HIERARCHY AND AUTHORITY AMONG THE HAUSA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PERIOD OF THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

by

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ABSTRACTS

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This thesis concerns hierarchy and authority among the Hausa of Northern Nigeria and Niger with special reference to the period in which the various Hausa city-states were brought under a single rule in the nineteenth century, known as the Sokoto Caliphate. However, contrastive discussion also centres on the pre-jihad (1804 A.D.) Hausa polities and those kingdoms which escaped conquest in the jihad.

The examination of hierarchy and authority in this study focusses on the ways in which the Hausa consistently conceive, in political terms, other non-political institutions in their society. This hierarchical organisation extends to such diverse social institutions as craft associations and associations of youth. In addition, many of the iskoki, 'spirits', are known by their political titles and, as a group, are hierarchically organised. It is through the duplication of titles at many levels of the society and through kinship that hierarchy is expressed.

Detailed Abstract

This thesis concerns hierarchy and authority among the Hausa of Northern Nigeria and Niger with special reference to the period in which the various Hausa city-states were brought under a single rule in the nineteenth century, known as the Sokoto Caliphate. However, contrastive discussion also centres on the pre-jihad (1804 A.D.) Hausa polities and those kingdoms which escaped conquest in the jihad.

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The methodology of this thesis is interdisciplinary. This study combines the approaches of social anthropology, political science, history, and Hausa literature. Use is made of the tremendous body of Hausa oral and written literature, thus allowing the

Hausa themselves to explain their history and social institutions. By combining these complementary methodologies a clear representation of Hausa society can be obtained.

The first chapter focusses on historical issues which have had a bearing on the constitution of the Hausa people and their categories of thought regarding their social and political institutions. There is no attempt in this chapter to reconstruct sequences of events in the Hausa states. The historical issues discussed in this chapter serve to introduce many of the subjects which form the bulk of this study.

Beginning with the foundation myth of the Hausa people and their political institutions, this chapter makes the distinction between the genesis of the people who are Hausa, or speak the Hausa language, and the formation of the early semi-autonomous city-states in Hausaland. Related to this is a discussion of the external and internal migrations of Hausaland and the effects that these have had on Hausa kinship and the constitution of the Hausa people. Finally, this chapter concentrates on the introduction and flourishing of Islam in Hausaland from about the fourteenth century. This aspect of Hausa society is studied within the contexts of commercialism, political centralisation, and the wider Islamic world. These events, which culminated in the jihad and even-

tual Fulani overlordship, illuminate the study of the social institutions of the Hausa speaking peoples today.

The second chapter initiates the detailed discussion of the hierarchical structure of the Hausa political system. Starting with the fact that leadership among the Hausa may be connoted by the term sarki, 'chief/king', this chapter begins to attempt to demonstrate that in addition to denoting the leader of a territorial entity, the term connotes qualities of leadership and authority. This authority is possessed in several spheres simultaneously: political, kinship, and religious. The discussion proceeds, then, to a discussion of the empirical bases of the structure of emirate and kingdom authority for a few select cases. Finally, this chapter focusses on the subjects of succession and deposition of leaders. It is argued here that succession to leadership in the Hausa emirates and kingdoms is predicated on the acceptability to higher authority (in the case of the Caliphate) and the consensus of the ruling families and titled officials. Interference with or negation of these premisses leads to an abrogation of the legitimacy of authority and withdrawal of the necessary consensus.

The third chapter expands further the discussion of the bases of emirate and kingdom authority as well as examines in detail the hierarchy of Hausa officialdom in the form of the numerous titled offices, the

sarautu (sing. sarauta). By paying particular attention to the hierarchical and segmentary aspects of Hausa government, it is possible to comprehend different kinds of social relationships which interact in the political sphere to create and maintain complex political structures. In addition to discussing the centralised aspects of Hausa government, this chapter concentrates on the decentralised aspects of territorial organisation. It is also found that a better understanding of the complexities of the sarauta system can be obtained by examining them as a series of binary oppositions, opposed by virtue of their official functions or historical basis. It begins to become apparent in this chapter that levels of political organisation are 'reflective' in the sense that the organisation of the hierarchical and territorial segments parallel the organisation of the centralised political system.

The fourth chapter deals with the parallel development of hierarchy in social institutions of the talakawa, 'common people'. Starting with a discussion of associations of youth, hierarchically organised, this chapter then proceeds to examine the organisation of craftsmen and, finally, to the spirit pantheon. It is demonstrated that political hierarchy, expressed through titles, is found in spheres of social life other than the political. Hierarchy is the single most important organisational principle in Hausa soc-

iety and is of equal importance in both the Fulani emirates and the Habe kingdoms.

The final chapter focusses on three important aspects of Hausa political institutions and ideology. The first two sections are devoted to examining the influence that Middle Eastern and North African Islam has had on the political institutions of Hausaland and other Sudanic states. Secondly, the notion of balance is examined as an important principle in Hausa political organisation. Balance is achieved and maintained in administrations composed of segments representing different interests. Finally, this chapter turns to examining, in Hausa terms, their own conceptions of hierarchy and authority. These indigenous concepts, together with their perceptions of the structure and processes of their political, economic and social institutions attest to a clear and consistent framework in the ordering of their social lives.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis deals with hierarchy and authority among the Hausa of Northern Nigeria and Niger in their political and other social institutions with special reference to the period after the jihad of A.D. 1804 and before the European incursion at the beginning of this century. This study concentrates on the ways in which 'political' processes are conceived by the Hausa themselves through their oral and written literature. Secondly, it is the perspective of this thesis than an interdisciplinary approach, involving the fields of social anthropology, political science, history, and Hausa literature is necessary to gain a better understanding of the complexities of Hausa society.

Hierarchy in Hausa society is 'reflective'. That is to say, non-political social institutions which are hierarchically organised 'reflect' the hierarchical organisation of the political system. In the political system, especially, kinship is the medium by which hierarchical relations are established and maintained. The importance of establishing the preeminence of the political system is demonstrated in two chapters of this study, delimiting in detail that realm of social activity. It is necessary, first of all, to outline in a wider theoretical discussion,

the ways in which political concepts will be used throughout this text.

For many anthropological specialists since the time of Morgan and Maine in the late nineteenth century, the order of kinship did not theoretically exclude the political order. Far from conceiving kinship and politics as mutually exclusive terms, anthropologists have revealed the complex ties that exist between the two systems and have analysed and developed their theoretical perspective. Acephalous societies, in which there is little differentiation between political functions and institutions, provided early anthropologists with the opportunity to study the relation of kinship and politics. However, in state societies, such as existed in Hausaland, the two orders of relations often seem complementary and antagonistic. The ambiguity which characterises this relationship between kinship and politics is part of the ambiguity which exists within each of these fields, as the differentiation of political roles increases.

At the theoretical level, an ambiguity presents itself as to the field which anthropologists, who specialise in the study of political institutions and processes, devote themselves. Many different interpretations have arisen, as Balandier (1967) points out. First of all, there are definitions of the political sphere based on territorial organisation. This orientation, descending from Morgan, Maine

and Weber emphasises the organisation of the political sphere as a system operating within a delimited area occupied by a political community. This viewpoint is shared by Evans-Pritchard (1950:265) who states that: 'Between local groups, there are relations of a structural order that can be called political...The territorial system of the Nuer is always the dominant variable in its relation to the other social systems.'

However, in traditional states, the mere delimitation of the political sphere within fixed boundaries is not the only criterion within the territorial sphere. The exercise of authority differs with respect to the kind of political system under consideration. Thus, although there is authority exercised within state boundaries, this can range from spheres of influence to direct centralised control. Zaria is an example of the ambiguity of this segmentation. During the nineteenth century, the emirs of Zaria owed allegiance to their overlords in Sokoto, the latter having the authority to appoint or depose certain of the rulers of Zaria. On the other hand, Zaria had within its borders several pagan and Islamic tributary chiefdoms and kingdoms bound in a more or less loose confederation.

Secondly, the political sphere has been studied with respect to the functions it serves. Basically, these functions are to ensure not only defence against ex-

ternal aggression, but also to ensure internal cooperation. This definition of the 'political' relies on the importance of coercive authority. Since Weber (1947:139), anthropologists have focussed on the sanctions imposed on political authority by the use of force. Radcliffe-Brown represents this perspective (1940:xiv): 'In studying political organisation, we have to deal with the maintenance or establishment of social order, within a territorial framework, by the organised exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the possibility of use, of physical force.'[1] In this respect, Radcliffe-Brown overgeneralised the sphere of political authority and overemphasised the role of 'force' within society.

Radcliffe-Brown's formulation was also biased in that it favoured the eufunctional aspects of political institutions. In other words, the political system must have positive consequences for the society and contribute to the maintenance of the social order. In this perspective it is difficult to distinguish political relationships from other social relationships. Functionalist analysis failed in the study of political systems of a complex order because it neglected external pressure and misunderstood internal pressure. As Balandier puts it (1967:191): 'Functionalist analyses ...have failed to recognise the full scope of the pol-

[1] Cf., Southall (1965:120) who agrees with Radcliffe-Brown but states that these sanctions are often remote or indirect.

itical sphere--usually confining it to the internal relations enforced by the state--and its specificity--regarding it as a system of well articulated relations, similar to organic or mechanical systems.' In other words, the concept of political process has been expanded by functionalists so as to make it of limited value.

The third and final approach to the study of political systems which can be outlined here as relevant to the study is concerned not with the functions of political institutions, but with political action. Balandier defines political action as follows (1967:29): 'Social action is political when it seeks to control or influence decisions concerning public affairs, that is policy.' Therefore, a political system is a system of political action.

For M. G. Smith, a major proponent of this schema for political anthropology, political action is to be contrasted with administrative action. The former are those actions oriented towards shaping and influencing policy (1956:47), while the latter are oriented towards the organisation and effectuation of policy or programmes of action. In Smith's sense, then, the political system consists of competition among individuals and groups for this power.

In the case of state societies, such as the political entities of Hausaland,[2] the emphasis must be

[2] Defining a 'state' society following Lowie (1948:317): '...the state embraces the inhabitants of a definite area who acknowledge the legitimacy of force when applied by the individuals whom they accept as rulers or governors.'

shifted from the administrative structure and rituals to the process of policy or decision making. Policy, in all state societies, is determined by the competition between interest groups in the society. That is to say, these groups have shared interests and each seeks to influence policy. In Hausaland, these interest groups are an elite of hereditary and non-hereditary titled offices, or sarautu. Recruitment to the titled offices in Hausaland followed three methods (Lloyd, 1965:75). In the first instance, through the personal favour of the king or other members of the aristocracy, offices are bestowed by reason of friendship, descent or patronage. The second method is through wealth. Finally, offices are granted automatically by virtue of descent or patronage.

Conflict and competition concern power. Power, far from the central function in the definition of political authority is, as has been seen, one way to defend a society against its weaknesses, and maintain its internal order. In this respect, power is inherent in every society. This implies a dissymmetry in social relations, or, hierarchy. This additional factor is necessary owing to the fact that there are no homogeneous societies.

Since Simmel's classic study of conflict and competition (republished 1955), it has been accepted that both of these processes have their integrative sides as well as their disintegrative. In addition, it was Simmel who out-

lined the structural situations differentiating conflict and competition along hierarchical and horizontal axes. In conflict, individuals or groups are not seeking identical ends, as in competition; each party has its own concept of political ends which differ from rival viewpoints. However, as Lloyd points out (1965:80): 'Both conflict and competition produce social change--the former when one group succeeds in its aims, and the latter when one contrasting group succeeds so often as to lead to the virtual extinction of the rival.' It quickly emerges that conflict and competition are special forms of opposition, in which political opposition is a form at another level. As Ionescu and de Madariaga (1968:14) assert: 'As an instinct, "opposition" is rooted in human nature, more or less controlled or repressed according to the degrees to which the society we live in allows its open manifestation.' With this in mind, the study of dynastic and sarauta competition in Hausaland becomes facilitated.

Office implies both status and role, the former is the position of a person within a group, and the latter is status in its dynamic aspect. Office, according to Balandier (1967:88): '...determines the type of power or authority conferred within the framework of political, economic, religious or other kinds of organisation...' In addition to its technical aspect, 'office' is infused with moral, religious and

hierarchical aspects. Within these ranked offices, there is inevitable competition.

One form that the conflict and competition of dynastic groups may take is in the process of factional politics. The essential characteristics of factions are: (i) they are conflict groups which arise in crises; (ii) they are political groups; (iii) they are not corporate groups, but are impermanent; (iv) their members are recruited by a leader; and (v) recruitment is by diverse principles. Factionalism is a process which balances political groups in conflict.

In the Hausa sarauta system, there is perpetual rivalry between members of the royal lineages for high office. Among the royal lineages and between regimes, each lineage segment puts forward eligible members for the throne. The segments are fused and fissioned, unite and compete with each other. The elected king or emir appoints his principal backers who are then his closest rivals to high office. This kind of political system would seem on the surface to be highly unstable, but in fact it is quite dynamically stable. In the face of perpetual rivalry from competing claimants, the ruler buttresses his own authority by the appointment of officials who depend on him alone: close kin, affines, clients, slaves, and eunuchs. Freed to some extent by his appointments, the ruler is able to enhance his own and his descendants' political position.

In Hausa political society, then, kinship was exploited in ways of influence and determination in the processes of succession and decision making. Far from Fortes' (1953) contention that the incompatibility between lineage and state produces instability, in this case, lineage within the state is the paramount stabilising factor.

The Hausa themselves, who number, according to the 1963 census, roughly fourteen millions (Elias, 1967: 1)[3] with perhaps as many as twenty million Hausa speakers in Northern Nigeria alone,[4] have a wealth of oral literature to explain their political and social institutions from their own perspective. It is a purpose of this thesis to organise the Hausa conception of society and history. As Vansina states in regard to the use of oral literature (1965:2): 'Each type of material enables us to catch a glimpse of one particular aspect of the past, although each has its limitations.' In this way, part of this thesis will be devoted to an elucidation of the Hausa notions of such concepts as 'prestige', girma, 'rank', daraja, and 'power/authority', iko. In addition, reference will be made

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[3] That is, people who consider themselves 'ethnically' Hausa.

[4] That is, those people who learn Hausa as their first language. Figures of ethnicity and language are probably open to a great deal of dispute and variation. However, for purposes here there will not be a distinction between people who are 'ethnically' Hausa and those who speak Hausa. Hausaland has, from early times been a focal point of immigration which has been of great influence to the Hausa people, their history and social institutions. In this sense, it is more correct to refer to the 'civilisation' of the Hausa (Cf., Nicolas, 1976).

to the symbolic as well as the structural associations of terms such as sarki, 'king/chief', and sarauta, 'titled office'.

The Hausa literature is not confined, however, to oral traditions. Much of their history and descriptions of social institutions is written in Hausa, Fulfulde, and Arabic.[5] These texts are used in this thesis wherever possible.[6]

This thesis is restricted in relation to time and space owing to the breadth of the subject. In order to avoid differences of the colonial and post-colonial period, this study is limited, for the most part, to an historical and political discussion of the period of the Sokoto Caliphate in the nineteenth century. Historical material also will be drawn from the pre-jihad period.[7] In terms of the territory under review, the study is restricted to the 'core' Hausa emirates together with the Habe refuge states of Abuja (unconquered portion of Zazzau) and Katsina Na Maradi (unconquered portion of Katsina).[8] Much of the non-political ethnographic literature referred

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[5] Much of this material is written in ajami: '...any writing not in the Arabic language commonly applied to the locally modified Arabic script in which Hausa is written'(Hiskett, 1957:550).

[6] In all vernacular texts, the transliteration of the work cited is used with the exception of vowel markings which are omitted.

[7] Arabic words in common English speech (e.g., jihad, Caliph) will not be underlined. The term Habe is reserved for the pre-jihad Hausa kingdoms and those states which resisted conquest.

[8] This territory roughly corresponds to the area covered by the states of the Hausa Bakwai, 'Hausa Seven'; see chapter one.

to in the fourth chapter is necessarily contemporaneous. This, however, can be defended owing to the continuity of talakawa ('commoners') social institutions.

There are many people I would like to thank for their assistance, both direct and indirect. Among these I would especially like to thank my supervisor, Dr. P. Lienhardt, for his insights, patience and help with matters concerning Islam and Arabic. I would also like to thank Mr. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene for his elucidation on points of Northern Nigerian history, Malam Mohamed Tairu for his assistance with Hausa ethnography, and Dr. P.M. Ryan for her help with the Hausa language. In addition, I would also like to thank Professor N. Skinner for his generosity in giving me access to his unpublished translations of F. Edgar's Litafi Na Tatsuniyoyi Na Hausa; and Dr. P. Duignan, Curator of the African Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University for allowing me to use the sources of that library. However, despite the helpful criticisms and insights of the above mentioned persons, they are not responsible for the views represented herein.

CHAPTER ONE

HISTORY: MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION

This chapter examines several historical issues each of which has, in particular, a bearing on the ways in which the Hausa people themselves see the history of their institutions. These issues include a detailed examination of the distinction between the genesis of the people who speak the Hausa language and the formation of the early semi-autonomous city-states in Hausaland, as reflected in written records and oral traditions. This topic is important because it points out the various processes by which the people known as 'Hausa' evolved and the formation of their institutions. Related to this, is a discussion of speculations regarding the historical mode of descent, particularly royal descent, as this contributes to a further understanding of the early history of Hausaland. Finally, the effects which various external and internal migrations have had on the determining of succession and descent will be examined.

Tue second part of this chapter deals with the introduction and flourishing of Islam in Hausaland from about the fourteenth century. This is studied within the contexts of commercialism, political centralisation, and the wider Islamic world. These events, which culminated in the jihad and eventual Fulani overlordship, illuminate the study of the social institutions of the Hausa speaking peoples today.

Throughout this chapter there will be no attempt made to reconstruct the sequences of events which occurred in the Hausa states. This task has been undertaken in other, more comprehensive sources (for example, Hogben, 1967; Hogben and Kirk-Greene, 1966; and Johnston, 1967). Rather, this chapter describes the history of processes which have had a bearing on the constitution of the Hausa people and their categories of thought regarding their social and political institutions. As Collingwood (1946:215) asserts: 'They (i.e., historical processes--R.P.B.) are not processes of mere events but processes of actions which have an inner side, consisting of processes of thought; and what the historian is looking for is these processes of thought. All history is the history of thought.'

I

Traditionally, the peopling of Hausaland and the formation of the pre-jihad semi-autonomous Habe kingdoms, has been described in the Hausa myth known as the 'Daura Legend'. One of the many similar variations of this myth proceeds as illustrated in the following undated girgam, or written record, which documents a much older, undated, oral tradition (Palmer, 1928ii:132-134):

> The people went up out of Canaan and settled in the land of Palestine. And a certain man among them named Najib the Canaanite went up out of Palestine with all his household and journeyed westwards into Libya, which is one of the Provinces of Egypt, and there they dwelt for many years. And a certain

man among them named Abdul Dar, and he was a son of Najib, went up out of Libya and dwelt in the Province of Tripoli. And after a time he sought the kingship of Tripoli, but the people refused. wherefore he rose with his people and journeyed to the south till he came to an oasis called Kusugu and dwelt there. And he begat children, and they were all daughters. Their names were Bukainya and Gambo and Kafai and Waizamu and Daura, and she was the youngest. All these he begat before they came to Daura.

And a certain man named Bayajidda (1), son of Abdullahi, King of Baghdad, quarrelled with his father and the people of the city. And they were divided into forty companies. Then Bayajidda with twenty companies journeyed until they came to Bornu, and they dwelt there. But the king of Bornu saw that Bayajidda was stronger than he and was of a mightier house, so he took counsel with his people. And they counselled him that he should give Bayajidda his daughter to wife, and become his father-in-law. And he did so and gave him his daughter Magira to wife, and he married her. Then the Sarkin Bornu said to Bayajidda that he wished to go to war and prayed him to lend him his horsemen and warriors to aid him against his foe, and he gave him three thousand horses with their warriors, together with princes to the number of seventeen. And he said, 'When we return from this war I will make them princes in my country.' And they went out to war and stayed for six months.

Then Sarkin Bornu took counsel to kill Bayajidda, but his wife Magira heard it and straightway told him. And when he saw all that had been done, that his horsemen had been taken from him and his princes, he saw that it was a plot to overcome him, and he spake unto his people and bade them flee to the north during the night. And they obeyed and left him, and he arose with his wife and journeyed to the west. And when they came to a place called Gabas ta Buram (2), his wife bore a son: and he left her there and passed on with his concubine and his mule, and his concubine also was with child.

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1 Most versions of the myth give his name as Bayajidda (or Bayajida) rather than Abuyazidu as appears in Palmer's text. I have opted for the more common Bayajidda. Some commentators, for example Palmer (1936:273-4) suggest that the legendary Abuyazidu had, in fact, an historical connection with Abu Yazid, who led the revolt of the nomadic Kharijite Berbers against the Fatimids in the tenth century (A.D.). Abu Yazid, who eventually lost his cause against the Fatimids and was killed by them, was probably born in the Western Sudan. For an extreme interpretation of this point see Hallam (1966).

2 Otherwise, Garin Gabas, Gabas ta Biram, Biram ta Gabas, or simply Biram.

And they journeyed until they came to Daura at night and they alighted at the house of an old woman whose name was Waira and he asked her for water. But she answered that they could not get water except on Fridays. And he asked her what hindered them, and she told him there was a snake in the well. And he took the bucket which she gave him and went to the well and let the bucket down into the water. When the snake heard the bucket she lifted her head out of the well to kill him, but he drew his sword and cut off her head--and her head was like the head of a horse. And he drew water and took the head of the snake, and it was night before Friday.

And in the morning the people assembled at the well and they questioned one another who had done this thing to the snake, whose name was Sarki, and they marvelled at that part which lay outside the well and that which remained within it. And the news was brought to the Queen of Daura, and she mounted with all her princesses and came to the well, and she asked who had done this thing. And many people spake falsely and said that they had killed the snake, but when she asked to be shown the head of the snake they were all dumb. Then spake the old woman at whose house Bayajidda had alighted, and said that a man had come to her house during the night with an animal which was like a horse and yet was not a horse; 'And he asked me for a bucket and I gave it to him, and he drew water and watered his beast and gave me what remained; perchance it was he who has done this deed.' And they summoned him and asked him, and he said he had done it, and showed them the head of the snake. And the Queen said, 'I have promised that whosoever should do this thing, I will give him half my town.' But Bayajidda said he wished rather to marry her. And she consented. And he dwelt in her house together with his concubine who was with child. And when the people came to the Queen to bring her news, she would bid them to go to the house of Makas-Sarki ('the Snake Killer'). Then the concubine bore a son and she named him 'Mukarbigari' (3). Then the Queen of Daura also bore a son and she named him 'Bawogari' (4). Then Bayajidda died and Bawo ruled in his stead. And Bawo begat six sons and these are their names:

Gazaura who became King of Daura
Bagauda who became King of Kano,
and these were the sons of the same mother (5).

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3 Or Karbo Gari, 'town seizer'.

4 Usually, and simply, 'Bawo'.


5 M. G. Smith (1961:340) states that the children of Bawo were three sets of twins.

Gunguma who became King of Zazzau
Duma who became King of Gobir,
   and these two were sons of the same mother.
Kumayau who became King of Katsina
Zamna Kogi who became King of Rano,
   and these were sons of the same mother.

The states which arose from the apical ancestor, Bayajidda, and his son from Daura, Bawo, and his own six sons (Gazaura succeeding his father to the throne at Daura) together with Biram, the son of Bayajidda and his wife from Bornu, Magira, make up what are known as the Hausa Bakwai, 'the Hausa Seven'. These seven states are considered to be the original Hausa kingdoms. In time, however, Rano became assimilated to Kano. In addition, although Gobir is generally listed as one of the original states, the Gobirawa, or at least their ruling families, do not consider themselves thus, preferring a myth of their own separate origin. The Gobirawa, it is said in oral tradition, were pushed southwards by the Tuareg to the area which today constitutes the western part of the border between the Republic of Niger and Nigeria. In fact, Sarkin Sokoto Muhammad said to E.J. Arnett (1922a:3): 'The Gobirawa have no country. They are guests (baki) of the Sarkin Zamfara. Their real country was Asben, and they lost it.'

Besides these seven Hausa states represented as deriving from the progeny of Bayajidda, there are a symmetrical seven states which are represented as being derivative from the offspring of the concubine

of Bayajidda. These are known as the Banza Bakwai, 'the bastard or worthless seven', and include: Kebbi, Zamfara, Nupe, Gwari, Yauri, Yoruba, and Kwararafa. These were states in which Hausa was not the language originally spoken. Although some of these states such as Kebbi, Zamfara and Yauri have been closely identified with and assimilated to the Hausa of the Hausa Bakwai, others such as Yoruba, Nupe and to a lesser extent, Gwari, remain quite disparate from their northerly neighbours. Thus, the Banza Bakwai are a heterogeneous group, unlike the homogeneity which characterises the Hausa Bakwai. The Daura Legend accounts for the existence of all these kingdoms, Hausa and non-Hausa. The relationship between the Hausa Bakwai and the Banza Bakwai, including their constituent states, as expressed in the kinship idiom of the Daura Legend, can be illustrated in the diagram below:



Hausa Bakwai

Banza Bakwai

Another way in which the Hausa Bakwai have been differentiated from the Banza Bakwai is in the assertion of the latter's birth from a heterogeneous marriage between parents of different localities. For instance, Muhammad Bello, son of Shehu Usman dan Fodio, and second Caliph of Sokoto, in his Infaq al-Maisuri states that the people of Kebbi were descended from a Katsina mother and a Songhay father, and the Zamfarawa were descended from a Katsina father and a Gobir mother (Arnett, 1922b:13; hereafter, Inf. M.).

Among the Hausa Bakwai, according to tradition, each kingdom was assigned a special duty or responsibility relative to each of the other kingdoms. These included (Hogben and Kirk-Greene, 1966:149):

> Gobir was appointed Sarkin Yaki, War Lord, charged with defending the other states from northern invasion, while Zaria was made Sarkin Bayi, the Lord of Slaves, and was expected to supply his brethren with abundant labour from the hilly country to the south loosely known as Bauchi. Kano and Rano were, each as Sarkin Baba, responsible for industry, especially dyeing and weaving, and Katsina and Daura each became Sarkin Kasuwa, responsible for trade and commerce.

In conjunction with the kinship diagram of the Daura Legend above, the offspring of two of the marriages of Bawo were each responsible for industry and trade (that is, the pairings of Daura and Kano, Rano and Katsina), while the offspring of the third of Bawo's marriages were charged with human predation from war and slaving (that is, Gobir and Zazzau, respectively).

Oral tradition also emphasises the assigning of

special duties or responsibilities to the inhabitants of the various emirates, taking into account representations of personal characteristics within these locales. This is illustrated in the following proverb (Whitting, 1940:142):

Alfarma na Kano, sarauta na Sokoto, yaki na Zaria, karin magana na Bauchi.
Kano for outward show, Sokoto for outward power, Zaria for bravery, Bauchi for proverbs.

The relationships between the emirates is also in evidence in oral tradition. One form that this takes, in addition to complementary services, is in the assigning of joking relationships (abokin wasa, sing.) between the emirates (for example, Katsina and Kebbi: Edgar, 1911a:241-2). Abokin wasa take the form of liberties in action and language, usually between a member of the Hausa Bakwai and the Banza Bakwai who, according to the Daura Legend, are related through their 'grandfather', Bayajidda, and either Daura or the concubine. This is illustrated in the following praise-song ('kirari') which also further documents the special attributes of each emirate (Edgar, 1911a:289-291; Skinner, n.d.III:233-4):

The kirari of all the Hausa towns:
About a Kano man they say 'Kano man, bow of beniseed, tricky bowstring of Indian hemp, learning that doesn't prevent thieving, gourd whose fruit spreads far abroad. At early morn a dyer, at mid-morn a malam, after midday a middleman trader and at night a thief; who comes in with "Peace be upon you" and goes out with "There is no God but Allah"--a tricky person to handle (lit. 'a pocket that is hard to get a hand into').' That's what the Zazzau people say of the Kano people.
The people of Kano have a joking relationship with the people of Zamfara and say of them 'Ali's

Zamfara--you are propped-up cornstalks, to you darkness is deceitfulness.' That's what the Kano people say of the Zamfara people.

As for the men of Zazzau, if the Kano people see one, they will say to him 'Chief whose father was a commoner--you respect your father, though he reduced the farmlands of Turunku, you respect a wastrel who says 'I saw your mother and thought she was mine.' You don't carry home any bundles of corn, but if someone prepares tuwo from one, you'll eat it--man of Zazzau, groundnut-oil that doesn't sleep.'

And the men of Zazzau say of the Katsina men 'Katsina, eating groundnuts and washing hands!'

And of the men of Gobir they say 'Slave-like, tying up fences like a saddle, you enjoy fine corn, and you burn them, Gobir home of fighting.'...

Of the men of Sokoto they say 'Dagyal (Degel), Bello's horse-tomb, which turns flour-water to honey; were it not for the buying and selling of corn, you would be pleasanter than Kano...'

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Labarin Kirarin Garuruwan Hausa Duka

Sunan kirarin Ba-Kano, a che da shi, 'Ba-Kano bakan ridi, tsarkiyar rama na dabo, karatu bai hana sata ba, duma mai-kai da nesa. Da safe marini, da hantsi Malami, da azuhur dilali, da da dare Barawo, mai-shiga da salamu alaikum, kana fita ana salati, kana wuta hannunka na jikka.' Hakanan Zazezagi su kan che da Kanawa.

Kanawa su kan che da Zanfarawa, gama abukanwasansu ne, su kan che da su, 'Zazfara ta Ali kara jingine ku ke, dufu zamba gare ku.' Hakanan Kanawa kan che da Zanfarawa.

Kanawa su kan che da Zagezagi, in sun ga mutumen Zazzau, su kan che da shi, 'Sariki dan talaka, kana girma ubanka, na rage gona na Turunku, ka girma da gaga, ya che na ga uwaka na che nawa ne, ba ka dauki dame ba, amma in an yi tuwo da damin ka chi, dan Zazzau main gyada ba ku barchi.' Hakanan Kanawa kan che da Zagezagi.

Zagezagi su kuma, su kan che da Katsinawa, 'Katsina dakin kara, a chi gyada, a wanke hannu.'

Gobirawa kuwa a kan che da su, 'Na bawa darma darni sirdi, kun san dadin hatsi, ku ke kona su, Gobir gidan fada.' ...

Sakwatawa kuwa a kan che da su, 'Dagel kushewar doki ta Bello maida Kasari zuma ba awo ba da kin fi Kano dadi...'

Variations of the Daura Legend are found as origin myths for many different societies in the area, for example, Yoruba, Kanuri (Johnston, 1967:140; Palmer,

1928:15-6). These variations exclude and include differing groups of people as descendants from their apical ancestors and under their suzerainty. It may be pointed out that, similar to the Daura Legend's incorporation of political and cultural relations with kinship relations, the Yoruba founding myth asserts that the founding fathers of Kanuri and Gobir were brothers of Oduduwa, the Yoruba apical ancestor.

It is difficult to divorce a discussion of the history of the Hausa from a history of the rest of West Africa, the Maghreb, and even Arabia as these myths demonstrate. Accompanying the increased movement of goods across the Sahara was the increased movement of people.

The migrations of people across Africa have been attributed to the hypothetical 'Hamites' who, arriving in the Sudan with their vastly superior technology and high level of political and social sophistication, are alleged to have influenced the indigenous inhabitants of the Sudan to establish more centralised forms of government than had existed in the Sudan prior to their arrival. This hypothesis, which at one time was widely held, maintained that (Seligman, 1939:96, 97):

> Apart from relatively late Semitic influence... the civilisations of Africa are the civilisations of the Hamites, its history the record of these peoples and of their interaction with the two more primitive African stocks, the Negro and the Bushman...
> The Hamitic cradle-land is generally agreed to be Asiatic, perhaps Southern Arabia or possibly an area

farther east...Be this as it may, there is no doubt that the Hamites and Semites must be regarded as modifications of an original stock, and that their differentiation did not take place so very long ago, evidence for this statement being furnished by the persistence of common cultural traits and linguistic affinities. Physically their relationship is obvious, as also their kinship with the European representatives of the Mediterranean race, though some anthropologists admit this relationship only for the Northern branch of the Hamites (i.e., Berbers, Tuareg, and Fulani), proposing to distinguish these from the Eastern branch (i.e., Beja, Nubians, Galla, Somali, and Danakil) by the term Libyan.

At this point it might prove profitable to investigate further the evidence of the early alleged migrations into Hausaland, in particular by 'Hamites'. Also this is important for the light which it might shed on the Daura Legend and the formation of Hausa states.

Within the framework of the Hamitic hypothesis, there have been a number of interpretations which have attempted to account for the historical accuracy of the Daura Legend and the formation of not only the Hausa states but also the Hausa people. Perhaps one of the more notable of these authorities is Johnston when he asserts that (1967:4-6):

> There is no doubt that at some period a considerable number of Berbers crossed the Sahara, settled among these people (i.e., the indigenous Negroes), and intermarried with them...Indirect though all this evidence is, there seems to be a strong probability that the crucial period of ethnic alchemy which was to produce the Hausa people and the Hausa language came between A. D. 1050 and 1100. The legend that the Hausa people cherish about their origins could well be a simplified myth based on such a chain of events...It seems probable that this legend crystallized the folk memory of the union between the Berber migrants and the indigenous peoples of Hausaland... One of the first products of the union was probably the Hausa language--which certainly goes back to this

period...While the language was evolving, the Hausa city-states began to emerge as separate powers... Together they cover an area which is about two hundred miles square and, though Hausaland has subsequently widened its frontiers, this region still forms its core.

Johnston then proceeds to document the dates when these migrations must have happened or could not have happened, and the kinds of people who composed each of the migrations. These assertions include: (i) migrations could not have occurred before the introduction of the camel and hence before the long-distance caravan routes were established; (ii) migrations took place before the advent of Islam in North Africa; and (iii) migrants themselves consisted not of 'tribes and clans', but small groups, primarily men who intermarried with the people through whose territory they either passed or settled in. This interpretation, being the only acceptable one for many years, is found in the writings of M. G. Smith who, tracing the origins of the Hausa people, relates the Daura Legend adding that (1961:340): '...the immigrants may have included Hamitic-speaking Negroes from the Chad basin as well as Berbers pushed south and west by Arab pressure.' Smith concludes by depicting the early communities which, as a result of their heterogeneity, were recognisable precursors of the Hausa communities known today. Communities such as Daura, Smith postulates, were ruled by these Berber or Hamitic peoples and only later intermarried.

Therefore, as these authorities show, the

question is often asked, even if indirectly, who exactly was Bayajidda? In addition, some diligent historians have tried to account for exact migrations of people as documented in the various foundation myths. Suffice it to say for purposes of this discussion, the error in this method lies in what Abdullahi Smith states is a confusion between the formation of the so-called Hausa people and the formation of the Hausa states (1970:330). In other words, as can be plainly seen in the quotation from Johnston above, the creation of the Hausa people or perhaps more precisely, those people speaking the Hausa language, is taken to have occurred at about the turn of the first Christian millennium, as a result of Berber migrations among the peoples in that part of the Sudan. Also, as this interpretation attempts to show, the formation of the Hausa city-states occurred at the same time as a result of the same migrations and the influences that the migrants fostered upon their arrival.[6] The confusion arises from just this juxtaposition. The evolution of a new ethnic type speaking a new (and presumably hybrid) language, is a different matter from the acquisition of the principles governing the foundation of new

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[6] This is at one level. At another, the history of the Hamitic hypothesis, which was a Judeo-Christian (and perhaps Islamic) myth unto itself, shows that it was clearly racialist and a justification for European exploitation of human resources (Vide, Sanders, 1969).

states. This point must be investigated further before proceeding with the historical outline.

First of all, as Abdullahi Smith states: 'There is really no evidence at all to show that the Hausa people as a distinct ethnic group did emerge as a result of Berber-Negro assimilation or, even if they did, that this assimilation took place at the end of the first millennium A. D.' (1970:331). In that case, at such a relatively recent date, some evidence should exist of this combination in the Hausa language which exists today. In fact, there is not this evidence of close affinity between the Hausa language and the language of their nearby Tamasheg Berber neighbours. Hausa is a Chadic language which emerged from the same protolanguage that included, according to Greenberg (1966:46), Ngizim, Shirawa, Bedde, Bolewa, Kerekere, Tangale, Angas, Ankwe, Montol, Buduma, Affade, Bachama, Tera, and Margi, to name just a few. It is to this group that the Hausa language belongs and not Berber. Even these languages are distinct enough from Hausa to have been differentiating for several thousand years. Therefore, any common origin of Chadic and Berber language families was very ancient indeed. There is, in fact, not even evidence of extensive borrowing of Berber words into the Hausa language. It is equally impossible to document the hybridisation of Berber and Central Sudanic peoples themselves, especially at such a late date.

In what way can migrations be seen to be a contributing factor in the formation of Hausa states? The Berbers and 'Hamites' have been eliminated from consideration in the complete absence of evidence indicating large-scale migrations before the turn of the last millennium. There are two neighbouring non-Hausa groups which have migrated in sufficient numbers in historical times to Hausaland to have been an influencing factor on their affairs: the Kanuri and the Tuareg. Of the Tuareg, Muhammad Bello states (Inf. M.:9):

> These five tribes of Tuareg came from Aujila. Their names were Amakita, Tamakkaka, Sandalu, Igidalan and Ajdanarnina. They decided to choose a Sarki in order to establish their rule and prevent their strength waning. They chose a man of Stambul. Later they changed their minds and deposed him. Then they chose another. This habit has never left them. Whenever a Sarki does not suit them they depose him.
>
> It is said that these Tuareg are the remnant of the Beriberi (i.e., Berbers--R.P.B.) who scattered at the time when Afrikiya (7) was conquered by the Moslems. And the Berbers are of the children of Abraham. Others say that they are the children of Japhet. Others say that they are descended from the Yajuju and Majuju whom Dthulkarmene imprisoned (8). A certain band got out and did much harm. They married Turks and Tartars.
>
> Others again say they are descended from jinns.

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7 Afrikia or Ifriqia, as the Arabs called the old Roman province of Africa. This province was the former dominions of Carthage in North Africa which Rome conquered in 146 B.C. The name later spread to the whole continent (Hogben, 1967:13).

8 Yajuju and Majuju are the Koranic versions of the Gog and Magog in the Bible. Dhu'l-Qarnain, 'the person with the two horns' (on his helmet ?) is also a Koranic figure, usually supposed to associate with Alexander the Great.

It has already been remarked that the Gobirawa once occupied the area of Asben (or Azben, Absen, in Aïr) until displaced by the encroachments of the Tuareg. However, did this pressure lead to the formation of a defensive Gobirawa state? This is possible, but remains uncertain. One thing is certain, however, any state which arose through such contact was not the result of borrowed institutions. The Tuareg government in Agades was an ephemeral alliance of nomad clan leaders for certain limited purposes connected with nomadic interests and quite unlike the states which had flourished and were to be in the Sudan. One group of adjacent outsiders can be credited with a limited amount of influence over the formation of these early Hausa states, and this is the case of the Kanuri of Bornu.

Centralised political institutions have long existed among the Kanuri. Kanem was the most powerful state in the Eastern Sudan since about 1000 A.D. A century later Islam came to Kanem, or at least to its rulers. From the mid-thirteenth to the end of the fourteenth century, however, Kanem was rife with civil war (Palmer, 1928i, passim). These wars, the Bulala wars, were most likely the result of a dispute within the ruling lineage of Kanem, one group, the Bulala, splitting off and challenging the authority of the Kanem control of the state. At the end of the fourteenth century, with the Bulala

victory approaching, the rulers of Kanem fled south-west to the comparatively greener lands on the western shores of Lake Chad, which would become known as Bornu. Although trade with the people occupying Hausaland had been common long before, the resettlement of the Kanem rulers and their followers initiated a period of intensive contact which culminated in the sixteenth century with most of the Hausa city-states being brought under the hegemony of Bornu.[9]

The influence upon Hausa by the Kanuri has been great, as can be discerned by the number of loan-words in Hausa from Kanuri, in particular words in the Hausa political vocabulary (Greenberg, 1960). However, even this influence does not lead to the assertion that the Hausa states were of Bornu origin. Even if it could be accepted that the establishment of states in Hausaland by Bornu was restricted to the Hausa Bakwai, it would still not explain the establishment of states in the Banza Bakwai. The Banza Bakwai are of much later origin, as their kinglists show, and were most likely formed as a result of migrations and contacts not from the 'Hamites' or from Bornu, but from Hausaland itself.

Therefore, the Daura Legend, apart from the

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[9] Prior to this, but for a much shorter duration, much of Western Hausaland was under the nominal suzerainty of the Songhay Empire. The movement of goods and ideas between these areas had been common since at least the fourteenth century.

lack of historical information concerning migrations reflecting the 'Hamitic hypothesis', contributes little to our understanding of the formation of Hausa states. The formation of Hausa states originated in the conditions which favoured centralised settlements within Hausaland.

The hierarchy of Hausa settlements ascends from the hut or compound, gida, the extended polygynous family grouping under a head known as the mai gida. Next, the unguwoyi, 'hamlet', is a larger territorial unit still based, if loosely, on kinship. Next comes the gari, 'town', whose ruler, Sarki or mai gari, rules a territorial segment rather than strictly a kinship segment. Finally, there is the birni, or walled town or capital ruled by a Sarki of a higher order. These large nucleated settlements arose not from the influence of foreign invaders but from internal factors, for example, economic, military, and religious. In contrast with the Daura Legend, some oral traditions indicate the indigenous character of the evolution of Hausa cities and states. This is illustrated in part of Wakar Bagauda (Hiskett, 1965:113-115):[10]

Bagauda made the first clearing in the Kano bush.
It was then uninhabited jungle.
A vast forest with nothing save idols,
Waterbuck, buffalo, and elephant...
There were no women; indeed it was men who cooked.
The encampment became extensive, grass hut upon grass hut.
Then they sent for the women, and they started coming...

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[10] The Kano Chronicle also emphasises the autochthony of Hausa institutions.

The people were living widely dispersed over the open
country, not subject to any authority.
There was no chief, no protecting town wall...
The elders said: let a chieftaincy be established.
They appointed Bagauda, the protector.

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Bagauda shi ya sari Kano da farko
Tana daji sa'an nan babu kowa.
Tana dawa kirmijin sai ko gumakai
Da imbeci da baunaye da giwa...
Ra ba mata maza ne ke dafawa.
Madaba tai yawa, bukka da bukka,
Fa sai aiki fa mata na tafowa...
Mutane ne sarai sun yi shanya.
Da ba sarki ba; ba garun tsarewa...
Da manya sunka ce: sai ai sarauta.
Sukai sarki Bagauda mai tsarewa.
(Hiskett, 1964:544-5)

The formation of Hausa states was a rather lengthy process instead of the instantaneous process of immigration and subjugation.

In this case, then, what can the Daura Legend really be interpreted as representing? For our part we have discounted its role as an historical chronicle, recording the events surrounding the migrations of 'Hamitic' peoples as well as the 'Hamitic' Bornuan role in establishing centralised Sudanic states. The Daura Legend, rather than accounting for the past of the historical entities of the Hausa kingdoms, justifies their present organisation (the present here referring to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).

II

According to the Daura Legend, before the arrival of Bayajidda, the city was under the rule of women. This has led several commentators to postulate the former existence of matriliny in the Hausa states, in

line with their Tuareg neighbours. As Hogben and Kirk-Greene state (1966:147): 'In early Hausa history the queen is often known as Magajiya, and the legend indicates that in olden times the Hausa states favoured uterine descent. The implication of this statement is that, with the arrival of Bayajidda and his followers, the form of descent followed in Hausaland changed to patrilineal. As M. G. Smith asserts (1961:341): 'They interbred with natives by marriage and concubinage, and may have introduced the principle of patrilineal descent in certain areas.' The list of rulers of Daura which has been handed down over the centuries in fact does at least support a contention of former matriarchy: the first seventeen rulers were women.[11]

(1) Kufuru
(2) Gino
(3) Yakumo
(4) Yakunya
(5) Walzamu
(6) Yanbamu
(7) Gizirgizir
(8) Innagari
(9) Daura
(10) Gamata
(11) Shata
(12) Batatume
(13) Sandamata
(14) Jamata
(15) Hamata
(16) Zama
(17) Shawata

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[11] This list is taken from Hogben and Kirk-Greene (1966: 154). The authors point out (p. 147) that unlike most lists which show the ancestor-hero, Bayajidda, marrying Daura, the ninth Queen of Daura, this one shows him marrying Shawata, the seventeenth. The name Daura, whom Bayajidda is said to have married, is probably a confusion with the title, Daurama, or 'Queen of Daura'.

Daura is, however, the only Hausa state which has a strong tradition of the consistent succession of queens to the throne. Another state, Zazzau (or Zaria), has a tradition of mixed succession of kings and queens to the throne. Perhaps the most famous of Hausa queens was the queen of Zazzau, Amina (or Aminatu) and her sister Zaria, who gave her name to the capital and the modern Emirate. These two women ruled Zazzau in the sixteenth century. There is much in the oral tradition of Zaria which tells of the exploits of Amina, for example (Hogben and Kirk-Greene, 1966:216-8):

> The elder daughter, Amina, is said to have built a walled camp wherever she sojourned on her extensive travels. Thus it is that in many parts of Hausaland ancient town walls are called ganuwar Amina, 'Amina'a walls', even though they were not necessarily built by her. By extension, the phrase now means the site of an ancient town. It has also given rise to the Hausa proverbs for emphasising respectable venerability: wane ya cika takama da tsufa kamar ganuwar Amina(12).
>
> ...Her prowess in battle earned her the throne of Zaria on the death of Karama in 1576 and the royal trumpets hailed her: 'Amina, 'yar Bakwa, ta san rana!'(13).
>
> ...Amina died in Atagara, near present-day Idah, for at that time Amina had pushed the frontiers of Zazzau south of the Niger-Benue confluence. Her praise is sung: 'Amina, daughter of Nikatau, a woman as capable as a man' (Kallabi tsakanin rawuna).

In fact it is said that she forced Kano and Katsina to pay her tribute, and brought Bauchi under her control, as well as Nupe and Kwararafa.

However, in spite of the strength of local trad-

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12 Literally, 'one who is filled with pride and age like the walls of Amina'.

13 As the authors state: 'Literally, "Amina, daughter of Bakwa, she knows the sun (or day)!", but with a meaning, "there are no flies on Amina!" or "she knows her way about!"'

itions and the lists of rulers which have been handed down to the present day, it is impossible to prove the contention of the former existence of matriliny among the Hausa. On the evidence which is present in the literature, for example, kinship terminology, indigenous rules of succession and inheritance (that is, as distinct from Islamic rules), and matrilineal rights and obligations, there is nothing in the present social structure to indicate this transition. Without historical evidence of the imposition of a foreign mode of descent, that is, patriliny, upon the indigenous matrilineal one, it cannot be taken as given or used as a premiss for further contention. Modes of descent are quite different rules from rules of royal succession.

III

Much of the development of the centralisation of the embryonic states is owed to the direct adoption of the Islamic religion or to the indirect influence from Islamic neighbours. Most sources agree that Islam began to be widely accepted in Hausaland in the fourteenth century, becoming firmly established by the end of the fifteenth century (Hiskett, 1973:5; Johnston, 1967:10). By way of contrast, the Kanuri of Bornu began to accept Islam on a large scale by at least the mid-thirteenth century (Cohen, 1967:14). Although Islam came to Hausaland at a comparatively

later date than it did to Bornu, it is possible to speculate, as Hodgkin does to '...suppose that Islamic influences from Kanem-Bornu were present in Kano from a quite early period' (1975:26; cf., Greenberg, 1960 and Schacht, 1957).

The first documentation of Islam in Hausaland occurs in the Kano Chronicle.[14] This puts the introduction of Islam in the reign of Yaji (ca. A.D. 1349-1385) when a group of Wangarawa persuaded the chief to become a convert. This story is told below in a portion of the Kano Chronicle:[15]

> In Yaji's time the Wangarawa came from Mali, bringing the Muhammadan religion...When they came they commanded the Sarki to observe the times of prayer. He complied, and made Gurdamus his Liman, and Lawal his Muezzin. Autu cut the throats of whatever flesh was eaten. Mandawali was Liman of all the Wangarawa and of the chief men of Kano, Zaite was their Alkali. The Sarki commanded every town in Kano country to observe the times of prayer. So they all did so. A mosque was built beneath the sacred tree facing east, and prayers were made at the five appointed times in it. The Sarkin Garazawa was opposed to prayer, and when the Moslems, after praying had gone home, he would come with his men and defile the whole mosque and cover it with filth. Dan Bujai was told off to patrol round the mosque with well-armed men from evening until morning. He kept up a constant halloo. For all that the pagans tried to win him and his men over. Some of his men followed the pagans and went away, but he and the rest refused. The defilement continued until Sheshe said to Famori, 'There

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[14] The Kano Chronicle is a source which, in its present form, was probably written down in the last decade of the nineteenth century. However, it probably represents a much earlier account. It records the events which occurred during the reigns of each of the forty-eight Habe kings and Fulani Emirs of Kano who ruled between 999 and 1892 A.D. The translation is by Palmer (1928ii).

[15] Palmer (1928ii:104-5), also quoted in Hodgkin (1975: 100-1. Hereafter cited as K. Chr.

is no cure for this but prayer." The people assented. They gathered together on a Tuesday in the mosque at the evening hour of prayer and prayed against the pagans till sunrise. They only came away when the sun was well up. Allah received graciously the prayers addressed to him. The chief of the pagans was struck blind that day, and afterwards all the pagans who were present at the defilement--they and all their women. After this they were all afraid. Yaji turned the chief of the pagans out of his office and said to him, 'Be thou Sarki among the blind. (16)

Whereas in Kano, where the rulers accepted Islam and the commoners remained aloof, in Katsina the reverse occurred. Islam made much more headway among the talakawa, or 'common people', than amongst the nobility Daniel (1937:5) The other Hausa states were much slower again in adopting the new religion which had already swept through much of the Sudan. Among these states, for example, the rulers of Zazzau accepted Islam in the sixteenth century, [17] as did the rulers of Zamfara and Gobir.

