APPENDICES

Complex Illusions of Peace:
An Interdisciplinary Approach to Conflict Reversion in Afghanistan, 1979-2014

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Hilary Term 2017

Contents

A.1. Transforming Raw Data into Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations Data..... A2

A.2. Further Testing for Non-normal Data A7

A.3. Control Variables Logistic and Multinomial Regression Results..... A8

A.4. Complexity Variables Logistic and Multinomial Regression Results A13

A.5. Interaction Effects of Complexity Variables..... A39

A.6. Further CEM Simulations: Conflict Reversion Parameters A41

A.7. Further CEM Simulations: Conflict Onset..... A44

A.8. Afghanistan Data: Rare Logit Regressions. A45

A.9. Afghanistan Data: Poisson Regressions..... A52

A.10. Afghanistan Data: Contingency Tables A57

A.11. R Code for CEM A67

A.1. Transforming Raw Data into Multiple Imputation by Chained Equations Data

Weighting is often used in statistical analysis to reduce bias. However, within the IR discipline if data is weighted data is it usually discarded via listwise deletion. Simply removing the data via listwise deletion causes biased estimates. In contrast, I apply multiple imputation by chained equations (MICE) as a method for amending missing data problems as missing data can prevent the estimation of a model (i.e., the inability to fit coefficients).[1] MICE is able to predict the missing observation by using non-missing observations. Instead of simply choosing one value for a missing value, MICE picks many out of a distribution and the uncertainty is represented in a repeated matrix of the beta coefficients. In addition, the imputed values created by MICE can be inspected and analyzed, which helps us to gauge the effect of the model assumption tests. Diagnostic checking after applying MICE assess whether imputations are plausible (i.e., values that are close to the data). Figures A.1.1 and A.1.2 illustrate methods of assumptions tests and diagnostic checking for the MICE data. The MICE data forms the main dataset for this thesis.

[1] van Buuren, S. (2012) *Flexible Imputation of Missing Data*. CRC Press, Boca Raton.

Figure A.1.1 Boxplots of Controls and Complexity Variables: Observed (blue) versus Imputed (pink) Values (m=10, maxit=40)




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
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

Figure A.1.2. XYplot of Controls and Complexity Variables: Observed (blue) versus Imputed (pink) Values (m=10, maxit=40)




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ExtSuppt
ExtSupptG
ExSupptN
.imp

A.2. Further Testing for Non-normal Data

The following QQplots demonstrate the necessity of applying logistic regression as my data was largely non-normal.

Table A.2.1. QQplots of Variables Under Analysis



A.3. Control Variables Logistic and Multinomial Regression Results

All models demonstrate significant fit to the data in that the residual is better fit than the null. The overall fit of the models is shown by the deviance statistic and its associated chi-square (X^2) statistic. The X^2 measures how much better the model is at predicting independent variables (i.e., compares the model versus constant only). Additionally, all models pass independence of errors assumption (i.e., Durbin-Watson statistic(DWT)). Lastly, the average variance inflation factor (VIF) scores demonstrate that the regression may be biased ($\bar{x}$VIF score is greater than 1, but not substantially); however other tests passed the assumption of no multicollinearity (i.e., VIF and tolerance tests). Thus, I can confidently confirm that assumptions have been met for all models.

I ran several logistic and multinomial models with different dependent variables to demonstrate how slight changes in the operationalization of the dependent variable can dramatically affect significance, parameter estimates, standard errors, magnitude of odds ratio values, and marginal effects to find best model fit. In addition to the logistic and multinomial models I ran rare logit models as robustness checks. All rare logit models, with the exception of Usher recur (FL and EPR prior) and UCDP recur (EPR prior), shared similar values.

Table A.3.1. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Onset, 1945-2013, FL Prior war

	***bl*FL 2003 onset**	**FL onset**	**UCDP onset**	**EPR onset**	**EPR G onset**	**Usher onset**
FL Prior war	-0.954**	3.021***	0.040***	1.179***	0.782**	1.906***
	(0.314)	(0.214)	(0.004)	(0.139)	(0.188)	(0.109)
GDP per capita income	-0.344***	-0.107*	-0.000**	-0.127***	-0.114***	-0.184***
	(0.072)	(0.045)	(0.000)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.029)
Population (log)	0.263***	0.001	0.000	0.186***	0.082	-0.130***
	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.000)	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.033)
% mountainous (log)	0.219**	0.061	-0.000	0.037	0.074	0.189***
	(0.085)	(0.065)	(0.000)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.030)
Noncontagious state	0.443	-0.240	0.000	-0.163	-0.586*	-1.067***
	(0.274)	(0.245)	(0.004)	(0.176)	(0.269)	(0.173)
Oil exporter	0.858**	0.638*	0.018***	0.674***	0.685**	0.617***
	(0.279)	(0.255)	(0.004)	(0.170)	(0.218)	(0.152)
New state	1.709***	1.277**	0.010	0.782*	1.003**	1.209***
	(0.339)	(0.464)	(0.009)	(0.328)	(0.382)	(0.240)
Instability	0.618**	0.492*	0.011**	0.648***	1.125***	0.679***
	(0.235)	(0.192)	(0.004)	(0.140)	(0.170)	(0.113
Democracy	0.021	0.018	0.000	0.013	-0.006	0.017*
	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.008)
ELF	0.166	-0.178	0.012*	0.861***	0.580	0.834***
	(0.373)	(0.343)	(0.005)	(0.245)	(0.310)	(0.197)
RLF	0.285	0.279	-0.004	-0.094	0.437	0.070
	(0.509)	(0.446)	(0.006)	(0.316)	(0.398)	(0.252)
Constant	-6.731***	-5.237***	0.004	-5.625***	-5.395***	-4.979***
	(0.735)	(0.618)	(0.008)	(0.434)	(0.547)	(0.353)
N	6610	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	984.8	1184	-11206	2363	159	3158
Null deviance	1077.1 Df= 6326	1526 Df= 8772	145.5 Df= 8780	2662 Df= 8780	1716 Df= 8780	3898 Df= 8780
Residual deviance	960.8 Df= 6315	1160 Df= 8761	143.0 Df= 8769	2339 Df= 8769	1566 Df= 8769	3134 Df= 8769
X^2	116.3***	267.7***	2.430	282.4***	150.28***	1558 ***
DWT	1.721***	1.963	2.012	1.830***	1.873***	1.341***
x̄VIF score	1.204	1.257	1.191	1.234	1.201	1.203

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.3.2. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Reversion and Persistence, 1945-2013, FL Prior War

	UCDP recurrence	Usher recurrence	Usher relapse	UCDP persistence	EPR persistence	EPR G persistence
FL Prior war	1.035*** (0.202)	1.277*** (0.226)	0.855*** (0.234)	2.652*** (0.089)	2.806*** (0.090)	2.300*** (0.091)
GDP per capita income	-0.053 (0.037)	-0.016 (0.035)	-0.148* (0.060)	-0.050*** (0.013)	-0.068*** (0.012)	-0.130*** (0.020)
Population (log)	0.163* (0.064)	0.256*** (0.074)	0.279*** (0.076)	0.287*** (0.028)	0.273*** (0.025)	0.120*** (0.029)
% mountainous (log)	0.043 (0.062)	0.158* (0.065)	0.061 (0.071)	0.096*** (0.026)	0.057* (0.024)	0.228** (0.027)
Noncontagious state	-0.293 (0.268)	0.081 (0.266)	-0.942* (0.377)	-0.521*** (0.112)	-0.502*** (0.106)	-0.360** (0.123)
Oil exporter	0.037 (0.280)	0.699** (0.260)	0.065 (0.347)	0.882*** (0.107)	0.961*** (0.098)	0.595*** (0.121)
New state	0.964* (0.438)	1.339** (0.447)	1.053* (0.537)	0.473*** (0.095)	0.942*** (0.195)	1.141*** (0.213)
Instability	0.876*** (0.196)	-0.024 (0.265)	1.186*** (0.222)	0.473*** (0.095)	0.571*** (0.089)	1.118*** (0.092)
Democracy	-0.007 (0.014)	0.000 (0.020)	0.009 (0.018)	0.032*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.010 (0.006)
ELF	1.000** (0.349)	1.579*** (0.430)	0.994* (0.417)	0.880*** (0.150)	0.966*** (0.138)	1.048*** (0.161)
RLF	0.751 (0.452)	0.151 (0.529)	0.452 (0.547)	-0.367 (0.194)	-0.550** (0.178)	-0.209 (0.205)
Constant	-6.724*** (0.638)	-8.462*** (0.750)	-7.917*** (0.781)	-5.648*** (0.276)	-5.006*** (0.249)	-4.640*** (0.286)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	1341	1052	974.2	4992	5773	4403
Null deviance	1436 Df= 8772	1164 Df= 8772	1075 Df= 8772	6657 Df= 8772	7781 Df= 8772	5946 Df= 8772
Residual deviance	1317 Df= 8769	1028 Df= 8761	950.2 Df= 8761	4968 Df=8769	5749 Df= 8769	4379 Df= 8769
X^2	118.6***	136.0***	125.6***	1383***	2031***	1566***
DWT	1.865***	1.735***	1.799***	0.474***	0.602***	0.643***
$\bar{x}$VIF score	1.226	1.298	1.204	1.212	1.202	1.194

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.3.3. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Onset, 1945-2013, EPR Prior war

	FL onset	UCDP onset	EPR onset	EPR G onset	Usher onset
EPR Prior war	0.227 (0.220)	-0.580** (0.188)	0.470*** (0.134)	-0.059 (0.164)	1.355*** (0.120)
GDP per capita income	-0.289*** (0.060)	-0.224*** (0.049)	-0.157*** (0.031)	-0.135*** (0.040)	-0.240*** (0.031)
Population (log)	0.122 (0.070)	0.120* (0.063)	0.195*** (0.043)	0.109 (0.057)	0.112** (0.034)
% mountainous (log)	0.084 (0.065)	0.117* (0.064)	0.042 (0.043)	0.089 (0.052)	0.134*** (0.029)
Noncontagious state	0.491 (0.256)	0.292 (0.231)	0.104 (0.170)	-0.451 (0.265)	-0.509** (0.163)
Oil exporter	0.667* (0.275)	0.624** (0.436)	0.596*** (0.169)	0.686** (0.217	0.413** (0.148)
New state	1.000* (0.442)	1.088*** (0.436)	0.604 (0.327)	0.950* (0.381)	0.797*** (0.242)
Instability	1.170*** (0.203)	1.088*** (0.178)	0.792*** (0.136)	1.263*** (0.166)	0.904*** (0.106)
Democracy	0.010 (0.016)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.008 (0.008)
ELF	-0.176 (0.367)	1.032 (0.325)	0.835*** (0.245)	0.649* (0.311)	0.641*** (0.191)
RLF	0.317 (0.483)	0.312 (0.421)	-0.140 (0.311)	0.478 (0.399)	-0.052 (0.242)
Constant	-5.604*** (0.693)	-5.732*** (0.569)	-5.688*** (0.422)	-5.552*** (0.544)	-4.979*** (0.313)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	1131	1411	2417	1606	3296
Null deviance	1216 Df= 8772	1526 Df- 8780	2622 Df= 8780	1716 Df= 8780	3898 Df=8780
Residual deviance	1107 Df= 8761	1387 Df=8769	2393 Df= 8769	1582 Df= 8769	3272 Df= 8769
X^2	109.5***	110.7***	229.1***	134.2***	625.7***
DWT	1.852***	1.778***	1.812***	0.068***	1.325***
x̄VIF score	1.194	1.232	1.218	1.187	1.178

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.3.4. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Reversion and Persistence, 1945-2013, EPR Prior War

	UCDP recurrence	Usher recurrence	Usher relapse	UCDP persistence	EPR persistence	EPR G persistence
EPR Prior war	18.07	17.61	4.436***	4.679***	2.555***	2.580***
	(407.8)	(406.9)	(1.009)	(0.271)	(0.095)	(0.113)
GDP per capita income	-0.027	0.000	-0.145*	-0.065***	-0.093***	-0.183***
	(0.038)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.023)
Population (log)	0.044	0.166*	0.161*	0.208***	0.208***	0.082**
	(0.064)	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.029)
% mountainous (log)	-0.006	-0.121	0.002	0.055*	0.035	0.186***
	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.028)
Noncontagious state	0.152	0.443*	-0.544	0.262*	0.203*	0.342**
	(0.266)	(0.317)	(0.373)	(0.105)	(0.096)	(0.119)
Oil exporter	-0.327	0.369	-0.145	0.365***	0.525***	0.326**
	(0.281)	(0.257)	(0.350)	(0.106)	(0.097)	(0.120)
New state	0.574	1.062*	0.687	0.352	0.456*	0.655**
	(0.444)	(0.452)	(0.541)	(0.227)	(0.200)	(0.221)
Instability	0.858***	0.115	1.160***	0.757***	0.833***	1.310***
	(0.190)	(0.257)	(0.021)	(0.091)	(0.083)	(0.090)
Democracy	-0.021	-0.008	-0.000	0.014*	0.007	-0.002
	(0.015)	(0.165)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
ELF	0.506	1.201**	0.545	0.294*	0.745***	0.695***
	(0.358)	(0.437)	(0.418)	(0.150)	(0.158)	(0.159)
RLF	0.753	0.002	0.373	-0.249	-0.447**	-0.468*
	(0.444)	(0.052)	(0.533)	(0.188)	(0.169)	(0.201)
Constant	-7.692***	-20.39	-10.00***	-7.841***	-5.031***	-5.087***
	(0.621)	(40.69)	(1.233)	(0.368)	(0.287)	(0.290)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	1182	961.8	887.1	4524	5774	4244
Null deviance	1436	1164	1075	6657	7781	5946
	Df= 8772	Df= 8772	Df=8772	Df= 8772	Df= 8772	Df- 8772
Residual deviance	1158	937.8	863.1	4050	5750	4220
	Df= 8769	Df= 8761	Df=8761	Df= 8769	Df= 8769	Df=8769
X^2	277.7***	226.6***	212.6***	2156***	2030***	1726***
DWT	1.916**	1.739***	1.826***	0.599***	0.696***	0.696***
$\bar{x}$VIF score	1.187	1.234	1.172	1.193	1.193	1.189

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

A.4. Complexity Variables Logistic and Multinomial Regression Results

Independent variables such as instability, dyad number, external support, politically active and excluded groups and power ratio all demonstrated statistically significant relationships across all conflict dynamics regardless of the intensity of prior war. Variables that were robustly and significantly related to all conflict dynamics (i.e., onset, reversion and persistence) were prior conflict, instability, dyad number, relative rebel capacity and third party involvement. Variables robustly and significantly related to onset were prior conflict, oil exporter, instability, dyad number,[2] political activity by unrepresented groups, relative rebel capacity, and third party involvement. Meanwhile, results were heavily mixed for conflict onset and bureaucratic capacity. Variables robustly and significantly related to persistence were prior conflict, percentage of mountainous territory, oil, instability, dyad number, excluded groups, rule of law, relative rebel capacity, tax capacity and third party involvement. In sum, economic opportunity had an effect on conflict persistence, a lesser effect on conflict onset, and no effect on conflict reversion, while political institutionalization and security proxied variables had an effect on onset, reversion, and persistence conflict dynamics.

[2] FL onset is the only dependent variable to receive this result. Although this result is not significant, it is important to report log odds as in logistic regression, these results hold more weight in comparison to the coefficient, if the log odds reported are reliable and robust.

