The Interest of 'North Britain': Scottish Lobbying, the Westminster Parliament, and the British Union-State, c.1760-c.1830



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Abstracts

Short abstract

This thesis is a study of the role of Scots and Scottish society in the politics of the Westminster Parliament and the British Union-state during the late Georgian period. Specifically, it analyses the lobbying activity of certain Scottish interests at Parliament and the central agencies of the British state in London during the period c.1760-c.1830. In doing so, this thesis is concerned with the developing efficacy of Scottish lobbies, as well as the extent to which they represented identifiably Scottish interests at Westminster and within the British Union-state over the course of this period. It aims to expand our understanding of how important elements within Scottish society gradually came to play an active role in the British political centre and argues that Scottish lobbying changed over this period from a position of nurturing and defending a separately constructed Scottish 'national' interest to becoming part of an integrated set of interests operating within a broader and more comprehensive British framework. This change was brought about by the need to represent Scottish interests more effectively within the British Union-state, particularly as the politics of Westminster became more important to certain parts of Scottish society from the 1780s onwards during the early industrial revolution. This process was, at times, uneven, and there was often tension between ongoing convergence and persistent distinction. Nevertheless, Scottish interests became more closely integrated within the British political system over the course of this period through their lobbying activities at the Westminster Parliament and of ministers in Whitehall. They increasingly operated more effectively as part of the British political and legislative process, and did so in ways which no longer presented them as separate or different in what was becoming a more authentically 'British' political culture.

Long abstract

This thesis is a systematic examination of the role of Scots and Scottish society in the politics of the Westminster Parliament and the British Union-state in the late Georgian period. Specifically, it provides an analysis the lobbying activity of certain Scottish interests at the British Parliament and the central agencies of the British state during the period c.1760-c.1830. It assesses their developing efficacy over this period, as well as the extent to which they represented an identifiably Scottish national interest at Westminster and within the British state. The period covered by this thesis begins in the early 1760s in the aftermath of the death of the third duke of Argyll, who had long been at the apex of a system of management which had controlled Scottish politics and patronage for much of the preceding half century. It continues through to the early decades of the nineteenth century and the so-called 'Age of Reform', in which Scotland developed politically from a position of semi-autonomy to becoming a more fully integrated part of the British state, and where English and Scottish politics underwent significant convergence.

Scottish political history in the eighteenth century has focused traditionally on events in Scotland, and few attempts, with several notable exceptions, have previously been made to examine how Scottish interests fared at Westminster and in Whitehall following the 1707 Act of Union. Alexander Murdoch, in his study of politics and administration north of the border in the middle decades of the eighteenth century, has claimed that Scotland enjoyed a state of 'semi-independence' where British state power was mediated through Scottish institutions which remained largely separate and distinct. The Act of Union in 1707 had unified the Scottish and English parliaments, but Scottish government and administration was still largely concentrated in Edinburgh. In addition, a separate system of local government, as well as distinctively Scottish institutions which were charged with economic regulation and political lobbying, such as the Convention of Royal Burghs, survived into the post-Union order. By the

early decades of the nineteenth century, however, English and Scottish politics were, according to Iain Hutchison, 'pretty fully meshed together' with more pronounced 'cross-border fusions' where politicians in both countries fought on the same issues, often irrespective of national difference. This thesis aims to bridge the gap between these two accounts: it argues that the increasing importance of the politics of Westminster to Scottish society prompted Scottish interests to develop the modes and operations of their lobbying practices which, in turn, focused Scottish society more intensely on politics at the Westminster Parliament and central government departments in London.

This study fits into current historical trends which are concerned with how local interests related to the British 'fiscal-military' state, and the extent to which the Westminster Parliament increasingly played a role in British 'domestic government'. Recent scholarship has focused on lobbying organisations across the British Atlantic world, such as the Irish lobby and various colonial interests, especially the West India lobby, and there has been some limited attention on how certain Scottish economic interests, such as the linen industry, succeeded in influencing ministerial policies and parliamentary legislation. This thesis aims to expand our understanding of how Scottish interests, and important elements within society, gradually came to play an active role in the domestic politics of the British Union-state and argues that Scottish lobbying changed over this period from a position of nurturing and defending a separately constructed Scottish 'national' interest to becoming part of an integrated set of interests operating within a broader and more comprehensive British framework.

The main body of this thesis is split into five thematic chapters and seeks to cover systematically Scottish lobbying from different angles, with most chapters charting change chronologically over the entire period. In doing so it draws extensively upon a variety of manuscript collections housed in all four corners of the United Kingdom, as well as some archives in the United States, in addition to printed correspondence, newspapers, and

parliamentary records. Chapter One examines Scottish lobbying in the 1780s, arguing that this decade was a particularly important episode of change for British politics generally, but especially so for Scottish relations with the British political centre, and that changes in Scottish lobbying in this decade foreshadowed more dramatic developments over the broader period. In particular, it analyses the early lobbying activities of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, which emerged from a need to defend new and diverse regional commercial and manufacturing interests at a time when more intrusive fiscal and taxation policies meant that Westminster was increasingly becoming viewed as more relevant and significant in Scottish society. It observes that this Chamber was similar to other chambers of commerce which emerged at the same time in Britain and Ireland, and indeed in the rest of the Atlantic World, but that it also built on lobbying practices and traditions connected with existing Scottish institutions, particularly the Convention of Royal Burghs. Chapter Two is a case study of lobbying activity on behalf of the Scottish cotton industry, and charts this particularly significant Scottish interest's relationship with the British political centre over the period c.1760-c.1830. The cotton industry in Scotland was of profound importance to the Scottish economy over this period of early industrialisation, and it came to prominence as cotton manufacturing was flourishing simultaneously south of the border. Unlike other textile interests, such as linen, cotton was not simply a 'national Scottish' concern, but an important economic interest for all regions which depended heavily on it throughout Britain, particularly Lancashire. This case study focuses on the construction of a new Scottish interest in this period, seeking to explain what gave it cause to lobby Parliament and important agencies of British state in the period, whilst assessing its developing efficacy, and examining how it developed over this period from an identifiably Scottish interest into one part of a broader industrial and business lobby.

Hereafter, the focus of the thesis shifts to the Westminster Parliament. Chapter Three examines Scottish representation at Westminster through the activity of certain Scottish MPs,

and charts their political behaviour as a coherent group and as individual lobbyists. It analyses the extent to which Scottish representation continued to be considered inherently different and separate from representation as practiced by other MPs, and the extent to which they assimilated with other MPs throughout this period, particularly through the emergence of party politics in the early nineteenth century. Chapter Four examines the growing importance of the Westminster Parliament north of the border through the sharp increase of legislation, particularly local legislation, pertaining specifically to Scotland. It observes this through a statistical analysis, before examining how parts of Scottish society developed alongside new notions of the 'public' to focus more intensely on the Westminster Parliament and in order to play a more enhanced role in the British legislative process. Chapter Five uses a comparative analytical model by examining Irish political activity at Westminster and within the British Union-state, before and after the Anglo-Irish Union of 1801, drawing upon the distinctions and similarities it reveals in order to highlight and clarify the significance of changes in the Scottish experience noted in the previous chapters. The main concern of this final chapter is to compare the experiences of Scottish and Irish lobbies in constructing and maintaining minority 'national interests' in a Westminster context so as to highlight the distinctiveness of the Scottish story of politicisation and integration in the British state by contrasting it with the Irish experience.

This thesis asserts that Scottish interests and important parts of Scottish society became more closely integrated within the British legislative and political system through their lobbying activities at the Westminster Parliament and of ministers in Whitehall. This was not a smooth process and there was often tension between ongoing convergence and persistent distinction. Nevertheless, over the course of this period, Scottish interests operated more effectively as part of the British political and legislative process, and gradually did so in ways which no longer presented them as separate or different in what was becoming a more authentically 'British' political culture.

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Thanks are due first and foremost to my supervisor, Bob Harris, who was instrumental in helping me conceive the proposal for this thesis when I came to him as a stranger in late 2011 with some vague ideas for a research project. Ever since, he has been a constant source of help, inspiration, and very sage advice. He has also shown extraordinary patience, which I fear I may have tested too much and too often. I thank him most sincerely for all of this and more. Further thanks are owed to other historians at Oxford, such as Perry Gauci who has been very generous with his time and supportive of this project. Joanna Innes in particular has been generous in providing me with a great deal of help and advice, not to mention very kindly allowing me to consult and use the database on legislation in the long eighteenth century, which she compiled with Julian Hoppit and others. She also acted as my internal examiner, alongside Andrew Mackillop as my external examiner, and I am deeply grateful to both of them for their generous encouragement and guidance, in addition to their very thoughtful comments and suggestions, during the viva process.

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Over the course of my research I have travelled extensively, including to all four corners of what is still – at the time of writing – the United Kingdom, as well as to the United States. In particular, I have been lucky enough to spend quite a lot of time in Scotland where I have always felt at home. Although I am not a native of that country, I am always desirous to take the high road north and have enjoyed immensely several lengthy research trips which have enabled me to do so. It has been an interesting time to research and analyse Scotland's relationship with the Westminster Parliament, and its position within the British Union-state, although my thesis cannot, and does not seek to, pass comment on any modern political debates. Nevertheless, I would like to think that my research contributes to a more informed understanding of Scotland's, and the United Kingdom's, political and constitutional past.

I am thankful for the help and advice of the archivists, librarians, and staff at the many research institutions I have had the pleasure to visit, which are listed in the bibliography. I would particularly like to place on record my sincere gratitude to Sir Charles Fergusson of Kilkerran, Sir Patrick Hunter Blair of Blairquhan, Patricia Macneil, David Parkinson of the Seven Incorporated Trades of Aberdeen, and the Royal Highland and Agricultural Society of Scotland, all for allowing me to access and use manuscript material from their private collections. In addition, I am grateful to Alison Rosie at the National Register of Scottish Archives, for facilitating many of these consultations.

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List of abbreviations

AA	Ayrshire Archives, Auchincruive
ACAA	Aberdeen City and Aberdeenshire Archives, Aberdeen
Add. MS.	Additional Manuscripts, British Library
BAH	Birmingham Archives and Heritage, Birmingham
BL	British Library, London
Cockburn Letters	T.F. Kennedy, *Letters chiefly connected with the affairs of Scotland, from Henry Cockburn, solicitor-general under Early Grey's government, afterwards Lord Cockburn, to Thomas Francis Kennedy, M.P., afterwards the right hon. T.F. Kennedy, with other letters from eminent persons during the same period, 1818-1852* (London, 1874).
Dempster-Fergusson Letters	Sir James Fergusson (ed.), *Letters of George Dempster to Sir Adam Fergusson 1756-1813, with some account of his life* (2nd ed., Glasgow, 2004).
ECA	Edinburgh City Archives
FRO	Flintshire Record Office
GCA	Glasgow City Archives, Mitchell Library, Glasgow
HL	Huntington Library, San Marino, CA.
HMC	Historical Manuscripts Commission
HoP, *Commons 1754-1790*	Sir Lewis Namier and John Brooke (eds), *The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1754-1790* (3 vols, London, 1964).
HoP, *Commons 1790-1820*	R.G. Thorne (ed.), *The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1790-1820* (5 vols, London, 1986).
HoP *Commons 1820-1832*	D.R. Fisher (ed.), *The History of Parliament: The House of Commons 1820-1832* (7 vols, London, 2009).
ML	Mitchell Library Special Collections, Glasgow
ODNB	*Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (online)
PKCA	Perth and Kinross Council Archives
PP	Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons
PRONI	Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast
NLS	National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh
NRAS	National Register for Archives in Scotland, Edinburgh
NRS	National Records of Scotland, Edinburgh
StAUL	University of St Andrews Library, Fife
TNA	The National Archives, Kew
TH	Trinity Hall, Seven Incorporated Trades of Aberdeen, Aberdeen

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Introduction

The new constitutional settlement established by the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707 had profound political repercussions for Scotland in particular. The Treaty of Union, agreed in 1706, and ratified subsequently by both English and Scottish parliaments, declared 'That the two Kingdoms of Scotland and England' would 'be united into one Kingdom, by the Name of GREAT BRITAIN'. Crucially, this included the important provision, in the third article of the Treaty, that this new Kingdom would 'be represented by one and the same Parliament, to be Stiled the Parliament of Great Britain'.[1] In reality, however, this 'new' British Kingdom, which was created on 1 May 1707, was simply an expanded incarnation of the increasingly powerful English state. Equally, the 'new' Parliament of Great Britain essentially was a continuation of the existing English Parliament in Westminster, with room provided for an additional 45 MPs representing Scottish constituencies in the House of Commons, and 16 Scottish representative peers in the House of Lords. This was not, therefore, the equal partnership between two political entities that the Treaty of Union had envisaged. Legally and constitutionally, the two kingdoms and parliaments were joined to form one new whole. In practice, however, the Scottish Parliament effectively was abolished – the Scottish Lord Chancellor, the earl of Seafield, described it as 'ane end to ane auld sang' – while the English Parliament continued without even dissolving. Thus, the final Scottish Parliament selected from amongst its existing 'commissioners' those who would journey south to sit in what was still, essentially, the second English Parliament of Queen Anne at Westminster.[2] While political life for English politicians

[1] *Articles of the treaty of union Agreed on by the commissioners of both kingdoms, on the 22d of July 1706* (London, 1706), pp. 2-3.
[2] This astute point is made by David Hayton in 'Adjustment and Integration: The Scottish Representation in the British House of Commons, 1707-14', *Parliamentary History* 27 (2008), 411-412.

and interests after the Union did not differ much from what had gone before, Scots and Scottish interests experienced significant change.

Following 1707, a significant concern for many contemporaries in Scotland was how their country would be governed as part of a new British Union-state. In particular, how would Scottish interests be treated, or even be heard, at the Westminster Parliament where Scottish representatives were hugely outnumbered by their English counterparts, and by a ministry which would have limited Scottish involvement? Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, a fierce opponent of incorporating union, had previously raised the prospect of a 'Union Parliament' dominated by English MPs and peers where 'the Members who serve for one part of the Kingdom, are frequently found in opposition to the Representatives of another, for the sake only of the particular Interest of their own Countries'.[3] Fletcher here was referring to the English Parliament's ban on woollen exports from Ireland in the Woollen Act of 1699, brought about by pressure from English woollen interests.[4] One pro-Union Scottish response to this was that Scottish representatives in a British Parliament would more naturally rally to 'take care of our Interest' than would be likely for English MPs, who would in any case be more likely to acknowledge the benefits they would receive from Scottish economic success.[5] James Erskine, Lord Grange, advised his brother, the earl of Mar, in 1708 that Scottish MPs should unite in order to attend to the 'welfare of north Britain':

> Do not the Members for York, or any other county, join for the common advantage of that county without being suspected to divide from the rest of Britain? And since Scotland has particular trades to pursue and advance, such as linen, fishing,

[3] Andrew Fletcher, *An account of a conversation concerning the right regulation of governments for the common good of mankind. In a letter to the Marquis of Montrose, the Earl of Rothes, Roxburgh and Haddington, from London the first day of December 1703* (Edinburgh, 1704), p. 45.
[4] Bob Harris, 'The Scots, the Westminster parliament, and the British state in the eighteenth century' in Julian Hoppit (ed.), *Parliaments, nations and identities in Britain and Ireland, 1660-1850* (Manchester, 2003), p. 124, idem., 'Towards a British Political Economy: An Eighteenth-Century Scottish Perspective' in Perry Gauci (ed.), *Regulating the British Economy, 1660-1850* (Farnham, 2011), p. 87.
[5] *A Sermon Preach'd to the People at the Mercat Cross of Edinburgh on the Subject of the Union* (Edinburgh, 1707), pp. 6-7.

> cattle, etc., as well as the clothing or tin counties of England have theirs, why should Scots Members uniting to advance these be reckoned as setting up a separate interest, inconsistent with the Union, more so than theirs?[6]

This did not, however, allay Scottish fears that they would be ignored by British ministers and the Westminster Parliament. Nor, indeed, did their early experiences of politics within the Union-state. A series of impositions and interventions by English ministers and the English dominated Parliament in the early years of the Union perpetuated this feeling. In 1709, for example, the ministry's Treason bill, which attempted to amend perceived shortcomings of the Scottish law of treason by creating a uniform law for the whole Kingdom, was passed despite almost universal Scottish opposition in both the Commons and the Lords.[7] Thereafter, the 'Hamilton affair' in 1711-12 in which the House of Lords refused the duke of Hamilton's right to sit as a British peer, rather than as one of the representative peers, caused consternation among Scottish politicians.[8] These perceived slights were combined with fiscal 'impositions' on Scottish economic interests, such as linen, and in particular the malt tax, which ultimately led to Lord Findlater's motion in the House of Lords in 1713 to repeal the Act of Union, which was lost only by four proxy votes.[9] This threat to dissolve the Union after only six years emphasised the extent to which there was Scottish dissatisfaction with the way Scottish affairs were being managed at the British political centre, before the Hanoverian succession and the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion altered the focus of Scottish and British politics.[10]

The representation of Scottish interests at Westminster and within the British state was therefore a major issue directly after the Union, and would continue to be an important concern

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[6] Quoted in Hayton, 'Adjustment and Integration', 419.
[7] P.W.J. Riley, *The English Ministers and Scotland, 1707-1727* (London, 1964), pp. 119-120.
[8] G.S. Holmes, 'The Hamilton Affair of 1711-1712: A Crisis in Anglo-Scottish Relations', *English Historical Review* 47 (1962), 257-82.
[9] Geoffrey Holmes and Clyve Jones, 'Trade, the Scots and the Parliamentary Crisis of 1713', *Parliamentary History* 1 (1982), 47-77.
[10] Christopher Whatley, *The Scots and the Union* (Edinburgh, 2006), pp. 357-376; Hayton, 'Adjustment and Integration', 422.

in British and Scottish politics throughout the eighteenth century and beyond. It is an issue which this thesis seeks to explore in order better to understand and explain the gradual political integration of Scotland into the British Union-state. Nevertheless, it does so from within an historiographical context where few historians of eighteenth-century Scotland previously have paid much attention to the relationship between Scotland and the British political centre. Partly this may be because, although the Scottish Parliament was no longer a feature of Scottish political life after 1707, and although the Scottish Privy Council was also abolished in 1708, much that made Scotland separate and distinctive internally remained after the Union. Scots law survived intact, with legal institutions such as the Court of Session retaining their jurisdiction, although soon after the House of Lords became the final court of appeal. The Presbyterian Scottish Kirk, and its ruling body, the General Assembly, were protected as the established church in Scotland by the Union settlement, and in particular the Act of Security which accompanied the Act of Union. The separate system of local government, in the burghs and the counties, remained, with the Convention of Royal Burghs in particular continuing to provide an important collective forum for urban interests which had no equivalent elsewhere in Britain.[11] In matters of government and administration, Scotland existed in a state of semi-autonomy, with ministers in London ignorant of, and for the most part, little interested in Scottish affairs. In 1761, at the beginning of the period which this thesis covers, Gilbert Elliot observed that officials in the Treasury and the Secretary's Office were 'extremely ignorant about the common course of Scotch business'.[12] Although initially Scottish affairs at Westminster were managed by a 'Third' Secretary of State, the post was allowed to lapse after the duke of Roxburgh left the role in 1725 due to his opposition to the malt tax. Thereafter, with the notable exception of marquess of Tweeddale's tenure as Scottish Secretary in the

[11] *Ibid*., 352-4.
[12] NLS, MS. 16720 (Saltoun papers), fos. 58-9, Gilbert Elliot to Lord Milton, 16 June 1761.

1740s, Scottish affairs were managed by the second and third dukes of Argyll until the latter's death in 1761.[13] Under their system of management, which was based on extensive powers of patronage and not recognised by any formal office, in exchange for their support for the British ministry, they were left largely to govern Scotland unhindered from interference by Westminster. As part of this, the dukes of Argyll had a profound effect on Scottish representation at Westminster as, through their patronage network, they were able to construct what has been described as the 'Argathelian regime' by which they controlled much of the Scottish electoral system, which was very susceptible to corruption and management, and thereby ensuring the support in Parliament of a majority of Scottish MPs for a British ministry of any political stripe.[14] As a consequence, eighteenth-century Scottish MPs acquired a reputation, both at the time, as well as subsequently among historians, as ministerial lackeys. Scotland during the eighteenth century has therefore been described as 'a machine politician's paradise', a portrayal which, to an extent, is borne out by the evidence.[15] This, however, has allowed historians to overlook the significance of the developing relationship between Scotland and Westminster after 1707 and beyond. In T.C. Smout's seminal *A History of the Scottish People, 1560-1830*, for example, Scottish activity at Westminster during the eighteenth century is briefly referred to as being 'for a long time so moribund as to be scarcely relevant any longer to a general history of Scottish society'.[16]

Many of those who have examined this topic have chosen to focus on the period of adjustment following immediately after 1707 and have therefore produced rather negative accounts, while differing in their main conclusions. In 1964 Patrick Riley, focusing on the first two decades of the Union, noted the extent to which Scottish interests felt ignored by ministers

[13] Whatley, *Scots and the Union*, 357.
[14] J.M. Simpson, 'Who Steered the Gravy Train?' in N.T. Phillipson and R.M. Mitchison (eds), *Scotland in the Age of Improvement* (Edinburgh, 1970), pp. 48-72.
[15] Bruce Lenman, *Integration, Enlightenment and Industrialization: Scotland 1746-1832* (London, 1981), p. 16.
[16] T.C. Smout, *A History of the Scottish People, 1560-1830* (London, 1969), p. 201.

and the Westminster Parliament. Nevertheless, he also pointed out that 'although the Scots were not always successful in maintaining their own special interests, particular Scottish sections were very quick to develop a lobbying technique in Westminster'. In particular, Riley noted that the Convention of Royal Burghs took on a lobbying role as early as 1707, and conducted its first successful 'intensive' lobbying campaign in 1708 to establish a drawback for Scottish merchants on salted meat and fish exports.[17] By contrast, John Shaw's account in 1983, which focused on the half-century or so following 1707, was more overtly negative. He questioned the ability of Scottish interests to engage actively with the politics of Westminster, or of their representatives in London to influence ministerial policies. He derided Scottish MPs and Scottish interests as 'weak' and unable to 'dictate to the English political and commercial lobbies' because of a 'general English apathy.'[18] Alexander Murdoch, however, in his account about Scottish politics and administration in the mid-eighteenth century, published slightly before Shaw's book, presented a more favourable interpretation. While stressing the position of 'semi-independence' which Scotland at that time experienced, he also emphasised the role played by the third duke of Argyll in representing successfully various Scottish interests with ministers: 'he did much to forward Scotland's economic interests by means of his very considerable skill'. Murdoch here was referring in particular to the successful campaign in 1754-6 to renew the bounty on coarse linen exports which had first been established in 1742.[19] Whilst Argyll and his allies – in particular Lord Milton – would protect his near-monopoly on Scottish affairs by resisting intrusions by ministers, for example on Scottish legal appointments, and thereby maintaining a certain Scottish distinctiveness, he could nevertheless also enhance Scottish interests' influence at Westminster and with ministers.

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[17] Riley, *The English Ministers and Scotland*, 118-122.
[18] J.S. Shaw, *The Management of Scottish Society, 1707-1764: power, nobles, lawyers, Edinburgh agents and English influences* (Edinburgh, 1983), p. 126.
[19] Alexander Murdoch, *The People Above: Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1980), especially pp. 68-73.

More recently, however, a positive appreciation of Scotland's relationship with the British political centre after 1707 has been developed. Christopher Whatley and Bob Harris have shown that, throughout the eighteenth century, Scots became increasingly adept at defending their own interests, particularly economic, at Westminster. In particular, they have demonstrated that Scots presented certain interests as being distinctively significant to Scotland, thereby constructing and maintaining a Scottish 'national' interest at Westminster.[20] Of course, this was often simply a rhetorical device used as a lobbying technique, given that many Scottish interests could easily come into conflict with one another. Differences between urban and landed interests over the corn laws, which were particularly evident in Scotland, readily come to mind in this context. Nevertheless, as Whatley has suggested, as a minority nation in the British Union-state, Scotland was able to adopt a 'more unified approach to economic success' which was particularly focused on distinctively Scottish economic interests, notably fisheries and the linen industry.[21] This is not to say that English interests did not also use language of the 'national interest', but as part of the majority nation, they had no need to present themselves as distinctive. Harris has identified the Scottish linen interest in particular as providing a focus for Scottish politicians and lobbyists given its importance to the Scottish economy, as well as its dependence on state support during the eighteenth century, notably the bounty on coarse linen exports which, as has already been noted, was established in 1742 and was renewed almost continuously until 1832.[22] This focus was often channelled through institutions such as the Convention of Royal Burghs which developed into a lobbying body for Scottish urban and economic interests after the Union. In doing so, it coordinated campaigns, often quite large in scale, by petitioning Parliament, soliciting help from Scottish MPs,

[20] Harris, 'The Scots, the Westminster parliament, and the British state'; Christopher Whatley, *Scottish Society, 1707-1830: Beyond Jacobitism, towards industrialisation* (Manchester, 2000), pp. 118-120.
[21] *Ibid*., 118.
[22] Harris, 'Towards a British Political Economy', 92-94. It was allowed to lapse briefly between 1754-6, before the third duke of Argyll helped to restore it, as mentioned above.

employing agents to lobby ministers and parliamentarians in London, and occasionally constructing alliances with similar interests, such as linen manufacturers in the north of England and in Ireland.[23] The Convention did much, therefore, to strengthen the link between certain important parts of Scottish society and the British political centre as a distinctively Scottish lobbying institution.

Moreover, recent work on political economy in both Scottish and British contexts has shown that while presenting Scottish economic concerns as part of a loosely constructed Scottish national interest, there was also a growing sense during the eighteenth century that Scottish prosperity should be encouraged as contributing to a broader British interest. Economic improvement was pursued in Scotland through institutions, such as the Board of Trustees for the Improvement of Manufactures and Fisheries, founded in 1727, which reflected a more positive and constructive relationship with the British state. This quasi-state institution was designed to distribute funds to encourage Scottish economic and industrial interests from various sources, notably the famous 'Equivalent' fund which had been part of the bargaining which had secured the Union in 1707. The Board was established by British ministers following the furore in Scotland prompted by the imposition of the malt tax in 1725.[24] It was in this context that Sir Robert Walpole became the first senior British minister to declare publicly and overtly that encouraging Scottish economic success was in the 'British' interest, and warning English MPs that state support north of the border was to be preferred to military intervention. Observing Walpole's speech in the House of Commons, the Convention's agent, George Drummond, seven times Lord Provost of Edinburgh, remarked that it was 'the finest I ever heard in that house'.[25] This contrasted with the immediate post-Union attitude, held by certain English ministers, that Scottish interests were separate from, and in some cases

[23] Harris, 'The Scots, the Westminster parliament, and the British state', 134-5.
[24] Whatley, *The Scots and the Union*, 374-6.
[25] Harris, 'The Scots, the Westminster parliament, and the British state', 131.

subservient to, English interests, such as Robert Harley's slip in the House of Commons in 1711, when attempting to counter Scottish opposition to a tax on linen exports, that England had 'bought' Scotland by the Union.[26] This would set a trend throughout the rest of the eighteenth century and beyond which saw Scottish economic improvement, particularly in the Highlands, as having distinctively Scottish characteristics, but with a significant British dimension. It was this developing relationship with the British political centre which allowed for state encouragement and protection of the various branches of the Scottish linen industry which, as we have just seen, Scottish lobbyists were concerned to establish and then preserve throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. That is why, as Harris has pointed out, it was at Westminster and in the central departments of the British state, particularly the Treasury, that efforts to sustain and broaden economic growth and improvement were increasingly directed after 1707.[27]

Any discussion of Scottish lobbying at this time also needs to be viewed in the context of continuing debates around the concept of the British fiscal-military state in the long eighteenth century. Since the publication of John Brewer's *Sinews of Power* in 1989, the British state in this period has been understood to have developed and strengthened around the collection and management of financial recourses, particularly through the establishment of a highly centralised taxation system.[28] Prompted by external factors, namely the increasingly competitive European and global states system and large-scale warfare, this allowed the British state to develop a civilian administration to secure immense financial resources in order to build and maintain enormous military and naval forces.[29] These were changes, however, which

[26] The Scottish Jacobite and staunch opponent of Union, George Lockhart of Carnwath, replied immediately that 'if Scotland was bought then there were some that sold it'. [George Lockhart], *A Letter from a Scots Gentleman Residing in London to his friend in Edinburgh* (Edinburgh, 1711), pp. 13-14; Hayton, 'Adjustment and Integration', 422.
[27] Harris, 'Towards a British Political Economy', 99.
[28] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (London, 1989).
[29] See John Brewer's supplementary analysis in his essay: 'The eighteenth century British state: contexts and issues' in L. Stone (ed.), *An Imperial state at war: Britain from 1688-1815* (London, 1994), pp. 52-70. The

also had a profound effect domestically and there has therefore recently been a greater historical focus on the increasing involvement of political interests throughout Britain and Ireland to engage with, and attempt to exploit, the expanded role of the British state.[30]

To a certain extent, studies of the British state in this context have concentrated on the concept of 'lobbying', usually of Parliament and the ministry, by a variety of groups and interests in Britain and throughout the British Atlantic world in order to influence ministerial policy-making and to propose or amend parliamentary legislation. These included religious groups, mercantile societies and associations, particularly colonial lobbies such as the developing West India interest or American lobbies, as well as local trading interests, such as the Bristol Merchant Adventurers. In the second half of the eighteenth century, these were increasingly joined by industrial and manufacturing interests, such as the Midland Association of Ironmasters.[31] As well as trying to influence policy or enact legislation, these lobbies were recognised increasingly by ministers and officials for their specialist knowledge, and were used as a source of information, such as on the specifics of a particular branch of commerce, or the circumstances of a distant colony. In this way, the British state has been seen as 'reactive' in its relations with these interests and lobbies by being pragmatic in its dealings with them.[32] The activity of such lobbies has been shown to have increased and expanded during the eighteenth century, ultimately from small specialised groups of elites who became government 'insiders', to more professional lobbies which sought to represent broader interest groups and expanded their target audience to a growing public sphere. In particular, new forms of lobbying were represented by the growing number of chambers of commerce which emerged throughout the British Atlantic world from the 1760s onwards to represent a combination of extremely

latest attempt to develop the themes raised by Brewer are a series of essays in Aaron Graham and Patrick Walsh (eds), *The British fiscal-military states, 1660-c.1783* (Abingdon, 2016).
[30] Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, ch. 8.
[31] *Ibid*., 231-49.
[32] *Ibid*., 232.

diverse mercantile and manufacturing interests.[33] These developments allowed greater participation in politics at the centre of the British state from new parts of society. Related to this, recent work on the Westminster Parliament has stressed its growing accessibility to parts of English society and the increasingly 'public' nature of the legislative process, articulated by Paul Langford's description of Parliament as a 'legislative marketplace' for a range of propertied interests. Considering the huge increase in legislation emanating from the Westminster Parliament from 1689, this is a significant development in our understanding of how parts of 'domestic' society engaged and participated in political and legislative activity in the British state during the long eighteenth century.[34]

From a Scottish perspective, however, these themes remain poorly understood, especially in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. To a certain extent, lobbying the 'reactive' British state in a Scottish context throughout the first seven decades or so after 1707 was distinct from other forms of interest group politics as it involved, as we have already seen, presenting Scottish interests as part of a minority 'national' interest. In this sense, it was similar to the Irish lobby, which was far more experienced and successful, certainly in the early decades of the eighteenth century. As a reflection of this, British ministers from the Walpolean era onwards were often cognisant of the necessity to ensure that economic prosperity was encouraged in all the nations of Britain and Ireland, and therefore, in cooperation with lobbies representing them, made efforts to encourage particular industries which were specific to those nations which, in the Scottish case – as well as the Irish – meant linen. But a deeper appreciation of how this developed and intensified in the later eighteenth century and beyond, has not yet been provided. This is a significant omission because this was a period of early industrialisation where Scottish economic prosperity and activity increased substantially,

[33] R.J. Bennett, *Local Business Voice: The History of Chambers of Commerce in Britain, Ireland, and Revolutionary America, 1760-2011* (Oxford, 2011).
[34] Paul Langford, *Public Life and the Propertied Englishman, 1689-1798* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 166-206.

particularly with the continued success of the linen industry and the subsequent and rapid rise of cotton manufacturing in Scotland. This, in turn, affected Scottish society in various ways, underpinning particularly much of the unprecedented growth of Scottish cities and towns in the early decades of the nineteenth century.[35] Equally, the drive for Scottish improvement, particularly in the Highlands, but also in county and urban contexts, contributed to enhanced efforts and organisation within Scottish society to pursue these objectives. There has, however, been no real attempt to investigate how these changes and developments affected the political dynamic between parts of Scottish society and the British political centre.

Certainly there are indications that the politics of Westminster and Whitehall became more important, and indeed relevant, to society north of the border from the final third of the eighteenth century onwards. Joanna Innes has shown that the number of legislative acts pertaining solely to Scotland, or uniquely Scottish issues, passed by the Westminster Parliament rose dramatically, from an admittedly very low base, from the 1760s onwards, particularly 'local' acts such as those concerning infrastructure projects like road building or urban improvement measures.[36] Contrasted with the first half century or so after 1707, where there was very little legislation specific to Scotland, this clearly represented a significant shift in the relevance of Westminster to Scots and certain parts of Scottish society. Similarly, the rise of Scottish newspapers in the final third of the eighteenth century contributed to a more intense focus in Scotland on Westminster politics, particularly in the coverage of parliamentary debates which was first permitted in the early 1770s.[37] At this time, there was growing circulation of English newspapers, both metropolitan and provincial publications, in Scotland, and they were available to read in Scottish towns through the growing number of subscription

[35] Whatley, *Scottish Society*, ch. 6; Bob Harris and Charles McKean, *The Scottish Town in the Age of the Enlightenment 1740-1820* (Edinburgh, 2014).
[36] Joanna Innes, 'Legislating for Three Kingdoms: how the Westminster Parliament legislated for England, Scotland and Ireland, 1707-1830' in Hoppit (ed.), *Parliaments, nations and identities*, pp. 19-28.
[37] Bob Harris, *Politics and the Rise of the Press: Britain and France 1620-1800* (London, 1996), pp. 42-3.

and commercial reading rooms.[38] Moreover, the Scottish press increasingly focused on the parliamentary activities of Scottish MPs in this period, and by the 1780s were reporting how these representatives were voting on important issues.[39] At the same time, developments within Scottish society and the emergence of new lobbying institutions, such as the Glasgow and Edinburgh chambers of commerce in 1783 and 1785, demonstrated that Scottish commercial and industrial interests were seeking new ways to influence the British ministry's economic and fiscal policies along similar lines to other chambers throughout Britain, Ireland, and the British Atlantic world.[40] This in turn reflected a growing tendency of these interests to lobby within industrial and sectoral, rather than national, alliances. To a certain extent, therefore, this seems to have represented a gradual integration of Scottish interests within a British lobbying framework, and more broadly, an assimilation of Scotland into a British political culture which, according to Iain Hutchison, was fairly comprehensive by the nineteenth century.[41] Yet this process has still to be fully explored and investigated.

Recent debates around Scottish participation in the British state in this period have, by and large, focused on the disproportionate Scottish contribution to specific external aspects of British power. This has been observed in the notable Scottish participation in parts of the British Empire, especially in the East India Company.[42] In particular, there has been a focus on the large number of Scots employed as officers in the British army, so that they consistently comprised around 25 per cent of British army officers during the period of almost continuous

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[38] Bob Harris, 'Scotland's Newspapers, the French Revolution, and Domestic Radicalism, c. 1789-1794', *Scottish Historical Review* 84 (2005), 41-2.
[39] *Caledonian Mercury*, 31 March 1784; Bob Harris, 'Parliamentary Legislation, Lobbying and the Press in Eighteenth-Century Scotland', *Parliamentary History* 26 (2007), 76-95.
[40] Bennett, *Local Business Voice*, ch. 9.
[41] I.G.C. Hutchison, 'Anglo-Scottish Political Relations in the Nineteenth Century, c. 1815-1914' in T.C. Smout (ed.), *Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603 to 1900* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 247-251.
[42] J.M. Mackenzie, 'On Scotland and the empire', *International History Review* 15 (1993), 109-38; T.M. Devine, *Scotland's Empire 1600-1815* (London, 2003); Douglas Hamilton, 'Scotland and the eighteenth-century empire' in T.M. Devine and Jenny Wormwald (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 426-9; Andrew Mackillop, 'Locality, nation and empire: Scots and the British Empire in Asia, c.1695-1813' in J.M. Mackenzie and T.M. Devine (eds), *Scotland and the British Empire* (Oxford, 2011), pp. 67-9.

warfare between 1793 and 1815.[43] Andrew Mackillop recently has posited the idea of Scottish 'human capital', or manpower, as an alternative form of wealth which was managed and mobilised by Scottish elites to be employed in certain services of the British fiscal-military 'complex' in return for state-funded remuneration to support Scottish economic interests, making Scotland what he has called a 'drawback province', rather than a 'subsidy state'.[44] Limited attention, however, is ever paid to the developing Scottish connection with the Westminster Parliament or the political faces of the domestic state as part of a gradual integration of Scotland into a British political sphere, or more accurately, a convergence of Scottish and English politics, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

This thesis, therefore, seeks to redress this imbalance by focussing attention on these neglected themes and examining the increasingly active role of Scots and Scottish interests in the politics of Westminster and the British Union-state. In doing so, it analyses lobbying by Scottish interests of Parliament and British ministers during the period roughly between the death of the third duke of Argyll in 1761 – which marked the decline and fall of Argathelian management in Scotland – and the accession of the Whig ministry under Earl Grey in 1830, which would radically alter the nature of Scottish representation in Westminster by the Reform Act (Scotland) in 1832. It argues that the increasing relevance of the politics of Westminster and Whitehall to Scottish society prompted Scottish interests to develop the modes and operations of their lobbying practices which, in turn, focused Scottish society more intensely on politics at the Westminster Parliament and the government departments in Whitehall. Scottish lobbying thus changed over this period from a position of nurturing and defending a

[43] J.E. Cookson, *The British Armed Nation, 1793-1815* (Oxford, 1997), p. 127. For the disproportionate Scottish involvement in the British military throughout the eighteenth century, see: J. Hayes, 'Scottish officers in the British army, 1714-1763', *Scottish Historical Review* 37 (1958), 23-33; B.J. Broomfield, 'Some 100 unreasonable parliament men – A study in military representation in the eighteenth-century British parliament', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 39 (1961), 94-6.

[44] Andrew Mackillop, 'Subsidy State or Drawback Province? Eighteenth-Century Scotland and the British Fiscal-Military Complex' in Aaron Graham and Patrick Walsh (eds), *The British fiscal-military states, 1660-c.1783* (Abingdon, 2016), pp. 179-200.

separate and constructed national interest to becoming part of an integrated set of interests operating within a broader and more comprehensive British framework. While there were constant tensions between convergence and distinction throughout this process, Scottish interests, particularly manufacturing and commercial groups, grew more confident in pursuing political and parliamentary advantage as they became gradually further assimilated into a broader British polity, and more comfortable of their place within it.

The analysis provided here does not, however, constitute a complete and comprehensive overview of Scottish political relations with the British political centre at this time. By the same token, it does not attempt to cover all possible aspects of Scottish lobbying during this period. It emphasises certain aspects of the Scottish relationship with the Westminster Parliament and British ministers over others and makes frequent use of case studies in order to acquire an impression of the developments taking place over the course of this period. Partly this is because of the nature of the evidence, which is sporadic and occasionally fragmented, but also because it is necessary to be selective when charting a seven-decade period in a relatively limited space. In particular, there is more of a focus on the Westminster Parliament over a thorough analysis of the relations between Scottish interests and government ministers. That is not to say that the latter goes unexamined: in the early chapters in this thesis, the importance of the relationship between Scottish commercial and manufacturing interests and central government departments in Whitehall, such as the Treasury and the Board of Trade, is investigated in some detail. When it came to government fiscal measures, economic interests targeted both executive and legislative branches of the political centre. Since the early eighteenth century ministers had increasingly established control over the state's fiscal policies which were implemented through public bills introduced to Parliament by the Treasury and, in principle, protected from petitions until after they were passed. Commercial and industrial lobbies could therefore usually influence taxation proposals

through private discussion and negotiation with ministers before they were presented to Parliament, or thereafter through parliamentary debate by sending petitions and giving instructions to their MPs.[45] Nevertheless, the themes analysed in the second half of the thesis, namely Scottish representation and legislation, are more easily observable in a largely Westminster parliamentary context.

Within that, there is similarly a concentration on the House of Commons at the expense of a thorough analysis on Scottish political activity in the House of Lords. This is not to minimise the importance of the House of Lords to Scottish interests during this period, but it is a consequence of Scottish representation in the House of Lords being significantly different to that in the Commons. Recent work by Philip Loft has indicated the peculiar importance of the House of Lords to various Scottish interests in the increasing number of legal appeals from Scottish communities after 1707. While themes raised by Loft, of Scottish integration into a British governing framework and an increased importance of Westminster to certain parts of society north of the border, overlap with the central concerns of this thesis, they nevertheless relate to a different story of Scottish litigation in a British context and the functions of the House of Lords as a high court.[46] Further work on the relationship between Scotland and the House of Lords would amount to an exploration of the particularly prominent role of the law in Scottish governance, and would complement recent work on the role of the Court of Session as the highest civil court north of the border.[47] It would, nevertheless, be a wholly separate project from the one conducted here. The main focus in this thesis is on Scottish lobbies in their attempts to influence ministerial policy as well as to propose and enact parliamentary

[45] Joanna Innes, 'Legislation and public participation, 1760-1830' in David Lemmings (ed.), *The British and Their Laws in the Eighteenth Century* (Woodbridge, 2005), p. 130.
[46] Philip Loft, 'Peers, Parliament and Power under the Revolution Constitution, 1685-1720', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University College London, 2015), pp. 53-99.
[47] The role of the Court of Session in Scottish urban government during the eighteenth century recently has been emphasised: Bob Harris, 'Scots burghs, 'privilege' and the Court of Session in the eighteenth century', *Urban History* (2016), 1-21 < https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:6038/core/journals/urban-history/article/div-classtitlescots-burghs-privilege-and-the-court-of-session-in-the-eighteenth-centurydiv/2A0D921F83FAC047F62C7C82C5DC4945> [Accessed 31 November 2016].

legislation. While, of course, Scottish political and legislative efforts were often directed towards the House of Lords as a required part of the parliamentary process, and certain Scottish representative peers were known assiduously to defend and represent Scottish interests throughout this period, the House of Commons was, increasingly during the eighteenth century and beyond, the more important of the two houses in this context.[48] This was certainly the judgement arrived at by most Scottish lobbyists who saw it as the primary forum in which to defend and promote their interests, and caused them to turn to Scottish MPs in the House of Commons, more often than the 16 Scottish representative peers, as their representatives in Westminster.

Thus, the thesis is split into five thematic chapters and aims to analyse Scottish political activity in Westminster and Whitehall from various angles, with most chapters charting change chronologically over the entire period. Chapter One focuses on the 1780s, arguing that this was a particularly important moment of change in British politics and political culture generally, but especially so in the context of Scottish political relations with the political centre, which set the course of integration for the rest of this period.[49] It broadly assesses the developments over the course of this period from the perspective of this decade, examining in particular the increased assertiveness of Scottish commercial and manufacturing interests through the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce which emerged from a need to defend and represent new and diverse regional economic interests in the west of Scotland at a time when innovative fiscal and economic policies were being enacted by the new ministry led by William Pitt the Younger. It observes that while the Glasgow Chamber was a similar lobbying institution in form and character to other chambers of commerce which emerged at the same

[48] M.W. McCahill, *The House of Lords in the Age of George III, 1760-1811* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 376-79 for Scottish representative peers who made a notable effort to defend Scottish interests. Hayton makes basically the same point about the primacy of the Commons in 'Adjustment and Integration', 416.

[49] This builds particularly on arguments made by Bob Harris in various places, such as his 'Parliamentary Legislation, Lobbying and the Press in Eighteenth-Century Scotland', 89-95; and most recently in *A Tale of Three Cities: The Life and Times of Lord Daer, 1763-1794* (Edinburgh, 2015), ch. 5.

time throughout Britain and Ireland, and indeed in the rest of the Atlantic world, it also built on lobbying practices and traditions connected with existing Scottish institutions, particularly the Convention of Royal Burghs. The second chapter is a case study of the lobbying on behalf of the Scottish cotton industry, charting one prominent Scottish interest's relationship with the British political centre over the period c.1760-c.1830. The Scottish cotton industry was of great and increasing importance to the Scottish economy over this period of industrialisation. At the same time, cotton manufacturing was flourishing south of the border and so was very much a 'British' industrial concern.[50] This case study is, therefore, a dramatic example of the changes undergone by Scottish lobbies as well as the new conditions and challenges they faced over this period. It focuses on the construction of a Scottish interest and explains what gave it cause to lobby Parliament and certain departments of the British state, such as the Treasury and the Board of Trade, whilst assessing its developing efficacy as a lobby, and examining how it developed over this period from an identifiably 'Scottish' interest into one part of a broader industrial and business lobby.

Hereafter, the main focus of the thesis shifts to Westminster. Chapter Three examines Scottish representation through Scottish MPs during c.1760-c.1830, and charts their political behaviour as a coherent group and as individual lobbyists at Westminster and to the British ministry. It analyses the extent to which Scottish representation continued to be considered inherently different and separate from representation as practised by other British and Irish MPs, charting their gradual and partial assimilation within a broader Westminster system of representation throughout this period, particularly through the emergence of party politics in the early nineteenth century. Chapter Four examines the growing importance of the Westminster Parliament north of the border through the sharp increase of legislation, both general and local, specifically pertaining to Scotland and Scottish interests. Inspired partly by

[50] Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 219-220.

the work of Julian Hoppit and Joanna Innes, this chapter initially observes the growth of Scottish legislation through a statistical analysis of the acts passed by the Westminster Parliament during this period which related solely to Scottish affairs.[51] It then looks specifically at Scottish local legislation and examines how parts of Scottish society, and new elements of 'the public', changed and developed to focus more intensely on the Westminster Parliament and in order to play a more enhanced role in the British political and legislative process. Chapter Five uses a comparative analytical model by examining Irish political activity in Westminster and the British Union-state, before and after the Union of 1801, drawing upon the distinctions and similarities it reveals in order to highlight and clarify the significance of changes in the Scottish experience noted in the previous chapters. The main concern of this final chapter is to compare the experiences of Scottish and Irish lobbies in constructing and maintaining minority 'national interests' in a Westminster context so as to highlight the distinctiveness of the Scottish story of politicisation and integration in the British state. While there are limits to this final exercise – the comparison between Scotland and Ireland only works to a certain extent – it sheds further light on the main arguments presented in the previous chapters.

One of the underlying concerns of this thesis is the efficacy – or otherwise – of Scottish lobbying in this period. This can be difficult to adjudicate, and many other studies of lobbying in the British state during the long eighteenth century have often reduced it to a simple analysis of whether various interests were either successful or unsuccessful in achieving their stated objectives.[52] It has been argued, for example, that the West India lobby was not as effective

[51] Julian Hoppit (ed.), *Failed Legislation, 1660-1800* (London, 1997); idem, 'Patterns of Parliamentary Legislation, 1660-1800', *Historical Journal* 39 (1996), 109-31; Joanna Innes, *Inferior Politics: Social Problems and Social Policies in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Oxford, 2009), especially ch. 3.

[52] See, for example, examinations of colonial lobbying in the eighteenth century: Alison G. Olson, 'The London Mercantile Lobby and the Coming of the American Revolution', *The Journal of American History* 69 (1982), 21-41; idem., 'The Virginia Merchants of London: A Study in Eighteenth-Century Interest Group Politics', *The William and Mary Quarterly* 40 (1983), 363-88.

after the American War of Independence, during which time it had advanced and extended its lobbying skills and tactics, because it did not succeed in opening its trading relationships with the new United States, and subsequently failed to prevent the abolition of the slave trade in 1807.[53] On the other hand, David Beck Ryden has argued recently that the West India interest was effective and influential beyond the 1780s, particularly through the lobbying of the London Society of West India Planters and Merchants. Despite operating within an unfavourable political climate which was increasingly hostile to West India planters as a political and economic class, the Society, while not achieving all of its stated objectives, succeeded in stalling the cause of abolition during the 1790s, and after 1807 persuaded the government to enact protective policies with regard to the sugar trade, such as the eventual prohibition on the distillation of spirits from corn in 1808.[54] Effective lobbying in this period depended on a multiplicity of long and short-term factors, many of which lobbyists themselves could not control. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for instance, Scottish commercial and industrial lobbyists campaigning for reduced customs and excise duties were often swimming against the political tide of a ministry which desired to raise taxes to fund the British military and naval effort against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. The fact, then, that they were not always successful is not, on its own, a meaningful or simple measure of their efficacy. Part of the focus, therefore, of the chapters which examine new lobbying tactics and operations, such as represented by Glasgow Chamber of Commerce in Chapter One, or as practised by Scottish cotton lobbyists with their allies from the industry throughout Britain and Ireland as seen in Chapter Two, or indeed as manifest in the organisational developments at a local level in Scottish society to discuss and propose legislation for the Westminster Parliament in Chapter Four, is how they became more sophisticated and determined over this period.

[53] Andrew O'Shaughnessy, 'The Formation of a Commercial Lobby: The West India Interest, British Colonial Policy and the American Revolution', *The Historical Journal* 40 (1997), 95.
[54] David Beck Ryden, *West Indian Slavery and British Abolition, 1783-1807* (New York, 2009); idem., 'Sugar, spirits, and fodder: The London West India interest and the glut of 1807-15', *Atlantic Studies* 9 (2012), 41-64.

While this might not always have been reflected in an increased number of notable successes or political victories, it can nevertheless be observed in the steady influence accrued by Scottish interests through the increasingly constructive nature of their political relationship with government ministers, as well as the developing and intensifying focus within parts of Scottish society on the politics of Westminster.

The primary concern of this thesis, however, is the extent to which a Scottish 'national' interest at the Westminster Parliament and within the British Union-state can be observed over the course of this period. Although, as we have already seen, such a concept was always a political construct, its maintenance by Scottish lobbyists at Westminster had nevertheless been a prominent feature of Scottish relations with the British political centre since the 1720s and had helped refashion Scotland within the Union as 'North Britain' from the middle of the eighteenth century.[55] Lobbyists connected with the Convention of Royal Burghs and the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce in the 1780s were still referring to the defence or the promotion of the 'Interest of Scotland' as the primary motivation for their activities at Westminster.[56] From that period onwards, however, Scottish lobbies gradually ceased to present themselves, and indeed to be perceived, in this manner, as they instead emphasised their interests as being complementary to, and part of, broader and, to varying degrees, more integrated British lobbying networks. Scottish interests increasingly established alliances with other British interests and operated across the Anglo-Scottish border along sectoral, industrial, and party political lines. As a result, a Scottish 'national' interest at the British political centre ceased to be so readily or clearly identifiable as Scots at Westminster merged with other interests and increasingly saw themselves as British subjects operating within a more integrated British political framework. In this sense, the Union-state – excluding Ireland – and the

[55] Harris, 'The Scots, the Westminster parliament, and the British state', 139.
[56] HL, PU 286, Box 23 (Pulteney papers), John Grieve to William Pulteney, 18 July 1783; GCA, TD1670/4/52 (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce papers), Ilay Campbell to Patrick Colquhoun, 11 October 1788.

Westminster Parliament had become more genuinely ‘British’, as originally conceived by the Treaty of Union, by the early decades of the nineteenth century than at any time since the passage of the acts of Union in 1707. Of course, this did not represent a complete convergence of Scottish and English political cultures, or a comprehensive assimilation of Scotland into the British state. Key Scottish differences, whether religious, legal, or cultural in nature ensured that there remained important and sometimes subtle distinctions in the relationship between Scotland and the British political centre by the end of this period. Nevertheless, lobbies from ‘North Britain’ as representatives of the ‘Interest of Scotland’ were replaced gradually by those seeking to provide a voice for more specifically local or regional, rather than national, concerns as they merged into a more integrated British political culture.

Chapter One

Scottish Lobbying in the 1780s

In recent years, the final third of the eighteenth century has been noted as a time where lobbyists of the British fiscal-military state developed from informal interest groups with narrowly focused concerns into more professional lobbies constructed through multiple, albeit still sometimes loose, alliances and institutions.[1] Andrew O'Shaughnessy, for instance, has charted the development of the West India commercial interest during and after the American War of Independence, from loose separate groups of planters and merchants, to a well-organised alliance operating as a single lobby through institutions such as the West India Committee.[2] Vivien Dietz has shown that, during William Pitt the Younger's ministry, manufacturers joined merchants, financiers and the landed interest as a more potent force in representing their special interests to the British state.[3] More recently, Robert Bennett has demonstrated that one manifestation of these lobbying changes was the spread of chambers of commerce in the British Atlantic World in the second half of the eighteenth century. These bodies were first established in mainland Britain as a response by local business interests to the Stamp Act of 1765, but it was not until the early 1780s that what Bennett has termed the 'second wave' of British chambers emerged from 1782-3.[4] This was largely prompted by the aftermath of the American War of Independence, in particular the unprecedentedly large national debt faced by the British government as well as the regulatory and fiscal policies required to manage this and aid national

[1] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (London, 1989), especially ch. 8.
[2] A.J. O'Shaughnessy, 'The Formation of a Commercial Lobby: The West India Interest, British Colonial Policy and the American Revolution', *Historical Journal* 40 (1997), 74-95.
[3] V.E. Dietz, 'Before the Age of Capital: Manufacturing Interests and the British State, 1780-1800', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Princeton University, 1991).
[4] R.J. Bennett, *Local Business Voice: The History of Chambers of Commerce in Britain, Ireland and Revolutionary America, 1760-2011* (Oxford, 2011), pp. 100-171. For his study on Liverpool, see idem., *The voice of Liverpool business: the first Chamber of Commerce and the Atlantic economy, 1774-c. 1796* (Liverpool, 2010).

recovery. During the 1780s, chambers or committees were established in Birmingham and Leeds, which joined existing chambers in London, Liverpool, Manchester, and North Staffordshire. Ireland saw the establishment of similar chambers in Dublin and Belfast, and in Scotland the first meeting of the Glasgow Chamber took place in January 1783, followed almost three years later by the Edinburgh Chamber in December 1785. By this time there were 11 chambers in Britain and Ireland which suggests that the Scottish contribution to these changes represented a quite significant development for Scottish lobbying of the Westminster Parliament and British ministers.[5]

However, our understanding of the ability of interests from north of the border to lobby the 'reactive' British state at this time remains quite limited. In recent years, there has been acknowledgement of the role played by institutions such as the Convention of Royal Burghs and its agents in representing effectively Scottish commercial and industrial interests to the Westminster Parliament and the central departments of the British state throughout the eighteenth century.[6] Still insufficiently appreciated and examined, however, is the strengthening relationship between Scottish interests and the British political centre, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the politics of Westminster and Whitehall became more important to various elements of Scottish society. A multiplicity of new and sometimes overlapping pressures developed in Scotland over this period which helped change the nature of the relationship between Scotland and the British political centre. These included the increasing amount of Scottish legislation emanating from the Westminster Parliament, such as economic public acts, but particularly local legislation, such as road and improvement acts.[7]

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[5] Bennett, *Local Business Voice*, 165.
[6] Bob Harris, 'The Scots, the Westminster parliament, and the British state in the eighteenth century' in Julian Hoppit (ed.), *Parliaments, nations and identities in Britain and Ireland, 1660-1850* (Manchester, 2003), pp. 134-135.
[7] Joanna Innes, 'Legislating for Three Kingdoms: how the Westminster Parliament legislated for England, Scotland and Ireland, 1707-1830' in Julian Hoppit (ed.), *Parliaments, nations and identities in Britain and Ireland, 1660-1850* (Manchester, 2003), pp. 15-47.

But it also included challenges such as emigration from the Highlands and, perhaps more significantly for this chapter, the new and increasingly diverse manufacturing and urban interests, notably the cotton industry, which continued to grow into the nineteenth century. This prompted changes in lobbying practices and arrangements, most visible in the creation of new institutions.

This chapter examines the rise of these new lobbying institutions in Scotland, with a particular focus on the establishment of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce and its early activities in the 1780s. It seeks to gauge the nature of developments during this period and assess the extent to which they were a departure from previous lobbying practices and arrangements and shows how these new institutions brought the views and concerns of elements within Scottish society closer to the Westminster Parliament and the central departments of the British state. Rather than being part of an 'ordering of middle class protest' as described by Stena Nenadic in her account of the contemporary political reform movement in this period,[8] what emerges is a more nuanced picture of Scottish politics in the 1780s, where a changing 'public' in Scotland took its place as part of sectoral 'British' lobbies, which complemented existing local and national bodies in their promotion of regional economic and industrial interests, and which sought their goals through, in the main, cooperation and consensus with the British political centre.

[8] Stana Nenadic, 'Political Reform and the 'Ordering' of Middle-Class Protest' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Conflict and Stability in Scottish Society 1700-1850* (Edinburgh, 1990), pp. 65-82.

I

The 1780s: a moment of change

Although Scottish politics operated within a semi-autonomous system until the early 1760s, existing Scottish institutions had proved to be quite adept at engaging with the British political centre on behalf of a variety of Scottish interests during the first half of the eighteenth century. Indeed, after the 1707 Act of Union, the Convention of Royal Burghs continued to act as a forum for Scottish urban interests, as well a lobbying institution which achieved notable successes, particularly on behalf of the Scottish linen industry. For example, it managed a campaign during 1719-21 against a threatened prohibition, promoted by English woollen and silk manufacturers, on using or wearing of other dyed or printed textiles. This would obviously have deprived the Scottish linen manufacture, already described as Scotland's 'staple' industry, of an important market and would have been ruinous for the Scottish economy. The Convention petitioned Parliament and sent representatives to Westminster to lobby a committee of the 'whole' House of Commons, and characterised linen as a national Scottish interest by arguing that 'it seems pretty strange to attempt the relief of one part of the Country, by laying an insupportable Hardship on the other, when both Parts are equally entitled to the Protection and Encouragement of the Legislature'.[9] These demands that Scottish interests be given the same treatment as interests south of the border were assisted by the duke of Roxburgh, the then Scottish secretary, who helped to persuade ministers of the potentially catastrophic consequences of the proposed prohibition on Scotland. Ultimately, the efforts of the Convention and Roxburgh were successful in removing the prohibition from the Calico Act of 1721, proving that it was possible for something presenting itself as a Scottish 'national' interest to make itself heard and have a significant influence at Westminster.[10] Along with the

[9] *The case of The Convention of the Royal Boroughs in Scotland, in relation to the Linnen-Manufactory of that Country* (Edinburgh, 1720), p. 2.
[10] Harris, 'The Scots, Parliament and the British State', 127-8.

Board of Trustees for the Promotion of Manufacturers and Fisheries, another Scottish institution, established in 1727, the Convention continued to promote and encourage Scottish economic development with a growing focus on the Westminster Parliament and the central departments of the British state. In continuing to lobby on behalf of the linen industry it played a crucial role in establishing the payment of bounties on linen exports in 1742, although the circumstances surrounding the introduction of this bounty await further investigation.[11] More is known about the campaign by the third duke of Argyll, in alliance with the Convention, in 1754-6 to restore this bounty on coarse linen exports after it had been abruptly abolished in 1754 at the behest, again, of English fancy weavers. Although this campaign did not represent the whole Scottish linen interest – fine linen manufacturers were opposed to the resumption of bounty payments for their coarse linen rivals – it was nevertheless presented as such, particularly a Scottish national interest in opposition to an English textile lobby – and was ultimately successful.[12] It was also largely responsible for encouraging other areas of Scottish economic development, such as the fisheries which received a notable legislative boon with the Scottish Fisheries Act of 1756, characterised as being necessary for national prosperity and economic regeneration.[13] This image of a 'national' Scottish lobby was arguably encouraged further by the fact it was being driven, in large part, by a national Scottish lobbying institution which had the crucial backing of Scottish political elites who generally had considerable, although occasionally limited, influence with ministers in London. This was generally the model of successful Scottish lobbying campaigns, particularly on behalf of commercial interests, until the last third of the eighteenth century.

[11] This payment was granted when the marquis of Tweeddale was in office and so he may have been heavily involved in lobbying for it. See John M. Simpson, 'Who Steered the Gravy Train, 1707-1766?' in N.T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison (eds), *Scotland in the Age of Improvement* (Edinburgh, 1970), p. 59.
[12] Harris, 'The Scots, Parliament and the British State', 132-3. See also Alexander Murdoch, *The People Above: Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1980), pp. 68-73.
[13] Bob Harris, 'Scotland's herring fisheries and the prosperity of the nation, c. 1660-1760', *Scottish Historical Review* 79 (2000), 57-8.

By the 1780s, however, conditions and circumstances were changing, partly as a result of the increasingly rapid and broadening development of the Scottish economy, as well as the new challenges which emerged in the aftermath of the American War.[14] The rise of different interests and concerns led to the creation of new Scottish bodies and institutions designed to establish a close relationship with the British political centre with the aim of influencing it. Highland improvement, for example, has long been recognised as a continuing and strengthening preoccupation of Scottish politicians and landowners, and which generated an increasing amount of political activity during this period. Andrew Mackillop has pointed to the creation of the Highland Society and the British Fisheries Society, in 1784 and 1786 respectively, as new institutions which displayed impressive abilities to influence the British political centre.[15] Similar to previous and existing Scottish lobbying institutions, these bodies combined a closeness to political authority with the organisational qualities of interest group politics necessary for successful lobbying. Specifically, they sought to fill a perceived void in the representation of regional Highland interests, particularly as emigrations were rapidly becoming the chief concern of local landlords. It was believed in the 1780s, as it had been in the 1740s and '50s, that promoting and creating the conditions for successful fisheries enterprises would inspire Highland clansmen to reap the benefits of commerce, industry, and independence.[16] There had been attempts to represent Highland interests through previous organisations, such as the Glasgow Highland Society, established in 1727, the Highland Society of London from 1778, and the Free British Fishery Society, which operated from 1749. Yet there appears to have been a feeling that these efforts had been inadequate: the London Highland Society's only notable lobbying achievement appears to have been repealing the post-

[14] Christopher Whatley, *Scottish Society, 1707-1830: Beyond Jacobitism, towards industrialisation* (Manchester, 2000), especially chs 2, 3 and 6.
[15] Andrew Mackillop, 'The Political Culture of the Scottish Highlands from Culloden to Waterloo', *The Historical Journal* 46 (2003), 522-523.
[16] James Anderson, *Observations on the Means of Exciting a Spirit of National Industry* (Edinburgh, 1775), p. 486.

1746 legislation which banned Highland 'garb', and the Free British Fisheries Society has been shown to have largely been a failure.[17] In 1775, it was remarked to the Highland landowner and politician, Sir James Grant, that it was 'a pity that some person does not represent the present situation of the highlands to Government'.[18] The proposed plan for the Highland Society, drawn up in 1784, sought therefore to fill that gap and described the new institution as 'an exertion to unite the efforts of the [Highland] Proprietors … [to] call the attention of Government'.[19]

Both the Highland Society and the British Fisheries Society followed the prescribed formula of previous Scottish lobbying campaigns of acquiring the support of political elites. They were led by Highland magnates, such as John Campbell, the fifth duke of Argyll, who was president of both, as well as various Scottish MPs, such as George Dempster and Sir Adam Fergusson.[20] The Highland Society made clear from its earliest meetings that it considered it crucial to secure the support of Henry Dundas, who was newly-installed as the leading Scot in Pitt the Younger's ministry, so as to develop a positive and cooperative relationship with the political centre. Both he and Robert Dundas, the then Lord Advocate, were thought to be 'well disposed towards the views of the Society'.[21] In 1791 a report on Scottish fisheries argued that the 'influence of the Highlands is great' and that it was capable of persuading the government to provide funds for improvement, which underlined the belief in their political strategy and

[17] Mackillop, 'Political Culture of the Scottish Highlands', 522-4; Bob Harris, 'Patriotic commerce and national revival: The Free British Fishery Society and British politics, c. 1749-1758', *English Historical Review* 114 (1999), 306-9.
[18] NRS, GD248/509/48 (Grant papers), James Wilcox to Sir James Grant, 25 March 1775.
[19] Henry Mackenzie, *Prize Essays and Transactions of the Highland Society of Scotland to which is Prefixed an Account of the Institution and Principal Proceedings of the Society, By Henry Mackenzie, Esq* (Edinburgh, 1799), p. iii.
[20] NRS, RH4/188/1 (Royal Highland and Agricultural Society of Scotland papers, Highland Society Sederunt Book, vol. I), fos. 1-4, 21, 26, and 42 (the Society here appealed to Dempster for his help as he was reported to have 'expressed himself very warmly in favour of this institution').
[21] *Ibid*., fo. 39 (copy of a letter to the duke of Argyll, 27 May 1784); Mackillop, 'Political Culture of the Scottish Highlands', 523.

tactics.[22] Both societies set about lobbying on behalf of specifically Highland interests, notably the fishing industry with regard to the separate Scottish salt laws and what they perceived to be unfair duties on foreign rock salt imports, as well as promoting plans for a canal between Fort William and Inverness, which had long been called for, and which was eventually constructed as the Caledonian Canal in the early nineteenth century.[23] In 1784, the Highland Society set about employing James Chalmers as a solicitor in London to promote the 'Interest of the Society' with ministers 'on the spot' and to obtain successfully the 'aid of Government'.[24] In their lobbying activity both societies conflated regional Highland concerns with government priorities, such as naval defence, with the British Fisheries Society's full official title being 'The British Fishery Society for extending the Fisheries and improving the Sea Coasts of this Kingdom.'[25] By 1803 Francis Humbertson Mackenzie, earl of Seaforth, indicated that his fellow Highland landlords had become quite adept at this in his rather cynical assertion that 'there is no race of men on earth better able to dress up a local and personal object in the garb of public utility.'[26]

There was, therefore, an explicit British dimension to these new institutions, which, in the case of the Highland Society and the British Fisheries Society, saw 'improvement' as a concern which was not limited to the Highlands, or even just to Scotland. Both Highland institutions received support from English politicians such as William Wilberforce, the famous anti-slave trade campaigner, and Henry Beaufoy, the MP for Great Yarmouth, demonstrating that support for these regional improvements went beyond the Highlands and even Scotland,

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[22] P. White, *Observations upon the present state of the Scotch fisheries and the improvement of the interior parts of the Highlands. Being an essay on these subjects, given in to the Highland Society of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1791), p. 189.
[23] Mackenzie, *Prize Essays and Transactions of the Highland Society of Scotland*, xxxv-xxxvi and cvi-cix (for salt laws) and 344-348 (letter from 1792 proposing what would become the 'Caledonian Canal', which was not a new suggestion even then).
[24] NRS, RH4/188/1, fo. 42
[25] Jean Dunlop, *The British Fisheries Society, 1786-1893* (Edinburgh, 1978), pp. 23-27.
[26] NRS, GD46/17/16 (Seaforth papers), Francis Humbertson Mackenzie, third earl of Seaforth, to Lord Hobart, 9 June 1803: 'Application of money to be advanced by government for the improvement of the Highlands of Scotland'.

and hints at a growing assimilation of interest lobbying, at least on this issue, across the Anglo-Scottish border.[27] This was reminiscent of similar connections forged in the earlier fisheries project which established the Free British Fishery Society in 1749, and which excited popular enthusiasm on both sides of the Anglo-Scottish border.[28] This suggests that the renewed drive for Highland improvement in the 1770s and '80s was similar in character, and to a certain extent in its hoped for objectives, to that which had taken place in the late 1740s and '50s. It was in large part an extension and an acceleration of an ongoing long-term project, advocated by many in England and Lowland Scotland, to integrate the Highlands more fully into the British state.[29] In the 1780s, politicians such as George Dempster were vocal enthusiasts for the transfer of agricultural improvement practices, common south of the border, to the Highlands and islands, being remarkably confident that this would transform the Highland economy, and describing the Hebrides as capable of being 'as well cultivated and inhabited as Jersey and Guernsey'.[30] This extended Anglo-Scottish interest in agricultural improvement would lead to Sir John Sinclair's exertions in establishing the Board of Agriculture in 1793, a government-funded body which aimed to encourage and promote agriculture 'over the whole kingdom', and which, according to Sinclair's modern biographer, Rosalind Mitchison, had been inspired by his experiences as a leading member of the Highland Society.[31] This was indicative of how lobbying developments in the 1780s could promote further assimilation of British interest politics along sectoral lines, in this case relating to agricultural concerns.

