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What Really Matters in Auction Design.

Abstract:: The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (we discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles), and the Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions may often perform better. However, everything depends on the details of ...
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APA Style

Klemperer, P. (2000). What Really Matters in Auction Design. (Vol. 2581). CEPR.

MLA Style

Klemperer, P. What Really Matters in Auction Design. CEPR, 2000.

Chicago Style

Klemperer, P. 2000. “What Really Matters in Auction Design.” C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. CEPR.
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Bibliographic Details

Publisher:: CEPR
Host title:: C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Series:: C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Volume:: 2581
Publication date:: 2000-01-01
Paper number:: 2581

Item Description

Language:: English
UUID:: uuid:c9eca3a7-80a9-4b2c-b714-b0f64256a0e6
Local pid:: oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11586
Deposit date:: 2011-08-16

Terms of use

Copyright date:: 2000

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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