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Household Nash Equilibrium with Voluntarily Contributed Public Goods.

Abstract:

We study noncooperative models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods. We focus on interior equilibria in which neither agent is bound by non negativity constraints, establishing the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. While adding-up and homogeneity hold, negativity and symmetry properties are generally violated. We derive the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix, and show that it can be decomposed into the sum of a symmetric and negative semide...

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Volume:
226
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2005-01-01
URN:
uuid:ca5eee0a-0c92-4d33-ab05-59c734e102ec
Local pid:
ora:1265
Language:
English

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