

**Ideo-Affective Politics and the Construction of U.S. Foreign Policy
The Beginning of the Cold War, 1945-1950**

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Table of Contents

Abstract	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1: Towards a Theory of Ideo-Affective Politics	22
Chapter 2: Ramping and the Beginning of the “Truman Offensive”	58
Chapter 3: Tamping, the Structure of Feeling, and the Shocks of 1949.....	115
Chapter 4: Revamping, NSC-68, and the Onset of the Korean War.....	154
Conclusion.....	198
Appendix.....	211
Bibliography.....	229

Abstract

Title: “Ideo-Affective Politics and the Construction of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Beginning of the Cold War, 1945-1950”

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This thesis asks, how it is possible that in five years, from 1945 to 1950, the United States reoriented its foreign policy to allow for a total Cold War mobilization, one that included both policy elites and the public? At a broader theoretical level, this thesis investigates how public mobilization operates and explores the consequences – both intended and unintended – of pursuing certain mobilization strategies, especially affectively-laden ones. Drawing on constructivist theorizing and recent scholarship on affect and emotions, I advance a theory of “ideo-affective politics,” or the political use of ideas and emotions, and outline a three-part conceptual pathway of foreign policy change: ramping-tamping-revamping. “Ramping” refers to the deliberate strategic cultivation of public emotions for the purposes of public persuasion; “tamping” to the strategic efforts at calming public sentiment and restoring the balance between elite and public structures of feeling when the latter is no longer politically advantageous; and “revamping” to the reconstitution of the initiating elite actor’s ideo-affective approach for either strategic or genuine reasons. Using a form of affectively-sensitive discourse analysis and process tracing, I examine archival, published, and secondary materials to trace the construction of the Cold War along this pathway, from the ramping up of public emotions in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine and its accompanying campaign, to the failed attempts to tamp down those same emotions (due to the creative capacities of emotions and the strategic maneuvering of political opponents) when confronted with the “shocks of 1949”, to the revamping of the administration’s own ideo-affective beliefs to match the newly reconstituted public structure of feeling in the face of the North Korean invasion in 1950. I argue that in strategically ramping up public emotions in 1947, the Truman administration unleashed dynamics that they could no longer control, laying the foundations for the reconstitution of their beliefs and interests to a Cold War footing by 1950. In examining this in-depth case, this thesis provides both a new explanation for the beginning of the Cold War and a new conceptual pathway for explicating the relationship between ideas and emotions in politics, highlighting the ways that emotions can be both strategic assets and dynamic phenomena that result in constraining structures.

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Introduction

“Persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions.”
-Aristotle, *Rhetoric*¹

“[I]n so far as we feel ourselves in any heightened trouble at the present moment, that feeling is largely of our own making.”
-George Kennan²

1 Arousing enthusiasm

On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman, throat parched from the first signs of illness, stepped before a joint session of Congress. “The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance,” the president began. “The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.”³ He continued speaking for nearly nineteen minutes, before he was greeted with a standing ovation. Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers later wrote about the historical significance of this speech that would come to be known as “the Truman Doctrine”: “President Truman’s foreign policy may be roughly divided into two parts, that covering the period from his accession to the presidency in April 1945, until the development of...the so-called Truman Doctrine in March 1947. He, himself, felt that this latter marked the beginning of his own foreign policy.”⁴

¹ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, trans. George A. Kennedy, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 8.

² Kennan qtd. in Samuel F. Wells, “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat,” *International Security* 4, no. 2 (1979): 128.

³ Harry S. Truman, “Address of the President to Congress, Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey [herein “Truman Doctrine”],” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, March 12, 1947, Online. I use the University of California at Santa Barbara “American Presidency Project” database throughout the thesis to access the President’s Public Papers, the Federal Register, and other publicly disseminated statements of the presidency. The entire database can be found at www.presidency.ucsb.edu.

⁴ Eben Ayers summary of Truman Foreign Policy, undated, Papers of Eben A. Ayers, Box 7, Subject File, Foreign Policy (1 of 2), Harry S. Truman Presidential Library [herein “HSTPL”].

The speech was designed to be momentous. Faced with the prospect of the cessation of British financial support to Greece and Turkey, Truman and his administration decided that the only way to shake a war-weary public into taking up the mantle of supporting European reconstruction was to “scare the hell out of the American people.”⁵ A year and a half before Truman presented his doctrine to Congress, the president laid out his understanding of the relationship between presidential policies and public ratification in an interview with Margaret Marshall of *The New York Times Magazine*.

A politician must be in a sense a public-relations man....The best ideas in the world are of no benefit unless they are carried out. In order to carry them out, reason and persuasion must be employed. If enthusiasm for them can be aroused, so much the better. Some men have the ability to arouse that enthusiasm more than others. They are the political leaders.⁶

The role of the president was twofold: to ensure both that the public understood ideas, and that they had confidence in and enthusiasm for them. To receive the funding to support Greece and Turkey, the president and his speechwriters set about crafting a speech that would pique the public’s emotional interests. It worked: the bill passed into law and helped pave the way for the more expansive European Reconstruction Program, better known as the Marshall Plan.

Two years later, Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalist government in China was in serious danger of defeat at the hands of Mao Zedong’s communist forces. For years, the U.S. government had foreseen this possibility and decided that the U.S. would not provide military assistance. As Dean Acheson wrote in the publicly disseminated “China White Paper,” the U.S had three options for dealing with China at the end of World War II: “(1) [the U.S.] could have pulled out, lock, stock and barrel; (2) it could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists to destroy the Communists; (3) it could...endeavor to avoid a civil war by working for a compromise between the two

⁵ This quote is commonly attributed to Arthur Vandenberg and will be discussed further in Chapter 2.

⁶ Margaret Marshall, “Interview with Truman,” October 14, 1945 qtd. in Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 129.

sides.”⁷ Rejecting the first option as “abandonment,” Acheson explained that the second, “while it may look attractive theoretically and in retrospect, was wholly impossible.” Rather than commit American troops – “a colossal commitment of our armies...that the American people would not have sanctioned” – the United States sought a diplomatic solution it knew might fail. As the civil war proceeded and the nationalist forces faltered and finally succumbed to defeat and exile on Taiwan, Acheson’s rationale held: the U.S. would not intervene, the China White Paper explained to the public, for some costs were simply too high. The Truman Doctrine did not apply to this case, for it was outside the perimeter of what the U.S. could reasonably defend.

One year later, the United States faced a similar choice over whether to intervene on the Korean peninsula. Truman had recently recalled American troops stationed in South Korea after World War II, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had deemed the protection of the peninsula to be of “little strategic interest.”⁸ And yet, when North Korean forces invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, the American decision to intervene was almost immediate. Hearing the news of North Korea’s actions, Truman told Acheson, “Dean, we’ve got to stop those sons of bitches no matter what.”⁹ A few days later, he commented, “Korea is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough now, if we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won’t take any next steps. But if we just stand by, they’ll move into Iran and they’ll take over the whole Middle East. There’s no telling what they’ll do, if we don’t put up a fight now.”¹⁰ No longer was the cost of an American intervention too high to bear; instead, as Truman declared in his July 19 address to the American people,

⁷ Acheson, Letter of Transmittal in United States Department of State, *United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), x.

⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Memorandum for the Secretary of State: The interest of the United States in military occupation of South Korea from the point of view of the military security of the United States,” September 27, 1947, in Harry S. Truman, “Further Statement by the President on the Decision to Withdraw U.S. Forces from Korea, 1947-1949,” *HSTPL*, November 2, 1952, Online.

⁹ Truman qtd. in Jonathan Mercer, “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” *International Organization* 67, no. 2 (April 2013): 232.

¹⁰ Memorandum, “President Truman’s conversations with George M. Elsey,” June 26, 1950, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 71, Korea–June 26, 1950, HSTPL.

“The principal effort to help the Koreans preserve their independence...has been made by the United States...because we know that what is at stake here is nothing less than our own national security and the peace of the world.”¹¹

2 Research question and argument

These short historical vignettes elucidate some of the chaotic elements that characterize the period known as the beginning of the Cold War. The United States went from being a war-weary nation in 1945, with a populace determined to focus on its own domestic growth, to one at the helm of a global struggle, enmeshed in international alliances and intervening in lands previously thought unimportant. This was the result not of a neat progression against a single culprit, but rather a multifaceted process that occurred in fits and starts.

With this in mind, this thesis seeks to answer the question of how it is possible that in five years, from 1945 to 1950, the United States reoriented its foreign policy to allow for a total Cold War mobilization, one that included both elites and the public. Shedding light on this empirical question allows me to offer an answer to the theoretical question of how public mobilization operates, and to explore the consequences – both intended and unintended – of pursuing certain mobilization strategies, especially affectively-laden ones.

Taking seriously the Cold War as not simply a policy decision but the full-scale mobilization of the public and elite, I argue that we need to understand the reorientation of U.S. foreign policy toward all out engagement as a three-part process beginning with the 1947 Truman Doctrine and its accompanying affective persuasion campaign. I introduce the notion of “ideo-affective politics,” or the political use of ideas and emotions, to trace each part of this process, from the deliberate ramping up of public emotions in 1947, to the failed attempts to tamp down those same emotions in 1949, to the revamping of elite

¹¹ Harry S. Truman, “Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Korea,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, July 19, 1950, Online.

emotions, beliefs, and policies in the face of the North Korean invasion in 1950. With this ramping-tamping-revamping cycle, I introduce a theoretical pathway to explain the potential consequences of public mobilization, one sensitive to the co-constitutive production of both the policy elite and the public structures within which they are embedded.

3 Understanding the Cold War

Unlike conventional military conflicts, the Cold War cannot easily be defined by a start and end date, or even by the locus of the main front. Any study of the Cold War must necessarily begin with explaining precisely what one means by the narrative construction of “the Cold War.” As alluded to above, when I refer to the period, I look at it not as a series of policy decisions, but as a whole-scale political, ideational, and affective effort involving both elite policymakers and the public which gave its assent to the policies and politicians that advanced them. I argue that it is necessary to do so because of the depth and breadth of the changes that occurred during the period. Robert Jervis contends that there were seven features that differentiated this period from what had come before:

(1) a high degree of conflict with the USSR; (2) a significant perceived threat of war; (3) high defense budgets; (4) large armies in Europe; (5) the perception of a united Sino-Soviet bloc; (6) the belief that limited wars were a major danger; and, following from the latter two beliefs, (7) anti-Communist commitments all over the globe.¹²

The list, while detailed, is hardly exhaustive. The Cold War also inaugurated new methods of political decision-making and bureaucratic organization, introduced the notion of national security as a policy paradigm, reshaped America’s education system and scientific infrastructure, and reoriented the nation’s relationship to the wider world. The Cold War, then, must be considered more than a decision made by elites in power over a particular policy or handful of policies to pursue. It was a period inhabited and shaped by both elites

¹² Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, no. 4 (December 1, 1980): 564.

and average citizens throughout the world. This thesis focuses specifically on the American populace, as it is concerned with issues of foreign policy and democratic mobilization, but they were hardly the only people impacted by the cross-cultural forces of the period.¹³ In looking at both the elite and public development of the Cold War, I am considering the phenomenon that some have labeled the “Cold War consensus,” or the dominant public and elite concordance on the nature of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.¹⁴

Historians have been looking at the causes of this broad conflict since nearly its beginning.¹⁵ In the early period, analyses tended to revolve around the historiographical delineations of “orthodox” scholarship (blaming Stalin for the Cold War) and “revisionist” scholarship (blaming the United States). Since the mid 1980s, however, scholars have attempted to move past the question of blame, introducing a diverse array of approaches, including post-revisionism, corporatism, and world-systems analysis to explain the vast changes that developed from 1945-1950.¹⁶

As this is a work of International Relations scholarship, rather than one situated within the disciplinary realm of History, it is worth grouping these recent approaches not

¹³ I look specifically at the United States so as to provide an in-depth account of the foreign policy and politics of one nation. This allows me to be able to focus on the specifics of the period with conceptual clarity and cultural sensitivity. In future research, I hope to extend the analysis into the realm of other states as well. For more on the pros and cons of international history vs. single country studies, see Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 4–5.

¹⁴ Ronald Krebs has recently taken issue with the popular notion of a Cold War consensus existing in its generally accepted manner. Using content analysis of newspaper editorials, he argues that the Cold War consensus did not form until 1953, began to dissolve after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and was far narrower than it was generally believed to be. While his analysis is impressive in its mixed methods approach, his reliance on newspaper editorials as his sole determinant of consensus focuses only on leader attitudes and ignores public determinants of or belief in those attitudes. I will discuss Krebs' work further below. For more, see Ronald Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pt. II; Ronald Krebs, “How Dominant Narratives Rise and Fall: Military Conflict, Politics, and the Cold War Consensus,” *International Organization* 69, no. 4 (September 2015): 809–845.

¹⁵ Louis Halle's work is a prominent example of such an *in situ* retrospective approach. Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper Collins, 1967).

¹⁶ For the canonical take on the orthodox-revisionist-postrevisionist delineation, see John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War,” *Diplomatic History* 7, no. 3 (July 1, 1983): 171–90. For an excellent overall summary of recent Cold War historiography, see Curt Cardwell, “The Cold War,” in Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan, eds., *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

by historiographical or theoretical school, but rather by analytical approach so as to include works from across both disciplines. I categorize these approaches as ones focused on 1) strategic adjustment, 2) individual/psychological adjustment, and 3) ideational adjustment. Each approach provides valuable insights to the Cold War researcher, but falls short in important ways in its efforts to explain the all-out elite-public mobilization of the period.

The first group of scholars fit into what I call the “strategic adjustment” school. These authors understand the massive changes undertaken in the early Cold War period as the consequences of rational actors operating within a changed international system. With the rise of the Soviet Union as its sole international rival, the United States had to readjust its strategic approach to security in an anarchic system. This approach, preferred mostly by IR realists,¹⁷ contends that foreign policy shifts occur when a state’s security is a) threatened or b) has the opportunity to be strengthened.¹⁸ Some seminal studies in this camp would include Stephen Walt’s *The Origins of Alliances*, which locates state action in attempts to balance threats, or John Mearsheimer’s *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, which sees security maximization as the end goal of state action.¹⁹ While these represent different notions of realism, they coalesce around the idea that states change the way they act depending on rational considerations of what is deemed to be most effective in power and security considerations. To explain the massive changes from 1945-1950, then, these scholars would argue that the new condition of the international system – bipolarity – necessitated a changed response by the United States. As structural conditions changed, so too did the American foreign policy put forward by the rational actors who shaped it.

¹⁷ There are few historians who fit into this approach, given that its macro-structural focus is antithetical to the historical discipline’s prizing of close contextualization as opposed to parsimony.

¹⁸ It should be noted that in even categorizing these changes as “foreign policy shifts,” I am speaking in language that would be antithetical to strict structural neorealists, like Waltz, who puts foreign policy theories and their lower levels of analysis on a different plane from theories of international relations. Kenneth Waltz, “International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy,” *Security Studies* 6, no. 1 (1996): 54–57.

¹⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003); Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

While these explanations provide a helpful first cut at the research question under consideration, they cannot answer it in full. These theories are persuasive in suggesting that a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was likely to occur due to the morphing of an international system from multipolarity to bipolarity, but they cannot answer the type of “how possible” question that this thesis asks. Further, as Jeffrey Legro points out, this approach implies the state as a unitary actor, responding as one to threats or provocation.²⁰ In this conception, the state acts and reacts under constraints of rationality, seeking to maximize benefit and minimize costs. This outlook is therefore inadequate to explain the mechanisms of public mobilization, as it does not account for a public at all.²¹ Strategic adjustment theories are helpful in their parsimony, but provide limited explanatory power.²²

Having explained the presence of a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, but not the particular type of conflict that took place or the process by which it was established, we must turn to the second type of explanation, “individual/psychological adjustment,” which opens the black box of the state to look at

²⁰ Jeffrey Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 44.

²¹ Two exceptions to this rule include John Mearsheimer’s *Why Leaders Lie* and Thomas Christensen’s *Useful Adversaries*. Mearsheimer does acknowledge the role of the democratic public but does so within a rationalist paradigm of agency, looking at lying as part of a realist leader’s policy tool belt. Similarly, the neoclassical realist Christensen argues that while post-WWII bipolarity meant that the United States would have to confront the Soviet Union, it was Truman’s need to get the public behind his new foreign policy that led him to “decide to adopt a more hostile or ideological foreign policy than [he] otherwise would prefer.” These works both address the role of the domestic public in the formulation of American foreign policy, but do so within a rationalist theoretical stance that reduces forms of public agency. Further, within the focus on the public, they employ concepts like “fear-mongering” (Mearsheimer) and “shock” (Christensen) that they fail to theorize, as affective notions do not fit within this rationalist ontology. John J. Mearsheimer, *Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

²² To be fair to these many of these works, such broad structural theories are designed to explain action over wide patches of space and time. They are not, however, designed to look at the particularities of change. As Waltz famously said in defense of his structural neorealism, to expect balance-of-power theory to explain the precise actions of states “would be like expecting the theory of universal gravitation to explain the wayward path of a falling leaf.” A strategic adjustment approach that pays closer attention to the level below the international system is David Welch’s *Painful Choices*, whose “loss aversion theory” contends that foreign policy defeats prompt the reevaluation of policies. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Waveland Press, 2010), 121; David A. Welch, *Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change* (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005).

the groups and individuals that are in charge of the machinery of decision-making. This was one of the earliest historical approaches, as historians have long debated (and continue to debate, even after the initial opening of the Soviet archives) the role that Stalin played in the beginning of the Cold War. While some argue that conflict was inevitable because of Stalin's personality and ideological convictions,²³ others have contended that he was a flawed practitioner of realpolitik who could have been negotiated with and managed.²⁴ Still others place their focus on Truman and his administration, looking either at individual personalities or the underlying motivations for the political maneuverings of these individual personalities.²⁵ A paradigmatic IR scholar writing in this vein is Deborah Larson, whose *Origins of Containment* uses cognitive social psychology to argue that the Cold War began the way that it did because of the changing beliefs and waxing and waning levels of power and influence of four key foreign policymakers: Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, Averill Harriman, and James F. Byrnes.²⁶ Larson, like other scholars utilizing the individual/psychological approach, argues that the changes that took place from 1945-1950 did so because of the actions taken by foreign policymakers.

²³ These works converged on understandings of Stalin as the inciter of conflict for different reasons. For works that contain an element of what Caldwell has called American "triumphalism," see John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin Books, 2007); Wilson D. Miscamble, *From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). For those that focus on Stalin's personality, see, for example, Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); V. M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Jonathan Haslam, *Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).

²⁴ Geoffrey Roberts has written a number of works in this vein, including Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). For more works on like this, see Cardwell, "The Cold War," fn. 11.

²⁵ Frank Costigliola, *Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Arnold A. Offner, *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Larson, *Origins of Containment*. Leffler's view is slightly different, arguing that these individuals were key to the inception of the Cold War, but that they were acting in ways that were appropriate given dominant understandings of international security. Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," *The American Historical Review* 89, no. 2 (1984): 346-81; Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

²⁶ Larson, *Origins of Containment*.

This form of explanation brings us closer to an answer to our guiding question, but again falls short in important ways. By looking at the policymaking process and the elites that guided it, we can come to better understandings of Truman's individual decisions in 1947, 1949, and 1950. However, we lose both the macro social structures and the emotional microfoundations undergirding those decisions. In focusing only on the foreign policy elite, we lose sight of the public and the social structures to which it contributes, structures which policy elites cannot escape. This limits our ability to answer a question about how elites *and* the public allowed for an all-out mobilization. Further, cognitive theories like Larson's often rely on embedded, though un-theorized, affective microfoundations.²⁷ These theories rely on individual beliefs to explain behaviors, but fail to recognize the role of emotions in constituting those beliefs or rendering them salient.²⁸ These explanations, then, are simultaneously too narrow in excluding the public and its influence and too wide in overlooking emotions.

To account for the all-out public and elite mobilization, then, we can turn to the third school of explanations, or the ideational adjustment school. Buoyed by the cultural turn in History and the constructivist turn in International Relations, this newly ascendant school focuses on diffuse, nonmaterial forces, such as ideas and ideology. In this form of scholarship, actors both make and are remade by the social reality within which they are embedded. Since meaning arises not from an objective material reality but rather from interpretation, it is important to study the process and consequences of those interpretations. Scholars in this camp pay close attention to ideational forces, including norms, ideas, and identities. In explaining Soviet Cold War foreign policy, for example, Ted Hopf places the focuses on publics and societies in his *Reconstructing the Cold War*, arguing

²⁷ For example, she argues that Truman believed that Stalin could be trusted, because he understood the leader as a Soviet version of the Kansas City political boss, Tom Pendergast, a man for whom he had fond feelings. *Ibid.*, 132–35.

²⁸ This point will be explained more fully in Chapter 1. For more on emotional beliefs, see Jonathan Mercer, "Emotional Beliefs," *International Organization* 64, no. 1 (January 2010): 1–31.

that the emergence of a post-Stalin “discourse of difference” – developed in resistance to the previous hegemonic “discourse of danger” – dictated the shifts in Soviet foreign policy from the Stalin to Khrushchev eras.²⁹ Historian Odd Arne Westad’s *The Global Cold War* is another recent proponent of this approach, arguing for the ideological-political struggle between capitalism and communism as the cause for the interventionist policies of Washington and Moscow throughout the world.³⁰ Other scholars focus on different cultural and ideational factors, including Michael Hunt’s study of American ideals of liberty, racial hierarchy, and opposition to revolution³¹; Michael Hogan’s analysis of an ascendant national security discourse³²; Frank Costigliola’s inquiry into gendered conceptions of containment³³; and William Appleman Williams’ earlier influential indictment of America’s expansionist imperial ideology.³⁴ In each work, societal conditions or ideas help explain the transition from the post-World II era into the Cold War era.³⁵

The contributions of this school are myriad, bringing us closer to an answer. First, these studies often constitute “middle-range theory,” located between the high level of

²⁹ Ted Hopf, *Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945-1958* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

³⁰ John Lewis Gaddis’ earlier work would also fit into this camp. John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

³¹ Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

³² Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

³³ Frank Costigliola, “‘Unceasing Pressure for Penetration’: Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan’s Formation of the Cold War,” *The Journal of American History* 83, no. 4 (1997): 1309–39.

³⁴ William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1972). Williams’ work is part of a larger historiographical debate in this realm concerning whether political-economic or security concerns dominated political decision making in this period. For a good historiographical overview of this debate, see Caldwell, “The Cold War,” 107-108. For arguments centering around the political-economic motivations for early Cold War American foreign policy, see Thomas J. McCormick, *America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Curt Cardwell, *NSC 68 and the Political Economy of the Early Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For those that subordinate the political-economic considerations to national security ones, see Craig and Logevall, *America’s Cold War*; Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*; Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*.

³⁵ Other historians focused on ideology as an explanatory variable in the beginning of the Cold War include Robert Jervis, “Identity and the Cold War” and David Engerman, “Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. I: Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997).

generality evoked by international systemic theories and the high degree of specificity promoted by individual-centered theories.³⁶ They locate individuals and collectives within social structures, often with the explicit purpose of illuminating the relative strengths of structure and agency. Second, these theories pay attention to nonmaterial forces that are often left unexamined by other foreign policy approaches. Rather than taking for granted the “common-sense” of interactions (e.g. a “self-help” system of international relations, in Wendt’s case), these scholars engage with it, looking at the ways common sense is constituted. However, a general shortcoming of this school lies in its inability to explain change that is anything but gradual. Relying on diffuse social forces like socialization or acclimatization, sudden shifts away from the norm are not well explained by the dynamics of mutual constitution.³⁷ These explanations, in other words, cannot explain the abrupt about-face of striking Korea from the list of top priorities to initiating a military intervention mere months later.

There are notable exceptions to this critique, including Jeffrey Legro’s *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*. Works like Legro’s seek to explain rapid foreign policy change or “critical junctures” by addressing “exogenous shocks that puncture stable equilibria.”³⁸ In these understandings, certain events occur that force a reconsideration of dominant ideas, or at least allow for contestation that might result in the toppling of hegemonic ideas by newly ascendant ones. While persuasive in many respects, these exogenous shock-focused explanations fail to explain *why* the events in question are shocking. The period under examination in this thesis is replete with potentially shocking events, but only some proved to be destabilizing. Why would the North Korean invasion of South Korea prove to be a shock to the Truman administration, while the Communist

³⁶ For the contributions of constructivism to middle range theory, see Hopf, *Reconstructing the Cold War*, vii.

³⁷ Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction,” in *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

³⁸ Legro, *Rethinking the World*, 29–35; Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security*, 180.

takeover of Beijing would not? These constructivist scholars of sudden change focusing on exogenous shocks cannot provide an answer.

A subschool of the ideational adjustment school does a better job, but, I would argue, still falls short in crucial ways. This subschool is what I term the “discursive adjustment” school. In it, scholars of discourse and narrative from the constructivist and poststructuralist worlds argue that change itself occurs only through language. What makes the exogenous shocks cited above shocking is their construction within a discourse. As Colin Hay writes, “crises are constituted in and through narrative.”³⁹ Members of this school include poststructuralist scholars like David Campbell, who argues that “the constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is...not a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility.”⁴⁰ A recent prominent work in this vein is Ronald Krebs’ *Narrative and the Making of US National Security*. Krebs uses a tripartite understanding of linguistic power – comprised of the rhetorical environment, speaker’s authority, and rhetorical mode – to argue that foreign policy change occurs when one dominant narrative is supplanted by another after a process of political contestation.⁴¹ This discursive school also includes the Copenhagen School’s securitization scholars, for whom events become emergencies when constituted as such through speech acts.⁴² For scholars of the Copenhagen School, when the trifecta of the speech act, the speaker, and the audience come together under facilitating conditions, securitizing agents are able to construct existential threats.⁴³ For these scholars, then, the massive changes of the early Cold War period can be explained via discursive and narrative changes.

³⁹ Colin Hay, “Narrating Crisis: The Discursive Construction of the ‘Winter of Discontent,’” *Sociology* 30, no. 2 (May 1, 1996): 254.

⁴⁰ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Revised (Manchester: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 13.

⁴¹ Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security*.

⁴² See, for the canonical example, Barry Buzan, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

⁴³ This explanation follows the traditional Copenhagen School understanding, as laid out in Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Other securitization scholars have argued for a more systematic or more normatively attuned approach,

Yet, even these discursive scholars, who endogenize what other scholars leave exogenous, suffer from explanatory shortcomings. These scholars explain change in terms of one narrative or discourse displacing another, but they do not sufficiently explain why one particular discourse may hold more resonance than another. By staying purely within a logic of discourse, these scholars fail to appreciate non-discursive factors that help pre-judge the outcome of contestation. Since discursive analysis is based entirely on contestation rather than any narrative per se, as Krebs writes, “we cannot look to the content of narratives of national security to identify the winners of narrative competition.”⁴⁴ While enticing in its generalizability, this approach provides no way to arbitrate between two speeches that have the same formal structure (or, in Krebs’ formulation, rhetorical mode) as it cannot account for speech content – in other words, it can tell us what happened, but not why. This, as Eric Van Rythoven has argued, is due to an ontological inconsistency embedded within securitization and other discursive theories. These theories rely on an ontology of language and sociality, but some of the main mechanisms of the theory – fear, resonance, and salience – do not fit into this ontological stance.⁴⁵ This matters for empirical analysis: in focusing purely on narrative and not theorizing *why* particular narratives were suited to reach hegemonic status, Krebs contends that a narrow Cold War consensus developed only in 1953, years after many of the key factors that he sought to explain were already established.⁴⁶ As will be discussed in Chapter

leading to recent different variants of securitization. See, for example, Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 357–83; Lene Hansen, “Reconstructing Desecuritisation: The Normative-Political in the Copenhagen School and Directions for How to Apply It,” *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 3 (July 2012): 525–46.

⁴⁴ Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security*, 55.

⁴⁵ Van Rythoven also argues that by looking only at language and sociality, securitization theorists ignore key aspects of fear’s affective ontology, including its embodiedness, its straining of the boundaries of articulation, and its pre-conscious nature. For more on this, see Eric Van Rythoven, “Learning to Feel, Learning to Fear? Emotions, Imaginaries, and Limits in the Politics of Securitization,” *Security Dialogue* 46, no. 5 (October 1, 2015): 458–75.

⁴⁶ To focus on Krebs specifically for a moment, the way that he measures how settled a narrative is through newspaper editorials; in the case of the Cold War, he argues that consensus only emerged in 1953, and it was narrower than we might expect. By only looking at these editorials for this measurement, he is measuring only an elite view – but not that of specific policymakers who actually are able to leverage power.

4, I argue that by theorizing dynamics left only implicitly addressed in discursive studies, 1950 emerges as the important year in which elite foreign policymakers became wedded to a Cold War worldview, and 1947 as the date in which the ideo-affective process of developing that worldview began.

4 Reintroducing affect to understand the Cold War

While strategic, individual, and ideational/discursive approaches all provide important parts of the answer to this thesis' overarching question of how the United States elite and public became mobilized for the Cold War in the way that they did, these pre-existing explanations are unable to fully account for the empirical case at hand. Strategic adjustment realists explain the presence of conflict between the two superpowers, but not any of the individual events that shaped the conflict into what would come to be known as the Cold War. Individual adjustment scholars provide valuable specificity towards explanations of elite decisions, but fail to account for the role or impact of these decisions upon the public or vice versa, thereby explaining only one part of the phenomenon under study. Ideational and discursive adjustment scholars come closest to accounting for the all-out shifts of both the public and the elite, but they fall short of explaining how it was possible that particular ideas – like national security or the inherent conflict between communism and capitalism – resonated more than other ideas – like antipathy towards a garrison state or fear of inflation.

To remedy these shortcomings, I present a synthetic approach that I label “ideo-affective politics.” To considerations of ideas and political institutions and practices, I add the theorization of affect and emotions, and their interactions with ideas and politics. In bringing in affect, my research joins the burgeoning field of IR scholarship that some have

In one way, then, it is too sensitive to elite understandings, while at the same time, by ignoring affective factors, it is not sensitive enough.

dubbed “the emotional turn.”⁴⁷ Beginning with groundbreaking works by Jonathan Mercer (1996) and Neta Crawford (2000), this school of IR scholars has employed insights from cognitive and social psychology to uncover and analyze the ways that “emotion and cognition interact from early perception to decision making and reasoning.”⁴⁸ From the role of emotion in the development and maintenance of credibility⁴⁹ to the establishment of trust and empathy in negotiations,⁵⁰ different aspects of emotions can be found to play large roles upon different parts of international relations and foreign policy decision-making. Further research has focused on group emotions, following collective “circulations of affect” that can explain the migration of emotions across large groups of individuals as well as the ways that fear of one particular thing – like terrorism – can become displaced from the anchoring phenomenon and spread to other things – like biological weapons.⁵¹

Building on these insights, I argue that by paying closer attention to the affective dynamics at play from 1945 to 1950, we can better understand Cold War mobilization and the fits and starts by which it took place. To do so, I introduce the three-part ramping-tamping-revamping pathway. Ramping refers to the strategic cultivation of public emotions for political purposes; tamping to the strategic attempts to quell public emotions; and revamping to the reconstruction of affective and political approaches by the original strategic actor. The main claim of this dissertation is that to comprehend the outbreak of the Cold War, we have to view it through the lens of these dynamics. Specifically, Cold War mobilization began with the Truman Doctrine and its accompanying campaign, as the Truman administration strategically attempted to ramp up public emotions (including both fear and patriotic pride) so that they might be able to pass the European aid policies that

⁴⁷ Evidence of this turn can be found in the presence of a 2014 special issue of *International Theory* and Hall and Ross’s 2016 agenda-setting article in *International Organization*.

⁴⁸ Phelps qtd. in Neta C. Crawford, “Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy,” *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (November 2014): 538.

⁴⁹ Mercer, “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” 225.

⁵⁰ Deborah Welch Larson, *Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

⁵¹ Andrew A. G. Ross, *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014), chap. 1, pg 70-76.

had previously fallen short of necessary congressional approval. In utilizing these strategies, the Truman administration unleashed a “sorcerer’s apprentice” dynamic, getting far more than they bargained for: in addition to the persuasive goals that they set out to accomplish, the newly unleashed affective dynamics exercised their creative capacities, migrating across populations and contexts. Opponents were able to take advantage of these dynamics, using the newly constituted “structure of feeling” to entrap the Truman administration in certain policy positions. When the Truman administration attempted to tamp down these emotions, they found that they were now out of touch with the public’s ideo-affective expectations, rendering their new approaches at calm ineffective. By 1950, when North Korean forces invaded the southern half of the peninsula, the Truman administration revamped their policy approach, determining almost immediately to intervene, and to present the policy to the public in purposefully affectively-laden terms. This was not only a case of a strategic readjustment (“if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em”) but also a genuine reappraisal prompted by a form of affective blowback. The initiating agents had effectively reconstituted the public ideo-affective structures in which they sought to operate in 1947, and by 1950, those structures had reconstituted the agents themselves.

