

ISSN 1471-0498



**DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES**

REVENUE TARIFF REFORM

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Number 688
December 2013

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December 10, 2013

Abstract

What kind of tariff reform is likely to raise welfare in situations where tariff revenue is important? Uncertainty about specification and risk from imprecise parameter estimates of any particular specification reduce the credibility of simulation estimates. A promising alternative is to develop rules which are robust with respect to such uncertainty. We present sufficient conditions for a class of linear rules that guarantee welfare-improving tariff reform. The rules span cones of welfare-improving tariff reforms consisting of convex combinations of (i) trade-weighted-average-tariff-preserving dispersion cuts; and (ii) uniform tariff cuts that preserve domestic relative prices among tariff-ridden goods.

Keywords: Trade policy reform; Generalized mean and variance of tariffs; Tariff revenue; Piecemeal policy reform.

JEL Classification: F13, H21

*We are grateful to Richard Blundell, Ian Crawford, Rod Falvey, Udo Kreickemeier, Will Martin, and participants at various seminars and conferences for helpful comments. Peter Neary thanks the European Research Council for funding under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013), ERC grant agreement no. 295669.

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What kind of tariff reform is likely to raise welfare in situations where tariff revenue is important? We propose new operational guidelines for beneficial reform that are robust to policy makers' two sources of uncertainty about the economy: the proper specification of the model economy and imprecision of estimates of supply and demand response parameters of any particular specification. The guidelines provide a theoretical foundation for the standard World Bank advice to developing country clients that they should reduce dispersion of tariffs while maintaining average tariffs to preserve revenue.¹ In plausible special cases the rules involve only observable data and a small number of credibly knowable aggregate elasticities.

Recent research (Anderson and Neary, 2007) provides guidelines for welfare-improving tariff reform when government revenue is not a concern, as when the government hypothetically has lump-sum tax/transfer power. The linear reform rules contained in a cone of welfare-improving reforms were derived as implications of reform that reduced either or both of two sufficient statistics, the generalized mean and generalized variance of the tariff structure. We apply and extend the methods of Anderson and Neary to the case where the government revenue constraint is active due to relaxing the lump-sum assumption.² All government tax changes become costly at the margin because they involve distortions. The same sufficient statistics prove useful in the case of an active revenue constraint, supplemented by plausibly knowable aggregate elasticity conditions. In a big step toward applicability with very limited information, Anderson and Neary also showed that in a special CES case, the generalized mean and variance reduced to the readily observable trade-weighted version of these statistics. The second contribution of the present paper is to demonstrate that observability of generalized moments obtains with weak separability, nesting not only the CES but most other widely-used preference/technology demand systems. A group of goods such as clothing under separability can contain pairs that are complements (shirts and trousers)

¹Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) review the empirical evidence on the revenue effects of trade liberalization, and examine whether countries have managed to offset reductions in trade tax revenues by increasing their domestic tax revenues in recent decades. They conclude that middle-income countries have succeeded in doing so, but that many low-income countries have not.

²Other studies of the interplay of revenue and efficiency considerations in trade policy reform include Falvey (1994), Emran and Stiglitz (2005), and Hatta and Ogawa (2007).

and other pairs that are substitutes (cotton and silk shirts). The separable setting permits another realistic extension to replace the representative agent with heterogeneous agents while maintaining feasible observable rules that yield Pareto improvement.

Replacing border taxes with domestic consumption taxation is often advocated.³ Anderson (1999) shows that gradual reform of this type need not improve welfare when uniform radial reductions are used to lower tariffs. The present paper admits a much broader class of trade reforms when domestic consumption taxation is the alternative revenue source and provides more optimistic prospects for tariff reform which reduces dispersion. Section 1 sets up the model. Section 2 analyzes trade reform and derives the main results of the paper. Section 3 extends the results to the case of many households. Section 4 concludes.

1 Equilibrium and the Effects of Tariffs and Taxes

A small open economy raises its revenue with a set of tariffs and with a wage tax. The wage tax is distortionary because labor supply is variable (due to household choice in an economy where immigration is shut down) and leisure cannot be taxed. Tariffs and the wage tax are initially set suboptimally. The objective of the reform is to move the taxes gradually toward their optimal (Ramsey) values. This section first describes the economy and then shows how tariff changes affects welfare and tariff revenue. These results are the key building blocks for our results on tariff reform in Section 2.

The representative consumer's net expenditure function is given by $e(\pi, w, u)$: u is the real income of the representative consumer, π is the vector of the prices of traded goods subject to tariffs, and w is the net-of-tax wage rate. Implicit in the list of arguments is the price of a composite export good, which we take as numéraire so its price can be set equal to one. By Shephard's Lemma, $-e_w$ gives labor supply while e_π gives the vector of final demand

³See for example, Hatzipanayotou, Michael, and Miller (1994), Keen and Ligthart (2002), and Kricke-meier and Raimondos-Møller (2008). The intuitive argument that the base is broader can be supplemented with optimality considerations. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) demonstrated that it is inefficient to distort productive efficiency when raising revenue with distortionary taxation. Trade taxes, by subsidizing production, drive a wedge between domestic and international marginal rates of transformation.

for traded goods. The GDP function is given by $g(\pi, w + t)$, where t is the tax on labor income. By Hotelling's Lemma, the vector of supply of traded goods (or where appropriate, minus the demand for traded inputs) is given by g_π while $-g_w$ gives labor demand.

The trade expenditure function for this economy is defined as the excess of domestic expenditure over GDP, with the added constraint that the labor market clears in the background:⁴

$$E(\pi, t, u) = \max_w [e(\pi, w, u) - g(\pi, w + t)]. \quad (1)$$

E gives the net transfer to the private sector needed to support utility u when domestic prices of traded goods are set at π and the wage tax is set at t . Shephard's and Hotelling's Lemmas imply that the labor market clears ($e_w = g_w$), so $E_t = -g_w$ is equilibrium employment, and that E_π is the vector of excess demand for traded goods. Since $e - g$ is concave in (π, w, t) , E is concave in (π, t) : compensated net import demand functions are downward-sloping.

The private-sector budget constraint is:

$$E(\pi, t, u) - s = 0. \quad (2)$$

Here, s is the transfer from the government to the private sector. If s is an active policy instrument, the government has lump-sum power. Otherwise, it is simply an exogenous transfer, which also serves as a useful analytic link between the private-sector and government budget constraints.

The government budget constraint expresses the requirement that a given amount of revenue must be raised net of subsidies. Taxes are collected on tradable goods at rates $\pi - \pi^*$ and on labor at the rate t , where π^* denotes the fixed vector of world prices of the taxed tradable goods. The government budget constraint is given by:

$$R(\pi, t, u, s) \equiv (\pi - \pi^*)'E_\pi + tE_t - s \geq R^0. \quad (3)$$

⁴See Anderson and Neary (2007) for the trade expenditure function when labor supply is fixed, and for further references.

