



FOOD INSECURITY AND THE SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOUR IN TANZANIA, 1919-1985

by

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes the socio-economic consequences of the Tanzania population's exposure to food insecurity between 1919 and 1985.

The thesis covers: the incidence of food inadequacy in peasant households throughout the country; the impact of famine relief measures of the colonial state and the Native Authorities; the role of Asian traders; the development of an African wage labour force and its food demand; the problems of supplying food to plantation workers and other geographically dispersed wage labourers during the inter-war period; state food policies arising from the exigencies of World War II; decolonisation and the restructuring of the social division of labour on a non-racial basis between 1950 and 1973; state food production and marketing policy in response to rapid urban growth; African marketing cooperatives, the national economic crisis years between 1973 and 1985; the parastatalisation of national marketed food supply; the parallel food market; the state's difficulties in implementing its industrialisation and peasant agricultural transformation policies; and the deterioration of the functional division of labour to the extent that the occupational division of labour between rural and urban areas blurs.

The central argument of the thesis is that food insecurity retards development of functional social groups and the organisational structure of the market and state relative to the household and clientage networks. This situation arises from the prevalence of risk-averting, household-based strategies of all functional groups in contradistinction to the maximizing strategies of market and state agents. With domination of household and clientage networks, the formation of functional groups is restricted to that made possible by face-to-face accountability or household ties. A circular process begins. Food insecurity is perpetuated and often intensified by the limited scale of the division of labour, its barriers to outside innovation and to the free flow of food between deficit and surplus areas through market channels. In the process, the technological development of food production is severely hindered.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APPCC - Agricultural Price Policy Coordinating Committee
BRALUP - Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning
CCM - Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party)
CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency
CDR - Centre for Development Research
DC - District Commissioner
DO - District Officer
DSM - Dar es Salaam
EA - East Africa
EAAFJ - East African Agricultural and Forestry Journal
EAAJ - East African Agricultural Journal
EARC - East Africa Royal Commission
ECB - Economic Control Board
ERB - Economics Research Bureau
FAO - Food and Agriculture Organisation
GSD - Grain Storage Department
HBS - Household Budget Survey
HMSO - His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office
IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDS - Institute of Development Studies
ILO - International Labour Office
IMF - International Monetary Fund
IRA - Institute of Resource Assessment
JASPA - Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa
KILIMO - Ministry of Agriculture
KNCU - Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union
LegCo - Legislative Council
MDB - Marketing Development Bureau
NAFCO - National Agricultural Farm Corporation
NAPB - National Agricultural Production Board
NEC - National Executive Committee
NESP - National Economic Survival Programme
NMC - National Milling Corporation
NMP - National Maize Project
OECD - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PC - Provincial Commissioner
PMO - Prime Minister's Office
PPR - Price Policy Recommendations (or Review)
PWD - Public Works Department

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS continued

RH - Rhodes House
SAP - Structural Adjustment Programme
SCOPO - Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisation
SIDA - Swedish International Development Agency
TANU - Tanganyika African National Union
TECSA - Tanganyikan European Civil Servants Association
TFNC - Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre
TNR - Tanganyika Notes and Records
TRDB - Tanzania Rural Development Bank
TT - Tanganyika Territory
UDSM - University of Dar es Salaam
UNICEF - United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNIDO - United Nations Industrial Development Organisation

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Paradoxically, countries that are primarily agrarian in nature tend to be the most vulnerable to deficits of staple foods. Tanzania is one of them. Roughly 85% of Tanzania's population live in rural areas, most of whom derive a livelihood directly from the soil, yet the country has experienced repeated shortfalls of food supplies during this century.

Tanzania's current food insecurity can be likened to the situation experienced in pre-industrial 18th century Europe. Virtually all countries on the eve of industrialisation face a similar dilemma, namely, how to generate a food surplus for the growing proportion of the population who are engaged in non-agricultural activities in addition to ensuring rural food supplies.

This chapter reviews classical and recent literature on the topic of food supply in transitional societies and discusses various theories that are helpful in constructing a conceptual framework for analyzing food insecurity in Tanzania. It is divided into four sections: the first is a brief review of four major political economists: Malthus, Ricardo, Preobrazhensky and W.A. Lewis, all of whom concerned themselves with the population/food production capability balance at the critical turning point between agrarian and industrial society that they witnessed in their respective countries. In comparing their writings, the dynamic character of the population/food production capability balance over the last two centuries becomes evident. The second section schematically juxtaposes the theoretical constructions of Malthus, Durkheim and Boserup and proposes a revised explanatory framework for understanding the inter-relationship between population and food adequacy. The third section provides some necessary background information on Tanzania and the final section describes the contents of the chapters to follow.

1. The Population/Food Production Capability Balance at the Outset of Industrialisation

The works of Malthus, Ricardo, Preobrazhensky and W.A. Lewis represent three different junctures in the process of industrialisation: Malthus and Ricardo were early 19th century British political economists analysing the country that was the first to industrialise and which was favoured by a simultaneous evolution of agrarian and industrial productivity. Preobrazhensky, on the other hand,

was writing in the Soviet Union during the 1920s when the preponderant majority of the Soviet population (80%) were still living in rural areas and the country's manufactures were not competitive in the world market. Finally, W.A. Lewis has been writing since the 1950s about the difficulties of industrialising predominantly agrarian third world economies. All of the authors addressed the food constraint in the process of industrialization and national development.

1. Malthus: The 'Natural Order' of the Pre-Industrial Food Economy

Malthus is famous for his pronouncement of three iron laws:

First, That food is necessary to the existence of man...Secondly, That the passion between the sexes is necessary and will remain nearly in its present state... [and finally]...that the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man. Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio.¹

Malthus was virtually blind to the possibility of technological transformation and changing social relations either in the sphere of food production or human reproduction. National populations were doomed to live on the knife-edge of physical survival unless moral restraint, i.e. the postponement of marriage was exercised. He assumed that the population would double every 25 years in the absence of positive or preventive checks. 'Positive checks' were defined as all factors contributing to the shortening of the natural duration of human life, particularly 'unwholesome occupations, severe labour and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns, excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine'.²

There is evidence to support Malthus' notion of food stress in England during the period just preceding his writings. Plotting the relationship between English food prices and population growth between 1541 and 1816, Wrigley found that the two variables had a uniformly close relationship until

¹ Malthus, T.R. An Essay on the the Principle of Population and Summary View of the Principle of Population, (Middlesex, Penguin Books, (1970 (1798 & 1830)), 70-71

² Malthus, Summary View, 23,238

1781 which could imply that food acted as a constraint on population growth. Thereafter, the relationship completely disintegrated.³ 1780 is the date most commonly accepted as the beginning of Britain's Industrial Revolution.⁴ The radical transformation of production brought about through industrialisation rendered Malthus's iron law of geometric population and arithmetic food growth rates irrelevant for Britain.

Malthus's disagreement with Ricardo over the Corn Laws led him to elaborate his premise of restricted agricultural growth relative to population increase, which has come to be known as the law of diminishing returns. Cherishing rural society against urbanization and market forces, Malthus represented the tail-end of physiocratic thought. He assumed that value ultimately derived from the land and supported the landlord class's high rents which were seen as synonymous with the expansion of national wealth.⁵ He opposed cheap food imports which he believed lowered the value of food production in the country and in so doing decreased property values, rents and national wealth.

In his opposition to the new industrial order, Malthus argued that declining food prices would lower the level of wages and would cause a glut of industrial production because there would not be enough working class purchasing power for buying industrially produced goods. He could not fathom the possibility of industrial production affording them a higher standard of living.

Despite the quaintness of several aspects of Malthus's theory and its empirical inaccuracy in predicting demographic and economic growth in 19th and 20th century Britain, Malthus's ideas continue to be influential in the discipline of demography for his insights into the inter-relationship between aggregate economic and demographic change and behaviour at the household level.⁶

³ Wrigley, E.A., 'Malthus's Model of a Pre-industrial Economy', in Dupaquier, J., A. Fauve-Chamoux and E. Grebenik (eds), Malthus Past and Present, (London, Academic Press, 1983), 117-118

⁴ Deane, P., The First Industrial Revolution, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), 3

⁵ Wolff, J., 'The Economic Thought of T.R. Malthus', in Dupaquier, A. Fauve-Chamoux and E. Grenbenik (eds.) Malthus Past and Present, (London, Academic Press, 1983), 66-67

⁶ N. Birdsall, J. Fei, S. Kuznets, G. Ranis and T.P. Schultz, 'Demography and Development in the 1980s', in P.M. Hauser (ed.) World Population and Development: Challenge and Prospects (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1979)

2. Ricardo: Expanding Food Supply through International Trade

Adhering to Malthus's theories of population growth and the law of diminishing returns, Ricardo was, however, an exponent of a new order, that of urban-based industrialists. Like Malthus, he desired the expansion of national wealth, but it was to be facilitated by increasing profits of capitalist industrialists rather than higher rents.⁷ Ricardo took the Malthusian sequence of population growth leading to higher food prices and higher rents, a step further, arguing that high food prices also led to higher wages and lowered profits for capitalists. Retaining the notion of the importance of land to value creation, his views were nonetheless based on a labour theory of value.⁸ Industrial production gave rise to the proliferation of use values that enhanced national wealth and well-being.⁹ Contrary to Malthus, he held the view that supply created its own demand.¹⁰ An increase in food imports would lower the cost of food and wage levels and make possible the proliferation of industrial production for the enhancement of national wealth, although it would be injurious to landlords and farmers in the short run.¹¹

Thus, high food prices were neither desirable nor unalterable. Ricardo admonished Malthus for not drawing the logical conclusion from the law of diminishing returns; some countries with more fertile land than England were producing food at lower costs and it was quite logical to import food from them, just as a country does not hesitate to cultivate its most fertile land prior to resorting to less fertile land. Thus each country could reap the benefits from its 'comparative advantage' in trade.

⁷ Ricardo, D. (ed. and intro. by J.H. Hollander and T.E. Gregory), Notes on Malthus and Principles of Political Economy (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1928), xxxix

⁸ Ricardo, Notes on Malthus, xxvi and Ricardo, D. (ed. and intro. by E.C.K. Gonner), Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, (London, George Bell and Sons, 1891) 404

⁹ Ricardo, Notes on Malthus, xlii

¹⁰ Ricardo, D. (ed. by J. Bonar), Letters of David Ricardo to Thomas Robert Malthus, 1810-1823, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1887), 34

¹¹ Ricardo, Notes on Malthus, lxix

The Corn Laws were not repealed until 1846. The Malthus-Ricardo debate took place between 1814 and 1823, drawn to a close by Ricardo's death. The most persuasive objection that Malthus raised to food imports was that reliance on them was a threat to national security. England had been at war with France, who was her most likely food-trading partner. In the early 19th century, transporting bulky staple foods was expensive. The comparative advantage of trade for food items might not have been as great as Ricardo assumed. Other European countries which relied on peasant production did not necessarily produce food more cheaply than Britain which was more agriculturally innovative.¹² These factors weighed against the advantages deriving from any relative abundance of fertile land. Not until the large-scale export of wheat from North America in the 1870s did grain imports lower grain prices in the manner that Ricardo had envisaged.¹³

Britain had the option to import grain because she was highly competitive in the export of manufactured goods. By the start of the industrial revolution, Britain had already developed a fairly complex market economy. The proportion of the population living in settlements of over 5,000 people in 1801 is estimated at 25%. Virtually all rural producers participated in labour or commodity markets.¹⁴ The social division of labour was relatively highly developed.

3. Preobrazhensky: Expanding Food Supply through State Appropriation from the Peasantry

Preobrazhensky was a Bolshevik intellectual and active in Soviet policy debates of the 1920s. His book, The New Economics,¹⁵ was aimed at providing a realistic assessment of the Soviet Union's prospects for industrialization in the absence of most of the conditions that had made the industrial revolution possible in Britain. World War I, the 1917 revolution which overthrew the rural landlord

¹² Kemp, T. Industrialisation in Nineteenth Century Europe, (Norfolk, Longman, 1969), 12,59

¹³ Petersen, W. Malthus, (London, Heinemann, 1979), 171

¹⁴ Deane, P. and W.A. Cole, British Economic Growth 1688-1959: Trends and Structure, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1962), 7,16

¹⁵ Preobrazhensky, E. (trans. by B. Pearse and intro. by A. Nove), The New Economics, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965)

class and the civil war imposed successive drains on the economy. During the civil war, the Bolshevik government had outlawed private trade and attempted to requisition peasant grain surpluses. The peasants resisted and lowered their sales and their production. The towns were threatened with starvation. In 1921, private trade in rural areas was restored. The peasantry produced the bulk of the Soviet Union's exports, in the form of grain, cotton, flax, timber and furs. Prices for these commodities were slumping in the international market. Soviet manufactured products were not competitive in the world market. However, it was the axiom of the Soviet leadership that rapid industrialization was the road to material development and to the achievement of a socialist society.

Industrialization required an increasing supply of peasant production both in the form of grain to feed a growing industrial working class and urban population and export crops to earn hard currency for the import of foreign machinery. Preobrazhensky pointed out that the Soviet Union could not expect to gain through any comparative advantage in the international market as Britain had, nor did it have colonies to exploit. Thus he advocated 'primitive socialist accumulation', which involved extracting surplus from the peasantry through state control of produce marketing and price setting at a level that was below the world market price, but above a minimum at which peasants would not have incentives to extend cultivation.¹⁶

Preobrazhensky foresaw various interferences in this strategy with regard to the grain market. First, the state had to operate within a limit that was outside of its control, namely the world price for grain. Second, the greater part of grain production was for peasants' subsistence needs and never entered the market or otherwise by-passed state procurement agencies and was channeled through a parallel market. Third, peasants could use their grain surpluses to enhance their standard of living. Feeding more grain to their livestock, the peasants improved their diet and had a lucrative exchange good. This was made possible by the removal of payments and services to landlords and the lifting of forced grain sales which had been a feature of the wartime years. Fourth, rural inequalities amongst the peasants led to the operation of inter-locking labour and grain markets.

¹⁶ Preobrazhensky, New Economics, 171

Poor peasants often had shortfalls of food supply from their own production and had to resort to market exchange, often on barter terms or through the exchange of their labour power for grain. State regulation of grain markets failed to undermine this practice.¹⁷

Despite these impediments, Preobrazhensky was confident that state control of grain marketing would develop as the natural course of events because: the extent of peasant reserves were limited by the nature of the product itself, the meat market was limited by slow growth and the perishability of meat restricted its entry into foreign markets. Furthermore, fluctuating harvests, as experienced in the 1920s, facilitated the penetration of state control because of the decline of grain prices during good harvests and the impact of state grain import on the free market during deficit years. Preobrazhensky saw the role of the state as mediator between the peasantry and the international market as its ultimate source of inevitable control. He saw peasant grain production expanding rapidly to such an extent that grain export would become more and more important.

Despite the optimism of Preobrazhensky in believing that primitive socialist accumulation could proceed on a non-coercive path, there were forebodings of possible problems in his characterization of both local traders and the peasantry. Local traders were viewed as 'parasites', whose appropriation, contrary to the forces of primitive socialist accumulation, did not lay the basis for industrialization and higher productivity in rural areas, even though it was admitted that they could operate at smaller costs per unit of circulation than state trading due to their low overheads and the underlying personal trust of employer and employees in the trading concern.¹⁸ The peasants themselves were seen as nascent capitalists. Preobrazhensky quotes Lenin approvingly regarding the need to replace the peasantry with modern large-scale production.¹⁹

Preobrazhensky was criticized by Bukharin and Stalin for claiming the need to exploit the peasantry and was expelled from the party in 1927, a year after his book was published. Under

¹⁷ Preobrazhensky, New Economics, 180-2

¹⁸ Preobrazhensky, New Economics, 133, 209-10, 239

¹⁹ Preobrazhensky, New Economics, 239

pressure, Preobrazhensky recanted his views in 1934. Nonetheless, he was put to death in the purge of 1937. Ironically, Stalin implemented the policy of primitive socialist accumulation in an extreme and highly coercive form beginning in 1928 with the requisition of grain, followed by forced collectivization a year later. By 1934, most of the land and the peasantry were collectivized.

Since then, the Soviet Union has become an industrial nation but still retains a large rural sector. In 1974, 40% of the population lived in rural areas. Rural household production was estimated as representing 28% of the nation's gross agricultural production and approximately 12% of commercialized production in 1970. The expansion of the national division of labour has had a somewhat limited impact on rural households' consumption pattern. In a 1971 survey, 70% of rural household food needs were met by their own production.²⁰ Overall, Soviet agriculture has not succeeded in generating grain surpluses big enough to feed its urban areas. Not unlike Britain in the 1870s, the Soviet Union in the 1970s was relying on North American imports of wheat to make up its national deficit each year.

4. W.A. Lewis: Expanding Food Supply through International Trade and Technology Transfer

In light of several countries' successful industrialization under a variety of conditions and combinations of state and market forces, Arthur Lewis analyses the economic growth made by the tropical countries since the 1880s.²¹ He argues that the tropical countries had two options, either to imitate the industrialization process of the developed countries or to trade with them. Since their colonial governments did not encourage industrialization and the countries lacked developed markets, an entrepreneurial class and other vital social institutions, the latter course was followed in virtually every case.²² An even greater impediment was their low level of agricultural

²⁰ Kerblay, B. 'Peasant Family Economy in the USSR Today', in E.J. Hobsbawm, W. Kula, A. Mitra, K.N. Raj and I. Sachs (eds), Peasants in History: Essays in Honour of Daniel Thorner, (Calcutta, Oxford University Press, 1980), 73

²¹ Lewis, W.A. Growth and Fluctuations 1870-1913, (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1978)

²² Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, 200

productivity.

While not openly opposed to state-led industrialization, Lewis sees industrialisation as not only an economic and political phenomenon, but also a profoundly sociological one, involving far-reaching structural changes in social organisation. He assumes that the market is the institution most capable of nurturing the requisite changes, in conjunction with state support.²³

To those who charge that participation in international commodity markets hinders the development of tropical countries Lewis demonstrates, through a careful historical review of international terms of trade, that third world international trading conditions have fluctuated over the past century, being especially depressed in the period spanning the two world wars, but have otherwise left room for manoeuvre.²⁴ For Lewis, developing countries' economic problems originate at the level of production rather than exchange.

[T]he poverty of the tropical countries is due mainly to the poverty of their low productivity and only secondarily to their terms of trade. Their productivity is not low because their terms of trade are poor; their terms of trade are poor because their agricultural productivity is low...so long as the bulk of tropical peoples are food farmers with relatively low productivity, tropical products are available to the rest of the world on an essentially low-wage basis, except in the few cases where the tropics can exercise an effective natural monopoly.²⁵

The food production capability/population ratio is an essential part of Lewis's theoretical framework and is analyzed through a historical comparison of world migration patterns and their consequences for international commodity markets. At the turn of the century, about 13 million Europeans settled in the temperate zone frontier areas of Canada, Argentina, Chile, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa and roughly 50 million Indian and Chinese left their countries to work on plantations in the colonial tropics of Asia and Africa. The difference in opportunity costs of labour²⁶ between the two groups was very large. An Asian farmer produced roughly 700 lb of grain per

²³ Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, 222-223

²⁴ Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, 169-170, 225, 234

²⁵ Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, 244

²⁶ This term is what Marx called historically determined 'socially necessary labour time' and welfare economists such as A.K. Sen refer to as the 'fallback position' of labour.

acre while his European counterpart produced 1600 lb per acre and cultivated more acreage. Lewis estimates that European produced roughly six or seven times more than the Asian farmer. These facts were reflected in the terms of trade of the developing world. Both sets of destination countries were unindustrialized, yet the tropical countries received lower prices for their export crops and displayed a lower standard of living than the temperate frontier zones because of their relatively unlimited supplies of Chinese and Indian labour willing to work for anything above the baseline earnings of 700 lb grain. The temperate countries, on the other hand, had greater grain yields and no labour reserves. In Lewis's words:

This analysis clearly turns on the long-run infinite elasticity of the supply of labor to any one activity at prices determined by farm productivity in Europe and Asia, respectively. This is applied to a Ricardian-type comparative cost model with two countries and three goods. The fact that one of these goods, food, is produced by both countries determines the factoral terms of trade, in terms of food...One important conclusion is that the tropical countries cannot escape from these unfavorable terms of trade by increasing productivity in the commodities they export, since this will simply reduce the prices of such commodities...The factoral terms of trade can be improved only by raising tropical productivity in the common commodity, domestic foodstuffs.²⁷

As productivity has continued to improve in food production in the industrialized countries over the last two decades, the prices of their non-food exports do not decline with the price of food in the world market because agricultural incomes are linked to the relatively rigid level of urban incomes. In the tropical countries', on the other hand, export crop prices decline because imported food is being substituted for locally grown staples such that more peasant farmers resort to growing export crops and through competition with one another drive export prices down.

The industrialized countries have a comparative advantage over tropical countries in both manufactures and agricultural products. One might assume that it is therefore unwise for tropical countries to engage in international trade. Lewis argues otherwise. Even though the developing countries have a disadvantaged trading position relative to the less populous industrial world, the market does allow them a means of lifting themselves out of stagnant subsistence peasant

²⁷ Lewis, W.A. The Evolution of the International Economic Order, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978), 15-16

production.²⁸ There are two aspects to the improvement. The market is a channel for technological transfer between the industrial and agrarian nations and the means by which material infrastructure, notably a transport network is provisioned; secondly, it is the medium through which entrepreneurship, middle-class professionalism and social institutions more conducive to an industrial society are fostered.²⁹ This social theme is emphasized very strongly by Lewis and distinguishes him from today's mainstream economists who prefer quantitative model-building and relegate social factors to the status of externalities.³⁰

Lewis's policy prescriptions are in no way new. Family planning is advocated to reduce the birth rate and heavy national investment in raising agricultural productivity. While Lewis argues for participation in the international trade, he sees such participation as a stage of growth rather than the ultimate solution. The ultimate aim is to effect an increase in agricultural productivity large enough to sustain an industrial revolution. Thus an agrarian revolution and industrial revolution are inseparable, both representing technological change and the advancement of the social division of labour. International trade is only a means to that end.³¹

II. The Relationship between Population, the Social Division of Labour and Food Supply

In the works of the four political economists' reviewed above, the balance between food production capability and population is formulated in various ways. Malthus sees 'food production

²⁸ Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, 192,218

²⁹ Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, 223; Lewis, W.A. (ed.), Tropical Development 1880-1913, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1970); Lewis, W.A. The Theory of Economic Growth, (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955)

³⁰ 'Attempts at putting economic history into a set of dynamic equations are doomed to failure...The world economy is a back drop against which the individual peripheral countries stage their very different performances. To make a model in which their rates of growth are determined primarily by events in the international economy - growth of world trade, international lending, migration, terms of trade - would be to omit the sociology of development.' (Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, 167,176)

³¹ Lewis, Growth and Fluctuations, 244

capability' (fpc) as an independent variable with a fixed upper limit. This is because he equates fpc with land availability. Population is posited as the dependent variable. Ricardo, Preobrazhensky and Lewis offer different interpretations of 'fpc'. None of them accept a fixed upper limit. Ricardo reformulates 'fpc' as food supply resulting from land availability and food import capability. National development of technology and the social division of labour determine food import capability. Preobrazhensky constructs 'fpc' as a combination of advances in technology and the social division of labour, notably the development of state marketing of peasant produce and eventual large-scale state production of food. Lewis sees 'fpc' in the same light as Ricardo, emphasizing technology and the development of the social division of labour rather than land availability. In contrast to Preobrazhensky, both Ricardo and Lewis see the market as primary in encouraging the development of the social division of labour.

Ricardo, Preobrazhensky and Lewis, however, still agree with Malthus that food supply and not population is the independent variable. In contrast, Durkheim and Boserup are outstanding proponents of the notion that population is an independent variable with technology and the social division of labour as dependent.

1. Reversing the Malthusian Formulation

1.1 Durkheim: Population Density and the Social Division of Labour

Durkheim never addressed the works of Malthus, yet his thesis in The Division of Labor in Society³² directly contradicted the central tenet of Malthus. For Durkheim, increases in population density are related to the enhancement of the social division of labour. Durkheim advanced the proposition that:

The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the volume and density of societies, and, if it progresses in a continuous manner in the course of social development, it is because societies become regularly denser and generally more voluminous.³³

³² Durkheim, E., The Division of Labor in Society, (New York, The Free Press, 1964 (1933))

³³ Durkheim, Division of Labor, 262

With the increase in population density, human needs proliferate and control over the means of production deepen. Durkheim sees this as giving rise to increased specialization of labour primarily due to the struggle for existence of the human collective.³⁴ Halbwachs, a student of Durkheim, added that in a small population, natural aptitudes are limited, such that the expansion of population gives rise to greater diversity of talent upon which the division of labour proliferates.³⁵

Amongst sociologists of the present day, Durkheim's ideas relating to population density and the social division of labour tend to be dismissed as neither an essential nor convincing part of Durkheim's work.³⁶ On the other hand, The Division of Labor in Society is commonly regarded as the blueprint for most of Durkheim's future work, specifically its discussion of social morality and the division of labour. He sought to explain why 'the individual, while becoming more autonomous, depends more upon society?'³⁷

Durkheim's definition of the division of labour extends beyond Adam Smith's notion of economic inter-dependence and task allocation to social consensus and moral rules of conduct. In the first part of the book Durkheim portrays ancient society virtually without the social division of labour. Coercive authority structures and law demand complete social conformity, a situation referred to as 'mechanical solidarity'. In contrast, modern society encourages an ever greater division of labour which is moulded by restitutive rather than coercive law. What results is an 'organic solidarity' built upon social consensus.

In the second part of the book the over-simplified and misleading dichotomy between mechanical

³⁴ Durkheim, Division of Labor, 266-268

³⁵ Halbwachs, M. Population and Society: Introduction to Social Morphology, (Illinois, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964 (1938)), 38

³⁶ Bellah, R.N. Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press Ltd., 1973), xxvi; Nisbet, R.A. The Sociology of Emile Durkheim, (London, Heinemann, 1975), 246. It should be noted that amongst geographers', 'central place theory', which is very similar to Durkheim's concept, is widely accepted.

³⁷ Durkheim, Division of Labor, 38

and organic solidarity is not stressed and is never picked up in Durkheim's later work.³⁸ Instead Durkheim recognizes that the division of labour exists in pre-market societies in the form of a division of labour and relations of dependence based on sex and age within the family.³⁹ He criticizes Spencer's notion that the division of labour arises out of deliberate rational foresight.⁴⁰ According to Durkheim, the division of labour evolves from the human need for order, harmony and social solidarity in the struggle for human survival. Maintenance of the division of labour is not solely a matter for the governing state; social consensus itself acts in this capacity exerting pressures to conform. Objectively and subjectively, each individual is dependent on the social division of labour for his survival and social cohesion arises therefrom.⁴¹

The elaboration of the division of labour in modern society involves the development of professionalism, i.e. occupational identities distinct from one's territorial or familial identity. Occupational morality is at the very root of a highly developed social division of labour.⁴²

The rules of occupational morality and justice...are...imperative... They force the individual to act in view of ends which are not strictly his own, to make concessions to consent to compromises, to take into account interests higher than his own. Consequently, even where society relies most completely upon the division of labor, it does not become a jumble of juxtaposed atoms, between which it can establish only external, transient contacts. Rather the members are united by ties which extend deeper and far beyond the short moments during which the exchange is made. Each of the functions that they exercise is, in a fixed way, dependent upon others, and with them forms a solidarity system. Accordingly, from the nature of the chosen task permanent duties arise. Because we fill some certain domestic or social function, we are involved in a complex of obligations from which we have no right to free ourselves.⁴³

In Professional Ethics and Civic Morals,⁴⁴ Durkheim elaborates his views on occupational

³⁸ Nisbet, R.A., Sociology, 242-243

³⁹ Durkheim, Division of Labor, 123

⁴⁰ Durkheim, Division of Labor, 263-282

⁴¹ Durkheim, Division of Labor, 5,274,401

⁴² Durkheim, Division of Labor, 189-190

⁴³ Durkheim, Division of Labor, 227

⁴⁴ Durkheim, E., Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1957)

morality. Professional ethics are categorised as intermediary between family morals and civic morals, defined as 'a code of rules that lays down for the individual what he should do so as not to damage collective interests...'⁴⁵. Rights and obligations are specific to each occupational grouping and 'can be established neither by the scientist in his study nor by the statesman; it has to be the task of the groups concerned';⁴⁶ a moral particularism, which arises out of the fact that modern economic life is too vast and too complex. The effectiveness of professional ethics depends on 'the greater the stability and the better the organisation of the professional groups themselves....When they [professional ethics] fail, it is because the cohesion of the group is at fault, because as a group its existence is too shadowy and the rudimentary state of its ethics goes to show its lack of integration.'⁴⁷

Durkheim did not directly consider the effect of the division of labour on food production, but did recognize that the division of labour is disrupted under conditions of material duress. In a famine situation the division of labour contracts as less essential functions are foregone to ensure the essential one, that of provisioning adequate food supply.⁴⁸ This is a point that will be considered in greater detail in the chapters to follow.

While there is a tremendous amount of conceptual fuzziness in The Division of Labor in Society, its optimism regarding human adaptability to the imperatives of survival represents an important contrast to Malthus.

1.2 Boserup: Population Increase and Technology

In her book The Conditions of Agricultural Growth, Boserup sets out to counter Malthus's central

⁴⁵ Durkheim, Professional Ethics, 14

⁴⁶ Durkheim, Professional Ethics, 31

⁴⁷ Durkheim, Professional Ethics, 8,13

⁴⁸ Durkheim, Division of Labor, 271

premise that land availability was the constraint determining food supply.⁴⁹ She argues from evidence of existing third world agricultural practices that the human response to land shortage is the adoption of more productive tools which serve to intensify land and labour usage. The succession from shifting cultivation with digging sticks, to hoes, to more intensive agricultural techniques with shorter fallow periods and ploughs, progressing to permanent mixed agriculture, was overlooked by Malthus who lived in an economy where permanent agriculture was the norm. Population growth actually serves to develop the agrarian economy technically and often materially rather than impoverish it as Malthus argued.

The underlying assumption behind Boserup's theory is that increasing land productivity has historically been bought at the cost of labour intensification. Generally, agrarian non-market societies are unwilling to intensify their labour expenditure until population pressure and human survival needs make it imperative.⁵⁰

In Boserup's analytical framework, population is the independent variable and is positively correlated with the dependent variable, namely, technological development in food production. Wrigley argues that one cannot safely assume that there is necessarily a positive correlation between the two. The societies that subsequent to demographic increase experienced higher mortality rates, falling back to their long-established equilibrium level of population for lack of technological innovation, are difficult to trace in the historical record, whereas the success stories which support Boserup's theory are far more salient. On the basis of lack of evidence, Wrigley refuses to accept the Boserup thesis as empirical fact but strikes a compromise position between Boserup and Malthus stating that 'there is an upper limit to productive capacity in all but the longest term.'⁵¹

Boserup shares Durkheim's optimism towards the beneficial effects of high population densities,

⁴⁹ Boserup, E., The Conditions of Agricultural Growth, (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965)

⁵⁰ On this point, see Sahlins, M. Stone Age Economics, (London, Tavistock Publications, 1974)

⁵¹ Wrigley, 'Malthus's Model', 305-306

but her stress is on the effects of population increase on technology rather than the division of labour. Labour intensification requires a restructuring of the division of labour and she clearly illustrates this with respect to women's participation in agricultural production under different agricultural regimes.⁵²

In Population and Technology,⁵³ Boserup traces the effect of population growth on the development of technology and material culture. Food supply was a constraint on the growth of urban settlement and its concomitant, the elaboration of the division of labour. Ancient and medieval cities arose not so much in areas known for higher than average agricultural productivity, but rather in places where there was a particularly high density of rural population in close proximity. It is the absolute rather than the relative surplus of grain that accrued in subsistence agricultural systems that was critical to urban development in ancient and medieval times.⁵⁴

Boserup cautions that the positive relationship between population and technological development does not persist in a coherent form once the impact of industrialization and the world market begins to act on an agrarian economy. Transport technology and the operation of the market brings agricultural innovations to rural populations that may be adopted for other reasons than population pressure. The forces of modernization on the part of a state bureaucracy or a particular ruling class are decisive. Nonetheless, Asia is more likely to develop faster technologically than Africa, because of its denser rural population who face land shortages and dispossession of their means of rural livelihood. The process of proletarianization combined with a long urban tradition are more conducive conditions for industrialization than those prevailing in the more sparsely populated African continent.⁵⁵

⁵² Boserup, E. Women's Role in Economic Development, (New York, St. Martin's, 1970)

⁵³ Boserup, E. Population and Technology, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1981)

⁵⁴ Boserup, Population, 65

⁵⁵ Boserup, Population, 156

In reviewing the present third world food problem, Boserup seems in agreement with Lewis. Cheap food imports from the developed countries' more technologically advanced and higher grain-yielding systems cause a displacement of third world food production and heightened export crop production that leads to lower prices. Nonetheless, like Lewis, she does not conclude that the situation is futile. With the right policies and perhaps more importantly, the right 'administrative technology' a simultaneous agrarian and industrial revolution is within the reach of the developing world. 'Administrative technology' is an awkward phrase that seems to have been devised to keep the technology theme of her book consistently in the forefront. It actually denotes the social division of labour, particularly the modernizing cadre involved in government decision-making and development projects.⁵⁶

2. Variation on the Classical Problem: Food Insecurity and the Social Division of Labour

It is apparent from the broad sweep of history that agricultural technology does advance as population increases, but not without setbacks and painful delays, causing ill-health and early death for countless numbers. The classical economists and their followers were concerned with suggesting state and market strategies for rectifying the imbalance between food production capability and food demand by a growing population. They assumed that the state and market were viable social institutions capable of serving as the organizers of the society's agricultural work effort. It is only Lewis who throws some shadow of doubt onto the situation with his emphasis on institution-building. Some developing countries clearly do not have entrepreneurs and market rationality or a state and modernising cadre strong enough to give sufficient impetus to technological development. There are other social institutions that are determining technology choice in these societies. And the question to be answered is why, despite the formalistic presence of the state and market in these societies, there is relatively little content to their operations. What is holding back their effectiveness?

⁵⁶ Boserup, Population, 188-210

Insight can be derived from being more analytically precise about the division of labour. Durkheim defined the division of labour as the economic interdependence of specialized producers and the ideologically cohesive force of occupational morality. I have chosen to define it as the combination of economic interdependence through labour specialization, function-based morality and social institutions. The occupational moralities can then be more precisely identified relative to their role in the societies' social institutions. As social institutions, the market and state are clearly pivotal, but there are others, notably, in the Tanzanian case, clientage networks and households, each of which has its own morality.

But how does food production capability relate to this expanded notion of the social division of labour? The interaction of food production capability and population is mediated by technology and the social division of labour. Having stated at the outset of this section that the long-term tendency is for food production capability to respond to population growth, on the other hand, in the short-term, restricted food production capability is a constraint on the quality if not the quantity of population. In other words, population growth may proceed under food supply constrictions, but the standard of living and dietary intake will suffer.

It is interesting that almost all the authors reviewed, assumed that restricted food supply would engender positive human efforts to increase food production and distribution. Malthus, however viewed such efforts as futile because of the limits of land availability. Durkheim, on the other hand, acknowledged the destructive effects of famine on the social division of labour, but did not extrapolate its consequences.⁵⁷

In general, Malthus's gloomy outlook has fortunately been proven wrong as technological developments in agricultural productivity have unfolded, but in specific contexts there appears to be certain short and medium-term bottlenecks in the development of technology and the division of labour that arises not out of any God-ordained limit, but rather from human action and social organization. In this thesis it is argued that the phenomenon of food insecurity, in and of itself, can act as a

⁵⁷ Durkheim, Division of Labor, 271

limiting factor on the food supply situation. This may seem tautological, but when seen in the context of a cycle its significance becomes clearer. Food insecurity defined as the inadequacy of the quantity and quality of food consumption, as well as its irregularity over time can lead to the contraction and ineffectiveness of the institutions that might serve as positive spurs to the enhancement of food production and distribution. In so doing, food insecurity acts as the independent variable holding back the development of the division of labour and technology that could bring about an increase in food production.

Briefly, the argument is as follows, food insecurity causes a reduction in the scale of the division of labour and impedes the development of the state and market. Households and clientage networks, smaller in scale and based on face-to-face interaction, encroach on state and market functions and tend to dominate under the duress of shortfalls of basic essentials such as food. With technological stagnation and a division of labour in agriculture restricted to that primarily based on sex and age within the peasant household, the age-old peasant need for household labour power influences women's fertility decision-making. Population increases, facilitated by improvements in health arising from imported medical technology. The combination of increased population exerting more food demand on a stagnant agriculture, the restricted social division of labour, and the fluctuation of weather serve to heighten food insecurity, and so begins another round of the vicious cycle of food insecurity.

FIGURE 1.1 depicts the cycle of food insecurity and contrasts it with the schemas of the three other authors considered in this section.

Food insecurity, arising from the vicissitudes of the weather, has profoundly influenced the development of the division of labour in Tanzania. Food insecurity leads to small-scale, risk-averse tactics on the part of all economic agents who are reacting to very basic material uncertainty, i.e. whether or not they and their households will have a sufficient supply of food. The moral content and the social organization of the division of labour have evolved around persistent food insecurity.

The household is the main unit of production. Peasant households continue to grow their own

food rather than depending on market supply and specializing in production. Distribution of food outside the household is increasingly channeled through clientage networks as material uncertainty grows. With domination of household and clientage networks, the proliferation of functional groups is restricted to that made possible by face-to-face accountability or household ties. A circularity sets in whereby this particular configuration of the division of labour and social organization can serve to perpetuate or even heighten food insecurity, by its limited scale, its barriers to outside innovation and to the free flow of food between deficit and surplus areas through market channels, as well as the consequent impediments to the development of food production technology.

The low density of the agricultural population and a severe lack of transport infrastructure contributes to the dominance of the household and clientage networks over the state and market. Formally the market and state exist, but their operation is modified by the household and clientage networks, which lend them their substantive social, economic and moral content.

In summary, a restricted division of labour is related to a high incidence of food insecurity. Food insecurity arising from low, erratic food output is an impediment to Tanzanian national development in the transition from rural agrarian to urban industrial society. This tendency should be seen in the context of contradictory forces at work. On the one hand, there exists embryonic economic accumulation and social change leading towards an expanded division of labour, urbanisation, industrialization and the evolution of the 'collective worker' whose work discipline is akin to Durkheim's notion of occupational morality. On the other hand, there are social forces responding to the material insecurity which take the form of personalistic strategies of the extended household and clientage networks aimed at ensuring household survival.

The argument developed in the following chapters is: food insecurity retards development of functional social groups and the organizational structure of the market and state relative to the household and clientage networks, due to the prevalence of risk-averting, household-based strategies of all functional groups as opposed to maximizing strategies of market or state agents. Thus a simple division of labour is related to a high incidence of food insecurity.

III. Background Information on Tanzania

Tanzania⁵⁸ is a relatively large sub-Saharan African country encompassing 881,289 square kms. It is amongst the 25 poorest countries in the world, with a per capita GNP of \$280 in 1982 and an economy overwhelmingly dependent on the efforts of peasant cultivators. The main exports are coffee, cotton, sisal, tea and cashewnut which constituted 57% of total export value in 1982. Industrial development at present is very limited, restricted mainly to the production of consumer goods like textiles, cigarettes, batteries etc. The manufacturing sector is estimated to have accounted for 9% of GDP in 1981 as opposed to agriculture's 54%; 21% being monetary and 33% subsistence agriculture.⁵⁹

Ethnically Tanzania is very diverse with over 100 different tribal groupings. During the last half of the nineteenth century Tanzania was the scene of an extensive long distance caravan trade in ivory and to a lesser extent slaves. Arab and Indian merchants operating under the protection of the Sultan of Zanzibar were the organizers and financiers of the trade. In 1891, Tanzania came under German colonial rule. Rural resistance to colonial rule led the Germans to establish military as well as civilian district administrations. German East Africa was the site of intense fighting between the Germans and the British during World War I. In the aftermath of the war, the League of Nations made Tanganyika⁶⁰ a mandated territory under the trusteeship of Britain. District and provincial boundaries and administrative headquarters established by the Germans remained roughly the same under the British (MAP 1.1).

The country achieved political independence from Britain on the 9th of December, 1961. At independence the provinces were broken down into smaller regional units whereas district boundaries were left relatively intact. Presently, the Tanzanian mainland is divided up into 20 regions subdivided into several districts each (MAP 1.2). On average there are 100 villages in a district.

⁵⁸ This thesis refers to Tanzania mainland and excludes Zanzibar and Pemba islands.

⁵⁹ IBRD, Economic Memorandum on Tanzania, 3086-TA, (Washington D.C., 1981), 101

⁶⁰ Tanganyika became known as Tanzania in 1964 when the political union between Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar was effected. Tanzania mainland is still frequently referred to as Tanganyika.

Between the village and district level there are wards. Usually a district encompasses 18 to 25 wards.

At the time of the 1978 census the total population numbered 17.0 million, of which 87% lived in the rural areas. In the inter-censal period between 1967 and 1978, the population growth rate was 3.3% per annum. Tanzania's overall population density is fairly low when compared with most non-African third world countries. At the time of the 1978 census it was 18.7 persons per square km., but rural population densities ranged between 1.0 and 233.6 persons per square km between districts.⁶¹

IV. Thesis Contents

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter Two examines characteristics of the peasant household and reviews types of household food inadequacy serving as background for the historical chapters to follow. Chapters Three through Six provide a detailed analysis of the development of Tanzania's social division of labour in relation to the incidence of national food insecurity during the periods spanning 1919-1950, 1950-1973 and 1973-1985. A summary and theoretical conclusions are contained in Chapter Seven. The supporting statistical tables, figures and maps for each chapter are provided in Appendix I. Appendices II through VIII offer supplementary technical information of a primarily geographical nature.

⁶¹ Maro, P., 'Population Distribution and Density', 1978 Population Census, Volume VIII, (DSM, Bureau of Statistics, 1983), 106-109

CHAPTER 2: PEASANT HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION, DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND FOOD INSECURITY, 1919-1985

In rural Tanzania, the primary unit of production and consumption is the peasant household. Food self-sufficiency is usually the peasant household's foremost productive aim.¹ Cereals and root crops constitute the bulk of the rural diet.² Food insecurity will be discussed exclusively in terms of these staple foods.

Because of the country's geographical and ethnic diversity, a wide variety of cereals and root crops are consumed. The most recent national household budget survey records rural household consumption in order of value as follows: maize (46%), rice (12%), sorghum/millet (10%), bananas (8%), cassava (6%), sweet potatoes (5%), barley (2%), potatoes (2%), wheat (1%), and other assorted starches (7%).³

In this chapter, some of the more important characteristics of peasant household production relations and technology will be outlined, before considering demographic features and the population/food production capability balance. Turning to the pattern of food consumption, a peasant household food supply decision-making model is presented, followed by a discussion of the types and incidence of peasant household food inadequacy.

1. Characteristics of the Peasant Household Farming Unit

Before colonial rule was established in the 1890s, Tanzania was a collection of local tribal agrarian economies loosely bounded by long-distance trade in hunting and gathering products, notably ivory, salt, and copal.⁴ The smallest unit of economic endeavour was not the household, but rather

¹ The 1976/77 Household Budget Survey indicated that eighty-one percent of a sample of rural households' food by weight is of subsistence origin (Tanzania, Central Statistical Bureau, '1976/77 Household Budget Survey', (HBS), Unpublished Computer Print-out Tables, 1983)

² 39% of total food consumption by value and 75% by weight (1976/77 'HBS', Tables 3A.1 and 10A.1).

³ Tanzania, 1976/77 HBS Table 3A.1 unpublished results

⁴ Iliffe, J. A Modern History of Tanganyika, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), 67-77

the lineage or in the case of some tribes the age-grade. After the establishment of colonial rule this gradually changed. Colonial economic policy aimed at a higher level of economic production and circulation than what could be sustained on the basis of hunting and gathering. Agriculture was to become pivotal to commodity production, in addition to being the foundation of subsistence production. Agriculturalists and pastoralists were drawn into commodity exchange through the imposition of taxes, and in this way a peasantry was created. The unit of tax collection was the residence of the reproductive couple referred to as the 'hut', and peasant households began to displace lineages as the primary unit of social organization. The social force of lineages and age-grades was to continue, but as units of economic reckoning they would become increasingly subsidiary and supportive to strategies of survival and accumulation based on the smaller household unit.

As a production unit, the peasant household is relatively small and based on familial relations. Because it serves as a unit of human reproduction and consumption, its productive, reproductive and consumption strategies all inter-lock. It has a great deal of autonomy over its labour resources, but the state is involved in defining its access to land and capital.

1. Household Labour Force

Tanzanian peasant agriculture is premised on household labour. In the past and continuing to the present, relatively few peasant households have hired in labour. During the colonial period, although migrant wage labour was highly prevalent in many areas, there is not much evidence of wage labour being employed on peasant holdings. Traditional forms of labour exchange were more common. Until 1925, chiefs could call on their subjects to perform labour service.⁵ Amongst the peasant producers, communal labour parties were often called for harvesting and strenuous work of an infrequent nature.

In the post-independence period, peasant wage labour is found in some areas, but it is by no

⁵ Iliffe, Modern History, 283

means widespread nor deeply entrenched. The 1971 Agricultural Census records only 0.4% of all peasant agricultural labour as other than household labour.⁶ In a more recent 1980 survey of 20 villages in 8 regions by Collier et al. 90% of the labour force gave their main or only occupation as farming and only 1% of total agricultural labour was allocated to non-household, non-communal farm work.⁷ Since the hiring of labour has been actively discouraged by the post-colonial government, these survey figures may be subject to under-reporting. Nonetheless, in comparing Tanzania with the rest of the third world, or even with neighbouring Kenya, the relative absence of a labour market in the peasant sector is striking. In the 1960s, hired labour constituted 10% of mandays worked on Sukuma farms.⁸ At present, in Bukoba, larger farms sometimes employ labour for harvesting coffee. In a 1983 survey 23% of the households hired labour for seasonal tasks or land clearance.⁹ In Kilimanjaro, where a similar cropping pattern of coffee and banana occurs, hired labour is not used to any noticeable extent.¹⁰

In 1978, the average rural household size was 5.0, ranging from 3.7 to 6.3 between regions.¹¹ The household labour force is characterised by a division of labour on the basis of age and sex. Task allocation varies somewhat between tribal groups but most areas fall into Boserup's 'female

⁶ Tanzania, Agricultural Census of Tanzania 1971/71, Vol. 1, Peasant Farming, (DSM, Bureau of Statistics, 1979), Table 15, 246

⁷ Collier, P., S. Radwan, S. Wangwe and A. Wagner, Labour and Poverty in Rural Tanzania, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986), 41,45

⁸ Collinson, M.P. 'The Economic Characteristics of the Sukuma Farming System', ERB 72.5, (1972), 14

⁹ Kajumulo-Tibaijuka, A. 'An Economic Analysis of Smallholder Banana-Coffee Farms in the Kagera Region, Tanzania', Report 240, University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden, (1984), 79

¹⁰ Schneider-Barthold, W. 'Farmers' Reaction to the Economic Situation in Tanzania with Respect to Production and Marketing: A Case Study of Five Villages in the Kilimanjaro Region', German Development Institute mimeo, Berlin, (1983), 67-68

¹¹ Tanzania, 1978 Population Census, Vol. VIII, (DSM, Bureau of Statistics, 1983), 476

farming' category.¹² Generally, men are expected to clear the land and assist in planting, while women provide the bulk of hoeing and weeding work. In those areas where ploughs have been adopted women are sometimes found ploughing, but more significantly the larger acreages that can be farmed with ploughs increases the time women must devote to weeding.¹³

Fifty-four percent of the rural household labour force were women in 1971.¹⁴ Studies of various rural areas of Tanzania have revealed that women are generally working longer hours than men.¹⁵ Detailed labour time studies have been concentrated in the Kagera Region (West Lake). Men's yearly labour expenditure in crop production was 84% of that of women in Rald and Rald's 1969 village survey.¹⁶ During the day, men distributed their activities proportionately between agricultural work (45%), leisure (44%) and social activities (11%), whereas the corresponding figures for women were 59%, 29% and 12%.¹⁷ Kajumulo-Tibaijuka's 1983 village sample survey records an even greater gap in leisure between the sexes with leisure accounting for 37% and 16% of daily activities for men and

¹² Boserup, E. Women's Role in Economic Development, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1970)

¹³ Kjaerby, F. Problems and Contradictions in the Development of Ox-Cultivation in Tanzania, Centre for Development Research (CDR), Copenhagen, No. 66 (1983), 63

¹⁴ Tanzania, 1971 Agricultural Census, Table 14

¹⁵ Ruvuma: Lewin, R., 'Matetereka' Mbioni, 5(3), (1969); Lushoto: Mbilinyi, M., 'The Changing Position of Women in Peasant Commodity Production: The Case of the Shambaa Kingdom', Symposium on Women and Work in Africa, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (1979); Mwanza: Ngalula, T.K.F., Women as Productive Force in the Tanzanian Rural Society: A Case Study of Buhongwe Village in Mwanza District, M.A. thesis, UDSM (1977); Omen-Myin, M.A., Involvement of Rural Women in Village Development in Tanzania: A Case Study in Morogoro District, Department of Agricultural Extension, UDSM, Morogoro, (1981); Bukoba: Storgaard, B., 'Women in Ujamaa Villages', Rural Africana, 29, (1976); Kilimanjaro and Bukoba: Swantz, M-L., 'Strain and Strength among Peasant Women in Tanzania', BRALUP Research Paper No. 49, UDSM, (1977)

¹⁶ Rald, J. and K. Rald, Rural Organization in Bukoba District, Tanzania, (Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1975), 78

¹⁷ Rald and Rald, Rural Organization, 70-71

women respectively.¹⁸

Historically, men have had a stronger presence in cashcropping throughout Tanzania while women have held greater responsibility for food crops. Kajumulo-Tibaijuka's detailed household farm management survey reveals the implications of this for the West Lake area. In the kibanja coffee plots, 52% of labour expenditure was by women as opposed to the annual food crops for household consumption which consisted of a female labour input of 87%. Traditionally, men performed land clearance and the practice continues. Seventy-six percent of kibanja plot expansion was done by men.¹⁹

In the 1971 Agricultural Census, 2.5% of the total peasant labour force were children under the age of 14, but this figure refers to field labour and does not include all the non-farm household tasks that children are expected to perform.²⁰ Mascarenhas found that nearly 50% of the parents in a Sumbawanga survey counted on their children's labour often in domestic tasks such as cooking, washing dishes, bathing other children, childcare and looking after the elderly, herding, fetching firewood and water, and shopping.²¹ Tasks that took the child outside of the immediate vicinity of the home were considered the responsibility of the boys, whereas the domestic tasks were performed mainly by the girls.

2. Household Fertility Pattern

Children's contribution to the household workload and their responsibilities to aged parents,

¹⁸ Daily time allocation by sex in 1983 village survey (Kagera Region): farming activities: male 44%, female 52%; other economic activities: male 6%, female 1.5%; domestic activities: male 4%, female 23%; social duties, male 6%, female 4.4% and sickness, male 3%, female 4%; leisure: male, 37% and female, 16% (Kajumulo-Tibaijuka, 'Economic Analysis', 77).

¹⁹ Kajumulo-Tibaijuka, 'Economic Analysis', 77

²⁰ Tanzania, 1971 Agricultural Census, Table 14

²¹ Mascarenhas, A.C. 'Participation of Children in Socio-Economic Activities: The Case of Rukwa Region' BRALUP Research Report No. 20.1, (January 1977), 14

makes each child an asset to the household. Female fertility is held in high esteem. Motherhood is considered to be the most important role a woman could ever fulfill, and through it she gains social recognition and status. Traditionally it was considered natural for women to give birth to a child approximately every three or four years throughout her childbearing years. For two to three years after the birth of a baby, lactation in conjunction with sexual abstinence were moral imperatives aimed at safeguarding women from pregnancy and ensuring their babies' health. Recent census data suggests that a natural fertility regime continues to prevail. The total fertility rate for the rural areas of Tanzania was reported as 7.4 and 6.4 children, and the mean average age of first marriage was 17.9 and 17.1 years, in the 1967 and 1978 censuses respectively.²²

Kocher attempted to identify determinants of rural fertility within the framework of neo-classical demand and supply models, measuring the relative costs and benefits of children in Kilimanjaro and Lushoto peasant households. The demand model did not yield significant R^2 s, indicating that little differentiation of fertility decision-making exists with regard to standard economic variables such as value of crops, income, religion, and level of mother's education. However, in the supply model, fertility had a highly significant, positive correlation with infant mortality, suggesting that women do try to compensate for the death of a child.²³

Rural infant and child mortality rates were 141 and 113 respectively in 1978. Life expectancy was 41 in 1967 and 44 in 1978.²⁴ The gradual decline in mortality rates and the persistence of high fertility has resulted in rapid population growth in the rural areas (TABLE 2.1.1-3).

²² Egero, B. and R.A. Henin, 'Fertility', 1967 Population Census, Vol. VI, (1973), 192; Henin, R.A. and B. Egero, 'The 1967 Population Census of Tanzania: A Demographic Analysis', BRALUP Research Paper No. 19, (1972), 19; Tanzania, 1978 Population Census, VI, 318,348-349. Note that the 1978 total fertility rate was regarded as possibly too low owing to an understatement of current births.

²³ Kocher, J.E. 'Rural Development and Fertility Change in Tropical Africa: Evidence from Tanzania', BRALUP Research Paper No. 53, (1979), 44-56

²⁴ Tanzania, 1978 Population Census, Vol. VI, 291 and 339

It is debatable when Tanzania's present rural population growth began.²⁵ Authorities tend to think that the population stagnated or even declined during most of the German colonial period, as a result of violent upheaval and pestilence. An upswing probably occurred in the 1920s.²⁶ Since then growth has been steady and seems to have accelerated in the 1960s (TABLE 2.1.1-3).

3. Household Land

Peasants' rights to land have been subject to unwritten customary law for most of the period under study. Their actual access has been largely conditioned by the degree of under- or over-population existing in their locality. There has been little landlessness in rural Tanzania, although many areas are supporting relatively high population densities. In the last two decades, rural over-population has been eased by a high urban migration rate.

Tanzania's land tenure policy has been eclectic during the British colonial and post-colonial periods. In the 1923 Land Ordinance, the entire territory was declared 'public land', with the exception of that land that had been alienated as freehold during the German period (roughly 1% of the total).²⁷ The government conferred two types of tenancy on public land: leasehold private rights of occupancy for a term not exceeding 99 years and rights of occupancy to tribal communities. The latter were entrusted to 'native authorities' headed by local chiefs under a system of indirect rule.²⁸ The native authorities guaranteed usufruct rights to peasant cultivators. However, by the 1950s, landlord and tenant relationships had appeared in the densely populated areas of

²⁵ The censuses before 1948 are suspected of being inaccurate.

²⁶ Goldthorpe, J.E. 'The African Population of East Africa: A Summary of its Past and Present Trends', in East Africa Royal Commission 1953-55 Report, Appendix VII, (London, HMSO, 1955)

²⁷ Under the mandate of the League of Nations, the British colonial government was obligated to protect African rights to land, which constrained land alienation to European settlers.

²⁸ Chief Secretary, Tanganyika to Colonial Office, 'Tanganyika Land Law', 1/7/33, PRO/CO691/60/214-216; Graham, J.D. 'Indirect Rule: The Establishment of 'Chiefs' and 'Tribes' in Cameron's Tanganyika', INR 77/78, (1976), 1-10

Kilimanjaro, Upare, Ukerewe, Bukoba and Usukuma.²⁹ A great deal of debate over land tenure took place in the last decade of colonial rule, with the official consensus being that African freehold should be enacted to ensure security of tenure and encourage modern farming methods and marketed production.³⁰

Nyerere, the chairman of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), soon to be president of Tanzania, had strong leanings towards Fabian socialism and was adamantly opposed to freehold tenure.³¹ In 1963, the post-colonial government converted existing freehold into leasehold which for the most part pertained to non-Africans. Peasants' land rights were left in the sphere of unwritten customary law, despite the dismantling of the power of the local chiefs with the abolition of the Native Authorities. Peasants' customary usufruct rights were upheld but the local conferring agency was left ambiguous throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.³² The 1975 Village Act specified peasants usufruct rights and vested the Village Council with the powers of land allocation, transfer and land use planning. More recently, the Ministry of Agriculture has proposed that Village Councils grant 33 year leaseholds to villagers with a stipulation that these cannot be bought or sold but rather revert to the Village Council when the land is not being used.³³ This measure is designed to meet the criticism that the law did not ensure peasants' security of tenure and was therefore a disincentive to peasant investment in land improvement.

²⁹ James, R.W. Land Tenure and Policy in Tanzania, (Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau, 1971), 22; Tanner, R.E.S. 'Land Tenure in Northern Sukumaland, Tanganyika: An Analysis of Present-day Trends in Two Parishes', EAAJ 21, (October 1955), 123; Iliffe, Modern History, 459

³⁰ East Africa Royal Commission, East Africa, 346-367

³¹ 'If we permit the land to be sold, like a garment today, the day after tomorrow, the land in Tanganyika will all belong to a comparatively few Africans and the great majority will be tenants' (Nyerere, J.K., Mali ya Taifa: Maoni juu ya Ardhi, (DSM, Thakars, 1958) transl. RH Mss. Afr.s.1749).

³² James, Land Tenure, 22

³³ Tanzania, Ministry of Agriculture, The Agricultural Policy of Tanzania, (DSM, Government Printer, 1983) 110

The 1971 Agricultural Census recorded the average peasant holding as 1.3 ha.; 32.3% being under 0.5 ha. Seventy-two percent of all peasant land was 'owned or held owner-like' under customary law, whereas only 4% of the land was rented, another 3% was owned or held owner-like under government tenure and the remainder existed under more than one form of tenure.³⁴ During the villagization programme of the mid-1970s which nucleated peasant settlements a great deal of re-allocation of land took place. Collier et al. record the average size of household holding in the pre- and post-villagisation period at 2.1 and 1.9 ha. respectively.³⁵ According to their findings, the distribution of land between households before and after villagization has not altered significantly. Fifty-eight percent of those who owned less than 0.5 ha. in the pre-villagization period had not increased their holdings whereas 70% with more than 5 ha. before retained that amount after. The Gini coefficient of land concentration was a low 0.35 in the post-villagization period with landlessness reported as negligible.³⁶

4. Household Non-Farm Activities

Collier et al.'s village survey found only 10% of total labour allocated to off-farm activities.³⁷ Other studies support this low figure.³⁸ Beer-brewing is by far the most important non-farm cash-earning activity of rural households, except in coastal Islamic areas. For many rural

³⁴ Tanzania, 1971 Agricultural Census, Table 2

³⁵ Collier et al. Labour and Poverty, 53. These figures would infer considerable under-reporting of land holdings in the 1971 Agricultural Census. Regional surveys differ widely on the size of average household land holdings, but in highland areas surveys, findings have been similar to those of the Agricultural Census, e.g. Bukoba, 1.0 ha. and Kilimanjaro, 1.2 (Kajumulo-Tibaijuka, 'Economic Analysis', 243 and Schneider-Barthold, 'Farmers' Reactions', 35).

³⁶ Collier et al., Labour and Poverty, 51

³⁷ Collier et al. Labour and Poverty, 45

³⁸ Rudengren, J. and M-L Swantz, 'Village Skills Survey: Report of the Pre-Pilot and Pilot Surveys', BRALUP Research Paper No. 42, (1976), 29

women, brewing is their only means of gaining cash, in an otherwise male-dominated village economy.³⁹

The existence of other non-farm activities tends to be limited by the low purchasing power of the villages. Periods of rural prosperity sustain an array of non-farm activities. During the mid-1950s in Bukoba, Reining found men spending a lot of time in secondary occupations, whereas in the depressed period of the early 1980s male and female farmers reported spending only 3% and 1.5% of their waking hours engaged in building, handicraft skills, trading and other non-farm activities.⁴⁰ Access to urban markets is another stimulus. In Rufiji district which is proximate to the Dar es Salaam market, 60% of the rural economically active population were engaged in crafts and extractive industries for market sale.⁴¹ In more prosperous Kiliwanjaro villages, 50% of cash incomes is derived from non-farm production of goods destined for sale to Moshi and Arusha urban residents.⁴²

Generally, except for beer brewing and the non-farm activities of rural areas exceptionally well-connected to urban markets, most peasant households are engaged almost solely in plant and animal husbandry activities. Only during the relatively few interludes of this century when peasant agricultural commodity production experienced an economic boom due to favourable terms of trade and weather conditions, has the village division of labour been able to specialize and expand.

5. Summary

It must be stressed that Tanzanian households have existed as units of production, consumption

³⁹ Bryceson, D.F. and M. Kirimbai, 'Subsistence or Beyond? Money-Earning Activities of Rural Women in Tanzania' BRALUP/UWT, (1980), 156; McCall, M. 'Heavier Burdens and Lower Status: Some Implications of Villagisation for Women in Tanzania', Technische Hogeschool, Twente, The Netherlands, (1984), 14; Mascarenhas, O. 'Women's Control of Resources and Its Implications for the Food and Nutrition Status of their Family', Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre/UNICEF Workshop on 'Hunger and Society', Soliwayo, Tanzania, (1983), 23

⁴⁰ Reining, P. 'Social Factors and Food Production in an East African Peasant Society: The Haya' in P. McLoughlin (ed.), African Food Production Systems, (Baltimore, John Hopkin's Press, 1970), 78-83; Kajumulo-Tibaijuka, 'Economic Analysis', 77

⁴¹ Havnevik, K.J. 'Economy and Organization in Rufiji District: The Case of Crafts and Extractive Activities', DERAP No. 112, Bergen, Norway, (1980), 29

⁴² Schneider-Barthold et al. 'Farmers' Reactions', 65

and reproduction throughout the period under study. They have tended to provision their own subsistence, while participating to a greater or lesser degree in agricultural commodity production. The development of land and peasant labour markets varies over the country, but overall they are still at an embryonic stage, in part because the post-colonial government did not encourage their development, and more significantly perhaps, because population densities did not reach critical levels. The rural division of labour is based primarily on age and sex which determines not only the allocation of the household workload, but also access to household resources. Finally, the high fertility of rural households during the period has resulted in demographic upsurge.

II. Food Production and Risk Aversion

Tanzanian peasant agriculture is primarily devoted to subsistence food production and exhibits a variety of cropping patterns and practices finely tuned to compensate for the precariousness of the physical environment. APPENDIX II lists the horticultural requirements, spatial distribution and average yields of Tanzania's main staple food crops. APPENDIX III provides information on the physical causes of food insecurity, erratic and low rainfall being the chief obstacle. Different classifications of agricultural zones are reviewed in APPENDIX IV. TABLE 2.2 gives the means and standard deviations for wet period precipitation from 15 Tanzanian rainfall stations. The standard deviations are much higher than those normally found in temperate climates, indicating the high level of uncertainty that peasant producers face.⁴³

In the absence of reliable statistics on annual production, it is impossible to measure the effect of rainfall variation on total grain production over time or space. However, net grain import/export statistics do exist for the period under review. They provide a long and consistent record of Tanzania's grain supply situation from which inferences can be made about domestic grain production. TABLE 2.3 lists net import/exports of maize, rice, sorghum/millet and wheat between 1920

⁴³ Nieuwolt, S. 'Seasonal Droughts in East Africa', East Afr. Agric. For. J., 43(3) (1978), 208-222

and 1984. TABLE 2.4 gives the Spearman's Rank correlation coefficients for rainfall and grain variables, specifically annual wet period rainfall from the 15 widely dispersed rainfall stations listed in TABLE 2.2 and annual national net grain import/exports listed in TABLE 2.3.

The correlations are not significant for most of the rainfall stations during the period between 1920-1982. In trying to discern a pattern, mean averages of the coefficients by grain type are given. The expected positive correlation, albeit low, is evident for maize, rice and sorghum/millet, in descending order of magnitude. Wheat has a negative average, which is understandable since wheat is grown in only a few places in the country, mostly in Arusha and Iringa regions. However, no clear pattern is discernable when comparing results between rainfall stations and grain types. When the series is broken down into three 21-year intervals, there is a tendency for the highest correlations to occur in the 1962-82 period for all grains except millet, and is particularly marked for the country's most important staple, maize (TABLES 2.5.1-4). This might suggest that food import and by inference grain production are more sensitive to rainfall fluctuation after national independence in 1961, and that peasant farming is becoming more rather than less physically vulnerable. There is no evidence of a decline in rainfall over time; the mean annual rainy season precipitation for all fifteen stations for the three successive 21-year periods was 923, 981 and 972mm.

TABLE 2.6 provides national summary data on rainfall by year and TABLE 2.7 correlates this data with net grain import/export figures. The results again show a significant correlation for the most recent period between 1970-80, particularly for maize.

Given the unreliability of rainfall, risk-averting farming practices are found throughout Tanzania, whatever the degree of cashcropping and cattle-owning. The most important one is intercropping.⁴⁴ In the 1971 Agricultural Census, 52% of all food crop hectarage was reported as inter-

⁴⁴ Evans, A.C. 'Studies of Inter-Cropping: 1-Maize or Sorghum with Groundnuts', EAAFI, 26, (July 1960), 1

cropped.⁴⁵ One of the most common crop combinations is a grain and a legume, such as maize and cowpeas. Agronomists acknowledge that inter-cropping is a sound practice. Different root depths are good for water balance, legumes are nitrogen-fixing and thereby enrich the soil, and most importantly, combining crops with different water requirements mitigates the possibility of a total harvest failure.⁴⁶

Because of differences in soils and micro-climate effects, farmers prefer to cultivate several scattered fields rather than one large holding to minimize the risk of crop failure.⁴⁷ The 1971 Agricultural Census recorded that 54% of all holdings were fragmented into more than one field.⁴⁸

Cattle over-stocking, the bane of the agricultural officer, is another risk-averting practice on the part of the individual farmer. The accumulation of cattle is not only a means of bridewealth payment and wealth display but also an important precaution against crop failure and famine. In the event of food shortage, cattle are readily bartered or sold.⁴⁹ Cattle over-stocking is a classic case of the isolation paradox. Each individual household benefits from cattle ownership, while the aggregate suffers from destruction of the resource base. What agricultural officers rarely acknowledge is that often cattle per person are declining as population and total cattle numbers

⁴⁵ This low figure may reflect under-reporting or alternatively a tendency for peasant farmers to switch to pure stands, as they adopt improved seeds (Tanzania, 1971 Agricultural Census, Table 5, 161-185).

⁴⁶ Robertson, J.K. 'Mixed or Multiple Cropping in Native Agricultural Practice', EAAJ, 6, (April 1941), 228-229; Mongi, H.O., A.P.Uriyo, Y.A. Sudi and B.R. Singh 'An Appraisal of Some Intercropping Methods in Terms of Grain Yield, Response to Applied Phosphorus and Monetary Return from Maize and Cowpeas', EAAFJ, 42,1 (1976), 69

⁴⁷ For a discussion of this see Richards, P. and N. Sachak, 'The Human Ecology of Subsistence Agriculture in Semi-Arid Areas of Africa', in van Apeldoorn (ed.), The Aftermath of the 1972-74 Drought in Nigeria, Proceedings of a Conference held at Bagauda, (Zaria, Federal Department of Water Resources and CSER, 1977

⁴⁸ Tanzania, 1971 Agricultural Census, Table 3, 49

⁴⁹ Iliffe, Modern History, 312-313; Kjaerby, F. 'The Development of Agro-Pastoralism among the Barbaig in Hanang District', BRALUP Research Paper No. 56, UDSM, (1979), 64

increase. From the perspective of the peasant household they are not aggrandizing cattle but merely trying to maintain long-established safety margins of per capita cattle ownership.

In agri-business management terms, inter-cropping, fragmentation of holdings and cattle overstocking are irrational because they do not optimize output and earnings. Peasant farmers however, must make their first priority that of producing their households' basic consumer needs. Having to contend with great rainfall variability, means taking precautions that may reduce yields and jeopardize the physical environment in the long run.

The other ubiquitous feature of peasant household farming systems is food self-sufficiency. Even in areas where cash cropping is very well-developed, peasant households generally aim to provision their own staple food needs.⁸⁰ The extent to which they succeed varies regionally depending on climate. In periods of economic prosperity, some reliance on market supply of food may develop. In a few areas, poorer households resort to market purchase of basic foodstuffs.⁸¹ But these are exceptions to the general rule; Tanzanian peasants have been and still remain largely self-sufficient producers of their basic food needs.

III. Settlement Pattern and Population Density

1. Determinants of Settlement

To a large extent, Tanzania's harsh physical environment has determined the settlement pattern and imposes continuing constraints on peasant cultivators. The two most important factors influencing the regional pattern of human settlement and defining the boundaries of agricultural zones are rainfall and tsetse fly. Tsetse is the carrier of trypanosomiasis which causes sleeping sickness in cattle and man. Tsetse thrive in miombo woodland, amidst wild game that act as vectors. Such a plant/animal complex arises in uncultivated areas of moderate rainfall. The extent and

⁸⁰ Schneider-Barthold, 'Farmers' Reactions', 66; Kajumulo-Tibaijuka, 'Economic Analysis', 55; Iliffe, Modern History, 459

⁸¹ Mascarenhas, D. 'Women's Control of Resources', 14; Community Development Trust Fund, 'Appropriate Technology for Grain Storage', DSM, (1977), 40-41; Kjaerby, 'Development of Agro-Pastoralism', 123

boundaries of tsetse fly infestation have varied over time as the balance between human populations, vegetation type and wild game populations have changed. The violent upheavals of the 19th century slave trade and German colonial conquest caused considerable human depopulation and movement that gave the tsetse fly room to advance.⁵² Throughout the British colonial period and to the present over half of the country has been infested. The areas of high rainfall have high population concentrations and have remained unaffected. Tsetse makes the presence of human settlement in moderate rainfall areas difficult, so areas of low and unreliable rainfall are far more densely populated than might otherwise be expected. Cattle-keeping is practiced extensively in these semi-arid areas and makes possible the support of above-average population densities (MAPS 2.1 and 2.2).

Rail and road transport connections have played a vital part in determining the settlement pattern (MAP 2.3). The most outstanding feature of the colonial transport infrastructure was its northern bias. While transport links were by no means highly developed in the north, the south's connections with Dar es Salaam, the capital and major port, were exceedingly poor. Some of the southern regions which were noted to have high agricultural potential at the outset of the British colonial period such as Iringa, Ufipa in Rukwa region, Rungwe in Mbeya and Songea in Ruvuma, languished as 'cinderella territories', often serving as labour reserves for the plantations and mines of the north.⁵³ Thus, population growth was depressed in these areas relative to their resource potential.