There are existing works that acknowledge, even if they fail to fully theorize, affective forces in the early Cold War period. In his 1972 *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, Richard Freeland argues that the inflammatory rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine and the deliberate fear campaign that it inculcated in the interest of foreign policy goals was responsible for the Red Scare of domestic anticommunism that overtook the nation in the early 1950s. In some ways, this early work comes to a conclusion that is closest to my own. “In the course of the campaign for the Marshall Plan,” Freeland writes, “the Truman administration became so committed to a foreign policy based on anti-communism that eventually it was forced into international commitments inconsistent with

its own perceptions of the national interest.”⁵² Freeland highlights the role of fear in unleashing policies antithetical to the interests of the Truman administration.⁵³ I take Freeland’s work several steps further, arguing not that they acted against their own interests, but rather that those interests became redefined by the campaign they had undertaken. A second important work that provides valuable affective insights into the beginning of the Cold War is Jonathan Mercer’s 2013 “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War.” Mercer, unlike the historian Freeland, is a scholar of International Relations, and consequently provides explicit theorization into the role that emotions played in the 1950-53 conflict. Focusing purely on the individual level of analysis,⁵⁴ he argues “emotion explains the American reversal of preferences, the mistaken belief that the U.S. reputation was in jeopardy, and thus the surprising U.S. commitment to fight a war in Korea.”⁵⁵ Mercer’s analysis of one particular episode conducts the type of emotionally sensitive analysis that this thesis strives to achieve while extending the period of analysis to a historical process (rather than an event) and beyond the key decision makers to the public at large. Freeland’s and Mercer’s works offer important contributions, but I would argue that they fail to capture the entire picture, one spanning across the elite and public, from 1945 to 1950.

This thesis thus makes both empirical and theoretical contributions. Empirically, it offers a new take on how the Cold War came to be and provides new insights regarding

⁵² Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948* (New York: New York University Press, 1985), xi.

⁵³ In the International Relations realm, Wesley W. Widmaier’s 2007 article builds on this work to argue that the Truman Doctrine and its accompanying framing of the Cold War as a civilizational conflict led to political victories for the Republican Party, as “Truman...proved incapable of controlling the political effects of his own rhetoric.” Wesley W. Widmaier, “Constructing Foreign Policy Crises: Interpretive Leadership in the Cold War and War on Terrorism,” *International Studies Quarterly* 51, no. 4 (December 1, 2007): 788.

⁵⁴ Historian Frank Costigliola’s *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances* is another important work that focuses on the individual level emotion in the beginning of the Cold War. Looking at “personal politics,” Costigliola argues that Truman mismanaged the U.S. relationship with Stalin because he failed to achieve the emotional connection that Roosevelt had achieved, relying on other emotional appraisals that led him to understand the Soviet Union as an unappeasable foe. Costigliola, *Roosevelt’s Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War*.

⁵⁵ Mercer, “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” 240.

officials' decisions about how to constitute the United States vis-a vis the Soviet Union. Theoretically, it draws upon work concerning emotions, persuasion, and public mobilization to explicate a theory of ideo-affective politics that introduces the “ramping-tamping-revamping” dynamic of foreign policy change. While this is not a generalized explanation that treats emotions as an unproblematic universal variable, the identified mechanisms I argue to be at work at the beginning of the Cold War can also be found in other times and places and affecting other issues.

5 The thesis to come

In Chapter 1, “Towards a Theory of Ideo-Affective Politics”, I outline the theoretical contours of the explanation that follows. I begin with an analysis of emotional “ramping,” looking at why policymakers might turn to affective strategies as a tool of public persuasion. I examine the conditions under which affective strategies might or might not work. I then turn to “tamping,” or why an administration might want to combat their original affective strategies if the effects were no longer advantageous. I again evaluate under what conditions tamping strategies may or may not work, focusing both on the ontological characteristics of emotional dynamics and the common strategic error of juxtaposing emotion and reason. Finally, I turn to “revamping” dynamics, or the dual strategic and genuine reconsiderations of ideo-affective beliefs and policies that may take place if tamping strategies are unsuccessful in changing the structure of feeling. I introduce the notion of “affective blowback,” arguing for the possibility of the reconstitution of the initiating agents' emotional beliefs as a result of strategic moves. In closing this chapter, I discuss methods of observing and analyzing emotions.

Chapters 2-4 comprise the empirical sections of the thesis. Chapter 2, “Ramping and the Onset of the Truman Offensive,” is focused on the period from 1945 through 1947, with a particular focus on the writing of the Truman Doctrine and its accompanying

affective campaign, which together I refer to as the “Truman Offensive.” I show why the decision was undertaken to ramp up public emotions and how that decision was rendered effective through the use of discursive and practice-based techniques. Chapter 3, “Tamping, The Structure of Feeling, and the Shocks of 1949,” turns to the aftermath of the Truman Offensive, highlighting both the immediate unintended consequences – whereby opposition politicians seized on the new ideo-affective approach to entrap the administration with regard to aid to China and suspicion over domestic communist subversion – and the longer term unintended consequences born from the administration’s reshaping of the public structure of feeling, including the public rejection of the administration’s efforts to tamp down public emotion following the “shocks of 1949.” Hamstrung in their abilities to conduct policy, the Truman administration entered 1950 with a certain strategic determination to reshape their policy approaches to better match public expressions of affect. In Chapter 4, “Revamping, NSC-68, and the Korean War,” I show both the strategic calculus made to return to ideo-affective techniques and reshape policymaking with a case study of the writing of NSC-68, and the affective blowback shown to be in full effect with the immediate decision to intervene in Korea. I argue that the administration had had its own ideo-affective approach revamped by the very forces it had strategically unleashed three years earlier. In 1947, they sought to use ideo-affective politics. In 1949, they found those politics used against them. And in 1950, they were transformed by those same politics.

In Chapter 5, I conclude the thesis by revisiting the proposed theory of ideo-affective politics and its ramping-tamping-revamping pathway. I evaluate its strengths and shortcomings in explaining the beginning of the Cold War. Since my theory is not a predictive one but a “how possible” one, I examine other potential ideo-affective pathways and variations on ramping-tamping-revamping. I close by analyzing the thesis’

generalizability and applicability to cases beyond the beginning of the Cold War, and outlining other avenues for future research.

Chapter 1: Towards a Theory of Ideo-Affective Politics

1 The Sorcerer's Apprentice

In Goethe's 1779 poem, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," an elderly sorcerer leaves his apprentice in charge of cleaning his workshop. The apprentice soon tires of filling and carrying buckets of water, and decides to attempt a complex charm to animate a broomstick, making it carry the water for him. Thinking he has achieved his goal, the apprentice allows the broomstick to work, but soon realizes that he cannot stop the broom as it continues to bring more and more water into the workshop. Frantically, the apprentice breaks the broom in a desperate effort to stop the flooding. But the broken pieces each become their own broomsticks, carrying more and more water faster and faster. The apprentice's accomplishment has turned to nightmare as the situation spins out of his control. Only when the sorcerer returns and casts a new spell does the chaos end.¹

In this chapter, I introduce the components of my theory of ideo-affective politics, components which help to illuminate the "sorcerer's apprentice"-like dynamics at play in the Truman administration during the beginning of the Cold War. In the pages that follow, I go through each step of this process of foreign policy change: ramping, tamping, and revamping. I show how the strategic decision to ramp up public emotions can unleash not only potentially beneficial tactics of persuasion and mobilization, but also unanticipated creative affective dynamics and opportunities for entrapment by political enemies. I then look at the conditions under which actors may want to tamp down the emotions that they have unleashed, to stop the broomstick from slopping water all over the floor, and the tactics that may allow those actors to do so – along with the attributes of emotions that make this tamping process difficult. I turn then to what happens if one is not able to tamp down disadvantageous public emotion: a revamping of the actor's ideo-affective political

¹ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," trans. Edwin Zeydel, *Virginia Commonwealth University Department of Foreign Languages*, 1779, http://germanstories.vcu.edu/goethe/zauber_e3.html.

approach (where the guiding analogy takes a sinister turn). I look at both strategic contributors to this phenomenon and the possibility for genuine transformation due to affective blowback. Finally, I close the chapter with a methodological inquiry into the analytical tools that I will then employ in the empirical chapters to capture and explicate emotions and affects.

Before turning to the analysis, it is important to pause on two conceptual points. The first is the distinction between affect and emotion. Neither term has been agreed upon with a single unproblematic definition.² For the purposes of this thesis, I follow the lead of Todd Hall and Andrew Ross and define emotion as “socially recognized, structured episodes of affectively valenced response, such as joy or fear,” while affect consists of the conscious and subconscious “embodied mental processes and the felt dimensions of human experience.”³ Consequently, I view emotions as socially-stereotyped phenomena, while affect remains a larger category of felt experience that may not be able to be articulated or even consciously noticed by the bearer.⁴ Affect can be diffuse and indeterminate, making even stereotypical emotions difficult to disentangle from one another.⁵

² George E. Marcus et al., *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), chap. 1.

³ Todd H. Hall and Andrew A.G. Ross, “Affective Politics after 9/11,” *International Organization* FirstView (May 2015): 2.

⁴ Intriguingly, in an earlier book, Ross argued that emotion and affect were interchangeable, used “as umbrella terms encompassing various emotion types.... emotion/affect [are] a multidimensional capability that consists of activations of the insular cortex and limbic system, employs maps of the body, and sometimes generates feelings.” Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 20.

⁵ With this caution in mind, I do not follow a “basic emotions” form of thinking, which contends that there are a number of emotions, like anger, joy, fear, happiness, etc. that operate in standard ways across populations and have significant unique effects. Because I argue for the socio-cultural making of emotions, I contend that it is difficult to distinguish between types of emotions, and that there are not standard physiological responses that can account for specific affective stimuli. For more on basic emotions, see the works of Paul Ekman, including Paul Ekman, “An Argument for Basic Emotions,” *Cognition and Emotion* 6, no. 3–4 (May 1, 1992): 169–200.

This leads to the second conceptual point. The reader will notice that, unlike many of my interlocutors, I speak of the role of emotion rather than fear per se.⁶ I do so to avoid the rump materialism stemming from realist notions of fear as a motivator of state practice in the state of anarchy. Given the social construction of emotions and the difficulties in differentiating one emotion in practice from another – who is to say that I am experiencing fear versus anxiety versus anger? – it is analytically limiting to focus only on fear to the exclusion of larger affective dynamics. That does not mean that I do not seek to observe when actors try to strategically inculcate fear; it simply means that I do so alongside recognizing the strategic uses of other emotions as well, like pride or shock, as well as that the intended emotions deployed by strategic actors may not be consistent with the emotions experienced by the public audience.

2 Ramping

2.1 *Why ramp up emotions to persuade?*

The first step in my proposed theoretical pathway is “ramping,” or the strategic cultivation of emotions in a mass public. In a democracy, the need for public mobilization, or mass persuasion, is crucial to the process of governing. “Politics, at its core, is about persuasion,” write Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody. “Politics is about turning minorities of today into majorities of tomorrow, and the risk as well as the strength of democratically contested politics lies precisely in its openness to change.”⁷ The practice of politics in a democracy is one of getting the public to agree with, or at least vote for, one’s desired policies. To make major changes, elite policymakers must mobilize the public in their favor.

⁶ As Shiping Tang has written, “fear has occupied a prominent place in the science of international politics since its very beginning.” Shiping Tang, “Fear in International Politics: Two Positions,” *International Studies Review* 10, no. 3 (2008): 459.

⁷ Diana Carole Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman, and Richard A. Brody, *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 1.

That is not to say that there is a neat link between policymakers and public opinion per se. Early studies of the subject tended to downplay the connection between the public and elites. The mid-twentieth century was dominated by the “Almond-Lippmann consensus,” which identified a volatile and unstructured public with little impact on foreign policymaking.⁸ These early efforts were backed up by work by Philip Converse, who argued that the idea of a coherent “public opinion” is little more than a myth, for there is a huge amount of variance in the levels of political knowledge that members of the public have.⁹ Since this work, however, other scholarship has challenged some of this discounting of the public’s influence on the policy process. This group has presented a more coherent, explicable view of public opinion, from Nincic’s observations of a “sensible public” with predictable responses to international events, to Page and Shapiro’s findings of policy changes being preceded by changes in public opinion.¹⁰ These studies often emphasize the “electoral connection,” or the idea that the public makes its opinions on foreign policy felt through the election or removal of its leaders. Despite the unresolved nature of the question as to whether or not the public truly influences foreign policymaking, the fact

⁸ For summary of these early studies and their impact on the field, see Ole R. Holsti, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus,” *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (1992): 439–66.

⁹ That variance matters, as John Zaller demonstrated, as people “are able to react critically to the arguments they encounter only to the extent that they are knowledgeable about political affairs.” This means, somewhat counterintuitively, that the most politically-attuned members of society are actually the most likely to have their opinions shaped by elites, because they are exposed to elite opinion in a way that politically disinterested members are not. Because of this agenda setting function of the political class, and the gate keeping function of the media, the public, in this classic conception, has its opinion shaped by the elite, making it a negligible factor in the making of policy. This is especially true in the case of foreign policy, which is farther removed from the realm of democratic deliberation. Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” *Critical Review* 18, no. 1 (1964): 1–74; Philip E. Converse, “Assessing the Capacity of Mass Electorates,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 3 (2000): 331–53; John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origin of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1.

¹⁰ Miroslav Nincic, “A Sensible Public: New Perspectives on Popular Opinion and Foreign Policy,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36, no. 4 (December 1, 1992): 772–89; Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy,” *American Political Science Review* 77, no. 1 (March 1983): 175–190. The findings of a more cohesive public should not be seen as completely overturning the previous work, but rather as complicating the findings. While scholars have found evidence of more stable public attitudes, the extent to which those cohere into electoral commitments and predictable actions remains unsettled. As Aldrich et al. write in their 2006 meta-review of public opinion research, “The public hold attitudes about foreign policy, but determining which aspects of those attitudes will get expressed is neither straightforward nor automatic. Elites appear to retain some leeway in shaping the expression of public opinion, but the mechanisms that give them that leeway are still little understood.” John H. Aldrich et al., “Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 9, no. 1 (2006): 487.

remains that the elites need to account for public wishes if they are to keep the public on their side, even if just to gain congressional approval for funding requests.

Studies of public persuasion emphasize a number of techniques that leaders might use. Some look at the role of argument to persuade, or focus more closely on discursive tactics.¹¹ Others look closely at the role of the media, including the effects of framing.¹² One of the oldest studies of political persuasion is Aristotle's *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. In his guide to the subject, the philosopher enumerated three forms of persuasion: *ethos*, the character of the speaker; *logos*, the content of the speech; and *pathos*, the emotional impact of the speech on the listener.¹³ Through marshaling these tactics together, a politician could be at his or her most persuasive.

Aristotle argues that *pathos* is crucial to persuasion because “the success of the persuasive efforts depends on the emotional dispositions of the audience.”¹⁴ An angry audience might perceive an argument one way, while a happy audience might perceive the same argument another way. A skilled orator will evoke an advantageous emotional response because that response dictates audience judgment and reasoning.¹⁵ Without *pathos*, the rhetorician's toolbox is incomplete.

In looking at public mobilization, this thesis is concerned with why politicians might turn to *pathos*, or the ramping up of emotions, to persuade their audiences and polities. Since the days of Aristotle, neuroscientific and psychological advancements have provided more insights into why emotions can be so persuasive. Three main reasons that I

¹¹ Vivien A. Schmidt, “Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2008): 303–26; Michael D. Cobb and James H. Kuklinski, “Changing Minds: Political Arguments and Political Persuasion,” *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 1 (1997): 88–121.

¹² For a good overview, see Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, “Framing Theory,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 10 (June 15, 2007): 103–26.

¹³ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric*, 38–39.

¹⁴ Christof Rapp, “Aristotle's Rhetoric,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2010 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2010), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/>.

¹⁵ For more on the Aristotelian conception of basic emotions – he conceived of six different emotions – see David Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), chap. 1.

will discuss below include the role of emotions and affect in judgment and reasoning processes; the role of emotions in evoking certain behaviors; and the powerful intersections between emotion and identity.

While much rationalist social science reifies a binary divide between emotion and reason, born of Cartesian dualism, modern neuroscience and psychology shows that the phenomena are actually intertwined. As Neta Crawford writes, “emotions and cognitions do not exist in dichotomy or discontinuity, except in our [political science] scholarship.”¹⁶ Instead, studies show that emotions are an inextricable part of cognition.¹⁷ Emotion affects reasoning,¹⁸ memory,¹⁹ attention,²⁰ risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses,²¹ probability calculations,²² and even price valuations of goods.²³ As Damasio et al. showed in their study of people with and without damage to the orbitofrontal cortex (part of the brain responsible for emotional regulation), decision outcomes are less effective for those who cannot evoke affective responses to the consequences of their actions.²⁴ Emotion and

¹⁶ Crawford, “Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics,” 538.

¹⁷ For a good systematic review of these studies, see Elizabeth A. Phelps, “Emotion and Cognition: Insights from Studies of the Human Amygdala,” *Annual Review of Psychology* 57, no. 1 (2006): 27–53.

¹⁸ Joseph E. LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

¹⁹ William James wrote of emotions and memory, “an impression may be so exciting emotionally as almost to leave a scar upon the cerebral tissues.” James qtd. in Stephan Hamann, “Cognitive and Neural Mechanisms of Emotional Memory,” *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 5, no. 9 (September 1, 2001): 394.

²⁰ Paula M. Niedenthal and Shinobu Kitayama, eds., *The Heart’s Eye: Emotional Influences in Perception and Attention* (San Diego: Academic Press Inc, 1996).

²¹ See for example the study conducted by Ditto et al. which found that “Visceral cues indicating proximity to objects of desire can lead people to be disproportionately influenced by the anticipated rewards of immediate gratification rather than the risks of consummatory behavior.” Peter H. Ditto et al., “Visceral Influences on Risk-Taking Behavior,” *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making* 19, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 99–113.

²² Cass R. Sunstein, “Terrorism and Probability Neglect,” *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 26, no. 2–3 (March 2003): 121–36.

²³ Kahneman, Daniel, Knetsch, Jack L., and Thaler, Richard H., “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5, no. 1 (1991): 193–206.

²⁴ In this famous experiment, the researchers gave subjects four different decks of cards. The subjects were told to turn over the cards from whichever decks they liked to try to win as much money as possible. Some of the decks were high risk-high reward, and some were much more predictable in providing the subject gain. Those with damage to their orbitofrontal cortex did a far worse job avoiding major losses, as they were not warded off by the negative affective consequences that those without brain damage experienced. See, among other works by this research team, Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio, and Antonio R. Damasio, “Emotion, Decision Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex,” *Cerebral Cortex* 10, no. 3 (March 1, 2000): 295–307.

cognition are not just non-opposed; instead, modern scientists contend, “that emotion interacts with cognition has become a fairly well accepted notion.”²⁵

This means that many contentions that people hold, such as notions of credibility, trust, or reputation are best thought of as what Jonathan Mercer refers to as “emotional beliefs.” These are not “irrational” beliefs, but rather beliefs constituted by and strengthened through affective dynamics.²⁶ As emotions are inextricably bound up with cognition, they play several crucial roles in reasoning and judgment. First, they are an assimilation mechanism, meaning that feelings come into operation when we make judgments. People “use their beliefs” – which are emotionally constituted – to “interpret evidence.”²⁷ And second, they are used as evidence themselves in making judgments, as “people use how they feel as independent evidence for a belief.”²⁸ This means that affect both impacts the interpretation of external evidence, and serves as evidence itself in interpreting a situation.

Beyond playing a crucial role in judgment and reasoning at the individual level, emotional ramping can also prove a useful tool for politicians because of the ways that emotional arousal can compel certain behavioral tendencies and demands for behaviors in others.²⁹ Political scientist Ted Brader has shown through experimental means that prospective voters who were made to feel enthusiasm were motivated to participate in the electoral process based on existing loyalties, while those who were made to feel fear

²⁵ Others go further than to suggest that these realms interact. Luiz Pessoa, for example, holds that “emotion is *not* separate from cognition in the brain.” Luiz Pessoa, *The Cognitive-Emotional Brain: From Interactions to Integration* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2013), 2–3.

²⁶ Mercer, “Emotional Beliefs.”

²⁷ Mercer, “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” 227.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 228.

²⁹ Just as the connection between emotions and reasoning is complex, so too are the connections between emotion, affect, and behavior. For a long time, the dominant understanding was one of direct causality: that emotions lead directly to particular behaviors (e.g. fear leads to fight or flight). More recently, social psychologists have suggested that the relationship may be more faithfully characterized as “feedback”, wherein emotions more indirectly influence behaviors through both conscious emotional states and non-conscious affective responses. For more, see Roy F. Baumeister et al., “How Emotion Shapes Behavior: Feedback, Anticipation, and Reflection, Rather Than Direct Causation,” *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 11, no. 2 (May 1, 2007): 167–203.

resorted to “reliance on contemporary evaluation” and were, overall, more persuadable.³⁰ Emotional arousal can cause citizens to be more likely to participate beyond the voting process, including through volunteering or contacting one’s representatives, while anger has even been shown to change political internet users’ information seeking habits, narrowing the sources they consult and inhibiting information processing and recall.³¹ Different emotions can encourage not only different behaviors, but also demands for particular behaviors by political leaders. Using survey data, scholars have demonstrated that following the attacks of September 11, respondents who were fearful wanted the government to take precautionary measures to prevent future attacks, while those who were angry were much less likely to demand such measures.³²

Efforts at persuasion benefit from emotional appeals not only because of affects’ impacts on reasoning and behavior, but also because of the relationship between identity and emotion. Different scholars theorize this relationship in different ways. On the one hand, approaches in the psychoanalytic tradition suggest that as socially constructed phenomena, identities are inherently unstable, open to contestation and processes of reconstitution. Identities constitute notions of the self and others, and humans desire to consolidate notions of the self through a secure identity.³³ Through offering secure constructions of the self, politicians can persuade publics emotionally through appealing to identity-based factors. On the other hand, findings by scholars working on social

³⁰ Ted Brader, “Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions,” *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 388–405.

³¹ George E. Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2000); Ted Brader, *Campaigning for Hearts and Minds* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Ted Brader, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay, “What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat,” *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 (October 1, 2008): 959–78. See summary of studies in this area in Ted Brader, George E. Marcus, and Kristyn L. Miller, “Emotion and Public Opinion,” in *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

³² Leonie Huddy et al., “On the Distinct Political Effects of Anxiety and Anger” in Marcus et al., *The Affect Effect*; Jennifer S. Lerner et al., “Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment,” *Psychological Science* 14, no. 2 (March 2003): 144–50.

³³ See more on this below. Ty Solomon, *The Politics of Subjectivity in American Foreign Policy Discourses* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015).

psychology's Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) suggest the existence of "group emotions," or, "emotions that arise when people identify with a social group and respond emotionally to events or objects that impinge on the group."³⁴ In other words, one of an individual's many identities is that of group member – perhaps Muslim, Canadian, citizen, Republican, etc. – and, when that identity is activated, individuals respond emotionally not as an individual, but as a group member. This can lead to the "convergence of emotions as well as attitudes and behaviors" among group members, and some social psychologists have gone so far as to argue that "membership in a group is itself sufficient to determine emotional experience."³⁵ Regardless of their ontological differences, both the psychoanalytic and social psychological approaches point towards emotional appeals as powerful sources of persuasion given their ability to activate social identities. The key insight that IET provides scholars of international politics and foreign policy is that "group emotions are not about aggregation of individuals' emotions but rather about the process by which the group becomes part of the individual self and the convergence of emotions within the group to a prototypical emotion."³⁶ IET explains why I might *feel* like an American even if I do not personally witness a potentially emotionally evocative event. It allows for there to be such a thing as a "public emotion" among hundreds of thousands of people located thousands of miles apart. Physical proximity is not the key to the synchrony of emotional experience; identity proximity is. This allows politicians' successful efforts at emotional ramping to lead to persuasion across groups.³⁷

³⁴ Eliot R. Smith and Diane M. Mackie, "Intergroup Emotions," in Lisa Feldman Barrett, Michael Lewis, and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, *Handbook of Emotions* (New York: Guilford Publications, 2016), 412.

³⁵ Brent Sasley, "Theorizing States' Emotions," *International Studies Review* 13, no. 3 (2011): 459–60.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 465.

³⁷ That I posit that there is such a thing as "group emotion" is not uncontested. "How emotions move from the individual to the collective is still inadequately articulated," writes Janice Stein. "Groups, after all, do not feel or think; individuals do." Because of this inadequate articulation, some contend that there is no such thing as collective feeling, for to feel requires a body. "Is shaming a state for its human rights abuses like shaming a toaster for burning toast?" Mercer asks. "Emotion requires a biological body, and neither states nor toasters have biological bodies. The practice of naming and shaming is not targeted at states as people, but at people in states." The embodied nature of individual emotion, however, does not preclude the existence of group emotion. Nor does it mean that group emotion is simply the aggregation of individuals'

Emotions, then, are a particularly potent phenomenon that politicians since antiquity have sought to ramp up for their own persuasive needs. Today, practitioners have set up cottage political consulting industries around emotional strategic communications.³⁸ It is common to speak of winning “hearts and minds,” and analyses of the 2016 U.S. presidential election often focused on the ability of the candidates to connect emotionally with their audiences. As De Gaulle commented, “sentiment inspires me as much as reason” – though of course, the two are intertwined.³⁹ Politicians need to mobilize their publics to get their policies passed, and seeking public emotional arousal – or ramping up public emotion – is an effective and powerful way to do so.

2.2 *How to ramp up emotions*

Given that we can understand affective dynamics as being crucial to processes of persuasion, we must then ask *how* affect and emotions can be ramped up within a public. The answer lies in discourse and practice. In Richard Rorty’s musings on *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, he noted the inherent sociality of emotions. While neuroscientists would continue to try and explore what was going on in people’s brains while experiencing

emotions. Instead, as modern neuroscientific research shows, “emotions are intersubjective social phenomena as much as they are biological subjective ones.” The “neuroplasticity” of the brain means that it changes and develops coextensively with the social environment in which humans are embedded, leading Mattern to assert, “that emotions are encoded in the social contests of world politics as much as they are in individual biology.” Even at the individual level, emotions are inherently social, as “affect is not a property of an individual but a capacity of a body that brings it into some specific social relation, such as a nation or political movement.” At the collective level, then, this intersubjective phenomenon is emergent from social interaction and identification among group members, but remains irreducible to these individual parts. Janice Gross Stein, “Threat Perceptions in International Relations,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology: Second Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jonathan Mercer, “Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity,” *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (November 2014): 516; Janice Bially Mattern, “On Being Convinced: An Emotional Epistemology of International Relations,” *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (November 2014): 590; Crawford, “Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics”; Todd H. Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 19.

³⁸ See, for example, the work of psychologist and consultant Drew Westen. Drew Westen, *The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008); Westen Strategies LLC, “Home,” 2010, <http://www.westenstrategies.com/>.

³⁹ De Gaulle qtd. in Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), lxxi. Jervis’ 2017 edition of his earlier work is notable for its newly rewritten preface, which acknowledges that he left out the vital role that emotions played in his original work. As he wrote, “Crucially, we rarely can go directly from the external situation to the actor’s response without considering emotions, and there is important variation here.”

different affective states, these efforts would be in vain: “the inside of people and quasi-people is to be explained by what goes on outside (and, in particular, by their place in our community) rather than conversely.”⁴⁰ In this understanding, emotions are expressed socially, and consequently, ought to be analyzed as such. Given this understanding of emotions “as about social life rather than internal states,” anthropologists Lutz and Abu-Lughod argued in 1990 for “focus[ing] on the constitution of emotion, and even the domain of emotion itself, in discourse or situated speech practices.”⁴¹ Discourses are the sites of construction and enactment of social emotions, both at the individual and collective levels.

Emotions can be embedded in, produced by, and evoked through discourse. Building on the work of Lutz and Abu-Lughod, Tamar Katriel argues for a tripartite understanding of emotional language. The three categories include: 1) discourses on emotion, wherein individuals name emotions and speak self-reflexively about how they are feeling; 2) emotional discourses, or the “expressivity of discourse...that is to say, the verbal and non-verbal ways through which people display their emotionality, and its specific nature and force through the act of enunciation”; and 3) emotion-evocative discourse, or “language used to bring forth particular emotions so as to affect listeners’ attitudes and actions.”⁴² This thesis is focused on the consequences of deploying emotion-evocative discourse, consequences which may be reflected in both discourses on emotion and emotional discourses. These categories, while analytically distinct, are overlapping in their real world instantiations and will be explored in concert with one another throughout this work.

⁴⁰ Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), 191.

⁴¹ Catherine Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod, *Language and the Politics of Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1–2.

⁴² Tamar Katriel, “Exploring Emotion Discourse,” in Tamar Katriel, “Exploring Emotion Discourse,” in *Methods of Exploring Emotions* (London: Routledge, 2015), 57–58.

The relationship between emotions and discourses is theoretically challenging to elucidate. As Solomon writes, “affect and discourse must be theorised as overlapping, yet not coterminous, phenomena.” Like ideas and emotions, discourse and affect are deeply intertwined in their appearance, but ontologically distinct. This ontological distinctiveness is crucial to acknowledge, for “if [affect and discourse] are viewed as partly but not always overlapping, then it becomes possible to theoretically differentiate between those discourses that become sites of affective investment for audiences (and thus become more dominant) than [sic.] those which do not become sites of investment.”⁴³ Put simply, the analysis of affect and emotional content allows the researcher to understand why some discourses are more successful in their acceptance by an audience than are others.⁴⁴

To achieve that success through the evocation of emotions, politicians and other orators may construct their emotion-evocative discourses through recourse to what scholars have variously referred to as “emotion codes,” “emotion schemas,” “emotionologies,” “emotional cultures” or “feeling rules, framing rules, and display rules.” These terms all refer to “sets of ideas about what emotions are appropriate to feel when, where, and toward whom or what as well as how emotion should be outwardly expressed.”⁴⁵ These socially-circulated discourses provide guidance to the listener as to the emotion that they, the member of the in-group, are supposed to feel. In the oft-cited example of the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the beginning of the War on Terror, these scholars argue that Bush’s speeches created a discourse suggesting how Americans ought to feel towards the instigators of these attacks and the

⁴³ Ty Solomon, “I Wasn’t Angry, Because I Couldn’t Believe It Was Happening?: Affect and Discourse in Responses to 9/11,” *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 4 (October 2012): 913.

⁴⁴ We must briefly reemphasize the distinction between emotion and affect once more to better conceptualize their relationship to discourse. Given that emotions are socially stereotyped expressed feelings, they are inherently discursive; in fact, their very existence is dependent upon their discursive expression. This is not the case, however, for affect. These more diffuse, often unconscious phenomena, exist independent of discourse, but can only be expressed and known through discourse. As Solomon writes, “Discourses, in a sense, *transform* affect into emotional expression.” *Ibid.*, 920.

⁴⁵ Donileen R. Loseke, “Examining Emotion as Discourse: Emotion Codes and Presidential Speeches Justifying War,” *Sociological Quarterly* 50, no. 3 (June 1, 2009): 498–99.

religious philosophy that animated them.⁴⁶ These emotion codes can be deployed strategically or “genuinely,” as part of the speaker’s reasoning and expression.

Politically emotional speech is made so through recourse to available referents within the cultural imaginary. These sociolinguistic constructions help to structure events in meaningful ways, providing an interpretation of events that are themselves open to multiple interpretations. Politicians use narratives to explain and persuade, and to sell audiences on their preferred interpretation of events, as well as their preferred policies to deal with those events.⁴⁷ Emotions are conveyed to the public through these narratives and strengthened through discourse. Embedded emotions also help make discourses salient.

In addition to ramping up emotions through appeals to socially accepted and understood cultural imaginaries, politicians might also ramp up emotions through recourse to identity. As discussed above, politicians might seek to construct discourses that offer a secure definition of the Self and the Other, fulfilling emotional desires for ontological security.⁴⁸ IR scholars Jacques Hymans and Simon Koschut have shown that emotional investments in national identities can be powerful motivators for action (or in the case of Hymans’ study of nuclear deterrence, inaction).⁴⁹ By appealing discursively to existing group identities, and seeking to fulfill the desire for secure identity definitions, politicians may evoke emotional responses in their populaces.

Of course, discourse is not the only way that emotion can be communicated and evoked. Practice is another key element. Emotions can be communicated through gestures and actions, policies and movements. Tears can signal sadness to an observer, and a punch or slap can more effectively evoke anger than words can. Hall’s work on emotional

⁴⁶ See also Koschut’s work on kamikaze pilots and emotion cultures of national self sacrifice. Simon Koschut, “The Structure of Feeling: Emotion Culture and National Self-Sacrifice in World Politics,” *Millennium* 45, no. 2 (January 1, 2017): 174–92.

⁴⁷ Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security*.

⁴⁸ Solomon, *The Politics of Subjectivity in American Foreign Policy Discourses*.

