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Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment.

Abstract:

The employment relationship with employees' ability and their actions, both private information (thus combining adverse selection with moral hazard), is modeled as a repeated game with self-enforcing contracts being perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibria. Under termination contracts, the equilibrium contract structure consists of a hierarchy of ranks, finite in number even though ability is continuous. Reputation acts as an effective device for worker discipline without the need for involuntary une...

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Journal:
Journal of Political Economy More from this journal
Volume:
96
Publication date:
1988-01-01
ISSN:
0022-3808
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:c787d606-a826-44eb-9dad-387d07b13eb8
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11039
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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