SENECA'S *DE IRA*: A STUDY

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ABSTRACT

‘Seneca’s *De ira*: a study’

Antony Smith, Corpus Christi College, Oxford

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This thesis offers new philosophical and literary interpretations of Seneca’s *De ira*. It takes as its starting-point the observation that both the philosophical position on which the text relies and the way in which it is organised appear to be chaotic, and it investigates how far and why this is the case. It shows that a coherent philosophical position underlies the text but that the text presents it as incoherent, and that it does this for therapeutic purposes. Similarly, it shows that the text is organised in a far more orderly way than has been previously appreciated, and it explains how the (apparent) disruption of that organisational system serves the text’s therapeutic function. In making these arguments, it presents new readings of the *De ira* that reveal the text’s philosophical and literary qualities, arguing that it constitutes a more sophisticated response to Seneca’s philosophical predecessors than previous accounts have claimed, and that the text, as it progresses, introduces new therapeutic strategies that provide ‘safety nets’ should its earlier principal strategies have failed. The thesis aims to be methodologically innovative in using Seneca’s descriptions of emotional responses as well as more explicit theorising to reconstruct his philosophical position and in suggesting a new approach to interpreting the role of interlocutors and addressees in didactic and dialogic texts.

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A NOTE ON REFERENCES

Numerical references of the form 2.9 or 1.17.1 are, except where otherwise indicated, to Seneca, *De ira* (using Reynolds (1977)'s text).

Abbreviated references to Galen's works always use a shortened form of the work's name. Otherwise, shortened forms of references to ancient texts use, where possible, the abbreviations employed by the *OLD* or *LSJ*. When passages quoted or cited feature in *SVF* or *LS*, references are provided, but, of course, the passages as printed in *SVF* and *LS* may not correspond precisely to the citation.

The following abbreviations refer to standard reference works. These works are not separately listed in 'Works cited'.

LS Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N. (eds.) (1987), *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

LSJ Liddell, H.G., Scott, R. and Jones, H.S. (eds.) (1996), *Greek-English Lexicon With a Revised Supplement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

OLD Clare, P.G.W. (ed.) (2012), *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Second Edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Pauly Cancik, H., Derlien, J., Egger, B., Salazar, C.F. and Schneider, H. (eds.) (2006-2010), *Brill's New Pauly: Encyclopaedia of the ancient world: Antiquity* (Leiden: Brill).

RE Pauly, A.F. von, Wissowa, G., Kroll, W., Ziegler, K., Witte, K. and Mittelhaus, K. (eds.) (1894-1972), *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler).

SVF von Arnim, H. (ed.) (1903-1905), *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Leipzig: Teubner).

TLL Lommatzsch, E., Dittmann, G. Rehm, B., Rubenbauer, H., Haffter, H., Ehlers, W., Flury, P., Beikircher, H. and Clavadetscher, S. (eds.) (1900-), *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (Leipzig: Teubner).

§1: INTRODUCTION

The *De ira* has often struck its readers as chaotic. This is true both of the philosophical theory underpinning the text and of its literary presentation. In his important book on ancient approaches to anger management, William Harris condemns Seneca for his logical inconsistencies, explaining that, amongst other faults, he

> 'even finds it difficult to maintain a distinction between anger and hatred, and he has no clear-cut position about what counts as *ira*.'[1]

For Cupaiuolo, meanwhile:

> 'Pertanto Seneca dà a volte l'impressione di aver scritto di volta in volta spirito quasi soltanto dalla necessità di obbedire al bisogno di riempire fino in fondo la pagina bianca, senza curarsi di vedere prima se quell'argomento dovesse essere trattato altrove o se l'avesse già affrontato.'[2]

The aim of this thesis is to find some order behind the apparent disorder and to understand the function of the (real and apparent) disorder. In the first, philosophical, part (§2), I argue that a coherent philosophical position on what emotions are and how they develop and fade underlies the text. In reconstructing this position, I make use both of the obviously philosophically relevant sections and of seemingly 'literary' descriptions of emotions growing or fading away. I also offer an explanation for why Seneca presents his consistent philosophical position in a way that may not be obviously coherent. In the second, literary part (§3), I try to understand the structure of the *De ira*, its apparently

[1] Harris (2001) 115. Cf. Quintilian's characterisation of Seneca as *in philosophia parum diligens* (Quint.*Inst.*10.1.129). The *De ira*'s relationship to the views of Seneca's philosophical predecessors has also been deemed chaotic: the *Quellenforschung* exemplified above all, perhaps, by Holler (1934) tends to characterise him as a confused eclectic (see Inwood (1993) 153-154).

[2] Cupaiuolo (1975) 68. Cf. Monteleone (2014) 129: 'Among the most controversial issues of Seneca's *De ira* has always been the problem concerning its compositional structure. Most scholars have agreed - albeit on different grounds - on the work's lack of unity'.

chaotic use of addressee and interlocutors and the seeming discontinuities in Seneca's construction of his own *persona*, both to identify some underlying order and to understand the function of its disruption for the text's therapeutic project.

This thesis is also, implicitly, an argument for why the *De ira* deserves to be taken seriously, both as a work of philosophy and as a work of literature. Some still see Seneca's thinking as unoriginal[3] or even substandard;[4] and others see little value in his prose works as forms of literary expression. Even the preface to the recent *Brill's Companion to Seneca: Philosopher and Dramatist*[5] plays up to this prejudice, insisting that the philosophical works be treated as philosophy and the tragic works as tragedies, with little apparent sympathy for the notion that the philosophical works deserve to be appreciated as literature as well as philosophy;[6] and many of the contributions seem to consider what we would think of as underlying incompetence as characteristic of his philosophical writings.[7] However, other contributors defy this trend[8] and so too have a number of recent volumes, with, for example, Inwood's collection *Reading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy at Rome*[9] demonstrating the depth and creativity of Seneca's thought and Griffin's *Seneca on Society: A Guide to* De beneficiis[10] revealing the artistry underlying the *De beneficiis*. What I hope to have produced is a study that shows how the *De ira* as well can be seen as successful from both perspectives, and one that does so by tackling

[3] Costa (1997) xix: 'he was not an original thinker'. It should be acknowledged that this charge might be anachronistic in a philosophical culture that valued allegiance to the views of one's school's foundational figures (Sedley (1989)).
[4] Harris (2001) 115 criticises the *De ira*'s philosophy as 'mediocre'.
[5] Damschen & Heil (2014a).
[6] Damschen & Heil (2014b) xi.
[7] See (e.g.) Mutschler (2014) 154 on the difficulty of identifying larger-scale structural principles in Seneca's prose works.
[8] See (e.g.) Scott Smith (2014) 116-117 on the *De prouidentia*, although, of course, structural analyses of the type he offers are not new, with earlier scholarship finding unity in far more complex works (see (e.g.) Leeman (1951) on Seneca's *Epistle* 102).
[9] Inwood (2005).
[10] Griffin (2013).

head-on its apparently unsatisfactory features: its moments of self-contradiction, its structural peculiarities, its awkward shifting of addressee and the fact that, for many readers, at times it simply isn't very interesting. In the philosophical section, I advance a new account of Seneca's analysis of this emotion and one that attributes to him a different and, I think, more sophisticated response to his philosophical predecessors than those suggested by Sorabji and Gill.[11] In the literary section, I offer a, to my knowledge, new interpretation of the text's therapeutic strategies that finds him using more sophisticated techniques than the existing analyses of Habinek, Roller, van Hoof and others suggest[12] and that invites the same complexity of interpretation usually afforded to the likes of Lucretius.[13]

This thesis, then, falls into two parts, the first principally 'philosophical' and the second principally 'literary.' This division may seem odd, because the two are clearly hard to separate in a work of philosophical literature: philosophical interpretation assists literary analysis, and vice versa. But (one) reason for the division is that philosophical interpretation and literary analysis have – or 'usually have' or, perhaps, 'should have' – fundamentally different objectives and employ seemingly incompatible hermeneutic principles.

[11] Sorabji (2000) 55-75, Gill (2005) 457-459.
[12] Habinek (1998) 137-150, Roller (2001) esp. 272-286, van Hoof (2007), Kaster (2010) 12-13, etc.
[13] For this reason, although I indicate in the footnotes a number of points of connection between Seneca's strategies in the *De ira* and those he employs in other texts, I emphasise comparisons with Latin didactic poems, which have been the subject of far more attention than Senecan works. Thus, while it is widely recognised that the *Epistles* follow a didactic plan, work remains to be done on how precisely the didactic exposition works. Similarly, while many other of his prose texts have been described as disordered (see (e.g.) Williams (2003) 27), the explanations offered have often been vague (see (e.g.) Williams (2003) 27); and I hope that this thesis demonstrates that these texts warrant more detailed analysis as well.

In literary theory, the author is dead, and has been for some time.[14] Under the influence of New Criticism, modern literary critics assert the impossibility of using an author's work to assess with certainty what his or her intentions or beliefs were. Instead, they emphasise the role of the (actual or ideal) reader (or audience member) in creating meaning.

In philosophical analysis, on the other hand, the author is alive and well. Aware that we can never be sure we have understood what the author thought, we have a go regardless. In doing so, we employ the 'principle of charity', the principle that we should interpret others' philosophical beliefs in their strongest possible form, i.e. in the way that avoids assuming that their work contains 'logical' errors.[15]

Establishing exactly what we are or should be seeking to do when we analyse texts is a question that is, of course, far beyond the scope of this chapter. But it is a question that cannot be ignored altogether, and I shall offer a brief justification for the shifting aims I have over the course of this thesis. These aims are:

- to recover the philosophical positions that underpin the *De ira* (§2), by reconstructing the positions advanced by *the author*; and
- to understand the strategies that allow the *De ira* to function persuasively in its original context (§3), by constructing the responses of *ideal readers*.

My justification of these aims inevitably involves considering the methodological problems they raise but I do not claim to justify fully every method that I use or every assumption that I rely upon.

[14] Barthes (1968).
[15] I use this word in a colloquial rather than a technical sense, so that it also includes, for instance, category mistakes.

In §2, then, I seek to recover the philosophical underpinnings of the *De ira* and to argue that a coherent understanding of *ira* underlies the work. My aim, in short, is to recover Seneca's positions.

As New Criticism teaches us, however, it is impossible to prove beyond doubt that an author intends a particular text to have a particular meaning or that it had a particular purpose. This is true for even apparently uncomplicated speech acts, like direct requests. To ask someone to pass the salt, for example, might be motivated not by a desire to have the salt passed to one but to move on from an awkward conversation. However, endless suspicion about the possibility of understanding authorial intention from texts or utterances would make much everyday activity impossible, and we go about our everyday lives working on the assumption that we can work out what people mean from what they say. Davidson rightly points out that the same applies to attempts to recover other peoples' philosophical beliefs, and formulates a so-called 'principle of charity' involving two distinct principles, of coherence and of correspondence.[16] However, it might fairly be objected that we can conclude not what they actually think, but what they want us to think that they think, and so I speak not of Seneca's beliefs but of his positions (and I reformulate Davidson's principles accordingly):

Requirement 1: COHERENCE – an assumption that the subject's positions are consistent and, as a result, a requirement to interpret his/her positions in a way that maximises consistency

[16] Davidson (1991).

Requirement 2: CORRESPONDENCE – an assumption that there is a causal relationship between each position and the real-world phenomenon which the position seeks to describe or to explain

This requirement, however, risks causing ancient theories to be reconstructed in such a way as to make them as similar as possible to contemporary thinking; for this reason, the principle of charity has been called a 'principle of patronization'.[17] If this objection is considered significant, the fact that my interpretation of Seneca's account of *ira* meets this second requirement, as I argue in §2.6.1, can simply be ignored. However, this second requirement also invites the charge of anachronism, and so we should add to it:

Requirement 3: AVAILABILITY – the account does not require the author to have made use of epistemic resources not at his/her disposal[18]

At this point, it might be objected that some texts are inherently – and deliberately – inconsistent: why should we privilege an analysis that we can, with a great deal of effort, reconstruct from the text over the one that it naturally invites? In response to this, we might add a further constraint on the principle of charity:

Requirement 4: EXPLANATION FOR INCOHERENCE - there is a good literary reason for the arising of confusion or inconsistencies

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[17] Ross (1985) 500.

[18] This combats the historical fallacy of availability (on which, see, briefly, Spoerhase and King (2009) 279-280; in more detail, Barnes and Barnes (1989), Prudovsky (1997), Jardine (2000)).

In this thesis, then, I favour the interpretations of the text that I consider would have been most likely to someone reading it with the cultural and linguistic expectations and assumptions of Seneca's readership (to the extent that these can be reconstructed) except where an explanation for accepting a less obviously likely interpretation can convincingly be provided – that is, except where Requirement 4 is met.

Of course, these four requirements are not enough to prove that we should accept the consistent theory that we recover. In the first place, what if several theories were to meet these four requirements? This is not, I think, a problem that my project faces as it is the first attempt to provide an analysis of the *De ira*'s philosophy that shows in detail how these requirements are met, and to do so with reference not only to the obviously philosophically relevant sections;[19] if it does seem a problem, though, it may well be that there is no rigorous way to choose between the different possible theories. However, we might examine the changes that Seneca would, on each interpretation of his theory, have made to previous versions of the theory, and ask for which of these possible interpretations the changes seem best-motivated. The motivations behind the innovations that Seneca made to the Stoic theory he inherited is an area that I shall address (although I do not go so far as to include this issue as a fifth requirement).

Moreover, even if we *can* arrive at one consistent theory, as I do, it remains valid to wonder whether it is right to accept that there is a consistent theory to be found at all. This

[19] It may be objected that Seneca's descriptions of emotions are designed for rhetorical effect and that Seneca may have permitted them to misrepresent his views on how emotions develop and fade for this reason. Such an assumption is probably the reason for the scholarly emphasis on the sections that set out philosophical views more explicitly. However, this understates the extent to which these seemingly more relevant sections are themselves potentially liable to misrepresent philosophical positions for rhetorical effect. It seems to me preferable to accept an account that matches the evidence from seemingly rhetorical descriptions as well as more obviously philosophical sections rather than one that only matches the evidence from the more obviously philosophical sections if that account meets the four requirements we have discussed.

is, after all, what we do in everyday life: we assume that everyday speech utterances are coherent and straightforward (that someone would like to salt their food or to pass it to someone who wants to do so) *unless* we have reason to doubt their motives, either internal to their words or from the context (an awkward topic of conversation that might cause them to want to create a distraction).

If the *De ira* were a text that offered a straightforward and obviously coherent exposition of philosophical arguments, making claims that were not undermined by other claims or by the text's style, there would be no good reason to doubt that the principle of charity should be applied. However, the *De ira* is not such a text. Many of the claims that it treats as most important – for example, that *ira* should always be avoided – are made consistently throughout, but the way in which *ira* is described sometimes, as we shall see, seems to undermine the claim that it should always be avoided. Moreover, Seneca's accounts of *ira* sometimes differ in ways that seem incompatible (even if it is, however, possible to reconstruct a consistent analysis of *ira* behind this inconsistency).

There are (at least) six responses to inconsistencies – that is, occasions when a section of a text or its implications seem to be logically incompatible with another section of that text or its implications – in texts that claim to teach:

- **Solution (a):** View the inconsistencies as the result of the text's inability to control reader response. Language is polyvalent and authors may use particular words or images that carry more or different meanings than the author would wish them to, or they might get 'carried away by their own rhetoric'.[20]

[20] This is, as Volk (2011) has argued, *probably* the cause of a number of self-contradictions in Manilius' *Astronomica.*

- **Solution (b):** View the inconsistencies as the text deliberately misleading the reader to suggest that an argument is more convincing or more complete than it is.[21]
- **Solution (c):** View the inconsistencies as the result of the teacher adapting his way of speaking to the level of the student's attainment (which changes over the text).[22]
- **Solution (d):** Attribute the problem to the author's incompetence (including, perhaps, his inability to understand his sources), the text's incomplete state or textual problems (such as interpolation).[23]
- **Solution (e):** View the inconsistencies as designed to promote independence of thought.[24]
- **Solution (f):** View the inconsistencies as humorous.[25]

The approaches open to us can be summarised as:

- If some underlying consistency can be found: solutions (a), (b), (e) and (f)
- If some underlying consistency cannot be found:

[21] For example, when Lucretius anticipates the complaints of mourners who lament that a man will no longer be able to enjoy the *tot praemia uitae*, including the sweet kisses of his children, his achievements and the opportunity to protect his family, he goes on to respond stridently, but only to some of their complaints (Lucr.3.894-930 (partly reproduced in *LS* 24E)). The reason for the inconsistency between what Lucretius implies he will be arguing against and the positions that he actually does argue against is, presumably, that Lucretius wishes to give the impression that he has argued against more reasons for the fear of death than he actually has.

[22] Thus, for example, one way to make sense of Lucretius' appeal to Venus in the proem of the *De rerum natura* is that it is meant to encourage first-time readers to find something reassuringly familiar in a potentially strange 'textbook' about Epicureanism and so to continue reading that book, but that, as we read the poem, we realise that it was a 'white lie.' In the case of Lucretius, this may be indebted to the way that, in their proems, Parmenides, Heraclitus and Empedocles (an important model for Lucretius), 'announce the theme or (part of the) subject of their work in such a way that one can only understand [...] what is meant after having studied the whole' (Mansfeld (1995) 226).

[23] The problem of Manilius' rejection of the *uulgata ratio* for working out the ascending degree of the zodiac shortly before endorsing that same method in disguise at Man.3.203-509 is probably best solved by one of these methods, as critics have recognised (authorial incompetence: Housman (1903-30) 3.xxi; incomplete state: implicit in Abry (1993) 210; interpolation: Brind'Amour (1983) 148), even if those who use one of these methods leave themselves open to accusations of cheating (cf. the title of O'Hara (2005)).

[24] This is a standard interpretation of the *Georgics*: on Nappa's formulation, Virgil 'tries to transmit a recognition of the problems of the human condition, and he hopes to inspire individual readers to develop whatever philosophical armature they can in order to cope with them' (Nappa (2005) 10).

[25] Ovid's didactic *persona* in the *Ars amatoria* frequently undercuts his own advice, seemingly as part of his humorous self-characterisation as a bogus teacher (Watson (2007), esp. 358-359) (although the laughter it provokes may have social, political and literary effects or functions).

- *Either* explain the inconsistencies away: solutions (c) and (d)
- *Or* interpret the inconsistencies: solutions (e) and (f)

If, as I shall argue, an underlying consistency can be found in the *De ira* (i.e. it meets Requirement 1), we should have recourse to one or a number of solutions (a), (b), (e) and (f). My position will be that the *De ira*'s (apparent) inconsistencies derive principally from (b),[26] but that (a) is occasionally a factor[27] and that there are hints of demands for our own intellectual engagement that might invite us to see (e) in play too.[28]

The fact that we have attributed the major tensions and inconsistencies to (b) rather than, say, to (f) makes the principle of charity more appealing, but it raises the question of why we choose (b) rather than (f). Why do we argue that the *De ira*'s therapy or didaxis is not meant to be funny?[29] It must be partly down to, I suspect, the expectations raised by other works written by the author and, perhaps especially, by the 'signals' of literary purpose and generic affiliation the text provides. Ultimately, however, it is impossible to prove that the *De ira* is a text that advances a central argument that anger is bad rather than a text whose incompetent, repetitive and at times hyperbolic teacher undermines his own teaching, either to make us laugh or to call into question the claims he seems to be advancing so forcefully. What I present in §3, then, is an account of how the *De ira* might function as a literary work on the assumption that it is a text that genuinely intends to provide the therapy that it claims to. An argument of this sort is circular: by assuming that

[26] See §2.7.
[27] See §2.5.1.2.
[28] See §3.3.1.3.
[29] Similarly, why do we not see the *Georgics* as a humorous text (solution (f)) that invites us to laugh at the expense of the 'bogus teacher'? Or why is the *Ars amatoria* not more often seen as provoking us to sustained intellectual reflection (solution (e)), especially when it has already been convincingly argued that it forces us to reject the polarity that Augustan morality posited between *matronae* and *meretrices* (on which, see Gibson (2003) 32-35)?

the *De ira* is a work that genuinely intends to achieve particular philosophical objectives, I assume that the coherent philosophical substructure that *can* be identified as underlying it *should*, as it meets the requirements I outline above, be identified as underlying it; and, by noting the existence of such a substructure, my argument for the genuineness of the *De ira*'s philosophical objectives gains credibility. But there does not seem to me to be a way to escape this circularity. We might, of course, try to formulate alternative, equally circular arguments involving the *De ira* provoking our own intellectual engagement or the *De ira* being an act of humour. So, for example, we might conclude from the apparent philosophical inconsistencies and chaotic organisation of the *De ira* that, much like Platonic dialogues, the text does not encode attitudes towards anger or encode an analysis of anger that we are meant to endorse but, rather, demands intellectual engagement; and we might conclude from the text's demand for intellectual engagement that we are not to seek coherent interpretations or attitudes (or, at least, not to interpret them as positions that Seneca advocates or (necessarily) endorses). Or we could conclude from the apparent chaos that the 'narrator' of the *De ira* is (humorously?) meant to be a bogus teacher, and from the interpretation that he is a bogus teacher, we might assume that we are not meant to try to find a coherent philosophical substructure underlying the text. It would then be up to individual readers to decide which of these necessarily circular interpretative arguments seems to them the most plausible. This thesis aims not to set out and to compare such circular interpretations. Rather, I set out one interpretation and show how it might work, in its strongest form.[30]

The aim of Chapter 3 is to understand how the text functions persuasively as an argument for the viciousness of anger. Apart from a discussion defending my interpretation of what

[30] I do not do so by recasting the *De ira* in formal terms because it is a text that (seems to) seek to be conversational and so does not invite this sort of treatment.

the text is trying to persuade us about the nature of anger, my aim is to explain how the text might have functioned persuasively for hypothetical 'ideal' readers.

This is, I suspect, what most critics offer when they interpret texts of this sort. In general, when they analyse texts, even those that allow many interpretations, scholars tend to offer one interpretation[31] (or, at least, one interpretation for each of a group of distinct groups[32]). Some would argue that this interpretation is just one way you could read it to get it to make sense, and that it has no more authority than other interpretations: any interpretation is valid, as we tell our students, so long as it is supported in the text (and context). But when scholars present arguments, they often don't just do this: they argue against other scholars' views, and this entails that they (we) think their views do (or, rather, should) in fact have more authority than those other views. What does this single interpretation consist of?

It could be the response of an ideal reader – one who interpreted the text as it should be interpreted – or it could be that of an average reader – one who interpreted the text as most people (of the particular context of its first, or another specific, reception moment) would have interpreted it. However, these may not be so different, at least in practice. Even if we imagine that we are recreating the responses of the 'average' reader and seek to recover in detail the 'cultural filters' through which they would have created meaning, most of us

[31] This interpretation might, of course, be that the text demands that readers reach their own independent, even if divergent, views on the text. The obvious example of this is Lucan's *De bello ciuili*, which sets itself up in opposition to Caesar's account of the civil war, his *De bello ciuili*, by presenting a version of events whose paradoxes and ambiguities often problematise rather than support the narrator's explicit judgements and shift the burden of interpreting history onto the reader. Thus, the question *quis furor* [...], *quae tanta licentia ferri?* (Luc.1.8) is addressed not to the Muse, as are the series of questions that begin in the corresponding line of the *Aeneid*, but to the *ciues* - which must include not only those of civil war Rome but also Lucan's contemporary readers: interpretative control is restored to the Roman people.

[32] We might think, for example, of the way that Pindaric odes often speak differently to his patron, to members of the patron's community and to those outside of the patron's community; and the way that apparently laudatory passages might look like praise to a patron but might convey subversive messages to his subjects (on doublespeak, see (e.g.) Bartsch (1994) on its presence in Neronian Rome).

construct a reader who is as careful as we are, one who is as sensitive to ambiguity and paradox, one who is as responsive to intertextual allusions (i.e. alert to their expressive power but not prone to read too much into them) – and so our 'average' reader is often our 'ideal' reader in disguise. For this reason, in this thesis, it is these 'ideal readers' whose responses I am interested in; and by 'ideal readers' in this context, I mean those (hypothetical) readers who read the text in the way(s) that make(s) it most persuasive.

There are some aspects of the attempt to reconstruct their responses that require discussion or clarification. Firstly, I do not seek to recover exactly how Seneca would have predicted they would have understood the text. 'Powerful and profound creativity', Bakhtin tells us, 'is largely unconscious and polysemic'.[33] If Bakhtin is correct, his first claim entails that Seneca would not necessarily have been deliberately using, or even conscious that he was using, particular techniques:[34] he may use a tricolon not because he is deliberately attempting to apply his childhood rhetorical training but simply because it instinctively 'feels' like the right way to express his thoughts.

Given this, in reconstructing ideal readers' experiences and seeking to understand how they would have been persuaded, both consciously and subconsciously, by the *De ira*, I make use, at the appropriate points, both of ancient literary theory and of modern research in anthropology, experimental psychology and neuroscience and related fields.

[33] Bakhtin (1986) 141-142.
[34] Seneca was evidently knowledgeable about rhetoric, being one of the addressees of his father's *Controversiae* and *Suasoriae* (see especially, for his (alleged) enthusiasm, Sen.*Con.*1 *praef.*1) and indeed teaching rhetoric to Nero (Tac.*Ann.*13.2), and this knowledge evidently informs his writing (Wilson (2007)). But it does not follow that he was consciously using particular techniques rather than writing what intuitively seemed to him to be persuasive.

Each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages. Ancient theoretical observations have the advantage of being culturally specific: they form an often generally accepted attempt to classify the techniques and strategies that made writing persuasive. They are not always based on intuition and, indeed, some quote supporting evidence that suggests they are based on an analysis of the features of texts that struck contemporary readers and audience members as effective. However, in general, they are based implicitly on appeals to probability and 'common sense', and this must be treated with some caution given that we now know that individuals do not always respond to arguments in as rational or predictable a way as we would imagine. Perhaps recognising this, many ancient writers seem to have ignored much of the advice given in rhetorical handbooks, many of which seem to have designed for early education and which, as instructions, are often quite non-specific (just as Horace's *Ars Poetica* would not provide an aspiring poet with the information required to write texts of the sophistication of his *Odes*[35]).

Modern research can provide a corrective to ancient theorists' claims as it identifies what actually persuades us rather than what we would instinctively expect (and hope) would persuade us, and it does this in ways that sometimes support and sometimes challenge the claims made by ancient theorists. However, this is a rapidly developing field and some of its claims must be seen as provisional; and, more importantly, effective modes of persuasion vary both synchronically and diachronically. Modern research on persuasion often seeks to understand what twenty-first century westerners find persuasive, and is therefore not straightforwardly applicable to first-century Romans.

[35] Reinhardt (2013) 500-502. Even within the *Odes*, Horace's metaliterary reflections do not always betray the complexity of the actual text. See (e.g.) West (2002) 264-5 on Hor.*Carm.*3.30.12-13.

To an extent, then, modern research can go some way to solving the major problem that ancient literary theory has, indicating which of the ancients' insights should not be rejected but at least treated with caution. Similarly, ancient literary theory can go some way to solving the major problem that modern research has, by helping us to identify and so leading us to interrogate more closely some of the claims that are inapplicable to Seneca's political, social and cultural context. Neither corrects the faults of the other completely: modern research cannot 'disprove' the claims of any ancient theorising, while ancient theorising dates from a fairly lengthy time span and the ancient theoretical texts that have come down to us tend to treat genres as frozen in time, even though literary strategies and cultures develop and change. I do not advance a 'one size fits all' approach to how these two approaches might most sensibly be combined; however, I hope that using sometimes one approach, sometimes the other, and sometimes both alongside each other allows a clearer understanding of how the *De ira* could have functioned persuasively in first-century AD Rome to emerge.

The above is true for almost all of the third chapter. My argument in Chapter 3 is structured as an account of how the text is ordered and how it is disordered, and the literary effects of this. As part of this, I discuss the organisation of the *De ira*, and explain, for example, how different structuring 'schemes' (the *De ira* as an argument against anger, the *De ira* as a therapeutic textbook and the *De ira* as a work divided into three books) interact to enable repetition, which in turn functions persuasively. This could be construed as an argument of how Seneca set about achieving his aim rather than an argument about how 'ideal' readers would have responded to it, and indeed here (as I do elsewhere, for the sake of convenience) I often write in terms of how Seneca organises the text. It need not be – it could be understood as how the 'ideal reader' might locate order in a seemingly

disordered text. But it is up to the individual reader to decide whether or not this defence stretches plausibility.

The second aspect of my approach to understanding how the text's 'ideal readers' would have responded to the *De ira* that I wish to emphasise relates to the second part of Bakhtin's observation, that creativity is polysemic. This observation may seem less applicable to a text that, I have argued, seeks to persuade readers of a particular philosophical view, especially given that creativity (often thought of as spontaneous) and philosophical argument (often considered the product of prolonged thought) are generally opposed in popular thought. No text is polysemic without limit: all texts close down our responses to some extent, and when one seeks to persuade, one seeks to close them down to a very great extent. The *De ira*, at least if we trust its statements of metatextual intent,[36] is just such a text. Although the *De ira* is open to being understood by different subsets of readers in different ways (in the same way that, we have seen, a Pindaric ode allows itself to be understood by the patron, by members of the patron's community and by other Greeks in very different ways) and so it would be understood very differently, for example, by a committed Stoic to someone suspicious of Stoicism, it seems to me sensible in interpreting the *De ira* to assume our 'ideal reader' is one who might need, to some extent, to be convinced of the views that are being expounded.

However, even when we restrict our ideal readership to those who, though they may be sympathetic to Stoic attitudes to *ira* and/or to Seneca's particular strategies to manage *ira*, are not fully convinced by them, Seneca's arguments may involve polysemy for the same audience. I shall discuss in §3.3.1.3 a section of the *De ira*, 1.3.2, in which what Seneca is

[36] These occur throughout the *De ira*: 1.1.1, 1.1.3, 1.5.1, etc.

arguing is clear and many of the premises that he accepts are also clear. But the logical relationships that relate different premises to each other and to the conclusion are obscure and can be interpreted in different ways and there seems to me to be no way of determining which Seneca intended us to accept. Philosophical arguments are one area that we would intuitively expect to control reader response firmly; although this is an extreme case, it demonstrates that even arguments that seem designed to argue logically and rigorously may be polysemic.

Our ‘ideal’ reader, then, as we have seen, should be the person who reads it in the most persuasive form available to one of Seneca’s contemporaries; and this means that he may understand a passage in more than one way. In the case of this passage, he will be someone aware of all these possible ways of construing the text. However, as we shall see, sometimes a particular text may evoke contradictory impulses in two different groups of readers, and a persuasive text may seek to be persuasive in different ways to both these groups, and so there may be times when positing more than one group of ideal reader is appropriate, as I do in this thesis. That is why I speak of ‘ideal readers’, in the plural, and what I have implied is a ‘single interpretation’ occasionally bifurcates, with different readings for different sorts of readers.

§2: SENECA'S ACCOUNT OF *IRA*

In this chapter, I set out Seneca's views on what *ira* is and how it develops and fades, and I argue that a coherent understanding of the emotion underlies his apparently confused claims and implications.

In §2.1, I establish that Seneca thought that *ira* was the desire to take revenge for an *iniuria* that one believes one has suffered. Such a formulation, though, does not provide much detail about what precisely Seneca thought occurred during the process of experiencing an emotion and, in §2.2, I outline what I think Seneca thought actually happened on a cognitive level. In §2.3, I explain and justify to what parts of this 'script'[37] I think Seneca would have applied the term *ira*. In §2.4, I offer an argument in favour of the 'script' of *ira* I presented in §2.2.

In §2.5, I discuss the physical and corporeal aspects of Seneca's views of emotions which, until this point, I have treated in cognitive terms. I discuss how he seems to rely upon, even though he does not explicitly lay claim to, a theory of different types of psychic *pneuma* existing in the human body and how he invites an interpretation of emotions in terms of the amount of heat in the body. I consider the implications of these two different physical explanations of *ira* for our understanding of the emotion.

Together, §2.1-2.5 implicitly constitute an argument that an internally consistent view of what *ira* is underlies the *De ira*. In §2.6, I examine the relationship between my interpretation of Seneca's account of *ira* and our everyday experiences (as described by

[37] I use the term 'script' to refer to a mapping-out of the different stages involved in experiencing an emotion rather than, as Kaster (2005) generally does, to describe the particular situations in which an episode of a particular emotion occurs.

modern scientific research) of how anger grows, peaks and then seems to ‘decline’ or dissipate (§2.6.1). I then set out the relationship between Seneca’s account and a small number of other ancient philosophical views about emotions and beliefs (§2.6.2). These provide two (apparently competing but not necessarily mutually exclusive) explanations for Seneca’s having made (some of) the changes that he made to the orthodox Stoic theory of the emotions. I hope that they therefore contribute to the plausibility of ascribing to Seneca the analysis of the emotions that I have set out. In §2.7, I consider the literary reasons behind the *De ira*’s presentation of his coherent philosophical position as incoherent.

As a whole, this chapter is intended to show that my interpretation of Seneca’s account of *ira* meet the four requirements that I argued in the introduction we should apply. §2.1-2.5 sets out to show that it meets the requirement of coherence (my Requirement 1) by advancing an interpretation of Seneca’s theory of anger and justifying my account: a watertight demonstration that the principle of coherence is met would require me to record the results of my having tested the theory I have reconstructed against every line of the *De ira*, which space does not allow. However, the nature of the theory as I have reconstructed it and the flexibility with which the term *ira* is applied by Seneca make it straightforward to see how any particular instance of *ira* described by Seneca is accommodated by my account of his theory. Then, §2.6.1 argues that the theory, on my reconstruction, meets the requirement of correspondence (my Requirement 2); §2.6.2 argues that it meets the requirement of availability (my Requirement 3); and §2.7 argues that it meets the requirement to provide an explanation for incoherence (my Requirement 4).

§2.1: SENECA'S DEFINITION OF *IRA*

According to Chrysippus' account of the emotions (which became the standard Stoic account), an emotion is an assent to an impression that something, either in the present or in the future, is either a good thing or a bad thing.[38] There are four main types of emotion (pleasure and desire, which are beliefs that something in the present and in the future respectively is a good thing; and pain and fear, which are beliefs that something in the present and in the future respectively is a bad thing). A particular emotion may be more precisely characterised, of course, as the belief that a *particular* thing is good or bad: there are different types of pleasure, for example, depending on what present thing is deemed to be good.

Exactly what Seneca thought *ira* to be is revealed in the definitional section that appears to have followed (even if not immediately to have followed) Seneca's introduction of his theme and his description of the effects of *ira* at 1.1.1-1.2.3a.[39] The beginning of this definitional section has, like the end of his description of the effects of *ira*, been lost, but it is reported by Lactantius at *De ira dei* 17.13:

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[38] There is, strictly, a difference between an impression and the propositional content that corresponds to that impression, and an impression is more than simply the propositional content that corresponds to it: see further n.384. For the sake of readability, in this thesis, I speak of 'the impression that…' where the 'that' clause gives the propositional content that corresponds to the impression. There is a slight difference between Chrysippus' and Seneca's accounts: Chrysippus' analysis of emotions involved assenting to two judgements, that which I have identified here and that which states that a particular response is appropriate: see further Sorabji (2000) 32-33. Seneca's definition, however, seems to combine the two, i.e. to involve both a belief that revenge will be a good thing and that it is appropriate to take revenge. This distinction does not affect this chapter's argument and so, for the sake of simplicity, I do not generally write in a way that acknowledges this particular feature of Chrysippus' theory. That Seneca (largely) agreed with the Chrysippan analysis of emotions is not something that could have been taken for granted given his claim for philosophical independence of thought (cf. n.242), but what follows in this section provides evidence that he did. See §2.6.2.2 for a more detailed discussion of how Seneca's position relates to Chrysippus' and to Zeno's positions (and how Chrysippus' position relates to Zeno's).

[39] I translate *ira* as 'anger' in this thesis, but in the philosophical section, where the precise meaning of the Latin term is most important for my argument, I generally refer to it by its Latin name.

nescisse autem philosophos quae ratio esset irae apparet ex finitionibus eorum quas Seneca enumerauit in libris quos de ira composuit. ira est inquit cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae aut, ut ait Posidonius, cupiditas puniendi eius a quo te inique putes laesum. quidam ita finierunt: ira est incitatio animi ad nocendum ei qui aut nocuit aut nocere uoluit. Aristotelis definitio non multum a nostra abest: ait enim iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi. (usually cited, in part, as 1.2.3b)

The almost complete accuracy of Lactantius' quoting of the fourth of these definitions, which is the only one to appear in the part of Seneca's definitional section that is transmitted in the *De ira*'s manuscript tradition,[40] gives us reason to be confident that Lactantius quoted Seneca faithfully.[41] If the text printed above is correct, Seneca endorses two definitions of *ira*.[42] According to both, *ira* is a form of *cupiditas*. In the first, which appears to be an abbreviated version of the standard Stoic definitions,[43] it is the *cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae*. In the second definition, which also appears to be a standard Stoic definition,[44] it is the *cupiditas puniendi eius a quo te inique putes laesum.*

[40] 1.3.3. The only difference is the insignificant detail that Lactantius writes *definitio* where the Senecan manuscripts report *finitio*.
[41] On Lactantius' reworking of the *De ira* and its significance for partially completing the lacuna in the *De ira*, see Barlow (1937).
[42] On Seneca's inclusive use of definitions, offering a number of definitions to allow a complete conceptualisation of the term being defined, cf. n.45. Other philosophers too, such as Aristotle, offered a number of accounts of particular concepts to reveal (often gradually) their natures, even if they would not strictly call them all definitions.
[43] Given that *libido* and *cupiditas* are interchangeable (see Cic.*Tusc*.3.24 = *SVF* 3.385), it adds to the definition given by Cicero, *ulciscendi libido*, at Cic.*Tusc*.4.44 only the notion that the revenge is being taken for an injustice (*iniuria*).
[44] It is very close to the version given at Cic.*Tusc*.4.21 = *SVF* 3.398 as *libido poeniendi eius, qui uideatur laesisse iniuria*. It also has much in common with the definition of anger given by Diogenes Laertius (D.L.7.113 = *SVF* 3.396), ἐπιθυμία τιμωρίας τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἠδικηκέναι οὐ προσηκόντως, and the similar formulations offered by Stobaeus (Stob.2.91.10 = *SVF* 3.395) and Andronicus (Andronic.Rhod.4 = *SVF* 3.397). The main difference between it and these accounts is that it specifies *explicitly* that person A will feel anger towards person B if person A thinks that person B has harmed him (person A) rather than if person A thinks that person B has harmed anyone (whether person A or a separate individual, person C).

There is no difference in what Seneca means by these two definitions. However, the first definition leaves it ambiguous what exactly is meant by an *iniuria*. Unsurprisingly given Stoic practice elsewhere,[45] Seneca uses the second definition to clarify what he means by *iniuria* in the first definition: the explicit introduction of the notion of harm (*laesum*) in the second definition brings out that Seneca sees an *iniuria* as involving (actual or perceived) harm;[46] and the second definition makes it clear that *iniuria* in the first definition refers to a *perceived iniuria* rather than an actual *iniuria*.[47] The idea that *ira* can be triggered by a perceived (as opposed to an actual) *iniuria* is one that is relied upon throughout the *De ira*[48] and it appears in the discussion of the definition of *ira* at 1.2.4-5, as I shall argue in §2.4.2.5.[49]

There are two alternatives to the interpretation of this passage that I have just set out. The first is that the first definition is meant to refer to an *actual iniuria* and the second to a *perceived* iniuria, and that Seneca's point is that *ira* can be triggered by either an actual or

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[45] It is common for the Stoics to offer several definitions of the same thing (as Crivelli (2010) 396-408 shows): this reflects the fact that they do not seem to have held that definitions reveal the essences of the things defined, and it also reflects their deeply integrated system so that, for example, an emotion may be understood from a physical or a cognitive perspective. The use of several definitions to ensure complete clarity is explicitly advocated by Seneca when he explains that *plura proponere tutius est ne una finitio parum rem comprehendat et, ut ita dicam, formula excidat* (Sen.*Cl.*2.3.1 = *SVF* 3.290). However, this view probably has earlier precedents: the original Greek definitions of ὀργή use a verb, ἀδικέω, that may be understood to imply 'harming without committing an injustice' (as in its medical uses (cf. Hp.*Nat.Hom.*9)) or 'committing an injustice without harming' (cf. *h.Cer.*367) or 'harming and committing an injustice' (cf. Aristotle's definition at Arist.*Rh.*1368^{b}6: τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον). Perhaps because of this potential ambiguity, Stoic definitions often add a separate clarification that wrongdoing was involved in ὀργή (in the Stobaean definition, for example, οὐ προσηκόντως).

[46] Cf. Sen.*Dial.*2.5.3: *iniuria alicuius mali patientia est.*

[47] Although *iniuria* most naturally refers to an act intended to harm (cf. *iniuria propositum hoc habet aliquem malo adficere* (Sen.*Dial.*2.5.3)) and is usually used of acts that are (deemed by the author to be) unjust, rather than those perceived (by someone experiencing the action) to be unjust, Seneca sometimes writes as if an *iniuria* is the act of experiencing some evil (cf. *iniuria alicuius mali patientia est* (Sen.*Dial.*2.5.3)).

[48] This is consistent with Seneca's assumption throughout the *De ira* that one can grow angry at things that cannot *actually* harm one: see (e.g.) 2.26.2.

[49] Where the text of the definitional section resumes, Seneca is in the middle of demonstrating that *ira* necessarily involves not that a true *iniuria* has been committed but that it is genuinely believed that an *iniuria* has been committed; there is no question that, if the further condition that an actual *iniuria* has been committed has been fulfilled, a genuine belief that an *iniuria* has been committed is not necessary for *ira*.

a perceived *iniuria*.[50] But it is hard to see how an actual *iniuria*, if unperceived, could trigger *ira*, and, as we shall see, it also goes against the discussion at 1.2.4-5.

The second alternative is based on a textual problem. An alternative reading to the text printed above has the second definition introduced with the words *alii ut ait Posidonius*, which would involve the definition being attributed to some unknown individuals (with Seneca, implicitly, rejecting it) and Seneca having chosen to credit the attribution to Posidonius. But it is hard to see why Seneca would not endorse this definition given that, as we have seen, it is for practical purposes the same as his;[51] and it is also hard to see what function *ut ait Posidonius* has: why would Seneca have so superfluously reported that he had learnt this entirely standard Stoic definition second-hand? Even name-dropping must have a point.[52]

Given this, we may conclude that Seneca's definition of *ira* is that it is the desire[53] to take revenge for an *iniuria* that one believes, whether correctly or incorrectly,[54] that one has suffered.[55]

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[50] The use of *aut* indicates that it is not the case that *ira* requires an *iniuria* that is both an actual injustice and perceived to be an injustice.
[51] *Pace* Asmis (2011) 174.
[52] The alternative, that Lactantius added *ut ait Posidonius* after Seneca's *alii*, seems to me to be implausible. Firstly, it would be somewhat strange given that Lactantius' immediate source was Seneca. Secondly, and more significantly, such an addition would be odd given how careful Lactantius is to quote exactly, without adapting what is said to the context. This is clear from the fourth definition, which is the same as appears in the manuscripts of Seneca's *De ira*, with Seneca's *nostra* included in *oratio recta* rather than changed to *Senecae definitione* or similar. Admittedly, if Lactantius is quoting verbatim, it is odd that *alii ut ait Posidonius cupiditas puniendi eius a quo te inique putes laesum* is an anacolouthon, but this problem can be solved by assuming that a verb introducing the quotation has been lost through scribal error. On the other hand, in the reading *aut, ut ait Posidonius,* the inclusion of *ut ait Posidonius* makes some sense, as Kidd (1988) 565 has suggested: Seneca will, at 1.3.3-8, argue in favour of a position (that animals cannot experience *ira*) that is opposed to Posidonius' beliefs. Seneca does not explain later that he is contradicting Posidonius but it may be that, expecting (some of) his readers to be aware that at 1.3.3-8 he is taking a position about which there is dispute in the Stoic school, he is attempting to establish, and to gain some philosophical authority from, the orthodoxy of his definition (for his school) here.
[53] Strictly (although it may not have been a matter about which he was particularly concerned), Seneca seems to present *ira* as a single belief. However, for the sake of readability, I often refer to the 'beliefs' involved in *ira*.

[54] Although the Stoics maintained that the only form of absolute commitment to a proposition consists of knowledge, i.e. strong assent to kataleptic impressions, sincerely or stubbornly held beliefs (which are strictly forms of weak assent to impressions) need not be true beliefs. So it is only if they are items of knowledge (and therefore strong assent to kataleptic impressions) that they necessarily involve true beliefs.

[55] Stoic sages do not experience *ira* (see (e.g.) 2.13.3). One apparent reason for this, not stated explicitly in the *De ira* but clear from Seneca's writings elsewhere, is that sages do not (and cannot) experience *iniuriae* (see (e.g.) Sen.*Dial.*2.2.3). This is not because actual injustices are not (or cannot be) directed at them (they are (and can be): see Sen.*Dial.*2.3.3-5), but because they are not (and cannot be) affected by them, recognising that the only truly bad thing is vice. This is consistent with my argument that *ira* does not necessarily involve an actual *iniuria* but necessarily involves a perceived *iniuria*, which I try to establish on the basis of evidence in the *De ira* in §2.4.2.5. Sages do, however, have an involuntary physical and mental response to things that appear to be (and may or may not actually be) *iniuriae*: this is the first *motus* (which I introduce in §2.2). Seneca does not open up on the particular feelings that they (may) experience when they (correctly) recognise that something is a good thing (*eupatheiai*) or when they make (appropriate) selections between indifferents, but this does not mean that there are not affective responses accompanying these events.

§2.2: THE SCRIPT OF SENECAN *IRA*

I now wish to set out what I think happens when someone experiences *ira* before, in §2.3, turning to consider which parts of this 'script' should be called by the term *ira*. I provide only a brief outline: during my justification of my approach in §2.4 and my discussion of physical aspects of *ira* in §2.5, I shall offer more details about the precise characteristics of each stage.

The sequence of events goes something like this if *ira* runs its course, by which I mean if it 'fades away' without being replaced by another emotion, such as pity, fear or (if the angry person takes revenge) pleasure:[56]

A. He perceives[57] something that is a (possible) *iniuria*.

B. He has an involuntary response (or involuntary responses) that might seem to us to be physical and/or mental. It might be, for example, a mental jolt that is hard to describe or an agitated feeling in his stomach.

C. He decides that he has experienced an *iniuria* and that it is a good thing for him to take revenge. He is committed to the notion but not so firmly committed to the notion that *ratio* cannot dissuade him. During this stage, therefore, counterarguments (whether made

[56] For the notion that one emotion can 'replace' another, see 1.17.2-6, 2.36.6.
[57] This does not mean that he perceives it rationally. When I talk about something being 'rational' or happening 'rationally' in this sense, I refer to an occurrence at the level of that form of psychic *pneuma* that humans possess that allows them to assent to rational impressions (i.e. impressions that have a linguistic counterpart: see S.E.*M.*8.70 = *SVF* 2.187 = *LS* 33C; this is further explained in §2.5.1.2), but which (for example) animals do not possess: see further §2.5.1.2, Vogt (2008) 164-168 and, esp., Long (1982) 49-53. This is generally the sense in which I use 'rational' in this thesis, except when I explicitly refer to the perfect rationality that the sage possesses, which involves assenting only to kataleptic impressions.

by the individual experiencing the emotion or by other people) can stop the emotion.

D. He is so firmly committed to the notion that it would be a good thing to take revenge for the *iniuria* that he thinks that he has experienced that arguments, whether made by himself or by other people, cannot dissuade him. If, while in this stage, he decides that he has not suffered an *iniuria* after all, it will not stop him from wanting to take revenge.

E. His commitment to the idea that it would be a good thing to take revenge for the *iniuria* that he thinks that he has experienced lessens and again arguments can dissuade him.

F. He no longer believes that it would be a good thing to take revenge for the *iniuria* that he has experienced. He is no longer experiencing an emotion.

We see, then, that the script of *ira* is in fact the script of changes in the extent to which one believes that one has suffered an *iniuria* and wants to take revenge. That said, this 'script' is somewhat schematic: as I suggest in §2.5.2.2, I do not think that Seneca would have held that changes within each of C, D and E were necessarily uniform. In other words, as one's *ira* develops, it does not steadily and smoothly increase in severity throughout stage C or decrease steadily and smoothly throughout E.

While he is having the response described in stage B, he may also consider at a rational level what he has perceived, pondering whether or not it is an *iniuria* and how he should

respond, but that does not mean that such pondering or reflection is a part of stage B.[58] It may be that the response that stage B describes continues while later stages occur.[59]

I explain that, in stage D, the agent's ability to reason logically is impaired in that rational argument is not able to dissuade him from his belief that he should take revenge. *Ira* is, though, associated with other forms of logical impairment as well. For example, in the angry agent's eagerness to take revenge, he might attack when revenge would be better served by waiting for a better time to attack. However, there is good evidence to think that Seneca did not think that the loss of rational ability in all areas of reasoning occurred at exactly the same time, and so, as I suggest in §2.4.3, loss of some rational capabilities may have occurred in stage C or continued into stage E. Similarly, while one is in stage D, one need not have lost all aspects of the ability to reason or to calculate. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to this as the boundaries between these different stages being a blurred one or as not being a clear-cut one.

As I argue in §2.5.1.2, B constitutes a response to a *species iniuriae* that is entirely non-rational and C, D and E a response that is (imperfectly) rational, even if, while stage B is occurring, (imperfectly) rational activity is also occurring.

In the terminology I introduce later, based on *De ira* 2.4, B constitutes the first *motus*, C the second *motus* and D the third *motus*; for convenience, I sometimes refer to E as the fourth *motus*, although this is not a Senecan term. I also call B the 'pre-emotions'. As we shall see, C, D and E constitute the emotion itself if we use *ira* in a general sense, but D alone constitutes the emotion if we use *ira* in a more restricted sense.

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[58] I argue in §2.5.1.2 that it is not.
[59] See further n.310.

§2.3: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE TERM *IRA*

Now that I have sketched what I think the script of an episode of *ira* looks like and before I justify my account (in §2.4), I wish to address the question of which parts of this script actually count as *ira*. My concern is with what precisely Seneca means by *cupiditas* when he defines *ira* as

> *cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae aut, ut ait Posidonius, cupiditas puniendi eius a quo te inique putes laesum.* (1.2.3b)

To what extent, though, do you need to believe[60] that you have suffered an *iniuria* and how much do you need to want to take revenge in order for what you are feeling to count as an instance of *ira*?[61] Do you need to be certain that you have suffered an *iniuria* and that taking revenge is a good thing, or is it enough to be very confident or even just quite confident? To rephrase the question more formally, what 'degree of belief'[62] or 'credence' do you need to have to be experiencing *ira*?[63]

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[60] It does not matter for present purposes whether I use the term 'belief' to refer to a conceptual attitude or in the stricter Stoic sense. Emotions are beliefs in the Stoic sense, i.e. they are forms of weak assent to propositions that may or may not be true; they are not items of knowledge, which involve strong assent. There is a term, ὑπόληψις, that seems to encompass all conceptual attitudes, i.e. both beliefs and knowledge, but this seems to have been a handy term that avoids inconvenient periphrasis rather than an important concept for the Stoics (see Vogt (2012) 165-166).

[61] I refer to the extent of one's belief rather than how justified one's belief is.

[62] The binary concept of belief may be analysed in terms of the notion that beliefs exist in degrees that may take any real number in [0, 1] as values; on this analysis, a statement is said to be 'believed' if it is assigned a degree of belief above a particular threshold (a version of a view attributed to Locke by Bovens and Hawthorne (1999)). Degrees of belief is a claim on which probabilism relies: Eriksson and Hájek (2007) examine and assess attempts to justify their existence and conclude that is a 'primitive concept' (i.e. one that cannot be, or is not, analysed in terms of other, more primitive concepts); it is clearly also an intuitive concept.

[63] We saw in §2.1 that *ira* is a particular sort of *cupiditas*: it is, in other words, an assent to a particular sort of impression. Assent may, of course, be analysed as a binary opposition: one either assents or one does not assent, and assent occurs when one's degree of belief (or epistemic commitment; I use the terms interchangeably) has reached a certain level. Here, however, we shall see that the term *ira* may refer to *cupiditates* held with differing degrees of epistemic commitment (at different times). The difference between the C (the second *motus*) and D (the third *motus*) is not whether or not one assents to the impression that one has suffered an *iniuria* and that one should take revenge. In both cases, on Seneca's account, one does assent to that impression. (Of course, others, with a different threshold for what degree of belief is required for assent, may disagree. That Seneca takes C (the second *motus*) to involve assent is clear from his

This may seem a surprising question to ask when writing about a Stoic philosopher given that the Stoics did not generally believe that there were degrees of belief, but it is one that Seneca himself, I shall suggest, engaged with specifically[64] and I shall go on to explain in more detail how it relates to ancient conceptions of belief.[65] Moreover, understanding that the term *ira* can be used in different ways, related to the varying 'degree of belief' that one has, is, I think, the key to finding consistency in Seneca's analysis of anger.

If *ira* used in a narrow sense, the term refers strictly to the most contumacious stage of the emotional experience, and to be angry, one's belief that it is a good thing to take revenge for an *iniuria* that one has suffered needs to be so great that it cannot be overturned by even sustained rational argument: in other words, it refers to the third *motus* (D). This is probably the way of using *ira* that Seneca uses in 1.2.4-5, and certainly it seems to be that used on a number of occasions in the text. For example:

> *'ira' inquit Aristoteles 'necessaria est, nec quicquam sine illa expugnari potest, nisi illa inplet animum et spiritum accendit; utendum autem illa est non ut duce sed ut milite.' quod est falsum; nam si exaudit rationem sequiturque qua ducitur, iam non est ira, cuius proprium est contumacia...* (1.9.2)

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description of it at 2.4, as my analysis in §2.4 argues; it is described as being a *uoluntas non contumax* (2.4.1) where *uoluntas*, *pace* Zöller (2003) *passim*, should be taken as equivalent to Stoic assent (cf. Scott Smith (2004)).) The difference between C and D, rather, lies in the epistemic commitment with which one assents to that impression. For this reason, just as we might talk of 'degrees of belief' while acknowledging that there exists a binary concept of 'belief' that can be analysed as occurring when one's belief reaches a certain level, so it makes sense to talk (as a convenient shorthand) of assent to greater or lesser extents.