It might be asked, at this point, what were the processes which led to the Hausa states (or at least the rulers of these Hausa states) to adopt Islam. In the cases of the first Hausa states to be converted to Islam, Kano and Katsina, the number of contacts with Islamic scholars and preachers increased with favourable trading conditions (Cf., Johnston, 1967:11). The increase of trade throughout this area led, as it did with Ghana, Mali, Songhay and Kanem-Bornu,

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[16] As Hodgkin points out (1975:101, n.1), there is a large organised community of blind people in Kano and this is their traditional story of origin.

[17] This was Abu, the eighteenth king of Zazzau, who was probably installed by the invading Songhay armies.

to the conversion of traders and then, those who profited by trade (the nobility, of course, profiting most from trade). In the case of those secondary trading states, those without direct trans-Saharan trade routes and who traded primarily with those states that did, they became Islamic as the primary traders 'exported' it (Cf., Smith, 1960:3).

The increase in trade to the area of Hausaland which led to the widespread adoption of Islam can be attributed to three factors. Firstly, a new caravan route in the fourteenth century linked Kano and Ghat, an important terminal of trade in the northern Sahara. This had the effect that trade could flow directly from North Africa into Hausaland rather than by the circuituous route by Lake Chad or the Niger Bend. Secondly, and shortly thereafter, was the reopening of the trade-route from Egypt to the gold-rich Ashanti area. This trade route, which had previously been closed because of the depredations of Nubian Christians, also went through Hausaland. Thirdly, the Egypt-Niger trade route was shifted south through Kano, initially owing to the raids of the Syrte Arabs, and later because of the invasion and destruction of Songhay by the Moroccans (Johnston, 1967:12).

With the increased trade between Kano and rival Katsina on the one hand, and the Islamic Arabs and Berbers of North Africa on the other, Islam could only have begun to flourish under the immense advant-

ages (for example, relative safety in travel) that belonging to that religion could confer upon traders in the Hausa states.

Economic changes in the Hausa states, and in particular Kano, had the effect of transforming areas of purely local significance into large metropolitan centres. These urban centres were not only important commercially, but also became the dominating political entities in the Central Sudan. As such, these embryonic states were instrumental in increasing the importance of the growing area of Hausaland.

The years that immediately followed the initial inroads that Islam made in Hausaland were characterised by conflict between the Muslims and the adherents of the traditional religion. It was not until the arrival of the North African jurist and theologian, Sheikh Muhammad al-Maghīlī in the late fifteenth century, that Islam became firmly established. Al-Maghili, a Maliki scholar, has been credited with the introduction of the Qadiriyya tariqa into the Sudan (Hiskett, 1973:120). He preached extensively in the oasis towns of the Sahara until he was forced to flee from his enemies and travel to the Sudan where he came upon Kano and Katsina. There he made a great impression upon the rulers and was given their favour in return for his advice. Leaving his disciples in each of the Hausa states to continue his work, he went on to Songhay and died in 1504 A.D. He was an .

important intellectual figure in the Sudanic tradition of reformism, his works being cited by the jihadists of Hausaland three centuries later.

Al-Maghili came to Kano during the reign of Muhammad Rumfa, said to be the most enlightened of all the pre-jihad rulers of Kano. For Rumfa, al-Maghili wrote a treatise on leadership entitled, The Obligations of Princes.[18]

Regarding his works on the reform of Islam, al-Maghili foreshadowed both Shehu dan Fodio and his teacher Jibril ibn 'Umar. After describing and condemning both the people of Songhay and their leaders, al-Maghili foretells of the recurrent mujaddid, 'reformer/reviver' of Islam, who would come to purify the faith once in every century (Hiskett, 1962:584):

> And accordingly it is related that at the beginning of every century God will send a learned man to the people to renew their faith, and the characteristics of this learned man in every century must be that he commands what is right and forbids what is disapproved of, and reforms the affairs of the people and judges justly between them, and assists the truth against vanity, and the oppressed against the oppressor, in contrast to the characteristics of the (other) learned men in his age.

Within the syncretist situation in which he found himself in the Sudan, al-Maghili preached that it was more meritorious to wage jihad against the syncretists, than it was to wage it against total heathens (Ibid.).

Of Muhammad Rumfa (ca. A.D. 1463-99), under whom Kano reached the height of its pre-jihad power, he has been credited with many innovations in Kano government and religious practices. These innovations

[18] Ta'rīf fīmā yajib 'aba' l-mulūk, trans. Baldwin, 1932.

included the building of mosques, instituting purdah, installing eunuchs into many important palace sarauta, and the observance of Ramadan.

Much of what this Islamic revival consisted of in the form of the preachings of al-Maghili and instrumentally enacted by muhammad Rumfa was to have a bearing on events which were to take place in Hausaland three hundred years later. At this time, after decades of backsliding by the Hausa states in the laws of Islam, Fulani reformers would cite the teachings of al-Maghili to justify the repurification of the Islamic faith in Hausaland. Three areas of the teachings of al-maghili were drawn upon by future generations of Fulani Islamic scholars and reformers. The first of these teachings was the role of the mujaddid, the 'Renewer of the Faith', in Islamic reform. Secondly, al-Maghili preached concerning the status of the sinner and the problem of unbelief in a mixed Islamic and pagan society. The third of his teachings centred on the problem of sophist Islamic scholars who loosely interpreted the law to meet their own ends and by introducing speculations into discussions on Islamic thought, debased the teaching and practice of Islam. It was for these reasons that a jihad was eventually waged by Fulani reformers against the nominally Islamic, or completely apostate, Hausa states.

IV

Tied to any discussion of Islam in Hausaland is

a discussion of perhaps its most enthusiastic bearers in the Sudan, the Fulani, who came slowly from the east to the Hausa states from at least as early as the thirteenth century A.D. (de St. Croix, 1972:5). These Fulani immigrants may be broadly divided into two groups. The first group of Fulani are those who are, in varying degrees, transhumant pastoralists. This group may be further sub-divided into a further two groups. The first sub-group, the Bororo'en are fiercely independent, usually non-Islamic, and remain in the bush.[19] The second sub-group are the Fulɓe na'i who are semi-sedentary, having dry and wet season camps, are often Islamic, and they trade or sell dairy products to nearby village or city dwellers. The second broad group of Fulani are the so-called 'Town Fulani', or Fulanin gida, although as Last points out (1967:lxxiv), they are not necessarily sedentary and do not necessarily live in towns. This group of Fulani may also be sub-divided into two groups. Firstly there are the Toroobe, who belong to the 'ruling and professional classes' (Johnston, 1967:21), are Islamic, and own few cattle. Secondly, there are the Fulɓe siire who, in spite of their pastoralist preferences, have lost their cattle owing to disease or mismanagement and have, as a result, been

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19 The independence and aloofness of these Fulani is emphasised in their description of themselves as birds--if one is touched, all the others will fly away (de St. Croix, 1972:6).

forced to settle among the local farmers and adopt that way of life.

In addition to this classification of the Fulani, they also divide themselves by place and by colour. In the first instance, there are the Dya and the So Fulani (Hogben and Kirk-Greene, 1966:112), which recognises an east-west division, recalling the points in Ghana and Sala, respectively. In the colour classification, the Fulani recognise two types: Wodabe (red) and Balebe (black). This classification is not physiologically determined.

The Fulani hold various myths of origin depending on whether they are of the sedentary or pastoral way of life, and whether or not they maintain the Islamic faith. As for the pastoral Fulani, their origin myth is told as follows (Kirk-Greene and Sassoon, 1959:6-7):

> A woman once quarrelled with her husband, and in a fit of temper ran out of the village, taking her baby son with her. She ran into the thick, lonely 'bush' and, putting her baby down under a tree, began to wander through the bush, trying to calm her anger. When at last she grew calm, she decided to go home and make it up with her husband. But alas! She could not remember when she had left her son. She searched everywhere but never found him.
>
> This boy did not die but grew up in the bush with the animals. One day he had a dream. A spirit told him that he would live all his life in the bush but that, if he obeyed the spirit, he would have many riches. The spirit commanded him to go down to the river, where he would see a white cow come out of the water. He must then walk away, and the cow would follow. But whatever happened, he must not look behind him.
>
> The boy did as he was told. When the white cow came out of the water, he walked away, and the cow followed. He walked for a long time until at last,

unable to contain his curiosity, he decided to look round. To his surprise he saw hundreds of cows behind him, for all the time he had been walking they had been coming out of the water. As soon as the boy turned round, the cows stopped coming out of the water. The legend ends by saying that all the cows were white except the last four, which were red. This explains why there are more white than red cattle in Fulani herds.

Fulani who are Islamic and settled stress that their origins ultimately connect them with the east--Arabia is often mentioned (Arnett, 1922a:14).

As the Fulani moved eastwards from Futa Toro and Futa Jallon, some groups or families, for one reason or another, decided or were forced to abandon the pastoral life and become sedentary. In the process of their settlement, many became farmers or mixed farming and pastoralism. Those Fulani who went to the towns and villages often became professionals or administrators. Still other Islamic Fulani took to scholarship and earned their living as teachers or as preachers.

In spite of the fact that the Fulani were settling amongst a 'host' society, and adopting many of their ways, there was not a great deal of intermarriage, curiously enough, between the two peoples (Johnston, 1967:25). The Fulani who became relatively wealthy by becoming professionals, however, did take Hausa concubines. In some towns and villages, the Fulani occupied separate wards or quarters. This practice, which occasionally occurs today, was common in ancient Ghana and Mali between the North African traders

and the indigenous Sudanese (Cf. Levtzion, 1973). This autonomy, in the form of endogamy, despite all the other aspects of cultural assimilation, can be seen quite clearly in the case of the Fulani who were Islamic scholars. As Last asserts (1967:lxxix): 'Almost constituting a clan themselves, the Fulani malams were self-supporting: they tended to intermarry either with their own clansmen, following Fulani practice, or with other scholar families, though doubtless they also took wives from their kin, the cattle Fulani, as Fulani sayings suggest.' Islamic education was also managed within the family group.

The relationship between the more pastoral Fulani and the settled and Islamic Fulani was never completely severed, as the quotation above demonstrates. There were the tangible ties of economic trade, in addition to the exchange of women. Islamic scholars of Fulani ancestry would also serve as mediators between the pastoral Fulani and both the rulers of lands through which they passed and the owners of the land on which they wished to graze their cattle. As de St. Croix points out (1972:7): 'Thus the scholar would in many cases become the go-between in the ruler's dealings with his nomadic relatives; and, in course of time, an intermediary between the ruler and the Nomadic Fulani frequenting the province.'

By this time, as Bello later put it (Inf. M.: 123): '...the Hausa chiefs, their people and their

mallams were evildoers.' In short, in the estimation of the generation of Islamic scholars that emerged at the end of the eighteenth century, the Hausa states and the Hausa rulers had been backsliding into heathenism. The extent to which the liberties of the Habe kings went is illustrated in Wakar Bagauda (Hiskett, 1965:123):

They flaunted themselves in the world and ruled as kings.
  Whatever they wished to do, they accomplished.
Verily they have gone to where they are as nothing;
  A dog is more than they. They have gone to the place of failure.

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Suna buki a dunya sun sarauta;
  Abin da su kai nufi, su ka cikatawa.
Fa sun je inda ba kome ba ne su;
  Kare ya fi su; sun tafi gun gazawa.
(Hiskett, 1964:553)

Following the writings of al-Maghili who had lived in the Sudan almost three hundred years earlier, their only recourse was the waging of a holy war. This the Fulani accomplished, with the help of some Tuareg and discontent Hausa, through the leadership and spiritual guidance of Shehu Usman dan Fodio.

V

This section of the chapter is devoted to an examination of the jihad which was waged in the Hausa states from 1804 A.D. A discussion is not attempted here of the chronology of events leading to, during, and immediately after the jihad.[20] The points which

[20] For a discussion of chronology, see: Arnett, 1922a,b, Hiskett, 1973, Hogben, 1967, Hogben and Kirk-Greene, 1966, Johnston, 1967, Last, 1967, and Smith, 1960.

are elaborated upon here are those which have a bearing on the present-day ethnic constitution and hierarchical organisation of Hausaland. With this in mind, discussion here is restricted to the following topics: (i) Shehu Usman dan Fodio, the first Caliph of Sokoto, and the enormous part that he played as a personal catalyst of events which led to the jihad; (ii) the reasons for the jihad, which include questions of ethnicity and unbelief in a heterogeneous society, including the post-jihad religious challenge of al-Kanemi of Bornu and the justifications put forward by the Shehu, his brother Abdullahi, and the son of the Shehu, Bello; and (iii) to judge, as best as can be determined, the success of the jihad in terms of the prescriptions laid down by the Shehu himself and his fellow reformers. In this way it is possible to gain a better understanding not only of the political and historical processes which culminated in the jihad, which are important for contemporary events and political relations, but also of subsequent social relations.

Shehu Usman dan Fodio[21] was born about 1755 A.D., and was the son of a Fulani Islamic scholar. From an early date those close to him in his village of Degel believed that there was something quite special about him. This is related in the following story of the

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[21] His honorific titles include: Nūr al-zamān, 'light of the age', and mujaddid al-Islām, 'reviver of Islam'.

young Shehu, who was asked by his father to travel to Marnona (some distance from their home in Degel) to collect a book (Hiskett, 1971:74-5):[22]

One day Fodio summoned the people and performed ẓuhr prayer,
He sent Shaihu to Marnona that he might go
And bring him back from there the Book. When he picked it up
He returned and took it there to his house,
And there he performed his prayer. His father saw him,
He said, 'Did you not go then?', because of his speed.
Shaihu stood up, he picked up the book, he gave it to Fodio,
The people there were amazed at him.

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Wata rana Fodio ya kira yai Azzuhur.
Marnona ya akkai shi zo ɗauko masa
Har cana littafi. Da yaɗ ɗauko kuwa,
Yad dawayo yak kai shi cana gida nasa,
Nan yay yi salla tai, Uba nasa yag ganai,
Yac ce, 'Halam ba ka zo ba?', don zafi nasa.
Yat tashi, yaɗ ɗauko shi, yab ba Fodio.
Jama'a da an nan sun yi mamaki nasa

In addition to the possession of these powers, there were at the time of his birth, messianic prophecies made about him. A woman, Umm Hani is said to have made a prophecy to this effect (date unknown). The Shehu relates this in the originally Fulani text, Sifofin Shehu Usuman ɗan Fodio ('Characteristics of Usman ɗan Fodio'; El-Masri and Adeleye, 1966:26) in which he draws attention to the similarity of characteristics between himself and the Prophet, on the one hand, and the Mahdi, on the other.

I say, 'peace be upon your Prophet',
Know that I have (obtained) many of his characteristics.
Know that a prophecy was made of him before his coming,
A similar prophecy was made of me, I am fortunate.

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[22] The work of Shehu's miracles, Waƙar Karamomin Shaihu by Isaɗan Shaihu is based on the work of Wazirin Sokoto Gidaɗo ɗan Laima: Rauḍ al-jinān fī dhikr ba'd karamāt al-shaykh 'Uthmān.

Ina yin sallama bisa Annabimmu
kusan na sam kamannunai da dama
Ku san shi an fadai tun bai tafo ba
Fadinnan anka yo mini na yi zama.

The Shehu received his Islamic education in the equivalents of what are today known in Hausa as makarantun ilmi, schools of higher Islamic learning. Of these schools, Hiskett remarks (1973:34): 'These schools should not be confused with Koran schools, which are really kindergartens where children learn to recite the Koran and nothing more. The makarantun ilmi are institutions of advanced education, covering the whole range of traditional Islamic learning.' Here the Shehu excelled in the study of tafsir, or Koranic exegesis, the Sunna, or the Way of the Prophet, and finally, astronomy.[23] In all these he progressed with such speed that he was soon teaching not only his brothers, but also other young scholars. In addition, the Shehu studied Sufism, the ideology which played an important part in the formation of his character as a reformer. The Qadiri order to which he belonged, '...unlike the Tijaniyya...as found in Sokoto tends to be individualistic and does not practise group recitations. Thus there is less community of feeling demonstrated among Qadiris' (Last, 1967:216).[24]

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[23] As a young aspirant Islamic scholar he was known as a tālib. In the course of his education he collected various ijaza, 'licences' to teach within his asnād, 'chains of authority for the transmission of learning'.

[24] The Shehu and his community were not, as has been alleged, Wahhabi, rather they were firmly rooted in Maliki, not Hanbali, orthodoxy (Cf., Hiskett, 1962:596).

The Shehu began to preach publicly about the year 1774 when he was about twenty years old. He began this career in and around Degel, but later went much farther afield, eventually becoming influential at the court of Gobir. Regarding his father, Bello wrote (Inf. M.:46):

> Shehu did not cease to expound to the people the duties of their religion. He increased the knowledge of those who were Mallams: he instructed the pupils and those who were entering on the path of his faith, and he taught them obedience, until the ignorant became learned. It was their boast that their conduct was equal to their knowledge. Shehu's pupils became Mallams of great judgement. Those whom he specially instructed to enter his way of life became very nearly saints.

The Shehu addressed himself to the reformation of the faith in the Hausa states where, over time, most of the ruling families, not to mention the talakawa, had either become lax in matters concerning Islam or were in open apostacy. The abuses which he condemned in his sermons revolved around five main topics. The first subject was the absolute necessity of following the Shari'a without deviation. Secondly, the Shehu stressed the importance of observing the Sunna. The third topic was a warning against the dangers of harbouring any religious doubts. Fourthly, he preached the prevention and avoidance of all evil. And lastly, he encouraged all who heard him to study the Shari'a and become seekers after knowledge and truth. An example of one of the Shehu's sermons can be seen below in which, following Islamic law, he discusses marriage (Inf. M.:37):

Whoever marries, let him marry if he wishes two wives or three or four, but not more than four, but not more than four. If he has not the means let him stop at once. Let him be just between his wives. The matter of their food and their dwelling is in his hand, but it must be in proportion to his means. Let him not give his nights to his women slaves. Even if a slave woman has born him a child let him not divide his nights with her.

From about 1789, the Shehu began to experience a number of visions which brought him face to face with the Prophet and with the twelfth century founder of the Qadiriyya order, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani.[25] From this time also the Shehu was increasingly being attributed with the performance of miracles. These miracles can be divided into four categories. The first set regarded his ability to be conversant with jinns and saints. Secondly the Shehu was attributed with a mastery of such phenomena as bilocation, instantaneous travel, or causing real things or unreal people to appear. In the third set of miracles, the Shehu, while being completely remote, answers the prayers of people in distress or in need of rescue. Finally, the Shehu was attributed with the foretelling of future events. Examples of these categories of miracles are related in the following textual material.

Wakar Karamomin Shaihu (Hiskett, 1971:74-5)
When the people begged him for a sight of the jinn,
They gathered together and came to his house.
He took them to Kankwanbile and the jinn
Appeared there, they gathered because of him.

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[25] Vide, Edgar, 1911a:269-70, for a story in which it is said that all the events leading up to the jihad and the course of the war itself were 'revealed' to him by Allah.

Jama'a da tar rokai ganowa aljanu,
su sunka tattaru sunka zo su gida nasa
Yaz zo da su Kwankwanbilo dada aljanu
Nan sunka bayyana, sun yi taro don nasa.

Ibid., (84-5)
Then again, Bello went to Kanoma, truly
He led a great company there because of his zeal (in Holy War),
When the fight was fierce, when he thought of Shaihu there,
Quickly the warriors obtained the victory because of Shaihu's rank.

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Kuma Bello ya zo can Kanoma, hakikatan
Attabu yak kai cana, don himma tasa
Da fadansa yai tsanani, da yat tuna Shaihu nan,
Maza sunka san fathi da alhurma tasa.

Ibid., (94-5)
(Yunfa, Sarkin Gobir, had dug a well and covered it to deceive the Shehu and let him fall into it.)
He (Yunfa) called him so that he might sit upon it, the Shaihu
came and sat down, looking at him,
Also, he fired a musket at him there, so it was said,
It backfired on him, it burned his gown.

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Dada yak kirayai don shi zamna, Shaihu kau
Yaz zo shi, yaz zamna, shina dubi nasa
Kuma ya buga mai can bindiga, anka ce
Tab birkite mai cana, tac ce tufa nasa.

Tarikh al-Sokoto (Hajji Sa'id, trans. Whitting, n.d.:6)
Then they went on and encamped at Ghuwakak, (Here) also the people were violently thirsty, and the Commander of the Faithful took his lance and struck it in the ground, saying to Mash, who was in charge of his water (supplies), 'Dig here'. He dug a little, and the water welled up.

Litafi Na Tatsuniyoyi Na Hausa (Edgar, 1913:397-9; Skinner, n.d.II:2)
Then there was a horse, that kicked like a mule (lit. 'like a scorpion). And they suggested to the chief that he should get his malam to come and give this horse a thorough inspection. 'For if the horse takes it into his head to kick him, we shall be rid of him.' Now this horse would let no one approach him, much less stroke him. But the malam went up to him and stroked the whole of it, even right under its stomach; and it didn't even put its ears back, let alone kick or bite. And so the malam returned home, to Ruggar Fakko, and resumed his life there.

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Akwai wani doki, mai-harbi kamar kunama. Sai suka

che, 'Kirawo Malamin nan naka, ya zo, ka che ya duba ma ka dokin nan duka; in ya so ya harbe shi, mu futa.' Shi kau, dokin nan, ba mai-raɓuwa tasa, balle ya shafa shi. Sai Malam ya tafo, ya shafe jikin doki, har ga mara; doki bai kashe kunne ba, balle shi shura, balle ya chiza. Sai Malam ya komo gida, nan Ruggar Fakko, ya yi zamansa.

Regarding the Shehu's mystical visions, we can probably discount Hiskett's speculation (1973:68) that perhaps this was the result of the ingestion of kola, or possibly other drugs together with fasting. Studies of millennial activities (Worsley, 1957; Wilson, 1973) have shown that mystical experiences need not have physical referents in this sense. However, Hiskett himself has provided other suggestions which are more sociologically based and are much more useful. The first of these suggestions is the need of the Sudanic Islamic community for their continuing identity (151). Even during the life-time of the Shehu, his community had begun to see themselves as a distinct sub-order of the Qadiriyya with its own wird, or esoteric litany, shrine (provided by the death of the Shehu) and the miracle tradition surrounding the Shehu. Thus, by stressing the miracle tradition in folk-lore, the Islamic community expressed their own religious uniqueness and solidarity. The second factor which increased the importance of the miracle tradition was the need to perpetuate, after the death of the Shehu, the social order which he had fought for. By his life, which was thought to be favoured by divine election, the Shehu justified not only the

jihad, retrospectively, by its very success, but also the social and political order which was to exist for generations to come.

Relations between the Shehu and the court of Gobir had been degenerating over the years. Succeeding kings had become suspicious of the intentions of the Shehu, and the Habe malams, who had the ear of the Sarki, had their own plans as pointed out by Last (1973:lxxvi): '...there were undoubtedly a large number of Hausa malams or scholars within these states which had had a Muslim tradition for several centuries already. Being, however, within the framework of their society, they had ties which prejudiced their assessment of it; they knew the limits of their position and were prepared to accept the status quo.' This is illustrated in the following text (Mischlich and Lippert, 1903:577):

> At that time none of the Hausa kings judged according to the Sharī'a. There were also many learned malams with them, but they did as the kings wished.
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>
> Amman fa sa'an nan sarakunan Hausa duka ba su yin hukumchin sharia. Akwai kuwa malamai marya--marya ma su karatu da yawa tare da su, amma abin da suka so, shi suke bi.

It might be possible, then, to assert that the established Hausa Islamic scholars feared Fulani competition and any curtailment that this might mean of their incomes.

The situation climaxed with a proclamation by Sarkin Gobir Nafata which forbade three things of the Muslims: (i) no one but the Shehu could preach, (ii) no one could be a Muslim except he whose father was one, and (iii) no man could be seen turbaned and no woman veiled.

Finally, Sarkin Gobir attacked the muslim settlement at Gimbana. These events led to hijra, or flight, which in imitation of the Prophet, was made a requirement of Muslims by the future jihad leaders and was tantamount to a declaration of war.

The Shehu, in a justification for the jihad, entitled Kitab al-Farq...[26] listed many of the sins and faults of the old regime for which necessitated the jihad. These charges fell into four main groups: oppression, corruption, self-indulgence, and technical offences against the Islamic code of behaviour.[27]

The opponents of the jihad, and hence, of Islam, fell into five categories as the text below illustrates: kāfir (kufarā), 'heathens'; murtaddūn, 'apostates'; muhammalūn, 'backsliders'; muhāribūn, 'war-mongers, trouble-makers'; and bughāt, 'oppressors' (Bivar, 1961: 240-241):[28]

(xi) And that by assent the status of a town is the status of its ruler: if it be Muslim, the town belongs to Islam; but if he be heathen the town is a town of heathendom from which Flight is obligatory;(29)
(xii) And that to make war on the heathen king who will not say 'There is no God but Allah' is obligatory by assent, and that to take the government from him is obligatory by assent;

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[26] Kitāb al-Farq bayn wilāyāt ahl al-islam wa bayn wilāyāt ahl al-kufr.

[27] These charges are specified in great detail, first in regard to the blameworthy customs of the people: excesses, miserliness, hatred, obstinacy and impiety, in Manhaj al 'Abidīn (El-Garh, 1971:27-68); and secondly in regard to government in Kitab al-Farq...: improper succession, illegal taxation, forbidden personal behaviour, forbidding the veiling of women, and so on.

[28] Cf., The Risala of Abu Muhammad (Edgar, 1911a:317-8).

[29] This assertion is repeated in the Shehu's Tanbihu'l Ikhwan (Palmer, 1914:53: 'The government of ~~a country~~ is the government of its king without question.'

(xiii) And that to make war upon the heathen king who does not say 'There is no God but Allah' on account of the custom of his town (bi sababi 'urfi 'l-baladi) and who makes no profession of Islam, is (also) obligatory by assent; and that to take the government from him is obligatory by assent;
(xiv) And that to make war upon the king who is an apostate (al-malik al-murtaddu), and who has abandoned the religion of Islam for the religion of heathendom is obligatory by assent, and that to take the government from him is obligatory by assent;
(xv) And that to make war against the king who is an apostate--who has not abandoned the religion of Islam as far as the profession of it is concerned, but who mingles the observances of Islam with the observances of heathendom, like the Kings of Hausaland for the most part--is (also) obligatory by assent, and that to take the government from him is obligatory by assent;
(xvi) And that to make war upon the backsliding Muslims (al-muhammalīn min al-muslimīn) who do not owe allegience to any of the Emirs of the Faithful is obligatory by assent, if they be summoned to give allegiance and they refuse, until they enter into allegiance;
(xvii) And that the anathematizing of Muslims on a pretext of heretical observances is unlawful by assent;
(xviii) And that the anathematizing of Muslims for disobedience (takfīr al-muslimīn bi 'l-mu'āṣr) is unlawful by assent;
(xix) And that residence in enemy territory (fī bilād al-ḥarb) is unlawful by assent;
(xx) And that refusal to give allegiance to the Commander of the Faithful and to his deputies is unlawful by assent;
(xxiii) And that to make war upon the heathen to whom peace has been granted (al-kuffār ahl al-āmān) is unlawful by assent; wrongfully to devour their property is unlawful by assent, and to enslave them is unlawful by assent;
(xxiv) And that to make war upon the congregation of the apostates (jumā'at al-murtaddīn) is obligatory by assent, and that their property is booty (fai'un), and that in the matter of their enslavement there are two opinions, the widespread one being its prohibition, and the other that the perpetrator of this act does not disobey (the law) if he is following an authority which asserts its lawfulness;
(xxv) And that to make war on the congregation of the war-mongers (juma'at al-muḥāribīn) is obligatory by assent, and that their enslavement is unlawful by assent, and that their property is booty;
(xxvi) And that to make war upon the oppressors (al-bughāt) is obligatory by assent, and that wrongfully to devour their property is unlawful by assent, for 'Use is made of their armour against them, and afterwards it is returned to them' (no source for this quotation), and their enslavement is unlawful by assent...

The tradition of the mujaddid, 'reformer/reviver',

in the Sudan extends several centuries as was seen in the discussion earlier of al-Maghili. The Shehu, in echoing al-Maghili regarding the necessity of the mujaddid stated (Hiskett, 1971:104-5):[30]

He said, 'In truth, a Revivalist will appear
In every century', pay heed to his words.
Whoever meets with him and does not preserve
Allegiance (to him), he shall not obtain the blessing
of his (divinely given) rank.

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Ya ce, 'Hakika Mujaddid na bayyana
Hakkan ga karni duk', ku lura batu nasa.
Kowa fa yag gamu nan da shi, bai kau tsare
Caffa, ba ya sam barkacin girma nasa.

It is impossible to separate as distinct aspects of the mujaddid, the 'reformer' (forward-looking, adjustment or change), and the 'reviver' (backward-looking, returning to forgotten ways) as Willis (1967:395) attempts to do. It is clear from the majority of writings that have been left from the protagonists of the jihad that it is a timeless fight, attempting to achieve religious perfection of personal and political life. Finally, portions of two poems by the Shehu illustrate his obsession with reform (Robinson, 1896:62-3; 76-7):

You who steal the earnest money (will be punished) unless you repent; deceit is the kingdom of the heathen.
Leave off playing darra (31) and deceit, o Mussulmana; leave off drumming and going about with bad women.
Those who go to sit in the place of intoxication behold that which is unlawful, they refuse to repent.

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30 The Shehu wrote many works concentrating on reform of the faith in the Sudan, including: Kitab al-Farq..., Sirāj al ikhwān, and Bayān al-bīda' al-shayṭānīya which was an orthodox Malikī tract concerning prohibited innovations.

31 A game of dice.

Da masutabin amana sai ku tuba da tsalumshi sarota nan ta asna
Ku ber na darra da tsalumshi musulmi kidda molo ku ber yawo da karma
Da masuẓawa mashaya don su ẓamna suna dubi haramu sun ki tuba.

Though thou desirest to be king in this world, thou knowest that thou shalt be down alone in the tomb.
Consider the great kings, there to-day in the next world they have nothing.

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Kadan ka so ka malika duniarga ka san kai dai ka kwan--tawar kushiwa
Ka dubi sarakuna duka maiamaia suna shan a lakhira yo ba su kowa.

Numerous interpretations have been given as to the reasons for which the jihad was waged. Not least among them are the views of the Shehu himself, listed above. Bello, his son, similarly expressed his views (Inf. M., 122-3): 'Now the reasons for which we waged this holy war were two. First, in order to repel attacks upon ourselves, our families, and our faith...And the second reason for our jihad was that they were heathens, the people of Hausa.'

Among contemporary analysts, the interpretations are much less consistent. Trimingham, for instance, states that the Shehu '...from 1786 preached the jihad in such a way that it became a racial as well as a religious war; (it)...differs from the other jihads on account of the number of nomads who joined in' (1962: 162). Gowers, on the other hand, has another interpretation: 'The jihad was the raising of the standard of revolt by Othman dan Fodio against the tyranny of the non-Muslim rulers of Gobir, in defence of his co-

religionists, whether Hausa or Fulani' (1921:10). Hodgkin (1975:51) takes a more intellectualist and reformist view of the matter in stating that the jihad was part of '...the secular process by which the ideas and institutions of Islam have been established, renewed, and spread in Africa south of the Sahara, from the period of the Almoravids on.'

In order to arrive at some sort of consensus regarding the reasons for the waging of the jihad, a closer examination must be made of the religious justifications for the holy war and also, the ethnic composition of the opposing sides. Keeping in mind these various interpretations as reasons for the jihad, M. G. Smith asserts (1966:410): 'Such divergent opinions might well reflect differing personal appraisals of the Fulani performance as a ruling stratum, since the jihad, and especially during this century' (emphasis supplied).

The jihad was launched against rulers who claimed to be Muslim, although they had become lax in observance. The point of contention, then, both during and after the jihad was that of the alleged heathenism of the Habe rulers. However, as might be expected, there is more than one kind of heathen. Referring back to al-Maghili, the grounds for heathenism are three. Firstly, one is a heathen by descent; secondly, he who is an apostate; and lastly, he who claims to be a Muslim, but acts otherwise. Clearly, from the point of view of the third condition, the

jihad seems to have been justified. By way of contrast, Jibrīl ibn 'Umar, the most important of the teachers of the Shehu and a strict fundamentalist, listed eight major sins which constituted unbelief (Last and al-Hajj, 1965:233): (i) not keeping the Shari'a; (ii) nakedness in front of women; (iii) mixing with women in public; (iv) depriving an orphan of his property; (v) having more than four wives; (vi) inheriting the widows of a kinsman; (vii) loosely interpreting the law without the backing of scholars; and (viii) following the pre-Islamic practices of one's ancestors. Although the Shehu abandoned the strictness of these teachings, the reforming spirit, which had developed in the Sudan over centuries, was important in the formation of his own ideas.[32]

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[32] Consider the strictness of Jibril ibn 'Umar in the following quotation in which he condemns the Sudanese as a whole as heathenistic (Bivar and Hiskett, 1962:128):

'...know that one who considers the people in the
Sudan, nay, one who takes note,
Will see nothing from them except him who claims Islam
with an ample mouth,
Covering himself by fasting and prayer against his being
accused of most foul sins;
He is in truth an obvious unbeliever, because this is
clearly forbidden.'

The Shehu, on the other hand, refined further the concepts of disobedience and unbelief, as will be demonstrated in the course of this discussion. Regarding the Islamic framework of those whom Jibril is condemning, the Shehu recognises different factions in his Naṣā 'ih al-ummat al-muḥammadīya (Hiskett, 1962:[illegible]): '...And I say--and success is with God--the Satanic parties which have appeared in these Sudanese countries are four: the first party is the party which denies (the existence of) unbelief at all in the Sudanese countries; the second party is the party which anathematizes on the grounds of belief; the third party is the party which anathematizes on the grounds of disobedience; and the fourth party is the party which follows blameworthy customs.'

However, in due course, the attack upon the Muslims by the Gobirawa eliminated the necessity of arguing, in isolation, whether or not they were heathens. By the very fact of their attack, the Gobirawa admitted, as far as the Muslims were concerned, their heathenism.

Turning to the question of ethnicity, although Johnston ultimately rejects the hypothesis that the jihad was fought for 'racial' reasons, he gives great support for why it might have had much to do with it. First of all, he asserts that the number of non-Fulani who took part in the jihad, at least initially, was small (1967:95), while the number of settled Fulani who were hostile to the cause of the Shehu was itself small (97). With these statements as his premisses, he continues to state that because of the overwhelming preponderance of Fulani in the movement, the Hausa were daunted from joining (Ibid.). This is in addition to the economic argument that if the Habe joined in the movement and it failed, all of their property would have been confiscated and their farms lost. Later, however, when the jihad appeared to be won, Johnston asserts, the Habe helped fight in great numbers on the side of the Shehu and subsequently made a '...significant contribution to the success of the jihad and the creation of the new empire'(98).

In examining the ethnic composition of the Islamic community, or jama'a, as well as the composition of

the armies which fought in the jihad, it is necessary to see to what extent the leaders of the jihad, in their own writings, considered the war one that was fought on ethnic grounds. Last states (1967:lxxvi, n.49) that: 'the term "Hausa", and its variation (e.g., Kado, Habe) are rarely used in the literature of the jihad' (cf., Last and al-Hajj, 1965:237). In fact, what few references that do exist support the contention of an Islamic community which included many Hausa malamai and commoners. Abdullahi dan Fodio, the brother of the Shehu, attested to this fact in a poem composed at the beginning of the hijra (1963:110):

And we are an army victorious in Islam,
And we are proud of nothing but that.
Tribes of Islam--and Turubbi is our clan
Our Fulani and our Hausa all united,
And among us other than these, certain tribes joined together
For the help of God's religion--made up the union.

Last (1967:17) attempts to approximate the relative numbers of Fulani and non-Fulani students and 'helpers' (ansar)[33] at Degel. He found that the percentage of non-Fulani 'helpers' was about nineteen percent, and about twenty-three percent of the students were not of Fulani origin. Although these percentages may seem small, the community itself, in the early days was small. Regarding the ethnic composition of the armies themselves, Last (1967:27) states that: 'Both armies were mixed racially...' (emphasis my own). In addition

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[33] This Arabic word refers to the 'helpers' of the Prophet Muhammad.

to the Haɓe who followed the Shehu, there were also Tuareg to be found. As with the jama'a at Degel, so too with the armies, Last estimates them to be about five to one Fulani to Hausa (and Tuareg). However, Hiskett states that (1973:77): '...the popular support the Shehu received came from an Islamic undercurrent that ran through all levels of Haɓe society--the result of a slow process of Islamic acculturation over preceding generations.' It may be accurate to say at this point that while the jihad may have been primarily conceived and fought by the Fulani, it was fought against the Haɓe rulers and not against the Haɓe commoners, many of whom took to the cause of the Shehu and Islam. Many did not join owing to the economic risks involved (destruction, confiscation, and loss due to non-production while fighting).

The cattle Fulani who fought the jihad on the side of the reformers, were in a sense settling old scores with the Haɓe rulers. The pre-jihad Hausa states were basically agricultural. However, as the Fulani moved east, passing through Hausaland in search of new pastures, they came into conflict with the farmers of the area. The Fulani herdsmen were subsequently heavily taxed, restricted in their movements, and occasionally victims of violence by Haɓe chiefs who were protecting not only their own interests, but the interests of their agricultural subjects.

The goodwill of some of the commoners was certainly

lost due to the need of food for the armies of the jihad. However, as the tide of the war slowly swung the way of the armies of the Shehu, more and more Hausa committed themselves to fighting on the apparent winning side. By the time that the capital of Gobir, Alkalawa, had fallen, the army of the Shehu was heterogeneous. 'The community by the end of the first jihad was a diverse group: the original community had been joined by others who did not share the standards which the early reformers expected of Muslims (Last, 1967:59).

In summary, while the early community was predominantly Fulani, it was no exclusively so, in fact not all Fulani were for the war or the Shehu at all. As the war progressed and the reformers made some significant victories, more of the Habe farmers joined the ranks. While there were quasi-ethnic reasons for fighting this war, as far as some factions were concerned (for example, the pastoral Fulani), these were directed towards the rulers of the territory and not towards the agriculturalists.

Much of the justification, or refutation, of the reasons for which the jihad was initiated was argued in a series of correspondences between the Shehu, Bello, on the one hand, and the Shehu of Bornu, Muhammad al-Aminu al-Kanemi. Al-Kanemi, who never formally took ultimate control over Bornu with the fall of the Sefawa dynasty, was nevertheless the head of state.

The letters which were exchanged between these Islamic scholars dealt primarily with issues discussed earlier in this chapter on the nature of belief and reasons for the jihad. The charges made against Bornu were three (Last and al-Hajj, 1965:238): (i) that Bornu was polytheistic; (ii) that they aided the pagan Hausa chiefs, thus making them pagans by association; and (iii) they attacked the Muslim Fulani who fought in self-defence. The replies of al-Kanemi were twofold: (i) although the people of Bornu were superstitious, they were not heathens; and (ii) they were the ones fighting in self-defence. Although the argument remained inconclusive, owing to the death of the protagonists, it is interesting to note that the Bornu reason for fighting the Fulani was the same as one of the reasons (as stated by Bello) for which the Fulani were fighting the Habe chiefs, that is, self-defence. Moreover, al-Kanemi made some accusations of his own (Inf. M., 103):

> In truth we have heard news of the character of Shehu son of Usuman son of Fodio and we have read his books. If it is a fact that what you are set upon is a project of the Shehu's mind, well, formerly we believed Shehu's character was noble, but if that is so then his character is not noble.

In answer to this, Bello replied (Inf. M.:109):

> Again you say of Shehu you used to think his character a noble one but now you see that is not so. You are mad in saying this. Your mind is deranged. Know you al-Kanemi that all you have said against us is not so. God is our helper against you.

And so the argument continued: the one side accusing the other of unbelief and each maintaining their

allegiance to Islam.

It is an important correspondence from the point of view of Bornu because it attempted to undermine (by contemporary account) the reasons which were put forward by the Shehu and others to justify their waging of the jihad.

Turning now to the short and long term successes and failures of the jihad, the fighting was virtually over with the fall of the Gobirawa in 1810, although war still went on in Nupeland, Ilorin and Adamawa for many years. Many of the old Habe rulers and their supporters went north to the present-day Republic of Niger and settled in and around Maradi and Zinder. From these outposts, they continued to raid the Sokoto Caliphate through the nineteenth century. To attempt to stem these attacks, the Caliphate established frontier outposts, or ribāts, at strategic points along the northern border. As Last states (1967:79-80): 'The establishment of ribats was a part of the policy of stabilising the frontiers and providing strongholds round which settlements could flourish despite the raids of the Kebbawa, the Tuareg, the Gobirawa, and their allies in Zamfara.'

However, many of the administrative and military problems that the successive Caliphs of Sokoto had to deal with were internal. First of all there was open internal strife. As Hiskett describes (1973: 108): '...ethnic tensions, largely submerged during

the common struggle of the jihad, now began to emerge to split the unity of the Muslim community.' In these civil wars, Kebbi and Hadejia split from the empire and there were many other attempts, for example in Zaria. However, the new Caliphate had other problems in maintaining itself, many of which were not openly violent, but just as potentially lethal.

The effects of the jihad can be divided into two categories: political and religious. On the political front, the jihad failed to completely sweep away the former system of administration. One reason for the failure of reform in a political sense was the lack of effective communications which were necessary owing to the very success of the jihad in a military sense and the immensity of the Caliphate. Another reason for this failure of political reform is in the freedom which Islamic law, and in particular the Maliki school of law practised in the Caliphate which allows for some degree of local variation. Islamic law also allows for considerable discretionary power (siyasa) in the hands of the individual rulers or Emirs (Levy, 1957:248). This, in the wrong hands, easily allows for decisive power to be concentrated at the throne rather than through the traditional system of delegated subsidiary officials. Additionally, old corrupt practices returned simply because, rather than change the political system along Abbasid lines,

as was originally intended, the new Fulani overlords kept the Habe political structure of hierarchy to the extent of retaining many of the titles.

Although it might be easy to blame the corruption of the political system on the failures of its individual rulers, it might also be said that it failed to reform because of the complexity of the system. On account of poor communications between the Caliph at Sokoto and the individual rulers in each of the emirates, a certain degree of autonomy was necessitated which often ran counter to the position of the Caliph (for example, in the case of Zaria where several Emirs were dethroned by Sokoto because they had exceeded independent limits).

Evaluating the success or failure of the religious aspect of the jihad is more problematical. It is not necessary to be as harsh as M. G. Smith in assessing the situation when he asserts (1964:180): 'While Habe observance of Islam before the jihad left much room for reform, there is such evident continuity under the Fulani that those who justify the jihad may well regard it as a substantial failure, while those who justify its results imply that the jihad was an error of judgement.' The jihad did have the effect of making the considerable corpus of Islamic literature available to a wider segment of the population. Whereas before the jihad, Islamic learning was confined to a small scholarly class, literate and artic-

ulate in Arabic, in post-jihad Hausaland, many previously untranslated Islamic works were made available in the Hausa script known as ajami.

The jihad also had the effect, to a limited extent, of ameliorating injustices owing to a more strict application of the Shari'a. It also went some way toward eliminating many customs not tolerated in Islam. In Wakar Bagauda reference is also made to the reform of Islam in Kano in verse (Hiskett, 1965:119):

Sulaimanu drove out (Alwali) and seized the chieftainship.
He reigned a full thirteen years.
He brought Islam, he drove out heresy.
He administered the Shari'a unswervingly.
There was no seizing of virgins, no confiscation
And no sprinkling of dust on the head with the Rodio family. (34)

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Sulaimanu ya korasa yai sarauta.
Ya shekara goma sha uku mai cikewa.
Da Islamci ya zo ya kore bid'a.
Yana shari'a da ba ta da karkacewa.
Da ba kamen budurwa, babu waso,
Da babu afin kasa gun Hodiyawa.
(Hiskett, 1964:549)

There is also a Hausa proverb which summarises one of the stated aims of the jihad, that of the application Shari'a and the avoidance of syncretism (Whitting, 1940: 76):

Sabo da arne shi ya kawo chin yankansa
Familiarity with the pagan causes eating what he has slaughtered; i.e., that being forbidden to a Moslem.

In addition to the wider dissemination of the rel-

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34 Afi, sprinkling dust on the head as a gesture of inferiority to a superior, was recorded by al-Bakri and by Ibn Battuta in Mali in 1352 A.D. (Vide, Gibb, Ibn Battuta, 1929:327).

igious and legal works of Islam, a great number of scientific tracts were translated from Arabic. This had the effect of introducing to Hausaland formerly esoteric ideas in cosmology, chemistry and physics. Although never converted to Islam completely, the Maguzawa and other predominantly non-Islamic groups were influenced by these ideas.

In conclusion, whatever were the political and administrative failures of the reformation signalled by the jihad, religiously and intellectually, the jihad while certainly not completing its aims, was a limited success. Some measure of success may be accorded to the Shehu and his followers on account of the greater implicit influence that Islamic and Arabic ideas had on the lives of the people of Hausaland.

VI

As this chapter has shown, the Hausa, far from being a culturally autonomous and homogeneous group of people, have been subject to the historical oscillations of power in the Sudan and to the movements of ideas and people. Politically, the people occupying the Hausa states have profited from and have been devastated by fluctuations in trade and the migrations of people by virtue of the fact that the Hausa were medial between the great empires of Songhay and Mali in the west and Bornu in the east. Primarily through trade, the Hausa people have technologically profited by the

exposure to Arabic ideas through the Islamic religion. And, although the success of the jihad is problematical, it did increase the exposure to these ideas in addition to the supplanting of the Haɓe rulers. All this has had a complex effect on Hausa social institutions. Just what effects these influences have had is the subject of subsequent chapters.

The praise of the Shehu is still sung today. In the song below, the Shehu is seen as the 'modern' uniter of all the Nigerian peoples (Richards, 1972:154-5, 159):

Song of Independence:

The great land of Shehu Dam Fodiyo,
Nigeria upholds the truth;
The great land of Shehu Dan Fodiyo,
Nigeria upholds the truth.

Baba (35), Nigeria is the mother who never deserts
But gives her milk as nourishment every morning;
The great land of Shehu Dan Fodiyo,
Nigeria upholds the truth.
(song continues)

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Waƙar Indefenda:

Babbar ƙasar Shehu ɗan Hodiyo

Najeriya ta tsare gaskiya
Babbar ƙasar Shehu ɗan Hodiyo
Najeria ta tsare gaskiya

Uwa ba guda Baba Najeriya
Ba da nono take yi sha sahe duk
Babbar ƙasar Shehu ɗan Hodiyo
Najeriya ta tsare gaskiya

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35 Member of the chorus of Sarkin Tabshi, the drummer.

CHAPTER TWO

SARAKUNA AND SUCCESSION

Starting from the point that leadership among the Hausa may be connoted by the term sarki or 'chief' (pl. sarakuna), this chapter begins by attempting to demonstrate that in addition to denoting the leader of a territorial entity (be it Caliphate, Emirate, town, or Habe kingdom), the term connotes the qualities of leadership and authority. Sarki refers to authority possessed in several spheres of activity at once: political, kinship, and religion. Having established the semantic field of 'authority', this chapter then attempts to survey the emirs and emirates, kings and kingdoms, and Caliph and Caliphate, in order to arrive at an understanding of the structure of the highest offices in traditional Hausaland. In this way, the territorial, judicial, religious, and administrative functions of authority will be examined. What this chapter neglects in terms of descriptions of the processes of political authority, the next chapter, which is devoted to the titled subordinate officials (sarautu, sing. sarauta), will explore more fully.

Discussions of the structure of political authority in the first half of this chapter are aimed towards the subjects of succession and deposition in the latter part of the narrative. It is argued here that succession to leadership in the Hausa emirates and kingdoms was

predicated not only on the assent of the higher authority of Sokoto (in the case of the Caliphate) but also on the consensus of the ruling families and titled officials of each emirate or kingdom. Interference with or negation of these premisses leads to an abrogation of the legitimacy of authority and a withdrawal of the necessary consensus.

I

The Hausa term by which the ruler of each of the emirates and kingdoms is known as Sarki.[1] This term is also used in reference to the Caliph at Sokoto. The term refers to leadership at different segmental levels of political authority as an antecedent to a place name or group name. Thus, for example, the ruler of Katsina Emirate is called Sarkin Katsina. Similarly, at lower hierarchical levels, the leaders of towns are known as Sarkin 'X'. Additionally, the title Sarkin Sudan is applied to the seniormost person within the royal family of Sokoto, not necessarily being the reigning Caliph (Last, 1967:109).[2]

Outside its political referent, the term Sarki is used in oral traditions in an hierarchical setting

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[1] Throughout this text, titles, as proper names, will not be underlined, but distinct from the general concept, 'sarki' which will be underlined.

[2] This title has been revived recently after years of disuse and is today held by Alhaji Shehu Malami, Sarkin Sudan Wurno, who is the district head of Wurno (outside Sokoto) and a descendant of the Shehu (Machet, 1975:1075).

either to compare personal qualities or relative strengths and weaknesses of people and things. This is illustrated in the following proverbial expression (Fletcher, 1912:26):

Sarikin yawa ya fi sarikin ƙarfi
The king of numbers is more than the king of strength. Numbers tell. The big battalions win.

Hausa tales are rich in the symbolism of comparative hierarchy employing the term sarki for this distinction. The following portions of texts below are examples (Skinner, n.d.II:179, 180, 187; Edgar, 1911a:1-2, 291-2, 155-6):

The speed king and the dodging king went on a journey together. There came a storm as they were in the bush. Said speed to dodging 'What shall we do about this storm here in the bush?' (They then devised plans which typified the characteristics of 'speed' and 'dodging'--R.P.B.).