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[27] Their names are present among the first subscribers of the British Fisheries Society: *Plan for raising by subscription a fund for a joint-stock company, by the name of The British Society for Extending the Fisheries and Improving the Sea Coasts of the Kingdom* (London, 1786).
[28] Harris, 'Patriotic commerce and national revival', 295.
[29] These continuities are observed by Bob Harris in 'Scotland's Herring Fisheries and the Prosperity of the Nation, c.1660-1760', *Scottish Historical Review* 79 (2000), 59-60.
[30] *Dempster-Fergusson Letters*, 138-9 (George Dempster to Sir Adam Fergusson, 26 December 1784).
[31] *Communications to the Board of Agriculture; on Subjects relative to the Husbandry and Internal Improvement of the* Country vol. I (London, 1797), p. xix; Rosalind Mitchison, *Agricultural Sir John: The Life of Sir John Sinclair of Ulbster,1754-1835* (London, 1962), ch. 11.

These developments were, however, more striking from the perspective of new lobbying arrangements made to represent mercantile and new manufacturing interests in Scotland. As important and significant as these Highland societies were, they were not established purely as new channels through which interests could lobby the government. Much of their resources were spent on directly funding improvement measures or investigations, or awarding prizes for essays. The Highland Society also had cultural ambitions such as attending to the 'preservation of the Language, Poetry, and Music of the Highlands.'[32] Dempster complained in 1790 that members of the Society were too busy encouraging 'the Bag Pipe to drown the noise & groans of the People, like Drums in a battle' and that they were neglecting matters of substance, such as 'destroying personal services and short leases'. This made them, in his opinion, 'a little defective in sincerity or understanding'.[33] This criticism was perhaps harsh, and the Highland Society would go on to achieve further lobbying success in securing the Passenger Act of 1803, which was the result of a large and comprehensive lobbying campaign between 1801 and 1803.[34] Yet similar criticisms could not be levelled at the new chambers of commerce, particularly the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, established in Scotland in the early 1780s. They were thoroughly professional and diligent organisations, capable of managing several large-scale lobbying operations simultaneously, although they also reflected some of the changes to Scottish lobbying referred to above. The rest of this chapter will focus, therefore, on a detailed examination of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce as, on the one hand, the most significant and influential instance of changes in Scottish lobbying made during this period, and on the other, as a model providing inspiration for future development.

[32] Mackenzie, *Prize Essays and Transactions of the Highland Society of Scotland*, p. iii and p. xiii.
[33] NRS, GD46/17/4, George Dempster to Francis Humbertson Mackenzie, 13 January 1790.
[34] Mackillop, 'Political Culture of the Scottish Highlands', 523-4.

II

The Glasgow Chamber of Commerce

The establishment of the Glasgow Chamber came at a moment of political and economic change and instability. Viewed in the longer term, the west of Scotland region was undergoing a period of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, which would lead to Glasgow overtaking Edinburgh as the largest Scottish town at the turn of the nineteenth century, and its neighbouring towns of Paisley and Greenock undergoing exceptional growth over this period and beyond.[35] In this period, there emerged new and multifaceted manufacturing interests, such as the cotton industry, whose early economic buoyancy was accompanied by a growing political confidence which, in the long term, required the development of new ways of influencing the political centre.[36] In the short to medium term, the aftermath of the American War of Independence was a period of uncertainty for many in Britain with the political elites recovering from the loss of the American colonies, and with pressing questions about how to relieve the post-war financial strain. During the conflict, the national debt had risen by an astonishing £114 million to £245 million, which the new ministry, led by William Pitt the Younger, was determined to tackle with a bold programme of fiscal innovation.[37] This created new challenges for Glasgow merchants and manufacturers such as, amongst other things, the imposition of new, or the extension of existing, excise taxes at a time when excises had already come to represent over 50 per cent of the total annual revenue yield.[38] In addition to this, Glasgow interests desired to influence the ministry during negotiations for the peace treaty in 1782 and the subsequent trade measures in a new age of commercial diplomacy.[39] The tobacco

[35] Bob Harris and Charles McKean, *The Scottish Town in the Age of the Enlightenment 1740-1820* (Edinburgh, 2014), pp. 28 and 120-3; R.H. Campbell, 'The Making of the Industrial City' in T.M. Devine and Gordon Jackson (eds), *Glasgow. Volume 1: Beginnings to 1830* (Manchester, 1995), pp. 184-213.
[36] Stuart M. Nesbit, 'The Making of Scotland's First Industrial Region: The Early Cotton Industry in Renfrewshire', *Journal of Scottish Historical Studies* 29 (2009), 1-28.
[37] John Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, 114.
[38] Dietz, 'Before the Age of Capital', 10.
[39] See, for example, the renewed Atlantic trade in P.J. Marshall, *Remaking the British Atlantic: The United States and the British Empire after American Independence* (Oxford, 2012). For the European dimension, see:

trade, for example, had suffered during the American War and Glasgow tobacco merchants were concerned specifically by a drop in tobacco prices in 1782 and saw the possibility of recovering uncollected debts dating from 1775 owed by the former tobacco colonies of Virginia, Maryland and North Carolina as a way of regaining solvency.[40]

There were therefore structural and conjunctural reasons behind the drive to enhance the existing lobbying arrangements in the west of Scotland. It also reflected the limits of these arrangements in respect of regional representation. In the process which typically prompted the Convention of Royal Burghs into lobbying action, Royal Burghs would petition the General Convention held in Edinburgh, in the hope that their cause might be remitted to the 'annual committee', which, after consideration and consultation with the other burghs, might recommend further action at the next Convention. The existence, however, of competing regional interests meant that there was always potential for division and a probability that some interests would feel underrepresented. For example, during the 1760s Edinburgh and Glasgow interests proposed rival plans for a Forth-Clyde canal, and the support of the majority of representatives in the Convention for the Edinburgh plan caused Glaswegian representatives to feel somewhat marginalised.[41] The Convention's 'national' approach was, structurally speaking, not one which could accommodate every interest equally, especially those which required immediate attention. Therefore, increasingly, interests in Glasgow and the west of Scotland felt the need to represent independently their own concerns to Parliament and British ministers. They had, for example, benefitted from the exertions of particularly assiduous MPs representing the Glasgow Burghs, such as Daniel Campbell of Shawfield earlier in the century,

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John Ehrman, *The British Government and Commercial Negotiations with Europe, 1783-1793* (Cambridge, 1962).

[40] T.M. Devine, *Glasgow Tobacco Lords: a study of the tobacco merchants in Glasgow and their trading activities, c. 1740-90* (Edinburgh, 1975), pp. 153-154.

[41] For the of the Convention of Royal Burghs' deliberations on this matter, and their decision to petition against the Glasgow Bill, see: T. Hunter (ed.), *Extracts from the records of the Convention of Royal Burghs of Scotland, 1757-1779* (Edinburgh, 1918), pp. 242-250, 30 March 1767.

who in the 1720s represented Glasgow tobacco interests at the Treasury.[42] Certain interests had become adept at lobbying for themselves, such as fine linen manufacturers, particularly from Paisley, who had obtained and then defended a ban on French cambric imports in 1745, ensuring that it was renewed five times.[43] By the 1780s the need for representation specific to Glasgow and the west of Scotland was enhanced by the increasing number of interests in this region and the greater significance of specific issues under consideration at Westminster for the region's economic fortunes.

One issue of growing concern to merchants and manufacturers in Scotland, and in Glasgow and the west of Scotland in particular, were the corn laws. Referring to a slightly later period, Boyd Hilton has remarked that Scotland was 'different' to other parts of Britain and Ireland 'in the bitter way the corn question divided town and countryside, producers and consumers'.[44] For merchants and manufacturers, it was important that grain was cheap so as to keep labour costs low, which was made easier by there being, since 1773, separate Scottish regional districts regulating the price under which grain could be imported, which allowed the west of Scotland district to import it at a cheaper price than other landowning districts which had higher protecting duties.[45] Since the introduction of the Corn Act in 1773, which authorised this district-based system, manufacturing and commercial interests had sought to defend the status quo, in particular from proposals by the 'producing' landed interest to create one large Scottish district. In 1777, for example, the representatives of the Glaswegian 'consumer' interest at the Convention of Royal Burghs' annual committee led the opposition against any alteration to the status quo which, they argued, would increase grain prices.

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[42] Jacob M. Price, 'Glasgow, the Tobacco Trade, and the Scottish Customs, 1707-1730', *Scottish Historical Review* 63 (1984), 18

[43] Bob Harris, 'Toward a British Political Economy: An Eighteenth-Century Scottish Perspective' in Perry Gauci (ed.), *Regulating the British Economy, 1660-1850* (Farnham, 2011), p. 94.

[44] Boyd Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Governments 1815-1830* (Oxford, 1977), p. 5.

[45] Christopher Whatley, 'Roots of 1790s Radicalism: Reviewing the Economic and Social Background' in Bob Harris (ed.), *Scotland in the Age of the French Revolution* (Edinburgh, 2005), pp. 23-48; Donald G. Barnes, *A History of the English Corn Laws from 1660-1846* (London, 1930), p. 43.

Although they were successful in persuading the rest of the Convention to reject the landed interest's submissions, they repeatedly faced opposition from Edinburgh delegates who wished to find a compromise.[46] The Convention could not react quickly enough when in January 1783 Patrick Colquhoun, the Lord Provost of Glasgow and a tobacco merchant, requested that it petition Parliament about the 'present alarming scarcity of Grain in this Country' following a poor harvest in 1782, and the constant lobbying by the landed interest for a change to the status quo showed that an alternative system of representing its concerns was required if matters of regional importance, like the corn laws, were to be quickly attended to without opposition.[47]

For a variety of reasons, therefore, merchants and manufacturers in the west of Scotland welcomed the proposals for the establishment of a chamber of commerce. In the autumn of 1782, Patrick Colquhoun circulated his 'Plan' for this new institution which received approbation from most quarters. A leading member of the Merchant House in Glasgow, James Dennistoun, expressed his 'pleasure to see an institution I have long wishd for, sett foot, & on proper terms, you will do a lasting service to the Commerce of this Country'.[48] Thomas Miller, the Lord Justice Clerk, and former Lord Advocate, was even more enthusiastic in his assertion that

> At any former period, such an Institution would have been of publick benefit. But at present, when the general System of Commerce has Undergone such a Revolution, and our Trade after suffering so much by the restraints of a Complicated War…it must be of great importance, to have the first efforts of our

[46] GCA, TD1670/4/2 (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce papers). See especially 'Resolution of the Annual Committee anent the Corn Bill, 14 Nov 1777', 'Report of the Committee on the Corn Bill 1777; And Act of the Town Council of Glasgow Thereon, 19 Nov 1777', and 'Minutes of the Annual Committee of Royal Burghs of the 13th & 16th Dec anent the Corn Bill, 1777'.
[47] GCA, TD1670/4/2, see entry for the Annual Committee on 17 January 1783.
[48] GCA, TD1670/4/12, James Dennistoun to Colquhoun, 3 November 1782.

> Trade and Manufactures by such new and untried Channells, directed and asserted by the Ablest Advice.[49]

Perhaps as importantly, Colquhoun's ideas received the support of merchants, manufacturers, and municipal leaders in Paisley, Port Glasgow, and Greenock who agreed to subscribe and to send members to represent their towns and interests, with John Cochran of Paisley predicting that the proposed Chamber would be a 'publick Blessing to this Manufacturing Country'.[50] Prominent commercial figures, such as William Cunninghame, the famous 'tobacco lord', and politicians, such as Lord Advocate Henry Dundas, also signalled their keen approval.[51] The significance of Dundas, an Edinburgh man who would soon become a leading member of Pitt the Younger's ministry and the dominant political figure in Scotland, giving his consent to this west of Scotland body largely lies in Colquhoun's desire for the Glasgow Chamber to be recognised by political and economic elites and thereby acquire enough influence to be effective, which would become a notable feature of its operations.

The Glasgow Chamber, therefore, began life as a product of consultation boasting the support of the manufacturing and mercantile classes in the west of Scotland, as well as the respect of local and political elites. The final draft of Colquhoun's 'Plan' for the Glasgow Chamber was prefaced with an introduction arguing for the need to 'give stability to trade and manufactures, in the present alarming and complicated state of national affairs' where issues of importance to commerce and industry 'must soon be the subject of public discussion; and new systems and regulations will undoubtedly now occupy the attention of the legislature.' This, it asserted, would 'require a species of exertion hitherto unknown' and suggested that

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[49] GCA, TD1670/4/14, Thomas Miller to Colquhoun, 11 February 1783.
[50] GCA, TD1670/4/12, Robert Douglas and William Howard (Magistrates at Port Glasgow) to Colquhoun, 2 November 1782, John Shippen (at Greenock) to Colquhoun, 7 September 1782; TD1670/4/13, John Cochran to Colquhoun, 27 December 1782.
[51] GCA, TD1670/4/12, William Risk to Colquhoun, 1 November 1782, William Cunninghame to Colquhoun, 2 November 1782, William Wilson to Colquhoun, 5 November 1782; TD1670/4/13, James Oswald, December 1782 with 'Observations on the Plan for a Chamber of Commerce in Glasgow'; TD1670/4/14, Henry Dundas to Colquhoun, 8 January 1783.

'[c]ommon utility, mutual wants, and the necessity of mutual services' necessitated 'uniting together' in service of the 'public good':

> A Chamber of Commerce and Manufactures, formed of men linked together in the same pursuits, and possessing a perfect knowledge of the various branches of trade, at present established in this country, cannot fail to be attended with the most beneficial consequences.[52]

There was, therefore, an emphasis on commonality of interest and the sharing of expertise and resources to 'become powerful and acquire influence', and therefore be assured of success in any 'public negotiation'.[53] Its portrayal of the Chamber as 'a new exertion' prompted by post-war political and commercial instability is revealing of the founder members' sense of the novelty of this enterprise, a sentiment echoed by Thomas Miller's letter quoted above, which gives the impression that the Chamber was a bold experiment. Nevertheless, it is important to be cautious here: it is easily possible to exaggerate its novelty. Indeed, investigation of the Chamber's early activities demonstrates persistent similarities with previous lobbying campaigns and arrangements.

In several important ways the Chamber represented simply the embodiment of an already functioning and politically experienced set of interests in the west of Scotland. As an institution, it did not seek to usurp the position of the Glasgow Merchant House or Trades Incorporation. It had few declared specific policy aims – one exception being 'to consider of all matters affecting the Corn Laws of this part of the United Kingdom' – and would direct its business only after receiving requests and proposals 'as shall contribute to the protection and improvement of those branches of trade and manufactures which are peculiar to this country'.[54] Patrick Colquhoun was elected as the Chamber's first chairman – an office he held, initially at

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[52] *Plan for the Chamber of Commerce and Manufactures in the City of Glasgow, comprehending the towns of Paisley, Port Glasgow, Greenock, and the Places Adjacent* (Glasgow, 1783), pp. 3-4.
[53] *Ibid.*, 3.
[54] *Ibid.*, 6-7.

least, concurrently with that of Lord Provost of Glasgow – and the first deputy chair, James McGrigor, was Glasgow's Dean of Guild, thereby cementing the Chamber's connections with key bodies in Glasgow. The Chamber was also governed initially by established colonial merchants, who made up more than half its first directors, although they represented less than a quarter of the total membership.[55] Occasionally the Chamber took a secondary role by becoming a means of support for otherwise independent lobbying campaigns. For instance, during the British ministry's consultation with trading and industrial interests which preceded the Eden Treaty in 1786 – the new commercial arrangement with France – Paisley and Glasgow cotton and linen manufacturers made representations directly to the newly instituted Board of Trade, or the Committee of Trade, as it was initially called.[56] Fine linen manufacturers from Glasgow and the surrounding area were experienced lobbyists owing to their defence of the 1745 prohibition of French cambric and lawn imports.[57] The Chamber supplemented this lobbying effort with Archibald Henderson, the chairman, writing to William Eden, the chief British negotiator, and forwarding a memorial from Paisley cambric manufacturers requesting that cotton be protected in any treaty with the French government.[58] During his consultation, Eden was increasingly confident that the 'Glasgow People', were 'becoming more reasonable', and believed he was close to securing an appropriate duty on the import of French cambric.[59] The Chamber here was helping to facilitate a compromise between an already experienced interest and the government, so that they could approve the eventual commercial treaty in

[55] T.M. Devine, 'The Golden Age of Tobacco' in T.M. Devine and Gordon Jackson (eds), *Glasgow. Volume 1: Beginnings to 1830* (Manchester, 1995), p. 165.
[56] On this, see John E. Crowley, 'Neo-Mercantilism and the Wealth of Nations: British Commercial Policy after the American Revolution', *The Historical Journal* 33 (1990), 339-360, and Anna Lane Lingelbach, 'The Inception of the British Board of Trade', *The American Historical Review* 30 (1925), 701-27.
[57] TNA, BT 6/113, The Committee of Trade's collection of evidence from witnesses. Un-paginated, but see also: BL, Add. MS. 34462, fos. 1-19 for Anderson and Edward Payne, an Edinburgh linen merchant, and fos. 61-76 for McKeverall.
[58] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fos. 173-177. For Henderson's letter, see BL, Add. MS. 34420, fos. 450-451, Henderson to Eden [n.d.].
[59] BL, Add. MS. 45728, fo. 87, Eden to Sheffield [marked Feb-March 1786].

January 1787, even though it admitted French cambrics for the first time in 40 years.[60] The Chamber, therefore, played a role in enhancing the lobbying practices of existing interests, in a way similar to the Convention of Royal Burghs, although on a specifically regional level.

Indeed, in terms of its structural make-up, as well as its practices and way of operating, the Glasgow Chamber bore a clear resemblance to the Convention. A general meeting of ordinary members met at least annually – which was very reminiscent of the annual General Convention – and it had an executive of directors who were elected annually by the members.[61] The directors met on a quarterly basis and, again, acted very much like the standing committee, or annual committee, of the Convention. Throughout the eighteenth century, the Convention had fostered a very distinctly Scottish tradition of assembling a diverse group of interests in the pursuit of a consensus around specific measures for which it would then lobby, and this was an approach continued by the Glasgow Chamber. Whenever a petition or memorial was submitted from a particular interest, a committee was established within the Chamber to investigate and report for the directors before they made a resolution on whether to take any action. Acting collectively as an institution, they could arbitrate disputes, synthesise interests, and reach compromises, driven by what might be termed the 'logic' of lobbying. Like the Convention, the Chamber sought information and to base its activities on careful investigation and gathering of relevant data. Quite soon after its foundation, it set about making a collection of papers and creating a library of relevant material, making book purchases and acquiring copies of relevant statutes for future reference.[62] This was an indication that their lobbying

[60] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fos. 246-247. For more on this, see Ehrman, *British Government and Commercial Negotiations*, 43-69 and 182-185.
[61] *Plan for the Chamber of Commerce*, 5-12.
[62] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fos. 82-90. On 12 October 1784, the directors appointed a committee to procure copies of statutes 'at large' and other relevant books so that they could refer to them 'at all times.' On 4 January 1785 they received a gift of the first five volumes of the *History of Great Britain, from the first invasion of it by the Romans Under Julius Caesar* (London, 1771-93) from its author, the minister and historian, Robert Henry in Edinburgh.

approach would not be radically different to that of the Convention, supporting local and regional, rather than 'national', needs.

Nevertheless, the simple existence of a new and active lobbying institution in the west of Scotland enabled a much greater focus on the specific concerns of the ever increasing interests in the region. This did not necessarily put the Chamber in conflict with the Convention; on the contrary, the two institutions worked together on matters of common concern, and their direct connection through the Glasgow Town Council meant that the Chamber's members often attended the Convention's annual committee.[63] Colquhoun acted as an agent both to the Convention and the Chamber in 1783 when he went to London to present the Convention's applications to Parliament in defence of the white herring fishery in 1783, and the Chamber and the Convention worked in concert later that year when lobbying the Treasury for relief for the flax and cotton manufacturers.[64]

There were, however, instances almost immediately after the establishment of Chamber where it began to replace the role of the Convention. One specific example was the way the Chamber asserted control over the management of lobbying campaigns in the west of Scotland for state-sponsored encouragement, such as bounties. Julian Hoppit has emphasised recently the extent to which Scottish industries were in receipt of a disproportionate number of bounties as a specific form of government support, so that by 1799 they were receiving 17 per cent of total bounties paid out by the British state, with nearly 70 per cent of the British herring fisheries bounties in the second half of the eighteenth century, and a 31 per cent share of the British linen bounties by 1790.[65] Ensuring the renewal of these bounties was a key responsibility and the Chamber began immediately to keep a record of the bounties on Scottish exports and to keep their members informed of when they were due to expire. Previously,

[63] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fo. 73.
[64] *Ibid*., fos. 14 and 22.
[65] Julian Hoppit, 'Bounties, the Economy and the State of Britain, 1689-1800' in Perry Gauci (ed.), *Regulating the British Economy, 1660-1850* (Farnham, 2011), pp. 145-146.

Scottish linen interests had attempted to renew or extend bounties by making representations to the Convention of Royal Burghs for it to lobby on their behalf, such as occurred in 1781 with the bounty on plain and printed linen.[66] With the establishment of the Glasgow Chamber, however, these interests, through the Chamber, had the time and resources to concentrate on and apply for new or renewed bounties which answered specifically to regional concerns. In January 1784, for example, the Chamber decided to apply for the continuation of the bounty on printed goods which was due to expire in two months.[67] There are indications that the directors of the Chamber were growing increasingly sceptical about the efficacy of bounties, perhaps influenced by Adam Smith, and they even described them as having 'bad consequences' when an application was made by Greenock merchants for a bounty on lumber imported from British settlements. Nevertheless, any unease felt by the directors was not shared by their constituent economic interests, nor did it stop them from representing assiduously the wishes of these interests to ministers in order to renew existing or create new bounties. In this case, after expressing their misgivings, the directors instructed Ilay Campbell, MP for the Glasgow Burghs, to lobby the Treasury on behalf of these Greenock merchants.[68] The belief that bounties were beneficial to the Scottish economy was widely shared by Scottish interests and those acting for them in this period, as shown by George Dempster's claim to Henry Dundas in 1788 that the bounty on linen exports had done 'more good perhaps than ever was done by any single measure of political eoconomy'.[69] The fact that the Glasgow Chamber played a particularly active, organised role in perpetuating and extending these benefits, a responsibility inherited from the Convention, indicates its significance as a new link between interests in the west of Scotland and the British political centre.

[66] ECA, SL30/1/1/14 (Convention of Royal Burghs Minute Book, 1776-1790), un-paginated. See 11 July 1781.
[67] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fo. 49.
[68] *Ibid.*, fo. 309.
[69] NLS, MS. 653 (Melville papers), George Dempster to Henry Dundas, 31 January 1788.

This link was important particularly when it came to proposing, and lobbying for, new legislation at the Westminster Parliament. During the 1780s, the number of acts relating to economic issues and matters largely or exclusively pertaining to Scotland rose significantly, from five acts in the period 1763-82, to 23 acts in the period 1782-1800.[70] As a well-resourced institution, the Glasgow Chamber had the capacity to lobby for specific bills or legislative measures which would need to be campaigned for over long periods of time, but which would particularly benefit its constituent interests. Legislation which the Chamber campaigned to carry through Parliament in this period, and which dominated their proceedings throughout the 1780s included, among many others, a bill to establish a system of regulation on thread manufacturing, and a tobacco bill which they hoped, by reducing duties, would prevent smuggling.[71] The regulation of thread manufacturing was one of the first issues of substance raised at a directors' meeting when William Carlisle, representing thread manufacturers in Paisley, proposed an investigation into the matter.[72] Over the next few years it was subject to numerous investigations and consultations by thread manufacturers from other Scottish and English regions which, among other matters, meant that it was necessary to restrict the bill to thread manufacturing in Scotland. A bill was drafted finally in February 1785, and underwent further negotiations, compromises, and revisions with manufacturers throughout Scotland. Finally the Chamber settled on a draft bill with which the manufacturers in Glasgow and Paisley were satisfied and which had made its way through both houses of Parliament by the end of 1788.[73] The issue of the tobacco bill followed a similar course. It was first proposed in 1784 by tobacco manufacturers and importers based in Glasgow, Greenock and Port Glasgow who drew up their own resolutions for lowering duties and presented them to the Chamber, and

[70] Innes, 'Legislating for Three Kingdoms', 25. See Chapter Four of this thesis to put these figures in their broader context.
[71] On the latter issue, see Devine, *Glasgow Tobacco Lords*, 153-60.
[72] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fo. 8.
[73] *Ibid*., fos. 110-116 and 299.

was the subject of extensive negotiations with ministers in London in 1785.[74] These were campaigns which previously could only have taken place with the backing of an institution such as the Convention of Royal Burghs. With the Chamber's backing, however, the volume of economic legislation increased, and the focus on specifically regional concerns intensified, bringing west of Scotland interests closer to the Westminster legislative process.

These developments were accompanied by increased lobbying transparency, publicity, and accountability, evident particularly in the growing use of newspapers. This period saw a noticeable increase in the discussion of legislation and Parliament in the growing Scottish press.[75] To a certain extent, the use of newspapers was not new and Scottish institutions like the Convention and the Board of Trustees had previously publicised their proposals in this way. But the Glasgow Chamber demonstrated that it was particularly adept at using a developing Scottish press to open up its activities and deliberations to a wider public. At its first meeting on 1 January 1783 it was agreed that notice of the Chamber's founding and the names of its inaugural directors should be 'published in the Glasgow News Papers to morrow'.[76] Throughout the 1780s, the Chamber increasingly used Glasgow and Edinburgh newspapers to provide notices such as this as well as to record their thanks to particular individuals for their services, such as their MP, Ilay Campbell, as well as to encourage interests to bring 'any business before the Chamber of Directors…by letter or memorial…to the secretary'.[77] Newspapers were used to advertise the Chamber's lobbying successes and to show local interests how they might benefit from them. For instance, in January 1784 the Chamber used the *Glasgow Mercury* to inform 'Merchants, Manufacturers, and Bleachers' of the successful

[74] *Ibid*., fos. 11-14, 21, 70, 80-81, and 125 (from the Glasgow importers of tobacco). See also fos. 150-153, and 192

[75] Bob Harris, 'Parliamentary Legislation, Lobbying and the Press in Eighteenth-Century Scotland', *Parliamentary History* 26 (2007), 76-95.

[76] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fo. 9. This notice appeared in *Glasgow Mercury*, 2-9 January 1783.

[77] The first mention of the Chamber's existence in a newspaper is in *Glasgow Mercury*, 2-9 January 1783. The thanks for the Chamber to Ilay Campbell was often requested to be printed in the local newspapers, e.g. GCA, TD 1670/1/1, fo. 202.

lobbying campaign for a drawback on all soap and starch consumed in preparing flax and raw cotton for manufacture and how they could take advantage of it.[78] The newspapers could also be used as a lobbying tool: in 1785, for example, Colquhoun requested that his updates from London during the campaign against William Pitt's Irish Resolutions be sent for publication in the Glasgow newspapers, in the hope that 'The Spirit of the People will get up if the Minister is determined to enforce the [Irish] measure'.[79] They also published extracts from their 1786 report on the corn laws in various Edinburgh – as well as some English – newspapers to ensure that their unequivocal viewpoint was publicised on this very contentious issue.[80] This latter example marked an intensifying of the public debate over the corn laws in Scotland which had started in the 1770s, particularly since the passage of the 1773 Corn Act, and which continued into the nineteenth century.[81] All of which is evidence of the Chamber engaging with a rapidly changing and increasingly diverse public in the Glasgow region, and indeed throughout Scotland, through new media in the pursuit of a more efficient lobbying operation. It was also part of a broader trend in Scottish society in which the press contributed to a widening of the public sphere, as other Scottish institutions such as county meetings, farmer's societies, and political groups such as the burgh reformers, sought to exploit the potential of the press as a form of publicity and means of channelling opinion.[82]

Despite this increasing public dimension, it remained very important that the Chamber was acknowledged and respected by British ministers to ensure lobbying success. The Chamber's original 'Plan' asserted that 'such a society will immediately acquire a respectability and weight sufficient to insure the utmost attention in all public negotiations.'[83]

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[78] *Glasgow Mercury*, 1-8 January 1784.
[79] GCA, TD1670/4/27, Colquhoun to Lord Provost, 25 March 1785. See also same to same 28 March 1785. See, for example, *Glasgow Mercury*, 24-31 March 1785 (minutes of the first meeting of the General Chamber), or 7-14 April 1785.
[80] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fos. 212 and 240.
[81] Harris, 'Parliamentary Legislation, Lobbying and the Press', 85-87.
[82] *Ibid*., 91.
[83] *Plan for the Chamber of Commerce*, 4.

This was indicative of a desire for an 'insider' status; in other words, for good communications and a close relationship with ministers. This was a characteristic of successful lobbying in the early decades of the eighteenth century, such as with London mercantile lobbies, and it had been similarly important to earlier Scottish lobbying.[84] Through the Argathelian system of management, interest group politics depended heavily on patronage and personal contacts, so that Scottish interests with the support of the Scottish 'manager' – 'insiders' – had direct access to ministers and therefore a much greater chance of success. In terms of the Convention's campaign in 1756 on behalf of Scottish coarse linen manufacturers, the third duke of Argyll successfully pressured the duke of Newcastle and Parliament to restore the bounty on coarse linen exports which had ceased in 1754.[85] It was not surprising, therefore, that the Chamber desired to have similar access, and the aspiration to 'insider' status was evident almost from its inception when the directors sought and acquired a Royal Charter. On the face of it, this brought little material advantage; indeed, acquiring it was a costly enterprise – the total sum being £100 – and Colquhoun complained that it 'has been a business of more trouble and anxiety than it is possible for you to believe'.[86] Nevertheless, it had great symbolic value: it was the first Royal Charter to be bestowed on a British chamber of commerce and it captured a particularly Scottish tradition, inherited from the Argathelian era, of being close to the establishment. It was also perhaps indicative of a desire to differentiate the Chamber from contemporary political reform movements which were focused on protesting against, not cooperating with, the political centre. John Seton, the Chamber's solicitor in London, remarked that it would give 'Permanency and Weight to the Establishment of your Chamber

[84] A.G. Olson, 'The London Mercantile Lobby and the Coming of the American Revolution', *Journal of American History* 69 (1982), 21-41; idem., 'Parliament, the London Lobbies, and Provincial Interests in England and America', *Historical Reflections* 6 (1979), 367-86; idem., 'The Board of Trade and the London-America interest groups in the eighteenth century', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 8 (1980), 33-50.
[85] Murdoch, *The People Above*, 68-73.
[86] GCA, TD1670/4/16, Colquhoun to Gilbert Hamilton, 14 June 1783. Lord North's office charged £50, Ilay Campbell's expenses amounted to 20 shillings, and John Campbell's were 10 shillings.

of Commerce'.[87] When the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce was formed in December 1785 its directors very quickly requested a Royal Charter, suggesting it was now deemed requisite for a successful business chamber.[88] It reveals how interests in the Glasgow Chamber saw themselves – as permanent, official, legitimate, and operating with an authority recognised at the highest national political level.

Image and reputation only went so far, however, and access and influence were dependent ultimately on those who represented the Chamber to Parliament and the ministry. The use of agents was far from a new lobbying practice either by Scottish or other British, Irish or colonial interests which required representation at the political centre. The Convention of Royal Burghs had often deployed agents on large-scale lobbying campaigns, such as William Todd and George Drummond who had assisted the duke of Argyll in the campaign to restore the bounty on coarse linen exports in 1754-6.[89] Patrick Colquhoun had also acted as an agent to the Convention, and, despite a reputation for idleness and subservience to the ministry's will, several of Scotland's 45 MPs, such as George Dempster and Ilay Campbell, both of whom have been referred to above, were remarkably assiduous and diligent in their representation of specifically Scottish interests to ministers and Parliament.[90] Nevertheless, Colquhoun dismissed the utility of Scottish MPs as a group, remarking when lobbying in London in 1783 that 'if it is necessary to do business here with success, application & Court must be paid to a different class of men.'[91] The Chamber employed a solicitor – John Seton – who was permanently based in London and managed the expenses and technicalities of the Chamber's business in Westminster and Whitehall and who was employed by a number of other Scottish

[87] GCA, TD1670/4/14, John Seton to Patrick Colquhoun, 11 February 1783.
[88] ECA, ED5/1/1 (Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce minutes, Vol. I), fos. 10-11. The Jersey Chamber followed suit in 1787, but other chambers did not for some time: Bennett, *Local Business Voice*, 169 and ch. 7.
[89] Bob Harris, 'The Scots, the Westminster Parliament, and the British state', 135.
[90] See chapter 3.
[91] GCA, TD1670/4/15, Colquhoun to Hamilton, 6 May 1783.

interests.[92] But the most active lobbying agents on behalf of the Glasgow Chamber during this period were Colquhoun and Ilay Campbell, the latter as the MP for the Glasgow Burghs, especially in 1785 during a marathon 15-week long lobbying campaign.[93] During this campaign Campbell was noted for having been particularly active on behalf of the Chamber's interests.[94] Having access to Henry Dundas, their fellow Scot, who after the formation of Pitt's first ministry was at the heart of government, was particularly useful as it meant the Chamber's agents could usually secure meetings with the highest authorities, including Pitt and Charles Jenkinson, President of the newly established Board of Trade.[95] Agents were instrumental in maintaining personal relationships and seeking recognition for the benefit of the Chamber, enabling it to be a key influence at the highest level. The importance of stationing an influential agent in Westminster was recognised by the Chamber when in 1788 they appointed Colquhoun to be their permanent 'Commercial Agent in London', reasoning that he would be available 'at all times [to] command a ready access to every Member of Parliament and even to the great officers of State…[and] to attend to the Commercial Interest of the Country'.[96] Colquhoun accepted this commission with great enthusiasm – indeed he was involved in proposing such a role – and he was active particularly in negotiations with MPs and ministers over proposed changes to the corn laws in 1789-91 which resulted in the 1791 Corn Act.[97] Employing effective representation was certainly made possible because the Chamber as an institution could afford the expenses involved and had the structural organisation to direct a lengthy large-scale campaign, albeit this was not in itself a new development in Scottish lobbying.

[92] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fos. 18, 21, 122, 125, 150, 192 and 205.
[93] *Ibid*., 'Report of the Delegates for the City of Glasgow' (1785), fos. 136-145.
[94] GCA, TD1670/4/27, Colquhoun to Lord Provost of Glasgow, 25 March 1785.
[95] For example, GCA, TD1670/4/27, Colquhoun to Lord Provost, 22 March 1785 in which he reports on meetings with Dundas and Jenkinson.
[96] GCA, TD1670/4/52, 'Plan of a Public Agency in London for Commercial Affairs' (1788). See also in this collection Ilay Campbell to Colquhoun, 11 October 1788, where he recommended appointing such agents to act 'where the Interest of Scotland or of Scotchmen is concerned.'
[97] *Ibid*., Colquhoun to Gilbert Hamilton, 31 December 1788.

However, the relationship between these representatives and government was also of paramount importance and, in this context, a transformation appears to have taken place in the middle of the 1780s. The Glasgow Chamber spent a brief period in open opposition to Pitt's new ministry in protest against the 1784 budget, which placed new duties on printed textiles and plain cotton, as well as the 1785 Irish Resolutions, which attempted to create a more open and liberal trading relationship between the British and Irish kingdoms and which the Chamber felt were too generous to their Irish rivals, raising fears that British interests, including those in Scotland, might be undersold in their domestic market. Opposition did not come naturally to Scottish lobbyists, but after an unsuccessful meeting with Pitt in March 1785 during a lobbying campaign in London, Colquhoun resolved to conduct an 'open opposition' to the ministry by targeting Parliament, and protesting to individual MPs in particular.[98] He spent countless hours collecting and presenting evidence and petitions at the bar of the House of Commons, although he quickly grew disillusioned with MPs, considering them ill-informed and uninterested in his representations.[99] He turned to a new institution in London, the General Chamber of Manufactures of Great Britain, which purported to represent all British manufacturing interests and which briefly came into existence during 1785-7.[100] Colquhoun became a daily participant in its activities aimed at delaying the government's progress: 'being convinced that it is through this Medium alone that we are to do any good I have thought it right to pay some attention to the general business of this institution'.[101] He nevertheless expressed frustration that taking this position of outright opposition meant that he forfeited any

[98] GCA, TD1670/4/27, Colquhoun to Lord Provost, 28 March 1785. Colquhoun here gives a report on his meeting with Pitt at Downing Street which took place the day before. See also TD1670/1/1, fo. 137.
[99] GCA, TD1670/4/28, Colquhoun to Lord Provost, 7 April 1785, TD1670/4/30, Colquhoun to John Campbell, 13 May 1785 (says that he spent 19 hours in the House of Commons that day), and same to same, 21 May 1785 where he is very disparaging about the parliamentary debate of the Irish resolutions: 'I begin to think it as well that evidence were not brought forward, for it is plain no advantage would have been derived whatsoever. – Conviction or argument or even danger seems out of the question entirely when put in Competition with the fear of offending the Minister' (emphasis in the original manuscript).
[100] Bennett, *Local Business Voice*, 410-423.
[101] GCA, TD1670/4/28, Colquhoun to John Campbell, 4 April 1785.

channel of communication with the government and that he was therefore powerless to influence the ministry in any way.[102] Although he became involved in the activities of this General Chamber, Colquhoun expressed a certain unease with the general tenor of the meetings: several of its leading members, including Josiah Wedgwood, sought to defeat the Irish Resolutions outright in a political alliance with Pitt's leading opponents – such as Charles James Fox and William Eden[103] – whereas Colquhoun on behalf of Glasgow interests wished simply to delay the measure in Parliament in order to force the ministry to make further compromises.[104] The latter approach was eventually vindicated in that it led to further meetings with Pitt at which the Glasgow interest secured the concessions that they had been agitating for regarding both the Irish Resolutions and securing the repeal of the cotton and printed goods taxes.[105] In response to this, an exasperated Colquhoun claimed that 'nothing favourable is to be done here by public opposition in either Houses of Parliament – Nothing but Private Negotiation…will do any good whatever'.[106] This was clearly his experience reinforcing a prior conviction; that it was through being an 'insider' and close to government that the Glasgow Chamber believed it could affect substantive change. He had been forced into opposition by Pitt's initial intransigence and determination to withstand opposition and pass this measure – a feature, perhaps, of the latter's inexperience, as well as an inadequate consultation with British interests due to the abolition of the Board of Trade in 1782. On the other hand, Colquhoun had been too hasty to bring Glasgow interests into an alliance with political opponents of the ministry, although given his initial failure to persuade Pitt, he probably did not have much of a choice.

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[102] *Ibid.*

[103] Samuel Garbett, a founder member of the General Chamber from the Birmingham Commercial Committee, also found that it had become too 'violent' and 'noisy' for his liking, rather than being productive, and wanted to prevent his Birmingham friends from 'throwing themselves into the arms of 'Mr Fox, Mr Eden'. See BAH, ZZ 61B, vol. i, fos. 160-161, Samuel Garbett to Lansdowne, 20 May 1785

[104] GCA, TD1670/4/27, Colquhoun to John Campbell, 22 March 1785; TD1670/4/28, Colquhoun to Hamilton, 8 April 1785: 'I am clear our strong ground is to ask a delay. – The opposition are not for this.'

[105] GCA, TD1670/4/30, Colquhoun to Hamilton, 23 May 1785.

[106] GCA, TD1670/4/32, Colquhoun to Hamilton, 21 June 1785 (emphasis in the original manuscript).

It was an experience from which both sides would quickly learn. Thereafter, Pitt was far more willing to listen to and consult a range of different commercial and manufacturing interests when devising government policy, as demonstrated by the extensive interviews conducted, and written submissions taken, by the new Committee of Trade during 1786 in the lead up to the negotiations for the Eden Treaty, as we have already seen.[107] Equally, those representing the Glasgow Chamber, such as Colquhoun, recognised the folly of protest and sought to project an image of themselves as friends of the ministry. In October 1785, for example, Henry Dundas visited Glasgow and reported to Pitt that the merchants and manufacturers there were 'attached to your Government beyond my Sanguine expectations'.[108] The leading members of the Chamber were convinced that this attachment between the British ministry and interests in the west of Scotland would enable them to be far more influential. This was the case even on the most contentious of issues, such as proposed changes to the corn laws. When, for instance, the ministry devised a new corn bill in 1790, Colquhoun, as the Chamber's commercial agent, met with ministers, such as Henry Dundas and Charles Jenkinson – now Lord Hawkesbury – who 'gave me so full a hearing', in order to persuade them to preserve as many of the existing arrangements as possible.[109] When the bill reached Parliament, Colquhoun and William McDowall, the new MP for the Glasgow Burghs, lobbied the Commons select committee and individual MPs to insert their own clauses and remove those they considered 'exceptionable'.[110] When they could not agree on a bill before the end of the parliamentary session, they persuaded Dundas to 'move…to put off the intended corn law for three to six months' to allow more time for negotiation.[111] After further negotiations,

[107] John Ehrman, *The Younger Pitt: The Years of Acclaim* (London, 1969); Michael Duffy, *The Younger Pitt* (Harlow, 2000).
[108] BL, Add. MS. 89036/1/1/17(i), Henry Dundas to William Pitt, 23 October 1785.
[109] GCA, TD1670/4/59, Colquhoun to Gilbert Hamilton, 16 April 1790. See also: same to same, 22 April 1790 where Colquhoun referred to Lord Hawkesbury as someone 'to whom I have access at all times'.
[110] See, for example, GCA, 1670/4/61, Colquhoun to Gilbert Hamilton, 28 May 1790.
[111] GCA, TD, 1670/4/61, William McDowall to Archibald Graham, 31 May 1790; TD1670/4/63, Colquhoun to Graham, 1 June 1790.

a bill was agreed to and became the 1791 Corn Act which the Chamber judged to be 'not so favourable to this Country in some respects, as we could have wished, yet upon the whole is better than we had reason to expect'.[112] The Chamber's lobbying experiences throughout the 1780s, and especially following 1785, had demonstrated clearly that, although they might not achieve everything they wished for, a carefully cultivated close relationship with the ministry bought them considerable influence.

This influence was magnified further as the Glasgow Chamber began to operate as part of broader sectoral and industrial lobbies throughout this period. From its establishment, the Glasgow Chamber appeared to recognise the potential benefits of becoming part of a broader network of similar chambers throughout the British Isles. It developed ties with chambers in Liverpool and Bristol, and worked with these two bodies in 1783 on commercial matters relating to the tobacco and sugar trades, as well as their developing industrial interests in iron manufacturing.[113] In March 1783, the Glasgow Chamber wrote in support of a plan to create a chamber of commerce in Dublin, expressing a desire to initiate 'a friendly communication with them for the benefit of trade in general'.[114] In liaising with these interests, the Chamber showed its enthusiasm to develop alliances with similar bodies which might afford them further opportunities for lobbying success. Equally, this pragmatism meant that it carefully chose which issues necessitated an alliance. For example, in May 1783, Colquhoun dismissed a request from Bristol to help with a reduction of the duties on rum and sugar as 'too absurd to merit any attention and so far as regards Glasgow I hope the merchants will think it right to have nothing to do with it.'[115] Following Colquhoun's difficult experiences as part of the General Chamber of Manufactures, the Glasgow Chamber politely, but firmly, declined to join

[112] GCA, TD1670/1/2, fo. 117.
[113] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fos. 14 and 17. See also TD1670/4/15, Colquhoun to Hamilton, 5 April 1783: 'I am glad you have opened a correspondence with Liverpool'.
[114] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fo. 18
[115] GCA, TD1670/4/15, Colquhoun to Hamilton, 6 May 1783.

other British interests to become a permanent part of this institution in 1786, and it collapsed the following year.[116]

Nevertheless, the idea of an integrated commercial and manufacturing interest was something to which the Glasgow Chamber was very receptive. In 1784 the Chamber's secretary, Gilbert Hamilton, had discussed ideas of 'one solid extensive Plan' for 'the whole of the Commercial & Manufacturing Interest' with Samuel Garbett of the Birmingham Commercial Committee.[117] Whilst in London in 1785, Colquhoun had operated as part of a broader industrial lobby, joining cotton and fustian manufacturers and printers from Lancashire and London in a campaign to repeal the duties imposed on these textiles by Pitt's budget of the preceding year – 'a most perfect union of interests and exertions…between the English and Scotch printers and manufacturers.'[118] They agreed on a negotiating position and after two meetings with Pitt, and several presentations at the Treasury and the Board of Excise, they persuaded the ministry to repeal the excise duties on plain cottons and fustians, and were later able to reach a compromise on printed goods involving an exemption for those which were low priced.[119] It is of course easy to exaggerate the extent to which this was novel. Scottish interests had cooperated earlier in the eighteenth century with similar interests from elsewhere in the British Isles, such as in the 1760s and '70s when Scottish linen interests in the Convention of Royal Burghs solicited help in their applications to parliament from similar interests in the north west of England and in Ireland.[120] However, with the growth of new industries such as cotton, which were of great economic importance both north and south of the border, this sectoral cooperation became increasingly necessary and even common from this period

[116] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fo. 178.
[117] BAH, ZZ 61B, i, fo. 102, Gilbert Hamilton to Samuel Garbett, 28 October 1784 (copy).
[118] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fos. 136-45.
[119] GCA. TD1670/4/29, Colquhoun to John Campbell, 21 April 1785; Colquhoun to Hamilton. 29 April 1785 (negotiations with the secretary of the Treasury); TD1670/4/30, Brown to Hamilton, 2 May 1785; Colquhoun to J. Campbell, 2 May 1785; same to same, 4 May 1785. See also Ehrman, *The Younger Pitt*, 209-13.
[120] Harris, 'Towards a British Political Economy', 102-3.

onwards. Indeed, in the case of the cotton industry, integration and assimilation of manufacturing interests north and south of the border developed quite naturally from the start, as we shall see in the following chapter. In this, the Glasgow Chamber in the 1780s and beyond enabled the development of lobbies which were consciously 'British', both in their identities and in their modes of operation, in contrast to the more distinctly 'Scottish' interests, such as the linen lobby. This process was far from complete in the 1780s, but this early integration of interests determined the direction of future travel, as can be seen in the next chapter.

Added to this, the fragmentation of what had been presented as a 'national' Scottish lobby earlier in the century, arguably embodied by older institutions such as the Convention of Royal Burghs, was highlighted by the differences between the Glasgow Chamber and its counterpart in Edinburgh. Although the Edinburgh Chamber was established initially in 1785 as the 'General Chamber for Commerce and Manufactures in Scotland', Ilay Campbell soon objected on behalf of the Glasgow Chamber, forcing this new body to change its name to The Chamber of Commerce and Manufactures in Edinburgh 'as more suitable, & not carrying any appearance of asserting upon the antecedent Rights of others', which was clearly a reference to Glasgow.[121] The Edinburgh Chamber took its inspiration as an institution from the Glasgow Chamber with the hope that their exertions would result in 'similar good effects'.[122] Yet it was for precisely this reason that it was different to the Glasgow Chamber; it sought to represent interests in the Edinburgh, Leith, and the Midlothian region generally, and therefore focused on issues specific to their concerns. In this period, these included lobbying for the establishment of a Stamp Office in Edinburgh so that Scottish manufactured paper did not have to be stamped in London, and a coasting trade bill for the navigation of firths and Estuary

[121] ECA, ED5/1/1, fos. 1-3 and 11-13. The first rule of this new body was that 'Every Merchant, Manufacturer, or Trader, residing in Scotland, shall have a right to become a Member of this Chamber', in contrast to the Glasgow Chamber whose founding plan was strictly regional in its scope and ambitions: GCA, TD1670/4/37, Ilay Campbell to Gilbert Hamilton, 30 May 1786.
[122] ECA, ED5/1/1, fos. 1-3.

Rivers. In 1787 the two Scottish chambers clashed dramatically when the Edinburgh Chamber supported proposed amendments to the corn laws which would create one Scottish district for the importation and exportation of corn, with prices set at the Midlothian standard.[123] In this it became allied to another new Scottish lobbying society, the 'Monthly Club'; a grouping of landowners meeting in Edinburgh to promote and defend landed interests, particularly – and predictably – relating to the corn laws.[124] In response, the Glasgow Chamber wholeheartedly rejected any change to the status quo which would, it predicted, disqualify the region from the same 'privileges' as those in English districts. It derided the Edinburgh Chamber's resolutions as merely reflecting the wishes of the landed interest, and vowed to fight any proposal of this nature.[125] This split in Scotland on the corn question was of course, as we have already seen, not a new development; it had been a matter of contention for some time. But the rise of new institutions during the 1780s, which brought different parts of Scottish society closer to the British political centre, embodied and arguably augmented these differences. Therefore, as interest lobbies north and south of the border continued to integrate along sectoral and industrial lines, it was becoming increasingly difficult, despite lobbying rhetoric, to identify a distinctly 'Scottish' interest.

The changes and developments in Scottish lobbying described in this chapter deepened and extended during the early nineteenth century. The Glasgow Chamber continued to represent these growing industrial interests in a similar fashion, and in later decades it helped establish additional institutions in this region as interests became more diverse and increasingly specialised. These included the Greenock Chamber of Commerce and Manufactures in 1813,

[123] ECA, ED5/1/1, fos. 53-56 for Edinburgh's Chambers resolutions, and pp. 58-61 for Glasgow's reply rejecting these resolutions.
[124] NLS, MS. 169 (Monthly Club Minute Book), fos. 35-37.
[125] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fos. 225-241.

as well as the Glasgow East India Association in 1812 which developed particularly strong links with its counterpart in Liverpool in the lobbying campaigns against the East India Company's monopoly in Indian and Chinese markets during 1812-14 and again from 1829 to 1833.[126] These campaigns were highly organised operations, directed by powerful and deeply integrated interests, and demonstrated a far more advanced use of innovative lobbying techniques, as well as enjoying influence and access to the political centre greater than those in the 1780s, as we shall see in the next chapter. These, nevertheless, were advances of scale rather than kind; the developments in lobbying in the early nineteenth century were clearly foreshadowed by those in the 1780s.

The emergence of the new lobbying institutions such as the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce therefore heralded a period of significant change for Scottish lobbying, particularly on behalf of mercantile and manufacturing interests in Glasgow and the west of Scotland. It is important not to overstate this; as we have seen, there was a balance between these changes and the continuation of earlier Scottish lobbying practices. Nevertheless, it is clear that the establishment of new Scottish lobbying institutions, particularly the Glasgow Chamber, marked the beginning of a fundamental reconstitution of existing lobbying arrangements during an especially fluid moment in British politics which saw the rising influence of manufacturing interests throughout Britain and Ireland. The Glasgow Chamber sought to engage with as broad an audience as possible in order to allow and encourage new sections of commercial and industry society in the west of Scotland to engage with, and become actively involved in, new modalities of discussion and debate. It provided them with a strengthened connection to the Westminster Parliament and the central departments of the British state – especially the Treasury and the Board of Trade – as part of a broader framework of interests,

[126] These campaigns are covered in the next chapter. See also: Yukihisa Kumagai, *Breaking into the monopoly: provincial merchants and manufacturers' campaigns for access to the Asian market, 1790-1833* (Leiden, 2013). For the Greenock Chamber of Commerce, see Bennett, *Local Business Voice*, 14-15.

which operated increasingly along sectoral and industrial lines. This chapter has, however, largely only focused on a snapshot of one notable example of this change, and further work on similar developments at other levels of Scottish society – for example in local burgh and county government, as well as other local societies, some of which will be covered in later chapters – would enable the creation of a more detailed picture of how Scottish interests reoriented themselves over this period to focus more intensely on the British political centre.[127] Nevertheless, this chapter serves to highlight important developments during the 1780s, which have been hitherto largely neglected by historians of eighteenth-century Scotland. It demonstrates that this decade deserves much closer examination as a bridge between the era of Scottish semi-autonomy, which characterised political life in Scotland for much of the eighteenth century, and a phase where local and regional Scottish interests cooperated closely with similar interests throughout the British Isles to engage increasingly, and more effectively, in the British political and legislative process.

[127] See Chapter Four of this thesis for on elaboration on this theme.

Chapter Two

The Scottish Cotton Interest

This chapter takes the form of a case study which examines the development of an important Scottish interest's relationship with the British political centre during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The Scottish cotton lobby has been chosen because of the cotton industry's increasing importance to the Scottish economy over this period, as well as its significance elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Although the origins of Scottish cotton manufacturing owed much to the linen industry, specifically fine linen in the west of Scotland, it was a relatively new sector at the beginning of this period. Thereafter, it was increasingly of profound importance to the Scottish economy and was a crucial locus of the industrial revolution in Scotland, as well as Britain as a whole.[1] The question, however, of how Scottish cotton interests fared politically in lobbying the Westminster Parliament, as well as government departments such as the Treasury and the Board of Trade, at a time when other economic and industrial interests were enhancing their lobbying practices, has largely been left unexamined.[2] The previous chapter observed the changes which took place during the 1780s in the way in which Scottish bodies and interest groups related to the Westminster Parliament and the British state. Scottish economic and industrial interests continued to lobby in ways similar to the

[1] The extensive literature covering the Scottish cotton industry includes, but is not limited to: G.M Mitchell, 'The English and Scottish Cotton Industries', *Scottish Historical Review* 22 (1925), 101-114; H. Hamilton, *The Industrial Revolution in Scotland* (Oxford, 1932); S.G.E Lythe and J. Butt. *An Economic History of Scotland, 110-1939* (Glasgow, 1975); T.M Devine, 'The Colonial Trades and Industrial Investment in Scotland c. 1700-1815', *Economic Historical Review* 29 (1976) and J. Butt, 'The Scottish Cotton Industry during the Industrial Revolution 1780-1840' in L. M. Cullen and T.C Smout (eds), *Comparative Aspects of Scottish and Irish Economic and Social History 1600-1900* (Edinburgh, 1977), pp. 116-128. Most recently, see Anthony Cooke, *The Rise and Fall of the Scottish Cotton Industry* (Manchester, 2010).

[2] Although for earlier in the eighteenth century, see: Patrick O'Brien, Trevor Griffiths and Philip Hunt, 'Political Components of the Industrial Revolution: Parliament and the English Cotton Textile Industry, 1660-1774', *The Economic History Review* 44 (1991), 395-423; idem., 'Scottish, Irish and Imperial Connections: Parliament, the Three Kingdoms, and the Mechanization of Cotton Spinning in Eighteenth-Century Britain', *The Economic History Review* 61 (2008), 625-50.

earlier eighteenth century, but within different organisational frameworks, such as the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, which were specifically regional and therefore reflected a wider shift away from single, national lobbying bodies such as the Convention of Royal Burghs. The longer-view taken by this chapter is partly to demonstrate more fully how the changes described in the last chapter induced further developments in the relationship between Scottish interests and the British political centre, and indeed their links with other British interests.

From the late 1770s onwards cotton was recognised in the Scottish political sphere as a new but important industry, increasingly mentioned by Scottish lobbyists alongside linen, which maintained its status as the 'staple' of the Scottish economy.[3] In 1788 the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce reported that 'cotton manufacturers, tho' only lately introduced into these parts, give employment & bread to many thousands of industrious families & are of the very first importance to the prosperity of the Country.'[4] By the turn of the nineteenth century, cotton was described increasingly as one of Scotland's 'staple' manufactures, and had overtaken linen as the primary textile product and driver of the Scottish economy.[5] While reliable Scottish cotton output figures do not exist, Christopher Whatley has described the growth of the industry as 'spectacular' when measured by raw cotton imports and the number of mills established. Imports of raw cotton rose nearly 17-fold from the early-to-mid 1780s to the early years of the nineteenth century and estimates of the number of Scottish cotton mills report 18 opening in the nine years following the construction of the first cotton spinning mill at Penicuik in 1778, with 192 in operation by 1839.[6] Spinning mills spread initially as a 'countryside industry' throughout Scotland, from Dumfriesshire in the south, to Fife and

[3] GCA, TD1670/4/27 (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce papers), Ilay Campbell to James Campbell, 29 March 1785. Ilay Campbell here described cotton as being in its 'infancy', with linen still being Scotland's 'staple' industry, as England's was wool.
[4] GCA, TD1670/1/1, (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce minutes, Vol. I), fo. 292.
[5] See, for example, GCA, TD1670/4/99, Petition to the House of Commons from Directors of Chamber of Commerce, 5 March 1803'. Manufacturing of cotton goods is described as 'a Staple of the very first importance'. See also: Christopher Whatley, *Scottish Society 1707-1830: Beyond Jacobitism, towards industrialisation* (Manchester, 2000), p. 223.
[6] Christopher A. Whatley, *The Industrial Revolution in Scotland* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 24-25.

Forfarshire in the east, through Stirlingshire, Perthshire, and north into Aberdeenshire, with the most northerly mill established at Spinningdale in Sutherland in 1792.[7] At the turn of the nineteenth century, however, with the introduction of Scottish steam-powered mills in 1798, cotton spinning became concentrated in the rapidly growing urban areas around Glasgow, Paisley, and the west of Scotland region generally, helping to drive Scottish urbanisation, which was exceptionally rapid by European standards, during this period.[8] By 1839, Glasgow and the surrounding urban area alone had 98 spinning mills, with the wider region comprising Lanarkshire and Renfrewshire being home to 175, which accounted for 91 per cent of all Scottish spinning mills at this time.[9] In addition to mechanised spinning, the number of handloom weavers rose, for all Scottish textiles, from 25,000 in 1780 to 78,000 in 1810. Powerlooms also spread rapidly, at least in the early years of the nineteenth century, to the extent that it is estimated by 1813 more than half of those employed in cotton manufacturing in Britain were in Scotland.[10]

While the Scottish linen industry continued to grow throughout this period and became concentrated in the east of Scotland, particularly in Dundee, cotton was crucial to the first phase of industrialisation in Scotland before the era of heavy industry from the 1830s onwards.[11] This case study, therefore, is based upon the premise that is appropriate to examine the importance of this Scottish industry in a political context. In focusing on cotton lobbying, however, there is a danger of seeming to marginalise the significance of important Scottish

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[7] *Ibid*., 25.
[8] Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 221-222; T.M. Devine, 'Urbanisation' in T.M. Devine and Rosalind Mitchison (eds), *People and Society in Scotland Vol I* (Edinburgh, 1992), pp. 29-36; Bob Harris and Charles McKean, *The Scottish Town in the Age of the Enlightenment* (Edinburgh, 2014).
[9] Whatley, *Industrial Revolution in Scotland*, 25; Stuart M. Nesbit, 'The Rise of the Cotton Factory in Eighteenth Century Renfrewshire', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Paisley, 2003); idem., 'The Making of Scotland's First Industrial Region: The Early Cotton Industry in Renfrewshire', *Journal of Scottish Historical Studies* 29 (2009), 1-28.
[10] Whatley, *Industrial Revolution in Scotland*, 26.
[11] *Ibid*., 26-28; Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 229-231; T.M. Devine, 'Industrialisation' in T.M. Devine, C.H. Lee and G. C. Peden (eds), *The Transformation of Scotland: The Economy Since 1700* (Edinburgh, 2005), pp. 34-70; W.W. Knox, *Hanging by a Thread: The Scottish Cotton Industry, c. 1850-1914* (Preston, 1995).

interests that were neither industrial nor commercial, such as religious or legal interests, which might, in turn produce only a partial picture of the shifting relationship between Scottish society and the British Parliament and state. Nevertheless, despite this, an approach which focuses on what became the most important Scottish economic interest during this period should illuminate certain important aspects of Scotland's developing role and place within the British Union-state.

The focus of this chapter is twofold: firstly, it examines the effectiveness of Scottish cotton lobbying throughout this period so as to better understand the level of engagement, and the nature of the relationship, between important Scottish interests and the British political centre. As has already been noted, lobbying efficacy is difficult for the historian to measure and previous scholars of lobbying in Westminster and the British state during the long eighteenth century have often simply conducted an analysis of lobbying successes and failures.[12] This case study, however, takes a more cautious approach which is mindful of the different factors upon which lobbying success depended during this period, many of which lobbyists themselves could not control. These might include encountering opposition from rival interests, such as the East India Company which, certainly in the early years of this period, was a formidable rival to the cotton lobby and far more influential with ministers.[13] Moreover, it was particularly difficult for lobbyists to achieve all of their stated objectives if they conflicted with the general tenor of government policy.[14] The ministry's need to raise revenue through taxation during an almost uninterrupted period of prolonged warfare between 1793

[12] Examples over the last few decades include: Alison G. Olson, 'The London Mercantile Lobby and the Coming of the American Revolution', *The Journal of American History* 69 (1982), 21-41; Andrew O'Shaughnessy, 'The Formation of a Commercial Lobby: The West India Interest, British Colonial Policy and the American Revolution', *The Historical Journal* 40 (1997), 71-95.

[13] For a view of this period as seeing the decline of the East India Company, however, see Anthony Webster, *The Twilight of the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-Asian Commerce and Politics 1790-1860* (Woodbridge, 2009).

[14] Perry Gauci makes a similar point about the West India lobby in the first half of the eighteenth century in 'Learning the Ropes of Sand: The West India Lobby, 1714-1760 in Perry Gauci (ed.), *Regulating the British Economy, 1660-1850* (Farnham, 2011), pp. 120-121.

and 1815, for example, made it particularly difficult for economic interests to prevent or repeal successfully what they considered to be fiscal impositions.[15] At the same time, lobbies were driven frequently by short-term factors, particularly economic crises or depressions, which forced them to act towards ministers and Parliament in a reactive or a defensive manner, particularly if they were in search of immediate financial relief, such as the Scottish linen lobby's unsuccessful attempts in the early 1770s to raise protective duties on imports during the sharp depression partly caused by the Ayr Bank crisis in 1772.[16] This might cause them to present unrealistic proposals to government, or it could result in splits and tensions within what might otherwise be a united lobby, but it was nevertheless typical of lobbying behaviour. This chapter, therefore, examines the efficacy of Scottish cotton lobbyists while recognising these limitations as an inevitable reality of interest politics, particularly their tendency to be reactive, which was a feature of their political activity throughout this period. It observes their developing ability to operate more effectively within these constraints, such as their growing flexibility and astuteness which allowed them to adapt to changing political circumstances and enabled them increasingly to achieve success, even when this might appear quite limited. This involved building on the changes developed during the 1780s, including the regional organisation of commercial and manufacturing interests, particularly in the west of Scotland, and a strengthening political coordination between different parts of this growing and increasingly diverse industry on both sides of the Anglo-Scottish border, as well as a concerted effort to develop closer relations with ministers and to align their interests with the ministry's agenda. Part of the underlying narrative of this chapter, therefore, is how an important Scottish economic interest became more effective at influencing the British state for its advantage, and generally more adept at operating within the British political system.

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[15] Patrick O'Brien, 'Public Finance and the Wars with France 1793-1815' in H.T. Dickinson (ed.), *Britain and the French Revolution, 1789-1815* (Basingstoke, 1989), pp. 165-85.
[16] Bob Harris, 'Towards a British Political Economy: An Eighteenth-Century Scottish Perspective' in Perry Gauci (ed.), *Regulating the British Economy*, 96.