Table A 4.1. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Onset, FL Onset 1945-2013, FL Prior War

	FL onset									
FL Prior war	2.867***	2.833***	2.809***	2.791***	2.575***	2.586***	2.579***	2.538***	2.573***	2.549***
	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.217)	(0.218)	(0.230)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.231)	(0.230)	(0.231)
GDP per capita income	-0.081*	-0.081*	-0.078	-0.060	-0.054	-0.068	-0.069	-0.070	-0.069	-0.068
	(0.395)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Oil exporter	0.473*	0.406	0.413	0.364	0.328	0.386	0.343	0.322	0.341	0.332
	(0.229)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.240)	(0.239)	(0.241)	(0.252)	(0.253)	(0.252)	(0.253)
New state	1.307**	1.354**	1.364**	1.373**	1.382**	1.312**	1.323**	1.308**	1.321**	1.309**
	(0.459)	(0.458)	(0.458)	(0.456)	(0.457)	(0.460)	(0.460)	(0.459)	(0.460)	(0.460)
Instability	0.565**	0.602**	0.612**	0.584**	0.590**	0.601**	0.606**	0.599**	0.607**	0.587**
	(0.187)	(0.188)	(0.189)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.193)
Dyad number	0.121	0.106	0.108	0.091	0.088	0.102	0.105	0.074	0.100	0.081
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Excluded groups		0.029**	0.009	0.006	0.004	-0.001	-0.004	-0.001	-0.004	-0.003
		(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Active groups			0.019	0.021	0.017	0.021	0.022	0.021	0.022	0.023
			(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
WGIRL				-0.003	-0.003	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Power ratio					-0.175*	-0.199**	-0.200**	-0.178*	-0.197**	-0.183*
					(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.075)
Bureaucracy						0.161*	0.172*	0.157*	0.170*	0.153*
						(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Tax ratio							0.637	0.468	0.596	0.466
							(1.038)	1.047	(1.060)	(1.049)
TPA								0.239		
								(0.212)		
TPA G									0.042	
									(0.218)	
TPA NSA										0.211
										(0.208)
Constant	-5.19***	-5.28***	-5.34***	-5.23***	-4.86***	-5.09***	-5.15***	-5.16***	-5.16***	-5.14***
	(0.207)	(0.211)	(0.223)	(0.260)	(0.294)	(0.312)	(0.327)	(0.328)	(0.327)	(0.328)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	1175.2	1171.6	1172.8	1174.1	1169.9	1166.6	1168.2	1169	1170.2	1169.2
Null deviance	1526.2	1526.2	1526.2	1526.2	1526.2	1526.2	1526.2	1526.2	1526.2	1526.2
Residual deviance	1161.0	1155.6	1154.8	1154.1	1147.9	1142.6	1142.2	1141.0	1142.2	1141.2
X^2	365.1***	370.5***	371.3***	372.0***	378.2***	383.5***	383.9***	385.1***	383.9***	384.9***
DWT	1.191***	1.925***	1.925**	1.924***	1.926***	1.930***	1.930***	1.928***	1.929**	1.928***
x̄VIF score	1.132	1.125	2.130	2.165	2.080	2.106	2.110	2.113	2.086	2.085

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.2. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Onset, UCDP Onset, 1945-2013, FL Prior War

	UCDP onset									
FL Prior war	0.450*	0.427	0.401	0.379	0.084	0.078	0.077	0.064	0.086	0.083
	(0.227)	(0.227)	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.220)
GDP per capita income	-0.097**	-0.098**	-0.096**	-0.076	-0.070	-0.068	-0.068	-0.069	-0.069	-0.069
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Oil exporter	0.872***	0.829***	0.861***	0.802***	0.711**	0.703**	0.697**	0.691**	0.700**	0.700**
	(0.210)	(0.213)	(0.214)	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.221)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.228)
Instability	0.513*	0.533**	0.537**	0.512*	0.416*	0.416*	0.416*	0.409*	0.420*	0.421*
	(0.199)	(0.200)	(0.199)	(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.200)	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.202)
ELF	0.482	0.437	0.312	0.269	0.114	0.113	0.110	0.098	0.118	0.117
	(0.322)	(0.324)	(0.332)	(0.333)	(0.335)	(0.335)	(0.336)	(0.338)	(0.338)	(0.338)
Dyad number	0.493***	0.479***	0.475***	0.456***	0.445***	0.444***	0.444***	0.438***	0.448***	0.447***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.068)
Excluded groups		0.022*	-0.015	-0.019	-0.026	-0.025	-0.026	-0.025	-0.271	-0.026
		(0.107)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Active groups			0.038	0.040	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031
			(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
WGIRL				-0.004	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Power ratio					-.439***	-.437***	-.437***	-.431***	-.440***	-.440***
					(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Bureaucracy						-0.021	-0.019	-0.022	-0.017	-0.016
						(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Tax ratio							0.112	0.099	0.134	0.123
							(1.049)	(1.04)	(1.054)	(1.052)
TPA								0.071		
								(0.216)		
TPA G									-0.051	
									(0.230)	
TPA NSA										-0.038
										(0.221)
Constant	-4.60***	-4.64***	-4.70***	-4.53***	-3.73***	-3.70***	-3.71***	-3.70***	-3.71***	-3.71***
	(0.227)	(0.228)	(0.230)	(0.268)	(0.286)	(0.302)	(0.315)	(0.315)	(0.316)	(0.316)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	1360.6	1359.1	1359	1359.7	1317	1319.9	1320.9	1322.8	1322.9	1322.9
Null deviance	1501.8	1501.8	1501.8	1501.8	1501.8	1501.8	1051.8	1501.8	1051.8	1501.8
Residual deviance	1346.6	1343.1	1341.0	1339.7	1295.0	1294.9	1294.9	1294.8	1294.9	1294.9
X^2	155.2***	158.7***	160.7***	162.1***	206.8***	206.9***	206.9***	207.0***	206.9***	206.9***
DWT	1.782***	1.785***	1.786***	1.786***	1.780***	1.780***	1.779***	1.779***	1.780***	1.780***
x̄VIF score	1.256	1.234	2.728	2.673	2.266	2.175	2.165	2.140	2.120	2.122

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.3. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Onset, EPR Onset, 1945-2013, FL Prior War

	EPR onset									
FL Prior war	0.267	0.265	0.230	0.202	-0.066	-0.088	-0.090	-0.189	-0.119	-0.116
	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.164)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.160)
GDP per capita income	-0.090**	-0.089**	-0.079**	-0.052	-0.042	-0.034	-0.036	-0.038	-0.035	-0.035
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Population (log)	0.125**	0.093*	0.031	0.048	-0.068	-0.079	-0.079	-0.082	-0.079	-0.076
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Oil exporter	0.603***	0.571***	0.645***	0.561**	0.481**	0.451**	0.434*	0.385*	0.425***	0.423*
	(0.164)	(0.166)	(0.167)	(0.171)	(0.173)	(0.174)	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.179)
New state	0.633	0.627	0.588	0.605	0.412	0.427	0.430	0.267	0.4011	0.399
	(0.338)	(0.338)	(0.338)	(0.338)	(0.351)	(0.352)	(0.352)	(0.360)	(0.354)	(0.354)
Instability	0.705***	0.723***	0.735***	0.691***	0.589***	0.589***	0.591***	0.533***	0.578***	0.570***
	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.148)
ELF	0.734**	0.733**	0.532*	0.470	0.348	0.346	0.339	0.249	0.312	0.310
	(0.242)	(0.243)	(0.245)	(0.246)	(0.251)	(0.250)	(0.251)	(0.252)	(0.252)	(0.253)
Dyad number	0.719***	0.715***	0.723***	0.690***	0.663***	0.663***	0.665***	0.594***	0.647***	0.650***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Excluded groups		0.017*	-0.054**	-0.058**	-.069***	-.068***	-.070***	-.066***	-.069***	-.069***
		(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Active groups			0.075***	0.076***	.077***	0.078***	0.079***	0.080***	0.079***	0.079
			(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
WGIRL				-0.007*	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Power ratio					-.623***	-.615***	-.615***	-.562***	-.605***	-.604***
					(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Bureaucracy						-0.090	-0.085	-0.110*	-0.092	-0.096
						(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.055)
Tax ratio							0.325	0.222	-0.092	0.277
							(0.787)	(0.786)	(0.054)	(0.787)
TPA								0.568***		
								(0.153)		
TPA G									0.168	
									(0.161)	
TPA NSA										0.153
										(0.156)
Constant	-5.33***	-5.09***	-4.70***	-4.60***	-2.68***	-2.47***	-2.50***	-2.47***	-2.49***	-2.50***
	(0.418)	(0.430)	(0.408)	(0.417)	(0.427)	(0.443)	(0.450)	(0.445)	(0.450)	(0.448)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	2169.8	2168.3	2154.6	2151.9	2019.5	2018.6	2020.4	2008.9	2021.3	2021.5
Null deviance	2621.7	2621.7	2621.7	2621.7	2621.7	2621.7	2621..7	2621.7	2621.7	2621.7
Residual deviance	2151.8	2148.3	2132.6	2127.9	1993.5	1990.6	1990.4	1976.9	1989.3	1989.5
X^2	469.9***	473.3***	489.0***	493.8***	628.1***	631.1***	631.2***	644.7***	632.3***	632.2***
DWT	1.766***	1.768***	1.774***	1.776***	1.804***	1.804***	1.804***	1.804***	1.803***	1.803***
$\bar{x}$VIF score	1.191	1.224	2.287	2.266	2.049	1.970	1.981	1.974	1.964	1.955

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.4. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Onset, Usher Onset 1945-2013, FL Prior War

	Usher onset									
FL Prior war	0.554***	0.548***	0.546***	0.451**	0.238	0.228	0.229	0.232	0.242	0.274
	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.145)
GDP per capita income	-.142***	-.141***	-.142***	-0.065	-0.068	-0.064	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	-0.059
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Population (log)	-0.068	-0.093*	-0.092*	-0.078	-0.131**	-0.139**	-0.139**	-0.139**	-.140**	-.142**
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
% mountainous (log)	0.072	0.071	0.071	0.060	0.050	0.055	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.039
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Noncontagious state	-1.13***	-1.12***	-1.12***	-.789***	-.806***	-.784***	-0.700**	-0.702**	-.702**	-.726***
	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.211)	(0.209)	(0.210)	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.216)	(0.216)
Oil exporter	0.400*	0.379*	0.375*	0.125	0.076	0.055	0.098	0.098	0.097	0.111
	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.178)	(0.184)	(0.188)	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.190)
New state	0.659*	0.643*	0.645*	0.614	0.534	0.540	0.538	0.541	0.544	0.583
	(0.315)	(0.316)	(0.316)	(0.319)	(0.326)	(0.327)	(0.326)	(0.328)	(0.326)	(0.326)
Instability	0.714***	0.731***	0.732***	0.574***	0.517***	0.511***	0.502***	0.503***	0.505***	0.523***
	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.137)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.139)	(0.138)	(0.139)
Democracy	0.026**	0.027**	0.027**	0.045***	0.037***	0.037***	0.036***	0.036***	0.036***	0.036**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
ELF	0.572*	0.558*	0.565*	0.442	0.335	0.317	0.328	0.331	0.340	0.359
	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.233)	(0.235)	(0.237)	(0.237)	(0.236)	(0.238)	(0.238)	(0.237)
Dyad number	1.836***	1.835***	1.836***	1.739***	1.573***	1.572***	1.569***	1.573***	1.581***	1.613***
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Excluded groups		0.026*	0.029	0.016	0.004	0.004	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
		(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Active groups			-0.003	0.001	0.002	0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003
			(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
WGIRL				-.024***	-.021***	-.021***	-.020***	-.020***	-.020***	-.019***
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.058)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Power ratio					-.522***	-.518***	-.517***	-.519***	-.521***	-.531***
					(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Bureaucracy						-0.047	-0.073	-0.072	-0.071	-0.059
						(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Tax ratio							-1.329	-1.322	-1.290	-1.196
							(0.824)	(0.826)	(0.829)	(0.829)
TPA								-0.017		
								(0.147)		
TPA G									-0.066	
									(0.152)	
TPA NSA										-0.243
										(0.150)
Constant	-3.72***	-3.56***	-3.56***	-2.92***	-1.60***	-1.47***	-1.303**	-1.303**	-1.303**	-1.304**
	(0.355)	(0.348)	(0.350)	(0.358)	(0.389)	(0.411)	(0.422)	(0.422)	(0.422)	(0.424)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	2207.3	2204.4	2206.4	2154.8	2055.7	2056.8	2056.1	2058.1	2057.9	2055.5
Null deviance	3897.3	3897.3	3897.3	3897.3	3897.3	3897.3	3897.3	3897.3	3897.3	3897.3
Residual deviance	2183.3	2178.3	2178.4	2124.8	2023.7	2022.8	2020.1	2020.1	2019.3	2017.5
X^2	1713.9***	1718.8	1718.8***	1772.4***	1873.5***	1874.4***	1877.1***	1877.1***	1877.3***	1879.7***
DWT	1.562***	1.563***	1.564***	1.583***	1.600***	1.600***	1.602***	1.602***	1.602***	1.603***

x̄VIF score	1.227	1.232	1.988	2.004	1.877	1.830	1.830	1.830	1.821	1.829

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.5. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Reversion, 1945-2013, UCDP Recurrence, FL Prior War

	UCDP recur									
FL Prior war	0.369	0.375	0.344	0.241	-0.101	-0.121	-0.118	-0.236	-0.183	-0.123
	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.231)	(0.213)	(0.215)	(0.215)	(0.216)	(0.218)	(0.218)
Population (log)	0.075	0.087	0.038	0.090	-0.062	-0.069	-0.067	-0.076	-0.069	-0.066
	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)
New state	0.889*	0.893*	0.862	0.827	0.563	0.563	0.560	0.354	0.488	0.554
	(0.442)	(0.442)	(0.442)	(0.441)	(0.457)	(0.457)	(0.457)	(0.466)	(0.461)	(0.460)
Instability	0.972***	0.966***	0.967***	0.8277***	0.653***	0.648***	0.641**	0.568**	0.609**	0.637**
	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.193)	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.198)	(0.198)	(0.199)
ELF	1.256***	1.261***	1.048**	0.785*	0.600	0.596	0.601	0.487	0.527	0.596
	(0.331)	(0.331)	(0.337)	(0.339)	(0.346)	(0.345)	(0.344)	(0.345)	(0.527)	(0.346)
Dyad number	0.502***	0.507***	0.498***	0.432***	0.459***	0.459***	0.457***	0.373***	0.417***	0.454***
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.076)
Excluded groups		-0.010	-0.067*	-0.075*	-0.102**	-0.104**	-0.102**	-0.096**	-0.096**	-0.101**
		(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Active groups			0.062*	0.059*	0.063**	0.064**	0.062*	0.063**	0.062*	0.061*
			(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
WGIRL				-0.014***	-0.007	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Power ratio					-.877***	-.874***	-.874***	-.805***	-.850***	-.872***
					(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.107)
Bureaucracy						-0.065	-0.078	-0.113	-0.097	-0.080
						(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.077)
Tax ratio							-0.650	-0.941	-0.867	-0.666
							(1.152)	(1.151)	(1.153)	(1.157)
TPA								0.687**		
								(0.209)		
TPA G									0.377	
									(0.216)	
TPA NSA										0.028
										(0.216)
Constant	-6.01***	-6.10***	-5.72***	-5.47***	-3.01***	-2.85***	-2.79***	-2.70***	-2.73***	-2.788**
	(0.573)		(0.584)	(0.609)	(0.617)	(0.643)	(0.652)	(0.644)	(0.651)	(0.652)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	1289.7	1291.3	1288	1276.7	1164.6	1165.8	1167.5	1158.8	1166.5	1169.5
Null deviance	1436.3	1436.3	1436.3	1436.3	1436.3	1436.3	1436.3	1436.3	1436.3	1436.3
Residual deviance	1275.7	1275.3	1270.0	1256.7	1142.6	1141.8	1141.5	1130.8	1138.5	1141.5
X^2	160.6***	160.9***	166.3***	179.6***	293.7***	294.5***	294.8***	305.5***	297.8***	294.8***
DWT	1.827***	1.827***	1.828***	1.835***	1.860***	1.859***	1.859***	1.858***	1.859***	1.859***
x̄VIF score	1.222	1.244	1.804	1.731	1.519	1.498	1.499	1.519	1.514	1.504

