"Untir'd Spirits and Formal Constancy":
Shakespeare's Roman Plays and the
Stoic Tradition

Thomas Geoffrey Miles

Volume II:
Notes and Bibliography
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION

1 Julius Caesar, II.i.226-27, in William Shakespeare, The Complete Works, ed. Peter Alexander (1951). All quotations from Shakespeare are taken from this edition; any departures from it are bracketed. Speech prefixes are silently expanded. Line numbering in prose passages is counted from the last preceding marginal number.

2 I use the description "the Roman plays" in its traditional sense, to refer to the three "Plutarchan" plays: Julius Caesar, Antony and Cleopatra, and Coriolanus. Recent critics such as John W. Velz, "The Ancient World in Shakespeare: Authenticity or Anachronism? A Retrospect," ShS, 31 (1978), 1-12, and Robert S. Miola, Shakespeare's Rome (Cambridge, 1983), have argued strongly that the category should include Titus Andronicus and Cymbeline. Nevertheless, I feel that the Plutarchan plays can claim the unity of a kind of trilogy; Titus, and even more Cymbeline, are placed in a different category by their differences in date, genre, and source, and by their unhistorical, fairy-tale plots. More important for my purposes, Titus, though it anticipates much of the ambivalence of Shakespeare's view of Roman virtue, is not significantly concerned with the idea of constancy; and I believe the same is true (despite Miola's arguments, ch. 7) of Cymbeline.

[1] The critical background


9 Simmons: *Shakespeare's Pagan World: The Roman Tragedies* (1973;


10 Simmons, Pagan World, p. 7; Platt, pp. 87-88; Miola, p. 17.

11 The first point is made, for example, by Cantor (pp. 9-10); the second by Platt (pp. 87-88, 161-62), Stampfer (quotation from p. 17), Simmons (pp. 14-15); the third by Simmons (pp. 2-3, 31-35), Miola (pp. 37-39).


Studies of the influence on Shakespeare of the Stoicism of Seneca, Cicero, and Montaigne are cited in the relevant chapters below. Two general studies may be mentioned here: Joseph Chang, "Shakespeare and Stoicism," Diss. Wisconsin 1965 (DA, 25 [1965], pp. 5902-3A), stresses as I do the importance of knowledge and opinion in Stoic thought, but otherwise is not particularly concerned with the theme of constancy. I have not yet seen Gilles D. Monsarrat, Light from the Porch: Stoicism in English Renaissance Literature (Paris, 1984); according to Lois Potter’s review, ShS, 38 (1985), p. 233, it adopts a very rigorous definition of
"Stoicism" which virtually removes the Roman plays from consideration.

13 On Erasmus, see Anson, pp. 13-14; on Cicero and Montaigne, see Vawter, "Division," pp. 174-76 and 182-83. For the Montaigne phrase, see p. 150 below.

14 T. McAlindon, Shakespeare and Decorum (1973), who discusses Ant. in ch. 6, and Simmons, in his brief discussion of decorum in Coriolanus (Pagan World, pp. 33-42, 53-56), concentrate on the linguistic sense of the word rather than its association with constancy; see ch. 3, n. 81 below.

2] Constancy

15 "Steadfastness," of course, has the same root meaning as constantia: "standing firm, remaining in place."

16 JC III.i.60. Latin constare and consistere are virtual synonyms, and both derive ultimately from stare (to stand).

17 I am largely ignoring a third sense of "constancy": "Steadfastness of attachment to a person or cause; faithfulness, fidelity" (OED, "Constancy" 2). This sense, which I shall call "constancy (fidelity)," is important in Shakespeare (as witness the Sonnets), but it is almost entirely distinct from the Stoic senses I am dealing with, and to deal with it would involve considering a quite separate tradition of theories of love and friendship.

18 The sense "consistency" is implied in lines 1047-48 ("And she ay sad and constant as a wal, / Continuynge evere hire innocence overal"; compare 708-11, though the word "constant" is not there used); Griselda’s constancy is contrasted both with the fickle inconstancy of the populace (995-1001) and with irrational obstinacy (701-05) (The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer, ed. F. N. Robinson [2nd edn, 1957]).

19 Kaufmann & Ronan, p. 28 and notes.

20 See below, ch. 2, n. 9, and ch. 4, passim.


23 Barish, p. 18; cf. pp. 22-3.
This outline of Stoicism is based principally on A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (1974), ch. 4, pp. 107-209 (the most lucid summary), and R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean ([1910], rpt. New York, 1962), which brings out most clearly the central importance of the idea of consistency. I have also drawn on the works of Seneca and Cicero discussed in the following chapters, especially Cicero, De finibus, Books III and IV, and Academica, I.35-39, and on the works of Epictetus and others collected in Jason L. Saunders (ed.), Greek and Roman Philosophy after Aristotle, Readings in the History of Philosophy (New York, 1966), sec. 2. Other secondary works consulted include E. Vernon Arnold, Roman Stoicism (Cambridge, 1911); Edwyn Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics (Oxford, 1913); J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969); Oxford Classical Dictionary (cited as OCD), 2nd edn (1970), s.v. "Stoa (1)"; F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics (1975).


Long, pp. 146-49; p. 148 defines the precise distinctions between these three concepts.

Hicks, pp. 77, 10.

This assumption is made explicit by Seneca in one of his letters: see below, ch. 2, n. 24.

For a more detailed account of Stoic epistemology, see Long, pp. 123-31, and p. 55 below.

I regret the use, here and throughout, of sexist language, but phrases such as "the wise man" are so much a part of Stoic tradition that to avoid them would be not only awkward, but also misleading, in camouflaging the extent to which the tradition is bound up with ideas of "manliness," andreia, virtus.


Long, pp. 206-7; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, IV.6.

Long, p. 177.

Long, p. 213-16 (on Panaetius), 233-34.


Rom. III.iii.55-57; Ado V.i.35-38.
For the sake of exposition I have somewhat exaggerated the differences between Seneca and Cicero. In fact their doctrines overlap: Cicero (especially in the Tusculans) could have given Shakespeare most of the "Senecan" Stoic doctrines on death, the passions, and so on; Seneca in De tranquillitate presents a more "Ciceronian" form of moderate Stoicism, and in Letter 120 clearly expounds the idea of decorum. The differences between them, though real, are in emphasis and tone.

Manual 17, in Saunders, Greek and Roman Philosophy, p. 137.


Hicks, p. 152.

T. W. Baldwin, William Shakspere’s Small Latine & Lesse Greeke (Urbana, Ill., 1944), II.581-610; see p. 54 and notes below.

See below, ch. 5, sec. 3, and ch. 6. "Neostoicism" is variously spelt (I prefer this form on the analogy of "Neoplatonism"), and variously defined. Some writers confusingly use the word to refer to (ancient) "Late Stoicism"; I use it exclusively to refer to the "Christian Stoicism" or "Stoic revival" of the 16th and early 17th centuries.

TGV V.iv.110-11.

The passage is discussed in more detail on pp. 186-87 below.

Two points of organisation may require defence. Chronologically, Cicero should precede Seneca, but it was more convenient to deal with Seneca’s more dogmatic Stoicism before Cicero’s critique of Stoic ethics, and with Seneca's "constancy" (which is the traditional kind of constancy and has been discussed by earlier Shakespeare critics) before Cicero’s decorum (the relation of which to the idea of constancy has not been fully recognised). Similarly, I do not mean to dispute the traditional dating of Antony to c. 1607 and Coriolanus to c. 1608; but Antony takes the theme of constancy further than does the later play, and, since the two were written closely together (and, I believe, probably planned as a pair), I have taken the liberty of dealing with them in the order more convenient for the development of my thesis.
Chapter Two

SENECA AND THE CONSTANCY
OF THE STOIC HERO

[1] Introduction

1 Sandbach, p. 149.


3 On Seneca's thought, apart from the general works on Stoicism cited in ch. 1, n. 24, I have used Miriam T. Griffin, Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford, 1976); Norman T. Pratt, Seneca's Drama (Chapel Hill, 1983), esp. ch. 3 ("Philosophy"), and Anna Lydia Motto, Seneca Sourcebook: Guide to the Thought of Lucius Annaeus Seneca in the Extant Prose Works (Amsterdam, 1970). Gordon Braden's excellent Renaissance Tragedy and the Senecan Tradition reached me too late to make use of it, but his analysis of the contradictions in Senecan Stoicism, though centred on the concept of "anger" rather than "constancy," is very similar to mine.


5 Palmer, Seneca's "De Remediis", p. 1; Baldwin, II.610. E. A. Sonnenschein, "Shakespeare and Stoicism," Univ. Rev., 1 (1905), 23-41, suggests some possible Senecan borrowings. Alice Harmon, "How Great was Shakespeare's Debt to Montaigne?", MLA, 57 (1942), 988-1008, argues that Shakespeare derived his Stoic sententiae from Seneca and others by way of anthologies and commonplace books. The only translations of Seneca's prose before 1614 were Whyttynton's version of the dubiously Senecan De remediis fortuitorum (1547; STC 22216; reprinted in Palmer) and Golding's of De beneficiis (1578; STC 22215).


7 According to Palmer, Seneca's influence "began to be felt intensively among the Elizabethans in the period from 1595 to 1620" and was at its height for the following twenty-five years (pp. 1-2); Ross refers to a "cult of Seneca" at this period (p. 146).


- Brev. De brevitate vitae
- Const. De constantia sapientis
- Ep. Ad Lucilium epistulae morales
- Ira De ira
- Prov. De providentia
- Tranq. De tranquillitate animi.


9 Examples from De constantia sanientis - apart from the regular translation of firmitas as "constancy" (e.g. 3.4, p. 660; 6.2, p. 662) - include "a more constant course" for virilem viam (1.1, p. 658), "one only man remained quiet and constant" for uni homini pax fuit (6.2, p. 662), "a willing and constant heart" for aequo placidique animo (8.3, p. 665), "virtue, [of] constancy and patience" for virtute ... dura tolerandi (10.4, p. 667), "constancy and greatness of his mind" for magnanimitatem (11.1, p. 667).
[2] Constantia sapientis

10 Lodge, p. 657; Sénèque "De constantia sapientis": Commentaire (Paris, 1953), p. 32.

11 Const. 1.1, p. 658; all subsequent quotations in this section are from De constantia sapientis unless otherwise noted. The phrase translated by Lodge as "above any humane miserie" is extra omnem teli iactum ("beyond the reach of any missile"). The combination of the images of height and of missiles recalls Tit. II.i.1-2 ("Now climbeth Tamora Olympus´top, / Safe out of Fortune´s shot...") - though the echo is ironic, since Tamora is no Stoic but a minion of Fortune.

12 2.1, p. 661.

13 3.1, 3.3, p. 660.

14 3.5, p. 660-61.

15 4.1-2, p. 661.

16 6.3, p. 663.

17 5.6, 6.2, p. 662.

18 6.6, p. 663; Ant. V.ii.3, 29-30. (The phrase "those two imposters," which precisely sums up the Stoic view, is from Kipling´s "If.")


20 Cor. V.iv.1; 6.8, p. 663.

21 V.iv.24-25.

22 According to Hereward T. Price, "'Like Himself,'" RES, 16 (1940), 178-81, the phrase derives from "worthy of himself", and implies "being what he is, he will be especially fine or great or noble" (p. 180). Price does not discuss its connotations of role-playing; nor does Brower, who alludes to the phrase throughout Hero and Saint (e.g. pp. 121, 221, 233, 366), though one passage (p. 233) implies he is aware of them. Shakespeare's consciousness of them is suggested by his witty exploitation of the phrase in H5, Prologue 5, in a context which is both heroic and theatrical: if the part of Henry V was played by a real king, he would really appear "like himself." Massinger plays similarly with the phrase in The Roman Actor, I.i.51-58 (The Plays and Poems of Philip Massinger, ed. Philip Edwards and Colin Gibson, Vol. III, Oxford, 1976), where the words "'Tis spoken like yourself" are addressed to an actor who proposes to show in real life the courage of the stage heroes he plays.
23 Ep. 31.8, p. 224.