The second and perhaps more salient focus of this chapter is the fragmentation of a 'national' Scottish textile interest and the gradual integration of Scottish cotton interests into a larger British industrial lobby. The growth of the cotton industry in Scotland was part of a broader development of cotton manufacturing throughout the British Isles during this period. As in Scotland, the growth of the cotton industry in England was remarkable, particularly in the region around Lancashire and Cheshire. By the end of the eighteenth century, Robert Peel, the Lancashire textile manufacturer and father of the future Prime Minister of the same name, owned and ran 23 different mills.[17] Cotton was therefore an exceptionally fast-growing industry in Britain as a whole throughout this period, which accounted for, according to certain estimates, 2.6 per cent of value added to British industry in 1770, growing to 17 per cent by 1831.[18] Moreover, although the introduction of cotton manufacturing to both countries began as seemingly separate enterprises, with the first English spinning mills established a decade before the opening of the first Scottish cotton spinning mill, there were industrial connections across the Anglo-Scottish border from very early in this period.[19] While the Scottish industry emerged and progressed initially because it was protected against Arkwright's English patent on his carding machine by Scots law, the first Scottish spinning mill in Penicuik was built on the instructions of John Hackett, a former employee of Arkwright and an acquaintance of the Lancastrian inventor of the spinning jenny, James Hargreaves.[20] Arkwright himself made a much publicised visit to Scotland in 1784, supposedly to 'find a razor' in order to 'shave' his competitors in Manchester, whereupon he was made an honorary burgess and guild brother in Glasgow and awarded the freedom of the city of Perth.[21] Following this, several new spinning

[17] Sven Beckert, *Empire of Cotton: A New History of Global Capitalism* (London, 2014), p. 71.
[18] N.F.R. Crafts, *British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 17-24. Crafts initially estimated the value added in 1831 to be 22.4 per cent, although this was later revised to 17 per cent in idem. and C.K. Harley, 'Output growth and the British industrial revolution: a restatement of the Crofts-Harley view', *Economic History Review* 45 (1992), 709.
[19] Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 219.
[20] *Ibid.*, 219.
[21] A.J. Cooke, 'Richard Arkwright and the Scottish Cotton Industry', *Textile History* 10 (1979), 196-202.

mills were established at New Lanark, Woodside, Stanley and Deanston with his involvement, and his principles of cotton spinning inspired various other Scottish cotton enterprises.[22] These connections strengthened and diversified during the early nineteenth century, exemplified by Kirkman Finlay who developed his west of Scotland textile business, James Finlay & Co., into a widely extended commercial and industrial concern with partnerships and trading connections throughout Britain, Europe, North America, the West Indies, and eventually India.[23] The interconnected nature of the cotton industry throughout Britain was reflected, therefore, in the political sphere: the cotton interest north of the border was not simply a 'national' Scottish concern but began as part of a loose network of allied sectoral interests throughout the British Isles and, over this period, gradually assimilated into a broader 'British' commercial and industrial lobby. This was a significant departure from lobbying on behalf of the Scottish linen industry which only intermittently sought links with other linen interests in Ireland and the north of England, and the impulse towards integration was much stronger and systematic from the outset in the case of cotton.[24] This chapter, therefore, is also a study of how a new and important Scottish interest become part of an identifiably 'British' lobby, and how this reflected and was part of a broader convergence of Scottish and English political cultures.

In order to explore these themes more thoroughly, this chapter is organised into four sections, the first of which surveys briefly the construction of the cotton interest and the developing frameworks through which it operated during this period. The analysis then shifts to a more clearly focused and chronologically-organised examination of the lobby's activities beginning in the 1780s and ending in the early 1830s. This is divided into three sub-periods which cover, broadly, the rise of the Scottish cotton interest in the 1780s and its initial

[22] Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 226.
[23] Colm Brogan, *James Finlay & Company Limited: Manufacturers and East India Merchants* (Glasgow, 1951).
[24] Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 56; Harris, 'Towards a British Political Economy', 88, 96-97, and 104.

experiences of lobbying; its increasing effectiveness and flexibility during the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars; before finishing with an analysis of its status as one part of a powerful, and increasingly diverse, manufacturing and commercial lobby in the post-1815 global order.

I

Constructing an interest

As Vivien Dietz has argued, the period following the end of the American War of Independence saw manufacturers become far more influential as political actors in Westminster and Whitehall. Whereas earlier in the eighteenth century they had been effectively excluded from the political process and dependent on commercial lobbies to represent their interests, the 1780s saw them increasingly active on their own behalf. Their collective opposition to new excise taxes, together with a greater confidence gained from the buoyancy of their industries caused by technological improvements, encouraged them to organise in unprecedented ways to influence government policy.[25] In a Scottish context, as shown in the previous chapter, the establishment of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce was a manifestation of this development, although its membership of merchants *and* manufacturers shows the continuing interconnection between commerce and industry. The cotton industry still depended on commerce as the production of cotton goods depended on imported raw materials, initially from the West Indies and South America, and it grew to be, of all the textile industries, the most export oriented. In addition, there was a direct link in that many Scottish colonial merchants became involved in the cotton industry, transferring capital as well as expertise.[26]

[25] V.E. Dietz, 'Before the Age of Capital: Manufacturing Interests and the British State, 1780-1800', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Princeton University, 1991), pp. 9-14.
[26] Devine, 'The colonial trades and industrial development in Scotland', 1-13.

R.H. Campbell has argued, indeed, that without this commercial framework, the industrial development of the years 1780 to 1830 would not have been possible.[27]

More importantly, however, cotton manufacturing in Scotland grew from the linen industry, specifically fine linen manufacturing which was dominant in the west of Scotland. The largest group of the cotton industry's earliest entrepreneurs were linen, flax, and silk dealers, as well as textile printers, dyers, bleachers and finishers who could transfer their specialisms to cotton manufacturing.[28] However, whereas the growth of the Scottish linen industry had long depended on mercantilist support from the state, in 1786 the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce asserted – ironically in a plea for financial support from the Board of Trustees – that, 'without public aid', the cotton industry had 'taken deep root in Scotland' and had 'become an object of much national importance'.[29] This interesting statement contradicted the norm of eighteenth century political economy, which emphasised state support for British textiles, notably in linen, but also wool, silk and worsted.[30] Nevertheless, the cotton manufacturers' fine linen predecessors had long benefitted from state support in the form of a prohibition on the import of French cambrics and lawns, first imposed by Parliament in 1745 which had been subsequently renewed, strengthened and extended five times until it was ended in 1786 as a concession made by Glasgow representatives during negotiations preceding the Eden Treaty.[31] Therefore, although the cotton industry's initial rise may not have been a

[27] R.H. Campbell, 'The making of the industrial city' in T.M. Devine and Gordon Jackson (ed.), *Glasgow, Volume I: Beginnings to 1830* (Manchester, 1995), p. 194.
[28] Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 224.
[29] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fo. 170 (24 January 1786).
[30] O'Brien, Griffiths and Hunt, 'Political Components of the Industrial Revolution'; Tim Keirn, 'Parliament, Legislation and the Regulation of the English Textile Industries, 1689-1714' in Lee Davison, Tim Hitchcock, Tim Keirn and Robert B. Shoemaker (eds)., *Stilling the Grumbling Hive: the Response to Social and Economic Problems in England, 1689-1750* (Stroud, 1992), pp. 1-24; Negley B. Harte, 'The Rise of Protection and the English Linen Industry, 1690-1790' in Negley B. Harte and Kenneth G. Ponting (ed.), *Textile History and Economic History: Essays in Honour of Miss Julia de Lucy Mann* (Manchester, 1973), pp. 74-112; Raymond L. Sickinger, 'Regulation or Ruination: Parliament's Consistent Pattern of Mercantilist Regulation of the English Textile Trade, 1660-1800', *Parliamentary History* 19 (2000), 211-32.
[31] It was eventually ended in return for allowing British cottons and muslins into the French market on a duty not exceeding that by which French cambrics and lawns were admitted into Britain: GCA, TD1670/1/1, fo. 176.

consequence of state-sponsored encouragement, it had nevertheless been born into a protectionist lobbying culture.

The initial campaigns on behalf of Scottish cotton interests were conducted in the early 1780s as part of an extended textile lobby, dominated by the linen interest, and were in pursuit of protectionist objectives. They were usually organised through the Convention of Royal Burghs and often received the support of a group of assiduous Scottish MPs, such as in 1780-1 when the bounty on the export of coarse linens (established in 1742) was successfully extended to all printed goods, including cottons.[32] This was followed in 1783 with a campaign, organised through the Convention of Royal Burghs and the new Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, and was led by Patrick Colquhoun, to propose a bill encouraging the linen and cotton industries as a form of compensation for the disadvantages they faced relative to Irish textiles which did not pay any excise duties. A drawback was proposed on all soap and starch consumed in preparing the raw materials of flax and cotton for manufacture, as well as on the brimstone and saltpetre used in making oil of vitriol for bleaching, and it was subsequently passed.[33] This legislation was highly valued by the industry and was guarded jealously, with periodic campaigns to renew it being conducted well into the nineteenth century. It supported the printing, bleaching and finishing branches of both cotton and linen industries and was powerful testimony to the initial link between both these interests and their lobbying activities. Similar to the linen interest, early Scottish cotton lobbyists spent much of their time campaigning to remove fiscal impositions placed on them by the ministry, such as Pitt the Younger's budget in 1784 which placed taxes on fustians and printed goods. This again united linen and cotton manufacturers; indeed George Dempster, who had long been a defender of the

[32] ECA, SL30/1/1/14 (Convention of Royal Burghs minutes, 1776-1790) 11 July 1781. The Scottish MPs were Henry Dundas (then Lord Advocate), Sir Lawrence Dundas, William Pulteney, George Dempster, Andrew Stewart, Crawford Drummond, Lord Frederick Campbell and Sir Adam Fergusson.
[33] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fo. 24; TD1670/4/16, Colquhoun to Hamilton, 9 June 1783, same to same 21 June 1783, same to same 24 June 1783, same to same 25 July 1783 enclosing 'Resolved of the House of Commons 24 July 1783'.

Scottish linen interest as MP for the Perth Burghs, boasted of 'that Alliance which I had some hand in forming between the Linen and Cotton Manufacturers' in the campaign against the duties on printed linens and cottons.[34]

The cotton industry, however, was never a 'national' Scottish industry in the same way that linen had been, and was, partly because of this, far more inclined to seek political alliances throughout the British Isles from the early 1780s onwards, particularly in opposition to the ministry's fiscal policies. This was also partly a matter of degree and context: as we have already seen, Scottish linen lobbyists had on several occasions readily worked with similar interests in the north west of England and in Ireland to lobby the ministry and to petition the Westminster Parliament. Yet early participants in the Scottish cotton industry appear to have recognised its great potential for growth on both sides of the Anglo-Scottish border which would in turn promote cooperation and coordination in lobbying. A Perthshire linen manufacturer and bleacher, William Sandeman, expressed his support and admiration for the young cotton industry during a tour south of the border in 1784 to observe manufacturing towns in the Midlands and in Lancashire.[35] From there he wrote to Gilbert Hamilton, the secretary of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, of how the spread of this industry in England had important political consequences for the Scottish industry. He expressed solidarity with the manufacturers whom he met in Nottingham, Birmingham and Manchester, promising 'that they will find in Scotland a ready concurrence to every measure that shall be thought proper for bringing forth the sense of the great manufacturing part so as the common & united voice of all may come with the weight becoming so great & important a concern to [the] ministry.'[36] He expressed concern about the lack of a coordinated lobbying effort to defend itself against what he saw as excessive taxation, and he was particularly troubled that different branches of

[34] PKCA, B59 24/8/32/1 (Perth Burgh records), George Dempster to George Faichney (Provost of Perth), 24 July 1784.
[35] C.D. Waterston, *Perth Entrepreneurs: the Sandemans of Springfield* (Perth, 2008), pp. 27-33.
[36] GCA, TD1670/4/22, William Sandeman to Hamilton, 24 November 1784.

the industry saw each other as rivals, something he experienced in Manchester where the calico printers and dyers could not come to any accord over their opposition to Pitt's taxes.[37] Sandeman warned that he would be 'vexed exceedingly if the Lancashire people from a partial view of the matter with regard to their own immediate deliverance should influence the putting off or delaying a general application of the manufacturing interest.'[38] Indeed he presciently proposed a body to represent cotton in the political arena as a British enterprise, 'where Deputies from the Manufacturing towns both in South & North Britain may meet'. He encouraged the Glasgow Chamber to communicate with Samuel Garbett on the Birmingham Commercial Committee and to lead the Scottish effort with the help of Perthshire and Aberdeen manufacturers.[39] Even in its earliest engagements, therefore, there was an assumption, at least in certain quarters, that the Scottish cotton lobby ought to operate as part of a broader network of British textile manufacturing interests.

Nevertheless, this presupposed that there was a cohesive Scottish cotton lobby to begin with. Such an entity was throughout this period a fluid alliance of the different branches of the cotton industry and trade in Scotland, and was constructed at the beginning in the 1780s primarily with the aid and direction of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce. Cotton manufacturers in the Chamber would often work in collaboration with a committee of bleachers and printers in Perth, in particular to defend and call for the renewal of the 1783 act encouraging flax and cotton production in which they were mostly successful, except for the ending of the drawback for brimstone used in making oil of vitriol in 1803.[40] They campaigned together on any and all matters concerned with printing and bleaching textiles, usually concerning taxation.

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[37] *Ibid*., Same to same, 15 November 1784. Internal rivalries within the Lancashire industry were common: Edwards has written of how the Lancastrian fustian manufacturers viewed calico and muslin branches as part of the competition: Michael M. Edwards, *The Growth of the British Cotton Trade, 1780-1815* (Manchester, 1967), p. 37.
[38] GCA, TD1670/4/22, Sandeman to Hamilton, 27 December 1784.
[39] *Ibid*., Sandeman to Hamilton, 24 November 1784. See also same to same 27 December 1784, same to same 31 December 1784 and TD1670/4/23, same to same 5 January 1785 where, for his efforts, Sandeman was made an honorary member of the Chamber.
[40] GCA, TD1670/1/2 (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce minutes, Vol. II), fo. 326.

From the 1790s into the nineteenth century, different branches of the Scottish cotton interest, from both the commercial and industrial sectors, formed committees under the auspices of the Glasgow Chamber, such as the calico printers chaired by John Stirling in 1801, through which representatives of the relevant interests from different parts of Scotland would meet, discuss, and propose lobbying campaigns, a process based on the practices of the Glasgow Chamber and designed to promote unity and prevent tensions from emerging – pursuing the 'logic' of lobbying, outlined in the previous chapter. In February 1803, for example, all those involved in the cotton interest in the west of Scotland – raw cotton importers, cotton spinners, weavers, printers and bleachers – formed a committee under the chairmanship of Archibald Campbell, a prominent West India merchant.[41] These committees reported regularly to the Glasgow Chamber's directors who would usually act on their applications, and the Chamber continued to play a very important role in reconciling and mediating between different interests within the same industry. This ensured that, throughout this period, the Scottish cotton industry, despite being disparate and multifaceted, was able to unite under the umbrella of representation afforded by the Glasgow Chamber, and that it established a clear and strong voice so as to influence effectively the British political centre. This, in addition to the capital investment provided by colonial merchants in Glasgow, is what has led R.H. Campbell to describe the Scottish cotton industry, which was then spread throughout different parts of Scotland, as being 'in Glasgow hands'.[42]

Later in this period, the concentration of the cotton manufacturing around Glasgow, Paisley, and the general west of Scotland area, enabled Scottish cotton lobbyists to assimilate within new and developing institutional frameworks through which they could generate even closer ties with parts of the lobby south of the border. Cotton interests were involved in the

[41] GCA, TD1670/4/99, Archibald Campbell to Cunningham Corbett, 14 February 1803.
[42] Campbell, 'The making of the industrial city', 198.

creation of the Glasgow West India Association in 1807, as well as the establishment of the Glasgow East India Association in 1812-13 and again in 1829-33. The Glasgow East India Association was established in order to lobby for the abolition of the East India Company's monopoly and greater access to Indian trade during the discussions surrounding the expiration and negotiated renewal of the Company's Charter between 1812 and 1814. Its importance insofar as the Scottish cotton industry was concerned is shown by the fact that, as Yukihisa Kumagai has demonstrated recently, of the 47 members of the Association's General Committee, 28 were directly connected with manufacturing, with 21 holding stocks in cotton spinning and manufacturing, as well as other textile industries, including prominent figures from the Scottish cotton industry such as Kirkman Finlay, Archibald Buchanan, John Gordon, Alexander Campbell and Robert Owen.[43] They were joined by other commercial and industrial interests, such as West Indian and American traders, sugar refiners, iron manufacturers, and other smaller interests. This cooperation between different economic interests in the pursuit of shared political objectives was obviously not new: indeed, many of these figures were simultaneously members of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, which continued as the primary channel used by Scottish cotton lobbyists until the end of our period. Nevertheless, the scale of this cooperation around a single political issue demonstrates how by this period a highly organised and professional lobby comprising a diverse array of commercial and industrial interests could be constructed. This scale is further underlined by the fact that this was a truly 'British' lobby; the creation of the Glasgow East India Association took place in association and in tandem with the establishment of similar organisations in Manchester, Birmingham, and especially Liverpool, with the similarly named Liverpool East India Association. This created a very powerful mercantile and manufacturing lobby from some of

[43] Yukihisa Kumagai, *Breaking into the monopoly: provincial merchants and manufacturers' campaigns for access to the Asian market, 1790-1833* (Leiden, 2013), pp. 42-46 & 54.

the largest urban industrial centres and regions on both sides of the Anglo-Scottish border, to which British ministers were compelled to listen, and in which Scottish cotton interests played a prominent part. In this way, it mirrored changes in the West India lobby, which in the early nineteenth century was developing similar lobbying institutional structures, such as West India associations in Liverpool in 1799 and Glasgow in 1807.[44] Of course, this type of large-scale industrial lobbying was not a constant feature of interest politics by the end of our period; the Glasgow East India Association dissolved in 1814 and only reconvened fifteen years later in 1829 for a similarly large-scale campaign for access to trade with China, as we shall see in more detail below. Nor did it herald a revolutionary change in the way Scottish cotton and other commercial and industrial interests organised and campaigned in the early nineteenth century. The Glasgow Chamber had instigated the creation of the Glasgow East India Association as a temporary lobbying operation, providing it with several of its more prominent members and lobbyists, such as Kirkman Finlay who was chairman of the Glasgow Chamber on eight separate occasions, as well as the Lord Provost of Glasgow and MP for the Glasgow Burghs during the 1810s. Afterwards, the Glasgow Chamber continued as the main channel through which cotton and other Scottish interests engaged with the politics of Westminster and Whitehall, although the role in this context developed and adapted as we shall see in the next section.

[44] Alexandra Franklin, 'Enterprise and Advantage: The West India Interest in Britain, 1774-1840', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Pennsylvania, 1992), ch. 2; T.M. Devine, 'An Eighteenth Century Business Elite: Glasgow-West India merchants, 1750-1815', *Scottish Historical Review* 57 (1978), 40-67; Anthony Cooke, 'An Elite Revisited: Glasgow West India Merchants, 1783-1877', *Journal of Scottish Historical Studies* 32 (2012), 141-2; Douglas J. Hamilton, '"Defending the Colonies Against Malicious Attacks of Philanthropy": Scottish Campaigns Against the Abolitions of the Slave Trade and Slavery' in Allan I. Macinnes and Douglas J. Hamilton (eds), *Jacobitism, Enlightenment and Empire, 1680-1820* (London, 2014), pp. 193-208.

II

Lobbying in the early Pittite state, 1784-1793

The early activities of Scottish cotton lobbyists saw them responding to a series of important political and economic challenges thrown up by the aftermath of the American War and the subsequent imposition of innovative fiscal policies by a new ministry, as outlined in the last chapter. Operating through the newly-established Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, they were represented initially amongst other west of Scotland textile interests. This was particularly apparent in the Glasgow Chamber's campaign to London in 1785 in what we have already seen was an important moment, both for Glasgow commercial and industrial interests, as well as for Pitt's ministry. Pitt's budget of 1784 imposed taxes on cottons and printed textiles, which were greeted with hostility by representatives of the new Scottish cotton industry who viewed them as an imposition on their young industry which, they feared, risked being strangled at birth. The 1785 campaign saw Patrick Colquhoun seek to work with Lancastrian cotton and fustian manufacturers to present a common line to the ministry and Parliament. They were eventually rewarded with an assurance from Pitt that the tax on white cotton and muslins would be repealed.[45] Further coordinated lobbying to repeal the printed goods tax by Lancashire, Cheshire and Glaswegian delegates resulted in a compromise with George Rose, the Secretary to the Treasury, which included a new protecting duty on foreign printed muslins.[46] It was an effective lobby with a fairly standard objective – namely, opposition to new taxes – which succeeded partly because it was united across national and along sectoral lines, as well as being prepared to compromise with ministers.

Nevertheless, relations between the new lobby and the ministry remained strained in 1785 over the Glasgow Chamber's opposition to Pitt's Irish Commercial Resolutions based on

[45] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fo. 138.
[46] *Ibid*., fos. 139-140; TD1670/4/30, Colquhoun to Hamilton, 4 May 1785, same to same 5 May 1785.

the belief that their Irish rivals would gain greater access to the British market without reciprocal arrangements for British cottons in the Irish market. This was a more complicated matter than simply opposing specific taxes and acted as something of a touchstone for the challenges and difficulties which Scottish cotton lobbyists would encounter throughout this period. Pitt, as a new and inexperienced minister, had attempted to create a more 'open trade' between the two kingdoms and thus walk a fine line between satisfying both British and Irish business interests. He failed, partly because of the inadequate consultation with British manufacturers due to the recent abolition of the Board of Trade, as we have already seen, but also because of the inability of both the British and Irish industries to cease seeing one another as rivals.[47] Representatives of Glasgow manufacturers, including Ilay Campbell and Patrick Colquhoun, wrote to Pitt on behalf of cotton and muslin, as well as other textile manufacturers, dismayed that they would be disadvantaged, while being sure to emphasise that their aim was simply to 'correct those parts of it [the bill] which they think hostile to the General Principle of Equality' and to promote 'liberality' and a truly reciprocal and open trade.[48] At a meeting in Downing Street on 26 March, however, they failed to convince Pitt to alter the proposed duties on 'Scottish manufactures sent to Ireland'.[49] Colquhoun had despaired that 'nothing can be done for poor Scotland' after Pitt refused to give any ground, forcing the Glasgow representatives into outright opposition.[50] Pitt appears to have been irritated by letters and memorials sent by Patrick Colquhoun on behalf of the Glasgow Chamber, writing in his notes on their submissions: 'Several of the… complaints marked in the Paper are too general to admit

[47] Harris, 'Towards a British Political Economy', 86. For the broader context, see Witt Bowden, 'The Influence of the Manufacturers on Some of the Early Policies of William Pitt', *The American Historical Review* 29 (1924), 655-74, and Dietz, 'Before the Age of Capital', ch. 3.
[48] TNA, PRO30/8/321 (Chatham papers), fos. 211-212,'Memorial relative to the White Cotton and Muslin Manufactory carried on in The City and Neighbourhood of Glasgow, 1785'; Paul Kelly, 'British and Irish Politics in 1785', *English Historical Review* 90 (1975), 548-9.
[49] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fo. 138.
[50] GCA, TD1670/4/28 and 29 *in passim*.

of a possible Answer'.[51] Their participation in the early meetings of the General Chamber of Manufactures, along with opposition Whigs, undoubtedly infuriated Pitt, who did not disguise his contempt for this institution, and it temporarily caused a deterioration in the relationship between the Scottish commercial and industrial lobbyists and the ministry.[52]

As we have already seen, however, the Glasgow Chamber and its constituent interests, including cotton, were nevertheless more determined to secure a deal with the ministry than some of their English counterparts in the General Chamber of Manufactures. Renewed negotiations between the Glasgow delegates and Pitt led to an agreement on the 'Prohibiting duties on Our Scots Manufactures…by fixing moderate duties' on both countries to protect their respective linen industries and Scotland's cotton industry. According to this agreement, any subsequent changes to the duties placed on British muslins and calicoes imposed by Ireland would be decided at a future date and the revenue offices of England, Scotland and Ireland were to have a 'Book of Rates' to be approved by both parliaments.[53] The following month, Henry Dundas personally promised Colquhoun that 'every exertion' would be 'made to remove all future cause of complaint'.[54] This episode demonstrated the learning curve that cotton lobbyists – as well as the British ministry – were experiencing during the 1780s. If a British cotton lobby can be said to have existed, it was a very loose network of disparate interests connected, rather tenuously, through the short-lived General Chamber of Manufactures. The Scottish cotton interest was itself still part of a Scottish textile lobby which was probably more concerned for the more identifiably 'Scottish' linen industry and its rivalry with the Irish linen interest. Nonetheless, this Scottish lobby had, more than its equivalents south of the border,

[51] TNA, PRO 30/8/321, fo. 241, 'Papers from the Lord Advocate containing Extracts from Glasgow respecting the Irish Business'.
[52] When instructing William Eden to negotiate a trade treaty with France the next year, Pitt emphasized the need to give 'as little employment or encouragement as possible to the Chamber of Commerce taken collectively': *The Journal and Correspondence of William, Lord Auckland* (London, 1861), vol. I, pp. 90-91.
[53] GCA, TD1670/4/30, Colquhoun to Hamilton, 23 May 1785; Alexander Brown to Hamilton, 28 May 1785.
[54] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fos. 136-145.

shown itself willing to negotiate for a more open trade with their Irish rivals, so long as their industry was not disadvantaged. It had, therefore, learned to cultivate a close relationship with the ministry, thereby enabling it to achieve some, if not all, of its objectives, contrary to the actions of its more opposition-minded colleagues in the General Chamber of Manufactures. The ministry, for its part, was concerned to take proper soundings from commercial and industrial representatives in the future. Pitt re-established the Board of Trade in 1786 and appointed to it, amongst others, his former political adversary, William Eden, who was tasked with negotiating a trade deal with France. Pitt instructed Eden to 'collect, from all parts of the Kingdom, a just representation of the interests of the various branches of trade and manufactures which can be affected by the French arrangement', demonstrating the new importance given to consultation in his approach to economic and fiscal policy.[55] The new 'Committee of Trade' began taking consultations in January 1786 from manufacturers and merchants from across Britain and Ireland, and Eden personally maintained a correspondence with many of these representatives during his negotiations in Paris.[56] This was a new and important channel of communication between these interests and the ministry and one which, if used carefully, Scottish cotton lobbyists might exploit to their advantage over the long-term.

Nevertheless, the cotton industry's first experience of economic instability demonstrated the extent to which short-term factors could drive lobbying activity. In the summer of 1787 a depression in the British cotton industry caused production temporarily to overtake consumption.[57] The young Scottish cotton industry was particularly vulnerable, having already experienced failures at the Rothesay Mills on Bute in 1785 and then at the Penuick Mills in 1788-9 during which time three major spinning partnerships in Renfrewshire

[55] *Auckland Journal*, i, 91.
[56] TNA, BT 6/113 (Board of Trade papers), Eden's collection of evidence, un-paginated. See also: BL, Add. MS. 34462 (Auckland papers); John Ehrman, *The British Government and Commercial Negotiations with Europe, 1783-1793* (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 183-184 and idem., *The Younger Pitt: The Years of Acclaim* (London, 1969), pp. 491-2.
[57] Edwards, *British Cotton Trade*, 11.

were dissolved and the mills put on the market.[58] The industrial panic induced by this crisis prompted a campaign on behalf of the British cotton industry during 1787-89, in which Scottish lobbyists played a major role, which was designed to protect British cotton piece goods against competition in the domestic market from the East India Company. A 'general meeting' was first called in Scotland in January 1788 to establish a committee of those involved in the west of Scotland cotton industry, where the East India Company was immediately blamed for 'dumping' their piece goods on the domestic market, particularly by muslin manufacturers who were new to the business of imitating India cotton goods. This temporary regional gathering resolved to send a deputation of the Scottish cotton interest to London to lobby government ministers and Parliament, led by Patrick Colquhoun, acting in his new role as the Glasgow Chamber's permanent lobbying agent.[59]

In many ways this campaign forged a deeper integration of something resembling a 'British' cotton lobby in which Scottish lobbyists played a leading part. The fear of East India Company competition in the domestic market was not confined to Scotland; it was conceived to be a problem for the industry throughout Britain and prompted Colquhoun and John Dunlop, a Glasgow merchant and leading figure in the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, to coordinate their intervention with delegates from south of the border, particularly from Manchester. In doing so, they took a leading role in forming an Anglo-Scottish lobby and represented it in several meetings with Pitt, Hawkesbury, and Dundas.[60] They forwarded petitions and

[58] *Glasgow Mercury*, 14 June 1788 (Todd, Shortridge, Perston & Bartholomew), February 1789 (Monteath, Finlay & Dunmore), July 1789 (Osburn at Thornliebank). Cooke, *The Scottish cotton industry*, 52; Nesbit, 'The Rise of the Cotton', 145.

[59] TNA, BT 6/140, fos. 36-39, 'At a General Meeting of the Cotton Spinners, and Manufacturers of White Cottons and Muslins, and others interested in the success and extension of the Cotton-Manufactory of Great Britain, residing in Glasgow, Paisley, and the neighbourhood, held in the Tontine-Tavern in the City of Glasgow, on Wednesday 13th February, 1788.' Further minutes were printed from Wednesday 20 February 1788.

[60] Harvard Business School, Baker Library, 44LTE 'Manuscript Memorandum of Cotton Manufacture in Great Britain', Vertical File Collection on textile industry. The inside cover of this volume shows Colquhoun's itinerary which included two meetings with Pitt and Dundas, four with Lord Hawkesbury, and another two meetings with an unnamed official.

memorials articulating an industry-wide view of the 'crisis', and Colquhoun's widely disseminated pamphlet entitled *An Important Crisis in the Callico and Muslin Manufactory in Great Britain, Explained*, was abundant with facts and statistics about East India imports and how they undermined British cotton sales.[61] It emphasised the existential nature of the crisis,[62] asserting that there was a risk that 'half the [British] mills would be thrown idle'.[63] The Board of Trade also received petitions from the proprietors, shareholders, and managers of cotton mills from across Britain, coordinated as part of the same campaign, and this included several Scottish mills such as Stanley in Perthshire, Woodside in Aberdeenshire, and all those in the west of Scotland (signed by Colquhoun, Dunlop, David Dale and others).[64] All blamed their plight on the 'unjust' competition from the East India Company and called for the state to intervene to protect what was presented as a young, vulnerable, but vastly important – both socially and economically – industry.

Despite this coordinated and large-scale lobbying effort, however, the cotton lobby's relative inexperience at this stage, combined with their limited influence when faced with a powerful adversary, prevented them from achieving any of their immediate objectives. To a certain extent, the adverse economic condition of the cotton industry seems to have forced its representatives to overreach in their negotiations with ministers. The delegates called for 'a total restriction of the East India calicoes and muslins for home consumption', arguing that the importation of raw cotton should be increased, while cotton yarns spun in India should be prohibited from being imported for domestic consumption, and that those imported for other

[61] Patrick Colquhoun, *An Important Crisis in the Callico and Muslin Manufactory in Great Britain, Explained* (London, 1788), pp. 10-13. India was described as 'foreign' when it was competing with the British industry, but here 'foreigners' meant non-colonial sources of raw-material.
[62] *Ibid*., 14.
[63] *Ibid*., 20-24.
[64] TNA, BT 6/140, fos. 95-96, 'The Petition of the Proprietors of Cotton Mills and Jennies in the West of Scotland' 8 April 1788'; fo. 129, 'The Petition and Representation of the… Proprietors of the Cotton Spinning Water Mills and Jennies at Stanley in the County of Perth, and at Woodside in the County of Aberdeen.

reasons should not exceed the average of the five years preceding 1788.[65] The East India Company, a far more experienced and powerful lobby, retorted that these propositions would prove 'fatal to the Company and highly injurious to the Nation' as it would push trade from India into foreign channels.[66] The extent of the weaknesses in the cotton lobby's case can be seen from the way in which their representatives proposed and advocated imaginative, but politically unrealistic, schemes to support the industry. One of Colquhoun's main proposals involved establishing an association which would warehouse domestically-produced cotton goods in London and act as a 'vend' in a cotton hall, which he argued would make it easier to sell to foreign markets.[67] This nevertheless encountered opposition within the Scottish industry itself. While Glasgow cotton spinners and muslin and calico manufactures expressed their enthusiasm for the plan to the Board of Trade,[68] similar support was not forthcoming from Paisley from where Andrew Brown wrote on behalf of cotton manufacturers representing their disapproval of such a scheme, arguing that the proposed association would increase irresponsible and adventurous speculation and that prices would be driven too low for the private trade, thus forcing it into ruin.[69] This very significantly hampered Colquhoun's campaign, and undermined the idea of a unified lobby representing the cotton industry. The proposals were considered by the Board of Trade on 23 July 1788 at a meeting attended both

[65] TNA, BT 6/140, fos. 140-141, 'Propositions of the Delegates on behalf of the Cotton Spinners & Callicoe & Muslin Manufacturers in Great Britain humbly submitted to the Right Honourable William Pitt First Lord Commissioner of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer', London 17 April 1788.
[66] *Ibid*., fos. 153-163, 'Observations of the Delegates in behalf of the Callico and Muslin Manufactures in Great Britain on the Answer of the directors of the Hoble East India Company with the New Propositions for finally adjusting the Business', London, 21 May 1788.
[67] Patrick Colquhoun, *Considerations relative to a plan of relief for the cotton manufactory by the establishment of a General Hall in the City of London, for the sale, by auction, at stated periods in the year of the British Cotton Goods* (London, 1788), pp. 11-15.
[68] TNA, BT 6/140, fo. 224, John Riddell to William Fawkner, 25 June 1788.
[69] *Ibid*., fo. 240, 'At a General Meeting of the Cotton Spinners and Muslin and Calico Manufacturers in Paisley held in the Town Hall there the first day of July 1788'.

by Hawksbury and Pitt, where the Board declared themselves to be 'satisfied' with the East India Company Directors' report criticising the proposed 'vend' as unrealistic.[70]

Although the channels of communication between the cotton lobby and the ministry had improved significantly since 1785, Scottish cotton lobbyists were still learning how to influence effectively the ministry's fiscal and economic policies. Representatives of the cotton industry had stressed the economic and social costs of the crisis they were facing as a sufficient reason for the state's protection. This attitude was in evidence even after the main Scottish lobbyists realised they had failed: Dunlop complained to Hawkesbury that their 'patience sufficiently tried by more than three months absence from their homes & businesses in a very critical time [was] nearly exhausted.'[71] Colquhoun wrote to William Fawkner, clerk of the Privy Council, that he was about to leave London and 'this very irksome business', and expressed his 'disappointment in not being able to procure relief for the Manufacture.'[72] The temporary economic depression of 1787-8, and the mill closures which it precipitated, had clearly shaken their confidence prompting their attack on a vastly more powerful rival lobby and advocating protectionist proposals which had no realistic hope of being adopted by ministers. Success in lobbying depended on a variety of factors, not all of which any lobby could control, and which might limit the prospect of achieving all their objectives. In this case, the cotton lobby attempted to persuade the ministry to protect and provide immediate relief for the cotton industry at the expense of a far more powerful and influential rival in the East India Company. Nevertheless, its lack of success in this case is also a measure of the cotton lobby's lack of political astuteness at this stage of its development. Unlike its political adversary, it had not yet found a way to align its interests with the ministry's agenda, and the industry it

[70] TNA, BT 5/5 (Board of Trade minutes), fos. 60-61 (23 July 1788); Vincent T. Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793: New Continents and Changing Values* (2 vols, London, 1952-64), vol. II, p. 507

[71] TNA, BT 6/140, fo. 208, John Dunlop to Lord Hawkesbury, 14 June 1788.

[72] *Ibid*., fos. 199-200, Colquhoun to William Fawkner, 8 June 1788.

represented was not yet of sufficient economic importance to compel ministers to listen to its demands. In the second volume of his seminal work, *The Founding of the Second British Empire,* Vincent Harlow noted: 'in this period the cotton manufacturers were still apprentices in the business, but they were learning fast'.[73] The panic induced by its first major economic setback had clearly exposed weaknesses in the construction of the cotton lobby, as well as the difficulties inherent in lobbying. Nevertheless, in its coordination across the Anglo-Scottish border, as well as in its persistent engagement with the ministry, particularly the new Board of Trade, this campaign also pointed to how the lobby could, and would, continue to develop in future years.

III

Navigating the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815

The next phase in the cotton lobby's development took place during a period of sustained global warfare, during which the British ministry's attempts to finance the British war effort, often through new and innovative ways, unsurprisingly impacted on economic and industrial interests. Patrick O'Brien has argued that the cotton industry's continued growth during this period made government measures to raise revenue, such as taxation, slightly more acceptable.[74] It is probably true that the Scottish and British economies, overall, benefitted from this period of conflict, despite intermittent trade depression and decreased purchasing power caused by price inflation. Unhindered access to the Atlantic trade – which was denied to the French by the Royal Navy blockade – as well as increased demand for military and naval stores, and rising money wages, enabled manufacturing regions throughout Britain to continue

[73] Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793*, ii, 507.
[74] Patrick O'Brien, 'The Triumph and Denouement of the British Fiscal State: Taxation for the Wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, 1793-1815', in Christopher Storrs (ed.), *The fiscal-military state in eighteenth-century Europe: essays in honour of P.G.M Dickson* (Farnham, 2009), pp. 167-200.

to grow.[75] It should be remembered, however, that the horizons of the cotton industry were focused constantly on its survival in the short term and its lobbying activities were often driven therefore by a continued sense of vulnerability. Nevertheless, over this period, Scottish cotton lobbyists grew more adept in their approach to the ministry, learning to choose more carefully those issues on which to campaign, and becoming more politically flexible in their campaign objectives which resulted in their being more effective and influential. This period also saw a profound transformation of the lobby from a loose alliance of manufacturing interests between the industrial urban centres of England and Scotland, into a highly integrated network of professional and politically shrewd business interests.

The beginning of this period demonstrated that the lobby representing the Scottish cotton industry was still learning how to conduct large-scale lobbying operations and that it was particularly prone to purely reactive tactics when prompted by economic panic. This was understandable as the prospects for the cotton industry north of the border looked bleak during a manufacturing depression in the period 1793-4 caused by a tightening of credit conditions after the outbreak of war with France. In 1793, cotton manufacturers in Glasgow and Paisley claimed that the numbers employed in the industry had fallen by half in one year, and the cotton industry in Perth was said to be 'very idle', prices for provisions rising.[76] In the west of Scotland there were two major economic failures: James Dunlop of Garnkirk, a leading merchant went bankrupt, and the economically important Glasgow Arms Bank fell. The bankruptcy of James and Archibald Buchanan, former partners of Richard Arkwright, affected the wider Scottish cotton industry with their two mills in Deanston in Perthshire and Balfron in Stirlingshire, eventually being saved by James Finlay & Co.[77] David Dale confided to his

[75] Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 220.
[76] NRS, GD 51/16/82 (Melville Castle papers), 'Observations on the State of the Cotton and Silk Manufactures at Glasgow and Paisley – October 8th and the Woollen Manufacture at Leeds, October 1793'.
[77] Campbell, 'The Making of the Industrial City', 201.

partner at Catrine that he was struggling to afford the weekly wages of his 'work people' and that he did not want to throw them 'out of employment but alas what can I do[?]'.[78]

The solution initially proposed to combat these ills was, once again, to attack the East India Company and to prevent its monopoly from being renewed in a new Charter. Representations on behalf of the Scottish manufacturers were made to Henry Dundas, their fellow Scot, who had just been appointed President of the Board of Control. Early contact with Dundas was made during 1792 by manufacturers in Glasgow, who joined other industrial lobbyists from Manchester, Exeter, Liverpool and elsewhere, in an attempt to reduce drastically the importation of Indian cotton goods, increase supplies of Indian raw materials, and to reduce substantially the Company's freight charges.[79] John Dunlop and John Monteith from Glasgow made it clear that west of Scotland cotton manufacturers were willing to withdraw their opposition to a renewed monopoly for the Company on condition that its Directors agreed to their demands. These included a prohibition on the importation of piece goods for sale in Britain; a condition that duties on piece goods imported should remain, but that drawbacks on exportation should be reduced; that British merchants should have the right to export manufactures and import raw materials to and from anywhere in the world in their own vessels; and that no British inventions of cotton machinery should be exported to India.[80] Manufacturers from Paisley also sent a petition criticising the Company for restricting the progress of the British cotton industry.[81]

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[78] ML, MS. 63/12 (David Dale correspondence), David Dale to Claude Alexander, 6 June 1786 and 63/17, 24 March 1794.
[79] Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763*-1793, ii, 520. The Glasgow Chamber of Commerce also made known its feelings that the East India Company should no longer have a monopoly: GCA, TD1670/1/2, fos. 140-141. It gave a report on 25 December 1792.
[80] BL, IOR A/2/11 (India Office Records), fos. 139-140, John Dunlop to Henry Dundas, 19 March 1793, fo. 143, John Monteith to Henry Dundas, 19 March 1793; J. Bruce, *Reports on the Negotiation between the Honourable East-India Company and the Public Respecting the Renewal of the Company's Exclusive Privileges of Trade for Twenty Years from March 1794* (1811), pp. viii-xi.
[81] *Ibid*., xvii-xviii.

This campaign, however, exhibited many of the weaknesses of the one conducted several years earlier, with little attempt to align their proposals with the ministry's objectives, and an inability to prevent arguments and divisions within the lobby itself. Whereas Glasgow and Lancashire manufacturers agreed on prohibiting the importation of all India muslins for domestic consumption, a committee in Paisley stated that it would be 'hurtfull, if not ruinous to the Muslin Manufacture'.[82] There was also an optimistic assumption on behalf of some in the Scottish lobby that Dundas would be compelled to side with the Scottish cotton industry against the East India Company because of its value to the Scottish economy. David Dale opined simply that 'we must fall upon some method to get Mr Dundas to… [give] the Inland consumpt to the British Manufacturer'.[83] Yet on 23 April 1793, Dundas, who had hoped to construct a 'regulated monopoly', rejected the manufacturers' demands as 'unreasonable' and retained the East India Company's monopoly in the newly negotiated Charter. He did so, however, whilst assenting to regulations which would provide British merchants and manufacturers with the means to export to India, as well as to import sufficient raw materials at a reasonable rate of freight for their own needs. These measures would encourage the long-term growth of the industry and might, therefore, have been considered a partial success for the cotton lobbyists.[84] Nevertheless, in a public, and doubtless humiliating, rejection of the Scottish industry's demands, Dundas asserted that their proposal of a total ban on imports of Indian goods would result in increased smuggling, and denied that their economic difficulties were in any way related to East India competition, predicting 'that the present distress of the Glasgow and Paisley Manufacture, will soon be succeeded by a greater prosperity in Trade than any they

[82] For Glasgow and Lancashire manufacturers agreeing on a total prohibition, see GCA, TD1670/4/75, minutes from the meeting of the Glasgow committee with John Monteith as Chair, 25 April. For Paisley, see *Ibid*., 'minutes and report form the committee in Paisley, 25 April 1793'; Kumagai, *Breaking into the Monopoly*, 21.
[83] ML, MS. 63/13, Dale to Claude Alexander of Ballochmyle, 12 September 1793.
[84] Webster, *The Twilight of the East India Company*, 36.

have hitherto experienced.'[85] Scottish cotton lobbyists were clearly angry and disappointed with the ministry's response; Dunlop complained to Dundas that manufacturers in the west of Scotland were 'very upset' because they felt their interests had been 'sacrificed to those of a more powerful and favoured rival.'[86] This, however, was indicative of a lack of any well-developed strategy in their relationship with the ministry. Manufacturing interests in the west of Scotland, in a loose alliance with those in Lancashire and elsewhere, had once again acted quickly in an effort to relieve their industry at a time of distress. They had relied on Dundas to come to the aid of his fellow Scots at the expense of their powerful rival without developing their proposals to a state where they chimed with the government's objectives, unlike the East India Company which was seen by the ministers as an essential agency of the British state in the expanding empire in India.[87] Nevertheless, the limited concessions that Dundas had made in response to their representations, as well as those of London and Indian mercantile interests, were indicative of the success that could be achieved, even in difficult circumstances, and despite the overall disappointment of not obtaining their main objectives.

A more astute approach to lobbying appears to have been developed shortly afterwards, however, in response to the ministry's new fiscal policies. The main challenge facing all manufacturing lobbyists throughout the two decades that spanned the wars with France, was defending their industries against taxes imposed by Pitt's ministry in its attempts to raise revenue for the war effort. Patrick O'Brien's work on the Pittite state during the 1780s and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars has shown that taxation on commerce and industry in this period became a crucial source of government revenue. Rough estimates for the financial cost of defeating revolutionary and Napoleonic France suggest a figure of £1,039 million, 58 per cent of which was financed by tax revenue compared to proportions ranging

[85] GCA, TD1670/4/76, 'Copy of a Letter from the Right Honourable Henry Dundas, to the Manufacturers of Glasgow, Whitehall, 23 April 1794'. In print and manuscript.
[86] NLS, MS. 1064 (Melville papers), fos. 104-106, Dunlop to Dundas, 16 September 1793.
[87] Webster, *The Twilight of the East India Company*, 37.

from 19 to 16 per cent in previous eighteenth-century wars. During the first four to five years of the war, Pitt hoped to cover these costs by borrowing, but after four years of unsuccessful warfare, and a growing awareness that the war with France would be more protracted than initially anticipated, he imposed significant tax increases on the cotton industry, amongst others, to finance the war effort.[88] Such new or extended taxes included a customs duty on cotton fibres, an extended excise duty placed on soap used in bleaching, an extended auctions duty, and, perhaps most famously, an excise on printed textiles. From the perspective of the cotton industry, both north and south of the border, they were all unwelcome impositions, but the tax on printed goods was especially troublesome, particularly as the Treasury found it to be a useful form of revenue, bringing in an additional £2.5 million over the course of the wars with France. O'Brien has argued, however, that taxes brought forward by the ministry in this period did not arouse strong opposition on grounds of principle and has suggested that 'patriotism', and an understanding of the need to raise funds for the defence of the realm, may have led to greater compliance.[89] To a certain extent, this attitude does seem to have been reflected in the stance adopted by Scottish cotton lobbyists during this period.

The lobbying activity of cotton and linen printers north of the border suggests that these industries maintained their focus on defending their interests, but were increasingly selective about which taxes they opposed. After Pitt's war finance regime was instituted, cotton lobbyists north of the border were only very rarely stirred into action. Pitt's duty on raw cotton imports, for example, became law in 1798, seemingly without any complaint from Scottish cotton lobbyists, with only minor opposition appearing from Bolton cotton spinners.[90] The only time

[88] Patrick O'Brien, 'Public Finance and the Wars with France 1793-1815' in H.T. Dickinson (ed.), *Britain and the French Revolution, 1789-1815* (Basingstoke, 1989), p. 178. The demands placed on the Bank of England by the ministry in getting it to transform Treasury bills into cash diminished the reserve of bullion. Such transformations reached panic levels in 1797 leading to a suspension of specie payments and Pitt resolved to finance the war effort using tax revenues.
[89] O'Brien, 'The Triumph and Denouement of the British Fiscal State', 185.
[90] *Ibid*., 173-4.

that the Glasgow Chamber was prompted to act against taxation after 1796-7 was in February 1801 when the Treasury proposed an extension in the printed goods tax. The Chamber petitioned the Treasury and enlisted the services of the then MP for the Glasgow Burghs, William McDowall, and this extension was dropped two months later.[91] O'Brien's thesis that 'patriotism' lay behind a lack of opposition from manufacturing interests may therefore require a slight modification in the Scottish case. That is, that it reflected simply a new realism on the part of industrial and commercial lobbyists who subsequently approached their opposition to Pitt's fiscal policies in a more strategic way, selecting those taxes which they considered to be particularly harmful, or which they believed they had the greatest chance of preventing, thereby allowing them to appear more reasonable and affording them a greater prospect of success.

It was perhaps this more strategic approach to opposing ministerial policy which affected their lobbying activity, or lack thereof, during the negotiations leading up to the Act of Union with Ireland in 1799-1800. As the events of 1785 made clear, the British and Irish cotton industries were fierce rivals, with the Scottish industry particularly envious of the state-sponsored encouragements given to its Irish counterpart. In addition to this, new import tariffs established in 1792 by the Irish Parliament effectively excluded British muslins and printed calicoes from the Irish market.[92] For these reasons, the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, on behalf of cotton manufacturers in the west of Scotland and bleachers and printers in Perth, lobbied consistently, and successfully, during this period for the renewal of the 1783 Act which allowed for drawbacks on imported materials used in the bleaching and finishing processes, mentioned earlier.[93] In 1795, for instance, the Glasgow Chamber lobbied Parliament and Pitt with claims that this encouragement allowed them 'in some measure to stand the Competition

[91] GCA, TD1670/1/2, fos. 281-283 (27 February and 8 April 1801).
[92] David Dickson, 'Aspects of the Rise and Decline of the Irish cotton industry' in Cullen and Smout (eds), *Comparative Aspects of Scottish and Irish Economic and Social History*, 104.
[93] GCA, TD1670/4/74, William King (Paisley) to Hamilton, 22 December 1792; TD1670/4/75, Watson, Myers & Russell (Preston), 7 March 1793; Thomas Elder (Edinburgh Town Council), 9 March 1793.

with the Manufacturers of Ireland'.[94] Nevertheless, despite this vocal concern about Irish competition, the record is silent on Scottish cotton manufacturers' attitude towards Union with Ireland. Pitt desired both kingdoms, once united, to agree to a more open trade, and stipulated that any remaining protecting duty should be capped at ten per cent. The existing Irish duty on British calicoes and muslins was, depending on quality, between 35-50 per cent, and the prospect of such a significant cut was enough to outrage Irish cotton manufacturers, who were worried about being undersold in their domestic market.[95] Viscount Castlereagh, the Chief Secretary of Ireland, wrote to Pitt and other members of the ministry stating that he was inclined to concede this point to the Irish manufacturers, proposing that they should retain the current duty whilst agreeing to a steady reduction over the next decade until it reached ten per cent.[96] Pitt and other ministers reluctantly allowed Castlereagh to negotiate on these terms, which were eventually agreed to in article six of the Act of Union.[97] Although one might have expected Scottish and other British cotton manufacturers to oppose viscerally such an arrangement, hardly any such evidence can be found. Robert Peel, the Lancastrian textile manufacturer, appears to have represented the whole of the British cotton industry in a long conference with William Eden – who was then baron Auckland, the Postmaster General – in March 1800 in which he 'and others' reluctantly agreed to 'acquiesce under a conviction that the general arrangement is wise and most beneficial to all'.[98] The ministry does not appear to have been at all troubled by any part of the British cotton lobby, encountering more hostility to the commercial aspects of the Union from English woollen manufacturers. Prohibitive duties on

[94] GCA, TD1670/1/2, fos. 181-184 (16 November and 15 December 1795).
[95] Charles William Vane (ed.), *Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh, second Marquess of Londonderry* (4 vols, London, 1848-52), vol. II, pp. 204-5. See also G.C. Bolton, 'Some British Reactions to the Irish Act of Union', *Economic History Review* 18 (1965), 369-70.
[96] TNA, PRO 30/8/327/1, fos. 43-44, Viscount Castlereagh to Pitt, 20 February 1800.
[97] Vane (ed.), *Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,* ii, p. 248 and pp. 250-1 (duke of Portland to Lord Cornwallis, 6 March 1800 and Pitt to Castlereagh, 7 March 1800). See also the correspondence between Portland and Cornwallis approving the negotiating position taken by Castlereagh: TNA, HO 100/95 (Home Office Ireland papers), fos. 385-397, Portland to Cornwallis (draft), 25 March 1800.
[98] Vane (ed.), *Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount* Castlereagh, ii, 249-250 (baron Auckland to Castlereagh, n.d. but March 1800).

British muslins and calicoes were left at their existing levels until 1808, and were gradually lowered until a full customs union was established eventually in 1824.[99]

There is no obvious explanation as to why British cotton lobbyists were so largely acquiescent in these arrangements. Cullen has noted that the Irish cotton industry was becoming less credible as a rival, and Bolton has argued that 'the growing technological superiority of the British cotton industry enabled it to weather without difficulty any frail competition arising from the recent growth of cotton-spinning in Ireland.'[100] But this does not square with the evident fear felt by parts of the Scottish cotton industry of the threat of Irish competition – they were not to know that the Irish industry would soon go into decline and that the Union would not result in an influx of capital investment into Ireland to support its industries. Perhaps the inactivity of any British cotton lobby on this issue, relative to their vigorous campaign of 1785, is a case of 'the dog that did not bark'. That is, that it was symptomatic of the more careful approach to lobbying that Scottish lobbyists had adopted by this stage, and a greater awareness of ministerial objectives – in this case a major political and constitutional event during an existential global conflict – which prompted them to focus on issues on which they had a greater chance of influencing ministerial policy.

There were nevertheless new challenges in this period with which the cotton lobby had no experience of dealing and for which responses had to be developed. One such emerging problem for cotton manufacturers was the growing activism of cotton employees, notably weavers, against whose campaigns for wage and labour regulation cotton masters felt compelled to defend themselves. The economic depression in 1800-1 fell hard on cotton spinners and weavers at a time of alarm about food shortages; indeed, during this extended period of warfare, the costs of both capital and labour increased for almost all sectors of the British economy.[101]

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[99] Dickson, 'Irish cotton industry', 107.
[100] L.M. Cullen, *An Economic History of Ireland since 1660* (London, 1972), pp. 105-109; Bolton, 'Some British Reactions', 374-5.
[101] O'Brien, 'Triumph and Denouement', 190.

On 13 April 1801, the *Aberdeen Weekly Journal* reported the 'truly lamentable and distressing' state of the muslin and cotton industry in Glasgow and Paisley, where soaring prices for provision, low employment, and poor wages were causing hardship and poverty. It claimed that two-thousand looms had been 'laid aside in the past few weeks'.[102] Christopher Whatley has written of a 'growing distrust' and 'social distancing' between masters and their employees in this period where there was an increased awareness amongst the latter of the prosperity of the former.[103] Organised resistance to employers had been developing during the course of the second half of the eighteenth century. By the late 1780s, handloom weavers in Calton, in Glasgow, were taking action against wage cuts by destroying the work of weavers who worked at the reduced rates, and by the turn of the nineteenth century, weaver-led campaigns were gaining momentum, operating within the industry, and were often led by Bolton fancy-weavers with a large network that spanned much of Britain, including Scotland.[104]

Cotton manufacturers seem to have been unsure in this period about how to counter campaigns conducted by their employees for wage and labour regulation. For example, Robert Peel had decided to seize the initiative by introducing limited child labour regulation on the back of increasing concern on the part of English magistrates.[105] This became the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act, passed in 1802, and, as Joanna Innes has argued, was the precursor for later Factory Acts in forcing Parliament to concede the principle that factory conditions required state regulation. It allowed for a maximum of 12 hours' daily labour, banned children from working at night, provided for whitewashing of walls, ventilation, education, religious instruction, separate dormitories, and periodic inspection by clergymen and magistrates. It

[102] Quoted from Bob Harris, *The Scottish People and the French Revolution* (London, 2008), p. 209.
[103] Whatley, *Scottish Society,* 269.
[104] Joanna Innes, 'Regulating Wages in Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth-Century England' in Perry (ed.), *Regulating the British Economy, 1660-1850*, 209-210.
[105] Joanna Innes, 'Origins of the factory acts: the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act, 1802' in J. M. Beatie and Norma Landau (eds), *Law, Crime and English Society, 1660-1830* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 230-255. For the Act's provisions, see p. 231.

encountered opposition from a manufacturing committee in Manchester, although only after it had passed into law, which produced petitions denouncing the act from all over Britain, including cotton manufacturers in Scotland.[106] But it was too late: cotton manufacturers had already lost the argument and conceded the principle of state regulation of working conditions, not least because one of their number had been responsible for sponsoring the bill in the first place. This revealed their approach in opposition to politicised weaver campaigns to be disorganised and fragmented. Although they would have to concede even more ground later in the early nineteenth century, they would do so as part of a coherent political strategy, rather than as defeated opponents, ensuring that this was an issue around which their opposition would prove more effective in future years.

Perhaps the largest threat to the British cotton industry in this period, however, was the shrinkage of export markets caused by the intensification of the Napoleonic wars. Napoleon's Berlin Decree in 1806 placed the British Isles in a state of blockade, and his Milan Decree of 1807 declared that every vessel from any state coming from or bound for Britain or a British colony was no longer neutral. This caused significant problems for Scottish cotton manufacturers, with the lack of overseas export markets leading to severe economic crises causing high unemployment and social unrest. War-fuelled inflation continued with shortages of grain leading to ever increasing food prices, and Kirkman Finlay, a Glaswegian cotton merchant and manufacturer, stated to a House of Commons committee in 1812 that the cotton industry in Scotland had been in a 'considerable depression' since 1810.[107] The British cotton industry had become dependent on American raw cotton imports and therefore encountered difficulties with the strained relations between the British and United States governments from 1807 onwards. The British Orders of Council in 1807 and 1809 attempted to force all neutral

[106] *Ibid*., 252-3.
[107] Brogan, *James Finlay & Company Limited*, 20.

vessels trading with Europe to pay duties at British ports.[108] This eventually led to the 'War of 1812', during which shipping and colonial interests almost succeeded in persuading the ministry to exclude American cotton in favour of imperial fibres.[109]

At this time, therefore, British industries, including cotton, attempted to find relief in expanding their access to export markets and by securing their supply of raw materials. This was evident in several campaigns which demonstrated further integration of the alliance between commercial and industrial interests throughout the British Isles. Merchants and manufacturers in Birmingham and Liverpool, for example, waged a successful campaign to repeal the Orders of Council in 1812-13.[110] Glaswegian interests also participated in this, but the campaign to open trade to India, which took place simultaneously, is far more instructive about the development of the framework in which Scottish cotton lobbyists operated in this period. Local interests who opposed the Company's monopoly saw another opportunity to gain access to Indian trade in the lead up to the expiration of the Charter in March 1814. The Glasgow Chamber of Commerce in March 1812 appointed a committee to cooperate with other industrial and commercial interests throughout the British Isles to prevent the Company from renewing their monopoly and subscribed 100 guineas to the campaign. At the same time a meeting of merchants and manufacturers was called by John Hamilton, the Lord Provost of Glasgow, which resulted in the establishment of the Glasgow East India Association.[111] This new institution was created to end the exclusion of private British ships from the India trade and to petition Parliament in a large campaign to oppose the renewal of the Company's monopoly.[112]

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[108] Anthony Webster, 'The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization: The East India Company Charter Act of 1813', *Economic History Review* 43 (1990), 405-8.
[109] O'Brien, 'Triumph and Denouement', 174.
[110] D.J. Moss, 'Birmingham and the campaigns against the orders in council and the East India Company charter, 1812-3', *Canadian Journal of History* 11 (1976), 173-88, and B.H. Tolley, 'The Liverpool campaign against the orders of council and the war of 1812' in J. R. Harris (ed.), *Liverpool and Merseyside: essays in the economic and social history of the port and its hinterland* (1969), ch. 5.
[111] GCA, TD1670/1/3, fos. 197-198.
[112] GCA, MS. 891001/1 (Glasgow East India Association Committee minutes, 1812-1813), fos. 1-2.

In many ways, the creation of the Association was, as we saw earlier in this chapter, an extension of the institutional capabilities of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce. The idea of an alliance of different regional economic interests to lobby the British political centre had already been established in the 1780s. Nevertheless, this episode marked a change of scale for a campaign involving Scottish cotton interests on a single issue. It saw a coordinated lobbying effort from across industrial and commercial towns and regions throughout Britain, with Scottish towns disproportionately active. Between March and June, 55 British towns submitted parliamentary petitions against the renewal of the Charter, including 22 from Scotland which the directors of the Glasgow Association had been anxious to 'stir up'.[113] Lobbying around this issue intensified with the formation of a 'general deputation' in London, representing major industrial and commercial towns throughout the United Kingdom as a unified interest to Parliament and to the ministry. The Glasgow Association sent three 'deputies', including Kirkman Finlay, who in April 1812 coordinated with representatives from Birmingham, Sheffield, Manchester, Bristol and Plymouth, and later from Belfast and Wolverhampton, and operated from the Spring Garden Coffee House in London. Although they acted initially on instructions from their respective towns, in their daily meetings in London they developed a common strategy to be adopted in talks with ministers. The Glasgow delegates met with Spencer Perceval, the Prime Minister, on 10 April, who left open the possibility of opening the India trade to British ports other than London if they could prove that there would be a secure collection of customs duties.[114] At the same time they canvassed support in Parliament and were confident that the 'sentiments of the members of both Houses [were] in favour of this great

[113] Kumagai, *Breaking into the Monopoly*, 59. A letter from Thomas Attwood of the committee in Birmingham requested that directors of the Glasgow Association 'continue your exertions to stir up the Towns of Scotland and Ireland': GCA, MS. 891001/3, (Glasgow East India Association Incoming Correspondence), Thomas Attwood to Glasgow East India Association, March 1812. See also: NLS, MS. 1064, fo. 179, H. Craufurd to Melville, 10 January 1812; fo. 181, same to same, 27 January 1812; fo. 183 same to same 29 February; fo. 185, 'At Greenock the Twenty fifth day of February Eighteenth hundred and Twelve Years'; fo. 187, David Stewart (one behalf of the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce) to Melville, 20 March 1812.
[114] GCA, MS. 891001/3, Kirkman Finlay to Archibald Buchanan, 10 April 1812.

cause.'[115] When Lord Melville, who had objected to allowing Indian imports into provincial ports, as well as opening up the China trade, was moved to the Admiralty and replaced by Lord Buckinghamshire as President of the Board of Control, the government's attitude to the general deputation became very favourable. The Glasgow Association continued to lobby the Board of Trade and gained the support of its Vice President, George Rose, who, after reading 'with very great attention every written and printed paper which had been sent to him' concluded that 'the Trade of India should be open, …[and] that the Company should not have an exclusive right to the trade of China'.[116] This was swiftly followed by Lord Buckinghamshire notifying the East India Company that the import trade should no longer be confined to the port of London.[117]

In many ways, the success in opening the India trade was a reflection of the development of a well-organised commercial and industrial lobby which fostered a good working relationship with the ministry. Anthony Webster has argued that the role of the 'provincial lobbyists' in liberalising the India trade should not be exaggerated and that the main factor influencing the ministry during this episode was the wider fiscal and economic imperative.[118] The attitude of government towards business lobbyists was more favourable because they were acutely aware of the instability being caused by inflation and trade disruption, in addition to social instability. Nevertheless, it is also important to recognise that these lobbyists pandered to the ministry's economic objectives as part of their lobbying strategy. In their initial meeting with Perceval in April 1812, Finlay and the other Glasgow delegates were at pains to stipulate that their proposals were designed to accelerate the 'improvement of national commerce and prosperity.'[119] The agreement over the opening of the Indian trade was by no means a foregone conclusion; indeed Buckinghamshire noted that lobbying by the Deputation had swayed

[115] *Ibid.*, Finlay to Buchanan, 13 April 1812.
[116] *Ibid.*
[117] Kumagai, *Breaking into the Monopoly*, 65.
[118] Webster, 'The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization', 416-17.
[119] GCA, MS. 891001/3, Finlay to Buchanan, 13 April 1812.

minister's minds when it came to opening the Indian import trade: '[t]he importance attached to these representations, induced His Majesty's Government to revise the arrangement which had been in contemplation'.[120] The Glasgow Association was equally certain that the 'ability and zeal of the Deputation' was responsible for 'a decided conviction on the minds of his Majesty's Ministers with regard to the propriety of permitting to the Outports a free exercise of the Import and Export Trade with India'.[121] Whilst it failed to secure the abolition of the Company's monopoly on the China trade,[122] it had, nevertheless, recognised the importance of cultivating a constructive working relationship with the ministry, which was more receptive to its representations.

In addition to this, the scale and public nature of the campaign, made it something which both the ministry and Parliament were compelled to listen. Despite the conciliatory nature of the deputation's conferences with ministers, the tone in the printed literature from the Glasgow Association and the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, as well as in the Scottish press, was far more strident. The memorials and petitions utilised the language of 'free trade', and no longer argued against the Company's monopoly on the grounds of protecting specific industries, such as cotton, although of course this was their primary objective. The Glasgow Association's first petition to the Commons made it a question of national and individual liberty; that the Company's monopoly had 'retarded national improvement' and that as 'the Right of all British subjects, to a free trade on an equal footing is undoubted', the subsequent 'abandonment of that right in any degree…can never be done without producing consequences highly prejudicial to the Nation'.[123] This was strong rhetoric, which implied that the East India Company's monopoly was disadvantageous to the British economy as well as an affront to the rights and

[120] *The Preliminary Debate at the East-India House on Tuesday, the 5th January, 1813, on the Negotiation with His Majesty's Ministers Relative to a Renewal of the Charter* (London, 1813), p. 47.
[121] GCA, MS 891001/1, fo. 33 (13 January 1813).
[122] *Ibid.*, fos. 31-32 (January 1813).
[123] GCA, GCA, MS 891001/1, fo. 5 (petition to the House of Commons, 25 March 1812).

liberties of all British subjects, articulating 'free trade' as a form of British patriotism. These criticisms of the East India Company were repeated in more than 30 essays and pamphlets which were widely disseminated throughout Britain during this campaign, such as *Letters on the East India Monopoly,* which were published by the *Glasgow Chronicle* in 1812.[124] There was also an effort to create a perception of transparency, on the Scottish side of the campaign at least, whereby minutes of the Glasgow Association's meetings were published routinely, and records of the negotiations in London were reported regularly. For example, instructions were given for the first resolutions made by Glasgow Association to be distributed among 'every Town of the United Kingdom' and published in Scottish newspapers, such as the *Glasgow Courier, The Herald, The Edinburgh Courant, The Caledonian Mercury,* as well newspapers printed in London, such as *The Times* and *The Morning Chronicle*.[125] While lobbying in London, Finlay advised the Glasgow Association to 'Publish all You like' about the conduct of the general deputation's negotiations.[126] This indicates that they were trying to generate political momentum throughout the commercial and manufacturing regions of Britain and Ireland and to create the perception that this was a 'public campaign'. It is difficult to say what effect this had on ministers and parliamentarians, but it gave the impression that the deputation in London was supported by a political movement in the industrial and commercial regions of Britain and Ireland, including the west of Scotland, which helped their private negotiations in London.

The scale of this campaign, and the alliance between British and Irish economic interests which conducted it, was only temporary, and the Glasgow Association dissolved in 1814. Nevertheless, in many ways the key elements displayed in this campaign reflected the extent to which lobbying on behalf of Scottish cotton interests had matured and developed since the

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[124] C.H. Philips, *The East India Company, 1784-1834* (Manchester, 1940), p. 182. See *Letters on the East India Monopoly, Originally Published in the Glasgow Chronicle, with Additions and Corrections* (Glasgow, 1812).
[125] GCA, MS 891001/1, fo. 4.
[126] GCA, MS. 891001/3, Finlay to Buchanan, 13 April 1812.

1780s. The most obvious shift was that this was no longer simply a 'cotton lobby', although cotton interests were dominant within it, but a highly integrated, organised and professional business lobby which united commercial and industrial regional interests from across the British Isles around simple and eminently attainable objectives, namely the opening of the India trade. In addition to this, any meaningful sense of a 'Scottish' lobby had by this period practically disappeared as Scottish commercial and industrial interests became submerged within this broader lobby. This campaign was not, therefore, simply a 'Scottish' initiative, although the Scottish contribution can be identified in the activity of the Glasgow Association and, to a lesser extent, the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce. These Scottish lobbying institutions, however, were operating on behalf of regional west of Scotland interests as part of a wider campaign encompassing a highly integrated array of commercial and industrial interests throughout the United Kingdom. While many of their leading figures, most notably Kirkman Finlay, were particularly active as part of this campaign, they were acting as 'British', rather than just as 'Scottish', lobbyists.

