), II, Bk.1, Ch.2; Strauss (1968), Ch. 2.

141. Peters (1981), p. 36.

142. Scruton (1980), p. 11.

143. Wilson, J., 'Education and Politics'. Unpublished paper.

144. Dewey (1916), p. 99. Cf. Ch. 7.

145. White (1988) p. 220. Cf. White (1982) p. vii, p.1, p.22, p.116, p.124, p. 148, p. 168, p. 169.

146. White (1990), p. 11

147. White (1990), p. 10.

148. White (1983), p.2.

149. White (1983), p. 169. Cf. pp. 2-3.

150. Gutmann (1987), p. 11.

151. Gutmann (1987), pp. 288-289.

152. Gutmann (1987), p. xi, p. 3.

153. Ackerman (1980), p. 8ff.

154. ibid. p. 4.

155. ibid. p. 7.

156. ibid. p. 26ff, Ch. 5.

157. ibid. pp. 302-303.

158. Rawls (1971), p. 101, p. 107, p. 250.

159. Rawls (1971), p. 101.

160. Walzer (1983), Ch. 1.

161. ibid. Ch. 8.

162. ibid. p. 206.

163. ibid. p. 202.

164. Mandeville (1970).

165. Friedman (1980), p. 20.

166. eg. Smith (1937), pp. 716-766; Smith (1969), p. 363-364.

167. eg. Knight (1982), Ch. 7, Ch. 13.

168. West (1970), pp. xl-xli; Hayek (1982), III, p. 61.

169. Friedman (1962), p. 86.

170. Muir (1994).

171. West (1970), p. ix, p. 3, p. 71, pp. 230-231; Friedman (1962), pp. 2-3, p. 4, p. 6, Ch. 6; Friedman and Friedman (1980), p. 86, p. 225, Ch.6; Hayek (1960), Ch. 24; Hayek (1982), III, Ch. 14 , pp. 60-62.

172. Scruton (1984), p. 11.

173. Scruton (1984), p. 155.

174. Kirk (1987), Ch. 7.

175. Kirk (1987), p. 83; Cf. p. 80.

176. The educational thought of Oakeshott will be examined in Chapter 10.

177. White (1983), pp. 1-2. Cf. Bowles and Gintis (1976); Mathews (1980); Berlowitz and Chapman (1980); Aronowitz and Giroux

(1985); Fromm (1965).

178. Smith (1983), p. 152.

179. Spring (1975), pp. 10-11; Smith (1983), Ch. 5; Barrow (1978).

Chapter Two.

1. White (1983), p. 6; Darling (1993). Cf. Muir (1995), 'The Evolution of Contemporary Philosophy of Education', Unpublished paper.

2. Castle (1962)

3. Castle (1961), p. 55-59.

4. One of Isocrates' works is mentioned, in a long and undifferentiated list of classical works. Nakosteen (1965), p. 30.

5. Knowles (1060), p. 60.

6. Boyd (1966), p. v.

7. Boyd (1966), p. 87. Compare Cochrane (1944), pp. 286-289.

8. Julian, Against the Galileans, 224C-224D.

9. Finley (1975), p. 199.

10. Boyd (1966), p. 4, p. 89.

11. Bowen (1972), p. 97.

12. Hirst (1971), p. 500, p. 506.

13. Politics 1337b14-17.

14. Curtius (1953), pp. 36-37

15. Wimsatt and Brooks (1957), p. 67, p. 72; Laistner (1971), p. 9; Boardman et al (1990), p. 230; Kennedy (1980), p. 37; Curtius (1953), p. 65; Beck (1964), p. 300.

16. Finley (1975); Marrou (1948); Marrou (1984); Wimsatt and Brooks (1957), p. 74; Curtius (1953), Ch. 3; Kimball (1986).

17. Finley (1975), p. 199; Knowles (1962), p. 61; Curtius (1953), p. 37; Kennedy (1980), p. 35; Marrou (1984), p. 200; Bolgar (1954); Gwynn (1964); Clarke (1971); Kimball (1986); Jaeger (1947); Knowles (1988), p. 54-55.

18. Hadas (1962), p. 30. Cf. Hadas (1969), p. 171; Finley (1975), p. 198; Knowles (1988), p. 55.

19. Compare Lord (1982) and Finley (1975).

20. Hirst (1971), p. 506.

21. Hirst (1971), p. 506.

22. Howaston (1989), p. 519.

23. Marrou (1984), p. 190; Curtius (1953), p. 37; Clarke (1971), p. 4.

24. Hirst (1975), p. 507.

25. Kimball (1986), p. 222; Curtius (1953), Ch. 3.

26. Dickens (1972), pp. 24-25. Cf. Hadas (1962), p. 68; Kennedy (1980), p. 196; Knowles (1988), p. 55.

27. Hadas (1962), pp. 37-38, p. 53; Finley (1975), p. 199; Curtius (1953), p. 37; Kristeller (1961), p. 12; Kennedy (1980), p. 31.

28. Adamson (1922), p. 96; Cf. Kennedy (1992), p. 271; Drabble (1985), p. 1001.

29. Wimsatt and Brooks (1957), p. 65, p. 74.

30. Sydney (1973), p. 20.

31. Ascham (1934), p. 109.

32. eg. Sinclair (1967), Ch. 7.

33. eg. Greene (1982).

34. Power (1965), p. 69.

35. Beck (1964), p. 288.

36. Isocrates, To Antipater, 2-3.

37. Isocrates, To Demonicus 7.

38. Isocrates, To Nicocles 12. Cf. Isocrates, Antidosis 207 - 214, 291.

39. Beck (1964), p. 269 -270.

40. Antidosis 304; Beck (1964), p. 269; Marrou (1948), I, p. 377; Johnson (1957).

41. Beck (1964), p. 257; Boyd (1966), p. 25; Proussis (1965), p. 62; Hudson-Williams (1940), p. 166; Laistner (1957), p. 435; Jebb (1893), II, pp. 6-7; Harvey (1984), p. 224; Howatson (1989), p. 203; Howland (1937), p. 151.

42. Isocrates, To Philip 8; Isocrates, To Dionysius 9.

43. Isocrates, Epistle 7.7; Antidosis 145, 147-148.

44. To Nicocles 8-9.

45. Against the Sophists 19-20; van Hook (1919).

46. Antidosis 30, 231-234; Areopagiticus 14; On the Peace 129; Panathenaicus. 15.

47. Jaeger (1947), Vol. 3, p. 49. Cf. Burk (1923).

48. Jaeger (1947), Vol. 3, p. 30.

49. Isocrates, Against the Sophists 19; Marrou (1948), I, pp. 133-134.

50. Against the Sophists 19; Marrou (1948), I, pp. 133-134.

51. Proussis (1965), p. 62; Dixon (1971), p. 9.

52. Strauss (1973); Strauss (1989c), Ch. 5; Cherniss (1977).

53. van Hook (1919); Howland (1937), p. 158.

54. Bloom (1953); Jebb (1893), II; Dobson (1919).

55. van Hook (1986), p. 3 ; Dobson (1919), pp. 156-157; Norlin (1984), p. xxxi.

56. Harvey (1984), p. 162.

57. van Hook (1986), p. 58.

59. van Hook (1986), p. 58.

59. Panathenaicus 126. Cf. Panathenaicus 36.

60. Panathenaicus 138.

61. Norlin (1986), III, pp. 100 - 101.

62. Isocrates, Bursiris 44.

63. Cf. To Demonicus 11.

64. Bursiris 49-50.

65. Loeb, III, p. 129.

66. Antidosis 270.

67. Antidosis 271.

68. Antidosis 271.

69. Marrou (1948), I, p. 129; Norlin (1980), p. xix; Dobson 1919), p. 128, p. 153; Hubbell (1913), p. 3;Grube (1965), p. 39; Hudson-Williams (1940), p. 166.

70. Antidosis 151. Cf. Epistle 3.6; Antidosis 145.

71. Bloom (1953), Ch. 4.

72. Antidosis. 79-81; Epistle. 8.10; Panathenaicus. 11; To Nicocles.83.

73. eg. Antidosis. 78.

74. On the Peace 123-125. Cf. To Nicocles 20-21; Panegyricus 77; Antidosis 89, 317; Panathenaicus. 12.

75. For tolman as daring, see Liddell and Scott (9th ed.), p. 709.

76. On the Peace 75, 37, 111-113.

77. To Philip 81; Panathenaicus 10; Epistle 1.9; Epistle 8.7.

78. Epistle 8.7.

79. eg. To Philip 129; To Nicocles 45-46; Antidosis 19, 303; Cf. Xenophon, Hellenica i.7.35; Panthenaicus. 12; Plato, Apology 32a-e; Diogenes Laertius II.24.

80. Plato, Apology 38d; cf. 36b; 32a-e.

81. van Hook's translation of Epistle 8.7, where the word is tolman. Loeb, III, p. 465.

82. Beck (1964).

83. eg. Friedman (1962); White (1983); White (1977), White (1973).

84. Hardie (1942).

85. Nunn (1945).

86. Peters (1983), p. 33; Tibble (1971), p. 14; Tibble (1966), p. 24; Kaminsky (1988), p.22; Dearden (1982), p.57.

87. Archambault (1965) p. 6.

88. O'Connor (1958).

89. Scheffler (1960), (1965).

90. Phenix (1964). Compare Peters (1966), p. 75 or Dearden (1982), p. 59 to Peters (1983), p. 53 as an illustration of growing parochialism. Reid (1962).

91. O'Connor (1957), p.v. My emphasis.

92. eg. Strauss (1959b.

93. See Chapter One.

94. Hirst in Hirst (1983), p. 1.

95. Hirst (1983), p.2.

96. Hirst (1983), p. 1.

97. Hirst (1983), p. 1; Tibble (1966) Table of Contents.

98. Tibble (1971), p. 91; Peters (1973); Hirst (1983), p. 2.

99. Compare Bullock and Stallybrass (1981), p. 40; Runes (1962), p. 235; Flew (1979), p. 248 to Peters and Hirst (1970), p. 13; Peters (1973a), P. 122; Peters and White (1973), p. 93; Moore (1982), p. vii.

100. Laslett (1956), p. vii; Quinton (1967), p. 19.

101. Peters (1973), p. 2.

102. Wilson (1979), p. 8.

103. Compare Strauss (1959a) Ch. 1; Strauss (1968), Ch.1, Ch.2.

104. Hare (1970), P. 15; Wilson (1979), p. 9.

105. Bloom (1968), p. x.

106. Arendt (1968).

107. Strauss (1959a); (1968).

108. Gadamer (1980), (1986).

109. See Strauss and Cropsey (1987); de Crespigny and Minogue (1976); Bernstein (1979).

110. Habermas (1989).

111. Hirst (1983), p. 1.

112. Peters (1973b), p. 4.

113. Peters (1983), p. 54.

114. Cooper (1986), p. 5.

115. Cooper (1986), p. 4.

116. Hirst in Cooper (1983), p. 37-38. Cf. Peters in Hirst (1983), p. 36.

117. Dearden (1982), p. 70.

118. Lord (1982); Tarcov (1984).

119. eg. Strauss (1959b).

120. See Muir (1995), 'The Evolution of Contemporary Educational Studies'. Unpublished paper.

121. eg. Harris (1988); Strauss (1959b); Strauss (1962); Strauss (1967); Adler (1982), Adler (1988); al-Attas (1968); Arkes (1981); Aronowitz and Giroux (1985); Lord (1982); Tarcov (1984); Blanshard (1973); Bloom (1987), Bloom (1990); Brann (1979), D'Sousa (1991); Gadamer (1980),; Habermas (1989); Hutchins (1956); Hutchins (1970); Jaspers (1959); Kimball (1986); Klein (1960); Pangle (1992); Schram (1991-92), Nicgorski (1985); Rudolph (1965); Proctor (1988).

122. Cooper (1986), p. 5.

123. Simon in Hirst (1983), p. 81.

124. Marsall (1992-93); Ferry (1990); Pangle (1994).

125. Peters (1973b), p. 273.

126. eg. Moore (1974), p. v.

127. Jonathan (1993), pp. 177-178. Cf. Darling (1993), pp.36-38.

128. eg. Nettleship (1935 [1880]); Quick (1880); Laurie (1903); Davidson (1899); Freeman (1922); Gwynn (1926); Jaeger (1947); Marrou (1948); Strauss (1959b); Strauss (1962); Beck (1964); Strauss (1967); Finley (1975); Brann (1979); Lord (1982); Tarcov (1984); Pangle (1992); Pangle and Pangle (1993).

129. eg. Darkey (1979); Bloom (1990); Pangle (1992); Lord (1982); Tarcov (1984); Pangle and Pangle (1993).

130. Maimonides (1975), pp. vii-viii; cf. Hartman (1976); Weiss (1991); Lasker (1992).

131. Alfarabi (1943), Praefatio; Mahdi (1966), p. 970; Mahdi (1969).

132. Maimonides (1963).

133. Pangle (1987), p. x.

134. Levy (1991), p. 51.

135. Bakshi (1987), p. 12.

136. Burnyeat (1985); Miller (1976); Bakshi (1987), p. 15; Paolucci (1970), p. 4; Dahl (1963), pp. 103-105; Merquior (1980), p. 29, p. 31, p. 45.

137. See Strauss (1975).

138. Botwinick (1993).

139. Bakshi (1987), p. 14-15; Crespigny and Minoque (1976).

140. Anastaplos (1985), p. 480, n. 286.

141. Thorson (1963).

142. Quinton (1967), p. 195. Cf. Keim (1983).

143. Oakeshott (1975), p. 148.

144. Gadamer (1975), pp. 482-491; Galston (1980), p. 11 on Habermas.

145. Strauss (1978). Cf. Pangle (1989), p. ix; Fortin (1984).

146. Miller (1976), p. 67; Paolucci (1970, p. 4; Anastaplos (1985), p. 260.

147. Schram (1991-92), p. 201.

148. Strauss (1962), p. 49; Strauss (1989a), p. 9. Cf. Schram (1991-92); Nicgorski (1985).

Part Two.

1. See Woody (1971), p. xxi.

2. Arnhart (1981), Ch.2.

3. eg. Aristotle Ars Rhetorica.

4. eg. Bowen (1972), I, p. xvi.

Chapter Three.

1. Kimball (1986), p. 14; Burk (1923), p. 68

2. Beck (1964), p. 7; Hudson-Williams (1940), p. 166.

3. Finley (1975), pp. 196-197.

4. Marrou (1948), I, pp. 140-143; Jaeger (1947), III, p. 46; Seigel (1968), pp. xii-xiii; Sinclair (1967), pp. 133-134; Wagner (1983), pp. 6-7; Beck (1964), pp. 290-300; Hudson-Williams (1940), p. 166.

5. Marrou (1948), I, p. 292. Cf. p. 128.

6. Clark (1957), pp. 5-6; Marrou (1984), p. 200; Hadas (1969),

p. 129; Finley (1975), p. 199; Wagner (1983), p. 7; Grube (1965), p. 38; Power (1962), p. 102; Newman (1975), p. 358; Knowles (1962), p. 60

7. Collingwood (1945), p. 44; Strauss (1953), p. 83; Strauss and Cropsey (1972), p. 3; Liddel and Scott, p. 772

8. Strauss and Cropsey (1972), p. 3.

9. Antidosis 254-256; Panegyricus 16-17, 150-153. Cf. Newman (1975), p. 359; Best (1980), Ch. 3.

10. Isocrates, To Alexander 4. Cf. Dixon (1971), p. 9.

11. eg. Areopagiticus 28-35.

12. Bloom (1953), pp. 8-9; McPherson (1962).

13. Antidosis 253-255.

14. Dixon (1971), p. 9.

15. Panegyricus 28.

16. Panegyricus 28.

17. Panegyricus 32-34.

18. Panegyricus 38-39.

19. Panegyricus 38-39; Antidosis 254-255.

20. Panegyricus 39-40. Cf. 41.

21. Panegyricus 40-46.

22. Panegyricus 48.

23. Panegyricus 47.

24. Panegyricus 48.

25. Panegyricus 49. Cf. To Nicocles 5-9; Antidosis 273.

26. Antidosis 257-258.

27. Antidosis 255. Cf. Antidosis 257.

28. Hubbell (1913); Burk (1923); Mathieu (1925); Jaeger (1947), III; Marrou (1948); Smethurst (1953); Johnson (1959a); Beck (1964); Finley (1975); Marrou (1984); Pangle (1992).

29. Antidosis 170-171, 173, 175.

30. Antidosis 173. Cf. 176, 177.

31. Antidosis 174.

32. Antidosis 175.

33. Areopagiticus 14. Cf. Panathenaicus 138.

34. Areopagiticus 15.

35. Areopagiticus 12.

36. Areopagiticus 16-17. Cf. Antidosis 232.

37. Areopagiticus 20.

38. Areopagiticus 21-22.

39. eg. Areopagiticus 20.

40. Areopagiticus 20.

41. Areopagiticus 20. Cf. 24.

42. Areopagiticus 20-24.

43. Areopagiticus 28.

44. Areopagiticus 29-31.

45. Areopagiticus 31-35.

46. Areopagiticus 36.

47. Protagoras 325a-326e.

48. Areopagiticus 37-38, 40.

49. Areopagiticus. 40.

50. Areopagiticus. 14, 22, 28.

51. Areopagiticus 60, 55.

52. eg. Peters in Hirst (1983), p. 42; To Nicocles.

53. eg. Antidosis 266.

54. Marrou (1948), I, p. 130. Cf. p. 127, p. 140; Jaeger (1947), III, p. 64; Seigel (1968), p. xiii; Burk (1923), p. 92; Beck (1964), p. 263.

55. Antidosis 292.

56. Antidosis 293-293. Cf. To Nicocles 6.

57. Antidosis 270. Cf. Antidosis 84.

58. Antidosis 270.

59. Antidosis 271. Cf. To Nicocles 51; Against the Sophists 2, 7-8; Marrou (1948), I, p. 140; Jaeger (1947), III, p. 58, p. 68.

60. Panathenaicus 30-32; Against the Sophists 7-8.

61. Antidosis 272.

62. Antidosis 290.

63. Antidosis 275.

64. Antidosis 275. Cf. 217-242.

65. Antidosis 275-277. Cf. 217; Against the Sophists 15.

66. Antidosis 278-280; To Nicocles 2; On the Peace 28-35.

67. Antidosis 279.

68. Antidosis 83.

69. Antidosis 84.

70. Against the Sophists 21.

71. Antidosis 85.

72. eg. Panathenaicus.

73. Areopagiticus 13-14.

74. On the Peace 13, 22.

75. Areopagiticus 26-27.

76. Antidosis 232. Cf. 232-235.

77. Panegyricus 49-50; Antidosis 204, 231-236, 306-309; On the Peace 135; On the Peace 75-76, 133 .

78. Antidosis 93-95.

79. To Nicocles 2-3.

80. To Nicocles 43.

81. Antidosis 266-267.

82. Marrou (1948), I, p. 132. Cf. Isocrates, Antidosis 180-185; Johnson (1959a), p. 26 ff.; Norlin (1980), p. xxi; Dobson (1919), p. 153.

83. Isocrates, Against the Sophists 10. Cf. Isocrates, Antidosis 176; Areopagiticus 43; Panegyricus 49.

84. eg. Areopagiticus 14.

85. Antidosis 268; Panathenaicus 26-27; Antidosis 268; Busiris 23.

86. Antidosis 264; Busiris 21-22.

87. Antidosis 267; Panathenaicus 25; To Nicocles 13.

88. To Demonicus 12-13; To Nicocles 20.

89. Antidosis 261, 267; To Demonicus 3.

90. To Demonicus 5; Busiris 21.

91. eg. To Nicocles 35.

92. Beck (1964), p. 277. Cf. Burk (1923), pp. 129-137.

93. Beck (1964), p. 279.

94. To Demonicus 40.

95. Antidosis 266; Marrou (1948), I, p. 83.

96. Antidosis 261-269; Panathenaicus 125-133.

97. Antidosis 261; Panathenaicus 26.

98. Antidosis 267.

99. Panthenaicus 26-28.

100. Antidosis 264.

101. Antidosis 263.

102. Antidosis 266.

103. Antidosis 262.

104. Antidosis 264.

105. Panathenaicus 28-29.

106. Panathenaicus 26.

107. Antidosis 264-265. Cf. Panathenaicus 25.

108. Antidosis 266.

109. Panathenaicus 30.

110. Antidosis 48.

111. Antidosis 50.

112. Sinclair (1967), p. 118.

113. Wilson (1980), p. 43.

114. Nettleship (1935), pp. 1-5.

115. Nettleship (1935), pp. 27-28; Finley (1975), p. 197.

116. Muir, J. (1995) 'The Evolution of Educational Studies.' Unpublished paper.

117. Curtis and Boultwood (1965), p. 28.

118. Boyd (1966), p. 42.

119. Mansfleid (1985), p. vii.

120. Strauss and Cropsey (1972), p. 55.

121. Freeman (1922), pp. 195-196.

122. Strauss and Cropsey (1972), p. 55; Klein (1960).

123. Robin (1928), p. 194; Ferry (1980).

124. Lord (1982); Pangle (1992).

125. Nakosteen (1965). pp. 102-103; Curtis and Boultwood (1966), p. 17; Boyd (1966), p. 36; Bowen (1972), p. 105.

126. Republic 592a-b.

127. Bloom (1990), pp. 167-168. Cf. Crombie (1962), I, p. 131.

128. Finley (1975), pp. 196-197; Marrou (1984), pp. 198-199; Knowles (1988), p. 55.

129. Marrou (1948), I, p. 79.

130. Marrou (1948), I, p. 12.

131. Marrou (1948), I, p. 128. Cf. Marrou (1984), p. 200; Finley (1975). p. 199.

132. Wagner (1983), p. 7. Cf. Laistner (1957), p. 447; Marrou (1948), I, pp. 293-294.

133. Gorgias 455a. Cf. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 2.15.18-19.

Chapter Four

1. Institutio Oratoria 12.2.12. Cf. Kennedy (1969), p. 34.

2. Plutarch Cato Major, 20; Pliny Epistle 8.14,6 Tacitus Dialogus de oratoribus 28;, Cicero Brutus 27.103-104, 57.210-211; Quintilian 1.1.6.