The post-colonial government had an ambitious transport development programme. The national road network was improved and extended during the 1960s, then in the 1970s the Tanzam railway was

⁵² Napier Bax, S., 'Notes on the Presence of Tsetse Fly between 1857 and 1915 in the Dar es Salaam Area', TNR 16, (1943), 33; Ford, J. and E.F. Whiteside, 'The Trypanosomiasis Problem', EAAJ 13, (1948), 192; Kjekshus, H., Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History: The Case of Tanganyika 1850-1950, (London, Heinemann, 1977), 51-68

⁵³ 'Settlement', PRO/CO691/62/81

built linking the southwest and the Zambian copperbelt with Dar es Salaam port. This had an immediate positive effect on southern regional development and population, particularly in Mbeya and Rukwa (TABLE 2.1.1).

2. Comparison between Settlement in 1931, 1967 and 1978

MAPS 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 show that the regional pattern of settlement has remained roughly the same for fifty years. Population is concentrated in the highlands of Bukoba, Kilimanjaro, Tanga and Mbeya, the cultivation steppe of Mwanza/Shinyanga, and finally the Mtwara region where moderately high rainfall is associated with maritime rather than orographic rainfall. In between these far-flung concentrations, corridors of settlement crisscross; a corridor from the southwest to the northeast originating in Mbeya, Rukwa and Ruvuma passing through Iringa and Dodoma intersects with an east/northwestwards corridor from Dar es Salaam, along the Central rail-line to Lake Victoria, which dips down to Kigoma on the northern most tip of Lake Tanganyika. There is another corridor running north/south along the coast from Mtwara to Tanga. Three sparsely populated areas stand out: the arid area of Arusha in the north, the two large tsetse-infested areas centered around Tabora in the west and Lindi and Songea in the south.

With regard to the 1931 population distribution, Gillman made the observation that two-thirds of the country's population was concentrated in one-tenth of its land surface in the highlands and cultivation steppe, whereas 62% of the land was virtually uninhabited.⁵⁴ The remaining third of the population lived in the savannah and coastal hinterlands practicing shifting cultivation.

With population growth of the subsequent 50 years, one sees the spilling out into the sparsely populated and uninhabited areas Gillman referred to. MAP 2.7 depicts changes in rural population density in the 1948-67 and 1967-78 inter-censal periods. The largest relative growth has taken place in the geographically unfavourable tsetse areas of Tabora, Lindi/Songea and arid Arusha.

⁵⁴ Gillman, 'A Population Map of Tanganyika', Geographical Review, XXVI(3), (1936), 370-372

Regional variation in levels of agricultural intensity is strongly related to the level of population pressure on the land. TABLE 2.8 shows district and regional over- and under-population relative to the carrying capacity of the land based on Moore's calculations⁵⁵ and TABLE 2.9 lists the percentage incidence of various farming practices by region according to the 1971 Agricultural Census. TABLE 2.10 provides the Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficients for regional over/under-population and farming practices. The incidence of cattle-keeping, agro-pastoralism and use of ploughs gives the strongest positive correlations with the population measure. Fertilizer usage, tractors and mulching also correlate. The association between population pressure and agricultural intensification, that Boserup so incisively identified, is strongly reflected in TABLE 2.10.⁵⁶ High population densities and plough agriculture co-exist.

Evidence from the colonial period seems to support Boserup's thesis that the transition from shifting cultivation to plough agriculture arises from exigencies of population growth. Colonial officials were inclined to classify African peasants into two groups, the hard-working industrious tribes with labour-intensive farming practices and the backward, feckless, 'lazy native' group practicing shifting cultivation. The colonial government tended to regard shifting agriculture as environmentally destructive and were eager to have peasants adopt terracing, contouring, ridging, and mulching which were very labour-intensive. They were worried about over-stocking and felt that agro-pastoralism did not take full advantage of what cattle-keeping had to offer. They wanted peasants to practice mixed farming, integrating animal and plant husbandry with use of the plough.

There are a number of colonial examples of labour-intensive farming systems. Ukara island is perhaps the most frequently cited. On this tiny, rocky island in Lake Victoria, mixed farming, crop rotation, manuring, planting fodder crops, mulching etc. allowed the population density to reach 240

⁵⁵ Moore, J.E. 'Rural Population Carrying Capacities of the Districts of Tanzania', BRALUP Research Paper No. 18, (1971)

⁵⁶ Boserup, E. The Conditions of Agricultural Growth, (New York, Aldine Publishing Company, 1965)

people per square km by the 1960s.⁵⁷

Another example is the Iraqw living in the rift highlands of northern Tanzania. In 1930, Gillman records that the southern Iraqw of Mbulu:

...are remarkable agriculturalists, as things go in East Africa. I have nowhere seen such carefully tilled fields and gardens as in South Irakh where the beds are throughout arranged in 'visible contours' more accurately set out than the most painstaking surveyor could ever attempt...Whilst contouring and terracing are the outstanding features of S. Irakh agriculture one must not forget that manuring and careful rotation are likewise universally practiced whereas irrigation, though known, need not, as a rule, be resorted to in the higher parts of the basin where climatic moisture is ample...Nowhere in the whole of S. Irakh...have I found signs of soil erosion due to agricultural and pastoral activities...Though the moister climate which is able to maintain a permanent vegetative cover and the turfy nature of the prevailing grasses (as opposed to the usual African tufty varieties) undoubtedly play an important part in the pleasing conservation of the soil which to me is the key-note of everything that is promising and good in this delightful little mountain oasis...

But he observes different farming practices within the same tribe:

No difference between S. and N. Irakh is, perhaps, more striking than the sudden change in the aspect of the fields of a people who are one in culture and who continue to be ruled by one paramount chief. None of the care, of the tidyness and of the resultant fertility that gladdens one's eye in S. Irakh. Hardly any attempt to terrace the ground, furrows running in careless old Bantu-fashion at all angles to the contours; herds more conspicuous and more widely roaming and around the Boma an undoubted overstocking. Seeing that the people are one the only explanation is that those of S. Irakh are favoured in their good intentions by their moister climate whilst for those of N. Irakh the climatic odds are too great to be overcome, when tedious irrigation had to be resorted to.⁵⁸

Gillman and other observant colonial officials recognized that favourable climate and physical factors in combination with population pressure gave rise to land and labour intensification rather than any inherent tribal characteristics.⁵⁹

IV. The Population/Food Production Capability Balance

Average yield estimates for peasant production are notoriously difficult to obtain because of

⁵⁷ Ruthenberg, H. Agricultural Development in Tanganyika, (Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1964), 29

⁵⁸ Gillman, C., 'Geographical Notes', RH, Mss. Afr. s.1175, 25-26/10/30

⁵⁹ Interview with Sir Roger Swynnerton, 22/4/85; Stenhouse, A.S. 'Agriculture in the Matengo Highlands', EAAJ, 10, (July 1944), 22-24

the almost infinite variation from place to place, year to year and level of crop husbandry. Present figures are more intelligent guesses based on agricultural surveys and market information. Average yield estimates for sixty years ago are non-existent and TABLE 2.11.1-4, listing recorded yields of the country's main staple grains, maize, rice, sorghum/millet and wheat taken from Department of Agriculture annual reports, is offered as a poor substitute. When comparing them with the more recent average yield estimates in APPENDIX II, it is difficult to come to any conclusions. Present estimated average yields seem to fall roughly mid-way in the range of recorded yields of the colonial period. From this fragmentary evidence, it appears that yields have stagnated over the past sixty years. If this were the case it would imply that labour, land and capital intensification have just managed to compensate for the land's diminishing returns arising from increasing population densities and a reduced fallow period.

While average yields per unit area of land are known at general levels of magnitude, approximate estimates of average yields per person are virtually impossible to obtain. With the increasing number of non-food producers, i.e. the greater proportion of the rural population under 15 years of age who are not fully involved in field production and the escalating numbers of urban dwellers, it is likely that staple food output per capita has declined even though the food output per producer may have remained roughly constant or even increased.

There is no way of knowing total output of staple food from year to year, given the largely subsistence nature of production and the lack of records on food passing through unregulated markets. Food imports, therefore are used as a proxy. FIGURE 2.1 plots 7-year moving averages of net food production import/export per capita between 1921 and 1982. The annual values show a strong downward tendency, beginning with a 3.5 kg per capita net export in 1921 and ending with a net import of 15.8 kg in 1982, with fluctuations in between. Continuing with the use of the three 21-year intervals previously established for analyzing rainfall data, between 1920 and 1940 net imports and exports fluctuated gently with a mean average of 0.4 kg net export per capita. During World War II and through the 1950s, the trend line first took a nose dive down to 4.9 kg net import then improved to

10.6 kg net export before sliding to a 7.1 kg net import. Fluctuations were much greater than the previous period with an overall deficit position of 1.3 kg. The period since independence has experienced, except for the first few years, a very marked decline to as low as 28.7 kg net import per capita with an overall average of 7.5 kg net import. This suggests that food production capability is at an all-time low.

V. Peasant Household Food Supply Decision-Making Model

Since the bulk of food consumption is direct household produce, peasant household food security depends primarily on the effective combination of household labour and land resources and the ability to cope with climatic fluctuations. Outside influences, namely, the state, the market and clientage networks, help or hinder household food security, depending on the household strategies adopted. In this section, a model of household decision-making under favourable and food stress circumstances is presented.

1. Household Decision-making under Favourable Conditions

In the course of a favourable agricultural year, the peasant household has a number of decisions which directly or indirectly influence food adequacy. The first consideration is ensuring household food supply, a goal that all household members hold jointly. Beyond that or in conjunction with it, household members engage in production destined for market sale, but the intra-household distribution of the monetary proceeds is by no means egalitarian and conflict can arise. The various members do not share exactly the same consumption pattern or production aims. There are three main stages of decision-making, conditionally inter-linked, but nonetheless quite separate which have different implications for the nutritional status of the household members: first, the decision for household members to engage in production inside the household (subsistence and cashcrop production) or outside wage labour and trading activities; second, if the former is chosen, the decision to produce crops for direct home consumption or for market sale; and third, the decision regarding how (and by whom) cash earnings are to be spent (FIGURE 2.2).

The first decision, the allocation of household labour to internal and external economic

pursuits can produce a variegated pattern of some household members serving as traders and wage labourers and others remaining at home. Becoming a wage labourer has usually been a male decision. A man's entry into the labour force has often meant physically distancing himself from his household and becoming a migrant.

The impact of wage labour on peasant household nutrition has varied over time. During the colonial period, entry into wage labour was usually in response to colonial coercive measures (e.g. taxation). Since the phasing out of the 'bachelor wage' system during the 1950s and early 1960s and until very recently, wage labour has become a far more lucrative option. But during the post-colonial period, there is less likelihood that substantial wage earnings make their way back to the rural household because most labour migration is now to towns and tends to be of a permanent rather than circular nature. Jakobsen documents the nutritionally precarious state of female-headed rural households in the Southern Highlands, characterized by male out-migration with low remittance levels.⁶⁰ Rural wage and trading earnings tend to be far less financially rewarding than those in the city. In some studies, those in low-income village wage employment or trade have been reported to experience a lower nutritional status than those in cashcropping.⁶¹

The second decision, the choice between home versus market production of crops has to do with the degree of 'fall-back' subsistence production that households retain. The market can be used as a hedge against annual and seasonal food crop fluctuation, whereas conversely household food production can be a risk-averting tactic against commodity price fluctuations and consumer goods availability in the market. The balance that the household strikes between home consumption and market purchase reflects not only the prevailing terms of trade, but also the anticipated volatility of the market. In Tanzania, market volatility has been extreme and led to the retention of a strong household-

⁶⁰ Jakobsen, O., 'Economic and Geographical Factors Influencing Child Malnutrition: A Study from the Southern Highlands, Tanzania', BRALUP Paper No. 52, UDSM, (1978), 53-55,79

⁶¹ Bantje, H. 'Household Characteristics and Nutritional Status in the Rufiji Valley', BRALUP Research Paper No. 72, UDSM, (1981), 22; Jakobsen, 'Economic and Geographical Factors', 59

produced food base to the present.

In addition, the sexual division of labour and intra-household distribution of resources conditions the degree of household cashcrop production. During the colonial period, men were encouraged to produce cashcrops and the sexual demarcation of cashcropping continues today. When men predominately produce for the market, the nutritional viability of the household depends upon male sensitivity to household purchased food needs and female subsistence food production.

Overtime households define the composition of their 'necessary' consumption of food and non-food items. Although the purchase of consumer durables is relatively infrequent, articles like soap, kerosene, cloth, and cooking oil are fairly standard purchased items. Peasants would feel hard-pressed without them. Thus a modicum of household cash-earning usually has to take place in one form or another.

Since peasant households aim to be relatively self-sufficient in food production in a normal year, in addition to producing cashcrops, it is usually only in years of bad food harvest that they have to resort to substantial food purchases. Because peasant income is low, buying the bulk of the household's food needs is generally impossible. Famine relief becomes necessary. In areas where the food crop is the cashcrop, especially in semi-arid millet and sorghum-growing areas that are unsuitable for any other cashcrop, the risk of food inadequacy is not confined to bad weather years. In this situation, a decision must be taken as to how much of the food crop will be sold. The oversale of the food crop to obtain the household's requisite purchased needs can frequently happen. These are often areas which have a greater tendency to need famine relief, e.g. Dodoma.

In contrast, in a coffee-growing area of the Southern Highlands, Jakobsen reports that food crop sales usually took place in relatively prosperous households, when food production over and above household food consumption needs was achieved.⁶² Thus selling food crops was an indication of prosperity and those households were generally better off nutritionally than the households solely

⁶² Jakobsen, 'Economic and Geographical Factors', 78

selling non-food crops.

The third decision concerning what will be purchased with the household's cash earnings, involves the division of labour and distribution of power in the household. In Tanzania, crop marketing is almost always in the hands of the men who then have virtually complete discretionary control over the cash proceeds from the crop.⁶³ Children's nutritional status has been known to suffer as a result of the lack of female purchasing power. When women have cash they tend to buy more goods for general household consumption and are more likely to be attentive to nutritional needs, especially of the children than men. Because women are held responsible for provisioning the household's food needs, men do not feel compelled to use their cash on food purchase. Jakobsen's survey reveals this most explicitly:

In 89% of the families the spending of money is reserved for the husbands. The mothers who have a say in money matters (11%) are frequently unmarried or widowed. They belong to an unprivileged economic group. Still they have relatively fewer underweight children than average...Apparently there is something in the way monetarization evolves which results in resources being drained away from mothers.⁶⁴

Men have a greater tendency to spend cash earnings on themselves. One of the items, that is especially popular is local brew. Since women brew the beer, this is a means through which they get access to otherwise male-monopolized village cash earnings. Unfortunately, because brewing uses up grain stocks, it can have an overall detrimental effect on village food supply and nutrition in those villages where surpluses in grain production are not achieved.⁶⁵

2. Household Decision-Making under Food Stress

In instances of food shortage, other decisions must be made, and again three stages can be discerned: first, famine prevention measures; second, internal alterations to household food supply

⁶³ Bryceson and Kirimbai, 'Subsistence or Beyond', 154

⁶⁴ Jakobsen, 'Economic and Geographical Factors', 53,75

⁶⁵ Bryceson and Kirimbai, 'Subsistence or Beyond', 60

and demand; and third, emergency appeals to external agencies.

It has been argued in a preceding section, that Tanzanian peasant agriculture is risk-averse. Cropping patterns and stock holdings are geared to precluding household exposure to food deficits. Besides these measures which are integral components of the agricultural calendar, in years of late and sparse rainfall, when it is apparent that the planted seeds have failed to germinate, farmers undertake a second and sometimes a third planting. This usually involves mobilization of additional household labour.

Decisions regarding internal alterations to household food supply and demand can occur during a normal weather year when household food stocks do not last the year and pre-harvest 'seasonal hunger' sets in or alternatively in the early stages of a famine year. Household food stocks can be expanded through appeals to close family relations and friends or through the liquidation of household assets, especially cattle.⁶⁶ A wide array of bush foods are resorted to as well. Peasants have a richer selection in thicket areas than in woodland or open country.⁶⁷

On the demand side, household food intake can be adjusted downwards by redefining the boundaries of the household unit, in other words, turning a deaf ear to the requests for food of kin and friends just outside of the immediate household who according to tradition have some entitlement to household produce. In Ikwiriri, situated in the Rufiji delta area, where food shortages are common, the cultural ideals of generosity and hospitality are espoused, while households retain strict secrecy about their food stores and project the image of perpetual deficit, thus making it difficult for extended family member's to claim their traditional rights to household food.⁶⁸ Reduced intake of the household members themselves usually follows. There is little knowledge of how the food deficit

⁶⁶ Mkunduge, G.L. 'The Ukaguru Environment: Traditional and Recent Responses to Food Shortages', Journal of the Geographical Association of Tanzania, 8 (1973), 74

⁶⁷ Crosse-Upcott, A.R.W. 'Ngindo Famine Subsistence', TNR 50, (1958), 2

⁶⁸ Bantje, H. 'Food Flows and Dietary Patterns in Ikwiriri Village', BRALUP, Research Paper No. 74, UDSM, (1982), 40

differentially affects family members. Crosse-Upcott notes that amongst the Ngindo of Lindi family social bonds tend to loosen and husbands and wives fend for themselves and keep food caches secret.⁶⁹

As a food shortage develops into an outright famine, more drastic measures are taken and appeals to agencies external to the village are made. Out-migration to extended family members in areas unaffected by food scarcity or in towns is an action that any of the adult household members may take, and they are sometimes accompanied by children. Men, more frequently than women migrate in search of wage labour in times of famine. This is especially common in Dodoma and miombo woodland shifting cultivation areas. State famine relief is a solution for many. It is often assumed that peasants are eager to receive famine relief, and in fact grow dependent on it if given the chance.⁷⁰ However, Mkunduge reports that asking for famine relief has shameful connotations and is often avoided until dire conditions have set in.⁷¹ The timing of famine relief remains critical, because people cannot be allowed to become so debilitated that they have no energy for planting and cultivating the next season's crops.

VI. Incidence of Household Food Inadequacy

In the above, three types of food inadequacy have been alluded to, namely: malnutrition, seasonal hunger and famine. 'Malnutrition' is defined as a chronic state of under-nutrition caused by a deficient intake of calories and/or proteins arising from a continuously inadequate supply of food. The inadequate supply may result from low production levels, unequal distribution, lack of nutrition education or a combination of any of these factors. Malnutrition is most manifest in children. Their physical growth and mental potential can be measurably impaired by under-nutrition. 'Seasonal hunger' is a cyclical dip in dietary intake, causing a temporary state of under-nutrition

⁶⁹ Crosse-Upcott, 'Ngindo Famine Subsistence', 2

⁷⁰ Ruthenberg, Agricultural Development, 130

⁷¹ Mkunduge, 'The Ukaguru Environment', 77

or exacerbating a chronic state of malnutrition. Seasonal hunger is an outcome of the annual progression of the crop calendar and is usually most acute in the pre-harvest rainy season. It has a general debilitating effect on all ages and sexes of the population, though it is often most easily measurable in women, particularly pregnant or lactating women. It does not necessarily have fatal or long lasting detrimental effects on health.

'Famine' is a situation of severe calorie deprivation arising from catastrophic natural and human events, e.g. droughts, floods, and wars. Famine can result in death. While it is usually assumed that famines result from drastic food production shortfalls, Sen cautions against hasty assumptions. He has advanced the 'entitlements' approach, arguing that starvation is often a result of maldistribution of available food rather than food shortfalls per se.⁷² Famines should not be over-dramatized relative to the other two forms of food insecurity. Nutritionists studying famine-affected populations in Tanzania have sometimes observed with surprise that the level of malnourishment of children in famine areas is not much lower than the country-wide average.⁷³ Far too little is known about the identification and measurement of stages of caloric stress, let alone their consequences for the future health of the surviving victims. Famine should be viewed as an accelerated worsening of food inadequacy on a widespread basis rather than a sudden and sharp decline.

1. Malnutrition

The problem of malnutrition was not officially recognized until the late 1930s, when under the instigation of the Colonial Office, East and Central African governments began to investigate its incidence. Jerrard and A.T. and G.M. Culwick called attention to the monotony of the peasant diet

⁷² Sen, A.K. Poverty and Famines, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980)

⁷³ Latham, M.C. 'A Clinical Nutrition Survey of Certain Areas of the Dodoma and Kondoa District', East African Medical Journal 41(2), (1964), 76; Latham, M.C. 'A Clinical Nutritional Survey of Certain Areas of the Rufiji District of Tanganyika', East African Medical Journal, 40(3), (1963), 93

and its low protein content.⁷⁴ Their findings were re-inforced by the poor state of nutrition and general health of the African conscripts recruited during World War II, many of whom could not pass their physical examinations.⁷⁵

Concern with the nutritional well-being of children and pregnant mothers, did not appear until the 1950s. From then on, numerous village surveys documented growth stunting and wasting amongst children, and a high incidence of protein calorie deficiency in under-fives.⁷⁶ In addition to low or inadequate food intake, intestinal parasites are often identified as causes of children's poor nutritional status.⁷⁷

Most of the social factors cited in the literature as being associated with children's malnourishment are related to the intra-household sexual division of labour and resource allocation: namely, men's higher calorie and protein intake relative to the rest of the household arising from their customary claims to bigger and more meaty portions of the household's cooked meals,⁷⁸ father's

⁷⁴ Jerrard, R.C. The Tribes in Tanganyika, Their Districts, Usual Dietary and Pursuits, (DSM, Government Printer, 1936); Culwick, A.T. and G.M., 'A Study of Factors governing the Food Supply in Ulanga, Tanganyika Territory', East African Medical Journal, 16, (1939), 43-61

⁷⁵ Mohamed, S.A. and J. McKeag, 'The History of Human Nutrition Activities in Tanzania', Human Nutrition Unit, Ministry of Health, DSM, (1970)

⁷⁶ In a 1956 study of Maposeni village in Songea, 76% of the school boys had signs of protein deficiency (Robson, J.R.K. 'Malnutrition in Tanganyika', TNR 58/59, (1962), 263); Results from surveys in the 1960s showed the percentage of under-fives with protein calorie deficiency as: Kisarawe (1965), 31%; Dodoma (1965), 22%; Tabora (1967), 8%; Bukoba (1967), 12%; and Kilimanjaro (1968), 24% (Maletnlema, T.N., R. Mhombolage and G.E. Ngowi, 'Family Food Consumption Surveys in Rural Tanzania', TNR 73, (1974), 52); Kreysler, J.V., 'Nutrition' The Young Child Study Tanzania, UNICEF, DSM, (1973); Latham, M. and F.J. Stare, 'Nutritional Studies of Tanzania (Tanganyika)', World Rev. Nutritional Dietetics, 7, (1967), 31-71; Seshmani, L. 'Food Consumption and Nutritional Adequacy in Iringa - A Case Study of Four Villages', ERB Paper B1.5, (1981)

⁷⁷ Carswell, F. et al. 'Nutritional Status, Globulin Titers, and Parasitic Infections of Two Populations of Tanzanian School Children', American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 34(7), (1981), 1292-1299

⁷⁸ Country-wide: Maletnlema et al. 'Family Food Consumption', 47; Kilimanjaro: Swantz, M-L, U-S Henricson and M. Zalla, 'Socio-Economic Causes of Malnutrition in Moshi District', BRALUP Research Paper No. 38, UDSM, (1975), 32; Rufiji: Bantje, 'Food Flows', 12

use of cash for drinking and eating out,⁷⁹ high female fertility,⁸⁰ male disapproval of women using family planning,⁸¹ and male outmigration.⁸² The female work load and the irregularity of meals has been identified by many as a very significant problem.⁸³ A recent UNICEF study argues that the irregularity of meals is in fact meal infrequency which has an especially detrimental effect on children under 4 years of age, whose small stomachs make it impossible for them to ingest large quantities of food at any one meal. Thus infrequent feeding results in inadequate total calorie consumption.⁸⁴ Low birth weight is also related to women's heavy workload. Women perform agricultural work throughout their pregnancies; the consequent low birth weight babies face higher risks of infant mortality. The UNICEF study pinpoints the severity of the female work load as the single most important factor causing infant malnutrition and mortality.⁸⁵

Women's responsibility for household food production arises from their traditional central role in agriculture whereas men were the hunters, cattle herders and warriors. As economic and political changes deprived men of their hunting and military activities, cashcrop production filled the void, but not entirely, men enjoyed far more leisure time than women whose working day included childcare and domestic duties in addition to their agricultural work. The deepening sexual division of labour has meant that women find it difficult to feed their children three meals a day; mid-day meals are

⁷⁹ Kilimanjaro: Swantz et al. 'Socio-Economic Causes', 25; von Freyhold, M., K. Sawaki and M. Zalla, 'Rural Area-Moshi District', The Young Child Study in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, UNICEF, (1973), 175,183,199 ⁸⁰ Kilimanjaro: Swantz et al. 'Socio-Economic Causes', 28

⁸¹ Kilimanjaro: von Freyhold, 'Rural Area-Moshi District', 178

⁸² Songea:Robson, 'Malnutrition', 263

⁸³ Country-wide: Culwick, G.M. 'Nutrition in East Africa', Africa, 14(7), (July 1944), 402; Kilimanjaro: von Freyhold et al. 'Rural Area-Moshi District', 182; Rufiji:Bantje, 'Food Flows', 17

⁸⁴ Tanzania and UNICEF, 'Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women and the Priorities for Child Survival and Development', UNICEF, DSM, (1985), 151-152

⁸⁵ Tanzania and UNICEF, 'Analysis of the Situation of Children', 394

generally forsaken, agricultural field work making them a locational impossibility.⁸⁶

Aspects of inter-household stratification of wealth or inadequacy of village resources are cited as causes of child malnutrition less frequently. Significantly, when they are mentioned they refer to areas of dense settlement and pronounced cashcropping, especially Kilimanjaro. In these areas, the lack of cattle, land shortage and consequent lack of variety in diet have been stressed as causative factors.⁸⁷

It is generally assumed that poor nutrition gives rise to high infant and child mortality, but a simple correspondence at the regional level does not exist. Analysis of the situation is made more complex by the fact that nutritionists have yet to come to a consensus on African recommended levels of intake and weight and height standards and criticize the application of European standards to African populations. Maletnlema et al. stress that the child's body can adjust to sub-optimal nutritional levels with consequent adverse effects on growth, rather than higher mortality.⁸⁸

TABLE 2.12 juxtaposes the percentages of children by region attending Mother and Child Health (MCH) clinics suffering from being underweight and having kwashiorkor with child survival rates in 1978. TABLE 2.13 gives the Spearman Rank correlations between the three variables for six-month periods between 1976 and 1978. While there is a positive relationship between underweightness and kwashiorkor in three out of the six periods, the expected inverse relationship between kwashiorkor and child survival only appears in two periods and underweightness is positively rather than

⁸⁶ Packed lunches away from home or the purchase of cooked food or packaged snacks to take away and eat on the agricultural work site are foreign to the rural areas of Tanzania. Generally, women cook once a day in the evening and the leftovers are eaten the following morning. There are no materials like plastic or paper bags or wrapping paper that could be used for packing a lunch.

⁸⁷ Kilimanjaro: Swantz et al. 'Socio-Economic Causes', 36,43; general: TT, 'Commission for Human Nutrition: Preliminary Survey of Nutrition among the Natives of Tanganyika Territory', Government Report of Committee, DSM, (1937); Kilimanjaro: von Freyhold et al. 'Rural Area-Moshi District', 173

⁸⁸ Maletnlema et al. 'Family Food Consumption' 53

negatively correlated with survival.⁸⁹

TABLE 2.14 lists more Spearman's Rank correlations on regional data in an effort to identify possible associations between nutrition and mortality on one hand and demographic, health, female status and economic variables, on the other. A detailed discussion of the results is appended to TABLE 2.14. The significant associations were: a strong positive association between the incidence of kwashiorkor and the total fertility rate, perhaps suggestive of the detrimental effects of short-spacing between births. Female education levels corresponded with a higher incidence of kwashiorkor that can only be sensibly interpreted as educated mothers are more likely to seek medical attention for their severely malnourished children. Regional infant mortality and child survival rates were better in those regions with more educated women, although not significantly so. Transport infrastructure displayed a pronounced inverse relationship with infant mortality. Food-selling as opposed to cashcrop-selling regions recorded higher rates of malnutrition, infant mortality, crude death and total fertility rates.

With the exception of the 1978 census mortality and fertility statistics, all the measures used in constructing TABLE 2.14 are not very reliable. The findings are offered tentatively in the absence of any previous attempts at interpreting the stark regional differentiation in child mortality. The nature of the relationships between malnutrition and infant and child mortality remain unclear, but it is clear that the incidences of malnutrition, infant and child mortality are very high in the country.

2. Seasonal Hunger

The availability and variety of food are conditioned by the seasons. Many areas have two

⁸⁹ The malnutrition data has to be regarded as fairly unreliable due to transcription errors between the rural dispensary records and publication of national statistics, and the calculation of underweightness by dividing children weighing below 80% of standard weight for age by all children weighed and unweighed, attending the MCH clinic. Finally the malnutrition frequencies are not broken down on an age-specific basis to reveal those in the at-risk weaning age bracket (Personal communication, Urban Jonsson, UNICEF, Dar es Salaam and Jean Rutabanzibwa, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine).

harvests, others only one, but the cycle of food availability coupled with labour expenditure in the agricultural calendar creates identifiable periods of caloric stress. Usually the most stressful time is during the rainy pre-harvest season, when low food stocks, higher incidence of infections and parasitic diseases and peak labour demand for planting and weeding all converge.

The phenomenon of seasonal hunger was identified as the major problem of peasant food supply in the first Tanganyikan government document regarding nutrition. Peasant improvidence was given as the cause of seasonal hunger:

Serious as famines may be the recurrent annual shortage of food before the new season's harvest is a much more serious question. It is due to the fact that many Africans plant or retain (if they sell food crops) a bare sufficiency when the store is at its fullest after the harvest; particularly is this the case with regard to the excessive use of grains in the making of beer at that time.⁹⁰

Surprisingly little attention has been given to seasonal hunger since then. Allan who developed the notion of the 'normal surplus' argues that seasonal hunger is not a common feature of African farming systems but rather is a manifestation of a system in disequilibrium either because of population pressure - Dodoma is cited as an example - or because of the removal of the practice of giving the chief tribute in kind that was then re-distributed in times of need.⁹¹ Changani analysing the relatively recent occurrence of seasonal hunger in Malangali, Iringa region, attributes it to abandonment of the area's major cashcrop, tobacco, after Rhodesia's tobacco marketing facilities were closed to surrounding black African nations in 1965.⁹² People depended on purchased food once their grain stores ran out. The men were thus resorting to migrant wage labour.

Seasonal caloric stress is reflected in birthweights. Tanzanian peasant women whose last trimester of pregnancy takes place during the rainy season have a higher probability of giving birth

⁹⁰ TT, 'Commission for Human Nutrition', 4

⁹¹ Allan, W. The African Husbandman, (Edinburgh, Oliver & Boyd, 1965), 46-47

⁹² Changani, A.S., 'Seasonal Food-Shortages and Agricultural Development', Journal of the Geographical Association of Tanzania, 8, (1973), 49-62

to an underweight child not only because of low food stocks but also as a result of the practice of working in the field right up to the time of delivery. Bantje documents the monthly pattern of birthweights in Rufiji over a period of seven years. Birthweights tend to be lowest at the beginning and end of the rainy season in February and June which coincides with peak labour expenditure on rice planting and harvesting.⁹³

3. Famine

The famine record is fairly complete for the British colonial period thanks to district annual reports and the compilation of mission records by Brooke.⁹⁴ It is more difficult to know exactly how widespread and frequent food shortages were during the first fifteen years of post-colonial rule, before the Prime Minister's Office began keeping systematic records of famine relief.

Food shortages occurred every year in one or another parts of the country (TABLE 2.15). The 1920s seem to have suffered the least hardship, although this may merely be a reflection of the less complete records for that early period. The 1930s was a difficult decade for the coast from Tanga to Lindi, whereas Dodoma was hard-hit in the 1940s. In the 1950s, rural food deficits were less frequent, and although the 1960s began with severe famine on the coast and in Dodoma, rural food supplies over the rest of the decade were not problematic, except in the Rufiji valley where flooding took its toll. The 1970s and the 1980s, were not so kind. Severe rural shortages were experienced in several places each year.

While Mascarenhas argues that food shortages tended to increase over the colonial period as more and more land and labour was devoted to cashcropping, Brooke argues that those areas which developed strong cashcropping were diversifying their economy and in a position to purchase food when their

⁹³ Bantje, H. 'Seasonal Variations in Birthweight Distribution in Ikwiriri Village', BRALUP Research Report No. 43, (1980), 21

⁹⁴ Brooke, C. 'Types of Food Shortages in Tanzania', Geographical Review, LVII(3), (1967)

food crops failed. The bulk of evidence seems to support the latter view. However, increasing population density relative to carrying capacities of the land (TABLE 2.8) is probably the most important determinant of an area's vulnerability to famine.⁹⁵ The widespread tendency to switch over from the highly drought-resistant sorghums and millet to higher yielding but less-drought resistant maize is often cited as a significant factor in increasing liability to famine in the more arid regions.⁹⁶

Using Gillman's classification of agricultural zones, APPENDIX V geographically differentiates the experience of food shortages and peasant response, whereas APPENDIX VI provides information on the temporal and spatial distribution of famine relief.

VII. Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, it has been argued that the physical environment, especially low and erratic rainfall, causes a continuous threat of food shortfalls. While there is no evidence of a declining rainfall trend or an increase in its fluctuation over time, correlations between annual grain imports and rainfall suggest that Tanzania has become more sensitive to annual rainfall fluctuation, especially with respect to maize, the main staple food (TABLE 2.5.1).

Tanzanian peasant farmers contend with an uncertain physical environment which, at the present level of technology, sets limits on labour specialization and market development. The material uncertainty that the physical environment imposes, profoundly affects the form and content of peasant household decision-making. Food becomes an axiomatic concern and food self-sufficiency is given precedence in household production. Household members' roles in the labour process are ascribed to

⁹⁵ Mascarenhas, A.C. 'Aspects of Food Shortages in Tanganyika, 1925-1945', Journal of the Geographical Association of Tanzania 3, (1968), 50-51; Mascarenhas, A.C. 'Agriculture, Food and Population Change in Tanzania', in J.E. Kocher (ed.), 'Social and Economic Development and Population Change in Tanzania', BRALUP Research Paper No. 36, (1975), 51-54; Brooke, 'Types of Food Shortages', 350

⁹⁶ Sumra, S. 'Changes in Agricultural Practises among the Peasants of Handeni District during the British Colonial Period', Social Science Conference of E. A. Universities, UDSM, (December 1976), 8

them on the basis of age and sex. Women are held more responsible for household food production than men.

Areal population densities have largely been shaped by the effort to avoid the most adverse physical environments both in terms of low rainfall and tsetse infestation. Food crop cultivation presents a very dynamic picture. While risk minimization regarding household food needs have been the underlying theme in Tanzanian peasant food systems, as population densities increase the need for greater production per unit of land has led to an increasing reliance on maize, a crop more sensitive to low rainfall than the traditional sorghums and millets. In those areas experiencing extreme population pressure, even higher-yielding cassava has been adopted but often at the expense of nutritional adequacy. Population pressure has given measurable impetus to labour intensification and technological development, notably the adoption of plough agriculture. With these innovations traditional female tasks of weeding and harvesting tend to mount within the household production unit.

The drastically increased population density that the growth of urban areas represents is a less direct pressure on the peasant household, and it remains to explore just how responsive peasant households are to it. In comparing population growth and food import figures, it is evident that Tanzanian agriculture has not been able to keep up with the food demand exerted by urban growth.

Peasant households' food insecurity was discussed in terms of three types of food inadequacy: malnutrition, seasonal hunger and famine, and evidence was provided of the within and between household differences in their incidence. Available evidence seems to suggest that women and children are most affected by malnutrition and seasonal hunger. Regional variation is very pronounced with the populous, northern export crop producing areas tending to experience less malnutrition and to some extent less famine than the more remote and sparsely populated southern and western parts of the country which are more tightly bound in a syndrome of food insecurity with attendant high infant mortality and fertility.

Two apparent paradoxes arise from these findings. If women perform the bulk of food production,

why should they and their children experience the worst incidence of malnutrition and seasonal hunger? Why aren't women looking after their interests in intra-household food distribution? Secondly, and at an aggregate level, how can Tanzania experience a high rate of population growth under conditions of food insecurity? If ill health and child mortality abound, why is fertility outstripping mortality?

The paradoxes are related, being micro and macro-level outcomes of the convergence of production, consumption and human reproduction logics in the peasant household. Beginning at the micro-level within the household, the deepening sexual division of labour has imposed an extremely heavy workload on women and bears directly on the widespread incidence of malnutrition amongst children and infants. Tiring work and inadequate nutrition during pregnancy results in low birthweight babies whose vulnerability to infant and child mortality is high. Women's agricultural work infringes on breastfeeding and household food preparation thereby contributing to children's malnourishment. Women compensate for the high rates of infant and child mortality by giving birth to large numbers of children. High fertility expands household food demand which in turn exerts pressure on household labour, notably female labour. And so the vicious cycle continues with population expanding and providing few incentives for capitalisation of agricultural production due to the availability of household labour (FIGURE 2.3).

As this cycle proceeds at greater or lesser intensities in peasant households throughout the country, aggregate population growth is fueled by food insecurity in the form of a high level of infant and child malnutrition and associated mortality. On the other hand, food insecurity in the form of famine and deaths arising therefrom have probably declined since 1919 relative to pre-colonial and German times as a result of state and market intervention.

The possibility of Malthusian cataclysm is remote, rather the Boserup effect of agricultural innovation following the attainment of localized critical population densities is evident, but it appears that after the adoption of new technology, such as a new cropping pattern, mulching, and ultimately ploughs, rural populations are not stabilizing immediately but continuing to grow on the knife-edge between chronic and intense food insecurity, alleviated by out-migration to the towns or

less densely populated rural areas. As long as technological innovation is achieved in conjunction with the deepening of the household sexual division of labour, rapid population growth can be expected to continue. Conversely, if the widening of the social division of labour outside the household became the main instrument of peasant household technological innovation, providing a viable productive and service infrastructure for peasant household change, it is hypothesized that the household cycle depicted in FIGURE 2.3 could be short-circuited and serve to gradually dissipate rural food insecurity. It seems imperative that a reduction in Tanzanian rural population growth takes effect before the limits of the intensification of household labour are reached.

CHAPTER 3: EXTRA-HOUSEHOLD SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND FOOD INSECURITY: STATE, MARKET AND CLIENTAGE NETWORKS, 1919-50

So far I have concentrated on the issue of food insecurity within the peasant household. The focus in the rest of the thesis will be on the evolution of the social division of labour outside the peasant household, namely labour specialization in the national economy, extra-household social institutions and their associated occupational moralities and forms of accountability. In this chapter, the categorization and periodicization of Tanzania's extra-household social institutions precedes a review of each institution's structure and content for the period between 1919 and 1950.

1. Definitions and Periodizing Extra-household Social Institutions

In Chapter Two, the peasant household was defined as a social institution and examined in terms of its functions: production, human reproduction and consumption. Its consumption function was definitive with household membership delimited on the basis of a shared cooking pot. As with all social categories, this standard definition of the household is an over-simplification of reality. It abstracts from the complexity of familial residential relations, giving precedence to consumption over production and human reproduction as well as inferring a relatively static view of the Tanzanian household that obscures the household's evolution from lineages and clans.¹ Nevertheless, the 'household' is a useful category, representing a social grouping that is the locus of concrete activities performed on a daily basis involving all of Tanzania's population. Delineating and defining Tanzania's other major social institutions is a more difficult task that requires special methodological clarification.

1. Standard Definitions of the State and Market

The state and market are standard categories used to denote the functions of distribution,

¹ Feierman documents how the household became the essential social unit during colonialism, replacing the corporate action of the lineage and the still earlier clans (Feierman, S. Concepts of Sovereignty among the Shambaa and their Relation to Political Action, (Oxford, D.Phil. thesis, 1972), 48).

exchange, power mediation and welfare generation outside the basic household unit. However, in a society where households predominate, the household naturally assumes many distributional and welfare functions otherwise held by the state and market. Furthermore, it is debatable whether the phenomena that are labelled state and market operations in Tanzania adhere to standard definitions of the market and state.

The 'state' refers to a bureaucracy adjudicating and administering according to impersonal, fixed legal norms. Bureaucratic officials are specially trained with powers that are strictly delimited. They work in a clearly established system of super- and sub-ordination that demands their full working capacity to the exclusion of other forms of gainful employment.²

The classical definition of the 'market' is exchange in which money price is determined by impersonal forces of demand and supply; buyers and sellers are dependent upon market exchange for their livelihood; and market prices crucially influence the allocation of resources and production. Profit maximization is the guiding principle. Market competition generates a tendency for marginal returns and costs to equalize between competitors.

The formalist/substantivist debate between Firth and Polanyi centered around whether or not the classical market concept was relevant to pre-industrial societies where so often the aims of exchange are to facilitate social reciprocity between particular people or validate the prestige of one person over another.³ From a substantivist perspective Bohannon and Dalton⁴ constructed an exchange typology that distinguishes the relative absence or presence of a classical 'market principle': first, communities without market places, where gift exchange or socially obligatory payments of

² Weber, M. Economy and Society, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968), 956-968

³ Polanyi, K., C.M. Arensberg and H.W. Pearson Trade and Market in the Early Empires, (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1957); Firth, R. (ed.) Themes in Economic Anthropology, (London, Tavistock Publications, 1967)

⁴ Bohannon, P. and G. Dalton (eds). Markets in Africa, (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1962), 4-12

goods or services to an allocative centre prevail; second, communities with market places where transactions take place that are small in value and market attendance is socially more than economically motivated; and third, market economies that adhere to the classical definition of the market and display a well-developed profit maximization principle.

The substantivists pinpointed the confusion concerning the applicability of the category 'market' to pre-industrial societies, but did not eliminate it. Bohannon and Dalton's typology distinguishes levels of market development which are quantitatively rather than qualitatively different. In such a schema the market remains a generic term. Using the 'market' to denote exchange relations other than those determined by impersonal forces of demand and supply causes great analytical confusion. The intrinsic logic of these exchange relationships should be thoroughly analysed rather than being merely contrasted with market rationality and classified in terms of the relative presence or absence of market principles.

Similarly, it is misleading to label actions of governmental agents as those of the 'state' when their behaviour is not reflective of an accountable bureaucracy. The terms, state and market, have been universalized without a careful consideration of the specific context in which their defined content is operationalized. Social scientists of classical, neo-classical and Marxist hues, all bandy about the terms state and market wherever exchange or governmental intervention appears. It is necessary to employ another social category with analytical parity to that of the state and market to isolate and examine extra-household distributive, exchange and power relations that are not of an impersonal nature like those of the state and market, even though their tendency may be to merge with elements of state and market operations.

2. Context and Content of Social Institutions

The material context of 19th century Europe, which gave rise to definitions of the state and market outlined above, was quite different from that prevailing in twentieth century Tanzania. Tanzania is less urbanized and industrialized than Western Europe of that era. Chapter Two emphasised how human control over the physical environment is very limited for the vast majority of

Tanzanian residents and living conditions are insecure, particularly with respect to staple foods. The provisioning of basic material needs is persistently uncertain and extra-household exchange and power relationships reflect this. In a country where transport and communications are poor and material uncertainty with regard to the essential requirements of life is great, impersonal exchange and power relations of the market and state are largely precluded. Personal appeals and inter-personal cooperation or conflicts over resources appear in their place, not mediated directly by profit calculations or legalistic considerations. Rather they are responses to survival imperatives.

These imperatives give rise to the social institution of clientage, whose importance is greatest where and when the material context is most uncertain. The social processes generated by clientage are different from that found where society is dominated by a state and markets.

FIGURE 3.1 traces this line of reasoning diagrammatically. The context is defined as the material possibilities given the physical environment and the technological capabilities of the society. The 'function' refers to the society's perceived collective needs and the social 'institution' is the conventional agency with the organizational means of achieving the perceived needs. The 'content' of the social institution refers to who the agents are and what objects they are organizing. The formal 'structure' of the institution is the behavioral pattern and logic of the institutional agents. Finally, the 'social processes' which can serve to change the institutional and material context arise in the interplay between institutions. In Tanzania there are four main social institutions: the household, clientage, market and state (FIGURE 3.2).

It is vital to distinguish the differences in institutional configurations between societies especially between industrial and primarily agrarian societies. It is unlikely that given Tanzania's particular material context, the categories of the market and state can exhaustively explain the dynamics of the society. On the other hand, it would be gratuitous to discard them as categories. Tanzania is part and parcel of the twentieth century world economy, albeit on its periphery. As a transitional society, rapidly undergoing a process of de-agrarianization and urbanization, Tanzania evidences elements of state and market operations in their classical form especially in relation to

the presence of state and market agents transplanted from other countries, and more latterly the impact of foreign education on nationals. The behaviour of these state and market agents is conditioned by their previous training and environment or the continued influence of another external context of reference which renders them relatively impervious to the inter-personal relations of the more materially insecure society they live in.

The next sub-section focuses on the anomalous exchange and power relations of clientage whose function, structural form and content are categorized as those of a distinct social institution which interacts with, but is not subsumed to, the state and market.

3. Defining Clientage as a Social Institution

Clientage is premised on the peasant household as the basic unit of production and consumption. The social content of clientage is the relationship between peasant producers on the one hand and monopolist appropriators on the other, who control access to scarce resources and 'modern goods' that can provide the means of improved production or an enhanced standard of living. Appropriation takes place through networks of clientage such that the monopolist patrons can become clients to one another as well, since they control different goods or services and must therefore seek access to each other's resources.

Clientage relationships are conditioned by the fact that peasants retain direct access to the means of production and hence prove difficult to control directly. Monopolists have the means of achieving some degree of control over the peasantry through their control over other scarce resources and the means of improved production and consumption.

Generally, the patron's control over scarce goods and services arises from his strategic position vis-a-vis the formal state and market. Patrons are often formally agents of the state or market, but their personalistic prestige-seeking behaviour displaces the behaviour of the professional bureaucrat or profit-minded merchant. The social relations between the producers and the monopolists and between the monopolists themselves are epitomised by non-market personalised exchanges in which the client assumes a dependent status that alleviates his material insecurity,

while the monopolist patron assumes dominance which enhances his prestige and power. The patron pursues conspicuous consumption in place of productive accumulation and investment; displays and distribution of wealth attract clients. The clientage relationship is constrained neither by communally-enforced moral obligations nor state-guaranteed legal rights. It is subject only to face-to-face accountability. Hence the patron's mobility and scope for escape from the personal pressures exerted by his clients is an important factor in determining the coherence of the network.

Appropriation by unequal exchange in the market and state taxation provides the context in which personalised exchange proliferates since the rates of extraction rarely strike a balance between what clients can afford and what the state and merchant capital extract. Clientage relations can evolve into a fine tuning mechanism through which the rate of extraction from the productive base and the pattern of distribution of surplus through the various levels of the network of channeled surplus are adjusted.

The clientage practices of state and market agents arise in the interstices of the state and market, and expand to the detriment of the fabric of state and market operations. In some cases they more or less dissolve these structures and replace them with clientage networks through which commodities, goods and services are channeled to and from the peasants.

Clientage networks form delicate branching chains which are easily broken and difficult to re-connect immediately. The networks are subject to constant imbalance even though they arise from the need for balance. Monopolists tend to hoard goods, services, commodities, money, and prestige thus serving to re-inforce the scarcity and irregularity of resources. Many monopolists have a vested interest in the stops and starts in the flow of products, services and information. Restricting information flows creates confusion and an aura of public unaccountability in which discretionary activities can proliferate. Forces outside the network, namely natural hazards and fluctuations of world market prices constantly impinge on it, rendering the network even more fragile.

The clientage network is a poor distributive system because its tendency towards expansion and incorporation is not built around the continuous supply of commodities, goods and services for the purpose of accumulation and investment, but rather around the monopolists' attempt to aggrandize

clients by increasing their own command over scarce resources. Productive accumulation and financial investment occur as fortuitous by-products rather than as the motivating force and necessary outcome of clientage practices. Financial investment and the savings behaviour it involves are anathema to clientage. Instead clientelistic 'social capital' investment is the organizing principle which serves to maximize power and prestige but does not necessarily provide viable incentives for increased production and a resultant widening of the provision of goods and services through the distributive network.

Clientage's material context arises on the one hand out of an agrarian economy which is subject to wide fluctuations in production and on the other hand from the influence of the capitalist world market, international relations between nation-states and the technological advances achieved in the industrial world. The means for improved production and enhanced living standards that the monopolists channel usually originate in the industrial nations of the world.

Both the agents and the goods and services channeled by these agents are intimately entwined with the agents and operations of the state and market, such that it may seem confusing or even pointless to distinguish clientage networks. However, since the logic of clientage is so different and often in direct conflict with that of the state and market, it is necessary to analyze and trace the development of clientage as a separate institution if we are to understand the nature of food insecurity and the constraints on the development of the social division of labour in Tanzania.

4. Periodization of Social Institutions

Most work on Tanzania is periodized on the basis of the state's transformation from a British colony to a politically independent state in 1961. This is a very formalistic periodization which, nonetheless, is treated as a profound break by most authors. There is little evidence that the material context of the state changed radically between the colonial and post-colonial periods.

The development of the market with respect to staple foods can be divided into four stages: the dominance of Asian merchant capital, 1919-1941; a state-regulated market, 1941-1957; the decline of Asian merchant capital and the rise of the African cooperatives, 1957-1973; and parastatal marketing, 1973-

1985.

The development of clientage is more difficult to periodize since it comes to permeate state and market channels without any clear symbol to denote its presence. Despite the ubiquity of clientage relations in extra-household affairs, clientage logic and practices are embodied in particular organizational forms at different times which do not preclude the incidence of clientage elsewhere but nonetheless typify its specific characteristics for each period. Thus the development of clientage networks can be divided into three stages coinciding with the rise and fall of three organizational forms, namely, the Native Authorities, 1919-1950; the cooperatives, 1950-1973; and the parastatals, 1973-1985.⁵

During the 66 years under study and especially since 1950, the tendency has been for the state and market to be engulfed gradually by clientage networks. For this reason, the stages of clientage development rather than those of formal state and market development are used as the basis for periodization in this thesis. Between 1919 and 1950, the state, market and clientage were identifiably separate social institutions inter-acting with each other. From 1950 to 1973, there was a tendency for clientage networks to undermine the operation of the market whereas the state retained its separate identity. Finally, from 1973 to 1985, the gradual merger of state and market operations into those of clientage took place.

The rest of this chapter considers the formal structure and content of the state, market and clientage during 1919-1950 within the context of pervasive food insecurity experienced in the peasant household. The focus will be on the logic, behavioural patterns and occupational accountability of the institutional agents.

⁵ The dates for these stages of clientage are not precise but rather rough approximations because the decline of one organizational form always over-lapped with the gradual rise of the next.

II. The British Colonial State and Food Insecurity

1. Colonial State Structure and Policy

Tanganyika Territory, previously German East Africa, was a League of Nations mandated territory awarded to Great Britain after World War I. The territory's central administration, headquartered in Dar es Salaam consisted of a Secretariat, High Court, Treasury and various technical departments, e.g. agriculture, labour, public works, etc. The Secretariat was composed of a Governor appointed by the Colonial Office and an Executive Council meeting once a week with day-to-day business presided over by the Chief Secretary. A Legislative Council convened three times a year. Both councils were made up of departmental heads and unofficial members appointed by the Governor who acted in a primarily advisory role to the Governor.

Tanganyika was divided into eight provinces headed by Provincial Commissioners who had the responsibility of ensuring that the Secretariat's policies were being carried out by the district administrations under their jurisdiction. There were roughly forty districts⁶ with a district commissioner in charge, supported by one or two other district officers in addition to police and technical officers of whom the most important were the agricultural officers.

TABLE 3.1 lists Tanganyika Territory's budgetary revenue and expenditure. The budget deficits during the Depression were of grave concern, but thereafter revenue exceeded expenditure in all but three years. The coercive nature of colonial rule is reflected in the large proportion of the budget devoted to prisons and police whereas a narrow humanitarianism is suggested by the large medical expenditure relative to that of education or agriculture. Undoubtedly, the continuous budgetary attention to medical needs contributed to population growth.

In 1926, Tanganyika's second governor, Cameron, elaborated a policy of 'indirect rule' whereby selected chiefs and other traditional authorities were delegated executive and judicial powers at the tribal level under the purview of the district administration. Indirect rule through Native

⁶ The number varied over the years as new districts were created and others amalgamated.

Authorities was the cheapest way of governing.⁷ For district administrators, it placed a buffer between them and the peasantry. The state's rural policies were first communicated to the chief who either facilitated or impeded their implementation. A district colonial official's essential duties were to ensure the payment of taxes and the avoidance of famine.

Economic policy was directed at spurring peasants to produce a surplus over and above their immediate household food needs. The surplus was to take the form of cashcrops, be it food or export crops, or alternatively wage labour. Districts distant from the rail-lines were more likely to fall in the latter category. The peasant surplus was not to be had at the expense of famine. In Governor Cameron's words:

The natives in some localities in the Territory are exposed to periodical famine and it is the duty of the Agricultural Department to ameliorate this state of affairs; to save a native community from famine is more important than the export of many bales of cotton.⁸

In effect, the territorial policy towards peasant production was one of household food self-sufficiency with male cash earning on the side, either in the form of cash crop production or migrant labour. Throughout the thirty year period under review, the lack of funds for developing productivity in peasant agriculture posed a dilemma for district administrators who had to formulate locality-specific policies that were capable of nurturing a delicate balance between subsistence food production and cash earning activities (TABLE 3.2). Failure to do so, and consequent tax default and/or food shortages reflected the impossibility of the task given the weather for that year and the area's potential under the prevailing level of agricultural technology. Most actively involved in this task were the District Administrative Officer and the District Agricultural Officer, whose agencies are examined in the following sub-section.

⁷ During the inter-war years, there were on average only 150-170 administrative officers in the country, including those on leave (Heussler, R.W. British Tanganyika, An Essay and Documents on District Administration, (Durham, N. Carolina, Duke University Press, 1971), 23).

⁸ Cameron, D., 'Sessional Paper No. 2: Instructions to Administrative Officers in regard to Native Labour and the Production of Economic Crops', DSM, Government Printer, 1926

2. District Administrative and Agricultural Officers

In a number of ways, the district administrative and agricultural officers were archetypal Weberian bureaucratic agents. Operating within an office hierarchy based on written documentation, they were appointed officials with a strong professional identity and bureaucratic impartiality. Their posts consumed all their working energies and were the source of considerable social esteem.

Recruitment was highly selective with tacit entry qualifications being a British public school and Oxbridge education.⁹ A district administrative officer was responsible for the overall well-being of the district which involved not only tax collection and peasant food supply, but also maintaining law and order, acting as a judicial officer and supervising infrastructural building such as roads and water supplies, health and educational services. Most of his duties were carried out in conjunction with the Native Authorities using Native Treasury funds.

The district agricultural officer's brief was to organise, improve and standardise African agriculture and assist in non-African agriculture in an advisory capacity upon invitation. They were expected to spend twenty days a month on safari, holding village barazas¹⁰ and visiting peasants in their shambas.¹¹ The Agricultural Department was grossly understaffed. In 1927, for example, only 14 districts had agricultural officers. Their numbers rose to 25 in 1930. In 1933, there were no agricultural officers throughout drought-prone Central Province.

Famine prevention was the agriculture department's most basic concern, especially during the drought and locust-ridden 1930s.

It is the first duty of the department to work towards the production of adequate supplies of food for local consumption. With the possible exception of the highland areas, any part of the

⁹ Furse, Sir R. Aucuparias: Recollections of a Recruiting Officer, (London, Oxford University Press, 1962), 239-241

¹⁰ General meetings held outside for all to come, usually in the form of a short address made by the visiting dignitary followed by a question/answer period.

¹¹ Translated 'farms'.

Territory, in any year, may suffer a partial or almost complete failure of the rains. When this occurs a shortage of grain foods is likely to arise. Furthermore the possibility of locust depredations must be taken into account, such crops as maize, sorghums and rice are particularly vulnerable to this pest. The anti-famine policy is simple; it consists of the planting of adequate areas of such root-crops as cassava and sweet potatoes, both of which are drought resistant and are not damaged by locusts to any appreciable extent. Provision exists in the Native Authority Ordinances to enforce the planting of anti-famine crops wherever necessary.¹²

District administrative and agricultural officers' salaries were fairly low compared with the earnings of those with like education in the U.K.¹³ Salary scales remained fixed between 1926 and 1943 with a 7.5% government deduction during the depression.¹⁴ In addition to their basic salary, officers were entitled to government loans free of interest to purchase cars and mileage allowances for official travelling and a nightly safari subsistence allowance.¹⁵

All district officers worked on a 'tours of service' system. Tours lasted two and a half to three years usually followed by a home leave of six months allowing officers and their families to return to the U.K. This usually resulted in fairly brief postings of only two to three years in any one district. The Secretariat favoured frequent transfers with an interspersal of desirable and hardship postings. This system was criticized for never allowing district administrative personnel to get to know a place well enough to make a positive impact.¹⁶

The work of the district administrative and agricultural officers was frustrating, strictly delimited in terms of the resources at the officer's disposal and highly impersonal and distant from

¹² Tanganyika, Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1937, 17

¹³ Furse, Aucuparias, 221; TT, Circular No. 22 of 1935

¹⁴ TT, Department of Agriculture to Secretary of Salaries Commission, Secretariat, DSM 'Anomalies in the Salaries of Officers of the Agricultural Department', 29 March, 1947, 6 in Stenhouse, A.S., RH Mss. Afr.s.417

¹⁵ Harvey, C., 'East African Extracts from Auto-biographical Journal (as District Agricultural Officer in Tanganyika, 1927-38)', RH Mss. Afr.s.1769, 43; Haarer, A.E., 'Memories covering 22 Years', RH Mss. Afr.s.1144, 34

¹⁶ Young, R. and H. Fosbrooke, Land and Politics among the Luguru, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1960), 125

the peasants that were supposed to be served by British mandated administration. After World War II, Wakefield, the former Director of Agriculture, had this to say:

...the work of the Agricultural Officer was very impersonal. Almost everything we thought should be done was passed on by the Chief as an instruction to the whole community. If an officer had a strong personality and the Chief had confidence in his knowledge and judgment, good progress could be achieved. But in this we did not think so much of the man and the well-being of his family as the prevention of famine in an area; the growing of cash crops so that taxes could be paid. (Administrative Officers were concerned with the percentage of tax collected in an area, and not what prevented the individual from meeting his obligation). All our work was pre-conditioned by the necessity to balance the territorial budget and to maintain law and order.¹⁷

3. Occupational Morality/Accountability: Food as a Bureaucratic Welfare Concern

It has been argued above that the district administrative and agricultural officers were bureaucratic agents. Was their behaviour on the job impersonal and impartial with regard to peasant food security? Famine prevention and relief measures were embodied in the Native Authority Ordinance of 1921, the Native Foodstuffs Ordinance of 1924, and Circular No. 33 of 1930. The former two dealt with preventive measures including planting orders and restrictions on trade and beer brewing, whereas the latter laid out detailed famine relief procedures beginning with the precautionary measures of surveying village and regional food reserves, submission of annual district food reports, and advance identification of relief public works, specification of famine relief distribution, its financial accounting and finally, the post-famine relief report that had to be submitted to the central government.

District officers' domestic supply of food was problematic. What was considered a 'reasonable diet for a European' was sporadically unavailable or absent virtually all the time in some desolate and remote up-country stations.¹⁸ The tropical climate and the scarcity of refrigerators, made it impossible to keep stores of many types of food.

¹⁷ Wakefield, 'Address to Colonial Office Summer School, Cambridge, August 1948', RH Mss. Afr.s.348-353, 2

¹⁸ Savory, B. in Heussler, R.W., 'British Colonial Service in Tanganyika', 1965, RH Mss. Br. Emp.s.480/4, 8

Nonetheless, the uncertainty of district officers' food supplies did not seriously interfere with their peasant food security duties for several reasons. First of all, there was a notion of the separateness of European foods and African foods, particularly in relation to staples; Europeans preferred wheat flour as opposed to Africans' sembe maize flour, sorghum/millet or plantains. Second, district officers had a varied number of sources of supply which tended to be far more reliable than those of peasants. Frequently, district officers' families moved into a station bringing with them a large stock of imported tinned goods.¹⁹ Households in the remoter stations often arranged to receive monthly food parcels from Dar es Salaam shops containing staples such as wheat flour, sugar, baby milk, and cheese. One district officer's wife in Rufiji did not hesitate to send a runner to Dar es Salaam over a hundred kilometres away to bring back condensed milk, potatoes and shoe polish when the household ran out of these items before schedule.²⁰ In other areas, local Asian dukas sold these items. Wives of district officers often kept kitchen gardens and many officers were avid wild game hunters. When it came to purchasing vegetables, meat and dairy products in local African markets it is interesting to note that the 'just price' principle rather than market supply and demand often operated. The 'just price' tended to be quite low and some Europeans insisted on paying more for their African-produced milk and eggs out of embarrassment whereas others, adherents of the backward-sloping supply curve theory, felt higher prices would cause shortages as African target earnings were achieved more quickly.²¹

Famine prevention measures were so basic and usually did not require funding, being merely the

¹⁹ White, E.G., 'Brief Domestic Reminiscences of Life in Tanganyika, 1929-34', RH Mss. Afr.s.172, (n.d.), 2

²⁰ Hall, Lady Lorna, 'A Bushwife's Progress: The Life of a Colonial Officer's Wife in Tanganyika, 1932-53', RH Mss. Afr.s.1834, (1982), 12-21

²¹ Leslie, J.A.K., Transcript of 'Interview upon his Service as D.O.; Commissioner, Social Development; and Permanent Secretary in Tanganyika, 1946-54', RH Mss. Afr.s.1516, 42-43; Hall, RH Mss Afr.s.1834, 40,55

loud and long exhortation to plant cassava and sweet potatoes. Famine relief measures were of an urgent nature and very few officers dared getting sidetracked onto other matters in the midst of a famine. Peasant food security was the lynchpin of district policy; to ignore it was to commit gross negligence.

The most notable incidence of administrative negligence which prevented the timely delivery of famine relief supplies occurred in Bugufi in 1929, when an estimated 500 peasants died. An official enquiry²² into the actions of Biharamulo's District Officer, and Bugufi's Assistant District Officer, revealed that the newly placed Assistant District Officer had been pre-occupied with constructing a sub-district headquarters and having been misinformed by the District Officer that in Bugufi the word njaa²³ meant a shortage of beer rather than food, it was not until he encountered corpses on the road that he realized the seriousness of the situation and started the machinery going for famine relief! The District Officer had a great deal to answer for having ignored the chief's written notification of impending food shortages four months before the outbreak of the famine.²⁴

Aloofness rather than conflicting interests seemed to be the basis of administrative officers' neglect in famine relief work. The primary problem was slow detection of food shortages. Commenting on the late discovery of a food shortage in Dodoma district in 1941, the Director of Agriculture remarked:

²² Governor's Secretariat Minute, 27 January, 1931 notes that the event would be reported to the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of Nations (TNA SMP 13252).

²³ Translated 'hunger'.

²⁴ Letters from Lumley, Assistant District Officer to Chief Secretary, 6 August, 1930 and 2 February, 1931 and Letter from Lukiko Nyamiaga, Bugufi to Maguire, District Officer, 26 November, 1928, TNA SMP 13252.

...it appears no proper information with reference to the crops reached the Provincial Commissioner until at least four months after he should have been fully informed as to the food prospects and I can see no avoidance of similar conditions unless officers of the Administration are in a position to get round their districts and away from the main roads more frequently²⁵...Compared with my experience when serving in Tanganyika fifteen years ago, I can say without hesitation that the Administration is no longer in touch with the ordinary native as it used to be and that in certain cases for prolonged periods of the year there is in effect no real continuous contact with the people...²⁶

Famine prevention and relief epitomized the paternalism of the colonial government and struck a deep responsive chord in officers. Most officers saw themselves as superior in intellect and culture to the African peasant populace. Their duty to the peasantry was defined by the British Empire's civilizing mission. This outlook is pointedly described by Rowe in an interview he had with Tawney, both having been district administrative officers in Tanganyika:

[We were] members of an alien administrative service, a colonial service with its own tradition. You and I and hundreds of others knew the form expected of us. We hoped to be able to think at the end of our service we had done something to help the country we were serving in and its people, but the people who we really had to satisfy were our masters, who were of our own race, our own traditions, our own outlook. We knew that as long as we were doing our stuff honestly and really trying, we would be backed by our Civil Service masters up to the Governor and, if necessary up to the Secretary of State.²⁷

III. The Asian²⁸ Market and Food Insecurity

1. Asian Market Structure

Some Asian families can date their ancestors' arrival in Tanzania to the late 18th century, but it was not until the mid-19th century that Asians began displacing Arabs as the principal merchants and financiers of the Zanzibari ivory caravan trade. In 1921, Indians numbered 9,411.²⁹ Thereafter,

²⁵ Many colonial administrators were of the opinion that as district officers became more reliant on motor cars and abandoned foot safaris, they got increasingly out of touch with the peasantry.

²⁶ Director of Agriculture's Secretariat Minute, 11 October, 1941, TNA SMP 13252.

²⁷ Rowe, E.G., 'Interview concerning Colonial Service in Tanganyika, 1928-1958', RH Mss. Afr.s.1698, 64

²⁸ Refers to people living in East Africa with Indian or Pakistani ancestry.

²⁹ TT, Non-Native Census, 1921, Report, (DSM, Government Printer, 1921)

under British colonial administration, heavy immigration, combined with a natural growth rate estimated at between 2 and 3%, brought their total number to 46,254 in 1948; almost a five-fold increase over 27 years.³⁰

Apart from a few Asians who had large-scale sisal plantation holdings, Asian businesses were mainly in wholesale and retail trade and transport. It was estimated that in 1939 Asians held 50% and 60% of the import and export trade and 80% of transport services in addition to 90% of town property and 17% of non-African agricultural land.³¹ Asian businesses were family concerns, very often run as a partnership between brothers or other close kin, and employing family relations for virtually all non-manual jobs. Businesses evolved around the mutual obligations of the patriarchal joint family as it had existed in Western India. The solidarity of the Asian communities strengthened business activity, provided meeting places for the exchange of trade information and helped to ensure the fulfillment of obligations and the recovery of loans between members of the community.³²

Asian commercial concerns were vertically and horizontally integrated. Wholesalers and sub-wholesalers were frequently retailers, and at all levels of the marketing chain, trade in consumer goods was combined with agricultural produce buying. There were several reasons for this. First of all, Tanganyika's large territory and poor rail and road conditions caused transport costs to be exorbitantly high. It was imperative to arrange that lorries and rail cars have return loads when sending a shipment of consumer goods to an area. Second, produce buying was the axis of all trading activities. Retail and wholesale margins were comparatively small on consumer goods relative to the

³⁰ TT, Report on the Census of the Non-Native Population taken on the Night of 25 February, 1948, (DSM, Government Printer, 1953)

³¹ Delf, G., Asians in East Africa, (London, Institute of Race Relations, 1963), 30

³² Ghai, D.P. and Y.P. (eds.), Portrait of a Minority, Asians in East Africa, (Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1970); Mangat, J.S. A History of the Asians in East Africa c. 1886-1945, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969); Honey, M.S. An Economic History of Asians in Tanzania and Zanzibar c. 1840-1940, Ph.D. thesis, UDSM, (1982)

greater margins but higher risks of produce buying.³³ Third, markets for consumer goods were extremely small. For many consumer items, the market was limited to immediately after the harvest when peasant farmers had just sold their produce and had money in their pockets. This seasonality of supply and demand put enormous stress on the poor transport and communications network and frequently led to unplanned surpluses or shortages and wide price fluctuation. Diversified trading helped to ease the normal volatility of such trading conditions.³⁴ High margins at one time of the year in particular products could help to smooth out the losses incurred in another product during lulls in trade.

There were a number of factors that could make the system vulnerable to monopoly. The network of dukas³⁵ in up-country areas was not dense, peasants could not compare the prices in several different shops, and since they were usually illiterate and often unaware of the range of different qualities in a product line, it could make it easy for a dukawallah³⁶ to charge monopoly prices. In the cases where there were a few shops in a trading centre to choose from, competitive pricing might be minimal if merchants had communal ties and practiced price collusion. These were always the fears of the colonial administration and in some areas, they were well-founded. In the Southern Province where transport was particularly difficult, oligopolistic practices were pronounced.³⁷

Ironically, it was in fact the effects of 'too many' rather than 'too few' traders that district administrations usually complained about. Throughout the 1920s and especially the 1930s, district administrators reported that numerous, under-capitalized traders were trading with the peasants and

³³ Economist Intelligence Unit, A Survey of Wholesale and Retail Trade in Tanganyika, (London, 1962), 124.

³⁴ Economist Intelligence Unit, Survey, 120

³⁵ Translated 'shops'.

³⁶ Translated 'shopkeeper'.

³⁷ Economist Intelligence Unit, Survey, 173

they were usually doing so on barter terms, which undermined the peasants' ability to pay tax in cash and, it was charged, left the peasants vulnerable to unscrupulous deals.³⁸

Despite the accusations levelled at the Asian rural marketing system by the colonial administration and the peasant resentment towards it, it is apparent that the Asian marketing system was reasonably competitive, allowing for the extremely difficult transport and communications. It was a highly cost-conscious system; there were low overheads from using family labour, spending little or no time or money on book-keeping and accounting and operating from very inauspicious premises and storage facilities. Traders from various religious communities often inhabited the larger settlements and this engendered competing prices for peasant produce and consumer goods. Asian trading firms tended to remain small rather than amalgamating into large monopolistic concerns because businesses were usually restricted to family labour and therefore limited by the size of the family. Finally, the notion of a 'just price' operated on various standard articles of basic consumption which benefitted the peasant as a consumer. Certain basic foodstuffs like sugar and maize meal had a conventional price and it was an imprudent dukawallah that tried to charge over and above that amount.³⁹

2. The Dukawallah

Despite the importance of the dukawallah in the political economy of Tanganyika and the strong imagery surrounding him, there is a dearth of documentary evidence. To colonial officials and

³⁸ Chief Secretary, to All Senior Commissioners and District Administrative Officers, Circular Letter No. 3998/35, 29 July, 1926, TNA SMP 3998; Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary, 1 December, 1930, TNA SMP 10138; Leubuscher, C. Tanganyika Territory, A Study of Economic Policy under Mandate, (London, Oxford University Press, 1944), 51

³⁹ Economists Intelligence Unit, Survey, 127,172

peasants alike he was the embodiment of profit-seeking greed,⁴⁰ whereas to the Asian population he was the most vital node in the trading network, living a hard-working, frugal life which was lonely and materially unrewarding in itself, but a necessary first step on the road to commercial success.⁴¹

The first up-country dukawallahs settled along the Central and Tanga rail-lines. As trunk roads were built in the period between the wars they settled further afield.⁴² The larger rural settlements or what was then called 'small towns' of over 2000 people were where they built their shops and adjoining houses made of sun-dried bricks and corrugated iron roofs. Generally, their immediate family and perhaps some more extended family members lived with them. The duka was a full-time occupation for virtually everyone in the family; wives, sons and daughters were all in attendance. The working hours were long, customers were served anytime between 7 a.m. and 10 p.m.