IV

Post-war challenges, 1815-c.1833

Following the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815 and the establishment of peace after an unprecedentedly expensive war, the concerns of Scottish and British cotton lobbyists began to shift. Throughout this period there was an anxiety among British cotton manufacturers that their industry was in decline; that it had peaked and that it would suffer from increasing global competition. After 1825 the cotton industry in Scotland would not experience the same level of growth and buoyancy, and stagnated thereafter, before going into a period of economic decline.[127] In 1823, Kirkman Finlay forecast that his industry's 'day of pressure & distress will

[127] Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 235.

come & probably is at no great distance'.[128] This view was prompted partly by the return to a peace-time economy which resulted in trade imbalances: wartime inflation and a short economic boom in 1817-18 had encouraged production, whilst a return to peace had significantly decreased demand thereby causing a fall in prices on goods, produce, and labour.[129] During the operation of Napoleon's 'continental system', British cotton merchants, such as Finlay, had shown considerable skill in discovering new trade routes to circumvent the effects of the Berlin Decree, as well as hostilities with the United States, in order to trade with continental Europe. Yet, as Edwards has demonstrated, this had done long-term damage to the stability of cotton exports which, by 1815 had come to resemble a 'gigantic dumping operation' during periods of panic, demonstrating how the cotton industry's dependence on supplying foreign markets for their continuing expansion had negative consequences.[130] In this period, its expansion would start to slow in the face of growing competition from abroad and, in a Scottish context, the emergence of new heavy industries, such as iron, would begin to take precedence in the Scottish economy.

During this period, the aims and objectives of the Liverpool ministry developed along lines sympathetic to the interests of the whole British cotton industry, removing much of the need to lobby. While taking the decision to resume cash payments in 1819, which had been suspended by Pitt in 1797, the Liverpool ministry had, since 1815 resisted any urge to implement interventionist fiscal policies – according to Boyd Hilton, they had 'marked time… proposing little and conceding much'.[131] This was largely welcomed by the cotton industry in Britain which, given government inaction, had little cause to act politically in the early part of this period. Despite his pessimistic prognosis for the future of the industry, Finlay opined in

[128] BL, Add. MS. 38746 (Huskisson papers), fo. 88, Kirkman Finlay to John Gladstone, 21 January 1823.
[129] Boyd Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Governments 1815-1830* (Oxford, 1977), p. 71.
[130] Edwards, *The British Cotton Trade*, 73-4.
[131] Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce*, 70.

1823 that 'The Cotton Manufacture is now no light thing to meddle with, it is going forward under the present system prosperously & quietly…without the impolitic interference of Government.'[132] Their prime motivation continued to be the defence of their industry, which in this period was navigating a wildly fluctuating economy and growing competition from abroad in domestic and foreign markets. They adopted a pragmatic stance and, as ever, were driven by short term considerations in their lobbying activities, as the government was in its economic policies.

When the ministry did implement significant economic and fiscal changes in the 1820s, it did so in consultation with commercial and industrial interests, especially cotton.[133] The tariff reductions of 1823-6 in particular were devised as a mechanism to re-balance trade; they were an attempt to achieve pre-war parity now that taxation was no longer as important a source of revenue as it had been during wartime. The ministry tried to steady what they considered to be the uncontrolled expansion of exports, and therefore reduced tariffs on imports as a way to 'free' trade and prevent speculation – 'a process of purification'.[134] This meant reducing the protective duties on foreign cotton imports which the British cotton industry had long enjoyed. But ministers, particularly William Huskisson as President of the Board of Trade, were at pains to ensure that they did not antagonise the cotton industry. Leading cotton lobbyists such as Kirkman Finlay, who was chairman of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce in 1823-4, enjoyed privileged access to Huskisson, who conceded that he was 'desirous and disposed to listen to Him [Finlay], and such as Him, upon subjects which they understand so much better than myself'.[135] Finlay appears to have been amenable to the ministry's 'endeavours to introduce the principles of a more liberal interchange in our commercial dealings with other Countries'

[132] BL, Add. MS. 38746, fo. 88, Kirkman Finlay to John Gladstone, 21 January 1823.
[133] Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce*, 195.
[134] *Ibid*., 179-180.
[135] BL, Add. MS. 38747, fo. 211, William Huskisson to Gladstone, 25 March 1826.

and to lower duties 'so as to make them really protecting, instead of prohibitory'.[136] Finlay and Huskisson appear to have enjoyed a warm professional relationship, with each admiring the other: Huskisson referred to Finlay as 'a Friend to just and liberal principles in Commerce', whereas Finlay stated that 'I do not think that History tells us of any Minister in any state who ever brought into operation so fine a system of mercantile policy'.[137] Finlay admitted that his praise was partly owing to Huskisson's assurances that commercial and tariff policies would be reformed 'without national injury to existing interests'.[138] The Liverpool ministry was determined, partly as a concern to avoid social disturbances, to ensure that industries which employed a huge proportion of the urban population continued to flourish and did not lose all protection. In 1825, for example, the chair of the East India Company petitioned the Board of Trade to relieve it of tariffs on its cotton piece goods in the British domestic market. The Board acquiesced, but only to the extent where it would still 'be sufficient to ensure an adequate Protection to the Cotton Manufactures of this Country'.[139] This is indicative of the significant shift in ministerial attitudes towards the cotton industry since their initial interactions with Pitt's ministry in the 1780s. At that time, cotton lobbyists had made considerable efforts simply to gain a hearing; now they were consulted as a matter of course and their continued economic success was considered a vital component of the ministry's objectives.

Nevertheless, there was a degree of continuity in the way cotton interests felt compelled to focus on short term concerns. In particular, cotton interests in Scotland continued to be reactive in opposition to taxation throughout this period. Following the high levels of expenditure necessary to defeat Napoleon, government spending between 1815 and 1832 was

[136] BL, Add. MS. 38746, fos. 134-6, Huskisson to Finlay, 12 February 1825 (copy).
[137] *Ibid*., fo. 134, Huskisson to Finlay, 12 February 1825 (copy); Add. MS. 38647, fo. 215, 'Extract from a Letter from Mr K Finlay to Mr Gladstone dated Hampstead, 23rd March 1826'.
[138] *Ibid*., fo. 215.
[139] TNA, BT 5/33, fo. 363 (21 March 1825).

twice what it had been during the early 1780s.[140] Martin Daunton has postulated the declining 'trust' of the state in matters of taxation; that after 1815, there was less acceptance of customs and excise duties falling on industries such as cotton than there had been during war time.[141] Certainly, leading representatives of the cotton lobby suggested that their acceptance of lower tariff duties should perhaps be considered as conditional on the ministry not subjecting the cotton interest to any further taxation, indicating that they felt more at liberty to oppose new or extended taxes than they had been during wartime. Despite his closeness to ministers such as Huskisson, Finlay claimed in 1823 that 'the Government now raises from the Cotton trade, a much larger sum than ever was raised before' and warned ministers that they would be foolish to 'look for more than they now get'.[142] There was, therefore, a suspicion of continuing high duties and during times of crisis in this period, parts of the Scottish cotton industry lobbied the government to relieve it from some of these impositions. When a depression and a subsequent financial crash hit the British economy in late 1825 and into 1826, cotton manufacturers in the west of Scotland lobbied the Treasury to repeal various taxes, including the duty on printed cotton, complaining that it was a 'languishing trade'.[143] In several memorials to the Treasury, Glaswegian power loom factory proprietors and west of Scotland calico printers complained that 'during the distress of the Commercial World' they feared being undersold in the domestic market by French and German printed cottons. As a consequence of this competition, they argued, 'the sale of Cotton printed handkerchiefs has been nearly annihilated' and argued that since silk manufacturers had successfully lobbied to remove the excise duty on printed silks,

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[140] Julian Hoppit, 'Checking the Leviathan, 1688-1832' in Donald Winch and Patrick K. O'Brien, *The Political Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688-1914* (Oxford, 2002), p. 284 for government expenditure before and after peace in 1815.
p. 284.
[141] Martin Daunton, 'Trusting Leviathan: the politics of taxation, 1815-1914' in Winch and O'Brien (ed.), *The Political Economy of British Political Experience*, pp. 319-324.
[142] BL, Add. MS. 38746 fo. 93, Kirkman Finlay to John Gladstone, 22 January 1823. Finlay referred to the cotton industry as the country's 'Golden Goose', fos. 111-112, Kirkman Finlay to John Gladstone, 31 January 1823.
[143] For this crisis, see: Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce*, ch. 7.

cotton manufacturers should be afforded the same courtesy as it otherwise disadvantaged printed cotton handkerchiefs in the domestic market.[144] This is indicative of the extent to which, during periods of temporary economic distress and panic, and despite the extent to which they were now routinely consulted by ministers about taxation policy, Scottish cotton interests might revert to more traditional reactive tactics focused on obtaining short term relief.

Social and political disruption, however, was an emerging issue around which Scottish and other British cotton interests developed a more coherent and organised lobbying strategy. The economic depression during 1819-22 caused considerable manufacturing unemployment which occasioned radical disaffection in urban centres throughout Britain, and which in Scotland became manifest in a growing popular political movement which culminated in the 'Radical War' of 1820.[145] In the period since 1815, the threat of famine had caused riots in Lancashire, urban Cheshire, the West Riding, and particularly in the south west of Scotland where, as Lord Liverpool himself stressed, 'the Evil is in a more advanced state and will not be stopped without bloodshed'.[146] In the age of 'Peterloo', the Liverpool ministry's fear of violence and insurrection was shared by cotton masters who were concerned by the disruption it was causing their industry at a difficult time. In 1810, the creation of the 'Association of Operative Cotton Spinners' in the west of Scotland had prompted manufacturers to create their own body in response, the 'Association of Master Cotton Spinners' in October of that year, which provided a specific channel through which cotton manufacturers could report violent 'outrages' committed by politicised cotton spinners in Glasgow to Parliament and British ministers.[147] As part of this, there was growing coordination throughout the industry, both

[144] TNA, T1/3491, Long bundle 72, Archibald Campbell to J. C Herries, 20 August 1826 enclosing 'The Memorial of the undersigned proprietors of Power Loom Factories in Glasgow and its vicinity'; Campbell to Harries, 4 August 1826 enclosing 'The Memorial of the Undersigned Calicoe Printers in the part of the United Kingdom called Scotland'; 'Memorial from the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce', October 1826.
[145] Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce*, 69; Gordon Pentland, *The Spirit of the Union: Popular Politics in Scotland, 1815-1820* (London, 2011), especially chs 3-4.
[146] Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce*, 78-79.
[147] GCA, T-MJ/99, (Minute book of the Association of Master Cotton Spinners).

north and south of the Anglo-Scottish border. For instance, in 1816 Manchester cotton manufacturers sought the aid of the Glasgow Chamber to send a memorial to the Home Office seeking harsher punishment for illegal combinations.[148] This was indicative of a growing willingness on the part of cotton lobbyists to solicit government intervention in order to maintain social stability, as well as signalling that it was becoming more adept at confronting this issue.

This organised approach to lobbying for legislative action was mirrored in a more coherent and pragmatic approach by British cotton manufacturers to opposing proposals for labour regulation during this period. Although Robert Owen, a Welsh cotton manufacturer and social reformer who owned the New Lanark mills and the neighbouring village in Lanarkshire, tabled a parliamentary motion in 1816 to restrict working hours for children and to introduce schools paid for by mill owners, he was isolated on this issue within the cotton industry.[149] Owen famously claimed to have proved at New Lanark that reduced hours and a more paternalistic care for the workforce would not lead to the ruin of the industry, but his optimism, perhaps unsurprisingly, was not shared by his fellow manufacturers who actively opposed him. When it came to lobbying against Owen's proposals, cotton manufacturers demonstrated an advanced ability to organise a campaign in Parliament against the proposed regulation. In particular, the select committee on the 'State of Children Employed in Manufactures' heard evidence from a number of members of the Scottish Association of Master Cotton Spinners, which paid for their lobbying expenses in London.[150] The Glasgow Chamber petitioned the House of Commons against a subsequent bill introduced by Robert Peel in 1818, which proposed to regulate the hours of work for children under the age of 16 and to prohibit the

[148] GCA, TD1670/1/4, fos. 1-3 (8 March 1816).
[149] Cooke, *Rise and Fall of the Scottish Cotton Industry*, 189.
[150] PP, 'Report of the Select Committee on the State of Children Employed in Manufactures', Vol. III (1816), pp. 20-22 (Robert Owen), and p. 245 (Henry Houldesworth).

employment of children under the age of nine.[151] Although the Factory Act of 1819 was eventually passed, cotton manufacturers throughout Britain had ensured that it was significantly watered-down, persuading Peel to prevent the introduction of state-enforced inspections, which were eventually included in the 1833 Factory Act.[152] While the political momentum behind the strengthening of state-sponsored labour regulation had meant they were unable to defeat this measure, their systematic and organised campaign in Parliament, and their close relationship with ministers such as Peel, meant they were better placed to limit the consequences of state intervention in factories.

By the end of this period, however, there is no doubt that the main concern of the British cotton manufacturers was the threat that increased global competition posed to their industry. As Kirkman Finlay pointed out to a House of Commons select committee in 1833:

> When I first knew the cotton manufactures in this country, which was in the year 1787 and when I first entered into the business extensively, which was in 1792, there was no manufacture of cotton of any importance in any part of Great Britain… In those times there was no cotton manufacture in France at all; none in Switzerland worth speaking of; none in any part of Germany… now there is not a single country in which there is not a great manufacture of cotton carried on.[153]

There was a genuine – if sometimes exaggerated – fear among cotton manufacturers that their industry would be forced into decline by competition with their rivals in Europe, such as France and Switzerland, as well as the United States, which, as John Gladstone noted, made 'every exertion…to cherish their own manufactures by [imposing] heavy duties on ours'.[154] This had led the cotton industry to seek access to additional export markets after Napoleon's defeat,

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[151] J.T Ward, *The Factory Movement 1830-1855* (London, 1962), pp. 20-26.
[152] *Ibid*., ch. 5.
[153] PP, 'Report of the Select Committee on Manufactures, Commerce and Shipping', Vol. VI (1833).
[154] BL, Add. MS. 38746, fo. 76, John Gladstone to Kirkman Finlay, 7 January 1823.

especially Spanish markets, which they hoped might be secured through a trade agreement, forecasted by both the Treaty of London (1809) and the Treaty of Madrid (1814). It nevertheless came to nothing in this period, as despite British cotton manufacturers and the Board of Trade agreeing that such an agreement would be desirable, the Spanish government in the autumn of 1814 prohibited foreign cotton goods coming into Spain.[155] As we have already observed, throughout this post-war period, British ministers were wary of expanding the export trade for fear that it would encourage speculation and lead to overproduction. Yet, by the very end of this period, a common objective to expand trade to the east was responsible for reuniting the British cotton interest as a new incarnation of a re-energised business lobby.

The campaign to gain access to the China trade, and to end the East India Company's monopoly, during the period between 1829 and 1833 shows that a broadly based commercial and industrial lobby, and its institutional structures, could be revived relatively easily, despite having been inactive since 1814. In Scotland, this revival was manifest in the newly restored Glasgow East India Association in 1829, initiated by Kirkman Finlay, again chairman of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, at a public meeting at the Tontine Hotel in Glasgow on 22 April.[156] At the following meeting, Finlay was elected unanimously as the revived Association's chairman, with James Anderson, another Scottish cotton manufacturer, as his deputy. As had been the case in 1812-13, the largest economic group in the Association was comprised of those directly involved in the cotton industry, who made up around one third of the membership. Kumagai has estimated that the cotton interest probably comprised more than half of the membership, given that many of the merchant members undoubtedly had an interest in cotton trading and manufacturing.[157] The Scottish branch of this business lobby was, therefore, once again dominated by cotton interests, and the ensuing campaign repeated many

[155] TNA, BT 5/23, fos. 432-433.
[156] GCA, TD1670/1/4, fos. 344-345. GCA, MS 891001/2 (Glasgow East India Association Minute Book, Vol. II), fos. 1-3 (22 April 1829).
[157] Kumagai, *Breaking the Monopoly*, 85-88.

of the tenets of the lobbying practices displayed in the previous campaign against the East India Company's monopoly in 1812-3.

This was especially true with regard to the coordination of another highly integrated commercial and industrial lobby in London, although ministers were now quite receptive to their request to access the China trade. After an initial meeting with the duke of Wellington (the then Prime Minister), Henry Goulburn (Chancellor of the Exchequer) and Lord Ellenborough (President of the Board of Control) which secured the establishment of a parliamentary select committee to investigate opening the China trade, a new 'general deputation' was established, organised by a central committee in London to represent commercial and manufacturing towns and coordinate lobbying in parliament and with the ministry.[158] Kirkman Finlay, who was in Westminster as a representative of the Glasgow Association, as well as in his role as MP for Malmesbury, was appointed to chair the deputation and in this capacity he reported back regularly to the Glasgow Association on the progress of the campaign in Parliament, occasionally requesting that witnesses be sent who could provide evidence to the committee.[159] In early 1833, the Glasgow East India Association, together with its counterpart in Liverpool, sent another delegation, and as part of this, Finlay regularly attended the Board of Control to negotiate arrangements for the opening of the China trade, and the new duties to be levied on Chinese imports. On 13 June, the efforts of this campaign were rewarded when Charles Grant, the President of the Board of Control, introduced a bill which ended the Company's monopoly on the China trade, as well as the Company's commercial privileges.[160] Once again, an organised and coordinated lobbying effort on behalf of provincial and regional British commercial and manufacturing regions, led in London by

[158] GCA, MS 891001/2, fos. 2-4.
[159] *Ibid*, fos. 26 and 46 (21 July 1830) where Finlay is thanked by the Association for his efforts in London.
[160] *Ibid*., 122.

experienced and influential representatives of industrial regions throughout the British Isles, had resulted in a successful campaign in Parliament and with ministers.

Perhaps more notably, this campaign had an even larger public dimension than that in 1812-3, connecting civil society in Scotland, specifically the west of Scotland region, more intensely to the political centre through the campaign to end the Company's monopoly. As with the previous campaign, this partly meant distributing a wide range of pamphlet literature and a more advanced use of the Scottish press. In ways similar to the previous campaign, these printed pamphlets and petitions made extensive use of the language of 'free trade'. In this context, the Glasgow East India Association used the writings and arguments of John Crawfurd, a Scot who had been employed as a medic in the East India army, and who throughout the 1820s had developed a reputation as a critic of the East India Company's monopoly.[161] He joined the general deputation in London as representative of British merchants in Calcutta, and his various pamphlets and essays, which criticised the Company's monopoly and called for a 'thorough freedom of commercial intercourse between the European and Indian dominion of the Crown' were printed and circulated throughout Glasgow, including in 1833 where the Glasgow Association agreed to print 600 copies of Crawfurd's *Notes on the Settlement or Colonization of British Subjects in India*.[162] This should not, however, be interpreted as an ideological crusade by the cotton lobby and its allies for the principle of free trade, but rather as a politically shrewd, and perhaps cynical, use of these arguments as a lobbying tactic to further British commercial and manufacturing interests at the expense of the East India Company. As Hilton has noted, 'all mercantile free trade was sectarian in that its object was cheaper raw materials or the abolition of some annoying monopoly'.[163] Although some members of the Glasgow Association promoted lectures by James Silk Buckingham,

[161] See Kumagai, 'Kirkman Finlay and John Crawfurd', *passim* for more details about this campaign.
[162] Idem., *Breaking the Monopoly*, 96.
[163] Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce*, 175.

another vocal critic of the East India Company, Finlay admitted that he was being used to influence public opinion in Glasgow and the region. When Buckingham visited Glasgow in August 1829, his lectures received a great deal of publicity and attention and were extensively reported in local newspapers, such as the *Glasgow Herald*.[164] Finlay noted that Buckingham was 'the most confident and impudent Charlatan', but added pragmatically that 'he has been of some use by enlisting many of the most noisy and ignorant…and we should not act wisely if we rejected their aid'.[165] This campaign was, therefore, even more than that which had been conducted fifteen years earlier, concerned with using the modalities of the ever expanding public sphere and promoting fashionable arguments of political economy to generate a political movement within civil society in Glasgow and the west of Scotland, around their cause.

This case study indicates that the changes made to Scottish lobbying in the 1780s, notably through the creation of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce outlined in the last chapter, were continued and expanded throughout this period. The lobbying techniques and strategies, developed by the Glasgow Chamber in its early years, appear to have provided a model by which cotton lobbyists north of the border were guided in their campaigns, often through the Glasgow Chamber itself, over this period.

Of these developments, perhaps two stand out as most significant. One was the way in which representatives of the cotton lobby not only recognised that cultivating good relations with ministers was crucial to lobbying success, which Patrick Colquhoun had established, or rather had confirmed in 1785. But, in addition to this, lobbyists learned to develop strategies which allowed them to present their interests as complementary to, and not in conflict with,

[164] *Glasgow Herald*, 10 August 1829, 'Mr Buckingham's Lectures'.
[165] GCA, MS 891001/1 (Glasgow East India Association Incoming Correspondence 1829-1830), Kirkman Finlay to James Buchanan, 25 November 1829.

ministerial policies and objectives. They therefore gradually became more cautious in their approach to ministers, particularly during the French and Napoleonic wars where their lobbying activity was constrained by the ministry's overriding focus on the war effort, and generally more selective about the campaigns they chose to conduct, so as to afford them a greater chance of influencing policy in a way that worked to their advantage. There was, of course, a limit to which this could be maintained as, throughout this period, the primary objective of Scottish cotton lobbyists was always the unhindered and continued growth of their industry, and it is notable, therefore, that their political activity remained largely reactive and focused on short term concerns. Nevertheless, it became easier to present the cotton industry as crucial to the 'national interest' as it gradually became more important to the Scottish, and indeed the British, economy over this period, as a source of government revenue, as well as to social order, particularly later in this period when ministers desired its success as a way to increase employment and defuse social tensions. This improved efficacy is also suggestive of the way in which important Scottish economic interests became more adept at lobbying the Westminster Parliament and central government departments for their advantage, and more broadly, how Scotland became further integrated within the British Union-state. Given that, as Martin Daunton has asserted, industrialisation was in part a 'political process', further investigation might concentrate more comprehensively on the development of the attitudes of British ministers towards cotton or other industrial interests, particularly from north of the border, over the course of this period, and how their changing relationship affected lobbyists in the way they operated within the British political system.[166]

The other significant, but connected, development over this period was the way the lobbying framework, which had developed in the 1780s, increasingly allowed Scottish cotton

[166] M.J. Daunton, *Progress and Poverty: An Economic and Social History of Britain 1700-1850* (Oxford, 1995), p. 545.

lobbyists to integrate with similar interests in manufacturing and commercial regions throughout the British Isles. Unlike linen, which usually presented itself as a Scottish 'national' interest, Scottish cotton interests became part of a broader 'British' sectoral lobby. The 'logic' of lobbying, practised by the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce in mediating and facilitating compromise between different regional economic interests, was therefore extended as a principle in the way it allowed different parts of the Scottish and British cotton industry gradually to integrate, from a loose alliance of similar interests operating in tandem, albeit separately, into an increasingly cohesive and professionalised business lobby. This was, of course, relatively easy to establish in the case of the British cotton industry, given its economic importance both north and south of the border. In this way, the political integration over this period was a reflection of the economic integration of cotton interests throughout Britain, in contrast to much of the eighteenth century where English and Scottish economic interests had been more easily demarcated, such as between the English woollen and Scottish linen interests.[167] This did not, however, amount to comprehensive assimilation, and there were inevitable tensions, difficulties, and conflicts within this enlarged lobby, even in the later period. The Glasgow East India Association, along with similar organisations based in industrial and commercial regions throughout the British Isles, was able to build a remarkably united and professional lobby comprising a large and diverse array of different interests in the pursuit of gaining access to eastern trading markets. But its value did not extend beyond this issue, as seen by its dissolution in 1814 after it successfully persuaded ministers and Parliament to open the India trade.[168] Nevertheless, the fact that a campaign on this scale was achievable on two occasions in this period is significant when considering the extent to which Scottish lobbying of the Westminster Parliament and the British state in this context had developed from

[167] Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 56; Harris, 'Towards a British Political Economy', 88, 96-97, and 104.
[168] Unlike its counterpart in Liverpool which remained politically active after this date: K. Charlton, 'Liverpool and The East India Trade', *Northern History* 7 (1972), 56–63.

defending a distinctive national interest, to representing local or regional industrial concerns in coordination with similar interests from around the British Isles. More broadly, it is indicative of the extent to which identifiably Scottish interests, particularly in the economic sphere, were by the end of this period becoming comprehensively assimilated into broader British sectoral and industrial lobbies.

This is, of course, a case study of one particular Scottish interest – albeit one of enormous economic and political importance at this time – and an investigation of other Scottish interests and their activities in Westminster and Whitehall would provide a fuller picture of the developments of Scottish lobbying over this period. This chapter has, for instance, focused on the Scottish cotton lobby principally as an employers' interest, and further studies might attempt to analyse the growth of politically active Scottish weavers and spinners, and how they engaged with other politicised cotton employees in the pursuit of wage and labour regulation.[169] Nevertheless, work that has been completed the development of political networks between West India planters and merchants both north and south of the border, would indicate that many of the themes emerging from this chapter reflect general trends in the ways in which Scottish interests, and by extension elements of Scottish society, adapted and integrated with similar interests to strengthen their connections with the British political centre.[170] The next chapter will continue to assess these changes and the growing importance of the politics of Westminster and Whitehall in Scottish society, through an examination of the activities of Scottish MPs and the changing nature of Scottish representation in British politics.

[169] Bolton fancy-weavers constructed a wide-ranging network among several English counties, and later into Scotland: Innes, 'Regulating Wages in Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth-Century England', 210.

[170] See further work on the Glasgow West India Association in the early nineteenth century, which Iain Whyte has described as 'the most powerful group representing slaving interests outside London': Iain Whyte, *Scotland and the Abolition of Black Slavery, 1756-1838* (Edinburgh, 2006), p. 146; Doulgas J. Hamilton, 'Defending the Colonies Against Malicious Attacks of Philanthropy', 193-208.

Chapter Three

Representatives of 'North Britain': Scottish MPs

There have been few attempts to assess systematically the role of Scottish MPs in representing Scottish interests at the Westminster Parliament and to ministers in the British state. Previous historians have written about Scottish interactions with the various branches of the British state in the eighteenth century, but rarely with a view to uncovering what kind of interests Scottish MPs represented and how they represented them. Patrick Riley, writing in 1964 about the two decades immediately following 1707, offered some interesting insights into the first Scottish MPs at Westminster when he revealed that 'any threat to what were thought to be Scottish interests at once united the Scottish members'.[1] Riley, however, was writing in the shadow of Lewis Namier, and was therefore concerned principally with studying power and managerial politics, and thus tended to portray Scottish MPs in a negative light. This tendency to focus on the servility of Scottish MPs is evident in Grayson Ditchfield's study of the campaign to repeal the Test Act as it applied to Scotland in 1790-91, as it emphasised the power of patronage that Henry Dundas exploited to force a large bloc of Scottish MPs (67 per cent of those who voted) to oppose this proposal when it came before the Commons.[2] Such facts have largely fed into the negative stereotype of Scottish MPs during the eighteenth century – a stereotype based on contemporary comments – that they were self-serving and corrupt, and took their orders from a Scottish 'manager', to whom they owed their position, and were therefore unquestioningly loyal to whichever ministry happened to be in power.[3] In 1784, James Boswell, for example, lamented the support of Scottish MPs for 'each administration of whatever principles'.[4]

[1] P.W.J. Riley, *The English ministers and Scotland, 1707-1727* (London, 1964), p. 119.
[2] G. M. Ditchfield, 'The Scottish Campaign against the Test Act, 1790-1791', *The Historical Journal* 23 (1980), 57.
[3] Michael Fry, *The Dundas Despotism* (Edinburgh, 1992), p. 55.
[4] James Boswell, *A Letter to the People of Scotland* (London, 1784), pp. 3-6.

Recently, however, there has been a more positive assessment of Scottish representation, with attempts to show that a Scottish 'national interest' did periodically succeed in making itself heard in Parliament in this period, particularly on economic issues.[5] This reflects, in turn, a transformed understanding of what Parliament did and the role of the central departments of the British state in 'domestic government'.[6]

This chapter seeks to examine Scottish MPs as they acted as representatives of Scottish interests at the Westminster Parliament in central government departments of the British state, and to chart their political behaviour as a group, or as groups, and as individual lobbyists. In doing so, it will use specific examples over the course of this broad period to focus on the extent to which they were active in representing a Scottish 'national interest' at Westminster, and how this changed over time. This chapter should, in this way, be viewed alongside the next one on Scottish legislation which looks specifically at how parts of Scottish society focused more intensely on Westminster politics during this period. The focus in this chapter on MPs as representatives is not to say that the sixteen Scottish representative peers were unimportant or inactive on behalf of Scottish interests; indeed a recent account has highlighted the diligent representation provided by the earls of Dumfries, Loudon and Abercorn in the late eighteenth century, particularly with regard to Scottish textile industries.[7] But, as David Hayton has asserted, the Commons was the more important of the two parliamentary houses in terms of legislation, and so Scottish political society more often turned to MPs to act as their delegates.[8]

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[5] Bob Harris, 'The Scots, the Westminster parliament, and the British state in the eighteenth century' in Julian Hoppit (ed.), *Parliaments, nations and identities in Britain and Ireland, 1660-1850* (Manchester, 2003), pp. 124-45. For a generally positive assessment of the first seven years following 1707, see: David Hayton, 'Adjustment and Integration: The Scottish Representation in the British House of Commons, 1707-14', *Parliamentary History* 27 (2008), 410-35.

[6] Joanna Innes, *Inferior Politics: Social Problems and Social Policies in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 3-4.

[7] M.W. McCahill, *The House of Lords in the Age of George III, 1760-1811* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 376-79. For Dumfries and Loudon, see especially their campaign lobbying for a post office in Paisley: HL, LO2134, Box 4 (Loudon papers), the earl of Dumfries to the earl of Loudon, 14 January 1778.

[8] Hayton, 'Adjustment and Integration', 416.

The following analysis covers around seven decades, from 1760 to 1830, and is divided into three sub-periods in order to capture as fully as possible several important changes over time. At the beginning of the 1760s there existed the last vestiges of an 'Argathelian' management system in which Scotland enjoyed a degree of political semi-autonomy.[9] Scottish representation within the British state after the 1760s began a period of change caused by the relative vacuum at the top of Scottish politics, which enabled a formerly managed group of Scottish MPs to represent various Scottish causes in a variety of new and different ways. From the final quarter of the eighteenth century, significant changes in Scottish civil society took place which affected its relationship with Westminster, and these developments deepened and extended into the early nineteenth century. Combined with the emergence of a more clearly defined party-political divide, this generally seems to have done much cumulatively to assimilate Scottish representation within a British framework. Following the Union of 1707, Scottish MPs inherited a peculiarly Scottish form of direct representation from the old Scottish Parliament – at least in theory – according to which they were 'commissioned' to represent their constituents.[10] This inheritance was not always a feature of Scottish MPs' activity, but there was a more explicit expectation of Scottish representatives to communicate regularly with their constituents. Scottish MPs would often receive instructions in a way which may have been similar to the experiences of certain English MPs, such as those who represented Bristol and received frequent communications from individuals representing important interests locally.[11] Scottish burgh MPs, however, were expected to keep their constituents constantly informed of important issues being considered in Westminster, such as amendments to the corn

[9] Alexander Murdoch, *The People Above: Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1980), ch. 1; John Stuart Shaw, *The Management of Scottish Society, 1707-1764: Power, Nobles, Lawyers, Edinburgh Agents and English Influences* (Edinburgh, 1983), ch. 5; Bob Harris, 'Towards a British Political Economy: An Eighteenth-Century Scottish Perspective' in Perry Gauci (ed.), *Regulating the British Economy, 1660-1850* (Farnham, 2011), p. 91.

[10] William Ferguson, 'Electoral Law and Procedure in Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century Scotland', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Glasgow, 1957), pp. 30-35.

[11] See, for example, Nicholas Rogers, *Whigs and Cities: Popular Politics in the Age of Walpole and Pitt* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 259-303.

laws, in a which could highlight their distinctiveness.[12] The extent to which Scottish representation continued to be different and separate from representation as practised by other MPs throughout this period is explored in this chapter.

There are, however, serious limits to this exercise. In covering such a broad period, one cannot expect to construct an exhaustive account of Scottish representation as practised by all MPs sitting for the 45 Scottish constituencies during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Much of the analysis is dependent on available evidence, which inevitably means a focus on particular MPs, and there are a good many for whom little evidence of their activities survives. There is therefore a heavy emphasis on certain Scottish MPs who were particularly, and perhaps unusually, assiduous in their representation of Scottish interests over this period. Similarly, meetings where Scottish MPs represented Scottish interests to ministers, or where several MPs operated together as a coherent group, were often unofficial and conducted in private, and so went unrecorded. We are therefore dependent on what little was documented about such conferences which sometimes takes the form of hints and passing references, about which we can only make limited inferences. For example, William Pulteney's meeting with William Pitt the Younger in 1784 on behalf of the Scottish linen interest is tantalisingly referred to briefly in a letter of thanks from Patrick Colquhoun, but there is no detailed account of their discussion.[13] Thanks to the ready availability of printed parliamentary records, such as the *Commons Journals* and Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, much Scottish parliamentary activity is recorded. But even this has limited use, as parliamentary committee work is largely hidden from view, and general membership composition of committee membership, which might be a useful tool in uncovering some of the collaborative work of Scottish MPs, is not recorded in the *Commons Journals* after the 1768 election. Detailing parliamentary campaigns

[12] Ronald Sunter, *Patronage and Politics in Scotland 1707-1832* (Edinburgh, 1986), pp. 134 and 145; Paul Kelly, 'Constituents' instructions to Members of Parliament' in (ed.), Clyve Jones, *Party and Management in Parliament, 1660-1784* (Leicester, 1984), pp. 179-186.
[13] HL, PU111, Box 25 (Pulteney papers), Patrick Colquhoun to William Pulteney, 19 July 1784.

can also be deceptive as many Scottish MPs promoting or opposing legislative measures usually first sought to obtain the approval of ministers, and only fell back on Parliament as a form of protest if they had already failed. All of which means the evidence upon which this analysis relies is fragmentary and significantly limited. Only a part of the story of Scottish representation by MPs can be told in this chapter; much of it remains hidden, and many of the conclusions reached are, by necessity, tentative and impressionistic.

Nevertheless, the analysis conducted in this chapter clearly charts an important period of change in Scottish political representation in the British political centre. Whereas Alexander Murdoch has argued that at the beginning of this period Scotland enjoyed 'a state of semi-independence', by the nineteenth century, as Iain Hutchison has observed, English and Scottish politics were 'pretty fully meshed together'.[14] Of course this was not a simple or smooth process: there was always a balance between integration and persistent difference, and patterns identified here were not constant or going in one direction. Moreover, it is unclear how widely they applied to Scottish MPs as a whole, as the analysis in this chapter is based on evidence from only a relatively small number of representatives over this period. However, as this thesis argues, protracted, nuanced, but significant change took place during this period, and it is the aim of this chapter to explore how the nature and operation of Scottish representation at Westminster and Whitehall, as exercised by certain MPs, reflected and was part of these deeper lying changes.

[14] Murdoch, *People Above*, 27; I.G.C. Hutchison, 'Anglo-Scottish Political Relations in the Nineteenth Century, c.1815-1914' in T.C Smout (ed.), *Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603 to 1900* (Oxford, 2005), p. 247.

I

Scottish MPs' backgrounds

Before looking at the record of MPs' activities in representing Scottish interests in the British political centre, we need briefly to consider who they were, their general backgrounds, and how this changed, or did not change, over our period. After all, as Paul Langford has argued, MPs in this period acted for all kinds of reasons and in response to different pressures, be they constituents, party leaders, colleagues, neighbours, or patrons.[15] The overwhelming majority of Scottish MPs at the beginning of this period came from landowning families and elite society and therefore inherited their political positions through landownership or family influence. This is of no surprise when considering that the right of voting in Scottish county elections lay in the hands of a small number of substantial landowners, many of whom also 'controlled', or had great influence in, burgh constituencies. Lord Frederick Campbell (MP for the Glasgow Burghs, 1761-1780), for example, was a classic product of the Scottish elite, being a nephew to the third duke of Argyll, and the son of the fourth duke.[16] Another example is James Stuart Mackenzie, younger son of the second earl of Bute, brother of John Stuart, the third earl, and another nephew of Argyll, who represented, at different times, Argyllshire, Buteshire, the Ayr Burghs, and Ross-shire between 1742 and 1780.[17] In addition to these MPs from the Scottish nobility, there were those from elite families of slightly lesser social standing, such as Gilbert Elliot of Minto who was a third baronet descended from the legal elite of Scotland, with large estates in Roxburghshire. His father had been MP for Roxburghshire, as well a judge of the Court of Session, as had his grandfather who had been an MP for Roxburghshire in the old Scottish Parliament.[18]

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[15] Paul Langford, 'Property and 'Virtual Representation' in Eighteenth-Century England', *The Historical Journal* 31 (1988), 84.
[16] HoP, *Commons 1754-1790*, Vol. II, pp. 182-4.
[17] *Ibid*., iii, 503-7.
[18] G.F Elliot, *The Border Elliots and the family of Minto* (Edinburgh, 1897).

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, and into the later stages of our period, landowners still held a monopoly on county seats which helped the House of Commons to retain its aristocratic flavour.[19] Several Scottish MPs in this period were younger sons of Scottish peers; indeed over the period 1790-1820, 22 younger sons of Scottish peers sat for Scottish constituencies.[20] One example is Lord Archibald Hamilton who was the second son of Archibald, ninth duke of Hamilton and sixth duke of Barnton. Through his family connections in Lanarkshire he won the county seat there against the Meville interest.[21] Also notable was William Maule, first Baron Panmure, who was the second son of George Ramsay, eighth earl of Dalhousie. He inherited enormous estates in Forfarshire from his great-uncle at the age of 16, which made him one of the richest men in Scotland, and through the Whig interest, he was elected for that county, briefly in 1796, and for over twenty-five years after 1805.[22] The landed interest was therefore always a large presence in the contingent of Scottish representatives throughout this period, but this did not mean that they consistently formed a lobby of Scottish landowners. Since the early years of the Union, Scottish burghs had recognised that it was better to nominate local landed magnates as their parliamentary representatives, rather than local magistrates who lacked the social and political contacts required to get business done in Westminster.[23] Lord Frederick Campbell, for example, represented urban interests in Glasgow and its neighbouring burghs, which was clearly won by Argyll family influence, but his tireless activities on behalf of the very demanding merchants and manufacturers there also showed that landownership could be perfectly compatible with civic responsibilities.[24]

[19] HoP, *Commons 1790-1820*, Vol. I, pp. 70-100.
[20] *Ibid*., 328.
[21] HoP, *Commons 1790-1820*, iv, 128-32.
[22] *Ibid*., 571-2.
[23] Hayton, 'Adjustment and Integration', 424.
[24] HoP, *Commons 1754-1790*, ii, 182-3.

The landed interest remained important particularly in the north of Scotland where there were tensions between prevailing ties of clanship and aspirations of Highland landlords to join the Anglo-Scottish ruling elite.[25] Usually, one noble family controlled politics at a county level, although in the north east, there was competition between several elite families – the Grants, the Brodies, the dukes of Gordon and the earls of Fife – leading to what one historian of Highland politics has called 'arguably the most byzantine political situation in later eighteenth century Scotland'.[26] In the early nineteenth century, this domination of Highland politics by elites continued: Charles and Robert Grant, MPs for the Inverness Burghs and Inverness-shire in the early nineteenth century, were the sons of Charles Grant the Elder who had been born into a disgraced Highland Jacobite family, but who had revived the family fortunes through a successful career as a *nabob*, rising to be secretary of the Board of Trade in India. Indeed, several Scots sitting in Parliament in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century were beneficiaries of East India patronage.[27] Upon returning to Britain, Grant bolstered the old Grant electoral interest in Inverness-shire, and he sat as MP for that county between 1802-1818, voluntarily allying his electoral interest with that of the Melvilles. He cultivated political support in this region where the landed gentry held great sway with institutions such as the 'Northern Meeting' – an annual meeting of eastern Highland gentry[28] – and maintained alliances with the Grant clan chief and the magistrates of the neighbouring burgh. The alliance with James Grant of Bught, Provost of Inverness, proved especially helpful to his sons in placating the landed interest in Inverness-shire over sensitive issues such as the revision of the corn laws.

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[25] Allan I. Macinnes, 'Landownership, Land Use and Elite Enterprise in Scottish Gaeldom: from Clanship to Clearance in Argyllshire, 1688-1858' in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scottish Elites* (Edinburgh, 1994), p. 3.
[26] Andrew Mackillop, 'Political Culture of the Scottish Highlands from Culloden to Waterloo', *The Historical Journal*, 46 (2003), 515-16.
[27] T.M. Devine, 'Scottish Elites and the Indian Empire, 1700-1815' in Smouth (ed.), *Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603*-1900, pp. 212-30. Many were 'nabobs', such as John Agnew, Alexander Bannerman, Sir George Dallas, Philip Dundas, and John Fleming. Others were East India Company directors such as George Dempster.
[28] Bob Harris, 'Landowners and Urban Society in Eighteenth-Century Scotland', *Scottish Historical Review* 92 (2013), 243.

The Scottish legal profession was well-represented in Parliament in the final decades of the eighteenth century. During the period 1754-90 there were approximately 20 practitioners of Scots law sitting for Scottish seats in the Commons.[29] This was perhaps a reflection of how powerful the legal elites were in Scotland; the survival of important Scottish legal institutions after 1707 ensured that legal figures played a prominent part in Scottish political identity. Henry Dundas came from a distinguished family of Scottish lawyers – with both his father and brother serving as President of the Court of Session – and he himself was Lord Advocate before his attachment to Pitt the Younger brought about his meteoric rise.[30] His successor as Lord Advocate, Ilay Campbell, was at the same time MP for the Glasgow Burghs in Parliament. He came from an Edinburgh-based family who were a part of a group of lesser landowners, the Campbells of Succoth in Dumbartonshire, who had been forced into professional employment due to relative low-income yields from their estates.[31] Ilay Campbell became allied to Dundas, who secured the position of solicitor-general for Campbell in 1783 when Dundas was still Lord Advocate. They both lost their positions when the Fox-North coalition briefly came to power, but, perhaps with Campbell's family connections to the west of Scotland in mind, Dundas secured Campbell's election to the Glasgow Burghs in 1784, after considering him initially for the Edinburgh seat.[32] He was already well-acquainted with Glasgow commercial elites and served them well as an assiduous representative in Parliament. Yet this was almost certainly incidental to his main task as a Scottish politician, which, as Lord Advocate, was to be the ministry's leading spokesman on Scottish legal matters.

The Scottish legal profession continued to be part of the make-up of Scottish representation into the early nineteenth century, although it became more overtly politicised

[29] HoP, *Commons 1754-1790*, i, 166-174.
[30] Fry, *Dundas Despotism*, ch. 1.
[31] Shaw, *The Management of Scottish Society, 1707-1764*, 14-15; Michael Fry, 'Campbell, Sir Ilay, of Succoth, first baronet (1734–1823)', *ODNB* <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4504> [Accessed 18 Oct 2014].
[32] GCA, TD219/6/69-92 (Campbell of Succoth papers), letters from Henry Dundas to Ilay Campbell in 1783-4, *passim.*

over this period. Nicholas Phillipson has noted that in the early nineteenth century 'politics was the lifeblood of the law', and many Scottish Whig MPs began as Scottish advocates.[33] There were 35 Scottish advocates sitting as Scottish MPs during the period 1790-1820, and 17 during the 12 years preceding the Scottish Reform Act in 1832.[34] Perhaps the most famous lawyer-politicians from Scotland in the later period were those 'New Whigs' tutored by Dugald Stewart at the University of Edinburgh, many of whom wrote for the *Edinburgh Review* such as James Loch, Henry Brougham, Francis Jeffrey, and Francis Horner.[35] Jeffrey eventually became Lord Advocate in 1830 and was one of the reform-minded Edinburgh Whigs who was allied to Thomas Kennedy, MP for the Ayr Burghs.[36] Both Kennedy – who was also a trained Scottish advocate – and Jeffrey sought to represent the Scottish Whig reform movement above anything else. Kennedy, for instance, does not appear to have been interested particularly in representing his Ayrshire constituents, preferring instead to follow the legal and constitutional agenda agreed between himself, Lord Henry Cockburn, and other Edinburgh Whigs.[37]

Many Scottish MPs came to the House of Commons as former army or navy officers. At the 1761 election, 13 out of 56 former army officers were Scots, a figure which rose slightly to 17 out of 54 at the 1784 election.[38] A disproportionate number of officer-Members during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars – nearly a quarter – were Scots, and two thirds of these sat for Scottish constituencies, many of which were county seats.[39] This reflects the Scottish tradition of military service, which had long been a way for Scots, particularly young

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[33] Nicholas Phillipson, *The Scottish Whigs and the Reform of the Court of Session, 1785-1830* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 11; T.E. Orme, 'The Scottish Whig party, 1801-1820', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Edinburgh, 2013), p. 35.
[34] HoP, *Commons 1790-1820*, i, 299-300; HoP *Commons 1820-1832*, Vol. I, pp. 259-64.
[35] 'The System of the North: Dugald Stewart and his pupils' in Stefan Collini, Donald Winch and John Burrow (ed.), *The Noble Science of Politics: A Study in Nineteenth-century Intellectual History* (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 23-62.
[36] Eric Richards, 'Loch, James (1780–1855)', *ODNB* <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/16883> [Accessed 10 Oct 2014]; Michael Fry, 'Jeffrey, Francis, Lord Jeffrey (1773–1850)', *ODNB* <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/14698> [Accessed 19 Oct 2014].
[37] *Cockburn Letters*, *passim.*
[38] HoP, *Commons 1790-1820*, i, 306-19.
[39] *Ibid*., 306-19.

Scots, to access British patronage networks and to participate in the British fiscal-military state.[40] It was also seen, by all social classes, as a way to supplement their income.[41] At the beginning of this period, when the Scottish population was one-tenth the size of England's, Scots represented one fifth of the British officer corps.[42] Many Scottish officer-politicians left the armed forces as soon as they inherited estates, such as Archibald Campbell of Blythswood whose father was a colonel and whose brother was killed in Martinique in 1794. He relinquished his position in the army when he inherited the Blythswood estate, which bordered Glasgow, and through his political control over the burgh of Renfrew, was successfully elected to represent the Glasgow Burghs in 1820.[43] Others like him included Hew Hamilton Dalrymple, who had been an army officer in the 1790s, after which he succeeded his father as MP in Haddingtonshire, and then, with the influence of Dundas, was elected for his home county of Ayrshire in 1807 and again in 1811.[44] In a later period, James Wemyss, whose father had been MP for Fife, was a former naval officer who became a Scottish MP, succeeding his father's estates in Fife and gaining election for that county in 1820 on the Melville interest.[45] These essentially were members of the landed elite, although the case of Campbell, who was a diligent representative of Glasgow interests, shows again that landowners could play an important civic role in their neighbouring towns and cities.

There were a growing number of Scottish MPs over this period who came from a mercantile background. London-based Scottish merchants were usually ambitious for a seat in the Commons, but many Scottish merchant-politicians were also landowners, which is indicative of broader patterns of social mobility in Scotland during the second half of the

[40] Stana Nenadic, 'Military Men, Business Men, and the 'Business' of Patronage' in Stana Nendic (ed.), *Scots in London in the Eighteenth Century* (Cranbury, 2010), p. 232.
[41] Andrew Mackillop, *More Fruitful than the Soil: Army, Empire and the Scottish Highlands, 1715-1815* (East Linton, 2000), pp. 136-139.
[42] Nenadic, 'Military Men', 232.
[43] HoP *Commons 1820-1832*, iv, 342.
[44] HoP, *Commons 1790-1820*, iii, 560-2. For the Dalrymples of Berwick with their connection to business and the military, see Nenadic, 'Military Men', 234-236.
[45] HoP *Commons 1820-1832*, vii, 692-4.

eighteenth century. Paul Langford has observed that property was important as a means of 'enforcing parliamentary accountability', where MPs with property or a residence outside their constituency would be part of a 'nexus of local interests' in which they might be 'accessible to legislative pressure from individuals and groups not necessarily to be found among their electors'.[46] James Hunter Blair, MP for Edinburgh in the early 1780s, and later its Lord Provost, was born into a wealthy mercantile family and as a teenager, was a young trainee at Coutts bank. He was brought onto the Edinburgh Town Council by Lord Milton in 1763 to support James Coutts' political interest, but he was also a dedicated agricultural improver on the Wigtownshire estate he inherited through his wife.[47] He had, therefore, both landed and mercantile concerns. This mixture of interests was also represented in James Duff (later Lord Fife), MP Banffshire (1754-84) and later Elginshire (1784-90). The Duff family fortune was made in trade and private banking in Banffshire by James' grandfather, William Duff, and his father, also named William, who had been MP for Banffshire during 1727-30 and a 'regional politician of substance'.[48] James inherited the same seat from his uncle, James Abercrombie in 1754, as well as his father's titles and estates in 1763 which were mainly in Aberdeen and Moray. He expanded these estates by purchasing more land in the north of Scotland, settling in Banff and living in his self-built Duff House, where he spent much of his time acting as an improver and a farmer.[49]

This mixture of landed and commercial concerns was particularly striking in MPs who hailed from elite colonial families, such as William McDowall, MP for Renfrewshire, Ayrshire

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[46] Langford, 'Property and 'Virtual Representation', 91-92.
[47] John Booker, 'Blair, Sir James Hunter, first baronet (1741–1787)', *ODNB* <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2565> [Accessed 19 Oct 2014].
[48] Allan I. Macinnes, 'Union, Empire and Global Adventuring with a Jacobite Twist, 1707-53' in Allan I. Macinnes and Douglas J. Hamilton (ed.), *Jacobitism, Enlightenment and Empire, 1680-1820* (London, 2014), p. 133.
[49] Anne Pimlott Baker, 'Duff, James, second Earl Fife (1729–1809)'*ODNB* <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/8168> [Accessed 11 Sept 2014]. See also: Alistair Taylor and Henrietta Taylor, *Lord Fife and His Factor; being the correspondence of James, Second Lord Fife, 1729-1809* (London, 1925).

and the Glasgow Burghs between 1783-1810, whose family were West Indian merchants based in Glasgow. His grandfather purchased plantations on Nevis, where he lived for 24 years before establishing himself as a West Indian merchant in Glasgow on his return to Scotland in 1724, and he subsequently purchased estates in Renfrewshire. When McDowall was born, the family was at the head of a commercial empire of sugar, rum, the slave trade, as well as owning extensive property in the West Indies and Glasgow.[50] Upon his father's death, he inherited the mercantile empire and the family ancestral lands of Garthland, as well as smaller estates in Lanarkshire and Ayrshire.[51] He had, therefore, substantial attachments to the Glasgow and west of Scotland region, and as such was keen to represent both Renfrewshire and the Glasgow Burghs during his parliamentary career, both in terms of his interest in landed, commercial and colonial matters. This mixture belies the idea of a simple division of landed and commercial interests and reflects what was becoming a rather complex rural society in Lowland Scotland in this period, implying that there could be an element of 'virtual representation' in the activities of Scottish MPs.[52]

This mix of interests could also apply to Scots who sat as MPs for non-Scottish seats. During the course of this period there were at least 250 MPs who were arguably Scottish – or could claim significant Scottish heritage – but who sat for English or Welsh constituencies. Many of these did not concern themselves in representing Scottish interests, either because they had acquired an English seat as an easier route to Parliament rather than attempting to navigate the complicated Scottish electoral system, such as Alexander Wedderburn, or because their connections to Scotland were purely familial and they had actually been raised and

[50] Stuart M. Nesbit, 'Clearing the Smokescreen of Early Scottish Mercantile Identity: From Leeward Sugar Planations to Scottish Country Estates, c. 1680-1730' in Macinnes and Hamilton (ed), *Jacobitism, Enlightenment, and Empire*, 109-122.
[51] T.M. Devine, 'An Eighteenth Century Business Elite: Glasgow-West India Merchants , c. 1750-1815', *Scottish Historical Review* 57 (1978), 62. See also Devine, 'Glasgow colonial merchants and land, c.1770-1815' in J.T. Ward and R. J. Wilson (eds.), *Land and Industry: The Landed Elite and the Industrial Revolution* (Newton Abbot, 1971), pp. 205-265.
[52] Bruce P. Lenman, 'Scotland between the '15 and the '45' in Jeremy Black (ed.), *Britain in the Age of Walpole* (London, 1984), p. 77.

educated south of the border, such as Lord Mountstuart. But several Scots who sat for non-Scottish seats did actively maintain an interest in Scottish affairs, with one prominent example being William Pulteney (known as William Johnstone before 1767), who had previously represented the Scottish county of Cromarty, but who sat for Shrewsbury between 1775 and 1801. He was the son of Sir James Johnstone of the Westerhall estate in Dumfriesshire, and was trained as a lawyer in Edinburgh. In 1760, he married the niece of William Pulteney, earl of Bath, who unexpectedly inherited from her uncle in 1767, and the couple adopted the Pulteney name.[53] He maintained his Scottish estate, Solway Bank in Dumfriesshire, where he continued to experiment with road improvement and fishery schemes in the 1770s and '80s.[54] This perhaps explains his continuing interest in Scottish affairs, especially in Highland improvement, which closely mirrored what he had been doing on his own estate. In the early nineteenth century, many Scots sitting as MPs for non-Scottish seats were leading advocates of the Scottish Whig party who maintained a partisan interest in Scottish affairs, such as James Loch, Henry Brougham, Francis Horner, who became MPs for English constituencies because the Whig vote in Scotland was squeezed by the Melville interest.[55] By 1830, however, with the decline of the Melville electoral regime, James Loch and Francis Jeffrey were able to return to Scotland and were elected for the Tain Burghs and the Perth Burghs respectively.

During this period, there were a small number of Scottish MPs who did not hail from elite or prestigious families. According to Ian Christie, there was a slight increase in the number of 'non-elite' British MPs over this period, so that 132 were elected in 1818.[56] Although few

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[53] M. J. Rowe, W. H. McBryde, 'Pulteney , Sir William, fifth baronet (1729–1805)', *ODNB* <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/56208> [Accessed 20 June 2014]. For a recent study of the Johnstone family, see Emma Rothschild, *Inner Lives of Empire: An Eighteenth-Century History* (Princeton, 2011).
[54] HL, Boxes 3-28 (Pulteney papers), *passim*.
[55] For Francis Horner, see especially Kenneth Bourne and William Banks Taylor (eds), *The Horner Papers: selections from the letters and miscellaneous writings of Francis Horner, M.P., 1795-1817* (Edinburgh, 1994), pp. 641, 718, 813-15, 829, 843, and 902.
[56] The description 'non-elite', according to Christie, covers men 'not born and bred in the landed society of aristocracy and gentry which constituted the traditional ruling class': I.R. Christie, *British 'non-elite' MPs, 1715-1820* (Oxford, 1995), pp. 2 & 128-130.

of them sat for Scottish constituencies, George Dempster stands out as the son of a Dundee corn merchant who had accumulated estates of some 6,000 acres in Forfarshire by 1754. He was therefore very attached to this area of the north east of Scotland, having also been educated at the University of St Andrews. He was elected in 1761 for the Perth Burghs, unseating the powerful incumbent, Thomas Leslie, brother of the earl of Rothes, who enjoyed the backing of the duke of Newcastle.[57] In doing this, he had made judicious use of the patronage at his disposal due to his attachment to Gilbert Elliot and Lord Milton, who both admired his stance as a firm advocate of the establishment of a Scottish militia. But he also developed and cultivated his electoral interest in the Perth Burghs district, becoming Provost of St Andrews, and later Forfar, as well as a burgess on the Dundee Town Council, all of which arguably gave him an unusual degree of freedom as a parliamentarian and he was able to develop a reputation for being a political 'independent'. His interest in this region led him to represent the Scottish linen industry, among many other local interests, because it was vital to his constituent towns and to the local – and the national – Scottish economy. This local motivation was often combined with his patriotism as shown by his fervent support for improvement schemes, such as Highland development.

The rise of increasingly powerful industrial interests in the early nineteenth century, representatives of which were increasingly part of a powerful civic elite, particularly in Glasgow, led to the election of more unusual MPs. The Glasgow Burghs were represented by Kirkman Finlay between 1812 and 1818 – the first native Glaswegian to represent the city for seventy years, and his election was clear evidence of a more assertive commercial and manufacturing elite.[58] Finlay was the son of James Finlay, a textile merchant, and was brought up and educated in Glasgow before joining the family firm as a partner, aged 17. He began to

[57] Andrew Munro Lang, *A life of George Dempster, Scottish M.P. of Dunnichen (1732-1818)* (Lampeter, 1998); John Evans, *The Gentleman Usher: The Life and Times of George Dempster (1732-1818): Member of Parliament and Laird of Dunnichen and Skibo* (Barnsley, 2005).
[58] Fry, *Dundas Despotism*, 319-331.

lead the company in the year following his father's death and expanded the business into a Glasgow-based mercantile and manufacturing concern which encompassed the European continent and the United States. [59] He was part of a civic group in Glasgow, which also included Henry Monteith, a Glasgow Lord Provost and MP for Linlithgow, which looked to Europe and the East to trade, and which gradually supplanted the 'West India elite' that had been dominant following the fall of the 'Tobacco Lords' after the American War of Independence.[60] The Glasgow Town Council saw Finlay as 'their man' in Parliament as he was Lord Provost when he became an MP in 1812, and his election followed his successful lobbying campaign to rescind the Orders in Council and limit the East India Company's monopoly. Finlay vociferously represented the increasingly industrialised interests in the west of Scotland and continued to lobby for them even after he lost his seat in 1818.[61]

Overall, then, the men who sat for Scottish seats during this period came from a mix of backgrounds. The overwhelming majority were, or became, landowners, which was also the case in England, and even more so in Ireland, and which did not radically change over this period. Yet not all Scottish representatives came from a titled background: compared to English, Welsh, and – after 1801 – Irish MPs, a large proportion came from legal and military backgrounds. As well as this, an increasing number were merchants with landed as well as civic interests, representing broader patterns of social mobility in Scottish society. Nevertheless, there does not appear to have been much change over time, and ultimately Scottish representation was constrained by electoral management throughout this period and remained, therefore, in the hands of a relatively small elite. Certain members of this elite, however, had a diverse range of interests and were subject to a variety of different pressures

[59] Colm Brogan, *James Finlay & Company Limited: Manufacturers and East India Merchants, 1750-1950* (Glasgow, 1951), pp. 26-28.
[60] Devine, 'An Eighteenth Century Business Elite', 53-54.
[61] Brogan, *James Finlay & Company*, 27-28; Yukihisa Kumagai, 'Kirkman Finlay and John Crawfurd: Two Scots in the Campaign of the Glasgow East India Association for the Opening of the China Trade, 1829-1833', *Journal of Scottish Historical Studies* 30 (2010), 175-99.

making the task of representation a complex one, for some at least. The rest of this chapter will assess and explore what interests these MPs represented at Westminster and how they did so.

II

The final stages of Argethelian management in the 1760s

During this period, something of a vacuum was created at the top of Scottish politics by the end of the Argathelian regime which had 'managed' Scottish politics for much of the preceding half-century. After the Jacobite Rebellion of 1715, the second duke of Argyll had gradually constructed an electoral power-base in which Scottish MPs were voting fodder for 'the court'. Under this system, Scottish interests had found ways to establish channels by which they could lobby the British political centre, such as through the Convention of Royal Burghs and new institutions such as the Board of Trustees, but only rarely solicited the services of Scottish MPs in Westminster.[62] Since the resignation of the marquis of Tweeddale in 1746 as the last official Scottish Secretary, the third duke of Argyll consolidated this control of the management of Scottish politics.[63] After Argyll's death in April 1761, however, certain Scottish politicians reasonably questioned the survival of this system. Argyll's nephew, the earl of Bute, favourite of the newly-crowned George III, told the duke of Newcastle that Scotland was merely like 'any other part of the United Kingdom', and that he would have 'little to do' there.[64] This assertion that Scotland had now integrated politically within the Westminster system of representation was reflected in the views of certain Scottish MPs, such as Gilbert Elliot, MP

[62] Hayton, 'Adjustment and Integration', 434-435.
[63] John M. Simpson, 'Who Steered the Gravy Train, 1707-1766?' in N.T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison (eds), *Scotland in the Age of Improvement* (Edinburgh, 1970), p. 59. See also Roger Emerson's recent biography of Argyll: Roger Emerson, *An Enlightened Duke: The Life of Archibald Campbell (1682-1761), Earl of Islay, 3rd Duke of Argyll* (Kilkerran, 2013).
[64] Alexander Murdoch, 'Lord Bute, James Stuart Mackenzie, and the government of Scotland' in Karl W. Schweiber (ed.), *Lord Bute: Essays in Re-interpretation* (Leicester, 1988), p. 131

for Selkirkshire, who proclaimed that Scottish MPs were 'true British subjects' and reasoned: 'Am I not a Member of Parliament with as much liberty to abuse ministers…as if I had been born in Wapping?'. Scots, he argued, were entitled to be heard in Westminster on the same basis as representatives from England.[65] Despite this, the last vestiges of the Argathelian management system prevailed until 1765 under Bute's brother, James Stuart Mackenzie, MP for Ross-shire, leaving very limited room for individual Scottish MPs to act independently of this management structure on behalf of constituent Scottish interests. Indeed, Bute complained to his brother that 'My Uncle's friends' in Scotland had 'implore[d] my protection', and he pleaded with Mackenzie to leave his comfortable diplomatic post in Italy to manage Scottish affairs.[66] The status quo continued therefore for a little while longer, but changes to the pattern of Scottish representation were beginning to show.

Mackenzie was attentive to the needs of various interests from his native land. As Murdoch has previously commented: 'if Mackenzie was bad at distributing patronage, he was undoubtedly diligent at seeking to further Scottish interests, in a limited way, with the government in London'.[67] Major Scottish projects conducted at this time included the design and implementation of a canal between the Forth and the Clyde, a Scottish Bank bill, the extension of a daily post from London to Scotland, and an attempt at legislation to prevent the practice of fictitious voting in Scottish county elections. Mackenzie played a full part in each of these schemes, although he was reacting as a representative of the government who could mediate between different Scottish interests. The case of the Scottish Bank Act of 1765 demonstrates how the system of 'managed' Scottish representation worked at this time, with

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[65] Quoted in George F.S. Elliot, *The Border Elliots and the Family of Minto* (Edinburgh, 1897), p. 387. This was a declaration of defiance against anti-Scottish prejudice, in response to Hume's complaint that 'there is not one Englishman in fifty, who, if he heard that I had broke my Neck to night, woud not be rejoic'd with it. Some hate me because I am not a Tory, some because I am not a Whig, some because I am not a Christian, and all because I am a Scotsman. Can you seriously talk of my continuing an Englishman? Am I, or are you, an Englishman? Will they allow us to be so?': J.Y.T. Greig (ed.), *The Letters of David Hume* (2 vols, Oxford, 1932), Vol. I, p. 470 (David Hume to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 22 September 1764).
[66] Murdoch, 'Lord Bute, James Stuart Mackenzie, and the government of Scotland', 124-5.
[67] *Ibid.*, 131.

Mackenzie playing the role of negotiator between the rival banks in Edinburgh and Glasgow. Monetary disturbances in Scotland, including the 'small note mania' in the 1750s and '60s, had prompted intense debate about the banking system in Scotland. The Edinburgh banks wished to be given the exclusive privilege of banking and issuing printed notes.[68] This provoked Archibald Ingram, Lord Provost of Glasgow, to respond on behalf of the bankers in his city by lobbying Mackenzie and requesting that he 'use your interest to promote the continuance of the Banks here, and also, that they may be put on an equal footing with the Banks at Edinburgh'.[69] This whole affair was managed and eventually resolved by Mackenzie and his Scottish parliamentary allies, who included Gilbert Elliot (MP for Selkirkshire), James Oswald (MP for the Dysart Burghs), Lord Milton (Argyll's former second in command), and William Mure (who was, by this stage, a former MP for Renfrewshire and a Scottish baron of the exchequer). Mackenzie wrote to Mure asking him to reassure 'the people of Glasgow' and to dispel any rumours that the ministry would award a monopoly to the public banks in Edinburgh, and he confided that he thought 'things will remain pretty much in status quo'.[70] The negotiations were fraught, particularly over the issue of limiting the amount of printed notes, and the Glasgow banks found it difficult to agree a position. In the end, Mackenzie appears to have negotiated a compromise between the Glasgow and Edinburgh banks, considering the matter, in March 1765, to be 'concerted and settled'.[71] The Act of 1765 abolished the so-called 'optional clause' for Scottish banks and restricted Scottish banknotes to £1 and one guinea notes.[72]

Ultimately, this episode demonstrates how political structures in Scotland still remained centralised and essentially reactive in the way they behaved. The fact that the new and growing

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[68] S.G. Checkland, *Scottish Banking: A History, 1695-1973* (Glasgow, 1975), p. 119.
[69] William Mure (ed.), *Selections from the family papers preserved at Caldwell* (2 Vols, Glasgow, 1854), Part II, Vol. I, p. 208 (Archibald Ingrahm to Stuart Mackenzie, n.d.).
[70] *Ibid*., 232 (James Stuart Mackenzie to William Mure, 2 February 1764)
[71] *Ibid*., 19-20 (Mackenzie to Mure, 11 March 1765).
[72] Checkland, *Scottish Banking*, 121,

banking interest communicated directly with Mackenzie and his allies as government representatives on Scottish matters is indicative of the managed nature of representation in this period. Frederick Campbell, MP for the Glasgow Burghs, was written to by John Glassford, a leading 'tobacco lord' in Glasgow, for his help when the legislation was being drafted, but his input in representing his constituent interests appears to have been limited with there being little evidence of his taking part in any of the negotiations which resulted in the drafting of the bill.[73]

Partly because of the perpetuation of the system of management, there remained considerable pressure on Scottish MPs from their constituents to ally with whichever ministry was in power. For example, in 1763, the freeholders of the county of Elgin instructed their MP, James Grant, not to engage in the 'progress of faction, that most dangerous enemy', and instead to support the government and 'concur in such constitutional measures as may be proposed'.[74] Many Scottish constituencies continued to believe that their MP's support for the ministry would grant them 'access', which made it quite difficult for the minority of Scottish MPs who desired to represent their constituents in opposition. Alexander Gilmour certainly found his allegiance to Newcastle in opposition to be a problem: in 1763-4 he travelled around Scotland in an attempt to generate support for the opposition among former supporters of Newcastle and 'the true Whig interest', but found that those with real influence in Scottish politics were 'entirely govern'd by Lord Bute and Mr Mackenzie'.[75] Gilmour's loyalty to Newcastle caused him trouble in his Midlothian constituency from his rival, John Dalrymple, who claimed that freeholders there were 'irritated' by Gilmour's parliamentary conduct. Dalrymple sought to gain election there by presenting himself as someone who would 'speak

[73] Mure (ed.), *Selections from the family papers preserved at Caldwell*, ii, ii, p. 3 (John Glassford to Mure, 8 January 1765).
[74] *Ibid.*, ii, i, p. 194 ('Instructions to Scotch Members of Parliament, 4 October, 1763).
[75] BL, Add. MS. 32949 (Newcastle papers), fo. 206: Newcastle to Kinnoull, 27 June 1763 (copy), fos. 310-311: Kinnoull to Newcastle, 10 July 1763, fo. 447: Gilmour to Newcastle, 30 July 1763; Add. MS. 32963, fo. 4, Lord Deskford to Newcastle, 22 October 1764, f. 34: Gilmour to Newcastle, 25 October 1764.