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Da sarikin zafi da sarikin baudiya suka gama tafiya, sai hadari ya taso ma su a chikin daji. Sai sarikin zafi ya che da sarikin baudiya, 'Kaka za mu yida wannan hadari a chikin daji?'

Here's the tale of the kings of thinness of Sokoto and of Wurno. An argument arose as to which of them was thinner. Some said the Sokoto man, some the Wurno...

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Ga ta na ke na ta Sarikin Rama na Sakwato, da Sarikin Rama na Wurno. Anka yi ta gardamassu, ana chewa na-Wurno ya fi rama. Wasu suche na Sakwato ya fi.

The king of greed came upon the king of meanness cooking. The [illegible] had boiled and was bubbling when the king of greed said 'Peace be upon you.' The king of meanness looked, saw him, but didn't even answer his salutation...

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Amma: Da Sarikin rowwa da Sarikin kwadayi. Sarikin kwadayi ya iske Sarikin rowwa, shina dafuwar nama. Tukunya ta tafasa, tana bararraka, sai Sarikin kwadayi ya che, 'Salamu alaikum.' Da dai Sarikin rowwa ya duba ya gan shi, ko amsa sallama bai yi ba...

It can be seen in the above that the term sarki has a

wide fan of hierarchical referents which spread far beyond the political sphere.

The term sarki is also used in proverbial expressions (karin magana, sing.) which, while alluding to the hierarchical position of the political leader, are associated with positive and negative values in the society. These proverbs refer to the power of wealth and miserliness, arrogance and pomp, and peace and the unwanted responsibility of office. The following expressions illustrate, first the positive associations (proverbs, 1-3), then the negative (proverbs 4-8) associations of sarki (Whitting, 1940, pagination after Hausa proverb; expression 1 is from Abraham, 1962:785):

Hasarad doki sai sarki
lit. the loss of a horse is nothing to a sarki
Big loss is trivial to the rich.

Mu wuche (ma fiche) hakan nan dan sarki a kan jaki (25)
lit. we are above such(pettiness), a prince on a donkey; i.e., the really great can dispense with show.

Talaka ba shi che ma sarki babu (142)
A poor man will not say 'No' to a chief.

Sarkin da ya halachi Sarkin Musulmi shi ya halichi jaba (19)
The Lord who created the Sarkin Musulmi created the stink rat too; i.e., don't think you're the only thing the Almighty created.

Da dama sarki a bisa jaki (28)
Moderately, like the chief on a donkey; i.e., nothing to write home about.

Domin naman sarki na bisa karaga ba a hana angulu jewa (34)
You can't stop the vulture from circling because it is the chief's meat on the butcher's bench; a cat can look at a king.

Komi ka gani gidan sarki akwai shi a kasuwa (112)
Anything you see in the chief's house can be found in the market; i.e., anyone's purchasing ability is limited to what there is available.

Zama lafiya ya fi zama sarki (134)
Living in peace is better than living as a king; i.e., a cheerful countenance is a good omen of favours to come.

Referring directly to the importance of the sarki in local affairs, that is, the area of his domain, proverbs are used to symbolise the centrality of the sarki revivifying the town, emirate or kingdom. The following proverbs demonstrate the associations of the political area coming to life during the presence of the sarki and, on the other hand, 'dying' in his absence or his own death (Dalby, 1964:284, 286):

garii yaa mutuu
(a) 'the town or village has been abandoned (or moved to another site)'
(b) 'the soil is no longer fertile'
(c) 'the Emir, or local head (or other important person) has died'
(d) 'the new Emir or head is weaker or less powerful than his predecessor'
lit. the town has died

sarkii nee ran garii
'the Emir has brought life to the town or village', referring to the increased activity when the Emir returns to his capital after a long absence, or when he visits one of his outlying towns or villages.'
lit. the Emir is the life of the town.

The concept of sarki, denoting leadership or authority, is distinct from the concept of mai in its political sense denoting 'possession' or 'ownership'. Examples of the use of this term range from mai gida, the 'owner of a house' or household head, to mai kyau, 'owner of good' or a good person. Increasing this distinction, the concept of emirate leader is equivalent to the Arabic term Amir (English, 'Emir'), the full titles of which are Amir al-mu'minin, 'Commander of the Faithful', which applies to the caliph, and

Amir al-liwa', 'flagbearer', or Amir al-jaish, military commander. The last two titles can refer to the subsidiary emirate heads.[3]

The term or title, sarki, then, refers to leadership or authority in the political and social spheres at all levels. The term refers to seniority in the sphere of kinship within the royal family, positive and negative personal characteristics, and political viability.

By way of introduction to the next section on the authority of the sarki within his political sphere, his importance is illustrated in kirari (sing.), descriptive praise-epithets or songs, as well as in proverbs. The following descriptive epithets demonstrate both the socially sanctioned use of authority and its misuse. The first epithet, said of Abdulkarim, Emir of Zaria (1834:46) contains multiple allusions to the pursuit of truth by this Emir, a predisposition in his early childhood,[4] and his unexpected selection as Sarkin Zazzau (Gidley, 1974:92). The second example

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[3] Amir al-jaish, Amir jaish al-Islam or Qa'id are alternative forms. These titles belong, in Hausaland, to the heirs of Ali Jedo and Buba Yero of Bauchi. These two men, military leaders of the jihad, kept this title. This title was also given to other flagbearers who conquered territory for the Shehu, although these titles lapsed into disuse. However, as Last points out (1967: 56), the men who were the original emirs throughout the Caliphate were primarily scholars by orientation, rather than military men.

[4] It is said that when Abdulkarim was a baby he would only sleep at night after his mother had brought him out to see the stars, thus symbolising his pursuit of the truth.

is a full proverbial expression[5] referring to Sarkin Musulmi Abdurrahman (1891-1902) who, as will be seen later in the chapter, interfered with succession rules, thus precipitating the Kano Civil War (Whitting, 1940: 120):

Dan dazaki[6] mai assubahi, in ka fito gari ya waye
Morning-star, dawn bringer, when you come out, the day has begun.

Danyen kasko ba shi kai ruwa ban daki
Like an unbaked pot, which won't carry water to the back of the house; i.e., as untrustworthy as a broken reed.

The full praise song, below, illustrates the military power of Sarkin Kano Aliyu (1894-1903) who defeated the forces of Damagaram late in the nineteenth century. The reference is important in illustrating the symbols used in the association of this Sarki to his position within the Kano ruling line as well as his military proficiency (Gidley, 1965:37-40):

Great visitor, son of Abdu,
Water it is that drowns whoever goes against it,
It overwhelms even the expert ferryman,
Mighty conqueror, (7) Sire of Danrimi ruthless and cruel...

Captain of our spearhead, Giant among men,
Mighty conqueror, leader of our horse (8) and foot(9),
Who does not know Abdu's son,
The slippery slope, the downfall of the unwieldy.

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5 Danyan kasko, 'unbaked pot', is the praise epithet.

6 A play on gamzaki, 'Venus, as morning star'.

7 Later,'Hard to break and filling vast spaces with horses and men.'

8 The horsemen were clad in chainmail, helmets and plumes. Jigba is a special headdress, lit., 'sons of jigba'. Sulke is a suit of chain armour, lit. 'sons of chain armour'.

9 Dara is a type of fez headdress, lit. 'sons of dara'.

Babban Bako na Abdu,
Ruwa ka ci mai goddama,
Shi ya kan ci gwanin maifitonsa ma,
Wandara makaye uban Danrimi dagazau maketaci.

Uban yan jigba mijin maza
Wandara makaye, uban yan sulke da yan dara,
Wa bai san na Abdu ba,
Santsi kada mai nawa.

While a more complete discussion of the importance of kirari must await the following two chapters, the above completes the discussion of the symbolism associated with the sarki as head of a polity, centre of authority, and referent of various personal attributes.

II

Turning to the functions of the emir within his political setting, it can be seen that these functions are religious, ceremonial, executive, legislative, and judicial in scope. Specifically, Bello on more than one occasion outlined the duties of the sarki in the political, religious, and moral life of each emirate. The following provide the broad categories (abstracted from Inf. M.:105):

(1) Organisation and deployment of armies in each locale;
(2) Administration of justice according to the Shari'a;
(3) Collection of taxes and waqf (endowments);
(4) Protection of women against insult;
(5) Protection of Islam against adulteration;
(6) Punishment of wrongdoers;
(7) Aiding pilgrims and other travellers.

Concerning the responsibilities of the sarki in time of war, Bello was quite specific. In a letter to Ya'qub bin Dadi, Emir of Bauchi, the Caliph describes the duties of the emir in supporting a siege at Banagha against the Habe in the north (Bivar, 1959:339):

So who is disobedient, and diligent, him they must leave alone in his obedience and his diligence. Whoever idles and is lazy, him they must treat severely until he becomes active; and if he refuses, they must threaten him, until he is chastened; and if he is not chastened me of it (sic), and of his name, and his situation, and of his origin--except if he volunteers for the siege of Banagha.

Moreover, we have commanded them to have regard for those whom the Law has excused, for there is no way to interfere with them: 'It is not for the weak, nor for the sick, nor for those who cannot find the means to contribute, any sin, provided they be sincere towards Allah and towards his apostle...

Finally, in matters of leadership, Bello outlines seven principles which reflect his concern for enlightenment, flexible leadership, one tied closely to Islamic law, and most importantly for purposes of this chapter and the next, a government which selects qualified persons for political and religious office to act as a balance within the segmentary structure of emirate government. The work of Bello in question is his Uṣūl al-siyāsa wa kayfīat al-makhlaṣ fī umūr al-ri'āsa, 'The Fundaments of Statecraft and the Way of Deliverence in Matters of Leadership' (Martin, 1971:80-85):

The first principle is that the amir, the imam, or the wali should fear God, and should be a follower of the Sunna of God's Prophet...

The second principle is that the amir or the imam or the wali should be flexible, capable of granting pardon, able to forget rancor, inclined to generosity and tolerance...

The third principle is that the imam or the amir or the wali should always be craving for the company of learned men of religion and be intent on listening to their advice to him...

The fourth principle is that the imam or the amir or the wali should lay conditions on his administrators, above all, to be just. He should select them from among the best of his men, and should look into their doings at all times...

The fifth principle is that the imam or the amir or the wali should order the people of his state to do justice and goodness and avoid tyranny among themselves,

to love good and hate evil. The result will be that the character of the people and the administrators will be on the same plane as that of the amir...

The sixth principle is that the imam or the amir or the wali is the one who lays down for the people of his state their worldly and religious duties. And he is the one who fosters the artisans...and is concerned that the people have a trade...

The seventh principle is that the amir or the imam or the wali should deal gently with his subjects, and should put the leading persons among them in eminent positions, each according to his rank...

Since the jihad, the emirs have each been regarded as the chief Imam of their respective communities. In addition, as the leader of the religious community, the sarki is responsible for all appointments within the religious hierarchy. In the Haûe kingdom of Abuja, the Sarki is here too the head of the religious community. The citation which follows (Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi, 1952:78) illustrates the centrality of the Haûe Sarki in religious matters, in this case, the celebrations which occur at the 'Month of the Great Feast', Watan Sallah Layya (or 'Id al-Kabir).[10]

When the tenth day of this month comes, the Emir and the people go out again to the prayer-ground of Idi just as they did for the Lesser Feast, and when the prayers have been said, then the Emir has a ram brought up which he orders the Salanke to slay there on the prayer-ground, and one of the servants takes the carcasse to the Emir's compound...

The reason why the Emir has the ram slaughtered at the prayer-ground is so that every man may see that the prayers are ended, and may go home and kill his own ram according to the rites of Islam, for it is

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[10] Cf., the description of 'Id al-Kabir in Gobir, Sokoto Province (Boyd, 1977:593-4) which is also a ceremonial occasion for the symbolism of the Sarki waging war on the Fulani. See, also, Taylor and Webb (1932:115-31) on the Emir and Ramadan; and Madauci (1968:36-41) on the role of the Emir in the ceremonies of the 'Id al-Fitr.

said that any ram killed before the Emir's counts for nothing, and the man has sacrificed it in vain.

Judicial appointments were also subject to the scrutiny of the sarki. Paden states that (1970:170) within Kano Emirate between the years 1920 and 1955, the reasons given for vacating judgeship in five districts were given as follows: eighteen per cent dismissal, forty per cent transfer or promotion, fifteen per cent death, and twenty-five per cent unknown. Judicial offices were traditionally regarded as 'political' in the sense that succession and dismissal depended on the authority of the emir who was the repository of ultimate judicial responsibility. Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi in their narrative of life in Habe Zazzau and Abuja describe the court of the Sarki as follows (1952:78):

> In olden times there was no alkali, but anyone who had a complaint to make came before the Emir and told him of it. The Emir was always there in his compound with the Sarkin Fada and the rest of the Body Servants, and anyone with a grievance would come and tell him his trouble. If the matter was of no great importance, not a question of murder or serious wounding, then the Emir would deal with it himself. But if it were serious, the Councillors were consulted; and though there was no alkali, he would always seek the advice of the Chief Malams on questions of Islamic Law.

Finally, in addition to the legislative functions of the sarki which arose in the colonial era, he would traditionally be of central importance in the running of the state. This was on account of his being the chief administrator in his territory, appointing and dismissing officials who, if they were not kin, tended

to be his personal clients. This aspect of the position of the sarki will be elucidated upon further in this chapter.

At different levels, the scope of authority of the sarakuna appear either as boundless or as limited. In regards to the former, that the sovereign had absolute power is reflected in the following expression: 'The emir is the shadow of God' (Sarki zillullahi ne). This also reflects on the legitimation of the sovereign. However, in practice it was the latter, conditional and restricted form of leadership which was, and is, the case. The sarki acted within a segmental system. This restricted unlimited action from within in the form of royal factionalism, and without in the form of submission to the Caliph or Islamic law, for instance.

Specifically, the authority of each particular sarki was bounded in a number of ways: (i) the vassalage to Sokoto or Gwandu; (ii) the working of Islamic law (Maliki school); (iii) the limitations imposed by local tradition; and finally (iv) the vested interests of the Fulani, non-ruling, nobility. Smith observes that the limitations on the sarki were greatest in relation to the overlap on to the areas of the titled nobility (1964:169): 'Probably the king was only checked on issues of immediate importance to his senior officials, namely their appointments and tenure of office, their powers, decisions of war and peace,

successions to the throne, certain judicial issues, and changes in the state religion.' The authority of leadership, then, is bounded within the legal parameters of Islam and tradition.

Besides the limitations imposed upon the authority of the sarki, he was obliged reciprocally to his subordinate officials and to his subjects. On the appointment to office, the sarki would give to a new title-holder the symbols invested with the particular office and 'turban' him. In addition, to his subordinate territorial heads he promised defence from both invaders and internal oppressions. To the populace, talakawa, the sarki was the most important asymmetric reciprocal partner as shown by Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi for Abuja (1952:79):

> He bought canoes for the big rivers so that the people might cross, and built bridges over the smaller streams. He helped needy strangers and destitute folk with clothing and with food; he helped the poor to provide for the marriage of their children and for the naming ceremony, and when death came he would give the winding sheet.
>
> He provided gifts at the completion of the readings of the Koran; and when a young man had finished his first learning of the Koran, he was brought before the Emir who gave him a fez and a robe--but first he would see if the youth could read what was written on his writing board.

The sarki, while being limited in his authority by his superiors and inferiors, contributes to both by a share of taxes (in the case of an emir to the Caliph) and gifts to the commoners and power to subordinate chieftains and officials.

In writing on the subject of leadership and the

ways that authority is delegated and transmitted through the medium of kinship, it is necessary to distinguish two topics which are interwoven. The first of these topics is the dynasties which have arisen to regulate authority within the emirates and kingdoms. The second topic is the dynamic aspect of dynasties, namely, succession. Membership within the ruling dynasties which governed the Caliphate, emirates and kingdoms was based on patrilineal descent, but implicit in this organisation was the non-equivalence of siblings. This latter principle contributed towards extreme internal differentiation within the dynasties which, in turn, favoured some candidates over others in the dynastic competition which highlighted succession. As M. G. Smith points out (1960:103): 'In part this differentiation of siblings was based on differences of maternal descent and kinship, and this was formalised by inheritance. The children of two brothers were further differentiated according to the rank and wealth of their fathers.'

It is important to remember, however, that although the office of sarki is vested in particular individuals, rulers and competitors pursuing personal as well as dynastic ends, the competition for leadership is essentially a competition between groups (that is, dynasties) rather than individuals. Thus invested with office, members of the family of the sarki would one day be eligible themselves for that

office. This preliminary account of dynasties and dynastic competition and appointments serves to demonstrate the pivotal position of the sarki between competing groups of kin for centralised power.

The sarki, the centre of both government and dynasty, increased his own power and authority through the appointment of administrators who were his kin and whose investiture in office not only reinforced the position of the sarki but also helped to ensure his authority continuing in perpetuity through his descendants.

Except for such political entities as Abuja which successfully resisted the Fulani advances in the first half of the last century, and Kebbi which overthrew the Fulani overlordship, most of the ruling families of Hausaland today are descended from the flagbearers appointed by the Shehu to carry out the jihad in various regions of the Central Sudan. These original flagbearers are listed below (abstracted from Inf. M. and the Raud al-jinan of Gidado):

Abu Hamid	Zamfara
'Umar Dallaji	Katsina
Sulaiman ibn Aba-Hamma	Kano
Ya'qub	Bauchi
Ishaq	Daura
Ibrahim	all Bornu
Muhammad Manga	east Bornu
Buba Yero	land in Bauchi
Maijo	Kebbi
Muhammad Nema	'the west'
Musa	Zaria
Adama	Yola (Adamawa)
Muhammad al-hajj al-amin	Baghirmi

In the succeeding pages is given a description of

the ruling families in a few selected emirates and kingdoms. This is followed by the genealogies of the families examined. The genealogies are given exclusively for the period of the Sokoto Caliphate and, where available or applicable, before.

Kano is one of the few emirates for which there exists a more or less complete genealogy of its rulers from the time of its founder, in this case Bagauda, to the present day.[11] This completeness is on account of the Kano Chronicle.[12] Succession in this Emirate, both before and after the jihad, as in most other emirates was, for the most part, from father to son, between brothers, or from brother to brother's son or father's brother's son to father's brother's son. At the time of the jihad, there were six principal Fulani clans in the area of Kano which carried out the jihad in the Kingdom. Two of these clans, the Modibawa and the Sulibawa, figured subsequently

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[11] Prior to the arrival of Bagauda and his followers, the area was inhabited by a Hausa speaking group known as the Abagayawa who, according to Paden (1973:45): '...believed themselves to be descendants of a blacksmith named Kano, who settled near Dala Hill inside what later became Kano City.' The Abagayawa were later conquered by another non-Muslim Hausa speaking group, the Maguzawa, who were in turn conquered by Bagauda and his followers (Cf., Hogben and Kirk-Greene, 1966:184).

[12] The Kano Chronicle records the reigns of forty-two Habe kings of Kano (with one listed twice) and five Fulani emirs. The dates in the tables of the genealogies below represent those given in Palmer's edition (1928ii). Recent work, however, has suggested the need for revision of these dates in light of new evidence (H.F.C. Smith, 1970, 1971).

in succession to the emirship. These clans may be listed below together with some of their leaders at the time of the jihad (Hogben and Kirk-Greene, 1966: 197):[13]

(1) Modibawa, originally known as the Igilawa
(2) Sulibawa, under Malam Jemo
(3) Daneji, under Dan Zabuwa
(4) Yolawa, under Malam Liman Yafi
(5) Jobawa
(6) Dambazawa, under Malam Dabo

Although comprehensive and conflicting, king-lists are to be found for the Habe kings of Katsina, there exists not one comprehensive list of the relationships between the kings. The genealogy below lists the Fulani emirs since the jihad and up to the arrival of the British. Prior to the Fulani uprising, Katsina was a very important trading and intellectual centre. During the nineteenth century, there was only one dynasty.

Zaria (Zazzau) Emirate represents an important case in the competition which arises in dynastic succession. It is for this reason that Zaria will be examined in greater depth later in this chapter. In all, four dynasties competed for power in Zaria: Mallawa, Bornawa, Katsinawa, and Sulibawa. Although there was only one reigning Sulibawa emir, a clan member was considered for election to emirship on several occasions owing to the fact of their initial election in 1854. Sokoto became increasingly preoccupied with

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[13] For an account of the part that each of these clans played in the jihad, see Paden (1973:239-40).

the affairs of Zaria, virtually ruling the Emirate directly, choosing the successors to emirship, and at other times, deposing them. Neither Musa nor his successor, Yamusa, were ever turbaned as Emirs, but retained the status of Malam and remained deputies of the Caliph at Sokoto. Their greeting was: Allah ya gafarta malam ('Salutations Malam'), and never were they given the royal salutation appropriate to an Emir (Hogben and Kirk-Greene, 1966:221).

The Kingdom of Gobir which is now, together with Zamfara, partially subsumed within the Emirate of Sokoto was, prior to the jihad, the most powerful of the Hausa states (Inf. M.:12). The rulers represented in the diagram below are only those whose rule immediately preceded the Fulani overthrowal of their capital at Alkalawa in 1808.

Easily, the first impression made upon examining the diagram of Abuja kingship is the regularity of the rotation of royal office between two collateral patrilineal lines. The Habe ruler of Zazzau, Makau, came to Abuja in 1804 owing to the fact that the Fulani had driven him out of his capital city, Zaria. Makau was forced to flee to one of his vassal states, Koro. Here he found refuge from the Fulani horsemen on account of the rugged terrain. The old Habe royal line of Zazzau flourished in this kingdom which takes its name from its first sarki, Abu Ja. The following account by Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi illustrates the

ritual significance of the location and position of the prayer-ground in Abuja in light of the Haɓe defeat in Zazzau (1952:4):

> They fell upon the King of Zazzau, Muhammadu Makau, on Saturday the tenth day of the month of Zulhaji in the year 1804 whilst he was at the prayer-ground of Idi outside the town. Though Makau had many men with him, he was defeated, for they could not get back inside the town to arm, and he was forced to flee. That is why, when Abuja was built, the people had their prayer-ground inside the town...and that is why the Emir's Bodyguard and the Archers stand behind him, facing west, whilst he turns in prayer to the east.


The Haɓe rulers of Maradi are descendants of the pre-jihad Haɓe royal line of Katsina. They came to Maradi (which was formerly part of the Haɓe kingdom of Katsina) after their defeat by the Fulani under Umaru Dallaji. The defeated Hausa ruler, Magajin Halidu, is said to have committed suicide by throwing himself down a well in despair of his loss (Daniel, 1937; Urvoy, 1936:328). One might see in the situation of the Haɓe at Maradi a similarity to the position of the Haɓe refuge kingdom at Abuja. In addition to the fact that descendants of the Katsina royal line rule on former Katsina territory, the descendants of Maradi's first king, Dan Kasawa, are entitled, Chiefs of Katsina, not of Maradi (Smith, 1967:96). In Maradi, the Haɓe were capable not only of repelling attacks by the Fulani, but also, and unlike other Haɓe refuge kingdoms, were capable of carrying out the offensive themselves. Succession in Maradi was irregular involving many collateral lines.

Turning now to the genealogies of the Caliphs of

Sokoto and the emirs of Gwandu, the family which initiated them both was that of Muhammad Fodio, father of Usman and Abdullahi dan Fodio. Their descendants ruled the empire which, for administrative purposes, was divided into two sections, east and west, the direct lineal descendants of the Shehu ruling Sokoto, and those of Abdullahi, Gwandu. After the death of the Shehu in 1816, the split of the Caliphate was finalised with the accession of the son of the Shehu, Muhammad Bello, to the Caliphate rather than Abdullahi.

I. Kano

(a) the Habe Kings



(25) Abubakar Kado (1565-1573)

(21) Abdullahi (1499-1509)

(22) Mohamman Kisoki (1509-1565)

(27) Mohamman Zaki (1582-1618)

(23) Yakufu (1565)

(24) Dauda Abasama (1565)

(26) Mohamman Shashere (1573-1582)

(28) Mohamman Nazaki (1618-1623)

(29) Kutumbi (1623-1648)

(30) Alhaji (1648-1649)

(32) Mohamman Kukuna (1651-2; 1652-60)

(31) Shekarau (1649-1651)

(34) Bawa (1660-1670)

(33) Soyaki (1652)

(35) Dadi (1670-1703)

(36) Mohamman Sharefa (1703-1731)

(39) Yaji II (1753-1768)

(37) Kumbari (1731-1743)

(38) Alhaji Kabe (1743-53)

(40) Babba Zaki (1768-1776)

(41) Dauda Abasama (1776-1781)

(42) Mohamman Alwali (1781-1805)

(b) the Fulani Rulers

(Modibawa/Bomundube)

(Sulibawa/Basullube)

(1) Suleimanu (1805-1819)

(2) Ibrahim Dabo (1819-1846)

(3) Usman (1846-1855)

(4) Abdullahi (1855-1883)

(5) Muhamman Bello (1883-1892)

(7) Aliyu (1894-1903)

(6) Muhamman Tukur (1893-1894)

II. Katsina Emirate

The Fulani Emirs

(1) Umaru Dallaji
(1806-1835)

(2) Sidiku (1835-1844)

(3) Muhamman Bello (1844-1869)

(4) Ahmadu Rufai (1869)

(6) Musa (1882-7)

(5) Ibrahim
(1870-1882)

(7) Abubakar
(1887-1904)

III. Zaria Emirate
The Fulani Emirs

Mallawa Dynasty

(1) Malam Musa
(1804-1821)

(6) Sidi Abdulkadiri (1853)

(9) Abubakar
(1871-1874)

Sulibawa Dynasty
(7) Abdulsalami
(1854-1857)

Bornawa Dynasty

(2) Yamusa
(1821-1834)

(4) Hamada
(1846)

(5) Mamman Sani
(1846-1853)

(8) Abdullahi
(1857-71; 1874-79)

(11) Yero
(1888-1897)


(12) Kwassau
(1897-1902)

Katsinawa Dynasty


(3) Abdulkarim
(1834-1846)

(10) Sambo
(1879-1888)


IV. The Habe Kings of Gobir



V. The Habe Kings of Abuja




VI. The Habe Rulers of Katsina Na Maradi




* Rulers at Katsina

VII. The Caliphs of Sokoto



VIII. The Emirs of Gwandu



Having completed this preliminary discussion of the sarakuna at various locales and levels, it remains the task to give a more detailed account of the principles and processes involved in succession to the highest office.

III

Although the matter of succession to leadership is of fundamental importance in a discussion of authority in the emirates as well as in the practicalities of government, there is little in the writings of al-Maghili, the Shehu, Abdullahi, and Bello to guide in the selection of leaders. As was seen in the prev-

ious chapter, Usman dan Fodio criticised the Hausa system of sons succeeding to power. Therefore, having to rely on the new power base in the Hausa kingdoms, the powerful Fulani clans, election in the early Caliphate quickly became an oligarchical affair.[14] Formally, the device by which selection and legitimisation of the successor to the throne was brought about either to the Caliphate or to the emirates, was the Electoral Council or 'Kingmaker' council, sarakunan karaga.[15] In Sokoto, for instance, the following title-holders were incorporated in the Electoral Council: Waziri, Sarkin Yaki, Alkali, Magajin Gari, Galadima, Magajin Rafi, and Ubandoma (Johnston 1967:145).

By the end of the century, the composition of the Council of Electors had changed and expanded and consisted of the following title-holders in Sokoto in order of precedence (Hogben and Kirk-Greene, 1966:409).

(1) Waziri
(2) Sarkin Yaki of Binji
(3) Galadiman Gari
(4) Magajin Rafi
(5) Magajin Gari

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[14] As Paden asserts (1973:219): 'Among the Kano malam class it is Sabil al-salama, Diya' al-siyasat, and Diya' al-hukkam by Abdullahi dan Fodio, plus Ifadat al-ikhwan by Muhammad Bello that have been regarded as among the authoritative statements on succession.'

[15] Last gives different terms (1967:98): the territorial electors are known as sarakunan shawara, 'Emirs of advice', and the caliphal councillors are known as sarakunan karagga, 'Emirs of the throne'. The term for council is majalisa, from the Arabic majlis al-shura, the early Muslim council which elected the third Caliph, 'Uthman. The term used by Bello (in Sard al-kalam) for a general council is ahl al-mashura.

(6) Sarkin Kebbi of Yabo
(7) Ardon Shuni
(8) Ardon Dingyadi
(9) Barden Wamako

Of these electors, the choice of the first two, the Wazirin Sokoto and the Sarkin Yaki of Binji outweighed that of the other seven. In addition, as Hogben and Kirk-Greene observe (Ibid.): 'It is noteworthy that the ancestors of four of the above were granted flags by the Shehu, and four others were holders of offices created by his son, Muhammadu Bello.' Therefore, the Council of Electors throughout the nineteenth century were taken from those officials closest to Caliphal authority, and secondly, from the important territorial chiefs of the Caliphate. However, this second group did not include emirs of the subordinate emirates.

To summarise, the election of the Caliph at Sokoto developed from an initially informal affair involving the consensus of those closest to Caliphal authority to one in which a formal council of electors existed whose membership, protocol, and functions were more or less delimited. The latter council consisted of members who could be, for our purposes, divided into two broad groups. The first group, the territorial electors, were the leaders of the three groups who supported the Shehu early in the jihad. These were Fulani clan leaders who were given territorial offices (not emirates) after the jihad. On the other hand, the second group consisted of electors who were the important title-holders of the deceased Caliph's administration. In this

group, the pre-eminent official was the Wazirin Sokoto, whose holders were descended from Gidado, the first Wazirin Sokoto and brother-in-law of the Shehu. Excluded from this electoral process (officially at any rate, their influence depended more on their personalities than their positions) were the emirs and the Caliphal lineage. Together, in theory, these two groups of electors represented the community as a whole, but in practice, as will be seen in the course of this narrative, the electors represented the vested interests of the family of the Caliphs, both lineally and collaterally.

The qualifications for election to the Caliphate were simple: closeness of descent from the Shehu and seniority within that line of descent at the time of election. Of all the Caliphs who were elected until 1881, only one was not the eldest from any of the three eligible houses descended from the Shehu. This exception was Ahmad Rufa'i who was a son of the Shehu about two years younger than the eldest surviving son of Bello at that time. However, as Last points out (1967:99): '...such a preference for seniority or kinship was not thought to be invariable.' In fact, younger brothers such as Atiku in 1817, Bukhari in 1837 and Sa'id in 1877 could attempt to vie for the Caliphate. In addition, Umar b. Bukhari, whose father had not been Caliph himself,[16] attempted to

[16] The practice of electing only sons of past Caliphs is said to have been instituted by Sarkin Gwandu Halilu in 1842 ('Umar b. Bukhari, Tanbih al-ikhwan; Last, 1967:98).

rally support in 1859. Although none of these candidates were successful, the fact of their competition denies the construction of any seniority rule of succession to the Caliphate. None of these candidates could base their claims on the criteria of seniority or paternal succession, rather their claims were based on merit: Sa'id was renowned for his scholarship and piety; Bukhari was also a scholar and a poet; 'Umar b. Bukhari was an historian.

Therefore, the criteria of succession throughout much of the history of the Caliphate, ideally, was the closeness of lineal descent from the Shehu, seniority within that line, and paternal succession. However, as has been seen, while these criteria did govern the actual successions, they did not limit nor, apparently, discourage, the competition for election to the Caliphate.

One further qualification, ideally, was necessary for succession to the office of Caliph. The nineteenth century Fulani Caliphs were, as a rule, Islamic scholars and devout Muslims. As the office was also a religious office in the form of the chief Imam of the Caliphate, Islamic scholarship was also of importance in Caliphal succession. This is illustrated in the following tale involving Mamman Konni, who was a poet and Islamic scholar from Bodinga, near Sokoto (Hiskett, 1970:212). The text also sheds light on the selection procedure for the Caliph.

When the Sultan died it was the custom of the councillors to summon all learned and pious malams in the district to Sokoto and consult them as to who was best fitted to succeed to the throne. On the death of Abubakar Atiku (1837-42), Mamman Konni was among those summoned. A long discussion took place, during the course of which the claims of rival candidates were pressed. Mamman Konni took no part in this but sat silently listening. Eventually he got to his feet and addressed the company: 'God Most High has said that you should appoint the most learned among you to be your Emir. I am more learned than you and all your candidates, and it is I who should be the Commander of the Believers.' When the councillors demured he stalked out of the council chamber.

Turning now to the mechanics of succession in the emirates, it can be seen that a somewhat similar situation was in force. First of all, the case of Kano between the accession of Suleiman early in the jihad and 1893, when the Kano civil war was fought, illustrates familiar themes in succession to authority in the Emirates. The first Emir, Suleiman, was one of the original flagbearers, and was entrusted with the command of the jihad in Kano.

In spite of the fact that emirate succession was generally referred to Sokoto for confirmation, in Kano, '...it became <u>customary</u> for the descendants of the Kano flagbearers to recommend a candidate for appointment by Sokoto' (Paden, 1973:231; emphasis supplied). This is in remembrance of the meeting with the Shehu at which Suleiman was given a flag. However, as will be subsequently seen, by the end of the nineteenth century, this custom became abused. This led to the events which precipitated the Kano civil war, after which time the succession to authority became a local-

ised affair, with only nominal deference paid to Sokoto (Paden, 1970:176).

During the time in which the selection was made by the Fulani clan leaders in Kano (including the leaders of the Sullubawa, Jobawa, Yolawa, and Dambazawa clans) and then that selection recommended to Sokoto for conferment, Sokoto represented the agency of authority necessary for the investiture in office. Religious confirmation was also necessary through the Imam of Kano (Paden, 1973:232).

Therefore, the process of selection was, in fact, one of a tripartite legitimation. In the first instance, the leaders of the four major Fulani clans of Kano met, upon the death of an emir, and reached a consensus as to the successor. This legitimised the selection in terms of the kinship oriented localised base of power in Kano. Thereafter, the selection was referred to the secular overlord in the form of the Caliph and subsequently through the religious authority vested in the Imam.

Before the Fulani conquest, the kingmaker council in Kano was a rather large body. First of all, the leaders of certain families or clans from the most powerful Kano districts (for example, Dutse, Gaya) met to select a successor upon the death of the incumbent. This group was joined by the Kano Imam, the major ministers, and the Korama (market representative) who was a woman (Paden, 1970:176). Referring back to

Diagram I above, it can be seen that prior to the Fulani conquest, succession was, primarily, from father to son. The kin categories are distributed as follows:

Sons	21
Brothers	8
Brother's sons	4
Father's brothers	3
Father's brother's sons	1
Brother's son's son's sons	2
Father's father's brothers	1
Father's father's father's brothers	1

A different situation presents itself in the Fulani period in which the succession focusses on the succession of brothers. The distribution is as follows:

Brothers	6
Sons	2
Brother's sons	2
Father's brother's sons	1

However, as the table below (immediately succeeding page) emphasises for the twentieth century, if we take the entire range of candidates, there is a predominance of sons. This classification of kin is distributed as follows:[17]

Sons	6
Grand-nephews	4
Brothers	3
Cousins	3
Nephews	2
Uncles	1
Father's cousins	1

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[17] The kinship terms are those listed from the source cited. More precise terminology is not available.

Table I

Candidates for the Office of Kano Emir: Twentieth Century
(successful candidate is listed first)
(Paden, 1973:235)

Time of succession and Name of Candidate	Age	Relation to Incumbent	Experience
(a) 1919			
1. Usman	67	brother	D.H. Kura
2. Abdullahi Bayero	43	eldest son	D.H. Bici
(b) 1926			
1. Abdullahi Bayero	50	nephew	D.H. Bici
2. Abubakar Usman	50	senior son	D.H. Kura
3. Muhammad Usman	26	junior son	D.H. Ringim
(c) 1953			
1. Muhammad Sanusi	53	second son (eldest living)	In charge of all District Heads
2. Abubakar Usman	77	cousin	D.H. Kura
3. Muhammad Usman	53	cousin	D.H. Rîngim
4. Aminu Bayero	53	son	D.H. Bici
5. Muhammad Inuwa	53	brother	D.H. Dawakin Kudu
6. Hashim Abbas	53	brother	D.H. Kiru
(d) 1963 (April)			
1. Muhammad Inuwa	63	uncle	D.H. Dawakin Kudu
2. Muhammad Usman	63	father's cousin	D.H. Kura
3. Abubakar Sanusi	36	son	D.H. Bici
(e) 1963 (October)			
1. Ado Bayero	33	nephew	Chief of Kano police
2. Ado Sanusi	33	grand-nephew	Chmn., Northern Regional Marketing Board
3. Abubakar Sanusi	36	grand-nephew	D.H. Bici
4. Aminu Sanusi	34	grand-nephew	Fed. ministry of External affairs
5. Abbas Sanusi	30	grand-nephew	D.H. Kiru and Waje; Kano Council
6. Ibrahim Cigari	c.55	brother	D.H. Zakiri
7. Muhammad Usman	63	cousin	D.H. Ringim

Therefore, as can be seen in the above discussion, although proportionately fewer sons have been elected to the emirship in post-jihad Kano, a similar ratio to to Habe practice is seen in those who have competed for

the office.

Finally, and in contradistinction to the succession to the Caliphate, successful candidates in Kano have been drawn from all age groups. To take succession within this century alone, the above table shows the relative ages (in order of succession) to be: 67, 50, 53, 63, and 33. Of those competing, the age distribution is similar, with a marked accent towards youth in this century. Unlike Sokoto, election to the leadership of Kano did not tend to be restricted to the election of the seniormost of those eligible.

Succession in Kano, to a much greater extent than succession to the Caliphate at Sokoto, did not follow rigid lines either before or after the jihad. In general, all one might say is that a candidate was eligible if his father had held the title. It may be seen in this a tie with the election of the Fulani clan leaders. As Paden (1973:232) asserts: '...this (pattern of succession) has also been true in the succession to Fulani clan leadership and in the succession to leadership of the semiautonomous districts within Kano Emirate.'

Within other conquered territories, those not having the structural status of emirates, kinship was employed in succession, but was subject to irregularities as a new Caliph or emir would want to strengthen his own position by appointing his own direct kin. The text below illustrates this point in relation to

Gobir Na Isa which occupied an area between Sokoto and what remained of Gobir in the north. This area changed hands frequently in the nineteenth century owing to the relative military strength of each side. In this example, succession could proceed from brother to brother or from father to son, except when a new Caliph wanted to instal his own lineal relations (Skinner, n.d. III:67-8; Edgar, 1911a:233):[18]

> As for Isa, son of Bello entered it and took it by force. Mu'allaidi was with him, and he was appointed chief. But the Sultan appointed his son, Abdurrahmani, to be chief of Isa. (He held the title of) Chief of Gobir of Isa, and when he died, his younger brother Umaru succeeded. When Sultan Abdu died, Umaru came to seek confirmation of his appointment, which was not given him. Instead the Sultan appointed his own son. Then Umaru's younger brothers, Halidu and Shefu, Dan Bafada, went to Gangara, to Balarabe, Chief of Gobir, who restored them and drove out the Sultan's son, and made Halidu, the elder, chief.
>
> ***
>
> Kuma Isa, Aliyu, Dan Bello, ya shiga, ya kwache ta kuma. Muwallaidi shina nan hal ya chi sarautar. Sarikin Musulmi, kuma, ya nada ma dansa, Isa, Abdurahamani, ya chi sarautar. Sarikin Gobir na Isa, da ya mutu, kanensa, Shefu na Isa, ya chi sarauta. Da Abdu, Sarikin Musulmi, ya mutu, ya tafo bidar sarauta, bai samu ba, nada dansa. Kanensa, Halidu, da Shefu, Dan Bafada, suka tafi Gangara wurin Sarikin Gobir, Ba-Larabe, ya kawo su, ya kore dan, wansu ya chi sarautar Isa.

Fulani Zaria presents a different situation altogether, owing to the keeness of competition for emirship resulting from the proliferation of dynasties (four). What Smith (1960:110) describes as 'degrees of royalty' which determine eligibility for succession to the throne can be summarised by the following system of rules:

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[18] Skinner's translation is not a literal one.

(i) Successive kings should not be chosen from the same dynasty.[19]

(ii) Only the sons of kings were eligible for promotion to the throne.

(iii) Only those princes who had held or were holding territorial office were eligible for promotion to emirate leadership.

In an emirate in which there were more than one dynasty which was powerfully competing for the throne, the rotation of the emirship accomplished at least two important ends. First of all, it ensured a (more or less) orderly succession where violence could have settled the issue. In addition, it prevented reigning emirs from directly selecting favourite sons or relatives as successors to his authority or, in fact, from appointing too many relatives to the important subsidiary offices. Therefore, this type of multi-dynastic political competition, which was at all times supervised by Sokoto, served as an insurance against both civil war and unilineal absolutism. The strength of the grasp on the affairs of Zaria can be seen in the number and the circumstances of depositions of

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[19] A notable exception to this rule is the election of Mommon Sani in 1846 who succeeded to the throne upon the death of his half-brother, Hamada, who had ruled for only fifty-two days. This, in the case of Zaria, differentiated the concepts of lineage and individual succession, and emphasises the role of groups in emirate politics. As Smith asserts (1960:110, n.1): 'In this way, the Fulani of Sokoto and Zaria indicated their awareness of the distinctions between an accession and a reign, and between kingship and an individual and a lineage rule.'

emirs at the hands of the Sokoto overlords. This aspect of emirate and Caliphate authority will be examined in the next section.

Finally, this intense dynastic competition had the effect of differentiating royalty not only on dynastic lines, but also on intra-lineage lines. The two rules of succession regarding paternal succession and territorial overlordship, as M. G. Smith points out (1960:111): '...intensified the differentiation of descent-lines within the dynasties by giving an hereditary significance to the difference in the ranks of their members.' In this way, competing members for dynastic and emirate authority were distinguished by the lineal distance of emirship and by the importance of the territorial headship. Without the successive generational links, the internal differentiation of dynasties by rank continued unabated. One method of reintegration of the differentiated sub-lineages was through intermarriage. This aspect of succession in Fulani Zazzau, reflects an aspect of inheritance in Hausaland generally.

Differentiation in inheritance developed through ɗakuna, 'huts' (sing., ɗaki). This subdivision of inheritance through half-brothers supported intra-lineage competition and thus, contraposed ɗakuna and agnatic descent. However, at the same time, as will be seen later in the narrative, a preference for cross-cousin marriage permitted the reintegration of property

rights as inheritance lines were fused. In these two ways, then, succession to high office and inheritance, lineages and lineage segments are fissioned and fused as politics and kinship are intertwined. This is exemplified to a high order in the discussion of succession in Abuja.[20]

By way of comparison, in pre-jihad Katsina, although there was a council of electors which included the title-holders: Kaura, Durbi, and Galadima, selection of a new sarki was left to 'supernatural powers'. According to tradition, the sarki was not allowed to die a natural death. Rather than letting the sarki, and hence, the community 'die' a prolonged death, he was said to have been strangled by a titled official known as Karyagiwa, 'the breaker of the elephant'.[21] Daniel (1937:2) continues the narrative of the choice of a new sarki:

> The new King was elected by the cast of a spear. The name of the candidate was called; the spear was thrown; if it remained upright, the nomination was confirmed. The new King was then laid, on a bed. A black ox was slaughtered over him so that he became drenched with its blood. He was then covered up with the hide and the bystanders slapped him with their hands crying, 'forget, forget'. Finally, the body of the dead King was placed inside the hide and dragged away for burial. (22)

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[20] The electing officials in Abuja are, according to Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi (1952:74): (i) Madawaki, (ii) Galadima, (iii) Wambai, and (iv) Dallatu.

[21] This title still exists in Katsina Na Maradi. Giwa, 'elephant', is a greeting when addressing a Sarki, Wambai, and Ubandawaki (Abraham, 1962:327).

[22] Nicolas (1975:147) gives a similar account to the selection procedure for Katsina Na Maradi.

This rite of passage stressed the continuity which was necessary for the 'health' (lafiya) of the community. The new sarki is brought from the dead as a person who presides over a perpetuity of office. The use of a spear to determine the successor to office emphasises that the selection of one who is the 'life' of the community is too important for human electors and is represented as being in the hands of supernatural agencies.

Having examined the mechanisms, processes, and results of the selection of the sarki both before and after the jihad established ruling houses over much of Hausaland, together with succession to the Caliphate, a number of points become apparent. First of all, and most importantly, agnatic descent and political prominence are intertwined. The politics of influence within agnatic groups was the core of the Caliphate and the emirates, in addition to the Habe kingdoms. This holds true not only in the matter of succession, but also deposition and disputed succession which will form the basis of the next section. The competition for authority is, in all three administrative systems, between dynasties (where they exist) and within ruling families. One result of the often intense competition at the Caliphate level, as well as the emirate level, was the progressive fission and fusion of families as they separated over successions and integrated in marriages. Although, at least nom-

inally, succession in the emirates was under the watchful eyes of the Caliph and his councillors, the selection which was forwarded was the product of family competition. The differences which might obtain in the different processes of selection in the Caliphate and the emirates were a matter of emphasis, the essential characteristics remained agnatic descent, and lineage seniority.

IV

As has been seen in the previous section, succession to emirate authority varied between theory and practice. Whereas in both the Hausa and Fulani systems, the office of sarki was theoretically open to any male relative of the deceased incumbent, that is, to any male member of the ruling lineage, in practice, certain restrictions evolved. Among these restrictions were: succession of the eldest or most qualified son, the holders of important councillor or territorial offices, and lineage seniority. This holds true not only for the Caliphate and the emirates, but also for the Habe kingdoms for the most part. Perhaps one reason for the absence of codification and rigidification of succession principles in the Sokoto realm lay in the observance of the Maliki school of Islamic law. As Smith observes (1965:277): '...under Maliki law, primogeniture, which is a Hausa principle as often breached as observed, enjoys no special recog-

nition. Maliki law does not prescribe direct transmission of paternal status, potestas, or property to one son to the exclusion of others.'[21] As much as certain emirs attempted to control their own succession in favour of particular sons, the project was doomed to failure.

On several occasions, a few of which are outlined below, disruptions in the organisation of emirate government were precipitated by disputes over succession and by the deposing of certain emirs. These, as will be argued, came about precisely because certain groups or individuals succeeded in influencing or forcing the matter of succession to emirship or high office not by legitimate means, hence at variance to the royal line, the community and Sokoto itself.

Implicit in the concepts of authority and succession is the concept of legitimacy and its relation to legitimate protest. Legitimacy, in the emirate sense, may be seen to be on a continuum between Weber's ideal types of traditional and legal authority. Authority is traditional because of the Fulani inheritance of the Hausa form of government, and legal on account of the influence of Islam. Weber's construction of the ideal type of 'charismatic authority' may apply to the legitimation of the authority of the Shehu and a few select others (for example, fellow jihadists, M. Sanusi, Sarkin

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[21] In fact, primogeniture is not a principle of any school of Islamic law.

Kano). To quote Weber himself on this matter (Gerth and Mills, 1948:78):

> First, the authority of the 'eternal yesterday', i.e., of the mores sanctified through the unimaginably ancient recognition and habitual orientation to conform. That is traditional domination exercised by the patriarch and the patrimonial prince of yore.
>
> There is the authority of the extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma), the absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership. This is charismatic domination, as exercised by the prophet or--in the field of politics--by the elected war lord, the plebiscitarian ruler, the great demagogue, or the political party leader.
>
> Finally, there is domination by virtue of 'legality', by virtue of the belief in the validity of legal stature and functional competence based on rationally created rules. In this case, obedience is expected in discharging statutory obligations. This is domination as exercised by the modern servant of the state and by all those bearers of power who in this respect resemble him.

In the anthropological context, Southall states that (1965:120): .'It is clear that political action usually takes the form of the exercise of authority, including both the giving and the receiving and implementing of commands'. This is relevant to the emirate situation as described in the previous sections and will be emphasised further in the next chapter. In the emirates, however, where there was, at least theoretically, the binding proscriptions and prescriptions of Islam, the legitimacy of authority took the special form of the notion of legitimate protest. One of the functions of the malam class in this system was to maintain the balance of the legitimacy of authority. Therefore, short of apostasy in which the ruler should be immediately overthrown, in Islamic Hausaland, leg-

itimacy was premissed on the assertion that the ruler was administering justice according to the Shari'a. However, for the emirates, authority may be withdrawn by their overlord, the Caliph at Sokoto.

Zaria has known several deposings commanded from Sokoto. It was Sidi in 1860 who was first deposed and for numerous reasons as Smith reports (1960:164):

> Until this date, no king of Zaria had been deposed. Nor had Zaria ever deposed its own vassals. Even the concept of deposition was unfamiliar. But Sidi had alienated his own lineage, his vassals, and his hakimi (officials), by imprisoning Muhammadu Baki, by giving Ali command of the army (both of whom were brothers), and by his treatment of Durum (abrogating its vassal status). His unusually harsh sentences in court had also frightened many, and his armies were absent from Zaria...Thus beside his lack of political support, Sidi was also without military force at the moment.

The rule of Sidi was short (less than a year), but it established a dangerous precedent of the suzerainty of Sokoto over the internal affairs of the subsidiary emirates which were increasingly becoming autonomous. Abdullahi was the second Emir of Zaria to be deposed (1871), although he was later reinstated by a later Caliph in 1874. The primary reason for his sudden removal (without legal process) was his revival of the claim of Sidi for autonomy for Zaria, and this became the reason for his second deposition in 1879. The fourth deposition of a Zaria Emir was Sambo (in 1888). The reason for his deposition, unlike both of the depositions of Abdullahi, was again for reasons of the failure to govern effectively and to the support of his dynasty.