⁴⁹ Koschut, “The Structure of Feeling”; Jacques E.C. Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

diplomacy shows the performative aspects of emotions as deployed in statecraft, as displays of emotions can be used both for expressive and substantive purposes.⁵⁰ Mattern argues that the only way to properly account for the ontological uniqueness of emotions as both embodied and socioculturally held is to put forward a “practice theory of emotions.”⁵¹ While discourses are among the most powerful persuasive tools of the president, actions and practices cannot be ignored. It was President Barack Obama’s 2016 tears as he discussed the deaths of children in a speech on gun control that captured international headlines, rather than the content of his speech.⁵² While the expression of emotions by an actor and evocations of emotions in others are not the same phenomena, these emotional displays can have important evocative impacts on audiences, allowing politicians to strategically undertake emotional ramping.⁵³

2.3 *The brooms awaken*

Up until this point we have considered why politicians might turn to affective strategies to persuade their publics, and how they might do so through affectively-laden

⁵⁰ Hall’s work is concerned not with “genuine” emotion but with the coordinated team performance of particular emotions to achieve diplomatic aims. For more, see Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy*; Todd H. Hall, “We Will Not Swallow This Bitter Fruit: Theorizing a Diplomacy of Anger,” *Security Studies* 20, no. 4 (October 1, 2011): 521–55.

⁵¹ Janice Bially Mattern’s diagnosis of the situation is worth repeating in full: “At the heart of the problem is that the phenomena of emotion does not ‘fit’ conveniently into any of the usual orienting categories of IR. Emotions are the embodied experiences of concrete persons but they are not actually the ‘properties’ of those persons. Rather than things people have, emotions are contingent ways-of-being human – that is, experiences of human *being* – that emerge from interactions between agencies and structures of both material and social sorts. They are neither substance nor process, neither natural nor cultural, neither cognitive nor psychological.” Janice Bially Mattern, “A Practice Theory of Emotion for International Relations,” in *International Practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 63.

⁵² Jessica Lussenhop, “President Obama’s Tears Prove as Controversial as Gun Policy,” *BBC News*, January 5, 2016, sec. Trending, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-35238309>.

⁵³ For more on the psychological and neuroscientific backing for the contention that one’s expression of emotion can impact the evocation of emotions in others, see the following works: for a study of how student responses to President Ronald Reagan were shaped by his expressive displays, see Gregory J. McHugo et al., “Emotional Reactions to a Political Leader’s Expressive Displays,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 49, no. 6 (1985): 1513–29. For evidence of the “contagiousness” of facial expressions, see Barbara Wild, Michael Erb, and Mathias Bartels, “Are Emotions Contagious? Evoked Emotions While Viewing Emotionally Expressive Faces: Quality, Quantity, Time Course and Gender Differences,” *Psychiatry Research* 102, no. 2 (June 1, 2001): 109–24. For a study of fear-responses to displays of anger, see Ulf Dimberg and Arne Öhman, “Behold the Wrath: Psychophysiological Responses to Facial Stimuli,” *Motivation and Emotion* 20, no. 2 (June 1, 1996): 149–82. See also summaries at Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, “Social Functions of Emotions at Four Levels of Analysis,” *Cognition and Emotion* 13, no. 5 (1999): 505–21.

discourses and practices. The sorcerer, looking to accomplish his goal of bringing in the water, has been given a spell to cast. The ideal outcome for the initiating agent is one of persuasion: the public, with its emotions aroused, is convinced to permit the politician to pass his or her desired legislation. But, once unleashed, emotions can be very hard to control. I turn now to considering the creative capacities of emotions and their dynamics across collectives.

One of the most interesting – and analytically difficult – facets of emotions is their creative capacity. “Emotions are not logical propositions,” writes Andrew Ross. “They can exit one environment and install themselves in another in ways that defy cognitive categories and scientific expectations.”⁵⁴ These creative emotions can spread throughout a society in “circulations of affect.” These “conscious and unconscious exchanges of emotion occurring in and through the process of social interaction” have important effects, potentially resulting in “emotional contagion.”⁵⁵ In other words, as social actors interact with one another, affective conditions can spread across these populations. This can happen through face to face interaction, as conversations may reinforce particular emotional responses, or through social media, political interactions, or other forms of media interaction.⁵⁶

One of the dynamics that may begin during the high intensity period of ramping and linger beyond the initial ramping action is “spillover.” Hall and Ross identify “spillover effects” as “strongly felt reactions generated by one event or object [that] color behavior

⁵⁴ Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 2.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 10, 16.

⁵⁶ Ross’ conception of “emotional contagion” broadly encompasses multiple dimensions of potential collective affective dynamics. To specify further, Hall and Ross suggest multiple avenues for affective change, including the rise of “affective waves” and “emergent collective solidarities” through top down, bottom-up, or horizontally transmitted affective responses. While different situations may produce these different dynamics, one of the “amendments” the authors put forward suggests a more general method of affecting change in emotional levels: “Affective experience in many (but not all) cases is a function of perceived external stimuli intersecting with specific pre-existing affective dispositions or concerns.” Hall and Ross, “Affective Politics after 9/11,” 10–14.

toward unrelated stimuli by virtue of superficial resemblance or the timing of exposure.”⁵⁷ At the individual level, these effects might see the frustration felt by a father stuck in traffic on his way home morph into frustration at his children for not cleaning their rooms. At a collective level, these effects might look like fear of external attacks morphing into suspicion of domestic protests. Emotions can move between social contexts in unpredictable ways.

In the political realm, I contend that affective spillover produces issue linkage. As emotions are borne across different contexts by individuals and political collectives, emotional affinities and other discursive, political, and ideational affinities interact, drawing issues into tandem that might not otherwise be interrelated. This can be taken advantage of strategically by politicians, encouraging similar affective states to suggest that the public should consider the two issues to be of a piece. The evocation of the September 11th attacks when discussing the prospect of invading Iraq is a clear example of the Bush administration strategically linking two contexts together through an ideo-affective appeal. But this issue linkage can also arise in ways that were unintended, due to the creative nature of emotional spillover. As in the case of the tired father who snaps at his children with little provocation, so too did fear of Arab-Americans spread across the United States following the 9/11 attacks despite the Bush administration’s continual insistence that the faith of Islam was not the enemy. This issue linkage-producing spillover – due to both the creative capacity of emotions themselves and the strategic shepherding of those emotions by politicians – is an important characteristic of the movement of emotions once they are unleashed. As emotions diffuse across populaces through different affective dynamics, so too do they infuse different objects and contexts.

⁵⁷ This has been asserted in the psychological literature in studies of risk perception and emotion-specific judgment. Jennifer S. Lerner and Dacher Keltner, “Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of Emotion-Specific Influences on Judgement and Choice,” *Cognition and Emotion* 14, no. 4 (July 1, 2000): 473–93; Hall and Ross, “Affective Politics after 9/11,” 4.


As the Bush example suggests, no democratic politician operates in a bubble. They are constantly partaking in competitive processes as their opponents seek to challenge dominant policies with their own favored ones. This can result in those opponents using the newly unleashed emotions for their own purposes, leading to a form of affective entrapment. Under traditional notions of rhetorical entrapment, an actor becomes entrapped, or forced to act in a particular manner, because another actor is able to use a previously constituted standard of legitimacy to implicate them.⁵⁸ While this is a persuasive and undoubtedly present phenomenon, the notion of rhetorical entrapment does not explain why some arguments stick while others do not. What makes one particular argument entrapping over another, even if they both stick to the same normative position? What if two people said the same exact thing, but one proved more persuasive than the other? The notion of affective entrapment is better suited to assess these things, as it views the process of entrapment as occurring along ideo-affective, not merely discursive, lines. Despite Bush's consistent verbal disavowal of Islamophobia, many continued to link terrorism and Islam. This linkage cannot really be considered classical rhetorical entrapment, because he made explicit discursive moves to the contrary. But Bush's larger emotional ramping campaign surrounding the War on Terror helped connect these phenomena despite the president's best efforts. Therefore, one can be entrapped not only by one's argument, but also by the emotions one's argument expresses. If one were to tell everyone that all is well, and then attempt an about face by trying to inculcate a sense of anxiety, an opponent would be able to hold them to account for expressing inconsistent emotions.

When a policy entrepreneur attempts to ramp up public emotions, he or she does so for a specific purpose, with limited aims (i.e. the passage of a particular policy).

⁵⁸ Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (December 2001): 47–80.

However, as affective dynamics take hold and other actors encourage those dynamics for their own purposes, the initial evoked emotions can move beyond the grasp of the initial agent. These effects may not be short lived. Consider the notion of a wave of affective intensity. We might expect the wave to rise and fall, returning to its initial position after the ramping campaign is complete. However, affective dynamics cannot be expected to do precisely that. Over time, we would expect an upswell to subside given the practical difficulty of sustaining heightened emotional states. There may be local maxima and minima over time, as the public mood is impacted by day-to-day activities, but without sustained innovative efforts, the high intensity effects will subside. Crucially, however, this does not mean that the public mood will return to its initial pre-ramping nature⁵⁹; instead, high intensity effects will give way to low intensity ones, in the form of lasting alterations to the public structure of feeling.

Figure 1: Public emotions following strategic ramping



Raymond Williams introduced the concept of “structures of feeling” to help identify collective public moods and spirits. “Structures of feeling,” writes Williams, “can be defined as social experiences in *solution*, as distinct from other social semantic formations which have been *precipitated* and are more evidently and more immediately available.”⁶⁰ In other words, structures of feeling refer to the contemporary, lived social

⁵⁹ Hall and Ross, “Affective Politics after 9/11,” 13.

⁶⁰ Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 133–34.

experiences and emotions of a particular period, rather than those that are seen to be calcified in retrospect.⁶¹ Structures of feeling are more defined than nebulous “spirits of the age”: there can be multiple, overlapping structures, and even when one is dominant, these cultural expressions of affect penetrate different areas of society unevenly.⁶² More than one specific emotion, a structure of feeling is an affective mood and cultural expression that exists in the interaction, not merely aggregation, of individuals and groups. These structures can penetrate the elite ranks of foreign policymaking, both through interaction and social relations, and through the electoral connection and necessity of satisfying a democratic electorate.

While originally meant as an aesthetic concept to allow for the interpretation of different forms of cultural production, subsequent sociologists, anthropologists, and cultural theorists have all applied structures of feeling to societal and political phenomena.⁶³ Most recently, Simon Koschut used the term to elucidate national self-sacrifice among Japanese kamikaze pilots. Emotions, he argues, provide a structuring mechanism for intersubjective feelings toward national identity and the behaviors associated with those feelings. He simplifies Williams’ aesthetic notion of structure of feeling to refer to “a set of emotions that show a regular pattern,” a definition which I find useful in analyzing how the American public might be feeling at a particular point in time.⁶⁴ Emotions can make for powerful tools of political agents, but they exist within a mutually constitutive relationship

⁶¹ Williams contrasts these structures with “world-view,” as worldviews are more settled, consciously constructed ideational phenomena. As Williams writes, “[F]eeling’ is chosen to emphasize a distinction from more formal concepts of ‘world-view’ or ‘ideology’. It is not only that we must go beyond formally held and systematic beliefs, though of course we have always to include them. It is that we are concerned with meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt, and the relations between these and formal or systematic beliefs are in practice variable (including historically variable), over a range from formal assent with private dissent to the more nuanced interaction between selected and interpreted beliefs and acted and justified experiences.” Ibid., 132.

⁶² Jenny Bourne Taylor, “Structure of Feeling,” in *Dictionary of Cultural and Critical Theory* (Blackwell Publishing, 1997), blackwellreference.com.

⁶³ For more examples of political and social applications of structures of feelings, see, for example, Mabel Berezin, “Secure States: Towards a Political Sociology of Emotion,” *The Sociological Review* 50, no. S2 (October 1, 2002): 33–52; William A. Callahan, *China: The Pessimist Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

⁶⁴ Koschut, “The Structure of Feeling,” 176.

with a sociocultural structure of feeling. This means when a political actor tries to ramp up public emotion, they can potentially reconstitute the structures in which they operate. They may give birth to a whole army of broomsticks, when they only intended to create one.

This reconstitution of the structure of feeling and its lingering affective effects presents a strategic problem for the initiating agent. While many scholars have argued for the strategic utility of public emotions, a smaller number have looked at the limits of overusing these tactics.⁶⁵ Keven Ruby is a notable exception to this characterization, arguing that while a state will want to drum up fear to avoid citizen complacency, it will also want to avoid encouraging mass panic. As he writes, “both public complacency and panic undermine state autonomy.”⁶⁶ This rationalist argument holds that the disjunction between official and public emotion serves as a strategic handicap, while its harmonization is an asset. Similarly, studies of terror and hysteria load these terms with a negative valence, as these emotions can lead to elites losing control of public opinion. One can imagine the limits of emotions besides fear as well; were a state to inculcate too much trust within a public, it might not be able to motivate them to act against a particular newly-constituted enemy. This is all to say that emotions are not determinate: the mere cultivation of an emotion does not mean that a public will react in a particular way. Instead, the intensity of the emotion is something that must be managed and calibrated as much as the nature of the emotion itself.

What becomes important, then, is not the specific basic emotion being wielded by a policymaker, but rather the extent to which public and elite affect are in sync. The disjunction between public affect and elite affect is a strategic deficit that must be managed, if the elite wishes to persuade through affective means. Redirecting an emotion once

⁶⁵ This remains a particular drawback of securitization theory, which leaves desecuritization comparatively under-theorized (as opposed to securitization). For more, see Hansen, “Reconstructing Desecuritisation: The Normative-Political in the Copenhagen School and Directions for How to Apply It.”

⁶⁶ Ruby, as in the case of many of the other scholars cited above, focuses exclusively on fear. Keven G. Ruby, “Society, State, and Fear: Managing National Security at the Boundary between Complacency and Panic” (Ph.D., The University of Chicago, 2012), xi.

evoked, however, is more challenging than its original evocation because the structure of feeling will have shifted, and the emotions, once unleashed, may have taken on lives of their own.

3 Tamping

In the previous section, I examined the strategic political use of emotions, or the phenomenon of “ramping” up public affect. The benefits of ramping lie in the ability of emotions to persuade. However, once those emotions are unleashed, it can become difficult for the original agent to control them, as emotions can take on lives of their own or be coopted by oppositional political opportunists. This situation can become a strategic issue for the initiating agent if the public structure of feeling is no longer harmonized with where elite policymakers want it to be. If this becomes the case, the policymakers will need to take action or risk losing their abilities to persuade (which could result in electoral defeat).

One can imagine several response pathways that the policymakers might take in this case. First, they may simply seek to ride out the affective wave, waiting until things cool down. This would require the least effort from the policymaker, but would most likely only be undertaken if the costs of inaction remained low. An alternative move would be for the policymaker to seek out scapegoats, rhetorically identifying another party as culpable for the behavior or stance that the public is no longer in favor of. A third move would be for the policymaker to reconstitute their own affective and policy approaches to match the newly constituted structure of feeling. This would reharmonize elite and public affect, allowing the policymaker to work with, rather than against, the public. It seems an unlikely first response, however, as it would involve the policymakers changing their policies as well as their rhetoric (for to change only one would risk hypocrisy, which is

unlikely to pay off in the long term⁶⁷) and potentially acting against their own interests. An alternative approach is far more likely: that politicians will attempt to once again persuade their publics, this time not by ramping up emotions, but by attempting to tamp them back down. This would allow for the strategic maintenance of public affect without having to compromise on policy positions or perceived interests. In other words, rather than becoming as frantic as the broomsticks and deciding to change his goals from cleaning the workshop to flooding the workshop, the apprentice chooses to try to stop the broomstick by breaking the broom in half. It is this latter strategy that I explore in this section.

To inform my work on tamping, I turn to psychological theories of emotion regulation. Emotion regulation refers to “shaping which emotions one has, when one has them, and how one experiences or expresses these emotions.”⁶⁸ This regulation of emotions can be internal – i.e. I regulate my own emotions – or external – i.e. I regulate others’ emotions. In the case of a politician trying to calm a public, it is external regulation that is relevant.⁶⁹ There are a number of strategies that one can take to regulate emotions: one might engage in situation selection (i.e. avoiding situations that might upset you, or actively seeking out situations that would give you pleasure); situation modification (changing the dynamics of a situation, like cleaning one’s room if one is feeling overwhelmed); attentional deployment (directing or redirecting one’s attention to emotional effect, like avoiding a potentially distressing situation); cognitive change (altering one’s way of thinking about a particular situation, like seeing being fired from a job as an opportunity to pursue a passion); or response modulation (or, “directly influencing experiential, behavioral, or physiological components of the emotional response,” like

⁶⁷ For more on the double-edged nature of hypocrisy, see Martha Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be,” *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 58–85.

⁶⁸ James J. Gross, *Handbook of Emotion Regulation, Second Edition* (New York: Guilford Publications, 2013), 6. For a historical overview of literature on emotion regulation, see James J. Gross, “The Emerging Field of Emotion Regulation: An Integrative Review,” *Review of General Psychology* 2, no. 3 (1998): 271–99.

⁶⁹ The internal and external levels may be manifest together, as in a case where I try to manage someone else’s emotions in the hopes of regulating my own. Gross, *Handbook of Emotion Regulation, Second Edition*, 6.

taking a deep breath).⁷⁰ A politician seeking to calm down his or her public might do so through encouraging a cognitive reevaluation of a situation or attempting to divert attention away from the situation altogether.

While these regulation approaches are myriad, they all share the common thread of addressing the emotion or affective dynamic to be regulated. They do not fall into the trap of juxtaposing emotion with reason. To do so, after all, would do little to combat emotional intensity. Psychologists Samoilov and Goldfried note the futility of attempting to change the way people feel through information campaigns, since “encouraging [a subject] to ‘know better’ or ‘know more’ may not always work in the long run, because ‘feeling it’...refers to a *qualitatively* distinct meaning level.”⁷¹ Affect must be matched with affect, if it is to be managed.

Given these findings, we would expect emotional tamping to work in certain circumstances but not in others. It will work if politicians are able to effectively regulate public emotions through tactics sufficiently attuned to affective factors; it will not work if they are unable to do so. While it is certainly possible to regulate public emotion, I contend that it is extraordinarily difficult for a number of reasons. First, the public structure of feeling is complex and multifaceted. There is no one emotion that every person experiences, and even the intersubjective dominant structure of feeling will be somewhat fragmented by the creative dynamics at play. This makes generating an appropriate tamping response difficult. Second, in addition to the creative dynamics of emotions themselves, other political actors may have found ramping to be advantageous for their own purposes, and will thus work against the efforts of the original actor to try to tamp things down. Third, since the structure of feeling has shifted under the feet of the original actor, his or her original calculations of public mood are no longer applicable, because his or her

⁷⁰ Ibid., 9–10.

⁷¹ Italics in original. Anna Samoilov and Marvin R. Goldfried, “Role of Emotion in Cognitive-Behavior Therapy,” *Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice* 7, no. 4 (December 1, 2000): 375.

ramping efforts have changed the rules of the game. In other words, effective ramping may be a barrier to effective tamping. And fourth, if the underlying emotions themselves are not adequately addressed, we could possibly see an intensification of the initial emotion. As social psychologists of groups have shown, collectives with a certain intergroup emotion are in possession of certain action tendencies – for example, a group that fears a national security threat will want the government to actively work to curb that threat in a manner that addresses the original emotional insecurity. If those emotional wants are not met, “impeding the behavioral tendency should intensify the emotion.”⁷² In other words, if one acts in a manner contrary to the manner dictated by the structure of feeling, people are more likely to invest more deeply in that structure. Taken together, this spells a low likelihood that the original actor will be able to tamp down public emotions at will. In other words, there *is* a magic charm that the sorcerer’s apprentice could use to calm the wild broomsticks, but it is likely far too complex for him to wield effectively.

In the original Goethe poem, the day is saved by the intercession of the master sorcerer who runs in and sets the scene right. In foreign policy, however, there is no master sorcerer who can come in and halt an out-of-control affective campaign. In politics, there are only two routes: first, there is the rough equivalent of the sorcerer stepping in – electoral change. Everything could reset with the appointment of new leadership. Or second, the apprentice could persist, the current political leadership remaining in power. But that leadership cannot continue with this unfavorable affective climate, just as the apprentice cannot continue with broomsticks slopping water all over the floor. Something has to change. In this case, we break from Goethe’s fable and see how the apprentice, while he cannot cease the tide of broomsticks, learns to adapt to the new flow, using it to his advantage.

⁷² Angela T. Maitner, Diane M. Mackie, and Eliot R. Smith, “Evidence for the Regulatory Function of Intergroup Emotion: Emotional Consequences of Implemented or Impeded Intergroup Action Tendencies,” *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 42, no. 6 (November 2006): 720–28.

4 Revamping

In the face of failed tamping – an outcome I have argued is more likely than effective tamping – a policymaker will have to somehow address the mismatch between his or her administration’s affective outlook and that of the public, which is a strategic deficit. Given that regulating the public approach has failed, the administration is likely to turn to the second option in the equation: itself. It may thus seek to change its expressed emotions to bring them into harmony with the public’s. Given the crucial nature of legitimacy to a democratic leader, and the extent to which leaders go to avoid being accused of hypocrisy, it is unlikely that a discursive change would not be matched by one of policy. Consequently, the revamping phenomenon may be one of both outward presentation and proposed foreign policies.

This denouement provokes an intriguing question: is the prospective ideo-affective and political change one that is genuinely felt, or is it merely calculated? In other words, does the original actor actually change his or her mind, feeling what he or she did not feel before and matching policy to those feelings, or does he or she merely express these emotions in order to satisfy a demanding public? In practice, it is difficult to discern the difference. However, theoretically, we might imagine both the strategic and genuine revamping of emotional beliefs taking place.

On the strategic side, an actor may be motivated by the logic of the old aphorism, “if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em.” In other words, having failed to change the way the public feels about an issue, a politician may choose to express corresponding feelings, even if he or she does not truly believe them, because it is advantageous in maintaining democratic control. A notable example of this behavior is Lyndon Johnson’s policymaking towards Vietnam. He truly believed in 1964 that it was a bad policy decision to intervene in the South Asian nation, but chose to do so because of reputational concerns over what would

happen if he did not.⁷³ In the face of an oppositional public, Johnson took a policy step he might not have otherwise taken to match affective expectations.

But the strategic logic is not the only reason that our original actor might revamp his or her approach. He or she might have genuinely been changed by the ramping and tamping experience. For this assertion, I build on the concept of “blowback,” as expressed by Jack Snyder. Looking at propaganda and tactical discourse by elites, Snyder characterizes blowback as “self-delusion” or “the blurring of sincere belief and tactical argument.”⁷⁴ As an individual or group puts forward an argument or belief – or emotion, I contend – for strategic purposes, and remains publicly committed to that notion, it can become difficult for the individual or group to disentangle his or her true beliefs or feelings from what he or she insists he or she is thinking and feeling.⁷⁵ The possibility for this “blowback” or confusion is only heightened when discussing ideo-affective, as opposed to purely ideational, factors. As psychologist Paul Ekman has showed, merely performing a non-genuine emotion can actually lead individuals to begin to feel those emotions.⁷⁶ In other words, even if an actor adjusts his or her expressed emotions, there is a good chance that the actor’s emotional state may well change. Thus, the third phase of the ramping-tamping-revamping pathway may be characterized by the genuine reevaluation of both emotions and policies. The apprentice no longer resists the marching of the brooms, instead leading them on to flood other areas, or profiting off the building of boats.

⁷³ Johnson famously was recorded venting to adviser McGeorge Bundy about the futility of the conflict in Vietnam. In the conversation, he said, “I don’t think it’s worth fighting for and I don’t think we can get out. And it’s just the biggest damn mess that I ever saw.” Less than a year later, he approved Operation Rolling Thunder, more fully committing the United States to the conflict in Southeast Asia. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs,” *Department of State Office of the Historian*, May 27, 1964, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v27/d53>.

⁷⁴ Jack L. Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 41.

⁷⁵ Snyder, like Schimmelfennig, also points out the possibility that elites may get entrapped in their own arguments, even if they do not organically change their minds, thus producing the same effects: “Even if the elite avoids internalizing its own myths, it may nonetheless become politically entrapped in its own rhetoric. . . . To stay in power and to keep central policy objectives intact, elites may have to accept some unintended consequences of . . . their imperial sales pitch.” This is the aforementioned strategic logic. *Ibid.*, 42.

⁷⁶ Ekman’s work focuses specifically on the generative qualities of facial expressions. See Paul Ekman, “Facial Expression and Emotion,” *American Psychologist* 48, no. 4 (April 1993): 384–92.

5 A constructivist theory of ideo-affective politics

I have outlined a three-part pathway of foreign policy change, going from 1) the strategic ramping up of emotions to persuade the public, to 2) the attempted tamping down of those emotions when they are no longer aligned with the needs of the original actor, to 3) the revamping of the actor's emotions and actions, for strategic and/or genuine reasons, in the face of the failure to tamp. In this section, I explore what I mean by labeling my theory one of "ideo-affective politics," and one of the constructivist school.

This thesis advances what I call a "theory of ideo-affective politics."⁷⁷ I define this as a theory that accounts for each of – and the interactions among – ideas, emotions, and political practices, for these concepts cannot be meaningfully separated from one another. Ontologically, then, the term "ideo-affective" is unnecessary: one cannot have affect without cognition, and one cannot have cognition without affect. The term, therefore, is redundant. However, I use it to combat the dominant notions of rationalist scholarship that seek to isolate these forces from one another. My theory is a synthetic one, weaving affect and its unique ontology into constructivist notions of ideational mutual constitution between structure and agent.

The interweaving of these theoretical stances is necessarily challenging. My theory of ideo-affective politics is a form of affectively-sensitive constructivism. The modifier "affectively-sensitive" is crucial: faced with a dominant rationalist/constructivist agreement that ignores or elides what makes affect unique, some emotion scholars have argued that these approaches are epistemologically unable to properly capture affect. Mattern argues for discarding rationalist paradigms for a practice theory of emotion; Markwica has suggested that a "logic of affect" should be added to notions of the "logic of consequences" and "logic of appropriateness"; Ross advocates a neo-Jamesian theory that preserves both

⁷⁷ The term "ideoaffective" has been used previously by psychologist Silvan Tomkins, albeit in a different manner, as he talks about two separate systems coming together. Silvan S. Tomkins, "Affect and the Psychology of Knowledge," in *Affect, Cognition, and Personality: Empirical Studies*, ed. Carroll E. Izard and Silvan S. Tomkins (New York: Springer PubCo, 1965).

the embodied nature of emotions and their “creative capacity” from the dominant rationalist-constructivist stance.⁷⁸ While coming to different conclusions as to the best solution, these scholars all share the conviction that the ontological characteristics of affect mean that realism and even constructivism are unable to properly capture faithfully emotional dynamics.

Hall and Ross’s 2015 “Affective Politics After 9/11” suggests, however, that by amending previously held understandings of actorhood so that they are consistent with what is now known about affect and emotion – including that reasoning remains largely unmotivated without affective guidance, and that affective dynamics can alter perception and judgment – emotions can be effectively integrated into existing theories.⁷⁹ In this thesis, I argue that the epistemological nature of emotional expression – through discourse and language – makes it a prime candidate for integration into a constructivism that remains sensitive to affective dynamics.

By bringing emotions into a constructivist theory, I hope to intervene within a disciplinary debate over a shortcoming of this form of theorizing. While much constructivist literature has been crucial in understanding the roles that non-material factors play in shaping social relations and social reality, it often suffers from placing too little emphasis on agency, privileging structure even when arguing for mutual constitution with agency.⁸⁰ Recent efforts at creating an “agentic constructivism,” such as Kathryn Sikkink’s *Justice Cascade*, have tried to focus not on “how deep structures constrain imagination and action” – the traditional preserve of structural constructivism – but rather

⁷⁸ Ross is an interesting case, for while his 2006 and 2010 works suggest that emotions cannot neatly be fit into traditional forms of constructivism, his 2015 piece with Todd Hall (discussed below) argues for exactly the opposite conclusion. Mattern, “A Practice Theory of Emotion for International Relations”; Robin Markwica, *Emotional Choices: How the Logic of Affect Shapes Coercive Diplomacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming); Andrew A. G. Ross, “Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions,” *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 197–222.

⁷⁹ Hall and Ross, “Affective Politics after 9/11.”

⁸⁰ Colin Wight is one scholar who has focused on this problem, calling for a “reformulation of the agent-structure relationship [that] highlights the fact that both agents and structures are indispensable” in constructivist theorizing. Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 280.

on “how agents...promote new ideas and practices.”⁸¹ Despite efforts like Sikkink’s, however, the resolution of this under-privileging of agency remains elusive. By examining the strategic use of affect and its co-constitutive role with public structures of feeling, I hope to open up a space for an agentic constructivism that not only preserves the role of agency, but also that of creativity and unexpectedness.

6 Methodology

One of the major barriers to the acceptance of affect and emotion studies in mainstream International Relations literature is the methodological slipperiness of capturing these ephemeral entities. From Jonathan Mercer’s warnings that “emotion is hard to define, hard to operationalize, hard to measure, and hard to isolate from other factors” to Neta Crawford’s worries about major “methodological concerns,” it is no wonder that many rationalist scholars share Robert Jervis’ feelings that they would love to integrate emotions into their theories but “at this point the challenge is simply too great.”⁸² Below, I address those challenges.

As I have outlined in the body of this chapter, I am making a three-part argument. For each of the three stages, I need to marshal different forms of evidence to make my case. Concerning ramping, I need to demonstrate that public officials strategically attempted to ramp up public emotion, and that those efforts had an impact on the public structure of feeling. In the case of tamping, I need to show that public officials attempted to calm public upswell and moderate public emotion, as well as show how those efforts succeeded or failed. The effective analysis of revamping involves demonstrating that the original actor displayed a new ideo-affective approach, distinctive from the tamping phase, as well as analyzing the extent to which that new ideo-affective approach was a strategic

⁸¹ Kathryn Sikkink, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 237.

⁸² Mercer, Crawford, and Jervis qtd. in Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, “Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics,” *Review of International Studies* 34, no. S1 (January 2008): 117.

calculation or genuine reappraisal. In what follows, I lay out how I seek to accomplish these tasks, the challenges I face, and how I deal with them.

To begin, ramping involves showing that policymakers deliberately decided to evoke emotions in a mass public, showing how they did it, and then examining whether public emotions were in fact aroused. Illuminating the decision-making process of ramping involves process tracing, examining private and public materials to retrace the steps behind the strategic decision. Process tracing is quite useful in historical studies, for it “attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes.”⁸³ This involves close analysis of changing dynamics across defined periods of time, a requirement for the specification and testing of any theory of foreign policy change. It is an effective method in trying to answer the type of “how possible” question that this thesis asks, a question for which a large-n analysis would be unsuitable.

It is the second stage of the ramping phase – showing how the actors went about the ramping – that requires the beginnings of ideo-affective analysis. As detailed above, my theory dictates that policymakers may attempt to evoke public emotions through discourse and practice. Consequently, my methods need to be able to detect affect in these two realms. In looking for evidence of ramping in official discourse, I conduct a form of affectively-sensitive discourse analysis. As Bleiker and Hutchison write, “one of the most promising locations to study emotions is the manner in which they are represented and communicated.”⁸⁴ Solomon, Zizek, and Laclau, among others, have noted the inability of traditional discourse analysis to capture fully the role of affect. Zizek, for example, has argued that there need to be “multiple dimensions to discourse analysis,” including not just the “analytical deconstruction and reconstruction of a discourse” but also the “articulat[ion

⁸³ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 6.

⁸⁴ Bleiker and Hutchison, “Fear No More,” 129.

of] the ways in which a discourse ‘implies, manipulates, [and] produces’ affective effects, and consequently contributes to the production of subjects.”⁸⁵

In examining ramping rhetoric and other forms of ideo-affective discourse, I take a tripartite approach, aimed at capturing the multidimensionality by which affect and emotions can be expressed. These three parts include identifying: 1) paralinguistic factors, 2) content factors, and 3) contextual factors. Paralinguistic factors include the extra-textual dimensions of performance, tone, volume, authority, etc. A major source of affective power in an oratorical setting comes from the oratorical performance itself. Pacing, volume, and tone can all be used to convey emotions, and to elicit emotions from an audience.⁸⁶ Research into the emotional effects of “prosody,” or the properties of supra-phonetic characteristics of speech (like rhythm, or emphasis), show that changes in intonation or stress can add to or detract from emotional emphasis.⁸⁷

Content factors include the specific words, ideas, and figures of speech used to invoke certain emotion codes, or affectively laden cultural touchstones calculated to resonate emotionally. Strong words are arrayed in particular combinations, and comprise figures of speech that change their meanings. Metaphors represent a particularly potent form of rhetorical power, as they “develop persuasive arguments by applying what is familiar, and already experienced, to new topics to demonstrate that [the speaker is] thinking rationally about political issues....Metaphor *provokes* affective responses because it draws on value systems by exploiting the associative power of language.”⁸⁸ Metaphors, like other content factors, use shared cultural notions to draw comparisons and evoke responses.