24 Ep. 20.2, 5, p. 201-2 (that is, "always to will X and always to reject Y"). It is unnecessary, Seneca adds, to specify that the "one thing" should be good, since "One and the same thing cannot alwaies please any man, except it bee right."

25 Ep. 35.4, p. 228; cf. Ham. I.iii.78, and Harold Jenkins's note ad loc. in the Arden edn (1982).

26 Lodge, p. 228. "Conveniently" translates Latin *convenienter* (appropriately, consistently), echoing Cicero's use of *convenientia* as a translation of *homologia* (Fin. III.21; for Cicero references see ch. 3, n. 1).

27 I have paraphrased this passage, since Lodge's free translation blurs the point.

28 Ep. 120.18-22, pp. 480-81 (quoting Horace, Satires I.3).

29 See Griffin, pp. 341-42. Panaetius' concepts of decorum and *personae* are discussed in ch. 3, secs 4 and 6 below.

30 Ep. 67.10, p. 289.

[3] The Stoic as god


32 Const. 8.2, p. 665.

33 Prov. 1.5, p. 499; Cor., V.iv.26-27.

34 Prov. 6.6, p. 508.

35 Ep. 73.11-13, 15-16, p. 299.

36 Lodge, p. 305.


38 Lodge, p. 499.

39 JC, I.ii.115-16; III.i.74; Cor., V.iii.150, V.iv.26-27.
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40 Ham. III.ii.68-70.

41 Shakespeare uses the pun in Taming of the Shrew, when Tranio urges Lucentio, who is proposing to devote himself to ethical philosophy, "Let's be no Stoics nor no stocks, I pray" (I.i.31). The casual joke is, arguably, developed into a major theme in Love's Labour's Lost.

42 Ep. 75.11-12, p. 314 ("improbable" means "blameworthy" [Lat. improbabiles], a sense not given in OED).

43 Ep. 75.12-14; Ira, I.16.7, p. 524.

44 Brev. 10.1, p. 684.

45 Ep. 85.9, p. 348-49.


47 Ira I.12.1-2, p. 520. Compare Macb. I.vii.46-47: "I dare do all that may become a man; / Who dares do more is none."

48 Clem. II.4.2, 5.5-6, p. 608.

49 JC II.i.20-21; I.ii.167; disturbance by emotions, e.g. I.ii.39-47; II.i.61-69, 237-55.

50 JC II.i.172, 175-77.

51 Const. 10.4, p. 665.

52 Const. 16.1-2, p. 668. I have altered Lodge's translation of premit vulnus as "dissembleth his wound," which obscures the point of the comparison.

53 JC IV.iii.192-93.

[5] The ethic of poses

54 Prov., 2.7-12, p. 500-1.

55 Ira. IV.i.38.

56 Prov. 2.4, p. 500.

57 Prov. 4.2-3, p. 503-4.
58 Clem. II.5 (quoted p. 33 above), Ep. 120 (quoted p. 26 above).


62 Const. 19.4, p. 674; Prov., 5.1, p. 506.

63 Tranc. 16.4, p. 653.

64 Cor. V.iii.74-75.


65 As we can see from Lodge's anxious marginal protests whenever Seneca discusses it: e.g. "this ... is but a Paradox of the Stoickes, refuted expressly by Nature, by the law of Nations, and condemned by the expres word of God" (p. 500).

66 Ant. IV.xv.87; Macb. V.viii.1; cf. Ham. V.ii.332-34 (Horatio).


68 Prov. 6.7, p. 509; Ira 3.15, p. 565; Ep. 77.6, p. 321.

69 Rist, pp. 247-9, takes this view; Griffin, ch. 11, argues that Seneca is basically orthodox despite his rhetorical extravagance, and that he is preaching not in praise of death but against the fear of death.

70 Griffin, p. 385.


72 Brev. 7.3, p. 681: "all our life wee must learne in the end how to dye."

73 Ep. 77.6, p. 321.

75 Ep. 70.6, p. 293-94; cf. Ep. 65.22, p. 280.


77 Ant. V.ii.6.

78 JC V.i.100-112; the passage is discussed in more detail below, pp. 90-92 and 215-16. My total of suicides includes Enobarbus (note Ant. IV.vi.35-36) and, more controversially, Coriolanus. The latter clearly provokes the Volscians to kill him, but it is debatable whether he does so deliberately (as, e.g., Alan Howard played the scene in the BBC TV version) or in unthinking rage.

79 JC I.iii.93-97 (cf. Ep. 26.10, quoted pp. 40-41 above); Ant. IV.xv.86; V.ii.4-5; JC III.i.102-4, V.v.41-42.

80 JC V.i.112, V.iii.34-35; Ant. V.ii.209-25, IV.xiv.94-95.

[7] Seneca's tragedies: amoral constancy and the Herculean hero

81 The influence of Senecan drama upon Shakespeare and Elizabethan drama in general has been exhaustively discussed (see n. 5 above). I shall here deal solely with the theme of constancy in the plays, leaving aside the more general problems of Seneca's influence on the form, techniques, and themes of Shakespearean tragedy. My view of the plays is indebted to C. J. Herington, "Senecan Tragedy," Arion, 5 (1966), 422-71.

82 Pratt, Seneca's Drama, pp. 12, 77-81.

83 Shakespeare may have drawn upon Thyestes in Titus Andronicus, though the evidence is not compelling: see J. C. Maxwell, Introd. to the Arden edn (3rd edn, 1961), pp. xxxi-xxxii.

84 Thyestes 442-43; the translation is Jasper Heywood's, in the Newton collection, Vol. I, p. 70. Future references to Thyestes (abbreviated as Thy.) will give Loeb line references followed by page references to Newton.

85 Thy. 453-54, 470, pp. 70-71 (cf. 3H6 III.i.59-65).

86 Thy. 421-22, 424-25, p. 69-70; 920-37, p. 87.

87 Thy. 696-705, p. 79; JC I.iii.3-4. Shakespeare may have been recalling Thyestes, since Cassius later in the scene (46-56) defies the deos minantes in a way much like Atreus and just as morally ambiguous.

88 Medea 159-63 (Loeb translation; John Studley's version, in the
Newton collection, is inaccurate and misleading.

89 Medea, 164-67, 176, 171. Brower (pp. 159-64) analyses Clytemnestra in Agamemnon in similar terms, as showing "Stoic consistency for non-Stoic ends" (p. 164), and suggests that this "ambiguous caricature of a noble Stoic attitude" shows how Seneca's rhetoric could pervert his philosophy (pp. 162, 159).


91 Seneca's authorship of Hercules Oetaeus (abbreviated as HO) has been disputed, but there is "a growing tendency" to accept it as authentic (Pratt, Seneca's Drama, p. 28 and notes), and it was so accepted in the Renaissance.


93 HO 151-55, 162-70 (Loeb trans.); cf. Cor. II.ii.101-20, and (with "whate'er he plans to overcome...") IV.vii.23-24 ("does achieve as soon / As draw his sword"), V.iv.25-26 ("What he bids be done is finish'd with his bidding").

94 HO 32-33. "Ercles' vein," MND I.ii.34; Bottom's audition speech clearly parodies some lines of this speech in Studley's version (and "Hercles" is a form Studley uses); see Harold F. Brooks' note ad loc. in the Arden edn (1979).

95 HO 1279-82; "shirt of Nessus," Ant. IV.xii.43-47. Shakespeare may be drawing on HO here: the image of lodging Lichas on the horns of the moon is more like Seneca's in astra missus fertur (817) than anything in the corresponding passage in Ovid.

96 HO 1207, 1479-82.

97 HO 1713-14, 1740-43, 1747-48. Waith calls this passage "a locus classicus of Stoic fortitude" (p. 37).

98 See n. 5 above; the phrases quoted are those of Waith, Wells, and Craig respectively.
[8] Shakespeare and Senecan constancy

99 Cor. V.2.105-6; Ant. V.ii.238; JC III.i.60, 74.

100 Cor. V.iii.150, 40-42.

101 This statement is not necessarily true of Stoicism as a whole, which contains conflicting public-spirited and quietistic tendencies; it is, of course, an oversimplification of Seneca's position, but, I think, essentially true. The complex question of Seneca's attitude towards political life is well analysed by Griffin, ch. 10, pp. 315-66.

Chapter Three
CICERO AND THE ROMAN ACTORS

[1] Introduction

1 Latin quotations and references are taken from the Loeb editions of Cicero's works, as follows: Academica, in De natura deorum, Academica, with an English trans. by H. Rackham (2nd edn, 1951); De finibus bonorum et malorum [abbreviated as Fin.], with an English trans. by H. Rackham (1914); De officiis [abbreviated as Off.], with an English trans. by Walter Miller (1913); De oratore, with an English trans. by E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, Vol. I (2nd edn, 1948); De re publica, De legibus, with an English trans. by Clinton Walker Keyes (1928); Letters to Atticus, with an English trans. by E. O. Winstedt, Vol. III (1918); Pro Murena, in In Catilinam I-IV, Pro Murena, Pro Sulla, Pro Flacco, with an English trans. by C. Macdonald (Cambridge, Mass., 1976); Tusculan Disputations [abbreviated as Tusc.], with an English trans. by J. E. King (2nd edn, 1945). References are to book and section (the marginal numbers), not book and chapter.

Translations of De officiis are from Marcus Tullius Ciceroes three bookes of duties, to Marcus his sonne, trans. Nicholas Grimalde (2nd edn, with parallel Latin text, 1558; STC 5282). Translations of Tusculan Disputations are from Those fyve cuestiones, which Marke Tullye Cicero, disputed in his Manor of Tusculanum; Written afterwardes by him, in as manye bookes, to his frende, and familiar Brutus, trans. John Dolman (1561; STC 5317). Other translations are taken from the Loeb editions.

pp. 23-30; Long, p. 211; Palmer, Seneca's "De Remediis", esp. pp. 17-18; Geoffrey Bullough (ed.), Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare, Vol. V: The Roman Plays (1964), pp. 6-7 ("Insofar as Tudor England had any sense of Roman values it was owing largely to Cicero"). Baldwin, II.581-610, discusses Cicero's importance in sixteenth-century English education. For the comparison of De officiis and the Bible, note Roger Ascham, quoted in Baldwin, II.585-86, and Grimalde, "Epistell to the reader," sig. Q2: "so rightely pointing out the pathway to all vertue: as none can bee righter, onely Scripture excepted."

3 Baldwin, pp. 601-10, demonstrates Shakespeare's knowledge of De officiis in a somewhat roundabout way, by arguing that the Duke's speech on death in Measure for Measure and Hamlet's "To be or not to be" soliloquy draw upon passages in Tusculans I in the original Latin (not Dolman's translation). (See also Marion H. Additiongton, "Shakespeare and Cicero," N&Q, 165 [1933], 116-18; I accept this proposed source, though I will not discuss it further.) If Shakespeare studied the Tusculans, which were normally prescribed only in addition to De officiis and the shorter works, he "had pretty certainly" studied the others previously (p. 601). Among possible specific debts to De officiis Baldwin (p. 596) cites 2H6 IV.i.108 ("Bargulus, the strong Illyrian pirate") but sets it aside on the grounds that 2H6 is of uncertain authorship; since most modern critics agree that the Henry VI plays are wholly Shakespearian, and since Shakespeare is unlikely to have encountered this scrap of information elsewhere, this evidence is, I believe, more conclusive than Baldwin suggests. On Shakespeare's possible acquaintance with Grimalde's translation, see p. 585; I have followed his suggestion in quoting from the 1558 edition with parallel text.

[2] Stoic and sceptic: Cicero's debate with the Stoics

4 Vawter, "Division," p. 174-77 and notes (n. 14, p. 194); his discussion covers much the same ground as mine in this section, but comes to quite different conclusions.


6 Douglas, p. 143. The New Academy nominally descended from Plato's Academy, but emphasised the scepticism inherent in the technique of Socratic dialogue, while abandoning Plato's positive dogmas. It must be distinguished from the confusingly named "Old Academy" founded by
Cicero's contemporary Antiochus of Ascalon, which claimed to return to
the original teachings of Plato, and taught an eclectic mixture of
Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic doctrines. On the Academics, see
Douglas, pp. 142-44; Long, pp. 88-106, 222-29 (on Antiochus); Bevan,
Lecture 4.

