

Painful Stories: the Experience of Pain and its Narration in the
Greek Literature of the Imperial Period (100-250).

Daniel King

Abstract

Thesis Title: *Painful Stories: the experience of pain and its narration in the Greek literature of the Imperial period (100-250).*

Name and College: Daniel King, Merton College

Submitted for examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Classical Languages and Literature, Hilary Term, 2011.

This research project investigates the relationship between pain and the practices of explaining and narrating it to others. Current scholarship argues that the representation of suffering became, during the Imperial period, an increasingly effective and popular strategy for cultivating authority and that this explains the success of Christian culture's representation of itself as a community of sufferers. One criticism of this approach is that the experience of pain has often been assumed, rather than analysed. Here, I investigate the nature of pain by attending to its intimate relationship with language; pain was connected to the strategies used to communicate that experience to others. I will show that writers throughout the Imperial period were concerned with questions about how to communicate pain and how that act of communication shaped, managed, and alleviated the experience.

I investigate this culture along three axes. Part 1, 'The Sublime Representation of Pain', investigates the way different authors thought about the capacity of sublime language and rhetorical techniques such as *enargeia* to effectively communicate pain. I argue that for writers such as Longinus, the sublime offers an opportunity to replicate the traumatic experience of the pain sufferer in the audience or listener—pain is narrated to the audience through a traumatic communicative mode. Contrarily, I show how authors such as Plutarch and Galen were particularly concerned to *desublimize* the representation of pain, reducing the affective power of images of pain by promoting the audience's conscious engagement with the text or representational medium. Part 2, 'Medical Narratives', examines a conflict between Galen and Aristides over the way language and narrative signified or referred to painful experiences. I show how both writers negotiate the way pain destroys and transcends ordered, structured, narrative by engaging in a process of narrative translation. I will illuminate the difference between scientific, diagnostic narratives which explain and rationalise pain experiences (in the case of Galen) and those which attempt to *give witness to* the nebulous, ineffable qualities of pain. In Part 3, 'Narrating Cures' I investigate ancient practices of psychotherapy. I show how various philosophical consolations were underpinned by an understanding of the power of pain to continually return and overwhelm the individual. I show further that the Greek romances engage in a type of talking cure: the novels use narration and storytelling to help assert the protagonists' distance from their past traumatic experiences and, thus, allow the individual to overcome their painful past.

For my father, who bore so much pain.

Contents

1. ANCILLARY MATERIAL	6
--Acknowledgements	6
--Abbreviations	8
2. INTRODUCTION	9
--History of the Body in the Imperial Period	11
--Pain, Language, and Trauma	18
--The Structure of the Argument	24
--Limitations of this Study	28
3. CHAPTER 1: SUBLIME PAIN: THE SUBLIME, DESENSITISATION, AND THE REPRESENTATION OF PAIN	32
--The Sublime and Trauma	39
--Plutarch, Mimesis, and Painful Images	50
--Representing Bodily Violation in Plutarch and Galen	71
--Conclusions	96
4. CHAPTER 2: DIAGNOSTIC STORIES: PAIN, NARRATION, AND KNOWLEDGE IN A CLINICAL CONTEXT	99
--Diagnosis, Narrating Pain and Narrative Control in Galen	109
--Aristides <i>Tales</i> , Translation, and the Witness	133
--Conclusions	162
5. CHAPTER 3: WRITING CURES, NARRATIVE, PAIN, AND MANAGEMENT IN CHARITON, XENOPHON, AND ACHILLES TATIUS	164
--Memory, Past Experiences, and Pain	171
--Therapeutic Novels: Painful Events, Narration, and Pleasure	182
--Poetic Immersion and Greek Novels	189
--The <i>Telos</i> , Narration, and Pleasure	209
--Conclusions	220
6. CONCLUSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES	222
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY	231

Acknowledgements

The production of this thesis caused me considerable pain! The production of any thesis involves a considerable amount of painstaking effort; the subject matter of this work seemed to contribute to the suffering of the author: I worked on pain, and in pain. Over the course of my DPhil candidature at Merton College, Oxford, I have been fortunate enough to receive assistance from a number of quarters. I am unable to repay these contributions, I would, however, like to express my gratitude.

The research work of this thesis was made possible through the generosity of Merton College, and the Clarendon Press. I have also been the recipient of a great deal of financial and administrative support from the college. In this regard, I would particularly like to thank Rvd. Simon Jones, whose pastoral care during times of uncertainty was a constant source of support. I was also lucky enough to be part of the Clarendon Fund community. I would like to thank the Clarendon Press for their generous provision of a scholarship which allowed me to study at Oxford. During my stay at Oxford I have also been fortunate enough to be the recipient of a Bursary to study at the Fondation Hardt through the generosity of the Classical Association of the UK. In addition, to this a number of scholars were generous with their time and willing to discuss my research with me. I have benefitted from their time, and their incisive questions: they include, Prof. John Morgan, and Dr. Ian Redpath; Dr. Jas Elsner, and Prof. Stephen Harrison, Prof. Tobias Rheinhardt, and Prof. Chris Pelling, who all read various sections of the work, and were kind enough to offer encouragement and advice which helped fine tune my argument. Finally, on a personal note, three people deserve special mention. I would particularly like

to thank. Dr. Tim Whitmarsh. Tim has contributed his time, effort, and his considerable knowledge of Imperial Greek literature at every stage to help develop the project; it could not have been completed without him. I would also like to thank Claire Jamset, who has been a source of great emotional support and advice over the whole project, but particularly over the final months and weeks of this document's preparation. Finally, to Ria, who has watched this project consume most of my energy over the last two months and has offered important proof reading services (particularly in the final days before submission), and patiently waited for me to return to normal civilian life.

Abbreviations

References to the texts and editions used throughout this thesis are as follows. In the narrative of my argument I have tried to cite the primary texts by their standard English name. This facilitates ease of reading. Where this would have caused undue difficulty, I have offered a suitable abbreviation, which will be indicated in the text. When I have referenced Greek material—either in the footnotes or the text—I have adopted the conventional citation format with one notable exception. In the case of Galen’s works, I have cited his texts following the standard list of Latin abbreviations as set out in the Appendices of the *Cambridge Companion to Galen*.

Moreover, I have endeavoured to quote Galen from the standard Kühn editions; where I have opted for a more recent edition this has been indicated in the footnotes. References to Kühn follow the traditional format of volume number (small roman numerals), and page number (Arabic numerals).

Introduction

*Δοκεῖ δ' ἄν μοί τις καὶ δόγμα παρ' αὐτῶν ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ τὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐχίδνης φασὶ
πληγέντα μὴ ἐθέλειν ἑτέρῳ λέγειν ἀλλ' ἢ ὅστις πεπείραται, οὕτω καὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς
πόλεως καλῶν ἰδὼν ἰδόντι μόνον κοινοῦσθαι, ἣ μέλλοντί γε αὐτίκα, εἰς ἑτέρους δὲ οὐκ
ἄν ῥαδίως τοὺς λόγους ἐκφέρειν ὥσπερ εἰς βεβήλους ἱερά·. (Aristid. XVII.18)*

When Aristides figures his reluctance or inability to speak about Smyrna, he compares his reticence to the pain sufferer's unwillingness to articulate his experiences to others: just as the victim of a snake bite is disinclined to speak to others who lack first hand understanding of the experience, so the orator is reluctant to tell his audience about the beauty of his city. Aristides' parenthetical comparison encapsulates the concerns of this thesis. His passing remark, which invokes the heroic sufferer Philoctetes, looks towards the presentation of himself as a paradigmatic sufferer throughout his epideictic career. The orator's interest in his own suffering is often taken as a paradigm for his age. Dodds argued that he was emblematic of the concern with illness, and the body, which characterised the 'age of anxiety'.¹ His reference to Philoctetes is, as Bowersock has shown, part of a broader cultural interest in the Homeric hero's status as a model of suffering and salvation.² I see the significance of this parenthetical comment in slightly more complex terms. Philoctetes operates as a model which emblemizes the inability to communicate intense or profound experiences to others. Aristides' passage taps into a widespread

¹ Dodds (1965), 41; cf. Behr (1968), 162. Bowersock (1969), 60.

² Bowersock (1994), 55-76, on Aristides and this passage see esp., 68. For the cliché, cf. Pl. *Smp.* 217e; for other references in Aristides see XXVIII.130.

concern about how we effectively communicate the experience of pain and suffering to an audience which doesn't have an experiential understanding of such experiences; he questions, and asks his readers to confront, the way pain is narrated; how audiences who have not endured similar forms of pain might understand, recognise, or empathise with the experiences of an other. In so doing, he provides access to an important *mentalité* of Greek imperial Greek culture.

This study provides a history of the representation of pain in the Greek literature of the first three centuries AD. It does not investigate the way pain was given symbolic meaning through its literary representation; rather, it attends to the way writers from this period conceptualised the problem of representing, communicating, or narrating the intense experience of pain to others. How do Greek writers in the Imperial period figure the relationship between the experience of pain, story, and the audience? By focusing on the way different authors confronted the problem of narrating the experience of pain to others, this thesis will provide a sophisticated history of the suffering body. Returning to this history of the body, and the notion of pain, in this period is urgent. As we will discuss further, the history of the body has become an increasingly analysed topic in the modern academy. Significantly, that historiography has hitherto played down the way the body operates as the locus of intense, sensorial, or phenomenological experiences. This history attempts to reclaim the body as the conglomeration of lived experiences of pain.³

My return to the history of the lived experience of pain is significant for two reasons. Suffering, pain, and trauma have emerged as significant issues within theoretical literature and historiographical practice. Recent work on the notion of pain and suffering

³ An increasing amount of work, particularly, in anthropology and archaeology has attempted to reclaim the history of the senses. For sensory studies generally see: <http://www.sensorystudies.org/>. This work has been particularly influenced by the work of Meyer (2010); cf. Throop (2010).

has proliferated to the extent that the question of pain, trauma, and suffering now occupy a central place in the modern theories of historiography and literature in general: as LaCapra puts it in reference to trauma studies, the debate has ‘...arisen as one of the most significant and at times controversial areas in psychoanalytic thought with significant implications for history and critical theory.’⁴ This thesis engages in a debate with the philosopher Scarry (*The Body in Pain*), the psycho-analytic literary critic Caruth (*Regarding the Pain of Others*), and the social critic, Sontag (*Regarding the Pain of Others*).⁵ As such, it not only attempts to contribute to this growing debate about suffering and its relationship to culture, but also contribute to the discussion about Classics’ role in contemporary political, social, and ethical discussion. At a second level, it will contribute to our methodological approach to the cultural history of the ancient world by providing a particular model for thinking through the relationship between the text and body. It asks: how do we write the history of the body’s experiences through the appreciation of textual material? How do we write a cultural history of the classical period, how do we practice the history of the body in a world that is dominated by the text.

THE HISTORY OF THE BODY AND SUFFERING IN THE IMPERIAL PERIOD

The history of the body in antiquity, and the Imperial period, in particular, is a growing field.⁶ Since the second and third volumes of Foucault’s *History of Sexuality* scholarly interest in the way this era presents a watershed in the ancient cultural concern

⁴ LaCapra (2009), 60. For further studies on violence and trauma see: Jay (2003); Sanyal (2006), esp., 1-11. *cf.* La Capra’s own further work, such as *History and Memory after Auschwitz*: LaCapra (1998).

⁵ Scarry (1985); Sontag (2003); Caruth (1996)—also influential her is her edited volume *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, Caruth (1995).

⁶ Porter (1999), 1, for the way the fascination with the classical body has discovered itself. For an overview of the field in its early form, *cf.* the work of Roy Porter: Porter (1991), 206-32. For more specific studies on antiquity see: Gleason (1995); Wyke (1997), (1998); Porter (1999); Gunderson (2000); Rimmell (2002); Garrison (2010).

with, and practices of, the body has developed rapidly.⁷ One central theme of this scholarly discussion has been the role played by the body in social and cultural conflict, resistance, and self-definition. Scholars have attempted to connect the Greek literary culture of the first three centuries AD with the emergence of Christian ethics and culture in late antiquity. The body has played a central role in how scholars position the Imperial society, as either the end of antiquity or the beginning of the Christian culture of late antiquity; the body has been read as an important site for the construction, authorisation, and reification of political and social authority of these two cultural movements. This scholarly positioning has undermined the complexity with which we approach the experience of pain. Pain, as a bodily experience, has often been assumed or given by scholars attempting to explain the emergence of Christian culture in the second and third centuries: Foucault, Brown, Shaw, and others have all attempted to see how the interest in the body and pain contributes to a new cultural understanding of the self and its relationship to society. This return to the history of suffering attempts, then, to address the limitations of our scholarly positioning of the body.

Let us begin by turning to Foucault's third volume of *The History of Sexuality*. For Foucault, the medical and philosophical interest in corporeal pleasures was built on an understanding of the body as an important site of social and political interest and ethical and hygienic action. Medical discourses and philosophical exhortation continually encouraged the individual to attend to the control and management of the body in an attempt to form himself⁸ as an ethical subject; the individual, denied the opportunity for the political and public honours available under the Republic, turned towards the management

⁷ Foucault (1987); (1990).

⁸ Foucault's treatment primarily focuses on formation of the adult male as an ethical subject. Despite the problems with such a gender specific focus, over the course of this thesis, my concern will be largely on the male experience of pain.

of the individual's self through the practice of attending, intensely, and constantly to the experiences of the body.⁹ Foucault's model of ethical concern with the body has been attacked from a number of different angles by (among others) Gleason and König.¹⁰ Nevertheless, his suggestion that the body operated as a site of cultural concern has been adopted and developed by scholars such as Brown who have shown how codes of sexual practice operated as an important medium for the engagement with (often in the form of resistance) the current political and social context of the Roman empire among different Christian and Jewish communities.¹¹ For Foucault and Brown the body operates as a site of cultural definition and political action throughout the Imperial period.

If the work of these two scholars has emphasised the centrality of the body to the cultural life of the Imperial period, then it has also used that model to engage in a particular historical mapping of that culture between Christian late antiquity and the Greco-Roman world. Foucault's ultimate aim in the *Care of the Self* was to place the ethics of Greek philosophers and writers alongside their later Christian counterparts. He writes of the codes surrounding the body:

...by focusing only on these common traits, one may get the impression that the sexual ethics attributed to Christianity or even to the modern West was already in place, at least with respect to its basic principles, at the time when Greco-Roman culture reached its culmination. But this would be to disregard fundamental differences concerning the type of relation to the self and hence the forms of integration of these precepts in the subject's experience of himself.¹²

⁹ Foucault (1990), 85.

¹⁰ Gleason (1995), xxv-xxvi; König (2005). For more general criticisms of Foucault's *Care of the Self* see: Goldhill (1995).

¹¹ Brown (1988), 5-32 on the austere sexual codes of antiquity.

¹² Foucault (1990), 144, cf. 39.

Foucault's placement of ancient ethics appears to emphasise the disjuncture between ancient pagan and Christian concern with the body. Yet his suggestion that the relationship is defined by similar codes, but a different 'relation to the self' appears ambiguous and (as Burrus points out) goes a long way to paving the way for a reintegration of Christianity into ancient ethical concern with the body's pleasures.¹³ More significantly, what interests me is the way Foucault's investigative task is framed and evaluated in terms of the comparison with Christian ethics. According to this formulation, Foucault's ultimate aim was to understand the trajectory which led to the development of Christian (and, ultimately, modern) sexuality.

The stance that Foucault adopts at this point is matched by Brown's who sees in the sombre codes of antiquity the origins of a Christian concern with austerity.¹⁴ What matters here is not the specific relationship between the codes and culture of the body that Foucault and Brown (in their different ways) document. These approaches attempt to place the body within a teleological account of ancient culture in which the ancient world is evaluated in terms of the bodily practices and belief system which emerged in Christian communities of late antiquity; it ultimately shapes the way the phenomena of Greek Imperial society, literature, and culture are read and understood. The Christian culture of late antique society becomes the *cynosure* against which the "pagan" world is understood.¹⁵ The implications of this approach are twofold. Firstly, it warps our interest in the cultural practices, and concerns of the Imperial period: the significance of different phenomena is evaluated in terms of their relationship, or contribution, to the development

¹³ Burrus (2004), 2-4.

¹⁴ Brown (1988), 21-3

¹⁵ The teleology of Brown's view is most explicitly stated in his *Making of Late Antiquity*: his aim was to map '...in the late second, third, and early fourth centuries the emergence of features that were far from clearly discernible at the time ... and which finally came together to form the definitively Late Antique style of religious, cultural, and social life that emerged in the late fourth and early fifth centuries.' Brown (1978), 1-2.

and success of later historical or cultural forms. Secondly, it assumes a teleology to the practices of pagan culture in the first three centuries AD. Such an evolutionary model promotes and solidifies a scholarly complicity in the triumphant history of Christianity.

The teleological model impacts directly on the way scholars have approached the history of pain and suffering in this period. In his article 'Body/Power/Identity', Shaw turns to the way the negotiation and endurance of pain and suffering offers a strategy for political resistance. For Shaw, the trials and executions of Christians operate as a way of using force (represented in the painful destruction of the body) to inscribe political ideology and power on the body of the condemned.¹⁶ Shaw's central argument is that individuals used the patient endurance of torture and suffering imposed by others to resist the imposition of cultural ideology by political authorities; by mobilising cultural codes which valorised the patient endurance (*ὑπομονή*) of torture were able to reverse the political relationships inherent in the infliction of bodily pain and torture.¹⁷ What interests me in this argument is the way in which pagan texts are used to document the cultural codes and assumptions which explain the success of Christian culture: according to Shaw the process of resistance through patient endurance ensured that individual instances of political domination through torture failed, and underpinned the ultimate failure of the pagan political authorities: 'the cumulative effect of individual acts of resistance compelled a final failure in the long term.'¹⁸ Shaw points to texts such as Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*, and the presentation of Leucippe's resistance and confrontation of her master (and would-be rapist) Thersandros as evidence for a change in the ethical codes

¹⁶ Shaw (1996), 269-312, esp., 275-8.

¹⁷ Shaw (1996), 278-84; 291-300; cf. Table 1 at 310

¹⁸ 'The body was indeed the site of a struggle. The spectacular trials and executions of the Christians are but an extreme instance of the use of force to elicit a certain public behaviour from subject bodies, to inscribe one sort of ideology on the body. In this case, it was rejected. Not only did such attempts fail in individual cases—the cumulative effect of individual acts of resistance compelled a final failure in the long term': Shaw (1996), 311

which valorise the passive resistance to power.¹⁹ Shaw's approach to, and use of, Achilles Tatius' novel co-opts the work into the construction of Christian ethics which emerge during the final stages of the Imperial period.²⁰ It is of course hard to deny that this text might have participated in, influenced (or been influenced by) the development of Christian culture. My concern emerges from the fact that reading the treatment of pain and suffering in these texts serves to reify a complicity with the ultimate success of Christian culture and ethics; secondly, it warps the complexity, and the potentially, instructive reading made apart from Christian sources. Can we evaluate Achilles Tatius' treatment of pain and suffering without focusing on the way they contribute to the emergence and dominance of Christian culture?

The problems of attempting to explain the success of Christian culture through the history of the suffering body is phrased in slightly different terms in Perkins' *The Suffering Self*. Like Shaw, Perkins' primary objective is to trace the way the cultural concern with the suffering body is transformed throughout the period; this transformation provides the basis for the "triumph" of Christianity: its success, she argues, needs to be mapped

...within the discursive struggle over these representations [of suffering]. It would be around one of these represented "subjects", the suffering self, that Christianity would form and ultimately achieve its institutional power.²¹

Perkins' interest in the representation of suffering has two primary limitations. Perkins' model is built on a particular interest in the way cultural representation helps to form the cultural understanding, awareness, and knowledge of the experience of suffering. The

¹⁹ For Shaw's use of Achilles Tatius, and other classical authors, see: Shaw (1996), 269-75.

²⁰ A point made more poignant by the fact that *L&C* appears to have been co-opted by ancient writers into the construction Christian ethics: cf. the epigram attributed to either Photius or Leon, *Anth. Pal.* 9.203.

²¹ For 'triumph', and quote: Perkins (1995), 3

concern with explaining the increasing focus on the representation of the self as a sufferer fails to treat the question of suffering in detail: the body's experience of suffering is taken as given; despite its apparent placement at the centre of her study, the experience of pain is often left in abeyance. The complexities of the way the novels construct the experience of suffering alongside the works of Aristides and Galen, for example, is ultimately not taken into account by a investigative strategy which focuses on the emergence of, and ultimate success of, Christian concern with the poor, sick, and suffering individual. In addition to this, it assumes that the process of representation is unproblematic: there is an inadequate delineation of how the experience of suffering is differentiated or modulated by the practices of representation across the authors and texts she works with. The body's experience of suffering is, almost paradoxically, assumed, rather given detailed focus.

This thesis departs from the work of Perkins and others in two important ways. The central contention of this study is that the Greek literary culture of the Imperial period was deeply concerned with the experience of suffering and its relationship to the process of narration and explanation. Building on Perkins' work, this thesis probes the close relationship between representational form and suffering: if suffering is, as Perkins contends, continually placed at the centre of the representational culture of the Imperial period, then how is that process inflected by the very nature of painful experience? How is the nature of painful experience influenced by the strategies used to communicate and represent that experience? How is that relationship negotiated and manipulated by different authors, working in different contexts? Is the reader's or audience's capacity to understand the painful experience of another influenced by the representational strategies adopted by different authors? By tracing the way different forms of narration operated at different points throughout the Imperial period, I will show how this culture engages with a particular conception of the relationship between the bodily experience of pain and its

communication. This concern with how authors approached the representation of pain experiences will help to return scholarly focus to the body and its experiences itself.

PAIN, LANGUAGE, AND TRAUMA.

This investigation of the way Greek authors negotiated the representation and narration of the experience of pain is designed to enhance our understanding of the body in the Imperial period by (a) investigating these “pagan” authors on their own terms; and (b) attending to the experience of pain in a more direct way. Here, I continue to build a context for the study by framing the interest in the relationship between pain and narrative against modern philosophical, anthropological, and psychoanalytic approaches to the pain-language relationship. I show, here, how the traditional philosophical model of the dialogue fails to provide an effective model for engaging with other’s pain on ethical or empathetic terms. I then argue that that a Freudian psychoanalytic approach to the relationship will provide an effective tool which will help unpack this ancient culture. This model will help us construct a model of bodily experience which emphasises to the complexity of the corporeal in this period, and which helps unpack the dynamic, mutually productive relationship between pain and language, suffering and narrative.

1. Pain and Language

The way different cultures give expression to the experience of pain has been the subject of inquiry among a range of philosophical, neurological and scientific, and anthropological scholars.²² One important trend in this intellectual field has focused on

²² The discourse on the capacity of man to speak effectively about their pain is considerable. The issue operates as a central example in Wittgenstein’s analysis of private language: Wittgenstein (1991) §241-6; Schroeder (1991), 174-98. *cf.* also the discussion of pain within clinical and neurological research: Mattingly (2000). *cf.* also from an anthropological viewpoint: Diller (1980), 9-26. which is specifically designed to

pain's status as an individual, private experience; one which denies the sufferer the capacity and the resources to effectively communicate that experience in language. In her influential work, *The Body in Pain*, Scarry argues that pain is inherently resistant to the process of socialisation. This resistance, she claims, is characterised by the way pain creates different levels of understanding, comprehension, and empathy between sufferers and others. The unsharability of pain is defined by its unavailability to linguistic or narrative representation. Physical pain 'does not simply resist language, but actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned.'²³ This unavailability to language raises questions about the possibility of understanding and empathising with others' experience of pain:

for the person in pain, so incontestably and unnegotiably present is it that "having pain" may come to be thought of as the most vibrant example of what it means to "have certainty," while for the other person it is so elusive that "hearing about pain" may exist as the primary model of what it is "to have doubt". Thus pain comes unsharably into our midst as at once that which cannot be denied and that which cannot be confirmed.²⁴

Scarry's formulation, then, confronts the possibility of ethical and empathetic action towards suffering, and cultural criticism of the experience of pain in stark terms. If pain is characterised by its resistance to knowledge and sharing, then how might we conceive both of genuine empathy and action, and the cultural history of pain?

explore the validity of Scarry's claims. In a classical context: cf. the discussion of the presentation of Philoctetes' pain by Budelmann (2007), 443-67.

²³ Scarry (1985), 4-5.

²⁴ Scarry (1985), 4.

Scarry's assertions about pain's incommunicability are predicated on a particular approach to a referential theory of language in which the capacity of words to indicate the inner sensations of the individual is prioritised over the performative aspects of speech. The reference to performative elements of language, here, is reminiscent of a number of theoretical ideas concerning the operation of language in society. Most notably, it looks to Butler's theories of language performativity: for Butler, performativity refers to that aspect of language or discourse which continually creates and shapes the phenomena to which it refers.²⁵ For the purposes of this study, my interest in performative language is connected to way different anthropologists have used the idea that discourse helps to shape the experiences it refers to. Scarry's suggestion that pain has the capacity to destroy language downplays the way different cultures offer individuals a range of resources and strategies for communicating their pain to others. Indeed, by adopting a more subtle approach to the presentation of suffering in language, it is possible to explore in greater detail the way in which pain maintains a close and productive relationship with narrative and language. As Kleinman, Das, and Locke explain in their work *Social Suffering*, the performative aspects of language and speech genres within particular communities help 'in moulding the experience of suffering so that certain experiences of pain and grieving become expressible while others are shrouded in silence.'²⁶ Indeed, they argue it is possible to think about the way in which language and pain maintain a close relationship, each working to shape the other: '... while experience is shaped by representations it can also push against these representations—resisting language, bending it in new directions, and distorting the received ways of expressing distress and desperation so that these distortions themselves transform the experience of suffering.' Kleinman, Das, and Lock propose, then, a model

²⁵ Reference to performative aspects of language can be taken in a number of ways. Judith Butler argues that performative language must be seen as 'that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains': Butler (1993), 2.

²⁶ Kleinman (1996), xiv.

which prioritises the close, performative, and mutually transformative relationship between language and pain.

2. *Freud, Language, and Trauma*

The philosophical work of Scarry and the anthropological work of *Social Suffering* provide alternate points of departure for this investigation's treatment of the pain-language dialogue. How might we investigate this productive or performative relationship? In order to create a methodological framework for this study, I turn here to Freud and his psychoanalytic theories about the experience of trauma. As has been acknowledged, many of the theories which underpin Freud's approach to psychoanalysis lack a scientific basis: they were often not intended to be more than hypothetical assertions about the individual and the experience of extreme traumatic events. Nevertheless, I will argue that Freud's approach to the analysis and treatment of traumatic past experiences forms an invaluable methodological *praxis* for the study of the pain-language relationship in the Imperial period.

The use of Freud to unpack the dynamics of ancient culture grates with the traditional approaches of classicists: psychoanalysis has had, hitherto, a problematic relationship with classical scholarship. Much of this criticism has been based on the absence of a scientific basis for Freud's theoretical assertions. According to Schmitz, for example, the lack of scientific basis to Freud's work has ensured that any attempt to use a Freudian reading to explain the dynamics of ancient culture are inherently speculative and deprived of authority.²⁷ This criticism has been developed particularly in relation to Freud's concern with the individuals' unconscious mind, which has been adopted to

²⁷ Schmitz (2007) 197, esp., n158-9 for further bibliography: 'if Freud's theories really lack a scientific basis, any interpretation of literary texts or cultural phenomena inspired by these theories cannot claim any form of authority' (197). For criticism of Schmitz' overly positivistic approach to Freud see Oliensis (2009), 3.

provide a methodology for thinking about the hidden meanings of texts, or the unconscious, psychological qualities of the author which stands behind classical texts.²⁸ Scholars have pointed out that the wholesale application of Freudian theories of the unconscious to classical texts is problematic. In order to overcome concerns about the scientific or factual basis of Freud's theories is use his approach to literature and trauma to raise new questions about the way pain and narrative interact in the second century. Using a Freudian methodology, in this instance, involves returning to the ancient evidence with a different eye; it will help to regenerate our understanding of pain because it will make it possible to place connect different aspects of ancient texts which have been downplayed in previous scholarship.

Freud's contribution to the methodological concerns of this thesis can be seen on two levels. The first concerns his particular definition of trauma. Freud's approach to trauma encapsulated a particular approach to the combined psychological and physiological nature of pain. The experience of trauma included exposure to extreme events or shocks which impacted on the physical body—accidents and physiological wounds are important elements in his list of potential traumas.²⁹ This physical element was replicated on a psychological level: extreme physical injuries or shocks rearranged the internal *psyche* in a manner analogous to the physical wound. For Freud, the destruction of the individual's psychological order constitutes the critical element of the traumatic experience, and was the foundation of the experience of traumatic neuroses and physical pain.³⁰ Importantly, non-physical experiences could have a similarly deleterious effect on

²⁸ Schmitz (2007), 198-99; Oliensis (2009), 1-13, esp., 5-11.

²⁹ Laplanche (1983), 465-73 for Freud's various treatments of trauma, traumatic hysteria, and traumatic neurosis.

³⁰ The most eloquent example of this can be found in his description of the question of shock to his friend Fliess, where he tells claims that the 'uncoupling of associations' and the 'rearrangement' of psychical energy associated with traumatic experience acts in a manner 'analogous to an internal wound, and causes pain: Freud (1985), 103-4. For a full discussion of this passage, see Chapter 1, below: text to notes 9-12.

the individual's psychological structure. It is for this reason that Freud's understanding of trauma encompassed a range of or emotional or primarily psychological experiences which had the capacity to rearrange the individual's internal *psyche*: that is, loss of the mother, loss of the libido, the death of a loved one, frustration of sexual development.³¹ What I take from this approach to trauma is the combined way that psychological and physical experiences contribute to the experience of pain. When I discuss the physical experience of pain, I mobilise Freud's understanding of the interaction between *psyche* and *soma*. Although I will refer primarily to the experiences of the body, it remains a central contention that the experience of pain (a) confounded the boundaries between the body and the mind of ancient sufferers, and (b) always involved a degree of psychological disintegration or rearrangement of internal emotional order.

The second important aspect of Freud's thinking which helps shape my critical approach is the relationship between literature and the experience of trauma. For the purposes of this study what is important is the way pain and language maintain a symbiotic relationship. On the one hand, Freud argued that trauma and pain served to confound certain literary forms—pain impacts on the capacity to create coherent complete narratives of our experience. As we shall discuss further, below, the basic rule of psycho-analysis presupposed that the process of producing an accurate narrative about one's dreams, or past traumas involved producing a story which broke free of the normal restraints of narrative genre, order, and coherence. Translating the overwhelming experiences of the past into sophisticated narrative form required the patient to break the normal rules of social discourse. At the same time, Freud's process of helping the patient to construct narratives which helped the individual make sense of, order, and arrange their experiences influenced their experience of pain. For Freud (and much subsequent psychotherapy) the

³¹ See above note 29.

production of coherent ordered narrative is central to the process of not only understanding pain, but a significant role in the healing process. As Eisenberg explains:

once the patient has a coherent “explanation” which leaves him no longer feeling the victim of the inexplicable and uncontrollable, the symptoms are, usually, exorcised.³²

Freud’s approach to psychotherapy asks us to return to way literature is impacted by, and effects changes in, physical experience. Approaching ancient texts through this framework will allow us to refigure the scholarly approach to the dynamic relationship between the experience of painful trauma, and the process of communicating that experience to others.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT.

Now that we have outlined the theoretical and methodological matrix of this thesis, let us outline the structure of my argument. In doing so, I will make two points. I wish to position myself within modern debates about ancient cultural history. Furthermore, I hope to show how each of my chapters adopt a slightly different approach to the history of the Imperial period.

This investigation of the nature of the body attempts to trace the history of a *mentalité* concerning pain-language relationship. The term *mentalité* has been taken from a specific genre of cultural history known as the *Histoire des Mentalités* promoted by a number of cultural historians, most notably Darnton, Chartier, and Zemon Davis.³³ This form of cultural history has often been criticised for failing to develop a precise definition for the concept which drives its methodology. Darnton, for instance, complains that

³² Eisenberg (1981), 245.

³³ Darnton (1984); Zemon-Davis (1987); Chartier (1991). For a discussion of this see Hunt (1989).

‘despite a prolegomena and discourses on method, ...[scholars] have not developed a coherent conception of *mentalités* as a field of study’.³⁴ Nevertheless, the absence of a coherent theoretical outline of what constitutes the object of study among historians of *mentalités* does not undermine its usefulness for this analysis of the ancient world. This study starts from a three-fold understanding of this concept. This history focuses on (a) the collective, communal, and often unspoken attitudes which exist within Imperial culture; (b) the perceptions and assumptions which lie behind texts we read, rather than solely their explicit theories or elaborated ideas; (c) and, finally, the relationship between everyday events or historical artefacts and broad structures of thought and practice.³⁵

Approaching the imperial period through this framework will allow us to build a complex picture of the way the body was approached throughout the first three centuries AD. The first concerns the idea of collective thought. A central part of this thesis is that texts from very different aspects of Imperial culture engage, negotiate, and work through common ideas; As we shall see, Plutarch’s *Concerning Flesh Eating* has little explicit connection either with Longinus’ *Concerning the Sublime*, or Aristides’ *Sacred Tales*. Nevertheless, by thinking about the Imperial world in terms *mentalités* it becomes possible to see how these texts are subtly linked by their engagement with a broad, unspoken assumption about the pain-language relationship. The notion of a *mentalité* allows us to see how Galen’s case history narratives and Aristides’ *Tales* argue for divergent views about the possibility of translating pain into language but engage with the same assumptions about the way pain and language interact with each other. Approaching different textual events from across this culture will allow us to understand how authors from across genres

³⁴ Darnton (1980), 346; cf. 344-7 on the way the concept of *mentalités* has subsumed other similar concepts from German and English historiography.

³⁵ This definition owes much to the position of Burke (1986), 359. For fuller discussions of this and other definitions of *Histoire des mentalities* see Hunt (1989), 9-11.

and from different periods contribute to the complexity of Imperial culture's engagement with the history of pain. The *histoire des mentalités* provides then, a type of anthropology of ideas which will help unpack the variegated negotiation of the ancient experience of suffering.

As I have intimated above, this investigation proposes two central contentions. 1. That the psycho-somatic experience of pain was intricately tied up with the way in which it was communicated and narrated. 2. That this relationship was defined by the way pain is experienced as a traumatic, overwhelming process. In order to argue for these two themes, I develop three discussions. In the first chapter, I turn to the culture of rhetorical representation. I am concerned here to investigate the way authors figured audience engagement with the rhetorical representation of pain. I turn to modern theories of representation and the process of desensitisation to help phrase the way in which authors from across the second century AD negotiate the capacity of rhetoric to communicate experience. I argue that the sublime forms of rhetoric developed in Longinus present a traumatic mode of communication which replicates the experience of trauma outside the original sufferer. Narration and communication, here, occurs at a level which allows pain to be recognised and understood through the vicarious experience of the audience: the text becomes a medium for the transmission of painful experience because it itself wounds and penetrates the reader. By modulating the use of rhetoric, authors at other points in the cultural landscape were able to strategically control the way audiences engage with other's pain. By tracing the different forms of engagement with the sublime, this chapter argues for the presence of a subtle, widespread assumption about the relationship between the body, its experience of pain and trauma, and language.

In Chapter 2, I turn to personal accounts of pain experience within a medical context. Here I use a medical anthropological perspective to explore how knowledge and practices of narration interact within a clinical sphere. I show how Galen and Aristides engage differently with the idea of pain as a nebulous, disordered experience which confounds, and transcends narrative. I show how Galen attempts to translate the language of patients' experiences into sophisticated discourse which links narrative recognition with the process of diagnosis. I show how this process of recognition through narrative translation is resisted by Aristides, who creates a text which deliberately and consciously uses the process of translation to deny the reader access to the experience of pain. In exploring how these two writers figure the translation of the body into sophisticated literature we will explore questions about how the body operates as a type of text: to what extent does pain render the body legible; can the experience of pain be tied down with scientific or rational certainty. We will see, ultimately, how the process of translation was used to confront and engage with the way extreme, overwhelming, and disordered pain experiences impact on language, narrative, and cultural forms of representation; and how medical culture attempts to negotiate that relationship.

Finally, in Chapter 3, I turn to the treatment of nebulous pain experiences. I show how some of the Greek romances, and philosophical consolation confront the notion of traumatic pain. My primary concern here is how the experience of pain is managed, and controlled. In the case of philosophical consolation, I turn to the question of how painful experiences are managed by systematically manipulating the individual's relationship with the past, often through the process of strategically remembering various pleasurable experiences. I then show how Greek romance novels continue to envisage the therapeutic management of pain through the process of controlling the individual's relationship with his past. I do this by investigating how the individual's ability to assert their distance from

the past events helps transform painful experiences into pleasurable ones. This chapter contributes two points to help conclude the investigation. It provides a powerful example of how pain transcends boundaries between past and present, always threatening to overwhelm the individual. It also shows how that process is, in the case of the novels particularly, modulated primarily through the practice of narrating lugubrious past events to others.

Throughout this thesis, the use of modern scholarly debates and theories will help elucidate and develop our understanding of the way ancient culture thought and operated. In all the chapters I use modern debate to help combine different texts from ostensibly different aspects of ancient culture. I turn to the works of scholars such as Sontag, or the modern debate about psychotherapy to help construct a sophisticated picture of the ancient world. I do not suggest that the thought and debates of the ancient world can be mapped simply by applying modern scholarly concerns and theoretical discussions. I justify the use of such theoretical works on two levels: firstly, I wanted to try and combine texts along lines that were not necessarily investigated before: desensitisation, for instance, allows us to think about a new combination of texts and a slightly different cultural *mentalité*. I wanted also to show how certain texts raised issues, confronted modern ideas about pain and language, and raised ethical questions which engage contemporary scholars. In order to achieve this it was necessary to frame ancient debates within more modern scholarly concerns.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

This thesis focuses primarily on the literary and linguistic communication of bodily pain. There are a number of other strategies for communicating bodily experience. Here I

want to outline three of those other paths, and the reasons which underpinned the focus of this thesis.

There are a number of other forms of representation which are concerned with the depiction of suffering. A more substantial analysis of the way pain is represented in other artistic forms such as painting, statuary, or grave *stelai* would certainly repay further examination. Statuary, paintings, and other cultural forms of expression like grave *stelai*, while dealing with the questions of grief and pain, don't offer the same possibilities for analysing the relationship between narrative and pain. The focus of this thesis was limited to the forms of textual or narrative representation discussed in the chapters below for two reasons. Firstly, I wanted to explore the way the body interacted in a culture in which the word maintains a great deal of power: how does the lived body interact with the text, the language and cultural forms of a highly rhetorical and literary society. The second, and related, reason concerns methodology. Texts provide greater scope for exploring the way narrative operates, they offer greater possibilities for exploring the relationship between silence and language, or the connection between voice, narrative, and cultural authority.

If one major limitation of this study of pain concerned the mediums which were analysed, another concerns the types of pain experience I have omitted from the following analysis. Two examples of this are the martial experiences, war wounds, and injury sustained on campaign, and the pains associated with labour and child birth. Both of these forms of experience have been excluded because they were culturally marginal. Accounts of war wounds, and the painful experience of life on campaign, have been preserved in a

number of writers; medical accounts of treating such victims have also been preserved.³⁶ Nevertheless, such accounts does not take on the cultural status of accounts of clinical practice in Galen or other doctors such as Rufus of Ephesus; secondly, such accounts are rarely developed in terms of the problem of narrating or explain pain to an audience. The case of labour and child-birth is slightly more problematic. Labour and pregnancy pain touches on a related issue of giving voice to, and focusing on, female experience within the ancient world—choosing not to focus on this gendered experience is a highly politicised decision, and contributes to the silencing of female experience (never something which should be undertaken lightly). Nevertheless, this experience is not given the same degree of discussion as other experiences of pain. Soranus' *Gynaecology*, for example, contains a number of prolonged discussions of the nature of the female body, and the treatment of pain associated with child birth.³⁷ Nevertheless, the question of pregnancy and its associated pains is less significant among ancient authors than masculine experiences: the pain felt by adult men is, put simply, given a great deal more air time than those of women.³⁸

This study, ultimately, does not aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of the experience of pain and suffering in the Imperial period: there are areas which require further analysis, and experiences which have been relegated to the periphery of my concerns. Nevertheless, it does make a significant contribution to the understanding of pain. It collects together, and provides an in depth analysis of the experience of pain in a number of texts central to the culture of the period. In doing so, it will not only adjust our understandings about the history of the body, it will raise historiographical questions about

³⁶ On the limited literary sources for war wounds see: Salazar (2000), 1-9; for his treatment of the perception of pain see 55. For further comments on the language associated with war wounds see: Gleason (2001), 50-85; Leigh (1995), 195-216 on the strategic use of war wounds within Roman politics.

³⁷ Soranus discusses the pain associated with pregnancy at, for example, Sor. *Gyn.* 1.67-9. His account provides, primarily, instructions for alleviating the pains associated with child-birth.

³⁸ On the gender politics of representing female pain in pleasurable ways see Richlin (1992).

the texts which contribute to this culture; it will also raise methodological issues both about how we practice the history of the body in the ancient world, and how that history contributes to our understanding of the politics of pain and its representation in modern ethical and philosophical discussions.

Sublime Pain: The Sublime, Desensitisation, and the Representation of Pain

In the Introduction, above, I proposed two arguments: I suggested, firstly, that the experience of pain in the second century was understood in terms similar to what modern theorists understand as trauma. As a corollary of this contention, I showed that the experience of pain was associated with a series of concerns or questions about how that experience might be effectively communicated to others. I suggested that it was possible to trace a broad cultural *mentalité* which centred on the difficulty of narrating, and socialising, suffering. In this first chapter, I begin to map out the contours of that set of inherited ideas by investigating the way the sublime was negotiated by authors concerned with the relationship between the reader, the nature of representational medium, and the painful subject matter it often aimed to communicate. The sublime offers a particularly efficacious strategy for overcoming the distancing effects of narrative representation by replicating the experience of trauma for the audience. By refiguring their engagement with this sublime experience authors constructed a culture of aesthetic ‘desensitisation’, in which the viewer’s direct sensual engagement with real pain was downplayed. As we shall see, this had profound effects on the way in which pain is seen, imagined, and empathised with in different cultural contexts such as medicine or the treatment of animal rights.

‘Desensitisation’ has become a central theme in modern critical discussions of the way narrative shapes the individual’s awareness of the suffering of others. Susan Sontag,

in her *Regarding the Pain of Others*, argues that the mass-media culture of the modern world has dramatically changed the relationship between reality and representation. The image has become reality: ‘... the vast maw of modernity has chewed up reality and spat the whole mess out as images. ... Each situation has to be turned into a spectacle to be real—that is interesting—to us.’¹ For Sontag, the fact that war and atrocity have become (for most) a series of images—as opposed to a set of real experiences—has desensitised us by undermining our capacity for ethical engagement with others on the basis of intense proximity to suffering and physical risk.² Kleinman’s ‘The Dismay of Images, The Appeal of Experience’ argues a similar point: the globalisation of suffering has created a cultural environment in which it has become a commodity that can be marketed, and the experience itself is undermined and distorted.³ One of the major critical models for thinking about the communication of others’ suffering, then, concerns the distancing effects of the very medium used to convey that experience.

The model presented by modern scholars concerns the way in which representation prevents the individual from imagining and understanding the experiences of another. Desensitisation phrases questions about our capacity to know and understand the experience of suffering, and ultimately empathise with the suffering of those immediately removed from the audience. Various aspects of ancient rhetorical and artistic theory were concerned with questions about the capacity of representation to induce control and manipulate the individual’s direct exposure to past or distant events. As has been acutely examined by Webb in *Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical*

¹ Sontag (2003), 109; cf. her own criticisms of the ‘provinciality’ of calling reality a spectacle on 109. Her analysis builds heavily on Debord’s *La Societe de la Spectacle*: Debord (1967).

² Sontag (2003), 111. Kleinman (1996), 1-24, esp., 4-5; cf. Shapiro (1988), xii: ‘...representation is the absence of presence, but because the real is never wholly present to us—how it is real for us is always mediated through some representational practice—we lose something when we think of representation as mimetic [directly imitative?].’ For further discussions see: Morris (1996), 25-45; Vas (1996), 67-91.

³ Kleinman (1996), 2-3.

Theory and Practice rhetorical vividness, which was built on the use of *ekphrasis* and *enargeia*, allowed individuals to experience events from which they were removed in space and time as first hand witnesses: *enargeia* and vividness underpinned the audience's ability to 'see' or imagine the experiences of others.⁴ In this chapter, I use that concern with imagination to engage with this modern debate in two ways. I argue firstly, that the sublime challenges the Sontag and Kleinman model by showing how it collapsed the distance between the listener (or reader) and the subject matter of the representation. Secondly, I map the contexts in which desensitisation developed; I argue that desensitisation emerged as a consequence of an ideologically motivated concern with the nature of art and language, which re-established the affective boundaries between trauma and pain, the representational medium, and the receptor.

1. *Trauma, Consciousness, and Desensitisation*

In order to provide a more secure basis for the examination of the relationship between rhetoric and desensitisation, I turn to Freud's approach to the experience of traumatic shock and its conscious negotiation. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Pleasure)* Freud argues that the living organism has to take specific measures to protect itself against the potentially overwhelming external energies which it encounters every day. These external energies were continually experienced as 'shocks' or 'traumas' which left permanent marks on the individual's subconscious or unconscious mind.⁵ The individual's conscious mind played a vital role in protecting this delicate unconscious from the external energies: the conscious perceptual system is responsible for protecting the individual from excessive shock through the interpretation and negotiation of, and protection against,

⁴ Webb (2009), 19-28; cf. Zanker (1981), 297-311 on *enargeia*; Elsner (2002), 1-18 for the connection with *ekphrasis*.

⁵ Freud (1963), 275: 'we apply it to an experience which within a short period of time presents the mind with an increase in stimulus too powerful to be dealt with or worked off in the normal way, and this must result in permanent disturbances of the manner in which the [psychical] energy operates.'

external stimuli or energies which induced excessive, overwhelming excitation.⁶ Throughout *Pleasure*, Freud conceives the living organism as surrounded by a ‘protective shield’. Although this protective shield is discussed in terms of a physiological barrier presented to the outside world, it is also conceived in terms of a broader psychological and metaphorical process: this metaphorical protective shield guarantees protection against

‘excitation ... by periodic cathexis and decathexis [ie. direction, redirection, and interpretation⁷] of the perception-consciousness system. Hence this system simply takes “samples” of the external world. The breaking-down of the mass of stimuli may therefore be treated as the work not of a purely spatial apparatus but of a temporal mode of functioning which assures a ‘periodic non-excitability’.⁸

Freud’s conclusions about the way the conscious perceptual system works were never intended to be more than hypothetical speculations about the operation of the individual’s psychological engagement with the real world. This hypothesis, however, allows us to engage critically with the factors central to the ancient rhetorical theory, viz., the psychologically destructive capacities of powerful rhetorical image or language. Indeed reading concepts such as the sublime through this framework of shock and its conscious negotiation allows us to see the traumatic nature of language in a new light.

The notion of shock is particularly instructive in this regard. The concept has a long history in studies of modernity, and psychological theories about an individual’s engagement with the industrial world.⁹ For 19th century neurologists like (George), Beard

⁶ cf. Freud on the sense organs, which in higher animals have withdrawn below the immediate physical shield, and consist mainly of the ‘apparatus for the reception of certain specific effects of stimulation, but which also include special arrangements for further protection against excessive amounts of stimulation and for excluding unsuitable kinds of stimuli’: Freud (1961), 28.

⁷ Lapanche (1973), s.v. *cathexis*.

⁸ On sampling, cf. Freud (1961), 26-8: ‘it is characteristic of them that they deal only with very small quantities of external stimulation and only take in samples of the external world’ (28).

⁹ Shock appears to have originally referred to the cumulative effect of exposure to modern industrialised society: it was particularly closely associated with ‘railway spine’, neurasthenia, and hysteria. On the various

shock involved the cumulative effects of exposure to extreme external stimuli.¹⁰ Freud, in contrast, held that trauma involved the immediate exposure to an overwhelming event. This trauma could be either internal or external in origin, so long as the event causes a collapse in the internal structure of the individual's psyche. When he wrote to Fleiss in 1894, he argued that the 'indrawing' of trauma 'into the psychic sphere' induced

...an effect of suction upon the adjoining amounts of excitation. The associated neurones must give up their excitation, *which produces pain* [my emphasis]. The uncoupling of associations is always painful; there sets in, as though through an *internal haemorrhage* [my emphasis], an impoverishment in excitation (in the free store of it) – which makes itself known in the other instinctive drives and functions. As an inhibition, this in drawing operates like a *wound* [my emphasis], in a manner analogous to pain.¹¹

There are several points to unpack here. Freud argues that external trauma operates like an internal wound by rearranging the association between different psychical areas of the brain. What interests me is the way in which trauma seems to confound the boundaries between inner and outer experience—phenomena from the external world penetrate the protective shell of the individual and serve to traumatise the internal psyche: it is possible to see how Freud's understanding of the individual's conscious barrier is embedded in Freud's particular approach to trauma. Freud's model of shock problematised, then, the boundaries between external stimuli and internal condition. It phrases that destructions of boundaries in terms of the experience of wounding and pain—the rearrangement of the psychical order *produces pain*, acts like an internal *haemorrhage*.

meanings of shock see: Schivelbusch (1989), 150-8; Stone (1988), 2: 242-271; Herman (1992), 20-8; Caplan (1995), 387-419. On Freud's significant role in linking the early conception of shock as a type of energy expenditure to a type of traumatic wound see Armstrong (2000), 60-73. For the application of shock to literary criticism see Benjamin (1968), for the analysis of the shocking status of art in the modern age, and (1982), for an analysis of Baudelaire using Freud's notion of shock.

¹⁰ Macmillan (1976), 379.

¹¹ Freud (1985), 103-4.

In what follows I want to map Freud's understanding of shock and its conscious negotiation onto the landscape of second-century literature. Freud's notion of shock's ability to penetrate the individual's psyche strikes a chord with ancient discussions of the powerful, physiological effects of language. The sublime challenges the Sontag and Kleinman model of representational desensitisation because it partakes of a literary and rhetorical culture which promoted the shocking, or traumatic, capacity of language. It communicated trauma through the active replication of traumatic effects on the audience. Desensitisation was carried out through a strategic process of protecting the individual's body from penetration (as we shall see the metaphorical language which is used to conceptualise this agonistic re-writing is determinedly corporeal); the conscious rational engagement with the representation of pain served to re-establish those boundaries between internal psyche and external stimuli.

* * *

The chapter is divided into three sections. In section 1, 'Trauma and the Sublime', I show how the sublime overcomes the problem of effectively capturing and conveying trauma through a model in which the distance between the subject matter and the receptor is elided. In Section 2, 'Plutarch and Mimesis', I argue that this distance was re-established by Plutarch's insistence on conscious intellectual engagement with the text or artwork itself; a process, I contend, which ensured the direct sensual engagement with suffering was mediated by the representational medium. In Section 3, 'Representation the Violated Body', I turn to two literary contexts—Plutarch's *Concerning Flesh Eating (Flesh)*, and Galen's anatomical works—in which the experience of trauma and its representation is particularly important to the ethical and paideutic concerns of the authors. I show how they

apply different types of rhetorical strategy to modify the reader's experience and understanding of the suffering of others.

My study plots out a *mentalité* by investigating the way different fragments of literary criticism figure our engagement with pain, and how various texts negotiate those models. The project is underscored by the fact that there existed no explicit debate solely devoted to the problem of representing pain. (Indeed, it is an implicit point of this chapter that although such explicit theorisation or discussion was absent, that texts across a series of genres and contexts drew on, deployed, and rewrote, a collection of inherited ideas about this representational problem.) This study is not exhaustive. There are a number of texts which have been excluded from analysis which would have repaid further exploration: Dio of Prusa's two orations concerning Philoctetes—Oration lii and lix—and the *Imagines* of Philostratus are three important examples. In this instance the works of Dio were excluded because they give very limited focus to the relationship between pain and its ability to affect the viewer through its linguistic representation.¹² The reasons for rejecting momentarily the art-critical work of Philostratus is more complex. Elsner, for example, has shown how the works of art in the *Imagines* texts of both Philostrati deal repeatedly with issues of audience engagement with the representation of pain and suffering.¹³ In these situations the relationship between pain, the text or narrative, and, the audience lies slightly outside the concerns of this work. In the work of the Philostrati, the relationship between the narrative and the experience of pain is telescoped through the texts respective concerns to narrate the representation of pain, in a painting, which is itself

¹² This is to deny neither their importance for literary criticism, nor their value for understanding the cultural importance of paradigmatic sufferers like Philoctetes. On Philoctetes as a cultural paradigm for suffering see Bowersock (1994), 55-76.

¹³ For an insightful analysis of the *Imagines* see Elsner (2007), 309-37. On more general issues of Ekphrasis see Elsner (2002), esp., 1-18.

a reading of earlier mythical stories (and often tragedies).¹⁴ To incorporate the concerns of these two texts into this study would have required adjusting the entire thrust of the research to accommodate questions about the representation of myth, the cultural status of tragedy in the Imperial period, the politics and processes of reception.

SECTION 1: THE SUBLIME AND TRAUMA

Let us begin with an investigation of the notion of the sublime as developed by Longinus in his treatise, *Concerning the Sublime (Sublime)*. Longinus' direct concern with pain and suffering is negligible: the treaty mentions the experience of *λύπη* only once so as to distinguish it as a low emotion, antithetical to the achievement of the sublime.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the model of linguistic effect that Longinus develops does have significant ramifications for the representation of pain in the imperial period. In what follows, I argue two central points: Longinus' model of the sublime presents literature as traumatic communicative mode; the moving, powerful language that Longinus associates with the sublime ultimately overwhelms, and impacts on the reader in a manner that corresponds to the notion of shock discussed above. This communicative mode offers an efficacious strategy for the communication of pain in other literary or representational contexts. The model Longinus' treatise develops corresponds in many ways to a broader cultural strategy of description in which the distance between the reader and the subject matter is elided by the psychological power of the medium itself; in many instances the sublime is used to stand in for the ineffability of the painful traumatic experience. The sublime constitutes, then, a direct challenge to the model of representation put forward by Sontag and Kleinman.

¹⁴ Elsner (2007), 310-13 on these issues.

¹⁵ ps.-Long. *de Subl.* 8.2: *καὶ γὰρ πάθη τινὰ διεστώτα ὕψους καὶ ταπεινὰ εὐρίσκεται, καθάπερ οἴκτοι λῦπαι φόβοι, καὶ ἔμπαλιν πολλὰ ὕψη δίχα πάθους.*

1. *The Sublime, Impactful Language, and Rhetorical Culture*

This discussion of the sublime uses Longinus as a starting point for mapping the rhetorical and narrative culture of the imperial period. The cultural context of the *Sublime* is uncertain; it is not known who wrote the treatise, and when, although it is generally thought to have been produced in the first or second centuries AD, probably by Dionysius Longinus or Longinus.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the text remains an effective tool for thinking through concepts of rhetorical language and imagery and their capacity to influence the reader. The notion of sublime language appears to have been a subject of considerable discussion among a range of literary critical authors, although not always under the same vocabulary or critical concepts.¹⁷ The notion of elevated speech emerges as a serious category of literary criticism during the 1st century AD: Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses the term to refer to the achievement of supreme literary standards; Philo, likewise, appears to have used it to refer to both the power of Moses' and Jehovah's language.¹⁸ Importantly, Longinus draws on a long tradition in which language is seen as a powerful embodied force operating within the physical world: it has both a corporeal and psychological effect. This tradition can be traced back at least to works like Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* in which language is described as a drug and a type of minute body which penetrates the

¹⁶ Russell (1964), xxii-xxx; Heath (1999), 43-74; Hunter (2009), 128-68. For convenience throughout the text I refer to ps.-Longinus as Longinus. For Further bibliography on the text see Too (1998), 187-217; Porter (2001), 63-92; Whitmarsh (2001), 57-71.