3. Marrou (1948) II, p. 11. Cf. Barclay (1959), p. 144, 146; Wilkins (1914), pp. 1-2; Paoli (1992), p. 167.

4. Paoli (1992), p.167; Carcopino (1941), p. 118-119.

5. Carcopino (1941), pp. 118-124; Cf. Paoli (1992), pp. 167-170; Barclay (1956), pp. 160, pp. 183-184; Wilkins (1914), p. 20; Lathrop (1933), p. 42; Grafton and Jardine (1986), pp. 4-9; Croll (1966), p. 55.

6. Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus 6.

7. Apuleis,Florida 20. Cf. Carcopino (1941), p. 122; Barclay (1956), p. 160.

8. Wilkins (1914), p. 27; Quintilian 2.15.19-22; Kennedy (1992), p. 269; Ogle (1926), pp. 172-173; Finley (1975).

9. Freeman (1922), p. 184. Cf. Antidosis 118, 266.

10. Newman (1975), p. 358. Cf. Quintilian, Institutio oratorio 12.1.1.

11. Ogle (1926), p. 173. Cf. D'Alton (1931), p. 438.

12. Dio Chrysostum, Training 1-2, 5.

13. ibid., 6-19.

14. ibid. 6. Cf. Isocrates Antidosis 180-185;; Johnson (1959a).

15. Haines (1919), p. ix.

16. Kennedy (1992), p. 169, p. 280; Carcopino (1941), p. 124.

17. Charlton (1965), p. 5.

18. Kennedy (1989), p. 100.

19. Hubbell (1914), p. 16. Cf. Lathrop (1933), p. 43.

20. Bowen (1972), II, p. 180. Cf. Norlin (1980), p. xvi; Dixon (1971), p. 10; Newman (1975), p. 358; Hubbell (1914); Kennedy (1992), p. 271; Finley (1975), p. 198; Jebb (1893), II, p. 68; Smethurst (1953), p. 263; Cary and Haarhoff (1940), p. 282; Romilly (1988); Grube (1965), p. 171; Croll (1966), p. 55; Marrou (1948), I, p. 127.

21. Snell (1953), p. 247. Cf. Marrou (1948), I, p. 152; Burk (1923), p. 92.

22. De oratore 2.10. Cf. 3.36.

23. De oratore, 2.94.

24. De oratore 3.36.

25. Brutus 8. Cf. Orator 13.40-42; De oratore 3.16.59; Brutus 6.26-9.35.

26. Smethurst (1953), p. 263.

27. De republica 1.25.40. Cf. 1.1.1; 1.2.4. Cf. D'Alton (1931), p. 438.

28. De oratore 1.8.31.

29. Isocrates, Antidosis 293; Cicero De inventione 1.4.5; De oratore 1.8.31-33. Cf. Snell (1953), p. 247.

30. De oratore 3.20.76; 2.2.5; Hubbell (1914), p. 20.

31. De oratore 2.6-8.

32. De oratore 1.73; 1.187],

33. De oratore 1.5.17; 1.6.20; 2.16.68; 3.30.121; Orator 4.14-16; 32.113-34.121. Cf. Hubbell (1914), pp. 21, 22.

34. De oratore 1.6.20. Cf. 1.6.21, 1.12.50.

35. De oratore 3.19.72.

36. De oratore 3.19.73.

37. De oratore 3.16.60-61; 3.19.72; 3.34.137; 3.15.57-60. Cf. D'Alton (1931), p. 249.

38. De oratore 3.16.59. Cf. Hubbell (1914), p. 31. Compare Isocrates, Antidosis 230-236, 306-308 to Cicero De oratore 3.16.56-61.

39. De oratore 3.16.59, 3.19.72. Cf. Hubbell (1914), p. 22.

40. Against the Sophists 16; De oratore 1.5.17-18.

41. Hubbell (1914), pp. 23-24.

42. De partitione oratoria 22.80; De oratore 3.15.58.

43. De oratore 3.23.86-89.

44. De oratore 1.14.60. Cf. 1.34.59; 1.15.68-69. Compare Isocrates To Nicocles 2, 6, 9,16; Evagoras 41-46; Panathenaicus 108-150; Antidosis 285.

45. Cicero, Republic 1.4.8.

46. Bowen (1972), I, p. 80 ; Snell (1953), p. 247.

47. De oratore 1.13.56-57.

48. De partitione oratoria 22.79.

49. De oratore 3.21.79.

50. De partitione oratoria 22.76.

51. De partitione oratoria 22.76.

52. De partitione oratoria 22.76-77.

53. Dixon (1971), p. 17.

54. Compare De oratore 1.8.31-34 to Panegyricus 50; Antidosis 207, 277, 293-294, 308. Cf. Hubbell (1914).

55. De partitione oratoria 22.76.

56. De inventione 1.1; Republic 1.7.12; De oratore 1.8.34. Cf. Bowen (1972), Vol. 1, p. 181.

57. De oratore 1.8.33; De partitione oratoria 40.140.

58. De oratore 1.8.30, 31-32.

59. Republic 1.20.33.

60. Republic 1.21.34. Cf. 2.1.1.

61. De oratore 1.44.195; 1.43.193.

62. De oratore 1.43.196. Cf De partitione oratoria 24.83-87; Republic 1.31.47, 1.43.67.

63. Bowen (1972), I, p.199; Kennedy (1969); Gwynn (1964); Wilkins (1914).

64. Institutio oratoria 2.8.11.

65. Institutio oratoria. 1.Pro. 9; 12.1.1; 12.11.9.

66. Institutio oratoria 12.10.22. Cf. 10.1.108-109.

67. Dixon (1971), pp. 19-20. Cf. Bowen (1972), I. 1, pp. 200-201; Ogle (1926), p. 173.

68. Adamson (1930), p. 96.

69. Institutio oratoria 1.Pro.27. Compare Isocrates, Against the Sophists 14-15; Antidosis 190-192.

70. Institutio oratoria 1.1.21; 12.2.12-13.

71. Institutio oratoria 2.16.15,17.

72. Institutio oratoria 2.16.12. Cf. 12.1.2, 2.16.15-17, 2.16.9-10, 2.16.19.

73. Institutio oratoria 2.16.9-10; 2.16.19.

74. Institutio oratoria 1.Pro.10-13; 1.Pro.17-18.

75. Institutio oratoria 1.Pro.13-15.

76. Institutio oratoria 1.Pro.11.

77. Institutio oratoria 1.Pro.6-7.

78. Institutio oratoria 1.1.4-12.

79. Institutio oratoria 1.4.2-4.

80. Institutio oratoria 1.8.1-1.9.1. See also Bk 10, Ch. 1.

81. Institutio oratoria 12.1.28.

82. Institutio oratoria 1.4.5.

83. Institutio oratoria 1.10.1, 1.10.4.

84. Institutio oratoria 1.Pro.17. Cf. 1.Pro.4-5; 1.10.4. Cf Bowen (1972), I, p. 200.

85. Institutio oratoria 1.10.5-49.

86. Institutio oratoria 1.10.35-37.

87. Institutio oratoria 1.11.16-19.

88. Institutio oratoria 12.2.29-31; 12.4.1.

89. Institutio oratoria 12.2.20-28; 12.2.4-6. Compare Isocrates Antidosis 261, 268 and Panathenaicus 26-27 to Quintilian Institutio oratoria 12.2.12-13; Cf Marrou (1948), I, p. 133.

90. Institutio oratoria Book 2.

91. Institutio oratoria Book 3-7.

92. Institutio oratoria Book 8-11.

93. Bowen (1972), I, p. 200; Newman (1975), p. 358. Cf. Quintilian Institutio oratoria 12.1.1-2; 1.Pro.9-10; 1.Pro.18; 12.1.31; 12.2.4.

94. Institutio oratoria 2.15.4-32.

95. Institutio oratoria 2.15.3-4.

96. Institutio oratoria 2.15.1-4; 2.15.34; 2.15.38.

97. Institutio oratoria 2.16.11-12. Cf. 2.16.1.

98. Institutio oratoria 2.15.33. Cf. Cicero, De inventione 1.5.6.

99. Institutio oratoria 2.15.35-36; 12.1.25.

100. Institutio oratoria 1.Pro.10-11.

101. Institutio oratoria 12.1.36-40.

102. Institutio oratoria 12.3.1. Cf. 12.3.2-10.

103. Institutio oratoria 12.1.12, 12.1.24. Cf. Isocrates, Antidosis 217.

104. Institutio oratoria 12.2.7-8. Cf. 12.2.13-14.

105. Finley (1975), p.195 ; Kimball (1986b), p.38; Burk (1923), p.89.

106. Institutio oratoria 12.1.1. Cf. 1.Pro.9; 12.11.91.

107. Institutio oratoria 12.1.8.

108. Institutio oratoria 12.1.11.

109. Institutio oratoria 12.1.2-13.

110. Institutio oratoria 12.1.27; 12.6.1. Cf Virgil Aeneas 1.151ff.

111. Institutio oratoria 12.1.16.

112. Institutio oratoria 12.1.15-16.

113. Lane Fox, R. (1986), p. 11.

114. Jaeger (1962), p. 139 n. 19. Cf. Finley (1975), p. 199; Marrou (1948), I, pp. 291-292; Laistner (1951), pp. 19-20.

115. Laistner (1951), p.3, 10, 15, 53; Jaeger (1962), pp. 91-92; Lathrop (1933), p. 42.

116. Panegyricus 47-50.

117. Jaeger (1962), p. 63, p. 44, p.124 n. 7.

118. Christ the Educator Bk. 1, Ch.1, Sec. 1.

119. Christ the Educator 1.1.1.

120. Christ the Educator 2.1.14.

121. Seneca, Epistle 95.65; Finley (1975), p.199.

122. Christ the Educator 1.1.1.

123. Christ the Educator 1.7.58. Cf. Muir, J.R. (1994) 'Anticipations of Isocrates in Ancient Jewish Educational Thought.' Unpublished paper.

124. Christ the Educator 1.7.60-61.

125. Christ the Educator 1.11.97. Cf. Galations 3.24.

126. Christ the Educator 1.8.74.

127. Christ the Educator 1.13.103.

128. Lactantius (1964), p. xii.

129. Cassiodorus (1946), Bk. 1, Ch.1, Sec. 1.

130. Curtis and Boultwood (1965), p. 72.

131. Curtis and Boultwood (1965), p. 89.

132. Stahl, Johnson and Burge (1977), Vol. 1, p. 15.

133. Augustine Confessions 4.16.30; 5.6.11.

134. Confessions 5.12.22. Cf. Clagett et al (1966), p. 15; Laistner (1957a), p. 49; Bowen (1972), I, pp. 274-275.

135. De beata vita 4.

136. Johnson (1976); Spence (1988).

137. Kennedy (1992), p. 282.

138. Jaeger (1962), p. 71, p. 136 n.2; Jaeger (1947), I, p. 117. Cf. Isocrates, Areopagiticus 29.

139. De doctrina christiana 4.1.1-2.

140. De civitate Dei Bk 11, Ch. 25.

141. De beata vita 8.

142. De ordine 2.43-44.

143. De ordine 2.36-42; De magistro 7.19; 1.

144. De civitate Dei 10.14; 5.24.

145. De civitate Dei 19.1; 19.3.

146. De doctrina christiana 4.5.7; 4.26.56; 4.27.59; 4.29.63.

147. De doctrina christiana 4.12.27-28. Cf. Cicero Orator 21.

148. De doctrina christiana 4.18.35.

149. De doctrina christiana 4.6.9-10.

150. Strauss and Cropsey (1972), p. 155.

151. De civitate Dei 14.1.

152. De civitate Dei 14.1.

153. De civitate Dei.14.2.

154. De civitate Dei 14.28.

155. De civitate Dei 19.1. Cf. 19.3.

156. De civitate Dei 19.4.

157. De civitate Dei 14.28. Cf. De doctrina christiana 3.23.

158. De civitate Dei 14.28.

159. De civitate Dei 22.22. Cf. 22.24.

160. Epistolae 137.7; De civitate Dei 19.17; De doctrina christiana 3.15.22.

Chapter Five

1. Clagett et al. (1966), p. 43; Foligno (1929), pp. 87-88; Oakley (1979), p. 145.

2. John of Salisbury (1955), p. ix. Cf. Haskins (1957b), pp. 92-93, p. 368; Coulton (1940); Southern (1967), Ch. 4; Rand (1928), Ch. 7; Bullough (1972).

3. Peters (1966), p. 291.

4. Pullan (1973), p. 183; Marrou (1948), I, p. 12; Ogle (1926), pp. 178-179; Lanthrop (1933), pp. 18-19; MacGarry (1948), p. 661; Ogle (1926), pp. 176-179; Haskins (1957b); Oakley (1979), p. 141; Clagett et al. (1966), Ch.1, Ch.2; Kimball (1986), pp. 44-45.
5. Oakley (1979), pp. 141-142.

6. Oberman (1975), p. 347.

7. Hay (1966), p. 376. Cf. p. 352.

8. Southern (1967), p. 163. Cf. Southern (1967), pp. 63-65; Ogle (1926), p. 174; Pullan (1973),p.183; Ives (1942); Croll (1966), p. 55; Kennedy (1992), p. 269.

9. Stahl et al (1977), p. 21; Lutz (1956), p. 33; Cook and Herzman (1983), p. 155; Kimball (1986b), pp. 39-40; Bolgar (1954), p. 35.

10. eg. Ulrich (1954); Nakosteen (1965), p. 143, p. 148; Curtis and Boultwood (1965), p. 89; Boyd (1966), p. 93.

11. Stahl (1977).

12. Stahl (1977), pp. 90-91, p. 116.

13. Stahl et al (1977), p. 9. Cf. Martianus De nuptiis 578 = Martianus (1977), p. 217. It should be noted that the collaborative work by Stahl, Johnson and Burge was completed and published some years after Stahl's death. As a result, the work is somewhat incoherent: assumptions made by Johnson are contradicted by the arguments made in the sections to which Stahl contributed.

14. eg. Kimball (1986b), p. 14; Kimball (1986a); Finley (1975), pp. 198-199.

15. De nuptiis 432 = Martianus (1977), p. 158.

16. Drabble (1985), p. 623; Kimball (1986), p. 40.

17. Cook (1983), p. 155.

18. Kimball (1986b), p. 51; Cary and Haarhoff (1940), p. 274.

19. Kimball (1986b), p. 40.

20. Kimball (1986b), p. 40.

21. De nuptiis 427 = Martianus (1977), p. 156. Cf. Isocrates, Areopagiticus 14.

22. De nuptiis 123 = Martianus (1977), p. 43.

23. De nuptiis 427 = Martianus (1977) p. 156.

24. Plato, Republic 521-531a.

25. De nuptiis 23 = Martianus (1977), p. 39; 123 = p. 43.

26. De nuptiis 114 = Martianus (1977), p. 39.

27. De nuptiis 892 = Martianus (1977), p. 346; 114 = p. 39.

28. Jones (1945); Jones (1947) Bowen (1972), I, p. 325.

29. Cassiodorus (1946), p. 34; Book 1, Ch.27-28.

30. Cassiodorus (1946), p. 32-36.

31. Cassiodorus (1946), p. 48, p. 52, pp. 62-63; Jones (1945); Jones (1947).

32. van de Vyver (1929); Ogle (1926), pp. 174-5; Kimball (1986b), p. 45.

33. Institutiones 1. Preface.1; 1. Preface.8; 1.32.3.

34. Institutiones Book 2. Preface.1-2.

35. Institutiones 1.17.

36. Insitutiones 2. Preface.4.

37. Institutiones 2.2.10.

38. Institutiones 2. Preface.4.

39. Institutiones 2.2.1. Cf. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 2.15.38; Cicero, De inventione 1.9.

40. Institutiones 2.2.1. Cf. 2.2.10.

41. Institutiones 2.2.10.

42. Institutiones 2; Conclusion.4-7.

43. Institutiones 2.Conclusion.4.

44. Institutiones 1.33.2. Cf. 1.32.3.

45. Institutiones 1.32.1-2.

46. Durkheim (1977), Ch.4, Ch.5; Marrou (1948), I, p. 12; Coulton (1940), p. 58. p. 87; Alcuin (1941), p. 3; Heer (1975), p. 195; Fichtenau (1978), Ch. 4; Davis (1957), p. 53; Kimball (1986b), p. 51; Stephenson (1943), p. 189-196; McKitterick (1994), (1983), (1989); Bullough (1980), Ch. 4; Haskins (1957b), p. 93; Southern (1967), p. 185; Clagett et al (1966), p. 15; Foligno (1929), Ch. 6; Boskoff (1952), p. 71; Liebeschutz (1967); Laistner (1957a), Ch. 8.

47. Alcuin (1941); West (1969); Kennedy (1992), pp. 284-285; Drabble (1985), pp. 14-15; Heer (1975), p. 166; Stephenson (1943), pp. 192-193; Duckett (1961).

48. Notker, Sec. 2.

49. Notker, Sec. 9; Cassiodorus (1946), pp. 52-53; Thorpe (1969), pp. 9-10.

50. Curtis and Boultwood (1965); Ulrich (1954).

51. Seigel (1968), pp. 182-183; Kennedy (1992), pp. 284-285; Alcuin (1947), pp. 22-33; Bowen (1975), II, p. 12.

52. Howell (1941).

53. Wallach (1959), p. 71; Wallace-Hadrill (1971), Ch. 5; Bowen (1975), II, p. 10.

54. Thorpe (1969), p. 9; Heer (1975), p. 154; Fichtenau (1978),

p. 91.

55. Einhard and Notker (1969), p. 49. Cf. Alcuin, 'Epistle to Charlemagne, c.797' = King (1987), p. 319.

56. Heer (1975), p. 154.

57. Davis (1957), p. 139.

58. Heer (1975), p. 169.

59. Wallach (1959), p. 62; Davis (1957), p. 136; Heer (1975), p. 155.

60. King (1987), p. 326 = Letter: Alcuin to Charles, October 802.

61. Heer (1975), p. 155. Cf. Wallace-Hadrill (1971), Ch. 5.

62. King (1987), pp. 320-321; Notker , Sec. 26; Einhard, Sec. 28.

63. Heer (1975), p. 154.

64. Heer (1975), p. 154.

65. Heer (1975), p. 183. Cf. Stephenson (1943), p. 191.

66. Boyd (1966), pp. 120-121.

67. Caspari (1968), p. 151.

68. Charlemagne, 'Programmatic Capitulary, Aachen, 802 = King (1987), p. 233 (First Article).

69. Heer (1975), pp. 158-159.

70. Fichtenau (1978), p. 91; Stephenson (1943), pp. 191-192; Heer (1975), p. 157.

71. Einhart and Notker (1969), Sec. 9.

72. Heer (1975), p. 179. Cf. Bowen (1975), II, p. 9.

73. King (1987), p. 208.

74. Fichtenau (1978), pp. 87-88.

75. Fichtenau (1978), p. 91.

76. Disputatio 1.21-22.

77. Stephenson (1943), p. 192; Heer (1975), p. 176; Davis (1957), p. 138.

78. Fichtenau (1978), p. 91.

79. Kimball (1986b), p. 51.

80. Bowen (1975), II, p. 11; Heer (1975), p. 191; Kimball (1986b), p. 52.

81. Alcuin, Disputatio 43.1166-1175; 47.1301-1307; 45.1233-1235.

82. Alcuin, Disputatio 1.1-17. Cf. 3.57-70; 47.1357-1368.

83. Paetow (1910), p. 7. Cf. Le Goff (1985), Ch. 1; Clagett et al (1966); Heer (1975), p. 195; Rashdall (1936), I, p. 93; McGarry (1948), p. 659.

84. John of Salisbury (1955), p. xv. Cf. Thorndike (1940), p. 408.

85. eg. Curtis and Boultwood (1965); Ulrich (1954).

86. Kimball (1986b), p. 58.

87. Kimball (1986b), p. 43.

88. eg. Kimball (1986b), p. 87; Oakley (1979), pp. 144-145.

89. Hamlyn (1988), p. 98.

90. Sabine (1955), p. 246; Bowen (1975), II, p. 87.

91. John of Salisbury (1955), p. xxi; McGarry (1948), p. 660.

92. John of Salisbury (1955), pp. xvii-xviii; McGarry (1948). p. 660.

93. Hugh of St. Victor (1991), p. 6.

94. Kimball (1986b), p. 59

95. Didascalicon 3.3; 3.4.

96. Leff (1958), pp. 137-138; Gilson (1955), p. 171; Jaeger (1993); Wagner (1983), p. 30 n.48; Stephenson (1943), p. 338; Claggett et al (1966), p. 21; Taylor (1957); Hugh of St, Victor (1991), pp. 4-5; Wolf (1968), p. 245; Stiefel (1985), pp. 18-19.

97. McGarry (1948), p. 659, 664; Jaeger (1993),p. 51.

98. Taylor (1957), p. 15.

99. Didascalicon (ed. Buttimer), 776B4; Hugh of St. Victor (1991), p. 98.

100. Jerome, Epistle 52.3.2.

101. Hugh of St. Victor (1991), p. 3. p. 158 n. 3; Bowen (1975), II, p. 61.

102. Gilson (1955), pp. 170-171; Jaeger (1993), pp. 58-59.

103. Didascalicon 6.5; 5.9; Hugh of St. Victor (1991), p. 173 n. 174.

104. Jaeger (1993), p. 69; Taylor (1957), p. 12.

105. Didascalicon 6.5; 5.9; Hugh of St. Victor (1991), p. 173 n. 174.

106. Patrologica Latina 176: 925c; Patrologica Latina 946; Jaeger (1993), p. 57.

107. Patrologica Latina 176: 927a.

108. Jaeger (1993), pp. 61ff, 69-70.

109. Jaeger (1993), p. 64.

110. Didascalicon (ed. Buttermer) 6.14 = Hugh of St. Victor (1991), Appendix A; Gilson (1955), p. 171; Leff (1958), p. 137.

