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Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide-and-Seek” Games.

Abstract:

“Hide-and-seek” games are zero-sum two-person games in which one player wins by matching the other's decision and the other wins by mismatching. Although such games are often played on cultural or geographic “landscapes” that frame decisions nonneutrally, equilibrium ignores such framing. This paper reconsiders the results of experiments by Rubinstein, Tversky, and others whose designs model nonneutral landscapes, in which subjects deviate systematically from equilibrium in response to them. ...

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Publisher copy:
10.1257/aer.97.5.1731
Publisher:
American Economic Association
Journal:
American Economic Review More from this journal
Volume:
97
Issue:
5
Pages:
1731 - 1750
Publication date:
2007-01-01
DOI:
ISSN:
0002-8282
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:cb015a13-ae2e-47b3-bd85-c0a8973b4365
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:14888
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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