Here, R^0 represents the government's revenue requirement, to fund public goods, repay foreign loans, or for some other purpose which does not directly affect private-sector decisions.

To clarify the implications of this setup, contrast it with the standard setting in the theory of piecemeal trade policy reform, where it is implicitly assumed that any revenue change is actively lump-sum transferred between private-sector and government budgets. Then the government budget constraint (3) can be solved for the active transfer s . The result is substituted into the private-sector constraint (2) to form the social budget constraint, or balance of trade constraint with the rest of the world: net expenditure by the private sector must be matched by tax revenue less government spending:⁵

$$E(\pi, t, u) = s = (\pi - \pi^*)' E_\pi + t E_t - R^0. \quad (4)$$

Here the government's revenue requirement is not an independent constraint on policy-making because the transfer s adjusts endogenously. This makes a crucial difference for evaluation of tariff reform: equation (4) leads to the standard results of piecemeal trade policy reform, augmented to allow for an exogenous wage tax. (Details are sketched in Appendix A.)

In our setting, by contrast, lump-sum transfers are infeasible, so the gradual reform problem is to determine welfare-improving directions of change in the set of reformable tariffs, equivalent to changes in π , while at the same time not decreasing revenue. One class of reforms takes the wage tax as given and examines tariff reform that raises both welfare and revenue. A more ambitious class of tariff reforms permits the wage tax to vary endogenously in order to maintain government revenue. To maintain revenue exactly, t must change to offset the movement in π . Assuming the government budget constraint is strictly binding, this implies the endogenous wage tax function:

$$t(\pi, u, s, R^0) = \{t : R(\pi, t, u, s) = R^0\}. \quad (5)$$

⁵All vectors are column vectors and a prime denotes a transpose.

1.1 Tariff Changes Only

Differentiating the private budget constraint (2) with t and s fixed shows that real income measured in expenditure units is directly reduced by increases in import prices:

$$E_u du = -E'_\pi d\pi. \quad (6)$$

Similarly differentiating the government budget constraint (3) and using (6) to eliminate $E_u du$ yields:

$$dR = R_\pi d\pi + R_u du = (1 - R_I)E'_\pi d\pi + [(\pi - \pi^*)'E_{\pi\pi} + tE_{t\pi}] d\pi. \quad (7)$$

The coefficient of real income in the first term depends on $R_I \equiv R_u/E_u = (\pi - \pi^*)'E_{\pi u}/E_u + tE_{tu}/E_u$, which denotes the derivative of revenue with respect to nominal income given the tax structure. We will assume, as is natural, that this is positive and less than one. A host of arguments has been raised in the literature on piecemeal policy reform to defend this presumption; the term $1 - R_I$ is the ‘‘Hatta (1977) normality term’’ or the inverse of the ‘‘shadow price of foreign exchange.’’ Normality suffices, as does homotheticity or a standard stability condition.⁶ Violation of the presumption would be perverse indeed, since it would imply that a gift of foreign exchange to the private sector, enabling a rise in real income, would at constant prices π either reduce government revenue or raise it by more than the value of the gift. In the presence of lump-sum redistribution, moreover, a negative value of R_I would imply that gifts make the economy worse off.

Comparing the first term on the right-hand side of (7) with (6) reveals the tension between private and public spending: more for the government means less for the private sector. The second term can, however, be positive by enough to offset the first term, permitting a rise in both real income and revenue. This possibility arises from reforms that remove inefficiency

⁶In the homothetic case, $R_I = R_u/E_u$ reduces to $T^a \pi' e_\pi / e - T^w (w + t) g_w / e$, the average tax rate on goods and employment as a share of total expenditure.

in the tariff structure. Below, we characterize such possibilities in terms of tariff moments.

1.2 The Marginal Cost of Funds

When we turn to consider choices between different forms of taxation, it is useful to express our results in terms of the Marginal Cost of Funds of different instruments. Consider the cost to the government of supporting the representative agent's real income u with a hypothetical subsidy ds when the wage tax t changes to raise revenue R by one dollar. From the private-sector budget constraint (2), the hypothetical compensating subsidy is $ds = E_t dt$; while from the public-sector budget constraint (3), the required change in the wage tax is $dt = \frac{1}{R_t} dR$. Combining gives $ds/dR = E_t/R_t$ which we define as μ^t , the Marginal Cost of raising a dollar of public Funds using instrument t . Similar operations define the marginal cost of funds for every other instrument such as π_i . That is, one at a time, raise a marginal dollar of public funds with typical instrument π_i , implicitly requiring a tax change $1/R_{\pi_i}$, with compensating hypothetical subsidy ds to the representative agent of μ_i^π , equal to E_{π_i}/R_{π_i} .

What is the likely magnitude of the marginal cost of funds? We assume that μ^t is positive, since otherwise the problem of how to cut tariffs without reducing revenue is trivial; the numerator E_t is the tax base, while the denominator R_t is positive provided the economy lies below the maximum of the Laffer Curve. From (3), the full expression for R_t is:

$$R_t = E_t + (\pi - \pi^*)' E_{\pi t} + t E_{tt}. \quad (8)$$

Recalling that E is concave in t , the direct substitution effect of a wage tax on labor supply E_{tt} tends to reduce R_t below E_t , and so encourages a value for the social cost of funds greater than one. This could be offset by the cross effect: if leisure is a complement for imports, so $E_{\pi t}$ is positive, a rise in t increases tariff revenue, encouraging a value for the social cost of funds less than one. However, values greater than one are typically found in applied studies and must be considered the norm. Similar considerations, *mutatis mutandis*, apply to the

magnitude of the marginal cost of funds of any other tax instrument.

1.3 Tariff Changes Compensated by Wage Tax Changes

Our second approach to tariff reform ensures revenue neutrality because tariff changes are compensated by wage tax changes. Thus we analyze reform of tariffs compensated by changes in t that solve the government budget constraint for given R^0 . This implies a reduced-form social budget constraint, which results from substituting the endogenous wage tax function (5) into the private-sector budget constraint (2):

$$E[\pi, t(\pi, u, s, R^0), u] - s = 0 \quad (9)$$

The differential of this can be rewritten by replacing t_π with $-R_\pi/R_t$ and t_u with $-R_u/R_t$ and using μ^t :

$$(1 - \mu^t R_I) E_u du = -\mu^t dR^0 - (E'_\pi - \mu^t R'_\pi) d\pi. \quad (10)$$

Including a change in the revenue requirement R^0 shows that the term $1 - \mu^t R_I$ is the shadow price of foreign exchange modified for the endogeneity of the wage tax. As in Section 1.1, we assume this is positive: a negative value would imply that a gift to the economy, permitting a cut in the revenue requirement R^0 , would lower real income.⁷ Factoring out the scalar elements of E_π , and using $\mu_i^\pi \equiv E_{\pi_i}/R_{\pi_i}$, (10), with $dR^0 = 0$, becomes:

$$(1 - \mu^t R_I) E_u du = - \sum_i (1 - \mu^t / \mu_i^\pi) E_{\pi_i} d\pi_i. \quad (11)$$

The intuitive implication of (11) is that reducing all elements π_i associated with $\mu_i^\pi > \mu^t$ and increasing all elements for which the inequality is reversed will produce a surplus. This in turn causes an increase in real income, provided the shadow price of foreign exchange is

⁷Empirically, requiring $1 - \mu^t R_I$ to be positive is more demanding than before, given that μ^t is likely to be greater than one. On the other hand, empirical studies typically find relatively low values of the labor supply elasticity, hence low μ^t is plausible.

positive.