111. Didascalicon (ed. Buttermer) 6.14 = Hugh of St. Victor (1991), Appendix A; Gilson (1955), pp. 170-171; Leff (1958), p. 137.

112. Didascalicon 6.3; Wolf (1968), p. 245; Gilson (1955), pp. 170-171; Leff (1958), p. 137.

113. Hugh of St. Victor (1991), p. 153.

114. Hugh of St. Victor (1991), p. 153; Taylor (1957), p. 9.

115. Didascalicon 2.30, 1.11 = Hugh of St. Victor (1991), p. 82, p. 59.

116. Didascalicon 6.3; Hugh of St. Victor (1991), p. 153.

117. Hugh of St. Victor (1991), p. 153; Gilson (1955), p. 171; Jaeger (1993), p. 69.

118. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.3.5; Jaeger 1993), p. 60, p. 68.

119. Jaeger (1993), p. 61.

120. Drabble (1985), p. 512. Cf. Lane Poole (1960)), Ch. 7; Coulton (1940), p. 89; Stephenson (1943), pp. 338-339; Gilson (1955), pp. 150-153; Stiefel (1985), p. 88; Paetow (1910), p. 608; Seigel (1968), p 184; Wagner (1983), p. 30 n 48; Liebeschutz (1950), p. 89; Brooke (1969), Ch. 3; Haskins (1957b), pp. 135-136.

121. John of Salisbury (1955), p. xxv. Cf. Liebeschutz (1950), Ch. 6.

122. John of Salisbury (1955), p. xxvii.

123. John of Salisbury (1955), p. xviii. Cf. Clagett et al (1966), p. 11; Boskoff (1952), p. 72; Dickenson (1926), p. 308; McGarry (1948), p. 659; Coulton (1940), pp. 90-92; Lane Poole (1960), p. 189; Southern (1967), p. 109; Berki (1977), p. 104; Gilson (1955), p. 150; Liebeschutz (1950), p. 87.

124. Policraticus 6.19 = John of Salisbury (1990), p. 124.

125. Metalogicon 1.7; Cicero , De oratore 1.6.21. Cf. Sabine (1955), p. 246; Gilson (1972), p. 150.

126. Gilson (1972), p. 150. Cf. Liebeschutz (1950), p. 69, p. 84.

127. Gilson (1972), p. 150.

128. Major (1964), p. 169; Bowen (1975), Vol. II, p. 340.

129. Policraticus, Prologue = John of Salisbury (1990), p. 4.

130. Liebeschutz (1950), pp. 88-90, p. 93; Coulton (1940), p. 89; Boskoff (1952), p. 72.

131. John of Salisbury (1955), pp. xxiii-xxiv; Metalogicon 3.10 = p. 190; John of Salisbury (1990), pp. xx-xxi. Cf. Gilson (1955), p. 150; Liebeschutz (1950), Ch. 6; McGarry (1948), p. 664; Seigel (1968), p. 184.

132. McGarry (1948), pp. 662-663, p. 669. John of Salisbury had no knowledge of Aristotle's Politics. Dickenson (1926), p. 308.

133. McGarry (1948), p. 663.

134. McGarry (1948), p. 663. Cf. Metalogicon 1.19-25 = 46.18-59.8; Boskoff (1952), p. 72; Kennedy (1992), p. 280; Bowen (1975), II. , p. 85.

135. Policraticus 4.1 = John of Salisbury (1990), p. 28.

136. Policraticus 5.2 = John of Salisbury (1990), p. 67. Cf. Liebeschutz (1950), p. 45; Lane Poole (1960), p. 207.

137. Liebeschuz (1950), p. 45.

138. John of Salisbury (1990), p. xxii.

139. Sabine (1955), p. 246.

140. Policraticus 4.1= John of Salisbury (1990), p. 28.

141. Policraticus 4.1 = John of Salisbury (1990), p. 28; Sabine (1955), p. 246; Lane Poole (1960), p 205.

142. Policraticus 4.2 = John of Salisbury (1990), p.30.

143. Policraticus 4.6 =John of Salisbury (1990), p. 41. Cf. Policraticus 6.1; Deuteronomy 5.6-22.

144. Policraticus 7.25 = John of Salisbury (1990), pp. 175-180; Liebeschutz (1950). pp. 55-57.

145. Policraticus 7.25 = John of Salisbury (1990), p. 175; Liebeschutz (1950), p. 55.

146. Policraticus 4.6 = John of Salisbury (1990), p. 41.

147. Policraticus 4.6 = John of Salisbury (1990), p. 44.

148. Policraticus 4.6 = John of Salisbury (1990), p. 45. Cf. Policraticus 4.8.

149. Policraticus 4.6; Liebeschutz (1950), p. 57.

150. Metalogicon 1.7 = John of Salisbury (1955), p.27; Metalogicon 1.1 = John of Salisbury (1955), pp. 11-12. Cf. Bush (1939), p. 60.

151. Isocrates, Areopagiticus 14; Policraticus 5.2.

152. Policraticus Prologue = John of Salisbury (1990), p. 3; Policraticus 5.10; Policraticus 7.Prologue = John of Salisbury (1991), p. 147; Metalogicon 1.3 = John of Salisbury (1955), p. 16.

153. Liebeschutz (1950), p. 64, pp. 77-78; Clagett et al (1966), p. 13.

154. Policraticus 5.2 = John of Salisbury (1990), p. 67; Liebeschutz (1950), p. 85; Clagett et al (1966), p. 13.

155. Policraticus 5.2. Cf. Leibeschutz (1950), pp. 89-90. Gilson (1972), p. 150.

156. Liebeschutz (1950), pp. 87-88.

157. Policraticus 4.2 = John of Salisbury (1990), p. 30.

158. John of Salisbury (1990), p. xxvi. Cf. McGarry (1948), p. 660.

159. Metalogicon 1.12 = John of Salisbury (1955), pp. 36-37.

160. Metalogicon 2.10-2.12 = John of Salisbury (1955), pp. 97-102; John of Salisbury (1955), p. xvii; John of Salisbury (1990), p. xx. Clagett et al (1966), p. 12; Thorndike (1940), p. 405; Seigel (1968), p. 185.

161. Metalogicon 1.13 = John of Salisbury (1955), p. 37.

162. Metalogicon 4.28 = John of Salisbury (1955), p. 244; Metalogicon 1.7, 2.9, 2.11, 4.3; Gilson (1955), p. 150. Cf. Quintilian 2.4.4 ff.

163. Metalogicon 4.29 = John of Salisbury (1955), pp. 245-247.

Cf. Johnson (1959).

164. Metalogicon 1.24, 2.13-14 = John of Salisbury (1955), p. 67; Liebeschutz (1950), p. 68, p. 77, p. 90; Clagett et al (1966), p. 11; Gilson (1972), p. 150.

165. Metalogicon 1.7; Liebeschutz (1950), p. 85.

Chapter Six

1. Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew Act I, Sc. I, lines 25-40.

2. Oberman (1975), p. 230, p. 275; McManamon (1989), p. 138; Woodward (1964), p. 120, 123.

3. Cassirer et al (1948), p. 5. Cf. Seigel (1968), p. 257.

4. Oberman (1975),p. 306, p. 321; Cassier et al (1948), p. 3.

5. eg. Burk (1923), p.211-217; Mathieu (1925); Jaeger (1947), III, p. 46; Marrou (1948).

6. eg. Beck (1964); Marrou (1956), English translation of Marrou (1948). This translation is 'wholly unreliable'. See Finley (1984), p. 201. .

7. Nakosteen (1965); Hirst (1971); Curtis and Boultwood (1965); Boyd (1966).

8. Caspari (1968), p. vii.

9. Caspari (1968), p. 16.

10. Caspari (1968), p. 18.

11. Caspari (1968), p. 18.

12. Caspari (1968), p. 17.

13. Newman (1975), pp. 358-359.

14. Woodward (1905), p. 219; Rice (1970), p. 87; Kinghorn (1971), p. 84; Cassirer et al (1948), p. 3; McManamon (1989), p. 159, p. 122; Holmes (1986), p. 75; Rice (1970), p. 90.

15. Dixon (1971), p. 10. Cf. Rice (1970), p. 87; Plumb (1961), p. 55; Skinner (1978), I, p. 88; Kennedy (1992), p. 280;McManamon (1989), p. 122; Woodward (1905) p. 219; Major (1964), p. 33; Holmes (1969), Ch. 1.

16. Oberman (1975), p. 3; Rice (1970), p. 87. Cf. Gray (1963).

17. Howatson (1989), p. 478; Caspari (1968), p. 14; Harvey

(1984), p. 357; Boskoff (1952), p. 75; Oberman (1975), p. 143, pp. 321-322; Kennedy (1992), p. 280, pp. 286-287; Plumb, (1961),p. 55; Woodward (1964), pp. 120-123; Holmes (1969), Ch. 1; McManamon (1989), p. 23, p. 32, pp. 137-138; Kennedy (1969), p. 54; Boyd (1966), p. 163; Nakosteen (1965), p. 225; Lathrop (1933), p. 206.

18. Lathrop (1933), pp. 42-43. Cf. Finley (1975), p. 208; Caspari (1968), p. 24, p. 52; Charlton (1965), pp. 117-118.

19. Isocrates To Demonicus 18; Ascham (1934), p. 89; Norlin (1980), p. 15 n. a.

20. Kristeller (1956), pp. 560-564; Skinner (1978), I, pp. 71-72.

21. Skinner (1978), I, p. 88, Seigel (1968), p. 31.

22. Petrarch, 'On His Own Ignorance', in Cassirer et al (1948), p. 101. Compare Bowen (1975), II, pp. 194-195.

23. Petrarch, 'Ignorance', in Cassirer et al (1948), p. 101. Cf. Seigel (1968), pp. 34-35.

24. Finley (1975), p. 199.

25. Petrarch, 'Ignorance', Cassirer (1948), p. 104. Cf. Skinner (1078), I, p. 88.

26. Cicero, De officiis , 1.1.4; Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1.6.987b1.

27. McManamon (1989), p. 159; Rice (1970), p. 90; Oberman (1975), p. 321; Caspari (1968),p. 22.

28. Oberman (1975),p. 3, p. 305; Cassirer et al (1948), p. 4; Rice (1970), p. 87; Bullock (1985), p. 12; Hay (1966b), p. 334, p. 337, p. 351; Gray (1963)],
29. Woodward (1905), p. 15. Cf. Boyd (1966), p. 163; Holmes (1969), p. 15; Kinghorn (1971), p. 88.

30. Baron (1938), p. 95; Kinghorn (1971), p. 89.

31. De ingenuis moribus 3.

32. Woodward (1905), p. 221; Kinghorn (1971), p. 89.

33. Bruni (1987). Cf. Woodward (1905), pp. 132-133; Ullman (1946), p. 59.

34. Grafton and Jardine (1986), p. 1.

35. McManamon (1989), p. 159; Woodward (1964), p. 120.

36. Kinghorn (1971), p. 89; Boyd (1966), p. 164; Plumb (1961), p. 26; Ferguson (1959), pp. 88-89.

37. Rummel (1985), p. 105; Woodward (1905), p. 180.

38. Charlton (1965), p. 117, p. 118; Simon (1979), p. 83, p. 112, p. 204, p. 253; Kearney (1970), p. 132; Caspari (1968), p. 255, p. 299; Simone (1969), p. 257; Gundersheimer (1969), p. 183; Grendler (1989), p. 267, p. 379; Grafton and Jardine (1986), p. 110, p. 171.

39. Oberman (1975), p. 61; Kimball, (1986b), p. 87.

40. Lathrop (1933), p. 68; Tracy (1978), p. 62.

41. Caspari (1968), pp. 23-24, p. 46, p. 52; Lathrop (1933), p. 32; Kinghorn (1971), pp. 90-91.

42. Erasmus (1986), p. 568. Cf. Clarke (1976),p. 24.

43. Curtis and Boultwood (1965), p. 126. Cf. Nakosteen (1965), p. 230; Boyd (1966), p. 174; Bowen (1975), p. 341; Bowen (1981), p. 7.

44. Woodward (1964), p. 36-37, p. 73.

45. Rummel (1985), p. 120-121.

46. Skinner (1978), I, p. 243; Caspari (1968), p. 62, p. 22.

47. Skinner refers to Erasmus (1968) (ed. Born), p. 150.

48. Dixon (1971), p 10; Rice (1970), p. 87.

49. Tracy (1978), p. 62, p. 66; Rummel (1985), p. 104; Kimball (1986b), p. 87; Woodward (1964), pp. 36-37.

50. Rummel (1985), p. 105.

51. Major (1964), p. 166.

52. Caspari (1968), p. 53.

53. Institutio principis christiani LB 4.564F = Erasmus (1986), p. 212.

54. De pueris LB 1.497d = Erasmus (1985), p. 312.

55. Institutio pricipis christiani, Dedicatory Epistle.

56. De pueris LB 1.489c = Erasmus (1986), p. 298. Cf. De pueris LB 1.491d; LB 1.493d; LB 1.497d.

57. Institutio principis christiani LB 4.578 = Erasmus (1986), pp. 234-235; Caspari (1968), p. 56.

58. Erasmus, Civitas non civitas LB2.1202; Tracy (1978), p. 124; Caspari (1968), pp. 69-70.

59. Caspari (1968), p. 70.

60. Woodward (1964), p. 37, p. 82; Caspari (1968), pp. 58-59.

61. Caspari (1968), pp. 53-54. Cf. p. 145.

62. Institutio principis christiani LB 4.561a-561d = Erasmus (1986), p. 207.

63. Kinghorn (1971), p. 91.

64. De pueris , Dedicatory Epistle; De pueris, LB 1.505c. Cf. Kimball (1986b), p. 88.

65. Institutio principis christiani, Dedicatory Epistle = Erasmus (1986), p. 203; De pueris LB1.489c-d, LB1.492a, LB1.508f = Erasmus (1985), p. 298, p. 302, p. 334; Woodward (1964), p. 37.

66. Institutio principis christiani LB4.563b = Erasmus (1986), p. 209. Cf. Rice (1970), p. 90; Caspari (1968), p. 51.

67. Institutio principis christiani LB4.561a, 566c-566d = Erasmus (1986), p. 206, pp. 214-215.

68. De pueris LB1.501d = Erasmus (1985), p. 319.

69. De pueris LB1.501d = Erasmus (1985), p. 319. Cf. De ratione studii 524b; Cicero Brutus 211.

70. De pueris LB1.509c = Erasmus (1985), pp. 335-336; De ratione studii 521b-c.

71. De pueris LB1.514c = Erasmus (1985), p. 344. Cf. De pueris LB1.499d, LB1.507a.

72. De pueris LB1.509c-510a = Erasmus (1985) pp. 365-367; De ratione studii 521b-523f.

73. Institutio pricipis christiani LB4.563e = Erasmus (1986), p. 210.

74. De ratione studii 525c-f; De pueris LB1.512f-513d = Erasmus (1985), pp. 341-343.

75. Laurie (1903), p. 38. Cf. Boyd (1966), p. 228; Ryan (1963), p. 251.

76. Kinghorn (1971), p. 92, pp. 95-96; Major (1964), p. vi; Charlton (1965), p. 84; Caspari (1968), p. 24, p. 149; Lehmberg (1960), pp. 52-53; Rollins and Baker (1954), p. 106; Boyd (1966), p. 229; Curtis and Boultwood (1965), p. 144; Elyot (1962), p. vi.

77. Lathrop (1933), p. 41; Lehmberg (1960), pp. 125-126; Major (1964), p. 167; Elyot (1962), p. vii.

78. Lehmberg (1960), pp. 75-76; Caspari (1968), p. 149; Harvey

(1984), p. 357.

79. Major (1964), p. 166. Cf. Lathrop (1933), p. 31; Lehmberg (1960), p. 59, p. 126.

80. eg. Nakosteen (1965); Ulrich (1954).

81. eg. Curtis and Boultwood (1965); Boyd (1966).

82. Governor, Bk I, Ch. 1-3; To Nicocles 9ff.

83. Governor, Bk. I, Ch. 4-27; To Nicocles, 12,39. Cf. Elyot (1962), p. vi; Lehmberg (1960), p. 37; Rollins and Baker (1954), p. 105; Kinghorn (1971), pp. 92-93.

84. Elyot (1962), p. v; Lehmberg (1960), p. 66.

85. Major (1964), p. 5; Caspari (1968), p. 160; Lehmberg (1960), p. 36; Elyot (1962), p. 5.

86. Major (1964), p. 6. Cf. Lehmberg (1960), p. 37, p. 52; Allen (1960), p. 247.

87. Governor, Proem = Elyot (1962), p. xiii.

88. Governor , Bk. I, Ch. 1 = Elyot (1962), p. 1.

89. Governor, Bk. I, Ch. 2.

90. Governor, Proem = Elyot (1962), p. xiii. Cf. Oberman (1975), p. 335; Rice (1970), pp. 90-91.

91. Governor, Bk I, Ch. 3 = Elyot (1962), p. 13.

92. Governor, Bk I, Ch. 3 = Elyot (1962), pp. 14-15. Cf. Bush (1939), p. 79; Kinghorn (1971), p. 93; Rollins and Baker (1954), p. 105.

93. Governor Bk I, Ch.3 = Elyot (1962), p. 14.

94. Governor, Bk. I, Ch. 13 = Elyot (1962), p. 46.

95. Governor, Bk. I, Ch. 13 = Elyot (1962), p. 46; Lehmberg (1960), p. 53.

96. Governor , Bk. I, Ch.5 = Elyot (1962), pp. 17-19. Cf. Bk. I. 9 = p. 27.

97. Governor , Bk. I, Ch. 4 = Elyot (1962), pp. 15-17. Compare Quintilian 1.1.7.

98. Governor, Bk. I, Ch. 9 = Elyot (1962), pp. 26-27.

99. Governor, Bk. I, Ch.6-9 = Elyot (1962), pp. 29-28.

100. Governor, Bk. I, Ch. 10 = Elyot (1962), pp. 28-33.

101. Governor, Bk. I, Ch. 11 = Elyot (1962), p. 34. Cf. Bk. I, Ch. 13; Caspari (1968),p.164; Curtis and Boultwood (1965), p. 144.

102. Governor, Bk. I, Ch. 11 = Elyot (1962), pp. 36-37. Cf. Governor, Bk. 3, Ch. 25-26; Kinghorn (1971), pp. 95-97; Lehmberg (1960), pp. 60-61.

103. Governor, Bk I, Ch. 11 = Elyot (1962), p. 34

104. Governor, Bk. 1, Ch.11 = Elyot (1962), p. 35.

105. Governor , Bk. I, Ch. 13 = Elyot (1962), p. 50.

106. Governor, Bk. 1, Ch. 14 = Elyot (1962), p. 53.

107. Governor, Bk. 3, Ch. 30 = Elyot (1962), p. 241.

108. Ascham (1966), p. x; Kinghorn (1971), p. 104; Rollins and Baker (1954), p. 105; Kimbal (1986b), p. 100.

109. Kimball (1986b), p. 100.

110. Ascham (1966), p. vii; Ryan (1963), p. 251.

111. eg. Ulrich ((1954).

112. Boyd (1966), p. 232; Curtis and Boultwood (1966), pp. 144-146.

113. Ryan (1963), p. 26, p. 282; Ascham (1966), p. xii.

114. Ryan (1963), pp. 105-106, p. 135, p. 196.

115. Ryan (1963). p. 280.

116. Ascham (1934), pp. 109-110; Isocrates Areopagiticus 37-49. Cf. Ryan (1963), p. 283.

117. Dixon (1971), p. 10. Cf. Ryan (1963), p. 282; Caspari (1968),p. 27; Bush (1939), p. 76; Kinghorn (1971), p. 185; Ryan (1963), p. 337 n. 59.

118. Scholemaster, Dedication = Ascham (1966), p. 1.

119. Ascham (1966), p. 5, p. 3.

120. Ascham (1934), pp. 64-65, pp. 99-100.

121. Ascham (1934), p. 109.

122. Ascham (1934), pp. 107-110; Isocrates Areopagiticus 40, 43.

123. Ascham (1934), p. 111; Isocrates, Antidosis 232-236.

124. Ascham (1934), p. 102.

125. Kimball (1986b), p. 100. Cf. Ryan (1963), pp. 261-262.

126. Ascham (1934), p. 69, p. 143.

127. Ascham (1966), p. xviii. Cf. Ascham (1934), p. 102; Ryan (1963), p. 257, 265.

128. Ascham (1934), p. 80. Cf. pp. 115-116.

129. Ascham (1966), Dedication = pp. 5-7.

130. Ascham (1934), pp. 71-73, p. 78.

131. Ascham (1934), pp. 76-80, pp. 81-82.

132. Ascham (1934), pp. 144-145. Cf. Ryan (1963, p. 106.

133. Ascham (1934), p. 151.

134. Ascham (1934), p. 111.

135. Ascham (1934), pp. 194-195.

136. Ascham (1966), p. 145; Cicero De Oratore 3.35. Cf. Seigel (1968), p. 134.

137. Ascham (1934), p. 154, p. 162, p. 165, p. 188. Cf. pp. 194-195.

138. Ascham (1934), pp. 86-92. Cf. Ryan (1963), p. 256, p. 333 n.12.

139. Lathrop (1933), p. 308.

Chapter Seven.

