Journal article
Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide-and-Seek” Games.
- Abstract:
-
“Hide-and-seek” games are zero-sum two-person games in which one player wins by matching the other's decision and the other wins by mismatching. Although such games are often played on cultural or geographic “landscapes” that frame decisions nonneutrally, equilibrium ignores such framing. This paper reconsiders the results of experiments by Rubinstein, Tversky, and others whose designs model nonneutral landscapes, in which subjects deviate systematically from equilibrium in response to them. ...
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- American Economic Association
- Journal:
- American Economic Review
- Volume:
- 97
- Issue:
- 5
- Pages:
- 1731 - 1750
- Publication date:
- 2007-01-01
- DOI:
- ISSN:
-
0002-8282
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- UUID:
-
uuid:cb015a13-ae2e-47b3-bd85-c0a8973b4365
- Local pid:
- oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14888
- Deposit date:
- 2011-08-16
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- Copyright date:
- 2007
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