Prices were arrived at through a process of bargaining on all but the most basic goods like sugar, rice, maize meal and soap. The price that the dukawallah agreed to was contingent on his stocks, the other purchases or sales being transacted with the customer, whether his need for cash was pressing at that moment and how urgently the customer desired the article. It is this process of bargaining which seems to have been the basis of suspicion on the part of African peasants and

⁴⁰ With reference to the dukawallahs, Gillman wrote in his diary: 'The idiotic policy of letting East Africa with its comparatively speaking innocent and certainly far from decadent, native population be invaded and inflicted by the scum of India' (23/1/1921, RH Mss Afr.s.1175). In the dukawallah's defence, V.M. Nazerali, an unofficial LegCo. Member responding to the Governor's call to dukawallahs to enhance their salesmanship, had this to say: 'Your Excellency has referred to the duka wallahs. Sir, it is the first time that this miserable species of human being has got some recognition from the Governor of the Territory. Generally amongst the Government circles -- and some other circles as well -- these duka wallahs have been considered as parasites and that attitude still persists...seen under impartial and reasonable light, these duka wallahs have sacrificed their own and their families' health, their children's education and their standard of living in trying to open up the country by penetrating in peaceful manner and opening our trade for which they receive very little, if any credit and very little if any recognition up to this time that Your Excellency has mentioned them' (LegCo. Proceedings, 25th Session, 15/11/50, 21)

⁴¹ Bharati, A. The Asians in East Africa, (Chicago, Nelson-Hall Company, 1972), 103

⁴² Some of the marginal producing districts could never attract Asian traders' permanent settlement. For example, Buha district, a labour reserve area in the far western part of the country still didn't have a resident Asian trader by the early 1950s (Leslie, RH Mss. Afr.s.1516, 16 (1950-54)).

colonial officials. It was however an almost inevitable form of market transaction given the volatility of supply and demand in the market and the transport and supply constraints operating on the dukawallah.

3. Occupational Morality/Accountability: Food as a Business

The dukawallahs' role in rural food supply depended largely on the degree to which peasants relied on purchased food and the number of rural waged labourers working on private estates in the area. Peasant households were almost entirely self-sufficient for staple foods.⁴³ Trade in food provisions was restricted mainly to the sisal estate areas where all the dukas stocked the basic maize meal, beans, rice, and sugar. These items sold at conventional prices which varied somewhat regionally because of different transport costs. Profit margins on foodstuffs tended to be small, which merchants were compensated for by their fast turnover rate and the wider margins on other less basic items like tinned food and piece goods.⁴⁴

How did the dukawallah react to a local harvest failure and a consequent food shortage or famine situation? In a number of ways, the dukawallah and his family occupied a very similar position to that of the district official. Both were outsiders only partially dependant on the local supply of food and practicing different culinary traditions from African peasants. Because an Asian's food habits were conditioned by ritualist purity and food taboos were an important aspect of communal identity, his dietary intake was culturally insulated from that of the African, European and members of other religious sects.

The staple foods Asians consumed were rice, wheat and atta flour. Since dukawallahs were frequently in touch with traders in the larger towns and Dar es Salaam, the supply of these products

⁴³ Except for sugar which was used for brewing. During the 1950s, however, the Sukuma became the exception to this general rule when specialization in cotton production became a viable proposition (Economist Intelligence Unit, Survey, 155).

⁴⁴ Economist Intelligence Unit, Survey, 127,134-135,145,183

for home consumption was generally assured regardless of the state of the local harvest and therefore would not have conflicted with the food supply of the local peasantry during famines. But beyond the Asian dukawallahs' immediate household food concerns, his trading interests were in many respects directly at odds with peasant food security.

Acute shortages of goods will engender high prices in markets anywhere. In Tanganyika, colonial officials did not desire the free inter-play of market forces, branding escalating prices as commercial malpractice. The reasons for this were two-fold. First of all, the buyers were considered commercially inexperienced and naive and persistently prey to overcharging. Second, supply was relatively inelastic because of poor transport and weak integration of commodity markets with factor markets. The inadequacies of an embryonic market were equated with market agents' wrongdoing in the minds of colonial officials. The dukawallah was accused of numerous unfair trading practices including underweighing/overweighing in his favour, bartering goods and using his two-way trade with peasants to his advantage, and advancing consumer goods to peasants on agreement that they sell their harvested produce to him at a price he knew to be undervalue.⁴⁵ The colonial administration was particularly concerned about these practices during famines and food shortages.

When conditions of intense food insecurity prevailed in the rural areas, the state's famine relief programme was a highly effective curb on skyrocketing food prices. If famine relief was distributed free, as was reluctantly done in some cases, and the quantities of relief were adequate to cover demand, the dukawallah's market evaporated.⁴⁶ Even when peasants had to pay for the food it was generally at cost or subsidized, making it difficult for the dukawallah to compete. On occasion, merchants were asked to facilitate distribution in one or another ways because of their strategic position in rural transport and commodity distribution, but in these cases they were under more than usual surveillance and it would have been highly unwise for them to act in other than a circumspect

⁴⁵ 'Trade in Districts Policy', TNA SMP 3998; 'System of Marketing of Produce', TNA SMP 10138

⁴⁶ TT, Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1943, 'Famine Finance', PRO/C0852/428/17630

fashion.⁴⁷

Thus the dukawallah whose motivation and morality was profit maximization, faced the superimposition of accountability to the state when it came to the matter of peasant food security. Since the staple food trade was never a product line offering great profit, due to its limited market and the 'just price' conventions surrounding it, it appears that the local dukawallah largely conformed to state dictates in this regard and could rarely be directly implicated in the incidence of rural famine.

IV. Native Authority Clientage and Food Insecurity

1. History and Structure of Native Authorities

Prior to colonial penetration, Tanzania was composed of a welter of tribal⁴⁸ groupings displaying a wide array of organizational forms that embraced a kingdom, dozens of matrilineal and patrilineal chiefdoms, age-grade societies as well as acephalous populations which did not cohere as corporate units until the superimposition of the colonial state made it expedient to do so.

In most societies, both the leadership and the collective groupings they led tended to be unstable. The combination of shifting cultivation with hunting and gathering practices gave rise to considerable geographical mobility and segmentary processes. Frequent leadership changes were a natural outcome of the fluidity of the groupings.

Leaders were the interceding agencies between the people and their ancestors. Appeals to ancestors were made in the hopes of securing favourable natural conditions for the survival and well-being of the tribal group. Ensuring crop and human fertility were the goals and the measures of good leadership. Related to this, leaders had the responsibility of preventing the tribe's devastation in war. Failure of the rains, locust invasion, defeat in war were all signs of a leader's lack of

⁴⁷ E.g. Dudbridge, B. 'Report on the 1949/50 Famine in the Maswa District', RH Mss. Afr.s.880

⁴⁸ I use 'tribe' to refer to societies where economic organisation and access to land are based on kinship (Mair, L., An Introduction to Social Anthropology, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), 14).

rapport with the ancestors, and could trigger the installation of a new leader.⁴⁹

Under German colonial rule the form of tribal authorities was altered and their content distorted when and where it was not conducive to bureaucratic administration. Most importantly, the colonial administration did not allow the continuation of frequent changes of leadership which would cause discontinuities in the execution of administrative orders. Overtime, colonial backing was given to the evolution of lifelong hereditary rulers with clear patrilineal succession, contrary to the dynamics of traditional tribal rule.⁵⁰ In so doing, tribal leadership became increasingly accountable to the colonial administration rather than to tribal membership.

The British policy of indirect rule consciously aimed at striking a balance between tribal authorities' local and bureaucratic accountability. On one hand, they sought to restore 'authentic' traditional rulers to power, on the other hand they unthinkingly perpetuated the system of hereditary rule and could not resist trying to standardize traditional authority and impose chiefdoms on all tribal areas regardless of their original organizational form or history of leadership succession. There were several tribes where chiefdomship was a subversion of the nature of leadership, since it imposed political functions on leaders who had previously been restricted to performing a magico-religious role.⁵¹

British colonial administration had no desire to retain an authentic content to the operations of the Native Authorities. Most colonial officials were of the opinion that traditional society had

⁴⁹ Chagga:Liebenow, J.G. 'Tribalism, Traditionalism, and Modernism in Chagga Local Government', Journal of African Administration, 10(2), (1958), 74; Sukuma:Cory, H. The Indigenous Political System of the Sukuma, (Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau, 1954), 11; Kimbu:Shorter, A.E.M. Chiefship in Western Tanzania: A Political History of the Kimbu, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972), 106

⁵⁰ Wright, A.C.A. 'The Transition from Native Administration to Local Government', Paper prepared for the Government of Tanganyika, (1952), 3, (Cory Collection No. 402, UDSM)

⁵¹ Fosbrooke, H.A. 'Tanganyika, the Application of Indirect Rule to Chiefless Societies', Rhodes-Livingstone Conference Proceedings, RH (1959), 22-23; Ranger, T., 'European Attitudes and African Realities: The Rise and Fall of the Matola Chiefs of Southeast Tanzania', Journal of African History 20, (1979), 82

tolerated autocratic excess.⁵² All forms of traditional tribute were outlawed in 1926 and chiefs and sub-chiefs received a salary paid from their Native Treasury, its amount stipulated by the central government according to the rank and the size of the chiefdom. The aim was to create an authority with legitimacy in the eyes of the peasants which was capable of collecting tax and implementing government policies at the local level efficiently. The machinery to do so was the Native Treasuries and the Native Courts. Chiefs were nominally in charge of both, but educated clerks were managing their day-to-day operations and the district officer was the overseer of everything, particularly the Native Treasury. Generally, over two thirds of Native Treasury expenditure went on the costs of tribal administration and salaries.⁵³

2. Rainmakers, Chiefs and Clerks

Because the Native Authority was endowed with both old and new functions and had been cast in a traditional mould, it is not surprising to find that its personnel and their activities represented a continuum of old and new aspects of the society, illustrated by the links between the rainmaker, the chief and the clerk.

Whatever the organizational form of the pre-colonial tribal society, the rainmaker was pivotal. In the acephalous groups, the ritual powers of the rainmaker provided a centre of gravity, whereas in the more hierarchical societies the chief's primary duty to his people was to have on hand or otherwise be an effective rainmaker, performing rituals that accorded with the dictates of the

⁵² To Cameron, indirect rule was a matter of using 'their own indigenous institutions in order to promote higher standards of civilization.' Whereas one former district officer and resident magistrate summarized the policy as: '(A) Bringing the African people to respect their gerontocracy and (B) making the gerontocracy worthy of that respect. (A) depended very considerably on (B), but (B) was often difficult to implement' (Cameron, Sir D., 'Native Administration in Nigeria and Tanganyika', Journal of the Royal African Society, XXXVI, (1937), 9); Savory, B. 'Answers to Questionnaire received from R. Heussler, Esq.' in Heussler, R.W., RH Mss. Br. Emp.s.480/4, (1965), 1)

⁵³ E.g. Tribal administration was 71% and 73% of total expenditure in the Native Authority Budget in Tabora Province and Sambia Native Administration, Tanga Province 1930/31 (Aplin, H.D. Report on Native Administration in Tanganyika Territory, (Zomba, Nyasaland Protectorate, 1931), 64, 628).

ancestors.⁵⁴

In the British colonial government's search for authentic tribal leaders, the local rain magicians were frequently selected.⁵⁵ Throughout the British colonial period, there is evidence for a number of areas that peasants continued to believe in the efficacy of rain ceremonies and judged chiefs on the basis of their fulfillment of ritual duties to the ancestors rather than their administrative performance and fiscal rectitude.⁵⁶

While the British were eager to harness the legitimacy derived from tribal leaders' magico-religious role, their aim was to gradually transform the nature of the chiefs' elite status from one rooted in traditional beliefs and honour to that of an educated bureaucratic elite. This was to be accomplished through the education of chiefs' sons. The Tabora Boys' school was Tanganyika's equivalent of Eton.⁵⁷

Elitism was further encouraged through the government's incomes policy. The government stressed that chiefs were not salaried civil servants requiring incentive increments, rather, the income a chief was given was a commutation of tribute, or in other words a stipend 'to enable him to maintain his position and meet the necessary expenses of his office',⁵⁸ the level fixed according to the size and wealth of the population in his area.

⁵⁴ Gogo:Adam, V. 'Rain Making Rites in Ihanzu', Paper presented at the East African Institute of Social Research Conference, DSM, (January 1963), 15; Hartnoll, A.V. 'Praying for Rain in Ugogo', TNR 13, (June 1942), 59; Sukuma, Hehe, Nyanwezi, Luguru:McCallum, D. 'Rain-making in Tanganyika', TNR 52, (March 1959), 53; Feierman, Sovereignty among the Shambaa, 380; Kimbu:Shorter, Chiefship, 106

⁵⁵ Whatever administrative arrangement had transpired under German rule the rain rituals endured (Luguru:Young and Fosbrooke, Land and Politics, 84; Shambaa:Feierman, Sovereignty among the Shambaa, 397; Sukuma:Ntundu, Y. 'The Position of Rainmaker among the Wanyiramba', TNR 7, (June 1939), 86).

⁵⁶ Adam, 'Rain Making Rites', 15; Feierman, Sovereignty among the Shambaa, 398

⁵⁷ Savory, B., in Heussler, RH Mss. Br. Emp.s.480/4, 2

⁵⁸ TT, Native Authority Memorandum, No. 3, (1930), 15.-(i)

The wealth of the chiefs relative to their people was considerable. In terms of formal salary, the 1929/30 figures for the Native Treasury of the Sukuma Federation show chiefs' salaries and pensions constituting 48% of the total salary bill, with the far more numerous headmen receiving only 27%, and clerks, messengers, tribal dressers and sanitary labourers accounting for the remainder.⁵⁹ Since Native Authority personal emoluments were usually over two thirds of total expenditure, tax payers received negligible services for their tax money.⁶⁰

According to Mitchell, the Secretary of Native Affairs, tribute had been commuted to a fixed salary because the development of a market economy upset the balance between the people and their chief and subverted the nature of tribute.

[Traditionally,] the people paid a tithe of their produce or stock, and gave their labour to hoe the Chief's fields and gather his harvest, to fetch him firewood and make and tend his game and fish traps. In a subsistence economy there was little risk of abuse in that for there was no market to which surpluses could be sold. But as soon as stock, maize, groundnuts, rice and the rest of it became salable for cash to merchants a very different state of affairs came into existence and in fact there were avaricious Chiefs whose demands on their people amounted to extortion. One who had perhaps about 100,000 people under him was found to have sold a surplus in one year worth £10,000; at the then prevailing produce prices that was clearly a great deal too much.⁶¹

The fact that the chiefs were accorded an elite status, but that chiefly rivalry had been built into the system at the time of selecting chiefly personnel and differentiating their salaries, meant

⁵⁹ Aplin, Report on Native Administration, 618

⁶⁰ E.g. the Sumbaa Native Authority budget expenditure in Tanga Province 1930/1 of £4,228 was broken down as follows:

Tribal Administration	73%	Roads	7%
Medical and Sanitation	12%	Tsetse Reclamation	0
Education	1%	Water Supply	0
Agriculture	5%	General	2%
Veterinary	0		

Source: Aplin, Report on Native Administration, 64

⁶¹ Mitchell, Sir P. African Afterthoughts, (London, Hutchinson, 1954), 126

that chiefs felt compelled to compete with one another in ostentatious consumption.⁶² As early as 1921 chiefs in Bukoba were reported having cars.⁶³ While the government attempted to keep competitive consumption in check by stipulating that chiefs must not incur liabilities for expensive articles without the sanction of the Provincial Commissioner,⁶⁴ nonetheless, chiefs had a tendency to get indebted to local Asian traders, who felt confident that the chiefs would not be willing to make their debts known to the district officer.⁶⁵

In return for the elite status accorded them by the colonial government, chiefs had to serve as the intermediaries between their people and district officers. In the eyes of the colonial government, the efficacy of this arrangement depended on: first, the degree to which the people recognized their chief as a legitimate leader; second, the chief's understanding and acceptance of the measures being advocated by the colonial government; and third, the chief's willingness to devote his energies to their implementation. In some areas, matters never got beyond the question of legitimacy and there was incessant bickering and ill-will concerning tribal leadership. Most of the complaints district officers made were lodged somewhere between the second and third impediments.⁶⁶

Colonial judgements regarding the progressive versus retrogressive role chiefs played under indirect rule have tended to be along the lines that chiefs became anachronisms with credibility only

⁶² Unomah, A.C., 'Indirect Rule and the Nyanwezi Traditional System in the Tabora Province of Tanganyika', Tarikh 3(3), (1970), 59

⁶³ TT, Bukoba District Annual Report, 1920/1

⁶⁴ TT, Native Authority Memorandum, No. 3, 15-(i)

⁶⁵ Cory, Indigenous Political System, 27

⁶⁶ Sturdy, D.S., Transcript of 'Interview concerning Agricultural Services in Tanganyika, 1926-45', RH Mss. Afr.s.1331, (1969), 14-15; Tomlinson, G.A., Miscellaneous Papers: 'Memorandum on Indirect Rule' RH Mss. Afr.s.370, (1937), 2-3; Perham, M., 'The System of Native Administration in Tanganyika', Africa, 4, (1931), 310; Young and Fosbrooke, Land and Politics, 86

as long as their people still retained ritual beliefs.⁶⁷ Otherwise they were viewed as highly autocratic and corruptible. It was considered inevitable that they were slowly edged out of power during the 1950s through local government reforms with chieftdomship finally abolished soon after independence in 1963.⁶⁸

Bureaucratic performance criteria were invariably used by officials and commentators for judging chiefs. The peasant's perspective was undoubtedly very different.⁶⁹ Chiefs had a strong identification with their people, precisely because their elite status was bound up in representing them to the colonial government. Such identification is a feature that is not always present in clientage relations and has implications for clientage practices, as will be argued later.

Native Authority clerks, unlike the chiefs, were all literate, mission-trained and generally fluent in Kiswahili. Like others on the payroll of the Native Authority, they often owed their jobs to the fact that they were relatives of the chief.⁷⁰ Their record keeping and general clerical duties were central to the operations of the Native Authority and district officers worried about illiterate chiefs being dominated by their clerks.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Heussler, British Tanganyika, 57; Friedland, W.H., 'The Evolution of Tanganyika's Political System', Syracuse University Program of African Studies, Paper No. 10 (1965), 44; Maguire, G.A., Toward 'Uhuru' in Tanzania, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969), 337

⁶⁸ Holmes-Siedle, Bishop J., Transcript of 'Conversation between Bishop Holmes-Siedle, Bishop of Kigoma in Tanzania, the White Fathers - and John Tawney, RH Mss. Afr.s.1595, (1969), 11; Johnston, P.H., Transcript of 'Interview 1972: District Officer and Provincial Commissioner in Tanganyika, 1938-65', RH Mss. Afr.s.1620, (1972), 20; Rooke Johnston, J., 'Bits and Pieces, or, Seven Years in the Western Province of Tanganyika Territory, 1933-40 as District Officer', RH Mss. Afr.s.1270, 17; Liebenow, J.G., 'The Sukuma', in Richards, A.I. (ed.), East African Chiefs, (London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1960), 253

⁶⁹ Culwick, A.T., 'What the Wabena Think of Indirect Rule', Journal of the Royal African Society, 36, (1937), 186-192

⁷⁰ Aplin, Report on Native Administration, 11; Wright, A.C.A., 'Transition from Native Administration', 12; TT, Native Authority Memorandum No. 3, 15-(vi)

⁷¹ Savory, B. in Heussler, RH Mss. Br.EMP.s.480/4, 23

Clerical salaries were extremely low and incremental scales were avoided until the late 1940s⁷² because the remuneration was intended for men 'who continue to lead their own life in their own rural centre, occupying their own land and their own house.'⁷³ But minimal earnings and a parochial outlook were precisely the things that an educated man was trying to escape. Frequently, irregularities in tax collection, pilferage and embezzlement of Native Authority revenues were traced to clerks.⁷⁴

District officers used harsh words to describe the clerks:

Repeatedly was I sickened by cases where an unsophisticated bush African had been fleeced and cheated by a literate clerk...I often shuddered to think what might be going on close to my office, one could only make the best safeguards possible. The cunning of some of these educated types was unbelievable.⁷⁵

It is usually the educated native who is a thief.⁷⁶

However rudimentary his education, it was his education, his literacy and numeracy, knowledge of Kiswahili and perhaps English or German that set him apart from the other villagers, and led him to identify more strongly with his former classmates, often in other parts of the country, than with the local chief and peasants. Almost before he arrived back in the village, the clerk yearned for a more cosmopolitan setting and hoped his clerical job in one way or another would provide him with the means of moving to the town.⁷⁷ He could far more readily abscond with Native Authority funds than the chief who forfeited his elitist position in so doing.

⁷² TT, Native Authority Memorandum No. 3, 15-(iii); TT, Local Government Memorandum No VIII, (DSM, Government Printer, 1949), 22 a) (i)

⁷³ Cameron, 'Native Administration', 9

⁷⁴ E.g. Bagshawe diary (Kondoa District) 22/4/19, 21/1/20, RH Mss. Afr.s.281; PC, Eastern Province to Chief Secretary, 11 August, 1939, TNA SMP 27245; TT, Second Convention of Representative Chiefs of Tanganyika, (DSM, Government Printer, 1958), 3

⁷⁵ Savory, B. in Heussler, RH Mss. Afr.s.480/4, 24

⁷⁶ Longland interview reported in Heussler, British Tanganyika, 57

⁷⁷ Tomlinson, RH Mss. Afr.s.370, 5

3. Native Authority Clientage Practices and Networks

Clientage has been defined as non-market personalised exchange in which the client assumes a dependent status that alleviates his material insecurity, while the monopolist patron assumes dominance which enhances his prestige and power. The monopolist seeks to maximize his prestige regardless of state laws or alternatively communal moral obligations.

Traditionally, chiefly prestige had been held in high esteem, being considered a reflection of the general prosperity of the community. But the chief's prestige aggrandizement through tribute collection, beyond the needs of tribal food security stocks and the consumption of the chiefly retinue and tribal old and infirm, had been restricted within affordable bounds by a number of subtle checks and balances imposed by the elders, clan heads, secret societies, young warriors and other authority figures. If chiefly excesses did exceed the consensual limit, threatening the well-being of the community, the chief could readily be replaced with a successor.

Colonial rule destroyed the internal power balance in tribal communities. Many of the authority figures that had imposed checks on the chief were not accorded legitimacy. Chiefly wealth took on a monetized form that was made personal and divorced from moral obligations to the people.⁷⁸ Tribute collection was outlawed, but tribute collection did not totally cease. The colonial state openly tolerated tribute of a ritualist nature and encouraged it to some degree by using the chiefs' traditional labour call-up powers for colonial economic purposes, notably for public works and portage.⁷⁹ In this way the tradition of tribute in labour and goods was perpetuated and chiefs continued to collect various traditional forms of tribute as well as adapting the tradition to new purposes.

Under British colonialism, the chief was accorded prestige through the payment of salaries

⁷⁸ Adam, 'Rain Making Rites', 18

⁷⁹ Liebenow, 'The Sukuma', 244; Liebenow, J.G., 'Tribalism, Traditionalism, and Modernism in Chagga Local Government', Journal of African Administration, 10(2), (1958), 77; Austen, R.A., Northwest Tanzania under German and British Rule: Colonial and Tribal Politics, 1889-1939, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), 188

vastly exceeding the earnings of other tribal members. He had three main sources of monopoly wealth: his official salary, his tribute collecting potential and the extra-legal or non-bureaucratic exercise of his Native Authority office for prestige aggrandizement. These last consisted of four main types of activities: non-execution of formal duties, discretionary decision-making in public office, the appointment of relatives to Native Authority posts, and financial irregularities in the form of fraud, pilferage and embezzlement.⁸⁰ All four were considered to be abuses of office by the colonial state, but from the perspective of the chief they were part of a logical, often requisite behavioural pattern. The non-execution of formal duties was usually with regard to measures that the chief knew would make him unpopular with his people. These were often labour-intensive projects like soil conservation or measures that required people's physical exertion but appeared to have no immediate benefits such as planting a new crop.⁸¹ Discretionary decision-making arose in innumerable instances, be it with regard to court orders and fines, illegal tax exemptions or allocation of tribal land and resources which were often hazy areas where customary law and colonial state policies were at odds. Whenever a chief was in a position to raise his prestige by helping or hindering someone, in contravention of colonial state laws and policy, he was likely to do so if the possible penalties to himself were not too great. The appointment of relatives to Native Authority office went back to the pre-colonial period when chiefs had surrounded themselves with their close kin to build up a viable political power base.⁸² Sometimes these appointments were made irrespective of Native Treasury revenue estimates.⁸³ The irregular financial practices were quite new and related to

⁸⁰ TT, Native Authority Memorandum No. VIII, (DSM, Government Printer, 1929), 20-23; Young and Fosbrooke, Land and Politics, 86; Liebenow, J.G., 'Some Problems in Introducing Local Government Reform in Tanganyika', Journal of African Administration, 8(3), (1956), 135

⁸¹ Culwick, 'What the Wabena Think', 184

⁸² Aplin, Report on Native Administration, 13; Cory, Indigenous Political System, 29; Graham, J.D. 'Indirect Rule: The Establishment of 'Chiefs' and 'Tribes' in Cameron's Tanganyika', INR 77/78, (1976), 6

⁸³ Tomlinson, RH Mss. Afr.s.370, 6

the fact that pecuniary gain afforded conspicuous consumption or investment in social capital both of which ultimately led to prestige aggrandizement.

These practices posed an enormous dilemma for the colonial state who on the one hand did not wish to undermine the prestige of the chiefs but on the other hand wanted a modicum of bureaucratic accountability and wished to prevent chiefs' abuses of power and finance from reaching a level which would cause alienation or material detriment to the peasants concerned. The dilemma is reflected in the Native Authority Ordinance.

...chiefs are not salaried servants of the Government in the way that Liwalis are or Akidas were, provided therefore, that their work is generally satisfactory, their 'minor' delinquencies should be made the occasion for guarded rebuke rather than punishment...there is sometimes a temptation to look for too high a standard in the native chief...As regards abuses, it must be remembered that abuses are inevitable, but the power of supervision exists and must be exercised, and we are using in this scheme of Native Administration an instrument which is being carefully and patiently fashioned for our purpose...Administrative officers must, of course, at once step in to put a stop to abuses, and if no other course is possible the deposition of the delinquent chief may be necessary but it should be regarded as an extreme step only to be recommended when all other means have failed.⁸⁴

Despite this expressed restraint, Native Authority depositions for financial misappropriation or inefficiency, sometimes a long consecutive string of them, were a common occurrence.⁸⁵ The clientage practices did not lessen overtime as Cameron's strategy intended. During World War II, Native Authority efficiency was described as 'as low as ever'.⁸⁶

Chiefs were at the apex of the clientage network. The appointment of relatives and friends to the positions of headmen, clerks, messengers, tribal dressers or lorry drivers formed the second, broader layer of the network. Chiefs had large immediate and extended families. Polygamy was widely practiced; some chiefs' had dozens of wives. The chief rarely if ever suffered a shortage of people

⁸⁴ TT, Native Administration Memorandum No. 1, (DSM, Government Printer, 1930), 21-22

⁸⁵ E.g. Morogoro: Young and Fosbrooke, Land and Politics, 86-87; Kigoma: Kasulu District Annual Report, 1947; Kimbu: Shorter, Chiefship, 379-381; Sukuma: Liebenow, 'The Sukuma', 246-251

⁸⁶ Heussler, British Tanganyika, 55; TT, Second Convention of Representative Chiefs, 3

to appoint as his clients, who in turn could operate as 'sub-patrons' with their access to the monopoly of goods, services and monetary funds at the command of the Native Authority. Because their salaries were far lower than the chief's there was an element of need that a chief could not so readily claim. Clientage practices, particularly on the part of native clerks, were widespread. The chief's Native Authority appointees like the lesser headmen were unsalaried, but the title was a boost to personal prestige and possible pecuniary gain.⁸⁷

At the bottom of the clientage network, the peasantry sought material security in a variety of forms from their immediate patrons and ultimately the chief. Peasants' primary concern was ensuring access to basic subsistence goods, precisely because these goods could not be taken for granted. The chief's famine prevention and relief duties contributed materially to the guarantee of peasants' subsistence, but apart from that, in the absence of a notable financial commitment to development on the part of the colonial government, chiefs for the most part were not, as later patrons under cooperative and parastatal clientage would be, intermediaries for the provisioning of 'modern' production and consumption goods to the peasantry. The chief's patronage to his people had a greater symbolic and spiritual content than patrons would have in subsequent cooperative and parastatal clientage networks.

The clientage practices, some which were clearly at the expense of peasants' material well-being, tended not to be of great concern or moral outrage for the average peasant and were not usually reported to colonial officers for a number of reasons.⁸⁸ In most cases peasants had a sufficient amount of respect and loyalty for their chief, tribal pride or fear, that kept them from

⁸⁷ Salaried headmen, upon the discretion of the chief, could receive modest monthly, quarterly or half-yearly salaries based on 3% of the taxes paid by their village, whereas further down those with less than 100 taxpayers did not receive remuneration (IT, Native Authority Memorandum No. 3, (1930), 15-(iv); Aplin, Report on Native Administration, 12; Leslie, J.A.K., Transcript of 'Interview upon his service as D.O.; Commissioner, Social Development; and Permanent Secretary in Tanganyika, 1946-54', RH Mss. Afr.s.1516, (1969), 26; Kayamba, H.M.T. African Problems, (London, 1948), 17-18

⁸⁸ Cory, Indigenous Political System, 10; Leslie, RH Mss. Afr.s.1516, 26; Heussler, British Tanganyika, 16

informing the foreign district officer about the chiefs' clientage practices. A former district officer recalls an illustrative incident:

In 1938 a retired Police Askari, accustomed to European procedure complained to me that the Mteni of Uyui had stolen his tax money. I camped at Uyui to investigate and, as complainants gained confidence, finished with over 70 separate complaints of a similar nature. To one complainant, whom I happened to know, I said: "We have often met, why have you never complained before?" To this day I remember his scandalized look, and his answer: "Complain against my chief?"⁸⁹

It was more likely that a peasant would feel the urge to lodge a complaint about a sub-patron such as a tax clerk, but in those cases the peasant feared that the chief and clerk would be cooperating with one another and he would face reprisals even if he won in court.⁹⁰ Complaints were more frequent in areas where chiefs had not traditionally ruled but were nonetheless imposed.⁹¹

Clientage practices rarely marred the good standing of a chief when he was known as an effective ritual leader. Peasants could get annoyed with the demands to intensify their labour effort issued by a zealous chief on behalf of the colonial state, but the ultimate criterion for judging a chief was his ability to intercede on their behalf with the ancestors to bring about favourable weather and soil conditions. The chief who failed in this role could meet with the wrath of his people. Despite the colonial government's removal of traditional checks and balances, peasants who were at odds with their chiefs always retained the traditional last resorts of escape or witchcraft. An irritating chief could be avoided by moving away or he could be confronted, indirectly but forcefully, through the retaliatory weapon of witchcraft.⁹² A chief who was suspected of tampering with the spiritual forces that guaranteed the community's well-being or otherwise acting to create discord and harm

⁸⁹ Savory, B. in Heussler, RH Mss. Br. Emp.s.480/4, 19

⁹⁰ Savory, B. in Heussler, RH Mss. Br. Emp.s.480/4, 26

⁹¹ Winnington-Ingram, C., Miscellaneous Papers: 'N. Mara district annual report', RH Mss. Afr.s.1749, (1950), 10

⁹² Gulliver, P. Labour Migration in a Rural Economy: A Study of the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of Southern Tanganyika, (Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau, 1955), 29

could be poisoned or his household huts burnt down with magical forces to blame.⁹³ Some areas of the country were rife with witchcraft, often those areas where chiefs' official performance in all senses of the word was deficient.⁹⁴

Finally, rivalries existed between chiefs and between chiefs and people who had just as much right to be appointed to chiefship but were not. They sometimes took the form of boundary disputes with the aim of acquiring jurisdiction over more population as a means of getting a higher salary and more prestige and contributed to a high degree of intra-tribal clan consciousness in some areas, much to the chagrin of colonial officials who were hoping for larger units of identification.⁹⁵

4. Occupational Morality/Accountability: Food as a Performance Indicator

Traditionally, tribute given to the chief in the form of grain was not a fixed amount; a poor harvest resulted in very little or nothing being demanded whereas peasants gave in abundance when a good harvest occurred, believing that the chief was at least partially responsible.⁹⁶ Tribute contributions were usually millet and sorghum, bulrush millet being particularly well suited to long storage of up to three years.

These grain stores were at the disposal of the chief to distribute to the community on an individual basis to especially needy people or at a time of collective hardship in the aftermath of drought, locust attack or a raid and could justifiably be used to feed his own household, but not to trade away or otherwise enhance his personal wealth.

In his capacity as guardian of the community's food supply, the chief could issue famine

⁹³ Leslie, RH Mss. Afr.s.1516, 27

⁹⁴ Rowe, E.G., Transcript of 'Interview concerning colonial service in Tanganyika, 1928-58', RH Mss. Afr.s.1698, (1969), 36-44

⁹⁵ Young and Fosbrooke, Land and Politics, 86

⁹⁶ Cory, Indigenous Political System, 19; Feierman, Sovereignty among the Shambaa, 348

prevention orders that his people were compelled to heed, such as the prohibition of beer brewing, the threat of punishment for anyone caught stealing crops in the field during a famine, as well as instructions on how and what to plant.⁹⁷ Tribal discipline of this sort and tribute contributions were only possible when the people had faith in their chief. As stated before, social cohesion and moral order centering around the chief as the people's intermediary with the ancestors who controlled their fate was underpinned by a system of consensual politics; a chief could readily be ousted in the event of consecutive poor harvests and material deprivation of the community.

Although chiefs were still found feeding needy subjects in some places at the outset of British colonial rule,⁹⁸ this welfare system was soon undermined. Famine prevention and famine relief functions which had been integrated and controlled by the chief were separated and bureaucratically compartmentalized. Under the Native Authority Ordinance, the chief was given responsibility for famine prevention which included the power to issue orders prohibiting the manufacture and distribution of intoxicating liquor, requiring peasants to cultivate minimum acreages to ensure adequate food supplies or drought-resistance crops, and during famines he could prohibit the sale or removal of foodstuffs from the area, require peasants to move to a place where they could be conveniently fed and order able-bodied men to work on public works. No longer the custodian of communal grain stores and no longer operating with discretion over famine relief distribution, the chief's role was to facilitate the colonial authorities' famine relief operations; in the course of which he was heavily supervised. In effect, the tribal food security system pivoting around the chief was shortcircuited with the powers to punish, i.e. famine prevention orders still in the hands of the chief, whereas the powers to reward, i.e. the distribution of free food, were replaced with bureaucratically administered famine relief controlled by the district officers that was withheld

⁹⁷ Wright, 'Transition from Native Administration', 2

⁹⁸ Tukuyu District Annual Report, 1919-20

from certain categories of peasants,⁹⁹ and had to be paid for.¹⁰⁰

Since the people no longer could remove chiefs at will, the chiefs' accountability to the people in famine prevention and rain magic was formally lost. On the other hand, a chief who did not have the respect of his people found it difficult to get their compliance on laborious famine prevention measures and the colonial authorities were quick to fault chiefs whose people suffered frequent famine from what was referred to as 'indolence' and 'improvidence' which generally meant laxity in planting drought crops and excessive beer brewing.¹⁰¹

Chiefs and headmen were accountable to the colonial government in this regard, and famine prevention negligence could be contributing causes to the removal of a chief for incompetence. In one case, a district officer tried to mete out a more immediate reprimand, by withholding half the salaries of four superior headmen and publicly whipping 25 village headmen. The salary measure was approved by the Chief Secretary but the corporal punishment caused the Governor to rebuke the District Officer.¹⁰²

Regarding the immediate conflicts chiefs might have had between their official role in facilitating the distribution of famine relief to peasant households and on the other hand, ensuring their own households' food supplies, the temptation to take advantage of their position was probably not very strong compared with the costs of being discovered. Unlike colonial officers and Asian

⁹⁹ In some cases it was pointedly stipulated that livestock owners were expected to sell their cattle before being eligible for famine relief and tax defaulters were required to labour rather than receive famine relief food on credit (Letter from DO, Bagamoyo to PC, 23/1/34, TNA SMP 19454).

¹⁰⁰ Unonah notes the consternation of Tabora peasants who were required to pay for famine relief food for the first time in 1925 (Unonah, 'Indirect Rule', 61).

¹⁰¹ Letter from DO, Musoma to PC, Lake Province, TNA SMP 13252; Elliot, Sir H.F. 'Food Situation in the Western and Southern Areas of Mwanza District', Safari Report addressed to the DO, Mwanza, 3/3/38, RH Mss. Afr.s.1430

¹⁰² Letters from: Chief Secretary to PC, Mwanza, 10/9/34; PC, Lake Province to Chief Secretary, 30/10/34; Hall, Acting DO, Maswa to PC, Lake Province, 20/10/34; Acting Chief Secretary to PC, Lake Province, 13/11/34, TNA SMP 13252

merchants, chiefs tended to have the same diet as the ordinary peasant, but in both the traditional and the colonial food security systems, chiefs and their families would be the last to starve. Strategic control over tribute contributions would have made this so in times gone by whereas during colonial rule chiefs were usually amongst the few in the rural community with cash to spare for buying food.¹⁰³

Clientage practices on the part of the Native Authority personnel in the distribution of famine relief, i.e. favouritism in supply to specific clients or food pilferage was restricted by colonial officers' heavy supervision of food allocation. Circular No. 33 of 1930 stipulated that 'European supervision at the work or place of food issue is essential' and additional colonial staff was to be made available where needed.¹⁰⁴

The long term interests of the chiefs in famine prevention and relief work were contradictory. To retain the sanction of the colonial state and stay in power, chiefs had to make some pretense if not actually exert themselves in exhorting peasants to undertake famine prevention measures.¹⁰⁵ Chiefs occupied an awkward position; to be too stringent in requiring peasants to follow laborious famine measures or plant unpopular crops like cassava without being able to offer in return a guaranteed free food supply after a harvest failure, made chiefs liable to falling into complete disfavour. Non-cooperation from their people could follow which placed the chiefs in a poor light vis-a-vis the colonial authorities. Thus, as in the pre-colonial period, food adequacy of the tribal community was an ultimate indicator of chiefly performance, but a particularly dodgy one.

¹⁰³ Cory, Indigenous Political System, 26

¹⁰⁴ TT, Circular No. 33 of 1930, (11)i, 2

¹⁰⁵ One district officer complained that cassava patches were planted right across the path he was likely to use on entering a village, but not elsewhere (Bagamoyo District Annual Report 1949, TNA Acc. 7).

V. Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, the significance of context was stressed in delineating and defining Tanzania's main social institutions. Due to the unharnessed physical environment, the low level of commodity exchange, and the high degree of food insecurity experienced by the peasantry, the state and market's institutional functions do not exhaust the peasants' extra-household organizational needs. Clientage networks constitute a third extra-household social institution that are epitomised by non-market personalised exchange between prestige-seeking monopolist patrons and people pursuing the alleviation of material insecurity. By subordinating themselves to a monopolist commanding allocative powers over scarce or valued resources, a client is in a position to make appeals to the monopolist in times of need. Between 1919 and 1950, clientage networks were most clearly manifest in the Native Authorities.

The content and structure of the state, market and Native Authority clientage networks are reviewed and their respective operations compared with respect to the problem of peasant food insecurity. It is argued that peasant commodity production was encouraged through Asian market penetration into up-country areas and through chiefs, but that the colonial state sought to avoid undermining the food production base of the peasantry by advocating a household and district food self-sufficiency policy. The colonial state assumed the chiefly function of ensuring peasant food security, but revamped famine relief to suit administrative procedures. Native Authorities, and to a much lesser extent Asian market agents, were drawn into the distribution of famine relief, both subjected to a great deal of supervision. Thus all three social institutions played a role, often ambiguous but primarily positive, in ensuring peasant food security between 1919 and 1950.

Certain conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. While it is commonly acknowledged that the colonial period was characterized by a racial division of labour, it is perhaps more significant to recognize that Tanganyika's extra-household social institutions were racially separated: a British state, an Asian market and African clientage networks, each with a different logic and occupational morality/accountability. The logics of bureaucratic accountability in the state, profit-maximization in the market and face-to-face accountability of prestige-seeking patrons were not innate racial

characteristics; they resulted from the objective positions of the state, market and clientage agents in the division of labour and in a subjective sense, their greater or lesser proximity to the material insecurity of the peasantry. It has been stressed that British colonial officers and Asian dukawallahs were materially as well as culturally isolated from peasants and were themselves distant from the threat of famine or serious food shortages. Clientage relations were foreign to them, not in the sense that they were incapable of being a part of them, but rather that they were removed from fundamental material insecurity, and therefore had no cause to be a part of them.

Native Authority clientage was not a pure form of clientage, as defined in this chapter, because it was transitional, having many vestige elements of the pre-colonial consensual society with its communally-accepted moral obligations. There was a lack of 'modern' production and consumption goods for monopolist patrons to distribute to clients, because the external supply of these goods was minimal. Chiefs and other patrons often dealt in intangibles, namely rain rituals and symbols. The Native Authority patrons were far more integrated with the state than the market and their networks were composed of sub-divided, non-overlapping branches under each district colonial administrative station. The clientage supply of goods and services was not transferred horizontally between patrons, only vertically from patron to client. The face-to-face accountability of the chief was fairly strong, partly because of his traditional obligations and perhaps, more importantly, because of the chief's strong local identity and lack of mobility associated with his hereditary position, unlike the Native Authority clerk, whose mobility was precursory to later forms of clientage relations. Finally, chiefs competed for prestige through conspicuous consumption. Generally their wealth was spent on consumption for themselves and their clients rather than being channeled productively into agriculture.

Overall, the colonial state, the Asian market and the Native Authorities' famine prevention and relief measures could be considered successful in protecting peasant households during the period between 1919 and 1950. The rural population did not decline over this period, but rather grew, with a likely decrease in famine deaths. However, this population growth belied chronic food inadequacy

and could only be addressed by policies aimed at radically developing food production in the peasant household rather than merely maintaining peasant food production and consumption at survival levels.

CHAPTER 4: WAGE LABOUR FORCE FOOD DEMAND AND SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS, 1919-50

In this chapter the general configuration of the wage labour force, the sources of food supply, and types of food demand and supply arrangements are described for the inter-war period. Changes in the nature of non-peasant household food demand and supply which occurred during and after World War II are then traced.

I. African Wage Labour Force¹

So far, analysis of African productive activity has been limited to that contained within the peasant household, almost all of which was family rather than wage labour. There was, however, a considerable amount of hired African labour involved in European and Asian-owned sisal and coffee plantations and extractive industries, particularly gold and diamond mining, as well as in state infrastructural development, mainly communications, road building and railway construction and maintenance, and finally in domestic service work located primarily in the towns.

1. Government Labour Policy and the Male Migrant Bachelor Wage Labour System

In 1926, Governor Cameron issued a policy statement regarding the division between peasant agriculture and wage labour. Its contents were influenced by prevailing labour force patterns and practices, Mandate sanctions against 'forced labour' and the pressures of European planters for easier access to African labour.² It stressed the need for government to induce African peasants to produce a surplus, be it in the form of cashcrop or wage labour, but not at the expense of household food production. In regions where there was no climatically suitable, marketable crop, peasants were encouraged to seek waged employment. On the other hand, district administrative and agricultural

¹ The non-African population of Tanganyika never constituted more than one percent of the total territorial population between 1919 and 1950.

² TT (Cameron), Instructions to Administrative Officers in regard to Native Labour and the Production of Economic Crops, Legislative Council Sessional Paper No. 2, (DSM, Government Printer, 1926); Letter from Cameron, Governor of Tanganyika to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 14/7/25, PRO/C0691/78/152.

officers were to refrain from promoting cashcropping in areas long accustomed to wage labour force participation. In remote areas it was surmised that migrant labour was the best course to follow.

Official opinion held that the divorce of Africans from usufruct land rights, 'de-tribalization', and proletarianization were to be avoided at all costs. Household provisioning of subsistence food needs was seen as the vital essence of African culture that had to be complementary to rather than undermined by African wage labour.

The creation of large industrial centres with workers completely divorced from food production would be an entire innovation of very doubtful desirability; it appears most unlikely to occur. The African man, and still more the woman, is firmly attached to the soil, and the whole fabric of social organization is based upon the right to cultivate; it thus seems probable that the native will always aim at having his own home among his own crops, whether in a distant village or as a 'squatter' on an estate.³

In practice, keeping the household and tribal units intact seemed a contradiction in terms. Theoretically, households were free to re-locate proximate to the place of work, but Native Authorities were not keen on losing taxpayers; and while willing to let their men migrate, they exerted pressure on women to stay behind, as an incentive for the men's eventual return.⁴ District officers noted difficulties in governing 'settler' communities, who were recalcitrant to rule by the local Native Authority and complained about the indiscipline of youth growing up in such communities.⁵ Plantation and mine management tended to encourage men of the same tribe to live together⁶ and elect an elders' council from amongst their numbers for governing their compounds, with

³ Orde-Browne, Major G. St. J., Labour in the Tanganyika Territory, (London, HMSO, 1926), 72

⁴ Labour Department Annual Report 1928, 9

⁵ See D.H. Barnes to Chief Secretary, 17/8/25 regarding the 12-15,000 Nyamwezi settlers scattered amongst the Digo, Bondei and Sumbaa Native Authorities of Tanga Province, TNA Acc 4/6/1/1; E.C. Baker (DO Tanga) to PC, Tanga, 10/5/35, TNA Acc. 45/700; TT, Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider and Advise on Questions relating to the Supply and Welfare of Native Labour in the Tanganyika Territory, (DSM, Government Printer, 1938), 10

⁶ '...the maintenance of the tribal atmosphere is of importance, and this should not be sacrificed to secure even valuable improvements in sanitation, housing, etc.' (TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1927, 50).

ultimate appeals handled by the management.⁷

Management's concern was primarily to obtain cheap labour. Local labour supplies were never enough to fill employers' needs. Sisal production, the main absorber of African labour, took place on the coast and along the Central line where local labour was not forthcoming in sufficient quantities.⁸ Wages were low but colonial theorists were of the belief that higher wages would not increase the supply of labour because labourers worked to reach a target rather than maximizing income. Tanganyikan production of tropical export products such as coffee, tea and sisal had to compete with products produced under the cheap labour conditions of Asia. With the severe drop in world commodity prices during the depression, wages tended to decline by a third to a half.⁹

The two main categories of labour, local and migrant wage labour, can be further subdivided. Local labour was derived from adjacent indigenous, settler or squatter populations.¹⁰ Migrant labour was attested labour which was recruited and transported to the workplace by an intermediary agency or non-attested labour which arrived unassisted from distant places. In view of the unavailability of reliable labour statistics it is difficult to establish what the relative proportions of people falling into these categories were and how much they varied over time. It appears, however, that

⁷ Labour Department Annual Report 1927, 50; Labour Department Annual Report 1928, 61; Tanga District Annual Report 1929

⁸ The legacy of slavery was purported to have made coastal people disdainful of manual labour, whereas in Morogoro it was believed that the Germans had used forced labour most extensively there, making peasants reluctant to seek waged employment (Tanner, R.E.S. 'Small Holdings on the Tanga Coast: A Comparative Study of Land Use in association with the Sisal Industry', EAAJ 24, (July 1958), 37-40).

⁹ Whead (Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association) to Chief Secretary, 3/11/31, TNA SMP 11475/1

¹⁰ Because of the wide availability of land, squatting tended not to generate intense conflicts. Some planters encouraged settlement, particularly of skilled labourers and clerical staff who served on a permanent basis. In Northern Province in 1947, eight percent of the labour force were squatters (Shivji, I.G. Development of Wage Labour and Labour Laws in Tanzania: Circa 1920-1964, Ph.D. thesis, UDSM, (1982), 51, quoting the Annual Report of the Northern Province Labour Utilization Board, 1947/48).

generally over half of the African wage labour force were migrants and the bulk of migrants, as many as three-quarters of them, were unattested.¹¹

All the categories were involved in the kipande system whereby labourers were employed to work thirty-day stints, that did not have to be on consecutive days. A day involved a specified work load which was marked on the labourer's kipande¹² and at the completion of thirty days work, he was entitled to his full pay. Migrant labour was recorded as having between a 75-90% daily turnout as opposed to local labour's 50-55%.¹³ On the other hand, migrant labour was generally only available for work for between six months and two years,¹⁴ and tended to do the more arduous tasks such as sisal cutting as opposed to clearing and hoeing. Local labour was continuously accessible. In either case, the labourer was being paid low, 'bachelor' wages. As much as half of the wage was spent on food costs while on the job, the remainder going towards the labourer's tax commitment, with little remaining for the purchase of consumer goods. The peasant household, nearby or distant, was the vital back-up to such an under-invested labour force.

2. Sectoral and Geographical Distribution of the Wage Labour Force

It is difficult to construct an exact picture of the size and distribution of the wage labour force. Prior to the 1944 labour census conducted by the Labour Department published statistics are

¹¹ In 1927, total migrants numbered 72,000 and local casual workers were 60,000 (equivalent to 10,000 full-time labourers) (1927 Labour Department Annual Report). In the 1945 labour census, 51% of the non-government labour, excluding women and children, were migrants. If women and children are included and counted as local (unfortunately there is no specification of this), then the percentage of migrant labour declines to 45% (Labour Census on 15 February, 1945 reported in the Labour Department Annual Report, 1945); By the late 1950s the balance had definitely tipped in favour of local labour at 60% to migrant labour's 40% proportion (Hitchcock, E., 'Labour and Employment in an African Plantation', Inter-African Labour Institute Bulletin, 6 (1958), 20).

¹² Translated 'card'.

¹³ Enclosure F. Longland, 'Report on Labour Matters in Sisal Areas: No. 1: Tanganyika', 29/3/36, TNA SMP 23544; TT, Report of the Committee, 10; TT, (By P.E. Mitchell) Labour: Notes on Labour in Tanganyika, (DSM, Government Printer, 1933), 9

¹⁴ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1929, 23

based on estimates rather than actual counts. TABLE 4.1 lists the totals for African wage labour force participation by sector and year. Its most noteworthy features are the decline in portage evident in the transport category, the drop in total employment that occurred during the Depression and its sharp rise during World War II.

Apart from the sprinkling of labourers engaged in portage and public works throughout Tanzania, the wage labour force was geographically concentrated by commodity. The sisal industry, centred in Tanga and radiating southwards along the coast and along the Central Line to Morogoro and Kilosa, was the biggest employer. In 1949, 46% of the territory's African labour force were working in Tanga and Eastern Provinces (TABLE 4.2). European coffee and tea farms were in the highland areas of Kilimanjaro, Arusha, Iringa and Mbeya. Lupa in the Southern Highlands and to a much lesser extent Mwanza were important for gold mining. During the late 1940s diamond mining was initiated at Mwadui in Shinyanga.

In this thesis, the urban population has been defined as those living in population concentrations of more than 20,000 people. Between 1919 and 1950, only Dar es Salaam could be counted as an urban area under this definition. Dar es Salaam represented a tiny proportion of the total territorial population (TABLE 2.1.3). Even when the ten largest 'towns' are counted, only 1.2% of the total population in 1931, rising to 1.9% in 1951 lived outside of a strictly rural setting.¹⁵ In urban areas, Africans' employment opportunities were largely confined to manual labour in the Public Works Department, Tanganyikan Railways or domestic service.

II. Food Demand and Associated Supply Difficulties, 1919-1939

In the inter-war period, as food demand of an expanding wage labour force increased, ad-hoc supply arrangements evolved that were structured on various combinations of household, clientage networks, market and state operations. These arrangements were accommodated to the specific

¹⁵ Molohan, M.J.B., Detribalization: A Study of the Areas of Tanganyika where Detribalized Persons are Living, (DSM, Government Printer, 1957), 14

magnitudes, frequencies and location of demand. Nonetheless, supply difficulties continued to arise from production and transport constraints.

1. Sources of Supply and Transport

There were three sources of food supply: non-specialized territorial production, specialized territorial production and import. Given the difficulties of transport, food supply for the wage labour force generally took the form of grains, notably maize. The bulkier and more perishable staples like plantains, cassava and sweet potatoes were consumed on a more incidental basis when and where they were readily at hand.

1.1 Non-specialized Territorial Production

Most African-supplied foodstuffs represented non-specialized primarily subsistence rather than cash-motivated production. Peasant-grown foodstuffs were sold in local markets in or around European or Asian-owned plantations. Often the African producer sold directly to the consumer. Generally the amount sold was restricted to the surplus over and above the peasant household's needs and constituted only a fraction of the household's total production. Peasants were neither willing nor able to sell food in bad harvest years and areas of frequent drought did not lend themselves to regular or abundant marketed food supply. Despite the active encouragement to peasants in Handeni district to supply adjacent plantations, the number of years of famine relief issue probably exceeded years when peasants supplied plantations.¹⁶

The highland areas overlooking the sisal plantations and mines, notably Lushoto and Upare in Tanga, Kilimanjaro, Uluguru in Morogoro, Uhehe in Iringa and Unyakyusa in Mbeya were the most

¹⁶ Sumra, S. 'Changes in Agricultural Practises among the Peasants of Handeni District during the British Colonial Period', Annual Social Science Research Conference of East African Universities, DSM, (December 1976), 8-16

frequent sources of supply.¹⁷ As the population in highland areas grew denser, and in the absence of frontier land to colonize,¹⁸ average acreages declined and saleable surpluses grew smaller. Thus the Sambia of Lushoto who were reported to be supplying all the local sisal estates in addition to exporting to Tanga town in 1928,¹⁹ became progressively less important as a source of supply over the years. Sambia maize cultivation was increasingly replaced with cassava, in an effort to keep up with their own food demand.²⁰

It was normal for all categories of wage labourers to produce some of their own food.²¹ This was most pronounced amongst local plantation labourers or squatters on farms where the male labourer lived with his family, as opposed to mine workers whose jobs were usually full-time occupations.²² The migrant kipande labourer's cultivation practice came in between these two extremes. It appears that the non-attested labourer was more involved in food cultivation than the time-constrained attested labourer.

In some of the more densely populated sisal estate areas of Tanga, which already had a

¹⁷ Uluguru, 1929: Bagshawe diary, RH Mss. Afr.s.288, 12/12/29; Uhehe: Friedland, W.H. Vuta Kamba, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969), 16; Upare, rice, 1933: TT, Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1933; Unyakyusa, rice, 1934: B.E. Eustace (Agricultural Assistant) to District Agricultural Officer, Tukuyu, 12/9/34, TNA Acc. 77/2/26; Thwaites, D.H., 'Wanyakyusa Agriculture', EAAJ, 9, (April 1944), 236-239; General: TT, Department of Agriculture Annual Report, 1936, 19

¹⁸ Overcrowding was particularly acute in areas ringed by sisal estates. On the other hand in Kilimanjaro, Chagga farmers were spreading out onto the plains and switching from banana to maize cultivation (President's Address, LegCo., 11th Session, 2/11/36).

¹⁹ Maize production had been boosted by the distribution of Potchefstroom Pearl and White Congo seeds by the Agriculture Department in that year (TT, Agricultural Department Annual Report 1928/29, 4,8).

²⁰ Iliffe, Modern History, 350

²¹ TT, Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider and Advise on Questions Relating to the Supply and Welfare of Native Labour in the Tanganyika Territory, (DSM, Government Printer, 1938), 10

²² On the other hand, a high seasonality of labour supply was reported for mine workers, particular at Lupa where workers were in the habit of returning to their home areas for the planting and harvesting season.

substantial settler population in addition to the indigenous one, it would not have been easy to obtain land and rivalry for land did at times cause friction. However, even in cramped Korogwe usufruct rights were granted to alien labourers by Sambia Native Authorities.

Tanner criticized the standard of plant husbandry of the kipande labourer whose lack of time during the agricultural season and short-term horizons led them to cultivate convenient, but agriculturally marginal sites, failing to give enough attention to clearing and burning, to the extent of causing uncontrolled fires, and leaving the plot after one or two harvests long before it had been fully exploited.²³

1.2 Specialized Territorial Production

Specialized territorial food production refers to the foodstuffs which were produced under a profit-maximization logic, such that market prices crucially affected resource allocation within and between the food-producing enterprises. Specialized food production was primarily in the hands of Europeans planters, to a lesser extent Asian planters and only was beginning to involve African production in a few isolated areas.

African marketed food demand was mostly that of African labourers on European and Asian-owned agricultural enterprises. Little information exists for the 1920s, but it appears that when and where possible the non-African planters were producing some food themselves, as well as encouraging Asian duka supplies and local peasant food markets.

In areas suited to the production of high value export crops like tea, farmers often felt that diversifying production into food crops was a waste of land. They preferred to rely on peasant surplus production and complained bitterly about 'lazy peasants' in the years when peasant marketed surpluses failed to materialize. In view of the risks of relying on peasant production, European tea farmers in the Southern Highlands petitioned the state for land on the plateau between Mbeya and Iringa, where European specialized maize production could take place. The state under Cameron's

²³ Tanner, R.E.S., 'Subsistence Agriculture on the Tanganyika Coast', EAAJ 24, (1958), 72

governorship was extremely cautious about land alienation. Nonetheless, land for one farm was alienated in a sympathetic acknowledgement of the problem.²⁴

It was the Northern Province where officialdom had from an early date been of the opinion that European commercial food production, along lines similar to those existing in the Kenyan White Highlands, could flourish.²⁵ Two blocks of land in Moshi district were alienated to European farmers in 1929 specifically for maize production.²⁶ In 1930, a Senior Agricultural Officer instituted a 'Buy Tanganyika Produce' campaign in conjunction with encouraging the expansion of maize production in a low-lying belt of European farms around Kilimanjaro. The intention was to curtail large imports of Kenyan maize. By 1934, 60 European families in Moshi alone were reported dependent on commercial maize production.²⁷

European maize production was generally mechanized, as well as being dependent on African hired labour. The European maize producers of Northern Province pressurized the state for 'favoured producer' status vis-a-vis Kenyan producers and demanded government supports along lines similar to those granted Kenyan European farmers.²⁸ In 1934 they formed the Kilimanjaro Planters' Association (KPA) and then endeavoured to make use of the existing Kenyan marketing and storage infrastructure by affiliating with the Kenya Farmers' Association (KFA).

In a trusteeship territory it was necessary to pay lip service to African interests so, while

²⁴ Bagshawe diary, RH Mss. Afr.s.288 and 289, 23/6/29 and 9/8/30

²⁵ Cameron, President's Address, LegCo., 1st Session, 7/12/26, 20-21

²⁶ TT, Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1929/30, 6

²⁷ Kilimanjaro Planters Association: Memorandum on the Maize Growing Industry, August 1934, TNA SMP 19533

²⁸ Malcolm, D.W. criticized Kenyan European subsidies which he identified as aping the South African model without the 'mountain of gold' to pay for it, with the result that European farming flourished on the 'backs of the Native Authorities' (Malcolm, D.W., Diary entry while assistant to Lord Hailey, 19/12/35, RH Mss. Afr.s.1445).

European producers were ordinary members of the KFA, membership by local Chagga maize producers in the KFA was urged, but on a different basis. They were to join en bloc through the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA), so that they would not be allowed to hold a decisive vote whatever their numbers.²⁹ Not surprisingly, the KNPA did not jump at the offer. In 1935, 95% of the membership of the KFA, re-organized as the Maize Growers Association, were non-African.³⁰ There was increasing European concern about the way Chagga producers undersold them in good harvest years.³¹ The Director of Agriculture refused European planters' requests for state intervention in the market and sagely observed that 'the native in time will desire to use the same agency, if it proves advantageous to do so'.³²

In 1936, Tanganyika Railways announced its intention to double rail rates. The rate increase made it far cheaper for Dar es Salaam to import maize from Kenya than rely on domestic supply and the state refused to restrict Kenyan imports.³³ European planters of Northern Province as well as the small number of Asian irrigated maize and cotton producers of the Central Province immediately protested.³⁴ Specialized food production was failing to prove its commercial viability. Transport was clearly one of the most intractable constraints.

1.3 Transport

At the outset of British colonial rule, the transport network consisted of two rail-lines and

²⁹ General Manager, KFA to Director of Agriculture, Tanganyika, 15/9/34, TNA SMP 19533

³⁰ Constitutionally, individual African farmers could join if they wished (Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary, 21/5/35, TNA SMP 19533).

³¹ Note on Governor's interview with W. Nicol, Chairman, Tanganyika Maize Growers' Association, 4/8/36, TNA SMP 19533

³² Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary, 6/5/37, TNA SMP 19533

³³ Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary, 15/4/36, TNA SMP 19533

³⁴ Indian Planters' Association, Kilosa District to Chief Secretary, 5/2/36, TNA SMP 19533

the movements of porters. Pack animals were mostly precluded by the prevalence of tsetse and other serious parasitic diseases. The Tanga rail-line, which serviced the sisal-producing areas of the northeast and Eastern Province, bisected the country.

In the 1920s, the government built a short extension of the Tanga line from Moshi to Arusha and added a branch from Tabora on the Central line to Mwanza. The former facilitated the coffee-producing farmers of Kilimanjaro and the latter penetrated the peasant cotton-producing areas of the cultivation steppe. The proposed branch from the Central line through the Southern Highlands that white settlers saw as so vital was pronounced infeasible by various investigators and scrapped. It was argued that food rather than export crops would constitute the majority of the produce from the area, and foodstuffs were too low in value by weight to make the rail-line economical.³⁵

Although the British colonial government had inherited from the Germans two major rail-lines totalling over 1500 kms. gratis and its investments had been restricted to extending these lines by another 300 kms., the state-owned railways quickly fell into debt, resulting from debt charges and severe under-utilization of the railways (APPENDIX VII).³⁶

While rates on foodstuffs generally fell into the middle category of higher than export crops but lower than high-value imports, rates for grain varied according to the type of grain. Rates on maize were kept low to keep down feeding costs for sisal labourers.³⁷ Rates for cassava, millet and sorghum were too high for these crops to be viably exported or involved in long-distance domestic

³⁵ Findings of Henn Commission quoted in Despatch from Cameron, Governor of Tanganyika to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31/10/30, PRO/CO691/108/29619/1708/3

³⁶ Throughout the late 1920s and 1930s, railway revenues and expenditures were carefully balanced, but debt charges on a Guaranteed Loan granted by the Imperial Treasury could not be paid off. In 1939, Tanganyika Railways carried 32,900 ton-miles per route mile in comparison with the Gold Coast Railways' 119,200; Kenya and Uganda Railways' 150,000; South Africa's 500,000; India's 598,000 and U.K.'s 868,000 ton-miles per route mile (TT, Tanganyika Transport: A Review by J.R. Farquharson, Chief Engineer, Tanganyika Railways and Ports Services, (DSM, Government Printer, 1945), 6).

³⁷ H. Jamal, LegCo., 9th Session, 31/10/34, 115

trade.³⁸ Mwanza peasants produced surpluses of rice which were consumed in Dar es Salaam and other towns. The long-distance domestic trade in rice was threatened by increased rates in 1933. The rate for exported rice was left unaffected to encourage competition in the world market.³⁹ This created the bizarre situation of food being railed to Dar es Salaam as exports, exported to the neighbouring port of Bagamoyo then brought back to Dar es Salaam for sale in the city.⁴⁰

Government transport policy of the inter-war period never aimed to develop an integrated domestic economy. Balancing the budget was the guiding principle and this generally had the effect of stifling internal trade. It was only during World War II, as commodity production increased in response to favourable world prices and war-time supply urgencies that rail tonnages could better support overhead costs and allow cheaper rates for long-distance domestic trade.

In the meantime, roads were proliferating. Between 1921 and 1929, total road length increased at a rate of 20% per annum. During the Depression, the growth rate was reduced to 5% per annum. After 1933 and until 1950, growth in total road length slowed to between one and two percent while road up-grading took precedence.⁴¹ The number of licensed lorries and buses trebled between 1935 and 1950,⁴² and petrol was declared the 'lifeblood' of the territory.⁴³

1.4 Imports

Tanganyika vacillated between net grain import and export during the inter-war period (TABLE 2.3). Until 1925, it was a substantial net exporter, primarily of millet/sorghum, but in the late 1920s and the mid-1930s it was forced to import large amounts of maize, interspersed by years when

³⁸ General Manager, Railways, LegCo., 8th Session, 7/11/33, 97

³⁹ General Manager, Railways, LegCo., 7th Session, 19/6/33, 260

⁴⁰ H. Jamal, LegCo., 9th Session, 31/10/34, 114

⁴¹ Hofmeier, R., Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania, (Munich, Weltforum Verlag, 1973), 323

⁴² Ibid., 327

⁴³ Major Bown, LegCo., 5th Session, 23/10/31, 203

modest net exports were possible. When the import/export figures are broken down by commodity, a fairly regular pattern emerges for millet/sorghum, wheat, and rice.

After the initial large net exports, millet/sorghum assumes a steady net export of between 20,000 and 30,000 quintals per annum. As an exceedingly low value crop with unfavourable rail rates, its persistence must be attributed to the historical legacy and comparative advantage of millet/sorghum export from the Southern Province, which otherwise lacked a notable export crop.

Net rice exports of between 10,000 and 30,000 quintals prevailed in the 1920s and rose in the 1930s to 50,000 then 80,000. This can partly be explained by the preferred rail rates for export rice, but it is more an effect of declining imports from India and Burma. In 1931 a suspended duty of Shs 2, in addition to the already existing custom duty of Shs 4 per 100 lb, was imposed on imported rice, which caused imports to drop sharply.

From 1924 onwards, net wheat imports were steady at between 20,000 and 40,000, reflecting an urban demand which could not be met by domestic production. Most wheat imports came from India and Kenya with the former being subjected to a duty of Shs 3 per 100 lb.

Unlike the other three grains, maize import/export presents a more erratic picture. From 1925 onwards, with the exception of 1932, there was a net import. Between 1925 and 1929, net imports ranged from 10,000 to 30,000 quintals per annum then fluctuate far more widely between 10,000 and 130,000. Maize was imported primarily from Kenya and occasionally South Africa. Prices for maize, as well as for the other grains were extremely depressed during the 1930s. Kenyan settler maize farmers were unable to find markets for their produce in Europe, so they were as dependent on Tanganyika for demand as Tanganyika was on them for supply.⁴⁴ Both maize and maize meal were free of import duties.

2. Food Demand Types and Supply Arrangements

There were four main types of food demand: small, incidental rural demand; small to moderate,

⁴⁴ Director of Agriculture, LegCo., 5th Session, 15/1/31, 101

fluctuating rural demand; large, predictable rural demand; and large, predictable urban demand.

2.1 Small, Incidental Rural Demand and Supply

Small, incidental rural demand was associated primarily with portering. African porters were hired to transport goods, carry supplies in survey work and accompany colonial officers in their district touring. Peasants in many areas of the country disdained portering, retaining vivid memories of the horrors associated with it during the German East African campaign of World War I.⁴⁵

There is virtually no information about the hiring and working conditions of porters by private individuals, whereas government portering has impressionistic statistical and descriptive coverage. Total man-days worked by porters for various government departments and district and native administrations ranged between 281,000 and 331,000 between 1928 and 1930.⁴⁶ This figure probably does not include messengers that were permanently employed at district headquarters for the long-distance delivery of messages and goods. Nor is it clear that it would cover the porters who were co-opted from their villages for only one or two days to accompany a visiting official to a neighbouring village.

Although the days of the caravan were over, sizeable groups of travelling porters seemed to be the norm. Bagshawe's diary recording his numerous foot safaris as District Officer, Provincial Commissioner and later head of the Land Development Survey, suggests that he frequently travelled with 20 to 30 porters, and during the survey had as many as 148.⁴⁷ During any safari of more than a few days duration the number of porters expanded and contracted as some finished their required days, absconded or were sent off on errands while new recruits joined.

⁴⁵ Iliffe, Modern History, 249

⁴⁶ Tanganyika, Labour Department Annual Report 1929-31

⁴⁷ Bagshawe, RH Mss. Afr.s.282-288

In view of portering's historical legacy and the state's sensitivity on the issue of forced labour, porters' conditions of government service were clearly stipulated. In the 1920s, voluntary and involuntary porters could not be made to work for more than 60 days in a year, this was later reduced to 30 days.⁴⁸ Loads were not to exceed 50 lbs. The daily march was not supposed to last for more than 8-hours which was equated with roughly 16 miles.⁴⁹ Distances covered in a day, however, varied with the terrain and purpose of the safari.⁵⁰ Generally, the march began before dawn and continued until around mid-day.

The lot of the porter was never a pleasant one. Load stipulation may have been adhered to, but a rain-soaked load weighed more. The prospects of food at the end of the march were far more certain than in German East African campaign times, but neither the quantity nor quality could be guaranteed, and the best laid plans sometimes inadvertently ended up with porters going to sleep with their stomachs rumbling.

The district officer or senior officer-in-charge was held responsible for adequate food supply to their porters in government portering.⁵¹ They were expected to ensure before embarking on the journey that supplies could be obtained en route. If there was any doubt, they were required to arrange for the carrying of supplies with them. The difficulties of getting an accurate picture of the supply situation in the area to be visited in view of the lack of markets and poor communications, meant that certainty of adequate supply was very rare. On the other hand, arranging for the entourage's food supply to be carried involved the transport of over 2 lbs. of food per person per day. A 30-day safari with 30 porters would have entailed approximately 20 additional

⁴⁸ Bagshawe diary, 4/8/29, RH Mss Afr.s.288; TT, Labour: The Recruitment, 14

⁴⁹ TT, Labour: The Recruitment, Employment and Care of Labour, (DSM, Government Printer, 1933), 13-14

⁵⁰ As an agricultural officer in Biharmulo, Savile travelled with a permanently on-call group of porters who could march 20 or even 30 miles a day (Savile, H.A., 'When God had One Eye Shut: The Recollections of a Member of the Colonial Agricultural Service during 27 Years in Tanganyika, 1928-54', RH Mss. Afr.s.1840, 34).

⁵¹ TT, Labour: The Recruitment, 9

porters carrying nothing but food, and raised the troublesome issue of who would carry their food. Obviously some risks had to be taken regarding the procurement of food on the way. A relay system was sometimes instituted with porters plying back and forth between the encampment site and district headquarters or a market centre to maintain a regular flow of food, but similar manpower and logistical tangles usually ensued.