[64] See further §2.4.2.5.

[65] See further §2.6.2.2.

There is also, though, a wider definition of *ira* that also includes moments when one assents to the impression that one should take revenge for an *iniuria* that one has suffered but not so firmly that one's belief cannot be overturned by rational arguments. It may include, then, moments when one's emotional response has not yet reached the stage when one's belief cannot be overcome by rational arguments and/or moments after this stage has passed. However, when it is used in this wider sense, the term *ira* is not always used in the same way.

On occasion, *ira* clearly seems to describe the whole emotion, by which I mean it refers to times when *ira* is not at its peak as well as those when it is at its peak (i.e. to stages C, D and E in the 'script' I outlined in §2.2):

> *quod maxime desiderasti, Nouate, nunc facere temptabimus, iram excidere animis aut certe refrenare et impetus eius inhibere. id aliquando palam aperteque faciendum est, ubi minor uis mali patitur, aliquando ex occulto, ubi nimium ardet omnique inpedimento exasperatur et crescit* (3.1.1)

On a number of occasions, what *ira* refers to is unclear: it could refer to the whole emotion from when it begins to when it ends, or it may refer only to some phases of the emotion. For example, in one passage, it seems to include the time before it is at its peak (C) as well as the time when it cannot be overcome by rational argument (D) (and it may well include the time after this stage (E)):

> *multos absoluemus, si coeperimus ante iudicare quam irasci. nunc autem primum impetum sequimur, deinde, quamuis uana nos concitauerint, perseueramus, ne uideamur coepisse sine causa, et, quod iniquissimum est, pertinaciores nos facit*

> *iniquitas irae; retinemus enim illam et augemus, quasi argumentum sit iuste irascentis grauiter irasci.* (3.29.2[66])

Elsewhere, it certainly includes the period during which it is contumacious (D) and the period immediately after that time (E), but we cannot know whether it includes or excludes the period before these periods during which one has assented to the beliefs that constitute *ira* but not so firmly that one's commitment to them may not be overturned by rational argument (C):

> *'at irati quidam constant sibi et se continent.' quando? cum iam ira euanescit et sua sponte decedit, non cum in ipso feruore est; tunc enim potentior est.* (1.8.6)

However, there are also occasions when *ira* refers to more than just the period during which it is contumacious (D) but clearly cannot refer to the whole period of the emotion. *Ira* can refer to the contumacious period (D) and to the period that follows that, during which reason may help to overcome the emotion (E), but not to the period immediately preceding the contumacious period (C). I cite the two passages I shall discuss again in §2.4.2.3:

> *primi eius* [= *irae*] *ictus acres sunt: sic serpentium uenena a cubili erepentium nocent, innoxii dentes sunt cum illos frequens morsus exhausit.* (1.17.6)

and

> *primam iram non audebimus oratione mulcere: surda est et amens* (3.39.2).

We see, then, that even this wider use of *ira* is a somewhat elastic one, referring possibly to the whole emotion and possibly only to certain stages of the development of the

[66] For a discussion of this passage and a justification of my interpretation, see §2.4.2.3.

emotion.[67] It is worth emphasising, however, that *ira* is never used to refer to what I call the 'pre-emotions', the involuntary mental and bodily responses that one experiences before assenting at all to the belief that one has suffered an *iniuria* and should take revenge (B).[68]

In using the same word in different ways, Seneca is not very far from the fairly common Stoic habit of using the same term to refer both to a *genus* and to a *species* that is a subset of that *genus*.[69] Seneca is, admittedly, being somewhat looser than his predecessors tend to be: we do not have simply one narrower sense and one wider sense, but one narrow sense and a series of other possible wider senses; and he does not articulate the different senses in which he uses the term *ira* clearly, explicitly claiming only the narrow sense of the stage when one's beliefs may not be overcome by rational argument. However, as I argue in §2.7, that is for good pedagogic reasons.

[67] An attempt to resist this conclusion and make *ira* consistently used in only one way could be made by claiming that, however it was used, *ira* refers to moments when one has a high degree of epistemic commitment, defined such that this 'high degree' is somewhat below the 'threshold' required to count as an episode of the third *motus* (D). However, this possible counter-argument strikes me as special pleading, because the passages I have described here include emotions very different from the sort envisaged at 1.2.4-5.

[68] Such responses, which were a standard part of many Stoic accounts of the emotions, are often referred to as προπάθειαι. I do not mean to claim, however, that there was consistency over how exactly such προπάθειαι were conceptualised, such as, for instance, over what degree of rationality (if any) was involved in their existence. See further §2.6.2.1 and Graver (1999).

[69] Parallels for this are listed at Crivelli (2010) 381n.69.

§2.4: THE DEVELOPMENT OF *IRA* (FROM A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE)

In §2.2, I outlined what I think Seneca thought the script of a complete episode of *ira* looks like and I assumed this to be correct when I explained in §2.3 what I thought the term *ira* referred to. I now turn to justifying this account, beginning with the development of *ira* (in the wider sense of the term) until it has reached its peak (§2.4.1-2.4.3). The key evidence for this comes from a short passage towards the beginning of *De ira* 2 whose interpretation is much-disputed. I start by outlining the relevant section of the text.

In 2.2-2.3 (partly reproduced in *LS* 65X), Seneca distinguishes (i) 'pre-emotions', such as involuntary blushing, which occur after one conceives in some way (whether rationally or non-rationally is not made clear) of (in the case of *ira*) a possible injustice but before one assents to the impression that it is an injustice (and that one should take revenge),[70] and (ii) actual emotions which involve assent to such an impression. 'Pre-emotions' are involuntary but actual emotions are voluntary.

At 2.4, Seneca undertakes to describe *quemadmodum incipiant adfectus aut crescant aut efferantur* and identifies three *motus*.[71] He tells us that:

> *est primus motus non uoluntarius, quasi praeparatio adfectus et quaedam comminatio; alter cum uoluntate non contumaci, tamquam oporteat me uindicari*

[70] The 'pre-emotions' that accompany *ira* occur *post opinionem iniuriae* (2.2.2). 2.1.3-4 makes clear that *opinio* here refers not to assent to an impression but to an impression that is merely being entertained (cf. *OLD* s.v. *opinio* 3). I argue in §2.5.1 that these 'pre-emotions' are in fact non-rational forms of response to external stimuli. On this reading, strictly, one receives a rational impression and a non-rational impression of an *iniuria* (or a complex impression with both rational and non-rational features), one responds non-rationally to it (a 'pre-emotion') and one then goes on to assent to the rational impression (or rational aspects of the impression; this is the actual emotion). (On my use of 'rational' and 'non-rational' here, see n.57.)

[71] Strictly, *motus* may refer either to a mental operation (*OLD* 4) or to a bodily movement or change (*OLD* 2a, 8a), and Seneca uses it in both senses, referring to bodily responses as *motus* (2.2.1) and to *motus [...] animorum* (2.2.5). However, each of Seneca's three *motus* may be associated with a(n apparently) distinct mental event.

cum laesus sim, aut oporteat hunc poenas dare cum scelus fecerit; tertius motus est iam inpotens, qui non si oportet ulcisci uult sed utique, qui rationem euicit. (2.4.1)

In the next two sentences, he explains that the first *motus* cannot be avoided through *ratio* but that the second *motus* can be eradicated through *iudicium*. There is nothing to indicate that Seneca means to make a distinction by using different words to refer to reasoning.[72]

2.5 then begins with the question of whether *ii qui uulgo saeuiunt et sanguine humano gaudent*[73] are angry when they kill those who have not and whom they do not believe to have harmed them. He answers that they are suffering not from *ira* but from *maius malum et insanabile* and that

origo huius mali ab ira est, quae ubi frequenti exercitatione et satietate in obliuionem clementiae uenit et omne foedus humanum eiecit animo (2.5.3)

He describes what they are suffering as *feritas*.

The interpretation of this section is much disputed. What is agreed, however, is that the first *motus* describes the 'pre-emotions', the involuntary mental and bodily reactions that even a sage experiences after receiving a *species iniuriae*. It is the interpretation of the second and the third *motus* that has been controversial. Most scholars have taken all three *motus* to be an account of the formation of *ira*[74] or, if (as I argue later[75]) Seneca offers an account which applies to all emotions, of any other individual emotion. However, Graver has recently challenged this consensus.[76] She argues that the second *motus* is *ira* and that

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[72] *Ratio* may refer to the exercise or faculty of reason (*OLD* 7a,b) or to a particular application of reasoning (cf. *rationem habere*). Likewise, *iudicium* refers to the faculty of deciding (*OLD* 11a) or to a belief (*OLD* 9a).

[73] On the meaning of *uulgo* (probably 'all over the place' rather than 'at random'), see n.106.

[74] Nussbaum (1994) 411n.18; Sorabji (2000) 61-63; Vogt (2006) *passim*; Gartner (2015) 219-225; Asmis (2015) 230-232.

[75] See n.114.

[76] Graver (2007) 125-132. Her argument follows Fillion-Lahille (1984) 181.

the third *motus* is the sort of behaviour described in 2.5, which Seneca calls *feritas*.[77] I call the two approaches the *ira*-third and the non-*ira*-third approach respectively. In §2.4.1, I argue in favour of the traditional *ira*-third approach.

If the *ira*-third approach is correct, there are two ways in which it might work: either the second *motus* occurs chronologically before the third *motus*[78] or they occur at the same time.[79] In §2.4.2, I argue that the former interpretation is correct, before considering, in §2.4.3, evidence that the distinction between the second and the third *motus* might not be a clear-cut one (in the sense which I briefly set out in §2.2, and which I define more fully in §2.4.3).

§2.4.1: ARGUMENTS FOR THE *IRA*-THIRD APPROACH

Graver presents three types of argument for her non-*ira*-third approach.

The first argument is based on the structural organisation of 2.4-2.5.[80] I argue in §2.4.1.1 that this in fact supports the *ira*-third rather than the non-*ira*-third approach.

Graver's second main argument is that the *ira*-third approach is not philosophically and philologically plausible.[81] In §2.4.2.1-2.4.2.5, I present five arguments in favour of this approach and, in §2.4.2.6, I respond directly to Graver's concerns.

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[77] In this thesis, unless otherwise stated, *feritas* refers to the sort of behaviour described at 2.5.

[78] Thus Nussbaum (1994) 411n.18; Sorabji (2000) 61-63; Vogt (2006) 70; Gartner (2015) 219-225; Asmis (2015) 230-232. Scholars disagree about whether the second and third *motus* both constitute *ira* (Nussbaum, Sorabji) or whether only the third *motus* constitutes *ira* (Vogt, Gartner, Asmis). As I explained in §2.3, I do not think that the term is used in a consistent way and I therefore do not consider it necessary to choose one of these approaches.

[79] Thus Inwood (as briefly indicated at (1993) 180-181 and reported at Graver (2007) 243n.52).

[80] Graver (2007) 126-127.

[81] Graver (2007) 127-129.

Graver's third argument is that the non-*ira*-third approach is a philologically and philosophically acceptable interpretation. The second *motus* (on its own), she suggests, adequately characterises *ira* and the third *motus* (on its own) adequately characterises the sort of behaviour described in 2.5.[82] In §2.4.1.2 and §2.4.1.3, I argue against both of these claims.

§2.4.1.1: THE STRUCTURAL ORGANISATION OF 2.4-2.5

Graver's first argument in support of the non-*ira*-third approach is based on the structural organisation of *De ira* 2.4-2.5. She writes that in 2.4, Seneca:

> 'supplies a brief explanation for the first event, then the second, then the third; then, again for the first, then for the second, and the paragraph ends. It seems reasonable to expect that the paragraph following [i.e. 2.5] will continue the flow of thought by describing the third movement.'[83]

However, this formulation is somewhat misleading. After going through and briefly explaining the three *motus* for the first time, Seneca does not just go through them again adding further explanation. Rather, he goes through them investigating whether each *motus* can be overcome by rational deliberation. That this is what he is doing is not a surprise because we have already been told that the purpose of describing the nature of *ira* is to understand whether it can be overcome by rational deliberation (and, indeed, understanding that it can be is essential to the argument of this explicitly *therapeutic* work[84]); he does this quite explicitly, referring (e.g.) to *ratio* and *iudicium*; and he does this, naturally enough, only as long as is necessary, i.e. stopping when he reaches a *motus*

[82] Graver (2007) 129-132.
[83] Graver (2007) 126-7.
[84] Cf. *exegisti [...] ut scriberem quemadmodum posset ira leniri* (1.1.1).

that rational deliberation can overcome. So the rhetorical movement of the passage does not give any reason to doubt a 'sharp break of sense at the end of 2.4'.[85] Indeed, the opening of 2.5, *illud etiamnunc quaerendum est*, suggests that there is such a break of sense. Therefore, the most natural way of taking the text is that both the second and the third *motus* form part of, and do not go beyond, an account of *ira*.

§2.4.1.2: DOES THE SECOND *MOTUS* (ON ITS OWN) ADEQUATELY CHARACTERISE *IRA*?

Graver acknowledges that, if, as the non-*ira*-third account requires, the second *motus* is *ira*, Seneca's description of the second *motus* as *cum uoluntati non contumaci* is surprising because 'contumacy is one of [*ira*'s] distinguishing features'.[86] Graver's response is that Seneca is articulating the distinction with *feritas* without denying that *ira* itself is contumacious: 'Anger may be non-contumacious in comparison with [*feritas*] and still contumacious in itself.'[87] I find this unconvincing. If contumacy is one of *ira*'s 'distinguishing features' (in the strict sense of the term *ira*), surely identifying the second *motus* as *cum uoluntati non contumaci* would make first-time readers wary of associating *ira* with the second *motus* alone (especially when the third *motus* seemed to offer the opposite). If Seneca's distinction between the second and the third *motus* really concerned the extent of certain feelings, why does Seneca not simply use a comparative instead? Arguably for rhetorical reasons, but these rhetorical reasons leave his meaning so cryptic that they are hard to believe in.[88]

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[85] Graver (2007) 127.
[86] Graver (2007) 130. We might add the qualification 'when *ira* is at its peak': this is *ira* in the narrower sense of the word.
[87] Graver (2007) 130
[88] Graver's argument here relies on claiming that Seneca is keen to bring out the similarity between *ira* and the third *motus*. To justify this position, she cites other examples (130-131) which could equally justify the

§2.4.1.3: DOES THE THIRD *MOTUS* (ON ITS OWN) ADEQUATELY CHARACTERISE *FERITAS*?

The answer to this question depends on what we take *feritas* to be. According to Graver, it is μελαγχολία ('melancholic insanity'), a very rare form of insanity (not in the sense that all who are not *sapientes* are insane) that involves the 'loss of the entire rational condition'[89] and that often seems to involve the loss of the rational soul's ability to properly form mental impressions, resulting in what we could hallucinations.[90] Our sources generally attribute it to physiological causes but Cicero, apparently following the Stoics, claims that it can also be caused by powerful emotions:

> *quem nos furorem,* μελαγχολίαν *illi uocant; quasi uero atra bili solum mens ac non saepe uel iracundia grauiore uel timore uel dolore moueatur, quo genere Athamantem, Alcmaeonem, Aiacem, Orestem furere dicimus.* (Cic.*Tusc.*3.11)[91]

In this subsection, I first sketch an alternative analysis of *feritas*. Then I examine the characteristics of *feritas* that Graver uses to justify taking it to be melancholic insanity and argue in each case that my analysis is either as applicable as hers or more applicable.

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ira-third approach. Graver claims that the reason for the confusion that this passage has caused is Seneca's attempt to do this while also trying to distinguish between them (130). But this does not seem to me an adequate explanation here. A comparative adjective would have brought out both the similarity and the difference.

[89] Simp.*in Cat.*f.102B = *SVF* 3.238.

[90] See Aetius 4.12.1-5 = *SVF* 2.54 = *LS* 39B and Graver (2007) 111-116, with further references.

[91] Graver (2007) 121-122 justifies the plausibility of attributing this view to the Stoics but I know of no other Stoic sources that actually make this causal connection. Her commentary (2002) *ad loc.* cites none other than *De ira* 2.5, which (as I shall explain) I dispute. She does not conclude from Sen.*Ep.*18 (cited as evidence for the Epicurean view) that Seneca held this view, despite *ingentis irae exitus furor est* (Sen.*Ep.*18.15). This seems sensible because it is unlikely that Seneca and Cicero always used *furor* in the same way given the description of *ira* as *furens* at 1.1.1 and the impossibility of experiencing melancholic insanity at the same time as an emotion (Graver (2007) 112).

Then, I use my conclusion that *feritas* involves emotions to argue that the third *motus* does not adequately describe *feritas*.[92]

Those who engage in *feritas*, Seneca tells us, are motivated by the prospect of achieving and then they do achieve *uoluptas*,[93] i.e. they experience a sequence of two distinct emotions (desire, then pleasure);[94] both emotions, in my account, are at their peak. What distinguishes these from other emotions? Seneca tells us that *feritas* occurs in those who, through frequent *ira*, have lost (*eiecit animo*) *omne foedus humanum*.[95] The concept of a *foedus*[96] between humans is thoroughly Stoic.[97] I am not aware of any parallels for the notion that the Stoics held that frequent violence against others made one feel less keenly the 'normal' human aversion to harming others, but it seems a plausible one.

Let us now consider the applicability of Graver's and my accounts. Graver explains that *feritas* involves an 'entirely new behavioral disposition'[98] and the obliteration of 'what is most human',[99] with 'the 'human contract' [...] [having] been thrown away.'[100] She uses this as evidence that *feritas* is melancholic insanity but the account I have given is, I think, just as plausible an explanation for these observations. One apparent problem for my account is that Seneca suggests that *ira* is the worst emotion,[101] which, if taken literally rather than explained as a pedagogic technique to demonstrate the undesirability of *ira*,

[92] Most of Graver's arguments in support of the non-*ira*-third position do not rely on what she takes *feritas* to consist of, so establishing that she mischaracterises *feritas* is not sufficient to disprove the non-*ira*-third position.
[93] *nec [...] in ultionem [...] sed in uoluptatem* (2.5.2); *uoluptate multa perfruuntur* (2.5.3).
[94] For the four distinct kinds of emotions, cf. Stob.2.88.8-2.90.6 = *SVF* 3.378 = *LS* 65A; Andronic.Rhod.1 = *SVF* 3.391 = *LS* 65B; Stob.2.90.19-2.91.9 = *SVF* 3.394 = *LS* 65E; etc.
[95] 2.5.3. Strictly, *ira* is the subject of *eiecit*, but for *ira* as the subject of verbs that logically require the agent as subject, cf. 1.1.1.
[96] For *foedus* in this sense, cf. *OLD* 4.
[97] Cf. (e.g.) Plu.*Alex.*329A = *SVF* 1.262 = *LS* 67A1.
[98] Graver (2007) 123.
[99] Graver (2007) 123.
[100] Graver (2007) 123.
[101] 1.1.1, 2.11.2, 2.12.6, etc.; cf. Cic.*Tusc.*4.54 = *SVF* 3.665.

might seem to establish that *feritas* (being, we are told, worse than *ira*) is not an emotion. I suggest that what Seneca means by this is that *feritas* is worse than *ira* in 'normal' agents. For any given agent, *ira* is the worst emotion; and the worst sort of emotion, then, is *ira* in those who have lost *omne foedus humanum*.[102] So, my account, just like melancholic insanity,[103] is consistent with Seneca's account of the *extreme* perversity of *feritas*.

Graver identifies several other characteristics of Seneca's description of *feritas* that she feels indicate that *feritas* is melancholic insanity. For each of these, though, emotions seem to me as good an explanation. The first is that '[a]ngry persons desire to harm those who have offended them; brutish agents desire just the harm itself, in which they find a perverse kind of pleasure.'[104] However, I suggest, they do not desire 'just the harm'; rather, they desire the perverse pleasure that they derive from the harm. Indeed, it is possible to provide some reasoning for why they might find such pleasure in harming others: they might feel it demonstrates their power and deem such a demonstration to be a good thing for them.

Other aspects of *feritas* that Graver sees as suitable for melancholic insanity are that:

> 'The feral human [...] rages about indiscriminately, 'at random.' Rather than harming because he has been harmed, he is willing even to receive an injury in

[102] This seems to be what Alexander is guilty of in his behaviour towards Clitus (3.17.1), which Seneca calls *feritas* but also describes as *ira*. I do not discuss Sen.*Cl.*2.4.1-3 which Graver cites for comparison because she does not give reason not to consider the *crudelitas* described there to be (an) emotion(s).
[103] Graver compares Seneca's observation that *feritas* is not *ira* but *maius malum et insanabile* with Cicero's description of melancholic insanity, 'that it is worse than the paradoxical sort of *insania*; that is, worse than the ordinary flawed condition.' (125)
[104] Graver (2007) 123.

order that he may hurt another. The ordinary kinds of connections between behaviour and self-interest have broken down; rational agency is compromised.'[105]

However, again, there is no reason to think that melancholic insanity fits this description better than emotions. Seneca often characterises the actions of angry agents as random, for instance at 1.11; it may be that such passages are not meant literally, but there is no reason to think he is being more rhetorical in these than at 2.5.[106] Similarly, Seneca repeatedly tells us that a willingness to harm oneself in order to harm others is characteristic of angry agents,[107] so Graver's observation is not evidence that *feritas* does not involve emotions.

So far, I have argued that my account is as plausible as Graver's. But another argument she advances to associate *feritas* with melancholic insanity, the alleged similarity of two of Seneca's examples of *feritas* and one of Cicero's of melancholic insanity, in fact provides evidence against her position.

> 'What Hannibal and Volesus [two examples of *feritas* from 2.5] think they see is drastically different from what they are really seeing. Their case is not altogether different from that of Orestes [an example of melancholic insanity from Cic.*Tusc.*3.11] when he looks at his gentle sister and sees an avenging Fury. They can speak, as could Orestes; what they say, though, is nonsensical when compared with their situation.'[108]

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[105] Graver (2007) 123.

[106] I assume that Graver is correct to translate *uulgo* as 'at random', but she may not be. This meaning is listed in the *OLD* (*uulgō*[1] 5a) alongside 'far and wide' and 'all over the place', but none of the passages cited there requires or is improved by this meaning rather than 'far and wide' or 'all over the place', and almost all (the major exception being Liv.26.27.7) make more sense without it. Of the other instances of *uulgo* in Seneca's works, 'at random' is never required and rarely seems appropriate (except at Sen.*Apoc.*9.3 where *uulgo* is probably a form of *uulgus*; and Sen.*Ben.*1.9.3 where 'everywhere' seems at least as apt). There are much better parallels for 'habitually' (so Basore (1928)) or 'often' (so Kaster (2010)); cf. *OLD* 3.

[107] 1.5.2, 1.11.8, 2.35.5, 3.2.6, 3.3.2, 3.5.6.

[108] Graver (2007) 123.

There is, though, an important difference that explains why Hannibal and Volesus – historical *exempla* who are not generally understood to be madmen (except in the strict Stoic sense that all non-sages are insane) - should be understood to have acted through emotions but Orestes should not. They, unlike Orestes, assented to impressions that ascribed values to a situation or action (for instance, deeming a ditch of human blood *formosum*). Stoic sources attest to emotions involving (or, perhaps, being[109]) just such judgements.[110] On the other hand, Orestes, like Cicero's three other *exempla* of melancholic insanity,[111] misunderstands the content of a visual impression.[112] I know of no evidence that any of Seneca's *exempla* of *feritas* did this.

There is, therefore, nothing in the text to make us doubt that 2.5 describes a sequence of two emotions, which is the most obvious reading of the passage given the subject of the treatise and the use of the term *uoluptas*,[113] and there is nothing to connect the passage with melancholic insanity. Indeed, Seneca's choice of *exempla* strongly suggests that *feritas* is very different from melancholic insanity.

Feritas, we may conclude, involves a sequence of two emotions. Since Seneca's account of the third *motus* involves assent to a single impression, *non si oportet ulcisci uult sed utique*, it must describe a single emotion. So, if we adopt the non-*ira*-third approach, we must assume that the third *motus* describes just one of the two emotions that constitute *feritas*. Given the use of *uult*, this one emotion must be desire rather than pleasure.

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[109] This is a controversial point: see (e.g.) Sorabji (2000) 55.

[110] See Brennan (1998) 30-31 with (esp.) the material collected at *SVF* 3.377-420 (for the sake of readability, I do not provide full citations for these sources).

[111] Ov.*Met.*4.152ff.; Cic.*Ac.*2.89-90 = Cic.*Luc.*89-90; Soph.*Aj.*42-43.

[112] Orestes features in Sextus Empiricus' *Against the logicians* (S.E.*M.*7.243-245 = *SVF* 2.65 = *LS* 39G) as someone struck by an appearance that was both true and false.

[113] It may be objected that *uoluptas* is used in a non-technical sense to describe a feeling that the melancholically insane have, but the repetition of *uoluptas* draws attention to it and I doubt that Seneca would have drawn attention to a non-technical use of a technical word at a point when he is making fairly technical distinctions.

Therefore, on the non-*ira*-third approach, both the second and the third *motus* are forms of desire - the desire to take revenge, then desire for pleasure. This makes it odd, if Seneca means to offer an account that applies to all emotions and not just to *ira*,[114] that the second and the third *motus* have completely different structures: one is rational in that it is characterised as involving assent to an impression that something in the future is a good thing (i.e. a desire: *cum uoluntate non contumaci*) and the other seems not to involve any such rational thought (*rationem euicit*).[115]

§2.4.2: ARGUMENTS THAT THE SECOND *MOTUS* OCCURS BEFORE THE THIRD *MOTUS*

I conclude, then, that the third *motus* forms part of the description of *ira*. I now turn to consider whether the second *motus* occurs at the same time as or before the third *motus*.

The answer is not straightforward because many passages seem contradictory. For example, at 1.7.4, the *animus* that has succumbed to *ira* (or to some other *adfectus*) is compared to someone who has jumped off a cliff. This implies that, as soon as one has given in to *ira*, one is no longer susceptible to reasoning and, therefore, that one is in the

[114] This is implied by the formulation *quemadmodum incipiant adfectus aut crescant aut efferantur*, rather than *quemadmodum incipiat ira aut crescat aut efferatur*; the fact that the propositions he uses as examples in describing the second and the third *motus* are appropriate only for *ira* is not a problem for this account because to have made his sample propositions applicable to all emotions would have required lengthy, potentially confusing circumlocution. Cf. Vogt (2006) 60. A possible counterargument is that *ira* is said to be the worst emotion; at 3.1.4, Seneca explains that *cetera uitia inpellunt animos, ira praecipitat*. However, this seems to be a rhetorical pose: at 1.7.4, a headlong fall seems to be characteristic of all *adfectus*. It seems hard to sustain the view that Seneca imagines different *adfectus* as having different *structures*.

[115] See §2.4.1.2 for my argument that *non contumaci* should be taken literally. Sorabji (2009) 152 raises a further problem with Graver's account, that if Seneca's description of the third *motus* refers to 2.5, which concerns occasions involving no perceived injustice, his use of *ulcisci* is odd. But proponents of the non-*ira*-third approach could plausibly justify *ulcisci* here. Although inapplicable to the sort of *feritas* described in 2.5, it is applicable to another sort of *feritas*, *ira* in agents who have lost *omne foedus humanum* (apparently described at (e.g.) 3.17.1). When describing the third *motus*, Seneca may have been imagining *feritas* generally and have chosen the illogicality of referring to it using the same verb used to describe the second *motus* to avoid distracting readers from the rest of his formulation and, therefore, from what he considered to be the key distinction between the two *motus*. See also Gartner (2015) 224-225.

third *motus* as soon as one begins to be angry. This would imply that the two *motus* must occur or, at least, start simultaneously. However, this comparison immediately follows the explanation that:

> *quarundam rerum initia in nostra potestate sunt, ulteriora nos ui sua rapiunt nec regressum relinquunt.* (1.7.4)

Given that pre-emotions (first *motus*), being involuntary responses to stimuli, are not *in nostra potestate*, it is most natural to take *initia* to refer to a period when one is able to use *ratio* to control one's emotions. This implies that the second *motus* occurs before the third *motus*.

This passage, then, does not make it clear whether the second *motus* is to be understood as occurring before the third *motus* or whether we should understand *ira* as beginning 'fully-formed' and so see the second *motus* as occurring at the same time as the third *motus*.[116] In this section, I offer five distinct arguments for the former position (§2.4.2.1-2.4.2.5). I do not claim that any of them is persuasive on its own but I hope that, cumulatively, they demonstrate that the most convincing interpretation of the evidence is that the second *motus* occurs before the third.[117] I then respond directly to Graver's arguments against taking the second *motus* to occur before the third *motus* (§2.4.2.6).

[116] The following sentences perhaps encourage the former interpretation. The use of *difficilis* in the almost immediately following *si coepit ferre transuersos, difficilis ad salutem recursus est...* (1.8.1) does not imply impossibility and so we might be tempted to say that the second *motus* precedes the third motus. On this reading, the comparison of the *animus* that has succumbed to *ira* to someone who has jumped off a cliff could be explained as being a traditional image that does not quite fit Seneca's philosophical position (the same comparison is made at Cic.*Tusc.*4.41, and Kaster (2010) 105n.74 suggests that it may go back to Chrysippus), and the preceding sentence *quarundam rerum...regressum relinquunt* may be an attempt to control the reader's interpretation of that image. However, this argument is far from decisive.

[117] I take it as acceptable in this thesis to draw conclusions on the basis of 'cumulative case arguments'. This position has been attacked ('If one leaky bucket will not hold water that is no reason to think that ten can' (Flew (1966) 62-63)). However, attempting to reconstruct ancient beliefs on the basis of texts that do not set out positions unambiguously does not allow certainty. If (for example) one has two independent arguments, one which one would judge 95% likely to be correct and another, independent argument which one would judge 85% likely to be correct, to present the first argument alone would make one 95% convinced of the position while to use both would make one over 99% convinced of the position. The result will never be absolute certainty, but one's confidence in the position should be increased by the number of independent

§2.4.2.1: ARGUMENT 1

My first reason is the way in which Seneca's account of the three *motus* is introduced and articulated. He promises to explain *quemadmodum incipiant adfectus aut crescant aut efferantur* (2.4.1).

Graver's interpretation is that Seneca has promised us three distinct events[118] and that

> 'It will not do for Seneca [then to] […] deliver one event plus one other event under two different descriptions'.[119]

This perhaps goes too far. To expect three events is to take what is a fairly standard rhetorical device (a tricolon) very literally.[120] However, I do not think that it makes sense to regard the expression simply as a florid way of saying *origo adfectuum* or something similar because the reference to the *adfectus* beginning, growing and growing wild suggests the development of the emotion over time. It is natural, then, for readers to take the following account of the three *motus* as an account of how *adfectus* develop over time.[121]

The three *motus* are described as *primus*, *alter* and *tertius*: this sequence may indicate conceptual rather than chronological order, but only very rarely (I am aware of only one example[122]), and, given the suggestion in *quemadmodum incipiant adfectus aut crescant*

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arguments. On the use of cumulative case arguments in other fields, see Wright (2002) (on law), Franklin (2013) 19-23 (on mathematics) and Draper (2010) (on theology).

[118] Graver (2007) 127.

[119] Graver (2007) 129.

[120] Using *aut* rather than *uel* does not entail that the three verbs describe distinct events, as Jennings (1994) 239-251 demonstrates (arguing against the claims of many 'school grammars').

[121] It does not preclude the first *motus* overlapping chronologically with the second *motus*, though, so long as it begins before the second *motus*: see further n.310.

[122] Cic.*Part.*33.

aut efferantur that a chronologically ordered account will be presented, to take it in this way would be unnatural.

If we are to accept an 'unnatural reading' of the text is the correct reading, I believe that we should be able to offer a good literary reason for why Seneca would wish to have or at least would be willing to tolerate an unnatural meaning (as I hope I provide in §2.7 for Seneca's account of *ira* not being the one that emerges from a natural reading of the text). However, I can think of no plausible literary reason why, if the second and third *motus* were, in fact, alternate aspects of the same state, Seneca would introduce the distinction between *ira* as the product of a rational process[123] and *ira* as an emotion that causes the loss of rational agency, which would presumably intended to clarify his account of *ira*, in such a cryptic way.

§2.4.2.2: ARGUMENT 2

The argument above focused on how the description of the three *motus* is introduced. However, the function of the wider text unit that opens Book 2 also supports the view that the second *motus* occurs before the third. We are told that

> *iram quin species oblata iniuriae moueat non est dubium; sed utrum speciem ipsam statim sequatur et non accedente animo excurrat, an illo adsentiente moueatur quaerimus. nobis placet nihil illam per se audere sed animo adprobante* (2.1.3)

The point of this inquiry, it is clarified, is

> *ut sciamus quid sit ira; nam si inuitis nobis nascitur, numquam rationi succumbet* (2.2.1)

[123] I do not, of course, mean 'rational' here in the sense of the perfect rationality of the *sapiens*.

In other words, the (or one) aim of this theoretical section is to demonstrate that *ira* can be stopped by rational arguments. If the description of the three *motus* is to be relevant to this aim, we expect it to demonstrate that there is a time when one does not assent to a belief that one must take revenge for an *iniuria* that one has suffered in a way that cannot be overturned by rational argument. What would this time be?

It could be the first *motus*: this is a time when one is not experiencing *ira* at all and one has involuntary reactions, but this does not mean that one cannot use reason during this time to combat the onset of *ira*. However, this seems unlikely because it makes the introduction of the distinction between the second and the third *motus*, subsequent to the distinction being made between pre-emotions (i.e. the first *motus*) and 'true' emotions, seem somewhat redundant. It seems unlikely, then, that it is the first *motus*.

It also seems unlikely for it to be the second *motus* if the second *motus* occurs at the same time as the third *motus*, because the third *motus*, by Seneca's very definition, involves anger being contumacious. We are left, then, with the conclusion that this time must be the second *motus* if the second *motus* occurs before the third (or it might be the second *motus*, in this scenario, and the first *motus* combined). In other words, the interpretation that the second *motus* precedes the third *motus* is the only interpretation that makes this section of the text fulfil its advertised function.[124]

[124] The counterargument might be made that the function advertised in 2.2.1 is fulfilled by the the discussion of emotions and pre-emotions, and that the account of the three *motus* fulfils a distinct purpose, advertised by *ut sciamus quemadmodum incipiant adfectus aut crescant aut efferantur* (2.4.1). This possibility is one reason why the argument in this section cannot be deemed conclusive. However, I do not find this counterargument very convincing: the emphasis on reasoning in the account of the three *motus* (as there was in the discussion of pre-emotions and emotions), together with the fact that the aim advertised in 2.4.1 is part of knowing 'what *ira* is', makes it seem that this objective is to be understood as subordinate to that advertised in 2.2.1.

§2.4.2.3: ARGUMENT 3

The third piece of evidence is that there are passages when *ira* does not appear to be at its peak when it begins:

> *multos absoluemus, si coeperimus ante iudicare quam irasci. nunc autem primum impetum sequimur, deinde, quamuis uana nos concitauerint, perseueramus, ne uideamur coepisse sine causa, et, quod iniquissimum est, pertinaciores nos facit iniquitas irae; retinemus enim illam et augemus, quasi argumentum sit iuste irascentis grauiter irasci.* (3.29.2)

Here, Seneca explains how we would let many people off punishments if we were sensibly to use our judgement[125] before becoming or being angry;[126] *nunc autem* introduces and contrasts the reality of what we actually do,[127] which is to follow up our *primus impetus* and then to persist in our *ira*. We would begin to use our judgement at the same time as we would otherwise be following up our *primus impetus*: in other words, after the *primus impetus*, there is a time when we have the capacity to make a judgement while using our judgement (i.e. sensibly). Given that the start of the second *motus* is characterised by a *iudicium* and the possibility of reason changing the course of events (2.4.2), the *primus impetus* must refer to the first *motus*. If *nunc autem primum impetum sequimur* refers to the second *motus*, the remainder of the sentence, introduced by *deinde*, refers to a later time when our *ira* has become more severe. There is nothing to prove that this is the third *motus*. However, in general, the narrative of increasingly severe *ira* is extremely similar to

[125] As all episodes of *ira* involve a judgement, *iudicare* here must refer to using one's judgement sensibly (*OLD* 11) rather than just to using one's judgement.
[126] Which meaning *irasci* has here makes no difference to the interpretation.
[127] For this function of *nunc autem*, see Rosén (2009) 365.

the narrative involved in the view that the second *motus* precedes the third *motus*. More specifically, the implication is that this is a time when we cannot use our judgement and when reason's ability to change our decision of whether we should take revenge has obviously been impaired because we act *quasi argumentum sit iuste irascentis grauiter irasci*.[128] This is, it is reasonable to conclude, the third *motus*.

Passages such as this sit uncomfortably beside passages where we are told that, when *ira* begins, it is at its peak, which seem to favour the interpretation that the second and the third *motus* occur simultaneously. For example, this is the implication, at least if we are willing to assume that *ira* begins at the same time as its first *ictus* occur, of

> *primi eius ictus acres sunt: sic serpentium uenena a cubili erepentium nocent, innoxii dentes sunt cum illos frequens morsus exhausit.* (1.17.6)

and elsewhere it is made quite explicit:[129]

> *primam iram non audebimus oratione mulcere: surda est et amens* (3.39.2).

We have, therefore, two apparently contradictory accounts. It seems to me that the only way in which they might both be true is (i) for *ira* to be used in a different sense in the two 'types' of passages and (ii) for *ira* in the broader of the two senses in which it is being used in these two 'types' of passages to involve a period of time that is after the pre-emotions but before it is *ira* in the narrower sense of the word and during which the emotional response is becoming more *contumax*.

[128] Our rational abilities more broadly have been affected too but this is not a defining characteristic of the third *motus*: see §2.4.3.
[129] This is true whether *primus* here means 'first' and there are conceived to be many *irae* in each episode of *ira* (*OLD* 3a) or, as seems more likely, *primus* means 'the beginning of' (*OLD* 3b).

An attempt to argue that the second and third *motus* occur simultaneously would have to involve both these claims. It would therefore involve accepting the argument that *ira* becomes increasingly severe even if it did not label the time when *ira* is at its fiercest the third *motus* and the time before that but after the pre-emotions the second *motus*. Any such counter-argument to my position would, it seems to me, be disagreeing on terminology rather than on the cognitive basis of what Seneca believed to be occurring during episodes of *ira*.

§2.4.2.4: ARGUMENT 4

The fourth piece of evidence is that there are passages where Seneca seems to describe *ira* that has not yet reached its peak still responding to reason. One example of this is, I think, the following passage:[130]

> *pugna tecum ipse: si <uis> uincere iram, non potest te illa. incipis uincere, si absconditur, si illi exitus non datur. signa eius obruamus et illam quantum fieri potest occultam secretamque teneamus. cum magna id nostra molestia fiet (cupit enim exilire et incendere oculos et mutare faciem), sed si eminere illi extra nos licuit, supra nos est. in imo pectoris secessu recondatur, feraturque, non ferat. immo in contrarium omnia eius indicia flectamus: uultus remittatur, uox lenior sit, gradus lentior; paulatim cum exterioribus interiora formantur.* (3.13.1-2)

This passage clearly describes two consecutive stages in the development of *ira*.

Stage 1: *Ira* is kept in check: it does not control the appearance (or the mind).

Stage 2: *Ira* controls the appearance (and also controls the mind).

[130] 3.12.4 also provides an example of this but the situation there is more complex, as I discuss in §2.4.3.2.

How does this map onto the three *motus* of *ira*? Clearly, there is a significant distinction between Stage 1 and Stage 2, involving not just the physical appearance of the individual involved: in Stage 2, the emotion controls them and their actions. This implies that the person who, in becoming angry, moves from Stage 1 to Stage 2 is also moving from one *motus* to another.[131] He is therefore either moving from the first *motus* to the second *motus* (which may or may not occur at the same time as the third *motus*) or from the second *motus* to the third *motus*.

My argument is that the second of these interpretations is correct.[132] I offer three reasons for this position, each showing either that Stage 1 is naturally understood to include the second *motus* (even if it also includes the first *motus*) or that Stage 2 is naturally understood to be the third *motus*, or both.

Firstly, Seneca urges us *signa eius obruamus* and *illam quantum fieri potest occultam secretamque teneamus*. It is not immediately obvious whether *signa eius* (= *signa irae*) refers to the physical manifestations of *ira* or to the physical manifestations of the pre-emotions[133] or to both, but *illam* can refer to nothing other than *ira*.[134] So it is clear that Stage 1 involves a time including *ira* in its broadest sense. It must therefore include the second *motus*. This is the case, too, in the following description of Socrates doing

[131] My discussion of the 'blurred boundary' between the second and the third *motus* (§2.4.3) explains why I say 'implies' rather than 'proves'.

[132] Although she does not relate this passage to the three *motus* of *ira*, Conradie (forthcoming) implicitly argues that the former interpretation is correct by claiming that Seneca's advice here is to 'counter these [involuntary] reflexes [i.e. the 'pre-emotions'] with voluntary behaviour', but she does not justify excluding the second *motus* from what I call Stage 1.

[133] For *signum* used in this way, cf. *nec ignoro ceteros quoque adfectus uix occultari, libidinem metumque et audaciam dare sui signa et posse praenosci* (1.1.7); *facile est autem adfectus suos, cum primum oriuntur, deprehendere: morborum signa praecurrunt* (3.10.2).

[134] *Ira* is not used by Seneca to refer to the pre-emotions or to periods of time that include the pre-emotions.

precisely what Seneca advises (and remaining in Stage 1), which makes it clear that Socrates is already experiencing *ira* rather than just the first, pre-emotional *motus*:

> *in Socrate irae signum erat uocem summittere, loqui parcius; apparebat tunc illum sibi obstare. deprendebatur itaque a familiaribus et coarguebatur, nec erat illi exprobratio latitantis irae ingrata. quidni gauderet quod iram suam multi intellegerent, nemo sentiret? sensissent autem, nisi ius amicis obiurgandi se dedisset, sicut ipse sibi in amicos sumpserat.* (3.13.3; my emphases)

Secondly (and less securely), the fact that we are told that *ira*, in Stage 1, desires *exilire et incendere oculos et mutare faciem* also provides some support for the notion that we are dealing here with the second *motus*. The suggestion is that *ira* has not done any of these things: it has not leapt out, it has not inflamed the eyes and it has not transformed the *facies*.[135] This does not mean that there are not physical manifestations, but that they are minor ones.[136] In Stage 2, the physical manifestations are more serious: it *has* leapt out, it *has* inflamed the eyes, it *has* transformed the *facies*. The strength of this distinction is entirely consistent with the difference in seriousness between the second and the third *motus*. However, it is inconsistent with the difference between the first *motus* and the second *motus*: although the physical manifestations of true *ira* are understood to be more severe than those of the first *motus*, those of the first *motus* are nonetheless quite obvious and serious (as the descriptions in 2.2 make clear).

Thirdly, evidence is also provided by the formulation, referring to Stage 2, that *si eminere illi extra nos licuit, supra nos est*. Here, *illi* must refer to true *ira*, not to the first *motus*,

[135] We are told that keeping *ira* hidden as far as is possible is a difficult thing to do because it wants to change the appearance; *cupere* normally refers to wanting something to occur in the future, which implies that if one keeps *ira* hidden as far as is possible, it has not yet changed the appearance.
[136] For this sense of *mutare*, referring to a significant change rather than simply a minor alteration, see *OLD* 12a alongside *OLD* 7a, 11.

because pre-emotions are able to 'stand out'[137] without exerting control over the body. What we have, then, is true *ira* occurring both in Stage 1 and in Stage 2. The most natural interpretation of this is that the second *motus* corresponds to Stage 1, as a time when one can use reason to fight against the onset of *ira*, and the third *motus* to Stage 3, as a time when *ira* has complete control over someone.

It seems, therefore, that Stage 1 is meant to refer to the second *motus* (even if it might also refer to the first *motus* as the advice being given is applicable to both *motus*) and that the difference between Stage 1 and Stage 2 is that between the second and the third *motus*. For similar reasoning to my final paragraph of §2.4.2.3, I conclude again that the second *motus* is to be understood as chronologically prior to the third *motus*.

§2.4.2.5: ARGUMENT 5

My final argument is based on a partly lost discussion of what exactly constitutes *ira* in the definitional section towards the beginning of Book 1. The text resumes after a lacuna with the following passage, which I quote as it is punctuated by Reynolds in his (1977) *OCT*:

> * * * *tamquam aut curam nostram deserentibus aut auctoritatem contemnentibus. quid? gladiatoribus quare populus irascitur, et tam inique ut iniuriam putet quod non libenter pereunt? contemni se iudicat et uultu gestu ardore ex spectatore in aduersarium uertitur. quidquid est tale, non est ira, sed quasi ira, sicut puerorum qui, si ceciderunt, terram uerberari uolunt et saepe ne sciunt quidem cur irascantur, sed tantum irascuntur, sine causa et sine iniuria, non tamen sine aliqua iniuriae specie nec sine aliqua poenae cupiditate. deluduntur itaque imitatione*

[137] This, rather than 'appear' (as, e.g., Basore (1928) 287's 'show itself'), must be the meaning of *eminere*, because in Stage 1 *ira* was able to appear to an extent (this is made clear by *quantum fieri potest*). For this use of *eminere*, cf. *quod alii adfectus apparent, hic eminet* (1.1.7).

plagarum et simulatis deprecantium lacrimis placantur et falsa ultione falsus dolor tollitur. (1.2.4-5)

During the lacuna, as we have seen, Seneca presents his definitions of anger, but the immediate context of this passage is unclear. However, we do know that it is followed by a series of objections to Seneca's definitions of *ira* or those similar to his with Seneca's responses to those objections (1.3.1-1.3.8). This seems to be what is happening here. What survives begins with words, * * * *tamquam aut curam nostram deserentibus aut auctoritatem contemnentibus*, that seem to be reporting a possible objection to Seneca's account of anger: Reynolds, in common with translators and other editors, takes these words to be spoken by Seneca's didactic/therapeutic persona but, given that the objections that follow are presented in *oratio recta*,[138] it seems to me more likely that these are the final words of the objector's words in *oratio recta* (and so should be punctuated *contemnentibus.'*). They seem to be giving the reasons for our growing angry at gladiatorial displays: 'on the grounds that[139] they are failing to show concern for us[140] and

[138] It does not seem to me to be a satisfactory counterargument that the objections that follow are not comparable because Seneca appears to respond to them less cryptically than he responds to this one. Firstly, I see no reason to think that Seneca's response here would be cryptic if the full text survived. Secondly, Seneca's response to the objection at 1.3.2 contains extremely compressed logic despite its apparently rigorous structure (see §3.3.1.3).

[139] All recent translators have taken *tamquam* to mean 'as if' (for this meaning of the term, cf. Tac.*Ann.*14.39), but it is better rendered as 'on the grounds that' (for this meaning, cf. Tac.*Dial*.32.7). In the mouth of the imaginary objector, 'as if' to introduce what is a comparative clause along the lines of 'I grow angry in this particular situation in the same way as I would if you were despising me' has the same meaning as 'I grow angry in this particular situation' if we add in the assumption that being despised causes the objector to grow angry. So the inclusion of this clause would be logically superfluous, and designed to have only rhetorical effect. But it is hard to see that Seneca would have included it for this reason. 'I grow angry when I see gladiators failing to fight as I would get angry if they were actually despising my authority' may be meant to mean that he gets angry with gladiators not fighting just as he gets angry with those who are in more obvious ways despising his authority (by hitting their masters, say). However, it is hard to see that this would be understood as a simple comparative clause and therefore have some rhetorical effect: by not fighting, they stop showing concern for the *populus* and they despise their *auctoritas*. Moreover, the repetition of *contemnentibus* (from the objection) in *contemni* (in Seneca's response), a common feature of Seneca's responses to these objections (see esp. 3.1-2), suggests that *contemnentibus* is the point of the objection rather than a comparison.

[140] This is Kaster's translation at (2010) 6 of *curam nostram deserentibus*; the phrase may also mean 'forsaking our protection' (Basore (1928) 113). These are two sides of the same coin: in not showing *cura*

despising our authority.' Presumably this is a response to the gladiators' failure to fight[141] or (perceived) failure to fight with sufficient enthusiasm.[142] With *Quid?*, Seneca responds indignantly to this objection.[143] He claims that the situation the objector describes is not really an episode of *ira*. He makes his point by comparing this situation to boys who fall down, hurt themselves and want the earth to be beaten. Seneca's use of *sicut* and the logical structure of the paragraph (i.e. the fact that the second episode is introduced to clarify why the first is not *ira*) indicate that it is for the same reason that each is not an episode of *ira*,[144] but it is not clear from the surviving text what that reason is.

In this section, I wish to present a (to my knowledge) new reading of this text according to which this passages engages with the question of how much one needs to desire to take revenge for one's reaction to constitute *ira*. Because the passage is a difficult one, I present the case for first the traditional interpretation and then my new interpretation, and I then explain the reasons I have for suggesting my new interpretation.

Interpretation (i)

The traditional explanation, which I call interpretation (i), is that neither of the situations constitute cases of *ira* because in neither case was an actual (rather than a perceived) *iniuria* committed.[145] It is hard to see that someone, as the gladiators apparently did, could inflict an *iniuria* on an entire group of people without performing an action directed at

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for the *populus*, they betray the *cura* the *populus* has shown to them, and it is through both of these that they arouse the *populus*' indignation.

[141] This is said to provoke the hatred of spectators at Cic.*Mil.*34.92.

[142] This is dramatised as provoking indignation from spectators at Sen.*Ep.*7.5.

[143] This is the commonest use of *Quid?* (on its own) in *De ira*: also at 1.13.4, 1.16.6, 1.20.4, 2.11.2, 2.36.6.

[144] For this reason, the most natural explanation of why the boys cannot be angry – that orthodox Stoic theory would assert that they are too young to be able to experience emotions – cannot be the conclusion we are meant to reach from Seneca's explanation (as it is not applicable to the *populus* as well). Moreover, Seneca treats children as capable of having emotions throughout the *De ira* (*passim*, but most explicitly at 1.20.3, 2.19.4, 2.21.8).

[145] This is the generally-held interpretation, noted and accepted by Cooper & Procopé (1995) at 20n.9 and by Kaster (2010) at 103n.50-51.

them, while the earth cannot inflict an *iniuria* at all.[146] Someone who wanted to hold this view would presumably argue that Seneca thought that what caused something was also constitutive of it – that if, for example, a student blamed their teacher for failing an exam because he sincerely believed that the teacher had mistaught him the subject and if he wanted to take revenge for this fact, he could not be said to be angry unless the teacher actually *had* mistaught him.

On this view, the objection to which Seneca responds would have been a common-sense objection rather than an objection from a specific philosophical school: perhaps something like 'We grow angry with gladiators who have not harmed us on the grounds that they have harmed us'.

Seneca responds by acknowledging the people hold beliefs and are reacting in a way that suggests they are angry (*contemni se iudicat et uultu gestu ardore ex spectatore in aduersarium uertitur*) but goes on to explain that they are not angry, but only *quasi* angry. This is for exactly the same reason as the reason why the boys are only 'angry' in inverted commas (*irascuntur* here is used ironically or is to be understood as focalised by the boys) – because they are *sine causa et iniuria*. This is probably best understood as a hendiadys: they lack an *iniuria* that counts as a *causa*. They have only some impression of an *iniuria* and some desire for revenge.[147]

The final sentence of this section fits this interpretation too:

> *deluduntur itaque imitatione plagarum et simulatis deprecantium lacrimis placantur et falsa ultione falsus dolor tollitur.*

[146] An *iniuria* involves an intention to harm: cf. Sen.*Dial.*2.5.3 (*iniuria propositum hoc habet aliquem malo adficere*).

[147] For this translation of *aliqua*, see *OLD* s.v. *aliqui*[1] 1a, c.

Here, Seneca is describing the consequences of the people's and the boys' indignation not being true *ira* in three paratactic clauses: the first most naturally refers to the boys, the second clearly only to the *populus*, the third to both. In other words, *itaque* identifies the empirical observations that boys are appeased by an *imitatio plagarum*, the *populus* by feigned tears and both by a *falsa ultio* as a consequence of the fact that what they are experiencing is not true *ira*. This seems to rely on the assumption that true *ira* could only be removed by true revenge, not simply the perception (whether true or not) that true revenge had occurred.

Interpretation (ii)

I suggest, however, a different explanation, which I call interpretation (ii): neither the *populus* nor the boys were sufficiently committed to the belief that they had suffered an *iniuria* and that it would be a good thing to take revenge. On this view, the objection to which Seneca responds (again a common-sense position) would have been something like 'We grow angry with people who we know haven't harmed us on the grounds that they have harmed us'. Seneca's response is that, although they may think that they have suffered an injustice, they do not have sufficient epistemic commitment to the notion that they have been wronged and that it would be a good thing to take revenge – or, to put it less formally, 'You may think that you have been wronged, but you are not experiencing *ira* because you don't *really* believe it.'

With a very simple repunctuation of the *OCT* (inserting a question mark after *uertitur*[148]), Seneca responds with two questions, first asking how it is[149] that the *populus* is angry with

[148] It may be that an original interrogative, such as *num* or *-ne* has been lost, in the case of *num* perhaps under the influence of the *-unt* of *pereunt*, but this is not necessary: approximately 40% of 'fact' questions do not contain an interrogative (Spevak (2010) 198).

gladiators and then asking whether it *really* judges that it is being despised[150] and so whether it *really* becomes *aduersarii*. The answer to these two questions is, evidently, meant to be 'no', and Seneca goes on to explain that whatever such a thing (*tale*) that the objector has described is, it is not *ira* but like the *ira* of boys who beat the ground. The boys are described as being angry and this description and the words that follow them are focalised by the boys. They are:

> *sine causa et sine iniuria, non tamen sine aliqua iniuriae specie nec sine aliqua poenae cupiditate*

In other words, despite thinking that they are angry, they do not really think that they have experienced a genuine *iniuria* that serves a genuine reason for anger. Rather, they think that they have experienced simply a 'limited'[151] *iniuriae species* and, therefore, they have a 'limited' *poenae cupiditas*.[152]

The final sentence of this section is also consistent with this interpretation. Seneca's point is that if one does not genuinely believe that one has suffered an *iniuria* and that revenge is a good thing, it is easier for one to convince oneself that the objects of one's indignation have been sufficiently severely punished because one applies less strict requirements to the revenge, either by demanding a less severe punishment or by assessing the effectiveness of the punishment less carefully (or both). That is why the *imitatio plagarum* is sufficient to stop the boys' indignation and the 'crocodile tears' of those begging for their lives is

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[149] There are two possible interpretations of *quare*. The question is either asking what the causes of people's *ira* are (for *quare* in this sense, cf. Cic.*Ver.*3.71) or it is asking whether they really are angry (for *quare* meaning 'in what way' or 'how', cf. Cic.*Att.*9.13.3). The ambiguity is a subtle one and perhaps best conveyed by the translation 'How is it that the *populus* is angry?'