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.6. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Reversion, 1945-2013, Usher Recurrence, FL Prior War

	Usher Recur									
FL Prior war	0.693*	0.691*	0.560*	0.621	0.215	0.243	0.263	0.034	0.212	0.284
	(0.317)	(0.316)	(0.327)	(0.335)	(0.300)	(0.300)	(0.301)	(0.304)	(0.305)	(0.307)
Population (log)	0.227**	0.238**	0.100	0.071	-0.105	-0.100	-0.088	-0.099	-0.090	-0.092
	(0.085)	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.097)
% mountainous (log)	-0.114	-0.112	-0.095	-0.078	-0.127	0.126	-0.170	-0.168	-0.164	-0.169
	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Oil exporter	0.792**	0.806**	0.908**	0.976**	0.863**	0.895**	1.013**	0.885**	0.923**	1.023**
	(0.294)	(0.297)	(0.300)	(0.308)	(0.305)	(0.308)	(0.319)	(0.321)	(0.319)	(0.320)
New State	0.914	0.914	0.855	0.846	0.480	0.474	0.442	0.155	0.393	0.451
	(0.612)	(0.612)	(0.613)	(0.613)	(0.642)	(0.641)	(0.640)	(0.655)	(0.642)	(0.640)
ELF	1.527**	1.526**	1.184*	1.337**	1.157*	1.146*	1.103*	0.931*	1.043*	1.132*
	(0.490)	(0.489)	(0.490)	(0.517)	(0.526)	(0.530)	(0.522)	(0.529)	(0.515)	(0.529)
Dyad number	0.411***	0.414**	0.416***	0.438***	0.439***	0.439***	0.438***	0.286*	0.361***	0.450***
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.132)	(0.116)	(0.109)
Excluded groups		-0.006	-0.101**	-0.099**	-0.102**	-0.110**	-0.099**	-0.094*	-0.095*	-0.099**
		(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)
		(0.018)								
Active groups			0.105***	0.108***	0.100**	0.101**	0.096**	0.101**	0.081**	0.096**
			(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.031)
WGIRL				0.005	0.012*	0.010	0.013*	0.012	0.011*	0.014*
				(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Power ratio					-1.22***	-1.22***	-1.23***	-1.10***	-1.16***	-1.20***
					(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.207)	(0.204)	(0.206)
Bureaucracy						0.088	0.049	0.012	0.066	0.060
						(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.109)	(0.114)
Tax ratio							-2.294	-2.503	-2.386	-2.287
							(1.679)	(1.677)	(1.638)	(1.643)
TPA								1.020**		
								(0.316)		
TPA G									0.351	
									(0.304)	
TPA NSA										-0.107
										(0.307)
Constant	-8.07***	-8.15***	-7.09***	-7.23***	-4.22***	-4.39***	-4.16***	-4.11***	-4.15***	-4.16***
	(0.799)	(0.838)	(0.832)	(0.834)	(0.836)	(0.857)	(0.862)	(0.854)	(0.501)	(0.864)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	710.9	712.8	705.1	706	630.3	631.7	631.7	622.9	632.6	633.6
Null deviance	776.9	776.95	776..9	776.9	776.9	776.9	776.9	776.9	776.9	776.9
Residual deviance	694.9	694.8	685.1	684	606.3	605.7	603.7	592.9	602.6	603.6
X^2	82.02***	74.05***	88.95***	92.94***	170.5***	171.2***	173.1***	184.0***	169.6***	168.4***
DWT	1.727***	1.727***	1.735***	1.735***	1.774***	1.774***	1.776***	1.767***	1.769***	1.771***
$\bar{x}$VIF score	1.233	1.255	1.966	1.993	1.691	1.724	173.1	1.736	1.586	1.580

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.7. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Reversion, 1945-2013, Usher Relapse, FL Prior War

	Usher Relapse									
FL Prior war	-0.001	0.035	0.032	-0.063	-0.271	-0.302	-0.302	-0.428	-0.354	-0.418
	(0.279)	(0.280)	(0.280)	(0.279)	(0.262)	(0.264)	(0.264)	(0.263)	(0.266)	(0.266)
GDP per capita income	-0.109*	-0.113*	-0.111*	-0.044	-0.036	-0.031	-0.031	-0.037	-0.031	-0.034
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Population (log)	0.222**	0.269**	0.260**	0.293**	0.173	0.163	0.163	0.145	0.160	0.156
	(0.080)	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.101)
Noncontagious state	-0.759*	-0.801*	-0.807*	-0.457	-0.670	-0.638	-0.641	-0.618	-0.650	-0.590
	(0.377)	(0.382)	(0.383)	(0.389)	(0.396)	(0.396)	(0.406)	(0.407)	(0.406)	(0.406)
New state	0.929	0.938	0.936	0.925	0.729	0.732	0.732	0.497	0.663	0.584
	(0.545)	(0.546)	(0.545)	(0.546)	(0.554)	(0.555)	(0.555)	(0.565)	(0.560)	(0.561)
Instability	1.321***	1.285***	1.284***	1.177***	0.957***	0.952***	0.952***	0.857***	0.917***	0.869***
	(0.221)	(0.222)	(0.222)	(0.223)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.228)	(0.228)
ELF	1.025*	1.023*	0.994*	0.851*	0.774	0.784	0.783	0.625	0.714	0.663
	(0.412)	(0.410)	(0.421)	(0.425)	(0.436)	(0.435)	(0.436)	(0.439)	(0.439)	(0.437)
Dyad number	0.562***	0.574***	0.571***	0.501***	0.534***	0.537***	0.537***	0.462***	0.509***	0.497***
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Excluded groups		-0.035	-0.043	-0.055	-0.098*	-0.105*	-0.105*	-0.097*	-0.099*	-0.102*
		(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Active groups			0.009	0.009	0.021	0.024	0.024	0.026	0.024	0.024
			(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)
WGIRL				-0.02***	-0.015*	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.014*	-0.015*
				(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Power ratio					-0.72***	-0.17***	-0.71***	-0.63***	-0.69***	-0.67***
					(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.118)
Bureaucracy						-0.089	-0.088	-0.132	-0.107	-0.139
						(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.095)
Tax ratio							0.050	-0.267	-0.110	--0.384
							(1.468)	(1.475)	(1.472)	(1.477)
TPA								0.751**		
								(0.245)		
TPA G									0.301	
									(0.256)	
TPA NSA										0.576*
										(0.243)
Constant	-7.40***	-7.74***	-7.68***	-7.37***	-5.37***	-5.16***	-5.16***	-4.99***	-5.10***	-4.99***
	(0.799)	(0.852)	(0.875)	(0.901)	(0.929)	(0.956)	(0.975)	(0.981)	(0.978)	(0.973)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	917.3	917.6	919.5	908.6	851.9	852.8	854.8	847.4	855.5	851.4
Null deviance	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075
Residual deviance	899.3	897.6	897.5	884.6	825.9	824.8	824.8	815.4	823.5	819.4
X^2	176.4***	178.1***	178.2***	191.1***	249.8***	250.9***	250.9	260.3***	252.2***	256.3***
DWT	1.777***	1.777***	1.778***	1.779***	1.788***	1.787***	1.787***	1.786***	1.784***	1.789***
x̄VIF score	1.250	1.295	1.604	1.608	1.496	1.481	1.491	1.515	1.506	1.498

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.8. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Persistence 1945-2013, UCDP Persistence, FL Prior War

	UCDP persist									
FL Prior war	0.664*** (0.027)	0.664*** (0.027)	0.662*** (0.027)	0.662*** (0.027)	5.785e-01*** (2.702e-02)	0.580*** (0.027)	0.581*** (0.026)	0.410*** (0.025)	0.436*** (0.026)	0.491*** (0.026)
GDP per capita income	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	5.059e-04 (1.779e-03)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Population (log)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.004)	1.070e-02 * (4.904e-03)	0.010* (0.004)	0.010* (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.010* (0.004)	0.019*** (0.004)
% mountainous (log)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-7.646e-03 (4.978e-03)	-0.008 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)
Noncontagious state	-0.045* (0.020)	-0.045* (0.020)	-0.046* (0.021)	-0.034 (0.021)	-4.396e-02 * (2.096e-02)	-0.047* (0.021)	-.071*** (0.021)	-0.036 (0.020)	-0.054** (0.020)	-0.027 (0.020)
Oil exporter	0.153*** (0.023)	0.152*** (0.023)	0.153*** (0.023)	0.145*** (0.023)	1.276e-01 *** (2.287e-02)	0.131*** (0.023)	0.109*** (0.023)	0.083*** (0.021)	0.091*** (0.022)	0.101*** (0.022)
New State	0.062 (0.048)	0.062 (0.048)	0.061 (0.048)	0.056 (0.048)	5.724e-02 (4.718e-02)	0.054 (0.047)	0.064 (0.047)	-0.020 (0.044)	0.017 (0.044)	0.022 (0.045)
Instability	0.073*** (0.021)	0.073*** (0.021)	0.073*** (0.021)	0.067** (0.022)	5.523e-02* (2.159e-02)	0.057** (0.021)	0.059** (0.021)	0.025 (0.020)	0.046* (0.020)	0.034 (0.021)
Democracy	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)	6.737e-03 *** (1.133e-03)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
ELF	0.097*** (0.028)	0.097*** (0.026)	0.089** (0.029)	0.074** (0.027)	4.236e-02 (2.742e-02)	0.045 (0.027)	0.036 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.026)	-0.004 (0.026)
Dyad number	0.835*** (0.011)	0.835*** (0.011)	0.834*** (0.011)	0.830*** (0.011)	7.956e-01 *** (1.143e-02)	0.796*** (0.011)	0.796*** (0.011)	0.632*** (0.011)	0.665*** (0.011)	0.736*** (0.011)
Excluded groups		0.000 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-3.093e-03 (3.525e-03)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Active groups			0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-7.807e-04 (3.195e-03)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)
WGIRL				-0.001** (0.000)	-2.504e-05 (3.226e-04)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-.001*** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-.001*** (0.000)

Power ratio					-9.806e-02 *** 4.887e-03	-.098*** (0.009)	-.098*** (0.004)	-.065*** (0.004)	-.079*** (0.004)	-.083*** (0.004)
Bureaucracy							0.025*** (0.006)	0.012 (0.006)	0.016* (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)
Tax ratio							0.589*** (0.087)	0.461*** (0.081)	0.458*** (0.083)	0.553*** (0.084)
TPA								0.967*** (0.028)		
TPA G									0.918*** (0.031)	
TPA NSA										0.511*** (0.0239)
Constant	-0.15*** (0.041)	-.153*** (0.043)	-.154*** (0.042)	-0.117** (0.044)	2.288e-01 *** (4.650e-02)	0.211*** (0.047)	0.141** (0.048)	0.146**	0.139** (0.046)	0.080* (0.047)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	17789	17791	17792	17784	17392	17391	17347	16228	16528	16905
Null deviance	8712.6	8712.6	8712.6	8712.6	8712.6	8712.6	8712.6	8712.6	8712.6	8712.6
Residual deviance	3890.4	3890.3	3889.9	3885.6	3714.8	3713.8	3694.4	3251.1	3364.1	3512.0
X^2	4822***	4822***	4822***	4826***	4997***	4998***	5018***	5461***	5348***	5200***
DWT	0.867***	0.867***	0.866***	0.865***	0.927***	0.928***	0.935***	1.012***	0.993***	0.959***
$\bar{x}$VIF score	1.230	1.235	2.211	2.224	2.176	2.146	2.140	2.134	2.122	2.106

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.9. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Persistence, 1945-2013, EPR Persistence, FL Prior War

	EPR persist									
FL Prior war	0.250***	0.250***	0.248***	0.243***	0.210***	0.211***	0.211***	0.147***	0.160***	0.181***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
GDP per capita income	-0.002***	-.002***	-.002***	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.009)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Population (log)	0.009***	0.008***	0.008***	0.009***	0.004*	0.004*	0.003*	0.002	0.003*	0.007***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
% mountainous (log)	-0.003*	-0.003*	-0.003	-0.003*	-.005***	-.005***	-0.004*	-0.004**	-0.004*	-.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Noncontagious state	-0.020**	-0.020**	-0.021**	-0.014	-0.019**	-0.019**	-.027***	-0.014*	-0.021**	-0.013
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Oil exporter	0.072***	0.072***	0.073***	0.066***	0.060***	0.061***	0.053***	0.043***	0.047***	0.050***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
New state	0.045**	0.044**	0.044**	0.042*	0.042*	0.041*	0.044**	0.013	0.028	0.031*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Instability	0.045***	0.045***	0.045***	0.042***	0.037***	0.037***	0.038***	0.025***	0.033***	0.030***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Democracy	0.001***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
ELF	0.052***	0.052***	0.045***	0.038***	0.018	0.019	0.015	0.002	0.001	0.006
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
RLF	-0.027*	-0.027*	-0.028*	-0.032*	-0.011	-0.012	-0.012	-0.018	-0.014	-0.026*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Dyad number	0.317***	0.317***	0.316***	0.314***	0.299***	0.299***	0.299***	0.238***	0.254***	0.279***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Excluded groups		0.000	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002*	-.004***	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**
		(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Active groups			0.003**	0.002*	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002*	0.002*	0.001
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
WGIRL				-0.00***	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000**	-.000***	-.000***	-.000***
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Power ratio					-.042***	-.042***	-.042***	-.030***	-.036***	-.037***
					(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Bureaucracy						0.001	0.007**	0.002	0.003	0.001
						(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Tax ratio							0.195***	0.147***	0.149***	0.183***
							(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
TPA								0.361***		
								(0.009)		
TPA G									0.319***	
									(0.010)	
TPA NSA										0.168***
										(0.008)
Constant	-0.039**	-0.036*	-0.037*	-0.016	0.129***	0.126***	0.103***	0.106***	0.102***	0.085***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	-535.3	-534.1	-539.5	-560.7	-1116	-1166	-1206	-2511	-2027	-1604
Null deviance	1192.1	1192.1	1192.1	1192.1	1192.1	1192.1	1192.1	1192.1	1192	1192

Residual deviance	481.7	481.6	481.2	479.9	447.7	447.7	445.6	383.9	405.7	425.7
X^2	710.4	710.5	710.9***	712.1***	744.4***	744.4***	746.5***	808.2***	787.4***	766.4***
DWT	0.681***	0.681*	0.680***	0.680***	0.728***	0.729***	0.732***	0.752***	0.620***	0.729***
x̄VIF score	1.230	1.235	2.158	2.175	2.134	2.113	2.109	2.105	2.093	2.078

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.10. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Onset, 1945-2013, FL Onset, EPR Prior War