The risks of authority in Zaria were great. A

fine line separated deference to Sokoto, the maximisation of authority in the ruling dynasty, and the sharing of offices with the other dynasties. To summarise, Abdullahi and, in part, Sidi, were deposed owing to their challenge to the authority of Sokoto. On the other hand, Sambo and Sidi were dethroned on account of their failure to govern effectively, their legitimacy being withdrawn even from their own dynasties. Zaria, then, provided a precedent and a test case for an even more serious challenge to the authority of Sokoto, that of the Kano civil war.

The events which led up to and precipitated the Kano civil war (in 1893) are complicated. Concentrating on the illegitimate use of Caliphal authority in the matter of Kano succession, the oral tradition below describes the sequence of events (Skinner, n.d.III:89-92; Edgar, 1911a:187-91):

> When Abdu had been Sultan of Sokoto for three years, Bello, Emir of Kano, died, and this concerns what followed. On the Thursday that Bello died, the Vizier of Sokoto, Buhari was in Kano city. The people collected and informed the Vizier 'Today the Emir has died.' And he answered 'Very well. Now, you people of Kano, which do you prefer--Tukur or Yusufu?' And the people answered the Vizier 'We should prefer Yusufu.'
>
> Then the Vizier sent a letter to the Sultan, in which he said 'Greetings to the Sultan. After greetings, the people of Kano say that they would prefer the emirate to go to Yusufu.' But the Sultan replied 'Tell the Vizier to appoint Tukur emir.'
>
> The messenger returned and said to the Vizier, 'The Sultan says to appoint Tukur emir.' And the Vizier answered 'Tell the Sultan again--the people of Kano have gathered together and said that if Yusufu is not made emir, there will be great dissension among them.' But the Sultan replied 'Tell the Vizier that if Tukur is not appointed emir, the Vizier will no longer be my friend.'

So the Vizier rose one night and put the turban of emirate on Tukur, saying 'The Sultan has bidden me appoint you emir, for the help you gave him in the war with Argungu.' And Tukur thanked the Vizier.

...Then the chief slaves and members of the emir's family gathered and said to Yusufu 'Since you have not been made emir, let us move completely from this town, and let us take the emirate by force, by war.'

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Sarikin Musulmi, Abdu, ya chi sarauta, ya shekara uku, Sarikin Kano, Bello, ya mutu, ranal Alhamis, Wazirin Sakwato, Buhari, yana nan a chikin Kano. Mutanen Kano sun taru, suka che da Waziri, 'Yau, Sarikin Kano ya mutu.' Ya che, 'To! Ku mutanen Kano, wa ku ke so tsakanin Tukur da Yusufu?' Mutane suka che da Waziri, 'Mu, dai, mun fi son Yusufu.'

Daga nan sai Waziri ya aike da takarda wurin Sarikin Musulmi. Ya che, 'A gaida Sarikin Musulmi. Bayan gaisuwa, mutanen Kano sun che sun fi so a ba Yusufu sarauta.' Sarikin Musulmi ya che, 'A gaya ma Waziri a ba Tukur sarauta!'

Manzo ya komo, ya che da Waziri, 'Sarikin Musulmi ya che a ba Tukur sarauta.' Waziri ya che, 'A sake gaya ma Sarikin Musulmi, mutanen Kano, fa, sun taru, sun che, in, dai, ba a ba Yusufu sarauta ba, za su rabuwa biyu.' Sarikin Musulmi ya che, 'A gaya ma Waziri, in dai, ba a ba Tukur sarauta ba, ni, kuwa, sai mu bata da shi.'

Sai Waziri ya tashi da dare, ya nada ma Tukur sarauta. Ya che da Tukur, 'Sarikin Musulmi ya che a ba ka sarauta domin ka taimake shi yakin Argungu.' Tukur ya che da Waziri, 'Na gode.'

...Manya manyan bayi da manyan yan Sariki suka taru, suka che da Yusufu, 'Mu, dai, tun da ba a ba ka sarauta ba, mu fita bayan birni, mu zamna, mu kwache sarauta da karifi da yaki.

It is plain in the above account that in Kano, unlike the problems of succession in Zaria, that it was Sokoto which was acting illegitimately. The Caliph acted in contraposition to the stance not only of the ruling families of Kano, but also of a sizable portion of the Kano populace and the Wazirin Sokoto. The Caliph, by interfering in Kano's succession, precipitated the civil war, which in due course, effectively terminated the suzerainty of Sokoto over Kano.

By way of comparison, a somewhat similar situation

occurred almost seventy-five years later with the deposition of Emir Sanusi of Kano, whose independent ways got him embroiled with the Premier of the Northern Region of Nigeria, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto (Paden, 1973:267), whose power he rivalled. As Paden asserts, with both crises in mind (376): 'The two crises in Kano reflect the ambiguity over whether Kano authority was autonomous or responsible to a higher authority. The question of multiple authorities is not dealt with explicitly in theoretical literature in Kano.' The ambiguity which was never resolved in Zaria, in Kano was temporarily resolved (until the coming of the British) in autonomy for Kano. In other words, legitimate succession was the victor over illegitimate interference with succession and over deposition.

On the other hand, as in the case of the Kano civil war, recognition by the supreme authority of the Caliph could be withdrawn from an emir. However, this refusal to recognise the Caliph did not have to take the form of open civil strife. In the nineteenth century, the emirs of the provinces were obliged to pay yearly homage to the Caliph, thus confirming their vassalar status. During the reign of Sarkin Musulmi Abdu (Danyan kasko[22]), several emirs refused to make

[22] As Last points out (1967:127): 'The oral tradition, in which the nickname is always used, concentrates on his propensity for executing people for little or no reason.' In general, he was an ineffectual Sultan, coming to the throne at the age of 62.

this annual visit to the Caliph at Sokoto. The signif-
icance of this is illustrated in the following text
(Skinner, n.d.III:32-33; Edgar, 1911b:349-350):

The Emir of Misau, who was called 'Mai-Manga' went and bought a brown ram and a white ram. Says he 'The white ram is Abdu 'Unbaked Pot', the Sultan, and the brown ram is me,(23) Emir of Misau, Mai-Manga. Now if the Lord God has destined me to conquer the Sultan, the brown ram will knock down the white ram.' And he put them to fight each other.

For he was refusing to visit Sokoto to pay homage to Sultan Abdu, 'Unbaked Pot'. Well, the two rams set to, fighting, and the white one butted the brown one, and the front legs of the brown one gave way and he knelt. Then said Mai-Manga 'So the Sultan is stronger than I. Then, even if I don't go in person, I'll send a representative.'

So that year he wouldn't go, nor would he for several years after. Nor was he the only one. For Aliyu, Emir of Kano, and Abubakar, Emir of Katsina, and Kwasau, Emir of Zazzau, and Mai-Gardo, Emir of Daura, and the Emirs of Kazaure and Hadeja, and Umaru, Emir of Bauchi, and the Emirs of Katagum and Adamawa--all these refused to go to Sokoto and pay homage during the reign of Sultan Abdu, 'Unbaked Pot'. For he was an evil man, and that was why they refused...

***

Sarikin Misau, ana che ma sa, 'Mai-manga', shi ya zo ya sayi rago ya, ya sayi rago fari. Ya che, 'Ragon nan fari, shi ne Abdu, 'Danyen kasko', Sarikin Musulmi; jan ragonga kuwa, ni ne Sarikin Misau, Mai-manga. Idan Allah, ubangiji, ya aza ni bisa ga Sarikin Musulmi, ragonga ja shi bugi farin nan, ya fadi.' Sai ya gamu su fada.

Nan kuwa ya kizowwa Sakwato, wurin Sarikin Musulmi, Abdu, 'Danyen kasko', garin mubaya'a. Sai suka rika fada, su ragunan nan. Sai ragon nan fari, sai ya buge ja sai kafafun jan ragon nan na gaba, sai suka durkushe. Sai Mai-manga ya che, 'I, Sarikin Musulmi ya fi ni karifi. Im ban je ba, ina aikawa.'

Shekaran nan ya ki zuwa, har ya yi shekaru bai zo ba. Ba ko shi kadai ba; da Sarikin Kano, Aliyu, da Sarikin Katsina, Abubakar, da Sarikin Zazzau, Kwasau, da Sarikin Daura, Mai-gardo, da Sarikin Kazaure, da Sarikin Hadeja, da Sarikin Bauchi, Umaru, da Sarikin Katagum, da Sarikin Adamawa; duka zamanin Abdu, 'Danyen kasko', Sarikin Musulmi, kinzowwa suka yi Sakwato, garin mubaya'a. Abdu, 'Danyen kasko', mugun hali gare shi, shi ya sa suka kizuwa...

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23 Emphasising the hierarchy through colour symbolism; see Ryan (1976).

As this section has shown, succession in the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate was a combination of the legitimate use of authority, both traditional and legal. Tied to the notion of the negative use of legitimate authority were the notions of protest, interfered succession, and deposition. As I have argued in the case of the deposed rulers of Zaria, either they became unable to govern because of dissension within their own dynasty or within the multidynastic power-sharing base. Failing these reasons, the reigns of two emirs (one twice) were abrogated owing to their illegitimate call for autonomy from Sokoto. In all cases, the attempts failed. Kano, on the other hand, succeeded on account of Sokoto's own illegitimate actions which brought not only a large proportion of the court officials to the side of the wronged party, but also large segments of the populace to wage civil war. In the end, then, kinship and authority, ruling families and political relations, were fused and became fissionable in succession.

V

The qualities of leadership denoted and connoted by the term sarki have now been outlined. In addition, it has been asserted that the absence of these qualities leads to possible deposition, succession and maintenance of office being predicated on their presence. The importance of these issues in modern Nigeria are

not to be underestimated. As Paden observes (1973: 313), competition for high office in Kano, either municipally or regionally, is based on the same principles: 'The patterns of succession resulting from... seven elections...were not significantly different from the patterns evident in emirate succession--a combination of dynastic principles and nondynastic political manipulation.' The principles governing succession, in whatever form, weave kinship and political authority so that political relations and affinal and consanguinal links become fused while other relations become fissive along lines of inheritance and succession in the political sphere. There is not <u>one</u> set of rules, historically or synchronically, in Hausaland governing inheritance or succession.

The next chapter will examine the same topics of succession and hierarchical balance for the subsidiary office-holders, the <u>masu sarauta</u>.

CHAPTER III

THE SARAUTU: GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES

This chapter investigates further the workings of government in the pre-jihad Haƀe kingdoms and the emirates of the post-jihad period. The previous chapter, which focussed on the centralisation of authority in the person of the sarki or emir, serves as a complement to the present one. Here, the discussion centres on the segmental, pyramidal, and hierarchical aspects of the structure of government within the kingdoms, emirates, and the Caliphate. The orientation of this chapter is to enable a comprehension of the different kinds of social relationships which interact in the political sphere to create and maintain complex political structures. In addition to a detailed discussion of the centralised governmental and territorial offices, or sarautu,[1] this chapter will be devoted to studying the decentralised aspects of territorial organisation.

I

The term, sarauta, in the Hausa language (Abraham, 1962:783) refers to 'being the ruler, having sovereignty or an appointed person to an official position.' Thus, sarauta actually refers not only to the administrative and territorial offices appointed by the sarki or emir, but also to the ruler himself.

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[1] Sarautu is the plural form of sarauta. 'Ownership' of a title, or 'office-holder', is termed mai sarauta (pl. masu-sarauta. When referring to the office-holders as a group, I will use the term in the singular, and to particular offices without the qualifier of possession.

In this way, sarauta signifies all official governmental positions appointed: the lesser officials by the emir, and the emir by a council of electors as discussed in the preceding chapter.

The term sarauta in the Hausa language, like sarki, refers to personal characteristics within the larger society. Thus, within proverbial expressions, karin magana (sing.), the term sarauta is used to express an hierarchical statement of value. The following proverbs illustrate this point (Abraham, 1962: 783):

Biki dai ba sarauta ba ne
lit. It is only a feast there is no sarauta
All is not gold that glitters.

Sarautar kura
lit. sarauta of the hyena
Mere self-seeking governing.

Talakan nan da sarauta yake
lit. This commoner is (acting as if) he was an office-holder
What airs this fellow gives himself.

Sarkin nan jin sarauta gareshi
lit. this chief is 'feeling' his office
This ruler is arrogant.

Expression of hierarchy within the various sarauta levels is also found in the terms which the Hausa apply to the planets within the solar system. In this system,[2] the Sarki is the Sun, the Moon is Dan Sarki (Chief's son), Venus is Uwar Soro (Head concubine), Magatakarda (Scribe) is Mercury, Yari (Head Warder) is Saturn, Ma'aji (Treasurer), Jupiter, and Dogari (Chief's Body-Guard), Mars (Hiskett, 1967).

[2] Presumably through historical times this system has been both terracentric and heliocentric.

At one level, that of the conscious model of the literati of the Hausa states, the model of post-jihad government was Islamic. In particular, the Islamic model in question is that of the Abbasid government which developed in the Middle East under Persian influence. This Middle Eastern form of government superseded the Umayyad system which was strongly centralised but much less bureaucratised than its successor. From these forms of Islamic government, modern Islamic constitutional theory developed. Indeed, as Hiskett (1973:135) states: 'The Abbasids took the process a stage further (i.e., the centralisation of government--R.P.B.) and created a court and administration that closely resembled that of the imperial Sassanid empire of Persia the Arab conquerors had overthrown.'

This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the history of Islamic government in the Middle East, but what must be kept in mind is the influence that these ideas had as they permeated the Sudan and accompanied the establishment of the early syncretist empires in this part of Africa. These topics were examined in greater detail in the first chapter. The importance of these events for the development of quasi or full Islamic states in the Sudan is reflected in the pluralism of Islamic states in North Africa and the Middle East following the declining influence of the Baghdad Caliphate from the thirteenth

century. Previously the empire had expanded to such an extent that its eventual break-up meant the delegation of authority on a smaller scale. As Hiskett (Ibid.) asserts:

> The jurists had to face the empirical situation and try to accomodate it within a theoretical framework of Islamic legality. They did so by evolving the theory that there could be more than one Caliph or imam...provided they were sufficiently separated by distance. They also evolved a complementary theory: delegation of authority that allowed the Caliph to delegate his powers to subordinates if the Islamic community became too large to be controlled by a single ruler.

This decentralisation of world Islamic authority not only allowed Islamic states in the western and central Sudan to develop independently of interference from northern Muslims,[3] but also allowed them to develop a syncretic state. And this, as will be seen, applies not only to the city-states prior to the jihad, but also to the Caliphate established at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The excesses of Islamic government in the Hausa states were condemned by the reformers. Shehu Usman dan Fodio reacted violently against the injustices of the Habe system of government as well as its syncretism. In his Kitab al-Farq..., the Shehu outlined the simpler form of government which he envisaged would return a Caliphal government to Islamic principles.

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[3] The invasion and short-term occupation by Morocco of much of the central and western Sudan in 1591 served only to emphasise the lack of cohesiveness on the part of the invaders, as well as the considerable practical difficulties of such a venture.

As a result, there were few titles in use during his tenure as Caliph. His prescription of government is seen clearly in the following quotation (Hiskett, 1960:569):

> Therefore do not follow their ways in their government, and do not imitate them, not even in the titles of their king, such as kukinnu and galadima and ubandawaki and dagi and barga and sarkin yari. Address your chief emir as 'Commander of the Believers', and the emir of each province as 'Emir of such and such a province', and the emir of each place as 'Emir of such and such a place', and the emir of each village an 'Emir of such and such a village', and him who has charge of God's statutory punishments as 'Emir of the statutory punishments'.

To set the stage for the ensuing discussion, the passage below gives an insight into the workings of government in Kano in the mid-nineteenth century. It comes from the explorer Heinrich Barth (1857ii:145-7):

> The authority of the governor is not absolute, even without consideration of the appeal which lies to his liege lord in Sokoto or Wurno, if the subjects' complaints can be made to reach so far: a sort of ministerial council is formed, to act in conjunction with the governor, which in important cases he can not well avoid consulting.

He then goes on to list several of the more notable office-holders and the functions of the office which will be elaborated upon in depth in this chapter.

> With regard to the government in general, I think in this province, where there is so much lively intercourse, and where publicity is given very soon to every incident, it is not oppressive, and there is, no doubt, a great deal of injustice inflicted in small matters. The etiquette of the court, which is far more strict than in Sokoto, must prevent any poor man from entering the presence of the governor. The Fulbe marry the handsome daughters of the subjugated tribe, but would not condescend to give their own daughters to the men of that tribe as wives.

The above quotation gives an excellent preliminary account

of the complexities of social rank in Hausaland.

Before turning to an expanded examination of the offices and their functions, it is necessary to return to a discussion of the ruling families from which most of the pre- and post-jihad office-holders were taken.

II

A large number of nomadic Fulani settled among the indigenous Hausa from about the sixteenth century (Hogben and Kirk-Greene, 1966:109).[4] Their erudition in matters of Islamic law and scholarship enabled them to become important administrative officials in the Habe city-states. The Fulani who settled in the towns, by virtual occupational monopolisation of many of the important administrative, judicial, and religious offices within the Habe kingdoms had increased their status and authority in what was becoming a pluralist society.

The position and composition of the Habe aristocracy at this time (that is, pre-jihad) is more difficult to discern owing to the lack of contemporary source material. One thing seems certain as Smith asserts (1959:241): '...the Fulani seem to have made less use of hereditary office in their government than the Habe.'

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[4] De St. Croix (1972:5) states that the Fulani emigrated from the thirteenth century to Hausaland. There is no documentation in de St. Croix for this assertion. While Fulani probably did come to Hausaland in small numbers from early times, they only came in large numbers from approximately the later date.

This can be seen in the succession to kingship in Haɓe Kano as contrasted with the succession to emirship in Fulani Kano. In the former, succession other than that from brother to brother and from father to son is the exception, whereas in the latter a more complicated kinship structure and meritocracy within the ruling families is in evidence. Nineteenth century Haɓe Abuja, which was never conquered by the Fulani, provides a useful parallel to political custom in the kingdoms before the jihad. Here, as was seen in the previous chapter, succession was clearly patrilineal with high office passing lineally from former office-holders. Succession to the free royal offices, that is, those that were not in the hands of eunuchs and royal slaves, depended on closeness of relationship to one of the two differentiated descent lines which held royal power each time selection of office-holders occurred.

Although the Daura Legend 'explains' the inception and rise of the ruling families in the Hausa Bakwai and the Banza Bakwai, it does not, as Abdullahi Smith explains (1970:337): '...answer the basic question of how a people operating segmented institutions of government came to substitute centralised institutions for them.' The Daura Legend is a justification for the ruling families which existed before the jihad rather than an historical document. Therefore, while a search for origins will lead nowhere, an examination

of the workings of the ruling families in government may prove profitable.

The Fulani, on the other hand, their overlordship being documented by copious contemporary sources give us a clearer idea of the nature and history of their ruling families. For the most part, the ruling families of each emirate are descendants of the flag-bearers of the jihad. Other important offices, especially territorial offices, were granted for services rendered during or after the jihad. In other words, in the Caliphal government and that of each emirate, there was a circular relationship between office and birth. The status of aristocracy qualified members by birth for political office and participation in office further enhanced their aristocratic stance and ability to gain higher office and wealth.

However, the circular relationship was far from being totally exclusive. First of all, commoners were never completely excluded from office. In fact, slaves held many of the important offices and amassed great wealth in the process. Secondly, owing to the high rate of death duty due on the death of titled office-holders to the emir or Caliph, the rate at which wealth was amassed by appointment was reduced. Thirdly, many aristocrats lost their ability to participate in government owing to the small number of offices and the large number of aristocrats. Concubinage and half-brotherhood proliferated the numbers

born of royal families. This increased the differentiation of lineage segments and denied office to certain of these lineage segments. Finally, later in the century, with the increasing difficulty in coordinating concerted action in the defence of borders, the security of slave property tended to diminish. The conditions of Fulani aristocracy and participation in government was not rigidified; a certain degree of mobility was necessary.

An important factor influencing the solidarity of the ruling families in the Sokoto Caliphate as distinct from the Habe city-states was the respective forms of marriage. Greenberg (1946:22) tells us that among the pagan Hausa, cross-cousin marriage (undifferentiated) is the preferred form of marriage. 'A joking relationship also exists between cross-cousins between whom, if they are of opposite sex, marriage is considered appropriate.' Greenberg also states categorically that there is an 'obligation' to marry outside the local patrilineal group.[5] Smith asserts (1961:344) that marriage was preferred between matrilateral cross-cousins, while for Greenberg a bilateral

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[5] Ibid.: 'Members of a sib have in common the name, a verse of praise recited at the marriage ceremony of one of its female members, an obligation not to marry within it, and a number of taboos against burning certain kinds of wood and killing or eating the flesh of certain animals. The idea of kinship between the forbidden animal and the members of the clan is not held; rather it is simply believed that if the taboo is broken, a series of swellings will break out over the entire body.' (Cf., Smith, 1961:344).

cross-cousin was sufficient. In contradistinction, the Fulani, more in keeping with Islamic practice, have patrilineages which were not exogamous. Marriage, for the settled Fulani at least, was nominally between the offspring of two brothers (FBD, FBS).[6]

This form of marriage allowed the Fulani to make, in essence, politically favourable patrilateral marriages thus enhancing one's own position as well as the solidarity of the ruling families (but also, possibly, its internal rivalry). In fact, although there is ambiguity as to who ideally is to be married, the Habe Emir of Abuja, on the other hand, clearly plays a role in the political selection of marriageable partners as is stated in the Chronicle of Abuja (Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi, 1952:55): '...the Emir has the right to arrange the marriage of any child born to the ruling houses.'

The societal differences which result from following either patrilateral endogamy or matrilateral exogamy are great in terms of the maintenance of solidarity at the lineage level. Although consistent marriage in the latter mode promotes a wider solidarity within the society as a whole (Cf., Lévi-Strauss, 1949) it

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[6] De St. Croix (1972:37) insists that this type of marriage is favoured by all Fulani: 'The type of marriage most favoured by all Fulani is that of first cousins: among the nomads generally, the marriage of a youth with his father's brother's daughter, and a youth with his father's sister's daughter, are favoured in that order: while the marriage of a youth to his mother's sister's daughter is not considered good, it is sometimes arranged.'

disintegrates the solidarity of the ruling family as a single entity. Wives must be drawn from outside the group, thus making the selection of 'political wives' increasingly more difficult. In the patrilateral variation, however, the patrilineal group remains a distinct entity through intermarriage and wives may be selected to enhance one's own or one's family's political position. As Keesing asserts (1975:145):

> '...in a system of lineage endogamy, kin will be related along multiple genealogical pathways due to the intermarriage of close relatives: a man and girl are likely to be related as the 'right kind' of cousins by some path. In marrying, they give social recognition to their patrilineal connection, rather than alternative relationships.'

In addition to the solidarity created and maintained by royal dynastic families intermarrying, other, non-dynastic aristocratic families increased their position in society and gained political and territorial office through marriage with dynastic families. In Fulani Zaria, for example, in addition to the royal families of the Mallawa, Katsinawa, Bornawa, and Suleibawa, other aristocratic families including: Yagwamara, Shanunawa, Dokajawa, Azbinawa, Zamfarawa, Wunjawa, Bebejawa, were of great importance politically. Members of these families held village appointments (dagatai, sing., dagaci, 'village head') and a few central government appointments in Zaria. While members of these families were usually clients of one or other of the royal dynasties, they proved more loyal

and more easily controlled than competing dynastic candidates. These client royal families thus were important as mechanisms to balance emirate power between the royal dynasties.

A detailed discussion of the structure and interrelationships of the leading ruling families of the Fulani period will now be presented. This will include not only an examination of administrative offices in the central government, but also the territorial offices and the relation between the two.

III

To begin the discussion of the structure and workings of the government of the post-jihad states, it is necessary tentatively to place, in general terms, the notions of administration and bureaucracy as they apply to our concerns here. We may initially take Weber's criterion of bureaucracy (Gerth and Mills, 1948:196-8) as comprising a set of rules or laws of administrative regulation. These rules govern three areas of the administrative field. According to Weber, first of all, the recurring and regular activities required of a political structure with bureaucratic administrative machinery are distributed in a more or less fixed way as official duties. Secondly, the authority necessary to issue commands required for the performance of the duties are also distributed in a stable way and is accompanied by rules delimiting

the means (coercive, sacerdotal, or otherwise) by which these commands may be implemented. Finally, provision is made for the regular and continuous execution of these duties and the corresponding rights by the appointed qualified persons. Tied to this, Weber finds an hierarchical regulating aspect. He states (1946:197): 'The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority means a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones.'

Simply put, then, a governmental administrative bureaucracy (as with any bureaucracy) is the allocation of administrative roles among qualified personnel, thus dividing the work and responsibility in a complex system. In addition, according to Easton (1959:228), this type of governmental machinery must be goal-oriented, as he states in the following quotation: '...there must be administrative processes or activities that will implement the decisions. Persons and facilities need to be initially organised and directed toward the attainment of the goals defined through the legislative process.'[7]

Increased political specialisation has certain advantages in government as Bailey (1969:80-1) points

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[7] That is, where there is a legislative process, otherwise in governments such as in the nineteenth century Hausa polities, through traditional, dynastic, consensual, or direct command from an overlord such as the Caliph to an emir.

out. First of all, and obviously, specialisation solves the problem of size. That is, a bureaucratic division of labour simplifies and routinises (to use Weber's term) the tasks of recruitment, maintenance, dispute settlement, decision-making and deployment of resources. Secondly, in dividing not only the work but leadership itself, the leader removes, to a greater or lesser degree, the possibility of a subordinate setting himself up as a rival. That is, as part of a specialised 'organism', a subordinate in a bureaucracy is usually not experienced in the workings of the whole structure.

Returning to the emirates in Hausaland, rivals to political power within the sarauta system do so, not individually, for reasons stated above, but within the dynasties and royal families of which they are members. Additionally, political relations were between offices and not individuals abstracted from their social standing. Therefore, while emirate government has some of the characteristics of Weber's typology of bureaucracy, it lies somewhere between his classifications of 'traditional authority' and modern bureaucratic authority. Weber himself discussed the character and development of these two kinds of authority. Setting aside certain of his notions such as rationality and impersonality which are normative and imprecise, this lengthy quotation is relevant to the present discussion (1947:315):

Bureaucracy first developed in patrimonial states with a body of officials recruited from extra-patrimonial sources; but, as will be shown, these 'officials' have originally been personal followers of the chief. In the pure type of traditional authority, the following features of a bureaucracy are absent: (a) a clearly defined sphere of competence subject to impersonal rules; (b) a rational ordering of relations of superiority and inferiority; (c) a regular system of appointment and promotion on the basis of free contract; (d) technical training as a regular requirement; (e) fixed salaries, in the type case paid in money. In place of a well-defined impersonal sphere of competence, there is (in traditional systems of authority) a shifting series of tasks and powers commissioned and granted by the chief through his arbitrary decision of the moment. An important influence is exerted by competition for sources of income and advantage which are at the disposal of persons acting on behalf of the chief or of the chief himself. It is often in the first instance through these interests that definite functional spheres are marked off, and with them definite administrative organs.

In spite of the differences between Weber's classification and the administrative bureaucracy of the Hausa polities, the sarauta system was organised through officially defined spheres of competence and responsibility with an ordering of hierarchic relations within the system. Finally, as these relations endured between offices rather than individuals, the character of the system could be said to be impersonal. Therefore, without the normative and ethnocentric approach of Weber's classification, within certain limits set, administrative authority in both periods of Hausaland could be said to be bureaucratic.

IV

Perhaps the best way to understand the complicated series of titles which comprise the sarauta system is

with reference to the interlocking oppositions by which they can be classified. These oppositions may be listed as follows:

(1) Islamic titles	non-Islamic titles
(2) Fulani titles	Habe titles
(3) Hereditary titles	non-hereditary titles
(4) Titles held by freemen	Slave titles
(5) Titles held by males	Female titles
(6) Military titles	non-military titles
(7) Titles held by eunuchs	non-eunuch titles
(8) Central government titles	Decentralised (territorial) titles
(9) Rukuni (lit. 'group', senior official)	Rawani (lit. 'turban', junior official)

No single title takes into account just one of these criteria, rather the categories overlap to present a governmental structure which is historically and hierarchically complex.

First of all, in examining the relationship between hierarchical office and kinship, it can be seen that the masu-sarauta are ordered according to their duties and closeness to the emir in political responsibility. So too in the royal families are kinship relations ordered according to the closeness of relation to the emir. Remembering that succession to the emirship in the Fulani period normally involved the two factors of: (i) father having been emir, and (ii) having held office oneself, the appointment of sons to office encouraged and legitimised the emir's allocation of office to his children ('yan sarki). That is to say, by appointing his sons to high emirate

office, the emir provided his dynasty with political continuity through creating eligible candidates for future successions to emirship. The importance of this cannot be underestimated in comprehending government in Hausaland during this period.


The centripetal nature of the political aspect of kinship in this system is seen in the hierarchical categories of appointable kin. First of all, in regards to sons, the emir tried to equitably distribute office among the sons of his various wives. Offices distributed in this way were referred to in Hausa as 'huts' (ɗakuna, sing. ɗaki). Normally, the emir was to appoint at least one son of each of his wives. Of the other kinsmen who were expected to be appointed to high office, full brothers had the greatest claim followed by half-brothers. Thirdly, jikoki (sing. jika) or grandchildren of former rulers, thus members of the same dynasty (in single dynasty polities) were also appointed. Fourthly, the emir was expected to appoint to lower office certain kinsmen related to him by cognatic descent, for example, a mother's brother or sister's son. Finally, the emir appointed certain affinal kinsmen, or surukai. This group included husbands of the king's daughters or sisters, and the brothers and fathers of the emir's wives. As Smith (1960:112) explains: 'These royal affines and cognatic kin were eligible for appointment to some of the offices to which the king's agnatic kin

were not usually appointed'; that is, the affines and cognates were not normally appointed to tne political core of offices.

Therefore, offices held by the emir's agnatic kin were classifiable according to their kinship status vis-à-vis their respective relationships to the emir. The sarautun 'yan Sarki, 'titles held by the sons of the king', were eligible because of their position to become eventual successors to the emirship. The jikokin Sarki, grandchildren of the king, were offices allocated to dynastic members who were not always themselves eligible for the emirship. Finally, offices allocated to affines, surukai, or dangi wajen mace, 'kinsfolk on the side of woman', formed a small, variable group of junior officials.


In the following diagrams, the relationship between consanguinity and affinity and appointed political office in Sokoto are illustrated. In the first, Gidado, the first Wazirin Sokoto and spouse of one of the daughters of the Shehu, Asma', gives rise not only to future Viziers, but also to other important Caliphal offices. In the second diagram, similarly, 'Umar al-Kammu, the first Magajin Rafi of Sokoto and close friend of the Shehu, gave his daughter to Caliph Bello thus contributing to the perpetuation of succession to office in his family. These two diagrams also illustrate the hereditary bias in Sokoto offices.

I. The Viziers of Sokoto and Leading Officials
(Last, 1967: insert)



Key: Block letters refer to the Vizier with dates of office; 1 = Dangaladima, 2 = Sarkin Fada, 3 = Wali

II. Succession to the Office of Magajin Rafi in Sokoto
(Last, 1967: insert)



Key: Numbers indicate the order of succession

In the table below, an indication of the way that this kinship principle in the sarauta system still functions in Kano Emirate is given. Now that more than six royal families are operative in the political system, the proliferation of appointments based on patrilateral and matrilateral kinship connections, as well as affinal ones, is evident.

Emirate Title-Holders, 1970, and Their Relation to the Emir (Paden, 1973:348-349)

Title	Name	Clan	Relation to Emir
Barde	Ibrahim Cigari Bayero	S	SB
Barde Kerarriya	Kabiru Bayero	S	SB
Ciroma	Aminu Sanusi	S	N
Dallatu	Also Nudil	LF	none
Dan Amar	Hamidu Bayero	S	JB
Dan Buram	Abubakar Bayero	S	JB
Dan Darman	Aliyu Munammad	J	affine
Dan Kadai	Muhammadu	Y	none
Dan Isa	Tijani Hashim	S	C
Dan Iya	Abbas Sanusi	S	N
Dan Lawan	Bashir Hashim Abbas	S	U
Dan Maje	Ahmadu Gwadabe	S	U
Dan Masani	Maitama Sule	Y	none
Dan Ruwata	Sani Ungogo	S	mat.
Dokaji	Sule	LF	mat.
Durbi	Abdulkadir Koguna	D	none
Galadima	Sani Bayero	S	SB
Magajin Gari	Inuwa Wada	G	mat.
Magajin Rafi	Ibrahim Cigari Mahmud	Y	mat.
Mai Unguwar Wundubawa	Sani Gezawa	LF	none
Makama	Bello Kano	Y	affine
Makaman Gado da Masu	Sani Gwarzo	LF	none
Marafa	Sule Minjibir	HD	none
Sarkin Bai	Muhammad Muhtari Adanan	D	affine
Sarkin Dutse	Maikano Dutse	LF	none
Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta	Bello Dandago	HF	affine
Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida	Isa Abbas	S	U
Sarkin Fada	Sule Gaya	LF	none
Sarkin Fulani Jaidanawa	Umaru Babura	D	affine
Sarkin Gaya	Adamu Gaya	LF	none
Sarkin Karaye	Garba Karaye	H	affine
Sarkin Kudu	Yakubu	LF	affine
Sarkin Rano	Abubakar	LF	affine
Sarkin Shanu	Muhammadu	Y	none
Tafida	Muhammad Usman	S	U
Turaki Maje	Abdullahi Bayero	S	SB
Wambai	Abubakar Sanusi	S	N
Waziri	Abubakar Gidado	Z	none

Key: Clan: S=Sullubawa, LF=Local Fulani, J=Jobawa, Y=Yolawa, D=Dambazawa, G=Gyanawa, HF=Hausa Fulani, H=Hausa, Z=Zarawa. Relation to Emir: SB=senior brother, N=unspecified nephew, JB=junior brother, C=unspecified cousin, U=unspecified uncle, mat.=unspecified matrilateral linkage, affine=close affinal linkage.

V

Starting from the point that wherever Fulani rule, Fulani is the dominant ethnic status and comprise most of the ruling families, and where Haɓe rule, this is not the case, it is possible to study the way in which ethnicity is a factor in the sarauta system. As will be expanded upon in the next chapter, this ethnic distinction is the primary one in the social stratification of Hausaland. This distinction in terms of authority is so strong as to lead to the assimilation of non-Fulani individuals in authority into the classification 'Fulani'. This is in addition to the assimilation of status through, for example, affinal relationships.

Although the system of high social status in the sarauta system was far from closed, as was shown in the second section, in the emirates ruled by Fulani overlordship, there were disproportionately fewer non-Fulani who held (or indeed hold) office, particularly the central series of offices. It would seem, then, that as the centripetal political forces increase towards the centre of the system of titles, where political duties and responsibilities are more crucially bound with the emir and the emirate, then almost exclusively, the first criteria for eligibility is Fulani descent. This applies to the district headships as shown in the Table below where, in Kano Emirate (1806-1903), five Fulani clans monopolise the positions.

Ethnic/Clan Affiliation of District Heads in Kano Emirate, 1806-1903 (Paden, 1970:244)

District	1806-1880	1881-1903
Tudun Wada	Yolawa	Yolawa
Gezawa	Tuareg	Hausa
Jabun	Yolawa	Sullubawa
Gabasawa	Hausawa Yerimawa	Yerimawa
Gwaram	Bauchi Fulani	Bauchi Fulani
Dawakin Tofa	Yolawa	Yolawa
Dambatta	Dambazawa	Dambazawa
Wudil	Jobawa	Jobawa
Dutse	Dutsawa	Dutsawa
Rano	Rano Fulani	Rano Fulani
Birnin Kudu	Birnin Kudu Fulani	Birnin Kudu Fulani
Karaye	local Fulani Habe	Habe
Gaya	Zakirawa (1809-27) local Fulani (1827) Kurawa (1827-44) (1844-70) Katagum (1870-72) (1872-83)	Kurawa (1883-88) Gombe (1888-91) Kurawa (1891-93) Jobawa (1893) Babura (1894) Kila (1894-98) Bornu (1898-1903)

Unlike the ethnicity of political status in the Hausa polities during the Fulani period (and after), the titles themselves were little affected by the introduction of Fulani overlordship. For example, in the case of Sokoto administration as Last tells us (1967:92), Fulani titles are few. Apart from the substitution of Lamido for Sarki or Emir, or terms for clan heads, Ardo or Dikko, Fulani titles are restricted to Lumo'o (the man in charge of the market) and Lamido Julbe which is equivalent to Amir al-mu'minin or Caliph.[8] This is another indication of the assimilation of Fulani culture into Hausa while retaining the political hierarchy of Fulani over Hausa.

[8] The use of Fulani titles was more common in Adamawa (Hogben and Kirk-Greene, 1966:428).

The use of Islamic (or Arabic) governmental titles is also restricted, as is reference to Islamic governmental philosophy. In the fundamentalist fervour of the pre-jihad and early Fulani period, the Shehu had denounced the excesses of courts, hierarchies, and titles, all of which he regarded as earthly vanities. During his tenure as Caliph, the machinery of Sokoto Calipnal autnority was rudimentary. In fact, during his administration, only seven titles were recognised and filled: Vizier (Waziri), Sarkin Yaki (the Captain General), Alkalin Alkalai (Chief Justice), Yari (Constable), Sa'i (Standard Bearer), Limam, and Ma'aji (Treasurer)(Johnston, 1967:93). Other titles of Hausaland and Bornu were strictly disapproved of, such as the titles Galadima and Ubandawaki. This system of Caliphal authority lasted only as long as the first Caliph's life. Consequently, hierarchies in the courts quickly proliferated.[9]

Outside of the minor titles such as Amir al-hudud (Police official), the Arabic form of titles is restricted to offices directly concerned with Islamic religious

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[9] That this quickly became the case is shown by Last (1967:91, n.8) who lists the titles borrowed from the former kingdom of Gobir and from Sabon Birni: Magajin Gari, Magajin Rafi, Galadima, Barazaki, Bunu, Dambazawa, Dangaladima, Durumbu, Marofa, Sardauna, Sarkin Baura, Sarkin, Bazai, Sarkin Tudu, Ubandawaki, Janzami, Barde, Sarkin Galma, Shentali, Wambai, Yerima. Because sufficient material relating to the nature and function of some of these titles is unobtainable for the Sokoto context, a thorough discussion is waived here in favour of awaiting a discussion of those governmental office-systems for which material is complete and reliable.

matters, Islamic law, and scholarship. The Alkali is the chief judicial title and religious titles of the malam class include, in their Hausaised forms: Limamin Juma'a (the Imam of the Friday mosque) and Limamin Kona ('kona' referring to a tribal group in Zaria Emirate). In Zaria, this association of Islamic practice and Arabic titles extends to the title, Sa'i (Ar. sā'). Abraham (1962:764) gives the following under this entry: (a) assessor of jangali (cattle tax) appointed by Muslim religious law to assess tithes (zaka, or zakka); (b) Zaria--one of the sarauta. Summing up, the use of Arabic and Islamic titles is rare (even in Sokoto), and when they occur, they tend to be associated with the very uppermost echelons of government (in Sokoto: Vizier, Amir al-mu'minin, Amir al-jaish) and with Islamic law and tax collecting (that is, taxes authorised under Islamic law).

VI

It now remains the task to list the titles of a few of the emirates and kingdoms, those where the information on this point is more complete: Zaria, Abuja, Kano, and Katsina Na Maradi. For Zaria and Abuja, the hierarchical divisions of the title-holders is illustrated. For Abuja and Kano, the duties and functions are given for the title-holders wherever possible. The Kano titles are also associated with their Fulani clan affiliations. Wherevener possible, an English translation is given for the Hausa title.

ZARIA STATE ORGANISATION IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY (M.G. Smith, 1960:100)*

Royal Officials	Vassals	Client Offices	Order of Malams	Slave Officials
1. 'Yan Sarki**	1. Under Madaki	1. Free Offices	Limamin Juma'a+	Without Fiefs
Madaki	Fatika	Galadima+	Limamin Kona+	1. Eunuchs
Wambai	Keffi	Sarkin Fada		Sarkin Zana
Dan Galadima	Jema'a	Fagaci		Kasheka
Iya	Kwotto	Waziri		Kilishi
Magajin Gari		Makama Babba	Alkali+	2. Military
Makama Karami	2. Under Makama	Turaki Babba	Salenke	Bakon Barno
	Kauru	Kuyambana	Magatakarda	Garkuwa II
2. Jikokin Sarki	Kajuru	Barde	Sarkin Malamai	Wagu
Dallatu		Sarkin Mai		Kwaramaza
Wali	3. Under the King	Ma'aji Babba	Free Household Officials	Sarkin Lifidi
Mardanni	Kagarko	Ma'aji Karami		Sarkin Karma
Sa'i	Doma		Majidadi	Sarkin Baka
Sarkin Ruwa	Durum (till 1860)	2. Quasi-hereditary	Hauni	Sarkin Bindiga
Turaki Karami	Lere	Dan Madami	Sarkin Garkuwa	Bajimin Gagas
		Iyan Kurama	Sarkin Yaki	Sarkin Dukaru
		Rubu	Sarkin Figini	3. Civil Services
		Katuku	Mahari	Sarkin Noma
		Magajin Zakara	Barwa	Sarkin Tambari
		Wan'ya	Magayaki	Sarkin Zagi
		Magaji Jisambo	Jagaba	Shamaki
		Cikum		Madauci
				4. Police
				Dogarai
				'Yan Doka
				With Fiefs
				Sarkin Yamma
				Sarkin Yarra
				Sarkin Ciyawa
				Shentali
				Sarkin Dogarai

* English equivalents to some of these titles are to be found, in alphabetical order, following the list of Abuja titles.
**Other 'Yan Sarki not listed under the Royal Officials are indicated by "+" following the title.

ABUJA STATE OFFICIALS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (M.G. Smith, 1960:37)

Chamber Eunuchs

Makama Karami
Sarkin Ruwa
Fagaci
Turaki
Ma'aji
Sarkin Zana

Royal Household

Sarkin Fada
Cincina
Jagaba
Bakon Barno**
Gwabare
Magayaki

Hauni
Madakin Hauni
Barden Hauni
Barde
Durumi
Kangiwa
Barde Kankane
Garkuwa Kankane
Madakin Barde
Jarmai
Ciritawa
Madakin Jarmai

Public Officials

Senior (rukuni)

Galadima*+
Wambai*
Dallatu*

Madawaki+

Junior (rawana)

Iyan Kasuwa
Barwa**
Dankekasau
Wan Diya
Sarkin Pawa
Sarkin Gayen

Kuyambana
Garkuwa Babba
Makama Babba
Lifidi
Shenagu
Sata**
Wagu**

Royal Officials

Dangaladima
Sarauniya=
Iya=

Malam Officials

Magajin Malam+
Magajin Dangi
Salenke+
Limamin Juma'a+
Magatakarda

Vassals

Kawu
Gawu
Jiwa
Kuje
Abuci
Kuta
Gwazunu
Izom

Slave Officials

1. Police

Dogarai
'Yan Doka

2. Military

Banaga
Sarkin Karma
Sarkin Bindiga
Sarkin Baka
Kunkeli

3. Civil Services

Sirdi
Shamaki
Madakin Gabas
Magajin Kwa
Sarkin Noma
Magajin Nagaba
Bikon Tambari
Boroka=

Key: *Eunuch
**Slave
=Female
+Royal Elector

English Equivalents to Some Zaria and Abuja Titles
(Source: Abraham, 1962)

Abuci: ?, but related to abuta, 'friendship'.
Barde: 'mounted attendant of the chief' (81)
Bakon Barno: Barno=Bornu
Bikon Tambari: Tambari=a hemispherical drum
Dan galadima: Son of the Galadima
Dan Madami: lit. 'son of a large calabash'
Fagaci: 'Inner council-chamber where chief tries cases, holds audiences with counsellors and receives friends' (244)
Hauni: 'left hand, side', executioner
Iya: A male title in Caliphate (Dan Iya in Kano), 'mother, maternal aunt'
Iyan kasuwa: kasuwa=market
Jagaba: 'leader, guide, intermediary' (413)
Kangiwa: 'head of elephant'
Kankane: Barde Kankane, kankane='the lesser'
Kilishi: Official in charge of spreading the Emir's rug.
Kuje: Official who led the horse for the travelling chief.
Kuta: Possibly an official in charge of archers (See, Abraham, 570).
Limami: Officiating Moslim priest. 'Kona'=Konawa, pagan tribe of Zaria; Juma'a=Jumma'a ('Friday').
Lifidi: Protective quilting for cavalry and horses.
Magaji: 'heir, successor'; Magajin Kwa, possibly related to kwai ('egg'), in the sense of booty: sojammu sun sha kwai, lit. our soldiers ate eggs, 'Our soldiers got booty' (Abraham, 576).
Magajin Gari: 'Heir to the town'
Magajin Zakara: zakara=person in congregation who leads responses in a loud voice; or an outstanding person (962).
Magayaki: lit: 'one who sees the war'
Makama: His epithet is Togai rumfar Sarki, 'Togai, roof of the Sarki' (642)
Sarkin Baka: Chief of the Bow
Sarkin Bindiga: Chief of the Firearm
Sarkin Ciyawa: Chief of the grass cutting
Sarkin Dukaru: Chief of the infantrymen (sing. dakare) (See Abraham, 174, under entry Dararu)
Sarkin Fada: Emir's chief councillor, fada=Chief's residence or audience chamber
Sarkin Figini: Chief of the ostrich feather fan
Sarkin Karma: Chief of the infantrymen
Sarkin Kunkeli: Chief of the shield
Sarkin Noma: Chief of the farming
Sarkin Pawa: =Sarkin Fawa, Chief of the Butchers
Sarkin Ruwa: Chief of the Streams
Sarkin Zana: Chief of the grass mat (i.e., to sit on)
Sata: (=Sati ?) war leader of infantry (787)
Waziri: =Vizier

Duties of the Traditional Abuja Title-Holders
(Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi, 1952:73-77)

1. The Chief Councillors

Madawaki: He was next in importance to the Emir and was, under him, Commander of the Army to protect the land from enemies. He was in charge of one half of the town, the part built to the east of the Nuchichiri stream. He advised the Emir upon the appointment or dismissal of the title-holders; he replied to the Emir's address on Feast Days; he summoned the Chief Councillors and the Turbaned Councillors to their meetings. With the other Chief Councillors he chose the new Emir, but later, if any of these were themselves members of the Ruling Houses then he called upon the Kuyambana and the chief Malams to help him.
Galadima: He was always a eunuch and was left in charge of the town when the Emir and the other chiefs went out to war. He arranged the marriages and naming of the children of the Ruling Houses.
Wambai: He was always a eunuch and in addition to his duties as adviser, he took part in the naming of children.
Dallatu: When the Emir went to war, he was responsible for building his quarters in the war camp where, too, he performed all those duties which the Galadima performed in the town.

2. The Turbaned Councillors (These were chosen from among the most important men in the town; even former slaves might hold these titles)

Following the Madawaki were:
Kuyambana: He was the Madawaki's chief adviser in all matters.
Sata: He was in charge of the Household Servants.
Garkuwa Babba: At the war camp he kept watch over the enemy's movements. He led the foot-soldiers in the war dance before the Emir; originally, the Emir himself used to lead the dance.
Makama Babba: He was responsible for the disposition of the troops in battle, and for sharing out the booty afterwards. With the Wagu, the Lifidi, the Shenagu and the Dankekasau he stood guard until the Emir came out to go to the prayer-ground of Idi.
Lifidi: He was the Captain of the Shieldb earing Horsemen.
Wagu: He guards the burial ground of the Emirs.
Shenagu: He made the tethering ropes for the Emir's horses.

Following the Galadima were:
Iyan Bakin Kasuwa: He was responsible for the markets in the towns and in the satellite villages.
Barwa: He was responsible for the arrangement of the Emir's quarters in the war camp.
Sarkin Fawa: He slaughters the cattle and other beasts in the market.
Wan-diya: He obtained the white cloth for the weddings of children of the Ruling Houses and helped with preparations.

Dankekasau: A jester

3. The Body Servants

Sarkin Fada: He was the chief official of the household. In time of war he helped the Makama Babba to divide the spoils...
Chinchina: He was the chief spy who would report on the state of the country and note any signs of unrest.
Jagaba: He was the chief of the heavily-armed foot soldiers.
Bakon Barno: Messenger to the Shehu of Bornu.
Gwabare: Attended to the houses in the Emir's compound.
Magayaki: Assistant to the Jagaba.
Jarmai: He was the chief warrior in the actual fighting. In times of peace he helped the Sarkin Fada in the household.
His followers were:
Chiritawa: He was the Jarmai's shield-bearer.
Madakin Jarmai: Assistant to the Jarmai.
Barde: With his followers he would go ahead of the Emir in his journeyings to see that all was safe and ready for him. In war he would spy out the position of the enemy and their strength and report on it to the Madawaki. In times of peace he helped the Sarkin Fada in the household.
His followers were:
Durumi: It was his duty to see that the Emir was properly guarded in the war camp...
Kangiwa: He received all the game that the hunters brought for the Emir...
Barde Kankana: He would assist the Barde in battle.
Garkuwa Kankane: Assistant to the Garkuwa.
Barden Mai-Daki: He would build and thatch the house of the Emir's chief wife, and serve her.
Magayakin Barde: Assistant to the Barde.
Madakin Barde: Assistant to the Barde and messenger.
Hauni: He took the place of the Jarmai when the latter was away and helped the Sarkin Fada.
His followers were:
Madakin Hauni and the Barden Hauni

4. The Emir's Eunuchs

Makama Karami: He was the spokesman of the Private Councillors and a messenger.
Ma'aji: He was the treasurer to the Emir.
Turaki: The Emir's messenger.
Sarkin Ruwa: The Emir's representative and messenger to the fishermen, and for all matters concerning the rivers.
Fakachi: One of the Emir's messengers.
Sarkin Zana: He was in charge of all parts of the Emir's Compound and a messenger.