¹⁷ The association of height and literary supremacy can be traced at least to Homer: winged words appear in Homer, in the set phrase ...ἔπεα πτερόεντ' ἀγόρευον (cf. for example, Hom. *Il.* 3.155 etc). As a term of literary criticism ὑψηλός appears in Pl. *Resp.* 545d, to describe the language of the muses. On the prominent forebears of Longinus, see Russell's discussion of Cicero, and Pliny the Elder: cf. Russell (1964), xl-ii.

¹⁸ Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 2.2; *Lys.*, 13; *Dem.*, 28, 34, 39; cf. ὑψηλόρου at Ph. *Quis rerum divinarum heres*, 4; or ὑψηγορία at *Quod Det.* 79.

corpus of the listener.¹⁹ Longinus' treatise is, then, part of a long tradition which is concerned with exploring the impactful qualities of language and discourse.

This impact was conceptualised in terms of a series of physiological metaphors. Recall Gorgias' famous claim that logos could penetrate the body of the listener.²⁰ Longinus' treatise as we shall see is full of metaphors in which language physically strikes or penetrates the body of the reader. The metaphor of physiological penetration has been extensively and acutely analysed by Webb, who shows that this was part of a model in which language brought about changes in the world: language is an effective force in the world.²¹ This discussion extends the conclusions of Webb by linking that effect to the particular problems of the communication of the unrepresentable, often ineffable experience or event. Sublime language caught and conveyed to the reader overwhelming powerful trauma through its ability to penetrate the body of the listener, and reorder his psychological economy.

Over the last decade, the sublime has played an increasingly prominent role in trauma studies.²² The concept has, primarily, offered scholars a language with which to conceptualise exposure to traumatic events: encountering traumatic experiences is the equivalent to encountering a sublime moment. As Bernard-Donals and Glejzer explain in *Between Witness and Testimony*:

... the disaster of the Shoah—in which the victim and the survivor find it impossible to know or put words to, the experience in which they find themselves—is located at the junction of the compulsion to speak and failure of speech, where the witness

¹⁹ cf. the use of *σώματι* at Gorg. fr. 11.8 DK for the broader implications of logos as a small body, which has powerful, divine effects; cf. also here Gorgias' discussion of *logos*' ability to create suffering in the soul of the listener: Gorg. Fr. 11.9 DK. For a discussion of this see Webb (2009), 23, 96-103, with further references.

²⁰ cf. the comparison of *pharmaka* to *logos* in Gorgias' *Helen*: Gorg. fr. 11.14 DK.

²¹ Webb (2009), 23, quoting Thompson (1980), 202-3.

²² Examples of this genre include: Caruth (1995), (1996), Stark (1998), Hartman (2006).

manages to ... leave a trace of it in language. The witness, confronted with the sublime object, is rendered speechless and is nonetheless compelled to speak.²³

Here the sublime appears to refer to the unmediated experience of an event which is unrepresentable. In what follows, I want to examine how the ancient notion of the sublime deals with the difficulty of representing, supposedly ineffable events or experiences. Our concern with the sublime's capacity to destabilise the boundaries between the reader/viewer/listener, the representational medium, and the painful experience (*i.e.* the subject matter) provides one avenue for investigating how trauma constitutes a sublime moment, but how sublime literary form effectively represents the nature of that experience to the audience.

2. *The Sublime and the Traumatic Experience.*

The sublime accounts for the distance between viewer and subject matter by replicating the psychologically forceful, coercive, and destructive elements of direct traumatic experience. This process is carried out through the extreme emotional effects sublime language has on the reader. For Longinus the language and imagery of poetry strikes the reader; sublime language is like a thunderbolt, indeed more difficult to experience than a lightning bolt.²⁴ At one point Longinus tells us that the aim of poetry was to astound the reader (...ἐν ποιήσει τέλος ἐστὶν ἔκπληξις, *Sublime*, 15.2). A similar set of aims inheres in the rhetorical art: although rhetoric aims at vividness (...ἐν λόγοις ἐνάργεια) they were connected by their common concern with the way images effected the emotions of the reader: ἀμφοτέραι ...ὁμῶς τό τε <παθητικὸν> ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ τὸ

²³ Bernard-Donals & Glejzer (2007), ix-xiii. For a critique of this connection see: LaCapra (2009), 59-89, esp. 62-5.

²⁴ ps.-Long. *de Subl.* 34.4: διὰ τοῦτο οἷς ἔχει καλοῖς ἅπαντας ἀεὶ νικᾷ καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐκ ἔχει, καὶ ὥσπερ καταβροντᾷ καὶ καταφέγγει τοὺς ἀπ' αἰῶνος ῥήτορας· καὶ θᾶπτον ἂν τις κεραυνοῖς φερομένοις ἀντανοῖζαι τὰ ὄμματα δύναιτο ἢ ἀντοφθαλμῆσαι τοῖς ἐπαλλήλοις ἐκείνους; cf. 1.4; 12.4. For the metaphor of a thunderbolt to explore the capacity of language to shock: Ar. *Ach.* 531. Plin. *Ep.* 9.26.

συγκεκινημένον, 15.2). The intensity of Longinus' metaphors here suggests that the sublime does more than simply move the emotions of the reader. Powerful astounding imagery transcends the reader's rational engagement with both the medium and the material. At 1.4 we are told that *πάντη δέ γε σὺν ἐκπλήξει τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν αἰεὶ κρατεῖ τὸ θαυμάσιον* (1.4). Conviction, Longinus argues, is 'up to us' (*εἶγε τὸ μὲν πιθανὸν ... ἐφ' ἡμῖν*), but the qualities of amazement and *ekplexis*, carry with them an irresistible power and force (*δυναστείαν καὶ βίαν ἄμαχον προσφέροντα*) which allows them to dominate every reader (*παντὸς ἐπάνω τοῦ ἀκροωμένου καθίσταται*, 1.4).²⁵

At 15.11 Longinus links this overbearing power with the nature of rhetorical images themselves:

ἅμα γὰρ τῷ πραγματικῶς ἐπιχειρεῖν ὁ ῥήτωρ πεφάνταται, διὸ καὶ τὸν τοῦ πείθειν ὄρον ὑπερβέβηκε τῷ λήμματι. φύσει δέ πως ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἅπασιν αἰεὶ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀκούομεν, ὅθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀποδεικτικοῦ περιελκόμεθα εἰς τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν ἐκπληκτικόν, ὃ τὸ πραγματικὸν ἐγκρύπτεται περιλαμβόμενον.

Longinus' metaphorical language connects the rhetor's representation of the imaginary with rhetoric's capacity to transcend the limits of conviction. *Phantasia* here is linked to the orator's construction of images which sit outside the normal experiences of the audience. The construction of imagined reality serves to transcend the boundaries of the rational mind, the limits of conviction are superseded. This process induces *ekplexis* a degree of astonishment, which drives the individual out of his rational mind, or 'knocks him out'.²⁶ *Ekplexis* taps into a range of emotional experiences which figure the power of

²⁵ *n.b.* the use of stoic language (*ἐφ' ἡμῖν*) to emphasise the passivity of the experience of rhetoric: cf. Arr. *Epict.* 1.1.

²⁶ Russell (1964), s.v. 1.4. ps.-Long. *de Subl.* 1.4; 12.5; 22.4; 35.4.

the image over the mind, but does so by asking us to contemplate something beyond the normal capacities of belief or experience.

The denial of conviction as the primary aim of the sublime is associated with a type of psychological destruction in which the reader is both removed ‘from himself’, and experiences a degree of psychological fragmentation. Longinus claims, early in his treatise, that the speaker aims to astound the reader (*ekplexis*) so he also aims to remove the reader from himself (*εἰς ἔκστασιν*, 1.4). At another point, when he mentions the power of Demosthenes to astound the emotions of the audience, Longinus figures the power of the Attic orator in a particularly forceful way: *ὁ μὲν ἡμέτερος* [i.e. Demosthenes] *διὰ τὸ μετὰ βίας ἕκαστα, ἔτι δὲ τάχους ῥώμης δεινότητος, οἷον καίειν τε ἅμα καὶ διαρπάζειν σκηπτῶνι παρεικάζοιτ’ ἂν ἢ κεραυνῶ*. Longinus’ metaphor of tearing to pieces is particularly eloquent, implying that the audience’s experience is particularly disembodied; it seems almost that Demosthenes’ style induces a critical loss of self, a loss of control and psychical wholeness which the individual ordinarily has. Like the traumatic experience, exposure to certain rhetorical styles poses significant problems for the individual’s psychological health.

3. Reader and Subject Matter

Longinus’ model induces a level of psychological disintegration akin to that experienced by the trauma victim. How might we imagine the sublime eliding the boundaries between reader and subject matter? On one level, this is played out through the mobilisation of the language of rhetorical vividness; and, importantly, through the way Longinus’ imagines the subject matter of the rhetorical discourse flowing into, and through, the reader.

Longinus' treatise draws heavily on the concept of rhetorical vividness, figured by his references to *enargeia*. As has been noted by Webb, *enargeia* was a central quality of the experience of ekphrasis in which the viewer was transformed into an eyewitness of events.²⁷ For rhetorical theorists it seems that this ability to penetrate the body of the listener is central to vivid description's capacity to induce an emotional effect (pleasure, indignation, pity, etc) in the reader.²⁸ This process commonly understood to involve an act of temporal or spatial displacement: the audience is transferred to events in the past in order to feel that they are actively involved in them.²⁹ Just as *enargeia* serves to collapse the distance between reader and event through a process of mental transportation, so other qualities confuse the distinction between subject matter, speaker, and listener. At 9.11 Longinus tells us:

...Ὅμηρος μὲν ἐνθάδε οὐρίος συνεμπνέει τοῖς ἀγῶσι, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι αὐτὸς πέπονθεν ἢ μαίνεται, ὡς ὅτ' Ἄρης ἐγγέσπαλος ἢ ὀλοὸν πῦρ οὔρεσι μαίνεται, βαθέης ἐν τάρφεσιν ὕλης, ἀφλοισμὸς δὲ περὶ στόμα γίγνεται

The poet's soul becomes infected with the very qualities and subject matter he attempts to convey. Longinus here taps into the concept of poetic inspiration, in which the poet is infused with divine spirit through which he is able to produce great literature.³⁰ At 15.1 Longinus figures this process in particularly significant terms. The concept is used now to refer specifically to whenever someone is overcome by a similar form of stimulation: ἤδη

²⁷ Webb (2009), 98-99. See especially her discussion of the rhetorical theories of Quintillian and Longinus. For further discussion of *enargeia* see: Zanker (1981), 297-311; Webb (1997b), 229-48; Dubel (1997), 249-64; Elsner (2002), 1-3 on the connection between ekphrasis and the qualities of *enargeia* and *saphēneia* in art.

²⁸ Webb (2009), 99-100; cf. Zanker (1981), 297-99.

²⁹ See the discussion of 'transference', 'metastasis', or 'metathesis' in Webb (2009), 100n34.

³⁰ On the application of inspiration to poetry cf. ἐπίνοιαν at ps.-Long. *de Subl.* 13.2; Dodds (1951), 80-2. Such inspiration was figured as one potential reader response to great poetry by Dion. Hal. *Demos.* 22: ἐνθουσιῶ τε καὶ δεῦρο κακείσε ἄγομαι, πάθος ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου μεταλαμβάνων....

δ' ἐπὶ τούτων κεκράτηκε τοῦνομα ὅταν ἂ λέγεις ὑπ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ πάθους βλέπειν δοκῆς καὶ ὑπ' ὅσιν τιθῆς τοῖς ἀκούουσιν (15.1). He repeats the point moments later when he quotes Euripides' *Iphegeia at Taurus*: οἷμοι, κτανεῖ με· ποῖ φύγω; ἐνταῦθ' ὁ ποιητῆς αὐτὸς εἶδεν Ἑρινύας· ὁ δ' ἐφαντάσθη, μικροῦ δεῖν θεάσασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἠνάγκασεν (15.1). Longinus' passages blur the distinction between the traumatic event and the reader; the subject matter appears not only to infuse the text and the author, but also directly engage the reader. Just as the author experiences a type of direct vision of the subject he is imaging in his text, so to the reader is compelled to 'see' in real and immediate terms. The text here becomes a vehicle which appears to facilitate the direct engagement of the reader with the traumatic or powerful subject matter the narrative communicates.

4. *The sublime and the Experience of Trauma*

To what extent does Longinus' model resonate with broader strategies of representation? The central metaphors which capture the shocking qualities of the sublime are replicated in the description of traumatic experience at other points in the cultural landscape of the Imperial period. In order to understand how Longinus' model works on the ground I turn to two encounters with traumatic events in the novel *Leucippe and Clitophon*. As has been acknowledged, Achilles Tatius' novel is deeply embedded in rhetorical culture. Indeed some of his scenes are particularly closely linked with the discussion of the sublime in Longinus.³¹ What I want to show is the correlation between encountering the sublime and encountering trauma.

³¹ One example is the description of sea storm at Ach. Tat. *L&C*. 3.1-2: for a discussion of the use of sea storms in the cultivation of the sublime see ps.-Long. *de Subl.* 43.1; cf. Hunter (2009), 134, 149.

Achilles Tatius' novel, *Leucippe and Clitophon* is filled with scenes in which Leucippe is apparently killed. For the experienced reader the theatricality and repetitive nature of these *Scheintode* dramatically reduces their traumatic nature. For Clitophon, however, the experience of witnessing these events is quite different. At one point he describes being disembowelled in dramatic terms, reminiscent of Longinus' notion of the sublime:

ταῦτα δὲ ὁρῶντες ... ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκ παραλόγου καθήμενος ἐθεώμην. τὸ δὲ ἦν ἔκπληξις· μέτρον γὰρ οὐκ ἔχον τὸ κακὸν ἐνεβρόντησέ με. καὶ τάχα ὁ τῆς Νιόβης μῦθος οὐκ ἦν ψευδής, ἀλλὰ κακείνη τοιοῦτόν τι παθοῦσα ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν παίδων ἀπωλείᾳ δόξαν παρέσχευ ἐκ τῆς ἀκίνησias ὥσει λίθος γενομένη. (*Leucippe*, 3.15.5-6)

In this way then, Clitophon, describes his affective response to such a traumatic episode. His language here associates the experience with Longinus' notion of the sublime: the events literally shock (*cf.* ἔκπληξις), and strike him like a lightning bolt (*cf.* ἐνεβρόντησε).³² Witnessing trauma is the equivalent to encountering the sublime. In her acute analysis, Morales argues that in this scene the encounter with the destruction and consumption of the female body is highly erotic.³³ Rather than thinking about this event in terms of erotics, I want to focus on the way it figures the experience of *ekplexis*. On one reading, the use of *ekplexis* here seems to refer to the emotional impact of the experience. Simultaneously, the experience appears to induce a loss of voice, or stupefaction. The reference to being turned to stone here could be read as a metaphor for being sexually aroused (as Morales does), it could also be read as a metaphor for emotional trauma and aphasia. The comparison with Niobē appears to emphasise the intense emotional impact of

³² On the implications of this passage for gender relations see Elsom (1992), 212-30, esp., 216-8 and Morales (2004), 56, 167-9.

³³ Morales (2004), 165-71, on this scene and the 'consumptive gaze'; for the erotics of the scene see 171: 'the dual possibilities implied by petrification complicate a straightforward reading of Clitophon's reaction and create an undercurrent of eroticism in the audience's reception of the Scheintod.'

the experience of trauma; the phrase *ἐκ τῆς ἀκινήσιας* especially implies emotional stupefaction and destruction; arguably the reference to petrification here also implies emotional destruction, and aphasia; moments later he tells us that he was unable to greet his friends since he had been stunned by the grief: *τοσοῦτον ἡ λύπη με τῆς συμφορᾶς ἐξεκώφησε* (3.15.2). Although it doesn't refer to Clitophon's reception of a narrative, the initial encounter with Leucippe's apparent death is figured in terms that link the direct encounter with trauma and the encounter with the sublime.

In another scene at 7.4 Clitophon describes how his experience of a story about his girlfriend's death traumatises him. (Again the reader's experience is shaped by the story's repetitive and dramatic qualities, whereas Clitophon's reaction is that of someone who is immersed in the story itself.) Upon hearing the story of how Leucippe was murdered he has a range of physical symptoms including changes in heart-rate, the inability to cry, and stupefaction; symptoms, he explains, of deep psycho-somatic injury.³⁴ Here the story's capacity to overwhelm Clitophon by exposing him to grievous events is figured by Clitophon's delayed reactions. As he repeatedly emphasises, he is not able to either speak or cry; it is only after he has recovered a little from this drunken daze (*μικρὸν δὲ νήψας ἐκ τῆς μέθης τοῦ λόγου*, 7.4.2) that he asks for more details about Leucippe's death. This delay is explained in terms of the way physical blows and injuries work upon the body.

ὅταν ὁ τῆς λύπης ὁδὸν κατὰ μικρὸν τὴν καρδίαν ἐκφάγη, κατέρρηκται μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ τραῦμα, ἀνέωκται δὲ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡ τῶν δακρύων θύρα, τὰ δὲ μετὰ μικρὸν τῆς ἀνοιξέως ἐξεπήδησεν. οὕτω καὶ μὲν τὰ μὲν πρῶτα τῆς ἀκροάσεως τῇ ψυχῇ

³⁴ Ach. Tat. *L&C*. 7.4.1: *Ὡς δ' ἤκουσά μου τὸν μῦθον τῶν κακῶν, οὔτε ἀνάμωξα οὔτε ἔκλαυσα· οὔτε γὰρ φωνὴν εἶχον οὔτε δάκρυα· ἀλλὰ τρόμος μὲν εὐθὺς περιεχύθη μου τῷ σώματι καὶ ἡ καρδία μου ἐλέλυτο, ὀλίγον δὲ τί μοι τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπολέλειπτο.*

προσπεσόντα καθάπερ τοξεύματα κατεσίγασε καὶ τῶν δακρύων ἀπέφραξε τὴν πηγὴν,
μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἔρρει, σχολασάσης τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κακῷ.³⁵ (7.4)

Clitophon's reaction dramatises a loss of emotional (and arguably intellectual) control; overwhelmed by the story of events, he is reduced to the passive emotional experiences of the trauma victim. Importantly, he is, in both of these scenes, not permanently traumatised by his experiences, his psychical economy is not refigured in precisely the way Freud imagines the effects of trauma operating. Nevertheless, what concerns me is the way language is thought to penetrate the soul of the individual and adjust his psychical order and normal functioning: *logoi* do induce traumatic changes in the condition and stability of the individual's *psyche*.

This episode correlates the experience of narrative with that of trauma itself—the effect of language literally repeats the action of trauma upon the body: the soul is wounded by a bolt of grief which has been shot from a *logos* (*ψυχὴ παταχθεῖσα τῷ τῆς λύπης βέλει, τοξεύσαντος λόγου*, 7.4). The correlation between the experience of this narrative and the experience of physical trauma mobilises the aspects of rhetorical theory in which language is seen as a powerful physical force operating on, and in many cases, penetrating the individual's body and soul.³⁶ One consequence of this correlation is the way in which narrative induces a type of vicarious experience among listeners. Rhetorical theory provides an opportunity for rhetoricians (and the novelist Achilles Tatius) to coercively include the audience in the traumatic experiences of the protagonists. Trauma is an experience which, at critical moments in rhetorical theory, has the potential to radiate out

³⁵ *cf.* the metaphor of the boar's tusk at Ach. Tat. *L&C.* 7.4.4.

³⁶ For the auditing of this story as a traumatic event *cf.* the ritual disembowelling at Ach. Tat., *L&C.* 3.15.6. No doubt the story is meant to re-play Clitophon's viewing of Leucippe's death again.

from the immediate victim; pain is potentially experienced by more people than just the victim.

5. *Conclusions*

There are then several important points to draw from our discussion of Longinus' model of the sublime. Firstly, that the sublime is concerned with a type of psychological dislocation: the sublime penetrates the reader (or listener's) body, causing a type of internal wound, a form of psychological destruction associated with the loss of speech and self. At the same time, the sublime—as a powerful and vivid rhetorical form—serves to collapse the boundaries and the distance between the reader and the subject matter: representation in this instance is less about distance, and more about direct sensorial and emotional exposure to traumatic events. This, we saw offered a direct challenge to Sontag and Kleinman approach to desensitisation and its relationship to representation. In the following discussion, I probe how this traumatic communicative mode was negotiated by different authors across the Imperial period.

SECTION 2: PLUTARCH, MIMESIS, AND PAINFUL IMAGES

The sublime, then, elides the distance between viewer and the suffering from which he is removed. It does so through the overpowering, impactful capacities of language. In this section, I examine how this model of powerful affective representation was problematised and then negotiated by Plutarch. My focus here will be two treatises composed early in the second century AD: *How the Young Should Listen to Poetry* (henceforth *Poetry*) and his *Sympotic Questions* 5.1. These two treatises deal explicitly with how we react to mimetic images of pain and suffering, and as such with the question of desensitisation we have been tracking in this chapter. I argue here that Plutarch develops

a model of desensitised engagement with literary representation. By countering the sublime model of representation with a process of conscious intentional engagement with the nature of the communicative model itself, Plutarch is able to re-establish the boundaries between the individual, and the traumatic event and protect the individual from the psychologically impactful nature of representation.

1. *Mimesis and Desensitisation*

Mimesis is a key term for Plutarch's understanding of both textual reception and the ethical development of the individual. A great deal of scholarly energy has been spent attempting to situate Plutarch's treatment of the concept in these two treatises within Platonic and Aristotelian models of *mimesis*.³⁷ For the purposes of this discussion, I stress two points. Firstly, for Plutarch the connection between *mimesis* and character development ensured that direct sensual engagement with traumatic and painful images was ethically dangerous. As Duff has acknowledged, Plutarch's literary project, especially in the *Lives* is tied up with the idea that vivid, mimetic narrative of past events and individuals serves to improve the character of the reader.³⁸ The boundaries between the literary imitation—viz., vivid representation of a subject—and the reader's ethical imitation of the subject has always been fluid.³⁹ For Plutarch, especially, the idea that literature was useful, or nourishing, for individuals was allied to the idea that the reader imitated what he encountered in literary or artistic form.⁴⁰ Poetry furnishes the reader with a series of images, practices, and conditions which the reader is able to either imitate or

³⁷ van der Stockt (1992), which discusses the question of *mimesis* across all of Plutarch's writings; see 40-55 for the two texts discussed in this section; for a more specific focus on the *de Aud. Poet.* and *Quaest. Conv.* 5.1 see Whitmarsh (2001), 49-57; Halliwell (2002), 296-302; Konstan (2004), 3-27; Konstan (2005), 1-16; Hunter (2009), 169-201.

³⁸ Duff (1999), 40-2.

³⁹ As Halliwell points out, *mimesis* seems to have incorporated concepts of visual resemblance, behavioural emulation or imitation, dramatic re-enactment, vocal production, and metaphysical resemblance. For a full discussion see Halliwell (2002), 15 n32-3, 16 for discussion of the relationship between 'mimesis' and 'representation'.

⁴⁰ On these issues see especially, Duff (1999), 37-41.

not. In this context, viewing painful images takes on a new complexion in which trauma and emotional expressions of suffering are dangerous to the ethical evolution of the reader. There are two immediate subsidiary implications which emerge from this ethical focus. Firstly, this concern with ethical development figures desensitisation as a particularly ideologically motivated process of shaping the reader's character. Inculcating the appropriate cultural values involves manipulating the individual's exposure to and engagement with others' suffering. There are also implications here for the Sontag and Kleinman model of desensitisation. As we saw above, a critical question about desensitisation was the way in which our capacity for ethical engagement was undermined by the practices of representation; desensitisation is actually associated with the development of the individual as an ethical being (rather than his failure as Sontag suggests). For Plutarch, the capacity to act in an ethical manner towards the suffering or pain of another was dependent on how he was desensitised to the experience of pain.

The second issue I wish to stress by the focus on *mimesis* concerns the audience's experiences of pain and pleasure. Plutarch's focus on mimetic representation is placed within a long tradition in which engagement with representation was thought to induce pleasure in the audience. This interest in pleasure has a particular way of structuring the individual's engagement with images and representations of pain. For the purposes of this discussion of desensitisation, and the reader's capacity for ethical engagement with suffering, the primary issue to draw from this nebulous tradition is the way Plutarch's text effects a form of rewriting of the audience's experiences of pleasure at painful images. Throughout Plutarch's *Poetry* and his *Sympotic Questions* pleasure operates as a marker of our engagement with the world view of the artist: in *Poetry* he moves from a notion of pleasure in which the reader is stirred by the emotion and suffering he encounters (pleasure as emotional affiliation with the sufferer) to one in which pleasure expresses an analysis of,

and agreement with, the world view of the author; in the *Sympotic Questions* pleasure is experienced because we are drawn to the style and the rationality that the artist reflects in his depiction of suffering. In both situations Plutarch closes by asserting the connection between pleasure and desensitisation—pleasure becomes the marker of the fact that the individual is drawn to the image, rather than the reality, of pain.

Mimesis and the Representation of Pain in Poetry

As has been acknowledged, Plutarch's *Poetry* attempts to revalidate poetry as an educational and philosophical tool.⁴¹ The strategies by which Plutarch achieves this have been extensively discussed by scholars. Konstan and Halliwell argue that Plutarch promotes a type of self-censorship, or resistant reading in which poetry can be purged by the reader's exercise of textual suspicion.⁴² In this section of my discussion of *mimesis* I argue that Plutarch promotes a form of conscious engagement with the structure of the textual or representational medium. By constantly reminding the reader of the way in which poetry communicates its message, or creates emotional effects in the reader, we are able to protect ourselves against its capacity to overwhelm and corrupt us. This corresponds to Freud's notion of conscious engagement which protects us from external energy.

1. Mimesis and Audience Affiliation.

Plutarch's tract begins with a model of the overwhelming power of poetry which can be traced back to Plato's *Republic*. In Book 10 of the *Republic* Plato attempts to justify

⁴¹ Plutarch's use of *προφιλοσοφήτεον* at *de Aud. Poet.* 15f. On this issue see Whitmarsh (2001), 49-50; Hunter (2009), 169-75.

⁴² On this issue see Konstan (2004), 8, who argues that Plutarch presents an example of the modern idea of the 'resisting reader'. Against this view see Hunter (2009), 174, who points out correctly that responsibility for the meaning of the text still lies principally with the poet. For self-censorship (as opposed to the political censorship of Plato's *Resp.*) see Halliwell (2002), 297; cf. Whitmarsh (2001), 52.

the expulsion of poetry from the ideal Republic on the basis of poetry's role stirring the emotions of the reader:

*οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὀμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν
μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς
ὀδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ἄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἷσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες
ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν
ποιητὴν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ. (605d)*

In this way then, Plato informs us that the standards by which the poet is judged are dependent on his ability to foster in the audience a sense of pleasure and pain at the experiences of another. As Plato sees it, poetry's representation of suffering appeals to the emotional and irrational parts of the soul; allowing us to express emotions in common with the hero which we would ordinarily eschew from our own behaviour. His ultimate point here is that poetry appeals to and strengthens the part of the psyche which must be kept in check by the rational soul. What interests me is the intimacy of the connection between the sufferings of the imitated figure and the audience. Plato's language here appears to suggest a form of psychological affiliation: we 'yield' and 'follow' the emotions of the hero (*ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπόμεθα*); we suffer in common with him (*συμπάσχοντες*). For Plato, *mimetic* poetry has the capacity to create a certain form of audience affiliation with the suffering depicted.

Plutarch's revalidation of the educational value of poetry begins from an assumption that it has the capacity to overwhelm its audiences. He begins by reminding the treatise's dedicatee Marcus Sedatus that ...ὅσον μᾶλλον αὕτη τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι πεφθκότος ἀπτεται, τοσοῦτο μᾶλλον ἀμεληθεῖσα βλάπτει καὶ διαφθείρει τὸν παραδεξάμενον

(*de Aud. Poet.* 15a). Indeed, for Plutarch, poetry appears to be a deeply ambivalent form containing both nourishing (*τρόφιμον*) and ‘pleasant’ (*τὸ ἡδύ*) elements, but also much that is misleading and disturbing (*τὸ ταρακτικὸν καὶ παράφορον*, 15c). The use of the adjective *ταρακτικός* here emphasises that psychological disturbance; Plutarch uses the same notion of disturbance when he talks of the audience’s reaction to the sufferings of heroes: *ἂν δέ ποιν συνταράττηται τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ κρατῇται φαρμαπτόμενος* (16e). Poetry has the power to induce a type of emotional unrest in readers, undermining their psychological harmony with the image of suffering and pain. This damage is caused ultimately by direct, or unmixed, sensual engagement with theatrical elements of poetry: Plutarch’s task is to prune and pinch the vine when the mythical and theatrical become overpowering (15f).

Plutarch’s reference to the theatrical elements of poetry seems to refer to the way in which we are made into spectators by vivid language: concern with these elements of poetry flags an apprehension with poetry’s most vivid, intense moments which bring events before their reader’s or listener’s eyes. This model of engagement draws heavily on aspects of the sublime we discussed above. Poetry shocks and astonishes the reader. Aeschylus’s tragedy *Psychostasis*, he argues, introduced terrible images concerning the weighing of Hector’s fate and death in order to disturb the reader: *τοῦτο δὲ παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι μυθοποίημα καὶ πλάσμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἢ ἔκπληξιν ἀκροατοῦ γέγονε* (17a). Plutarch’s reference here to *ἔκπληξις* here links the achievement of shock and terror with the stylistic qualities of poetry. The experience of shock and astonishment at poetry is a mark of its figured nature; its especial combination of mythical and figured elements. This relationship between poetry’s combination of different factors and the production of terror is repeatedly stressed throughout the treatise:

...πάλιν ἄι περὶ τὰς νεκρίας τερατουργίαι καὶ διαθέσεις ὀνόμασι φοβεροῖς
ἐνδημιουργοῦσαι φάσματα καὶ εἰδῶλα ποταμῶν φλεγόμενων καὶ τόπων ἀγρίων καὶ
κολασμάτων σκυθρωπῶν οὐ πάνυ πολλοὺς διαλανθάνουσιν ὅτι τὸ μυθῶδες αὐταῖς
πολὺν καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὥσπερ τροφαῖς τὸ φαρμακῶδες ἐγκέκρται. (17b)

In this way, then, Plutarch emphasises how powerful poetic language strikes us by mixing terrible imagery and fearful conditions. Poetry's complex outward shape, its introduction of powerful, traumatic images, terrifies the reader,⁴³ traumatises him in a manner reminiscent of the sublime

2. *Protecting the Reader from Poetry*

If it is true that Plutarch's tract provides a lesson in how to resist the dangerous psychological effects of poetry, how does Plutarch imagine that process taking place? Below I argue that Plutarch asks the reader to engage actively with the referential qualities of poetry. On one level, this involves actively cultivating an awareness of the truth content of poetry; on another, it involves evaluating the style of the poet's representation of different traumatic events. In both these instances the primary focus remains a conscious engagement with how different mediums represent trauma, rather than an affective reception of the subject matter.

This protective function is consistently phrased in terms of the re-establishment of the body's boundaries. This metaphor is most apparent in the opening stages of the discourse in which Plutarch tells us that protecting the individual from poetry is the equivalent of helping a city protect itself against incursions. There is no point, Plutarch

⁴³ cf. Plut. *de Aud. Poet.* 25d: τὸ γὰρ ἐμπαθὲς καὶ παράλογον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον, ᾧ πλείστη μὲν ἔκπληξις ἔπεται πλείστη δὲ χάρις, αἱ μεταβολαὶ παρέχουσι τοῖς μύθοις· τὸ δ' ἄπλοῦν ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἄμουσον.

claims in defending the young against pleasure in drinking and eating (notably a metaphor for textual consumption itself⁴⁴), if we let pleasure rush in through other means:

οὔτε γὰρ πόλιν αἱ κεκλειμέναι πύλαι τηροῦσιν ἀνάλωτον, ἂν διὰ μιᾶς παραδέξῃται
τοὺς πολεμίους, οὔτε νέον αἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ἐγκράτεια σώζουσιν, ἂν τῇ δι’
ἀκοῆς λάθῃ προέμενος αὐτόν, ἀλλ’ ὅσον μᾶλλον αὐτῇ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι
πεφυκότος ἄπτεται, τοσοῦτο μᾶλλον ἀμεληθεῖσα βλάπτει καὶ διαφθείρει τὸν
παραδεξάμενον. (14f-15a)

The metaphor of the city here has obvious resonance with Plato’s *Republic*—particularly in the context of a discussion of the incursion of pleasure through the pursuit of poetry. Yet, it is also important that Plutarch’s model figures the individual as a type of internal city, protected from the external world by walls. Plutarch’s task is to protect that inner city against incursion by establishing and ensuring that the access points to the soul (the gates, or the ears) remain firmly stable. Plutarch’s model of protection appears to entail, then, an attempt to counter the idea of penetrative, impactful language by re-establishing the boundaries of the body.

Poetry’s relationship to pleasure and astonishment is dependent on a particular connection with reality. Some poets tell lies, Plutarch claims, in pursuit of grace and the pleasure of hearing (*ἡδονὴν ἀκοῆς καὶ χάριν*); they do so, because the truth (*τὴν ἀλήθειαν*) is counted as more harsh than falsehood (*αὐστηροτέραν ἡγοῦνται τοῦ ψεύδους*, 16a);⁴⁵ reality (*ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔργῳ γιγνομένη*) does not deviate (*ἐξίσταται*), even if the end is without pleasure (*κἂν ἀτερπὲς ἔχῃ τὸ τέλος*), while sculpted narratives turn easily aside

⁴⁴ Rimell (2002) For further discussion see below: text to notes 75-7.

⁴⁵ Plut. *De Aud. Poet.* 16a: εἰσάγειν εἰς τὰ ποιήματα δεῖ τὸν νέον μηδὲν οὕτω μεμελετημένον ἔχοντα καὶ πρόχειρον ὥς τὸ πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἄοιδοι. For the lying qualities of poets cf. Arist. *Met.* 983a3-4.

from the painful towards the pleasurable (τὸ δὲ πλαττόμενον λόγῳ ῥᾶστα περιχωρεῖ καὶ τρέπεται πρὸς τὸ ἥδιον ἐκ τοῦ λυποῦντος, 16b). The ultimate argument here is that there is nothing quite so striking as a plot which combines falsehood and truth effectively (ἐν ποιήμασι μεμιγμένον πιθανότητι ψεῦδος ἐκπλήττει καὶ ἀγαπᾶται μᾶλλον τῆς ἀμύθου καὶ ἀπλάστου περὶ μέτρον καὶ λέξιν κατασκευῆς, 16c). Deviation from a reality which is potentially painful or lugubrious is central to a poetics which prizes the pursuit of pleasure, grace, and the power to astonish and frighten. Plutarch's phrasing here seems to mobilise a particular notion of fictional representation.⁴⁶ Reference to 'shaped' narratives, marking a range of potential artistic and narrative forms, figures the way ornate narrative adopts a particular position in terms of the relationship between pleasure and painful realities. Plutarch's text might be primarily concerned with poetry, but his language implicates a spectrum of artistic, shaped, ornate art forms. *Poetry* begins with a fundamental question, then: what is the relationship between shaped or sculpted narrative, pleasure, and painful reality.

Awareness of the shaped nature of poetic discourse will help protect the reader. The audience should approach poetry having rehearsed the phrase πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί. In this way, Plutarch claims, he will create a type of mental filter for approaching poetic representation. The point is reinforced moments later when we are told that he who remembers and keeps clearly in his mind (κατέχων ἐναργῶς, 16d) the sorcery of poetry, when they encounter falsehood will remain impervious to poetry's deception (16d-e). The reader as a consequences will not suffer badly (πείσεται δεινὸν), but will check himself (ἐπιλήψηται, 16e), when he feels afraid at Poseidon lest he tear apart the earth and reveal

⁴⁶ On this see Halliwell (2002), 297.

Hades; he will cease to shed tears for Achilles and Agamemnon, ἀδυνάτους καὶ ἀσθενεῖς χεῖρας ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ζῆν ὀρέγοντας (16e); and if he is affected by their suffering, and overcome by the sorcery he will remind himself that such things are falsehoods and women's tales.

Plutarch's treatment of the false qualities of poetry taps into a broader discussion of the way we react to or interpret the truth claims of poetry directly impinges on our engagement with traumatic or emotional images. Acceptance of the truth content of poetry involves being swept away, while conscious engagement with its mixed nature protects the individual against its emotional effects. At 16d, he informs us that whenever something inappropriate (ἄτοπόν τι) or distasteful (δυσχερὲς) occurs, the one who accepts the *logos* as true (ὁ μὲν ὡς ἀληθῆ προσδεζόμενος λόγον οἴχεται) is borne along by it and corrupted in his opinion (φερόμενος καὶ διέφθαρται τὴν δόξαν). Plutarch's warning figures a particular psychological approach to representation in which we engage intensely with events when we simply accept them at face value. In contrast to this form of experience, recognising the way poetry combines falsehood and myth with truth induces an entirely different experience.

Plutarch's use of ἐναργῶς here grates with rhetorical theory. We saw above that *enargeia* is usually mobilised to refer to the vividness of poetic or rhetorical images themselves, which in due course forces the reader or listener to endure the emotional and psychical experiences of an eyewitness.⁴⁷ Vividness is the quality by which we are transported by the text to the event itself. There are moments in Plutarch's treatise when the concept of vividness is mobilised in this way, such as 36b where Plutarch refers to the

⁴⁷ On *enargeia* see above, text to notes 25-7, with further bibliography.

vivid sayings of Aeschylus.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, its use at 16d appears to emphasise the change in our experience that Plutarch seeks to effect: the power of poetic images is countered by the vividness of the reader's own practiced saying. If *enargeia* is one of the representational qualities that allow audiences to move beyond the text and experience the subject matter directly at a sensual and emotional level, then Plutarch's rephrasing of the notion of vividness forces the individual to confront the poetic text; to experience it as textual or representative medium; to interpret and resist it.

3. *Poetry as a Mimetic Art*

The second major technique Plutarch uses to protect the reader from the emotional power of poetry concerns the emphasis of its *mimetic* status. At 17f Plutarch specifically instructs us that we will further assist the critical interpretation of poetry if we remind the young that poetry is a mimetic art (*μιμητικὴ τέχνη*) and that its power is akin to that of the life-painting.⁴⁹ A great deal has been said about Plutarch's treatment of *mimesis* in chapters 18-19 of *Poetry*, which has stressed the way it engages with Platonic and Aristotelian notions of imitation.⁵⁰ In this discussion, I don't want to propose an alternative way of reading Plutarch's explicit treatment of the theory mimetic art. Rather, I seek to make two points which will allow us to see the way Plutarch's concern with pain is developed throughout *Poetry*. I point out that Plutarch aims to refigure how we view artistic images; secondly, I show how this process directly impacts on the ethical engagement with the pain and suffering of others.

Plutarch's tract explicitly attempts to rephrase how we engage with poetic imagery.

This involves teaching the individual how to see and judge artwork.

⁴⁸ Plut. *de Aud. Poet.* 36b: ὥν τὸ μὲν εἴρηκεν ὁ Αἰσχύλος ἐναργῶς.

⁴⁹ cf. Pl. *Resp.* 605.

⁵⁰ van der Stockt (1992), 49-55; Konstan (2004), 3-27; (2005), 1-17; Halliwell (2000), 296-302.

διδάσκωμεν αὐτὸν ὅτι γεγραμμένην σαύραν ἢ πίθηκον ἢ Θερσίτου πρόσωπον ἰδόντες
ἡδόμεθα καὶ θαυμάζομεν οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ὅμοιον. ἢ δὲ μίμησις, ἂν τε περὶ
φαῦλον ἂν τε περὶ χρηστὸν ἐφίκηται τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἐπαινῆται. (18b)

When painters or writers depict shameful or disgraceful acts (*πράξεις ἀτόπους*), it is particularly important, Plutarch continues, to remind them that it is not the subject matter of the *mimetic representation* but the style (*τὴν τέχνην*) of the artist which is praised (18b). Plutarch's language resonates with earlier discussions of the power of poetic narrative over the audience. His use of *ἐπαινῆται* picks up Plato's suggestion that the poet is praised because he stirs our emotions; yet here praise is critically redirected to the artist's cultivation of the quality of likeness (*ὁμοιότητος*). Similarly, Plutarch explicitly reverses the experience of wonder and pleasure we feel towards representation: we 'experience pleasure' (*ἡδόμεθα*) and 'wonder at' (*θαυμάζομεν*) the likeness of representation, not the subject matter which is represented. There is a critical movement here away from a direct focus on the subject matter of the representation towards the texture of the representational medium itself. It is especially important Plutarch argues, that when confronted with inappropriate (*ἀτόπους*) images, youths are trained that the represented act is not praised (*τὴν πράξιν οὐκ ἐπαινοῦμεν ἧς γέγονεν ἢ μίμησις*), but the skill (*τὴν τέχνην*) of the artist is, in so far as it has represented the matter appropriately (*εἰ μεμίμηται προσηκόντως τὸ ὑποκείμενον*, 18b).

Plutarch's reference to *τὴν τέχνην* highlights the way in which the engagement with the represented subject is subordinated to the appreciation of the artistic qualities of the communicative medium. What matters for Plutarch is how the artist represented, not what he represented. This point is developed further in the following lines:

ἐπεὶ τοίνυν καὶ ποιητικὴ πολλάκις ἔργα φαῦλα καὶ πάθη μοχθηρὰ καὶ ἥθη μιμητικῶς ἀπαγγέλλει, δεῖ τὸ θαυμαζόμενον ἐν τούτοις καὶ κατορθούμενον μὴτ' ἀποδέχεσθαι τὸν νέον ὡς ἀληθὲς μὴτε δοκιμάζειν ὡς καλόν, ἀλλ' ἐπαινεῖν μόνον ὡς ἐναρμόττον τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ προσώπῳ καὶ οἰκεῖον. (18b)

Plutarch's final line here hammers home the point. Praise is given on the basis of the fit achieved between the artist's representation and the subject matter. Just as Damonidas' boots were shameful, but were appropriate; so the artistic representation must manifest a similar degree of appropriateness. Thus the interpretative and intellectual focus of the reader is directed towards evaluating the referential relationship between the artist's work and the subject matter; the nature of the subject matter is important in this context only in so far as it provides the basis for the evaluation of the artistic work. Importantly, Plutarch's rewriting of *mimesis* effects a transition in the dynamics of our pleasure—from direct emotional effect to one in which we experience pleasure and wonder (nb., once again, the use of τὸ θαυμαζόμενον) at how the artist has captured the world. Forming ourselves as ethical evaluators of represented suffering involves engaging with, and evaluating the world view of the author, rather than simply reacting to the pain. This aesthetic model figures a specific reaction to the artistic presentation of painful experiences:

καὶ νοσώδη μὲν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ὕπουλον ὡς ἀτερπὲς θέαμα φεύγομεν, τὸν δ' Ἀριστοφῶντος Φιλοκτῆτην καὶ τὴν Σιλανίουτος Ἰοκάστην ὁμοίους φθίνουσι καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσι πεποιημένους ὁρῶντες χαίρομεν. (de. Aud. Poet. 18c)

On one level there is a transition in experience from audience pain to pleasure—a deliberate rejection of the way real painful experiences hold our interest and our concern, as opposed to the way we are attracted by the artistic image.

Viewing Pain in Plutarch's *Sympotic Questions* 5.1

In the discussion of *Poetry* we saw how intellectual consideration of the text constructed barriers to the direct engagement with represented suffering. In this discussion I continue to investigate that question by showing how direct sensual appreciation of pain was mediated by the individual's cultural ideology. Man's cultural beliefs, represented by his *dianoia*, serve to manage the way we engage with pain and its representation. This I contend corresponds to a model of cathexis and decathexis which Freud saw as a crucial part of the conscious perceptual system's protection of the individual *psyche*. In this context it creates situation in which pain only becomes interesting when it is represented in the safe context of an image. If the Longinian model of the sublime confronted the Sontag and Kleinman model of desensitisation by permeating the boundaries between audience and trauma, forcing them to confront and imagine others' suffering in real psycho-somatic terms, then this text creates an ideologically driven form of desensitisation in which we are drawn only to those experiences which are represented artistically and cleverly.

1. *Direct Sensual Engagement and the Sympotic Questions* 5.1

So far in this chapter, we have examined the way language of poetry or rhetoric forces the individual to see suffering through its manipulation of vividness. In what follows, I change approach slightly. In *Sympotic Questions* 5.1 Plutarch approaches the question of direct sensual engagement—the discussion of *mimesis* is subordinated to a discussion of how the individual perceives the world at the level of the senses. Plutarch's text, as we shall see, is mired in what Plutarch presents as a debate between the Cyrenaic and Epicurean philosophical traditions concerning the *pathē* of pleasure and pain (which will be discussed below). There are two immediate implications for this chapter's concern with desensitisation. The first relates to the fact that we now move to texts which are

explicitly focused on the way the body operates as the site of sensual perceptions. The relationship between the audience's body and the trauma depicted is negotiated in terms of multi-sensory engagement: how do we see, hear, touch, and ultimately smell phenomena. More significantly, the texts we investigate here are determined to construct, and normalise, different modes of sensorial interaction between real suffering and its represented counterpart: these texts teach readers how to see, hear, and feel pain.

Plutarch's tract starts from a familiar question: why do we feel pleasure at mimetic representation, but feel pain at real suffering.⁵¹ The question has an obvious Platonic and Aristotelian ring to it, and also recalls Plutarch's earlier literary critical work in the *Poetry*. Not surprisingly, then, the two work have often, hitherto, been read alongside each other, used to enhance our understanding of the author's approach to *mimesis*. Konstan and van der Stockt both place this text within a long tradition of thinking about how *mimetic* representation induces the reader's pleasure.⁵² Van der Stockt, for example, argues that this treatise adopts and develops an understanding of *mimesis* which was underemphasised in Aristotle's *Poetics*.⁵³ What this focus misses is the way the question of our pleasurable engagement with artistic works is subordinated to a philosophical debate about how individuals perceive, and understand, the world. In this context, questions about why we feel pleasure at images of pain but pain when we encounter the real thing operate not in terms of their mobilisation of Aristotelian ideas, but are used to engage Epicurean and Cyrenaic views about the way in which the senses directly perceive the nature of the external world. This text is ultimately about how the senses operate as sites of direct engagement and perception.

⁵¹ On the hoary nature of this question see Konstan (2005), 1.

⁵² Konstan (2005), 1-17; Van der Stockt (1990), 27-31.

⁵³ van der Stockt (1990), 31.

The context of Plutarch's discussion is made most apparent in the final passages of his tract where he aligns himself with a Cyrenaic approach to perception. His argument, he claims, is an excellent proof (*τεκμήριον*) for the views of the Cyrenaic sect:

...τοῦτο δ' εἶπον, ἄνδρες Ἐπικούρειοι, καὶ τεκμήριόν ἐστι μέγα τοῖς Κυρηναϊκοῖς
πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοῦ μὴ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν
ἡμῶν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκούσμασι καὶ θεάμασιν. (674a-b)

Plutarch's strategic alignment with the Cyrenaic school is no doubt related to the agonistic context of the entire dialogue.⁵⁴ What interests me is the way in which the passage allows us to negotiate Plutarch's approach to sensual perception. A central concern of these two hedonistic philosophical schools concerned the role the perception of pain and pleasure played in both the individual's knowledge about the world and the way that knowledge guided ethical action.⁵⁵ Although the possibility of an ancient debate between these two sects is impossible to confirm, it appears clear that Epicureans and Cyrenaics agreed on the importance of the *pathē* of pleasure and pain being the guiding forces behind ethical action: we act to flee painful experiences, and are ineluctably drawn to pleasurable ones.⁵⁶ According to this passage in Plutarch, where the two schools disagreed was on the central role played by the sensory mechanisms of the body in determining the nature of external events. Plutarch and other later writers imagined that the two sects were divided on the role of the mind or *dianoia* in determining the nature of our experiences of pleasure and pain: whereas Epicureans believed in the primacy of sense perceptions, Cyrenaics argued that

⁵⁴ cf. Plut. *Quaest. Conv.* 673e: ἐγὼ δέ, καίπερ ἐν ἀλλοτρίῳ χορῶ πόδα τιθεῖς.

⁵⁵ On the possibilities of an ancient debate between these two sects see: D.L. ii.90 (=fr. 189 Mannebach).

⁵⁶ On the importance of the *pathē* of pleasure and pain in both Epicurean and Cyrenaic philosophies of knowledge see: Tsouna (1998), 1-9 on the *pathē*, 68-73; (1992), 161-92; for the role of pleasure in determining our ethical action cf. the views of Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* xi.96 (=fr. 398 Us.) on the Epicureans: ἀλλ' εἰώθασί τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐπικούρου αἰρέσεως...λέγειν, ὅτι φυσικῶς καὶ ἀδιδάκτως τὸ ζῶον φεύγει μὲν τὴν ἀλγηδόνα, διώκει δὲ τὴν ἡδονήν; cf. Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1122E (= fr. 411 Us.).

sense perceptions were inevitably shaped by the nature of man's mind or soul.⁵⁷ By framing his sympotic discussion within this philosophical debate, Plutarch asks his audience to turn immediately to questions of the reader's or viewer's direct sensual engagement with the phenomena they encounter in art or life.

The implications of this alignment for Plutarch's approach to representation and real suffering is significant. Belief, and ideology, become critical factors in our engagement with artistic representation. In one instance (in this case the observation of Parmenion's squealing pig), Plutarch notes, the reaction of the audience was dominated by what they believed about what they saw. Plutarch, claims emphatically that the same sensory experience (τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος, *Quaest. Conviv.* 674c) did not affect (διατίθησι) the soul in the same way (ὁμοίως), since the spectators did not believe that skill and striving (λογικῶς ἢ φιλοτιμῶς, 674c) had contributed to the sight. Plutarch's language here gives the game away—our sensual reaction is conditioned by the presence of qualities central to the Greek sense of reason, or rationality, and striving to achieve honour. Our reaction to visual effects depends on our capacity to see some central Greek cultural values in the artistic image.

2. *Being Drawn to Images of Pain*

What are the implications of Plutarch's Cyrenaic position for how we react to pleasure and pain? Plutarch's adoption of an agonistic stance towards the Epicurean understanding of direct sensual engagement with the external world lays the groundwork for developing a model of aesthetic desensitisation. Plutarch's approach to *dianoia*

⁵⁷ For references to the difference between the two sects cf. Plut. *Non Posse* 1089a-b (=fr. 240 Mannebach); D.L. ii.90 On the similarities between Epicurean and Cyrenaic positions see: Tsouna (1998), 115-22 on the relationship between the two schools. For the discussion of the Cyrenaic understanding of sense perception and its relationship to 'internal touch', see Tsouna (1998), 10-12.

produces a model of aesthetic engagement in which man engages with, and is drawn to, artistic images on the basis of their manifestation of the audience's cultural ideology.

Plutarch's associates man's mental capacities—his *dianoia*—with the love for art and rationality. Throughout his treatise Plutarch continually tells us that man is born a lover of art and beauty. At 673d he claims that men are by nature (*φύσει*) logical and lovers of art (*λογικοί και φιλοτεχνοί*). His assertion of the naturalness of man's interest is repeated throughout the treatise: at 673e, he claims that since man was born a lover of art and beauty (*γεγονώς φιλότεχνος καὶ φιλόκαλος*, 673e) he is naturally drawn to those creations which manifest those qualities. Although Plutarch situates man's pleasure within nature (*nb.*, *φύσει* above), it is clear that such language merely places the Greek cultural ideology of rationality and skill onto the natural plane. For Plutarch, man's *dianoia* is embedded in his (according to Plutarch) innate love of art, skill, and technical proficiency.

Plutarch's elevation of these mental qualities to a central place in an individual's aesthetic engagement with art immediately raises questions about how cultural taste might influence the reaction to the reality and image of pain. The way our sight is mediated by cultural ideology dramatically changes our reaction to images of pain and suffering: when we see a sick man we are pained (*φθισικοὺς μὲν ὁρῶντες δυσχεραίνομεν*, 674b), but when we gaze upon statues and images of the sick we do so pleasingly (*ἀνδριάντας δὲ καὶ γραφὰς φθισικῶν ἡδέως θεώμεθα*) because the mind is naturally lead by the mimetic image (*τῷ τὴν διάνοιαν ὑπὸ τῶν μιμημάτων ἄγεσθαι [καὶ] κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον*, 674b). Plutarch's understanding of our engagement with pain is redolent with philosophical implications about perception. Plutarch tells us repeatedly that we view real suffering shamefully or

painfully—the sick and dying are viewed *ἀνιαρῶς* (674b); yet, we see their representation in startlingly different terms (*γραφᾶς ... ἡδέως θεώμεθα*, 674b). In contrast to how we view pain, we are drawn to the representation of those experiences: *ἔλκει γὰρ ὡς οἰκεῖον ἀδιδάκτως τὴν φύσιν τὸ γλαφυρὸν καὶ πανοῦργον* (673f).

3. *Universal Pain and Stylistic Representation*

Plutarch's association of philosophical attraction and pleasure with representation is built on a particular understanding of the differences between pain and its artistic representation. At one point in his treatise Plutarch characterises the differences in the experience of pain and its representation in a provocative way. When we look at a man genuinely suffering pain (*λυπούμενος*), he is seen to experience certain common experiences and movements (*ἐν τισι κοινοῖς πάθεσι καὶ κινήμασιν ὁρᾶται*, 673f). Importantly, pain is conceived here as a type of universal experience: the possibility of different reactions to—or experiences of—suffering is downplayed by Plutarch's use of *κοινοῖς*.⁵⁸ There are two related implications to this conception of the experience of pain. Firstly, Plutarch's language places the actual experience of pain at odds with that of imitation, which displays a cleverness (*πανουργία*) and a conviction all of its own (*πιθανότης*, 673f); an increasing distinction between the artistic image and the experience of pain emerges throughout Plutarch's *Sympotic Questions* 5.1.

⁵⁸ Plutarch's language here combines both Cyrenaic and Epicurean references to sense perceptions. Throughout this tract, Plutarch continually manipulates the language of both sects repeatedly, suggesting his aim is less a discussion of poetics (as Konstan, and van der Stockt assume), and more a philosophical discussion of the perception of other's pain. For the vocabulary of the two schools see: Teodorsson (1990), 139-52.