[150] *Contemni* here, at the start of the sentence, picks up the final word of the objection and challenges its appropriateness: does the *populus* genuinely feel that it is being *despised*, as opposed to, say, simply treated with disregard?

[151] For *aliqua* carrying the sense 'to some extent', see *OLD* s.v. *aliqui*[1] 2a.

[152] An alternative reading of this section would be to see *contemni se…aduersarium uertitur* as focalised by the *populus*: the people thinks that it is being wronged. However, the following comparison to the boys' situation shows that their belief is not a genuinely-held one.

sufficient to stop the *populus*' indignation. *Falsus dolor* is not *always* stopped by *falsa ultio* - but this final limb of the tricolon does not claim to be generally true rather than true for the examples in question here.

Arguments for interpretation (ii)

I now turn to offering some reasons which, even if none is convincing in itself, together justify accepting my new interpretation (ii).

Firstly, Seneca will suggest that appreciating that what one perceives to be an *iniuria* is not actually an *iniuria* is one way to stop instances of *ira*:[153] it would be odd for Seneca in his definitional section to contradict ideas of such importance for his therapeutic strategy.[154]

A second reason is provided by the phrase:

> *tantum irascuntur, sine causa et sine iniuria, non tamen sine aliqua iniuriae specie nec sine aliqua poenae cupiditate*

On interpretation (ii), as we have seen, these words make sense if focalised by the boys, leading to a common-sense scenario where the boys are imagined as being aware, almost, that they are playing up for the sake of playing up. However, on interpretation (i), the focalisation ends immediately after *irascuntur* with *sine causa et sine iniuria* provided in Seneca's own voice: this seems a rather odd shift mid-sentence. Moreover, the detail *non tamen sine aliqua iniuriae specie nec sine aliqua poena cupiditate* is an odd inclusion. It

[153] Cf. (e.g.) 2.26.2-3.
[154] This argument is consistent with the general Stoic view that someone's reaction to an event is shaped by one's beliefs about what that event was rather than what the event actually was (except insofar as the latter affects the former) – that is, in the terminology introduced by Anscombe (1965), by intentional rather than material objects. However, this argument is not conclusive because Seneca may have held that *ira* could only be *ira* in the narrow sense if an *iniuria* had genuinely been committed, and that Seneca's descriptions of *ira* when *iniuriae* have not been committed refer to *ira* in the stage during which it can still be overcome by reason. But this seems to me unlikely because Seneca sets out the difference between *ira* in the narrow sense of D (the third *motus*) and in its broader senses clearly, and this distinction is not clearly articulated.

is not immediately relevant to the explanation for why what they are experiencing is not *ira*. It could be defended on the grounds that Seneca is clarifying that a perceived *iniuria* is irrelevant to whether or not something is actually *ira*, but this is unlikely given that it is at odds with his stance in the *De ira* as a whole and given that it confuses rather than clarifies his explanation.

Thirdly, the use of *dolor* in the expression *falsa ultione falsus dolor tollitur* adds weight to the case for interpretation (ii). This is a surprising word to choose because, while *dolor* is often used in a sense close to *ira,*[155] *ira* would be clearer and avoid any confusion with what is, in Stoic thought, a completely different sort of an emotion (a belief that some present thing is bad rather than a belief that some future thing is good), especially given that *dolor* has not been used in the *De ira* in a sense that would invite it to be seen as equivalent to *ira*. Given this, why does Seneca choose the word *dolor*? It is very unlikely that it is meant to be equivalent to *iniuria*, as *dolor* describes a response to a situation, not a situation. It seems more likely, then, that *dolor* is meant to suggest one's belief that one has suffered an *iniuria*.[156] If so, the fact that Seneca wrote *falsa ultione falsus dolor tollitur* (rather than, for example, *falsa ultione falsa iniuria uindicatur*) suggests that the reason why this is not *ira* is the lack of a belief (held firmly enough that it overcomes *ratio*) that an *iniuria* had been experienced rather than the lack of an *iniuria*.

I conclude, therefore, that 1.2.4-5 explains that there is a minimum level of cognitive commitment to the impressions that one has been wronged and that one should take

[155] *TLL* s.v. *dolor* III B.
[156] Unlike a word like *cogitatio* or *iudicium* which could also evoke this notion, *dolor* implies not just a belief but a belief that is held in an emotional way. This is crucial to Seneca's view of what *ira* (in the narrow sense of the word) is: it is a belief that cannot be overturned by *ratio*.

revenge for someone to be experiencing *ira*.[157] Seneca makes clear that *aliqua iniuriae species*, which we might loosely translate as 'some sort of impression that one has been wronged' or 'a feeling that one has been wronged', and *aliqua poenae cupiditas*, 'some sort of desire for punishment' or 'pretty much wanting to exact a punishment', is not enough: one needs to genuinely believe that one has been wronged and to genuinely, with real cognitive commitment, desire to take revenge.[158] The relevance of this conclusion to my argument that the second *motus* occurs before the third *motus* is that it shows Seneca engaging, in the definitional section of his thesis, with the idea that beliefs can be held with different degrees of epistemic commitment. This, of course, does not *prove* that the second *motus* occurs before the third *motus* as the argument can be made that this passage merely establishes what degree of belief is necessary for *ira*. However, the early emphasis on degrees of belief makes it far more natural to read the later account of the three *motus* as one involving and describing the changing degrees of belief that one might have to the impressions involved in *ira*.

§2.4.2.6: THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE *IRA*-THIRD APPROACH: A RESPONSE TO GRAVER

I now respond directly to Graver's claims that the *ira*-third approach is unacceptable by suggesting the validity of the version of the approach in which the second *motus* occurs before the third *motus*.

[157] It is not plausible that *aliqua iniuriae species* or *aliqua poenae cupiditas* refers to the feeling one might have as a pre-emotion (A) because * * * *tamquam aut curam nostrum deserentibus aut auctoritatem contemnentibus* makes it clear that some sort of rational belief is being held and I shall argue in §2.5.1.2 that pre-emotions are non-rational.

[158] *Species* is Seneca's standard term for 'impression', although it is sometimes used to mean 'false seeming' (Graver (2014) 264).

Graver's reason for denying this is that, on this interpretation, the second *motus* constitutes an intermediate stage between pre-emotions and true *ira* during which

> 'one endorses the full cognitive content of anger but is not yet disobedient to reason. One is angry and yet not carried away by anger.'

She identifies two main problems with this. The first problem is that

> 'it finds Seneca to be committed to a notion which his treatise is otherwise very eager to combat. Repeatedly in *On Anger* he strives to show that once people get angry at all, there is no turning back.'[159]

Graver is right to point out that there are times when Seneca does describe *ira* as a time when one has no control (and cannot regain control) over one's actions, but as, I argued in §2.3, the term *ira* is used in a wider as well as a narrower sense. When Seneca seems to claim that 'once people get angry at all, there is no turning back', he is, I suggest, actually only committed to the claim that 'once people get angry at all in the restricted sense of the third *motus*, there is no turning back'. That this is Seneca's position is not clear, admittedly, but I explain in §2.7 that there are good pedagogic reasons for this unclarity (and it does not entail that his absolute rejection of *ira* relates only to *ira* in a restricted sense of the word).

The second problem is that Seneca's view, on this interpretation, is a modification of Chrysippus' view[160] and

> 'It would be strange [...] if Seneca were to create (or uphold) a modification of Stoic psychology in which a person can go only partway to anger, having some substantive reaction and yet stopping short of the full anger response. It would be

[159] Graver (2007) 128.
[160] As proposed by (e.g.) Sorabji (2000) 61-63.

> stranger still if he should introduce such an idea without making any effort to develop it or explain its moral implications. Yet no trace of the supposed intermediate response [i.e. the second *motus*] is to be found even later in this same book of *On Anger* (though it would certainly have application there), and neither is anything made of it in his later works. Seneca comes out as a whimsical philosopher indeed, who revises an explanation which is centrally important to his own larger concerns and then proceeds as if the original explanation were still in force.'[161]

I do not see why it is strange that Seneca, a philosopher who elsewhere is so willing to disagree with his school,[162] modified the Stoic view (or accepted a modification of the Stoic view). I postpone until §2.6.2 an argument for the plausibility of his having modified the orthodox Stoic account in the way that I have suggested although, in fact, as I explain in §2.6.2.1-§2.6.2.2, I see Seneca as having developed rather than 'modified' the orthodox account if 'modified' is taken to involve changing in a way that contradicts the orthodox Stoic account, as Graver seems to use it.

While it is true that Seneca does not explicitly develop the theory he sets out, I do not find this surprising. This chapter argues that the *De ira* relies on a developed and sophisticated theory.[163] If this is accepted, what Graver finds striking, then, would be that Seneca does not explicitly set out the theory in its developed form. It may be that he felt no need to do so (perhaps he had developed it elsewhere); in any case, it does not seem to me surprising that he does not feel the need to do so *here*, even if it was not set out elsewhere, because,

[161] Graver (2007) 128.
[162] Cf. n.242.
[163] I hope that much of §2.5 brings out just how developed Seneca's theory was, and that much of §2.6.2 shows how nuanced its response to previous philosophical thinkers was.

despite its technical sections, the *De ira* is directed above all towards the practical business of anger management.

It is, similarly, true that Seneca does not explain the theory's moral implications explicitly. However, that does not entail that Seneca considers his theory to lack moral implications, and indeed he makes good use of these moral implications. For example, as in passages like 3.13.1-2, some cures for *ira* - the stated aim of this explicitly therapeutic work - rely on his analysis, rather than the Chrysippan analysis, being correct by offering cures that work when *ira* is in the second *motus*.

Traces of this intermediate response, then, *are* to be found later in the *De ira*, as the passages discussed in §2.4.2.3, §2.4.2.4, §2.4.3.2 and §2.4.3.3 attest. It is true that the theory does not seem to inform his later works, but I do not see this as an argument against Seneca holding this view here: even if the distinction were relevant in later texts, it seems unfair to require Seneca not to change his views over time when we are happy to allow Plato's Socrates' ideas to develop.

Graver's final criticism – that Seneca proceeds as if there were no second *motus* – is one that I do not accept in full, as I have explained. However, I think it is often true that he uses *ira* in a restricted sense, to refer only to the third *motus*, and thus often conceals the existence of this second *motus*. But I see this not as a sign that he is a 'whimsical philosopher' but as a literary device with good pedagogic purposes, as I explain in §2.7.

§2.4.3: THE BLURRED BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE SECOND AND THE THIRD *MOTUS*

We have distinguished between the second *motus* and the third *motus* based on the level of one's commitment to the notion that it is a good thing to take revenge. When one's desire to take revenge can be overturned by rational counterargument, one is in the second *motus*; when it cannot be, one is in the third *motus*. The distinction is a clear-cut one, and it is the defining characteristic of the two *motus*.[164]

The rational functioning of emotional people differs from that of those not experiencing emotions in other ways too, of course. We are told, for example, that those who are angry lose the capacity to delay when doing so will help them to meet their aims[165] and that they rage not against the objects of their *ira* but against whatever comes in their way.[166] In this section, I argue that the moment of transition between the second *motus* and the third *motus* does not necessarily correspond to any change in one's rational abilities beyond the loss of the ability to overturn the desire for revenge: different changes may occur at slightly different times.[167] I refer, as a convenient shorthand, to the fact that the second *motus* and the third *motus* are not distinguished by a change in one's rational abilities generally as the boundary between them being blurred.

I justify this claim by giving four case studies from Seneca's therapeutic sections of descriptions of how anger develops or of the behaviour of the angry. We might conclude from them, of course, that Seneca's descriptions are simply careless, but my use of these

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[164] By contrast, Gartner (2015), which appears to offer an account similar to mine in that she sees the third *motus* as involving a belief that it would be a good thing for the agent to take revenge for an *iniuria* that s/he believes s/he has suffered, does not seem to require (although she allows) the second *motus* to involve the agent giving any credence to such a claim (see esp. 219-225).
[165] 1.11.5.
[166] 3.1.3.
[167] Although we might naturally associate all aspects of diminished mental capacity with *ira* in the restricted sense, the third *motus*, during which time we are told that it *rationem euicit* (2.4.1), *ratio* here need not refer to the entire faculty of reason.

sections as evidence for Seneca's philosophy allows us to identify a coherent philosophical substructure underlying the entire *De ira* (and one that as we shall see in §2.5.2.2, is consistent with the physical explanation of emotions that Seneca gives and, as we shall see in §2.6.2.3.1, is part of the way in which Seneca's theory accommodates the objections that Posidonius had made against Chrysippus' theory).

§2.4.3.1: ARGUMENT 1

My first case study is the following passage:

> *incipit magno impetu, deinde deficit ante tempus fatigata, et, quae nihil aliud quam crudelitatem ac noua genera poenarum uersauerat, cum animaduertendum est, iam [ira] fracta lenisque est. adfectus cito cadit, aequalis est ratio. ceterum etiam ubi perseuerauit ira, nonnumquam, si plures sunt qui perire meruerunt, post duorum triumue sanguinem occidere desinit. primi eius ictus acres sunt: sic serpentium uenena a cubili erepentium nocent, innoxii dentes sunt cum illos frequens morsus exhausit.* (1.17.5-6)

Here, Seneca describes two possible scenarios that occur in the stage of *ira* when it is past its peak, with *ceterum* marking a contrast between them. In the first scenario, the emotion does not last for a long time but, rather, fails, *ante tempus fatigata.* In the second scenario, I suggest, although it has lasted for a long time, the *ira* nonetheless endures and yet it ceases to effect what it wishes to.[168] This account of the second scenario is consistent with the explanation that *perseuerauit* but *occidere desinit*: the *ira* has not ceased or diminished in severity, but simply ceased to have an effect on other people.[169] My account is also

[168] It is not plausible that the contrast is that in the second scenario, the *ira* simply lasts slightly longer. This would hardly warrant *ceterum.*

[169] It may seem that this interpretation sits uncomfortably alongside the tense of the verbs in *etiam ubi perseuerauit ira, nonnumquam [...] occidere desinit*; it may be thought that the perfect in the generalising

consistent with the comparison of *ira* to snakes who are able to harm as they leave their beds but who, when they have been raging for some time, are unable to harm even though, the implication is, they still wish to harm. This in turn, we may presume, implies that it is not through physical exhaustion that they are unable to harm those whom they wish to harm but through some other reason, such as (perhaps) their having used up all their poison.

This explanation relies on a 'blurred boundary' between the two *motus*. The *ira* has not been diminished – and *ira* in this case presumably refers to holding the particular beliefs held in the way that they are held when *ira* is at its peak, i.e. the third *motus* – but some of the capabilities that are associated with *ira* at its peak have been lost. Given the earlier argument that exhaustion does not seem to be a factor, these must be *rational* capabilities characteristic of the third *motus* that have been lost.

§2.4.3.2: ARGUMENT 2

My next case study is from 3.12.4-7, where Seneca is offering advice about how to cure *ira*. He explains:

(indefinite) clause suggests that the continuation of *ira* ceases before *ira* ceasing to kill. Woodcock (1959) 175 notes that '[F]or generalizing clauses in the present, the perfect indicative is the usual tense […] But the present and [in the case of generalizing clauses in the past] imperfect tenses are used, if the action in the temporal clause is continuous, i.e. co-existence and contemporaneous, with that of the main clause'. However, (i) the *perseverance* of anger is not co-existent with the end of killing, so a present would not be required according to Woodcock's rule; and (ii) Woodcock's rule is not an absolute one, as one of his own examples reveals: *istos noui polypos qui, ubi quicquid tetigerunt, tenent* (Pl.*Aul.*198), when presumably the time at which the octopuses touch something is exactly the same as the time when they start to stick to it. The interpretation I advance may naturally seem to require a present tense, but it may be that it was so common for a perfect tense to accompany a present tense in this sort of construction that it was used to indicate the generalising nature of the construction even when a present tense would be more logical. This tendency to expect particular tense patterns in particular situations explains other apparent exceptions to the strict rules that grammar books have formulated, such as the future perfect indicative (where a future indicative would be expected, perhaps even if we appeal to an aspectual explanation) in *oratorem sic iam instituam, si potuero, ut quid efficere possit ante perspiciam* (Cic.*de Orat.*2.85).

maximum remedium irae dilatio est, ut primus eius feruor relanguescat et caligo quae premit mentem aut residat aut minus densa sit. quaedam ex his, quae te praecipitem ferebant, hora, non tantum dies molliet, quaedam ex toto euanescent; si nihil egerit petita aduocatio, apparebit iam iudicium esse, non iram. (3.12.4)

A three-stage process is being described (with, in my account, each stage being conceptually but not *necessarily* chronologically ordered):

Stage A: the agent experiences the *primus feruor* of *ira*

Stage B: the agent starts to delay

Stage C: some of the causes that appeared to provoke *ira* seem less important and the agent now appears to be experiencing a *iudicium* rather than *ira*

First, I wish to establish that the starting-point of this process, Stage A, seems to be at a time when the agent is experiencing *ira*, whether the second or the third *motus*, rather than during the pre-emotional stage (the first *motus*). I have three arguments for this claim.

My first reason is the formulation of the phrase *caligo quae premit mentem*. The language here is metaphorical (as is, say, Cicero's use of *temeritas* to refer to rashness in assent[170]) and the use of this language elsewhere is therefore of little help to our discussion because metaphors are not necessarily applied consistently,[171] so we must consider instead whether the image better fits the pre-emotions or the emotions. The phrase implies that the capacities for rational thought are disrupted: the metaphorical meaning of *premit* is hiding

[170] Cic.*Ac.*1.45 = *LS* 68A4; the term is used somewhat differently at Cic.*Ac.*2.31 = Cic.*Luc.*31 = *LS* 40N5.
[171] There are two other non-literal uses of *caligo* in the *De ira*: in 2.10.1, to refer to the mental deficiency shared by all humans, and in 3.27.2, to refer to this disadvantage that we share with other animals as well as with other humans. However, the *caligo* described here is clearly something different, as it is imagined as being experienced by humans only occasionally.

or overshadowing[172] but the point of its use seems to be that it hinders or suppresses[173] the *mens*. This would be oddly applied to the first *motus* for two distinct reasons. Firstly, the detail that the *caligo* suppresses the *mens* is peculiar if Stage A is meant to describe the first *motus*, because, although there are what appear to be mental consequences, the first *motus* is, as I discuss in §2.5, characterised as a corporeal rather than a mental event. Secondly, it would be odd to claim implicitly that the first *motus* involves a disruption of mental processes given that, as we are told in 2.2.2, even sages experience first *motus*. When elsewhere the sage's ability to experience pre-emotions is imagined metaphorically, these connotations are not present: *caligo quae premit mentem* suggests that the person's mind is being pressed upon by an external force and is therefore being affected by it, whereas the apparently similar image of the sage's ability to suffer pre-emotions as a *cicatrix* (1.16.7 = *SVF* 1.215) does not suggest the sage is being affected mentally because a *cicatrix* is, as Seneca makes clear, something experienced *after a wound has healed*.[174]

A second, perhaps less conclusive, reason for thinking that Stage A is not the first *motus* is that it would be odd for *dilatio* to be recommended as the *maximum remedium* to avoid becoming truly angry. After all, during the first *motus*, one's mental capacity to assess the *species iniuriae* should be unaffected, and so it is hard to see why *dilatio*, rather than a fair assessment of the nature of the *iniuria* presented to them and the appropriateness of *ira* as a response to it, would be recommended as the *maximum remedium* for the first *motus*.

A third reason for thinking that Stage A does not occur during the pre-emotional first *motus* is that we are told that, in Stage C, *apparebit iam iudicium esse, non iram*. The *iam*

[172] *OLD* 17.
[173] *OLD* 20a.
[174] On the interpretation of this passage, see §2.5.1.2.

marks a contrast and suggests that, in Stage A, the person is subject to *ira* rather than to a *iudicium*.[175]

Now that I have argued that Stage A involves *ira* rather than a pre-emotional reaction, the question I am interested in is what *motus* the person undergoing this process is experiencing.

It seems to me that the person is experiencing the third *motus* in Stage A but, by the time he has reached Stage C, he is experiencing the fourth *motus* (the stage that I proposed existed after the third *motus* when one has a belief that one should take revenge for an injustice that one believes that one has suffered, but does not believe it so strongly that one's belief cannot be overturned by rational counterargument). My reason for saying this is that we are told that, in Stage C, *apparebit iam iudicium esse, non iram.* In other words, it is and appears to be[176] a *iudicium* – that is, a judgement held as a consequence of reasoning and calculation[177] – and it does not appear to be *ira*.[178] Given that the *iam* marks a contrast, it seems likely that in Stage A, what was being experienced appeared to be (and was) *ira* but did not appear to be a *iudicium*. In other words, in Stage A, there is no judgement held as a consequence of reasoning and calculation. This fits very neatly onto the distinction between the second *motus* (where the belief(s) involved is/are the logical-seeming judgements that are the result of belief in other judgements, and that are removed if assent to those earlier beliefs is removed) and the third *motus* (where the judgements

[175] At first sight, the choice of the verb *apparebit* may undermine this claim, but *appareo* did not, in fact, have the connotations of misleading appearance that its common English translation 'appear' often has. It is, rather, factitive (see *OLD* s.v. *appareo*).
[176] On this meaning of *appareo*, see n.175.
[177] This is the general implication of *iudicium* (especially in its non-legal uses), as the different precise meanings identified at *OLD* s.v. *iudicium* reveal.
[178] This does not, of course, entail that it is not *ira*: *appareo* requires *both* being *and* appearing to be something.

involved are not logical in the same way, because they cannot be affected by reason and so if assent to a proposition like 'I have been wronged' is removed, the judgement will not be affected). This indicates that Stage A is the third *motus* and Stage C is identical in structure to the second *motus*, and is the stage that I call the 'fourth *motus*'.

However, during this stage, the angry person has not lost all their broader rational capabilities. Most obviously, they are able to delay (something which it is implied is not possible for *ira*, presumably *ira* in the narrower sense (i.e. the third *motus*), at 1.11.5).[179] The distinction between the *motus*, then, seems to be 'blurred'.

§2.4.3.3: ARGUMENT 3

Shortly after the above passage, continuing his series of items of advice on how to cure *ira*, Seneca offers an exemplary anecdote of Plato's behaviour:

> *non potuit inpetrare a se Plato tempus, cum seruo suo irasceretur, sed ponere illum statim tunicam et praebere scapulas uerberibus iussit, sua manu ipse caesurus; postquam intellexit irasci se, sicut sustulerat manum suspensam detinebat et stabat percussuro similis; interrogatus deinde ab amico qui forte interuenerat quid ageret, 'exigo' inquit 'poenas ab homine iracundo.' uelut stupens gestum illum saeuituri deformem sapienti uiro seruabat, oblitus iam serui, quia alium quem potius castigaret inuenerat.* (3.12.5-6)

[179] Further evidence may come from the use of the imperfect tense in *quae te praecipitem ferebant*. This 'imperfect of the immediate past' (on which, see Adema (2008) 91) indicates that the person in Stage A is in the process of being carried headlong. Although this may refer to a still increasing degree of belief that s/he should take revenge, it is most natural, given that this person has already been carried headlong in the sense that their belief that s/he should take revenge cannot be overturned by rational counter-argument, to take it to refer to the fact that s/he is still losing their rational capabilities more broadly – and that the loss of further rational capabilities is to come.

At the start of his account, Plato is clearly in the second rather than the third *motus*, because when and seemingly because he realises that he is angry,[180] he abandons his belief that he should take revenge (in favour of a belief that he should punish himself).[181] This is also suggested by the implication that he is not yet raging when we are told that he *preserved* (*seruabat*) his *gestus [...] saeuituri* rather than, say, his *gestus saeuientis*. However, he is also nonetheless said to be incapable of getting himself to delay his revenge. This shows that one's broader rational capabilities may be impaired without being in the third *motus*: the boundary between the second and the third *motus* is again seen to be 'blurred'.

§2.4.3.4: ARGUMENT 4

My final case study comes from 3.39.2-3, where Seneca is explaining how to manage someone whose *ira* is at its peak:

> *primam iram non audebimus oratione mulcere: surda est et amens; dabimus illi spatium.* […] *ipsum quoque impetum, quem non audet lenire, fallet: remouebit omnia ultionis instrumenta, simulabit iram ut tamquam adiutor et doloris comes plus auctoritatis in consiliis habeat, moras nectet et, dum maiorem poenam quaerit, praesentem differet.* (3.39.2-3)

Seneca here seems to be referring to the third *motus*, because he refers to a time when *ira* is *surda* and *amens*, the combination of which suggests that the angry person does not

[180] I take it that *cum seruo suo irasceretur* is meant to indicate that he is, indeed, angry (although it does not mean that he is experiencing *ira* in the restricted sense of the third *motus*). Of course, *irasceretur* might mean that Plato was becoming angry (*OLD* s.v. *irascor* b) rather than that he was angry (*OLD* s.v. *irascor* a), but Plato *would* have been able to grant a delay if he had merely been in the first *motus*.

[181] What is described is clearly not a case of Plato recovering his ability to delay: he tells us that he has chosen to remain in the same position in order to punish himself, and he is said to have forgotten the slave whom he had wished to punish.

listen to arguments. His rational capacities more broadly have been affected, as the detail (not included in the quote above) that he will only be provoked further if someone tries to dissuade him from his *ira* indicates, but he is clearly still capable of some rational activity: he is imagined as being able to plot and to connive with someone pretending to be his ally, even though such plotting is a capacity that the angry often lose (at least in severe forms of *ira*, including, we might naturally expect, those in the third *motus*).[182] This is, then, another example of a time when someone who is in the third *motus* has not lost *all* their rational capabilities.

§2.4.4: *IRA* AFTER THE THIRD *MOTUS*

Now that I have justified my interpretation of how *ira* develops until it reaches its peak and explained in what sense the division between the second and the third *motus* is blurred, I wish briefly to justify my claim that it then fades over a period of time, becoming (in general) increasingly more able to be overcome by rational counterarguments. I do this by offering a brief selection of passages that rely quite clearly on this assumption. I do not offer further argument because this claim is, to my knowledge, uncontroversial.

My first example is that, at 1.8.6, Seneca imagines an interlocutor remarking '*at irati quidam constant sibi et se continent*' and responds by explaining that this happens

> *cum iam ira euanescit et sua sponte decedit, non cum in ipso feruore est.* (1.8.6)

A second example comes from later in Book 1:

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[182] Cf. 1.11.

> *iram saepe misericordia retro egit; habet enim non solidum robur sed uanum tumorem uiolentisque principiis utitur, non aliter quam qui a terra uenti surgunt et fluminibus paludibusque concepti sine pertinacia uehementes sunt: incipit magno impetu, deinde deficit ante tempus fatigata, et, quae nihil aliud quam crudelitatem ac noua genera poenarum uersauerat, cum animadvertum est, iam [ira] fracta lenisque est.* (1.17.4-5)

A third occasion when Seneca relies on the idea that *ira* fades in this way after the third *motus* comes from 3.39.2-3.39.3, which seems to describe the liminal environment at the start of the third *motus*,[183] when Seneca explains that:

> *primam iram non audebimus oratione mulcere: surda est et amens; dabimus illi spatium. remedia in remissionibus prosunt* […] *'quantulum' inquis 'prodest remedium tuum, si sua sponte desinentem iram placat!'*

This implies that *oratio*, presumably including rational counterarguments, can be used to combat *ira*, but only after it has been at its 'peak.'

[183] Cf. §2.4.3.4.

§2.5: THE PHYSICAL STORY

The *De ira* does not devote much space to analysing physical aspects of the emotions. This is unsurprising given that Seneca's work is essentially a therapeutic text, designed to offer strategies by which *ira* may be eliminated, and most of the strategies that Seneca suggests aim to address the cognitive failures involved in episodes of *ira*. However, not all of them do, and for this reason, Seneca does occasionally make reference to physical manifestations of pre-emotions and emotions. The connection between such physical manifestations and cognitive events is unsurprising: for the Stoics, the soul was a physical substance and assent to impressions (and therefore emotions) involved physical changes in the make-up of the soul.

I examine two different levels at which we might seek to understand what happens physically when we experience an emotion – the activity of different types of *pneuma* (in §2.5.1) and the amount of heat in the body (in §2.5.2). I hope to show that an understanding of the physical aspects of emotions explains some aspects of the theory outlined so far and that it enriches our characterisation of some of the *motus* that I have already briefly described. The physical aspects of emotions are not fully explained by Seneca, but what is set out or can be inferred is fully consistent with the account presented so far, and so this chapter implicitly contributes to showing that Seneca's theory meets the requirement for coherence.

§2.5.1: *IRA*: COULD IT BE CHANGES IN THE *PNEUMA*?

§2.5.1.1: ESTABLISHING THE CORPOREALITY OF PRE-EMOTIONS AND THE INCORPOREALITY OF EMOTIONS

I begin by exploring the relationship between, on the one hand, 'pre-emotions' and emotions and, on the other hand, the body and the mind. I shall argue that 'pre-emotions' are associated in particular with the body and emotions with the mind, and then go on, in §2.5.1.2, to interpreting this connection. I delay describing the general Stoic attitude on the relationship between the body and the mind until then.

In Seneca's description of pre-emotions at 2.2-2.3 (partly reproduced in *LS* 65X), he lists a number of examples of pre-emotional responses, from getting goosebumps when sprinkled with cold water to the (seemingly) fearful response of those reading historical narratives. Some of these, like the goosebumps, seem to be mostly if not entirely bodily while others, like the readers' response, seem to be mostly if not entirely mental. In fact, though, Seneca implies that all pre-emotions involve both bodily and mental responses, referring to the unavoidability of *primus ille ictus animi* (2.2.2) and comparing this to the inevitability of *illa* […] *quae diximus accidere corporibus* (2.4.2), presumably referring to the list of possible responses in 2.2-2.3. Similarly, true emotions are presented as a combination of both bodily and mental responses: Seneca's account of *ira* emphasises both its horrendous effects on the body and the changes it makes to the way it which one responds to counterarguments. For Seneca, then, both pre-emotions and emotions seem to consist of an *ictus animi* and an impact on the body.

However, to say without qualification that both pre-emotions and emotions are both bodily and mental sits uncomfortably besides Seneca's references to the *animus* and the *corpus*:

nihil ex his quae animum fortuito inpellunt adfectus uocari debet: ista, ut ita dicam, patitur magis animus quam facit. ergo adfectus est non ad oblatas rerum species moueri, sed permittere se illis et hunc fortuitum motum prosequi. nam si quis pallorem et lacrimas procidentis et inritationem umoris obsceni altumue suspirium et oculos subito acriores aut quid his simile indicium adfectus animique signum putat, fallitur nec intellegit corporis hos esse pulsus. itaque et fortissimus plerumque uir dum armatur expalluit et signo pugnae dato ferocissimo militi paulum genua tremuerunt et magno imperatori antequam inter se acies arietarent cor exiluit et oratori eloquentissimo dum ad dicendum componitur summa riguerunt. (2.3.1-3 (partly reproduced in *LS* 65X))

Seneca tells us that pre-emotions do not involve the activity of the *animus*[184] but that the effects are *corporis pulsus*; and, it must be inferred from this (or else the contrast will lose its point), emotions involve the activity of the mind and are not bodily in the same way that pre-emotions are. In other words, although pre-emotions, like emotions, affect both the *animus* and the *corpus*, (a) all[185] pre-emotions are *pulsus corporis* and all emotions are not bodily in this same sense; and (b) all emotions involve the activity of the *animus* in a way that all pre-emotions do not.

§2.5.1.2: A (SPECULATIVE) INTERPRETATION OF THIS CONCLUSION

[184] This does not entail that they do not affect the *animus*. This is why I do not see the reference to pre-emotions as *animi ictus* at 2.4.2 as a 'correction' of his describing them as *corporis pulsus*, as Graver (1999) 312n.22 does.

[185] This passage indicates that *all* pre-emotions are bodily. The first two sentences make the claim that pre-emotions do not involve what we might call 'mental agency' whereas emotions do involve 'mental agency'. The third sentence provides, with *nam*, a justification for this claim: the fact that pre-emotions are bodily rather than mental. Seneca's argument relies on the assumption that 'pre-emotions' refers to '*all* pre-emotions': in other words, the list of pre-emotions in the third sentence must be taken to refer to all pre-emotions. Graver (2007) 98-99, although her interpretation of this section differs from mine, agrees with this claim, but for a different reason (the logical structure of the passage indicated by the pronouns and connectives).

What exactly, though, does Seneca mean when he says that all pre-emotions are bodily and all emotions are mental?

Seneca gives no explicit answer. He may really mean that emotions are products of the rational activity of the mind and that pre-emotions are reactions of the body. However, I do not think that this is likely. My explanation of why, and of what he really does mean, relies on the orthodox Stoic account of the relationship between the soul and the body, which I now summarise.[186]

In the Stoic universe, everything – from rocks and stones to human beings and other animals – was a combination of matter and *pneuma*, which was itself a physical substance (a fine-textured mixture of fire and air) that could exist at different levels of tension and so in different forms. In rocks and stones, this *pneuma* is (only) cohesive *pneuma* that holds them together;[187] plants additionally contain vegetative *pneuma*, which explains their growth and reproduction;[188] and, on top of this, human beings and animals contain psychic *pneuma*, the characteristic features of which are (not necessarily rational) imaging, assent and impulse.[189] The term *psychē* can be used to all three types of *pneuma* but in a more restricted sense, it refers specifically to what I have called psychic *pneuma*.[190] This allows us to set out the Stoic distinction between the body and the soul: the body is 'earth and

[186] The following paragraph is based on Long (1988) and, to a lesser extent, Graver (2007) 18-24. The only difference is that I assume that humans may (in the opinion of some Stoics) simultaneously possess both rational and non-rational psychic *pneuma*: I provide an argument for the plausibility of this view in §2.6.2.1.2.

[187] Achilles, *Isagogue* 14 = *SVF* 2.368; Ph.*de legibus allegoriae* 2.22-23 = *SVF* 2.458 (partly reproduced in *LS* 47P); Clem.Al.*Strom.*2.487 = *SVF* 2.714; Origen, *De principiis* 3.1.2-4 = *SVF* 2.988 (partly reproduced in *LS* 53A); S.E.*M*.9.78-80 = *SVF* 2.1013; etc.

[188] Clem.Al.*Strom.*2.487 = *SVF* 2.714; Procl.*in Prm.*5.135; etc.

[189] See Ph.*de legibus allegoriae* 1.30 = *SVF* 2.844 = *LS* 53P; Ph.*de legibus allegoriae* 2.22-23 = *SVF* 2.458 (partly reproduced in *LS* 47P); Alex.Aphr.*Fat.*205.24-206.2 = *SVF* 2.1002 = *LS* 62I; etc. with Long (1988) 46.

[190] Long (1988) 44.

water [i.e. matter] informed by cohesive and vegetative (soul) pneuma, but not specific soul [in my terminology, psychic] pneuma'[191] while the soul consists of, depending on one's definition, either all *pneuma* or specifically psychic *pneuma*.

It makes little sense from a Stoic perspective to say that Seneca genuinely means to attribute pre-emotional responses to the *corpus* and emotional responses to the *animus* because the body, pervaded as it is only by cohesive and vegetative *pneuma*, is simply not capable of even non-rational imaging, assent or impulse: it cannot perceive external stimuli in any way. Seneca need not have agreed with all the details of the Stoic theory of *pneuma* to have accepted this basic point: the body alone is not capable of such activity.

With the Stoic theory in mind, though, what could Seneca's distinction between the *corpus* and the *animus* be referring to? We are looking for a distinction in the sort of *pneuma* that is capable of perception; and because it can be conceptualised as similar to the distinction between the *corpus* and the *animus* (an analogy that must have some point), the distinction presumably involves a difference in rationality.[192] (We shall return to what precisely this distinction is.) Evidence external to the *De ira*, from one of Seneca's *Epistles*, supports this conclusion:

> *non educo sapientem ex hominum numero nec dolores ab illo sicut ab aliqua rupe nullum sensum admittente summoveo. memini ex duabus illum partibus esse compositum; altera est inrationalis, haec mordetur, uritur, dolet; altera rationalis, haec inconcussas opiniones habet, intrepida est et indomita. in hac positum est summum illud hominis bonum.* (Sen.*Ep.*71.27)

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[191] Long (1988) 40. See 39-40 for a justification of this position.

[192] Of course, because it must exist in those who experience emotions, it cannot be the distinction between the psychic *pneuma* that ordinary mortals possess and the perfectly rational psychic *pneuma* of the *sapiens*. Distinctions involving differences in rationality are, similarly, the basis of distinctions in human cognitive development: see Cic.*Ac.*2.21 = Cic.*Luc.*21 = *LS* 39C and Crivelli (2010) 371-396.

Shortly afterwards, he tells us that:

> *ne extra rerum naturam uagari uirtus nostra uideatur, et tremet sapiens et dolebit et expallescet. hi enim omnes corporis sensus sunt. ubi ergo calamitas, ubi illud malum uerum est? illic scilicet, si ista animum detrahunt, si ad confessionem servitutis adducunt, si illi paenitentiam sui faciunt.* (Sen.*Ep.*71.29)

The first of these passages (a) distinguishes the non-rational part of a man, which even in a sage will experience *dolor* and other pre-emotions, and (b) the rational part of a man, which in a sage will never experience any form of negative emotions (or pre-emotions). In the second passage, Seneca explains that (a) the *dolor* and other similar sensations that the sage experiences are *corporis sensus* and (b) true evil is only experienced in the *animus* (and not, it is implied, by the sage). We may draw two conclusions. Firstly, the non-rational part of man, i.e. the part where pre-emotional responses occur, is connected with the *corpus*. Secondly, the rational part of man, i.e. the part where, except in a sage, true badness like emotions occurs, is connected with the *animus* and, given that this is the rational part, this must refer to the specifically rational *animus* that humans have.

Given that this is the case, the only possible distinction that can be being made in our section of the *De ira* is, it seems to me, the distinction between non-rational and rational forms of psychic *pneuma*. My argument, then, is that the first *motus* constitutes a response to a *species iniuriae* at the level of the non-rational psychic *pneuma* and true *ira* a response at the level of the rational psychic *pneuma*. These are characterised, as a convenient shorthand, as bodily and mental responses respectively.[193]

[193] On the commonness of and the difficulties of interpreting Seneca's metaphors, see Inwood (1993) 156-161. That he is using these terms symbolically rather than literally is unsurprising given that the *animus* is, in Stoic thought, corporeal. For this reason, I cannot follow Inwood (1993) 181 in denying that Seneca was a psychological dualist.

This conclusion allows a clearer conceptualisation of the structure of pre-emotions. Being non-rational responses to external stimuli, they do not contain any propositional content[194] (even if we, as (imperfectly) rational agents, can describe and conceptualise them[195]). Rather, they are, in structure, like the impressions that animals can have, which Brittain has shown can be complex even if they are not propositional:[196] after all, a dog has to be able not simply to identify, say, pink mush as pink mush but has to be able

> 'to represent the object somehow as a thing for it to eat, by integrating e.g. its visual and olfactory fixes on it into a complex impression. If this is right, a dog can see the pink mush as *nice food* (it can *see* 'food, here' nicely): it has a 'quasi-concept' of food as well.'[197]

The pre-emotions that humans experience, then, are like the quasi-emotional responses that animals have: these cannot be true emotions because they are not the product of rational assent, and like our pre-emotional responses, they occur at the level of the non-rational psychic *pneuma* (the only form of psychic *pneuma* that animals have).[198] Such pre-emotions may cause animals to flee or to attack or other such dramatic activities; they can cause humans to behave involuntarily in certain ways too (by trembling, for example). Seneca does not explain why they do not cause adult humans to do anything that dramatic

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[194] This claim is also made by Sorabji (2009) 153, but for different reasons (and I am not sure whether he would accept many of the suggestions I make, e.g. those concerning the relationship with *pneuma* and the connection with animals).

[195] A possible counterargument to the notion that the pre-emotions do not contain propositional content is the scenario that *putauit se aliquis laesum, uoluit ulcisci, dissuadente aliqua causa statim resedit*, which Seneca tells us is not true *ira* but a *motus animi rationi parens* (2.3.4). However, if this does describe a pre-emotional stage, the use of vocabulary connected to reasoning need not entail that Seneca thinks this stage involves propositional content: Seneca has no other vocabulary to express the content of non-propositional impulses. Moreover, it may not describe the pre-emotions: although the context distinguishes between pre-emotions and emotions, and the three *motus* have not been introduced yet, it is not a problem for Seneca's argument, using the narrow definition of *ira* that Seneca reminds us of in 2.3.4 to explain why pre-emotions cannot be *ira* in 2.3.5, for the scenario described in 2.3.4 to be the second *motus* rather than the first *motus*. This is, I suspect, how we would most naturally understand this description after reading 2.4.

[196] Brittain (2002) 256-274.

[197] Brittain (2002) 264.

[198] 1.3.3-1.3.8.

given that *ratio* cannot stop pre-emotions. It may be that the impulses generated by (imperfectly) rational decision-making are capable of overriding those generated by pre-emotions if they are contradictory. Or it may simply be that when rational decisions have caused one to act in a certain way, the world around us has changed in such a way that the non-rational impressions that caused particular pre-emotional responses no longer exist.

This does not mean that the first *motus* do not interact with rational thought. Reading books, for example, might cause a pre-emotion. However, I do not see that it is impossible to have a non-rational response to an impression generated through words (if hearing the story of a shipwreck, one may generate a mental image of that event which one responds to at both a non-rational and a rational level, just as if it were any other visual stimulus). We are told that *consuetudo* and *adsidua obseruatio* can perhaps (*fortasse*; note the hesitant tone) lessen them (2.4.2). This seems to me to be entirely compatible with our understanding of the first *motus* as not containing any propositional content. If human's first *motus* are akin to animal reactions, any dog owner knows that dogs grow used to ignoring certain repeated stimuli in certain situations or can seem to expect particular forms of behaviour. And, of course, an explicit choice to behave in a certain way at the level of rational psychic *pneuma* can in part distract an individual from an involuntary, but somewhat opposed, response generated at the level of non-rational psychic *pneuma*.

I now present, as a final argument for this position, two advantages that my account offers. Firstly, it helps to explain why the distinction between the pre-emotions (the first *motus*) and true emotions (the second and third *motus* and what we might call the fourth *motus*) is conceptualised as a clear-cut one[199] whereas the distinction between the second *motus* and

[199] This does not entail that the first and the second *motus* may not overlap chronologically: see n.310.

the third *motus* or between the third *motus* and the fourth *motus* is not: *ira* may be used to refer to parts or all of the second *motus*, the third *motus* and the fourth *motus* but never to refer to the first *motus*.[200]

On a cognitive level, the explanation is quite clear: although we have seen that Seneca treats assent as something that occurs on a scale in that there exist degrees of belief, it remains the case that one either assents (in which case, one is experiencing *ira*, even if not the third *motus*) or one does not assent (in which case, one is not experiencing *ira*, although one might be in the first *motus*). The explanation I have proposed allows us to see more clearly from a physical perspective as well why Seneca is able to insist on the distinction between the first and the second *motus* being a clear-cut one. The reactions involved in the first *motus* and the reactions involved in *ira* (in its broader sense) occur in our non-rational and rational parts respectively, and at the level of different types of *pneuma*.[201]

The second advantage of this position is that it is able to explain how sages respond to *species iniuriae* in the same way that non-sages do except in that they do not experience emotions. That even sages experience the first *motus* is clear from 2.2.2, and the following passage indicates that their responses are identical to those of non-sages:

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[200] I discuss in §2.4.2.4 the advice given at 3.13.1-2, which may be applicable to both the first and the second *motus*. But this is not a reason to think that the distinction between the two *motus* is blurred: the advice may be effective for a different reason in the case of each *motus*.

[201] We shall see in §2.5.2 that *ira* is associated with an increase in the body's temperature. The account presented so far raises the question of how this relates to changes in these two types of *pneuma*. There are two plausible explanations: (i) both interact with bodily heat and can cause the body's temperature to rise, but the rational psychic *pneuma* 'overrides' the non-rational psychic pneuma; and (ii) only the rational psychic *pneuma* has an effect on the body's temperature. If (i), we would expect the first *motus* to end before the second *motus* begins; if (ii), although we expect the first *motus* to start before the second *motus*, it does not necessarily cease before the second *motus* begins and so there might be a time when one is both experiencing a pre-emotion (responding involuntarily to events) and a real emotion (during the stage when one is assenting very weakly to the particular propositions that make up the emotion). However, if (ii) is true, the sharp conceptual distinction between pre-emotions and emotions may still be maintained: the distinction between them is not blurred in the sense that one is simply an earlier or less advanced form of the other. I am not sure that there is anything in the *De ira* to allow us to decide between these two options.

quid enim est indignius quam florere quosdam et eos indulgentia fortunae abuti quibus nulla potest satis mala inueniri fortuna? sed tam commoda illorum sine inuidia uidebit quam scelera sine ira; bonus iudex damnat inprobanda, non odit. 'quid ergo? non, cum eiusmodi aliquid sapiens habebit in manibus, tangetur animus eius eritque solito commotior?' fateor: sentiet leuem quendam tenuemque motum; nam, ut dicit Zenon, in sapientis quoque animo, etiam cum uulnus sanatum est, cicatrix manet. sentiet itaque suspiciones quasdam et umbras adfectuum, ipsis quidem carebit. (1.16.6-7 = *SVF* 1.215)

The sage experiences something that he has experienced before he became a sage: the *cicatrix* remains (*manet*), we are told,[202] and this is emphasised by the *etiam* of *etiam cum uulnus sanatum est.*[203] If human psychic *pneuma* in adults who are not sages consists of both rational (but not perfectly rational) and non-rational psychic *pneuma*, it seems reasonable that, if and when a particular adult becomes a sage, (i) his rational (but not perfectly rational) psychic *pneuma* will become perfectly rational psychic *pneuma* and (ii) his non-rational psychic *pneuma* will remain. The sage will therefore respond to a *species iniuriae* at the level of his non-rational psychic *pneuma* and therefore will have an involuntary (and acceptable) response to the stimulus. I suggest that the *uulnus* represents the imperfectly rational nature of the psychic *pneuma* that a non-sage possesses, i.e. the (both rational and non-rational) psychic *pneuma* that lacks perfect rationality; and that the *cicatrix* represents the imperfectly rational nature of the psychic *pneuma* that a sage possesses, i.e. the completely non-rational psychic *pneuma* that he had before becoming a

[202] A *cicatrix* is not necessarily a scar created after the wound: it may refer also to scar-tissue created on a wound before it has properly healed. Cf. *OLD* s.v. *cicatrix* 1a.
[203] It is not a difficulty that *ut dicit Zenon* may be understood to introduce either a paraphrase or a direct translation; if it is a direct translation, the emphases may be Zeno's rather than Seneca's. However, even if this is the case, Seneca has chosen to accept implicitly the implications of Zeno's phrasing and he could have signalled similarity or allegiance to Zeno's view in a way that did not involve doing this.

sage too.[204] It is not clear to me that the alternative view, that pre-emotions, although they do not involve assent, are rational, is able to accommodate this: if it were the case, when someone becomes a sage, all his rational psychic *pneuma* becomes perfectly rational,[205] so any pre-emotional response he would be experiencing would have to be understood as a different phenomenon.[206]

§2.5.2: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN *IRA* AND HEAT

This explanation leaves fairly undercharacterised what, on Seneca's account, exactly happens to the *pneuma* during either a pre-emotion or an emotion. This is not made clear by the *De ira* and so firm answers are impossible. However, it is clearly associated with

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[204] Graver's interpretation of the *uulnus*, as representing (probably) 'a capacity for emotion', is close to mine. However, she differs in seeing the *cicatrix* as representing the sage's 'having once held the same mistaken evaluation of externals as disposes the imperfect mind to emotion' ((2007) 91). However, I do not see what there is in Seneca's theory that could explain how this previous state would cause sages to respond in a particular way. Cooper (1998) 96 has a similar interpretation, though without this argument and without claiming that Zeno's *cicatrix* is necessarily non-rational. Kaster interprets 1.16.6-7 differently, suggesting that this *leuis* […] *tenuisque motus* must be distinct from pre-emotions because the metaphor of a scar or wound suggests that this stirring is 'is not innate in our human makeup but is a residue of the "wounds"-the episodes of passion-that the wise man's mind suffered when he was still a fool' (Kaster (2010) 107n.15). However, a number of factors tell against this. Firstly, Seneca refers to *a* wound and *a* scar (*uulnus* rather than *uulnera*), which makes it less natural for the reference to a wound to refer to a number of episodes of emotions. Secondly, it seems to me to be a mistake to assume such a close correspondence between the details of the metaphor and the situation to which it alludes. While Inwood is right to observe that we cannot find 'a single right way of interpreting metaphors and similes in philosophical texts' ((1993) 157), it nonetheless seems to me mistaken to expect Seneca's imagery to have as many precise correspondences with reality as, for example, many of Virgil's so-called multiple-correspondence similes (on which, see West (1969)) have or, at least, seem to have. Our starting-point, rather, should be to look at the details of the particular correspondence that Seneca explicitly claims between the situation of the sage and the imagery. Thirdly, there is no reason to think that Seneca believed a sage would have any response to a *species iniuriae* other than a pre-emotion (and perfectly rational contemplation of that *species*). Fourthly, there is no indication in the *De ira* that episodes of emotions are thought to have any long-lasting effect on anyone other than in episodes when they are very intense, as at 3.41.3, when *ira* hardens into *odium*; and at 2.36.5, when Ajax's prolonged *irae furor* causes death. However, neither of these situations can apply to the sage.

[205] Cf. the argument made by Cooper at (1998) 96.

[206] The alternative interpretation of the evidence I have set out would be that Seneca did, in opposition to orthodox Stoic thought, believe that the *corpus* could respond to stimuli and held that it was at the level of non-psychic (presumably vegetative rather than cohesive) *pneuma* that 'pre-emotions' occur. Such an interpretation would make little difference to the argument in this chapter (other than undermining the comparison to animals) because it would still constitute a form of non-rational response to stimuli, but I find it less likely than the notion (admittedly not universally held amongst Stoics) that only psychic *pneuma* can respond to stimuli and that it can exist in both rational and non-rational forms in the same human being at a particular time, an argument for the plausibility of which I present in §2.6.2.1.2.

heat in some way; and in this section, I set out the evidence for this position and discuss its implications.[207]

§2.5.2.1: SENECA'S ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS CONNECTION

In 2.19, Seneca describes how, on a physical level, *ira* is connected to heat. He tells us that

> *cum elementa sint quattuor, ignis aquae aëris terrae, potestates pares his sunt, feruida frigida arida atque umida; et locorum itaque et animalium et corporum et morum uarietates mixtura elementorum facit, et proinde aliquot magis incumbunt ingenia prout alicuius elementi maior uis abundauit.* (2.19.1)

Seneca implies that we all have, by our individual natures (dependent on, amongst other things, the region where we live), a certain amount of heat in us. An increase in the amount of heat is causally associated with outbursts of *ira*: *uinum incendit iras, quia calorem auget* (2.19.5), he explains, and this notion is implicit also at 2.19.4, where he tells us that

[207] Seneca may well also have thought that *ira* involved some sort of expansion, but the evidence for this is inadequate: *pace* Sorabji (2000) 31n.10, it does not seem to me that there is at 2.4.1 engagement with the idea of emotions as (or involving) contractions or expansions that is prominent in earlier accounts (see Galen, *PHP* 4.7.4 = *SVF* 3.481; Andronic.Rhod.1 = *SVF* 3.391 = *LS* 65B; etc.). The idea of expansion may also be suggested by references to *ira* as being a *tumor* (1.20.1) or having a *uanus tumor* rather than a *solidum robur* (1.17.4) but these references may simply be metaphorical.

3.9 gives evidence that Seneca's theory incorporated a belief that bile had a role in causing emotions. Exhaustion is said to stir up bile and thus, it is implied, to make us more inclined to anger; this is said to be the reason why hunger and thirst also should be avoided (3.9.4; cf. 3.9.1). Studies that give us pleasure soothe our minds (3.9.2) and it may be that this is because they reduce bile. The references to bile seem unlikely to be metaphorical given Seneca's explanation that food can balance bile (3.9.4). Although Seneca tentatively offers some explanations for why exhaustion may stir up bile (3.9.4), he does not explain why bile causes anger or how precisely it relates to heat (indeed, he does not seem certain himself). There is nothing in 3.9 that is inconsistent with the explanation I set out here but, equally, the evidence is not sufficient to be the basis for further conclusions.

quibus umidi plus inest, eorum paulatim crescit ira, quia non est paratus illis calor sed motu adquiritur; itaque puerorum feminarumque irae acres magis quam graues sunt leuioresque dum incipiunt.

This suggests that the more heat there is, the more serious the *ira*.

He does give a more detailed explanation of the physical processes involving the boiling of blood: the hotter the blood, the more serious the *ira*. However, it is not quite clear whether or not Seneca endorses this claim. On the one hand, he attributes it to some unnamed members of the Stoic school:[208]

uolunt itaque quidam ex nostris iram in pectore moueri efferuescente circa cor sanguine (2.19.3)

On the other hand, he sees their making this claim as a consequence (*itaque*) of previous claims that he himself accepts, and he immediately suggests that the reason for this claim is an observation about the human body that is reported in the indicative as a cause rather than an alleged cause:

causa cur hic potissimum adsignetur irae locus non alia est quam quod in toto corpore calidissimum pectus est. (2.19.3)

This does not *prove* that Seneca endorses this claim: he may see it as an incorrect inference from a correct empirical observation. Seneca, then, leaves it uncertain whether or not he accepts this claim. What is important for my purposes to note is that, whether or not

[208] Which members is uncertain, but Kaster notes that this view 'is consistent, for example, with locating the mind's "ruling principle" in the chest […] and with Chrysippus' definition of anger as "rising in a vapour from the heart, being forced outward, and blowing upon the face and hands" ([Galen, *PHP* 3.1.25 =] *SVF* 2.886; my thanks to Margaret Graver for pointing me toward this fragment).' (Kaster (2010) 115n.182) It is consistent too with the connections between one's physical state and one's character traits made by Posidonius (Galen, *PHP* 5.5.22-23 = *LS* 65M). Close parallels with this passage may be found in non-Stoic texts as well: see Pl.*Cra.*419e for *thumos* involving the boiling of the soul; and Arist.*de An.*1.1.403a16-32 for physical definitions of emotions and anger as the boiling of blood or a warm substance around the heart. Alternative explanations existed as well, of course: see (e.g.) Hp.*Acut.*1.36 for irascibility being determined by the nature of the passages through which the soul passes.