In areas where market activity was widely developed, porters were paid in cash, and expected to buy their own food, sometimes with the warning that they must not buy more than a day's rations to avoid too much additional weight to their load.⁵² However, such areas were frequently where motorized transport rather than portage could be expected to be found. In villages off the beaten track unaccustomed to producing foodstuffs for sale, or localities where harvests had failed and stocks were low, porters were expected to rely on supply arrangements organized by the officer-in-charge.

Officers' enroute supply arrangements consisted where possible of bulk purchases through the Native Authorities as well as some degree of self-provisioning in the form of wild game. Many government officials travelled with rifles, ready to shoot a buck or other animal on site. More importantly, Native Authorities were expected to facilitate the safari by the sale of foodstuffs at a fixed price.⁵³ Government policy was opposed to officials accepting gifts of food from chiefs on behalf of themselves or their porters, whether or not this was a traditional form of hospitality. So too, the government wished to avoid placing peasants in a position in which they had to present food to the chiefs in a tributary manner which the chief in turn sold to the strangers.⁵⁴ It was clearly stipulated that chiefs were obliged to arrange to have their people sell food directly to the

⁵² TT, Labour: The Recruitment, 14; Bagshawe diary, 22/7/29, RH Mss. Afr.s.288

⁵³ TT, Labour: The Recruitment, 15

⁵⁴ Ibid, 15

official at the fixed price.⁵⁵ There were instances of chiefs' unwarranted non-cooperation in the sale of foodstuffs, but these were isolated cases.⁵⁶ A clause in the Native Authority Ordinance permitted District Officers or Provincial Commissioners to issue a Native Authority with orders to supply food in emergencies or when food was plentiful and the inhabitants refused sale.⁵⁷ This was to be used as an extreme last resort and applied only to basic foodstuffs rather than eggs, milk, chickens, etc. Non-government safaris were also required to pay the fixed prices for food.⁵⁸

Overall, supply arrangements were tedious and tenuous. In a desperate situation a runner could be sent to district headquarters with instructions for additional porters to bring supplies. The officer's safari diaries were strewn with numerous housekeeping notes about who had gone off to procure food, and the payment for this or that consignment of a few bags of maize or beans from a particular Native Authority or trader, and concern that the cook did not abscond with supplies.⁵⁹ When one runs across diary entries, such as 'For once in our lives we have plenty of food!'⁶⁰ one realizes that despite the organizational attempts of the officer-in-charge, food insecurity was a daily event for the safari porter.

2.2 Moderate, Fluctuating Rural Demand and Supply

Moderate, fluctuating rural demand was most commonly found in mining areas, lumbering sites and at enroute labour camps. Labour camps had a seasonal occupancy pattern related to the agricultural

⁵⁵ Undoubtedly the fixed price was fairly arbitrary in terms of the seasonality and specific location of the sale.

⁵⁶ P.C. Mitchell to Governor, 1/11/30, TNA SMP 11306; Dundas, A. Beneath African Glaciers, (London, H.F. & G. Wetherby, 1924), 96-98

⁵⁷ TT, Labour: The Recruitment, 14

⁵⁸ 'Control and Sale of Foodstuffs to Travellers, 1927-28', TNA SMP 11226

⁵⁹ Brinkworth, H. 'Tanganyika Safari Diary, 1946', RH Mss. Afr.s.788, 5

⁶⁰ Bagshawe diary, 21/9/29, RH Mss. Afr.s.288

year. Mining camps were often impermanent sites. In both cases, the unpredictability of demand and the remoteness of the locations made them difficult to supply.

Labourers migrating to the coastal sisal plantations usually took several days to reach their destinations, especially in the 1920s when most of the distance was covered by foot. Attested labourers were supposed to be fed by their recruiter, while the majority who were unattested took supplies of dry foodstuffs with them. Apart from the difficulty of carrying enough food for their needs during the journey, they frequently lacked adequate cooking utensils, and employers were constantly complaining about the poor nutritional state of newly arrived workers.⁶¹

As the years passed and the migrant labour system became more entrenched, well-trodden migration routes emerged, which sometimes actually prompted some market response in the form of wayside taverns.⁶² However, this was uncommon. Migrating labourers had little or no money to spend on their way to the work site or for that matter on their way back. In many cases, they had to make their food packets from home last or otherwise work for food during the journey.⁶³

The Labour Department was established in 1926, and one of its main functions was to operate enroute labour camps at strategic places, ideally one day's walk apart from each other on the most frequently used labour routes. Kilosa camp, the earliest and most important camp for sisal workers, was catering for over 38,000 labourers in 1927.⁶⁴ By 1940 there were 201,840 travelling labourers accommodated in 26 labour camps.⁶⁵ But here again, there was a problem of payment for food. Workers who were accredited labourers of any well-known plantation or farm could have their meals charged

⁶¹ Shivji, Wage Labour, 100

⁶² In the Southern Highlands, during the 1930s, a few taverns sprung up along the labour migration routes (Friedland, Vuta Kamba, 22).

⁶³ TT (Mitchell), Labour: Notes, 4

⁶⁴ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1927, 62

⁶⁵ Individual camps total annual occupancy ranged between 40 and 19,000 (TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1940, 14-15).

against that workplace, whereas the others were expected to have the means to pay.⁶⁶ Citrus fruit, a source of ascorbic acid which prevents scurvy, was the only free hand-out.⁶⁷ It appears that there was little problem in keeping the labour camps stocked with sufficient foodstuffs. Monthly statistics were kept of labour camp occupants so that seasonal demand could be predicted. Many of the labour camps were located on major roads and rail junctions and therefore easy to supply.

The main mining areas during the inter-war period were the Lupa, Southwest Mwanza and the Musoma goldfields. Lupa was an arid, inaccessible plain of the Southern Highlands that was uninhabited in the mid-1920s, when the gold rush began. From a mere trickle of non-African 'diggers'⁶⁸ and their African labour, the Lupa goldfield grew to a population of more than 20,000 by the mid-1930s. The alluvial deposits beckoned amateur miners and adventurers as well as the professionals.

Food supply to the area was problematic due to the lack of peasant habitation and agricultural potential in the immediate vicinity as well as its remoteness from the railway and the absence of roads. To boost labour productivity, employers tried to provide food rations to their labour. In the early days, diggers appointed buyers from amongst their hired labour and sent them off in the company of several porters to Tukuyu, some 80 kilometres away to purchase foodstuffs. The diary of Dickson, a young gold mining adventurer who roughed it for six months on the Lupa in 1925, reveals that he had between 10 to 30 workers with four to five additional men who served as buyers, assisted by anywhere between three and ten porters each, operating in relays.⁶⁹

As small-time venture capitalists, the non-African diggers were frequently illiquid and could

⁶⁶ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1930, 8

⁶⁷ Shivji, Wage Labour, 100

⁶⁸ 'Digger' was a misnomer. African labourers did the actual digging and panning.

⁶⁹ Dickson, J., 'Lupa Diary, 1925', RH Mss. Afr.s.738

not pay their labour in money or food, let alone provide decent housing.⁷⁰ Nor had they the means to buy foodstuffs in quantity for storage after the harvest when prices were low.⁷¹

By the early 1930s, the Lupa had gained the reputation of being Tanganyika's inferno. Sanitation and food supplies were stretched far beyond the limits of public health. Scurvy was rife. Asian traders had appeared, purchasing maize, rice and beans from the Native Authorities in Mbeya, the closest being 60 kms. away, and transporting most of the foodstuffs by portage. Maize was selling at over two times the amount that was considered 'normal' in other parts of the country. The Indians were accused of forming a collusive ring to escalate food prices.⁷² To what degree high maize prices were due to Indian collusion as opposed to a genuine shortage of maize and a transport bottleneck is impossible to ascertain now, but it is unlikely that the sharp increase in food demand over such a short space of time could have elicited an immediate supply response.

A supply response was, however, developing. Nyakyusa peasant households were migrating from their densely populated home areas in Rungwe and Tukuyu to Mbeya, where they produced maize as a cash crop.⁷³ Similarly, the shores of Lake Nyasa were being planted with paddy for the Lupa market, and in the process ploughs were increasingly being used.⁷⁴ But colonial officials were impatient with the rate at which the Nyakyusa were managing to supply the market and encouraged Mbosi European coffee

⁷⁰ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1940, 6

⁷¹ TT, Report of the Committee, 30; Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1935, 26

⁷² In 1935, Malcolm, a visiting government official, records maize posho being sold at 230 Shs. a ton, while peasants in the the Native Authority markets were receiving only 60 Shs and the 'normal' price for maize in other parts of the country was considered to be 140 Shs. However, in his back-of-an-envelope calculations, Malcolm, figured that the only feasible way the government could break the 'ring' would be to bring maize down from the railhead at Dodoma to the Lupa at a cost of 250 Shs, recommending that it be sold at 180 Shs, a loss of 70 Shs which needless to say was never pursued (Malcolm, Diary 29/11/35, RH Mss Afr.s.1445).

⁷³ Thwaites, 'Wanyakyusa Agriculture', 236-239; Hall, R. de Z., 'Local Migration in Tanganyika', African Studies IV, (1945), 53-69; Iliffe, Modern History, 316

⁷⁴ B.E. Eustace, Agricultural Assistant, Monthly Agricultural Report, Tukuyu, December 1933, TNA Acc. 77/2/19/68; Iliffe, Modern History, 293

planters to produce maize, as well as considering alienating more land to European farmers.⁷⁵

The government was slow to take action amidst the Depression. In 1935, a road was built from Mbozi to the Lupa to facilitate supply. A medical inspector was appointed to the area the following year and in 1937 Kenyan hybrid seeds were distributed to farmers and special concessions were made to allow food imports from Nyasaland duty free.⁷⁶ The latter measure came after the domestic supply of foodstuffs was virtually resolved. Food imports were anticipated to have disincentive effects on local production.⁷⁷

African labourers were generally dependent on their employers for their rations, and worked on a full-time daily basis rather than taking time off to procure food or grow it. However, most were reluctant to work for more than three or four months of the year and tended to return to their home areas to cultivate when the planting season arrived.⁷⁸ The majority were Nyakyusa from the surrounding highlands.

Food supply to the Southwest Mwanza and Musoma goldfields posed less difficulties. These consisted of reef mines, usually involving working populations of over 50 people, and in one or two cases as many as 3,000. They were in accessible areas, either proximate to densely populated settlements of peasants who were used to producing cotton and rice for the market, or in the case of Southwest Mwanza, more sparsely populated, but through employers' active encouragement peasant settlement and marketed food production had gradually developed.⁷⁹ If the local peasants' harvest

⁷⁵ TT, Report of the Committee, 30

⁷⁶ President's Address, LegCo., 10th Session, 12/11/35, 8; Acting Chief Secretary, LegCo., 11th Session, 20/10/37, 332; TT, Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1937, 28

⁷⁷ Adamjee, LegCo., 11th Session, 20/10/37, 335

⁷⁸ TT, Report of the Committee, 30; Khamsini, D.R., The Gold Miners and Mine Workers on the Lupa Goldfield, 1922-1963, M.A. Thesis, UDSM, (1978), 81

⁷⁹ TT, Report of the Committee, 28-30

failed, the mines were relatively accessible to the railway for easy food importation from Dar es Salaam or by lake from Kenya. Mine labourers' demand for maize was instrumental in prompting the adoption of the plough in the Lake Province during the late 1930s.⁸⁰ Rations were usually provided by the employer, but the employers were more likely than on the Lupa to be professional miners, small syndicates or mining companies able to pay better wages and provide food regularly.⁸¹ In the large mining concerns food was cooked for the labourers. Geita mine, in particular, was officially viewed as a model workplace with respect to its provisioning of a balanced, daily diet of cooked food for the workers.⁸²

Diamonds were not discovered at Mwadui until 1940. The Mwadui diamond mine was financed by international capital, notably that of the South African, Oppenheimer. To prevent diamond thefts, workers lived in closed compounds, with their rations fully provided for them. After World War II, Mwadui became a model of workers' social welfare measures.⁸³

The fluctuating demand of rural labourers working on the railway and in the timber industry is evident but not well documented. Rural railway workers got higher than average pay because of the isolation of their work and the expectation that they would be working full-time on the job.⁸⁴ Fairly detailed commentary exists on enclaves of railway platelayers at Itigi and Tengenji in 1946.⁸⁵ Railway workers were normally not provided with rations, but at that time, they were given the option of receiving a food ration in lieu of a portion of their wage. 1946 was a year of widespread food

⁸⁰ Iliffe, Modern History, 294

⁸¹ TT (Mitchell), Labour: Notes, 14

⁸² TT, Report of the Committee, 29

⁸³ Ofunguo, A.C., History of Labour on the Mwadui Diamond Mine: 1940-75, M.A. Thesis, UDSM, (1978), 63-70

⁸⁴ Pearson, N., 'Trade Unionist on Safari, 1949', RH Mss. Afr.s.394, 68-70, 107

⁸⁵ General Manager, Railways, LegCo., 5th Session, 15/1/31, 132

shortages and all had opted to take the rations. However, it was found that many were selling some of the more basic items in their rations like maize meal, on the lucrative black market, while trying to make the remainder stretch to meet their families' needs. Railway men were not in the habit of cultivating the surrounding area, anticipating that crop loss through animal depravation would make it a waste of time. Instead, they were accustomed to returning to their home areas during the planting season. However, in so doing, they forfeited the chance of receiving a retirement gratuity which required 15 years of uninterrupted service, in spite of the fact that many had worked for the railways for decades on a regular basis.

In summary, employers tended to provide rations or pay relatively high wages to wage workers situated in remote areas for concentrated periods of time or doing very demanding work, rather than leaving it up to workers' food self-provisioning on the job. But there was no fixed pattern. Employers and workers resorted to all sorts of ad-hoc measures depending on the agricultural potential of the surrounding area, distance from worker's home area and the resources and concerns of the employer. In contrast to the small, incidental food demand discussed earlier, Asian traders came to play an active role in supplying mining and other fluctuating populations of wage labourers, since the extent and location of demand, could be anticipated within a reasonable range of accuracy.

2.3 Large, Predictable Rural Demand and Supply

Large, predictable rural demand emanated from the plantations and farms of the sisal corridors and European farm clusters of the country. These enterprises constituted the bulk of non-peasant household food demand in the country and exerted the greatest pressure on the country's restricted food-producing capacity. Generally, with the exception of some of the Southern Highland farms, they were accessible to the railway or a high-grade road. Reliance on imported food was quite pronounced.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1927, 42

Government held employers responsible for the adequacy of their workers' diet. The government recommended diet for labourers consisted of a daily ration of 24 oz. of maize meal, 4 oz. of beans, 2 oz. of groundnuts and a weekly allocation of 2 lbs. of meat, one pound of fresh vegetables and 2 oz. of salt.⁸⁷ The state declined to make this diet statutory, arguing that due to the difficult food supply conditions in so many parts of the country, employers had to be left with room to adapt to the local availability of foodstuffs and transport circumstances.⁸⁸ Labour inspectors, with the powers of second class magistrates, visited plantations and checked workers' complaints about diet.⁸⁹ Despite the very dedicated work of labour inspectors like R.C. Jerrard, the small staffing of the Labour Department never allowed for comprehensive enforcement.⁹⁰ Instead, the state tried to propagandize the advantages accruing to the employer who paid sufficient attention to workers' nutritional needs.⁹¹

The Masters and Native Servants Ordinance of 1924 placed responsibility on employers to provide food for their non-local labourers only in the event that foodstuffs were not reasonably and readily available in the vicinity of the workplace. Those workers who were rationed by their employers, the so-called 'fed labour', were few in number on sisal estates.⁹² Attested labour often had a food ration clause in their contract, but they could opt out of this arrangement.⁹³

An employer's main task therefore was to ensure the adequate supply of purchasable foodstuffs

⁸⁷ TT, Labour: The Recruitment, 20; TT, Government Notice No. 144 of 1936

⁸⁸ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1927, 42

⁸⁹ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1928, 12

⁹⁰ Tambila, A. A History of the Tanga Sisal Labour Force: 1935-64, M.A. Thesis, UDSM, (1974), 58

⁹¹ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1928, 44; TT, Suggestions for Improving the Feeding of Labourers in Tanganyika, (DSM, Government Printer, 1941)

⁹² TT, Report of the Committee, 28; Shivji, Wage Labour, 110

⁹³ Shivji, Wage Labour, 110

for his labour force. A sisal estate labour force usually numbered between 200 and 1000 workers.⁹⁴

The supply arrangements involved one or a combination of the following: first, encouraging local peasants to regularly sell their surpluses to the labourers;⁹⁵ second, opening up a shop on the estate which they supplied through bulk orders for maize from Kenya⁹⁶ or from nearby settler farmers who specialized in maize production; and third, allowing an Asian dukawallah to establish a shop on the estate to cater for the workers' food requirements. The first option rarely if ever provided a regular, inexhaustible source of supply. So it was the latter two, particularly the third that became common features of the estate landscape.

Government was alert to profiteering at the expense of workers' diet. Frequently, labourers were given small weekly or daily advances by their employer to buy food and other essentials before the completion of their kipande. The advance was often barely enough to cover the workers' essential food needs.⁹⁷ Government was critical of the prolonging effects this could have on workers finishing their kipande. On the other hand, prior to remuneration labourers rarely had cash for purchasing food. Employers' who engaged in the 'truck system' or had 'tommy shops' faced legal penalties. In the truck system, an employer unilaterally issued food claim chits in lieu of a portion of a worker's wage. This, in effect, was a barter transaction, labour for food with the labourer unable to judge how much he was getting in the exchange. Tommy shops were complementary to the truck system. The employer or his relations usually managed the tommy shop which they supplied with foodstuffs and other consumer goods that were either purchased in large bulk amounts at discount prices or

⁹⁴ TT, Report of the Committee, 28

⁹⁵ Major Lead, LegCo., 2nd Session, 16/1/28, 39

⁹⁶ Prior to the development of the maize industry in the Northern Province there was no strong long-distance bulk grain trading channels established within the country. Most large contracts went to Kenya. Thereafter, Kenya continued to fill the gap between domestic supply and demand (TT, Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1930, 13).

⁹⁷ Shivji cites the Tanga Provincial Annual Report, 1935, (Shivji, Wage Labour, 112).

alternatively were inferior quality goods purchased at cheap prices.⁹⁸ The labourer was a captive customer who exchanged his claim chits for the goods, having no way of avoiding the inferior goods nor being availed any discount.⁹⁹

Another employers' practice that jeopardized workers' nutritional well-being was that of withholding wages. Employers withheld wages as a disciplinary measure or because they were illiquid.¹⁰⁰ Amongst the employers of fed labour, there was the widespread practice of issuing rations at the end of the day but linking the more desired items like meat to work output or the completion of five or six consecutive days work. In addition, food rations were frequently underweighed or an undue proportion of maize meal issued in place of protein dietary components. Absentee or sick labourers were not always given their full daily ration.¹⁰¹

Similarly, the state had its reservations about Asian dukawallahs' practice of extending credit to African labourers to buy foodstuffs and consumer durables. It was a well-entrenched system that the state voiced disapproval of, but did not act to dismantle.¹⁰² The consumer durables were kept in locked tin boxes in the duka until the completion of the workers' kipande when accounts between the dukawallah and labourer could be settled. Sometimes a dukawallah had hundreds of these boxes in his shop. In the event of bankruptcy, these boxes could not be claimed by the creditor due to the Restrictions of Credit to Natives Ordinance.

⁹⁸ Sometimes the estate owner and dukawallah cooperated in this with chits being redeemable at the dukawallah's shop rather than one owned by the estate (R.C. Jerrard, Inspection Report, Tongoni Estate (Tanga District), 4/8/38 TNA SMP 25908/1).

⁹⁹ Shivji, Wage Labour, 280

¹⁰⁰ In 1930 almost half of the employers' offences were the withholding of wages (Shivji, Wage Labour, 109).

¹⁰¹ Estates tended to give the sick who attended the dispensary a half ration (Raymond, W.D. 'Nutrition and Tanganyika', TNR 11, (1941), 22; Shivji, Wage Labour, 113-115).

¹⁰² Chitale, LegCo., 5th Session, 16/1/31, 146

As for labourers' self-provisioning of food under the kipande system, in some cases, employers directly facilitated the practice by allocating a section of the estate for food cultivation. In the Southern Province, where food rationing was exceedingly rare, workers were encouraged to plant food crops between the rows of sisal on many estates.¹⁰³ In isolated instances, there is evidence that some employers were openly antagonistic to workers' food cultivation; for example, one employer uprooted his labourers' food crops in protest against their low labour productivity and was fined by a labour inspector for doing so.¹⁰⁴ It is difficult to surmise from the existing literature the proportion of self-provisioned as opposed to purchased food that workers consumed, but it seems likely that the bulk of food consumed on sisal estates was purchased, because of the constraints on the workers time. Farms were different. Farm labourers and their families generally squatted on the farm and grew most of their own food.

A good deal of the early official concern centered on dietary standardization rather than dietary improvement. Labourers coming from a variety of geographical areas with different basic food staples had to be made accustomed to a maize-based diet to facilitate lower labour costs. Those coming from plantain and milk diets were considered especially vulnerable.¹⁰⁵ De-worming and a special feeding programme for those workers who arrived at plantations in obvious states of malnutrition were recommended. Dietary considerations were constantly linked with the issue of labour productivity. Estate managers and state officials alike claimed that labourers tended to leave the plantation in a better state of nourishment than they entered.¹⁰⁶

During the 1930s the state became increasingly sensitive to the nutritional deficiencies

¹⁰³ TT, Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1928, 9

¹⁰⁴ Jerrard, Labour Inspection Report, Bombwera Estate (Tanga District), 17/6/38, TNA SMP 25908/1/66

¹⁰⁵ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1927, 14; Charron, K. The Welfare of the African Labourer in Tanganyika, (DSM, Government Printer, 1944)

¹⁰⁶ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1928, 47; TT, Report of the Committee, 28

experienced by the Tanganyikan wage labour force, particularly on sisal plantations. Labour inspectors were highly conscious of the variation in estates' food policies and the detrimental effect of managements that tried to cut costs by inadequate provisioning of food to workers.¹⁰⁷ The 1938 committee report on the supply and welfare of native labour reflected the growing international recognition of nutritional problems in the colonies.¹⁰⁸ It took the view that the widespread nutritional inadequacies were systemic rather than being due solely to negligent employers. Against the background of growing labour shortage and the belief that there were no untapped labour reserves to be drawn upon, hence the need for making the existing labour force more productive, it associated nutritional inadequacies with the lack of fed labour and aspects of the bachelor wage system. They argued that those labourers who did not receive rations from their employers tended to skimp on food purchases, and were too tired at the end of a day's work in the field to collect firewood and cook, let alone engage in food cultivation. Thus, the report recommended that employers provide their labour with cooked meals, or alternatively encourage the settlement of entire families, whereby labourers' wives could attend to the food production, firewood collection and cooking.¹⁰⁹

Soon after this report was published the state commissioned a committee to advise on nutrition.¹¹⁰ The war underlined the need for nutrition reform. One-third of the African men that were conscripted for military service during World War II could not pass their medical examination.¹¹¹ In 1944, a

¹⁰⁷ Jerrard notes that Bird and Co. estates were notoriously bad, but even the better estates had a great deal of room for improvement (R.C. Jerrard Inspection Report, Kange Estate (Tanga), 10/6/38; Jerrard Inspection Report Hale Estate (Pangani), 15/6/38, TNA SMP 25908/1).

¹⁰⁸ IT, Report of the Committee, 28, 32-33; International Labour Office, Studies and Reports. Series b Social and Economic Conditions, No. 23, Workers' Nutrition and Social Policy, (Geneva 1936)

¹⁰⁹ The report acknowledged the difficulties of family settlement, namely: that labourers often prefer that their wives stay behind to look after the land; second, many estates may not have spare land for family settlement; third, attested labour on contracts of a specified duration are reluctant to bring their families for a limited time (IT, Report of the Committee, 33).

¹¹⁰ Draft Report of Nutrition Committee (1940), TNA SMP 25987; IT, Suggestions

¹¹¹ Mohamed, S.A. and J. McKeag, 'The History of Human Nutrition Activities in Tanzania', Human Nutrition Unit, Ministry of Health, DSM, (1970)

standardized diet became compulsory for fed labour.¹¹² After World War II, the incidence of fed labour increased, a prelude to the overhaul on the bachelor wage system that was to follow in the decades to come. Furthermore, there was a growing concern on the part of nutritionists that a 'fed' labourer living with his family needed rations for his wife and children as well, to ensure that the labourer consumed the entirety of his ration rather than sharing it.¹¹³

2.4 Large, Predictable Urban Demand and Supply

During the inter-war period, Dar es Salaam was the only population settlement numbering over 20,000 people. Between 1921 and 1939, its population rose from 24,600 to approximately 41,000. In 1939 roughly a quarter were Asians and Europeans were between 2% and 3%.

The marketed food demand of Dar es Salaam contrasted quite strikingly with that of the rest of the country. Three cultural food traditions intersected: the diverse African staple food tradition of sorghum, millet, maize, plantains, rice and cassava; the Asian predilection to rice and to a lesser extent wheat and the European one to wheat and Irish potatoes. Interestingly, rice was the city's preferred staple food, and had been so already in German times when African migrants from up-country areas eager to adopt an urban image embraced the Swahili coastal culture with its rice-based cuisine. In 1931, amidst the reduced purchasing power of the Depression and the imposition of a duty on imported rice in conjunction with incentives to increase domestic rice exports, the African population was forced to turn to maize as their staple. However, they continued to disdain posho,¹¹⁴ and insisted on the more refined but less nutritious unga wa kutwanga.¹¹⁵ Asians preferred particular

¹¹² Master and Native Servants (Proper Feeding) Regulations of 1944

¹¹³ Raymond, W.D. 'The Nutrition of Sisal Labour', (DSM, Medical Laboratory, 1940), 4; Charron, African Labourer, 43

¹¹⁴ I.e. the maize meal fed to rural labourers.

¹¹⁵ I.e. finely machine ground maize flour ('Report of Enquiry into Wages and Cost of Living of Low Grade African Government Employees in Dar es Salaam', Appendix C, (1942), TNA SMP 30598).

rice varieties imported from India to Tanganyikan rice and were thus more affected by the 1931 duty than any other group. However, their higher incomes allowed them to maintain their consumption pattern.¹¹⁶

Dar es Salaam was served by numerous dukas usually owned by Asians or Arabs, that carried basic staple food items which were often sold on credit. With the exception of domestic servants, most employed Africans did not receive food rations from their employers and had to make their wages stretch to meet food and non-food requirements. African wages in Dar es Salaam for skilled and unskilled labour were considerably higher than in the rest of the country, but prices also were higher,¹¹⁷ and the tension of living in close proximity to brown and white populations that were receiving salaries in vast excess to their own, made African Dar es Salaamites acutely aware of the discomforts of a low wage.

In Dar es Salaam, as elsewhere, African employees were subjected to a bachelor wage system but they were more likely to have dependants living with them in contrast to the bachelor compound existence of plantation labourers. In 1942, a state enquiry revealed that 90% of the African government unskilled employees sampled were living with a woman. The average family consisted of a man and woman and 1.23 children. Earning less than 60 Shs. a month, they were found to be 'in receipt of a wage on which they cannot possibly subsist without getting into debt and remaining in debt.'¹¹⁸ These findings confirmed the observations of previous commentators and inferred grave difficulties for unskilled non-government employees whose wage rates tended to be less than half of those of the government.¹¹⁹ There were no great voices of reform calling for an increase in African

¹¹⁶ Dr. Malik, Legco., 5th Session, 4/12/31, 226

¹¹⁷ TT, Annual Report on Tanganyika Territory, 1921: Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, (London, HMSO, 1921), 11

¹¹⁸ 'Report of Enquiry into Wages', 7, TNA SMP 30598

¹¹⁹ District Officer, DSM to PC, Eastern Province, 18/12/29, TNA Acc. 61/295

wages, Orde-Browne, alert to the possibility of any appearing, had written more than a decade before:

An increase in wages will...prove the merest temporary palliative; the higher the wage the greater the extraction of the magnet and the larger the flow of deluded victims towards the mecca of the town harpy, and the worse the eventual result. The town native will be eventually no better off and the cost of living will have increased for all concerned...¹²⁰

Without waged employment, it was difficult to survive. Legislation restricting itinerant trading acted against the development of a large informal sector.¹²¹ African unemployment in Dar es Salaam had been a policy concern from the outset of British colonial rule. Following the war in 1920 and 1921, destitute Africans were repatriated to the rural areas.¹²² During the Depression unemployment mounted.¹²³ By 1939, an estimated 4,300 men, approximately 33% of all adult men had no visible form of income.¹²⁴ The state's reflex response, as always, was to get the African back on the land.

An enquiry was set up in 1939 to investigate the availability of land in the immediate environs of Dar es Salaam for cultivation by the unemployed.¹²⁵ Since Dar es Salaam's founding in the the 1860s the low-lying valleys had been used for rice and coconut cultivation.¹²⁶ Maize and cassava were

¹²⁰ Labour Commissioner Orde-Browne to Chief Secretary, 14/3/28, TNA Acc. 61/295

¹²¹ In 1938, hawkers of dried fish and certain fresh foods were, however, exempted from the Itinerant Traders Bill after the investigations of the government-appointed Nutrition Commission. There was considerable opposition to this measure from some unofficial LegCo. members who claimed that most hawkers' produce was stolen from farmers' fields (Major Sir William Lead, LegCo., 12th Session, 29/3/28, 119-122).

¹²² TT, Tanganyika Territory 1921, 16

¹²³ TT, Provincial Commissioner's Annual Report, Eastern Province 1932, 9

¹²⁴ Depelchin, J., 'The "Beggar Problem" in Dar es Salaam in the 1930's', History Department Seminar Paper, UDSM, (1978), 5

¹²⁵ McCleery, H.H., 'Extent and Conditions under which Natives are occupying Land in the Outskirts of Dar es Salaam', RH Mss. Afr.s.870

¹²⁶ Bryceson, D.F. 'A Century of Food Supply in Dar es Salaam: From Sumptuous Suppers for a Sultan to Maize Meal for a Million', in Guyer, J. (ed.), Feeding Africa's Cities, (London, International African Institute, 1987)

grown on higher ground. Freehold for Africans and non-Africans had been allowed under German law, but non-Africans were tending to buy up the freehold and reduce Africans to a tenant or squatter status. Of 7,000 acres of Crown land within a 5 mile radius from the city centre, only 950 unoccupied acres were identified for settlement by the unemployed. Approximately 1200 acres was unsuited for agriculture and the rest was being cultivated by an estimated 500 people living in the city who went out daily to farm, in addition to squatters who had built over nine hundred huts on the land and cultivated adjacent shambas. However, the local Native Authority, with the jurisdiction to grant usufruct rights for the cultivation of annual crops on the area's Crownland, were not in control of the situation. Most of the African cultivators were non-Zaramo immigrants, who were not enjoying simple usufruct rights. Many had planted permanent crops like fruit trees and coconut palms. Frequently, they had fallen into debt with non-Africans, notably Arabs who mortgaged the land. Hired labour was not uncommon and over-grazing was taking place.¹²⁷

Cultivation on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam was primarily to meet subsistence needs and along with direct farm supply from the up-country homestead, was a vital part of African urban household food supply. There is no way of knowing the extent of subsistence production. The district officer investigating Dar es Salaam land usage maintained that: '...the wages earned by the natives of Dar es Salaam are still largely spent on luxuries...The basic food stuffs are still produced on his shamba.'¹²⁸

Whether the foodstuffs consumed in Dar es Salaam were bought in the market or came directly from farms, the bulk of the city's staple food supply did not originate in the immediate environs of the city or Uzaramo. Rice came from Rufiji and Mwanza; maize from Northern and Central Provinces; cassava from the surrounding districts of Kisarawe, and Bagamoyo; sorghum and millet from Lindi. The

¹²⁷ McCleery, 'Extent and Conditions', 28-41

¹²⁸ McCleery, 'Extent and Conditions', 10

railways and roads all led to Dar es Salaam, so sources of domestic supply were diverse. As the country's major port, Dar es Salaam was in the most accessible position for receipt of food imports. In comparison with other places, Dar es Salaam was easy to supply. It had the largest number of consumers dependent on purchased supplies and the heaviest concentration of Asian traders to facilitate distribution. The market in food was well-developed. Nevertheless, food provisioning direct from peasant household farms was a significant feature even of Dar es Salaam's urbanized setting.

III. Systematization of Territorial Food Supply: 1939-1950

State food marketing policy during the inter-war period was non-interventionist. With the exception of rice which was an important export crop, marketing of foodstuffs was not subject to state controls. Sources of food supply for the wage labour force, produce marketing arrangements and food distribution to workers were left to develop on an ad-hoc basis. Patterns were identifiable as described in the above; but there was great spatial variation. During the 1940s, this was to change. Under increasing state intervention in the spheres of distribution, production and consumption, a more uniform, territorial pattern of supply evolved.

1. World War II Economic Environment

World War II was a tremendous boom to the Tanganyikan economy. Sisal, coffee, cotton, and tea were in short supply in the allied world and their prices rose accordingly. Pyrethrum, a fairly new crop and rubber which Tanganyika had relinquished to East Asian competition some decades back, became important export crops. Increased tonnages of export crops removed the railway under-capacity and debt problem. The country's balance of payments became very strong and the territorial budget was continually in surplus (TABLE 3.1).

Labour demand reached an all-time high. Employers' ability to attract labour was hampered by the acute shortages of imported consumer incentive goods which afflicted the country as well as the

higher earnings peasants made through the sale of food crops.¹²⁹ To optimize labour usage the state made it mandatory for a labourer to complete a kipande in 42 days in prescribed areas and the Tanganyika Sisal Growers' Association agreed to pay a bonus of three shillings for its completion in that time.¹³⁰

Immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939, the Tanganyikan state instituted price and commodity controls on lines similar to those of Britain. The intention was to retain the pre-war cost of living and ensure consumer supplies of vital goods. This involved setting retail price levels for a number of basic commodities. Under the Defence Regulations, an Economic Control Board was set up whose main functions were to select the commodities to control and authorize approved traders for them.¹³¹ Organizationally, it was divided into an East African War Supplies Board (1940) which provisioned military foodstuff requirements and the East African Civil Supplies Board (1941) that facilitated close cooperation between the three East African territories in import, export and commodity control of foodstuffs and other categories of goods. These agencies increasingly intervened in Asian trading channels, at first merely at the extreme ends, i.e. retailing and import/export, but, as war-time exigencies mounted, their monitoring and supervisory activities encroached on the whole gamut of trade.

2. Burgeoning Food Demand amidst Domestic Production Constraints, 1939-1942

During World War II, the number of people dependent on purchased food catapulted. The additional people included several thousand refugees and prisoners of war, most of whom were

¹²⁹ TT, Labour Department Annual Report, 1942, 2

¹³⁰ Applied in certain provinces in the production of sisal, certain essential crops and railway sleepers (TT, Labour Department Annual Report, 1942, 3); TT, Labour Department Annual Report, 1941, 6.

¹³¹ Its membership included the General Manager of the Railways, the Comptroller of Customs and the Director of Agriculture (Phillips, E.C., 'Answer to Career Questionnaire', RH Mss. Afr.s.1695, 27-29).

European, and tens of thousands of African labourers, military recruits and urban migrants.¹³² The former lived in camps and were fed a wheat-based diet, while the Africans were usually consuming the standard maize posho diet. In addition, Tanganyika was expected to export food to the Middle East as part of its war contribution.

Mindful of food supply difficulties that could ensue for agricultural employers, the state fixed the wholesale f.o.r. price for maize meal in Arusha, Moshi, Kilosa and Morogoro in 1940.¹³³ The fledgling European wheat industry was boosted by 1940 legislation that established a wheat marketing board and wheat growers' associations. The bill made it possible for orders to be served on wheat growers of specified classes and areas to market their wheat through the board, which was to be aligned with Kenya in the event of need for export.¹³⁴ Wheat was a far less developed settler commercial crop than maize, and this legislation, gave them the organizational structure around which the industry could expand.

In November 1941, the United States' entry into the war triggered a price boom for agricultural commodities. East African grain production became an important source of supply for the Middle East. The Kenyan state responded by guaranteeing producer prices to its farmers. The Tanganyikan state followed suit in January 1942, ostensibly to eliminate the extremely low maize prices Tanganyika European farmers had experienced as a result of the dumping of Kenyan maize surpluses over the previous two years.¹³⁵ However, since other outlets for Kenyan maize had opened up, it no longer posed

¹³² There were 87,000 Tanganyikan Africans enlisted in the military forces, proportionally one of the highest in Africa (President's Address, LegCo., 20th Session, 2/12/46, 258).

¹³³ 'Maize Price Fixed', Tanganyika Standard, 15/1/40, TNA SMP 28259/8

¹³⁴ The fear was that given Tanganyika's lack of comparative advantage in wheat production and a low world market price, export would involve heavy losses to the state (The Sale of Wheat Bill (1940), LegCo., 14th Session, 18/3/40, 157-172).

¹³⁵ Memorandum for Standing Finance Committee, 'Guaranteed Prices for Foodstuffs to ensure Maximum Production', 29/12/41, TNA SMP 30157

such a threat, and a domestic producer price rise was probably inevitable.¹³⁶

Price control involved setting guaranteed minimum prices for maize, wheat, rice, sesame, groundnuts and beans.¹³⁷ In addition, European farmers were encouraged to form non-African farmers' district production committees that could serve as the settler farmers' self-governing and planning bodies to liaise with the state. Two committees were established in 1942, the Moshi District and the Arusha District Production Committees. They marked the organizational beginnings of a strong settler lobby that was to persist until independence.

3. Food Crisis and New Policy Directions, 1943-1945

In 1943 the state extended its intervention from trade in food to production and consumption. In that year, drought struck much of the country, causing severe famine in Central Province. The drought affected Kenya as well and eliminated her maize export capacity, leaving Tanganyika without a cheap source of imports. The Colonial Office engaged in a world-wide search for grain and shipping space to rescue East Africa.¹³⁸ Failing to procure Argentinian maize, Tanganyika eventually had to make do with large imports of expensive Australian wheat. This event prompted a wide array of policies to be devised for alleviating the situation and preventing its re-occurrence, which will be reviewed under the headings of production, distribution and consumption.

3.1 Production Policies

In the sphere of production, there were four main policies: exhortation of peasants, plantation

¹³⁶ It has been argued for Kenya that price control was opportunely introduced to restrain prices that would otherwise ride the crest of the world commodity price boom. This argument could have applied to Tanganyika as well (Anderson, D. and D. Throup, 'Africans and Agricultural Production in Colonial Kenya: The Myth of the War as a Watershed', Journal of African History 26(4), (1985), 335).

¹³⁷ President's Address, LegCo., 16th Session, 9/12/42, 5; TT, Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1942, 1

¹³⁸ 'Food Supplies to EA: Crop Failure 1943', PRO/C0852/428/17600/11

self-sufficiency, non-African production support and state farms. Towards the close of 1942, when the certainty of food shortages in the following year loomed large, the state stressed the need for the stimulation of peasant production by propaganda, fair prices and, if need be, planting orders issued through the Native Authorities.¹³⁹ But the increased peasant production campaign of the 1930s had left a bitter aftertaste for government and peasants alike. The state refrained from goading peasant commodity producers.

Food self-sufficiency was already an aspect of Tanganyikan colonial agricultural policy with respect to the peasant household and district administrative units. Its appearance in 1943 in the form of plantation self-sufficiency is noteworthy. Up until that time, the Tanganyikan state had encouraged maximum production of the strategic exports such as sisal, rubber and pyrethrum, with a clear division of labour between food-producing and export crop-producing non-African farm units. In 1943, the Governor was forced to acknowledge that food production was 'the first essential in the maintenance of the whole war programme' in Tanganyika.¹⁴⁰ Plantations were served with planting orders, with the general intent of making them produce food for their own labourers as far as possible.¹⁴¹ The Sisal Growers' Association agreed to assist in persuading all members who had suitable land to grow food crops.¹⁴² Plantation managers frequently protested, complaining of the unsuitability of their soils etc., but agricultural officers made periodic checks to ensure their compliance with the policy.

Having organized themselves into District Production Committees, European farmers were ready to

¹³⁹ Draft replies to questions to be asked in Legislative Council, 30/11/42, TNA SMP 30626

¹⁴⁰ President's Address, LegCo, 18th Session, 6/12/43, 5

¹⁴¹ Plantation production of food crops had been a feature of the World War I economy under the Germans (Henderson, W.D., 'The War Economy of German East Africa, 1914-1917', Economic History Review, 13, (1943), 107).

¹⁴² Director of Agriculture, LegCo., 17th Session, 10/12/42, 93

pressurize for all sorts of perks to boost their commercial food production. They were availed grants and loans for the breaking of new ground and the purchase of machinery.¹⁴³ By the end of 1944, approved agricultural loans totalled £55,000.¹⁴⁴ The Increased Production of Crops (Guaranteed Minimum Returns and Grants) Rules (1944), applied only to non-Africans, and gave District Production Committees executive powers to order farmers to utilize their land to maximize food production, and take fullest advantage of machinery loans by stipulating methods of production.¹⁴⁵ Coercion was more apparent than real since non-African farmers submitted programmes of production to their local District Production Committee which were approved then issued as planting orders.¹⁴⁶ Non-African maize and cereal acreage increased by 10,000 acres between 1939 and the end of 1944.¹⁴⁷

As the war progressed, non-African producers, particularly food producers, found it increasingly more difficult to procure adequate amounts of waged labour. The state came to their assistance by conscripting labour under the Defence Regulations. During 1941 and 1942, labour conscripts numbered 3,255, then shot up to 13,594 in 1943, 30,647 in 1944 and 26,256 in 1945. Almost one-third of all conscripts over the years were engaged in food production, mostly on farms in Northern Province.¹⁴⁸

Europeans and Asians persistently pressured the state for land alienation during the war. The state, maintained its mandate stance, but compromised by demarcating blocks of land in Iringa, Moshi, Arusha, and Mbulu where they were willing to give short-term land leases, usually of three years on

¹⁴³ President's Address, LegCo., 17th Session, 9/12/42, 5

¹⁴⁴ President's Address, LegCo., 19th Session, 7/12/44, 4

¹⁴⁵ Director of Agriculture, LegCo., 18th Session, 27/4/44, 140

¹⁴⁶ Government Notice No. 307, 'The Increased Production of Crops Ordinance', 1944, TNA SMP 31886

¹⁴⁷ President's Address, LegCo., 19th Session, 7/12/44, 3

¹⁴⁸ Orde-Browne, Major G. St. J., Labour Conditions in East Africa, (London, HMSO, 1946), 10; Orde-Browne noted that the incidence of conscription on the African male population was uneven, and suspected that favouritism and bribery were common (p.43).

the approval of the Governor.¹⁴⁹ By the end of 1944, over 50,000 acres of agricultural and pastoral land had been leased.¹⁵⁰

The initiation of state farming was prompted by the desire for wheat import substitution. Using U.S. Lend Lease equipment and Masai grazing land, the state launched the Northern Province Wheat Scheme.¹⁵¹ The Scheme lasted four years, ending with the 1947 wheat crop. Average yields over the period of four years amounted to a disappointing 2.35 bags per acre which was attributed to a sequence of alternating extremely heavy and light rain, army worm attack and lack of trained mechanics.¹⁵² However, the Scheme's financial performance was considered reasonable, facilitated by the fact that over one-third of the total capital expenditure had involved free lend-lease equipment. Furthermore, the scheme had succeeded in its original purpose of import substitution to save shipping space. The equivalent of two shiploads was produced over the four year period.

3.2 Distribution Policies

Asian traders were squeezed more and more out of grain trading. In 1943, produce control was introduced which entailed grains like maize and sorghum being bought and sold at appointed selling places under the Economic Control Board.¹⁵³ Only persons holding permits could purchase and move the grain from one district to another. A black market in maize appeared in the Northern Province in 1944. The pastoralist Masai and Wa-Arusha were suspected of trafficking it at 24 Shs. a

¹⁴⁹ Director of Lands and Mines, LegCo., 17th Session, 9/12/42, 19-22

¹⁵⁰ President's Address, LegCo., 19th Session, 7/12/44, 4

¹⁵¹ Fuggles-Couchman, N.R., 'Northern Province Wheat Scheme Report, 1942-50', RH Mss. Afr.s.886; Financial Secretary, LegCo., 17th Session, 9/12/42, 13

¹⁵² Financial Secretary, LegCo., 19th Session, 14/12/44, 41

¹⁵³ 'Notes of a Meeting held at Government House at 11 a.m. on Friday, the 26th December 1941 to consider the fixing of prices to be guaranteed by the East African Governments for Agricultural Products for Military Requirements', TNA SMP 30157/1

bag.¹⁵⁴ Distribution was not helped by the shortage of lorries that the Economic Control Board was doing its hardest to rectify.

At the retail level, public food rationing at controlled prices was instituted in Dar es Salaam and Tanga. A retailer was only allowed to sell to those presenting coupons from his area and not all retailers were given rations to distribute.¹⁵⁵ The consumer endured long queues and tiresome inconvenience, which Economic Control Board officials hoped would serve as a deterrent to further urban migration.¹⁵⁶

3.3 Consumption Policies

During the 1943 food shortage, the state reduced the recommended ration of fed labour from 28-30 oz to 20 oz maize meal and on the Tanga line it was further cut to 12 oz.¹⁵⁷ The onus was on employers to substitute other foodstuffs.¹⁵⁸ It is remarkable that while measures were being taken to reduce labourers' grain intake, the state was on the other hand making special efforts to ensure the supply of food to government employees, and a free ration was instituted for African government employees in Dar es Salaam and Tanga in June 1942.¹⁵⁹ At the beginning of 1943, a Cost of Living Relief Committee was appointed to consider the nature and level of cost of living allowances to be awarded to African, Asian and European civil servants, aimed at maintaining their standard of living at pre-war levels. It was estimated that the European cost of living had increased by 30% between 1939 and 1943, whereas

¹⁵⁴ Financial Secretary, LegCo., 19th Session, 14/12/44, 50

¹⁵⁵ 'Complaints against Control of Distribution', TNA SMP 31665

¹⁵⁶ Minutes of a Special Meeting of the E.C.B. held at Keken House, Dar es Salaam at 9 a.m., 4/1/44, TNA Acc. 61/443/1

¹⁵⁷ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1943, 2; Cypher Telegram from East African Governors' Conference to Secretary of State, Colonies, 19/3/43, PRO/C0852/428/17600/11

¹⁵⁸ The value of the ration was believed to have risen sharply as a result of rising food prices and the necessity of substituting staple grains (TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1944, 5).

¹⁵⁹ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1943, 10

Africans in Dar es Salaam and Tanga had experienced not less than a 50% increase.¹⁶⁰

European and Asian allowances depended on the officer's salary level and family size and could not exceed 25% of the officer's salary.¹⁶¹ They were applicable to Europeans earning less than £644 and Asians earning less than £252. Africans earning less than Shs. 60 per month were given an allowance of Shs. 2/50 plus a food ration. Those with earnings over Shs. 60 received an allowance of up to Shs. 12 without a ration. Africans complained about the mixed cash and food form of their allowance and stated they preferred receiving all cash, which the government ruled was nutritionally inadvisable.¹⁶² The cost of living allowances were reviewed and upgraded on an annual basis.

Public food rationing was racially differentiated: Europeans received 4 oz Straightun wheat flour per day, 8 oz rice per month and 16 oz sugar per week; Asians' 18 oz of rice per week, 12 oz of Atta flour per day, 16 oz sugar per week, 8 oz ghee per week, and Africans' maize/millet/sorghum/cassava mixed flour ration varying between 18 and 28 oz depending on area, 8 oz sugar per week and cooking oil.¹⁶³ Rationing was a means of controlling urban influx. Migrants were refused ration cards, unless they had been instructed to come to Dar es Salaam by an employer.¹⁶⁴ Nonetheless, the consumption of African foodstuffs by registered ration card holders exceeded all estimates.¹⁶⁵ The growth of Dar es Salaam was likened to 'a volcano which may erupt at any moment'.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁰ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1943, 8

¹⁶¹ This was later to be raised to 33%, then 50% (TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1945, 10).

¹⁶² Minutes of a Meeting of the Sub-Committee of the Cost of Living Committee, 2/5/44, TNA Acc. 61/295/2/2

¹⁶³ Essup Dar es Salaam to Chief Secretary, 22/7/44, TNA SMP 29549

¹⁶⁴ District Officer, DSM to PC, Eastern Province, 14/12/32, TNA Acc. 61/443/1

¹⁶⁵ Minutes of a Special Meeting of the E.C.B. held at Keken House, Dar es Salaam at 9 a.m., 4/1/44, TNA Acc. 61/443/1

¹⁶⁶ Molohan, M.J.B. (Labour Officer, DSM), 'Unemployment and Wage Rates in Dar es Salaam', 27/9/41, TNA Acc. 61/443/1

It is not clear what happened to the nature and extent of cultivation by urban-dwelling Africans during the 1943 food crisis and its aftermath. In the 1942 survey of low grade African government employees in Dar es Salaam, only 6% of those surveyed said that they owned a shamba.¹⁶⁷ The incidence of peri-urban cultivation was probably higher amongst the more lowly paid non-government workers and the unemployed.¹⁶⁸ Cultivation within the city's boundaries was, however, prohibited in accordance with a long-standing health regulation.¹⁶⁹

4. Post-World War II Economic Hardships and Horizons, 1946-1950

The cessation of the war did not bring a removal of state concern over the territory's food supply. A world-wide grain shortage led to exceptionally high international grain prices and reversed Tanganyika's historical position as a relatively high-cost producer. It became beneficial to rely on domestic production rather than expensive grain imports.

It was apparent that the increased number of purchased food consumers of the war period was going to be a permanent, if not continuously expanding, feature of the economy. Returning military servicemen were considered unlikely to quietly slip back into the peasantry. Many would desire town life. After six years of war, it was impossible to expect a siege economy to be acceptable to the populace. The food demand of the urban and rural wage labour force was going to have to be met in some other way. The 'era of development' began, with hope vested in economic planning, agricultural experts and mechanization.

¹⁶⁷ Cost of living allowances for African government employees were calculated with the assumption that virtually none had their own agricultural plot in Tanga or Dar es Salaam.

¹⁶⁸ Wood, W., 'Cost of Living in Tanga Province, Tanganyika 1939', RH Mss. Afr.s.1062, 5

¹⁶⁹ The rationale for this health ordinance was that cropping provided breeding places for mosquitoes, thereby encouraging the spread of malarial infection in high population density areas ('Cultivation by Natives in Populated Centres', Circular No. 627, Director of Medical Services, 1/1/43, TNA SMP 30626).

4.1 Cost of Living and Incomes

Everyone had an acute awareness of the cost of living. Racially-distinct standards of living based on markedly different income levels starkly manifested the three-tiered racial structure of the society.¹⁷⁰ Rationing further enforced the day-to-day consciousness of a world in which race was fate and fate was niggardly. In 1946, cereal rations were cut by 2 oz per day for Africans, with the warning that no further Africans arriving in Dar es Salaam after the 5th of May, except civil servants and military staff would be issued with rations.¹⁷¹ In September, there was a mass demonstration by Africans in Dar es Salaam protesting not so much the quantity of the ration, as its quality; the mixed meal contained mostly cassava and sorghum. African resentment remained at a high pitch in the years that followed, receiving additional punch from the political combativeness of African nationalists:

In Dar es Salaam today...the African should feed on the worst machine flour of any kind of corn that is not poisonous to him and the non-native feed on the best foodstuffs procurable...Is this because the whiteman has got the Government in his hands? Or is it because the insides of Africans and non-natives are different from each other...¹⁷²

Despite efforts to hold down food prices, the price of a kilo of maize meal in Dar es Salaam rose from 9 cents in September 1939 to 23 cents in September 1948 then to 39 cents in November 1949,¹⁷³ and 44 cents in 1950.¹⁷⁴ African urban workers, rather than plantation labourers, were the hardest hit

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¹⁷⁰ In 1947, monthly salaries for civil servants were: Europeans, Shs. 500-2667; Asians, Shs. 150-770; and Africans Shs. 50-140. Europeans were earning over four times more than Asians and 16 times more than Africans (Circular Letter No. 45 of 1947 to all Heads of Department, 12/4/47, 'Revision of Cost of Living Allowances', in Stenhouse, RH Mss. Afr.s.417).

¹⁷¹ Tanganyika Standard, 2/5/46

¹⁷² Extract from the African weekly Kwetu, 11/7/48, TNA SMP 31555/1

¹⁷³ 39 cents was nonetheless a partially subsidized price.

¹⁷⁴ The 1950 price rise was accompanied by an increase of the minimum rate of pay for daily paid Government labourers from Sh. 1/60 to Sh. 1/75 (TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1949, 19; Press Release, 1/2/50, TNA SMP 39114).

by escalating prices, since very few had employers providing them with food.¹⁷⁵ A sample of 100 Dar es Salaam African households earning Shs. 75¹⁷⁶ a month revealed that actual calories and protein consumed were approximately half of the amount contained in the government's recommended diet.¹⁷⁷ Plantation labourers however had their share of problems as well. During the 1946 food shortages, bulk allocations of maize at provincial and district levels destined for employers' distribution to their workers did not always cover the needs of labourers' resident wives and children.¹⁷⁸

Racial differences in salaries were being challenged.¹⁷⁹ Two Africans were appointed to the Legislative Council and started registering their dissatisfaction.¹⁸⁰ Labour unrest and strikes were on the increase. The 1947 dockers' strike became a general strike that spread along the rail-lines to Morogoro, Dodoma, Tabora, Kigoma, Mwanza and Mpanda, involving railway workers first and foremost but in various places plantation labourers, teachers and civil servants also participated. The strike resulted in pay rises of 33% on average for harbour workers.¹⁸¹

The Railway African Association and the Dockworkers' and Stevedores' Union were both formed in 1947.¹⁸² In 1950 a dockers' strike sparked off rioting that resulted in violent confrontations and the

¹⁷⁵ The tendency for rural employers to give rations was increasing: Arusha, 35%; Morogoro, 72%; Tanga and Pangani, only attested labour; Tabora, 64%; Lindi, 22%; Korogwe, 30% and all Dar es Salaam sisal estates (TT, Labour Department Annual Report, 1947, 14); and TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1949, 17).

¹⁷⁶ An average salary for an African government employee.

¹⁷⁷ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1950, 32

¹⁷⁸ J.H.S. Tranter, LegCo., 20th Session, 12/12/46, 267

¹⁷⁹ Pearson, 'Trade Unionist', 48, 59-60, 115

¹⁸⁰ M.H. Abdiel Shangali, LegCo., 20th Session, 7/3/46, 129

¹⁸¹ Iliffe, J. 'The Creation of Group Consciousness among the Dockworkers of Dar es Salaam 1929-1950', in R. Sandbrook and R. Cohen (eds.), The Development of an African Working Class, (Bristol, Longman, 1975)

¹⁸² Pearson, Trade Unionist, 210-213

deaths of two Africans. The state arrested the strike's leaders, confiscated the union's property and caused many of the dockers on permanent employment to flee. Iliffe notes that this effectively destroyed the traditions and experienced personnel of the African labour movement that had been built up over the preceding decade.¹⁸³

Meanwhile the state had made some efforts to improve conditions for the rural wage labour force. With the increase of sisal prices by £18, Shs. 10 per ton, the Ministry of Supply stipulated that £2, Shs. 10 per ton must be devoted to workers' welfare measures in the industry and the Labour Commissioner could sanction the withholding of this amount if a plantation did not comply.¹⁸⁴ But this measure was a reforming gesture that begged the larger issue of eliminating the need for recruitment altogether and stabilizing the wage labour force. Many sisal plantation employers were favourably inclined to such a development, seeing 'permanent settled labour on the basis of family life...the most satisfactory form of labour.'¹⁸⁵ Orde-Browne put his rubber stamp on the need for it.

...there appears to be little doubt that there must gradually be a readjustment of population to bring the workers nearer their place of employment, and thus to eradicate the existing constant waste of time and energy represented by the journey to and from the industrial centres. This will of course entail heavier charges on industry for the social services at present lacking or superfluous; but the great economy effected, and the resultant increase in efficiency should counterbalance this expense...¹⁸⁶

In the same vein, there was a general feeling in the government that bachelor wages were not suitable for urban African workers. A Minimum Wage Ordinance had been passed in 1939 which remained a mere formality in the absence of any machinery for wage fixing. In 1947 and 1950, bills were passed to set up a Minimum Wages Board and Wages Council as a first step towards establishing a

¹⁸³ Iliffe, 'Creation', 68-69

¹⁸⁴ TT, Labour Department Annual Report 1946, 11

¹⁸⁵ Annual Report of the East African Sisal Industry, 1946, TNA SMP 19417/3

¹⁸⁶ Orde-Browne, Labour Conditions, 22

minimum wage for urban areas.¹⁰⁷

4.2 Planning Production and Distribution

During the inter-war period, the territorial economy was only nominally integrated. Perennial labour shortages led to state efforts to rationalize labour usage geographically and temporally. Outside of the inter-provincial transport of labour, there was little official concern with or promotion of inter-regional commodity flows. Export and food commodities travelled by road and rail to Dar es Salaam or Tanga to be exported or consumed there. Imported food and consumer goods in turn were transported up-country.

After World War II, this began to change when it was realized that cheap food imports from Kenya and the outside world could not be used to balance supply and demand to the same extent as before. Suddenly basic foodstuffs, their domestic production and transport, became pivotal. Food pricing was at the heart of a conscious process of territorial economic integration. Government fixing of producer prices for food relative to export crops and geographical differentiation of producer and consumer food prices were aimed at balancing the economy and promoting economic expansion rather than mere maintenance and survival.

The alleviation of food insecurity remained an underlying premise of policy. Grave concern over the territory's food supplies instigated the launching of a 'four-year food plan'¹⁰⁸ implemented between 1946 and 1950 with the intent of making Tanganyika self-supporting; the theme of self-

¹⁰⁷ Minimum Wages (Amendment) Bill, 1947 and Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Bill, 1950. Provincial committees were set up in 1949 to review wage rates. (II, Labour Department Annual Report 1949, 16)

¹⁰⁸ Circular Letter to all Provincial Commissioners, Administrative and Agricultural Officers from Director of Agricultural Production, 12/8/46, TNA SMP 35061; President's Address, Legco., 20th Session, 2/12/46, 255 and LegCo., 12/12/46, 311

sufficiency had at last reached the territorial level.¹⁸⁹ African wage labourers' food requirements strongly motivated the plan. Miller, the Director of Agriculture, calculated that feeding the 350,000-strong wage labour force would require the utilization of 407,050 acres of arable land and 1,750,000 acres of pasture and would demand 10% of all African peasants' farming efforts, which they could spare in a good agricultural year, but not in a poor season.¹⁹⁰ The solution to this dilemma was seen to be agricultural intensification and storage. Mechanization was both a means and an end. On a more modest scale, the four-year food plan mirrored the Groundnut Scheme's belief in the machine.

Settler farming rather than peasant farming was the modus operandi of the plan. Peasant agriculture was regarded as too erratic and lacking in policy responsiveness.

It is essential to maintain, and as far as possible to increase the European production of wheat and maize which has proved the most dependable source of supply. Unless this is done there is grave danger of a deficiency.¹⁹¹

The agricultural policies of the 1943 crisis were to continue, but with heightened government material support and emphasis on mechanization. Plantations were expected to be as self-supporting as possible in food production.¹⁹² But with high export prices prevailing, there were some

¹⁸⁹ However, Tanganyika's identity as a self-sufficient unit accommodated import reliance on Kenya. 'The East African territories were inter-dependent in regard to food in spite of the tendency on the part of certain of these territories to break away.' ('Minutes of a Meeting held...on 1st December at the Chief Secretary's House to Discuss Inter-Territorial Food Supplies', (1946), TNA SMP 30626); Secretary for Trade, Finance and Economics, 'Memorandum on Food Production', 31/8/50, TNA SMP 41185/1; The Director of the ECB went further in acknowledging Kenya's role. 'I would like to pay tribute to the Kenyan European producer. It is the Kenyan European producer who has provided the only absolutely reliable source of foodstuffs for the Cereals Pool' (E.C. Phillips, LegCo., 20th Session, 12/12/46, 277).

¹⁹⁰ Miller, R.W.R., 'Rations for African Labour', EAAJ 12, (October 1946), 108

¹⁹¹ Memorandum for Standing Finance Committee, 'Measures to Stimulate Production of Food', 6/3/46, TNA SMP 30626

¹⁹² 'Food Subsidy Bill Passed', Tanganyika Standard, 17/1/47, TNA SMP 35085

reservations about continuing the policy amongst sisal growers.¹⁹³

The Increased Production of Crops Ordinance was renewed for the duration of the plan, and non-African District Production Committees became beehives of activity. All non-African farmers were required to submit their programmes of food production to their local District Production Committee, who together with the Senior Agricultural Officers would scrutinise the programme and devise planting orders with the approval of the Director of Agriculture that included various financial perks in the form of breaking grants, acreage grants for mechanized production, guaranteed minimum returns per acre and bonuses for delivery in 10-bag lots.¹⁹⁴ Subsidies to non-African farmers averaged over £60,000 per annum between 1946 and 1948.¹⁹⁵ Planting orders and guaranteed minimum return acreage payments were primarily for maize.¹⁹⁶

The Land Bank was established in 1947 to facilitate agricultural loans to non-Africans. Furthermore, the short-term land leases of the war were renewed for another four years.¹⁹⁷ Over the same period the ex-German properties totalling 278,000 acres were allocated to settlers in addition to 95 farms on newly alienated land covering 73,000 acres.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹³ '...my Association will protest against any 'Order to Plant', being made by Government on those estates where production of food crops merely means a waste of seed material and labour owing to the soil, climate and weather conditions being unsuitable for economic planting of these crops.' (Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association (TSGA) Secretary to Director of Agricultural Production, 20/8/46, TNA SMP 30626). In 1949, TSGA claimed that very few estates that planted maize would harvest more than 25% of their requirements due to crop failure (Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association to Member for Agriculture, 23/5/49, TNA SMP 30626).

¹⁹⁴ Farmers were often given a choice regarding the type of grant or bonus they received, with the state wary of double collection (Memorandum No. 5 for Executive Council, 'Maize and Wheat Prices', 2/2/48, TNA SMP 31301/III).

¹⁹⁵ Memorandum No. 92 for Executive Council, 'Grain Prices and Price Guarantees', 8/49, TNA SMP 38804

¹⁹⁶ 'List of Payments in respect of Guaranteed Minimum Returns', n.d., TNA SMP 31886

¹⁹⁷ Director of Agriculture, LegCo., 20th Session, 12/12/46, 303

¹⁹⁸ Twining, President's Address, LegCo., 25th Session, 15/11/50, 9

Peasant agriculture was not totally overlooked. Peasants were encouraged to intensify their production by adopting better farming methods, rather than being expected to increase their acreages in the 'Plant More Crops' manner of the 1930s. An Agricultural Development Fund was established that dispensed approximately £45,000 by 1950, mostly in small amounts of £50-100.¹⁹⁹ Seven Native Administration ploughing schemes for the cultivation of rice were introduced in the river valleys of the Ruvuma, Kilombero, Rufiji and Luengera as well as at Same, Kilosa and Bagamoyo.²⁰⁰

The four-year food plan involved the continuation of government price fixing and controlled marketing with exclusive trading rights being granted to particular Asian traders.²⁰¹ Settler food producers were disgruntled in 1946 because producer prices for food crops did not afford them the returns that were enjoyed by export crop producers. They accused the state of allowing a bloated margin of Sh 18. between the producer price of Sh. 13/50 and the retail price of Sh. 31/50, Sh. 9/50 going to the Economic Control Board and asked for the producer price to be raised to Sh. 23 per bag. Black marketeering of African-grown maize gave peasant producers higher returns than them. Not forsaking the aim of minimizing food costs to the consumer, the state raised guaranteed producer prices to a compromise level of Sh. 17/50 with an additional hidden incentive to non-Africans in the form of a bonus for 10-bag railhead deliveries.²⁰² Prices were set on a fixed free-on-rail basis, so that producers in remote Mbeya and Njombe were afforded the same returns as others.²⁰³

¹⁹⁹ E.C. Philips, LegCo., 25th Session, 23/11/50, 65

²⁰⁰ 'Food Production in Tanganyika', n.d., TNA SMP 41185

²⁰¹ Minutes of a Meeting held at the Chief Secretary's House...on 22/1/47 to consider Producer Prices of Controlled Produce', TNA 31301/111

²⁰² The maize producer price was raised to Sh. 17/50 per 200 lb bag in 1947 with the stipulation that all maize had to be sold to the ECB ('Food Subsidy Bill Passed', Tanganyika Standard, 17/1/47, TNA SMP 35085; Minutes of a Meeting held at the Chief Secretary's House to consider Producer Prices of Controlled Produce, 23/1/47, TNA SMP 35085).

²⁰³ Despite the higher transport cost, maize from the Southern Highlands was still Sh. 7 cheaper per bag than that imported from Kenya and way below international import parity ('Maize Prices', Director of Agriculture, 25/10/48, TNA SMP 38804).

However, settler food farmers continued to feel cheated and pressurized for higher prices each year.²⁰⁴

The contention of the maize farmers in the Northern Province of Tanganyika is that they are not prepared to subsidise any longer the producers of export crops and others who are making fortuitous profits owing to causes beyond their control by supplying them with maize at prices which may be regulated as 'cut' compared with the cost of imported maize.²⁰⁵

In between the low yielding years of 1946 and 1948, the 1947 harvest was fairly successful. The inability of the prevailing marketing organization to handle such fluctuation quickly surfaced. A glut of marketed production appeared in the Southern Province that traders were refusing to purchase at the controlled prices because transport costs were too great.²⁰⁶ Southern Highlands producers feared the same thing happening to them.²⁰⁷

Since 1943, the state had hankered for a food marketing organizational structure with storage capacity that could iron out the wide fluctuations in year to year production. In 1949, state aspirations came to fruition with the founding of the Grain Storage Department (GSD) headquartered at Moshi. The GSD took over the marketing and storage of African staples²⁰⁸ from the Economic Control Board and was the agency through which Tanganyika continued its membership in the East African Cereals Pool. The GSD was set up to operate as a self-financing parastatal with an ultimate planned storage capacity of 52,600 tons.²⁰⁹ Managing its stocks in relation to the booms and busts of

²⁰⁴ Arusha District Production Committee to Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, 28/10/50, TNA SMP 38804

²⁰⁵ Memorandum for Executive Council on Maize Prices in relation to those for Export Group, 1948, TNA SMP 38804

²⁰⁶ TT, Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1947, 106-108

²⁰⁷ 'We are aware that Government could not care less whether Iringa grows maize for export to the Central Line or not: it costs too much, in normal times to carry it there' (Member of LegCo., Iringa to Director of Agriculture, 12/11/49, TNA SMP 39114).

²⁰⁸ Includes maize, sorghums, millets, cassava, mixed beans, paddy and rice.

²⁰⁹ Situated at Moshi, Korogwe, Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Kilosa, Dodoma, Tabora, Mikindani, Mtwara and Lindi.

Tanganyikan harvests was to prove its biggest headache, but stock losses were very minimal. In 1949/50, only 1.7% of its stock disappeared in transit from source of supply in Kenya through the docks and by rail to ultimate retail destination and 0.4% was lost due to pest infestation.²¹⁰

In the GSD's founding year, a drought occurred which was described as the worst drought in 50 years.²¹¹ The GSD was plunged into the necessity of importing huge amounts of grain to bridge the gap between territorial purchases of 15,831 tons versus sales of 111,050 (TABLE 2.3). Dar es Salaam, where food import was the mainstay, was in a particularly vulnerable position.²¹²

The late 1940s had been a period of oscillating food insecurity. 1946 and 1949 were exceedingly bad years for domestic food production. 1945 net food imports at over 1,500 tons was the highest to date, but 1946 imports more than doubled that figure and 1950 imports in the wake of the 1949 drought quadrupled it (TABLE 2.3). Thus although it was the conscious policy of the country to avoid food imports they were more than ever dependent on them. However, it was a period of budgetary surpluses, making food imports not as serious a drain on the economy as might have otherwise been.

Amidst the drought of 1949, the newly appointed Governor Twining re-iterated the call for self-sufficiency in food but in so doing he added a new twist. For the first time, there was a call for regional specialization and an implicit rejection of district and household food self-sufficiency, the cornerstone of peasant agricultural policy for over 30 years:

...much effort is wasted in endeavouring to grow foodstuffs in unsuitable soil and climatic conditions...it may...be necessary for us to make some fundamental changes in our internal economy and to concentrate on the production of foodstuffs in those areas where soil and climatic conditions are favourable and to encourage the breeding of livestock and the cultivation of cash crops in the areas where staple foodstuffs are difficult to grow.²¹³

²¹⁰ Acting Director of Grain Storage, 31/1/51, TNA SMP 35181

²¹¹ TT, Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1949, 1

²¹² '...during the food shortage following the 1949 drought food in Dar es Salaam was, on several occasions reduced to less than a weeks supply' (Press Communique, 15/8/50, TNA SMP 35181).

²¹³ Governor Twining, President's Address, LegCo., 24th Session, 23/1/49, 4

If implemented, the implications of such a policy for the country's social division of labour were profound.

IV. Chapter Conclusion

Between 1919 and 1950, the size of the African wage labour force expanded with a only a temporary setback during the Depression. The inter-war years were characterized by four different types of food demand met by assorted supply arrangements involving marketed supply from peasant households, European farms and imports, as well as direct farm supply from peasant households or through clientage. Under the influence of bachelor wages and the kipande system, workers divided their time between wage labour and their own food production, the latter being either interspersed with day-to-day work on the plantation or pursued in their home areas after spending short intervals in paid employment. Over time, the kipande system came under increasing criticism for the low level of labour productivity that was achieved under its sway.

During World War II, Tanganyika's economy was kindled by better export crop prices and imperial demands for strategic raw materials. Tens of thousands of young men were recruited into the military. Tanganyika's plantations and mines were faced by a severe shortage of African wage labour. Labour conscription and measures to spur workers to finish their 30-day kipandes more quickly were intended to rationalize African wage labour usage. The kipande restriction was the first step in a long process of stabilizing the labour force and removing the food self-provisioning element of African wage labour. The expansion of the rural labour force was accompanied by a deluge of migrants into the city of Dar es Salaam and the smaller towns.

The increased numbers of people removed from their rural households and the presence of thousands of refugees sojourned in Tanganyika for the duration of the war caused an extremely rapid rise in purchased food demand. Food supply arrangements of the previous decades had to be revised. From the outset of the war, state supervisory agencies were established to monitor the food trade. During the drought and food crisis of 1943, the state assumed more and more market supervision functions and over the remaining years of the decade state price controls led gradually

to the evolution of a territorially-integrated food market. Trying to avert heavy reliance on food imports, the state-subsidized European commercial food production, but the policy failed to achieve its ends; imports oscillated reaching higher and higher peaks on the upswing.