Secondly, the universality of painful experience is constructed as the reason for its inability to attract the attention or engagement of the audience: pain is uninteresting because it is universal. Plutarch's formulation figures the experiences of audience and sufferer. Pain and suffering only become matters or problems to which audiences are drawn to when artistic qualities render the experience sufficiently individualised. The common experience of pain sufferers, here, fails to render the experience intellectually or ethically interesting, or attractive for the individual who is born to be pleased by technical proficiency:

τὸν δὲ γεγραμμένον Φιλοκτήτην καὶ τὴν πεπλασμένην Ἰοκάστην, ἧς φασιν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον ἀργύρου τι συμμιῖξαι τὸν τεχνίτην, ὅπως ἐκλείποντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ μαραιομένου λάβη περιφάνειαν ὁ χαλκός, <ιδόντες> ἡδόμεθα καὶ θαυμάζομεν.
(674a)⁵⁹

Artistic style comes to the fore. Plutarch places particular emphasis on the technical skill required to produce the imitations (*cf. τι συμμιῖξαι τὸν τεχνίτην*), which induces the audience's pleasure and amazement. Plutarch's use of *συμμίγνυμι* is significant, flagging the theme of mixing which is central to Plutarch's conception of the attraction of art. He tells us that children wonder at things which share in intelligence and reason (*νοῦ καὶ λόγου μετέχον*, 673e); just as children are more drawn to images in which they can see that logic and skill (*τεχνικὸν καὶ λογικὸν*) have been combined (*καταμεμιγμένον*, 673e). What interests me is the way such an emphasis effects a transition: the level of engagement becomes, critically, on Plutarch's formulation, the way something is created, rather than the subject matter of the representation. Audiences, Plutarch argues, engage with pain at the level of style; true suffering fails to attract the wonder or the engagement of the viewer

⁵⁹ *cf. Plut. Quaest. Conv.* 673d-e: *φύσει λογικοὶ καὶ φιλότεχνοι γεγονότες πρὸς τὸ λογικῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς πραττόμενον οἰκείως διακείμεθα καὶ θαυμάζομεν, ἃν ἐπιτυγχάνηται.*

because it lacks such stylistic layering. Here the responses of wonder and amazement become a reflection of the artist's and the audience's shared cultural values: aesthetics here emerges not as an affective engagement with the impactful subject matter, but rather, an expression of shared interest in technical skill and proficiency.

We discussed in the introduction how modern mass-media culture has influenced the way in which pain becomes a 'real' phenomenon. For Sontag, following Guy DeBord, the question concerned how the sheer proliferation of images in a modern mass media culture had led us to find greater interest in the way things are depicted than their subject matter. In this situation, Plutarch appears to present an aesthetic code in which pain only becomes an arresting subject when it is presented as a stylistic artistic image. This has dramatic implications for the experience of pain and the possibilities of representation. On one reading, pain is relegated to the world of the universal, uninteresting because it is a universal experience. At another level, pain becomes the subject of a representation which in order to be interesting and arresting for viewers deliberately combines the reality of pain with other artistic elements. Plutarch's formulation raises an important question about representation and pain: what are the possibilities for describing or depicting pain in a viewing culture in which that experience is figured as interesting in a medium which plays upon its distance from reality?

4. *Conclusions*

There are several points which need to be drawn out of this discussion of Plutarch's critical negotiation of *mimesis*. For Plutarch *mimesis* draws together questions of audience engagement with text, and through that medium, reality. This has dramatic implications for his approach to how we think about the powerful effective character of the sublime and its transference of traumatic experience. In the first instance Plutarch's *Poetry* attempts to

reassert the boundaries between the receptor and the subject matter by asking the reader to engage critically with the stylistic qualities of the representational medium. This would ensure that they could ‘check themselves’ when they were confronted with painful images and not suffer any damaging effects.

Secondly, we saw how this idea was advanced in Plutarch’s *Sympotic Question* in which Plutarch argued that man was characterised by indirect sensual engagement in which his *dianoia* influenced how he reacted to *realia* and represented images. In the cultural world Plutarch envisages man is drawn to the rationality of the image itself: pain becomes an object of ethical and intellectual consideration when it is represented in a way that combines the Greek cultural values of rationality and logic. This induced a type of complicity between the audience and the artistic medium: we engage with the artists’ world view, rather than the realities of painful experience.

SECTION 3: REPRESENTING BODILY VIOLATION IN PLUTARCH AND GALEN

In the first two sections of this chapter, we have developed two models for thinking about the communication of suffering: one in which sublime language impacted upon the reader, another in which conscious or rational engagement with the artistic work served to desensitise. In this final section, I want to fill out the map of the representational landscape by investigating the way violence and pain are represented in two very different authors from opposite ends of the second century. My focus here will be on how the representational dynamics of Plutarch’s *Concerning Flesh Eating* (henceforth *Flesh*) and Galen’s *On Anatomical Procedures* (henceforth *Anatomy*) figure our engagement with violated and tortured bodies. These two texts present very different reactions to the problem of how to represent suffering to readers: in Plutarch’s text the primary concern

focuses on mobilising the emotions of the reader to empathise with, and understand, the suffering of others; in Galen, the concern to enhance the reader's knowledge of the body's structure and form underpins a subtle relationship with the model developed by Longinus and Plutarch's model of poetic desensitisation—Galen's text has sublime elements, but uses these elements in ways very different from Longinus or Achilles Tatius. What combines these two authors is a conscious effort to shape the way we imagine the pain of others through the manipulation of the sublime elements of literary representation.

1. Violence towards Animals

The first point to note about these two works is their focus on the animal body. These texts are situated within a cultural tradition in which animals help to phrase questions about culture, justice, rationality, and the human body.⁶⁰ Their focus on violence towards animals highlights the problem of desensitisation and the related questions of emotional, imaginative, and ethical affiliation we have been tracking over this chapter. Indeed, as we shall see, it raises the stakes in the cultural discussion we have tracking over this chapter, precisely because it plays on fundamental questions about how we recognise not only other human experiences, but the experiences of other species; species, furthermore, whose experience of pain and hold on man's ethical sensibilities was in question.

For Plutarch, approaching questions of violence towards animals explicitly raises questions about man's capacity to understand, and imagine, the suffering of others. Questions of empathy, and justice, are exacerbated precisely because animals lack the capacity to communicate with us. The fact that animals lack the linguistic capacity to

⁶⁰ Cassin (1997), for an overview of the main issues; *cf.* Lloyd (1997), 417-34; on the role of animals in medical thought Ayache, (1997), 55-74; and in anatomy specifically see Hankinson (1997), 75-93.

express their claims to justice or describe their treatment underpinned a philosophical debate about the whether or not animals did in fact experience pain in a similar manner to humans: as Sorabji has pointed out the critical lack of a linguistic capacity justified (in stoic thought at least) the idea that animals could be mistreated on the basis that their experiences were of a fundamentally different (and lesser) nature than ours.⁶¹ Plutarch's text simultaneously speaks about animals, and for them. That dual process is designed both to bridge an imaginative (and ultimately empathetic and ethical) divide between man and animal: the strategy of speaking for animals asks us to confront the Stoic assumption that lack of communication indicates the poverty of experience; giving them a voice forces us to imagine and confront their experiences directly.

For Galen the significance of representing animal violence is tied to the ideological and legal structures surrounding anatomical demonstration in the Imperial period. Although it appears that the dissection of humans had been undertaken in the Hellenistic period, it is clear that Galen was prevented from anatomical work on live human bodies; restricted, ultimately, to the vivisection of animals.⁶² Galen's use of the animal body is ambivalent. On one level, Galen uses animals to construct a model for thinking about human suffering. In order to construct animal bodies as an effective means for thinking about the human body, Galen repeatedly argues for a homological structure between animal bodies and human.⁶³ Indeed, there are times throughout Galen's corpus when the

⁶¹ Sorabji (1997), 7-16, 78-96 on animal reason and speech; 107-133 on animal claims to justice. A number of texts in Plutarch's corpus deal explicitly with the way animals communicate and their experience of pleasure and pain: cf. *Plut. Brut. Anim.* (which contains a sustained argument for the superiority of animal virtue, and intensity of their sensual experiences, especially pleasure); *Terrest. an Aquat.*; on these two texts and their connection with *De Esu Carn.* see: Newmyer (1992), 38-54.

⁶² On the dissection and vivisection of human bodies in Alexandria see: von Staden (1989), 29-30; 139-53. As von Staden points out the practice appears to have been short-lived (139-40). On the legal restrictions in Galen's time see Hankinson (1997), 76.

⁶³ Gleason (2009), 85-88; cf. Hankinson (1997), 75-93.

distinction between the human and the animal all but disappears.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the practice of operating on animal bodies also serves to distance his readers from real human pain and suffering. As has been acknowledged, Roman imperial culture marked one's position in the social hierarchy in terms the capacity to inflict violence upon the body. The capacity of violence to lay claim to the viewer's empathy and understanding was increasingly limited as the legal capacity for the infliction of violence increased—Galen's use of animals cordons off violence, pain, and suffering into a world which had little hold on the Roman imagination or sense of empathy.⁶⁵ The Sontag and Kleinman approach to desensitisation, with which we began this chapter, problematised the way representation distanced the reader and therefore prevented them from understanding and empathising with suffering in other parts of the world. These two texts complicate, and in many ways intensify, that question of affective distance by focusing on violence towards a body's whose ability to hold engage our emotional responses is deeply limited.

Plutarch's *Flesh*⁶⁶

Plutarch's two treatises concerning the consumption of flesh present a rhetorical argument for the adoption of a diet of restrained, just meat eating. As a consequence it has been taken as an expression of Plutarch's (highly unusual) concern with, and advocacy

⁶⁴ cf. Galen's advice to those who are not lucky enough to see exposed human corpses at AA.ii.222: ἔκλεξαι δὲ εἰς τοῦτο τῶν πιθήκων τοὺς ὁμοιοτάτους ἀνθρώπων. τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν, ὧν οὐθ' αἱ γέννες προμήκεις, οὐθ' οἱ κυνόδοντες ὀνομαζόμενοι μεγάλοι. τοῖς δὲ τοιοῦτοις πιθήκοις εὐρήσεις καὶ τᾶλλα μόρια παραπλησίως ἀνθρώποις διακείμενα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βαδίζοντάς τε καὶ τρέχοντας αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ δυοῖν σκελοῖν.

⁶⁵ On the issue of homology see Gleason (2009), 111; on the relationship between animals and the status of slaves see: Fitzgerald (2000), 99-102, esp. 100, for the fluid boundaries between the bodies of slaves and animals and their susceptibility to mistreatment.

⁶⁶ The text of *de Esu Carn.* is badly mutilated. There are *lacunae* indicated at 994d, 994f, 995e, 996b, 997a. The extant text is also disputed at, for example 994b-d. Finally both discourses appear to end with the promise of more material: cf. 996c; 999b. I will refer to these problems in more detail when they affect my reading of the text directly.

of, animal rights, and vegetarianism.⁶⁷ *Flesh* engages directly with the question of desensitisation and its relationship with bodily boundaries we have been tracking over this chapter. The tract begins with a model of desensitisation in which the individual has been hardened against genuine appreciation of the experiences of others. This sensual malaise is countered by Plutarch's attempt to shape our appreciation of the destroyed animal body through our engagement with powerful, emotively forceful language and rhetoric. As we shall see, although explicit reference to the experiences of amazement and shock (upon which the Longinian model of the sublime was built) are absent from this work, the sublime still plays a critical role in promoting our affective engagement with the suffering of others.

1. *Luxury, Desensitisation, and Violence*

One of the primary focuses of *Flesh* involves critiquing the sensual malaise characteristic, Plutarch claims, of his contemporaries. His tract opens with the confronting rhetorical questions about how man could endure the pollution of eating, or how his sensorial organs could endure the sight, smells, and sounds associated with animal slaughter.⁶⁸ Plutarch answers his own question by developing a model of desensitisation in which the search for pleasure and the continual exposure to deleterious sights has served to render man callous and unable to imagine the pain and suffering of others.

According to Plutarch, man's desensitisation starts from his pursuit of pleasure:

εἶθ' ὥσπερ ἐν γυναιξὶν κόρον ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἐχούσαις ἀποπειρώμενος πάντα καὶ
πλανώμενος <ὁ> ἀκολασταίνων ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὰ ἄρρητα, οὕτως αἱ περὶ τὴν ἐδωδὴν

⁶⁷ Barrow (1967), 112 for Plutarch's "sympathy" towards animals; Newmyer (1992), 40; (2005); cf. Beer (2008), 106: 'Plutarch...makes a sustained plea for the just and humane treatment of animals.'

⁶⁸ Plut. *de Esu Carn.* 993a-b.

ἀκρασίαι τὸ φυσικὸν παρελθοῦσαι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον τέλος ἐν ὠμότητι καὶ παρανομίᾳ
ποικίλλουσι τὴν ὄρεξιν. (997a-b)

When Plutarch imagines the desire of women as ‘trying all things’ and ‘wandering’, he figures the achievement of pleasure as an endless quest. The repeated markers of liminality and transcendence are significant here (cf. for example, τὸ φυσικὸν παρελθοῦσαι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον τέλος; ἐξέπεσεν): the achievement of satiety here is presented not only as a transcendence of the ‘natural limit’, but also an endless journey (πλανώμενος) of one who goes beyond in an ineluctable search for the new, for variety. This quest has important corporeal implications. He continues his social analysis by reminding his reader that the sense organs (τὰ αἰσθητήρια, 997c) become sick (συννοσεῖ) and cease to be governed by proper limits, when they are presented with excess in other areas; exposure to shameful music, for instance, engendered illness in the sense of hearing, which in turn fostered desire (ποθεῖ) for effeminate gropes and pleasures; foreign or inappropriate sights (θέατρα ἔκφυλα) follow shameful dances and music; and wild images in the theatre, induce insensitivity and savagery towards man (θέαμασιν ἀνημέροις ἀπάθεια πρὸς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ὠμότης, 997c). The torture of animals to produce alimentary delicacies is, so Plutarch argues, a direct correlate of man’s sensual illness.

Plutarch’s vision of this malaise presents a model in which exposure to forms of suffering alters the way the senses operate. Encountering acts of savagery actually changes the way different phenomena are seen: such spectacles of violence taught sight (...τὴν ὄψιν ἐδίδαξε...), not to take pleasure in warlike exercises, gesticulations or refined dances, or statues or paintings (μὴ πυρρίχαις χαίρειν μηδὲ χειρονομίαις μηδ’ ὀρχήμασι γλαφυροῖς μηδ’ ἀγάλμασι καὶ γραφαῖς), but to make slaughter and death, the wounds of man, and the

spectacle of war, most refined (*πολυτέλεστατον*, *de Esu Carn.* 997c). The model Plutarch adopts here is critically different to the model of sensual perception mobilised in his *Sympotic Questions* 5.1. In this context, the sheer volume of exposure is the critical matter. Plutarch's model ultimately seems well suited to the critique of a society where the spectacular image of pain and suffering, violence and torture saturated the cultural fabric. Indeed, Plutarch's argument attempts to extrapolate from the treatment of animals to the fundamentally violent, bellicose nature of ancient society. It is through gradual exposure to violence, he claims, that being hardened (*στομώσαντες*) we developed the appetite (*τὴν ἀπληστίαν*) for the slaughter of man, and war (*ἐπὶ σφαγὰς ἀνθρώπων καὶ πολέμους καὶ φόνους*, 998b). Pleasure in the pain of others is taken to be a result of a certain kind of perceptual reconditioning induced by long exposure to similarly deleterious spectacles, and characterised by the failure to be governed by natural limits.

Nothing, Plutarch admonishes his listeners, shamed civilised men: ...οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς *δυσωπεῖ*, οὐ χροῖας ἀνθηρὸν εἶδος, οὐ φωνῆς ἐμμελοῦς πιθανότης (994e). In this instance, *δυσωπεῖ* appears to refer directly to the experience of shame. However, it also suggests, if no more than metaphorically, a problematic process of direct sensual engagement: the very process of looking at animals has been readjusted by our pursuit of pleasure. The point is hammered home moments later. In this situation we imagine their voices to be inarticulate cries, rather than requests for justice: *εἴθ' ἅς φθέγγεται καὶ διατρίζει φωνὰς ἀνάρχρους εἶναι δοκοῦμεν* (994e). Our sensual malaise has undermined our capacity to imagine or to understand the experiences of others.

2. Consuming Animals, Reading the Text, Viewing Terrible Sights.

We can see then, how *Flesh* narrative creates a model of desensitisation in which the metaphor of hardened body figures our inability to empathise with and understand the sufferings of others. Plutarch's engagement with that sensual malaise is primarily motivated towards shocking the reader out of their aesthetic hardness. The process by which he achieves that involves manipulating different aspects of the rhetorical sublime. This manipulation is encapsulated, I argue, in the way the reader is forced to engage psycho-somatically with the subject matter of the discourse. Plutarch sublimates the representation of pain and suffering, forcing the reader to recognise and understand others' experiences by moving the emotions of the reader and eliding the distance between the traumatic subject matter and the reader's internal body. Although *Flesh* is not impactful in the way Longinus' or Achilles Tatius' texts were, it does serve to render us more susceptible to understanding of suffering by eliding the distance between the reader and the suffering animals' bodies.

a) *Emotional Language*

The primary method by which Plutarch achieves this is the mobilisation of emotionally powerful language. The topic of emotion and its place in Plutarch's overall aims appears explicitly towards the end of the second treatise in which he asks his readers to examine properly the suggestion that animals have a claim to just treatment: ...σκεψώμεθα, τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸς τὰ ζῶα δίκαιον ἡμῖν, μήτε τεχνικῶς μήτε σοφιστικῶς, ἀλλὰ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἐμβλέψαντες τοῖς ἑαυτῶν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἀνθρωπικῶς λαλήσαντες καὶ ἀνακρίναντες... (de Esu Carn. 999b). Plutarch's text works from an assumption that the movement of the emotions is central to ethical action of understanding animal suffering; it attempts to move the emotions of the reader through the manipulation of sublime or elevated powerful language and images.

Central to this aim is the vivid presentation of the reality of the practices that man engages in. At 993b Plutarch asks, provocatively, how man could endure the flaying and skinning of the dead carcasses (τὸν φόνον σφαζομένων δερομένων διαμελιζομένων). Plutarch's use of *σφαζομένων* carries implications of ritualistic slaughter (of both human and animal victims), while his references to flaying or skinning insinuate wanton violence, punishment, and torture.⁶⁹ He continues by confronting readers with a series of powerful images: ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ... προσήψατο σαρκὸς καὶ νεκρῶν σωμάτων (993b); portions (τὰ μέρη) which not long before had βρυχώμενα ... καὶ φθεγγόμενα καὶ κινούμενα καὶ βλέποντα (993b); meat eating involves touching the juice and ichor from the mortal wounds of foreign bodies (...ψαύουσιν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ τραυμάτων θανάσιμων χυμούς καὶ ἰχώρας ἀπολαμβάνουσιν, 993b). For Plutarch, clearly, meat eating is mired in the bloody, gory, wounding of animals, and the pollution of the human body with the carcasses of the dead.

These early sections of the treatise mobilise powerful rhetorical imagery and language which help to develop our awareness of the viciousness of our carnivorous practices. Note the *onomatopoeias* (βρυχώμενα ... καὶ φθεγγόμενα) which imbue the passage with a degree of vividness.⁷⁰ The effect of the *onomatopoeia* here is literally to bring the sounds of the erstwhile animal into the treatise itself: to make the reader hear its voice. Also significant is the use of the accumulative strategies of *polusyndeton* (cf. ... βρυχώμενα ... καὶ φθεγγόμενα καὶ κινούμενα καὶ βλέποντα) and *asyndeton* (cf.

⁶⁹ cf. the use of ἐκδείραντι at 996b which continues to strengthen the implications of torture.

⁷⁰ The use of φθεγγόμενα here appears to imply human speech. For the term in connection with human language see Hdt. 2.57.

...σφαζομένων δερομένων διαμελιζομένων). The effect of these two rhetorical tropes is powerfully emotive: rhetorical theory associates these strategies with the achievement of character and grandeur in rhetorical narrative. In his *Concerning the Pursuit of Intensity* Hermogenes suggests that the appropriate use of these respective tropes creates μέγεθος and ἥθος.⁷¹ What interests me here is the way in which Plutarch's language has been shaped in order to cultivate a certain form of impact: the quality of μέγεθος, in particular, is closely associated with the achievement of sublime rhetorical form.⁷² Plutarch's text confronts us with animals' suffering through the employment of rhetorical language which is designed to have an impact on the emotional constitution of the reader.

b) *Hearing the Animal Voice*

The second strategy Plutarch employs to force the reader to confront animal suffering involves the use of the animal voice. Plutarch's treatise refers to the animal voice on a number of occasions (cf. the use of *onomatopoeias* discussed above). Importantly it also makes use of the strategy of *prosopopoiia* in which animals are explicitly represented as pleading for justice before the listener. This strategy was common throughout classical rhetorical practice as a particularly effective technique for forcing the audience imagine inarticulate beings such as animals or inanimate objects such the dead. Quintillian notes that it is a particularly effective for making the audience see the speaker as both possessed of human qualities, and being present before them.⁷³ In this context, I argue that it serves firstly to humanise the animal, eliding the ethical bridge that exists between man and animal, and forcing them to confront their suffering in visceral emotional terms.

⁷¹ Hermog. *Meth.* 11.1-4: ...τὸ ἀσύνδετον σχῆμα καὶ τὸ μετὰ τῶν συνδέσμων λεγόμενον δοκεῖ τὸ μὲν δεδέσθαι, τὸ δὲ λελύσθαι. ταῦτὸ δὲ ἀμφοτέρω ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ ἐργάζεται καὶ μέγεθος ὁμοίως καὶ ἥθος.

⁷² For the use of the sublime to achieve *megēthos* see: ps.-Long, *de Subl.* 9.1 33.2

⁷³ On *Prosopopoiia* see Quintillian, 9.3.30-34, esp., 34.

The first example of this is played out in a provocative scene from early in the first treatise. In the middle of this emotive passage, Plutarch turns to Homer to provide another image for the mistreatment of animals:

*εἶρπον μὲν ῥινοί, κρέα δ' ἄμφ' ὀβελοῖς ἐμεμύκει ὀπταλέα τε καὶ ὠμά, βοῶν δ' ὥς
γίγνετο φωνή· τοῦτο μὲν πλάσμα καὶ μῦθος ἐστι, τὸ δέ γε δεῖπνον ἀληθῶς
τερατῶδες. (993c-d, quoting Hom. *Od.* 12.395-6).*

On one reading, the textual strategy seems to distance the reader. Plutarch's description of the passage as *πλάσμα καὶ μῦθος* serves to neatly bracket off the reference to the animal voice: by highlighting the mythical nature of the quotation, Plutarch protects the reader from direct engagement with the sound of the animal voice as the beast burns on the spit. What interests me is the way in which a connection is drawn between the treatment of the animal and voice. Read at one level the quote from Homer seems to emphasise the close association between the treatment of animals as food—in this case cooking—and the expression of pain and grief. Plutarch's passage seems to play up a strategy for making us think through the effect of animal wounding.

The second example of this process occurs in a context in which Plutarch represents animals literally pleading their case for just and humane treatment:

*εἴθ' ἂς φθέγγεται καὶ διατρίζει φωνὰς ἀνθρώπων εἶναι δοκοῦμεν, οὐ παραιτήσεις
καὶ δεήσεις καὶ δικαιολογίας ἐκάστου λέγοντος "οὐ παραιτοῦμαί σου τὴν ἀνάγκην
ἀλλὰ τὴν ὕβριν· ἵνα φάγῃς ἀπόκτεινον, ἵνα δ' ἥδιον φάγῃς μὴ μ' ἀναίρει. (994e-f)*

On one level this passage could be taken as polemical towards stoic opinions that animals lacked the capacity to express themselves or their understanding of justice. At another, it asks the reader to renegotiate their understanding of animal speech. On this reading animal cries are transformed from inarticulate cries into powerful and provocative expressions of

pain and suffering; expressions of objection to the injustice of their treatment. By bringing their voice into the text itself, Plutarch forces, furthermore, the reader to vividly imagine the animal, its unjust treatment, and its suffering before their eyes. Just as *prosopopoiia* forces the audience to imagine inanimate objects speaking before them, so we are dragooned into imagining the experiences of the other.

c) *Touching and Eating the Corpse.*

The final method I touch on concerns the way *Flesh* elides the distance between the body of the reader and the traumatised, polluting body of the animal carcass. We saw in Section 1, that an important aspect of the sublime involved dissolving the boundaries and affective distance that separated the reader from the subject matter of the text. This was primarily approached in terms of the process of poetic inspiration and vividness. Here I suggest, Plutarch's text engages in a slightly different process, but still aims to break down the barriers between the reader and the text's subject.

This is achieved through two techniques. Firstly, as we saw above, by emphasising the way the animal carcass polluted the consumer's own *corpus*. As Plutarch's comments in the first lines of the tract point out, the consumption of the animal body involves the pollution of the human body with that of 'other' (*ἀλλοτρίων*) carcasses and their wounds (*τραυμάτων*, 993b). Plutarch's rhetorical questions concerning how the sense of sight and of smell could endure the destruction of animals and the ichor flowing from their bodies plays heavily on the way the dead body of the animal impacts on the body of the viewer, penetrating and mingling with his corpus.

The second technique Plutarch uses concerns a more direct correlation between flesh eating and textual consumption—Plutarch figures our consumption of the animal

body and the text as not only analogous, but distinctly unpleasurable and even traumatic. The suggestion that the consumption of food could operate as a metaphor for textual consumption was well established within rhetorical and literary theory.⁷⁴ Plutarch's text itself is deeply mired in the confusion between these two modes of consumption: at one point he tells us that his aim is to speak to the belly—*χαλεπὸν μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ Κάτων ἔφησε, λέγειν πρὸς γαστέρας ὅτα μὴ ἐχούσας* (996d). The interplay between the belly and its lack of aural equipment plays up precisely Plutarch's attempt to negotiate between the various modes of the audience's consumption. Extending the metaphor, he tells us that his aim is to extract the 'hook' of meat-eating (*τὸ ἄγκιστρον ἐκβάλλειν τῆς σαρκοφαγίας*) which is embedded in the love of pleasure (*ἐμπεπηγμένον τῇ φιληδονίᾳ καὶ διαπεπαρμένον*, 996e). The metaphorical presentation of his aims here reverses the ordinary relationship between the reader and his meal: reference to the 'fish-hook' (*τὸ ἄγκιστρον*) casts the reader as the passive victim of the process of hunting; it is the reader who has been caught, and trapped; and who will be the subject of violent treatment. It also suggests our normal pleasurable practices will be reversed by the rhetorical success of Plutarch's treatise. Plutarch's text then is conceived not only as talking directly to the process of bodily consumption, but also violently destroying the body's integrity; and undermining the normal associations of pleasure and consumption.

Much of this process revolves around the practice of explicitly describing how the animal should be treated and nurtured in order to satisfy the tastes of consumers. Early in his first *logos* he links the production of delicacies with the process of teaching people how

⁷⁴ cf. Rimell (2002), esp., 1-15, 20-23 on the relationship between body and text, and reading and eating as comparable models for textual consumption in Petronius, *Satyricon*.

to raise and prepare different animals.⁷⁵ At other points he goes into a great deal more detail, describing specific methods of slaughtering animals for different meals by *ὀψοποιούντες*:

οἷα νῦν πολλὰ δρῶσιν οἱ μὲν εἰς σφαγὴν ὑῶν ὠθοῦντες ὀβελοὺς διαπύρους, ἵνα τῇ βαφῇ τοῦ σιδήρου περισβεννύμενον τὸ αἷμα καὶ διαχεόμενον τὴν σάρκα θρύψη καὶ μαλάξη· οἱ δ' οὕθασι συῶν ἐπιτόκων ἐναλλόμενοι καὶ λακτίζοντες, ἥν' αἷμα καὶ γάλα καὶ λύθρον ἐμβρύων ὁμοῦ συμφθαρέντων ἐν ὠδίσιν ἀναδόντος, ὃ Ζεῦ καθάρσιε, φάγωσι τοῦ ζώου τὸ μάλιστα φλεγμαῖνον· ἄλλοι γεράνων ὄμματα καὶ κύκνων ἀπορράψαντες καὶ ἀποκλείσαντες ἐν σκότει πιαίνουσιν ...⁷⁶ ἄλλοκότοις μίγμασι καὶ καρυκείαις τισὶν αὐτῶν τὴν σάρκα ὀψοποιούντες. (996e-997a)

In this way, then, Plutarch brings home the savagery of our carnivorous diet. A range of possible readings obtain in this passage. On one approach, this scene might be read through a framework associated with the consumptive gaze of the reader.⁷⁷ Plutarch's narrative technique obscures the destroyed animals from view, presenting instead a series of disassembled body parts prepared, simply, for their gastronomic consumption. Seen in this light, the reader is asked to engage pleasurably with the destruction of the animal body—Plutarch's text fetishizes the animal body for the consuming pleasure of the reader. Yet, the passage is embedded in a particular approach to carnivorous meals which Plutarch has developed throughout the treatise. At one point, he refers to the tables of rich, laid with carcasses, as a terrible sight;⁷⁸ in a more provocative process he suggests that eating an

⁷⁵ Plut. *de Esu Carn.* 993c: διδάσκοντα ἀφ' ὧν δεῖ τρέφεσθαι ζώντων ἔτι καὶ λαλούντων, <καὶ> διαταττόμενον ἀρτύσεις τινὰς καὶ ὀπτήσεις καὶ παραθέσεις· τούτων ἔδει ζητεῖν τὸν πρῶτον ἀρζάμενον οὐ τὸν ὀψὲ παυσάμενον.

⁷⁶ A lacuna is indicated here in the in Wil. Edition. Although the full meaning of the original passage is obviously unavailable, I still feel my point about the argumentative thrust and technique of the passage holds.

⁷⁷ Morales (2004), 32-4, 165-6..

⁷⁸ Plut. *de Esu Carn.* 994e-f: δεινὸν μὲν ἔστι καὶ τιθεμένην ἰδεῖν τράπεζαν ἀνθρώπων πλουσίων νεκροκόσμοις χρωμένων μαγείροις καὶ ὀψοποιοῖς, δεινότερον δ' ἀποκομιζομένην.

animal meal can be seen in analogous terms to eating human flesh (997e-f). These scenes impact on how we approach the present of animals and their preparation as meals at 996f-7a: arguably, we are invited to renegotiate our understanding of the pleasurable process of consumption by its continually association with terrible, and traumatic images. In this scene, then, we are given a particularly poignant example of the way Plutarch's text speaks to different levels of readerly consumption—rather than figuring the consumption of the animal body in pleasing or luxurious terms, Plutarch emphasises the shocking and terrible nature of this process of act of reading. In this scene, we may be invited to consume the animal body, but we consume it in ways which deny the pleasure of that form of engagement.

d) Conclusions

Plutarch's *Flesh*, then, attempts to shock the reader out of a type of sensual malaise. In order to do this, the narrative mobilises different aspects of ancient rhetorical theory, such as emotive language, and *prosopopoiia* to ask the reader to imagine the suffering of the other. It also seeks to elide the distance between the subject matter and the reader by presenting the consumption of the text and the animal body itself in traumatic, destabilising terms. Although Plutarch's text doesn't develop qualities such as *ekplexis* in the way Longinus' model does, it does serve to traumatise and shock the individual in order to remove him from his sensual malaise.

Galen and the Representation of Violated Bodies

Let us turn finally to a discussion of the dissected animal body in Galen's *Anatomy*.⁷⁹ Galen's *Anatomy* continually presents readers with images of the violated, tortured, and broken animal body. Over the last decade a considerable amount of work has been done to place this text—and its treatment of the body—within the rhetorical culture of the Imperial period. Von Staden, for instance, has shown that the *Anatomy* employs strategies of display and rhetorical conviction drawn from contemporary culture.⁸⁰ Gleason, similarly, argues that the strategies of bodily display and narration employed by Galen intersect with a culture of spectacular violence and bodily control in the arena.⁸¹ The focus on desensitisation we have developed over this chapter will help to adjust the findings of these scholars slightly. Here I argue that Galen's concern with the paideutic development of the reader inflects the way the broken body is presented, and ultimately how the reader engages with and imagines the pain and suffering of the dissected animal: Galen ultimately desensitises the reader by rephrasing the shocking, ekplectic qualities of the tortured body in terms reminiscent of Plutarch's *Sympotic Questions* 5.1.

1. *Teaching the Medical Gaze*

Galen's *Anatomy* is designed to teach the reader about the structure and form of the body, and, thus, to inculcate a particular mode of engagement with the patient's body. It aims at creating, and enforcing, a medical gaze through which the experienced doctor takes hold of the body of the patient. Galen's texts are explicitly dedicated to those who are training themselves in the medical profession: he tells us that the treatise should serve as a memory aid for those who have seen his demonstrations; it explicitly instructs people how to effectively manage dissections. One implication which emerges from the educational

⁷⁹ For a good overview of Galen's anatomical work see, Rocca (2007), 242-62, esp., 260-2 for a full list of anatomical works.

⁸⁰ *cf.* his discussion of *epideixis* in AA. Relevant here also is Galen's stress of private practice vs. public demonstration: for further discussion of these two issues see von Staden (1995b), 48-9.

⁸¹ Gleason (2009), 85-114, 111-4; von Staden (1995b), 47-66; Debru (1991), 69-81. For a history of science approach to Galen's anatomical work see: Siegel (1970).

and instructive nature of Galen's text concerns the way the experienced medical viewer, the inexperienced observer, and the lay person engage with the violent images of the dissection of the animal body. This, in turn, impacts on the way the viewer outside the text engages with the pain and suffering of the other.

The process of teaching the medical gaze takes place through a number of strategies. Galen continually commands the reader to pay attention to certain aspects of the body (cf. AA.ii.663: *ἐνταῦθα δέ σε προσέχειν ἀκριβῶς χρὴ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις σώμασι ταῖς ἀνατεμνομέναις ἰσὶ*) and to ignore other aspects of the animals' condition: *...ἀλλὰ καταφρονήσεις γε νῦν τῆς αἰμορρογίας αὐτῶν· οὐ γάρ σοι πρόκειται νῦν ζῶν φυλάττειν τὸ ζῶον* (AA.ii.640 K).⁸² At other times, the process of instruction is more subtle. Galen tells his readers that they will 'clearly see' certain aspects of the body's internal structure, or that certain facts are 'evident' (*enargōs*).⁸³ Galen's use of this rhetorical term figures the visibility of the narrated body he presents to readers. Importantly, here, we can trace the way Galen defines his textual project against the engagement with rhetorical vividness discussed in Longinus and Plutarch. Rather, than figuring only a sense of direct exposure and emotional transportation, the quality of *enargeia* is also mobilised towards a more scientific, evidence based process of engaging with the destroyed body. These statements are far from innocent reflections on the apparent state of evidence: rather they constitute forceful moments in the text whereby Galen structures both what the reader should see and how they see it. They constitute an attempt to construct the body as 'clear' or its internal makeup as 'evident'. The final strategy Galen uses to teach us how to see the internal body

⁸² cf. the repetition of *προσέχων ἀκριβῶς* at Gal. AA. ii.685, 686, and *προσέχειν δ' ἀξιώ σε τὸν νοῦν* at ii.684. For a slightly different take on the process see the repeated use of *ἐθεάσασθε* at Gal. AA.ii.677-8. Galen's text tells not only what to observe, but what we observed.

⁸³ See above text to notes 4, 47. See also, for example, Gal. AA. ii.640: *ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εὐθέως ἔσται σοι δῆλα*. For a thorough discussion of the use of *enargeia* and *saphēneia* in Galen see von Staden (1995), 64-5.

is allied to Galen's descriptive style. As has been acknowledged Galen's text guides the reader methodically through the different structures of the body: at a macro level, his texts proceed from one area of the body to another, methodically moving along the frame of the body; at a micro level, the reader follows Galen's scalpel or the course of a particular artery, nerve or muscle as it moves through the body. This process has the effect of forcing the reader to engage with the body as an ordered, structured (and hierarchical) organism.

Galen's *Anatomy* then figures our engagement with the body in very specific and intense ways. This engagement with the body is emphasised by Galen's constant reference to concepts of *σαφήνεια* and *ἐναργεία*.⁸⁴ On one reading, such references present Galen's representation of the body as *mimetic*. Von Staden and Gleason have both emphasised the way Galen's narratives collapse the distance between the anatomical demonstration, the text, and viewer: according to von Staden, readers of Galen's *Anatomy* are constructed as eyewitnesses of the anatomical demonstrations Galen describes.⁸⁵ My interest, here, lies less in the straightforwardly *mimetic* qualities of Galen's accounts, and rather in the way the text shapes and curtails the reader's engagement with the body of the dissected animal: reading these texts through the concept of *mimesis* disguises the way in which Galen shapes our experience of the text and the body. Galen's texts only allow the reader limited access to the body. Ultimately, readers engage with the structured ordered body of Galen's texts, rather than the disordered, traumatised, broken, messy and bloody body of the anatomical demonstration. This has dramatic implications for how we engage with the experience of pain; with the opportunities to imagine or empathise with the experience of suffering.

⁸⁴ For *σαφήνεια*: Gal. AA. ii.216, 218, 220; for the quality of *ἐναργεία* see the use of *ἐναργῶς* at Gal. AA. iii.225, 241, 265.

⁸⁵ Von Staden (1995), 64-5; Gleason (2009), 100-2.

The most obvious consequence of this process is the way in which the reader is made aware of the pain or suffering experienced by his subjects only at strategically relevant moments. In a particularly eloquent passage, Galen describes the way in which he (among others) treated some of the victims of an anthrax epidemic in Pergamum:

...ἑτοίμως τ' ἐγνωρίζομεν αὐτὰ καὶ διηρθρωμένην ἐποιοῦμεθα τὴν διάγνωσιν, ἐπιτάττοντες τοῖς κάμνουσι, κινεῖσθαι τινα κίνησιν, ἣν ἠπιστάμεθα διὰ τοῦδέ τινος ἐπιτελεῖσθαι μὴ, ὀλίγον τι παραστέλλοντες καὶ παρατρέποντες ἐνίοτε τοὺς μὴς ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεάσασθαι παρακειμένην ἀρτηρίαν μεγάλην ἢ νεῦρον ἢ φλέβα. τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἅπαντας ἐωρῶμεν οἷον τυφλοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τε τὰ γεγυμνωμένα μόρια, καὶ πάσχοντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ πολλὰ μέρη τῶν ἐψιλωμένων μυῶν ἐπαίροντάς τε καὶ παρατρέποντας, ἐξ ὧν ἀνιαροὶ οἱ κάμνοντες ἐγίγνοντο, μάτην ἐνοχλοῦντας.... (AA.ii.245)

Galen's supreme ability and knowledge, it appears, is felt on the level of the patient's body. As has been acknowledged, this scenario is structured to emphasise the author's (and his companions') ability over that of other doctors.⁸⁶ What interests me in this scene is the way that process guides our engagement with the pain the patient feels. The focus on the structure of the body, on elucidating form and function of the muscles involves a reduced focus on the physiological experiences of pain. Pain only becomes an issue when his discussion moves from structure and form to the treatment the patient receives at the hands of others. It is not until the final lines that the use of *πάσχοντας* raises the possibility of the patient's suffering; the final line of the episode that we learn that movements of the muscle cause distress. Pain here is associated, implicitly, with the incompetence of medical practice, rather than with the experience of disease.

⁸⁶ For a reading of this passage as an example of Galen's emphasis of his control over the body see Gleason (2009), 90.

2. *Science and Pain*

It is possible to see, then, how Galen's concern with order and structure figures our engagement with the pain felt by wounded or sick individuals. In the following two sections, I probe this process in two further ways. I show, firstly, how animal expressions of pain are renegotiated in terms of evidence for the form and structure of the body, rather than developed as opportunities for the audience's imagination or empathetic engagement with another's suffering. In this context, phenomena such as animal screams are treated primarily as evidential material at the expense of discussing the experience of the patient or victim. Secondly, I explore how Galen refigures concepts such as *ekplexis* in order to shape the desensitised viewing of the animal body by experienced medical practitioners. Galen's concern with elucidating the form and structure of the body ensures a particular focus to his narratives of bodily destruction, in which our capacity to engage affectively with suffering is downplayed in favour of scientific interests.

a) *Painful Evidence*

The first technique Galen uses to desensitise our engagement with the animal body concerns the way he renegotiates animal phonation. Screaming is a particularly evocative example of the way in which Galen shapes his narrative, and controls audience responses. In Plutarch's *Flesh*, for example, the animal's phonation was treated in a manner that forced the reader to imagine the painful experiences of another; it was used to "humanise" non human communication of suffering: screams operated not only to stir the imagination of the audience, but to express the experience of suffering in evocative and emotional terms. In Galen's accounts of the body, the animal scream is treated purely as evidence for the function of different muscles and the structure of the body.

In his discussion of the Thoracic cavity, Galen focuses particularly closely on the way the scream indicates the nature of the body's structure. At ii.684 he informs his readers that animals draw in large amounts of breath when it has an impulse to cry out, as they sometimes do when they are being dissected.⁸⁷ Throughout, Galen focuses closely on the way the scream indicates the operation of the muscular system: it is at the moment when the animal cries out (*ἐν ᾧ φωνεῖ χρόνῳ τὸ ζῶον*, AA.ii.685), when one is able to visualise clearly (*ἀκριβῶς*) the position of the ribs which the vivisectionist needs to cut out.⁸⁸ On one reading, this process is about the control of the body: Galen forces us to recognise his capacity to control animal bodies; at the same time, it also speaks to the way in which our affective capacities are negotiated in a scientific text. The confluence between the phonation of the dissected animal and the ability of the operator to see the body's structure suggest that screams render the internal body legible. Significantly, Galen does not mention what the scream might be trying to communicate; the possibility that the scream operates to express suffering is simply ignored by the doctor. In this instance, the way the reader's attention is dramatically redirected: the voice is downplayed as an act of expression with which we must engage, and emphasised as a physiological action which allows us to see the body more clearly.

b) The Shocking Body

A second aspect to Galen's interest in directing our attention towards the structure of the body concerns the way he renegotiates various aspects of the sublime. The sublime is a central concept in the way Galen forces his audience to engage with his understanding and control of the body.⁸⁹ Galen's mobilisation of the sublime, impactful qualities of the

⁸⁷ cf. Gal. AA. ii.684

⁸⁸ Indeed, animal screams provide an opportunity to observe the body more closely: Gal. AA. ii. 685-6.

⁸⁹ For this see Gleason (2009), 98-100.

body are used in a number of ways to structure the reader's experience and engagement with painful or disturbing scenes. In this section, I want to show that being astounded is figured in terms deeply reminiscent of our engagement with *mimetic* art in Plutarch and other writers: in other words, painful scenes become interesting and profound for the viewer when they display technique, structure, and *panourgia*.

Galen's concern with teaching readers how to view the body is underpinned by a particular engagement with sublime concepts like *ekplexis*. As has been acknowledged, at various points Galen presents his dissections as powerful, shocking experiences, which amaze viewers. I argue that this process is specifically figured as a quality of inexperience: the experienced medical reader of Galen's text is disassociated with the sublime, impactful experience of encountering the animal body. At one point in his *Anatomy* he figures the inexperienced viewing of the body in a particularly interesting way. Galen explains that certain viewers, notably the inexperienced, will find the various experiments disturbing and difficult: ἀπείρω μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸν φαίνεται τὸ πρᾶγμα (AA. ii.693). As he continues in more detail he develops this connection between inexperience and a particular viewing mode in more direct terms:

...θεασαμένων δέ τινι πολλάκις ἐμὲ τοῦτο πράττοντα διὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει
πεπεισθαι τὸ δυνατόν τῆς εἰρημένης ἀνατομῆς· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν φαντασίαν μᾶλλον, οὐ
κατὰ τὴν ἐαυτῆς δύναμιν ἐκπλήττουσα τοὺς ἀπείρους φαίνεται δύσκολος. μὴ τοίνυν
καταπλαγῇ τις, ἀλλ' ἐπιτολμάτω τῇ πείρᾳ.

Here Galen teaches the reader how to view the body. His passage creates a division between those who are inexperienced and those who have seen the operation many times. This division is mapped onto a distinction between particular viewing experiences. The nature of the experiment literally strikes the inexperienced viewer, amazing him; the case

appears to be quite different for those who have seen it done many times. Importantly, the last line of the passage is particularly significant. Arguably, the subjunctive invites the inexperienced to both improve their experience and adjust the way they are struck by the image of the experiment. The experience of shock appears to be associated with those who experience and ability needs to be developed.

A slightly different example of this process of the construction between experience and desensitisation occurs at *Anatomy* ii.669. Here Galen claims to astound viewers with a particular experiment: and the reaction of the viewers is constructed explicitly in terms reminiscent of the Longinian model of the sublime we discussed above. At one point in his treatment of the thoracic nerves Galen produces a display which amazes viewers:

Κέκραγε γὰρ οὕτω παιόμενον, εἴτ' ἐξαίφνης ἄφωνον γινόμενον ἐπὶ τῷ σφιγχθῆναι τοῖς λίνοις τὰ νεῦρα τοῦς θεατὰς ἐκπλήτται. Θαυμαστὸν γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ, νεύρον μικρῶν κατὰ τὸ μετὰφρενον βροχισθέντων, ἀπόλλυσθαι τὴν φωνήν.

Ostensibly, this example suggests that shock and amazement are fundamental parts of reaction to the sublime presentation of the dissected body. According to Gleason, this scene is a prime example of the way in which Galen compels his audiences: audiences are amazed, and are compelled to validate Galen's understanding of the body.⁹⁰

There are two points which interest me, and which inflect our reading of amazement here. Firstly, this scene is explicitly embedded in a passage in which Galen advises other doctors how to control and overpower the crowd. In other words, there is a type of collusion between experienced medical practitioners wishing to control and exert their influence over a third group of people, implicitly presented as inexperienced and

⁹⁰ Gleason (2009), 98-100.

unaccustomed to the body. This complicity implies that shock and awe are experiences felt by certain types of viewer or audience. Read alongside the reference to inexperienced viewers, this passage suggests that *ekplexis* is a viewing mode associated with the inexperienced audience. Amazement and awe lie within the range of possible reactions to the presentation of animal vivisection, but are relegated to a particular type of audience or viewer; that viewing process is, in a large part, at odds with Galen's instructional process in which the reader, as we saw, is being encouraged to develop their experience with, and understanding of, broken, dissected bodies.

The second factor that inflects our reading of amazement here concerns the object of our amazement. The sense of amazement and the shock (flagged here by *Θαυμαστόν* and *ἐκπλήτται*) appears to refer specifically to the way the realisation of the structure and order of the body affect the audience; the audience reacts less to the suffering and trauma of being exposed to the dissected body, but rather to its structure and order. Amazement and wonder are directed towards a particular aspect of the body, that part associated with the very function of Galen's anatomical project: to reorder the body in a logical and meaningful way.

Galen's mobilisation of the concept of astonishment, fright and awe is reminiscent of a range of other contexts throughout his anatomical works. Reference to the quality of *ekplexis* for instance recalls the way in which Galen ascribes to the viewing of the body the particular experience of viewing works of art across his corpus: at *On the Usefulness of Parts* iii.239 he compares the body to the work of the *demiourge* which astounds (*ἐκπλήττει*) and the work of Pheidias, the beauty (*τὸ ... κάλλος*) of which astounds (*ἐκπλήττει*) the both the viewer. At other points, Galen is more explicit about the

connection between viewing the body and how we encounter the wonder of nature. At another point in *On the Usefulness of Parts* he tells his readers that he wonders at the art of nature (τεθαυμακέναι τῆς φύσεως τὴν τέχνην, UP iv.81 K).⁹¹ How might we read Galen's treatment of the qualities of amazement and wonder? Although Galen's terms here are critically different to those of Plutarch's in the *Sympotic Questions* 5.1, the two authors appear to draw on the same concept for their viewing context. The image becomes meaningful in a situation in which we are capable of observing the art and skill or the demiurge and the cunning structure and form of the image itself. What are the implications of the connection between wonder and amazement? Structure, form, and *technē* are qualities that Galen constructs for the body. They don't represent our profound engagement with the dissected body or with the traumatic experience; but rather an engagement with a mediated form of the body.

3. Conclusions

Galen's *Anatomy* presents a profoundly violent subject—the dissection, and in many cases, vivisection of animal bodies. Yet, he shapes our engagement with this violent manipulation and mutilation of the body in a remarkably desensitising way. Galen's treatise, as we saw, was designed to inculcate, and exhort the reader to practice, a medical, scientific gaze with which to engage the dissected, broken body. We saw how this had a number of implications for the representation of pain. Suffering was, in the first instance, downplayed, to be introduced when it suited Galen's strategic (and ultimately rhetorical) goals; secondly, we saw how expressions of pain were renegotiated as evidence for the form and structure of the body. Finally we saw how the *ekplectic* elements of Galen's

⁹¹ For other examples see: Gal. UP. iii.238; Loc. Aff. viii.444; On Galen's amazement towards the opinions of other doctors cf. Gal. Loc. Aff. viii.365; MM. x.57.

treatment of the dissected, traumatised body were framed in terms of the reader's engagement with the structure and order of the body.

CONCLUSIONS

There are several points which can be drawn from this discussion of the process of desensitisation. In this chapter, I have investigated the possibilities rhetoric offers for thinking about the socialisation of trauma and pain; this was achieved by mapping the course of a representational *mentalité* in which rhetoric (and especially, the sublime) was understood as a traumatic communicative mode. This traumatic communicative mode was defined by the way in which rhetoric allowed for direct exposure to traumatic events. Audiences' engagement with the sublime was seen as traumatic precisely because rhetoric helped elide the distance between viewer and the painful events described; it replicated the experience of trauma in the audience or viewer. We continued to develop our understanding of both the experience of pain and its relationship to language by showing how language served to communicate a violent, overwhelming traumatic experience.

This approach to rhetoric privileges the way language operates as a powerful effective force within the world: language isn't simply a disembodied process of narrative phonetic description, but rather a force which impacts on the body of the individual, and conveys meaning through its capacity to change and influence the body and soul of the listener. Importantly, this view of rhetoric not only has implications for our approach to rhetorical texts, and the possibilities of effectively communicating pain and suffering to others. As Plutarch's *Flesh*, showed the sublime nature of rhetoric has the capacity to stir the audience to ethical action.

A second crucial element of this survey of rhetorically orientated texts concerned how different authors sought to manipulate or control the way rhetoric impacted on the individual. We saw how Plutarch's works of poetic theory attempted to restrict the impact of rhetorical images on the audience, by constructing the text as a barrier to direct engagement with traumatic events: a process figured as protecting the body against the incursion of language and pleasure. This theme has a direct impact on how we approach the question of desensitisation. This process was picked up by Galen, in his discussion of anatomy and vivisection of animals. The engagement with order and rationality helped to construct the image of pain as an artistic image, thereby protecting the reader from direct exposure to trauma and disorder. Conscious, intellectual engagement with the textual narrative itself helped readers protect themselves from the traumatic subject matter of the representation; we saw here how the individual engaged not with real suffering, but with the style and structure of the artistic medium itself. In the last chapter, we saw how the ideological concerns of two authors incorporated different aspects of these two models into their representational projects.

The particular focus on Galen's use of rhetorical images has important implications: it raises questions about the way rational scientific engagement with the body serves to desensitise the audience. According to Gleason, Galen uses tactics of 'shock and awe' to help convince the audience and control their intellectual engagement with his work. On this reading however, the scientific concerns of Galen—i.e. the desire to delineate the rationality and logical structure of the body—constantly denies, downplays, and eschews the experience of pain. Medical narrative, here, for all its power to display the body appears little concerned with the process of indicating others' pains.

The final implication to be drawn from this discussion shows how the relationship between the experience of pain and language, narrative (and more generally representational art) developed. What emerges from this chapter is a culture constantly trying to negotiate the way in which language impacts on the body; transfers the experience of pain and suffering from the traumatic event and the sufferer to those detached by time and space. There are profound implications about the body here. Pain—the implication runs—can be captured, conveyed, and transferred by language; pain is not simply, or straightforwardly, an individual experience in this context; language and narrative always threatens to replicate that experience. We can see how the negotiation of the question of desensitisation constantly played with an understanding of the deep intersection between pain and language, or narrative.

Diagnostic Stories: Pain, Narration, and Knowledge in a Clinical Context

Let us turn to an investigation of the relationship between pain and language within the medical culture of the second century AD. Chapter 1, above, focused on the crucial role played by rhetorical form in allowing audiences to recognise, imagine, and ultimately empathise with the painful experience of others; authors could control their audience's engagement with the pain of others through the manipulation or renegotiation of the sublime qualities of literary representation. Here, I shift focus by using a medical anthropological approach to investigate the description and narration of an individual's pain within the clinical encounter.¹ As has been acknowledged, the clinical encounter is a cultural space which links the act of narration with the understanding and interpretation of past and present pain symptoms, the individual's internal condition, and the process of treatment. This space provides, then, an important space for the socialisation and recognition of pain through narrative practices. Below, I probe two examples of the clinical encounter in order to investigate the way different authors attempted to negotiate the problematic description and narration of pain to readers. I focus on Galen's case histories, which are scattered throughout his corpus, and continually dramatise the process of diagnosing the ill body through the narration of pain; and the *Sacred Tales* (henceforth *Tales*) of Aelius Aristides, which record and describe, *ad nauseam*, the symptoms and

¹ 'clinical encounter' is a term which has emerged in the anthropological analysis of medical practice to refer to those moments in which doctors and patients encounter each other within a healing context. Throughout this chapter, I will use the term to refer simply to scenarios in which doctor and patient meet for the purpose of understanding, and healing illness.

treatment of his prolonged painful illness. I am concerned with two important issues: I show how second century AD medical culture was defined by an intense debate about how to represent pain and suffering; secondly, I show how that debate was fought out over the management of the way pain resisted linguistic and narrative representation.

Over the last three decades, medical anthropology has highlighted the central role that narrative plays in the treatment of illness. Kleinman's *Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture* argued that health care systems are characterised by (among other elements) 'the management of particular illness episodes through communicative operations, such as labelling and explaining'.² For Kleinman such communicative operations serve to fit illness into a culture's semantic system by elucidating an individual's physical symptoms, providing *aetiologies*, narrating the course of illnesses through time, explaining their severity, and labelling their particular form.³ Kleinman's assertion has been central to a recognition of the politics which obtains in the description of pain, and the ensuing diagnosis of an individual's suffering.⁴ Frank and Cassell argue (differently) that modern medicine serves to silence subjective personalised stories in favour of a rational, scientific understanding of illness and pain.⁵ Within this discourse, patient based narratives of suffering are seen as important precisely because they foreground 'the human dramas surrounding illness'; such narratives construct an individual significance for pain by explaining its causes, diachronic course, and the nature of its symptoms on their own terms. As Sacks suggests, 'to restore the human subject at the centre—the suffering, fighting, afflicted, human subject—we must deepen a case-history to a narrative or a tale; only then do we have a "who" as well as a "what", a real person, a

² Kleinman (1980), esp., 71-2 on core clinical functions.

³ Kleinman (1980), 71-118.

⁴ On Politics see: Kleinman (1988), 1-55; Montgomery (1991), 5-26; Mattingly and Garro (2000), 6-9. For the application of medical anthropological approaches to classics see: King (1999) 269-86; Mattern (2008).

⁵ Frank (1995); Cassel (1985).

patient, in relation to disease'.⁶ The validation of patient narratives as a legitimate source of relevant therapeutic information has been part of an attempt to return patient to the centre of clinical operations.