Seneca endorses this particular claim, he says nothing to make us doubt that he accepts the other claims that he makes about the relationship between *ira* and heat.[209]

§2.5.2.2: IMPLICATIONS

The first implication of this physical aspect of the script of *ira* is that it is easy to see how the boundary between the second and the third *motus* might be blurred given one of Seneca's descriptions of the appearance of the angry man:

> *ut de ceteris dubium sit, nulli certe adfectui peior est uultus, quem in prioribus libris descripsimus: asperum et acrem et nunc subducto retrorsus sanguine fugatoque pallentem, nunc in os omni calore ac spiritu uerso subrubicundum et simile cruento, uenis tumentibus, oculis nunc trepidis et exilientibus, nunc in uno obtutu defixis et haerentibus* (3.4.1)

His description involves two two-way contrasts, signposted by the fourfold anaphora of *nunc*. The first of these contrasts the paleness of the face when blood withdraws with the redness of the face when *calor* and *spiritus* returns, presumably through the blood (as the reference to swollen veins implies). The suggestion is that, in an angry person, blood

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[209] It may be objected that Seneca would not have distanced himself from this story if he did not wish to signal either doubts regarding the explanatory power of physical theories or a lack of interest in those physical theories (or both). However, it seems to me that, had he wished to do either or both of these, it would be odd that he did so only by inviting suspicion for a claim that is not an essential part of his physical story. Why, then, did Seneca state and then distance himself from the claim that *ira* is associated with the boiling of blood? One possible reason is that he accepted its pedagogic value even if he would not have accepted without qualification or some hesitation its precise details. However, this seems to me unlikely given that no therapeutic or didactic purpose is explicitly served by this particular claim rather than the more general link between *ira* and blood (even if *ira* is associated with the surging of blood around the body: see further §2.5.2.2). More plausible, at least to my mind, is that Seneca was attempting to establish his authority by demonstrating caution about physical claims. There is a strand in the Aristotelian tradition critical of such 'physical stories' (see Arist.*P.A.*642a), and Seneca may be signalling to readers sympathetic to this hostile strand that he is not unthinkingly accepting such stories. (The notion that he had some interest in physical theories is consistent with our growing appreciation that Seneca was not interested in physics only towards the end of his life (see Inwood (2002) 123-124), even if it is in a text probably from towards the end of life, the *Natural Questions*, that Seneca asserts (at Sen.*Nat.*1*pref.*), as Chrysippus had done (Plu.1035A-F (partly reproduced in *SVF* 2.42, 2.30, 3.68, 3.326, 2.50, 2.127 and in *LS* 26C, 60A, 31P)), that physics is the superior science.)

surges around the body, controlled by heat. The suggestion of *nunc…nunc* is that what is being narrated is not the development of the emotion but simply what occurs during an emotion. It may be unwise to read too much into a passage with an obvious rhetorical colouring, but it does perhaps imply that the development of an emotion is not through gradual and smoothly increasing severity. Firstly, it opens up the possibility that you could move from the second to the third *motus* and then slip back into the second before moving back into the third. Secondly, if blood surges around the body, this suggests a certain randomness that might explain why a move from the second to the third *motus* is not necessarily associated with a particular change in an individual's broader rational abilities (and, indeed, why, within each *motus*, that person's broader rational abilities may increase and decrease even if that person's commitment to a belief that an *iniuria* has been committed and that he/she should take revenge increases steadily). This is consistent with the idea of the distinction between the second and the third *motus* being blurred in the sense I which suggested in §2.4.3, i.e. that different rational capabilities change at different times.

The second implication of this analysis is that the second *motus* may be very short-lived or not experienced at all. The notion of heat increasing while the passion is being aroused fits the description of the second *motus* when one's belief that one should take revenge for the *iniuria* that one believes that one has suffered increases. Then, when the body contains a certain amount of heat, presumably, we have the fiercest *ira* (i.e. that which *ratio* cannot overturn). Of course, we all start with bodies that are naturally of different temperatures: some people, who have *umidi plus* in them, have *ira* that grows gradually, while *siccis aetatibus uehemens robustaque est ira, sed sine incremento, non multum sibi adiciens, quia inclinaturum calorem frigus insequitur* (2.19.4). There are two ways to interpret what

Seneca means by this. If he refers to the third *motus*, he says that, within the third *motus*, the *ira* of the first group gets worse before getting better while the *ira* of the second group is fully formed when it starts. If, on the other hand, he refers to the second *motus* and beyond, he says that the *ira* of the first group gets worse during the second *motus* (presumably being worst at the start of the third *motus*); but he says that the *ira* gets no worse for the second group: this indicates that these people have *ira* that begins fully-formed and therefore they have no second *motus*. Seneca's use of *crescit* and of the description *iram in pectore moueri* (indicating the origins of *ira* are being discussed) suggests that the second interpretative option is the correct one. So it seems that (theoretically, at least) not everyone experiences the second *motus*: those whose bodies ordinarily contain a certain, very high amount of heat do not. But presumably very few of us fit in this category, even if many of us may have temperatures close to this point and therefore have brief second *motus*.

Thirdly, this physical account of *ira* helps to explain how Seneca conceptualised the relationship between *ira* and *iracundia*. Seneca discusses this relationship explicitly in 1.4, where he makes two different points, explicitly distinguished by Seneca in his summary of material already covered at 1.5.1: (i) *ira* differs from *iracundia* because the former is the emotion while the latter is a disposition to experience that emotion; and (ii) there are many *species* of *ira*. My concern is with the first of these.

In Latin *ira* could refer either to anger or to irascibility,[210] and so the distinction Seneca makes here functions almost as a stipulative definition of *ira*, identifying which of the

[210] For *ira* as anger, see *OLD* 1a; for *ira* as irascibility, see (e.g.) Cic.*Tusc.*4.78, Cic.*Off.*1.136, Ov.*Met.*5.41.

everyday meanings of *ira* Seneca has in mind.[211] While the attempt to distinguish separate meanings for two words derived from the same root that were often used interchangeably is one aspect of the elimination of optional variation that marked the development of Classical Latin,[212] the purpose of the distinction here seems not to be to establish terminology that will later be deployed precisely, unless we accuse Seneca of incompetence, because (although the judgements in these cases can be sometimes be subjective) there are occasions later when he uses *ira* but may well strictly mean *iracundia*[213] and vice versa.[214] Rather, the purpose may be to anticipate counterarguments based on the mistaken assumption that *ira* refers to a proneness to certain emotional experiences rather than those emotional experiences.[215] In doing so, Seneca makes the common distinction between an emotion and a 'proclivity': this goes back at least until Aristotle[216] and has parallels in Stoic thought.[217]

There is a complication. In his discussion of (ii), Seneca hints that *iracundia* is a *species* of *ira*, a position that seems at odds with (i). He does this by introducing his list of *species* of *ira* as the other things (*cetera*) which *in species iram distinguunt*; and by including among (*inter hos*) the *species* of *ira* what he calls a *delicatum iracundiae genus* (even if he does this somewhat cautiously, strictly allowing others to include it along the list of *species* of *ira* rather than doing it himself: *ponas licet*). Why does Seneca imply, especially with *in species iram distinguunt*, that *ira* refers to (and here I use the terms *genus* and *species* technically, as Seneca appears not to have done, at least in the case of

[211] On the various roles of stipulative definitions in Stoicism, see Crivelli (2010) 369-370
[212] On this, see further Rosén (1999) 62-74.
[213] E.g. at 2.20.4 (with Kaster (2010) 115n.186, who explains that interpreting *ira* as *iracundia* is necessary to avoid a contradiction with 2.19.4).
[214] E.g. at 1.16.6, 1.19.1, 2.14.1, 3.39.1.
[215] Similarly, Cicero makes the same contrast between *ira* and *iracundia* at Cic.*Tusc.*4.27 = *SVF* 3.423 but does not maintain the distinction (see (e.g.) Cic.*Tusc.*4.43-50).
[216] It is implicit, for example, in Aristotle's appeal to observance of the mean at (in relation to anger) Arist.*EN* 2.7, 4.5.
[217] For references and discussion, see Graver (2002) 153-154 and (2007) 142-145.

genus) a *genus* which has, as its *species*, both *iracundia* and occurrent emotions that might deserve the term *ira* in a stricter sense?[218]

The idea that emotions and dispositions are part of the same *genus* might seem problematic when viewed from the perspective of the cognitive processes that Seneca's definitional section appears to have emphasised. *Ira* is (or involves) a (non-ingrained) value judgement about one's response to a particular situation. *Iracundia* might involve an ingrained belief that taking revenge is the appropriate way to behave in response to a perceived *iniuria* or it might involve a readiness to believe that particular situations are *iniuriae* (which will not necessarily be the product of a false belief) or it might involve a combination of these factors. *Ira* and *iracundia*, seen from this perspective, seem very different. However, Seneca's conflation of the two is more understandable at the level of the angry person or irascible person's physiology. We have seen that Seneca seems to maintain that heat in the soul is necessary for anger, noting that *quibus umidi plus inest, eorum paulatim crescit ira, quia non est paratus illis calor sed motu adquiritur* (2.19.4), and that heat in the soul makes men irascible because less heat needs to be added for them to have enough heat to be counted as angry, noting that *iracundos feruida animi natura faciet; est enim actuosus et pertinax ignis* (2.19.2). An increase in heat therefore seems, at least in theory, in certain situations, able to bring about both *ira* and *iracundia*. This physical background thus explains why Seneca might with some justification have thought of *ira* and *iracundia* as very closely related, even if we would still hesitate to think of them as different *species* of the same *genus*.

[218] We may compare this to the way in which Chrysippus seems to conflate *nosēmata* (fondness for money, fondness for drink etc.) and emotions: for references and some possible echoes of this conflation, see Graver (2002) 153-154 and (2007) 141-142.

§2.6: SENECA'S ACCOUNT OF *IRA* IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN SCIENTIFIC ANALYSES OF ANGER AND ANCIENT PHILOSOPHICAL THINKING ABOUT BELIEFS AND EMOTIONS

So far in this chapter, I have presented an interpretation of Seneca's analysis of *ira* that finds it to be internally consistent. I suggested in the introduction, though, that for any such account to be accepted, it should meet further requirements: 'correspondence' (i.e. there should be a causal relationship between the account and the real-world phenomena which it seeks to describe), 'availability' (i.e. the account should not require Seneca to have made use of epistemic resources not at his disposal) and 'explanation for incoherence' (i.e. there should be a good literary reason for the impression of inconsistency that the text gives).

In this subsection, I first argue that my interpretation of Seneca's account comes very close to modern (especially) scientific accounts of forms of quasi-emotional responses in general and to accounts of anger and its development in particular. This shows that, if we are willing to assume the accuracy of modern analyses of anger, Seneca's account meets the requirement for correspondence (§2.6.1).[219] I then argue that Seneca's position is entirely consistent with the views of Zeno and Chrysippus, and that the adjustments he makes to their accounts do not include innovations that it would be anachronistic to ascribe to him. I also try to show how Seneca improves the account of the emotions that the Stoics offer.

[219] This, of course, rests on assuming a correspondence between *ira* (in Seneca's use of the term) and '(episode of) anger' (in our modern use of the phrase). It is now something of a commonplace that precise equations of this sort are misleading and, for this reason, my conclusions in this section are inevitably somewhat tentative. There is, however, much that is not culturally-specific about anger (see (e.g.) Kövecses (2000)) and what is culturally specific is largely how and when it is expressed rather than its biologically-determined mechanisms, so it seems to me unnecessarily limiting to ignore the possible relevance of much modern research about anger to our understanding of ancient analyses of *ira*. For this reason, I do not think the (slight) difference between *ira* and 'anger' is a problem for my argument here.

This shows that my interpretation of his account meets the requirement of availability and, in doing so, makes a case for viewing Seneca as an original philosophical thinker[220] (§2.6.2).

In the next sub-section, I shall argue that my interpretation of Seneca's account meets the final requirement in that there is an explanation for the (apparent) incoherence. Taken together, §2.6 and §2.7 provide the further argumentation required to accept the argument that I have presented that there is an underlying order to Seneca's account of anger, and §2.7 by itself provides the explanation for the seeming disorder.

§2.6.1: THE RELATIONSHIP OF SENECA'S ACCOUNT OF *IRA* TO MODERN (ESPECIALLY SCIENTIFIC) ANALYSES OF ANGER

§2.6.1.1: THE FIRST *MOTUS*

The first *motus* – instinctive, involuntary responses to stimuli that do not involve rational judgement and which do not involve cognition even though they may appear quite complex – may be compared to the very quick responses to stimuli generated by the part of the brain known as the amygdala.[221] These, similarly, are automatic responses that may occur even when the person is not conscious of what exactly they are responding to and

[220] More cautiously, given that Seneca may have taken over a theory developed by another (or by several others), we might say that the theory on which Seneca relies is, to our knowledge, new. Cf. (e.g.) Gartner (2015) 220n.18.

[221] On these responses, see LeDoux (1996) 157-165. The connection is made by, and this paragraph is indebted to, Sorabji (2000) 144-150, esp. 148. Graver (2007) 97 criticises Sorabji's connecting of the first *motus* to the involuntary and almost instantaneous responses of the amygdala on the grounds that 'examples involving information presented verbally-dirty jokes, stage plays, and stories in books-indicate that even fully articulate thoughts can occur in us without meeting the requirement for voluntariness.' But the amygdala response can and does occur in such situations (alongside, of course, responses in the cortical parts of the brain): see (e.g.) Wallentin et al. (2011).

that may take a wide variety of forms, which may appear simply physical (like blinking) but may seem to be the consequence of deliberation (like running away). Le Doux's research indicates, although it has not yet conclusively established,[222] that they precede rather than follow judgements or thoughts.[223]

We might also compare the first *motus* to aliefs, a sort of mental state in modern philosophy proposed by Gendler:[224]

> 'A paradigmatic *alief* is a mental state with associatively linked content that is representational, affective and behavioral, and that is activated-consciously or nonconsciously-by features of the subject's internal or ambient environment. Aliefs may be either occurrent or dispositional.'[225]

When, for example, someone is watching a horror film and shouts and clutches at his chair in anxiety, he does not believe that he is in danger but he does 'alieve' it, and it is the alief that generates his responses (both those that may appear to us moderns as his mental 'feelings' and those that seem to us to be bodily responses).[226] Aliefs are automatic, non-

[222] LeDoux's research is based on fear in rats but he considers it likely to be true for fear and other reactions in humans too. For the close connection between anger and fear, the mechanisms of each of which involve the amygdala, see Schultz et al. (2010) 317-318.
[223] LeDoux (at (e.g.) (1996) 19, 246) believes they always precede judgements. This dovetails with the evidence for the activation of the amygdala occurring before conscious awareness of the stimulus (see (e.g.) Rauch, Whalen, Shin et al. (2000)). Sorabji (2000) 145 does not agree that these automatic responses always precede conscious thought.
[224] This notion is introduced, distinguished from beliefs and justified by Gendler (2008a) and (2008b). As Gendler (2008b) 560-561 emphasises, her account is consistent with dual-processing accounts of cognition made by psychologists and others. Such accounts distinguish an automatic, fast-operating cognition system associated with a lack of any sense of voluntary control (sometimes called 'System 1') and a system that involves deliberate judgements and choices about the suggestions made by the other system, even if it often simply accepts those suggestions ('System 2'). For a helpful introduction, see further Kahneman (2011) 19-30.
[225] Gendler (2008a) 642.
[226] This example is adapted from Gendler (2008a) 637.

rational and held both by humans and by other animals.[227] In all these characteristics, occurrent aliefs are identical to Seneca's first *motus* on the analysis that I have suggested.

We see, then, that the first *motus* meets the requirement of 'correspondence.'

§2.6.1.2: THE GROWTH AND CEASING OF *IRA*

Modern research has shown that anger increases, even when the provocation does not change, in what is often but not always a gradual escalation.[228] A lack of research means that there is no scholarly consensus on how the development of anger relates to the angry person's changing commitment to certain beliefs or attitudes, but it seems likely that there is some relationship[229] and psychologists can detect the point at which one's commitment to the desire to take revenge becomes independent of one's assessment of the appropriateness of this response.[230] This point matches the distinction between the second and the third *motus*, as indeed Seneca's 'script' of *ira* more generally matches the trajectory that modern research describes.

Anger stops either by gradually decreasing ('decaying') or through an exstrinsic process ('quenching'), such as fear 'replacing' anger or the agent being distracted.[231] It is clear that the notion of anger naturally decaying also maps neatly onto our account of Seneca's

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[227] Gendler (2008b) 556-7.
[228] This is clear both from self-reports of anger and from laboratory experiments. It also has a plausible evolutionary basis: animals using anger as a mechanism for coercion and domination may reasonably be expected to start with a less serious form of that mechanism because this involves less effort and less risk. See Potegal (2010) 389-390 for further discussion and references.
[229] Cf. Potegal (2010) 386: '[T]he very rapid rise of anger places significant constraints on the depth of processing, but the question of if and how appraisals may contribute to the time course of anger is not just unanswered, it is unasked. Arguably, the rising phase of anger, if not its entire trajectory, represents the envelope of appraisal processes for which these models should account.'
[230] Sorabji (2000) 62.
[231] Potegal (2010) 392-396, to which this section is indebted.

script of *ira*, but so too do many of the other processes by which anger stops (Seneca observes that emotions like fear may override anger). Attempts to replace anger with another emotion and other extrinsic processes like distraction are sometimes effective and sometimes ineffective at ceasing outbursts of anger. This is entirely consistent with Seneca's account of *ira*. Over the script of the emotion, one's broader rational capacities change and this may be the basis of an explanation of why one's reaction to, for example, distraction changes over the script of an episode of *ira*.[232]

So far, I have considered what happens when anger first increases and then decreases, and tried to demonstrate that Seneca's analysis fits the 'rise' of anger and the various ways in which it may subsequently 'fall'. Anger may, however, not decrease or, at least, not *entirely* decrease but instead be extremely long-lasting: recurrent angry rumination reported by those experiencing it to be 'unintentional' sometimes occurs long after the incident that gave rise to the anger and the defence of provocation may still in theory be permitted months (or longer) after the initial provocation precisely because anger may exist even if it is unexpressed for a very long time.[233] Seneca does not engage with this issue directly but does allude at least once (at 3.41.3) to the notion that *ira* may harden into *odium*, which seems to describe such cases of long-lasting rage.

§2.6.1.3: THE 'BLURRED' BOUNDARIES BETWEEN *MOTUS*

[232] A third claimed group of reasons for the ceasing of anger is catharsis and catharsis-like effects, when the expression of anger relieves psychological and physiological tension (description adapted from Potegal (2010) 395). However, this hypothesis is largely discredited (see Bushman (2002)), and the effects that the hypothesis seeks to explain can, in any case, be adequately described by the mechanisms that Seneca introduces. Feeling happy after crying, for example, may be explained by the idea of one emotion taking over another, and so is adequately 'captured' by Seneca's account (Seneca does not seek to offer an explanatory framework for why particular emotions take over from anger).

[233] Potegal (2010) 388, 386.

The 'blurred' boundaries between different *motus* that I discussed in §2.4.3 finds an analogue in research into the phenomenon called 'Out of Control' (OOC) anger. The third *motus* of *ira* describes a time when one's commitment to taking revenge cannot be overturned by rational deliberation. This is what we would now call OOC anger: anger when one's experiencing of the emotion is involuntary, which, in neurophysiological terms, seems to involve a shift from responses controlled in the usual parts of the brain towards automatic processing, with responses controlled by ventrally located structures in or associated with the limbic system.[234]

We must admit that the correspondence between the third *motus* and OOC anger is not necessarily quite as clear-cut as this account suggests, because of the nature of the evidence that the modern account relies on. When subjects in experiments describe anger as not entirely volitional, their accounts may be referring not just to the inability to stop one's anger through reason (our definition of the third *motus*) but also to the inability to control one's own behaviour while angry (a feature of behaviour that may occur in other *motus* too and which need not occur throughout all of the third *motus*). This is unsurprising: different characteristics of OOC anger often obviously occur simultaneously and neurophysiologically, their causes are evidently related, so the differentiation of these characteristics is often difficult in experimental situations (especially in extreme cases such as children's tantrums).

Importantly for the question of the applicability of this phenomenon to Seneca's account of *ira*, OOC anger need not occur in such obviously extreme situations. Even angry thinking

[234] Potegal (2010) 391-392.

(so-called 'anger rumination') can seem unintentional.[235] This indicates that even at lower intensities anger may be and may seem to be OOC. This in turn suggests that at times when one is evidently able to control oneself in many ways (one's anger not having proceeded beyond rumination), one's anger may seem non-volitional. This makes it plausible that, at times when one's rational capacities have in other ways not been that seriously impaired, one might be experiencing the third *motus*. The inverse is also true: anger of all sorts and intensities is associated with an impact on our broader rational capacities[236] even though most anger would not be characterised as OOC anger.[237]

It would, of course, be going too far to claim that Seneca's description and analysis of *ira* precisely anticipate modern scientific descriptions and analyses of anger,[238] but they are sufficiently similar to suggest the plausibility of Seneca's account of *ira* (on my interpretation) as an analysis designed to represent accurately real human experiences. We might also note that my interpretation of Seneca's account of *ira* bears more resemblance to modern accounts than other interpretations of his account: Graver's interpretation, for example, does not allow Seneca to capture the growth of anger, and neither her nor Sorabji's interpretation seems to capture the fact that anger may be non-volitional when it has had little impact on certain of our other rational capabilities.

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[235] Sukhdolsky et al. (2001).

[236] Litvak et al. (2010) summarises and reviews important recent research into the impact of anger on judgement and decision-making. Even if equating the third *motus* to OOC anger is to make the third *motus* more extreme than Seneca intended it to be, everyday experience tells us that not all anger is experienced as non-volitional to the extent that it cannot be overturned by reason whereas, as the research reviewed by Litvak et al. reveals, most anger has some effect on one's broader rational capabilities.

[237] This is the implication of Potegal (2010) 391.

[238] See also Gill (2010) 345-346 on the limitations of the analogy between Stoic and modern scientific theories. Gill identifies in particular the Stoic emphasis on emotions rather than pre-emotions and the claim that the truly virtuous (i.e. the wise) will not experience emotions. However, neither of these seem to me to undermine the general argument of §2.6.1 that the correspondences between the *descriptions* and, to a lesser extent, the explanatory frameworks offered by Seneca and by modern scientific theorists are strikingly close. A perhaps greater problem is that Seneca's clear-cut separation of non-rational and rational responses to stimuli is not supported by recent research: see (e.g.) Haidt (2001) on moral reasoning.

I conclude, then, that Seneca's account of the development and fading of *ira* meets the requirement for 'correspondence.'

§2.6.2: THE RELATIONSHIP OF SENECA'S ACCOUNT OF *IRA* TO SOME OTHER ANCIENT PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS

In this sub-section, although I do not exclude the possibility of other intellectual influences on Seneca's philosophical thought,[239] I attempt to explain how the *De ira* responds to contemporary and previous philosophical, and especially Stoic, thought.[240]

I first consider the pre-emotions and emotions separately (§2.6.2.1 and §2.6.2.2), and in each case, *(i)* I set out, with some supporting evidence, Zeno and Chrysippus' accounts and I argue that Seneca's account is consistent with theirs; and *(ii)* I argue that the innovations that Seneca made to their accounts do not require him to have made use of epistemic resources not at his disposal. Taken together, these two sub-sections show that my interpretation of Seneca's account of *ira* fulfils the third requirement of 'availability' that, I suggested in the introduction, all philosophical interpretations of the sort I am concerned with in this thesis must meet.

I then argue that Seneca's account of *ira* accommodates the objections that Posidonius (seems to have) raised against Chrysippus' account of *ira*[241] at least as effectively as

[239] Bocchi (2011) discusses the possible influence of the Pneumatic school of medicine. Fillion-Lahille (1984) 261-272 makes much of the correspondences between Seneca and Sotion, one of Sextius' pupils who taught Seneca and wrote about anger.

[240] For Seneca's access to the theories of earlier Stoics, see Sellars (2014). My discussion necessarily involves reconstructing lost theories. This, of course, brings methodological problems of its own given the possibility of an author's views changing between texts, but it is acceptable, if imperfect, for my purposes given that my aim is to come as close as possible to their views as Seneca would have understood them, which we may speculate would have been through a number of their works. On this approach, see Gill (2010) 297-298; for the old-fashioned *Quellenforschung* (seeking to reconstruct lost *texts*) with which it contrasts, see Mansfeld (1999) 13-16.

Posidonius' account of *ira* did, and that his account is, in many ways, far more acceptable to an orthodox Stoic than Posidonius' (§2.6.2.3). This part of my thesis thus makes a case for Seneca innovating in response to a debate within Stoicism about the nature of the emotions.[242] This, and other innovations that I identify in this section, may seem at odds with the lack of explicit indications of innovation in the text, especially in comparison with Posidonius' apparently explicit indications of innovation.[243] However, the fact that Seneca's *text* does not explicitly engage with previous texts or theories does not entail that Seneca's *theory* does not respond to previous (texts or) theories.[244] And there is good reason why Seneca's text might have shied away from setting out his relationship with his predecessors: this would have required lengthy theoretical sections that, given that some of his views are not orthodox, might have undermined his *auctoritas* without contributing to the therapy of *ira*, which the first sentence of the *De ira* advertises as its primary function.[245]

[241] Posidonius' changes are sometimes seen as a reformulation of Chrysippus' theory (Cooper (1998), Gill (1998) 124-130) rather than a rejection of them (Sorabji (2000) 93-132). However, if they are seen as a reformulation that shows how Chrysippus' theory accommodates problems it must be able to accommodate, what is important is that it can be seen as an incorrect reformulation of Chrysippus' views just as it can be seen as an incorrect rejection of them.
[242] The Stoics, like other ancient philosophical schools, usually framed their debates as arguments about how correctly to interpret their founder rather than questioning whether their founder was right or wrong. Seneca, who advertises his own independence of thought and was willing to endorse views from even other philosophical schools (see Sen.*Ep.*33.4 and Sen.*Dial.*8.3.1 with Sellars (2014) 106-109), is an important exception to this tendency (Sedley (1989) esp. 98, 119).
[243] Thus Gill (2005) 458.
[244] I do not see it as a problem that Seneca, by contrast, does explicitly criticise Aristotle in the *De ira* (1.9.2, 1.17.1, 3.3.1-2), partly because the point of the engagement with Aristotle and certain other philosophers is quite different (the issue of whether *ira* is always bad rather than of what *ira* consists of and how it develops) and partly because interaction with Aristotle's views is one of several ways in which Seneca situates his account as similar to Chrysippus' *On Passions* and establishes similar emphases (on this, see further Gill (2010) 298-300). Moreover, one philosopher's decision to quote a second philosopher need not indicate that the second philosopher exerted a significant influence on the first: it may simply be because the second philosopher's views are prominent in the doxographical tradition and the first philosopher wanted to refer to a quote that was pithy and easily extractable even if it did not affect the formation of his own views.
[245] Similarly, Posidonius' account of the emotions is also related to his therapeutic aims. This is made clear by (e.g.) Galen, *PHP* 5.6.15 and (esp.) Galen, *PHP* 5.6.19. I do not mean to suggest that Posidonius did not have other goals as well in writing his treatises; many of his engagements with Chrysippus may well have been related to these other goals as well as (indirectly) related to his therapeutic goals by justifying the theory of the emotions on which his therapy was based.

§2.6.2.1: SENECA'S PRE-EMOTIONS

Here, I shall attempt to show that the first *motus* that Seneca describes is entirely consistent with the accounts offered by Zeno and Chrysippus (§2.6.2.1.1) and that his key innovation, the fact that the reaction to a stimulus is non-rational, is one that finds parallels in the theories of earlier Stoic thinkers (§2.6.2.1.2).

§2.6.2.1.1: ZENO'S AND CHRYSIPPUS' 'PRE-EMOTIONS' AS UNDERCHARACTERISED

Although there is only limited evidence for whether or not Zeno and Chrysippus had theories of involuntary responses to *species iniuriae* or other stimuli that might, in a non-sage, lead to emotions (usually called προπάθειαι),[246] what evidence there is suggests that they did.

In the case of Zeno, the most helpful evidence is the brief passage from the *De ira* itself in which Seneca claims that Zeno maintained that sages responded involuntarily to those stimuli that might, in a non-sage, lead to emotions. Zeno, I have argued, if we accept Seneca's translation or formulation of his simile, emphasises continuity between the condition of the sage and that of the non-sage, and so suggests that Zeno did indeed hold that non-sages also experienced pre-emotions.[247]

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[246] Graver (1999) provides a full discussion of the evidence and at 301n.4 outlines different scholars' positions on who first proposed such a theory. Here, I discuss only those pieces of evidence that clearly associate προπάθειαι with Zeno or Chrysippus rather than with orthodox Stoic thought more generally, as such an orthodoxy may have developed later.

[247] See §2.5.1.2 on 1.16.7 = *SVF* 1.215.

Similarly, there is some evidence that Chrysippus also believed that sages experienced such involuntary non-emotional affective responses:

> ἔλεγεν δὲ ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σοφόν, μὴ βασανίζεσθαι δέ· μὴ γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τῆι ψυχῆι. καὶ δεῖσθαι μέν, μὴ προσδέχεσθαι δέ. (Stob.3.7.21 = *SVF* 3.574)

Further evidence is provided by Aulus Gellius, who describes a similar theory when he has a philosopher, described as being *in disciplina Stoica celebratus* and a man of some *auctoritas*,[248] being asked why he shows signs of fear during a storm while on board a ship. In response, the philosopher tells him to listen to what the *conditores sectae Stoicae* thought about *iste brevis quidem, sed necessarius et naturalis pauor*, before deciding instead to tell him to read an extract (recorded by Aulus Gellius in Latin) from Epictetus' fifth book of *Discourses.*[249] This extract sets out a theory of προπάθειαι and is, the philosopher tells us, consistent with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus.[250] This comment indicates that he was referring to them when he mentioned the *conditores sectae Stoicae*. The philosopher's explanation that Epictetus' views are consistent (*congruere*) with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus means that we cannot be certain that his views are *exactly* the same as theirs, but a clear reason for telling his interlocutor to read Epictetus is given (the advantages of reading in assisting believing and memorising[251]) that presents his writings as an alternative means of understanding rather than an improved version of their theory. So the fact that the philosopher thought that *iste brevis quidem, sed necessarius et naturalis pauor* could have been explained by Zeno and Chrysippus in a way that was, at the very least, very similar to the way suggested by the extract from

[248] Gel.19.1.4.
[249] Gel.19.1.11-21 (partly reproduced in *LS* 65Y).
[250] Gel.19.1.14.
[251] Gel.19.1.13.

Epictetus provides a strong indication that the theory of προπάθειαι that is then set out is one endorsed, Aulus Gellius thought, by Zeno and Chrysippus.

All in all, then, the evidence points to (even if it cannot prove) Zeno and Chrysippus having a theory of προπάθειαι and one that involved involuntary responses in non-sages as well as sages.[252] The next question we might wish to ask is what form these προπάθειαι took.

Given the unlikelihood of Zeno and Chrysippus having admitted the existence of non-rational response to stimuli but figures like Galen not having recorded this, it seems to me reasonable to assume that they did not present them as being either completely or even partly non-rational. So there seem to me to be two possible alternative solutions: προπάθειαι may have been conceived as wholly rational (even if not perfectly rational) or they may not have been (at least in the philosophy that was recorded in writing) fully worked out as philosophical concepts. I think the second of these possible solutions is preferable.

It would be very odd, if Zeno and Chrysippus had described their προπάθειαι explicitly as (imperfectly) rational (or described them in a way that entailed that they were rational), that Galen did not interrogate further the question of what form they took in the hope of exposing an inconsistency. He is, after all, very keen to show Chrysippus at least to be

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[252] In my assessment of this evidence, then, I differ from Sorabji (2000) 70-71, who does not think that Zeno believed in προπάθειαι and is undecided as to whether or not Chrysippus did. My conclusion dovetails with the evidence of Philo of Alexandria that Graver (1999) discusses, although her evidence must be treated with greater caution given that, as Graver acknowledges, Philo not only adapts concepts borrowed from Greek philosophy but also 'could conceivably have conversed with Seneca' (303), which somewhat undermines her claim that he 'could not in any case have drawn everything he knows of the προπάθειαι either from Seneca or from Cicero' (303).

incoherent and inconsistent.[253] If they are rational, for them simply to be characterised as a weak form of belief would probably not have satisfied Galen given that they occur in sages and that the Stoics believed that sages at least had perfect knowledge - so there must be some other sense in which they are rational (whether existing in a perfectly or imperfectly rational human). This leaves open the question of how precisely προπάθειαι should be characterised and, if Zeno and Chrysippus offered a characterisation, whether that characterisation meets Galen's requirements for rationality.

This 'under-characterisation' may seem surprising. However, it is less out of place given that, as Gill has shown, it appears unlikely that, by the time of Zeno and Chrysippus, the contrast between part-based and monistic psychological models had become an explicit point of debate.[254] Chrysippus was aware of Plato's tripartite theory of the soul in the *Timaeus* and the *Republic*, but, strikingly, did not explicitly respond to it,[255] even though he was happy elsewhere to distance himself clearly from the views of other schools, rejecting Platonic theories such as the political ideals of the *Republic*.[256] His reticence in rejecting part-based models suggests that this issue, which we deem so important, was a less urgent one in his eyes, and makes his 'under-characterisation' of προπάθειαι more understandable.

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[253] See Gill (2010) 252n.206 for discussion.

[254] Gill (2005) 459-467, suggesting that it becomes an explicit point of debate only at (roughly) the time of Plutarch (465). Posidonius and Panaetius, I shall suggest in §2.6.2.1.2, accepted that there were non-rational parts of the soul. Gill may be right to suggest that their work too derives from a context where there was no explicit debate between part-based and monistic psychological models. The evidence for this position is perhaps somewhat weaker, at least in the case of Posidonius, because he *appears*, if we trust Galen's testimony, to have been more careful in differentiating his views from those of Chrysippus (and the differences have become so great that it becomes less plausible that they were not consciously understood as adjustments to Chrysippus' theory). If they are deemed to be engaging directly with an explicit debate, it is not a problem for my account of Chrysippus' behaviour because Posidonius, like Panaetius, lived during a period when commentary on previous literature, including Platonic and Aristotelian texts, was increasingly important – so there is a good reason for a change in attitude at roughly the time of Posidonius, as Gill acknowledges (Gill (2005) 463; see 462-463).

[255] According to Galen's testimony: see Galen, *PHP* 3.1.19-21; Galen, *PHP* 4.1.6 = *SVF* 2.905; Galen, *PHP* 4.1.15 = *SVF* 3.461; Galen, *PHP* 4.3.6 (partly reproduced in *SVF* 3.462); Galen, *PHP* 5.7.43; Galen, *PHP* 5.7.52. This observation is emphasised by Gill (2005) at 460n.56.

[256] See Schofield (2000) 446-449.

This all points, I suggest, to Zeno's and Chrysippus' theory (or theories) featuring προπάθειαι in some form, but not to their setting out accounts of what precisely they were that were fully worked out as philosophical concepts. Given the lack of emphasis placed on it, it may also be taken to suggest that it was a part of their theories that was not seen as particularly significant. In other words, it was (whether intentionally or not) an outline account that could be expanded and reformulated in various ways that were entirely consistent with it.

§2.6.2.1.2: STOIC ANTECEDENTS FOR NON-RATIONAL THOUGHT

I now wish to present a justification for the plausibility of the view that Seneca developed the under-characterised account of 'pre-emotions' that he inherited from Zeno and Chrysippus in the way I suggested in §2.5.1.2, i.e. by positing that there existed in humans forms of non-rational response (and, therefore, that the human soul contained non-rational as well as rational psychic *pneuma*).

The reason why such a justification is necessary is that the view I have attributed to Seneca is inconsistent with the scholarly consensus that, for the Stoics, human perception was all entirely rational and that the human soul contained only rational psychic *pneuma*.[257] For example, Long's important (1982) study accepts Kerferd's argument that, in humans, all *phantasiai* are *logikai* and concludes that psychic *pneuma* in humans is rational, even if not

[257] This does not mean that others have not attributed it to Seneca. Setaioli (2014) is confident enough in it to write in a 'handbook'-style volume, without warning of alternative views, that 'Seneca accepts Posidonius' doctrine of the existence of an irrational element within the human soul' (246); however, Setaioli's position seems to me to be unusual.

(except in the sage) perfectly rational.[258] Similarly, Brittain (2002), the best treatment of the Stoic theory of non-rational perception, claims:

> 'Stoic psychology rules out the simultaneous possession of rational and non-rational cognitive faculties by one subject'.[259]

Given Seneca's self-presentation as a Stoic willing to challenge the views of his school,[260] it is not a problem if Seneca does not hold the orthodox Stoic view. Nor need we assume that Seneca would have, in fact, seen what seems to us to be a striking difference to be particularly significant: it may be, as we have seen, that this was not an explicit point of debate at this point;[261] and Seneca may even have seen the 'conventional' Stoic clear distinction between the non-rational psychic *pneuma* of children and animals and the rational (even if imperfectly rational) psychic *pneuma* of adult humans as an oversimplification for pedagogic purposes, especially given the fact that the notion that adults have non-rational psychic *pneuma* has, I think, an inherent plausibility.[262]

That said, I think it would improve the likelihood of Seneca having held this view if other Stoics could be shown to have held similar views. Two Stoics active after the time of

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[258] Long (1982) 56n.43, accepting Kerferd (1978) 252-253, which is based above all on D.L.7.51 = *SVF* 2.61 = *LS* 39A and which argues against what Kerferd presents as being at that time the orthodox view.
[259] Brittain (2002) 255.
[260] Cf. n.242.
[261] Cf. n.254.
[262] To simplify, in orthodox Stoic thought, (i) children are entirely non-rational and they develop into (ii) (imperfectly) rational adults who may (but, in practical terms, only very rarely if ever actually ever do) develop into (iii) perfectly rational sages (see further Inwood (1985) 182-215; in the *De ira*, Seneca treats children as rational (cf. n.144), but it is not clear that this is not a pedagogic simplification). I see no obvious reason why *all* the non-rational psychic *pneuma* must be 'converted' into imperfectly rational psychic *pneuma* as we move from stage (i) to stage (ii); and, indeed, although the Stoics do seem to have identified roughly one's fourteenth year of age as the time when a child became an adult (Galen, *PHP* 5.5.34), it seems implausible and there is (to my knowledge) no evidence that the Stoics held that there was a sudden and instantaneous transformation on a particular day when a child became a completely different sort of human being. On the other hand, they presumably saw this process as a gradual one. This allows, but of course does not prove, that it could be conceptualised by some Stoics as being one without an absolutely clear end-point. Cooper (1998) 90 makes a similar argument in defence of Posidonius' theory of affective movements: the fact that there exist such movements that are common to both children and adults makes the transition to adulthood a less clear-cut one and more commonsensical one than it would otherwise be.

Chrysippus but before that of Seneca do appear to have held views that resemble Seneca's and this indicates that Seneca may have been engaging with recent and contemporary Stoic theories when formulating his views.[263]

One such Stoic was, of course, Posidonius, who maintained that the soul contained two non-rational powers alongside the rational powers[264] and who thought that emotions occurred when non-rational 'affective movements' of the soul were 'taken up' by reason into a fully-formed emotion.[265]

Secondly, Panaetius, Posidonius' teacher, also seems to have held that there were non-rational forms of human response to stimuli, without having made the additional claim that there were two non-rational parts of the soul. The evidence that is generally cited[266] for this position comes from Cicero's *De officiis*, at least the first two books of which are based on Panaetius' *On duty*:[267]

> *duplex est enim uis animorum atque natura: una pars in appetitu posita est, quae est horme Graece, quae hominem huc et illuc rapit, altera in ratione, quae docet et explanat quid faciendum fugiendumque sit. ita fit ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet.* (Cic.*Off.*1.101[268])

Similar conclusions may be drawn from passages like:

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[263] His views were not identical to theirs, of course, but I defer a fuller explanation of how and why Seneca adapted their views (referring specifically to Posidonius) until §2.6.2.3.2, after I have identified a possible stimulus for Seneca's introduction of the seemingly non-Stoic idea of 'degrees of belief' into his theory (§2.6.2.2). There were other important differences too, of course, such as Seneca's denying that emotions could occur in animals at 1.3.3-8, in contrast to Posidonius' attribution of emotions to animals (on which, see (e.g.) Galen, *PHP* 5.6.37 = *LS* 65I4). Of course, Seneca engages with the views of other philosophers too, notably Aristotle.
[264] See (e.g.) Galen, *PHP* 6.2.5.
[265] I give a fuller account of Posidonius' theory in §2.6.2.3.2.
[266] See (e.g.) Sorabji (2000) 103.
[267] Dyck (1996) 19-21.
[268] Dyck (1996), amongt others, athetizes *ita fit ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet.*

etenim uirtus omnis tribus in rebus fere uertitur [...] *alterum cohibere motus animi turbatos, quos Graeci pathe nominant, appetitionesque, quas illi hormas, oboedientes efficere rationi* (Cic.*Off.*2.18)

and:

motus autem animorum duplices sunt: alteri cogitationis, alteri appetitus. cogitatio in uero exquirendo maxime uersatur, appetitus impellit ad agendum. curandum est igitur ut cogitatione ad res quam optimas utamur, appetitum rationi oboedientem praebeamus. (Cic.*Off.*1.131)

This evidence, accepted by Inwood and Sorabji,[269] has nonetheless been challenged.[270] What I wish to do here, therefore, is to present an additional and, to my knowledge, new argument for the idea that Panaetius held this view, based on a passage that appears towards the beginning of the *De officiis* (Cic.*Off.*1.11-12).[271] I quote the relevant passage with my own divisions:

1a *principio generi animantium omni est a natura tributum, ut se, uitam corpusque tueatur, declinet ea, quae nocitura uideantur, omniaque, quae sint ad uiuendum necessaria anquirat et paret, ut pastum, ut latibula, ut alia generis eiusdem.*

1b *commune item animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus procreandi causa et cura quaedam eorum, quae procreata sint.*

2 *sed inter hominem et beluam hoc maxime interest, quod haec tantum, quantum sensu mouetur, ad id solum, quod adest quodque praesens est se accommodat,*

[269] Inwood (1985) 292-3n.19; Sorabji (2000) 103.

[270] Straaten (1976).

[271] This passages appears just after just after a direct discussion of a position put forward by Panaetius with which Cicero disagrees (Cic.*Off.*1.9-10). This implies (but cannot prove) that, if Cicero had at Cic.*Off.*1.11-12 been disagreeing with Panaetius' views, he would have said so explicitly; and so I take this passage to be Panaetian in the same way that those quoted above are generally assumed to be.

paulum admodum sentiens praeteritum aut futurum.

3a *homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum uidet earumque praegressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus adiungit atque adnectit futuras, facile totius uitae cursum uidet ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias.*

3b *eademque natura ui rationis hominem conciliat homini et ad orationis et ad uitae societatem ingeneratque inprimis praecipuum quendam amorem in eos, qui procreati sunt impellitque, ut hominum coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri uelit ob easque causas studeat parare ea, quae suppeditent ad cultum et ad uictum, nec sibi soli, sed coniugi, liberis, ceterisque quos caros habeat tuerique debeat, quae cura exsuscitat etiam animos et maiores ad rem gerendam facit.*

Let us consider how this passage is structured. First (1a), Cicero describes how *natura* brings it about that creatures (humans and animals) protect themselves, their lives and their bodies; reject what seems harmful; and procure what is necessary for life. The first part of the tricolon describes personal οἰκειωσις and the second and third parts the manifestation of that οἰκειωσις in creatures' actions. Then (1b), Cicero explains that creatures instinctually procreate and care for *quae procreata sint*. What does this refer to? Cicero chooses to use a periphrasis rather than a form of *natus* (< *nascor*). This cannot be explained on the grounds that *natus* is unsuitable for animals because this term was applied to animals at around the time of the *De officiis*' composition.[272] So it seems that it refers to

[272] *OLD* s.v. *natus.* Shortly afterwards (3b), Cicero explains that nature unites men to each other and in particular creates a special love *in eos, qui procreati sunt*. The choice of the same verb and the similar morphological form suggest a certain parallelism, which might lead us to expect the same translation in 1b as in 3b; Atkins (at Griffin & Atkins (1991) 6) translates the text in 3b as "for his offspring". However, this is not a problem for my argument here because (i) the text in 3b could refer to a special love for the young (who might be thought of as needing special care) rather than to one's offspring; and (ii) the text in 3b is uncertain (see Dyck (1996) *ad loc.* for a discussion of the problems and the source of a possible interpolation).

something broader than a (human or animal) parent's care for his children.[273] But even if it does refer simply to a parent's care for his children, it clearly describes a form of social οἰκειωσις. Then (2), Cicero sets out how *ratio* distinguishes humans and animals. Then (3a), Cicero explains how *ratio* allows men to plan for the future. Finally (3b), Cicero explains how nature, through reason, brings men together.

To summarise:

1a: Instinctual personal οἰκειωσις

1b: Instinctual social οἰκειωσις

2: Introduction to *ratio*

3a: Personal οἰκειωσις in the context of *ratio*

3b: Social οἰκειωσις in the context of *ratio*

The structural organisation suggests a parallelism between 1a and 3a and between 1b and 3b. This makes us expect that, in humans, both 'personal' οἰκειωσις and 'social' οἰκειωσις involve both rational and non-rational stages.

'Social' οἰκειωσις does indeed involve both a non-rational mechanism (described in 1b) and a rational mechanism (described in 3b, which explains (a) how reason brings men together (*conciliat*) and (b) that this causes (*ob easque causas*) further 'social' οἰκειωσις (*studeat* implying that *ratio* affects agents' *motivation* to care for others)). However, 'personal' οἰκειωσις seems to involve a non-rational mechanism (described in 1a) but not a rational mechanism. We would expect this rational mechanism for 'personal' οἰκειωσις to

[273] This interpretation, that animals have concern for animals other than their offspring, is consistent with Cicero's statement that animals can have *fortitudo* (Cic.*Off.*1.50) when combined with his explanation that *fortitudo* involves concern for others in a way that suggests 'others' is not limited to one's offspring (*utilitas communis*, Cic.*Off.*1.63).

be described in 3a but what 3a offers us is not, say, an explanation of how *ratio* helps us to develop an awareness of the future and the past and hence the ability to make comparisons that allows us to understand better that we are an object of care for ourselves but, instead, a description of how *ratio* helps men to look after themselves, i.e. to achieve what having 'personal' οἰκειωσις makes them wish to achieve.

Does Cicero's failure to offer a rational mechanism for 'personal' οἰκειωσις necessarily reflect the fact that he, or his source, did not believe that 'personal' οἰκειωσις had one? I believe that the careful structural organisation of the passage, which I have discussed in detail, suggests that it does. It is clear that Cicero is attempting to draw out similarities and parallels, and it seems likely that he would have drawn out all the parallels that the theory he inherited from Panaetius allowed him to draw. It is almost as if Cicero (or his source) is trying to create a unified account of οἰκειωσις in human agents, but is having difficulty achieving it.

On this interpretation, the mechanism of 'personal' οἰκειωσις does not involve a rational component even in rational (even if not *perfectly* rational) human beings (even if the mechanism of 'social' οἰκειωσις does). This implies that there is a level of human perception and response to perceptions that occurs at the sub-rational level. Taken together with the evidence generally cited, I hope that it is enough to indicate that Panaetius held this view.

I do not claim that either Posidonius' or Panaetius' theories precisely anticipated Seneca's theory. Panaetius' may seem closer to Seneca's in that it does not (to our knowledge) posit

two parts of the non-rational,[274] but he is closer to Posidonius' in that the rational can, does and should conquer the non-rational.[275] This is quite different from Seneca's insistence that *ista* [= *primos motus*] *non potest ratio uincere* (2.4.2). I shall offer in §2.6.2.3 some possible reasons for Seneca's having made this change. However, what I wish to emphasise at this stage is that Seneca's account of pre-emotions is both entirely consistent with Zeno's and Chrysippus' theories; and that the assumption of the existence of non-rational psychic *pneuma* is one that has precedents in significant earlier, but post-Chrysippan, Stoic thinkers (including, in the case of Posidonius, one whom Seneca deems important enough to refer to in the *De ira*[276]). Although most Stoics did not believe that the psychic *pneuma* of adult humans contained non-rational psychic *pneuma*, there was therefore an impetus from within his own school as well as from other schools of philosophical thought[277] for Seneca to reconsider the orthodox Stoic view.

§2.6.2.2: SENECA'S ACCOUNT OF THE EMOTIONS

Similarly, Seneca's account of the emotions is consistent with the accounts provided by Zeno and Chrysippus.[278]

[274] Gill (2005) 460-1, though, observes that this sort of comparison may have seemed less significant in the ancient world than it does to us given the willingness with which Plato and Aristotle deploy various different models even in the same texts with, for example, Plato's *Republic* using a tripartite model (Pl.*R.*436a-441c), a bipartite model (Pl.*R.*602c-603b, Pl.*R.*604b-605c), and an apparently unified model (Pl.*R.*611b-612a).
[275] This is something of a simplification. The passages from Cic.*Off.*1.101 refer to reason being in charge and those from Cic.*Off.*1.131 and Cic.*Off.*2.18 refer to the (ethical) importance of this occurring. My discussion of Cic.*Off.*1.11-12 not only suggests that there is no rational mechanism for 'personal' οἰκειωσις but it also offers no indication that one will be developed. This need not be considered a problem (it may be held that a sage would develop one), but it may also be evidence that Panaetius did not always conceptualise non-rational response to stimuli in a consistent way. It is possible, then, that he did, in certain situations, have a view of such responses that more closely anticipated Seneca's view than I have suggested.
[276] 1.2.3b.
[277] On non-rational parts of the soul in Plato and Aristotle, see (e.g.) Lorenz (2006). This should not be taken to imply that Seneca was innately hostile to the views of other schools: see further Sellars (2014) 106-109. The Stoics in general, indeed, were profoundly influenced by Platonic philosophy: see further (e.g.) Long (1988) 150-154.
[278] My emphasis is on the cognitive rather than the physical aspects of emotions. On the consistency of the physical aspects of Seneca's accounts with (e.g.) Chrysippus' (a topic for which there is little evidence

Both Zeno and Chrysippus recognised that emotions involved judgements and a loss of rationality, but they appear to have differed in their precise definitions. Zeno thought that an emotion consisted of the loss of rationality that occurs after a judgement.[279] Some have maintained that he thought an emotion consisted of the loss of rationality *and* the judgement,[280] but this conclusion does not give due weight to Zeno's claim that emotions occur ἐπί ('on the occasion of') judgements.[281] Chrysippus, on the other hand, saw emotions as involving both these things: judgements and an accompanying lack of rationality.[282]

Seneca's account of the development of emotions is consistent with both these accounts. The third *motus* describes a time when one has a judgement but one's rationality has been impaired: this fits exactly Chrysippus' conceptualisation of an emotion.[283] It is also, though, a state that arises ἐπί one has accepted a particular belief (i.e. ἐπί the second *motus*). The fact that it still involves that belief does not make it peculiar for it to be described as occurring ἐπί a judgement, because what makes it an emotion may plausibly be understood as the change in rationality that has caused the judgement to be held in such a way that it cannot be overturned by rational argument.

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available), see (briefly) n.208. There are aspects of earlier accounts with which Seneca seemingly does not engage – for example, emotions as flutterings of the soul (Zeno: Stob.2.39.8 = *SVF* 1.206; Chrysippus: Stob.2.88.11-12 = *SVF* 1.206 = *LS* 65A, Galen, *PHP* 4.5.6 = *SVF* 3.476) – but this does not entail divergence from those accounts.

[279] See (e.g.) Sorabji (2000) 34-35.

[280] See (e.g.) Price (2005), esp. 481; Gill (2005), esp. 453-454.

[281] See (e.g.) Galen, *PHP* 4.2.6 = *SVF* 3.463 = *LS* 65D.

[282] See (e.g.) Galen, *PHP* 4.2.8 = *SVF* 3.462.

[283] Because I think that the third *motus* still involves a judgement, I cannot agree with Gill (2005) 456-7 that Seneca separates chronologically two distinct aspects of Chrysippus' analysis of emotions (the judgement and disobedience to reason). Graver identifies as a point of disagreement with Chrysippan doctrine the fact that the second *motus*, on the sort of interpretation I have adopted, involves a time when '[o]ne is angry and yet not carried away by anger' ((2007) 128; cf. Donini (1995) 206-9). However, Seneca could accommodate this objection by saying that the second and fourth *motus* did not truly constitute *ira*, even if he sometimes referred to them as *ira* because they were affective events related to *ira*. Such a claim is, indeed, required by the analysis I have presented in this sub-section.