Equation (10), with $dR^0 = 0$, can alternatively be written as follows:

$$(1 - \mu^t R_I) E_u du = [(\mu^t - 1) E'_\pi + \mu^t (\pi - \pi^*) E_{\pi\pi} + \mu^t t E_{t\pi}] d\pi. \quad (12)$$

This provides an insightful contrast with the usual results in the theory of piecemeal tariff reform when lump-sum taxes are available (see, for example, equation (32) in Appendix A), and it clearly reduces to them when labor supply is fixed so a wage tax is effectively lump-sum ($\mu_t = 1$ and $E_{t\pi} = 0$). However, saying more about the tariff reform problem using (12) as it stands is challenging. Instead, we turn in the next section to extend the tools of Anderson and Neary (2007) to the present context.

2 Tariff Moments and Tariff Reform

The tariff reform problem is to advise on directions of change of tariffs from initial values. Full optimization is not feasible by assumption.

Assume, plausibly, that the analyst has at least some information about the economy. We seek to characterize cones of welfare-improving tariff reform that are sufficient under limited information. The information set assumed here includes the knowledge that the economy has a price-taking representative agent with convex technology and preferences, and that there are no distortions other than those of taxes. The information set includes some additional knowledge about the specification of technology and preferences and about the structure of taxes and their implications that is spelled out below. This knowledge may include whether tariffs are on average over or under-utilized, in the sense that a uniform absolute tariff change (one that preserves domestic relative prices) has a marginal cost μ^T which is greater or less than the alternative source of funds μ^t .

A diagram illustrating the case of two goods subject to tariffs aids intuition. In Figure 1, initial tariffs are such that domestic prices equal π^A . Optimal revenue tariffs imply Ramsey-




Figure 1: The Tariff Reform Problem

A is the initial point, F is free trade, R is the Ramsey optimum

optimal prices π^R . These are associated with points A and R respectively. The locus drawn through point A is an iso-welfare contour, implicitly defined by the social budget constraint (9) for given (u^0, s, R^0) . As drawn, the locus encloses a convex set of π 's and is upward-sloping at A , but these properties are neither necessary to the analysis nor particularly to be expected. The tariff reform problem is to devise rules which will improve welfare under limited information; directions of change for π that bring the economy closer to R in the sense of attaining a higher iso-welfare contour.⁸

2.1 Tariff Moments

The key intermediate step in the analysis of trade reform is a decomposition of the effect of tariff changes into their effect on various moments of the distribution of tariffs. Anderson and Neary (2007) examine welfare-improving directions of tariff reform in the case where revenue considerations are unimportant, so $\mu^t = 1$. Here we extend their moments decomposition technique to the revenue tariff problem. Table 1 summarizes the notation.

⁸Atkinson and Stern (1974) show in a similar setting that, as the permitted level of lump-sum taxation rises, there exists a path from R to the first-best optimum F along which welfare increases steadily. Here we are interested in characterizing the desired direction from an arbitrary initial point A towards R .

Name	Symbol	Structure
Government Revenue Function	$R(\pi, t, s, u)$	$(\pi - \pi^*)' E_\pi(\pi, t, u) + t E_t(\cdot) - s$
Substitution Effects Matrix	$E_{\pi\pi}$	Negative definite
Substitution Weights Matrix	S	$-\frac{\pi E_{\pi\pi} \pi}{\pi' E_{\pi\pi} \pi}$ positive definite, $\iota' S \iota = 1$
Generalized Mean Tariff	\bar{T}	$\iota' S T$
Trade-weighted Average Tariff	T^a	$E'_\pi \bar{\pi} T / E'_\pi \pi$
Cross-weighted Average Tariff	T^θ	$E_{t\pi}(\pi - \pi^*) / E_{t\pi} \pi$
Own Elasticity	η	$-\pi' E_{\pi\pi} \pi / \pi' E_\pi$
Cross Elasticity	θ	$E_{t\pi} \pi / E_t$
Employment Elasticity	ω	$-d \ln E_t / d \ln(w + t)$
MCF for wage tax	μ^t	$E_t / R_t = (1 - T^w \omega + T^\theta \theta)^{-1}$
MCF for scalar T reform	μ^T	$E'_\pi \pi / R'_\pi \pi = (1 - \eta \bar{T} + \lambda^t \theta)^{-1}$

Table 1: Notation

We begin by defining “tariff factors,” tariffs measured as a proportion of domestic prices: $T_i \equiv (\pi_i - \pi_i^*) / \pi_i$. These can be written in matrix form as: $T = \bar{\pi}^{-1}(\pi - \pi^*)$, where $\bar{\pi}$ denotes a diagonal matrix formed from the vector π . The analog for the wage tax is $T^w \equiv t / (w + t)$. Following Anderson and Neary (2007), we define the generalized mean tariff \bar{T} and the generalized variance of tariffs V as a weighted average and variance respectively of the tariff factors T :

$$\bar{T} \equiv \iota' S T = \pi' E_{\pi\pi}(\pi - \pi^*) / \pi' E_{\pi\pi} \pi, \quad V \equiv (T - \iota \bar{T})' S (T - \iota \bar{T}) \quad (13)$$

The weights are normalized elements of the substitution effects matrix $E_{\pi\pi}$: the positive definite weighting matrix S is defined by $S \equiv -\bar{s}^{-1} \bar{\pi} E_{\pi\pi} \bar{\pi}$, where $\bar{s} \equiv -\pi' E_{\pi\pi} \pi > 0$ is the normalization coefficient for the substitution effects matrix, and ι is a vector of ones. The normalization implies that $\iota' S \iota = 1$. The focus in the present paper on the revenue constraint and endogenous labor supply requires that we define two further average tariffs: the trade-weighted average tariff and the cross-weighted average tariff, where the weights

are the cross-elasticities between leisure and each good:

$$T^a \equiv E'_{\pi} \underline{\pi} T / E'_{\pi} \pi, \quad T^{\theta} \equiv E_{t\pi} (\pi - \pi^*) / E_{t\pi} \pi \quad (14)$$

As for changes in trade policy, we define the changes in tariff moments as Laspeyres-type approximations, using initial trade shares and responses as weights:

$$d\bar{T} \equiv \iota' S dT, \quad dV \equiv 2T' S dT - 2\bar{T} d\bar{T}, \quad dT^a \equiv E'_{\pi} \underline{\pi} dT / E'_{\pi} \pi, \quad dT^{\theta} \equiv E_{t\pi} d\pi / E_{t\pi} \pi, \quad (15)$$

where $dT \equiv \underline{\pi}^{-1} d\pi$. Except for the trade-weighted average tariff, all these generalized moments and their changes are complicated functions of consumer and producer behavior. Nonetheless, they summarize the implications of the full matrices of aggregate demand and supply responses in an intuitive and parsimonious way. They are analogous to the shadow price of foreign exchange: typically it was thought necessary to make strong assumptions about income effects, such as requiring all goods to be normal, before Hatta (1977) showed how they could be summarized in a convenient way.⁹ In the same way, the generalized tariff moments provide a set of sufficient statistics for the substitution effects in the economy. As we will show, analytic expressions in changes in generalized means and variances help formulate linear tariff change rules that guarantee welfare improvement even in the absence of detailed information about substitution effects.