Despite the differences in food supply arrangements during the inter-war years and during World War II, the two periods can nonetheless be regarded as part of the same food supply regime. From an institutional perspective, the persistence of bachelor wages resulted in the peasant household serving as the material fallback for workers' needs. Workers continuously drew on their peasant farming skills. The assumption underlying both rural and urban wage employment was that the worker would sooner or later return to his upcountry home.

The state, market and clientage remained quite distinct and separate institutions identifiable with European, Asian and African agents respectively. State supervision of the Asian market during the 1940s led to some displacement and a hierarchical ordering of power relationships but not institutional mixing. Clientage seems not to have played a very central role in workers' food supply. Clientage networks were operating primarily within Native Authorities, with networking beyond the geographical boundaries of the Native Authority restricted by limited access to transport and communications. Neither state nor market agents were able or found it necessary to merge their activities with clientage activities. European state agents and Asian market agents were not exposed to the material circumstances that would have made them amenable to clientage practices. They acted on logics that were in many respects antithetical to those of clientage. On the other hand, African employees in the state and market were heavily supervised, to prevent them from engaging in clientage practices.²¹⁴ And in the 1940s when they were exposed to serious deprivation, African state employees were cushioned against extreme hardship with the award of cost of living allowances.

²¹⁴ Beginning with the memsahib's practice of marking the level of sugar in the sugar bowl, and extending to every corner of gainful employment, African wage workers were subjected to the suspicion and watchfulness of Asian and European employers, creating an atmosphere that could hardly be considered optimal for the promotion of racial harmony.

Between 1919 and 1950, increasing food importation asserted itself as a long-term tendency (FIGURE 2.1). During the inter-war years the state saw food imports as a natural outcome of Tanganyika's poor harvest years as well as its lack of comparative advantage in producing maize and wheat. In the 1940s, the rise in international grain prices gave Tanganyika a relative advantage in grain production. But poor and in 1943 and 1949 devastating harvests, in addition to the strains of rapidly expanding food demand, and the even greater comparative advantage that Tanganyika had in some of its export crops made imports not just a continuing feature, but a deepening one. At the macro level, under the direction of the Colonial Office, the Tanganyikan state was following a classic Ricardian comparative advantage approach with respect to staple food production and import policies.

One of the central arguments of this thesis is that there is a tendency for the institutional influence of the state and market to decline under conditions of increasing food insecurity. At first glance, the evidence of this chapter would appear to contradict this argument. After all, during the food insecurity of the 1940s, the state assumed a more dominating, supervisory role and there is no indication that the market contracted if one considers the operation of both the officially sanctioned and unofficial parallel market. Furthermore, clientage was fairly inconsequential relative to the activities of the state and market.

In defence of the argument, it is necessary to differentiate the experience of food insecurity in the population. The state took action to ensure the relative food security of its agents. Market agents as distributors probably had the most reliable food access in the economy. As long as market and state agents were not directly exposed to food insecurity, it was possible for the state and market to remain coherent.

Going on to another central tenet of the thesis, did occupational specialization undergo a process of involution under the food insecure conditions of the 1940s? This was the era when commercialized food farming was getting a big impetus from state subsidies, and agricultural mechanization was given generous support, which might suggest that the answer is no. However, it

must be remembered that the commercialized farming which was expanding was European and thus pertained to a minute portion of the rural population.

The development of European commercial farming represented the intensification rather than the expansion of the social division of labour. The intensification of the division of labour on the basis of race in the economy at large was analagous to the deepening of the sexual division of labour in the peasant household. Both represented the involution rather than enhancement of the social division of labour. Even though the African wage labour force was growing during this period, it consisted almost entirely of unskilled agricultural labourers, with virtually no occupational differentiation.

The policy of subsidizing European food farming was in effect a 'peasant bypass', postponing the urgent need to transform peasant agriculture technologically and socially. The policy was contrary to the spirit of the Mandate and was folly in terms of what it set out to do. Short of the achievement of miraculous yields, there were not enough European agriculturalists in the country to grow the requisite food crops. Peasant household production units, meanwhile, were not just bypassed, they were mined for labour. Tens of thousands of young men were siphoned off through military and labour conscription, which undoubtedly served to re-inforce the sexual division of labour in the peasant household.

In conclusion, it is apparent that amidst the food crises of the 1940s, the colonial state's inability to mount a policy package that would confront the underlying causes of food insecurity directly, led to policies that rigidified the social division of labour on the basis of race. The state and market remained intact during the period, somewhat self-absorbed perhaps, while the peasant household and its many internal and environmental problems were for the most part shelved. Clientage, on the other hand, was waiting in the wings, preparing to make its big debut on the territorial stage.

CHAPTER 5: STRUCTURAL SOCIAL CHANGE AND URBAN FOOD SUPPLY, 1950-73

National independence in 1961 and the government's intention to follow a socialist development path as set out in the Arusha Declaration of 1967 are historic landmarks. Most social scientists have used these dates to periodicise Tanzania's recent history. In tracing the development of the social division of labour I have been struck by the thematic coherence of the period between 1950 and 1973. The Native Authorities and migrant labour system were dismantled and replaced with new social institutions centering around the expansion of peasant commodity production and marketing cooperatives. The cooperative movement coalesced during the 1950s, became the backbone of the national economy in the 1960s, but found itself increasingly at cross purposes with the post-colonial state during the latter half of the 1960s. However, state policies did not spell certain doom to its operations until 1973.

The years between 1950 and 1973 were fairly uniform with respect to external factors. World market prices for Tanzania's primary products, with the exception of sisal, were buoyant (TABLES 5.1 and 5.2). Rainfall was better than during either the preceding or succeeding periods.¹

In this chapter, the re-structuring of the extra-household social division is described through an examination of the elimination of the migrant wage labour force, the decolonisation and Africanisation of the state, the erosion of the Asian market and the changing nature of clientage relations in the proliferation of African social organisations that surfaced during the 1950s. The cooperatives' clientage relations are singled out for closer examination. Against the backdrop of these social changes, food demand and supply are traced and related to the growth of urbanization.

I. Re-ordering of the Extra-Household Social Division of Labour

The years between 1950 and 1973 saw an African challenge to the three-tier racial structure of the colonial society. European and Asian personnel were replaced by Africans in the state and market

¹ Mean average annual rainfall totals for the 15 stations listed in TABLE 2.2 were: in 1920/21-1950/1, 948 mm; in 1950/51-1972/73, 974; and 1972/3-1982/3, 959 mm

and the nature of these institutions changed in the process. The stark racial division of labour gave way to more subtle African cleavages, those of region, town and country and muted economic differentiation of the peasantry.

Perhaps the theme of 'nation-building' most aptly embraces the many developmental strands of the period. Nationalist consciousness prompted the dismantling of the racial division of labour and the harnessing of rural peasant household production to the national integrative forces of the state and market. Clientage networks served as the adhesive that often acted corrosively on state and particularly market functions. But before considering the interaction of the state, market and clientage networks, it is necessary to examine the transformation of the African wage labour force.

1. Stabilising the Wage Labour Force

In the early 1950s, the African wage labour force was largely agricultural, unspecialized and impermanent; it was made up of unskilled male migrants receiving bachelor wages (TABLES 5.3 and 5.4). Despite the state's prodding and employers' declared interests in promoting a more productive, permanent wage labour force, it was the political pressure of African nationalists that finally brought about an end to the migrant labour system.

1.1 Labour Organisation and the Minimum Wage

Formal labour organization took shape during the 1950s. In 1955, two activists² of the African Commercial Employees Association in close contact with the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), founded the Tanganyikan Federation of Labour, which served as an umbrella organization for the labour movement for the next nine years. An avalanche of trade union registrations followed. In 1957 labour unrest became very pronounced and did not abate until the establishment of a territorial minimum wage in 1963 (TABLE 5.5).

The concept of minimum wages was not novel; the British colonial state had set minimum wages for

² M.M. Kamaliza and M.M. Mpangala

its employees for decades and the enabling legislation for establishing territorial minimum wages had been passed as early as 1939.³ In 1957, minimum wage rates were set for Dar es Salaam and Tanga, raising the daily earnings of unskilled labourers by approximately 50%, but the territorial minimum wage did not come into effect until January 1, 1963.⁴ Over the next ten years the minimum wage was revised only twice (TABLE 5.6).

Setting a rural minimum wage was controversial. The bulk of the lowly-paid worked in the plantation sector of the economy and employers were loathe to concede higher wages which would reduce profit margins.⁵ During the 1950s, plantation workers' wages, however, did improve as the sisal price rose and increased peasant commodity production led to acute labour shortages.⁶ The 30-day kipande system was abolished when minimum wages were granted in 1963.⁷ The imposition of the minimum wage had a more drastic effect on real wages in the agricultural sector than the non-agricultural sector.⁸ The bachelor wage system and all its trappings became a thing of the past. In wage negotiations, trade unions favoured the transmutation of food rations into cash.⁹

³ The legislation was in conformity with a 1928 International Labour Office convention (Acting Chief Secretary, Legislative Council, 13th Session, 30/5/39, 145).

⁴ Monthly minimum wages were: Shs. 150 in DSM and Tanga; Shs. 125 in 18 main townships; and Shs. 100 in all other areas, with the exception of non-plantation agricultural workers who were subject to a second minimum wage order granting them between Shs 80-91 per month (Jack, D.T., Report on Methods of Determining Wages in Tanganyika, (DSM, Government Printer, 1959)); Tanganyika, Report on the Territorial Minimum Wage Board, (DSM, Government Printer, 1962); Tanganyika, Report of the Non-Plantation Agricultural Workers Minimum Wages Boards, (DSM, Government Printer, 1963)

⁵ Molohan, M.J.B., Detribalization, (DSM, Government Printer, 1957), 62; LeMaitre, LegCo., 33rd Session, 20/9/57, 140-142; A.S. Bajaj, Unofficial Member, LegCo., 36th Session, 17/10/60

⁶ Tanganyika, Labour Department Annual Report 1951, 19; Labour Department Annual Report 1956, 8

⁷ Tanganyika, Labour Department Annual Report 1963, 2

⁸ Average real wages increased by approximately 44% and 33% in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors respectively (Sabot, R., Economic Development and Urban Migration: Tanzania 1900-1971, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), 59).

⁹ Between 30-40% of the labour force had been receiving food rations during the 1950s. Beginning in 1960 this proportion decreased rapidly (Tanganyika, Labour Department Annual Report 1960, 17).

1.2 Impact of the Territorial Minimum Wage

The territorial minimum wage had far-reaching effects. An immediate dip in total employment occurred as many employers sought to rationalise labour usage (TABLE 5.4).¹⁰ Agricultural employers made the most drastic cut-backs which in the case of sisal were compounded by the severe drop in sisal prices on the world market (TABLE 5.2).¹¹

The territorial minimum wage engendered substantial African income differentials. TABLES 5.7 through 5.9 listing various cost of living indices are used as the basis for calculating real wages in TABLES 5.10 and 5.11. As a result of the minimum wage order, average real wages rose by 32% between 1962 and 1963 (TABLE 5.10). Not only did the wage permit labourers to bring their families with them to their work location, but many more men and women were attracted to wage employment and gravitated to the urban areas. Seemingly overnight Tanganyika's perennial labour shortage became a labour surplus and urban unemployment was identified as a social problem (TABLES 5.3 and 5.4).

In 1967 in conjunction with the Arusha Declaration which asserted Tanzania's intention to build a socialist society, the state's wage policy changed to one of concern over the increasing level of average wages for regular employees and the non-expansion of wage employment. Efforts were made to reduce income differentials, to limit overall annual wage increases to 5% and make them conditional on performance. ~

Labour specialisation amongst African wage earners progressed throughout the entire period. Unfortunately, it is difficult to give precise figures for this since labour statistics were collected on the basis of citizenship rather than race beginning in 1961.¹² The increasing

¹⁰ Chesworth, D., 'Statutory Minimum Wage Fixing in Tanganyika', International Labour Review, XCVI, (1967), 43-66

¹¹ Rweyemamu, J.F., 'Some Aspects of the Turner Report', ERB Paper 69.20, UDSM, (1969), 16

¹² It can be safely assumed that well over 90% of all citizens in the labour force were Africans.

diversification of the African wage labour force is, however, implicit in the shrinking proportion of agricultural estate labourers (TABLE 5.4).¹³ TABLE 5.4 also shows that the public sector, which was highly responsive to Africanisation pressures, was expanding relative to the private sector.

2. Decolonizing and Africanizing the State

During the early 1950s, a growing nationalist consciousness was evident in towns around the country with its epicentre in Dar es Salaam. The Tanganyika African National Union party was founded in 1954. The early nationalists tended to have one thing in common. Almost all had travelled away from home, either through military service during World War II or wage employment. Most had had some formal education and were often employed in white collar jobs in the civil service or teaching profession.¹⁴

Julius Nyerere, the Makerere graduate and Dar es Salaam school teacher who became president of TANU, had a creative genius for adopting nationalist models to the Tanganyikan context and communicating them in a lively, convincing way. Under his leadership TANU was constituted as a mass party. Politicizing throughout the country, TANU took up local peasants' disgruntlement over land issues and agricultural extension enforcement measures as a means of opposing the colonial state.¹⁵

2.1 Colonial State Reforms

The colonial state tried to contain TANU's influence while hurriedly implementing reforms aimed at building up more productive and social service infrastructure as well as giving Africans some say in colonial government. The territorial budget expanded, assisted by the Colonial and Welfare

¹³ As a percentage of total labour, estate agricultural labour was: 51% in 1961 and 23% in 1973.

¹⁴ Bienen, H. Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970), 24, 46-48

¹⁵ Cliffe, L., 'Nationalism and the Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika during the Colonial Period' in L. Cliffe and J.S. Saul (eds.), Socialism in Tanzania, Vol. I, (DSM, East African Publishing House, 1972), 17-24

Development Fund. Democratisation took the form of trying to establish a local government system based on elected representatives which would exist side by side with the Native Authorities. The first local governments were set up in Lake Province but were not successful due to interference from the chiefs' and TANU's disapproval.¹⁶ Nonetheless, after independence, the local government system was adopted by the post-colonial state in preference to Native Authorities.

The colonial state made an effort to train African administrators from the early 1950s. The education vote increased from 4% to 15% of the annual budget between 1950 and 1960/1 (TABLE 5.12). Numerous commissions deliberated on the issue of civil servants' remuneration which was controversial in view of the extreme racial differentiation of salaries.¹⁷ A compromise strategy resulted. African civil servants received substantial increases in salary particularly at subordinate and junior levels, but were not eligible for the various allowances that European civil servants enjoyed. Nyerere was the foremost proponent of limiting African salaries to what was affordable.¹⁸ Nevertheless, passage of the Tanganyikan Salaries Commission's recommendations placed the Tanganyikan civil service firmly in the mould of a meritocratic public administration with civil servants enjoying a considerably higher standard of living than their rural relations, thus removed from the fluctuations of the agricultural production base.

Between 1954 and 1960, the number of Africans holding senior positions in government rose from 5

¹⁶ Maguire, G.A., Toward Uhuru in Tanzania, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969), 276-277

¹⁷ These included the 1954 Commission on the Civil Services of the East African Territories, the reports of Coates (1958), Jack (1959) and Adu (1960). See Chief Secretary, LegCo., 29th Session, 13/10/54, 205-208 and Report of the Tanganyika Salaries Commission 1961, LegCo., 36th Session, 41-66, 85-103.

¹⁸ Nyerere warned two years before independence: 'The position is that our Civil Service is largely an expatriate Civil Service. What happens? We draw salaries not to suit the condition of Tanganyika at all...We have huge salaries of £2,500 and £2,700 and we take them for granted in a country of mud huts...We must not think that again year after year when we are independent we are going to come here and vote salaries. We will have to put the emphasis where that emphasis must be laid and that is raising this country, sparing every penny so that that penny produces another penny for the development of this country' (Nyerere, LegCo., 34th Session, 27/5/59, 131).

to 346, even though only 70 Africans held university degrees in 1960.¹⁹ In the late 1950s, colonial officialdom hurriedly revamped the territorial administration into a ministerial government. The power of the district commissioner was reduced and district administration became more plural and formalised. The numerous functions that the colonial district commissioner performed were parcelled out to different officers, the idea being that the Africans who assumed these new positions would have less education, less experience and would receive less pay than the colonial district officer.²⁰ This expanded the available civil service jobs for Africans, but was criticized for causing disjointed administration.

2.2 Objectives of the African State

The post-colonial state was a visionary government facing the abysmally low level of technology, harsh physical conditions and scanty productive and social service infrastructure of Tanganyika. The state's main constituency and developmental challenge was the multitude of peasant cultivators subjected to periodic famine, a low life expectancy and widespread illiteracy. A war on 'ignorance, poverty and disease' was proclaimed. The transformation of peasant agriculture from the land-extensive shifting cultivation by hoe to more intensive, permanent agriculture was seen as a development imperative. Industrialisation was a subsidiary theme.

These goals were couched in a humanistic philosophy which was palatable to peasants and liberal-minded Westerners alike. Nyerere's formulation of African socialism was a pragmatic blend of the traditional moral ethic of mutual support in peasant subsistence societies and Fabian socialism with policy elaborations frequently inspired by development experiences in other non-industrialised societies aspiring towards socialism. Its aim was participatory nation-building. It offered

¹⁹ Chief Secretary, LegCo., 35th Session, 18/5/60, 96

²⁰ Meek, C.I., 'Transcript of Taped Interview, 1969, dealing with his Administrative Career in Tanganyika, 1941-1962, RH Mss. Afr.s.1691, 30

peasants a more intimate frame of reference than the anonymous nation-state. The term ujamaa²¹ projected one's identification with immediate kin onto the country's citizenry, conjuring the need for collective effort throughout the nation for the nation in defiance of the extreme tribal heterogeneity and regional variation of Tanganyika. African socialism was indeed an 'attitude of mind'.²²

In 1967 Nyerere announced the Arusha Declaration marking Tanzania's intention to build a 'socialist nation on the basis of the ujamaa philosophy. The Arusha Declaration urged rural development through collective endeavour in ujamaa villages, with the promise of government assistance to the wajamaa.²³ The importance of good leadership on the part of the government bureaucracy and party was emphasized and certain industries were nationalised.²⁴ The Arusha Declaration heightened stress on state planning. The second five-year plan beginning in 1969 reaffirmed the country's concentration on agricultural development with industrial expansion as a secondary aim. The 1971 TANU Guidelines asserted Tanzania's socialist path more emphatically, urging people to scrutinize leaders who exhibit 'arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous and oppressive' behaviour.²⁵

State-led nation building was the responsibility of the party and government bureaucracy. The party was seen as the organ of the common man with a neighbourhood ten-house cell system and peoples' militia as the channels for mass participation. The government bureaucracy was the executor of

²¹ Translated 'familyhood'.

²² Nyerere, J.K., 'Ujamaa - the Basis of African Socialism', (1962) in Freedom and Unity, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1966), 162

²³ Nyerere, J.K., Socialism and Rural Development, (DSM, Government Printer, 1967), 26

²⁴ Tanzania's industrial base was very limited at that time. The industries nationalised included banks, insurance, import-export firms and several grain mills.

²⁵ This call engendered a wave of downing-of-tools and lock-outs in factories in protest against arrogant managers (TANU, T.A.N.U. Guidelines 1971, reprinted in Coulson, A., (ed.), African Socialism in Practice, (Nottingham, Spokesman, 1977), 37, (para. 15).

government programmes and encompassed the more technocratic view of the newly-trained Tanzanian experts. Africanization of the civil service proceeded rapidly; between 1961 and 1969 the percentage of Tanzanians in the middle and senior rank civil service rose from 26% to 80%.²⁶ Although their numbers were dwindling, expatriate officials were highly influential. As pensioned officers left, the government resorted to employing short-term consultants whose decision-making power was often considerable.

The high salary status of the bureaucracy became a source of tension.²⁷ In 1966 Nyerere took a 20% cut in pay in response to university students' complaints that ministerial salaries were too high. Heads of government and party followed suit with cuts in pay of 15% and 10%.²⁸ The Arusha Declaration pared many of their fringe benefits, but bureaucrats remained economically privileged relative to other wage earners.

From 1964, there was no strict separation between the party and government. Civil servants were encouraged to become party members and could be promoted to party positions. Some positions, notably Regional and Area Commissioners, combined party and government functions.²⁹ Lack of government staff led party officials to take on governmental functions, even tax collection. Furthermore, party and government-appointed officials tended to be transferred frequently from place to place to counteract the possibility of an official developing a local power base, thus keeping him dependent on the powers that be in Dar es Salaam and re-inforcing a national orientation to the job.³⁰ Both government

²⁶ Tanzania, 'Annual Manpower Report to the President 1969', DSM, Government Printer, (1969), 27

²⁷ Pratt, C., The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-68, (Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1978), 218-219

²⁸ Bienen, Tanzania, 433

²⁹ An Area Commissioner was the district party secretary and the government's chief administrator in the district.

³⁰ Bienen, Tanzania, 143

and party-appointed officials worked with a national schema in mind, however vague its policies might be.

The state bureaucracy was based on the principles of meritocracy, but overly selective recruitment was not possible nor desired in the face of a shortage of suitably trained Africans, political pressure for rapid Africanisation, and the increasing role of state-led nation-building programmes.³¹ Civil servants were to be guaranteed not just a family wage, but one that insulated them from the material uncertainty experienced by the peasant population. Their salaries were to serve as their only source of income, so that they would neither be tempted to engage in ancillary income-generating employment that would detract from their official job, nor to accept bribes in their line of duty.³² Bureaucrats were known to acquire commercial interests, notably real estate and transport businesses.³³ But, on the whole their salaries were not usually sufficient to provide the initial capital for a sizable business and use of office for private accumulation was, in the main, severely constrained by the Arusha Declaration and TANU Guidelines. Despite the lower educational qualifications of the African bureaucracy compared to their elitist Oxbridge-trained predecessors, the job performance standards were largely upheld during the first decade of independence. The monetary incentives of relatively well-paid employment and the nationalist fervour of the bureaucratic agents combined to stimulate professional performance.

3. Eroding the Asian Market

Whereas peasants rarely came into contact with colonial officialdom, the Asian dukawallah was

³¹ Nyerere had persistently maintained that Africanization of the civil service could not proceed more quickly than the development of education (Nyerere, Eastern Province, LegCo., 35th Session, 17/5/60, 90).

³² Chief Secretary, LegCo., 33rd Session, 12/12/57, 328

³³ Fimbo, G.M., 'Land, Socialism and the Law', in Ruhumbika, G. (ed.), Towards Ujamaa, (DSM, East African Literature Bureau, 1974), 252; Shivji, I.G., Class Struggles in Tanzania, (DSM, Tanzania Publishing House, 1975), 95

usually a familiar, but unpopular personage. African nationalists fanned these feelings to bring about an avalanche of mass support for the independence struggle and the cooperative movement.

3.1 Barriers to the Emergence of the African Trader

The colonial state actively encouraged the cooperative movement, during the 1950s, particularly in the areas of high value cash crops. When the government Department of Cooperative Development was established in 1946, cooperative societies had already been operating for many years amongst tobacco growers in Songea and coffee producers in Bugufi and Kilimanjaro. The Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union was by far the most successful. The Cooperative Department was headquartered in Moshi and actively sought to register new cooperative societies and to ensure that each society had suitably trained personnel and facilities for produce buying.

Simultaneously African cotton growers were taking steps against Asian traders. In 1947, independent weighing stations were established close to Asian buying posts on Ukerewe Island. They spread throughout the Lake Province and provided the nucleus for the formation of cooperative societies. In 1955 a three-tiered organizational structure was adopted; cooperative unions were formed to oversee the societies on a ginnery zone basis and the Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions (VFCU) served as the umbrella organization for Sukumaland as a whole.

The state's philosophy was that through 'cooperation' African peasants could circumvent the Asian produce market and gain economic benefit on the basis of principles of 'traditional' egalitarianism and mutual support. Economic uplifting of the community, rather than individual profit, was the theme. This policy begged the question of the emergence of the African entrepreneur.

African entrepreneurs were generally ignored by the colonial state and the nationalists. There were numerous farmer/traders, but very few rose to the level of operations of an average Asian dukawallah.³⁴ Their businesses tended to be very small and short-lived. The vast majority kept

³⁴ In 1952/53 there were an estimated 27,000 African traders, usually holding stocks worth not more than a few hundred pounds, frequently not over £50 (Wright, F.C. African Consumers in Nyasaland and Tanganyika, (London, HMSO, 1955), 50-52).

agriculture as their main preoccupation.

The Credit to Natives Restriction Act which was not repealed until almost the eve of independence in 1961 made it difficult for Africans to obtain sufficient starting capital. In response to the East African Royal Commission's recommendation a credit scheme was initiated to promote African traders, but it was very low-key and seemed to have little impact. It was generally felt that African traders showed little talent for capital accumulation in comparison with their excessively thrifty Asian counterparts. Nyerere remarked:

...in my going round I have told the African this example. I say - there is this striking difference between the African and, say, the Asian. I have repeated this over and over again to drive the point: if you give an African Shs. 2000 his first idea is 'what do I buy?' and he rushes to the shop and buys this, that and the other thing. If you give an Asian Shs. 2000 his first idea is 'what do I do to make this Shs. 2000 Shs 4000?' That is what he thinks first. And he will do it. He will be busy and after a year or two or three he will tell you 'That house is a result of the Shs. 2000 I have received.' The African will have squandered that in two days and get finished with it.³⁵

The Africanisation of the market was infinitely more difficult than the Africanisation of the state. The Asian market was a 'closed shop'. The Asian family firm could not train young African merchants as the colonial service had trained civil servants; the family firm environment was too intimate and African/Asian relations too estranged. Furthermore, the Asian trader could not afford to view the relinquishing of his position to an African in the same manner as could a European career civil servant. The Asian trader's family extended back several generations in East Africa; Tanganyika was the limit of his working experience, whereas the colonial officer's stay in Tanganyika was a career option, which, if disrupted, was in personal terms annoying but did not harbour the same degree of threat to income and property.

Despite their lack of training and capital, African farmer/traders' businesses were mushrooming during the 1950s. Their one advantage over Asian dukawallahs was that they were not subject to the delimitation of their operations to trading centres which avoided an expensive building premise,

³⁵ J.K. Nyerere, LegCo., 34th Session, 27/5/59, 128

thereby reducing overhead costs and lowering the scale of viable stock turnover. But there were also disadvantages in siting one's business in a village particularly one's home village. It was difficult for the trader to separate his trade from material obligations to kin and neighbours and personal feelings often took precedence in the bargaining encounter.³⁶ Selling by the heap rather than accurately measuring quantities and treating all money returns as profit rather than distinguishing between gross and net profit contributed to the frequent liquidation of African trading enterprises.³⁷

One rung up from the village-based farmer/trader was the aspiring African trader/transporter. Upcountry transport had been almost entirely in the hands of Asian firms until the early 1950s when a few African farmers-cum-traders started purchasing lorries and buses. The inauguration of a Transport Licensing Authority with the powers to issue public and private carriers' licenses in 1957 revealed fierce rivalry and resentment between Asian and Africans in upcountry transport. The Transport Licensing Ordinance was supposed to reduce 'uneconomic competition' and ensure the safety and regularity of upcountry transport services for the customer. Both Africans and Asians opposed the bill fearing that it would be used to delimit their transport activities for the benefit of the other. As it turned out, the Authority's policy was to view with favour all African applications that were supported by sufficient facilities and finance.³⁸ The hitch was that most African transporters were severely under-capitalised and found it extremely difficult to compete against well-established Asian transporters.³⁹ Africans usually obtained second-hand vehicles on hire-

³⁶ Leslie, J.A.K., A Survey of Dar es Salaam, (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), 137

³⁷ Wright, African Consumers, 54

³⁸ Hofmeier, R. Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania, (Munich, Weltforum Verlag, 1973), 156; Tanganyika, Transport Licensing Authority 1956-1957 Annual Report, DSM, 8; Siyovelwa, (Iringa), Legco., 36th Session, 22/5/61, 242

³⁹ In 1965, the total number of African public carrier vehicles was 1,218 and non-Africans 1,792. The number of vehicles operated per Public Carrier Licence was: Africans 1.2 and non-Africans 2.2 (Hofmeier R., Transport, 334).

purchase schemes. When they failed to make the repayments on schedule, as frequently happened, their vehicles were repossessed. In 1966 hire-purchase schemes were declared illegal only to be re-instated again three years later upon popular demand. Gradually the number of African private transporters increased but their businesses tended to be small-scale and fragile.

Kilimanjaro was the only place where Asian traders were successfully challenged by African entrepreneurs. Significantly, this was made possible by the organizational strength of the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) as well as the talent of the entrepreneurs themselves. During the 1950s the Chagga Traders' Cooperative, an offshoot of the KNCU, purchased consumer goods in bulk for African retailers. The KNCU tended to open up an area for African traders and then retreat when it was evident that they were able to withstand Asian competition.⁴⁰ Over the years, increasing rural population density and earnings from coffee had led to more and more off-farm cash-earning activities. Population pressure had generated a land market and a market mentality was generally more pervasive. Even though most traders retained one foot in agriculture, the success of their businesses was probably more vital to livelihood than in most other places in Tanzania.

3.2 The State Trading Option

After independence, despite the successes of the cooperatives in seizing control over coffee and cotton produce buying, the Asian market was largely unconquered terrain as far as African nationalists were concerned. Post-colonial officialdom was made up primarily of men with peasant origins and civil service and academic training. They had little faith in African entrepreneurial abilities nor did they favour the growth of an African merchant class. Traders tended to be seen as synonymous with exploitation of the peasant. State trading was the logical policy solution to rid the territory of Asian merchant capital.

⁴⁰ von Clemm, M., People of the White Mountain: The Interdependence of Political and Economic Activity amongst the Chagga in Tanganyika with special reference to Recent Changes, D.Phil Thesis, Oxford, (1962), 350-355

State trading expanded in four directions. First, the cotton and coffee marketing boards received further staffing and facilities and other crop marketing boards were established which plugged into the cooperative marketing network. Second, the state-owned trading company Intrata, a joint venture between a Netherlands firm and the Tanganyikan government, was launched. It gained approximately ten per cent of the import/export trade from Asian and European companies. Third, in 1962, state wholesaling and retailing of consumer goods was vested in the Cooperative Supply Association of Tanganyika (Cosata). Since it was acknowledged that Asian retailers were providing consumer goods at reasonable prices, Cosata's establishment had purely political objectives.⁴¹ It was an apex cooperative commercial unit, managed by Israelis, which was to act as an import-export-wholesale firm for the African retail cooperatives that were emerging. At all levels of operation, Cosata management was disastrous. The retail outlets lacked people with even rudimentary knowledge of accountancy and stock-handling. The Israeli managers assumed that the Tanganyikan population had similar consumer tastes to those of Israel, which resulted in expensive, slow-moving stocks.⁴² Fourth, in 1965 the Tanganyika National Transport Cooperative Ltd. (TNT) was formed, taking over vehicles from local debt-ridden transport cooperatives. Many of the vehicles were still subject to hire-purchase agreements which caused continual financial confusion. The TNT quickly edged towards bankruptcy and the government had to step in with a guarantee.⁴³

⁴¹ 'It must be emphasized that the motivation for this decision was not that the profit margins were excessive on the contrary the available evidence is that competition had kept them very low indeed. The political decision was a consequence of the fact that the bulk of the retail trade in Tanganyika was in the hands of Asian merchants who had not identified themselves with the aspirations of Tanganyika nationalism and whose commercial dominance appeared to be an obstacle to the full development of the Africans, who made up some 98 per cent of the population. The hostility was compounded by the fact that many of the Asian commercial enterprises were linked by family and caste ties, and by the failure of most of the Asian merchants to bring Africans into their firms in any meaningful way' (Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards, (DSM, Government Printer, 1966), 46-47).

⁴² Green, R.H., 'Developing State Trading in a Peripheral Economy: Reflections on Tanzanian Experience and its Implications', IDS Discussion Paper 151, Sussex, (July 1980), 5-7

⁴³ Tanganyika, Presidential Special Committee, 49

In 1967, the Arusha Declaration nationalisations led to more of the import/export trade coming into state control. These firms were amalgamated with Intrata and Cosata to form the State Trading Corporation (STC). This brought a large proportion of import/export-wholesale as well as some retail outlets into the state's orbit. The STC proved to be an entirely unwieldy complex. There was a tendency towards overmanning, stock ordering showed a lack of awareness of the consumer market and stock management was chaotic. Pan-territorial pricing for a large number of goods on the basis of discounted rather than averaged transport costs of upcountry distribution proved unviable. In 1969/70, the STC experienced serious financial difficulties. The following year these difficulties were passed on to the consumer in the form of shortages of goods. In 1972, the STC had to be bailed out by the Bank of Tanzania and the Treasury and broken down into smaller regional trading companies. It was evident that poor management was the root problem. The hope was that smaller regional state trading firms would be easier to manage.⁴⁴

3.3 Vestiges of the Asian Market and the Void Beyond

By the early 1970s, the foundation of the Asian market had been removed, produce marketing was completely in the hands of cooperatives and state marketing boards. State control of the import/export and wholesaling of consumer goods was extensive. The 'finishing touch' for African nationalists or 'final straw' for Asians was the Buildings Acquisition Act of 1971 which nationalised all individually-owned buildings, with the exception of owner-occupied buildings. Much of Asian capital accumulation had gone into urban rental property and buildings.

African state trading firms' weaknesses were most clearly evidenced in their handling of retail trade so Asian merchants with their far more varied stocks were allowed to remain in urban retailing, although their stocks dwindled over time as wholesale supply became more erratic.

Since Asians were a small minority of the population and their colonial legacy was one of political powerlessness, Asians' most common response to nationalist policies was demoralization, the

⁴⁴ Green, 'Developing State Trading', 9-18

running down of their businesses, capital flight and ultimately emigration.⁴⁵ While the Asian population grew by 5.7% per annum between 1948 and 1957, during the next ten years it declined by 0.2%.⁴⁶

In the dismantling of the Asian market, the form but not the content of Asian marketing activities was adopted by African market agents and state trading concerns. The consequence might best be described as a phantom market; there in name but not in substance. Entrepreneurial skills were lacking and market rationality was subverted by the logic of clientage.

4. Proliferation of Clientage Networks

During the 1950s Native Authorities' budgets expanded in line with the economic development of the territory as a whole. Native Authority clientage practices were reportedly flourishing. But amidst the boom, the colonial state was experimenting with various alternative forms of local government, based on the English model.⁴⁷ This experimentation precipitated the Native Authorities' decline, although at the time colonial officialdom denied that this was their objective. TANU, never overtly anti-chief during the independence struggle, nonetheless, unsentimentally did away with the Native Authorities in 1963. Chiefs retained ritual functions in many areas.⁴⁸ Some were wealthy or educated men who could find status and material rewards elsewhere, but the chiefs as a group and the Native Authorities as an identifiable social force vanished. It is questionable if Native Authorities would have lasted even if officialdom had been more supportive of them.

⁴⁵ A large proportion of them had taken up British nationality at independence, so that many migrated to the United Kingdom and various Commonwealth countries (Shivji, I., Class Struggles in Tanzania, (DSM, Tanzania Publishing House, 1975), 80-84).

⁴⁶ Tanzania, 1967 Population Census, VI, 171

⁴⁷ Liebenow, J.G., 'Some Problems in Introducing Local Government reform in Tanganyika', Journal of African Administration 8 (3), (1956), 132-139; IT, Speech by the Member for Local Government, First Convention of Representative Chiefs, (DSM, Government Printer, 1957), 8-15

⁴⁸ Shorter, A. Chiefship in Western Tanzania, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972), 318

During the 1950s, chiefly authority and tribal solidarity were steadily being undermined by peasants' growing participation in commodity markets. Pressures on land and labour resources began to appear that challenged the harmony of local interests that chiefs were supposedly presiding over.

As the colonial state made more investments in education, a growing number of young men with primary school education were beginning to populate the rural areas. The Native Authority gerontocracy made them restless. State initiatives to devise a local government system was largely in response to the Native Authorities' anticipated loss of legitimacy in the eyes of these young men, whose personal abilities and ambitions were being thwarted by uneducated, traditional chiefs. The energies of educated men got channeled into a variety of new social organizations with Western constitutional forms, based on democratic election rather than hereditary leadership. In addition to the new local governments, these included the party, the trade unions and the cooperatives.

It would be a mistake to assume that these Western-modelled organisations transferred to Tanganyika would or could operate with the same internal checks and balances on the exercise of power as operated in their exemplars. Their functions were also likely to differ from that in Western industrial societies because Tanganyika lacked occupational plurality and well-defined interest group politics.⁴⁹ Thus in Tanganyika's radically different material context, the content of these social organisations was bound to diverge from the model.⁵⁰ New forms of clientage emerged in these organisations. Far from disappearing with the Native Authorities, clientage was penetrating new spheres of the economy and polity.

4.1 Context and Content of 'Neighbourhood' Clientage

In the 1950s and 1960s better than average weather conditions and producer prices offered peasants the possibility and indeed the expectation of an enhanced standard of living. The magnitude

⁴⁹ Political traditions were consensual rather than oppositional (Hopkins, R.F., Political Roles in a New State, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971), 32).

⁵⁰ Friedland, Vuta Kamba, 10

of improvement varied widely depending on regional differences in natural endowments. Furthermore, food insecurity was too fresh in peasants' memories and too likely to re-occur for market participation to become the dominant strategy for peasants, with the exception of a tiny minority. Nonetheless in most areas peasants had at their disposal either more monetary income or more state-provisioned social and productive infrastructure or both. The allocation of these 'improved means of production and consumption' was, to an increasing extent, mediated by young semi-educated African men who found their way into one or more of the new Western-styled social organisations.

In their allocative functions, these agents had two counterposing identities. On one hand, they usually had some education and were identified with Western occupational specializations. Their technical skills were to be applied to the competent handling of organizational matters connected with the state and market. On the other hand, they were subject to the clientage demands of the people they served. These demands were modifications of those that had been previously placed on Native Authority personnel. They embodied the old need for insurance in times of material need as well as the people's expectations for a gradually improving standard of living. Thus, even though their appointment or election was usually posited on their Western qualifications, their performance was frequently judged on clientage criteria.

There was a new democratic element to the clientage equation when patron selection was based on elections rather than hereditary rule. With no legitimate claims to magico-religious powers, patrons were forced into a more egalitarian relationship with their clients. In the absence of ritual decorum and prescribed chiefly hierarchy, clientage was structured by the social etiquette of good neighbourliness and mutual benefit. The patron's prestige was still exchanged for the alleviation of the client's material insecurity, but the client was in a position to demand wider and more direct accountability than was ever possible with Native Authority chiefs who had been primarily subject to the colonial state's approval. Neighbourhood patrons could be held accountable through elections or by their clients' perhaps disingenuous appeal for professional standards of performance.

Yet, the democratic element of 'neighbourhood' clientage bore more resemblance to some features of the traditional agrarian society than to Western social organization. There were at least two pre-colonial legacies of good neighbourliness that could be drawn upon. The first and very pervasive one was that of the moral claim to assistance from kin-neighbours⁵¹ in shifting cultivation societies. Gulliver, describes it for the Ndendeuli as:

...the rule that (1) 'You must help a man because he is your kinsman' had the same imperative quality as (2) 'You must cultivate because you must provide food for your family.' Both were accepted as axiomatic, and as having the same constraining quality as (3) 'You must cultivate because you need food to live': that is, all three statements had an inescapable, natural and practical quality...They were part of the natural order of things, inherent in the process of living.⁵²

Utani, the inter-tribal joking relationship that evolved between specific tribes during the long-distance trading of the nineteenth century, was a second tradition to draw upon. Utani involved members of one tribe considering any members of another tribe as relatives upon which they could make demands for food or other consumable goods enroute, even though they may have had no means of immediate repayment. The relationship was accompanied by good-natured jesting which served as a means of identification of the stranger as well as helping to alleviate the strain associated with such demands. Utani was an inter-personal relationship that involved some risk to the individual participant but was of undisputed benefit to the tribal collectivity interested in maintaining peace. An utani had to give a fellow utani a proper burial if he should die away from his home and kinsmen; a practice that reflected the survival ethic that underlined social relationships.⁵³

⁵¹ kinship was defined by a continuing active mutually-supportive relationship rather than by geneological connection per se (Gulliver, P., Neighbours and Networks: The Idiom of Kinship in Social Action among the Ndendeuli of Tanzania, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971), 287); Amongst the Nyanwezi, neighbours were defined solely by locational proximity rather than kinship and could be called upon for help with the expectation of equivalent return (Abrahams, R.G., 'Neighbourhood Organization: A Major Sub-System among the Northern Nyanwezi', Africa XXXV (2), (1965), 168-186).

⁵² Gulliver, Neighbours, 217

⁵³ Personal communication, M.M. Mulokozi, Institute of Kiswahili, UDSM, April 1986; Leslie, Survey, 33-37

'Neighbourhood' clientage had the features of a survival-based, welfare-enhancing exchange relationship based on reciprocity between individuals, one of whom enjoyed better access to 'modern' goods and services that he then shared with his client in return for prestige and political support. Neighbourhood clientage relations depended on locational proximity and frequent face-to-face encounters. Patrons, as deliverers of improved means of production and consumption were usually fairly geographically-mobile. They travelled between the source of supply of these goods, usually Dar es Salaam or some smaller regional town centre, and their clientele. Thus they were frequently out of the direct scrutiny of their clients and their social identity was not strictly local. Patrons often trod a very thin line between being an insider and an outsider in their neighbourhoods. When their clients deemed they had stepped too far out, they could be disposed of through elections or more traditional forms of non-cooperation. In this way, neighbourhood clientage engendered a much more fluid social situation than that of Native Authority clientage. There was more temporal and spatial instability of patrons. Nonetheless, patrons had a local identity and in some respects were more directly accountable to their clients than the Native Authority chiefs. Patrons frequently put the interests of their locality above the national policies and plans, in defiance of the duties of their official position. They often resorted to extra-legal means of marshalling resources to benefit their local clients. Furthermore, as under Native Authority clientage, resources and funds were sometimes siphoned off for personal use.

In the towns, a neighbourhood identity was sustained by tribal affiliation and utani association. One could expect special favours and loans from one's loosely defined kin, but in the wider arena of social interaction, cash rather than affective ties characterized the inter-personal clientage exchange relationship. This was the other side of the survival ethic. Encounters between unrelated Africans amounted to personal power plays. Just as the African peasant farmer faced a hostile physical environment that he exerted little or no control over, so too the urban migrant

faced a hostile social environment, the pori⁵⁴ between the neighbourhood enclaves, which he had to resign himself to, getting by with help from his kin-neighbourhood wherever possible. Describing Dar es Salaam's economy in 1956, Leslie observes:

...one pays here to get a job, unless one is lucky enough to meet the Indian or European employer face to face; one pays to get favourable attention, or attention at all, for an official application; one pays to get to the top of a queue for rented housing, or a plot to build one's own; one pays to avoid arrest or to gain a further respite from the payment of tax; wherever there is a slice of power in a man's hands, to give or withhold, it has a price, and the price is exacted. This is not resented; or let us say it is resented in the same way and to much the same degree as one resents the income tax or a licence fee. It is unpopular (with the payer) but is recognized by Africans as the normal course of life...In general its effect is to strengthen the ties of kin which already hold a man's life together in town as in the country, by increasing the importance to a man of the help of his relatives, who alone may give what he wants free.⁵⁵

4.2 Contradictory Tendencies of Neighbourhood Clientage and Nation-State

The party, trade unions, local government and cooperatives were Western social organizations that were adopted in step with changing attitudes and a new nationalist outlook, yet they provided the framework for neighbourhood clientage.

This development was not directly at odds with Tanganyikan nationalism and the policies of the state. TANU had won state power largely on the basis of rural populist sentiment. Populism continued to be a prominent feature of post-colonial party and government policies. The philosophy of ujamaa was couched in terms of kin loyalties. On the other hand, the state had set itself the task of spearheading technical and social development which involved mobilizing people and resources to increase productivity. Economic investment requiring fairly long gestation periods and considerable material sacrifice was the order of the day. In this respect neighbourhood clientage practices were a distraction from the task at hand, if not a total derailment.

Although TANU was a nation-wide organization it suffered from problems of integration and lack of control from central headquarters. The incidence of clientage practices in TANU's early days is

⁵⁴ Translated 'unfarmed bushland inhabited by wild animals'.

⁵⁵ Leslie, Survey, 107

largely open to conjecture. Leslie refers to repeated embezzlements in the main political parties at the time he was writing (1956), but other commentators reviewing the history of TANU do not mention this.⁵⁶ They emphasize problems of financial accountability, especially in the collection of dues with frequent failure to remit funds to TANU headquarters in Dar es Salaam, interpreting this as a matter of poor administration rather than suspected pilferage, even though TANU officials at that time worked voluntarily or received very low salaries.⁵⁷ The fervour of the nationalist vision and the self-sacrifice required from the early party activists seems to have kept a check on clientage.⁵⁸

1965 marked the beginning of the Tanzanian 'one-party' state. Stress was placed on bureaucratizing the party's internal structure to increase administrative efficiency.⁵⁹ Party cadre continued to be imbued with a strong nationalist outlook that was reinforced by frequent postings around the country. The party's expanding budget rested heavily on subventions from central government rather than from locally solicited sources.⁶⁰ The party bureaucracy was becoming virtually indistinguishable from the government bureaucracy.⁶¹ On the other hand, elected officials of the regional and district committees were described by Bienen as loosely-knit, localised 'political oligarchies'.⁶² They had considerable status but somewhat limited control over resources. Their

⁵⁶ Leslie, Survey, 108

⁵⁷ Bienen, Tanzania, 4-14, 63, 80; Iliffe, Modern History, 568

⁵⁸ Maguire, Toward 'Uhuru', 287

⁵⁹ The Second Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa announced: '...it was not enough to run the party with only politicians, we have got to have people who will put our policies into action' Standard, 15/8/68, quoted in Ingle, C.R., From Village to State in Tanzania, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1972), 134; Hopkins, Political Roles, 30; Bienen, Tanzania, 440

⁶⁰ Finucane, J.R., Rural Development and Bureaucracy in Tanzania, (Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974) 78; Ingle, Village to State, 237

⁶¹ Goulbourne, H. Politics and State in the Third World, (London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979), 209

⁶² Bienen, Tanzania, 110-111

status rested on being part of a powerful nation-wide political organisation. Thus their localism was of a contradictory nature, neutralised by a national identity that was regularly reinforced by their attendance at biennial national party conferences.

Trade unions were a different matter. With the formation of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour in 1955, the trade union movement was posited on a nationalist ideology. However, there was a strong tendency for trade union branches to break away effectively from their headquarters, fail to remit dues and adopt their own policies. Mismanagement of funds and pilfering were common. Salaries of trade union officers were not guaranteed. Dues often had to be used to pay bills and salaries.⁶³

The trade union movement as a whole came to loggerheads with the government over the issue of Africanisation. The state was committed to Africanisation but at a gradual rate, trying to ensure performance standards in the process. The Tanganyika Federation of Labour demanded much faster Africanisation. The contentious issue may well have been merit versus patronage. Africans' wage employment opportunities were not keeping pace with the growing numbers of job seekers. The pressures on neighbourhood patrons at their places of work to engage in nepotistic hiring practices were undoubtedly great in many sectors. In 1964, the Africanisation issue was abruptly resolved in favour of the state when some of the leadership of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour were implicated in the army mutiny and arrested.⁶⁴ The Tanganyika Federation of Labour was banned and replaced by the party-affiliated National Union of Tanganyika Workers, (NUTA). It was inevitable that it would be adopting a stance more in line with the party's nationalists in the future.⁶⁵

Local government, already established in some places during the final years of colonial rule, was adapted to the post-colonial state's government/party structure and extended nation-wide.

⁶³ Friedland, Vuta Kamba, 36,65-90

⁶⁴ Bienen, Tanzania, 368-369

⁶⁵ Bienefeld, M., 'Workers, Unions and Development in Tanzania', IDS mimeo, (1973), 26

District councils' revenues were derived primarily from local rates as well as poll tax and produce cesses. Financial irregularities were common.⁶⁶ Bienen described a councillor's job as follows:

District and town councilors are not paid officials...being a councilor means that one is 'in on' projects under consideration in the district. The benefits can be substantial if one is a councilor and has some connection with building or supplying for local government...many government complaints about misappropriation of district council funds come about because some district and town councils think they are entitled to kickbacks. While downright embezzling has occurred, it is probably more common for district councilors to get remunerations for favors done or anticipated. The district council has the power to rebate school funds and allow nonpayment of tax in hardship cases. These are areas where the members of the finance or education committee are able to feather their own nests. Being a district or town councilor also confers status.⁶⁷

Official expenditure was clearly more attuned to local pressures for the expansion of social service infrastructure than the production programmes of the state.⁶⁸ In 1969, the central government withdrew the district's taxation powers and a Regional Development Fund was set up which annually distributed much smaller funds to the regions. In 1972, the centralisation tendency reached its logical end through the ironically named decentralization policy. The district and ward elected councils were abolished and replaced with regional, district and ward development committees that were staffed by central government appointees with technical expertise. All funds were centrally controlled, but forward and backward lines of communication and participatory decision-making were supposed to characterize the various committee levels.⁶⁹

What is evident in these three institutions is the contradiction between local populism and nationalism. Populism became synonymous with the dynamics of welfare-oriented, face-to-face

⁶⁶ Tordoff, W. Government and Politics in Tanzania, (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1967), 123

⁶⁷ Bienen, Tanzania, 108

⁶⁸ Finucane, Rural Development, 56; Ingle, Village to State, 364

⁶⁹ Finucane describes it as 'a deconcentration of departmental authority to lower levels, a better meshing of administration at these lower levels, and a 'human relations' approach to clients (Finucane, Rural Development, 177).

encounters between patrons and local clients. The content of local populism was a natural outcome of the existing level of material development, reflecting the very basic uncertainties which people experienced as well as their perception of new opportunities for improvement of their standard of living. Neighbourhood social pressure enveloped clients' appeals to local patrons. When a patron did not respond, he risked rejection or non-compliance from his clientele.

In contrast, nationalism's need for wider social and political loyalties to support nation-building required less immediate and more impersonal responses to demands. The infrastructural investment plan promised material gratification at some future date rather than the imperative present. Bureaucrats of the central government and party had a more nationalist outlook, informed largely by the models of Western constitutional government and socialist party structure from abroad, rather than the immediate material conditions of the country. Their mission was seen as the technical execution of policies and plans and they enjoyed the security of well-paid employment. As first generation urban-dwellers, they did not escape the demands of neighbourhood clientage. Various commentators have noted a decline in accountability of the post-colonial government compared with the colonial government indicated by the increase in improper use of government vehicles, unaccounted loss of stores, peculation, etc.⁷⁰ However, when comparing central government and party performance with that of the less bureaucratized employees of the trade unions, local governments and cooperatives, there is far less evidence of clientage practices. During the period under review, government and party officials tended to approach their work with relatively more impersonal professionalism and consistently adopted policy measures that were aimed at curtailing neighbourhood clientage.⁷¹ As far as the state was concerned, neighbourhood clientage was a threat to national welfare.

⁷⁰ Chambers, C.V., RH Mss. Br. Emp.s.476, 14-15; Holmes-Siedle, Bishop J., RH Mss. Afr.s.1595, 39

⁷¹ Finucane, Rural Development, 10

11. Cooperatives and Clientage Exchange

Amongst the new social organisations, the cooperative movement was the most powerful at independence by virtue of its strong populist base as well as its strategic importance to the national economy. The cooperative movement was vital to TANU's spread during the independence struggle, so the newly-installed government had a political debt to it. Furthermore, it played a profound role in rendering Native Authority clientage networks obsolete.

1. Cooperative Development and the National Economy

Not too long before independence, Nyerere publically mused:

...supposing I were given the alternative of turning the whole of Tanganyika into a sisal estate or turning the whole of it into a KNCU. I know what I would do. Easy. I would multiply the KNCUs all over Tanganyika. If we multiply the KNCUs we become the envy of the outside world. We become the envy of the rest of Africa...If we turn the whole of Tanganyika into sisal estates I do not know how many times we would multiply the labour force and give the big job to Rashidi Kawawa, a job he would never be able to handle at all...of those two, one has no foreign capital whatsoever, none. The other has foreign capital...Multiply the KNCUs; see the people using the natural resources; organizing them and getting the best out of them.⁷²

In effect, TANU's rural economic policy for fifteen years was precisely the above. African cooperative membership multiplied six times between 1948 and 1960 largely through grassroots initiatives that were legitimized by the Registrar of Cooperatives.⁷³ The cooperative movement did not spread to the northeastern and coastal plantation zone nor to the labour reserves; cooperative development took place alongside rather than in place of the plantations. However, as the movement gained momentum it began surpassing the plantations in importance. After independence, the post-colonial state embarked on a nation-wide cooperative programme. Societies were established in the more economically marginal areas, which frequently did not have a viable export crop. Thus many of the new cooperatives were based on food as a cash crop. These were far less successful than the

⁷² Nyerere, J.K., LegCo., 34th Session, 27/5/59, 130; Note: at the time Rashidi Kawawa was a nationalist labour leader.

⁷³ African cooperative membership totalled 52,565 and 322,928 respectively in 1948 and 1960 (Tanganyika, Annual Report on Cooperative Development, 1948 and 1960, (DSM, Government Printer, 1949 and 1961)).

coffee and cotton cooperatives of the northern and lake regions and were always viewed by the local peasants as the government's societies, not evidencing much popular participation.⁷⁴

To facilitate the national development of cooperatives, the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika (CUT) was founded as an umbrella organization servicing all cooperative unions throughout the country. The CUT, together with the unions and the primary society formed a three-tiered system. The crop marketing boards purchased specified crops for export and provided extension advice.⁷⁵

By the mid-1960s the cooperatives' crucial significance to the national economy lay in their perceived role in Africanizing the market, being a rich source for government taxation as well as a tool for achieving government planning targets with respect to the stimulation or regulation of crop production.⁷⁶

2. Peasant Attitudinal Change and the Rise of the Cooperative Patron

Peasants' commodity prices had been lifted out of a decade-long trough during World War II, but it was the inflationary effect of the Korean war and a world commodity price boom that gave Tanganyikan peasants' their first whiff of prosperity. Suddenly peasants could afford to buy consumer durables like bicycles, radios and corrugated iron for roofing their houses which provided convenience, comfort and broadened awareness. There were now good reasons for engaging in income-generating activities, besides paying one's taxes and bridewealth payments.⁷⁷ Peasant acquisitiveness

⁷⁴ Hyden, G. Cooperatives in Tanzania, (DSM, Tanzania Publishing House, 1976), 11-12; Westergaard, P., 'Co-operatives in Tanzania as Economic and Democratic Institutions', in Widstrand, C.G. (ed.), Cooperatives and Rural Development in East Africa, (New York, African Publishing Corporation, 1970), 129

⁷⁵ There were marketing boards for each major cash crop as well as the National Agricultural Products Board (NAPB) covering grains, oil seeds and nuts.

⁷⁶ The post-colonial state participated in international commodity agreements, notably that of coffee which required regulation of crop production.

⁷⁷ Tanganyika, 'Annual Report of Co-operative Development 1958', 20

and the cashcrop boom went together and had far-reaching social implications.

Up until the 1950s, there was very little differentiation in living standards and income amongst peasants with the exception of the chief and Native Authority personnel.⁷⁸ As cashcropping became more prevalent, this began to change. Individuals' differences in skills in farming and marketing led to variation in income and some of the most successful could begin rivalling chiefs in wealth. These men were innovative, upwardly-mobile and usually relatively young. Migot-Adholla argues that they were in situation of 'status inconsistency', because their wealth was based on individual achievement, yet they lived in societies which, consistent with the survival ethic, upheld mutual support as a moral virtue.⁷⁹

Frequently these men had extended their activities beyond farming to trade or lorry transport, but farming remained their main source of income. As members of local peasant communities, they were subject to the neighbourhood kinship loyalties and the moral dictates of sharing described above.⁸⁰ They were destined to become a particular form of neighbourhood patron, the 'cooperative' patron.

The innovating farmer-cum-trader/transporter was the dynamizing force behind the spread of the cooperatives during the 1950s as well as the natural candidate for cooperative leadership.⁸¹ Given the formidable competition that Asian traders posed for emergent African traders, African entry into produce marketing had to be a collective one and required political aggressiveness to succeed. Mass peasant support for cooperatives and their leaders was readily mobilized around the highly emotive

⁷⁸ Economic differentiation produced by life cycle effects was evened out by living in extended households.

⁷⁹ Migot-Adholla, S.E., 'Traditional Society and Co-operatives', in Widstrand, C.G. (ed.) Co-operatives and Rural Development in East Africa, (New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1970), 26-33

⁸⁰ Migot-Adholla, 'Traditional Society', 32

⁸¹ Iringa: Awiti, A., 'Economic Differentiation in Iswani, Iringa Region', African Review, (3), (1973), 214; Sukumaland: Maguire, Towards Uhuru, 82

race issue.

Marketing cooperatives provided a material foundation for the operation of clientage networks. At the village level, the elected committee members, steered the affairs of the primary society. They generally were successful farmers with at least basic literacy and numeracy. They were assisted by a salaried secretary who was educated and had usually received some special training for the job.⁸² Committee members could also ration out other paid employment opportunities associated with the society's operations. The society's main activity was crop purchasing, and after independence, credit allocation.

The cooperative union was usually situated in a small town. The union had its elected committee, but the elections were proportional rather than direct and frequently allowed the entrenchment of powerful regional cliques.⁸³ Cooperative patrons at the union level were one step removed from their peasant clients. They were more urban in outlook and often less acceptable to the peasant producer, but nonetheless a vital link in the chain as far as peasant producer prices and credit allocation were concerned. The union was the site of inter-regional conflict over the division of cooperative resources.

3. Cooperative Clientage Exchange Relationships

The cooperative patron represented a source of the means of improved production and consumption to the peasant, either indirectly through his facilitation of crop marketing or directly through the grant of special favours like preferential supply of fertilizer, tractor ploughing, etc. As an

⁸² TT, 'A Guide for Primary Produce-Marketing Co-operative Societies', DSM, Department of Co-operative Development, (1951), 8

⁸³ Migot-Adholla, S.E., 'The Politics of a Growers' Cooperative Organisation', in Cliffe, L., P. Lawrence, W. Luttrell, S. Migot-Adholla, J.S. Saul, (eds.), Rural Cooperation in Tanzania, (DSM, Tanzania Publishing House, 1975), 243

elected committee member, he enjoyed prestige as a local mkubwa.⁸⁴ Unless he was also of a ruling clan or held a ritual leadership position, the respect he commanded was of an entirely secular nature. His prestige derived from being an affluent member of the rural community who had economic and political power to influence the welfare of less advantaged peasants. In addition, he together with his fellow committee members could allocate themselves 'posho'⁸⁵ and 'zawadi'⁸⁶, i.e. allowances and bonuses of various sorts. The rank and file membership usually knew about these perks and condoned them as befitting men of importance.⁸⁷ There was also the unsanctioned siphoning of cooperative funds and resources which tended to be blamed on the salaried secretaries, but increasingly it was believed that committee men were also involved.⁸⁸

Official cooperative marketing margins had an enforced ceiling for most of the period under review, that of the Grain Storage Department's and later the National Agricultural Production Board's into-store price, but the floor was a matter of negotiation and approval. During the mid- and late 1960s, all unions had to forward their costs estimates to their Regional Commissioners which were then sent on to the Commissioner of Cooperatives. Once these costings were approved they were binding and cooperative unions and societies were expected not to exceed their stipulated margins and obliged to pay farmers' the residual which became the established producer price for that area. Thus there was an inverse relationship between the size of the cooperative margin and the level of

⁸⁴ Translated 'big-man'.

⁸⁵ Translated 'food ration'.

⁸⁶ Translated 'gifts'.

⁸⁷ There was a very thin line between bonuses and peculation: '...the peculator on a scale large enough to make it worth while is too often the object of admiration of the very persons he has defrauded' (Tanganyika, Annual Report on Co-operative Development 1958, DSM, (1959), 1); Migot-Adholla, S.E. 'Power Differentiation and Resource Allocation: The Cooperative Tractor Project in Maswa', in Hyden, G. (ed.), Cooperatives in Tanzania, (DSM, Tanzania Publishing House, 1976), 51

⁸⁸ Tanganyika, Report of the Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry in to Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards, (DSM, Government Printer, (1966), 9; Rutaguzo, G.H.M., 'The Cooperative Leadership', in Hyden (ed.), Cooperatives, 33

producer prices. The size of cooperative margins was the object of much criticism by economic commentators.⁸⁹

Towards the end of the 1950s international commodity prices declined and peasants started to complain about the prices which cooperatives paid to producers, particularly because Asian traders were often offering higher prices (TABLES 5.13 and 5.14).⁹⁰

The combination of decreasing world commodity prices, the state's expanding use of peasant marketed production as a source of tax revenue, and peasants' growing awareness of marketing margins, particularly for food crops, had the potential of creating discontent during the 1960s.⁹¹ It is unclear if inefficiency on the part of cooperative staff, and posho payments and speculation substantially increased during the 1960s or were just more noticeable because there were far more

⁸⁹ Rene Dumont was particularly scathing: 'Since 1962, and because of the co-operatives, the prices paid to the producers have greatly fallen. At Lushoto, a ton of maize, bought at Shs. 440/- by the Marketing Board, only brings the producer Shs. 220/-. We have never seen anywhere in the world, such high deductions [Dumont's emphasis] reaching half the value of the product...The reasons for such bad management seem to us so numerous that it seems difficult to classify them in order of importance. Certainly lack of honesty and of incompetence seem amongst the more serious...' (Dumont, R., Tanzanian Agriculture after the Arusha Declaration, (DSM, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning, (1969), 50); Temu points out that when marketing mark-ups are averaged for all parts of the country for the years between 1964 and 1973, the cooperative mark-up amounts to a full 48% of the average producer price for maize whereas the marketing board margin was only 25% and he thus identifies the cooperatives as the 'villain' of inflated marketing costs (Temu, P., Marketing Board Pricing and Storage Policy with Particular Reference to Maize in Tanzania, Ph.D. thesis, Stanford, (1975), 81,95).

⁹⁰ Price awareness became pronounced beginning in 1956/57 when the deregulation of the grain trade opened the way for Asian competition in produce buying. Asian traders' offer of higher grain producer prices led to widespread defection by cooperative members in Iringa and North Mara (Tanganyika, Annual Report on Co-operative Development 1956, 6-7; 1957, 2).

⁹¹ Kriesel et al. estimates that the proportion of the final sales value of maize going to producers dropped from 76% to 48% between 1956 and 1969 in Iringa (Kriesel, H.C. et al. Agricultural Marketing in Tanzania, (East Lansing, Michigan State University, 1970), 38). Ellis calculates that by 1970-72, peasant producers were receiving 45% of the sales value at cost for staple grains and 67% of export crops' sales value (Ellis, F., 'Agricultural Marketing and Peasant-State Transfers in Tanzania', Journal of Peasant Studies, 10(4), (1983), 225).

cooperatives in existence.⁹² The rapid expansion of the cooperatives, subject to less government supervision and with less well trained staff, made increased inefficiencies likely. Peculation may have been on the increase as the vested interests of the clientage networks deepened. Cooperative staff at society level were complaining about low wages. Posho payments were still widely accepted as legitimate sources of income for committee members. After independence, cooperatives became the channel for government-sponsored agricultural credit schemes and input supply, offering expanded scope for local patronage.⁹³

A successful local patron was one that succeeded in steering more goods and services to his society over that of the others. Different cooperative societies competed against each other for shares of the credit available from their unions. The management of credit within the society tended to be haphazard. In some places almost every one sought loans often for the mere sake of having one.⁹⁴ Farmers and their societies tended to be late placing their input supply orders.⁹⁵ Accounting systems were very rudimentary and debts frequently went unrecorded. In such instances the union

⁹² Most observations made in the Department of Co-operative Development's Annual reports suggest that defalcation was far from rampant during the 1950s. In 1950 (p.4): 'The high standard of honesty amongst the employees of co-operative societies occasions periodic surprise. It exists because every peculation becomes known without delay and unlike the peculation of public money, in which the public appear to feel no direct interest, causes resentment in the community in which the peculator lives.' In 1957 (p.20): 'Fraud and peculations have increased but the standards of honesty are still surprisingly high when it is considered that some £7,425,273 was paid out in cash to members; in more advanced countries, where the major have bank accounts, most payments are made by cheque, thus reducing the enormous temptations which exist when large sums are paid out in cash. Furthermore, the majority are illiterate, thus putting even greater temptation before the officials of the societies. In 1958 (p.1): 'It is regretted that the incidence of dishonesty still causes concern. There were no major defalcations during the year but the general level of integrity leaves room for considerable improvement...It is not enough to claim that the co-operative standards compare not unfavourably with those in other walks of life. They could, and should be a great deal higher.' In contrast in 1966, corruption, petty thievery and nepotism were cited as very widespread (Tanganyika, Report of the Presidential Special Committee, 9-16).

⁹³ Migot-Adholla, 'Power Differentiation', 44-55

⁹⁴ Heijnen, J.D. Development and Education in the Mwanza District (Tanzania): A Case Study of Migration and Peasant Farming, (Rotterdam, Bronder-Offset, 1968), 139

⁹⁵ Anthony, K.R.M. and V.C. Uchendu, Agricultural Change in Geita District, Tanzania, (Nairobi, East African Literature Bureau, 1974), 46

tended to impose an extra levy on all crops sold. Thus the virtuous were left subsidizing the defaulters, compounded by the fact that larger farmers tended to have obtained larger loans and hence bigger outstanding debts.⁹⁶

4. Vying for Peasant Popularity

At independence, the state viewed the cooperative movement as its most essential organizational tool in developing Tanzanian agriculture, by 1966 the government was beginning to see the cooperatives as a threat to development. Corruption by local cooperative officials was known to be all-pervasive. A presidential committee, appointed to investigate the cooperatives, took the view that the inefficiencies and 'corrupt' practices of cooperative personnel and associated low producer prices were an active disincentive to peasant commodity production.⁹⁷ It recommended increased government supervision of cooperatives. The powerful VFCU in Sukumaland was dismantled at this time. These measures kept cooperatives in existence but attempted to restrict cooperative patrons' maneuverability. Tax versus posho was at issue.⁹⁸ Government taxes and patrons' clientage practices put competing demands on peasant commodity production. •

These reforms did not engender any marked improvement in cooperative performance. Financial mismanagement continued to be widespread. Approximately 40 per cent of all societies in the three years between 1967 and 1969 had annual net deficits and 20 per cent of the societies were insolvent.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Raikes, P., The Development of Mechanized Commercial Wheat Production in North Iraqw, Tanzania, Ph.D. thesis, Stanford, (1975), 43

⁹⁷ Tanganyika, Presidential Special Committee, 9-12

⁹⁸ Tanzania, 'Proposals of the Tanzania Government on the Recommendations of the Special Presidential Committee of Enquiry into the Cooperative Movement and Marketing Boards', Government Paper 3, (1966), 18

⁹⁹ Westergaard, P. 'Analysis of the Accounts of the Co-operative Societies in Tanzania for the Years 1967-69', ERB 73.2, (1973), 33

Similar to the state bureaucracy's reaction to the incidence of neighbourhood clientage in the party, trade unions and local government, the cooperatives were served with a 'bureaucratization or perish' order.¹⁰⁰ However, the cooperative movements' sheer size and history made it a force to reckon with. It took ten years for the state's bureaucratic encroachment to culminate in the complete abolition of cooperatives. Over those ten years, the state increasingly turned to the village as the focus of development rather than the cooperative society.¹⁰¹ In 1973, when villagization became a nation-wide programme, the cooperatives were effectively doomed, although cooperative unions were not officially dissolved until 1976. The cooperative movement, Tanzania's strongest bastion of neighbourhood clientage, was the last to fall to the nation-state's centralising and bureaucratising tendencies.

There were a number of hitches in the state's efforts to develop peasant agriculture without local cooperative patrons in the latter part of the 1960s and the early 1970s under the ujamaa policy. First, cooperative patrons tended to be the most technically innovative farmers in the rural areas, the so-called 'progressive farmers'. While research stations produced improved seed varieties and implements, it was the wealthier than average farmers who usually paved the way for rural household adoption of these improvements. They were the peasant farmers who could afford to experiment without jeopardizing their families' subsistence.

Second, the level of material development in the countryside did not augur well for the successful benefaction of an impersonal state. People were used to having a patron locally accessible to receive their appeals. Often these appeals demanded very little time, effort or material disbursement on the part of the patron, but they were nonetheless vital to the well-being of the peasant and to his perception of his well-being. In essence, the patron ran a low-cost, multi-purpose service centre that could include amongst other functions: an insurance agency, citizen's

¹⁰⁰ Finucane, Rural Development, 59

¹⁰¹ 'Cooperatives Head for Change to Serve the Masses', newspaper interview with the Minister for Agriculture and Co-operatives, Sunday News, 31/10/71; Hyden, Cooperatives, 17

advice bureau, transport service, productive input supplier, etc. Being a very new form of clientage, neighbourhood clientage had untested limits. Nonetheless, as long as the cooperative patron was allowed his posho and input supply from union headquarters continued, he had sufficient means to secure 'cheap popularity' amongst the peasants and further his own agricultural and business endeavours.

The state, in contrast had ambitious plans for transforming the rural areas and peasant production which required massive expenditure to improve the social service and productive infrastructure of rural areas. Hoping to gain widespread popular appeal amongst peasants, the ujamaa programme embodied this promise. Ujamaa villagers were to receive priority allocation of government services and supplies of productive inputs delivered by well-salaried, efficient bureaucrats or dutiful party cadre. This was 'pricey popularity', which did not offer the face-to-face accountability that peasants saw as so vital.

The peasants' preference for men of 'cheap popularity', is vividly illustrated by the electoral fate of Paul Bwani, one of the original founders of the cooperative movement in Sukumaland. He became a highly successful statesman in the post-colonial state and one of the most outspoken national leaders on rural development policy, yet failed to win his local parliamentary seat during the first election after independence in 1965.¹⁰²

Finally, state expenditure on rural infrastructure had to be weighed against the demands of urban areas, demands which state decision-makers were more acutely aware of being urban-dwellers themselves.

III. Urban Growth and Food Demand

Between 1950 and 1973, urbanization proceeded at the rate of 10.5% per annum, raising the

¹⁰² Hyden, G., Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, (London, Heinemann, 1980), 89; Bienen notes that in the 1965 parliamentary elections many incumbents lost on the basis of ceasing to be a 'local' (Bienen, Tanzania, 395).

proportion of Tanzania mainland's population living in settlements of over 20,000 people from 1.4% to 7.0%.¹⁰³ As growth proceeded, urban areas displaced plantations as the main source of food demand in the economy.