The concern medical anthropologists have shown for the cultural politics which inheres in the description of pain will influence this study in a number of critical ways. I investigate the politics of describing pain along several axes. In both sections of this chapter, I show how the process of describing and representing pain was inflected by concerns about narrative voice and authority; we will see, in both Galen and Aristides, how doctors' and patients' voices interact in the clinical context? We will see how narrative authority emerges out of the dynamic relationship between different types of subjective and objective voice, and the pain experience itself. At a second level, this chapter attempts to juxtapose the works of two powerful hyper literary figures. By placing Galen's and Aristides' texts alongside each other, I show how two figures from the medical culture of the late second century AD interact with, and confront, the model of narrative representation presented by the other: Galen and Aristides emblemise two examples of the complex debate throughout this culture about how to effectively represent pain to public audiences; the politics of the clinical encounter is not only played out along the vertical axis of doctor-patient, but also along a horizontal plane between contemporary figures within imperial culture. In investigating these issues, I hope to achieve two things. I advance the medical anthropological debate about narrative by providing a sophisticated re-evaluation of the current anthropological model, as developed by the Frank, Cassell, and Sacks, of rational 'professional' accounts of suffering vs. 'lay' subjective narratives: as we shall see, patients' subjective accounts of their own experience interact in interesting and multifaceted ways with the professional, objective voice of the doctor. I will also develop

⁶ Sacks (1987), viii.

our understanding of how second century AD culture confronted the problem of narrating the intense experience of pain: we will see how different authors attempted to confront the way the overpowering, traumatic experience of pain resisted linguistic or narrative representation.

1. *Ineffable Pain, Freudian Narrative Control, and Translation*

When scholars have paid attention to the description of pain in ancient culture they have focused, primarily, on the way medicine eschews emotional or metaphorical language. Rey, in his study of Homeric, Classical (*viz.*, Tragic and Hippocratic texts), and second century Greek medical works uncovers a trend in medical contexts to eschew the use of emotional or symbolic language used in other cultural settings such as Tragedy or Epic.⁷ Horden confirms this view: medicine ‘steps aside from the religious and ethical frameworks which construct meaning for pain’.⁸ Approaching the meaning of pain through metaphoric and metonymic quality of the language used to describe it is problematic for two reasons.⁹ It induces a circumscribed analysis of the medical discourse because it fails to account for the similarities and common practices between the works of Galen and texts like the *Tales*, where, *for example*, Aristides’ use of medical terminology is set within a framework of epic narration.¹⁰ More fundamentally, it fails to account for the primary issue these texts are concerned with: how, and in what ways, does language allow readers access to the nature of another’s physical condition? How does the audience or reader recognise or develop an understanding of the pain of another through the narration of that experience? Is it possible for narratives about the body’s symptoms communicate the individual’s experience or reveal the internal condition of the body to audiences? If Galen

⁷ Rey (1995), 22, 36.

⁸ Horden (2008), 296-7—medicine ‘steps aside from the religious and ethical frameworks which construct meaning for pain’ (296); *cf.* Ballester (1982), 3-24.

⁹ King (1988), 58-60; King (1999), 71-6..

¹⁰ *cf.*, for example: Aristid., XLVII.1-3. For a discussion of the assumption of an epic voice see Holmes (2008), 81-2.

and Aristides construct a meaning for the body, such meanings are constructed through the process of negotiating the resistance of pain to language, and narrative representation.

If Kleinman's contention that narrative serves to fit suffering into a culture's semantic system is true, then how are we to see that process operating in the medically orientated texts of late second century AD? In order to think through their engagement with this problem, I will turn to Freud's interest in the way the individuals' traumatic pasts are communicated to others. As we have discussed, the psycho-analytic work of Freud constitutes an important theoretical framework for the mechanics of confronting the description of pain throughout this thesis. Here (and in the next chapter), I am primarily concerned with the way Freud confronts the overwhelming nature of patients' experiences as a model for thinking about how the figures in the second century AD approached the narration of painful histories. A considerable amount of scholarly attention has been given to the status of narration within Freud's work—this attention has focused on Freud's capacity for exercising narrative control throughout his *Interpretation on Dreams* and numerous case histories of hysteria patients. Freud was one of the great 'narrative synthesisers'¹¹; his diagnoses of patients' maladies were founded in his construction of coherent narratives which ordered individual's pasts and nebulous experiences, and produced 'narrative truth'.¹² Here I want to discuss two aspects of that process: the relationship between *free association* and *evenly hovering attention* of the therapist; and the way in which Freud controls language throughout his case histories.

¹¹ Spence (1994), 21: 'he was a master at taking pieces of a patient's associations, dreams, and memories and weaving them into a coherent pattern that is compelling, persuasive, and seemingly complete...' cf. Berkenkotter (2008), 101-5.

¹² Spence (1994), 21-2.

Let us begin with what has come to be understood as the basic rule of psycho-analytic practice: *free association*. In his 1913 article, 'On Beginning the Treatment', Freud argued that it was important to get the patient to speak in a particularly 'free' manner:

'What you tell me must be different in one respect from ordinary conversation. Ordinarily, you try to keep a connecting thread running through your remarks ... so as not to wander too far from the point. ... So say whatever goes through your mind. Act as though, for instance, you were a traveller on a train sitting next to the window of a railway carriage and describing to someone inside the carriage the changing views which you see outside.'¹³

In this way Freud outlines the way the patient should be instructed to report all that comes into his mind during the psycho-analytic encounter. (There are a number of critical problems which Freud's notion of *free association* seems to ignore: such as the difficulty of actually describing something in a manner which could be seen as true 'free association'.¹⁴) What interests me is the way in which Freud's narrative constructs a type base text for the analysis of the patient and the production of a diagnosis of their condition. *Free association* aims to produce an account of experiences which is undetermined by the constraints of normal conversation; which includes everything, and is not governed by pre-determined ideas about relevance, order, or structure. *Free association* was coupled with an assumption about the way memory operated as a thread of associations; speaking without constraint or preconceived ideas of order allowed the patient to communicate his memories, dreams, and trauma in a more realistic manner. The technique represents, then, a way of translating the nebulous, disorganised, unstructured experiences of the dream in an unmediated fashion to the analyst.

¹³ Freud (1913), 134-5. For an incisive analysis of the notion of *free association* see Spence (1994), 81-135.

¹⁴ Such as turning translating pictures into words: on this issue see Spence (1994), 39-79.

As a number of scholars have pointed out, Freud's notion of *free association* confounds external efforts to understand narrative. As Spence has argued, the idea of completely unstructured discourse required for Freud (and always requires) external ordering: meaning and significance, the construction of order takes place in the discursive space between analysand and analyst; it allows understanding and recognition of the patient's symptoms. Freud's assumptions about accurate and complete reporting of either the dream state, or the patient's memories, were founded on a narrative form which fundamentally resisted interpretation. Consequently, in order to create meaning, Freud's ideal analyst always practices a type of external editing and narrative ordering: if the patient is instructed to produce a narrative which reflect the nebulous nature of his subject matter, then the analyst must always exercise his capacity to listen attentively, construct order, and reify meaning from the mass of material which he is given. Freud's narrative practices start from an assumption that the patient's narrative must be edited.

Freud's interest in this method of translation is characterised most explicitly by the narrative structure of his case histories: if his analysis begins from the practice of *free association* then his case histories present the analyst as a master of controlling the unstructured narrative of the patient. As has been noted, Freud's case histories are motivated by a desire not only to diagnose the patient, but to 'prove' his psychoanalytic theories, and to instruct readers through demonstration how to engage in psychoanalysis.¹⁵ In order to achieve these aims, Freud constructs narratives which connect the discovery of the patient's malady with their own language and descriptions. Freud's concern was to uncover and order the patient's past, and in so doing reveal the *aitia* of the patient's

¹⁵ On Freud's use of his own narratives as an example of psychoanalytic practice see Berkenkotter (2010), 100-102.

condition. In order to achieve this he quoted, and continually, manipulated patient's narratives in order to emphasise the critical aspect of his psychoanalytic theory. As Berkenkotter explains in relation to his treatment of Dora:

‘What he created in *Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria* and his later case histories was a rich, multilayered account that straddled a fine line between the scientism of his time and an alternative hermeneutic approach to the study of mind. Recording Dora's speech in various degrees of closeness and fidelity highlights the emphasis Freud put on the idea of talk as the phenomenon which both reveals and conceals meanings that the psychoanalyst works to recover.’¹⁶

Freud's diagnosis of patient's maladies then is grounded in the ways in which the patient's narrative is controlled and ordered by the analyst: interpretation and understanding of the patient's account of their past requires rearranging their accounts to produce a powerful, coherent narrative.

As has been recognised, Freud's narrative practices were specific to his early 20th century context: his model of narrative discovery was drawn from contemporary fiction, for example; his treatment of Dora, in particular, was overlaid with contemporary ideas about gender.¹⁷ In relation to this study, Freud's engagement with the question of narrative dramatises two important points concerning a process of translation: firstly, the way in which the vast, unstructured quality of the individual's memories, dreams (and past traumas) might be translated first into an incoherent, disordered ‘stream of consciousness’ text; and how that text might be re-ordered, or re-structured, to facilitate the recognition or diagnosis of a condition, to reveal the *aitia* of the patient's malady. Freud's engagement with *free association* provides a model for thinking about the transition from narratives

¹⁶ Berkenkotter (2010), 126.

¹⁷ On the issue of his treatment of women generally see: Chodorow (1992), 224-38, esp., 230ff on his treatment of Dora and Anna O.

which reflect the nature of experience, into narratives which allow for recognition and understanding. This framework, I contend, provides an important structure for thinking through how Galen and Aristides negotiate the narration of pain. Their concern with pain's resistance to language is played out on two levels: they begin from the assumption that the experience of pain is translated into narrative form which is characterised by fragmentation, silence, and disorder: pain produces narratives and language which inhibit interpretation. In order to facilitate interpretation and understanding of the experience of pain, these authors attempt a process of translation from this banal, fragmentary text to a sophisticated, public discourse. This process of translation, I argue, can be read against the process of interpretation, editing, and restructuring which characterises Freud's case histories. Like Freud, the expression of linguistic control and narrative power are found in their manipulation of this process.

Over the course of this chapter I present two models for thinking about this process of managing the translation of pain experiences into sophisticated public language. In section 1, I turn to Galen's case histories which dramatise the diagnosis of the patient's body. I show how Galen adopts a model of narrative control similar to Freud's: if pain overwhelms the patient's ability to describe the experience, Galen overcomes that problem by translating their language and descriptions into clear, effective language which allows him and readers outside the text to understand, recognise, and diagnose the body. In section 2, I confront the Galenic model of translation and diagnosis with the *Tales* of Aelius Aristides. I show how these sophisticated texts resist the process of diagnosis through the development of a narrative which *testifies* to his experience. I show how Aristides' testimony is constructed through a different relationship between *aporetic* bodily experience and sophisticated, structured narrative; and how this is directed towards

denying the reader's capacity to diagnose, or recognise, the profound experiences of Aristides' past.

There are a number of important implications which must be drawn from the interaction of these two authors and their respective models of how to translate the body's experiences into narrative. The first concerns the cultural politics involved in the process of recognition and understanding. The different models of translation presented by Galen and Aristides represent a confrontation over the process of incorporating the body into cultural discourses of knowledge. These two texts manifest a broad cultural concern about how individuals come to recognise and understand the body. Foucault and Brown suggest (in different ways) that the body operates as a site of cultural conflict throughout the imperial period. In this discussion, I explore how concerns over cultural status, and rhetorical authority intersect with a deep concern about how to capture the full intensity of the body's nebulous experiences. The idea that language and narrative fail to capture the full range of human sensorial or perceptual experiences is a common theme in both philosophical and medical anthropological work. This discussion contributes to that idea by investigating how different figures attempted to make cultural mileage out of that fundamental disjunction.

* * *

This chapter focuses primarily on the narratives of Galen and Aristides. There are a number of other figures or narrative contexts to which this chapter could have turned: further study of Rufus' of Ephesus' *Medical Questions* is needed, for example. There are two reasons for thinking primarily about the dynamics of narration in these two authors. Firstly, Galen and Aristides present examples of two hyper-literary figures whose concerns

with the narration of the body are inflected by their broader rhetorical and cultural concerns. As we will see, Galen's interest in how we narrate pain is linked particularly closely with his conception of himself as the gate keeper of the medico-literary tradition, and a guardian of appropriate medical language. Aristides' representation of pain's resistance to narrative form is figured in terms of his arrogation of the status of the paradigmatic sufferer/narrator. Reading these two figures alongside each other will help to show how the politics of rhetorical status inflects the narration of bodily experience.

Secondly, Galen and Aristides are particularly closely linked within the medical culture of the late second century AD. They were approximate contemporaries: although the precise date of Aristides' *Tales* cannot be determined, it appears that they were written sometime between 171 AD and 176 AD; Galen's career at Pergamum and in Rome was well established by the mid-170's.¹⁸ Moreover, it is arguable that Galen at least knew Aristides. During his incubation at the Asklepeion, Aristides consults the doctor, Satyrus, whom Galen names as one of his teachers during the late 140s.¹⁹ In his *Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* Galen makes explicit reference to Aristides, and his experience of ill-health.²⁰ Here he refers to Aristides as someone whose soul was strong but his body was weak. Although, as Behr has suggested, this does not constitute incontrovertible evidence that Galen had met, or knew Aristides personally it does suggest that Galen was at least aware of Aristides.²¹ Both figures appear to operate within the same cultural and medical spheres.

SECTION 1: DIAGNOSIS, NARRATING PAIN, AND NARRATIVE CONTROL IN GALEN

¹⁸ For a chronology of Galen's life see Hankinson (2007), 1-5. Galen claims to have held at least one major medical post in Pergamum between 157 and 161 AD: Gal. *Comp. Med. Gen.* xiii.599-601.

¹⁹ Aristides, XIL.8-11. For Galen's references to his education with Satyrus see: Gal. *Ord. Lib. Prop.*, xix.57-8.

²⁰ For the passage, now preserved in Arabic, and translated into German: see Schröder (1934), 33.

²¹ Behr (1968), 162.

Let us turn now to an investigation of the process of diagnosis and its relationship with narrative in Galen's case histories. Galen's corpus includes approximately 240 case-histories which range from philosophical conversations with a patient concerning the course of their lifestyle to one sentence descriptions of patients' experiences of illness and their symptoms.²² These accounts often (although not always) deal explicitly with the process of describing the type, or nature, of the individual's painful experience: the description of pain and suffering offers an important strategy for the diagnosis and recognition of the patient's body. In this section, I focus on the way the doctor's and the reader's understanding or recognition of the body's conditions is intricately connected with the language and the narrative structure of the case history. I argue two points. Firstly, that the reader's capacity to understand and recognise the body is shaped by the way Galen controls, manipulates, and modifies his patients' language and narration of their symptoms into structured, clear narrative form. Secondly, this process of controlling the language of his patients reflects his attempt to overcome the way pain resists transformation into language. The case histories of Galen, then, present a marked resemblance to the narrative strategies of Freud.

1. *Case Histories and Reading the Body in the Second Century*

Galen's case histories provide an important site for cementing the body's, and the experience of pain's, place at the centre of ancient medical discourse; they incorporate the body into broader forms of cultural knowledge by dramatising the process of *diagnosis* through reading and narrating the body's experiences. The accounts studied below draw on a long cultural tradition which can be traced back to the Hippocratic *corpus* at least:

²² For philosophical discussion see the case of Eudemus: Gal. *Praen.* xiv.605; for briefer case-histories see the numerous cases discussed at *Loc. Aff.* viii.449. For a full list of case histories see: Mattern (2008), 173-202.

Epidemics, for instance, was read, commented on, and contributed to medical practice throughout the Imperial period.²³ The work of Rufus of Ephesus from the late first century contains a number of accounts of clinical encounters, which may have circulated as a discrete collection of therapeutic case notes.²⁴ Such collections were central to the development of medical knowledge. According to Galen, reading case histories formed an important part of the training of Empiricist doctors, who were able to increase their ‘experience’ by incorporating the knowledge gained by reading the accounts of therapy provided by other doctors.²⁵ Arguably, some forms of case histories were used as notes to assist in rhetorical medical displays at different points throughout the first and second centuries AD.²⁶ Galen’s case histories, and the process of recognition which they dramatise, incorporate the body into both medical culture, and imperial culture generally: they construct a powerful machinery for recognising and understanding the body in the Imperial period.

2. *Diagnosis, Teaching, and Translating in Galen’s Case-Histories*

If Galen’s accounts of his clinical encounters incorporate the body into second century medical culture, this process is based on the substantiation and justification of the process of reading the body and its narratives. Galen’s approach to the scientific understanding of medicine has been generally approached through questions of form, related to his rationalist approach to medicine: Frede, for instance, explores questions of Galen’s epistemological stance by investigating his unusual combination of both dogmatic

²³ For discussion of the status of Hippocratic case histories in Galen see: Lloyd (2009), 115-31; Mattern (2008), 28-31 for the case history tradition in general.

²⁴ Ullman (1978). For a description of this work, now preserved in Arabic, containing approximately 20 accounts of patient treatment see Mattern (2008), 33-4, 216 n107-8 for further bibliography.

²⁵ On *historia* and the development of medical experience see Deichgräber (1965), 298-301.

²⁶ Ullman (1978), 24-5.

and empiricist ideas about understanding.²⁷ Here I argue that Galen presented diagnosis as a type of hermeneutic system in which recognition of the body's internal condition proceeded by reading both the body itself and narratives of bodily experience. I show, secondly, how this process of internal reading within the case histories is mirrored by readers outside the text, whom Galen attempts to teach.

Galen's case histories dramatise the way the conditions of the body are understood, and recognised, on a local level, between doctor (or doctors) and the patient. Galen's diagnostic system was built on the combination of three elements: the sensorial appreciation of the body's condition—how it looks, smells, and feels; the patient's descriptions of their past and present experiences of pain, their life-style, and their previous treatment at the hands of others; and his application of an understanding of the nature of the body, its diseases and their relationship to various symptoms.²⁸ In this context, patient language plays an important part in helping the doctor recognise not only what the patient currently feels, but also the circumstances which surrounded his disease. Galen repeatedly asks patients what they feel, and the circumstances which led to his involvement in their suffering. That narration often provides the key to the diagnostic epiphany or the confirmation of Galen's initial suspicions about the patient's conditions; diagnosis, as we shall see, proceeds through the process of interpreting and understanding what the patient says. Diagnosis in Galen builds on a process very similar to Freud's, where the way doctors and readers engage with narration and language is central to recognising the *aitia* of the patient's suffering.

²⁷ Frede (1981), 65-86, esp. 66; Frede (1987), 279-98, Hankinson (2007); on Galen's Philosophy see also Moraux, (1981), 87-116.

²⁸ Ballester (1981), 13-46 on the aspects of Galen's clinical techniques.

Just as Galen's texts dramatise the process of reading at a local level between doctor and patient, so they speak to the broader audience outside the text. Galen's case histories are underpinned by his attempt to contribute to medical knowledge, to teach his audience, on three levels. On one level, these texts provide copious amounts of physiological data about the body's conditions, treatments, *etc.*; they contribute to a *corpus* of knowledge about the body. At the same time, his accounts teach his readers by providing proofs of Galen's theories about the body and its structure, about the relationship between certain symptoms and various internal conditions. Finally, they offer a paradigmatic way for practicing diagnosis and treatment. Galen's texts teach their readers by providing examples of the best, and successful, way to conduct therapeutic practice. The local aspect of Galen's case histories is, then, embedded in a discursive act of teaching, in which the process of narrating and reading the body is inflected by Galen's broader discursive and instructional aims.

The impact of this two-sided aspect of Galen's case-histories on his engagement with patient language is significant. Scholars have noted that Galen's concern with language is often explicitly divided between a concern for teaching (and the transmission of knowledge), and the practice of medicine.²⁹ In his *Method of Healing* he suggests that if one wishes to teach (*διδάσκειν*) what he knows it is necessary to use clear language: ...ὅρον τε τῆς χρήσεως αὐτῶν ἔξει τὴν σαφήνειαν· (MM. x.81). Indeed, ὁ γὰρ ὡς ἂν ὁ μανθάνων ἐκμάθοι σαφέστατα μάλιστα σπουδάζων ὀνομάζειν, ἄριστος διδάσκαλος (MM. x.81). According to Galen, at least, teaching is built on the use of clear language; speaking to the discourse involves using clear, structured language which facilitates the transmission of knowledge. As we shall see, Galen's case histories are beset by the problem of moving

²⁹ cf. Hankinson (1994b), 166-87, esp., 171-80; von Staden (1995), 499-518; Morrison (2008), 138-43.

from the narrative provided by the patients, which is characterised by gaps and fragmentation, to the sophisticated narrative which teaches his readers about the body, and how to engage in diagnosis.

The process of translation in Galen, then, is characterised by the desire to move from the fragmentary, problematic nature of patient's narratives about their pain to sophisticated, clear descriptions of their experience which facilitates teaching. In order to achieve this, Galen continually expresses his control over patient language: he does so, firstly, by constructing an authoritative voice for describing pain; and secondly, by manipulating the way patients' language is incorporated into Galen's published works.

3. Pain, and Patient Descriptions in Galen

Galen's control of the process of translation was built upon a particularly forceful relationship with patient's subjective descriptions of their physical suffering. As we mentioned above, Galen's approach to teaching and diagnosis was underpinned by an assumption in the value of clear, precise language, or names, to describe physiological phenomena.³⁰ In this section, I examine how Galen's assumptions about the physiological experience of pain underpin a complex construction of appropriate, useful language for describing pain to doctors and teaching others. This construction begins by denying the trustworthiness of patient's subjective narrative, and then validating a linguistic register in which the patient's language is elided with language already seeded within the medico-literary tradition. As we shall see, this creates a framework in which Galen can use the language of the tradition to overcome the failures of patient based language.

³⁰ See above, text to notes 27.

A central question of linguistic and philosophical interest in pain concerns whether or not pain contains propositional content. Although Galen does not deal explicitly with this question, he does investigate extensively the way patients' silences, or the fragmentary nature of their narratives of suffering, hamper the diagnosis of the body and the process of teaching. If these processes turn on the patients' descriptions of their symptoms, then they are continually undermined by the inherently unreliable nature of patients and their descriptive capacities. On one level, this is related to patients' inability to speak about their experiences through physical incapacity caused either by injury or mal-practice; or their unwillingness, based on the shame the patient feels toward their condition.³¹ This point is developed particularly forcefully at *On Affected Parts* viii.88-9: it is just (δίκαιον) to eschew (καταλιπεῖν) the use of unclear names for diseases, 'as if they had never been written, (καθάπερ εἰ μὴδ' ὅλως ἐγγράπτο, *Loc. Aff.* viii.88) and it is better to discuss diseases with 'clear terminology'. But, he acknowledges,

χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον κριτήριον, ὥς ἂν ἑτέροις πολλάκις ἀναγκαζομένων ἡμῶν πιστεύειν, οὔτε παρακολουθοῦσιν σαφῶς οἷς πάσχουσιν διὰ μαλακίαν ψυχῆς, οὔτ', εἰ καὶ παρακολουθοῖεν, ἐρμηνεῦσαι δυναμένοις, ἢ τῷ μὴδ' ὅλως οἷους τ' εἶναι λόγῳ δηλῶσαι περὶ ὧν πάσχουσιν, οὐ γὰρ μικρᾶς δυνάμεως τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἢ τῷ μὴδ' εἶναι ῥητὸν αὐτό. (*Loc. Aff.* viii.88-9)

In this way then Galen brings the contingent nature of medical practice to the fore. What interests me in this passage is the way in which the unreliability of the patient's subjective description is built on a particular presentation of pain's relationship to language. Galen's assertion that clinical practice relies on figures who are not able to understand clearly what they suffer through *μαλακία ψυχῆς* is particularly poignant. Reference to a weakness of

³¹ Inability to speak through physical injury: Gal. *Loc. Aff.* viii.54-5 in which incompetent surgery caused aphasia; for loss of voice resulting from injuries sustained during a fall see *Loc. Aff.* viii.50.

soul here appears to imply a failure to remain strong in the face of painful experience;³² arguably, pain resists straightforward transformation into language through its capacity to undermine the strength of the patient.

The suggestion that they are not able to translate (*ἐρμηνεύσαι*) is significant here for a number of reasons. Galen's suggestion that patients cannot express their experiences clearly seems to recall statements throughout his *corpus* in which he figures the necessity of describing or defining unclear phenomena with rational discourse. As von Staden has pointed out, this is particularly important in situations in which phenomena appear to have no immediately apparent name; when the individual encounters phenomena which are anonymous it is necessary to explain them with rational discourse.³³ On one reading, Galen's suggestion appears to place the description of pain in the hands of the patient's inability to mobilise the appropriate level of language required for effective clear description necessary for teaching. The final clause, moreover, appears to figure the ineffability of pain itself. His final suggestion—*ἢ τῷ μηδ' εἶναι ῥητὸν αὐτό*—recalls references throughout his corpus to things which are *ἄρρητα*.³⁴ It recalls for instance the designation that the certain types of pulse cannot be described in words, although they can be recognised by touch.³⁵ Galen's suggestion that the experience could not be put into language appears connected to his engagement with the inherently resistant qualities of pain experiences. Galen then rejects the patient voice as a reliable aspect of the medical

³² Importantly, those figures are set in opposition to the legitimate citizens of the polis in Pl. *Grg.* 491b4; cf. the use of *πονηρότατοι* and *πονηρίαν* at Xenoph. *Oec.* 1.19.4.

³³ For a full discussion of this issue see von Staden (1995a), 499-518. References to matters which are without a name (*ἄνόνημος*) occur throughout Galen's corpus, but are particularly closely associated with the different types of pulse: cf. Gal. *Diff. Puls.* viii.508, 525, 680, 692. For further reference see von Staden (1995) 511.

³⁴ Gal. *MM.* x.604, 731, 810.

³⁵ See above, note 33.

discourse for a number of reasons, primarily owing to the way in which pain resists their attempts at communication.

Galen counters this rejection of patients' narratives with a complex, multilayered construction of a legitimate voice and an appropriate language for the description of pain symptoms. This process appears to begin in an ambiguous, contradictory fashion. He begins by acknowledging the important status of the doctor's voice in describing medical conditions:

...καταλείπεται τοίνυν αὐτὸν πεπονθέναι τὸν μέλλοντα γράψειν ἐκάστου τῶν ἀλγημάτων τὴν ἰδέαν, ἱατρόν τε ὄντα καὶ ἄλλοις ἐρμηνεῦσαι δυνατόν, ἑαυτῷ τε παρηκολουθηκότα μετὰ φρονήσεως, ἥνίκ' ἔπασχεν, ἄνευ μαλακίας ψυχῆς. (Loc. Aff. viii.89)

Here the doctor's capacity to speak clearly to others (*ἄλλοις ἐρμηνεῦσαι*) about the experience or forms of pain is grounded in his possession of different intellectual and psychical qualities to lay sufferers. The person best qualified to translate their symptoms into medical discourse is the *iatros* who observes the symptoms attentively, though intelligence and without *μαλακία*. Of course, the suggestion that the doctor is in the best place to write about pains that he has himself experienced creates immediate problems. (Galen acknowledges this immediately by pointing out that no doctor has experienced all forms of pain.³⁶) Galen's construction of an appropriate voice for the discussion of pain is, then, beset by the problem that the patient's voice is unreliable, as is the detached medical voice of the doctor. This problem is overcome, I argue by thinking through the kind of language which is appropriate to use in the medical context. The type of language which

³⁶ Gal. *Loc. Aff.* viii.91ff.

emerges, I suggest, is a subtle combination of patient's language, and the language of the medical discourse.

Galen's construction of this language is mired in a specific (and disingenuous) attack on the overtly scientific language developed by his rival Archigenes. In the following lines he critiques Archigenes for his development of scientific terminology for the description of pain: *ἔοικεν οὖν ἐπινοίαις τισὶν ἰδίαις λογικαῖς, ἢ τῇ πείρᾳ τῶν πεπονθότων, ὁ Ἀρχιγένης ἀποπιστεῦσαι, διηγουμένων ὡς ἡδύναντο τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀλγημάτων* (*Loc. Aff.* viii.90). His criticism continues at a later point in the same discussion of pain symptomology. At viii.116 Galen suggests that Archigenes' use of terms such as 'harsh', 'rough', 'astringent', or 'drawing' (*στύφοντες δὲ καὶ στρυφνοὶ καὶ ἀνστηροὶ*) to describe certain types of pain is 'useless' (*ἄχρηστος*) for lecturing. It is so because the specific types of pain to which Archigenes refers are inexpressible (*...ἄρρητός ἐστιν ἡ ιδιότης πᾶσα κατ' αὐτούς*) by patients.³⁷ Secondly, he suggests we are ignorant of any type of suffering we have not experienced ourselves. Using terminology such as 'being ill at ease' (*τὸ ἀλβεῖν*) is easily understood and 'clear' (*δῆλον*) since we have 'suffered in this way' (*τῷ πεπονθένει*, *Loc. Aff.* viii.118). But it is not possible to 'recognise' (*νοῆσαι δύναται*) the 'harsh' (*ἀνστηρόν*) pain since we 'do not know to what this name refers' (*οὐκ εἰδὼς καθ' ὅτου ποτε πράγματος ἐπιφέρει τοῦνομα*), even if we have experienced it. Archigenes' development and use of scientific terminology for pain brushes over a question of reference: how does pain terminology used in teaching refer to the actual experiences of patients.

³⁷ Galen's use of *ἄρρητός* here recalls his suggestion that pain is sometimes inexpressible. Here however, he appears to be referring to specific forms of pain, apparently documented by Archigenes, rather than making a general statement about the ineffability of the experience.

Significantly, Galen's polemic juxtaposes the use of Archigenes' scientific language with what he sees as common or habitual usage. Galen points out in response to his use of terms such as 'harsh' and 'astringent' that all the previous doctors *τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν πόνων γράψαντες* (*Loc. Aff.* viii.116) did not 'dare' (*τόλμησαν*) to use 'names other than the customary ones' (*ἐτέροις ὀνόμασι χρήσασθαι τῶν συνηθῶν*), which it was 'possible to hear from the patients' (*παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν καμνόντων ἐστὶν ἀκοῦσαι*, *Loc. Aff.* viii.116).³⁸ On one reading, the reference to 'the patients' (*τῶν καμνόντων*), here, is interesting, suggesting that Galen's rejection of arcane, specialist terminology favours the use of a patient centred language to describe pain. Ostensibly, Galen overcomes the referential problems created by Archigenes language by returning to the language used by patients. On one level, this term appears to point towards the development of a patient centred language: the term can be used to designate common, spoken language and particularly *koine* Greek. However, another reading is possible. The term *συνήθεια* is commonly used in Galen's overt statements about the usefulness of clear language within medical descriptions: Galen repeatedly asserts that to speak clearly requires using habitual language.³⁹ At the same time, however, such constructions of what constitutes clear, and habitual language cannot be separated from Galen's interest in the medico-literary tradition: common everyday language which it is possible to hear from those who suffer pain is intimately connected with the discourse, and imbued with the authority of, the Greek medico- literary tradition.

³⁸ Note also his reference to Hellenic custom at *Gal. Loc. Aff.* viii.116: *ὡς ἔθος ἐστὶν τοῖς Ἑλλήσι*.

³⁹ *cf. Gal. Diff. Puls.* viii.567; *PHP.* 3.7.6: *...ἐπαινέσομεν αὐτοῦ [Χρύσιππου] τὸν λόγον καὶ φήσομεν ἀγωνίαν καὶ λύπην καὶ ὀδύνην ἀληθόνας εἶναι τῷ γένει, μᾶλλον δ' εἰ χρή τοῖς ὀνόμασι κατὰ τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων χρήσασθαι συνήθειαν, ὀδύνας μὲν καὶ ἀληθόνας οὐδέτερον ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ κίονα καὶ στῦλον οὐδ' ὤπας καὶ ὀφθαλμούς.* (quoted from De Lacy (1978-1984)). For further discussion of Galen's concern with habitual language see Sluiter (1995a), 520-22; for an overview see Morrison (2007), 143-47.

Appeals to the notion of *συνήθεια* were common among linguistic evaluations of authors and texts among the Alexandrian scholars.⁴⁰ Its relevance for Galen's commentaries and grammatical works is acute: firstly, Galen's commentaries on various Hippocratic treatises. His evaluation of Hippocrates' *Aphorisms* and *Prognostics* as genuinely Hippocratic texts is confirmed by their use of what Galen common language:

ὁ γὰρ τοι τοῦ Ἡρακλείδου υἱὸς Ἱπποκράτης, οὗ καὶ τοὺς Αφορισμοὺς καὶ τὸ Προγνωστικὸν εἶναί φασι, φαίνεται συνηθεστάτοις τε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο σαφεστάτοις ὀνόμασι κεχρημένος, ὃ καλεῖν ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς πολιτικά....⁴¹

Hippocrates' assumed use common and clear language was a central element of Galen's praise for Hippocratic texts and a central reason for their importance to current medicine. But also a central strategy for the determination of what constitutes the Hippocratic corpus. Galen's rejection of the arcane scientific language of his predecessor Archigenes is mired in his treatment (and indeed, his re-affirmation) of the canon of medical literature, and the language of the medical tradition. The implications of this process are twofold. Firstly, Galen rejects Archigenes' scientific language by affirming the value of a language that is already seeded within the discourse: it is the language of Hippocrates. Secondly, it is a language that he plays an important role in defining through his practices as a textual critic.

Galen's approach to the problem of talking about pain, and the difficulty of explaining the experience to the discourse, is founded on his authorisation of the appropriate language with which to discuss suffering and pain. Clear language, which is useful for teaching emerges when there is a fit between the qualities of language that Galen

⁴⁰ Sluiter (1995a) 520 Scholia at Σ Hom. *Il.* 15.437.

⁴¹ Gal. *Hipp. Epid.* xviiA.219; 678; for an extended discussion see Sluiter (1995a), 522-6. Gal. *Hipp. Art.* xviiiA.646.

associates with the Greek medico-literary tradition, the patient's descriptions of suffering. These two elements are underpinned by Galen's own ability to control and define what counts as habitual language. The reference to *common* or *habitual* language mark out, then, a sophisticated elision of the language of the discourse, and the descriptive practices of patients. Over the next three subsections I want to investigate the way Galen's interest in the description of pain is underpinned by this complex relationship with the patient's voice. I show this in three principal areas: that which relates to overcoming fragmentation; that which relates to the process of editorial management of patient stories; that which relates to classification of patient's pathologies.

4. *Translating Fragmentary Narratives.*

If Galen's medical practice is underpinned by his complex engagement with the descriptions of patients, in what way does this impact on his diagnostic process? As we have seen, a central theme in his treatment of subjective patient based descriptions of their suffering was the difficulty caused by the potentially unreliable nature of the patient. Patients' narratives are untrustworthy, and often characterised by fragmentation and consist in gaps. In this section, I show how Galen's narrative strategy involves filling these gaps or overcoming the fragmentary nature of subjective narration by inserting a discursive voice into the space left by the failures of the patient. Translating the experience of pain in this instance involves a process in which the language of the discourse speaks to, and for, the patient.

In a particularly poignant example, Galen emphasises the inability of the particular sufferer to relate his experience of epilepsy effectively. Galen begins this scenario by telling us that a boy (παῖς) began to 'narrate the beginning of his condition' (διηγουμένου τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς διαθέσεως..., *Loc. Aff.* viii.194). The case history begins with a standard

diagnostic opening, viz., the patient describing the beginning and course of the illness throughout his body. As the story continues however, it emerges that the boy is unable to describe the final stages of his condition effectively:

ἐπειδὴ δὲ πρῶτον ἐκείνης ψαύσῃ, μηκέτι παρακολουθεῖν ἑαυτῷ. τὴν μέντοι ποιότητα τοῦ φερομένου πρὸς τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἰατρῶν ὅποια τις εἶη, λέγειν οὐκ εἶχεν ὁ παῖς· ἀλλ' ἕτερός γέ τις ἐκείνου νεανίσκος, οὐκ ἄφρων, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ γιγνομένου δυνάμενος, ἐρμηνεύσαι θ' ἑτέρου δυνατώτερος, οἷον αὖραν τινὰ ψυχρὰν ἔφασκεν εἶναι τὴν ἀνερχομένην (Loc. Aff. viii.194)

The dynamics of speech and description here look back to his earlier treatment of the patient's voice, discussed above. The passage is characterised by the fragmentary narrative of the epileptic sufferer. This incapacity appears deliberately set against the ability of the 'other youth' (ἕτερος ... νεανίσκος) to 'translate' (ἐρμηνεύσαι) the experience based on his possession of different level of mental acuity, figured here by the tag, οὐκ ἄφρων. Galen strategy here involves using the narrative of an other to fill in the gaps created by the fragmentary nature of the sufferer's account.

There are two questions raised by this passage, concerning the status of the *neaniskos* and the type of account he gives of the experience. A number of scholars (such as Mattern) have suggested that the ἕτερος ... νεανίσκος is, in fact, a different figure who also suffers from the disease, and is, thus, describing his own symptoms: for Mattern this passage constitutes two distinct case-histories.⁴² Nevertheless, it is possible that the youth is just an example of the audience which continually appear in descriptions of medical

⁴² Mattern (2008), 181.

case-histories.⁴³ Intriguingly, Galen shows little concern for this ambiguity—his Greek resists any definite interpretation and he gives no further elucidation of the scene. The problems of deciphering Galen’s account suggest, at least, that the author is uninterested in exploring the potential problems involved in one person speaking for another; the creation of a single, unified narrative concerning the body’s physical symptoms from multiple, heterogeneous accounts.

The second issue raised by this passage concerns the language with which the second youth describes the experience of epilepsy and its relationship to Galen’s theory of epilepsy. On initial glance, the terms used to describe the experience—*αὔραν τινὰ ψυχρὰν*—of the youth reflects Galen’s desire to hear symptoms in the everyday terminology of patients. (Supporting this reading, Temkin suggests that this is one scene in which the terminology later adopted by medical science—notably, the idea of the ‘epileptic breeze’—is introduced into medical discourse by a patient.⁴⁴) In fact, however, the reference to the ‘breeze’ appears to be knowingly discursive: the metaphor of the ‘cool breeze’ is already seeded in the literary and medical traditions of Greek culture. The term *αὔρα ψυχρὰ* appears in, for instance, the description of vapours rising from the sea in Aristotle (Aristotle, *De Mundo*, 394b13), or cooling breezes in Hippocratic texts such as *Airs, Waters and Places* (cf. 6.7). In these texts, the phrase is not used to describe the progression of epilepsy through the body. But the idea of a cool breeze or wind was a common metaphor for the onset of the disease: the Hippocratic text *On Breaths*, for instance, attributed the onset of epileptic attacks to the winds and vapours moving through

⁴³ cf. e.g. Gal. *Praen.* xiv.609; 646. For further discussion (with bibliography) Mattern (2008), 84-7.

⁴⁴ Temkin (1971), 37.

the body.⁴⁵ The terminology adopted by the *neaniskos* mirrors the language and phraseology of earlier medical texts. A fragment of Erasistratus (from the 3rd century BC) describes the symptoms which occurred among epileptic patients in remarkably similar terms: *αὔρας τινὸς ἀνερχομένης κατὰ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον*.⁴⁶ The confluence of metaphorical descriptions between the case history and the medico-literary tradition could be due to a number of factors involving the circulation of narratives and literature concerning epilepsy throughout elite culture in the second century. It is significant, however, that in a narrative context in which speaking with clear language for the purposes of teaching and diagnosis is mired in the close relationship between the language of patients and the habitual language of the literary tradition, that gaps in patient language are overcome with passages which reflect Greek culture's habitual way of speaking about the experience and symptoms of epilepsy. The fragmentary patient narrative is translated into clear, effective narrative through the strategic insertion of language already seeded in the discourse. Galen overcomes the gaps in the patient's narrative, fills in the missing information, with the language of the literary tradition.

Importantly, the metaphor of the breeze has a certain fit with Galen's broader theories about the spread of epilepsy through the body. Galen created a number of theories for different types of epileptic attack. In one particular category, the primary cause of the attack lay in various extremities of the body and then spread to the brain.⁴⁷ In these instances, Galen suggests, a certain 'pneumatic substance' (*πνευματικὴ ... οὐσία*) spreads over the body from the affected area (*Loc. Aff.* viii.194-5). The other youth describes the symptoms through a metaphor which is both seeded within the medical discourse and

⁴⁵ See the use of *ἀήρ* and *πνεῦμα* at Hipp. *Flat.* 14 where their ability to mix with, and cool, the blood is seen as crucial to the onset of epilepsy; note also the common theme of 'cooling' blood at *Flat.* 12, 14.

⁴⁶ Garafalo (1988), Fr. 293. Note also the use of *ἀνέρχεσθαι* at Hippocrates, *Flat.* 14.

⁴⁷ On the different types of epilepsy see Temkin (1971), 63-4; cf. Gal. *Loc. Aff.* viii.194-5.

corresponds with Galen's own theoretical ideas about the disease. It is arguable that the language of medical discourse is speaking through the mouthpiece of an observer. The experience of epilepsy here is given a meaning, explained, by simply filling in the silence of patient accounts with the language of the discourse; the language that is, in this way, attributed to the patient is used to substantiate Galen's scientific theory.

5. *Controlling Patient's Narratives of Past Experiences*

The second aspect of Galen's diagnostic system which I want to discuss involved learning about the patient's past experiences. Here I explore how the past is structured by Galen's precise and controlling method of patient interrogation, which structures the way the past is incorporated into the process of diagnosis and recognition. Rather than narrating their past experiences on their own, subjective terms, in a manner which allows the patient to describe the significance of their experiences, Galen controls the relationship between narration and the past. This process connects Galen's discovery of the causes of the patient's symptoms with the patient's controlled narrative.

Galen's diagnostic theory was built on a particular concern with the patient's past symptoms. It is necessary, he claims in *On Affected Parts*, to examine everything closely (πάντ' ἐπισκέψασθαι), both present symptoms and those which occurred before (τά τε παρόντα καὶ τὰ προγεγονότα συμπτώματα). The process of learning about what has passed involves questioning not only the patient, but those around him: ὅσα δ' ἔμπροσθεν ἐγένετο διαπυνθανόμενον οὐ τοῦ κάμνοντος μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων (*Loc. Aff.* viii.8). Galen's instructions to the potential doctor here are reflected throughout numerous examples of his diagnostic practice. In one particular instance, once he has seen the injuries of a particular patient Galen immediately enquires about the individual's previous experiences (...ἐγὼ

θεασάμενος αὐτὸν ἡρώτων τε τὰ προγεγονότα πάντα, *Loc. Aff.* viii.213). The use of the ἐρωτᾶν here reflects a formula used throughout Galen's corpus to enquire about his patient's life-styles, earlier medical treatment, or their illness history.⁴⁸

At one point in *On Affected Parts* Galen encounters a patient with a series of hand-problems. The patient comes to Galen with a loss of sensation in his hand:

ἔχων τις ἐπικείμενον φάρμακον τοῖς τριζὶ δακτύλοις τῆς χειρὸς, ἔφασκε τριάκονθ' ἡμερῶν ἤδη τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτῶν ἀπολωλέναι, τῆς κινήσεως ἀβλαβοῦς φυλαττομένης, ὀνίνασθαί τε μηδὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιτιθεμένων φαρμάκων (*Loc. Aff.* viii.57)

This example of diagnosis has two important parts. In the first half, Galen attempts to discover the cause of the patient's problems through a structured process of close-questioning of the patient. Galen begins by asking (ἡρώτησα) what medicaments former doctors had applied; when he discovered (εὔρον) they were appropriate, he sought (ἐζήτησεν) the cause of their ineffectiveness by asking about his previous symptoms (ἡρώτων τε τὰ προηγησάμενα συμπτώματα); when the patient tells him that he did not have φλεγμονήν, nor ψύζειν, nor had he been struck (πληγὴν) Galen, when he was surprised by his answer, asked again (θαυμάζων πάλιν ἡρόμην) if he had been struck in any part of his body, and ἐν ἀρχῇ δὲ τοῦ μεταφρένου πληγῆναι φάσκοντος μ' αὐθις ἡρόμην ὅπως τε καὶ ὁπότ' ἐπλήγη (*Loc. Aff.* viii.57).⁴⁹ Galen's narrative presents the doctor as a type of medical sleuth, seeking out the answers to his present pain in the past experiences of the patient.

⁴⁸ For the importance of questioning the patient see also the work of Rufus of Ephesus: *Ruf. Quaest. Med.* 1:ἐρωτήματα χρή τὸν νοσοῦντα ἐρωτᾶν· ἐξ ὧν ἂν διαγνωσθεῖη τι τῶν περὶ τὴν νόσου ἀκριβέστερον καὶ θεραπευθεῖη κάλιον. The idea of asking questions of the patient was well established within the medical case history genre.

⁴⁹ For more on the use of these terms see below, notes to text 61.

What is interesting about this case is the relationship between the depth of enquiry and the questions which elicit information from the subject. Galen's questions not only control the information, but its order: one answer induces the next question by eliminating diagnostic possibilities and thus driving the search for more information; the patient is allowed to proceed to the next level of description only because his answers fail to provide satisfaction or surprise the doctor. Galen's passage presents him controlling the order of the past: the patient's previous experiences contribute to the recognition of his current problems, but only through the structured arrangement of their narration. Galen's method for investigating the past experiences of the patient here offers a way of structuring that historical narrative so that its information can be incorporated into the process of medical recognition.

As the case develops, Galen's strategy evolves to include a slightly different aspect. This process involves the application of Galen's developed understanding of the body to the patient's statement that he fell from his chariot and landed on the upper part of his back:

*καὶ μέντοι καὶ ἀποκριναμένον, ... ἔτεκμηράμην ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τοῦ μετὰ τὸν ἑβδομον
σπόνδυλον νεύρου διεκπτώσει μόριόν τι ἐπὶ τῇ πληγῇ φλεγμῆναν σκιρρώδη διάθεσιν
ἐσχηκέναι. τοῦτο δ' ἐνόησα, μεμαθηκώς διὰ τῆς ἀνατομῆς, ὅτι τὰ νεῦρα κατὰ
περιγραφὴν μὲν ἰδίαν, ὡς αἱ φλέβες, ἐκφυόμενα φαίνονται, καὶ δόξαις ἂν ἐν
ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν φλέβα· τὰ δ' ἐστὶν εὐθέως ἀπὸ
τῆς ἀρχῆς πολλὰ, σφιγγόμενα ἅπαντα καὶ συνεχόμενα κοινοῖς περικλήμασιν ἀπὸ
τῶν μηνίγγων ἐκπεφυκόσιν. (Loc. Aff. viii.57)*

Galen's ability to determine the affected parts, to diagnose and eventually treat the patient is dependent upon the information supplied by the patient's narrative—note the genitive

absolute *ἀποκριναμένου*. But his description of the interpretative process privileges the importance of the understanding of the body's nature: the participle *μεμαθηκώς* implies, arguably, a causal relationship between understanding the significance of the patient's narrative and the doctor's theoretical knowledge of the body. For the patient's story to be understood, to be given significance and meaning, within the clinical scenario, it must be submitted to Galen's theoretical understanding of the body. Galen's technique attributes a critical role to the patient's account of his symptoms. It is built on a constructed link between the way the body is described by the patient and his developed, theoretical, rational, scientific knowledge: and in so doing, creates the impression that the patient's language has led to the discovery of the physical ailment. Diagnosis takes place when a fit is created between what Galen knows of the body, and the patient's descriptions. That process was, however, profoundly inflected by Galen's structuring and ordering of the patient's language, and narrative.

6. *Quotation and Classification.*

The description of the individual's past experiences was not the only way that Galen's patients put their experiences into meaningful language. In this discussion, I turn to an example of the way that patients name the type of pain they are experiencing. Galen's concern with names is allied to the way Galen imagines and divides the world into different categories: for Hankinson, Galen's interest is built on the correlation between names and the real ontological categories of the universe.⁵⁰ In this section, I investigate how his concern with the way patients name their experiences inflects the diagnostic process. I show that Galen uses names to pathologise the experience of his patients by

⁵⁰ Hankinson (1994), 181-7 for Galen's ontological realism and its relationship with linguistic concerns with clarity.

strategically reinterpreting their utterances in accordance with his theoretical understanding of the body.

Let us begin by thinking about the importance of categorisation and classification in Galen's medical system. Galen's *That the Best Doctor is also a Philosopher* suggests that this central aspect of medical practice extensive training and understanding of the process of the categorisation and division of phenomena.⁵¹ This interest in the classification of diseases is most evident in the four treatises concerning the difference and the causes of diseases and symptoms: *Differences of Diseases*; *Causes of Diseases*; *Differences of Symptoms*; and *Causes of Symptoms*.⁵² Although pain itself is not discussed extensively within these works, the experience does occupy a central position in this classificatory system. According to *On Affected Parts* we are able to diagnose the affected parts of the body through an understanding of the various parts of the body; the causes of their changes and conditions; and the difference in symptoms.⁵³ It is important to learn the differences between different symptoms since their peculiarity serves to indicate the particular internal condition of the body: τὸ μὲν ἄλγημα τόδε τῶνδε τῶν διαθέσεων ἐστὶ δηλωτικὸν ἢ τῶνδε τῶν τόπων (*Loc. Aff.* viii.70). The emphasis on the indicative power of the symptoms of different pain types reveals the close link between cognition, recognition, and categorisation which underpins Galen's diagnostic practice. For Galen the type of pain symptoms the individual experiences help to fit the individual into a universal pathological category, the nature (strength or character) of which is indicated by the nature of a particular symptom.

⁵¹ Barnes (1991), 65-6. Hankinson (1991), 167: the 'successful doctor ... needs to know the proper taxonomical structure of disease'.

⁵² Gal. *Morb. Diff.* vi.836-835; *Caus. Morb.* vii.1-41; *Symp. Diff.* 42-84; *Caus. Symp.* 85-272.;

⁵³ Gal. *Loc. Aff.* viii.69-71.

Galen's work on *Affected Places* is built around a lengthy theoretical discussion of the different types of pain that patient's present: throughout this work, he continually attempts to construct a framework for understanding and diagnosing patients' pain. At one point, Galen tells that people suffer pain in two principal ways:

πολλάκις δ' ἐν ἑτέροις εἰρηκῶς οἶδα δύο τοὺς πρώτους τρόπους ὀδύνης, ἀθρόαν ἀλλοίωσιν κράσεως καὶ συνεχείας λύσιν, οἷς οὐ μάχεται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα. (*Loc. Aff.* viii.79)

Galen's structuring of the nature of pain cuts deeper than this, however. Galen's treatment of pain extends to categorising different experiences of pain sensation. At viii.81 he states that the person who has been shot by an arrow and one who has a corrosive humour suffer in a common manner.⁵⁴ Following Hippocrates he tells in the same chapter he tells us that pain (ὀδύνη) in the kidneys feels 'heavy' (*βαρεῖα*)⁵⁵; a little later he tells us that the pain of pleurisy is 'piercing', but that of an inflammation is 'throbbing'⁵⁶; or that the intensity of certain pains in the intestines goes along with the nature of thickness of a particular person's intestinal tube.⁵⁷ Such categories have little to do with the individual experience of pain—they are universal rules to which all bodies are susceptible: at viii.87 he reminds his readers that ἐπιστεύσαμεν ἅπασιν γίνεσθαι ταὐτὸν, ὁρῶντες ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ὁμοιοπαθεῖς ἡμᾶς ὑπάρχοντας, ὥς ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτίων πάσχειν τὰ αὐτά. Galen's systematic approach to scientific knowledge provides him with a series of categories of pain sensation which have little to do with individual, subjective experience.

⁵⁴ Gal. *Loc. Aff.* viii.81: καὶ γὰρ τὸ τεινόμενον καὶ τὸ θλιβόμενον καὶ τὸ θλώμενον καὶ τὸ τιτρωσκόμενον ὀδυνᾶται, λυομένης τῆς συνεχείας αὐτοῦ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅταν ὑπὸ βελόνης τιτρώσκηται τις, ἕτερον πάθος πάσχει τοῦ γινομένου κατὰ τὴν ὑπὸ δριμέος χυμοῦ διάβρωσιν.

⁵⁵ Gal. *Loc. Aff.* viii.78-9: καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' Ἱπποκράτης μὲν πρῶτος ἔγραψεν· καὶ εἰς νεφρὸν ὀδύνη βαρεῖα· μετ' αὐτόν τ' οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν ἀρίστων ἰατρῶν οὐκ ὀδύνης ὀξείας, ἀλλὰ βάρους αἰσθησιν ἐν ταῖς τῶν εἰρημένων σπλάγχων φλεγμοναῖς ἔφασαν γίνεσθαι.

⁵⁶ Gal. *Loc. Aff.* viii.86.

⁵⁷ Gal. *Loc. Aff.* viii.41: τὰ μὲν οὖν σφοδρότατα τῶν τοιούτων ἀλγημάτων εἰκὸς εἶναι κατὰ τὰ παχύτερα τῶν ἐντέρων.

How does this concern with classification influence Galen's reading of patient language. At one point, Galen tells us that he diagnosed and successfully treated a number of patients for stomach pain, possibly colic.⁵⁸ In these examples Galen observes a range of physical symptoms, which suggest a diagnosis to him; which is then confirmed by the patient's description of the type of symptoms they feel:

*έώρων τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς θερμοῖς ἐδέσμασί τε καὶ φαρμάκοις καὶ ὅλως
δαιτήμασι παροξυνόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς εὐχύμοις τε καὶ κατακεραστικοῖς
ὀνομαζομένοις ὠφελούμενον• έώρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς τῆς ἀσιτίας αὐτὸν βλαπτόμενον.
ὥς δὲ καὶ πυνθανομένῳ μοι καὶ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὀδύνην ιδέας ἔφη δακνώδη τινὰ
ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐλπίδα τῆς ἀληθοῦς διαγνώσεως ἀφικόμενος
ἐτόλμησα δοῦναι τοῦ πικροῦ φαρμάκου• θεασάμενός τε προφανῶς ὠφελθέντα τὸν
ἄνθρωπον ἐπέισθην ἐγνωκέναι βεβαίως, ἥ τίς ἐστὶν ἡ διάθεσις. (Loc. Aff. viii.41)*

The structure of Galen's diagnostic process is obvious here: observation of physical symptoms, followed by questioning of the patient, which leads to a particular treatment strategy. What interests me is the way the passage appears to adjust and alter the patient's language in order to fit the past into Galen's diagnostic categories. The use of *δακνώδη* reflects Galen's intense interest in how individuals designate, or name, the different pain sensations they experience.

Galen's reference to the patient's language reflects a common strategy for incorporating patient language into his diagnoses in which fuller, more wide ranging statements are summarised briefly by a term or name. We saw an example of this in the

⁵⁸ Gal. *Loc. Aff.* viii.39-42.

last case history where the patient's description was summarised by a few strategic words (such as *φλεγμονήν* or *ψύξιν*).⁵⁹ At other points in the corpus when Galen wishes to indicate the precise words used by patients he uses either the formula 'as he himself named it' (*cf.* the use of *ὡς αὐτος ὠνόμαζεν* at *San. Tued.* vi.434) or quotes them directly.⁶⁰ Galen's use of indirect speech in the passage above is significant, allowing him to move from a potentially fuller account of experience to a single, succinct, and meaningful term.⁶¹ The significance of this process emerges as we investigate the discursive significance of the term *daknodē*. The phrase is relevant here because it fits in with Galen's surrounding discussion of the character of certain forms of bodily humours. Galen's use of *daknodē* in this context picks up the discussion of the biting humour, a central element in the disease of colic, only lines before.⁶² Galen's text produces a diagnostic fit by linking the language of the patient with the nature of the bodily humour central to the diagnosis.