I follow Sorabji, then, in arguing that the *De ira* is ‘the earliest extant attempt to reconcile the two conceptions of emotion’, even if, because I see judgements as existing in the third as well as in the second *motus*, I do so for different reasons.[284]

What allowed Seneca to harmonise Zeno’s and Chrysippus’ accounts was his introduction of the assumption that one’s commitment to the belief that one has suffered an *iniuria* and should take revenge varies over time: it is not simply that one either believes it or does not believe it, but that one may assent to it with a range of different epistemic commitments.[285] Even though there is good evidence for other schools of ancient philosophers maintaining that one could have less credence in some beliefs than in other beliefs,[286] even though it is, to us at least, a perfectly instinctive claim[287] and even though it is one that Seneca’s experiences in an uncertain political climate *may* have encouraged him to adopt, this position may seem surprising in a Stoic philosopher given that Stoicism is associated with

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[284] Sorabji (2000) 61. As Gill (2005) 455 interprets him, Sorabji thinks the idea of emotions as rejecting reason was associated with Zeno and that of emotions as mistaken judgements with Chrysippus; and sees the former assigned to the third *motus* and the latter to the second *motus*. However, Sorabji elsewhere argues that Chrysippus thought that emotions consisted of rejecting reason as well as mistaken judgements, and that in this he was inconsistent (Sorabji (2000) 57-58). On this reading, Seneca’s harmonisation is a more complex one: (a) of making Chrysippus’ inconsistent account consistent by separating out the two aspects of emotions; and (b) demonstrating the consistency between Chrysippus’ and Zeno’s accounts by having the third *motus* equivalent to Zeno’s account of emotions and to one aspect of Chrysippus’ account of emotions.
[285] Strictly, Seneca’s account need only involve three degrees of belief: no assent, assent when one’s commitment to the belief can be overturned by reason, and assent to the extent that one’s commitment to the belief cannot be overturned by reason. I speak of degrees of belief more generally because Seneca’s account of the physical changes accompanying episodes of *ira* – the (presumably gradual) increase of heat – implies but cannot prove that a range of different epistemic commitments is imagined. However, it does not affect my account if that is not the case. See further §2.5.2.2.
[286] Aristotle, for example, who may indeed have influenced Seneca, provides examples of claims which we have more or less confidence in than other claims, as in, for example, his discussion of beliefs to which we are not properly attached in his analysis of sophisms; at Arist.*Rh.*1.1, 1355a3-6 (ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔντεχνος μέθοδος περὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις (τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα ὅταν ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὑπολάβωμεν)…); and at Arist.*Rh.*1.2, 1356a5-8 (διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἤθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἁπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μὴ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς).
[287] Indeed, to desire to take revenge for an *iniuria* that we believe we have experienced but not to desire it so much that one’s actions cannot be stopped by reason is a common human experience, and one that Seneca may well have considered incompatible with the orthodox Stoic analysis.

sharp dichotomies: perhaps most famously, the Stoics maintained that one was either wholly virtuous or wholly vicious and that there were no degrees of virtue or vice.[288]

However, there is some evidence that this position was not as alien to the Stoic view as it might at first sight seem to be. Chrysippus himself, at least on Galen's testimony, seems at least on occasion to have relied on the assumption that degrees of belief could exist.[289] There is, moreover, a particular reason to think that some Stoics may have been re-examining this question: the Academic Sceptics, with whom the Stoics had been engaged in a long-running debate about the nature of knowledge,[290] maintained that there were such things as degrees of belief. More precisely, while refusing to accept that there existed cognitive impressions, they assumed that the wise would be guided by impressions that were πιθανός and (at least from Carneades onwards) that this sort of persuasiveness of impressions could be graded.[291] The Stoic theory that Seneca inherited does, in fact, seem to have gone some way towards accepting and accommodating differing degrees of epistemic commitment, both in allowing assent to positions of which one is uncertain by assenting to an impression along the lines of, say, 'It is reasonable that I am alive tomorrow';[292] and in allowing that obstacles might exist in the way of impressions that one

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[288] D.L.7.127 = *SVF* 3.536 = *LS* 61I. This was famously expressed through the analogy that those who are drowning are still drowning regardless of how far they are below the surface of the water (see (e.g.) Plu.1063A-B = *SVF* 3.539 = *LS* 61T).

[289] Galen, *PHP* 4.5.24-26 (partly reproduced in *SVF* 3.480 and in *LS* 65L).

[290] Although by the time of Seneca, the Academy as an organised School was no longer in existence and its Scepticism 'seems to have gone soft' (Bett (2010) 4), its influence through writers such as Cicero must have remained strong, and there would be later figures who identified themselves as Academic Sceptics, such as Favorinus (on whom see Lévy (2010) 96-98). The possibility of a Stoic adopting a view akin to that of the Academic Sceptics was assisted, moreover, by the fact that the difference between the two viewpoints was often questioned (or, in other words, that there was, in practical terms, no difference between Stoic cognitive and Academic Sceptic probable impressions). For example, Aenesidemus had described the debate between the Stoics and later Academics as 'Stoics fighting Stoics' (Phot.*Bibl.*170a16 = *LS* 71C). Indeed, the Academics' introduction of probabilism was probably a response to a stand-off in their debate caused by such claims, as Allen (1994) 104 argues.

[291] For a discussion of the evidence, see Allen (1994) 90-99.

[292] Cf. *LS* 40F (a conflation of D.L.7.177 = *SVF* 1.625 and Ath.354E = *SVF* 1.624) with Brennan (1996), esp. 319-325.

would otherwise accept.[293] It is at least plausible that Seneca was continuing this pattern of acceptance and accommodation.

We also need not accept unthinkingly the assumption that the Stoic acceptance of clear-cut dichotomies was, as they saw it, the full picture. Alongside their belief that all those who were not sages were equally wicked, they also accepted that non-sages could make gradual progress towards wisdom.[294] What we have here is a clear distinction between (i) the sage and (ii) the non-sage, but with a range of different states involved in (ii). With this in mind, it would be less surprising for a Stoic to maintain that there was a clear-cut distinction between (i) assent to a proposition (i.e. with the result that, if the judgement was of the right sort, the resultant judgement would constitute an emotion and so one's belief in it could not be overturned by reason) and (ii) the lack of such assent, while at the same time acknowledging that, within (ii), there were a range of different cognitive states that might exist.

I conclude, therefore, that Seneca's account of the emotions is consistent with Zeno's and Chrysippus' accounts, and that the innovations he made use epistemic resources at his disposal and are plausible ones for him to have made.

§2.6.2.3: THE RELATIONSHIP OF SENECA'S THEORY TO POSIDONIUS' THEORY

§2.6.2.3.1: SENECA'S THEORY AS A RESPONSE TO POSIDONIUS' OBJECTIONS TO CHRYSIPPUS' THEORY

[293] S.E.*M.*7.253 = *LS* 40K.
[294] See further Roskam (2005) 15-136.

Having established that both the pre-emotional and the emotional parts of Seneca's theory are consistent with and are plausible developments of Zeno's and Chrysippus' theory, I now wish to argue that Seneca's theory meets the objections that Posidonius levelled against Chrysippus' theory. I follow Richard Sorabji's ordering of the objections in his *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, where he discusses how Posidonius' new theory accommodates the objections he raised;[295] I pay closer attention to his first two objections because I agree with Sorabji's argument that Seneca's theory accommodates the final three objections.

§2.6.2.3.1.1: POSIDONIUS' FIRST OBJECTION THAT JUDGEMENTS ARE INSUFFICIENT FOR EMOTIONS[296]

One of Posidonius' major objections to Chrysippus' theory is that it fails to explain why emotions fade as time passes or as the agent becomes tired even if the initial judgement remains.[297] Judgements, then, are insufficient for emotions.

Seneca's analysis, I have suggested, involves the idea that the time at which one's belief that one has suffered an *iniuria* and ought to take revenge reaches the point at which it cannot be overturned by reason is not necessarily the same time at which other changes in one's rational capabilities occur. As an emotion fades, it is therefore possible to 'recover' one's broader capabilities, such as one's ability to reason correctly about what it is sensible to do, before one ceases to believe in the propositions that constitute *ira* to such an extent

[295] Sorabji (2000) 109-132.
[296] Sorabji's first objection: Sorabji (2000) 109-114.
[297] Posidonius seems to reject Chrysippus' explanation that an emotion involves more than one judgement (cf. n.38) and that, with the passage of time, assent to one of these judgements may no longer exist and so the emotion will fade. There is an obvious counterargument to this explanation, though, that there are occasions when one's commitment to both judgements remains and yet the emotion fades. See further Sorabji (2000) 110-111.

that those beliefs cannot be overturned by rational argument. Thus, it is possible to hold the beliefs involved in *ira* with such intensity that they cannot be overturned by rational argument but no longer to feel 'emotional' in the modern colloquial sense of that term.[298] Another way in which Seneca's account can accommodate the objection that Posidonius raised about Chrysippus' account (and that Chrysippus himself had raised) is by saying that the scenarios described earlier describe what I have called the fourth *motus*, although this has less explanatory force because the counterargument might be made that in these scenarios the person's belief that they should take revenge for an *iniuria* s/he believes s/he has suffered still cannot be overturned by rational argument: in other words, it simply isn't true to say that they are in the fourth *motus*.

It would, I think, be a fair charge that Seneca provides us with a narrative of *how* emotions fade without fully explaining *why* they fade in this way (i.e. why different aspects of one's rational capabilities change at different times). This does not entail that he did not have one[299] – it is not the aim of the *De ira* to set out his best possible defence of his theory – but even if it did not, it does not change the fact that his theory still seeks to accommodate this phenomenon.

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[298] Cf. (esp.) 1.17.5-6, discussed in §2.4.3.1.

[299] He does, in fact, hint at one. The explanation offered at 1.17.5-6 seems to be related to exhaustion (both of the scenarios described there, the second of which maps onto the situation we are discussing here, is compared to the wearing-out or exhaustion of a snake's *morsus*). This is similar to the explanation that Posidonius gave explicitly for the fading of emotions while judgements remained intact, that emotions fade when the non-rational 'affective movements' of the soul become wearied. There is nothing inherently implausible, it seems to me, in Seneca having thought that rational parts of the soul could have become wearied bearing in mind the physicality of the emotions, involving the surging of blood around the body, that we described in §2.5.2.1. Nor, given this physical dimension to the rational part of the soul, does it seem to me implausible that Seneca would have held that different rational capabilities of the soul become wearied at different points.

§2.6.2.3.1.2: POSIDONIUS' SECOND OBJECTION THAT JUDGEMENTS ARE INSUFFICIENT FOR EMOTIONS[300]

Another complaint that Posidonius makes against Chrysippus' account is that imagination is necessary for emotions or, to put it another way, that judgements without a visualisation of the stimulus are insufficient for emotions to arise:

> 'οἶμαι γὰρ ὅτι πάλαι βλέπετε πῶς διὰ λόγου μὲν πεισθέντες κακὸν ἑαυτοῖς παρεῖναι ἢ ἐπιφέρεσθαι οὔτε φοβοῦνται οὔτε λυποῦνται, φαντασίας δὲ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν λαμβάνοντες. πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις λόγῳ κινήσειε τὸ ἄλογον, ἐὰν μή τινα ἀναζωγράφησιν προσβάληται αἰσθητῇ παραπλησίαν; οὕτως γοῦν ἐκ διηγήσεώς τινες εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκπίπτουσι καὶ ἐναργῶς ἐγκελευσαμένου φεύγειν τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον λέοντα οὐκ ἰδόντες φοβοῦνται.' (Galen, *PHP* 5.6.24-26 = *LS* 65Q3-4).

The charge is that Chrysippus' account cannot accommodate the empirical observation that assent to particular impressions naming something as an evil does not cause an emotional response unless the person also imagines it. For Posidonius, this indicates that there must be a non-rational component in the sequence of events bringing about an emotion.

However, Seneca's account is also able to deal with this charge. One may hold beliefs to different extents, and a (false) belief that something is a good or an evil thing only becomes an emotion (in the restricted sense of the term) when it is held with a certain level of conviction. Seneca may have responded that holding a belief that an evil is present or approaching without imagining it may not be enough to cause one's belief to be held so

[300] Sorabji's second objection: Sorabji (2000) 114-120.

firmly that it constitutes an emotion (in the restricted sense) but when the stimulus is imagined, one's belief may start to be held sufficiently firmly. In other words, the visualisation of something is a particularly effective means by which we may become more convinced that it is a good or a bad thing because it provides (what appears to be) 'added' information[301] that influences our judgement, and if we become convinced enough of this, we are experiencing an emotion in the sense of the third *motus*.[302]

We can see this if we reconsider the two examples that Posidonius gives. In the case of the first example, we might say that we need to use our imagination in order to fall in love with a description because by imagining the person rather than reading a description of them without imagining them, we are more easily convinced that they are attractive. Posidonius' second example is that a vivid injunction to flee a lion causes an emotion even when the lion is not seen, with the implied point of comparison being that a non-vivid injunction to flee (again, when the lion is not seen) does not cause such a response. However, an instruction telling someone to flee from a lion might make someone reflect less on what the lion was capable of doing to them or likely to do to them and so make them less convinced that the approaching lion was a bad thing than an instruction that noted (for example) the proximity of the lion, the size of its teeth and its speed.

There are also occasions when Posidonius' claim that imaginations are involved in the formation of emotions might be questioned. Seneca may have responded that, although imagination is often required for one to believe that something is good or bad sufficiently to have an emotional response, there are other ways this can happen as well. Posidonius goes on, in a part not quoted above, to point out that his account is able to explain the fact

[301] This information need not be propositional content: impressions involve more than that (see n.384).
[302] See D.L.7.53 = *SVF* 2.87 = *LS* 39D and Sheppard (2014) 11-13 on Stoic theories of how we imagine things, including those of which we have no experience.

that those advancing towards virtue do not experience distress at the fact that they are not perfectly rational. His explanation is that their thought that they are not perfectly rational is arrived at through rational argument rather than through their (non-rational) imaginations,[303] and so they do not feel emotions. However, Posidonius' claim that *proficientes* do not feel distress at their imperfect rationality is one that may be disputed: many well have done, even if it was distress that sometimes faded (in which case, their situation can be explained according to the line of argument presented in §2.6.2.3.1.1). However, if we accept Posidonius' observation, Seneca may well give an alternative explanation of why the *proficientes* whom Posidonius describes do not react in a way that Posidonius considers emotional. Seneca may have held that a *proficiens* would not have agreed too strongly to a statement along the lines of 'The fact that I am vicious is a bad thing' – perhaps because he pays insufficient attention to this statement to believe it too strongly; or perhaps because he is distracted to reflection on (say) his overall progress or the lessons that he is learning from his vicious actions.[304]

§2.6.2.3.1.3: POSIDONIUS' OBJECTIONS THAT JUDGEMENTS ARE NOT NECESSARY FOR EMOTIONS

[303] Galen, *PHP* 5.6.28.

[304] Sorabji, explaining Posidonius' observations, gives the following example: 'Being intellectually convinced of the need to respond to a hostile foreign power will not provoke pity or fear in the absence of imagination. Some Britons may have felt like this about Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was bad for Czechoslovakia and for Britain and it would have been appropriate to react. But in Prime Minister Chamberlain's words, Czechoslovakia was a distant country of which we knew little.' (Sorabji (2000) 114) Sorabji's point is that, on Posidonius' reading, Czechoslovakia's distance from Britain would have made it harder for Britons to imagine the distress that a German invasion would have caused. Seneca's account is quite capable of dealing with this situation: that subset of Britons to whom Sorabji refers, Seneca would (I suspect) have said, believed that German aggression was bad for Czechoslovakia and for Britain and that they should react, but that they did not believe this so strongly that felt pity, fear or a desire for action so strongly that they could be termed emotions. The distance between Britain and Czechoslovakia may have reduced the extent to which they genuinely believed that an invasion of Czechoslovakia presented a danger to Britain; and it may have reduced their feelings of association with the Czechoslovakian people and reduced the extent to which they believed that they were a suitable object of pity. Seneca, then, would have a plausible response to this situation too – by saying that it is not because of the absence of imagination that emotions were not experienced, but because (for a variety of reasons) the people did not believe with a sufficient degree of credence one of the propositions they would have had to believe to experience an emotion.

Posidonius' theory was also designed to accommodate Chrysippus' theory's inability to accommodate various situations that seemed to show that judgements are not necessary for emotions. The situations that Posidonius gives are when one weeps without a judgement;[305] when children and animals, who are (he thinks, in line with orthodox Stoic thought) incapable of rational deliberation and therefore of judgements, experience emotions;[306] and when music, unaccompanied by words, causes emotions even though there are no judgements.[307] However, as Sorabji himself observes, all of these situations may be analysed as examples of the first *motus*:[308] thus, although they are not emotions, they are nonetheless affective responses that Seneca's theory of emotions can accommodate.

There is a slight complication in the case of the first situation. Seneca's account does not make clear whether or to what extent pre-emotions continue while the second and the third *motus* are occurring: are the tears that might occur while someone is experiencing the second and the third *motus* caused by the non-rational psychic *pneuma* as a result of the first *motus* or are they physical changes caused by the rational psychic *pneuma* as a result of the second or third *motus*?[309] If the former is the case, as seems to me to be most likely,[310] Sorabji's analysis holds. If the latter is the case, the case of someone continuing

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[305] Sorabji's third objection: Sorabji (2000) 121-125.
[306] Sorabji's fourth objection: Sorabji (2000) 125-130.
[307] Sorabji's fifth objection: Sorabji (2000) 130-132.
[308] Sorabji (2000) 72.
[309] Of course, tears could be caused by both pre-emotions and by 'true' *ira* (whether in the restricted sense of the word or not), in which case each of the following explanations is relevant.
[310] Given that the second *motus* involves any degree of epistemic commitment to the notion that one should take revenge, even a very slight belief, it seems likely that in many, perhaps most, cases the second *motus* will occur almost as soon as the possible *iniuria* has been observed; unless the first *motus* is often extremely short and often unnoticeable, we would expect it to overlap somewhat with the second *motus*. The fact that it occurs at a different level of *pneuma* from the 'proper' emotions means that it is not a problem for such an overlap to occur. It also seems quite logical for it not to stop always at the same time as real emotions if it is

to cry after they have stopped believing that they have suffered an evil seems to disqualify Sorabji's analysis. This is not a problem, though, because it is possible that some instances of tears without judgements are not to be analysed as examples of the first *motus* but as occasions (in the second or fourth *motus*) when there is a belief to which only a small degree of credence is attached. There would thus be an emotion in the weaker but not in the stricter sense of the term.

This would allow tears to occur with only a weak judgement. Given that assent or non-assent to impressions is a binary choice, with assent occurring when one's degree of belief reaches a certain level, whether or not a very weakly-believed judgement is held with sufficient conviction to constitute assent is, of course, a subjective choice; what is important is that, even if Posidonius denied such a very weak judgement constituted assent, Seneca could reasonably hold that it did. On either interpretation, we see that Seneca's analysis is able to explain satisfactorily the situations that Posidonius faulted Chrysippus' theory for failing to adequately address.

§2.6.2.3.2: THE ADVANTAGES OF SENECA'S ACCOUNT OVER POSIDONIUS'

We have seen, then, that Seneca's account is at least as effective as Posidonius' in meeting the objections that Posidonius raised against Chrysippus' account. I now turn to considering some ways in which Seneca's account may seem to be, at least from an 'orthodox' Stoic standpoint, preferable to Posidonius'.[311]

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not generated, as real emotions are, by (imperfectly) rational perception but by non-rational perception of impressions. It seems likely that the two would not always coincide exactly.

[311] This reconstruction of Posidonius' theory and the discussion of its differences from Stoic orthodoxoy are indebted to Cooper (1998). I differ from Cooper, though, in seeing important differences between Seneca's and Posidonius' theories, even though I accept that Posidonius is likely to have been one of the influences

In Posidonius' theory, emotions arise through a combination of (rational but imperfectly rational) existing beliefs and (non-rational) 'affective movements'. Cooper, following the account Galen provides at *PHP* 5.5.21 (partly reproduced in *LS* 65M8),[312] describes it as follows:

> 'When an emotion arises on some particular occasion the person supposes falsely that some particular thing thought to be present or available is good or bad for him, and he is induced to suppose this by the force of the affect (i.e., of the "affective movement") he happens to be feeling in relation to it at that time. This supposition is something he infers to; it is a conclusion […] But the affect has force sufficient to drive him to that conclusion only because, having a generally weak mind, he made prior mistakes of judgement.'[313]

There is no evidence for what Posidonius thought these prior mistakes of judgement were, but Cooper's suggestion that they involved incorrect judgements about whether particular (types of) things were good or bad must be correct. Despite that, Cooper must also be correct to argue that affective movements, though non-rational, contain 'inchoate evaluative attitudes':

> '[H]is view is that emotions are caused, not by mere attractive but false appearances, but rather by the force of some affect the agent feels, which leads him to form the belief "on the basis of the movement of the affective power" that some thing is good or bad, and so generates the emotional state on that basis. This brief quotation does not make it clear that this force influences the judgement by itself

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that made Seneca receptive to the idea of non-rational response to stimuli in humans; Cooper, by contrast, considers Seneca to be following Posidonius (see Cooper (1998) 98-99).

[312] For the text Cooper uses, see Cooper (1998) 107-108n.37.

[313] Cooper (1998) 88.

> causing Chrysippus' attractive appearance, but Posidonius is being cited here as pressing the question "why pleasure projects the persuasive impression that it is good" (Galen, *PHP* 5.5.19-20 [= *LS* 65M7]), so that is presumably what he thought.'[314]

There is no reason to think that affective movements in sages are any different from those in non-sages (Galen, *PHP* 5.5.21 (partly reproduced in *LS* 65M8) makes it clear that, although the false beliefs of a rational power precede the affective movements, they do not cause them or determine their nature), and so this entails that the affective movements that the sage feels also constitute, non-rationally, inchoate evaluative attitudes.

This is why it is plausible to assume that Galen is correct in attributing to Posidonius a virtue of the non-rational part of the soul that is itself non-rational[315] as well as a virtue of the rational part of the soul. This suggests that knowledge and understanding is not sufficient for virtue and that perfecting the non-rational part of the soul through non-rational means (such as habituation[316]) is also necessary.

These two conclusions – that the sage's affective experiences include experiencing feelings that involve 'inchoate evaluative attitudes' (which would be in conflict with his (perfectly) rationally held evaluative attitudes, opening up the possibility of conflict in the sage's existence[317]) and that virtue is not achieved only through the development of perfect rationality – are remarkably inconsistent with Stoic orthodoxy.

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[314] Cooper (1998) 88-89; the phrase 'inchoate evaluative attitude' is from 96.
[315] Galen, *PHP* 5.5.35-37 (partly reproduced in *SVF* 3.257).
[316] Galen, *PHP* 5.5.29.
[317] Cf. Cooper (1998) 96.

Seneca's theory, on the other hand, does not entail either of these conclusions. It is true that, as I set out in §2.5.1.2, Seneca seems to have been a psychological dualist, at least in one important sense in which we would use the phrase 'the soul', in that he seems to have maintained that human beings (other than sages) contain non-rational psychic *pneuma* as well as (imperfectly) rational psychic *pneuma*. However, there is nothing in the *De ira* to suggest that Seneca saw this non-rational psychic *pneuma* as interacting with the (imperfectly) rational psychic *pneuma*, and, as we saw, it is presumably to emphasise the difference between the two that he represents one as *corpus* and the other as *animus*.

For Seneca, then, there is no such thing as a virtue relating to the non-rational side of one's existence that does not consist of knowledge, and there is no such thing as a sage experiencing, even non-rationally, inchoate evaluative attitudes that are 'incorrect'.[318] To an orthodox Stoic, then, Seneca's account lacks the strikingly unorthodox implications that Posidonius' has.[319] Given that we saw in §2.6.2.3.1 that it is as effective as Posidonius' account at meeting the objections that Posidonius raised against Chrysippus' account, Seneca's account may be understood as the product of an attempt to develop Chrysippus' (and Zeno's) accounts (without contradicting them) in a way that meets Posidonius' objections but does not involve the unacceptable implications of Posidonius' analysis.

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[318] It may be objected that Seneca's *primi motus* are just such non-rational, 'incorrect' inchoate evaluative attitudes. It can be counter-intuitive for us to conceptualise, say, tears being shed by a wise man at (what to others would appear to be) a sad scene on the stage without assuming that this reflects an inchoate attitude that what is going on on stage is a bad thing. But there is no reason to think that Seneca would have conceptualised such tears as involving such an inchoate evaluative attitude. Unlike Posidonius' 'affective movements', Seneca does not seem to think that there is any characteristic of his *primi motus* that encourages a particular evaluative judgement.

[319] Arguably, there is a 'cost' (in terms of introducing unorthodoxy) of his resistance to Posidonius' version of non-rational forms of response, and that cost consists of his use of the notion of 'degrees of belief'. However, for the pressures on Seneca to incorporate the idea of 'degrees of belief', see §2.6.2.2. Moreover, a second important advantage is that the introduction of the second *motus* clearly introduces into Seneca's theory a time when it is possible to reflect on possible courses of action and to reject a desire to take revenge – in other words, it introduces a time when the therapy that the *De ira* propounds is possible (see Asmis (2015) 232).

Taken together, I hope that §2.6.2.1-2.6.2.3 have suggested the plausibility of Seneca having developed the account of the emotions that he inherited from Zeno and Chrysippus in the way that I have suggested, an important argument to make especially given Graver's doubts of the likelihood of his doing so,[320] and demonstrated that the account I have given of Seneca's theory meets the requirement for availability.

[320] Cf. Graver (2007) 128: 'It would be strange […] if Seneca were to create (or uphold) a modification of Stoic psychology in which a person can go only partway to anger, having some substantive reaction and yet stopping short of the full anger response.' This is quoted at greater length at §2.4.2.6.

§2.7: THE LITERARY REASONS FOR SENECA'S CRYPTIC PRESENTATION OF HIS STANCE

I now turn to explaining how my interpretation of the *De ira* meets the fourth requirement I suggested it should, the constraint that any apparently illogical or inconsistent features of the text should be able to be explained as the consequence of plausible literary or pedagogic objectives.

We have seen that *ira* refers to times when one has a *cupiditas ulciscendae iniuriae* – the definition Seneca offered, according to Lactantius' testimony – but it may refer either strictly to the time when one's commitment to this *cupiditas* may not be overturned by reason (the third *motus*) or also to other periods of time when one has this *cupiditas* but does not assent to it so strongly. The result of using the same term to refer to different, though closely related, concepts is that the *De ira* has struck many readers as an inconsistent work. I suggest that Seneca's inconsistent use of the term *ira* is the product of a tension between a desire to conceal forms of *ira* other than the third *motus* and a need to refer to forms of *ira* other than the third *motus*.

Firstly, why would Seneca wish to conceal the existence of forms of *ira* other than the third *motus*? The *De ira* sought to explain not just how *ira* could be avoided but to justify the idea that it should always be avoided. To do this, Seneca argued that *ira* was not subject to *ratio*. However, in Seneca's theory, *ira* is not subject to *ratio* only in the restricted sense, of the third *motus*. To have explained this distinction would have opened himself up to counterarguments along the lines of 'I will fight using the second *motus* of *ira* while employing *ratio* to ensure that I do not enter the third *motus*.' These are

counterarguments that Seneca may well have felt able to argue against convincingly: he might have pointed out, for example, that, as we saw in §2.4.3, even in the second *motus* our mental capacities are diminished to below their 'normal' level – that is to say, other aspects of our rational capabilities may be impaired. Or he may have argued that we do not have control over when our *ira* moves from the second to the third *motus*. However, to have introduced such distinctions might have been to seem to acknowledge weaknesses in his argument. A far more persuasive case (or, at least, *prima facie* a far more persuasive case) could be made by using the verbal slippage between *ira* in the broader sense and *ira* in the narrower sense to conclude from the fact that *ira* (in its narrower sense) is never subject to *ratio* that *ira* (in its broader sense) is never acceptable.[321]

Why, then, does Seneca not conceal the existence of the second *motus* altogether? The answer, I think, is that there are occasions where Seneca does want to refer to times when one wishes to take revenge but when one is not experiencing the third *motus*. One reason for this is that the existence of a time (during the second or the fourth *motus*) when reason can overturn one's beliefs is evidence for *ira*'s unsuitability for getting things done: this is deployed, for instance, at 1.17.4-5. A second, probably more important, reason is that some of Seneca's prescriptions for how *ira* can be soothed involve intervening at times other than the third *motus*, such as the second *motus*, as at 3.13.1-2,[322] or at times when the

[321] In making this suggestion, I do not rule out other possible motives as well. One may simply be the matter of convenience. I argued in §2.3 that *ira* is used in a variety of ways (what I sometimes call its 'broader sense' in fact is a number of different senses): these different usages are not random but linked to what Seneca needs to refer to. At 3.29.2, for example, *ira* includes the second *motus* because Seneca wants to explain how one can still use judgement to overcome *ira* before it has reached the third *motus* whereas at 3.39.2, *ira* only begins with the third *motus* because Seneca is explaining how to deal with fully-formed *ira* and when to intervene to try to stop it. How the term *ira* is used, then, depends on what precise period of the emotion he needs to refer to for his particular pedagogic and therapeutic purposes. He could have been more obviously consistent by making his precise usage of the term at different points explicit, of course, but his meaning is clear without presenting a number of different stipulative definitions of *ira* and, by not doing this, he avoids the charge of hair-splitting that was often levelled at the Stoics (cf. Cic.*Fin*.4.5-6).
[322] On this passage, see §2.4.2.4.

emotion is at a liminal stage between different *motus*, as at 3.39.2-3.[323] So Seneca could not simply conceal the existence of forms of *ira* other than the third *motus*.

The *De ira*, then, exhibits a tension between concealing the existence of forms of *ira* other than the third *motus* and harnessing the explanatory force that these other forms of *ira* have: one result of this tension is that *ira* is sometimes used in different ways and the text consequently appears inconsistent. But, as I hope to have shown, a coherent understanding of *ira* underlies Seneca's text and the apparent inconsistencies he introduces are for sound pedagogic reasons:[324] Seneca deliberately misrepresented his account of the 'script' of *ira* as part of a strategy to impress upon his readers the harmfulness of *ira*.

[323] Seneca does not explicitly identify this as a liminal stage: a justification of this is provided in §2.4.3.4. By 'liminal stage', I mean either that the agent is in the third *motus* but not all his broader rational capabilities have been affected or that he is not in the third *motus*, but his broader rational capabilities have been affected.
[324] He was not, of course, alone in doing this. The illogicalities that he introduces are broadly similar to Lucretius' conflation of different forms of 'fear of death', presenting arguments suitable to eliminate one form of 'fear of death' as though they provided evidence against other forms: see Reinhardt (2002) 291-294.

§3: LITERARY ORDER & DISORDER

As we have seen, it is not only the *De ira*'s philosophical underpinnings that strike its readers as chaotic but also its literary form. In this section, I try to identify the organisational principles underlying the text and to understand why that order is distorted, and to understand what I argue are discontinuities in the *persona* that Seneca adopts.

§3.1: SENECA'S INTERLOCUTORS: METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS

The *De ira*'s arguments are presented in response to the questions and complaints of various interlocutors, and our interpretation of the text's organisation and its pedagogic strategies depends on who, at any given time, Seneca is addressing. Working out how Seneca's 'ideal' readers would have answered this question is far from straightforward. It is a problem that we also face, for example, when reading the *De rerum natura*: is Townend right to argue that, as Lucretius wrote the poem, he replaced Memmius with an impersonal addressee?[325] Or is, as Clay argues, Memmius 'there explicitly from its [the poem's] beginning to its end'?[326]

However, the situation with the *De ira* is, if anything, even more complicated. On the most basic level, speech attributed to Seneca's interlocutors may invite characterisation as the speech of either a second person or a third person.[327] There are several interjections from named individuals in the third person, such as Aristotle, and others from unnamed third person interjectors: *inquit* is regularly used to introduce them with no indication of

[325] Townend (1978).
[326] Clay (1983) 213.
[327] There are some first person plural references (e.g. at 1.5.3) which can be understood as a combination of the text's speaking *ego* and at least one of a second person and a third person addressee.

who is speaking. What is not clear is whether *inquit*, when used on its own, refers to the previous named person to interact with Seneca or whether it refers to a hypothetical (generic?) objector.

The second person addressee of the text as a whole is Nouatus, Seneca's brother. Other people are addressed in the second person too, some explicitly[328] and others implicitly. This causes uncertainties. When, for example, a second person is used in a rhetorical question to respond to an objection raised by an unnamed third person speaker, who is the second person addressee: the unnamed third person speaker or the generic 'you'?[329] This uncertainty is more acute when forms of second person address are used some time after an interjection. The addressee then could be the previous person (whether named or not) to address Seneca in the text, Nouatus or the generic 'you'.

There are also interjections that are not easy to categorise as second or third person: when, for example, Seneca's justification for the view that *ira* is not *secundum naturam* of 1.5.2-3 is interrupted by *'quid ergo? non aliquando castigatio necessaria est?'* (1.6.1), is this interjection to be attributed to the second or to the third person (or even the first person)?

This complexity – both the number of different forms of introducing the interjections and the difficulty of distinguishing them - is typical of Seneca.[330] There are various possible approaches to tackling this complexity. I outline the three main options:

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[328] For example: *'irascuntur boni uiri pro suorum iniuriis.' cum hoc dicis, Theophraste, quaeris inuidiam praeceptis fortioribus et relicto iudice ad coronam uenis…* (1.12.3)

[329] For example: *'quid ergo?' inquit 'uir bonus non irascitur, si caedi patrem suum uiderit, si rapi matrem?' non irascetur, sed uindicabit, sed tuebitur. quid autem times ne parum magnus illi stimulus etiam sine ira pietas sit?* (1.12.1)

[330] Hine (2010).

Option 1: Assume that all second-person and third-person interjections (other than those clearly identified as coming from a particular other individual) come from Nouatus.

Option 2: Deny that any interjections at all come from Nouatus and assume that all interjections, other than those coming from clearly named individuals, come *either* from a particular anonymous interlocutor *or* from a series of changing interlocutors whose identity is unimportant.

Option 3: Assume that certain interjections may be identified as coming from specific, identifiable interlocutors (including Nouatus) and establish criteria for assessing when subsequent interjections should not be understood to come from that interlocutor or those interlocutors as well.

One response to interpreting the identity of the addressees has been to assimilate the differences and to treat all interjections (other, perhaps, than those explicitly attributed to figures like Theophrastus) as coming from the same interlocutor (Option 1). Thus Nussbaum's analysis of the text argues that the anonymous third-person interlocutor 'speaks forth-from, it seems, deep in Novatus' soul itself'[331] and sees objections from a second-person interlocutor as reflecting not a different speaker but the presence in Nouatus of 'perhaps a more direct personal engagement in the process of therapy'.[332] However, the

[331] Nussbaum (1994) 407; she seems to take a somewhat different view at 405, where we are told this person may or may not be Nouatus, but it is clear that Nussbaum's analysis treats all interjections as coming from the same person.
[332] Nussbaum (1994) 409. The result of Nussbaum's analysis is a reading of the *De ira* that sees it as a dramatisation of the course of Nouatus' therapy, as he progresses from (in Book 1) an Aristotelian view of the importance of *ira*, at least in some circumstances, to (by the end of Book 3) being 'convinced that the cultivation of *humanitas* in himself and in others requires the removal of anger' (Nussbaum (1994) 410). But even if we accept her assumption that the subject of *inquit* introducing objections is Nouatus, her argument runs into difficulties given that (e.g.) the final objection raised seems to come from someone who seems to think that *ira* (in moderation) is acceptable: see further §3.3.2. Instances such as this could be

reason for the distinction between *inquit* and *inquis* that Nussbaum posits – that it reflects a difference in the commitment with which Nouatus engages in the political discourse - seems to me implausible.[333] Moreover, even if another reason could be found to explain the use of both *inquis* and *inquit* with Nouatus as their subjects, this would be very odd Latin. Latin does (on occasion) use one person when another person is strictly required. This phenomenon is noted by Quintilian:

> *et de nobis loquimur tamquam de aliis: 'dicit Seruius, negat Tullius,' et nostra persona utimur pro aliena, et alios pro aliis fingimus. utriusque rei exemplum pro Caecina Pisonem, adversae partis advocatum, adloquens Cicero dicit: 'restituisse te dixti: nego me ex edicto praetoris restitutum esse': uerum enim est illud: 'restituisse' Aebutius dixit, 'nego me' Caecina [ex edicto praetoris restitutum esse]: et ipsum 'dixti', excussa syllaba, figura in uerbo.* (Quint.*Inst.*9.3.21-22)

However, this device is rare and it is, to my knowledge, never used in a way that creates an ambiguity. In the first example that Quintilian cites,[334] Cicero refers to himself using the third person but by naming himself as the subject of the verb, it is quite clear who is meant. The second example is less straightforward:[335] Cicero uses the first person singular to refer to his client, Caecina; and he uses the second person singular, naturally taken to refer to Piso, the prosecuting advocate, to refer to Aebutius, who had brought the case against Caecina. This is intelligible as the assimilation of Cicero to his client and of Piso to his client, and it is one where the context (a court case) made any possible ambiguity impossible. In the *De ira*, however, there is the risk of ambiguity, so it seems to me that

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accommodated by a generic 'you' but that would create a circular argument in which interjections are identified as coming from Nouatus on the basis of an assumed progression in Nouatus' understanding.

[333] It might be that Nouatus was introduced as the subject of the first third person objection in the part of the definitional section that is not extant. However, if this were the case, we would expect Nouatus to be restated as the subject after third person interjections attributed to others.

[334] Crawford (1994) 297.

[335] Cic.*Caec.*82.

any interpretation of the *De ira* must take the difference between the second and third person forms of address seriously.

The extreme alternative to this approach, Option 2, involves denying the importance of Nouatus for our response to the text. On this line of analysis, advocated by Harris, Nouatus 'comes into the work only in the most formal fashion' and should be seen as 'simply part of the customary rhetorical furniture'.[336] There seem to me to be two main reasons for adopting this approach: the conventionality of an address to a particular individual in this sort of text and how few addresses there actually are to Nouatus in the *De ira* (just as there very few addresses to him in the *De uita beata*). However, neither of these factors (either individually or when they are combined) should exclude the interpretation of the address to Nouatus. We often interpret features of texts that are conventional, even if they are not very common in a particular text. For example, anachronisms and direct references to contemporary situations form part of our expectations when we watch modern versions of Greek tragedies yet we interpret them and we revisit our understanding of the play in the light of them even in versions, such as Frank McGuinness' *Euripides' Hecuba*,[337] when they are rare. The question we face – would an ancient reader have ignored the address to Nouatus or not? – is, in fact, similar to the question we face whenever we find an intertextual allusion – would an ancient (ideal) reader have interpreted or reacted to this quotation or reference, or would he have dismissed it as 'background noise', contributing to the text's literary texture but doing little else?[338] If an ideal reader *would* have interpreted the role of addressees, we might expect a trigger to drive them to attribute interjections to speakers and to align themselves with or

[336] Harris (2001) 379 and 379n.78.
[337] McGuinness (2004).
[338] For present purposes, this (simplified) account of the interpretative options available to us is sufficient. For a more nuanced interpretation, see Hinds (1998) 17-51.

against those speakers. In Lucretius' *De rerum natura*, another text where, as we have seen, there is debate as to whether the identity of the addressee carries any interpretative significance,[339] this could be the negative portrayal of Memmius.[340] In the case of Seneca's *De ira*, this trigger, the (or 'a') trigger is the shifting (and, as we shall see, at times uncertain) identity of the addressee.

If the *De ira* were a letter, there would, I think, be less dispute that the identity of its addressee was, or could be, meaningful. However, it is a mistake to posit too great a distinction between the letters and Seneca's *dialogi*.[341] If we enumerate the 'contextual and formal characteristics' of letters, as Trapp has done,[342] we might find that Seneca's *dialogi* lack several - they do not have conventional formulae at the end, nor are they fairly short[343] – and we cannot tell whether they possess others (such as being from two people far apart and to be conveyed from one to the other). But such an approach would neglect the notion that a text like the *De ira*, even if we may hesitate to call it a letter, may nonetheless share characteristics with and work within the tradition of letter-writing, and so expect to be judged by the criteria of that genre.[344] Seneca's *dialogi*, in fact, combine

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[339] There are two distinct issues here. The first, as we have seen, is whether the second person addressee is Memmius throughout. The second is the question of whether or how the historical identity of Memmius is significant: for example, *if* the Memmius is indeed the C. Memmius L. f., *pr.* 58, his anti-Epicurean tendencies, his disdain for Latin poetry, his political ambition and his love-affairs would all affect our interpretation of how the didaxis of the *De rerum natura* operates (Hutchinson (2001) 158 sets out the evidence for these historical claims but sees them as difficulties for this identification of the addressee; he suggests, cautiously, a different Memmius as the addressee at 159). The same two issues apply to *De ira.* I address the first of these here; the second is relevant to my discussion in §3.3.1.1.

[340] See (e.g.) Volk (2002) 81.

[341] Roller (2015) 65-66 discusses the similarities and differences between Seneca's *dialogi* and letters, especially Seneca's *Epistles*. Demetrius's discussion at Demetr.*Eloc.*223-235 of the similarities and differences between letters and dialogues show that at least some ancients saw a close connection between the two genres.

[342] Trapp (2003) 1. On the dialogue as deserving the term 'genre', see Roller (2015) 54-65.

[343] It should be emphasised that just as if we were to draw up a list of the characteristics of (for example) epic poetry, we would not expect all epic poems to have all those characteristics, so not all examples of letters meet all these criteria. For example, Seneca's longest letters (Sen.*Ep.*94, Sen.*Ep.*95) are longer than his shortest (fully-surviving) *dialogus*, *De prouidentia.*

[344] On the value of the Wittgensteinian idea of the 'family-resemblance concept' for liminal cases that seem *almost* to be letters, see Gibson & Morrison (2007) 14-16.

features of letters with those of dialogues.[345] From the typical letter, Seneca (like many didactic poets[346]) borrows the notion that the text is 'equivalent to, or a substitute for, face-to-face conversation' with the addressee;[347] from the typical dialogue (or at least, from some dialogues), Seneca borrows the number of interlocutors.[348] The result is a primary conversation between Seneca and Nouatus, with other interlocutors present who may interrupt or whose interests Seneca may need to address, and one in which there is no reason to think that the addressee is significant.

We are left, then, with Option 3 (and not simply by default after rejecting Options 1 and 2: many of the arguments I advanced in rejecting Option 2 may be reframed as positive reasons for accepting Option 3). Given this acceptance of the principle that different objections come from different interlocutors, how should we go about deciding who is responsible for which objections?

Sometimes, we can be sure that we know who is being addressed in the second person singular. The start of the first book provides a clear example:

> *exegisti a me, Nouate, ut scriberem...* (1.1.1)

Following second-person addresses, subsequent second-person addresses, so long as they do not follow after too great a gap (I shall return to this), have no reason to seem to come from a different person. Therefore, when, shortly after an address to Nouatus at 2.1.1 and

[345] On the characteristics of *dialogi*, see Roller (2015) 54-58; on their relationship with letters, see Roller (2015) 65-66.
[346] Cf. my remarks on simultaneity in §3.2.5.
[347] Trapp (2003) 213 and 238, with references. I describe this as characteristic of letters rather than dialogues, but the distinction is not clear-cut: Ciceronian dialogues (unlike Platonic dialogues) tended to name addressees, although in these cases there can be debate about whether the text was imagined as 'equivalent to […] face-to-face conversation'.
[348] We may think, for example, of Cicero's *Academica* 2 (his *Lucullus*). Similarly, though, this phenomenon does appear in letters too: Seneca's (later) *Epistles.*

with nothing to cause us to change who we consider the second person addressee to be, it is natural to take the subject of *inquis* in

> *'quorsus' inquis 'haec quaestio pertinet?'* (2.2.1)

to be Nouatus himself.

However, there are some factors that will cause us to dissociate the second person from a particular individual (what I shall sometimes refer to as a 'reorientation' of the addressee). These are:

(a) an interjection or direct speech that is attributed to an anonymous third person speaker, other than one occurring in an anecdote or *exemplum*. For example, Book 2 begins with an explicit address to Nouatus and there follows, at 2.2.1, an interjection attributed to him as well as, for example at 2.4.1, second person addresses. However, at 2.6.1, we find an interjection attributed to an unidentified third person speaker (marked by *inquit*): this must be someone other than the second person addressee, Nouatus.

(b) an interjection or direct speech attributed to a particular individual, other than one occurring in an anecdote or *exemplum*. For example, at 1.9.2, *inquit Aristoteles* clearly identifies the interjection as coming from Aristotle.[349]

It is also quite possible, perhaps even likely, but we can never be certain, that a 'reorientation' will be caused by one of the following factors:

[349] I see no reason why a new *inquit* would, in itself, suggest a new interlocutor; it is not intuitive that it would and there do not seem to be any generic expectations that would invite this reading.

(c) a significant gap between the naming of an interlocutor and a particular interjection, especially if there is a substantial portion of text with no or very few interjections.[350]

(d) a third-person potential subjunctive ('someone might say') to introduce an imaginary objection.

(e) a reported statement.

(f) a significant number of interjections from unidentified sources since the naming of the interlocutor.

When the approach I have outlined[351] is applied to the *De ira*, we are able to identify the sections of the text where the interjections seem *definitely* to come from Nouatus (and Nouatus is being addressed), and other sections where they *probably* or *quite possibly* come from Nouatus (and Nouatus is *probably* or *quite possibly* being addressed).[352] We

[350] Cf. Mazzoli (2000) esp. 259 on *De prouidentia*: 'il destinatore e il destinatario sono portati, in corso d'opera, a perdere rilievo o addirittura a uscire di scena'.

[351] This approach may seem 'hypercritical:' it certainly has much in common with the sort of arguments that Roller has in mind when he writes 'Efforts to distinguish *inquis* from *inquit* as indicating different speakers, or to distinguish voices that object from those seeking clarification, seem to me hypercritical' (Roller (2015) 61n.25, citing in particular Codoñer Merino (1983) 135-139, who sees *inquis* as indicating that a comment comes from a dialogue's addressee and *inquit* as indicating that a comment comes from a different specific interlocutor who or whose characteristics can often be identified by considering (for example) his ideology). However, I do not claim to work out with precision who is interjecting at particular moments; I argue for the more modest set of claims that (i) an ideal reader (not necessarily the average historical reader) would at certain times naturally understand interjections to come from the work's addressee and at other times would not do so; and (ii) there are moments when there is uncertainty over who is being addressed, and this uncertainty, we shall see, can have a pedagogic or rhetorical function.

[352] It may be objected that we are not to imagine that every objection introduced simply by *inquit* comes from the same objector; or that an objection introduced simply by *inquit* that comes immediately after an objection explicitly identified as coming from Aristotle is to be understood as coming from Aristotle as well. The difficulty of determining which third person is intervening in the argument is typical of the complexities involved in Seneca's use of speech in his philosophical works (on which, see Hine (2010)), but here it might be seen to have a particular purpose: it contributes to a sense that Seneca is fending off the attacks of a number of interlocutors. However, given the dialogic nature of the text, we should not be too concerned if a thought that might not be Aristotelian is attributed to Aristotle: cf. Cicero claiming to speak through the characters of his dialogues at Cic.*Fam.*7.32.2. For the purposes of this thesis, though, what is important is that such interjections come from someone other than Nouatus.

can see, for example, that 1.1-1.2.5 (at the latest) and 2.1.1-2.5.5 seem certainly to be addressed to Nouatus, as explicit interjections to Nouatus open the sections (at 1.1.1 and 2.1.1 respectively) and ‘reorientation moments’ occur at their ends: in the former case, it occurs perhaps during the lost definitional section with an unnamed or named third-person interlocutor but, if not, certainly by the third-person interjection introduced only by *inquit* at 1.3.1, according to criterion (a). In the latter case, the orientation moment also occurs through criterion (a), with a third-person interjection introduced by *inquit*, at 2.6.1. In §3.2.5 and §3.3.2, I shall set out some further results and consider how they affect our interpretation of the *De ira*’s pedagogic strategies.

None of the above is intended to deny that, behind every second-person, lies or might potentially lie the actual reader: the objections raised by different (second-person and third-person) interlocutors are those that readers (might) themselves make, and when Seneca addresses ‘you’ in responding to them, he addresses the reader as well as his (real or imaginary) interlocutor. In fact, we shall see that, as we read the *De ira*, we are forced to face the question of whether we side with, or against, Seneca’s interlocutors and, indeed, to face this question repeatedly (as we might phase in and out of sympathy with them).

§3.2: THE STRUCTURE OF THE *DE IRA*

Having established how we might respond to Seneca’s shifting addressees, I now turn to consider two forms of disorder in the *De ira*: the text’s structure, often attacked (as we saw in §1) as chaotic, (§3.2); and the discontinuities that are, I argue, present in the therapeutic *persona* that Seneca adopts (§3.3). Seneca’s relationship with Nouatus and with his other

interlocutors will turn out to be important to making sense of both of these issues, and my analysis of each will, at the end of each section (§3.2.5 and §3.3.2), provide an explanation for the chaotic shifting of addressees we have just observed.

§3.2.1: THE *DE IRA* AS AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ANGER

I treat first the structural organisation of the *De ira*, focusing on its large-scale 'architecture' rather than the organisation of shorter discourse units.[353]

The text's seemingly chaotic organisation has often seemed to be hard to reconcile with well-ordered Stoic therapy. Such an instinct led Wycislo to suggest that the *De ira* is (a parody of) an epistolary *responsum*.[354] What I would like to do in this section is to suggest an approach that, though less adventurous, does, I hope, make sense of some of the text's structural curiosities. My key move is to understand the *De ira* as an argument against anger. Seneca, on my interpretation, thinks that anger is always wrong and, as we shall see, convincing his readers of the truth of this claim is the central way in which the *De ira* provides its readers with the therapy that it seems to promise at the very beginning. I then seek to show how this argument against anger, which is structured as a forensic speech made against anger, is at the same time also (i) a therapeutic manual, (ii) a work with three books and (iii) a work that involves addresses to and the interjections of a number of interlocutors and so is, we might loosely say, dialogic in form;[355] and I explain how the

[353] This is because Ramondetti (1996) already provides a helpful analysis of the structure of a number of shorter discourse units. I shall, however, provide at §3.3.1.2 a case study of 1.1.1-1.2.3a as an example of how one of these is presented in a way that obscures its logical structure (for purposes quite different to those which I identify here).
[354] Wycislo (2002).
[355] There are, of course, other criteria that are necessary before making the formal claim that the text's genre is the dialogue. On the status of the *De ira* and Seneca's other so-called *dialogi* as dialogues, see Roller (2015) 54-65.

interaction of these different organising principles allows repetition of the key arguments against anger. There is an underlying order, I hope to show, but one that is disrupted: in §3.2.5, I discuss the rhetorical and didactic advantages and risks of repeating oneself, and I discuss how, through the disruption of that order and through the use of the addressee, the text seeks to manage those risks.

§3.2.1.1: A DEFENCE OF SENECAN ABSOLUTISM

My argument that the *De ira* might function as a sustained argument against anger rests, amongst other things, on the claim that the *De ira* consistently condemns anger as something that is always wicked. However, this view is not universally accepted. William Harris has argued that Seneca does not reject anger without qualification. 'Seneca's position', he claims 'is nominally 'absolutist', but he modified this doctrine somewhat.'[356] Such modification would not necessarily undermine my argument: (a.) he might still advance the view that anger was anger was always bad if this was the case, perhaps because he believed but did not 'alieve' it[357] or (b.) he might be trying to encourage critical engagement with his philosophical thinking rather than unthinking acceptance of the views he expounds.[358] However, it might also be because (c.) he was not fully committed to this position and this, in turn, would reduce the plausibility of his conceiving his whole therapeutic dialogue as an argument against anger. I shall therefore now defend my view of Seneca's position towards anger from the counter-arguments that have been made.[359] I do so in detail because it will, I hope, protect my claim that the *De ira* is, fundamentally,

[356] Harris (2001) 113-114.
[357] On the difference between belief and alief, see §2.6.1.1.
[358] See further §1.
[359] I pass over as irrelevant Harris (2001) 114's charge that Seneca's definition of *ira* is too narrow, as this accuses Seneca of modifying a doctrine that he never claimed to hold.

an argument against anger from the objections expressed by (c.); the accompanying rejection of (b.) will be relevant to our discussion of the *persona* that Seneca adopts.

Potentially most damningly, it has been suggested that Seneca implicitly or explicitly endorses anger. Harris cites as an example Seneca's warning that bringing up children not to be angry may blunt their *indoles* (2.21.1-5).[360] However, Seneca does not hold that *ira* is the only vice, and in the section to which Harris is referring, he is claiming that well-intentioned attempts to stop a child from becoming angry may cause other problems. Praising a boy excessively when he wins a competition with friends is dangerous because it will lead him to form so high an opinion of himself that he will be so ready to perceive *iniuriae* that he will become prone to *ira*. This might make you want not to praise him at all so as to avoid raising an irascible child, but in fact, Seneca says, you should praise him to a certain extent to ensure that he continues to work to achieve excellence. So while Seneca undeniably thinks there are risks involved in those parenting or teaching strategies that seek to avoid *ira*, he does not think that those strategies should not be used nor, as the structure of Harris' argument seems to require, does his awareness of those risks make him think that *ira* should not be avoided.

Harris argues that further examples of Seneca endorsing anger are found in other works, but it is methodologically unsound to draw conclusions about the view Seneca advances in the *De ira* from those advanced in other texts. That said, neither of the two passages Harris cites stands up to close scrutiny: at *Cl.*1.12.3,[361] Seneca explains that he will talk about Sulla later in the work *cum quaeremus quomodo hostibus irascendum sit.* The section to which Seneca refers does not survive and so we do not know for certain how he

[360] Harris (2001) 114.
[361] Harris (2001) 114.

treated this subject, but I do not see any reason to assume that he went on to endorse feeling *ira* towards one's enemies. Rather, his plan may have been to promise to show how *ira* should be used before revealing that *ira* should not be used at all,[362] leaving a more controversial aspect of his philosophical beliefs (that *ira* is never permissible) for later in the treatise, when readers would be more amenable to his claim by already having been led (hopefully) to accept other, related Stoic doctrines.[363] The other example that Harris cites is Seneca's distinction between *animi morbi* and *adfectus* at *Ep.*75.11 (partly reproduced in *SVF* 3.428): Seneca contrasts *animi morbi* and *adfectus*, with those who are close to perfection able to experience the latter, and Harris argues that this distinction undermines Seneca's condemnation of the emotions.[364] However, Seneca's point is that those who habitually make the errors of judgement that cause emotions to arise are further from perfection than those who only occasionally make the errors of judgement that cause emotions to arise, and nowhere does he imply that the *sapiens* will ever make those errors of judgement.[365]

It has also been suggested that Seneca, on occasion, *almost* endorses anger by, for example, allowing the *sapiens* to use *uis* even if not *ira*.[366] However, I do not think that Seneca thinks this gives the *sapiens* any leeway: *uis* is not, for Seneca, innately a good

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[362] On this reading, Seneca would be exploiting an ambiguity in the meaning of *quomodo*, which naturally means 'in what way?' (*OLD* 1a) but can also carry the meaning 'how is it possible that?' (*OLD* 1b) which merges into the meaning 'is it possible that?', as in *quomodo* [...] *tantum nefas sileam?* (Curt.6.9.4): *quomodo hostibus irascendum sit*, then, can mean '(how) it is possible that one should be angry with one's enemies.'

[363] For a possible parallel in the *De ira* (*leniri* in *exegisti a me, Nouate, ut scriberem quemadmodum posset ira leniri* at 1.1.1, which first-time readers might understand as 'be soothed' but which, we later realise, means 'be eliminated', at least in the sense in which Seneca approves of his brother's request), cf. n.459.