1. Bloom (1987), p. 263.

2. Strauss (1959), p. 40. Cf. Cassirer (1946), p. 128; Gilbert (1973), p. 153.

3. Bloom (1987), p. 185; p. 187; Beck (1961); Hassner, in Strauss and Cropsey (1972), pp. 556-557.

4. Strauss (1959), p. 40; Strauss (1970b), p. 14; Strauss (1975c), p. 84,; Strauss (1983), Ch. 12; Strauss and Cropsey (1972) p. 395; Bloom (1987), p. 286. Cf. Cassirer (1946), Ch. 10; Winiarski (1963), p. 247; Berlin (1979); Best (1980), p. 59; Nicgorski (1985), p. 245; Pangle and Tarcov (1987), pp. 916-917; Bloom (1987), p. 263.

5. Winiarski (1963), p. 247.

6. Machiavelli (1985), p. viii. Cf. Cassirer (1946), Ch. 10.

7. Machiavelli (1985), p. viii. Cf. Best (1980), p. 59; Berlin (1979), pp. 25-39; Plamenatz (1963), I, pp. 40-43; Cassirer (1946), Ch. 10.

8. Newman (1975), p. 359. Cf. Cassirer (1946), p. 144; Strauss (1970b); Mansfield (1979).

9. Berlin (1979), p. 37. Cf. Plamenatz (1963), I, p. 17.

10. Strauss (1970b), p. 10; Machiavelli 1985), p. x.

11. Strauss (1970b), p. 12. Cf. Prince, Ch. 15; Strauss (1975c), p. 84; Bloom (1987), pp. 285-286; Winiarski (1963), p. 247; Best (1980), pp. 62-63.

12. Strauss (1970b), p. 10.

13. Strauss (1975c), p. 88.

14. Dearden (1971), p. 93.

15. Peters (1966), p. 47; Jeffreys (1967), p. 42.

16. Boyd (1966), p. 274, p. 278; Curtis and Boultwood (1965), p. 226; Nakosteen (1965), p. 289; Jeffreys (1967), Pt. 2.

17. Locke (1968), p. 400; Thoughts Concerning Education Sec. 182, Sec. 186-187; Tarcov (1984), p. 5.

18. Tarcov (1984), p. 6; Harrison and Laslett (1971), pp. 21-22.

19. Harrison and Laslett (1971), p. 181. Cf. p. 21.

20. Locke (1960), p. 87. Cf. p. 23.

21. Locke (1960), p. 86; Tarcov (1984), p. 6.

22. Thoughts (Axtell ed.), p. 164 n.4.

23. Two Treatises of Government 2. Sec.170-171.

24. Treatises,1. Sec. 90, Sec. 93.

25. Locke, Treatises , Book 2, Sec. 67, Cf. Sec. 68-69.

26. Treatises, Book 2, Sec. 170.

27. Treatises, 2.14, Sec. 100-103, 110.

28. Plamenatz (1963), I, p. 215; Strauss (1953), p. 215; Tarcov (1984), p. 1.

29. Plamenatz (1963), I, p. 250. Cf. Plamenatz (1963), I, pp. 249-251, pp. 215-216; Pangle (1992), p. 140; Strauss (1953), p. 234; Horowitz (1977), pp. 133-134.

30. Bloom in Plato (1968), p. xi; Tarcov (1984), p. 2.

31. Locke (1986), p. 112.

32. Tarcov (1984), p. 5.

33. Tarcov (1984), p. 5. Cf. Pangle and Pangle (1993), p. 61; Horowitz (1977), p. 134; Pangle (1992), p. 145.

34. Thoughts , Sec. 134ff.

35. 'Concerning Reading and Study', Locke (1968), pp. 398-399; 'Of Study', Locke (1968), p. 406; Thoughts, Sec. 188. Cf. Locke (1968), p. 397, p. 406; Tarcov (1984), p. 5, p. 191; Pangle and Pangle (1993), p. 59.

36. Thoughts, Sec. 136, 143, 146; Tarcov (1984), p. 190.

37. Thoughts, Sec. 140.

38. Compare Locke Thoughts, Sec. 140 to Isocrates Antidosis 271 and Against the Sophists 2, 7-8.

39. Thoughts, Sec. 147.

40. 'Concerning Reading and Study,' Locke (1968), p. 398.

41. Bloom (1979), p. 4.

42. Peters (1966), p. 65.

43. Rousseau (1979), pp. 3-4; Beck (1960), p. 6, pp. 235-236; Hassner, in Strauss and Cropsey (1972), pp. 556-557; Bloom (1990), pp. 277-278. Cf. Strauss (1953); Shklar (1969); Schwartz (1984); Kendal (1985); Cassirer (1954).
44. Dearden (1971), p. 93.

45. Kendall (1985).

46. Bloom (1990), p. 277. Cf. p. 281; Bloom (1987), pp. 185-187.

47. Rousseau, Discours, Book II, Par. 6. Cf. Strauss (1947), p. 458.

48. Rousseau (1985), p. 20.

49. Horowitz (1977), p. 130.

50. Rousseau (1985), p. 23.

51. Rousseau (1985), p. 19.

52. Rousseau (1985), p. 20, pp. 23-24.

53. Rousseau (1985), p. 20.

Part Three

1. Bloom (1968), p. xvii.

Chapter Eight.

1. Tocqueville, Democracy in America 2.1.2.

2. Finley (1975), p. 208.

3. Bowen (1972), p. xvii.

4. Melton (1988), p. xix.

5. See Melton (1988) for an excellent discussion of this process. Cf. Chisick (1981); Lawrence (1970); Mack (1938); Maynes (1985); Muller et al (1987); Paulsen (1908); Rothblatt (1976); Simon (1960); Simon (1987); Stephens (1987); West (1970).

6. Finley (1975), p. 212; Mendus (1992); Jonathan (1993).

7. Muir (1994).

8. Kymlicka (1989); McLaughlin (1984).

9. Muir (1995).

10. Marrou (1948), I, p. 333. Cf. Bourdieu (1967), p. 340.

11. Bourdieu (1967), pp. 340-341; Bourdieu and Passerson (1990), pp. 72-89; Finley (1975), p. 209.

12. Peters (1983), p. 42.

13. Peters (1983), pp. 42-3.

14. O'Heer and White (1991), p. 10.

15. Ivinskaya (1978); Pasternak (1990).

16. Horowitz (1977), p. 144; Pangle and Pangle (1993), pp. 54-57.

17. Max Scheler, quoted in Curtius (1953), p. 3.

18. McLaughlin (1984), p. 75. Cf. White (1990), p. 22; Peters (1966), Ch. 11.

19. eg. White (1990), p. 142.

20. Berlin (1969), p. 128. Cf. Bloom (1990), pp. 289-290.

21. Sinyavsky (1971); Solzhenitsyn (1980). Cf. Pangle (1992), pp. 211-214; Bloom (1990), p. 11.

22. Strauss (1959) pp. 37-38.

23. Mill (1961), 'M. de Tocqueville on Democracy in America'.

24. Pangle (1992), p. 206.

25. Bloom (1987), p. 246. Cf. Dannhauser (1985); Horowitz (1977), p. 133; Bloom (1990), p. 292; Pangle (1992), pp. 212-216; Talmon (1961).

26. Tocqueville Democracy in America 2.1.2.

27. Pangle (1992), pp. 192-193.

28. Bloom (1990), p. 345.

29. Compare Tooley (1993) to Knight (1982); Friedman (1962); (1980); Letwin (1983).

30. Tooley (1993), p. 34.

31. Tooley (1993), p. 34.

32. Charlton (1965), p. 84.

33. Tooley (1993), p.34.

34. Tocqueville, Democracy in America 2.1.3.

35. Tocqueville, Democracy in America 2.1.3.

36. Tocqueville , op.cit., 2.1.3.

37. Tocqueville, op. cit., 2.1.3.

38. White (1990), p. 24, p. 26, p. 95.

39. White (1990), p. 142. Cf. p. 75.

40. White (1990), p. 23. Cf. p. 25, p. 101.

41. White (1990), p.98.

42. White (1990), p. 25, 95, 103.

43. White (1990), p. 25.

44. White (1990), p. 104.

45. White (1990), p. 153. Cf. pp. 127-128.

46. White (1990), p. 153. Compare Bloom (1987), p.41

47. See Edward Said's Orientalism.

48. Muqaddimah 2.365-2.735; Muir (1995).

49. Finley (1975), p. 208.

Chapter Nine.

1. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 2.1.10.

2. Strauss (1968), Ch,1, Ch,2; Brann (1979); Klein (1960); Schram (1991-92); Lord (1982); Tarcov (1984); Nicgorski (1985); Darkey (1979); Bloom (1987); Bloom (1990), especially pp. 295-314; Pangle (1992); Pangle and Pangle (1993); Bolotin (1994).

3. Eudemian Ethics 1214a15-20.

4. Eudemian Ethics 1214a31-35.

5. Eudemian Ethics 1215a32-1215b3.

6. Eudemian Ethics 1216a29-38.

7. Eudemian Ethics 1216b 20-25.

8. Strauss (1968), p. 11.

9. Eudemian Ethics 1215a35-1215b4.

10. Eudemian Ethics 1216b20-25.

11. Pangle (1992), pp. 123-124.

12. Eudemian Ethics 1216a37-1216b3.

13. Eudemian Ethics 1216b3-8.

14. Eudemian Ethics 1216b9-11.

15. Eudemian Ethics 1216b19-21.

16. eg. Annas (1981), p. 276; Pangle (1992), p. 193.

17. Republic 514a1-2.

18. Barrow (1976), p. 42.

19. Barrow (1976), p. 42. Cf. Crombie (1962), I, p. 131; Annas (1981), p. 276; Pangle (1992).

20. Republic Book 8.

21. Republic 511a. Cf. 510b.

22. Republic 511b.

23. Republic 533b-c.

24. Republic 533d.

25. Republic 534b-c.

26. Pangle (1992), p. 186.

27. Barrow (1976), p. 69.

28. Bloom (1968), p. x; Bloom (1990), p. 166.

29. See Strauss (1983) pp. 2-5.

30. eg. Strauss (1959), p. 39; Strauss (1983), p. 5.

31. Plato, Apology 21d; Bloom (1990), p. 18.

32. Strauss (1959), p. 10. Cf. Best (1980), p. 17; Pangle and Tarcov (1987), pp. 925-6.

33. Strauss (1979), pp. 113-114. Cf. Nicgorski (1985), p. 236.

Chapter Ten.

1. Nietzsche (1920-29), Vol. 16, p. 318; Griswold, Jr. (1986),p. 177.

2. Strauss (1959), pp. 38-39.

3. Bloom (1987), p. 372.

4. Pangle in Strauss (1989), pp. xv-xvi. Cf. Pangle (1992), p. 205.

5. Bloom (1987), p. 380.

6. Bloom (1987), p. 21.

7. Bloom (1990), p. 20.

8. Bloom (1990), p. 20.

9. Bloom (1990), p. 13.

10. Bloom (1987), p. 141. pp. 185-193.

11. Hirsch (1987), p. 12. Cf. p. 19.

12. eg. Adler (1988), pp. xix-xxvii; Bloom(1987), p. 54, p. 344; Bloom (1990), pp. 302-303; Bloom (1992), p. 4.

13. Adler (1988), p. xxiii.

14. Adler (1988), p. xiii.

15. eg. Oakeshott (1989), p. 13; Strauss (1968), p. 7; Pangle (1992), p. 197.

16. Oakeshott (1989), p. 71.

17. See Fuller's introduction to Oakeshott (1989), p. 5.

18. Oakeshott (1989), p. 147. Cf. p. 15, p. 146.

19. Oakeshott (1989), pp. 146-147.

20. Oakeshott (1989), p. 150.

21. Oakeshott (1989), p. 4.

22. Bloom (1990), pp. 246-247; p. 303.

23. Memorabilia, Bk. 1, Ch. 6, Sec. 14.

24. Strauss (1968), p. 6; Nicgorsky (1985), p. 237; Bloom (1990), p. 10; Pangle (1992), p. 194.

25. Bloom (1987), p. 25; Bloom (1990), p. 16; Pangle (1992), p. 196.

26. eg. White (1990), pp. 17-22.

27. Bloom (1990), p. 23.

28. Bloom (1990), p. 23.

29. Bloom (1990), p. 23.

30. Bloom (1990), p. 19; Pangle (1992), p. 192-193.

31. Strauss (1964),(1975c), (1989c); Bloom (1987); Bloom (1990); Detwiler (1990); Pangle (1992).
32. Strauss, L. (1946), pp. 326-327, pp. 327-328. Cf. Bloom, (1990) p.240, p.310-312.

33. Republic 539b1-539c3.

34. Republic 539c5-539d1.

35. Republic 536d.

36. Letter to Ulrike von Kleist, 23 March 1801. Cf. Kleist (1957), p. 7.

37. Republic 531d7-10.

38. Republic 525b3-6.

39. Republic 525d8-10.

40. Republic 527b5-6.

41. Republic 526a8-526b3.

42. Republic 526d9-526e4.

43. eg. Pangle (1992), pp. 128-129, p. 149, p. 170; Pangle and Pangle (1993), p. 35, p. 48, p. 82; Strauss (1968), p. 11.

44. Strauss (1959), pp. 93-94. Cf. Gourevitch (1968a), p. 65; Miller (1976), pp. 72-73.

45. Plato, Laws 654.

46. Plato Laws 654e. Cf. Republic 376e.

47. Bloom (1987), p. 71.

49. Bloom (1987), p. 72. Cf. Plato, Republic 401b-402a.

50. Strauss (1968), p. 11; Nicgorski (1985), p. 242; Brann (1993), pp. 205-212; Pangle (1992), p. 164.

51. Plato, Laws 653a-b.

52. Pangle (1992), p. 188.

Bibliography

Acts du Quatrieme Congres International de Philosophie Medievale (1969) Arts Liberaux et Philosophie au Moyen Age. Montreal: Institut d'Etudes Medievales.

Abelson, P. (1906) The Seven Liberal Arts, A Study in Medieval Culture. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ackerman, B.A. (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Adams, J.W.L. (1976) 'Platonism and Education', in Simmons, G.C. (ed.) Paideia: Special Plato Issue. Fifth Annual MXMLXXLI, pp. 43-49.

Adamson, J.W. (1922) A Short History of Education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Adler, M.J. (1982) The Paideia Proposal. New York: Macmillan and Company.

Adler, M.J. (1988) Reforming Education: Opening the American Mind. New York: Macmillan.

Aelfric (1978 [c. 1000]) Aelfric's Colloquy (ed. G.N. Garmonsway). Exeter: University of Exeter.

Alberti, L.B. (1966, revised ed.) [1435]. On Painting (trans. J.R. Spencer). New Haven: Yale University Press.

Alcuin (1941 [796 A.D.]) The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne (trans.with introduction , W.S. Howell). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Alfarabi (1962 [c. 920 A.D.]) Alfarabi's Philosohpy of Plato and Aristotle (trans. M. Mahdi). Glencoe: The Free Press.

al-Farabi (1943) De Platonis Philosophia (Arabic text with Latin translation, ed. F. Rosenthal, R. Walzer). London: Warburg Institute.

Allen, J.W. (1960) A History of Political Thought in the Sixtenth Century. London: Methuen.

al-Razi, A.B.M.Z. (1993) The Book of the Philosophic Life (trans. C.E. Butterworth), Interpretation, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 227-236.

Anastaplo, G. (1985) The Artist as Thinker: From Shakespeare to Joyce. Chicago: Swallow Press.

Anderson, W. (1966) Ethos and Education in Greek Music. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press.

Annas, J. (1981) An Introduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

Archambault, R.D. (ed.) (1965) Philosophical Analysis and Education. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Arendt, H. (1968) 'The Crisis in Education' , in Between Past and Future. New York: The Viking Press.

Aristotle (1984) Ethica Nichomachea (ed. I. Bywater). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Aristotle (1957) Politica (ed. W.D. Ross). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Aristotle (1984) The Politics (trans. with Introduction, C. Lord) Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Aristotle (1991) On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse (trans. with intro. by G.A. Kennedy). New York: Oxford University Press.

Arnhart, L. (1981) Aristotle on Political Reasoning: A Commentary on the "Rhetoric". De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press.

Aron, R. (1962) The Opium of the Intellectuals. New York: W.W. Norton and CO.

Aron, R. (1968) Progress and Disillusion: The Dialectics of Modern Society. London: Pall Mall Press.

Aronowitz, S.A., Giroux, H.A. (1985) Education Under Seige: The Conservative, Liberal and Radical Debate over Schooling. South Hadley: Bergin and Garvey.

Ascham, R. (1934 [1571]) The Scholemaster (ed. J.E.B. Mayor). London: G. Bell and Sons.

Ascham, R. (1966) The Scholemaster (ed. R.J. Schoeck). Don Mills: J.M. Dent and Sons.

Ashley, R. Mosely, E.M. (1953) Elizabethan Fiction. Toronto: Rinehart and Co.

Athanassiadi - Fowden, P. (1981) Julian and Hellenism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Augustine (1966) The Fathers of the Church: Writings of St. Augustine. (17 vols.) Washington: The Catholic University of America Press.

Averroes (1969) Averroes' Commentary on Plato's Republic (Hebrew text ed. with intro., trans. and notes, E.I.J. Rosenthal). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ayer, A.J. (1946; 2nd ed.) Language, Truth and Logic. New

York: Dover.

Bakshi, O. (1987) The Crisis of Political Theory. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Barclay, W. (1959) Educational Ideas in the Ancient World. London: Collins.

Barilli, R. (1989) Rhetoric (trans. G. Menozzi). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.

Bark, W.C. (1958) Origins of the Medieval World. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Barker, E. (1948) Traditions of Civility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barker, E. (1959) The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle. New York: Dover.

Barnard, H.C. (1968, 2nd edition) A Short History of English Education, 1760-1944. London: University of London Press.

Barnard, H.C. (1970) The French Tradition in Education.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barnes, H.E. (1962 [1937]) A History of Historical Writing. New York: Dover Pubications.

Baron, H. (1938) 'Cicero and the Roman Civic Spirit in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance', Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Vol.20, pp.72-97.

Baron, H. (1955) Humanistic and Political Literature in Florence and Venice at the Beginning of the Quattrocentro. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Baron, H. (1968) Petrarch to Leonardo Bruni: Studies in Humanistic and Political Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Baron, H. (1988) In Search of Florentine Civic Humanism: Essays on the Translation from Medieval to Modern Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Barrett, H. (1987) The Sophists: Rhetoric, Democracy and Plato's Idea of Sophistry. Novato, California: Chandle and Sharp.

Barrow, R. (1976) Plato and Education. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Barzun, J. (1954) Teacher in America. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books.

Barzun, J. (1959) The House of Intellect. London: Mercury Books.

Barzun, J. (1968) The American University: How it Runs, Where it is Going. New York: Harper and Row.

Baskin, W. (ed) (1966) Classics in Education. London: Vision Press.

Baxandall, M. (1971) Giotto and the Orator: Humanist Observers of Painting in Italy and the Discovery of Pictorial Composition, 1350-1450. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baxandall, M. (1988; 2nd ed.) Painting and Experience in Fifteenth -Century Italy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Beck, L.W. (1960) A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Beck, F.A.G. (1964) Greek Education, 450-350 B.C. London: Methuen and Co.

Bellow, S. (1987) More Die of Heartbreak. London: Penguin Books.

Benardete, S. (1978) 'Leo Strauss's The City and Man, The Political Science Reviewer, Vol. VIII, pp. 1-20.

Benardete, S. (1984) The Being of the Beautiful : Plato's Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Benardete, S. (1989) Socrates' Second Sailing: On Plato's Republic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Benda, J. (1955 [1927]) The Betrayal of the Intellectuals. Boston: Beacon Press.

Berki, R.N. (1977) The History of Political Thought. London: J.M. Dent and Sons.

Berlin, I. (1979) 'The Originality of Machiavelli,'in Against the Current. London: The Hogarth Press.

Berlowitz, M.J., Chapman, F.E. (eds.) (1980).The United States Educational System: Marxist Approaches. Minneapolis: Marxist Educational Press.

Bernstein, R. J. (1979) The Restructuring of Social and Political Thought. London: Methuen and Company.

Best, J.A. (1980) The Mainstream of Western Political Thought. New York: Human Sciences Press.

Black, R. (1991) 'Italian Renaissance Education: Changing Perspectives and Continuing Controversies', Journal of the

History of Ideas, Vol 52, No. 2, pp. 315-334.

Blanshard, B. (1973) The Uses of a Liberal Education. La Sale: Alcove Press.

Blits, J.H. (1985) 'Socratic Teaching and Justice: Plato's Clitophon', Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol 13, No. 3, pp. 321-334.

Blitz, M. (1991) 'Strauss's Laws', The Political Science Reviewer, Vol. XX, pp. 186-122.

Bloch, M. (1961) Feudal Society (trans. L.A. Manyon). Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Bloom, A.D. (1953) The Political Philosophy of Isocrates. Unpublished A.M. Thesis, Thesis Number 1865, University of Chicago.

Bloom, A.D. (1968) 'Preface' in Plato (1968) The Republic of Plato. (trans. A.D. Bloom) New York: Basic Books.

Bloom, Allan (1971) 'The Political Philosopher in Democratic Society: The Socratic View', in Casanova, J.-C. (ed.)(1971) Melanges en l'honneur de Raymond Aron. Paris: Editions Calmann-Levy.

Bloom, A. (1987) The Closing of the American Mind. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Bloom, A. (1990) Giants and Dwarfs. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Bloom, A. (1993) Love and Friendship. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Boardman, J. Griffin, J., Murray, O. (eds.) (1991) The Oxford History of the Classical World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Boethius (1973) Philosophiae Consolationis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bolgar, R.R. (1954) The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bolgar, R.R. (1969) 'The Training of Elites in Greek Education', in Wilkinson, R. (ed.) (1969) Governing Elites: Studies in Training and Selection. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bolgar, R.R. (ed.) (1971) Classical Influences on European Culture, 500-1500. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bolgar, R.R. (1976) Classical Influences on European Culture, 1500-1700. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bolotin, D. (1989) 'The Life of Philosophy and the Immortality of the Soul: An Introduction to Plato's Phaedo'. Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 7, pp.39-56.