[freeholders'] sentiments of attachment to the measures of Government, instead of indulging his own opposition.'[76]

Gilmour's problems with his Midlothian freeholders illustrate the paradox of representation by Scottish MPs in this period. Many constituents believed that their interests were best served by their representative being a supporter of government, but this made it all the more difficult for MPs to then oppose government measures which might adversely affect their constituents' interests. Several years later, George Dempster, MP for the Perth Burghs, complained to his fellow Scottish MP, Sir Adam Fergusson, that this was one of many 'glaring contradictions' of the prevailing political system:

> It is expected that we Members of Parliament should be independent men and men of influence at the same time. That we should be ready to serve our country by opposing bad measures, and our constituents by supporting every ministerial measure, and that we should disregard the frowns and yet court the favour of our rulers. It is a wonderfull grumble and a wonder the grumble does not unhinge our brains.[77]

Dempster himself did not conform to the stereotype of a servile Scottish MP and had allied himself to the opposition Rockinghamites in the early 1760s. Nevertheless, he complained to his friend, William Pulteney in 1775 that 'tho my Constituents have been very good to me yet they to a man wish me to be a Courtier and tell me so'.[78] Dempster was unusual in being able to stay in opposition, but his constituents' wish that he support every ministry was typical.

The inherent difficulties in constructing a truly 'national' Scottish lobby outside the system of Scottish management, and especially against the wishes of ministers, are demonstrated by the proposed Scottish militia bills in the early 1760s. A movement in Scotland

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[76] Mure (ed.), *Selections from the family papers preserved at Caldwell,* ii, i, pp. 283-285. (John Dalrymple to Mackenzie, 24 November 1764 and John Dalrymple to 'The Freeholders of Midlothian').
[77] *Dempster-Fergusson Letters*, 120-121 (Dempster to Fergusson, 22 September [1783]).
[78] HL, PU 161, Box 12, George Dempster to Pulteney, 15 March 1775.

for the establishment of a Scottish militia, equivalent to the English militia which had been established by the Militia Act in 1757, had started in 1760. This campaign argued for the right to self-defence during the Seven Years War (1757-1762) when fears of a possible French invasion were widespread, and it was driven and promoted by many of the leading lights of the Scottish Enlightenment, principally Alexander Carlyle and Adam Ferguson. Their shared argument was that a Scots militia would complete the Union and bring 'liberty' to Scotland.[79] In Parliament, the campaign for a Scottish militia bill was spearheaded by Gilbert Elliot who worked with several other Scottish MPs, including George Townshend, James Oswald, Alexander Hume-Campbell, Henry Erskine, and Andrew Fletcher to draft and present proposals.[80] A committee of 31 MPs, including 26 Scottish MPs, was given permission to prepare a bill in early 1760[81], but it failed to secure a favourable Commons vote in April of that year against the determined opposition of the duke of Newcastle, then leading the ministry, even though all but two Scottish MPs voted in support of this measure.[82] Despite this failure, it was a remarkable and unusual instance of a Scottish measure being supported actively by the overwhelming majority of Scottish representatives and shows that there could indeed be a Scottish 'national' interest in Parliament. Following the election of 1761, there was a renewed attempt to pass a similar bill by most Scottish MPs, including the newly elected George Dempster, who had published his own pamphlet in 1760 arguing that the extension of the militia was necessary for Scotland to be an equal part of the Union.[83] Nevertheless, the strong support in Scotland, which had backed the first bill, was in fact now fragmenting in the

[79] Richard Sher, *Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: the moderate literati of Edinburgh* (Edinburgh, 1985), p. 224. See also John Robertson, *The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue* (Edinburgh, 1985), pp.115-121; J. R. Western, *The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century* (Toronto, 1965), pp. 162-3.
[80] NLS, MS. 11015 (Saltoun papers), fos. 32-33, Lord Milton to Gilbert Elliot, 23 February 1760; MS. 16522, fos. 53-54, Andrew Fletcher to Milton, 28 February 1760; MS. 16713, fos. 135-7, Alexander Hume-Campbell to Milton, 28 February 1760.
[81] NLS, MS. 16522, fos. 64-65, Andrew Fletcher to Milton, 13 March 1760.
[82] Robertson, *Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue*, 112.
[83] George Dempster, *Reasons for Extending the Militia Acts to the Disarmed Counties of Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1760).

knowledge that the ministry was opposed to such a measure, and most Scottish burghs and counties were evenly split on the matter.[84] This split led to the failure in 1762 of the new bill and on 22 March 1762, Scottish MPs, admitting defeat, met and voted unanimously not to try again.[85] Scottish MPs, as a group, clearly had the capacity for action, outside the traditional management structures, on behalf of identifiably Scottish issues, but the difficulties that could stand in the way of constructing an essentially 'national' Scottish lobby, if opposed by ministers in London, remained insurmountable at this stage.

During this period, the Convention of Royal Burghs continued to provide an important means for Scottish urban economic and industrial interests to seek influence at Westminster. We have already seen elsewhere in this thesis how, since 1707, the Convention of Royal Burghs played a key role in lobbying on behalf of Scottish burgh interests. This is not to say that the Convention was immune to political management; it is well known that earlier in the eighteenth century it was particularly susceptible to control from the Argyll interest.[86] Yet as a lobbying institution, it frequently utilised the services of MPs who sat for burgh districts to supplement the efforts of the Convention's agents. Lobbying agents were appointed periodically to represent the interests of Scottish burghs, but it made sense to utilise MPs who were already in London and who could sit on parliamentary committees, and who had ready access to ministers. Occasionally, the Convention would simply ask all burghs to write and 'instruct' their MPs, such as in December 1765 when it made an application to Parliament to stop the exportation of grain and requested the 'liberty' to import Indian corn.[87] Its agents in this period – Alexander Grey and George Ross – were occasionally instructed to conduct their lobbying in collaboration

[84] Opposing burghs included St Andrews, which was part of Dempster's own constituency district, StAUL, B65/11/6 (St Andrews Town Council Minutes), fos. 28-29 (9 March 1762).
[85] NLS, MS. 16523, fos. 115-16, Andrew Fletcher to Milton, 23 March 1762; MS. 1404, fos. 166-7, John Murray to John Mackenzie, 23 March 1762; Robertson, *Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue*, 118-121.
[86] Shaw, *Management of Scottish Society*, 95-98.
[87] T. Hunter (ed.), *Extracts from the records of the Convention of Royal Burghs of Scotland, 1757-1779* (Edinburgh, 1918), p. 193.

with Scottish MPs. When attempting to lobby the Postmaster General to improve the postal network from London to Edinburgh in March 1762, they instructed Grey and Ross to seek the 'countenance of all the great Scots people now in London, and particularly for that of the representatives of the burrows in Parliament, for obtaining success in this affair.'[88] We know that Scottish MPs had met in London at establishments such as the British Coffee House on Cockspur Street since 1707.[89] Although there are very few recorded examples of Scottish MPs meeting formally as a group to co-ordinate a political campaign,[90] it is well-known that there was a distinctive community of Scots in London by the 1760s which was made up of those who had migrated for literary, professional, business, or military, as well as political purposes.[91] They built up social, business and patronage networks, and met in drinking and dining clubs; indeed, James Boswell recorded at this time that he was spending too much of his time in London socialising with his fellow Scots.[92] It is very plausible, therefore, that during this period MPs for the Royal Burghs frequently met in London in a similar fashion.

This is certainly implied on occasions when the Convention demanded the support of all Scottish MPs for what it considered to be a measure of importance. In January 1767, for instance, the Scottish linen interest prepared its own bill for a bounty on the cultivation of flax and hemp with Walter Biggar, a linen manufacturer, and Neil McVicar, a linen merchant, and the Convention then requested the aid of Scottish MPs.[93] Scottish MPs were subsequently thanked *en masse* when this bill was successful in the following July, and Sir Laurence Dundas (MP for Edinburgh) and Sir Alexander Gilmour (MP for Midlothian) received individual notes

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[88] *Ibid*., 86.
[89] Bryant Lillywhite, *London coffee houses: a reference book of coffee houses of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century* (London, 1963), pp. 132-133.
[90] For one of the few recorded examples of such meetings, see Clyve Jones, 'A Westminster Anglo-Scottish Dining Group, 1710-12: The Evidence of Lord Ossulton's Diary', *Scottish Historical Review* 71 (1992), 110-28.
[91] Nenadic, *Scots in London in the Eighteenth Century*, 20-33, 230-231.
[92] Gordon Turnbull (ed.), *James Boswell: London Journal, 1762-1763* (London, 2010), p. 128. Thursday, 3 February 1763: 'I find that I ought not to keep too much company with Scotch people, because I am kept from acquiring propriety of english speaking, and because they prevent my mind from being filled with London images, so that I might as well be in Scotland'.
[93] Hunter (ed.), *Records from the Convention*, 242.

of thanks for guiding it through the Commons.[94] Scottish MPs could very often be part of a chain of lobbying: a burgh interest might approach the Convention, which would then request the support of a select group of burgh MPs. In April 1766, the Convention's annual committee received an application from Edinburgh and Glasgow brewers complaining that they were being charged a higher duty on beer than English brewers. Judging this to be a fair objection, the Convention's annual committee wrote to the Lord Advocate (Thomas Miller, MP for the Dumfries Burghs), Lord Frederick Campbell, James Stuart Mackenzie, James Oswald, Sir Alexander Gilmour, James Coutts, Gilbert Elliot and George Dempster, asking them all to correct this perceived injustice by lobbying the Treasury.[95]

This was one obvious way in which MPs could be directed by specific Scottish interests to represent their causes and demands to ministers and Parliament, independently of the Argathelian system. While there was nothing especially new about this – Scottish MPs had been receiving instructions from the Convention of Royal Burghs since, and even before, 1707 – the decline of the Argathelian interest, and the power vacuum this created in Scottish politics, is discernible in the increased activity of a select group of individual Scottish MPs. However, the Convention was still a national body representing different and sometimes competing urban interests which were occasionally at odds. On the one hand this might allow the Royal Burghs to negotiate a line and lobby for a common cause, but on the other, it might cause certain interests to be favoured over others, a fact which highlights the limitations of this institution as a facilitator of representation.

The Convention's limitations arguably became more pronounced during the 1760s as the growth in the number and importance of diverse commercial and manufacturing interests gave cause for some to feel under-represented. The rival lobbying campaigns to allow the

[94] *Ibid*., 265 and 272 for the individual letters to Sir Alexander Gilmour and Sir Laurence Dundas.
[95] *Ibid*., 194.

construction of a Forth-Clyde canal is just one important example. A canal through the central isthmus of Scotland had been an attractive proposition to various Scottish interests on the east and west coasts for several decades. In this period, Edinburgh's interests in Europe and Glasgow's trade in America prompted rival plans from the Board of Trustees based in Edinburgh, and merchants based in Glasgow and the west of Scotland region.[96] Mackenzie was in favour of the idea in principle, and began negotiations to formulate the means of implementing such a plan.[97] However, believing that the Board of Trustees' plans for a canal were inadequate, Glasgow magistrates and the Glasgow Merchants House collaborated to promote a shorter canal, and soon afterwards their MP, Lord Frederick Campbell, introduced a bill in Parliament for the 'power to execute the work'.[98] This was, however, opposed by the Convention of Royal Burghs and Edinburgh Town Council who instead proposed a deeper cut designed by John Smeaton and were supported by petitions from Aberdeen, Banff, Elgin, Haddington, Linlithgow, Perth, Selkirk and Stirling. This majority support in the Convention for the Edinburgh plan meant that it then sent instructions to all Scottish burgh MPs requesting that they oppose the Glasgow measure.[99] This combined pressure forced the Glasgow supporters of a smaller canal to drop their plans on 13 May 1767, with Campbell withdrawing the bill in the Commons, and the following December supporters through the Convention of Royal Burghs petitioned Parliament for leave to bring in a bill, which received royal assent on 8 March 1768.[100] A majority in the Convention of Royal Burghs had clearly favoured the

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[96] Jean Lindsay, *The Canals of Scotland* (Devon, 1968), p. 17.
[97] Mure (ed.), *Selections from the family papers preserved at Caldwell,* ii, ii, pp. 12-14. (James Stuart Mackenzie to William Mure, 16 February 1765).
[98] *Memorials of the public life and character of the Right Hon. James Oswald of Dunniker: contained in a correspondence with some of the most distinguished men of the last century* (Edinburgh, 1825), p. 322 (William Mure to James Oswald, 11 March 1767); J.D. Marwick and Robert Renwick (ed.), *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow* (11 vols, Glasgow, 1876-1916), Vol. VII, p. 237, p. 256, p. 263 (23 January 1768, when the Lord Provost, George Murdoch, was instructed to travel to London to see to the progress of the bill) and pp. 265-7.
[99] For the considerations of the Convention of Royal Burghs on this matter, and their decision to petition against the Glasgow bill, see: T. Hunter (ed.), *Extracts from the records of the Convention of Royal Burghs of Scotland, 1757-1779* (30 March 1767), pp. 242-250. See the letter to all burgh MPs on pp. 245-6.
[100] *Ibid*., 312 (1 August 1768); Lindsay, *Canals of Scotland*, 18-20.

Edinburgh plan and marginalised Glasgow interests. This left Glasgow, with its single MP, in this instance, excluded from a self-defined Scottish national interest in London. This was, of course, a systemic problem with one national lobbying body claiming to represent all Scottish interests and directing MPs accordingly; it had long had the potential to create division and exclude certain interests. Nevertheless, it left certain Glaswegian manufacturing interests searching for alternatives to the Convention, and the disintegration of the system of Scottish management would gradually allow them, over the next couple of decades, to increasingly seek to take matters into their own hands and create new channels of representation, as examined in the first two chapters of this thesis.

By the end of the mid-to-late 1760s, the system of Scottish political management was crumbling. In 1765, Mackenzie was dismissed by George Grenville who had long disapproved of the hold on Scottish patronage that the Lord Privy Seal of Scotland seemed to have.[101] Although Lord Frederick Campbell briefly acted as Mackenzie's replacement, this, along with the death of Lord Milton, Argyll's former *sous-ministre*, in 1766, appears to have marked the end of the 'Argathelian' regime and its powerful control of Scottish representation at Westminster.[102] During Rockingham's first short ministry in 1766, Gilmour sent Newcastle a list showing where certain Scottish MPs' loyalty lay: 20 were now in opposition, including James Oswald, Lord Frederick Campbell, Gilbert Elliot, and Patrick Crawfurd, as opposed to 17 supporters of government, including, unsurprisingly, Gilmour as well as George Dempster and James Coutts.[103] Scottish loyalties in Westminster were becoming more divided, and this fragmentation was allowed to continue gradually over the next couple of decades. One

[101] Grenville and Mackenzie had quarrelled over matters of Scottish patronage, most famously over an incident in Banffshire when Mackenzie appointed a sheriff depute over the head of Lord Fife, the MP there who also happened to be a supporter of Grenville: HL, ST7 (Stowe Collection, Grenville Letter Books, Vol. I), Grenville to earl of Fife, 1 July 1764, Grenville to Charles Jenkinson, 2 and 4 July 1764, Grenville to Stuart Mackenzie, 6 July 1764, Grenville to Fife, 6 July 1764, Grenville to Jenkinson, 6 July 1764, Grenville to Fife, 23 July 1764, and Grenville to Mackenzie, 30 July 1764.
[102] HL, ST 7 (Stowe Collection, Grenville Letter Books, Vol. II), Grenville to Lord Frederick Campbell, 25 July 1765. For more on Lord Milton, see: Shaw, *Management of Scottish Society*, especially ch. 7.
[103] BL, Add. MS. 32974, fo. 23-25, Gilmour to Newcastle, 18 February 1766.

consequence was that a new and less structured system of representation began to develop, which might allow certain MPs to act more effectively as Scottish representatives.[104]

III

Scottish representation during the 1780s

The general period of peace following the end of the American War in 1782 and the outbreak of hostilities with France in 1793 saw a Scot, Henry Dundas, at the heart of government as Navy Treasurer and William Pitt the Younger's right-hand-man. While Dundas came to dominate Scottish electoral politics, he was Pitt's subordinate and, unlike the third duke of Argyll, was not governor of a 'semi-autonomous' polity. Scottish politics was undoubtedly more fluid than it had been in the previous period, but the presence of a Scot at the heart of power was of great benefit to Scottish interests throughout this period and beyond. The fifth duke of Argyll noted in 1787 that because of Dundas' attachment to Pitt, 'the affairs of Scotland have at this period a little better chance of being attended to, than was ever the case before or perhaps will be again.'[105] During this period the context in which Scottish MPs and interests were operating was changing in important ways: the aftermath of the American War of Independence presented new and complex challenges for certain Scottish interests, as has been discussed earlier in this thesis. This, combined with a growing volume of local and general legislation pertaining to Scotland in this period, meant that the focus on Westminster in Scotland was continually increasing, as seen by the growing number of references to parliamentary debates in Scottish newspapers.[106] The growing importance of Parliament and central government to Scottish interests required a small number of Scottish MPs, who can be

[104] Hayton, 'Adjustment and Integration', 410-435.
[105] Quoted in Murdoch, *People Above*, 11.
[106] Bob Harris, 'Parliamentary Legislation, Lobbying and the Press in Eighteenth-Century Scotland', *Parliamentary History* 26 (2007), 92; idem, *Politics and the Rise of the Press: Britain and France 1620-1800* (London, 1996), p. 41.

identified as having been particularly diligent, to be more active as lobbyists. This, along with the rise of new and diverse manufacturing interests led to certain issues being debated in new places, such as in the press, commercial reading rooms, county meetings, as well as the new chambers of commerce in Glasgow and Edinburgh. Some Scottish MPs were therefore called upon to represent more politically-engaged constituents who were becoming increasingly proficient at representing themselves in pursuit of aims such as economic improvement.

Scottish MPs continued to work together, either through institutions such as Convention of Royal Burghs, or more informally. In 1783, during Shelburne's peace negotiations after the American War, 11 Scottish MPs who sat for the Royal Burghs, including George Dempster, met in the British Coffee House in London on 10 February 1783 under the chairmanship of James Hunter Blair, MP for Edinburgh. They wished to promote the exportation of British linen to Spain and France, and also agreed to lobby the ministry to extend the bounty on white herrings. A few months later they formed a delegation composed of Dempster, Sir Adam Fergusson, James Hunter Blair, Thomas Longlands (the Convention agent) and Patrick Colquhoun (then Lord Provost of Glasgow and chair of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce) to thrash out an agreed position on which to lobby the Treasury with regard to the latter issue.[107] Despite the lack of evidence of similar meetings, Scottish MPs continued to work together and collaborate more informally on improvement schemes and projects which might have a 'national' dimension. Such schemes increasingly required legislation, such as bills for the improvement of the city of Edinburgh as well the harbour of Leith, sponsored by the Edinburgh Town Council and Chamber of Commerce which Edinburgh MP, Sir Adam Fergusson, navigated through the House of Commons.[108] Because

[107] PKCA, B59/34/67/2 (Perth burgh records), 'Minutes of the Meeting of the Members of Parliament for the Royal Boroughs of Scotland held at the British Coffee House, 10th February 1783'; AA, Accession 884, Bundle 25 (Hunter Blair of Blairquhan papers), George Dempster to James Hunter Blair, 1 May 1783.
[108] NRAS, 3572/2/123 (Fergusson of Kilkerran papers), James Anderson to Fergusson, 18 and 27 February 1788; John Grieve to Fergusson, 21 February 1788, charging him with seeing the bill through the House of Commons.

of the legislative process, it was common for the proposers of improvement legislation to follow a set format.[109] Ilay Campbell as Lord Advocate sometimes advised MPs who wished to enact local legislation and helped them to draft and amend local bills such as those erecting lighthouses, and Henry Dundas showed particular willingness to aid MPs when they were proposing improvement measures, especially those involving Edinburgh.[110] Scottish MPs would also make use of the same agents and solicitors in London: when Fergusson was navigating the Edinburgh 'improvement' bill through committee stages in 1785, he was instructed by James Hunter Blair, the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, to employ John Seton who was also employed by Patrick Colquhoun and Ilay Campbell for legislation relating to Glasgow.[111]

One example of a major improvement venture, which saw MPs working in tandem was the project of Highland development, co-ordinated through the new British Fisheries Society, which was established and run with the help of several Scottish MPs, including Dempster, Sir Adam Fergusson, Sir John Sinclair, and William Pulteney. In the 1780s, fisheries policy was viewed as the best way to encourage Highland development, and interest in it grew when a report by James Anderson proposed the creation of fishing towns on the northwest Scottish coast.[112] This must also be seen in the context of ambitions to rebuild and further strengthen British naval power and protection of the coasts following the American War, and in that sense resembled, at least in some respects, the Free British Fishery Society formed in the aftermath

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[109] Bob Harris, 'The Enlightenment, Towns and Urban Society in Scotland, c. 1760-1820', *Scottish Historical Review* 126 (2011), 1106.

[110] NRAS, 3572/2/149, Ilay Campbell to Sir Adam Fergusson, n.d., but probably 1788 when he was dealing with Dempster's resolutions to place lighthouses on parts of the North Sea for safety of navigation to be included in the 'Act for Erecting Certain Light-houses in the Northern Part of Great Britain', and with Francis Humberstone Mackenzie and Fergusson on the former's proposed bill on the importation of rock salt. For Dundas' help, see AA, Acc. 884, Bundle 32, Sir Adam Fergusson to James Hunter Blair, 24 February 1785; Henry Dundas to Sir Adam Fergusson, n.d. On a related note, for a recent study of Scots lawyers' involvement in appeal cases before the House of Lords in the eighteenth century, see John Finlay, 'Scots Lawyers and House of Lords Appeals in Eighteenth-Century Britain', *The Journal of Legal History* 32 (2011), 249-277.

[111] AA, Acc. 884, Bundle 32, Sir Adam Fergusson to James Hunter Blair, 18 February 1785; same to same, 24 February 1785; same to same 25 February 1785.

[112] Jean Dunlop, *The British Fisheries Society, 1786-1893* (Edinburgh, 1978), pp. 18-20.

of the War of the Austrian Succession.[113] In 1785, Dempster and William Pulteney lobbied Henry Dundas and George Rose for the ministry to fund Anderson's excursions to the Hebrides, and both Dempster and Fergusson themselves went on tours of the north west region of Scotland.[114] That year, Dempster seconded a motion by Dundas to establish a Commons select committee to investigate further, which resulted in a Fishery Act which increased payments of bounties to fishermen, which had first been established in 1750, but reduced in 1771.[115] The committee also believed that further encouragement was required to develop the Highland fisheries, but that money should be raised privately, and so another Act was passed establishing a Joint Stock Company, 'The British Fishery Society for extending the Fisheries and improving the Sea Coasts of this Kingdom.' The latter part of its title alludes to the enhanced protection of British coasts, implicitly combining government concern for naval defence with Highland improvement. The fifth duke of Argyll was elected its governor, and it had 13 directors, five of whom were Scottish MPs, including Dempster, Fergusson, Francis Humberstone Mackenzie of Seaforth, and two English members, Henry Beaufoy and William Wilberforce, with later directors being Sir John Sinclair and William Pulteney.[116] They would sometimes meet as a committee to discuss British Fisheries Society matters at Waghorn's Coffee House in Old Palace Yard in Westminster.[117] MPs involved in the Society used it as a plaform for various lobbying campaigns, such as the effort to abolish duties on English rock salt. As part of this, Francis Humberstone Mackenzie, MP for Ross-shire, and Sir Adam Fergusson sent a memorial to the ministry on this question in April 1788 and, with Ilay Campbell, drafted legislation on the importation of rock salt, although this was ultimately

[113] Bob Harris, 'Patriotic Commerce and National Revival: The Free British Fishery Society and British Politics, c. 1749-58', *English Historical Review* 114 (1999), 285-313.
[114] HL, PU 179, Box 28, George Dempster to William Pulteney, 14 November 1785.
[115] Dunlop, *The British Fisheries Society*, 22.
[116] *Ibid*., 23-27.
[117] *Dempster-Fergusson Letters*, 163 (quoting Dempster to Grimur Jonsson Thorkelin, 3 June 1787).

unsuccessful.[118] As was examined in Chapter One of this thesis, the Society was part of a renewed lobbying effort on behalf of Highland development, which also included the establishment of the Highland Society, and which carried out several important lobbying campaigns in this period, 'colonizing' regional state bodies, and establishing committees of Highland elites to make the case for improvement legislation.[119] More saliently, it showed that a number of assiduous Scottish MPs could work together to represent what they considered to be 'patriotic' causes.

The much-heralded patriotism attached to Highland development arguably exemplifies the rhetoric used by certain Scottish MPs in this period to convey the sense of a Scottish 'national' interest to the ministry, Parliament, and to their own constituents. The encouragement of Highland fisheries was indicative of a more widely used rhetoric to foster a sense of Scottish solidarity which might be effective when lobbying the ministry and Parliament. George Dempster, a founding director of the Highland Society who represented urban interests in Fife, Perthshire and Forfarshire, often deployed the language of patriotism in appealing to the 'interest of Scotland', even if he was in fact only lobbying on behalf of very specific sectional interests. He was very active on behalf of the Scottish linen industry, particularly coarse linen, which was of great importance to his constituents and which he described as 'our only great Scotch manufacture'.[120] He tried to garner Scottish support for the linen industry against Pitt's tax on printed goods in 1784, although he wrote back to the Provost of Perth to confess that in the eventual Commons vote he had only been joined by 'a few solitary Scotchmen against England Wales & Ireland'.[121] This characterisation of Scotland

[118] NRAS, 3572/2/150, 'Observations on the Salt Duties & Salt Laws relative to the Herring & Cod Fishery, 1787' (in Sir Adam Fergusson's hand); 3572/2/149, Ilay Campbell to Fergusson, n.d. but probably 1788; Francis Humberstone Mackenzie to Fergusson, 9 April 1788 enclosing 'Memorial relative to the present state of the salt laws in Scotland with Draft of a clause for an Act of Parliament, &c'. For the broader context around the salt laws, see Edward Hughes, *Studies in Administration and Finance, 1558-1825: with special to the history of salt taxation in England* (Manchester, 1934).
[119] Mackillop, 'Political Culture of the Scottish', 522-25.
[120] *Dempster-Fergusson Letters*, 143 (Dempster to Fergusson, 22 August 1785).
[121] PKCA, B59/34/8/32/3, George Dempster to George Faichney, 5 August 1784.

as being outnumbered by representatives from other nations was disingenuous given how the Scottish linen industry had on previous occasions formed a united lobby with northern English and Irish linen manufacturers. But it was part of his lobbying style designed to maintain the support of his constituents and unify the linen lobby around a Scottish identity. On another occasion, he linked the prosperity of the linen industry to that of Scotland when lobbying for the extension of the coarse linen bounty in 1788, telling Dundas: 'This growing prosperity of the Country keeps pace with the Linen Manufacture… where that ends, Scotland will be found nearly in the same state it was, at the Union of the two Kingdoms'.[122]

In some ways, patriotic rhetoric was particularly relevant in the context of the increasing importance of Westminster and Whitehall to various Scottish interests. For example, in his defence of linen interest, Dempster solicited support from elsewhere in Scotland, persuading the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce to join him in lobbying the ministry to establish a bounty on printed linens in 1784, which the Chamber concurred was of 'national' importance. Following their success in this campaign, Dempster, along with Ilay Campbell, was made an honorary member of the Chamber.[123] William Pulteney, although MP for Shrewsbury, played an active part in supporting the linen industry in his native country. He helped lobby to extend the bounty on plain linens to all printed goods and, as mentioned earlier, personally met with Pitt in the summer of 1784 in an attempt to dissuade the ministry from levying a tax on printed linens. Both John Grieve, as Lord Provost of Edinburgh, and Patrick Colquhoun, on behalf of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, wrote to Pulteney to thank him for his 'laborious zeal and active parts you took in every matter relating to the Interest of Scotland'.[124] During this campaign, James Hunter Blair, as MP for Edinburgh, was charged

[122] NLS, MS. 653 (Melville papers), Dempster to Henry Dundas, 31 January 1788.
[123] GCA, TD1670/1/1 (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce Minutes, Vol. I), fos. 54, 56, and 80 for him taking up his place at a meeting.
[124] HL, PU 286, Box 23, John Grieve to Pulteney, 18 July 1783; Box 25, PU 111, Patrick Colquhoun to Pulteney, 19 July 1784.

by Grieve to 'convene as soon as possible the members of Parliament for Scotland now in London and lay before the Memorials now transmitted requesting their Aid' against Pitt's new taxes on printed linens and silk gauzes.[125] Sir Adam Fergusson, a particularly diligent MP for Edinburgh after 1784, who was praised by Hunter Blair, then Lord Provost of that city, for his 'publick spirited conduct',[126] was, like Dempster, occasionally approached for help from other Scottish interests, such as Glasgow tobacco traders in 1784 and brewers from the same town in 1787. Fergusson's sense of representing the 'national interest' led him to chastise the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce, his own constituents, when he felt that they were acting contrary to the 'Interest of Scotland' by requesting that he attempt to delay the passage of the bill to allow Scottish imports of English rock salt duty free, campaigned for by the British Fisheries Society.[127]

It was easy to characterise interests such as the linen industry as a national cause because, as we have seen in earlier chapters, it was the Scottish 'staple' industry and responsible for much industrial growth in Scotland throughout the eighteenth century.[128] Yet the story differs depending on what is being observed. Dempster had allied himself with the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce against Pitt's taxes because it was in both their interests and it was increasingly becoming necessary to develop new and innovative ways to oppose a ministry which was imposing, in their eyes, burdensome taxation measures on domestic industries. But his support for this institution was conditional on it being beneficial to his constituents. For instance he opposed a bill put forward by the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce to regulate the thread industry because Dundee coloured thread manufacturers were against it and, indeed, he was personally 'against regulations as they act as discouragements to

[125] AA, Acc. 884, Bundle 32, John Grieve to James Hunter Blair, 13 July 1784.
[126] NRAS, 3572/2/54, James Hunter Blair to Fergusson, 3 July 1783
[127] NRAS, 3572/2/149, William Forbes (on behalf of the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce) to Fergusson, 14 May 1788; Draft 'Memorial respecting the Importation of Rock Salt into Scotland, 1788'; 3572/2/149, Fergusson to Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce, 19 May 1788 (copy).
[128] Harris, 'Towards a British Political Economy', 92.

manufacturers'.[129] Nor did he join the Chamber in its lobbying campaign against Pitt's Irish Resolutions in 1785, stating that he could see no danger 'to either kingdom by the propositions upon the table', although he did insist on care being taken of 'the linen gauze trade of Scotland.'[130] He occasionally chastised Lowland MPs for their failure to understand the plight of dearth faced by their compatriots in the north of Scotland, such as when he wrote to Hunter Blair in 1783 that 'you folks around Edinb[r] can hardly guess at the dismal Effects of a cold Season & a late Harvest in the higher parts of Scotland.'[131] The fact that Dempster was a tireless one-man crusader for a variety of Scottish interests was reflected by the gratitude expressed by the Convention of Royal Burghs when they presented him with a plate, worth 100 guineas, in 1786 'as a testimony to their sense of his unremitted and constant attention to the Business of the Royal Burghs of Scotland for these Twenty five years past'.[132] But it is clear that his active lobbying stemmed from his determination to represent the interests of his constituents in the Perth Burghs and the north east of Scotland, as well as his patriotism and belief in improvement.

While the Convention of Royal Burghs continued to act as a lobbying institution well into the nineteenth century,[133] the ever-increasing variety of local and regionally oriented interests in Scotland brought about greater demands for representation. The failure of the Glasgow plan for a Forth-Clyde canal, referred to earlier, underlined the limitations of existing lobbying channels. Glasgow, one of four burghs which shared an MP, had always sought to be represented in Parliament by someone who would diligently represent their local interests, as Daniel Campbell of Shawfield had done in relation to tobacco interests at the Treasury in

[129] GCA, TD1670/4/43 (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce papers), Dempster to Hamilton, 5 April 1787.
[130] *Scots Magazine*, xlvii, p. 180 and p. 382.
[131] AA, Acc. 884, Bundle 25, George Dempster to James Hunter Blair, 1 May 1783.
[132] ECA, SL30/1/1/14 (Convention of Royal Burghs Minutes), 11 July 1786.
[133] Harris, 'Landowners and Urban Society', 240.

1721.[134] During the 1780s, the MP for the Glasgow Burghs played a crucial part in ensuring their voices were heard. Ilay Campbell proved to be an exemplary representative of Glasgow interests in Westminster. Although technically the ministry's placeman as Lord Advocate, he opposed Pitt's printed goods tax in 1784 and fought for Scottish linen and cotton interests during negotiations over the ministry's Irish Resolutions in 1785. Gratitude was showered on both Patrick Colquhoun and Campbell when they returned as lobbying agents from their 15-week-long campaign in London, which had resulted in the repeal of the printed good tax and the re-negotiation of the Irish Resolutions.[135] In letters written back to the Chamber and Glasgow's Lord Provost, Colquhoun praised Campbell as 'the most attentive and most indefatigable member that ever represented the City of Glasgow'.[136]

Campbell carefully followed the instructions of his constituents, acting as unofficial agent to the Glasgow Chamber and the Glasgow Town Council and providing them with access to ministers. He was perhaps the ideal constituency delegate, and his position as Lord Advocate, in addition to his continued close relationship with Dundas, secured his status as Glasgow's 'insider' in London. As has been seen in earlier chapters, Campbell promoted the early Scottish cotton industry, lobbied for a bill for regulating thread manufacturing, and represented tobacco interests at the Treasury – all on the instructions of the commercial and manufacturing interests which comprised the Glasgow Chamber. He was given instructions repeatedly by the Chamber's directors and regularly reported to them, keeping them informed of developments in London and, on occasion, warning them of potential instances of unwelcome government interference.[137] In this he behaved similarly to Dempster, who also

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[134] Jacob M. Price, 'Glasgow, the Tobacco Trade, and the Scottish Customs, 1707-1730', *Scottish Historical Review* 63 (1984), 18.
[135] GCA, TD1670/1/1, fo. 146. Thanks to Campbell also came from the Glasgow Town Council on 29 June 1785: Robert Renwick (ed.), *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow*, viii, 173.
[136] GCA, TD1670/4/27, Colquhoun to Lord Provost of Glasgow, 25 March 1785.
[137] See his numerous updates in correspondence to the Chamber post-1785 in TD1670/4/35, 37, 41, 43, 45 *passim*. Campbell also promoted general Scottish measures, such as lobbying the Commons and Dundas in favour of Scottish distilleries and of hawkers and pedlars, for which efforts he received several letters of gratitude which are to be found in his papers: GCA, TD219/6/109 (Ilay Campbell papers), James Haig, Praeses

regularly informed the provosts of Perth and Dundee of his activities in Westminster, indicating the extent to which this was done by a group of especially diligent MPs, and showing that this kind of communication continued to be an important aspect of parliamentary representation for MPs representing certain burgh districts.[138] Campbell was succeeded in 1790 by William McDowall, another MP who assiduously represented Glasgow interests and who, even before he became MP for Glasgow, had, as MP for Ayrshire, acted with the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce and Colquhoun to lobby the Board of Trade and both houses of Parliament to defeat successfully the ministry's attempt to alter the corn laws in 1790.[139] The flurry of correspondence over a four-month period between the Chamber's secretary, Gilbert Hamilton, and McDowall and Colquhoun at this time, which sometimes consisted of daily updates from McDowall, demonstrates the extent to which Glasgow interests remained in communication with their MP when he was active in London, especially over important measures such as alterations to the corn laws. This is indicative of the fact that Glaswegian and west of Scotland manufacturing and commercial interests were becoming better represented in this period due to the combination of a tireless Member of Parliament acting on behalf of a more assertive and well-organised group of interests.

This period, therefore, witnessed important developments as Scottish MPs adjusted to the growing relevance of Westminster to important Scottish interests and civil society. The increase in improvement legislation produced and depended on close collaboration between Scottish MPs seeking to represent identifiably 'Scottish' concerns, while growing industrial interests established new organisations to create innovative ways to access the British state, facilitated in large part by representatives in Parliament. Nevertheless, these Scottish interests

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of Distillers, to Ilay Campbell, 9 August 1786; TD219/6/157, James Gordon (on behalf of the Caledonian Society) to Ilay Campbell, 22 July 1789.

[138] See, for example, PKCA, B59/24/8/33/1, George Dempster to William Aiton, Provost of Perth, 4 June 1787 and B59/24/8/33/2, Dempster to John Pitcairn, Provost of Dundee, 4 June 1787.

[139] GCA, TD1670/4/58-63, *passim*.

still seem to have depended on a particularly assiduous group of MPs whose activity is relatively easy to observe in this period, but who were probably unusual when compared to the majority of Scottish MPs. In this sense, certain Scottish interests were probably still provided with limited representation by Scottish MPs as a whole, and Scottish bodies such as the Highland Society in Edinburgh, continued to be necessary in providing certain Scottish interests with access to the British state, in the same way that the Board of Trustees had been charged with economic improvement during the years of Argathelian management.[140] However, the changes observable in this period would continue, and further deepen, in ensuing years, when the growing desire for local legislation, as well as the re-emergence of party politics, would bring about increased activity on the part of a growing number of Scottish MPs.

IV

Scottish representation in the early nineteenth century

The early nineteenth century saw the changes witnessed in the 1780s extend more widely and deeply, so that certain parts of Scottish representation became gradually much more fully integrated with those which existed elsewhere in Britain, although this was a very uneven process. To a certain extent, it was frustrated during the 1790s and 1800s as the Dundas, or (after 1802) Melville interest extended its grip on Scottish electoral politics, patronage networks, and therefore Scottish representation in the House of Commons. Over this period, Pittite supporters of Melville in Scotland solidified as a group and consolidated their hold on Scottish management, becoming allied to English ministerialists.[141] As David Brown has

[140] Mackillop, 'Political Culture of the Scottish Highlands', 522-25.

[141] There is an issue here of political nomenclature which deserves some clarification. The term 'Tory' was not widely used in the early nineteenth century and most Westminster politicians still referred to themselves as 'Whigs'. However, whereas the followers of Fox and then Grenville had colonised use of the term 'Whig' by this time, government supporters were simply referred to as 'official' or 'ministerialist'. 'Tory' was a term of abuse, used by those in opposition to the ministry, and it still had connotations of loyalty to the Stuarts. It was only after 1827, and the resignation of half of Lord Liverpool's cabinet after his stroke, that it became more commonly attached to an extreme group of ministerialist 'Ultra Tories' who were opposed to the 'liberalism' of their former colleagues. For more on this, see: Boyd Hilton, *A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People? England,*

shown, over the course of 20 years in support of Pitt's ministry and principles, they had become a 'formidable body', thereby leaving little room for politically independent Scottish representatives to act outside these political structures, a situation which was reminiscent of Argathelian management in the first half of the eighteenth century.[142] When Pitt left power for the first time in 1801, he had no opponents sitting for any Scottish seats. Although Melville's political interest sustained a temporary blow in 1806 with Pitt's death and the formation of the 'Ministry of the All the Talents', Scottish Whigs failed subsequently to break Melville's hold on Scottish electoral politics. The Melville interest – which after 1811 was led by Robert Dundas, the second viscount Melville, who was First Lord of the Admiralty throughout Lord Liverpool's ministry – continued, therefore, to dominate the Scottish contingent in the House of Commons until the end of this period. Nevertheless, within these admittedly rigid constraints, there are hints of changes in the nature of Scottish representation at Westminster.

As Scottish industrial and commercial interests in Scotland became more important and politically powerful, they were able to extend their influence, to a limited extent, to the election of MPs who would represent them explicitly. Kirkman Finlay was elected MP for the Glasgow Burghs in 1812 as a member of the new civic elite of Glasgow, being at the time of his election the Lord Provost and having played a leading role in the campaign to open the trade to India at the expense of the East India Company.[143] As we saw in the last chapter, he developed good relations with individual ministers in the 1820s, such as Huskisson. But during his time as an MP, he was determined to represent assiduously his constituents, and commercial and industrial interests more broadly, as a political independent. In a speech made to the Glasgow

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1783-1846 (Oxford, 2006), pp. 195-209. While, therefore, the term 'Whig' will be used here to describe those MPs in opposition before 1830, the term 'Tory' will only be used sparingly, with the more accurate 'ministerialist' chosen as the preferred description.

[142] David J. Brown, 'Scotland and the Ministry of All the Talents, 1806-1807' in Alexander Murdoch (ed.), *The Scottish Nation: Identity and History* (Edinburgh, 2007), p. 103.

[143] Merwick and Renwick (eds), *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow*, x, 131. The Glasgow Town Council bestowed thanks upon Kirkman Finlay for his 'zealous and judicious exertions in London' on 9 June 1812.

Town Council just before his election, he promised that his parliamentary conduct would be 'regulated by constitutional and independent principles' so that he could better focus on representing Glasgow's growing economic and industrial interests.[144] He told his friend and business colleague, John Gladstone in Liverpool, that he would 'never be influenced by the violence of any faction or expect favours of any Minister' and would instead attend to the 'common wishes and the universal hopes of my constituents'.[145] In this vein, one of his first actions as an MP was to resist any protectionist change to the corn laws, as lobbied for by landed interests, and which was proposed by a select committee led by Sir Henry Parnell in 1813.[146] He was a keen advocate at Westminster for various local improvement schemes, exemplified by his lobbying of the ministry to allocate a grant for the construction of a road between Glasgow and Carlisle and was intimately engaged in the proposed local legislation to build a bridge in Lanark.[147] In 1817, James Abercromby, the Scottish Whig MP sitting for the Wiltshire seat of Calne, informed Thomas Kennedy, who was not yet an MP, that Finlay was at that time the only Scottish Member who attended to 'the details of Scotch business'.[148] To this extent, there was at least the perception that he was unusual in acting diligently on behalf of Scottish interests, especially for his commercial and manufacturing constituents in the west of Scotland. This raises the issue of whether Scottish representation at Westminster was subject to fluctuating effectiveness throughout this period, and if it was dependent on hard-working individuals, such as Finlay, who were uncommon.

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[144] *Ibid*., 153 (8 October 1812).
[145] FRO, GG/108 (Glynne-Gladstone papers), Kirkman Finlay to J. Hodgson, 11 October 1812 (copy).
[146] Merwick and Renwick (eds), *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow*, x, 187 (2 July). For the proposals, see Donald Barnes, *History of the English Corn Laws, 1660-1846* (London, 1930), pp. 117-121 and Boyd Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce: the economic policies of the Tory governments, 1815-1830* (Oxford, 1977), pp. 3-10
[147] ML, MS. 37532 (Robert Haddow correspondence), Finlay to Robert Haddow, 14 February 1818; same to same, 18 March 1818; same to same, 4 April 1818.
[148] NRAS, 136 (Kennedy of Dalquharran and Dunure papers), James Abercromby to Thomas Kennedy, 25 December 1817.

More significantly, however, his activity as an MP signalled a greater political coordination between representatives acting on behalf of Scottish and other British commercial and industrial interests. His friendship and political partnership with John Gladstone, the Scottish merchant based in Liverpool, exemplifies the connection that was building between representatives of this interest north and south of the Anglo-Scottish border. They were both close to that political faction which later became known as the 'liberal Tories', who were inclined to be friendly to commercial and industrial interests, and which included politicians such as William Huskisson and George Canning, to whom Gladstone was particularly close. Gladstone led the campaign in 1812 to secure Canning's election as the MP for Liverpool, which had the support of Finlay who wished 'our friend M[r] Canning' success as he campaigned for his own election in the Glasgow Burghs.[149] As we saw in the last chapter, both Finlay and Gladstone had been leading protagonists in the campaign to open the India trade during 1812-13 in what Finlay described as 'this universall national under taking', and he was anxious that his efforts in the Glasgow East India Association would be complemented by the 'exertions of your Committee' in Liverpool.[150] As an MP after 1812 he personally lobbied Lord Buckinghamshire at the Board of Control about the duties that would be levied on exports to India once the trade was opened and, with the help of Canning, facilitated joint representations from mercantile interests in 'Liverpool, Bristol and Glasgow' on this matter.[151] Thereafter, Finlay was anxious to continue to represent British mercantile and manufacturing interests as a Scottish representative in the House of Commons. While serving on the Commons select committee on the corn laws in 1814, Finlay solicited the views of, and information from,

[149] FRO, GG/108, Finlay to Gladstone, 5 October 1812. See S.G. Checkland, *The Gladstones: A Family Biography, 1764-1851* (Cambridge, 1971), ch. 9. For Canning and 'liberal Toryism', see: Stephen M. Lee, *George Canning and liberal Toryism, 1801-1827* (Woodbridge, 2007).
[150] FRO, GG/108, Finlay to Gladstone, 20 December 1812.
[151] *Ibid*., Finlay to Gladstone, 10 June 1814; same to same, 6 July 1814.

Gladstone and other economic interests in Liverpool as well as his constituents in Glasgow.[152] In his opposition to the taxes levied, continued, or extended by Vansittart in 1816 and thereafter, Finlay corresponded with Gladstone about his efforts to repeal 'our Present high duties'.[153] Throughout his tenure in Parliament, he hinted at establishing a cadre of MPs, from both north and south of the border, who would aid him in attending to commercial and industrial interests in Parliament. These included Sir James McIntosh, MP for Nairnshire from 1813, whom Finlay referred to as being 'with us' and 'a tower of strength', as well as Charles Forbes, a Scot who sat for the Yorkshire seat of Beverley, whom Finlay described as 'our worthy friend'.[154] There was therefore an attempt to establish a contingent in Parliament, representing seats from both sides of the Anglo-Scottish border, who would promote a British commercial and industrial interest.

This, however, had limited success within the context of Scottish representation. Finlay's determination to act as a political independent, and as an opponent to many ministerial policies, appears to have caused him electoral difficulties in Glasgow where he lost his seat in 1818. He was viewed with suspicion by the Melville interest which regarded him as being 'equivocal in politics', and although he attempted later to redress this, with John Marjoribanks, MP for Bute and then Berwickshire, reporting to Melville in 1819 that 'You will see him [Finlay] steadily supporting Government in the next Session', he was not returned to Parliament for the Glasgow Burghs in 1820.[155] At the 1820 election, the Liverpool-supporting Archibald Campbell of Blythswood was felt by the Melville interest to be a more dependable candidate for the important Glasgow Burghs; the independent diligence offered by Finlay no

[152] *Ibid*., Finlay to Gladstone, 30 May 1814; same to same, 10 June 1814. Merwick and Renwick (ed.), *Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow*, x, 288 (24 February 1815), 290 (24 March 1815), 291 (4 April 1815).
[153] FRO, GG/108, Finlay to John Gladstone, 27 March 1816; same to same 16 April 1817.
[154] *Ibid*., Finlay to Gladstone, 5 October 1812; same to same, 19 June 1817. Both Forbes and Finlay were returned to represent the seat of Malmesbury in 1818.
[155] NRS, GD51/5/97 (Melville Castle papers), John Marjoribanks to Lord Melville, 1 September 1819.

longer seems to have been as valuable to his former constituents in the Glasgow Burghs. There was, therefore, in this later period a degree of continuity with eighteenth-century conceptions of Scottish representation in the way that many Scottish constituencies assumed that their MPs would best attend to their concerns by being a 'friend' of the ministry. The maintenance of the Melville structure of 'management' during this period largely ensured that this continued in the early decades of the nineteenth century, and hindered the creation of a long term industrial interest as represented by Scottish MPs.

Nevertheless, there is a sense that in this period Scottish representation was becoming more complex, particularly as, in certain cases, expectations of Scottish MPs within local Scottish communities grew. There were more frequent meetings, particularly in Scottish counties, to discuss and deliberate on political matters, such as proposing and drafting local legislation, and MPs were sometimes expected to report on their activities to their constituents at these gatherings. It is certainly the case that many Scottish MPs acted in the knowledge that they would be required to explain their actions to their constituents. James Wemyss, for example, wrote to Robert Peel, the then Home Secretary, in January 1826 to ask if he might be absented from certain debates in the Commons during the next session, particularly those concerning changes to the corn laws, because he did not wish to antagonise his landowning constituents in Fife:

> There are two Questions which may be brought on early (the Catholick question & the Corn Bill) from neither of Them would I like to be about when debating: altho my County don't at all interfere with my Hostile views to the Former, …[they are] deeply interested in the Latter.[156]

This conveyed the increasing complexity of being a ministerialist Scottish MP, which could involve reconciling their duty to their constituents with their loyalty to the ministry, as well as

[156] BL, Add. MS. 40385 (Peel papers), fo. 40, James Wemyss to Robert Peel, 8 January 1826.

their own personal views. Wemyss particularly struggled with this, and later that year, he renounced his support for the Liverpool government at the 1826 election because of his constituents' opposition to the ministry's introduction of a sliding scale on the import price in the corn laws which eroded the protection long enjoyed by the landed interest. As he explained to his landowning constituents at an election hustings in 1826, and as was reported in several Scottish newspapers, he abandoned his support for the ministry because of their 'vacillating conduct on the corn laws', and he pledged that in future he would vote 'as he saw fit'.[157]

The growing assertiveness of local communities in Scotland in relation to Westminster politics could create difficulties for MPs who had to balance their support for ministers and their policies, with their constituents' wishes. One notable example in this period is Charles Grant the Younger who had to contend with the needs of his landowning constituents in Inverness-shire while simultaneously fulfilling his responsibilities as a minister committed to reducing import duties in the corn laws. In December 1825, a faction among the commissioners of supply in Inverness-shire, which advocated protectionism in the corn laws, attempted to force a declaration from the county in favour of resolutions to enhance protective duties on corn imports, which Grant worried would 'bring me into difficulties with my Constituents on the Corn question' as a member of the government.[158] Grant was able to muster his own local supporters in Inverness-shire to thwart this attempted coup and so temporarily avoiding embarrassment. Yet at this time of economic depression, the Liverpool government was worried about the possibility of famine and wanted to keep prices within range of distressed manufacturing labourers and so introduced temporary measures to suspend the normal corn laws.[159] This was difficult for Grant as he was charged with defending this government measure in Parliament and piloting it through the House of Commons whilst at the same time

[157] *Edinburgh Evening Courant*, 8 and 12 June 1826*; Scotsman*, 1 July 1826.
[158] NRS, GD23/6/746/79 (Warrand of Bught papers), Charles Grant to James Grant of Bught, December 1825.
[159] Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce*, 274-276

a county meeting in his constituency declared their opposition to it.[160] This was a rare dilemma for a Scottish MP: those sitting for Scottish seats since 1707 had seldom attained senior cabinet positions, and those who had, such as Henry Dundas, were secure enough in their electoral position to enable them to serve two masters simultaneously. But Grant's position on the corn question raises interesting notions about Scottish representation, especially as he ultimately prioritised his principles above the wishes of his own increasingly vocal landowning constituents.[161]

For much of the early nineteenth century, difficulties of a different sort were faced by those who sought to represent the growing Scottish Whig interest in Westminster. Despite having partially eroded the Melville electoral interest during the Ministry of All the Talents in 1806-7, the Scottish Whig interest had fared rather poorly in parliamentary elections in the following two decades.[162] Therefore, although a reform-minded group of Scottish MPs was alive and active in this early nineteenth-century period, it was a small and, in parliamentary terms, relatively ineffective force until the Grey ministry came to power in 1830. After the 1812 election, the recovery of the Melville interest under a stable Liverpool ministry squeezed the Whig vote in Scotland, so that from 1818 the committed Scottish opposition were reduced to a rump of between nine and eleven.[163] Scottish Whig MPs had followed Lord Archibald Hamilton, the MP for Lanarkshire, in his parliamentary campaigns for burgh reform in 1819, 1820, and 1821, but a majority of Scottish MPs prevented them from achieving success.[164] By

[160] *Inverness Courier*, 28 March 1827.
[161] Hilton, *Corn, Cash, Commerce*, 287-289.
[162] It had been able to unify into a coherent party, evolving from the Scottish Foxites of the 1790s. It comprised a relatively broad social spectrum, being composed of nobles, gentry and professionals, and had long combined those who campaigned for burgh, parliamentary and legal reform, particularly reform of the Court of Session, in Scotland. T.E Orme, 'Toasting Fox: The Fox Dinners in Edinburgh and Glasgow, 1801-1825', *History* 99 (2014), 593; Gordon Pentland, *Radicalism, Reform and National Identity in Scotland, 1820-1833* (Woodbridge, 2008); Phillipson, *The Scottish Whigs and the Reform of the Court of Session*.
[163] Fry, *Dundas Despotism*, 342-370.
[164] Further attempts at reform were attempted by James Abercromby's motions in 1824 and 1826 to reform the representation of Edinburgh, but these also failed: Pentland, *Radicalism, Reform and National Identity*, 20; Orme, 'The Scottish Whig party', 83.

1822, Hamilton was despondent about Scottish Whig prospects in Parliament, complaining that 'London is yet thin on [Scottish Whig] MPs' and that he saw 'no prospect…of much concert, nor any chance of procuring a new head to our discordant body'.[165]

Yet, during the 1820s, there was an increasingly successful effort to promote a specifically Scottish reforming agenda in Parliament. Thomas Francis Kennedy, MP for the Ayr Burghs from 1818, spent much of his time in Parliament representing the interests of the new generation of Whig lawyers in Edinburgh, often on the instructions of Henry Cockburn, the prominent lawyer and leading Whig figure in Scotland. Cockburn and Kennedy forged a close political partnership, with the former remarked of the latter, 'With great judgement, high principle, and love of work, he was thoroughly acquainted with Scotland, and had no ambition greater than that of doing it good.'[166] Kennedy was a very partisan member of the Whig opposition, but was electorally comfortable in his seat for the Ayr Burghs, secured by the patronage of the Whig-supporting sixth duke of Argyll.[167] As a committed member of the opposition he had very little prospect of influencing ministers and therefore had to perform much of his lobbying in the House of Commons and on parliamentary committees. In doing so, he acted as a representative, not of his constituents in the Ayr Burghs, but of a growing Scottish Whig interest, largely connected to the Edinburgh legal elite. At one point, in October 1826, Cockburn requested that Kennedy go to Edinburgh before travelling down to London 'to be instructed', and gave him a ten-point plan for his parliamentary business, which included the promotion of an Edinburgh improvement bill, a Scottish entails bill, business regarding judicial appointments in Scotland, judge's salaries, and the raising of £50,000 for the National Monument to the soldiers and sailors of the Napoleonic War on Calton Hill in Edinburgh.[168]

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[165] *Cockburn Letters*, 40 (Lord Archibald Hamilton to Kennedy, 31 January 1822).
[166] Cockburn, *Memorials*, 384.
[167] HoP *Commons 1790-1820*, ii, 594, iv, 331-332.
[168] *Cockburn Letters*, 147 (Cockburn to Kennedy, 7 October 1826).

Without question, being in opposition prevented Kennedy from achieving his political objectives. Nevertheless, this did not stop him from continuing to propose and develop legislative measures in Westminster. He was, for example, a supporter of Thomas Chalmers' poor relief schemes, and sought to enact them in an unsuccessful Scottish poor bill. In 1819 he sat for the Commons select committee on the poor law in Scotland, and in April was given leave to present his proposal for placing the responsibility of poor relief with local authorities and to limit, and eventually abolish, assessments.[169] This failed, and although he attempted to re-introduce it in 1824 with the support of the earl of Minto and Thomas Chalmers, who advised him when drafting it, this attempt also failed because of the large opposition that it faced within Scotland, with petitions opposing it being sent to the Commons from his own county of Ayrshire.[170] He also had limited success with the issue of Scottish criminal juries which were chosen by a judge from a 'leet' of 45 qualified persons prepared by the Sheriff. With Cockburn's encouragement, and with the help of his fellow Whig MP, the aforementioned James Abercromby, Kennedy attempted to reform this so that jurors in criminal trials were chosen by ballot, as in civil trials. His proposal was controversial in Scotland, with Ayrshire commissioners of supply in his own constituency opposing him, and it was defeated in 1821 by Melville and other Scottish 'ministerialists'.[171] Its continued failure depressed Kennedy to the extent that he considered resigning his seat. Cockburn dissuaded him, writing that '[i]t is melancholy for us that even one should be taken from the slender number of efficient Scots members, – but particularly so that this one should be you.'[172] The fact that Melville adopted Kennedy's jury proposals in a government-approved bill which reformed Scottish criminal juries in 1825, highlights the extent to which by the 1820s, outright party opposition to the

[169] Rosalind Mitchison, *The Old Poor Law in Scotland: The experience of poverty, 1757-1845* (Edinburgh, 2000), pp. 149-153.
[170] *Cockburn Letters*, 120 (Cockburn to Kennedy, 27 May 1824).
[171] *Ibid.*, 19-22 (Minutes of Ayrshire Commissioners of Supply, 30 April 1821).
[172] *Ibid.*, 72 (Henry Cockburn to Thomas Kennedy, 25 December 1822).

Melville, and by extension the government, could hamper a Scottish MP's proposals regardless of their merits.[173] Nevertheless, his Scottish Whig colleagues implored Kennedy to persevere: Cockburn demanded that he 'must fight on in Parliament…without ceasing, and without despairing', remarking a few years later that 'the future peace of Scotland is left in the hands of a few who care for her in London'.[174] This is demonstrative of the importance that Scottish Whigs were increasingly placing on their parliamentary efforts. Abercromby confirmed the significance of this principle to Scottish Whigs when he advised Kennedy that '[i]n Parlt. you ought to fight for all you can get, but being resolved to take what they will give you', as well as noting that 'the voice of each individual [MP] as well as his vote, has an influence on affairs'.[175] Although during the 1820s it was difficult to achieve much legislative success without ministerial support, there was clearly a belief that hard work and persistence in Parliament had – or would eventually lead to – a desirable result for their reforming agenda.

Despite this lack of success before 1830, Kennedy's political activity in Westminster demonstrates the increased capacity of a minority of Scottish MPs in this period to operate systematically along party, and across national, lines. Throughout the 1820s, Kennedy constructed a network of reform-minded MPs and peers who were supportive to the causes he was championing. These included the earl of Minto, his chief supporter and collaborator in the House of Lords, as well as English Whig MPs, such as William Wolryche Whitmore, MP for Bridgnorth and a supporter of Kennedy's efforts to protect the salmon fisheries, and Sir James Graham, the MP for Cumberland and a future Home Secretary.[176] Referring to Graham, Cockburn stated in 1827 that their Scottish causes needed 'a good English member to look after

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[173] Pentland, *Radicalism, Reform and National Identity in Scotland, 1820-1833*, 56-57. Cockburn noted the similarity of Melville's bill to Kennedy's original: 'What an important difference on your bill does his Lordship make, in ordering the names to be written on parchment, where you used paper!': *Cockburn Letters*, 129 (Cockburn to Kennedy, 18 March 1825).
[174] *Ibid*., 92 (Cockburn to Kennedy, 25 July 1823) and 126 (Cockburn to Kennedy, 4 May 1827).
[175] NRAS, 136, Abercomby to Kennedy, 1 September 1830; same to same, 25 July 1830.
[176] *Cockburn Letters*, 110-13 (earl of Minto to Kennedy, 1 February), and 183-5 (William Woolryche Whitmore, 14 December 1827).

us' and thanked Graham for his 'services this Session on Scotch matters.'[177] It was Graham who later encouraged Kennedy to take up the cause of Scottish parliamentary reform in 1830, promising his 'most cordial cooperation, and every effort of the humble assistance which I can give.'[178] James Abercromby, about whom Cockburn remarked 'Scotland never had such a friend', was a particularly close colleague of Kennedy's in Parliament as a supporter of his reform proposals. He was, for example, instrumental in supporting Kennedy's attempted reform of Scottish entails, advising him on how and when to move for a parliamentary committee on the subject, and emphasising the necessity of cultivating support in Parliament, especially from Scots familiar with Scots law – 'the Scotch solicitors' – who were sitting for English seats, such as Alexander Robertson and Andrew Spottiswoode: 'No pains should be spared to excite a strong feeling in favour of your Bill'.[179] When attempting to pass a bill to remove the political role from the office of Lord Advocate in 1828, Abercromby advised Kennedy on how to debate the matter with ministers in the Commons: 'You must at all hazards stay and speak and exert yourself to the utmost for the Scotch public'.[180] Abercromby also helped to connect Kennedy with the broader Whig party at Westminster, urging him to prevail upon 'the good conduct and character of some of the Whig Leaders' and to use them as 'our main source of strength and hope'.[181] Whilst it should be noted that not all measures divided along partisan lines in this period, the experience of Scottish MPs such as Kennedy nevertheless reflects the significance of a deepening level of party political integration, and indicates that, despite being in a minority among Scottish MPs, Scottish Whigs were increasingly keen to, and capable of, successfully working with others to present their Scottish proposals as part of a broader British Whig reform agenda. The developments during the 1820s

[177] *Ibid.*, 172 (Cockburn to Kennedy, 15 June 1827).
[178] *Ibid*., 240-2 (Sir James Graham to Kennedy, 26 September 1830).
[179] NRAS, 136, Abercromby to Kennedy, 4 March 1828; same to same, 15 March 1828.
[180] *Ibid*., Abercrbomy to Kennedy, 28 April 1830; same to same, 1 May 1830.
[181] *Ibid*., Abercromby to Kennedy, 4 August 1821.

were thereafter quite rapidly enhanced once Earl Grey's Whig ministry came to power in 1830, which afforded Scottish Whigs the opportunity to pressure British Whig ministers to extend the Whig reforming agenda to Scotland culminating in the successful passage of the Scottish Reform Act in 1832.[182] And this would continue, particularly as the nature of Scottish representation at Westminster developed in the aftermath of its reform.

By the end of this period, Gilbert Elliot's assertion in 1764 that Scottish MPs were no different to English MPs, while perhaps not accurate just after the fall of the Argethelian regime, was increasingly becoming a reality by the 1830s, although important distinctions remained. In 1829, Melville wrote to Robert Peel, the Home Secretary in the duke of Wellington's ministry, in order to propose a scheme to better accommodate Scottish issues at Westminster:

> There is one topic…on which I have for several years felt very desirous that the Govern[t] should adopt some remedial measure, – I mean the inconvenience frequently complained of by the natives of Scotland, particularly the Members of Parliament, that there is no special officer or office in London for the transaction of the Parliamentary or other business connected with that part of the Kingdom… It should be a House of Commons office, held during pleasure, under either the Treasury or the Secretary of State, & hereafter there need be no necessity for the holder of it being a native of North Britain; but whether in the first instance it might be deemed advisable to nominate a Scotchman might be a point for future consideration.[183]

[182] For the events surrounding the passage of the Scottish Reform Act, see: Pentland, *Radicalism, Reform and National Identity in Scotland, 1820-1833*, ch. 3.

[183] NRS, GD51/5/542, Melville to Peel, 15 November 1829. Quite independently of this, almost three years later, Cockburn and Kennedy were discussing the 'absolute necessity of a Scotch secretary', albeit presumably one that would be sympathetic to their Scottish Whig platform, and not something which would have met with Melville's approval. Nevertheless, it is important to note that at the end of this period, there was a growing

Although this suggestion was not implemented, and the establishment of a Scottish Office in London, operating along the lines outlined by Melville, did not occur until 1885, his comments are indicative of the shifting balance between the developing integration of Scottish issues at Westminster and their ongoing distinctiveness, which was a constant and defining feature of Scottish representation throughout the period covered by this chapter.

The analysis presented here has not attempted to examine the activity of all Scottish MPs during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and has been necessarily reliant on several prominent examples over the course of this period, which were selected partly because they were unusually assiduous in representing Scottish interests, but also because they have left the most evidence of their activities. There are limits, therefore, to what can be extracted from this evidence which is made up of fragments and hints, and large parts of the full story of Scottish representation in this period remains hidden. The evidence provided here has, nevertheless, been illuminating in suggesting the extent to which a Scottish 'national' interest at Westminster was discernible throughout this period, and how it changed over time as parts of it integrated with, or became assimilated into, other similar interests. Patterns of change were uneven and were not guided in one obvious direction. To a certain extent, Scottish representation throughout this period was limited by a particularly venal electoral system, and a structure of political management, at first under the Argathelian regime and then renewed and strengthened under the Dundas, and then the Melville, interest, at least until 1827. This encouraged servility to the ministerial agenda and incentivised MPs to attend their constituents by securing patronage and jobs, rather than representing Scottish interests to ministers and in Parliament. The strength and effectiveness of Scottish MPs as representatives during this period could and did fluctuate as it was heavily dependent on a relatively small number of

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desire for improved institutional provision for Scottish issues at Westminster. *Cockburn Letters*, 404 (Cockburn to Kennedy, 5 May 1832).

individuals. Yet, within these constraints, and as the politics of Westminster and Whitehall became more important to parts of Scottish society, certain Scottish MPs appear to have worked particularly assiduously to represent Scottish interests in the British political centre. In doing so, they operated increasingly in coordination with other MPs to further common objectives, be this on behalf of an industrial and commercial interest, or as part of a broader party-political agenda. Scottish MPs gradually came to operate within a more integrated British framework of representation which did not exclude the promotion of issues which were specifically or distinctively Scottish, but where Scottish representatives were no longer seen as always serving a distinct national interest. This process was often nuanced and by no means complete by the end of this period. But it is indicative of a trend, which would become more significant throughout the nineteenth century, of growing 'cross-border fusions', in which politicians from both north and south of the border fought on the same issues along party lines or as part of the same campaign, often irrespective of national difference.[184] It was also, perhaps, one aspect of a broader and deeper shift in the relationship between Westminster and Scottish society, parts of which were creating new ways to engage with and influence the British political centre. The next chapter attempts to explore this more thoroughly through an examination of Scottish legislation at the Westminster Parliament.