5. The Household Servants

Sirdi: He was in charge of all the harness of the Emir's horses.
Shamaki: He was in charge of the horses themselves.
Madakin Gabas: He was the guard of the rear part of the Emir's compound.

Kunkele: He was the Captain of the Shield-Bearers.
Sarkin Karma: He was in charge of the fire-raising party in surprise dawn attacks on towns and villages.
Banaga: In charge of those who cleared paths through the forests for the army.
Sarkin Bindiga: The Captain of the Musketeers.
Sarkin Baka: The Captain of the Archers.
Magajin Kwa: The Emir's Barber.
Sarkin Noma: He was in charge of the Emir's farms.
Magajin Nagaba: The Chief Drummer (ordinary drums).
Bikon Tambari: The Chief Drummer of the Emir's Drums.
Boroka: A female messenger.

6. The Children of the Ruling Houses
Dangaladima: He was the heir presumptive.
Sarauniya: She was usually the daughter of an Emir, and looked after the women of the household during the absence of the Emir.
Iya: Usually a wife of the Emir's father, she arranged for the Emir's concubines when he died.

7. The Imams
Liman Juma: He is the Chief Imam. He officiates at the service in the mosque on Fridays. He was sometimes consulted in the choice of a new Emir.
Salanke: He officiates at the prayer-ground of Idi, and prays at the death of all chiefs and title-holders; he was sometimes consulted about the choice of a new Emir.
Magajin Malam: The representative of the Shehu of Bornu. It is he who usually installs the new Emir.
Magatakarda: The Chief Scribe and private Imam of the Emir's Household.

8. Other Titles
Kachalla: Messenger to the Shehu of Bornu.
Sarkin Gayen: Territorial Chief.
Abokin Sarki: When the Emir marries, he acts as his personal representative and best friend.

9. The Bodyguard and Watch
Dogarai: The Emir's Bodyguard. Assisted the 'Yan doka.
'Yan Doka: They were mainly responsible for the custody of prisoners charged with serious offences. They inflicted the punishment of whipping, and acted as executioners. They were also used as Town Criers and Watchmen.

Some Kano Emirate Titles (Paden, 1973:432-435)

Barde: A title that has alternated between Sullubawa and Yolawa (clans). This title is mentioned in the Kano Chronicle (1928ii:100).
Chiroma: A Sullubawa title, usually associated with the senior son of the Emir (usually spelt without the 'h').
Dan Amar: A Sullubawa title, usually a son or brother of the emir. It is not associated with any particular district. (This title=Dan Buram in clan affiliation).

Dan Darman: A Sullubawa title, usually a senior son of the Emir. The present title-holder (who is Jobawa) is district-head of Wudil, his father's district when he was Makama.
Dan kadai: A Yolawa title, which has been associated from earliest times with the district headship of Tudun Wada.
Dan Isa: A Sullubawa title, usually associated with a senior son of the Emir or the Emir's brother (isa= worth, high rank; Abraham, 1962:408).
Dan Iya: A Sullubawa title, usually associated with a senior son of the Emir (lit. 'son of mother, maternal aunt', the title in Katsina and Zaria is Iya; Abraham, 1962:408).
Dan Lawan: The title is a Sullubawa one and usually is given to a brother of the Emir. It has often been associated with the district headship of Minjibir (Abraham, 1962:616: lawani--'a Northern Hausa term for village-head=dagaci).
Dan Maje: A Sullubawa title usually given to a brother of the Emir and not associated with any district.
Dan Makwayo: A Sullubawa title, usually given to the Emir's brother (Abraham, 1962:649: 'A Katsina term for village-head=dagaci').
Dan Masani: A title given to a trusted person who may or may not be from the royal family, and who in the past acted as spokesman for the Emir (masani=knowledgeable, learned or expert person; Abraham, 1962:661).
Dan Rimi: Next to Emir in marching order, a slave official (Gidley, 1965:35).
Dokaji: Not associated with any particular district.
Galadima: A pre-Fulani title taken over by the Sullubawa and usually held by a senior son or brother of the Emir. In Fulani times he was a member of the Kano War Council.
Madaki: A Yolawa title of major importance. Present title-holder is responsible for all district heads. According to Gidley (1965:35) this title, 'Master of the Horse', was an important military title in the Fulani period and was a member of the Kano War Council.
Mai Unguwar Mundubawa: A local Fulani title associated with the district headship of Gezawa (lit., 'owner of the district/town of Mundubawa).
Makama: A Jobawa title associated with the district of Wudil. Formerly was a member of the Council of War.
Makama Gado Da Masu: A title given to a trusted person outside the royal family (possible lit., 'Makama of inheritance and spears').
Makaman Shamaki: Deputy Chief of the Stables (Gidley, 1965:35).
Sallaman Kano: Captain of the Kano Musketeers.
Sarkin Bai: A Dambazawa title. In Fulani times was held by a slave; a military title sitting on the War Council (lit., Chief of the Slaves).
Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta: Most of the holders of this title have been non-royal Sullubawa. The title-holder is usually a close personal friend of the Emir. Usually

the district-head of Gwarzo. Formerly was a member of the Kano War Council (lit., Chief of horses, owner of a flag).
Sarkin Dawakin Tsakar Gida: A Sullubawa title (lit., Chief of horses, centre of house/compound).
Sarkin Dutse: The local Fulani district head of Dutse.
Sarkin Fada; A title given to a most trusted servant or follower of the Emir outside his own family (lit. Chief of the Palace).
Sarkin Fulani Jaidanawa: Dambazawa title, district-head of Garki.
Sarkin Gaya: Local Fulani head of Gaya.
Sarkin Karaye: Local Fulani head of Karaye.
Sarkin Kudu: Local Fulani head of Birnin Kudu.
Sarkin Rano: Local Fulani head of Rano. In pre-jihad times was the youngest son of the Habe Emir.
Sarkin Shanu: A Habe title. In Fulani times was the keeper of the herds and Quartermaster in charge of transport in military matters (Gidley, 1965:35)(lit., Chief of the Cattle).
Sarkin Yaki: In the nineteenth century was the Emir's councillor for war. Of the Sarkin Yaki Baba states (M.F. Smith, 1954:163): 'His job in wartime was to remain in the compound in the hamlet, he did not take refuge in the walled town.'
Shettima: In Fulani times he was an important slave official equivalent to a Chief Chamberlain (Gidley, 1965:35).
Tafida: A Sullubawa title usually a son of the Emir.
Turaki: A Habe title taken by the Sullubawa and usually given to a brother of the Emir.
Wambai: A Sullubawa title, usually a senior son of the Emir, district-head of Kura, and a member of the War Council.
Waziri: Chief advisor to the Emir on legal matters.

Another criterion by which sarautu may be classified and understood is by their transmission. That is to say, some titles are hereditary, gado, while others are open or non-hereditary, shigege.[10] All emirates have titles which contain aspects of both. In other words, some titles are totally hereditary, while others are not, still others are open to competition

[10] Gado: 'inherited' (Abraham, 1962:283); shigege: 'person following non-hereditary trade' (Ibid., 811).

between increasingly narrow bands of kinship within certain royal lines. The manner in which office was transmitted through hereditary aristocratic right was outlined in the second section. At the emirate level, the incidence of hereditary office depended to some degree on the situation that each emirate or kingdom found themselves during the period of the Sokoto Caliphate. For instance, in Zaria, three or four dynasties openly competed for the throne and offices, each with somewhat equal chances and, more importantly, support was needed from each for effective administration. This was distinctly different from Sokoto where a strong tradition was established of hereditary rights descending from the Shehu and his close associates. Zaria may also be contrasted with Abuja which, as a defensive minority stronghold, developed hereditary tendencies in offices descending from Makau.

The appointment to office, even where a hereditary tradition in office was strong, depended upon many factors. Smith (1965:275) puts it as follows: 'At all levels individuals sought to have their sons rather than their brothers to succeed them in office.' To achieve this was a different matter. After a long tenure of office, a mai sarauta may ask the Emir's permission to step down in favour of a son; on the other hand, the office-holder may die or be dismissed. In such cases, the senior members of the larger fam-

ily are consulted as to their nominations for a suitable succession. The conditions dictating the choice of one or the other candidate was strongly influenced by at least the following four factors: (i) kinship conventions favoured the election of a younger brother of the previous holder, or failing this, an eldest son; (ii) military conditions favoured the election on meritocratic grounds of a strong leader or military adept; (iii) political conditions were favourable for the contender who had the widest political support, even if he be a younger son; and (iv) administrative requirements favoured the candidate who was most experienced in office, having held at least one of the more senior titles.

This complex situation made selection difficult and left many promising contenders and their supporters dissatisfied, with the possibility of political instability. Smith recognises the complexities of the selection system in the following quotation (1965:274): 'This variety of interests and conditions which underlay appointments to hereditary office precluded uniformity in succession rules or procedure.'

Within oral literature, particularly, stories abound of a commoner being given a sarauta owing to some deed of heroism, uncovering a misdeed by an important official, outstanding virtue, and so on. This aspect of oral tradition serves to emphasise the normative 'openness' of the corpus of sarauta. This

is illustrated in the following text in which Auta exposes the Yarima as a wrongdoer (Skinner, n.d.II: 230-236; Edgar, 1913:73-79):

> Then the chief fetched a sword and gave it to Auta, saying 'Cut off Yarima's head'. And Auta cut off Yarima's head. Then the chief said to Auta 'Magajiya has a younger sister, whom I give you as wife' and he went on 'And from today you are appointed Yarima. I give half the town to you, so that a part is yours and a part mine.' And Auta sent for the young man who had taken his place in chains, and gave him a position close to himself.
>
> ***
>
> Sariki ya kawo takobi, ya ba Auta. Sai ya che ma sa, 'Auta, sare kain Yarima.' Sai Auta ya sare kain Yarima. Sariki ya che, 'Auta, Magajiya tana kanuwa, na ba ka ita.' Ya che, 'Yau kuwa, kai a yi Yarima.' Ya che, 'Na ko ba rabin gari; kai da shiya, ni da shiya.' Sai Auta ya kirawo yaro chan da ya karbe shi mari, ya kawo shi kusa da shi.


The Kano Chronicle also illustrates the normative value of open <u>sarauta</u> achievement, for example, in the two portions of texts below (Palmer, 1928ii:104, 106):

> (In the reign of Tsamia (ca. 1307-1343), after he had routed the pagans) Tell me the secret of your God.' They told him. When he had heard, the Sarki said to Danguzu, 'I make you Sarkin Garazawa.' He said to Gamazo, 'I make you Sarkin Kurmi.'
>
> (In the reign of Yaji (ca. 1349-1385) after a battle against the pagans) He said to Gwoji, 'Choose whatever you want.' Gwoji said, 'I only want to become Madawakin Kano.' The Sarki said, 'I give you the office.'
>
> Gasatoro, who was turned out of the post of Madawaki, built a house at Gawo, and for that reason was known as Madawakin Gawo, to distinguish the two.

Returning to the hereditary aspect of <u>sarauta</u> transmission, the following four diagrams illustrate the reality of office attainment in Kano Emirate. Kano, not plagued by the competing dynasties for the throne in the way that Zaria was, to a greater extent allowed the perpetuation of office in certain royal


families. In these offices, Sarkin Bai, Sarkin Dutse, Madaki, and Sarkin Kudu, the regular form of patrilineal succession that characterised most emirate succession was evident (though to a lesser extent for Sarkin Dutse). The successions: father to son, brother to brother, and father's brother's son to father's brother's son are the most common.[11] In the final, fifth, diagram below, the less complex succession to office in Sokoto is illustrated by the offices of Galadima and Amir al-jaish where patrilineal succession to authority was more the rule. These posts tended to be hereditary, passing to descendants of the original title-holder.

Succession to Authority (Office of Sarkin Bai): Dambazawa Clan, Kano, 1808-1970 (Paden, 1973:407)




[11] The incidence of normatively hereditary office in Kano where transmission to the Emir's sons is quite high: Ciroma, Dan Iya, Sarkin Dawaki Tsakar Gida, Wambai, Tafida, Galadima; to sons or brothers: Dan Amar, Barde, Turaki, Dan Biram, Dan Darma. The titles of Dan Isa, Dan Lawan, Dan Makwazo can be given to any relative of the Emir (Paden, 1970:182, n.5).


Succession to Authority (Office of Madaki): Yolawa Clan, Kano since the jihad (Paden, 1973:406; dates not supplied)



District Heads and Chiefs of Birnin Kudu (Office of Sarkin Kudu): Local Fulani, 1819-1970 (Paden, 1973:408)



District Heads of Dutse (Office of Sarkin Dutse): Alternation Between Local Fulani (Musa's House and Salihu's House), 1809-1916 (Paden, 1973:409)



Musa's House

2 Musa
1819-1840

4 Suleiman	3 Bello	7 Ibrahim	8 Abdu
1849-1868	1840-1849	1894	1894-1901

10 Halidu	13 Abdu	Nuhu	Madaki	Halilull	9 Abdulkadir
1903-1910	1911-6		Hassan	1910-11	1901-1903

14 Suleimanu
1916-

Succession to the Office of Galadima in Sokoto (Last, 1967, insert)

1 Doshero

Abu Bakr	2 Ahmad	3 Ibrahim	4 'Umar

5 Shehu

Succession to the Office of Sarkin Yaki in Sokoto (Binji Ribat)(Ibid.)

1 'Ali Jedo

Abu Bakr	2 Abu 'l-Hasan	3 'Abd al-Wahhab	4 Ahmad Zurruku
5 Abu Atiku		6 Ahmad	

Succession to the Office of Magajin Gari in Sokoto (Ibid.)

1 Abu Bakr	2 Sulayman	Muhammad Yero

3 Muhammad	5 Muhammad Nadakura	6 Muhammad Mai alashaf	4 Namanga

7 'Abd al-Qadir

Before continuing with a discussion of the sarauta system of Katsina Na Maradi, a note must be made of an analytical category of some use, but one which cannot be substantiated through the lexicons. Smith (1960:39) groups titles into two sets of hierarchical

order: rawuna and rukuni. The distinction Smith employs as follows: 'Offices...were grouped into two contraposed units, each of which contained offices belonging to two different ranks, namely, the rukuni or senior order, and the rawuna (turbans) or junior order.' Smith makes reference to this analytical device in reference to the Haɓe kingdoms of Abuja and Katsina Na Maradi (Cf., also 1967). The lexicons do not reflect this distinction indigenously. Rawani (sing.) does indeed denote 'turban' and signifies 'office' in the following manner (Abraham, 1962:728):

Ya ajiye rawani
lit. he has put down turban
He has resigned office.

Ya warware rawunansu
lit. he has unwound their turban
He dismissed them from office.

Indeed, 'turbanning' is a part of the installation of most sarauta and marks other changes in social status.[12] The installation of the Magajiya by 'turbaning' is illustrated in the following text of Baba (M. F. Smith, 1954:64): '...then they went to the house of Sarkin Zarewa, where he gave her a turban and appointed her Magajiya.

However, rukuni is merely listed as 'group, section, party' (Abraham, 1962:743). This distinction is not repeated in any other texts.[13] The hierarch-

[12] For example, in marriage, a cloth is wrapped around the bride's head by her ƙawa, 'female friend'.
[13] Not even Nicolas (e.g., 1975), who has published quite extensively on Katsina (Maradi), mentions it.

ical distinction is important, especially with reference to Hausa categories. Unfortunately at this stage it is difficult to substantiate.[14]

In Haɓe Katsina (at Maradi) a quasi-hereditary state with significantly different features evolved. In eighteenth century Katsina, the four senior titles were: Ƙaura, Galadima,[15] 'Yan Daka, and Durbi. Together, they formed the rukuni, or seniormost officials who exerted important restraints on the Sarki. Three of these offices were invested in noble patrilineages. The Ƙaura, a nominal slave, commanded the military forces of the state. The Galadima, a eunuch, was the senior civil administrator. The rukuni both elected the new Sarki and, if necessary, could depose him. Rule in Haɓe Katsina was impossible without the mutual dependence that this form of government necessitated. This balance is reflected by Smith who asserts (1967:106): 'Though the ruler's office was clearly senior, and traditionally dominant, the legitimacy of its power was conditional on support from the council of state.' In practice, however, most of the rulers of Maradi who succeeded Dan Baskore (1858-1879) were dismissed by the rukuni officials.

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[14] Malam Tairu cannot recall this distinction. In reference to Smith's material on the Haɓe states we will use his distinction keeping in mind the qualifier above. P. Lienhardt suggests that the term may be related to the Arabic rukun, 'support, general staff'. Unfortunately, no Hausa lexicon gives the etymology for this term.

[15] The praise epithet of the Galadima in Katsina is Nda babban bawa, 'Nupeman, the Great Slave' (Usman, 1972:176).

Titles in Haɓe Katsina (at Maradi) were profuse: excluding twenty-two titled princes ('Yan Sarki), nine princesses, and nine titled wives and concubines, Maradi had over one hundred and thirty titled offices. The four rukuni title-holders had a staff of forty-five. Among the courtiers of the Sarki were twenty-seven free offices, thirty-four titled eunuchs and slaves. There were twelve territorial chiefs and nine titled clerics (Smith, 1967:104; cf., Nicolas, 1975). Though the offices represented the main status groups, their distribution showed a bias towards those status distinctions important to Muslim Hausa. Many of the offices were reserved for members of the ruling dynasty and their retainers. Offices were reserved for the dynasty and the other following categories: the ruler's wives and kinswomen, his principal councillors and their kin, clients, slaves, eunuchs and civilian or military slave staff, free clients and Muslim clerics. A discussion of the royal slaves and eunuchs, as well as the titles held by females in Maradi and elsewhere will be deferred until a later section in this chapter.

Selection of both shigege and gado title-holders was often made by agreement between the ruler and the rukuni. In the case of the hereditary offices, the selection was made after a canvassing of the senior men of the lineage in which the titled was vested. Independently of the ruler, the rukuni distributed the

princely titles which were, on the whole, honourific, entailing little or no administrative duties. Among the rukuni themselves, the offices were kept strictly apart in the sense that promotion from one to another was not allowed.

An interesting symbolic classification of Maradi officials roughly corresponded to the division between gado and shigege offices and between warrior and civil administrators. This classification, one of 'the right hand and left hand' (hannun dama da hannun hagu) is best illustrated in assembly meetings as reported by Smith (1967:112):

> Behind Galadima and his staff sat 'Yan Daka, his entourage, the princes, the Maradi and his staff, the Sarkin Fulani, the lesser eunuchs under Dan Kanshe, and the hakimai and their attendants when present. On the ruler's left, behind the Kaura and his staff, sat Durbi with his, followed by the Magajin Bakebbi and the throne slaves, the ruler's craft officials, clients, and titled warriors. No female official, even Iya, took part in this assebmly.

David confirms the symbolic ascription of the 'left hand' to the military establishment in Maradi while the civil administrators are known as officials of the 'right hand' (1969).

Maradi, a fugitive Habe Katsina state which was never conquered by the Fulani to the south, was an oscillating system which represented an imperfect balance between hereditary tradition and administrative bureaucracy, each checking the authority of the other.

Equally important as appointment and promotion

to offices in a non-hereditary situation is dismissal from office. During the pre-jihad period, this could occur for a number of reasons including: incompetency, corruption, and most importantly, the upsetting of the balance between the sarki and his officials and among the sarautu themselves. This can clearly be seen in the following extract from the Kano Chronicle (Palmer, 1928ii:110) regarding the Wambai of Kano (during the reign of Mohamma Nazaki, ca. 1618-1623) who was very accomplished in military matters, and thus, in slaves and booty:

> The Wombai left Kano and went to Karayi. Every day he fought the Katsinawa and took much spoil from them in war. He became master of a hundred mailed horsemen and a thousand horses. He was sung as 'The Elephant who reduces his neighbours to servitude.' He became so mighty that it was feared he would revolt. Hence he was turned out of office in the time of Kutumbi. (16)

The importance of this balance was equally important in nineteenth century Katsina Na Maradi.

During the period of the Sokoto Caliphate, balance was focussed in equal subtlety. This was accomplished by means of a variety of measures. First of all, the countervailing position of the Caliph was non-existent in the pre-jihad Habe kingdoms. Secondly, in many emirates, and most notably in Zaria, dynasties competition had the effect of determining to a great extent the choice of officials in a new administration. This occurred along lines of lineage cleavage, with the most important offices being alloted to the dynasty and lineage of the new emir.

16 Cf., the story of Galadima Dauda who was so strong that Atuma (sarki, ca. 1452) was deposed after a reign of seven days for fear of trouble with the Galadima.

This relationship can clearly be seen in the following Table (below), which shows the dynasty, office, and conditions of appointment or dismissal in a temporal situation. Finally, a balance is maintained through territorial office. As most administrative offices have a territorial component, the opportunity for amassing power through the aggrandisement of contiguous territories was avoided by separating the individual land holdings. Map I (p. 180) demonstrates this relationship.

The problem of achieving and maintaining a balance in an hierarchical polity will be examined in greater depth in the final chapter.

Appointments and Dismissals from the Principal Dynastic Offices in Zaria Between 1804 and 1900 (M. G. Smith, 1955:77-79)

Sarkin Zazzau	Madaki	Magajin Gari	Wambai	Dan Galadima	Iya
M. Musa (M) 1804-21	Makaye (Kw) (fled)	Zakari (son of Musa)	Fache (Habe) (died)	Sidi Abdul-kadiri (M)	Atu (Musa's) daughter (M)
Yamusa (B) 1821-34	Yamusa (B) (promoted S.Z.)	(dismissed)	Sodengi (Habe)		(dismissed)
	Jaye (SR) (died)	Bapaiyo (B) (died)	(died) Mamman Sani		Atiku (B)
	Hamada (B)	Hamman (B)	(B)		
Abdulkarim (K) 1834-46	(dismissed)	(dismissed)		(dismissed)	(dismissed)
Hamada (B) 1846 (52 days)	Abubakar (M)	Jamo (K)			Aliyu (K)
		no appointments			
Mamman Sani (B) 1846-60	(dismissed)	(dismissed)	Anu (B)	Sidi Abdul-kadiri (M)	(dismissed)
	Abdu (B) (died)	Hamman (B) (reinstated)		(reinstated)	Bagemu (B) (died)
	Sule (B) (died)				
	no appointment				
Sidi Abdulkadiri (M) 1860	Abdullahi (B)	(dismissed)		(promoted S.Z.)	Aliyu (K)
Abdusallami (S) 1860-63		Jembari		Ibiro (B)	(reinstated)
Abdullahi (B) 1863-73	(promoted S.Z.)	(dismissed)	(dismissed by	(promoted	(died)
	Ibiro (B) (died)	Audu (B)	Sokoto) Abubakar (M)	Madaki) Husseini (B) (died)	Abdurrah-man (K)
	Yero (B)				
Abubakar (M) 1873-76	(dismissed)		(promoted S.Z.)	Nuhu (M)	
	Ali (M)		Sambo (K)		

Sarkin Zazzau	Madaki	Magajin Gari	Wambai	Dan Galadima	Iya
Abdullahi (reinstated) 1876-81	(dismissed) Yero (B)				(dismissed)
Sambo (K) 1881-90	(dismissed by Sokoto) Anu (B) (dismissed) Lawal (K)	(dismissed) Baba Gana (B)	(promoted S.Z.) (Appointments made by Sokoto until British occupation, 1902) Zubairu (M) (died) Nuhu (M) (died) Yaro (M) (died) Sa'adu (M) (died) Aliyu (M)	(promoted Wambai) Bamurna (M) (died) Gabdo (M) (died)	Usuman (K)
Yero (B) (formerly Madaki) 1890-97 Kwassau (B) 1897-1902 (deposed by the British)	(dismissed) Kwassau (B) (promoted S.Z.) Kindi Ibrahim (B)	(dismissed) Mai-Kawari(B) (died) Dalhatu (B)		Sule Mai-Turare (B)	(dismissed) Fate (B) (died) Zubairu (B)

Notes: Royal family of each title-holder is indicated by the initials in brackets: (M) Mallawa, (K) Katsinawa, (Z) Zamfarawa, (B) Bornawa, (S) Suleibawa, (SR) Suleibawa of Ricifa, (Kw) Kwantambale.

VII

Another oppositional categorisation in titled offices exists in those offices which were held by eunuchs (baba).[17] It can readily be seen that in terms of free status and the ability to transmit office to heirs within a line, the relation of eunuchs is ambiguous to that of the status of free title-holders and sarautu occupied by slaves. The former are noble freemen whose offices can often be perpetuated in a descent line,[18] while slave officials were not freemen and normally could not perpetuate office through their descendants. Eunuchs, on the other hand, were not necessarily slaves, yet obviously could not pass on their title to any descendants. In other words, eunuchs were freemen (often) but the value of that free status was diminished in terms of succession and inheritance.

Castration was illegal by Shari'a law, yet it existed in much of the Islamic world up to the present century. Concerning eunuchs in Sokoto, nineteen are listed in Bello's court. However, '...(the) numbers dwindled, since castration, properly illegal in Islam, is said not to have been practised...as cas-

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[17] Baba is used for example in the expression Baban Sarki, the 'Emir's eunuch'. This term also refers to a sexually impotent man (Abraham, 1962:51).

[18] For example, the seniormost official in the hierarchy, the sarki, was normally required, as has been seen, to have been descended from a father who himself was an Emir.

tration continued outside Sokoto, some must always have been available'(Last, 1967:92). In both Habe and Fulani times, eunuchs were obtained from Nupeland and from Bornu and Wadai (K.Chr., 111 and Works, 1976: 69, respectively).

The Kano Chronicle is specific on the introduction and governmental functions of eunuchs in the courts of Habe Kano. According to this source, Muhammad Rumfa (ca. 1463-1499) introduced the custom as seen in the first quotation below. The use of eunuchs was expanded under the reign of Mohamma Shashere (ca. 1573-1582) as shown in the second quotation (K.Chr., 112, 115):

> He began the custom of giving eunuchs the offices of state, among them, Dan Kusuba, Dan Jigawa, Dan Tarbana, Sarkin Gabbas, Sarkin Tudu, Sarkin Rua, Maaji, Sarkin Bai, Sarkin Kofa. There were four eunuchs left without a title. He said to them, 'I make you chiefs of the treasury.

> He was the first to give a eunuch the title of Wombai...He also gave to a eunuch called Dabba the title of Sarkin Dawaki. He gave to another eunuch called Mabaiyi the title of Dagachi.

It can be seen from the above that while the use of titled eunuchs continued in Fulani times, their use was prolific during the Habe era. Thus it was in the Habe system, which was characterised by a more centralised authority structure in the hands of the sarki, that the titled eunuchs filled a role of governmental balance outside the titled offices which were competed for from within the sphere of royal kinship.

In the Middle East, as B. Lewis states (1970:84): 'Eunuchs were in fact required in considerable numbers,

in many countries for households from the palace downwards.' However, even here by the nineteenth century their numbers were greatly diminished. In many countries, for example Egypt, the act of castration was forbidden on their soil. Interestingly, in the Middle East the notion of eunuchs was tied closely to notions of race. 'The corps of eunuchs was virtually the only route by which a black could attain to high office' (B. Lewis, 1970:84). However, by and large, in the establishment of post-jihad government, the Fulani reformers, in keeping with Islamic norms, eliminated eunuchs from certain offices such as Wambai, Galadima, Dallatu, Makama Karami, and Ma'aji in Zazzau.

In Abuja, the order of eunuchs of the king's inner chamber were close dependents of the king and acted as his advisors. However, they were differentiated from senior councillors in respect that no action could be taken on their advice alone. In addition, unlike the other orders of officials in Abuja, as a category they lacked internal segmentary organisation. Although this lack of internal political segmentation deprived them from exercising certain powers (such as initiating political actions and being a decisive part of the decision making process), titled eunuchs could discuss important issues informally with the king and could be of great influence.

In Abuja, the offices occupied by titled eunuchs

required technical expertise and precision of execution. Two of the officials, the Wa'aji and the Sarkin Zana, were entrusted with the treasury and the harem, respectively. The other four titled eunuchs in Abuja acted as messengers between the sarki and other officials or territorial subordinates.

In summary, the orders of eunuchs in Habe Abuja as well as the few titled eunuchs within the Sokoto Caliphate acted as intermediaries or caretakers emphasising their ambiguous symbolic position.

Titles held by pure slaves, on the other hand, while fulfilling the same function as eunuchs, namely the entrusting of important administrative responsibilities without the relative risk of titled freemen, were, owing to their increasingly dependent position, particularly important in territorial and military organisation as well as in the running of the royal household.

The use of slaves in offices, in both the Fulani and the Habe periods, would appear to be rather more complex than the depiction given by Smith (1955:87). He envisages two parallel and complementary series of sarauta titles, one for slaves and the other for freemean, each having unique and bipolar duties. The corpus of slave titles is, however, undifferentiated, unlike titles held by free persons. Some slave titleholders were immensely important and powerful in regards to the administration and defence of the kingdom

or emirate. Yet, through his status as a slave, differentiation was unimportant.[19] This class aspect of slavery in the emirates and kingdoms is illustrated in the following proverbs (Whitting, 1940:93, 94):

Bawa ba ya gasa da da
A slave and a free man cannot be cooked together; i.e., incompatibles.

Bawa bawa ne ko da ya sami dukiya
A slave is a slave for all that he is rich.

As political functionaries, eunuchs, slaves, and female title-holders (section VIII, below) all act as important balancing mechanisms in the government. This is primarily owing to the fact that they were ineligible for the kingship or emirship, and were usually incapable of transmitting their own titles to offspring.

VIII

Heretofore, the discussion has primarily centred on a discussion of those titles held by males, either free, slave, or eunuch. Titled offices were also reserved for females of the ruling dynasties and their titles were associated with specific functions. In practice, most of the titled offices held by women were abolished or held by men upon the change of government between the Haɓe and the Fulani. This can clearly be seen in a comparison of female titles in Abuja and Zazzau. Three titles held, with qualification, by females in the Haɓe administration and subsequently held by men after the jihad are of partic-

ular interest. These are the titles of Iya, Magajiya, and Mardanni. These titles were filled by the three daughters of the first post-jihad Emir of Zazzau, Musa, but were abolished or filled by male dynastic members by his successor, Yamusa (Smith, 1960:148).[20]

The title of Iya ('mother, maternal aunt' Abraham, 1962:408) was, in Haɓe Abuja, held by one of the wives of the previous chief, and not necessarily the mother of the ruling chief (Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi, 1952 :34). That is to say, in nineteenth century Abuja, the Iya was one of the wives of the Emir's father. One of her duties was the arrangement of marriages for the deceased king's wives and concubines (Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi,. 1952 :76). In addition, the Emir held counsel with the Iya on matters concerning the womenfolk of the palace (Smith, 1960:340).[21] Under the first Fulani Emir in Zaria, Malam Musa, prior to the abandonment of the policy of female appointees, the Iya held a number of territorial jurisdictions, but 'the title-holder's husband had effective

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[20] Several other, less important, female titles existed, primarily in Haɓe kingdoms. Among these titles are: Saraki (leader of the dance for the youth associations (jumiyyar samari): see chapter four; Gabsai (carries on her back the royal infants); and Dakama (title of the head of the musicians attached to Gabsai). These titles which are recorded for Daura Emirate are reported to be of considerable antiquity and are still in existence (A.E.V. Walwyn, in Palmer, 1928ii:145).

[21] Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi (1952.:78) list only 'concubines' rather than Smith's general 'womenfolk'.

charge of these' (Smith, 1960:143). After the accession of Emir Yamusa, the office was filled with male appointees of the ruling dynasties or were left vacant.

The second title under discussion is that of Magajiya. Literally denoting the wide field of 'heiress, elder sister, title for chief's mother or his elder sister or his father's younger sister, title for senior procuress, princess (in Zaria)(Abraham, 1962: 632), this title of Fulani Zazzau is, as Smith (1960: 130-1) suggests equivalent to the Abuja title, Sarauniya. The evidence for this is given below:

> ...Ajuma, sister of the Habe king of Zazzau Aliyu IV (1767-73) who founded the town of Kumbada in Niger Province, held the Habe title of Magajiya at Zazzau. Mallam Hassan also related that the Sarauniya Zainabu, who fled with Makau from Zaria, later built a ward in the town of Abuja known as the Magajiya ward. (22)

The office of Magajiya has recently reappeared as the title for the head of the prostitutes, the usual translation of the term karuwai, in any local area (Smith, 1955:98). The position of Sarauniya persisted at a purely titular level in Fulani Zaria, being held by the king's mother, who was known as Sarauniya, Mama, or Uwar Sarki. In Abuja, on the other hand, the Sarauniya looked after the women of the royal household during the Emir's absence, was in charge of arrangements for the marriages of his female chil-

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22 This distinction was not made in Smith's earlier formulation (1955:71).

dren, and finally, together with the Iya, prepared the feasts given by the Emir at the Middle Fast, Gani (Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi, 1952 :76). In addition, the king held counsel with the Sarauniya on all matters relating to the daughters of the royal line (Smith, 1960: 340).

The title of Mardanni, given to one of the daughters of Musa, was said to have been a title transferred from the administration of Haƀe Zazzau (Smith, 1960:131), although, if this is true, it has lapsed in use in Abuja. Yamusa initiated the practice of appointing males to this office.

Farther to the north, in the Haƀe refuges at Tsibiri and Maradi (the Haƀe remnants of Gobir and Katsina), female titles persisted, as in Abuja, but their numbers were greater and their responsibilities more important. Hierarchically, the Inna at Tsibiri and the Iya at Maradi were second only to the Sarki as indicated by Nicolas (1975:151): 'Le second personnage de la Principauté hausa est une femme appartenant au clan du Sarki et désignée par lui.'[23]

In Maradi, as in Abuja, the duties of the Iya included presiding over the marriages and kinship ceremonies of the females of the royal lineages, and

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[23] Smith (1967:108) contradicts this. According to this writer, the Iya of Maradi was selected by the four rukuni from among the senior royal kinswomen for her disposition, marital status (that is, she was usually divorced and unmarried) and good sense.

'...was the official head and patron of local prostitutes and devotees of the pre-Islamic cult of spirit possession (bori),[24] whom she led in to greet the chief on the Muslim Sabbath (Smith, 1967:108).[25] In addition to these functions, the Iya held territorial office and exacted duties (Nicolas, 1975:152), having her own attendants, subordinates and clients. However, while these clients included both males and females, the males were not her jural subjects. Finally, the Iya was frequently called upon by the rukuni to act as a mediator between them and the Sarki. This was on an informal basis as the Iya was not a member of the emirate council. It can be seen that in the northern refuge states, the Inna and the Iya wielded considerable powers and influence unlike her counterparts to the south. Indeed, as Nicolas relates (1975:151): 'Elle trône dans l'une des salles du palais lors des cérémonies publiques, remplace le Sarki lors de la procession de Ramadan, revêt des vêtements d'homme et joue un très grand rôle dans la vie politique du pays.'

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[24] For a complete discussion of these cults, see J. Nicolas (1967), Onwuejeogwo (1970).

[25] This brings up another interesting clash of sources. Nicolas (1975:151) erroneously equates the office of Iya and Inna with Magajiya and Magaram. This is vitiated by the separate existence of the office of Magajiya in Maradi. However, the Iya in Maradi, as head of the 'prostitutes' associated with the bori cult performs the function of the Magajiya in other Hausa states (for example, Abuja and Zaria).

An account by Nicolas (1975:151-2) of the installation of the Iya is rich in political and sexual symbolism and is given in its entirety below owing to its uniqueness in Hausa literature:

> À Maradi, elle est d'abord portée par un haut fonctionnaire, sur le dos de celui-ci, jusqu'au palais du prince. Là, ce dernier la revêt de vêtements analogues aux siens (pantalon d'homme, tunique, turban, burnous). Puis, la nouvelle Iya est conduite aux tambours de la sarauta pour y frapper quatre coups. Après cela cela, on lui passe aux poignets les mêes bracelets qu'ua Sarki et on lui confie une gerbe d'épis de millet et de sorgho, 'pourque le pays ait une récolte abondante'. Après cela, l'élue accomplit une retraite da sept jours (zaman wara wara), comme le Sarki, toujours parée des bracelets et de la gerbe. Au lieu des jeunes vierges offertes à l'"époux du pays", ce sont un homme et une femme de clan gardien des bracelets d'intronisation qui l'accompagnent dans cette retraite. La première dort à ses côtés et le second se couche en travers du seuil de son habitation pendant le temps du zaman wara wara.
>
> Au terme de cette réclusion, la nouvelle Iya est présentée au peuple. Puis elle entreprend une tournée à cheval dans le pays. Cette tournée porte le nom de "jet de lance" (yada mashi). Au cours de celle-ci, on lui présente toutes les femmes adeptes du Bori, que sa principale fonction consiste à diriger ainsi que les femmes libres du royaume. Elle les juge, vérifie leurs dispositions et prélève une taxe annuelle, appelée "argent de la reine" (Kudin Iya), auprès de toutes les adeptes.

The Magajiya of Maradi was, unlike the Iya, a junior kinswoman of the ruler. She was attached to a territorial office (that of Liyadi) and administered it through her staff. In addition, she led the women's celebrations at the palace after the Ramadan Fast. Contrary to the quotation of Nicolas pointed out above (footnote 25), Smith asserts (1967:108) that, 'Presumably some Magajiyas might be promoted to the senior title of Iya on the latter's death'.

That the Magajiya was connected within the sarauta

system of the central royal family is reflected in oral tradition. This is seen in the following portion of a Hausa tale (Skinner, n.d.II:142-143; Edgar, 1911b: 280):

> There was once a woman called Magajiya who had several younger brothers. The eldest of them was chief. The next was made Galadima; the next, vizier; and the next, chiroma. And they all lived in the one town. And Magajiya would come and visit each of her brothers, spending a day at each of their homes, but only once a year.
>
> ***
>
> Wata mache ke nan, ana che ma ta, 'Magajiya', tana da ƙaune. Mai-bi ma ta, shi ne Sariki. Sauran kuwa, aka yi ma wannan, galadima; aka yi ma wannan, waziri; aka yi ma wannan, chiroma. Suna nan zamne chikin garinsu. To, ita ko Magajiyar garin nan, ta kan tafi wuni gidan ƙannenta. In ta tafi, ta komo; kuma ba ta komawa sai badi, kana ta koma.

Summing up, the practice of appointing female members of the royal dynasties to sarauta positions, like that of appointing eunuchs and slaves, differentiated all of the pre-jihad Habe states and the Habe refuge states from the Fulani administrations. In the states where it occurred with frequency, these positions, including eunuchs and slave title-holders, were associated with important royal household functions involving the personages of the royal family. That these structurally important positions were associated with people who could not ascend to the throne was crucial to the system of authority balance.[26]

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[26] Consider, for example, the yearly ceremony called Jan Dodo ('Red Spirit') in which the women and children of the royal household 'elected' royal officials from among themselves reflecting the hierarchy of the court. Unfortunately, this ceremony is poorly reported in the literature (Hiskett, 1960:574).

IX

Finally, sarauta involves, in most cases, territorial responsibility and administration. This administration of land is either in the form of control by central kingdom or emirate title-holders of town/ward or provincial districts or satellite states. In addition, there are the peripheral territorial sarautu, the village-heads (dagatai). One final territorial unit is the ribat which was usually a northern (especially provincial Sokoto) defence post. In the past, these ribats were inhabited and worked by groups of Fulani scholars who were, often, untitled but led by an emir who usually was a descendant of the founder, often himself a Sokoto royal (See, Last, 1966:58; 1974:28).

Beginning with the decentralised territorial official, his function was similar to that of the emir, though one hierarchical level down. The village-head is referred to as Sarki in the form of Sarkin 'X' (village or town). He is also an important component of village ceremonial life, thus fulfilling, at his level of segmentation, the role as head of a territorial entity. In addition, he works, on the whole, through local, often titled people (especially in the case of craft titles where these exist). His similarity to the emir, conceptually, is seen in the following expressions (Dalby, 1964:274, 283, 289):

An baa shi garii = An danka garii a hannunsa
(a) 'He has taken over or has been put in charge of the town or village, of a new or acting head.'
(he has been given the town = the town has been given into his hands)

Shii nee mai garii = Shii nee Sarkin garii
'He is the local chief', referring to the head of a village or rural town (dagacii), but not the head of a district (hakimii).
(he is the owner/chief of the town)

Shii nee uban garii
'He is father of the community', said of a village-head.
(he is father of the town)


As with the series of centralised titles, so too with the peripheral ones: some are hereditary while others clearly are not, depending on the locale and its associated tradition. Baba (M. F. Smith, 1954:240) differentiates between practice in both Kano and Zaria Emirates in this regard when she states:

> In Zarewa the chieftainship was not hereditary, the King of Kano appointed whom he liked; perhaps it was because of wealth, or because the townspeople wanted him? I don't know the grounds for his choice. Here in Giwa it is inherited, from kinsman to kinsman.

Unlike the dagatai, or village-heads, the hakimai, or district-heads were not strictly territorial chiefs. The typical hakimi (sing.) was a state official, who ruled his territorial areas by proxy, as it were. These large districts were, on the whole, non-contiguous for reasons of not allowing the aggrandisement of power through large tracts of land (Cf., Map I, p.180) above, as well as the Table immediately below which illustrates the number of local entities which a central official might have at any one time). This political balance is again expressed by the residence of the

MAP B

The Distribution of Fiefs and Vassal-states of Fulani Zazzau in the nineteenth century.



(Smith, 1960)

hakimi in the capital rather than in his district. These district-heads, like the village-heads at a lower level at a lower level, were responsible for the administration of Shari'a in their province, the collection of taxes and the maintenance of order. The hakimi, too, has his ceremonial importance in a territorial function, as distinct from his administrative one as is seen in his part in the Id al-Fitr festival (Madauci, 1962:38-9):

> After the prayers are over the district heads make their way to the palace, each surrounded by their own people, contingent by contingent. At the head of each contingent are the 'zagage' or pages, usually three in number. These invariably carry folded blankets over their shoulders; with the blankets they cover the saddle of their master's horse when he alights to say his prayers. They also carry swords slung over their shoulders. The swords have sheaths coloured red, green or some other colour. They also carry a stout bamboo club to ward off unruly horses. One of them carries his master's staff...
>
> Those who come benind the district head, like the village and ward heads, his courtiers, his sons and brothers, his servants and those of his subjects who have horses of their own, are all dressed in their best; some are even more gorgeously dressed than himself, some just as well dressed and some not quite so well dressed. But none of them can wear a burnouse, except himself. Behind the district head come his drummers and musicians. There will be continuous drumming and singing and when the procession enters the town the spectacle prompts some women to give off loud shrieks of excitement and joy--adding still further to the grandeur of the occasion.

Below are listed the major title-holders of nineteenth century Zaria together with the extent of their districts (Smith, 1960:350):[26]

Sarkin Zazzau: Gangara, Makarfi, Ruma, Kidandan, Kagarko, Bugai, Mangi, Kwoi, Dumbi, Awai, Dan Alhaji, Hunkuyi, Gubuci, Kwari, Mayare

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[26] Including only those towns or rural areas which persist under a single title rather than those which have frequently been transferred.

Dynasty Members

Madaki: Janjala, Keffi, Kwotto, Karigi, Bagaji, Jema'an, Yelwa, Kwassallo, Zaben Kudun, Gimba, Ricifa, Madaci, Kuringa, Fatika, Rigacikum
Dan Galadima: Kasaya, Koraukorau, Sherifa, Ginta, Ashehu, Ibada, Turunku, Kakangi, Wusono, Kwandoro
Nambai: Gwibi, Talata, Jaba, Danayamaka, Sabon Gari, Bajimi, Samban Gida.
Magajin Gari: Saulawa, Garun Gwunki, Dan Mahawayi, Turawa, Rikoci, Dakaci, Auchan
Makama Karami: Kahugu, Agunu, Kauru, Kahuru, Igabi, Juran Taba, Rubu
Iya: Dan Dako, Sakadadi, Kauran, Wali, Iyatawa
Wali: Bikaratu, Juman Kari, Bakura, Rahama

Free Clients (Barori)

Galadima: Aribi, Katuga, Kubaca, Lazuru, Tudai, Amawa, Gure, Kadara, Kaje, Zonkwa, Zabi, Haskiya, Parakwai, Amana, Kwarau, Ifira, Kangimi, Afaka, Rikoka, Birnin, Bawa
Sarkin Fada: Kudan, Madobi, Doka, Bankanawa, Dan Dako
Turaki Babba: Guga, Soba, Likora
Turaki Karami: Cawai, Dan Damisa, Shimbir
Sarkin Ruwa: Likoro, Kawu, Nasari, Girku, Damau, Kaban, Bomo, Cigo
Dan Madami: Bassawa, Zuntu, Karshi
Salenke: Tukur Tukur, Matarkaku
Fanaci: Abaji, Wutana, Makwolo, Rikobi, Gimi
Mardanni: Mardanni
Makama Babba: Riawa, Marke
Dallatu: Anchau, Dambo, Sabon Birni
Katuka: Ikulu, Gadagau
Iyan Kurama: Dutsen Wai, Kadaru, Gaskora, Lewa, Sagau
Wan'ya: Gwaraji, Togace, Kan Rafi
Sarkin Mai: Gadas, All Maguzawa
Jisambo: Gwagwada, Kadi
Magajin Zakara: Sheru
Cikum: Cikum, Dafako Gwari
Sa'i: All Bororo Fulani in Zaria
Hauni: Dan Nata

Military Titles

Barde: Paki, Dawaki
Kuyambana: Luka
Rubu: Ifira Dinka, Tanni, Keffin Bangoji, Moroa

Slaves

Sarkin Yara: Dan Guzuri, Kacia town
Sarkin Ciyawa: Bogari
Shentali: Gwanda

Religious and Judicial Offices

Limamin Juma'a: Zangon Aya, Gwanda, Kufena
Limamin Kona: Kona, Matari
Alkali: Nuzata

Vassals

Sarkin Kajuru: Kasar Bishini, Mai Ido, Kafayawa, Anguwan Sarkin Bawa, Pambambe, Kajuru, Kacicere

Sarkin Kauru: Kauru, Buruma, Kaibi, Kitimi, Gidan Agam, Karko
Sarkin Fatika: Fatika, Rafin Taba, Galadimawa, Yakawadda, Murai, Butaro, Kaya, Yankore, Anguwan Gagara, Kushariki, Gahun, Kadage, Laban, Kurmin Mallo, Rago
Sarkin Lere: Lere Domawa, Sheni, Kayarda, Saminaka
Sarkin Kagarko: Jere, Kagarko, Buba, Akote, Kabara, Kazaze, Kurmin Dangana, Kubo, Kuduri, Kasuru
Magajin Keffi: Keffi
Sarkin Kwotto: Kwotto
Sarkin Jema'a: Jema'an Dororo, Sambon, Nok
Sarkin Doma: Doma
Sarkin Bagaji: Bagaji (now in Keffi)

The hakimi is represented in his district by titled subordinates known as jakadu (sing. jakada), 'intermediaries'.[27] The jakadu dealt directly with the local chiefs, reporting to the hakimi the events in his district, he made recommendations, and most importantly collected the taxes in the district. The tax-collecting function of a jakada even extended, according to oral tradition, to the iskoki, 'spirits'. In the portion of a Hausa story below, the jakada has among his responsibilities the collection of taxes from Sarkin Aljanu, the 'Chief of the Jinns' (Skinner, n.d.II:263-271; Edgar, 1911b:162-170):

There was once a tax-collector whom the emir would send to the chief of the jinns to collect his tax. He continued collecting the tax for many years, but at length he fell ill and sent to the chief of the jinns telling him to come...

***

Wani jekada Sarikin aljannu; Sariki na aikin sa wurin Sarikin aljannu, ya je ya karbo kudin kasa. Kullum hakanan, sai ran nan chiwo ya kama shi, sai ya aiki wurin Sarikin aljannu, ya che shi zo...


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[27] The feminine gender equivalent to this title, jakadiya was a palace functionary who, like the jakada, was an intermediary who served as a screen for visitors wanting to see the sarki.

Another tax-collecting official, the Sa'i (derived from Arabic, 'messenger') was responsible for the collection of jangali, 'cattle tax', from the Fulani and was, in general, an intermediary between Fulani pastoralists and Hausa agriculturalists (Bivar, 1961:237).

X

The hierarchy of Hausa political segmentation is clearly seen in the territorial title system. This can be represented in a conventional segmental diagfram as below:



The way in which this segmentation worked in practice is most clearly seen in relation to the collection of taxes. Here, in the emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, every part of Caliphal administration was involved in its collection and subsequent distribution. This is illustrated by Baba (M. F. Smith, 1954:80):

> ...The Chief of Zarewa would send his men to collect the money. His courtiers went to each house and collected the money for tax. In those days there was not only the household tax, gandu tax, there were also taxes on all sorts of different farming--groundnut tax, sweet potato tax, sugar-cane tax, and others; we called them kudin noma-noma, the farming taxes; there were craft taxes, too...Only the household taxes went to the King of Kano, the other taxes were kept by the town chiefs. If they used up all the money themselves, the common people had to pay...When Mai Koko had collected the household taxes, about thirty or forty keso--'mats'--he took the money to the Chief of Karaye; when Sarkin Karaye had collected the tax from all his towns he took it to Sarkin Kano, the king...Then they took his share to the Sultan of Sokoto, and the balance belonged to the King of Kano.

The duplicative aspect of the hierarchies of the political system within the emirates (and kingdoms) has now been described in detail in the last two chapters. Within the segmentary structure of the polity, at whatever level, there is a duplication of titles, functions, and relationships between juniors, seniors, and coequals. The way in which this hierarchy is reflected among the titled elites of the talakawa, or 'common people', is the subject of the next chapter. Indeed, it will be seen that this segmentation is reflected in the spirit world, craft associations, and youth associations

in addition to the political organisation. The political system in the Caliphate and, to a lesser extent, the Haȏe kingdoms, can best be understood through the interrelationships of these reflective hierarchies and the way in which they are expressed in a series of oppositions.