⁸⁵ Zizek qtd. in Solomon, “‘I Wasn’t Angry, Because I Couldn’t Believe It Was Happening,’” 913–14.

⁸⁶ Jo-Anne Bachorowski and Michael J. Owen, “Vocal Expressions of Emotion,” in Michael Lewis, Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones, and Lisa Feldman Barrett, eds., *Handbook of Emotions*, 3rd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 2008).

⁸⁷ See, for example, Elliott D. Ross, “Affective Prosody and the Aprosodias,” in *Principles of Behavioral and Cognitive Neurology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

⁸⁸ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 35. For more on metaphor theory, see George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1980).

Contextual factors refer to the ways in which what is said in a particular speech compares and contrasts to the previously constituted discursive environment. A speech act is not simply released onto a blank canvas. Rather, it is situated within a larger social context. That context can both shape and be shaped by particular entrepreneurial interventions. It is in this realm that the importance of novelty – of “shock” – can be seen, since an individual speech act, if it is effective, can introduce something entirely new into the mix, unsettling prior notions of the original discursive structure. To identify ramping, then, I look at archival materials and public discursive products and analyze key documents across each of these three dimensions of affective criteria. I also look for evidence of emotional responses in audience members (through newspaper reports and public opinion polls) to calibrate what others consider to be affecting.

To have the most effective affective campaign, the policy entrepreneur will need to move beyond rhetoric alone, emphasizing emotional performance and non-linguistic practice. To identify these sources of affect, I look at secondary accounts for evidence of coordinated media campaigns from all levels of an administration, as well as rallies, parades, pageantry, or any other form of expressive display. In order to present a unified vision, the policy entrepreneur and his or her administration may need to engage in what sociologist Ervin Goffman calls a “team performance,” wherein all members of the “team” of the policy entrepreneur coordinate their actions so as to cultivate the same emotional position.⁸⁹ I look for evidence of this in archival materials, like policy memos and interdepartmental correspondence.

My theory contends that effective ramping will lead to changes in the public structure of feeling. To evaluate this (and thus, the potential need for future tamping), I borrow methodologically from Ted Hopf’s societal constructivism, consulting a range of

⁸⁹ For an example of bringing the concept of emotional team performance into the study of international politics, see Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy*.

sources to try and triangulate the lived experiences of those in the period under question.⁹⁰ The public structure of feeling is nowhere written down; rather, it is expressed through cultural production and expression. Consequently, this interpretive look at art, music, literature, and public action is a crucial addendum to a high-level political analysis. As Richard Fried writes, to understand the lived experience of those in a particular period, “we need to know what was in the Metro or Women’s section as well as on the front page.”⁹¹

The methodological demands of tamping are similar to those of ramping. Whereas for ramping, I needed to show strategic efforts to evoke public emotions, for tamping I need to show that the policymakers deliberately attempted to calm the emotions that they had previously sought to evoke. To do so, I once again begin with process tracing of official decision making with reference to both policy and the public communication of that policy. Within public-aimed discourse, I look for evidence of the opposite tactics of ramping in discourse across the paralinguistic, content, and context axes. Where under conditions of ramping, I would expect to identify evocative discourse designed to appeal to certain elements of a secure identity through recourse to the security imaginary, under conditions of tamping I would expect to see discourse stripped of emotional metaphors and similes, and without references to self/other relations that would have culturally affective resonance. Further, as with the case of ramping, I also examine government practices and expressions beyond pure discourse. This might take different forms, including internal government correspondence indicating efforts to try affect an emotion opposite to the one they are trying to quell – for example, attempting to drum up happiness in the face of sadness – or taking the common strategic move of trying to

⁹⁰ I say “borrow” rather than “use” Hopf’s methods for two main reasons: first, his approach, being purely constructivist, is not focused on affective factors but rather identity based ones. Consequently, his collecting method is of more relevance than his analytical approach once those sources are collected. And second, in his *Reconstructing the Cold War*, Hopf specifies his methods to the particular context of the Soviet Union and its singular official discourse. As he himself writes, “determining the predominant official discourse on Soviet national identity is much easier than, say, finding the official predominant American national identity in the United States.” I adjust accordingly to the American institutional context. Hopf, *Reconstructing the Cold War*, 25.

⁹¹ Richard M. Fried, *The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming!: Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold-War America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), x.

present “just the facts” to combat out-of-control emotions. Just as with ramping, in looking for evidence of the ideo-affective politics of tamping at work, I follow the lead of Hutchison and Bleiker, who write, “examining [their] representations is as close as we can get to understanding emotions.”⁹² In order to get at the contributions of emotions above and beyond ideational or discursive processes, I look not for the emotion itself – for it is epistemologically indistinguishable from other phenomena – but rather for the particular effects produced by affective dynamics. Just as the human eye cannot directly detect the moisture content of the air, but it can see the rainbow that content produces, so too can we look not for the ontological fact of the existence of any particular emotion, but rather for the effects that would not make sense with purely ideational causes and can be better explained by the addition of affective factors.

Finally, when looking for evidence of revamping, I need to methodologically capture evidence of whether or not the initiating agent’s ideo-affective approach has changed. This requires moving back and forth between different levels of analysis. To evaluate whether the administration has changed its public ideo-affective stance from what had come before, I conduct the same tripartite affective analysis on key texts that I did with the ramping and tamping sections. But to evaluate whether this ideo-affective change was strategic or genuine, I move to consider the motivations of individual policymakers responsible for the decisions. This involves looking at archival and secondary materials to find evidence of emotional appraisals or changes of heart. Since epistemologically, it may be impossible to truly discern the difference between strategic and genuine emotion, as the possessor of the emotion may not know him/herself (see Chapter 4 and Conclusion for more), I rely on private, internal correspondence and expression as the realm in which the strategic and genuine may be meaningfully disentangled.

⁹² Bleiker and Hutchison, “Fear No More,” 129.

I explore the case of the Cold War as an exemplary case, one that is historically significant and deserves explanation. In exploring the Cold War, I borrow heavily from and am inextricably involved with the field of History. My approach might be considered “qualitative historical analysis,”⁹³ wherein I use textual and discursive sources to conduct a political scientific inquiry of a historical period. This confluence of disciplines remains fraught, as any attempt at interdisciplinarity necessarily does. As Christian Reus-Smit outlines in his “Reading History Through Constructivist Eyes,” historical International Relations research was marginalized before the end of the Cold War, as rationalist and positivist approaches tended to dominate. Since the 1990s, there has been a rediscovery within IR of historical subjects, especially by constructivists, for whom the development of social systems necessarily involves the examination of diachronic periods.⁹⁴

Despite this constructivist turn towards history, these scholars have been, in the words of Michael Barnett, “less attentive to historiographical issues than they probably should be.”⁹⁵ As part of this neglect of the Historical tradition of historiography, Reus-Smit has noted that International Relations theorists have implicitly pursued an embedded Skinnerian approach to historical inquiry – one which emphasizes the constructedness of history and the necessity of recovering meaning in use – in a manner completely anathema to the historian’s approach: rather than carefully located studies of single periods of contexts, IR scholars have tended towards large comparative case studies, a method completely at odds with those of historians.⁹⁶

⁹³ Cameron G. Thies, “A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of International Relations,” *International Studies Perspectives* 3, no. 4 (November 1, 2002): 351–72.

⁹⁴ Christian Reus-Smit, “Reading History through Constructivist Eyes,” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (December 1, 2008): 395–414.

⁹⁵ Michael Barnett, “Historical Sociology and Constructivism: An Estranged Past, a Federated Future?,” in *Historical Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 101.

⁹⁶ “Skinnerian” history refers to that inspired by the work of Cambridge School historian Quentin Skinner. Skinner held that history was not a single entity, but rather multiple, and created by historians. This is an attractive proposition for constructivist scholars, as “[t]he idea that historians construct history,” writes Reus-Smit, “lies at the heart of the constructivist embrace of history.” See, for examples of his philosophy, Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” *History and Theory* 8, no. 1 (1969): 3–53;

In this thesis, I turn the historian's lens on IR, embracing the shared epistemological claims of both disciplines to conduct an in-depth, carefully situated analysis of a single historical period. I make extensive use of archival materials from the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and the National Archives at College Park to reconstruct policy processes and accompanying public relations campaigns, as well as the ideo-affective stances of particular policymakers at different points in that period. I supplement these analyses with secondary historical analyses and historiographical deliberation. In the Conclusion, I turn to other potential cases of applicability, examining the potential for generalizability beyond the Truman administration and the beginning of the Cold War.

Quentin Skinner, "The Practice of History and the Cult of the Fact," in *Visions of Politics*, vol. I: Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Chapter 2: Ramping and the Beginning of the “Truman Offensive”

1 Writing history in retrospect

In 1955, former State Department official Joseph M. Jones published his account of the development of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in a volume called *The Fifteen Weeks*. “The convergence of massive historical trends upon that moment was so real as to be almost tangible,” Jones wrote of the period. “How much of what was sensed and felt at that moment would find its way into histories written years later wholly from dusty records? How much of the atmosphere and drama would be recaptured?”¹ Writing eight years later, Jones felt that it was his duty to relate the story of these momentous weeks, when he argued that the United States truly became an international power.

Jones’ boss in the Truman State Department, Dean Acheson, took a more cautionary approach when he penned his memoirs, *Present at the Creation*. He closes his preface by quoting the British historian C.V. Wedgwood: “history is lived forward but it is written in retrospect. We know the end before we consider the beginning and we can never wholly recapture what it was like to know the beginning only.” Acheson agrees with Wedgwood, noting, “those who acted in this drama did not know...the end.”²

In this chapter, with the benefit of “knowing the end” – the onset of the Cold War – I attempt to recapture, as fully as possible, “what it was like to know the beginning only.” From the perch of an American citizen observing the international system and its participants in the post-World War II period, there was little indication that a mass mobilization would necessarily take place. That it would do so was the consequence of strategic decisions and deliberate action, though not all by the same actors for the same reasons. As will be discussed below, I argue in this chapter that the Truman Doctrine marks the true “beginning” of this period.

¹ Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955), vii.

² Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970), xvii.

To substantiate this argument, I introduce the first stage of my posited ideoaffective pathway: ramping. The Truman Doctrine and its accompanying follow-up campaign represented a deliberate strategic decision by the president and his administration to ramp up public emotions in order to persuade the public and Congress to approve their desired European economic aid policies. This chapter begins with a historical overview of the post-war period, consulting publicly disseminated and private archival materials to show how when the Truman administration failed to convince Congress and a war-weary public of the need for renewed investment in Europe, they decided to strategically evoke fear within the public through the issuance of the Truman Doctrine. I examine the doctrine itself along paralinguistic, content, and context dimensions to show how the speech was designed to be affectively laden, before turning to the immediate responses of the press, public, and political rivals. I then show how the Truman Doctrine was only one part of a larger ideoaffective campaign, which I refer to as the “Truman Offensive,” that included other speeches, policies, and demonstrations designed to persuade the public through evoking emotions of fear, patriotism, and pride. I conclude this chapter by using this ideoaffective analysis to enter into a longstanding historiographical debate on the importance of the Truman Doctrine.

2 The postwar political landscape

When Harry S. Truman assumed the office of the presidency upon Roosevelt’s death, he inherited a war in its final stages. While Truman himself was responsible for some of the most historically significant developments of the conflict – including the Potsdam conference agreements and the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – much of his early presidency was focused on reorienting the American economy, military, foreign policy, and government to a peacetime footing. The president and opposition fought over price controls, labor relations, the specter of inflation, the

organization of the defense establishment, and the demobilization of troops to appropriate peacetime levels.³ While struggling through these battles at home, Truman also attempted to pursue his Wilsonian vision of a strong United Nations, backed by firm American commitments.⁴

Though all of these decisions had to be made and political battles raged over them, the American public was tired of war. Not only had they sustained years of war since the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, but memories of the First World War still loomed large. The nation favored demobilization and reconversion, roundly supporting the rapid movement of troops back to American shores.⁵ As of June 1946, only 11 percent of the population “considered foreign policy issues as the most important problems facing the American people.”⁶ And five months later, over 50% of poll respondents said that the United States ought to cut taxes even if it resulted in a failure to repay war debts.⁷ Consumers wanted an end to rationing, and businesses wanted an end to price controls. In a letter to the editor of the *New York Times*, Ashley Pettis summed up the desires of many Americans: “With the

³ See, among others, Robert M. Collins, *More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 1; Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1996), pt. II; Charles S. Maier, “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II,” *International Organization* 31, no. 4 (September 1977): 607–633; William Edward Leuchtenburg, *In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to George W. Bush* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), chap. 1; James Gross, *Broken Promise: The Subversion Of U.S. Labor Relations* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010); Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*.

⁴ See Truman’s memoirs (especially vol. I) for more on his belief in the United Nations.

⁵ Truman had to issue several statements and speeches addressing why the demobilization was not taking place at the public’s desired pace. See, for example, Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President Concerning Demobilization of the Armed Forces,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, September 19, 1945, Online; Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President on Demobilization,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, January 8, 1946, Online.

⁶ The high point prior to that period was November 1941, when 81% of the public saw foreign problems as most vital. The two polls prior to the June 1946 poll saw 7% in October 1945 and 23% in February 1946. Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 1977), 73. In March 1947, on the eve of the Truman Doctrine, only about 30% of respondents to a Council on Foreign Relations poll were aware of most events in American foreign affairs, while “only a quarter of the electorate was reasonably well informed.” Thomas G. Paterson, “Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The Truman Years,” *Diplomatic History* 3, no. 1 (January 1979): 6.

⁷ Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 41.

relaxing of the rigors of war, it is to be expected that the normal pursuits of peace will attain their accustomed equilibrium.”⁸

As the public expected and demanded a Harding-esque return to normalcy, so did many of the policies of the government reflect the transition to peace. The number of armed forces dropped from 12 million soldiers in May 1945 to 1.6 million in July 1947. At the same time, the defense budget was cut from \$83 billion to \$12.8 billion between 1945 and 1947.⁹ Lend-Lease provisions ended in September 1945, and Truman announced the end of price controls on November 9, 1946.¹⁰ In late 1945, Truman took the symbolic step of changing the official U.S. seal: rather than having the bald eagle facing its left talons, which held a clutch of arrows, it would face towards its right talons, adorned with an olive branch of peace.¹¹ With the official proclamation of the “Cessation of Hostilities of World War II” on December 31, 1946, the United States finally seemed to have put war behind it.¹²

Despite the movement toward a peace footing, however, the relationship between the United States and one of its principal allies, the Soviet Union, was becoming increasingly unclear. The popular figure of “Uncle Joe” no longer held as the dominant characterization of the Soviet Union’s leader. Administrative policy continued on an allied basis, though rumblings of dissent began to spring up both inside and outside of the executive branch. Secretary James Byrnes felt that cooperation with the Soviet Union was no longer possible, and Averill Harriman, once a Soviet booster in his role as ambassador, began to question Soviet intentions after their failure to honor key sections of the Yalta

⁸ Ashley Pettis, “Shall They Return?,” *The New York Times*, December 15, 1946, sec. From the Mail Pouch.

⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 23.

¹⁰ Harry S. Truman, “Executive Order 9801 - Removing Wage and Salary Controls Adopted Pursuant to the Stabilization Act of 1942,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, November 9, 1946, Online.

¹¹ Henry R. Nau, *Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan* (Princeton University Press, 2015), 1.

¹² Harry S. Truman, “Proclamation 2714 - Cessation of Hostilities of World War II,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, December 31, 1946, Online.

agreements.¹³ George Kennan penned his Long Telegram from Moscow, warning of the expansionist nature of the Soviet Union, and followed up with the explosive “X Article” in *Foreign Affairs*, forming the basis for a strategy of containment based on a suspicious orientation towards the American partner in World War II. All of these administrative positions coalesced in the writing – and subsequent locking away – of the classified Clifford-Elsey report, which worried about “democratic countries which are in any way menaced or endangered by the USSR.”¹⁴ Outside of the White House, Republican Arthur Vandenberg advocated harsher treatment of what he saw as Soviet duplicity, while Winston Churchill warned the gathered crowd at Fulton, Missouri that “an iron curtain has descended across” Europe.¹⁵

As for President Truman himself, he remained in an ambiguous, undecided state. He famously lost his temper with Soviet intransigence, yelling at Foreign Minister Molotov in their first meeting in April 1945, while simultaneously viewing Stalin as a reincarnation of Tom Pendergast, the Missouri party boss he was used to dealing with.¹⁶ He vacillated between fury and conciliation, holding out hope that the Soviets might be brought back into the column of allies, rather than enemies.¹⁷ These vacillations were not reported to the outside world, however; Truman’s public statements and speeches remained conciliatory and friendly.¹⁸

As individuals’ minds changed and larger groups began to fear Soviet intentions, Soviet actions did little to mollify doubters. A central turning point came with the

¹³ Larson, *Origins of Containment*, 336, 117–19.

¹⁴ While written by Clark M. Clifford and George M. Elsey, the report was compiled by consulting with people throughout different levels of the Truman administration. As Bostdorff notes, the report showed “the degree to which a consensus was developing within the administration about the threat the USSR posed and how the United States should respond to that threat.” I cite Bostdorff’s work extensively in this chapter, as her full-length monograph on the writing of the Truman Doctrine is rich in empirical detail. Denise M. Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine* (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 39–40.

¹⁵ Julian E. Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security—from World War II to the War on Terrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 63–64.

¹⁶ Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, 243.

¹⁷ For more detail on the specific aspects of Truman’s psychology and changing attitudes, see Larson, *Origins of Containment*, chaps. 3, 8.

¹⁸ See below for more on Truman’s discursive descriptions of the Soviet Union.

controversy over Iran. During the War, it was agreed that the Soviet Union and Great Britain would withdraw their troops from Iran within six months of the end of fighting. The Soviet Union failed to do so, moving southward to consolidate friendly, oil-rich territory in the People's Republic of Azerbaijan. Only after several sanctions at the hands of the United Nations and additional American diplomatic pressure did Stalin finally withdraw his troops.¹⁹ For many, this represented clear Soviet hostility, the first move in the war to come.

But even with the Iran crisis, Soviet intentions remained blurry. They pulled back from Czechoslovakia and Manchuria while cultivating friendly governments in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. They fulfilled their Potsdam promise of keeping Germany whole while deepening their penetration into Eastern Europe.²⁰ Truman's public rhetoric in his pre-Truman Doctrine discourse remained conciliatory, with his only public references to the events in Iran coming during news conferences, not public speeches, statements, or proclamations.²¹

Despite the activities of the Soviet Union, and because of Truman's "rhetorical reticence" when it came to stoking conflict, the public's firm anti-war stance became clear during the congressional elections of 1946.²² The Republicans ran on an economically-conservative, anti-inflationary platform, promising tax cuts and deficit reduction, and blaming all difficulties on the current president with two slogans: "Had Enough?" and "To

¹⁹ Fernande Scheid Raine, "The Iranian Crisis of 1946 and the Origins of the Cold War," in Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, eds., *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005); Warren I. Cohen, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: America in the Age of Soviet Power*, vol. IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 30.

²⁰ Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 53.

²¹ I make reference here to the "pre-Truman Doctrine discourse." See section 4 below for my compiling of this corpus of 626 presidential statements, speeches, and news conferences. Prior to the Yalta Conference, Truman only answered questions – with equivocal and conciliatory statements – regarding the situation in Iran at news conferences on December 7, 1945; March 8, 1946; March 14, 1946; March 28, 1946; April 3, 1946; and April 18, 1946.

²² Martin J. Medhurst, "Truman's Rhetorical Reticence, 1945–1947: An Interpretive Essay," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 74, no. 1 (February 1, 1988): 52–70.

Err is Truman.”²³ The campaign worked, because, as Thomas J. Christensen wrote of this period, “in calling for American retrenchment and lower budgets, the Republicans were reflecting, not leading, the general attitudes of society.”²⁴ Two weeks before Election Day, only 32% of Americans approved of Truman’s job performance and on the day itself, Republicans swept to victory across the country, controlling both houses of Congress for the first time since the Hoover years.²⁵ The famously conservative class of new congressmen included Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) and John Bricker (R-OH), “economic nationalists and political isolationists, more eager to attack the president for being soft on communists at home than to press him to do anything abroad.”²⁶ It was clear which way the wind was blowing, and despite growing suspicion of Soviet motives, large-scale foreign policy priorities were clearly unfavorable. In this climate, selling any form of costly internationalist policy proved extraordinarily difficult.

2.1 *The administration and Europe*

While the public may have “had enough” of Democratic internationalism, the Truman administration continued to push forward a discourse and policy of international involvement, especially in Europe. In this way, the policy thrust of the Truman Doctrine was not new. The Truman administration had begun work on plans for economic aid to Greece and Turkey in September 1946, and Secretary of State George Marshall had begun designing a policy to increase assistance to both Turkey and Greece even before the idea

²³ Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy,” in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, I: Origins, 75; Offner, *Another Such Victory*, 184; Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, 77.

²⁴ Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 41.

²⁵ Sean J. Savage, “Truman in Historical, Popular, and Political Memory,” in Daniel S. Margolies, ed., *A Companion to Harry S. Truman*, Blackwell Companions to American History (Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell, 2012), 10; Offner, *Another Such Victory*, 184; Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 40.

²⁶ Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 70.

for the Truman Doctrine arose. “Clearly,” writes Walter LaFeber, “the formulation of the Truman Doctrine was not a sudden and drastic departure in American foreign policy.”²⁷

Europe had been the top regional priority in the Truman administration’s foreign policy since its beginning.²⁸ Upon returning from the Potsdam conference, the president informed the American people, “If we let Europe go cold and hungry, we may lose some of the foundations of order on which the hoped for world-wide peace must rest. We must help to the limits of our strength. And we will.” Six weeks later, he reaffirmed that commitment, reminding the public, “That pledge, made not only to our Allies, but to the American people, must be kept.”²⁹ Europe would be the lynchpin for a new world order.

The biggest issue facing Europe was that of reconstruction. The war had devastated the continental economy, and industrial standstills and food shortages threatened political stability. Reports sent to Truman warned that “At the threshold of every problem which confronts us today in international affairs is...appalling devastation, hunger, sickness, and pervasive human misery”; “the forces of starvation, disease, suffering and chaos...threatened to engulf the world in the wake of the war”; and “A chaotic and hungry Europe is not fertile ground in which stable, democratic and friendly governments can be reared.”³⁰ Acheson testified before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency that the situation in Europe – in which industry and society “had come to a complete and

²⁷ Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966*, America in Crisis (New York: Wiley, 1967), 44.

²⁸ Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 331.

²⁹ Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President on the European Relief and Rehabilitation Program,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, September 17, 1945, Online.

³⁰ Harry S. Truman, “Letter to Heads of War Agencies on the Economic Situation in the Liberated Countries of Northwest Europe,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, May 22, 1945, Online; Harry S. Truman, “Message to the Congress on the State of the Union and on the Budget for 1947,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, January 21, 1946, Online; Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress Requesting Appropriations for Aid to Liberated Countries,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, February 21, 1947, Online.

total standstill” – “threatens the very foundations, the whole fabric of world organization which we have known in our lifetime and which our fathers and forefathers knew.”³¹

This was an issue not only of human suffering, but also of the political consequences of that suffering. As Truman said in his April 6, 1946 address in Chicago on Army Day, “we find [Europe] suffering from terrible pangs of hunger and privation. Economic reconstruction is first of all a task for the people and the governments of Europe. Help from the outside, however, will quicken the pace of reconstruction and reduce the cost of human misery.” The reasons provided for help encompassed a wide range of rationales:

We shall help because we know that we ourselves cannot enjoy prosperity in a world of economic stagnation. We shall help because economic distress, anywhere in the world, is a fertile breeding ground for violent political upheaval. And we shall help because we feel it is right to lend a hand to our friends and allies who are recovering from wounds inflicted by our common enemy.³²

It was the right thing to do, Truman noted, but it was also the smart thing to do: “political upheaval” might rise out of the mire of economic distress. Other speeches and statements of his doubled down on this message, emphasizing in the 1947 State of the Union address, “We must continue to provide subsistence to prevent disease, hunger, and unrest, and to provide proper administration, if these lands are eventually to become democratic and self-supporting.”³³ In a special radio address to the nation, the President urged citizens to conserve food for those starving abroad, cautioning that “A sound world order can never be built upon a foundation of human misery.”³⁴ This was an issue of political, not merely humanitarian, consequences.

³¹ Acheson qtd. in Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945-1952,” in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, I: Origins, 74.

³² Harry S. Truman, “Address in Chicago on Army Day,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, April 6, 1946, Online.

³³ Harry S. Truman, “State of the Union Address,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, January 6, 1947, Online.

³⁴ Harry S. Truman, “Radio Appeal to the Nation for Food Conservation to Relieve Hunger Abroad, April 19, 1946,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, April 19, 1946, Online.

Despite these public efforts, anti-interventionist and anti-inflationary sentiment severely circumscribed the ability of the administration to intervene in European affairs and mollify the desperate situation. When the idea was first floated to provide England with financial assistance in February 1946, only 36% of the public approved.³⁵ Truman managed to send hundreds of American election observers to aid the post-war electoral process in Greece and helped the Greek government get a \$25 million loan from the Import-Export Bank.³⁶ Yet, the U.S. pulled back from more involved aid, even when the prime minister visited Truman in December 1946.³⁷ Congress blocked a \$3.75 billion loan to Britain as well as the expansion of the Export-Import Bank by \$1.25 billion.³⁸ Europe's situation was dire, but the Truman administration had very little latitude with which to act to address the crisis. Their initial attempts to achieve their foreign aid goals had failed.

2.2 *The British notes*

While the entire continent of Europe was struggling, the situation in Great Britain was particularly alarming. The U.K. was the historical arbiter of European affairs, the strongman that aided the continent and had twice stepped up militarily to defend its integrity. But at the close of World War II, the economy was in shambles. On January 20, 1947, the Attlee government issued a White Paper pronouncing the British economic situation "extremely serious."³⁹ The next month, the government released the Economic Survey for 1947. It described the dire state of post-war Britain, cautioning that the British

³⁵ National Opinion Research Center, "Postwar Cooperation Poll," *Roper Center for Public Opinion Research*, February 1946, <http://ropercorner.comnell.edu>.

³⁶ Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 46.

³⁷ Despite not being promised any aid, Prime Minister Tsaldaris announced to the public that he had done so. *Ibid.*

³⁸ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 106.

³⁹ Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, 71.

way of life was under threat. The *London Times* described the White Paper as “the most disturbing statement ever made by a British Government.”⁴⁰

Britain’s problem became impossible for the United States to ignore when on February 21, the First Secretary of the British Embassy, Herbert M. Sichel, met with Loy Henderson, the director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs. Sichel handed Henderson two notes, both concerning their “most earnest and anxious consideration to the important problem that on strategic and political grounds Greece and Turkey should not be allowed to fall under Soviet influence.” Reports from the ground in Greece showed that “the Greek economic situation is on the point of collapse” and in great need of external stabilization. But – and here was the difficulty – “His Majesty’s’ Government, in view of their own situation, find it impossible to grant further financial assistance to Greece.” Instead, the Ambassador asked “the United States [to] agree to bear, as from the 1st April, 1947, the financial burden.”⁴¹

The notes were, in the words of Dean Acheson, “shockers.”⁴² The United Kingdom had been the cornerstone of European stability, and now it was abdicating that position to the United States. Three days after the original delivery of the note, British Ambassador Lord Inverchapel met with Secretary of State Marshall and convinced him of the necessity of American intervention. This, combined with reports from the American missions in Athens and Moscow, convinced President Truman of the need to act.⁴³

Action was swift and united: within a week, the State Department had prepared a document of its position, and that document had been approved by Acheson, Marshall, the

⁴⁰ Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 406–7.

⁴¹ The notes were both intended for delivery to Secretary of State George Marshall, but as Marshall was out of town (he was giving a speech at Princeton University), Henderson was the immediate recipient. “The British Embassy to the Department of State, Aide-Memoire,” *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*) 1947, Vol. V, 32, 34, 35.

⁴² Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 217.

⁴³ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. II. Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1955), 105.

Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the President.⁴⁴ They advocated “that this government should accept the responsibilities in question and should do its best to discharge them in such a way as to maintain confidence in the United States and in their own ability to resist Soviet pressure.”⁴⁵ Secretary James Forrestal sent his own memo on March 7 as well, warning that the United States had to act before the “Russian poison” crippled not only Europe, but also “South America, and ourselves.”⁴⁶

With this in mind, the State Department outlined a policy of several steps, including responding to the British, consulting with the Treasury Department, studying the situations in Greece and Turkey, and drafting appropriate legislation. Two of the steps illuminated the difficulties the administration had previously had with procuring public and political sanction for efforts at foreign aid: “The problem [must] be discussed privately and frankly by the leaders of the administration with appropriate members of Congress” and “Measures [must] be adopted to acquaint the American public with the situation and with the need for action along proposed lines.”⁴⁷

Despite these foreseeable difficulties with regards to opposition acceptance of administration actions, the Truman administration remained remarkably in agreement on the need to address the economic situations in Greece and Turkey. As Jones, detailed years later, “The singleness of reaction grew from accumulating facts that had been shouting for recognition for a long time. One more fact was added, and the situation no longer shouted, but commanded, and was obeyed. History took a new course.”⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 130.

⁴⁵ “Position and Recommendations of the Department of State Regarding Immediate and Substantial Aid to Greece and Turkey,” undated, *FRUS* 1947, Vol. V, 53.

⁴⁶ LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966*, 47.

⁴⁷ “Position and Recommendations,” 55.

⁴⁸ Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 130.

3 The decision to ramp

Of course, history cannot merely “take a new course.” A stream does not divert itself as it runs downhill; a dam must be built, a fork laid out. So too did the Truman administration need to compel their desired changes in foreign policy. In the section that follows, I outline the decision to undertake strategic ramping and evoke emotions in the public to persuade them to go along with expanded foreign programs. As outlined above, Truman and other executive branch leaders had previously attempted to wage a battle of ideas in the public sphere, outlining the need for greater intervention, especially economically, into the affairs of European (and some Far Eastern) states so as to preserve stability. But these tactics had failed, resulting in stymied legislation, slashed budgets, and a brutal congressional defeat.

Truman understood that getting ratification for his desire to send aid to Greece and Turkey constituted “the greatest selling job ever facing a president.”⁴⁹ In order to make the sale, as contemporary journalist James Reston wrote, “officials concede[d] probably nothing short of a shock would persuade Congress to act.”⁵⁰ They would gain Congressional approval by “plac[ing] before it a specific proposal about a specific country in an atmosphere of crisis.”⁵¹ To break the dominant cycle of anti-interventionist ideas, the Truman administration resorted to a new tactic: emotional ramping. In this section, I examine the process of writing the Truman Doctrine to elucidate the calculated attempt to evoke emotions in the public and congressional audience.

After receiving the British notes and determining that the United States would have to assume the aid-giving duties of Great Britain, the administration turned to the question

⁴⁹ “Cabinet Meeting Minutes, March 7, 1947,” Matthew J. Connelly Papers, Notes on Cabinet Meetings II, HSTPL.

⁵⁰ James Reston qtd. in J.J. Iselin, Draft of Book Chapter on the Truman Doctrine, August 3, 1964, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 17, 1947 March 12, “Truman Doctrine” speech, HSTPL.

⁵¹ James Reston, “Direct Approach Favored in Making Foreign Policy; Reticence During Growth of Greek Crisis Cited as Example of Veiled Technique,” March 7, 1947, *The New York Times*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (clippings), HSTPL.

of how it would be able to pass legislation to allow it to undertake these duties. As early as February 24th, the administration understood that it would need to “electrify the American people” in order to get ratification.⁵² Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton also warned that “the United States will not take world leadership effectively unless the people of the United States are shocked into doing so.”⁵³ These nods toward “electrification” and “shock” metaphorically demonstrate how the administration understood the need to emotionally arouse the public.

The evolution of this affective strategy can be seen in microcosm at a February 27 meeting between Marshall, Acheson, Truman and a group of Congressional leaders. The meeting began with Marshall outlining the nature of the situation: that Greece and Turkey were in dire straits, and the United Kingdom no longer had the economic capacity to aid them. After the presentation of this material “in outline form,” “the reaction of the Congressional leaders was rather trivial.” At that point, Acheson stepped in.⁵⁴ The Assistant Secretary “reviewed the situation throughout the world, the pressure of Communist parties everywhere, and the necessity, in the interest of the security of the United States, in taking a firm stand.”⁵⁵ He drew parallels to previous eras in world history:

Not since Athens and Sparta, not since Rome and Carthage have we had such a polarization of power. It is thus not a question of pulling British chestnuts out of the fire. It is a question of the security of the United States. It is a question of whether two-thirds of the area of the world and three-fourths of the world’s territory is to be controlled by Communists.⁵⁶

⁵² “Minutes of the First Meeting of the Special Committee to Study Assistance to Greece and Turkey, February 24th, 1947, 3:00 P.M.,” *FRUS* 1947, Vol. V, 47.