Notice that whereas $T^a > 0$ so long as imports are not heavily subsidized, the generalized mean tariff need not necessarily be positive even with all positive tariffs. Being able to assume a positive generalized mean turns out to be important for our approach to the assessment of the welfare implications of tariff changes when information is limited. Fortunately, a negative generalized mean is an unlikely perverse case.¹⁰ In the remainder of this paper we assume

⁹Foster and Sonnenschein (1970) assumed that all goods were normal, which we now know is far stronger than needed to obtain results about piecemeal policy reform. Bruno (1972) seems to have been the first to appreciate that income effects could be summarized in a single parameter.

¹⁰Anderson and Neary (2007) show that \bar{T} is positive if all tariff rates are equal or if all goods subject to tariffs are general-equilibrium substitutes for the numéraire (which, with variable labor supply, must be

that the generalized mean tariff is positive.

An important special case of preferences and technology provides a very illuminating and convenient illustration of the generalized moments and their relationship to the trade-weighted moments. Suppose that the group of goods with price vector π enters preferences and technology separably:¹¹

Definition 1. The trade expenditure function is implicitly separable in goods and leisure when: $E(\pi, t, u) = F[\phi(\pi, u), t, u]$, where the function $\phi(\pi, u)$ is concave and homogeneous of degree one in π .

Separability is a very common assumption in applied work with both econometric and simulation modeling. Appendix B shows that all our present argument can be applied to any separable group while more general substitution possibilities continue to govern relationships between groups. The payoff to assuming separability is that it implies that both generalized average tariffs equal the observable trade-weighted average tariff:

Proposition 1. *Under separable preferences or technology as defined above, both the generalized mean tariff and the cross-weighted average tariff are equal to the trade-weighted average tariff: $\bar{T} = T^\theta = T^a$. The second result also holds if either one of preferences or technology is separable in goods and leisure.*

Proof From the definition of \bar{T} :

$$\bar{T} = -\bar{s}^{-1} \pi' E_{\pi\pi} (\pi - \pi^*). \quad (16)$$

For the separable case, using the homogeneity of ϕ , $\pi' E_{\pi\pi} = F_\phi \pi' \phi_{\pi\pi} + F_{\phi\phi} \pi' \phi_\pi \phi'_\pi = F_{\phi\phi} \phi \phi'_\pi$,

extended to general-equilibrium substitutes for the composite commodity made up of the numéraire and leisure). With a zero wage tax, negative \bar{T} implies $\mu^T < 1$, hence welfare increases with a rise in the tariff because marginal dead weight loss is actually negative. Replacing lump-sum taxes with a uniform absolute rise in tariffs would be welfare-increasing. If exports or imports are heavily subsidized, the perverse case becomes more likely, but this perversity is also likely to show up in a negative value for T^a .

¹¹See Anderson and Neary (1992) for further discussion.

$\bar{s} = -\pi' E_{\pi\pi} \pi = -F_{\phi\phi} \phi^2$, and therefore:

$$\bar{T} = \phi'_\pi (\pi - \pi^*) / \phi = T^a. \quad (17)$$

A similar though slightly more elaborate proof shows that $T^\theta = E_{t\pi} (\pi - \pi^*) / E'_{t\pi} \pi = T^a$. Under separability, the group of goods aggregated in the price index ϕ enter either preferences or technology. In general, $E_{t\pi} = -g_{w\pi} - g_{ww} w_\pi$ and $w_\pi = -(e_{w\pi} - g_{w\pi})(e_{ww} - g_{ww})$. With separability, either $e_{w\phi} = 0$ or $g_{w\phi} = 0$, but in either case $E_{t\pi}$ is proportional to ϕ_π . Then like terms cancel in forming T^θ and the unlike terms give the trade weights. \square

This proposition is a significant generalization of Anderson and Neary (2007), who showed that \bar{T} equals T^a in a special case where tariffed imports were final goods imperfectly substitutable with domestic production, and preferences were CES. Separability is a considerably weaker sufficient condition.¹²

2.2 Tariff Changes Only

With tariff reform restricted to tariff changes only, the task is to find directions of improvement that raise welfare and/or revenue without lowering either one. We reexpress the differentials of the private and government budget constraints (6) and (7) in terms of the generalized moments of the tariff structure:¹³

$$E_u du / E_\pi \pi = -dT^a \quad (18)$$

$$dR / E_\pi \pi = (1 - R_I) dT^a - \eta \left(\frac{1}{2} dV + \bar{T} d\bar{T} \right) + \lambda^t \theta dT^\theta. \quad (19)$$

¹²The CES case also yields a simple observable expression for the generalized variance of tariffs. No such simplification is possible for the much wider class of weakly separable preferences or technology, but none is needed for our purposes.

¹³To derive (19), we use: $(\pi - \pi^*)' E_{\pi\pi} d\pi = T' \underline{\pi} E_{\pi\pi} \underline{\pi} dT = -\bar{s} T' S dT = -\bar{s} \left(\frac{1}{2} dV + \bar{T} d\bar{T} \right) = -\eta \left(\frac{1}{2} dV + \bar{T} d\bar{T} \right) E'_\pi \pi$.

Here we introduce two new elasticities, which summarize the effects of a uniform change in goods prices: $\eta \equiv -\pi' E_{\pi\pi} \pi / E'_\pi \pi = \bar{s} / E'_\pi \pi$ is the own-elasticity of the π group with respect to an equiproportionate change in π ; while $\theta \equiv E_{t\pi} \pi / E_t$ is the cross-elasticity of employment with respect to an equiproportionate change in π . We also use $\lambda^t \equiv t E_t / E'_\pi \pi$ to denote wage-tax revenue relative to the value of imports.