CHAPTER IV

HIERARCHY AMONG THE TALAKAWA

This chapter concludes the description of the modes of hierarchical organisation in Hausa society. Whereas the previous two chapters dealt with hierarchy as expressed in the political system based on a territorially segmented allocation of authority, this chapter deals with hierarchy among the governed, the talakawa. Starting from the point of discussing associations of youth, hierarchically organised, this chapter then proceeds to examine the organisation of craftsmen and, finally, the spirit pantheon. It will be demonstrated that political hierarchy, expressed through titles, is found in spheres of social life other than the political.

I

In the Hausa 'youth associations', taron tsaran juna or jam'iyyar ta samari,[1] the hierarchy of court officials, their titles, functions and statuses is duplicated among the pre-adolescent Hausa. Despite the apparent generalness of these youth associations,[2] they are only infrequently encountered in the literature. However, the references which do exist are reliable and allow the following description and comment.

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[1] Taron tsaran juna: literally, 'group of one's equals (Abraham, 1962:434, 854, 878). Juna indicates a reciprocal relation. Hill's (1972:328) item in her glossary makes clear the choice of tone patterns for tsara which is missing in Smith (1955:101). Jam'iyyar ta samari, 'association of youths' is preferred here to Smith's 'play association' (1955:101) which may be misleading.

[2] Baba (1954:60) mentions that each ward of Zarewa (Zaria), including the Fulani ward, have their own youth association. Smith asserts (1955:101) that until recently they were universal in Hausaland.

At the outset it is important to state that in Hausa society there is no institution so comprehensive and delimiting as age-grades in which '...the total range of age-defined roles may constitute a graded system, which emphasises the progressive movement from role to role...and prescribes the relationships between people in different grades' (Gulliver, 1968: 157). Rather, these groups of near age-mates lack initiation procedure into the group,[3] or into any successive group levels, there are no group names or common symbols of identification vis-à-vis other groups or adults. They are organised, however, along lines of sex and indirectly related to the occupational class system. In addition, the titled positions of authority in use in these associations are in direct imitation of the administrative titles of the emirate.

The duration of these associations is ephemeral and transitory as M. G. Smith states (1955:101): '...duration was a matter for common consent, but as most of the important members of the group, that is the title-holders, would be approaching marriageable age, the groups would gradually lose their members by marriage, and tend to co-opt new members from the younger children.' Marriage signals the passage from the status of youth to that of adult and full membership in the society. In this respect, as shall be

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[3] As distinct from the initiation procedures for the series of titles within the group which will be examined below.

seen, membership in the youth associations is a transitional and educational phase in the lives of Hausa children in which they learn the hierarchical and cooperational values of the society they are about to join. As first marriage comes young to Hausa (thirteen or fourteen years of age), the three or four years spent in the youth associations are important in imparting these values.

At the apex of these youth associations' hierarchy is the Sarkin Samari, 'Chief of the Youth'.[4] Although he is given a turban as a symbol of the authority of his position by the district head in rural localities or by the emir, the Sarkin Samari is selected by the other youths. In A Chronicle of Abuja (1952:62; cf., 1946:16; hereafter cited as Chr. A.) the writers add that since the arrival of the Europeans, during the reign of Muhamman Dani (1902-1917), the appointment of the Sarkin Samari has been made by Sarkin Abuja himself. In Zaria, Baba of Karo gives an in-depth description of the selection and installation of the Sarkin Samari (M. F. Smith, 1954:59; hereafter cited as Baba):

One Friday in the dry season all the youths and

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[4] Abraham (1962:790-1) lists the word samari under its singular, saurayi. Another plural equivalent to saurayi is sauri. It is interesting to note, however, that the Sarkin Sauri is given by Abraham to mean: '...the head of the young girls for arranging work, play, and assignations.' This title is equivalent to hutsaye in Katsina Emirate (meaning unclear), Sarkin Dare (or Jiraye), also from Katsina signifying a sarauta of junior Sarkin Sauri (Abraham, 1962:842). Sarkin Samari seems to be the most widespread term in Zaria (Baba, 58; Smith, 1955:101) and in Habe Katsina (Nicolas, 1975:164).

girls would gather together in front of the Chief of Zarewa's palace, the boys in one place and the girls in another. The elders who appointed the Sarkin Samari sat with the Chief of Zarewa. Sarki would install the Sarkin Samari and give him a turban to wear. The young men selected their leader because he was popular and good-tempered, not because he was wealthy; when they had chosen him they would go to Sarkin Zarewa and say 'We want so-and-so to be Sarkin Samari.' He would say 'Very well, we will install him next Friday.'

In this account of the selection and conferment of position between generations, there is an anology with the procedures involved in referring the newly selected emir to the Sultan at Sokoto for confirmation and the consensus of electors in the Habe states.

Among the girls there are parallel groupings with their own title series. The senior title-holder is called Mama in Zaria, Magajiya in Katsina Na Maradi, or Sarauniya 'Yam Mata in Abuja.[5] She is selected by the young girls and confirmed by the emir or district or town authority. The selection of Mama and other female heads is done separately and without the involvement of the young men (Baba, 61; Chr. A., 1946: 16) as are the male titles selected without the females. Although these parallel associations participate in common activities and festivals, their separation in selection procedures and judicial scope, as described below, clearly establishes them as parallel, yet complementary, groups.

From the extended account of Baba (58-61) it becomes clear that the transmission of these titles is

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[5] Baba (Ibid.), Nicolas (Ibid.), Hassan and Shuaibu Na'Ibi (1946:16), respectively.

not, at least in Zaria, totally open to competition. First of all, the two senior titles can be transmitted through siblings. As Baba states (61): 'Asama'a was Mama from the time she was ten years old until she was married; then they appointed her younger sister Asabe, she was nine...If one Sarki grew too old they would appoint his younger brother or his kinsman, they wouldn't lack a suitable boy in the family.' The fraternal and sororal transmission of titles is, in this case, part of another organisational hierarchy, namely, the occupational groups. In Baba's account, the Mama is always taken from the Chief Butcher's compound in the Butcher's ward while the Sarkin Samari is recruited from the Onion Farmers' ward (Ibid.). In this way, then, these three hierarchies: political, occupational, and junior generational are all interlinked in their expression of a common organisational principle.

Turning now to the subsidiary titles of the youth associations, all the major titles of the emirate are repeated. Each title, as in the emirate system, is associated with defined activities within the group and each is given a measure of respect and deference appropriate to the title. In Abuja, these titles include the Galadima, Madawaki, and Imam (Chr. A.: 62). In Zaria, the following titles are to be found: Ciroma, Galadima, Turaki, Madaki, Ma'aji, Shentali

and Majidadi (Baba, Ibid.). Since the colonial occupation, other titles have entered the system, including: King-of-England, Lagos-Governor, Kaduna-Governor, Lawyer, Doctor and Surveyor (Chr. A., 62). In Katsina (Maradi), which was colonised by the French, the titles include: Gomna (Governor) and Kumandau (Commandant) in addition to titles such as Dandwan (Customs Officer) which are peculiar to that area (Nicolas, 1975:165). The girls have a similar division of titled officials.[6] As with the leading boy's and girl's titles, so also are the holders of the subsidiary titles taken from the occupational groups from which are drawn the Sarkin Samari and Mama (Baba, 61). Competition for the titles, however, is intense and proceeds along lines of clientage and gift-exchange common in the emirate administration. Finally, all of the titles accrued in the youth associations may be kept by the holders after marriage and throughout life as terms of address and reference, that is, until they receive a higher title.[7] Smith states regarding the Sarkin Samari (1955:97): '(this is)...partly as a tribute for his management of the age-grade he controlled, and partly as a reminder of the holder's earlier distinction, by which suitability

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[6] Unfortunately, none of these girl's titles have been published.

[7] Although members are replaced upon marriage, occasionally the Sarkin Samari may continue in his capacity for a few years after marriage (Chr. A., 62).

for promotion is implied.'

The Hausa youth associations are closely tied to their courting practices known as tsarance. Through this custom, young courting couples can sleep together and indulge in fore-play, though completion of the sex act is theoretically not permitted (Tremearne, 1913:777).[8] The following portions from Hausa tales show the relationships between tsarance partners, sex equals, and the family. The first demonstrates the form involved in courting and deference to the paternal generation, while the second exhibits the extent of young male cooperation in tsarance arrangements (Skinner, 1969:348-9, 118; Edgar, 1913:143, 270-1):

There was once a lad who was courting a girl, whom he used to visit, going to her town every day.
But one day he arrived at night, and came to her compound. And as he got there, the girl's mother was saying to her 'Get up and close the hut, so that we may go to sleep.'
The boy made formal greeting, and the girl answered 'Welcome'. 'Come along, let's be going' he said, but the mother said 'Going? Where?' The boy answered 'To my compound.' 'Oh no' said she, 'Since you didn't come early, before night fell, and have left it till now to come--I won't have a hyena eating up my daughter!' 'Oh no' said the boy, 'for, you see, I have some spears.' At this she agreed, and the girl went out and they set off.

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Wani yaro yana tsaranchen wata buduruwa; daga wani gari ya ke zowwa wurin buduruwan nan kullum.
Sai ran nan ya zo da da dare, ya je gidansu buduruwan nan. Sai ya taras uwatta ta che ma yarinya,

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[8] Abraham (1962:878) gives the following definition of the term: 'The custom whereby a girl is permitted mutual masturbation with a boy whom she is not to marry, provided actual connection does not occur (but as the latter occurs, its epithet is...Tsarance madakin zina ('Tsarance is the counterpart of fornication').' The related term, tsaranci, means 'fornication between young people'. Nicolas (1975:193) also questions the nature of the relationship in the modern context, noting that in the past, 'Cette virginité faisait l'objet d'un contrôle public lors du mariage.'

'Tashi, rufe muna ɗaki, mu yi kwana.'
Sai yaro ya yi sallama, sai yarinya ta che, 'Maraba!' Sai ya che ma yarinya, 'Tafo, mu tafi.' Sai uwar yarinya ta che, 'Ku tafi ina?' Sai yaro ya che, 'Mu tafi gidan-mu.' Sai ta che, 'A'a! Da ba ka zowwa da wuri, tun dare bai yi ba, sai yanzu za ka tafo; ni ban yarda kura ta chanye ma ni ɗiya ba.' Sai yaro ya che, 'A'a! Ai ina da masu'. Sai ta che, 'To!' Sai yarinya ta fito, ta kama hanya.

There were once two young men, who had shared a hut ever since they were boys. Now they were grown to young men and each had his own hut in the compound, but still one would leave his own hut and go and spend the night with his friend, such was their friendship.
Later they would go and bring home their girls as tsarance partners and when they fetched them, they would all go to the compound of one of the two boys and there spend the night.

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Da samrayi da samrayi, tun sun yara su ke kwana ɗaki ɗaya, har suka girma, suka zama samari, kowa ya yi ɗakinsa gidansu. Wannan samrayi domin yarda sai ya bar ɗakinsa, ya tafi ɗakin abokinsa, suna kwana tare.
Sai ran nan suka je, suka ɗauko yam-mata, suna tsaranche, sai su tafi gidan wanchan samrayi, su kwana.

Both of these examples show tsarance to be a relation of formal courtship with appropriate behaviour and friendship among age-mates. Between the courting couple, the relationship is furtner formalised with the giving of gifts (toshin tsarance) to the young girl to secure her favours (Smith, 1955:59). In addition, gifts (for example, toshin salla) are given to the young girl's parents at the time of festivals (Abraham, 1962: 870). This is illustrated in the following text Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi, 1952:61; 1946:14):

In times past if a youth saw a girl with whom he desired this friendship, he would go to her parents' house with four hundred cowries to tell them that he had seen their daughter and wanted her to be his friend (lit., tsarance partner). They, when they accepted the money, would say, 'Very well; here is the girl, we commit her to your care. See that no harm befalls her--that you do not get her with child--and the day when

she fails to come to your house as usual, let us know.' Then on the next Feast Day, either the Lesser Feast of Id el-Fitr at the end of Ramadan or the Greater Feast of Id el-Kebir, the young man would send to the parents four hundred cowries for the girl to have her hair dressed.

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A zamamin da idan sauriyi ya ga wata budurwa yana sonta da tsarance, sai ya tafi gidan iyayenta da tsabar kuɗi arbaminya, ya ce da iyayenta ya ga ɗiyarsu yana sonta da tsarance. Su kuma su kan karɓi kuɗin, sa'an har mu ga wani lahani tare da ita. Watau kada a gan ta da ciki, kuma ran da ba ka gan ta a ɗakinka ba ka zo ka gaya mana.' Ranar Karamar Salla duk ko Babbar Salla ya kan aika wa iyayen da kuɗi arbaminya su ba yarinya ta yi kitso.

In the youth associations, tsarance is organised as an activity within the group. At night, there is dancing and singing involving all the members of the group. When the festivities are over, each sex is shown a resting place in the forecourts (zaure, sing.) of the houses of the hamlet. There, the young men choose their tsarance partners for the night, remaining together until sunrise (Baba, 59-60). Smith (1955: 101) points out, however, that the 'freedom of choice' of tsarance partners increases with group status expressed through the title system. This aspect further impresses upon the young group members the meaning and exercising of the rank system of the society in which they are soon to become full members through marriage.

Members of the youth associations are also involved in preparing for the marriage celebrations of one of their number. Sarkin Samari, in this event, calls together the members of the youth association to help with the celebrations (Chr. A., 62; cf., 1946:16). Help for former members also comes after one has left

the group. When a former girl member is about to give birth to a child, Sarkin Samari calls together the current members to cut wood for her use (Ibid.). In this way, then, not only does membership in the youth association create individual bonds which last throughout life, but also a bond is maintained to the group through which individuals pass before their own marriages.

In imitation of the emirate administration, the senior titles in the youth associations exercise judicial functions in the control of group members. The judiciary is split along sex lines: the Mama and senior girls pass judgement on the girls of the group, and the Sarkin Samari and the Alkalin Samari discipline the young boys. There is no interaction between these two sets of disciplinaries (Baba, 61). Sarkin Samari and Mama have the power to exact fines in such matters as: quarrelling; market disturbances, or failure to conform to the groups' rules. Other punishments include: 'play imprisonment', beatings, and ostracism. In fact, gross injustices against individuals could lead to parents refusing to allow their children to enter a group (Smith, 1957:37).

Furthermore, the Sarkin Samari may order members to carry out various tasks in the village or town (gayyar samari, lit., communal labour of youth). Usually this involves farming someone's land. In this case, the boys hoe while the girls, who do no work, put

on their best clothes, sing encouragement to the boys as they work, and give them food (Baba, 59-60). The emir, also, can ask the children of the youth associations to perform tasks for him. These chores most often have to do with the cleaning of his residence or the mosque. When their work is completed, the emir gives them kolanuts (Chr. A., 62). In this way, authority and the sanctions imposed or rewards given by people in authority, either from within the youth association or from the emirate officials, is taught to Hausa youth prior to their entering society as adults.

In the activities of the youth associations, those members with titles, and particularly the Sarkin Samari and Mama, are treated with the respect and circumscribed behaviour given those who hold titles in the emirate hierarchy. For example, Baba tells us (59-60) that in the touring of the countryside after the appointments of titles are confirmed, those with titles mount horses while those without titles walk. When they arrive in a village, the titled youth would dismount and be given food and stools (the others would sit on the ground). The food given by the hamlet to the Sarkin Samari and Mama would then be redistributed by them to their respective male and female followers. When they left a place, the Sarkin Samari and Mama were preceded by bodyguards and attendants in the manner of a royal procession. The Sarkin Samari, in

addition, would be greeted in the manner of a chief: 'May you life be long' (Ranka ya dade). Finally, the titled youth have 'praise songs' (roko, sing.)[9] and 'songs' (wakoki) sung in their honour as well as possessing 'praise epithets' (kirari, sing.). A waka sung for Mama and Sarkin Samari is given below (Baba,60).

See Mama, the chief's mother,
See Mama, the chief's mother,
See the chief, see the chief,
See the chief, see the chief,
See the chief, see Mama,
See Mama, the chief's mother.

The analogy here refers to the title mama, or Iya, a pre-Fulani title reserved for the mother of the Sarki in the central administration.

At a ceremony reported to occur in Zaria, the kalankuwa,[10] the two associations meet outside the

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[9] Roko is the craft (sana'a) practised by maroka (m.s. maroki, f.s. marokiya) who sing eulogies to the accompaniment of drums and various other instruments for political title-holders, for other important people, to beckon the bori spirits, or at important social functions such as at a marriage. Maroka either sing individually or in teams and are paid by retainer or for an individual performance. The themes of the eulogies range from panegyric to ridicule and, as monitors of public opinion, the maroka exercise a great deal of social control. Kirari are praise epithets which accompany each official title and are sung by maroka for the title-holder (Cf., Abraham, 1962:522, 660; Smith, 1957). A discussion of the maroka in terms of craft organisation appears in the next section.

[10] The kalankuwa is reported by Smith (1957:37) to occur once a year, and by M.F. Smith (1954:260, n.6) twice a year. This ceremony is not cited in any other text (though it is possible that Nicolas, 1975:164 refers to it. Unfortunately he does not elaborate). Abraham (1962:460) lists the term together with the following expressions: an yi mana kalankuwa jiya, 'last night drumming party was held for us who start gayya (collective work) today', which equals the phrase: saran gayya; yam mata suna yi mana, 'girls are singing to us at gayya, to light our toil'. Bargery (1934:538) gives similar listings. This seems to indicate that kalankuwa refers to the activities of the youth work groups which occur with greater frequency than once or twice a year.

town walls or some fallow farm land and establish an imitative town complete with its own political and legal structure (Smith, 1957:37). This ceremony which lasts three or four days, is a formal dramatisation of the state political system on which these youth associations are modelled. An important part in the kalankuwa is played by the maroka of the community who, by eulogising, instruct the young participants in the hierarchical tenets of adult Hausa society.

The Hausa youth associations express and duplicate the hierarchy of the central emirate system of government in a number of ways. First of all, they are educative. They teach young Hausa the meanings of hierarchy in their society: deference, respect, obedience, competition, privilege, clientage, and reward. As Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi state (1946:16; cf., published translation, 1952:62):

> This association teaches the children how they pay respect in relation to those ahead of them--from the time of their youth--until they become owners of their own gida (house/compound).
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>
> Wannan jam'iyya tana koya wa yana yadda za su yi biyayya ga na gabansu, tun daga lokacin samar--taka har su zama masu gidan kansu.

The pervasive importance of rank in the dealings of adult Hausa society requires an intense instruction into the political aspects of social life and is accomplished through the imitative behaviour in the youth associations. Furthermore, the youth associations are a kind of levelling device through which the rural areas duplicate the hierarchical structure of the town

(gari) and are brought into a wider understanding of emirate affairs. The youth associations also provide Hausa with the beginnings of friendships which persist through their lifetimes. Finally, other than their didactic value, the youth associations are symbolic expressions of hierarchy in their society as the youths perceive it to operate.

II

In dealing with Hausa crafts or professions, sana'a,[11] the discussion here will concentrate on those craftsmen who pursue their occupation either on a full-time or part-time basis in the production of goods or in providing services, usually within the market context, and also on those craftsmen who are organised into distinct groups of specialists which are internally differentiated in terms of hierarchy. The range of practised crafts is very wide in Hausa society, reflecting the complexity of the economic system and the role that voluntary associations play in a society in which kinship is of peripheral importance. These occupational specialisations include: masons, potters, hunters, fishers, butchers, tanners, various kinds of leatherworkers, weavers, dyers,

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[11] Plural: sana'o'i. The term is derived from Arabic (Abraham, 1962:775). It will not be the concern of this discussion to describe in detail the actual work of the craftsmen. For these accounts see: Madauci, et. al. 1968; Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi (1952).

carpenters, blacksmiths, whitesmiths,[12] drummers, praise singers, malamai, and so forth. The following three Tables demonstrate the diversity of craft specialisations, their frequencies and distribution by economic category.

I. Traditional Occupations: Kano (Paden, 1973:24, adapted)

Occupation	Number of Persons	Percentage
(1) Wealthy traders	43	.37
(2) Chief traders	200	1.74
(3) Kola sellers	472	4.12
(4) Groundnut sellers	142	1.24
(5) Grain sellers	143	1.25
(6) Skins sellers	153	1.33
(7) Chief butchers	69	.60
(8) Potash sellers	62	.54
(9) Dyers	337	2.94
(10) Whitesmiths	204	1.78
(11) Builders	220	1.92
(12) Horse sellers	40	.34
(13) Blacksmiths	64	.55
(14) Barbers	167	1.43
(15) Beggars	197	1.72
(16) Brokers	479	4.19
(17) Saddle cloth	61	.53
(18) Leather workers	473	4.13
(19) Scent sellers	53	.46
(20) Indigo sellers	70	.17 (sic)
(21) Petty traders	776	6.70
(22) Weavers	227	1.98
(23) Tanners	122	1.06
(24) Tailors	877	7.67
(25) Cap makers	2,405	21.03
(26) Sweetmeat sellers	38	.33
(27) Horse trappings makers	49	.42
(28) Petty meat traders	296	2.58
(29) Mallams	1,320	11.54

[12] A blacksmith, makerin baki, traditionally works with iron, bakin karfe (lit., 'black iron'); while a whitesmith, makerin fari, mainly works with gold and silver (Jagger, 1973:99). This distinction is seen in the following text collected by Taylor and Webb (1932:210-13): 'There are two kinds of smiths. There are blacksmiths, that is to say workers in iron. There are also workers of 'white' metals, that is to say of brass and tin.'// Akwai makera iri biyu. Akwai na babbaku; watau masu-kirar tama. Kuma akwai na farfaru; watau masu-kirar farin-karfe da tutiya.

II. Traditional Occupations: Katsina by 'Economic Group'* (adapted from Hill, 1972:72)

Occupation	Economic Group 1 and 2	3	4	Total
Traders				
(1) 'Yan kwarami (corn)	8	-	-	8
(2) Shopkeepers, etc.	5	2	-	7
(3) Sweet potato	3	2	-	5
(4) other	5	8	2	15
Craftsmen				
(5) Tailors	4	3	-	7
(6) Builders	3	1	2	6
(7) Blacksmiths	3	-	-	3
(8) other	2	2	3	7
(9) Butchers	2	4	3	9
(10) 'Free goods'	3	10	13	26
(11) Barori	3	9	3	15
(12) Building and labour	-	6	4	10
(13) 'Services'	2	7	2	11
(14) Koranic studies	11	2	-	13
(15) Drummers	-	2	3	5
(16) none	1	6	-	7

*'Economic Group' is Hill's term, a rough equivalent to relative 'standard of living' (see: Hill, 1972:58-60).

III. Traditional Occupations: Zaria (Smith, 1955:242-3; adapted)

Occupation	Community A	B	C	D	Total
Dyeing	2	1	-	24	27
Mallams	4	8	2	18	32
Tailors	5	1	-	12	18
Mat weavers	-	1	1	12	14
Butchers	1	1	-	8	10
Barbers	-	3	1	4	8
Weavers	8	3	1	4	16
Builders	4	3	-	4	11
Thatchers	3	3	-	3	9
Maroka	3	4	1	3	11
Leatherworkers	-	1	-	2	3
Blacksmiths	2	1	-	1	4
Potters	-	-	-	-	-
Drummers	1	7	1	1	10
Kolanut traders	2	6	-	6	14
Fatauci (long distance trade)	-	-	-	27	27
Brokers	2	7	-	7	16

The value of crafts and craft specialisation to the Hausa is emphasised in proverbial expressions. The following proverbs show the importance that Hausa place on their crafts in terms of personal identification and indicate a hierarchy of values in which craftsmanship is held in high esteem (1-3: Whitting, 1940:116, 118, 119; 4:Abraham, 1962:775):

A san mutum a kan chikinsa ko shan giya ya ke
One knows a man by his trade even if it is drinking beer; i.e., the cobbler is known by his last.

A san ma-aiki da kayan aikinsa
The craftsman should be recognised by the tools of his craft; i.e., the craftsman ought to have his tools in evidence.

Sana'a wadda ta fi bawan gado
A craft which excels an inherited slave; i.e., the former sticks by you the latter may not.

Sana'a ta fi dukiyar gado
Having an occupation is better than to inherit wealth.

In addition, in proverbs, the various crafts are referred to symbolically, representing political relationships, interpersonal behaviour and health. This is illustrated in the following expressions (Whitting, 1940):

Abin majin yache na mai-magani ne (115)
The sick man's property belongs to the doctor; i.e., pence are not counted in time of illness.

Wanzami ba ya son jarfa (115)
The barber does not like cuts (on his face); i.e., injury to others becomes very difficult when done to yourself.

In da duniya tana dagaskiya, ba a bar mazeri tsirara ba (117)
Were the world truthful, the spinner would not be left naked; i.e., one does not always get one's desserts.

In za a yi tukka a yi mata hanchi domin kada ta warware (118)
If you are going to twist thread make your knot so that it doesn't unwind; i.e., be sure that your story is based and can't be upset.

Wai an che da akwiya sarkin pawa ya mutu: ta che sho! ya mutu da wukar yanka ne? (120)
When the goat was told that the head butcher was dead she said 'Oh! has the butcher's knife died with him?' i.e., the oppressor may be dead but the oppression will continue.

Crafts may be pursued on a part-time basis, either during the dry season or all year round. In a rural setting, Batagarawa, Katsina, is typical (Hill, 1972:71): '...nearly all Batagarawa farmers, other than some of those who are decrepit or retired, pursue one or more types of remunerative non-farming occupation, either during the dry season only or (as with butchers, shopkeepers, 'yan kwarami, blacksmiths and others) at all times of the year.' In another rural area, in Zaria, Baba recollects the balance between full-time and part-time craftsmanship prior to the coming of the British (Baba, 42):

In the afternoons after work on the gandu farm was finished, some of the slaves worked at crafts. Some wove on the men's narrow looms, some were brokers in the market, some were salt-sellers, some sold kola-nuts or sugar-cane or sweet potatoes or cotton, or other things. Some were dyers, some grew onions or sugar-cane in marsh-plots. Some just farmed their own plots. Those who did crafts had been born in the rinji; slaves who were bought in the market could not do anything except farming. If a slave had a son he would see a craftsman working, he would go and watch him and he would learn.

In the urban context of the gari and the birni, economic complexity carries with it increasing specialisation. Here to a much greater extent than in rural districts, individuals abandon the farm in favour of pursuing their crafts or trades on a full-time basis (Yeld, 1960:117).

Most Hausa craftsmen are organised into associations (jam'iyya, sing.) according to specialisation. This facet of occupational organisation has, as shall be seen, repercussions in matters of residence, ceremonies, and interpersonal relationships. The hierarchical organisation of the crafts under titled officers will form the second part of this examination.

It is necessary, first of all, to distinguish the Hausa occupational associations from the European 'guild' (or 'gild'). The two are commonly confused in the literature on the Hausa. Paden (1973:23), in defining the associations of the sana'o'i likens them to 'guilds' as follows:

> A guild (jam'iyya), or union, was equivalent to a combination of welfare society, labour union, and family council. These guilds regulated recruitment of membership and managed the affairs of the occupational groups. Many of the occupations were ethnically based, and many of the guilds were based in particular clans.

Thus, Paden defines the 'guild' of craftsmen as regulating the recruitment and behaviour of its members, recruitment being determined to a certain degree by heredity and ethnicity. Smith (1962:305) finds the occupational organisation 'reminiscent of guilds' owing to their hierarchical, officially recognised, structure, the collection of taxes and organising of services or supplies for the sarki, and the controlling of prices and quality of merchandise. Finally, Yeld (1960:117), while stating that there is no Hausa guild system, incorrectly asserts that there is no occupat-

ional cooperation above the level of the extended family. Her assertion will be countered throughout the text by examples from Hausa areas other than Kebbi.

In a comparative context, the use of the term 'guild' refers to a whole series of voluntary associations over a period of centuries in many different locations in Medieval Europe. Thrupp (1968:184) reminds us that originally (and in some locations continuously) the 'gilds' of Europe were not occupationally based at all: 'This was not the original sense of the word. It was specific only in signifying that members were under obligation to 'geld', that is, to make payments for purposes agreed upon. Throughout the Middle Ages, it was also synonymous with fraternities--definable as a pseudo-kinship group of a character in principle congenial to Christianity.' Surveying the history of guilds in Europe, Thrupp finds that originally the organisations had as their function the preservation of civil order at a time of weak state control. This entailed several aspects: (i) the protection of property, (ii) discouraging violence, (iii) mutual aid in sickness, (iv) common worship, and (v) assuring a decent burial. The cooperation was binding by an initial oath and the members met yearly at banquets. As the guilds and states evolved, new forms of each developed to meet new situations. However, as Thrupp states (1968:187):

'In all their phases, European gilds were in part particularistic[13] in spirit, but it was their contributions to order and religion that, from the first, were the basis of their legitimation.' By way of comparison with European guilds, a summary may be given of the organisation and activities of the associations of Hausa craftsmen.

Firstly, membership in some crafts is hereditary and members tend to intermarry, while membership in others is voluntary with a preference for alliances created through intermarriage with members of other crafts. This will be examined in greater depth below.

Secondly, in urban areas, members of the same craft tend to live in the same ward of the town. This was shown in the examination of the youth associations.

Thirdly, in being identified as a group, there are certain infra-associational activities, rules, greetings, and so forth, which mark the members of the group off from other groups of the same type. As Nicolas states (1976:405): '...chaque sana'a possède un statut, une devise, des danses, une réputation qui s'étend à tous ses membres.'

Fourthly, relations between and within crafts are framed in a context of kinship. These devices include 'joking relationships' (abokin wasa) and a quasi-kinship based on kindred bonds (zumunta). In other words, craft reciprocities are one aspect of a wider social network of reciprocal relations.

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[13] Unlike the artisan guilds of Middle Eastern Islam which were the bearers of a universalistic philosophy (Goitein, 1964).

Thus, the blacksmiths (makeri) are the abokan wasa (sing.) of the Bugaje and the 'hunters' of the malamai.

Fifthly, the Kano Chronicle (Palmer, 1928ii:99) suggests that prior to the reign of Bagauda there was a religious interconnection among the craft specialists expressed through rituals devoted to Tchunburburai, who was their protector and oracle.

Sixthly, contrary to Yeld's assertion, at least prior to the European occupation, there was a great deal of intercraft cooperation especially as it related to the needs of the court and in time of military preparation. As an informant told Nicolas (1975: 170):

> Leurs fonctions traditionnelles consistaient, jadis, à orienter la production de leurs Métiers en fonction des besoins de la Cour, notamment en ce qui concerne les métiers intéressant l'armament de l'armée locale. Lors de la préparation d'une expédition guerrière, les forgerons étaient mobilises pour réparer les armes, en fabriquer de nouvelles, fabriquer des mors, des étriers; les artisans du cuir, pour confectionner ou réparer selles, boucliers, harnais, carquois, baudriers.

Intercraft cooperation has only declined in comparatively recent times as the importance of craft associations themselves have declined. Within each craft, prices and the quality of workmanship are regulated.

Lastly, although craft cooperation in production has declined, the rituals binding crafts in life-cycle ceremonies remain. For example, at the time of marriage, each craft is responsible for different phases of the marriage. The occupational affiliation of both parties to the marriage has its praises sung

as Baba relates for her own family (97):

They gave me a stick and a bowl and told me to go begging, while they drummed the song of the malams --my father was a malam.

House of blessing, house of the Book,
House that is filled with ablution-jars,
House of blessing, house of the Book.

Then my 'parents' on my mother's side pretended they were angry, and said I must do the dance of the blacksmiths--they put a tomato in my mouth for the red-hot iron.

You eat fire bel-bel, the blacksmiths' game,
You eat fire bel-bel, the blacksmiths' game,
Sons of the blacksmiths, you eat medicine,
Playing with fire
only the blacksmiths.
You sons of the blacksmiths, you eat medicine.
Only the blacksmiths can play with fire.

Everyone has his special dance for feasts like this; the blacksmiths heat iron until it is red, red, then they play with it in their hands and against their bodies and heads until there is lots of smoke. They have magic, it doesn't burn them. The onlookers give them money. At a butchers' feast they fill their mouths with porridge and dance; they sit down and pretend that they are selling their meat in the market.

Having summarised the salient features of Hausa craft associations, it remains the task to examine the Hausa occupational organisations as a type of 'guild'.

Although there are significant differences in the operation of Hausa craft associations both before the arrival of the British and in this century, certain observations can be made. In relation to the early European guilds, there is little commonality between these guilds and the Hausa craft associations. The Hausa craft associations, according to the sources, are not oath-taking, do not protect internal property or themselves from external violence, and they are not bound by a religious order.[15] In relation to

[15] With the exception of the malamai. In areas where Islam is common, this religion does not relate specifically to an occupational order.

later European guilds, the Hausa craft associations do, to a limited extent, control the quality and prices of products, and control internal dispute. However, the craft associations were involved in the payment of taxes to the craft heads who, in turn, gave the money to the sarki, rather than make payments to further any goals of the association. In conclusion, misunderstandings and inaccuracies may arise in comparing the jam'iyya of the Hausa sana'o'i with the guilds of Medieval Europe. The associations of craftsmen are voluntary associations of specialists who come together in the context of the market (kasuwa), and certain ceremonial occasions. Many of these facets of craft organisation will be examined below.

III

In the Hausa language, the distinction between an office or affiliation which is transmitted hereditarily and one which is open to competition, revolves around the terms karda and shigege, respectively.[16] But, this clear distinction has been eroded in recent decades as most crafts, and especially new crafts, have become open to all (Nicolas, 1976:505). However, general observations may be made, and examples drawn from them.

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[16] As shown in the discussion in chapter three. It will be remembered that while shigege is listed in the Hausa lexicons (e.g., Abraham, 1962:811) as 'a person following a non-hereditary craft', karda is not found in the lexicons.

Beginning with hereditary crafts, the 'heredity' of these crafts does not necessarily mean the direct transmission from father to son or to all sons equally. If a son is disinclined to follow in his father's trade, equivalent socioeconomic occupations would be available to him (Paden, 1973:23). The crafts are perpetuated through the larger patrilateral affiliations[17] associated with descent, residence, ethnicity, and religious ties which, together with occupation, coincide in a common frame of reference. In this respect, in terms of hereditary Hausa occupational specialisation and the resultant class structure, there is little difference between Islamic and non-Islamic Hausa and between those who are urban or rural. This aspect of hereditary craftsmanship is indicated in a Hausa proverb (Merrick, 1905:no.92):

Kowoni tsuntsu ya yi kuka'n giddansa
Every bird has the note peculiar to its own kind: If you are born among people who weave, farm, etc., you will do the same.

Moreover, there is a definite prestige ranking involved in the superiority of an inherited craft to one which is learned. Occupational ranking will be more closely examined in section seven below, but for purposes here it may be pointed out that this hierarchy involves status and prestige (girma) as an informant explained to Smith (1959:248): '...the superior status of karda simply expresses the general preference for

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17 Not patrilineal.

social continuity and for stability in the status order' (Cf., Low, 1972:20). In addition to the maintenance of an equilibrium, it may also be posited, paralleling the case of political succession, that hereditary occupational groups reduce conflict stemming from the competition for limited resources, limited markets, and restricted access to craft-headship. Related to this status hierarchy based on karda/shigege, Yeld (1960:117) alludes to the phenomenon of crafts learned through apprenticeship which become hereditary after several generations, clearly being an attempt by a group of kinsmen to raise their status.

Crafts which have lost the hereditary organisational aspect are increasing in recent times, for example, butchers (mahauta, pl.). But among those professions in which it has remained strong, for example, 'griots' (makaɗa, pl.), and especially among non-Islamic Hausa, hereditary craftsmanship is important to 'clan' (dangi) organisation.

Apprenticeship in a hereditary craft begins in childhood. Apprenticeship in non-hereditary crafts may be initiated at any time. Among the non-hereditary crafts may be included those of traditional calabash-engraving, embroidery, shoe making, certain types of trading and, above all, those of more recent introduction and those oriented toward export and the modern economy such as taxi driving. Apprenticeship in a non-hereditary craft is the same as that in a hereditary

one: a prospective student works for the head of a workshop, if such a shop exists, or for an individual craftsman. One craft, that of bokanci (a practising 'medical specialist', boka) which formerly was hereditary, presents an example of an occupation which one takes up as an apprentice and becomes accepted into the profession once an ordeal has been completed (Nicolas, 1975:212):

> Pour y accéder, il faut se mettre à l'école d'un maître, lequel enseigne à ses élèves son savoir et leur communique progressivement une part de ses pouvoirs. Puis le postulant est soumis à une épreuve par les 'génies' (aljanu). Cette épreuve a lieu à minuit, dans un endroit retiré et hanté par les Esprits. Il peut, s'il y résiste, conclure une alliance avec certains dieux. Il peut alors librement professor le métier de boka. Chaque 'magicien' travaille pour lui-même.

Illustrating one setting in the taking-up of an hereditary or non-hereditary craft is the following story which also demonstrates the relationship of father and son, inheritance and craft specialisation (Skinner, n.d.II; Edgar, 1911a:73-4):

> There was once a rich man who had eight sons. One day he fell ill of a fever and had all his sons called to him. And when they had come, he said to them, 'Now, you can see I have a fever, and it will not leave me. I shall die of it. But first I have a question for each of you.' And turning to the eldest, he asked him 'When I am dead, what trade will you follow?' 'Farming' said the eldest son. Then the father had some of his slaves brought, and gave them to him, saying 'These will help you in farming.'
>
> Then he sent for the next one and asked him 'When I am dead, what trade will you follow?' 'Learning' said he, and his father had slaves brought and gave them to him saying 'These will keep you supplied with corn stalks for writing.'
>
> Then he sent for the next one and asked him 'When I am dead, what trade will you follow?' 'Weaving' said he, and his father had slaves and the instruments of weaving brought and gave them to him.

Then he sent for the next one and asked him 'When I am dead, what trade will you follow?' 'Smithing' he answered, and his father had slaves and the tools of the smith brought and said 'These slaves will keep you supplied with charcoal for your smithy.'

Then he sent for the next one and asked him, 'When I am dead, what trade will you follow?' 'Thieving' said he, and his father had charms to make him invisible brought, and gave them to him.

Then he sent for the next one and asked him, 'When I am dead, what trade will you follow?' 'War' said he, and his father sent for a horse and warrior's belts, shield, spear and sword, and slaves to gather grass and water the horse, and gave them to him.

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Wani mutum ke nan, mai-dukiya, da yayansa takwas. Sai ran nan masassara ta kama shi, sai ya sa aka kira yayan duka; suka zo. Ya che, 'To! Kun ga masassara ta kama ni, ba ta bari na, zan mutu ne.' Sai ya che, 'Bari in tambaye ku.' Ya che ma babban, 'In na mutu, wache sana'a za ka yi?' Ya che, 'Noma.' Sai ya kawo bayi, ya ba shi, ya che, 'Wadanga su taya ma ka noma.'

Ya kira daya, ya tambaye shi, ya che, 'In na mutu, wache sana'a za ka yi?' Sai ya che, 'Fatauchi.' Ya kawo jakai da alfadari da bayi, ya ba shi.

Sai ya kira daya, ya che da shi, 'In na mutu, wache sana'a za ka yi?' Ya che, 'Karatu.' Ya kawo bayi, ya ba shi, ya che su riko wo ma karan karatu.

Sai ya kira daya, ya tambaye shi, ya che, 'In na mutu, wache sana'a za ka yi?' Sai ya che, 'Saka.' Sai ya kawo bayi da kayan saka, ya ba shi.

Sai ya kira daya, ya che da shi,'In na mutu, wache sana'a za ka yi?' Sai ya che, 'Kira.' Sai ya kawo bayi da kayan kira. Ya che, 'Bayinga su riko wo ma gawayin kira.'

Ya kira daya, ya tambaye shi, ya che, 'In na mutu, wache sana'a za ka yi?' Sai ya che, 'Sata.' Sai ya kawo layu na layar zana, ya ba shi.

Sai ya kira daya, ya tambaye shi. Ya che, 'In na mutu, wache sana'a za ka yi?' Sai ya che, 'Yaki.' Sai ya kawo doki, da damaru, da garkuwa, da mashi, da takobi, da bayi masu-yankan chiyawa da ruwan doki, ya ba shi.

There is no strict delimitation of hereditary and non-hereditary crafts in Hausa society. Formerly, more crafts were hereditary. Today, the only crafts which practise, to a limited extent depending on locale, the hereditary transmission of craft knowledge are those traditional crafts of, for example, the butcher (mahauci), blacksmith (makeri), and praise singer

(maroki). Among those kindred (bilaterally) or 'clans' (patrilineally) who do transmit craft knowledge hereditarily, it is considered to be their 'heritage' (Nicolas (1975:passim), that is, a part of the combination of inherited social features which characterise and define the group amongst others. However, the varieties of individual family organisation, time, and locale blur the distinction of karda/shigege and the status organisation implied.[18]

In matters of affinity, the occupational groups practise both endogamy and intermarriage depending on such factors as the group concerned, desirability of alliance formation, and locale. The desirability of alliance formation is related to the occupational class structure which will be examined below. Generally, however, there is a tendency towards endogamy at either end of the 'class' spectrum. This tendency is modified, on the other hand, by traditional intermarriages between different class levels, for example, between the malamai and blacksmiths in Zaria (Smith, 1959:249).[19] Baba illustrates a Hausa attitude toward certain intermarriages (102):

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[18] This conceptual difficulty is intensified when it is remembered that Hausa often pursue more than one craft.

[19] Yeld (1960:117), on the other hand, flatly states that among the Hausa of Kebbi there is no group endogamy with the exception of potters, the only craft in Kebbi practised by both sexes. This is clearly at one extreme of Hausa practices.

Dabo, the son of Sarkin Zarewa our town chief, loved me and I wanted him, but my family would not agree to our marrying, they did not like titles and title-holders, they were farmers (many of whom were malamai--R.P.B.), they liked their daughters to marry farmers. We often married into the families of blacksmiths, too; blacksmiths are the farmers' friends, they make our tools.

For groups other than those involved in traditional alliances, membership in one of the lower class occupational groups such as butchers, blacksmiths, drummers, etc., is a bar to intermarriage with many higher classes (Smith, 1960:86; using 'class'in its widest sense). The establishment of alliances between different occupational groups parallels alliance formation among the royal families: that is, the enhancement of standing in the social hierarchy (Nicolas, 1975: 172). Intermarriage strengthens the position of a family socially and potentially economically. This is in spite of the fact that the individual status connection between a man and a highly mobile wife is tenuous.[20]

IV

Women in Hausa society have their own crafts and, under certain conditions, are involved in the market oriented economy. While some crafts are practised by both men and women, women are particularly involved in the manufacturing of various food-stuffs for sale,

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[20] That is, a woman who has been married several times which, in Hausa society, is the rule rather than its exception.

cotton thread and blankets, they make pots, are small-time traders, purveyors of medicines, praise singers, 'prostitutes' (karuwai) and are the principal participants in the spirit-possession cult (bori). Like Hausa men, the women often engage in many different occupations. In a study of four communities in Zaria, Smith found women's occupational involvement distributed according to the Table below:

Women's Crafts in Zaria (adapted from Smith, 1955:244)

	Community				
Occupation	A	B	C	D	Total
Spinning	44	157	11	174	386
Weaving	20	64	4	129	217
Hairdressing (kitso)	?	6	1	?	7
Selling firewood	-	2	-	3	5
Bori	?	15	?	1	16
Cooked Foods					
Fura (spiced dumpling)	13	16	4	8	41
Waina (bean cake)	-	2	-	3	5
Locustbean cakes	?	2	-	6	8
Groundnut oil and cakes	1	13	-	8	22
Danwake (bean cake)	-	2	-	3	5
other foods	2	7	-	1	10
Trading and Brokers					
Corn and farm produce	1	1	-	1	3
Hoarding and selling grain	-	2	-	2	4
Selling cotton	-	?	-	2	2
Selling grain, peppers, and other produce	-	2	-	1	3
Palm oil	-	2	-	-	2
Fatauci	-	-	-	1	1
Prostitutes	1	1	-	-	2
Women with no craft	-	-	-	2	2
Women with one craft	28	49	10	39	126
Women with two crafts	12	68	2	122	204
Women with three crafts	-	1	-	1	2
Women with one trade	5	2	-	1	8
Women with two trades	1	2	-	1	4
Women with one trade and one craft	11	35	4	20	70
Women with one trade and two crafts	1	-	-	11	12
Women with two trades and one craft	-	5	-	1	6
Women with two trades and two crafts	-	1	-	2	3

Baba (251-252) explains her participation in various crafts at a relatively advanced age:

> When I return home I shan't go into the bush to fetch wood for sale, my foot is sore. I shall do some spinning. If you spin for about five months and collect many spindles of thread, then you can sell it and get money for a cloth, about four or five shillings, or if thread is dear you may get seven shillings. I don't weave any more now, the big loom is hard work. Then if a feast comes along I shall sell a goat and buy things for the feast--that is the usefullness of keeping goats.

Finally, women are organised into their own craft associations (Low, 1972:21) which are arranged into their own status hierarchies. How the status of women is interrelated with the status of men will be examined in section seven below.

V

Traditionally, taxes (haraji, sing.) were payable in the emirate system according to one's craft (including farming) through each craft-head who, in turn, delegated the collection of taxes to titled subordinates responsible for particular geographical areas. The collated Table below shows the amounts of taxes levied for crafts in the last century (ca. 1880-1900). The Table does not show all taxes paid by the talakawa (those such as zakka, 'annual tithe') neither does the Table take into account all areas (Zaria: Arnett, 1920:16, Smith, 1955:96-7; Sokoto: Arnett, et. al. in Temple, 1922L545):

Zaria

(1) Hoe tax (kudin galma)	
(a) towns east of Zaria	7000 cowries per hoe
(b) towns south of Zaria	6000 cowries per hoe
(c) towns west of Zaria	4000 cowries per hoe
(d) towns north of Zaria	6000 cowries per hoe
(2) Cassava tax (kudin rogo)	4000 cowries per plot
(3) Tobacco tax (kudin taba)	2000 cowries per plot
(4) Onion tax (kudin albassa)	2500 cowries per plot
(5) Sugar-cane tax (kudin kara)	8000 cowries per plot
(6) Indigo tax (kudin shuni)	3000 cowries per plot
(7) Butchers tax (kudin fawa)	5000 cowries per man
(8) Blacksmiths tax (kudin kira)	7000 cowries per man
(9) Brokers tax (kudin dillalai)	5000 cowries per man
(10) Dyers tax (kudin korofi)	3200 cowries per pit
(11) Bookeepers tax (kudin zuma)	3000 cowries per man
(12) Tobacco-grinders tax	5000 cowries per man
(13) Drummers tax (kudin kida)	4000 cowries per man
(14) Bori dancers tax (kudin bori)	4000 cowries per dancer

Sokoto

Kudin kaibi	1500 cowries on farms
Kudin rafi	1500 cowries on each market garden
Kudin marina	250 cowries per dye pit
Kudin saka	500 cowries per weaver

The occupational taxation system in the nineteenth century emirates, owing to poor communication systems over vast distances, necessitated large numbers of titled subordinates to collect the taxes. These titles will be examined in depth in section eight below.

VI

The importance of the market (kasuwa) to the organisation of the crafts lies in the necessity for cooperation as well as the market's opportunity to promote commerce. As Nicolas states (1975:171): 'La plupart de ces métiers sont liés au kasuwa et bénéficient de la situation de liberté relative sans laquelle le

commerce se trouverait paralysé.' The rotating weekly and daily city markets are organised under the craft heads who have jurisdiction over the behaviour and business practices of their subordinates and members, all of whom share common lines in the market place. City markets are usually centrally located, while the rural and provincial town markets are usually peripheral. In addition, the markets serve as important communication centres for the area, exposing the participants and those frequenting the markets to news and ideas from afar as well as the opportunity to renew social ties and contacts.

Apart from Fulani women who sell sour milk and butter in the market, there is an absence, in Islamic areas, of adult Hausa women, excluding much older women. Trade and marketing are usually the prerogative of the male. This may be explained by the fact that married women are secluded. Often the wares and foodstuffs manufactured by the secluded wife are given to the pre-adolescent daughters to sell in the market. As Baba explains in regard to children in the market (54-55):[21]

> After the morning meal we went to the compound and if mother had things to sell we went to market and

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[21] Talla, as distinct from fataucin yam mata, the long distance trading expeditions of Hausa girls in which they used their own capital to trade individually, keeping the profits. This kind of trade is modelled on the trade distinction among adults of fatauci/kasuwanci (long distance trade/trade in a particular market) the former of which, in the nineteenth century, linked the emirates with places as far away as north Africa (cf., Smith, 1954:18-19).

sold them for her. If she made beanflour cakes you took them, if she made cornflour cakes you took them, or little bean-cakes. We went to market and walked about selling our wares, and brought home the money... When you had sold everything you went back home with your cowries and your mother counted them--that's all till tomorrow! She hid them in a cooking-pot, and if you saw something you wanted she would buy it and give it to you. My mother was a secluded wife, she didn't leave the compound.

The establishment of a new kasuwa provides a situation for the symbolic unification of the parallel hierarchical structures of the emirate or kingdom. Here, the territorial hierarchical segments, occupational groups, and religious agencies, both Islamic and non-Islamic, are invoked to make the foundation of a new market a propitious occasion for the future success of its participants. The salient features of the procedures of market establishment are given below (cf., Nicolas, 1975:391-3; Baba, 188, 218-22; Smith, 1962: 306-307).

In establishing a new market, the local traders must meet regularly at some open space deemed able to support the new venture. If the market is likely to succeed, in terms of competition from other markets, accessability, and so forth, approval is required from the immediate political supervisor of the area above the level of the village-head. Most often this was a hakimi, or district-head. This senior official is thereafter responsible for the new market, although the village-head is directly in charge.