⁵³ William Clayton, “Memorandum, March 5, 1947,” William L. Clayton Papers, General File, Box 60, Marshall Plan Memos, 1947, HSTPL.

⁵⁴ The heightened role of Acheson has been built through his own accounts of the period, which were then fed into Joseph Jones’ notes at the time, as well as his book detailing the period, *The Fifteen Weeks*. Other accounts, like *Washington Daily News* correspondent Lyle Wilson, suggest that it was Marshall who “sounded the alarm.” As historian Denise Bostdorff notes, whether Acheson alone can take credit for changing the minds of the Congressional leaders – or whether Marshall played a larger additional role as well “has been a subject for speculation ever since” the meeting itself. Either way, the point remains that the affective appeal was what changed Congressional minds; the controversy merely exists over whether it was Acheson’s or Marshall’s doing. Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 69.

⁵⁵ Joseph M. Jones, “Memo for the file re: drafting of President’s message to Congress, March 12, 1947,” Truman Doctrine Student Research File, HSTPL.

⁵⁶ As noted above, there is some controversy over who uttered these words. In Jones’ notes from February 27, he does not specify whether it was Acheson or Marshall who spoke – he says only that “the Secretary and

The response was immediate. “Most of the Congressional leaders were greatly shaken,” Jones’ notes recall.⁵⁷ The leaders promised to support Truman’s efforts in Congress, on the condition that he present it “to the public in terms almost as frank as those in which Secretary Marshall had presented it to them.”⁵⁸ Acheson took away from this meeting an important lesson: that “he had to pull out all the stops and speak in the frankest, boldest, widest terms to attract...support.”⁵⁹ Vandenberg summed up this demand succinctly: Truman would have to “scare the hell out of the American people.”⁶⁰

This meeting proved a turning point in the Truman administration’s strategies for getting public and congressional approval for their foreign policies. While other tactics had not worked, Acheson and Marshall’s deliberately emotion-evocative overtures to Congress had proved successful. This would be the strategy that the administration would seek to undertake to mobilize the collective public. In heeding Vandenberg’s advice to “scare the hell” out of the American people, the administration decided to turn to emotional ramping.

3.1 *Drafting the Truman Doctrine*

Presenting the policy to Congress and the public became the top priority. As Jones later wrote in an official summary of the drafting process, “The President had been concerned from the beginning not so much about the decision he had to make regarding Greece and Turkey as about the extent to which Congress and the American people could

Mr. Acheson proceeded to a very frank discussion of the whole situation.” Only later in his *The Fifteen Weeks* does he attribute the words solely to Acheson. Joseph M. Jones, “Meeting notes, February 27,” J.M. Jones Papers, Truman Doctrine Student Research File, HSTPL.

⁵⁷ Joseph M. Jones, “Memo for the file re: drafting of President’s message to Congress, March 12, 1947”

⁵⁸ Joseph M. Jones, “Meeting notes, February 27”

⁵⁹ Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 143.

⁶⁰ Vandenberg qtd. in David C. Unger, “The Politics, and Political Legacy, of National Security Policies,” in Mary Ann Heiss and Michael J. Hogan, eds., *Origins of the National Security State and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman* (Kirksville, Missouri: Truman State University Press, 2015), 174. Like much attribution of this particular meeting, there is some controversy over the veracity of this statement. While it is rife in contemporary histories of the period, Bostdorff notes that the claim of Vandenberg making this statement seems to date from Eric Goldman’s book, *The Crucial Decade* (1956). Vandenberg himself makes no note of this in his private papers from the period, noting only the difficulties of bipartisan foreign policy “on a crisis basis.” Arthur H. Vandenberg, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (London: Gollancz, 1953), 340; Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 71–72.

be convinced that a program of aid was necessary...the President, Marshall, Acheson, Vandenberg, and the Cabinet as a whole had emphasized the central importance of the public approach.”⁶¹

To mobilize the public, Acheson and his team set out to implement this emotional ramping via writing Truman’s message to Congress.⁶² With little guidance from the Acting Secretary, three men began writing drafts of the speech: Loy Henderson, James Jones and Gordon Merriam. The differences between these initial attempts and their reception by Acheson showcase clearly the desired affective approach to the speech. Henderson’s draft opened with a lengthy sentence, reminding the audience of recent American victories: “On that eventful day in September 1945 when we received the news that Japan had surrendered it was our fervent hope that we were at the threshold of a new era in which all democratic and liberty-loving people, relieved of threats of aggressive totalitarianism, would be free to devote their energies to the tasks of reconstruction and to cooperate in the maintenance of a peace based on justice and respect for the rights of human beings and of nations.”⁶³ Jones’ opening salvo was much punchier: “I lay before you today one of the gravest problems of national security ever to confront the nation.”⁶⁴ His opening paragraph continued in the same alarmist vein: “We are face to face with a crisis in foreign policy...upon the decisions that must be made now will depend the security and well-being of the American people.”⁶⁵ Upon reviewing the drafts, Acheson quickly selected Jones’ as the one that they would pursue. Henderson’s draft was simply “much more timid

⁶¹ Joseph M. Jones, “Drafting of the President’s Message of March 12, 1947: Chronology,” Truman Doctrine Student Research File, HSTPL.

⁶² Originally there were to be two separate speeches – one to Congress, and one to the public over the radio. It was decided on March 6 that the “fireside chat” be abandoned. The Message was shaping up in a pretty forceful way, and Jones suggested it would be more impressive if the President went to Congress to deliver it in person.” Joseph M. Jones, “Drafting of the President’s Message of March 12, 1947: Chronology.”

⁶³ Loy Henderson’s draft of the President’s Message, ca. March 1947, Truman Doctrine Student Research File, HSTPL.

⁶⁴ Joseph M. Jones, “Suggestions for the President’s message to Congress in regard to the Greek situation,” March 3, 1947, J.M. Jones Papers, Subject File. Truman Doctrine Drafts, HSTPL.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

than what Acheson wanted.”⁶⁶ Jones’ was a “bolder and more imaginative presentation of our economic policy needs.”⁶⁷

It would only become more so. Acheson set Jones the goal of “charg[ing] the Presidential statement with enough electricity to shock Congress into prompt action.” This speech would be “the opening gun in a campaign to bring people up to the realization that the war isn’t over by any means.”⁶⁸ In linking shocking Congress to a campaign of persuasion, Acheson was advocating the strategic evocation of public emotion that we have come to identify as ramping.⁶⁹

The evolving drafts between Jones’ March 4 effort – the first written with Acheson’s feedback – and Truman’s eventual delivery of the speech eight days later show both the consistent heightening of the emotional content of the speech and the widening of the speech’s scope.⁷⁰ These would be the consistent editorial suggestions, from the February 27 decision to “talk of Communist development in all critical areas...instead of talking about the Russians encircling Greece” to Jones’ note to Henderson that “I would change the emphasis somewhat from the general dollar problem...[to] the necessity for bolstering up democracy throughout the world.”⁷¹ Both the March 4 and March 7 drafts opened with a description of “a grave problem” of American national security: “The

⁶⁶ Henderson qtd. in J.J. Iselin, Draft of Book Chapter on the Truman Doctrine, August 3, 1964, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 17, 1947 March 12, "Truman Doctrine" speech, HSTPL.

⁶⁷ Joseph M. Jones to Loy Henderson, February 28, 1947, Truman Doctrine Student Research File, HSTPL.

⁶⁸ Clark Clifford memo to George Elsey, March 9, 1947, qtd. in J.J. Iselin, Draft of Book Chapter on the Truman Doctrine.

⁶⁹ Truman later took credit for the increased intensity of the speech: “The first version was not at all to my liking. The writers had filled the speech with all sorts of background data and statistical figures about Greece and made the whole thing sound like an investment prospectus. I returned this draft to Acheson with a note asking for more emphasis on a declaration of general policy. The Department’s draftsmen then rewrote the speech to include a general policy statement, but it seemed to me half-hearted. The key sentence, for instance, read, ‘I believe that it should be the policy of the United States...’ I took my pencil, scratched out ‘should’ and wrote in ‘must’...I wanted no hedging in this speech. This was America’s answer to the surge of expansion of Communist tyranny. It had to be clear and free of hesitation or double talk.” Despite these statements, however, the draft speeches held in the Truman Library do not offer evidence of Truman’s authorship. Truman, *Memoirs*, II. Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953, 111.

⁷⁰ During this period, a number of other people became involved in the drafting process. In addition to Jones, Henderson, Merriam, and Acheson, Clark Clifford and George Elsey also became involved. For more on the collaborative and varied authorship, see drafts in Truman Library archival holdings and Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 92–93.

⁷¹ Joseph M. Jones, Meeting Notes, February 27, 1947.; Joseph M. Jones to Loy Henderson, February 28, 1947.

British Government...as of March 31...will be obliged to discontinue its program of financial assistance to Greece.”⁷² By the next draft, however, the introduction spoke not just of American national security, but “the gravity of the situation which confronts the world today.” It then continued: “One phase of the present problem...concerns Greece and Turkey.”⁷³ The immediate context for the speech had become just one issue among many global ones, following Acheson’s stricture that this would make the speech more shocking.

The conclusion of the address evolved similarly. Considered the most important part of any speech, the conclusion (or “peroration”) went through a revving up process. In the March 4 draft, Jones concluded:

If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before Congress. This is a time when the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government must work together expeditiously, and in close coordination, to ward off dangers which are no less certain to affect the peace, security, and prosperity of the nation because they are a step removed in time and space.⁷⁴

The paragraph remained unchanged in the March 7 draft. However, it was met with dissatisfaction by the president’s assistants, Clifford and Elsey. “Stronger Peroration,” Jones noted on his draft of the speech after meeting with these men.⁷⁵ The next draft, of March 10, took this advice to heart. Moving the previous peroration to page 13 of a 15-page speech, the new draft concluded much more forcefully:

We have had placed upon us, by the swift movement of events, great responsibilities. We shall be tested as never before. We must face the realization that the future of this nation depends upon the continuation of the fundamental belief in human freedom and democracy, not only within our own country, but among the peoples of the world.⁷⁶

⁷² Joseph M. Jones, “Draft of President’s Message to Congress on the Greek Situation,” March 4, 1947. Truman Doctrine Student Research File. HSTPL; “Draft of President’s Message to Congress on the Greek Situation,” March 7, 1947. George M. Elsey Papers, Box 17, March 12, “Truman Doctrine” Speech, HSTPL.

⁷³ Truman Doctrine Draft of March 10, 1947, Truman Doctrine Student Research File, HSTPL.

⁷⁴ Joseph M. Jones, “Draft of President’s Message to Congress on the Greek Situation,” March 4, 1947.

⁷⁵ Joseph M. Jones, “Draft of President’s Message to Congress on the Greek Situation,” March 7, 1947.

⁷⁶ Truman Doctrine Draft of March 10, 1947.

Throughout, the speech became more and more forceful. “The force of the argument,” Jones noted at the time, “was increased by the editing....This I attribute primarily to the fact that the President had promised to explain this situation frankly to the public and there was no possibility of going back on that promise and thus of watering down the argument.”⁷⁷

In drafting the Truman Doctrine, Acheson, Jones and the other administration officials tasked with shaping the president’s address sought to make the speech as emotionally-evocative as possible (the specific discursive ways that the final draft of the speech was designed to achieve those aims will be discussed below). In doing so, they subscribed fully to the strategy of emotional ramping, seeking to excite public emotions for the purposes of political persuasion.

3.2 *Internal critiques*

While the decision to aid Greece and Turkey was popular within nearly all branches of the administration, the method of delivery was questioned by some as being too over the top. On March 6, George Kennan of the Policy Planning office checked in on the Near Eastern division to see how the speech was progressing. Kennan, the author of the famous Long Telegram and X Article, blanched at the address. “To say that he found objections is to put it mildly,” Jones recalled. Kennan critiqued the “tone and ideological content of the message, the portraying of two opposing ways of life, and the open-end commitment to aid free peoples.” He worried that “the Russians might even reply by declaring a war!”⁷⁸

George Elsey, assistant to the Special Counsel to the President, had similar reservations. On March 7, the day after Kennan’s expression of disquiet, Elsey drafted a

⁷⁷ Joseph M. Jones, “Memo for the file re: drafting of President’s message to Congress, March 12, 1947.”

⁷⁸ In Kennan’s memoirs, he also described disapproving of the wording of the Truman Doctrine as too incendiary and provocative. Despite that evidence, repeated in many scholarly works from Daniel Yergin’s *Shattered Peace* to Arnold Offner’s *Another Such Victory*, a 2009 article by Robert Frazier suggests that Kennan may not have been as resolutely against the speech at the time as later accounts suggest that he was. For more on the historiography of this, see Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 155; Daniel H. Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War*, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin, 1990), 282; Offner, *Another Such Victory*, 200; Robert Frazier, “Kennan, ‘Universalism,’ and the Truman Doctrine,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 11, no. 2 (April 1, 2009): 3–34.

memo to his boss, Clark Clifford. “I do not believe that this is the occasion for the ‘All-out’ speech,” he wrote. He worried that since there “has been no overt action in the immediate past by the U.S.S.R. which serves as an adequate pretext,” “the most significant speech in the President’s administration” might be taken the wrong way. He noted that “the public is not prepared”:

Public acceptance and support – the unity of all the people – must come after the ‘All-out’ speech. Nothing would be more disastrous than to have such a speech divide the country. I believe an ‘All-out’ speech will have a divisive effect if delivered too soon. A series of Presidential and Cabinet speech and Executive Department actions will be necessary to educate and inform the public to the point where the ‘All-out’ message can be delivered and have the desired effect....the forthcoming speech should be one of a series, building up as rapidly as possible to the great climax – the ‘All-out’ speech.⁷⁹

The problem with the ‘All-out’ speech, as Elsey saw it, was not the policy it belied. Aid to Greece and Turkey, and further aid to other countries resisting communist aggression, was essential. The problem was its ‘All-out’ nature, introduced to an unsuspecting public before there could be a steady educational campaign. With this in mind, Elsey recommended “that next week’s message should be limited in scope. I recommend as a subject ‘U.S. Responsibility for European Reconstruction.’”⁸⁰ Elsey’s admonitions, like Kennan’s, were overruled, and the ramping efforts continued.

3.3 *Preparing the audience*

Elsey was not the only one worried about public preparation. Instead of scaling back the speech as Elsey advocated, however, the State Department doubled down on the overall strategic approach and decided to engage in an active public information campaign in the immediate days before the president’s remarks. The State Department had recently become interested in public affairs, from beginning to publish the publicly available *Bulletin of the Department of State* in October 1943 to the creation of the Office of Public Information

⁷⁹ George Elsey to Clark Clifford, March 7, 1947 qtd. in “Letter from Elsey to Richard Freeland,” George M. Elsey Papers, Box 17, 1947 March 12, ‘Truman Doctrine’ speech, HSTPL.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

and Division of Public Liaison in January and February of 1944 respectively.⁸¹ Upon receipt of the British notes in February 1947, Frances Russell was the Director of the Office of Public Affairs, and on the February 28, he was put in charge of the information campaign to prepare the public for the Truman Doctrine.

Russell called a meeting of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information to discuss the issue. The importance of public information was such that the State Department even asked for the public affairs office's help in designing the overall policy. Many of their ideas from one section of their report, "Basic United States Policy," would end up in the final Truman Doctrine.⁸² Regarding the selling of the policy, the subcommittee determined that there would have to be a three-part information effort. First, they would need to "furnis[h] full and frank information" to the "American people" in order to "make possible the formulation of intelligent opinions." Second, the content of that information ought not just be centered on the specific situation in Greece or Turkey, but rather on "the world conflict between free and totalitarian or imposed forms of government." And third, with that wide lens established, the committee hoped "to bring about an understanding by the American people of the world strategic situation."⁸³ With this document, we can see both the need for public support, and the attempts to attain that public support through widening the issue at hand to one of freedom versus tyranny. Over the course of the meeting, Dean

⁸¹ Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 63; Graham H. Stuart, *The Department of State: A History of Its Organization, Procedure, and Personnel* (New York: Macmillan Co, 1949), 391, 404.

⁸² In this section, they argue that "A cardinal objective of United States foreign policy is a world in which nations shall be able to work out their own way of life free of coercion by other nations....The intent of this country [is] to maintain a world of free peoples..." This wide definition of the problem, despite being set only the task of examining a policy of aid to Greece and Turkey, was instrumental in helping to set out the ideas behind the Truman Doctrine. "Report by the Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information of the State-Navy-War Coordinating Committee," undated, *FRUS* 1947, Vol. V, 76.

⁸³ Joseph M. Jones, "Drafting of the President's Message of March 12, 1947: Chronology."

Acheson emphasized that the matter “must be put over forcefully” and that the “U.S. position must be made strong and clear.”⁸⁴ Tone mattered.

As part of the public relations campaign, Acheson and other members of the administration cultivated members of the press.⁸⁵ Bostdorff notes that the “news coverage in the two weeks prior to Truman’s March 12 speech largely reflected the views perpetuated by the White House,” due to the strategic use of background briefings and the personal cultivation of individual reporter-source relationships. Press reports previewed both the emotion-evocative content and tone of Truman’s speech, warning of “the gravest crisis” that had emerged “like a bolt from the blue” or “a slap in the face.” These papers began suggesting the necessity for American intervention because “the germ disease of another world war had already taken root – this time in Greece.” One reporter noted that Washington had been left “sobered and frightened” by a briefing by Marshall, while another wrote that the United States was standing “on the threshold of a policy decision on which the future peace of the world would unquestionably hang.”⁸⁶ The press had begun to play the part of accomplice in preparing the people, beginning the process of emotional ramping in anticipation of Truman’s words.

4 How did the Truman Doctrine ramp up emotions?

The question then becomes, why did the speech work as a tool of persuasion? How did the speech’s ideo-affective content work to ramp up public emotion for the purposes of mobilization? In 1970, analyzing the speech for their book *Moments in the Rhetoric of the Cold War*, Wayne Brockriede and Robert Lee Scott noted that the Truman Doctrine was not conventionally designed and was instead “articulated with a power that easily eludes

⁸⁴ “Meeting Minutes from Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information, February 28, 1947,” J.M. Jones Papers, Box 6, Truman Doctrine, HSTPL.

⁸⁵ For description of Acheson’s regular meetings with the press, see Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 144.

⁸⁶ Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 76–81.

the critic.”⁸⁷ In this section, I attempt to account for that power. I argue that by looking at ideo-affective factors through the form of the emotionally-sensitive discourse analysis outlined in the previous chapter’s methods section, the analyst can uncover affective sources of persuasion within and related to the text. I examine the text of the Truman Doctrine for evidence of three sources of discursive ramping: paralinguistic features (non-lexical elements, like tone, volume, or gestures), content-based features (embedded in the words of the speech itself), and context-based affect (arising from the situation of the speech within a larger discursive oeuvre).

A brief methodological note: portions of this chapter rely on a set of speeches that I call the “pre-Truman Doctrine corpus.” To construct this corpus, I examined all of the president’s public statements from his assumption of the presidency on April 12, 1945 through to his issuance of the “Truman Doctrine” on March 12, 1947. There were 626 of these speeches, news conferences, proclamations, statements, messages, and letters delivered during the period under question. There were also 303 executive orders issued during this period, but I did not include these within the corpus of texts for analysis given their unique legal vernacular and lack of public circulation.⁸⁸ The pre-Truman Doctrine corpus is used below to establish baseline discursive parameters at the beginning of the Truman presidency.

4.1 *Paralinguistic affect*

A major source of affective ramping in an oratorical setting comes from the oratorical performance itself. Pacing, volume, and tone can all be used to convey emotions,

⁸⁷ Wayne Brockriede and Robert Lee Scott qtd. in Robert L. Ivie, “Fire, Flood, and Red Fever: Motivating Metaphors of Global Emergency in the Truman Doctrine Speech,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (September 1, 1999): 571.

⁸⁸ I used the University of California at Santa Barbara’s “American Presidency Project” database to isolate these texts from the Public Papers of the President and Federal Register. To see the full list of included documents, see Appendix.

and to elicit emotions from an audience.⁸⁹ This might lead researchers to assume that part of the emotional impact of the Truman Doctrine came from the president's verbal delivery of the speech, especially since the speech was delivered in Congress and broadcast to a national audience via the radio. Yet, listening to a recording of the 18-minute speech is in many ways unremarkable, discounting traditional theories about paralinguistic gestures in soaring oratory.⁹⁰ The president spoke carefully, his voice conversational, staying at a consistent volume. He did not shout, and barely varied the tone of his voice. He tripped over his words several times. The audio alone can hardly be considered dramatic. The audience remained unimpressed by the delivery itself.⁹¹ There were only three breaks for applause, despite ample pauses where others might have expressed their approval. About six minutes in, there was a brief smattering of clapping when he declared, "it is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece." Four minutes later, there was more robust affirmation, after the words, "We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes." And seven minutes after that, a lone person began a small round of applause after a long pause, clearly taking Truman by surprise as he continues to speak.⁹² When the speech ended, there was the obligatory standing ovation.⁹³

Observers outside the room were similarly unimpressed. Joseph Jones noted that the President's "voice was flat and not impressive."⁹⁴ The *Washington Post*, in an analysis of

⁸⁹ Jo-Anne Bachorowski and Michael J. Owen, "Vocal Expressions of Emotion," in Lewis, Haviland-Jones, and Barrett, *Handbook of Emotions*.

⁹⁰ For publicly accessible audio, see Harry S. Truman, *The Truman Doctrine: Audio*, 1947, Harry S. Truman Library, <https://www.trumanlibrary.org/audio/mp3s/play.php?aud=sr64-47.mp3>.

⁹¹ Jones' latter recollection reframed what this author considered a lukewarm response as one of total shock: "It was as though the President's listeners were stunned, some perhaps dismayed, by the sweep, the boldness, of the President's utterance." Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 22.

⁹² Minute 6:33, 10:45, 17:33, Truman, *The Truman Doctrine: Audio*.

⁹³ Truman later recalled the memory fondly: "When I ended my address, the Congressmen rose as one man and applauded. Vito Marcantonio, the American Labor Party representative from New York, was the only person in the hall who remained seated." Truman, *Memoirs*, II. Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953, 112.

⁹⁴ Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 18-19.

the “President’s Delivery” the day after the speech, also commented on the lack of flair in Truman’s presentation. Truman was unable to muster the gravitas that FDR “used to obtain from his historic utterances. He was asking America to be Atlas,” and yet “his flat voice carried no significance of his fateful recommendation.” The *Post* felt that he spoke with a “think-it-over” approach, failing to “elici[t] applause by driving home his points.”⁹⁵ Perhaps more generously, *Newsweek*, reported that “the president’s delivery was somber; his pace uncommonly slow.”⁹⁶

That the delivery of the Truman Doctrine was less than staggering was unsurprising for a man often characterized as bumbling and “plain speaking.” And yet, despite the paralinguistic flatness, the speech was perceived as historically shocking. The *New Republic’s* coverage summed up the disjuncture between the matter-of-fact delivery and the bold statement: “for 18 minutes, Harry Truman’s even monotone spelled out the new and momentous decisions of his Administration....In Harry Truman’s dry delivery the march of disaster often seemed a sprint against the clock. Yet the ominous beat was unmistakable.”⁹⁷ Some suggest that the shock actually came from his “anti-rhetorical” delivery; while other speakers might bloviate or appear to be trying too hard, Truman’s matter-of-fact tone devoid of all rhetorical flourish may have done the trick to convince his audience of the seriousness of the matter.⁹⁸ As Robert Ivie suggests, “Truman used his matter-of-fact manner and plain style of speaking to emphasize as well as literalize the image of a global emergency.”⁹⁹ The flat rhetoric, then, may have been an asset in conveying gravity.

⁹⁵ “President’s Delivery,” March 13, 1947, *The Washington Post*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (Clippings), HSTPL.

⁹⁶ “The Union: America’s Date with Destiny,” March 24, 1947, *Newsweek*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (Clippings), HSTPL.

⁹⁷ “The Truman Doctrine,” March 24, 1947, *The New Republic*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (clippings), HSTPL.

⁹⁸ Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 131.

⁹⁹ Ivie, “Fire, Flood, and Red Fever,” 581.

Of course, flat style can only be an asset if what it is underscoring is a powerful discursive speech. To fully understand the nature of this shock, then, we must then turn away from purely paralinguistic factors to discursive ones. I identify two forms of discursive ramping tactics: content-based affect, where I examine the specific words of the speech in and of itself, and context-based affect, where I examine the speech within the context of the larger corpus of Truman's presidential speeches. Taken together, I understand the strategic ramping techniques of Truman's words as deriving from a combination of emotionally-coded language and the affective novelty of this address from all those that had come before.

4.2 *Content-based affect*

When examining what I term "content-based affect," I identify three categories of affective language at play: strong and emotionally evocative words, metaphors and other figures of speech, and the construction of morally evocative binaries. The simplest explanation for the affective power of the speech stems from the traditional strength of many of the selected words. The speech opens: "The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved." With the words "gravity," "necessitates," and the references to "national security," the speech immediately grabbed contemporary listeners, warning them of the need to listen. The speech continues with similarly strong word choice, from adjectives like "cruel," "tragic," "indispensible," "terrorist," and "totalitarian," to the use of abstract nouns, like "chaos and extremism," "human want and misery," and "coercion and intimidation." While frank in tone, the vocabulary of the Truman Doctrine packs affective content into its lexicon.

These strong words are not existent in isolation. Rather, they are arrayed in particular combinations, and comprise figures of speech that change their meanings. Much

of the power of the Truman Doctrine comes from the metaphorical language of health and disease – another point of similarity between the Truman Doctrine and Roosevelt’s “quarantine” speech. In the opening of his speech, Truman urges action “if Greece is to survive as a free nation.” Similar health-related language pops up throughout the text, as Truman warns of issues of “subsistence” and “defects” in governance. In contrast, United States “aid” will help towards “recovery,” ideally leading to a state “in which a healthy democracy can flourish.”¹⁰⁰ The consequence of inaction was disease and the “endanger[ing of] the welfare of our own nation.” As Robert Ivie writes, “By implication, the patient was freedom...the disease was aggression and chaos....Stopping the spread of communism became ‘literally’ a matter of life or death.”¹⁰¹

Alongside the metaphorical comparisons of Greece and Turkey to ailing patients, the speech also introduced language of infestation and hazardous growth. In one of the most literary sections of the speech, Truman states in his peroration: “The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.” To preserve the integrity of the healthy garden that is American democracy, the U.S. must actively cultivate its own soil. In both the human and agricultural metaphors, there is inherent a fear of contagion. If Greece or Turkey were to fall, “confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the Middle East.” The fate of one nation could have a “disastrous” effect on “neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.”

Ivie notes the impact of these metaphors on the public by showing the reproduction of the language of disease in public reactions to the speech. Words like “quarantine,” “virus,” “paralysis,” “enervating,” “infection,” and “epidemic” appeared

¹⁰⁰ Truman, “Truman Doctrine.”

¹⁰¹ Ivie, “Fire, Flood, and Red Fever,” 578.

throughout the press, with Senator Edwin Johnson arguing, “the best cure for communism is a good dose of communism.”¹⁰² Metaphors of health and weakness had touched a nerve, so to speak.

Throughout the strong language and embedded metaphors, the speech text added to the affective content as well by creating a morally laden binary between good and evil. As the speech proceeds, Truman alludes to several dichotomies with clear moral valences (“the forces of liberation” vs. “the Germans [who] destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine”; “the Greek state” vs. “the terrorist activities...led by Communists, who defy the government’s authority”; “we and other nations” vs. “countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations”). A little over halfway through the speech, Truman outlines the central binary:

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

In creating this binary between the free world and the communistic one, Truman evoked certain emotion codes familiar to American audiences. Freedom, within the American cultural milieu, is a positive trait, one associated with goodness and Americanness. Consequently, the opposite of freedom becomes not only bad, but also evil.¹⁰³ These tropes have a long history within American political and cultural speech, and with their stark statement within the neat framing device of a binary, the result is affective activation through emphasizing the self/other divide and offering a secure group identity.

¹⁰² Ibid., 583.

¹⁰³ For brief encapsulation of some aspects of the American-democratic cultural imaginary versus a Soviet-communist one, see Thomas G. Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), xiii–ix.

Perhaps the most commented-upon section of the speech in later press accounts, and the piece that constitutes the substance of the “Truman Doctrine” itself, is also framed in terms of a morally clarifying binary: “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.” With these words, Truman drew a line across international society: on the side of the United States would be “free peoples,” while on the other side would remain “armed minorities” and “outside pressures.” The enormous nature of those binary categories, alongside the depth of the implied commitment to these abstract coalitions of unnamed groups, added to the affective nature of the speech.

4.3 *Context-based affect*

There is a major aspect (among others) of the lexical characteristics of the Truman Doctrine that show the inability of content-based affect to cover fully the emotional power of the speech. The speech was considered “something like an explosion” because it was widely interpreted as being a firm panegyric against the Soviet Union. However, the words “Soviet Union” or “Russia” never appear in the speech. A similarly culturally-evocative word – “communist” – is only uttered once: “The very existence of the Greek state today is threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists...” The affective nature of the challenge, then, cannot simply be captured by the exact words that appeared in the speech. To this end, I turn to look at context-based affect, or the affect derived from the comparison of the current text with the larger discursive context. In this setting, I show that the affective power of the speech in context comes from its novelty with regard to previous discursive actions. This does not mean that the words were not anticipated (for they often confirmed rather than subverted people’s beliefs) but rather that they had not been previously stated by an actor with the power of the president, and consequently had not been emotionally resonant in the same way.

The first element of the discursive context that provides a counterpoint for comparison with the Truman Doctrine is what Martin J. Medhurst has referred to as “Truman’s rhetorical reticence.”¹⁰⁴ Truman had failed to address the growing public concern about Soviet actions and intentions. While public fears were growing, and opposition politicians questioned the president’s leniency towards the Soviet Union, Truman continued to speak in a conciliatory manner towards the Soviet Union. Acknowledging the “difficulty of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union” in his State of the Union address in 1947, he still maintained that “whatever differences there may have been between us and the Soviet Union....our policy toward the Soviet Union is guided by the same principles which determine our policies toward all nations.”¹⁰⁵ Even when pressed on the subject, Truman would display equanimity towards the controversial ally. When a reporter asked Truman what his thoughts were on Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech, he responded with a simple “I have no comment.” At a special conference before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April 1946, Truman stated, “Our relations with Russia are as cordial as they have always been....I have no feeling but of the friendliest sort for Russia.”¹⁰⁶

An analysis of the pre-Truman Doctrine corpus of presidential texts shows this willingness to give the Soviet Union the benefit of the doubt. As Table 1 shows, Truman’s pre-Docctrine references to the Soviet Union are rather benign. In his own speeches, they tended to appear in the form of recounting policy proposals or other occasions in international affairs. During news conferences, Truman responded to reporters questioning the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship by either reassuring his audience of Soviet cooperation or by choosing not to comment at all.

¹⁰⁴ Medhurst, “Truman’s Rhetorical Reticence, 1945–1947.”

¹⁰⁵ Truman, “1947 State of the Union Address.”

¹⁰⁶ Truman qtd in Medhurst, “Truman’s Rhetorical Reticence, 1945–1947,” 57, 59.

Table 1: Selected pre-Truman Doctrine references to the Soviet Union

<i>In Speeches:</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “The people in the United States, in Russia, and Britain, in France and China, in collaboration with all the other peace-loving people, must take the course of current history into their own hands and mold it in a new direction—the direction of continued cooperation.” (Navy Day Address on Foreign Policy, October 27, 1945) • “in accordance with the agreement at Yalta, the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States conferred together....The Soviet Union, France, and China have joined us in the purpose of introducing in the General Assembly a resolution for the establishment of such a commission [“for control of atomic energy”].” (State of the Union address, January 21, 1946) • “In Korea we are even now working with our Soviet Allies and with the Korean Leaders to create a provisional democratic government....We recognize that the Soviet Union, and the British Commonwealth, and other nations have important interests in the Far East.” (Army Day Address in Chicago, April 6, 1946)
<i>In news conferences:</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Question: “Mr. President...I have read that one of the causes for the lack of accord between this country and Russia – or on Russia’s part, at least – grows out of the fact that we have the atomic bomb, and Russia doesn’t.” Truman: “It isn’t true – it isn’t true at all.” (News conference at Tiptonville, TN, October 8, 1945) • Q: “Mr. President, several months ago, you said – at a press conference – that you didn’t share the unholy fear of Russia that was manifested by some people, and that sometime you would comment at length on that. I wonder if you could comment now, in view of the current revelations about the atomic secrets. Truman: “No comment.” Q: “—recently by the” Truman: “No comment.” (President’s news conference, February 21, 1946) • Q: “Mr. President, Ambassador Harriman is reported to have told the House committee that he thinks Russia is bluffing by these various moves in the world theater. Do you share the Ambassador’s views?” Truman: “He has a right to his own opinion. I have nothing to say about it.” (President’s news conference, March 14, 1946)

Even during the Iran crisis, Truman remained conciliatory. When asked by a reporter what he would do “if Russia declines to withdraw from Iran,” Truman responded by first putting off the question (“that is a matter that will be handled when it comes up”) and, when then pressed, defending Soviet intentions (“I don’t think Russia is going to go down a one-way street.”)¹⁰⁷ By the end of 1946, Truman began to allude more to the fact that “all is not harmony in the world today.”¹⁰⁸ But it was too little too late. By the beginning of 1947 when Truman was to deliver his address on the need for aid to Greece and Turkey,

¹⁰⁷ Harry S. Truman, “The President’s News Conference,” March 8, 1946, Online.