	FL onset									
EPR Prior war	0.331	0.240	0.185	0.106	-0.356	-0.343	-0.345	-0.524*	-0.462*	-0.444*
	(0.195)	(0.199)	(0.201)	(0.204)	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.217)	(0.230)	(0.227)	(0.224)
GDP per capita income	-.174***	-.176***	-.164***	-0.123**	-0.110*	-0.121*	-0.125*	-0.114*	-0.113*	-0.110*
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.224)
Oil exporter	0.691**	0.609**	0.647**	0.544*	0.456	0.491*	0.428	0.363	0.409	0.382
	(0.224)	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.234)	(0.234)	(0.235)	(0.243)	(0.244)	(0.243)	(0.245)
New state	0.650	0.698	0.702	0.710	0.689	0.646	0.653	0.540	0.625	0.580
	(0.434)	(0.434)	(0.434)	(0.433)	(0.438)	(0.439)	(0.439)	(0.445)	(0.441)	(0.444)
Instability	1.106***	1.138***	1.130***	1.075***	0.943***	0.949***	0.951***	0.873***	0.918***	0.869***
	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.181)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.186)	(0.185)	(0.187)
Dyad number	0.490***	0.502***	0.485***	0.443***	0.391***	0.401***	0.405***	0.345***	0.378***	0.372***
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.070)
Excluded groups		0.035***	-0.024	-0.028	-0.028	-0.030	-0.037	-0.031	-0.032	-0.030
		(0.009)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Active groups			0.058**	0.060**	0.045*	0.046*	0.049*	0.052*	0.051*	0.052*
			(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.004)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
WGIRL				-0.009*	-0.006	-0.007	-0.009	-0.010*	-0.009*	-0.011*
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Power ratio					-.398***	-.412***	-.412***	-.386***	-.422***	-.404***
					(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Bureaucracy						0.107	0.128	0.089	0.095	0.075
						(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.073)
Tax ratio							1.119	0.927	0.817	0.889
							(1.025)	(1.026)	(1.029)	(1.023)
TPA								0.801***		
								(0.217)		
TPA G									0.577**	
									(0.222)	
TPA NSA										0.672**
										(0.204)
Constant	-4.40***	-4.36***	-4.53***	-4.29***	-3.65***	-3.79***	-3.91***	-3.69***	-3.64***	-3.64***
	(0.188)	(0.163)	(0.182)	(0.213)	(0.232)	(0.251)	(0.274)	(0.306)	(0.305)	(0.305)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	1362	1355	1351	1349	1312	1311	1312	1303	1307	1303
Null deviance	1526	1526	1526	1526	1526	1526	1526	1526	1526	1526
Residual deviance	1348	1341	1335	1331	1292	1289	1288	1272	1279	1275
X^2	174.5***	184.5***	190.4***	195.1***	234.1***	236.6***	237.7	248.7***	242.7***	246.8***
DWT	1.855***	1.861***	1.865***	1.865***	1.890***	1.892***	1.892***	1.892***	1.890***	1.892***
x̄VIF score	1.051	1.061	2.775	2.704	2.304	2.303	2.332	2.351	2.337	2.296

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.11. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Onset, 1945-2013, UCDP Onset, EPR Prior War

	UCDP onset									
EPR Prior war	-2.04***	-2.24***	-2.31***	-2.43***	-3.18***	-3.19***	-3.20***	-3.72***	-3.62***	-3.37***
	(0.252)	(0.270)	(0.272)	(0.273)	(0.284)	(0.285)	(0.285)	(0.324)	(0.323)	(0.300)
GDP per capita income	-.152***	-.149***	-.136***	-0.083*	-0.040	-0.035	-0.035	-0.033	-0.033	-0.031
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Population (log)	0.169**	0.112	0.079	0.114	-0.012	-0.016	-0.014	-0.018	-0.014	0.009
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.066)
% mountainous (log)	-0.098	-0.112	-0.107	-0.121	-0.101	-0.101	-0.104	-0.116	-0.092	-0.111
	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Oil exporter	1.242***	1.176***	1.224***	1.043***	0.937***	0.907***	0.926***	0.869***	0.905***	0.885***
	(0.214)	(0.218)	(0.219)	(0.226)	(0.233)	(0.235)	(0.244)	(0.246)	(0.244)	(0.246)
New State	0.679	0.707	0.716	0.735	0.732	0.776	0.771	0.548	0.660	0.703
	(0.479)	(0.480)	(0.480)	(0.481)	(0.497)	(0.499)	(0.499)	(0.520)	(0.507)	(0.506)
Instability	0.829***	0.885***	0.887***	0.836***	0.697***	0.685**	0.684**	0.546*	0.620**	0.602**
	(0.201)	(0.202)	(0.203)	(0.203)	(0.209)	(0.209)	(0.209)	(0.213)	(0.210)	(0.212)
Dyad number	0.862***	0.873***	0.857***	0.809***	0.901***	0.896***	0.895***	0.838***	0.849***	0.862***
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Excluded groups		0.051***	-0.026	-0.029	-0.041	-0.040	-0.037	-0.026	-0.019	-0.032
		(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Active groups			0.026**	0.078**	0.083**	0.083**	0.082**	0.086**	0.077**	0.080**
			(0.080)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.004)
WGIRL				-0.013**	-0.008*	-0.007	-0.006	-0.007	-0.006	-0.008
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Power ratio					-.760***	-.753***	-.754***	-.692***	-.726***	-.715***
					(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Bureaucracy						-0.074	-0.081	-0.129	-0.132	-0.121
						(0.076)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.082)
Tax ratio							-0.320	-0.326	-0.639	-0.191
							(1.148)	(1.154)	(1.151)	(1.143)
TPA								1.190***		
								(0.258)		
TPA G									1.054***	
									(0.279)	
TPA NSA										0.587*
										(0.242)
Constant	-5.10***	-4.67***	-4.62***	-4.46***	-2.23***	-2.10***	-2.07***	-2.04***	-2.04***	-2.23***
	(0.557)	(0.540)	(0.500)	(0.522)	(0.533)	(0.551)	(0.559)	(0.559)	(0.564)	(0.567)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	1284	1273	1267	1258	1141	1142	1144	1125	1132	1140
Null deviance	1501	1501	1501	1501	1501	1501	1501	1501	1501	1501
Residual deviance	1266	1253	1245	1234	1115	1114	1114	1093	1100	1108
X^2	235.1***	248.5***	256.5***	267.3***	386.4***	387.4***	387.4***	408.4***	401.3***	393.1***
DWT	1.706***	1.707***	1.708***	1.707***	1.700***	1.699***	1.700***	1.691***	1.695***	1.695***
x̄VIF score	1.284	1.357	2.704	2.655	2.372	2.279	2.286	2.348	2.367	2.267

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.12. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Recurrence, 1945-2013, EPR Onset, EPR Prior War

	EPR onset									
EPR Prior war	-0.178	-0.209	-0.238	-0.312*	-1.01***	-1.02***	-1.02***	-1.25***	-1.10***	-1.07***
	(0.153)	(0.155)	(0.156)	(0.158)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.450)	(0.180)	(0.175)	(0.171)
GDP per capita income	-.099***	-.098***	-.087**	-0.055*	-0.029	-0.021	-0.022	-0.019	-0.020	-0.020
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Population (log)	0.133**	0.100*	0.038	0.060	-0.047	-0.059	-0.059	-0.060	-0.056	-0.052
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Oil exporter	0.638***	0.607***	0.685***	0.590***	0.517**	0.480**	0.463*	0.395*	0.445*	0.441*
	(0.166)	(0.167)	(0.168)	(0.172)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.181)	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.182)
Instability	0.731***	0.754***	0.765***	0.718***	0.616***	0.610***	0.611***	0.530***	0.585***	0.572***
	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.147)	(0.146)	(0.047)
ELF	0.822***	0.828***	0.623*	0.559*	0.428	0.432	0.427	0.312	0.378	0.376
	(0.245)	(0.246)	(0.248)	(0.248)	(0.255)	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.256)	(0.255)	(0.256)
Dyad number	0.785***	0.784***	0.789***	0.754***	0.767***	0.764***	0.766***	0.671***	0.726***	0.737***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)
Excluded groups		0.019*	-0.056**	-0.061**	-.073***	-.071***	-.073***	-0.067**	-.069***	-.073***
		(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.057)
Active groups			0.080***	0.080***	0.085***	0.086***	0.087***	0.089***	0.087***	0.087***
			(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
WGIRL				-0.008*	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Power ratio					-.739***	-.731***	-.731***	-.675***	-.717***	-.712***
					(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Bureaucracy						-0.094	-0.089	-0.124*	-0.105	-0.109
						(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Tax ratio							0.307	0.186	0.150	0.254
							(0.798)	(0.798)	(0.800)	(0.796)
TPA								0.813***		
								(0.160)		
TPA G									0.370*	
									(0.370)	
TPA NSA										0.278
										(0.158)
Constant	-5.30***	-5.05***	-4.66***	-4.54***	-2.29***	-2.07***	-2.09***	-2.02***	-2.06***	-2.10***
	(0.415)	(0.427)	(0.402)	(0.413)	(0.427)	(0.444)	(0.450)	(0.447)	(0.451)	(0.448)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	2171	2169	2154	2150	1982	1981	1983	1960	1980	1982
Null deviance	2621	2621	2621	2621	2621	2621	2621	2621	2621	2621
Residual deviance	2155	2151	2134	2128	1958	1955	1955	1930	1950	1952
X^2	466.0***	470.0***	487.1***	493.7***	662.9***	666.0***	666.2***	691.7	671.0***	669.2***
DWT	1.750***	1.750***	1.757***	1.756***	1.775***	1.775***	1.775***	1.774***	1.773***	1.773***
x̄VIF score	1.190	1.231	2.434	2.401	2.191	2.094	2.101	2.101	2.090	2.062

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.13. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Onset, 1945-2013, Usher Onset, EPR Prior War

	Usher onset									
EPR Prior war	0.056	0.026	0.027	-0.145	-.800***	-.807***	-.802***	-.824***	-.816***	-.786***
	(0.150)	(0.152)	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.166)
GDP per capita income	-.131***	-.129***	-.131***	-0.048	-0.035	-0.030	-0.026	-0.026	-0.026	-0.028
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Population (log)	-0.066	-0.092*	-0.089*	-0.067	-0.114*	-0.124**	-0.124**	-.123**	-.122**	-.126**
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
% mountainous (log)	0.074	0.073	0.072	0.064	0.063	0.070	0.057	0.058	0.058	0.057
	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Noncontagious state	-.909***	-.902***	-.899***	-0.512*	-.629**	-.604**	-0.524*	-0.519*	-0.527*	-0.532*
	(0.196)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.202)	(0.201)	(0.202)	(0.208)	(0.208)	(0.208)	(0.208)
Oil exporter	0.278	0.259	0.249	-0.027	-0.070	-0.097	-0.047	-0.049	-0.045	-0.040
	(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.175)	(0.182)	(0.184)	(0.185)	(0.188)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.188)
New state	0.549	0.540	0.543	0.588	0.599	0.615	0.610	0.592	0.609	0.628
	(0.317)	(0.318)	(0.318)	(0.318)	(0.325)	(0.326)	(0.325)	(0.327)	(0.325)	(0.325)
Instability	0.805***	0.826***	0.826***	0.703***	0.644***	0.633***	0.623***	0.614***	0.618***	0.637***
	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)
ELF	0.606**	0.604**	0.623**	0.500*	0.360	0.337	0.339	0.322	0.325	0.356
	(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.233)	(0.234)	(0.237)	(0.237)	(0.236)	(0.237)	(0.238)	(0.237)
Dyad number	1.902***	1.907***	1.908***	1.835***	1.730***	1.725***	1.720***	1.696***	1.706***	1.745***
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Excluded groups		0.024*	0.034	0.024	0.011	0.011	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020
		(0.010)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.254)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Active groups			-0.009	-0.006	-0.003	-0.002	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.008
			(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
WGIRL				-.023***	-.020***	-.020***	-.019***	-.019***	-.019***	-.019***
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Power ratio					-.641***	-.637***	-.636***	-.629***	-.633***	-.643***
					(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Bureaucracy						-.063	-0.090	-0.094	-0.093	-0.083
						(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Tax ratio							-1.317	-1.357	-1.360	-1.252
							(0.836)	(0.148)	(0.839)	(0.839)
TPA								0.117		
								(0.148)		
TPA G									0.083	
									(0.153)	
TPA NSA										-0.135
										(0.149)
Constant	-3.75***	-3.59***	-3.60***	-3.04***	-1.37***	-1.195**	-1.014*	-1.011*	-1.013*	-1.013*
	(0.355)	(0.351)	(0.354)	(0.366)	(0.405)	(0.427)	(0.439)	(0.439)	(0.439)	(0.440)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	2226	2224	2225	2179	2044	2044	2044	2045	2046	2045
Null deviance	3897	3897	3897	3897	3897	3897	3897	3897	3897	3897
Residual deviance	2204	2200	2199	2151	2014	2012	2010	2009	2010	2009
X^2	1692***	1697***	1697***	1746***	1882***	1884***	1887***	1887***	1887***	1887***
DWT	1.546***	1.547***	1.547***	1.555***	1.561***	1.561***	1.564***	1.564***	1.564***	1.564***
x̄VIF score	1.212	1.224	2.159	2.164	1.976	1.904	1.903	1.893	1.884	1.892

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.14. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Reversion, 1945-2013, UCDP Recurrence, EPR Prior War

	UCDP recur									
EPR Prior war	17.92 (411.4)	17.95 (411.4)	17.90 (411.0)	17.79 (409.8)	17.06 (392.2)	17.06 (392.1)	17.07 (392.5)	17.02 (393.8)	17.05 (392.9)	17.07 (392.4)
Instability	0.792*** (0.187)	0.774*** (0.187)	0.753*** (0.188)	0.688*** (0.192)	0.566** (0.196)	0.562** (0.196)	0.552** (0.196)	0.505* (0.198)	0.536** (0.197)	0.562** (0.198)
Dyad number	0.399*** (0.055)	0.413*** (0.056)	0.394*** (0.057)	0.362*** (0.060)	0.321*** (0.068)	0.319*** (0.069)	0.319*** (0.069)	0.247** (0.079)	0.296*** (0.075)	0.327*** (0.072)
Excluded groups		-0.020 (0.017)	-0.084** (0.029)	-0.087** (0.029)	-0.105** (0.032)	-0.106** (0.032)	-0103** (0.033)	-0.097** (0.033)	-0.099** (0.033)	-0.103** (0.033)
Active groups			0.062** (0.021)	0.063** (0.021)	0.052* (0.021)	0.052* (0.021)	0.049* (0.021)	0.047* (0.021)	0.049* (0.021)	0.050* (0.021)
WGIRL				-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)
Power ratio					-.627*** (0.101)	-.624*** (0.101)	-.623*** (0.101)	-.573*** (0.103)	-.611*** (0.102)	-.628*** (0.103)
Bureaucracy						-0.039 (0.070)	-0.056 (0.073)	-0.079 (0.073)	-0.063 (0.073)	-0.515 (0.074)
Tax ratio							-0.963 (1.166)	-1.237 (1.167)	-1.080 (1.172)	-0.910 (1.179)
TPA								0.468* (0.203)		
TPA G									0.174 (0.208)	
TPA NSA										-0.069 (0.211)
Constant	-21.69 (411.4)	-21.66 (411.4)	-21.78 (411.0)	-21.44 (409.8)	-19.97 (392.2)	-19.90 (392.1)	-19.81 (392.5)	17.02 (393.8)	17.05 (392.9)	17.07 (392.4)
N										
AIC score	1144	1144	1139	1139	1081	1082	1084	1080	1085	1086
Null deviance	1436	1436	1436	1436	1436	1436	1436	1436	1436	1436
Residual deviance	1136	1134	1127	1125	1065	1064	1064	1058	1063	1064
X^2	299.8***	301.4***	308.5***	310.9***	371.1***	371.4***	372.1***	377.5***	372.8***	372.3***
Durbin-Watson statistic	1.879***	1.878***	1.883***	1.887***	1.900***	1.900***	1.900***	1.899***	1.900***	1.900***
x̄VIF score	1.000	1.029	1.738	1.682	1.443	1.418	1.430	1.449	1.441	1.439