Bolotin, D. (1994) 'Leo Strauss and Classical Political Philosophy', Interpretation, Vol.22, No.1, pp.129-142.

Bonner, S.F. (1977) Education in Ancient Rome: From the elder Cato to the younger Pliny. London: Methuen and Company.

Boorstin, D.J. (1973) The Americans. (3 vols.) New York: Vintage Books.

Booth, A.D. (1978) 'The Appearance of the Schola Gammatici', Hermes, Vol. 106, pp. 117-125.

Booth, W.C. (1974) Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bos, A.P. (1989) 'Exoterikoi Logoi and Enkyklioi Logoi in the Corpus Aristotelicium and the Origin of the Idea of Enkyklios Paideia', Journal of the History of Ideas, vol L, No.2, pp. 179 -198.

Boskoff, P.S. (1952) 'Quintilian in the Late Middle Ages,' Speculum, Vol 27, No.1, pp. 71-78.

Botwinick, A. (1993) Postmodernism and Democratic Theory. Philadelphia: Temple University Perss.

Bourdieu, P. (1967) 'Systems of education, and systems of thought,' International Social Science Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 338-358.

Bourdieu, P. Passeron, J.-C. (1990: 2nd ed.) Reproduction in Eduation, Society and Culture. London: Sage Publications.

Bowen, J. (1972) A History of Western Education. Vol. I: The Ancient World. London: Methuen.

Bowen, J. (1975) A History of Western Education. Vol. II: Civilization of Europe. London: Methuen and Co.

Bowen, J. (1981) A History of Western Education. Vol. III: The Modern West. London: Methuen and Co.

Bowle, J. (1961) Western Political Thought. London: Methuen.

Bowle, J. (1970) The Unity of European History. London: Oxford University Press.

Bowles, S. Gintis, H. (1976) Schooling in Capitalist America. New York: Basic Books.

Boyd, W. (1966, 8th ed.) The History of Western Education (Revised by E.J. King). London: Adam and Charles Black.

Boyer, E.L., Levine, A. (1981) A Quest for Common Learning. Washington: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

Boyer, E.L. (1990) Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professiorite. Princeton: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

Brann, E.T.A. (1979) Paradoxes of Education in a Republic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Brann, E.T.H, (1993) 'The Canon Defended,' Philosophy and Literature, Vol 17, No. 2, pp. 193-218.

Braver, G.C. (1959) The Education of a Gentleman: Theories of Gentlemanly Education in England 1660-1775. New York: Bookman Associates.

Breen, Q. (1952) 'Document: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola on the Conflict of Philosophy and Rhetoric', Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XIII, No. 3, pp. 384-426.

Brinton, C. (1950) Ideas and Men: The Story of Western Thought. New York: Prentice-Hall.

Brooke, C. (1969) The Twelfth Century Renaissance. London: Thames and Hudson.

Brown, P. (1967) Augustine of Hippo: a Biography. London: Faber and Faber.

Brucker, G. (1969) Renaissance Florence.New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Brucker, G. (1979) 'Humanism, Politics and the Social Order in Early Renaissance Florence', in Bertelly, S. Rubenstein, N., Smyth, C.H. (eds.) (1979) Quattrocento. Vol. I: Florence and Venice: Comparisons and Relations. (pp. 3-11). Florence: La Nuova Italia.

Bruell, C. (1983) 'Strauss on Xenophon's Socrates', The Political Science Reviewer, Vol XIII, pp. 99-153.

Bruni, L. (1987) The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni (trans and intro. G. Griffiths, J. Hankins, D. Thompson). Binghampton: The Renaissance Society of America.

Buford, T.O. (1977) 'Plato on the Educational Consultant: An Interpretation of the Laches,' Idealistic Studies, Vol. 7, pp. 151-171.

Bullock, A. (1985) The Humanist Tradition in the West. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Bullough, D.A. (1972) 'The educational tradition in England from Alfred to Aelfric: teaching utriusque linguae,' Settimane

di studio del Cantro Italiano di Studi sull' Alto Medioevo, Vol XIX, pp. 453-494.

Bullough, D. (1980) The Age of Charlemagne. London: Ferndale Editions.

Burckhardt, J. (1954 [1860]) The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. (trans. S.G.C. Middlemore). New York: The Modern Library.

Burk, A. (1923) Die Pedagogik des Isokrates als Grundlegung des humanistischen Bilduns-Ideals. Wurzburg: Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums.

Burke, E. (1901 [1791]) 'Letter to a Member of the National Assembly', in The Works of Edmund Burke, Vol. II. London: George Bell and Sons.

Burnyeat, M. (1985) 'Sphinx Without a Riddle', New York Review of Books, 24 October, 1985.

Burton, R. (1926 [1651; 6th ed.]) The Anatomy of Melancholy (3 vols). London: G. Bell and Sons.

Bury, J.B., Meiggs, R. (1975; 4th ed. revised) A History of Greece. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.

Bury, R.K. (1937) 'Theory of Education in Plato's Laws', Revue des Etudes Greques, Vol. 50, pp. 304-320.

Bush, D. (1939) The Renaissance and English Humanism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Bush, D. (1945) English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century, 1600-1660. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Butler, G.G. (1977) 'Fugue and Rhetoric', Journal of Music Theory, Vol 21, pp. 49-109.

Butler, G.G. (1980) 'Music and Rhetoric in Early Seventeenth Century English Sources', The Musical Quarterly, vol. 66, pp. 53-64.

Butterworth, C.E. (1993) 'The Origins of al-Razi's Political Philosophy,' Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol 20, No. 3, pp. 237-257.

Butts, R.E. (1973) The Education of the West: A Formative Chapter in the History of Education. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.

Cambell, B. (1980) 'Intellect and the Political Order in Plato's Republic,' History of Political Thought, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 361-390.

Cantimori, D. (1937) 'Rhetoric and Politics in Italian

Humanism', Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, Vol I, pp. 83-102.

Caplan, H. (1970) Of Eloquence: Studies in Ancient and Medieval Rhetoric. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Carcopino, J. (1941) Daily Life in Ancient Rome. Harmondworth: Penguin Books.

Cary, M. Haarhoff, T.J. (1940) Life and Thought in the Greek and Roman World. London: Methuen.

Caspari, F. (1968 [1954]) Humanism and the Social Order in Tudor England (Classics in Education No. 34). New York: Teachers College Press.

Cassiodorus Senetor (1946) An Introduction to the Divine and Human Readings (trans. L.W. Jones). New York: Columbia University Press.

Cassirer, E. (1945) Rousseau, Kant, Goethe. (trans. J. Gutmann, P.O. Kristeller, J.H. Randall, Jr.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cassirer, E. (1946) The Myth of the State. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Cassirer, E. (1951) The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (trans. F.C.A. Koelln, J.P. Pettegrove). New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Cassirer, E. (1954) The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (trans. P. Gay). New York: Columbia University Press.

Cassirer, E. Kristeller, P.O., Randall, J.H. (1948) (eds.) The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Castle, E.B. (1961) Ancient Education and Today. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Castle, E.B. (1962) Educating the Good Man: Moral Education in Christian Times. New York: Collier Books.

Cavanagh, F.A. (ed) (1979 [1931]) James and John Stuart Mill on Education. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Charlton, K. (1965) Education in Renaissance England. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Chaucer, G. (1966) The Franklin's Prologue and Tale (ed. A.C. Spearing). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cherniss, H. (1944). Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy. New York:

Cherniss, H.F. (1962 [1945]) The Riddle of the Early Academy. New York: Russell and Russell.

Cherniss, H. (1977) 'Ancient Forms of Philosophic Discourse,' in Selected Papers. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Chisick, H. (1981) The Limits of Reform in the Enlightenment: Attitudes towards the Education of Lower Classes in Eighteenth-Century France. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Clagett, M. Post, G., Reynolds, R. (eds.) (1966) Twelfth-Century Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society. London: University of Wisconsin Press.

Clark, D.L. (1957) Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education. New York: Columbia University Press.

Clarke M.L. (1959) Classical Education in Britain 1500-1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clarke, M.L. (1971) Higher Education in the Ancient World. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Clarke, M.L. (1976) 'The Educational Writings of Erasmus,' Erasmus in English, Vol. 8, pp. 23-31.

Clement of Alexandria (1954) Christ the Educator (trans. S.P. Wood, C.P.). Washington: The Catholic University of America Press.

Coby, P. (1982) 'The Education of a Sophist: Aspects of Plato's Protagoras,' Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 139-158.

Coby, P. (1987) Socrates and the Sophistic Enlightenment: A Commentary on Plato's Protagoras. London: Associated University Press.

Cochrane, C. N. (1944) Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action From Augustus to Augustine. London: Oxford University Press.

Collingwood, R.G. (1945) The Idea of Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Commission on the Humanities (1980) The Humanities in American Life. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cook, W.R., Herzman, R.B. (1983) The Medieval World View. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cooper, D.E. (ed.) (1986) Education, Values and Mind. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Corbett, E.P.J. (1965) Classical Rhetoric for the Modern

Student. New York: Oxford University Press.

Copleston, F. (1979) On the History of Philosophy. London: Search Press.

Coulton, G.G. (1938) Medieval Panorama, Vol. II: The Horizons of Thought. London: Fontana Library.

Coulton, G.G. (1940) Studies in Medieval Thought. London: T. Nelson and Sons.

Cremin, L. (ed.) (1957) The Republic and the School. New York: Teachers College Press.

Crane, R.S. (1953) The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Crittendon, B. (1988) Parents, the State and the Right to Educate. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Croce, B. (1934) History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century (trans. H. Furst). London: George Allen and Unwin.

Croce, B. (1955) History as the Story of Liberty. New York: Meridian Books.

Croll, M.W. (1966) Style, Rhetoric, and Rhythm (ed. J.M. Patrick, R.O. Evans). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Crombie, I.M. (1962) An Examination of Plato's Doctrines (2 vols). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Cropsey, J. (ed.) (1964) Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy in Honor of Leo Strauss. New York: Basic Books.

Cropsey, J. (1975) 'Leo Strauss: a bibliography and memorial, 1899-1973', Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 133-147.

Curtis, S.J., Boultwood, M.E.A. (1964; 3rd ed.) An Introductory History of English Education Since 1800. London: University Tutorial Press.

Curtis, S.J., Boultwood, M.E.A. (1965) A Short History of Educational Ideas. London: University Tutorial Press.

Dahl, R.A. (1963) Modern Political Analysis . Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Curtius, E.R. (1953) European Literature in the Latin Middle Ages (trans. W.R. Trask). New York: Pantheon Books.

D'Alton, J.E. (1931) Roman Literary Theory and Criticism. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

Danford, J.W. (1978) Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dannhauser, W.J. (1974) Nietzsche and the Problem of Socrates. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Dannhauser, W.J. (1985) 'Some Thoughts on Liberty, Equality and Tocqueville's Democracy in America', in Paul, E.F., Miller, Jr., F.D., Paul,J. (eds.) (1985) Liberty and Equality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Dante, A. (1967) Dante's Lyric Poetry (ed. with trans. K. Foster, P. Boyde). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Darkey, W.A. (ed.) (1979) Three Dialogues on Liberal Education. Annapolis: The St. John's College Press.

Davidson, T. (1904 [1899]) Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Dearden, R.F. (1968) The Philosophy of Primary Education. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Dearden, R.F. (1971) 'The Philosophy of Education', in Tibble, J.W. (ed) (1971) An Introduction to the Study of Education. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Dearden, R.F. (1979) 'Philosophy of Education', in A Dictionary of Philosophy. (ed. A. Flew). London: Pan Books,

Dearden, R.F. (1982) 'Philosophy of Education, 1952-82', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. XXX, No. 1, pp. 57-71.

de France, M. (1986 [c.1180]) The Lais of Marie de France.(trans. G.S. Burgess, K. Busby) Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

de Crespigny, A. Minogue, K. (eds.) (1976) Contemporary Political Philosophers. London: Methuen and Co.

Degenhart, M.A. B. (1984) 'Educational Research as a source of educational harm'. New Univerisities Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 232-252.

De Rijk, L. M. (1965) ' 'Enkyklios Paideia' : A Study of its Original Meaning'. Vivarium, Vol. III, pp. 24-93.

de Romilly, J. (1988) Les Grands Sophists dans l'Athenes de Pericles. Paris: Editions de Fallois.

Desjardins, R. (1990) The Rational Enterprise: Logos in Plato's Theaetetus. Albany: State University of New York.

Deutsch, K.L. Soffer, W. (eds.) (1987) The Crisis of Liberal Democracy: A Straussian Perspective. Albany , New York: State

University of New York.

Dewey, J. (1916) Education and Democracy. New York: The Macmillan Co.

Dewey, J. (1939) Intelligence in the Modern World (ed. J. Ratner). New York: Modern Library.

de Wulf, M. (1956 [1903]) An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy, Medieval and Modern (trans P. Coffey). New York: Dover.

Dickens, A.G. (1972) The Age of Humanism and Reformation. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Dickinson, J. (1926) ' The Mediaeval Conception of Kingship as Developed in the Policraticus of John of Salisbury, Speculum, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 308-337.

Diogenes Laertius (1972) Lives of Eminent Philosophers (2 vols). London: Wm. Heinemann.

Dixon, P. (1971) Rhetoric. London: Methuen and Co.

Djilas, M. (1966) The New Class. London: Unwin Books.

Dobson, J.F. (1919)The Greek Orators. London: Methuen and Co.

Drabble, M. (ed.) (1985, 5th ed.) The Oxford Companion to English Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dresden, S. (1968) Humanism in the Renaissance (trans. M. King). London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Dryden, J. (1912 [1671]) 'On Comedy, Farce, and Tragedy,' Dramatic Poesy and Other Essays (ed. W.H. Hudson). London: J.M. Dent and Sons.

Dryden, J. (1964 [1684]) Of dramatick Poesie (ed. J.T. Boulton). London: Oxford University Press.

Dryden, J. (1970) The Poems and Fables of John Dryden (ed. J. Kingsley). London: Oxford University Press.

D'Souza, D. (1991) Illiberal Education. New York: The Free Press.

Du Boulay, F.R.H. (1970) An Age of Ambition: English Society in the Late Middle Ages. New York: The Viking Press.

Duckett, E.S. (1951). Alcuin, Friend of Charlemagne. New York: Macmillan.

Dumont, L. (1977) From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dunn, J. (1984) The Politics of Socialism: An Essay in Political Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dupre, L. (1989) 'Is the History of Philosophy Philosophy?', Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 42, pp. 463-482.

Durkheim, E. (1973[1925]) Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education (trans. E.K. Wilson and H. Schnurer). New York : Free Press.

Durkheim, E. (1977 [1938]) The Evolution of Educational Thought. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Dyson, A.E. Lovelock, J. (eds.) Education and Democracy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Egan, K. (1992) 'The Roles of Schools: The Place of Education', Teachers College Record, Vol. 93, No. 4, pp. 641-655.

Ehrenberg, V. (1969: 2nd ed.) The Greek State. London: Methuen and Company.

Ehrenberg, V. (1973, 2nd ed.) From Solon to Socrates. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Einhard and Notker the Stammerer (1969) Two Lives of Charlemagne. (trans. L. Thorpe) Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Ellis, J.M. (1992) 'The Origins of PC', The Chronicle of Higher Education, 15 January, 1992, pp. B1-B2.

Elyot, T. (1962) The Book named The Governor. London: Dent.

Empedocles (1908) The Fragments of Empedocles. La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company.

Erasmus, D. (1985) 'De pueris instituendis, in Collected Works of Erasmus, Vol. 26, (ed. J.K. Sowards). toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Erasmus, D. (1986) 'Institutio principis christiani,' Collected Works of Erasmus, Vol. 27 (ed. A.H.T. Levi). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Euben, J.P. (1990) The Tragedy of Political Theory: The Road Not Taken. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Feaver, D.D. , Hare, J.E. (1981) 'The Apology as an Inverted Parody of Rhetoric', Arethusa, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 205-216.

Feller, I. (1986) Universities and State Governments: A Study in Political Analysis. New York: Praegar.

Ferguson, W.K. (1959) Facets of the Renaissance. New York: Harper and Row.

Ferry, L. (1990) Political Philosophy (3 vols) (trans. F. Philip). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fichtenau, H. (1978) The Carolingian Empire (trans. P. Munz). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Finnis, J. (1980) Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Finley, M. I. (1975) 'The Heritage of Isocrates', in The Use and Abuse of History. London: Chatto and Windus.

Finley, M.I. (1983) Politics in the Ancient World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Finley, M.I. (ed.) (1984) The Legacy of Greece. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fletcher, J. M. (1994) 'Some Considerations of the Role of the Teaching of Philosophy in the Medieval Universities,' British Journal of the History of Philososophy, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 3-18.

Flew, A. (ed) (1979) A Dictionary of Philosophy. London: Pan Books.

Foligno, C. (1929) Latin Thought During the Middle Ages. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Forrest, W.G (1966) The Emergence of Greek Democracy. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Forster, L. (1969) The Icy Fire: Five Studies in European Petrarchism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fortin, E.L. (1984) 'Gadamer on Strauss: an Interview,' Interpretation: a Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 1-13.

Fortin, E.L. (1989) 'Thomas Aquinas and the Reform of Christian Education,' Interpretation: a Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol 17, No. 1, pp. 3-17.

Foster, M.B. (1934) The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Frankena, W.K. (1965) Three Historical Philosophies of Education: Aristotle, Kant, Dewey. Glenview: Scot, Foresman, and Company.

Freeman, K.J. (1922; 3rd ed.) Schools of Hellas: An Essay on the Practice and Theory of Ancient Greek Education. London: Macmillan and Company.

Friedman, M. (1962) Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Friedman, M. Friedman, R. (1980) Free to Choose. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Fromm, E. (ed.) (1967) Socialist Humanism: an international symposium. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press.

Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. London: Hamish Hamilton.

Gabriel , A.L. (1956) The Educational Ideas of Vincent Beauvais. Notre Dame, Indiana: Medieval Institute.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1975) Truth and Method. New York: The Seabury Press.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1980) Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1986) The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy (trans. P. Christopher Smith). New Haven/London: Yale University Press.

Gaff, J.G. (1983) General Education Today: A Critical Analysis of Controversies, Practices and Reforms. San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass.

Galgan, G. (1984) 'Reinterpreting the Middle Ages', The Political Science Reviewer, Vol. XIV, pp. 1-38.

Gallie, W.B. (1960) A New University: A.D. Lindsay and the Keele Experiment. London: Chatto and Windus.

Galston, W. A. (1980) Justice and the Human Good. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Galston, W. (1989) 'Civic Education in the Liberal State' in Rosenbloom, N.L. (ed.) (1989) Liberalism and the Moral Life . London: Harvard University Press.

Gardner, P. (1983) 'Liberty and Compulsory Education', in Phillips Griffiths, A. (ed.) (1983) Of Liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gay, P. (1964) John Locke on Education. New York: Teachers College Press.

Gay, P. (1966) The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. Vol. I: The Rise of Modern Paganism. New York: Vintage Books.

Geanakoplos, D.J. (1962) Greek Scholars in Venice: Studies in the Dissemination of Greek Learning from the Byzantium to Western Europe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Geanakoplos, D.J. (1966) Byzantine East and Latin West. Oxford: Blackwell.

Giamatti, A.B. (1981) The University and the Public Interest. New York: Atheneum.

Giamatti, A.B. (1988) A Free and Ordered Space. The Real World of the University. New York: W.W. Norton and Co.

Gibson, M. (1975) 'The Continuity of Learning circa 850 -- circa 1050', Viator, Vol. 6, pp. 1-13.

Gifford, B.R. (1984) The Good School of Education: Linking Knowledge, Teaching and Learning. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gilbert, F. (1973 [1965]) Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politic and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence

Gildin, H. (1983) Rousseau's Social Contract: The Design of the Argument. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gilmore, M.P. The World of Humanism, 1453-1517. New York; Harper and Row.

Gilson, E. (1972) History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. London: Sheed and Ward.

Giroux, H.A. (1987) 'Schooling and the Politics of Ethics: Beyond Liberal and Conservative Discourses'. Journal of Education, Vol. 169, No. 2, pp. 9-33.

Glenn, Jr., C.L. (1987) The Myth of the Common School. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Godman, P. (ed.) (1985) Poetry of the Carolingian Renaissance. Norman: University of Oaklahoma.

Godwin, W. (1965 [1797]) The Enquirer: Reflections on Education, Manners and Literature. New York: Augustus M. Kelly.

Godwin, W. (1976[1798]) Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Modern Morals and Happiness. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Gomperz, T. (1964 [1901]) Greek Thinkers (4 vols.). London: John Murray.

Gouinlock, J. (1972) John Dewey's Philosophy of Value. New York: Humanities Press.

Gourevitch, V. (1968) 'Philosophy and Politics, I', Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XXII, No. 1, pp. 58-84.

Gourevitch, V. (1968) 'Philosophy and Politics, II', Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XXII, No. 2, pp. 281-328.

Grafton, A., Jardine, L. (1986) From Humanism to the

Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in the 15th and 16th Century Europe. London: Harvard University Press.

Grafton, A. (1991) Defenders of the Text. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Grant, G.P. (1966) Philosophy in the Mass Age. Vancouver: Copp Clark.

Grassi, E. (1980) Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition. London: The Penn State University Press.

Graves, F.P. (1922) A History of Education During the Middle Ages and the Transition to Modern Times. New York: Macmillan Company.

Gray, H.H. (1963) 'Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence,' Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 497-514.

Green, A. (1990) Education and State Formation. London: Macmillan.

Green, V.H.H. (1969) The Universities. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Greene, T.M. (1982) The Light in Troy: Imitation and Discovery in Renaissance Poetry. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Grendler, P.E. (1989) Schooling in Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning, 1300-1600. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Grendler, P.F. (1991) 'Reply to Robert Black,', Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 335-337.