Having been politically inaugurated, the new

market must be initiated by religious methods, both Islamic and non-Islamic, in the latter case by the local devotees of the spirit possession cult (bori). In the former, the representatives of Islam, the malamai and clerics of the community, call upon Allah to make the new market prosperous. They may instruct the political functionary, under whose jurisdiction the new market falls, to give alms or make sacrifices. This ceremony is then supplemented by the devotees of the spirits whose support in the new venture is essential for success. This second aspect of supernatural invocation also involves the 'medical specialists', praise singers and butchers, led by the Sarkin Fawa.

In situations in which the market site is not determined by the local traders, the location is chosen by a medical specialist (boka) who selects according to the advice of the spirits (Nicolas, 1975:391). Once this emplacement has been selected, the Sarkin Fawa calls upon the local bori adepts who themselves invoke the spirits. The named spirits are addressed personally. The most important of these named spirits is Inna who is considered to be the 'Mother of the Market'. As Baba explains (219):

> '...Inna, the Fulani woman, came...Two bori-dancers ...went to see her tree in the middle of the night and fetched her. When they asked her to come she said 'Very well, if they want me to come let them give me a white cloth and some milk, let them build fifteen market stalls; then I shall come.' Inna is lame, so they went to fetch her with something to carry her back in...Before Inna was brought the market would not go properly, the mother of the market was not there. Then at the foot of her

tamarind tree, when they had brought her, they gave her milk and they gave alms in the market, the children of the townspeople came and drank milk.

In Katsina (Maradi), the Sarkin Fawa then leads the community in numerous sacrifices to propitiate the spirits who 'drink' the blood of these sacrifices, thus making the spirits partners with humans in the market.[22] These sacrifices, in which the butchers, praise singers, and bori adepts participate, all emphasise the unification of the local community in the market. The goats offered to the spirits in sacrifice are of both sexes and include combinations of the colours black, white and red (Nicolas, 1975:392). This synthesis of oppositions, expressed through the sex and colour of the sacrificed animals, serves as a referent to the unification of diverse interests in the market.

After the foundation of the kasuwa, the market operations are placed under the control of the butchers who mediate in litigations between vendors and buyers. Hausa state that: 'It is the butchers who found the market' (Mahauta suke yin kasuwa)(Nicolas, 1975:393).

This lengthy description of the inauguration of a new market was necessary to show that several aspects in the organisation of Hausa society are interrelated. Firstly, there is the hierarchical aspect which includes the order of political officials, religious functionaries and spirits, both Islamic and non-Islamic,

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[22] In the predominantly Islamic areas, it is the malamai who lead these sacrifices.

and the hierarchy of occupational office, all of which combine at the opening of the market. Secondly, there is the integrative aspect involved in unifying these spheres, particularly the syncretist religious spheres. Regarding the coexistence of these two separate, yet interdependent, religious systems, Baba states (222): 'All the rulers like the bori--if they didn't, would their work be any good?...So do the malams, secretly. The malams call on the bori in private, in the darkness at night...The work of the malams is one thing, the work of bori experts is another, each has his own kind of work and they must not be mixed up.' This unification of diverse elements within the society and the hierarchies which internally composes it is symbolised in the ceremonies which found a market. The market provides one important aspect in daily life which combines all levels of the local society.

VII

Rank, daraja, in Hausa occupational groups is found both between and within such groups. Rank is recognised in the Hausa language as an organisational principle, as illustrated by the following expressions (Abraham, 1962:192):

Daraja tasu daban
They differ in rank.

Darajansu ta hau
They have been promoted.

Mobility between rank levels is indicated in other ways. In the example below, there are perjorative connotations toward an individual who is upwardly social mobile (Whitting, 1940:117):

Gyartai ya chi sarauta ya che ban da tuna baya
The mender of calabashes became a great one and said, 'Let us not remember the past', i.e., he wished to forget his origins.

However, the determination of relative rank is much more difficult among the talakawa than we found to be the case among the aristocratic families of the emirates where birth and office combine along a single rank scale.

Occupational rank is difficult to establish owing to a number of factors. There is a great deal of local variation in the placement of rank levels. For example, occupational status assumes greater importance in the larger villages, towns and cities, while it plays a relatively small part in the smaller homogeneous communities. In addition, the number of occupational groups is too great to be strictly delimited into ranked sets. Taken together with the fact that Hausa often practise more than one craft, the complexity of the economic situation becomes manifest. While the hereditary distinction of karda/shigege may be parallel and complementary to rank distinctions in a number of social contexts, it relates primarily to prestige (girma) at an individual or familial level. That is, while karda indicates at one level higher status and prestige, at another level, hereditary

occupations such as butchers and blacksmiths are not ranked among the highest craft or trade groups. In fact, in the cases cited, they are ranked among the lowest.

Below are listed, for a few emirates, the ranking of occupations. It must be remembered that these rankings are fluid in the sense that the series have great local and situational variation and are not discrete 'class' levels.[23]

Zaria (Smith, 1955:16)

(1) Malamai and Koranic scholars
(2) Attajirai-successful merchants
(3) Masu-sana'a-craftsmen other than those listed below
'Yan kasuwa- smaller traders
(4) Dillalai-brokers
(5) Manoma-farmers with unimportant subsidiary occupations
(6) Makira-blacksmiths
(7) Maharba-hunters
(8) Maroka and Makada-musicians, drummers and eulogists
(9) Mahauta-butchers

Haôe Katsina (Nicolas, 1975:172)

(1) Malamai
(2) All other crafts other than those below
(3) Makada ('griots')
(4) Mahauta (24)

In the emirates listed below, the eastern satellite emirates, it is interesting to note that the hierarchy of occupational groups differs greatly from rank in the Hausa Bakwai. This difference can be attributed to the much higher percentage of non-Hausa craftsmen and traders in the eastern emirates which have aproximately equal numbers of Kanuri. Similar rank differences occur in Kebbi where blacksmiths have

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24 Elsewhere, Nicolas also places the blacksmiths in a low rank, although without an exact position.

23 Thus any attempt to assign a number of 'classes' in Hausa stratificational analysis is doomed to fail.

high status (Yeld, 1960:117).

Eastern Satellite Emirates (Low, 1972:22)[25]

Gombe	Katagum	Hadejia
(1) Blacksmiths*	(1) Blacksmiths*	(1) Long-distance traders
(2) Butchers*	(2) Weavers	(2) Butchers*
(3) Weavers	(3) Builders	(3) Butchers*
(4) Dyers*	(4) Barbers*	(4) Blacksmiths*
(5) Barbers*	(5) Islamic scholars*	(5) Builders
(6) Long-distance traders	(6) Long-distance traders	(6) Dyers
(7) Builders	(7) Leatherworkers*	(7) Brokers
(8) Leatherworkers*	(8) Dyers*	(8) Barbers*
(9) Goldsmiths*	(9) Butchers*	(9) Goldsmiths*
(10) Carpenters	(10) Brokers	(10) Leather-workers*
(11) Islamic scholars*	(11) Carpenters	(11) Praise singers*
(12) Praise singers*	(12) Goldsmiths*	(12) Potters
(13) Hunters	(13) Petty traders	(13) Islamic scholars*
(14) Brokers	(14) Potters	(14) Weavers
		(15) Hunters

Accounting for the differences in these satellite emirates relative to the Hausa Bakwai, Low states (1972: 21): '(they are)...a revealing index of late nineteenth century cultural and economic heterogeneity...'

Although the general social ranking of occupational groups as the blacksmiths, butchers, praise singers and drummers is low, it is a position which has its own advantages in the status system. Nicolas states in this regard (1975:172): 'Toutefois, il peut être extrêmement avantageux d'être lié à des "griots" ou à des bouchers, car leur influence est grande.' The praise singers or drummers, for instance, are often political agents, held by ties of clientage to various political offices ranging from the village-head to the

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[25] An asterisk after the craft refers to those crafts which are usually hereditary.

Sarki himself (Smith, 1957:29). Maroka (praise singers) may also be in a position of influence with wealthy merchants. A tie by intermarriage, for example, to a family of influential praise singers has advantages for the intermarrying group. This is not always the case, however, and particularly in a situation in which two occupational groups are not traditionally intermarried. Baba retells of one such case (77):

> When I was a girl Sarkin Makada, the chief of those drummers, my mother's kinsmen, wanted to arrange a marriage of kinship for me, but the people at Karo refused; he had wanted my elder sister Dije, but they refused, then he wanted me, but my father's people would not agree. My mother's people were drummers of the farming drum, they were not praise-singers, but my father's family said I was not to go wandering around with them and singing.

Finally, drummers and praise singers have important ceremonial functions, most notably at marriages and naming ceremonies (Baba, 93, 140, 144).

The blacksmiths, makera, while ranked low in the Hausa status system, nonetheless possess what Nicolas terms 'une auréole "numineuse"' (1975:425) owing to the traditional awe in which this occupation is held. The ambivalence which Hausa express toward this craft is seen in the following proverbs (Whitting, 1940: 104, 120):

Kira ta fi noman raggo. Mutum daga zaune ya sayi Albarka ya sayi Nasamu?
The trade of a smith is better than the farming of a wastrel, by sitting does a man buy two slaves?

Zama kusa da mai-saida turare ya fi zama kusa da makeri.
Residence near a scent seller is better than residence near a blacksmith.

In Katsina Na Maradi, the blacksmith is very important in the village by virtue of his performance of certain annual rituals designed to avert the burning down of the village (Nicolas, 1975:426). In this and other ceremonies in which the blacksmiths are instrumental, they are important sacrificial mediaries between the spirit world and the community. Blacksmiths are also thought to have a special antidote to prevent themselves from being burnt and can use this power malevolently (Taylor and Webb, 1932:212-213):

> And most smiths have a secret antidote which prevents fire from burning them if they use it. These smiths sometimes injure their enemies by nullifying their antidotes so that fire burns them. And they do not tell this secret to any one except their children or a trusted servant who has served them a long time.
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>
> Kuma yawanchin makera suna da asiri wanda in sun yi, wuta ba ta kuna tasu. Su makera kuma wata sa'a su kan yi wa abokan-adawa tasu keta, su kan karya maganin abokan-adawan nan nasu har wuta ta kan kone su. Shi kuwa asirin nan ba su ba kowa sai yayansu, ko wani yardajjan baransu wanda ya dade yana yi musu bauta.

Blacksmiths are also thought to have charms to protect them from sharp instruments and this too is susceptible to the counteraction of enemies (Madauci, 1968:60). Finally, P. G. Harris states in regard to the blacksmiths' power (1936:113): 'Of all the arts and crafts of the Hausa states...perhaps the strongest and most respected is the craft of the blacksmith. This is expressed in the Hausa saying, 'The Chief, the Scribes, and the Smiths--these are the wielders of power...'

Butchers are also ambiguous in the rank system. While in the Hausa states they are among the lowest

occupations in terms of rank, they are nevertheless important in the establishment and continuation of the kasuwa. In fact, the head of the butchers' organisation in Zaria, Sarkin Fawa, who was one of the few titled occupational representatives to hold this office on an emirate level, controlled supplies and prices in the kasuwa and assured the personal supply of meat for the Sarkin Zazzau (Colvin, 1971: 108). Yet, the butcher is generally regarded with a degree of opprobrium. The following expressions illustrate the Hausa attitude toward butchers, showing them to be unscrupulous, foolish, and cunning (Whitting, 1940):

Ba riba fawar kan jimina (110)
There is no profit in (exposing for sale) an ostrich head on a butcher's stall; i.e., there is no money in it.

Koni mugun tayin mahauchi ba ya ta ya giwa dari bakwai (114)
However poor the butcher's wife, he won't get an elephant for 3½d.

Kome na duniya, wukar pawa ne ta yanka guzuma ta yanka karsana (117)
Capable du tout, the butcher's knife butchers cow and heifer; i.e., people will stop at nothing.

Finche ba ya hana fawa (119)
Cutting off bits of meat while flaying doesn't stop the butcher's trade; i.e., a slice off a cut loaf will never be missed.

Fawa ta gagari yan fawa bare yan finche (119)
The butcher's trade can be too much for their sons, not to mention the flayers; i.e., fools step in where angels fear to tread.

Kawa ya yi wuya ya isa (a) yanka (119)
Anyone with a neck can be butchered; i.e., all's grist that comes to his mill.

The 'scorn' (rena) directed toward the butchers is

great.[26] On the other hand, this too is tempered with an ambiguity, such as characterised the blacksmiths.[27] As has been seen, the Chief of the Butchers is given a position of authority in the market and his presence is important in its initiation. Symbolically, the butcher represents a triad of connotations. He is at once revered (ritually indispensable), despised (lowest social rank), and feared (ambivalence).[28]

The above occupational examples serve to demonstrate the difficulty in establishing rank orders in the Hausa social system. As these examples show, this difficulty, even among the lowest extremes of occupational rank, springs from the situationally variable aspect of the relationship between individual ritual necessity and individual social status. This situational distinction rests on the Hausa notion of girma ('bigness', 'prestige') which permeates all levels of the rank system. The following expressions

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[26] Nicolas (1975:426) reports that Hausa say the foetus of the infants of butchers are likened to the foetuses of dogs and do not change upon birth.

[27] Although of relatively higher status than blacksmiths, the barber (wanzami) is subject to a certain degree of scorn despite his importance in ceremonial functions: e.g., circumcision, removal of a new-born child's uvula, cicatrisation. This scorn is illustrated in a tale (Edgar, 1911a:60; Skinner, 1969:209).

[28] A Hausa tale (Edgar, 1911b:71; Skinner, in press) illustrates this ambiguity. The Chief of the Butchers, in this story, is shown to be clever in saving his own skin, yet in doing so, the town learns the importance of his magic (in this case, the withholding of rain for five hundred years).

give some indication of the way in which girma may operate as an independent ranking variable (Abraham, 1962:325-326):

Yana da girmen duniya
lit. he has bigness of the world
He has an assured position.

Girmansa ya faɗi
lit. his bigness fell
He's lost his good name.

Ba a ga girmansa ba
lit. one couldn't see his bigness
He was not looked up to.

Thus, social rank is defined in terms of an additional situational variable. As Hill states in this regard (1972:176): 'A society cannot be considered as "class-stratified" merely because its members are status ranked.'

'Prestige' (girma) acts within ranked levels of rough equivalence or within the same occupational group. Variables such as pilgrimage to Mecca, income, marital ties, legal status, and wife-seclusion, all contribute to prestige ranking in the social system. The way in which prestige and social rank combine in the occupational system to produce a title system duplicating the titles of the sarauta will be examined in the next section.

The Hausa system of occupational groups are each tied by ritual, mottos, the market, common interests, in some cases mutual protection, kinship and affinity. In addition, each group is vertically fractured by rank and horizontally by prestige. All of these combine to express group integration and hierarchy per-

meating Hausa society from the political system through childhood to adult occupation.

VIII

The practice of installing titled leaders at the head of each organised craft is, in itself, of quite early origin in Hausa society. The Kano Chronicle begins with an account of the leadership of the pagan peoples around what is now Kano, before the coming of Bagauda, the founder of the early Kano 'state'. In this account a plurality of leaders is described, many of whom are chiefs of occupational groups (Palmer, 1928ii:99):

> The greatest of the chiefs of the country was Mazauda, the grandfather of the chief of the blind. Gijigiji was the blacksmith; Babazau was the brewer. Hanburki doctored every sickness; Danbuntunia, the watchman of the town at night, was the progenitor of the Kurmawa. Tsoron Maje was the Chief of the Youths, and Jandodo was chief of the drummers. Besides these there was Maguji who begot the Maguzawa, and was the miner and smelter among them. Again there was Asanni, the forefather of the minstrels and chief of the dancers. Bakonyaki was the archer. Awar, grandfather of the Awrawa, worked the salt of Awar. He was the Sarkin Ruwa of the whole country. In all there were eleven of these pagan chiefs, and each was, the head of a large clan. They were the original stock of Kano (29)

While the historicity of this account is dubious, emphasising as it does the contrast between government, particularly Islamic government, and less centralised authority structures, its choice of occupational titles in the description is a significant contrast.

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[29] The citation is from Hodgkin (1975) owing to his more modern orthography.

Today, however, craft titles are in the decline. This may be partially accounted for by a change in the taxation system. Formerly, the title-holders collected the tax due from each craft. That Hausa do not compete, as once was the case, for occupational titles, may be shown by the following saying (Smith, 1955:7): Sarauta maras amfari wanne yana so? ('Who wants a useless title?').[30]

The leaders of the crafts are termed sarki rather than mai, 'owner of', which may apply to the individual craftsmen. This, as was shown in the second chapter, indicates that in addition to the denotation of sarki as the 'local sovereign', it also connotes all holders of authority. Thus, the craft heads have a certain and varying amount of authority over their craftsmen and are designated by the term of institutionalised authority: sarki.

The occupational titles are invoked for most crafts. In fact, as the story below points out, there is also a title for the 'Chief of Thieves' (Sarkin Barayi). 'Thievery', as a craft, seems usually to have been inherited (Cf., Edgar, 1913:89). The Chief of the Thieves saw to it that crime remained within socially acceptable norms. Any breach of

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30 In addition, when Smith questioned a man who was offered the title of Chief Potter (Sarkin Maginin Tukunya) and who subsequently refused it, it was explained (1955:98): 'I should have to go on giving my superior gifts (gaisuwa), and who is going to give me gifts nowadays?'

these norms would entitle the Sarkin Barayi to cooperate with the authorities. The story below points to the official sanction for the trade (Johnston, 1966:54):

> Soon afterwards the Chief sent for the head of the thieves' guild. 'Sarkin Barayi' he said 'I want you to go to the house of No-Lord-but-God and steal the ring which I gave him.'
>
> That night the head of the thieves' guild broke into the house of No-Lord-but-God and searched all the rooms. But he did not find the ring and so he went back to the Chief and told him that the ring had been hidden.

Typical of the social standing, responsibilities, and political position of the sarki of a craft is that of the Sarkin makera, 'Chief of the Blacksmiths'. The extended account below demonstrates the importance of this titled occupational leader in emirate or local affairs (Harris, 1936:113).[31]

> He is entitled Sarkin Makira, or King of the blacksmiths, who lives at the headquarters of the Hausa State; he, by virtue of his position, is also the king's or chief's blacksmith. As far as I know, he is not paid by the chief in any way except by gifts of, say, a horse now and then, meat at festivals, etc., but he has to hold himself in readiness to perform any of the chief's commands. He is also an ex-officio member of the Council on all matters concerning smiths...He is expected to look after all the smaller or provincial 'King of smiths' when they come in to headquarters. He certainly holds land...he, or persons under his direction, makes all the kingly insignia such as sword, dagger, metal work for saddlery, etc.

The relationship between different levels of titled occupational officials is clear from the above account.

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[31] This lengthy quotation is given in its entirety as its existence has not been cited before, to my knowledge. It is a letter from P.G. Harris to A.M. Hocart.

In the segmentation of occupational authority, the emirate level occupational sarki has authority over the provincial occupational sarakuna who have authority over the local craftsmen.

This relationship between occupational and political title-holders is true for other professions as well. The Sarkin Fawa of Zazzau, as has been seen, provides for the personal supply of meat for the Sarkin Zazzau. Chiefs of drummers and praise singers are officially attached to the courts (Richards, 1972: 137). The hierarchy of the Caliph, emir, and occupational title-holder is illustrated in the following text (Skinner, n.d.III:78; Edgar, 1911a:209):

So a horseman was sent off at a gallop, and reaching the Emir of Kano he greeted him, and said 'The Sultan says that you must give him some used indigo-dye, to prepare medicine for a horse sick in the stomach.' 'That's easy' said the Emir and, to his own people, 'Tell the chief dyer to produce some used indigo-dye, ten pitchers full and have it taken along!'

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Sai aka sa mai-doki guda ya yi hammadanchi. Ya iske Sarikin Kano, ya gaishe shi. Ya che da shi, 'Sarikin Musulmi ya che ka ba shi dagalo, za a yi maganin chiwon chikin doki.' Sai Sarikin Kano ya che, 'Don wannan abu mai-sauki ne. A fada ma Sarikin rini shi bada dagalo, tulu goma, a kai.'

Although the institution of craft organisations with titled heads is quite ancient in Hausa society, the form that this took in post-jihad Hausaland was different. Under the Fulani, the main function of occupational title-holders was the collection of taxes. Moreover, with the Fulani exercising a virtual monopoly over political offices in the emirates, the granting of occupational titles tended to diffuse

positions of authority in the lower echelons of political segmentation among the mainly Haɓe talakawa. The system of occupational offices, as it existed in the Fulani emirates, was developed under Sultan Aliyu Babba (1842-1859). The creation of this variation in the system of occupational titles had the effect of defining ethnic relations between Haɓe and Fulani throughout the nineteenth century. During this period, senior offices were reserved in the emirate government for Fulani, while Haɓe could be appointed occupational tax-collectors. An extreme case illustrating the transformed institution comes from the eastern satellite states (Hadejia, Gombe, Katagum) where there were, previous to Fulani suzerainty, no commoners holding titles and during the nineteenth century becoming craft heads (Low, 1972: 15). This is not to say, however, as Smith seems to suggest (1960:134) that occupational offices were absent from the Haɓe states, Zazzau for example.[32] Rather, as has been seen, in the Haɓe kingdoms which existed contemporaneously with the Fulani Emirates, as well as the Haɓe kingdoms which were prior to them, occupational title-holders were involved with much more than tax collecting. The offices in these Haɓe kingdoms were invested with considerable symbolism

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[32] Hassan and Shuaibu Na'ibi (1952:73-7), for instance, list the Sarkin Fawa, Sarkin Noma, Iyan Bakin Kasuwa, Sarkin Ruwa (leader of the fishers), Magajin Kwa (chief barber), Bikon Tambari (chief of the emir's drummers), Magajin Nagaba (chief of the ordinary drummers), and the Liman Juma (chief malam) among the craft-heads in Abuja.

and were incorporated, to a much greater extent than their emirate counterparts, into bori rituals and rituals designed to increase the safety and success of the community and its undertakings.[33]

The craft titles, those subsidiary to the craft sarki of a particular occupation, duplicate those titles of the central emirate and kingdom government. For example, in Zaria, craft titles included: Madaki, Galadima, Dangaladima, Ciroma.[34] The craft titles which are subsidiary to the occupational sarki, in general, assist in the delegation of craft duties. In the nineteenth century, the subsidiary title-holders assisted in the collection of taxes, of which they were entitled to a share. Other duties include assisting in the control of the quality and price of craft goods and services and in keeping order in the markets (Smith, 1962:305). However, on the whole, the responsibilities and authority of the craft heads

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[33] See, for example, the descriptions above of the rituals on opening a new kasuwa and the rituals to protect the village from fire. Moreover, the makaɗa in Haɓe Katsina is to a much greater extent than in the Islamic-Fulani areas, active in rituals associated with the supernatural. In addition, the Chief Hunter (Sarkin Baka) is ritually important as the protector of the bush (Tremearne, 1914:204-207). The drummers and praise singers in the less Islamic areas are also more general in their activities, yet tied more often to specific 'clans', communities and crafts. In the Fulani areas, the art of the drummers and praise singers is more remuneratively oriented (Cf., Nicolas, 1975:173).

[34] These same titles are also to be found in Katsina Na Maradi (Nicolas, 1975).

varies in the emirates and kingdoms according to the locale and the craft in question. At one extreme, in Kebbi (Yeld, 1960:117), the craft heads are representatives of the crafts to political authorities, yet have little authority over their own members. In another locale, in Katsina Na Maradi, the craft heads are important not only in economic and political matters, but also in dealings of the community with the supernatural.[35] As Nicolas states in regard to the Sarkin Noma (1975:117): 'Ses vertus et sa science héréditaires le situent au-dessus des humbles cultivateurs soumis aux caprices de cycle pluviométrique, aux atteintes des bêtes et des hommes, aux lois implacables de la production et de la consommation profanes.' In every case, however, the focus of craft head responsibility and activity is the market. Here, under the Sarkin Kasuwa, and often the Sarkin Fawa, the crafts are organised as parallel hierarchies to the political organisation.

The benefits of occupational office are often considerable. Mention has already been made of the economic benefits of occupational office. In addition to

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[35] A discussion here has not been possible regarding the existence of craft organisations and craft titles within the communities of expatriate Hausa. For example, along the Sudanic pilgrimage routes to Mecca, are numerous communities and wards within towns, of Hausa who, for various reasons, could not or did not complete the pilgrimage or the return journey. These communities have organised occupational groups with titled office holders (Works, 1976). In addition, Hausa caravans are led by titled officials: Magudu, 'caravan leader', Ubandawaki, 'leading horseman in charge of transport', and Jagaba, 'guide' (Works, 1976:21; Goody and Mustapha, 1967:613).

economic benefits, the title-holders are often the recipients of privileges and respect. The Sarkin Noma in Katsina (Maradi), for instance, retains the right to sit on a mat during public reunions, to bear special insignia (in this case a metallic hoe), and to gifts from social inferiors at the time of the Dubu, a redistributive ceremony held yearly in certain (usually non-Islamic) areas (Nicolas:116-7).[35]

Craft heads may be appointed or elected, but usually appointed. Although appointment of the craft sarki and his subordinates is usually along lines of kinship, affinity, clientage, or formerly, personal slavery, competition for occupational office is intense. In Katsina Na Maradi, the craft titles are chosen by the local sarki, at the level of the village or town, on the advice of his councillors (Nicolas, 1975:170). This kind of appointment is also true of Zaria Emirate (Smith, 1965:138). Moreover, in Zaria, the craft head is occasionally put in charge of the territorial office of ward head. This is especially the case in regard to the butchers who are to a greater extent clustered in wards. The female head of the 'prostitutes/bori adepts', Magajiya, is also appointed by the local government authority after an initial payment and the consent of the other 'prostitutes'. These 'prostitutes', as Baba tells us, come from families of nobles, malamai, and com-

[35] For a description of the Dubu see also Nicolas (1967).

moners. Magajiya is their 'mother'. Her appointment and installation is shown in the following account (Baba, 229-230):

> She was a bori adept, she used to initiate new bori dancers...She gave Fagaci (local title-holder--R.P.B.) some money and he appointed her Magajiya; he asked the prostitutes and they said they agreed. Then the prostitutes, men and women, were summoned, and they celebrated her appointment for seven nights. When he was going to appoint her Fagaci came to the entrance of his compound with his attendants and Magajiya came with her people, he called her and she and her women came and knelt down. He gave his jakadiya a beautiful new head-kerchief, the jakadiya took off Magajiya's old one and put on the new one. She thanked him, then the women all applauded, and they went to her compound to drum and dance.

The turbaning of Magajiya empowers her to fine any man who uses the services of one of her 'prostitutes' and does not pay for them.

Competition for occupational office is present even in situations of appointment and is in opposition to the ethic of intracraft cooperation. While Smith (1955:98) maintains that this competition for occupational office is primarily owing to the economic rewards of the office, I argue that this is only part of the explanation for competition. Where access to senior hierarchical positions is open or semi-open, competition for office will result for reasons which include not only economic, but also prestige, family, and power.

IX

Finally, by way of comparison rather than a detailed exposition, the spirits (iskoki) also have

among their ranks those who hold 'political' titles. There are various lists of spirits published for different locales (for example, Greenberg, 1946; Reuke, 1969; King, 1967; Nicolas, 1975; and Fletcher, 1912) but all emphasise the essentially hierarchical nature of their organisation. Below are listed some of the more prevalent of the titled iskoki from the above sources:

Sarkin Aljanu (Chief of the jinns)
Sarkin Rafi (Chief of the water; also known as Alkali in the Fulani emirates)
Sarkin Barade (Chief of the horsemen) (36)
Sarkin Fulani (Chief of the Fulani) (37)
Dan Galadima (also known as Yarima in the Fulani emirates) (38)
Sarkin Fushi (Chief of anger)
Magajiya
Sarkin Makada (Chief of drummers)
Kaura (Katsina title)
Malam Alhaji
Sarkin Gwari
Sarkin Karfi (Chief of strength)
Bawa ('Slave'; also known as Fada, 'court')
Sarkin Yaki (Chief of war)
Kusada (sarauta reserved for 'yan sarki)
Sarkin Tudu
Sarkin Garki (Chief of shields)
Galadima
Inna
Magaji
Sarkin Samari
Ubandawaki

Although these spirits can be encountered by humans anywhere in the universe (for example, within trees), they may be specifically invoked by their devotees during bori rituals. In these bori rituals, each spirit

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36 His tsere, 'protecting object', is a red cloth or reddish cock, red being the colour of royalty (Fletcher, 102-107).

37 His tsere is a string of cowries, a characteristic ornament of the Fulani (Ibid.)

38 His tsere are a robe and trouser of blue, white turban, and shoes, the complete attire of an official (Ibid.)

is personified by his or her particular devotee ('yan bori, plur.). The organisation of the spirits and devotees in this cult demonstrates clearly the way in which the iskoki reflect and duplicate at another level the hierarchical organisation of the political system. Baba of Karo (164) illustrates this point particularly well in relation to Sarkin Aljanu for whom the devotees arrange a 'court':

> She used to be possessed by Sarkin Aljanu, the king of the spirits; when he really comes, you put mats on the floor of the hut like a chief's court, and when you have done that, then his medium speaks and everyone prostrates themselves and listens.

In addition to the subordinate titled spirits listed above, Sarkin Aljanu also has a retinue of spirits which duplicate in organisation the court of the political sarki. This is illustrated in the text below (Skinner, n.d.II:269; Edgar, 1911b:168):

> And the chief of the jinns ordered that they should build a compound with all speed, to be quite finished before dawn, a finer one than that of the chief of the town. And immediately it was built; it had twelve entrance-huts, each with its own jekadiya guarding it. If a stranger came to the outer one and made formal greeting, that jekadiya would pass word on to the next one in, and she in her turn to the next, and so on till word had been carried right to the tweflth and inmost.
>
> ***
>
> Sarikin aljannu ya che, 'Maza, kamin assuba, a gine gidan nan sarai, har ya fi na Sarikin garin nan kwawo. Aka yi nan da nan, aka yi zaure goma sha biyu, kowanne shina da mai-tsaransa, jekadiya. In an yi sallama ga wannan zaure, mai-wannan zaure sai ta je ta gaya ma mai-wannan, mai-wannan sai ta je ta gaya ma mai-wannan. Zauren nan goma sha biyu, duk hakanan a ke ma su.

Finally, as with title-holders in the political and occupational spheres of Hausa life, the spirits

are similarly honoured with personal kirari composed and recited on their behalf. In the bori 'liturgy' recorded by King (1967), sixty-nine iskoki have their praises sung in descending hierarchical order. Within this group of spirits are included those with political titles. The kirari attached to some of these spirits are given in the texts below. These texts are rich in symbolic associations and illustrate the various relationships which exist among the spirits. Such relationships are often phrased in the idiom of kinship.

Sarkim Makaɗa (Sarki of drummers)(p.3)

Allaa gaskiyaa	Allah (is) truth;
Ma 'aikin Allaa gaskiyaa	The worker of Allah (is) truth.
Sarkim Makaɗaa gaskiyaa	Sarkim Makaɗa (is) truth.
na Maryamu	One of Maryamu (39)
mai tamburaa da koowaa kee soo	Owner of tambura (drum) whom everyone is desiring.

Magajiya Algaje (8)

Magaajiyaa Algaajee	Magajiya Algaje;
Mai babban zanee na gooyaa 'yaa'yaa	Owner of a big body-cloth of carrying on the back children.
ʊwar ɗiyaa	Mother of children.

Ɗan Galadima (12)

Muhamman na Muhamman (40)	Muhamman, one of Muhamman;
kuraatan ceetoo ɗam Maalan Alhaji	Recruits of rescuing, son of Malam Alhaji.
Muhamman na Muhamman	Muhammam, one of Muhamman;
jirgii ɗan naa goodee	Conveyance, son of 'I give thanks.'

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39 Maryamu--one of his wives.

40 An alternative name for Ɗan Galadima.

Sarkin Yaƙi (Sarki of War) (15)[41]

Gaa na Gajeera baa daamaa	Here is the one of Gajera, there is no choice.
a kooya suuka Baraade na Sarkin Tuduu	Let one teach piercing; Barade, one of Sarkin Tusu.
Baraade na Auta	Barade, one of Auta;
hawaa da suukaa	Riding with piercing.

In addition to kirari, waƙoƙi, 'songs', are also composed on the behalf of each spirit. Within the bori rite, these are recited sequentially, as in the case of the kirari. One of these waƙa is listed below (King, 1967:48-9):

Magajiya Algaje (42)

S. taa zaka taa zaka Magaajiyaa
A. taa zaka taa zaka Magaajiyaa
S. gaa Magaajiyaa Algaajee
A. gaa Magaajiyaa Algaajee
S. taa ɗau tsoo/
A. maa mai tsoomaa kee zari sandarki saa mazaa guje
A. taa ɗau zoomaa (i.e., tsoomaa) mai tsoomaa kee zari sandarki saa mazaa guje
S. kin girmaa ragee faɗaa kinaa da baaya
A. kin girmaa ragee faɗaa kinaa da baaya
S. gaa Magaajiyaa Algaajee
A. gaa Magaajiyaa Algaajee

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She came, she came, Magajiya
She came, she came, Magajiya
Here is Magajiya Algaje
Here is Magajiya Algaje
She picked up dip/ (43)
ping, the owner of dipping, you, grab your stick, put men running away.
She picked up dipping, the owner of dipping, you, grab your stick, put men running away.
You (have achieved) bigness; lessen quarrelling, you are with back (44)
You (have achieved) bigness; lessen quarrelling, you are with back

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41 His alternative names are Barade (derived from 'mounted warrior'), and Damau, 'mixer', i.e., men in war.

42 This waƙa takes the form of a soloist (S.) and the audience respondants (A.).

43 That is, 'she started dancing, the dancer'.

44 That is, 'you have children tied on the back'.

Here is Magajiya Algaje
Here is Magajiya Algaje.

At a level removed from the social institutions of the Hausa, then, hierarchy is expressed through the system of titled offices. The spirits interact among one another 'reflecting' their human counterparts and are deferred to by their devotees within the cult.

X

This chapter concludes the part of this study which examines the ways in which titled offices are repeated throughout different social institutions in Hausaland. Within this hierarchical society, is a duplicating series of titles which is a consistent means of delegating and exercising traditional authority. Beginning with the Caliph, on the political scale, authority is segmented on a territorial basis, first through the emirates, and then to the hakimai, towns and villages, each level duplicating the next in structure. This political hierarchy is dually extended throughout the social system, firstly in terms of occupational stratification, and secondly in terms of occupational titles. These occupations involve religious and magical specialists (malamai, bokaye, and 'yan bori), commercial specialists (the various traders and kasuwa representatives) as well as persons purely involved with crafts and services. In addition, the hierarchy which permeates Hausa society is taught and expressed early in their lives in the

youth associations. Finally, the world of the spirits is represented as containing titled spirits and they form an important part of the spirit hierarchy. In conclusion, hierarchy is the single most important organisational principle in Hausa society and is of equal importance in both the Fulani emirates and the Haɓe kingdoms.

CHAPTER V

HIERARCHY AND AUTHORITY
IN HAUSA POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Having shown in the previous chapter the ways in which political conceptions of hierarchy and authority permeate other social institutions, I return in this final chapter to a discussion of Hausa political institutions. Specifically, this chapter focusses on three important aspects of Hausa political institutions and ideology. The first of these is the pervasive influence of Islam and Islamic conceptions of leadership and authority. Whereas the first chapter considered the history of the spread of Islam in the central Sudan, this chapter expands the discussions of the importance of Islamic political ideology in the Sokoto Caliphate developed in the second and third chapters. Then, a brief comparison is made with political institutions in other large Sudanese states. Secondly, the notion of balance is examined as an important principle in Hausa political organisation. Balance is achieved and maintained in administrations composed of free nobles, slaves and eunuchs, and between different dynasties and segments of one dynasty. Political imbalance, occurring when one segment has greater access to political power than other segments, is redressed either by a temporary realignment of segments or by dismissal or rebellion. Finally, this chapter concentrates on Hausa political vocabulary which is important in understanding the ways in which the Hausa conceive of hierarchy, authority, power and prestige.

I

It is necessary to explore further the effect that the Islamic/Arabic orbit of influence had on government in the Hausa area, especially in the post-jihad emirates.

The influence of 'Islamic' notions of governmental forms is itself, strictly speaking, minimal, as the Muslim faith does not distinguish political from religious matters. The Qur'an has nothing to say on the structure and processes of state government as Levy states (1957:276): 'In spite of the intimate relationship between the temporal and spiritual sides of the new dispensation, the Koran itself contains almost nothing that may be called civic or state legislation.' This is also stated by von Grunebaum (1955:131): 'The concept of the state is alien to Muslim political theory in its classical period and down to Ibn Haldūn (d. 1406)' (emphasis my own). The influence that Islam had on peripheral areas such as Hausaland[1] was indirect and related to the evolution of particular governments of Muslims to the north and east.

Islamic tradition has it that the Prophet Muhammad appointed the first office-holders in Arabia. These were military titles (amīr, sing.) and those appointed to collect alms taxes (zakāt; the title is 'āmil, pl. 'ummāl).

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[1] That is, outside the North African and Middle Eastern conquest areas.

Other traditions of the Prophet relate to the notions of leadership and obedience to lawful authority. The Hadiths below illustrate the position of the Imam or Caliph over the community of Muslims, the divine source of his authority, and the obedience which is owed to the legitimate government.[2]

> Bukhari and Muslim, from Abu Hurayra: The Messenger of God, may God's blessing and peace be on him, said 'Whoever obeys me obeys God, and whoever disobeys me disobeys God. Whoever obeys the Commander obeys me, and he who disobeys him disobeys me. The Imam is simply the shield behind whom the fighting takes place, from which one seeks protection. So when he orders fear of God and is just, he shall receive his reward, but if he holds otherwise, it will bring guilt upon him.'
>
> Bukhari and Muslim, from 'Umar's son: The messenger of God--God's benediction and peace upon him--said 'Hearing and obeying are incumbent on a Muslim man, so long as he is not ordered to disobey God. When he is ordered to do that, there is no hearing it and not obeying.' 'Ali reported a similar tradition.
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> Bayhaqi, from 'Umar's son: The Prophet, God bless him and give him peace, said 'The Government (al-Sultan) is the shadow of God on the earth; all of his servants who are oppressed shall turn to it. When it is just, it shall be rewarded, and the flock must be grateful. When it is tyranical, the burden is upon it, and the flock must be patient.'

Although religious law in Islam is independent of secular authority in the sense that the former could only be divinely given and revealed (Gibb, 1970:67), the Caliph is given a place in the religious law of Islam. The Caliph '...was endowed with the attributes of a religious scholar and lawyer, bound to sacred law in the same way as qadis were bound to it...' (Schacht, 1970:557). The essential function

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[2] From a collection of Hadiths of al-Khatib al-Tibrizi, Niches of Lamps (Mishkāt al-Maṣābiḥ), written in A.H. 737/A.D. 1336; reprinted in Williams, 1971:66-67.

of the Caliph, then, is as the trustee of the Sharī'a as revealed in the Qur'an and interpreted by the jurists.

In the evolution of the Caliphate in the Middle East, there were, as has been seen in the second and third chapters, great differences between the governments of the Umayyads and the later Abbasids. Most of these differences revolved around the increased centralisation and bureaucratisation necessary owing to the vast and complex empire which was under Muslim control. Although under the Umayyads, administrative and governmental institutions were relatively simple (Cahen, 1970:532), they were themselves instrumental in initiating the centralising process after the four 'Orthodox Caliphs'. Schacht states in this matter (1970:547): '...they represented the centralising and increasingly bureaucratic tendency of an orderly administration as against Bedouin individualism and the anarchy of the Arab way of life.' The Caliph in this setting delegated administrative responsibilities to his relatively few temporal chiefs.

Under the Abbasids, however, an extensive administrative bureaucracy was established. This was so much the case that a specialised class of officials came into being, the kuttāb (pl. kātib, lit. 'scribes').

Generally, the duties of the Caliph included judgement, taxation, the Friday service and the

jihad. The obligations of the leader in Islam to the community were the subjects of legal treatises in the Abbasid period and later. The two texts below illustrate the concern of legal theorists for the religiously and legally sanctioned uses of authority. The first text is taken from al-Mawardi (d. A.H. 450/A.D. 1058), the late Abbasi theorist of the Shãfi'ĩ legal school, and the second is taken from the Shãfi'ĩ scholar Ibn Jama'a (d. A.H. 733/A.D. 1333) who wrote after the sacking of Baghdad by the Mongols (in Williams, 1971:86-7, 93):

There are ten things incumbent on the Imam as matters of the common interest:
1. He must maintain the religion according to the principles established and agreed upon by the earliest Muslims (salaf al-umma), and if an innovator appears, or someone with dubious opinions who deviates from those principles, then he must clarify matters by logical proofs, and show him the correct way, and finally apply the rules and punishments to which he is bound, that religion may be preserved from disorder, and the Community from stumbling.
2. He must apply legal judgements for litigants, and stop contention among plaintiffs, so that equity reigns, without aiding the oppressor or weakening the oppressed.
3. He must guard Islamic territory and protect what is sacrosanct, so that people may gain their bread and move from place to place secure from any threat to life and property.
4. He must apply the punishments of the Law, so as to secure God's prohibitions from violation, and preserve the rights of God's servants from attack or destruction.
5. He must fortify the marches with adequate garrisons and deterrent power, so that the enemy may not appear due to neglect, committing misdeeds or shedding the blood of any Muslim or confederate.
6. He must struggle with holy war against those who have been invited to join Islam and rejected it, until they either convert or enter into the status of tribute-paying non-Muslim subjects, to make victorious the truth of God over every (other) religion.
7. He must collect the taxes on conquered territories and the poor-tax in conformity with the Law as written

and interpreted, without fear or oppression.
8. He must administer the outlays and proper expenditures of the public treasury, without lavishness or niggardliness, and with punctuality.
9. He must see to it that trustworthy and loyal men are delegated to look after the offices and the monies under his control.
10. He must himself oversee matters and examine the circumstances, in order to direct the affairs of the Community and safeguard the Religion, and not delegate his authority seeking to occupy himself with pleasures or devotion, for a loyal person can yet turn traitor, and a faithful commander can yet deceive.

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As for the ten duties of the ruler to the subjects, the first is to protect the Muslim heritage (bayda) and defend it, whether in every region, if he is caliph, or in his own country if he is delegated over it, and to struggle against idolators and put down rebels...

The second is to guard the religion in its principles and beliefs, and put down innovation and heretics and encourage the religious sciences and study of the Law, venerate learning and the 'ulama', and raise places from which the light (of Islam) may shine...

The third is to uphold the rites of Islam, such as the obligation of prayer and the congregational prayers and the call to prayer and performance of it, and the sermons and leadership of the prayers, and looking after the matter of the fast and the feasts, and keeping the calendar, and the pilgrimage; and part of the last is facilitating the pilgrimage from all the districts, and keeping the roads clear and giving people security on the way and appointing people to look after them.

The fourth is to make the final decisions on court cases and sentences, by appointing the governors and judges, so as to reduce contentiousness and keep oppressors from the oppressed, and not to appoint any but those who may be depended on: virtuous 'ulama'.

The fifth is to wage the jihad himself and with his armies at least once a year, if the Muslims have strength enough, and oftener than that if necessity demands it.

The sixth is to apply the punishments imposed by the Law, and make no distinctions when doing so between the powerful and the weak. The Messenger of God--God bless him and give him peace--said '(The communities) before you only perished because they used to apply God's punishments to the lowly and let the high ranking alone, but by Allah! if Fatima were to commit theft, I would cut off her hand!'

The seventh is to collect the poor-tax (zakat) and the protection money (jizya) from those who are to pay it, and the booty (fay') and the land-tax, and to use it as the Law stipulates...

The eighth is to supervise pious and family foundations, keep bridges and roads in good repair, and make smooth the ways of welfare.

The ninth is to supervise the division and distribution of booty...

The tenth duty is justice in the ruler in all his affairs.

Conversely, the community of Muslims must recognise its leadership and owe to it the duties which are prescribed by law. These duties are outlined by Ibn Jama'a (in Williams, 1971:92):

The first duty to the ruler is to render him outward and inward obedience in all he commands or forbids, unless it means committing rebellion against God. 'Obey God and the Messenger and those in authority among you' (4:62). These are the Imam and his representatives, according to most, and some also say, the 'ulama'.

The second duty is to give him good counsel, secretly or openly...

The third is to exert oneself to render them help outwardly and inwardly, because it is a help to all the Muslims, and gives protection to religion and stops the activities of adversaries.

The fourth is to recognise how great is his rank, and how necessary it is that his power be magnified, and to treat him (accordingly)...

The fifth is to remind him when he is forgetful and to guide him when he strays, which compassion for him...

The sixth is to protect him from any enemy or anything which can be feared, and this is one of the most important duties to him, and the most necessary...

The seventh is to inform him of the ways of his officials, for whom he is responsible, and those charged with the protected communities (al-dhimma) so that he may attend to carrying out the protection, and see to the Community in the interests of his government and his flock.

The eighth is to help him to carry the burdens imposed by the interests of the Community as far as possible.

The ninth is to turn disaffected hearts to him for the benefit of the Community and the good order of the affairs of the Muslims (al-milla).

The tenth is to defend him in word and deed, and possessions and person and family, outwardly and inwardly, secretly and openly...

Not only must the Caliph act in his political capacity within the strictures of Islamic law, but also he must be seen to be in possession of certain personal characteristics which are requisite to attaining and maintaining high office. Generally, these characteristics include justness, knowledge, soundness of mind and body, freedom to act within his capacity as leader, and pedigree. These personal qualities are listed by al-Mawardi (in Williams, 1971:85):

> As for those persons fitted for the Imamate, the conditions related to them are seven:
> 1. Justice, in all its characteristics.
> 2. Knowledge requisite for independent judgement (ijtihad) about revealed and legal matters.
> 3. Soundness of the senses in hearing, sight, and speech, in a degree to accord with their normal functioning.
> 4. Soundness of the members from any defect that would prevent freedom of movement and agility.
> 5. Judgement conducive to the governing of subjects and administering matters of general welfare.
> 6. Courage and bravery to protect Muslim territory and wage the jihad against the enemy.
> 7. Pedigree: he must be of the tribe of Quraysh, since there has come down an explicit statement on this, and the consensus has agreed...The Prophet said 'The Quraysh have precedence, so do not go before them,' and there is no pretext for any disagreement, when we have this clear statement delivered to us, and no word that one can raise against it.

As the texts above illustrate, the Islamic conception of leadership encompasses both religious and legal considerations as well as personal qualities. These notions of leadership were to be of great importance not only to the Sokoto Caliphate, but also from the time that Islam was first introduced into Hausaland.

As has been seen in previous chapters, the evolution of government in the Sokoto Caliphate paralleled the evolution of government in the Middle East. This telescoped evolution encompassed the simplicity under the Shehu and quickly accelerated in complexity after his death owing to the same considerations of administration in an increasingly complex empire.

Whereas in the pre-jihad Habe kingdoms, no single kingdom was able for long to assert its dominance owing to military equivalence, the Sokoto Caliphate set up complex machinery to deal with the problems of security and communication. Leadership in this setting revolved around succession from the Fulani flag-bearers in the jihad and the large group of (Islamic) educated elite, the ulama (malamai). Succession in the Sokoto Caliphate and emirates generally followed the Abbasid practice of attempted preliminary nomination and fraternal exclusion although, in practice, succession was generally a matter of relative dynastic strength (Cf. Levy, 1957:281-2).

Regarding the structure of government in the Sokoto Caliphate, the description of the functions of government by Bello may be recalled (Inf. M., 105): (i) organisation and deployment of armies; (ii) justice; (iii) collection of taxes; (iv) punishment of wrongdoers; (v) safeguarding Islam; (vi) protect-

ion of women; and (vii) aiding pilgrims and travellers. Usman dan Fodio, in his Kitab al-Farq..., examined in greater detail his conception of the structure of government. This is illustrated in the following quotation (Hiskett, 1960:569):

'...the foundations of government are five things: the first is that authority shall not be given to one who seeks it. The second is the necessity for consultation. The third is the abandonment of harshness. The fourth is justice. The fifth is good works. And as for its ministers they are four. (The first) is a trustworthy wazīr to wake the ruler if he sleeps, to make him see if he is blind, and to remind him if he forgets, and the greatest misfortune for the government and the subjects is that they should be denied honest wazīrs. And among the conditions pertaining to the wazīr is that he should be steadfast in compassion to the people, and merciful towards them. The second of the ministers of government is the judge whom the blame of the blamer cannot overtake concerning the affairs of God. The third is a chief of police who shall obtain justice for the weak from the strong. The fourth is a tax-collector who shall discharge his duties and not oppress the subjects.'

The simplicity of the Shehu's conception of the workings and structure of government can be contrasted with the reality which emerged after his death. The Shehu saw the need for four offices only: wazīr, qādī, chief of police (walī al-shurta), and 'āmil (tax-collector), in keeping with the early Islamic practice. In addition, the Shehu saw each territorial representative (amīr), as responsible for the distribution of the classes of collected monies: zakāt, kharāj ('land tax'), jizya ('Personal tax from "protected peoples" ', dhimmī), irth ('inheritance money'), and khums (one fifth booty), together with his local responsibilities as head of the administration

of justice and morality (Abubakar, 1974:216).[3]

The prescriptions for lawful government and the actions of its leaders listed by the Shehu echoed those of al-Maghili who, as was seen in the first chapter, helped to bring the Habe states, especially Kano, closer to Islamic governmental models. In the portion of the text below, taken from his treatise, The Obligation of Princes, al-Maghili lists the personal qualities necessary for leadership (in Latham, 1964:25-6):

> Authority rests on wise management in government. Every prince must order his kingdom well both at home and abroad, and must do all that in him lies for the welfare of his subjects. For this he has servants in his presence to do him service; men of wisdom who give council, trusty men who collect and spend, scribes and accountants who keep records, messengers, informants, watchers, and patrols. There are also learned men and trusty who guide aright, meritorious leaders who assemble to prayer, upright men who bear witness, advocates who intercede, trusty judges who give decisions, men who honour God, governors who love to pay His due, waziris who fear none but God. Again, there are strongholds well fortified and provisioned...
>
> The prince must watch his governors vigilantly in all their works, weigh carefully their statements and examine their conditions. He will estimate their wealth before appointing them and will watch their conduct on all occasions. If any of them is the object of repeated complaints, albeit the evidence is not clear, he will change if he can find a substitute. Otherwise he will use him as the householder uses the steps of his house or the milker a man who holds the horns of his cow...
>
> The course of an upright prince to follow in the division of tribute is this. He will first strengthen

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[3] Cf. Kitab al-Farq... (Hiskett, 1960:566): 'It is incumbent on him (i.e., the Caliph--R.P.B.) to appoint someone to act for him in the towns if it is not possible for him to conduct all affairs himself...(and) the appointing of a sultan in each of the provinces of his country to whom shall be referred back the laws of the emirs of all his provinces.'

fortresses, weapons and the like where these are weak. Next he will provide for the learned doctors, the judges, the summoners to prayer and all those who uphold the welfare of the Faithful, such as the warriors. Then he will provide for the poor, each according to his need...Lastly he will include the rest of the people, without distinction or race or wealth, keeping only what he chooses to set aside against disasters. All this he will do with honest intention and great care.