Equations (18) and (19) show how the informational requirements are reduced relative to only five parameters (not counting the easily observable T^a and λ^t): still substantial, but a major economy of information relative to the full matrices needed to understand and calibrate equations (6) and (7). Equation (18) implies that the change in money metric utility as a percent of trade expenditure is equal to minus the change in the trade-weighted average tariff. Equation (19) reveals that revenue must fall with a fall in T^a , unless compensated by changes in the other tariff moments. What type of tariff structure changes can induce both welfare and revenue to rise?¹⁴

Reductions in the generalized variance must always increase revenue, all else equal. Mean-preserving reductions in dispersion are thus attractive if it is feasible to preserve all three means (T^a, \bar{T}, T^θ). When the group of tariff-ridden goods being reformed enters preferences or technology separably, the three first moments are all equal, from Proposition 1. *Then, under separability, cuts in tariff dispersion that preserve the trade-weighted average tariff will raise revenue.*

Anderson and Neary (2007) show that a uniform absolute tariff cut is attractive because it raises both welfare and market access (the value of imports at world prices). Unfortunately, it ordinarily must reduce revenue. The uniform absolute reduction reform, $dT = -\iota d\alpha$, brings about a uniform proportional reduction in domestic prices, $d\pi = -\pi d\alpha$, so imported goods constitute a Hicksian composite commodity. Such a reform leaves dispersion unchanged ($dV = 0$) and reduces all three average tariffs by the same proportion: $dT^a = d\bar{T} = dT^\theta =$

¹⁴In contrast, Anderson and Neary (2007) show that welfare and “market access” (trade volume) are moved in the same direction by changes in \bar{T} but in opposite directions by changes in variance V .

$-\alpha$. Revenue changes by:

$$dR/E'_\pi\pi = -(1 - R_I - \eta\bar{T} + \lambda^t\theta) d\alpha = -(1/\mu^T - R_I) d\alpha. \quad (20)$$

Here we use μ^T to denote the marginal cost of funds of the group of tariff-ridden goods, which, by the composite commodity theorem, can be treated as if it were a single good when prices move equiproportionately:

$$\mu^T \equiv E'_\pi\pi/R'_\pi\pi = (1 - \eta\bar{T} + \lambda^t\theta)^{-1} \quad (21)$$

As discussed in Section 1.2, there is a presumption that the marginal cost of funds is greater than one for each individual good, so it must be considered highly unlikely that this marginal cost of funds of a composite group could be less than one. We also expect R_I , the effect of a unit gift of foreign exchange on government revenue, to lie between zero and one, as discussed in Section 1.1. Given this, the sign of the right-hand side of (20) is ambiguous, although there is a presumption that the direct price effect $1/\mu^T$ outweighs the income effect R_I : uniform absolute reductions ordinarily imply that revenue falls.¹⁵

Pulling together results:

Proposition 2. *(i) Under separability, trade-weighted average preserving cuts in tariff dispersion raise revenue while not harming welfare.*

(ii) Uniform absolute reductions in T raise both welfare and market access but have an ambiguous effect on revenue.

Considering that very large dispersion is common in tariff structures, even in countries that raise a substantial portion of government revenue from tariffs, the proposition implies considerable scope for efficiency improvement from dispersion cuts. Absolute tariff cuts with dispersion constant decrease revenue and this creates a presumption against average tariff

¹⁵In the neighbourhood of zero taxation, $\mu^t = 1$ and $R_I = 0$, implying that quite substantial levels of tariffs and taxes are necessary for revenue to rise.

reductions as part of a reform package when tariff revenue is important (i.e., when tariffs are the only instrument).

2.3 Tariff Reform with Compensating Wage Tax Changes

Tariff reform advice has more scope for efficiency gains when the wage tax t can be changed so as to hold revenue constant. Advice remains problematic because information about the expected values and standard errors of MCF's of the various tariffs and taxes is limited. What rules can be derived which are robust to the analyst's restricted information about the MCF's of individual tariffs?

The method of this paper advances beneficial revenue tariff reform guidelines by applying the tariff moment definitions. Reexpressing equation (10) with $dR^0 = 0$ in terms of tariff moments gives:

$$\frac{1 - \mu^t R_I}{E'_\pi \pi} E_u du = (\mu^t - 1) dT^a - \mu^t \eta (dV/2 + \bar{T} d\bar{T}) + \mu^t \lambda^t \theta dT^\theta. \quad (22)$$

The first term on the right-hand side of (22) is increasing in the trade-weighted average tariff provided that $\mu^t > 1$. This term gives the revenue effect of the tariff change at constant quantities demanded, without substitution effects. The second term gives the effect of tariff changes acting through within-group substitution effects, all multiplied by the own-price elasticity of the composite imported good, η . It is decreasing in the generalized variance and, provided $\bar{T} > 0$, in the generalized mean. The third term gives the cross effect on revenue due to the change in the cross-weighted average tariff T^θ multiplied by the leisure-goods cross-elasticity θ .

What combinations of assumed information and rules for tariff changes are likely to improve welfare in this case? The general expression (22) provides useful clues. First, variance reduction is useful, all else equal. Second, the uniform absolute reduction reform is once again an important benchmark. Proposition 2 (ii) shows that it usually reduces

revenue. Can a wage-tax increase compensate and still permit a real income gain? In this case equation (22) reduces to:

$$\frac{1 - \mu^t R_I}{E'_\pi \pi} \frac{E_u du}{d\alpha} = 1 - \mu^t / \mu^T \quad (23)$$

$$= 1 - \mu^t (1 - \eta \bar{T} + \lambda^t \theta). \quad (24)$$

As discussed in the last section, μ^T , the composite marginal cost of funds of the group of tariff-ridden goods, is presumptively positive. What of μ^t , the marginal cost of funds of the employment tax? Using (8), we can write it in terms of generalized moments as:

$$\mu^t \equiv E_t / R_t = (1 - T^w \omega + T^\theta \theta)^{-1}, \quad (25)$$

where $\omega \equiv -d \ln E_t / d \ln(w + t)$ is the general-equilibrium elasticity of employment with respect to the tax t .¹⁶ As the detail on ω illustrates, general results on the sign of $1 - \mu^t / \mu^T$ are not possible and empirical evidence is sparse.¹⁷ However, it seems plausible that $\mu^t / \mu^T < 1$, a tariff is less efficient than the alternative distortionary tax. For example, this is the finding of Erbil (2004) in a simulation exercise comparing the MCF of trade taxes with consumption taxes for a number of countries. From equation (23), this is all we need to assume to be confident that combining reductions in dispersion with scalar cuts in tariffs offers room for welfare- and revenue-improving reforms that are robust to our very substantial uncertainty about economic structure.

For more general results that can cover more of the complexity of actual tariff changes, it is very helpful to consider a more general radial tariff reform rule introduced by Anderson

¹⁶In general equilibrium, the wage tax affects employment both directly and by changing the wage. Applying the implicit function theorem to the labor-market clearing condition $e_w(\pi, w, u) = g_w(\pi, w + t, v)$ yields $dw/dt = g_{ww}/(e_{ww} - g_{ww})$. A rise in the wage tax alters employment $E_t = -g_w$ by $dE_t/dt = -g_{ww}(1 + dw/dt)$. Then $-d \ln E_t / d \ln(w + t) = (w + t)(g_{ww} e_{ww}) / [g_w(e_{ww} - g_{ww})] > 0$ by the concavity of e , convexity of g , and $g_w = -E_t < 0$.