7 Fin. V.76. Cicero follows the "probabilism" of Carneades and of
his teacher Philo of Larissa, rather than the more thorough-going
scepticism of Arcesilaus, the founder of the New Academy. His Academic
scepticism must be distinguished from the absolute scepticism of the
Pyrrhonians (see pp. 156-57 below), who reject "probability" and claim
that all beliefs are quite arbitrary. Cicero discusses these
epistemological questions in the Academica.

8 Tusc. V.83; compare V.32-33, where Cicero jokingly refuses to be
bound by constantia (consistency) with what he has said elsewhere.

9 Tusc. II.5, sigs I3-V-4r.

10 Off. I.18, sig. A8-V.

11 JC I.iii.34-35. This point is made by Vawter in "After Their
Fashion"; however, he limits its significance by relating it to Cicero's
criticisms of Stoic views of fate and divination, rather than the wider
question of the difficulty of making moral judgements and decisions on
the basis of external observations.

12 The title may be translated "Views of the Nature of the Chief
Good and Evil." I do not wish to suggest (as Vawter does, "Division",
p. 174) that Shakespeare knew De finibus, which is highly technical and
was not translated into English in his lifetime.

13 Fin. III.42.

14 Fin. IV.30-31; the phrase is from R. A. Foakes, "An Approach to
Julius Caesar," SQ, 5 (1954), 259-70 (270), summing up (without
reference to Stoicism) the flaw of Shakespeare's Romans.

15 Fin. IV.23; Seneca, Const. 3.

16 Fin. IV.19-23 (21).

17 Fin. IV.52-53; IV.7.

18 Fin. IV.26-33 (26).

19 Fin. IV.34-36 (36).

20 Fin. IV.40-41, 63-68 (68).
21 Cicero makes similar criticisms in his speech Pro Murena (60-67), in which (wittily but unfairly, as he admits at Fin. IV.74) he makes fun of Cato’s Stoicism as the cranky views of a naive ivory-tower academic.

22 This is the position of Antiochus, the founder of the "Old" Academy, in his synthesis of Stoic and Aristotelian views; Douglas, pp. 145-46; Rackham, introd. to Fin., pp. xxiv-xxv.

23 Fin. V.84-85.

24 Vawter, "Division," who argues that Cicero’s position is simply anti-Stoic, completely ignores the development of the argument in Fin. V.

25 Tusc. V.1, sig. Y6V.
26 Tusc. V.2, sig. Y7r (Dolman’s version omits the idea of praying: did he perhaps feel its implications were anti-Christian?).
27 Tusc. V.2-4, sigs Y7r-8r.
28 Tusc. V.82, sig. C[C]8r.
29 Douglas, pp. 146-47 (146); Cor. V.iii.35-36.
30 Long refers to the "humane Stoicism" of De officiis (p. 321), and Douglas to the "moderate popular Stoicism" of the Tusculans (pp. 147-48).

[3] Roman virtue and the public temper

31 Tusc. I.2, sigs BlV-2r.
32 Off. III.105, sig. V8r.

33 De re publica, VI.13. The Somnium is part of the last book of De re publica, but survived independently through the middle ages and was included in the standard school collection of Cicero’s shorter works (Baldwin, pp. 581, 590).

34 Tusc. II.3-4, sigs I2v-I3r.
35 Off. I.3-4.

36 Shakespeare refers to it (or perhaps to Orator, as Baldwin thinks, II.63-64) at Tit. IV.i.14.

37 De oratore, 10.
"Cato" implies this when he slightingly calls these arguments of Cicero's *popularia* (Fin. IV.24).

39 Tusc. V.104, sig. D[D]8\textsuperscript{v}.

40 Off. I.99, sig. F4\textsuperscript{r}.

41 Tusc. II.45-46, sigs L6\textsuperscript{v}-7\textsuperscript{r}.

42 Tusc. III.2-4, sigs N1\textsuperscript{v}-3\textsuperscript{r}.

43 *JC* V.iii.67, II.i.178-80 (my emphasis), I.ii.305; *Cor.* III.iii.122-27 and passim, II.i.226.

[4] **Officia**

44 On Panaetius, see Long, pp. 211-16; Arnold, pp. 100-4.

45 Off. I.8; III.13-16, sigs P3\textsuperscript{v}-P4\textsuperscript{r}. All subsequent quotations from Cicero, unless otherwise noted, are from *De officiis*.


47 The analogy, of course, must not be pushed too far: Stoicism, unlike Calvinism, teaches that you can be "saved" by your own efforts.

48 Douglas, p. 149; Hicks, p. 93; Long, pp. 188-89.

49 Hicks, p. 93.

50 Long, p. 188. Cicero explains and defends his use of the word in *Letters to Atticus*, XVI.11 and XVI.14 ("Don't we say the officium of consuls, of the Senate, of generals?"). Compare Seneca's use of the word *dignitas* (see pp. 42-43 above).

51 I.19.

[5] **Greatness of courage**

52 I.61, sigs D3\textsuperscript{v}-D4\textsuperscript{r}.

53 *Cor.* II.ii.82; Tusc. II.43.

54 I.62-4, sigs D4\textsuperscript{r}-D5\textsuperscript{r}.

55 I.65, sigs D5\textsuperscript{r-v}.

56 *Cor.* I.x.38, I.i.32.
57 I.66-67, sigs D5r-D6r (reading "manly" for "manny").

58 I.70, sigs D7r-v.

59 I.72, sig. D6v.

[6] Decorum

60 I.14, sigs A6v-A7r.

61 Long, pp. 215-16.

62 I.94, sig. F1v.

63 I.96, sig. F2v.


65 I.97, sig. F3r.

66 I.107, sig. F7r.

67 I.97-98, sig. F3r-v.

68 I.100-6.

69 I.98, sig. F3v.

70 Oth. V.i.19; JC V.v.73-75. An even closer analogy is Ciceron's statement of the same idea in Tusc. III.30-31, which makes it explicit that the health and beauty of the soul, as of the body, arises from the harmonious mixing [temperatio] of its various parts.

71 I.110, sigs F8v-G1r.

72 I.111, sig. G1r.

73 I.112, sig. G1v. The ambiguity of constantia is well illustrated by this passage: Grimalde translates it as "stedfastnesse," Miller and Higginbotham as "consistency"; both ideas are probably present.

74 See pp. 42-43 above, and the discussion by Griffin there cited (n. 76).

75 I.113-14, sig. G2r.
Notes to Chapter Three

76 I.114, sigs G2r–v.
77 I.115; I.117-18, sig. G4r.
78 I.120-21.
79 I.119, sig. G4v; I.120, sig. G5r (closely echoed at I.125, sic. G7r).

[7] Shakespeare and Ciceronian decorum


81 McAlindon concentrates on decorum as a linguistic principle, decorum as cosmic order, and the moral and analogical relation between the two; he touches only briefly (pp. 11-12) on its connection with "constancy," and almost ignores the idea of role-playing which I regard as central to Cicero's concept. Dealing only with Antony of the Roman plays (ch. 6; see ch. 10, n. 36 below), he does not note the special importance of decorum for Shakespeare's Romans. Simmons' discussion of decorum in Coriolanus (Pagan World, pp. 38-42, 53-56) similarly concentrates on the linguistic and rhetorical sense of decorum, relating it to the appropriateness or "propriety" of public opinions and honours to their subjects; he does not relate it to Stoic constancy, or to the other Roman plays.

82 Jc I.ii.222; V.iv.25; I.ii.64-65.
83 Cor. III.i.15-16; III.i.105-6, 111-23; V.iii.33.
84 Ant. II.ii.240; I.i.49.
Chapter Four
PLUTARCH’S CONSTANCY TRIPTYCH

[1] Introduction

1 The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romanes, Compared Together by that Grave Learned Philosopher and Historiographer, Plutarke of Chaeronea, trans. Sir Thomas North (1579; 2nd edn, 1595); hereafter cited as North. There is some probability that this is the edition Shakespeare used (Philip Brockbank, Introd. to Coriolanus, Arden edn [1976], p. 29). For the Greek text and modern translation I have used Plutarch’s Lives, with an English trans. by Bernadotte Perrin, Loeb Classical Library, Vols IV (1916), VI (1918), and XI (1920); for Amyot’s version, Les vies des hommes illustres, Grecs & Romains, comparees l’une avec l’autre par Plutarque de Chaeronee, trans. Jacques Amyot (2nd edn, Paris, 1565). References are to page number in North, followed by chapter and section in Loeb. I have also consulted Shakespeare’s Plutarch, ed. T. J. B. Spencer (Harmondsworth, 1964).


3 I shall not deal in detail with "The Life of Julius Caesar," which I believe, like Spencer (Shakespeare’s Plutarch, p. 14), influenced Shakespeare less than the other three lives. Plutarch (or North) does not associate Caesar with constancy, stressing rather his resilience and adaptability; Shakespeare’s figure, with his Senecan poses and preoccupation with his public image, owes little to the "Life" and seems to me to be designed more as a reflection of Brutus.


5 Plutarch wrote several essays against Stoicism, which are collected in Plutarch’s Moralia, Vol. XIII, Part II, with an English trans. by Harold Cherniss, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), and is thus a contributor to the "anti-Stoic" tradition (see also Russell, pp. 68-69); but these attitudes do not really emerge in the "Lives" which Shakespeare used.

[2] Constant Brutus

6 It is somewhat misleading to speak of Brutus’ "Stoic" virtue; as Plutarch makes clear ("Brutus" 2.1-2), he was an adherent of the "Old Academy" of Antiochus (see ch. 3, n. 6 above) - which, however, was very close to Stoicism in its ethical doctrines.
Notes to Chapter Four

7 North, p. 1053 ("Brutus" 1.1-2); cf. Amyot, p. 686r.

8 On the rumour that Caesar was Brutus' father (which Shakespeare suppresses), see "Brutus" 5.2.

9 North, p. 1066 ("Brutus" 29.2); in the Greek, he is apathēs with respect to anger, pleasure or greed.

10 North, p. 1055 ("Brutus" 6.4-5); cf. Amyot, p. 687v.

11 North, p. 1056 ("Brutus" 7.4). This "constant" is North's; Amyot has la force de son courace (p. 688v), translating Plutarch's alken and thumon (both meaning spirit, courage). The effect is a shift in meaning from courage to moral principle.

12 North, p. 1069, on "Brutus" 35 (cf. JC IV.iii.1-28).

13 North, p. 1058 ("Brutus" 8.1).

14 North, pp. 1058-59 ("Brutus" 8.4-5).

15 North, p. 1060 ("Brutus" 15.4-5).

16 North, p. 1059 ("Brutus" 14.4); North's side-note underlines "The wonderfull constancie of the conspirators."

17 North, p. 1060 ("Brutus" 15.6).

18 Shakespeare (deliberately, or misled by North's confused version of the passage) conflates two versions of Portia's death in Plutarch (North, p. 1078; "Brutus" 53.4-5): in one she killed herself after Brutus' death; in the other she died earlier, of illness complicated by depression. Shakespeare's version suggests that Portia, "Impatient" (JC IV.iii.150), i.e. lacking in Stoic patience, kills herself "for fear of what might fall" - a course Brutus calls "cowardly and vile" (V.i.103-5, my emphasis).

19 North, p. 1063 ("Brutus" 23.2). This incident may have helped to suggest Brutus' response to the Poet in IV.iii: in each case a character's self-control under extreme emotional pressure is finally shattered by a trivial provocation.

20 N, p. 1063 ("Brutus" 23.4). These two references to constancy derive from Amyot.

21 North, pp. 1071-72 ("Brutus" 40.4-5). "Constantly" comes from Amyot (p. 698v), and, in conjunction with "patiently," gives a Stoic turn to Plutarch's adeos (fearlessly).

22 E.g. MacCallum, pp. 184-85. Amyot's version is correct but
capable of being misread.

23 J.C. V.i.100-14. Shakespeare's sharp awareness of dealing here with a pagan philosophy is suggested by his removal of North's Christian language: the suggestion of an afterlife in "an other more glorious world" (a misinterpretation by North) is replaced by an "everlasting farewell," and "God" (which is in the Greek) is replaced by a vague "some high powers."