Grene, D. (1950) Greek Political Theory : The Image of Man in Thucydides and Plato. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Greven, P. (1977) The Protestant Temperament : Patterns of Child-rearing, Religious Experience and the Self in Early America. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Griswold, Jr., C.L. (1986) Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Griswold, Jr., C.L. (1986) 'Philosophy, Education, and Courage in Plato's Laches,' Interpretation: a Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 14, Nos. 2-3, pp. 177-19.

Grote, G. (1869) 'The Drama -- Rhetoric and Dialectics'. A History of Greece, Vol. 8. London: John Murray.

Grube, G.M.A. (1958) Plato's Thought. Boston: Beacon Press.

Grube, G.M.A. (1965) The Greek and Roman Critics. London:

Methuen and Co.

Gundersheimer, W.L. (1969) French Humanism, 1470-1600. London: Macmillan and Co.

Guthrie, W.K.C. (1971) The Sophists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gutmann, A. (1980) 'Children, Paternalism and Education: A Liberal Argument', Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 338-358.

Gutmann, A. (1982) 'What's the use of going to school? The problem of education in utilitarianism and rights theories', in Sen, A., Williams, B. (eds.) (1982) Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gutmann, A. (1987) Democratic Education. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gutmann, A. (1989) 'Undemocratic Education', in Rosenblum, N.L. (ed.) (1989) Liberalism and the Moral Life. London: Harvard University Press.

Gwynn, A. (1926) (1964 [1926]) Roman Education : From Cicero to Quintillian. New York: Russell and Russell.

Haarhof, T.J. (1958, 2nd ed.) Schools of Gaul: A Study of Pagan and Christian Educaton in the Last Century of the Western Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Habermas, J. (1989) The New Conservatism. New York: Polity Press.

Hadas, M. (1960) Humanism: The Greek Ideal and its Survival. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Hadas, M. (1962) Old Wine, New Bottles. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Hadas, M. (1969) The Living Tradition. New York: Meridian Books.

Haines, C.R. (1919) 'Introduction,' in The Correspondence of Marcus Cornelius Fronto (ed. C.R. Haines). London: William Heinemann.

Hale, J.R. (1961) Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy. London: The English Universities Press.

Halevy, E. (1972 [1928]) The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism. London: Faber and Faber.

Hallowell, J.H. (1946) The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology, with Particular Reference to German Politico-Legal Thought. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company.

Hamlyn, D.W. (1985) 'Need philosophy of education be so dreary?' Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 19, pp. 159-165.

Hamlyn, D.W. (1988) The Pelican History of Western Philosophy. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Hampton, C. (1990) Pleasure, Knowledge and Being: An Analysis of Plato's Philebus. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Hankins, J. (1990) Plato in the Italian Renaissance. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Hans, N. (1951) New Trends in Education in the 18th Century. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Hardie, C.D. (1942) Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hare, R.M. (1970) 'General Introduction,' The Dialogues of Plato (trans. B. Jowett). London: Sphere Books.

Hare, R.M. (1977) 'Opportunity for What? Some Remarks on Current Disputes about Equality in Education,' Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 207-216.

Haren, M. (1985) Medieval Thought: The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the Thirteenth Century. London: Macmillan.

Harris, K. (1988) 'Dismantling a deconstructionist history of philosophy of education,' Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol 20, No. 1, pp. 50-58.

Harrison, J. Laslett, P. (1971: 2nd ed) The Library of John Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hartnell, A., Naish, M. (1976) Theory and Practice of Education, Vol. I. London: Heineman.

Harvard Committee (1946) General Education in a Free Society. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Harvey, P. (1984) The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Haskins, C.H. (1957 [1923]) The Rise of the Universities. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Haskins, C.H. (1957 [1927]) The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century. New York: Meridian Books

Hay, D. (1966a) Europe: The Emergence of an Idea. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Hay, D. (1966b) Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. London: Longman.

Hay, D. (1977; 2nd ed.) The Italian Renaissance in its Historical Background. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hayek, F.A. (1944) The Road to Serfdom. London: George Routledge and Sons.

Hayek, F.A. (1960) The Constitution of Liberty. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Hayek, F.A. (1978) New Studies in Philosophy. Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Hayek, F.A. (1982) Law, Legislation and Liberty. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Heer, F. (1961) The Medieval World: Europe 1100-1350. New York: Mentor Books.

Heidegger, M. (1977 [1947]) 'Letter on Humanism,' Basic Writings (ed. D.F. Krell). New York: Harper and Row Publishers.

Heidegger, M. (1985 [1933]) 'The Self-Assertion of the German University: Address, Delivered on the Solemn Assumption of the Rectorate of the University of Freiburg,' Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 38, pp. 467-480.

Heidegger, M. (1985 [1983]) 'The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts,' Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 38 , pp. 481-502.

Hendly, B. P. (1987) Plato, Time and Education. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Highet, G. (1949) The Classical Tradition: Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Highet, G. (1951) The Art of Teaching. London: Methuen and Company.

Highet, G. (1954) Man's Unconquerable Mind. New York: Columbia University Press.

Highet, G. (1962) Juvenal the Satirist: A Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hirsch, Jr., E.D. (1987) Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Hirst, P.H. (1971) 'Liberal Education,' in Deighton, L.C. (ed.) (1971) The Encyclopedia of Education, Vol. 5. New York: Macmillan.

Hirst, P.H. (1973) 'Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge,' in Peters, R. (1973b).

Hirst, P.H. (ed.) (1983) Educational Theory and its Foundation Disciplines. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Hirst, P.H. (1986) 'R.S. Peters's contribution to the philosophy of education,' in Cooper, D. (1986).

Hitchcock, D. (1985) 'The Good in Plato's Republic,' Apeiron, Vol. XIX, No. 2, pp. 65-92.

Hofstadter, R., Smith, W. (eds.) (1961) American Higher Education: A Documentary History (2 vols). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hofstadter, R. (1964) Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. London: Jonathan Cape.

Hollins, T.H.B. (1964) (ed.) Aims in Education: The Philosophic Approach. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Holmes, G. (1969) The Florentine Enlightenment, 1400-50. New York: Pegasus.

Holmes, G. (1970) The Later Middle Ages, 1272-1485. London: Sphere Books.

Holmes, G. (1986) Florence, Rome and the Origins of the Renaissance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Holmes, S. (1989) 'Truths for philosophers alone?' [Review of Leo Strauss (1989), The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism], Times Literary Supplement, 1-7 December, pp. 1319-1324.

Holmes, S. (1990) 'Leo Strauss' [Reply to Pangle (1990)]. Times Literary Supplement, 12-18 January, p. 35.

Horowitz, R.H. (1977) 'John Locke and the Preservation of Liberty: A Perennial Problem of Civic Education,' in Horowitz, R. H. (ed.) (1977) The Moral Foundations of the American Republic. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.

Houston, R.A. (1988) Literacy in Early Modern Europe: Culture and Education, 1500-1800. London: Longman.

Howland, R.L. (1937) 'The attack on Isocrates in the Phaedrus,' Classical Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 151-159.

Hubbell, H.M. (1913) The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and Aristides. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hudson, S.D. (1986) Human Character and Morality: Reflections from the History of Ideas. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Hudson-Williams, H.L. (1940) 'A Greek Humanist', Greece and Rome, Vol. 9, pp. 166-172.

Hugh of St. Victor (1939) Didascalicon: de Studio Legendi (ed. C.H. Buttimer) Washington: The Catholic University Press.

Hugh of St. Victor (1991) The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor: A Medieval Guide to the Arts (trans. J. Taylor). New York: Columbia University Press.

Hume, D. (1963 [1776]) Essays Moral, Political and Literary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hunt, E.L. (1963) 'Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians,' in Howes, R.F. (ed) (1963) Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians. London: Cornell University Press.

Hunt, R.W. (1968) 'English Learning in the Late Twelfth Century,' in Southern, R.W. (ed.) (1968) Essays in Medieval History. London: Macmillan.

Hutchins, R. M. (1953) The University of Utopia. Chicago; University of Chicago Press.

Hutchins, R. M. (1956) Some Observations on American Education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hutchins, R.M. (1962 [1936]) The Higher Learning in America. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hutchins, R.M. (1970) The Learning Society. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Ives, S.A. (1942) 'A Rhymed Latin Poem on the Seven Arts,' Speculum, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 416-417.

Ivinskaya, O. (1978) A Captive of Time (trans. M. Hayward). London: Collins and Harvill.

Jaeger, W. (1947) The Ideals of Greek Culture (3 vols). Oxford: Blackwell.

Jaeger, W. (1962) Early Christianity and Greek Paideia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jaeger, C.S (1993) 'Humanism and Ethics at the School of St. Victor in the Early Twelfth Century,' Mediaeval Studies, Vol. 55, pp. 51-79.

James, D.G. (1951) The Dream of Learning: An Essay for the Advancement of Learning, Hamlet and King Lear. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Janik, A., Toulmin, S. (1973) Wittgenstein's Vienna. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Jaspers, K. (1951 [1931]) Man in the Modern Age (trans. E. and C. Paul). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Jaspers, K. (1959) The Idea of the University (trans. H.A.T. Reiche, H.F. Vanderschmidt). Boston: Beacon Press.

Jebb, R.C. (1893) The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus. (2 vols.) London: Macmillan and Co.

Jefferson, T. (1943) The Complete Jefferson. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce Inc.

Jeffreys, M.V.C. (1967) John Locke: Prophet of Common Sense. London: Methuen and Company.

Johnson, R.S. (1959a) 'Isocrates' Method of Teaching,' American Journal of Philology, Vol. LXXX, No. 317, pp. 25-36.

Johnson, R.S. (1959b) 'The poet and the orator,' Classical Philology, Vol. LIV, No. 1, pp. 173-173.

Johnson, W.R. (1976) 'Isocrates Flowering: The Rhetoric of St. Augustine,' Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol 9, No. 4, pp. 217-231.

Jonathan, R. (1993) 'Education, Philosophy of Education and the Fragmentation of Value,' Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1993, pp. 171-178.

Jones, A.H.M. (1966) The Decline of the Ancient World. London: Longman.

Jones, L.W. (1945) 'The Influence of Cassiodorus on Medieval Culture,' Speculum, Vol. XX, No. 4, pp. 433-442.

Jones, L.W. (1947) 'Further Notes Concerning Cassiodorus' Influence on Medieval Culture,' Speculum, Vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 254-256.

Jones, M.G. (1938) The Charity School Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Joseph, H.W.B. (1948) Knowledge and the Good in Plato's Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press..

Kaletski, A. (19750 Metro: a novel of the Moscow underground. London: Methuen.

Kaminsky, J.S. (1986) 'The First 600 months of Philosophy of Education -- 1935-1985: a Deconstructionist History,' Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 42-47.

Kaminsky, J.S. (1988) 'Philosophy of Education in Austrolasia: A definition and a history,' Educational Philosophy amd Theory, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 12-26.

Kaminsky, J.S. (1992) 'A Pre-History of Educational Philosophy in the United States: 1861-1914,' Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 179-198.

Kandel, I.L. (1943) The Cult of Uncertainty. New York: Macmillan Company.

Kant, I. (1960[1803]) Education (trans. A. Churton). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kant, I. (1979 [1798]) The Conflict of the Faculties (trans M.J. Gregor). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Katz, M.B. (1987) Restructuring American Education. London: Harvard University Press.

Katznelson, I. Weir, M. (1985) Schooling for All: Class, Race and the Decline of the Democratic Ideal. New York: Basic Books.

Kearney, H. (1970) Scholars and Gentlemen: Universities and Society in Pre-Industrial Britain, 1500-1700. London: Faber and Faber.

Kedourie, E. (1989) Perestroika in the Universities. London: I.E.A. Health and Welfare Unit.

Kedourie, E. (1992) 'Diversity in Freedom,' Times Literary Supplement, 10 January 1992, pp. 5-7.

Keim, J.A. (1983) 'Strauss and Watkins on Hobbes' Political Philosophy,' The Political Science Reviewer, Vol. XIII, pp. 179-212.

Kendall, W. (1985) 'How to Read Rousseau's Government of Poland,' in Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1985).

Kennedy, G. (1963) The Art of Persuasion in Greece. London: Routledge and Kagan Paul.

Kennedy, G. (1969) Quintilian. New York: Twayne Publishers.

Kennedy, G. (1972) The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 300BC -- AD300. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kennedy, G. (1980) Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Kennedy, G. (1983) Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kennedy, G. A. (1989) 'Oratory,' in Easterling, P.E. Knox, B.M. W. (eds.) (1989) The Cambridge History of Classical Literature, Vol. 1, Part 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kennedy, G.A. (1992) 'Rhetoric' in Jenkyns, R. (ed.) (1992) The Legacy of Rome: A New Appraisal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kerferd, G.B. (1981) The Sophistic Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kermode, F. (1983) The Classic. London: Harvard University Press.

Keynes, J.M. (1935) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. New York.

Kimball, B.A. (1980) 'Liberal versus Useful Education: Reconsidering the Contrast and Its Lineage,' Teachers College Record, Vol. 87, No. 4, pp. 575-597.

Kimball, B.A. (1983) 'Founders of Liberal Education: The Case for Roman Orators Against Socratic Philosophers,' Teachers College Record, Vol. 85, pp. 225-249.

Kimball, B.A. (1986) Orators and Philosophers: A History of the Idea of Liberal Education. New York: Teachers College Press.

Kimball, R. (1990) Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education. New York: Harper and Row.

King, P.D. (1987) Charlemagne: Translated Sources. Lambrigg: P.D. King.

Kinghorn, A.M. (1971) The Chorus of History: Literary-historical Relations in Renaissance Britain, 1485-1558. London: Blandford Press.

Kirk, R. (1987) The Wise Men Know What Wicked Things Are Written on the Sky. Washinton; Regnery Gateway.

Kitcher, P. (1991) 'Seeing in the dark,' Nature, Vol. 354, No. 6349, p. 118-119.

Klein, J. (1960) 'The Idea of Liberal Education,' in Weatherford, Jr., W.D. (ed.) (1960) The Goals of Higher Education. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Klein, J. (1965) A Commentary on Plato's Meno. The University of North Carolina Press.

Klein, J. (1977) Plato's Trilogy: The Thaeatetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kleist, H. (1962 [1801]) Prinz Friedrich von Homburg. London: Harrap.

Klibansky, R. (1969) 'Questions et discussions,' in Actes du quatrieme Congres international de philosophie medieval: Arts

liberaux et philosophie au moyen age. Montreal: Institut d'Etudes Medievales.

Kneller, G.F. (1941) The Educational Philosophy of National Socialism. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Knight, F.H. (1982) Freedom and Reform: Essays in Economics and Social Philosophy. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.

Knowles, D. (1988, 2nd ed.) The Evolution of Medieval Thought. London: Longman.

Koerner, J.D. (1965 [1963]) The Miseducation of American Teachers. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

Kohak, E.V. (1962) 'The Road to Wisdom: Lessons on Education from Plato's Laches,' Classical Journal, Vol 56, pp. 123-132.

Kohl, B. Witt, R. Welles, E. (eds.) (1978) The Earthly Republic: Italian Humanists on Government and Society. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press. Manchester: University of Manchester Press.

Kohlberg, L. (1981) Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I: The Philosophy of Moral Development. San Fransisco: Harper and Row.

Kohn, H. (1962) The Mind of Germany: The Education of a Nation.London: Macmillan and Company.

Kohn, H. (1963) Reflections on Modern History. Princeton: D. van Nostrand Co.

Kohn, H. (1966) Political Ideologies of the Twentieth Century. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Kolakowski, L. (1978) Main Currents of Marxism. Vol. 3: The Breakdown (trans. P.S. Falla). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Koller, H. (1955) 'Enkyklios Paideia,' Glotta, Vol.34, pp. 174-189.

Korsgaard, C. M. (1986) 'Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value,' Ethics, Vol. 96, pp. 486-505.

Koyre, A. (1945) Discovering Plato (trans. L.C. Rosenfield). New York: Columbia University Press.

Kristeller, P.O. (1965) Renaissance Thought II: Papers on Humanism and Arts. New York: Harper and Row.

Kristeller, P.O. (1976) Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic and Humanist Strains. New York: Harper and Row.

Kymlicka, W. (1989) Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford:

Clarenon Press.

Lactantius (1964) The Divine Institutes (trans. M.F. McDonald) Washington: The Catholic University of America Press.

Laistner, M.L. W. (1930) 'The Influence of Isocrates's Political Doctrines on Some Fourth Century Men of Affairs,' The Classical Weekly, Vol. 23, No. 17, pp. 129-131.

Laistner, M.L.W. (1951) Christianity and Pagan Culture in the Later Roman Empire. London: Cornell University Press.

Laistner, M.L.W. (1957) A History of the Greek World From 479 to 323 B.C. London: Methuen and Company.

Laistner, M.l.W. (1957) (2nd ed.) Thought and Letters in Western Europe, A.D. 500-900. London: Methuen and Company.

Laistner, M.L.W. (1971) The Greater Roman Historians. London: University of California Press.

Lane Fox, R. (1986) Pagans and Christians. Penguin Books.

Lane Poole, R. (1960 [1920]) Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning. Cambridge: Speculum Historiale.

Lasch, C. (1979) The Culture of Narcissism. New York: Warner Books Edition.

Lasker, D.J. (1992) 'Review of Oliver Leaman (1990) Moses Maimonides,' Speculum, Vol. 67, No.2, pp. 436-438.

Laslett, P. (1956) (ed) Philosophy, Politics, and Society. New York: Macmillan.

Lathrop, H.B. (1933) Translations from the Classics into English From Caxton to Chapman, 1477-1620 (University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, No. 35). Madison: np.

Lauglo, J. (1988) 'Soviet Education Policy 1917 - 1935: from ideology, to bureaucratic control,' Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp.285-299.

Laurie, S.S. (1903) Studies in the History of Educational Opinion from the Renaissance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lawrence, E. (1970) The Origins and Growth of Modern Education. Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books.

Lawson, J. (1967) Medieval Education and the Reformation. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Leach, A.F. (1911) Educational Charters and Documents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leach (1916; 2nd ed.) The Schools of Medieval England. London: Methuen and Co.

Leavis, F.R. (1948) Education and the University: A Sketch for an 'English School'. London: Chatto and Windus.

Leavis, F.R. (1969) English Literature in Our Time and the University. London: Chatto and Windus.

Leavis, F.R. (1982) 'The "Great Books" and a Liberal Education,' in The Critic as Anti-Philosopher (ed. G.H. Singh). Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, p. 156-170.

Leavis, Q.D. (1932) Fiction and the Reading Public. London: Chatto and Windus.

Leclerq, J. (1982; 3rd ed.) The Love of Learning and the Desire for God. New York: Forham University Press.

Leff, G. (1958) Medieval Thought: St. Augustine to Ockham. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Le Goff, J. (1985) Intellectuals au Moyen Age. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Lehmberg, S.E. (1960) Sir Thomas Elyot, Tudor Humanist. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Lerner, R., Muhsin, M. (eds.) (1963) Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Letwin, W. (ed.) (1983) Against Equality. London : Macmillan.

Levi, A.W. (1976) 'Philosophy as Literature: The Dialogue,' Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 1-20.

Levy, D. J. (1991) 'Philosophy in the City,' Salisbury Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 51-53.

Lewis, A.R. (1990) 'The Islamic World and the Latin West, 1350-1500,' Speculum, Vol. 65, pp. 833-844.

Liebeschutz, H. (1950) Mediaeval Humanism in the Life and Writings of John of Salisbury. London: The Warburg Institute.

Liebeschutz, H. (1967) 'The Debate in Philosphical Learning During the Transition Period (900-1080),' in Armstrong, A.H. (ed.) (1967) The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Ch. 37). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lindberg, D.C. (1978) 'The Transmission of Greek and Arabic Learning to the West,' in Science in the Middle Ages. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.

Locke, J. (1922) 'The Conduct of the Understanding,' in Adamson, J.W. (ed.) The Educational Writings of John Locke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Locke, J. (1937 [1690]) Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company.

Locke, J. (1958 [1676]) Essays on the Law of Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Locke, J. (1960 [1689]) Two Treatises of Government (ed. P. Laslett). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Locke, J. (1968) 'Some Thoughts Concerning Education,' in Axtell, J.L. (1968) Locke's Educational Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Locke, J. (1975 [1700]) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (ed. Nidditch, P.H.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Locke, J. Clarke, E. (1975) The Correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke (ed. B. Rand). New York: Books for Libraries Press.

Lodge, R.C. (1947) Plato's Theory of Education. London: Kegan Paul.

Lord, C. (1978) 'Politics and Philosophy in Aristotle's Politics,' Hermes, Vol. 106, pp. 336-357.

Lord, C. (1982) Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle. London: Cornell University Press.

Lord, C. O'Connor, D.K. (eds.) (1991) Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lovejoy, A.O. (1955 [1948]) Essays in the History of Ideas. New York: George Braziller Inc.

Lowenthal, D. (1985) 'Leo Strauss's Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy,' Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 297-320.

Lowith, K. (1964 [1941]) From Hegel to Nietzsche: the Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought (trans. D.E. Green). London: Constable.

Lucas, J.R. (1986) 'Philosophy and Philosophy Of,' Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. LXXII, pp. 247-267.

Lukacs, J. (1970) The Passing of the Modern Age. New York: Harper and Row.

Lutz, C.E. (1956) 'Remigius' Ideas on the Origin of the Seven Liberal Arts,' Medievalia et Humanistica, Vol. 10, pp. 32-49.

Machiavelli, N. (1950) The Prince and the Discourses. New York: Modern Library.

Machiavelli, N. (1985 [1532]) The Prince (trans. H.C. Mansfield Jr.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

MacIntyre, A. (1987) 'The Idea of an Educated Public,' in Haydon, G. (ed.) (1987) Education and Values. London: Institute of Education, University of London.

Mack, E.C. (1938) Public Schools and British Opinion 1780-1860. London: Methuen.