Galen's use of patient language appears, in this case, to figure a particularly forceful process in which diagnosis is constructed through the creation of a narrative fit between the patient's name and the qualities of the disease Galen is attempting to understand. What matters in this example is the fact that patient language does not reflect their own descriptions, but rather Galen's knowing interpretation of their more expansive suggestions. Fitting patient's into Galen's pathological categories is built on a fundamentally close tie between diagnosis and the language Galen ascribes to patients.

7. Conclusions

⁵⁹ See above, text to notes 51.

⁶⁰ *cf.* *τοῦτο γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγεν* at *Gal. Cur. Ven. Sect.* xi.299

⁶¹ I have been particularly influenced by the notion of 'de re' interpretations of indirect discourse. For full discussion see Coulmas (1986), 3-7; also influential here has been the work of Berkenkotter on the pathologisation of psychiatric patients in American psychiatric practice: Berkenkotter (1997), 256-74.

⁶² *cf.* the references to *δακνώδη χυμὸν* at *Gal. Loc. Aff.* viii.40, and further references to *ἀλγήματα δακνώδη* at 41.

In this discussion of Galen I tried to show how Galen uses and manipulates patient language. We saw that the treatment of the patient's body was linked to the two fold nature of the case history, in which the diagnosis of the patient's experiences contributed to a discussion with the medical discourse. We examined the implications of this relationship between diagnosis and teaching by thinking through two levels of Galen's treatment of patients: we saw how Galen overcame the fragmentary and unreliable nature of the patient's voice by replacing those gaps with a discursive voice he was able to control more precisely. We then examined how the diagnosis of the patient was figured through the strategic control of patient's language to create powerful, cohesive narratives which facilitated the achievement of diagnosis. In this case, diagnosis emerged as dependent on the narrative fit created by Galen's accounts of that experience. The body, then, entered medical discourse, through Galen's ability to control the language of the sufferer. Galen's practice of diagnosis then, appears to have a considerable amount in common with the translatory practices of Freud. In the next section, I argue that Aristides resists this process by redefining the context for the literary translation of the body.

SECTION 2: ARISTIDES' *TALES*, TRANSLATION, AND THE WITNESS.

In order to flesh out our appreciation of second century medical culture, I look now towards Aristides and his account of his long illness. The six *logoi* which comprise the *Tales* are intimately concerned with the narration of the physical *minutiae* of their author's pained existence. (Indeed, the focus on his physical pain and bodily condition has been taken as both a marker of Aristides' unusualness and his profound self-obsession.⁶³) These texts provide difficult, problematic narratives of their author's pain symptoms. In what

⁶³ 'Brainsick' and 'unpleasant': Dodds (1965), 43-44; Misch (1951), 506; on these readings, with further examples see Perkins (1995), 245-6.

follows, I attend closely to the strategies the author uses to shape the way the reader engages with, recognises, and understands his experiences. I argue two points. I suggest, primarily, that Aristides' *Tales testify*, or *give witness*, to his physical experiences. As has been shown by a number of scholars, the works deliberately present Aristides' past experiences as immense, numinous, and inherently resistant to representation; his narratives *testify* to his experience by constructing a text which reflects the ineffable nature of those experiences.⁶⁴ This argument builds on our understanding of Aristides' *logoi* by investigating the way Aristides representation of his experience confronts the type of relationship between text, narrative, and the bodily experience of pain which we encountered in Galen's case-histories. Aristides treatment of his own pain constitutes a sophisticated engagement (and critique) of the possibilities of communicating pain experiences by translating them into sophisticated, structured, discourse.

1. *The Tales, Case History, and Recognitions.*

Aristides' *Tales* present a complex text which manifests a range of different generic characteristics and connections.⁶⁵ Here I am primarily concerned with the way their religious context is mobilised to inflect the creation of narratives of pain symptoms. The *Tales* represent a hyper-literary example of (what were normally) short, often epigraphic thank-offerings placed in the sanctuaries of Asclepius and Serapis by their beneficiaries. Such offerings generally documented the physical ailments the incubant endured, the regimen the god prescribed, and praise for the god's healing powers.⁶⁶ As Aristides claims

⁶⁴ Percy (1988) 371-99; Holmes (2008), 85: 'the body, and particularly embodied experience, is metonymic of all that Aristides wishes to represent as beyond the public record and sometimes beyond words altogether.'

⁶⁵ Such as biography: Misch (1951); Bompaire (1993), 199-209; Harrison (2002), 245-59

⁶⁶ There does not seem to have been a rigid formula for such offerings. Nevertheless, they were often little more than carvings of particular body parts, such as the eyes (to signify blindness or some other ocular failing), inscribed with the name of the beneficiary: Petsalis-Diomidis (2005), 206-17. Although it is unclear whether *aretology* existed as a clearly defined genre, it is certain that there were literary works which provided extensive lists of, and praise for, the miracles (*aretai*) of divine figures. Such documents were often

on a number of occasions his aim was not simply to record his symptoms, but to narrate and reveal the forethought and power of the divine:⁶⁷ the texts are, then, thoroughly embedded in an aretological tradition. Aristides' narratives use the communication of the body's experiences to allow readers to see or recognise the power and nature of the divine: producing a sophisticated, and cagey, narrative of his experience of pain constitutes an important strategy for representing the powerful, nebulous nature of Asclepius. The religious aspect to the *Tales* allows Aristides to raise the stakes in the debate about how to represent, and socialise, the experience of suffering within late second century medical culture.

There are three important implications to draw from the intersection of religion and the narration of the body in the *Tales*. The first concerns the mode of translation Aristides adopts to transform his physical experiences into sophisticated discourse. Over the last decade, literary scholars have given increasing attention to the way narratives *give witness to* or *testify* to the experience of extreme trauma or pain.⁶⁸ LaCapra points out that narratives which recount the experience of extreme or prolonged trauma adopt a particularly poignant strategy for giving reference to that pain: rather providing a structured, ordered narrative of experience, they testify to the intensity and immensity of their experience by producing narratives which mirror their disorder and nebulous qualities. As Percy (among others) has acknowledged, the *Tales* attempt to provide a true account of the divine by breaking free from the constraints of genre, and chronology.⁶⁹ In order to produce an effective narrative of his body, Aristides translates his experience into a sophisticated story which communicates the nature of his experience by emphasising,

particularly associated with eastern cults. For a discussion of *aretology* see Winkler (1985), 236-38. For the connection between the *Tales* and *aretology* see Percy (1988), 378; Petsalis-Diomidis (2007), 193-212.

⁶⁷ cf. Aristid. XLVII.2.

⁶⁸ LaCapra (2009), 60-2; cf. Hartman (2006). I have been especially influenced here by Caruth's analysis of *Hiroshima mon Amour* and the politics of understanding another's trauma: Caruth (1995), 25-56.

⁶⁹ Percy (1988), 388-90

and displaying, the impact of his pain on language and narrative. Whereas Freud's and Galen's reaction to the disordered narratives of sufferers was to exercise control over the editing and arrangement of material in order to produce precise understanding and *diagnosis*, Aristides recasts that process in more difficult, cagey terms. Rather than translating his experiences into clear, structured discourse which explains the cause of pain, Aristides' *logoi* reveal the nature of that experience by representing the way painful experience impacts on, confounds, and transcends the limits of clear, ordered narration.

Such a narrative form can be seen, furthermore, in terms of the author's conscious (dis)engagement with the case history narrative form. The connection between thank offerings and the case history narrative form have been documented by a number of scholars.⁷⁰ In Aristides' situation, that connection is most obvious at XLVII.2, when he claims that each of his days and nights has a story: *ἐκάστη γὰρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἡμερῶν, ὡσαύτως δὲ νυκτῶν, ἔχει συγγραφὴν, εἴ τις παρὼν, ἢ τὰ συμπίπτοντα ἀπογράφειν ἐβούλετο, ἢ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν διηγείσθαι.*⁷¹ Aristides' language here vividly evokes the context of case histories: the phrase *τις παρὼν* recalls references throughout Galen, and other medical figures, to bystanders who observe the work of the doctor at the bedside, and who are responsible for the narration of a patient's symptoms to the physician; the reference to the record of symptoms appears to invite a reading alongside medical case histories which provide lists of physiological conditions or experiences.⁷² Throughout the *Tales* Aristides presents the reader with contexts in which one might ordinarily expect the type of case history narrative readers encounter in Galen (and other medical practitioners). When

⁷⁰ See especially Mattern (2008), 31-37 with further references.

⁷¹ There is a textual problem here: Keil edition reads *τις παρ' ἑν*. Here I follow Wilamowitz (and others, including Behr) in reading *παρὼν*, which can be defended on the basis of comparison XLVIII.56 and L.20. For discussion see Behr (1968), 205.

⁷² For examples of bystanders at medical diagnoses see: Gal. *Diff. Puls.* viii.572; *Praen.* xiv.606.

Aristides presents himself as consciously resisting the encouragement of others to speak about his symptoms he plays up the politics of speaking and narrating within the clinical encounter. His rejection of the case history form is far from innocent, rather it reflects a conscious awareness and emphasis of the limitations of, and the power relations inherent in, that form of narrative.

The third implication raised by the testimonial nature of Aristides' text concerns the type of recognition that *logoi* produce. If Galen aimed to produce a scientific understanding of the body's condition which was embodied in the process of diagnosis, then how might we approach recognition in Aristides' *Tales*. Here I want to discuss two issues. Aristides' primary aim is to produce a narrative which allows for an understanding of the power and nature of the divine by both readers (primarily, but not always, doctors) inside the text and outside the narrative. Here I suggest, briefly, that genuine understanding of both Aristides' experience and the nature of the divine is achieved by understanding the impossibility of pinning down Aristides' body, the impossibility of producing an exact, scientific reading or understanding of Aristides' experiences. As we shall discuss further, Aristides' doctors continually fail to recognise or understand his painful symptoms. At XLVIII.69, he tells us that his doctors failed to recognise the complexity of his disease (...οὐτε ἐγνώριζον τὴν ποικιλίαν τῆς νόσου). The failure of doctors to diagnose Aristides correctly is repeated throughout all of Aristides' *Tales*. This failure to recognise the body's symptoms, I suggest, operates as a model for thinking about how the body is constructed as a form of text which can be understood or recognised by doctors and readers outside the narrative. Such internal misreading emphasise the failure to pin down the body, to categorise its experiences in a single disease or cure within the terms of the diagnostic culture of the last chapter.

If Aristides' body resists straightforward reading, or diagnosis, so his text undermines the process of understanding or recognising completely the immensity of his experiences. Understanding Aristides' past experiences is a slippery, difficult process; the nature of Aristides' translation continually hampers the reader's ability to 'tie down' the meaning of the body. The type of problematic engagement with the process of recognition is dramatised in a subtle way in his second *Tale*:

εἰ δὴ ταῦτά τις προσλογίσαιτο καὶ σκέψαιτο ἐφ' ὅσων καὶ οἷων τῶν παθημάτων καὶ ὁποίας τῆς περὶ ταῦτα ἀνάγκης εἰς θάλατταν καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ φρέατα ἐκόμιζε, καὶ τῷ χειμῶνι μάχεσθαι προσέτατε, φήσκει πᾶν ὡς ἀληθῶς περαιτέρω θαυμάτων εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ τε θεοῦ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν μειζρόνως ὁψεται. (XLVIII.59)

Here Aristides' links understanding the God's power to the reader's understanding and ability to see his experiences. Aristides' passage has been taken, by Perkins, as a straightforward statement of the author's facilitation of readerly understanding of his experiences, and through them, the divine.⁷³ Yet the passage is far from straight forward. The conditional nature of the clause appears to raise questions about the way his narrative allows readers to 'see' the wonders of the divine: the *εἰ* + optative structure here never quite confirms that the narrative will allow the reader to see his experiences. Furthermore, the reference to the ontological status of his experiences (*φήσκει πᾶν ὡς ἀληθῶς περαιτέρω θαυμάτων εἶναι*) implies that the type of recognition his text creates lies outside the normal verification and scientific confirmation of the body's experiences. In order to create this type of recognition and understanding Aristides' adopts a particular approach to the translation of his experiences into sophisticated discourse.

⁷³ Perkins (1995), 182.

The combination of religious and corporeal concerns, in Aristides' *Tales* serves, then, to create a remarkable textual dynamic. The orator confronts Galenic medical practice by rephrasing the translation of bodily experience into sophisticated narrative. In what follows, I argue that this practice of translation can be seen as a process in which Aristides' narrative testifies to the nature of his experiences. In order to argue this case, I adopt four primary arguments. I show that Aristides adopts a narrative voice which privileges the impact of pain on language and narrative form; he adopts a translatory mode which reflects the nature of his private 'inner' experience; and finally, he emphasises the illegibility of his own body. These strategies, we will see, raise serious questions about not only the way we think about the socialisation of pain, but also the relationship between the profound experiences of the body, narrative, and the public, epideictic culture of the second century.

2. *The Case History and the Politics of Voice*

Let us begin by thinking about Aristides' voice: if it is true that Aristides' *Tales* attempt to confront the politics of narrating the body which obtains in Galen's case histories, then one of the primary strategies for that process involves refiguring the relationship between his narrative voice and suffering. Aristides' narration of his suffering is underpinned by the construction and substantiation of his own narrative authority. According to XLVI.1 he will make *κατὰ τὴν Ἑλένην τὴν Ὀμήρου τὸν λόγον*: Aristides' representational project is conceived in terms of his arrogation of an epic voice.⁷⁴ In what follows, I explore how his epic voice reflects the way physical pain and suffering impact on the narrative capacity of the sufferer. Aristides' epic voice is built on a negotiation of the way pain induces silence and fragmentary narration. By emphasising, and valorising,

⁷⁴ Holmes (2008), 81-2. The adoption of Helen as a model is problematic for a number of reasons—she is far from a straightforward replication of Homer's epic voice.

the fragmentary nature of his narrative voice, Aristides' *Tales* shape the way the reader is able to understand his experiences in a radically different way to Galen.

a) *Silence and the Immensity of Experience*

Aristides' *Tales* open with an emphasis on the limitations of his voice; his incapacity to narrate his experiences, and his consequent choice to remain silent. In his *prooemium* to the first *Tale* Aristides claims that he decided, in the light of the immensity of his experiences, *παρέχειν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ τῷ θεῷ σιγῇ* (XLVII.4). This reference to silence builds on a lengthy discussion of the impossibility of describing his experiences; lines earlier, he claims that he refused the advice of his friends to speak or write about his experiences, fleeing what appeared to him to be an impossible task.⁷⁵ It is easy to see how his statement might be taken with a grain of interpretative salt: Aristides claims to be silent, and then immediately proceeds to narrate his experiences at length. Yet, it is also susceptible to a more subtle, and supple reading. As has been acknowledged, the impact of extreme trauma on the sufferer is often felt in terms of their consciousness of the incapacity to capture and convey the immensity of their experiences: testimonies of extreme trauma are often characterised by the vacillation between the compulsion to speak, and the inability to capture all their experiences.⁷⁶ On this reading, this silence testifies to the impact of his bodily experiences on his narrative capacity. Aristides' construction of his silence might well be seeded within the aretological and epic traditions of narration, it also attests to the overwhelming power of pain to undermine the capacity for narrative description.

⁷⁵ Aristid. XLVII.1: ...ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσοι πάποτε τῶν φίλων ἐδεήθησαν ἢ προὔτρεψαν εἰπεῖν καὶ συγγράφαι περὶ αὐτῶν, οὐδενὶ πάποτε ἐπέισθην, φεύγων τὸ ἀδύνατον; see also his reference to Hom. *Il.* 4.249 as an example of the immensity of the subject matter.

⁷⁶ LaCapra (2008), 65, with further references.

Aristides' reference to silence, here, introduces a concern with *aphasia* which reverberates throughout the *Tales*; Aristides' loss of voice in the face of his painful experience remains a constant theme across the six *logoi*. Early in the second *Tale* he recounts how his early attempts to dictate his experiences were fundamentally limited by his bodily pain: ὦν τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ἐπήει γράφειν, ἀπιστίᾳ τοῦ μὴ περιέσεσθαι· ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ σῶμα οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ εἶα σχολάζειν τούτοις (XLVIII.1). The passage here emphasises the closeness between bodily experience and the capacity to speak, or write, about suffering. At other points, throughout the second and third *Tales*, this closeness is linked to his incapacity to engage in oratory. He tells us at one point that he gave the practice of oratory during the early stages of his illness.⁷⁷ At other points he recalls how he was in such pain that to orate seemed impossible: ἔφην οὖν ἐγὼ μὴ ἔχειν ὅ τι χρῆσθαι, προστετάχθαι γάρ μοι ἴσα καὶ πέτεσθαι, μελέτην λόγων ἀναπνεῖν οὐ δυναμένῳ... (L.17). As we shall discuss further, this scene is part of a process in which Aristides depicts the God's concern for the recuperation, and improvement of his rhetorical ability. At this point, what concerns me is the way Aristides figures the destruction of his voice. The loss of oratorical capacity can, arguably, be associated with a critical loss of self. The use of *μελέτην λόγων* appears to look directly towards the apparent loss of his epideictic career. Yet, reference to *logos* in both these contexts also draws the reader's attention to the *Tales* themselves, and their narration of his symptoms and divine *proinoia*. Silence here becomes a way of expressing the overpowering traumatic nature of Aristides' experience; the reader comes to understand the close link between the body's experience and the *Tales* themselves. Narrating experience involves testifying through the emphasis of the way the experience of pain damages language and narrative capacity.

⁷⁷ Aristid. L.14: ἐνιαυτὸν μὲν γὰρ μάλιστα τὸν πρῶτον τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐξέλιπον τὴν περὶ τοὺς λόγους διατριβὴν, οἷα ἐν τοσούτοις τε καὶ τοιούτοις πράγμασι τοῦ σώματος.

b) *Overcoming Silence and Health*

Just as Aristides' experience of the illness was defined by silence, so his return to health is characterised by the development of his oratory and his capacity for loquacity. In the last section, we saw that Galen's interaction with the patient's voice was defined by two characteristics: (a) the problems fragmentation and silence presented for clear diagnosis; and (b) the insertion of discursively seeded language into the gaps in patient narratives. In this context, I show how Aristides' silence is overcome through the ameliorative actions of Asclepius; as we shall note, Aristides' voice remains both characterised by the immense experience of suffering, and authorised by the very silence and fragmentation that this experience induced.

Late in the fifth *Tale* Aristides returns to the issue of his silence once more:

ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ μὲν τι τῷ σώματι καὶ κατ' οἶκον ἔδωκεν ἴαμα, διηγείσθαι τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἅ ὁμοῦ τὸ σῶμα ἀνίστη, τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπερρώννυ, τοὺς λόγους ἡὔξε μετ' εὐδοξίας, ταῦτα δὲ οὕτωςι παρελθεῖν σιωπῇ. (LI.36)

In this way, Aristides' recalls earlier descriptions of his inability to honour the God by writing down his dreams and various cures. Silence, here, has now become the object of choice which he can deliberately reject. As well as documenting the movement away from a state characterised by silence, Aristides' also figures the return of his oratorical ability as an effect of the God's treatment of his devotee. The suggestion that the god *τοὺς λόγους ἡὔξε* insinuates that Aristides' experience was one which improved his rhetoric. The theme is a common *topos* within the *Tales* and Aristides' corpus as a whole.⁷⁸ At other points

⁷⁸ on the way the divine augmented Aristides' status as a rhetor see King (1999), 283-6; Perkins (1995), 182-3.

during his *Tale* Aristides is more explicit: ...καὶ ἔδοξεν ὁ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ χρόνος οὐ σιωπῆς, ἀλλ' ἀσκήσεως εἶναι (L.18). Aristides here figures his silence as a period of training: silence—the quality induced through the immensity of his physical suffering—becomes an ascetic process which augments his narrative capacity.⁷⁹

There are, then, a number of points that are important in Aristides' presentation of his narrative development. Firstly, Aristides' connects his rhetorical ability with the care of the divine.⁸⁰ Secondly, Aristides' representation connects narrative voice with his suffering in a positive way. Aristides' voice is authorised by the way pain and suffering impacted on his abilities. The silence induced by the immensity of Aristides' experience isn't simply overcome, transcended, (as it was in Galen), it is incorporated into an active construction of narrative authority. The voice used to describe suffering is authorised and legitimised precisely because of its dependence on the experience of suffering.

3. *Translating the Unrepresentable*

If Aristides' *Tales* are narrated through a voice which is authorised by the way suffering impacts on the narrative capacity of their author, how might we view the way that narrative socialises or communicates painful experience? In this section, I am primarily concerned with three elements of Aristides' representational project: the way the text claims to reveal or display the experiences of the author; the way the narrative is figured as a sophisticated translation of his experiences; and finally, the way the author mobilises an intertextual connection with the *apologoi* of Odysseus. These three narrative strategies all help to construct an account which denies the reader a clear, or certain, understanding of

⁷⁹ The idea that silence formed a critical period of ascetic training is common: cf. Philostr. VA. 1.14.1-15.1; 1.16.3.

⁸⁰ On this issue see, for example, Bompaigne (1989), 28-39.

his experiences by emphasising the text's or narrative's limitations; its inability to represent those experiences clearly; and, finally, by continually questioning the believability and factual character of his own account of the author's past.

a) *The Politics of Revelation*

One of the primary strategies Aristides uses to confront the Galenic approach to the translation of bodily symptoms concerns the manipulation of the revelatory context of the speeches. Here I focus on one important aspect of that process: I examine his continued claims to 'reveal' or 'indicate' the body through the use of the *dēloun*. Aristides continually recontextualises the act of revealing the condition of his body and, in so doing, downplays the connection between the medical process of revelation and his own politics of bodily presentation. I argue that these aspects of the text form a crucial part of the author's attempt to construct its approach to the problematic act of translating the body's experiences into meaningful public discourse.

It remains unclear to what extent the *Tales* were intended as a rhetorical performance, or were created for a public, rhetorical, context.⁸¹ Although it is clear that they were not intended as *epideictic* works in the sense of other speeches from Aristides' *corpus*, the *logoi* are internally figured as an act of public display and revelation. According to XLVIII.1 Aristides was compelled by dream visions to bring his past experiences into the public arena: ὄψεις ὀνειράτων ἀναγκάζουσιν ἡμᾶς ἄγειν αὐτὰ πῶς εἰς μέσον. The theme of revelation, emphasised by the phrase 'agein eis meson', appears particularly acute at this point. The phrase here recalls the works of Demosthenes and

⁸¹ cf., the views of Downie—who argues that the first *logos* was a 'deliberately public account with a rhetorical aim' and that this work delivers a 'professional self-portrait': Downie (2008), 116. Quet (1993), 119-222 suggests that the dream diary was conceived for a public audience.

Isocrates (not to mention others) in which the phrase was used to designate the rhetor's act of bringing issues before the public assembly.⁸² This act of revelation also links the *Tales* with Galen's acts of public revelation of the body in the anatomical theatre, and the theoretical works in which he reveals the nature of the body for his audience. Galen's anatomical work is founded on the principle that he will bring the body of the dissected animal, and display his understanding of the internal conditions of the body in public.⁸³

Aristides begins the account of his conditions by telling his readers that he wishes *τὸ τοῦ ἥτρου δηλῶσαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς...* (XLVII.4). Aristides' revelatory practices here appear to look towards the process of revealing the body's internal physical structure in the public arena within contemporary medical discourse. In Chapter 1, above, we saw that Galen connected the knowledge of the body through the public display of its internal structure and form. This process was continually figured through verbs such as *dēloun* and *sēmainein*. His *Anatomy* is littered with claims that he has indicated, or will indicate, the nature of the body: at ii.499 K for instance, he claims ...τὸν θώρακα μῶν ἐδήλωσα τὴν ἐνέργειαν; while at other places he claims that his works show the structure and the order inherent in the body.⁸⁴ Aristides' use of the *dēloun* immediately figures his revelation of the physical *minutiae* of his body within this medical culture of public revelation and debates about the viewing of the internal body within medical dissection and vivisection.

⁸² For the formula see Hdt. iv.97; *Demos.*, xviii.139; ii.6; Isoc. xlvii.6; cf. Dion. Hal. *Antiq. Rom.* 1.78.3, for the connection with public revelation of secret business.

⁸³ Gal. *UP.* iii.66.13: *ἔπειτα δ' οὐδ' ἀκριβῶς εἰς τὸ μέσον τῶν πλαγίων ἐκατέρους ἤγαγεν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἔξωθεν ὑψηλοτέρους ἐποίησε πλησιαιτέρον μὲν θεῖσα τῶν ἐκτεινόντων, πορρωτέρω δ' ἀπάγουσα τῶν καμπόντων.*

⁸⁴ cf. the use of *sēmaino* at Gal. *Loc. Aff.* viii.111; 381. For the use of *δηλόω* as part of the diagnostic and teaching process see *Loc. Aff.* viii.231; 311; 313; 314; 410.

However, as the process of revelation continues throughout the *Tales*, the reader's security about the way the narrative allows for clear recognition of the body is gradually undermined. Aristides uses the verb *dēloun* to perform two other major tasks throughout the *Tales*: at L.76, he uses it to structure how he communicates with governors; it also describes acts of dream revelation performed by the God: *πολλὰ ἄλλα λόγια ... ἀμφοτέροις ἐδηλώθη*.⁸⁵ How are we to read this connection between multiple forms of revelation? On one reading, Aristides' use of the term constructs the *Tales* as a form of translation. Just as Aristides reveals to the reader the nature of the body, so Asclepius reveals his prescriptions, treatments, and commands to Aristides: the text replicates towards the external reader, the internal narrative of dream revelation and bodily treatment which obtains in his personal relationship with the God.

If Aristides assimilates revealing the body to the process of narrating his dreams, how does this influence the reader's capacity to understand the body? Divine revelation in Aristides' narrative can be presented in language which suggests clarity. So, at XLVIII.31 we are told that the signs from the divine 'were revealed as vividly as possible' (*ἐδηλώθη δὲ ὡς ἐναργέστατα*), just as *...μυρία ἕτερα ἐναργῆ τὴν παρουσίαν εἶχε τοῦ θεοῦ*. In this context, the God's revelations take on a clear, vivid character. At this level, revealing both the commands of the god, and the internal conditions of the body seems unproblematic, providing a vivid path to understanding both the nature of Aristides' conditions, and experiences, and the power and nature of the divine. Having said this, at other points they are introduced or remembered in a manner which stresses the ineffable and mysterious nature of divine command. At one point, in describing a dream revelation, Aristides tells us

⁸⁵ Aristid. XLVII.75 (for other's communication with Aristides); XLVIII.36; XLVIX.48; L.21, 67. Other examples are discussed in the text.

that *τούτων ὁφθέντων ὑπενόησα μὲν ἀσιτίαν δηλοῦσθαι* (XLVII.55). The uncertainty conveyed here is strengthened moments later when he asks Asclepius *σημῆναι σαφέστερον ὁπότερα λέγοι* (XLVII.55). Aristides' language here suggests problematic interpretation. At other times he is more explicit about the possibility understanding divine revelation. Late in the second *Tale* he returns to the problem of reading the body and understanding divine commands in a particularly poignant fashion:

...ἀλλ' ὅσα μὲν σύμβουλοι διήμαρτον χωρὶς ἔστω· καίτοι καὶ ταῦτα ἔοικε τῶν σφόδρα πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δίαιταν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πράγματα, ὁπότε μὲν ὁ θεὸς ἡγοῖτό τε καὶ διαρρήδην εἴποι, σωτηρίαν, ἰσχὺν, κουφότητα, ῥαστώνην, εὐθυμίαν, πάντα τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρειν, ἄλλου δέ του συμβουλευσαντος καὶ μὴ στοχασαμένου τῆς γνώμης τοῦ θεοῦ πάντα τὰναντία τούτοις ἐπιφέρειν, πῶς οὐ μέγιστον σημεῖον τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς δυνάμεως; (XLVIII.73)

Aristides' passage here assimilates the act of reading, understanding, and diagnosing the body to the act of interpreting the God's will. Importantly, for the purposes of this discussion, that process is figured in terms of the difficulty and uncertainty of that reading.

Aristides' treatment of the issue of revelation here, figured through his use of the *dēloun*, places the discussion and narration of the body's experiences within a highly medicalised narrative and revelatory context. However, rather than affirming the audience's capacity to read and understand the body through this act of revelation, Aristides' undermines that process by assimilating his external act of revelation to the internal act of revelation from the God. This process dramatically undermines the security of our readings of, and understanding of, Aristides' internal conditions. Aristides' act of translation here seems to undermine the goals of the Galenic process of narration we

discussed above. However, in this instance, it is the text's denial of clarity which testifies to the nature of painful experience.

b) Artful Translation

The second major strategy Aristides uses to shape the *testimonial* nature of his work concerns his explicit treatment of the question of translation. The *Tales* are a secondary narration: the *logoi* present themselves as an abridged, artful recounting of his experiences which were initially recorded in a dream diary.⁸⁶ Percy has argued that Aristides uses this distinction to construct the extant text as a more appropriate representation of the god's providence and power: '...in order to create a true narrative of the god's workings the *Tales* had to free themselves from these note-books and the constraints of chronology and genre that they imply.'⁸⁷ In what follows, I investigate two related aspects of Aristides' translatory practice. I show how he deploys the *Tales'* relationship with disordered memories, and how he presents the act of abridgement. Both of these aspects, I argue serve to deny the reader's capacity to understand or recognise in precise terms, the nature of his bodily condition.

The first aspect of Aristides' presentation of the *Tales* as a sophisticated narration concerns the way Aristides figures their dependence on the process of memory and the nature of past experiences. A number of scholars have argued that the experience of chronic illness involves strategic attempts to reorder the past to construct the meaning of their suffering. Kleinman has pointed out that in searching for the meaning of their pain, chronic pain sufferers often present themselves as researchers in an archive, trying to reconstruct from their memory the disordered experiences of their past, and piece them

⁸⁶ Aristid. XLVIII.1-4.

⁸⁷ Percy (1988), 383.

together into a sophisticated, ordered form.⁸⁸ We saw in the last section, that Galen's process of using narratives of the patient's past symptoms involved exercising tight control on the release and ordering of information. In that context, the act of delving into the patient's past was controlled by the rational approach that Galen adopted to question the patient; information from the past was included at specific points, and incorporated into the investigation of the individual's symptoms through the process of differential diagnosis. Here Aristides resists that type of external medical ordering in favour of a more difficult, disordered process which resists definite interpretation.

Aristides' engagement with the process of memory is made explicit early in the second *Tale*, through the discussion of his dream diary. He tells us that the dream diaries are immense in size—they include over 300, 000 lines—even though they are not a recording of everything that has happened to him over the course of his illness.⁸⁹ This presentation of the diaries is part of a broader process in which the past is connected with, and understood in terms of narrative. Recall, for instance, the statement at XLVII.2 that each of Aristides' nights and days have a *συγγραφή*. The dream diaries operate as a figure for the way in which the disorder of the past impacts on the creation of narrative: the disorder and loss of some of the material immediately undermines their usefulness for the construction of the *Tales*. Aristides' narrative doesn't involve simply recounting the past in an ordered, structured, and chronological fashion.

As a result Aristides presents himself relying heavily on the process of memory. A considerable amount of scholarly ink has been spent investigating the question of whether or not Aristides' mnemonic capacities were sufficient to allow him to remember his

⁸⁸ Kleinman (1988), 47

⁸⁹ Aristid. XLVIII.3.

experiences effectively.⁹⁰ Here I think about how memory's impact on *Tales* is presented. That impact is verbalised at a number of points throughout the *logoi*. Early in the second *Tale*, for instance, he exhorts himself and his readers to remember different events from various places: *ὑπόλοιπον οὖν ἐστὶ κεφάλαια λέγειν, ἄλλα ἄλλοθεν ἀναμνησκόμενον, ὅπως ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἄγῃ τε καὶ κινῇ* (XLVIII.4)⁹¹ On one level, this statement it relegates a great deal of responsibility for that process of memorisation to the divine: the controlling influence of Galen's rational structure is, here, replaced by divine concern for the order and structure of the narrative.⁹² On another reading, by strategically mobilising the difficulty of memory, Aristides forces the reader to confront the difficulty of ordering the past. By presenting his narrative as something produced by the unstructured nature of memory he asks the reader to consider how we construct narratives out of past experience, how we order the nebulous, quotidian experiences of the body. Aristides' passage here, is a concerted reflection on the text's embeddedness in the process of the narrative reconstruction of a disordered past. Whereas Galen's strategy for narrating past symptoms involved the structured release, and control of information, according to his knowledge of the body; Aristides' text produces a narrative disordered by the difficulty of ordering the past and his bodily experiences.

The second aspect I want to discuss concerns the way Aristides presents his narrative as an artful pleasing abridgement. Here I suggest that the reader's understanding of events is conceived in terms limited or undercut by the process of abridgement. Artfulness and sophistication are central qualities of Aristides' literary project. He stresses that his translation is a 'narration' or 'representation' (*diēgēsis*) of Asclepius' concern for

⁹⁰ Behr (1968) 116-21; Percy, (1988), 381.

⁹¹ cf. Aristid. XLVIII.1: *Φέρε δὴ καὶ τῶν ἀνωτέρω μνημονεύσωμεν, ἐάν τι δυνώμεθα.*

⁹² For the divine's role in ordering the narrative see: Aristid. L.50.

him, as distinct from a simple, banal ‘record’ or ‘list’ (*apographē*) of dreams.⁹³ At the same time, the *diēgēsis* is a summary (*kēphalaios*) of the almost exhaustive record of the diaries.⁹⁴ Importantly, this process of translation is presented as circumscribing the narrative’s claims to reveal and enhance the reader’s understanding of Asclepius.

Here, I want to connect the qualities of abridgement with Aristides’ concern for vividness, and the quality of *enargeia*. The *logoi* lay claim to the quality of vividness at a number of points throughout the six speeches (*cf.* for example, XLVIII.8,31,32; LI. 34). We have already seen how some dream visions *ἐδηλώθη δὲ ὡς ἐναργέστατα* (XLVIII.31). However, rather than affirming the *Tales*’ vividness, Aristides engages in a slightly more subtle construction of his text. This moment of perceptual intensity is specifically contrasted with the qualities of his narrative: a few lines earlier, Aristides’ admits

Ὅτι μὲν δὴ τῷ παντὶ φρικωδέστερον καὶ ἐναργέστερον αὐτὰς τὰς ὄψεις καθαρὰς διηγείσθαι δῆλον ἀνάγκη δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων χρῆσθαι τῇ ὑποθέσει ἥπερ ἐνεστησάμην, καὶ κεφάλαια ἐπιτρέχειν... (XLVIII.29).

At another point he repeats a similar point with a slightly different emphasis:

εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἀκριβέστατα γινῶναι βουλήσεται τῶν γεγενημένων ἡμῖν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὥρα τὰς διφθέρας αὐτῷ ζητεῖν καὶ τὰ ὀνείρατα αὐτά... (XLVIII.8).

Aristides’ treatment of the theme of precise knowledge here creates a distance between the translatory text and the events they claim to describe. As we saw in Chapter 1, above, *enargeia* operated as a rhetorical quality which allowed individuals to see experiences for themselves, to encounter them as if they were eyewitnesses. Here Aristides’ engagement with *enargeia* and precise knowledge emphasises the way his text fails to facilitate that

⁹³ This distinction has been discussed by a number of scholars: for the most extensive treatment see Percy (1988), 377-91.

⁹⁴ On this issue see Percy (1988), 388-90.

process. Precise recognition, or understanding, is not facilitated by the text, but by consultation of another collection of texts; by consulting the banal, sub-literary record (τὰς διφθέρας), or seeking out the experiences themselves (τὰ δεινὰ αὐτά). The *Tales* construct themselves as a vague, and ultimately inadequate source for understanding Aristides' experiences. It is precisely the vividness of Aristides' past that the narration can only convey by representing its distance from the actual narrative before the reader.

By figuring his narrative's failure to provide precise knowledge, Aristides refigures the engagement with vividness and clarity we see in Galen's treatises. Galen's *Anatomy*, for instance, is underpinned by claims that he will 'explain' (*diēgēsthai*) the function of the human body (AA. ii. 652). Similarly, Galen's constant use of verbs of seeing, visual wonder, and display throughout works such as *Anatomy* or *How to Recognise the Best Physicians* constantly invite readers to see the body through this rhetorical narratives.⁹⁵ Yet, Galen's interest in the display of different, unusual aspects of the body presents a remarkably different texture to that of Aristides. Galen continually connects the sight and display of the body to clear and precise knowledge achieved through the process of narrative description. This connection is enforced by Galen's use of adverbs such as *akribōs*, *saphōs* and *alēthōs*. At one point in his *Anatomy*, for instance, he tells his readers that he will engage in dissection so that they will learn accurately (*ἀκριβῶς*) about the heart.⁹⁶ Galen's narrative replays the central questions of Aristides' literary effort—a concern for the relationship between narration and the reader's perception and knowledge of the body. Yet, throughout the *Tales*, the relationship is defined by the difficulty of reading the body, and the mysteriousness surrounding its revelation; in Galen, the interest in clarity and precision presents the reader with a very different perspective on suffering.

⁹⁵ see von Staden (1995b), 47-66, esp., 63-6.

⁹⁶ Gal. AA. ii.603.

4. *Bodily Experience, Pain, and Truth*

In this final section, I turn to the way Aristides constructs his body as a type of text. According to this approach to the body the narrative operates as a type of text on which the past is inscribed, and upon the reader is able to read and verify the nature of the individual's past experiences. Within the context of this investigation of Aristides, I suggest that the treatment of the body critiques that approach to the body's textual qualities. Aristides' constructs his body (and the narrative itself) as one which confounds belief and factual verification, and problematises the very process of reading. In order to investigate that process, I turn to two strategies: Aristides' manipulation of an intertextual relationship with the *Odyssey*, and the emphasis of his doctor's inability to read or diagnose his *corpus*.

Here I want to focus on the way in which the text and the body present a symbiotic relationship. Recent scholarship has given particular focus to the way in which the body operates within the narrative of the *Tales*. Percy has suggested that the *Tales* narrate the creation of two texts: the *Tales* themselves, and Aristides' body upon which his experience can be read; King has suggested that the story of his physical symptoms is designed to help construct a narrative meaning for Aristides' experiences.⁹⁷ Finally, Holmes has argued that the *Tales* are characterised by a degree of illegibility.⁹⁸ In this section, I want to show that Aristides' body is written against the idea of clear precise knowledge, Aristides' physical experience resists tying down.

a) *The Odyssey and Truth*

⁹⁷ Percy (1988), 387-90; King (2002), 177-82.

⁹⁸ Holmes (2008), 96-105, on inscription of the body.

The *Tales* relationship with the *Odyssey* is developed from the first lines of the first *Tale*. The *Odyssey* is central to the *Tales* theme of suffering and endurance. Aristides continually presents himself as a heroic sufferer, a new Odysseus. When he likens his task of narrating all his experiences to narrating the hypothetical experience of all the waves of the sea, it is arguable that he is asking us to think about Odysseus' experiences in *Odyssey* 5; in a similar fashion, his physical traumas are referred to through metaphors of the sea (cf. the use of *τρικυμιῶν* at XLVII.2) which appear to recall the figure of Odysseus. The relationship with the *Odyssey* encapsulates both Aristides' understanding of his experiences, and his narrative project; in drawing this connection, Aristides consciously problematises the *Tales* as a believable or true account of his experiences.⁹⁹

The *Tales* open with a quotation in which Aristides claims that he will narrate like Homer's Helen:

Δοκῶ μοι κατὰ τὴν Ἑλένην τὴν Ὀμήρου τὸν λόγον ποιήσεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη
πάντας μὲν οὐκ ἂν φησιν εἰπεῖν ὅσοι Ὀδυσσεύς ταλασίφρονός εἰσιν ἄεθλοι. πρᾶξιν
δὲ τινα αὐτοῦ μίαν ἀπολαβοῦσα, οἶμαι, διηγεῖται πρὸς τὸν Τηλέμαχον καὶ
Μενέλεων... (XLVII.1)

What does it mean to speak like Helen? On one level, the passage refers (as much recent scholarship has pointed out) to Aristides' inability to tell all his experiences: Helen here represents a primary model for Aristides' summarisation of his experiences.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, however, the reference to Helen's stories about Odysseus raises more invidious questions about the type of *logos* Aristides will produce which are never totally resolved. Helen's story (*Od.* 4.235-64) appears to be a rhetorical performance which attempts to reshape her *kleos* by recounting an event in which she assisted one of the Greek heroes; it

⁹⁹ Stanford (1968), 66-80; 160ff.

¹⁰⁰ Percy (1988), 380; Whitmarsh (2004), 442-443

is a performance fraught with questions about her honesty: Helen herself tells us that her story is ‘plausible’ (ἐοικότα, *Od.* 4.239);¹⁰¹ moments later, Menelaos tells us that she spoke ‘according to her share of fate’ (κατὰ μοῖραν) rather than accurately (*Od.* 4.266). According to Doherty, Menelaos’ response to Helen’s speech suggests that her account might be less than factual.¹⁰²

Aristides’ willingness to adopt Helen as a model for his task of emblematising his experiences poses an interpretative challenge for his readers: will his account be the genuine and sincere account of a devotee? Or, does making a *logos* like Homer’s Helen mean he will produce a something *like* the truth? The problems raised by the use of the *Odyssey* penetrate further. At a range of points throughout his *Tales*, Aristides’ suggests that his stories need to be understood against the Odysseus’ *apologoi*: they are *πέρα ἢ κατ’ Ἀλκίνοῦ ἀπόλογον* XLVIII.60). Aristides is clearly playing here on the proverbial meaning of the phrase *Ἀλκίνοῦ ἀπόλογον*: The term’s earliest recorded usage in Plato’s *Republic* (*Resp.* 614b) implies long-winded babbling. But the phrase also carries implications of mendacity. The phrase can recall Homer’s placement of Odysseus’ experiences in the outer ocean—a geographical and literary space characterised by incredible *thauma* and lying tales of travellers.¹⁰³ Aristides’ self-conscious engagement with the *apologoi* here raises questions about his truthfulness. Such questions are strengthened by Aristides’ willingness to refer to his *Tales* as a type of Odyssean journey (*καὶ συμβαίνει τις Ὀδύσσεια*, XLVIII.65), and his reference to a dream in which Athena tells him that he is both

¹⁰¹ Her language here mirrors the treatment of Odysseus’ act of disguise: cf. the use of ἐοικώς at Hom. *Od.* 4.245. For a discussion of this see: Gumpert (2001), 38; for a discussion of the role of Helen and rhetorical trickery in this passage see Zeitlin (1996), 410, who sees the passage dominated by the figure of Proteus, and the themes of deception and disguise; for Helen’s story as a slippery act of public relations see Doherty (1995), 81-92, esp. 86-8.

¹⁰² For Menelaos’ story as proof that Helen is lying: Doherty (1995), 86-88.

¹⁰³ Tümpel (1893), 522-533.

Telemachus and Odysseus and that the *Odyssey* was not a collection of fictional tales (μύθους XLVIII.42). Aristides' references here are far from unproblematic. At one level, Aristides' suggestion that the *apologoi* should be read as more than fictional stories appears to suggest that their more modern analogue, the *Tales*, should themselves be seen as truthful. At more a fundamental level, however, Athena's denial of the *Odyssey*'s fictional status raises questions about where readers should situate both texts on the spectrum of narrative believability or facticity. Are we to approach the *Tales* as factual narratives in the same way that we approach the facticity of the *apologoi*? By emphasising its Odyssean nature, the *logoi* allude to the problems these narratives posed as true *logoi* as opposed to *muthoi*.

The *Tales* are continually represented as a collection of stories which pose problems in terms of our belief, or trust, in them—the connection with the *Odyssey* places the *Tales* at the boundaries of readers' credulity. Far from attempting to solve this interpretative problem, Aristides attempts to augment the readers' uncertainty: at XLVIII.40, he exhorts readers who do not believe him to stop reading: τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ὅτῳ μὲν φίλον πιστεύειν πιστεύετω, ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ, χαίρετω. This game with belief is, perhaps, reminiscent of another type of odyssey: Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*. During the account of Apollonius' travels to India, Philostratus tells the reader that it would be better to neither believe or disbelieve anything (VA 3.45) written in his account.¹⁰⁴ How are we to read these authors' delicate flaunting their texts' (un)believability? It is hard to accept that either Philostratus or Aristides want readers to treat them as either straight forwardly true or untrue. Rather, I suggest, it is more productive to see these authors

¹⁰⁴ Philostr. VA. 3.45: Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ὁδε ὁ λόγος ἀναγέγραπται τῷ Δάμειδι σπουδασθεὶς ἐκεῖ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς μυθολογουμένων θηρίων τε καὶ πηγῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, μηδ' ἐμοὶ παραλειπέσθω, καὶ γὰρ κέρδος (ἂν) εἴη μήτε πιστεύειν, μήτε ἀπιστεῖν πᾶσιν. Bowie (1978), 1699, esp., 1663-67 for the VA's status as fiction; cf., Bowie (1994), 181-199.

deliberately using the text's problematic status to emphasise a type of truth about their subject matter: the truth about Aristides' experience of Asclepius is that it, like the *apologoi*, and like Philostratus' Apollonius, strain at the boundaries of factual veracity and believability. They confound attempts at factual or historical verification.

This process of confounding verification at the level of narrative believability or factual verification is replicated at the level of the body. This process is dramatically represented in his discussion of his experience of a scar he receives after his endurance of a debilitating tumour. Amazingly, after a prolonged battle with a tumour in his leg, Aristides informs his readers that the God healed him so completely that all evidence of his experience disappeared:

ὁ δ' ἄρα οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐκείνοις παρήκεν, ἀλλ' οὔσης τῆς ἀποστάσεως θαυμαστῆς
ὄσης καὶ δοκοῦντος ἅπαντος ἀπηλλοτριῶσθαι τοῦ δέρματος, ὥν κελεύσας
ἐπιχρίειν οὕτως ἰάσατο καὶ συνήγαγε πάντα εἰς ταυτὸν, ὥστε ὀλίγων ἡμερῶν
παρελθουσῶν οὐδεὶς οἶός τ' ἦν εὔρεῖν ἐν ὁποτέρῳ μηρῷ τὸ φῦμα ἐκεῖνο ἐγένετο,
ἀλλ' ἥστην ἀμφοτέρῳ καθαρῶ τοῖς ἅπασι. (XLVII.68)¹⁰⁵

Aristides' discussion of his recovery is no doubt used to lionise the particular curative capacities of Asclepius. At the same time, however, it taps into a long-standing literary and cultural tradition about the way scars facilitate a process of reading the body. Reference to the absence of the scar here recalls the reference to scars in Books 19 of the *Odyssey*: in which Odysseus' nurse recognises the hero by observing his physical text; the scar in this context facilitates an understanding and a verification of the individual's identity through

¹⁰⁵ cf. Holmes (2008), 104-5; I'm grateful to John Morgan for this point. For further examples of scars as examples of confirmation of experiences see: Ach. Tat. *L&C*. 5.11; for further discussion: Gleason on bodily mutilation in Gleason (2001), 50-85; Leigh on scarification and identification in Roman culture, Leigh (1995), 195-212.

the confirmation of his past experiences.¹⁰⁶ In Aristides' context, the absence of the scar seems to precisely deny that possibility. Indeed, as Aristides points, out it was impossible, henceforth, to confirm even on which leg the tumour had originally arisen (*οὐδεὶς οἶός τ' ἦν εὐρεῖν ἐν ὁποτέρῳ μηρῷ τὸ φῦμα ἐκεῖνο ἐγένετο*). Aristides' body, here refuses to be pinned down; refuses to be read; refuses to offer factual verification of his historical experiences. Through the manipulation of the Odyssean intertext, both text and body refuse to present the reader with the possibility of confirming, or tying down the factual nature of Aristides' experience.

b) aporia and diagnosis

This resistance to reading and verification, or precise knowledge, is manifested in a range of ways throughout the narrative. Here I focus on the way Aristides presents his body as *aporetic*. Reference to the body's aporetic qualities denies internal readers (especially doctors) the opportunity to diagnose the body. In a similar fashion, readers outside the text are denied the opportunity to genuinely understand or recognise Aristides' experiences.

Throughout the *Tales* narrative and physical condition or experience have a symbiotic relationship. Physical health facilitates the production of narratives within the *Tales* (and the *Tales* themselves), and the act of speaking and writing alleviates physical suffering (e.g., at XLVII.60). Body and text are both the site of divine forethought and action. Asclepius interferes with the writing process to ensure its proper direction and its form, and interferes with Aristides' body to ensure its proper health and preservation. When spectators gaze on Aristides they wonder at both his words and his body: just as

¹⁰⁶ Hom. *Od.* 19.391

various speeches and narratives within the *Tales* are amazing, ineffable, and confounding, so too does Aristides' body evoke both confusion and awe among both medical and 'lay' spectators (at, e.g. L.22). The resistance to reading and interpretation that characterises the *Tales* is played out on the level of the body.

Aristides repeatedly stresses the body's resistance to human interpretation. The treatment he receives at the hands of human doctors is characterised by their failure to diagnose Aristides' physical conditions accurately. At XLVII.62 he recalls that when confronted with a growth or tumour the *ἐνταῦθα οἱ μὲν ἰατροὶ πάσας φωνὰς ἠφίεσαν, οἱ μὲν τέμνειν, οἱ δὲ ἐπικάειν φαρμάκοις, ἢ πάντως δεῖν ὑπόπνον γενόμενον διαφθαρῆναι*. In this context, the doctor's failure to read the body is counterpoised with the reading provided by the God (c.f., *ὁ δὲ θεὸς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐτίθετο, ἀντέχειν καὶ τρέφειν τὸν ὄγκον*). At one level, Aristides uses the failures of the doctors to play up the capacity of the divine doctor Asclepius. What interests me is the way these examples of the failure to interpret the body correctly implicates not only contemporary medical culture, but also readers outside the text and their capacity to understand the body. The medical failure in the case of the tumour is not an isolated incident. At the beginning of the next *Tale* he tells us that when he returned from Italy and consulted doctors about his condition he was confronted with a similar inability: *ἦν τοῖς ἰατροῖς ἀπορία πολλή μὴ ὅτι ὠφελεῖν οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γνωρίσαι ὅ τι εἴη τὸ σύμπαν*. (XLVIII.5) and at XLI.11—*θόρυβος ἦν εἶπερ ποτέ* concerning the nature of his physical condition; at other times the process reflects a failure to recognise the complexity of his disease.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Aristid. XLVIII. 69: *...οὐτε ἐγνώριζον τὴν ποικιλίαν τῆς νόσου*.

Aristides' language is worth considering in more detail. The use of *θορύβος* here recalls confused, hysterical shouting of sailors in a storm at XLVIII.12. More significantly, it recalls confusion felt before other *logoi*, such as his narration of a dream at L.20: *καὶ οἱ παρόντες οὐδέν πω τοῦ ὀνείρατος προπεπυσμένοι, τῶν δὲ λόγων ἀκροώμενοι τότε πρῶτον, μάλιστα δὴ τοῦτο ἐπεσημήναντο τὸ ἀξίωμα. καὶ τοῦτο πλεῖστον ἦν αὐτοῖς τοῦ θορύβου*. The correlation between the reaction to Aristides' *logoi* and his body (flagged by the correlation of *θορύβου* figures a more general connection between the reactions of those who directly encounter Aristides body and fail to recognise it, and those who encounter it through the *logoi* of the *Tales* themselves.

Aristides use of *aporia* at XLVIII.5 is significant in this context. It is used to figure medical confusion about his body at other points such as XLVIII.63—*ὁ δὲ ὄγκος ἔτι ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ἤρετο καὶ ἦν ἀπορία πολλή*.; at other times it is used to refer to the difficulty of the regimen Aristides was prescribed (by far the 'most difficult' thing was);¹⁰⁸ and finally to describe his actual physical experiences—there was 'great difficulty' (*ἀπορία πολλή*) with my palate (XLVIII.16). How are we to interpret this confluence? Importance should be given to the fact that *aporia* carries a heavy literary baggage. *Aporia* and its stronger form of *diaporia* were often used to designate a strategy in which *rheto*rs feigned ignorance about how to most effectively arrange and develop their narratives.¹⁰⁹ The notion of rhetorical *aporia* seems particularly relevant to the *Tales*. Scholars have often noted how the narrative consciously plays with its own confusion and disorder, emphasising its own aporetic qualities. During the second *Tale*, for instance, he appeals specifically to Asclepius in order to direct him about where to turn to best develop his

¹⁰⁸ For other references to *aporia* see, eg, XLVII.62-3, 73; XLVIII.5;46;57;61;64.

¹⁰⁹ Lausberg (1998), s.v. *dubitatio* § 776.

narrative.¹¹⁰ The *Tales* and Aristides' body (his physical regimen and his physical conditions) intersect at the point of disorder and confusion.

Aristides' *Tales* then are characterised by examples in which the body of the sick, pained patient is (mis)read by the representatives of medical discourse. On one reading, Aristides' contrast between divine and human interpretation appears to reflect a specific criticism of contemporary medical practice, or at least a lionisation of Asclepius' ability. On a more problematic reading, this failure to understand or recognise the condition resonates out and inflects our ability to understand the body and the text of Aristides. The correlation between the confusion and difficulty felt at the level of the body and that of textual disorder and disorganisation undermines the reader's ability to understand precisely the nature of Aristides' condition. The narrative, like Aristides' physical condition, resists reading; prevents the reader from laying hold or, or pinning down, the diagnostic recognition of the body.

5. Conclusions

Throughout this investigation, I have placed Aristides' narration of his painful experience within the medical culture of the second century AD. I have tried to show, broadly, that Aristides' narratives testify to the experience of pain, rather than explain it. The testimonial nature of Aristides' text can be read against the type of narrative translation that Galen presents throughout his case histories. Aristides' *Tales* testimony is defined by a type of recognition in which scientific verification of the body's experiences and conditions is continually denied, replaced by a more nebulous mystical form of understanding.

¹¹⁰ cf. Aristid. XLVIII.11; or XLVIII.24: ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν σὸν ἤδη, ὦ δέσποτα, γίγνεται δεῖξαι καὶ παραστήσαι ὅ τι ἐξῆς λέγοντες καὶ ὅποι τραπόμενοι σοί τ' ἂν κεχαρισμένα ποιοῖμεν καὶ τοῦ λόγου προῖοιμεν ὡς κάλλιστα.

Importantly, Aristides' translation of his bodily experience into narrative form was shown to develop a different relationship between narrative and the body. The impact of pain and physical experience on language was emphasised in the construction of Aristides' voice, and his fragmentary, abbreviated narrative. The text testified to the experience of pain by representing its impact on language and narrative. We saw further how Aristides' text constructed the experience of pain as an experience which could not be communicated clearly in language or narrative, only the vivid or revelatory terms of medical culture. Finally, we saw how the body was shown to resist factual verification or reading. All of these strategies critiqued the idea that precise knowledge of the body's experiences could be gained through narrative. The socialisation of the body for Aristides offered only an opportunity to show his experiences as experiences which transcended a medical form of recognition. Aristides' representation of the body presented it as something inherently resistant to both structured straightforward narration and recognition by readers.