¹⁷An important benchmark is optimality, the solution to the Ramsey problem. This requires that the MCF be equal for all π , and equal to the MCF for the alternative source of tax revenue, in this case the wage tax.

and Neary (2007), $dT = -(T - \beta\iota)d\alpha$. This implies an equiproportionate change in the gap between all tariff rates and an arbitrary uniform tariff rate, denoted by β . A rise in α always lowers variance and will lower any average tariff provided it is greater than β .¹⁸ This general linear path is a combination of uniform absolute and uniform proportional changes in tariffs. It is also a convex combination of uniform absolute tariff changes and trade-weighted mean preserving variance changes.¹⁹ Along the linear path:

$$\frac{1 - \mu^t R_I}{E'_\pi \pi} \frac{E_u du}{d\alpha} = (1 - \mu^t)(T^a - \beta) + \mu^t \eta V + \mu^t [\eta \bar{T}(\bar{T} - \beta) - \lambda^t \theta (T^\theta - \beta)]. \quad (26)$$

Then using $\mu^T > 1$ (so $\eta \bar{T} > \lambda^t \theta$) and additionally supposing that $\bar{T} \geq T^\theta \geq \beta$, the expression in square brackets must be positive. In particular, setting the tariff change rule such that $\beta = T^a$, welfare rises with α whenever $\bar{T} \geq T^\theta \geq T^a = \beta$. Summarizing:

Proposition 3. (i) *Trade-weighted mean-preserving reductions in tariff variance are welfare-improving when $\bar{T} \geq T^\theta \geq T^a$ and $\mu^T > 1$;*

(ii) *Uniform absolute tariff reductions are welfare-improving when $1 < \mu^t < \mu^T$;*

(iii) *Convex combinations of uniform absolute tariff cuts and trade-weighted mean-preserving dispersion cuts, $\beta \leq T^a$, are welfare-improving under the conditions of (i) and (ii).*

Proof: (i) and (ii) have already been proved. To prove (iii), rearrange the right-hand side of (26), dividing by $T^a - \beta > 0$ as

$$1 - \mu^t \left[1 - \eta \bar{T} \frac{\bar{T} - \beta}{T^a - \beta} + \theta T^w \frac{T^\theta - \beta}{T^a - \beta} \right] + \mu^t \eta \frac{V}{(T^a - \beta)}. \quad (27)$$

The square bracket term is smaller than the inverse of μ^T under the conditions of (i) and hence the entire expression is positive under the condition of (ii). \square

The condition $\bar{T} \geq T^\theta \geq T^a$ is problematic, depending on two unobservable average tariffs.

¹⁸ $dT^a = -(T^a - \beta)d\alpha$, and similarly for $d\bar{T}$ and dT^θ ; while $dV = -2Vd\alpha$.

¹⁹ $(T - \beta\iota)d\alpha = [\omega(T - T^a\iota) - (1 - \omega)\delta\iota]d\gamma$ where $d\gamma = d\alpha/\omega$ and $\beta = T^a + \delta(1 - \omega)/\omega$ for $1 \geq \omega \geq 0$. The scalar δ can be positive or negative.

However, it is guaranteed if separability holds, from Proposition 1. It follows that Proposition 3 holds with separability and $1 < \mu^t < \mu^T$. In the future, more insight into the behavior of the unobservables will be generated by examining simulations with a variety of models and data for different countries.

The separable case shows that mere substitutability is not important in ranking \bar{T} and T^θ relative to T^a . Substitution effects within classes of tariff-ridden goods are irrelevant, complementarities are admissible along with highly asymmetric substitution effects. For example, it is natural to think of an aggregate like clothing as a goods class, entering preferences separably but having complex substitution effects within class: shirts and trousers may be complements while silk and chambray shirts may be substitutes. What does matter for the ranking is that nonseparability admits varying substitution effects between tariff-ridden goods and the numeraire. Using the standard algebra of covariance, $\bar{T} - T^a = Cov(\omega, T) - Cov(\omega^a, T)$, where the covariance uses arithmetic (equal) weights. The generalized weights ω differ from the trade share weights ω^a only if the goods are non-separable and $\bar{T} < T^a$ with non-separability if numeraire substitution effect shares ω are more sensitive to high tariffs than are trade shares ω^a .

Proposition 3 can readily be extended to many classes of separable tariff-ridden goods. Let T^{ka} denote the trade-weighted average tariff in separable goods class k , while T^a continues to denote the overall trade-weighted average tariff and \bar{T} continues to denote the overall generalized mean tariff.

Proposition 4. *Welfare improves with:*

- (i) *trade-weighted mean preserving dispersion cuts within separable goods classes;*
- (ii) *any convex combination of such dispersion cuts and a uniform absolute tariff change across as well as within classes that decreases tariffs when they are over-utilized or increases them when they are under-utilized .*

Proposition 4 is proved in the Appendix. The key element is that, from Proposition 1, the condition of Proposition 3 is met under separability. The proposition is quite useful because

separability is a ubiquitous assumption in applied work. Faced with some ten thousand tariff lines, aggregation is inevitable for any econometric or simulation work. The proposition assures the analyst that trade-weighted average preserving dispersion cuts within classes are welfare-improving without detailed knowledge of substitution effects (either parameter values or specification) within goods classes. National tariff schedules are full of dispersion in detailed product classes, so there is a lot of room in practice for beneficial cuts. It is worth noting that under separability, a trade-weighted mean-preserving tariff dispersion cut improves welfare strictly by raising government revenue; trade expenditure remains constant under this reform.

Note finally that, from (21) and (25), the separable case where $\bar{T} = T^\theta = T^a$ yields directly useful expressions for μ^T and μ^t that can be used to calculate the relative under- or over-utilization of tariffs:

$$\mu^T = (1 - \eta T^a + \lambda^t \theta)^{-1}, \quad \mu^t = (1 - T^w \omega + T^a \theta)^{-1} \quad (28)$$

T^a , λ^t and T^w are observable, so it is relatively easy to test the sensitivity of μ^t/μ^T to alternative values of the elasticities η , θ and ω which are not known with certainty.

2.4 How Over-Sufficient Are the Conditions?

Clearly the conditions derived so far are only sufficient, and additional restrictions on either the structure of the economy or the type of trade reform permitted would allow some strengthening of them. Specialization to the CES case with zero cross-effects between goods and leisure ($\theta = 0$) is insightful since in this simple but canonical setting the marginal cost of funds for each individual tariff can be derived independently of all others:²⁰

$$\mu_i^\pi = [1 - \eta T^a - \sigma(T_i - T^a)]^{-1}. \quad (29)$$

²⁰In the CES case, $\phi_{ij} = \sigma(-\delta_{ij} + w_j)w_i \frac{\phi}{\pi_i \pi_j}$.