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.15. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Reversion, 1945-2013, Usher Recurrence, EPR Prior War

	Usher recur									
EPR Prior war	17.29 (407.8)	17.29 (407.7)	17.29 (408.4)	17.37 (408.1)	17.05 (606.3)	17.05 (606.0)	17.09 (606.4)	16.92 (613.6)	17.04 (608.2)	17.09 (606.5)
Population (log)	0.095 (0.078)	0.103 (0.084)	0.056 (0.089)	0.047 (0.089)	-0.094 (0.090)	-0.089 (0.091)	-0.102 (0.091)	-0.113 (0.088)	-0.103 (0.090)	-0.101 (0.091)
Noncontagious state	0.629* (0.260)	0.626* (0.260)	0.618* (0.265)	0.549* (0.278)	0.371 (0.278)	0.361 (0.279)	0.459 (0.292)	0.481 (0.293)	0.453 (0.292)	0.457 (0.293)
New state	0.945* (0.456)	0.949* (0.456)	0.908* (0.457)	0.900* (0.458)	0.715 (0.483)	0.714 (0.483)	0.690 (0.484)	0.522 (0.490)	0.652 (0.485)	0.694 (0.486)
ELF	0.961* (0.403)	0.952* (0.404)	0.782 (0.417)	0.873* (0.434)	0.979* (0.439)	0.994* (0.442)	0.982* (0.437)	0.807 (0.441)	0.924* (0.439)	0.988* (0.442)
Dyad number	0.569*** (0.057)	0.569*** (0.058)	0.566*** (0.058)	0.586*** (0.063)	0.618*** (0.071)	0.620*** (0.072)	0.612*** (0.072)	0.542*** (0.077)	0.590*** (0.075)	0.614*** (0.075)
Excluded groups		-0.003 (0.013)	-0.040 (0.029)	-0.037 (0.300)	-0.055 (0.030)	-0.055 (0.030)	-0.044 (0.032)	-0.036 (0.032)	-0.042 (0.031)	-0.045 (0.032)
Active groups			0.040 (0.029)	0.040 (0.029)	0.051 (0.028)	0.050 (0.028)	0.045 (0.028)	0.046 (0.029)	0.046 (0.028)	0.045 (0.028)
WGIRL				0.004 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)
Power ratio					-1.14*** (0.207)	-1.14*** (0.207)	-1.13*** (0.207)	-1.02*** (0.205)	-1.11*** (0.207)	-1.14*** (0.209)
Bureaucracy						0.030 (0.083)	0.004 (0.085)	-0.028 (0.085)	-0.005 (0.085)	0.006 (0.087)
Tax ratio							-1.657 (1.389)	-1.896 (1.382)	-1.754 (1.387)	-1.641 (1.399)
TPA								0.710** (0.225)		
TPA G									0.249 (0.221)	
TPA NSA										-0.022 (0.230)
Constant	-22.98 (407.8)	-23.04 (407.7)	-22.64 (408.4)	-22.82 (408.1)	-20.53 (606.3)	-20.62 (606.0)	-20.37 (610.1)	-20.22 (613.6)	-20.33 (608.2)	-20.38 (606.5)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	876.7	878.7	878.8	880.1	807.5	809.3	809.9	801.8	8101.6	811.8
Null deviance	1164	1164	1164.4	1164.4	1164	1164	1164	1164	1164	1164
Residual deviance	862.7	862.7	860.8	860.1	785.5	785.3	783.9	773.8	782.6	783.8
X^2	301.6***	301.7***	303.6***	304.3***	378.9***	379.0***	380.5	390.6***	381.8***	380.5***
DWT	1.753***	1.753***	1.752***	1.750***	1.819***	1.819***	1.820***	1.827***	1.822***	1.821
x̄VIF score	1.178	1.214	2.552	2.506	2.087	2.065	2.051	2.015	2.000	2.009

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.16. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Reversion, 1945-2013, Usher Relapse, EPR Prior War

	Usher relapse									
EPR Prior war	4.225***	4.244***	4.240***	4.078***	3.580***	3.574***	3.576***	3.489***	3.563***	3.529***
	(1.010)	(1.009)	(1.009)	(1.011)	(1.016)	(1.016)	(1.016)	(1.018)	(1.017)	(1.017)
GDP per capita income	-0.133*	-0.136*	-0.131*	-0.079	-0.073	-0.068	-0.066	-0.061	-0.064	-0.060
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.062)
Population (log)	0.059	0.115	0.098	0.136	0.046	0.035	0.036	0.031	0.035	0.035
	(0.071)	(0.080)	(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Instability	1.104***	1.063***	1.064***	0.984***	0.851***	0.845***	0.842***	0.784***	0.833***	0.783***
	(0.063)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.218)	(0.222)	(0.222)	(0.222)	(0.224)	(0.224)	(0.225)
Dyad number	0.436***	0.451***	0.449***	0.397***	0.400***	0.401***	0.400***	0.335***	0.391***	0.361***
	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.081)	(0.080)
Excluded groups		0.451***	-0.052	-0.062	-0.091*	-0.097*	-0.096*	-0.087*	-0.094*	-0.093*
		(0.065)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Active groups			0.015	0.018	0.027	0.030	0.029	0.026	0.029	0.028
			(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)
WGIRL				-0.014*	-0.012*	-0.011	-0.011	-0.011	-0.011	-0.011
				(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.089)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Power ratio					-0.53***	-0.52***	-0.52***	-0.46***	-0.51***	-0.49***
					(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Bureaucracy						-0.072	-0.079	-0.114	-0.085	-0.117
						(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.090)
Tax ratio							-0.386	-0.806	-0.467	-0.798
							(1.400)	(1.407)	(1.417)	(1.415)
TPA								0.542*		
								(0.236)		
TPA G									0.087	
									(0.246)	
TPA NSA										0.420
										(0.236)
Constant	-8.83***	-9.24***	-9.14***	-9.01***	-7.14***	-6.94***	-6.91***	-6.87***	-6.90***	-6.86***
	(1.190)	(1.232)	(1.243)	(1.263)	(1.280)	(1.302)	(1.307)	(1.306)	(1.308)	(1.305)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	844.3	843.6	845.3	842.0	813.3	814.6	816.5	813.2	818.4	815.4
Null deviance	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075	1075
Residual deviance	832.3	829.6	829.3	824.0	793.3	792.6	792.5	787.2	792.4	789.4
X^2	243.2	246.2***	246.4***	251.8***	282.4***	283.1***	283.2***	288.5***	283.3***	286.3***
DWT	1.809***	1.810***	1.181***	1.811***	1.808***	1.807***	1.807***	1.807***	1.806***	1.809***
x̄VIF score	1.048	1.131	1.618	1.626	1.503	1.479	1.474	1.487	1.482	1.474

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.17. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Persistence, 1945-2013, UCDP Persistence, EPR Prior War

	UCDP Persist									
EPR Prior war	0.408*** (0.015)	0.413*** (0.016)	0.412*** (0.016)	0.416*** (0.016)	0.353*** (0.016)	3.584e-01*** (1.675e-02)	0.353*** (0.016)	0.287*** (0.015)	0.295*** (0.016)	0.326*** (0.016)
GDP per capita income	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-8.985e-05 (1.795e-03)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Population (log)	0.013** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.016** (0.004)	0.015** (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	6.671e-03 (4.909e-03)	0.006 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)
% mountainous (log)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.011* (0.004)	-1.278e-02* (4.995e-03)	-0.009 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.015** (0.004)
Noncontagious state	0.044* (0.020)	0.048* (0.020)	0.047* (0.020)	0.044* (0.021)	0.026 (0.020)	2.054e-02 (2.095e-02)	0.001 (0.021)	0.017 (0.019)	0.002 (0.020)	0.038 (0.020)
Oil exporter	0.098*** (0.023)	0.102*** (0.023)	0.102*** (0.023)	0.105*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	1.015e-01*** (2.305e-02)	0.084*** (0.023)	0.062** (0.021)	0.069** (0.022)	0.077*** (0.022)
Instability	0.121*** (0.021)	0.118*** (0.021)	0.118*** (0.021)	0.120*** (0.021)	0.104*** (0.021)	1.076e-01 *** (2.143e-02)	0.109*** (0.021)	0.059** (0.020)	0.082*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.020)
Democracy	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	2.882e-03 * (1.150e-03)	0.002* (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
ELF	0.044 (0.026)	0.047 (0.026)	0.043 (0.027)	0.046 (0.027)	0.021 (0.027)	2.573e-02 (2.747e-02)	0.019 (0.027)	-0.022 (0.025)	-0.023 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.026)
Dyad number	0.884*** (0.010)	0.885*** (0.010)	0.884*** (0.010)	0.885*** (0.010)	0.850*** (0.010)	8.519e-01 *** (1.074e-02)	0.852*** (0.010)	0.662*** (0.011)	0.699*** (0.011)	0.775*** (0.010)
Excluded groups		-0.003** (0.001)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-6.183e-03 (3.519e-03)	-0.008* (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)
Active groups			0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-1.121e-03 (.196e-03)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
WGIRL				0.000 (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	7.133e-04 * (3.427e-04)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Power ratio					-.091*** (0.004)	-9.214e-02*** (4.953e-03)	-.092*** (0.004(	-.057*** (0.004)	-.072*** (0.004)	-.075*** (0.004)

Bureaucracy						1.789e-02** (6.427e-03)	0.030*** (0.006)	0.015* (0.006)	0.019** (0.006)	0.010 (0.006)
Tax ratio							0.463*** (0.087)	0.361*** (0.081)	0.351*** (0.083)	0.438*** (0.084)
TPA								0.994*** (0.027)		
TPA G									0.950*** (0.030)	
TPA NSA										0.548*** (0.023)
Constant	-.183*** (0.041)	-.207*** (0.042)	-.207*** (0.042)	-.271*** (0.043)	.118* (0.046)	8.513e-02 (4.822e-02)	0.033 (0.049)	0.049 (0.045)	0.043 (0.046)	-0.029 (0.047)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	17733	17728	17729	17731	17398	17392	17366	16149	16466	16845
Null deviance	8712	8712	8712	8712	8712	8712	8712	8712	8712	8712
Residual deviance	3866	3863	3863	3863	3718	3715	3703	3222	3341	3488
X^2	4846***	4849***	4849***	4849***	4994***	4997***	5009***	5489***	5371***	5223***
DWT	0.854***	0.824***	0.824***	0.824***	0.882***	0.884***	0.889***	0.982***	0.962***	0.920***
x̄VIF score	1.200	1.210	2.286	2.308	2.253	2.216	2.207	2.196	2.183	2.165

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table A.4.18. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Persistence, 1945-2013, EPR Persistence, EPR Prior War

	UCDP Persist									
EPR Prior war	0.130*** (0.005)	0.131*** (0.005)	0.130*** (0.005)	0.128*** (0.005)	0.099*** (0.005)	1.002e-01 *** (5.887e-03)	0.098*** (0.005)	0.073*** (0.005)	0.077*** (0.005)	0.089*** (0.005)
GDP per capita income	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-9.768e-04 (6.307e-04)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Population (log)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.003 (0.001)	3.191e-03 (1.725e-03)	0.003 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)
% mountainous (log)	-0.005** (0.001)	-0.005** (0.001)	-0.005** (0.001)	-0.005** (0.001)	-.006*** (0.001)	-6.930e-03 *** (1.755e-03)	-0.005** (0.001)	-.005*** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-.007*** (0.001)
Noncontagious state	0.011 (0.007)	0.012 (0.007)	0.011 (0.007)	0.013 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	3.636e-03 (7.362e-03)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.009 (0.007)
Oil exporter	0.056*** (0.008)	0.057*** (0.008)	0.058*** (0.008)	0.057*** (0.008)	0.052*** (0.008)	5.359e-02 *** (8.099e-03)	0.047*** (0.008)	0.039*** (0.007)	0.042*** (0.007)	0.045*** (0.007)
Instability	0.065*** (0.007)	0.064*** (0.007)	0.064*** (0.007)	0.063*** (0.007)	0.055*** (0.007)	5.632e-02*** (7.528e-03)	0.057*** (0.007)	0.038*** (0.006)	0.047*** (0.007)	0.045*** (0.007)
Democracy	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	1.004e-03 * (4.041e-04)	0.000* (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
ELF	0.030** (0.009)	0.031*** (0.009)	0.024* (0.009)	0.021* (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)	1.072e-02 (9.650e-03)	0.008 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)
Dyad number	0.340*** (0.003)	0.340*** (0.003)	0.339*** (0.003)	0.339*** (0.003)	0.322*** (0.003)	3.231e-01*** (3.772e-03)	0.323*** (0.003)	0.251*** (0.003)	0.268*** (0.003)	0.297*** (0.003)
Excluded groups		-0.000 (0.000)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-.004*** (0.001)	-4.177e-03*** (1.236e-03)	-.005*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-.004*** (0.001)	-.003** (0.001)
Active groups			0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	1.624e-03 (1.123e-03)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
WGIRL				-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	7.903e-05 (1.204e-04)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Power ratio					-.042*** (0.001)	-4.225e-02 *** (1.740e-03)	-.042*** (0.001)	-.029*** (0.001)	-.035*** (0.002)	-.036*** (0.001)
Bureaucracy						3.451e-03 (2.258e-03)	0.007** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)

Tax ratio							0.157*** (0.030)	0.118*** (0.028)	0.118*** (0.029)	0.149*** (0.029)
TPA								0.376*** (0.009)		
TPA G									0.338*** (0.010)	
TPA NSA										0.185*** (0.008)
Constant	-.055*** (0.014)	-.061*** (0.015)	-.062*** (0.015)	-.055*** (0.015)	0.099*** (0.016)	9.319e-02 *** (1.694e-02)	0.075*** (0.017)	0.081*** (0.015)	0.079*** (0.016)	0.054** (0.016)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	-386.6	-387.9	-392.5	-393.1	-960.4	-960.7	-985.2	-2419	-1910	-1465
Null deviance	1192	1192	1192	1192	1192	1192	1192	1192	1192	1192
Residual deviance	490.1	489.9	489.6	489.4	458.7	458.6	457.2	388.1	411.3	432.7
X^2	702.0***	702.2***	702.5***	702.7***	733.4***	733.5***	734.9***	804.0***	780.8***	759.4***
DWT	0.647***	0.648***	0.647***	0.647***	0.689***	0.690***	0.692***	0.729***	0.735***	0.697***
x̄VIF score	1.200	1.210	2.286	2.308	2.253	2.216	2.207	2.196	2.183	2.165

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Figures A.4.1-A4.4 reports the main results in a graph based on logistic and multinomial regression. The multiple dependent variables are shown and separated between conflict intensities of ≥1,000 battle-related deaths (FL prior, left-hand side of table) and ≥25 battle-related deaths (EPR prior, right-hand side of table). All four figures graphically illustrate these statistical models in which the dots represent coefficients and their dashed lines their 95 percent confidence intervals. If a dot is on the right or the left side of the graph where the line does not overlap the vertical line are statistically significant.

Figure A.4.1. Complexity Variables Regressed Against Onset Variables (FL prior)



Figure A.4.1. Complexity Variables Regressed Against Onset Variables (FL prior). The coefficient demonstrates how significantly different the value is from 0. If there is a significant difference, then one may assume that the predictor is making a contribution to the prediction of the outcome.