CONCLUSIONS

Over the course of this chapter I have shown that medical practice throughout the second century AD was concerned with the question of how to translate pain into a sophisticated literary form. The encounter between doctor and patient was seen as an important cultural space which was defined by the way individuals talked about and communicated their suffering to others; the socialisation of pain experiences was seen—in both Galen and Aristides—as critically linked to a process of diagnosis and recognition of the body's experiences of pain. As a result both authors engage deeply with questions about the relationship between bodily pain, narrative, and reader engagement with the

body. When read against each other these two authors can be seen as part of a debate about how to represent pain within a medical context.

There are also implications for medical practice and a scientific approach to the body. Galen uses language to control the body, and its experiences: narrative operates as a site for the control of bodily experiences. The process of translation always has the power to limit experience, by placing it in particular narrative forms—we can see here how the narrative form and strategies used to socialise pain serve to construct and control the experience of pain in a particular way. There are a number of important ethical questions raised by this reading of Galen. The first concerns his interest in ‘real’ physical and mental pain. Galen’s interest in pain is as narrative based as any other form. Science’s view of the body is as implicated in cultural forms of narration and language as Aristides’ or rhetoric’s presentation of suffering. Our duty here is to try and unpack Galen’s rationalist system. Doing so will provide a far more complete picture of pain and its experiences.

Writing Cures: Narrative, Pain, and Management in Chariton, Xenophon, and Achilles Tatius

In the last chapter we investigated the pain-language relationship in a clinical context. We saw how medical discourse was defined by a debate between Galen and Aristides over how to translate the disordered, ineffable experience of pain into sophisticated discourse: medical culture is underpinned by the need to negotiate the way pain impacts on language and how different narrative forms control and define suffering. In this chapter, I consider the pain-language relationship in a slightly different therapeutic context: philosophical consolation (Dio's *Concerning Pain*, and Plutarch's *Consolation to his Wife*), and the Greek romance novels of the Imperial period—Chariton's *Chareas and Callirhoe*, Xenophon's *An Ephesian Tale*, and Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*. My primary concern is to show that the novels are part of a therapeutic tradition in which the overwhelming nature of pain is managed by a structured and controlled engagement with our past. As we shall see, this therapeutic concern is embedded in the connection between the overwhelming, traumatic character of the protagonists' experiences and how they narrate their lugubrious life stories to others. The novels are not normally read as therapeutic: nevertheless, I contend, they continually adopt, and manipulate, different aspects of a therapeutic concern in which reaching the *tēlos* of one's journey helps to manage and redefine the traumatic past of the protagonists. This therapeutic concern places the novels squarely within a genre of ancient psychotherapeutic literature.

Over the last two decades, scholars have given increased attention to the question of ancient psychotherapy. It is clear that there is a long tradition of psychotherapy, in which *logos* plays a central role in alleviating the individual's pain or suffering. Laín Entralgo argues that this tradition can be traced back to Homer's understanding of the 'cheering' words of Nestor in the *Iliad*, and finds its apogee in the development of *catharsis* under Plato and Aristotle.¹ According to Ps.-Plutarch's *Lives of the Ten Orators*, Antiphon the sophist developed a technique to cure people of their grief through various rhetorical practices.² In a similar vein, we have discussed how rhetoric, and especially *logoi*, were conceived as powerful effective elements which could change the condition of the listener's soul: Gorgias especially associated the power of rhetoric with a process that could stop grief, and charm the soul, through a process akin to *psychagogia*.³ This early tradition has been extensively studied by Laín Entralgo, Gill, and Thome.⁴ Importantly, for the purposes of this chapter, considerable attention has also been given to the way in which major Hellenistic philosophical schools—viz., Stoic, Epicurean, and Skeptic—approached philosophy as a type of psychotherapy. As Nussbaum and Gill have pointed out (in different ways), Hellenistic philosophy was committed to improving the condition of the individual's soul through the application of philosophical arguments and teaching.⁵ This notion of therapy was built on the idea the individual's possession of false beliefs (in the case of Stoic and Skeptic thought) about the external world or emotional disturbance (in

¹ Laín Entralgo (1970), 1-32 (Homer), 108-38 (Plato), 171-240 (Aristotle).

² cf. ps.-Plut. *Orat. Vit.* 833c: ποιήσει τέχνην ἀλυπίας; According to Plutarch, Antiphon claimed that he was able τοὺς λυπουμένους διὰ λόγων θεραπεύειν. For full discussion of this passage see: Baltussen (2009), 70-74. See also the comments of Philostr. *VS.* 1.15. For a fuller, sceptical, discussion of Antiphon's status as a psychotherapist see Furley (1988), 198-216.

³ cf. the metaphors of leading at Gorg. *Fr.* 11.8-14 DK; see also Segal (1962), 99-155.

⁴ Gill (1985), 307-25; cf. Gill (2010), 243-329 (on the status of emotional therapy in Galen) 350-63 (on parallels between ancient and modern psychotherapy); Riese (1951), 442-56, who focuses on a range of psychotherapeutic practices; cf. Laín Entralgo, (1970); Thome (2001).

⁵ Nussbaum (1994), 3: 'they practiced philosophy not as a detached intellectual technique dedicated to the display of cleverness but as an immersed and worldly art of grappling with human misery'; for an overview of the concern with the soul in all three major Hellenistic schools see pp13-15; for references in Gill, see above, note 4.

the case of Epicureans) constituted a form of psychical illness of which the individual needed to be cured.⁶

An important aspect of this concept of therapy concerns the way different philosophical schools approach the question of pain. As we have stressed at a number of points throughout this thesis, the experience of pain plays an important role in hedonistic philosophical practice: for Epicureans and Cyrenaics it constitutes a significant marker of the ethical value of different phenomena.⁷ For the hedonistic philosopher pain and pleasure were experiences which communicated truths about different aspects of everyday experience and played an important role in guiding the ethical decision making process.⁸ Whereas Stoic consolatory practice can adopt the policy of denying the validity of someone's beliefs about their pain, this therapeutic route is less open to hedonistic philosophy. As a consequence, Epicureans and Cyrenaics were particularly attentive to the need to alleviate the individual's experience of pain. This process involved using the memory of pleasant experiences to distract the individual's attention from his current painful situation, and pre-rehearsing the possibility of disaster and pain to help prepare oneself for future suffering.⁹ In his famous last letters to Idomeneus, Epicurus presents his primary technique for countering painful experiences, viz., distracting the mind's attention, and remembering past pleasures:

...στραγγουρικά τε παρηκολούθει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα

τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους. ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τοῦτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ

τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμη... (D. L. VS. x .22).

⁶ The aim of philosophy according to Gill was the creation of *apatheia* (in the stoic case), or *ataraxia* (in the Epicurean): Gill (2010), 246-7. See also the instructive comments of Nussbaum on the medical metaphors of Hellenistic philosophy: Nussbaum (1994), 13-5.

⁷ See above, Chapter 1, text to notes 55-8.

⁸ See above, Chapter 1, text to notes 55-8.

⁹ Nussbaum (1994), 111; 288-9 on the importance of memory in countering physical pain. On this issue, see also Baltussen (2009), 89-91; cf. Graver (2001), 155-77, esp., on memory 171-5.

Here Epicurus attests to his intense experiences of pain associated with his urinary problems (στραγγουρικά) and his dysentery (δυσεντερικά). However, he is able to array in opposition to all these experiences (ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις) pleasures associated with the memory (μνήμη) of his past conversations. Diogenes' account of Epicurus' epistle may be historically inaccurate: it may have been adapted to fit the development of Epicurean doctrine by later writers. Here memory has played a crucial role, not in removing the experience of pain, but allowing it to be counterbalanced by the process of recalling past pleasure. Memory, here, plays a central role in redirecting the sufferer's attention away from his intense pain.¹⁰ This strategy for managing the experience of pain continues to play a role in the philosophical thought and consolatory practice of the Imperial period and later. Plutarch, for instance, continued to produce treatises which engaged with, and debated, the ideas of Epicurus and his followers, such as Colotes.¹¹ According to these texts, memory plays a vitally positive role in allowing the individual to confront their present¹² experience of pain; therapy, in this model, is based on the pleasurable use of the individual's past.

The following investigation of therapeutic literature in the Imperial period will confront this approach to pain. The therapeutic technique dramatised by Epicurus' mnemonic strategy proposes a particular relationship between past and present experiences: the pleasant aspects of the past are used to confront the individual's current pain. In this chapter, I complicate this therapeutic model by exploring how past painful

¹⁰ On this passage, and memory's role in adjusting the mind's attention, see Graver (2001), 174ff.

¹¹ cf. Plut. *Non Posse*. 1086c-1107c; *Adv. Col.* 1107d-1127e.

¹² One related issue is the way philosophers negotiated potential future ills. This process involves recalling the pain experiences of others, in order to inure the individual to the potential pain they will suffer in the future. For an informed discussion of the philosophical issues surrounding this see Graver (2001), 155-177. Although the assumptions about the experience of pain and its connection to literature inherent in this strand of philosophical practice would repay further study, I have not discussed this issue in detail. This is primarily because it rests on the assumption that the individual has not yet experienced pain: indeed, it is a form of practice designed to ensure that one never suffers pain.

experiences can continue to cause the individual suffering. The traumatic past has the capacity to overwhelm the individual, continuing to influence their life well after the initial experience of a traumatic event. By approaching therapy through this framework, we will be able to see how the process of therapy is linked to a process of structuring the individual's relationship to their lugubrious past; in the context of the novels, this process of structuring our relationship with the past is embedded in the process of narrative representation and communication.

2. *Freud and Therapy*

In order to investigate the relationship between the management of painful or traumatic experiences and narration, this chapter turns to the theories of psychoanalytic practice developed by Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Although he was not a literary critic himself, various aspects of Freud's approach to the process of psychoanalytic therapy have been quite influential among literary critics as a way of thinking both about narrative economies of pleasure and pain—and their relationship to meaning, plot, and story.¹³ Here, my engagement with Freud's model concerns the relationship between narration and a traumatic, painful past. Turning to Freud will help open up new questions about the relationship between the past, narrative, and the management of pain and pleasure; the relationship, in short, between the painful past and the erotic, pleasing literature of the novels.

For Freud, psychoanalytic therapy was built around what he saw as the process of *working through* (*durcharbeiten*) the patient's resistance to bringing to light his past

¹³ cf. Caruth (1996) on the notion of memory and history in cases of collective social trauma (eg., the bombing of Hiroshima) and individual forms of suffering.

experiences.¹⁴ This process is built on complex approach to the conscious and unconscious mind, and the capacity of past traumas to override the individual's deliberate attempts at control and negotiation. In his 1914 article, 'Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through', Freud argued that under the influence of resistance the individual was bound to repeat or act out, through physical neuroses, or other forms of abnormal behaviour, the effects of past traumatic experiences.¹⁵ The individual is bound to relive continuously in the conscious world the past experiences they think they have forgotten or repressed. Under the influence of resistance the patient is resigned to acting out, or repeating, the experience rather than simply remembering what he has forgotten and repressed.¹⁶

Central to Freud's model was a particular method of exposing patients to past experiences in such a way that they become aware of their resistances. Freud's insistence on awareness is allied to his assumptions about the way traumatic experiences penetrate the boundaries between the psychical plane of memory and the real world. The critical therapeutic moment existed in allowing the patient to become aware of, conversant and familiar with, and in due course, to transcend the resistance which underpinned traumatic repetition.¹⁷ In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, he rephrased the same idea in terms of the concept of aloofness: 'he [the therapist] must get him to re-experience some portion of his forgotten life, but must see to it, on the other hand that the patient retains some degree of aloofness'.¹⁸ If the process is successful, the patient will, he argues, 'recognise that what

¹⁴ Freud (1958) 147-56.

¹⁵ Originally published in 1914 under the German title: 'Weitere Ratschläge zur Technik der Psychoanalyse (II), Errinern, Wiederholen und Durcharbeiten'. The shorter German title was adopted in both German and English reprinted versions after 1924. Here it is quoted as Freud (1958), 147-56.

¹⁶ Freud (1958), 150; for the relationship between *repeating* and resistance see 151-2.

¹⁷ Freud (1958), 155: 'One must allow the patient time to become conversant with this resistance with which he has now become acquainted, to work through it, to overcome it...'

¹⁸ Freud (1989), 19.

appears to be reality is in fact only a reflection of a forgotten past'.¹⁹ Freud's sense of therapeutic procedure is founded on assumptions about the potential of traumatic experiences to penetrate boundaries—between past and present, psychical and physical planes. Concomitantly, therapy is centrally concerned with how those boundaries might be re-established; constraining trauma within not only mnemonic boundaries, but boundaries of space and time, primarily to the past.

Freud's theories about *working through* incorporate a range of complex, and culturally specific, ideas about the individual's psyche, and the notion of trauma, which do not apply to the ancient world. Gill has argued, convincingly, that the Hellenistic and Roman concept of the self has very little interest in the relationship between the unconscious and conscious mind and their relationship with the individual's psychological makeup.²⁰ There are, however, a number of key concepts within Freud's theory which will help us unpack the therapeutic dynamics of Dio's and Plutarch's philosophical consolations and the Greek romances. Firstly, working through is built on a particular distinction between the process of repetition and the process of conscious recollection from a position of aloofness. In the texts studied below this distinction is not apparent. Rather, what Freud saw as two discrete processes we shall encounter as different aspects of the same broad concept of remembrance. The act of memory, I argue, vacillates between painful repetition, which continually threatens to overwhelm the individual, and pleasant recollection. An important aspect of what I want to show is that the ancient writers demonstrate a concern with, and desire to manage, that bivalent aspect of memory. It is the

¹⁹ Freud (1989), 19, on the different process of remembering and repeating traumas as contemporary experiences see 18.

²⁰ Gill (1985), 323-4: 'while ancient moral philosophy is interested in (indeed, preoccupied with) the 'irrational', it does not recognize, to any significant extent, the notion of the 'unconscious''. For a contrary view see: Nussbaum (1994), 134, who argues that Epicurus' focus on memory is a central part of his discovery of the unconscious. It remains unclear how this process of memory operates in a manner analogous to Freud's concept of the unconscious mind.

management of that mnemonic process that concerns us and, I contend, corresponds to the technique of psychotherapy as developed by Freud.

Over the course of this chapter, I use Freud's ideas about therapy in two ways. In Section 1, I focus on the philosophical consolatory works of Dio and Plutarch. I argue here that they mobilise an approach to pain which privileges its capacity continually to return and overwhelm the individual in his present life. The experience of pain, in this context, is conceived as an inherently passive one, in which the individual is overcome by the way the past returns; this process, as we shall see, is allied to an imagined connection between pain and recollection. In order to overcome this debilitating experience, it is necessary to adopt a controlled, specific engagement with the past through the specific reshaping of the act of memory. Philosophical therapy, thus, turns on the negotiation of the potentially ambivalent process of remembering the past. In the second half of this chapter, I emphasise the way traumatic experience continues to haunt the individual well after the initial painful experience: for the novels, as for the consolatory texts of Dio and Plutarch, pain and trauma returns. The overwhelming nature of traumatic experience is controlled and managed by the strategic negotiation of the individual's relationship with his past. By emphasising their aloofness from the events of their past the protagonists are able to refigure their lugubrious pasts on more pleasurable terms. The ability of the novels' protagonists to negotiate and overcome their traumatic pasts rests on their ability to recognise their distance from the past. As we shall see, this is linked to, and has dramatic implications for, the processes of recollection and narrative recapitulation throughout the novels.

SECTION 1: MEMORY, PAIN, AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONSOLATION

If the claim that therapy involves managing the capacity of the lugubrious past to repeat or continually return, then how might we map that concern with past painful experiences in the cultural landscape of the Imperial period? In order to create a context for the discussion of the therapeutic strategies of the novels I turn to a discussion of the role of memory in philosophical consolation: my primary concern here are the consolatory texts of Dio (*Concerning Pain*), and Plutarch (*Consolation to his Wife*). As we shall see, these two texts focus, although in subtly different ways, on how the individual overcomes the suffering and pain associated with past traumatic experiences: Dio and Plutarch aim ultimately at assuaging pain through the reframing of the individual's negotiation of their past. This process is built on two important aspects. Firstly, in both authors pain is understood as a traumatic experience which is intimately associated with memory, and has the capacity to continually return and overwhelm the individual. Secondly, in Plutarch's *Consolation to his Wife*, the process of overcoming or countering trauma involves reframing our ability to understand and mobilise the memory of different aspects of our past; a strategic form of controlled memory of, or return to, the past becomes the key for countering traumatic pain.

1. *Memory and Therapy in the Second Century AD*

This discussion of memory and consolation uses the works of Dio and Plutarch to construct a particular approach to the problematisation of memory and pain in second century culture. There are two important implications to this: that which relates to the cultural status of the two authors' works; and that which relates to their place in the philosophical tradition concerned with the role of memory in philosophical consolation. Both these texts are part of a contemporary interest in philosophical consolation and the management of grief through the application of philosophical *logoi*. Philosophical consolations which aimed to cure readers of their misconceptions about, and grief

concerning exile stretches back to the Hellenistic work of Teles. Teles' work was drawn on and developed by a number of Imperial writers, including Plutarch, Favorinus, and Dio. The use of philosophical consolation to which claims to re-educate readers about the apparent evils of exile can be traced back to the Hellenistic period and the work of Teles.²¹ This tradition continued throughout the Imperial period: Musonius Rufus, Favorinus, Plutarch, and Dio writing exilic consolations.²² Plutarch especially appears to have shown considerable interest in the connection between consolation and pain related to the experience of death.²³ Dio and Plutarch's interest in pain and its relationship with memory is mirrored by later texts such as Galen's newly discovered *Concerning Painlessness* in which Galen explains how the recollection of other people's suffering helped him overcome the trauma of losing his library in 192-3.²⁴ These two texts are part of a vibrant, culturally significant discussion of the management of pain and suffering.

2. *Dio of Prusa and Concerning Pain*

Let us turn to Dio of Prusa's 16th oration, *Concerning Pain*. This *logos* sits at the periphery of modern scholarship on both the rhetorical works of its author and the philosophical tradition of consolation.²⁵ Here Dio appears to argue a straightforward point: that to overcome suffering the individual needs to obtain wisdom or cleverness, which will make our burdens easier to bear (xvi.9-10). What interests me about this discourse is the way in which this advice builds on a concern with the nature of suffering, and its capacity to dominate the individual. I argue two points in this section. I show, firstly, that the

²¹ Nesselrath (2007), 87-109, on the influence of Teles on Plutarch and Favorinus works on exile.

²² On exilic consolation in general see Claassen (1999); on Roman forms (especially Cicero and Ovid) see Doblhofer (1987); on the Greek literary tradition in the Imperial period see Whitmarsh (2001), 133-180.

²³ On consolatory literature in general see: Kassell (1967) for an overview of some texts. Martin (1978), 397-410, with further bibliography; to this genre can now be added Galen's *Concerning Freedom from Pain*: for discussion and text see Boudon-Millot (2007), 73-124.

²⁴ Gal. *Concerning Painlessness*, 1-10 (for his experience of painlessness in the face of loss of his library), 4 (for comparison with others who have lost their libraries).

²⁵ For its place within the consolatory tradition, cf. Dio Chr. xvi.4: ...οὐκουν καθ' ἑκαστον αὐτῶν δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραμυθίαν.

experience of pain is passive—pain enslaves the individual, forcing them to continually suffer, long after the traumatic experience has passed. Secondly, I suggest, this aspect of pain is connected to the process and nature of memory.

Dio's examination of the nature of suffering begins by emphasising its ability to dominate the individual: we are, he claims, enslaved by pain. If it is understandable that we are beguiled and controlled by pleasure (*ἡδονή*), the fact that we are enslaved by pain (*λύπη δεδουλώσθαι*) seems completely irrational (xvi.1). Dio's concern with how we suffer is allied to the particular way individuals react to this suffering: although we feel pain and are distressed by the harshest tortures of all (*ὀδυνώμενοι γὰρ καὶ βασανιζόμενοι τῇ χαλεπωτάτῃ πασῶν βασάνῳ*, xvi.1), we remain in it (*μένομεν ἐν αὐτῇ*), and refuse to accept the discourse which will free us, and provide a release from pain (*ἀπαλλάσσοντα τῆς ἀλγηδόνας*, xvi.1). It is easy to see how Dio's opening passage constructs a need for consolation in general and his consolatory text specifically: the reference to the *logos* which will provide a release *τῆς ἀλγηδόνοσ* appears to remind the reader of Dio's own rhetorical piece. What interests me here is the way pain's relationship with the suffering individual is figured. Dio's reference to enslavement in the first line emphasises the experience of passivity which overcomes the sufferer. Dio's suggestion that pain 'enslaves' is part of a *mentalité* in which the individual's experience of suffering is characterised by a lack of control. Dio's text operates on an understanding of pain in which the experience overwhelms and masters the passive individual.

The overwhelming experience of pain is connected to the fact that sufferers continue to experience the symptoms of pain after their initial trauma has passed. Dio

appears to place considerable stress on the fact that we continue to suffer pain; *μένομεν ἐν αὐτῇ* implies that pain is far from a momentary experience. This continuing nature of pain, Dio contends, is due to the practices of sufferers. On the one hand, they refuse to accept the arguments or words which will free them from their suffering. But, they also devise external practices (*προσμηχανᾶσθαι τινα ἔξωθεν*, xvi.2) which compel the mind to adopt a particular stance and never stand aside from the experience of pain (*ἀναγκάζεσθαι τρόπον τινὰ τὴν διάνοιαν μηδέποτε ἀφίστασθαι τῆς λύπης*, xvi.2); indeed, they are reduced to always recall and suffer (*ἀλλ' αἰεὶ μνημονεύειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι*). Dio's formulation here is interesting, proposing a particular association between memory and the experience of *λυπή*; pain and memory are co-extensive, according to Dio. The orator presents, then, a particularly vicious circle in which suffering predisposes the individual to the sentiments and practices which force them to remember and thereby compound and prolong their suffering.

Dio's initial comments are clearly designed to create a context for accepting the (or his?) therapeutic *logos*. Nevertheless, he returns to this concern with memory in a more sustained examination of how individuals suffer moments later. According to xvi.5 there is an intimate connection between the practice of memory and the capacity of the individual to repeat painful experiences. The common people, he argues, will always bring to mind painful memories: *οἱ ... πολλοί, ἐὰν γένηται τι τῶν νομιζομένων ἀτόπων, αἰεὶ τούτου μνημονεύουσι, δυσχεροῦς οὔσης τῆς μνήμης* (xvi.5). Dio's comments appear to contradict the idea that memory allows for the individual to overcome, or distract the attention from pain: indeed, the final clause (*δυσχεροῦς οὔσης τῆς μνήμης*, xvi.5)

insinuates that memory, is directly constitutive of a certain type of pain. As Dio goes on, however, the connection between pain and the practice of recollection is elucidated:

...ὅμοιον δὴ τι πάσχοντες τοῖς παιδίοις. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα τοῦ πυρὸς ἄψασθαι
προθυμεῖται, καίτοι σφόδρα ἀλγοῦντα, καὶν ἀφ᾽ ἧς, ἄψεται πάλιν. (xvi.5)

Dio's passage contains a number of insinuations which need to be unpacked. The comparison of *hoi polloi* with children suggests a distinction between the actions of the majority and those of the wise man. There are intimations of a distinction between the philosophically educated and those who lack the appropriate level of philosophical development. In a similar vein, the phrase *καὶν ἀφ᾽ ἧς* appears to suggest that he has in mind the way in which advice (or instructions) are disobeyed by recalcitrant children: Dio's text subtly develops a warning against not following the advice of his treatise. If we don't heed his words, we will continue to suffer pain: just as this simile figures the reader as a potentially uneducated member of *hoi polloi*, who suffers in the manner of children, so it suggests that suffering will take the form of a repetition, or replaying, of the experiences which cause pain. Dio connects the process of memory to the experience of suffering, and, importantly, the active repetition of painful activities.

There are two caveats to this reading of Dio's 16th oration. Firstly, I do not want to suggest that Dio is building a particular psychoanalytic theory of repetition, akin to that which mobilises Freud's work on therapy and trauma. Nevertheless, he does develop a model of the uneducated engagement with suffering in which memory produces a certain psychic condition and practices which never allow the individual to escape their suffering: memory underpins the way pain continues to overwhelm the individual well after the initial experience of trauma. Dio's advice is, naturally, designed to alleviate a tendency he associates with a lack of philosophical development; the educated or wise do not suffer in

this repetitive way. What interests me is the way Dio's treatise is developed in such a way as to counteract what he sees as a viable problem: in order to bite, Dio's text needs to engage with a culturally prevalent reaction to the painful past. In aiming to release sufferers from the problems of the repetitive nature of pain and memory, he simultaneously constructs that experience as demographically significant.

3. *Plutarch's Consolation to his Wife*

If Dio of Prusa's text offered a threatening image of pain's relationship with memory and endless repetition of painful experiences, then Plutarch's consolation offers a more positive vision. Plutarch's treatise has been explored from a number of perspectives which have emphasised the way he approaches the treatment of grief through an Epicurean framework. As has been acknowledged, a central aspect of the strategy Plutarch adopts throughout this text involves mobilising the memory of past pleasures to counteract the pain that his wife now feels about the death of their daughter.²⁶ In what follows, here, I contribute a number of small points to the discussion of the role of memory in this treatise. I show that, like Dio, Plutarch appears to be deeply concerned with confronting the problematic nature of memory. This is evident on two levels: firstly, he exhorts his wife to reject the common practice of fleeing memory; and secondly, on a process of psychological priming in which memory is reconstructed as a positive force for overcoming pain.

a) *Overwhelming Memories and Pain*

Plutarch's *Consolation to his Wife* is a letter addressed to his wife after the death of their daughter in which he consoles her for their loss, praises the way she has conducted

²⁶ On the conventional themes of the consolation see: Martin (1978), 394-441, esp., 397-413; Pomeroy (1999), 77-8.

herself throughout her grief, and exhorts her to overcome her continuing pain.²⁷ This process of exhortation engages with the problems of memory in two critical ways. In this section, I turn to how Plutarch treats the potentially overwhelming nature of memory.

The treatment of the theme of memory begins early in his treatise where he exhorts his wife to recall the pleasures their daughter gave them when she lived. According to 608d, he does not understand why the things which delighted them when their daughter lived should now distress and disturb (*ἀνιάσει καὶ συνταράξει*) when they are recalled (*λαμβάνοντας ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν*). Indeed, Plutarch goes on to claim that he fears they will be throwing out the memory of their child along with pain and grief:

ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδια πάλιν, μὴ συνεκβάλωμεν τῷ λυποῦντι τὴν μνήμην, ὥσπερ ἡ Κλυμένη
λέγουσα μισῶ δ' ἀγκύλον τόξον κρανείας, γυμνάσιά τ' οἷχοιτ' αἰεὶ φεύγουσα καὶ
τρέμουσα τὴν ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ παιδός, ὅτι συμπαροῦσαν λύπην εἶχε· πᾶν γὰρ ἡ φύσις
φεύγει τὸ δυσχεραίνόμενον. (*Cons. ad Ux.* 608d-e)

Plutarch's ultimate argument here is that memory should be cultivated as a force to help overcome pain rather than eschewed. On a straightforward interpretation, Plutarch's advice associates pleasure with the memory of the little girl: the Epicurean interest in recollection as the site of past pleasure helps the individual overcome current suffering through remembrance.²⁸ Yet, on a slightly more supple reading, this positive aspect appears to intersect with a more problematic concern with the painful aspects of memory. The reference to Clymene emphasises the capacity of recollection to cause the individual pain by continually reminding them of their traumatic experiences. There are two points which

²⁷ Plut. *Cons. ad Ux.* 608b-f. On the intimate nature of this letter see: Nikloaidis (1997), 27-88; Baltussen (2009), 67-98.

²⁸ On memory in this passage and its relationship with ἐπίνοια in the previous and the following passages see: Martin (1978), 419-22.

are significant about Plutarch's reference to the (now lost) *Phaethon* of Euripides.²⁹ Firstly, his consolation rejects a tragic model for behaviour: adopting the appropriate relationship with memory and past trauma involves eschewing the type of suffering and distress which underpins the tragic genre. At the same time, by looking towards the genre of tragedy and the suffering of a mythological figure like Clymene, the passage reaffirms the fact that this form of behaviour constitutes one of the possible reactions to past trauma; not only is continually remembering and rehearsing past trauma possible, it is a form of action authorised by important cultural modes of representation. The passage appears to play up, then, the fundamental reasons for Plutarch's advice to his wife to maintain her recollection of their child: to guide her away from the natural reaction in which pain is caused by the capacity of memory to remind her of what is lost. If the *Consolation* exhorts the reader to recall the pleasure associated with the dead child, then it does so precisely because the normal, un-philosophical reaction is to associate memory with the continuing pain of grief.

b) *Using Memory to Overcome Pain*

Just as it is true that Plutarch's treatment of memory in the previous passage acknowledged the possibility that memory had the capacity to cause the individual pain by facilitating the continual return of past trauma, so he attempts to use the process of memory to place his wife's relationship with the past on a more pleasurable footing. In order to do this, Plutarch mobilises an important aspect of the Epicurean mnemonic strategy we discussed above. At 610e, he stresses the ameliorative benefits of careful recollection of the individual's past. It is, we are told, the one who draws on his memory most, who will profit more from the past:

²⁹ cf. Nauck (1889) Eur. Fr. 785. For the lost play see: Diggle (1970), 1-49, esp., 177-8 for this fragment.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις ὁ μάλιστα τῇ μνήμῃ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπαρνητόμενος³⁰ καὶ τοῦ βίου
πρὸς τὰ φωτεινὰ καὶ λαμπρὰ μεταστρέφων καὶ μεταφέρων ἐκ τῶν σκοτεινῶν καὶ
ταρακτικῶν τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ παντάπασιν ἔσβεσε τὸ λυποῦν ἢ τῇ πρὸς τοῦναντίον
μίξει μικρὸν καὶ ἀμαυρὸν ἐποίησεν. (*Cons. ad Ux.* 610e)

Plutarch's language here is significant: we have already seen how the process of 'mixing' (flagged here by *μίξει*) is central to Plutarch's model of countering disturbance in the *Poetry*.³¹ Here skimming off the memory of good things will help to allow the individual to render pain more amenable through combination of both the unpleasant and the more enjoyable aspects of the past. The process of memory allows for a critical re-evaluation of the nature of one's experience and a reorientation of the mind's away from suffering. The operation of memory is just like that of a sweet odour. For just as a sweet smell always adjusts the sense of smell towards the malodorous (τὸ μύρον ἀεὶ μὲν εὐφραίνει τὴν ὀσφρησιν πρὸς δὲ τὰ δυσώδη, 610e), so, for those who do not flee the memory of useful things (τοῖς μὴ φεύγουσι τὸ μεμνηῖσθαι τῶν χρηστῶν), recollection of good things during times of pain (ἢ ἐπίνοια τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐν τοῖς κακοῖς) provides a necessary and useful assistance in all matters.³² How might we read the functional role of Plutarch's passage here. Plutarch is clearly arguing for a type of appropriate thinking, in which memory is adopted as a source of pleasure. There are two points which interest me here. Firstly, Plutarch's text appears to engage in a process of psychological priming, which prepares the individual for a pleasant re-engagement with the past. We have seen in the discussion of Freud's psychoanalytic theory, that the analyst was encouraged to help the analysand's relationship with traumatic experiences by making them aware that what they were

³⁰ This form of ἀπαρνώ is found only at *Cons. ad Ux.* 610e. I have kept this form as it is used in both the Tuebner edition, and the Liddell and Scott.

³¹ See above, Chapter 1: text to notes 43 and 58.

³² For a discussion of Plutarch's ambiguous, or confused, treatment of the issue of fortune in this passage see: Brenk (1977), 145-83; Dillon (1977), 208-11.

remembering was part of the past.³³ Here, Plutarch's strategy centres around ensuring that the individual is able to pick and choose certain aspects of their past, which will help alleviate present suffering. Arguably, the suggestion that the individual should be able to 'skim off' certain aspects of the past is built on an assumption about the individual's perspective of the past: the sufferer can pick, choose, and focus on particular (and pleasing or useful) aspects of the past, which will ensure pleasant memories and help to counter the experience of pain. Plutarch's approach to countering pain appears, then, to play on the sufferer's ability to exercise a type of control over the painful events of their past.

4. *Conclusions*

Dio's and Plutarch's texts are, then, critically concerned with how past trauma impacts on suffering. Memory plays a crucial role here as the battleground on which our engagement with overwhelming trauma is played out. Although both texts presented different reactions to the relationship between memory and suffering, there are a number of common points to be drawn out of this discussion. Firstly, both texts suggest that the normal practice of engaging with memory is one in which recollection has the potential to return the uneducated or unwise individual to painful experiences in the past; implicitly, this is in contrast to those who accept the author's *logos*. The two *logoi* present themselves as counteracting the prevailing cultural context in which memory allows the individual's painful past to return, to repeat. For their consolatory texts to have an impact, both these authors work with what they present as a culturally significant approach to the traumatic capacities of memory. Pain here, through the operation of memory, has the power to return and overwhelm the individual. Secondly, Plutarch's text also offers a positive view of memory in which recollection of certain aspects of the past helps to overcome pain. In Plutarch this process is built around a structure in which he encourages our strategic

³³ *cf.* the instructions to return to certain aspects of the past, before their child was born at 610d.

recollection of past events in order to ameliorate the individual's grief. In what follows below, I want to explore how the novels structure our engagement with painful overwhelming experiences.

SECTION 2: THERAPEUTIC NOVELS: PAINFUL EVENTS, NARRATION, AND PLEASURE

We have seen then how the consolatory works of Dio and Plutarch are concerned to negotiate the traumatic nature of pain in which the experience continually threatens to overwhelm the individual; it is only by controlling the engagement with the past that the individual is able to overcome that painful experience. In what follows, I turn to an investigation of the therapeutic process in the ancient novels. Over the next three sections, I argue that the novels are energised by a therapeutic structure in which individuals come to manage and negotiate their traumatic experiences. This argument has three basic points. I contend, firstly, that this process of therapy is reflected by the dynamic interplay between *poetic immersion* and the cultivation of *aloofness*. In section 3, I argue that the characters' affective response to events is characterised by a sense of *poetic immersion*. This experience is reflected in the association between the way in which the protagonists recount their experiences, and their affective responses to those accounts. In section 4, I argue that this state of *immersion* is finally overcome through the process of asserting the character's distance from the events of the past: *aloofness* in this context underpins a significant transition in the affective nature of the stories the protagonists tell, and the control they exercise over their past experiences.

1. *The Novels, the Therapeutic Mentalité, and Narration*

The novels under investigation below are taken from a collection of texts known as the 'ideal' Greek romances. This designation has underpinned the critical assumption that

they can be treated as a single, generic block of cultural artefacts which convey a single, socially acceptable (and elite) ideological message.³⁴ Scholarship over the last decade has done much to dispel the idea that the Greek novels are straightforward messages which conform to, and confirm, elite ideology: the novels are rather a collection of different, diverse, often subversive, texts.³⁵ All of the Greek romances confront the relationship between narrative form, pain, and therapy in various ways: they emphasise, explore, and negotiate different aspects of an inherited cultural assumption which connects an individual's hermeneutic and temporal distance from events with the transcendence of pain. This chapter attends to the complex and individual forms of the novels' engagement with this inherited cultural *mentalité* in order to trace the character of this enduring cultural assumption.

This discussion focuses on three examples of the genre of Greek romances. A number of other texts, such as Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe* and Heliodorus' *An Ethiopian Tale*, could have treated in more detail. There are several factors which underpin their relegation to the periphery of this study. 1. Longus' connection with consolation and pain is mediated primarily by his connection with bucolic poetry. Longus' claim that he will heal the sick and encourage the forlorn and remind lovers—...ὁ καὶ νοσοῦντα ἰάσεται, καὶ λυπούμενον παραμυθήσεται, τὸν ἐρασθέντα ἀναμνήσει—suggests that *Daphnis and Chloe* would be ideal for this study.³⁶ However, I suggest, the work's engagement with the genre of consolation has a slightly different focus to that presented by Chariton, Xenophon, and Achilles Tatius; taking account of the consolatory concerns of Longus would involve divergence into Hellenistic poetry and Longus' bucolic heritage. 2. Longus' treatment of pain is differs substantially from the concerns of the three novelists we will focus on. Pain, as I will discuss very briefly below,

³⁴ cf. Foucault, (1990), 228-32; Konstan (1994); Perkins (1995), 41-76, esp. 44-5; Swain (1996), 101-9.

³⁵ On Foucault's 'misrecognition' of the novels' complexity see: Goldhill (1995), x-xi, 44-5; Whitmarsh, (2008), 6-7.

³⁶ Long. *D&C praef.* 3.

in Longus' novel takes on a much more marginal status than it does in other texts: the bucolic concerns of the novel ensure that pleasure and pain are negotiated in very different ways, which have less relationship with dialogue between pain and narration.³⁷ Similarly, in Heliodorus the engagement with pain and suffering differs from the main concerns of this thesis. The treatment of pain, and the process of narrating the experience, focuses primarily on the diagnosis of Charikleia's love-sickness at 4.7. This scene plays heavily on a connection with the medical tradition and the diagnosis of psychological disorders such as love-sickness.³⁸ The scene in which Charikleia is diagnosed would repay further investigation. In this context however, it sits slightly outside the therapeutic concerns of the chapter.

2. Pain, Pleasure, and Therapy

As has been acknowledged, the novels are centrally concerned with pleasure. In his prologue, Longus famously refers to *Daphnis and Chloe* as a *κτῆμα ... τερπνόν*, combining Thucydidean models of utility with Herodotean notions of pleasing stories.³⁹ Further examples can be found across the genre: the claim that *ὑπέκκαυμα ... ἐπιθυμίας λόγος ἐρωτικός*, (Ach. Tat. *L&C*. 1.5.6) seems to imply that the stories within Achilles Tatius' narrative and the novel as a whole will contribute to the pleasure, or desire, of the reader. As we shall discuss further, Chariton refers to the final sections of his work as *τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἡδιστον*.⁴⁰ Despite this concern with pleasure, they contain a considerable

³⁷ For Longus' engagement with the consolatory tradition see Hunter (1983), 40-50, 50n108-9, who associates Longus' therapeutic claims with love elegy and the rhetorical tradition; cf. Morgan (2004), 149-50. For the connection with bucolic love poetry see: Theoc. *Idyll*. 11.1

³⁸ cf. Toohey (2004), 69-84 on doctors and love-sickness generally; Amundsen (1974), 320-37.

³⁹ Long. *D&C praef.* 3; cf. Thuc. 1.22: *‘κτῆμα ἐς αἰεῖ’*; on the connections between Longus and Thucydides see esp. Hunter (1983), 47-51; Morgan (2004), 16-7. For the debate between pleasure and utility in imperial historiography see Fox (2001), 76-93.

⁴⁰ Chariton 8.4.1.

collection of painful, lugubrious experiences. The protagonists throughout all three of these novels are beaten, enslaved, captured by pirates, exiled from their homeland.⁴¹

In this discussion, I attend to the way in which such painful experience interact with the pleasure associated with the novels. A number of scholars have analysed the way in which pain in the form of violence towards female characters is part of the novels' treatment of gender; Morales, in particular, has shown how the way readers inside and outside *Leucippe and Clitophon* view the mistreatment of Leucippe's body in a pleasurable, and, indeed, erotic way.⁴² Here, I take a different strategy by thinking about the relationship between narrative structure of the novels, the practice of narration, and the experience of pain. If the novels are concerned with pleasure, what space in them is given to this experience of pain? Is it even possible to think of a productive relationship between these experiences and the novelistic form? How ultimately, are the dynamics of pain and grief implicated in the novels' cultivation of *ἡδονή*?

In order to answer these questions let us propose two models: that which is related to location or the *ἡδύς τόπος*; and that which is related to a slightly more complex question of the *τέλος*. Longus' *Daphnis*, for example, locates the telling (and setting) of the erotic story within a landscape that is constructed as a place of pleasure. The painting which inspires Longus' story is contained within a cave dedicated to the Nymphs, within a beautiful grove.⁴³ In choosing to locate the telling of the story in a 'sweet place' Longus reifies a literary *cliché* which can be traced back to Plato's *Phaedrus*, at least.⁴⁴ The world

⁴¹ Chew (2003), 129-41 on the treatment of women throughout the novels. For further discussion see Burrus (2005), 49-88.

⁴² Particularly in reference to the Schientod scene at Ach. Tat. *L&C*. 3.15-22: Morales (2004), 165-72.

⁴³ Long. *D&C praef.* 1: *καλὸν ... τὸ ἄλσος*.

⁴⁴ Pl. *Phdr.* 227a-30e. For a discussion see Trapp (1990), 171; Hunter (1983), 97; for other references to the *ἡδύς τόπος* see, Ach. Tat. *L&C*. 1.2: *πάντως δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος τόπος ἡδύς καὶ μύθων ἄξιος ἐρωτικῶν*; cf. the

Daphnis and Chloe inhabit is presented as a pleasurable place: there are clear implications of a close relationship with the bucolic poetry of Theocritus in which the country-side is seen as a place, and source, of pleasure: recall the use of the adjective *ἡδύς* in the opening, and programmatic lines, of *Idyll 1*.⁴⁵

Just as our first model privileges a locative approach to the experience of pleasure, so the second emphasises a processural aspect associated with the achievement of the *τέλος*. As has been acknowledged, the novels attempt to instantiate a ‘happy ending’, embodied in the final reunion, marriage, and re-integration into society of the young couple.⁴⁶ The achievement of this state is often closely associated with the experience of *ἡδονή*:

νομίζω δὲ καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον τοῦτο σύγγραμμα τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἡδιστον
γενήσεσθαι· καθάρσιον γάρ ἐστι τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις σκυθρωπῶν. οὐκέτι ληστεία
καὶ δουλεία καὶ δίκη καὶ μάχη καὶ ἀποκαρτέρησις καὶ πόλεμος καὶ ἄλωσις, ἀλλὰ
ἔρωτες δίκαιοι ἐν τούτῳ <καὶ> νόμιμοι γάμοι. (Chariton, 8.1)

Chariton’s passage is a prime example of the way in which the ideal novels might be thought to reify a social ideology: the happy ending embodied in the valorisation of civic values of *ἔρωτες δίκαιοι* and *νόμιμοι γάμοι*. What interests me is Chariton’s proposal of a particular relationship between *ἡδονή*, the *τέλος*, and the experiences which constitute the

reference to the Plane tree (or Plato) at Plut. *Amat.* 749a. The description of pleasant countryside was closely related to the question of ‘pleasing’ style or *γλυκύτης*; for a discussion see, Hunter (1983), 92-8. The other major example of a space associated with pleasure is the symposium: Dupont (1977), 19-39; Xen. *Smp.* 7; cf. Plut. *Quaest. Conv.*, 621d-e on the role of the symposiarch in inducing pleasure at banquets; cf. 629ff on pleasing questions appropriate for symposia.

⁴⁵ cf. Theoc. 1.1-3: *Ἀδύ τι τὸ ψιθύρισμα καὶ ἅ πίπνς, αἰπόλε, τήνα, ἅ ποτὶ ταῖς παραῖσι, μελίσδεται, ἀδὺ δὲ καὶ τὴ σὺρίσδεσς*. For discussion of Longus’ bucolic heritage, esp. Sappho, see Hunter (1983), 73-6; Morgan (2008), 22-3; for the pastoral as pleasing see Saïd (1999), 104-7.

⁴⁶ For the novel’s valorisation of marriage’s social and civic importance see: Perkins (1995), 46; Swain (1996), 118-30; for critiques of the teleological reading see: Morales (2004), 228-9.

earlier parts of his novel. Chariton's reference to τὰ σκυθρωπά, here, figures the standard novelistic *topoi* (piracy, slavery, etc.) as experiences which evoke grief and lugubriousness. If the final book of *Chareas and Callirhoe* is 'the most pleasing', it is only because it will induce a particular relationship with τὰ σκυθρωπά; a process figured by the evocative adjective *katharsion*. Achieving pleasure, by Chariton's formulation, requires the management of baneful experiences; pain is not anathemic to the novel; rather, its management is central to the economy of pleasure.

Chariton's use of the metaphor of *katharsis* suggests that any therapeutic claims might be understood through an Aristotelian framework.⁴⁷ Karl Müller argues that Chariton's use of *katharsis* suggests that the final book of the novel will provide an intensification of pleasure at, and empathy for, the experiences the characters, which the reader has felt throughout the novel; for Müller, it is both a trivialisation and misunderstanding (!) of Aristotle's notion of tragic *katharsis*.⁴⁸ Rijksbaron suggests that Chariton's passage constitutes an ancient piece of evidence for the application of the concept of *katharsis* to the way tragic poets cleanse events of their impure or painful character through the manipulation of the plot.⁴⁹ The problems of approaching this phrase through an Aristotelian framework are considerable. Modern scholarship's understanding of the Aristotelian notion of *katharsis* is simply too insubstantial to justify comparison with Chariton's passage: is there a genuine, and definite, model of Aristotelian *kartharsis* with

⁴⁷ cf. Arist. *Po.* 1449b28: δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀγγελίας, δι' ἑλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν; cf. κάθαρσιν at *Pol.* 1341a23, 1341b38-1342a11. For discussion of *katharsis* across Aristotle's writings see, Belfiore (1992), 257-360.

⁴⁸ Müller (1976), 134-5: cf. '...auch ein wenig (mißverständene und trivialisierte) peripetetische Poetik mit im Spiele sein.'; Hägg (1971), 259-60; Reardon (1982), 21-2 for the concept of 'sentimentalisation'.

⁴⁹ Rijksbaron (1984), 307.

which we can evaluate the novel?⁵⁰ By comparing Chariton to a vaguely understood, and nebulous, concept readers of the novel risk simplifying the complexity of Chariton's passage, and the dynamics of his novel.

In what follows, I return to the notion of psychoanalytic therapy developed by Freud to help unpack the novels' kathartic character. We saw above that one of the key aspects of Freud's theory was way the therapeutic process was defined by forcing the individual patient to develop a sense of aloofness from past experiences. Understanding that an event has passed has profound ameliorative benefits. Here I use Freud's concept to unpack a key structural dynamic in the novels in which the management of pleasure and pain is mapped onto an individual's temporal and hermeneutic distance from past experiences. This dynamic concerns, primarily, the way in which protagonists move from a state of *immersion* in which they are overwhelmed by their traumatic lugubrious experiences, to a state characterised by *aloofness* in which they are, like Freud's patients, able to transcend their past traumatic experiences. Throughout much of the novelistic action, the protagonists remain *immersed* in their painful, traumatic experiences; it is only when they are able to assert and confirm their distance from such experiences—to see them as genuinely past events—that those experiences are renegotiated as pleasurable. As we shall see, reaching the *tēlos* of the novel is key to this transitional and therapeutic process.

The novels' cultivation of aloofness and its relationship with pleasure continues an ancient debate about the psychological effects of stories of woe. In *The Varieties of Enchantment*, Walsh suggests that the experience of song was allied to its ability to control the twin experiences of forgetting and recollection: it fosters memory of events which are

⁵⁰ The passage has been extensively discussed by later authors as well: Reardon (1982), 1-27; Tilg (2010), 131-5 where the passage is taken as 'tangible' allusion to Aristotle's *Po.* (131), in which he adapts Aristotle's notion of purging of the emotions to the elements of the plot (134).

far-off, and a forgetting of the listener's immediate context. Central to Walsh's reading is the assertion of a sense of bardic aloofness: the bard (or at least his song) was removed from the everyday experience of listeners; they sung of subjects not immediately connected to listeners; the pleasure they invoked revolved around the consequent ability to remove them from their present conditions.⁵¹ This model of aloofness provides a way of conceptualising the reactions of paradigmatic listeners and story-tellers such as Odysseus to the tales of their own woes. His affective response to the stories told by Demodocus at *Od.* 8.486-531 are those of a man who has not been removed from his contemporary experience; his closeness to the events at Troy prevents any form of aloofness on his part; the Phaiacians experience only the pleasure of a song about far-away events, never experienced. In a similar way, Odysseus' painful experience of telling his own stories appears related to his own immersion within the complex of events he describes.⁵² The novels' therapeutic model is, arguably, well established within the novelistic genre, stretching back at least to Homer and the recapitulation of past pains in the *Odyssey*.

SECTION 3: POETIC IMMERSION AND THE GREEK NOVELS

In this section, I turn to an examination of the experience of immersion throughout the Greek romance texts. The experience of immersion, I argue, is characterised by pain and grief. This is allied to the way in which individuals' feel unable to control, order, or ultimately understand their experiences. The central point of this section concerns the way in which this experience of imbrications or immersion dramatises a particular way of reacting to, and mobilising stories about past experiences. Stories continue to immerse the individual in their past experiences, causing them pain and suffering.

⁵¹ Walsh (1984), 22-4.

⁵² Walsh (1984), 22; cf. Hom. *Od.* 9.13: σοὶ δ' ἐμὰ κήδεα θυμὸς ἐπετράπετο στονόεντα εἶρεσθ', ὄφρ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ὀδυρόμενος στεναχίζω.

1. Poetic Immersion

Poetic Immersion refers to the experience of being overwhelmed, stupefied by the sudden occurrence of (often traumatic and painful) events. There are two slightly different ways of thinking about the experience of immersion. In the first model, immersion refers to the way a narrative induces pain and suffering in the listener or audience: narratives, in this context, replicate the experience of trauma, inducing a type of vicarious pain in the reader or listener; they do so by initiating a type of return to original trauma or suffering by vividly exposing the audience to that form of suffering. In the second, narratives (and events themselves) have the capacity to overwhelm the interpretative capacities of their listeners, undermining the audience's ability to make sense of events, to construct a meaning for, and understand, different experiences.

a) Traumatic Returns in Narrative

One example of *poetic immersion* occurs at *Leucippe and Clitophon* 7.4.⁵³ This example of suffering was discussed in the first chapter as a way of thinking about the impact of powerful rhetorical language.⁵⁴ In this context, I want to draw out a number of aspects. Firstly the way in which Clitophon's engagement with the story is figured in terms of his immediate silence: an important aspect of this scene is that Clitophon experiences a degree of *aphasia* along with emotional stupefaction: he cannot cry out, he cannot even cry (Ὡς δ' ἤκουσά μου τὸν μῦθον τῶν κακῶν, οὔτε ἀνώμωζα οὔτε ἔκλαυσα· οὔτε γὰρ φωνὴν εἶχον οὔτε δάκρυα, *L&C*, 7.4). It is only after he has recovered from this drunken daze (μικρὸν δὲ νήψας ἐκ τῆς μέθης τοῦ λόγου, 7.4.2) that he is able to figure out what the story means, and

⁵³ For another example, see: Ach. Tat. *L&C*. 3.15.6-7: ἐγὼ δὲ ἐκ παραλόγου καθήμενος ἐθεώμην. τὸ δὲ ἦν ἔκπληξις· μέτρον γὰρ οὐκ ἔχον τὸ κακὸν ἐνεβρόντησέ με.

⁵⁴ See above, Chapter 1, text to notes 31-6.

analyse the information he has been given by asking questions. Clitophon's loss of voice and his inability to speak imply a critical loss of self; the story overwhelms Clitophon, destroying his ability for the normal human practice of speaking or expressing grief. There is a failure of his rational capabilities in the face of a narrative that simply serves to repeat for him the experience of Leucippe's death. This story returns Clitophon to earlier painful and traumatic experiences, causes him pain and undermines his emotional control.

b) *Overwhelmed by Narrative*

Another important example of *poetic immersion* is dramatised by the parental reactions to the prophecy of Anthia and Habrocomes' future travails given by the Oracle at Colophon in Xenophon's *An Ephesian Tale* (*Eph.* 1.7-10). Upon hearing the words of the oracle, the fathers of the lovers suffer hopelessness:

Ταῦτα ὥς ἐκομίσθη τὰ μαντεύματα εἰς Ἐφεσον, εὐθὺς μὲν οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἦσαν ἐν ἀμηχανίᾳ καὶ τὸ δεινὸν ὃ τι ἦν πάνυ ἠπόρουν, συμβάλλειν δὲ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγια οὐκ ἐδύναντο. (*Eph.* 1.7)

The parents' reaction emphasises the way the immediate exposure (*n.b.* ὥς ἐκομίσθη; εὐθὺς) to events produces lugubriousness and hermeneutic problems. Xenophon's reference to *aporia* and *amēchania* flag a sense of resourcelessness in the face of exposure to overwhelming information. The verb ἀπορεῖν here seems to emphasise the problem of ordering and arranging events into a structured narrative—we have seen already, in the discussion of Aristides' *Tales* how *aporia* figured a form of ironic confusion;⁵⁵ immediately, the phrase συμβάλλειν ... οὐκ ἐδύναντο reiterates the point.⁵⁶ Like a great

⁵⁵ See above, Chapter 2, text to notes 108-11.

⁵⁶ cf. the Mythemians' inability to understand the cause for the appearance of Pan at Long. *D&C.* 2.26: τὴν αἰτίαν συμβάλλειν.

many passages in the novels (particularly in relation to the oracles in *Ephesian*) this passage is both analeptic and proleptic: recalling the lines of the oracle only a few pages before; anticipating the travails the protagonists will experience in novel to come. On one level, then, such passages appear to enhance people's ability to create order: *these will be the events of the novel, this will be the order*. Yet, here the use of *συμβάλλειν* seems to emphasise precisely the characters' inability to construct order, to arrange and tie together different textual moments into a structured narrative. Here the experience of immersion seems primarily concerned with the destruction of the audience's interpretative capacities. Yet, the deterioration of emotional control is dramatised in the Achilles Tatius passage above is not far from the surface. Only moments later Habrocomes' parents, when they recall everything at once, fall to the ground, and faint: ...πάντων ἅμα ἐν ὑπομνήσει γερόμενοι, τοῦ χρησμοῦ, τοῦ παιδός, τῆς ἀποδημίας, ἔκειντο εἰς γῆν ἀθυμοῦντες. (*Eph.* 1.10).⁵⁷

In what follows, I argue that the experience of pain and grief in the novels is intimately tied to the experience of immersion. To do this, I will adduce two arguments. I show first that the traumatic experience of love and the suffering it induces overwhelms, or threatens to overwhelm, the protagonists. This is particularly true of Anthia and Clitophon whose reactions to their painful *pathēmata* are bound up with the inability for comprehension and control. Secondly, I show that many of the story-telling events throughout the protagonists' respective progressions through the novels continue to cause pain by immersing both speaker and audience in the traumatic events of the past.

⁵⁷ cf. Of course, their reaction to events is not the only possible one. Anthia's parents are able to deal more felicitously with the overwhelming moment—Xen. *Eph.* 1.10: ὁ δὲ Μεγαμήδης καὶ ἡ Εὐίππη ἐπεπόνθεσαν μὲν τὰ αὐτά, εὐθυμότεροι δὲ ἦσαν, τὰ τέλη σκοποῦντες τῶν μεμαντευμένων. For a metaliterary reading of *θύμος* in this passage see Whitmarsh (2008) 140-1. It is not insignificant in this instance that we discover in the final stages of the narrative that Habrocomes' parents have died from their grief (Xen. *Eph.* 5.15).