1. Africanization of the Towns

African migration was the main cause of urban growth. The European and Asian populations which constituted 27% of the urban population in 1952, declined to approximately 13% by 1967.¹⁰⁴

In contrast to 1950 when only Dar es Salaam and Tanga numbered over 20,000, by 1967, there were a profusion of small towns.¹⁰⁵ The primate city, Dar es Salaam, grew at the rate of 7.5% between 1950 and 1967, whereas the aggregate growth of small towns speeded ahead at 15.4% per annum. As crop-bulking points, small towns were direct beneficiaries of the cashcrop boom. However, when considering the small towns individually, only Arusha's growth rate superceded that of Dar es Salaam. The towns with the largest preponderance of men in the early 1950s experienced the fastest growth, as female migration served to even out the sex ratio progressively (TABLE 5.15).

Prior to the establishment of urban minimum wages, the African urban household was barely a collective unit of consumption. The intention of the minimum wage legislation was to promote the establishment of nuclear family units in urban areas with the implication that women would be financially dependant housewives. In Leslie's resurvey two years after the minimum wage orders were

¹⁰³ In the 1967 and preceding censuses, urban areas were defined as all townships and former government townships irrespective of size. I have refrained from using the administrative classification of urban areas because it is both misleading and arbitrary, lumping village trading centres with towns and cities and impossible to compare between inter-censal periods when new townships are dropped or added. In the 1948 census the number of gazetted towns was 27 with a total population of 197,266, as opposed to 91,594 living in towns of over 20,000. In 1967, the comparable figures were 700,143 in townships and 557,750 in urban areas of over 20,000.

¹⁰⁴ TT, Report of the Census of the Non-Native Population taken on the Night of 20/21 February, 1957; Tanzania, 1967 Population Census, Vol. 2, 159-161

¹⁰⁵ Tanga (60,106), Mwanza (34,496), Arusha (32,012), Moshi (26,612), Morogoro (25,097), Dodoma (23,440), Iringa (21,444), Kigoma (21,048), Tabora, (20,862), Mtwara (20,118).

passed in Dar es Salaam, he reports that 'the adoption of settled town life and an intention to remain there [Dar es Salaam] with one's wife and children' was already strongly evident.¹⁰⁶

2. Urban Food Demand

Urban food demand expanded. There was a notable tendency towards the replacement of the traditional staples by the so-called preferred cereals. Maize meal was substituted for sorghum, millet and plantains, a pattern already well-established on the plantations. African consumption of the more expensive staple foods like rice and wheat was on the increase in urban areas.

Nonetheless, the 1969 household budget survey revealed the persistence of racially-distinct consumption patterns. At middle levels of expenditure African consumption bore more in common with the lower levels of African expenditure than with the comparable middle levels of non-African expenditure (TABLE 5.16). Africans with rising incomes had a tendency to hold to a starch-based diet with roughly equal expenditure on maize and rice and restricted consumption of dairy products in comparison with non-Africans. However, at minimum levels of African income, demand elasticities for meat and dairy products were strongly related to household expenditure (TABLES 5.16 and 5.17). After the initial break from a bean-based to a meat-based protein component to the diet, African dietary patterns were remarkably similar across income groups. Household budget surveys between 1950 and 1973 consistently indicated that one half to two-thirds of low-income African expenditure was on food as opposed to one-third to one-quarter spent by higher-income households (TABLE 5.16). The proportion of expenditure on food rose with family size, but not drastically. These findings are not dissimilar from earlier surveys (TABLE 5.18).

All the evidence suggests that urban food supply was reasonably secure, at least for the employed, during the 1950s and 1960s. The cost of living allowances for civil servants continued to

¹⁰⁶ Leslie, Survey, 281

keep pace with the cost of living index during the first half of the 1950s.¹⁰⁷ But as the index started to decline there were official utterances that the time had at last come to phase out the civil service's cost of living allowances.¹⁰⁸ In 1956, in conjunction with a general reform of the civil service salary structure, the allowances were abolished.¹⁰⁹ However, urban food prices were very stable during the 1960s and their rise only began to supercede that of non-food commodity prices in 1971 (TABLES 5.19 and 5.20).

The adequacy of food purchasing power is also suggested by the incidence of subsistence farming on the part of urban residents. In a 1950 survey of African labourers in Dar es Salaam, fourteen percent of those interviewed had farms in the perimeter of the town, the majority of which were devoted to subsistence crops, mainly rice.¹¹⁰ Eighteen years later, in the wake of minimum wage legislation and stable food prices, a survey of the Kinondoni area of Dar es Salaam did not find any of the interviewed residents engaged in farming.¹¹¹

Seemingly conflicting evidence arises from the 1967 population census which included a question on the incidence of urban farming.¹¹² Nineteen percent of the Dar es Salaam households who answered the question were engaged in farming. However, this was a relatively small proportion in comparison with the secondary towns which averaged 35%, ranging between 10% and 58%.¹¹³ Cities with

¹⁰⁷ Temporary allowances peaked at 35% of Senior and Junior officers' salaries in 1953, while those earning less than Shs. 120 per month received a Shs. 5 per month maize allowance (Tanganyika, Labour Department Annual Report 1953, 12-13).

¹⁰⁸ President's Address, LegCo., 27th Session, 12/2/53, 175

¹⁰⁹ Member for Finance and Economics, LegCo., 31st Session, 26/4/56, 54

¹¹⁰ Tanganyika, 'Report of the Committee on Rising Costs', DSM, Government Printer, (1951), 63

¹¹¹ Hoad, P., 'Report on a Socio-Economic Survey of Kinondoni', University College, DSM, Institute of Public Administration, Physical Training Course, (1968)

¹¹² 1967 Population Census, Vol. 2, 178-180

¹¹³ Similarly, in Heijnen's survey of Mwanza town, 35% of all families and almost a quarter of all unmarried town residents cultivated a farm (Heijnen, Development and Education, 64).

proportionally larger female populations had a significantly higher incidence of urban farming by household which could suggest that women's traditional agricultural role was not completely forsaken in the urban context.¹¹⁴ The incidence of urban farming was also inversely correlated with city size, although not at a significant level.¹¹⁵

IV. Marketed Food Supply

The 1950s and 1960s saw increasing regional specialisation and greater peasant production of food for sale (TABLES 5.21-5.24). There are no statistics on parallel market sales which varied over time. Even for the officially marketed production, it is impossible to know what proportions were contributed by peasants as opposed to settlers and African capitalized producers.

1. Sources of Supply

1.1 Specialized Domestic Production: Settlers

Settler production of staple foods, which was launched with state support in the 1940s, reached its zenith in the 1950s. It was concentrated in the Northern Province and Eastern Province.¹¹⁶ The Land Utilization Board¹¹⁷ allocated settlers land in Kilosa and Morogoro districts for maize production and in Arusha and West Kilimanjaro for wheat production.¹¹⁸ It is ironic that land policy became more

¹¹⁴ The Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient for inter-town incidence of farming and urban sex ratios was -.55 which is significant at the .005 level.

¹¹⁵ The correlation between urban population size and urban farming was -.40 which was not significant.

¹¹⁶ In 1958, large-scale cereal farms occupied 54,784 acres provincially apportioned as follows: Northern, 43%, Eastern, 43%; Southern, 5%; Western, 3%; Southern Highlands, 2%; Central, 1%; Tanga, 1%; Lake, 0.2% (Tanganyika, Agricultural Census, (DSM, Government Printer, 1958).

¹¹⁷ Operating between 1950 and 1955, the Land Utilization Board had the stated goal of advising on how 'the development of the territory's land and agricultural resources should be carried out by the combined efforts of all races.' In addition to identifying areas for non-African alienation the committee was supposed to consider the stabilization of African land tenure (Member for Lands and Mines, 27th Session, 25/11/52, 138 and Governor's Address, 30th Session, 20/4/55, 17).

¹¹⁸ President's Address, LegCo., 26th Session, 31/10/51, 16

pro-settler during the final decade of colonial rule. Under Twining's governorship, land alienation in certain highly fertile, but relatively unpopulated areas was justified in terms of the government's efforts to develop the country agriculturally.¹¹⁹ Nearly 60% of government revenue derived from non-African sources.¹²⁰

The European settlers' were organized into a number of different farming associations which tended to become highly politicized, bent on keeping the forces of nationalism from encroaching on their farms and way of life.¹²¹ The district production committees liaised with the government to facilitate the apportionment of guaranteed minimum returns to large-scale European grain producers.¹²² As nationalist consciousness grew, the blatant racial discrimination of these payments became a source of unease for the government, but they continued until 1955.¹²³

European settler farmers were greatly favoured over Africans with agricultural loans. Raikes estimates that the African loan funds set up in the 1950s annually disbursed less than one-tenth of what European farmers received through the Land Bank which offered low interest rates of five to six

¹¹⁹ Although most of the areas were relatively unpopulated, they could and sometimes did become hotly contested. African protest over the Sanya Corridor, which blew up into the famous Meru Land Case, was presented before the United Nations in 1952.

¹²⁰ Governor Twining, LegCo., 30th Session, 20/4/55 and 33rd Session, 17/9/57, 19

¹²¹ By 1958 there were ten farmers' associations: five were geographical in representation, four related to specific crops, whereas the Tanganyika National Farmers' Union was a general association of farmers. All of these were represented in the newly formed Northern Province Convention of Associations, founded as a forum for political and economic discussion in the run-up to independence.

¹²² The amount of money which was dispensed through the guaranteed minimum returns programme totalled £10,960 in 1950 and £6,000 in 1951 (Tanganyika, Department of Agricultural Annual Report, various years).

¹²³ Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, LegCo., 26th Session, 27/8/52, 418; 27th Session, 1/10/53, 293; 29th Session, 13/10/54, 252

percent.¹²⁴ Over the 1950s, European farms became more and more mechanized. In 1958, there were over 1500 tractors on non-African farms.¹²⁵

The settlers' favourable investment climate quickly evaporated after independence. The increase in agricultural labourers' wages, input supply difficulties and declining producer prices, all adversely affected farm profits. In 1972, President Nyerere was asked by the Chairman of the Kilimanjaro Farmers Association what lay ahead. Nyerere replied:

If I tell you that there is any future for individual large scale farming in Tanzania, I will be cheating you. Tanzania is different from Kenya, because here we have the Arusha Declaration to implement.¹²⁶

During the course of the next three years, most settler farms were nationalised. Thereafter very few European farmers remained in the country.

1.2 Specialized Domestic Production: African Capitalized Farmers

At the beginning of the 1950s a new type of African farmer emerged from the peasantry in a few 'frontier' localities, notably Ismani in Iringa and Hanang and Northern Iringa in Arusha. These were areas that had previously been underpopulated. In Arusha, tsetse clearance had opened up more land, whereas in Ismani lack of perennial sources of water had been the constraint. The rise of the capitalized farmer was stimulated by the improved producer prices of the 1940s and early 1950s, the example of the agricultural methods of the settler farmers and the higher producer prices offered by the Grain Storage Department for grain delivered in 3-ton lots which encouraged large-scale grain

¹²⁴ Raikes, P. Wheat Production, 39; Member for Finance and Economics, LegCo., 30th Session, 3/11/55, 653.

¹²⁵ The 1958 Agricultural Census records capital expenditure per cultivated areas as TShs. 56.40 on average with the following regional variation: Southern Highlands, 194.10; Northern Province, 121.50; Lake, 92.40; Tanga, 52.20; Central, 43.30; Eastern, 29.60; Southern, 14.20 (Tanganyika, Agricultural Census, 1958, 8-9).

¹²⁶ Daily News 9/6/72 cited in Fimbo, 'Land', 252

production by those with lorries.¹²⁷

The African capitalist farmers had a great deal of land at their disposal and proceeded to farm on a land-extensive basis, maximizing productivity per unit of labour rather than land. Farms were sometimes over a hundred acres in size, a far cry from the two to three acre holdings of the average peasant farmer. Tractor mechanization and hired labour enabled farmers to cover such expanses. In Arusha, where the climate was appropriate for wheat, its cultivation was well-suited to mechanization. Although the first African commercial wheat farmers who appeared in Karatu in 1942 used ox-ploughs, by 1950, there were five African-owned tractors in the area.¹²⁸ In 1962, in Hanang district of Arusha region, local government allocated 20-60 acre plots to African farmers who could grow wheat on a mechanized basis.¹²⁹

Tractorization of maize was far more limited in scope such that farmers did not branch into specialized maize production in Arusha. In Ismani, climate and soils precluded wheat. In 1949, when large-scale maize production began, hired labourers, particularly famine-stricken peasants from Bogoland, were employed. Within a few years, investment in tractors took place here as well.¹³⁰ By 1953, an estimated 15 square miles of former bush-land was under maize and maize sales jumped from 500 to 4000 tons between 1950 and 1952.¹³¹

African capitalised farmer distanced themselves socially from other producers. Using hired labour rather than more communal forms of labour removed them from the bonds of reciprocal exchange. The Ismani capitalized farmers were often non-resident, the core group being successful mechanics,

¹²⁷ Lunan, M. and J. Weir, 'Maize-Growing at Ismani, Iringa, Tanganyika', EAAJ, 20, (1954), 92

¹²⁸ Raikes, Wheat Production, 134

¹²⁹ Kjaerby, F., 'The Development of Agro-Pastoralism among the Barbaig in Hanang District', BRALUP Research Paper No. 52, (1979), 32

¹³⁰ Awiti, 'Economic Differentiation', 213

¹³¹ Lunan and Weir, 'Maize-Growing', 92

lorry transporters and small shopowners in Iringa town. Feldman notes that they operated on the basis of de facto individual land tenure contrary to customary law.¹³² They were not popular amongst the peasants who actually settled in the area and in 1971 when Nyerere made a call for the formation of ujamaa villages peasants saw this as a means of ousting capitalized farmers from their midst. In Arusha, the capitalized farmers were usually resident, but interestingly, they had found another way of distancing themselves from the rest of the local Iraqw population. Raikes mentions in a passing footnote that most of them were members of the Roman Catholic temperance society.¹³³ By not participating in the local drinking sessions which occupied a large part of the male peasant's social world, they not only saved time and money, they also avoided the numerous clientage exchange relationships that laced the drinking sessions.

While the small nucleus of African capitalized farmers' agricultural methods and social stance bore more in common with settler farmers rather than neighbouring peasants in several respects, there were, however, important features that distinguished them from the settler farmer. First, and especially in the case of the Northern Iraqw, they were over-capitalized. The African loan schemes of the 1950s and 1960s favoured 'progressive farmers'. Farmers' loans on average did not exceed TSh. 2000 during the 1950s and only about 150 African farmers obtained them. But under the Agricultural Credit Agency established in 1962 African credit opportunities burgeoned. Over 4,000 larger loans averaging TShs. 13,300 each were dispensed.¹³⁴ Credit continued to expand with the founding of the National Development Credit Agency which facilitated lending through the cooperative movement and later the establishment of the Tanzania Rural Development Bank in 1971. But credit agencies had few ways of enforcing repayment because African capitalized farmers were still subject to customary land

¹³² Feldman, R., 'Custom and Capitalism: Changes in the Basis of Land Tenure in Ismani, Tanzania', Journal of Development Studies 10(3/4), (1974), 315

¹³³ Raikes, Wheat Production, 244

¹³⁴ Raikes, Wheat Production, 39-40

laws, making land and property dispossession impossible.

The second major difference was that African capitalist producers tended to produce all their own food needs rather than purchase from the market. Third, African capitalized farmers were engaged in non-farm activities of an economic and political nature to a far greater extent than settler farmers. Many ran shops, restaurants, bars, taxi services or were involved in local politics.¹³⁵ Such dispersion of activity could be considered a risk-minimization strategy, in view of the uncertainty of the state's agricultural policies.

The colonial state began to take note of the existence of African capitalized farmers during the early 1950s. While admiring their entrepreneurial initiative, on the other hand, the state deemed their methods of farming, particularly in Ismani, to be detrimental to soil conservation.¹³⁶ But as the 1950s progressed, the colonial state became more supportive of large African farmers through half-hearted attempts to avail them agricultural credit. After independence, as Nyerere's rural development strategy unfolded, African capitalized farmers became an anomaly that could not be tolerated for too much longer. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, they were, however, still thriving.¹³⁷

The call for ujamaa village development in Ismani was the first and most pointed confrontation between the state and the African capitalized farmers. The farmers took a belligerent line and the

¹³⁵ Raikes, Wheat Production, 192; Awiti, 'Economic Differentiation', 218

¹³⁶ Soil erosion was identified already in the mid-1950s. At first farmers were getting from 12 to 20 bags per acre, this declined to about five bags by the late 1960s (Lunan and Weir, 'Maize-Growing', 92-93; Awiti, 'Economic Differentiation', 216; Tanganyika, Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1955, 24).

¹³⁷ In Awiti's survey of four villages (1970-72) nine percent of the farmers owned 96% of the capital equipment, 47% of the cattle in the village and were utilizing 53% of the land, 88% of which was purchased and the rest was allotted. They accounted for 69% of total maize production (Awiti, 'Economic Differentiation', 219, 231). In Raikes' 1970 survey of 40 households in Karatu and Mbulumbulu, capitalized tractor owners comprised 3% of the households in the area and cultivated about 40-50% of all wheat land on their own account (owned or share-cropped land) and another 40% under contract arrangements (Raikes, Wheat Production, 4).

conflict culminated with the murder of Dr. Klerruu, the zealous Regional Commissioner who was bent on uncompromising execution of the government's villagization policy. In the aftermath of this event, the capitalized farmers appear to have shunned the headlines. With their diversified economic interests they had other options and could afford to keep a low profile when their land holdings became an issue during villagization.

It should be emphasized that the African capitalized grain farmers were few in number.¹³⁸ They operated on a different economic logic from that of the neighbourhood patron. Like the neighbourhood patron, they were viewed by the Tanzanian state as a target for elimination and were far more vulnerable because they did not enjoy local popular support.

1.3 Specialized Domestic Production: State Farms

State farms' cereal production was insignificant during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1951, the government established Lupiro farm on an experimental scale for paddy production in the Kilombero valley. After three good harvests it was decided to mechanize and enlarge the project and operate a commercial accounting system. Over the course of the next three years, the scheme did not prove to be economically viable. Game depravation and the failure to adapt mechanization to the erratic flooding of the Kilombero river led to the abandonment of the farm at a loss of £15,000.¹³⁹

State farms did not begin to play a significant role in staple food supply until the 1970s. In 1969, the National Agricultural and Food Corporation parastatal (NAFCO) was established within the Ministry of Agriculture. It was to serve as the holding company for a number of agriculturally-based

¹³⁸ The 1967 Population Census enumerated 3,043 employers in the agricultural industry of cereal production, which constituted only 0.06% of all people engaged in non-sisal estate agriculture and 22% of all employers in non-sisal estate agriculture. Only a portion of these 3,043 would have been operating on a scale sufficiently large to be considered capitalized farmers (Tanzania, 1967 Population Census Volume 4, Table 314, 357).

¹³⁹ Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1956, 38; Minister for Natural Resources, LegCo., 34th Session, (1959), 7

enterprises, amongst them the Canadian Basotu Wheat Scheme in Arusha which had been operated by the National Development Corporation.¹⁴⁰ More than 50 large staple food farms and coffee estates in Kilimanjaro region, mostly owned by ex-patriates, were nationalised in 1973.¹⁴¹ The majority of these were handed over to cooperative unions. Nationalisation of the large settler wheat farms of Arusha was announced the following year.¹⁴² Chinese aid was also obtained for large-scale irrigated paddy production at Mbarali and Ruvu. The belief was that agglomeration of holdings into state farm operations would rationalize production. The early 1970s was a period of unproven optimism concerning the possibilities of state farm production of staple foods.

1.4 Non-specialized Domestic Production by Peasants

The phenomenal growth of peasant commodity production was stimulated by the same social and economic forces that triggered the appearance of capitalized African farmers. The Korean war commodity price boom sparked off peasant commodity production levels that proved beyond a shadow of a doubt peasants' price responsiveness under conditions of fair weather and sufficient market and productive infrastructure. As prices dropped, peasant market participation was sustained by new-found purchased needs as well as the declining importance of migrant wage labour as a source of income for tax payment.

Peasants outside the cotton and coffee zones were beginning to adopt new cash crops such as cashewnut or tea or they were attempting to produce food surpluses of the so-called 'preferred cereals' that had a ready-market in the burgeoning urban areas. The areas that were specializing in the preferred cereal production were of two types. Either they were areas particularly suited for the production of the crop by climate and soil type, such as paddy production in the Rufiji delta

¹⁴⁰ Packard, P., 'Corporate Structure in Agriculture and Socialist Development in Tanzania: A Study of the National Agricultural and Food Corporation', in Coulson, A. (ed.) African Socialism in Practice, (Nottingham, Spokesman, 1979)

¹⁴¹ Daily News, 25/10/73

¹⁴² This involved 66 farms of over 78,000 acres in total (Daily News, 29/9/74, 14/11/74).

area, maize in Iringa, and wheat production in Hanang and Mbulu, or they were areas that were not suitable for the production of any of the major export crops and so by default took up marketed production of food, attempting to produce surpluses of their staple foods and succeeding in doing so in good harvest years, Dodoma and Singida being the prime examples of this. Obviously, the former areas generated a more regular supply than the latter.

Since peasant households were still producing their staple food needs as before¹⁴³ and the productivity of staple food production had not noticeably increased, there was a need to augment land, labour and capital resources of the household to produce an additional amount for the market. Most places still had available land. Where there was a decline in male out-migration, e.g. Iringa, additional labour resources were available. However, capital-intensification in the form of tractor-hiring schemes offered by Native Authorities, settlers and later African capitalized farmers and cooperatives was the most notable feature of areas with peasant commercial food crop production.

Tractor hiring always posed a number of logistical problems, both in terms of the scheduling of services, the transport of tractors from area to area, their mechanical maintenance and the collection of service fees. One by one, over the 1950s, the Native Authorities were forced to close down the schemes because of their economic unviability.¹⁴⁴ The cooperatives' tractor schemes proved just as unwieldy.¹⁴⁵ In Iringa and Arusha, settlers or capitalized African farmers offered tractor services whereas in the Rufiji there was no alternative service at hand once the Native Authority and cooperative schemes broke down.¹⁴⁶ One of the major drawbacks faced by the peasant hiring a tractor

¹⁴³ Only Sukuma peasants were observed to be reliant on market purchase for a portion of their food needs (Economist Intelligence Unit, Survey, 105).

¹⁴⁴ Department of Agriculture Annual Report (1955), 27-29; (1956), 37

¹⁴⁵ D.V. Chambers, Director of Agricultural Development in 1962 facilitated the allocation of 400 tractors to cooperative societies. He notes: '...two years later half of these tractors were out of commission and the average area effectively ploughed was of the order of 100 acres per tractor per annum' (Chambers, D.V., (1983), RH Mss. Br. Emp.s.476, 7); Finucane, Rural Development, 58

¹⁴⁶ Department of Agriculture Annual Reports, 1950-1959

was that his fields were ploughed only after the tractor owner's fields, often resulting in late planting and comparatively lower yields.¹⁴⁷

During the 1950s and 1960s, the agricultural policy of the state was aimed at helping to boost peasant households' commodity production over and above their normal subsistence food production. It was generally acknowledged by the government that such a policy would contribute to the tendency for fallow periods to be shortened. The 1955 East African Royal Commission, highlighting the need for the transformation of shifting cultivation to more intensive systems of agriculture, prompted the Department of Agriculture to coordinate the work of the country's agricultural research stations more effectively.¹⁴⁸ Maize breeding projects were directed at providing locally improved varieties.¹⁴⁹ During the 1960s higher-yielding Ukiriguru and Ilonga maize composites were developed.¹⁵⁰ Local experiments on fertilizer response were giving positive results as well.¹⁵¹ Both the colonial and post-colonial governments had similar research objectives vis-a-vis peasant agriculture and both pursued these objectives through local and East African-based research stations.¹⁵²

The main difficulty faced by both governments was in the realm of peasant agricultural extension. Not only was the peasantry very dispersed, its household labour constraints and lack of money to invest usually led it to be unwilling or unable to follow extension officers' suggestions.

¹⁴⁷ Raikes, Wheat Production, 287

¹⁴⁸ Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1955, 1

¹⁴⁹ Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1955, 11

¹⁵⁰ Bolton, A., 'Territorial Maize Variety Trials in Tanzania 1966-70', EAAJ 37, (October 1971), 109-124

¹⁵¹ E.g. in the drought year of 1966 fertilizer trials in ten districts of northern Tanzania showed that light applications of compound fertilizer to maize yielded between 318 and 1,010 lb. more per acre and offered between TShs. 7/70 and TShs. 111/50 per acre greater net profit (Anderson, G.D., 'Responses of Maize to Application of Compound Fertilizers on Farmer's Fields in Ten Districts of Tanzania', EAAJ, 34, (1969), 382-397).

¹⁵² Notably the East African Agriculture and Fisheries Research Organisation (EAAFRD).

The Sukumaland Development Scheme, beginning in 1947 and lasting over the next ten years, was the colonial government's most ambitious agricultural extension effort. It and the Mbulu Development Scheme, the Uluguru Land-Use Scheme and other programmes in the Usambara and Pare mountains rested on the assumption that peasants had to be penalized for not adhering to government agricultural directives. Labour-intensive tie-ridging, terracing and manure application became mandatory. In 1955 peasants rioted against enforced conservation measures in the Uluguru mountains. The government, challenged by farmers and nationalists, abandoned its insistence on labour-intensive terracing and tie-ridging and embarked on a new 'focal point' approach whereby the extension officer's role as policeman gave way to that of teacher. In this approach, the peasant farmers most receptive to change were targetted for extension with the hope that they would set a convincing example for the others to emulate. At the same time, a few settlement schemes were initiated on former Groundnut Scheme land, the aim being to create yeoman farmers that would eventually farm extensive acreages.¹⁵³

At independence, agricultural 'teaching' was to take two forms: the 'improvement approach', similar to the 'focal point' approach in its reliance on farmers already inclined to the adoption of new farming techniques, and second, the 'transformation approach' which amounted to attempts at spoonfeeding peasants. This entailed the establishment of settlement schemes in a few special areas, placing peasants in a new physical environment which, it was considered, would spur their acceptance of new agricultural practices.

The improvement approach became increasingly at odds with the post-independent government's egalitarian goals whereas most of the settlement schemes were short-lived, suffering severe organizational and supply problems. With a record of heavily supervised production, frequent over-capitalisation and mismanaged mechanisation, the government decided to abandon the settlement scheme

¹⁵³ Coulson, A., 'Agricultural Practices in Mainland Tanzania', Review of African Political Economy, 10, (1977), 87

programme in 1966.¹⁵⁴

1967 was a year for bold policy assertions. In his paper, 'Socialism and Rural Development', Nyerere rejected the 'improvement' approach and restructured the transformation approach into a far more ambitious rural development programme centering around an all-out call for the establishment of ujamaa villages.¹⁵⁵ In the years that followed, spoonfeeding often became force feeding as 'operations' to villagize peasants in Rufiji (1969), Mtwara (1970), Iringa (1971), Dodoma (1971-72), Chunya and Kigoma (1973) took place. Most of these places were marginal commodity producing areas often subject to floods or droughts leading to food shortages and hence the operations were often carried out in the vein of disaster prevention. It was felt that agricultural extension would be easier in villages that had nucleated settlement. In 1972, the National Executive Committee of the party issued the policy statement Siasa ni Kilimo which adopted the stance that improving peasants agricultural technology usage and productivity throughout the country was imperative.¹⁵⁶

1.5 Imports

The years between 1950 and 1972 were characterized by an overall net import of grain averaging roughly 270,500 quintals of maize, rice and wheat per annum. Until independence, the annual average was 119,400 quintals as opposed to 421,500 between 1962 and 1972. These quantities were considerably in excess of the annual average deficit of 26,800 quintals prevailing from 1920 to 1950 (TABLE 2.3).

Breaking the deficit down into separate grain categories: maize, the country's most important staple, registered an annual net import of only 18,400. This however disguises the extreme difference between an average annual net export of 107,600 quintals between 1950-1961 and a net

¹⁵⁴ Cliffe, L. and G.L. Cunningham, 'Ideology, Organisation and the Settlement Experience in Tanzania', in Cliffe, L. et al. (eds), Socialism in Tanzania, II, (DSM, East African Publishing House, 1973), 137

¹⁵⁵ Nyerere, 'Socialism and Rural Development', (1967)

¹⁵⁶ Translated 'politics is agriculture'.

average annual import of 144,500 during the post-colonial period. The low overall average but inter-year volatility of maize contrasts markedly with wheat which had a high overall annual net import of 246,000 quintals with relatively little change in volume during the colonial and post-colonial period at 202,800 and 289,500 quintals respectively.

Between 1950 and 1973 there was a net annual rice import of 21,200 quintals with a net average export between 1950-1961 of 400 quintals annually and a net average import of 42,700 during the post-colonial period. If one considers rice and maize together the overall net import was only about 40,000 quintals per annum. Thus, it was Tanganyikan consumers' newly found but steady and mainly urban demand for wheat which accounted for the bulk of net imports over the years.

2. Transport

With the expansion of peasant commodity production, Tanzania's existing transport infrastructure was used more heavily, thereby making it more cost-effective. Freight volume on the railways increased annually by over five percent between 1950 and 1965. The total number of motor vehicles in the country increased at a rate of nine percent per annum (TABLE 5.25). Road traffic density rose by 7.5% annually between 1957 and 1966 (APPENDIX VII).¹⁵⁷

The transport of food became less problematic. The trunk road network was organised to complement the rail-lines and more attention was paid to feeder roads. Fuel costs were stable between 1950 and 1970,¹⁵⁸ but between 1970 and 1973 the price of fuel doubled in the world market which was a foreboding development considering Tanzania's vast distances, scattered settlement and dependence on cheap imported fuel.

3. Staple Food Marketing Structure

At first glance, the array of government marketing policies that unfolded during this period appear as a tangle of contradictory measures aimed at undoing the effects of the policy immediately

¹⁵⁷ Hofmeier, Transport, 118

¹⁵⁸ \$1.59-1.60 per barrel ex-port Kuwait.

preceding it. The colonial and post-colonial states were primarily concerned with food security in the form of guaranteeing food availability as well as stable producer and consumer prices. The extent to which the state intervened in marketing organization largely depended on whether food security was felt to be under threat. The various marketing structures that characterised the period do not represent volleys between state control and the 'free' market. Rather they were solutions tailored to particular circumstances, displaying a range of policy options vis-a-vis food security objectives, the relative ordering of consumer and producer demands, centralisation versus decentralisation of marketing organisational structure, and import reliance versus domestic self-sufficiency.

Even during the periods of more active state intervention in food marketing, the state stopped far short of eliminating the operation of the market completely for a number of reasons. First of all, Tanzania participated in the world markets for wheat, rice and particularly maize in the event of shortfalls or gluts of national production. The costs of local production and transport of grain to the main consuming centres fell between export and import parity prices. In the event of a good or bad harvest, recourse to foreign import or export of grain brought about greater financial expense which could jeopardize the viability of the state marketing agency that had to shoulder the financial burden. Second, unofficial markets always emerged when the state-controlled market failed to provide for its clientele's needs. Failure took a number of forms: either failure to provide timely purchase of farmers' produce thereby causing farmers to have to resort to lower prices from illegal traders, or failure to sell adequate amounts of produce to consumers engendering the sale of foodstuffs by traders at higher prices, or excessively wide margins engendering a parallel market which operated on narrower margins.

The 1950-73 period was one of relatively good food availability. The food security concerns of the state reflected this. No longer over-taxed with efforts to ensure supply to rural and urban areas under conditions of scarcity, the state became pre-occupied with policies to stabilize producer

and consumer prices for foodstuffs. Given the wide fluctuation of staple food production over time and space in Tanganyika, price stabilization was no small task, but the colonial and post-colonial state felt it was warranted to ensure domestic stability in both an economic and political sense.

There are three distinct stages of food marketing between 1950 and 1973. The particular blend of state and market operations of each will be examined in detail below.

3.1 Grain Storage Department, 1950-1957

The main aim of the Grain Storage Department (GSD) was to serve to even out the fluctuation of supply and price through a government-managed storage scheme handling maize/mtama and to a lesser extent paddy. At its peak, storage capacity was over 40,000 tons. The GSD refrained from engaging in widely dispersed marketing operations, buying grain from licensed traders and large-scale farmers in large amounts at railheads (FIGURE 5.1). All grain that was bulked into amounts weighing three-tons or over was deemed to be a commercial quantity and had to be sold to the Department. This allowed private entrepreneurs room to buy smaller amounts in addition to their functions as millers and retailers. Their trading margins were restricted by the controlled price at which the Grain Storage Department purchased grain from them, the price at which it was sold back to them, and ex-mill and retail prices that were specified by the District Commissioner through powers delegated to him by the Price Controller under the 1951 Price Control Act. Controlled prices varied regionally depending on local handling and transport costs.

The GSD, which was expected to breakeven financially was itself hemmed in by externally-determined prices. From 1953 onwards, the cheapening of international supplies, resulted in the cost of domestic supplies being positioned between export and import parity. Exporting local supplies was to prove as expensive as importing foreign ones. Pricing policy, aimed at matching local supply with marketed demand, was therefore critical to the sound management of the Department. Nonetheless, the extreme fluctuation of domestic supplies was to prove the GSD's undoing.

1949 and 1953 were drought years and the GSD ran at a loss but was generally recognized as providing invaluable service in meeting the challenge of regional shortages. In the intervening

years until 1955, the GSD, although acknowledged to be operating efficiently, was frequently criticized for its pricing policy.¹⁵⁹ Complaints from non-producers about the guaranteed high level of producer prices were most frequent and the extension of GSD's buying operations to the Southern Highlands, where transport costs were still held to be prohibitive, was heavily criticized.¹⁶⁰ Trade and milling mark-ups were still quite modest.¹⁶¹ Employers of plantation labour were particularly critical about the price they had to pay to feed their labourers knowing that international grain prices were declining.¹⁶² Parallel markets did spring up from time to time in different places, notably areas near the Kenyan border like North Mara and Moshi.¹⁶³

It was in this climate that the 1955 East African Royal Commission delivered its blast to government agricultural marketing policy, challenging the raison d'être rather than the operations of the GSD.

One of the most untoward consequences of a subsistence economy is the recurring danger of a failure of the basic food supply due to droughts, pests, diseases and other natural causes. The

¹⁵⁹ GSD's stocks were continuously assessed with detailed attention to stock loss. During 1953 and 1954, the Acting Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources reported that only 956 bags of grain disappeared, at a net loss of £1,601 out of a total turnover of £3,900,000. Eight staff members were dismissed and one was surcharged (LegCo., 29th Session, 2/12/54, 300).

¹⁶⁰ D.B. Soskice, Unofficial Member, (DSM), LegCo., 27th Session, 24/11/52, 101; I.C. Chopra, (Mwanza), LegCo., 28th Session, 26/11/53, 81

¹⁶¹ The mark-up for a kg of of maize in Northern Province in 1955 was reported as:

GSD into-store price	- Shs. 0/44
Operating and overhead charges margin	- Shs. 0/07 (16%)
Milling margin	- Shs. 0/03 (7%)
Wholesale and retail margin	- Shs. 0/03 (7%)
Retail posho price	- Shs. 0/57 (30%)

(Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, LegCo., 30th Session, 10/6/55, 422); In the sisal-producing areas the mark-up was reported to be over 43% with an into-store price of Shs. 0/42 and retail posho price of between Shs. 0/60 and Shs. 0/70 (A.L. LeMaitre, (Tanga), LegCo., 30th Session, 11/5/55).

¹⁶² B.J. Wallis, (Northern Province), LegCo., 30th Session, 12/5/55, 231

¹⁶³ In 1954, African growers in Moshi tended to sell privately to avoid the two cents District Council cess (Department of Agriculture Annual Report (1950), 145 and (1954), 14; Annual Report of the Cooperative Department (1953), 7).

absence of a modern system of distribution, the long distances separating populated or cultivable areas, and the inability of the subsistence economy to produce regular marketable surpluses by specialized production without risking a food shortage at critical periods of the year, have led the indigenous populations to seek security by clinging to their customary methods of production...[I]n the policies which they [the East African governments] have adopted they have been unduly influenced by the fears and practices of the indigenous populations, and by encouraging district, regional and even territorial self-sufficiency they have perpetuated the cause of the evil which their measures were intended to combat, namely the system of self-sufficiency itself. In their anxiety to achieve security in the matter of food supplies they have tended to regard the ordinary mechanism of the market as an obstacle to the solution of their difficulties rather than as a solvent of the problem....[T]his philosophy of restriction of production in order to achieve self-sufficiency in food supplies underlies the whole of the state-controlled marketing system...¹⁶⁴

Although the Department of Agriculture was reluctant to abandon the goal of territorial self-sufficiency, this hesitation was over-shadowed by events.¹⁶⁵ 1955/56 was a bumper harvest and the tonnage of grain that was off-loaded on the GSD was overwhelming. The Department was faced with a surplus of 110,000 tons of maize/mtama compared with preceding years when deficits had been as high as 95,000 tons and surpluses had never gone beyond 25,000 tons (TABLE 5.22).¹⁶⁶ The surplus was exported at a loss of over £1 million. The government had to absorb the financial loss.¹⁶⁷ Steps were immediately taken to wind up the operation of the GSD to the disappointment of the settler grain farmers and the delight of plantation interests.¹⁶⁸ It finally ceased to exist in 1957.

3.2 Private Grain Marketing, 1957-1963

In 1957, the Produce Control and Price Control Acts were repealed and the Milling Act of 1952 was amended so that only the licensing of wheat milling was retained. Traders were required to carry

¹⁶⁴ EARC, East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report, (London, HMSO, 1955), 65-67

¹⁶⁵ Hon. Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, LegCo. 30th Session, 13/5/55, 342

¹⁶⁶ Tanganyika, Grain Storage Department, Annual Report July 1956-July 1957, (DSM, Government Printer, 1957), 12-14

¹⁶⁷ Member for Finance and Economics, LegCo., 31st Session, 26/4/56, 40; Member for Finance and Economics, LegCo., 32nd Session, 1/5/57, 28

¹⁶⁸ Tanganyika National Farmers' Union Correspondence, Record of a Joint Production Committee Meeting held at Arusha 25/2/55, RH Mss. Afr.s.1222, 40-41

out their purchasing in accordance with Native Authority market regulations and pay market cesses, but otherwise they were free of restrictions.¹⁶⁹ The only food security measure the central government continued was the maintenance of a small grain reserve for famine relief supervised by the Department of Commerce and Industry.¹⁷⁰

For six years grain marketing reverted into private hands. Although over two-thirds of licensed traders were Africans by 1961 their participation in the grain trade was restricted to retailing small amounts. In conjunction with the growth of urban food demand and the loosening of government marketing controls, large-scale Asian produce buyers specializing in foodstuffs began to dominate the regional grain trade in their capacity as produce buyers, wholesalers, brokers and millers. In the absence of telephones and good transport conditions, staple foodstuff produce buyers had to operate on a fairly large scale with a substantial capital outlay, storage capacity and ability to withstand financial risk. Many became millers. They were likely to be oligopolistic and even monopolistic, with only one or two buyers operating in most areas.¹⁷¹ While they made profitable returns, they nonetheless did not serve to inflate the trading margins due to the economies of scale they achieved and their avoidance of the fixed capital costs of buying posts. They reduced overhead costs by relying on a network of small dukawallahs to serve as collecting agents. The dukawallahs were remunerated through a salaried or credit arrangement.¹⁷²

It was the grain wholesalers and brokers in Dar es Salaam who acted to balance the flow of trade

¹⁶⁹ In some areas it was estimated that up to 75% of produce sales took place 'illegally' outside the Native Authority markets (IBRD, The Economic Development of Tanganyika, (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1961), 72).

¹⁷⁰ In contrast to the GSD's 40,000-ton grain storage this reserve never exceeded 5000 tons (Tanganyika, Department of Commerce and Industry, Annual Reports 1957-1960).

¹⁷¹ The Southern Province had the most pronounced monopolistic buying arrangement (Economist Intelligence Unit, Survey, 173).

¹⁷² Hawkins, Wholesale and Retail Trade, 99

from supply areas with the rate of territorial consumption, setting price levels that cleared the market and arranging for exports and imports in relation to internal demand and the difference between territorial and international prices (FIGURE 5.2).

Producer prices were considerably lower than the artificially high level set by the Grain Storage Department. Wholesale and retail mark-ups remained moderate.¹⁷³ The Economist Intelligence Unit's 1962 report identified staple food margins as low in comparison with other product lines and in comparison with other countries.¹⁷⁴ Staple foodstuffs were fast-moving items and they sold at conventional price levels. The 'just price' criterion was firmly in place in the free market.¹⁷⁵

Producer and consumer prices varied regionally depending on the cost of transport. There was virtually no government regulation except in the form of the Transport Licensing Authority which affected rail rates and the number of road transporters competing for business.

The late 1950s were fair weather years with very satisfactory food production overall whereas the early 1960s were not. 1961/62 was a drought year that severely affected central parts of the country, causing consumer prices to rise and engendering public resentment against traders just as the country gained political independence.¹⁷⁶ These developments were to reverberate quickly in the post-colonial government's marketing policy.

3.3 Cooperatives/National Agricultural Production Board/National Milling Corporation, 1963-1973

In 1963 the the National Agricultural Products Board (NAPB) was established for the single

¹⁷³ The wholesale mark-up for basic foodstuffs at 2-3% was cited as 'probably the most competitive in the whole distribution system' (Economist Intelligence Unit, Survey, 133-139,145,175).

¹⁷⁴ Kreisel et al. gives a price breakdown for maize at Iringa between 1957 and 1963 (inclusive). The average producer and retail prices were Shs. 0/28 and Shs. 0/39 respectively, representing a 39% mark-up (Kreisel et al., Agricultural Marketing, 38).

¹⁷⁵ Economist Intelligence Unit, Survey, 127

¹⁷⁶ Debate on food prices, LegCo., 36th Session, 14/2/61, 38-39; Swai, Minister for Commerce and Industry, LegCo., 36th Session, 20/5/61, 211

channel marketing of an array of products, namely: maize, rice, wheat, cashewnut, and oilseeds. African public demand had been instrumental in bringing about this move. In addition to general resentment over the rise of food prices in the wake of the 1961/62 drought, the difficulties that cooperative societies were facing from the competition of Asian produce buyers in maize and rice trading made the establishment of the NAPB under African management popular.¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, the post-colonial government saw this measure as an integral part of its food security function.

Food crops are directly concerned with the feeding of the Nation and as such should come under the direct control of Government which has this fundamental responsibility.¹⁷⁸

The NAPB was obliged to provide purchasing services throughout the country, buy all the produce that was offered to it, and keep a famine reserve stock for distribution to needy areas. The 1964 National Agricultural Products Board Act gave the NAPB powers to regulate sales, transport, storage and processing as well as fix minimum prices at any stage of the marketing process. The NAPB's exercise of control was restricted to fixing into- and ex-store prices, set on the basis of projected costings which had to be first approved by the Agricultural Price Policy Co-ordinating Committee (APPPC) of the Ministry of Agriculture and ultimately the Economic Committee of the Cabinet. Producer prices were to be the residual of the into-store price once cooperative unions and societies' costs were deducted. Town councils and Regional and Area Commissioners authorized by the Price Controller in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry set maximum retail prices. The strategic political importance of food pricing is clearly evident in this price-setting arrangement. At its two extremes, producer and consumer prices were determined by local political pressures whereas the highest level of collective governmental decision-making, the Cabinet, was instrumental in setting the NAPB's price levels rather than leaving it entirely up to the NAPB.

As in the previous two periods, the licensing of retailers continued. The licensing of millers

¹⁷⁷ I.B.M. Munanka, (N. Mara), LegCo., 36th Session, 20/10/60, 418; P. Bomani, Minister for Agriculture and Cooperatives, same session; N. Buhatwa, (Ukerewe), LegCo., 36th Session, 26/5/61, 525

¹⁷⁸ Tanganyika, 'Proposals', 15

was re-instated. The NAPB issued milling licenses on the recommendations of Area Commissioners and the Commissioner for Cooperatives. In the 1960s local authorities were very stringent in the allocation of licenses to private millers, obviously influenced by the cooperative unions' investments in milling.¹⁷⁹ In 1967, the Arusha Declaration brought about the nationalisation of the country's large urban-based mills which were then amalgamated to form the National Milling Corporation (NMC).

While the NAPB single channel marketing bore very strong resemblance to the GSD system, there were a number of significant differences (FIGURE 5.3). The NAPB system aimed at more all-encompassing government control. The maximum amount of grain that could be traded and transported by private individuals was only four bags (360 kgs) rather than three tons. Whereas the local produce buying agents under the GSD had been mostly licensed private traders, under the NAPB they were almost exclusively cooperatives. The GSD's into- and ex-store prices had generally been region-specific, the NAPB's were pan-territorial, giving an implicit transport subsidy to the more far-flung regions.¹⁸⁰ The 1960s saw the gradual demise of private milling, replaced by the cooperatives at the local level and by the NMC in the major towns. Wholesale distribution of milled products passed through the cooperatives, or, in Dar es Salaam, the National Distributors Ltd., a subsidiary of the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika. Transport of produce was about the only aspect of the trade that remained primarily in private hands. Few marketing cooperatives had vehicles of their own; there were too many organizational difficulties if they did and specialized transport cooperatives were not proving to be successful.¹⁸¹

The goals of the NAPB were identical to the GSD; that of national food security and price

¹⁷⁹ Kreisel et al., Agricultural Marketing, 24

¹⁸⁰ Helleiner, G.K. 'Agricultural Marketing in Tanzania - Policies and Problems', ERB Paper 68.14, UDSM, (1968), 22

¹⁸¹ Hofmeier, Transport, 161

stabilization. Like the GSD, the bane of NAPB's operations was the financial losses incurred from trading in the world market while following a course of national price stabilization. Within the financial confines of the NAPB, it seemed that the realization of national food security was incompatible with price stabilization. In the years when national food security was most successfully achieved, price stabilization, which served to ensure food security at the level of the individual, was most threatened because heavy losses were incurred on domestic grain export. At these points, either the NAPB was allowed to include an export-loss fund in the following year's costings or the Treasury had to intervene with a subsidy or both.¹⁸²

Helleiner and Livingstone criticized the NAPB for failing to achieve its objective of temporal and spatial price stabilization and questioned the validity of price stabilization as a goal in view of the extremely low producer prices offered.¹⁸³ The NAPB set a pan-territorial into-store price but the price that the producer received varied a great deal from place to place and over time depending on the administrative performance and clientage practices of local cooperative unions and societies. The cooperative margin was excessively large compared with the services performed and there was duplication in union and NAPB functions.¹⁸⁴ Total mark-ups were considerably greater than those

¹⁸² The export loss fund amounted to: Shs. 103.50/ton in 1965, Shs. 60/ton in 1966 and Shs. 50.33/ton in 1970 (Kreisel et al. Agricultural Marketing, 26-27).

¹⁸³ Helleiner, 'Agricultural Marketing', 21-24; Livingstone, I., 'Production, Price and Marketing Policy for Staple Foodstuffs in Tanzania', ERB Paper 71.16, UDSM, (1971), 3; Temu, Marketing Board Pricing, 108, 194

¹⁸⁴ Temu, Marketing Board Pricing, 190, 198; Dumont, Tanzanian Agriculture, 50

prevailing in the 1950s.¹⁸⁵

Kreisel et al. identified the urban price of sembe as intolerably high and blamed it for the need for a high minimum wage.¹⁸⁶ With NAPB's over-abundant stocks of maize in 1968, the Ministry of Agricultural proposed lowering the into-store price to deter farmers from producing grain and to lower consumer prices, but the Executive Committee of the NAPB did not comply and the 1969 into-store price remained at the 1968 level.¹⁸⁷ In 1970, however, the price dropped.¹⁸⁸

High marketing margins and consumer prices engendered an illicit market in grain both within Tanzania and across the border in Kenya. It was estimated that about 70% of all production was retained for on-farm consumption and official marketing channels handled between 10 and 20% of all maize production. The remainder would have consisted of the legal under-four bag transactions of farmers and traders and larger-scale, illicit trading.¹⁸⁹ Very little is known about the nature of

¹⁸⁵ The average maize mark-up between 1963 and 1969 in Iringa region was 77%. In 1967/8 the cost break-down for a kg of maize NAPB ex-store was as follows:

Producer price	- TShs. 0.30
Cooperative society costs	- TShs. 0.0547 (18%)
Cooperative union costs	- TShs. 0.0507 (17%)
NAPB costs	- TShs. 0.1532 (51%)
NAPB ex-store price	- TShs. 0.5590 (86%)

Compare this with previous margins listed in footnotes 161 and 174. In 1967/68 the NAPB ex-store price was TShs. 0.52/kg maize, resulting in a deficit of almost four cents per kg. The retail price for maize meal in Dar es Salaam was Shs. 0/79 representing a 164% mark-up (Kreisel et al. Agricultural Marketing, 28,38). Temu calculated the average maize mark-up between producer price and NAPB ex-store for the country as a whole (1964-1973) as 85% with a year-to-year range of 69% to 103% (Temu, Marketing Board Pricing, 81).

¹⁸⁶ Kreisel et al., Agricultural Marketing, 35,107

¹⁸⁷ D.N.M. Bryceson, 'Price, Production and Marketing Policies for Maize', Paper No. 60 of 1968, submitted by the Minister for Agriculture & Cooperatives, MDPC/A.50/26/4, n.d.; Minutes of an APPCC Meeting to Discuss 1969 Oilseeds and Maize Prices, held in DevPlan on 12/11/68

¹⁸⁸ Kreisel, Agricultural Marketing, 27

¹⁸⁹ Helleiner, 'Agricultural Marketing', 31; Kreisel, et al., Agricultural Marketing, 20; Temu, Marketing Board Pricing, 172

this trade, its extent, who were the agents, what were their margins and profits.¹⁹⁰

The NAPB was trapped in a vicious circle. The wide official margins were traced back to the inflated costs of the cooperatives as well as the NAPB's need for a special fund to cover losses arising from its import and export of grain and the implicit transport subsidies that distant regions received. The NAPB was completely unable to limit the primary procurement costs of the cooperatives and the wide fluctuation of its stocks. When the cooperatives exceeded their approved margins, the NAPB had to cover the cost.¹⁹¹ Oversupply was frequent, storage and export costs were financially draining, leading to widening margins and the fueling of the parallel market which undermined demand for NAPB products and further contributed to oversupply. By the early 1970s the situation was becoming untenable.

However, the problem of a public glut of basic foodstuffs has to be kept in a historical perspective. The predicament facing the NAPB would have been enviable to past and present-day policy-makers wrestling with Tanganyika's food shortages. Despite relatively low producer prices, the NAPB was faced with over-abundant stocks. Abundance was reflected in the existence of the parallel market as a cheaper source of marketed food supply for waged workers; household budget data showing that food expenditure took up less than half of low-income household earnings (TABLE 5.16);

¹⁹⁰ Raikes estimates that 50% of marketed maize in N. Iraqw in the early 1970s was handled by the parallel market (Raikes, Wheat Production, 48). In Temu's survey of parallel markets in six regions during the harvest season of 1972 (a below average-harvest following a drought year), the median value of parallel market prices reigning in local maize markets was Shs. 0/33 to Shs. 1/03 per kg of maize while regional into-store buying prices ranged from Shs. 0/21 to Shs. 0/28. Examining each region separately, the median parallel market price exceeded the cooperative society buying price in all cases by a magnitude of: Mara, 59%; Iringa, 69%; Kilimanjaro, 93%, Arusha, 96%; Dodoma, 186% and Tanga 329% and exceeded the cooperative selling price in four of the six regions: Iringa, -5%; Mara -7%; Dodoma, 37%; Kilimanjaro, 17%; Arusha, 11%; Tanga, 96% (Temu, Marketing Board Pricing, 140-2). The surprisingly high NAPB procurement in Dodoma for 1972/3 (TABLE 5.22) despite a wide differential between parallel market and official market prices is probably connected with the implementation of the villagization campaign in Dodoma during 1971 and 1972.

¹⁹¹ E.g. in 1966/7, the NAPB distributed Shs. 4.3 million to cover union losses (Kreisel et al., Agricultural Marketing, 28).

and limited use of the famine reserve.¹⁹²

The NAPB had to resort to government subsidy in its first years to cover export losses and then again in the late 1960s.¹⁹³ This was a drain on public revenues, deflecting finance from development projects and affecting the taxpayer adversely, but NAPB's operational difficulties did not undermine the population's confidence in a secure food supply. There were no serious food shortages in the country even though peasants were growing increasing amounts of cash crops.

Unfortunately, security suddenly vanished in 1972. The 1971/72 harvest was extremely poor, necessitating an historically unprecedented amount of food imports. This event took place alongside other adverse economic indicators. Between 1969 and 1971, the balance of trade had slid into a deficit position for the first time since independence. This was not due to a decline in export earnings; they registered a four per cent increase. Rather the import bill had ballooned by a full 79% largely because machinery imports increased by 130%.¹⁹⁴ In 1972, the trade imbalance widened with the increase in food imports.¹⁹⁵ Meanwhile, fundamental changes were taking place in the world market. Between 1969 and 1973 the price of oil doubled.

Within this inhospitable climate, the government and party were pursuing ambitious economic and social reform with the attitude that state organization and planning could supercede external economic set-backs and eliminate the limitations of domestic peasant production and high costs of cooperative marketing. The state embarked on the drastic restructuring of state agencies through such policies as decentralisation in 1971 and marketing reform in 1973. Following the record-

¹⁹² The NAPB dispensed 49,666 tons of grain as famine relief between 1966 and 1970 (Temu, Marketing Board Pricing, 110).

¹⁹³ Kriesel et al., Agricultural Marketing, 38

¹⁹⁴ The Second Five Year Plan with a prominent industrial component was launched in 1969.

¹⁹⁵ In 1972, food imports amounted to 7% of the total import bill whereas they had constituted only 3% during the previous two years.

breaking food imports of 1972 (TABLE 2.3), the NAPB was dissolved and the National Milling Corporation was elevated to serve as the axis of the single-channel marketing system. It was clearly an effort to cut out duplication of functions by eliminating more than one node of the marketing chain. NMC was to deal directly with cooperative societies in cases where the cooperative unions were especially ineffective. The pivotal importance of the into- and ex-store price was replaced with a far more ambitious price-setting arrangement. Pan-territorial producer prices, cooperative society and union margins were all fixed. The cooperatives became the mere executing agents of NMC parastatal marketing. Without cooperative autonomy in price determination, cooperative clientage was handcuffed by the state.¹⁹⁶

V. Chapter Conclusion

A number of tendencies are evident in the period between 1950 and 1973. Most significantly for the argument of this thesis, the African population in both rural and urban areas was not subjected to the same degree of food insecurity as had prevailed between 1919 and 1950. Although food importation increased in the country as a whole, this was related to the expansion of the urban population and their new-found demand for wheat rather than an increased incidence of rural food shortages, famine and urban scarcity. Both the colonial and post-colonial states endeavoured to ensure urban food security through cost of living allowances and later through food price stabilization policies, such that the African urban population became reliant on a regular marketed supply of food. This alleviation of the burden of food insecurity provided a necessary condition for the blossoming of the social division of labour.

The extremely rigid tripartite racial division of labour began to disintegrate, superceded by an urban/rural divide and the beginnings of regionally-specialized peasant agriculture and intra-village class differentiation. The development strategy of the Tanganyikan state approximated the export crop strategy advocated by W.A. Lewis. A reasonable degree of success was being achieved until the

¹⁹⁶ Tanzania, MDB, 'A Strategic Grain Reserve Programme for Tanzania', Vol. 11, DSM, (1974), 27-31

beginning of the 1970s as indicated by the favourable balance of trade in contrast to the preceding and subsequent periods (TABLE 5.26). The economy was capable of supporting a proliferation of African occupational specializations. The food supply for the expanding numbers of urban-dwellers rested to a considerable extent on food import rather than increases in peasant food output, but such food imports were affordable within the context of the peasant cashcrop boom.

Households, with less likelihood of having to cope with rural famine and with an increase in cashcropping, generally had more cash in hand and were beginning to experience the effects of enhanced educational opportunities for youth and rural outmigration. An age schism became apparent in the clientage relations of the Native Authority. The clientage networks of cooperatives sprouted alongside the power of the chief and his retainers in the main cashcrop producing areas. The cooperatives were pivotal to the nationalist movement affording TANU an organisational base in many rural areas. After independence the cooperative movement was generously rewarded by the state who formally abolished the Native Authorities and invested in the expansion of the cooperative movement to all areas of Tanzania in conjunction with the removal of Asians from rural produce buying. The physical departure of Tanganyika's Asian market agents left a vacuum that was filled by cooperatives and state trading corporations. Cooperatives which encouraged rural/small town mobility and the cash nexus were functional in breaking down tribal identity which stood in the way of the development of a national identity, and linked the nation-state to the peasant household via neighbourhood-based clientage networks. Increasingly over the 1960s, the state viewed cooperatives and their clientage relations as clientage networks. Increasingly over the 1960s, the state viewed cooperatives and their clientage relations as a sticky mess to clean up rather than as a vital adhesive between the urban-based bureaucracy and rural peasantry.

The state during this period had expanded the numbers on its payroll and its ambitions to spur peasant production. The state bureaucrat differed from the cooperative official because he was usually based in an urban area and had a salary that covered his immediate family's basic needs as well as modest improvements to his standard of living. Thus, he was comparatively more insulated

from clientage pressures. A sense of bureaucratic duty during the first decade after independence was maintained more or less intact in the party and government, a phenomenon which was related to Nyerere's elaboration of African socialism as an moral code which bridged the ethics of peasant household survival needs and the bureaucratic duty of state officials serving in the vanguard of nation-building activity. Capitalist profit and patrons' perks were antithetical to the tenets of African socialism as well as being seen as a drain in the state-managed fund for nation-building. It was this attitude in combination with the worsening of Tanzania's terms of trade in the world market which were to underly the state's frontal rural development programme from 1973 onwards.

CHAPTER 6: URBAN FOOD INSECURITY AND THE UNDERMINING OF OCCUPATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1973-1985

The preceding chapter documented the rapid development of labour specialization, the ascendancy of the state vis-a-vis the market and the changing nature of clientage networks under conditions of relatively secure national food supply. In contrast, this chapter examines the erosion of labour specialization and the encroachment of clientage on the state under food supply stress.

1. Merger of the State and Clientage

By 1973, the post-colonial state's systematic attempts to crush clientage practices had resulted in a wide sphere of government supervisory control over the cooperatives, local government and trade unions. This section analyzes the nature and aims of state control, then focuses on why clientage practices began to displace bureaucratic administration as the modus operandi of state agencies.

1. Testing State Hegemony

During the 1970s, the state restructured the hierarchical ordering of the government and party and the locational distribution of state agents.

1.1 Party Supremacy and Rationalization of the Government Bureaucracy

The move towards party supremacy began in 1965 with the establishment of a one-party state and was reinforced by the Arusha Declaration in 1967. Party supremacy achieved a de jure status through an amendment to the constitution in 1975 and was reinforced by the merger of TANU and Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi party into Chama cha Mapinduzi¹ (CCM) and the adoption of a new constitution in 1977.

The party not the parliament held the initiative in major policy formulation. The national party organs remained fairly spontaneous and unrestricted by set procedure and did not have the organizational structure nor the expertise for proposing or evaluating policies in the same way as

¹ Translated 'revolutionary party'.

parliament. Thus, party policy orbitted around the ideas and personal charisma of Nyerere.²

Because of its grassroots orientation, TANU and later CCM became a means for the emergence of many natural leaders to elected party positions who had not been availed the educational opportunities enjoyed by government bureaucrats. At district and branch level, their energies tended to be directed at enforcing a socialist lifestyle and morality. Depending on the most recent national policy directive, local party officials were able to influence where people lived (villagization), what they were to wear (indecent dress campaign), where and how they farmed (block farm extension) and where they were to shop (Operation Maduka involving the closure of private shops). The TANU Guidelines of 1971, otherwise known as Mwongozo, brought party activism to the workplace with its call for vigilance against arrogant and oppressive managers.³ Often the national party directives were vague or indirectly communicated. Not surprisingly, implementation varied a great deal from place to place. Ambitious officials tended to be over-zealous, adopting the extreme interpretations of policies or tried to implement them rapidly, causing huge disruptions to people's daily lives. However, implementation of any specific policy tended to be sporadic and haphazard. People could find loopholes to escape the full force of policies and they knew that party officials' vigorous implementation was bound to subside with time.

Nyerere saw the party as the vital check on bureaucratic performance.⁴ Checks included: the enforcement of the Leadership Code on all high and middle level government employees; reviewing government planning documents; intervening in personnel disputes through the local TANU party branch at the workplace; and monitoring access to higher education and government jobs through the Musoma Declaration mature age university entry scheme which required applicants to gain party approval

² 'The Party's supremacy...represents in effect the power of the presidency' (Goulbourne, Politics and State, 219).

³ TANU, T.A.N.U. Guidelines 1971, (DSM, Government Printer, 1971), 5,11

⁴ Mwansasu, B.U., 'The Changing Role of the Tanganyika African National Union', in Mwansasu and C. Pratt (eds.), Towards Socialism in Tanzania, (DSM, Tanzania Publishing House, 1979), 176

before being accepted by the university. The 1981 CCM Party Guidelines reinforced the party's powers.⁵

Adedeji, in his review of the bureaucracy, expressed concern about the implications of party supremacy on professionalism.

In a politicised system, a relatively junior civil servant may be quite high up in the party hierarchy and therefore the superior of his civil service boss in the party. How can the latter really control and discipline the former within the civil service structure without always fearing retaliation at party levels...The recent TANU Guidelines frown at hierarchical control as being an example of 'colonial working habits and leadership methods'. How can an organisation function effectively and efficiently without hierarchy, control, authority and responsibility. Politicisation of the bureaucracy is likely to weaken the institutional responsibility and turn the civil service into 'countless clusters of personal influence.'⁶

Curbing bureaucratisation was one of the stated objectives of the decentralisation policy implemented in 1972.⁷ The policy's administrative reorganisation was based on the recommendations of the management consultancy firm, McKinsey and Co., so it would be naive to accept the slogan of 'power to the people' at face value. The most central aim of decentralisation was rationalisation of government planning and financial expenditure in the regions. Regional allocative decisions became less subject to direct local control by the inhabitants or their elected representatives.⁸ Regional and district development directors were in charge of planning. The functional officers, recruited from various ministries in Dar es Salaam, were removed from the authority of their parent ministries, placed under the supervision of the Prime Minister's Office, and transferred to regional offices.

⁵ Mlimuka, A.K.L.J. and P.J.A.M. Kabudi, 'The State and the Party', in Shivji, I.G. (ed.), The State and the Working People in Tanzania, (London, Codesria, 1985), 80

⁶ Adedeji, A., The Tanzania Civil Service a Decade after Independence, Ife University Institute of Administration, Monograph Series 2, Ife-Ife, Nigeria, (1974), 27-28

⁷ Coulson, A. Tanzania: A Political Economy, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982), 254

⁸ 'We are trying to eradicate the thicket of red tape and the tyranny of 'the proper channels', not to plant them out all over the country...officers are intended to be servants entrusted by the people with certain duties, not Gods whose order must be obeyed for fear of damnation' (Nyerere, J.K. Decentralisation, (DSM, Government Printer, 1972), 10).

The geographical dispersion of civil servants did not result in rapid expansion of the government bureaucracy (TABLE 6.1). Between 1965 and 1973 government employment increased at 7.1% per annum, whereas between 1973 and 1978 the rate was only 3.7%. It did however support the growth of the secondary cities at a slightly faster rate than that of Dar es Salaam (TABLE 2.1.3). Dar es Salaam civil servants were loathe to be transferred to the regions. The government believed that the presence of high-ranking officials in the regions could effect faster rural development.

The emphasis was on frontal development programmes with the attendant need for generous financial endowment. Foreign donor sources were sought through the government's encouragement of Regional Integrated Development Plans (RIDEPs). Over the latter half of the 1970s each of Tanzania's twenty regions was subjected to the scrutiny of expatriate planning teams sponsored by different donor agencies. The plans required the approval of the regional party and government officials and the Prime Minister's Office before implementation but prior to that point very little coordination came from government. Implementation of the plans ultimately depended upon whether or not the donor agencies offered funding. Only a few regions received substantial financial support.⁹

1.2 State Development Programmes and Intervening Obstacles

In 1973, the state embarked on a nation-wide villagization programme which sought to undermine peasants' shifting cultivation practices, bringing them into nucleated settlements in which they would practice 'modern' agriculture. A sense of urgency underlined the programme.

The relocation exercises took place in 'operations' organized on a regional basis under government and party supervision often prodded by the militia and in some cases the Field Force Unit. Between 1973 and 1976, millions of peasants were moved into nucleated settlements, usually along accessible roads, to facilitate the state provisioning of productive and social service

⁹ Notably, funding by the World Bank in Kigoma, USAID in Arusha and West German aid in Tanga (Kleemeier, L., 'Foreign Assistance Projects in Regional Planning, Tanzania 1972-1982', Geography Department seminar paper, (March 1982)).

infrastructure.

Peasant agricultural transformation was all the more imperative in view of the state's industrialisation programme. Despite the disavowal of rapid industrialisation in the Arusha Declaration and the stated priority given to agriculture, the nationalization of key industries in 1967 and the Second Five Year Plan (1969-1974) pointed Tanzania on the path of industrialisation aimed at establishing a good mix of foundational industries. In the Basic Industries Strategy of the Third Five Year plan between 1975/76 and 1976/77, industrial expenditure leapt from 1.9% to 7.4% of the national budget (TABLE 6.2).

The similarities between the strategies of Preobrazhensky's Soviet Union and Tanzania during the 1970s are striking. State commitment to industrialization and intervention in peasant agricultural production and marketing underlined by extreme optimism about the invincibility of the state characterized both. In Tanzania's case the realization of these policies was thwarted by several obstacles.

Amidst the villagisation campaigns, the oil crisis hit with full force. 1974 oil prices were 350% higher than the previous year causing Tanzania's fuel import bill to rise by TShs. 200 million (TABLE 6.3). The impact of higher oil prices was ubiquitous, raising international shipping as well as domestic transport costs for export crops and peasant incentive goods. The value of Tanzania's imports rose by 73% while exports only increased by 13% between 1973 and 1974 (TABLE 5.26).

Inadequate rainfall in 1973/4 and especially 1974/5 in combination with the dislocating effects of villagization and transport constraints, led to food shortages in rural and urban areas (TABLE 2.15). The all time high level of net food imports in 1975 reflects this (TABLE 2.3).

Despite these blows the country made a marked recovery in 1976 and 1977. Food imports fell back and the deficit in the balance of trade was considerably reduced, even though the liberalization of imports policy under World Bank direction and the launching of the Basic Industries Strategy kept imports high (TABLE 2.3 and TABLE 5.26). But reprieve was brief. In October 1978, the country became embroiled in war with Amin's Uganda. Imports shot up to support the war effort and, to a lesser extent, exports declined as the country's transport system was adversely affected by the

commandeering of public and private vehicles for use by the army. The war ended in May 1979, but economic recovery was nowhere in sight as the second oil crisis hit. Again the value of the oil import bill went up while volume declined. The transport system shrivelled, causing the effects of poor rainfall in 1979/80 to be magnified (TABLE 2.6). Food shortages led to renewed high net imports of grain (TABLE 2.3). The years that followed were characterized by a vicious downward spiral reflected in all economic indicators.

Besides the logistical difficulties of a collapsing transport system, the performance of the party and government bureaucracy was undermined by the disincentive effects of declining real wage and salary levels (TABLES 5.10 and 5.11). Wages and salaries were raised in 1974 to counteract the effect of inflationary price rises following the first oil crisis, but on H.A. Turner's recommendation, the government froze the minimum wage for the next five years and restrained civil service salaries.¹⁰ The real purchasing power of wage earners quickly eroded. By 1983 the purchasing power of the minimum wage was at a par with the 1939 level. Urban families struggled to meet their basic needs on what amounted to a bachelor wage. As peoples' material expectations became increasingly frustrated and economic uncertainty loomed large, clientage practices on the part of the government and party bureaucracy became prevalent.

Clientage relations during this period had distinctive features. They were pervasive in all realms of the state and market, but just as cooperative clientage epitomized clientage during the 1950s and 1960s, it will be argued that parastatal clientage characterised the 1970s and 1980s.

2. Parastatalisation

2.1 Establishment and Organisational Structure

Parastatals in Tanzania are defined as establishments in which the government has at least 50% of the equity and the accounts are calculated on a profit-loss basis. Clark estimates that already

¹⁰ Valentine, T.R., 'Government Wage Policy, Wage and Employment Trends, and Economic Instability in Tanzania since Independence', ERB 81.1 (1981), 54

in 1964 the government had parastatal assets worth TShs. 606 million. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 prompted the government to nationalise a number of key industries and commercial enterprises with assets worth TShs 362 million, 37% in industry, 33% in agriculture, 27% in finance and 3% in commerce.¹¹ The private sector's reluctance or ability to invest in large infrastructural and industrial projects made parastatals an attractive option for the government. Furthermore the government's attempts at planning the economy, it was thought, would be enhanced by the expansion of the parastatal sector.

The number of large national parastatal firms grew from 64 in 1967 to 190 in 1980 (TABLE 6.4).¹² In the Second Five Year Plan parastatal investment was projected to be over ten times greater than private sector investment.¹³ The parastatal's contribution to total capital formation peaked at over 50% in the first half of the 1970s (TABLE 6.4). Between 1966 and 1980, its contribution to GDP expanded from 3% to 22%. The parastatal sector was a motley assortment of enterprises which included: investment banks, import/export agencies, an insurance corporation, crop marketing boards, trading corporations, holding companies for productive enterprises, companies directly involved in production and corporations for the servicing of public transport and communications.

Whatever their specific function parastatals shared a similar organisational structure. Each parastatal had a parent ministry. A Board of Directors had overall responsibility for the corporations' operations and investment decisions. The day-to-day management and hiring was in the hands of the General Manager, assisted by sectional managers depending on the nature of parastatal

¹¹ Clark, W.E., Socialist Development and Public Investment in Tanzania, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1978), 102,107

¹² Tanzania, Analysis of Accounts of Parastatal Enterprises 1972-1980, (DSM, Government Printer, 1983), 3. When one includes the district development corporations and other small firms the total count is doubled. In 1981 Tanzania had almost 400 parastatals (IBRD, Tanzania: Agricultural Sector Report, 4052/TA, (1982), 68).

