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Moral hazard in repeated procurement of services

Abstract:

This paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a two period model with a potential repeated agency relationship. In the first period, there is an incumbent who provides a service. In the second period, there is a contest stage in which the principal selects the next service provider. The agents’ effort is non-contractible and the contest stage is the mechanism to mitigate potential moral hazard problems. The principal takes account of the past service effort in the contest stage by c...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS Division
Department:
Computer Science
Department:
Unknown
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Elsevier
Journal:
International Journal of Industrial Organization More from this journal
Volume:
48
Issue:
2016
Pages:
244-269
Publication date:
2016-07-11
Acceptance date:
2016-06-24
DOI:
EISSN:
1873-7986
ISSN:
0167-7187
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:980282
UUID:
uuid:cb17a710-5196-4a12-95b1-49d3e6347fd8
Local pid:
pubs:980282
Source identifiers:
980282
Deposit date:
2019-08-23

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