¹⁰⁸ Truman quoted in Medhurst, “Truman’s Rhetorical Reticence, 1945–1947,” 60.

people had become suspicious of Soviet intentions. But Truman had failed to give voice to these suspicions, and did not imbue them with the *ethos* of presidential agreement.

Much of the affective power of the Truman Doctrine, then, came from the novelty of the president's pronouncement. The Truman Doctrine did not introduce new ideas to the public sphere. Fear of an expansionist Soviet Union had been well engrained within the public, especially with the Republican congressional campaigns. But it was novel for the president himself to confirm these fears. The baseline for ramping then, was not a complete societal lack of fear about the intentions of the Soviet Union, but rather what had previously been seen as an unsubstantiated fear, or at least one that the president was determined to reverse. At a press conference on November 11, 1946, Truman himself inadvertently noted the rhetorical vacuum he had created, and the potential ways that other could exploit it: "My concern is lest any in either party should seek in this field an opportunity to achieve personal notoriety or partisan advantage by exploitation of the sensational or by the mere creation of controversy."¹⁰⁹ He had fallen prey to that "exploitation of the sensational" in the Congressional elections of 1946, and he himself had used that very tactic in the Truman Doctrine to try to achieve political advantage. As Medhurst writes, "the articulation of the Doctrine, after nearly two years of presidential silence and in the midst of Republican charges and disconcerting international events, came as a shock to many people. Never before had the President of the United States spoken so bluntly to the public."¹¹⁰

Of course, as discussed above, the speech itself never mentioned the Soviet Union by name. This was a deliberate tactic. The speech would take place in the midst of the Moscow Conference, and Secretary Marshall did not want to torpedo all chances of diplomatic agreements. (At one point, Truman suggested putting in a reference to "Latvia,

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 64.

Lithuania, and Estonia” as other countries, like Greece and Turkey, who were endangered, but this was quickly scrapped for being too incendiary towards the Soviets.)¹¹¹ Yet, the speech was still understood as a clear challenge to the Soviet Union, reflecting the success of the public information campaign and the general anxiety towards Soviet intentions.

A second example of a striking difference between the Truman Doctrine and the presidential discourse that had come before was the role of the notion of “freedom.” Freedom has a longstanding history in the American cultural imaginary, and it is itself a word that is meant to evoke societal emotional codes of patriotism, pride, and reverence. In some ways, the use of the words “free” and “freedom” is an example of content-based affect. The word itself is affecting. But these words also constitute an example of context-based affect by contrast to earlier lack of prioritization of the term. In the pre-Doctrine discourse, the value most commonly evoked was “peace.” This was the goal of appeals to the United Nations and for greater appropriations; such a word plays to the public’s aversion to more war. Stemmed words of “peace,” (i.e. including counts of “peaceful” and “peacefully”) are the 23rd most frequently used word in the pre-Doctrine corpus.¹¹² “Free” and “freedom” do not even make the top 250.¹¹³ It was peace, not freedom, that Truman’s pre-Doctrine discourse suggested American foreign policy was oriented towards.

The Truman Doctrine reversed that trend. The word “free” appeared fourteen times in the text, making it the 10th most frequently appearing word (behind “Greece,” “united,” “nations,” “government,” “states,” “assistance,” “Greek,” “Turkey,” and “peoples.”) “Freedom” appeared 10 additional times, coming in at the 15th most frequent. “Peace” and “peaceful” only appeared five times combined.¹¹⁴ Beyond mere word

¹¹¹ Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 106.

¹¹² If I exclude news conferences from that count (in order to isolate scripted remarks), they become the 17th most frequent.

¹¹³ If I exclude news conferences, “free” and “freedom” both appear within the top 250 most frequently used words, but not the top 200.

¹¹⁴ Word counts were conducted including stemmed words.

frequencies, the ideational heart of the speech captured clearly the changing priorities of peace vs. freedom:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

Freedom was the value that the speech was centered around, a fact that contributed towards emotional ramping both via its emotional content and by comparison to previous presidential discursive moves.

5 Immediate emotional reactions

With the above analysis of a) the administration's intentions to strategically ramp up public fear in drafting the Truman Doctrine and b) the document's embedded affective content, it becomes clear that the Truman administration designed the rollout of its European aid policy in such a manner as to encourage the public not only to *think* a certain way, but also to *feel* a certain way. Looking at the text in and of itself, as I did in the previous section, provides important clues as to why the speech had the potential to work as a tool of persuasion, but, as noted in the previous chapter, affective power is not deterministic. There is no guarantee that these tactics would actually result in public emotional ramping. For this reason, I turn back to archival and secondary sources to examine contemporary reactions to the speech. While historians may quibble as to whether or not the speech truly was momentous (see below), an analysis of contemporary reactions shows the extent to which audiences found it extremely shocking.

5.1 Press response

The speech was roundly reported as utterly shocking. The press noted the “blanched’ faces of a ‘much-shaken Congress’ that was ‘awed,’ ‘anxious,’ and ‘shocked.’”¹¹⁵ Words like “frank” and “blunt” dominated newspaper coverage, with the *New York Times*’ headlines emblematic of the general response. On the front page, a banner headline screamed, “TRUMAN ACTS TO SAVE NATIONS FROM RED RULE....President Blunt in Plea to Combat ‘Coercion’ as World Peril,” while an inner page blared, “EUROPE IS AMAZED BY BLUNT WARNING.”¹¹⁶ The *Dallas News* began their editorial by declaring, “Seldom in American history has a President gone to Congress with a message so blunt and with words so full of implication.”¹¹⁷ *The Washington Daily News* agreed: “the implications of the ‘Truman Doctrine’ are as grave as any the people of the United States were ever called upon to face.”¹¹⁸ Despite the “dramatic lack of dramatics” in presentation, Truman’s address was seen to “take rank as one of the most momentous utterances ever made by any head of state in any era.”¹¹⁹

The press focused not on the president’s delivery, but rather on its widespread potential consequences. The “effect” proved to be “something like an explosion.”¹²⁰ *The Rochester Democrat and Chronicle* was quoted in the *New York Times* for its succinct expression of the momentous nature of the speech: “It was a declaration of a foreign policy that may,

¹¹⁵ Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 136.

¹¹⁶ Articles by Felix Belair Jr. and Harold Callender, March 13, 1947, *The New York Times*. George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (clippings), HSTPL.

¹¹⁷ *Dallas News* editorial qtd. in “Extracts from American Editorial Comments on President Truman’s Message,” March 13, 1947, *New York Times*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (clippings), HSTPL.

¹¹⁸ William Philip Simms, “Truman Doctrine,” March 14, 1947, *Washington Daily News*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (clippings), HSTPL.

¹¹⁹ Bert Andrews, “President for Support of all Free Peoples,” March 13, 1947 *New York Herald Tribune*, Joseph M. Jones Papers, Box 1, Clippings (1 of 2), HSTPL.

¹²⁰ Samuel Grafton, “I’d Rather Be Right,” March 17, 1947, *New York Post*, Record of the Democratic National Committee, Box 19, Harry S. Truman File - Comment of Columnists on Message on Greek Crisis, March 12, 1947, HSTPL.

if carried out, decide not only our future, but the future of the whole world.”¹²¹ “Breathtaking in its literal implications,” the *Washington Post* wrote, the speech rendered “this country as much shocked as the Politburo by the wide implications of the Truman Doctrine.”¹²² Not all accounts were laudatory: famed columnist Walter Lippmann worried publicly, “words of that sort, when pronounced by the head of a state in a time of intense crisis and of passionate confusion, are imprudent....A vague global policy, which sounds like the tocsin of an ideological crusade, has no limits.”¹²³

Truman was portrayed as a newly-emergent bold figure. *New York Times* columnist Anne O’Hare McCormick noted that “a few months ago,” the President “was rated timid, uncertain, and overpowered by events and responsibilities too big for him.” Yet, with “the boldest declaration ever offered by an American President in peacetime...Mr. Truman emerged from comparative obscurity to the position of world leader.”¹²⁴ The *St. Louis Post Dispatch* approved that the President had presented the Soviet Union with “an ultimatum which reads: ‘Thus far and no further.’”¹²⁵ The affirmation of Truman’s boldness stemmed largely from the extent to which the speech seemed to confirm a larger sense of growing unease as to Soviet intentions. A conservative columnist in the *Washington Times Herald* saw the speech as “the first honest expression on the character of the Soviet government and the absolute hostility of communism and Communists to the American government and its

¹²¹ Editorial, *Rochester Democrat and Chronicle*, qtd. in “Extracts from American Editorial Comment on President Truman’s Message,” March 13, 1947, *New York Times*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (clippings), HSTPL.

¹²² “American Destiny,” March 13, 1947, *Washington Post* and Anne O’Hare McCormick, March 22, 1947, *The New York Times*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (clippings), HSTPL.

¹²³ Walter Lippmann, “Policy or Crusade?” March 15, 1947, *New York Herald Tribune*, Record of the Democratic National Committee, Box 19, Harry S. Truman File – Comment of Columnists on Message on Greek Crisis, March 12, 1947, HSTPL.

¹²⁴ Anne O’Hare McCormick, “The Emergence of President Truman as a World Leader,” March 15, 1947, *The New York Times*, Record of the Democratic National Committee, Box 19, Harry S. Truman File – Comment of Columnists on Message on Greek Crisis, March 12, 1947, HSTPL.

¹²⁵ “America’s New World Role,” March 13, 1947, *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, Record of the Democratic National Committee, Box 19, Harry S. Truman File - Editorial Comment on Message on Greek Crisis, March 12, 1947, HSTPL.

principles that has come from the White House in 14 years.”¹²⁶ Bits and pieces of information had leaked to the press, leading many to suspect much of the contents of the speech ahead of time (“When Mr. Truman goes before Congress today,” the *New York Times* wrote before the speech had been delivered, “...he will ring down the curtain on one epoch in America’s foreign policy and begin a new chapter”¹²⁷). Yet even though “it [was] common knowledge and has been said in bits or a little less discretely by many official spokesmen for the United States,” this speech served, in the words of *Newsweek* columnist Ernest K. Lindley, as a “matter of emphasis and sharpness....It was important that the situation be outlined bluntly by the head of the only nation which has the means to assure that this aggression is halted and repelled.”¹²⁸ The anticipation of the general gist of the speech only served to heighten its impact and lend assistance to ramping strategies.

The emotional reactions to the speech were heightened by press comparisons to two previous speeches: the 1823 Monroe Doctrine and Franklin Roosevelt’s 1937 “quarantine speech.” The delivery of the Monroe Doctrine was not a sensational oratorical performance: it was a small part of a routine annual message to Congress, drawing little to no notice from domestic or international audiences.¹²⁹ Yet its exhortation of foreign non-involvement in the Western Hemisphere became a crucial tenet of American policy. Reporters and columnists noted the similarities – and fundamental differences – between Truman’s and Monroe’s pronouncements. While “both are founded on the fear that our freedom is threatened by ambitious European powers,” popular columnist Arthur Krock commented, the Truman Doctrine was far larger than its Americas-focused predecessor,

¹²⁶ Westbrook Pegler, “Fair Enough,” March 18, 1947, *Washington Times Herald*, Record of the Democratic National Committee, Box 19, Harry S. Truman File – Comment of Columnists on Message on Greek Crisis, March 12, 1947, HSTPL.

¹²⁷ “Mr. Truman Goes to Congress,” *The New York Times*, March 12, 1947.

¹²⁸ Ernest K. Lindley, “What the President’s Speech Means,” March 24, 1947, *Newsweek*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (clippings), HSTPL.

¹²⁹ State Department Office of the Historian, “Monroe Doctrine, 1823,” <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe>.

for it “excludes no world area from our ‘entanglement.’”¹³⁰ “There is little doubt,” wrote Felix Belair Jr. of *The New York Times*, “that Mr. Truman’s message will take its place beside the Monroe Doctrine.”¹³¹ Not that the comparison was always favorable: the *Chicago Daily Tribune* bemoaned the fact that “in content and spirit the two speeches were strikingly parallel as a promise of war.”¹³²

The most common historical comparison was to Roosevelt’s October 5, 1937 speech in Chicago, where he warned of the growing crisis on the European continent. “The epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading,” he declared, and “when an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.”¹³³ With those words, Roosevelt let the world know that the United States would not hesitate to act against aggressors if provoked. The press quickly portrayed Truman’s Doctrine as “a speech comparable with President Roosevelt’s famous ‘quarantine’ speech against aggressors.” But the younger man “was more blunt, and he called unmistakably for action which will launch the United States on a new and positive foreign policy of world-wide responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order.”¹³⁴ Columnist Anne O’Hare McCormick agreed:

The Truman pronouncement has been compared in its timing and significance as a challenge to President Roosevelt’s ‘quarantine’ speech. But last Wednesday’s message is far more definite and audacious than the 1937 address. There is a great difference between a warning directed at a potential aggressor in a speech in Chicago and an executive message to Congress demanding action to stop further expansion on the part of an allied power with which we are currently engaged in negotiations.¹³⁵

¹³⁰ Arthur Krock, “‘Must’ Is the Key Word in New Foreign Policy,” *The New York Times*, March 22, 1947.

¹³¹ Felix Belair Jr., “Truman Assumes Lead in Fight on Communism,” *The New York Times*, March 15, 1946.

¹³² “Here We Go Again,” March 13, 1947, *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Record of the Democratic National Committee, Box 19, Harry S. Truman File - Editorial Comment on Message on Greek Crisis, March 12, 1947, HSTPL.

¹³³ Franklin Roosevelt, “Address at Chicago,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, October 5, 1937, Online.

¹³⁴ “Warning to Russia,” March 13, 1947, *The New York Times*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (clippings), HSTPL.

¹³⁵ Anne O’Hare McCormick, “The Emergence of President Truman as a World Leader,” March 15, 1947, *The New York Times*, Record of the Democratic National Committee, Box 19, Harry S. Truman File – Comment of Columnists on Message on Greek Crisis, March 12, 1947, HSTPL.

While Truman could be compared to his celebrated forebears, his boldness and audacity – the extent of his commitment of the United States to proactive measures, rather than warning off foes – set him apart.

While there was some dissent on the basis of the vast span of the speech (“Put baldly, Mr. Truman’s message was a plain declaration of political war against Russia,” Freda Kirchwey despaired in *The Nation*¹³⁶), the vast majority of press coverage was overwhelmingly positive. The White House collected 225 editorials from March 13-18th, and of these, only 13 opposed the president’s message.¹³⁷ Most lauded the president’s bravery, his willingness to do what was necessary to contain communism. While some disagreed with the president’s speech on the basis of its war-like tone and interventionist commitments, most complaints centered around his marginalization of the United Nations. Why, many asked, was “the problem of the Greek-Turkish frontier [not] a job for the United Nations – a logical question,” noted one columnist.¹³⁸ The anti-Truman *Chicago Daily Tribune* was much harsher in its critiques: “The Truman speech...leaves the United Nations as a meaningless relic of mistaken intentions. The world league to insure a lasting peace is a fraud and a sham, so impotent that Mr. Truman proposes that the United States ignore it and seek peace by force and threat of force – the very means which the U.N. was intended to exclude in international dealings.”¹³⁹ Even those who supported the general policy of aid to Greece and Turkey remained wary of the implications of the unilateral United States declaration for the United Nations.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ Freda Kirchwey, “Manifest Destiny, 1947,” March 22, 1947, *The Nation*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (clippings), HSTPL.

¹³⁷ Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 135.

¹³⁸ Thomas L. Stokes, “Better Greek Plan?” March 17, 1947, *Washington News*, Record of the Democratic National Committee, Box 19, Harry S. Truman File - Comment of Columnists on Message on Greek Crisis, March 12, 1947, HSTPL.

¹³⁹ “Here We Go Again,” March 13, 1947, *Chicago Daily Tribune*, Record of the Democratic National Committee, Box 19, Harry S. Truman File - Editorial Comment on Message on Greek Crisis, March 12, 1947, HSTPL.

¹⁴⁰ Administration officials identified this as a problem both before and after the delivery of the speech. Beforehand, George Elsey anticipated that bypassing the U.N. would prove unpopular, and asked that Carl

5.2 Public response

Public reaction largely mirrored the press response. A *New York Times* feature from March 23 aggregated reports from correspondents nationwide to determine national responses to the Truman Doctrine. They reported four main findings: “(1) Isolationism in the pre-war sense is nearly dead....(2) Fear of Russian expansionism is widespread...[and it is] coupled with a general antipathy toward communism as a system. (3) Americans ...are a little uneasy at the thought that the ‘Truman Doctrine’ may have bypassed the U.N. (4) A ‘strong’ policy toward Russia has won broad approval, yet there is uncertainty as to the best method.”¹⁴¹ The public was ready to challenge the Soviet Union in the international arena, but they worried about the potential military consequences of their actions. As McCormick wrote in the *New York Times*, “Most worried citizens of this country...are seriously anxious to ‘do what’s right’ in the new and oppressive role destiny allows to them in the earth shaking shifts of postwar power.”¹⁴²

The first poll taken after speech found that 56% of the public approved of aid to Greece, with only 32% disapproving.¹⁴³ The speech also resulted in a huge jump in Truman’s approval rating, as the proportion of the country saying they were “satisfied with the way Mr. Truman is handling his job as president” went from 48% in February to 60%

Humelsine add in a paragraph on the subject. He did so, and in the final speech, Truman said, “We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.” After the speech delivery, however, the administration understood that this remained a major problem, identified in opinion reviews of the situation. See Truman, “Truman Doctrine”; Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 111–12.; “Evaluation of the Current Opinion Situation on Greek-Turkish Problem,” Joseph M. Jones Papers, Box 6, Truman Doctrine, HSTPL.

¹⁴¹ “As the Country Sees the ‘Truman Doctrine’ – A National Survey,” March 23, 1947, *The New York Times*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (clippings), HSTPL.

¹⁴² Anne O’Hare McCormick, “The Confused Newcomer in World Politics,” March 20, 1947, *The New York Times*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (clippings), HSTPL.

¹⁴³ When it came to Turkey, 49% agreed that the U.S. should provide aid, whereas 36% disagreed. A second internal poll, run through the university of Denver, found 61% agreeing and only 26% disagreeing with the provision of aid to Greece. George Gallup, “Truman’s Greek Policy Winning Wide Public Support. War Not Feared, Poll Finds,” March 27, 1947, *Public Opinion News Service*, Records of the American Institute of Public Opinion, Box 1, 1947. HSTPL; and “Evaluation of the Current Opinion Situation on Greek-Turkish Problem,” Joseph M. Jones Papers, Box 6, Truman Doctrine, HSTPL.

by the end of March.¹⁴⁴ Interestingly, public approval of the policy was not party-dependent. 56% of polled Democrats and 56% of polled Republicans alike favored American aid to Greece.¹⁴⁵ The messages flowing into the White House conformed to the same patterns. Within a single day, Eben Ayers reported “between 300 and 400 telegrams,” with “the first received” being “commendatory” and “the percentage of those opposed grow[ing] during the day.”¹⁴⁶

Many of the telegrams and letters that reached the president from ordinary citizens reflected the same sense of history-making nature. Brannon B. Selph of New York wrote that the “speech...will be rated in history along with Washington’s farewell and Lincoln’s Gettysburg.” Adrian Conan Doyle, youngest son of the famed British mystery writer, sent a telegram invoking his father: “Every free man of the world will applaud your brave and historic speech. Fifty years ago my father wrote ‘all who are stricken and wronged will turn their faces to America.’ The heart and hand of every man and woman who hopes for an individual future are with you.” A man from Jacksonville, Florida, wrote simply: “The best speech I’ve ever heard against communism [sic]. I’m one hundred percent for you.”¹⁴⁷

The public expressed an interesting mixture of ramped up shock and resignation. A *Washington Post* editorial commented on this, noting, “the reception of the President’s proposal indicted that “danger had been sensed in the public mind.”¹⁴⁸ Letters from members of the public to the president uphold this notion. A Miss Nellie Ball of Norfolk,

¹⁴⁴ George Gallup, “Truman’s Popularity Shows Another Sharp Upswing Following New Turn in Foreign Policy,” March 29, 1947, *Public Opinion News Service*, Records of the American Institute of Public Opinion, Box 1, 1947, HSTPL.

¹⁴⁵ George Gallup, “Attitudes on Greece Found Unaffected by Political Party Differences,” April 3, 1947, *Public Opinion News Service*, Records of the American Institute of Public Opinion, Box 1, 1947, HSTPL.

¹⁴⁶ Ayers and others would later suspect many of the disapproving telegrams of being “inspired,” or coordinated by political opponents, as they appeared to be form letters. See Eben Ayers, Diary entries of March 13-15, 1947, Papers of Eben A. Ayers, Box 20, Diary, January 1 1947-June 30 1947, HSTPL; and United Press, “‘Inspired’ Messages Flood Capital,” ca. March 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Personal File, Box 345, Message to Congress on Aid to Turkey and Greece, March 12 1947, HSTPL.

¹⁴⁷ Brannon B. Selph telegram to Matt Connolly, March 13, 1947, Adrian Conan Doyle to Harry S. Truman, March 14, 1947, and W.M. McCrory telegram to Harry S. Truman, March 12, 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Personal File, Box 345, Message to Congress on Aid to Turkey and Greece, March 12 1947 (Pro), HSTPL.

¹⁴⁸ “Seeing It Through,” March 15, 1947, *Washington Post*, Record of the Democratic National Committee, Box 19, Harry S. Truman File - Editorial Comment on Message on Greek Crisis, March 12, 1947, HSTPL.

Virginia said that the president's words had "blast[ed] us all out of our little sand holes," reminding Americans of the duties they must uphold.¹⁴⁹ Alongside the shock and fear, then, was the steadfast resolution to bear the burdens that must be borne. *Time Magazine* shared a telling anecdote from a World War II veteran turned student at the University of Oklahoma: "Well, I told my wife to dust off my uniform."¹⁵⁰ Alf Landon, former Republican presidential candidate, assured the president that "the American people will rally behind your call to the liberty loving democracies of the world. We are flush up to the plowing season. Either we perform now or suffer the fate that time worn procrastination has always meant."¹⁵¹ A majority of polled Americans thought that providing aid to Greece and Turkey would hopefully stave off major conflict – a lesson learned by analogy to the appeasement of Hitler – but were prepared to take on the consequences if necessary.¹⁵²

Those who were unhappy with the president's speech shared two of the press's major concerns: that the United Nations had been bypassed, and that this speech might be committing the nation to another costly war. A man from Chicago sent a telegram to the president, stating what had been implied in the speech: "the military support of Greece means you must be prepared to go to war with Russia. Why do you force on Congress and our people a hurried decision on so grave a question?"¹⁵³ Like the press, a majority of the public "express[ed] regret" that the United Nations had not been initially consulted.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁹ Nellie Ball letter to Harry S. Truman, March 17, 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Personal File, Box 345, Message to Congress on Aid to Turkey and Greece, March 12 1947 (Pro), HSTPL.

¹⁵⁰ "The Nation," March 24, 1947, *Time Magazine*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 65, Foreign Relations – Truman Doctrine (clippings), HSTPL.

¹⁵¹ Alf M. Landon telegram to Harry S. Truman, March 12, 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Personal File, Box 345, Message to Congress on Aid to Turkey and Greece, March 12 1947 (Pro), HSTPL.

¹⁵² When asked, "Do you think that lending money to aid Greece and Turkey is or is not likely to get us into war?" 54% answered "is not likely" while 30% answered "is likely." George Gallup, "Truman's Greek Policy Winning Wide Public Support. War Not Feared, Poll Finds," March 27, 1947, *Public Opinion News Service*, Records of the American Institute of Public Opinion, Box 1, 1947, HSTPL.

¹⁵³ Unsigned telegram, March 12, 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Personal File, Box 345, Message to Congress on Aid to Turkey and Greece, March 12 1947 (Pro), HSTPL.

¹⁵⁴ George Gallup, "Truman's Greek Policy Winning Wide Public Support. War Not Feared, Poll Finds," March 27, 1947, *Public Opinion News Service*, Records of the American Institute of Public Opinion, Box 1, 1947, HSTPL.

5.3 *Political reaction*

The political reaction to the Truman Doctrine was less affectively laden than that of either the press or the public. This is unsurprising, given the necessities of party loyalty and professional persuasion demanded by the job. However, despite the ascendancy of Republican party politics at the time, initial reactions to the speech were largely favorable. An internal tallying of opinions held that of the 75 published congressional statements from March 12-14, 35 were supportive while 22 were opposed (the remaining 18 were noncommittal). The supporters tended to be those of both parties who were internationalists, while those who were opposed tended to be “consistent opponents of a strong U.S. role in world affairs.” These groups did not split easily along party lines. Republican senators like Arthur Vandenberg and Arthur Kapper praised the president’s plan, with Senator Bridges agreeing that “now is the time...to try to stop the spread of communism...before any more of the world’s population and resources are enmeshed in the Communist orbit.” Similarly, some Democrats questioned the president’s plan, with Senator Pepper of Florida worrying about “the U.N. if they are left out of consultation” and Senator O’Daniel of Texas warning, “this maneuvering has all the earmarks of a plot to rush us into another war.”¹⁵⁵

The administration was pleased with the general political reaction. They acknowledged that there were two main groups who opposed the plan, but that they were unlikely to form a coalition. The “two sharply-distinct groups” consisted of “‘liberals’ of the Henry Wallace school” who believed that the United States was treating the Soviet Union too harshly, and “consistent opponents of foreign policy measures which project the United States actively in world affairs.”¹⁵⁶ But as neither of these groups were ever likely to sanction a plan of the internationalist Truman – especially not Wallace, who had

¹⁵⁵ “Congressional Statements on President Truman’s Address Asking Aid for Greece and Turkey,” March 18, 1947, Joseph M. Jones Papers, Box 6, Truman Doctrine, HSTPL.

¹⁵⁶ “Summary,” ca. March 1947, Joseph M. Jones Papers, Box 6, Truman Doctrine, HSTPL.

been fired from the Truman administration for questioning the president's harsh handling of the Soviets – their opposition meant little. “There has been a favorable reception except by the crackpots headed by Henry and his crowd,” Truman wrote in a letter to his wife, Bess. “I don't believe they can get a following. It was pleasing the way Congress reacted – didn't you think it was nearly unanimous?”¹⁵⁷

Yet, both those in agreement and in opposition focused on the ramping tactics embedded within Truman's statement. Henry Wallace accused Truman of fear-mongering and plunging the United States into “a century of fear.”¹⁵⁸ He asked, “What is this crisis that necessitates Truman going to Capital Hill as though a Pearl Harbor has suddenly hit us? How many more of these Pearl Harbors will there be?”¹⁵⁹ Even Vandenberg, who had been so adamant about the need for affective persuasion, worried that the President may have gone too far, resorting to a “crisis method” whereby the “President ask[ed] us to ‘declare war.’”¹⁶⁰ Others echoed newspapers in dubbing the address “frank” and “blunt.”

Taken together, the press, public, and political responses show the extent to which the discursive tactics employed with the Truman Doctrine worked to immediately evoke emotional responses within the public. While previous logical arguments had failed to convince the public of the need for internationalist foreign aid policies, the Truman Doctrine's new ideo-affective stance – one designed specifically to ramp up public emotion – paved the way, allowing for the passage of Truman's desired legislation.

6 The onset of the “Truman Offensive”

While the affective content of the Truman Doctrine was undoubtedly powerful, one speech cannot a total policy shift make. Recognizing this, the administration set out on

¹⁵⁷ Letter from Harry S. Truman to Bess W. Truman, March 14, 1947. Truman Papers - Family, Business, and Personal Affairs Papers. Online, HSTPL.

¹⁵⁸ LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966*, 46.

¹⁵⁹ Henry Wallace, “Speech on the Truman Doctrine,” *Teaching American History*, March 27, 1947, <http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/speech-on-the-truman-doctrine/>.

¹⁶⁰ Vandenberg, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, 340, 342.

a coordinated campaign of persuasion designed around the tactic of emotional ramping. The Truman Doctrine, then, becomes merely the opening salvo in a campaign I call the “Truman Offensive.” This all-out blitz across various parts of the executive branch was designed to continue to push for the desired policies through emotional persuasion – and notably, not only through fear and shock. Joseph M. Jones called the period from February 21 (when the British notes were delivered) to June 5, 1947 (when George Marshall delivered a commencement speech at Harvard University calling for “the Marshall Plan”) the “fifteen weeks [that] laid the basis for a complete conversion of American foreign policy and of the attitudes of the American people toward the world.”¹⁶¹ The delivery of the Truman Doctrine, while significant for representing a change in persuasion tactics, was only part of a larger period of persuasion. In the section that follows, I briefly outline the aftermath of Truman’s speech and the ways that the administration deliberately continued to undertake public emotional ramping to forward their European policies.

Just as the State Department had worked actively to try to sell the Truman Doctrine to the public before Truman ever stepped up to the podium, so too did the executive branch continue in their efforts after he had departed the rostrum. There were several issues that the public and other politicians had to be convinced of, including the decision to spend such a great sum of money; the non-authoritarian nature of the Greek and Turkish governments that the United States was defending; and the continued importance of the United Nations. To do this, officials went before audiences across the country, meeting with business, labor, agricultural, and religious leaders. Others went on the air on NBC’s *Our Foreign Policy* program, where Loy Henderson and Assistant Secretary of State Willard Thorp discussed “Why Are We Helping Greece?” and the Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration’s mission to Greece, Paul Porter, presented on “What Does the Truman Doctrine Mean?” Truman and Acheson appeared separately at a

¹⁶¹ Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 8.

number of these events, and both spoke with the American Society of Newspaper Editors to try to bring these opinion-shapers on board. In Truman's off-the-record remarks, he asked the editors to "help us prepare to meet that situation" of Soviet aggression, noting that if the United States remained unprepared, "it will destroy us and everybody else. And that we don't care to contemplate."¹⁶² The switch in pre-Doctrine and post-Doctrine rhetoric became clear when he delivered a speech on May 13: the Soviets, he claimed, "understand one language [force] and that is the language they are going to get from this point."¹⁶³

The sales campaign raged in Congress as well. Truman and his administration faced an adversarial conservative opposition who had to be persuaded to authorize the expenditure. The day after the speech, Arthur Vandenberg met with a group of Republican senators to see if they could be persuaded to vote for the president's appropriations bill, and found that only two expressed "all-out support" for the relief effort.¹⁶⁴ The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Vandenberg, held public hearings from March 24 through March 31, with members of the administration testifying and answering questions. Many of the questions had to do with the unprecedented scope of the commitment. Senator Tom Connally asked the question on a lot of people's minds: "Does this mean a complete reversal of our foreign policy, and does it mean that all over the world any country that applies to us will be in such a position that we have to make them a loan or take action similar to that set forth in this bill?" Acheson answered unequivocally: "That is very true, Senator Connally. That is exactly the situation."¹⁶⁵ Others demanded to know why the same protection had not been offered to Korea or China, questions that

¹⁶² Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 141; Harry S. Truman, "Remarks at a Meeting With the American Society of Newspaper Editors," *UCSB American Presidency Project*, April 17, 1947, Online.

¹⁶³ Athan G. Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 41.

¹⁶⁴ Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 137; Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 188.

¹⁶⁵ Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 190.

would foreshadow debates in the years to come (and foreshadow discussion in the next chapter of this thesis).

At these hearings, Acheson and Vandenberg, along with other officials drafted into service, continued to hammer home the message of unprecedented emergency. With Acheson being hounded by questions, the Republican Vandenberg stepped in. After several questions about the broadness of the concept, Vandenberg restated Acheson's claims: "In other words, I think what you are saying is that wherever we find free peoples having difficulty in the maintenance of free institutions, and difficulty in defending against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes, we do not necessarily react in the same way each time, but we propose to react." "That," Acheson agreed, "is correct."¹⁶⁶ Together, the two men, using the same language as had been used in the Truman Doctrine ("aggressive," "free peoples," "impose," "totalitarian") underscored the sense of alarm, and the impetus to act in the name of freedom. Vandenberg demanded that his fellow Republicans "face facts," a fact Acheson was more than happy to underscore.¹⁶⁷ Their efforts did the trick: on April 3, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved the aid bill and sent it to the Senate. After two weeks of debate, the Senate passed the bill on to the House. Jones writes excitedly that "the bipartisan majority was the largest ever given in the Senate to any major controversial measure in the whole field of American foreign policy since the outbreak of the war in Europe."¹⁶⁸ The smooth legislative passage of the bill continued as it went through the House of Representatives on May 8, only two days after debate on the bill had begun. Truman signed the aid bill into law on May 22.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 193.