24 Ham. III.i.57-60.

25 North, p. 1075 ("Brutus" 46.3).

26 North, p. 1076 ("Brutus" 50.2-3). Plutarch's phrases are tes doxes anaxion (unworthy of his reputation) and axios ... eautou (worthy of himself).

27 The only explicit criticism in the "Life" is the condemnation of a military atrocity (North, p. 1075; "Brutus" 46.1), and this is immediately "wisely excused by Plutarke" (in the words of North's side-note) with the reflection that Antony and Octavius did worse things but were judged by laxer moral standards.

28 North, p. 1079 ("Comparison of Dion and Brutus" 3.3).

29 North, p. 1079 ("Comparison" 3.5).

30 Simmons, Pagan World, p. 76. My conception of Shakespeare's relationship to Plutarch as an exploration of Plutarch's unresolved paradoxes is indebted to Simmons, though my specific interpretation is rather different.

[3] Inconstant Antony

31 North, p. 975 ("Antony" 14.3).

32 North, p. 1000 ("Antony" 46.4).

33 North, p. 985 ("Antony" 36.1).

34 North, p. 976 ("Antony" 17.2-3); cf. Ant. I.iv.56-71.

35 What Plutarch says (in the Loeb translation) is "But it was his nature to rise to his highest level when in an evil plight, and he was most like a good and true man [homoiotatos en agathoi] when he was unfortunate." (Amyot's phrase is veritablement vertueux, p. 635v.) North blurs Plutarch's neat antithesis (that Antony was best when things were worst), and substitutes the Stoic overtones of "patience" and "constant."
[4] Obstinate Coriolanus


37 North, p. 236 ("Corio." 1.4); cf. Cor. II.ii.81-83. This is one of the very few passages in which Plutarch acknowledges that moral standards differ in different cultures, that "our virtues / Lie in th'interpretation of the time" (Cor. IV.vii.49-50); the point is made by Russell, p. 103.

38 North blurs Plutarch’s point that Martius’ vices are simply his virtues viewed from a different angle. The passage "Yet men marveling ... was disliked," is translated in Loeb as: "They did indeed look with admiration upon his insensibility to pleasures, toils, and mercenary gains, to which they gave the names of self-control, fortitude, and justice; but in their intercourse with him as a fellow-citizen they were offended by it as ungracious, burdensome, and arrogant" (my emphasis).

39 North, p. 235 ("Corio" 1.2); Cor. IV.i.32.

40 North, p. 243 ("Corio." 15.3-4).

41 North, p. 243.

42 North, p. 244 ("Corio." 17.3).

43 North, pp. 246-47 ("Corio." 21.1-2); side-note, p. 246. North's "good hap" is an error; Amyot has infortune (p. 154F).

44 North, p. 254 ("Corio." 34.2).

45 North, p. 259 ("Comparison of Alcibiades and Coriolanus" 4.5).

46 Cor. IV.vii.42-45 (my emphasis). The echo of this word has not, I think, been previously noted.

47 Cor. III.ii.41. Brockbank, p. 28, makes a similar point.
Chapter Five
THE AMBIVALENT TRADITION:
STOICISM IN THE RENAISSANCE


[1] Stoicism, Christianity, and Augustine

2 Hugo, p. 47*.

3 Verbeke, pp. vii, 45 (quotation); Wenley, p. 123; Ross, p. 124.

4 Zanta, pp. 112-5; Wenley, p. 125.

5 Tertullian, De anima 20, quoted by Hugo, p. 50*.


7 Augustine, XIV.2, p. 548.

8 Augustine, XIX.4, p. 852.

9 Augustine, XIX.4, pp. 854-55.

10 Augustine, XIX.4, pp. 855-87.

11 Augustine, XIV.9, pp. 564-5.

12 Augustine, XIV.6.
Augustine, XIV.9, p. 561; cf. IX.5.

Augustine, XIV.9, p. 566.

Augustine, V.12, p. 197.

Augustine, V.18, p. 211. Simmons, Pagan World, sees these passages of Augustine as central to Shakespeare's view of Rome (e.g. p. 18). Although I am indebted to Simmons, I see Shakespeare as closer to Montaigne than Augustine, sceptically inquiring rather than dogmatic, and exploring the contradictions within the Roman ethos rather than condemning it for its failure to conform to Christianity.

[2] The humanists and eclectic Stoicism

Verbeke, pp. 1-19, documents the "largely unconscious" (p. 1) presence of Stoicism in medieval thought, and the use of Cicero and Seneca by thinkers like Aquinas, Abelard, and John of Salisbury.

First editions: Cicero's De officiis, Mainz, 1465; Seneca's tragedies, Ferrara, c. 1474-84; his moral works, Naples, 1475; Epictetus' complete works, ed. Trincavelli, 1435; Marcus Aurelius, ed. Xylander, Zurich, 1558. Details are from John Edwin Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, Vol. II (Cambridge, 1908), pp. 103-5; Long, pp. 238-39.


Haydn, p. 55 and passim; Long, p. 238.


Haydn, p. 53-4 (53); Palmer, Seneca's "De Remediis", pp. 2, 17-18.


Governour, III.19.


The Handbook of the Militant Christian, in The Essential Erasmus,


29 The Praise of Folie (see ch. 2, n. 2), ch. 30 (pp. 39-40). Anson, pp. 13-14, discusses this passage, but does not note that the images Erasmus is playing with are themselves Stoic.

30 Hugo, p. 57*.

31 Calvin, Commentary, on I.3, II.4, II.5.


33 Shr. I.1.31. Braden, p. 240, has a useful note on this pun.

[3] The rise of Neostoicism

34 For bibliographical details of these Neostoic works, see ch. 6, nn. 1-5, and ch. 7, n. 1.

35 Levi, p. 54.

36 Palmer, Seneca's "De Remediis", pp. 24-25.


38 Levi, p. 55. As well as the works by Lipsius and Du Vair, he cites an anonymous treatise De la constance requise aux afflictions des misères de ce temps (Paris, 1589).


40 Croll, p. 120.

41 Kirk, Introd. to Lipsius, pp. 20-23; the counter-argument is made by Hoopes, p. 135; see also Zanta, pp. 47-73.
Notes to Chapter Five


43 Palmer, Seneca's "De Remediis", p. 19; see also Kirk, Introd. to Lipsius, pp. 13-30, on the English translation of Stoic works.

44 Clarence Beverley Hilberry, Ben Jonson's Ethics in Relation to Stoic and Humanistic Ethical Thought (Chicago, 1933); but Patrick, in Croll, p. 25, notes that Jonson got his borrowings from Lipsius at second hand, though he "may well" have also read him directly.


50 Baker, p. 302. See the essays by Craig, Ure, and Wells cited in ch. 2, n. 4 above, and discussed on p. 50.

51 Barish, p. 104.


53 "Stoicism, Ethics and Learning in Seventeenth-Century England,"
Notes to Chapter Five

Mosaic, 1 (1968), 82-94 (85).


Chapter Six
CONSTANCY AND OPINION: FOUR NEOSTOICS


3 The True Way to Vertue and Happinesse. Intreating specially of Constancie in publike Calamities, and private Afflictions..., trans. [Andrew Court] (1623; STC 7373.2). This edition is a reprint, with new title page, of A Buckler against adversitie: or a treatise of constancie (1622; STC 7373).


5 Essayes by Sir William Cornwallis, the Younger, ed. Don Cameron Allen (Baltimore, 1946).

6 The possible influence of Lipsius' De constantia on Julius Caesar was suggested by Anson, esp. pp. 14-15, 17, and developed by Vawter, "Division," p. 178, and Simmons, "Antique Romans," p. 85. Arthur F. Kinney, "Some Conjectures on the Composition of King Lear," ShS, 33 (1980), 13-25, argues for the probability that Shakespeare knew Lipsius' writings, but his parallels between Politica and Lear are not compelling. Simmons, Pagan World, pp. 33, 41-42, quotes Cornwallis on honour with reference to Coriolanus, without developing the connection between this theme and that of constancy. The relationship between Shakespeare and Neostoicism has not been deeply explored; I began this thesis with the intention of exploring it, but have come to the conclusion that, though the Neostoic movement may well have stimulated his interest in Stoic constancy, Seneca and Cicero are more fundamental influences.
Notes to Chapter Six

[1] "To be immooveable": Lipsius and Du Vair on constancy


8 On the popularity of De constantia see Kirk, Introd. to Lipsius, pp. 9, 34; Croll, p. 176.

9 Lipsius, p. 207.

10 Lipsius, p. 73.

11 Lipsius, pp. 77-78.

12 Lipsius, p. 79 (bracket in original).

13 Lipsius, pp. 79-80. The idea that matter is evil is Neoplatonic, not Stoic (Saunders, Justus Lipsius, p. xv; Levi, p. 67).

14 Lipsius, pp. 81-82.

15 Lipsius, p. 83.


17 Lipsius, pp. 82-83.

18 Lipsius, p. 83.

19 Lipsius, p. 112.

20 Lipsius, pp. 106-7.


22 Lipsius, p. 111.

23 On Du Vair's life and thought see Kirk, Introd. to Du Vair, Moral Philosophie, pp. 7-14, 25-37; Levi, pp. 74-95; Zanta, pp. 241-72.

24 In fact, it plagiarises certain sections of the earlier work: the
second half of Book II follows Lipsius' discussion of providence and destiny (II.8-17) almost word for word.

26 True Way, p. 6.
29 True Way, p. 149.
30 True Way, p. 156.
31 Hall, pp. 86-87 (see pp. 138-40 below); Cornwallis, e.g. Essay 1, pp. 5-7; Essay 8, p. 30.

[2] "Opinion that is constant never"

32 Ure's "Opinion" is an excellent study of this idea, though he does not specifically discuss the writers I am here dealing with.

33 Kirk's gloss of "opinion" as "prejudice" (p. 4) is thus, I think, an oversimplification.


35 See pp. 65-68 above.
36 Du Vair, Moral Philosophie, p. 78.
37 JC I.ii.51-70 (52-53); Tro. III.iii.95-123.
38 Moral Philosophie, pp. 78-79.
39 Moral Philosophie, p. 81.

40 On Cornwallis, see Allen's Introduction; Douglas Bush, English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century, Oxford Hist. of Eng. Lit., Vol. 5 (2nd edn, Oxford, 1962), pp. 198-200; on his debt to Montaigne, R. E. Bennett, "Sir William Cornwallis's Use of Montaigne," PMLA, 48 (1933), 1080-99, and his own comments in Essay 12, p. 42. Apparent Shakespearian echoes in Cornwallis (e.g. the passage in Essay 24 about old men who talk about nothing but their wild youth, which sounds very like a recollection of Justice Shallow) are probably the
result, as Allen suggests (p. xv), of Cornwallis's playgoing.

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41 Cornwallis, Essay 36 ("Of Knowledge"), pp. 132, 140.

42 Essay 41 ("Of Sorrow"), pp. 165-66.

43 Essay 16 ("Of Opinion"), pp. 54-55.

44 Essay 30 ("Of Popularitie"), p. 102. Simmons, Pagan World, p. 41, notes the parallels of phrasing and thought with Cor. II.iii.16-23.

45 Essay 35 ("Of Trappes for Fame"), p. 126.

46 Merc. I.i.50-56, 86-102; compare especially 55-56 ("they'll not show their teeth in way of smile / Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable") with Cornwallis's "Never laugh - let the occasion bee never so just." It is presumably Cornwallis who is echoing Shakespeare here, but his borrowing suggests that he recognised Stoic ideas behind Gratiano's diatribe against "this fool gudgeon, this opinion" (102), and perhaps also behind Antonio's image of life as a play.

Though I would not suggest that Neostoic opinion is an important theme in The Merchant, it may well be so in Much Ado, uniting a number of the play's themes (observation and error, honour and reputation, self-knowledge, "fashion").

[3] Constancy and grace

47 Lipsius, pp. 111-22; p. 99.

48 Lipsius, p. 200.

49 Levi, p. 92.

50 Du Vair, Moral Philosophie, p. 129.

51 On Hall, see Kirk's Introd., pp. 19-65; for the nickname, p. 52. Heaven upon Earth went through four editions 1606-10 (STC).