The CES expression (29) for the marginal cost of funds reveals that the focus of Propositions 3 and 4 on convex combinations of mean-preserving tariff cuts and dispersion-preserving mean cuts does indeed capture all the relevant characteristics of welfare-improving revenue tariff reform which can be guaranteed without full knowledge of substitution effects. If exact values of η and σ are assumed to be known, it is of course possible to improve welfare with tariff reforms outside the cones based on (29).²¹ As substitution possibilities range more widely beyond the CES, more welfare-improving revenue tariff reforms can be found which are not within the cones of Propositions 2 and 3. But again, showing that these reforms raise welfare depends on information that this paper assumes, realistically, that the analyst is unlikely ever to have with any certainty.

Note that the CES expression sheds light on the esoteric possibility that some tariffs may actually have a marginal cost of funds less than one. From (29), the necessary and sufficient condition for $\mu_i^\pi < 1$ is $(1 - \eta/\sigma)T^a > T_i$. The sufficient condition requires either that $\eta/\sigma < 1$, substitution elasticities within the separable group exceed substitution elasticities between that group and all other goods, or that good i is subject to an import subsidy, so $T_i < 0$. Normally neither condition would be met.

2.5 The Desirability of Dispersion Cuts

Further analysis of the desirability of trade-weighted mean-preserving dispersion cuts is useful, since it seems to argue for uniformity in contrast to the intuition of the Ramsey principle. The sufficiency condition $\bar{T} \geq T^a$ appears to be puzzlingly powerful.

Returning to Figure 1, the ray OR through the Ramsey optimal tariff point R divides the domestic price space into half spaces. Starting at point R , draw a mean-preserving line to the uniform tariff ray OF . For points on this line between the uniform tariff ray

²¹In the CES case the half space of welfare-improving reforms is defined by tariffs such that $\{\iota - [\mu^t(1 - \eta T^a)\iota - \mu^t\sigma(T - T^a\iota)]\}'d\pi < 0$. The condition that $\mu^t/\mu^T > 1$ is equivalent to $\mu^t(1 - \eta T^a) < 1$. Mean-preserving dispersion cuts reduce government costs, dispersion-preserving mean cuts (uniform absolute cuts) reduce government costs, convex combinations of these also reduce costs. But many other cuts lie in the half space below the constraint.

OF and the optimal tariff ray OR , trade-weighted mean preserving dispersion increases are welfare-improving. For points in the space below ray OR , dispersion increases are welfare decreasing. If the cone FOR is small, the World Bank intuition about the desirability of dispersion reduction holds in some sense for most of the tariff space.

Next, consider the initial tariffs A , lying on an iso-utility locus as shown. The line labeled $dT^a = 0$ gives the mean-preserving tariff change path. As drawn, decreases in dispersion raise welfare, implying $\bar{T} > T^a$. A line tangent to the iso-utility locus at point A represents the situation where $V + \bar{T}(\bar{T} - T^a) = 0$. If the locus $dT^a = 0$ is steeper than the tangent line to G^A at A , dispersion reductions lower welfare.

With separability, $\bar{T} = T^a$, hence welfare rises for mean-preserving changes in dispersion. This implies that the Ramsey-optimal tariff is uniform in the separable case (Guesnerie (1995)); i.e., point R lies on OF . Extending separability to multiple classes as in Proposition 4, uniformity of tariffs within classes is optimal. This benchmark case suggests that optimal departures from uniformity may be small for a fairly wide class of reasonable general equilibrium structures.

The desirability of dispersion cuts becomes less mysterious when we recall that the linear reform rule restricts outcomes relative to the starting point. The full optimum is not attainable. The optimal tariff structure implied by the linear reform rule $dT = (T - \beta\iota)d\alpha$ is, for mean-preserving dispersion changes $\beta = T^a$, consistent with $V = -\bar{T}(\bar{T} - T^a)$. Figure 2 illustrates a case where the mean-preserving dispersion cut line AU is associated with increases in welfare relative to u^A for each point on the path to the uniform tariff ray OF . Nevertheless, the full optimal tariff point R is non-uniform and yields still higher welfare.²² Moreover, there is a best tariff subject to the linear rule and the initial condition T^A which lies somewhere on the path from A to U , and this tariff is non-uniform unless it lies at U . $\bar{T} < T^a$ is necessary for a movement from A to U not to raise welfare relative to u^A for each point on the path.

²²The Ramsey-optimal tariff vector is given by $T^0 = \frac{\mu^t - 1}{\mu^t s} S^{-1} \underline{\pi} E_\pi$, where all variables are evaluated at the Ramsey optimum.




Figure 2: Welfare-Improving Dispersion Cuts

On path AU , trade-weighted-mean-preserving tariff cuts raise welfare

On path AO , uniform absolute tariff cuts first raise welfare, then lower it

3 Many Households

The preceding expressions extend with appropriate modification to the case of many households. For simplicity, assume that zero cross effects obtain, $\theta = 0$. The government budget constraint continues to hold using E for the aggregate trade expenditure function and its derivatives while E^h denotes the individual household h trade expenditure function.

To economize on notation, we express the change in welfare in terms of the hypothetical subsidy that must be made to each agent h to maintain their real income. By definition $ds = \sum_h ds^h$, the aggregate subsidy is the sum of subsidies needed to maintain each agent's real income. The budget constraint for agent (household) h yields:

$$ds^h = E_\pi^h \cdot \pi dT^{a,h} + E_t^h(w + t)dT^w, \quad (30)$$

where $T^{a,h}$ is the trade-weighted average tariff using the trade weights of agent h . dT^w is endogenously generated from the government revenue constraint to compensate for the exogenous tariff changes. Solving that aggregate constraint as before, substituting into the

equation above and rearranging yields:

$$ds^h = E_\pi^h \cdot \pi dT^{a,h} - \left(\frac{E_t^h}{E_t} E_\pi \cdot \pi \right) \mu^t dT^a - \left(\frac{E_t^h}{E_t} E_\pi \cdot \pi \right) \mu^t [\eta dV/2 + \bar{T} d\bar{T} - T^\omega \theta dT^\theta]. \quad (31)$$

Summing over households h , the first two terms cancel out. The condition that reform be beneficial in the aggregate (representative agent) case is that the third term be negative. Propositions 3 and 4 apply.

The potential for individual loss is confined to the deviation due to the balance of the first two terms. Agents can differ in their tastes for work vs. consumption, generating differences in the aggregate weights attached to the average tariff differentials, and they can differ in their consumption patterns within the tariffed goods bundle when faced with the same price vectors. The latter results in $dT^{a,h} \neq dT^a$ while the former results in $E_\pi^h \cdot \pi \neq (E_t^h/E_t)E_\pi \cdot \pi$.

