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The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment

Abstract:

Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, suggesting that the issue of artificiali...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Not peer reviewed
Version:
Author's Original

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Research group:
Development economics
Department:
Social Sciences Division - Economics - Centre for the study of African Economies
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Oxford college:
St Antony's College
Department:
Social Sciences Division - Economics - Centre for the Study of African Economies
Role:
Author
Series:
CSAE working paper series
Publication date:
2008-01-01
URN:
uuid:c5b2293b-0313-4e7c-a31d-c6c8ea37947d
Local pid:
ora:2540

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