52 Hall, pp. 85-86.

53 Hall, pp. 86-87. Compare Lipsius' definition of constancy; the two words are almost synonymous, but have different connotations, reflecting the difference in tone between Seneca's De tranquillitate animi and De constantia sapientis: "tranquillity" suggests calm of mind in everyday life, "constancy" immovable endurance in extreme situations.

54 Hall, p. 88.
Chapter Seven
MONTAIGNE AND THE PROFITABLE
BUT ABSURD DESIRE

[1] Introduction


3 Montaigne and Shakespeare, and Other Essays on Cognate Questions, 2nd edn (1909; first published as Montaigne and Shakespeare, 1897), pp. 119, 196.


5 For Harmon, see ch. 2, n. 5. George Coffin Taylor, "Montaigne-Shakespeare and the Deadly Parallel," PQ, 22 (1943), 330-37, is a reply.

6 "Shakespeare, Montaigne, and 'the Rarer Action,'" Shaks, 1 (1965), 261-64 (261). Prosser contributes another convincing parallel (Temp. V.i.25-30 and Montaigne, II.11, p. 108). Other parallels proposed in recent notes are vulnerable to Harmon's critique; e.g. T. Sipaghil, "Montaigne's Essays and Othello," N&Q, 219 (April 1974), 130, connects Oth. IV.i.261-65 with Montaigne I.54, p. 353, but the wise man's invulnerability to Fortune's arrows is a Stoic cliché. The most substantial recent discussion is Robert Ellrodt, "Self-consciousness in Montaigne and Shakespeare," ShS, 28 (1975), 37-50, whose judicious
summary of the influence question (pp. 37-42) includes a convincing answer to Harmon (pp. 39-40). Ellrodt's thesis is tangential to mine: he sees both writers' treatment of inconstancy and self-dramatisation as symptoms of an interest in the psychology of "self-consciousness."

7 On the early history of the debate, see Robertson, pp. 31-37; Hooker, pp. 313-14; Harmon, pp. 988-89.


9 Sayce, p. 2.

10 Les sources et l'évolution des Essais de Montaigne, 2 vols (1908; 2nd edn, Paris, 1933); developed in Les essais de Michel de Montaigne, Les grands événements littéraires (Paris, 1946), and in his commentaries in V.


12 On Montaigne as Neostoic, see Skinner, II.275-84; on his connections with Lipsius (whom he called "the most sufficient and learned man now living," II.12, p. 295) and other Neostoics, see Frame, pp. 86, 249, 303. His use of Seneca is documented in the index to V.

13 Claude Expilly and Florimond de Raemond, quoted in Sayce, p. 163.

14 III.12, pp. 300-1 (quoted p. 116 above).

15 Frame, p. 154.

16 II.13, p. 326.

17 II.13, p. 331 (quoting Ep. 77.6); I.18, p. 72 (quoting Ep. 26.6); see p. 42 above.

18 I.20 in the numbering of modern editions: the 1595 French edition shifted essay I.14 to become I.40, with consequent misnumbering of the intervening essays (Sayce, p. 14), and Florio follows this numbering. The quotation is from Tusc. I.30.

Notes to Chapter Seven

20 JC IV.i.ii.189-90.

21 I.19, pp. 80, 86, 87, 89, 90.

22 JC I.iii.89-100, II.ii.32-37; Lear V.ii.9-11; Ham. V.ii.211-17.

For opposing views of these parallels, see Hooker, pp. 317-21, and Harmon, pp. 999-1001. Hooker (citing Feis, 1884) argues convincingly that Montaigne's passage "The time you leave behinde..." explains and justifies the F reading of Hamlet's speech ("since no man ha's ought of what he leaves...").

23 I.50, p. 278.

24 Villey, Les Essais, p. 45.

25 II.i.1, p. 110. Prosser discusses Shakespeare's possible use of this passage.

26 I.40 (I.14 in the original), p. 283.

27 I.50, p. 343.

28 Ham. II.ii.249-50. The parallel has been often noted, e.g. by Hooker, pp. 336-37; Robertson, pp. 50-51.

29 I.12, pp. 57, 59 (quoting Aeneid IV.449; this passage is added in 1595).

30 II.13, p. 331; I.18, p. 73. In the 1588 edition Montaigne changed seurement ("constantly") to sourdement ("quietly"), marking a significant change in outlook (V., p. 80n.).

31 II.1, p. 8 (quoting Ep. 20.5); II.2, p. 23.

32 II.1, p. 9; I.36, p. 245.

33 II.11, p. 111-12.


35 Sayce, p. 328; Skinner, II.276; C.A. Mayer, "Stoïcisme et purification du concept chez Montaigne," Studi Francesci, 72 (1980), 487-93, (though the assumption that purification du concept is a peculiarly Stoic technique is dubious).

36 V., headnote to I.1; Sayce, p. 107. Villey believes I.1 is a later essay, placed first in order to stress the "idée capitale" of inconstancy (p. 7). Burke, ch. 8, has an excellent brief discussion of Montaigne's sense of change.

37 I.1, p. 19.
38 II.1, pp. 8, 9, 14.
39 II.37, p. 523.
40 II.1, pp. 7-8.
41 II.1, p. 11.
42 II.1, p. 15.
43 I.37, pp. 248-49.
44 Ant. I.ii.119-23; the same motif appears in Octavius's reaction to Antony's death (V.i, esp. 28-30) and Enobarbus' comments on Antony's lament for Brutus (III.ii.51-8).

45 For Montaigne's judgement of Plutarch see esp. II.10, pp. 102-3.

46 Ant. I.iv.46. The imagery of the essay is very similar to that of the play; e.g. compare Octavius' speech with Montaigne's "we are carried: as things that flote..." (p. 9).

47 II.1, p. 8.
48 II.1, pp. 13-14 (my emphasis).
49 II.1, p. 14 (quoting Ep. 120.22).

50 II.2, p. 23. Taylor notes the echo of this in Hamlet's "the thousand natural shocks / That flesh is heir to" (III.i.62-63); "flesh" perhaps sharpens the parallel, since Montaigne's point is the power of the body to disturb the mind.

51 II.1, p. 23.
52 JC I.ii.128.
53 II.2, pp. 24-26.

54 M. A. Screech, Montaigne and Melancholy: The Wisdom of the "Essays" (1983), pp. 153-54, has an interesting discussion of this
passage in relation to the theme of "ecstasy" and heroic madness.

[4] The "Apologie" and the repudiation of Stoicism

55 Villey, Sources, II.143-223; Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley, 1979), p. 43; Sayce, pp. 173-4.

56 Sayce, p. 328; Frame, p. 175; Burke, p. 65.

57 My account of Pyrrhonism is largely based on the lucid summary by Popkin, Preface, pp. xiii-xvi, and on Montaigne's own account, II.12, pp. 203-8; other sources include Long, pp. 75-88; Bevan, Lecture Four; OCD, s.v. "Pyrrhon," "Scepticism."

58 II.12, p. 207.

59 II.12, p. 200, 277. I assume, like most modern critics, that Montaigne's fideism is genuine rather than an ironic cloak for religious scepticism: see Popkin, pp. 54-55 and notes; Sayce, ch. 9; Burke, ch. 4; Stone (in Jones), p. 58.

60 Frame, pp. 170-72.

61 Louis Cons, quoted in Frame, p. 170.

62 II.12, p. 137.

63 I am indebted to Frame's excellent analysis and tabular summary, pp. 163-70, 172-73.

64 II.12, pp. 276-77 (reading "nay" for "my").

65 II.12, pp. 277-78.

66 II.12, p. 281. This view of emotion is Aristotelian (Levi, p. 10).


68 II.12, pp. 296, 298.

69 The phrase is Frame's (p. 169).

70 II.12, p. 323.

71 II.12, p. 325.

72 II.12, pp. 325-26; the Senecan quotation is from Quaestiones...
Notes to Chapter Seven

naturales 1.

73 Frame, p. 175; cf. pp. 179-80.


[5] Self-knowledge and sceptical constancy

75 II.1, p. 15 (see p. 151 above).

76 III.2, p. 23.

77 III.2, pp. 23-24.

78 Eccl. 12:9.

79 III.9, pp. 237, 239.

80 III.9, p. 237; Lear, IV.vi, esp. 118-23 (the "simp'ring dame"), 160-7 (the lustful beadle and usurer-judge).

81 III.9, p. 239; Ham. II.2.524-25; this parallel was noted by Robertson and Taylor.

82 III.9, p. 237; Off. I.110.

83 LLL V.ii.582.

84 I.40, p. 275 (quoting Tusc. II.25); cf. II.12, pp. 188-89.

85 II.37, p. 493.

86 III.9, pp. 224, 231.

87 III.9, p. 195.

88 III.2, pp. 26, 27.

89 III.10, pp. 262-63.

90 The index to V. (p. 1342) lists fifteen citations in Book III, as against four in Book I and six in Book II.
91 "Montaigne's Critique of Cicero," JHI, 36 (1975), 595-612 (606). Green does not specifically discuss the concept of decorum.

92 Higginbotham's judgement that Montaigne's ideas of truth to onself are "largely prompted" by Cicero (Introd. to Cicero on Moral Obligation, p. 28) is thus in my view overstated.

93 Cor. III.ii.121.

94 II.12, pp. 284-85.

95 II.17, pp. 380, 381.

96 II.17, p. 385 (quoting Off. I.II).

97 II.29, pp. 430-32.

98 Levi (e.g. pp. 11, 56-57) argues that in the Renaissance Pyrrhonian scepticism and Stoicism were virtually identified. While this argument illuminates the passage under discussion, I think his view is overstated, neglecting the crucial distinction between the Neostoic idea that we accept false opinions instead of truth, and the Pyrrhonian idea that truth is unattainable.

[6] The benefit of inconstancy


100 II.1, p. 14.

101 Cor. IV.vii.42; Ant. II.ii.240, I.v.60.

102 III.4, pp. 51, 57.

103 As Brutus, after endorsing the Stoic method of confronting suffering (JC IV.iii.188-90), finds practical comfort in distracting his mind to the work at hand (194-95).

104 As Villey argues, Sources, II.399-401.

105 III.9, p. 236.

106 III.12, p. 307; V., p. 1051.

107 III.12, p. 308.

108 III.12, pp. 304-5.

109 III.12, p. 305.
Villey, in V., p. 1064: "on y peut chercher, sinon à proprement parler la conclusion de Montaigne, du moins quelques idées sur lesquelles ... il tient à prendre congé de son lecteur."

III.13, pp. 352-53.

AWW IV.iii.67-68.

III.13, p. 379.

III.13, pp. 385, 386.

The word decorum is Florio's addition (Montaigne simply has "avec ordre"), but I think a legitimate and accurate one.

Montaigne, Shakespeare, and the critique of constancy

II.2 (see p. 154 above); TGV V.iv.110-11.

Cor. II.i.36-39.


Chapter Eight
"FORMAL CONSTANCY": JULIUS CAESAR

Introduction

The Elizabethan tendency "to make a four-way identification between stoic, constant, heroic, and Roman behaviour" is noted by Kaufmann and Ronan, pp. 27-29 (28) and notes.

JC II.i.225-27. Subsequent references are to Julius Caesar unless otherwise noted. Apart from the Alexander text, I have consulted the following editions of Julius Caesar: New Variorum, ed. H. H. Furness (Philadelphia, 1913); New Cambridge, ed. John Dover Wilson (Cambridge, 1949); New Arden, ed. T. S. Dorsch (1955); Signet, ed. William and

3 Note ad loc.; Wilson does not explicitly make the connection with Cicero. "Formal" means "in outward form or appearance" (OED 1c), but with overtones of more pejorative senses: merely in outward appearance, preoccupied with forms (OED 2c, 8). Compare the use of "form" with implications of pretence and deceit in I.ii.298 ("puts on this tardy form") and IV.ii.40 ("this sober form ... hides wrongs").