Figure A.4.2. Complexity Variables Regressed Against Onset Variables (EPR prior)



Figure A.4.2. Complexity Variables Regressed Against Onset Variables (EPR prior). The coefficient demonstrates how significantly different the value is from 0. If there is a significant difference, then one may assume that the predictor is making a contribution to the prediction of the outcome.

Figure A.4.3. Complexity Variables Regressed Against Reversion and Persistence Variables (FL prior)



Figure A.4.3. Complexity Variables Regressed Against Reversion and Persistence Variables (FL prior). The coefficient demonstrates how significantly different the value is from 0. If there is a significant difference, then one may assume that the predictor is making a contribution to the prediction of the outcome.

Figure A.4.4. Complexity Variables Regressed Against Reversion and Persistence Variables (EPR prior)



Figure A.4.4. Complexity Variables Regressed Against Reversion and Persistence Variables (EPR prior). The coefficient demonstrates how significantly different the value is from 0. If there is a significant difference, then one may assume that the predictor is making a contribution to the prediction of the outcome.

A.5. Interaction Effects of Complexity Variables

Table A.5.1. Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict of Best Fit with Interaction Effects, 1945-2013

	UCDP onset (EPR prior)	Usher recurrence (FL prior)	Usher relapse (EPR prior)	EPR persistence (EPR prior)
EPR Prior war	-3.622***	0.259	3.491***	1.427***
	(0.315)	(0.242)	(1.018)	(0.167)
GDP per capita income	-0.034		-0.061	-0.135***
	(0.032)		(0.063)	(0.033)
Population (log)	-0.016	-0.053	0.030	0.056
	(0.064)	(0.085)	(0.093)	(0.056)
% mountainous (log)	-0.114	-0.004		-0.042
	(0.073)	(0.099)		(0.048)
Noncontagious state				-0.243
				(0.213)
Oil exporter	0.882***	0.652*		1.004***
	(0.245)	(0.263)		(0.203)
New state	0.587	0.465		
	(0.519)	(0.502)		
Instability	0.544*		0.785***	0.280
	(0.212)		(0.224)	(0.172)
Democracy				0.036**
				(0.011)
ELF		0.771		0.426
		(0.454)		(0.263)
Dyad number	0.859***	0.577***	0.331***	4.253***
	(0.081)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.139)
Excluded groups	-0.063	0.025	-0.077	-0.130**
	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.041)
Active groups	0.071*	0.073*	0.028	0.032
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.023)
WGIRL	0.001	0.008	-0.011	-0.013
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Power ratio	-0.514***	-0.901***	-0.465***	-0.239**
	(0.113)	(0.263)	(0.117)	(0.078)
Bureaucracy	-0.174*	0.012	-0.113	-0.054
	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.109)
Tax ratio	-0.816	-1.243	-0.797	0.720
	(1.244)	(1.409)	(1.407)	(1.813)
TPA	1.118***	0.917***	0.542*	1.986***
		(0.230)	(0.236)	(0.214)
Excluded*Active	0.001	-0.002	-0.000	0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)
WGIRL*Power ratio	-0.006*	-0.125		-0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.009)		(0.001)

Bureaucracy*Tax ratio				0.605 (0.700)
WGIRL* Bureaucracy				0.003 (0.002)
Constant	-2.031*** (0.319)	-4.639*** (0.784)	-6.883*** (1.306)	-4.301*** (0.607)
N	8773	8773	8773	8773
AIC score	1123	828.7	815.2	1794
Null deviance	1501.8	1164.4	1075.8	7778
Residual deviance	1092.8	794.7	787.2	1750

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

A.6. Further CEM Simulations: Conflict Reversion Parameters

Figures A.6.1 and A.6.2 show stochastic competitive effects. In figure A.6.1 the competition coefficient is less than one for all actor groups and in A.6.2 the competition coefficient is greater than one for all actor groups.

Figure A.6.1. Stochastic Competitive Effects on Three Actor Groups, α<1



Figure A.6.1. Stochastic Competitive Effects on Three Actor Groups, α<1. Alpha values range from [0:0.50]. Alpha values are less than one, drawn three times from a gamma distribution (R function rgamma()). The minimum of these three values are used (*see* Chapter III for theoretical justification). This figure shows aperiodic fluctuations and extinction. Actor group initial values are 500 (green), 150 (orange), and 100 (blue). Orange withdrawals from the conflict by t=250 days. r= 0.50.

Figure A.6.2. Stochastic Competitive Effects on Three Actor Groups, α>1



Figure A.6.2. Stochastic Competitive Effects on Three Actor Groups, α>1. Alpha values range from [0:0.50]. Alpha values are less than one, drawn three times from a gamma distribution (R function rgamma()). The minimum of these three values are used (*see* Chapter III for theoretical justification). This figure shows aperiodic

fluctuations and extinction. Actor group initial values are 500 (green), 150 (orange), and 100 (blue). r.1=0.40, r.2=1.25, r.3= 0.10.

Figures A.6.3. are results for non-significant parameter estimates from the conflict recurrence model. After simulating the normally distributed model for up to 1,000 time steps the model did not diverge from equilibrium. This outcome immediately illustrates that statistical significant testing for parameter estimation is important when using estimates from a normal distribution and when modeling stochastic behaviors.

Figure A.6.3. Stochastic Competitive Effects on Three Actor Groups with Non-Significant Competition Coefficient Parameters for Conflict Recurrence



Figure A.6.3. Stochastic Competitive Effects on Three Actor Groups with Non-Significant Competition Coefficient Parameters for Conflict Recurrence. Drawing from 3 times from the distribution, then drawing the minimum. R function rnrom()).. Green represents government actors, orange represents NSA, and blue represents TPA. Government actor initial value is 10, NSA is 10, and TPA is 10. Growth rates are r.1=0.50.

Although, complexity seems to have decreased when simulating non-significant parameters, there are indicators that the CEM is simulating a system that is complex. For example, all actor groups demonstrate similar level of activity and competitiveness until around t=31 (figure 5.11). Next, the orange and green actor groups suddenly increase in activity until both groups overcompensate (as a consequence of time lags) against the other group's competitiveness via

their corresponding activity levels. However, because of the time lag, which is a realistic consequence in most complex systems due to feedback and non-linearity, the orange and green actors do not respond adequately to other competing actor groups, and soon afterwards both withdrawal after spiking in activity. Moreover, the blue actor group in figure 5.11 demonstrates that although a conflict may have ended by t=42, the blue actor group is still active within this particular system. As competition is now less severe or non-existent among other competing actor groups, blue actor group activity oscillates near carrying capacity and the system has stabilized. This observation gives evidence that the system is complex, albeit a decrease in complexity.

Figures A.6.4. are results for non-significant parameter estimates from the conflict relapse model. After simulating the normally distributed model for up to 100 time steps the model did not diverge from equilibrium. Behaviors are much more dynamic for conflict relapse (figure A.6.4) compared to recurrence (figure A.6.3). This outcome immediately illustrates that statistical significant testing for parameter estimation is important when using estimates from a normal distribution and when modeling stochastic behaviors.

Figure A.6.4. Stochastic Competitive Effects on Three Actor Groups with Non-Significant Competition Coefficient Parameters for Conflict Relapse



Figure A.6.4 Stochastic Competitive Effects on Three Actor Groups with Non-Significant Competition Coefficient Parameters for Conflict Recurrence. Drawing from 3 times from the distribution, then drawing the minimum. R function rnrom()).. This figure shows aperiodic fluctuations. Green represents government actors,

orange represents NSA, and blue represents TPA. Government actor initial value is 10, NSA is 10, and TPA is 10. Growth rates are r.1=0.50.

A.7. Further CEM Simulations: Conflict Onset

Figure A.7.1 Stochastic Competitive Effects on Three Actor Groups for Conflict Onset



Figure A.7.1 Stochastic Competitive Effects on Three Actor Groups with Non-significant Competition Coefficient Parameters for Conflict Onset. This figure shows aperiodic fluctuations. Green represents NSA, orange represents government actors, and blue represents third party actors. Government actor initial value is 10, NSA is 10, and TPA is 10. Growth rates are r=0.5. Competitive coefficient values are drawn from the estimated parameter values from the onset model derived from table 5.4. rnorm = -0.026, -0.007, -0.129

A.8. Afghanistan Data: Rare Logit Regressions.[3]

Table. A. 8.1. Rare Logit Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict FL Onset, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
FL prior war	-9710611***	9710609***	28.56	35.72	24.54
	(2673)	(2673)			
EPR prior war	1.043	-2.981**	37.83	35.72	33.83
	(1.146)	(1.016)			
GDP	0.667	-3.258***	37.80	35.72	33.80
	(0.444)	(0.838)			
Population (log)	-0.156	-0.824	39.66	35.72	35.66
	(1.001)	(3.230)			
% mountainous (log)	-1.317	-2.591***	37.87	35.72	33.87
	(0.808)	(0.516)			
Noncontagious state	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Oil exporter	1.826	-2.591***	38.42	35.72	35.42
	(1.264)	(0.515)			
New state	1.0e+07***	-3.176**	39.41	35.72	35.41
	(2.7e+03)	(1.013)			
Instability	1.489	-3.176**	36.31	35.72	32.31
	(1.148)	(1.013)			
Democracy	0.176	-1.189	38.69	35.72	34.69
	(0.147)	(1.025)			
ELF	-11.04	4.665	37.87	35.72	35.72
	(6.784)	(4.292)			
RLF	-29.89	5.519	37.87	35.72	33.87
	(18.35)	(4.813)			
Dyad number	0.000	-2.333***	39.59	35.72	35.59
	(0.215)	(0.556)			
Excluded groups	0.585*	-3.987***	35.27	35.72	31.27
	(0.274)	(1.023)			
Active groups	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
WGIRL	-0.038	-2.137***	38.73	35.72	34.73
	(0.123)	(0.584)			
Power ratio	-0.429	-1.465*	37.16	35.72	33.16
	(0.324)	(0.683)			
Bureaucracy	0.318	-3.212	39.44	35.72	35.44
	(0.842)	(2.397)			
Tax ratio	-19.90	-1.909*	39.09	35.72	35.09
	(30.64)	(0.748)			
Third party active	0.734	-2.707***	38.94	35.72	35.72
	(0.948)	(0.725)			

p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

[3]Rare logit regressions were performed in R, with R package Zelig. *See* Choirat, C., *et al*. (2017) "relogit: Rare Events Logistic Regression for Dichotomous Dependent Variables". *Zelig: Everyone's Statistical Software*. http://zeligproject.org/.

Table. A. 8.2. Rare Logit Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict UCDP Onset, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
FL prior war	-26396210*** (4407)	26396207*** (4407)	12.31	10.42	8.313
EPR prior war	3.318e+07*** (4.941e+03)	-2.981e+00** (1.016e+00)	12.96	10.42	8.962
GDP	1.087 (1.461)	-4.251* (1.736)	14.38	10.42	10.38
Population (log)	-1.690 (2.227)	13.18 (21.62)	14.40	10.42	10.40
% mountainous (log)	-11729274*** (2292)	49247755*** (9622)	14.33	10.42	10.33
Noncontagious state	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Oil exporter	3.930e+07*** (5.377e+03)	-3.651e+00*** (1.008e+00)	14.30	10.42	10.30
New state	2.891e+07*** (4.612e+03)	-3.682e+00*** (1.008e+00)	14.36	10.42	10.36
Instability	-29035833*** (4622)	29035830*** (4622)	12.62	10.42	8.628
Democracy	0.307 (0.376)	-1.066 (2.822)	14.41	10.42	10.41
ELF	-98383199**** (19222)	64763784*** (12653)	14.33	10.42	10.33
RLF	-266226393*** (52015)	72360325*** (14138)	14.33	10.42	10.33
Dyad number	0.463 (0.573)	-3.619** (1.161)	14.30	10.42	10.30
Excluded groups	0.785 (1.014)	-4.763* (2.268)	14.37	10.42	10.37
Active groups	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
WGIRL	0.273 (0.312)	-3.719** (1.250)	14.14	10.42	10.14
Power ratio	-0.189 (0.787)	-2.581 (1.327)	13.55	10.42	9.549
Bureaucracy	-1.529 (1.802)	0.416 (3.798)	13.14	10.42	9.142
Tax ratio	-88.74 (122.0)	0.545 (4.671)	13.54	10.42	9.540
Third party active	4.148e+07*** (5.524e+03)	-3.176e+00** (1.013e+00)	13.35	10.42	9.352

Table. A. 8.3. Rare Logit Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict EPR Onset, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
FL prior war	-26396209*** (4407)	26396207*** (4407)	17.76	18.04	13.76
EPR prior war	-0.059 (1.435)	-2.981** (1.015)	22.04	18.04	18.04
GDP	0.507 (0.835)	-3.603** (1.211)	22.03	18.04	18.03
Population (log)	2.153 (2.275)	-24.14 (22.73)	20.42	18.04	16.42
% mountainous (log)	-11729274*** (2292)	49247755*** (9622)	21.86	18.04	17.86
Noncontagious state	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Oil exporter	1.446e+07*** (3.261e+03)	-3.192e+00*** (7.184e-01)	21.8	18.04	17.80
New state	1.064e+07*** (2.797e+03)	-3.224e+00*** (7.181e-01)	21.92	18.04	17.92
Instability	-29035832*** (4622)	29035830*** (4622)	18.41	18.04	14.41
Democracy	0.1662 (0.268)	-1.845 (2.013)	22.03	18.04	18.03
ELF	-98383199*** (19222)	64763784*** (12653)	21.86	18.04	17.86
RLF	-266226384*** (52015)	72360323*** (14138)	21.86	18.04	17.86
Dyad number	0.140 (0.407)	-3.087*** (0.828)	21.8	18.04	17.80
Excluded groups	0.626 (0.389)	-4.873** (1.666)	19.44	18.04	15.44
Active groups	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
WGIRL	0.062 (0.130)	-3.286*** (0.927)	22.03	18.04	18.03
Power ratio	-0.438 (0.792)	-1.898* (0.893)	18.69	18.04	14.69
Bureaucracy	-0.522 (1.194)	-1.664 (0.589)	21.87	18.04	17.87
Tax ratio	-5.274 (45.57)	-2.888* (1.249)	22.02	18.04	18.02
Third party active	0.362 (1.436)	-3.176** (1.013)	21.98	18.04	17.98

p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table. A. 8.4. Rare Logit Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Usher Onset, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
FL prior war	1.639**	-1.316***	81.18	87.02	77.18
	(0.557)	(0.373)			
EPR prior war	3.492**	-2.981**	59.14	87.02	55.14
	(1.074)	(1.016)			
GDP	0.792*	-1.577**	84.07	87.02	80.07
	(0.354)	(0.489)			
Population (log)	0.464	-5.131	89.90	87.02	85.90
	(0.583)	(5.658)			
% mountainous	-0.131	-0.107	91.02	87.02	87.02
(log)	(0.762)	(3.155)			
Noncontagious state	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Oil exporter	-0.129	-0.635*	90.86	87.02	86.86
	(1.184)	(0.263)			
New state	0.681	-0.681**	90.79	87.02	86.79
	(1.438)	(0.261)			
Instability	1.771**	-1.494***	79.34	87.02	75.34
	(0.564)	(0.416)			
Democracy	0.422*	2.341	76.04	87.02	72.04
	(0.187)	(1.396)			
ELF	-1.102	0.066	91.02	87.02	87.02
	(6.392)	(4.161)			
RLF	-2.982	0.1515	91.02	87.02	87.02
	(17.29)	(4.654)			
Dyad number	0.407**	-1.452***	76.20	87.02	72.20
	(0.127	(0.374)			
Excluded groups	-0.107	-0.406	90.6	87.02	86.60
	(0.220)	(0.547)			
Active groups	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
WGIRL	-0.547*	0.806	63.54	87.02	59.54
	(0.218)	(0.457)			
Power ratio	-0.318	0.110	86.94	87.02	82.94
	(0.170)	(0.467)			
Bureaucracy	0.754	-2.694*	87.98	87.02	83.98
	(0.477)	(1.345)			
Tax ratio	3.236	-0.728	90.97	87.02	86.97
	(16.29)	(0.472)			
Third party active	2.085***	-1.666***	75.33	87.02	71.337
	(0.588)	(0.442)			