2. Defining Love

‘It was Sappho who first called eros “bittersweet”. No one who has been in love disputes her. What does she mean?’⁵⁸ As has been acknowledged, the experience of love presents Greek writers with a paradox: love encapsulates experiences of both pleasure and pain. Phaedra’s nurse claims at *Hippolytus* 348 that love is both the most sweet and most bitter of experiences; the assertion that love was a type of νόσος was common from early Greek poetry.⁵⁹ In this section, I investigate how two characters react to the painful, traumatic experience of love. Much has been written about how the experience of love, and especially unfulfilled love, was presented in the novels as a profoundly passive, nosological experience.⁶⁰ Here I want to shift the terms of this debate by arguing that the pain they feel is intimately associated with the experience of immersion. This has implications both for how we see the novel as a narrative about love, and how the novels invite readers to approach the relationship between story and the physical experience of suffering.

The onset of love is violent and painful. Chareas’ experience of seeing Callirhoe is not only described as a trauma (μετὰ τοῦ τραύματος, *Eph.* 1.1.7), but its physical effects are likened to receiving a mortal wound (ὥσπερ τις <ἄρισ>τενὺς ἐν πολέμῳ τρωθεὶς καιρίαν, 1.1.7).⁶¹ Similarly, Habrocomes suffers pain at the hands of Eros: ὁ θεὸς ... ὠδύνα μὴ θέλοντα (*Eph.* 1.4.4). This recurring emphasis on violence has been seen as part of a long

⁵⁸ Carson (1998), 3.

⁵⁹ For this tradition see Carson (1998). Eur. *Hipp.* 348: ἡδιστον, ὦ παῖ, ταῦτόν ἀλγεινόν θ’ ἄμα.

⁶⁰ See below note 60.

⁶¹ cf. Ach. Tat. *L&C.* 1.4.4: ἐρωτικῶ τραύματι.

standing literary tradition.⁶² But what the focus on that literary heritage has missed is the specific connection between incomprehensibility and trauma: falling in love is in many of the novels *both* traumatic and perplexing. Anthia, for instance, receives the God in a painful way (πονήρως, 1.3.2; cf. 1.4.6), and describes her experience as a ‘strange’ or ‘new’ pain (ὀδυνῶμαι καινὰ). In Longus, both protagonists refer to pain when describing the incomprehensible nature of falling in love: Νῦν ἐγὼ νοσῶ μὲν, τί δὲ ἡ νόσος ἀγνοῶ· ἀλγῶ, καὶ ἔλκος οὐκ ἔστι μοι· λυποῦμαι, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν προβάτων ἀπόλωλέ μοι· (D&C. 1.14); moments later, Daphnis describes his experience as a ‘strange disease’ (νόσου καινῆς), of which he does not know the name (ἥς οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν οἶδα τὸ ὄνομα, 1.18).

The *καινότης* of love plays, ironically, on the literary heritage of the novels. It implicates the experience of love in the novelists’ sense of novelty: as has been acknowledged, *καινός* often refers to the novelists’ awareness of their own status within the canon of literary genres.⁶³ Read one way reference to the *καινότης* of love implicates the very physical experience in the novels’ glorification of themselves as new, unusual, different: love as a new, perplexing physical experience. Read another way, by referring to love as a series of events which *are* acknowledged literary *clichés* it introduces a sense of irony into the claim to strangeness. What the protagonists experience on a physical level might be ‘strange’, but it is not, by any stretch of an aware imagination ‘strange’ or ‘new’ on a literary level: love as ‘old-hat’, a well worn, universal literary experience. The introduction of irony instantiates distance: the reader is safely protected (in Chariton and Xenophon) from the threat of exposure to love’s pain. Importantly, it also opens up questions about the connection between the literary and the physiological experience of

⁶² For a discussion of precisely these symptoms and their literary tradition see, Toohey (1992), 365-86; (1999), 262-5.

⁶³ Tilg (2010), 164-197.

pain; the characters of the novel experience on a physical level that which is profoundly literary.

a) *Defining Questions in An Ephesian Tale*

In Xenophon's *An Ephesian Tale*, the connection between love, suffering, and ineffability is allied to the creation of the narrative itself. Falling in love is both the moment in the text which initiates novelistic action, and also an experience which induces, if it does not necessitate, narrative explication. When Anthia laments to herself about her love for Habrocomes at 1.4.7 her language locates epistemological uncertainty at the centre of her (and readers') concerns: ...τίς ἔσται ὁ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὄρος καὶ τί τὸ πέρας τοῦ κακοῦ;. Anthia's questions gesture in a number of directions. Arguably, τὸ πέρας invokes slippage between literary boundaries and geographical thresholds. In Lucian's *True Histories* and Heliodorus' *An Ethiopian Tale*, πέρας designates the point where the geographical limits of the characters' respective journeys and the novels end.⁶⁴ In questioning her experience in this way, Anthia collapses the distance between the corporeal experiences of suffering and desire and the text—the end of her desire and suffering are assimilated to literary boundaries; the end of the novel.

Anthia's desire for knowledge is echoed at other points in the same novel. Anthia's parents', ignorant of the cause (αἰτίαν) of her suffering, send for seers and priests in order to learn the remedy for the disease.⁶⁵ In the end the parents of both lovers seek ...τήν τε

⁶⁴ For πέρας as a geographical boundary cf. 'περάτων' at Thuc. 1.69; cf. Hom. Od. 23.243; scholion at Σ Hom. Od. 23.296: Ἀριστοφάνης δὲ καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος πέρας τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας τοῦτο ποιοῦνται. Luc. VH. 1.5; Hld. Aeth. 10.41.4: ...τοιόνδε πέρας ἔσχε τὸ σύνταγμα τῶν περὶ Θεαγένην καὶ Χαρίκλειαν Αἰθιοπικῶν.

⁶⁵ Xen. Eph. Eph. 1.5.6: ...τήν δὲ αἰτίαν οὐ φαινομένην τῆς συμφορᾶς. Εἰς τέλος εἰσάγουσι παρὰ τὴν Ἀνθίαν μάντις καὶ ἱερέας, ὥς εὐρήσοντας λύσιν τοῦ δεινοῦ.

αἰτίαν τῆς νόσου καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν from the Oracle at Colophon. Apollo's response is programmatic:

Τίπτε ποθεῖτε μαθεῖν νόσου τέλος ἥδ' ἐκ ἀρχήν; Ἀμφοτέρους μία νοῦσος ἔχει,
λύσις ἔνθεν ἀνέστη. Δεινὰ δ' ὁρῶ τοῖσδε σσι πάθη καὶ ἀνήνυτα ἔργα· ἀμφοτέροι
φεύζονται ὑπεὶρ ἄλλα ληστοδίωκτοι, δεσμὰ δὲ μοχθήσουσι παρ' ἀνδράσι
μιζοθαλάσσοις καὶ τάφος ἀμφοτέροις θάλαμος καὶ πῦρ ἀῖδηλον, καὶ ποταμοῦ
Νείλου παρὰ ῥέμασιν Ἰσιδι σεμνῇ σωτείρῃ μετόπισθε παραστῆς ὄλβια δῶρα. Ἀλλ'
ἔτι που μετὰ πῆματ' ἀρείονα πότμον ἔχουσι. (1.6.2)⁶⁶

The oracles' framing of the parents' desire plays heavily on the polysemous nature of *τέλος* and *ἀρχή*: as with Anthia's query, the beginning and end of suffering are assimilated to the bookends of narrative itself. The oracular pronouncement links the parents' desire for knowledge about the 'end' and 'beginning' of disease to the two structuring moments of the text—the text which is to come?

What is the significance of this search for meaning, and for the *tēlos*? Anthia's and her parents' desire to find the *tēlos* and the *archē* can be read in terms a desire to construct the meaning of her experiences. In his *Reading for Plot*, Brooks argues that the end occupies a determinative position for understanding the meaning of a plot: 'the very possibility of meaning plotted through sequence and through time depends on the anticipated structuring force of the ending; the interminable would be meaningless, and the lack of ending would jeopardise the beginning...'.⁶⁷ Xenophon's opening initiates a narrative defined, in part, by a yearning for explanation and understanding. The capacity

⁶⁶ The passage is textually problematic. The only confusion in the first two lines (with which we are predominantly concerned here) is the reading of *ἀνέστη* which has the variations *Ἀνυστή* (B) and *ἄμ' ἔσται* (Lumb). There is considerable confusion over precisely what the oracle foretells. For discussion of the textual problems associated with the oracle's response see Hägg (1971), 229-31.

⁶⁷ Brooks (1984), 92-3.

for explanation and understanding is unavailable to the characters precisely because they stand at the beginning of the novel, uninitiated, inexperienced; unable to see events in their broad perspective. Read one way, Anthia's and her parents' searching underscores the central role of the *tēlos* in the narrative of her suffering. Reaching the *tēlos* in Xenophon's account involves not only reaching the book-end, or the boundary of one's experiences, but reaching a state in which one is able to see what has passed in greater perspective: to understand how the various moments of the action of the novel relate to each other; to understand the various experiences within a broader perspective. It is a progression towards a moment in which individuals gain a degree of hermeneutic control over their experiences and are able to place them in an order: to create meaning from the events in which they were once immersed; in short, to reach a state in which they can exercise narrative control.⁶⁸ Anthia's longing for the *tēlos* is eloquent, simultaneously expressing her desire for meaning and hermeneutic control, and attesting to its absence.

b) Narrative and Story in Leucippe and Clitophon

Achilles Tatius' novel offers readers a cagier example of the ancient romance, and is often considered deliberately subversive of generic practices. In the initial scenes of the work, the narrator is inspired by a painting to contemplate the power of love (*L&C.* 1.2),⁶⁹ which in this case leads to an exploration of suffering. In his dialogue with the unnamed narrator, Clitophon confirms the power of Eros by emphasising his first-hand knowledge of the god: *Ἐγὼ τὰντα ἃν εἶδείην, ἔφη, τοσαύτας ὕβρεις ἐξ ἔρωτος παθών*. Clitophon's language is eloquent here, figuring the generic *topoi* as both *ὕβρεις* and *παθήματα*:⁷⁰ the power of Eros is understood through the first hand experience of suffering. As if to confirm

⁶⁸ cf. Whitmarsh (2003), 194-5.

⁶⁹ Long, *D&C praef.* 1

⁷⁰ cf. Ach. Tat. *L&C.* 6.16.2, 6. 5.4, 6.16.1, 7.14.3, 8.1.4, 8.3.2, 8.5.5.

the point, the narrator asks for a rendition of his experiences: *τί πέπονθας, εἶπον, ὦ ἀγαθέ; καὶ γὰρ ὁρῶ σου τὴν ὄψιν οὐ μακρὰν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τελετῆς* (L&C. 1.2). Through the conversation between the two figures, Achilles manoeuvres the reader from a contemplation of Love's power to a desire to hear about the nature of an individual's suffering. Achilles' narrative is not mobilised by a confusion about a *nosos*, the causes of which must be explained. But, its conceit is grounded in the desire to understand the character and extent of Love's capacity to induce suffering.

Clitophon's interchange with the unnamed narrator has a number of interesting elements. He begins by warning his interlocutor that *Σμῆνος ἀνεγείρεις λόγων· τὰ γὰρ ἐμὰ μύθοις ἔοικε* (1.2). The echoes of Plato's *Republic* in the first half of this sentence are clear, and this phrase has received considerable attention from a literary critical perspective.⁷¹ What interests me here is the way in which Clitophon's passage represents the potential effects of the story. The metaphor of a bee swarm can be taken to refer to an ambivalence about both the experiences of love, and the potential effects of his story: does it imply sweet, pleasing honey, or painful stings? Bees figure the narrative in a number of ways. Clitophon's metaphor suggests the story may resist reasonable attempts at control, not only threatening to break the boundary between story and listener, but to swarm around, surround, and overwhelm both speaker and listener. Clitophon's representation of his account of his own sufferings here doesn't evoke the medical metaphors we saw in the discussion of *An Ephesian Tale*, but it does suggest that his story will resist efforts and containment and control, and bite.

⁷¹ cf. Pl. *Resp.* 450b1. For a discussion of this scene and its representation of the story-telling moment, see with further bibliography Ni-Mheallaigh (2008), 232-3; cf. Morales (2004), 50-60, who discusses the allusion to Pl. *Resp.* 450b1. The scene has been analysed particularly heavily in terms of its *Phaedrean* setting. This is particularly evident in the reference to a *hēdus topos* at 1.2.3; cf. Pl. *Phdr.* 229a-b3.

3. *Painful Stories, Repetition, and Immersion*

In this section I investigate the way the narration of stories through the novels continues to cause both speaker and listener pain. Over the course of the novels, the protagonists repeatedly engage in acts of narration which—as has been outlined by Hägg⁷²—recapitulate earlier material. Here I focus on three fields of repetition specifically associated with grief: embedded letters, which are written with the express purpose of inducing grief in the reader; tragic lamentations, which are spoken between tears and tragic-style groans; and, finally, narrations of characters' vicissitudes which are speciously motivated to evoke others' tears, grief, and pity. The stories, as we shall see, serve to re-expose the individual to trauma. By immersing the characters in events which undermine their hermeneutic and emotional control these narratives induce pain.

a) *Memory and Pleasure*

Let us begin by thinking about the dynamic of memory, repetition, and pleasure in the novels. The centrality of memory to the operations and construction of plot has been a *leitmotif* of psychoanalytic literary criticism.⁷³ Brooks argues that the mnemonic functions of a narrative are centrally connected to its pleasurable effects. For Brooks, the repetition of different events serves to create an act of return and repetition within the narrative, an oscillation forward and backwards in the action of the plot;⁷⁴ this act, in turn, problematises the inexorable forward movement towards the *tēlos*. Oscillation is key to the pleasure associated with reading because it operates as a type of foreplay, a 'tease' which enhances

⁷² Hägg (1971), 245-87; on their 'intellectual' rather than emotional function see esp., 259, 330-2.

⁷³ Caruth (1996). For an application of Brooks' interpretation of Freud to a classical text see Quint (1993), 53-96;

⁷⁴ '...repetition is so basic to our experience of literary texts that one is simultaneously tempted to say all, and say nothing on the subject ... all the mnemonic elements of literature and indeed most of its tropes are in some manner repetitions that take us back in the text, that allow the ear, the eye, the mind to make connections, conscious or unconscious, between different textual moments, to see past and present as related and as establishing a future that will be noticeable as some variation in the pattern.' Brooks (1984), 99.

the ultimate pleasure the reader experiences upon reaching the end.⁷⁵ This model of repetition/delay/pleasure explains only part of the dynamics of recollection and repetition within the ancient novels. We have already suggested that the novels build upon a theory of recollection and forgetfulness developed in the early Greek poets Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar. We saw, above, that the ability of a poem to charm and please was determined by its ability to induce *forgetfulness* of current or recent ills, and the *memory* or contemplation of distant events unconnected from the listener. Demodocus' song, for instance, induces pain in Odysseus because it induces memory of, a return to, events which Odysseus was directly exposed to; recapitulation of past woes, in this context, serves to immerse Odysseus in a world of pain and grief.⁷⁶

b) *Tragic Lamentation and Uncertainty*

Tragic style lamentations occur throughout the novels.⁷⁷ They are typically associated with excessive emotional outbursts, most notably of grief and pain. (The verb *τραγωδεῖν* is used on a number of occasions to point to bombastic and histrionic language and behaviour.⁷⁸) In many instances these tragic lamentations play on a relationship between hermeneutic *aporia* and the expression of grief. The outpouring of grief associated with these textual moments can be linked to the lack of control they attempt to cope with.

Let us begin with a tragic lament uttered by Habrocomes as he and Anthia realise they are the objects of piratical affections:

⁷⁵ '...they create a delay, a postponement in the discharge of energy [i.e. desire or pleasure], a turning back from immediate pleasure, to ensure the ultimate discharge will be more pleasurable.' Brooks (1984), 101-2.

⁷⁶ Walsh (1984), 22-4; cf. Hes. *Theog.* 98ff.

⁷⁷ For a discussion of tragic lamentations see Hägg (1971), 262-3, 72-3, 283; cf. Birchall (1996), 1-17.

⁷⁸ Pl. *Cra.* 414c, 418c.

Ὡ πάτερ ἔλεγον, ὦ μήτερ, ὦ πατρίς φιλτάτη καὶ οἰκεῖοι καὶ συγγενεῖς. Τελευταῖον δὲ ἀνενεγκῶν ὁ Ἀβροκόμης ὦ κακοδαίμονες ἔφησεν ἡμεῖς, τί ἄρα πεισόμεθα ἐν γῇ βαρβάρῳ, πειρατῶν ὕβρει παραδοθέντες [πειρατῶν]; Ἀρχεται τὰ μεμαντευμένα· τιμωρίαν ἤδη με ὁ θεὸς τῆς ὑπερηφανίας εἰσπράττει· ἐρᾷ Κόρυμβος ἐμοῦ, σοῦ δὲ Εὐξείνος. Ὡ τῆς ἀκαίρου πρὸς ἑκατέρους εὐμορφίας, εἰς τοῦτο ἄρα μέχρι νῦν σώφρων ἐτηρήθην, ἵνα ἐμαυτὸν ὑποθῶ ληστῇ ἐρῶντι τὴν αἰσχρὰν ἐπιθυμίαν; Καὶ τίς ἐμοὶ βίος περιλείπεται πόρνη μὲν ἀντὶ ἀνδρὸς γενομένῳ, ἀποστερηθέντι δὲ Ἀνθίας τῆς ἐμῆς; Ἀλλ' οὐ μὰ τὴν μέχρις ἄρτι σωφροσύνην ἐκ παιδός μοι σύντροφον, οὐκ ἂν ἐμαυτὸν ὑποθείην Κορύμβῳ· τεθνήξομαι δὲ πρότερον καὶ φανοῦμαι νεκρὸς σώφρων. Ταῦτα ἔλεγε καὶ ἐπεδάκρυεν. (Eph. 2.1)

This lament is bookended by references to tears and lamentations: καταβαλόντες ἑαυτοὺς ἔκλαιον, ὠδύροντο (2.1); ἐπεδάκρυεν (2.1) and plagued by questions of control and epistemological uncertainty. At one point, Habrocomes is said to gain control of his emotions (Τελευταῖον δὲ ἀνενεγκῶν ὁ Ἀβροκόμης), yet this sense of emotional control is, arguably, immediately undercut by the emotional breakdown which acts as a bookend to his questions and promises a few lines later: ταῦτα ἔλεγε καὶ ἐπεδάκρυεν (2.1).⁷⁹ Habrocomes' lack of understanding is manifested in the open ended questions about the future which plague the passage: cf. for example, τί ἄρα πεισόμεθα; and moments later, τίς ἐμοὶ βίος περιλείπεται πόρνη μὲν ἀντὶ ἀνδρὸς γενομένῳ, ἀποστερηθέντι δὲ Ἀνθίας τῆς ἐμῆς. This uncertainty appears to be marked further by the reference to the prophecy: the use of ἀρχεται is eloquent, flagging the disjuncture between the beginnings of the predicted

⁷⁹ Fusillo (1999), 60-82.

action, but the absence of any certainty about the *tēlos*.⁸⁰ The oscillation between gaining control and losing it on an emotional level is marked by the failure to assert control over the events described on a hermeneutic level.

This ambivalence is played out at other points across the corpus. When Callirhoe reaches the Euphrates in *Chareas and Callirhoe*, she laments the seemingly endless course of separations and depravations she has experienced:

Τύχη βάσκανε, κατὰ μιᾶς γυναικὸς προσφιλονικοῦσα πολέμῳ, σύ με κατέκλεισας ἐν τάφῳ ζῶσαν, κἀκεῖθεν ἐξήγαγες οὐ δι' ἔλεον, ἀλλ' ἵνα λησταῖς με παραδῶς. ἐμερίσαντό μου τὴν φυγὴν θάλασσα καὶ Θήρων· ἡ Ἑρμοκράτους θυγάτηρ ἐπράθην καί, τὸ τῆς φιλίας μοι βαρύτερον, ἐφιλήθην, ἵνα Χαιρέου ζῶντος ἄλλῳ γαμηθῶ. σὺ δὲ καὶ τούτων ἤδη μοι φθονεῖς· οὐκέτι γὰρ εἰς Ἰωνίαν με φυγαδεύεις. ξένην μὲν, πλὴν Ἑλληνικὴν ἐδίδους γῆν, ὅπου μεγάλην εἶχον παραμυθίαν, ὅτι θαλάσση παρακάθημαι· νῦν δὲ ἔξω με τοῦ συνήθους ρίπτεις ἀέρος καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ὅλῳ διορίζομαι κόσμῳ. Μίλητον ἀφείλω μοι πάλιν, ὥς πρότερον Συρακούσας· ὑπὲρ τὸν Εὐφράτην ἀπάγομαι καὶ βαρβάροις ἐγκλείομαι μυχοῖς ἢ νησιῶτις, ὅπου μηκέτι θάλασσα. ποίαν ἔτ' ἐλπίσω ναῦν ἐκ Σικελίας καταπλέουσαν; ἀποσπῶμαι καὶ τοῦ σοῦ τάφου, Χαιρέα. τίς ἐπενέγκη σοι χοάς, δαῖμον ἀγαθὴ; Βάκτρα μοι καὶ Σοῦσα λοιπὸν οἶκος καὶ τάφος. ἄπαξ, Εὐφράτα, μέλλω σε διαβαίνειν· φοβοῦμαι γὰρ οὐχ οὕτω τὸ μῆκος τῆς ἀποδημίας ὥς μὴ δόξω τινὶ κἀκεῖ καλή. (Ch.5.1.4-7)

Callirhoe's recollection of her earlier exiles at this critical narrative threshold provides a framework for how we should interpret the crossing of the Euphrates: one more privation

⁸⁰ cf. Hägg (1971), 227-33.

in a series of hardships. Her lament suggests that her new experience should be interpreted in terms of its repetition of all her previous tribulations. Her new experiences constitute the return of her past trauma: pain and grief associated with exile has the capacity to continue to leak into the protagonist's present experience.

Her lament verbalises not only her pain but the strategic attempt to force her experiences into a narrative order, to bring them to completion. Arguably the use of *loipon* marks out a degree of finitude to her experiences, capping her long experience of separation and travail (*cf.* *λοιπὸν οἶκος καὶ τάφος*). Yet her lament also seems to play up the difficulty of such an act of capping and ordering. Her attempt to supply an ending to her story of suffering is surrounded by questions: *τίς ἐπενέγκη σοι χόας, δαῖμον ἀγαθὲ;* and uncertainties about the future. In these two examples, such 'tragic' moments appear to emphasise precisely the problem of defining and truly understanding events which have not come to conclusions; the narratives reflect a desire for order and control, but ultimately fail to provide either, remaining open-ended. This open-ended is associated, then, with a degree of pain and grief. Both tragic laments sets up present experiences as reminders of an earlier list of sufferings, and simultaneously problematize the opportunity to understand or define those experiences in relation to the character's uncertain futures.

c) Epistolary Returns and Visualising Past Events.

The question of emotional and narrative control is played out in a slightly different way in a range of epistolary narratives, such as Leucippe's letter to Clitophon at *Leucippe and Clitophon* 5.18. This letter is a good example of the connection between recollection,

pain, and exposure to traumatic events.⁸¹ Leucippe's letter begins with the powerful assertion of the necessity of reminding him of her sufferings: *ὅσα μὲν διὰ σὲ πέπονθα, οἶδας· ἀνάγκη δὲ νῦν ὑπομνήσαι σε* (L&C. 5.18.3). Leucippe's insistence on reminding Clitophon of what he apparently already knows plays on a common novelistic theme in which characters lament the incommensurability of the two protagonists' experiences. Recall for instance Anthia's lament that she does not experience suffering similar to Habrocomes (*ὡ πάντα ἄδικος ἐγὼ φησὶ καὶ πονηρά, ὡς οὐχὶ τοῖς ἴσοις Ἀβροκόμην ἀμείβομαι*, Eph. 3.5); that she does not remember (*ἀμνημονῶ*) Habrocomes' sufferings. In Anthia's case, she herself remembers what Habrocomes has endured for her, and rehearses his experiences.⁸² In the case of Clitophon, Leucippe feels she must force him to remember all that she has endured on his behalf. Here, this process is applied to exposing the reader to the traumatic experiences of the other: forcibly reminding the reader of the experiences of the other involves ensuring Clitophon encounters Leucippe's trauma as if he were an eyewitness and a victim himself:

ὥς δὲ εἰς τὰς μαστίγας καὶ εἰς τὰς βασάνους ἐγενόμην, ἅς ὁ Σωσθένης αὐτῇ παρετρίματο, ἔκλαον ὥσπερ αὐτὰς τὰς βασάνους βλέπων αὐτῆς· ὁ γὰρ λογισμός, πέμπων τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ ὄμματα πρὸς τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν τῶν γραμμάτων, ἐδείκνυ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὡς δρώμενα. ... οὕτως ἡσυχνόμην καὶ τὰ γράμματα. (L&C. 5.19.6)

In this way readers are informed of the intensity of Clitophon's engagement with all that Leucippe has suffered. Leucippe's letter exposes Clitophon to her experiences by mobilising a broad notion of *ekphrasis* and *enargeia*. As we saw with the discussion of

⁸¹ Chareas' letter is explicitly written on advice to undermine her potential emotional stability—Ch. 4.4.5: *... λυπηθήτω, χαρήτω, ζητησάτω, καλεσάτω*.

⁸² Xen. Eph. Eph. 3.5: *Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἵνα ἐμὸς ἀνὴρ μείνη καὶ δεσμὰ ὑπομένει καὶ βασάνους καὶ ἴσως πον καὶ τέθνηκεν· ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ ἐκείνων ἀμνημονῶ καὶ γαμοῦμαι δυστυχῆς, καὶ τὸν ὑμέναιον ἄσει τις ἐπ' ἐμοί, καὶ ἐπ' εὐνήν ἀφρίζομαι τὴν Περιλάου.*

Longinus and others the quality of *enargeia* was recognised in antiquity as one of the strategies by which literature produced an emotive response similar to that of an eyewitness in the reader.⁸³ More than simply documenting his ‘emotional’ response to vivid description, Clitophon’s reference to the interplay between the ‘eyes of his soul’ (τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ ὄμματα) and his reception of visual phenomena (ἐδείκνυ τὰ ὁρώμενα ὡς δρώμενα) tap into a particular aspect of *ekphrastic* theory which explores the way language exposes individuals to events. Webb has emphasised how rhetorical theorists’ discussions of *ekphrasis* start from a conception of language in which words operate as a powerful physical force which penetrate the readers’ (or listeners’) bodies and appeal to the eyes of the soul.⁸⁴ For rhetorical theorists it seems that this ability to penetrate the body of the listener is central to vivid description’s capacity to induce an emotional effect (pleasure, indignation, pity, *etc*) in the reader.⁸⁵ This process commonly understood to involve an act of temporal or spatial displacement: the audience is transferred to events in the past in order to feel that they are actively involved in them.⁸⁶ The emotive responses of Clitophon are, on this rhetorical reading of the passage, manipulated through a process in which the description of suffering literally transports him in time and space back to those events. On one level, Clitophon’s emotional response is specifically associated with a painful reaction—*ἔκκλαον* seems to point to a tragic feeling of grief.

d) *Recounting Tales of Woe*

⁸³ Zanker (1981), 297-311. For more bibliography see above: chapter 1, notes 4, 27.

⁸⁴ Webb (2009), 98-99. See especially her discussion of the rhetorical theories of Quintillian and Ps.-Longinus.

⁸⁵ Webb (2009), 99-100.

⁸⁶ See the discussion of ‘*transference*’, ‘*metastasis*’, or ‘*metathesis*’ in Webb (2009), 100n34. the use of rhetoric to express the theme of ‘absence’ vs. ‘presence’: Robiano (2007), esp. 203-4: ‘*la lettre est à la fois l’indice d’une présence et l’indice d’une absence*’ (204). On the scenes of letter reception in general see Koskeniemi (1956), 172-86.

The grievous effects of Leucippe's powerful rhetoric are repeated in other moments of strategic narration in which narrators seek to induce feelings of pity and *philia* among listeners. Autobiographical accounts of one's vicissitudes or painful experiences are common throughout the novels. The ability of these autobiographical accounts have to shape affective relationships between people has been discussed by Most, who focuses on the way pity leads inexorably to feelings of friendship between strangers.⁸⁷ What interests me is the way in which the evocation of pity induces a painful return to traumatic events.

In a provocative scene at 3.14 Clitophon tells his story to the general who has saved him from a group of bandits in Egypt. Clitophon's description of this act of narration emphasises its emotional effects—...καὶ παρὰ τὸ δεῖπνον ἐπυθάνετο τὰμὰ καὶ ἀκούων ἡλέει (*Leucippe*, 3.14.2); moments later we are told that Clitophon's story led the General to tears (...δάκρυα προαγαγεῖν, 3.14.4). Clitophon goes to some length to explain his audience's affective response to his story. Clitophon's explanation of the General's reaction presents his response as one of pity: 'sympathy' (*συμπαθής*) and 'pity' (*ἔλεον*) are the natural responses of 'one who listens to others evils' (*ἀκροατῆς ἀλλοτρίων κακῶν*, 3.14).⁸⁸ For Clitophon this reaction is an inexorable product of the effect of grief and suffering on others' souls: ἡ ... ψυχὴ μαλαχθεῖσα πρὸς τὴν ὧν ἤκουσε λύπην, συνδιατεθεῖσα κατὰ μικρὸν τῇ τοῦ πάθους ἀκροάσει τὸν οἶκτον εἰς φιλίαν καὶ τὴν λύπην εἰς τὸν ἔλεον συλλέγει. (3.14). Exposing someone to one's own suffering or grief 'softens' the soul of another, inducing grief and, eventually, friendship.

⁸⁷ Most (1989), 114-33.

⁸⁸ For a discussion of *sumpatheia*, particularly in relation to Aristotle and pity see: Konstan (2001), 59-61.

The intersection of pity and sympathy here also links the passage's theory of pity with the discussion in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Pity for Aristotle constituted a kind of pain (*λυπή*) which occurs at the appearance of evil (*φαινομένῳ κακῷ*), which is either deadly or grievous (*φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ*, *Rh.* 1385b13-4). Central to Aristotle's interpretation of pity is a process in which the individual comes to realise the relevance of another's suffering for themselves. One feels pity when they realise that they, or their loved ones, might suffer a similar fate: ὁ καὶν αὐτὸς προσδοκῆσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνεται (*Rh.* 1385b14-6).⁸⁹ The mechanics of this process are stressed a few moments later when Aristotle tells us that a man is moved to pity when is moved in such a way ὥστ' ἀναμνησθῆναι τοιαῦτα συμβεβηκότα ἢ αὐτῷ ἢ <τω> τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ τῷ τῶν αὐτοῦ. (1386a1-2). What interests me here is Aristotle's focus on the idea of recollection: for Aristotle, pity occurs in combination with mnemonic action—when past experiences are remembered, individuals feel pity. Built into Aristotle's theory of pity is a sense in which exposure to certain events returns individuals to past traumas.⁹⁰

An overt example of the process of being 'returned' to one's own suffering is the interaction between Menelaos and Clinias at *Leucippe and Clitophon* 2.27. During their journey to Egypt, Menelaos tells the story of his accidental manslaughter of his lover to Clitophon and Clinias:

ἐπεδάκρυσεν ὁ Κλεινίας αὐτοῦ λέγοντος Πάτροκλον πρόφασιν, ἀναμνησθεῖς
 Χαρικλέους. καὶ ὁ Μενέλαος, “Τὰμὰ δακρύεις,” ἔφη, “ἢ καὶ σέ τι τοιοῦτον
 ἐξήγαγε;” στενάζας οὖν ὁ Κλεινίας καταλέγει τὸν Χαρικλέα καὶ τὸν ἵππον, καὶ ὥ

⁸⁹ Arist. *Rh.* 1385b16-9: δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸν μέλλοντα ἐλέησειν ὑπάρχειν τοιοῦτον οἷον οἶσθαι παθεῖν ἂν τι κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοιοῦτο κακὸν οἷον εἴρηται ἐν τῷ ὄρω ἢ ὁμοιον ἢ παραπλήσιον.

⁹⁰ Rutherford (2001), 119.

τάμαυτοῦ. Ὀρῶν οὖν ἐγὼ τὸν Μενέλαον κατηφῇ πάνυ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μεμνημένον, τὸν
 δὲ Κλεινίαν ὑποδακρύνοντα μνήμη Χαρικλέους, βουλόμενος αὐτοῦς τῆς λύπης
 ἀπαγαγεῖν, ἐμβάλλω λόγον ἐρωτικῆς ἐχόμενον ψυχαγωγίας. (2.27)

Here Menelaos' story induces a process in which Clinias is returned to his own grievous experience: the phrase *Πάτροκλον πρόφασιν* (cf. *Il.* 19.302) eloquently flags the way exposure to one event evokes a memory of a more personal trauma: another's suffering returns one to one's own traumatic past.⁹¹ The interaction between Clinias and Menelaos replays with remarkable accuracy the mnemonic process Aristotle attributes to the excitation of grief and pity: Menelaos is *κατηφῇ* since he *μεμνημένον*; Clinias 'weeps a little' *μνήμη Χαρικλέους*. Recollection is a painful process. Konstan argues that Aristotle's theory of pity allows no room for the experience of self-pity: pity is an experience felt towards individuals distant from the pitier.⁹² Clitophon's passage, in combination with Aristotle's use of recollection, suggests that self-pity was not only possible but actually central to the emotion: self-pity is built into the process of returning the individual to the lugubrious experiences of their past.

4. Conclusions

There are then a number of central points to be extracted from this discussion. The recapitulations discussed above do far more than serve what Hägg sees as an intellectual function, recapping the material for the benefit of the reader. Rather they create a return or a repetition within the text which is associated with a number of important emotional states: namely grief, and emotional *aporia*. In Freudian terms the characters continue to

⁹¹The phrase seems to have been proverbial for the act of thinking about one thing while having another in mind; cf. Plut. *de Ipsum Laud.* 546e: ὅπως καθαροὶ καὶ ἀνύποπτοι φιλαυτίας καὶ περιαντολογίας ὥσι καὶ μὴ δοκῶμεν 'Πάτροκλον πρόφασιν' σφᾶς δ' αὐτοῦς δι' ἐκείνων ἐπαινεῖν.

⁹² Konstan (2001), 62-4.

repeat their traumatic experiences because they have not been able to assert their hermeneutic or temporal distance from them. The action of repetition within the novels serves to problematise, firstly, the easy association of the novels with pleasure; and secondly, asks readers to think about how the act of telling stories infects and influences readers, psychologically and physically: reading stories of painful, lugubrious events is a dangerous business.

SECTION 4: REACHING THE END, PAINFUL EXPERIENCES, AND PLEASURE

In order to complete our understanding of the relationship between the Greek romances and the ancient tradition of psychotherapy let us turn to a discussion of the *tēlos*. We saw above how the novels were concerned to instantiate a happy ending in which the painful experiences of the past were renegotiated: Chariton's use of the adjective *kartharsion* pointed to a managerial process associated with the achievement of the *tēlos* in which *ta skuthrōpa* of earlier books were redefined in more pleasurable terms. In this section, I develop our understanding of that therapeutic function by investigating the connection between the assertion that the protagonists have reached the end of the novel, and the nature of the stories they tell of what that they have endured. I argue two central points. Firstly, I show that the pleasurable nature of such recapitulations is underpinned by the sense of distance, *aloofness*, from the past. This has, I suggest, a number of implications for the way the protagonists are able to engage with, recount, and control the narrative of past painful experiences. Secondly, this sense of *aloofness* particularly in the novels of Chariton and Xenophon underpins the capacity of the protagonists to exercise a degree of narrative control over their experiences.

1. *Recapitulation, Aloofness, and Psychology*

The *tēlos* of the novels is characterised by the acts of narrative recapitulation which communicate the suffering and the experiences of the protagonists to those who have not been immediately exposed to them. In contrast to the acts of storytelling and narrative recapitulation throughout earlier sections of the novels, these stories are explicitly characterised in terms of the pleasure they will bring listeners and narrators. The different affective nature of these stories is underpinned by the explicit emphasis of the protagonists distance from past events—the characters and the storytelling episode is cut off, and protected from the past. Both of these techniques centre around the creation of *aloofness* which facilitates the development of pleasurable accounts of past trauma.

The instantiation of aloofness constitutes the prime aspect of the novels' engagement with the notion of psychoanalytic therapy. We discussed above (*cf.* text to note 17) that a central part of the therapeutic process involved the therapist helping the reader to re-experience his past in a detached way. In this context, Freud argued that the therapist take specific measures to make the patient understand that what he was re-experiencing was part of his past. This act is associated with a sense in which the patient is helped to adopt a perspective of aloof detachment from those experiences. In other words, Freud asserted that by making the patient aware that his experiences were in his past, the analyst would assist the patient in overcoming his traumatic neuroses and pain.⁹³

2. *Recapitulation and Pleasurable Spaces.*

If the *tēlos* is characterised by a pleasurable recapitulation of the protagonists' past experiences, that pleasure is figured partially in terms of pleasurable spatial context in which such stories are retold. The narrative recapitulations which characterise the end of the three novels we have been investigating are underpinned by the presentation of the

⁹³ See above this chapter text to notes 15-20.

locus of the story-telling event. In Achilles Tatius' novel the spatial context for the final recapitulation of the protagonist's story has two elements: Sostratus, Leucippe, Clitophon, and the Priest all meet and recount their stories within the temple of Artemis (*L&C*, 7.4-5). The temple is particularly significant in this context, because it is presented as a space in which virgins and slaves can seek protection from their masters.⁹⁴ The temple of Artemis in this instance takes on the status of discrete, enclosed space which protects the individuals from the outside world. Within this space, the interaction between the three characters is described as a *symposium* (cf. the use of τὸ συμπόσιον at *L&C*. 8.5).⁹⁵ We have already noted the connection between the symposium and the experience of pleasure.⁹⁶ In this instance, there is a clear play on the notion of the ἡδύς τόπος: the pleasure associated with this cultural space is presented as guaranteeing the affective reaction to the process of recapitulation. The symposium creates a cultural space in which pleasure, and happiness, are linked to the narration of one's experiences; that pleasurable expectation is further enhanced by the fact that the symposium is embedded in a space which is presented as offering protection from the outside world.

In Chariton's work the play on the spatial context of the final recapitulation is slightly different: the symposium is replaced by the assembly, and the theatre: the citizens detain Chaereas in the assembly to tell his story (Chariton 8.7). The context for Chaereas' recapitulation has a number of implications. On one reading we might see the reference to the theatre in terms of the way in which the novels present readers with manipulations of

⁹⁴ Ach. Tat. *L&C*. 7.13; cf. Clitophon's remarks at 8.2: Ποῖ φύγωμεν ἔτι τοὺς βιαίους; ποῖ καταδράμωμεν; ἐπὶ τίνα θεῶν μετὰ τὴν Ἀρτεμιν; ἐν αὐτοῖς τυπτόμεθα τοῖς ἱεροῖς; ἐν τοῖς τῆς ἀσουλίας παιόμεθα χωρίοις.

⁹⁵ A similar association between the recapitulation of stories and a sympotic context inheres in Xenophon's novel although the implications of this connection have been left undeveloped by the author—Xen. *Eph*. 5.13: ...ὥς δὲ ἔθυσαν ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας καὶ εὐωχήθησαν, πολλὰ καὶ ποικίλα παρὰ πάντων τὰ διηγήματα, ὅσα τε ἔπαθεν ἕκαστος καὶ ὅσα ἔδρασε, παρεξέτεινόν τε ἐπὶ πολὺ τὸ συμπόσιον, ὥς αὐτοὺς ἀπολαβόντες χρόνῳ.

⁹⁶ See above, this chapter note 42.

drama and comedy. (Such a reading would fit well with the reading of Chariton's reference to the final book as *karthasion* as a reference to Aristotle's notion of tragic *katharsis*.) Yet, it also recalls the context of public, civic oration and epideictic performance throughout the Imperial period. One particular contextual reference point is Dio of Prusa's seventh oration, the *Euboian Oration*. The connections between Dio's oration and the genres of pastoral romance and the novelistic genre have been well discussed.⁹⁷ What interests me in this instance is the way Dio's practice of speaking before the people in an epideictic setting provides a context for a pleasurable story: as Dio himself tells us, it is not without pleasure to recall the travels of a vagrant or old man: ...since *πολλὰ τυχὸν ἀμφοτέροι πεπόνθασιν, ὧν οὐκ ἀηδῶς μέμνηνται*.⁹⁸ The cultural context of Dio's and Chareas' narrations serves not only to provide a boundary between the protagonists and their past experiences, but also shapes the affective reactions of the audience to their recapitulations. These stories are located within a particular cultural and spatial context which means we should interpret them within a framework associated with pleasure.⁹⁹ The recapitulations are placed in cultural spaces which pre-figure the transition to pleasing recapitulation.

3. *Story-telling, Pleasure, and the Past*

The second strategy adopted by the novelists involves a more psychologically attuned process of shaping the way the protagonists understand the relationship with their experiences. The protagonists are made aware that their journey, and the traumatic events of their past, have come to an end. This process allows them to adopt a changed perspective towards their trauma. In so doing, it allows them to overcome the shame they

⁹⁷ Highet (1973), 35-40; Jouan (1977), 38-46. Anderson (2000), 143-50. For the connection between the *Euboicus* and Longus see Hunter (1983), 66-7.

⁹⁸ Dio. Chr. vii.1.

⁹⁹ Although remember that the context for Clitophon's narration to the unnamed narrator takes place within an apparently pleasant place: Achilles Tatius plays on the expected pleasure associated with the *hedus topos* and the powerful, and potentially painful nature of the story: Ach. Tat. *L&C*. 1.2.

feel towards their experiences, and to express a degree of narrative control over their experiences.

a) *Re-evaluating the Past in Chariton and Achilles Tatius*

Chareas' recapitulation of his experiences is defined by a process in which he is helped to overcome his resistance to narration. Chareas initially shirks from recounting his experiences (ᾠκνει Χαιρέας, Chariton 8.7.4) due to a combination of fear and embarrassment. He attempts to begin at the end, wishing not to pain the people (κακείνος ἀπὸ τῶν τελευταίων ἤρξατο, λυπεῖν οὐ θέλων [ἐν] τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ σκυθρωποῖς τὸν λαόν, 8.7.3); when asked to tell the whole story he feels embarrassment at narrating events which did not go according to plan (τῶν οὐ κατὰ γνώμην συμβάντων αἰδούμενος, 8.7.4). Chariton's resistance to public discussion of his lugubrious experiences appears founded, at one level, in a reticence to inflict pain on others through recounting a narrative of grievous experiences: arguably, Chariton's resistance to speaking is a reaction to the way stories throughout the novels cause pain to their listeners.

Importantly, however, this resistance is overcome through the positive reinforcement of the effects of reaching the *tēlos*. Hermocrates attempts to remove Chareas' reticence by emphasising the presence of a brilliant end to his travels: ...μηδὲν αἰδεσθῆς, ὦ τέκνον, κἂν λέγῃς τι λυπηρότερον ἢ πικρότερον ἡμῖν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος λαμπρὸν γεγόμενον ἐπισκοτεῖ τοῖς προτέροις ἅπασιν... Ch. 8.7.5). Achieving a brilliant end alters the affective reception of the lugubrious events in earlier books—all is well that ends well. How might we read Hermocrates' words here? They appear to perform a similar function to the act of psychological priming we encountered in Plutarch's *Consolation to his*

Wife.¹⁰⁰ There we saw that the addressee—in that case, Plutarch’s wife—was directed towards a particular attitude towards past events by the guidance provided by an outsider. A similar effect inheres in this context. Hermocrates’ advice ultimately requires Chareas to rethink how he views the past, and its potential to cause pain; it does so by asking him to think about how the ending plays the determinative role in shaping our understanding of events. Hermocrates’ statement enforces the fact that the children have reached the *tēlos* (in other words their ordeal is over), and asks them to re-evaluate their understanding of those experiences in light of the fact that all has ended well.

A similar form of psychotherapeutic reinforcement occurs in Achilles Tatius, where the encouragement of the audience shapes the protagonists’ understanding and aloofness from their past experiences. Initially, the *symposium* in which Clitophon, Sostratus, and the priest discuss the events of the novel, is defined by shame and embarrassment: ...καὶ ἦν ὅλον τὸ συμπόσιον αἰδώς (L&C. 8.5). The reference to symposium heightens the awkwardness and embarrassment felt by the different parties by locating their discussion in a space typically reserved for *philia*, free-speech, and pleasure. The awkward silence is finally broken by the combination of wine and the prodding of a priest who attempts to elicit a story from Sostratus by reminding him of what is appropriate for sympotic contexts: ...τί οὐ λέγεις, ὦ ξένη, τὸν περὶ ὑμᾶς μῦθον ὅστις ἐστί; δοκεῖ γάρ μοι περιπλοκάς τινας ἔχειν οὐκ ἀηδεῖς· οἶνω δὲ μάλιστα πρέπουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι (8.8.4). The point is re-enforced moments later when Sostratus encourages Clitophon to tell his story.¹⁰¹ Like Chareas, Clitophon is encouraged to overcome his embarrassment at narrating a painful story:

¹⁰⁰ Chapter 3, text to notes 32-3.

¹⁰¹ The reference to wine here seems to make the point even more explicit; cf. Ach. Tat. L&C. 8.4: *προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ πότου καὶ τοῦ Διονύσου κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξίλασκομένου τὴν αἰδῶ (ἐλευθερίας γὰρ οὗτος πατήρ) ἄρχει λόγου πρῶτος ὁ ἱερὺς πρὸς τὸν Σώστρατον.*

καὶ γὰρ εἴ τί μοι συμβέβηκε λυπηρόν, μάλιστα μὲν οὐδὲ σὸν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ δαίμονος·
ἔπειτα τῶν ἔργων παρελθόντων ἢ διήγησις τὸν οὐκέτι πάσχοντα ψυχαγωγεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ
λυπεῖ. (L&C. 8.4.5)

The assertion that the narrative of events which have passed (*n.b.* the tense of *παρέρχομαι*) will charm the soul more than grieve it has a number of implications. At one level, it reaffirms that the lugubrious events of the narratives earlier books are in the past—Clitophon is now someone who ‘is suffering no longer’ (τὸν οὐκέτι πάσχοντα). The way in which the affective capacity of this particular narrative is figured is also significant. The verb *ψυχαγωγέω* is eloquent here: on one level it invokes psychological theories about narrative expressed in Gorgias’ *Encomium of Helen* about the power *logos* has to charm and lead the soul.¹⁰² Sostratus’ encouragement taps into a long tradition in which narrative has the power to act as a drug which charms the individual, stops grief and eases suffering.¹⁰³ At a more fundamental level, it figures the role of rhetoric in playing a therapeutic role by changing the condition and orientation of the soul. Sostratus’ language here encourages us to see the *psychagogic* power of this narrative, invites us to think of this narrative in terms of the therapeutic tradition; not in terms of pain, but pleasure. The renegotiation of Clitophon’s story on more pleasurable terms connects a sense of aloofness from the past with the psychological charm and pleasure of a story of *past* events.

b) Narrating, Finality, and Control

The second important aspect of the acts of narrative recapitulation which occur at the closure of the novels concerns the way the protagonists exercise narrative control over

¹⁰² Gorg. Fr. 11.8-14 DK.

¹⁰³ On Gorgias and Isocrates use of enchantment see Constantinidou (2008), 162-88. *cf.* the use of *ψυχαγωγία* at Pl. *Phdr.* 261a to designate rhetoric’s capacity to create conviction; *cf.* Hld. *Aeth.* 1.9.1: Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐκ ἀνίσταν ἀλλὰ παντοίως λέγειν ἰκέτευον, μεγίστην ἡγοῦμενοι παραψυχὴν τὴν τῶν ὁμοίων ἀκοήν, ἀρχεται ὁ Κνήμων ἐντεῦθεν.

their past experiences. As we have seen throughout the novels, the experience of suffering associated with the recapitulation of past experiences centred around a connection with the way in which repetition threatened the achievement of the *tēlos*. Narrative repetition constituted, and enforced a return to past trauma in a potentially endless journey. In this section, I argue that in Chariton and Xenophon (in a slightly more problematic way) Achilles Tatius a central aspect of the pleasure associated with the final act of recapitulation is connected to the way the protagonists are able to exercise control over their narrative experiences.

a) Chariton

Chareas' narrative strategy before the *dēmos* is characterised by an ability to exercise narrative, or editorial, control over the events of his story. His initial attempts to recount the experiences of the couple are defined by his desire to rearrange the order or structure of his story: *κακείνος ἀπὸ τῶν τελευταίων ἤρξατο, λυπεῖν οὐ θέλων [ἐν] τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ σκυθρωποῖς τὸν λαόν* (8.7.3). In a similar fashion, at 8.8.2 he requests that the crowd allow him to pass over certain painful events: *ἐπιτρέψατέ μοι τὰ ἐξῆς σιωπᾶν, σκυθρωπότερα γάρ ἐστι τῶν πρώτων*. Chareas' interaction with the assembly, here, appears to suggest that he is a passive partner in the process of narrating his experiences: when it comes to hearing stories, the crowd gets what it wants—they force him to begin at the beginning, and insist on hearing the whole story.¹⁰⁴ Yet, it is also important to recognise the degree of control that Chareas believes he can, and should, exercise over his story. The decision to begin at the end implies a degree of story-telling sophistication: will he re-write his life-story in a more pleasing way by making different editorial choices, by arranging material differently? Chareas' editorial decisions invite interpretation alongside the famous

¹⁰⁴ cf., for example, Ch. 8.8.2: *ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἐξεβόησε λέγε πάντα*.

Odyssean question, *τί πρῶτόν τοι ἔπειτα, τί δ' ὑστάτιον καταλέξω;* (Od. 9.13). Might we read Chareas as a new Odysseus, who can arrange and shape narratives to control the affective response of his audience? What interests me here is the way Chareas' sentiments appear to exercise a degree of editorial awareness and intent towards the narrative of his past experiences. Chariton is presented as a figure who is capable of understanding events in a broader perspective and exercising narrative control over them. This editorial awareness appears to reflect his development over the course of his novel: whereas earlier attempts to understand the experiences of the novel have ended in open ended questions and failed attempts to control the *tēlos* of events, here his desire to begin at the end implies a different relationship with, and perspective on, those events.

b) Xenophon

The relationship between finality and narrative form is slightly different in the other two novels with which we are concerned. In Xenophon's *Ephesian*, I want to emphasise one element: the generic form into which the experiences of the protagonists are translated—the inscription and religious offering. This process of translation is, I contend, imbued with implications of finality and narrative control.

Upon returning to Ephesus Anthia and Habrocomes immediately give thanks to the God Artemis for their safe return:

Προεπέπυστο δὲ τὴν σωτηρίαν αὐτῶν ἡ πόλις ἅπασα· ὡς δὲ ἐξέβησαν, εὐθὺς ὡς εἶχον ἐπὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἤεσαν καὶ πολλὰ ἠϋχοντο καὶ θύσαντες ἄλλα <τε> ἐνέθεσαν ἀναθήματα καὶ δὴ καὶ [τὴν] γραφὴν τῇ θεῷ ἀνέθεσαν πάντα ὅσα τε ἔπαθον καὶ ὅσα ἔδρασαν. (Eph. 5.15)

What interests me in this context is the way their experiences are connected with the process of inscription and commemoration. This act of inscription has a number of

connotations. The suggestion that it commemorated their sufferings and their adventures (cf. πάντα ὅσα τε ἔπαθον καὶ ὅσα ἔδρασαν) connects the inscription with the novel itself: the experiences of the novel are inscribed in stone. Arguably, the inscription marks out a degree of immutability and finality to the story of their experiences. These insinuations of finality are reinforced by the way the process of inscription and memorialisation helps map the protagonists movement through the novel. The protagonists journey away from, and return to Ephesus over the course of the previous five books was mapped by the placement of inscriptions or dedications at important geographical and narrative points. In Book 1 Habrocomes and Anthia offer a dedication at the temple of Helius.¹⁰⁵ The statue marks the last point before they are captured by Pirates as they leave Rhodes (*Eph.* 1.13). During the protagonists separate return journeys, inscriptions again play an important role in marking out the protagonists progression towards the end. At 5.10, Habrocomes returns to the panoply the couple had set up, and laments his failure to return home with Anthia; similarly, at 5.11 Anthia leaves an inscription and dedicates a lock of hair to Helius. The use of inscriptions and dedications map the progression of the protagonists through the novel. Encountering these landmarks helps to mark out the stages in their journey away from, and then respective returns towards the Ephesian community, and their reunification. When viewed in this light this final act of commemoration appears to mark out a degree of finality: the inscription identifies the arrival home. The act of inscribing their experiences into stone is underpinned by the intimation of both homecoming, finality, and narrative immutability.

c) *Achilles Tatius*

If Chariton's and Xenophon's novels carry implications of finality and control, then Achilles Tatius' work offers a very different, far more problematic scenario. Like

¹⁰⁵ Xen. Eph. *Eph.*, 1.12.

Chariton's work, *Leucippe and Clitophon* emphasises the capacity of the narrator to exercise a high degree of control over the process of narrative recapitulation. Clitophon's account of his and Leucippe's experiences is dominated by statements about narrative editing. When he reached the chapters about Melite I modified my account: ἐξῆλλον τὸ πρᾶγμα ἑμαυτοῦ πρὸς σωφροσύνην μεταποιῶν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐψευσδόμην, τὸν Μελίτης ἔρωτα καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τὴν ἐμήν (L&C. 8.5). Clitophon's use of the verb *metapoiein* here suggests a degree of editorial sophistication: Clitophon appears to take on the status of a editor, controlling information and its release.¹⁰⁶ Although in the other novelists, the ability to exercise narrative or editorial control was associated with the achievement of the *tēlos*, Clitophon's capacity to manipulate and control the story of events reflects his ability to exercise narrative control and editorial shrewdness throughout the entire narrative. Exercising control in this example is not simply an expression of his changed understanding of his relationship with past events, but his narrative sophistication and self-awareness throughout the entire narrative.

At another level, the implications of finality and closure are ultimately undermined in this context. The final narrative recapitulation ends with a question which invites further action:

Τὰ μὲν ἡμέτερα, εἶπον, ἠκούσατε• ἐν δὲ αἰτῶ καὶ γὰρ μαθεῖν παρὰ σοῦ, ἱερεῦ,
μόνον• τί ποτέ ἐστιν ὁ τελευταῖον ἀπιῶν ὁ Θέρσανδρος κατὰ Λευκίπης προσέθηκε,
σύριγγα εἰπών; (L&C. 8.5.9)

The second important aspect of this is the way the novel fails to return exactly to the opening scenario of the action. As has been recognised, Achilles Tatius' narrative doesn't return the reader to the opening scenes in which Clitophon begins to narrate his

¹⁰⁶ I am tremendously grateful to Dr. T. Whitmarsh for this point concerning *metapoiein*.

experiences to an unnamed interlocutor.¹⁰⁷ There are two points I want to emphasise about this fact. Achilles Tatius' novel of the experience of love doesn't ultimately allow the protagonist to achieve closure, or finality: the suffering associated with the experience of Eros doesn't end unproblematically or cleanly; achieving finality is not possible. Achilles Tatius confronts the possibility that stories of suffering will continue to cause pain. In other words, the failure to effect finality, and closure in these final scenes, is deliberately written against the expectation that the *tēlos*, will provide aloofness from suffering and help the protagonist renegotiate his experiences in more pleasurable terms. This helps explain the nature of the opening scenes in Achilles Tatius in which Clitophon continued to argue that his stories might cause pain: Achilles has come to understand the impossibility of achieving aloofness and closure. The narrative of love's pain will always have the potential to bite.