[364] Harris (2001) 114.

[365] This is part of a comparison of one's behaviour in different stages on the path to wisdom; Harris misrepresents Seneca's emphasis, which is not that the man who is close to perfection can still experience emotions but that such a man can experience emotions *but will not do so habitually.*

[366] Harris (2001) 114.

thing or a bad thing.[367] Rather, it may be used by the wise man or by the angry man. For Seneca, the distinction is that the wise man will use *uis* appropriately, guided by perfect *ratio*, whereas the angry man will use it wickedly, guided by perverted judgements.

The other major type of argument that has been used to suggest that Seneca was not absolutist in his condemnation of anger is that he sees anger as inevitable[368] (presumably on the assumption that if something is inevitable, it cannot be a vice[369]). One reason for this is the extreme rareness of *sapientes*,[370] but it is hard to conclude from this that vice is acceptable, since Seneca seems to have maintained that becoming a *sapiens* was, at least theoretically, possible for everyone.

More problematic is Harris' argument that:

> '[T]he whole matter is determined by a man's particular physical combination of the four elements fire, water, air and earth; if he has a lot of fire in him he will be irascible, and apparently there is not much that he can do about it-a quite modern touch.'[371]

Harris cites a passage that argues that heat in the soul, which may be caused by one's geographical environment, may make one *iracundus*:

[367] This is consistent with the orthodox Stoic doctrine that the only good thing is virtue and the only bad thing is vice; all other things are indifferents.
[368] Harris (2001) 114.
[369] It is hard to determine whether or not Seneca would have agreed with this premise; it is consistent, however, with the Stoic belief that the perfect rationality of the *sapiens* is open to all and consists of a human being living in perfect accordance with nature.
[370] 2.10.6.
[371] Harris (2001) 114.

refert quantum quisque umidi in se calidique contineat; cuius in illo elementi portio preualebit, inde mores erunt. iracundos feruida animi natura faciet (2.19.2)

However, when we are told that a *feruida animi natura* makes individuals *iracundi*, does Seneca mean that it inevitably causes them to experience *ira* frequently or does he mean that it makes them more likely than other people to respond with *ira* to any given situation?[372] *Iracundus* is usually understood to refer to the former (at least when it means 'irascible' rather than 'angry') but, because the two options both (usually) describe exactly the same individual in practical terms,[373] this observation cannot be given much weight.

The difficulty in interpreting which of these Seneca means is compounded by the fact that the language he uses in the following passages sometimes seems to support the former and sometimes the latter interpretation:

> *sed quemadmodum natura quosdam procliues in iram facit, ita multae incidunt causae quae idem possint quod natura: alios morbus aut iniuria corporum in hoc perduxit, alios labor aut continua peruigilia noctesque sollicitae et desideria amoresque; […] sed omnia ista initia causaeque sunt: plurimum potest consuetudo, quae si grauis est alit uitium.* (2.20.1-2)

On the one hand, *natura*, we are told, makes people *procliues in iram*, which implies that it makes them inclined to experience *ira* but does not inevitably cause them to do so. On the other hand, the other factors mentioned are described in a way that suggests (but does not

[372] Seneca's definition of *iracundus* at 1.4 may imply that it means the former (1.4.1) but it is elsewhere used in a way that invites the latter interpretation (see (e.g.) 2.14.1, where *iracundia* seems to mean anger rather than irascibility); in general, the term is not used consistently (cf. §2.5.2.2).

[373] Except for the very rare individual who is almost but not quite a Stoic *sapiens*.

prove[374]) that they bring about *ira* inevitably – this is suggested by *causa* and by the verb *perduxit* – and we are told that both *natura* and the *multae* […] *causae* act in the same way (*quemadmodum* […] *ita*).

Which is meant (or are both meant)? The answer, I think, comes from *plurimum potest consuetudo*, which suggests that *consuetudo* has the most influence (*plurimum* refers to 'most' rather than 'very much'[375]); the *sed* that introduces this claim connects its greatest influence adversatively with the explanation of the influence that *natura* and other factors can achieve, and thus it implies that *consuetudo* can override *natura*.

Seneca immediately goes on to explain that:

> *naturam quidem mutare difficile est, nec licet semel mixta nascentium elementa conuertere; sed in hoc nosse profuerit, ut calentibus ingeniis subtrahas uinum, quod pueris Plato negandum putat et ignem uetat igne incitari.* (2.20.2)

This passage is followed by a number of other ways in which those with an *animus* that is naturally *feruidus* should be treated, including a number related to life choices such as exercise. Taken as a whole, with the preceding sentence, the logical structure does not seem to deny humans the ability to stop emotions from arising: '*Consuetudo* has the most influence. Admittedly,[376] it is difficult to change *natura* and you cannot change the *nascentium elementa*, but[377] this is what you can do.'

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[374] As the terms may be being used loosely.
[375] See *OLD* s.v. *plurimum.*
[376] For *quidem* marking a concession, see *OLD* 4.
[377] For *sed* expressing a 'contrasting, but not contradictory, idea', see *OLD* 4.

Moreover, the idea that Seneca thought that something could be done ties in with the structure of the larger discourse unit of which this passage forms a part. At 2.18.2, Seneca explicitly started to discuss how one should bring up one's children. Almost immediately, he started explaining how physical factors affect one's character, but that he has not forgotten about the therapeutic purpose of the section is shown by the fact that the advice in 2.20.2-5 is, explicitly in 2.20.2 and implicitly later, identified as being concerned with how one should treat children; and the theme of child-raising continues explicitly in 2.21.1 and beyond. The physical explanation is not an irrelevant digression, because it justifies the remedies he advises, with the fact that wine provokes *ira* by adding heat (2.19.5), for example, justifying the later advice to keep ardent natures from wine (2.20.2), and because it allows him to explain why specific child-raising strategies should be used in some areas but not in others (hot parts of the world and cold parts of the world cause people to be more likely to succumb to different vices, and different vices should be prevented in different, and sometimes opposing, ways (2.20.4)). In other words, this section is a relevant part of a longer section that is directed towards showing how *ira* can be avoided. If Seneca thought that having a *feruida anima* because of growing up in a hot part of the world made it inevitable that you would experience *ira*, i.e. if by *iracundus* in *iracundos feruida animi natura faciet* he meant 'inevitably experiencing *ira*', it would be odd for him to have given advice seemingly directed at exactly such people.

Growing up in a hot part of the world, then, makes individuals more likely to be angry, but Seneca does not treat it as either necessary or sufficient for *ira*.[378] This is consistent with

[378] It may be objected that Seneca may have held that, *in theory*, there could exist someone who, because of where he was born, was so naturally hot that he was, effectively, born angry. But there is no reason to think that Seneca believed this was physically possible.

Seneca's insistence at 2.2.1, without any qualifications, that anger can yield to reason, and his argument at 2.12.1-2.13.2 against the inevitability of anger.[379]

A final possible counterargument to the notion that Seneca always regards anger as vicious is that, as we shall see (§3.3.2), the 'therapeutic' tone that he adopts on occasion seems so indignant that he nonetheless seems angry – so, at best, he does not seem to 'alieve' what he claims.[380] Nussbaum makes an argument of this sort:[381] although she does not explicitly claim that Seneca does not think that anger is always wicked, her claim that Seneca is 'wrestling with the tensions in his own position'[382] is clearly a move in that direction and thus paves the way for counter-argument (c.) above. However, the difficulty is not as acute as it might at first seem to be, because, while Seneca's writing represents a softening of the Stoic position towards the use of emotional appeals,[383] nowhere in the *De ira* does he seem to indicate that he desires to take revenge against those who disagree with him, even if he does treat them very harshly. We cannot, therefore, say that he appears to be angry rather than to be displaying another emotion (pain, the belief that some present thing – anger – is an evil), and it may be that Seneca thought certain other emotions were permissible for *proficientes* in certain circumstances.[384] Moreover, at

[379] Cf. also (e.g.) 3.13.7, introducing *exempla* of how far anger can control itself; 3.26.1, an objection that anger cannot always be endured to which Seneca responds.
[380] On the difference between belief and alief, see §2.6.1.1.
[381] Nussbaum (1994) 431-435 (cf. Gill (2010) 299-300, comparing this (possible) feature of Seneca's *De ira* to Chrysippus' works). Nussbaum cites in particular Seneca's apparently emotional remarks as he lists *exempla* at 3.14-15. See also Wilson (2007) for a similar argument for the case of Sen.*Ep*.
[382] Nussbaum (1994) 434.
[383] See Atherton (1988) on Stoic rhetoric, for the most part not discussing Seneca; she cites at 426-7 Rutilius Rufus as a poignant example of a good man whose commitment to the Stoic principles of how to speak well and his consequent failure to persuade resulted in his exile.
[384] This would be in keeping with Chryippus' view that it was acceptable to arouse emotions in others in the therapy of urgent cases (*Cels.*8.51 = *SVF* 3.474; Quint.*Inst.*6.1.7, with Atherton (1988) 405, 423-4), and Seneca certainly seems to see anger as so vicious an emotion that its therapy might always be seen as urgent. Notwithstanding that all emotions are wicked, this may have been seen, on a common-sense level, as the 'lesser of two evils'. However, on the possibility of acceptable emotions, note: (i) Frede (1986b) 104-7 discusses how, in Stoic thought, judgements were generally understood to involve assent to impressions, not to propositions; and impressions involve non-sensory content that is not part of the proposition. (On the question of whether we assent to propositions or to impressions, see Brennan (2005) 54-58.) Thus, subjects

2.17.1, Seneca explicitly argues that an orator (whom we may take to represent all who wish to persuade someone of a position) is allowed to feign anger even though he is not allowed to feel it.[385]

I conclude, then, that Seneca is indeed an 'absolutist': he holds the view that *ira* is always wrong.

§3.2.1.2: THE *DE IRA* AS AN *IN IRAM*?

I now turn to explaining how the *De ira* may be understood to function as an argument against anger. This will emerge from analysing it using the *partes orationis* more commonly used to understand the structure of forensic speeches (and with which Seneca was familiar thanks to his considerable exposure to rhetoric and declamation as a young man[386]).[387] We see that the *De ira* matches the five-part arrangement that Quintilian

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can 'think of' propositions in different ways. Atherton (1988) 409 argues that this 'points the way to understanding how Stoic oratory can be acceptably emotive (although presumably not in the strict Stoic sense of an 'emotion'): an impression can embody [...] some sort of emotional assessment of and response to its message, its 'signified content' strictly speaking; and where the impression is linguistic, signifiers can or can fail to be selected which accurately connote this 'emotional content'.' (ii) Brennan (2005) 111-112n.11 proposes the existence of a category of emotions ('kataleptic emotions') that involve assent to kataleptic impressions and which the Stoics would not deem unacceptable. This would explain why, for example, as Kamtekar (1998) discusses, Epictetus approves of *aidōs*.

[385] *Pace* Basore (1928) 203, Cooper & Procopé (1995) 56 and Kaster (2010) 46, Seneca does not claim that it is acceptable to arouse anger in others. The words *modo iram, modo metum, modo misericordiam, ut aliis incutiamus, ipsi simulabimus* (2.17.1) can mean that we aim to use *ira*, *metus* and *misericordia* to experience some unspecified emotional or non-emotional response rather than that we aim to inspire exactly the same emotion in others (cf. *OLD* s.v. *incutiō* 1). This is a natural reading of the text: we do not necessarily respond to an orator who seems to be angry because of some injustice and to desire to take revenge on the perpetrator by experiencing exactly the same sort of anger as the orator rather than with, for example, sympathy for its victims, disgust at the *iniuria* or a belief that justice – rather than revenge – is called for.

[386] On this, see Wilson (2007) 425-427. The four-part structure that I describe shortly is adopted by declamations as well as by forensic speeches: see Bonner (1949) 54.

[387] Seneca's prose treatises are usually denied this form of organisation. Cf. Wilson (2007) 431 (who seems to agree with the claims he reports): 'While the surface texture of Seneca's writing reveals the intelligent application of rhetoric in every paragraph, the underlying structure of his various works has seemed to many readers personal and idiosyncratic and to lack the kind of systematic arrangement espoused in the rhetorical treatises'. The main exception is Wright's (1974) argument for the influence of the organisational principles laid down in the rhetorical handbooks on (some of) Seneca's philosophical prose works. In the case of the *De ira*, he identifies 'introductory material [...] [consisting] of an *exordium* [1.1.1-1.2.3a] followed by

advocates,[388] although with, as was (as we shall see) acceptable, the *probatio/confirmatio* and *refutatio* united.[389]

1.1.1-1.2.3a: *Exordium/prooemium*

1.2.3b-1.4.3: *Narratio*

1.5.1-3.40.5: *Probatio/confirmatio*

3.41.1-3.43.5: *Peroratio*

I treat each of these parts in turn, comparing the relevant section of Seneca's treatise with some of the relevant rhetorical theory. It should be noted at the outset, though, that we should not expect too close a match: the theorists themselves make this clear,[390] and it may also be that, just as forensic oratory was often partly indebted to epideictic oratory,[391] so the structural organisation of Seneca's quasi-forensic argument against anger is partly indebted to a sort of epideictic oratory, the *lalia*, that even theorists do not claim aims at preserving a regular order.[392]

Exordium

Ancient rhetorical theory indicates that the intention of the *exordium* is to prepare the reader for what follows by making him *benevolus*, *attentus* and *docilis*,[393] and the opening of the *De ira* does precisely this. What survives of 1.1.1-1.2.3a, I shall argue in §3.3.1,

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preliminary remarks on terminology [1.2.3b-1.4.3; not understood as a *narratio*]' (Wright (1974) 56); a *diuisio* at 1.5.1; and a three-fold argument from 1.5.2 to 1.21.4. He does not argue that Books 2 and 3 can be incorporated in this scheme (or that they have their own organisational schemes based on rhetorical models) on the grounds that Book 1 'can be considered as a separate entity for our purposes' (Wright (1974) 54). Scott Smith (2014) 116-117 approaches an analysis of the sort that I have advanced here by seeing the *De prouidentia* as organised as *prooemium*; (hesitantly) *narratio*; *propositio* and *diuisio*; and *confirmationes*.

[388] Quint.*Inst.*3.9.1-5.

[389] Its closest similarity, then, is to Aristotle's four-part scheme (Arist.*Rh.*3.13.4).

[390] See (e.g.) Cic.de *Orat.*1.145-146.

[391] See (e.g.) *Rhet.Her.* 3.15.

[392] Men.Rh.391.

[393] Cic.*Inv.*1.20, *Rhet.Her.*1.6, Quint.*Inst.*4.1.5.

consists of Seneca's establishing a close rapport with his addressee, Nouatus, in a way that presents him (Seneca) in a positive light and thus makes the reader well-disposed to him. This is followed by the evocation of *fastidium* towards anger, creating an emotional response that emphasises the urgency and the importance of Seneca's project.

It is not a problem to find emotional appeals in the *exordium* since, although *exordia* were often deemed places where emotional appeals should be reined in,[394] this general 'rule' was often disregarded;[395] if *fastidium* seems a particularly visceral emotion to choose, this may be explained by its being an emotion that is, as I go on to discuss, intimately connected to the boundaries of what is and what is not human. It is therefore an emotion that is easily aroused in all sorts of different people, important in a part of the text that corresponds to that part of the speech in which theorists particularly directed orators to match their way of speaking to the judge.[396] Equally, the often high stylistic register of this passage is not a problem for seeing this section as an *exordium*: though usually avoided in order to avoid the impression of careful preparation,[397] it was not always[398] and, in any case, the style, we shall see, seems here to be closely linked to its rhetorical purpose.

Narratio

There follows, it appears (the *lacuna* prevents certain conclusions), an account of what anger is, defining it and responding to possible counterarguments against this definition. This might be understood as a *narratio*.

394 Quint.*Inst.*4.1.28.
395 *Pro Rabirio* and *Pro Murena* contain clearly emotional *exordia*. On emotional and other appeals in *exordia*, see Cerutti (1996) *passim.*
396 Quint.*Inst.*4.1.17.
397 Cic.*Inv.*1.25, *Rhet. Her.*1.11; Quint.*Inst.*4.1.54-60.
398 The *exordia* of Cicero's *Pro Rabirio* and *Pro Murena* provide counterexamples to this general rule (as does that of the *Pro Archia*), as Berry (1996) 126 notes.

It may be objected that there is a degree of sophistry in calling this a *narratio* given that, in a forensic speech, the *confirmatio* is used to demonstrate that the account that one has provided in the *narratio* is correct. We should, then, expect the *narratio* to describe the wickedness of anger rather than to define it. However, such a view would be a misleading account of what *narrationes* (which were, in any case, sometimes omitted[399]) consisted of. As Clarke observes,

> 'In his [= Cicero's] civil cases we find the formal *narratio*, but in his criminal cases there is seldom anything that really deserves the name until we come to *Pro Milone* and *Pro Ligario*, both the product of abnormal circumstances.'[400]

In light of this variation in practice, rhetorical theorists accepted that a *narratio* need not involve setting out the facts of the case but, rather, facts that were relevant to the case.[401] In this sense, of course, it is clear that the *De ira* does possess a *narratio*.

It is not a problem to find elements of justification in the *narratio*: Quintilian observes that they can sometimes be appropriate[402] and, although Seneca's proof may be longer than Quintilian seems to anticipate, that is easily justified by the fact that what is being set out (and demonstrated) in this *narratio* (i.e. what anger is) is not *exactly* the same as what will be demonstrated in the *confirmatio*'s argument against anger. In a forensic speech, they generally would be the same.

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[399] Cf. Cic.*de Orat.*2.330.
[400] Clarke (1953) 67.
[401] Quint.*Inst.*4.2.11.
[402] Quint.*Inst.*4.2.54ff. Moreover, the *narratio* is, of course, not an unbiased account: see (e.g.) Dyck (1998) esp. 222-227 on the *Pro Milone*, providing 'not a simple narrative but an account inter-penetrated with tendentious interpretations of Clodius' behavior and motive' (quote from 223).

Diuisio/partitio

Following Seneca's *narratio*, he explains at 1.5.1 (as he does elsewhere) how he will divide up the material that follows. For some theorists, although not for Quintilian, this was a necessary part of a speech;[403] but, even if it is, it should not be seen as a problem that Seneca does not accurately anticipate the content of the *entire* text.[404] (For the sake of clarity, I omitted this section from the scheme above.)

Confirmatio

There then follows a *confirmatio* in which Seneca argues that anger is always wicked. The *confirmatio* is split into two parts. The divide comes at 2.18.1, where Seneca introduces his discussion of the *remedia* of anger.

In the first part (1.5.1–2.17.2), Seneca argues explicitly that anger is always vicious. This is quite clear in the part of the *confirmatio* contained in the first book: he addresses in turn the questions of whether anger is in accordance with nature, whether it is useful and whether it contributes to greatness of spirit. It is also true of the start of the second book: this contains a theoretical discussion about how anger arises and develops but Seneca makes it clear, in response to the imagined question '*Quorsus* […] *haec quaestio pertinet?*', that he is writing

> *ut sciamus quid sit ira; nam si inuitis nobis nascitur, numquam rationi succumbet.* (2.2.1)

[403] A common six-part scheme, attested in Cicero, involves Quintilian's five parts, as described above, plus a *partitio/diuisio* (Cic.*Inv.*1.19, *Rhet.Her.*1.4, Cic.*de Orat.*1.143, Sulp.Vict.*Inst.*17, Cassiod.*Rh.*9). Mart.Cap.*Rh.*44 gives a five-part scheme comprising these six parts but combining *probatio/confirmatio* and *refutatio*.

[404] For misleading *partitiones*, see Cic.*Mil.*6 with Fotheringham (2007) 71-73, and Cic.*Arch.*4 with Fotheringham (2007) 87-88 and (esp.) Fotheringham (2006).

The *nam*, as typically, marks an internal causal relationship, i.e. one that explains his reason for the preceding statement:[405] the purpose of the explanation of the nature of anger at 2.1.1-2.5.5[406] is, therefore, that it functions as an argument against the inevitability of anger. In the remainder of this part (2.6.1-2.17.2), Seneca offers a number of other arguments against anger, sometimes repeating (to a significant extent) arguments that have already been made.

In the second part (2.18.1-3.40.5), Seneca offers a roll-call of situations (including some communicated through *exempla*[407]) in which he argues that anger should be shunned. Some but not all of the situations that he mentions in Book 2 (and he mentions others in Book 3 too) are: when we are provoked by inanimate objects (2.26.2), or by children (2.26.6; cf. 2.30.1), or by natural phenomena (2.27.2), or by a slave being too slow (2.25.1), or by a father or a woman or someone acting under compulsion or a judge or a king (2.30.1), or by something unexpected (2.31.2-3), or by someone's facial expression (2.22.4; cf. 2.22.2), or by a rumour that we have heard (2.22.3)… The cumulative effect of all these scenarios is to suggest that, even if one thinks that anger could in theory be acceptable, it is in fact unacceptable in every conceivable situation.[408]

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[405] This is the traditional account of *nam*, as Kroon (1995) 129-132 explains (even if it is not entirely applicable).

[406] 2.5 functions as a counterargument to a possible objection that the existence of some people who are seemingly habitually cruel provides evidence that anger is unavoidable in some people. Seneca's counterargument is that such behaviour is not, in fact, anger at all.

[407] On the didactic function of *exempla*, see the definitions cited at n.513.

[408] The reason that anger is not appropriate in any individual situation is that what one perceives to be an injustice is never actually an injustice. Admittedly, he does not say so in as many words (and for this reason, the significance of his reflections on what are and what are not injustices for his argument against anger has been denied (Nussbaum (1994) 410)): to do so would have necessitated setting out a version of the Stoic theory of indifferents, and it would have provoked all the counter-arguments that this theory invites. But his enumeration of situations that appear to be injustices but which, he insists, are not makes his position quite clear, and it may be that this part of *De ira* should be seen as an implicit argument for this position (which he comes close to advocating explicitly at (e.g.) 2.25.1). We may compare the strategy of *De breuitate uitae*, where Seneca 'systematically demonstrates that one group after another cannot obtain or even appreciate leisure. And he keeps adding to their numbers until almost everyone in society is included in the indictment' (Motto and Clark (1994) 164-169; quote from 169).

As a result, the *De ira* presents an argument of the form:

(a) Anger is never right (1.5.1-2.17.2); and

(b) Even if it were sometimes right, it is not right in any particular situation that confronts you (2.18.2-3.40.5).

This is a version of the form of argument that:

(a) My case meets the legal requirements to be successful; and

(b) Even if it did not, it should still be judged successful.[409]

This (unnamed) rhetorical device is first discussed (in extant theorising) as late as Quintilian[410] but it can be traced back to a treatise by Gorgias[411] and it was used extensively by Cicero. Its most striking uses are in the *Pro Archia* and the *Pro Milone*, whose *confirmationes* are structured around these devices.[412] Interestingly, the structure of these speeches matches that of the *De ira* as I have analysed it above: *principium – narratio – confirmatio* (in two parts) – *peroratio.*[413]

The situation in the case of the *De ira* is not, of course, as straightforward as my description so far has suggested. The roll-call of particular situations when anger is shown to be unacceptable is often interrupted by arguments that, on my analysis, should appear in

[409] (b) can, of course, be formulated in a different way. It could be seen as an argument from exhaustion ('We have found anger to be inappropriate in all circumstances') or as an argument from probability ('We have found anger to be inappropriate in so many circumstances, the chances are it's wrong in all circumstances').
[410] Quint.*Inst.*4.5.13-17.
[411] Gorg.82B1-5.
[412] For discussion and references, see Craig (1985). Note that (b) in these arguments can also be formulated in different ways: the *Pro Archia*, for example, takes the form (a) Archias is a Roman citizen; and (b) even if he were not a Roman citizen, he deserves to be one. Here, (b) could function as an argument from probability: 'If he deserves to be a Roman citizen, he probably is one' – an argument that is made explicitly at Cic.*Arch.*25.
[413] *Pro Archia:* 1-4a : 4b-7 : 8-30 : 31-32; *Pro Milone:* 1-23 : 24-29 : 30-91 : 92-105.

the first part of the *confirmatio*.[414] To the extent that this *confirmatio* is structured according to a rhetorical 'rule', we should remember that such rules were not (and, at least some influential orators believed, were not supposed to be) applied too strictly.[415] A clear-cut distinction is certainly not maintained in the *Pro Archia*.[416] However, the disorganisation is more noticeable than that in the *Pro Archia* is, and the reason for this is, as we shall see, to be found in the way that the structural principle that I am outlining here interacts with the other structural principles that we shall discuss.[417]

Lack of a *refutatio*

The *De ira* does not have a *refutatio* as a distinct section from the *confirmatio* – arguments in favour of the wickedness of anger are combined with counter-arguments from those who argue that it is not (always) wicked. This, however, mimics the standard practice of Ciceronian speeches, as Cicero's own theorising confirms and explains:

> *quia neque reprehendi quae contra dicuntur possunt nisi tua confirmes neque haec confirmari nisi illa reprehendas idcirco haec et natura et utilitate et tractatione coniuncta sunt.*[418]

[414] It is less of a problem that we find Seneca responding to counter-arguments along the lines of, for example, '*orator* […] *iratus aliquando melior est*' (2.17.1) in the first part of the *confirmatio* as this belongs here just as much as it belongs in the second part, even if it is another particular instance of when anger is wrong that contributes to the cumulative argument made in the second part.

[415] See (e.g.) Cic.*de Orat.*1.145-146.

[416] Most strikingly, the so-called *digressio*, though it is claimed to be concerned with demonstrating Archias deserved citizenship even if he did not have it, supports the case that he already did. For instance, the ironic comment, derived from a discussion of the connection between poets and generals, *itaque credo, si ciuis Romanus Archias legibus non esset, ut ab aliquo imperatore ciuitate donaretur perficere non potuit* suggests that, if Archias were not a Roman citizen in the way that Cicero has claimed, he would have become one through another of the routes open to him (Cic.*Arch.*25). This misrepresentation of the purpose of the section's argument would be unsurprising to Roman audiences: it is akin, for example, to the way in which panegyric praises the ruler by inviting or advising him to do something that he is already doing, as (e.g.) at Hor.*Carm.*3.6.1-4, composed after Augustus has begun to repair the temples of Rome.

[417] 2.7ff. seems to be the other major exception. But these sections are all part of an argument 'If someone gets angry at every aspect of vice, he will constantly be angry because there is so much vice', i.e. an argument against *all anger.*

[418] Cic.*de Orat.*2.331.

Peroratio

The closing paragraphs of the *De ira* mark a separate discourse unit from what precedes, marked by the move from offering instruction addressed to a second person to a first-person appeal that, as typically of *perorationes*, involves an appeal to the emotions.[419]

We see, then, that the *De ira* is structured, on one level, as an argument against anger. It does not advertise its quasi-forensic organisation explicitly but this is not a problem for my argument. We shall go on to see that there were good reasons for this and, indeed, even well-organised forensic speeches sometimes concealed their organisation: Tempest has recently shown, for example, that, when its five component speeches are treated together, the *Actio Secunda* of the *In Verrem* can be seen to be structured according to the precepts laid down by rhetorical theory.[420]

§3.2.2: THE ARGUMENT AGAINST ANGER AS A THERAPEUTIC MANUAL

Although the *De ira* may be analysed in the way that I have presented, it may also be understood as a therapeutic manual. Here, we need to be cautious because we do not really know how (Stoic) therapeutic manuals tended to be organised – the *De ira is* 'the one surviving Stoic work which falls squarely into the therapeutic category';[421] however, in what follows, I shall argue that it plausibly is structured as a therapeutic manual as well as as an argument against anger,[422] as the table below illustrates.[423]

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[419] For example, Cic.*Ver.*1.40-54; for reflections on this trend, see (e.g.) Cic.*Part.*15.53, Quint.*Inst.*6.2.6-7.
[420] Tempest (2007). This provides an example of a text organised as if it were a single speech whose structure is concealed by, amongst other things, its division into distinct speeches (each of which *may*, of course, have its own internal organisation: see Frazel (2004) 135-138), just as the *De ira*'s similar status as a text organised as if it were a single speech is concealed, amongst other things, by its division into books.
[421] Gill (2013) 344.
[422] A Senecan parallel for two complementary structuring devices may be found on a smaller scale in the *Consolatio ad Marciam* at Sen.*Dial.*6.19.4-25.3. According to a rhetorical structuring principle, the passage is structured as 'Do you grieve a) because Metilius died [Sen.*Dial.*6.19.4-20.6] or because he died

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">The De ira as an argument against anger</th><th colspan="2">The De ira as a therapeutic manual</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Exordium (1.1.1-1.2.3a)</td><td colspan="2">Introductory remarks (1.1.1-1.2.3a)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Narratio (1.2.3b-1.4.3)</td><td rowspan="2">Theoretical section (1.2.3b-2.17.2)</td><td>The definition of anger (1.2.3b-1.4.3)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="5">Confirmatio (1.5.2-3.40.5)</td><td>How anger is always wicked (1.5.2-2.17.2)</td><td>The (vicious) nature of anger (1.5.2-2.17.2)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="4">How anger is, on every occasion you will encounter it, wicked, with some repetition of ‘How anger is always wicked’ (2.18.2-3.40.5)</td><td rowspan="4">Therapeutic section (2.18.2-3.40.5)</td><td>I. How anger is to be avoided during child-rearing (2.18.2-2.21.11)</td></tr>
<tr><td>II. How anger is to be avoided during adulthood (2.22.1-3.9.5)</td></tr>
<tr><td>III. How to stop when angered (3.10.1-3.38.2)</td></tr>
<tr><td>IV. How to stop another person when he/she is angered (3.39.1-3.40.5)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Peroratio (3.41.1-3.43.5)</td><td colspan="2">Concluding remarks (3.41.1-3.43.5)</td></tr>
</table>

My claim, then, is that the *De ira* is simultaneously a therapeutic manual and an argument against anger; and that these are, *almost*, ‘two sides of the same coin.’[424] In what follows, I justify this claim and set out how the structuring of the *De ira* as a therapeutic manual permits the repetition of arguments.

§3.2.2.1: THE FIRST (THEORETICAL) HALF

prematurely [Sen.*Dial.*6.21.1-25.3]?’ whereas, in a philosophical structuring principle (in terms of the Socratic dilemma), the passage is structured with the Epicurean attitude to death, combined with the *opportunitas mortis* theme, at Sen.*Dial.*6.19.4-22.7 and then with *laus mortui* framed by a description of the Stoico-Platonic afterlife at Sen.*Dial.*6.23.1-25.3: see further Manning (1981) 109, whose formulations I have only slightly reworked. *Pace* Manning, the same is not demonstrated by Wright (1974) 56-57 for *De ira* 1 as the two structural principles Wright adduces do not describe the structure of exactly the same sections of the text.

[423] For the sake of clarity, I omit from the table the *diuisiones* at 1.5.1 and 2.18.1.

[424] I do not wish to overstate the case: I do not suggest that those forms of therapy that the *De ira* offers that are unrelated to an appreciation of the viciousness of anger would have been considered by Seneca to be unimportant pieces of advice. (On the importance of non-cognitive methods for eliminating emotions in Stoic thought, see (briefly) Brennan (2003) 278-279.) However, I do think that, to a very great extent, Seneca, in light with orthodox Stoic thought, held that the therapy for anger *is* the argument that it is wrong.

At first sight, the *De ira* might not appear to be entirely devoted to therapy: in the first half, Seneca explains what anger is and argues that it is always wrong, and it is only in the second that he turns explicitly to addressing the cures.[425] However, this hardly gives us reason to doubt the therapeutic character of the work as a whole:[426] an appreciation of the viciousness of anger functions as a protreptic to applying the remedies prescribed (to the extent that Seneca feels they should be applied – that is, always) and an understanding of what anger is (implicitly) provides a justification for many of the cures that Seneca will go on to offer.[427] Moreover, words that may appear to be protreptic may make one less likely to be angry or, if repeated when becoming angry, stop that process: these arguments, in effect, turn out to be *remedia*.[428] Thus, the apparently theoretical first half turns out to be directed towards the text's therapeutic goals.[429]

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[425] This is a slight overstatement: at 1.8.1, for example, in the 'theoretical' part, Seneca writes in such a way as to imply that his primary focus is suggesting a cure. But the way in which each half of the text is 'directed' is, in general, extremely consistent; and given that, as we have seen, the argument against anger turns out to be one of Seneca's main cures for anger, minor deviations should not be given too much weight.

[426] Similarly, Chrysippus' *On Affections* seems to turn to therapeutic matters chiefly in the final, fourth book (on whose status in relation to the rest of the work, see (briefly) Nussbaum (1994) 368n.25), but this does not mean that the first three books do not, whatever their other purposes, contribute to this therapeutic end.

[427] The significance of this final observation should not be exaggerated given that Seneca does not, in the first half, provide justification for all of the *remedia* he provides in the second half (and he provides a basis for some of his *remedia* at (e.g.) 2.19.1-5).

[428] Thus the division, made by some theorists, between protreptic, therapy (eliminating the false beliefs that cause psychological ill health) and advice (generating true beliefs to replace the false ones) is hard to maintain: see Gill (2013) 342-343.

[429] However, they are not *presented* as being subordinate to the second, more obviously therapeutic, part. The formulation of the transition to the second part reveals the importance of the arguments against anger for their own sake: *quoniam quae de ira quaeruntur tractauimus, accedamus ad remedia eius* (2.18.1). *Quoniam* here, as always in the Classical period (Baños (2011) 209-210), expresses a causal relationship: it is because the questions concerning anger have been treated that Seneca is able to progress to the therapeutic section. The implication might appear to be that we need the theory to understand the therapy. However, the natural formulation for this would be not *quae de ira quaeruntur* but, rather, 'what we needed to investigate about anger', i.e. something along the lines of *quae de ira quaerenda sunt*. Why, then, are *quae de ira quaeruntur* treated? It is not, apparently, that *quae de ira quaeruntur* are presented as actually being part of the therapy: that does not fit with the jussive sense of *accedamus ad remedia eius*. Rather, the implication is that there were two topics that Seneca wanted to treat, the questions that he has just dealt with (which are important for their own sake) and the *remedia* that he is about to describe. Since these questions, as we have seen, involve understanding its truly wicked and yet eradicable nature, the somewhat awkward formulation of this phrase reveals the tension between Seneca's two structural principles, the therapeutic manual and the argument against anger; and, thus, highlights the importance of the latter as well as the former for Seneca's project.

Indeed, the way in which the first, theoretical half of the *De ira* is organised is designed to allow repetition of arguments against anger. In this thesis, I use 'repetition' fairly loosely, to refer both to repetition of an argument of (roughly) the same logical form, but also to the use of an argument that is in its form or mode of presentation similar to, and might be understood be a reader as being a different way of expressing or very close to 'simply' being a different way of expressing,[430] a previously-made argument.

In Book 1, after what I termed above the *narratio* in which he set out his definition of anger, Seneca presents arguments in favour of three claims:
(a) anger is not in accordance with nature (1.5.2-1.6.5)
(b) anger is not useful (1.7.1-1.19.8)
(c) anger does not contribute to greatness of spirit (1.20.1-1.21.4)

In Book 2, before the transition to the theoretical half, we may split the arguments that Seneca makes into two:
(a) an argument against the view that anger is inevitable, at 2.1.1-2.5.5[431]
(b) a series of further arguments, introduced by interjections (2.6.1-2.17.2)

There are two main strategies that allow the repetition of arguments. One, which I discuss in §3.2.4, is the way that interjections are introduced that involve interlocutors making objections that require Seneca to repeat arguments already made. The other is the way that the three claims that Seneca defends in Book 1 are (treated by Seneca as being) the same claim: 'anger is not in accordance with nature' is treated as equivalent to 'anger is not in accordance with man's true (even if very rarely fulfilled) nature as a truly virtuous person';

[430] Thus, for example, an *exemplum* may be used rather than a 'logically-formulated' argument; or a specific counter-example may be given instead of a statement that counter-examples exist.
[431] For a justification of the view that this is the function of this section, see §3.2.1.2.

‘anger is not useful’ is treated as equivalent to ‘anger is not useful for a man to fulfil his true nature as a truly virtuous person’; and ‘anger does not contribute to greatness of spirit’ becomes ‘anger does not contribute to fulfilling what makes a man great-spirited, i.e. his fulfilling his true nature as a truly virtuous person’. This ‘false division’ allows the same or very similar argument to be used more than once.

§3.2.2.2: THE SECOND (THERAPEUTIC) HALF

The second half of the *De ira*, unlike the first half, clearly *is* structured therapeutically. Seneca offers four main types of therapy:

I. how to prevent anger in children (2.18.2-2.21.11)

II. how to prevent anger in oneself (as an adult) or in other adults (2.22.1-3.9.5[432])

III. how to stop or to lessen the effects of anger in oneself (as an adult) (3.10.1-3.38.2)

IV. how to stop or to lessen the effects of anger in another adult (3.39.1-3.40.5)

How, though, are these therapeutic scenarios handled? The philosophical theory that underpins the *De ira* allows anger to be viewed from two different perspectives, a physical perspective and a cognitive perspective. According to the physical perspective, anger involves physical changes, most notably an increase in the amount of heat in the body. According to the cognitive perspective, anger is the desire to take revenge for an injustice that one believes that one has suffered.

[432] There is, as I discuss in §3.2.3, a ‘break’ at 3.1.1-3.5.2 caused by the start of the new book.

The first type of therapy, addressing how to prevent anger in children, approaches the problem from both a physical and a cognitive perspective. Those suggestions that prevent anger from a physical perspective include avoiding avoid too much wine and food. Those that seem to prevent it from a cognitive perspective are based (implicitly or explicitly) on the notion that children should not be treated in such a way that they do not develop the ability to judge accurately whether or not an injustice has really been committed: thus, they should not be treated in such a way as to give them too high an estimate of their self-worth.[433]

The second and third types of therapy treat anger almost exclusively from a cognitive perspective. There are exceptions at 3.9, with, for example, observations about thirst and hunger making one more prone to anger (in relation to II), and at 3.13.1-3, where Seneca discusses (in relation to III) how attempting to limit how one's body changes when one becomes angry can stop or, at least, slow the process. Some of the 'cognitive' types of therapy, as in the case of children, seem to refer to instances where we are encouraging correct beliefs through non-direct means, such as socialising with the correct people. However, the overwhelming majority of the therapy provided in II and III involves explicit arguments that anger is bad or that anger, in particular circumstances, is inappropriate.

The fourth type of therapy that Seneca offers takes a cognitive perspective but, as it addressed to moments when anger is at its peak and unresponsive to reason, many of the arguments involve distracting it or trying to remove means of vengeance until it might 'decay' naturally or until it might be more susceptible to counter-argument, or (in rare

[433] There are clear similarities between Seneca's view on the importance of habituating the young to correct attitudes and behaviour and Aristotle's (on which, see Burnyeat (1980)), but Seneca does not see such an upbringing as necessary for later virtue.

cases, where it can be treated from a position of authority) trying to replace it with another emotion such as fear.

The main observation to be made is that Seneca gives priority to cognitive cures. This is reflected in the way that the first and fourth types of therapy, which do not involve, to a very great extent, argument against anger (or encouraging one to believe that individual situations should not be assessed as *iniuriae* which, as we have seen, is part of Seneca's argument against anger),[434] are dealt with extremely succinctly. The much longer sections II and III, on the other hand, emphasise arguments against anger. The overall priority given to the cognitive approach of arguing against anger is reflected in the way that, by the time he starts to describe the cures of anger, Seneca has already, in the definitional sections at 1.2.3b-1.4.3 (supported by, but not also requiring, his account of the development of anger at 2.1.3-2.4.2), provided us with the theoretical understanding that justifies his cognitive approach to tackling the emotions, but has not (as far as we can tell) done so for the physical perspective, resulting in his impromptu explanations at 2.19.1-2.19.5 and 3.19.3-3.19.5.

Thus, the emphasis in the therapeutic half is on arguments against anger. Indeed, two further aspects of its organisation allow the repetition of such arguments. The first aspect

[434] It may seem odd that IV is treated so briefly given that it might be an opportunity for a repetition of the arguments against anger. There are two possible (non-competing) explanations. Firstly, Seneca might have judged that the disadvantages of the boredom that might have resulted outweighed the advantages (cf. §3.2.5). Secondly, in IV, Seneca treats how to deal with anger in others and explains that one should not attempt to soothe it with speech when it is at its peak but, rather, to deflect it, to delay it and to minimise the potential for harm, unless one is in a position to shame or to frighten it into submission from a position of authority. He implies that he will also offer cures for anger when not at its peak but he does not go on to do so. Presumably if he did, he would have had the opportunity to repeat arguments against anger previously seen in (e.g.) II and III but it would also seem to require the repetition of (a.) how the effects of anger could be limited and (b.) explanations about how evoking emotions like fear can be used to 'conquer' anger. It may be that Seneca did not wish to draw attention to these arguments, which go against the claim that anger cannot be controlled (which is, of course, an important argument that Seneca makes against anger).

is the way in which the organisation of the speech according to rhetorical principles interacts with its organisation as a therapeutic manual. The *confirmatio*, as we saw in §3.2.1, is structured as a general argument against anger followed by an (exhaustive) list of individual situations when anger could be seen to be wrong. The second part of this – that is, the list of individual situations – is equivalent to the second, therapeutic section of the text according to the model that sees the *De ira* as a therapeutic manual. The therapeutic section inevitably requires general arguments against anger as well as arguments against anger in individual situations. Therefore, the second part of the *confirmatio* includes some general arguments as well as arguments based on individual situations. And so, there is some repetition of arguments from the first part of the *confirmatio* in the second part (even if sometimes in abbreviated form[435]), something that seems appropriate because the second part of the *confirmatio* is also the therapeutic section.

Another way in which the therapeutic section allows repetition is through the nature of the distinction it makes between II and III. Making the distinction between how to avoid becoming angry and how to stop when already angered might seem like a sensible division. However, we have seen that *ira* is an ambiguous term with broad as well as narrow definitions. Given that Seneca involves rational counter-arguments to anger in III, he must, when making the distinction between II and III, be taking anger in a broader sense, so that it does not involve commitment to the notion that one should take revenge for an injustice one has received so strong that it cannot be overturned by rational counter-argument. It follows, then, that II and III involve very similar advice: even if we were to imagine Seneca using a precise definition of anger, when one's belief in the notion that one had received an injustice and should take revenge had reached a certain level, the ways

[435] It may be that the repetition functions intratextually, with (e.g.) the abridged reference to the disgusting appearance of the angry at 2.36.1 recalling the fuller description at 1.1.3-4 (and reminding us of our emotional reaction to it).

in which one might remove that belief[436] (and so prevent anger arising or remove it once it had arisen) remain mostly the same both before and after that level. However, by making the distinction between II and III,[437] the *De ira* allows itself to repeat the therapy that it offers - that is, to repeat its arguments against anger. For example, the argument that apparent *iniuriae* from children should be overlooked given the age of the perpetrator is made at 2.30.1 and 3.24.3. Sometimes they are repeated in a different form, in particular through the use of *exempla* in Book 3, with, for example, the *fastidium* evoked at Lysimachus' treatment of Telesphorus of Rhodes at 3.17.3-4 re-presenting the argument that anger should be rejected for its disgusting appearance that is made at, for instance, 2.35.3-6.

§3.2.3: THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT AGAINST ANGER INTO BOOKS

So far, I have tried to explain how two organisational principles – the structuring of the text as, almost, a forensic speech making a case for the viciousness of anger and its structuring as a therapeutic text – and the way in which they are combined allow repetition of the arguments against anger. Now, I hope to explain how the arrangement of the *De ira* into books has the same effect.

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[436] If it could be removed, and had not reached the stage where rational counter-argument, the main form of therapy available to Seneca, could have no effect.

[437] The unnecessary nature of this distinction is perhaps reflected in the way that III is introduced. Unlike the 'signposts' used to introduce I, II and IV, all of which clearly mark the transition to a logically distinct discourse unit (see the table in §3.2.3), the move to III is 'signposted' by *optimum est itaque ad primum mali sensum mederi sibi…* (3.10.1, with the following text and comparison clarifying that Seneca is not referring to 'healing' the pre-emotional stage). This establishes a logical relationship between III and the immediately preceding material and thus 'blurs' the boundaries between the two sections. Indeed, a very small amount of the advice in III strictly belongs in II rather than III (e.g. 3.11.1).

The *De ira*, as we have seen, is composed of a very brief *exordium*, a very brief *narratio*, an extremely long *confirmatio* and a very brief *peroratio*. That *confirmatio* – the body of the dialogue – is divided into two parts, a series of arguments against anger described as theoretical questions and the section that discussed individual situations. The *De ira*, then, is more naturally divided into two than three.[438] However, Seneca splits it into three rather than two books - even though neither of the two parts of the *De ira* that the bipartite structure of the *confirmatio* (1.5.2-2.17.2 and 2.18.2-3.40.5) consists of, though long, is so long that it could not be a book in its own right.[439]

The start of Book 2

The second book opens by announcing a move to more theoretical matters:

> *primus liber, Nouate, benigniorem habuit materiam; facilis enim in procliui uitiorum decursus est. nunc ad exiliora ueniendum est; quaerimus enim ira utrum iudicio an impetu incipiat, id est utrum sua sponte moueatur an quemadmodum pleraque quae intra nos <non> insciis nobis oriuntur.* (2.1.1)

The reason for this theoretical discussion, as we have seen, is announced at the start of 2.2.1: it constitutes an argument against anger. Unlike the arguments in Book 1 which all make their case by showing that anger does not contribute to being a good man, this argument functions by demonstrating (as a response to possible counter-arguments) that anger is not inevitable. Those arguments that we find in Book 2 that demonstrate that anger does not contribute to being a good man, and that repeat arguments already made in Book 1, are largely motivated by interjections.[440] However, Seneca's responses often

[438] This is the division that the introductions of the most important recent English translations foreground: see Kaster (2010) 3-4; Cooper & Procopé (1995) 3.
[439] Cic.*de Orat.*2 (for example) is much longer than either half. So too is Cic.*Fin.*5.
[440] On which, see §3.2.4.

seem longer than the interjections strictly demand. The start of a new book makes this more seem more natural because they seem to be at a greater distance to the discussion in which they have already appeared. Thus, the start of a new book facilitates, to a certain extent, Seneca's repetition of arguments. This line of interpretation, however, should not be pushed too far; it seems to me that a main function of the division of the *De ira* into three books (rather than the more natural two) is the repetition allowed by the start of the third book rather than by the start of the second. I now turn to considering this.

The start of Book 3

The start of any new book is an opportunity to introduce the new book and to re-announce how the text is organised. These two might naturally occur at the same time, but Seneca separates them in *De ira* 3, introducing the book before, some while later, explaining the structure of what will follow. Each of these moments is used to allow the repetition of arguments.

(a) Seneca's introduction of the book

I treat first the fact that the start of a new book is an opportunity to introduce the book in a way that explains how it relates to the function of the work as a whole. This occurs partway through the section I labelled II in the table above:

> *quod maxime desiderasti, Nouate, nunc facere temptabimus, iram excidere animis aut certe refrenare et impetus eius inhibere. id aliquando palam aperteque faciendum est, ubi minor uis mali patitur, aliquando ex occulto, ubi nimium ardet omnique inpedimento exasperatur et crescit…* (3.1.1)

Seneca continues in this vein for a short while (3.1.1-3.1.2), expanding on the notion that anger must be combatted differently in different situations and giving examples of the different responses that might sometimes be appropriate. One of these responses is delay, which he says should be employed as a last resort, and he goes on to justify this claim by appealing to the fact that anger is more vicious than other emotions: this is signalled by *enim*, marking, as typically, an internal causal relationship. Some of the arguments that he offers for the particular viciousness of anger are relevant to the inappropriateness of using delay to cure anger: for example, he tells us that, unlike other vices, anger is complete when it starts (3.1.3). However, not all of the arguments that he offers for anger being a particularly vicious emotion are strictly relevant to the question of the effectiveness of delay as a cure for anger: for example, he tells us that, unlike luxury or laziness, anger affects all people, and at the very least more argumentation is needed to see how this should be related to the appropriateness of delaying as a remedy for anger. In other words, the introduction of the third book is a 'false start' to the resumption of the cures of anger that Seneca is in the middle of; this 'false start' allows Seneca to present arguments against anger rather than specific *remedia*.

Seneca's interlocutor seems to pick up on this irrelevance and demands to know, twice, the purpose of Seneca's discussion. On the first occasion, Seneca explains that it is because Aristotle defends anger and so it is necessary to prove anger's *foeditas* and *feritas* (3.3.2); on the second occasion, Seneca explains that he is writing this section

> *ut nemo se iudicet tutum ab illa, cum lenes quoque natura et placidos in saeuitiam ac uiolentiam euocet.* (3.5.1)

Only then does Seneca return to his therapeutic agenda, and it is to II, not to III, that he returns, even though the start of Book 3 (including the formulation of 3.1.1, quoted above) seemed to indicate that he is about to begin III.

(b) Seneca re-announcing the organisation of the work

As we saw, the start of a new book also allows the opportunity to 're-announce' the text's organisation. At the start of the therapeutic section, halfway through the second book (in a sort of 'proem in the middle'), Seneca had announced a division of material in which he would first explain how anger is to be avoided and then how it is to be restrained;[441] the first of these two parts (how anger is to be avoided) is then divided into two periods of life, child-rearing and the time that follows (2.18.1):



[441] There is no reason to see the use of the first person plurals in describing these parts as an indication that Seneca's interest lies only in how we might avoid anger in ourselves or restrain it in ourselves.

At 3.5.2, Seneca announces a new, three-part division of his therapy: not becoming angry, stopping when angered and curing another person's anger:



However, these two schemes are logically compatible with each other:

<table>
<tr><th>Two-part scheme</th><th>Three-part scheme</th></tr>
<tr><td>A1. How anger is to be avoided during the time of child-rearing</td><td rowspan="2">1. How not to become angry</td></tr>
<tr><td>A2. How anger is to be avoided during adulthood</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">B. How anger is to be restrained</td><td>2. How to stop when angered</td></tr>
<tr><td>3. How to stop another person when he/she is angered</td></tr>
</table>

The reality of how the schemes map onto the text is, of course, slightly more complicated because the three-part scheme is announced only partway through II. This necessitates a 're-announcement' of the subject matter of II partway through the section.

	Two-part scheme		Three-part scheme	Corresponding text	Signpost
I.	A. How anger is to be avoided *ne incidamus in iram* (2.18.1), paraphrased as *iram […] repellere* (2.18.1)	A1. During the time of child-rearing *educatio* (2.18.1)		2.18.2-2.21.11	*ut [sc. iram] uitemus, quaedam ad uniuersam uitam pertinentia praecipientur: ea in educationem et in sequentia tempora diuidentur. educatio maximam diligentiam plurimumque profuturam desiderat…* (2.18.1-2)
II.		A2. During adulthood *sequentia tempora* (2.18.1)		2.22.1-3.9.5 (with a 'break' at 3.1.1-3.5.2 for the introduction to Book 3)	*sed haec ad liberos nostros pertinent; in nobis quidem sors nascendi et educatio nec uitii locum nec iam praecepti habet: sequentia ordinanda sunt.* (2.22.1)
			1. How not to become angry *quemadmodum in iram non incidamus* (3.5.2), a response to the aim *non irasci* (3.5.2)		*sed cum primum sit non irasci, secundum desinere, tertium alienae quoque irae mederi, dicam primum quemadmodum in iram non incidamus, deinde quemadmodum nos ab illa liberemus, nouissime quemadmodum irascentem retineamus pacemusque et ad sanitatem reducamus. ne irascamur praestabimus, si…* (3.5.2-3)
III.	B. How anger is to be restrained *ne in ira peccemus* (2.18.1), paraphrased as *[sc. iram] compescere* (2.18.1)		2. How to stop when angered *quemadmodum nos ab illa liberemus* (3.5.2), a response to the aim *desinere* (3.5.2)	3.10.1-3.38.2	*optimum est itaque ad primum mali sensum mederi sibi, tum uerbis quoque suis minimum libertatis dare et inhibere impetum.* (3.10.1)
IV.			3. How to stop another person when he/she is angered *quemadmodum irascentem retineamus placemusque et ad sanitatem reducamus* (3.5.2), a response to the aim *alienae quoque irae mederi* (3.5.2)	3.39.1-3.40.5	*contigit iam nobis, Nouate, bene componere animum: aut non sentit iracundiam aut superior est. uideamus quomodo alienam iram leniamus; nec enim sani esse tantum uolumus, sed sanare.* (3.39.1)

The therapy of how we are to avoid becoming angry during adulthood (II) is thus 'begun' twice. This allows the introduction of further *remedia* that involve reflection on the viciousness of anger, but it also allows those *remedia* or arguments that have already been set out to be treated again. For example, at 3.5.6, Seneca makes the same argument he made earlier in II, at 3.31.6, that anger is by its very nature opposed to humans, who are by contrast gentle and kind.

Thus, the start of the third book allows two moments that function almost as 'fresh beginnings', one marking the start of the new book and the other advertising the structure of the work; and these 'fresh beginning' are used to allow repetition of arguments.

§3.2.4: INTERJECTIONS

So far, we have seen how the *De ira*'s complex structure may be seen to be, in large part, the consequence of the interaction of three different principles: it is at once structured as an argument against anger, as a therapeutic manual and as a text organised into three books; and these principles and the way they interact allow the *De ira* to repeat its arguments against anger. These principles suggest that the text has more underlying order than it may appear to, but the overall impression the text gives is not one of tight organisation and, indeed, these principles do not *fully* explain the text's structure. Rather, the text is 'disordered' by (at times seemingly random) interjections.[442] These create opportunities for the text to introduce new arguments for positions that it has already defended – as at 2.12.1-2.12.6, where arguments for the inevitability of anger different to those already

[442] The most striking example of this is, as we saw at §3.2.2.1, the series of arguments introduced by interjections (2.6.1-2.17.2) after the argument against the inevitability of anger. Of course, sometimes Seneca seems to move from responding to an objection to what may appear to be a slightly distinct argument against anger, but this distinction is often a very subjective one and this does not change the effect of the interjection – to 'distract' from the orderly exposition of the *De ira*'s subject matter.

presented at 2.1.1-2.5.5 are made[443] – and, importantly for our purposes, to repeat arguments that it has already given – as, for example, 2.11.1 introduces the objection that anger is useful because it keeps one from being despised and thus allows Seneca to introduce, as a counterargument, the idea that anger causes the angry person harm (2.11.3), an idea that he has already argued for in detail (for instance, at 1.11.2-8) and is, indeed, introduced as early as 1.1.1.

