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Journal article

Insider trading, costly monitoring, and managerial incentives

Abstract:: We derive conditions under which permitting manager “insiders” to trade on personal account increases the equilibrium level of output and the welfare of shareholders. These increases are produced by two effects of insider trading. First, insider trading impounds information about hidden managerial actions into asset prices. This impounding of information allows shareholders to make better personal portfolio-allocation decisions. Second, allowing insider trading can induce managers to increase...
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APA Style

Noe, T., & Hu, J. (2001). Insider trading, costly monitoring, and managerial incentives.

MLA Style

Noe, T., and J. Hu. Insider Trading, Costly Monitoring, and Managerial Incentives. 2001.

Chicago Style

Noe, T, and J Hu. 2001. “Insider Trading, Costly Monitoring, and Managerial Incentives.”
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+ Hu, J More by this author

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Bibliographic Details

Publication date:: 2001-01-01

Item Description

UUID:: uuid:c7dc9c9d-9cde-464f-8628-9bd98a8ad9b6
Local pid:: oai:eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk:1122
Deposit date:: 2011-11-10

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Copyright date:: 2001

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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