Maclure, S. (1976) 'Politics and Education,' Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 17-25.

Magid, H.M. (1955) 'An Approach to the Nature of Political Philosophy,' Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LII, No. 2, (20 January), pp. 29-42.

Magid, H.M. (1964) 'Political Philosophy as the Search for Truth,' in Cropsey (ed) (1964).

Mahdi, M. (1966) 'Ibn Khaldun,' in Sharif, M.M. (ed.) A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vol I. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

Mahdi, M. (1969; rev. ed.) Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Ithaca: Cornell Paperbacks.

Maimonides, M. (1963) The Guide of the Perplexed (trans. S. Pine). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Maimonides, M. (1975) Ethical Writings of Maimonides (eds. R.L. Weiss, C. Butterworth). New York: Dover Publications , Inc.

Major, J.M. (1964) Sir Thomas Elyot and Renaissance Humanism. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Mandrou, R. (1978 [1973, French]) From Humanism to Science, 1480-1700. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books.

Mandeville, B. (1970) The Fable of the Bees. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Mann, T. (1938) The Coming Victory of Democracy. New York: Alfred A.Knopf.

Mansfield, Jr., H.C. (1979) Machiavelli's New Modes and Orders: A Study of the Discourses on Livy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Mansfield, Jr., H.C. (1985) 'Introduction,' Machiaveilli, N. (1985) The Prince (trans. H.C. Mansfield Jr.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mansfield, H.C. (1992) 'Dewey, all-out democrat,' Times Literary Supplement, 24 January, p. 26.

Marie de France (1986 9c.1180] The Lais of Marie de France (trans. G.S. Burgess, K. Busby) Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Marrou, H.-I. (1938) 'Culture, Civilization, and Decadence,' Revue de Synthese Historique, Vol. LVII, p.p. 133- 160.

Marrou, H.-I. (1948; 7th ed.) Histoire de l'education dans l'Antiquite. (2 vols.). Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Marrou, H.-I. (1956) A History of Education in Antiquity (trans. G. Lamb). London: Sheed ad Ward.

Marrou, H.-I. (1969) 'Les arts liberaux dans l'antiquite classique,' in Actes du quatrieme Congres international de philosophie medieval: Arts liberaux et philosophie au moyen age. Montreal: Institut d'Etudes Medievales.

Marrou, H.I. (1984) 'Education and Rhetoric,' in Finley, M.I. (ed.) (1984) The Legacy of Greece. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marshall, T.E. (1992-93) 'Review of Ferry,' Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 217-224.

Martianus Capella (1977) The Marriage of Philology and Mercury. (trans. W.H. Stahl, R. Johnsn, E.L. Burge). New York: Columbia University Press.

Martorell, J., de Galba, M.J. (1984 [1490]) Tirant Lo Blanc (trans. D.H. Rosenthal). London: Macmillan.

Masi, M. (1981) (ed.) Boethius and the Liberal Arts. Bern: Lang

Mathews, F. (1990) 'The Attack on "Historicism": Allan Bloom's Indictment of Contemporary Historical Scholarship,' American Historical Review, Vol. 95, pp. 429-447.

Mathews, M.R. (1980) The Marxist Theory aof Schooling. New Jersey: Humanities Press.

Mathieu, G. (1925) Les Idees Politiques d'Isocrate. Paris: Societe d'Edition les Belles Lettres.

Maynes, M.J. (1985) Schooling for the People: Comparative Local Studies of Schooling History in France and Germany, 1750-1850. New York: State University of New York Pres.

Maynes, M.J. (1985) Schooling in Western Europe: A Social

History. Albany: State University of New York Press.

McGarry, D.D. (1948) 'Educational Theory in the Metalogicon of John of Salisbury,' Speculum, Vol. 23, No. 4, P. 659-675.

McKeon, R. (1942) 'Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,' Speculum, Vol. XVII, No. 10, pp. 1-32.

McKeon (1946) 'Poetry and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: The Renaissance of Rhetoric,' Modern Philology, Vol. 43, pp. 217-234.

McKeon, R. (1954) 'Dialectic and Political Thought and Action,' Ethics, Vol. 65, pp. 1-33.

McKeon, R. (1990) Freedom and History and Other Essays (ed. Z.K. McKeon). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McKitterick, R. (1983) The Frankish Kingdoms Under the Carolingians, 751-987. London: Longman.

McKitterick, R. (1989) The Carolingians and the Written Word. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McKitterick, R. (ed.) (1994)Carolingian Culture: Emulation and Innovation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McLaughlin, T.H. (1984) 'Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of Children,' Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 75-83.

McManamon, J.M. (1989) Funeral Oratory and the Cultural Ideals of Italian Humanism. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

Mecklenburger, J.A. Hostrop, R.W. (eds.) (1972) Education Vouchers: From Theory to Alum Rock. Homewood, Illinois: ETC Publications.

Meinecke, F. (1972) Historism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook (trans. J.E. Anderson). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Melton, J. Van H. (1988) Absolutism and the Eighteenth Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mendus, S. (1992) 'All the King's Horses and all the King's Men: justifying higher education,' Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol 26, No. 2, 1992, pp. 173-182.

Merquior, J.G. (1980) Rousseau and Weber: Two Studies in the Theory of Legitimacy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Michelangelo (1963) Complete Poems and Selected Letters of Michelangelo (trans. C. Gilbert). Princeton: Princeton

University Press.

Michels, R. (1962 [1915]) Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (trans. E. and C. Paul). New York: Free Press.

Mill, J.S (1818) 'On Education,' in Cavenaugh (ed.) (1979).

Mill, J.S. (1961) The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (ed. M. Cohen). New York: The Modern Library.

Mill, J.S. (1967) 'Inaugural Address at St. Andrew's University,' in Cavenaugh (ed) (1979).

Miller, Jr., E. F. (1976) 'Leo Strauss: The Recovery of Political Philosophy,' in de Crespigny, A. Minogue, K. (eds.) (1976) Contemporary Political Philosophers. London: Methuen and Company.

Miller, Jr. M. (1980) The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Milosz, C. (1980 [1953]) The Captive Mind (trans. J. Zielonko). Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Milosz, C. (1981) Native Realm (trans. C.S. Leach). London: Sidgwick and Jackson.

Minogue, K.R. (1963) The Liberal Mind. New York: Vintage.

Minogue, K.R. (1973) The Concept of the University. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Mirandola, P. della (1965) On the Dignity of Man, On Being and the One, Heptaplus. (trans. C.G. Wallis, P.J.W. Miller, D. Carmichal) Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril.

Mishima, Y. (1977) Mishima on Hagakure: The Samurai Ethic and Modern Japan. (trans. K. Sparling). Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Montefiore, A. (ed.) (1975) Neutrality and Impartiality: The University and Political Commitment. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.

Montesquieu (1959 [1748]) The Spirit of the Laws (trans. T. Nugent). New York: Hafner Publishing Company.

Moore, J.M. (1975) Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy. London: Chatto and Windus.

Moore, T.W. (1974) Educational Theory: An Introduction. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Moore, T.W. (1982) Philosophy of Education: An Introduction. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Moran, J.M. (1985) The Growth of English Schools. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Morrison, J.S. (1949) 'An Introductory Chapter in the History of Greek education,' The Durham University Journal, New Series, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 55-63.

Muir, J.R. (1994) 'The Isocratic Idea of Education and the Irrelevance of the State vs. Market Debate,' Papers of the Annual Conference, Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, 8-10 April, pp. 21-27.

Muir, J.R. (1995) 'The Isocratic Idea of Education and Islamic Education,' Papers of the Annual Conference, Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, 31 March-2 Paril, pp. 28-36.

Muller, D.K., Ringer, F., Simon, B. (eds.) (1987) The Rise of the Modern Educational System: Structural Change and Social Reproduction, 1870-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Murphy, J. (1972) The Education Act 1870: Text and Commentary. Newton Abbot: David and Charles.

Murphy, J.J. (1974) Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance. Berkeley/London: University of California Press.

Murphy, J.J. (ed.) (1978) Medieval Eloquence: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Medieval Rhetoric. Berkeley/London: University of California Press.

Murphy, W.M., Bruckner, D.J.R. (eds.) (1976) The Idea of the University of Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Myers, E.D. (1960) Education in the Perspective of History. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Nakosteen, M. (1965) The History and Philosophy of Education. New York: The Ronald Press.

Nettleship, R.L. (1935 [1880]) The Theory of Education in Plato's Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nettleship, R. L. (1897) Philosophical Lectures and Remains (2 vols.). London: Macmillan and Company.

Neumann, H. (1970) 'Plato's Defense of Socrates: An Interpretation of Ancient and Modern Sophistry,' Liberal Education, Vol. 56, pp. 458-475.

Newman, J.H. (1915 [1859]) On the Scope and Nature of University Education. London: J.M. Dent and Sons.

Newman, K. (1975) 'Without vision, the people perish,' The

Listener, 20 March, pp. 358-359.

Nicgorski, W. (1978) 'Cicero and the Rebirth of Political Philosophy,' The Political Science Reviewer, Vol VIII, pp. 63-101.

Nicgorski,W. (1982) 'Leo Strauss,' Modern Age, Vol. 26, (Summer/Fall), p. 270-273.

Nicgorski, W. (1985) 'Leo Strauss and Liberal Education', Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 233-250.

Nichols, Jr., J.H. (1976) Epicurean Political Philosophy : the De rerum natura of Lucretius. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Nichols, M.P. (1987) Socrates and the Political Community. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Nietzsche, F. (1920-29) Gasammelte Werke (23 vols). Munich: Musarion.

Nietzsche, F. (1954) The Portable Nietzsche (ed. and trans. W. Kaufmann). New York: The Viking Press.

Nietzsche, F. (1968) Basic Writings of Nietzsche (ed. W. Kaufmann). New York: Modern Library.

Nietzsche, F. (1982) Daybreak (trans. R.J. Hollingdale) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, F. (1983) 'Schopenhauer as Educator' [1874], Untimely Meditations (trans. R.J. Hollingdale). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nisbet, R. (1971) The Degradation of the Academic Dogma. London: Heinemann.

Norlin, G. (1980) 'General Introduction,' Isocrates, Vol. I. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Nunn, P. (1945) Education: Its Data and First Principles. London: Edward Arnold.

Nussbaum, M. (1980) 'Aristophanes and Socrates on learning practical wisdom,' in Henderson, J. (ed.) (1980) Yale Classical Studies 26. Aristophanes: Essays in Interpretation, pp. 43-97.

Nussbaum, M. (1986) The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Oakeshott, M, (1975) Hobbes on Civil Association. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Oakeshott, M. (1989) The Voice of Liberal Learning: Michael Oakeshott on Education. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Oakley, F. (1979) The Crucial Centuries: The Medieaeval Experience. London: Terra Nova Editions.

Oberman, H.A., with T.A. Brady, Jr. (ed.) (1975) Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of its European Transformation. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

O'Connor, D.J. (1957) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

O'Hear, A. (1981) Education, Society and Human Nature. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

O'Hear, A. White, J. (1991) A National Curriculum for All: Laying the Foundations for Success. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.

Ogilvie, R.M. (1980) Roman Literature and Society. Harmondsworth; Penguin Books.

Ogle, M.B. (1926) 'Some Aspects of Mediaeval Latin Style,' Speculum, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 170-189.

Olafson, F. A. (1973) 'Democracy, "High Culture" and the Universties,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 385-406.

Oppenheimer, J.R. (1959) 'Science and Our Common Understanding ,' [Interview with R. Aron], in Rouze, M. (1964) Robert Oppenheimer: The Man and His Theories (trans. P. Evans). London: Souvenir Press.

Orme, N. (1973) English Schools in the Middle Ages. London: Methuen.

Orme, N. (1976) Education in the West of England, 1066-1548. Exeter: University of Exeter.

Orme, N. (1984) From Childhood to Chivalry: The Education of the English Kings and Aristocracy 1066 - 1530. London: Methuen.

Owens, J. (1987) 'Aristotle's Notion of Wisdom,' Apeiron, Vol. XX, No. 1, pp. 1-16.

Paetow, L.J. (1910) The Arts Course at Medieval Universities with Special Reference to Grammar and Rhetoric.

Pangle, T.L. (1980) 'Translator's Preface,' in Plato (1980) The Laws of Plato (trans. T.L. Pangle). New York: Basic Books.

Pangle, T.L. (1983) 'Introduction,' in Strauss, L. (1983).

Pangle, T.L. (1985) 'Socrates on the Problem of Political Science Education,' Political Theory, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 112-137.

Pangle, T.L. (ed.) (1987) The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues. London: Cornell University Press.

Pangle (1989a) 'Review of An Introduction to Plato's Laws,' Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 321-323.

Pangle, T.L. (1989b) 'Editors Introduction,' in Strauss, L. (1989) The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Pangle, T.L. (1992) The Ennobling of Democracy: The Challenge of the Postmodern Era. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Pangle, T.L. (1994) Personal correspondence with author. 21 February, 1994.

Pangle, T.L., Tarcov, N. (1987) 'Epilogue: Leo Strauss and the History of Political Philosophy,' in Strauss, L., Cropsey, J. (eds.) (1987).

Pangle, T.L. (1990) 'Leo Strauss' [Response to Holmes (1989)], Times Literary Supplement, 5-11 Jauary, p. 11.

Pangle, L.S., Pangle, T.L. (1993) The Learning of Liberty: The Educational Ideas of the American Founders. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.

Panofsky, E. (1972: 2nd ed.) Renaissance and Renaissances in Western Art. New York: Icon Editions.

Papalos, A.J. (1981) 'Herodes Atticus: Education in the Antonine Ages,' History of Education Quarterly, Vol 21, No. 2, pp. 171-188.

Paoli, U.E. (1992) Rome: Its People, Life and Customs.London: Bristol classical Press.

Passmore, J. (1970) The Perfectibility of Man. London: Duckworth and Company.

Passmore, J. (1980) The Philosophy of Teaching. London: Duckworth and Company.

Pasternak, E. (1990) Boris Pasternak: The Tragic Years, 1930-1960. London: Collins and Harvill.

Paul, J., Miller, Jr., F.D. (1990) 'Communitarian and Liberal Theories of the Good,' Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 43, pp. 803-830.

Paulsen, F. (1908) German Education: Past and Present (trans. T. Lorenz). London: T. Fisher.

Payne, H.C. (1976) The Philosophes and the People. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Pelikan, J. (1992) The Idea of the University: A Re-examination. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Peters, R.S. (1964) 'The Place of Philosophy in the training of teachers,' Education and the Education of Teachers. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Peters, R.S. (1966a) Ethics and Education. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Peters, R.S. (1966b) 'The Philosophy of Education,' in Tibble (1966).

Peters (1973a, revised ed.) Authority, Responsibility and Education. London: Allen and Unwin.

Peters, R.S. (ed) (1973b) The Philosophy of Education. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Peters, R.S. (1979) 'Democratic Values and Educational Aims,' Teachers College Record, Vol. 8, No. 3.

Peters, R.S. (1981) 'Democratic Values and Educational Aims,' Essays on Educators. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Peters, R.S. (1983) 'Philosophy of Education,' in Hirst, P.H. (ed.) (1983), Educational Theory and its Foundation Disciplines. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Peters, R.S. Benn, S.I. (1959) Social Principles and the Democratic State. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Peters. R.S., Hirst, P.H. (1970) The Logic of Education. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Peters, R.S., White, J. (1973) 'The Philosophers Contribution to Educational Research,' in Taylor, W. (ed.) (1973) Research Perspectives in Education. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Peterman, L. (1986) 'Approaching Leo Strauss: Some Comments on Thoughts on Machiavelli,' The Political Science Reviewer, Vol. XVI, pp. 317-351.

Peterson, S. (1985) 'Remarks on Three Formulations of Ethical Relativism,' Ethics, Vol. 95, pp. 887-908.

Phillips, D.L. (1986) Toward a Just Social Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Phillips, D.Z. (1973) 'Democratization: Some Themes in

Unexamined Talk,' British Journal of Educational Studies 21:2, pp. 133-147.

Phillips, M.M. (1949) Erasmus and the Northern Renaissance. London: The English Universities Press.

Pincoffs, E.L. (1986) Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.

Plamenatz, J. (1963) Man and Society: A Critical Examination of Some Important Social and Political Theories from Machiavelli to Marx. London: Longman.

Plato (1900-1907) Platonis Opera (5 vols.) (ed. J. Burnet). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Plato (ed. J. Burnet) (1924) Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Plato (1963, 2nd. ed.) The Republic of Plato (Critical notes, commentary and appendices by J. Adam) (2 vols). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Plato (1968) The Republic of Plato (trans. A. Bloom). New York: Basic Books.

Plato (1969, 2nd ed.) The Symposium of Plato (ed. R.G. Bury). Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons.

Plato and Aristophanes (1984) Four Texts on Socrates (trans. T.G. West, G.S. West). Ithaca: Cornell Univeristy Press.

Plumb, J.H. (1961) The Italian Renaissance. New York: Harper and Row.

Polanyi, K. (1944) The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press.

Pole, J.R. (1978) The Pursuit of Equality in American History. London: University of California Press.

Popper, K. R. (1945) The Open Society and Its Enemies: Vol. I, The Spell of Plato. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Popper, K.R. (1945) The Open Society and Its Enemies: Vol. II, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Popper, K. (1957) The Poverty of Historicism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Popper, K.R. (1972, 4th ed.) Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Popper, K.R. (1976) 'Reason or Revolution?,' in Adorno, T.W. et al (1976) The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology.

(trans. G. Adey and D. Frisby). London: Heinemann.

Postman, N. (1987) Amusing Ourselves to Death. London: Methuen and Company.

Powell, A. (1980) The Uncertain Profession: Harvard and the Search for Educational Authority. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Power, E.J. (1965) 'Review of F.A.G. Beck's Greek Education, 450-350 B.C.,' History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 68-69

Power, E.J. (1966) 'Class Size and Pedagogy in Isocrates' School,' History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 22-32.

Price, K. (1967) 'History of Philosophy of Education,' in Edwards, P. (ed) (1967) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6, pp. 230-242.

Proctor, R.E. (1988) Education's Great Amnesia: Reconsidering the Humanities from Petrarch to Freud. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Pullan, B. (1973) A History of Early Renaissance Italy. London: Allen Lane.

Purpel, D.E. (1989) The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education. Massachusetts: Bergin and Garvey.

Quick, R.H. (1880) 'Intorduction,' in Locke, J. (1880) Some Thoughts Concerning Education (ed. R.H. Quick). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Quick, R.H. (1893) Essays on Educational Reformers. London: Longmans.

Quintillian (1933) Institutio Oratoria (4 vols.). London: Wm. Heinemann.

Quinton, A. (ed.) (1967) Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Quoniam, P. (1983) The Louvre. (trans. B. Shuey). Paris: Editions de la Reunion des musees nationaux.

Rahe, P.A. (1991) 'John Locke's Political Partisanship,' The Political Science Reviewer, Vol. XX, pp. 1-43.

Ramage, E.S. (1963) 'Urbanitas: Cicero and Quintilian, a Contrast in Attitudes.' American Journal of Philology, Vol. 84, pp. 390-414.

Rand, E.K. (1928) Founders of the Middle Ages. New York: Dover Publications.

Rashdall, H. (1936 [1895]) The Universityies of Europe in the Middle Ages (ed. F.M. Powicke and A.M. Emden) (3 vols.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ravitch, D. (1983) The Troubled Crusade. New York: Basic Books.

Ravitch, D. (1985) The Schools We Deserve: Reflections on the Educational Crisis of Our Times. New York: Basic Books.

Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap Press.

Rawson, E. (1985) Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.

Reid, L.A. (1962) Philosophy and Education. London: Heinemann.

Reitzel, J.M. (1980) 'The Medieval Houses of Bons-Enfants,' Viator, 10, pp. 179-207.

Review of Politics, The(1991) Special Issue on Leo Strauss, Vol. 53, No. 1.

Revue de metaphysique et de morale. (Leo Strauss, historien de la philosophie) (1989), Vol. 94, No. 3.

Reynolds, L.D., Wilson, N.G. (1974, 2nd ed.) Scribes and Scholars: A Guide to the Transmission of Greek and Latin Literature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Rice, Jr., E.F. (1970) The Foundations of Early Modern Europe, 1460-1559. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Riche, P. (1976, from 3rd ed. French) Education and Culture in the Barbarian West, Sixth through Eighth Centuries. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press.

Richter, M. (ed.) (1980) Political Theory and Political Education. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Riesman, D. (1958) Constraint and Variety in American Education. New York: Doubleday Anchor.

Roberts, J.T. (1987) 'Florentine Perceptions of Athenian Democracy,' Medieval et Humanistica, New Series 15, pp. 25 - 41. New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield.

Robin, L. (1928) Greek Thought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company.

Rollins, H.E. , Baker, H. (eds.) (1954) The Renaissance in England. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co.

Roocknik, D. (1990) The Tragedy of Reason: Toward a Platonic

Conception of Logos. New York: Routledge.

Rorty, A.O. (1990) 'Varieties of Pluralism in a Polyphonic Society,' Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 44, pp. 3-20.

Roseman, N. (1971) 'Protagoras and the Foundations of his Educational Thought,' Paedagogica Historica, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 75-89.

Rosen, S. (1969) Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rosen, S. (1987) Hermeneutics as Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rosen, S. (1983) Plato's Sophist: The drama of Original and Image. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rosen, S. (1987, 2nd ed.) Plato's Symposium. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rosen, S. (1989) The Ancients and the Moderns: Rethinking Modernity. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rosenthal, F. (1941) 'Some Pythagorean Documents transmitted in Arabic II: Plato's Exortation Concerning the Education of Young Men,' Orientalia, N.S. X., Vol. 10, pp. 383-395.

Rothblatt, S. (1976) Tradition and Change in English Liberal Education: An Essay in History and Culture. London: Faber and Faber.