The *De ira*, then, appears to be chaotically organised and it is *almost*, but not quite, possible to produce a convincing account of its structural organisation:[444] interjections objecting to Seneca's position prevent the unfolding of an orderly text. The reason for this disruption will emerge from the next section's consideration of the way the *De ira* exploits its addressee.

§3.2.5: THE ROLE OF NOUATUS

The *De ira*, we have seen, uses a variety of devices to allow the repetition of a number of the key arguments it makes against anger: the apparently chaotic structure of the text appears to be, in part, the result of an attempt to exploit the therapeutic format and the dialogue's status as a text divided into books to repeat its messages as a rhetorical device;

[443] Such a move is made again at 2.14.2; cf. also (e.g.) 1.14.1.

[444] Several other (seemingly) didactic texts similarly seem to have clear organising principles but defy attempts to impose precise structural analysis, and this feature has important effects (as it does in the *De ira* too, as I argue in §3.2.5 and §4). In the *Georgics*, the inability to be entirely certain about the organisational principles may be a corollary to the text's insistence on our inability to acquire certain knowledge (on which, see Kronenberg (2009) ch.6-7). In *Ars amatoria* 3, the way that the move from 'elementary' to 'advanced' instruction does not always seem competently handled (see Gibson (2003) 3-4) may be part of Ovid's characterisation of his didactic persona as a bogus teacher (on which, see Watson (2007). A particularly apt comparison to the *De ira* is the *Ars Poetica*, where the absence of clear structural devices and the way that '[l]ines and sections read quite differently according to what you hold in mind from the context, and whether you look forward or back' (Russell (1973) 116) – in other words, the same ability to view the text's structure from different perspectives that we find in the *De ira* – may be a challenge to the reader to devise their own interpretation of the text and to create literary theory themselves, as Reinhardt (2013) 511 suggests.

and it is also the result of interjections from interlocutors that, similarly, allow the repetition of arguments that have already been made.

To give a specific example of this, the argument that anger is not useful in war because its unrestrained nature prevents it from being useful is made:[445]

- at 1.7.1-4, during the section of Book 1 devoted to an argument that anger is not according to nature; it is introduced by an interjection from a third-person interlocutor.
- at 1.9.2-4, during the section of Book 1 devoted to an argument that anger is not useful; it is introduced by Seneca's persona as a part of his argument.
- at 3.3.5-6, during the introduction to Book 3; the (much briefer) argument offered here is introduced as part of the justification of the arguments against anger that is offered in this introduction.
- at 3.20.2-3.21.4, in the form of negative *exempla*, during the section of Book 3 devoted to explaining how to stop when angered; the *exempla* are introduced as *remedia* in that recollection of them constitutes a way to stop when angered.

Such repetition is, clearly, a rhetorical device.[446] However, identifying repetition as persuasive is so commonplace that it is easy to forget how important it can be. Recent research has demonstrated that humans are 'motivated reasoners' in that we often seek to preserve our beliefs by unduly disregarding pieces of evidence that undermine the

[445] It is often hard to decide when something is an argument or a claim (it is arguable that the third example I give here is actually a claim, but the explanation that anger's *effrenata [...] rabies* must be revealed to avoid people thinking that it can be useful seems to give a reason for rejecting the usefulness of anger).
[446] Repetition may often have other functions as well: in particular, it may create intratextual connections with other passages. Reading an argument that has been made in an earlier passage will be informed by one's reading of that earlier passage. Moreover, the precise contexts of each passage will be significant: the repeated argument, even if it seems to be little changed in mode of presentation from its former appearance, is not divorced from its new context. However, I have not found either of these lines of enquiry particularly helpful for understanding the strategies underlying the *De ira*.

positions we already hold ('confirmation bias'). Indeed, such evidence or such arguments often are not merely disregarded but make us believe our original views even more strongly.[447]

However, predictably enough, this process does not (always) continue *ad infinitum*. Rather, a 'tipping point' is reached at which the effect of our motivated reasoning is outweighed by increased scrutiny of the argument generated by the repetition of counter-arguments that results in increased anxiety and, therefore, in increased motivation for an individual to investigate their environment.[448] Repetition, then, by helping people to reach this 'affective tipping point', is an important way of persuading people to accept claims that are opposed to the views they previously held. However, this result is not true indefinitely: when a persuasive message is repeated an increasing number of times, the proportion of those who hear it who agree with the message first increases, as individuals scrutinise the arguments,[449] until what I call the 'second tipping point', at which point it starts to decrease, as individuals grow frustrated at the tedium of the repetition.[450]

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[447] See (e.g.) Redlawsk (2002) and Taber & Lodge (2006). The same is true for corrections of misperceptions: see (e.g.) Nyhan & Reifler (2010).

[448] Redlawsk, Civettini & Emmerson (2010).

[449] Repetition at this level increases the scrutiny of personally relevant arguments (Claypool et al. (2004)), and so its consequences depend on the quality of the argument (Cacioppo & Petty (1989)). It may be objected that this result, although applicable to modern American society, may not have been applicable to ancient Rome. However, it seems to be a feature even of societies that relies on the 'opposite' form of argumentation, the Arab world. Repetition is probably more important in Arabic than in Western argumentation, even if for different reasons (modern Arabic argumentation is 'essentially paratactic, abductive and analogical', with deference to a figure whose authority is externally constructed, rather than, like (stereotypical) Western argumentation, 'based on a syllogistic model of proof'; repetition and paraphrase from an authoritative sources can thus form an argument in itself in modern Arab society) (Koch (1983), quotes from 47). See further §3.3.2.

[450] Cacioppo & Petty (1979); similar results in children were detected, and the same explanation offered, by Gorn & Goldberg (1980). I am not aware of evidence from the Arab world for this position. I go on to cite Roman evidence that indicates that Romans, at least, thought this might be a risk. That said, the argument that follows about Seneca's use of boredom does not rely on this analysis being true: it relies on the ancient Romans being able to *be convinced that they are or might be bored*, which is quite different.

The basic outline of this account was, in fact, open to Seneca, as the Stoics certainly recognised the importance of repetition. Chrysippus seems to have approved of it[451] and Epictetus certainly advocates it.[452] There is also evidence for ancient rhetorical theorists being aware of the dangers of undermining one's rhetoric by boring one's audience through repetition.[453]

In short, repetition can be an extremely powerful persuasive strategy, but if used to excess, it becomes counter-productive.

Despite the number of different arguments that the *De ira* employs and despite the differing ways in which it presents those arguments, this is a risk that the *De ira* runs. His modern readers certainly find Seneca somewhat tedious at times:

> 'But even the most dedicated Senecans should and do admit his stylistic failings (the failings in his life are not relevant here). There are many passages in which Seneca's love of his own technique gets the better of him, and he indulges himself to what seems to modern readers boring extremes. So all too often we are treated to an interminable series of *exempla*, far exceeding the need to prove the necessary point, or a stretch of rhetorical questions filling half a page of text and pushing at an open door in the reader's mind: Seneca, in a word, is being too clever or learned, and does not have that quality of the supreme artist, knowing when to stop.'[454]

[451] Fro.*Ant.*2.p.68(146 N) = *SVF* 2.27.
[452] Epict.*Ench.*1.5, Epict.*Ench.*2, Epict.*Ench.*3, Epict.*Ench.*4, Epict.*Ench.*9, Epict.*Ench.*10.
[453] See (e.g.) Cic.*Inv.*1.98, Quint.*Inst.*6.1.2, Quint.*Inst.*6.3.1. *Pace* (e.g.) Spacks (1995), who, despite acknowledging (at 7-8) the evidence of Hor.*S.*1.9 for boredom existing in the ancient world, sees boredom as a social construction dating to the mid-eighteenth century, I do not see it as anachronistic to see certain (parts of) ancient texts as likely to have been seen as boring. Toohey (1988) surveys the ancient evidence for the existence of the concept of boredom in the ancient world; we might add to his evidence the passages just cited.
[454] Costa (1995) 108-109.

This reaction, I think, must have been true in the ancient world too, even allowing for their (presumably) greater tolerance for the sorts of flourishes taught in the declamation schools.[455]

Given that the optimal level of repetition will vary from person to person, there is no 'perfect' amount of repetition, and the *De ira* does not seek to achieve that. Rather, it accommodates the problem by seeking to influence our response to this repetition through the relationship between Seneca('s didactic persona) and his interlocutors within the discourse world of the text and, by doing this, to turn our (possible) tedium at the repetition to its own advantage.

There are three main characters (or groups of characters) involved in the text. In theory, of course, we need not agree with any of them but, in practice, our possible responses to the text require us to ally ourselves with one of the following:

- the interlocutor(s), who generally seem anonymous but can occasionally be identified with Aristotle or Theophrastus[456]
- Seneca himself; and
- Nouatus.

Who, then, do we side with?

There is no easy answer to this question, of course. We might side with more than one of these three; given that those whom I have just grouped together as 'the interlocutor(s)' include more than one person who present quite different arguments, we might side with

[455] This point is made by Wright (1974) at 42-43, citing (amongst other examples) 3.16.2-3.
[456] In using this phrase, I do not include Nouatus.

one interlocutor but not all interlocutors; and, above all, our attitude may shift as we read the text (just as, for example, we phase in and out of sympathy with the interlocutor's responses when we read Platonic dialogues). The *De ira*, after all, exhibits what Volk has termed 'simultaneity' – that is, 'the pretense that the poem [or text] comes into being only as it evolves before the reader's eyes'.[457] I shall investigate more fully the answer to this question in §3.3.2.

What is important for the time being is that we might isolate three different types of reader:

A. those who do not agree with Seneca that anger is always wicked, whose position is akin to that of the interlocutor(s);

B. those who agree with Seneca that anger is always wicked but are not bored by his repetition of his arguments, whose position is akin to that of Seneca;

C. those who agree with Seneca that anger is always wicked and are bored by his repetition of his arguments.

Those who fall into categories A and B do not pose a problem for Seneca's therapeutic project, on the line of argument that I have just advanced. Those who fall into category A need the repetition to pass over the first 'affective tipping point', to allow them the possibility of being convinced.[458] Those who fall into category B, who have not passed the

[457] Volk (1997) 289.

[458] The counterargument may be made that those in group A do pose a problem for Seneca's therapeutic project if they are bored by his repetition of arguments. However, (i) these people are likely to be small in number, as Seneca's constant rearguing of his point hopefully provokes many of those in group A's engagement in the debate; (ii) there is nothing that the *De ira*, or any text, can do to convince someone once it has stated and presented all arguments in favour of its position if that position is found unconvincing and the reader or listener will not listen to repetition or clarification of the arguments other than (with little prospect of success) go over those arguments yet again; and (iii) there is a (very) slight possibility that, through their boredom, they will be drawn into sympathy with those in group C and thus the distance between their attitude and Nouatus' lessened. So the *De ira* is doing all that it can do for such people.

‘second tipping point’, do not suffer at all, and may indeed benefit, from the repetition of the arguments.

It is those in category C who present the challenge for the *De ira* (and, indeed, for any other text that uses repetition as a persuasive strategy). Those in this category, in fact, share, or, at least, by the start of Book 3, come to share the perspective of Nouatus. When we apply the method I suggested in §3.1 to the *De ira*, we see that objections to notion that anger is wicked all come from interlocutors other than Nouatus. Until *perhaps* late in Book 3 (a point to which I return in §3.3.2), Nouatus himself never suggests that anger has any redeeming features.[459] In fact, the start of the third books reveals that, at least by this stage, Nouatus has become bored and frustrated by the (unknown) interlocutor(s)’ inability to understand Seneca’s point and at the text’s consequent, almost obsessive, return to arguments against anger: *‘non est […] dubium quin magna ista et pestifera sit uis: ideo*

[459] The *De ira*, then, does not, as Nussbaum argues, present the drama of Nouatus gradually being brought round to Seneca’s way of thinking (a development that Seneca uses in other texts: see Griffin (2013) 142-145 on Aebutius Liberalis’ progress in *De beneficiis*; Griffin (1976) 351-353 on that of Lucilius in *Epistles*; Griffin (1976) 353-355 (with 316-317) on that of Annaeus Serenus across *De constantia sapientis, De tranquillitate animi* and *De otio* (if it was addressed to Annaeus Serenus); and Morgan (2007) 286-290 on Marcia’s progress in *Consolatio ad Marciam*). One possible counter-argument to my claim that no change in Nouatus’ attitude towards anger is detectable is the suggestion that Seneca’s formulation of Nouatus’ request at the start of the text (*exegisti a me, Nouate, ut scriberem quemadmodum posset ira leniri* (1.1.1)) differs from the formulation of that request at the start of Book 3 (*quod maxime desiderasti, Nouate, nunc facere temptabimus, iram excidere animis aut certe refrenare et impetus eius inhibere* (3.1.1; cf. 2.18.1)). For Nussbaum (1994) 410, Nouatus’ position has changed. However, (a) if Nouatus reformulated his request to Seneca after being convinced by Seneca’s initial arguments, the perfect tense of *desiderasti* would have to refer to Nouatus’ formation in the *recent* past of a new hope: this would probably require an adverb of time qualifying *desiderasti*. (b) It does not seem to me that there is necessarily a significant difference between *lenire* emotions and *excidere animis aut certe refrenare et impetus eius inhibere*: the latter involves both eliminating emotions and simply reining them in (and, of course, *De ira* provides both). Similarly, *lenio* could refer to simply soothing emotions (i.e. *aut certe refrenare et impetus eius inhibere*) but it can also refer to their total elimination: a close parallel is Sen.*Ep.*40.5, *lenienda sunt quae me exterrent* (it is particularly close given that we are about to hear that what ‘Nouatus’ utterly fears (*pertimuisse*) is *ira*). Here, *lenienda* is parallel to a number of other gerundives that all denote checking and eliminating vices (*conpescenda, quae inritant, discutienda, quae fallunt, inhibenda luxuria, corripienda auaritia*); this suggests that *lenire* had, or could have, a sense close to that of *excidere animis*. After all, in Stoic terms at least, to make anger *lenis* surely involved eliminating it altogether. Cf. n.363.

quemadmodum sanari debeat monstra', he exclaims shortly after the third book begins (3.3.1); *'quorsus [...] hoc pertinet?'* he demands a little while later (3.5.1).[460]

Although the text does not over-emphasise it (if a text is too keen to announce that it is dull, there is always a risk that the reader may take note and give up[461]), it nonetheless reminds us that boredom is a perfectly natural response to what is presented to us.

How do we react to the boredom? There is no need to follow Costa in condemning it (on these occasions, at least) as amongst Seneca's 'stylistic failings':

> '[B]oredom, as psychoanalysts have suggested, often contains hidden overtones of aggression. [...] If one takes seriously the charge that a book is boring-meaning that it bores many of its readers-it would seem appropriate to seek what frustrations the book induces, what aggressiveness it may release in its readers.'[462]

On this line of analysis, for example, the third book of Virgil's *Aeneid* might be considered by its 'ideal readers' to be boring, and to be boring in a way that dovetails with the poem's

[460] Seneca's addressee in *De beneficiis* is also presented as bored and frustrated towards the end of the work, although this is employed by Seneca in a different way, with Aebutius Liberalis told to signal to Seneca through his facial expression how long to spend on individual topics (Sen.*Ben.*6.1), and he often performs this task (for instance, at Sen.*Ben.*6.5.3-6.7.1; see further Griffin (2013) 144-145). Thus, Seneca uses the (alleged) boredom of his addressee as a way of justifying the length and detail of his treatment of particular aspects of his subject.

[461] Seneca's defence of the repetition of arguments is, of course, important in this regard. This is perhaps one reason why it is uncertain how many different interlocutors lie behind the anonymous interjections: the possibility of a large number of different people making these statements contributes to a sense of how numerous those who defend anger are and thus forms an implicit defence of Seneca's project.

[462] Spacks (1995) 130. On the links between anger and aggression, see Dahlen et al. (2004). This is an, at first sight, surprising rhetorical strategy. Texts may seem boring but they rarely acknowledge the possibility that they might be. An obvious parallel to Seneca's acknowledgement is Tac.*Ann.*4.32-3; cf. Woodman (1988) 180-186. Boredom may function in other ways too: as boring teaching can drive students who believe that the subject cannot be as dreary as their teacher makes it seem to seek out what is interesting (see Lewkowich (2010)), the monotony of Ovid's *Heroides* has been claimed to encourage the reader to stimulating reflection on the revealing differences between apparently similar poems (see Fulkerson (2009) 79-80; see further Lindheim (2003), suggesting further functions for the repetitiveness).

preoccupation with the *tantae molis* involved in the founding of the Roman race:[463] although its intellectual and emotional impacts are now appreciated,[464] Book 3 still seems to me to communicate (to us and to the text's internal audience, whose sympathy Aeneas is trying to secure) something of the Aeneadae's weary frustration.[465] In the case of the *De ira*, the frustrations and the aggressiveness are (meant to be) directed at those who defend anger: their interjections disrupt the order that we might otherwise find in the text and, even when they do not interject, Seneca makes clear that it is the need to argue against them that entails the potentially boring and alienating repetition and re-elaboration of the same counter-arguments. 'Blame those who defend anger, not me', Seneca seems to be saying in response to both these 'offences'. The boredom that might lead readers who have passed the 'second tipping point' to turn against the text's arguments and their irritation at the fact that order cannot – *quite* – be found in the *De ira*'s structure are harnessed to increase their support for Seneca's position and to alienate those who defend anger.

§3.3: SENECA'S (DIDACTIC/THERAPEUTIC) *PERSONA*

So far, I have pointed to a certain structural order underlying the *De ira* that allows repetition as a pedagogic technique; and I have identified as one of the main vehicles for its disruption the chaotic interjections of various interlocutors. My explanation for Seneca's use of such interlocutors has been that it serves to mitigate the possible negative side-effects of the build-up and repetition of arguments on the same topic. I now wish to consider another consequence of Seneca's use of Nouatus and various interlocutors, how it

[463] Verg.*A*.1.33.
[464] See (e.g.) Hexter (1999).
[465] See Allen (1951). We might compare Orwell's *A Clergyman's Daughter* (Orwell (1935)).

allows him to effect a change in the *ēthos* he adopts and to (attempt to) control his readers' responses to that change.

§3.3.1: SENECA'S GENTLENESS

I start by arguing, at some length because my stance is at odds with the scholarly consensus,[466] that, for the majority of the *De ira*, Seneca presents himself as a very gentle teacher who does not construct hierarchical power relations with his addressee or rely on appeals to established social or political hierarchies; rather, his appeals are to those values that unite us as human beings. This does not mean that he does not share many central Roman values with his Roman readers, but his characterisation as a gentle and non-hierarchical comes to be felt to be Roman because the text advances a new sense of what it means to be a Roman. The result is that, if his strategy is successful, Seneca comes across as a man whom we like – and those whom we like, we tend to believe, as ancient literary theorists understood[467] and modern psychological research has confirmed.[468]

It would take too long, of course, to go through the *De ira* and to demonstrate that this position can always be sustained.[469] So, instead, given that beginnings of texts are, of course, particularly important points for the construction of *personae*, I examine the opening of the text in detail as a case study of various aspects of Seneca's self-presentation (§3.3.1.1-3.3.1.4). This case study provides examples of seemingly diametrically opposed

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[466] See (e.g.) Habinek (1998) 137-150 but esp. 141-142, Roller (2001) esp. 272-286, van Hoof (2007) and Kaster (2010) 12-13.
[467] See (e.g.) Cic.*de Orat.*2.182.
[468] See (e.g.) McCroskey and Teven (1999).
[469] This position is, of course, consistent with my claim that the *De ira* is an argument against anger that takes the form of a therapeutic manual. It seeks to cure by understanding the root causes of diseases in the manner of proponents of the Dogmatic school of medicine, which 'accepted the importance of theoretical and physiological and pathological research for the doctor' (Vallance (1990) 4; cf. Frede (1983), (1986a)), and was known as characteristically gentle, as shown above all by the approach of its most famous proponent, Asclepiades of Bithynia (Nutton (2004) 168-170).

styles of argumentation, from the emotional *exordium* at 1.1.1-1.2.3a to the tersely logical 1.3.2. While I do not wish to deny the variation in tone, I hope to show that each of the text units I analyse is consistent with the characterisation of Seneca's *persona* that I have suggested above, either in suggesting Nouatus' non-hierarchical didactic relationship with his addressee or in showing that his modes of argument rely on a sense of what it means to be a human. I then move on to respond to possible objections to my analysis (§3.3.1.5).

§3.3.1.1: SENECA AS A FAMILY MAN

The opening of the *De ira* immediately establishes that Seneca has a familiar, almost intimate relationship with his addressee, Nouatus, who was, in fact, Seneca's brother:[470]

> *exegisti a me, Nouate, ut scriberem quemadmodum posset ira leniri, nec inmerito mihi uideris hunc praecipue adfectum pertimuisse maxime ex omnibus taetrum ac rabidum.* (1.1.1)

By characterising the treatise as a response to a request, Seneca gives his work something of an epistolary character,[471] suggesting an exchange with his brother. The use of *a me* and *mihi* is in keeping with this, because the use of pronouns was a feature of many letters,[472] but the fact that they are unnecessary makes their relationship seem more

[470] Seneca's elder brother, Lucius Annaeus Nouatus (who became Lucius Iunius Gallio Annaeanus after his adoption). For further details, see *RE* 1.2236.66-2237.28; Pauly *s.v. Iunius* II.5; Griffin (1976) index *s.v.* 'Junius Gallio Annaeanus, L., Seneca's elder brother'; and (on his legal experience and expertise) Wycislo (2002) 47.

[471] This is true even though texts that are not letters were often claimed to be written in response to requests; see Plin.*Ep.*6.15.1-3 for an anecdote revealing the conventionality of such requests in an elegiac verse text (which may, of course, have had an epistolary character). For philosophical treatises as letters, see §3.1; on epistolary prose prefaces more generally, see Janson (1964) 106-112.

[472] Cf. Sen.*Ep.*1.1.6 etc. This sense that the text is, at this stage, presented as a genuine interaction with his brother is furthered by Seneca's use of *enim* rather than *nam*: *enim* 'indicates an appeal to the involvement and cooperation of the addressee in the speech-event' (Kroon (1995) 171; on the difference between *nam* and *enim* generally, see Kroon (1995) 144-209 with Langslow (2000)). This point should, clearly, not be given too much weight as Seneca's choice is not inconsistent with his general practice. He favours it over the

informal: such redundancy was typical of 'colloquial' Latin.[473] It is hard to follow van Hoof in seeing the first person references as giving the opening an immodest, perhaps even commanding, tone:[474] if anything, their use suggests that Seneca was putting himself in a subordinate position to Nouatus, as first person singular addresses tend to be used, in English at least, by lower-status individuals addressing their social superiors.[475]

If this is true, it is consistent with the way in which Seneca draws attention to the burden that has been imposed upon him. Seneca's claim that his treatise is a response to another's request is a dedicatory *topos* that goes back, in Latin literature, at least until Catullus and Cicero[476] but even bearing in mind that such dedications often emphasise the incessant nature of the request,[477] its formulation is striking. The verb *exegisti* is, for its time, surprisingly forceful, certainly more so than, for example, *rogauisti*. When used in the present sense of 'call for', 'demand', it must have retained some of the violence of some of its literal meanings.[478] This tone is picked up by the unnecessary clause *ut scriberem*,[479] using a verb, *scribere*, used by Seneca not only of writing letters[480] but also of composing treatises, where it suggests something of the scale of the venture.[481] This – the extent of the task that Nouatus has imposed on him – must be the point here. Why is Seneca 'stropping' about the nature of his task? The answer is, I think, that Nouatus is Seneca's

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(generally) less interactional *nam* by about 4:1 in his prose texts whereas Lucretius uses *nam* only slightly more frequently than *enim*, which is partly because of the different ways in which the two authors construct their authority and their relationships with their readers. But this does not mean that Seneca's choice of the word *enim* here does not contribute to the tone of the passage.

[473] 'Colloquial' is a broad term that includes literary creations which seem 'non-literary' (Chahoud (2010) esp. 61; Clackson (2010)); 'conversational' may be a more apt description here.

[474] van Hoof (2007) 62

[475] Pennebaker (2011) 174; I am not aware of any research into this phenomenon in Latin.

[476] Cf. Catul.66.15-18, Cic.*Fam.*1.9.23, etc. with Stroup (2010) 176-191.

[477] Cf. Tac.*Dial.*1.1 with Goldberg (1999) 225. This is often part of the author's justification of his literary output.

[478] *OLD* 1-3. When Seneca elsewhere uses *exigo* in the same sense as here, this tone is often present (Sen.*Ben.*6.13.1). Such assertiveness is found usually in later writers: see Janson (1964) 117-120.

[479] The clause may have been omitted (as in the parallel construction at Sen.*Dial.*1.1.1) or replaced with a verb lacking connotations of writing (cf. Sen.*Dial.*7.1.1).

[480] Cf. Sen.*Ep.*1.1.1, etc.

[481] See Braund (2009) on Sen.*Cl.*1.1.1.

brother and that between brothers or other intimates, such 'temper-tantrums' may be jokes between people who know each other well enough to get away with it. In other words, rudeness may express intimacy or respect; an exaggerated reluctance to perform a *beneficium* for another may be a mechanism to articulate one's closeness to that person.[482] That Seneca has been 'joking' seems to me confirmed by the second half of the sentence, beginning *nec inmerito mihi uideris* which is most likely an explanation that Seneca does not mind (and, indeed, approves of) his brother's request[483] that moves into a justification, which the following sentence will develop, for devoting a substantial treatise to one particular passion.

A second joke is at work at the opening of the *De ira*, and this too contributes to Seneca's self-presentation as a 'family man.' The opening word, *exigo*, a legal term used of exacting debts, services and so on,[484] makes the text seem to be a legal transaction, and the following sentences continue to do this: *consilium* has common legal applications,[485] *uanis agitata causis* is 'perfectly straightforward legalese for "excited by groundless cases"'[486] and *inpotens sui* recalls the legal phrase *sui iuris*.[487] There are other terms that are

[482] We may compare the use of *heus tu* 'normally only with people with which one is on familiar terms, or with inferiors or disreputable characters' (Ferri (2009) 20). Cf. the role in other languages of swearing in reinforcing and construction social bonds, on which see Stapleton (2010) 296-300. The fact that this abruptness may be accompanied by more intimate language, as the use of pronouns may suggest, is not a problem. We may detect a blend of intimacy and abruptness in Cicero's use of the legal idiom *mecum ut tibi illa traderem egisti* (Cic.*Top.*2, using a verb of course closely related to our *exegisti*; cf. Reinhardt (2003) *ad loc.*) to explain his writing of the *Topica* shortly after he has explained that he was motivated by *voluntas tua* (Cic.*Top.*1).
[483] More formally, this is a *captatio beneuolentiae*; cf. Sen.*Cl.*1.1.1-1.2.2. Van Hoof (2007) 62 takes a different approach: 'Seneca even allows himself to judge the importance of his dedicatee's request (*nec immerito*) before complying with it: he takes the reins and will hold them for the rest of the treatise.' However, Seneca's formulation of his judgement makes it appear more modest: we find *nec inmerito mihi uideris [...] pertimuisse*, not *nec inmerito pertimuisti*; this formulation is parallel to Fundanus' μοι δοκεῖ (Plu.457D) that van Hoof later (78) cites as an indication of modesty.
[484] *OLD* 8 and, esp., *TLL* 5.2.1456.67ff.
[485] Wycislo (2002) 194 with *OLD* 3c.
[486] Wycislo (2002) 48.
[487] Wycislo (2002) 48.

probably legal as well,[488] and those terms that are certainly legal may have brought out the possible legal nuances of more common words like *ratio*.[489] What is the effect of adopting this register? One interpretation would be that the text employed the register to represent anger as something opposed, in a technical sense, to the rule of law, something likely to resonate with any Roman,[490] but with a special resonance for Nouatus given that he was what we would now call an administrator. However, technical registers are often used to make jokes[491] and the presence immediately beforehand of another joke suggests that this is what is happening here. Seneca is mimicking his brother's 'professional' register, and this gentle 'banter' advertises his closeness to his brother.

§3.3.1.2: THE *EXORDIUM* AS AN ARGUMENT BASED ON ONE'S INSTINCT OF WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN

I now turn to the *exordium* as a whole and suggest that the persuasive power of the text relies on its evocation, through a particular emotion (*fastidium*), of a sense that anger is somehow beyond the boundaries of what it means to be a human being.

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[488] With *aequi uerique*, cf. (perhaps) the jurist Celsus' definition of *ius* as *ars boni et aequi* (Cels.*dig.*1.1.1). *Inhabilis* occurs most commonly in Justinian (jointly with Seneca).

[489] Cf. Wycislo (2002) 48. This is perhaps assisted by the number of rare prosaic words that may have afforded a terse tone, such as *necessitudo* (all 310 uses occur in prose texts, despite its meaning inviting its use in poetry), *dispectus* (a rare word restricted to the prose of Pliny the Elder and Seneca the Younger) and *inhabilis* (a rare word restricted to, especially fairly technical, prose).

[490] *Pace* Wycislo (2002) 49: 'a set of ideal criteria of little significance unless for someone entrusted with judicial authority'. Roman citizens were ideally conceived as subject to the rule of law and Roman judges were generally lay people rather than professional lawyers. The legal nuances may encourage all readers to see the angry as little different to those deemed legally insane; such people were treated as legally incapable (cf. du Plessis (2010) 144-145), and for the angry to be like these people reinforces the notion that the angry lack self-control.

[491] Agha (2004) 29-30. Latin comparisons may be found in the legal references in Cicero's *Topica* (Reinhardt (2003) 181) and his letters to Trebatius (Fraenkel (1957) 68; Hutchinson (1998) 180), and in Seneca's own use of language connected to his addressee's work in the *De breuitate uitae* (Motto and Clark (1994) 162-164).

The *exordium* is cast as an explanation of why *ira* has been regarded as a *breuis insania* (although it soon becomes an explanation of why it *is* a *breuis insania*). It relies on a method of argumentation, inference from empirical observations, that is common in non-philosophical contexts[492] and was a legitimate method in Stoic epistemology.[493] The passage is also seemingly logically organised:

1.1.2:	shared characteristics of *ira* and *insania* indicate that *ira* is a *breuis insania*
1.1.3-1.1.4:	the angry and the insane have similar physical appearances, which suggests that the angry are insane
1.1.5-1.2.3a:	anger is the worst emotion, both in terms of its physical effects on those who experience it (1.1.5-1.1.7, showing that it is the hardest emotion to conceal) and in its destruction of human lives and communities (1.2.1-1.2.3a[494]). This indicates that anger is a *breuis insania* because at 1.1.2, the use of *itaque* has made the analysis of anger as a *breuis insania* a consequence of its being the worst emotion

However, despite this apparently[495] logically rigorous substructure, this passage does not *seem* very logical. This is partly because Seneca does not seem concerned to make clear the logical steps his argument requires: at 1.1.7, the conclusion drawn is about the ugliness

[492] Cf. *OLD* s.v. *indicium* 4.
[493] See Allen (2001) esp. 147-193 and Hankinson (2003) 306-309.
[494] This is certainly true for 1.2.1-1.2.3. Owing to textual problem, we cannot be certain that 1.2.3a argues for this as well, but its theme, that anger makes what is best turn into what is worst, dovetails with the concerns of 1.2.1-1.2.3 and its combination of both familial and civic problems aptly summarises the concerns that are articulated in 1.2.1-1.2.3.
[495] I do not claim that Seneca's argument is logically valid from a Stoic perspective. The fact that animals cannot become angry indicates that not all stages of the argument are acceptable. If the argument is valid in parts (and it is hard to tell because of the poor state of the evidence for the Stoic criteria for such arguments being valid), it meets the criteria for weaker inferential relationships rather than those for the superior method of inference from 'tokens', where there is a 'genuinely connective relation between the token and that of which it is a token' (Allen (2001) 186; see 184-188). This is both because of the vagueness of the descriptions (potentially applicable to more than one emotion) and because of the stringent demands placed by Stoic writers on the knowledge of relationships and causes required to be able to assert that something is a token (on which, see Allen (2001) 155).

and hatefulness of anger, not about its being the worst emotion, and, unless it occurs belatedly in a section that has been lost, we are not reminded at 1.1.5-1.2.3a of the crucial link between anger being the worst emotion and its being a *breuis insania*. Rather, Seneca seems more interested in urging his readers to visualise rather than to analyse what he describes. He instructs them:

> *ut scias autem non esse sanos quos ira possedit, ipsum illorum habitum intuere* (1.1.3)

The postponement of *intuere* is striking[496] and focuses attention on the directive which, although it may involve intellectual engagement,[497] urges especially careful, or at least prolonged, *visual* examination,[498] an implication emphasised by the intensification of *habitum*[499] by *ipsum*. The text's appeal to its readers to 'see' what is described is repeated insistently in the remainder of the sketch: *uides* (1.1.5), *intueri*, *uidebis* (1.2.1), *aspice, aspice, aspice* (1.2.2), *aspicere* (1.2.3).

In ancient terms, the text advertises itself as ἐνάργεια: that is, it claims to make readers feel that they are actually experiencing or observing the situations, events or people described.[500] To those modern readers who do not have 'visual brains',[501] it may seem

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[496] For the extreme rareness of imperatives, other than future imperatives, in final position in the sentence, see Spevak (2010) ch.5 esp. 221.

[497] The Stoic conception of what was a perceptible feature differs from our own: they did not understand 'seeing' appearances in the same way that we do, and they considered the way in which we do 'see' appearances to be very similar to the way in which we recognise (e.g.) virtue.

[498] The verb used is that used in Quintilian's rhetorical question at Quint.*Inst.*8.3.64 asking whether anyone is so unimaginative that he does not, on reading a particularly 'vivid' passage from *In Verrem,* see (*intueri*) the scene described.

[499] *Habitus* here refers to physical appearances quite generally (*OLD* 1a, 2, 3, 5); Kaster (2010)'s rendering as 'demeanour' (*OLD* 2) would make the argument indistinct from that in 1.1.2, which is inconsistent with the function of *autem*, signalling a text segment which is distinct from but nonetheless parallel to the segment which precedes it (Kroon (1995) ch.10 esp. 269-277).

[500] We might distinguish this from the evocation of a mental image that accurately matches the image that the text's author imagines or views.

[501] Many claim never to experience 'vividness' of this sort (see (e.g.) Small (1997) 130-131 on the research of Michael Denis; and Webb (2009) 24n.33). However, we should be wary of understating the extent to

fanciful to assume that the Romans genuinely reacted in this way, but ancient theorists and authors alike seem to have been confident that this effect was commonplace[502] and neurohistorians are able to explain why reading would have evoked much more powerfully engaged responses than those which it generally evokes today.[503] And if we accept that ἐνάργεια could genuinely be achieved, this passage is, I suggest, one that would have achieved it.

It requires little argument that this is true for the description of the appearance of the angry at 1.1.4, where the accumulation of specific details matches our intuitions of what makes a passage 'vivid' and fulfils Quintilian's prescription that ἐνάργεια may be achieved by describing a scene through a number of specific details (*ex pluribus*).[504] It is less obviously true that some of the vaguer and briefer descriptions of the effects of *ira* at 1.2.1-1.2.3a provide ἐνάργεια: here, Seneca uses phrases like *totarum exitia gentium* or *ingentia spatia regionum hostili flamma relucentia* (1.2.1) that seem comparable to the phrase, 'The city has been stormed', that Quintilian gives as an example of a description that does *not* achieve ἐνάργεια.[505] However, a recent study has shown that descriptions of faces where the image is not built up piece-by-piece but perceived holistically, are more vivid (in our sense of the word) than those that rely on the accumulation of specific points

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which we generally experience it today. Reading words associated with strong smells or movement activates those parts of the brain related to smelling or movement (González et al. (2006); Boulenger et al. (2006)). Our emotional responses to art are generally similar in kind and intensity to those experienced in our daily lives (Oatley (1994)).

[502] See (e.g.) Tompkins (1980) on the evidence of Longinus and Quintilian; Luc.7.210-213; and Pers.1.19-21 (although, of course, satirical references are more problematic forms of evidence: is he parodying the extreme reactions of readers or is he mocking the extreme claims of authors and literary theorists (or both)?).

[503] The explanation relates to the body's tendency to become desensitised to 'autotropic devices' such as books (and coffee and tobacco) (Smail (2008) 187-189). As a result, we are, in twenty-first century Europe, less responsive to the power of literature than eighteenth-century Europeans were, when swooning and fainting after reading emotionally involving texts was (apparently) common (Melton (2001) 110-117).

[504] Quint.*Inst.*8.3.66. By 'specific' details, I do not mean necessarily *obviously relevant* details: the presence of 'attendant circumstances' was important too (cf. Demetr.*Eloc.*209-210).

[505] Quint.*Inst.*8.3.67.

of detail.[506] This suggests, counterintuitive though it may seem, that even a very brief and undetailed description may provide ἐνάργεια. Quintilian's claim may be common sense, then, but it may not be correct; and, indeed, Theon's *Progymnasmata*, which was probably written at around the same time as the *De ira*,[507] provides some evidence that it is not when it identifies a single line of the *Odyssey*[508] that very briefly describes someone, albeit by offering a few details, as bringing the subject vividly before the eyes.[509] Moreover, the idea that these brief phrases that place the burden of creating mental images on the reader's imagination may have created ἐνάργεια is consistent with Quintilian's own expectation that readers would use their imaginations to add their own details to a description.[510] And Seneca's text seems to exploit this means of demonstrating ἐνάργεια even in descriptions explicitly identified as *exempla*,[511] which we expect to be specific references but which Seneca often describes in ways that could refer to a number of different historical events.[512] Of course, by evoking several *exempla* under the guise of a specific exemplum,[513] the text invites the assumption that behind each of Seneca's numerous *exempla* potentially lie several historical events, which generates a sense of how many crimes *ira* has inspired. Nonetheless, it still urges us to visualise them all, and the lack of

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[506] Jajdelska et al. (2010). See esp. 439-446.
[507] See Webb (2009) 14, rejecting the arguments of Heath (2002/2003).
[508] Hom.*Od.*19.246.
[509] *Prog.*118.6.
[510] Quint.*Inst.*8.3.64-65. This might have involved the reader assimilating the description to details from other texts or stories with which they were familiar and which involved approximately similar scenarios. In this, it is somewhat similar to intertextuality but if the scene is a familiar one, the reader is not directed to a specific text or texts as (s)he is by intertextual allusions.
[511] *aspice tot memoriae proditos duces mali exempla fati…* (1.2.2).
[512] The leader killed in the forum could be Lucius Appuleius Saturninius (V.Max.9.7.4) or Asellius (App.*B.C.*1.54). The crucified leader could be Gavius (crucified by Verres: Cic.*Ver.*5.158-170), or Hannibal (by his own men; not Hannibal Barca: D.S.1.119, D.S.3.69), or Hermias (by Darius III, according to some accounts: Did.*in D.*col.5, 19-20) (even Jesus has been suggested: Herrmann (1970) 41-43).
[513] The rhetorical use of such a tension between generality and specificity characterises Seneca's use of *exempla* elsewhere: cf. Sen.*Ep.*76.20 with Conradie (2010) 55 and Sen.*Ag.*115-121 with Tarrant (1976) *ad loc.* This should affect our understanding of what an *exemplum* is. Modern and ancient definitions of *exempla* tend to emphasise that *exempla* are *specific* references (cf. *Rhet.Her.*4.62; Habinek (1998) 46; Chaplin (2000) 3; Oppermann (2000) 19; van der Blom (2010) 68). However, Seneca's use of *exempla* suggests that an *exemplum* may imply a group of different possible historical and mythical figures and events 'lying behind it'. Allusions to *exempla*, then, may turn out to be more similar to intertextual allusions than has been recognised. Moreover, as with intertextual allusions, their power (in this case, their persuasive power) may be enhanced by our having been forced to identify the possible references ourselves.

specificity, as we have seen, may in fact have encouraged readers to respond to the events as if they were actually there.

I have argued so far, then, that the text advertises itself as achieving and does indeed achieve ἐνάργεια. Why does this matter? For ancient theorists, the function (or, at least, one effect) of such representation was to influence the emotions of the readers;[514] and their claim dovetails with modern theorising that if a reader responds to a description exactly as if he were present at the scene or events it describes, he will respond with the same intuitions that behavioural economists and psychologists insist form our primary response to particular situations.[515]

What precisely, though, would this emotional response be? In Stoic terms, it would clearly be pain (that is, the belief that something present is a bad thing), but I think we can be more precise and suggest (necessarily speculatively) that the text invites an (ideal) reader to feel an especially visceral aversion to the events it describes. We are told, for example, that the *habitus* of the angry is characterised, for example, by the *articulorum se ipsos torquentium sonus* (1.1.4): this is a reference to the cracking of joints, a sound that many perform deliberately today but which many others find physically repellent. The unnecessary emphasis of *se* by *ipsos* brings out the unnaturalness of the action. Similarly, the *facies* of the angry is described as *foeda uisu et horrenda […] deprauantium se atque intumescentium* (1.1.4): especially after the physical use of *horrent* of hair earlier (1.1.4), *horrenda* suggests that the man's appearance is so foul that it causes the viewer's entire body to shudder or to tremble.

[514] See (e.g.) Quint.*Inst.* 6.2.29 and Longin.15.2.
[515] Kahneman (2011).

Such an intense aversion is, in ancient terms, *fastidium*.[516] In modern terms, this is something like (the unusually culturally universal emotion[517]) disgust. Disgust-related emotions are often aroused by feelings of contamination, and the description of the angry as swelling (*intumescentes*) may evoke these feelings.[518] Such emotions are also often created by reminders of humans' connection to the animal world, and so may be aroused here also by the animalistic tone of the description of the angry.[519]

Such a visceral aversion would, I suggest, have been a natural response to Seneca's description of the effects of *ira* as well as to his descriptions of the angry, because the Romans also felt *fastidium* for what was especially ethically abhorrent[520] and Seneca here adds details and references that make the effects he describes particularly shocking for a Roman readership. For example, he refers to a *dux* killed *intra sacra mensae iura* (1.2.2). The phrase, although its precise meaning (or meanings[521]) is unclear, articulates the ethical and religious associations of meal-times as occasions connected both with *amicitia*[522] and with sacred rituals.[523] It thus encourages a particularly horrified response. Similarly, in 1.2.3a, *ira* is associated with the perversion of family relationships, turning *patres* into *inimici*, *filii* into *parricidae*[524] and *matres* into the conventionally villainous[525] *nouercae*:

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[516] For the analysis of *fastidium* on which I base this claim, see Kaster (2005) 104-112. I do not exclude the possibility that readers would have responded in other ways too, but I seek to use the textual clues to reconstruct the response of the ideal reader by identifying how the text directs the reader to respond.
[517] Nussbaum (2004) 97.
[518] *Intumescentium* has medical uses too (cf. Cels.5.26.1, Curt.6.11.17); Romans often felt *fastidium* at illnesses with obvious physical manifestations (cf. Ov.*Ars* 2.323-334).
[519] *Dentes comprimuntur* of the angry anticipates the image of the (quasi-)angry boars grinding their tusks (also *dentes*) (1.1.5); *mugitus* is much more commonly applied to animals than humans; *pulsata humus pedibus* is identical in syntactic structure and very similar in content to the description of (quasi-)angry bulls at 1.1.6 (*harena pulsu pedum spargitur*).
[520] Kaster (2005) 110-112.
[521] The meaning was probably contested and may have depending on the type of *cena*: see Dunbabin & Slater (2011) 438-440.
[522] See Gowers (1993) 25-26; Dunbabin & Slater (2011) 460-463.
[523] See Schmeling (2011) on Petr.60.8.
[524] The Romans found parricide more horrific than other forms of murder: see further Gaughan (2010) 84-88.
[525] See Noy (1991) and Watson (1995) esp. 92-222.

this represents a distortion of the affection that the Romans held naturally and rightly existed between family members.[526]

Such a visceral aversion could, in Roman terms, be directed at people, objects or situations that are not disgusting *per se* but disgusting because of their lower status[527] (this is the *fastidium* of the town mouse for the country mouse's way of life[528]) and, when it is directed at something that is disgusting *per se*, *fastidium* can involve a sense of superiority too.[529] However, there is nothing in the text here that evokes this hierarchical sort of *fastidium*. Habinek has argued that this section relies on encouraging socially elite readers to feel disdain for non-aristocratic characteristics of anger and the angry, but I cannot follow him in this: Seneca describes larger groups of people and family relationships as well as *duces*, and while much of what he describes could be seen from the viewpoint of an aristocrat – the destruction of peoples *could*, as Habinek argues, be taken to imply 'anger's potential to destroy order, dissolve boundaries, and trample on hierarchies'[530] – there is nothing in the text that leads us to read it in this way. Rather, the *fastidium* on which the *exordium* relies is that which rejects behaviour as non-human rather than that which rejects it as being appropriate to a subordinate form of human being.

The *exordium*, then, encourages it readers to shun anger and so it provides an 'opening gambit' to Seneca's case against *ira* that precedes the first arguments that are explicitly identified as such. The conclusion that anger should be shunned could also be reached by combining the conclusion of the text's argument that *ira* is a *breuis insania* with the (for a

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[526] See Treggiari (2005) 16-29.
[527] These two types of *fastidium* are distinguished by Kaster (2005) at 104-121.
[528] Hor.*S*.2.6.86-87.
[529] See Kaster (2005) 121-129.
[530] Habinek (1998) 142.

Roman, unobjectionable) premise that one should shun *insania*.[531] However, as we have seen, the section's persuasive power relies on the evocation of a particular emotion, *fastidium*,[532] that is related to what it means to be a human being rather than one that might be more rooted in social hierarchies.

§3.3.1.3: SENECA'S NON-AUTHORITARIAN STANCE

Shortly following in the text as it survives is 1.3.2, where Seneca imagines and responds to a potential counterargument to his definition of *ira*:

> *'ut scias' inquit 'non esse iram poenae cupiditatem, infirmissimi saepe potentissimis irascuntur nec poenam concupiscunt quam non sperant.' primum diximus cupiditatem esse poenae exigendae, non facultatem; concupiscunt autem homines et quae non possunt. deinde nemo tam humilis est qui poenam uel summi hominis sperare non possit: ad nocendum <omnes> potentes sumus.*

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[531] The *exordium*'s primary function appears to be as a 'sketch' of *ira*: that is, an account that introduces a concept by offering a simplified definition of it that might serve as the basis for an enquiry into a genuine definition of the concept (on the term, see Crivelli (2010) 394-396). However, it seems unlikely that this is its primary function given that the notion of *insania* does not appear in Seneca's definition of *ira* at 1.2.3b.

[532] The argumentative function that *fastidium* has is perhaps more complicated than this analysis suggests. Disgust-related emotional responses to people/objects often generate disgust-related responses to other people/objects with which those people/objects are associated (Rozin et al. (1986)). For example, the Nazis generated disgust towards the Jews by comparing them to maggots (Nussbaum (2010) 15-17). Such 'projective disgust' may be generated by the text against the insane. Despite Seneca's insistence that the insane man is identical in appearance to the angry man, the description of him seems far less frightful and, indeed, many aspects of his appearance even allow positive interpretations (*audax uultus: audax* is an ambiguous term; *tristis frons:* seen as appropriate for the old by a Chorus at Sen.*Phaed.*453; *torua facies:* approved of by a Chorus at Sen.*Phaed.*798 and fitting later, positive statues of Caracalla; *citatus gradus*: a sign of *constantia* for Cicero at Cic.*Off.*1.131 (see further Dyck (1996) *ad loc.*)). If association with the angry, who (as described by Seneca) do evoke disgust, is used to make the insane seem disgusting too (through projective disgust), the reason for this may be that the insane look like what we expect most of those actually experiencing outbursts of anger to look like (whereas the angry do not: Seneca's description of them is clearly exaggerated). Thus, an 'ideal' reader would feel projective disgust towards those experiencing emotions, including anger, which manifest themselves simply by a *citatus gradus* or *inquietae manus*; and so find both the extreme outbursts of anger whose effect on one's appearance Seneca describes here and also low-level anger disgusting.

What I wish to argue now is that Seneca's response to the counter-argument is one that seems to be non-authoritarian because, while directing its readers' final responses, it does not seem to dictate *exactly* how they reach those responses.

The basic form of the imaginary interlocutor's objection is:

Premise 1. The weak can be angry at the strong.

Premise 2. The weak do not desire to punish the strong.

Therefore:

Conclusion. *Cupiditas* is not necessary for *ira*.

Premise 1 is implicit in Seneca's appeal to empirical evidence: *infirmissimi saepe potentissimis irascuntur*.

Premise 2, articulated in *nec poenam concupiscunt*, is itself a consequence of:

Premise (i). The weak do not expect[533] to punish the strong (which must be the *poenam* […] *quam non sperant*).

Premise (ii). To expect something is necessary to desire that thing (implicit rather than explicitly expressed[534]).

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[533] The counterargument reveals that what is at stake is the ability to take revenge, so *sperare* must mean 'expect' (for which sense, cf. Verg.*A*.4.292, Verg.*A*.4.419, Verg.*A*.11.275) rather than 'hope for (= desire)'. Moreover, if it meant 'hope for (= desire)', the contrast made between *concupiscere* and *sperare* would have little argumentative force (as it would serve only to make the claim that you must want something in order to want it a lot).

In his first counterargument (*primum diximus...non possunt*), Seneca distinguishes *cupiditas* from *facultas* and then (*autem*[535]) explains that people do desire what they cannot have or achieve: Seneca claims, in other words, that the implied premise (ii) is untrue, and with no argument other than that it is not what happens. The interlocutor's formulation *nec poenam concupiscunt quam non sperant* is echoed and contradicted by Seneca's response *concupiscunt autem homines et quae non possunt*: *nec concupiscunt* becomes *concupiscunt*. The interlocutor's *poenam quam* becomes *et quae*, which simply generalises his claim. The shift from *non sperant* to *non possunt* is striking. There are two possible interpretations of Seneca's reasons. Firstly, Seneca is claiming that people do desire things that are far less likely to be achieved than a *poenam quam non sperant*: the sense would be something like 'We can desire not only what we don't *expect* but things that *are impossible*' (and, the implication would have to be, 'that people know are impossible').[536] The use of *et* ('even') supports this interpretation. Secondly (and perhaps additionally), Seneca might be trying to imply (without grounds) that his interlocutor is guilty of muddled thinking. *Sperare*, used by the interlocutor to mean 'expect', most commonly carries connotations of desiring: Seneca's change might be defended as a clarification of what is meant, but he has just made precisely that clarification with *primum diximus cupiditatem esse poenae exigendae, non facultatem.* It is hard to avoid the impression that the interlocutor has failed to make an appropriate distinction.

[534] *Sperant* is indicative rather than subjunctive, suggesting that *quam non sperant* is not a causal relative clause explaining why the *poena* (i.e. of the strong) is not desired.
[535] *Autem*'s basic discourse function is signposting that a section of text is discrete from its preceding context (Kroon (1995) 226-227). Here, this is in introducing a new stage in the argument (for which function, cf. Cic.*Top*.53, Sen.*Ep*.4.6).
[536] For Seneca's omission of the focaliser of these words, cf. the shortly preceding *sed tantum irascuntur* (1.2.5) and *sine causa et sine iniuria* (1.2.5), discussed at §2.4.2.5.

Seneca's second counterargument (*deinde nemo… potentes sumus*) argues for the position that the weak can expect to punish the strong. This appears to be intended to function as a counterargument to premise (i), 'The weak do not expect to punish the strong'. Strictly speaking, it must be acknowledged, his argument does not rebut premise (i) but we are presumably meant to combine Seneca's argument in favour of the position that 'The weak can expect to punish the strong' with the implicit assumption that if a group of people can do something (that they consider to be a good thing), then some at least would do that thing. It may be that Seneca thought this more convincing than the appeal to empirical evidence required to assert directly that 'The weak do expect to punish the strong.'

Seneca's argument for the position that the weak can expect to punish the strong may be understood in two ways.

On interpretation (A), if *sperare* means 'expect', as it did in the interlocutor's words, Seneca asserts that nobody is so lowly that he cannot expect to punish even a powerful man[537] and then claims, as an explanation, that we are all powerful to harm.[538] This is not argued for directly, but it is a consequence of Seneca's claim in 1.3.1 that a desire to harm is sufficient to commit harm and his claim earlier in 1.3.2 that we can all desire to commit harm (because we can all desire everything, even what we cannot attain).

[537] *Humilis* and *summi* refer to political, social or economic status rather than to physical capability, a subtle shift of emphasis from that of *infirmissi / potentissimis*, which refer to physical capability as well as to political or economic power: note, in particular, Hellegouarc'h (1963) 231 on *summus*: 'On ne le trouve ordinairement appliqué qu'aux personnages les plus éminents de l'histoire romaine'. Perhaps Seneca thought that the idea of a politically weak individual overcoming a politically strong one is instinctively easier to grasp than that of a physically weak individual overcoming a physically strong one. (At the same time, the shift may articulate the relevance of this discussion to the real-life Roman social and political context, as well as providing *uariatio*.)

[538] Whether or not we accept Viansino's *omnes* makes no difference to this. Without *omnes*, the sentence means 'We (i.e. those of us who are *humiles*) are powerful to harm' but it in fact implies that we all are powerful to harm (if even those of us who are lowly can harm, then all humans can): Viansino's clarification brings out this implication explicitly while muting the implication of Seneca's claim that he is *humilis*.

On interpretation (B), *sperare* might be taken to mean ('hope for' in the sense of) 'desire', especially given Seneca's (possibly deliberate) conflation of the two notions. We have just heard that men desire what they cannot have. Therefore, even weak men can desire to punish the strong. Therefore, assuming, as Seneca explained at 1.3.1, that a desire to commit harm is sufficient to commit harm, we can all harm even the strong.

On interpretation (A), *ad nocendum <omnes> potentes sumus* explains *nemo tam humilis est qui poenam uel summi hominis sperare non possit*, whereas on interpretation (B) it is explained by it. The lack of a connective introducing *ad nocendum <omnes> potentes sumus* means that we are not guided to take a particular interpretation.

On interpretation (A), what I call my second counterargument, introduced by *deinde*, is indeed a separate counterargument. On interpretation (B), though, *deinde* introduces the next stage of the preceding argument, what I call my first counterargument. Readers, therefore, might have understood one argument, running from *primum diximus* to *potentes sumus*, or two arguments, the first running from *primum diximus* to *non possunt* and the second running from *primum diximus* to *potentes sumus*.