What minimal information is needed to specify welfare-improving rules for each household (Pareto superior rules)? Tariffs are widely levied on intermediate goods. In this case there is no household-specific weighting, $T^{ai} = T^a$, so dispersion cuts are Pareto-superior. As for final goods, assume that imported goods in a separable goods class have no domestic perfect substitute, and that household expenditure patterns E_π^h are observable. The former is a widely used empirical assumption because the perfect substitutes assumption yields implications wildly at variance with the trade data. The observability of household expenditure patterns is a more problematic assumption but it is satisfied for a number of countries.

Under these assumptions, the β^h parameters can be set equal to the household level trade-weighted average tariff $T^{a,h}$ to implement the mean preserving dispersion cut: $dT^h = (T - T^{a,h})d\alpha$. The mechanism is a uniform deviation from the common tariff cut rule for each household: $dT^h - dT = (T^{a,h} - T^a)\iota d\alpha$. All tariffs are changed according to $dT = (T - T^{a,\iota})d\alpha$. Implementation of the household specific deviations could presumably take place at the retail level (as with food stamps or senior citizen discounts), supplemented by some governmental identification system. Doing so, for example, all clothing tariffs change

according to the common rule, then each household receives or pays its household specific deviation $(T^{a,h} - T^a)d\alpha$. Alternatively, the implementation could be done through income tax credits. To avoid shirking, the common rule could be set around the highest $T^{a,h}$, so that all households with lower average tariffs receive a rebate.

In this scheme of tariffs, the real income of each household is maintained, the individual variation of β^h is revenue neutral since $\sum_h (T^{a,h} - T^a)\pi' E_\pi^h = 0$, and the government revenue will rise due to the revenue-increasing cut in dispersion. Thus dispersion cuts are a Pareto-superior reform. As for uniform absolute cuts in tariffs, the requirement of Propositions 2 and 3 that ‘tariffs are over (under) utilized’ becomes extremely stringent because it requires that the marginal cost of funds of the alternative revenue source be less (more) than *each* individual agent’s marginal cost of funds of tariffs. This is seldom likely to appear plausible to analysts evaluating potential reforms.

The implication is that the Pareto-superiority of dispersion cuts holds in the many household case under the separability assumption and zero cross effects, understanding that trade-weighted average tariffs must be calculated and applied at the household level. The separability assumption is plausible for some goods classes and not for others. Still, this discussion suggests the surprisingly wide desirability of dispersion cuts.

4 Conclusion

This paper has set out cones of welfare-improving trade reform that permit confident policy advice despite the (assumed partial) ignorance of analysts about the ‘true’ structure of the economy. Dispersion reducing trade reform is surprisingly widely beneficial: whenever households have implicitly separable preferences with respect to the same partitions of goods, dispersion of tariffs within separable groups is inefficient. Cuts in average tariffs are efficient when the marginal cost of funds of such tariffs is greater than the marginal cost of funds of alternative revenue sources. Convex combinations of uniform absolute cuts and mean-

preserving dispersion cuts are beneficial under these conditions.

Appendices

A Piecemeal Policy Reform with Lump-Sum Transfers

Differentiating the balance of trade constraint, equation (4), yields:

$$(1 - R_I)E_u du = -dR^0 + [(\pi - \pi^*)'E_{\pi\pi} + tE_{t\pi}]d\pi + [(\pi - \pi^*)'E_{\pi t} + tE_{tt}]dt \quad (32)$$

where R_I , the income responsiveness of revenue, is defined in Section 1.1. The coefficient of the change in real income, $1 - R_I$, is the shadow price of foreign exchange discussed there. Assuming it is positive, the right-hand-side terms in (32) lead to the standard results of piecemeal tariff reform, as extended by Anderson and Neary (2007), and allowing in addition for a labor tax.

B Proof of Proposition 4

The separable case gives rise to useful simplifications of the model. Here the logic is extended to many separable classes.

Suppose that the tariff-ridden group of goods forms an implicitly separable class in the trade expenditure function: $E(\pi, p, \pi_0, u) = F[\phi(\pi, u), p, \pi_0, u]$, where ϕ is concave and homogeneous of degree one in π . When imported goods form separable classes indexed by k , such as $\eta^k(\pi^k)$, the logic of the text yields $\bar{T}^k = T^{ak}$ with the natural extension of notation. Mean-preserving dispersion reduction is desirable within classes. When combined with overall uniform tariff change, the tariff change policy rule is given by

$$dT^k = (T^k - \beta^k \iota^k) d\alpha, \forall k \quad (33)$$

where ι is understood to be the vector of ones with dimension appropriate to goods class

k and β^k is a scalar for goods class k . The combination of trade-weighted mean preserving change with uniform absolute change overall requires $\beta^k = T^{ak} + \beta$. As for overall mean tariffs, we define $T^a = \sum \omega_k^a T^{ak}$ where $\omega_k^a = E_{\eta^k} \eta^k / \sum E_{\eta^k} \eta^k$, the trade weights for the classes of imports. The generalized mean overall tariff is defined by $\bar{T} = \sum \omega_k T^{ak}$ where the generalized weights are defined as in the text, but using the price aggregators η^k as the individual prices.

Define the row vector $b' \equiv \{\beta^1 \iota^1, \dots, \beta^K \iota^K\}$. The trade-weighted average of b is $b^a = T^a + \beta$, while the generalized average of b is $\bar{b} = \bar{T} + \beta$. Applying the rule (33) to evaluate its effect on the cost of supporting real income yields:

$$\frac{dG}{d\alpha} = (1 - \mu^t)(T^a - b^a)E'_\pi \pi + \mu^t \bar{s} \{V + \bar{T}(\bar{T} - \bar{b}) - Cov(T, b)\}.$$

Here, Cov denotes the generalized covariance $(T - \bar{T})'S(b - \bar{b})$. In the separable case with b constructed as given, the covariance is equal to zero. Covariation within class is obviously equal to zero because the elements of b within class do not vary. Between classes, the class-mean-preserving element of β^k implies no change in price aggregates while the mean shift element of β^k implies a uniform shift which gives no variation. Applying the other implications of the structure of b yields

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dG}{d\alpha} &= -\beta(1 - \mu^t)E'_\pi \pi + \mu^t \bar{s} \bar{T} \{V/\bar{T} - \beta\} \\ &= -E'_\pi \pi \left[(\mu^t/\mu^T - \mu^t) V/\bar{T} + \beta (1 - \mu^t/\mu^T) \right]. \end{aligned}$$

The substitutions from the first to the second line also uses $\bar{s}\bar{T}/\pi'E_\pi = 1 - 1/\mu^T$ and then simplifies. When $\lambda/\mu^T < 1$, $dG/d\alpha > 0$ when $\beta < 0$. This is the case of uniform tariff increases combined with trade-weighted mean-preserving dispersion increases, so such reductions improve welfare. Thus we have proved Proposition 4.

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