4 OED "Tire" v3 1a. None of the editions I have consulted comments on the word.

5 Jonathan Goldberg, James I and the Politics of Literature (Baltimore, 1983), pp. 164-65, discusses this passage in similar terms, but in my view blurs the central problem by creating imaginary difficulties.

6 The relevant articles are cited in ch. 1, n. 12 above. As suggested there, Rackin, Anson, and Vawter take an anti-Stoic position, and the latter two an extremely hostile one: Anson, tracing a strained pattern of physiological imagery, sees Caesar and others dehumanised and petrified by their suppression of human emotions; Vawter treats Brutus as a semi-insane villain, cut off from humanity, who by killing Caesar "unleashes his demented mind upon the already sickened world" ("Division," p. 182). Such extreme views fail to recognise the gap between the characters' inhuman ideals and their actual flawed humanity. Levitsky's attempt at a more sympathetic view is flawed by unsubtlety, carelessness (e.g. the misquoted title), and a crucial misreading (see n. 21 below). The best of these essays, in spite of the pretentious and jargon-ridden style of its opening pages in particular, is Kaufmann and Ronan's; I am in broad agreement with their views on the central importance of constancy and the image of "moving," the difference between what the characters are and pretend to be, and the mixture of sympathy and ironic criticism in Shakespeare's attitude to Brutus and Rome. Kaufmann and Ronan, however, not discussing the origins of the idea of constancy, fail to distinguish Senecan from Ciceronian constancy, or to see the ironic relationship between constancy and opinion.

7 Earlier critics tended to see the stiffness of the characters as signs of failed realisation: e.g. Mark Van Doren, Shakespeare (1939; New York, 1955), p. 153 ("its persons are more orators than men"); Harley Granville-Barker, Prefaces to Shakespeare, Vol. II, introd. and notes by M. St. Clare Byrne (1963), pp. 191-94, 211, 240-41. MacCallum in 1910, however, perceived the distinction between the private person and public
role in Caesar ("He has to live up to an impossible standard, and so he must affect to be what he is not," p. 231) and Brutus ("a kind of pose," p. 241). These insights have become the commonplaces of later criticism, with an increasing emphasis on the play's acting imagery: examples include John Palmer, Political Characters of Shakespeare (1945), ch. 1; J. I. M. Stewart, Character and Motive in Shakespeare (1949), ch. 3; L. C. Knights, "Personality and Politics in Julius Caesar" [1965], in "Hamlet" and Other Shakespearean Essays (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 82-101; Peter Ure, "Character and Role from Richard III to Julius Caesar," in Elizabethan and Jacobean Drama, pp. 22-43; Proser, Heroic Image, ch. 1; Stampfer, pp. 77-99; John W. Velz, "If I Were Brutus Now': Role-playing in Julius Caesar," Shaks, 4 (1969), pp. 149-59; Kaufmann and Ronan, esp. pp. 20 ("Stoicism is a form of acting"), 37-43; Simmons, Pagan World, ch. 3 ("Julius Caesar: Our Roman Actors"); Thomas F. Van Laan, Role-playing in Shakespeare (Toronto, 1978), pp. 152-61; Goldberg, ch. 4 ("The Roman Actor"), pp. 164-76. Kaufmann and Ronan and Simmons relate acting specifically to Romanness and Stoicism, but do not discuss the idea of decorum.

On the problematic quality of the play, see Schanzer, pp. 10-70, and Adrien Bonjour, The Structure of "Julius Caesar" (Liverpool, 1958). Foakes, "Approach to Julius Caesar" (a seminal essay to which I and many other modern critics are indebted), was perhaps the first to see the thematic importance of knowledge and error: "All is the result of a self-deception, an obsession with names and an ignorance of reality...." (p. 270). This epistemological theme has been developed by Mildred E. Hartsock, "The Complexity of Julius Caesar," PMLA, 81 (1966), 56-62; René E. Fortin, "Julius Caesar: An Experiment in Point of View," SQ, 19 (1968), 341-47; D. J. Palmer, "Tragic Error in Julius Caesar," SQ, 21 (1970), 399-401 (rather too Stoic in its view that it is the influence of passion rather than reason that leads to error); Wilders, ch. 5. Chang, "Renaissance Historiography," and Rice, "Judgment of the Senses," relate the theme to Renaissance scepticism, and Vawter, "After Their Fashion," to Stoic ideas on fate and divination. No critic has noted the ironic relevance of the Stoic opposition between constancy and opinion.

[2] "A thing unfirm": the world of Julius Caesar

On the problematic quality of the play, see Schanzer, pp. 10-70, and Adrien Bonjour, The Structure of "Julius Caesar" (Liverpool, 1958). Foakes, "Approach to Julius Caesar" (a seminal essay to which I and many other modern critics are indebted), was perhaps the first to see the thematic importance of knowledge and error: "All is the result of a self-deception, an obsession with names and an ignorance of reality...." (p. 270). This epistemological theme has been developed by Mildred E. Hartsock, "The Complexity of Julius Caesar," PMLA, 81 (1966), 56-62; René E. Fortin, "Julius Caesar: An Experiment in Point of View," SQ, 19 (1968), 341-47; D. J. Palmer, "Tragic Error in Julius Caesar," SQ, 21 (1970), 399-401 (rather too Stoic in its view that it is the influence of passion rather than reason that leads to error); Wilders, ch. 5. Chang, "Renaissance Historiography," and Rice, "Judgment of the Senses," relate the theme to Renaissance scepticism, and Vawter, "After Their Fashion," to Stoic ideas on fate and divination. No critic has noted the ironic relevance of the Stoic opposition between constancy and opinion.

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[2] "A thing unfirm": the world of Julius Caesar
JEGP, 57 (1958), 51-56 (on Seneca's comments on the murder of Caesar in De beneficiis); Norman Rabkin, "Structure, Convention and Meaning in Julius Caesar," JEGP, 63 (1964), 240-54; Knights, "Personality and Politics."

12 Wilson Knight's "The Eroticism of Julius Caesar," in Imperial Theme, pp. 63-95, is eccentric, but in stressing the importance of emotion in the play it brings out well the elements in it which are opposed to Stoic constancy; see also Knights, esp. p. 87. On imagery, see Knight, "The Torch of Life: An Essay on Julius Caesar," in Imperial Theme, pp. 32-62, and Charney, ch. 3.

13 V.i.95, 123-26.

14 See pp. 171-74 above, and (on the association between Stoicism and scepticism) Levi's discussion there cited (n. 98).

15 This causal relationship has not, I think, been recognised. Vawter, "Division," p. 184, cites the lines as demonstrating that constancy is impossible, failing to see that they also show how desirable it is.

[3] "True-fix'd and resting quality": Senecan constancy

16 It must be acknowledged that Shakespeare does not use the word "Stoic" in the play, and that he knew from Plutarch that Brutus was not a Stoic but a follower of the "Old" Academy (see ch. 4, n.6 above). Nevertheless, he is writing under the influence of Stoic and Neostoic thought, and when Cassius speaks to Brutus of "your philosophy" (IV.iii.142) he clearly has Stoicism in mind.


18 IV.iii.1-28; North, p. 1069.

19 I.i.62; (of the plebeians) III.i.235; III.ii.229, 272. The meaning "persuaded" is clearest at I.iii.121; elsewhere it almost always has emotional overtones. Kaufmann and Ronan, p. 26, note the centrality of the image of being "mov'd" (though they fail to distinguish the various senses of the word).

20 III.i.40.

21 II.i.20-21. Levitsky badly misinterprets Brutus' position by
taking this passage as criticism rather than praise of Caesar (p. 242). On Brutus and reason, see Vawter, "Division," p. 182 (though his comments are too extreme).

22 II.i.10-34 (11).

23 IV.iii.43-44, 46-48. *OED* and editors define "budge" as "flinch," but the modern sense is surely also implied.


25 III.ii.142; echoing Marullus' "You blocks, you stones..." at I.i.36.

26 Compare Knights, "Personality and Politics," p. 91 ("personal feelings ... are in fact active in public life. ... Unacknowledged, they influence simply by distorting the issues"), and Vawter, "Division," p. 185 ("For a man to believe himself insusceptible to emotional persuasion makes him all the more liable to it because of his ... pride").

27 I.ii.37-40; II.ii.61-69 (69), 237-270 (268).

28 II.i.299-301; II.iv.6-7; III.i.22.

29 Shakespeare elsewhere uses "sides" (i.e. of the body) in the context of repressing powerful emotions: e.g. *TND* II.iv.92, *Lr* II.iv.196.

30 Const. 16 (see pp. 35-36 above).

31 IV.iii.142-3.

32 I.ii.87; I.iii.114-15.

33 IV.iii.188-90 (see also pp. 213-15 below). See also Benjamin Boyce, "The Stoic Consolatio and Shakespeare," *PMLA*, 64 (1949), 771-80, who notes the ironic effect of the use of such Stoic responses to death by the hypocritical Claudius and the nihilistic Macbeth.

34 II.ii.32-37.

35 III.i.99-106. I have restored 102-3 to Casca, as in F; Alexander gives them to Cassius, but there seems no necessity for the change. I agree with Granville-Barker’s reading of the passage, pp. 227-28 ("Into the sophistical trap [Brutus] walks").

36 I.iii.96-97; V.v.41.

37 As Vawter suggests ("Division," pp. 174-76) — though, as I have
argued (ch. 3, nn. 4 and 24), his interpretation of Cicero's position is oversimplified.

38 IV.iii.225; cf. Anson, p. 30; Vawter, "Division," p. 186.


40 Lipsius, pp. 83, 81 (see pp. 125-26 above). OED, most editors, and Vawter ("Division," p. 177) take "apprehensive" to mean "rational, intelligent"; I prefer, with Humphreys, to take it as meaning primarily "capable of perception" (OED's sense 2 rather than 4). The point is arguable, but for Caesar in this context to praise humanity in general for quick intelligence seems incongruous.

41 III.i.39-43; MfM I.iii.51-52. My discussion of this passage is indebted to Anson (pp. 14-18), the first critic to perceive the relevance of Lipsius; he does not note the parallel with Angelo. (As noted above, I find Anson's subsequent argument unconvincing.) Simmons, Pagan World, pp. 92-94, interprets the passage in a way more sympathetic to Caesar, but it surely supports rather than disproves Brutus' fear that Caesar may "change" into a tyrant (whether its ironic relevance to Brutus himself).

42 III.i.255.

43 Critics who have noted the parallelism of Caesar and Brutus include Rabkin (pp. 112-14), Stewart, and Simmons (Pagan World, p. 87).

44 IV.iii.67.

[4] Roman opinion


46 II.i.223; IV.iii.185-86; V.iii.99; II.i.136-40; cf. I.iii.57-59, III.i.35-36.

47 II.i.85-92, 134, 138, 308-9. This passage is well discussed by Simmons, Pagan World, pp. 95-98.

48 III.ii.15. On Shakespeare's view of honour I am indebted more to Norman Council, When Honour's at the Stake: Ideas of Honour in Shakespeare's Plays (1973; ch. 3 deals with Julius Caesar) than to Curtis Brown Watson's simplistic Shakespeare and the Renaissance Concept

49 Montaigne, II.12, p. 298 (quoted p. 160 above).


51 I.iii.157-60; II.ii.144-46.

52 II.i.30.

53 II.i.177-80; cf. Kaufmann and Ronan, p. 40.

55 II.ii.128-29 ("earns" = grieves).

57 See Cicero, Tusc. III.2-4 (quoted pp. 67-68 above), and Du Vair (quoted p. 133 above). Compare also Tro. III.iii.95-123, where the idea is placed into an even more overtly ironic context.

58 II.i.63-65.

59 II.i.68, 317-18; II.i.44-45, 51.

60 II.i.90-93.

61 I.ii.257-61; III.i.112-14.

[5] "A Roman's part": Ciceronian decorum

62 V.iii.89; Montaigne, III.13 (quoted in p. 179 above).


64 Velz, "Ancient World," p. 10; he discusses the device in "If I Were Brutus Now," but his conclusions are different to mine.
65 I.ii.17; II.ii.28, 65; I.ii.46; I.iii.90; II.i.287; I.iii.116.