In this section as a whole, then, what Seneca is arguing is clear and many of the premises that he accepts are also clear. But the logical relationships that relate different premises to each other and to the conclusion are obscure and can be interpreted in different ways: we are not guided to accept one rather than the other. Rather, Seneca leaves it up to us to decide how to construe his argument: we are in the driving seat, not him – or, at least, he gives us the impression that we are.

§3.3.1.4: SENECA AS A PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHER

Another effect of Seneca's refusal to formulate his argument in logical terms is to construct himself as a philosopher whose concerns are practical rather than theoretical:[539] Seneca does not avoid theoretical matters, of course, but it is their practical applications that he emphasises, as, for example, his explanation of the physical underpinnings of anger at 2.19.1-2.20.2 is structured so as to allow it to form the basis for practical advice. This can, I think, be seen as a component of his self-presentation as a non-hierarchical philosopher: by emphasising that his interests are not purely theoretical, he defines himself in opposition to those who operate at a distance from real-life, issuing irrelevant philosophical 'edicts' to others from their 'ivory towers'.

In 1.4.2-3, after Seneca has discussed various definitions of *ira* and explained the difference between *ira* and *iracundia*, the text advertises how many forms of *ira* there are using a *praeteritio* justified by an appeal to the poverty of the Latin lexicon, a topos famously employed by Lucretius:[540]

> *cetera quae pluribus apud Graecos nominibus in species iram distinguunt, quia apud nos uocabula sua non habent, praeteribo, etiam si amarum nos acerbumque dicimus, nec minus stomachosum rabiosum clamosum difficilem asperum, quae omnia irarum differentiae sunt; inter hos morosum ponas licet, delicatum iracundiae genus. quaedam enim sunt irae quae intra clamorem considant, quaedam non minus pertinaces quam frequentes, quaedam saeuae manu uerbis parciores, quaedam in uerborum maledictorumque amaritudinem effusae;*

[539] Cf. Barnes (1997)'s analysis (at 12-23) of Seneca as a 'logical utilitarian', i.e. one who saw logic as neither wholly useful nor wholly useless but as useful if used in particular ways for particular (useful) ends.
[540] Lucr.1.136-139, Lucr.1.830-833, Lucr.3.258-261; for further examples and discussion, see Farrell (2001) 28-39 and Fögen (2000).

quaedam ultra querellas et auersationes non exeunt, quaedam altae grauesque sunt et introrsus uersae: mille aliae species sunt mali multiplicis.

Although the Romans did have a smaller lexicon for words referring to anger and its types than the Greeks,[541] it is not convincing that Seneca could not have listed the types of *ira* if he wished to do so, just as Cicero did briefly at Cic.*Tusc.*4.21 (= *SVF* 3.398),[542] even if this required coining new words (as Cicero often did). The reason for not doing so is, perhaps, that the precise divisions that often accompanied the Stoics' definitions[543] and might have been expected at this point appear to have been regarded as unconnected with practical advice;[544] and should be connected with the Stoic reputation for hair-splitting.[545]

Of course, Seneca could have tried to combat this stereotype by dividing *ira* into *species* that were pedagogically useful.[546] Why did he not do this? Presumably because this would have involved making only a few distinctions: some types of *ira* are to be treated differently from others (cf. 3.40), but Seneca, for the most part, prescribes them all the same cure in addition to the same diagnosis. There would only be a few *species* of *ira*, then, and Seneca seems keen to emphasise how many different sorts of activity count as instances of *ira*.[547]

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[541] Harris (2001) 50-70.
[542] Drawing on Greek sources: see further Graver (2002) *ad loc.*
[543] See further Crivelli (2010) 390-391.
[544] Cf. Cic.*Tusc.*4.9.
[545] Cf. Cic.*Fin.*4.5-6.
[546] I use the term *species* loosely, as Seneca does here (his ethical theorising here being popular rather than formal): *ira* cannot be analysed further down, even if it can manifest itself in different ways that Latin has terms for.
[547] This seems to be one point of the list of Latin terms describing *ira* and of the sentence starting *quaedam enim*, and it has an important pedagogic function. So far, the *De ira* may have given the impression that true *ira* occurs quite rarely: *ira* is what causes murder and the destruction of cities (1.2.1), not what ordinary people experience when they think they are empassioned at the gladiatorial games (1.2.4-5). Seneca would not wish to make his account of *ira* seem inapplicable to everyday life: even if his text is to be understood as having a particular resonance or relevance for certain classes, he sees it as applying to everyday situations as mundane as reading books with small print (2.26.2). Seneca's description of the various types of *ira*, some

So, instead of demonstrating the value of Stoic division, Seneca used the excuse of the poverty of the Latin lexicon[548] to avoid listing the *species* of *ira*. This has an important consequence. If the Latin lexicon's poverty forces Seneca to pass over what might be an expected part of his treatise and was associated with irrelevant hair-splitting, the Latin lexicon's poverty may make Latin a more effective vehicle than Greek for the exposition of practical philosophy because it forces one to philosophise in a particular, and a particularly useful, way.[549] That said, Seneca's list of Latin terms for types of anger somewhat undermines his observation that the *species* do not have their own Latin labels. Strictly, it does not problematise either the claim that the Greeks have more terms for types of anger (*pluribus apud Graecos nominibus*) or the implication that the Greek lexicon is more precisely technical. Nonetheless, Seneca demonstrates that the Latin language has the capacity to describe many types of *ira*. On one level, this might be understood as a claim about the Latin language – by advertising Latin's suitability for philosophical discourse, Seneca seems to tread a careful line between, on the one hand, boasting of the advantages that Latin's lexical poverty brings and, on the other hand, denying the complete lexical poverty[550] that might be misinterpreted as a disadvantage. On the other hand, it also characterises Seneca: while Seneca's appeal to be governed by the limitations of the Latin language places him in a good tradition of Roman authors and evokes the *Romanitas* of his project, it is clearly not the Latin language that is stopping Seneca from hair-

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not expressed violently, anticipates this potential complaint and asserts the applicability of this therapeutic text to everyday life.

[548] The claim of linguistic poverty is, of course, always a strategy rather than a genuine obstacle.

[549] For a similar argument concerning Lucretius' use of the 'poverty topos', see Farrell (2001) 39-51.

[550] It may be that we are not meant to see even Greek as having an absolute ability to describe particular forms of emotions. *Mille* at 1.4.3 is used vaguely to describe a great number (*OLD* 1b). In this sense, it is often hyperbolic. It may hint that there are so many types of *ira* that even the Greek lexicon would not be able to describe them all: if this is so, is the implication that, while the perceived poverty of the Latin language gives it an advantage over the Greek, the actual poverty of the Greek language means that it does not have the advantage it is claimed to have over the Latin language?

splitting: it is Seneca.[551] By avoiding hair-splitting in this way, Seneca distances himself from more hierarchical forms of philosophical teaching.

§3.3.1.5: RESPONSE TO COUNTERARGUMENTS

We have seen, then, that the opening of the *De ira* advertises Seneca as a 'gentle' teacher, who is non-hierarchical in that he *neither* establishes a sense of authority over Nouatus *nor* relies on or constructs social or political 'pecking orders'. The obvious objection to this account is that Seneca clearly does construct an 'in-group' that is (ethically) superior to outsiders. If, Seneca says, you join me in rejecting anger, you will be a morally better human being than those who think that anger is (or, at least, can be) a good thing. I do not think that this is a significant problem for my position because any argument in favour of a particular position that rejects the opposite position as incorrect cannot help but establish a hierarchy of this sort. What would be a problem, however would be if this morally superior 'in-group' were conflated with or set up as a substitute for another socially or politically-constructed 'in-group'. In this section, I would like to argue that the hierarchy that Seneca inevitably establishes – that those who agree with him are ethically superior to those who do not – does not build upon or exploit a reader's sense of aristocratic or national identity.

§3.3.1.5.1: ARISTOCRATIC EXCLUSIVENESS?

I begin by responding to the possibility that the *De ira* relies upon social elitism for its full persuasive effect. Roller has argued, in a study treating Senecan prose in general but

[551] If avoiding hair-splitting is what good Romans do, Seneca is more Roman than the Latin language.

referring to the *De ira* in particular, that, in Seneca's world view, philosophy allows the elites to maintain their exclusive status in a world where it is threatened by the prospect of (literal or metaphorical) violence from the emperor and the increased power of imperial freedmen. It is able to do this because the new 'aristocracy of virtue' requires:

(i) the acceptance of particular forms of behaviour and of thought which dovetail closely with those behaviours and attitudes that are 'aristocratic' in the traditional sense; and

(ii) having the sort of education generally only open to the upper classes.

Thus, although the 'aristocracy of virtue' is in theory open to all, in practical terms it is open only to the existing elites.[552]

However, neither of these seems to me to be important aspects of the sort of behaviour Seneca seems to seek in the *De ira*.

Roller's argument in favour of (i) builds on Habinek's analysis of Senecan prose; I have already discussed the arguments from the *De ira* that Habinek advances and provided my own alternative analysis of the passages on which he focuses (§3.3.1.2). The concerns I have about Roller's additional points are similar to those I raised in connection with Habinek's arguments: Roller sees the rejection of anger as linked with 'crucial aristocratic patterns of thought and action',[553] but these dispositions and behaviour traits – a sense of shame, respecting one's duties, self-control and so on – do not seem to me to be characteristically noble.[554] Roller points out that Seneca, at 2.15.1-2.16.2, 'denies that

[552] Roller (2001) 272-286.
[553] Roller (2001) 280.
[554] What it meant to be a *bonus* was socially constructed in Rome and was not something that was generally considered to belong 'naturally' or 'inherently' to an aristocratic elite. *Bonus* was originally associated with material wealth (lexicographically, it was equivalent to *locuples*), but this meaning had fallen out of use by Seneca's time. Kronenberg observes that 'many scholars have noted an especial tendency for traditional

anger has anything noble (*generosus*) in it',[555] but in fact, while Seneca's interlocutor associates anger and nobility, Seneca refuses to engage with the debate on those terms, talking instead about whether anger contributes to bravery: this should be linked to Seneca's reduction of the objection 'Does anger add to greatness of spirit?' to the question 'Does anger make you a morally better person?' (1.20.1-9). Seneca, in other words, rejects association with nobility as a criterion for judging the value of an action. Roller's most plausible argument, to my mind, is his observation that the imagery Seneca uses at 3.25.3 of the man who rejects anger as able to look down from above onto those who provoke him (for example, at 3.25.3):[556] this clearly fits with the notion that aristocrats had a higher social status than others. However, the effect of this imagery does not rely upon its conjuring up ideas of high social status.[557] In sum, I do not think that there is good reason to think that the ideal reader would have linked the rejection of anger to characteristically aristocratic patterns of behaviour and thought.

Roller's argument in favour of (ii) is derived from Seneca's position, articulated especially in the *Epistles*, that acquiring philosophical wisdom requires philosophical study rather than the study of skills that will provide a ready income,[558] combined with the assumption that non-elites would not be able to afford the sort of education required to acquire wisdom. Yet it does not seem to me that this latter claim, though one that must have been true (at least to some extent), is one that Seneca seeks to emphasise; certainly, it is one over which he has no control and which does not feature in the *De ira*.

Greek and Roman morality to be guided more by external, communally determined standards of behavior, than by intrinsic concepts of right and wrong' (Kronenberg (2009) 26).

[555] Roller (2001) 280.

[556] Cited by Roller at (2001) 280.

[557] Cf. Costa (1995) 111 on the image of the mind soaring to the *cosmos* in the preface of the *Natural Questions*: 'This is another familiar Senecan picture, and it reflects at least partly the Stoic theory that the soul or mind (*animus* can be translated by either English word according to context) of each human being derives from the cosmic *pneuma*, which informs the universe, and seeks instinctively to return to it.'

[558] See (e.g.) Sen.*Ep.*88.1-2.

§3.3.1.5.2: *ROMANITAS*?

The *De ira*'s construction of a non-hierarchical didactic *persona* may also seem to be in tension with its denunciation of anger as non-Roman, because this position seems to rely on a view of the superiority of being Roman. I argue now, without pretending to give a full account of how Roman identity functions in the *De ira*, that this is not a problem for my account because of the way that text conflates (or attempts to conflate) 'true' Roman nature and 'true' human nature.

Anger is presented as something opposed to *Romanitas* (to use an anachronistic term[559]): its rejection is made to be characteristic of former generations of Romans who have enjoyed military success (1.11.4-7) and anger is associated above all with barbarians living in the cold north (2.15.5). To construct anger as opposed to Roman nature (a version of the (fairly common) association between irascibility and barbarians[560]), of course, harnesses readers' instinctive support of what is associated with their national identity.[561]

What is striking, though, is the way that Seneca conflates 'being a good Roman' with 'being a good human'. For example, Seneca insists that it is important to treat all people as if they were members of one's own community:

> *nefas est nocere patriae; ergo ciui quoque, nam hic pars patriae est – sanctae partes sunt, si uniuersum uenerabile est; ergo et homini, nam hic in maiore tibi urbe ciuis est. quid si nocere uelint manus pedibus, manibus oculi? ut omnia inter se membra consentiunt quia singula seruari totius interest, ita homines singulis*

[559] Apparently first attested at Tert.*Pall*.4.
[560] See Harris (2001) 222 with references at 222n.90.
[561] On the influence of identity in arguments, see Berreby (2006).

parcent quia ad coetum geniti sunt, salua autem esse societas nisi custodia et amore partium non potest. (2.31.7)

The moral requirement to avoid harming other human beings is presented as a logical consequence – *ergo, nam, ergo, nam* - of the impulse to protect one's own fatherland that, though common to many other nations, forms an essential part of Roman identity (even if who is a *ciuis* or what is harm may be contested in particular instances); and it is a definition framed in the language – *patria, ciuis,* perhaps even *urbs*[562] – of Roman political life.

Not long after this passage, in which an awareness of one's shared humanity is made to seem like a Roman thing to have, and shortly after a description of Priam as the *Romanus pater* suppressing his anger (2.33.6), Seneca declares that such an approach also has benefits for Roman *imperium*:

quos populus Romanus fideliores habet socios quam quos habuit pertinacissimos hostes? quod hodie esset imperium, nisi salubris prouidentia uictos permiscuisset uictoribus? (2.34.4)[563]

The parallelism between *fideliores [...] socios* and *pertinacissimos hostes* (in word order as in syntax) and the intimate connection made by the almost sexual verb *permisceo*[564] between the *uicti* and the *uictores* stress the importance of this relationship.

Yet it is precisely the mingling of peoples that results from the Roman impulse for friendship that has resulted in moral decline. *Ira*, we are told, is an immigrant vice. Seneca, as he moves from describing foreign to Roman instances of *ira*, exclaims:

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[562] The parallel between *urbs* and *cosmos* is, of course, well-established. Cf. also the use of *res publica* at 1.6.4.

[563] Cf. Claudius' appeal for the enlargement of the Senate at Tac.*Ann.*11.24 (responding to opposing views).

[564] It is an intensified form of *misceo*, for the sexual connotations of which see *OLD* 4c.

utinam ista saeuitia intra peregrina exempla mansisset nec in Romanos mores cum aliis aduenticiis uitiis etiam suppliciorum irarumque barbaria transisset! (3.18.1)

Ironically, the growth of *ira* as a result of the mingling of nations now seems to threaten the very *imperium* that the mingling of nations preserved: after citing the Cimbri and Teutoni as examples of hardy folk undone by anger, he continues:

necesse erit certe nobis mores Romanos repetere. quo alio Fabius adfectas imperii uires recreauit quam quod cunctari et trahere et morari sciit, quae omnia irati nesciunt? perierat imperium, quod tunc in extremo stabat, si Fabius tantum ausus esset quantum ira suadebat (1.11.4-5)

Seneca does not set out the reasons for this decline, but it is not difficult to reconstruct from the *De ira* a plausible narrative to explain it: contact with other races is a good thing, necessary for the promotion of *imperium*. However, some races are more irascible than others because they contain more heat;[565] and contact with angry people makes one angry oneself.[566] *Romanitas*, then, requires contact with irascible races, which makes the Romans more irascible, which is a betrayal of their *Romanitas*.[567]

What is important for our purposes, though, is that Seneca does see *ira* as in opposition with what it means to be Roman but, in tandem with this, drives a redefinition of what it means to be Roman that equates it with what it means to be (truly) human.

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[565] 2.19.1-2; cf., on the Germans, 3.26.3 with 2.19.5.

[566] 3.2.2; 3.8.1.

[567] This is not the account of the reasons for the Romans' moral decline that we might have accepted: the arrival of luxury from the East was usually seen as the trigger (cf. Sal.*Cat.*11.5-6; Liv.34.2.1-2, 39.6.7; etc.), and Seneca does indeed associate luxury with irascibility (at (e.g.) 2.25.3). Nowhere, however, despite opportunities to do so, such as when he refers to the other 'immigrant vices' that, like anger, came to Rome from overseas (3.18.1), does Seneca see other races as particularly prone to anger. It may be that Seneca was trying not to associate luxury and anger too closely, in case he implied a causal link between them when he saw that not all races had luxury even though all had anger and when he believed that eliminating luxury was not sufficient for eliminating anger. Or it may be that an explanation in purely physical terms made other races seem somehow less to blame for their vices and, therefore, the notion of a shared humanity more appetising.

§3.3.2: SENECA'S HARSHNESS

The account that I have given of Seneca's gentle, non-authoritarian approach is true for much, though not all, of the *De ira*. There are moments when Seneca is sternly admonitory and almost confrontational. We may cite, for example:

> *respondisse tibi seruum indignaris libertumque et uxorem et clientem; deinde idem de re publica libertatem sublatam quereris quam domi sustulisti. rursus, si tacuit interrogatus, contumaciam uocas. et loquatur et taceat et rideat!* (3.35.1-2)

The unnecessary explanation contained in *quam domi sustulisti* triumphantly picks up *sublatam* to expose the second person addressee's hypocrisy; the bitingly sarcastic injunction *et loquatur et taceat et rideat!* unfairly misrepresents the addressee's presumable complaints (that the individuals do not behave in the way that is appropriate at the time) to make their position seem absurd.

However, this 'tone that inclines toward sarcasm or hectoring',[568] as Kaster describes it, does not seem to me to be characteristic of Seneca's style in general but, rather, to surface only occasionally.[569] The judgement of whether particular passages are abrupt or not is, of course, subjective and it would take too long to go through every occasion when the text *might* be interpreted as being rude to justify why I do not think it a likely interpretation, but I shall briefly look at what seem to me to be the two major contenders that I reject. The first is Seneca's response to the interlocutor's surprise that, on Seneca's line of argument, a good man is not angered at the sight of his being killed or his mother being

[568] Kaster (2010) 13.
[569] Kaster (2010) 13 sees this tone as one of 'the forceful gestures that are the hallmarks of Seneca's homiletic style'. It is telling, however, that, although his list does not claim to be exhaustive, all his examples are from the later parts of Book 3.

raped. He replies by explaining that, although he is not angered, the good man will nonetheless defend them and by asking *quid autem times ne parum magnus illi stimulus etiam sine ira pietas sit?* (1.12.1). Here, however, the possible rudeness of implying that the interlocutor's beliefs commit him to thinking that he is not virtuous enough to protect his relatives without anger is lessened by the attribution of this inadequacy not to 'you' but to *illi*, referring to a hypothetical (or, at least, generic) *uir bonus*. The second is his exclamation that *his irasci quam stultum est, quae iram nostrum nec meruerunt nec sentiunt!* at 2.26.2. Here, the use of the first person plural in the preceding sentence indicates that Seneca has behaved in this way and so the harshness of Seneca's condemnation of others is mitigated.

On this basis, let us examine those moments when Seneca does, in my opinion, behave rudely.[570] These fall into two main groups.

The first group consists of those moments clearly directed at specific individuals other than Nouatus. Most of these involve Seneca cursing those who have committed wrongdoing and who are not addressees, such as the speaker of *oderint dum metuant*.[571] To see this as evidence of a harsh didactic persona is problematic, though, as it is most naturally understood as indignation at wickedness; indeed, to fail to show such an emotion would run the risk of seeming, to everyone but a Stoic *sapiens*, to show a lack of humanity (and showing such an emotion can be defended on the basis that one is only *feigning* the

[570] I argued in §3.3.1.1 that apparent abruptness was a sign of intimacy at 1.1.1, and it may be objected that the moments of rudeness I discuss here should be interpreted in the same way. However, the context of the passage discussed there contained reminders of Seneca's personal relationship with his addressee, such as naming him and the use of legal puns that humorously brought to mind his legal background, which allowed the rudeness to be interpreted charitably. The passages I discuss here lack such features. An increasing lack of specificity in characterising addressees is not unique to the *De ira*: see, for example, Williams (2012) 14 on *Natural Questions*, where the effect is different (leading us to lose sight of the 'importance' of Lucilius' work and to imply Seneca's distance from the political world as he acquires a 'view from above').
[571] 1.20.4; other examples are 3.14.3-3.14.4, 3.15.4.

emotion[572]). A similar account may be applied to the only other occasion of harshness that comes into this category: his treatment of Theophrastus at 1.12.3.[573] By the abrupt rejection of another philosopher's views in a book whose teaching is generally mild and gentle, Seneca may be seen to be protecting the interests of his students.

Secondly, there is a cluster of moments of rudeness towards the end of Book 3,[574] as Seneca grows frustrated with someone who resists his argument against anger. Significantly, the 'someone' at whom this rudeness is directed seems to be Nouatus. Until these moments, Nouatus has never said anything to imply that he does not share Seneca's absolute condemnation for *ira* and his belief that it can be totally eradicated.[575] However, at these points, someone who *appears* to be Nouatus speaks in a way that indicates he finds Seneca's arguments or his solutions unconvincing: at 3.26.1, the second person addressee complains, in response to Seneca's suggested *remedia*, *'non possum [...] pati; graue est iniuriam sustinere'* to which Seneca harshly replies *mentiris*. The addressee's hypocrisy and other faults are sharply and bluntly exposed at 3.28.1, 3.31.3[576] and 3.35.1-3.35.5. There has been nothing since the address to Nouatus at 3.1.1 to mean that we see someone other than Nouatus saying these words, but *possible* reorientation of who the second person addressee represents has occurred with *dicat itaque sibi quisque* at 3.24.1,

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572 See further §3.2.1.1.

573 *cum hoc dicis, Theophraste, quaeris inuidiam praeceptis fortioribus et relicto iudice ad coronam uenis.* I find it hard to see as rude the responses to the two following objections which begin with the possibly pejorative description *isto modo* (1.13.3, 1.14; cf. *OLD* s.v. *iste* 2, 3). If they are, they fall into the same category of being addressed to Theophrastus, the latter explicitly and the former as following an address to Theophrastus without meeting any of the criteria for a reorientation of addressee.

574 These are at 3.26.1, 3.28.1, 3.32.1, 3.35.1-3.35.5, 3.43.4.

575 A possible exception is Nouatus' indignant complaints of boredom, discussed at §3.2.5: he would clearly like Seneca to stop talking and does not understand why he carries on speaking, but I find it hard to treat these as episodes of anger (rather than, say, a type of *dolor*) because there is no indication that Nouatus seeks revenge.

576 In the context of the harsh claims that precede, *magnam rem sine dubio fecerimus, si seruulum infelicem in ergastulum miserimus!* (3.32.1) takes on an abruptness that it otherwise would not have even though the use of the first person plural, including Seneca in the offence, mitigates that harshness. Here, perhaps, context should push us to including it among the examples of harsh discourse when we exclude the earlier example; I do not do so to avoid the risk of a circular argument.

under criterion (d), and because of the length of time since the reference to Nouatus, under criterion (c).

At 3.39.1, Nouatus is explicitly addressed and so soon afterwards, with no intervening reason for an interjection, it is hard to deny that it is Nouatus who exclaims at 3.39.3 *'quantulum […] prodest remedium tuum, si sua sponte desinentem iram placat!'* – not endorsing anger, but certainly criticising Seneca's response. The interjection at 3.41.2 is, or at least is very close to, a defence of anger – *'at uulgus animosa miratur et audaces in honore sunt, placidi pro inertibus habentur'* – and this too seems to come from Nouatus. It is also almost certainly he who exclaims, at 3.43.4, *'nolo […] utique occidere, sed exilio, sed ignominia, sed damno adficere'* and this certainly suggests that he does not truly believe that anger is wicked; the distance between them seems to me not to be great enough to bring about a reorientation (according to criterion (c)). Thus the somewhat harsh response to this latter interjection – *magis ignosco ei qui uulnus inimici quam qui pusulam concupiscit* – (and its harshness is mitigated by the use of *ei qui* rather than *tibi qui*) is probably, but not certainly, directed at Nouatus.

We have seen, then, that Seneca usually adopts a gentle, non-hierchical style but occasionally – including when referring to the views of interlocutors other than Noautus and, *perhaps*, when addressing Nouatus in the later parts of Book 3 – he adopts a harsher tone. To understand the function of all this, let us return to the question of with whom we ally ourselves. The options, as we saw, are:

- the interlocutor(s), who generally seem anonymous but can occasionally be identified with Aristotle or Theophrastus;[577]

[577] In using this phrase, I do not include Nouatus.

- Seneca himself; and
- Nouatus.

I shall now argue that we are likely to side with Seneca or (*or* and/or) Nouatus until, towards the end of Book 3, we are led to distance ourselves from Nouatus' position – a distancing with its own pedagogic purposes.

I think it unlikely that we side with the interlocutors. Their repeated resistance, together with the anticipated resistance of others (for example, at 3.3.1), requires the repetition of the same arguments: it is as if, unlike the seemingly more alert Nouatus, they have not or cannot be expected to grasp the arguments that Seneca advances rather than that they are engaging in a high-level debate in which both sides come up with new arguments. The situation is not dissimilar to a Platonic dialogue, where, as Mitsis notes:

> '[F]ew of us identify with the interlocutors refuted by Socrates, whether or not we truly have understood all the details of a particular socratic [*sic*] argument.'[578]

Moreover, in the *De ira*, the interlocutors who reject Seneca's arguments are 'outside' the friendly relationship that Seneca constructs himself as having with his brother Nouatus; to side with the interlocutors is to exclude ourselves from that relationship and, as we have seen, occasionally to be the subject of somewhat harsh treatment oneself.[579] If we do side with the interlocutors, we have our objections countered, repeatedly – as they need to be, as we have seen, if we are to be convinced that we are wrong, usually fairly gently but sometimes slightly more harshly (this is the first group of moments of rudeness). This is a compromise, perhaps, between speaking severely to those who do not share Seneca's

[578] Mitsis (1993) 126.
[579] The I-you relationship is typically important in Seneca's prose works, a fact reflected in the rarity of third-person verbs (Herington (1982) 515).

views and who might (as we shall) respond well to a severe response, and maintaining a generally friendly *persona*.

The effect of this may be increased by a misrepresentation of contemporary attitudes towards anger. I have spoken so far about whom the reader sympathises with the *De ira*'s stance as if such a reader were a naturally hostile person who was convinced by Seneca's argument. Of course, Seneca's readers would have come to the *De ira* with their own pre-existing views, but what these views generally were is very difficult to reconstruct. It seems likely that many would have thought that anger was acceptable in certain circumstances:[580] we may think in particular of Claudius' famous declaration that his episodes of anger would be short and harmless and his *iracundia* would be just.[581] There must be some truth in Mattern-Parkes' claim that:

> 'Seneca's concept of anger [...] reflects a culture pervaded by a kind of ruthless, zero-sum competition for honor through reciprocal injury that ancient Rome seems to share with other ancient and modern Mediterranean societies. [...] Seneca disapproves of this phenomenon and is arguing against it; but the fact that he needs to do so is evidence that the type of anger he describes is prominent in his society.'[582]

However, it is possible that Seneca somewhat exaggerates the extent of the opposition that his views would attract: his attitude to anger is, effectively, the same as that of Cicero's stance in the *Tusculan Disputations*,[583] and it seems plausible (but it is hard to find direct evidence for the claim that) the readership of Seneca's *dialogi* was probably skewed in the direction of those familiar with and sympathetic to Stoic teaching (broadly defined), even

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[580] On Roman attitudes to anger, see Harris (2001) 201-228.
[581] Suet.*Cl.*38.1.
[582] Mattern-Parkes (2001) 177.
[583] Cic.*Tusc.*4.48-55 (a relevant section is reproduced in *SVF* 3.665; it is also partly reproduced in *LS* 32H), 4.77-79.

if it does not follow from this that they were not aimed at others too. Indeed, during the Julio-Claudian era, the many representations of emotion or even vigour present in earlier and later sculptural representations of important figures are less commonly found.[584] This suggests that any aspects of one's appearance that suggest a lack of *tranquillitas* may have had more negative connotations at this time. Moreover, the idea that Seneca might exaggerate the opposition to his views is a reasonable one. It may partly be because he wishes to provide some justification for repeating his argument, which he (perhaps) sees as vital therapy for those who believe but do not alieve that anger is bad.[585] It may also be a deliberate rhetorical strategy directed at those who oppose anger, similar to the way in which Cicero speaks (or writes) in the *Pro Archia* as if he anticipated extensive opposition from the jurors that any poetry could have any value whatsoever; although many members of the jury must have had significant prejudices,[586] the evidence for even the Roman *uulgus* listening to significant amounts of poetry[587] indicates that Cicero overstates it. Cicero's tactic seems to be to polarise the debate (as if to say 'You either love all poetry or you hate all poetry') and to invite his audiences to show themselves to be above everyone else by choosing the truly Roman and the truly cultured path of recognising the value of literature. Similarly, Seneca polarises the debate, rejecting the middle ground for those who think anger can sometimes be useful, and encourages his audiences to join the exclusive, intimate relationship that he has with Nouatus and, in doing so, to reject all forms of anger.[588]

[584] Giuliani (1986).
[585] Stryer (2012) provides an example in Edmund Burke's rhetoric of exaggeration for seemingly similar purposes.
[586] Berry (2004) 302-303 gathers some of the evidence for this position, but of course evidence from Cicero's speeches, which seek to construct and to manipulate attitudes towards intellectuals for particular rhetorical purposes, must be treated with caution.
[587] Wiseman (1982) 36-37 gathers some of the evidence.
[588] Hyperbole is not alien to Seneca's practice in other areas either: see Sen.*Ben.*7.22.1-2 for his exaggeration of his moral advice (cf. also Cic.*Mur.*65 (Cato), D.L.6.35 (Diogenes the Cynic)).

Whether or not the previous paragraph is found convincing, it nonetheless seems more likely that the ‘ideal reader’ sides with Seneca or Nouatus over the (other) interlocutor(s).[589] For much of the *De ira*, it is not clear which, if either, we would most naturally associate with - nor does it necessarily matter. However, when Nouatus complains of boredom, we might start to associate more strongly with one or the other, depending on our own responses to the text. It is possible that we side with the patient Seneca, who carefully explains to Nouatus that others remain unconvinced. If so, the *De ira*’s therapeutic strategy has been successful: we both condemn anger and understand the importance of fully understanding why it is wrong. However, it is probably far more likely, I think, that we side with Nouatus, who struggles to understand why Seneca must continue to argue in favour of a position that he has already accepted.

However, the second group of rude moments, late in Book 3, probably changes this response. At this point, Nouatus, who has insisted for so long that he agrees with Seneca that anger is vicious and who is frustrated by the accumulation of arguments against anger, is (probably) revealed to hold some beliefs alien to his alleged view. So, as readers, we must renegotiate our alliances. The key question is: do we side with or against Nouatus?

We probably side against Nouatus. After all, he has been exposed as a hypocrite who does not understand what, as we have seen, he has been claiming that he does understand. In our frustration at his change of heart and our dismissal of his incompetence in failing truly to understand what he thinks he understands, we are likely to distance ourselves too from his endorsement of anger. At the same time, his hypocrisy adds a further justification for Seneca’s lengthy argument against anger – and the possibility that we might have turned

[589] The occasionally harsh treatment of the other interlocutor(s) may make us wish to enjoy Nouatus’ relationship with Seneca and so associate ourselves with one of those two.

out to be like Nouatus makes us recognise the need for constant vigilance against the sort of thinking that leads to a belief that anger is a good thing.

But what if we actually side with Nouatus? Lucretius' *De rerum natura* offers an authoritarian sort of didaxis[590] but ends with a 'test' that requires the reader to think for himself and to apply the knowledge he has learnt to the Athenian plague.[591] The reader might pass or fail the test – and, if he fails, the didactic project has failed too: there is no safety net.[592] The *De ira* does the reverse. Its didaxis is gentle and if, at the end, we fail the test by continuing to side with Nouatus (the character we are most likely to have associated with), there *is* a safety net. Seneca's new tactic is to address Nouatus (and therefore us) with a persona that is no longer gentle but stern and authoritative. In other words, he starts to shout. This response is, in fact, in line with Seneca's observation that, just as doctors use gentler methods first if they can, they turn to harsher methods later if need be:

> *ita legum praesidem ciuitatisque rectorem decet, quam diu potest, uerbis et his mollioribus ingenia curare, ut facienda suadeat cupiditatemque honesti et aequi conciliet animis faciatque uitiorum odium, pretium uirtutium; transeat deinde ad tristiorem orationem, qua moneat adhuc et exprobret...* (1.6.3)[593]

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[590] I find the argument of Mitsis (1993) convincing. For a helpful summary of the key arguments, endorsing Mitsis' interpretation over that advanced most forcefully by Clay (1983), see Volk (2002) 79-83.
[591] See Fowler (1997).
[592] It is possible that the *De rerum natura* is incomplete (see Sedley (1998) 134-165, esp. 160-165) and, if so, that a 'safety net' would have been incorporated into the conclusion to Book 6.
[593] This comparison might put us in mind of the conceptualisation in Plato's *Laws* of how the laws should persuade, using (as Seneca does) comparisons to doctors (see esp. Pl.*Lg.*719e-723c). He advocates rational persuasion (see Bobonich (1991) on this) followed by a statement of laws including the punishments that await the law-breaker. This is, at first sight, different from Seneca's method, where, if gentle persuasion has been successful, there is no need for further, more aggressive persuasion; but this is *perhaps* a consequence of the fact that the laws cannot be adapted for each individual recipient, and Plato sees a value in the gentle – and *rational* – persuasion of people to obey the laws beyond simply ensuring that they obey the laws (see Bobonich (1991) 386).

The change of tactic is also very sensible. Different people, of course, respond to different sorts of argument.[594] Some of Seneca's (ideal) readers would, no doubt, have been persuaded by his gentle, non-authoritarian approach. However, those (ideal) readers who by their natures tended to be convinced by the arguments from those who presented themselves as experts may well not have been. For this group of people, for whom his initial strategy was unlikely to succeed,[595] Seneca adopts an authoritative stance at the end.[596]

One question which remains is why it is important that it is not *definitely* Nouatus who is making the objections I described above and whom Seneca is treating harshly. Seneca

[594] As I observed in n.449, modern Western argumentation is 'based on a syllogistic model of proof and made linguistically cohesive via subordination and hypotaxis' while Arabic argumentation, essentially paratactic, makes its claims through repetition and paraphrase (Koch (1983) 47). Johnstone (1986) provides an example of the breakdown in communications that can result from a clash of these modes of argument: the two people working from different forms of argumentation simply could not understand each other. One required what we might think of as logical argumentation and the other required paratactic argumentation appealing to an externally-constructed authority.

[595] In §3.3.1, I wrote that 'Seneca presents himself as a very gentle teacher who does not construct hierarchical power relations with his addressee but, rather, relies on appeals to those values that unite us as human beings. [...] The result is that, if his strategy is successful, Seneca comes across as a man whom we like – and those whom we like, we tend to believe'. My point here is that some people might not 'like' Seneca's *persona*, and might not be convinced by it, precisely because of his gentleness and rejection of hierchical power relations (with his addressee and in society more broadly).

[596] The body of research associated with 'moral foundations theory' (which was first proposed in Haidt & Joseph (2004)) has proposed that there are a certain number of 'moral foundations', and that some people construct moral systems based on all these foundations whereas others construct them based on only some. Thus, in modern America, it is argued, political liberals rely on foundations related to harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, whereas political conservations rely on these two foundations and, in addition, those related to ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity. So conservatives can appeal to what seem to them to be moral principles; liberals simply will not be able to understand how they can think of such arguments as morals; and the conservatives will not be able to understand why the liberals cannot understand (Haidt and Graham (2007); Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009)). The sort of readers whom I refer to as unlikely to be convinced in this paragraph would be those whose particular commitment to the authority/respect foundation made them more open to appeals on the (implicit) basis of a hierarchical relationship with the person presenting the argument. Quite how many people of this sort there were in first-century AD Rome, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer; but we may speculate that it was quite high in an, in general, fairly hierarchically organised society (the rigidity of the class system is well illustrated precisely by the indignation that many felt at its breaches). Whether or not Seneca's change of approach is successful or not with this group is, of course, a different question, not least because his previous construction of his identity as a gentle and mild teacher and the 'disorder' that the *De ira* seems at first sight to possess (both in its organisation and in the philosophical theory it relies upon) may have undermined its authority. Moreover, Seneca's arguments may have been found unappealing on the basis of other foundations too - his redefinition of *Romanitas*, as explored in §3.3.1.5.2, is somewhat at odds with the ingroup/loyalty foundation – and there is no alternative strategy to resolve these issues. But my aim here is not to investigate this question but to sketch how the *De ira* would function at its most persuasive for different groups of 'ideal readers'.

leaves it (just) possible for us, if we want, to see someone other than Nouatus behind these objections and his responses to them.

Having Nouatus as the addressee or interlocutor making these particular final objections raises some potential problems. Firstly, on a hostile reading, Nouatus, on scrutinising the arguments, seems to have shifted from thinking anger is bad to thinking that there might be some merit in it after all. The *De ira*, then, would dramatise a failure to convince. Secondly, the notion that it is Nouatus might disrupt Seneca's self-presentation as a kind, gentle man: he impatiently turns on his own brother and, if we have associated ourselves with Nouatus and he has insulted Nouatus, he has almost insulted us. Given that, as we saw in §3.3.1, we believe ideas that are presented by people we like, this could be a problem.[597] By making it open to question whether it really is Nouatus who is being addressed, Seneca allows himself a 'get-out clause' to these objections.[598]

Seneca's use of addressees, as we have seen, seems chaotic and hard to pin down. However, it forces us to negotiate our alliances and allows him, if he needs to, to change tactics at the very end of the work. Unlike the *De rerum natura,* which has no solution to the possibility that it alienates its readers through the brutal treatment of Memmius, Seneca has a back-up plan if his 'plan A' – that is, his initial strategy of charming his readers – fails.

[597] It may be relevant that it seems to me that, of the 'rude' treatments of (probably) Nouatus, the ruder ones are at 3.26.1, 3.28.1, 3.32.1 and 3.35.1-3.35.5, when (as discussed above) the likelihood of it being Nouatus who is being addressed is lower.

[598] It is important, too, to remember that the moments of abruptness are embedded in a section that contains moments of gentleness: there is a tension between Seneca's adjusting his *persona* to allow him to convince the unconvinced and between his not alienating those readers who responded to his original *persona*.

§4: CONCLUSION

This thesis has made a case for the philosophical and literary sophistication of the *De ira*. It has suggested that Seneca accepted that one could have some commitment to the notion that one wished to take revenge before being so committed to it that one's belief could not be overturned by reason, and that the difference between these two states did not necessarily correspond to the changes in one's rational capabilities more generally. By introducing this distinction, and by positing pre-emotional responses to stimuli at the level of non-rational psychic *pneuma*, he was able to harmonise the somewhat different accounts of Chrysippus and Zeno in a way that protected their theories from the counterarguments raised by Posidonius. This appreciation of Seneca's qualities as a philosopher and of the nature and extent of his innovations is, I hope, not only of interest for our understanding of his own work but also required for, when combined with an awareness of how his texts function on a literary level, forming a considered view on how we can use his works as a source for Stoic doctrine, an area that warrants further attention: we might wonder, for example, whether he should be given more prominence in *SVF*.

My study has also pointed to the *De ira*'s 'literary quality'. It is well-appreciated that Seneca's more rhetorical and emotionally engaging style makes it more accessible and perhaps, therefore, more therapeutically useful than much previous Stoic and especially Chrysippan writing, which was thought by many of its early readers to be terse.[599] It is also accepted, at least by some, that Seneca's philosophical works compare favourably to

[599] Despite the presence (or, perhaps, in part because of the excessive use of) mythological content (on which, see Tieleman (1996) 134, 138), Chrysippus' style was widely condemned (cf. D.H.*Comp.*4.30-31 = *SVF* 2.28).

those of Cicero, where the stylisation, although certainly present,[600] sometimes seems to be a superficial layer added to pre-existing material to the extent that, when reading it, we almost feel tempted to translate it into Greek. I hope, though, to have made the case for the *De ira*'s effectiveness in its own right, showing how Seneca forces us to 'take sides' in his encounters with various interlocutors in a way that introduces two 'safety nets' in case his text is unconvincing, one combatting his readers' possible boredom and frustration and the other enabling a change in tone in case the reader has not responded to the gentle didactic approach he has adopted up to that point.[601]

I have also, though, made an argument about the ways in which the text is and is not ordered: in short, that the *De ira* is fundamentally ordered but is made to seem disordered. Seneca relies on a coherent philosophical position but he describes it in an apparently incoherent way so as to conceal aspects of his theory that might lead his readers to find fault with his absolute rejection of anger. The text is organised through the combination of a number of different structural principles to allow the repetition of arguments, but this level of order is further disrupted by interventions from interlocutors that have, as we have seen, their own important didactic and therapeutic functions.

These explanations for the disorder do not mean that, when we read it, the disorder does not strike us as surprising. As a philosophical system, Stoicism was, was understood to be and, in all probability, was intended to be (and to be understood to be) supremely systematic. As Cicero's Cato puts it,

[600] We may compare Lucullus' speech in the *Lucullus* (Cic.*Ac.*2.11-62 = Cic.*Luc.*11-62), which is much more effective than many Stoic fragments on the same subject (for which, see Sedley (2012) 334-346).
[601] This conclusion is relevant to the debate over whether *De ira* 3 is a separate work to the first two books (for references, see Monteleone (2014) 129): if *De ira* 3 is a much later addition, it is at the very least a much later addition that employs pedagogic strategies that sensibly develop those employed in the previous books.

quid enim aut in natura, qua nihil est aptius, nihil descriptius, aut in operibus manu factis tam compositum tamque compactum et coagmentatum inveniri potest? quid posterius priori non conuenit? quid sequitur, quod non respondeat superiori? quid non sic aliud ex alio nectitur, ut, si ullam litteram moueris, labent omnia? nec tamen quicquam est, quod moueri possit. (Cic.*Fin.*3.74)[602]

We expect literature too to be ordered, and it usually is. This is something of an exaggeration, of course: Cicero's speeches are never quite as neatly structured as the *partes orationis* that handbooks lay down might lead us to expect,[603] Aristotle's clear descriptions of Greek tragic structures rarely seem applicable to surviving plays,[604] and many texts seem, often playfully, to defy our expectations of their organisation: we might think, for example, of the way that the 'proem in the middle' of the *Aeneid* occurs partway into rather than at the start of the seventh book,[605] or the 'false closure' at the end of *Ars amatoria* 3, although the *Ars amatoria* will, in a sense, be continued by the *Remedia amoris*.[606] However, Latin literature – even Senecan tragedy, which describes disordered universes and which, although there are a number of logical breaks, with choruses famously disappearing,[607] nonetheless has its own formal structures – generally seems ordered enough that Morgan can refer to 'that quality of order and system that is an intrinsic feature of conventional literature'.[608] The *De ira* seems to threaten this 'order and system'. Morgan goes on to observe that the genre that does this *par excellence* is satire:[609] those disordered texts that are not straightforwardly classified as *saturae* often

[602] See further Long (1970/1971) 90-91 and (esp.) Schofield (2003) 236-239.
[603] See §3.2.1.2.
[604] See (e.g.) Scodel (2010) 7-13.
[605] Verg.*A.*7.37-45.
[606] A common observation: see (e.g.) Davis (2006) 109-110.
[607] See (e.g.) Sen.*Phaed.*599-601.
[608] Morgan (2005) 175.
[609] Morgan (2005) 175.

seem to have something of the satirical about them, like Petronius' *Satyricon* (on at least one level, a Menippean satire[610]) or Lucan's *De bello ciuili* ('an epic', as Leigh puts it, 'attuned less to pathos than to satire'[611]). (Our stereotype of) satire is, in this regard, the opposite of (our stereotype of) philosophy. The *De ira*'s disorder, then, makes it strangely like satire.

It is not only this similarity that invites the comparison. Again and again, in the vehement, perhaps exaggerated condemnation of his opponents and of contemporary society, and in the grounding of his criticism of Roman society in contemporary references, the *De ira*'s tone is that of a satire. Wycislo has provided a full analysis, which I do not repeat:[612] he cites, for example, 2.7.2-2.8.2, which, through comparison to to Lucilius, Horace and Juvenal, he finds 'mimics a revulsion not unlike that voiced by Rome's finest verse satirists'.[613]

The connection that Wycislo demonstrates for the case of the *De ira* between satire and philosophy is not altogether surprising:[614] they are, as Branham puts it, 'fratricidal siblings

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610 On this question, see Rimell (2005) 164-169.
611 Leigh (1997) 210.
612 Wycislo (2002) 13-41. This monograph's principal claim is that the *De ira* is a parody of epistolary *responsa* (epistles by jurisconsults addressing contemporary legal issues) that aims to criticise the law's justification of *ira*. The difficulty with this argument is the weak evidence for the claimed similarity of the *De ira* to epistolary *responsa*, partly because we do not have enough *responsa* surviving to vindicate the alleged structural parallels and partly because many of the terms that Wycislo sees Seneca as employing as part of sustained legal parody do not seem particularly legal. He lists even terms like the perfectly ordinary *inquam* and *iniuria* (Wycislo (2002) 195), which may well have seemed a particularly *philosophical* rather than a particularly legal term after its employment in the definitional sections (1.2.3b). It is, of course, true that other obviously more legalistic terms might encourage readers to notice legal nuances in other words but, even bearing this in mind, the evidence does not seem to me sustained enough to justify seeing epistolary *responsa* as a model. For an alternative interpretation of a moment where legal terminology does seem present, see §3.3.1.1.
613 Wycislo (2002) 17.
614 Other Senecan philosophical texts contain satirical moments: for example, on satire in the *De breuitate uitae*, see Williams (2003) on Sen.*Dial.*10.2 and Sen.*Dial.*10.12; and on satire in the *Epistles*, see Wilson (1997) 56-59. On philosophical aspects of Seneca's satire *Apocolocyntosis*, see Nussbaum (2009).

[…], destined to be forever at odds but ultimately inseparable.’[615] Satire and (ethical) philosophy have a similar function, defining, whether implicitly or explicitly, what is and what is not acceptable conduct. Yet they do this in very different ways. Like other disordered texts, even those satires that seem to (seek to) define the limits of acceptable conduct seem, paradoxically, very ‘open’ and they seem to frustrate our attempts to pin down what they are ‘trying to say’ or what they ‘mean’, while, as we have seen, philosophical texts that seek to persuade people of particular points of view (generally) seem ordered and to (seek to) close down readers’ responses. The *De ira*, though, is a disordered text but one that seeks to close down the responses of its readers and to encourage them to have a particular attitude towards anger. This makes it something of an anomaly. Its anomalous nature is the great risk that Seneca takes, and over the course of the thesis we have seen some of the strategies that Seneca used to mitigate that risk.[616]

I close by offering one final reason for Seneca taking that risk. Only a century before, in Rome, philosophy, even when written in Latin, had been a Greek activity: neither Lucretius nor Cicero wrote original philosophy,[617] but, instead, they set out existing Greek philosophy in Latin.[618] On one level, of course, this was an attempt to ‘Romanise’ Greek philosophy, to make it culturally ‘at home’ in Rome, but it would be hard to maintain that

[615] Branham (2009) 140. On the possibility of practising philosophy through satire, see Diehl (2013). The connection is most famous, perhaps, in Plato’s Socrates: see Branham (2009) 141-145.

[616] Whether it is a risk that paid off is not a question this thesis seeks to answer. See, however, n.596. In general, ‘Seneca's own example [of ‘doing’ philosophy in Latin] proved not to be a trend-setter. Seneca did not mark any major and enduring change in regard to the language of philosophy. Romans who came later would choose to practice philosophy in Greek’ (Inwood (1995) 67; see 67-68). However, despite this, it may be that it was a sense that there was an underlying truth and an underlying coherence to this chaotic text that caused St Martin of Braga to reorder and to rework it, in a way not dissimilar to the Virgilian *cento* tradition (on St Martin’s *De ira*, see Torre (2008)).

[617] Inwood (1995) 66-67. Note 66n.8: ‘One might want to make an exception for *Off*.3 here, or for the *Laelius* and *Cato*. But even if one does, the general character of Cicero's philosophical writing is still “missionary” writing and Cicero himself is no role model for the philosophical life.’

[618] For Lucretius, see Sedley (1998); for Cicero, see Striker (1995).

the attempts are wholly successful. While the opening invocation to Venus[619] and his (very often) Ennian style[620] may at first sight[621] make the *De rerum natura* seem to be an attempt to 'domesticate' Epicurean philosophy, other features, such as the assimilation of Epicurus via Ennian allusion to Pyrrhus of Epirus, a Greek invader of Italy,[622] and to the giants who fought the Olympian gods,[623] advertise just how alien the world-view Lucretius advertises is.[624] Cicero may have made greater attempts, at least on occasion, to appear Roman, but at least partly thanks to (what is often acknowledged as) the essentially Greek nature of what he is setting out in Latin[625] and to the fact that they were written by a man who was, at least in parts of his life, attacked in invective as a *Graikos*,[626] his philosophical works retain something of a 'foreign' tone.

If Cicero and Lucretius wrote philosophy that was ordered and felt non-Roman, the *De ira* is philosophy that is disordered and, perhaps for this reason, feels peculiarly Roman. Satire, after all, was *the* Roman genre – *satura quidem tota nostra est*, Quintilian

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[619] Lucr.1.1-49.

[620] Leonard & Smith (1965) 32 describes archaism as 'the most notable feature of Lucretius' style and diction'.

[621] After the nature of the Epicurean subject matter becomes clear, they may be reinterpreted. For example, the use of language associated with what was at the time Rome's great national epic may have brought out quite how counter-cultural the *De rerum natura*'s claims were. If, to make an imperfect comparison, for want of a better candidate for an English 'national poem', a poem were written that alluded to Owen's *Dulce et Decorum est* (Owen (1920) 15) but reversed its conclusions, it is hard to imagine that it would not seem extremely jarring.

[622] *Graius homo* at Lucr.1.66 alludes to Enn.*Ann.*165 (both using a final long syllable; this is the only definite appearance of this feature in the *De rerum natura*). For a different view, see Harrison (2002) 9: 'There is no doubt that the two invasions are to be regarded very differently: that of Pyrrhus constituted one of the greatest risks to the Roman Republic, while that of Epicurus paradoxically brought true peace and enlightenment to a previously crude and benighted culture.'

[623] Lucr.1.62-79.

[624] There is, then, a tension in the *De rerum natura* between reassuring sweetness and unsettling bitterness: Lucretius famously compares himself to a doctor who administers wormwood by sweetening it with honey (Lucr.1.936-950), but this causes it not to taste entirely sweet but to taste sweet *labrorum tenus*. This may be a deliberate strategy, advertising that, at a dangerous and uncertain time in Rome's history (*hoc patriai tempore iniquo*, Lucr.1.41), the *De rerum natura* provides a solution very different to the 'more of the same' – the continuation of discord and rivalry – that the different political factions in Rome may have seemed to have offered.

[625] See (e.g.) Cic.*Fin.*1.1.

[626] Plu.*Cic.*5.2.

declared[627] - and perhaps the disorder of the *De ira* functions somehow to make the text somehow more 'at home'.[628] The *De ira*'s disorder distances the text from previous Latin philosophical writing[629] that seemed so Greek[630] and from what we might speculate were typically well-ordered, usually Greek, Stoic writing. In its place we have philosophy that, because it puts on a pretence of being disordered, strikes its readers as typically, reassuringly Roman – and as reassuringly Roman in a way that does not rely on the risky redefinition of *Romanitas* that the *De ira* makes to combat the notions that being a good Roman, whether through upholding the law or securing *imperium*, required anger. Thus, the disorder that is a reassuring feature of truly Roman literature is used in the service of Seneca's project of ordering (Roman?) minds and, if those minds belong to the powerful elites, perhaps of ordering (Roman?) society as well.

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[627] Quint.*Inst.*10.1.93. For discussion, see Freudenburg (2005) 1-7.

[628] As a brand of a moralising philosophy concerned with ordinary life, it might be tempting to assimilate the *De ira* (at least in part) to 'diatribe'. The connection between Senecan prose and this 'genre' is advanced by (e.g.) Wright (1974) 45-46. However, no ancient works that fit modern descriptions of this genre survive and there is no record of ancient grammarians holding this view. Most of our evidence for diatribe comes from satire and from Senecan prose on the basis of an assumption that they have been influenced by diatribes. Most scholars now agree that 'diatribe' as a genre did not exist (see Jocelyn (1979) and (1982)). For a very brief but helpful summary of the issues, see Moles (2012). However, this does not entail that there was not a brand of popular philosophy to which the *De ira*'s organisation makes it *somewhat* comparable (I say 'somewhat' because of the flexibility of the form of a diatribe). This raises two distinct questions. Firstly, would readers have felt kinship with satire (a literary genre) or diatribe (a way of doing philosophy, though not a 'genre') more keenly? Presumably this would vary from reader to reader, and there may have been considerable overlap between (some) diatribe(s) and (some) satire(s). Secondly, if the answer to the first question is 'diatribe', are the Greek origins of diatribe a problem for the argument that disorder Romanises philosophy? I think the answer to this question is that it is not if diatribe was, as it seems to have been, a philosophy of the street and therefore one (relatively) 'at home' in Rome.

[629] It may be that Seneca was not unique in distancing himself from his immediate philosophical predecessors in this way: our knowledge of his predecessors and contemporaries is too limited to say. See Sellars (2014) for a convenient summary.

[630] This sense is perhaps one reason for the hostility that many, even educated, people felt towards philosophy, to the extent that Cicero could exploit it in his speeches (see (e.g.) Cic.*Mur.*60-66 and Cic.*Pis.*) and Petronius could satirise it in his *Satyricon* (Petr.71.12): this connection is supported in particular by Agricola's mother's anxiety that he showed more enthusiasm for the subject than was suitable for a Roman and a senator (Tac.*Ag.*4.3).

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