¹³ Tanzania, Second Five Year Plan, (DSM, Government Printer, 1969), 212-213

operations.¹⁴

This structure was nested in a wide array of regulatory agencies. The President had ultimate control of the establishment of new parastatals, the reorganisation of existing ones and the appointment and dismissal of top level personnel.¹⁵ Nyerere was known to inspect parastatals personally, particularly the ones involved in essential goods supply.¹⁶ The Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisation (SCOPPO), established in 1967, was charged with designing and enforcing a code of conduct as well as setting standard salary levels and fringe benefits. A number of different bodies had supervisory functions over accounts including the Parliamentary Accounts Committee (est. 1978), the Treasury, the Bank of Tanzania, the Tanzania Audit Corporation and the Party Committee for Supervising Parastatal Activities. Major investment decisions were subject to the approval of the parent Ministry and the Economic Commission of the Cabinet.¹⁷ The Price Commission set fixed prices for parastatal products, the Central Bank controlled parastatals' access to foreign exchange and licensed imports, and parastatals were answerable to the party for their employees' working conditions. Despite all these controls, the general complaint outside of the parastatals was that accountability was lacking and that the division of responsibility between ministries, boards, management, workers and party organs was not clear or that technical decisions were left to uninformed politicians.¹⁸

¹⁴ James, R.W. and S. Ligunya, 'Organisational Relationships and the Control of Parastatals in Tanzania', Eastern Africa Law Review 5(1), (1972), 52

¹⁵ Corporation Sole (Establishment) Act 1974

¹⁶ El-Namaki, M.S. Problems of Management in a Developing Environment: The Case of Tanzania (State Enterprise between 1967 and 1975), (Amsterdam, N-Holland Publishing Company, 1979), 244

¹⁷ Ghai, Y., 'Law and Public Enterprise in Tanzania', in Ghai, Y. (ed). Law in the Political Economy of Public Enterprise: African Perspectives, (Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1977), 220

¹⁸ Kahama, G.C., T.L. Maliyamkono and S. Wells, The Challenge for Tanzania's Economy, (London, James Currey, 1986), 92; IBRD, Tanzania: Basic Economic Report, Annex V, 1616-TA, (1977), 60

The financial performance of parastatals, promising at first, deteriorated drastically over the 1970s.¹⁹ Published parastatal accounts were notoriously unreliable. Any aggregate statistics were at best indicative of trends. However, some parastatals were profitable, primarily those dealing in finance or commerce rather than industrial or agricultural production.²⁰ Part of the parastatals' financial problems were traced to under-capitalisation at the time of their establishment.²¹ In general, there was a tendency for over-capitalisation of fixed assets and under-capitalisation of working capital.²² As TABLE 6.5 indicates profits took a nose dive in 1974, while negative cash balances mounted. In the Third Five Year Plan disappointment was expressed at the failure of the parastatal sector to generate adequate investible surpluses.²³ Over time parastatals drew more and more heavily on local borrowing to cover debts which led to rapid expansion of the money supply and inflation.²⁴

Not surprisingly, indicators were that factor productivity was extremely poor. Kim found that on average parastatal firms required two to three times more capital to generate a unit of output

¹⁹ IBRD, Economic Memorandum on Tanzania, 3086-TA, (1981), 46

²⁰ Clark, Socialist Development, 118,183; The profitable industrial parastatals tended to be the firms nationalised at the time of the Arusha Declaration rather than newly created enterprises (IBRD, Tanzania: Basic Economic Report, Annex V, 1616-TA, (1977), 55).

²¹ Moshi, H.P.B., 'Towards Improving the Performance of Public Enterprises in Tanzania: The Missing Factors', Paper presented to an 'Economic Policy Workshop', DSM, (February 1986), 5,20; Daily News: 'Public firms accounts poor', 11/11/85

²² Moshi, H.P.B., 'Financial Performance of Public Corporations: The Case of District Development Corporations (DDCs)', ERB 80.2, (1980), 28

²³ Tanzania, Third Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1st July 1976-30th June 1981, (DSM, Government Printer, n.d.), 3

²⁴ In 1982 the money supply had expanded by TShs. 5 billion over and above the government's official budget (IBRD, Agricultural Sector Report, 78).

than private firms.²⁵ A UNIDO study identified widespread excess capacity.²⁶

As the parastatal sector expanded, its 'socialist' versus 'capitalist' nature was heatedly debated.²⁷ The critics of capitalist penetration slated the introduction of management models derived from American business schools and the role of McKinsey and Co. in the reorganisation of the National Development Corporation and the State Trading Corporation.²⁸ Foreign management contracts were identified with the drain of profits outside the country, the biasing of choice of technology towards capital-intensification and financial irregularities.²⁹ Tanzanian management experts were at pains to point out the socialist nature of parastatal management in terms of planning goals and participatory decision-making.³⁰ But the debate pivoted on the capitalist or socialist form of the parastatal sector and ignored the content of parastatal operations which did not conform to the norms of a state bureaucracy of socialist or capitalist description nor were they suggestive of market rationality. They were primarily conducted on the basis of patron-client relations of managers and employees.

²⁵ Kim, K., 'Enterprise Performance in the Public and Private Sectors: Tanzanian Experience', Journal of Developing Areas 15(3), (1981), 474; Barker, C.E., M.R. Bhagavan, P.v.Mitschke-Collande and D.V. Wield, African Industrialisation, (Hants, Bower, 1986), 123

²⁶ UNIDO, 'The Potential for Resource-Based Industrial Development in LDCs, No. 3, Tanzania', (Vienna, 1982)

²⁷ Parker, I.C., 'NDC Investment Policy and Its Relation to National Industrial Planning Objectives', ERB Discussion Paper, (December, 1970), 5; El-Namaki, Problems of Management, 196-199; Loxley, J. and J. Saul, 'The Political Economy of the Parastatals', in Mapolu, H. (ed.), Workers and Management, (DSM, Tanzania Publishing House, 1976), 17-23

²⁸ Clark, Socialist Development, 113; Loxley, J., 'Principles of Financial Management in Capitalist and Socialist Economies', Rasilimali, (January 1973), 15

²⁹ Shivji, I., 'Capitalism Unlimited: Public Corporations in Partnership with Multinational Corporations', African Review 3(3), (1978), 358-381; Coulson, A., African Socialism in Practice, (Nottingham, Spokesman, 1979), 179-190

³⁰ Mwapachu, J.V., Management of Public Enterprises in Developing Countries: The Tanzania Experience, (New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., 1983)

2.2 Parastatal Managers, Directors and Employees

By the early 1980s there were over 400 parastatals usually headquartered in Dar es Salaam and of a highly centralised nature involving the planning and coordination of economic activities throughout Tanzania. Parastatal management personnel were expected to be imbued with business professionalism as well as being committed to the national development goals of socialism and self-reliance.³¹ Each parastatal had a presidentially-appointed General Manager. The basis for their selection was never made explicit, but political rather than professional credentials of the candidates often took precedence.³²

Members of the Board of Directors of each parastatal were usually appointed by the concerned Minister whereas the Board's Chairman was a presidential appointee. Board members were generally either high-ranking politicians or civil servants. While the extent of their influence varied from one parastatal to another, it is generally argued that they were ineffective because of their lack of business know-how, their appointment to too many boards,³³ the infrequency of their meetings and their indifference arising from the low monetary remuneration they received.³⁴ Ghai describes them as 'largely redundant', maintaining that managerial accountability was to the Minister not the Board.³⁵

³¹ Nsekela, A.J., 'The Public Enterprise as an Instrument of Economic Development in Tanzania', in G. Ruhumbika (ed.), Towards Ujamaa, (DSM, East African Literature Bureau, 1974), 115

³² El-Namaki comments that 'As a result of the heavy politicized nature of the state and the lack of properly trained personnel to man professional and technical posts the process of selection and promotion of top level technocrats in Tanzania tends to be strongly influenced by factors other than sheer professional competence. Although there are no established channels for that selection, as it mostly follows an informal pattern based on contacts and personal knowledge, considerations of political commitment, ideological orientation and patriotic pretensions weigh heavily on the government's decision' (El-Namaki, Problems of Management, 45).

³³ Some individuals were on more than 40 boards (Carvalho, V.N., 'The Control of Managing Agents in Tanzanian Parastatal Organizations with Special Reference to the National Development Corporation', Eastern Africa Law Review 5(1), (1977), 95).

³⁴ They were recipient to per diem allowances and token honorariums (El-Namaki, M.S.S., 'The Effectiveness and the Managerial Behaviour of Company Boards in Tanzania', International Review of Administrative Sciences, (December 1976), 244).

³⁵ Ghai, 'Law and Public Enterprises', 228

While superior educational attainment generally separated management from both white and blue collar employees, the social background of all three groups was remarkably similar. They were all first generation urban dwellers who maintained contact with rural kin. According to von Freyhold's Dar es Salaam survey, the higher income management stratum had the strongest links in terms of rural visits and remitting money. More than half of both groups expected to hold land rights in their rural home areas indefinitely, although most intended to stay in Dar es Salaam for the majority of their lives.³⁶

Parastatal employees received higher wages than government employees of the same occupational rank (compare monthly earnings in TABLES 6.1 and 6.4).³⁷ But whereas their earnings were considered way above the average in the 1960s, SCOPD-enforced rigid salary scales kept them from escalating during the 1970s.³⁸ Bonus schemes to boost salary productivity had to be approved by the Permanent Labour Tribunal and management were reluctant to initiate them.³⁹ The party had been known to block such schemes.⁴⁰ Parastatal managers' salaries were supplemented by numerous perks which varied over time, including entertainment allowances, travel and nights out allowances, company cars, trips abroad, houses, and overseas training. Parastatal employees' perks were far less generous, namely lunch vouchers or subsidized canteen lunches, and company buses to transport them to and from work.

³⁶ von Freyhold, M., 'The Workers, the Nizers and the Peasants', Department of Sociology mimeo, UDSM, (1972), 18-20,69

³⁷ Jackson, D., 'The Disappearance of Strikes in Tanzania', Journal of Modern African Studies 17(2), (1979), 248-250; Knight, J.B. and R. H. Sabot, 'From Migrants to Proletarians: Employment Experience, Mobility and Wages in Tanzania', Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 44(3), (1982), 214

³⁸ Lindauer, D.L. and R.H. Sabot, 'The Public/Private Wage Differential in a Poor Urban Economy', Journal of Development Economics 12, (1983), 141-142

³⁹ Kahama et al., Challenge, 93

⁴⁰ E.g. the National Bank of Commerce's bonus scheme in 1972.

2.3 Parastatal Clientage Practices and Networks

Whether socialist or capitalist objectives are imputed to the parastatal sector, expectations regarding the formal behaviour and work performance of managers' and employees' are essentially the same, i.e. the professional execution of their jobs in an efficient, hierarchically coordinated manner to achieve planned targets of production and to generate investible surpluses for the national economy. There were numerous external agencies that could regulate and impose checks on parastatal performance. However, so many of the checks could not be enforced in the absence of up-to-date audited accounts which the vast majority of parastatals continuously failed to produce on time.⁴¹ Indeed, few parastatals kept careful account of their financial transactions and stocks making annual audited accounts an impossibility.⁴² The parastatals with the most out-of-date accounts tended to be the ones with the biggest overdrafts and rumoured to be the most corrupt. Nonetheless, banks continued to be willing to loan to parastatals disregarding their creditworthiness and failure to produce audited accounts,⁴³ particularly in the case of the crop authorities which were seen as

⁴¹ According to the Minister of Finance, '...on average 70% of the over 400 parastatals have questionable standards of accounting.' The percentage of parastatals with annual accounts in arrears grew from 3% in 1976 to 46% in 1983. '...it was clear that the managements in the parastatals in arrears had little or no control over their financial affairs. It was small wonder that 165 such institutions made a loss of 910.21m/- in 1983...If all the accounts in arrears are available, it is needless to add that the losses incurred by the nation due to poor financial controls in parastatals would be very high' (Daily News: 'Minister warns on arrears' 16/3/85). The Chairman of the National Board of Accountants and Auditors revealed that '...the Government is losing 2.5 bn/- annually by way of subvention due to failure by some parastatal organisations to submit their reports of accounts (Daily News: 'Accounting standards poor', 16/3/85).

⁴² Moshi estimated that 60% of the parastatals had substantial amounts of unvouched and improperly vouched expenditure (Moshi, H.P.B., 'Adequacy of Control in Tanzania's Public Enterprises', Public Enterprises 5(1), (1984), 36); Daily News: 'Over 213m/- unaccounted for', 20/4/85).

⁴³ Repeatedly the government stated its intention to close down loss-making parastatals, yet the liberal granting of bank overdrafts continued (IBRD, Tanzania: Basic Economic Report, 103; Daily News: 'Public firms told: Credit no panacea for poor performance', 12/12/80; 'Repay loans Treasury', 19/9/84; 'Losing firms warned', 8/11/85; A Ministry of Finance spokesman 'attacked crop authorities saying they were experts in making budgets while their reports of accounts were in arrears' ('Accounting standards poor', 16/3/85); 'Loss-making institutions should go' 20/5/85).

strategic to national welfare.⁴⁴

Parastatals were riddled with clientage practices which grew more profuse and ingenious as the national economic crisis deepened. The general manager, his retinue of supporting managers and the accounting staff had the best access to parastatal resources. They could engage in a long list of malpractices including: misuse of public vehicles, dubious imprests, falsification of records on purchases particularly with private customers, favouritism in allocating goods, lack of proper procedures in the application of funds from Treasury, misappropriation and fraud, poor control and management of movable fixed assets, fraudulent accounting, negligence, theft and embezzlement,⁴⁵ inadequate project feasibility studies resulting in the acceptance of uneconomic projects which involved kickbacks,⁴⁶ and

⁴⁴ Between 1973 and 1982 commercial bank lending to agricultural produce marketing rose from 31% to 61% of total lending (Bank of Tanzania, Economic and Operations Report, (June 1983), 69); Daily News: 'Public accounts', 28/4/85; As of 1982, none of the most important agricultural marketing and production parastatals had up-to-date accounts. The latest audited accounts were as follows with their 1980/81 profit/losses listed in brackets in millions of Tanzanian Shillings:

1977: Tanzania Sisal Authority (-34.8), Coffee Authority of Tanzania (+10.1), National Milling Corporation (-470.0)

1978: Cashewnut Authority of Tanzania (-23.5), Tanzania Cotton Authority (-5.3), National Food Corporation (-0.2)

1979: GAPEX (-20.3), Tobacco Authority of Tanzania (-128.5)

1980: Tanzania Pyrethrum Board (-9.6), Tanzanian Tea Authority (-18.2), Sugar Development Corporation (+2.6)

Source: IBRD, Tanzania: Agricultural Sector Report, 76

By 1986, seven agricultural parastatals had accumulated losses of 2,483m/- (Daily News: 'Msuya emphasises tight expenditure', 17/1/86).

⁴⁵ Daily News: 'Public funds theft rises', 5/7/77; 'Corruption is now an epidemic', 20/1/78; 'Millions of Government cash stolen', 18/7/78; 'Surprise checks may reduce fraud-Aboud', 8/9/79; 'Firms Start on Wrong Footing', 8/8/80; 'Watchdog of Public Accounts', 6/9/80; 'NEC bans vibali', 11/1/81; 'Millions spent on car hires', 22/1/81; 'Bankers implicated in bribery bid', 5/5/81; 'Ntagazwa urges good materials management', 16/5/84; 'NDL Workers Told: Don't incite row', 15/9/84; 'CATA losses over 22m/-', 30/11/84; 'Report corrupt workers - RTC', 11/12/84; 'Permits disrupt RTC activities', 21/12/84; 'Essentials supply snags explained', 4/2/85; Moshi, 'Adequacy of Control', 36

⁴⁶ Major investment decisions were frequently taken in the absence of basic financial data (IBRD, Agricultural Sector Report, 89).

accumulation of large outstanding debts.⁴⁷ Moshi's extensive research on parastatal operations led him to conclude that:

...the PEs [public enterprises] turned out to become instruments for privatisation of benefits and for socialisation of costs (losses). This explains why PE managers are usually healthier than the organisations they are managing.⁴⁸

Stock control was very lax allowing pilfering.⁴⁹ Those employees who had poor access to either finances or stocks could always neglect to do their jobs.⁵⁰ Arriving late for work, reading newspapers, chatting and absence during the day to do errands unconnected with work were the norm.⁵¹ Under a perpetual 'go-slow', workers could extract small bribes for merely agreeing to 'speed-up' execution of their work tasks.⁵² Statutory security of employment made job dismissal an infrequent occurrence. One cannot conclude however that more lowly-placed workers were completely isolated from the big rake-offs. For example, the messenger and a guard that were implicated in the 1984 Bank of

⁴⁷ According to the Director of Operations of the National Institute of Productivity; '...business is mostly conducted on credit, as such by withholding payment of debts to creditors the management is able to show that a parastatal is doing well while in actual fact would have fared badly if it had paid the debts on time' (Daily News, 'Give Detailed Reports, Firms Told', 10/9/80). Often there were disagreements over the size of debts and refusals to pay (Moshi, 'Adequacy of Control', 37).

⁴⁸ Moshi, 'Towards Improving Performance', 3

⁴⁹ Daily News: 'How stores men lose millions', 2/10/79; According to the Auditor General's annual report, discovered store losses totalled TShs. 126 million whereas cash losses were only TShs. 33 million (Daily News 'Tight control on funds urged' 18/9/84).

⁵⁰ Nyerere, The Arusha Declaration Ten Years After, (DSM, Government Printer, 1977), 35; Daily News: 'Report on falling discipline', 9/7/80; Nyerere stated: 'We have failed to punish those who fail to do their work. As a result no work is done; and the people do not get what they are supposed to get' ('Be bold, says Nyerere', 12/1/82).

⁵¹ Hyden interprets workers' apathy as a direct result of the abandonment of 'capitalist management' in the wake of Mwongozo. 'For most wage-earners work was the price you paid for urban residence and access to its amenities. It was not something honoured in itself. Only the sanctions imposed by capitalist management had made many workers accept this obligations...requests for time off to visit sick relatives, or loans for emergency needs in the family, were made with less constraint, because many workers expected such favours to be granted now that the capitalist concern for profit had been officially condemned' (Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa, 160-161). I would argue that Mwongozo probably facilitated this direction, but it was the decline in the purchasing power of urban wages which was the main motive force.

⁵² Daily News: 'Juwata raps corruption', 15/6/81

Tanzania fire were, it was rumoured, acting on behalf of people higher up who had reason to seek the destruction of the Bank's financial records.⁵³

Quantitative measurement of clientage practices is impossible. The Bank of Tanzania fire is perhaps indicative of what lengths could be taken to cover up activities. But an impression of their extent can be gleaned from newspaper accounts of frauds and the National Audit Board reports on incomplete submission of parastatal accounts. The enormous bank overdrafts that most of the parastatals had are suggestive of malpractice. But other factors which will be covered in the discussion of the National Milling Corporation also determine the size of a parastatal's bank overdraft.

Unlike Native Authority and neighbourhood clientage, parastatal clientage was pursued with a certain amount of discreteness, even secrecy, because it was knowingly a transgression of professional conduct and often the law.⁵⁴ The dynamic underlying parastatal clientage relations

⁵³ Daily News: 'Fire guts Central Bank', 18/5/84; During a National Assembly session, '[t]he MP of Kigoma Urban...questioned as to how a case like that involving the gutting of the Bank of Tanzania could have been committed by a mere messenger and clerk' ('Call to fight corruption', 20/4/85).

⁵⁴ In 1970 the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance was amended to cover parastatal employees charged with bribery, fraud or collusion very broadly defined. Similarly, a Penal Code amendment set a common minimum sentence for parastatal and government employees convicted of theft in the course of their duties or damage of public property (James and Ligunya, 'Organizational Relationships', 43). Carvalho argues that '...the fear in...the employees of parastatal organisations has heightened to a point of quite a lot of them attempting to shirk responsibilities as much as possible... (Carvalho, 'Control of Managing Agents', 110). This should be compared with El-Namaki's view, some years later, that the 'scope for punitive action' was far too narrow. He maintains that government failed to take corrective measures until matters reached a crisis proportion and suggests there is a limit to the punitive action government can take because the shortage of management personnel makes it relatively futile to fire managers (El-Namaki, Problems of Management, 238-239, 251, 254). The enigma of stiff penalties but lax legal enforcement is, in the opinion of Ghai, related to the mode of operation of the party versus the judiciary. The Party is 'happy in the language of moral norms and ethics, not in that of regulations and administration...there is an impatience with [judicial] rules and procedures'...and... 'an anxiety at the unpredictability of the results through the legal process. The underlying principles and procedures of the legal system are among the state institutions in Tanzania to undergo the least change since independence. The independence of the courts has been maintained, and the adversary system as well...The control by the executive over and through the legal system is perceived to be less effective than over the administrative process, and produces the tendency towards either moving the matters in question to the administrative sector or altering the balance in the legal process' (Ghai, 'Law and Public Enterprise', 256).

differed from that which had prevailed under Native Authority and cooperative clientage. The material insecurity was still the motive for initiating clientage practices, but rather than mutual support between patrons and clients with clients bestowing prestige on patrons in return for favours, managers and employees plundered parastatal resources at will. They had to be willing to participate to some degree in a conspiracy of silence, turning a blind eye to each others' exploits.⁵⁵

The conspiracy of silence was lubricated by nepotistic practices. Besides overmanning in parastatals, it was constantly rumoured that managers placed relations or friends in posts within their enterprises.⁵⁶

Clientage relations within the parastatal cohered on the basis of combined material insecurity and fear. Face-to-face accountability rested more on mutual fear of exposure than close identification between management and worker. But the accountability of parastatal employees vis-a-vis the rest of the population was very limited, particularly with respect to the peasantry. As consumers of parastatal goods and services peasants suffered from the serious inefficiencies of the erratic delivery service and high prices. As producers, they received low prices for their crops. As service takers, they received scant attention and as taxpayers they were over-burdened by the bank overdrafts that ultimately came down on their shoulders.

⁵⁵ Moshi, despairingly, writes that a blind eye was pervasive throughout government and the parastatal sector. '...there is no code of conduct in the operations of the PEs. Some are run like ministries, others like personal empires, still others like cars without drivers. The effect of all these is a situation of nil accountability; public funds are embezzled with impunity, arrogant and irresponsible workers confidently boast that they can't easily be dismissed, errant officials instead of being sacked are transferred from one institution to another, where the sins are repeated and lastly, officials who steal money from the PEs are sacked but never get prosecuted. In short, the Tanzania's softness promotes laxity and corruption whose perpetrators are 'heros and heroines' rather than a curse for which they should be declared national outcasts' (Moshi, 'Towards Improving Performance', 25).

⁵⁶ Personal contacts were especially important in unskilled job recruitment (Knight and Sabot, 'From Migrants to Proletarians', 221); Daily News: 'Nepotism is rampant-MP', 27/6/81; 'Kawawa denies nepotism', 28/6/81; 'PM discounts nepotism claims', 30/6/81; 'Train workers, employers told', 28/2/84

What most distinguishes parastatal clientage from that of the Native Authorities and cooperatives is that its networks largely failed to engulf the rural areas, despite the fact that the parastatals had been designated as the main provisioners of the modern, improved means of production and consumption that peasants sought. Based in urban areas and shielded from the public behind a facade of corporate business procedures, the face-to-face accountability that the peasantry had exercised over the cooperative patrons had less chance to be exerted. Clientage no longer adjusted the processes of market and state surplus extraction. Over-extraction through a decline in peasant producer prices and a rise in consumer prices and a marked deterioration in the rural standard of living was evident (TABLES 6.6 and 6.7). This will be illustrated in the discussion of the National Milling Corporation.

Parliamentary committee reviews of parastatal performance were to little avail. Over the latter part of the 1970s the press began to take an active role in trying to uncover corrupt practices in the government and parastatals, eagerly reporting the investigations of the government's Anti-Corruption Squad.⁵⁷ President Nyerere, under the instigation of the party, was increasingly exercising his right to dismiss managers. An anti-corruption campaign was launched following a 1981 NEC extraordinary party meeting to discuss essential goods shortages.⁵⁸ For Nyerere it was a matter of weeding out certain corrupt individuals in an otherwise sound governmental and parastatal system:

We must introduce a little bit of hell in our fight against corruption in Tanzania'...We have not found out that one parastatal organisation is the source of corruption for another.'⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Daily News: 'Corruption: Preventive dose needed now', 4/1/76; 'Okulu is guilty', 28/5/76; 'Squad to open branches', 24/6/76; 'Beware corrupt leaders, CCM Chairman warns', 16/4/77; 'Comment: Corruption', 18/1/78; 'ATC reservations staff negligent-GM', 19/7/80; 'On swindles and losses', 2/8/81

⁵⁸ Some of the more spectacular scandals that were uncovered were: the Air Tanzania Corporation (ATC) contract that resulted in the removal of a Minister, the ATC General Manager and the Chairman of the Board of Directors; the Tanzania Investment Bank scandal involving the sacking of the Chairman and Managing Director and the General Manager; and the Tanzania Elimu Supplies fraud followed by the removal of its General Manager (Mlimuka and Kabudi, 'The State', 79).

⁵⁹ Daily News: 'Corrupt people face hell', 12/2/81; At an Extraordinary National Party Conference in 1982, Nyerere 'said almost all leaders wanted lots of money and were being bribed clandestinely' ('Mwalimu slates corrupt leaders', 24/1/82).

There were limits to this however. Some government and party officials widely suspected of gross misconduct were not netted, and it was rumoured that they were too powerful for such treatment.⁶⁰ The campaign's firing squad was in danger of getting a return volley with unpredictable consequences for state stability. The government's emphasis switched from an anti-corruption theme to economic efficiency, appointing a special commission in January 1983 to look into the activities and performance of parastatal corporations with a view to reducing operating costs.⁶¹ However, just before the completion of his last term of office, Nyerere, in his characteristic see-saw style of policy-making, appealed for management autonomy.⁶²

Parastatal clientage practices probably resulted in a net value transfer from rural areas to the urban areas, since most parastatal employees were urban dwellers. Ellis' work suggests that this was true of the marketing boards which had the largest bank overdrafts in the parastatal sector.⁶³ Considering that most of this money probably went into the private pockets of parastatal employees, how did they spend it?

After 1975 urban incomes were declining at a faster rate than rural incomes (compare TABLES 5.10, 5.11 and 6.7). Since so much of peasant consumption was self-provisioned, urban residents were evidently experiencing a much more drastic decline in their accustomed standard of living than peasants. It is likely that a great deal of the value transfer was used to try to stave this fall in

⁶⁰ Dimsdale, J., 'Rhetoric meets reality', Africa Report, November/December 1983

⁶¹ Tanzania, The Economic Survey 1982, (DSM, Government Printer, 1983), 74

⁶² 'Mwalimu...said managers of public enterprises must...be allowed to operate without undue interference from Party branches and government bureaucrats..."Our managers are asked too many questions"...like managers of private concerns, public sector managers must enjoy operational freedom provided they operated their institutions profitably, paid dividends to the Treasury registrar and maintained good relations between the management and workers' (Daily News: 'Let managers do their job', 30/10/86).

⁶³ Ellis, 'Agricultural Marketing', (1983)

urban material welfare. Secondly, the money could have been used for ostentatious consumption but strict import controls throughout this period imposed limitations. There was investment in house building, but cars, boats, expensive liquors, holidays abroad, etc. were very difficult to obtain. Furthermore, since most of Tanzania's elite were first-generation urban dwellers, they tended not to have aspirations for the trappings of a 'bourgeois' lifestyle as defined by European consumers. Non-essential consumption was more on the traditional lines of drinking large quantities of beer, as well as a growing incidence of cigarette smoking. Bottled beer and cigarettes were subject to enormous sales tax and constituted one of the largest sources of government revenues.⁶⁴ Outside of the infamous chicken farms of government and parastatal 'wakubwa',⁶⁵ it is very difficult to gauge how much was productively invested. The stringent controls on property ownership imposed by the Leadership Code, which applied to all middle and high income personnel, put a damper on investment possibilities.

The imposition of peasant face-to-face accountability on parastatal patrons was not completely undermined. Peasant demands could be lodged through household channels. Rural-based peasant branches of the extended family could and did make demands on their urban kin, often for consumer goods that were unobtainable in the rural areas or lodging rights in the urban areas for schooling children or ill members seeking urban hospital services.

In summary, parastatal clientage like the other forms of clientage represented inter-personal exchange relations under conditions of extreme material insecurity. Unlike earlier forms, its inter-personal dealings were conducted by people who identified as urban wage earners and salaried

⁶⁴ As export revenues declined, sales and excise tax became an ever increasing share of total government revenue, amounting to 53% in 1980/81 (Tanzania, Economic Survey 1982, 41). Of this 33% derived from beer and 15% from cigarettes (ILO, Basic Needs in Danger, Addis Ababa, JASPA, (1982), 167). Significantly, unlike other industries, the capacity utilization of the beer and cigarette industries did not significantly drop between 1976 and 1981 (Singh, A., 'Exogenous Shocks and De-Industrialization in Africa: Prospects and Strategies for Sustained Industrial Development', Trade and Development Review 78, (1987), Table 7).

⁶⁵ Translated 'big-men'.

professionals purportedly adhering to the norms of corporate business impartiality and legality. Under these circumstances, clientage practices became more secretive. Furthermore, the urban location of the patrons put them out of the range of face-to-face accountability with the peasants. Thus, urban occupational accountability was undermined in almost all respects, which had grave implications for the viability of labour specialisation in the national economy.

II. Government and Parastatal Staple Food Management

Increasing domestic production and marketed supply of food were necessary pre-conditions for successful industrialisation and attendant urbanisation. As state policy aims, their importance was reinforced by the drought, domestic food shortages and massive food imports of the mid-1970s. With a sense of urgency and confidence in its own organisational capability, the state embarked on a number of measures in line with Preobrazhensky's theories.

I. State-regulated Peasant Production

1.1 Villagisation

In 1973, President Nyerere publically announced: 'To live in villages is an order'.⁶⁶ For decades, peasants' dispersed settlement and shifting cultivation had been seen as the greatest obstacle to the country's agricultural development. Unlike the preceding ujamaa village policy, the villagisation programme carried out between 1973 and 1976 was directed at nucleating settlement rather than collectivising production. The rationale was that once peasants were aggregated, they could more easily be provided with improved inputs and social services, and their fields, whether or not they were collectively cultivated, could be contiguous, facilitating mechanisation and fertiliser and insecticide application. The National Maize Project is the best illustration of a post-villagisation agricultural development project (APPENDIX VIII).

Relatively rich peasants as well as the middle and poor peasants were subject to the dictates of

⁶⁶ Daily News: 7/11/73. In September 1973 the TANU Biennial Conference had passed a resolution that the whole rural population should reside in villages by 1976.

the villagisation 'operations' carried out by regional government and party officials. As a result, considerable social and economic levelling took place. Although the rich peasants were by no means eliminated, the inconvenience of having their residence moved, the restrictions placed on the amount of land they could farm and the general supremacy of the village chairman and council in allocating resources represented a set-back.⁶⁷

By 1978 the government estimated that 86% of the population lived in 7,768 villages compared with only 809 villages recorded in 1969.⁶⁸ A 'critical mass' of 250 households or more, was sufficient for the village to be registered as a corporate unit under the 1975 Village Act.⁶⁹ The registered village functioned as a multi-purpose cooperative. Village collective farms were encouraged by party and government officialdom, but it was left up to the initiative of village leaders to organise. Not all villages had collective farms and those that did tended to be small when measured in terms of per capita acreage.⁷⁰ More common was the 'block farm' where peasants cultivated individual plots which were contiguous.⁷¹

The government's attempts at supervising village production took several forms. Villages were

⁶⁷ Kjaerby, F., 'Agricultural Productivity and Surplus Production in Tanzania: Implications of Villagization, Fertilizers and Mixed Farming', Discussion Paper, UDSM, (1979), 20; However, in some cases the elected village chairman was a rich peasant which mitigated decisions against that group (Friis-Hansen, E., 'An Assessment of Changes in Land Tenure and Land Use since Villagisation and the Impact of the Development of Peasant Agricultural Production in Tanzania', CDR Research Report, Copenhagen, (May 1986), 17).

⁶⁸ Statistics from Prime Minister's Office, Dodoma, 1978), cited in Ngware, S.S.A., 'Emerging Trends after Villagisation', ILO JASPA, DSM, (1981), 7

⁶⁹ According to the 1978 census, Tanzanian mainland had 7990 villages with an average of 365 households per village (Tanzania, Population Census, IV, 90).

⁷⁰ For example, in Tibaijuka's sample of 13 villages in Iringa, Mbeya and Ruvuma, on average adults only cultivated 0.14 acres communally (Tibaijuka, A., 'An Economic Survey of Village Projects in Iringa, Mbeya and Ruvuma Regions, 1979', ERB 81.3, UDSM, (1981), 20).

⁷¹ Block farms constituted one-third of all cultivated area in a 1977/78 Kigoma villages' sample (Loft, M. and J. Oldevelt, 'Developments in Peasant Agriculture in Kigoma Region during the Post-Villagisation Years', ERB, UDSM, (1981), 39).

required to devise work time tables which would 'enable Regional heads to know, supervise, guide and evaluate work being done by villagers in order to achieve better results.'⁷² Beginning in 1978, the post of village managers was created with the aim of providing on-the-spot supervision in the technical aspects of agricultural production.⁷³ Besides the difficulties that the government had in filling these positions, village managers tended to resent their postings to the rural areas and consequently were not highly motivated.⁷⁴ Overall, attempts at organising peasant economic life through the village government were limited by the insufficient managerial and accountancy skills of the village leadership, their failure to identify with the higher echelons of the government and party bureaucracy and the widespread incidence of clientage practices.⁷⁵

1.2 Changes in Peasant Agriculture

There were two powerful forces exerting pressure on Tanzanian peasant agriculture during the period under review. The first was purely domestic, namely the state's efforts to modernize agriculture through its villagisation programme and the imposition of numerous state regulatory measures. The second was the economic crisis triggered by drastic price changes in the world market and its economic and political reverberations in Tanzania. Even in the absence of the latter, it is not very probable that the state's plan for peasant agriculture could succeed as intended. The hope of many urban-based bureaucrats was to create factory-like production on the part of peasant

⁷² Daily News: 'PM calls for work time-tables', 4/5/77

⁷³ Daily News: 'Government looks for village managers', 10/2/78

⁷⁴ McCall, M. and M. Skutsch, 'Strategies and Contradictions in Tanzania's Rural Development: which path for the peasants?', in Lea, D.A. and D. Chaudhri (eds.), Rural Development and the State, (London, Methuen, 1983), 258; Ngware, 'Emerging Trends', 57

⁷⁵ Moore, M.P. and P. Stutley, 'Smallholder Food Production in Tanzania', DSM, Report to SIDA and the Government of Tanzania, (1981), 64

households in a three-staged process.⁷⁶ First, the state would provide the peasants with improved productive inputs, initially at a subsidized rate to promote their adoption, but eventually remove the subsidy. Second, the household would use these inputs to produce improved yields. Third, the output would be sold to state marketing agencies at an incentive price, but one well below world market prices. Thus, the state would serve as the production and marketing manager of peasant household units, advancing the capital to combine with peasants' land and labour inputs, then marketing the output. There were, however, innumerable things that could and did go wrong.

The state's input delivery system had numerous shortcomings. Because of Tanzania's large geographical area and input expense, village coverage was always restricted. Untimely delivery and poor storage of inputs reduced the effectiveness of the inputs' effect. Many of the inputs were clearly wrong and sometimes even harmful, for the specific environmental conditions of Tanzania's different agro-economic zones (APPENDIX VIII).

Peasants experienced a number of problems in utilizing the inputs, the most notable being the lack of household labour for additional tasks connected with input application. Villagization had compounded the labour shortage situation. Peasants had to spend more time walking to and from fields which were more liable to crop destruction by vermin.⁷⁷ The semi-urban atmosphere of the now larger nucleated villages created a youth sub-culture amongst the male youth who flaunted urban tastes and disdained rural life and agricultural toil.⁷⁸ Much of the increased workload associated with

⁷⁶ '[T]he villages could be conceived of as factories in the field.' Kighoma Malima, then Minister for Planning and Economic Affairs in a lecture at the UDSM, 20/2/79 quoted in Kjaerby, 'Scratching the Surface: the Tanzanian Tractor Fiasco, the Undiscovered Oxenization Boom and the Drag of Mixed Farming', Draft, CDR, Copenhagen, (November 1984), 4

⁷⁷ McCall, 'Resource Planning Implications of Tanzania's Villagization Programme', Twente University of Technology, The Netherlands, (1983), 6

⁷⁸ Kjaerby, 'Scratching', 14

agricultural intensification fell on the women.⁷⁹ Furthermore, the implementation of the Universal Primary Education caused a large reduction in the availability of child labour.

A major pitfall in the 'state factory' schema was the peasants' ability not to deliver the output to state agencies. The peasantry could eat their surplus if it was in the form of food, or sell it outside official state marketing channels. It was for these reasons that, like Preobrazhensky, the Tanzanian state saw peasant agriculture as extremely cumbersome and preferred the more direct control of large-scale state farming.⁸⁰

What actually happened to peasant agriculture after villagisation? Villagisation made the continuation of shifting agriculture impossible. By nucleating population, villagisation artificially raised critical population densities⁸¹ to the point at which agricultural intensification and technological change in the Boserupian sense became imperative. Kjaerby argues that villagization engendered a 'land-use crisis' which pre-empted most of the traditional preventive and regenerative responses to loss of soil fertility.⁸² The concentration of population in villages put more pressure on the soils, pasture land and firewood availability.⁸³ Various animal grazing patterns in combination with dispersed, shifting settlement were no longer possible. People could no longer move when soil fertility was depleted or when insect and rodent infestation and the build-up of

⁷⁹ McCall, M. 'Heavier Burdens and Lower Status: Some Implications of Villagisation for Women in Tanzania', Twente University of Technology, The Netherlands, (1984), 4-15; Kjaerby, 'Scratching', 8

⁸⁰ Moore and Stutley, 'Smallholder', 92,97

⁸¹ I.e. before population growth rates caused them to be so.

⁸² Kjaerby, 'Scratching', 2-13

⁸³ In some cases, the government conceded that the villages were too large and advocated the formation of smaller 'satellite' villages around a core service area especially in Tabora (McCall, 'Resource', 11).

plant, livestock and human diseases became serious.⁸⁴ Furthermore, it saved peasants' time to intensify production on the fields closest to the settlement.⁸⁵

Throughout Tanzania, peasants turned away from export crop production. Coffee, cotton and cashew, the main export crops, declined (TABLE 5.1). It would be a mistake to attribute this directly to the effects of villagization since real export values as well as domestic prices were declining (TABLE 6.6). Instead peasant agriculture concentrated on food production, spurred by higher relative prices as well as a re-emphasis on household food self-sufficiency.

Despite the impact of villagization and government agricultural programmes, the adoption of improved inputs by peasants in the nation as a whole was still very limited. Fertiliser distribution increased from 0.9 kgs. to 6.6 kgs per rural resident between 1962 and 1980 boosted by the state's substantial fertiliser subsidy.⁸⁶ Similarly between 1974 and 1980 improved seed distribution expanded from 0.1 to 0.4 kgs.⁸⁷ However, a significant portion of this would have gone to the large-scale farming sector rather than peasant producers. By the early 1980s peasant usage was registering a noticeable decline.⁸⁸ In 1982, for example, out of 8,029 tons of improved seeds produced by TANSEED, only 32% was purchased by the farmers.⁸⁹ As input subsidies were lifted, only the commercial food crop farmers could buy fertilizers and insecticides. The cultivation of hybrid maize was pursued

⁸⁴ Contiguous fields and continuous mono-cropping increased the likelihood of plant infestation and disease. The alarming spread of the 'scania' borer in maize came in the wake of villagisation (Golob, P. and R. Hodges, 'Study of an Outbreak of Prostephanus truncatus (Horn) in Tanzania', Tropical Products Institute 6164, London, (1982)).

⁸⁵ Friis-Hansen, 'Assessment', 30

⁸⁶ In 1981/82 the fertiliser price and transport subsidy amounted to nearly TShs. 750 million (Stewart, F., Economic Policies and Agricultural Performance: The Case of Tanzania, Paris, OECD, (1986), 55)

⁸⁷ IBRD, Tanzania: Agricultural Sector Report, 126

⁸⁸ Between 1979 and 1982 domestic production of fertilisers fell by 70% without a compensating increase in imports (Stewart, Economic Policies, 73).

⁸⁹ Ndulu, B. and L.A. Msambichaka, 'Agricultural Sector Development in Tanzania 1961-1982', Arne Ryde Symposium on the Primary Sector in Economic Development, University of Lund, Sweden, (1983), 17

mainly for cash rather than home consumption.⁹⁰ Peasants' were reluctant to improve the land with long-term fixed investments, thinking that their plots may be subject to re-allocation in follow-up villagisation measures.⁹¹

Overall, did peasant agricultural productivity improve? In the absence of detailed yield data measuring the before and after situation, it is impossible to say. However, it seems likely that in the case of the Southern Highlands productivity per land and labour unit probably increased due to a combination of capital injection and the 'vent for surplus' effect created by improved transport conditions. Hybrid maize became the area's specialized cash crop. Improvements in productivity per unit of capital, however, are highly questionable, especially in view of the huge deficits in the parastatals servicing input supply and peasant marketing. In the Northern areas, Kjaerby conjectures that productivity per unit of labour declined,⁹² whereas it could have increased per unit of land and capital with the spread of ox-ploughing. At the aggregated level of total peasant output, it seems likely that the decline in export crop production was not fully compensated for in terms of increased food production, at least in value terms; the best evidence for this being the overall decline in standards of living of the Tanzanian population. Incentives for peasants to produce over and above subsistence levels were lacking due to the scarcity of purchasable consumer goods.⁹³

⁹⁰ Farmers did not like to rely on hybrid maize for home supply because it did not store as well as the traditional local varieties and they did not like its taste (Schneider-Barthold, W. et al., 'Farmers' Reactions to the Present Economic Situation in Tanzania with Respect to Production and Marketing' German Development Institute, Berlin, (1983), 78; Rasmussen, T. 'Commercialised Maize Production among Smallholders in the Southern Highlands, Tanzania', CDR 86.3, Copenhagen, (1986), 11; Friis-Hansen, 'Assessment', 99).

⁹¹ Tanzania, Ministry of Agriculture, The Agricultural Policy of Tanzania, (DSM, Government Printer, 1983), 63

⁹² Kjaerby, 'Scratching', 20

⁹³ In connection with this, Kjaerby has recorded an increased incidence of beer brewing and drinking representing a domestic use for grain surpluses as well as a expressed preference for leisure over labour expenditure (Kjaerby, F. 'Effects of the Tanzanian Crisis Economy and Agricultural Intensification on Adoption of Innovations and Social Forms of Peasant Production', CDR, Copenhagen, (August 1983), 7; Moore and Stutley, 'Smallholder', 13)

2. State Farms

Despite the rapid expansion of the state farm sector and its importance to domestic marketed food supply, it is extremely under-researched. The analysis in this section relies primarily on the insightful work of Han Bantje whose investigations were carried out at farm level and at National Agricultural and Food Corporation (NAFCO) headquarters.⁹⁴

2.1 Expansion

In Tanzania, the term 'state farm' embraces a number of state institutions including those that attempt to produce food for their own internal needs, most notably the prisons, the army and many schools of higher learning,⁹⁵ as well as the commercial state farms operated by the Ministry of Agriculture and various parastatals. Of the latter, the NAFCO group and its subsidiaries was by far the largest, being a holding company of over 20 different farms.⁹⁶

1973 marked the beginning of a clearly distinguishable state farm sector with the nationalisation of European and Asian farms in Kilimanjaro and Arusha. These farms were divided amongst the cooperatives, district development corporations and NAFCO.⁹⁷ The rationalisation for expansion at this point was the incongruity of prosperous, large private farms with the tenets of the

⁹⁴ Bantje, H., 'NAFCO', Draft Paper, IRA, UDSM, (1984)

⁹⁵ Daily News: 'Brigade steps up production', 4/5/78; 'Army should feed itself - Kawawa', 27/1/85

⁹⁶ As of 1984 the group included: Mbeya: Mbarali Rice Farm, Mfinga: Madibira Rice Farm, Hanang: Mulbadaw, Gidagamowd, Waret Wheat Projects, Murjanda Wheat Scheme, Gawal Wheat Farm, Moshi: Kahe Estate, Morogoro: Dakawa Oil Seed Farm, Mbozi: Mbozi Coffee Farms, Songea: Nantumbo Maize Project. The subsidiaries were: Hanang: Basotu Plantations Ltd., Setchet Wheat Co. Ltd, Coast: Ruvu Rice Farms Ltd., Bagamoyo Farms Ltd., Morogoro: Dakawa Rice Farms Ltd, Arusha: Kiru Valley Development Co. Ltd., Oljoro Farms Ltd., Mbozi: Mbozi Maize Farms Ltd., DSM: Kigamboni Poultry Farm Ltd.

⁹⁷ Shah, R.M., Problems and Methodology of Farm Management in the State Farms: A Case Study of Arusha Plantations, M.A. Thesis, UDSM, (1976), 41-43, 147

Arusha Declaration. Thereafter, state farm growth, although phenomenal, received little publicity.⁹⁸ Following the food shortages of 1973-75, NAFCO was given the green light to expand as fast as foreign aid could take it in the spheres of wheat, rice and maize production. The aim was to bolster and regularise domestic marketed supply, much in the same way as the 1943 food shortages had led the colonial state to vest hope in large-scale capitalised farming over lower-yielding, erratic peasant production.⁹⁹ In 1981, NAFCO reported wheat, paddy and maize hectarages of 18013, 3373 and 1233 with total tonnage output of 21868, 23792 and 3502. Between 1973/74 and 1981/82 NAFCO cultivated area expanded from 5510 ha. to 30,346 ha (24% annual growth rate) with cereal output increasing from 7715 tons to 68,203 tons (31% annual growth rate).¹⁰⁰ As in the 1940s, capitalised wheat production received the most investment.

2.2 Operations

Besides their large-scale, mechanised nature which distinguished them so starkly from the surrounding peasant farms, the NAFCO state farms were operated on bureaucratic principles of management, which some critics say was antithetical to viable agriculture. The farm management often had little knowledge of horticulture and sometimes refused to work outside of office hours.¹⁰¹ Many decisions had to be cleared with the NAFCO bureaucracy in Dar es Salaam before they could be implemented on site, resulting in the untimely execution of agricultural tasks.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ State farm policy was treated as an internal matter for the Ministries of Agriculture, Planning, Treasury, and concerned parastatals. This may be because state farms were inconsistent with Tanzania's stated commitment to peasant agriculture.

⁹⁹ A production target of 20-30,000 tons yielding at the rate of 4.5 tons per ha. with an initial investment of TShs. 40.2 million was proposed for maize (Tanzania, MDB, 'Large-Scale Maize Production: A Preliminary Economic Analysis', DSM, (1976), 1).

¹⁰⁰ Bantje, 'NAFCO', 10

¹⁰¹ Interview with Brian Freyberg, Arusha wheat farmer, 4/4/81

¹⁰² Packard, P.C., 'Corporate Structure in Agriculture and Socialist Development in Tanzania: A Study of the National Agricultural and Food Corporation', in Coulson, A. (ed.), African Socialism in Practice, (Nottingham, Spokesman, 1979), 205

Clientage practices as described in the preceding section were widely prevalent. Although NAFCO's financial account keeping was above average for parastatals, this left room for a great deal of irregularities in cash disbursements and embezzlement.¹⁰³ Stock keeping was lax. Privileged supply of farm products to private individuals as well as local government and party officials was common.¹⁰⁴ Some managers allotted portions of state farm land to people of influence.¹⁰⁵ The biggest scandal, though not publicised, was the disappearance of approximately 10,000 tons of wheat between the Basotu farm and the NMC Arusha mill, undetected for some time because tonnage was only recorded at the place of delivery.¹⁰⁶ The transporters were suspected of the theft with possible collaboration from the state farm management.

Overmanning of administrative staff was very common.¹⁰⁷ Personal loans to staff employees from company funds were frequent, as was borrowing and lending between NAFCO farms. The tendency was for these loans to be left outstanding for long time periods, eventually being written off as bad debts.¹⁰⁸ Staff members benefitted from the ruling that all should be allocated individual plots for the cultivation of household food needs.¹⁰⁹ They could hire the state farm's tractors and other machinery on Sundays, which proved highly lucrative, since any surplus grain was sold on the parallel market.¹¹⁰

¹⁰³ Bantje, 'NAFCO', 20-21

¹⁰⁴ Daily News: 'NAFCO', 25/3/84

¹⁰⁵ Daily News: 'Farm managers lose jobs', 23/1/82; 'Moshi', 25/9/84

¹⁰⁶ Bantje, 'NAFCO', 22,40; Interview with Canadian High Commissioner, Mr. K. Johansen, 15/4/82

¹⁰⁷ Bantje, H. 'The Impact of Mbozi Maize Farms on the Surrounding Villages, A Reconnaissance', IRA No. 59, (1983), 23; CIDA, Report of the Wheat Sector Study Team Tanzania 1977, Manitoba Pool Elevators, (1977), 60

¹⁰⁸ Bantje, 'NAFCO', 21

¹⁰⁹ Bantje, 'Mbozi', 23

¹¹⁰ Tractor hiring is such a well-established practice that when there was an attempt to abolish it, a massive resignation of staff members followed (Bantje, 'Mbozi', 23).

Land conflicts between the villages and state farm employees, most of whom were non-local, were frequent.¹¹¹ In an extreme case the state farm employees were charged with burning peasants' homes to make them move.¹¹²

Operationally, state farm managers, not unlike peasant farmers, had to contend with the shortcomings of the wider economy. Transport constraints, the restricted availability of foreign exchange and productive inputs were all the more pressing given the capitalised nature of state farm production.¹¹³ Since all of NAFCO produce had to be sold through the official government marketing channels, government pricing and inter-parastatal debt defaulting were direct determinants of NAFCO's financial status.¹¹⁴

2.3 Overall Performance

In evaluating the performance of the state farms, it is important to recognize that two aims were accomplished, namely higher grain yields and a growing proportion of officially marketed grain came from the state farm sector. Wheat yields rose impressively from 700 kg to 1750 kg per hectare, under the Canadian research programme.¹¹⁵ Maize yields at Mbozi increased from approximately one

¹¹¹ Bantje, 'NAFCO', 41

¹¹² Interview with Finn Kjaerby, Anthropologist in Hanang District, 5/12/84

¹¹³ Sunday News: Interview with V. Ngula, General Manager of NAFCO, 'State farming in Tanzania', 10/11/85; CIDA, Report, 94; Daily News: 'Wheat from Hanang', 21/8/81; 'Appeal to save Mbarali paddy', 24/6/80

¹¹⁴ 'NAFCO is itself in the position of the farmer, selling to NMC at government controlled prices. It is therefore sensitive to all inherent weaknesses of the agricultural sector. Its dilemma is that, by concentrating on locally consumed foodcrops, it is not in a position to generate its own foreign exchange requirements. It will therefore never be self sufficient, and will continue to depend on the Government or on foreign donors for its inputs' (Bantje, 'NAFCO', 45).

¹¹⁵ Young, R., Canadian Development Assistance to Tanzania: An Independent Study by Roger Young, (The North-South Institute, 1983), 64

ton/ha in 1974 to four tons in 1982.¹¹⁶ Rice at Mbarali was recorded as high as 7.5 tons/ha, three times higher than that of peasants nearby.¹¹⁷ State farm production accounted for 96%, 91%, and 7% of officially marketed wheat, rice and maize, respectively in 1982/83.¹¹⁸

NAFCO and government officials were eager to point out that foreign exchange was saved by averting food imports.¹¹⁹ But this was doubtful since so much of Tanzania's food imports were obtained on concessional terms during the period under review and state farm production was far more heavily dependent on imported inputs, notably fuel, than peasant production. Increasingly the economy's foreign exchange constraints impinged on the state farm's input supply. The cost of NAFCO's wheat and rice production in 1981/82 was estimated as 62% and 63% of import parity value.¹²⁰ Only 17% of the sector's requests for foreign exchange were granted between 1978/79 and 1980/81.¹²¹ This led to under-utilisation of capacity and financial losses.¹²²

Between 1975 and 1982 the NAFCO group's accumulated losses ranged between TSh. 0.7 million and TSh. 18.2 million whereas the subsidiary companies had an accumulated loss of TSh. 62.8 million in 1983.¹²³ By 1982, state policy was primarily concerned with improving the state farm sector's efficiency rather than expanding its operations.

¹¹⁶ Bantje, 'NAFCO', 11

¹¹⁷ Daily News: 'The inside of Mbarali rice farm', 22/1/79; Dumont, R., 'Self-Reliant Rural Development', DSM Draft, (1979), 34

¹¹⁸ Bantje, 'NAFCO', 12; MDB figures listed in TABLES 6.8-10

¹¹⁹ Tanzania, MDB, Price Policy Recommendations, (PPR), I, (1984), 13

¹²⁰ Tanzania, MDB, 'Estimates of 1981/82 Import Requirements for the Production, Processing and Marketing of Major Crops in Mainland Tanzania', DSM, (1981), 8

¹²¹ Bantje, 'NAFCO', 44

¹²² Tanzania, The Tanzania National Agricultural Policy, (DSM, Printpak, 1982), 91,152

¹²³ In 1981/82 and 1982/83, they succeeded in registering profits averaging TSh. 6.7 million., whereas in the preceding seven years its average annual loss was TShs. 5.7 million. The subsidiary companies (including the two Canadian wheat schemes) ran at an annual loss of TSh. 4.3 million between 1979 and 1981/82 but achieved a profit of TShs. 10.7 million in 1982/83 (Bantje, 'NAFCO', 26a,29a,33,36).

The majority of NAFCO's staff not only worked in the rural areas but also lived there, unlike most parastatal enterprises.¹²⁴ But only a small minority of the white collar and skilled staff were from the area, whereas most manual labourers were local people, generally hired on a casual basis. The administrative and technical staff were reported to be alienated from and disdainful of the local peasantry. Their mechanized methods of production were completely out of reach of the peasant.¹²⁵ Wages on the state farm were low creating problems of recruitment of labour.¹²⁶ However, workers did have a right to buy grain direct from the farm. Bantje argues that:

...the main impact of the state farm on the villages is the food security it provides by selling maize in times of food shortage. There are indications that the management uses this 'food power' to persuade the villages to come and work, by refusing to sell maize to those that do not.¹²⁷

Peasants' contributed labour service was being exchanged for food availability in times of need almost in the fashion of the Native Authorities. Thus, the state farm did function to some degree in the alleviation of peasant food insecurity. Peasants could also steal grain from the enormous fields of the state farms.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Only 9% of the NAFCO senior, middle level and junior staff worked at the DSM headquarters and the zonal office (Bantje, 'NAFCO', 24-25).

¹²⁵ Bantje identifies the technological gulf as a disincentive to peasant agricultural production: '...farmers are exposed to the sight of tractors effortlessly ploughing wide stretches of land at the NAFCO farm, and thus become psychologically turned-off from manual agriculture' ('Mbozi', 18).

¹²⁶ Sometimes the management had to resort to barter arrangements with village leaders in which collective labour of the village was performed in exchange for state farm ploughing services on the village communal farm. These arrangements were frequently expedited by local party and government officials, often on the farm's board of directors, who imposed financial or political penalties on those that did not comply (Bantje, 'Mbozi', 29-31).

¹²⁷ Bantje, 'Mbozi' 30,36-37

¹²⁸ Bantje, 'Mbozi', 25,32; Daily News: 'Students explain hitches at Ruvu', 13/12/79

3. Food Marketing

3.1 NMC Establishment and Organisational Features

In 1973, the government abolished the National Agricultural Products Board, handing over its staff, fixed capital and crop procurement activities to the National Milling Corporation (NMC). Government policy objectives in the realm of staple food marketing had not changed. The main preoccupation was still to achieve food security by ensuring stable consumer prices and incentive producer pricing. Eliminating the cooperatives' wide marketing margins rather than the NAPB per se was the aim of reorganisation. The NMC could by-pass inefficient cooperative unions and purchase directly from the cooperative societies,¹²⁹ thus consolidating the principle of single channel marketing.

The NMC quickly expanded to become the largest government marketing parastatal. By 1978, it employed 4200 people, 1600 in Dar es Salaam.¹³⁰ Apart from the highest echelons of management, its staff were poorly educated and trained, most having gained their positions through long service in the NAPB or cooperatives rather than formal schooling.¹³¹

NMC faced formidable circumstances during its early years as a marketing parastatal. First, the NMC inherited the NAPB's liabilities, including a large bank overdraft of TShs. 64 million.¹³² Second, in 1974/75, the country experienced a severe shortfall of domestic food production and a drastic decline in marketed output (TABLES 6.8-10). Rural famine relief had to be supplied by the NMC to a number of places (APPENDIX VI). At the same time, urban food demand was expanding as a result of rapid urbanisation and posed a greater political threat than rural demand in the event of supply

¹²⁹ This abolished the cooperatives' system of into-store buying prices (Tanzania, MDB, 'A Strategic Grain Reserve Programme for Tanzania', II, DSM, (1974), 31).

¹³⁰ IBRD, Staff Appraisal Report: Tanzania Grain Storage and Milling Project, 2693a-TA, (1980), 11

¹³¹ 82% of the staff had no formal training (Tanzania, MDB, 'Report on Investigation into the Financial and Operating Position of Kilimo Crop Authorities: NMC', DSM, (1979), 10,79).

¹³² Tibenderana, H.K., The Factors affecting Tanzania's National Milling Corporation's Performance (1968-1981), M.A. Thesis, UDSM, (1982), 109,115; Kaberuka, D., 'Evaluating the Performance of Food Marketing Parastatals', Development Policy Review 2, (1984), 190-216

failure (TABLE 2.1.3). NMC's sales became more and more focussed on Dar es Salaam and secondarily the other major towns with residual supply to the rural areas (TABLE 6.11).¹³³ 1974 and 1975 were characterised by unprecedented levels of grain importation (TABLE 2.3).

After the completion of the villagisation operations and the passage of the 1975 Village Act, the state abolished local cooperative societies in May 1976. The NMC was to procure staple food directly from village governments which were more numerous than primary cooperative societies. From village to central mill, the NMC had control. At the wholesale level, the Regional Trading Companies were generally in charge up-country and the parastatal, National Distributors Ltd. served Dar es Salaam. Only retailing of staple foods was not under direct state control.

3.2 NMC's Policy Implementation Difficulties

NMC's policies were largely decided externally by government. Frequently, NMC's assigned tasks and procedures did not match its actual operational capabilities.

- Village Produce Buying

Village produce buying had serious shortcomings. Unlike the other crop parastatals, NMC was instructed to make advance payments to the village governments for its purchase of staple food crops to counter farmers' bitter experience with the cooperatives' late payments and discourage farmers from selling foodstuffs in the parallel market. But an effective advance payment system required judicious estimates of marketed crops as well as detailed accounting of issued payments. Village governments were paid 9 cents/kg. for their role as NMC buying agents but they lacked accounting expertise and recording of crop purchases and money disbursements tended to be fragmentary. At the end of the 1978/79 buying season, village cash advances worth TShs. 110.2 million were still

¹³³ The Regional Trading Corporations distributed grain in the regions. Because they received little or no extra remuneration for sale of grain in the rural areas, the bulk of regional supplies, an estimated 80%, was sold in the regional towns (Keeler et al., The Consumption Effects of Agricultural Policies in Tanzania, Sigma One Corporation, USAID, (1982), 73).

outstanding.¹³⁴

The NMC seemed to be succeeding in providing payment on delivery and keeping the parallel grain market in maize at bay with record level purchases arising from abundant harvests from 1976 until the Ugandan war erupted (TABLE 6.8).¹³⁵ During the 1979/80 buying season, government and private transport was commandeered which seriously impaired NMC's ability to collect produce. Meanwhile, the second oil shock caused a deterioration in Tanzania's balance of payments. Shortages of essential consumer goods such as soap, cooking oil, batteries let alone more expensive items like cement, corrugated iron roofing, and bicycles deprived peasants of incentives to sell crops. This created scope for a parallel market in staple foodstuffs, notably maize, on a scale significant enough to undermine NMC purchasing.¹³⁶ By 1984, the operating costs of many NMC regional branches had become excessive due to the declining tonnage being handled.¹³⁷

- Pan-territorial Procurement, Pricing and Transport

NMC was obliged to buy all staple food crops offered to it throughout the country at set pan-territorial prices. This policy drained the NMC's finances.

During the 1970s investment in transport facilities and maintenance declined as a result of decentralisation budgeting, the economic crisis and the Third Five Year plan's emphasis on industry (see TABLE 6.2, Public Works Department). Serious mismanagement, technical problems, lack of spare parts and the break-up of the East African Railways and Harbour Corporation impeded a smooth flow of rail traffic, halving the traffic load of agricultural commodities between 1974 and 1978. Only 25%

¹³⁴ Tanzania, MDB, 'Financial and Operating Position: NMC', 29

¹³⁵ Tanzania, MDB, 'Review of Crop Buying Arrangements 1976/77', DSM, (1977), 1

¹³⁶ Daily News: 'Mbeya middlemen deprive NMC of rice', 30/10/79; 'Middlemen cheat peasants', 31/5/80; 'Middlemen cash in on NMC vacuum', 16/10/80

¹³⁷ Tanzania, MDB, 'PPR', I, (1984), 36

of the grain crop tonnage offered to the Tanzania Railways Corporation was actually moved.¹³⁸ The rail line between Dar es Salaam and Kigoma was antiquated, limiting traffic and causing frequent derailments, whereas the TAZARA railroad was new, but suffered from lack of trained staff and underutilisation. Designed for a capacity of 2.0 million tons per year, its peak load was only 1.3 million tons in 1978 declining to 0.9 million tons in 1979.¹³⁹

The majority of food crops were transported by road. The trunk and feeder roads deteriorated under the impact of overloaded lorries. Potholes reached gigantic proportions before they could be repaired. The poor state of the roads led to increased wear and tear on vehicles and spare parts and tyres became scarcer. These factors in addition to the growing prevalence of petrol rationing kept demand for road haulage of crops in excess of supply.

In 1975, the country's lorry fleet totalled about 13,000 vehicles, 3,000 of them publically owned.¹⁴⁰ NMC had a lorry fleet of about 200 of which some 25% were grounded at any one time. Consequently, most procured food crops were moved by hired private transport. Between 1969 and 1979 road haulage rates increased on average by 150% reflecting the effects of the oil crisis and inflation.¹⁴¹

Food crops were extremely sensitive to transport costs. NMC's transport difficulties were more extreme than most other crop parastatals. Dar es Salaam was the major centre of food demand, but food crops were grown everywhere and the pan-territorial pricing system served to encourage the geographical specialisation of marketed food production in an inversion of von Thunen's concentric rings. The most distant areas, namely Ruvuma, Rukwa and Mbeya were producing the greatest amounts of

¹³⁸ Only 10% in the case of maize (Tanzania, MDB, 'The Inter-regional Transport of Major Agricultural Commodities in Tanzania', R5/79, (1979), 22-24).

¹³⁹ IBRD, Economic Memorandum, 22

¹⁴⁰ IBRD, Economic Memorandum, 21

¹⁴¹ Tanzania, MDB, 'Inter-regional Transport', 32-43

officially marketed food crops. In 1978/79 the overall weighted average cost of transported maize between NMC regional godown and central mill was estimated at TShs. 211 per ton, approximately 12% of the senbe retail price. But Ruvuma and Rukwa's transport costs were TShs. 650 and 470 respectively.¹⁴² These regions accounted for only 12% of NMC's maize purchase in 1978/79, but by 1982/3 they were 52% of the total (see TABLE 6.8). Criticism of the expense of the pan-territorial pricing policy and the evocation of the principle of comparative advantage led the government to revise the policy but not in the direction that economists hoped for.¹⁴³ Beginning in 1982, 'comparative advantage of production' was the basis for regional differentiation in pricing, awarding higher prices to climatically-suited areas regardless of distance.¹⁴⁴

NMC's pricing policy, like that of the NAPB, was externally-determined. The Economic Committee of the Cabinet was free to overlook the well-researched price recommendations of the Ministry of Agriculture's Marketing Development Bureau and set prices according to their perception of 'fair' incentive prices for producers and 'just' prices for the fulfillment of consumers' basic staple food needs. The resulting squeeze on NMC marketing margins was not the main concern of the political decision-makers.

The food crisis spurred the government to raise peasant producer prices for food from their hitherto stagnant level (TABLES 5.13 and 6.12). Prices for the famine-reserve crops, cassava, millet and sorghum were increased at a par with the preferred cereals, maize, rice and wheat. The latter had an assured urban market, whereas the former ended up being surplus stocks that NMC found

¹⁴² Tanzania, MDB, 'Inter-regional Transport', Appendix 14, 49

¹⁴³ Ndulu, B., 'The Impact of Inter-regional Transport Subsidy Policy on Commercial Supply of Food Grains in Tanzania: The Case of Paddy and Maize', ERB Seminar Paper, (November 1979); Tanzania, MDB, 'An Analysis of Regional and Seasonal Price Options for Maize in Tanzania', DSM, (November 1980)

¹⁴⁴ All regions except Singida, Lindi, Mtwara, Coast and Mwanza (Tanzania, MDB, 'Agricultural Pricing in Tanzania', DSM, (1984), 13).

difficult to store and eventually had to export at a considerable loss.¹⁴⁵ The increase of food prices succeeded in bringing about a notable supply response in food crops, but probably contributed to the reduction in production of peasant export crops whose prices fell relatively.¹⁴⁶

The combination of the staple food producer price rise, the transport subsidy and the over-valued exchange rate of the Tanzanian currency led the costs of NMC's domestically procured maize, rice and wheat to supercede import parity as well as export parity.¹⁴⁷ It was considerably cheaper for the NMC to purchase imported maize shipped to Dar es Salaam, the main centre of demand, than to purchase and transport domestic maize.¹⁴⁸ The availability of supplies on concessional aid terms reinforced the cost difference.

The government's consumer pricing policy rested on the unswerving principle that controlled staple food prices had to be low enough to allow the basic nutritional needs of the minimum wage earner's nuclear household to be met. This principle became an adjunct of the wage policy. Between 1975 and 1980 the government refrained from raising the minimum wage despite its declining purchasing power (TABLE 5.10). The controlled price of seabe, the main urban staple food, was held constant (TABLE 6.13). After the oil shock of 1979, as inflation skyrocketed, the government had to relent and raise the minimum wage slightly, a measure which was reinforced by the lowering of the seabe price by 29%. Until 1984, the minimum wage and seabe prices continued to be balanced such that the purchasing power of a day's minimum wage, measured in terms of kgs. of seabe, never slipped below 7 kg. (TABLE 6.14).

¹⁴⁵ Tanzania, MDB, 'PPR', (1979), 43

¹⁴⁶ Ellis, 'Agricultural Marketing', 225

¹⁴⁷ Tanzania, MDB, 'Proposals for Staple Food Prices under the Structural Adjustment Programme', DSM, (1983), 8; Tanzania, MDB, 'PPR', (1980), 46; 'PPR' (1977), ii

¹⁴⁸ For example, in 1982/83, imports were 30% cheaper than local maize (Kaberuka, 'Evaluating the Performance of Food Marketing Parastatals', 190-216).

The seme subsidy made NMC marketing margins impossibly slim (TABLE 6.15). The maize marketing margins between producer and ultimate seme consumer price for 1964/65 through 1972/73 was 309%, 110% between 1973 and 1980 and only 37% between 1980 and 1984. The NMC's bank overdraft consequently mounted steadily from the level inherited from the NAPB. Retailers' margins as well as those of the NMC were squeezed. Complaints were made that retailers refused to stock seme in their shops or required customers to buy slow-moving items with any seme purchase.¹⁴⁹ The seme subsidy was lifted in 1984 under pressure from the IMF, causing a 320% increase in the consumer price.¹⁵⁰ Its removal was accompanied with a 35% compensatory increase in the minimum wage (TABLE 5.10), so that seme's price doubled in relation to workers' purchasing power (TABLE 6.14).

The post-1973 official grain mark-ups of rice and wheat dropped only slightly below their pre-1973 level, quite unlike that of maize/seme (TABLE 6.15). Through its pricing policy, the government succeeded in tipping consumer demand more towards maize which was a cheaper staple and less import-reliant than wheat and rice (TABLE 6.16).¹⁵¹

3.3 NMC Operational Failings

- Urban Food Shortages

The majority of NMC sales took place in Dar es Salaam and the secondary cities of the country. The urban growth rate was over 10% per annum (TABLE 2.1.3). TABLE 6.16 measuring NMC sales as a percentage of total urban requirements shows a fairly steady decline at an annual rate of 9%. Frequent urban food shortages were the inevitable consequence. Maize shortages were concentrated in the years of bad harvests and increased importation, 1973 through 1975 and then 1979 onwards, whereas

¹⁴⁹ Daily News: 'Distribution affects Dar food situation', 4/6/84

¹⁵⁰ The Dar es Salaam City Council won the special concession of having the price raised to TShs. 6/60 rather than TShs. 8/00 on the grounds that Dar es Salaam relied on imports which were cheaper than up-country supplies (Tanzania, MDB, 'PPR', I, DSM, (1984), 28).

¹⁵¹ Wheat consumption fell when the government abruptly raised the price of flour in November 1973, (CIDA, Report, 129).

shortages of rice and wheat were continuous features of the period gradually worsening over time (TABLES 2.6 and 6.8).¹⁵²

As supplies diminished, NMC sales became increasingly concentrated in Dar es Salaam. In 1974/75 Dar es Salaam accounted for 33% of NMC's total maize sales, by 1983/84 the figure had risen to 57%, disproportionately high relative to the 46.5% of the nation's urban population living in Dar es Salaam (TABLE 6.8). The same pattern pertained to NMC rice and wheat sales. However, NMC distribution was falling far short of Dar es Salaam requirements as well. In this context, Nyerere appealed to Dar es Salaam regional government authorities to by-pass the NMC and 'shoulder the responsibility of feeding the city themselves and look for supplies from producer regions in the country.'¹⁵³

Consumers grew accustomed to queueing at dukas for staple food purchases. In order to save their employees' time, many ministries, parastatals and private firms made efforts to procure supplies in bulk from the NMC to sell to their employees on an ad-hoc basis. In 1983, the government finally instituted a party-supervised rationing system. Ward party secretaries were responsible for collecting the daily allocations for their areas from the National Distributors Ltd. for distribution to retail shops. Households registered with their neighbourhood retail shop and received a rationing card that entitled them to 1/2 kg. of staple grain per capita per day. At first the system seemed to be an improvement. However, retailers' discretionary sales were not eliminated and eventually the

¹⁵² Daily News: 'Dar hit by acute food shortage', 29/1/74; 'Maize flour shortage: NMC Chief blames Ugawaji, traders', 20/2/79; 'NDL explains food shortage', 25/4/85

¹⁵³ Daily News: 'Mwalimu tells Dar: Get Down to Business', 19/4/84; 'NDL explains food shortage', 25/4/85

rationing system procedures were themselves blamed for persisting shortages.¹⁵⁴

- Parallel Markets

As consumer shortages spread, unofficial parallel marketing expanded.¹⁵⁵ On the parallel market dried maize sold at roughly twice the price of controlled seabe and rice cost on average two and half times more than NMC rice in 1983 and 1984.¹⁵⁶ Keeler reported parallel market prices for maize in the Lake Region which were 303% greater than the official price in 1979-81 and 101% greater for rice.¹⁵⁷ NMC's acute transport problems during the Ugandan war led to crops in many areas not being procured in time.¹⁵⁸ Thereafter NMC buying performance did not improve and economic conditions and harvests were never conducive to farmers willingly returning to selling their crops to the NMC if better prices in parallel market outlets were at hand, notably Kilimanjaro and Arusha.¹⁵⁹ Between 1978/79 and 1981/82, their NMC maize sales as a proportion of total NMC sales dropped from 38% to 4% (TABLE 6.8).