Rousseau, J.-J. (1918 [1762]) Du Contrat Social: Ou Principes du Droit Politique (ed. C.E. Vaughan). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Rousseau, J.-J. (1951) Emile ou de l'education. Paris: Garnier Freres.

Rousseau, J.-J. (1964) 'Discours sur les sciences et les arts,' in Oeuvres Completes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Vol. III. Paris: Pleiades.

Rousseau, J.-J. (1979) Emile, or On Education (trans. with Introduction, A. Bloom). New York: Basic Books.

Rousseau, J.-J. (1979 [1782]) The Reveries of the Solitary Walker. (trans. with Interpretive Essay, C.E. Butterworth). Indianapolis: Hackett.

Rousseau, J.-J. (1985 [1772]) The Government of Poland (trans. W. Kendall). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Rubenstein, D. Stoneman, C. (eds.) (1972, 2nd ed.) Education for Democracy. Harmondsworth. Penguin.

Rudolph, F. (ed.) (1965) Essays on Education in the Early Republic. Cambridge: Belknap Press.

Rummel, E. (1985) Erasmus as a Translator of the Classics. Toronto: Iniversity of Toronto Press.

Rusk, R.R. (1962) The Doctrines of the Great Educators. London: Macmillan and Co.

Russell, D.A. (1989) 'Arts and Sciences in Ancient Education,' Greece and Rome, Vol. xxxvi, No. 2, pp. 210-225.

Ryan, L.V. (1963) Roger Ascham. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Ryle, G. et al (1956) The Revolution in Philosophy. London: Macmillan and Company.

Sabine, G.H. (1955) A History of Political Theory. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Said, E.W. (1978) Orientalism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

St. Victor, Hugh of (1961) The Didascalicon of High of St. Victor: A Medieval Guide to the Arts (trans. J. Taylor). New York: Columbia Uiversity Press.

Saintsbury, G. (1898) A Short History of English Literature. London: Macmillan and Co.

Salisbury, John of (1955) The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: A Twelfth Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium (trans. D.D. McGarry). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Salisbury, John of (1990 [1159]) Policraticus (ed. and trans. C.J. Nederman). Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.

Sankari, F.A. (1970) 'Plato and Alfarabi: A Comparison of Some Aspects of Their Political Philosophies,' Vivarium, Vol. VII, pp. 1-9.

Santayana, G. (1956 [1920]) Character and Opinion in the United States. New York: Doubleday Anchor.

Sarason, S. (1982, 2nd ed.) The Culture of the School and the Problem of Change. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Scheffler, I. (1960) The Language of Education. Springfield, Charles C. Thomas.

Scheffler, I. (1965) Conditions of Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Schneider, H. (1931) The History of World Civilization: from Prehistoric Times to the Middle Ages (2 vols.). London: George Routledge and Sons.

Schram, G.N. (1991-2) 'The Place of Leo Strauss in a Liberal Education,' Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 201-216.

Schwartz, J. (1984) The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Scolnicov, S. (1976) 'Three Aspects of Plato's Philosophy of Learning and Instruction,' in Simmons, G.C. (ed.) Padiea: Special Plato Issue. Fifth Annual MCMLXXLI, pp. 50-62.

Scolnicov, S. (1981) 'Plato's Euthydemus: A Study on the Relations Between Logic and Education,' Scripta Classica Israelica,' Vol. 6, pp. 19-29.

Scolnicov, S. (1983-84) 'Socrates on the Unity of the Person,' Scripta Classica Israelica, Vol. VII, pp. 14-25.

Scolnicov, S. (1988) Plato's Metaphysics of Education. London: Routledge.

Scruton, R. (1980) The Meaning of Conservatism. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Scruton, R. (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought. London: Pan Books.

Scruton, R. (1984) A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein. London: Ark Paperbacks.

Seeskin, K. (1987) Dialogue and Discovery: A Study in Socratic Method. State University of New York Press.

Seigel, J. (1966) 'Civic Humanism or Ciceronian Rhetoric,' Past and Present, Vol. 34, pp. 3-48.

Seigel, J.E. (1968) Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sextus Empiricus (1954) Against the Professors. London: Wm. Heinemann.

Shahar, S. (1990) Childhood in the Middle Ages. London: Routledge.

Sher, G. (1989) 'Educating Citizens,' Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 68-80.

Shevchenko, A.N. (1985) Breaking with Moscow. London: Grafton

Books.

Shklar, J.N. (1969) Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sidney, P. (1973 [1595]) An Apology for Poetry (ed. G. Shepherd). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Silver, H. (1977) The Concept of Popular Education. London: Methuen and Company.

Simon, B. (1960) Studies in the History of Education 1780-1870. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Simon B. (1965) Education and the Labour Movement 1870-1920. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Simon, B. (1985) Does Education Matter? London: Lawrence and Wishart .

Simon, B. (1987) The Rise of the Modern Educational System, 1870-1920. Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press.

Simon, J. (1979) Education and Society in Tudor England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Simon, Y.R. (1951) Philosophy of Democratic Government. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press.

Simone, F. (1969) The French Renaissance: Medieval Tradition and Italian Influence in Shaping the Renaissance in France (trans. H. Gaston Hall). London: Macmillan and Co.

Sinaiko, H.L. (1965) Love, Knowledge and Discourse in Plato: Dialogue and Dialectic in Phaedrus, Republic, Parmenides. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sinclair, T.A. (1962) A History of Classical Greek Literature: From Homer to Aristotle. New York: Collier Books.

Sinclair, T.A. (1967, 2nd ed.) A History of Greek Political Thought. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Sinyavsky, A. (1971) For Freedom of the Imagination. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Skidelsky, R. (1988) 'Bloom's Symposium,'New Society, 29 April, pp. 28-29.

Skinner, Q. (1978) The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Vol. I: The Renaissance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skinner, Q. (1978) The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol.II: The Age of Reformation.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smethurst, S.E. (1953) 'Cicero and Isocrates,' Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 84, pp. 262-320.

Smith, A. (1937) The Wealth of Nations. New York: Random House.

Smith, A. (1969 [1853]) The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.

Snell, B. (1953) The Discovery of Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought (trans. T.G. Rosenmeyer). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Solmsen, F. (1941) 'The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric,' American Journal of Philology, Vol. LXII, No. 245, pp. 35-50, and No. 246, pp. 169-190.

Solmsen, F. (1975) Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Solomon, R.C. (1980) History and Human Nature: A Philosophical Review of European Philosophy and Culture, 1750-1850. Brighton: The Harvester Press.

Solzhenitsyn, A. I. (1980) East and West. New York: Harper and Row.

Southern, R.W. (1967) The Making of the Middle Ages. London: Hutchinson and Co.

Southern, R.W. (ed.) (1968) Essays in Medieval History. London: Macmillan.

Southern, R.W. (1970) Medieval Humanism and Other Studies. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.

Spearing, A.C. (1985) Medieval to Renaissance in English Poetry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Spence, S. (1988) Rhetoric of Reason and Desire: Vergil, Augustine, and the Troubaours. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Spring, J. (1985, 3rd. ed.) American Education: An Introduction to Social and Political Aspects. New York: Longman.

Stahl, W.H. Johnson, R. Burge, E.L. (1977) Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts. (2 vols.) New York: Columbia University Press.

Stal, I., Thom, F. (1988) Schools for Barbarians (trans. K. Connolly). London: The Claridge Press.

Steiner, G. (1971) In Bluebeard's Castle: Some Notes Towards the Redefinition of Culture. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Stephens, W.B. (1987) Education, Literacy and Society, 1830-70. Manchester: University of Manchester Press.

Stephenson, C. (1943) Medieval History: Europe from the Second to the Sixteenth Century. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Stiefal, T. (1985) The Intellectual Revolution in Twelfth Century Europe. London: Croom Helm.

Stone, L. (1964) 'The Educational Revolution in England 1560 - 1640,' Past and Present, Vol. 28, July, pp. 41 - 80.

Storing, H.J. (ed.) (1962) Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Strauss, G. (1978) Luther's House of Learning: Indoctrination of the Young in the German Reformation. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Strauss, L. (1936) 'Quelques remarques sur la Science Politique de Maimonides et de Farabi,' Revue des Etudes Juives, Vol. 100, pp. 1-36.

Strauss, L. (1936) The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis (trans. E.M. Sinclair). Oxford; Clarendon Press.

Strauss, L. (1945) 'Farabi's Plato,' Louis Ginzgerg Jubilee Volume. New York: Proceedings of the American Academy of Jewish Research.

Strauss, L. (1946) 'On a New Interpretation of Plato's Political Philosophy,' Social Research, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 326-367.

Strauss, L. (1947) 'On the Intention of Rousseau,' Social Research, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 455-487.

Strauss, L. (1973 [1952]) Persecution and the Art of Writing. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Strauss, L. (1953) Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, L. (1958) Thoughts on Machiavelli. Chicago; University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, L. (1959) What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press.

Strauss, L. (1959) 'What is Liberal Education?' in Fletcher, C.S. (ed.) (1961) Education for Social Responsibility. New York: Norton.

Strauss, L. (1962) 'Liberal Education and Responsibility,' in Fletcher, C.S. (ed.) (1962) Education: The Challenge Ahead. New York: Norton.

Strauss, L. (1991 [1963]) On Tyranny (revised and expanded edition) (ed. V. Gourevitch, M.S. Roth). New York: The Free Press.

Strauss, L. (1964) 'The Crisis of Our Time' and 'The Crisis of Political Philosophy,' in Spaeth, H.J. (ed.) (1964) The Predicament of Modern Politics. Detroit: University of Detroit Press.

Strauss, L. (1965) Spinoza's Critique of Religion. New York: Shocken Books.

Strauss, L. (1980 [1966]) Socrates and Aristophanes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, L. (1967) 'Liberal Education and Mass Democracy,' in Goldwin, R.A. (ed.) (1967) Higher Education and Modern Democracy. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Strauss, L. (1968) Liberalism Ancient and Modern. New York: Basic Books.

Strauss, L. (1970a) Xenophon's Socratic Discourse. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Strauss, L. (1970b) 'Machiavelli and Classical Literature,' Review of National Literatures, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 7-25.

Strauss, L. (1972) Xenophon's Socrates. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Strauss, L. (1975a) The Argument and the Action of Plato's Laws. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, L. (1975b) Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo Strauss (ed. H. Gilden). New York: Pegasus Books.

Strauss, L. (1975c) 'The Three Waves of Modernity,' in Strauss (1975b).

Strauss, L. (1978) 'Correspondence with Hans-Georg Gadamer Concerning Warheit und Methode,' The Independent Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 2, pp. 5-12.

Strauss, L. (1979) 'The Mutual Influence of Theology and Philosophy,' The Independent Journal of Philosophy, Vol. III, pp. 111-118.

Strauss, L. (1981) 'On the Interpretation of Genesis,' L'Homme: Revue francaise d'anthropologie, 21:1, pp. 5-36.

Strauss, L. (1981) 'Progress or Return? The Contemporary

Crisis in Western Civilization,' Modern Judaism, Vol. 1.

Strauss, L. (1983) Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, L. (1987 [1935]) Philosophy and Law: Essays Toward the Understanding of Maimonides and his Predecessors (trans. F. Baumann) . New York: Jewish Publication Society.

Strauss, L. (1989, 2nd ed.) An Introduction to Political Philosophy (ed. H. Gildin). Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Strauss, L. (1989 [1968]) Liberalism Ancient and Modern (forward by A. Bloom). New York: Cornell University Press.

Strauss, L. (1989) The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism. An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss (selected and introduced by T.L. Pangle). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, L., Cropsey, J. (eds.) (1972, 2nd ed.) History of Political Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, L., Cropsey, J. (eds.) (1987, 3rd ed.) History of Political Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, L. , Klein, J. (1970) 'A Giving of Accounts: Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss,' The College, Vol. XXII, No. 1.

Strike, K. (1982) Educational Policy and the Just Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stock. B. (1983) The Implications of Literacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sturt, M. (1967) The Education of the People. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Swanton, C. (1985) 'On the "Essential Contestedness" of Political Concepts,' Ethics, Vol. 95, pp. 811-827.

Sylvester, D.W. (ed.) (1970) Educational Documents 800-1816. London: Methuen and Company.

Symonds, J.A. (1877) Renaissance in Italy: The Revival of Learning. London: Smith, Elder and Company.

Talmon, J.L. (1961 [1952]) The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. London: Mercury Books.

Talmon, J.L. (1960) Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase. London: Secker and Warburg.

Tarcov, N. (1982) 'Quentin Skinner's Method and Machiavelli's Prince,' Ethics, Vol 92, pp. 692-709.

Tarcov, N. (1984) Locke's Education for Liberty. London: University of Chicago Press.

Taylor, A.E. (1960 [1926]) Plato: The Man and His Work. London: Methuen.

Taylor, J. (1957) The Origin and Early Life of High of St. Victor: An Evaluation of the Tradition. Texts and Studies in the History of Medieaval Education, No. 5. Notre Dame: The Mediaeval Institute, University of Notre Dame.

Teloh, H. (1986) Socratic Education in the Early Dialogues. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Terry, P. (1963) Lays of Courtly Love. Garden City: Anchor Books.

Thomas, J.L.H. (1989) 'The Schoolman's Advocate. In Defense of the Academic Pursuit of Philosophy,' Mind, Vol. 98, No. 392, pp. 483-506.

Thorndike, L. (1940) 'Elementary and Secondary Education in the Middle Ages,' Speculum, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 400-408.

Thorson, T.L. (ed.) (1963) Plato: Totalitarian or Democrat? Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Thucydides (1989 [1959]) The Peloponnesian War (trans. T. Hobbes). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tibble, J.W. (ed.) (1966) The Study of Education. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Tibble, J.W. (ed.) (1971) An Introduction to the Study of Education. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Tillich, P. (1968) A History of Christian Thought. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Tocqueville, A. (1945 [1835]) Democracy in America (trans. H. Reeve). New York: Vintage.

Tooley, J. (1993) A Market-led Alternative for the Curriculum: Breaking the Code. London: Tufnell Press.

Tracy, J.D. (1978) The Politics of Erasmus. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Trask, W.R. (1965) 'Translator's Afterword,' in Holderlin, F. (1965 [1799]) Hyperion (trans. W.R. Trask). New York: The New American Library.

Treadgold, W. (ed.) (1984) Renaissances Before the Renaissance: Cultural Revivals of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Trilling, L. (1963) 'Commitment to the Modern,' Teachers College Record, Vol. 64, No. 5, pp. 404-408.

Trilling, L. (1967) Beyond Culture: Essays in Literature and Learning. Harmondsworth: Peregrine Books.

Trilling, L. (1970) The Liberal Imagination. Harmondsworth: Peregrine Books.

Trilling, L. (1982) 'The Uncertain Future of the Humanistic Educational Ideal,' in The Last Decade: Essays and Reviews, 1965-1975 (ed. D. Trilling). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Turner, F.M. (1981) The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain. New Haven : Yale University Press.

Tyack, D.B. (1974) The One Best System. Harvard University Press.

Ulich, R. (ed.) (1954) Three Thousand Years of Educational Wisdom. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Untersteiner, M. (1954) The Sophists (trans. K. Freeman). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Vander Waerdt, P.A. (1985) 'Kingship and Philosophy in Aristotle's Best Regime,' Phronesis, Vol. XXX, No. 3, pp. 249-273.

van de Vyver, A. (1929) 'Les etapes de developpement philosophique du haut-moyen-age,' Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, Vol. 8, pp. 425-452.

van Hook, L. (1919) 'Alcidamas versus Isocrates: The Spoken versus the Written Word,' The Classical Weekly, Vol. XII, No. 12, pp. 89-94.

Vassar, R.L. (1965) Social History of American Education (2 vols.). Chicago: Rand McNally and Company.

Veblen, T. (1957 [1918]) The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Business Men. New York: Sagamore Press.

Verdenius, W.J. (1970) 'Homer: the Educator of the Greeks,' Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. Afdeling, Letterkunds, Nieuwe Reeks Deel 33, No. 5, pp. 207 - 231.

Vickers, B. (1984) 'Figures of Rhetoric/Figures of Music,' Rhetorica, Vol. 2, pp. 1-44.

Vickers, B. (1988) In Defense of Rhetoric. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Vico, G. (1965 [1709]) On the Study Methods of Our Time

(trans. E. Gianturco). New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

Vincent, W.A.L. (1950) The State and School Education 1640-1660 in England and Wales. Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge.

Vlastos, G. (1983) 'The Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy,' Political Theory, Vol. 11,pp. 495-516.

Vlastos, G. (1988) 'Socrates,' Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. LXXIV, pp. 89-111. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Voros, F.K. (1975) 'Democritus' educational thought,' Paedagogica Historica, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 457-470.

Waddel, H. (1934, 7th ed.) The Wandering Scholars. London: Constable and Company

Wagner, D.L. (ed.) (1983) The Seven Liberal Arts in the Middle Ages. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Wallach, L. (1959) Alcuin and Charlemagne. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Wallach, L. (ed.) (1966) The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic Books.

Warnock, M. (1977) Schools of Thought. London: Faber and Faber..

Warrington, J. (ed.) (1961) Everyman's Classical Dictionary. London: Dent Dutton.

Watkins, F. (1962) The Political Tradition of the West: A Study in the Development of Modern Liberalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Watson, F. (1908) The English Grammar Schools to 1660; their Curriculum and Practice. Cambrige: Cambridge University Press.

Watson, F. (1914) 'The Study of the History of Education,' Contemporary Review, Vol. CV, pp. 78-87.

Weatherford, W.D. (ed.) (1960) The Goals of Higher Education. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Weaver, T. (1987) America's Teacher Quality Problem: Alternatives for Reform. New York: Praeger.

Weber, M. (1949) The Methodology of the Social Sciences (trans. and ed. E. Shils, H.A. Finch). New York: The Free

Press.

Weinberger, J. (1986) 'But Which Gods Will Save Us? The Political Legacy of Nietzsche and Heidegger,' The Political Science Reviewer, Vol. XVI, pp. 353-412.

Weiss, R.L. (1991) Maimonides' Ethics: The Encounter of Philosophic and Religious Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Weiss, R. (1941) Humanism in England during the Fifteenth Century. Oxford: Blackwell.

West, A.F. (1969 [1892]) Alcuin and the Rise of the Christian Schools. New York: Greenwood Press.

West, E.G. (1970, 2nd ed.) Education and the State: A Study in Political Economy. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

West, T.G. (1984) 'Introduction,' in Plato, Aristophanes (1984) Plato and Arisophanes: Four Texts on Socrates. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

White , F.C. (1975) 'Protagoras as a moral educator,' Paedagogica Historica, Vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 128-141.

White, F.C. (1990) 'The Good in Plato's Gorgias,' Phronesis, Vol. XXXV, No. 2, pp. 117-127.

White, J.P. (1982) The Aims of Education Restated. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

White, J.P. (1987) 'The medical condition of philosophy of education,' Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 155-162.

White, J.P. (1988) 'Two National Curricula -- Baker's and Stalin's: Towards a Liberal Alternative,' British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. XXXVI, No. 3, pp. 218-231.

White, J.P. (1990) Education and the Good Life. London: London Education Studies.

White, M., White, L. (1964) The Intellectual versus the City. New York: New American Library.

White, M. (1972) Science and Sentiment in America: Philosophical Thought from Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey. New York: Oxford University Press.

White, P. (1973) 'Education, Democracy and the Public Interest,' in Peters, R.S. (ed.) (1973) The Philosohpy of Education. London: Oxford University Press.

White, P. (1979) 'Socialization and moral education or bringing up children to be decent members of society,' in

Cochrane, D.B., Hamm, C.M., Kazepides, A.C. (eds.) (1979) The Domain of Moral Education. New York: Paulist Press.

White, P. (1983) Beyond Domination: An Essay in the Political Philosophy of Education. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Wieruszowski, H. (1966) The Medieval University. New York: Van Nostrand.

Wilcox, S. (1942) 'The Scope of Early Rhetorical Education,' Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 53, pp. 121-155.

Wilkins, A.S. (1914) Roman Education. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilkinson, R. (ed.) (1969) Governing Elites: Studies in Training and Selection. New York: Oxford University Press.

Williams, B. (1987) 'What Hope for the Humanities?,' Educational Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 183-189.

Wilshire, B. (1990) The Moral Collapse of the University. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Wilson, J. (1979) Preface to the Philosophy of Education. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Wilson, J. (1980) 'Philosophy and Education: retrospect and prospect,' Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 41-52.

Wilson, J. (1982) 'The Credibility of Educational Studies,' Oxford Review of Education, Vol 8, No. 1, pp. 3-19.

Wilson, J. (1986) What Philosophy Can Do. London: Macmillan Press.

Wilson, J. (1989) 'De-intellectualism and Authority in Education,' Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 111-119.

Wilson, J. (1991) 'Education and Transcendental Enterprises,' Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 337-344.

Wilson, J., Cowell, B. (1989) Taking Education Seriously. London, Ontario: Althouse Press.

Wilson, T. (1909 [1560]) The Arte of Rhetorique (ed. G.H. Mair). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wimsatt. Jr. W.K., Brooks, C. (1957) Literary Criticism: A Short History. New York: Vintage Books.

Windelband, W. (1956 [1899]) History of Ancient Philosophy. New York: Dover Books.

Winiarski, W. (1963) 'Niccolo Machiavelli,' in Strauss, L., Cropsey, J. (eds.) (1963) History of Political Philosophy. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co.

Wolff, P. (1968) The Awakening of Europe. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Wolin, S.S. (1960) Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Woodward, W.H. (1905) Vittorino da Feltre and Other Humanist Educators. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Woodward, W.H. (1906) Studies in Education during the Age of the Renaissance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Woodward, W.H. (1964) Desiderius Erasmus Concerning the Aim and Method of Education. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University.

Zeller, E. (1955) Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy. New York: Meridian Books.

Zuchert, M.P. (1985) 'Appropriation and Understanding in the History of Political Philosophy: on Quentin Skinner's Method,' Interpretation : A Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 403-424.