66 II.ii.42-43, 101; I.ii.46-47.

67 II.ii.65; II.i.253-55, 258-59.

68 I.ii.198-201, 211-12.

69 Palmer, Political Characters, p.39; II.ii.10, 56.

70 II.i.56-58.

71 Off. I.iii (quoted pp. 78-79 above).

72 I.ii.298; I.iii.3ff, 100-102 and 116-19; change of opinions, see II.i.143, 153. Critics (e.g. Granville-Barker, p. 212; Dover Wilson, pp. 96-97) have regarded Casca as an inconsistent character, but in a play so concerned with constancy, Casca's inconsistency is surely as deliberate as Cleopatra's.

73 I.ii.203, 313; III.iii.226-27.

74 Montaigne, III.10 (quoted p. 169 above).

[6] "Like Brutus, like himself"

75 IV.iii.115-17, 141-45.

76 IV.iii.150-55.

77 IV.iii.185-93.

78 The view that this passage is an earlier version of the scene, intended to be replaced by IV.iii.141-56 but accidentally printed along with it, was put forward in 1882 and at one time generally accepted (Dorsch and Dover Wilson bracket the lines, Sanders and Riverside reject them in their notes). Recent critical and bibliographical arguments, however, lead Humphreys to leave the question open (pp. 79-81) and the Oxford Shakespeare to print the passage rather than relegate it to an appendix. Its authenticity is defended by Warren D. Smith, "The Duplicate Revelations of Portia's Death," SQ, 4 (1953), 153-61; Brents Stirling, "Brutus and the Death of Portia," SQ, 10 (1959), 211-17; and Thomas Clayton, "Should Brutus Never Taste of Portia's Death but Once?: Text and Performance in Julius Caesar," SEL, 23 (1983), 237-58: the first two interpret it simply as evidence of Brutus' nobility, Clayton more complexly (and convincingly).

79 V.i.92-112 (110-12); see pp. 90-92 above.
80 V.iii.89.

81 V.iv.1-11. I tentatively accept Alexander's assignment of 7-8 to Brutus, though other editors plausibly give it to Lucilius; the difference does not affect my argument.

82 V.iv.21-25. It may seem perverse to lay such stress on a phrase which Shakespeare takes from Plutarch ("he will be found like himself," North, p. 1076), but I think the emphasis Shakespeare gives it by repetition and placing at the end of the speech, and the recall of it in V.v.58-59, suggest the significance he wishes it to have.

83 Foakes, "Approach," p. 267, notes the importance of the episode but not the significance of "like himself"; Brower, p. 233, connects the phrase in passing with Brutus' "noble role," but fails to develop the insight.

84 V.v.23-25. This Stoic idea is not made explicit in Plutarch's account of Brutus' death.

85 V.v.41-42, 50-51.

86 V.v.36-38, 45-46, 53-59.

87 See pp.42-43 above.

Chapter Nine
"I PLAY THE MAN I AM": CORIOLANUS

1 Kaufmann and Ronan, in a footnote to their study of Julius Caesar (p.50), briefly discuss constancy in Coriolanus. Matthew N. Proser, "Coriolanus: The Constant Warrior and the State," CE, 24 (April 1963), 507-12, rev. and enl. in Heroic Image, pp. 135-70, argues for constancy as Coriolanus' defining quality, but interprets it too narrowly (without reference to Stoicism) in terms of his destructive warrior role ("his constancy lies in this: he is always the potential killer": Heroic Image, p. 154), and imposes too black-and-white a judgement in insisting that his flaw is not "native integrity" but a "deep distortion of nature" ("Constant Warrior," p. 510) - whereas in my view it partakes of both. Of course, many other critics have stressed Coriolanus' refusal to change without explicit reference to constancy: e.g. William Rosen, Shakespeare and the Craft of Tragedy (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 161-207 ("a kind of predetermined, unalterable being," p. 205); A. P. Rossiter, "Coriolanus," in Angel with Horns and Other Shake-
spearean Lectures, ed. Graham Storey (London, 1961), pp. 235-52 (who notes the "depressing paradox" that his attempt to be unyielding makes him as "unstable and trustless" as the plebs he despises, pp. 238, 252). Simmons, Pagan World, ch. 2, discusses the Ciceroian idea of decorum in the play, but (as I have noted, ch. 2, n. 81) interprets it differently, as an aspect of the theme of honor, without relating it to constancy. Nevertheless, and despite reservations about his dogmatic Christianising and his endorsement of Coriolanus' class prejudices, I have found Simmons' the most valuable account of the play's themes: of Coriolanus as the product and embodiment of Roman values, and the clash between his absolute and Rome's pragmatic interpretation of them.


The role-playing theme has been discussed by many critics, including Proser, Carr, Rabkin, Stockholder, I. R. Browning ("Coriolanus: Boy of Tears," Essays in Criticism, 5 (1955), 18-31); Joyce Van Dyke ("Making a Scene: Language and Gesture in Coriolanus," SHS, 30 (1977), 135-46). Most critics, however, draw too simple a contrast between Coriolanus' "nature" and his role, failing to appreciate the paradox of decorum embodied in his line "I play / The man I am." Two exceptions, which I encountered after writing this chapter, are Philip Edwards, "Person and Office in Shakespeare's Plays," PBA, 56 (1970), 93-109, who sums up the paradox in the words "Coriolanus' 'nature' ... is ... a second nature" (p. 97); and Michael Taylor, "Playing the Man He Is: Role-playing in Shakespeare's Coriolanus," Ariel, 15 (1984), 19-28, who rightly argues that Coriolanus' "authentic self is irrepressibly social," but (in my view) falsifies the submission scene by seeing it simply as a return to his true Roman role.
2 Cor. V.iii.33. Subsequent references are to Coriolanus unless otherwise noted. Apart from the Alexander text, I have consulted the following editions of the play: New Variorum, ed. H. H. Furness, Jr (Philadelphia, 1938); New Cambridge, ed. John Dover Wilson (Cambridge, 1960); Signet, ed. Reuben Brower (New York, 1966); New Penguin, ed. G. R. Hibbard (Hammondsworth, 1967); Arden, ed. Philip Brockbank (1976), with an excellent introduction and notes; and the Riverside and Oxford Shakespeares. For the sake of simplicity, I call the hero "Coriolanus" throughout. "Brutus" refers throughout to the hero of Julius Caesar; I call the tribune "Junius Brutus."

[1] The constancy of Coriolanus

3 I.i.237.


5 North, pp. 235-36, 243 (quoted p. 98 above).

6 IV.vi.42.

7 I.v.4; I.vi.44-45; I.vii.5-6; cf. I.iv.41, II.ii.101. "[M]overs" may imply "removers (of loot)," but the idea of lack of steadfastness is, I think, dominant; cf. Brockbank, note ad loc.

8 HO 151-55 (see p. 48 above). Waith, though he discusses the godlike and Herculean imagery applied to Coriolanus (esp. pp. 121-22), does not note this parallel.


10 IV.i.3-11; V.iii.72-75.

11 I.i.236-37; I.vii.1-2.

12 II.iii.16; III.i.66; I.i.168-71, 179-82.


14 III.i.62, 83-86.

15 I.i.41-42; IV.vii.8-11, 41-45.

16 III.iii.67; V.vi.87. O. J. Campbell, Shakespeare's Satire (Oxford, 1943), pp. 198-217, takes this view to an extreme, seeing the play as a "tragical satire" in which Shakespeare "mocks and ridicules" the hero throughout; Rossiter (p. 245) more convincingly suggests that Shakespeare keeps him just on the verge of becoming a Jonsonian humour. Stockholder invokes Jonson's humours and Bergson on the comic effect of
automatism, seeing the play as about "the tragic process by which a man limits himself to his type, and by which 'types' tend to become comic" (pp. 229, 234, 235).


[2] Roman virtue: virtus and honour

17 II.ii.81-83. On this speech and its implications, see Brower, pp.355-57; Simmons, Pagan World, pp. 18-20; and Davidson ("Coriolanus represents not virtue but virtus," p. 271).

18 I.vi.67-72.


20 III.ii.22, 20-21, 40-43, 67. Shakespeare's ironic criticism of Roman values in these passages has been so well discussed by a number of critics that I merely touch upon it here: see L. C. Knights, "Shakespeare and Political Wisdom: A Note on the Personalism of Julius Caesar and Coriolanus," Sewanee Review, 41 (1953), 43-55; Carr, pp. 225-27; Stockholder, pp.235-36; Miola, pp. 171-72. Wilson Knight, "The Royal Occupation: An Essay on Coriolanus," in Imperial Theme, pp. 154-98, stresses the unnatural, metallic imagery which characterises both the play's Rome and Coriolanus in particular.

21 I.i.161; V.vi.154. Michael Goldman, "Characterizing Coriolanus," ShS, 34 (1981), 73-84, notes that "noble" occurs more often in Cor. than in any other Shakespeare play (p. 82).

22 III.i.72-73; IV.i.32.

23 Off. I.64 (see pp. 71-74 above). Miola's discussion of Cicero in the play, pp. 181-92, focuses on public speaking (De oratore), but ends by quoting Off. III and drawing a similar contrast to mine between Cicero's social and Coriolanus' potentially anti-social morality.

24 I.iv.52-53.

25 My discussion of honour, opinion, and (in the next section) of the naming of Coriolanus is deeply indebted to these critics, listed in n. 1 above, though my relation of it to the constancy-decorum dichotomy is original. Two other discussions which I encountered only after my own ideas were formed are Platt, pp. 86-116, and Jonathan Dollimore, Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Brighton, 1984), pp. 218-30, which, within a Marxist and structuralist framework, draws a similar distinction between Coriolanus' "essentialist" view of virtue and the Roman view of it as a social construct.
Notes to Chapter Nine

26 I.iii.5, 12, 15, 17, 20.
27 I.ix.55-58 (cf. 19-27); I.i.32.
28 IV.vii.49-50.

29 Simmons, Pagan World, p. 20.
30 II.ii.83-85.
31 I.i.65-70. Brockbank calls this passage "a proleptic invocation of Martius" (p. 40).
32 I.i.65-70; Const. 6 (quoted p. 24 above).
33 IV.i.9-10; III.ii.108; V.iii.62-63.
34 III.ii.64-65.
35 This irony is noted by several critics: Bradley, "Coriolanus," p. 466; Carr, p. 230.
36 V.i.13.
37 II.ii.94-95.
38 III.ii.107-10.
39 II.ii.142-43, 145; II.iii.123-25.
40 III.ii.13-15.
41 Carr's formulation is perceptive, though he does not develop it: "People are continually acting parts.... Coriolanus, on the other hand, fits his so completely that it has become his nature" (p. 224).
42 III.ii.19-20, 121-23.
43 Cicero, Off. I.114 (see p. 80 above); Montaigne, III.10 (see p. 169 above).
44 See ch. 2, n. 80 above.
45 III.iii.125.
46 III.i.255; III.ii.40.
[4] "Some other deity than Nature": Coriolanus outside Rome

Waith defends Coriolanus against critics who see irony here: "he is not inconstant. Shakespeare makes it clear that his first allegiance is always to his personal honour" (p. 131). While it is true that Coriolanus is constant by his own lights, Waith fails to see how this very fact contributes to Shakespeare's critique of constancy (and, of course, of "honour").

III.iii.137; IV.v.53-78 (56-57, 73); V.i.11-15.


IV.i.52-53.

See above, pp. 171-74 and p. 191.

V.ii.72-76; V.iv.1-5; V.ii.90, 104-6. The irony of Menenius' simile is increased if one associates it with Seneca's contrast between the Capitol, which can be conquered, and the unconquerable constancy of the sapiens (Const. 6.8; quoted p. 24 above). Miola acutely notes "a touch of the 'northern star' complex" in these passages (p. 200).

V.ii.65.

V.iii.150; V.iii.34-36; V.iv.26-29; Seneca, Prov. 1.5 (quoted pp. 28-29 above).