¹⁵⁴ The Minister for Industries and Trade told the Daily News that '...none of the shop operators followed the city ration regulations, neither did the divisional and ward functionaries make serious supervision to ascertain equitable distribution of the commodities' (Daily News: 'Dar Distribution snags explained', 12/6/84); 'Check food leakages - Machunda', 10/2/84; 'Distribution is the problem', 16/1/84.

¹⁵⁵ Maize, rice, wheat, cassava, millet, sorghum and beans were scheduled for control under the NMC Act of 1975. The Act stipulated that a private individual's sale of these crops could not exceed thirty kgs. The transport of grain by individuals for household use was restricted to 100 kg, although this amount was subject to variation and revision by regional authorities' orders. Penalties for breaking the law included a fine of TShs. 5000, imprisonment of up to one year and seizure of the grain (Keeler, A. 'Preliminary Report on the Parallel Market for Grains in Tanzania', MDB, (March 1983), 1).

¹⁵⁶ The proportion by which parallel market prices exceeded the controlled price for rice ranged between 21% and 268% in 1983 and 45% and 281% in 1984. Parallel market dried maize exceeded the seabe price by a wider spread of 0% to 344% in 1983 and -36% to 191% in 1984 after the removal of the seabe subsidy (Tanzania, MDB, Monthly Marketing Bulletin, December 1982-December 1984).

¹⁵⁷ Keeler, Consumption Effects, 81

¹⁵⁸ Daily News: 'Bid to save Tabora crop', 7/9/79; 'Campaign to save crops', 2/10/79; 'Storage, transport hamper NMC operations', 14/12/79; 'Buy crops fast - call', 27/7/80

¹⁵⁹ Daily News: 'Tons of maize get spoilt', 6/9/81; 'Pay now, NMC told', 10/3/81; 'Pay peasant promptly', 6/6/81; 'Mbeya NMC blames villages', 16/11/81; 'Shinyanga plans food transport', 18/1/84

NMC's maize procurement more than halved. Ruvuma, Rukwa, Mbeya and Iringa assumed the lead as NMC suppliers at that time.

- Financial Deficit

The combined effects of government's welfare-oriented policies and NMC's various operational failings culminated in an escalating bank overdraft. In 1973/74, the overdraft stood at TShs. 286.5 million, rising to TShs. 524 million in 1976 and an astronomical TShs. 2.3 billion in 1981, topping the league of parastatal overdrafts.¹⁶⁰ NMC's accounts were in complete financial disarray.¹⁶¹ It was obvious that NMC's actual marketing costs vastly exceeded the margins delimited by government price controls, however, no one could give precise figures. Audited accounts were in arrears by several years. Besides the usual problem of insufficiently trained accounting staff, the NMC had decentralised its accounting system to branch level, which led to even less supervision and uniformity in accounts.

Over the years, a number of agencies and investigating committees scrutinized NMC's operations and finances.¹⁶² By 1981, the government had agreed that NMC was over-extended, and in need of reorganisation. It was suggested that the NMC be decentralised in a manner similar to the way the State Trading Corporation had been broken down into Regional Trading Companies ten years before. A task force of Tanzanian professionals rejected this proposal, fearing that decentralisation would engender an expansion of staff and bureaucracy.¹⁶³ Instead they proposed the reinstatement of marketing cooperatives to handle regional produce buying. The Cooperative Bill was passed in

¹⁶⁰ Tanzania, MDB, 'Financial and Operating Position: NMC', 33; Coopers and Lybrand Assoc. Ltd., Grain Storage and Milling Project, DSM, (1977), B18; Tanzania, MDB, 'Basic Considerations on NMC Capital Restructuring', DSM, (March 1983), 1

¹⁶¹ Daily News: 'NMC accounts books "in mess"', 26/5/84

¹⁶² Coopers and Lybrand Associates, (1977); CCM party and the Marketing Development Bureau (1979), World Bank (1980), Special Government-appointed Task Force (1981)

¹⁶³ Daily News: 'NMC task force meets on Tuesday', 25/7/81

parliament in 1982.

The return to cooperative buying was to be implemented gradually. Cooperative buying first resumed in some regions in 1984.¹⁶⁴ Numerous problems over the division of financial and fixed capital assets bogged down implementation of the cooperative legislation. After relinquishing its role as primary produce buyer, NMC was to continue as the country's bulk buyer from the cooperative unions, as principal miller, as manager of strategic grain reserves, as monitor of the national food situation and as provisioner of famine relief.¹⁶⁵

Meanwhile various measures were taken to reduce or contain the NMC's deficit and bank overdraft. From its enormous 1980 level, the seabe consumer subsidy was reduced through a cross-subsidy on sugar and compensating payments from the treasury.¹⁶⁶ Finally in 1984 the subsidy was removed having cost the government an estimated TShs. 1.2 billion.¹⁶⁷ In the five years between 1978/79 and 1983/84 the NMC was reported to have received TShs. 10.6 billion out of a total TShs. 12 billion in subsidies allocated to agricultural parastatals.¹⁶⁸

- Staff Performance

It is impossible to know whether NMC staff performance was below the generally low standards of parastatals, but it is clear that NMC's accounting system was particularly deficient and the lack of middle-level cadre supervising an overmanned and untrained labour force was very pronounced.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴ Daily News: 'Cooperatives take-off hits snags', 30/9/84; '9 Coops take-over from NMC', 23/5/85

¹⁶⁵ Daily News: 'NMC to continue buying crops', 4/10/84

¹⁶⁶ Tanzania, MDB, 'Proposals for Staple Food Prices', 1

¹⁶⁷ Daily News: 'NMC got 1bn/- subsidy', 18/7/84

¹⁶⁸ Daily News: 'Crop bodies got 12bn/-subsidy', 29/10/84

¹⁶⁹ Tanzania, MDB, 'Financial and Operating Position: NMC', 79

Clientage practices proliferated in an atmosphere of declining salaries, gross inefficiency, poor management and unaccountability.¹⁷⁰ The staff were dealing in extremely valued food commodities and large sums of cash which led to frequent financial and commodity distribution irregularities.¹⁷¹ The newspapers' reported cases of NMC staff involved in peculation, fraud and parallel marketing, were undoubtedly only the tip of the iceberg.¹⁷² For example, the hiring of private cars for the transport of NMC executives and employees became a common practice as in most parastatals, but it was particularly abused at NMC's headquarters in Dar es Salaam.¹⁷³

In 1984, government investigations into the problems of staple food distribution revealed corrupt collusion on the part of the senior management and rank and file workers of the National Distributors Ltd., the parastatal serving as wholesale trader for cereal products in Dar es Salaam. The appointment of a new General Manager resulted in 'workers...initiating a strike and writing letters threatening to physically eliminate the NDL new General Manager, Ndugu Abdul Buddy, who had instituted tough measures to curb laxity and apathy in the company.' The Chief Accountant, the Depot Manager and Chief Cashier were dismissed in connection with the disappearance of over TShs. 30 million.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰ The MDB Investigating Team found: 'Currently if a staff member does not do what is asked of him, i.e. figures requested are not submitted, no action seems to be taken. The system grinds to a halt' (Tanzania, MDB, 'Financial and Operating Position', 11)

¹⁷¹ Tibenderana reported: 'According to NMC's records from 1972 till 1977 the corporation lost Shs. 1,856,813/65 through staff misappropriation of funds and stocks, but the incidence of misappropriation reached astronomical proportions between May 1977 and July 1979, when the corporation lost a total sum of Shs. 11,504,027' (Tibenderana, Factors, 140); In 1977/78 stock losses were estimated at 16.8% (TShs. 148.6 million); 7.5% due to deterioration and 9.3% from stock disappearance (Tanzania, MDB, 'Financial and Operating Position', 27,32).

¹⁷² Daily News: 'NMC man on theft charges', 23/12/78; 'Dodoma', 11/8/79; 'Morogoro', 15/8/81 and 30/12/81; 'Court Round-up', 11/4/84; 'Dodoma', 27/6/84; 'NMC worker jailed 9 years', 3/11/84; 'NDL sacks 7', 8/11/84; Uhuru, 'Mwanamke afikishwa mahakamani kwa wizi', 21/3/83

¹⁷³ Between 1979 and 1980 NMC spent TShs. 126 million on hired cars (Daily News: 'VP stresses frugality', 18/8/81).

¹⁷⁴ Daily News: 'NDL sacks 7', 8/11/84

4. National Food Security: Domestic Food Self-Sufficiency vs. Imports

Through a number of seemingly conflicting policies, the government endeavoured to guarantee the Tanzanian population's food security. Measures to achieve food security took two forms: long-term programmes and short-term expedients. Regarding the latter, when the Marketing Development Bureau investigated the NMC's financial disarray, it found:

The overall justification explanation and rationale given on every topic was that NMC had such a critical role to play in the national economy that its main aim was to make sure every one had food, and every other consideration was incidental.¹⁷⁵

4.1 Sectoral Planning

The aim of national food self-sufficiency was clearly enunciated in the Third Five-Year-Plan.¹⁷⁶ However, food imports were massive in 1981 at the close of the Third Five-Year-Plan (TABLE 2.3). Critics maintained that the Third Five Year Plan's investment concentration on the Basic Industries Strategy had diverted Tanzania from its expressed aim of developing peasant agriculture following villagisation.¹⁷⁷ From independence until 1976, expenditure on industry was on average 2.2% and on agriculture 10.7% of the total government budget. From 1976 to 1981, under the Third Five Year Plan, industry's share spurted to an average 8.5% and agriculture's declined to 9.7% (TABLES 5.12 and 6.2).

National food self-sufficiency was the primary objective of the National Food Strategy, a Danish-funded, FAO-consulted plan which was commissioned by the government in 1982, and a central tenet of the 1982 Agricultural Policy.¹⁷⁸ The danger was that the food self-sufficiency strategy would

¹⁷⁵ Tanzania, MDB, 'Financial and Operating Position: NMC', 3

¹⁷⁶ Tanzania, Third Five-Year Plan, i

¹⁷⁷ Hanak, H. The Tanzanian Balance of Payments Crisis, M.A. Thesis, UDSM, (1981), 78-88; IBRD, Tanzania: Agricultural Sector Report, 43

¹⁷⁸ Tanzania, Ministry of Agriculture, 'Tanzania: National Food Strategy', Second Draft, (June 1982), 1-2; Tanzania, Ministry of Agriculture, 'The Tanzania National Agricultural Policy', (DSM, Printpak, 1982), vii

detract from peasant export crop production. The import requirements for the country's major export crops was estimated at 27% of the crops' export parity value in 1981/82, whereas import requirements for food crops were 51% of food crops import parity value.¹⁷⁹ The figure for maize was 45%; transport costs accounting for almost half. This suggests that a household food self-sufficiency strategy which minimized transport costs was the wisest policy.¹⁸⁰ Under prevailing conditions, Tanzania clearly had a comparative advantage in the production of export crops. But national food self-sufficiency had been a treasured aim for so long that few planners accommodated this fact. In any case, long-term investment-demanding food strategies had a tendency of getting swept aside by the urgency of current food insecurity. Crisis-management policies took precedence over food sector planning.

4.2 National Famine Prevention Measures

Amidst the food crisis of 1974-75, the MDB proposed a programme which entailed the storage of 100,000 tons of grain independent of NMC commercial stocks but under NMC supervisory control for use in times of severe food shortfalls.¹⁸¹ The assumption was that Tanzania would become broadly self-sufficient in maize and paddy over the following years and stocks would be replenished by local surpluses.¹⁸² But the actual implementation of the project in 1978 was based on pledges of food aid and reliance on food aid continued.¹⁸³ The lack of storage facilities separate from the NMC commercial stocks, and Tanzania's failure to secure surplus stocks of the preferred cereals meant

¹⁷⁹ Tanzania, MDB, 'Import Requirements', 7-8

¹⁸⁰ The National Food Strategy recognized the need for minimizing transport and argued for regional self-sufficiency of food (Tanzania, 'National Food Strategy', 32).

¹⁸¹ Tanzania, MDB, 'Strategic Grain', (1974)

¹⁸² '...a national strategic reserve is only justified if the country is in a position of long-term self-sufficiency' (Tanzania, MDB, 'Strategic Grain', 38).

¹⁸³ Daily News: 'WFP pledges 7,000 tons of food aid', 5/11/77; 'Food reserves to get priority', 23/11/77

that the strategic grain reserve existed in name rather than fact.¹⁰⁴

The Early Warning and Crop Monitoring Programme (EWCMP), a small unit of FAO-funded experts attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, instituted in 1978 was more successful. It developed a reporting system for rainfall and crop growth based on weekly and monthly reports from regional agricultural officers and meteorological department personnel. Its ability to forecast food-deficit districts facilitated the timely delivery of government famine relief. It advised the NMC on the anticipated size of crop harvests and the need for food imports.¹⁰⁵

4.3 Food Imports

Relatively large net imports of grain prevailed in every year except 1973 and 1979 (TABLE 2.3). The average annual net import was roughly 2 million quintals, half of which consisted of maize with wheat and rice each accounting for a quarter. This contrasts with the period between 1950 and 1973 when imports were mainly wheat. Per capita import reached historically unprecedented levels in 1975 of almost 30 kgs per person (FIGURE 2.1).

The priority accorded food security by the government was most poignantly expressed by Nyerere when he declared that he was willing to import South African maize if necessary despite Tanzania's militant opposition to apartheid.¹⁰⁶ The costs of food import during the 1974-75 crisis weighed very heavy on the economy. World market prices for grain were high and shipping costs were escalating. Tanzania, hitherto recipient to only small amounts of international food aid, succeeded in getting some assistance, but at that time most food aid was being channeled to the Sahel. The NMC incurred a TShs. 500 million loss on importing grain at world market prices and selling it at low controlled

¹⁰⁴ Cook, K.D., Dimensions of Food Security/Insecurity: Tanzania, A Case Study, M.A. Thesis, UDSM, (1984), 130

¹⁰⁵ Tanzania, MDB, 'Proposals for a Short Term Reporting System for NMC Cereal Stocks, Sales and Famine Relief Issues', DSM, (May 1976)

¹⁰⁶ Quoted in J-P. Langelier's feature in The Guardian, (London), 9/11/80

consumer prices.¹⁸⁷ During the 1980s, the costs of food importation were prohibitive. The volume of food aid increased and in the process food aid dependence became a structural feature of the economy (TABLE 6.17). The MDB explained the phenomenon as: 'Tanzania's need for imports is influenced more by the balance of NMC purchases and historical sales levels to NMC's usual customers than by the overall food situation in the country.'¹⁸⁸ In other words, with subsidized consumer prices, effective demand for NMC's products remained high whereas the operation of the parallel grain market was deflecting local supplies from the NMC.

A food aid scandal in 1981 indicated that clientage practices were pursued not only in very high echelons of the state but also in the extremely sensitive realm of national food security.¹⁸⁹ Rainfall that year was sub-normal (TABLE 2.6). The expatriate-staffed Early Warning and Crop Monitoring Programme started predicting a bad harvest in its regular reporting to the Minister and Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and estimated a minimum food import requirement of 170,000 tons. This information was not communicated to the channels which would have started the machinery in motion for timely requests of food aid from donors. The expatriate incharge of the ENCMP revealed the urgency of the situation to a foreign journalist.¹⁹⁰ The State House and the President were informed through the journalist's enquiries. An emergency cabinet meeting was called in which the Ministry of Agriculture was ordered to solicit food aid. Donors responded with alacrity, thereby averting famine. A series of charges and counter-charges ensued. The Ministry of Agriculture dismissed the ENCMP expert from his job for conveying confidential information to an outside party. Soon afterwards, the Minister of Agriculture was removed in a cabinet reshuffle and some months later

¹⁸⁷ Tanzania, MDB, 'Strategic Grain Reserve', 9-10

¹⁸⁸ Tanzania, MDB, 'PPR', (1984), 1

¹⁸⁹ Guardian (London): 'Officials accused of 'criminal negligence' in face of famine: Tanzania inaction will bring starvation', 28/10/81; The Economist: 'The Cupboard is Bare', 31/10-6/11/81

¹⁹⁰ Interview with Martha Honey, journalist, 11/4/82

the Principal Secretary was replaced.¹⁹¹

It is unclear what the motive was for withholding information on the critical state of national supplies. The Principal Secretary had told the journalist in October that they anticipated stocks would run out in December-January and were looking into the possibility of purchasing food on the open market, an odd reply in view of Tanzania's desperate shortage of foreign exchange. Newspaper articles speculated that the Principal Secretary or the Minister or both wanted to negotiate a food aid deal from which they would profit, others believed that the aim was to discredit the government politically.¹⁹²

4.4 Policies to ensure Household Food Security

At least 80%¹⁹³ of NMC sales took place in urban areas and the seabe consumer subsidy was targeted at urban minimum wage earners. The government controlled staple food market was the largest and most expensive urban food security measure but it did not exhaust state efforts. During the 1974-1975 food crisis, the party launched the Kilimo cha Kufa na Kupona¹⁹⁴ campaign to get urban dwellers directly involved in cultivation. Government offices, factories and other places of work in Dar es Salaam were issued with land outside the city for cultivation by their employees.¹⁹⁵ Problems of transport, time taken from normal working hours for cultivation and the inexperience and lack of coordination evidenced in the production effort limited the campaign's usefulness.¹⁹⁶ The campaign was not re-invoked during the 1980 food crisis, but the Prime Minister called on urban councils to

¹⁹¹ Weekly Review (Kenya): 'Tanzania cabinet changes: agricultural minister sacked', 12/2/82

¹⁹² Africa Now: 'Tanzania food scandal', May 1982

¹⁹³ Marketing Development Bureau rule-of-thumb estimate.

¹⁹⁴ Translated 'agriculture for life or death'.

¹⁹⁵ Sunday News: 'Ilala District ready to go into first gear: Farm plans needed by Tuesday', 24/11/74

¹⁹⁶ Bryceson, D.F., 'Tanzanian Grain Supply', Food Policy, (May 1982), 117

allocate farming areas to town dwellers.¹⁹⁷ In 1985, government announced that all DSM's unplanted valley areas would be taken over by the City Council and allocated to the unemployed for cultivation.¹⁹⁸ These were ad-hoc measures, undoubtedly open to malpractice since land in and around Dar es Salaam was being cultivated on all sorts of individual and village usufruct terms as well as being subject to illegal and legal purchase agreements.¹⁹⁹

The governments' attempts at containing urban growth were en passant directed at depressing urban food demand. The general policy was that urban residence should be restricted to waged workers and their families in line with the anti-vagrancy laws of colonial days. There was a strong current of thinking that anyone without a formal job was a parasite, unjustifiably using the city's amenities and consuming its food supply. From time to time in the 1970s adult urban residents were required to carry identity cards from their places of work and were subjected to house checks by militia. In 1983 this policy was more systematised with the passage of the Human Resources Deployment Act and the launching of the nquvu kazi campaign, which involved the militia in the stop and search of all males suspected of not having legitimate employment. If the man being questioned could not produce a valid identification card and proof of employment, he was to be sent to a rural area or one of the northern sisal plantations experiencing a shortage of labour.²⁰⁰ It was widely believed that many, if not most, of the rusticated people quickly made their way back to the city.²⁰¹ More successful were the attempts to get the unemployed and unlicensed hawkers to settle and farm in the outlying areas of the town.²⁰²

¹⁹⁷ Sunday News: 'Keep your home clean - Sokoine', 7/9/80

¹⁹⁸ Daily News: 'Dar valleys for distribution', 15/1/85; '...it would be assumed that those valleys which were not cultivated had no owners, hence their being taken' ('DSM', 16/3/85).

¹⁹⁹ Daily News: 'Dar villages told to strive hard', 12/2/84; 'Expanding Dar City', 21/2/81; 'Dar City Council decision dangerous', 19/2/80

²⁰⁰ Daily News: 'Sokoine stresses hard work', 14/2/84; Bryceson, 'Food and Urban Purchasing Power', 520

²⁰¹ Daily News: 'Resources deployment revisited', 22/4/84; Friis-Hansen, 'Assessment', 46

²⁰² Daily News: '1000 start farms in Kinondoni', 1/2/84; 'Mwalimu starts Dar tour', 8/2/85; 'Morogoro to develop farming', 20/1/86

III. Household and Clientage Survival Strategies

Throughout the period under review, state and market activities, defined in a strict sense (Chapter 3), were disintegrating. Parastatal and government agents were increasingly involved in clientage practices. The state controlled market was progressively less able to service the population's basic needs. As indices of real wages (TABLES 5.10-11), real producer prices (TABLE 5.14) and food and non-food costs of living (TABLE 5.19-20) show, by the late 1970s the standard of living affordable through official labour and commodity markets had drastically deteriorated. The real minimum wage in 1983 was at the same level as 1939, but now it was supposed to cover the needs of an urban nuclear family in contrast to the bachelor wages of pre-World War II (TABLE 5.10). Urban residents and peasants lacked purchasing power and availability of essential goods.

This situation was instigated by international factors, notably skyrocketing oil prices and Tanzania's declining terms of trade, and exacerbated by domestic policies. The disruptions caused by villagisation, a premature and rapid industrialisation strategy, the disorganisation of the state marketing system as well as government efforts to eliminate private retail trading were all exacerbating factors. Operation Maduka, the national campaign to encourage villages to run cooperative shops in place of private dukas, began in 1976. Despite consumer complaints of inexperienced management and clientage practices, government-fostered cooperative shops continued to be formed in the following years, adding to the deteriorating supply of consumer goods.²⁰³ As the availability of goods and services provisioned through the state and state-controlled market declined, people had to devise ways and means outside of formal channels to procure their essential consumer requirements.

²⁰³ Daily News: 'All private shops in villages must close', 17/2/76; 'Stop it-Nyerere', 23/5/76; 'Operation Maduka: 2000 new shops set up', 30/8/76; 'Ministry clarifies on shops', 23/11/80; 'Village shops', 7/12/80; Tanzania, Maduka ya Ujamaa, Prime Minister's Office, (DSM, Printpak, 1976)

1. Rural Areas

Peasants had to confront three main problems: first, what goods were essential and could not be foregone; second, how could the essential goods be obtained. Could they be produced directly or did they have to be bartered for or purchased; and third, how could one's cash income be raised for the purchase of such goods.

Two main responses developed in the rural areas, namely, a household-based strategy which involved autarkic production, food self-sufficiency and exchange of goods and services between rural and urban segments of extended households and second, an extra-household, clientage-based strategy of parallel marketing.

Autarky entailed a diminution in peasants' definitions of basic needs as well as a proliferation of their productive activities. NMC supplies to the rural areas, never plentiful, dwindled to virtually nothing by the early 1980s.²⁰⁴ This reinforced the household's 'food-first' strategy.²⁰⁵ The 1976 Household Budget Survey reveals that 87% of cereal consumption was of subsistence origin (TABLE 6.18). Some large consumer durables like radios, bicycles, and spare parts for machinery and vehicles were not obtainable by any means. Peasants had to try to devise substitutes for soap and cooking oil, pressing their own oil seeds, or alternatively worked out informal networks of supply through urban-based members of the extended household. Certain items such as batteries or prescribed medicines could not be directly produced by the peasant and so requests were lodged with family relations or close friends who might have more ready access to obtain them. Such favours were repaid in kind more often than cash and payment tended to be deferred. There is no way to estimate the volume of intra-household exchange of essential goods, but casual observation would suggest that it was considerable and filled some very vital gaps in household consumer supply.

²⁰⁴ Comparing NMC sales in 1973/74 with those of 1983/84 and assuming that firstly the NMC's distribution of maize, rice and wheat is directed at urban cereal requirements (TABLE 6.16), the remaining distributable amounts represented 11.5% of rural requirements in 1973/74 and -0.02 ten years later.

²⁰⁵ Schneider-Barthold et al., 'Farmers' Reactions', 46-47

Increasingly, peasants' trading activities circumvented the official market.²⁰⁶ Peasants exchanged grain and other agricultural produce for consumer goods by barter or cash sales. Barter offered the immediate receipt of desired scarce commodities. There is no way of measuring its extent. The incidence of parallel marketing was the subject of several speculative estimates based on fragmentary price data and interviews with peasant farmers in a few areas. In 1984, the Marketing Development Bureau's guesstimates of the proportions of marketed production going through parallel markets was 75% of maize, 80% of rice and 25% of wheat.²⁰⁷ In Kigoma, Loft and Oldevelt estimate that 80% of farmers' marketed crops were sold in the parallel market, but only 13% was marketed. Thus 10% of production made its way to the parallel market.²⁰⁸ In Iringa (1983), Rasmussen estimates that 40% of the maize was sold, almost all of it to private traders.²⁰⁹

Some of the grain traded in the parallel market was smuggled to neighbouring countries; encouraged by Tanzania's increasingly over-valued currency relative to neighbouring countries.²¹⁰ The main smuggled commodity flows were from: Kilimanjaro, Arusha, and Mara to Kenya, Rukwa and Mbeya to Zambia, Kigoma to Burundi and Kagera to Uganda, Rwanda and Kenya.

Rasmussen used 1983-85 MDB data to argue that there was 'a quite well-functioning market' between Southern Highland surplus maize areas and Mwanza/Shinyanga with spatial equalization of profits and no extra black market profit, although parallel market margins were far in excess of

²⁰⁶ Tanzania, MDB, 'Strategic Grain Reserve' II, 10; Tanzania, MDB, 'PPR', (1977), 8

²⁰⁷ This amounts to 15%, 40% and 17.5% of the total production of maize, rice and wheat assuming that 20-25% of all peasant-produced maize, 50% of rice and virtually all wheat was marketed (Tanzania, MDB, 'PPR', I, (1984), 1).

²⁰⁸ Loft and Oldevelt, 'Peasant Agriculture', 96

²⁰⁹ Rasmussen, 'Commercialised Maize', 3

²¹⁰ By following a relatively fixed exchange rate policy with only minor intermittent devaluations, the government allowed the Tanzanian Shilling to appreciate sharply from early 1979 onwards (Kaberuka, 'Food Marketing Parastatals', 190-216).

NMC's official margins because of abnormally large profits accruing to transporters due to the shortage of lorries.²¹¹ Using the unit import price of maize in dollars, converted into local currency on the basis of the parallel market money exchange rate, as a proxy for parallel market maize prices, Keeler plotted NMC purchases against the difference between official and estimated parallel producer prices. He claims that one-quarter of the variance could be attributed to weather and the rest to prices. This would infer that not only is the parallel market very widespread, it is achieving arbitrage with the world grain market.²¹² Odegaard argues that smuggling of grain across Tanzania's borders was possibly so extensive that the Ministry of Agriculture's high production estimates, which many economists found improbable, could be correct.²¹³ However, economists' work on the parallel market so far has been piecemeal and with timeframes rarely exceeding a year or two, and thus open to a great deal of a priori assumptions about market operations.

The best evidence to date upon which to evaluate the parallel market's efficiency is the Marketing Development Bureau's monthly parallel market consumer price data collected for more than 30 towns and settlements beginning in December 1982. I used this data to test for market integration. If markets are integrated one would expect that the movement of prices in one market would be similar to those in another, particularly in contiguous areas.

TABLES 6.19.1-3 give the results of monthly intermarket price correlations using Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient tests. Southworth, Jones and Pearson using this method to study price integration amongst 16 Ghanaian markets got first quartile correlation scores at 0.85-0.89 for maize

²¹¹ Rasmussen, T., 'The Private Market for Maize in Tanzania - A Preliminary Analysis', CDR Paper D.85.13, Copenhagen, (1985), 8-14

²¹² However, the years with the lowest differential between parallel and official prices are the years of very good harvests (Keeler et al., Consumption Effects, 87-89) and would thus be expected to coincide with a larger NMC uptake. Therefore, it would be impossible to disaggregate the effects of good harvests and world market prices.

²¹³ Odegaard, K., 'An Analysis of the Food Market in a Dual Market Structure: the Case of Maize in Tanzania', Arne Ryde Symposium, University of Lund, Sweden, (August 1983), 18-20

and 0.75-0.79 for rice. They concluded that market integration was high with a significant degree of spatial integration.²¹⁴ In contrast, the Tanzanian data gave low first quartile results of 0.30-0.34 and 0.40-0.44 for maize and rice. Spatial arbitrage was not even remotely achieved in Tanzania's maize and rice parallel markets. Others had already observed the absence of temporal arbitrage and attributed it to lack of storage.²¹⁵

MAPS 6.1 and 6.2 show the locations of highest price correlations. They were not necessarily between contiguous markets. The pattern for maize is very different from that for rice. The results suggest that the Southern Highlands, notably Njombe was the point of origin of the parallel maize market, whereas the rice market seemed to originate in the Mwanza area and to a lesser extent around Tanga (Upare). It is likely that the bulk of marketed rice production in the country has been traded in parallel markets for a longer time than maize.²¹⁶

The lack of spatial arbitrage can be interpreted in a number of ways. Transport was scarce and the market may have been extremely disorganised and/or very oligopolistic. The parallel market was at a formative stage during the early 1980s. Monopoly would more likely be a reflection of newness rather than entrenched mercantile interests.

There were five possible categories of parallel marketing agents: first, the remaining Asian merchants based in urban areas;²¹⁷ second, the comparatively less experienced African entrepreneurs

²¹⁴ V. Roy Southworth, W.O. Jones and S.R. Pearson, 'Food Crop Marketing in Atebubu District, Ghana', Food Research Institute Studies, 17(2), (1979), 189; Jones, W.O., Staple Food Crops in Tropical Africa, (New York, Cornell University, 1972), 140

²¹⁵ Tanzania, MDB, 'PPR', (1984), 9; Rasmussen, 'Private Market', 6

²¹⁶ NMC paddy/rice purchases began to decline after the sharp rise in the controlled consumer price for rice in 1974/75 while the producer price remained fairly stable, thus widening official margins. Already in 1977, the MDB estimated that the parallel market encompassed 50% of marketed production (Coopers and Lybrand, Grain Storage, II, A18; Tanzania, MDB, 'PPR', (1977), 34).

²¹⁷ They were primarily involved in retail trade and small industrial workshops.

with transport or trading businesses headquartered in Dar es Salaam and some of the larger towns;²¹⁸ third, local private African or Asian millers²¹⁹ and transporters²²⁰; fourth, parastatal and government employees whose official work took them to rural locations;²²¹ and fifth, young primary school leavers disenchanted with farming who engaged in petty trade, and in the border areas often specialised in smuggling food in exchange for consumer goods or foreign currency.²²²

Local millers and transporters probably played a pivotal role, since they had the most information about the availability of marketable crops. A lot of crops were moved out of the rural areas in 'by the way transport', i.e. if a transporter/trader or state agent had an empty vehicle or any spare space on his return trip he would naturally fill it if he could.²²³ This could in part account for the great volatility of parallel market consumer prices. Drivers purchased several bags of maize and added them to their consigned loads on return journeys. It was expensive to

²¹⁸ They are a category of people that very little is known about in terms of their social origins and the nature of their businesses. The government and party's campaigns to rid the country of 'racketeers' and 'saboteurs' during the 1980s, aimed at Asian merchants and African entrepreneurs involved in illicit trading and/or hoarding, suggested that African entrepreneurs had a significant presence in the regional towns and Dar es Salaam.

²¹⁹ Only about 1/3 of the country's milling activities were carried out by parastatals (i.e. NMC and NAFCO). Approximately 25% of all villages had mills owned jointly or privately for maize. There was an extensive network of private rice mills, many Asian-owned, throughout the country (IBRD, Staff Appraisal Report, 5; Tanzania, MDB, 'A Review of the Production and Marketing Arrangements for Maize, Paddy and Wheat with particular reference to the Milling Sector', II, DSM, (1972), Appendix 5).

²²⁰ Approximately 75% of the country's lorry fleet was in private hands.

²²¹ Government and parastatal employees could use parallel marketing as a way of supplementing their salaries (Keeler, 'Preliminary Report', 10).

²²² Kjaerby, 'Scratching', 15; Keeler, 'Preliminary Report', 13

²²³ 'Much of the flow of grains into district and even regional centers, is done in a small-scale informal way. The expense of transportation, however, forces this trade to use vehicles and fuels efficiently. Many cars and trucks on other business carry a sack or two of grain as well. There are enough farmers with reason to go to town and enough town residents with friends or relatives in peripheral areas to account for a large part of this trade' (Keeler et al., Consumption Effects, 78).

circumvent road blocks by transporting small amounts of grain by donkey or headload.²²⁴

In areas with regular annual grain surpluses, it was worthwhile for more organised buying and transport facilities to be provided, most likely by local millers and/or transporters possibly in association with urban-based African entrepreneurs, Asian merchants or even high-ranking government/parastatal personnel. Such organisation explains the greater market integration between the well-known surplus-producing areas like Njombe and Arusha and centres of food demand in up-country towns like Mwanza.²²⁵

There is virtually no documentation of how parallel marketing was carried out, but it is possible to piece together a plausible picture. Inter-regional parallel marketing of a substantial volume of grain required fixed capital for purchasing, transporting and milling as well as good relations with regional government officials. Road blocks to prevent the movement of parallel market goods were strategically placed throughout the country. There was variation in policy from region to region on what constituted illegal goods, but the specification for grain was usually a load greater than five bags.²²⁶ It would have been expensive and hazardous to attempt bribery at each road block. Personal contact with district and regional government officials with their go-ahead for the free movement of grain would have greatly facilitated the trade. Urban-based Asian merchants who could offer large material incentives or the few African businessmen or more numerous African government/parastatal personnel who established friendships of mutual benefit with regional officialdom would have been well-placed to arrange to circumvent the roadblocks. Without the intercession of more powerful urban-based state officials or private individuals, local transporters/millers had to strike up understandings with regional, district and village officials.

²²⁴ Keeler, 'Preliminary Report', 18

²²⁵ For example, Ali Mpore was an African entrepreneur reputed to have a large specialised two-way trade in cooking oil from Mwanza and food crops from Arusha (Daily News: 'Government names 6 more Saboteurs', 13/4/83; Keeler et al. Consumption Effects, 78).

²²⁶ Daily News: 'Mbilinyi clarifies on food movement', 2/3/84

With the launching of the Anti-Economic Sabotage campaign in 1983, their risks increased.

The parallel market did not represent a 'market' in the classical sense of the term. The numerous inter-personal relations that encrusted the parallel market negated the operation of impersonal forces of demand and supply. The irregularity of the market's operation in time and space made it virtually impossible for peasant produce sellers or urban consumers to rely on it fully for their livelihood.

2. Urban Areas

Residents of urban areas, like their rural relations, had to devise strategies to lessen the adverse effects of the lack of essential consumer goods and services distributed through state marketing channels. The peasant option of adopting a household autarky strategy was far less feasible. Increasing one's cash income to afford the purchase of price-inflated essential goods was of paramount importance. There was a rapid increase in the incidence of clientage practices in salaried employment, frequently involving the siphoning of money and commodities, during this period. There were gradations of involvement from large-scale fraud down to the pervasive non-performance of one's allocated work tasks, a habit that increased as people became involved in 'miradi'²²⁷ and devoted less and less time and energy to their official paid employment.

Almost all urban consumers preferred NMC because it was the cheapest source of supply, particularly for seme. The 1976/77 Household Budget Survey reveals that in the poorest households seme accounted for 17.2% of the total value of their consumption declining in the successively higher income groups until it amounted to only 0.8% in the highest income group. The mean was 5.2% (TABLE 6.20). Even after the subsidy was removed NMC seme sales did not drop. Demand continued to exceed supply. Supplies of seme as well as rice and wheat dwindled. No amount of patient queuing

²²⁷ Translated 'projects', referring to the small-scale trading and farming activities that people undertook as private individuals to help make ends meet in the household budget.

could bring about quantities sufficient for most households' requirements particularly in up-country towns.

People tried to gain privileged access to the limited NMC supply. The NMC at Dar es Salaam headquarters and most up-country go-downs were willing to supply in bulk to government/parastatal agencies or private individuals with a kibali²²⁸ authorised by regional government officials and parastatal managers.²²⁹ These customers avoided wholesale and retail marketing and transport costs. The growing complaint was that they were the higher-income with influential contacts and motor transport. Low-income consumers could only try to chat up the retailer to gain an advantage in the distribution.

The 1976/77 Household Budget Survey records that 49% of household food consumption was direct farm supply unmediated by market exchange. The lowest income groups derived the greatest proportion of their total food consumption this way. The share decreases with successive income levels but a slight upturn is recorded with the top two income groups (TABLE 6.18). As NMC shortages got worse, the proportion of non-market household supply of food increased, with possible differences in the rate of increase by income group according to access to transport, land and agricultural inputs.

In urban cultivation, land rather than labour was the scarce factor of production. Women's relative absence from the formal urban labour force made them a ready source of labour. Wives often farmed the household plot. Alternatively other family relations or hired labour were employed. Land proximate to one's residence was not usually readily at hand in Dar es Salaam and the larger secondary towns. Municipal authorities made some land available for plot allocation or lease sale, otherwise people resorted to more informal arrangements which included squatting on land or buying land illegally from individuals who claimed rights to it. Alternatively, in villages on the

²²⁸ Translated 'permission'. Written authorisation by someone in a responsible party or government position allowing the holder to be exempted from normal procedures.

²²⁹ Daily News: 'Mwanza acts on "urushaji"', 3/11/80; 'Leaders warned on food permits', 7/1/84; 'Ilala bans 'social' food permits', 23/2/84; Schneider-Barthold et al., 'Farmers' Reactions', 77

perimeter of the city urban residents sometimes used party or government contacts to gain access or even quasi-legal rights to the land, even though they lived outside the village boundaries.²³⁰ As the town's agricultural frontiers were pushed further away from the city centre, transport became critical to whether or not a household could manage an 'urban' farm.²³¹ In Dar es Salaam, some government officials went as far as Bagamoyo district villages to get plots, sometimes hiring labour or working out a sharecropping arrangements with villagers who were provided with inputs in return for some of their output.²³² Frequently, government rather than private transport was used by the 'urban absentee farmer'. For those with extremely limited acreage, cassava was the favoured crop because of its high yield.

Urban households also sent family members to the household's rural home area for the periods of planting, cultivating and harvesting. Usually the family member would be a woman, i.e. the wife or other unemployed women in the household. In a 1980 Dar es Salaam nutrition survey, 33% of the high income earners and 44% of those with low incomes had a farm either somewhere around Dar es Salaam or in their home areas. Finally, a whole range of exchange relationships between rural and urban kin took place. Rural-based kin were often willing to supply a substantial portion of the grain requirements of the urban family in exchange for cash, goods or services.²³³ Frequently, the grain was transported by members of the family travelling between the up-country home and Dar es Salaam for business or social reasons. During the food shortages of the 1980s, although road block checks were

²³⁰ Daily News: 'Dar City Council decision dangerous', 19/2/80; 'City to extend its borders', 9/1/82; 'Peasants to win land case', 5/1/84; 'Plot allocation system is faulty', 19/11/85

²³¹ Furthermore, some towns insisted on enforcing bans on farming within the municipal boundaries ('Keeping Mbeya clean of...maize', 19/2/79; 'Bukoba', 23/5/79; 'Moshi Council destroys crops', 4/5/84; 'Mbeya', 18/10/84).

²³² Interview with Dr. K. Mustafa, 22/6/85; Daily News: 'Kibaha', 26/12/81

²³³ Schneider-Barthold et al., 'Farmers' Reactions', 62, 80

numerous, the government remained tolerant of the transport of one to five bags of food.²³⁴

The parallel market was most people's last resort because of its higher prices (compare TABLE 6.13 with TABLES 6.21.1 and 6.22.1). For many consumers, it was the only market option. Except for Dar es Salaam, parallel-marketed maize was available year-round in most towns (TABLE 6.21.2), but the supply of rice was more erratic (TABLE 6.22.2). Northern towns, particularly around Lake Victoria, paid two to three times the price for maize than southern towns.

In some cases, parallel market sales took place in the shops of licensed merchants who were either to get a higher margin or to compensate for higher prices they had had to pay to corrupt state wholesale agents.²³⁵ Parallel marketed supplies were often available in central town markets. The higher prices were an open secret or tacitly condoned by officials whose first concern was to keep the town supplied.²³⁶ Some towns, Dar es Salaam in particular, tried to enforce rigid bans on sale of uncontrolled grain. Some traders, licensed or unlicensed, managed to circumvent the ban by selling in markets in the town perimeters.²³⁷ They were subject to periodic official swoops. The Prime Minister, Sokoine, took a strong anti-trader stance maintaining that traders' profiteering went unchecked because too many people without proper retail premises had been given trading licenses.²³⁸

The importance of household and clientage-based sources of staple foodstuffs explains why the removal of the sembe subsidy in 1984 and the consequent 320% rise in the official price was not

²³⁴ In a public seminar, Judge Mnzavas 'cautioned the police "to act sensibly" when looking for smugglers particularly those carrying food crops to avoid harassing innocent citizens carrying small food quantities for domestic use' (Daily News: 'Judge warns law organs', 24/10/81).

²³⁵ According to one irritated consumer: 'The price depends upon whether the seller knows you or not. If he does well and good, you get it at a normal price. If not you must get it at an exorbitant price' (Daily News: 'Bukoba high prices', 2/3/82).

²³⁶ E.g. Mwanza, Mbeya and Morogoro (Keeler, 'Preliminary Report', 10).

²³⁷ E.g. Iringa, Dodoma and Dar es Salaam.

²³⁸ Daily News: 'Fake traders' days numbered, 14/8/80; 'City to check bogus traders', 7/5/81; 'Axe may fall on bogus traders', 9/9/81; 'City to fight hawkers', 31/12/81; 'Tribunal jails Dar traders', 7/2/84

followed by food riots or any other visible form of political protest.²³⁹ People complained, but the majority of urban consumers no longer solely depended on NMC supplies and the new official price was still 40% below the mean annual price for parallel marketed maize grain (TABLE 6.21.1).

The urban households' food self-sufficiency strategy probably contributed to Tanzania's continuing political security but there were costs. Labour specialisation was sacrificed both in terms of the attention and actual time that it took away from one's paid employment.²⁴⁰ Furthermore, urban dwellers were usually very amateur farmers:

[Nyerere] said he was impressed that many people in DSM, including intellectuals, had taken to agriculture but expressed concern over lack of farming expertise evident in almost all the farms he visited. 'There is no expertise at all. They (farmers) plant crops anyhow.'²⁴¹

IV. State Response to Crisis, 1979-1985

1. Economic Situation

There were three dimensions to Tanzania's economic crisis: first, the marked deterioration of the balance of payments resulting in an acute shortage of foreign exchange; second, the decline of economic sectoral performance, notably that of agriculture and industry; and third, the near collapse of public finance.

The serious deterioration in the trade balance that began in 1979 sprang from the worsening of Tanzania's international terms of trade (TABLE 6.6) and declining export volumes (TABLE 5.1). The value and volume of imports, on the other hand, increased as a result of import requirements for the Ugandan war, the second oil price shock and the government's liberalisation of import controls in

²³⁹ Jamal had calculated the the removal of the subsidy would result in at least 80% of a minimum wage earner's salary going on food alone: 'In human terms this would mean not just progressive, but immediate starvation. People may emigrate to the rural areas to escape this, but chances are, long before that they will riot. It is truly an "apocalypse scenario"' (Jamal, V., 'The Political Economy of Devaluation in Tanzania', ILO Draft Paper, (1984), 33-34).

²⁴⁰ Cook, Dimensions, 142-144

²⁴¹ Daily News: 'Irresponsible workers warned', 26/2/85

1977-78 upon the advice of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The trade deficit widened to an unprecedented level, despite attempts to cut imports to the barest minimum (TABLE 5.26). As the crisis deepened, Tanzania had to increasingly resort to short-term loans and suppliers' credit.²⁴²

The volume of fuel imported declined to crippling proportions (TABLE 6.3), while road, rail and vehicle maintenance deteriorated. By 1981 only nine percent of foreign exchange requests for the transport sector was being granted (TABLE 6.23). Industry was recipient to 27% of investment during the Third Five Year Plan.²⁴³ The Basic Industries Strategy required large imports of intermediate and capital goods. However, industry's foreign exchange allocations were slashed by more than half between 1977 and 1981 (TABLE 6.23). Capacity utilisation in some factories was as low as 20% by 1980.²⁴⁴

Poor sectoral performance took a heavy toll on public finance. In 1978/79, the government's budget slid into a deep deficit over two times greater than that of the previous year (TABLE 6.2). Expenditure on defence rose astronomically as a result of the Ugandan war. Although defence spending shrunk the following year, the effects of the oil crisis, Tanzania's heavy commitments to government development programmes, the financing of flagging parastatals and the provision of producer and consumer subsidies kept government expenditure high.

Government revenues meanwhile stagnated. Tanzania had been heavily dependent on export taxes and as agricultural exports declined, alternative sources of revenue were not forthcoming. Excise taxes fell in step with the decline of industrial output. The tendency for farmers to increase their subsistence output and production for untaxable parallel markets caused the state's tax base to shrink. Sales taxes, particularly on luxury items like cigarettes and beer, were raised to very high

²⁴² IBRD, Tanzania: Update on the State of the Economy, Washington, D.C. (June 1982), 56-58

²⁴³ Hanak, Tanzanian Balance of Payments, 47-48; The Third Five Year Plan had budgeted 24.2% of investment to industry and only 11.5% to agriculture (Tanzania, Third Five Year Plan, I, 11).

²⁴⁴ ILO, Basic Needs, 219

levels.²⁴⁵ Most significantly, beginning with the Ugandan war and continuing over time, the government had to rely on bank overdraft facilities. Consequently, the money supply expanded on average by 26% between 1978 and 1983, followed by an even higher rate of inflation in the economy (TABLES 5.7-5.9).²⁴⁶ At current prices gross foreign aid disbursements increased from \$362 million to \$696 million between 1978 and 1982,²⁴⁷ but most of this was project aid that Tanzania could not use for balance of payments support.²⁴⁸

In 1979, the Tanzanian government was forced to seek IMF assistance. In July 1980 a major programme was negotiated for a three-year stand-by facility, but this agreement collapsed in November of the same year because Tanzania exceeded the domestic budgetary ceiling imposed by the IMF.²⁴⁹ For the next five years there was a continuous deadlock between the IMF and Tanzania regarding IMF conditionality. Throughout this period IMF withheld financial assistance.

2. Undermining of State Agents' Occupational Accountability and the National Ideology Impasse

As the economic crisis deepened, government and parastatal personnel experienced the perpetual decline of the purchasing power of their salaries (TABLE 5.11). This had a detrimental impact on their work performance. The spread of clientage practices undermined occupational accountability and bureaucratic professionalism.

²⁴⁵ Between 1977/78 and 1981/82 sales tax as a proportion of total government revenue increased from 35% to 56% (Tanzania, Economic Survey, (1983), 41).

²⁴⁶ Bank of Tanzania, Economic and Operations Report, annual

²⁴⁷ IBRD, Tanzania: Update, 48

²⁴⁸ Singh argues that this project aid worsened Tanzania's balance of payment problem (Singh, A., 'Tanzania and the IMF: The Analytics of Alternative Adjustment Programmes', Development and Change, 17, (1986), 443).

²⁴⁹ Daily News: 'Budget speech', 19/6/81

During this period, Nyerere and the CCM party continued to exhort the socialist path.²⁵⁰ In 1981, the party issued guidelines aimed at instilling moral fibre in staff performance and generally reasserting socialist public accountability.²⁵¹ The socialist ideology, as it had been defined by Nyerere, rested on the tenets of cooperation and brotherhood, not unlike the unsanctioned but all-pervasive ideology of clientage. However, Nyerere's socialism was first and foremost a nationalist ideology, in which the notions of cooperation were to extend beyond face-to-face encounters to the entire citizenry. Clientage, therefore, was an opposing outlook and social force, which the advocates of a socialist public morality simply condemned as corrupt. Clientage practitioners were labelled wrongdoers that had to be apprehended and punished. It is not surprising that this period witnessed public campaigns against clientage.

But while party stalwarts pursued their struggle for socialist purity, clientage practices became all the more apparent in every avenue of state and market activity and all the more demoralising for those removed from any influence over the channelling of goods and services.

Nyerere raised the theme of socialist morality to the level of international debate when he attacked the IMF's antagonism to Tanzania's socialist development strategy.²⁵² Just as state 'service' was contrasted with market 'greed' at the domestic level, 'socialist' Tanzania was contrasted with the 'capitalist' IMF at the international level. This depiction had the unintended effect of winning some Tanzanians, particularly frustrated management-oriented professionals or aspirant merchants, to the side of 'capitalism'.²⁵³

²⁵⁰ Daily News: 'Socialism Tanzania's Goal says Mwalimu', 8/7/79; Nyerere stated: 'The message must always be: Re-charging our socialist convictions and then demonstrating the results by increased productivity in agriculture, factories and offices', as reported in 'Nyerere tells rally: Recharge economic survival batteries', 17/7/81; 'Thrust is self-reliance', 27/4/84

²⁵¹ Daily News: 'New Party Guidelines announced', 9/12/81; 'Party launches 19 Guidelines', 21/1/82

²⁵² Daily News: 'Don't waver, Nyerere', 8/7/81

²⁵³ Daily News: 'Views on trade liberalisation', 18/5/85

Clearly, the debate had been reduced to an over-simplistic dichotomy between the state and market, with the loaded terms 'socialism' and 'capitalism' volleyed back and forth. Ironically, during this period, the operational content of both the state and market in Tanzania were straying so far from the classical definitions of these two institutions (see Chapter 3) that it was analytically difficult to identify either of them anymore. The debate was extremely myopic. The economic crisis had reduced the vast majority of the population whatever their occupational role in the society to giving priority to the basic needs of the household, notably food. Clientage networks incorporated elements of state and market operations but were primarily informed by the logic of basic need fulfillment, rather than capitalist profit or socialist cooperation. Nonetheless, the vociferous opponents in the state/market debate continued to thrash out the usual arguments for or against the state. Clientage was not being analysed nor realistically addressed through policies. Campaigns to root out clientage practices were futile because the practices were not restricted to isolated individuals; they had become the modus operandi of the economy in which everyone participated in different capacities to a greater or lesser extent.

3. State Policy Retreat

The Ugandan war had lasted only seven months and had been won with a fairly minimal loss of life, but its financial cost to Tanzania was estimated at between 3.6 and 4.0 billion shillings.²⁵⁴ In addition there were various destabilising after-effects: the agricultural marketing situation was no longer being effectively managed within the confines of parastatal marketing arrangements due in part to the disruption in crop transport that had taken place during the war, more than ten thousand soldiers were promised jobs by the state as a reward for their military services,²⁵⁵ troop disarmament was not thorough and guns and ammunition in the hands of ex-soldiers and other civilians caused the

²⁵⁴ Daily News: 'Mwalimu warns of hard times ahead', 19/6/79; IBRD, Economic Memorandum, 31

²⁵⁵ Daily News: 'Heroes get employment', 30/9/79

incidence of robbery and lawlessness to rise very markedly.

Government policies were increasingly couched in terms of tactical and emergency measures to free a besieged economy. The patriotic rallying slogans of the Ugandan war were transferred to the economic front. In 1981, the state initiated the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP)²⁵⁶ which involved a six billion shillings export target that all government and parastatal institutions were expected but failed to implement. In 1982 the emphasis switched to cutbacks and prioritising expenditure to optimise output with the launching of the three-year Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).²⁵⁷ The SAP demarcated the areas of the economy that had first claims on scarce foreign exchange. One of the main aims of the programme was to provide agricultural inputs and incentive goods to farmers. In industry, priority was to be given to those industries supplying basic amenity and incentive goods. Over 200 development projects were suspended for lack of funds and non-economic industries were slated to be closed down.²⁵⁸

While the economic planners tried to optimize the utilization of the country's extremely meagre capital resources, the party campaigned against individuals who were thought to be undermining Tanzania's economy. They targetted first, the 'economic saboteurs', those who were dealing in illegal marketing and corrupt practices; and second, the urban unemployed and under-employed defined as all those who did not have a formal job or were engaged in unlicensed market activity. In 1983, under the Economic Sabotage Act, a 12-member tribunal for the hearing and conviction of 'economic crimes' was set up. By the end of 1983, 1,745 cases had been filed before the National Anti-Economic

²⁵⁶ Daily News: 'NEC launches survival plan', 18/5/81. NESP was prepared by the government and launched by the party.

²⁵⁷ Tanzania, Structural Adjustment Programme for Tanzania, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, DSM, (June 1982)

²⁵⁸ Daily News: 'Over 200 projects suspended', 18/6/82

Sabotage Tribunal.²⁵⁹ In 1984, the Human Resources Deployment Act was passed in conjunction with the nquvu kazi campaign that involved the rounding up of all noticeably unemployed in the towns and small unlicensed market vendors, who were then sent to the rural areas for resettlement. Thousands were arrested.²⁶⁰

As these measures to halt economic decline proceeded, the government was also engaged in reversing a number of policies that had hitherto been considered landmarks of Tanzania's development strategy. Thus in 1982, marketing cooperatives were reinstated and the 1971 Decentralisation policy and the 1975 Village Act were superceded by the Local Government Act which reinstituted local councils. New national and party constitutions were promulgated which reduced the President's leverage, giving the elected Parliament more power.²⁶¹ Meanwhile, steps were being taken to accord more recognition of private property and the private sector. The 1982 Agricultural policy specified that villagers should be given 33-year leases to their land.²⁶² In 1981, the Minister of Agriculture had stated that large-scale private farming was welcomed by the government. By the mid-1980s private investments in farming were being actively encouraged and positively reported by the press and the ban on rented private property was lifted.²⁶³ Furthermore, the government liberalised external trade, allowing Tanzanians to import goods without having to state how they obtained the foreign exchange.²⁶⁴

In his 1981 New Year address Nyerere had blasted the IMF demands as an affront to national sovereignty, but increasingly over time, government policy was incorporating measures recommended by

²⁵⁹ The Tribunal included four judges and eight others, mostly politicians. They tried 372 cases, making 212 convictions as of 3 February, 1984 (Daily News: 'Police files 1,745 cases', 3/2/84).

²⁶⁰ Daily News: 'Police swoop nets 1,623 Dar "jobless"', 7/1/84

²⁶¹ Daily News: 'CCM Constitution changes endorsed', 22/1/82; 'NEC constitutional proposals out', 7/6/84; 'Constitutional Changes: Bill for Bunge', 21/9/84; 'Constitutional Changes: Bill passed', 31/10/84

²⁶² Tanzania, National Agricultural Policy, 26

²⁶³ Daily News: 'Large-scale farmers welcome', 6/6/81; 'Bohra to start fruit farm', 15/2/84; 'Policy on private sector underway', 13/2/84; 'Now you can build houses for rent...', 19/5/85

²⁶⁴ Sunday News: 'Mwalimu elaborates on trade liberalisation', 19/5/85

the IMF.²⁴⁵ Nyerere's position was not a complete rejection of IMF policies, but rather an insistence on deciding their intensity and timing. In Nyerere's words:

I cannot sign (an agreement with the IMF) and then have riots on the streets...You [the IMF] may be the economic experts but I am the political expert - allow me at least to say how much the people can take.²⁴⁶

Tanzania did have small devaluations four times between 1981 and 1985.²⁴⁷ Social services were cut back drastically, partly out of default and partly out of conscious policy. Subsidies on seabe and fertilizer were removed in 1984. Parastatal budgets were severely limited. Despite all these measures which were precisely what the IMF wanted, Tanzania and IMF remained at loggerheads throughout Nyerere's presidency because the IMF maintained that these measures and currency devaluation had to be more drastic. Thus Tanzania continued to be denied IMF special drawing rights that were so desperately needed to bridge the balance of payments problem.²⁴⁸

V. Chapter Conclusion

In 1973, the urban population constituted roughly 7% of the national total, a percentage which was to double over the next eleven years. It was in this context that the state embarked on its ambitious industrialisation and agricultural transformation programme bearing strong resemblance to measures advocated by Preobrazhensky. Villagisation, single-channel state marketing and the Basic

²⁴⁵ Nyerere stated: 'When did the IMF become an International Ministry of Finance? When did nations agree to surrender to it their power of decision-making?', Daily News: 'NO to IMF meddling', 3/1/80

²⁴⁶ Daily News: 'Nyerere explains stand on IMF Conditions', 23/11/84; 'Nyerere reiterates stand on IMF loan', 8/3/85; 'Nyerere stresses rural progress', 13/3/85

²⁴⁷ The devaluations that took place measured against the U.S. dollar were: 10% on 20/1/79, 12% on 6/3/82, 20% during June 1983; 26% on 14/6/84, and 33% in June, 1985.

²⁴⁸ In 1985, Nyerere declined to run for president again and Ali Hassan Mwinyi was elected to the position. The following year the IMF and the Tanzanian government reached an agreement that entailed a 100% devaluation against the dollar and the release of approximately \$800 million (Financial Times: 'Tanzania to receive \$800m in aid and loans, 13/6/86; 'Tanzania-IMF agreement ends longstanding feud', 20/8/86).

Industries Strategy were implemented by the government's growing ranks of civil servants and parastatal employees. Despite the high profile peasant agricultural development got in Tanzania's official policy declarations, industrial investment superceded agricultural investment and state farm initiatives were gaining importance in Tanzania's agricultural strategy.

Some, notably the IMF, when offering explanations for Tanzania's economic crisis would cite the state's dominance over the market as the most deleterious factor. Many Tanzanian critics, including the government itself on occasion, blamed inefficient or corrupt state agents. No matter how much weighting is placed on domestic policies and their implementation, they cannot be divorced from exogenous factors, namely the 1973/74 and 1979 oil booms, the droughts of 1973-75 and 1979/80, and the Ugandan war. The fact that Tanzania's import/export balance plunged so radically following each oil crisis strongly suggests that the instigating forces in Tanzanian economic decline were of an external nature, while domestic factors tended to reinforce the downward slide.

The 1973-75 drought was met with successful state measures to guarantee food security in rural and urban areas. Heavy food importation made up for the deficit in domestic production and large wage and salary increases adequately covered increased food costs for urban dwellers (TABLES 5.10-11 and 6.14). From 1979 onwards the situation was different. Tanzania had to become increasingly reliant on food aid because of its severe shortage of foreign exchange. Although the sembe subsidy was an attempt to guarantee urban residents' food security, it failed in one important respect: the NMC could not meet urban demand and several towns were simply not supplied with anywhere near per capita requirements, even in Dar es Salaam which had supply priority severe shortages were frequent. Salaried and waged workers were adversely affected by the lack of purchasable basic staple foods and the inflationary prices of the parallel food market.

It is not difficult to argue that food insecurity, the most basic uncertainty that the population faced during this period, had a profound effect on the social division of labour. Clearly, the social division of labour was contracting in a number of respects. The occupational accountability associated with professionalism and the complex division of labour of the urban society, quickly eroded under material stress. The lack of bureaucratic accountability on the part

of government and parastatal agents was particularly apparent. Parastatal clientage came to the fore. In comparison with the other variants of clientage described in preceding chapters, parastatal clientage's networks and face-to-face accountability did not extend as effectively down to peasants in the rural areas. Even within the parastatals, face-to-face accountability was based more on fear than mutual reciprocity and the exchange of prestige and security between patron and client. Parastatal clientage was far more fragile as a network and far less effective as a distributive channel for productive goods and services than cooperative clientage. Unwittingly, the government's call for adherence to a socialist morality merely served to call attention to the spread of clientage practices rather than putting a check on them.

Parastatals were not succeeding either as public service agencies nor profitable concerns. In addition, they were increasingly unable to provide their employees with salaries that covered their basic consumer needs. The large deficits that the parastatals were incurring jeopardized the national economy. The performance of civil servants in government ministries was following a similar course. The fact that Tanzanian government policy had vested so much in state control of the economy at every level and every sector meant that poor performance of state agents had an all-pervasive effect. Industry and agricultural output slumped and the produce marketing network under parastatal control became more and more erratic.

As the state marketing infrastructure crumbled, everyone, peasants and urban dwellers alike, had to become increasingly reliant on localised household and clientage survival strategies. This had direct implications for the functional division of labour. Besides the formal employment lay-offs that started taking place in the early 1980s, informally, the occupational division of labour was eroding as people took time off from their formal jobs to engage in non-sanctioned income earning activities and farming.

Thus, this period in Tanzania's history witnessed a failure to launch industrialisation and a peasant agricultural transformation programme, as well as deterioration in the existing functional division of labour to such an extent that the occupational division of labour between rural and urban

areas was being undermined. The lack of sufficient agricultural surplus to feed Tanzania's existing urban settlements and an associated complex of occupational specialisation was never more apparent.

CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Referring back to the cycle of food insecurity (FIGURE 1.1), the findings of this thesis can now be summarised. In Chapter 2, the physical causes of food insecurity are outlined. Tanzanian peasant producers have faced a highly vagarious physical environment and their household pattern of production has necessarily given primacy to food self-sufficiency. High fertility rates have led to rapid population growth. There is evidence that in a Boserupian fashion, the peasant household has responded to increasing rural population density with changes in agricultural technology and the intensification of the working day, the latter it appears has been especially borne by women. Food production capability has gradually risen roughly in correspondence with the increase in the rural population, contrary to Malthusian thought. But, agricultural adaptations have not succeeded in eliminating the fluctuation of supply due to weather variability, as indicated by the wide spatial and temporal incidence of food inadequacy in peasant households over the past 66 years. It is evident from this that although the level of food production capability in Tanzanian peasant production has supported rapid growth of the rural population it provides an extremely tenuous basis for the territorial supply of food to the non-peasant population.

Chapter 3 juxtaposes Tanzania's three main extra-household social institutions: the state, the market and clientage networks. It is shown that the state was dominated by Europeans, the market by Asians and clientage networks by African rural dwellers between 1919 and 1950. The incidence of food stress was restricted primarily to Africans. Europeans and Asians rarely were directly exposed to food insecurity. African household food insecurity was mediated by Native Authority clientage networks that operated on the basis of the moral obligations of highly localised societies, involving continuous face-to-face encounters between patrons and clients.

Chapter 4 reviews the food supply arrangements for the expanding African wage labour force between 1919 and 1950. A combination of ad-hoc state measures, market activity and a not inconsiderable amount of self-provisioning by the labourer himself under the kipande system took place during the inter-war period. During the 1940s, African marketed food demand rose sharply as

the wage labour force grew and urbanisation accelerated. Domestic food supply fell far short of demand. Food importation increased. The state imposed controls on food marketing, offered cost of living allowances to ensure African state employees' basic nutritional needs and tried to spur increased domestic supply by supporting European capitalised food production, at the expense of peasant producers. In this way, food insecurity was minimised in the urban areas, whereas African agriculture stagnated.

Chapter 5 traces the elimination of the racial division of labour and the dismantling of the European state and the Asian market under relatively good weather conditions and favourable international terms of trade between 1950 and 1973. The performance and accountability of the newly-installed, urban-based African state bureaucracy was supported by relatively high incomes in comparison with the rest of the African population, a strong national identity and the ethos of African socialism. The market, on the other hand, started to disintegrate during this period. Asian traders were edged out and replaced by the cooperatives and state trading corporations. The cooperatives operated on the basis of clientage networks extending from regional towns downwards to village level. A 'neighbourhood' sense of identity replaced tribal identity. The network was conducted on the basis of face-to-face accountability. Patrons were no longer^o vested with magico-religious powers, but the new goods and services they offered peasant producers gave them a magnetic attraction. The modernising state was impatient with both the inefficient ways that cooperatives operated as well as the way agricultural surpluses were eluding state control.

Chapter 6 covering the period between 1973 and 1985 describes the state's abolition of the cooperatives and the parastatalisation of the economy. The government's ambitious plans at the outset were set at no less than peasant agricultural transformation and industrialisation. But the intervention of drastically declining international terms of trade, the Ugandan war and adverse weather undermined the state's development programme as well as the state marketing and productive and social service delivery systems. State and parastatal agents, who had been charged with executing the programme, became increasingly demotivated as the purchasing power of their salaries declined to a point at which basic requirements like food were threatened. Clientage practices on

the part of state and parastatal agents proliferated as food insecurity mounted. Parastatal clientage lacked effective conduits down to the peasants. Peasants were increasingly marginalised from the goods and services that the parastatals distributed officially or unofficially. A growing proportion of the exchange that took place between urban and rural areas was channeled through extended households. As the supply of state-provisioned goods and services dwindled, both rural peasants and urban dwellers had to resort to survival strategies characterised by increasing household self-sufficiency in food production. Households and clientage networks encroached more and more on the terrain of the state and market.

Having summarised each chapter it remains to tease out the theoretical implications of the Tanzanian case in relation to the general problem of increasing a nation-state's food supply at the turning point between agrarian and industrial social organisation. It has been argued that over the decades since 1919, Tanzania's development evidenced elements of the Ricardian and W.A. Lewis 'comparative advantage' approach whereby reliance was placed on food importation and peasant export cashcropping. More latterly during the 1970s, the Preobrazhensky state marketing and state-led industrialisation strategy held sway. But during the 1980s, the positive results of these approaches were dimmed by the serious inadequacy of Tanzania's domestic food supply, giving credence to Malthusian gloom, at least in the short run. Had it not been for a large increase in per capita food imports, some parts of the population, notably those in urban areas would have experienced life-threatening shortages of food.

The inadequacy of domestic food supply resulted from rapid increases in demand arising from population growth, de-agrarianisation, the development of occupational specialisation and urbanisation, on the one hand, and insufficient development of agricultural productivity, on the other. Tanzania's declining terms of trade exacerbated the effect of these tendencies, as well as calling into question the viability of Tanzania's urban areas and the occupational specialisation that they represented.

The assumption made by Ricardo, Preobrazhensky, Lewis and most social scientists of the present

day, namely that the operation of the state and market determine national production and distribution cannot be applied uncritically in the Tanzanian case, particularly under conditions of food stress. When household food insecurity is as rampant as it was in the 1980s and most importantly, when food insecurity pervades urban as well as rural households, state and market operations contract as clientage network practices become more prevalent.

It has been argued that the peasant household is Tanzania's basic unit of production and in the rural areas the division of labour has been premised on household and clientage social organisation. Under British colonial rule, a rigid racial division of labour was super-imposed in conjunction with the entrenchment of a European-controlled state and an Asian-controlled market. The struggle for independence and post-colonial state policies represented a frontal attack on the colonially-constructed extra-household racial division of labour. The state and market were Africanised. The state adopted a bureaucratic mode of operation similar to the one followed by the British whereas the market deviated from the competitive, profit-maximizing model set by the Asians and absorbed the aims of rural neighbourhood clientage networks. Meanwhile, little was being done to change the internal rural household division of labour based on sex and age. The state, adverse to localised clientage practices and keen on deepening nationalist consciousness, promoted a secular public morality in the form of 'African socialism'. Under Nyerere's leadership African socialism became an ethos equally meaningful to peasants and educated urban-dwelling civil servants. On the foundation of this configuration of social institutions and public accountability, the state embarked on agricultural transformation and industrialisation during the mid-1970s.

Food insecurity arising from adverse weather and the declining purchasing power of urban wages in the wake of Tanzania's drastic deterioration in international terms of trade, put an end to the state's ambitious plans. Urban occupational accountability was undermined and neither Durkheim's notion of 'organic solidarity' nor 'mechanical solidarity', were applicable. Durkheim had used the term organic solidarity to denote the social interaction of people under the influence of market complementarity and a complex division of labour whereas mechanical solidarity had referred to a more simplified division of labour under the direction of a coercive state. In the Tanzanian case, once

food insecurity became an all-pervasive feature of the economy, the impersonal state and the market ceased to dominate extra-household exchange.

Perhaps the term 'basic solidarity' is most appropriate to the situation that prevailed. The division of labour was eroding to its elemental basis that of age and sex in the household. Clientage networks were serving as the main distributive channels. Inter-personal association arising from one's immediate neighbourhood, place of work, place of birth or family ties functioned as the basis for ad-hoc exchange and distribution, underpinned by face-to-face social accountability. Professional ethics declined as membership in an occupation-based moral community took second place to membership in the consumption-based social unit of the household. In addition to its role as a consumption unit, the urban household was increasingly taking on subsistence farming and other productive activities. Under these circumstances 'family morals' took precedence over professional job performance. As Durkheim so sagely observed professional ethics are contingent on the stability of the professional social groups. When their material security is threatened they cease to be accountable and self-regulating.

The effective operation of the state and market require a certain level of economic surplus capable of supporting occupational labour specialisation. In the absence of a sufficient surplus, 'basic solidarity' arises. The satisfaction of essential household need and inter-household prestige rather than carrying out the tasks of an impersonal state bureaucracy or market profit-maximization become state and market agents' pre-occupation. Thus, consistent with Durkheimian theory, food insecurity, as it has been experienced by the Tanzanian population particularly in the late 1970s and 1980s, has affected the social division of labour with respect to: one, the involution of occupational specialisation; two, the erosion of occupational accountability; and three, the realignment of the main social institutions, the state and market, being increasingly undermined by the smaller scale inter-personal relations of the household and clientage networks.

The question remains how can Tanzania move from basic solidarity to what might best be termed 'balanced solidarity', i.e. a complex division of labour arising from a balanced, interactive state

and market. The fundamental precondition for this to happen is more favourable international terms of trade, whereby Tanzania's exports become remunerative vis-a-vis essential imports, notably fuel. After this vital pre-condition is met, a resolution to the problem of balancing national food supply and demand as the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture shrinks must be sought in domestic policy. This will require the refinement of agricultural packages to localized climatic and soil conditions. It will require the provisioning of an efficient productive, transport, credit and social service infrastructure to the peasants by professionally-minded agents. On the demand side, it will require slowing down the population growth rate which inter alia entails an improvement in rural women's social and economic status. It will necessitate an urbanisation policy that keeps urban growth at a manageable rate. These requirements are easy to list, but exceedingly difficult to translate into measures that can be combined in a balanced fashion and realistically implemented with the resources and personnel on hand.

Ricardo, Lewis and Preobrazhensky never put time limits on how long the resolution of the problem of erratic and inadequate national food production takes in the transition from agrarian to industrial social organisation. It is clear that each society has not only its own speed but its own way of solving the problem. The Tanzanian case illustrates that there are serious obstacles to the goal's attainment. Positive change is most likely to arise out of policies that avoid dichotomizing the role of the market and state and which do not ignore their functional interaction with household and clientage networks. The state and market require stable institutional foundations through which the social division of labour can expand. State and market operations cannot be assumed, they must be created and solidified. In the meantime the omnipresent logic and practices of clientage networks are inevitable and necessary for human survival.