[184] Hutchison, 'Anglo-Scottish Political Relations', 247-248.

Chapter Four

Scottish Legislation at the Westminster Parliament

Within the last few decades there has been a concerted effort by historians to understand the legislative process of the Westminster Parliament during the long eighteenth century. In particular, Julian Hoppit, Joanna Innes, and Paul Langford have transformed the study of parliamentary history from a Namierite analysis of power, ministries, and parties, to an historical model which includes, and indeed prioritises, the study of legislation and its effect on society.[1] That the legislative output of the Westminster Parliament began to rise exponentially from 1689 has long been recognised. However, a fuller appreciation of the public nature of the legislative process which improves our understanding of the relationship between the political centre and local society is comparatively recent.[2] In this context, historians, largely working on England, have stressed the growing accessibility of Parliament to propertied groups and individuals and the consequent effects on English governance and society.[3] Historians of eighteenth-century Scotland, however, have not yet examined the extent to which parts of Scottish society engaged with and participated in the Westminster legislative process and how this might have affected Scotland's place within the British Union-state.

This chapter examines the growing importance of the Westminster Parliament to society north of the border through the increasing output of legislation pertaining to Scotland and Scottish interests. It is divided into two main parts, the first of which examines patterns of parliamentary legislation relating largely or exclusively to Scotland. It has long been

[1] Julian Hoppit, Joanna Innes, and John Styles, 'Project Report; Towards a History of Parliamentary Legislation', *Parliamentary History* 13 (1994), 313.
[2] Julian Hoppit, 'Patterns of Parliamentary Legislation, 1660-1800', *The Historical Journal* 39 (1996), especially 131.
[3] Paul Langford, *Public Life and the Propertied Englishman, 1689-1798* (Oxford, 1991), pp. 166-206. Langford observed Westminster as a 'legislative marketplace' in the context of his study of how Parliament was used to transform the nature of rule in England, creating a new governing class of propertied elites during the eighteenth century.

acknowledged that in the first half-century or so following the Act of Union in 1707, very few acts pertaining specifically to Scotland were passed. In fact, the transfer of Scottish legislative authority from Edinburgh to Westminster resulted in a sharp decrease in Scottish legislation.[4] This has led some historians to view Westminster's impact on Scotland in a negative light. In particular, John Shaw has written of Scotland's and Scottish politicians' 'inconsequentiality in the legislative process', observing only nine acts relating to Scotland passed between 1727 and 1745 of which four were punitive measures to deal with forfeited estates and the killing of Captain Porteous in 1736. He has painted a picture of Westminster politics in which 'Scotland's MPs were so ineffectual' and where 'their friends in Scotland were bound to be weaker still'.[5] Looking at the broader period, however, Joanna Innes has more recently shown that from the middle of the eighteenth century to around 1830 there was a steady and fairly rapid rise in Scottish legislation, particularly local legislation.[6] This first section of the chapter therefore observes and considers the increase in general and local legislation which began to take place from the 1760s to the early decades of the nineteenth century. It categorises and distinguishes between different types of legislation, including those bills which ultimately failed to become law, and considers the reasons for, and significance of, the steady rise of Scottish legislation in this period. The second part of the chapter looks in more detail at local legislation, focusing in particular on road legislation to make some general observations, and then conducting a case-study of Scottish police legislation in order to analyse the practices employed by Scottish lobbies in the process of developing, drafting, and promoting legislation. It emphasises the increasingly public nature of the legislative process and examines the changes which were taking place at a local level to provide a greater focus on legislative processes, as

[4] Joanna Innes, 'Legislating for Three Kingdoms: how the Westminster Parliament legislated for England, Scotland and Ireland, 1707-183' in Julian Hoppit (ed.), *Parliaments, nations and identities in Britain and Ireland, 1660-1850* (Manchester, 2003), p. 21.
[5] J.S. Shaw, *The Management of Scottish Society, 1707-1746: Power, Nobles, Lawyers, Edinburgh Agents and English Influences* (Edinburgh, 1983), p. 126.
[6] Innes, 'Legislating for Three Kingdoms', 19-21.

well as the representation provided by Scottish MPs and other lobbyists, and how all of this affected the relationship between Scottish localities and the political centre.

Examining general trends in legislation in this period is a difficult and challenging task which has its problems and pitfalls. For the earlier parts of this period, we are dependent on the *Commons Journals* which, as Julian Hoppit has observed, are of limited help when it comes to identifying how contested certain bills could be, such as by the length of the debates.[7] The *Journals* also sheds an imperfect light on the role played by parliamentary committees in the drafting and scrutiny of legislation. Furthermore, counting acts is not a simple exercise and there is the possibility of exaggerating the growth of certain types of legislation. When considering road and turnpike legislation, for example, it needs to be remembered that a good deal of this comprised renewals, expansions, or amendments of existing acts.[8] Limitations of space necessitate focusing on particular types of local legislation in the second half of the chapter, and case studies are used to seek to shed light on the broader political impact of the processes involved in lobbying for legislation. A full and comprehensive account of Scottish legislative activity in this period must therefore await further research to see how far the conclusions reached in this chapter are more widely applicable.

Overall, however, this chapter argues that the rise of Scottish legislation, especially local legislation, was a crucial manifestation of the deeper and wider integration of Scotland into the British state. Scottish politics was in the process of being reconstituted during this period so that various interests north of the border came to see legislating in Parliament as the key route to change or to solve local or national problems, and therefore the Westminster political and legislative system gradually became increasingly important to Scottish society. Yet, at the same time, the growth of Scottish legislation was also distinctive by the very fact

[7] Hoppit, 'Patterns of Parliamentary Legislation', 116.
[8] *Ibid*., 121.

that it sought to provide solutions to local problems, in the context of a separate system of local governance with a different legal system and peculiarly Scottish institutions. Scottish society began to adapt, and in the process reshaped and redefined the notion of the 'public', as it focused more closely on Westminster and the advantages offered by parliamentary legislation.

I

Patterns of Scottish legislation

Figure 1: All acts pertaining largely or exclusively to Scotland, or Scottish regions, passed by the Westminster parliament, 1760-1830.



Before analysing in detail the processes involved in proposing and lobbying for Scottish acts, the chapter begins with a statistical analysis of the changing volume and composition of Scottish legislation. Figure 1 shows the consistent, and relatively dramatic, rise of all kinds of Scottish acts during this period.[9] Until 1798, legislation was divided into two categories: public

[9] I would like to thank Joanna Innes for allowing me to use and analyse the database of legislation compiled for a project on a history of parliamentary legislation which she conducted with Julian Hoppit and John Styles. The original database was compiled by Julian Hoppit from the *Commons* and *Lords* Journals to 1800. This was then extended to 1830 by Andrew Hann. This database has informed all graphs, charts and tables in this chapter. I have used Innes' geographical categorisation which counts as applying to Scotland all acts where the intention to do so was explicit. I have also used Innes' categorisation of 'local act' as, in addition to formally labelled 'local acts' after 1798, and their earlier counterparts, those applying to 'sub-national' areas or non-governmental institutions. For more information on this, see: Innes, 'Legislating for Three Kingdoms', 41, n. 5. For more about the legislation project, see: Julian Hoppit, Joanna Innes, and John Styles, 'Project Report: Towards a History of Parliamentary Legislation, 1660-1800', *Parliamentary History*, 13 (1994). For one of the results of

and private – although, as Julian Hoppit has remarked, by this period this categorisation was rather meaningless and unhelpful for the purposes of analysis.[10] It is far better, and more useful, to divide them into 'general' and 'local' acts. 'General' legislation is a label given to those acts which pertained largely or solely to one or several of the nations in the British Union-state, and local acts are judged to be those which related to particular regional or local concerns. This is not a perfect demarcation, and it completely ignores fiscal legislation and other general acts which pertained to the whole of Great Britain (or the United Kingdom after 1801). This is a significant omission given the benefits claimed by Scottish commercial and manufacturing interests from government bounties. Scotland received a disproportionate share of bounties on fisheries, whaling and linen in the second half of the eighteenth century, and the first two chapters of this thesis have demonstrated the consistently strong interest in British fiscal legislation in Scotland throughout this period.[11] Nevertheless, this statistical model works rather well for the purposes of measuring broadly the growing relevance of the Westminster Parliament to Scottish society during this period.

Figure 1 makes clear that local legislation was increasingly important in shaping relations between Scottish society and Westminster in this period, the growing volume of local acts significantly outstripping that of general acts. In the 1760s, there were a relatively insignificant number of Scottish acts, 25 in total, 18 of these being local. The total, however, more than doubled in the next decade to 57, 42 of which were local. Although the overall figure increased marginally in the 1780s to 63, the number of Scottish local acts in this period actually stayed at broadly the same level, with a slight decrease to 41. Nevertheless, it rose

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this project, see: Julian Hoppit and Joanna Innes (eds), *Failed Legislation, 1660-1800: Extracted from the Commons and Lords Journals* (London, 1997).

[10] Hoppit, 'Patterns of Parliamentary Legislation', 116. Hoppit explains, for example, that local turnpike acts were labelled as 'public' and enclosure acts were 'private', because the former affected the king's highway and levied a charge on the public. By this period, all Scottish private acts were local in character and related to personal estates and wealth.

[11] Julian Hoppit, 'Bounties, the Economy and the State in Britain, 1689-1800' in Gauci (ed.), *Regulating the British Economy*, 146-155.

dramatically to 93 in the final decade of the eighteenth century with an overall figure for all Scottish acts of 144. Thereafter, the rise in local legislation was maintained, with a particularly marked jump between the 1810s and 1820s, so that in the final decade of this period, local acts numbered 169 out of a total of 233 for all largely or exclusively Scottish acts. There was a rise in Scottish general legislation, but this remained uneven and fairly modest after 1800. The number of general acts rose from seven in the 1760s to 51 three decades later, remaining at a broadly similar level thereafter, reaching only 64 in the 1820s, and seeing a slight decrease in the 1800s and 1810, to 42 and 50 respectively. There are, however, obvious limits to this simple counting exercise. Levels of legislative activity were influenced by events such as participation in the French and Napoleonic wars, and the units of time are not strictly speaking equal in this sense. Nevertheless, the trends demonstrate the importance of local legislation in drawing Westminster and parts of Scotland much closer together in this period.

A more comprehensive picture of Scottish legislative activity during this period requires consideration of unsuccessful legislation. Unfortunately, available data on failed bills during this period only extends as far as 1800, but this still enables us to gain a better impression not only of the increasing attempts made at passing legislation, but also the increasing efficacy with which this was done.[12] From 1760-1800, as Figure 2 shows, Scottish bills which successfully passed the parliamentary process consistently outnumbered those which failed. There had been a period before 1745 when failed Scottish bills outnumbered all Scottish acts, but this changed with a growth in the number of successful Scottish acts after 1746, although this figure is largely inflated because of the government programme in the Highlands in the aftermath of the Jacobite Rebellion.[13] Although Scottish failed legislation increased in absolute

[12] Figures for all failed legislation between 1660-1800 can be found in Hoppit (ed.), *Failed Legislation, 1660-1800*.

[13] B.F. Jewell, 'The Legislation Relating to Scotland after the Forty-Five', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of North Carolina, 1975) [Microfilm copy held at the NLS]; Alexander Murdoch, *The People Above: Politics and Administration in Mid-Eighteenth Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1980), pp. 33-39. Innes has emphasised this shift in the success rate of Scottish legislation in her 'Legislating for Three Kingdoms', 28.

terms between 1760 and 1800, this simply reflected the growth in attempts to pass Scottish acts. And while the relative chance of successfully passing legislation – what might be termed the 'success rate' – declined somewhat in the 1780s, following an increase in the previous decade, the marked increase in the number of failed bills was a consequence of a greater demand in Scotland to legislate at Westminster. The lower success rate might have been caused by increased divisions within Scottish society over proposed local bills. The large proportion of local bills in the failed legislation figures, as shown in Figure 3, indicates that this might have been the case in the early stage of this period, and that whether through inexperience in securing local agreements on draft legislation or an inability to navigate successfully the parliamentary process, attempts to obtain local acts could meet with mixed success. There were signs that Scottish interests and parliamentary lobbyists were learning after the 1780s, as the success rate during the 1790s increased dramatically from 62 per cent (in the 1780s) to 72 per cent, so that there were nearly three times as many Scottish acts as failed bills. This was, however, a slightly lower success rate than that in the 1770s (78 per cent), which is perhaps indicative of the different order of legislation being proposed by the 1790s. As we will see later in this chapter, legislation concerning road development and improvement became more extensive in scope and ambition, and so these figures could well be disguising deeper lying changes concerning the ability of parts of Scottish society to pass more complicated acts at Westminster. In addition to this, these figures exclude proposals which may have been suggested to Parliament in petition, but which fell short of formally becoming part of a bill. It is therefore probable that this appreciably underestimates the increased level of Scottish parliamentary activity in Westminster during this period. Although there are no numbers of failed bills available for the period beyond 1800, it would be very surprising if, as the amount of legislation passed continued to increase as seen in Figure 1, the success rate substantially decreased.

Figure 2: All Scottish acts compared with all Scottish failed legislation, 1760-1800



Figure 3: Scottish failed general and local legislation, 1760-1800



Figure 4: Scottish General Acts 1760-1830 by subject

	1760-1770	1770-1780	1780-1790	1790-1800	1800-1810	1810-1820	1820-1830
Finance	2	6	2	15	8	12	13
Economy	2	1	5	15	5	7	13
Improvement	0	0	3	5	5	0	1
Communications	0	3	3	0	5	8	5
Law	1	1	1	2	2	1	6
Legal admin.	1	1	5	1	5	11	13
Social	0	0	0	0	2	5	3
Religion	0	1	1	2	1	2	4
Government	1	2	1	5	1	2	5
Military	0	0	0	7	8	2	0

General legislation

Figure 4 shows Scottish general legislation throughout this period broken down by subject. As mentioned earlier, this is an analysis of legislation pertaining largely or exclusively to Scotland and excludes British and, after 1801, UK-wide fiscal and general legislation. It therefore has the potential to be somewhat misleading and, as a result, too much should not be read into these figures. As has been shown throughout this thesis, various Scottish interests were particularly active in lobbying for or against fiscal measures and general acts such as those regulating the importation and exportation of corn during this period. Nevertheless, given that the 1707 Union settlement maintained Scots law, Scottish legal institutions, Scottish burgh and county government, the Kirk as the established church, and Scottish universities, it is noteworthy that subjects such as law and religion in Scotland gradually became matters over which Westminster had some, albeit limited, say. Although Scottish legal matters, particularly in criminal law, were largely left to the discretion of the courts of Session and Justiciary, there was a limited number of acts during this period dealing with changes to Scots criminal and civil law, the former including attempts to deal with Luddite organisation in 1812 and radical

agitation in 1816-20.[14] More prominent was legislation dealing with legal administration which grew in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, perhaps unsurprisingly given the emergence of the Scottish Whig legal reform movement which promoted reform of Scottish juries and the Court of Session.[15] Acts pertaining to religion were few in number; the General Assembly remained the preferred forum to deal with such matters, although there were measures to provide for ministers' livings and entitlements. The increase in military legislation during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, and its decrease thereafter, is unsurprising, and concerned military recruitment, the raising of Scottish militia and fencibles, as well as military pensions. Improvement legislation mainly concerned fisheries acts and the establishment of improvement institutions such as the British Fisheries Society. Along with legal administration, finance and economic measures were subject to the most general acts during the course of this period. Those pertaining to finance were concerned with Scottish banking, bankruptcy and debt, as well as some matters relating to the customs and excise, which were relatively numerous during the 1790s.[16] Economic legislation during this period related to internal trading, retail, as well as specific manufactures, such as numerous changes to the separate Scottish distillery licensing system, which, following sustained lobbying from Highland and Lowland distillers, was established in 1786.[17] Areas such as economic and financial regulation, as well as legal reform, were therefore subjects about which Scots felt increasingly confident being legislated on at Westminster during this period.

[14] Gordon Pentland, *The Spirit of the Union* (London, 2011).
[15] Nicholas Phillipson, *Scottish Whigs and Reform of the Court of Session, 1785-1830* (Edinburgh, 1990).
[16] S.G. Checkland, *Scottish Banking: A History, 1695-1973* (Glasgow, 1975).
[17] Vivien Dietz, 'Before the age of capital: Manufacturing interests and the British state, 1780-1800', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Princeton University, 1991), ch. 4.

Local legislation

We now turn to local acts which, as Figure 1 demonstrates, were the most common form of legislation in Scotland throughout this period. Although local legislation was not formally recognised as a distinct category until 1798, this analysis will use retrospectively the definition subsequently given to local legislation, which essentially focused on the provision of local amenities and services.[18] Ann Whetstone has argued that Westminster's attitude towards Scottish issues in this period was one of 'benign neglect' as they were 'not usually sufficiently interested in Scotland to make concerted efforts to alter its institutions'.[19] While this view has some truth to it, it is nevertheless also correct to say that, as Figure 1 shows, the amount of Scottish local legislation passed by Parliament increased throughout this period at a much faster pace than Scottish general legislation, and is indicative of a greater Scottish interest in Westminster. This was an era of broadening and accelerated 'improvement', particularly in Scotland, where society was, relative to south of the border, starting from a low base.[20] Improvement processes in Scotland were, therefore, arguably more dramatic and focused in a shorter period, and as a result, the drive for improvement was arguably more delineated. This had a corresponding effect on the amount of local legislation passed at Westminster pertaining to Scotland and Scottish issues.

Local legislation in this period is widely understood to have involved empowering local communities.[21] Therefore, the fact that Scotland had a separate legal system and a different system of local government to that operating in England, as well as a distinctive legislative history, was a source of marked difference in lobbying for Scottish local legislation. Perhaps

[18] Joanna Innes, *Inferior Politics: Social Problems and Social Policies in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Oxford, 2009), 79.
[19] Ann E. Whetstone, *Scottish County Government in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Edinburgh, 1981), p. x.
[20] For 'improvement' in an English context, see: Paul Slack, *The Invention of Improvement: Information and Material Progress in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford, 2014).
[21] Innes, *Inferior Politics*, 96.

the most commonly cited difference between English and Scottish local legislation was the absence, in the case of Scotland, of the need for enclosure legislation. This was partly because of different land-holding laws, as well as two acts passed by the old Scottish Parliament in the late seventeenth century which empowered local officials to deal with this issue.[22] Such differences were common and are illustrated in Scottish attempts to legislate for improvement and road building**,** but what is perhaps more significant for our purposes here is the extent to which the legislative process, as experienced at a local level in Scotland, gradually over time enabled important parts of Scottish society to adapt so that they could focus more effectively on the Westminster Parliament.

Acts relating to communication measures made up the majority of Scottish local legislation throughout 1760-1830, as shown by Figure 6. On average, they represented 65 per cent of all local legislation, and even more than that in each decade from 1760 to 1810. The next largest category was improvement legislation at 13 per cent, which includes fisheries, agricultural measures, and improvement schemes in the urban sphere, such as the increasing number of police acts.[23] This demonstrates how much communications legislation dominated Scottish local legislation in this period. If we exclude private acts – which almost entirely related to private landed estates – and only consider public local legislation, communications acts made up 73 per cent of the total for the whole period. Communications legislation included local acts relating to roads, bridges, ports and harbours, canals, railways, lighthouses, and shipping. It is quite clear that road legislation comprised the bulk of this, making up 62 per cent of the total in this category, as shown in Figure 5. Occasionally, road and bridge measures were included in the same bill, and bridge acts were the next most popular form of Scottish

[22] *Ibid*., 103; I. Whyte, *Agriculture and Society in Seventeenth-Century Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1979), pp. 100-110; M. Turner, *Enclosures in Britain 1750-1830* (London, 1984), pp. 28-32.

[23] These are categorised as 'improvement' measures because, in addition to law enforcement, police acts provided for urban improvements such as street lighting and paving. See the case study on the Aberdeen police acts below.

local legislation, along with port and harbour acts. Yet road acts dominated these communications measures and were consistently the more common type of local legislation for Scotland throughout this period. Between 1760 and 1810, road acts accounted for 40 per cent of local legislation, reaching a high point of 60 per cent between 1790 and 1800. A more comprehensive analysis of road legislation follows below, but it is important to acknowledge here that the motivation in Scotland throughout this period to improve existing roads and to create new road networks was clearly a crucial factor in strengthening the link between Scottish society and Westminster by means of the need to secure local legislation.

Figure 5: Scottish local acts by category, 1760-1830



Figure 6: Scottish local communications acts, 1760-1830



Figure 7: Local Acts during 1760-1830 from each region of Scotland

	1760-1770	1770-1780	1780-1790	1790-1800	1800-1810	1810-1820	1820-1830
Scotland*	2	3	1	1	13	3	1
Aberdeenshire	0	1	0	7	7	8	10
Argyllshire	0	2	0	3	1	3	3
Ayrshire	1	3	3	4	10	10	9
Banffshire	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Berwickshire	1	1	3	4	4	3	7
County of Bute	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caithness	0	0	0	1	2	0	1
Clackmannanshire	0	0	1	2	4	2	2
Cromartyshire	0	0	1	0	0	2	2
Dumfriesshire	2	1	3	4	4	10	7
Dunbartonshire	0	0	3	2	2	4	11
Edinburghshire (Midlothian)	2	5	1	10	10	18	32
Elginshire	0	1	0	0	3	1	0
Fife	0	5	2	5	8	11	14
Forfarshire	0	1	2	3	3	10	9
Haddingtonshire	1	1	0	1	2	2	2
Inverness-shire	0	0	1	2	3	2	2
Kincardineshire	0	0	0	2	1	1	4
Kinross-shire	0	0	0	1	3	1	4
Kirkcudbrightshire (Stewartry of Kirkcudbright)	0	2	1	2	1	0	2
Lanarkshire	3	9	8	24	19	24	45
Linlithgowshire (West Lothian)	1	2	1	12	1	9	7
Nairnshire	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Orkney	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Peebles-shire	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
Perthshire	1	1	3	9	7	14	10
Renfrewshire	0	0	3	7	9	8	6
Ross-shire	0	0	0	0	1	3	5
Roxburghshire	1	0	3	4	3	3	6
Selkirkshire	1	2	0	0	2	2	0
Shetland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stirlingshire	0	2	2	6	0	11	9
Sutherland	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Wigtownshire	0	1	2	1	1	0	5

*When regional attribution is Scottish, but otherwise unclear.

Local legislation was enacted for almost every region of Scotland in this period, although several were especially prominent. Figure 7 shows the number of acts pertaining to each county in Scotland as they existed at the time. Some acts have been counted more than once in this table if they related to several counties. Although all but two Scottish counties had at least some experience of local legislation during this entire period – Bute and Shetland were the only regions to fail to secure any legislation – regions with the largest urban centres led the way in terms of proposing and lobbying for local acts. It is not surprising that Lanarkshire and Midlothian were the counties responsible for the largest number of local acts, with a total of 132 and 78 respectively over this period, given that they contained Glasgow and Edinburgh, the two largest Scottish towns in this period.[24] Other regions of note in this context included Perthshire, Fife, Ayrshire, Renfrewshire, and Aberdeenshire. Ayrshire, which accounted for 39 local acts during this period, initially led the way in passing road bills, and included the relatively important town of Ayr which gained a police act in 1818 and passed three harbour acts in 1772, 1794 and 1817.[25] Perthshire and Fife followed Midlothian and Lanarkshire in their experience with local legislation with a total of 45 local acts each. Fife developed a particularly comprehensive road network during this period, which involved the passage of 12 road acts (9 turnpike acts and 3 statute labour conversion acts) between 1753 and 1829.[26] In Perthshire, in addition to a similar high level of local road and bridge legislation, its largest town, Perth, successfully obtained several police and improvement acts in the early nineteenth century.[27] Renfrewshire and Aberdeenshire were both responsible for 33 local acts each; Renfrewshire included the towns of Paisley and Greenock which were exceptional in their dramatic growth during this period, and which were both especially eager to apply for various

[24] Bob Harris and Charles McKean, *The Scottish Town in the Age of the Enlightenment 1740-1820* (Edinburgh, 2014), p. 28.
[25] *Ibid*., 110 and 122.
[26] Owen B. Silver, 'The Development of the Fife Road System, 1700 to 1850', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of St Andrews, 1985), ch. 4 and 7.
[27] Harris and McKean, *The Scottish Town,* 123.

urban improvement acts.[28] Aberdeenshire obviously contained Aberdeen, which was the fourth largest Scottish town by population at this time, and, as we shall see later in this chapter, was also motivated to pass several important urban improvement acts.[29]

Overall, given that communications and improvement legislation comprised the bulk of Scottish local legislation at this time, it is perhaps unsurprising that regions with large urban centres accounted for the most local acts. Early industrialisation and urban growth greatly affected the Scottish rural and agricultural transformations taking place simultaneously in neighbouring counties, providing the impetus amongst landowners for estate reform and to expand their markets. There was therefore a growing need for improved methods of communication to ease the transportation of agricultural produce, particularly grain, to urban markets. Roads and bridges provided this improved access from rural areas to urban markets. It has been estimated that between £2-3 million was spent improving internal communication networks in Scotland between 1790 and 1815.[30] Related to this, a major impulse behind urban improvement was the pressure for better and easier access and movement throughout towns created by the increasing circulation of goods and people. The general context of urbanisation and improvement, alongside the transformation of the rural economy, and their increasing interdependency, is very important, therefore, when viewing the significance of Scottish local legislation during this period.

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[28] *Ibid*., 120-123.
[29] W. Hamish Fraser and Clive H. Lee (ed.), *Aberdeen 1800-2000: A New History* (East Linton, 2000).
[30] T.M. Devine, *The Transformation of Rural Scotland: Social Change and the Agrarian Economy, 1660-1815* (Edinburgh, 1994), pp. 41-46; Anne Gordon, *To Move with the Times: The Story of Transport and Travel in Scotland* (Aberdeen, 1988), pp. 36-55; Christopher Whatley, *Scottish Society, 1707-1830: Beyond Jacobitism, towards industrialisation* (Manchester, 2000), pp. 237-241.

II

Local Road Acts and Scottish society

There were, at this time, generally two types of road legislation in Scotland: the 'road act' and the 'turnpike act'. The former was a solution to a distinctly Scottish problem with existing Scottish road laws. It was deemed easier to use payment from tenants and cottars in the county to pay for labourers to maintain roads, rather than the existing system of statute, or forced, labour which required these tenants to work six days of the year attending to roads. The solution was to pass a local act which would force cash payment in lieu of personal labour and allow the commissioners of supply to pay for properly supervised maintenance of the roads.[31] The first Scottish acts were passed for Ayrshire in 1766, with similar acts being passed elsewhere in Scotland throughout the '70s and '80s. The turnpike act, on the other hand, had long been a feature of English road-building. A turnpike road imposed charges, or 'tolls', on road users, thereby, in theory, eventually repaying the turnpike trustees who had lent money for the road to be built in the first place, as well as providing a fund to finance road repair. Legislation for this was required because it was illegal to charge a toll on a public highway without parliamentary consent.[32] Turnpikes had first been established in England in 1696 and had increased in number throughout the first half of the eighteenth century. In Scotland, a turnpike act had been passed to set up a trust in Midlothian in 1714, but it was only after 1750 and the establishment of the Haddington Trust in East Lothian that it was considered a viable solution to road building in Scotland. Thereafter the pace quickened: a Berwickshire trust was established in 1753 and a more comprehensive Ayrshire roads trust in 1767, and they became more numerous after 1770.

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[31] This was not needed in England where a system was devised so that the power of justices of the peace (JPs) was used to fine parishes for failing to maintain their roads: Innes, *Inferior Politics*, 102.

[32] Eric Pawson, *Transport and Economy: The Turnpike Roads of Eighteenth Century Britain* (London, 1977), pp. 74-76. To view this in the context of parliamentary and government-sanctioned road-building in Britain, and the creation of the 'infrastructure state' in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see: Jo Guldi, *Roads to power: Britain invents the Infrastructure state* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2012).

This came about at a time of, what Ann Whetstone has called, a growing 'county consciousness' when commissioners of supply were becoming more assertive in local government, and this affected the way in which this legislation was conceived and constructed.[33] Under the terms of the 1686 Road Act passed by the Scottish Parliament, county roads came under the joint-purview of justices of the peace (JPs) and the commissioners of supply. The commissioners of supply were, essentially, in charge of county government in this period until the introduction of county councils in 1889. In the period between 1707 and the mid-eighteenth century, the role of the commissioners of supply was largely confined to collecting the land tax, for which purpose they often only met annually. By law, commissioners were supposed to meet annually with JPs to implement the Scottish road acts, although in practice this was usually left to the commissioners. After 1750, however, meetings became more frequent as commissioners began to assume new and increased duties. In particular, there was a rise in the number of county meetings, or 'special general meetings', called to consider important local or, occasionally, national issues.[34] It was within this developing sphere of local government that local legislation, particularly road legislation, was proposed, debated, and agreed upon.

In the early part of this period, there was a tendency for the process of drafting and applying for this legislation to be fairly disorganised and inefficient. This was partly because there was no established pattern to follow. Road bills of all kinds could easily cause tension and conflict between farmers and landowners, as well as counties and towns.[35] To take an example from early in the period, a turnpike bill for Berwickshire in the early 1770s met with considerable opposition, largely because of lack of consultation with the wider community. This bill appears to have been driven by a small number of commissioners of supply who,

[33] Whetstone, *Scottish County Government*, 69.
[34] *Ibid*., 61-70.
[35] Bob Harris, 'Parliamentary Legislation, Lobbying and the Press in Eighteenth-Century Scotland', *Parliamentary History* 26 (2007), 87.

acting as a committee, pushed for a bill in late 1771 or early 1772, and provoked opposition from a significant number of heritors and farmers in the county who complained at having had little or no hand in making it and accused the proponents of not 'Submitting it to the Sense of the Country at any Publick meeting' or even consulting gentlemen of the county on the clauses and terms of the bill.[36] They were also clearly opposed to a turnpike bill in principle and wanted a much-watered down version of the bill which would simply augment statute work.[37] They accused the bill's proponents of holding secretive meetings, including a meeting in Edinburgh early in 1771 which was only advertised to 'Freeholders and every person concerned', which a group of heritors resented as being exclusive and 'not a proper invitation to the…Heritors at Large'.[38] According to these opponents, organisers of this meeting proposed that freeholders should declare their sentiments towards the turnpike bill before they attended, the implication being 'that none but promoters of the Bill had any business there'.[39]

In response, a group of heritors established their own committee in opposition to the bill which eventually forced a compromise. They were, initially, equally as well organised as the commissioners of supply in favour of the bill, and they met throughout late 1770 and 1771, at meetings which had been advertised, and planned to stall the bill's progress in Parliament by petitioning and writing to the MP for Berwickshire, James Pringle.[40] They spent £172 on their collective opposition, which was initially successful as in early 1771 the original bill had to be withdrawn from the Commons, and the bill's opponents believed that the proponents were 'now willing to enter a compromise'.[41] Following a general meeting, which resulted in the proposers sending a new bill to Parliament, negotiations took place firstly in Edinburgh,

[36] NRS, GD206/1/68 (Hall of Dunglass papers), 'Declaration from some heritors of Berwickshire' (n.d., but 1771/1772).
[37] *Ibid*., John Foulis to William Hall, 18 January 1771.
[38] *Ibid*., 'Sundry Objections to the Berwickshire Turnpike Bill', n.d; 'Advertisement in the Edinburgh papers', 5 January 1771.
[39] *Ibid*., William Hall to unknown recipient, 13 February 1771.
[40] *Ibid*., Heritors (25 names) to James Pringle, n.d.
[41] *Ibid*., William Hall to James Montgomery (Lord Advocate), 26 February 1771.

and then in London, between the proposers and those, such as Sir William Hall of Dunglass, who continued to represent a group of heritors and express their objections to the bill, and who lobbied to ensure that certain goods – most importantly coal and lime – would be exempt from toll charges.[42] By March 1772, this resulted in a hard-won compromise which divided the opposition. Several important figures who had petitioned the Commons against the bill, including the earls of Lauderdale and Haddington, and Lords Elibank and Kames, were persuaded by John Spottiswood, the bill's solicitor in London, that their demands had been 'complied with' and they signed an agreement after which they withdrew their opposition.[43] This left Hall isolated in London as he complained that the agreement was 'only a Partial remedy of the Evils complained of'.[44] His colleague, Alexander Hay, complained that those 'who have agreed to the amendments…have been very easily pleasd'.[45] Yet by April 1772 they conceded that the passage of the bill was now inevitable and Hall admitted that 'The only re-source now left' was to 'oppose to [sic] great a hardship in the county, where I have little expectation of meeting with favour'.[46] In the end, a compromise had been reached in the county for a turnpike bill, but it had been by way of intense local conflict followed by a messy compromise in the coffee houses of Edinburgh and London. Indeed, the final compromise had been made in London at a very late stage as the bill made its way through Parliament. At this stage there was no generally accepted framework or procedure for going about canvassing opinion in the county, providing a forum for debate, and securing an agreement, and so these early attempts to draw-up and propose local road acts have the sense of being rather haphazard. There were few previous Scottish turnpike acts which might serve as a model – although it is notable that the first examples of Scottish turnpike acts were very quickly used for this

[42] *Ibid*., 'Extract Minutes of the Meeting of Heritors of the County of Berwick In Terms of the Advertisement in the Edinburgh News Papers in that behalf, Greenlaw 22 October 1771'.
[43] *Ibid*., John Spottiswood to William Hall, 9 March 1772.
[44] *Ibid*., William Hall to John Fordyce, 23 February 1772 (copy).
[45] *Ibid*., Alexander Hay to William Hall, 16 March 1772
[46] *Ibid*., William Hall to Sir John Hall, 2 April 1772 (copy).

purpose.[47] There was also a lack of accepted arrangement and coordination between urban and county authorities which made it difficult to resolve disagreements such as that between Selkirk Town Council and the county turnpike trustees in 1769 over a proposal for a road going into the town.[48]

By the very end of the eighteenth century, however, Scots were learning the lessons of these earlier attempts and making the necessary adjustments in order to apply more efficiently and effectively for road legislation. In particular, and in complete contrast to the experience of the aforementioned Berwickshire Turnpike Act of 1772, there was a growing recognition that it was better to be open and transparent when proposing a road or a turnpike bill and to consult and canvass opinion widely, negotiate, and compromise, clause-by-clause, particularly as opposition to these bills was often anticipated. In the early 1790s, for example, when discussing another turnpike bill covering an area which stretched from Dumfriesshire over the border into Cumberland, being promoted by the duke of Buccleuch – by this period, a notable improver[49] – Sir James Graham of Netherby, who was promoting the bill, assured the duke that he had 'done everything in my power to prevent Opposition' by calling a General Meeting which would appoint a committee to frame a bill and consult all who took an interest.[50] Similar sentiments were expressed at the meeting of the commissioners of supply for Banffshire who wished to propose a road (commutation) and turnpike bill that, as it was 'a matter of the most essential importance to the County' stated that 'each Clause…ought to be maturely considered and deliberated upon before attempting to pass it into a Law.'[51] Archibald Young, a writer

[47] NRS, GD206/1/68, Hall to the Lord Advocate (James Montgomery), 26 February 1771, where Hall suggests they adopt a similar bill to that which has been passed for East Lothian. He makes the same suggestion in 'Observations with regard to the High roads in the Shire of Berwick read at a general meeting of Heretors at Edin 22 December 1762'.
[48] Harris, 'Landowners and Urban Society', 248.
[49] See Brian Bonnyman, *The Third Duke of Buccleuch and Adam Smith: Estate Management and Improvement in Enlightenment Scotland* (Edinburgh, 2014), chs 4-5.
[50] NRS, GD224/583/1 (Buccleuch papers), Sir James Graham to the duke of Buccleuch, 24 February 1794.
[51] NRS, GD44/42/3/3 (Gordon papers), 'Minutes of Committee of Commissioners of County of Banff, 20 October 1802'.

working on the bill, reported that in the meeting before it was sent to Parliament, it 'was again gone thro' clause by clause and various amendments adopted'.[52] Even opponents of road and turnpike acts took a more positive and constructive attitude towards their opposition. For instance, when a new turnpike act was being proposed in Berwickshire, one of the chief opponents advised that they 'confine our opposition to those parts of the intended Bill only which seemed to trench on our trade… In doing so, it is probable that we will be listened to'.[53]

This greater regularity and transparency partly grew from the fact that road and turnpike bills created new precedents, conventions, and even institutional frameworks at a local level. Road and turnpike trustees and commissions were increasingly established, which exercised the new powers granted under the acts. The trustees were often the same individuals who were acting as the commissioners of supply, but frequently places were reserved for the sheriffs depute and substitute, as well as occasionally provosts from the neighbouring burghs. The invitation of provosts is particularly noteworthy as it was usually an attempt to cater for an essential aspect of negotiations around road legislation, namely town and county relations, although it is not always clear how assiduously and how early in the negotiating process the opinion of local burghs was canvassed. Nevertheless, a culture of openness and discussion was encouraged with regular general meetings, which nobles were not prohibited from attending, unlike commissioner of supply meetings.[54] Newly established trustees were instrumental in discussions over new road and turnpike bills, and although they often comprised many of the same individuals who made up the older institutions – i.e. the commissioners of supply – their more open procedures became an important part of the consulting, debating, and drafting process for subsequent local legislation. It is notable that this occurred in parallel with

[52] NRS, GD44/42/3/3, Archibald Young to John Menzies, 1 May 1803.
[53] NRS, GD206/1/69, William Jeffreys to William Hall, 13 March 1792.
[54] Whetstone, *Scottish County Government*, 87.

important developments in urban society, such as the rise of subscription and commercial reading rooms, which promoted discussion, amongst other things, of local legislation.

The legislative process at a local level became, therefore, more efficient and governed by more widely recognised and accepted conventions. This led to more constructive applications for local legislation, one manifestation of which was organised cooperation between towns and counties. An example of this was the joint committee of the counties of Wigtownshire and Kirkcudbrightshire, established in 1791 to apply for a turnpike act, which had representation from most quarters of the south west region of Scotland. The Wigtownshire side was represented by the earl of Galloway and his brother, the former MP for Wigtownshire, Admiral Keith Stewart, as well as the then current MP, Andrew McDouall. Kirkcudbrightshire was represented by Lord Daer, the Provost of Kirkcudbright and the eldest son of the earl of Selkirk, in addition to the MP for that county, Patrick Heron.[55] Together with commissioners of supply and road trustees from each county, they represented a blend of titled, landowning, county, and urban interests, and they first met at the end of 1791 to agree upon a bill to convert the statute labour in both counties that would also allow them to put turnpikes on roads. Together they agreed on a basic plan for a turnpike bill, which included the institutional apparatus for joint oversight of roads in both counties.[56]

This was not a perfect arrangement and tensions did arise, as suggested by the fact the turnpike bill did not pass until 1796. For example, almost a year into their negotiations in 1792, Lord Daer, a notable improver in Kirkcudbright, was very forceful during negotiations on the detailed clauses of the turnpike act, stating that 'I look upon it that a turnpike act is so oppressive & expensive a mode of making roads that it can only be tolerated on a certainty of

[55] Bob Harris, *A Tale of Three Cities: The Life and Times of Lord Daer, 1763-1794* (Edinburgh, 2015), pp. 95-98, for Daer's extensive activities around road development in this general south-west region of Scotland as part of a wider programme for improvement in the 1780s and early 1790s.
[56] NRS, GD46/13/12 (Seaforth papers), 'Copy Minutes of the Committee upon the Turnpike Bill, 24 October 1791'.

having them very well done'. He threatened to oppose the bill unless the earl of Galloway and Keith Stewart agreed that his 'clauses of caution' – essentially safeguards against the potential abuses of power by the new trustees and the inappropriate application of tolls – should be an integral part of the bill before it came to Parliament. The process of conducting negotiations still was not an easy process by any means. Daer estimated that most people 'in both counties dislike Turnpikes, but are asleep', which was a veiled threat as well as a helpful reminder that opposition from within the region could still easily arise if they did not carefully negotiate the details of the bill.[57] But there were those who made sure that the process of debating the bill in detail was as efficient and as thorough as possible. William McConnell, a representative of Wigtownshire in the negotiations, wrote to Stewart to complain of the difficulties inherent in drawing up a complex turnpike bill by committee and making sure that all interests were consulted and all suggestions considered:

> You were not quite satisfied with the proceedings of last meeting and I did not wonder at it. It was late before the Trustees met, when they did meet the day was wasted with business foreign to the purpose of meeting which caused the revision of the Bill to be done in a hurried manner, but even before it was finished in that hasty manner, Gentlemen tired, droping [sic] off one by one till for a great part of it only three Commissioners were in the room. – At future meetings on this business Gentlemen should attend early, 12 o'Clock at the latest – The Bill should be read over clause by clause deliberately – If observations are offered…they should be discussed immediately without going to other matter, which too often happens and shortly minuted… the clause should be referred [to] and, approved, rejected as unnecessary or the like – or altered to purport so and so.[58]

[57] NRS, GD46/17/7, Lord Daer to Keith Stewart, 14 September 1792.
[58] NRS, GD46/17/7, William McConnell to Keith Stewart, 3 December 1792.

This illustrates the growing importance placed on open and efficient negotiations to be held in public meetings, as well as the inevitable difficulties which remained. The politics in respect of road bills continued to be tough: while there may have been improvements in the way negotiations proceeded, the key issues, such as financial responsibility for maintaining existing and building new roads, and the risks around costs and tolls which might hinder trade, remained the same. In the case of the joint Kirkcudbrightshire and Wigtownshire bill, many of the key participants in the early negotiations, including Daer and Stewart, had died before the bill eventually reached the statute book in 1796. There were plenty of examples of negotiations between urban and county leaders deteriorating in this later period, with towns not necessarily being fully consulted at every stage. Arguments could still be pursued in the Court of Session, such as when in 1792 the Paisley Town Council sought to be reimbursed by the Renfrewshire turnpike trustees for the cost of maintaining a road through the town.[59] This process, therefore, was not necessarily as smooth or efficient as the example of cooperation in Kirkcudbrightshire and Wigtownshire might imply. In fact, this example may not be wholly representative in that the partnership between the burghs of Wigtown and Kirkcudbright were assisted by their unusually close relationships with the dominant local landowners. The seventh earl of Galloway, for example, was Provost of Wigtown, and the Selkirk family had a close interest and were deeply involved in Kirkcudbright, particularly through Lord Daer, the fourth earl's eldest son.[60] Further research might uncover similar examples elsewhere, but it is important to note that cooperation was easier to establish here perhaps than in some other places. Nevertheless, the fact that there were attempts to create arrangements whereby urban and county interests could consult and negotiate is significant.

[59] Harris, 'Landowners and Urban Society', 248.
[60] *Ibid.*, 250-253.

In addition to this, it became standard practice to engage in a form of evidence-based policy making. This often included the commissioning of a report or a survey which, it was hoped, would inform those participating in negotiations, mitigate any initial opposition, and mollify local concerns. The report ordered by Aberdeenshire commissioners of supply in 1792 was designed specifically to neutralise the very sizable opposition in Aberdeenshire, both in the burgh of Aberdeen and in the county, to a turnpike bill by asking commissioners of supply to consider 'the present state of the Highways in this county…and whether an application for Turnpike or any other mode would be more eligible'. As was perhaps expected, the report, which was published a few months later, concluded in favour of an application for a commutation and turnpike bill. The commissioners then used this report to push for the bill, and whilst it still faced considerable opposition and went through several drafts over the course of 2-3 years, it nevertheless reached the statute book in May 1795.[61] This was thanks, in part, to the evidence-based approach taken by its advocates at the very beginning.

Another key development was the growing emphasis on transparency, which was particularly evident in the increasingly systematic use of print and newspapers. As emphasised elsewhere in this thesis, this period saw a noticeable increase in the discussion of legislation and Westminster politics in the growing Scottish press. To a certain extent, the use of newspapers was a compulsory part of parliamentary procedure. Meetings to discuss proposed legislation were compelled to be advertised in advance, as laid down by the standing orders in the House of Commons which stipulated the need to give notice in local and London newspapers before petitioning for legislation.[62] But there were noticeable improvements in the way local newspapers advertised and covered meetings which discussed legislation. For example, while Sir William Hall in 1772 had complained that newspaper advertisements for

[61] John Patrick, *The Coming of Turnpikes to Aberdeenshire* (Aberdeen, 1982), pp. 6-9.
[62] Innes, *Inferior Politics*, 100.

meetings concerned with the Berwickshire turnpike bill were limited or non-existent, by the end of the century it was quite common to learn about plans to bring in a bill to Parliament via Edinburgh and more regional or provincial newspapers.[63] For example, the London-based Scottish solicitor, John Seton, wrote that he had observed 'by the Edinburgh News Papers That a Bill is intended to be brought in next Session for an Act for making a Turnpike Road from Kinross to Alloa'.[64] Provincial newspapers were increasingly used to advertise key general and special meetings, such as the *Dumfries Weekly Journal* which was used in the case of the joint turnpike bill for Wigtownshire and Kirkcudbrightshire.[65] In addition, the provincial press progressively became a vehicle to record or even conduct debates. This happened as early as 1777 when the Provost of Dumfries wrote an open letter to Sir William Maxwell in the *Dumfries Weekly Magazine* suggesting an exemption clause in the turnpike bill then going through Parliament, a request which had been anticipated and was accordingly accepted, publically and in print.[66] Matters of agreement and resolutions from key meetings were printed in local newspapers, such as those from the 'gentlemen of Kinross-shire' in relation to a turnpike bill in 1793.[67] These developments stemmed from the desire to enable all concerned to be fully informed, or at the very least an acceptance that this was necessary. This was evidenced by the printing and dissemination of reports, memorials, minutes of meetings, heads of bills, handbills, and the draft bills themselves. A printed report of the minutes of a discussion of the Perth Road Bill in the 1790s stated that:

> …it will not be unacceptable to see the different lights in which the matter has been viewed; as thereby they may be the better enabled to form an opinion with regard to what will probably be the chief subject of deliberation at the next General

[63] NRS, GD206/1/68, 'Sundry objections to the Berwickshire Turnpike Bill', n.d.
[64] NRS, GD29/2084/14 (Kinross House papers), John Seton to George Graham, 7 October 1796.
[65] NRS, GD46/17/7, William McConnell to Keith Stewart, 3 December 1792 (insert paper: 'Roads in Wigtownshire').
[66] Harris, 'Parliamentary Legislation', 87 (quoting *Dumfries Weekly Magazine*, 8 April 1777).
[67] NRS, GD29/2103/1, John Syme to George Graham, 22 October 1793.

> Meeting of the County… With this view, it was thought proper to print and transmit to the several Gentlemen of the County the Minutes of the above Meeting held at Edinburgh'.[68]

Therefore, even those meetings between a few individuals negotiating in Edinburgh were made public so that the broader county community, which might have an interest in the proposed road and attend the general meeting, could approach the matter as well informed as possible.

All these developments were visible in attempts to pass road and turnpike legislation by the very end of this period. The Fife Turnpike Act, which was passed by Parliament in 1829, was first formally proposed after several reports had been drawn up in 1826 at the annual general meeting of the Fife commissioners of supply. At this meeting, a committee was appointed 'to collect and bring in to shape the reports of the several districts of the County on the subject of the Bill'.[69] From the beginning the support of major local landowners was sought, such as the earl of Rosslyn who was appointed as convener of this committee. Negotiations and the framing of the bill took place over several years in as open a way as possible, combined with an evidence-based approach. The bill's proposers were at an advantage because of the experience of securing turnpike acts in Fife earlier in 1753 and 1790,[70] and proponents of the bill also sought advice from architects of the recent turnpike act which had been passed for Stirlingshire: indeed one of the bill's framer's in Cupar went so far as to say, 'The Stirling shire act will serve as a complete model for our new intended act', which clearly demonstrates that by the end of this period there was a growing body of similar acts to draw upon for inspiration, or even to copy.[71] When a draft of the bill was completed at the end of 1828, the committee made sure that copies of the bill, as well as related documents,

[68] NRS, GD15/906/6 (Erskine of Cardross papers): 'Perth Road-Bill' memorial, addressed to James Erskine of Cardross, n.d.
[69] NRS, GD164/1780/2 (Rosslyn Papers), Thomas Horsburgh to the earl of Rosslyn, 20 June 1826.
[70] Silver, 'The Development of the Fife Road System', 76-82.
[71] NRS, GD164/1786/2, Thomas Horsburgh to Rosslyn, 29 September 1828.

such as schedules of toll fares and reports on roads, were circulated to the trustees and others, including heritors. The earl of Rosslyn's solicitor in Edinburgh, William Walker, made sure that 'every Heritor of the County, without exception, should have the privilege of examining all these documents' before it went to Westminster, after which its progress to the statute book was uneventful.[72] The contrast between this and the negotiations surrounding earlier road and turnpike acts demonstrates some of the changes which took place in proposing, negotiating, and drafting local legislation in Scotland before it was submitted to Parliament. To a certain extent, it was only to be expected that greater experience would enable Scottish local government and society, both urban and county, to learn and become more efficient at doing this over time. At the same time, it is significant that important groups within Scottish society were adapting in response to the growing importance and relevance of parliamentary legislation.

As the last chapter demonstrated, certain Scottish MPs were, throughout this period, assiduous in acting upon the instructions of their constituents at Westminster and representing their interests in Parliament and to ministers. One key role MPs performed was helping in the passage of local legislation. Given that the rules and regulations surrounding parliamentary procedure over this period largely remained the same, the role of Scottish MPs and lobbying agents in ensuring that Scottish local legislation successfully made it on to the statute book once it had been placed in their charge, did not undergo any fundamental transformation. Yet, as Scottish civil society grew more adept at producing local legislation which attempted to satisfy most key interests in any given local area, the role of Scottish MPs, as well legal agents and other representatives in Westminster did change in subtle ways, all the while strengthening the link between various Scottish localities and the legislature.

[72] NRS, GD164/1786/7/1, William Walker to the earl of Rosslyn, 10 January 1829.

At the beginning of this period, much of the process of debate and negotiation took place in London. Using the Berwickshire Turnpike Act of 1772 as a good example of an earlier local act, it went through several iterations, partly because it was deemed to be inadequate and the proposers in that county were not fully aware of parliamentary procedure. For example, the first version of the bill was sent to Parliament without its proposers having been aware of the correct form of petitioning the Commons for legislation, so that a petition had to be 'writ for in great haste and was procured from folks who had never seen the Bill'.[73] Ultimately, the first draft of the bill was reported as having been 'found deficient' because it 'would not pass without great alterations' and so was sent back to Berwickshire.[74] At the same time those opposing the bill wrote to their MP, James Pringle, in an attempt to persuade him to stall it, although they believed him to be 'more nearly with others in County politicks, especially in such as relate to the Turnpike bill to which he hears a very warmer side'.[75] He nevertheless complied with the opposition heritors' request, in that he promised to 'not only take upon me to delay any material Proceedings on the Bill, but will not present the Petition 'till I have further directions from the Committee'.[76] It was, however, also reported that the real delay was caused by Sir Gilbert Elliot, acting on behalf of his Roxburghshire constituents who were concerned about the turnpike road extending into their county, who stated to Pringle that he would oppose the bill in its current form.[77]

Ultimately, Pringle and the solicitors employed in London facilitated negotiations between advocates of a turnpike bill and its opponents. Pringle, it seems, forced the 'Friends of the Bill' to make certain amendments, after which representatives from both parties agreed to 'Certain Articles of Agreement' which led to most of the bill's opponents agreeing to

[73] NRS, GD206/1/68, 'Sundry objections to the Berwickshire Turnpike Bill', n.d.
[74] *Ibid*., William Hall to unknown recipient, 13 February 1771 (copy), with paper entitled: 'Objections'.
[75] *Ibid*., William Hall to Lord Elibank, 15 March 1771 (copy).
[76] *Ibid*., James Pringle to William Hall, 6 February 1772.
[77] *Ibid*., William Hall to Sir John Hall, 17 February 1772.

'withhold their Petition and drop all opposition to the Bill.'[78] Although some opposition persisted, it was not enough to force any delay on the Commons committee as 'Col^{o} Pringle had been so industrious in securring [sic] all the Scots members that no a single man of them would stand by us but Mr Lyon [the MP for Aberdeenshire]'. Other MPs on the Commons committee, who had been lobbied by the bill's opponents, including those representing neighbouring constituencies such as Berwick-upon-Tweed and County Durham, were reassured by Pringle's amendments that gave exemptions from toll payments to postal services and coal. In the end, Hall conceded that there was 'little expectation of reconciling people so as to make any formidable a stand to the united body of Scots members on the report or third reading of the bill', and so it passed not long thereafter.[79] Hall had previously expressed a wish that the bill 'should be settled in the County',[80] but it is clear that this was very much a bill proposed in Berwickshire, and redrafted and settled at Westminster.

Thereafter, road and turnpike bills continued to be altered and amended in London, but there is evidence of more developed and efficient channels of communication between Scotland and Westminster having been established. Two decades after the Berwickshire Turnpike Act was passed in 1772, meetings took place between the proponents and opponents of a new turnpike bill for Berwickshire, as well as the then MP for Berwickshire, Patrick Home, the MPs for the neighbouring English constituencies of Berwick-upon-Tweed and County Durham, and the bill's solicitor, Thomas Longlands.[81] As part of these negotiations, proponents agreed to give up applying for the power to take materials for roads out of Berwick fields and to charge tolls on the road to Eyemouth. The proponents then wrote to Scotland 'for new instructions' and the opponents wrote to their colleagues in Berwickshire to 'frame and suggest a clause or clauses to the above effect, that, when the Bill comes before the Committee

[78] *Ibid*., John Spottiswood to William Hall, 9 March 1772.
[79] *Ibid*., William Hall to Sir John Hall, 2 April 1772.
[80] *Ibid*., William Hall to a 'Mr Dickson', 20 February 1771.
[81] NRS, GD206/1/69, R Burdon to William Jeffrys, 15 February 1792.

[in Berwickshire which was charged with drafting the bill], we may be prepared.'[82] There were, therefore, instances of negotiations taking place simultaneously in both Scotland and Westminster, but with the final say remaining with the local interests in Scotland.

While some bills appeared to make it onto the statute book with little evidence of any trouble in Parliament, an absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence. We might be able to judge by the speed with which legislation made it through Parliament, as in the case of the 1795 Aberdeenshire turnpike bill which, after protracted negotiations at the local level, appears to have enjoyed a smooth passage to the statute book.[83] It is clear, however, that the attitude taken at a local level was changing in favour of ensuring that agreements could be made in Scotland to ensure greater local control, which might be lost in a hurried London-based negotiation. This involved pre-empting and occasionally making concessions to local opposition. For example, in the 1790s, when the counties of Fife, Perthshire, and Kinross-shire were negotiating a turnpike bill for a road from North Queensferry to Perth, George Graham, MP for Kinross-shire, was keen to represent the complaints of his constituents. John Syme, a writer working on the bill, suggested that he and others from Kinross-shire should meet with proponents of the legislation in Edinburgh to 'consider the Bill cooly & deliberately which surely would be much better than to dispute the matter in parliament' and that it might be of more benefit for all concerned if they could come to an agreement with the other two counties 'in an amicable manner'.[84]

Nevertheless, a fear remained that even if a bill was agreed at a local level, it might undergo substantial revision at Westminster. Such a fear was expressed by Lord Daer in the case of the joint application by Wigtownshire and Kirkcudbrightshire in the 1790s when he demanded commitments from Keith Stewart and the earl of Galloway: '… I think I can have

[82] *Ibid*., William Hall to unknown recipient (possibly William Jeffreys), 8 February 1792.
[83] Patrick, *The Coming of Turnpikes to Aberdeenshire*, 9.
[84] NRS, GD29/2103, John Syme to George Graham, 31 October 1793.

influence to stop the bill now; but if it gets once into Parliament I cannot and you can'. He therefore threatened to 'instantly set myself to oppose the bill' while it was still being negotiated in Scotland unless he could get a commitment that it would not change substantially in any parliamentary redrafting.[85] The desire to get agreement at a local level was certainly shared by those working on the bill who desired a local 'conversation on the different clauses to render them if possible as palatable to all concerned as possible'.[86] There remained, therefore, a tension between the desire to reach agreement in Scotland, and the possibility of further negotiation and redrafting at Westminster.

A good example of the way in which negotiations over Scottish local legislation persisted at Westminster was the case of the Banffshire turnpike bill in the early years of the nineteenth century. This bill had initially received the duke of Gordon's agreement in principle in 1801 at a general meeting. Yet three years later, the duke's factor, William Tod, complained that 'In its progress through Parliament, it [the bill] has assumed so different a shape from what was originally understood'.[87] The root of the problem was the nature and extent of assessment in the county for raising money for roads and bridges; and at a county meeting, Tod forwarded the duke's concerns and requested a delay so that they could negotiate this further. But this was overruled as the local supporters of this bill were anxious to proceed, and so the duke of Gordon employed his own solicitor in London 'to keep a watchfull Eye on the Member for Inverness Shire and the Party who are so anxious for bringing forward this very obnoxious Bill' to 'be prepared to give Opposition to it in every State'.[88] The duke's solicitors appealed to Charles Grant, MP for Inverness-shire, to 'see propriety of allowing a reasonable time for consideration' and complained that the bill was being pushed through Parliament in a 'hurried manner', saying that if further time was not given, the bill would have to be 'opposed in all its

[85] NRS, GD46/17/7, Lord Daer to Keith Stewart, 14 September 1792.
[86] *Ibid*., William McConnell to Keith Stewart, 5 December 1792.
[87] NRS, GD44/42/3/2, Thomas Pitreak to William Tod, 24th March 1804.
[88] *Ibid*., William Tod to James Robertson, 24 April 1804.

stages'.[89] It appears, however, that not long after this, Gordon was persuaded to withdraw his opposition after the MP for Aberdeenshire, James Ferguson, as well as Robert Dundas, persuaded him that any continued opposition would be 'prejudicial to the Interests of the Highlands'.[90] Nevertheless, this shows that, despite the improved organisational structures and conventions developing in Scotland at a local level to find agreement around local legislation, there always remained a possibility that there might be further debates and struggles in London.

Throughout the period, MPs, lobbying agents, and solicitors were used consistently by interests within Scottish communities during the Westminster parliamentary process. It was, for example, important for local committees drafting legislation to ensure that, once sufficient agreement had been reached at a local level, their bill survived the parliamentary process, particularly the committee stage, with minimal difficulties. For example, once local agreement had been reached on the Longtown Road bill (which crossed the Anglo-Scottish border) in the early 1790s, the duke of Buccleuch and the earl of Galloway, both of whom were ardent supporters of this scheme, were required to go to London to aid the English MP for Westmorland in its passage through the Commons. Buccleuch was even required to 'take the Management of the Bill' in the House of Lords which involved having to 'move the Second reading' and 'Attend the Committee' to give evidence.[91] Indeed, in the case of the Banffshire road bill in 1804, with an agreement reached, solicitors promoting the bill became engaged in a hurried exercise of persuading any Scot in London, MP or otherwise, familiar with the area to give evidence to the House of Lords committee. Ensuring that a local act such as this passed relatively unscathed through the parliamentary committee stage was not necessarily a simple or easy process, particularly if certain members of the committee were known for being sticklers for proper legislative procedure. In particular, John Spottiswood, Buccleuch's

[89] *Ibid*., James Robertson to John Spottiswood, 30 April 1804 (copy).
[90] *Ibid*., the duke of Gordon to James Ferguson of Pitfour, 28 May 1804.
[91] NRS, GD224/583/1/9, John Irving to the duke of Buccleuch, 3 June 1794; GD224/583/1/19, Sir James Graham to the duke of Buccleuch, 24 February 1794.

solicitor, noted that 'with every precaution it is often difficult to satisfy Lord Walsingham', the then Chairman of Committees in the House of Lords.[92] They required someone from Banffshire, as well as the duke of Gordon's signature of approval, in order to demonstrate local support for the bill. Thomas Telford and the duke of Atholl had both given evidence, but when it transpired that, in the short time available, no one from Banffshire would be able to attend, James Robertson suggested that 'M[r] Spottiswood can be at no loss to find several members of Parliament well qualified to give local Information', suggesting Sir John Sinclair and Robert Dundas in addition to several of 'our Countrymen…now in London'.[93]

The services of MPs, solicitors, and lobbying agents were, perhaps unsurprisingly, crucial in the process of securing the passage of Scottish local legislation at Westminster. They had the knowledge and expertise to navigate the parliamentary process and were able to facilitate and conduct negotiations in London. They were able to give important strategic and tactical advice, as, in the case of the solicitors, they were the same individuals acting for multiple local acts for a variety of different Scottish localities. For example, in the late eighteenth century, solicitors such as John Spottiswood and John Seton were very busy acting on behalf of many different Scottish interests: they were able to provide expert guidance on, for example, orders of the House of Commons and whether there was enough time in any given session to petition successfully for and pass a bill. As the organisation between important local groups in Scottish society improved, the role of representatives and lobbyists in Westminster changed so that the nature of MPs' activity was ideally to ensure that the legislation agreed at a local level successfully cleared the necessary parliamentary hurdles. The fear that a last-minute negotiation in Westminster might lead to an undesirable bill appears to have prompted local authorities to reach an agreement in order to minimise the threat of opposition or

[92] NRS, GD44/42/3/3, John Spottiswood and James Robertson to John Gordon of Cluny, 12 May 1804.
[93] *Ibid*., James Robertson to John Menzies, 21 May 1804.

substantial amendments. The lines of communication between localities and Westminster, in the context of drawing up and securing local legislation, were therefore strengthened and made more effective over this period, which, in turn, deepened and broadened the process of Scottish integration in the British political and legislative system.

III

The Aberdeen Police Acts, 1790-1829

This final section of the chapter concentrates on the Aberdeen police acts of 1795, 1818 and 1829 as a case study of how one relatively large Scottish burgh lobbied for and acquired local improvement legislation. In his study of the development of Scottish urban law enforcement and improvement in the nineteenth century, David Barrie has shown that before the first piece of national legislation relating to Scottish policing was passed – the 1833 Burgh Police (Scotland) Act – a growing number of Scottish burghs had, for some time, been introducing local police acts.[94] By 1833, quite a few Scottish burghs were electing police commissioners to administer police affairs and improve law enforcement in a context of rapid urban growth. This created what Barrie has called a 'system of dual administration' which had profound consequences for the way urban Scotland was governed. Police commissioners usually had a wide range of responsibilities, including the imposition of rates and borrowing powers, which resulted in them occasionally being seen as potential alternative urban authorities to the town councils. Local police bills – which were focused on providing general urban improvement, including lighting, paving and watching – started with several acts in the Edinburgh region in the early 1770s, with around 30 acts following in different towns before the late 1820s, including Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Dundee.[95] In addition, Barrie has studied in

[94] David Barrie, *Police in the Age of Improvement: Police development and the civic tradition in Scotland, 1775-1865* (London, 2008), pp. 4-5.
[95] *Ibid*., 10-11, 92-94.

detail the Glasgow Police Act of 1800, which took 16 years to coax into existence – the first attempt to promote a Glasgow police bill being in 1783. The delay in its successful passage on the statute book was due largely to its novelty as a form of legislation as well as it being subject to a process of negotiation between older, powerful, and established urban institutions, such as the Glasgow Trade's and Merchant's houses, as well as the Town Council, at a time when local Glaswegian politics was increasingly characterised by conflict between different older and emerging interests.[96] The politics of Glasgow, however, were not representative of all burghs, although there were similar conflicts between local groups and interests in the case of the Aberdeen police acts as the town grew and as local civil society became more multi-layered and diverse.

This case study begins by outlining the chronology of the processes which led to each of the three Aberdeen police acts before conducting an analysis of the political processes involved, both locally and at Westminster, in each case. Over the course of the three acts, obtained over a period of roughly 40 years, the local institutions and structures for drawing up urban improvement legislation changed and developed considerably. The first Act was proposed initially in 1791 by the Aberdeen Dean of Guild Court in a report to the Town Council which recommended a bill to widen streets and add a considerable number of new lamps, as well as to procure an additional supply of spring water for the inhabitants of the town and to replace the existing prison with a new bridewell. In 1792 the Dean of Guild reported to the Town Council the need to acquire the consent of Parliament for tax and assessing powers to fund a new 'Commission' which would carry out these improvements.[97] In order to draft this legislation, the consent of other established Aberdeen civic institutions was required, such as the Incorporated Trades who disapproved initially.[98] The trades councillors represented their

[96] *Ibid*., ch. 3.
[97] ACAA, CA/1/1/66 (Council Register 1788-1793), fos. 138 and 213 (25 April 1791 and 15 September 1792).
[98] TH, Aberdeen Incorporated Trades Minute Book, 1764-1829, [unpaginated] 26 May 1791 and 24 January 1793.

misgivings about the bill at Council meetings and the Incorporated Trades organised a public meeting in 1793 to express their opposition.[99] But the drive behind and the operation of drawing up the legislation was very much with the Town Council. The Provost and the baillies were appointed by the Council as a committee to draw up the proposed bill which went through several iterations. By the beginning of 1794, the Incorporated Trades still opposed the bill, however, and the Council was forced to offer a compromise by appointing a committee comprised of the town's magistrates and two trades councillors, as well as inviting the Incorporated Trades to 'furnish them [the Council] with the heads of such a Police Bill as your Constituents wish to suggest'.[100] At the same time, this negotiation took place in the context of the movement for burgh reform, which had particularly well-organised advocates in Aberdeen who pressed for a more open and accountable Police Commission.[101] A compromise was eventually reached between January and March 1795 after the Council agreed to several alterations proposed to their bill 'for the sake of reconciling all ranks and classes of the Inhabitants to a measure of so great importance to the general interests of the whole Community', and the act was subsequently passed.[102]

This Act created the Police Commission, a new type of institution, 'Stamped with the Authority of Parliament', as it somewhat pompously, but revealingly, claimed, comprised of elected officials, and distinct from the Town Council or the Incorporated Trades. This was to have major consequences for the process of proposing, debating, negotiating, and drafting legislation. Two decades after it had been created, the Commission proposed the establishment of a 'night watch' owing to a crime-wave in Aberdeen which followed the end of the

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[99] *In a General Meeting of the Citizens, Burgesses and Inhabitants of Aberdeen, called by public Advertisement in Hands Bills, and in the Aberdeen Journal of the 11th instant, to consider the Heads of a Police Bill published by the Magistrates, and circulated among the Citizens for their Consideration and Opinion* (1793) [Held at NLS, X. 225.a.1(57)]; TH, Aberdeen Incorporated Trades Minute Book, 1764-1829, 31 January 1793 and 4 March 1793; ACAA, CA1/1/66, f. 234 (2 February 1793).
[100] ACAA, CA/1/1/67 (Council Register 1794-1800), fo. 40 (9 October 1794).
[101] E. Patricia Dennison, David Ditchburn and Michael Lynch (eds), *Aberdeen Before 1800: A New History* (East Linton, 2002), pp. 283-284.
[102] ACAA, CA/1/1/67, fos. 56-60 (27 January-13 March 1795).