On this dualism in the imagery applied to Coriolanus, see Charney; Traversi, pp. 233-34, 265; Christopher Givan, "Shakespeare's Coriolanus: The Premature Epitaph and the Butterfly," Shaks, 12 (1979), 143-58 (153-55). F. N. Lees, "Coriolanus, Aristotle and Bacon," RES, NS 1 (1950), 114-25, relates it to Aristotle's dictum in the Politics that the man who cannot live in society is either a beast or a god. While Lees' suggestion is brilliant and convincing, I believe that Shakespeare is also drawing on the Stoic images of god and rock, and the traditional dualism which sees the Stoic sapiens as either superhuman or subhuman or both (as in Erasmus' godlike statue or Montaigne's dichotomy of angel and beast). This tradition explains better than Aristotle Shakespeare's images of Coriolanus as a thing of rock or metal. To suggest that Shakespeare is alluding both to Aristotle's dictum and to the Stoic tradition is also to acknowledge that what makes Coriolanus unable to live in society is not simply his innate character, as
Aristotle (and Plutarch) would suggest, but also the moral ideal he pursues.

58 V.iv.10-14. Ide (p. 183) independently makes the same association.

59 IV.vi.91-93.


[5] Constancy, decorum, and nature: the submission of Coriolanus

61 This device of setting up an ethical hypothesis is a recurring one in the play: compare the Volscian guard's "though it were as virtuous to lie as to live chastely" (V.ii.27-28).

62 V.iii.24-37.

63 V.iii.40-42.

64 V.iii.54, 56-62, 184.

65 Off. I.110 (quoted p. 78 above).

66 V.iii.20, 183-85.

67 This is the most variously interpreted scene of Coriolanus. For more ironic or pessimistic readings than mine, see (e.g.) Palmer, Political Characters, pp. 296-303; Rabkin, Common Understanding, pp. 141-44; Campbell, Shakespeare's Satire, pp. 213-15; Traversi, pp. 280-81; Waith, p. 141. I agree with Bradley (with qualifications to the word "passion"): "We are witnessing only the conquest of passion by simple human feelings, and Coriolanus is as much a drama of reconciliation as a tragedy" ("Coriolanus," p. 468). Hermann Heuer, "From Plutarch to Shakespeare: A Study of Coriolanus," ShS, 10 (1957), is a sensitive study of Shakespeare's emphasis on "nature" in this scene.

68 Charney, p. 31, notes the surprise and disappointment we feel that "his yielding seems to have had no effect on his moral being."

69 V.vi.71-73, 105-6.

70 V.vi.114-17, 154.
Chapter Ten
"INFINITE VARIETY": ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA

1 Other critics have seen a similar pattern in more Plutarchan terms: Bullough, pp. 454-45, sees a contrast of irascible and concupiscible passion; Howard Erskine-Hill, The Augustan Idea in English Literature (1983), ch. 6, sees the plays as a "diptych" representing opposed types of heroic "intemperance," with Octavius (and Menenius) as an "approximate mean" (p. 155).


3 I.i.49.

[1] The mutable world of Antony and Cleopatra

One must rise above it. The natural ... state of man is the state of rest" (p. 86).

5 As Adelman notes, p. 41.

6 II.i.10; I.iv.44-47. The galley scene (II.vii) is well discussed by Emrys Jones, pp. 21-22.

7 Montaigne, III.2 (quoted p. 116 above).

8 II.v.115.

9 I.iii.119-24 (121-23); III.ii.51-58; V.i.28-30.

10 Montaigne, I.37 (see pp. 151-52 above).

11 See, for instance, Adelman's discussion of the problem of Cleopatra's "betrayal" of Antony in the final battle, pp. 15-16 and n. 9.

12 I.i.1-13.

13 IV.xiv.1-14.


15 Montaigne, II.12; II.1; III.12 (quoted above, pp. 161, 150, 164).

16 II.vii.91; see Arden note ad loc., and (on the double meaning) OED, "Wheel" sb. 15b. Though the phrase is commonplace, its association in both contexts with drunkenness (and with Egyptian pyramids, cf. II.vii.18) suggests that Shakespeare may have had the Montaigne passage in mind.

[2] Octavius and Roman constancy

17 JC I.iii.4; Cor. IV.iv.12.

18 I.i.33-34. Examples of Egyptian images are I.ii.45-47, II.vii.17-23; of Roman images, I.i.33-34, II.iii.6-7, II.ii.130-31; the two are explicitly contrasted in III.vii.61-66.

19 II.vii.93; V.ii.198; IV.xv.87.


21 I.iv.1-10, 16-33, 55-71; North, p. 976 (quoted pp. 94-95 above).

22 V.ii.3-4; III.xiii.79-81 (I use the Folio form "Thidias" rather than Alexander's "Thyreus").

23 I.iv.16-17, 28-33; V.ii.44-45 (compare his speech on popular opinion, I.iv.41-47).

24 III.vi.51-53: commentators disagree whether Octavius means that unshown love is unfelt or is thought to be unfelt (see e.g. Case vs Ridley in the Arden edn); I think the point is in Octavius' confusion of the two ideas. My view of Octavius is influenced by Cantor, pp. 29-30, and Adelman, p. 25, who notes his perpetual concern for self-justification; see also J. Leeds Barroll's subtle and devastating analysis in "The Character of Octavius," ShakS, 6 (1972), 231-88.

[3] "Whom everything becomes": the ideal of inconstancy


27 Montaigne, III.3 (quoted p. 175 above).

28 I.i.46, 54; II.v.18-23; II.ii.9-10.

29 II.vii.98-99; this interpretation of the line is debatable, but is supported by Furness, Ridley, Dover Wilson, Jones, and Everett.
R. E. Fitch, "No Greater Crack," SQ, 19 (1968), 3-17, stresses the centrality of these lines, though his judgement that they define the play's "atheistical twilight of values" (p. 5) is very different from mine.

Discussions of Cleopatra's inconsistency include MacCallum, pp. 418-21 (his quotation from La Rochefoucauld, p. 420n., is very suggestive); Stewart, ch. 4 (who argues, against critics who find her character contradictory, that the contradictions are the essence of her character: if we find them strange and disturbing, "this, after all, is rather what Antony found!" [p. 64]); Harley Granville-Barker, Prefaces to Shakespeare, Vol. III, illus. edn, notes by M. St Clare Byrne (1963; 1st edn, 1930), pp. 81-96 ("She is true enough to the self of the moment...," p. 91); Rosen, ch. 3 (a hostile view, but perceptive on Cleopatra's role-playing, p. 150); and Leo Kirschebaum, "Shakespeare's Cleopatra," Shakespeare Assoc. Bull., 19 (1944), 161-71 (which finds Cleopatra consistent in her sensuality - oversimplified, but a good corrective to views which over-spiritualise the death scene).

31 V.ii.238; III.xiii.153; I.v.25.

32 II.ii.239-40; I.iii.3-5.

33 I.i.48-51. I am inclined to prefer Ridley's "how every passion" (also adopted by Oxford) to Alexander's "whose"; it gives a richer meaning, as Ridley argues, and also reinforces the pun in "becomes" (the passions strive to become Cleopatra, in both senses).

34 I.v.51-61; Ridley's comment is in his note ad loc.

35 Off. I.120, 117-21 (see pp. 80-81 above).

36 McAlindon's chapter on decorum in Antony (ch. 6, pp. 167-213) is stimulating and useful, but his conclusions are very different to mine. Taking Ciceronian decorum as a moral yardstick, he sees the lovers as condemned and indeed ridiculed for indecorum throughout most of the play, but rising to true decorum in the final acts - a view which seems to me overly simple and moralistic at both extremes. McAlindon acknowledges the possibility that Shakespeare may not believe in decorum or that the lovers may transcend it (pp. 184-92), but not that he and they may be redefining it. I am more indebted to Adelman, pp. 141-45, who perceives that "Egyptian decorum" is something peculiar - though she defines it in terms of excess rather than variety, and does not relate it to constancy. Phyllis Rackin, "Shakespeare's Boy Cleopatra, the Decorum of Nature, and the Golden World of Poetry," PMIA, 87 (1972), 201-212, and Ide, ch. 5, use the concept of decorum more in an aesthetic than an ethical sense.

37 I.ii.70; V.ii.17-18. The third use is MfM I.iii.30-31: "The baby beats the nurse, and quite athwart / Goes all decorum" (Spevack).
38 Spevack lists seventeen occurrences, as against four in *Julius Caesar* and nine in *Coriolanus*.

39 I.iii.96-97; I.iv.21; II.ii.2; II.ii.242-43; III.xii.34.

40 This point is made by Adelman (pp. 144-45) and briefly by McAlindon (p. 186); neither notes the contrast between this idea of decorum as becoming and the traditional idea of decorum as unchanging consistency.

41 II.ii.3-4 (cf. JC V.iv.25, V.v.58-59).

42 Nandy makes this point, p. 183.

43 I.i.12-13, 34, 36-37, 40-43, 49, 57-59.

44 II.vii.41.

[4] "I am Antony yet": the tragedy of Antony

45 I.ii.80, 113; I.iii.70; I.v.42-61; II.ii.94.

46 The phrase is Bradley's ("Antony," p. 288).


48 IV.ii.43-44.

49 III.xiii.31-34, 195-96.

50 III.iv.22-23; III.xi.3-4, 44.

51 III.xiii.110.

52 III.xiii.90-93, 98-99, 157, 142-43, 186-87.

53 IV.xiv.9-14.

54 IV.xiv.21-22.

55 IV.xiv.21-22; IV.xv.14-17 (cf. JC V.v.56-59). Miola, pp. 147-51, analyses the similarities and differences between Antony's suicide and those of Brutus and Cassius, but his conclusion that they are similar "only in externals" is overstated.

56 Shapiro, p. 28; IV.xv.57-58, 19-21; IV.xiv.62, 100.

57 IV.xv.86-88, 91; V.ii.1-8 (I have emended Alexander's "dug" back to F's "dung," which, like most recent editors, I find far more meaningful and forceful).

58 V.ii.237-40.

59 On the Seleucus episode, see Brents Stirling, "Cleopatra's Scene with Seleucus: Plutarch, Daniel, and Shakespeare," in Shakespeare 400, ed. J. MacManaway (New York, 1964), 299-301, and J. Shaw, "Cleopatra and Seleucus," REL, 7 (1966), 79-86; both argue that the scene is staged, but Stirling suggests that we are not meant to be sure of this until afterwards. Contrast Granville-Barker, p. 92 ("She cheats and lies ... as a matter of course").

60 V.ii.279, 298-311, 314.

61 V.ii.213-20 (220), 324-25.

62 Faerie Queene, III.vi.47. My view of the play's ending is influenced by those critics who see Cleopatra's triumph in creating by art an alternative version of truth to that of the Romans: Ornstein, "Ethic of the Imagination"; Rackin, "Shakespeare's Boy Cleopatra"; Anne Barton, "Nature's Piece 'Gainst Fancy": The Divided Catastrophe in "Antony and Cleopatra" (1973); Adelman, ch. 3; Duncan S. Harris, "Again for Cydnus: The Dramaturgical Resolution in Antony and Cleopatra," SEL, 17 (1977), 219-31. Of these, Barton defines the themes of the ending in terms closest to mine (movement versus rest), but whereas she sees the issue as whether Cleopatra will be "fixed" in Octavius' way or in her own, I see Cleopatra's triumph in her evasion of a single fixed definition. McAlindon's view of Cleopatra's "final change ... from levity to gravity, from weakness into unchanging nobility ... from becoming into being" (p. 210) is, I think, misleading. Ide, pp. 127-28, presents a view similar to mine, though in terms of a synthesis of (perfect) art and (imperfect) nature, rather than of constancy and mutability.

CONCLUSION: "WERE MAN BUT CONSTANT..."

1 TGV V.iv.110-112. The suggestion that Two Gentlemen is Shakespeare's first play is made in the Oxford Shakespeare, p. 1.
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The Bibliography is divided into Primary and Secondary Sources; a more detailed subdivision was impracticable, since many items cover more than one topic.

Under Primary Sources, translations of classical works are listed in chronological order following the original text (title of original is given in square brackets if not obvious). Editions of Shakespeare's plays are listed in chronological order under title of play. Collections precede individual works.

Secondary Sources include all works of criticism of the Roman plays, and other material relevant to the topic, which I have consulted. Items by the same author are listed in chronological order.

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