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Thesis

Subjectivity and temporariness

Abstract:

Non-reductivists about phenomenal consciousness believe that physical facts are insufficient to ground the existence of phenomenal consciousness. It will be argued that if one is going to be a non-reductivist, then one should not limit oneself to expanding one’s catalogue of the world’s basic features, as recommended in the paradigmatic non-reductivist approach developed by David Chalmers. One should rather take a realist stance towards subjectivity. A realist about subjectivity thinks that ...

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Oxford college:
Corpus Christi College
Department:
Humanities Division - Philosophy Faculty

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Role:
Supervisor
Publication date:
2011
Type of award:
BPhil
Level of award:
Bachelors
URN:
uuid:c5da9ca7-d2ba-4261-9b25-4ccdc4cab3af
Local pid:
ora:5501

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