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this final chapter, I have examined the way different forms of psychotherapeutic literature combated the nature of pain. We started with a model of psychotherapeutic work in which we saw that hedonistic philosophy paid great attention to the problem of distracting the individual from suffering. I engaged with that discourse of philosophical psychotherapy on two levels. In section 1, I showed that the philosophical consolatory works of Dio and Plutarch were specifically concerned with the way past trauma and pain could continue to overwhelm the individual. In Plutarch's case this needed

¹⁰⁷ There is much scholarly literature on this issue. For a discussion of the implications of this incomplete framing see Redpath (2005), 250-65, esp., n3 for further bibliography. Solutions for this 'problematic' ending range from (a) incompleteness of the text and incompetence of the author—Anderson (1997), 2278-99, esp., 2284—to the deliberate creation of ambiguity and resistance to closure: for an overview of these solutions see Redpath (2005), 252-4, 256-60.

to be overcome by engaging in a structured, controlled manipulation of the past through the use of psychological priming.

In the remainder of the chapter, I showed how the novels should be considered part of the therapeutic tradition. I argued that they were characterised by the way they attempted to negotiate the twin experiences of *poetic immersion* and *aloofness*. In this process the protagonists' ability to control, narrate, and move on from their experiences—in other words, to cultivate a sense of aloofness—allowed them to renegotiate those experiences as pleasurable. The novels' engagement with this *mentalité* was, I argued, figured in terms of a broadly Freudian idea in which the protagonists moved a state of immersion—in which they were overwhelmed by events, unable to create order out of their experiences—to a state in which, conscious of their distance from past ordeals, they were able to recount their experiences; that transition, I argued, was mapped onto a process of managing the relationship between pain and pleasure. Moving from a state of immersion to one of aloofness figured a transition in which events were cleansed of their painful or grievous character.

This discussion had a number of important implications for our approach to the pain-language relationship. I showed how our experiences of pain were managed by the way, and the contexts in which, we narrated those experiences. Throughout the novels, protagonists' ability to control and manage their experiences was undermined by the way narratives continued to return the protagonists to their past experiences.

Conclusion

This investigation provided a history of the experience of pain within Greek literary culture of the first three centuries AD. In order to achieve this it was necessary to attend to the complex relationship between pain, language, and narrative representation. The pain-language relationship is a difficult and cagey subject: philosophers, anthropologists and professionals working in medical and neurological sciences have all given considerable attention to the possibility of, and techniques for, putting the experience of pain into meaningful language. I contributed to this ongoing scholarly discussion by using different elements of Freud's psychoanalytic thought to unpack the complex relationship which inhered between bodily experience, language and sophisticated narrative form in the Imperial period.

The significance of this research can be traced along three axes. 1. It adjusted classical scholarship's understanding of the boy and pain in the Imperial period. It showed that pain was experienced as a powerful, overwhelming, traumatic experience. This experience had the body capacity to overwhelm the individual's psychological and physical order; we also saw that this experience had a symbiotic relationship with language and narrative: on the one hand, pain had the capacity to destroy the linguistic and narrative resources of the sufferer; at the same time, the experience itself was shaped, managed, and alleviated by the process of narration and communication. 2. The conclusions of the research raised methodological questions about how historians approach the history of the

body, and the history of culture in the ancient world. We saw that the history of pain in the Imperial period could not be understood simply in terms of the themes and ideas which contributed to late antique Christian society; but rather the concern with suffering needed to be understood on its own terms; we saw that when understood in this way, Imperial Greek literature was characterised by an intense concern with the way the pain experience related to different forms of cultural representation. Scholarly understanding of the history of the body during this period, thus, needs to attend to the complex, mutually productive relationship between representation and experience. 3. Finally, it emphasised the potential of Classics to play a role in current ethical and political debates about the individual's experience of pain and its relationship to the broader community. The concern with the way pain was experienced and communicated raised issues and questions which continue to contribute to, for example, the ethical concerns of Kleinman and Susan Sontag.

1. The Structure of my Argument

Current scholarship on the history of pain in the Imperial period argues that the representation of suffering became, during the first three centuries AD, an increasingly effective and popular strategy for cultivating authority; and that this explains the success of Christian culture's representation of itself as a community of sufferers. This approach is associated with the work of Foucault, Brown, and Perkins (among others) who are concerned to understand how the Imperial period can be seen either as the end of antiquity or contributed to the emergence of Christian society in later centuries.¹ This approach to the history of pain expresses a problematic and dangerous complicity in the history of Christianity's triumph, by providing a reading of ancient society in which Christian ethics becomes the critical lens through which previous cultures are evaluated. Against this

¹For references and discussion, see above Introduction, text to notes 7-21.

Christian-centric approach, this thesis innovated by providing a complex analysis of ancient “pagan” culture on its own terms.

My investigation proposed two central arguments. I suggested that the experience of pain was intricately tied up with the strategies and techniques used for communicating that experience to others. I argued, furthermore, that this relationship was characterised by the way language attempted to negotiate the overwhelming, traumatic nature of the painful experience. To support these contentions, I adduced three different arguments. In chapter 1, I turned to the question of desensitisation. Here I made a number of key points. I showed that rhetoric—and particularly the rhetorical sublime—offered an important cultural strategy for representing the suffering of an individual (or an animal) to the audience. It did so by replicating the experience of trauma in the viewer. I showed further that authors were able to control and manipulate their audience’s capacity to understand the pain and suffering of others by attempting to control their engagement with the sublime elements of representation. We saw, particularly in the works of Plutarch and Galen, how the rhetorical nature of their descriptions of violated animal bodies was able to induce different reactions in their audiences through their manipulation of the text’s visceral impact on the audience.

In Chapter 2, I showed how medical discourse within the second century approached the problem of translating painful experiences into comprehensible narrative form. I compared and contrasted two ways of confronting the disordered, vague, often ineffable nature of pain and the damage it does to language and narrative structure, and the problems it poses to audience recognition, diagnosis, and understanding of the suffering body. I showed that Galen attempted to control the experience of pain and its narrative representation by translating fragmented, unclear patient discourse into sophisticated literary form which allowed the reader to understand, and diagnose, the sufferer’s bodily

condition. I showed how Aristides resisted that act of control by presenting a narrative which testified to the ineffable, overwhelming nature of his pain experiences. This form of testimonial narrative confronted Galenic modes of narration by playing up, emphasising the impact of painful traumatic experience on language. Chapter 2 contributed to our models for the pain-language relationship and the experience of pain itself by emphasising the way certain authors attempted to negotiate the destructive impact of pain on narrative and linguistic capacity.

Finally, in Chapter 3, I turned to the ancient practice of psychotherapy. Here I argued two points. I connected the Greek romance novels with the tradition of philosophical consolation through their concern for the capacity of the past to continue to overwhelm the individual in the present. I showed that the consolatory work of Dio and Plutarch was designed to control our engagement with a past which always had the capacity to return and continue to cause the individual pain. We showed how the novels by developing a therapeutic concern developed an understanding of a similar problem. By helping the protagonists to overcome their past, they managed painful experiences. This management of past painful experiences served to control the past, restrain overwhelming traumatic experiences to the past. This has dramatic implications for how we see the narratives of the romances as pleasurable narratives. Thus chapter 3 contributed to our model by showing how trauma could be controlled and managed through the process of narrating painful experiences.

This investigation was not comprehensive.² It did, however, focus on three fields of cultural action which were a central part of Imperial society. The importance of rhetorical

² A number of aspects of ancient culture would have benefitted from further analysis: stoic approaches to suffering in the thought of Epictetus, and the work of Marcus Aurelius; there are also a number of Lucian's

discourse, medical diagnostic practices, and Greek romance novels suggests that the questions these texts engage with concerning the pain-language relationship and the experience of pain itself were of central importance to Imperial culture. The literary areas that I have investigated here are embedded in a broader culture which is, I contend, deeply concerned with how to negotiate the relationship between pain, suffering, language and narrative, and the audience.

2. *Consequences for the History of the Body in Antiquity*

If it is true that this study has changed the way scholars understand the significance of pain in the Imperial period, then it also has a number of implications for how we approach the body in antiquity and other historical periods. A central consequence of the revaluation of the experience of pain in this culture was to reframe the way we approach the body.

Over the last decade, increasing attention has been given to the importance of reclaiming sensory experiences from the past in cultural anthropology, sociology, and archaeology. This study aimed to contribute to that growing discourse on the phenomenology of the body by exploring how sensory or corporeal experience was continually being moulded and shaped by literary form. What I wanted to move away from was a scholarly focus on the way the body operates as a site of meaning, and becomes, rather a site of lived experience. In the case of pain, particularly, we have attempted to understand the way the experience is represented as a metaphor for the individual, or a place in which we can read the either the individual's self, or verify his experiences. For

works concerned with pain, such as *Podagra*. In a slightly different vein, further analysis is needed on the role played by figures such as Prometheus and Philoctetes as cultural paradigms of suffering: for a discussion see Bowersock (1994), 55-76. For further discussion of some of the limitations of this thesis see above: Introduction, text to notes 39-44; Chapter 1, text to notes 13-14; Chapter 2, text to note 21; Chapter 3, text to notes 32-33.

Helen King, in her article, 'Chronic Pain and the Creation of Narrative', the body of the sufferer is treated as a text which others can read and view. She writes of Aristides, in particular, that the body,

susceptible to pain, disease, old-age, and death, seems to be a sign of distance from the divine world, but the creation of story from the minute details of its physicality paradoxically seeks to transcend its materiality and make it into a *sign* [my emphasis] of divine favour.³

What interests me here is the way the body is continually treated as a sign or text. The assertion that the body's conditions—particularly the experience of pain—is prevalent in other contexts as well. Gunderson and Gleason have pointed out that within rhetorical contexts, the body is often manipulated as a collection of rhetorical signs which allow the individual to construct his identity as a masculine, virile, and legitimate *rhētor*;⁴ in her article, 'Mutilated Messengers: Body and Language in Josephus', Gleason continually shows how the mutilation of the body and the representation of suffering operates as a privileged mode of communication between Romans and Jews.⁵ It is clear that in certain contexts the role the body plays as a sign has cultural validity. Nevertheless, one of the ultimate consequences of this study was to show that understanding the experience of pain requires taking a slightly different approach to the relationship between body and text; rather than approaching the experience of pain in terms of a 'body as sign/text' model, we need to attend to the way narrative representation and body help to form and shape each other.

Understanding the history of bodily experience involves recognising that bodies and texts have a dynamic, interactive, and fluid relationship. We saw, for instance, particularly in the discussion of the sublime that powerful language has a materiality which not only impacts on the emotions, but is continually conceived in terms of its destruction of

³ King (2001), 282. The idea that Aristides' body, especially, operated as a readable text appears in Percy: Percy (1988), 387-91.

⁴ Gunderson (2000); cf. Gleason (1995), 55-81 on deportment as a language, esp., 58 on the importance of the ancient science of physiognomics as a 'tool for decoding the signs of gender deviance'.

⁵ Gleason (2001), 50-85.

the individual's corporeal order: Longinus' *Sublime* and Plutarch's *Flesh* both aimed to impact on the physical order of the reader, by exposing them to trauma; Plutarch's *Flesh* especially, attempted to adjust the way the individual saw, smelled, and listened to the infliction of violence on animals. In a slightly different way, the Greek novelists operated with an understanding that the way we tell stories of our experience is intimately connected to the amelioration and transcendence of our past traumatic experiences. By emphasising this relationship between the corporeal and linguistic or narrative forms of communication this thesis opened up possibilities for thinking about ancient culture in dynamic and productive ways: how are other bodily experiences—such as smell, or taste—influenced by the way they are communicated or described by individuals? How were texts, or narratives, received at the level of the body? To what extent does the materiality of language influence the way orators and audiences interact in the Imperial period?⁶ By attending to the way texts interact with bodily experience, it will be possible to reinvigorate our understanding and approaches to the body, and sensorial experience, in the ancient world.

The second important consequence for the history of the body concerns the implications of my study of Galen and Aristides for the history of medical science. As I mentioned briefly in Chapter 2, approaches to the history of pain in antiquity have either focused on the way the experience of pain is classified and treated by doctors; or how our scientific understanding of pain has developed since Galen.⁷ Galen plays an important part in the development of not only our scientific understanding of the body, but also our rational approaches to its treatment. The method of differential diagnosis which he employs throughout his case-histories is still practiced in modern clinical contexts. As Montgomery has shown, in *Doctor's Stories*, medical students are still taught to ask

⁶ One interesting and provocative example is the treatment of *synaesthesia* and the reception of oratory: Stevens (2008), 159-171.

⁷ For language and classification see Rey (1995), 22, 36; Horden (2008), 295-315. For a 'history of scientific ideas' approach see Siegel (1970).

questions and develop techniques for the analysis and diagnosis of disease in ways we have seen are central to Galen's diagnostic methodology.⁸ The implications of this method are twofold: firstly, it implies that the body has an innate readability; secondly, it suggests that the experience of illness and pain, can be understood in scientific, rational terms. My discussion of Galen's narrative practices showed the politics inherent in assuming that the body's experiences have a rational, scientifically discoverable, and readable quality. One of the dangers in engaging in this Galenic approach to diagnosing the body is that it silences and ignores the potential for other, more supple (and subtle) approaches the problem of the individual's experience of pain. If scholars are to continue to envisage the body as a type of text then we have to give appropriate focus to the way that process reflects the politics of controlling the body: Galen's texts present a 'straight' scientifically proven narrative about the body's stable experience of pain; to accept that story is to be complicit with the political aims of Galen's desire to narrate; our duty as historians of the body is to resist that complicity, discovering in the process how Galen's story was made straight—how the body was rendered as a readable text, and constructed as an object of scientific enquiry and knowledge.⁹

3. Questions for Modern Ethical Debates about Suffering

This investigation was framed within modern debates about pain and language, and the ethics of understanding others' suffering. The primary reason for this was to emphasise the role Classics has in contributing to these debates. The ancient world presents scholars with a cultural space within which it is possible to develop theories about the body, and contribute to modern philosophical and ethical discussion. In this context this study has

⁸ Montgomery (1991), 59-82.

⁹ For a general discussion of the mysteriousness of the body, despite its importance in our understanding of our 'selves' see Rimmell (2002), 9-16: 'while bodies appear to be integers of reality (they display age, gender, experience, status), they also work to dodge or transcend it—they are the prime agents of disguise and transformation' (13).

raised several questions about our approach to suffering. The first concerns the idea of representation and its ability to communicate trauma and pain. Firstly, the study of the sublime rhetorical form developed in Chapter 1 suggests that some of the strategies of representation that dominated the Imperial period offer an effective and productive method for communicating suffering. Sontag and Kleinman in particular have seen representation as a means by which we are desensitised to others' painful experiences:¹⁰ this thesis raises the possibility of adjusting our appreciation of others' experiences by altering how we understand narrative forms of communication; to what extent does rhetoric have the potential to change the way suffering impacts on audiences?

Secondly, this thesis provides an opportunity to renegotiate our understanding of pain in more supple terms. The capacity of rhetoric and communication to transmit experiences asks us to rethink the idea that pain is an individual experience. In this instance, the notion of rhetoric allows us to see how suffering and pain radiate out from the immediate traumatic moment through the cultural mechanisms and resources used to communicate that experience: does pain, as Scarry suggests, really come into our midst as something 'incommunicable' and 'unshareable',¹¹ or do we all share in the visceral experience of suffering?

¹⁰ Sontag (2003), 111; Kleinman (1996), 1-24, esp., 4-5.

¹¹ Scarry (1985), 4.

Bibliography

1. Primary Texts

- Allen, T (1917), *Homeri Opera, III- IV* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- Arnim, J (1893-6), *Dionis Prusaensis quae exstant I-II* (Berlin).
- Benndorf, O & Schenkl K (1893), *Philostrati maioris imagines* (Leipzig: Teubner).
- Burnet, J (1963) *Platonis Opera I-IV* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- DeLacy, P (1978), *Galen On the doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (Corpus Medicorum Graecorum vol. 5.4.1.2, pts. 1-2; Berlin: Akademie Verlag).*
- Diels, H & Kranz, W (1935), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker II* (Berlin: Weidmann).
- Dindorf, G (1855) *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Odysseam, I* (Oxford).
- Dilts, M (2002), *Demosthenis orationes, I* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Garofalo, I (1988), *Erasistrati Fragmenta* (Biblioteca di Studi Antichi; Pisa: Giardini).
- Gärtner, H (1962), *Rufus von Ephesos Die Fragen des Arztes an den Kranken (Corpus Medicorum Graecorum suppl. 4; Berlin: Akademie Verlag).*
- Helmreich, G, Marquardt, J & Müller, I (1893), *Claudii Galeni Pergameni scripta minora III* (Leipzig: Teubner).
- Hubert, C (1938), *Plutarchi moralia, IV* (Leipzig: Teubner).
- (1954), *Plutarchi moralia, VI.1* (Leipzig: Teubner).
- Hude, K (1927), *Herodoti, Historiae I* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- Jacoby, K (1885-1905), *Dionysii Halicarnasei antiquitatum Romanarum quae supersunt, I-IV* (Leipzig: Teubner).

- Jaeger, W (1957), *Aristotelis Metaphysica* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- Kayser, C (1870), *Flavii Philostrati opera, I* (Leipzig: Teubner).
- Keil, H (1898), *Aelii Aristidis, Omnia quae suersunt I-II* (Berlin).
- Kühn, C (1824-1829), *Claudii Galeni opera omnia, I-XXVIII* (Leipzig: Knobloch).
- Litré, É (1840-49), *Oeuvres Complètes d'Hippocrate, II-VI* (Paris: Baillière).
- Mannebach, E (1961), *Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum Fragmenta* (Leiden: Köln).
- Mau, J (1971) *Plutarchi Moralia v.2* (Leipzig: Teubner).
- Mewaldt, J (1914), *Galenus in Hippocratis de natura hominis commentaria tria (Corpus Medicorum Graecorum 5.9.1; Leipzig: Teubner).*
- Paton, W & Wegehaupt, I (1974), *Plutarchi Moralia I* (Leipzig: Teubner).
- Rabe, H (1913), *Hermogenis opera* (Leipzig: Teubner).
- Rattenbury, R & Lumb, T (1960), *Héliodore, Les Ethiopiques I-III* (Paris).
- Reeve, M (1982) *Longus Daphnis et Chloe* (Stuttgart: Teubner).
- Papanikolaou, A (1973), *Xenophontis Ephesii Ephesiacorum libri V de Amoris Anthiae et Abrocomae* (Leipzig: Teubner).
- Reardon, B (2002), *Chariton de Callirhoe Narrationes Amatoriae* (Leipzig: Teubner).
- Russell, D (1968), *Libellus de Sublimitate Dionysio Longino Fere Adscriptus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Ross, W (1962), *Aristotelis Politeia* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- (1959) *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- Schäfer, G (1811), *Gregorii Corinthii et aliorum grammaticorum Graecorum libri de dialectis linguae Graecae* (Leipzig: Weigel).
- Schröder, H (1934), *Galenus in Platonis Timaeum Commentarii Fragmenta* (CMG; Leipzig: Teubner).
- Usener, H (1887), *Epicurea* (Leipzig).

- Vilborg, E (1955), *Achilles Tatius Leucippe and Clitophon* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell).
- Wendland, P (1896-8), *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, I- III* (Berlin: Reimer).
- Wenkebach, E (1934), *Galen in Hippocratis Epidemiarum librum i commentaria III (Corpus Medicorum Graecorum 5.10.1; Leipzig: Teubner).*
- West, M (1998-2000), *Homeri Ilias, I-II* (Stuttgart: Teubner).

2. Secondary Texts

- Abbenes, J, Slings, S & Sluiter, I (eds.) (1995), *Greek literary Theory after Aristotle: A Collection of Papers in Honour of D. M. Schenkeveld* (Amsterdam: Vrije University Press).
- Alcock, S, Cherry, J & Elsner, J (eds.) (2001), *Pausanias: Travel and Memory in Roman Greece* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Amundsen, D (1974), 'Romanticizing the Ancient Medical Profession: The Characterization of the Physician in the Graeco-Roman Novel' *BHM* XLVIII: 320-337.
- Anderson, G (1997), 'Perspectives on Achilles Tatius' *ANRW* 2.34(3): 2278-99
- (2000), *Fairytale in the Ancient World* (London: Routledge).
- Armstrong, T (2000), 'Two Types of Shock in Modernity' *Critical Quarterly* 42(1): 60-73.
- Ayache, L (1997), 'L'Animal, Les Hommes et l' "Ancienne Medicine"' in B Cassin (ed.), *L'Animal dans l'Antiquité* (Paris: Vrin), 55-74.
- Ballester, L (1981), 'Galen as Medical Practitioner: Problems in Diagnosis' in V Nutton (ed.), *Galen: Problems and Prospects* (London: Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine), 13-46.

- & Rodriguez, R (1982), 'El Dolor en La Teoría y Práctica Médicas de Galeno' *Acta Hispanica ad Medicinae Scientiarumque Historiam Illustrandam* 2: 3-24.
- Baltussen, H (2009), 'Personal Grief and Public Mourning in Plutarch's "Consolation to his wife"' *AJPh*, 130(1): 67-98.
- Barnes, J (1991), 'Galen on Logic and Therapy' in F Kudlien and R Durling (eds.), *Galen's Method of Healing* (Leiden: Brill), 50-102.
- & Jounna, J (eds.) (2003), *Galien et la Philosophie* (Genève-Vandœuvres: Fondation Hardt).
- Barrow, R (1967), *Plutarch and his Times* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
- Bartsch, S & Elsner, J (eds.) (2007), *Ekphrasis: Special Issue of Classical Philology* 102.
- Beer, M (2008), 'The Question is not, Can they Reason, nor, Can they Talk, but, Can they Suffer: the Ethics of Vegetarianism in the Writings of Plutarch' in D Grummet & R Muers (eds.), *Eating and Believing: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Vegetarianism and Theology* (London: T & T Clark), 96-109.
- Behr, C (1968), *Aelius Aristides and The Sacred Tales* (Amsterdam: Hakkert).
- Belfiore, E (1992), *Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Berkenkotter, C & Ravotas, D (1997), 'Genre as Tool in the Transmission of Practice Over Time and across Professional Boundaries' *Mind, Culture, and Activity* 4: 256-274.
- (2008), *Patient Tales Case Histories and the Uses of Narrative in Psychiatry* (Studies in Rhetoric/Communication; Columbia: University of South Carolina Press).
- Bernard-Donals, M & Glejzer, R (2003), *Witnessing the Disaster: Essays on Representation and the Holocaust* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press).
- Betz, H (ed.) (1978), *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (Leiden: Brill).

- Biraud, M (1985), 'L' Hypotexte Homérique et les Rôles Amoureux de Callirhoé dans le Roman de Chariton.' *Sémiologie de l'Amour dans les Civilisations Méditerranéennes* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres), 21-7.
- Birchall, J (1996), 'The Lament as a Rhetorical Feature in the Greek Novel' *Groningen Colloquia on the Ancient Novel*. 7: 1-17
- Bompaire, J (1989), 'La Sacré dans les Discours d'Aelius Aristide' *REG* 102: 28-39.
- (1993), 'Quatre Styles d'Autobiographie au II Siècle Apres J-C: Aelius Aristide, Lucien, Marc-Aurele, Galien ' in M Baslez, P Hoffman & L Pernot (eds.), *L'Invention d'Autobiographie: d'Hésiode à Augustin: Actes du Deuxième Colloque de l'Équipe de Recherche sur l'Hellénisme Post-Classique* (Études de Littérature Ancienne; Paris: Presses de l'École Normale Supérieure), 199-209.
- Boulanger, A (1968), *Aelius Aristide et la Sophistique dans la Province d'Asie au II Siècle de Notre Ère*. (Paris: Boccard).
- Bowersock, G (1969), *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- (1994), *Fiction as History: Nero to Julian* (Sather Classical Lectures; Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Bowie, E (1968), 'Apollonius of Tyana: Tradition and Reality' *ANRW* 2.16(2): 1652-99.
- (1994), 'Philostratus: Writer of Fiction' in J Morgan & R Stoneman (eds.), *Greek Fiction: the Greek Novel in Context* (London: Routledge), 181-199.
- (1999), 'The Greek Novel', in S Swain (ed.), *Oxford Readings in the Greek Novel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 39-59.
- Brenk F (1977), *In Mists Apparelled: Religious Themes in Plutarch's Moralia and Lives* (Leiden: Brill).
- Brethes, R (2007), 'Poiein Aischra kai Legein Aischra, Est ce Vraiment la Même Chose? Ou la Bouche Souillée de Chariclée ' in V Rimell (ed.), *Seeing Tongues, Hearing*

- Scripts: Orality and Representation in the Ancient Novel* (Ancient Narrative Supplement 7; Gronigen: Barkhuis), 223-56.
- Brooks, P (1984), *Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative* (New York: A Knopf).
- Brown, P (1988), *The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press).
- (1978), *The Making of Late Antiquity* (Boston: Harvard University Press).
- Budelmann, F (2007), 'The Reception of Sophocles' Representation of Physical Pain' *AJPh* 128(4): 443-67.
- Burke P (1986) 'Strengths and Weaknesses of the History of Mentalities' *History of European Ideas* 7(5): 439-51.
- (ed.) (1991), *New Perspectives on Historical Writing* (Pennsylvania State University Press).
- Burrus, V (2004), *The Sex Lives of Saints: an Erotics of Ancient Hagiography* (Divinations; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press).
- (2005), 'Mimicking Virgins: Colonial Ambivalence and the Ancient Romance' *Arethusa* 38(1): 49-88.
- Butler, J (1993), *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex*. (New York: Routledge).
- Cairns, D (ed.) (2001), *Oxford Readings in Homer's Iliad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Carson, A (1998), *Eros the Bittersweet* (London: Dalkey Archive Press).
- Caruth, C (ed.), (1995), *Explorations in Memory* (London: John Hopkins University Press).
- (1996), *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).

- Cassell, E (1985), *Talking With Patients* (MIT Press Series on the Humanistic and Social Dimensions of Medicine, vols. 1-2; Cambridge: Michigan Institute of Technology Press).
- Cassin, B (ed.) (1997), *L'Animal dans l'Antiquité* (Paris: Vrin).
- Chartier, R & Cochrane, L (trans.) (1991), *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution* (London: Duke University Press).
- Chew, K (2003), 'The Representation of Violence in the Greek Novels and Martyr Accounts' in S Panayotakis (ed.), *The Ancient Novel and Beyond* (Leiden: Brill), 129-41.
- Chodorow (1992), 'Freud on women' J Neu (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Freud* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 224-38.
- Claassen, J-M (1999), *Displaced Persons: the Literature of Exile from Cicero to Boethius* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press).
- Constantinidou, S (2008), *Logos into Mythos: the Case of Gorgias' Encomium of Helen* (Athens: Kardamitsa).
- Coulmas, F (1986), 'Reported Speech: Some General Issues' in F Coulmas (ed.), *Direct and Indirect Speech* (Trends in Linguistics, Studies and Monographs 31; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter), 1-28
- Deichgräber, K (1957), *Galen als Erforscher des menschlichen Pulses: Ein Beitrag zur Selbstdarstellung des Wissenschaftlers* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag).
- Darnton, R (1980), 'Intellectual and Cultural History,' in M Kammen (ed.), *The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States* (Ithaca, NY), 327-354.
- (1984), *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History* (London: Allen Lane).

- Das, V (1996), 'Language and Body: Transactions in the Construction of Pain' in A Kleinman, V Das & M Lock (eds.), *Social Suffering* (London: University of California Press), 67-93.
- Debord, G (1967), *La Société du Spectacle* (Paris: Buchet/Chastel).
- Debru, A (1991), 'Les Démonstrations Médicales à Rome au Temps de Galien' *CM* 27: 69-8
- de Jong, I, Nünlist, R & Bowie, A (eds.) (2004), *Narrators, Narratees, and Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature: Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative* (Leiden: Brill).
- Diggle, J (1970), *Euripides' Phaethon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Diller, A (1980), 'Cross-Cultural Pain Semantics' *Pain* 9: 9-26.
- Dillon J (1977), *The Middle Platonists: a Study of Platonism, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* (London: Duckworth).
- Dodds, E (1951), *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- (1965), *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Doherty, L (1995), *Siren Songs: Gender, Audiences, and Narrators in the Odyssey* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).
- Duff, T (1999), *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Dubel, S (1997), 'Ekphrasis et Enargeia: La Description Antique comme Parcours' in Lévy & Pernot (eds.), *Dire l'Evidence* (Paris: L'Harmattan), 249-64.
- Dupont, F (1977), *Le Plaisir et la Loi, du Banquet de Platon au Satiricon* (Paris: F. Maspero).
- Eisenberg, L (1981), 'The Physician as Interpreter: Ascribing Meaning to the Illness Experience' *Comprehensive Psychiatry* 22: 239-83.
- Ellmann, M (ed.) (1994), *Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism* (New York: Longman).
- Elsner, J (2002), 'Introduction: the Genres of Ekphrasis' *Ramus* 2002 31(1-2): 1-18.

- & Rutherford, I (eds.) (2005), *Seeing the Gods: Pilgrimage in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Antiquity* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- (2007), 'Philostratus Visualises the Tragic: Some Ekphrastic and Pictorial Receptions of Greek Tragedy in the Roman Era' in C Kraus, H Foley, S Goldhill & J Elsner (eds.), *Visualising the Tragic*, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 309-37.
- Elsom, H (1992), 'Callirhoe: Displaying the Phallic Woman' in A Richlin (ed.), *Pornography and Representation* (London: Oxford University Press), 212-230.
- Festugiere, A, Saffrey, H, & Goff, J (1986), *Aelius Aristide, Discours Sacrés: Rêve, Religion, Médecine au IIe siècle après J.-C.* (Collection Propylées; Paris: Macula).
- (1969), 'Sur les Discours Sacrés d'Aelius Aristide' *REG* 82, 117-53.
- Fitzgerald, W (2000), *Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination* (Roman Literature and its Contexts; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Foucault, M & Hurley, R (trans.) (1988), *The History of Sexuality vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure*, (London: Penguin).
- (1990), *The History of Sexuality vol. 3: The Care of the Self* (London: Penguin).
- Fowler D (1997), 'Second Thoughts on Closure' in D Roberts, F Dunn, and D Fowler (eds.), *Classical Closure: Reading the End in Greek and Latin Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 3-22.
- Fox, M (2001), 'Dionysius, Lucian, and the Prejudice Against Rhetoric in History' *JRS* 91: 76-93.
- Frank, A (1995), *The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics* (London: University of Chicago Press).
- Frede, M (1981), 'On Galen's Epistemology', *Galen: Problems and Prospects. A collection of Papers submitted at the 1979 Cambridge Conference* (London: Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine Press), 65-86.
- (1987), *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

- Furley, W (1992) 'Antiphon der Athener: ein Sophist als Psychotherapeut?' *RhM* CXXXV: 198-216.
- Fusillo, M (1997), 'How Novels End: Some Patterns of Closure in Ancient Narrative' in F Dunn D Roberts & D Fowler (eds.), *Classical Closure: Reading the End in Greek and Latin Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 209-27.
- (1999), 'The Conflict of Emotions: a *Topos* in the Greek Erotic Novel' in S Swain (ed.), *Oxford Readings in the Greek Novel* (Oxford: OUP), 60-82.
- Freud, S & Strachey, J (trans.) (1958), 'Remembering, Repeating and Working Through' in J Strachey (ed.) *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud vol. II* (London: Hogarth Press), 147-56.
- (1961), 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' in J Strachey (ed. & trans.) *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud vol. XII* (London: Hogarth Press).
- (1963), 'Fixation to Traumas—The Unconscious' in J Strachey (ed.) *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud vol. XVI* (London: Hogarth Press), 273-86.
- Freud, S & Masson, J (trans.) (1895), *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fleiss, 1877-1904* (Massachusetts: Belknap Press).
- Gaertner, J (ed.) (2007), *The Discourse of Displacement in Greco-Roman Antiquity and Beyond* (Mnemosyne Supplementum 283; Leiden: Brill).
- Garrison, D (2010), *A Cultural History of the Human Body*, 6 vols. (Oxford: Berg).
- Gay, P (1995), *The Freud Reader* (London: Vintage).
- Gill, C (1985) 'Ancient Psychotherapy' *JHI* XLVI: 307-325.
- , Whitmarsh, T & Wilkins J (eds.) (2009), *Galen and the World of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 85-114.

- (2010), *Naturalistic Psychology in Galen and Stoicism* (Oxford : Oxford University Press).
- Gleason, M (1995), *Making Men: Rhetoric and Manhood in Ancient Rome* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- (2001), 'Mutilated Messengers: Body Language in Josephus' in S Goldhill (ed.), *Being Greek Under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic, and the Development of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 50-85.
- (2009), 'Shock and Awe: the Performance Dimension of Galen's Anatomy Demonstrations' in C Gill, T Whitmarsh & J Wilkins (eds.), *Galen and the World of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 85-114.
- Glock, H-J (ed.) (2001), *Wittgenstein: a Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Goldhill, S (1995) *Foucault's Virginity: Ancient Erotic Fiction and the History of Sexuality*, Cambridge: CUP.
- (ed.), (2001), *Being Greek Under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic, and the Development of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Gourevitch, M & D (1968), 'Le cas Aelius Aristide ou Mémoires d'un Hystérique au ii Siècle' *Informations Psychiatriques*, 44: 897-902.
- Graver, M (2001), 'Managing Mental Pain: Epicurus vs. Aristippus on the Pre-Rehearsal of Future Ills' in J Cleary (ed.), *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* (London: University Press America), 155-184.
- Gregor, B (2005), 'Selfhood and the Three R's: Reference, Repetition, and Refiguration' *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 58(2): 63-94.
- Gumpert, M (2001), *Grafting Helen: the Abduction of the Classical Past* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press).
- Gunderson, E (2000), *Staging Masculinity: the Rhetoric of Performance in the Roman World* (Body, in Theory; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).

- Hägg, T (1971), *Narrative Technique in Ancient Greek Romances: Studies of Chariton, Xenophon Ephesius, and Achilles Tatius* (Stockholm).
- Halliwell, S (2002), *The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Hankinson, R (1994a), 'Galen's Anatomical Procedures: a Second-Century Debate in Medical Epistemology' *ANRW* 2.37(2): 1834-55.
- (1994b), 'Usage and Abusage: Galen on Language' in S Everson (ed.), *Language* (Companions to Ancient Thought; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 166-87.
- (1995), 'The Growth of Medical Empiricism' in D Bates (ed.), *Knowledge and the Scholarly Medical Traditions* (NY: Cambridge University Press), 60-83.
- (1997), 'Le Phénomène et l'Obscur: Galien et les Animaux' in B Cassin (ed.), *L'Animal dans l'Antiquité* (Paris: Vrin), 75-93.
- (ed.) (2008), *The Cambridge Companion to Galen* (Series of Cambridge Companions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Harris, W & Holmes, B (eds.) (2008), *Aelius Aristides Between Greece, Rome, and the Gods* (Leiden: Brill).
- Harrison, S., (2000), 'Apuleius, Aelius Aristides and Religious Autobiography' *AN* 1: 245-59.
- Heath, M (1999), 'Longinus, "On Sublimity"' *PCPhS*, 45:43-73.
- Heinrichs, A (2003), "'Hieroi Logoi" and "Hierai Bibloi": the (Un)Written Margins of the Sacred in Ancient Greece' *HSCP*, 101: 207-66.
- Hight, G (1973), 'The Huntsman and the Castaway' *GRBS* XIV : 35-40
- Holmes, B (2008), 'Aelius Aristides' Illegible Body' in W. Harris and B. Holmes (eds.), *Aelius Aristides Between Greece, Rome, and the Gods* (Leiden: Brill), 77-109.

- Horden, P., (2008), 'Pain in Hippocratic Medicine' in P Horden (ed.), *Hospitals and Healing from Antiquity to the Later Middle Ages* (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum), 295-315.
- Hunt, L (ed.) (1989), *The New Cultural History* (London: University of California Press).
- Hunter, R (1983), *A study of Daphnis & Chloe* (Cambridge Classical Studies; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- (1994), 'History and Historicity' *ANRW* 2.34(2): 1055-86.
- (1996), 'Education at the Margins: Response to J.R. Morgan, 'Erotika Mathemata: Greek Romance as Sentimental Education" in C Atherton & A Sommerstein (eds.), *Education in Greek Fiction* (Nottingham Classical Literature Studies 4; Bari: Levante).
- (1998), *Studies in Heliodorus* (Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society).
- (2009), *Critical Moments in Classical Literature: Studies in the Ancient View of Literature and its Uses* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Jay, M (2003), *Refractions of Violence* (New York: Taylor and Francis).
- Jones, C (1966), 'Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works' *JRS* LVI: 61-74.
- Jouan, F (1977), 'Les Thèmes Romanesques dans l'Euboïcos de Dion Chrysostome' *REG* XC: 38-46.
- Kaplan, E (1995) 'Trains, Brains and Sprains: Railway Spine and Two types of shock in modernity the Origins of Psychoneuroses' *BHM* 69: 387-419.
- Kassel, R (1958) *Untersuchungen zur Griechischen und Römischen Konsollationsliteratur*. (Munich).
- Kauffman, L (1986), *Discourses of Desire: Gender, Genre, and Epistolary Fictions* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
- King, H (1988), 'The Early Anodynes: Pain in the Ancient World' in R Mann (ed.), *The History of Pain Management* (Lancashire: Carnforth).

- (1999), 'Chronic Pain and the Creation of Narrative', in J Porter (ed.), *Constructions of the Classical Body* (Michigan: Ann Arbor), 269-86.
- Kleinman, A (1980), *Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture: An Exploration of the Borderland Between Anthropology, Medicine, and Psychiatry* (Comparative Studies of Health Systems and Medical Care, 3; London: University of California Press).
- (1988), *The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing and the Human Condition* (New York: Basic Books).
- & Kleinman, J (1996), 'The Dismay of Images, The Appeal of Experience: Cultural Appropriations of Suffering in our Times' in A Kleinman, V Das, & M Lock (eds.), *Social Suffering* (London: University of California Press), 1-24.
- , & Das, V., & Lock, M., (eds.) (1996), *Social Suffering* (London: University of California Press).
- König, J (2005), *Athletics and Literature in the Roman Empire* (Greek culture in the Roman world; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Konstan, D (1994), *Sexual Symmetry: Love in the Ancient Novel and Related Genres* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- (2001), *Pity transformed* (Classical interfaces; London: Duckworth).
- (2004), 'The Birth of the Reader: Plutarch as a Literary Critic' *Scholia* 13: 3-27.
- (2005), 'The Pleasures of the Ancient Text or The Pleasure of Poetry from Plato to Plutarch' in F Cairns (ed.), *Greek and Roman Poetry: Greek and Roman Historiography* (Langford Latin Seminar 12; Cambridge: Francis Cairns), 1-17.
- Koskenniemi, H (1956), *Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des Griechischen Briefes* (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedekat).
- Kudlein, F & Durling, R (eds.) (1991), *Galen's Method of Healing: Proceedings of the 1982 Galen Symposium* (Leiden: Brill).

- LaCapra, D (1998), *History and memory after Auschwitz* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
- (2001), *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).
- (2009), *History and its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence* (New York: Cornell University Press).
- Laín Entralgo, P, Rather L & Sharp, J (trans.) (1970), *The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity* (London: Yale University Press).
- Laplanche, J & Pontalis, J. (1973), *The Language of Psycho-Analysis* (International Psycho-Analytical Library; London: Hogarth Press).
- Lausberg, H & Bliss M (trans.) (1998), *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: a Foundation for Literary Study* (Leiden: Brill).
- Leigh, M (1995) 'Wounding and Popular Rhetoric at Rome' *BICS* 40: 195-216.
- Lloyd, G (1997), 'Les Animaux dans l'Antiquité étaient Bons à Penser: Quelques Points de Comparaison entre Aristote et le "Huainanzi"' in B Cassin (ed.), *L'Animal dans l'Antiquité* (Paris: Vrin), 545-562.
- (2009), 'Galen's Un-Hippocratic Case-Histories' in C Gill, T Whitmarsh & J Wilkins (eds.), *Galen and the World of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 115-132.
- Macmillan, M (1976), 'Beard's Concept of Neurasthenia and Freud's Concept of the Actual Neuroses', *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 12: 376-90.
- Maraux, P (1981), 'Galien Comme Philosophe; la Philosophie de la Nature', in V Nutton (ed.), *Galen: Problems and Prospects* (London: Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine), 87-116.

- Martin, H & Philips, J (1978), 'Consolatio ad Uxorem Moralia 608a – 612b' in H Betz (ed.), *Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature* (Leiden: Brill), 394-441.
- Mattern, S (2008), *Galen and the Rhetoric of Healing* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).
- Mattingly, C (1998), *Healing Dramas and Clinical Plots: the Narrative Structure of Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- & Garro, L (eds.) (2000), *Narrative and the Cultural Construction of Illness and Healing* (London: University of California Press).
- Meyer, B (ed.) (2010), *Aesthetic Formations: Media, Religion, and the Senses* (London: Macmillan).
- Michenaud, G & Dierkens, J (1972), *Les Rêves dans les "Discours Sacrés" d'Aelius Aristide, IIe siècle ap. J-C* (Mons: Université de Mons).
- Misch, G & Dickies, E (trans.) (1998), *A History of Autobiography in Antiquity 2 vols* (International Library of Sociology; London: Routledge). Montgomery, K (1991), *Doctors' Stories: the Narrative Structure of Medical Knowledge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Morgan, J (1982), 'History, Romance, and Realism in the *Aithiopika* of Heliodorus' *ClAnt* 1: 221-65.
- (1989), 'A Sense of Ending: the Conclusion of Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*' *TAPhA* 119: 299-320.
- & Stoneman, R (eds.) (1994), *Greek Fiction: the Greek Novel in Context* (London: Routledge).
- (2004), *Longus Daphnis and Chloe* (Oxford: Aris & Phillips).
- Morales, H (2004), *Vision and Narrative in Achilles Tatius' Leucippe and Clitophon* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).

- Morris, D (1996), 'About Suffering: Voice, Genre, and Moral Community' in A Kleinman, V Das & M Lock (eds.), *Social Suffering* (London: University of California Press), 25-45.
- Morrison, B (2008), 'Language' in R Hankinson (ed.), *Cambridge Companion to Galen* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 116-56.
- Most, G (1989), 'The Stranger's Stratagem: Self-Disclosure and Self-Sufficiency in Greek Culture', *JHS*, 109:114-33.
- Müller, C (1976), 'Chariton von Aphrodisias und die Theorie des Romans in der Antike', *A&A XXII*: 115-36.
- Nesselrath, H-G (2007), 'Later Greek Voices on the Predicament of Exile: From Teles to Plutarch and Favorinus' in J Gaertner (ed.), *The Discourse of Displacement in Greco-Roman Antiquity and Beyond* (Mnemosyne Supplementum 283; Leiden: Brill), 87-108.
- Newmyer, S (1992), 'Plutarch on Justice towards Animals: Ancient Insights on a Modern Debate' *Scholium* I: 38-55.
- (2005), *Animals, Rights, and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics* (London: Routledge).
- Nikolaidis, A (1997), 'Plutarch on Women and Marriage' *WS* 110: 27-88.
- Ni-Mheallaigh, K (2008), 'Philosophical Framing: the Phaedran Setting of *Leucippe and Clitophon*' in J Morgan & M Jones (eds.), *Philosophical Presences in the Ancient Novels* (Ancient Narrative Supplement 10; Groningen: Barkhuis), 231-44.
- Nimis, S (1994), 'The Prosaics of Ancient Novels' *Arethusa* 27: 387-411.
- Nussbaum, M (1994), *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton : Princeton University Press).
- Oliensis, E (2009), *Freud's Rome: Psychoanalysis and Latin Poetry* (Roman Literature and its Contexts; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

- Panayotakis, S, Zimmerman, M, & Keulen, W (eds.) (2003), *The Ancient Novel and Beyond* (Mnemosyne Supplementum, 241; Leiden: Brill).
- Paschalis, M, Panayotakis, S & Schmeling, G (eds.), (2009), *Readers and Writers in the Ancient Novel* (Groningen: Barkhuis).
- Pearcy, L (1988a), 'Diagnosis as Narrative in the Sacred Tales of Aelius Aristides' *AAPhA* 45: 595-616.
- (1988b), 'Theme, Dream, and Narrative: Reading the *Sacred Tales* of Aelius Aristides' *TAPA* 118: 377-91.
- Perkins, J (1995), *The Suffering Self: Pain and Narrative Representation in the Early Christian Era* (London: Routledge).
- Petsalis-Diomidis, A (2005), 'The Body in Space: Visual Dynamics in Graeco-Roman Healing Pilgrimage', in J Elsner and I Rutherford (eds.), *Seeing the Gods: Pilgrimage in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Antiquity* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- (2006), 'Sacred Writing, Sacred Reading: the Function of Aelius Aristides' Self-Representation as Author in the *Sacred Tales* ' in B McGing & J Mossman (eds.), (2006), *The Limits of Ancient Biography* (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales), 193-211.
- Pomeroy, S (ed.) (1999), *Plutarch's Advice to the Bride and Groom and Consolation to his Wife: English Translations, Commentary Interpretative Essays, and Bibliography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Porter, J (ed.), (1999), *Constructions of the Classical Body* (Body, in Theory; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).
- (2001), 'Ideals and Ruins: Pausanias, Longinus, and the Second Sophistic' in S Alcock, J Cherry & J Elsner (eds.), *Pausanias: Travel and Memory in Roman Greece* (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 63-92.

- Porter, R (1991), 'History of the Body' in P Burke (ed.) (1991), *New Perspectives on Historical Writing* (Pennsylvania State University Press), 206-32.
- Quet, M (1993), 'Parler de Soi pour Louer son Dieu: Le Cas d'Aelius Aristide' in M Baslez, P Hoffman, and L Pernot (eds.), *L'Invention d'Autobiographie: d'Hésiode à Ausgustin: Actes du Deuxième Colloque de l'Équipe de Recherche sur l'Hellénisme Post-classique* (Paris: Presses de l'École Normale Supérieure), 211-51.
- Quint, D (1993), *Epic and Empire: Politics and Generic Form from Virgil to Milton* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Reardon B (1982), 'Theme, Structure and Narrative in Chariton' *YCLS* XXVII: 1-27.
- Redpath, I (2005), 'Achilles Tatius' "Leucippe and Cleitophon": What Happened Next' *Classical Quarterly* 55(1): 250-65.
- Rey, R (1995), *The History of Pain* (London: Harvard University Press).
- Richlin, A (1992), 'Reading Ovid's Rapes' in A Richlin (ed.), *Pornography and Representation in Greece and Rome* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 158-79.
- (ed.) (1992), *Pornography and Representation in Greece and Rome* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Riese W (1951), 'An Outline of a History of Ideas in Psychotherapy' *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* XXV: 442-456.
- Rijksbaron A (1984), 'Chariton 8, 1, 4 und Aristot. *Poet.* 1449b28' *Philologus* CXXXVIII: 306-307.
- Rimell, V (2002), *Petronius and the Anatomy of Fiction* (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- (ed.) (2007), *Seeing Tongues, Hearing Scripts: Orality and Representation in the Ancient Novel* (Ancient Narrative Supplement 7; Groningen: Barkhuis).
- Roberts, D, Dunn, F, & Fowler, D (eds.), (1997), *Classical Closure: Reading the End in Greek and Latin Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

- Robiano, P (2007), 'La Voix et la Main: la Lettre Intime dans *Chaereas et Callirhoe*' in V Rimell (ed.), *Seeing Tongues, Hearing Scripts: Orality and Representation in the Ancient Novel* (Ancient Narrative Supplement 7; Groningen: Barkhuis), 201-22.
- Rocca J (2008), 'Anatomy' in R Hankinson (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Galen* (Series of Cambridge Companions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 242-62.
- Rosenmeyer, P (2001), *Ancient Epistolary Fictions: the Letter in Greek Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Russell, D (1964), *Longinus On the Sublime* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Rutherford (2001), 'Tragic Form and Feeling in the *Iliad*' in D Cairns (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Homer's Iliad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 260-94.
- Sacks, O (1987), 'Forward' in Luria, A, *The Man with a Shattered World: The History of a Brain Wound* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).
- Saïd, S (1999) 'Rural Society in the Greek Novel, or the Country Seen from the Town' in S Swain, (ed.), *Oxford Readings in the Greek Novel* (Oxford : Oxford University Press), 83-107.
- Salazar, C (2000), *The Treatment of War Wounds in Antiquity* (Leiden: Brill).
- Sanyal, D (2006), *The Violence of Modernity: Baudelaire, Irony, and the Politics of Form*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press).
- Scarborough, J (1971), 'Galen and the gladiators', *Episteme*, 5:98-111.
- Scarry, E (1985), *The Body in Pain: the Making and Unmaking of the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Schivelbusch, W (1986), *The Railway Journey: the Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

- Schmitz, Thomas (1997), *Bildung und Macht: zur Sozialen und Politischen Funktion der Zweiten Sophistik in der Griechischen Welt der Kaiserzeit* (Zetemata 97; München: Verlag).
- (2007), *Modern Literary Theory and Ancient Texts: an Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing).
- Schroeder, S (2001), 'Private Language and Private Experience' in H-J Glock (ed.), *Wittgenstein: a Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell), 147-72.
- Segal, R (1962), 'Gorgias and the Psychology of the *Logos*' *HSPH* LXVI: 99-155.
- Shapiro, M (1988), *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press).
- Shaw, B (1996), 'Body/Power/Identity: Passions of the Martyrs', *J ECS*, 4(3): 269-312.
- Siegel, R (1970), *Galen On Sense Perception: His Doctrines, Observations, and Experiments on Vision, Hearing, Smell, Taste, Touch and Pain, and their Historical Sources* (New York: S Karger).
- Sorabji, R (ed.) (1997), *Aristotle and After* (London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London).
- (1993), *Animal Minds and Human Morals: the Origins of the Western Debate* (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology; Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
- Sontag, S (2003), *Regarding the Pain of Others* (London: Penguin).
- Sluiter, I (1995), 'The Poetics of Medicine' in J Abbenes, S Slings, & I Sluiter (eds.), *Greek Literary Theory after Aristotle: A Collection of Papers in Honour of D.M. Schenkeveld* (Amsterdam: VU University Press), 193-213.
- (1995), 'The Embarrassment of Imperfection: Galen's Assessment of Hippocrates' Linguistic Merits', *CM* 28: 519-35.
- Sommerstein, A & Atherton, C (eds.), (1996), *Education in Greek Fiction* (Nottingham Classical Literature Studies 4, Bari: Levante).

- Spence, D (1994), *Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis* (New York: Norton).
- Staden, H von (1989), *Herophilus: the Art of Medicine in early Alexandria: Edition, Translation and Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- (1995a), 'Science as Text, Science as History: Galen on Metaphor', *CM* 28: 499-518.
- (1995b), 'Anatomy as Rhetoric: Galen on Dissection and Persuasion', *JHM* 50(1): 47-66.
- (1997), 'Galen and the "Second Sophistic"', in R Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle and After* (Bulletin of the Institute of Classics Studies Supplement 68; London: Institute of Classical Studies), 33-54.
- Stanford, W (1954), *The Ulysses Theme: a Study in the Adaptability of a Traditional Hero* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Stevens, B (2008), 'The Scent of Language and Social Synaesthesia at Rome' *CW* 101(2): 159-71.
- Stockt, L van der (1990) 'L'Expérience Esthétique de la Mimesis selon Plutarque' *QUCC* 65: 23-31
- (1992), *Twinkling and Twilight: Plutarch's Reflections on Literature* (Brussel: Paleis der Academiën).
- Swain, S (1996), *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World, AD 50-250* (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- (ed.) (1999), *Oxford Readings in the Greek Novel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Temkin, O (1971), *The Falling Sickness: a History of Epilepsy from the Greeks to the Beginnings of Modern Neurology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).

- Teodorsson, S-T (1990), *A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks, Vol. II: Books 4-6* (Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia; Gothenburg: Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg Press).
- Thome J (1995), *Psychotherapeutische Aspekte in der Philosophie Platons* (Hildesheim: Ohms-Weidmann).
- Throop, C (2010) *Suffering and Sentiment: Exploring the Vicissitudes of Experience and Pain in Yap* (London: University of California Press).
- Tilg, S (2010), *Chariton of Aphrodisias and the Invention of the Greek Love Novel* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Too, Y (1998), *The Idea of Ancient Literary Criticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Toohey, P (1992), 'Love, Lovesickness, and Melancholy' *ICS* 17(2): 265-86.
- (1999), 'Dangerous Ways to Fall in Love' *Maia* 51(2): 259-75.
- (2004), *Melancholy, Love, and Time: Boundaries of the Self in Ancient Literature* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).
- Trapp, M (1990) 'Plato's Phaedrus in the Second Century' in D Russell (ed.), *Antonine Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 141-73.
- Tsouna, V (1992), 'The Cyrenaic Theory of Knowledge' *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 10: 161-192.
- (1998), *The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Tümpel, K (1893), 'Alkinou Apologos', *Philologus*, 52: 522-33.
- Ullman, M (1978), *Krankenjournalen* (Weisbaden: Harrassowitz).
- Walsh, G (1984), *The Varieties of Enchantment: Early Greek Views of the Nature and Function of Poetry* (London: University of North Carolina Press).
- Webb, R (1997) 'Mémoire et Imagination: les Limites de l'*Enargeia*' in B Lévy & L Pernot (eds.), *Dire l'Evidence* (Paris), 229-48.

- (2009), *Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice* (Farnham: Ashgate).
- West, W (1999), 'Repeating: Staging Meaning Between Aristotle and Freud' *Substance* 28(2): 138-58.
- Whitmarsh, T (2001), *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: the Politics of Imitation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- (2003), 'Reading for Pleasure: Narrative, Irony, and Erotics in Achilles Tatius' in S Panayotakis, M Zimmerman & W Keulen, W (eds.), *The Ancient Novel and Beyond* (Mnemosyne Supplementum, 241; Leiden: Brill), 191-205.
- (2004), 'Aelius Aristides', in I de Jong, R Nünlist, and A Bowie (eds.), *Narrators, Narratees, and Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature: Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative* (Leiden: Brill), 441-47.
- (ed.) (2007), *Cambridge Companion to the Ancient Novel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Wieviorka, A & Stark, J (trans.) (1998), *The Era of the Witness* (New York: Cornell University Press).
- (ed.), (2008), *The Cambridge Companion to the Greek and Roman Novel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Winkler, J (1985) *Auctor and Actor: a Narratological Reading of Apuleius's The Golden Ass* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Worth, S (2000), 'Aristotle, Thought, and Mimesis: Our Responses to Fiction', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 58(4): 333-39.
- Wyke, M (1997), *Gender and the Body in Mediterranean Antiquity* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- (1998), *Parchments of Gender: Deciphering the Bodies of Antiquity* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- Zanker, G (1981) 'Enargeia in the Ancient Criticism of Poetry', *RhM* 124: 297-311.

Zeitlin, F (1996), *Playing the Other: Gender and Society in Classical Greek Literature*
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

Zemon-Davis, N (1987), *Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in
Sixteenth-Century France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).