p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table. A. 8.5. Rare Logit Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Usher Recurrence Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
FL prior war	4.839e+07***	-3.273**	13.54	10.42	9.545
	(5.967e+03)	(1.012)			
EPR prior war	-35194953***	35194950***	13.08	10.42	9.081
	(5089)	(5089)			
GDP	1.110	-4.027*	14.24	10.42	10.24
	(1.873)	(1.823)			
Population (log)	1.839	-21.19	13.45	10.42	9.457
	(3.256)	(32.65)			
% mountainous (log)	-11729274***	49247755***	14.33	10.42	10.33
	(2292)	(9622)			
Noncontagious state	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Oil exporter	3.930e+07***	-3.651***	14.30	10.42	10.30
	(5.377e+03)	(1.008)			
New state	2.891e+07***	-3.682***	14.36	10.42	10.36
	(4.612e+03)	(1.008)			
Instability	-29035833 ***	29035830***	12.62	10.42	8.628
	(4622)	(4622)			
Democracy	0.307	-1.066	14.41	10.42	10.41
	(0.3764)	(2.822)			
ELF	-98383200***	64763784***	14.33	10.42	10.33
	(19222)	(12653)			
RLF	-266226391***	72360325***	14.33	10.42	10.33
	(52015)	(14138)			
Dyad number	0.463	-3.619	14.30	10.42	10.30
	(0.809)	(1.161)			
Excluded groups					
Active groups	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
WGIRL	0.553	-3.699**	13.79	10.42	9.790
	(0.527)	(1.268)			
Power ratio	7.382*	-3.589**	11.70	10.42	7.709
	(3.665)	(1.345)			
Bureaucracy	0.181	-3.586	14.06	10.42	10.06
	(2.124)	(6.444)			
Tax ratio	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Third party active	4.148e+07***	-3.176**	13.35	10.42	9.352
	(5.524e+03)	(1.013)			

p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table. A. 8.6. Rare Logit Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Usher Relapse Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
FL prior war	3.265e+09*** (9.037e+04)	3.918e+09*** (5.369e+04)	4	0	3.9451e-10
EPR prior war	-298479825*** (86410)	5223396911*** (61993)	4	0	3.9451e-10
GDP	5040771757*** (53131)	-520374176*** (73054)	4	0	3.9451e-10
Population (log)	-9.544e+09*** (8.451e+04)	9.706e+10*** (8.157e+05)	4	0	3.9451e-10
% mountainous (log)	-3.335e+10*** (1.280e+05)	1.427e+11*** (5.298e+05)	4	0	3.9451e-10
Noncontagious state	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Oil exporter	4.040e+10*** (1.835e+05)	2.693e+09*** (4.452e+04)	4	0	3.9451e-10
New state	8.357e+10*** (2.556e+05)	2.612e+09*** (4.384e+04)	4	0	3.9451e-10
Instability	1.847e+09*** (8.775e+04)	4.309e+09*** (5.631e+04)	4	0	3.9451e-10
Democracy	1.626e+09*** (1.715e+04)	1.678e+10*** (1.309e+05)	4	0	3.9451e-10
ELF	-2.797e+11*** (1.073e+06)	1.868e+11*** (6.987e+05)	4	0	3.9451e-10
RLF	-7.570e+11*** (2.905e+06)	2.084e+11*** (7.814e+05)	4	0	3.9451e-10
Dyad number	1.371e+09*** (1.789e+04)	2.651e+09*** (5.350e+04)	4	0	3.9451e-10
Excluded groups	3.629e+09*** (3.472e+04)	-3.149e+09*** (8.970e+04)	4	0	3.9451e-10
Active groups	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
WGIRL	6.835e+08*** (7.318e+03)	1.666e+09*** (5.650e+04)	4	0	3.9451e-10
Power ratio	-182427487*** (27133)	5528264523*** (80719)	4	0	3.9451e-10
Bureaucracy	-1.629e+09*** (7.416e+04)	9.420e+09*** (2.026e+05)	4	0	3.9451e-10
Tax ratio	-1.548e+10*** (2.741e+06)	5.442e+09 *** (7.889e+04)	4	0	3.9451e-10
Third party active	1.847e+09*** (8.775e+04)	4.309e+09*** (5.631e+04)	4	0	3.9451e-10

p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table. A. 8.7. Rare Logit Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict EPR Persistence, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
FL prior war	2.913*** (0.806)	-0.743* (0.323)	72.81	94.03	68.81
EPR prior war	-3.318e+07*** (4.941e+03)	-2.981** (1.016)	12.96	94.03	8.962
GDP	6.253*** (1.870)	-5.484*** (1.666)	47.45	94.03	43.46
Population (log)	0.658 (0.538)	-6.228 (5.204)	95.78	94.03	91.78
% mountainous (log)	1587376*** (843)	-6664922*** (3540)	94.09	94.03	90.09
Noncontagious state	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Oil exporter	-1.956e+06*** (1.200e+03)	1.283e-16*** (2.500e-01)	92.72	94.03	88.72
New state	-3.913e+06 *** (1.697e+03)	5.971e-02 (2.463e-01)	95.43	94.03	91.43
Instability	2.158*** (0.597)	-0.710* (0.337)	80.72	94.03	76.72
Democracy	0.506* (0.202)	3.914* (1.575)	83.70	94.03	79.70
ELF	13314643*** (7071)	-8764776*** (4655)	94.09	94.03	90.09
RLF	36029620*** (19135)	-9792850*** (5201)	94.09	94.03	90.09
Dyad number	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Excluded groups	0.318 (0.230)	-0.603 (0.553)	95.12	94.03	91.12
Active groups	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
WGIRL	-0.955** (0.315)	3.040*** (0.835)	40.53	94.03	36.53
Power ratio	-0.617** (0.197)	1.700 (0.590)	83.76	94.03	79.76
Bureaucracy	1.204* (0.470)	-3.092* (1.282)	89.95	94.03	85.95
Tax ratio	-18.34 (15.63)	0.558 (0.453)	96.54	94.03	92.54
Third party active	-5.614e+06 *** (2.032e+03)	-1.339*** (3.953e-01)	44.03	94.03	40.03

A.9. Afghanistan Data: Poisson Regressions

Table. A. 9.1. Poisson Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict FL Onset, Continuous Variables, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
GDP	0.570	-3.380***	38.38	26.10	24.38
	(0.397)	(0.7947)			
Population (log)	0.220	-4.739	40.04	26.10	26.04
	(0.967)	(9.389)			
% mountainous	-1.028	1.5286	38.50	26.10	24.50
(log)	(0.680)	(2.670)			
Democracy	0.141	-1.665	39.16	26.10	25.16
	(0.135)	(0.9286)			
ELF	-8.624	2.889	38.50	26.10	24.50
	(5.707)	(3.561)			
RLF	-23.33	3.554	38.500	26.10	24.50
	(15.44)	(3.999)			
Dyad number	-0.070	-2.499***	39.97	26.10	25.97
	(0.208)	(0.534)			
Excluded groups	0.5086*	-4.053***	36.22	26.10	22.22
	(0.234)	(0.9559)			
Active groups	NA (12)	-2.610***	38.10	26.10	26.10
		(0.447)			
WGIRL	-0.098	-2.247***	39.17	26.10	25.17
	(0.120)	(0.556)			
Power ratio	-0.447	-1.734**	37.74	26.10	23.74
	(0.308)	(0.628)			
Bureaucracy	0.404	-3.716	39.84	26.10	25.84
	(0.811)	(2.316)			
Tax ratio	-22.11	-2.137**	39.54	26.10	25.51
	(29.56)	(0.711)			

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table. A. 9.2 Poisson Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict UCDP Onset, Continuous Variables, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
GDP	-0.254	-3.956*	14.40	8.439	8.404
	(1.452)	(1.722)			
Population (log)	0.273	-6.867	14.42	8.439	8.422
	(2.211)	(21.48)			
% mountainous	9.206	-42.82	14.34	8.439	8.348
(log)	(3311)	(13905.6)			
Democracy	0.030	-4.002	14.43	8.439	8.432
	(0.373)	(2.797)			
ELF	77.22	-55.01	14.34	8.439	8.348
	(27779.6)	(18286.8)			
RLF	208.9	-60.97	14.34	8.439	8.348
	(75172.1)	(20431.7)			
Dyad number	-0.175	-3.983***	14.31	8.439	8.319
	(0.570)	(1.151)			
Excluded groups	-0.213	-3.765	14.38	8.439	8.386
	(1.008)	(2.251)			
Active groups	NA (12)	-4.22***	12.43	8.439	8.439
		(1.00)			
WGIRL	-0.131	-3.771**	14.16	8.439	8.161
	(0.310)	(1.238)			
Power ratio	-0.640	-3.104*	13.57	8.439	7.578
	(0.780)	(1.302)			
Bureaucracy	-1.856	0.115	13.19	8.439	7.193
	(1.682)	(3.510)			
Tax ratio	82.24	-6.863	13.56	8.439	7.567
	(121.20)	(4.647)			

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table. A. 9.3. Poisson Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict EPR Onset, Continuous Variables, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
GDP	0.087	-3.625**	22.09	14.10	14.09
	(0.821)	(1.193)			
Population (log)	2.527	-28.40	20.54	14.10	12.54
	(2.201)	(22.02)			
% mountainous	9.019	-41.35	21.92	14.10	13.92
(log)	(0.996)	(8434.2)			
Democracy	0.030	-3.309	22.09	14.10	14.09
	(0.263)	(1.978)			
ELF	75.65	-53.28	21.92	14.10	13.92
	(16849.2)	(11091.5)			
RLF	204.7	-59.1	21.92	14.10	13.92
	(45594.2)	(12392.5)			
Dyad number	-0.175	-3.290***	21.86	14.10	13.86
	(0.403)	(0.814)			
Excluded Groups	0.616	-5.380***	19.655	14.10	11.65
	(0.366)	(1.626)			
Active groups	NA (12)	-3.526***	20.10	14.10	14.10
		(0.707)			
WGIRL	-0.014	-3.455***	22.09	14.10	14.09
	(0.128)	(0.913)			
Power ratio	-1.026	-2.099*	18.87	14.10	10.87
	(0.778)	(0.848)			
Bureaucracy	-0.480	-2.284	21.94	14.10	13.94
	(1.171)	(3.013)			
Tax ratio	-6.885	-3.366**	22.08	14.10	14.08
	(44.90)	(1.228)			

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table. A. 9.4. Poisson Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Usher Onset, Continuous Variables, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
GDP	0.421*	-1.621***	96.00	49.86	46.00
	(0.198)	(0.359)			
Population (log)	0.400	-4.966	99.1	49.86	49.10
	(0.483)	(4.711)			
% mountainous	0.009	-1.122	99.86	49.86	49.86
(log)	(0.622)	(2.576)			
Democracy	0.176**	0.059	92.70	49.86	42.70
	(0.060)	(0.396)			
ELF	0.077	-1.134	99.86	49.86	49.86
	(5.218)	(3.974)			
RLF	0.210	-1.140	99.86	49.86	49.86
	(14.12)	(3.799)			
Dyad number	0.208**	-1.606***	91.73	49.86	41.73
	(0.068)	(0.313)			
Excluded groups	-0.096	-0.872	99.57	49.86	49.57
	(0.186)	(0.448)			
Active groups	NA (12)	-1.084***	97.86	49.86	49.86
		(0.2085)			
WGIRL	-0.397**	-0.219	80.55	49.86	30.55
	(0.148)	(0.266)			
Power ratio	-0.213	-0.605	97.21	49.86	47.21
	(0.132)	(0.334)			
Bureaucracy	0.534	-2.557*	97.84	49.86	47.84
	(0.386)	(1.117)			
Tax ratio	2.272	-1.139**	99.83	49.86	49.83
	(13.26)	(0.387)			

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table. A. 9.5. Poisson Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict UCDP Recur, Continuous Variables, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68 **==NO EVENTS**

Table. A. 9.6. Poisson Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Usher Recurrence, Continuous Variables, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
GDP	-0.680	-3.581*	14.26	8.439	8.262
	(1.860)	(1.805)			
Population (log)	2.841	-32.24	13.49	8.439	7.489
	(0.375)	(32.11)			
% mountainous	9.206	-42.82	14.34	8.439	8.348
(log)	(3311.8)	(13905.6)			
Democracy	0.030	-4.002	14.43	8.439	8.432
	(0.373)	(2.797)			
ELF	77.22	-55.01	14.34	8.439	8.348
	(27779.6)	(18286.8)			
RLF	208.95	-60.97	14.34	8.439	8.348
	(75172.1)	(20431.7)			
Dyad number	-0.175	-3.983***	14.31	8.439	8.319
	(0.570)	(1.151)			
Excluded groups	-19.17	16.40	11.54	8.439	5.545
	(6140)	(6140)			
Active groups	NA (12)	-4.22	12.43	8.439	8.439
		(1.00)			
WGIRL	-0.277	-3.506**	13.81	8.439	7.812
	(0.523)	(1.252)			
Power ratio	-2.251	-2.367	11.77	8.439	5.772
	(3.560)	(1.294)			
Bureaucracy	1.160	-7.521	14.082	8.439	8.081
	(2.102)	(6.386)			
Tax ratio	-44552.0	304.7	11.41	8.439	5.416
	(10877087.5)	(75051.9)			

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table. A. 9.7. Poisson Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict Usher Relapse, Continuous Variables, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68 ==NO EVENTS

Table. A. 9.8. Poisson Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict UCDP Persistence, Continuous Variables, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
GDP	0.523***	-0.261	218.72	139.4	110.0
	(0.088)	(0.171)			
Population (log)	0.394	-3.388	244.8	139.4	136.0
	(0.226)	(2.201)			
% mountainous	0.120***	1.246***	234.9	139.4	126.1
(log)	(0.030)	(0.214)			
Democracy	0.120***	1.246***	234.9	139.4	126.1
	(0.030)	(0.214)			
ELF	-3.617*	2.771*	244.7	139.4	136.0
	(1.779)	(1.146)			
RLF	-9.788*	3.050*	244.7	139.4	136.0
	(4.815)	(1.283)			
Dyad number	0.214***	-0.107	208.7	139.4	100.0
	(0.032)	(0.147)			
Excluded groups	0.138*	0.105	244.3	139.4	135.6
	(0.067)	(0.195)			
Active groups	NA (12)	0.434***	246.1	139.4	139.4
		(0.097)			
WGIRL	-0.384***	1.284***	162.1	139.4	53.39
	(0.067)	(0.124)			
Power ratio	-0.252***	0.989***	231.3	139.4	122.6
	(0.062)	(0.152)			
Bureaucracy	0.679***	-1.453**	233.7	139.4	125.0
	(0.186)	(0.544)			
Tax ratio	-10.63	0.676***	245.2	139.4	136.5
	(6.227)	(0.165)			

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Table. A. 9.9. Poisson Regression Analyses of Determinants of Intrastate Conflict EPR Persistence, Continuous Variables, Afghanistan Data, 1945-2013, n=68