¹⁶⁷ Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 137.

¹⁶⁸ Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 197.

6.1 *Encouraging zeal and freedom*

The Truman Offensive consisted not only of speeches and statements, but also practices and policies. Those practices and policies were designed not only to “scare the hell out of the American people,” but also to inspire the more positive emotions of pride and patriotism. These latter sentiments would help protect American citizens from the temptations of what Attorney General Tom Clark referred to as “the rising tide of totalitarianism that is coming to our shores.” As a bulwark against this tide, Clark insisted on the need “to reawaken in the American people the loyalty we know them to have to the American way of life....our best defense against subversive elements is to make the ideal of democracy a living fact, a way of life such as to enlist the loyalty of the individual in thought, in feeling, and in behavior.”¹⁶⁹ In April 1947, one month after the issuance of the Truman Doctrine, U.S. Commissioner of Education John Studebaker inaugurated the “Education to Implant the Ideals and Benefits of Democracy and to Reveal the Evil Character and Tactics of Communism” program, shortened to the “Zeal for Democracy” curriculum. As the title would suggest, this curriculum encouraged the development in students of a normative “democracy versus communism” binary that set the American way of life “in opposition to totalitarianism.”¹⁷⁰ The Office of Education continued to encourage schools to emphasize the benefits of democratic life, dedicating a “National Education Week” in 1947 to “education and security” and developing classroom materials, including a study guide titled, “Growing into Democracy” which “shows how the principles of democracy may be inculcated in children through precept and experience.”

¹⁶⁹ Clark qtd. in Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, 227.

¹⁷⁰ While the program was not officially run by Truman himself, Studebaker understood the program as “his attempt to aid Truman in compelling the nation to submit to the task of containing communism across the globe.” Andrew Hartman, *Education and the Cold War: The Battle for the American School* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 70–71.

The American Federation of Teachers took up the rallying cry, holding its 1947 annual convention on the theme “Strengthening Education for National and World Security.”¹⁷¹

Another notable program encouraged to inculcate American pride in democracy was the “Freedom Train.” From September 1947 to January 1949, a train housing 133 historical American documents – including the Mayflower Compact, Bill of Rights, Gettysburg Address, Washington’s copy of the Constitution, and the Iwo Jima flag – toured the country, seeking to “enhance civics education and national pride through celebrating the virtues of America.”¹⁷² In the words of sponsor Attorney General Clark, “critical times” necessitated an “intensive, dramatic and militant program to reassert the emphatic advantages of American democracy.”¹⁷³ The program was spectacularly successful, with nearly one in three Americans visiting the train during its journey. Run by the American Heritage Foundation (which was convened by the Justice Department), the Freedom Train was designed to be one prong of a three part strategy to encourage patriotic fervor: the second prong was for each town the train visited to have a “rededication week,” where the town would be reminded of and recommitted to American values, and the third prong was a public relations campaign designed to complement and forward the message carried by the train.¹⁷⁴ While begun as a government initiative, this program took on a life of its own in the private sector, as creative executives took over the American Heritage Foundation, and in public responses and reactions. I will revisit this unique program in the following chapter, where I examine the public structure of feeling following the Truman Offensive.

¹⁷¹ Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, 230–31.

¹⁷² Stuart J. Little, “The Freedom Train: Citizenship and Postwar Political Culture 1946-1949,” *American Studies* 34, no. 1 (1993): 35, 39.

¹⁷³ Clark qtd. in Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 428.

¹⁷⁴ Little, “The Freedom Train,” 40–41.

6.2 *The Marshall Plan*

With the focus on aid to Greece and Turkey covered by the Truman Doctrine and subsequent legislative activity, the administration turned to an expansion of aid beyond merely the two enumerated countries. While there was no specific geographic focus to the guarantee of aid put forth in the Truman Doctrine, the regional prioritization of the government remained steady on Europe. Worrying that “the patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate,” Secretary of State George Marshall decided that the entire continent of Europe needed relief.¹⁷⁵ Together with the Policy Planning Staff, led by George Kennan, Marshall began to outline what would become known as the Marshall Plan. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, Truman would later quip, were “two halves of the same walnut.”¹⁷⁶ I argue that the Marshall Plan was an invaluable part of the Truman Offensive, extending and strengthening administration ramping efforts, that was only made possible because of the initial issuance of the Truman Doctrine.

Though Marshall generated the idea for the plan beginning at the Moscow Conference, public pressure for action on European recovery had been building, showcasing the effectiveness of the administration’s ramping tactics during the preparatory period immediately before and follow-up after the delivery of the Truman Doctrine: “There is no question whatever,” wrote Jones, “that Secretary Marshall’s proposal at Harvard was to an important degree the consequence of public pressure built up and

¹⁷⁵ LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966*, 47.

¹⁷⁶ It should be noted that by placing the Marshall Plan in a “follow up” position regarding the Truman Doctrine, I am entering into a subject of some historical controversy. While some argue that the Marshall Plan was the logical outgrowth of the Truman Doctrine (Jones, for example, states that “the Truman Doctrine led to the Marshall Plan”), others – like Martin Folly in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Military and Diplomatic History* – argue that one did not lead to the other, but rather that both were consequences of the same impulse to intervene more proactively to support American interests. While I agree with Folly that the Truman Doctrine was not designed with the thought of the future Marshall Plan in mind, I do not agree that the Marshall Plan might have existed independent of the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine, I argue, via its use of ramping tactics created the ideational and argumentative space for a plan of such great economic proportions. It also changed the nature of the policy approach, meaning that while the speech itself may not have given birth to the Marshall Plan, the ideo-affective atmosphere created in the planning stages produced similar offspring. Consequently, the Marshall Plan is in many ways an heir, if not the direct descendent of, the process of writing and selling the Truman Doctrine. Martin Folly, “Truman, Harry S.,” in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Military and Diplomatic History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), Accessed Online; Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 198.

suggestions advanced, during the weeks following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, in an interplay of ideas between the nation's leaders and the public.”¹⁷⁷

Similar tactics were at work in the selling of the Marshall Plan as with the selling of the Truman Doctrine. There were two main speeches – one delivered by Dean Acheson, the other by George Marshall himself – that represent the central elements of the rolling out of the Marshall Plan. Journalist Arthur Krock later described the Acheson speech as a “forward pass” which Marshall’s speech “caught and ran” with, while Elsey dubbed Acheson’s speech “an important landmark on the road to the formal unveiling of U.S. proposals in Marshall’s address at Harvard.”¹⁷⁸ On May 8th, Acheson spoke to the Delta Council in Cleveland, Mississippi, delivering a speech titled, “The Requirements of Reconstruction.” He made headlines by urging the wholehearted reconstruction of Germany and Japan, despite their recent combatant status. He then repeated language from the Truman Doctrine, saying that the administration was determined to aid “free peoples who are seeking to preserve their independence and democratic institutions and human freedoms against totalitarian pressures.”¹⁷⁹ Intriguingly, despite similar content, the speech was understood to be less shocking than its antecedent two months earlier. “Most felt that the speech,” an internal summary of news coverage wrote, “represented a ‘conscious effort’ on the part of the Administration to emphasize the ‘positive’ side of European reconstruction rather than the ‘military, ideological and emotional’ aspects of ‘battling Communism.’”¹⁸⁰ There are three reasons for this: first, the speech was delivered by the Under Secretary of State, rather than the president with the power of the “bully pulpit”; second, the speech was a much more clinical discussion of the specifics of European

¹⁷⁷ Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 226.

¹⁷⁸ Robert L. Beisner, *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 70. George M. Elsey to Richard Freeland, May 11, 1967.

¹⁷⁹ Dean Acheson, “The Requirements of Reconstruction,” May 8, 1947. *The Department of State Bulletin*, Volume XVI, Number 411, pages 991-994. Truman and the Marshall Plan Research File, HSTPL.

¹⁸⁰ “Initial Press and Radio Reaction to Under Secretary Acheson's Speech at Cleveland, Mississippi on May 8, 1947,” May 15, 1947, Joseph M. Jones Papers, Box 1, Acheson, Dean, HSTPL.

recovery, an idea that had already been put on the legislative table with the Truman Doctrine and was in the process of being passed in Congress; and third, the language that had been so shocking within the Truman Doctrine was becoming part of the political verbiage, thereby detracting from any affect born of novelty.

But it was Marshall's speech before an audience of Harvard graduates that would be remembered in the annals of history. After thanking the administration for inviting him to speak, Marshall immediately switched tone, echoing the Truman Doctrine's opening words of "the gravity of the situation which confronts the world": "the world situation is very serious." He then proceeded to outline the "plight...of the long suffering peoples" in Europe before turning to the meat of his statement: "the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace."¹⁸¹ The United States would provide aid to all European nations who needed it. To all of those people wondering about the broad nature of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall's speech had provided a current boundary, a continent wide.

Marshall's speech was not written in the exact same affective vein as the Truman Doctrine. It did not draw the same binaries between the U.S. democratic system and the Soviet Union's communist one as had the Truman Doctrine for political reasons, because the U.S. wanted to include Soviet satellite states within the umbrella of aid recipients, and force the U.S.S.R. to be the bad guys in making these nations turn down the money. However, in describing the "the basis of modern civilization" in Europe as being "threatened with breakdown," the speech exploited already existent fears stoked by the Truman Doctrine, thus contributing to the overall effect of the Truman Offensive. As several months had passed since the delivery of the Truman Doctrine, the administration

¹⁸¹ George Marshall, "Marshall Plan' speech at Harvard University," *OECD*, June 5, 1947, <https://www.oecd.org/general/themarshallplanspeechatharvarduniversity5june1947.htm>.

sought a new affective jolt to allow for the passage of the Marshall Plan. Marshall's speech before the Harvard commencement class provided just that jolt. And as the Truman Doctrine led to passing the Greco-Turkish aid bill, so too did Marshall's speech lead to the signing into law of the European Reconstruction Program, in April 1948.

7 How important was the Truman Doctrine?

This chapter has argued that the Truman Offensive played a pivotal role in the beginning of the Cold War, as the strategic decision to undertake emotional ramping for the purposes of public mobilization constituted the conditions of possibility for public acceptance of increased foreign aid policies. Without employing the ideo-affective techniques outlined above, the Truman administration would likely have failed to push their European aid policies through, as they had previously failed before deciding to “scare the hell out of the American people” with the Truman Offensive.

One might argue that even without the new turn to ramping, Greco-Turkish aid might have been passed simply because of the British abdication of the role of primary financial supporter. I argue that this was unlikely for two reasons: first, the lugubrious pace with which the actual aid reached Greece suggests that the “crisis” was a discursive construction of convenience. Truman received the British notes in February 1947 and announced the crisis to the public in March, but the first parts of the actual aid did not reach Greece until eight months later, in October 1947. As Freeland writes, “considering together the long development of the American commitment to Greece and the long period that elapsed after the aid had been approved before any of it reached there, it is not difficult to conclude that the crisis of March 1947 had its origins in American politics rather than developments in Greece.”¹⁸² And second, as deliberately amplified as the crisis

¹⁸² Congress approved the Greco-Turkish aid bill on May 22, 1947 (which, as Richard Freeland notes, was already “two months after Acheson had given the Greek economy the capacity to survive for one month”). Through August 1947, the main aid reaching Greece was British, and the Americans still delivered no

in Greece was, the second locale – Turkey – was even more so. Turkey was always subordinated to Greece in official discussions of the Truman Doctrine, and in the final draft, it earns only a handful of sentences, for as the president explained to the public, “Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece....Nevertheless, Turkey needs our support.”¹⁸³ Including Turkey in the Truman Doctrine, almost as a secondary thought after the meat of material on Greece, showcases not realist conceptions of how shifting international conditions dictated eventual policy, but rather the ways that ramping techniques were employed to construct a crisis of global proportions.

By giving the Truman Doctrine this counterfactual power, I am attributing to it a place of considerable significance – the beginning, in Wedgewood’s above conception – in the process of constructing the Cold War. In arguing for such pride of place for the Truman Doctrine, I am entering into a fraught scholarly conversation. That conversation revolves around the titular question of John Lewis Gaddis’ 1974 *Foreign Affairs* article, “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?” On one side, a group of historians – beginning with the earliest orthodox assessors – argues that it was, in fact, a major turning point in American history: that the speech marked the moment at which the United States committed to a policy of containment and aggressive anti-Communism. Freeland summarized this point of view when he declared, “The Truman Doctrine speech was an official pronouncement of unusual historical significance.”¹⁸⁴ In this understanding, the address provided the framework through which the Cold War crisis would be viewed, legitimizing anti-communism as a motivating feature of American foreign policy.¹⁸⁵ The speech, to these historians, represented the moment of expansion in American foreign

economic aid (though they transferred a small amount of military aid that month). Economic aid was not provided to Greece until October. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, 92–93.

¹⁸³ Truman, “Truman Doctrine.”

¹⁸⁴ Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, 88.

¹⁸⁵ Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression*, 50–51.

policy, redefining how the United States would interact in the world.¹⁸⁶ Following the cultural and linguistic turns in History and IR, a related group of scholars has coalesced around the understanding of the Truman Doctrine not necessarily as the causal moment at which the Cold War began, but rather as an essential part of setting the constraining discursive and policy frameworks that would come to define the era subsequently.¹⁸⁷

On the other side of this debate over Gaddis' question lies Gaddis himself and a revisionist group of historians. In his famous *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, William Appleman Williams held that the Truman Doctrine was simply a new expression of an old idea: namely, the traditional "open door policy" of free markets.¹⁸⁸ Gaddis argued that the "Truman Doctrine, far from representing a revolution in American foreign policy, was very much in line with previously established precedents for dealing with shifts in the European balance of power" and "that despite its sweeping language the Truman administration, between 1947 and 1950, had neither the intention nor the capability of policing the rest of the world."¹⁸⁹ It was not the Truman Doctrine, he claimed, but the onset of the Korean War that determined the reorientation of American foreign policy. A new contemporary scholarly school formed around this point of view.¹⁹⁰

This chapter has served to bolster the claims of the former group of historians, reattributing to the Truman Doctrine significant constitutive (not causal) power. By focusing on the ideo-affective components of discourse and practice, and thus expanding inquiries beyond the Truman Doctrine to the larger "Truman Offensive", my analysis of

¹⁸⁶ In addition to above, see also Kolko and Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 332.

¹⁸⁷ See, for example, Norman A. Graebner, "Myth and Reality: America's Rhetorical Cold War" in Martin J. Medhurst and H.W. Brands, *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric & History* (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University Press, 2000); B. Thomas Trout, "Rhetoric Revisited: Political Legitimation and the Cold War," *International Studies Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (1975): 251–84; Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O'Loughlin, "Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power," *Media, War & Conflict* 7, no. 1 (April 1, 2014): 70–84.

¹⁸⁸ Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 1972.

¹⁸⁹ John Lewis Gaddis, "Reconsiderations: The Cold War: Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?," *Foreign Affairs* 52, no. 2 (January 1974): 386.

¹⁹⁰ See for example, Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War"; Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security*, chap. 7; Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, chap. 3.

the strategic decision to pursue emotional ramping techniques gives credence to these early and more critical scholars' claims that the Truman Doctrine was a significant moment in the beginning of the Cold War. I take a somewhat "neo-orthodox" position, then, one informed by the linguistic and affective turns of more recent scholarship.

8 Reacting from "an emotion of the moment"

In this chapter I have demonstrated how the Truman Doctrine and accompanying Truman Offensive were, above all, attempts to domestically ramp up public sentiment for the purposes of mobilizing support behind a limited set of policy goals. The Truman Offensive sought to ramp through discursively activating emotions via paralinguistic, content, and contextual means, and by following up with speeches and practices deliberately designed to encourage fears of communism and pride in American democracy. This ideo-affective approach was successful in its aims: public, press, and political responses all displayed significant levels of shock and, subsequently, persuasion, as the Greco-Turkish aid bill passed through this highly partisan Congress that had previously foiled Truman's attempts at procuring aid packages. Approaches that dismiss the Truman Doctrine as simple rhetoric overlook the effect it had on the nature of political debate and sentiment within the country. It is here that its significance lies.

But George Marshall's closing words in introducing the Marshall Plan begin to illuminate the potential danger of employing such ramping methods. In his Harvard address, Marshall commented that he regretted that each time he had previously made a public statement on the international situation, "he had been forced by the necessities of the case to enter into rather technical discussions." But he had done so out of conviction. "To my mind," he said, "it is of vast importance that our people reach some general understanding of what the complications really are, rather than react from a passion or a

prejudice or an emotion of the moment.”¹⁹¹ The Marshall Plan speech, he explained, was – like the rest of the Truman Offensive – an exception to his restrained general rule.

This chapter on emotional ramping has shown the strategic utility of the decision to make that exception and encourage the public to “react from...an emotion of the moment.” In the chapters that follow, I turn away from the Truman administration’s successful persuasive campaign of emotional ramping to lay out the consequences of such ramping, consequences that extended beyond the policies it was intended to bolster. I turn now to the affective dynamics unleashed by the Truman Offensive, and show how the 1947 ramping campaign constrained the Truman’s administration’s ability to maintain a sense of calm and reason during the crises of 1949, and foiled their subsequent efforts at tamping down public emotions.

¹⁹¹ Marshall, “‘Marshall Plan’ speech at Harvard University.”

Chapter 3: Tamping, the Structure of Feeling, and the Shocks of 1949

1 A “nerve wracking” turning point

By the close of the famed “fifteen weeks” of 1947 – from the receipt of the British notes withdrawing support from Greece and Turkey, through the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, to the creation of the Marshall Plan – the Truman administration was fully committed to an affective campaign designed to ramp up public emotions. From the fear stoked through presidential rhetoric designed to “scare the hell” out of the American people, to the sense of civic pride encouraged by the development of the Freedom Train, emotional appeals dominated the executive branch’s attempted salesmanship of European aid. And these tactics were successful: the notoriously conservative congressional class of 1946 approved the Greco-Turkish aid proposals, and, after a series of continued fear-infused statements when support seemed to be waning, allowed for Marshall Plan funding to pass.

In the months and years following the Truman Offensive, President Truman experienced some of his biggest foreign policy victories. By the beginning of 1949, he had led the United States into its first peacetime military alliance outside of the Western Hemisphere, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, bringing together Atlantic and Western European powers in a commitment towards collective security. Truman had also faced down Stalin in one of their most heated confrontations yet, subverting the Soviet blockade of Western entrances to Berlin with a cavalier airlift of food, fuel, and other supplies. Yet, when in 1956 noted historian Eric Goldman published *The Crucial Decade: 1945-1955*, he placed the defining locus of Truman’s foreign policy not with these public successes, but with his failures in 1949. Of 1949, he concluded that the “year of shocks” was “the most nerve-wracking of all the disquieting periods the United States had known

since V-J....The year 1949 was...a turning point.”¹ This chapter seeks to elucidate why that was the case.

In this chapter, I turn away from the Truman Offensive and its immediate successes in getting policies passed to look at the lingering effects of ramping beyond the administration’s intended context, and the administration’s strategies to combat those effects. Specifically, I argue that ramping resulted in ideo-affective spillover and issue linkage due to both the nature of emotions themselves and the strategic shepherding of those emotions by opposition politicians, and that these dynamics contributed to a reconstruction of the public structure of feeling. This created new policy dilemmas for the Truman administration, which they sought to counter through a deliberate campaign of strategic calming, which I term “tamping.” The processes of ramping and tamping are interlinked: successful ramping leads to tamping – and, I argue, is likely to undermine tamping’s success.

I begin my empirical analysis by looking at the affective dynamics that were unleashed almost immediately upon the beginning of the Truman Offensive. I show how the administration’s deliberately ramped-up emotions spilled over into other realms, including debates over the nature of support to Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalist government and measures addressed at domestic communism. I then turn to the ways in which these newly ramped up emotions contributed to a reconstituted public structure of feeling, one centered around fear and anxiety, as seen through elements of cultural production and other forms of public expression. Finally, I examine the “shocks of 1949” – or the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) victory and the explosion of the Soviet Union’s first atomic bomb – and show how the administration attempted to address these issues, which need not have been shocking, by undertaking a deliberate tamping campaign through discursive and expressive means nearly antithetical to those undertaken in the Truman Offensive.

¹ Eric Goldman, *The Crucial Decade: America, 1945-1955* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 112.

This tamping campaign proved futile, however, as the new dominant public structure of feeling meant that the administration was out of sync with public sentiment. The Truman Offensive had allowed them to pass legislation in 1947, but by 1949, the emotions it had unleashed were acting as a strategic constraint, making official discourse less, rather than more, persuasive.

2 Immediate creative and strategic dynamics

As discussed in Chapter 1, one of the unique facets of emotions is their creative capacity, or ability to “exit one environment and install themselves in another in ways that defy cognitive categories and scientific expectations.”² Capturing these capacities are central to my analysis, as they lend credibility to my contention that the beginning of the Cold War cannot be fully captured without accounting for affect. These phenomena cannot be explained by discursive or ideational means alone. The presence of spillover, linkage, and contagion are crucial to identifying affective factors as play.

In the section that follows, I look at the presence of these affective dynamics immediately after the delivery of the Truman Doctrine and in the midst of the Truman Offensive. I show that the affect unleashed in a particular context – that of asking for money specifically to target Europe, the key region to a strongpoint defense – spilled over into undesired contexts. This happened both because of the nature of affective forces per se (in that they are creative and unpredictable) and because political opposition strategically took advantage of that spillover to strengthen opportunities for policy linkage in contexts that would be disadvantageous to the Truman administration’s desires.

There are two main areas in which this very phenomenon occurred: the “Red Scare” and fears of domestic communism, and critiques of the president’s China policy. These two cases elucidate different dynamics of affective linkage, as the former was initially

² Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 2.

instigated by the original policymakers themselves before taking a turn beyond their liking or control, while the latter occurred over the explicit objections of the original policymakers.

2.1 *The Red Scare and domestic anticommunism*

As discussed in the previous chapter, part of the affective power of the Truman Doctrine came from its tapping into historic American fears of communist subversion. Within recent memory, the nation had undergone a “Red Scare” during the 1920s, climaxing in Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer’s raids on individuals and organizations suspected of communist subversion. Even since Truman’s taking office, these fears had been invoked by both opposition Republicans and administration officials, with charges of being “soft on communism” dogging the Democrats in the 1946 elections. The administration responded by setting up such measures as the Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty and standing by the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Consequently, fears of communism were part of the evocative atmosphere surrounding the issuance of the Truman Doctrine. The administration made that linkage even more explicit when on March 21, 1947 – a week after the Truman Doctrine speech – Truman signed Executive Order 9835, establishing “an employee loyalty program in the executive branch of government.”³ Taken together, the foreign and domestic policies outlined within a week of each other combined to paint a portrait of an immediate and serious communist threat.

But while this linkage was deliberately inculcated in order to encourage an affective climate that would allow smooth passage of aid to Greece, Turkey, and eventually, the rest of Europe, the nature of emotional spillover would prove difficult for the administration to control. In labeling communism as an international problem of an enormous and imminent

³ Harry S. Truman, “Executive Order 9835,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, March 21, 1947, Online. For more works on the loyalty oaths and domestic anti-communism under Truman, see also Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression*; Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*.

nature, Truman legitimated attitudes and governmental functions that he did not approve of. HUAC and J. Edgar Hoover's FBI gained greatly in power, and began operating on their own agendas, rather than those that might be politically useful to the president. Hoover appeared before a HUAC committee to stoke the flames of communism further, arguing for the Communist Party as "a fifth column if there ever was one" whose "allegiance is to Russia, not the United States," and which was consequently working towards "the overthrow of our government." The links to the Truman Doctrine became explicit when he noted, "since the President called for aid to Greece and Turkey the Communists, opposing the plan, [have] been mobilizing, promoting mass meetings, sending telegrams and letters to exert pressure on Congress."⁴ This usage of the Truman Doctrine to promote a domestic agenda was the reverse of what the administration intended.

Those counterpoised intentions produced linked outcomes that the administration was unable to control. This was both a political instrumental movement perpetuated by a Republican opposition, and a genuine public affective response. On the political side, administration officials like Harry Dexter White of the Treasury Department and Acheson himself began to come under suspicion. Perhaps the most salient accusation came from Whittaker Chambers, when he accused New Dealer and Yalta-attendeé Alger Hiss of being a Soviet spy. Truman angrily called this series of accusations a "red herring," provoking even more ire from the public, who flooded his office with letters.⁵ One of his aides referred to the "spy" issue as "the Administration's weakest link."⁶

⁴ Here again we see the references to Eben Ayers' aforementioned declaration of "inspired" letters to the president. Hoover qtd. in Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, 146.

⁵ For public responses to Truman's red herring comments, see the Truman Library's collection of letters to the president. While there is one slim folder of "pro" responses, there are two much larger ones filled with "con" responses. Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box OF 263 – 1022, Misc. "Red Herring remarks." HSTPL.

⁶ Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 80–81.

The Republicans continued to take advantage of their ability to piggyback off of the fear created by the Truman Doctrine in their legislative moves. In 1948, Representatives Mundt and Nixon co-sponsored HR 5852, which would have members of the Communist Party register with the government. To sell the bill, HUAC used language cribbed from the Truman Doctrine:

The President asked the Congress to appropriate several billions of dollars to build American defenses against the world communist conspiracy of which the communist movement in the United States is a constituent element....To resist communist aggression abroad and ignore it at home would be an utterly inconceivable pattern of procedure.⁷

Truman was against Mundt-Nixon (which later become “Mundt-Ferguson,” after the original bill died in the Senate), as well as several other proposed anti-communist measures that Congress threw his way.⁸ Yet, his opponents rode the wave generated by his ideas and affective power to pursue their own agendas antithetical to his own. They exploited analogical similarities between international anti-communism and domestic anti-communism, made more salient by the ideo-affective post-Truman Offensive atmosphere in which they were operating. Emotions are not easily constrained to one context, and Truman’s Republican foes helped encourage it into other areas.

The culmination of fears surrounding domestic communism came with Joseph McCarthy’s declaration on February 9, 1950 that he was in possession of a list of over 200 names of known communists working in the State Department.⁹ What this section has tried to show, however, is that McCarthyism ought not to be seen starting merely with Joseph McCarthy. Rather, as Theoharis and Griffith wrote, McCarthy was “the product of

⁷ HUAC qtd. in Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, 310.

⁸ Donald A. Ritchie, *Congress and Harry S. Truman: A Conflicted Legacy* (Kirksville, Missouri: Truman State University Press, 2011), 113.

⁹ Joseph McCarthy, “Speech in Wheeling, West Virginia,” *George Mason University History Matters*, February 9, 1950, <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6456>. As mentioned above, the canonical work linking the Truman Doctrine to McCarthyism is Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*.

America's cold-war politics, not its progenitor."¹⁰ There were many strands that combined to lead to this period, and the president's own deliberate evocation of an international communist threat was one of them.¹¹ The spillover from international threat to domestic threat was not intended to take place the way that it did, and consequently, the growth of fear in different domains served to destabilize the administration's status as the purveyor of affective innovation. Enabled by the administration's instrumental ramping up of fear discourses to gain ratification for its European policies, opposition politicians and fearful publics linked the unrelated context of domestic security to foreign policy reasoning.

2.2 *The Chinese Civil War*

Unlike with fears of domestic communism, which the administration originally sought to cultivate for its own purposes before losing control to Republicans, the post-Truman Doctrine outbursts of fear and anger directed towards the administration's China policy occurred despite the explicit objections of the president and his top officials. Since the end of World War II, when the Chinese Civil War between Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) and Mao Zedong's communist forces (CCP) – put on hold by the Japanese invasion – began to rage once more, the Truman administration had practiced a policy of mostly hands-off disengagement. In December 1945, Truman asked General George Marshall to undertake a mission to China to “persuade the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, to effect a cessation of hostilities.”¹² His mission accomplished neither of these goals. As fighting continued to rage and intensify and Chiang proved to be an ineffective and corrupt force, the American

¹⁰ Griffith and Theoharis qtd. in Laura McEnaney, “Cold War Mobilization and Domestic Politics: The United States,” in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, I: Origins, 424.

¹¹ For more on the different strands that combined to lead to McCarthyism, or the “many McCarthyisms,” see Ellen Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1998).

¹² Harry S. Truman, “Draft of Letter to General Marshall,” December 31, 1945, *FRUS* 1945, Vol. VII, 765.

general was unable to bring the National and Communist parties to a lasting agreement.¹³ By late 1946, Marshall advocated that the U.S. government should cease providing aid to the Kuomintang.¹⁴

Other officials across the Truman administration continued to back up Marshall's assessments advocating as limited support as was politically feasible. The estimated costs of what it would take to ensure a Nationalist victory were far beyond what the government was willing to bear. There was no appetite for American intervention, and to rely only on economic aid would cost the U.S. at least \$1.3 billion.¹⁵ Even then, the corruption and ideological bankruptcy of the KMT might make all of the prospective economic and military aid come to naught if people could not trust or find inspiration in a Nationalist alternative to the Communists.¹⁶ Furthermore, many believed that Mao's regime was not *truly* communist, in that it was not thought to be under the thumb of the Soviet Union. Rather, Acheson and other State Department officials thought that this home-grown communism might be a perfect place to foster Titoism, or a non-Soviet aligned state like Yugoslavia that would become a thorn in Stalin's side.¹⁷ Taken together, the corruption, ineptitude, and hopelessness of the Nationalist cause, combined with China's political distance from the Soviet Union and its location in Asia rather than top priority Europe,

¹³ By November 1946, Marshall worried in a telegram to Truman that future hostilities "if initiated...would...terminat[e] my mission." George Marshall, Telegram to President Truman, November 16, 1946, *FRUS* 1946, Vol. X, 548-549.

¹⁴ George Marshall, Personal Statement, January 7, 1947, RG 59, 1945-1949 Central Decimal File, Box 3400, 711.93/1-2648. National Archives at College Park (herein NACP).

¹⁵ Division of Research for Far East, "Cost of Supporting Alternative American Policies in China 1947-1949," October 15, 1947, RG 59, 1945-1949 Central Decimal File, Box 3399, Item 711.93/10-1747, NACP.

¹⁶ As Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart wrote in a November 1947 report on "spiritual or human factors in China's civil war," "The Communist organizers have a fanatical faith in their cause and are able to inspire their workers and to a large extent their troops and the local population with belief in this rightness, practical benefits and ultimate triumph. As against this the Government employes [sic.] are becoming ever more dispirited, defeatist and consequently listless or unscrupulously self-seeking....The effect on military morale is disastrous. In this drift toward catastrophe they clutch at American aid as at least postponing the inevitable. This is all that such monetary aid can do unless there is also among the KMT leaders a new sense of dominating purpose, of sacred mission, of national salvation, expressing itself in challenging slogans, arousing them to fresh enthusiasms, leading them to forget their personal fears, ambitions and jealousies in the larger, more absorbingly worth-while cause." J. Leighton Stuart, "Comments on Spiritual or Human Factors in China's Civil War," November 24, 1947, RG 59, 1945-1949 Central Decimal File, Box, 7272, Item 893.00/11-2447, NACP.

¹⁷ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 67.

meant that, in the words of State Department adviser John Carter Vincent, according to the “urgency of need and importance to the national security of the United States,” China ranked low on the list of national concerns.¹⁸

When drafting the Truman Doctrine, officials anticipated that some might interpret the new policy in a more expansive way than intended, especially when it came to China. This was not to be desired. As George Kennan wrote, “If I thought for a moment that the precedent of Greece and Turkey obliged us to try to do the same thing in China, I would throw up my hands and say we had better have a whole new approach to the affairs of the world.”¹⁹ Truman agreed, stating that providing the Nationalist government with the same kind of aid “would be pouring money down a rat hole.”²⁰

But despite the administration’s best wishes, people began to apply the logic of the Truman Doctrine to the case of China. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs peppered Acheson with questions as to where China fit into the new policy. Representative Walter Judd of Minnesota slammed the administration’s China policy, arguing, “China is left with internal troubles like Greece. It is difficult for me to believe that we do not have obligations there almost as great – perhaps greater – than those in Greece, from the point of view of the security of the United States.”²¹ Other congressional remarks from the so-called “China Lobby” reached administrative ears as well: in Joseph Jones’ notes on “Congressional Statements on President Truman’s Address Asking Aid for Greece and Turkey,” a number of congressmen mentioned China within two days of hearing the Truman Doctrine. Senator Brewster expressed an interest in “having the administration

¹⁸ Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 59–60. W. Walton Butterworth, the State Department’s Director of Far East Affairs, later made reference to a 1928 assessment of China that he said was “still valid as a definition of American policy,” showing the long-term consistency of American policy: “The good will of the United States toward China is proverbial and the American Government and people welcome every advance made by the Chinese in the direction of unity, peace and progress. We do not believe in interference in their internal affairs.” W.W. Butterworth memo, August 20, 1949, RG 59, 1945-1949 Central Decimal File, Box 3400, 711.93/8-2049, NACP.

¹⁹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 40; Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 61.