If wealth abounds he will preserve a surplus in the treasury for possible emergencies, for building mosques, ransoming captives, discharging debts, marrying women, aiding pilgrims and other necessities.

The abuse of office has long been a topic of Islamic reformers in Hausaland as has been illustrated in the writings of al-Maghili and the Shehu and his family. Al-Maghili, for instance, assures those who abuse high office (Palmer, 1915:188): 'Be sure if you abuse the kingly office and are wicked, thinking the God will pardon you, and even do evil under the cloak of the Sharī'a, be sure, I say, that you are Unbelievers.' In admonitory verse (Hausa: wa'azi) especially, writers express the gravity of misusing political office. The following verse of jihadist Muhammadu Tukur demonstrates this point (Hiskett, 1975:95, 233):

You should know that death will take us all under
the ground;
Leave off causing us to strut proudly upon the earth,
During our sojourn in the grave we shall cease to want
to demonstrate our power.
The people who glorify you will say, 'Oh how powerful
you are!'
Then they will take you to the grave and cast you
there alone.

No longer will horns be blown for you, nor will you
hear the drums,
He will no longer put on his gowns of silk,
Whether he is a king of the Muslims or of the unbelievers,

He will never again sit in his entrance chamber,
enjoying life
In this world, nor will he send out his harem
messenger.

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Ku san mutuwa da za ta kai mu cikin ƙasa,
Ku bar sa muna yin takama birbishin ƙasa,
Zamammu kushewa duk mu bar son gwadin isa,
Mutane da ke haushe ka su ce, 'Kai fa ka isa.'
Su kai ka kushewa can su yashe ka, kai ɗaya.

Ba a ƙara busa ma bare ka ji tambari,
Ba a ƙara sawa(r) rigunansa na alhari,
Sarakin Musulmi ne fa ko na kafiri,
Ba ya ƙara zamnawa ga soro da marmari
Cikin duniya balle shi aiki jakadiya.

It can be seen from the above that Islam, while lacking in detailed religious prescriptions dealing with the structure and process of government, provided a model for the protagonists of the jihad in terms of centuries of political evolution in the wider Islamic orbit. These influences were concerned with territorial administration, collection of taxes, court officials, and the degree of centralisation in government. This system was, in turn, absorbed into the Hausa hierarchical scheme. The influence of Islam on Habe and Fulani governmental models also concerned the qualities requisite in a leader as well as the Islamically sanctioned usage of authority.

II

Islam was of great political importance throughout the Sudanic region. This is reflected in political institutions as well as conceptions of political

authority in many of the states and empires which have flourished in the Sudan from about 1000 A.D. As with the states and Caliphate of Hausaland, however, these states had to accomodate elements of the traditional political structure into the Islamic framework. Syncretism was especially the case of Sudanic polities up to the time of the reform movements of the nineteenth century. In the comparisons which follow, no attempt will be made completely to describe the political systems of the states involved. Rather, the task will be to point to some of the similarities and differences which have evolved in varieties of responses to the introduction of Islam in the Sudan.

In one of the earliest accounts of a Sudanic kingdom, the Moorish geographer and poet, al-Bakri (ca. 1040-1094) described the kingship in ancient Ghana at a time when Islam was little more than an occasional royal cult (reprinted in Latham, 1964:14-16). This extract deals with the sovereign, Tenkamenin in 460 A.H. (A.D. 1067-1068):

> He was a prince worthy of praise as much for his management of affairs as for his zeal for justice and his friendliness towards the Muslims...When he gives an audience to his people to hear their complaints and remedy them he sits in a tent around which are drawn up ten horses caparisoned with cloth of gold. The governor of the town sits on the ground in front of the king and all around sit the waziris. The opening of the royal council is announced by the sound of a drum which they call 'deba' and which is made of a long piece of hollow wood. At the sound of the instrument the people gather. When those of the same faith as the king appear before him they kneel down and throw dust on their head, such is their way of greeting their sovereign.

In this earliest of Sudanic kingdoms in which Islam had any effect, the above text illustrates the syncretism which existed prior to Islamic reform movements. Until the reforming conquest of the Almoravids in the eleventh century A.D., Muslims lived in separate, autonomous trading communities. The kings, only nominal Muslims (if they found even the pretence necessary), nevertheless had great use for the Muslim clerics and traders. Besides serving as qadis in the towns, the Muslim inhabitants of Ghana served as interpreters, treasurers, and scribes. In fact, al-Bakri goes on to state that the majority of the ministers of the king were Muslims (in Levtzion, 1973:111).[4]

By way of contrast to the Hausa system of territorial administration, in Ghana the king maintained the loyalty of his territorial subordinates by keeping their sons in the capital as hostages (Levtzion, 1973: 112). This form of coerced loyalty, however, did not prevent the centrifugal tendencies which were common in the early Sudanic states.

In Ghana, there was no wholesale conversion of the population to Islam and little in the way of Islamic governmental institutions prior to the conquest by the Almoravids of the Sahara. On the other hand, with Muslims holding a great deal of administrative power, Ghana became a nascent Islamic state owing to

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[4] The seniormost official was the Wali al-Madina (lit., 'governor of the town').

the centralised bureaucracy that developed which balanced the fissive tendencies of the vassal chiefs.

While information on the political system of Ghana's successor state, Mali, is as scarce as its predecessor, there is rather more opportunity to describe the political institutions at the village and district level. Mali, which had become more or less completely Islamised by the thirteenth century A.D., also had a tradition of using Muslims in the bureaucratic affairs of the empire. Al-'Umari, who wrote between 1342-1349 A.D.,[5] states that the king of Mali had scribes and chancelleries. Ibn Battuta, who visited the area between 1352-3 A.D., attests to the existence of the nā'ib (lit., 'deputy') who led the farāriya (emirs) into the king's audience.

At the village and district level, authority was segmented in a way not unlike the manner which was to be seen in Hausaland. At the head of the extended family, lu, was the fa, who administered communal property, regulated relations within the group and, with the lineage elders, was the link with the ancestors. Leading the village, dugu, was the dugu-tigi, who was the fa of the lu believed to be the earliest occupant of the place. The dugu-tigi also acted as the village priest. Villages were grouped into districts known as kafus, the heads of which, who were

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[5] Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār (French translation, L'Afrique moins l'Egypte, annotated by Gaudefroy-Demombynes, Paris, 1927).

appointed by the king, were known as the kafo-tigi (sing.). Finally, there was a territorial governor of districts called the dya-mana-tigi or mansa (a title also given the king). As appointed offices, the kafo-tigi and the mansa represented the importance of the territorial factor over kinship, a feature which recurred throughout the Islamic Sudan. In addition, the two levels of provincial offices tended to be vested in members of the royal dynasty, thus increasing the power at the centre of the empire.[6]

Mali combined traditional with Islamic elements in government as well as the society generally. However, unlike Ghane, Islam in Mali was an imperial cult which gave great prestige in membership (Levtzion, 1973:193). The combination of both these religious systems, Islamic and pagan, strengthened and upheld the legitimacy of the kinship. Another feature differentiated Ghana from later states such as Mali and early Hausaland. In the former, Islam stood in opposition to the kingship and, while this was the case, Muslims were separated from the community. However, in Mali and pre-jihad Hausaland, where royalty themselves combined Islamic and pagan elements, traditional customs had to be accommodated by the Muslim community.

Songhay, unlike the preceding empires, had a direct influence upon the Hausa states by virtue of

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[6] And, as with Ghana, the king, in order to discourage independent action on the part of his vassals, would keep their sons in the capital.

having conquered most of Hausaland early in the sixteenth century. Songhay hegemony over the Hausa states, however, was short-lived as Songhay itself was overrun by the invading Moroccan armies in 1591 A.D.

Under its Soninke ruler, Askia Muhammad, who usurped power from the syncretist king, Sonni Ali, Songhay flourished both militarily and economically. Islam under the Askia reached its height as the state religion. In the Kitāb al-Fattāsh by three generations of the contemporary al-Kati family in Timbuktu, the Askia is described as a devout Muslim who eliminated many of the former pagan practices in Songhay (quoted in Trimingham, 1962:97):

> He cared for the 'ulamā', holy men and seminarists; he made many acts of almsgiving, and performed both the obligatory and supererogatory duties of religion. Although one of the most intelligent of men he showed humility before the 'ulamā', offering them slaves and wealth in order to assure their interests in the welfare of the Muslims as well as assist them in their submission to God and for the practice of the cult. He eliminated all the innovations, forbidden practices and bloodshedding characteristic of the shī (dynasty--R.P.B.), and established Islam upon sure foundations.

However, Askia Muhammad cannot be said to have initiated a wave of conversion to Islam and he failed to institute Islamic governmental apparatus in Songhay. For example, provincial and state titles were of Songhay, rather than Islamic, origin. The empire was divided into provinces, the heads (fāri, s.) of which were appointed and usually related to the Askia. One of these provincial chiefs, the head of Kurmina, was also known as the Kanfāri ('Superior

Chief').[7] Under the provincial governors were district subordinates known as koi (sing., lit. 'possessor, master of'). Among the state officials are included the Fāri Mundya (in charge of the royal estates), the Hou-kokorai-koi (master of the royal household), Korei-Farima (responsible for the Arab and Berber traders and settlers), Hi-Koi (master of the fleet), Balema (garrison commander). In addition, while the Askia himself would hear complaints and disputes, qadis administered justice to the Islamic population in the large cities of Songhay.

To the east of Hausaland, yet more proximate, is Bornu which, to an even greater extent than Songhay, influenced Hausa political institutions. Bornu, like Songhay, for a time held many of the autonomous Hausa city-states in its power. The history of Bornu prior to the conquests of Rabeh and the Europeans in the late nineteenth century, can be divided into three periods: the ancient kingdom of Kanem to the east of Lake Chad which was destroyed by civil war; the pre-nineteenth century kingdom of Bornu to the southwest of Lake Chad; and the nineteenth century in which a second dynasty took over the throne. This brief description will concentrate on the second period of Bornuan history.

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[7] Kurmina was known as the 'granary of the empire' (Trimingham, 1962:101). The word fāri is of Mandinka origin meaning 'brave, powerful', and 'war-lord' (Hunwick, 1972:228).

Islam has always been important in the organisation of government in Kanem-Bornu. Unlike Ghana, Mali, and Songhay, even in early Kanem Islamic titles existed alongside traditional ones. These titles included the Wazīr, Khāzin (treasurer), Ṭālib (a high ranking judicial officer), and the Qādī. Among the important traditional titles were the Arjinoma, Mustrema, Tegoma, Galadima, Yerima, and Ciroma, the last three of which were titles to be found in many Hausa states. While these title-holders were originally state officials, eventually they became fiefholders as well. A second class of purely provincial fiefholders, the mainas, were instituted to check the power of the state fiefholders (A. Smith, 1972:175).

Changes in the second kingdom centred on an increased amount of power for the ruler, the Mai. The form that centralisation took in Bornu closely paralleled that of the Hausa states both before and after the jihad. This can clearly be seen in the royal management of the fiefholders. As with Hausaland, fiefholders were obliged to remain in the capital, leaving their provinces to be administered by subordinates. Furthermore, the districts held by each provincial title-holder were not fixed. That is, the districts could be shifted between title-holders, they could be broken up and redivided (Cohen, 1970: 191). In addition, the districts held by any one

title-holder were not contiguous. In this way, then, no one fiefholder could mobilise easily a large portion of the kingdom to revolt.

Slaves and eunuchs were also used in state offices similarly to their use in Hausaland. By having important governmental functions in the hands of persons who were legally dependent on the Mai, he could check the designs of dynastic competitors.

Regarding the Islamic zeal of the Mais of Bornu, there are many references in contemporary accounts which attest to this. Ahmed ibn Fartua, Imam to Mai Idris Alooma (ca.1571-1604 A.D.), while recording the events of the first twelve years of the reign of this great Mai, also gave insights into the importance of Islam in the government of Bornu (Palmer, 1926:33, 50, 53):

> The Sultan was intent on the clear path laid down by the Kura'an (sic) and Sunna and the words of the wise, in all his affairs and actions. He never went outside the sanctions of these three guides to conduct, or shunned, or avoided their obligations...
> He did not put off the times of prayer.
> Even though he were pressed and busy, he was immensely generous, compassionate to orphans and widows, and the poor, constant in endeavour to improve his country, and impatient of its hurts...
> If he found a precedent in the Kura'an or Hadiths upon which the four rightly guided Imams who have gone before agreed, he did it following the example of those who had gone before; if he did not find any precedent in the Kura'an or traditions, he would leave off, and turn aside from his course altogether.

Of an earlier Mai, Idris Katagarmabe (ca. 1504-1526 A.D.), it is recorded by a contemporary (in Palmer, 1928iii:24):

'... the Commander of the Faithful and Khalifa, victorious over his enemies, the vigorous, with his two fortunate hands striking his enemies, the prince who guides aright his land, and people, and strives to do the will of God, and enforce the Sunna and prevent innovation, the lamp of darkness, cave of truth, exalted, whose words are good, who holds aloft the flag of the Shari'a...

While government in Bornu probably was the closest to the North African and Middle Eastern Islamic governments in its form, the religion still remained a royal cult as most of the Kanuri population remained pagan. It was not until the nineteenth century reform movements, which had its effects felt throughout the Sudan, that there were both large-scale conversions to Islam and a more consistent application of Islamic governmental principles.

It can be seen in the history of states and empires in the Sudan that while individual rulers may have been devout Muslims and Muslims were the important administrators and businessmen, Islamic principles of government were not followed. Among largely pagan populations, a measure of syncretism was inevitable in order to maintain political authority. This incomplete Islamisation in government extended through to the Sokoto Caliphate, as has been seen in earlier chapters. It was in the response to syncretism that from time to time in the Sudan reformers like al-Maghili and Shehu dan Fodio arose to redress the wrongs which had been committed by ostensively Islamic rulers.

III

In the definition of Goody (1966:53, n.9), dynastic succession is: '...hereditary succession to high office, in particular to monarchical succession.' This definition best describes the form of succession in Hausaland.

In a dynastic society, succession involves various problems for the stability of the leadership of the society and, hence, the society itself. The uniqueness of office and rivalry in succession caused by a plurality of heirs which can threaten fission of the community is partially solved by hierarchical principles within the ruling lineage and by the multiplicity of offices. It is to this aspect of the segmentation of political hierarchy which Goody addresses himself when he states (1966:5-6, 7):

> The possibility of partitioning the territory and duplicating the supreme office obviously provides some solution to the problem of the plurality of heirs (particularly in "corporate" dynasties) as well as to incipient rebellion...The fissiparous state does modify the uniqueness of monarchy and permit more than one of the royal heirs to enjoy the fruits of high office, providing as it were a form of institutionalised rebellion for both the dynasty and the wider political system.

Thus, the regulation of the type of succession to be followed at the appropriate time by the appropriate means within the dynastic group decreases the likelihood of an open breach.

In the Sokoto Caliphate and the Habe kingdoms, as has been seen, the rules were flexible in their

expression. For example, in the case of Zaria, succession to emirship was defined by three principles: firstly, only those males whose father had held the emirship were eligible for succession to the throne; secondly, of the group of sons of the previous emir, only those sons who had held prominent territorial or administrative offices were eligible to succeed; and finally, in Zaria, insofar as it was possible, succession to leadership should be rotated among the dynasties. In this system, then, the paramount office was succeeded to along flexible lines while the subsidiary offices were appointed according to past and future dynastic considerations.

In Abuja, on the other hand, where there were no competing dynasties as such, succession to the kingship proceeded along collateral lines from the Habe founder of Abuja from Zazzau. The method of succession in this society thus defined the roles, over time, of individual members of the dynasties or collateral lines, ascending the hierarchical political scale through offices. The circular system thus entitled the dynasty members to higher office by virtue of having occupied lower offices in the hierarchy.

Concerning the matter of complexity, lineage and state reacted as similar organisations in dealing with the problems of centralisation and diversification. In the Sokoto Caliphate in the last century,

the complexities and decentralisation which evolved in the system, in the form of an increase in the numbers of offices, paralleled the increase in the numbers of lineage segments in stateless societies in similar circumstances. This analogy is mentioned in order to point to the position of leadership in complex societies, either state or stateless, a position which involves consideration of the notion of balance.

Cohesiveness within the royal descent groups is achieved through royal intermarriage. This closed aspect of dynastic descent groups serves to reinforce their solidarity, apart from the larger society. The Hausa oral literature abounds with references to the above phenomenon as the portions of texts below illustrate (Skinner, n.d.II:316-18, Edgar, 1911b: 277-9; Skinner, n.d.III:15, Edgar, 1911b:342-3):

Now in the town that he came to, it chanced that there was the daughter of the chief, who was being courted by the son of the galadima of the town. These two had gone before the chief and made a promise. The boy had said that if she saw him with another girl, she might kill him. And she said that if he saw her with another man than him, he might kill her.

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Garin da ya tafi, ashe akwai diyar Sariki. Ita kuma, dan Galadiman gari shina bidan ta. Suka tafi wurin Sariki, suka yi alkawali. Ya che, 'Kadan ta gan shi da wata, ta yanka shi.' Ita kuma, ta che, 'Idan dan galadima ya gan ta da wani namiji, im ba shi ba, ya yanka ta.'

Halilu, Vizier of Sokoto, who was the father of Rufa'i (among others) married the daughter of Abdullahi, Emir of Kano.

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Waziri, Halilu, na Sakwato, uban su Rufa'i, ya amri diyar Sarikin Kano, Abdullahi.

With increasing complexity and centralisation comes the necessity to allocate office not just by genealogical considerations, but also by, for example, administrative efficiency. As Hocart states in this regard (1936:39): 'Centralisation means specialisation. Centralisation can only be achieved by selecting different individuals to perform different tasks.' The elements of succession based on achievement are infused into the royal lineage owing to the complexity of the organisation to be controlled. Within the corpus of 'electables' the ambiguity of the selection process ensures, to a greater or lesser degree, accession by a capable person. In the emirates and kingdoms of Hausaland, following this schema, elements of both intrude. The sarauta are, on the whole, appointed as junior officers within the dynasty. Succession to emirship, it will be remembered, is in the hands of an electoral council whose hierarchical position ranges from very junior to a small number of royal equivalents, as in the case of Sokoto. In these cases, royal lineages are political units, in which choice is exercised in the appointment to office and the attainment of higher status through office.

Conflict and competition for elective office have important unifying and stabilising effects for the society as a whole. Following the classic study of Simmel (1955:13), conflict may be characterised

as a method of resolving divergent dualisms and of achieving some sort of unity according to some mutually recognised rules. The difference in forms of conflict arises in situations of conflict within the group or between groups. Simmel summarises the difference as follows (Ibid., 33):

> Within the closed circle, hostility usually means the termination of relations, withdrawal, or avoidance of contact, and these negative characteristics even accompany the passionate interaction of open fight. By contrast, these groups, as whole units, live in mutual indifference side by side as long as there is peace, while they gain active reciprocal significance for one another only in war.

Competition, on the other hand, according to Simmel (Ibid., 57), exists when the conflict is indirect. That is, annihilation of one's opponent is not characteristic of competition. Rather, competition involves parallel efforts for the same ends. It is this specialised form of conflict which often characterises the selection of qualified people for high office in traditional states.

Conflict in dynastic descent groups must somehow be controlled in order to avoid physical conflict at the time of a disputed succession. At times, in the Sokoto Caliphate, the failure to resolve dynastic conflict led to open rebellion,[8] as in the case of the Kano civil war.

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[8] Rebellion in Gluckman's sense (1965:165): 'Rebellion ...has therefore to be examined as a process of repetitive change, since after it occurs there is no alteration in the structure of authoritative offices or the character of the personnel who hold them.'

The more normal resolution of conflict in succession is the conciliation of the weaker contender with a high office in the present or the promise of greater office in the future. Owing to the succession rule that sons of a sarki are eligible for the throne, this latter arrangement initiated even more contention for leadership because it made eligible other descent lines. The pacified resolution of successional conflict is related in the history below (Skinner, n.d.III:6; Edgar, 1911a: 228-229):[9]

> Buhari was then son of Shehu and what made him go away was jealousy of his relative. He went away when his father, Shehu built Dogondaji for his grandson, Bara'u, while Buhari was at Tambawel. When Buhari died, his son Umaru succeeded to the title. He was succeeded by his son, Haruna. But when Haruna died, a dispute arose over whether his younger brother or a son of his elder brother should succeed. His nephew did succeed and after him Haruna's younger brother.

In succession systems such as in the Sokoto Caliphate, the larger the number of candidates for the throne, the greater is the lineage distance between incumbent and successor and among rival candidates. Thus, the possibility of conflict is also increased. As Goody (1966:23) states: 'Indeterminacy increases the tension between potential heirs; the very openness of the succession encourages the struggle for power. But it does something to assuage the conflict between incumbent and successor.' In 'uncertain'

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[9] This translation is a paraphrase of Edgar's published account, therefore I have omitted the original.

systems of succession, such as in the Habe and Fulani systems, where there are many heirs but few offices, conflict is lessened by the corporate nature of the dynastic group which, in a sense, finds the members 'sharing' the scarce resource of leadership.

Factionalism contributed both to disruption and the maintenance of political processes in the emirates. In Zaria, for example, the situation was made complex by factionalism within dynastic groups, between them, and between the dynastic groups and the administration of Sokoto which had its own interests to preserve. The case of Sarkin Zazzau Sambo who was ultimately deposed in 1890 is a exemplary. Sokoto had weakened the power of the Emir of Zaria fearing a move towards autonomy. Sambo, unable to rule effectively in such a position, went against the past tendency of ruling within a coalition of dynastic descent groups and appointed his own relatives to the most important posts. Rather than increasing, his power was weakened by opposition from the other dynastic descent groups and by opposition instigated by the Hausa Sarkin Ruwa, Suleimanu. After open conflict, it was apparent that Sambo was unable to rule and he was deposed by Sokoto (Smith, 1960:178-88). Likewise, a more serious breach was brought about by the interference of Sokoto in the successional conflict leading up to the Kano civil war of 1893.

These were factional conflicts in which the conflict was controllable. They involved, in the first instance, the more ephemeral factionalism of the Sarkin Ruwa of Zazzau, and in the second, the more permanent organisation, yet intermittently active, of oppositional descent groups or collateral segments.

Understanding factionalism in a segmented, yet centralised political structure, involves an understanding of the balance which must be maintained between the segments of the structure. This resolution of potential and real factional conflicts revolves around the creation of patron/client relationships between hierarchical levels, loyalties outside formal patronage, rewards, and complementarity between various office-holders. In addition, Abubakar (1974:213) posits that office-holders had their own kin to consider in alliance-formation: 'The loyalty of the masu-sarauta was...partly motivated by their desire to continue in office and to entrench the position of their families in their respective offices.' The necessity to avoid or resolve conflicts, then, in both phases of Hausa and Fulani states was at least partly grounded in the goal of maintaining and enhancing political position to the advantage of descendants.

Non-free office-holders, eunuchs and slaves, also fulfilled important balancing functions within the state. These office-holders could, especially

in the Habe administrations, balance the position of the sarki between competing dynasties. This was achieved by placing offices in the hands of those who could not reasonably expect to usurp ultimate power. Slaves and eunuchs freed important functions from the competition of royal families (Fisher and Fisher, 1971:167):

> While several subordinate rulers in the Sokoto empire of the nineteenth century tried to govern their respective emirates independently of the Fulani aristocracy, relying largely on eunuchs and slaves, the abler despots, in order to encourage rivalries, frequently redistributed offices among their slaves, gave critical functions to freemen or kin when advisable, and sometimes summarily executed senior royal slaves.

With rivalries between dynastic segments and dynasties often common in the Sokoto Caliphate, the sarki in many instances preferred to place political authority in the hands of those who were his legal dependants.

The power of the sarki rested on his ability to achieve and maintain a balance between competing groups of kin and office-holders. The extension of authority to these groups not only had the effect of sharing administrative responsibilities, but also allowed the sarki a measure of control over these competing groups. However, oral tradition has many examples of the inability of a sarki to create or maintain this important balance. The following examples from the Kano Chronicle illustrate three results of the failure to balance power at different

hierarchical levels of the polity. In the first example (a, p.110), Galadima Dauda acquires great tracts of land owing to his military power under the Sarki, Abdullahi Burja (ca. 1438-1452 A.D.). His power was responsible for the deposition of the succeeding Sarki, Atuma. The second example (b, p. 117) illustrates the result of the deposition of a Wambai owing to his threat to the balance of Kano under Mohamma Nazaki (ca. 1618-1623 A.D.). Finally, in the reign of Dauda Abasama (ca. 1776-1781), his Galadima, Makama, became so powerful that the Sarki is described as a 'Wazir' of the Galadima who acts as 'Sarki' (Palmer, 1928iii:127).

(a) The Galadima was sung as follows:--
Gatherer of the axes of the south:
Gatherer of the axes of the south:
Drum of wealth, Galadima:
Drum of land, Galadima.
...The Sarki asked him, 'What are the names of the towns you have built?' The Galadima said, 'Their names are Ibdabu.' The Sarki said, 'I make you ruler of all these towns and their domains.' Because of this the Galadima was called 'Daudu', the strength of the city. The next year the Sarki sent to Dussi to ask for a wife. He was the first Sarki who married Sarkin Dussi, Sarkin Shirra and Sarkin Rano, and also a daughter of the Galadima.
...the eighteenth Sarki was Atuma, son of Dakauta. He was king for seven days only. He was turned out of the office of Sarki, for fear of trouble with the Galadima Daudu.

(b) The Wombai left Kano and went to Karayi. Every day he fought the Katsinawa and took much spoil from them in war. He became master of a hundred mailed horsemen and a thousand horses. He was sung as 'The Elephant who reduces his neighbours to servitude.' He became so mighty that it was feared he would revolt. Hence he was turned out of his office in the time of Kutumbi.

(c) He had a mind above favouritism or revenge, and

took the Galadima Makama's advice in everything. The Galadima Makama was like a Sarki, while Dauda was like his Wazir, because he was so forebearing.

The notion of political balance, then, in the Habe kingdoms and the Sokoto Caliphate involved ephemeral and permanent coalitions based within segments of royal families or segments of the administration. As Abdullahi Smith states in this regard (1972:189): 'Far therefore from being a hereditary autocracy, this type of government was one where the power of the king rested on the maintenance...of a delicate balance between the interests of the sarki on the one hand and the fiefholding masu-sarauta on the other.' These coalitions, which had as their bases patronage, loyalty, and reward all were addressed toward creating and maintaining a balance of political authority.

One important mechanism for resolving administrative disputes was the institution of the advisory emirate council. In the Sokoto administration, it will be remembered, during the lifetime of the Shehu there were no permanent councils. After his death, with the ascendancy of Bello, a council came into being to deal with the complex problems of the Caliphate. Last (1967:102) states that the council of Sokoto had no fixed membership, but '...would consist of such notables as were present.' However at the core of the council was usually the Caliph, Vizier, Magajin Gari, Magajin Rafi, and the Gala-

dima. In Sokoto, as well as in the emirates, the council was an advisory body, whose advice to the emir was not binding. Paden (1973:229) asserts that this relates to the theocratic position of the emir: '...the function of the Emir was as an executor of divinely inspired legislation, not as a legislator. As sole interpreter of divine legislation, however, the Emir was in effect an intermediate legislator.' In this role, the emir was assisted by a council of advisors. Each of these councillors had specific administrative responsibilities within the government.

In Kano, the early emirate council was composed of the leaders of the major Fulani clans and members of the royal family. Later, the group included the Vizier, Sarkin Yaki, the Chief Alkali, Ma'aji, Babban Mallamai, and Wakilin Attajirai.[10]

In Zaria, the multidynastic system presented serious obstacles for the maintenance of a stable council. Musa had tried to create a council of malamai, but the idea was abandoned after his death. Having to cope with the changing dynastic balance and succession patterns, councils tended to be informal, issue oriented, and biased towards intimacy of the relationship to the emir.

In the Habe administrations, Abuja for example, the council structure was complicated by the exist-

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[10] Wakilin Attajirai, a business representative, literally, 'representative of the wealthy traders'.

ence of subsidiary councils surrounding the major office-holders as well as the major administrative and military councils. The decreased position of the emir as autocrat in Abuja revolves around a different conception of the notion of kinship. In Abuja, the king was the repository of important administrative functions. As Smith puts it (1960:66): '...as the pivotal point of the governmental system, being simultaneously the supreme administrative official and the central office of the political system, the kingship was basic both to the equilibrium and coordination of the total system.' In this type of government, the position of the king in the council was conciliatory and mediating. The council acted purely on consensus with the king's power coming to the fore in crisis situations involving the failure to arrive at compromise. In such situations, the king's position was decisive.

Following the continuum to the extreme, in Katsina Na Maradi and in Gobir, the rukuni officials who were the core of the council wielded considerable powers (Nicolas, 1975:106). In these systems, the sarki, while being hierarchically and traditionally dominant, placed the legitimacy of his office in the hands of the council of state.

The ways in which Hausa conceive of councils and councillors are indicated in the proverbs below (Wnitting, 1940). In relation to the hierarchical pos-

ition of the councillors themselves, the proverbs below indicate their political and economic pre-eminence. In addition, councillors are referred to in relation to their individual political acumen within the council setting and their function as a balance within the emirate and kingdom administrations.

Farfarin likkafu, ko a fada sai yan-sarki (82)
White stirrups, even in the council only (used by) princes; i.e., because of their expense.

Ma je fada da banza balle sarki ya kira shi (144)
A man who goes to the council for nothing much more when the chief calls him; i.e., used of doing something any how, much more when there is a cause.

Rigaya zua fadda ba shi ne samu'n sariki ba[11]
'First come to the council', does not always 'catch king'.
First come is not always first served.
Though a man may have been in the king's service a long time, it does not follow that he will always have the king's ear.

Lallashi shi ne fadanchi (140)
It's persuasion that is councillorship; i.e., it's good advice, not fine cloth, that makes the councillor.

Ba a mugun sarki sai mugun bafada (146)
There is no bad chief, only a bad councillor; i.e., because the former depends on the latter.

Councils in both the Haƃe and Fulani states were composed of a small and fixed membership, with each member having his own administrative responsibility. They were, in varying degrees, decision-making, authoritative bodies. These councils arrived at their decisions through consensus. The basic difference between the Haƃe and Fulani administrations

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[11] This proverb is from Merrick, 1905:12; all others are from Whitting. The page number follows the proverb.

regarding their respective councils, lies in the reference to a higher authority. In the emirates within the Sokoto Caliphate, the councils were advisory to another political entity, the theocratic emir. In the Habe kingdoms, the king participated in a general consensual council, only exercising his pivotal role when conflict could not be resolved among other council members. To separate these governmental functions, to put the councillor system into a wider framework, the councils of Hausaland performed administrative functions in the delegation of authority and the making of decisions in the maintenance of the state. Councils in Hausa states also were important in resolving conflicts between factions within the major segments of royal families.

IV

The Hausa themselves, in their oral literature, proverbs, and ethnohistory, have numerous references

to their own conceptions of hierarchy, authority, and power. These concepts, together with perceptions of the structure and processes of their own political, economic and social institutions attest to a clear and consistent framework in the ordering of their social lives. The Hausa vocabulary of hierarchy provides an understanding of their social ranking which is complementary to and augments an analysis of the more formal features of the system.

Beginning with the Hausa concept of rank, daraja, it was seen in the fourth chapter how rank was important in the ordering of occupational hierarchy. Daraja not only expresses rank at an abstract level, but also attaches to that rank a normative value as the expressions and proverbs below illustrate. In this second sense, daraja expresses the social importance of the attainment of higher rank (Abraham, 1962:192):

Mutum mai daraja
lit. a man owner of rank
A valuable person (thing)

Ya ba su daraja
lit. he gave them rank
He showed them the respect due.

Abu wanda daraja tasa ta iya biyan abin da ake ɓatawa
lit. a thing of rank/value is able to pay for that which has been spoiled, i.e., squandered
A sum large enough to recoup them for the expenditure.

Wanda ya san darajar goro, shi ya kam biɗam masa huhu
lit. one who knows the value/rank of a kolanut he will always seek a cover for it
If one values a thing one looks after it.

Rank is expressed also in Hausa proverbs by allegory. In this way, such diverse phenomena as differences in

animals or body parts are used to describe differences in rank in society. This is illustrated in the following proverbs below (Merrick, 1905:101,424):

Idan angulu ta bia maka maradi, zabua ta taffi da zanenta
If the vulture fulfills your desire, the guinea fowl will pass you by, (beautiful) marks and all.
If you are satisfied to associate with such low people, a better class will have nothing to do with you.

Karriya ne, kunne ba shi finn kai
It is a lie, the ears are not bigger than the head.
The servant is not a bigger man than his master.

In the second and third chapters, Hausa proverbs and tales illustrated within the political context the relative hierarchical positions of officials in terms of strength or influence. Proverbs also make fine distinctions in the grading of hierarchical levels. The following proverb further demonstrates this principle (Rattray, 1913, II:260):

Idanun da ya gani sarki ba shi tsoro galadima
The eyes that beheld the chief do not fear the galadima.

The deference to a higher hierarchical official is reinforced not only by oral tradition, but also by political custom. For example, regarding the relationship between the second Caliph of Sokoto, Muhammad Bello and his father's brother, Abdullahi, in light of the former's succession to leadership over the latter,[12] deference is reflected in political custom in the contemporary relationship between Sokoto and Gwandu. When the Emir of Gwandu arrives in Sokoto,

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[12] The events involve Bello assuming the throne after the death of the Shehu in the absence of Abdullahi. This he did to maintain linearity in succession. After a break in relations, Abdullahi acknowledged the preeminence of Bello.

he presents his cloak to the Vizier, recalling Abdullahi's gesture of acceptance to Bello. In addition, the Emir of Gwandu retains the right to sit in the place of the Wazirin Sokoto at the council of Sokoto, as both Abdullahi and Bello acted as Vizier to Usman during his Caliphate (Hiskett, 1963:20).

Hierarchy is expressed through the concept and practice of gaisuwa. Not easily translated into English, it usually signifies in the lexicons 'salutations', 'greetings', and 'tribute' (Robinson, 1925). The practice of gaisuwa refers to a reciprocal relationship involving the giving of gifts from inferior to superior in exchange for favours, or an audience, for example. Not to be confused with a 'bribe', gaisuwa is a recognition of a relative status as is indicated in the following expression (Abraham, 1962: 287):

Ya yi masa gaisuwa
lit. he gave to him gaisuwa
(a) He saluted him (a superior) on meeting him.
(b) He gave him (superior)
  (i) customary offering sanctioned by usage.
  (ii) 'bribe' to secure position or some advantage.
(c) He gave him (guest) present of food on arrival.

The 'giving of gaisuwa' is employed in letters to a superior. Thus, in a situation of distance, the relative hierarchy is involved prior to the matter to be discussed. This is illustrated below (Ibid.):

Audu ya ce a yi masa gaisuwa
lit. Audu said that you are to be given gaisuwa
Audu (your inferior) sends you his compliments.

Daga Hakimin A, Garba, gaisuwa da aminci zuwa Sarkin Kano, Audu dam Mamudu. Bayan haka...

lit. From District-Head of A., Garba, gaisuwa and friendliness to Sarkin Kano, Audu son of Mamudu. After this...
Most profound and respected salutations from District-head of A, Garba, to the Emir of Kano, Audu son of Mamudu, I write to say that...

Gaisuwa can also be exchanged among equals. It is this generally unrecognised feature of gaisuwa which emphasises its reciprocal, rather than extortionist, aims. This is shown in the expression below (Ibid.):[13]

Wokacin gaisuwa a kan ce 'ina gajiya'.
lit. in the period of gaisuwa it is said 'how is the tiredness!'
When exchanging salutations, people say 'I hope you are not tired!'

Although the practice of gaisuwa continued after the jihad, it was actively discouraged by the Shehu. In Islam, similar practices are clearly forbidden, as indicated in the following passage from the Qur'an (II, 188): 'And swallow not up your property among yourselves by false means, nor seek to gain access thereby to the judges, so that you may swallow up a part of the property of men wrongfully while you know.' In recorded Hausa oral traditions which deal with religious and political ethics, the proscription of gaisuwa is clearly expressed. The first passage below is from Waƙar Bagauda (Hiskett, 1965:131; 1964: 562) and the second, from Waƙar Karamomin Shaihu (Hiskett, 1971:96-7):

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[13] In fact, gaisuwa is exchanged upon a death: gaisuwar mutuwa, lit. gaisuwa of death, 'condolence on a death'. The range of meanings of gaisuwa extends to the unpleasant as the following illustrates: nama yana gaisuwa, lit. the meat is giving gaisuwa, 'the meat's going bad.'

It is almighty God forbids the accepting of illicit gifts

If you accept bribes and wax fat,
The fat of your bribes will seethe in hell-fire!

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Da cin suhuta Ta'ala ke hanawa
Izan dai ka ci rashwa ka yi taiɓa,
Kibar rashwa wuta ke babbakawa!

If greeting presents came to him (i.e., Shehu), as for him, he did not like it,
He would just say, 'Give everyone his share',

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In gaisuwa ta zo garai, shi ba shi so,
Sai ko shi ce, 'Kowwa, a ba shi rabo nasa.'

The practice of gaisuwa, then, is clearly an expression of relative hierarchy in Hausa society. It facilitates the approachability of a superior so that a favour may be asked, and is a reciprocal salutation between hierarchical equivalents.

Deference to a higher authority operates on a number of levels both in political symbolism and custom. Apart from Allah, the sarki is the ultimate authority and is conceived, at one level, to have absolute authority as the proverbs below illustrate:

En Sarki ya che bakki mu che kirin, en ya che fari sai mu che kul (Fletcher, 1912:30)
If the king says 'black' we say 'very'; if he says 'white' we say 'absolutely'.
Deference to one's superiors, right or wrong.

Idan sarki ya che, kowa shi yi kuka shi chika masaki da nawaye, kai mai-idanu guda dai, fara tun dawuri (Rattray, 1913, II:276)
If the chief commands that everyone is to weep and fill a calabash with tears, do you, who have only one eye, begin from the very first.

There are a number of social factors which define the correct usage of authority. Among these definitional factors may be included: segmental balance, Islamic law, and traditional law. The Shehu, drawing

on the latter two sources of legitimation further describes proper leadership in Tabbat Hakiikan, 'Confirmed Truth' (quoted in Wakokin Hausa, 1957; Hiskett, 1975):

Whether a man is a person of rank,
Or holds office, or is impoverished,
Or has wealth and is miserly or generous,
He who does not honour the Commander of the Believers,
He will die in unbelief, be sure of that!

If you are a ruler of man,
Then protect their rights, let alone those pf your own kinfolk,
Also, do good, lest you burn in Hell Fire.
He who becomes a ruler in order to despoil men,
The fire will despoil him, be sure of tnat!

However, as this study has shown, the socially sanctioned use of authority is all too often most evident in its infraction. At each juncture of infraction, the political system is redressed by the individuals and groups in a position to correct the equilibrium. This notion of balance goes some way toward explicating some of the major causes and the ultimate success of the jihad, as well as such events as the Kano civil war. Witnin the context of less serious breaches of the political balance, higher or powerful lower groups act to depose a sarki or some overly ambitious official title-holder. This aspect explains such disparate events in time and place as the interference of Sokoto into the affairs of Zaria and the events described in the Kano Chronicle relating to political balance. Oral tradition gives a measure of understanding of these political processes. In the text below, Sultan Abdu, nicknamed,

'Unbaked Pot', after overstepping his legal authority in numerous regards, earns the opprobrium of his courtiers, fadawa (Skinner, n.d.III:27; Edgar, 1911a:212-213):

> Here's the story of Sultan Abdu, 'Unbaked Pot', in the time when he killed people so freely. Anyone convicted of any offense against him he would have killed. Forbearance and mercy were unknown to him. If any man begged him to forbear, he would himself rush at the man and kill him. In the days just before the European occupation, if he saw anyone wearing shorts and a singlet, he would have him seized and killed.
>
> ...And the courtiers said to themselves 'May God preserve us from the nature of this ruler! May God part us and him without further ill!'
>
> ***
>
> Wani labari zamanin Sarikin Musulmi, Abdu, 'Danyen kasko', zamanin da shi ke kashe mutane. Kowa ya yi ma sa laifi sai a kashe shi, ba a bada hankuri, babu kamun kafa. Kowa ya che zai bada hankuri, sai ya yi kamar ya gama da shi, ya kashe. Da zamanin Turawa ya yi kusa, kowa aka gani da yachiki da dan-wando, sai a kama shi, a kashe.
>
> ...Sai fadawa suka che, 'Allah shi kiyashe mu da halin Sariki nan. Allah she rahu mu da shi lafiya.'

The concepts of hierarchy and authority in the Hausa language are closely allied to the concepts of force, power, strength, control and wealth, all of which intersect as a matter of political reality. In this regard, the Hausa have a large political vocabulary: for example, iko, 'power, control'; karfi, 'strength' (in the sense of power); daula (derived from Arabic), 'power, wealth'; kuwa (derived from Arabic), 'strength, power'; agar, 'strength' (in the sense of maturity), 'authority'; kasaita and gawurta, 'power' (in the sense of size). The expressions and proverbs below demonstrate the ways

that these concepts are intertwined to give a coherent, yet multiplex perspective of hierarchy and authority in Hausa society (Abraham, 1962):

Ba shi da iko ya ce 'i' ko 'a'a' (398)
lit. he has no power he says 'yes' or 'no'
He is powerless.

Mai iko (398)
lit. owner of power
Leader, commander

Karamin ƙarfi gareshi (487)
lit. smallness of strength to him
He's not well off, he holds only a small position.

Sarkin yawa ya fi sarkin ƙarfi (952)
lit. the chief of many exceeds the chief of strength
It's better to have backers than to be strong.

Ya yi daula (203)
lit. he had power
'He ruled'.

Ba shi kuwar zuwa (572)
lit. he has no authority to come

Ya yi agar (9)
(a) He's full grown and strong.
(b) He has much authority.

Power/authority, then, has many sources: occupation, religious, political, economic, personal, and ethical. The ways that these combine provide a clear and consistent understanding of the structure and processes of the various traditional elites within Hausa society.

The final concomitant of leadership in Hausa society is the subjective appraisal that is attached to the higher hierarchical echelons. This subjective appraisal, as was seen in the fourth chapter, involves the Hausa concept of girma, 'prestige', 'bigness',

'honoured position'[14] (Abraham, 1962:325). The 'prestige' attached to office is valued apart from the economic rewards. As Baba (210) states, there is even 'medicine' to enhance one's chances or destroy another's chances to succeed to a local title: 'There is medicine for titles, it can be put in the compound of a chief; if a stranger succeeds to the title and not a son of the dead chief's house. The stranger will be terrified. It isn't good that a stranger should inherit the title.' The subjective value of office, then, is great. This value, as expressed in the Hausa concept of girma, is illustrated in the following expressions and proverbs (Abraham, 1962:325):

An yi masa girma
lit. one did to him bigness/prestige
He is honoured.

Halin girma gareshi
lit. disposition of bigness/prestige to him
He's liberal (15)

In dai rakumi da girma, kayansa da yawa
lit. althougn the camel is large/prestigious, his loads are many
The rich man has many calls on his purse.

A girma, a ci kasa?
lit. one of stature/prestige does he eat earth?
Should one who has reached high estate behave like one of low degree?

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[14] Girmana: persons of prestige. Other associations of girma indicate its far-ranging importance in Hausa thought: 'to be promoted', 'to be circumcised', 'to be married', 'to increase'.

[15] That is, a wealthy or powerful person is in a better position 'to be liberal'.

Ya ya da girmansa (940)
lit. he threw away his prestige/bigness
He behaved in undignified way.

In ka ga babbar saniya tsakanim maruka, girmanta ya zube (656)
lit. when you see a big cow in the midst of calves, her stature is poured away (i.e., collapses)
Anyone who associates with inferiors lowers his dignity.

Girma, then, is the subjective component of the complementary aspects of leadership in Hausa society. The verbal concepts of hierarchy, authority/power, all combine to create a web of conceptualisations that enrich the vocabulary of political phraseology beyond the structural concepts of sarki, sarauta, and sana'a. It is the combination of the structural concepts with the processual ones that define the Hausa system of hierarchy and authority in all phases and forms of collective life.

V

As this chapter has shown, the structure of Hausa political institutions as well as the Hausa conception of hierarchy and political authority is grounded in a variety of sources. Notions of leadership and the sanctioned usage of authority rest on the influence that Islam has had throughout the region of Hausaland together with indigenous conceptions as shown in the Hausa language. Moreover, an understanding of the mechanisms of government in both Habe and Fulani states involves examining the way administrations and groups of royal kin resolve conflict and cooperate among themselves.

CONCLUSIONS

Hierarchy is ubiquitous in human societies. Generally, this hierarchy is defined in terms of rights and obligations. Although all men in all societies have rights and obligations, the rights of some are superior in defining the obligations of others. Even in the simplest societies, those in which there is little social differentiation of status, inequalities are based within the kinship group in terms of such criteria as descent and age. In the organisation of these status differences, more or less consistent criteria of evaluation are found. In fact, in complex societies, especially, there are, as Béteille points out (1977:19) '... attempts within each culture to bring about some consistency between the different criteria of evaluation, and one obvious way of doing this is by placing the criteria themselves in some kind of hierarchy.'

In Hausa society, the criteria of evaluation of status include royal birth, closeness of descent within the royal descent group, ethnicity, age, sex, wealth, occupation, and access to power expressed through the system of titled offices. Clearly, these criteria are circular. High status in the political system, for example, increases the chance, through territorial holdings, to amass wealth thus increasing the general status of the individual concerned. This is to be expected in a relatively closed system, such as the Hausa system,

in which attainment of political office is restricted to a few families. As was seen in chapter four in relation to the associations of craftsmen and youth, this aspect of office is often true among the talakawa as well.

Within the political system itself, principles of kinship, expressed through descent and succession, and political authority are woven so that political relations and affinal and consanguinal links become fused. At another level, that of competing segments of descent groups or different descent groups, political relations become fissive. The latter tendency led to political instability through administrative conflict and could ultimately lead to deposition of the weakest member or members. The former tendency led to a dynamic equilibrium of competing, rather than conflicting, royal families. Patronage was also encouraged in this aspect of the political result of relations of consanguinity and affinity. By appointing his sons or affines to high office, the sarki provided his descent line with political continuity through creating eligible candidates for future royal succession. The centripetal nature of the political aspect of relations of kinship is seen in the hierarchical categories of appointable kin.

Although the fluidity of the political system could only be defined through the sarauta held by royal persons, the political system was balanced also

by persons not expected to compete for the position of sarki. These positions included royal men not eligible for the throne, royal women, eunuchs, and slaves. This complex aspect of Hausa political hierarchy, also often expressed through political patronage, served to balance competing interests by placing important administrative responsibilities in the hands of 'safe' appointees.

Again, balance was achieved in the system, often described as 'feudal', of giving territorial responsibilities to the centralised title-holders. These hakimai, 'district-heads', often held great tracts of land which yielded great wealth and political power. However, the balance lay in making territorial tracts non-contiguous, and forcing each hakimai to reside in the emirate capital. It is at the territorial level of the political system where, descending in hierarchy from the sarki, that the reflectivity of office is first evident through the subordinates of the hakimi.

The parallel development of hierarchy expressed through titled office was seen in the fourth chapter to permeate other, non-political, social institutions. Titled office in the youth and craft associations (as well as among the spirits) presents a consistent and a readily apparent criterion of evaluation of hierarchical status. In addition, the duplicating series of titles provides a consistent means of del-

egating and exercising traditional authority.

Beginning with the Caliph, on the political scale, authority is segmented on a territorial basis, first through the Emirs, and then the hakimai, towns and villages, each political level duplicating the next in structure. This political hierarchy is dually extended throughout the social system relating to craft specialisation: firstly in terms of occupational stratification, and secondly in terms of occupational titles. These occupations involve all members of the society from religious and magical specialists, and those involved with all types and scales of commerce, to those persons involved in the crafts and services. In addition, the hierarchy permeates Hausa society in the form of youth association titles, and cosmology through hierarchically organised titled spirits.

Finally, the Hausa concepts of 'rank', daraja, 'power', iko, 'strength', karfi, and 'prestige', girma, among others, attest to a clear and consistent framework in the ordering of their social lives. The Hausa vocabulary of hierarchy provides an understanding of social ranking in their own terms. The verbal concepts within the Hausa language which express hierarchy, authority and power enrich the vocabulary of Hausa political phraseology beyond the structural concepts of sarki, sarauta, and sana'a.

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AA = American Anthropologist
ALR = African Language Review
ALS = African Language Studies
BJS = British Journal of Sociology
BSOAS = Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
CAD = Centre of Arabic Documentation
JAH = Journal of African History
JAS = Journal of the African Society
JHSN = Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria
JRAI = Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute

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