IV	Coefficient	Constant	AIC	Null	Residual Deviance
GDP	0.509***	-1.308***	112.3	45.79	36.33
	(0.152)	(0.292)			
Population (log)	0.391	-4.424	120.6	45.79	4.64
	(0.385)	(3.752)			
% mountainous	-0.412	1.054	120.7	45.79	44.74
(log)	(0.367)	(1.499)			
Democracy	0.118*	0.162	117.4	45.79	41.41
	(0.052)	(0.368)			
ELF	-3.460	1.600	120.7	45.79	44.74
	(3.078)	(1.983)			
RLF	-9.363	1.867	120.7	45.79	44.74
	(8.329)	(2.220)			
Dyad number	0.207***	1.152***	109.2	45.79	33.27
	(0.055)	(0.249)			
Excluded groups	0.131	-0.947**	120.6	45.79	44.62
	(0.116)	(0.334)			
Active groups	NA (12)	-0.636***	119.7	45.79	45.79
		(0.166)			
WGIRL	-0.369***	0.196	93.18	45.79	17.18
	(0.111)	(0.212)			
Power ratio	-0.262*	-0.064	115.6	45.79	39.60
	(0.106)	(0.258)			
Bureaucracy	0.592	-2.274*	117.9	45.79	41.95
	(0.312)	(0.907)			
Tax ratio	-8.835	-0.432	121.09	45.79	45.09
	(10.60)	(0.285)			

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

A.10. Afghanistan Data: Contingency Tables

Table A.10.1. Afghan Data with Contingency Table for Discrete Variables

		FL prior war		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
FL onset	0	44	19	63
	1	0	5	5
	Total	44	24	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	7.072**	Poisson correlation coefficient	19.73
	X^2 (Fisher's)	0		(3862.9)

		EPR prior war		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
FL onset	0	32	31	63
	1	1	4	5
	Total	33	35	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	0.741	Poisson correlation coefficient	1.327
	X^2 (Fisher's)	4.053		(1.118)

		Noncontagious state		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
FL onset	0	63 (0.93)	0 (0.0)	63
	1	5 (0.07)	0 (0.0)	5
	Total	68	0	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	49.47***	Poisson correlation coefficient	0

		Oil exporter		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
FL onset	0	60 (0.88)	3 (0.04)	63
	1	4 (0.06)	1 (0.01)	5
	Total	64	4	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	0.1652	Correlation coefficient	0.1690
	X^2 (Fisher's)	4.794		
			Poisson correlation coefficient	1.386 (1.118)

New state

		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
FL onset	0	61	2	63
	1	5	0	5
	Total	66	68	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	1.168(e-31)	Poisson correlation coefficient	-14.72 (2452)
		Instability		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
FL onset	0	39	24	63
	1	1	4	5
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	1.851	Poisson correlation coefficient	1.743
	X^2 (Fisher's)	6.329		(1.118)
		TPA		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
FL onset	0	38	25	63
	1	2	3	5
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	0.173	Poisson correlation coefficient	0.762
	X^2 (Fisher's)	2.251		(0.912)
		FL prior war		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
UCDP onset	0	44	23	67
	1	0	1	1
	Total	44	24	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	0.096	Poisson correlation coefficient	19.12
	X^2 (Fisher's)	0.047		(6369.0)
		EPR prior war		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
FL onset	0	32	35	67
	1	1	0	1
	Total	33	35	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	0.0008	Poisson correlation coefficient	-17.80
	X^2 (Fisher's)	0		(43331.2)
		Noncontagious state		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*

UCDP onset	0	67	0	67
	1	1	0	1
	Total	68	0	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 64.05***		Poisson correlation coefficient	NA
		Oil exporter		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
UCDP onset	0	63	4	67
	1	1	0	1
	Total	64	4	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 9.8921e-31		Poisson correlation coefficient	-15.14
	X^2 (Fisher's) 0			(4713.3)
		New state		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
UCDP onset	0	65	2	67
	1	1	0	1
	Total	66	2	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 4.2956e-31		Poisson correlation coefficient	-14.11
	X^2 (Fisher's) 0			(4042.9)
		Instability		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
UCDP onset	0	40	27	67
	1	0	1	1
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 8.9204e-30	0.032	Poisson correlation coefficient	18.97
	X^2 (Fisher's) 0	0		(6679.8)
		TPA		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
UCDP onset	0	38	28	67
	1	1	0	1
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 8.9204e-30		Poisson correlation coefficient	-17.61
	X^2 (Fisher's) 0			(4842.5)
		FL prior war		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR onset	0	44	22	66
	1	0	2	2
	Total	44	24	

	X^2 (Pearson's) 1.422		Poisson correlation coefficient	18.82
	X^2 (Fisher's) 0			(3862.9)
		EPR prior war		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR onset	0	32	34	66
	1	1	1	2
	Total	33	35	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 2.041e-31		Poisson correlation coefficient	-0.058
	X^2 (Fisher's) 0.9419			(1.414)
		Noncontagious state		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR onset	0	66	0	66
	1	2	0	2
	Total	68	0	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 60.23***		Poisson correlation coefficient	NA
		Oil exporter		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR onset	0	62	4	66
	1	2	0	2
	Total	64	4	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	1.6289e-30	Correlation coefficient	-15.83
	X^2 (Fisher's)	0		(4713)
			Poisson correlation coefficient	
		New state		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR onset	0	64	2	66
	1	2	0	2
	Total	66	2	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	1.7482e-31	Poisson correlation coefficient	-14.80
	X^2 (Fisher's)	0		(4042.9)
		Instability		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR onset	0	40	26	66
	1	0	2	2
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	0.973	Poisson correlation coefficient	18.66
	X^2 (Fisher's)	0		(4051.5)
		TPA		

		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR onset	0	39	27	66
	1	1	1	2
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	1.2411e-30	Poisson correlation coefficient	0.356
	X^2 (Fisher's)	1.436		(1.414)
		FL prior war		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
Usher onset	0	35	10	45
	1	9	14	23
	Total	44	24	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	8.334**	Poisson correlation coefficient	1.048* (0.427)
		EPR prior war		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
Usher onset	0	32	13	45
	1	1	22	23
	Total	33	35	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 24.55***		Poisson correlation coefficient	3.032** (1.022)
		Noncontagious state		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
Usher onset	0	45	0	45
	1	23	0	23
	Total	68	0	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	7.117**	Poisson correlation coefficient	NA
		Oil exporter		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
Usher onset	0	42	3	45
	1	22	1	
	Total	64	4	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	1.9824e-30	Poisson correlation coefficient	-0.318
	X^2 (Fisher's)	0.640		(1.022)
		New state		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*

Usher onset	0	44	1	45
	1	22	1	23
	Total	66	2	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 1.9178e-29		Poisson correlation coefficient	0.405
	X^2 (Fisher's) 1.978			(1.022)

Instability

Observed cell frequencies (percentages)

		0	1	*Total*
Usher onset	0	33	12	45
	1	7	16	28
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	9.860**	Poisson correlation coefficient	1.183**
				(0.453)

TPA

Observed cell frequencies (percentages)

		0	1	*Total*
Usher onset	0	34	11	45
	1	6	17	23
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	13.40***	Poisson correlation coefficient	1.398**
	X^2 (Fisher's)			(0.474)

FL prior war

Observed cell frequencies (percentages)

		0	1	*Total*
Usher recurrence	0	43	24	67
	1	1	0	1
	Total	44	24	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 6.9236e-30		Poisson correlation coefficient	-17.51
	X^2 (Fisher's) 0			(5230.5)

EPR prior war

Observed cell frequencies (percentages)

		0	1	*Total*
Usher recurrence	0	33	34	67
	1	0	1	1
	Total	33	35	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 2.9613e-30		Poisson correlation coefficient	17.75
	X^2 (Fisher's) 0			(4460.6)

Noncontagious state

Observed cell frequencies (percentages)

		0	1	*Total*
Usher recurrence	0	67	0	67
	1	1	0	1
	Total	68	0	

	X^2 (Pearson's)	64.05***	Poisson correlation coefficient	NA
		Oil exporter		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
UCDP recurrence	0	63	4	67
	1	1	0	1
	Total	64	4	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 9.8921e-31		Poisson correlation coefficient	-15.14
	X^2 (Fisher's) 0			(4713.3)
		New state		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
Usher recurrence	0	65	2	67
	1	1	0	1
	Total	66	2	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 4.2956e-31		Poisson correlation coefficient	-14.11
	X^2 (Fisher's) 0			(4042.9)
		Instability		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
Usher recurrence	0	40	27	67
	1	0	1	1
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	0.032	Poisson correlation coefficient	18.97
	X^2 (Fisher's)	0		(6679.8)
		TPA		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
Usher recurrence	0	39	28	67
	1	1	0	1
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 8.9204e-30		Poisson correlation coefficient	-17.61
	X^2 (Fisher's) 0			(4842.5)
		FL prior war		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
UCDP persistence	0	30	3	33
	1	14	21	35
	Total	44	24	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	17.11***	Poisson correlation coefficient	1.011***
				(0.199)
		EPR prior war		

		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
UCDP persistence	0	33	0	33
	1	0	35	35
	Total	33	35	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 64.05***		Poisson correlation coefficient	27.4 (54341.2)

Noncontagious state

		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
UCDP persistence	0	33	0	33
	1	35	0	35
	Total	68	0	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 0.058		Poisson correlation coefficient	NA

Oil exporter

		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
Usher recurrence	0	33	0	33
	1	31	4	35
	Total	64	4	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 2.208		Poisson correlation coefficient	0.724* (0.306)
	X^2 (Fisher's) 0			

New state

		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
Usher recurrence	0	33	0	33
	1	33	2	35
	Total	66	2	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 0.456		Poisson correlation coefficient	0.693 (0.420)
	X^2 (Fisher's) 0			

Instability

		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
UCDP persistence	0	27	6	33
	1	13	22	35
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	12.21***	Poisson correlation coefficient	0.882*** (0.201)

TPA

		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
UCDP persistence	0	33	0	33

	1	7	28	35
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	41.63***	Poisson correlation coefficient	1.743***
	X^2 (Fisher's)			(0.244)

FL prior war

		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR persistence	0	30	2	32
	1	14	22	36
	Total	44	24	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	19.98***	Poisson correlation coefficient	1.058**
	X^2 (Fisher's)	22.37***		(0.341)

EPR prior war

		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR persistence	0	30	2	32
	1	14	22	36
	Total	44	24	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	19.98***	Poisson correlation coefficient	3.497***
	X^2 (Fisher's)	22.37***		(1.014)

Noncontagious state

		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR persistence	0	32	0	32
	1	1	35	36
	Total	33	35	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 60.27***		Poisson correlation coefficient	NA

Oil exporter

		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR persistence	0	32	0	32
	1	32	4	36
	Total	64	4	
	X^2 (Pearson's) 2.037		Poisson correlation coefficient	0.693 (0.530)

New state

		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR persistence	0	32	0	32
	1	34	2	36
	Total	66	2	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	0.402	Poisson correlation coefficient	0.663 (0.727)

		Instability		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR persistence	0	27	5	32
	1	13	23	36
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	14.36***	Poisson correlation coefficient	0.927** (0.347)

		TPA		
		Observed cell frequencies (percentages)		
		0	1	*Total*
EPR persistence	0	32	0	32
	1	8	28	36
	Total	40	28	
	X^2 (Pearson's)	39.161***	Poisson correlation coefficient	1.609*** (0.400)

*p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001

A.11. R Code for CEM

```
# CEM Model

maxT =500
xnot = 1
deltaT = 0.01

Govt.1 = 250
NSA.1 = 100
Tp.1 =50

Govt.2 = 250
NSA.2 = 100
Tp.2 =50

Govt.3 = 250
NSA.3 = 100
Tp.3 =50

K = 1000
r.1 = r.2 = r.3 =0.5

outdata = NULL
for(t in seq(1,maxT,deltaT)){

#competition within species (intraspecific competition)
s=runif(1, 1.001,  2)
# s=rnorm(3, 0.086, 0.005)
# s=rgamma(3, 0.026, 1)
  alpha1.1=min(s)
```

```
s2=runif(1, 1.001,  2)
# s2=rnorm(3, 0.086, 0.005)
# s2=rgamma(3, 0.026, 1)
     alpha2.2=min(s2)

  s3=runif(1, 1.001,  2)
# s3=rnorm(3, 0.086, 0.005)
# s3=rgamma(3, 0.026, 1)
   alpha3.3=min(s3)

 #competition among species (interspecific competition)

  s4=runif(1, 1.001,  2)
# s4=rnorm(3, 0.086, 0.005)
# s4=rgamma(3, 0.026, 1)
  alpha1.2 = min(s4)

  s5=runif(1, 1.001,  2)
# s5=rnorm(3, 0.086, 0.005)
# s5=rgamma(3, 0.026, 1)
  alpha2.1 = min(s5)

    s6=runif(1, 1.001,  2)
# s6=rnorm(3, 0.086, 0.005)
# s6=rgamma(3, 0.026, 1)
  alpha1.3= min(s6)

  s7=runif(1, 1.001,  2)
# s7=rnorm(3, 0.086, 0.005)
# s7=rgamma(3, 0.026, 1)
    alpha3.1= min(s7)
```

```
   s8=runif(1, 1.001,  2)
# s8=rnorm(3, 0.086, 0.005)
# s8=rgamma(3, 0.026, 1)
  alpha2.3= min(s8)

  s9=runif(1, 1.001,  2)
# s9=rnorm(3, 0.086, 0.005)
# s9=rgamma(3, 0.026, 1)
     alpha3.2= min(s9)



 Govt.1.next = Govt.1  + (r.1*Govt.1 *(1-(alpha1.1*Govt.1  + alpha1.2*NSA.1 +
alpha1.3*Tp.1 )/K))*deltaT
 Govt.2.next = Govt.2  + (r.1*Govt.2 *(1-(alpha1.1*Govt.2  + alpha1.2*NSA.2 +
alpha1.3*Tp.2 )/K))*deltaT
 Govt.3.next = Govt.3  + (r.1*Govt.3 *(1-(alpha1.1*Govt.3  + alpha1.2*NSA.3 +
alpha1.3*Tp.3 )/K))*deltaT



 NSA.1.next = NSA.1 + (r.2*NSA.1*(1-(alpha2.1*Govt.1  + alpha2.2*NSA.1
+alpha2.3*Tp.1)/K))*deltaT
 NSA.2.next = NSA.2 + (r.2*NSA.2*(1-(alpha2.1*Govt.2  + alpha2.2*NSA.2
+alpha2.3*Tp.2)/K))*deltaT
 NSA.3.next = NSA.3 + (r.2*NSA.3*(1-(alpha2.1*Govt.3  + alpha2.2*NSA.3
+alpha2.3*Tp.3)/K))*deltaT


   Tp.1.next = Tp.1 + (r.3*Tp.1*(1-(alpha3.1*Govt.1  + alpha3.2*NSA.1
+alpha3.3*Tp.1)/K))*deltaT
 Tp.2.next = Tp.2 + (r.3*Tp.2*(1-(alpha3.1*Govt.2 + alpha3.2*NSA.2
+alpha3.3*Tp.2)/K))*deltaT
 Tp.3.next = Tp.3 + (r.3*Tp.3*(1-(alpha3.1*Govt.3 + alpha3.2*NSA.3
+alpha3.3*Tp.3)/K))*deltaT


 Govt.1 = Govt.1.next
 NSA.2= NSA.2.next
```

```
  Tp.3=Tp.3.next

  outdata = rbind(outdata,data.frame(time=t,Govt.1,NSA.2,Tp.3))

}
```