Napoleonic wars, in a renewal of the existing Police Act which was due to expire.[103] Because this was a controversial subject, the need for a public meeting to discuss the matter in an open and transparent setting was obvious.[104] In October 1816, a meeting appointed a committee, independent of the Police Commission, to 'consider the most prompt and effectual means of establishing a nightly watch for the general protection of the property of the Inhabitants'. The commissioners initially expressed a willingness to 'cooperate in a measure so necessary', but it very rapidly descended into a tug-of-war and an argument over who had the primary authority to drive the process of drawing up new legislation.[105] The commissioners believed it was their 'duty' to ensure that the Act was renewed, and consented to consider 'any suggestion from the Committee', but later came to question the legitimacy of the committee as they came into conflict.[106] The Commission began independently to draw up a bill with the original Act 'taken as the ground Work', and the committee, without consulting the commission, called a special meeting to report to 'all liable to assessment of Police Tax'.[107]

In 1817 the Commission and the committee to set up a 'watch' created a joint-committee in an attempt to iron out differences and accelerate the process. By this point there was the added pressure that the 1795 Act's expiration was imminent: the commissioners believed that this would create 'great hazard and confusion, besides leaving the Town in Darkness', while the committee suggested that if they could not establish a watch in the new bill, that 'the renewal might be might be allowed to drop for a Season'.[108] Many commissioners became greatly concerned that if the 1795 Act was allowed to expire, then the assessment would become impossible to collect 'when the authority of the Legislature is withdrawn'.[109]

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[103] R. Tyzack, '"No Mean City?" The Growth of Civic Consciousness in Aberdeen with Particular Reference to the Work of the Police Commissioners' in T. Brotherstone and D.J. Withrington (eds), *The City and its Worlds: Aspects of Aberdeen's History since 1794* (Glasgow, 1996), pp. 151-154
[104] ACAA, CA/9/1/2 (Aberdeen Police Commissioner Minutes, 1809-1821), fo. 183 (4 September 1815).
[105] ACAA, CA/9/1/2, fo. 202 (29 October 1816).
[106] *Ibid*., fo. 208 (12 November 1816).
[107] *Ibid*., fos. 213-214 (27 November and 6 December 1816).
[108] *Ibid*., fos. 232-233 (20 March and 25 March 1817).
[109] *Ibid*., fo. 247 (4 August 1817).

In August 1817 the Act did expire and another general meeting was called at which the commissioners agreed to continue 'in the discharge of the Public Duty'.[110] By April 1818, they were so desperate to acquire a new police act that they were very reluctantly forced to accept a proposal from the committee to create several *ex officio* members of the Commission – the Provost of Aberdeen and other magistrates. The new bill was hastily assembled and passed, but with this last-minute amendment, the commissioners were unhappy with the final result, claiming that 'the Bill is so materially changed, as in comparison to be far inferior in point of the Public utility to the Act lately expired.' [111] Nevertheless, two months later it had cleared all parliamentary hurdles and became Aberdeen's second Police Act.[112] On the one hand, this was a lengthy and disorderly process which differed greatly from that of constructing the first Police Act and which led to a hurried and substandard bill drawn up at the last minute. On the other hand, however, compared with the process which led to the previous Act, it had been relatively open and transparent and had attempted to engage new parts of the community and to obtain the widest possible consensus.

The process leading to the third Act was a deliberately more orderly affair which saw the Commission more or less take charge of the entire process. In 1826 a group of 31 inhabitants of Aberdeen petitioned the Police Commission for an additional police bill to empower it to assess further inhabitants in order to procure 'an additional supply of Water' from the River Dee.[113] They stressed the need to 'prevent opposition' so that the bill should be 'satisfactory to all parties'. The commissioners agreed that a new bill was needed to legitimise an additional assessment for bringing in a greater supply of water and to extend the Commission's boundaries to the suburbs of Aberdeen, as well as to correct the 'defects' of the 1818 Act. A general meeting was called which approved almost all the Commission's

[110] *Ibid*., fo. 251 (26 August 1817).
[111] *Ibid*., fos. 264-266 (28 April 1818).
[112] *Ibid*., fo. 269 (1 June 1818).
[113] ACAA, CA/9/1/3 (Aberdeen Police Commissioner Minutes, 1821-1828), fo. 370 (12 September 1826).

resolutions for a new bill. The meeting appointed a committee to draft the 'heads' of a bill which comprised all the important elements of local civil society: the three *ex officio* members of the Commission, the Convenor of the Incorporated Trades, five police commissioners, as well as the presidents of the society of Advocates and the Shipmaster Society.[114] There was therefore a concerted effort to ensure that older civic institutions were working with the new Commission towards the same goal. The Commission invited those who had objections to the bill, as well as representatives from the suburbs, to meet with the committee drawing up the bill to submit their suggestions in an attempt to find common ground and reconcile opinion, and, as a result, they accepted suggested exemptions from water assessments.[115] This led subsequently to the creation of a joint committee, with a sub-committee representing the suburbs, which revised the draft bill, although the final version still encountered vocal opposition even when it was before Parliament.[116] It was a long process taking nearly three years, and in May 1829 the new police bill finally became law. Despite this, it was still the most open and efficient process yet, producing an act to which various different groups in Aberdeen and its environs had contributed in important ways.

The processes which underpinned the three police acts differed, therefore, with stronger elements of transparency and efficiency developing over the course of this period. In the process which created the 1795 Act, the Town Council does not appear to have engaged in any public meeting, whereas the Incorporated Trades called one, albeit in opposition and for tactical reasons to gain a hearing, and it seems to have had the desired effect.[117] Negotiations took place in private between delegates from the Council and their local opponents, as the former

[114] *Ibid*., fos. 372-373 (20 September 1826).
[115] *Ibid*., fo. 517 (21 October 1828 when the Commission received a memorial from opponents of the proposed rate of assessment), fo. 519 (a requisition from 'proprietors and occupiers of Houses & Shops, West of the Den Burn'), p. 524 (a meeting on the 7 November 1828 with a committee from the suburbs), p. 540 (on making a concession on the assessment for water supply on 19 November 1828).
[116] *Ibid*., fo. 555 (19 December 1828 on the creation of the joint committee).
[117] *In a General Meeting of the Citizens, Burgesses and Inhabitants of Aberdeen,* (1793).

believed they should 'endeavour to procure the approbation of the principal part of the Citizens & particularly the Incorporations of Trades'.[118] However, 20 years later when the second Act was being negotiated, principles of public openness and accountability were more entrenched locally. The police commissioners were elected by those eligible for assessment under the 1795 Act and referred to themselves as 'Stewards of the Community', as well as boasting of how they 'regularly and annually rendered to the Public a state of their Accounts, and their Books'.[119] They were, however, forced to work with the committee which had been appointed by a public meeting to establish a night watch. Further public meetings were called by this committee, one of which they called without the knowledge of the Police Commission, to agree broad principles of the new bill, such as whether magistrates should be *ex officio* commissioners, as well as to approve the draft legislation and petitions to Parliament.[120] Clearly, these public meetings were designed to confer legitimacy on proceedings, but they occasionally frustrated some commissioners who wished simply to renew the 1795 Act in good time. When it looked as though this was not going to happen, commissioners complained that it was not 'agreeable to sense, or sound reason, that the opinions and resolves of One Hundred or more persons in any given Meeting, can be binding upon a community of Twenty Thousand for any pecuniary or other persons'.[121] The commissioners believed they were accountable to the community as a whole, and not simply to, as they saw it, an unrepresentative group who happened to attend a public meeting. Problems such as this were typical at a time when notions of the 'public' were undergoing redefinition, in a process that was strongly contested. Ultimately, the 1818 Act was drafted between the Commission and the committee, as well as by the Commission's solicitor in London, in a hurry, with several additions which had not been agreed on at any public meeting. Yet new methods of public engagement played an

[118] ACAA, CA/1/1/67, fo. 40 (13 October 1794).
[119] ACAA, CA/9/1/2, fos. 200-201 (21 October 1816).
[120] *Ibid*., fos. 214-218 (6 December 1816, with an account of the public meeting).
[121] ACAA, CA/9/1/2, fo. 237 (1 April 1817).

increasingly important role in the process leading up to the 1829 Act. A general meeting in 1826 established a committee comprised of different parts of the community in and around Aberdeen to agree on the broad resolutions and principles which should be reflected in the bill.[122] During the three-year negotiations before the bill was enacted, some opponents of the bill, who disliked the direction the legislation was taking under the management of the committee and the commissioners, proposed calling public meetings as a stalling tactic, but they were in the minority and their calls were overruled.[123] Much of the work, however, was then completed by committees and sub-committees which represented various areas and interests in the Aberdeen area, many of which were new to this process. As one of the main objectives of the bill's proponents was to extend the boundaries of the Commission's jurisdiction to the suburbs, the inhabitants were given a role in negotiating the legislation, such as on a committee which claimed to have the backing of 'upwards of one hundred Proprietors and occupiers of Houses & Shops West of Union Bridge'.[124] These submissions by different committees came at the prompting of the Police Commission, which invited the opinions of all those liable to be assessed under the new act to 'reconcile any difference of opinion' and as commissioners were 'desirous to conciliate all parties'.[125] The experience of the negotiations leading to these three acts demonstrates, therefore, the changes in local organisation related to negotiating legislation, which although at times may have sacrificed efficiency, nevertheless steadily allowed a wide participation and sought a broad local consensus.

The growing importance of the public negotiation and consensus-building was matched by the more careful and systematic use of print in the process of proposing and agreeing on legislation. It remained standard practice throughout this period to print reports, accounts of

[122] ACAA, CA/9/1/3, fos. 372-373 (Account of the 'General Meeting' on 20 September 1826).
[123] *Ibid*., fos. 447, 454, 455, 456 (14 January, 18 February, and 23 February for the multiple requests for another public meeting and Commission's vote against them).
[124] *Ibid*., fo. 519 (21 October 1828).
[125] *Ibid*., fos. 521 and 540 (28 October and 19 November 1828).

meetings, handbills, as well as 'heads' and drafts of bills, and for these to be circulated and distributed throughout the town. In November 1816, for example, the notices for the renewal of the 1795 Police Act were ordered to be 'posted on the Church, the Court House, and Records Office Doors'.[126] There was also significant development in the use of newspapers. The Town Council in the process leading up to the 1795 Act made limited use of the local press and only appears to have done so to comply with the standing orders of the House of Commons, although the Incorporated Trades made their opposition to the bill known in the *Aberdeen Journal*, and they printed an account of the public meeting they called in 1793 in a pamphlet.[127] Newspapers, particularly in the regions, were rapidly maturing as vehicles of opinion and information.[128] Public meetings were advertised, and accounts of their proceedings were recorded in, the *Aberdeen Journal* and the new local newspaper, the *Aberdeen Chronicle*, founded in 1806.[129] In 1816, the correspondence between police commissioners and members of the committee charged with establishing a watch was published in the *Aberdeen Chronicle*.[130] Indeed, the editor of the *Aberdeen Chronicle* was, at this point, an elected member of the Police Commission, and was at one public meeting accused by a member of the independent committee of providing only partial coverage so as to favour the commissioners, a charge he vehemently denied.[131] He was again charged with using his editorship of the *Chronicle* in 1828, ten years later in disputes over the third Police Act, to publish 'the lowest abuse about Magistrates, Commissioners of the Police & the New Bill Committee'.[132] But local newspapers were used to more productive effect by the Commission when in late 1828 it

[126] ACAA, CA/9/1/2, fo. 210 (19 November 1816).
[127] TH, Aberdeen Incorporated Trades Minute Book, 1764-1829. They resolved to publish their opinions in the *Aberdeen Journal* on 1 January 1793 and 20 February 1794.
[128] Bob Harris, 'Scotland's Newspapers, the French Revolution and Domestic Radicalism (c.1789-1794), *The Scottish Historical Review* 84 (2005), 42-45; idem., 'Parliamentary Legislation, Lobbying and the Press', 84-95.
[129] See, for example, records of public meetings in *Aberdeen Chronicle*, 2 November 1816, and 1 March 1817.
[130] ACAA, CA/9/1/2, fo. 207 (12 November 1816).
[131] *Ibid*., fo. 218 (6 December 1816). The *Aberdeen Chronicle* sometimes expressed an editorial view, such as *Aberdeen Chronicle*, 2 November 1816 when it commented on the establishment of 'an efficient Watch' for 'our Fellow-citizens'.
[132] ACAA, CA/9/1/2, fo. 488 (5 May 1828).

invited opponents and those in the suburbs to submit their objections and suggestions. In addition, reports of the meetings, such as one in 1829 of those in favour and those opposed to the bill in the suburbs, were published in both the Aberdeen newspapers.

Related to this were significant attempts to learn from previous experiences of passing police acts in other burghs, although a serious attempt to adopt a more evidence-based approach to drafting legislation was a later development. In the case of the 1795 Act, there was a conscious effort to copy clauses from existing police acts which might be considered suitable and desirable for one in Aberdeen. The Council directly contacted the clerk of Dumfries Town Council in 1793 to ask for a copy of their Police Act 'as we have in view at present to apply for a similar Act for this city.'[133] A letter from the Provost to the Deacon Convener of the Trades revealed that in drawing up their bill they simply copied previous police acts, without conducting any serious investigation or study, stating that it was 'in many parts little else than a transcript from the most approved Acts of the kind obtained for other Towns.'[134] Given that the second Aberdeen Police Act was designed initially to be a simple renewal of the original legislation, there was little call for any detailed investigation in initial discussions, although the committee appointed to establish a night watch did produce an 'interim report'.[135] Thereafter, in the chaos and confusion which followed the expiry of the 1795 Act, there was a rush to secure a renewed act, and last minute additions to the bill by members of the committee were hurriedly accepted by the Commission as the price for passing the legislation onto the statute book, despite their misgivings. The process, however, which led to the third Act in 1829 was much more efficient and designed to ensure that those participating in drafting the legislation were as well-informed as possible. Once again, they looked at previous police acts when drafting clauses on rates of assessment, following the examples of acts passed for Edinburgh

[133] Quoted in Harris and McKean, *The Scottish Town*, 97.
[134] ACAA, CA/1/1/67, fo. 40 (13 October 1794).
[135] ACAA, CA/9/1/2, fo. 212 (27 November 1816).

(1805) and Dundee (1824).[136] But in addition, the committee appointed to draft this bill also produced reports on different schemes which might provide Aberdeen and the surrounding suburbs with an additional water supply.[137] Subsequent reports were ordered when there was opposition to the plan in the police bill for the scheme of a water work, and so a civil engineer, James Jardine, was commissioned to present a report on the best means of bringing water into the town and how much it was likely to cost.[138] All of this was designed to prevent, or at least limit, any opposition, as well as to ensure that agreement might be more easily attained. It was also, however, an attempt to make sure that the bill was more workable and technically refined, presumably to avoid the difficulties which had been encountered with the previous act, and to ensure its suitability for the particular needs of Aberdeen and its surrounding environs.

Nevertheless, as was the case with all local legislation during this period, the desire to negotiate and agree upon bills at a local level was balanced with the need to ensure they could navigate the parliamentary process. The first Act suffered a delay in London in 1794 due to opposition from representatives of the bill's opponents in Aberdeen, which forced it to be sent back to Scotland so that alterations to create a more accountable Police Commission which might satisfy burgh reformers could be made.[139] The process which established the 1818 Act was a messy affair and the actual process of seeing it through to the statute book was decidedly rushed. Throughout negotiations, the commissioners had employed and instructed a London-based solicitor from Aberdeen, one James Duthie, to act for them in Westminster. In the scramble to get the new bill passed in April 1818 in 'the busy & last session of the present Parliament', the committee drafting it had added a clause permitting *ex officio* commissioners which upset the Police Commission who considered the bill 'so materially changed, as in

[136] ACAA, CA/9/1/4 (Aberdeen Police Commissioner Minutes, 1829-1831), fo. 19 (1 April 1829).
[137] ACAA, CA/9/1/3, fos. 434, 439-440 (5 November 1827).
[138] *Ibid.*, 434-440.
[139] ACAA, CA/1/1/67, fos. 21-26, 41, 59, 79 and 84 (1 March, 14 June and 9 October 1794 and 13 March 1795).

comparison to be far inferior in point of Public'. Yet it was still the responsibility of the commissioners to remit money to Duthie to pay him for his services and allow him to pay the requisite parliamentary fees to get the Act passed as quickly as possible.[140] In the 1820s, despite the more consultative process which had produced a bill in 1829, it encountered strong opposition in London. The Commission sent several of its members, including the clerk, to London to give evidence before parliamentary committees, but they were forced into last minute negotiations in London with their opponents who had come to London to delay the bill. The MP for the Aberdeen Burghs, Joseph Hume, facilitated these discussions and wrote to the commissioners in Aberdeen to persuade them to agree to certain concessions.

Ultimately these negotiations were successful, with the Commission having the final say in conceding points on qualifications for commissioners, as well as on a scale of rates, and the bill became law in May 1829.[141] Even though some last-minute concessions had to be made during the parliamentary process, the communication between MP and locality had improved dramatically since the process which had led to the second Police Act. Partly this was because the organisational framework at a local level was much more efficient. But it was also dependent on the personalities of the individuals involved and the diligence of the MP, who, in this case, was very assiduous in facilitating an agreement. A combination of these two circumstances allowed the link between Aberdeen and Westminster, in this instance, to function more effectively.

During this period, Scots became more confident, and more adept, at participating in the legislative processes of Westminster, and seeking legislation to support their ambitions. This

[140] ACAA, CA/9/1/2, fos. 264-266 (28 April 1818).
[141] ACAA, CA/9/1/4, fos. 16, 18, 19, and 23 (16 and 23 March, 1 April, and 18 May 1829).

was seen most obviously in the rise of local legislation which stemmed from the accelerating and broadening impulse for improvement in different parts of rural and urban Scotland. As a consequence of this deepening involvement, notions of the 'public' in Scotland were subject to an important process or redefinition. This extended to, and was advanced in, different parts of the country as elements within society adapted their outlook to focus more closely and constructively on Westminster and London. Long-standing bodies and institutions, such as commissioners of supply, burgh councils and trades incorporations, were compelled to accommodate themselves in different ways to this new imperative, as well as to ensure that demands for greater accountability and consultation were met. They were also joined gradually by new local bodies – road or turnpike trustees, or police commissions – which contributed to a new political culture involving new conventions around transparency, canvassing local opinion, and seeking compromise through broader and more meaningful 'public' consultation.

This has important consequences for how we view the relationships between localities in Scotland and the British political centre. The developments described above were distinct to Scotland and yet also operated in ways which served to anchor Scottish society more closely and more deeply within the Union-state. The balance between persistent difference and integration, observed in the last chapter, was therefore a key factor in Scotland's developing relationship with the Westminster Parliament. Moreover, these changes in the politicisation of Scottish society took place during an era of what is often characterised as political reaction, and continued even after conservative forces had halted agitation for burgh reform after 1792. This suggests that contested notions of the 'public' in Scotland were focused at the local level on how ways in which measures to improve infrastructure, or promote growth and prosperity, were proposed and discussed, and developed into legislative proposals. It was arguably here that in the longer term a new, more transparent and open public sphere emerged in Scotland,

rather than as a result of national political developments or campaigns for 'reform', although they overlapped at various points.

This chapter has also touched on political developments in the counties, a subject which is largely ignored in the existing historical literature. Scottish historians have in recent years mostly confined their accounts of political culture and change to urban-civil society, and have focused, for example, on how the Scottish lower orders challenged landed rule.[142] Although this is important, it overlooks, and risks ignoring, the increased political activity taking place within Scottish counties and among landed interests throughout this period, particularly in their increasing cooperation with neighbouring urban interests. Ann Whetstone's monograph on Scottish county government is the only modern piece of scholarship to explore changing forms of government and administration in the counties, and understanding of this sphere remains limited. This chapter has briefly surveyed notable developments in relation to proposing, drafting, and applying for county road legislation, but there remains scope for work to expand further our picture of how different elements within Scottish society engaged with the business of legislation, which, in turn, had the effect of drawing them deeper into a 'British' political system.

[142] See the various contributions in T.M. Devine (ed.), *Conflict and Stability in Scottish Society 1700-1850* (Edinburgh, 1990).

Chapter Five

The Interests of Scotland and Ireland

The previous chapters have sought to demonstrate that during the later Georgian period, Scottish interests, and important parts of Scottish society, became more fully and closely integrated within what was becoming a more genuinely 'British' legislature and political system; and that lobbying activities directed towards Westminster and state agencies in London were a crucial aspect of this transformation. This final chapter seeks to highlight distinctive elements of this developing relationship with the British political centre, but by comparison with another interest group – or series of groups – which can also be characterised as representing a 'national' interest: the Irish.

Ireland provides an instructive comparison for Scotland in its relationship with the 'reactive' British state. This is because the relationships between Irish interests and the British political centre offer ready points of similarity and difference with Scotland. Their respective linen industries are the most obvious example of this, but there were also parallels between the drive for improvement in both the Highlands and in Ireland with regard to the building of roads and bridges. Scottish and Irish lobbies had conceptions of themselves as serving distinct national interests, with all that this might entail. In 1750, for example, Sir James Lowther, MP for Cumberland, referred to Scottish and Irish interests in Westminster as being 'more national than the English'.[1] Their constitutional positions within the British Union-state were similar – or came to be so after 1801 – although the historical and political contexts of their respective acts of union were quite different and affected the distinct ways in which they integrated, or did not integrate, with what by the end of this period had become the United Kingdom of Great

[1] Quoted in Christopher Whatley, *Scottish Society, 1707-1830: Beyond Jacobitism, towards industrialisation* (Manchester, 2000), p. 118.

Britain and Ireland.[2] Scotland had been an independent Kingdom whose Parliament voted – in controversial circumstances – to become part of what was called an 'incorporating' Union in 1707. Ireland was a *dependent* kingdom with substantial legislative autonomy which in the middle of this period came to join this Union on a similar, although not identical, basis. Crucially, after 1801, both nations had direct representation in the Westminster Parliament, most obviously in the form of MPs representing 45 Scottish and 100 Irish constituencies who might be expected to defend or promote their respective national interests. English MPs were still numerically dominant, which might make a particular and focused defence of their interests more necessary. There was occasionally some overlap between the two interests and the way in which they both engaged with the Westminster Parliament and the British ministry. This could be in the way that the linen interest in the two countries forged temporary alliances, as for example occurred in the 1760s, as we saw in previous chapters. On the other hand, they might also compete as rival interests for economic protection or encouragement from the British state, which has been most visibly detailed in previous chapters with regard to the debate over Pitt's Irish Resolutions in 1785. This is, nevertheless, in the main an analysis of how minority national interests were constructed in the political sphere, especially in respect of lobbying Parliament, and how they sought to represent themselves within the Union-state.

This chapter is not a systematic comparative analysis of all Scottish and Irish political lobbying in Westminster and the British state during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It is primarily an examination of the Irish experience in the Westminster Parliament and the British Union-state over the period covered by this thesis with a constant and underlying ambition to draw contrasts with the Scottish story as it has been detailed in previous chapters. To a certain extent this is possible because Ireland has been covered much more

[2] For the historical context of the two unions, and how they related to one another, see in particular Alvin Jackson, *The Two Unions: Ireland, Scotland, and the survival of the United Kingdom, 1707-2007* (Oxford, 2012).

comprehensively than Scotland in the historical literature, although there are aspects of the Irish story that remain unclear, such as how Irish government and society operated in relation to the Westminster Parliament in the early nineteenth century.[3] A common criticism of comparative methods is when they are not based on a 'symmetric' analysis of primary sources. Some have argued that there is, in this context, a danger of reinforcing historical clichés, and that, therefore, there are strict limits to how useful a comparative analysis can be if there is a serious imbalance of evidence.[4] This chapter is avowedly, however, an exercise in synthesis and is, partly as a result, somewhat tentative and speculative. This chapter explores the organisation, representation, and leadership of an Irish interest at Westminster, as well as the tenacity and ambition with which it was associated, rather than primarily its efficacy, although this is not ignored. There are some obvious limits to the comparison to Scottish lobbies, not least because of their different experiences of, and standing within, the British Union-state, as well as their very different political trajectories. Before 1801, Ireland had its own Parliament in Dublin, and Irish interests often divided their focus between the Irish and Westminster parliaments, with an emphasis on lobbying the former for protections and encouragements.[5] Even after 1801, and once part of a new 'incorporating union' with Britain, as we will see below, much about their political and administrative relationships to Westminster served to perpetuate Irish distinctiveness within the United Kingdom. Whilst examining, therefore, Irish experiences at Westminster to shed further light on important aspects of the Scottish relationship to the British and United Kingdom Parliament, various important, analytical limits to this exercise must be acknowledged at the outset.

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[3] Although see R.B. McDowall, *Public opinion and government policy in Ireland, 1801-46* (London, 1952) and V. Crossman, *Local government in nineteenth century Ireland* (Belfast, 1994).
[4] Jeroen Duindam, 'Early Modern Europe: Beyond the Structures of Modernization and National Historiography', *European History Quarterly* 40 (2010), 606-623.
[5] Eoin Magennis, 'Coal, Corn and Canals: Parliament and the Dispersal of Public Moneys, 1695-1772', *Parliamentary History* 20 (2001), 71-86; idem., 'The Irish Parliament and the Regulatory Impulse, 1692-1800: The Case of the Coal Trade', *Parliamentary History* 33 (2014), 54-72.

This chapter begins with an examination of the changing relationship between Ireland and the British state during the 1780s, and how this affected the organisation of Irish interests compared to the developments in Scottish lobbying, before the Union of 1801. It will then turn to an examination of Scottish and Irish 'national' economic interests throughout this period, focusing particularly on the Scottish and Irish linen industries. It examines the theme of representation, by Irish MPs, as a comparison to the activity of Scottish MPs, although this will, by necessity, emphasise the post-1801 period when Ireland was granted direct representation in the House of Commons and Westminster became the focus of Irish political attention. Finally, it compares Irish and Scottish Westminster legislation, and the ways in which elements within Irish and Scottish society were drawn into closer involvement in political and legislative processes of the United Kingdom legislature in the early nineteenth century.

I

Developments in the 1780s

Irish experiences of and at Westminster, and of the British state, were necessarily different from those of Scots. Ireland was a separate, albeit subordinate Kingdom with, before 1801, its own Parliament in Dublin. Until 1782, this autonomous legislature had operated within certain restrictions, notably Poyning's Law, which conferred on the British Privy Council the power to amend or veto Irish legislation, and the Declaratory Act of 1720, which declared British parliamentary sovereignty over Ireland. In practice, however, the Irish Parliament achieved considerable legislative initiative. The War of American Independence created the opportunities, nevertheless, for Irish 'Patriots' to challenge Irish subordination within the British imperial system. The initial campaign was for 'free trade' – which meant equal access to trade within the British Empire. Due to the increasing strength of Irish political opinion on

this matter, and the more pressing matter of the American War, Lord North acceded to these demands in 1778-9 by eventually allowing Irish merchants to trade on equal terms with their British counterparts in global markets and allowing them to export to and import from British colonies.[6] Thereafter, a campaign for constitutional and political reform was instigated, although its success only came following the fall of the North ministry in early 1782. North and his ministers had been opposed to granting independence to the Dublin Parliament, and while Lord Rockingham's ministry was no more favourably disposed to the idea, at least without clarification of the nature of Ireland's new relationship to London, following a series of mishandled dealings with a determined Irish Patriot leadership, and under threat of further agitation, it felt compelled to yield unconditionally to Irish demands.[7]

The 1780s, therefore, was a decade of important change both with respect to Irish and Scottish relations with the Westminster Parliament and the British Union-state. For the Scots, as we have seen in earlier chapters, this period saw the emergence of a much clearer trend towards wider and fuller integration with the British Parliament and associated activities and political culture. This was particularly evident in the lobbying activities of new, diversifying mercantile and manufacturing interests which sought to unite on a regional as well as sectoral basis, and on occasion to act in concert with similar interests elsewhere in Britain. The 1780s were also a notable moment for Ireland and Irish commercial and manufacturing interests, and their relations with Westminster. Some of the reasons for this were similar to those in the Scottish case; but others were distinctive to Ireland. To begin with, moreover, the spur for change in Ireland was a specific reaction to the newly-enacted legislative independence.

Eighteenth-century Ireland, as with Scotland, had specific para-state institutions which were designed to encourage and protect national economic interests throughout the eighteenth

[6] James Kelly, *Prelude to Union: Anglo-Irish Politics in the 1780s* (Cork, 1992), pp. 21-31.
[7] *Ibid*., 32-42.

century. In Scotland, the Convention of Royal Burghs acted as an important and permanent forum and lobbying body for urban commercial and manufacturing interests throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It performed this function, however, with the Board of Trustees, which, as has been mentioned earlier in this thesis, had been established in 1727 and which distributed funds from various sources in an effort to promote economic development. In this sense, it was very similar in form and practice to the Irish Linen Board, which had been established in 1711 to improve and regulate linen manufacturing by implementing legislation designed to maintain standards in flax cultivation and linen production, as well as granting bounties, premiums and prizes.[8] It had helped to maintain linen as the national industry in Ireland, and had an agent stationed in London who represented Irish economic interests in Westminster and who had helped to negotiate the freeing of Irish trade with the North ministry in 1777-9.[9] The Linen Board had contributed directly to several important achievements in this 'free trade' settlement, notably the removal of prohibitive duties levied by Britain on Irish coloured, striped, checked and printed linens, as well the provision for allowing Irish shippers access to foreign and colonial markets on more liberal terms.[10] Nevertheless, in the early 1780s there were complaints that it was not functioning adequately and that places were being given on the Board to people who were either underserving of being a trustee or uninterested in actively promoting Irish interests. The American War significantly damaged the Irish linen industry, and output in 1780 was lower than at any time in the previous 15 years. Robert Stephenson, an Ireland-based Scottish linen manufacturer around this time complained to his friend, John Foster – another trustee and prominent Irish politician – that certain members of the Board did not share his 'cursed zeal of doing public service [which]

[8] R.B. McDowall, *Irish Administration, 1801-1914* (London, 1964), p. 195.
[9] See, for example, PRONI, D562/5560 (Foster Papers), Robert Knox (Linen Board agent in London) to Broghill Newburgh (secretary to the Linen Board), 2 May 1780.
[10] Conrad Gill, *The Rise of the Irish Linen Industry* (Oxford, 1925), pp. 201-3.

has put thousands of pounds out of my pocket.'[11] In 1781, he asserted the 'the Board are too great to attend to advice on this side of the water [Ireland], and too little to be noticed on the other [Great Britain]' and tried to persuade Foster to pay 'some little attention to this Board' in order to 'do greater service to the Kingdom than you at present have in contemplation'.[12] He also asserted that the efficiency and 'consistency' of the Irish Linen Board compared unfavourably with the Scottish Board of Trustees, sending Foster a copy of the latter's 'Scotch Acts and their Instructions to their Lappers by which their Trade is Guarded', and challenged the record of the Irish Linen Board 'to stand examination' in 'any one year' of the previous 20 to 40.[13] There was, therefore, a perceived feeling, at least among some Irish merchants and manufacturers, that the Irish Linen Board, compared to the Scottish Board, was inadequate in that it did not properly represent Irish linen interests and did not have a high enough standing in London to be effective anyway. Nevertheless, like the Scottish Board, it continued to operate throughout this period, until its abolition in 1828, although its primary function was not as a lobbying body for Irish interests.

This role was instead fulfilled by other institutions which developed in ways not dissimilar from their counterparts in Scotland. The establishment of various Irish chambers of commerce, more or less contemporaneously with those in Scotland and elsewhere in Britain, is instructive in this regard. In Dublin, for example, there had been dissatisfaction within the mercantile community with the 'utter inattention of corporate bodies [primarily the Dublin Corporation] to the interest of trade' and this had given rise to the formation of a 'Committee of Merchants' in 1761.[14] This was very active throughout the 1770s in lobbying the Lord Lieutenant and the Irish executive at Dublin Castle on a host of issues, and maintained communications with merchants in Cork and Belfast. The concessions by London of free trade

[11] PRONI, D562/5683, Robert Stephenson to John Foster, 24 April 1781.
[12] PRONI, D562/5682, Stephenson to Foster, 18 April 1781; D562/5693, Stephenson to Foster, 31 May 1781.
[13] PRONI, D562/5696, Stephenson to Foster, 27 July 1781.
[14] *The Case of the Merchants of Dublin* (Dublin, 1768).

and legislative independence, combined with political and economic challenges presented in the aftermath of the American War, prompted these merchants to enhance and adapt their lobbying capabilities. This intensification of mercantile activity was noticed in Dublin Castle with William Eden, Irish Chief Secretary, complaining in 1781 that he was sometimes 'spending 13 hours a day' listening to Irish lobbyists and their concerns.[15] In February 1783 a meeting of the Committee of Merchants deliberated upon a 'plan for instituting a Chamber of Commerce in this city'. This 'Plan', employing language similar to that used in putting forward a similar scheme by Patrick Colquhoun in Glasgow in the same year, revealed the similarities and differences between the establishment of the Dublin body and those in Britain:

> The present important situation of this country, its lately renewed constitution, its fond hopes of rising commerce and consequently increasing opulence, the variety of commercial regulations necessarily incident to this change of circumstance and particularly requisite from the late revolution in the political system: every consideration appearing to demand a general union among traders and a constant unwearied attention to their common interests; from a view whereof to promote these laudable objects in this particular district and to hold forth an example for imitation and cooperation to the rest of the kingdom.[16]

This directly echoed views, being expressed contemporaneously in Glasgow, of the need to 'give stability to trade and manufactures, in the present alarming and complicated state of national affairs' by 'men linked together in the same pursuits, and possessing a perfect knowledge of the various branches of trade'.[17] It points to common reasons behind the establishment of chambers of commerce in Ireland and in Britain. Dublin and Belfast, like

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[15] BL, Add. MS. 34418 (Auckland papers), fos. 144-5, William Eden to Alexander Wedderburn (Baron Loughborough), 20 October 1781.
[16] Quoted in L.M. Cullen, *Princes & Pirates: The Dublin Chamber of Commerce 1783-1983* (Dublin, 1983), p. 45.
[17] *Plan for the Chamber of Commerce and Manufactures in the City of Glasgow* (Glasgow, 1783), pp. 3-4.

Glasgow, were cities engaged in the Atlantic trade and were therefore cognisant of the commercial opportunities afforded by peace after the American War, as well as the accompanying dangers thrown up by new government-imposed regulations. As with the Scottish chambers, particularly Glasgow's, Dublin and its environs saw a rise of new commercial and manufacturing interests with a corresponding drive to unify these interests regionally in order that they would be able to act collectively on their shared concerns, as well as wield more political clout in Ireland and throughout the British Atlantic world. The Glasgow Chamber read approvingly of the plan to establish the Dublin Chamber in March 1783 and agreed to initiate a 'friendly communication with them for the benefit of trade in general'.[18] Nevertheless, the emergence of the Dublin body occurred in a very different political context, which included a newly independent Irish Parliament. The twin foci of the Dublin and Belfast chambers' lobbying activities were Dublin Castle and the Irish Parliament, and only rarely did they target ministers in London and the Westminster Parliament.

Different political circumstances were responsible, therefore, for the different consequences of the foundation of the chambers for the relationships between local and regional society and the Westminster Parliament. The Scottish chambers were very consciously 'British' institutions which sought to acquire 'insider' status with ministers and politicians in Westminster and Whitehall. As was discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, one of the initial ways in which this status was sought was through acquiring a Royal Charter in order to 'acquire a respectability and weight sufficient to insure the utmost attention in all public negotiations'.[19] Despite a brief and unusual period of opposition to ministers in the first stages of its existence, the leaders of the Glasgow Chamber recognised the benefits of being seen by government as a key vehicle of opinion and influence, and as a constructive partner.

[18] GCA, TD1670/1/1, (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce Minutes Vol. 1), fo. 18 (7 March 1783).
[19] *Plan for the Chamber of Commerce in the City of Glasgow*, 4.

While the Dublin and Belfast chambers were closely influenced by the Glasgow Chamber, and sought a similar respectability through seeking a Royal Charter, local political and social circumstances in Ireland, and Dublin particularly, acted in ways which prevented their becoming as influential or successful.[20] Perhaps unsurprisingly it was politics, or rather political division, which proved most disruptive. The tight-knit nature of the Glasgow mercantile elite and a tradition of cooperation, as well as competition, amongst its members, and the respect that it commanded locally, helped the Chamber acquire respectable status relatively easily. By contrast, many of Dublin's merchants and manufacturers were supporters of the Patriot faction in Dublin civic politics.[21] Although membership of the Dublin Chamber included prominent merchants such as Travers Hartley, who had been heavily involved as a member of the Corporation and was Dublin's MP as an 'independent', this was insufficient in the eyes of the majority of MPs in the Irish Parliament, who increasingly after 1782 viewed new local organisations as potential agents of the Patriot opposition interest in Dublin.[22] The Chamber initially attracted the interest and support of more conservative, and arguably politically important, merchants such as Jeremiah Vickers, Arthur Guinness, David Jebb (a great friend of John Foster), and Robert Brooke (an early prominent cotton manufacturer), and attempted to tackle important issues such as Irish access to Portuguese trade and what they saw as excessive custom house fees, recommending to the Cork Merchants Committee that chambers of commerce were 'earnestly recommended to the others ports of this kingdom'. It even established an office in London to deal with 'remote legislation' at Westminster.[23] On 22 November 1783, however, the Irish House of Commons refused to accept a petition from the Dublin Chamber, rejecting it on the basis that its name was not recognised in law, its

[20] Robert J. Bennett, *Local Business Voice: The History of Chambers of Commerce in Britain, Ireland, and revolutionary America, 1760-2011* (Oxford, 2011), p. 48.
[21] Jacqueline Hill, *From Patriots to Unionists: Dublin Civil Politics and Irish Protestant Patriotism, 1660-1840* (Oxford, 1997), ch. 6.
[22] *Ibid*., 171-3.
[23] Bennett, *Local Business Voice*, 298.

application for a Royal Charter having failed.[24] This, perhaps understandably, provoked feelings of distrust in the Chamber towards the Irish Parliament and growing support for opposition politics. By 1784, the turbulent and divided nature of Dublin politics provided a challenging context for the Chamber to be as successful as its counterpart in Glasgow. Divisions in the Chamber's council and its membership made it incapable of successfully influencing the Irish Parliament, and led its membership to decline sharply so that 'Patriot' members came to dominate its proceedings. This explains its address of thanks to the Patriot Whig opposition in the Irish Parliament – 'the members of the minority of the House of Commons' – for rejecting Pitt's Commercial Resolutions in 1785 after they had been passed and amended in Westminster. Such an action was completely at variance with Patrick Colquhoun's attitude, also expressed in 1785, that 'Nothing favourable is to be done…by public opposition'.[25] The Dublin Chamber's political positioning was not conducive to lobbying success, and it limped on, with ever declining membership, until its last recorded meeting in February 1791.[26]

This was indicative of wider differences in the experiences of lobbying for Scottish and Irish interests during the 1780s. Economic interests throughout the British Isles in this period were seeking to unite around often regional shared interests, so as to be able more effectively to represent these to political authorities and achieve greater influence. The success of the Glasgow and Edinburgh chambers in doing this throughout the 1780s, compared to the relative failure of the Irish chambers, reflects the greater extent to which the developing ties between Scottish society and the British political centre deepened and strengthened during this decade and thereafter. Irish chambers were unable to perform this role to the same extent, and this

[24] Cullen, *Princes & Pirates*, 43.
[25] GCA, TD1670/4/32 (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce papers), Colquhoun to Hamilton, 23 May 1785.
[26] Cullen, *Princes & Pirates*, 52.

would remain true after the Anglo-Irish Union, despite the revival of the chambers in Dublin and Belfast, and the establishment of several new ones, in Cork, Waterford, and Sligo.[27]

During the 1780s there were several instances where the concerns of Irish economic interests were communicated to Westminster and British ministers through more traditional means. In negotiations over Pitt's Irish Commercial Propositions in 1785, the Eden Treaty in 1786, and the Navigation Act of 1787, prominent Irish politicians intervened with British ministers to support important Irish interests. John Foster, for example, did so as Chancellor of the Irish Exchequer and as an expert in matters of trade and industry, his father having been a prominent linen merchant with connections to many other merchants which Foster maintained. In 1779 he had been encouraged by Lord Buckinghamshire, the then Lord Lieutenant, to 'stand forth…[as] the leading man in all matters of finance', and in 1784 was appointed as Irish Chancellor. This post had hitherto been a sinecure usually held for life by an absentee former Chief Secretary, but under Foster it was agreed that it should become 'a responsible office, which, in conformity to the practice in England, may for the future be considered here as entrusted to a person speaking the sentiments of Government in the House of Commons on these two subjects, finance and commerce'.[28] With this change, Foster was able at least to attempt to act as a conduit for communication between Irish economic interests and government. He did this during the early stages of negotiation over Pitt the Younger's Irish Commercial Propositions by engaging with British ministers, first in a memorandum of Irish economic concerns, and then directly and in person in London, along with John Beresford, the commissioner of the Irish revenue, and Thomas Orde, the Chief Secretary.[29] Foster attempted to dissuade Pitt from his idea of an annual Irish contribution towards imperial charges by emphasising his familiarity with the 'sentiments of people' and concluding that 'it

[27] Bennett, *Local Business Voice*, 298-9.
[28] Trevor Robert McCavery, 'Finance and Politics in Ireland, 1801-17', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (The Queen's University of Belfast, 1980), pp. 75-6.
[29] Kelly, *Prelude to Union*, 92-3.

would be extremely dangerous to try it [the contribution] now.'[30] He similarly advised caution to Henry Grattan and the other Irish 'Patriots' when they made their 11 amendments in the Irish Parliament, although he acknowledged that there was no hope of the Propositions passing the Irish Parliament without them. But his attempts ultimately foundered when the Westminster Parliament returned what were now the Commercial 'Resolutions' which it had made unpalatable to Irish interests and politicians. He was more successful in the negotiations over the Eden Treaty, partly because his political status was by that stage enhanced in Ireland and Britain: in 1786 he was appointed Speaker of the Irish House of Commons, a British privy councillor and, significantly, a member of the British Board of Trade.[31] He remained in close contact with Eden while the latter was negotiating with the French government and forwarded to him the concerns of Irish linen merchants and manufacturers. At the final stages of the negotiation he persuaded Eden and Pitt to convince French ministers to accept his amendment protecting Irish linen at home against French competition and against penalising duties in the French market. Once the Treaty had been completed, he argued in favour of it in Ireland and even the Belfast Chamber of Commerce were persuaded to withdraw their opposition.[32] There was therefore a shift in the way that British ministers viewed Irish political elites, particularly John Foster, when it came to Irish issues. As we have already seen, Pitt was learning rapidly and after 1785 became increasingly disposed to consult and listen to representatives of economic and commercial interests. This applied equally to Irish interests, although here the issues were different and specific to Ireland's distinctive political circumstances. Before Eden had even commenced the negotiations with the French, the duke of Rutland, then Lord

[30] PRONI, T341/1/2 (Stanhope papers, photocopy), John Foster to William Pitt, 23 January 1785. Quoted in A.P.W. Malcomson, *John Foster (1740-1828): the politics of improvement and prosperity* (Dublin, 2011), pp. 73-4.
[31] *Ibid*., 92-3.
[32] BL, Add. MS. 34422, fos. 458-64, John Foster to Eden, 13 October 1786; Add. MS. 34424, fos. 286-8 and f. 310, same to same, 7 April 1787, and George Rose to Eden, 10 April 1787; Add. MS. 34424, fos. 367-8, Rose to Eden, 1 May 1787.

Lieutenant of Ireland, commended Pitt for choosing 'three of the fittest men [i.e. John Foster, Sir John Parnell, and John Beresford]…to consult with on the interests of Ireland in the adjustment of this treaty.'[33] By the time the ministry came to consider updating the Navigation Acts in 1786, Irish political leaders were more confident in advising the British ministry on Irish matters and they persuaded Lord Hawkesbury to avoid binding Ireland to the British Navigation Act of 1786. Although Hawkesbury attempted to draft a specifically Irish Navigation Act in 1787, he allowed Foster and other Irish politicians to redraft it so that it was not tied to future British legislation and might pass smoothly through the Irish Parliament. He recognised subsequently that their suggested amendments had been 'judicious and well calculated to remove objections on your side of the water'.[34]

Being represented in this manner was how, in the main, Irish interests had their concerns communicated to British ministers and gained influence in British ministerial deliberations, a pattern which contrasted in some important ways with Scottish interests. The 1780s saw Irish politicians gaining confidence when it came to asserting their expertise on local matters, and this habit cast a lengthy shadow over the early decades of the nineteenth century, as demonstrated below. British ministers had granted autonomy to the Irish Parliament reluctantly, and feared growing political separation between Ireland and Britain. The failure in 1785 to remove constitutional and commercial ambiguities in the Anglo-Irish relationship, created by Grattan's revolution in 1782, acted as a spur to British ministers to attend more closely to the views of Irish politicians. This, in turn, gave men such as John Foster potentially more influence, and certainly opportunity, to voice the concerns of Irish interests, particularly the linen industry, in London. His exertions in the 1780s as Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer, and then as Speaker of the Irish House of Commons, helped

[33] HMC, *The manuscripts of His Grace, the Duke of Rutland, G.C.B. preserved at Belvoir Castle* (4 vols, London, 1888-1905), Vol. III, pp. 338-339.
[34] Malcomson, *John Foster*, 95-97; Kelly, *Prelude to Union*, 222-231.

reshape the relationship between the Irish and British governments and to transform Irish political offices, such as Chancellor of the Exchequer, into positions with significant political influence. By 1796 Lord Camden, as Lord Lieutenant, informed Pitt of the growing importance of the Irish Chancellorship, an office now held by Sir John Parnell: 'I am instructed, and I ought so to be, by him upon financial subjects'.[35] This pattern continued after the Union in 1801 and into the early nineteenth century, particularly when Foster returned to the top of Irish government as Chancellor and First Lord of the Irish Treasury in 1804-6 and again in 1807-11. Combined, however, with the relative failure of institutions such as the Dublin Chamber of Commerce, this may have been another factor militating against interest groups in Ireland becoming more directly involved in politics and discussions at Westminster and in Whitehall. Irish economic interests depended heavily on a handful of Irish politicians to communicate their concerns to the British political centre. In this way, there is at least a partial resemblance between Irish politics in the 1780s and the politics of management and semi-autonomy which prevailed in Scotland in the early Hanoverian period.

II

National economic interests at Westminster and the British Union-State

An Irish 'national' interest in Westminster and Whitehall is perhaps most easily observed, as with Scotland, in relation to economic and commercial issues. This is particularly helpful in a comparison with Scotland as their economic interests, certainly in the later eighteenth century, often overlapped. This was specifically the case with the linen industry, which was the staple industry for both Scotland and Ireland throughout most of this period. Linen was vital to both the Scottish and Irish economies, such that they were occasionally allies in Westminster and Whitehall in the promotion and protection of that industry. Yet increasingly during this period,

[35] TNA, PRO 30/8/326 (Chatham papers), Lord Camden to William Pitt, 8 December 1796.

Scottish and Irish economic interests found themselves at odds, be it in respect of textiles or distilling of spirits, partly because, as Scottish interests became part of more identifiably 'British', Irish interests, governed as they were by different economic and financial regulations even several decades into the British-Irish Union, remained clearly demarcated as a distinctive national interest.

In the late eighteenth century, both Scottish and Irish lobbyists were concerned to defend their respective linen industries. To a certain extent this was an issue around which representatives of these industries from both countries could find common ground. That commonality was personified in Robert Stephenson, a Scottish linen merchant who resided, and whose business was based, in Ireland. Unsurprisingly, given this Scottish-Irish pedigree, he was particularly keen to develop links between their industries and, at a political level, their lobbies. In 1780, for example, he reported to his friend, John Foster, about meetings he had been holding on a trip to London: 'I yesterday dined by appointment with a number of the Scotch Merchants on the mutual interest of our two Countries, and I find they see the Irish as absolutely necessary to assist them in obtaining anything in the British Parliament.'[36] Statements from some Scottish representatives at around this time further reveal the will that existed for cooperation between the two interests. A year later, George Dempster consulted John Foster and enquired about the Irish linen bounty when proposing to extend the British bounty to printed linen in 1781, so that it would be 'equally usefull to that Kingdom [Ireland] and this'.[37] Dempster was adamant that similar encouragements for Irish and Scottish linen would 'be of the utmost importance to the Linen Manufacture of both Kingdoms', and hoped that any 'unhappy Jealousies' between the two would end given that their 'Interests are in fact the same.'[38]

[36] PRONI, D562/5675, Robert Stephenson in London to John Foster, 13 May 1780.
[37] PRONI, D562/5562, George Dempster to Lord Sheffield, 19 June 1781.
[38] PRONI, D562/5563, Dempster to John Foster, 31 December 1781.

Nevertheless, this kind of rhetoric could not mask the fact that the Scottish and Irish linen industries were rivals. The failure of Scottish linen lobbyists to obtain a bounty in 1780, combined with the failure on the part of Irish lobbyists to help them in their application, led them to attack their counterparts in Ireland when applying for a bounty on printed linens the next year as a new tactic. When Scottish lobbyists proposed a bounty on British printed linens in 1781, Stephenson reported to Foster that 'Mr. Dempster has made a motion in favour of the Linen Manufacture of Great Britain in the House of Commons in very hostile terms.'[39] Indeed, the Scottish lobby's achievement in extending the coarse linen bounty to all printed goods in 1781 was partly a reaction to the perceived advantages that the printing and bleaching branches of the Irish textile industry had over their British competitors.[40] Linen manufacturers from Perth, Dundee, and Aberdeen, as well as the fine linen and cotton manufacturers in Glasgow, complained that Irish bleached goods did not have to pay any excise or customs duties, and persuaded the Convention of Royal Burghs, the Board of Trustees, and the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce to apply to Parliament for 'legal encouragements'.[41] Stephenson was disappointed in the failure of Irish lobbyists to aid the Scottish application a year earlier and complained that he had warned Foster and other trustees of the Linen Board that, in response, Scottish lobbyists 'would likely turn their fire on poor Ireland'. He lamented that '[t]his might have been avoided and something extremely advantageous obtained this Session for the Linen Manufactures of both Countries'.[42] But the following years would prove these well-intentioned sentiments to be hopelessly unrealistic as British and Irish interests repeatedly came into conflict. It suited Scottish lobbyists very well to emphasise the threat that rival Irish textile industries posed to them, since this enabled them to call successfully for the 1783 drawback on all soap and starch consumed in preparing flax and raw cotton for manufacture, as well as on

[39] PRONI, D562/5682, Stephenson to Foster, 18 April 1781.
[40] ECA, SL30/1/1/14 (Convention of Royal Burghs Minute Book, 1776-1790), 11 July 1781.
[41] *Ibid*., 10 July 1782.
[42] PRONI, D562/5682, Stephenson to Foster, 18 April 1781; D562/5684, same to same, 28 April 1781.

the brimstone and saltpetre used in making oil of vitriol. Even when Scottish lobbyists applied for the renewal of this act ten years later their primary argument was that it was essential because 'our Manufactures are not on an equal footing with Ireland', as one Perthshire bleacher claimed, due to the Irish paying no duty on starch or soap.[43] We have already seen how Pitt's 1785 Commercial Resolutions pitted Scottish and Irish textile interests against one another, and indeed pushed Scottish and English linen and cotton representatives into an alliance. Representatives of Glasgow manufacturers, including Ilay Campbell and Patrick Colquhoun, wrote to Pitt dismayed that they would be disadvantaged compared to their counterparts in Ireland. George Dempster, who voted in favour of Pitt's Commercial Resolutions in the Westminster House of Commons, was nevertheless exasperated by Irish attitudes during this affair and complained: 'What provokes me is the Irish supposing I wish to take the trouble of making laws for them when we have trouble enough making them for ourselves.'[44] Implicit in this view was that Scottish interests should be prioritised in Westminster because they were 'British', whereas Irish interests had their own legislature to provide generous encouragements. This marked a complete reversal of his conciliatory language to Foster in 1781 and showed that while both lobbies were similar in strongly representing their national industries, they often did so against one another, and increasingly so during the 1780s and thereafter.

From 1785 onwards they began to diverge in the way they presented their respective 'national' interests. While Scottish lobbyists, such as Colquhoun and other Glasgow representatives were much more receptive to dealing with British ministers and compromising in order to benefit their commercial and industrial interests, Irish interests remained continually stubborn and resistant to making concessions. In 1785, Glasgow gave Lancastrian opponents to Pitt's Commercial Resolutions short shrift because of their alliance with the Foxite Whigs

[43] GCA, TD1670/4/76, William Turnbull (from Luncarty bleachfield) to Duguld Bannatyne, 12 February 1794.
[44] *Dempster-Fergusson Letters*, 141 (George Dempster to Sir Adam Fergusson, 29 July 1785).

as well as their unwillingness to negotiate. By the end of May, Colquhoun had contributed to an agreement with Pitt on fixed 'moderate duties' to protect both Scottish and Irish linen industries with any change to be agreed at a future date by both parliaments. [45] In Ireland, however, there was no appetite for compromise, with the Belfast Chamber of Commerce calling the Resolutions 'a complex and unintelligible system, a farrago of politics and commerce' and calling on the Irish Parliament 'to protect their manufacturers' with duties sufficient to 'prevent the manufactures of Ireland being undersold in their own markets'. The main Irish opposition to the Resolutions centred on the politics of the Irish Parliament, and the perceived threat to legislative independence, with Grattan promising to 'oppose them with the strength and with the last breath of his lungs'.[46] There was thus a marked contrast in the willingness of Scottish and Irish economic interests to cooperate with the British government.

This contrast was present, although more subtle, during negotiations for the Eden Treaty in 1786-7. Before the negotiations, Charles Jenkinson warned Eden that he had to take particular care over any deal involving linen in order to avoid 'a very violent opposition, from the Linnen manufacturers of Scotland & Ireland – you know how great their influence is in the House of Commons, and by not pleasing them, we may happen not to succeed.'[47] Eden did not anticipate much cooperation from Scottish linen interests, saying, 'I never had much notion of good from Scottish Exertions.'[48] Yet only four months later, having dealt and negotiated principally with representatives of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, he stated his belief that 'the Scotch people' would not 'in general object…to the admission of Cambricks on a reasonable duty' and, later, that '[t]he Glasgow People are growing more reasonable'.[49] Fine linen manufacturers from Glasgow and the surrounding area had benefited from a prohibition

[45] GCA, TD1670/4/30, Colquhoun to Hamilton, 23 May 1785; Alexander Brown to Hamilton, 28 May 1785.
[46] Kelly, *Prelude to Union*, 161.
[47] BL, Add. MS. 34422, fo. 177, Charles Jenkinson to Eden, 3 September 1785.
[48] BL, Add. MS. 45728, fo. 62, Eden to Sheffield, 22 October 1785.
[49] *Ibid*., fos. 85-87, Eden to Sheffield, 3 February 1786 and same to same, n.d. (February-March 1786).

on the import of French cambrics and lawns since 1745, so this was therefore a very significant concession on their part.[50] Throughout their correspondence with Eden and British ministers during the course of negotiations, there was never any doubt that they considered a more liberal trade with France to be beneficial, as long as their industries – linen in particular – would not as a result be worse off. Archibald Henderson, the then chair of the Glasgow Chamber, told Eden that 'every class of the king's subjects would be promoted by commercial treaties'.[51] By contrast, in Ireland John Beresford predicted that 'this Country will not hear of any thing like opening to Linnen Cambricks' from France. Sheffield, writing to Eden on the subject of a more liberal trade with France, observed: 'it is not natural for Ireland to be reasonable on that subject'.[52] There was a fear both on the part of merchants and politicians of the potential damage to the Irish linen industry in the event of a liberalisation of trade with France. Nevertheless, because negotiations in Paris were very successful, giving Ireland the ability to opt out of the duty on linens agreed by Britain and France, Irish political and mercantile opinion grew more receptive to the idea of exporting linen to a more open French market.[53] John Foster told Eden that linen merchants from the north of Ireland had visited him in Dublin '& every man almost who spoke to me expressed a sanguine hope for a new Market for their Linens in France, if the Duty be kept low there.'[54]

Even so, given the febrile nature of Irish politics, the Treaty was particularly susceptible to the kind of opposition to which Pitt's Commercial Resolutions had been subjected. In fact, it all nearly collapsed when, through poor communication on the part of British ministers, the Irish Parliament approved the Treaty before there was any official confirmation that the French

[50] Bob Harris, Toward a British Political Economy: An Eighteenth-Century Scottish Perspective' in Perry Gauci (ed.), *Regulating the British Economy, 1660-1850* (Farnham, 2011), p. 94.
[51] BL, Add. MS. 34420, fos. 450-451, Archibald Henderson to William Eden [n.d. but 1786].
[52] *Ibid*., fo. 299, Sheffield to Eden, 28 December 1785.
[53] James Kelly, 'The Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786: The Irish Dimension', *Eighteenth-Century Ireland* 4 (1989), 100.
[54] BL, Add. MS. 34422, fo. 460, Foster to Eden, 13 October 1786.

had agreed to Foster's proposal of the duty on Irish linen imported into France being at or below the 'hereditary' – or perpetual – duty currently on Dutch linen imports. When French negotiators pressed for an *ad valorum* duty of 12 to 15 per cent, Foster warned Eden quite candidly: 'Allow me to say without reserve, that such a change is impracticable – the Kingdom is satisfied with the treaty…. & to turn back upon it… will justly alarm & give suspicion'.[55] This was clearly indicative of the limits to which Irish politicians and interests were willing or able to cooperate, in this case because of the understandable Irish concern for their ability to withstand Dutch and German competition in the French market. Fortunately, Eden managed to persuade French negotiators of the strength of the Irish position, and there was clearly relief among British ministers that the matter had been settled. George Rose congratulated Eden in May on 'the success of your Endeavours respecting the Linnen Business' and hinted at the level of embarrassment among ministers for their mistakes by commenting that 'the People of Ireland for once at least were not to blame'.[56] Nevertheless, this situation had been caused by British ministers recognising the need, in the light of the failed Commercial Resolutions in 1785, to placate Irish interests and politicians and to treat them with sensitivity. This is perhaps indicative of the lack of scope afforded to Irish interests and politicians for being constructive and cooperative given the relatively poor state of the Irish economy and its heavy reliance on the Irish linen industry. Nevertheless, it provides a notable contrast to representatives of the Scottish linen industry who, though robust in defending their interests, were, partly because of the strength of the Scottish economy and linen industry, much more cooperative in their dealings with British ministers and enthusiastic about gaining access to a large foreign market.

A key reason for this contrast, aside from the differing economic conditions of Ireland and Scotland, was that Scottish economic interests were increasingly identifying, and being

[55] BL, Add. MS. 34424, fo. 286, Foster to Eden, 7 April 1787.
[56] *Ibid*., fo. 367, George Rose to Eden, 1 May 1787.

treated by British ministers, as part of a broader British interest, whereas Irish interests were considered to be separate. Earlier in the eighteenth century, Scottish linen interests had sought, and had often been granted, mercantilist protection on the basis of their importance to Scottish prosperity, and had been considered completely separate from industries such as wool which were primarily English. Both Scottish linen interests and British ministers had been conscious of the extent to which the economic success of the linen industry, and therefore social stability in Scotland, depended on state support.[57] The attitude of Scottish lobbyists during their consultations with Eden before trade negotiations with the French began, however, shows their growing confidence about their industry in feeling 'little to dread' by the Treaty, given that 'when on general grounds we exchange the Consumption of about 8 million for the Consumption of 24 millions opened to us by France'. '[T]he ballance', it was therefore predicted, 'is decidedly in favour of Britain'.[58] These Scottish lobbyists viewed trade negotiations with France in 1787-6 positively, partly because they believed they would benefit from them, but they also appear to have been increasingly identifying themselves and their fortunes within a broader British context, as opposed to simply or mainly a national Scottish one.

A similar identification of interests was, however, unable to take place in Ireland because of protectionist impulses on both sides of the Irish Sea. There remained some unease amongst Irish linen interests during treaty negotiations, as James Corry related to John Foster, who 'all lament[ed] that the Staple Trade of Ireland should be sacrificed to promote the Woollens and Hardwares of England' and stipulated '[t]hat our Linens shall pay no more on Import into France than the Linens of other Nations pay there'.[59] Irish interests saw themselves as differently positioned and separate from British interests, despite the fact that certain Irish

[57] Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 105-9.
[58] BL, Add. MS. 38221, fo. 257, Patrick Colquhoun to Ilay Campbell, 3 March 1787.
[59] PRONI, D562/85551, James Corry to Foster, 14 October 1786.

politicians sought to emphasise commonality between Ireland and Britain. John Foster, for example, during the discussions over changes to the British corn laws in 1790, protested: 'I hate the mistaken policy of deeming the two countries as rivals.'[60] Edward Cooke, the former private secretary to the Irish Chief Secretary, and later an MP in the Irish Parliament, advised Eden in 1786 to see 'Community in Interests between the Sister Kingdoms and if their Interests be in any point different, not to consider them as different but as the same'.[61] Yet this attitude was not representative of broader opinion in Ireland, as well as unrealistic in the context of British – including Scottish – knee-jerk opposition to any perceived advantages being given to their Irish rivals. Additionally, it could not survive in the politically charged era of 'Grattan's Parliament' in Ireland in which Irish Patriots saw any attempt to reconcile British and Irish interests as a threat to Irish legislative independence.

These differences continued as Scottish textile interests became more focused on representing the concerns of the cotton industry. As we have seen in the second chapter of this thesis, as cotton became a more important industry throughout Scotland, Scottish lobbyists joined those from England, particularly Lancashire, as part of a broader industrial lobby. The cotton lobby from north of the border therefore had a Scottish dimension, but from the very beginning it was essentially part of a broader sectoral lobby, being more integrated with other British cotton interests than the linen interest had ever been. By contrast, Irish manufacturers continued to fear British textile industries as rivals; indeed, if anything, their fear had grown more acute. From 1792 the Irish Parliament effectively excluded British muslins and printed calicoes through the imposition of new import tariffs, and in 1800, during the negotiations over the Irish Act of Union, Irish manufacturers believed that, in the event of free trade between the kingdoms, British cotton imports would be able to undersell them in the Irish market by up to

[60] A.P.W. Malcomson (ed.), *An Anglo-Irish Dialogue: A Calendar of the Correspondence between John Foster and Lord Sheffield, 1774-1821* (Belfast, 1976), pp. 6 and 9.
[61] BL, Add. MS. 34420, fos. 344, Edward Cooke to Eden, 24 January 1786.

50 per cent. We have already seen that British ministers were prepared to accommodate Irish cotton manufacturers' demands to maintain this protecting duty on British calicoes and muslins on the condition that it was reduced gradually over time.[62] We have also noted the surprising silence on the part of British cotton manufacturers in reaction to this point. Yorkshire woollen interests were, however, very far from silent about the threat posed by their Irish rivals and argued that Irish protective duties should be completely abolished as part of the Union settlement.[63] They had been galvanised by John Foster, who, as an ardent opponent of proposals for the Anglo-Irish Union, had warned them of the danger which the commercial clauses of the Act of Union posed to their industry.[64] There was, therefore, a significant element of political opportunism in this, with Foster using and provoking tensions between British and Irish interests in order to prevent a Union and protect his vision of an autonomous conservative and Protestant Ireland. His seemingly contradictory attitudes at this time frustrated Thomas Pelham, the Chief Secretary, who in 1798 complained that:

> He [Foster] says that the country will be very unwilling to give up an independent legislature which they have so recently acquired, and under which together with their free trade, they have so much flourished. At the same time, he says that anything which can unite and cement the affections and interests of the two countries is a desirable object, and sure of his support. He states the linen trade to be hostile to the measure, and uses arguments which I suspect he has framed for them…'[65]

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[62] Charles William Vane (ed), *Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh, second Marquess of Londonderry* (4 vols, London, 1848-52), Vol. II, pp. 204-5, 248 and 250-1 ('Memorandum on Irish Cotton Manufactures' and duke of Portland to Lord Cornwallis, 6 March 1800 and Pitt to Castlereagh, 7 March 1800). See also G.C Bolton, 'Some British Reactions to the Irish Act of Union', *Economic History Review* 18 (1965), 369-70.
[63] *Ibid*., 371.
[64] Malcomson, *The Politics of Improvement and Prosperity*, 147.
[65] Malcomson (ed.), *An Anglo-Irish Dialogue*, 73.

Any notion of unity was undermined, therefore, by significant Irish resistance to an incorporating economic and political Union and the tenacious demarcation of national interests. While prohibitive duties on British muslins and calicoes were, following the Union, left at their existing levels until 1808, and were gradually lowered until a full customs union was eventually established in 1823, the Irish cotton industry had never been in as thriving condition as its British counterpart.[66] Foster commented in 1790 that 'linen is increasing fast, but the cotton is at a stand, if not declining.'[67] Throughout the early nineteenth century, it experienced almost continuous decline; only a small number of cotton mills were established outside Belfast, and most of these were adapted quite quickly for use in linen manufacturing. In 1810, Foster informed Spencer Perceval that '[o]ur cotton weavers are still out of employ. Numbers are going every week from Drogheda to Liverpool, and the accounts they send back encourage others.'[68] Economic crises in 1819-20 and 1825-6 intensified this decline and reinforced a renewed focus on linen as the national Irish industry.[69] Even after the Union, Scottish cotton lobbyists continued to present these Irish textile interests as rivals and used the prospect of Irish competition as a political weapon, as we have already seen earlier in this thesis.[70] There was, therefore, very little prospect of Irish interests joining a broad sectoral lobby with British interests, such as that experienced by Scottish cotton interests, despite Scotland and Ireland now occupying similar constitutional positions within the United Kingdom.

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[66] David Dickson, 'Aspects of the Rise and Decline of the Irish cotton industry' in L. M. Cullen and T.C Smout (eds), *Comparative Aspects of Scottish and Irish Economic and Social History 1600-1900* (Edinburgh, 1977), 107.
[67] Malcomson (ed.), *An Anglo-Irish Dialogue*, 9.
[68] C.R. Fay (ed.), *Huskisson and Irish Affairs: Based on the Foster Papers in the Public Record Office, Belfast* (Belfast, 1955), p. 36.
[69] L.M. Cullen, *An Economic History of Ireland since 1660* (London, 1972), 105-109.
[70] Scottish cotton manufacturers continued to seek the same benefits as Irish manufacturers and bleachers when in 1810, and again in 1814, they requested a new drawback on the salt used to create oxymuriate of lime used in bleaching: GCA, TD1670/1/3, (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce Minutes, Vol. III), fos. 135-6. They sent a memorial to the Treasury in February 1810 saying that this new drawback was needed especially considering that on brimstone had been removed in 1803, and the duty on brimstone used by Irish bleachers was negligible. For the 1814 petition to the Treasury, see fos. 325-327.

Continuing administrative and political differences between Ireland and Britain fostered, nevertheless, maintenance of a visibly separate Irish national interest. Although full incorporation of Ireland into the Union-state had appeared to be promised by Pitt in 1799-1800, Ireland retained a separate executive and administration in Dublin which nurtured the continuing sense of Ireland as separate and distinct from the rest of the United Kingdom.[71] The offices of Lord Lieutenant and Chief Secretary were retained, there was a separate Irish revenue department and Treasury until 1816, and there were separate customs and excise departments until 1823, and stamp departments until 1827.[72] It was only by the 1830s that all Irish revenue was collected by United Kingdom departments.[73] Meanwhile, attempts to bring Irish and British taxation rates further into line stoked opposition from Irish industrial interests. For example, Isaac Corry as Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer attempted to include Irish linen exports in an additional war levy of one per cent on all exports, but this was then attacked by Foster in Westminster during the 1803-4 parliamentary session with the support of Irish manufacturing interests, and the duty was successfully repealed.[74] Foster was still concerned that competition from the Scottish linen industry was causing a 'great decay in our linen market' and was worried specifically about 'the quantity of flax going to Scotland, which is a new and alarming trade.'[75] There was outrage among northern Irish linen manufacturers when in 1814 William Vesey-Fitzgerald as Irish Chancellor tried to place duties on imported raw materials used in bleaching linen, such as ashes, barilla and flaxseed, or, as Fitzgerald himself observed, 'articles which had never yet been subject to taxation' in an Irish context. There was also controversy at this time over transit duties paid on foreign linens on their re-export, such

[71] K. Theodore Hoppen, *Governing Hibernia: British politicians and Ireland, 1800-1921* (Oxford, 2016), pp. 37-39.
[72] *Ibid*., 39; Peter Jupp, 'Government, parliament and politics in Ireland, 1801-41' in Julian Hoppit (ed.), *Parliaments, nations and identities in Britain and Ireland, 1660-1850* (Manchester, 2003), pp. 146-68.
[73] McDowall, *Irish Administration 1801-1914*, 92.
[74] McCavery, 'Finance and Politics', 233.
[75] Malcomson, *An Anglo-Irish Dialogue*, 38.

that Vesey-Fitzgerald found it impossible to be seen publicly to oppose the demands for the protection of the Irish linen industry because of the reaction it might provoke, especially in the north of Ireland. But in private he was uncomfortable continuing with mercantilist policies which hindered the financial and economic amalgamation between Ireland and Great Britain, which was rapidly becoming the accepted policy position of Irish ministers.[76] Vesey-Fitzgerald oversaw an almost 25 per cent increase in customs duties in 1813, in 1814 all customs duties were equalised, and in 1815 assessed taxes and imported hops, malt, and tobacco duties were all raised to British rates.[77] Yet the Irish reaction to growing fiscal integration demonstrated that acceptance of a unity of interest remained strictly limited.

A clear illustration of this in the post-Union period is seen in the issue of distillery prohibitions during this period. Fear of food scarcity throughout the United Kingdom during the Napoleonic Wars prompted the British government to enact a prohibition on distillation from corn several times in the period from 1800 to 1813. In particular, in 1808 the ministry headed by Spencer Perceval decided, partly as a sop to the West India interest, that distilleries throughout the United Kingdom, including Ireland, should distil only from sugar. Irish distillers, farmers, and politicians were extremely concerned about the loss of business and of revenue to the Irish Exchequer. Foster worked hard in 1808 to get the prohibition in Ireland lifted as early as possible, but Perceval refused due to his concern for the need to ensure Britain had enough food supplies from Ireland, even if this came at the expense of the profitability of Irish agriculture.[78] Perceval made it very clear where the British government's priorities lay when he conceded: 'you perhaps have a better estimate of the Irish feeling, but it is by the English one that our conduct will be judged.'[79] While Foster convinced Perceval of the case for exempting Ireland from the prohibition in 1809, the ministry still faced opposition from

[76] McCavery, 'Finance and Politics', 233-235.
[77] *Ibid*., 232.
[78] Fay (ed.), *Huskisson and Irish Affairs*, 36.
[79] PRONI, D562/1247, Spencer Perceval to Foster, 9 April 1808.

powerful interests, such as the West India lobby. Foster eventually, nevertheless, secured Ireland's exemption from the prohibition in March 1810. After another prohibition in 1812, Fitzgerald had similar trouble acting on behalf of the Irish 'agriculture-distiller' interest, encountering opposition from fellow British distillers who agreed that the prohibition should be lifted, but not in Ireland alone. Nonetheless, early Irish exemption was granted in September 1813. Yet it was very clear, from all these episodes, that not only was an Irish economic interest still separate from, and often competing with, a broader British interest, it was also quite low in ministers' priorities.

Throughout this period an Irish national economic interest was readily visible at Westminster in a way that a similar Scottish interest was not in the early decades of the nineteenth century. They may have been broadly similar in construction and in the ways they operated in the later eighteenth century; but the strengthening integration of English and Scottish economic interests, seen most notably in the cotton industry, was not mirrored in respect of Irish interests after 1801. This was due to a combination of factors, including political identities and entrenched ways of soliciting support from politicians and expectations of government support. Irish interests in the early part of our period had become used to lobbying the Irish Parliament, which during the eighteenth century was more generous in its mercantilist protections and encouragements, such as the dispersal of parliamentary grants, bounties, and appropriated duties, than Westminster.[80] Conrad Gill referred to this as 'Parliamentary Colbertism' which was as strong in Ireland as in any other European country.[81] They were faced with competition from rival British interests who often complained that these Irish legislative encouragements and lower labour costs gave Irish interests a competitive advantage. In the post-Union period, Ireland still enjoyed a semi-autonomous status which

[80] Magennis, 'Coal, Corn and Canals', 71-86.
[81] Gill, *Rise of the Irish Linen Industry*, 197.

continued to encourage the maintenance of a separate and distinct Irish economic interest. In this sense, its position in the early nineteenth century makes for a suitable comparison with Scotland's in the half-century after 1707, although the Anglo-Scottish Union had produced deeper fiscal integration, albeit with some delays.[82] As well as a separate Irish Treasury, and customs and excise departments, there were various state-funded boards and commissions established to promote prosperity in the Irish economy, just as the Board of Trustees and other bodies had been established for similar purposes in Scotland. The Irish Linen Board was not abolished until 1828 and remained an important body dealing with a large quantity of detailed business involving the regulation and encouragement of the Irish linen industry. In addition, there were directors of inland navigation promoting canals, roads, bridges, and a fishery board which existed from 1819 to 1830 and was responsible for lobbying the Westminster Parliament for bounties on Irish fisheries. There were also several commissions appointed in the post-1815 period to distribute government money to distressed merchants and manufacturers as well as local infrastructure projects which were later subsumed by the United Kingdom Treasury, but only in 1831.[83] It is therefore not so surprising that Ireland remained something of a special case in the initial decades after 1801. As Theodore Hoppen has asserted recently, far from achieving the assimilation of Ireland into the British Union-state, the Anglo-Irish Union had in many ways made Ireland more separate and distinct.[84]

III

Scottish and Irish representatives

Despite there being a clearly defined national interest throughout this period, it is also clear that in the years that followed the Anglo-Irish Union, Irish MPs were, both individually and

[82] Whatley, *Scots and the Union*, ch. 9.
[83] McDowall, *Irish Administration*, 195-204.
[84] Hoppen, *Governing Hibernia*, 57-60.

collectively, relatively ineffective at Westminster and in influencing British ministers. Irish MPs in the immediate post-Union period have gained a reputation similar to that acquired by Scottish MPs in the eighteenth century: that they were ministerial fodder and uninterested in lobbying for, or vigorously representing, Irish interests. Peter Jupp, who has conducted more work on Irish parliamentary representation in the immediate post-Union period than anyone else, has calculated that between 1801 and 1820, the majority of Irish MPs consistently voted with the government of the day.[85] We saw in the third chapter of this thesis that the negative portrayal of Scottish MPs in the eighteenth century, while containing elements of truth, does not do justice to some of the work accomplished by several Scottish MPs in representing Scottish interests, nor the gradual assimilation of Scottish parliamentary representatives into broader party political allegiances. The experience of Irish MPs in Westminster was, however, very different. Before 1801 there were no MPs sitting for Irish constituencies; although there were a good number of MPs who had Irish business or family connections, or who owned land in Ireland. There had long been an 'Irish lobby' at Westminster comprising Anglo-Irish Protestant families which, immediately after 1707, had been more adept at representing a national interest than the Scottish MPs who were newly arrived at the British Parliament.[86] Yet when Ireland acquired direct representation in the Westminster House of Commons from 1801, their MPs appear to have lacked the same effectiveness, or even appetite, for representing Irish interests.

To a certain extent there was a period of uncomfortable adjustment for Irish MPs, just as there had been for Scottish MPs after 1707, which perhaps limited their involvement in the politics of Westminster and Whitehall. Only a minority could afford to travel and spend

[85] Peter Jupp, 'Irish MPs at Westminster in the early Nineteenth Century' in J.C. Beckett (ed.), *Historical Studies* VII (London, 1969), p. 71.
[86] David Hayton, 'Adjustment and Integration: The Scottish Representation in the British House of Commons, 1707-14', *Parliamentary History* 27 (2008), 432; F.G. James, 'The Irish Lobby in the Early Eighteenth Century', *English Historical Review* 81 (1966), 543-57.

extended periods in London, and many of those who did were ill at ease in their new parliamentary surroundings. Broderick Chinery, MP for Brandon, told Lord Shannon that his fellow representatives appeared 'bewildered and quite at a loss how to act in this large field they have entered upon; they appear disunited among themselves and in my opinion, no future session will ever exhibit so many Irish faces.'[87] John Beresford in 1800 predicted to ministers that 'after the novelty is over, you will not be much troubled with Irish members. The expense, and the different mode of carrying on business and debate, will prevent most of our people from attending or speaking.'[88] This turned out to be a rather prescient remark. Nor was there a welcoming embrace from existing MPs. There was a certain degree of snobbery from British MPs and ministers about the new Irish members and about Ireland generally. The new 100 Irish representatives were dismissed as 'wild Irish…Paddies' by Lord Sheffield, and there were depressingly predictable taunts made by English MPs at the accents and style of oratory of the new Irish speakers in the Commons, which many Scottish MPs, even those as senior as Henry Dundas, had occasionally endured.[89] The Westminster House of Commons had been previously a forum for many Irish-born speakers, perhaps most famously Edmund Burke whose powers of oratory and talent for parliamentary debate were the subject of praise and approval.[90] But the style of rhetoric employed by those who had been used to speaking in the Irish Parliament jarred initially on their introduction to the new 'Imperial Parliament'. Henry Grattan's maiden Westminster speech in May 1805, for example, was given a mixed reception because of this, and it added to the impression, felt by many Irish MPs, that they were a 'distinct

[87] Jupp, 'Irish MPs at Westminster', 65.
[88] A.P.W. Malcomson (ed.), *Eighteenth Century Irish Official Papers in Great Britain, Private Collections: Volume Two* (Belfast, 1990), p. 308.
[89] Lord Sheffield quoted in Geoffrey Bolton, *The Passing of the Irish Act of Union: A Study in Parliamentary Politics* (London, 1966), p. 86. For English mockery of Scottish MPs, see Charles Abbot, MP for Helston in Cornwall, who described Dundas as being '[m]iserably Scottish in his accent': Charles Abbot, second baron Colchester (ed.), *The Diary and Correspondence of Charles Abbot, Lord Colchester, Speaker of the House of Commons, 1802-1817* (3 vols, London, 1861), Vol. I, p. 22.
[90] Commenting on Burke's first speech in the Commons in January 1766, David Garrick praised his 'Virgin Eloquence'. Richard Bourke, *Empire & Revolution: The Political Life of Edmund Burke* (Princeton, 2015), pp. 2 and 233.

species'.[91] Perhaps because of this, the attendance, speaking, and voting records of Irish MPs in the first few years following the 1801 Union were particularly poor.

Irish MPs, therefore, remained largely detached and were usually only thought of by ministers when they needed their support in Commons votes.[92] Irish politics had long had a reputation for corruption which Irish MPs now inherited, a negative image similar to that attached to Scottish MPs in the eighteenth century, with Redesdale warning Vansittart in 1805 that 'you will find every Irishman in England is jobbing for his own advantage… not one of them is to be trusted.'[93] In this sense, therefore, Irish MPs were 'managed' and used as voting fodder for the government by the Lord Lieutenant and the Chief Secretary, just as Scottish MPs had been under the Argethelian regime, and to a large extent under Henry Dundas, rather than as independent representatives of Irish interests. There were several occasions when the ministry depended heavily on Irish votes in the House of Commons. As early as 1804, Sir Evan Nepean as Chief Secretary informed Hardwicke as Lord Lieutenant that 'the Irish Members generally have been very steady and have in fact kept the present [Pitt] Government on its legs'.[94] The ministry's confidence that it could count on a sizable proportion of Irish MPs to support it in the Commons could result in it concentrating much of its attention on their whereabouts at times of crucial votes. During Melville's impeachment hearings in 1805, for example, Sir Lawrence Parsons, MP for King's County, wrote to his wife that he and his 'Irish friends' were being forced to stay in London in order to vote with the ministry, but he promised that it would soon be over so that 'my cage door will…be thrown open, and I will not delay a moment taking advantage of it'.[95]

[91] Jupp, 'Irish MPs at Westminster', 77; idem., 'Government, parliament and politics in Ireland', 150.
[92] Hoppen, *Governing Hibernia*, 32.
[93] BL, Add. MS. 31320, fo. 66, Redesdale to Vansittart, 25 June 1805.
[94] BL, Add. MS. 35715, fo. 107, Sir Evan Nepean to earl of Hardwicke, 5 July 1804.
[95] A.P.W. Malcomson (ed.), *Calendar of The Rosse Papers* (Dublin, 2008), p. 378.

In this context, it is not surprising that Irish MPs found it difficult to represent Irish interests either independently or assiduously. As Jupp has argued, only two issues prevented Irish MPs from supporting automatically the government of the day: matters concerning the Prince of Wales – later the Prince Regent – and the vexed question of Catholic emancipation.[96] In fact, the latter subject was so controversial for Irish representatives in Westminster that, on this, they were far more likely to take orders from their constituents than their ministerial masters or to vote with their own consciences. On a vote on Catholic 'claims' in 1805 Vansittart, the Chief Secretary, noted that 'the number of Irish Members who supported the petition appeared to me larger than I hoped it would have been' and concluded that several Irish MPs 'for the sake of gaining a little popularity voted for the petition against their own judgement' knowing that it would be defeated anyway.[97] The extent to which this occurred more generally, in a way that was comparable to Scottish MPs acting on 'instructions' from their constituents, particularly burgh MPs on issues such as the corn laws, is unclear and would warrant a more thorough study. On the currently available evidence, however, that would seem unlikely as there does not appear to have been much interest at all in defending or promoting specifically Irish interests. John Foster had initially hoped to create a phalanx of Irish MPs which might amount to an 'Irish party' to attend to Irish interests, in a similar fashion to the way Scottish MPs had, since 1707, acted on occasion when it came to certain Scottish issues. With Foster in opposition in the early years of the Union, William Wickham, as Chief Secretary, was afraid that 'he is evidently aiming at forming a party of his own among his own countrymen, with the express view of being able more seriously to embarrass the government in any moment of difficulty or danger'.[98] However, Foster was usually left disappointed whenever he made efforts in this direction, such as when he attempted to lift the prohibition on

[96] Jupp, 'Irish MPs at Westminster', 72.
[97] BL, Add. MS. 35716, fo. 67, Vansittart to Hardwicke, 15 May 1805.
[98] BL, Add. MS. 35713, fo. 14, William Wickham to earl of Hardwicke, 8 March 1802.

Irish distillation from corn: 'I feel quite ashamed of our Irishmen who decline coming over to assist me, when such a desperate attempt is made on our Agriculture'.[99] Commenting on this issue several years later, Edward Wakefield, the statistician who authored the *Account of Ireland, Statistical and Political* in 1812, remarked that 'even the representatives of that country in the British parliament seemed either unacquainted with her true interests as far as related to this great question, or unable from want of sufficient information to state and enforce it so as to produce a beneficial effect.'[100] A year later Foster's desperation on this issue was clear when he hoped that a 'West Indian Interest joining in the internal concerns of Ireland may induce an Irish Interest to unite', although he conceded that it 'is a wretched Policy to suffer any such bodies to form' and indeed ultimately he did not receive the support from Irish MPs that he required.[101] Foster's efforts in this respect were deemed by contemporaries to be hopeless because of the widely held negative opinion of the capabilities of Irish MPs. In 1804 Lady Downshire expressed approval for Foster's 'patriotic exertions', but feared that '[w]ithout the active interference of well-informed, independent Irish members, I fear little can be done for Ireland'.[102] Wickham informed Addington a year earlier that there was a 'shortage of 'efficient men' among the Irish members'.[103] Certainly there was a general view that Irish interests were not well represented in the House of Commons in the early nineteenth century, in contrast to the more effective way that important Scottish interests were represented by certain particularly diligent Scottish MPs from the 1780s onwards, such that Jupp has described a 'general air of lethargy' in Irish parliamentary proceedings at this time.[104]

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[99] PRONI, D207/34/37, Foster to George Rochfort, 2 April 1808.
[100] Edward Wakefield, *Account of Ireland, Statistical and Political* (2 vols, Dublin, 1812), Vol. I, p. iv. Quoted in McCavery, 'Finance and Politics', 247.
[101] PRONI, D562/10224, Foster to James Crofton, 27 March 1807; McCavery, 'Finance and Politics', 221.
[102] PRONI, D607/I/25 (Downshire papers), Lady Downshire to John Reilly, 9 April 1804.
[103] PRONI, T2627/5/P/69 (English politicians in Ireland papers), William Wickham to Addington, 29 August 1803.
[104] Jupp, 'Irish MPs at Westminster', 79.

To a greater extent, however, there was a degree of party political assimilation. A small minority of the Irish representatives in the Commons supported either the British Pittites/ministerialists, or Whigs, with notably an 'Irish Whig' group which promoted the cause of political reform. There was a longer history of British and Irish Whig cooperation, which could be traced back to the connections established between Foxite Whigs and Irish Patriots, such as Henry Grattan, in the Irish Parliament. During the 1780s they had worked in concert to defeat Pitt's Commercial Resolutions, and throughout the 1790s this political relationship strengthened through the Irish Whig Club in Dublin as Fox and his followers became concerned with Catholic emancipation and the Pitt ministry's treatment of Ireland.[105] Recent research by Jennifer Ridden has demonstrated the extent to which a 'Whig' reform movement existed in Irish society in the early nineteenth century, in competition with the O'Connellite movement, led by liberal Protestants in Irish towns, and represented in Westminster by MPs such as Thomas Spring Rice, who represented Limerick in the 1820s and would in 1835 become Chancellor of the Exchequer.[106] Spring Rice gained a significant standing within the wider British Whig movement, writing for the *Edinburgh Review* during the 1820s and 30s.[107] Jupp has calculated that by 1830, the number of committed ministerialists/Tories and Whigs among the Irish contingent in the House of Commons was only 20 to 30 out of 100 MPs, although party political affiliation in the House of Commons was still in its infancy during the early decades of the nineteenth century.[108] Nevertheless, certain individual Irish MPs connected with the Irish Whig movement did distinguish themselves in this period, particularly Henry Grattan (MP for Dublin), Sir John Newport (MP for Waterford and briefly Chancellor of the

[105] For more on Fox and the Irish Whigs, see: Martyn J. Powell, 'Charles James Fox and Ireland', *Irish Historical Studies* 33 (2002), 169-90.
[106] Jennifer Ridden, 'Irish reform between 1798 and the Great Famine' in Arthur Burns and Joanna Innes (eds), *Rethinking the Age of Reform: Britain 1780-1850* (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 281-288; idem., ''Making Good Citizens': National Identity, Religion, and Liberalism among the Irish Elite, c.1800-1850', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (King's College, University of London, 1998).
[107] Ridden, 'Irish reform between 1798 and the Great Famine', 287.
[108] Jupp, 'Government, parliament and politics in Ireland', 153.

Irish Exchequer under the Ministry of All the Talents), Sir Henry Parnell (MP for Queen's County), and Christopher Hely-Hutchinson (MP for Cork). Grattan continued as an effective orator, particularly for the cause of Catholic emancipation, and Hely-Hutchison for the reform of Irish administration. Parnell and Newport were advocates of economic reform and worked towards the amalgamation of the British and Irish economies.[109] Spring Rice was particularly assiduous in advocating an Irish Whig reform programme in the 1820s which included Catholic emancipation, tithe reform, reform of the criminal code and the establishment of a police force, as well as legal and educational reforms.[110] As chair of a parliamentary committee on education reform in 1828 he offered recommendations which formed the basis for the Irish National Schools Act in 1831.[111] There were, therefore, notable and important similarities between the Scottish and Irish Whig representatives at Westminster from the 1820s onwards, particularly in the way Spring Rice and others assimilated into a broader British Whig movement to promote a distinctly 'Irish' reform agenda, in a way that was similar to the activities of Thomas Kennedy and his 'Scottish' reform agenda. Nevertheless, the comparison is limited because the respective cases for Irish and Scottish Whig reform were different at a deeper level. The Scottish 'new' Whig movement was initiated by legal elites in Edinburgh and was concentrated on legal and parliamentary reforms designed to enable Scots to enjoy what they perceived to be the benefits of the British constitution more fully.[112] The Irish 'moderate' reform movement, however, had a much wider scope in seeking political, economic, and social reform, in order, ultimately, to eradicate religious divisions from Irish society. Whilst Irish Whigs achieved notable successes in the Westminster Parliament from the 1820s, which mirrored the rising fortunes of their Scottish counterparts, their failure to

[109] Jupp, 'Irish MPs at Westminster', 79.
[110] Ridden, 'Irish reform between 1798 and the Great Famine', 282.
[111] *Ibid*., 287.
[112] Gordon Pentland, *Radicalism, Reform and National Identity in Scotland, 1820–1833* (Woodbridge, 2008), p. 14.

exert enough influence on British Whig ministers' policies relating to Ireland – such as in response to the Great Famine in the late 1840s – as well as the enduring divisions within Irish society, meant that any further party political integration would not last as they lost support to more radical Irish organisations such as the Young Ireland movement, and later to the Fenians.[113]

The individual arguably who did the most independently to represent Irish concerns at Westminster after the Union was John Foster. He had been vociferously opposed to the idea of an Anglo-Irish Union before 1801 and was initially reluctant to go to Westminster as an Irish MP, partly because of his fundamental disagreement with the Pitt ministry in the Union debates, after which he believed that he would not 'have their confidence and I could therefore do little good'. Nevertheless, after his initial distress prompted by the creation of the Union – of which he complained that '[n]o nation was ever yet so wantonly disturbed' – he resolved to 'quit Ireland for the chance of serving it' and was returned as MP for County Louth.[114] As we have already seen, Foster was, throughout this period, perhaps the Irish linen industry's fiercest political advocate and, before the Union, was perceived by Irish mercantile and manufacturing interests as a useful ally in representing their concerns to British ministers. Foster's friend, the Dublin merchant David Jebb, had in 1780 paid tribute to Foster's lobbying prowess in Westminster saying, '[y]our going to England at this time gives me the most sanguine expectations of… Bills for the advantage of Ireland returning'.[115] His first few years as an Irish MP in Westminster were spent in opposition to the ministry, during which time he made life difficult for Isaac Corry, the first Chancellor of the Irish Exchequer after 1801, although in this he usually acted alone – it was reported to Hardwick that 'Not an Irishman supported Foster', after Foster had attacked Corry in the Commons – and, as we have seen, failed to create a

[113] Ridden, 'Irish reform between 1798 and the Great Famine', 281-92.
[114] Malcomson (ed.), *An Anglo-Irish Dialogue*, 36-37 and 40.
[115] PRONI, D562/8060, David Jebb to Foster, 14 June 1780.

grouping of Irish MPs as a party which would promote and defend an Irish 'national' interest.[116] Nevertheless, it became apparent to Pitt, after his return to government in 1804, that Foster would be the ideal candidate to replace Corry, given his connections to Irish economic interests and considerable experience in Irish political life.

Foster accepted the position of Chancellor of the Irish Exchequer with the express intention of furthering Irish economic interests and defending the Anglo-Irish Protestant establishment. Under Pitt he had considerable power over the Irish government, such that his colleagues in the British government and, perhaps more significantly, in Dublin Castle, began to complain bitterly about the extensive influence that he had accumulated. Vansittart, as Chief Secretary, reported to Hardwicke as Lord Lieutenant that Foster 'considered himself as holding a situation exactly similar to that of the First Lord of the Treasury in England.' Such a view was obviously threatening to the leading members of the Irish administration in Dublin who held that this 'claim was incompatible with the practice & frame of the Irish Government as always understood'.[117] Foster's role was more than that of being responsible simply for collecting Irish revenue and setting the Irish budget. On both occasions that he was Irish Chancellor, in 1804-6 and 1807-11, he was perceived by British ministers and Irish economic interests as a bridge between the two. In 1809, for example, George Rose consulted Foster on whether there were 'any solid objections to the admission of woollen goods in both countries duty free'.[118] Even various British ministers who disliked Foster and thought that his 'schemes are impracticable' nevertheless conceded that, as perhaps the dominant Irish political figure at Westminster, he was 'necessary in Parliam[ent]' and to have in the ministry.[119] Pitt had as early as 1801 desired Foster's presence at Westminster to be able to continue 'promoting its

[116] BL, Add. MS. 35712, fo. 115, Charles Abbot to Harwicke, 17 March 1802.
[117] BL, Add. MS. 35716, fo. 101, Vansittart to Hardwicke, 17 June 1805.
[118] PRONI, D562/11379, George Rose to Foster, 8 December 1809.
[119] BL, Add. MS. 35725, fos. 121-2, Marden to Hardwicke, 25 December 1804.

[Ireland's] internal improvements and local interests'.[120] Foster was perfectly candid upon accepting his ministerial position that he would work to attain any possible advantage for Ireland.[121] Certain Irish merchants and manufacturers were equally happy to see Foster as a prominent representative, both in Parliament and in the ministry, as when the Dublin Guild of Merchants sent him an address of thanks upon his appointment in 1804.[122] In representing Irish interests he was fond of decrying any perceived slight as a 'Violation of the Act of Union', in language almost identical to that of a 'breach' of the 1707 Union which Scottish lobbyists complained of throughout the eighteenth century, such as when he forwarded an application of a ship from Cork carrying tobacco which had been 'detained at Liverpool' and 'not admitted to Entrey'.[123] He used similar language when he was Chancellor for the second time under Perceval when he referred to 'an infraction of the Articles of Union' when representing Irish distillers in their quarrel about the whisky trade in 1807 between Britain and Ireland.[124] He was, as we have already seen, always keen to protect the Irish linen industry – such as when he led a parliamentary campaign of several Irish MPs to repeal Corry's duty on linen exports in 1803-4 – as well as Irish agricultural interests, and he vehemently advocated protectionist policies long after many of his colleagues and successors, such as Vesey-Fitzgerald, were pushing towards free trade and a deeper integration of the British and Irish economies.[125] In particular, he could be partial in pushing in favour of certain Irish interests over others. He was, for example, known to favour Irish brewers over distillers, despite his actions to exempt Ireland from prohibitions on distilling from corn which was probably due to his concern for Irish agricultural interests.[126] But it meant that he was not as receptive to lobbying by distillers

[120] Malcomson, *The Politics of Improvement and Prosperity*, 166.
[121] *Ibid*., 186.
[122] PRONI, D562/6331, James Corry Jnr to Foster, 12 April 1804.
[123] TNA, PRO 30/8/328, fo. 54, John Foster to William Pitt, 29 September 1804.
[124] Fay (ed.), *Huskisson and Irish Affairs*, 31.
[125] McCavery, 'Finance and Politics', 233-5.
[126] *Ibid*., 286. See also: BL, Add. MS. 33108, fo. 47: Henry Pelham to Hardwicke, 24 September 1801 (copy) where Pelham says that 'M^{r}. Foster has always espoused the cause of the Brewers, while M^{r}. Beresford has been always considered the Champion of Distillers'.

when it came to townland fines or when he attempted to raise the malt tax in Ireland in 1809. Irish brewers, on the other hand, often depended on Foster's favour, and when lobbying for a free malt trade between Great Britain and Ireland in 1810, Arthur Guinness determined to 'leave our cause entirely in your [i.e. Foster's] hands'.[127] Even after he left office he continued to receive requests to lobby on behalf of various interests, including Irish corn merchants during confrontations over the whisky trade in 1814; indeed he was praised by Leland Crosthwait, a Dublin merchant who had formally been a prominent member of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce, for his 'well known labours' on behalf of corn producers.[128] This was testament to his considerable efforts on behalf of Irish interests, and his immediate successors could not live up to his energy or his patriotic zeal which matched, and perhaps even surpassed, that of Scottish 'improvers' in the Westminster Parliament, such as George Dempster and Sir John Sinclair. It might also indicate that the continuing dependence on Irish elites, such as Foster, to represent and promote certain Irish interests, worked for them and for Ireland, at least some of the time, especially in the early years of the Anglo-Irish Union.

Nevertheless, Foster's personal success highlights the inertia of other Irish parliamentary representatives in the post-Union period, in contrast to the assertiveness of a good number of Scottish MPs. With some exceptions, Foster usually acted alone and made little effort, after his initial unsuccessful attempts to create an 'Irish party', to foment activity on behalf of an Irish 'national' interest amongst Irish MPs, or indeed to encourage integration with MPs from other UK nations to work on behalf of shared interests, as was more often the case with some Scottish MPs. He was able to achieve much on behalf of various Irish economic interests because of the power he acquired as head of the Irish Treasury and because of the constructive working relationships he had with Pitt, and later with Perceval. To some extent,

[127] McCavery, 'Finance and Politics', 288-9.
[128] PRONI, D562/15685, Leland Crosthwait to Foster, June 1814. See also the request for help from corn producers: D562/15681, James Conolly to Foster, 21 May 1814.

this was a victory against the more xenophobic impulses of English politicians such as Charles Abbot, who thought that Irish government offices should be filled by Englishmen as they were 'better qualified', or Vansittart who feared that Foster would persuade British ministers to 'govern Ireland by Irish intrigues instead of the weight and consideration of an efficient English government residing there.'[129] Yet the limits of this as a spur for Irish integration into the British Union-state are highlighted by a comparison, which was made at the time, and subsequently by historians, with Henry Dundas. Lord Redesdale, as Lord Chancellor of Ireland, complained in 1805 that Foster 'seems determined to be in Ireland what Lord Melville was in Scotland'. Malcomson, in his recent biography, suggests that Pitt hoped that Foster would be his 'Irish Dundas'.[130] Except that, as we have repeatedly seen throughout this thesis, Dundas was neither an eager representative of Scottish interests, nor was he the all-powerful governor of Scotland – 'Harry the Ninth', as James Boswell memorably put it – as he is sometimes presented.[131] It is clear that certain Scottish representatives benefitted from having the ear of a leading figure in Pitt's ministry. Nevertheless, Dundas was very much a 'British' minister, rather than simply Pitt's minister for Scotland, and any help that he gave to Scottish lobbyists was discreet and has left hints about which we can only speculate. Any power he had in Scotland was focused on patronage and electoral control through which he could ensure that Pitt's ministries were supported by a majority of the 45 Scottish representatives in the Commons.[132] Foster, on the other hand, was very open about his Irish bias and, although he was a member of the British ministry in the post-Union period, it was as the head of a separate Irish Treasury in a semi-autonomous Irish government. Whereas Scottish interests were able

[129] Malcomson (ed.), *Eighteenth Century Irish Official Papers*, ii, 322 and 439.
[130] Malcomson, *The Politics of Improvement and Prosperity*, 191.
[131] James Boswell, *A Letter to the People of Scotland, on the Alarming Attempt to Infringe the Articles of the Union and to Introduce a Most Pernicious Innovation, by Diminishing the Number of the Lords of Session* (London, 1785), p. 6.
[132] David J. Brown, 'The Government of Scotland under Henry Dundas and William Pitt', *History* 83 (1998), 265-79.

to make increasing use of a group of particularly hardworking Scottish MPs in this period who were playing a growing role in bringing Scottish society closer to Westminster politics, Irish interests could ignore their representatives, most of whom were decidedly ineffectual, as we have seen, because they had access to distinct Irish governmental institutions and, in the case of Foster, a particularly active Irish representative and minister. Perhaps this dependence on the Irish political hierarchy, and a lack of integrated parliamentary representation, is why in 1825 David Jebb wrote to Foster in retirement, now Lord Oriel, complaining about Lord Wellesley as Lord Lieutenant and hoping that the ministry would 'form such a Government for Ireland as prevails in Scotland at present'.[133] It is not entirely clear what he meant by this, but perhaps instead of a comparison with Dundas, it might be more appropriate to compare Foster's role as a representative for post-Union Ireland with that of the third duke of Argyll's management of Scotland in the mid eighteenth century.

IV

Irish and Scottish Legislation at the Westminster Parliament[134]

This heavy dependence on powerful members of the political elite to represent Irish interests can also be discerned through a brief examination of Irish legislation at Westminster in the three decades following the Anglo-Irish Union. While there is not space here to undertake as comprehensive an analysis as that made of Scottish legislation in the last chapter, a broad statistical comparison can offer insight into how far and how deeply groups within both

[133] PRONI, D562/16383, David Jebb to Foster (now Lord Oriel), 3 November 1825.

[134] The following analysis again makes heavy use of the legislation database compiled by Joanna Innes et al from the *Commons Journals*. However, it only considers Irish and Scottish public local and general acts, as opposed to the last chapter which took private local Scottish acts into account in the statistical analysis. This is because private acts relate mostly to private estates and are relatively insignificant in number and so would distort a more meaningful comparison between the respective ways in which Irish and Scottish society legislated at Westminster.

societies were directly involved in pursuing legislation. This also reveals some important differences in how the Westminster Parliament legislated for Ireland and Scotland.

Figure 8 demonstrates that, although Westminster consistently legislated more frequently for Ireland during this period, there was a decline in the amount of Irish legislation which contrasts with the steady rise in Scottish legislation examined in the previous chapter. In the decade following the 1801 Union, there was a total of 322 Irish acts which increased to 369 in the following decade. In the 1820s, however, there was a sharp decline to 244 acts. There was more than double the number of Scottish acts in the first 19 years of Union, but by the 1820s, this difference had decreased substantially. To a certain extent, this pattern is explained by the amount of legislation required to incorporate Ireland into the United Kingdom and the fact that, before 1817, Irish-only acts also included those dealing with fiscal and military matters. After the implementation of fiscal 'amalgamation' in 1817, these became a matter for United Kingdom legislation, as was the case for Scotland.

Figure 8: All public acts, both local and general, passed by the Westminster Parliament, pertaining largely or exclusively to Ireland and Scotland, 1801-1830



Figure 9: All public Irish acts, both general and local, passed by the Westminster Parliament, 1801-1830



Figure 10: Irish public general legislation compared with Scottish general acts, 1801-1830



Figure 11: Irish public local legislation compared with Scottish public local legislation, 1801-1830



Figure 12: Irish Public Acts 1801-1830 by subject[135]

	1801-1815	1816-1830
Irish government	33	13
Government Finance	221	68
Economy	63	26
Land	6	12
Transport and improvement	26	12
Order	19	18
Legal	27	66
Social	26	37
Religion	12	16
Local government	11	27
Military	52	15

The next three tables demonstrate, however, that Westminster legislated for Ireland principally through general legislation, whereas, as was shown in the last chapter, local legislation became ever more important in shaping relations between Scottish society and Parliament. During this period, there were more than five times as many Irish general acts as there were local. This compares to there being almost three times as many Scottish local acts than general. There were 142 Irish public local acts in the 29 years following the Union compared to 357 Scottish ones. This compares to 793 Irish and 156 Scottish general acts during the same period. In addition to this, Irish public local acts stayed at more or less the same low level over this period (between 40 to 54 per decade), whereas the number of Scottish local acts continued their steady rise, from 99 acts in the first decade after 1801 to 143 in the decade before 1830. This suggests that Scottish localities played a much bigger role in the Westminster legislative process than local areas in Ireland. On the other hand, the large amount

[135] These figures are taken from Jupp, 'Government, parliament and politics in Ireland', 156, although the categories are slightly modified here. His figures come from PP, 'Acts passed 1800-1833' XLVIII (1834). Irish government, government finance, religion, and military acts are the same as Jupp's categorisations. Economy acts relate to trade, commerce, and agriculture. Transport and improvement acts are those concerning harbours, shipping, lighthouses, roads, coaches, and urban improvement measures. Legal acts are those concerning changes to any aspect of the law, aside from those concerned with order. Order acts are measures to deal with disturbances. Local government acts are concerned with local authorities and their officers, as well as elections. Social acts relate to welfare legislation, such as hospitals, poor relief, public works, as well as education, such as schools, and local banking and loan measures.

of Irish-specific general legislation indicates that Ireland was still sufficiently separate from the rest of the United Kingdom in order to require separate legislation on general matters promoted by ministers, or more likely, its semi-autonomous administration in Dublin Castle.

Irish semi-autonomy in political and administrative terms, as well as the view held by British ministers of Ireland as different to the rest of the United Kingdom, is perhaps what explains this pattern. As we have already seen, the positions of Lord Lieutenant and Chief Secretary were retained in Ireland after the 1801 Union; what changed was the growing power of the Chief Secretary and the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer, who both sat in the Westminster Parliament and agreed, with British ministers, a programme of 'Irish business' which they were charged with guiding onto the statute book.[136] The Irish legislative system was unusually centralised, therefore, particularly before 1817 as can be seen in Figure 11 which breaks all Irish public acts down by subject. Military and, most especially, financial legislation dominated the Irish legislative output from Westminster between 1801 and 1815. The amount of Irish government finance legislation accounted for 221 acts in this period, or 45 per cent of total Irish acts the period between the Union and Waterloo, largely because of the retention of a separate Irish Treasury. This contrasts quite starkly with the much smaller figures for Scottish financial general legislation as seen in Figure 4 in the last chapter (i.e. eight acts in the 1800-1810 period and 12 acts in the following decade). This was because Scotland was a more integrated part of the United Kingdom, with fiscal legislation pertaining to Scotland being 'British' in scope, and so the figures shown for this earlier period are, therefore, not strictly comparable. After fiscal amalgamation, and with Ireland becoming a more integrated part of the United Kingdom fiscal state, Irish financial legislation decreased substantially to 68 acts between 1816 and 1830, although this still accounted for the largest number of general acts in this period, closely followed by legal acts. A thorough investigation of who was responsible

[136] Innes, 'Legislating for Three Kingdoms', 32; Crossman, *Local government in nineteenth century Ireland*.

for initiating all legislation is not possible in this brief survey, but Irish administrative structures enabled the most obvious process for Irish legislation in this period, and so with this in mind, and from these figures, it seems reasonable to suggest that much Irish legislation was initiated by Irish ministers or political elites as part of an official legislative programme. British ministers in London were largely uninterested in Irish affairs, aside from their eagerness to legislate to prevent or suppress rebellion and agrarian disturbances, such as the Insurrection Act of 1807, which was revived in 1814 and again in 1822.[137] There was therefore a dependence on officials in the Irish administration or Irish political elites to secure specifically Irish legislation.

We saw in the last chapter that it was, in significant measure, the desire for local acts, especially road and turnpike acts, which provided the impetus behind applications for legislation from different parts of Scottish society, and that over time Scots became more familiar with the relevant processes and adept at securing their desired legislative outcomes. This was not the case in Ireland, or at least not anywhere near to the same extent. In the first place, few local acts for Ireland were passed by the Westminster Parliament in this period, although this may partly be explained by the fact that road and communications acts were not required in the same way that they were in Scotland. This was because the Irish Road Act of 1765 allowed grand juries to levy a charge per acre on all farming households for the repair of roads and bridges, or the construction of new ones. There were further acts in 1771-2 which allowed parishes to raise a levy for roads and enabled grand juries to raise money to construct new roads.[138] On the relatively rare occasion that Irish local acts were forthcoming, their passage appears to have been organised through central Irish administrative channels, or at least this was smoothed by the intervention of figures from this sphere. John Foster, as

[137] Hoppen, *Governing Hibernia*, 48-49; idem., 'An Incorporating Union? British Politicians and Ireland 1800-1830', *The English Historical Review* 123 (2008), 349.
[138] Jeremy Black, *Eighteenth-Century Britain, 1688-1783* (Basingstoke, 2001), p. 63.

Chancellor of the Exchequer, was heavily involved in securing local legislation for lighthouses, bridges, harbours, or turnpikes, such as a Belfast lighthouse in 1811 and a bridge over the River Liffey in the same year.[139] Foster complained about Westminster parliamentary and legislative procedure concerning Irish turnpike legislation, in that they were regarded as 'private acts after the Union and therefore renewable only for 21 years'.[140] This not only suggests that he was deeply involved with framing and passing Irish turnpike legislation at Westminster, but also that there was an uncomfortable adjustment after the Union from the way turnpike legislation had typically worked in the Irish Parliament. Similarly, it was quite common to approach the Irish Chief Secretary to apply for local legislation in Westminster.[141] The Dublin Police Act of 1808, for example, was passed by Sir Arthur Wellesley as Chief Secretary, and, unlike the Scottish local police acts, which were essentially urban improvement measures, this was aimed more at suppressing rebellion and was an attempt by the central Irish administrative authorities to more effectively police the Dublin area.[142]

While not all Irish legislation was initiated through official channels, it is clear that it was dependent on a few very senior Irish politicians. When complaining about Foster trying 'almost surreptitiously' to guide a road bill through Parliament in 1805, Lord Redesdale reported that the 'grand jury of the county of Dublin have framed strong resolutions against the bill, which he has treated with utmost contempt'. It was Redesdale's belief that a great deal of Irish legislation was being promoted by a group of Irish politicians against the wishes of local authorities:

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[139] PRONI, D562/11867, Leland Crosthwait to John Foster, 25 May 1811; D562/11893, Foster to Crosthwait (copy), 10 June 1811; D562/11938, Crosthwait to Foster, 24 July 1811.
[140] PRONI, D562/14120, Foster (as Lord Oriel) to James McClelland, 22 May 1823.
[141] For example: PRONI, D562/15405, 'Copy suggestions offered by a deputation from the Ballast Office to Charles Grant', 3 January 1819.
[142] Hoppen, *Governing Hibernia*, 56. This might be comparable, however, with the Metropolitan Act of 1829, which the Home Office played a leading part in passing.

> The whole country complains that bills are passed locally affecting the people, without their knowing anything of the matter. There are certain great manufacturers of Irish legislation, Mr Foster, Mr Lee of Waterford, Sir John Newport, Mr Fitzgerald, etc., and they seem to assist each other, "I will not oppose your bill, if you will not oppose mine". Something must be done to prevent this rage for legislation.[143]

Redesdale, as Lord Chancellor of Ireland and a firm political opponent of Foster's, as we have already seen, was likely to emphasise and perhaps even exaggerate the problem of Irish politicians legislating in Westminster without informing, or even against the wishes of, Irish local society. Yet it is true that a group of Irish MPs, in addition to John Foster, were particularly assiduous in guiding Irish legislation through Parliament. These were those MPs, cited above in the preceding section on Irish representation, who were connected to the Irish Whig party and were unusual in their energetic parliamentary activity, often on behalf of reforming causes. Sir John Newport, for example, helped to secure public funding for lunatic asylums in Ireland in 1806, and in 1812, there were a series of Irish MPs, such as Richard Synge Cooper (MP for County Sligo) and Vesey-Fitzgerald, as Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer, who attempted to pass legislation which would reform Irish grand juries.[144] It is unclear as to whether there was quite the *quid pro quo* arrangement between these MPs, as alleged by Redesdale, when it came to passing Irish legislation. Peter Jupp has estimated that for the period before 1828, the ratio of ministerial to private member bills was approximately 70:30. Ministerial bills were therefore much more numerous in this period, although Jupp and Crowe have emphasised that there was also a rise in the number of bills authored by independent Irish MPs – to a ratio of 60:40 in the 1830s – and those jointly sponsored by

[143] Malcomson (ed.), *Eighteenth Century Irish Official Papers*, 409.
[144] Innes, 'Legislating for Three Kingdoms', 32-33.

government and MPs.[145] Even so, these 'independent' Irish MPs were often few in number and comprised of groups of particularly zealous members who were responsible for a disproportionate number of bills. For example, between 1828 and 1830, seven Irish MPs were responsible for 22 private member bills.[146] This gives an impression, therefore, of Irish politicians in Westminster legislating for Ireland from above.

That is not to say that Irish society was indifferent to the politics of Westminster; indeed, the reverse is true. There is very little scholarship on Irish 'public' participation in or awareness of the Westminster legislative process after the Union from which to draw.[147] Most historians of the public sphere in Ireland after 1800 have understandably concentrated on the political activity of Daniel O'Connell and his agitations in support of Catholic emancipation and the repeal of the 1801 Act of Union.[148] Nevertheless, it is possible to observe in this period the establishment of new and more moderate bodies, such as civic improvement institutions in Sligo, chambers of commerce – new or renewed – such as those in Cork, Limerick and Waterford, as well as various clubs and societies. In more rural areas, county meetings continued to be the forum to organise and express rural opinion.[149] In terms of their participation in Westminster politics, it is arguably instructive to examine the rise of Irish petitions sent to the House of Commons in the post-Union period, particularly as petitioning was often the first step in applying for legislation. Jupp argues that the first half of the nineteenth century was a period of major change in this regard, with a dramatic increase in the number of Irish petitions in the last decade of this period: 38 petitions in 1818 and 1,600

[145] Jupp, 'Government, parliament and politics in Ireland', 157; B.D. Crowe, 'The parliamentary experience of the Irish members of the House of Commons, 1833-41', unpublished Ph.D. thesis (The Queen's University of Belfast, 1995), pp. 57-61.
[146] Jupp, 'Government, parliament and politics in Ireland', p. 157.
[147] But see McDowall, *Public opinion and government policy in Ireland*.
[148] Angus Macintyre, 'O'Connell and British politics' in Kevin B. Nowlan and Maurice R. O'Connell (eds), *Daniel O'Connell: Portrait of a Radical* (Belfast, 1984), pp. 88-9; K. Theodore Hoppen, 'Riding a Tiger: Daniel O'Connell, Reform and Popular Politics in Ireland, 1800-1847' in T.C.W. Blanning and P. Wende (eds), *Reform in Great Britain and Germany, 1750-1850* (Oxford, 1999), pp. 121-43.
[149] Jupp, 'Government, parliament and politics in Ireland', 160-61.

petitions in 1828. The latter figure is inflated due to O'Connellite petitions relating to Catholic emancipation, which probably dominated, but following years show this level of Irish petitioning to have stayed at roughly the same level: 1,089 petitions in 1833 and 1,364 petitions in 1834.[150] Although these petitions were organised initially through traditional local structures, such as county or civic meetings, they were increasingly sent from new clubs and often through the agency of churches which enabled huge increases in the number of petitions and signatures.[151] Our knowledge of this transformation is very limited, but it is certainly indicative of an increased public awareness and interest in the politics of Westminster, even if that did not necessarily mean substantial participation in the legislative process.

Irish society was not, therefore, involved in the pursuit of legislation in the same ways as growing parts of Scottish society, and so far as there was a drive for legislation in Ireland, it was more often than not driven by official bodies or a small political elite. As Joanna Innes has argued, a 'consultative system' involving Irish extra-parliamentary bodies, insofar as it existed, was designed to defend against, or attempt to amend, any imposed legislation from above. It could not be used to propose, frame or lobby for legislation in Westminster. Equally, as Innes also points out, Irish society, in a political and religious context, was decidedly more divided than in Scotland.[152] Therefore, whereas in the last chapter a redefinition of the 'public' in Scotland in connection with participation in the legislative process was emphasised, it is more difficult to discern a parallel political trajectory in post-Union Ireland where political conflict and a very different set of political dynamics complicate the picture. There seems little evidence to contradict Jupp's assertion that in Ireland the Westminster Parliament was 'seen more as a court than an institution which could adequately represent national interests'.[153] This was in stark contrast to Scotland where not only did Westminster represent Scottish 'national'

[150] *Ibid*., 162-3.
[151] *Ibid*., 162-4.
[152] Innes, 'Legislating for Three Kingdoms', 33.
[153] Jupp, 'Government, parliament and politics in Ireland', 164.

interests, Scottish society itself adapted in order to participate more frequently, and more effectively, in the British legislative process.

Key differences between Irish and Scottish experiences at Westminster and in the British Union-state are observable throughout this period, and became progressively starker in the early nineteenth century. Constitutional and political distinctions between Scotland and Ireland meant that differences between their respective relationships with the British political centre were inevitable. This was the case even after the Union of 1801 when Ireland remained a *de facto* semi-autonomous state until the 1830s. Nevertheless, throughout much of the eighteenth century, both Irish and Scottish lobbies had, as Sir James Lowther observed in 1750, presented themselves to the British political centre in similar terms: as representing their respective national interests. Although English interests also characterised themselves in this way, as part of the 'majority' nation, they had little need to present themselves as having a distinctive national identity. There was, therefore, a similar unified approach to lobbying for economic success and improvement, exemplified in the way the Convention of Royal Burghs or the Board of Trustees in Scotland, and the Linen Board in Ireland, operated throughout much of the eighteenth century.[154] Nevertheless, from the 1780s onwards, Scottish lobbies gradually ceased to present themselves, and indeed to be perceived, in this manner, as they instead emphasised their interests as being complementary to, and part of, broader British sectors and interests. By contrast, the changes in the relationship between Ireland and the British Union-state at the same time reinforced, and even perhaps augmented, the existing demarcation of national interests. Thus, while Scottish interests increasingly established alliances with other

[154] Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 118.

British interests and operated across the Anglo-Scottish border along sectoral, industrial, and party political lines, Irish interests remained, for the most part, resolutely separate.

Moreover, while Scottish society changed and adapted so as to allow increasingly broader 'public' participation in Westminster politics, similar engagement in Ireland after 1801 appears to have been much more limited, partly as a result of the control exercised by a tiny elite over legislative business. As has been emphasised at various points, the political cultures and processes in Scotland and Ireland were very different, and this had a strong bearing on how groups in both countries viewed and engaged with the British political centre. Nevertheless, further investigation of civil society in Ireland during the early nineteenth century, particularly with regard to its participation in Westminster politics, would provide a clearer picture of how limited it really was. This chapter has briefly alluded to the Irish Whig reforming movement in Irish urban society, which established links with the broader British Whig political movement in a connection similar to that which was developed by Scottish Whig politicians in the 1810s and '20s, and which represented an example of how more moderate elements within Irish society might operate within a Westminster context. Further work on this might focus on the new Irish chambers of commerce which, Jennifer Ridden has shown, were becoming increasingly politically active and involved in urban coalitions pressing an economic and political reform agenda.[155] This would illuminate the comparison with Scottish society and demonstrate more clearly the differences and similarities in the way the 'peripheries' of Ireland and Scotland connected with the British 'centre', particularly in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the examination of Irish experiences at Westminster provided here goes some way to demonstrate, by comparison, the scope of the change experienced by

[155] Ridden, 'Irish reform between 1798 and the Great Famine', 284-5. For Dublin, see Hill, *Patriots to Unionists*, 359-62.

Scottish interests in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as they ceased to present themselves mainly as representatives of a distinct and separate Scottish ‘national’ interest.

Conclusion

By the end of this period, much that had previously set Scotland apart politically and made it distinctive at Westminster and within the British Union-state was coming to an end. In late 1829, several Scottish MPs, including Archibald Campbell of Blythswood and Henry Home Drummond, made representations to Robert Peel, then Home Secretary, in the hope that he might intercede in the appointment of a new secretary to the Board of Trustees in Edinburgh. Peel was baffled somewhat by these requests, explaining to Campbell that 'I doubt whether I have as Secretary of State any control over the appointment', and admitting to Home Drummond that 'I confess I was not aware of the existence of a Board of Trustees for Manufactures in Scotland'.[1] It is not all that surprising that Peel, as a senior British minister, did not concern himself with the various para-state or lobbying bodies in Scotland in any detail; indeed, if he was especially familiar with any part of the United Kingdom, other than England, it was Ireland, not Scotland.[2] Nevertheless, his general ignorance of this body is also perhaps explained partially by Home Drummond's reply, which complained that the Board of Trustees was currently making itself unpopular as 'much of their expenditure is…of a questionable nature', which had caused it to be attacked in the House of Commons 'as a superannuated and useless establishment'. The Treasury had already withdrawn some of their funds for 'more interesting objects', such as the Highland Society, which Home Drummond estimated was 'as useful to the Country as five times that amount expended by the [Board]'.[3] Peel later confirmed that Melville had established an inquiry which aimed for the 'partial or total reduction' of the Board's funds.[4]

[1] BL, Add. MS. 40399 (Peel papers), fo. 399, Archibald Campbell to Robert Peel, 20 September 1829; fo. 342, Henry Home Drummond to Robert Peel, 21 September 1829; fo. 369, Peel to Campbell, 18 October 1829.
[2] Peel was Chief Secretary of Ireland from 1812 to 1818. For a relatively recent analysis of his role in Irish politics, see: Richard A. Gaunt, *Robert Peel: The Life and Legacy* (London, 2010), ch. 2.
[3] BL, Add. MS. 40399, fos. 372-3, Home Drummond to Peel, 3 November 1829.
[4] *Ibid*., fos. 389-90, Peel to Home Drummond, 17 November 1829.

This was a dramatic departure from its importance throughout the eighteenth century as one of the main forums for discussion of economic improvement, and vehicles through which the British state encouraged and promoted Scottish economic prosperity. As late as 1784, the economic writer, John Knox, had credited 1727, the year of the Board's founding, as the most important turning point in Scotland's national story, ahead of 1707, although this assertion also relied on other factors, in addition to the establishment of the Board.[5] In this, he was probably repeating a view common in Enlightenment Edinburgh from at least the 1750s.[6] Such was the importance that Knox placed on this body that he proposed that the proceeds raised from taxes regulating trade in Scotland should be used to fund an expanded Board of Trustees which would become a Commercial Parliament for Scotland.[7] This view was predicated on the tendency to talk about economic improvement north of the border within a 'national' Scottish framework, and a belief that, although Scottish economic success ultimately contributed to British power, it needed to be treated differently to England as a 'special case'.[8] By the end of this period, however, Scotland was a far more integrated part of the British state precisely because it was no longer viewed in this way. Other emblems of Scottish 'national' difference within a Westminster context throughout much of the eighteenth century were brought to an end around this period, further signifying the extent to which Scottish and British politics had converged. This included state encouragement of the 'national' Scottish linen industry through the bounty on coarse linen, the value of which was decreased by 20 per cent in 1825, and which continued to fall by 10 per cent every year until its eventual abolition in 1832.[9] In addition, the

[5] John Knox, *A View of the British Empire, More Especially Scotland: with some proposals for the improvement of that country, the extension of the fisheries, and the relief of the people* (London, 1784), p. li.
[6] See for example, Gilbert Elliot, *Proposals for carrying on certain public works in the city of Edinburgh* (Edinburgh, 1952), pp. 1-43.
[7] Knox, *View of the British Empire*, 100-12.
[8] This point is made by Bob Harris in 'Towards a British Political Economy: An Eighteenth-Century Scottish Perspective' in Perry Gauci (ed.), *Regulating the British Economy, 1660-1850* (London, 2011), pp. 90-1. Of course, as Harris notes in this essay, this was part of the move towards economic liberalisation which was arguably a genuinely 'British' phenomenon, politically, ideologically, as well as economically.
[9] *Ibid*., 94; Conrad Gill, *The Rise of the Irish Linen Industry* (Oxford, 1925), pp. 303-4; Alexander Johnston Warden, *The Linen Trade: Ancient and Modern* (London, 1864), pp. 660-8.

Convention of Royal Burghs, which had steadily been declining as a national lobbying body since the 1780s, and had instead largely focused on opposing burgh reform, was further emasculated by the Municipal Reform Act of 1834, after which its abolition was contemplated, although it survived in various guises until 1975.[10]

This thesis has identified a general and gradual shift in the relationship between Scotland and the British political centre as taking place over approximately seven decades in the later Georgian period. From the fall of the Argathelian regime in the 1760s, when Scotland was arguably still semi-autonomous in its governance and politics, until the decline of Melvillite electoral dominance north of the border in the late 1820s and early 1830s, Scottish interests and important parts of Scottish society became more closely integrated within the British legislative and political system, in large part through their lobbying activities at the Westminster Parliament and of ministers in Whitehall. This thesis has argued that the 1780s represented a crucial turning point in this development, particularly in the way new and increasingly diverse commercial and industrial interests allied, and to a certain extent assimilated, with similar interests from other parts of Britain. Although these changes were balanced with continuing features of previous Scottish lobbying activity, they ultimately set a course for deeper and extended integration and convergence over the broader period, so that various Scottish interests gradually became local or regional components of larger and broader sectoral lobbies, as was explored in the case study on Scottish cotton lobbying. There was therefore a gradual disappearance of easily identifiable Scottish interests, or a visible Scottish 'national' interest, at Westminster, which this thesis has also observed through an examination of Scottish MPs and how they represented Scottish interests at the British political centre by

[10] It experienced something of a resurgence in the later nineteenth century when it admitted parliamentary and police burghs in 1879 and 1895 respectively: Michael Lynch (ed.), *Oxford Companion to Scottish History* (Oxford, 2001), pp. 534-5.

their, at least partial, assimilation into other forms of British representation. At the same time, however, it has been emphasised that change was uneven and not all in one direction.

Nevertheless, this thesis has sought to demonstrate that much of this shift was brought about by the need to represent certain Scottish interests more effectively within the British Union-state, as the politics of Westminster became more important to certain parts of Scottish society. To a certain extent, this was the result of an intensifying preoccupation with improvement, particularly in the Highlands, seen in the establishment and activity of institutions such as the Highland and British Fisheries societies. It was also caused by the first stages of the industrial revolution in Scotland, and the growing necessity to represent important economic and industrial interests, which were increasingly local or regional rather than national. To a certain extent, interests were always importantly regional, whilst also being identified as 'national', but from the 1780s onwards there was a more particular emphasis on regional differences within Scotland.[11] In this sense, the growing ability of mercantile and manufacturing interests in the west of Scotland to lobby and influence Parliament and ministers with steadily increasing effectiveness stands out as the most prominent example of this. Moreover, the increasingly interconnected nature of emerging industries throughout Britain in this period, such as cotton, helped accelerate the integration of these regional interests in Scotland within broader 'British' lobbies in order to conduct large-scale campaigns on matters of shared interest. By doing so, they were generally, although not always, able to exert more influence on ministerial policy or parliamentary legislation. This demonstrates how the twin foci of this thesis – the fragmentation of a Scottish 'national' interest at Westminster, and the developing efficacy of increasingly active Scottish interests – were inextricably linked developments. An increased political adeptness at the British political centre was, however, not exclusive to society in the west of Scotland region, nor indeed to Scottish economic and

[11] To a certain extent, this was a shift in the rhetoric of identification.

industrial interests more generally. The examination in this thesis of Scottish legislation, specifically local legislation, demonstrates that important parts of society throughout Scotland, in both urban and county contexts, underwent developments in order to focus more closely on, and participate more frequently and effectively in, the Westminster legislative system. Prompted by an increasing and widespread desire within local society to implement improvement, infrastructure, and other measures through parliamentary legislation, existing local Scottish institutions adapted and developed new modes and mechanisms in order to engage and cooperate with, as well as to consult more widely, local 'publics' which were redefined as part of this process. As has already been noted, this served to draw Scottish society more deeply into the British legislative and political system in a way that was distinct to Scotland. Indeed, the final chapter in this thesis, by way of a comparison with Ireland, highlights the distinctiveness of the Scottish experience at Westminster and within the British Union-state. Over this period, Scottish interests operated more confidently as part of British political processes, and, unlike their Irish counterparts, gradually did so in ways which no longer presented them as separate or different in what was becoming a truly 'British' political culture.

There are of course limits to the conclusions that can be made about Scotland's relationship with, and place within, the British Union-state, based on the evidence presented here. Large parts of this thesis are based on case studies, partly because of the fragmented nature of the evidence as well the large scope of the period, which have been chosen in order to acquire an impression of the broader picture. Therefore, one cannot say with full confidence that they are more widely applicable or representative until further and more comprehensive investigation has been completed. This thesis has, for instance, concentrated heavily on the Scottish experience at the Westminster Parliament, and has not conducted a comprehensive examination into Scottish interests in their dealings with ministers and the central agencies of the British

state. Whilst it has been alluded to and partially examined, particularly earlier in the thesis, further and more systematic investigation might focus on the attitudes of various ministers in Whitehall to Scottish affairs or interests.[12] Additionally, the scope of further research might be broadened beyond the Treasury and the Board of Trade, which have occasionally featured in this thesis, to other or more specific state departments and services, such as the extent to which Scottish affairs fell under the jurisdiction of the Home Office, or the role of the Admiralty in the defence of Scottish coasts or the development of Scottish fisheries.[13] As Aaron Graham and Patrick Walsh have observed recently, our knowledge of the 'fiscal-military state' as it existed in and applied to Scotland after 1707 remains limited, especially after the mid-eighteenth century where Alexander Murdoch's analysis of Scottish administration ends.[14] In particular, further research into how the customs and excise services operated north of the border, and, more generally, how Scotland was part of broader state formation in Britain during this period, is required. This might lead to a fuller appreciation of Scotland's place within the British Union-state, and its development from administrative 'semi-independence' after the first half-century or so following 1707.

Overall, however, this thesis has done much to explain how, by the early decades of the nineteenth century, Scottish and English politics had undergone substantial convergence. In his essay on Anglo-Scottish political relations from Waterloo until the outbreak of World War I, Iain Hutchison has observed that this deepened and was evident in political campaigns which had similar or equal significance on both sides of the border, as well as further and deeper party political assimilation, and the ability of Scots to obtain frequently the highest political offices

[12] This might take a similar form to that recently conducted with regard to Ireland by Theodore Hoppen: K. Theodore Hoppen, *Governing Hibernia: British Politicians and Ireland 1800-1921* (Oxford, 2016).
[13] Harris, 'Towards a British Political Economy', 105.
[14] Aaron Graham and Patrick Walsh, 'Introduction' in idem., (eds), *The British Fiscal-Military States, 1660-c.1783* (Oxford, 2016), pp. 23-4.

in the British state.[15] As Lord Rosebery, a Liberal politician and a Scot who would go on briefly to become Prime Minister in 1894-5, observed in 1871: 'Now indeed the jealousies and mistrust which once separated the two countries divide them no more than does the Roman wall'.[16] Nevertheless, elements of Scottish separateness and distinctiveness remained throughout the nineteenth century in ways which have also been observed throughout this thesis. As Colin Kidd has recently observed, the first century or so of the Anglo-Scottish Union saw the rise of what he has called an 'amphibiousness in political culture', by which he means the ability to participate in 'British' and as well as more distinctively 'Scottish' political cultures simultaneously.[17] Moreover, Kidd has specified that this distinctiveness should not be dismissed as 'offshoots of a dominant English culture': Scottish political culture after 1707 remained a product of its own distinctive history and separate legal or religious traditions, as much as it also gradually came to share common British norms.[18] In the nineteenth century, this was manifest in an occasional dissatisfaction with the way in which certain distinctively Scottish issues were managed at Westminster and in the British state. There was, for instance, occasionally a fear that Scottish institutions, such as those concerned with Scots law or the separate Scottish education system, were becoming increasingly Anglicised; or alternatively, an irritation that certain distinctively Scottish issues were not given enough attention, or indeed that they were not sufficiently understood by those in Westminster.[19] This led to an underlying, but tenacious, demarcation of Scottish political culture from its English counterpart, within the parameters of the British Union-state, which Graeme Morton has termed 'unionist

[15] I.G.C. Hutchison, 'Anglo-Scottish Political Relations in the Nineteenth Century, c.1815-1914' in T.C. Smout (ed.), *Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603 to 1900* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 246-51.
[16] Archibald Primrose, earl of Rosebery, *Miscellanies, Literary and Historical* (2 vols, London, 1921), Vol. II, pp. 101-2. Quoted in Hutchison, 'Anglo-Scottish Political Relations', 246.
[17] Colin Kidd, 'From Jacobitism to the SNP: the Crown, the Union and the Scottish Question' (unpublished paper, 2013), p. 14.
[18] *Ibid*, 38-9.
[19] Hutchison, 'Anglo-Scottish Political Relations', 251-62.

nationalism'. Morton argues, for instance, that in the nineteenth century, local civil society in Scotland continued to operate distinctively from that south of the border.[20]

Yet here perhaps we should return to Kidd's point about amphibiousness. This thesis has argued that the conventions and pressures of lobbying acted as a force for a degree of convergence, albeit one that necessarily had its own peculiarities and distinctively national and local inflections north of the border. In the pursuit of local legislation, for example, long-standing and distinctively 'Scottish' local institutions played an important part alongside the new notions of the public. The fact that, as Hutchison shows, Scottish local legislation at Westminster continued to grow throughout the nineteenth century, and that through this, local society in Scotland continued to represent and promote its own interests at the British political centre, is suggestive of how the developments observed in this thesis deepened and extended beyond the period that it covers.[21] It is also demonstrative of the fact that, ultimately, part of the story of Scottish convergence on a British political culture should be focused at the local or regional level.

[20] Graeme Morton, *Unionist Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland, 1830-1860* (Edinburgh, 1999).
[21] *Ibid*., 37-44; L. Paterson, *The Autonomy of Modern Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1994), pp. 46-55; Hutchison, 'Anglo-Scottish Political Relations', 262.

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