²⁰ Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 62.

²¹ Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 195–96.

define the subtle difference between Chinese Communists and Greek Communists,” while Joseph McCarthy – whose response Jones underlined – “wondered whether China was being forgotten.”²² Chiang Kai Shek’s government drew the same parallels themselves, submitting three requests for aid following the March Doctrine announcement.²³

Despite its intentions not to, the Truman Administration itself got drawn into this connection of policies. This linkage took legislative form with the China Aid Bill of 1948, which Christensen argued was only allowed to pass because of “the mobilization drive for Europe”; in other words, Truman approved this bill to continue to aid a losing cause in Asia because he did not want to threaten support for his more important ERP.²⁴ The State Department’s Policy Planning Staff concluded, “the United States should extend the minimum aid necessary to satisfy American public opinion.”²⁵ In other words, the government would continue to aid a faction they felt was corrupt and bound to be defeated because it had been successfully tied to a wider struggle against global communism.

This issue linkage was a case of ideo-affective linkage. The “Asialationists,” in the word of Thomas Christensen, who combined an Asia-first attitude with fiscal conservatism, had been previously unable to secure the administration’s support for increased aid to China. But the Truman Doctrine and its accompanying offensive had provided a new way to advance their agenda. These dynamics accord with Schimmelfennig’s notion of “rhetorical entrapment,” whereby an argumentative logic is used to assimilate an undesired

²² Office of Public Affairs, “Congressional Statements on President Truman’s Address Asking Aid for Greece and Turkey, March 12-14, 1947,” Joseph M. Jones Papers, Box 6, Truman Doctrine, HSTPL.

²³ Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 63.

²⁴ This is not an uncontentious claim. While Christensen argues for a domestic impetus behind the decision to support further aid to China, other scholars – like Feaver, Kusnitz, and Leffler – argue that a domestic pro-Chiang coalition could not have possibly destabilized Truman’s foreign policy, and that instead, this represented a changing reorientation towards Asia as an important sphere of Cold War conflagration. I side with Christensen’s interpretation of events because of the continuing internal assessments (many of which are cited in the above text) of China as a lost cause. For these alternative visions, see John H. Feaver, “The China Aid Bill of 1948: Limited Assistance as a Cold War Strategy,” *Diplomatic History* 5, no. 2 (April 1, 1981): 107–20; Leonard A. Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America’s China Policy, 1949-1979* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984); Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*.

²⁵ Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 66.

position by the opposition.²⁶ But the ways in which this entrapment took place shows the ideo-affective dynamics at work, contributing to the emotional salience of the analogical connections. A Republican congressperson provocatively accused the administration of “appeasement in the State Department” when it came to China, while others employed deliberately evocative language, referring to the administration’s lack of support as “a tragic error,” especially as China was now a “happy hunting group” for communism.²⁷ When Acheson was hauled before Congress to answer whether the Truman Doctrine would apply to China, he was “severely criticized” for adopting a stance that suggested that the situation in China was not serious – a form of ideo-affective mismatch that presaged what would come in 1949 (see section 4.2 below for more).²⁸

The campaign was working: popular support for military aid to the KMT went from 32% in February 1947, right before the Truman Doctrine, to 55% in April, right after.²⁹ In some ways, the Asialationists’ success in compelling the passage of the China Aid Bill mirrored that of the Truman administration’s success in passing a bill for Greco-Turkish aid. In both cases, new ideo-affective approaches proved persuasive where previous political appeals had not. The Asialationists were only able to use this approach because of the spillover and linkage produced by the Truman Offensive’s ramping campaign, despite the administration’s clear intentions to avoid the connection.

As Leonard Kusnitz wrote in his 1984 study of American public opinion and the China question, “The public hostility which some Americans did display toward the communist Chinese was likely a ‘spillover’ from the distrust most Americans had recently acquired toward the Soviet Union....leading the public to link the Asian communists with

²⁶ Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap.”

²⁷ Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 73; Walter LaFeber, “American Policy-Makers, Public Opinion, and the Outbreak of the Cold War, 1945-1950,” in *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1977), 55–56.

²⁸ Tang Tsou, *America’s Failure in China 1941-50* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 449.

²⁹ Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 75.

the on-going ‘international communist conspiracy.’”³⁰ Truman’s opponents gained strength and analogical salience by connecting the Chinese case to the administration’s expressed strategy, and appealing to the public through emotional arguments that deliberately recalled the strong sense of fear with which the administration’s Europe policy was presented.

3 The altered public structure of feeling

In using ideo-affective political strategies, the Truman administration unleashed results characteristic of affective dynamics. In turning from the examination of strategy and the agency that goes along with that, it becomes crucial to see how that exercise of agency impacted the larger structures in which they were operating. To do so, I turn to an analysis of the changed structure of feeling following the Truman Offensive.

Readers will recall from Chapter 1 that the notion of a structure of feeling draws from Williams’ understanding of the structure “as social experiences in *solution*, as distinct from other social semantic formations which have been *precipitated* and are more evidently and more immediately available.”³¹ In political science terms, Simon Koschut defines the term as “a set of emotions that show a regular pattern...[and] that constrains and compels our affective experience.”³² The previous chapter examined the Truman administration’s attempts to compel a particular structure of feeling – one that encouraged both fear of communism and pride in American democratic institutions – and I turn now to an examination of the public for evidence of its “social experiences in solution.”

While many historians and later observers have observed a qualitative shift in cultural production and spirit coming in 1950, following the Korea intervention and at the formal start of McCarthyism, by looking at the structure of feeling, or nascent mood, I

³⁰ Kusnitz, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, 25.

³¹ Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 133–34.

³² Koschut, “The Structure of Feeling,” 176.

argue that one can see it dawning from several years earlier.³³ It should be noted that I do not see the Truman Offensive as the sole purveyor of a new structure of feeling; for something as amorphous and multiplicative as public emotion, it is impossible to point to one singular source. However, in its deliberate inculcation of fear and threat, underscored by the institutional authority of the presidency, the Truman Offensive reverberated throughout not only the political, but also the social and cultural spheres of American life, interacting with existing phenomena and dampening or amplifying them in previously unrealized ways.

In what follows, I briefly attempt to capture the public structure of feeling that dominated from 1947 in order to understand how the actions of legislators and other discursive actors served not only to constitute ideational structures, but also emotional ones. To capture something as broad as the public structure of feeling, I borrow methodologically from Ted Hopf's societal constructivism, consulting a vast range of sources to try and triangulate the lived experiences of those of the period under question.³⁴ The public structure of feeling is nowhere written down; rather, it is expressed through art, music, literature, and public action. (A brief note about why I do not make many references to public opinion polls in this section. Gallup polling was still in its infancy during this era, and its methodology was notoriously poor. In addition to the infamous case of the 1948 election predictions that led to "Dewey Defeats Truman" headlines, the reliability of polls ought to be called into question in everyday analyses as well. Pollsters rarely asked the same question multiple times across a long period, leading to snapshots of

³³ Lisle A. Rose's *The Cold War Comes to Main Street* argues that 1950 marked the true beginning of a Cold War "collapse" of confidence. Citing public opinion surveys and oral histories, Rose argues that "the public temperament at the end of 1949, although far from buoyant, thus remained cautiously optimistic. The warm recollections of later years, seen through the golden haze of nostalgia, really did reflect the era.... One year later the United States had become another country." I do not argue with Rose that the sense of hysteria became more acute in 1950 with the rise of McCarthy and the United States entry into the Korean War. I do, however, argue that these events did not arise out of nowhere, and that the public structure of feeling had been shaped earlier than Rose acknowledges. Lisle A. Rose, *The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 5–6.

³⁴ See Chapter 1, Section 6 for caveats regarding my adaptations of Hopf's method. Hopf, *Reconstructing the Cold War*, 25.

one particular sample rather than any form of discernable trends.³⁵ Further, contemporary scholars have pointed to high levels of bias in sampling and analysis.³⁶ Historian Michael Hogan has concluded, “public opinion polls are less than reliable for the early postwar period and do not give expression to popular sentiment in any event.”³⁷)

3.1 “*The Age of Anxiety*” in culture

When looking at the public in the wake of the Truman Doctrine, one can see a growing state of fear and anxiety, and elite works often referenced these sentiments explicitly. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s famous *The Vital Center* warned of the dangers of totalitarianism, titling his second chapter, “Politics in the Age of Anxiety.” Renowned composer Leonard Bernstein performed his second symphony, *The Age of Anxiety*, for the first time in 1949, a piece one musicologist described as “a dark, cynical and ultimately anti-heroic piece of music.” Bernstein himself later dubbed it “my most American work.”³⁸ The Pulitzer Prize in Poetry for 1948 went to W.H. Auden’s *The Age of Anxiety: A Baroque Eclogue*. Its opening prose lines summed up how many felt: “When the historical process breaks down and armies organize with their embossed debates the ensuing void which they can never consecrate, when necessity is associated with horror and freedom with boredom, then it looks good to the bar business.”³⁹

Even those pieces that managed to forgo mentioning anxiety in the title also reflected and added to the newly constituted structure of feeling. Concerns about totalitarianism permeated elite treatises, from Friedrich Hayek’s *Road to Serfdom* to renewed

³⁵ See George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971* (New York: Random House, 1972).

³⁶ Elizabeth A. Martin, Michael W. Traugott, and Courtney Kennedy, “A Review and Proposal for a New Measure of Poll Accuracy,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69, no. 3 (September 21, 2005): 342–69.

³⁷ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 419.

³⁸ Bernstein qtd. in Philip Max Gentry, “The Age of Anxiety: Music, Politics, and McCarthyism, 1948–1954” (Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, 2008), 30.

³⁹ W. H. Auden, *The Age of Anxiety: A Baroque Eclogue* (Princeton University Press, 2011), 3.

interest in Harold Lasswell's 1941 article, "The Garrison State."⁴⁰ The Pulitzer Prizes in National and International Reporting went to coverage of the State Department's internal security issues and the political and cultural situation of the Soviet Union.⁴¹ By 1949, the trend towards anxiety and the faults of America became even more apparent: the Pulitzer for fiction went to James Gould Cozzens' *Guard of Honor* (a realist, non-romantic account of a U.S. Army airbase's reaction to a racial incident); the prize for drama went to Arthur Miller's *The Death of a Salesman* (the dour tale of a middle class American stuck in the suffocating torpor of everyday life); and the prize for history went to Roy Franklin Nichols' *The Disruption of American Democracy* (which argues that the Civil War was caused by ambitious politicians working towards their own ends).⁴²

These concerns reached beyond the learned commentaries of opinion leaders like Walter Lippmann or George Kennan. The 1947 annual report of the Office of Education, rather than confining itself to usual commentary on teachers or facilities, opened by warning, "When historians come to record the developments of the past year, they will probably set in bold italics the grave disappointment and growing anxiety of the American people..."⁴³ By mid-1947, pollsters started asking every month whether people believed that the United States would find themselves in a war within the decade. More than half of the population was consistently concerned that that would be the case.⁴⁴

According to more popular tallies, like the *New York Times* bestseller list, the same trends held. The second biggest book of 1948 in terms of sales was Norman Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead*, a partly autobiographical account of American soldiers fighting in

⁴⁰ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 420.

⁴¹ "1948 Pulitzer Prize Winners & Finalists," *The Pulitzer Prizes*, accessed November 8, 2016, <http://www.pulitzer.org/prize-winners-by-year/1948>.

⁴² "1949 Pulitzer Prize Winners & Finalists," *The Pulitzer Prizes*, accessed November 8, 2016, <http://www.pulitzer.org/prize-winners-by-year/1949>.

⁴³ Office of Education qtd. in Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, 230.

⁴⁴ Pollsters had previously asked about whether or not respondents thought the United States would find itself in another war, but prior to 1947, the questions were asked about the hypothetical war occurring in 25 years, not 10 (the one exception was the Foreign Affairs Survey of November 1946, which did ask about 10 years). National Opinion Research Center, "Foreign Affairs Surveys," *Roper Center for Public Opinion Research*, March 1946-January 1950, Online.

World War II – one that did not glorify the war, but rather emphasized loneliness, terror, and death.⁴⁵ The 1949 British film *The Third Man* became a huge hit in the United States, with its theme song as the most popular song internationally.⁴⁶ And an abridged version of British historian Arnold Toynbee’s seminal work, *A Study of History*, became a popular bestseller. Toynbee’s work identified a cycle of the “rise and fall of civilizations” throughout human history, tapping into contemporary fears of the vast civilizational threat that the United States existed under.⁴⁷

3.2 *Fear, anxiety, and pride in public practice*

While the above actions and products showcased the feelings of the elite and literary, homegrown citizen-led affective displays showed the extent to which these sentiments were penetrating into the daily lives of average Americans as well. The anxiety manifest itself in grandiose displays of patriotism and pageantry, and censure for those who objected to it. Annual May Day parades were met with “Loyalty Day” parades to counter them across the country.⁴⁸ At the beginning of World War II, a combination of business and political interests had combined to create “I am an American Day,” celebrating a romantic vision of citizenship and patriotism. By the 1947 parade, however, that celebration had also turned towards an event of warning: the mayor of New York City demanded that citizens “declare publicly their faith in the stability and permanence” of American institutions, while the Attorney General Tom C. Clark warned of “subversives.”

⁴⁵ Mailer’s work led the bestseller lists all year until November, when Lloyd C. Douglas’ *Big Fisherman* overtook it in sales. As the *New York Times* book section writer said at the time, however, Douglas’ last minute surge to overtake Mailer was a result of the former being “an old timer, with a ready-made audience” unlike Mailer, who was a first-time novelist. Ralph Thompson, “In and Out of Books,” *The New York Times*, January 16, 1949.

⁴⁶ The *Billboard* charts show that of all of the most popular songs of 1950, two different versions of the “Third Man Theme” sat at #3 and #4, behind only Pattie Page’s “The Tennessee Waltz” and Gordon Jenkins & The Weavers’ “Goodnight Irene.” Charles Drazin, *In Search of the Third Man* (New York: Proscenium Publishers, 1999), 107.

⁴⁷ James David Hart, *The Popular Book: A History of America’s Literary Taste* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), 277.

⁴⁸ The tradition started in New York with the Veterans of Foreign Wars, but soon became a national movement, with similar parades popping up all across the country. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 437–39.

A year later, the governor of Illinois warned his audience to beware of “communist threats abroad and communist propaganda at home.”⁴⁹ The Kansas City, Missouri Junior Chamber of Commerce took an even less subtle approach, creating the September 1948 “Democracy Beats Communism Week.”⁵⁰

Perhaps the most extreme expression of this anxiety towards and fear of communism came in 1950 from Mosinee, Wisconsin. This town of two thousand decided that the federal government was not taking the communist threat seriously enough. To demonstrate to the country how terrifying the prospect of such an anti-democratic force could be, Mosinee “put itself behind an iron curtain for a day” by staging a communist takeover. “It can happen here,” the local paper explained.⁵¹ The American Legion took over the town square in a mock battle before “detaining” town leaders in a “concentration camp.” They showed propaganda films in the movie theaters and erected barbed wire around town.⁵² They raised prices in stores and served nothing in restaurants except for bread and potato soup. The goal, wrote the editors of the *Mosinee Times*, was “to present a message on Americanism that can be the beginning of an awakening as to the privileges inherent in our way of life.”⁵³

These popular affective displays interacted in intriguing ways with deliberate administrative moves. In the previous chapter, I discussed the case of the Freedom Train and the official attempt to inculcate a sense of patriotism and pride by sending this locomotive laden with the documentary history of the United States around the country. While this was clearly a top-down led initiative, constructed for nakedly instrumental purposes, individuals’ experiences of the train seemed to be genuinely affecting. People

⁴⁹ Fried, *The Russians Are Coming!*, 18.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁵¹ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 440.

⁵² Rose, *The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950*, 162–63.

⁵³ Intriguingly, this mock event may have had a death toll. The mayor had been roughly roused from his bed in the morning and put on a show trial in the town square. He suffered a heart attack from the excitement and died. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 440.

waited for hours in line to view the Mayflower Compact, Thomas Jefferson's draft of the Declaration of Independence, and the Northwest Ordinance, among others. There were reports of people fainting, crying, and battling storms to get a chance to glimpse these pseudo-religious artifacts. A train staff member told a reporter, "when you see what this country and these documents mean to people – how they'll stand out there all day to see the things they feel make the nation great – you get a lump in your throat." By the end of the "Rededication Weeks," a full third of Americans had participated in the display.⁵⁴

3.3 *Counter-structures of feeling*

Of course, not everyone was positively moved by the display of the Freedom Train, nor was every individual in the country anxious, scared, or patriotic. While a structure of feeling can become dominant, that does not mean it remains uncontested. Dissenting emotion discourses consistently contended with the dominant one, providing the administration and its supporters with even more reason to continue to advance ideoaffective displays consistent with its own point of view.

The reaction to the Freedom Train presents a microcosm of the contestation within a dominant structure of feeling. Some labor leaders expressed their outrage over the display, accusing it of glorifying American businessmen and ignoring the contribution of workers. This was especially poignant to them following the 1945-46 strikes that had paralyzed the country and nearly doomed Truman's political future.⁵⁵ The NAACP and other black leaders highlighted the irony of a celebration of American freedoms as a large minority of the country was actively repressed and discriminated against. They prevented

⁵⁴ Little, "The Freedom Train"; Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 430–33.

⁵⁵ The staff of the National Archives had originally suggested including copies of landmark labor relations bills, including the liberal Wagner Act and conservative Taft-Hartley Act, but the committee decided against both in the "spirit of equality and non-controversy." Little, "The Freedom Train," 48–49.

the Train from going to Birmingham, as a protest against its brutal segregation laws.⁵⁶

Langston Hughes summed up the dissonance of the affair for African Americans in the

New Republic:

Can a coal black man drive the Freedom
Train?
Or Am I still a porter on the Freedom
Train?
Is there ballot boxes on the Freedom
Train?
Do colored folks vote on the Freedom
Train?
When it stops in Mississippi will it be
made plain
Everybody's got a right to board the
Freedom Train?⁵⁷

An affective strategy is not a deterministic one, and just as emotions spilled over into foreign policy and national security areas that the Truman administration had intended to keep separate, so too did the public structure of feeling become altered in the area of civil rights. While this period would see great gains in legislative action, it also saw the same fervent anti-communism refracted in different ways.⁵⁸ The civil rights community became torn apart by the communism issue, as many other communities were, with the new anticommunist leadership of the NAACP backing away from global civil rights and alienating the National Negro Congress.⁵⁹

Taken together, these different areas of public life and culture help showcase the extent to which the public displayed a new structure of feeling that only continued to intensify after the issuance of the Truman Doctrine. While it was never monolithic or

⁵⁶ John White, "Civil Rights in Conflict: The 'Birmingham Plan' and the Freedom Train, 1947," *Alabama Review* 52, no. 2 (April 1999): 121–41.

⁵⁷ Hughes qtd. in Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 444.

⁵⁸ See Dudziak for the canonical account of civil rights activists' use of the Cold War as a resource in the fight for legal equality. Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton University Press, 2011).

⁵⁹ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 424.

uncontested, the intersubjective structure of feeling was dominant, allowing people to speak of a national “mood” of anxiety and fear.

4 Managing shocks in the new structure of feeling

Public emotion can be a strategic resource, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, or it can become a strategic constraint. As the above analysis has sought to show, following the success of the Truman Offensive, the Truman administration found itself making policy within a new structure of feeling – one that they had instrumentally introduced, but had not necessarily genuinely believed in. In the immediate aftermath of the campaign, this resulted in unwanted linkage between the Truman Doctrine’s European aid policies, the Chinese Civil War, and domestic anticommunism. But the unintended consequences of the Truman Offensive were not limited to 1947 and 1948. The ramping campaign had shifted the public structure of feeling, meaning that political discourses and practices had to be recalibrated to match public affect.

In the section that follows, I look at the effects of the Truman Offensive upon events in 1949. Even though the high intensity affective dynamics had died down by that time, the effects of the ramping campaign lingered in the reconstituted public structure of feeling. I center my analysis around the historically well-known “twin shocks” of 1949, the first Soviet atomic explosion and the victory of the CCP in China, and show the deliberate administration attempts (and failures) to address not only ideational concerns, but also ideo-affective ones through a concerted tamping campaign. In this section, I make two points: first, that the administration deliberately sought to achieve an affective end (calming down the public) through ineffective means (making ideational, not affective, arguments); and second, that because of the affective mismatch between administrative and public emotions, the administration proved unable to persuade the public to accept their narrative of events. In other words, it was affective criteria, not merely discursive ones, that

accounted for the magnitude of response to the events of 1949 and led to tampering's ultimate failure.

4.1 *The Soviet Union and the atomic bomb*

“Joe-1,” as the first Soviet atomic test was known to the U.S. (or “First Lightning,” as it was known to the Soviets), took place on August 29, 1949.⁶⁰ From the end of World War II, Anglo-American intelligence had been trying to predict when the Soviet Union would be able to test its first atomic bomb.⁶¹ Widely varying estimates held that the event would occur between 1950 and 1965.⁶² By September 1948, just under a year before the actual event in question, a CIA report maintained, “The earliest date by which the Russians may have exploded their first bomb is mid-1950; the probable date by which they will have exploded their first test bomb is mid-1953.”⁶³ The prediction process was crucial, for the date of Soviet atomic acquisition would represent the end of the American atomic monopoly, plunging the United States into a new strategic situation. Despite the widely varying estimates, the Truman administration actively prepared for what was seen as an inevitable. As Michael D. Gordin writes, “in the period from 1945 to 1949...every American atomic decision was fundamentally built around the potentiality of a Soviet atomic bomb.”⁶⁴

⁶⁰ For a detailed look at the process of Soviet acquisition of the bomb, see David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

⁶¹ As the Director of Central Intelligence, R.H. Hillenkoetter, wrote in a 1949 memorandum to the National Security Council, “Any estimate of the present or future military capabilities of the USSR which does not include the status of the Soviet atomic energy program will not meet the requirements for planning....In order that the United States may develop adequate defensive measures, including the preparation of counter offensive plans, it is essential that every means be utilized to provide a continuous and current picture of the status of the Soviet program, and to fix the precise location of major atomic energy installations in the USSR.” R.H. Hillenkoetter, “Atomic Energy Program of the USSR,” April 21, 1949, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files [hereafter PSF], Box 176, Atomic Energy: Russia, HSTPL.

⁶² Michael S. Goodman, *Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb* (Stanford University Press, 2007), 2; Michael D. Gordin, *Red Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly* (Macmillan, 2009), chap. 2.

⁶³ Gordin, *Red Cloud at Dawn*, 86.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

While the public was not necessarily aware of the policy considerations being taken into account, from the end of the Second World War polls showed that most people believed the Soviet Union would develop a nuclear weapon at some point.⁶⁵ As the Social Science Research Council reported, “only two people out of a hundred think other countries will be unable to make the bomb.”⁶⁶ The country had undergone several nuclear scares prior to 1949. A January 1946 claim by a Northern Irish professor that the Soviets had produced a nuclear weapon so took hold in the public mind that Truman and the CIA had to confirm that no such test had taken place. Rumors continued to pop up here and there about atomic tests, other unprecedented weapons, even “death rays.”⁶⁷ That the Soviets would one day develop an atomic weapon was well within the public imagination, even expectation.

When Joe-1 did occur in August 1949, the Soviets made no official announcement, and the Americans were unaware that the event had taken place. It took two weeks to confirm that the Soviets had in fact done what it had long been feared they would do.⁶⁸ When the explosion was determined to be legitimate, the administration began to discuss if and how the public should be notified of the event. While there were some factions who preferred withholding atomic information for security reasons, Truman decided to tell the public, so that they would be able to manage the information themselves, rather than having it disturb the public in leak form.⁶⁹ Although Acheson and Charles Ross did not

⁶⁵ According to a survey run by the National Opinion Research Center, 83% of polled Americans believed other countries would be able to develop an atomic bomb. Of those, 83% believed that the event would occur within 10 years. National Opinion Research Center, “National and International Policy Survey,” *Roper Center for Public Opinion Research*, October 1945, <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu>.

⁶⁶ SSRC qtd. in Gordin, *Red Cloud at Dawn*, 63.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 63–64.

⁶⁸ There had been 111 false alarms in recent months, leaving observers skeptical of the 112th alarm. Charles Ziegler, “Waiting for Joe-1: Decisions Leading to the Detection of Russia’s First Atomic Bomb Test,” *Social Studies of Science* 18, no. 2 (1988): 217.

⁶⁹ Many members of the military were worried about the “ever-increasing desire on the part of some people to release to the public more and more information on our atomic energy activities” because it could prove “detrimental to our future security.” R.B. Landry, “Release of Information Regarding Atomic Energy Activities,” April 6, 1949, Development of an Atomic Weapons Program Student Research File, Box 2, HSTPL. Intriguingly, a temporal inaccuracy in Truman’s memoirs shows the extent to which Truman prized being seen as communicating directly and openly with the public. In his memoirs, Truman later noted that he

think that the president should make a public announcement at all for fear of “dramatiz[ing] the situation too much,” the rest of his advisors were united in favor of the announcement.⁷⁰ They did share Acheson and Ross’s fears, however, of making the situation seem too shocking. As Stuart Symington of the Air Force wrote to Secretary of Defense Johnson, government officials worried that any “exploitation” of “the atomic explosion in Russia” would plunge the public into a “dangerous snowball of fear.” It was important that “a reconsideration of military plans and programs should be the result of sober reflection rather than reaction to a single dramatic event.”⁷¹

In order to manage public emotion and prevent the building of a “dangerous snowball of fear,” the crafting of the presidential statement of notification was designed to accomplish two things, both focused on curbing affective responses: 1) to provide the public with enough information that they could respond rationally, and 2) to emphasize the expected nature of this event. On the first item, Kennan urged informing the public immediately, as “it would have a steadying effect on the American people and give them a sense of security if this Government could give assurance that the U.S.S.R. probably could not, without our knowledge, have a bomb or bombs for any length of time.” As Gordin comments, Kennan’s words and others like them show that the administration believed, “knowledge was important because it structured American responses. The more that people knew, the more rationally they could act.”⁷² The effect of providing this information also fed into the second goal of emphasizing the expected nature of the event. The administration, in other words, attempted to handle this shock by arguing that the event,

was informed of the explosion on September 21, delivering his public remarks only two days later. However, the documentary record seems to show that he was informed of the explosion in late August, with explicit confirmation arriving on September 19. Truman, *Memoirs*, II. Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953:324; Goodman, *Spying on the Nuclear Bear*, 48–49.

⁷⁰ Gordin, *Red Cloud at Dawn*, 223–24.

⁷¹ Stuart Symington, “Memorandum to Secretary Johnson,” November 8 1949. Development of an Atomic Weapons Program Student Research File, Box 2, HSTPL.

⁷² Kennan and Gordin qtd. in Gordin, *Red Cloud at Dawn*, 216–17.

while it had undoubtedly occurred, was not, in fact, shocking. The event of the atomic weapon could easily be fit into the existent administration discourse.

By undertaking the same tripartite affective analysis of the president's statement as we did for the Truman Doctrine in the previous chapter, we can see the nearly opposite affective approach that was taken. First, paralinguistically, Truman did not deliver the statement himself, thus deliberately stripping it of the impact engendered through the use of the presidential bully pulpit. Instead, press secretary Ross distributed copies of the statement to news correspondents following his regular press briefing.⁷³

Second, when looking at the content dimension of the text in and of itself, we can see that instead of deliberately playing on metaphors and other rhetorical moves that could evoke fear, the administration chose to keep the language plain, emphasizing routineness and calm. Truman began by explaining why he was making a public statement: "I believe the American people, to the fullest extent consistent with national security, are entitled to be informed of all developments in the field of atomic energy. That is my reason for making public the following information." He then moved into as clinical a description he could possibly give for the subject of his talk, almost immediately tempering the news with efforts designed to calm with evocations of anticipated-ness:

We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R. Ever since atomic energy was first released by man, the eventual development of this new force by other nations was to be expected. This probability has always been taken into account by us. Nearly four years ago I pointed out that "Scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based is already widely known. There is also substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge in time."⁷⁴

To diffuse the situation, to mollify a public alarmed by what seemed to be a completely new development, Truman attempted to push back on notions of novelty by 1) emphasizing that this was a foreseen event and 2) making reference explicitly to a

⁷³ Ibid., 231.

⁷⁴ Harry S. Truman, "Statement by the President on Announcing the First Atomic Explosion in the U.S.S.R.," *UCSB American Presidency Project*, September 23, 1949, Online.

statement he had made several years prior, showing consistency and attempting to offer proof that they truly had foreseen this event. Truman closed his statement by reminding his audience of the need – once again using language that emphasized repetition and continuity – to work towards international atomic agreements: “This recent development emphasizes once again, if indeed such emphasis were needed, the necessity for that truly effective enforceable international control of atomic energy which this Government and the large majority of the members of the United Nations support.”⁷⁵

By the third dimension of discursive affect – the statement in its wider discursive context – the Soviet atomic bomb statement also differed from the Truman Doctrine. Other than the very fact of its announcing a first (that the first Soviet nuclear weapon had been detonated), the statement did not introduce any new information or framing. Instead, its language and contents were perfectly consistent with what had come before, fitting seamlessly into dominant Cold War narratives. It even quoted previous examples of those narratives.

And just as the follow up campaign to the Truman Doctrine continued to hammer home the vast threat that was facing the nation, so too did the follow up campaign to the president’s statement continue to emphasize the opposite: that all was well, and that this changed nothing. In addition to drafting statements for the president and other top officials, people got to work planning out a press strategy. Secretary Dean Acheson held a press conference at the United Nations to follow up on Truman’s statement. He addressed “four basic matters”: first, “the fact...that there has been an atomic explosion in the Soviet Union”; second, “that this was contemplated and has been contemplated and has been

⁷⁵ In an earlier draft of the statement, Truman characterized the Soviet position in slightly different language: “The Soviets have been working on atomic weapons for a considerable period, and from the high priority they have given this effort it was to be expected they would have reached the point of having a weapon to test by this time. The testing of an atomic weapon in the Soviet Union would not affect our attitude toward the world situation since our basic policies have taken such an event into account.” “Draft Statement by the President in Response to Request: Has USSR Exploded an Atomic Weapon?,” Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF, Box 164, Russia: General: 1949-1952, HSTPL.

taken into account. That is important”; third, that “it was always clearly stated that this situation would develop. [Truman] has reminded you of that fact”; and fourth, “that this event makes no change in our policy.”⁷⁶ Officials drafted responses to twenty questions they predicted reporters would ask, including:

1. Does this mean that the Russians have the bomb? [We know there was an atomic explosion. That is all we can say.]
7. Did the Russians steal the atomic secrets or did they work them out? [There is no reason to believe that this development is the result of anything that was stolen or copied from us. Nearly four years ago the President pointed out that ‘Scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based is already widely known’...]
8. Will this cause any change in our policy toward the international control of atomic energy? [None at all....]
12. In what way has this development been taken into account in our basic policy? [As stated in the President’s announcement, we have always known that efforts would be made to develop this weapon, and it has been no secret that such efforts were in progress in the Soviet Union...]⁷⁷

Acting Secretary Webb followed these guidelines at a Department of State Press and Radio News Conference held five days after the president’s speech. Bombarded by questions about the timing of the announcement and whether or not the U.S. had been blindsided by the Soviets’ unanticipated early technical developments, Webb continued to maintain that everything had been as anticipated: “our policies had taken into account the fact that they would eventually be able to make atomic weapons....this particular knowledge was included in the present range of our policies and had been taken into account in their formulation.” Frustrated by the press’s continued pushing him on the subject, Webb snapped, “don’t you think this is implicit in what he said?”⁷⁸

Truman’s speech and the follow up public relations campaign showed the calming efforts underway, in the form not of emotional ramping, as had been previously done, but its opposite, emotional tamping. The administration attempted to do this using two

⁷⁶ Dean Acheson, “Secretary Acheson’s Press Conference, United Nations, September 23, 1949.” Dean G. Acheson Papers, Box 72, July-December, 1949, HSTPL.

⁷⁷ Press briefing, undated, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF, Box 176, Atomic Energy: Russia, HSTPL.

⁷⁸ James Webb, “Department of State Press and Radio News Conference, Wednesday, September 28, 1949.” Dean G. Acheson Papers, Box 72, July-December, 1949, HSTPL.

strategies: 1) emphasizing the routine, expected nature of events, so that the event would be seen not as a “shock” and 2) providing information as the basis from the which the public could begin to reason. To combat the changed structure of feeling, the administration turned to logic and ideas.

As was detailed in Chapter 1, however, this strategy was doomed to fail. In failing to recognize the extent to which the public held emotional beliefs, rather than clinically-produced cognitive ones, the administration did not address properly what was so shocking about Joe-1 – its ideo-affective content, not its artificially purely-ideational content. As Mercer reminds us, “providing information that neglects the source of one’s concern is unlikely to address the problem and is likely to only reinforce initial beliefs.”⁷⁹ It did not matter that the administration had previously predicted this outcome, and informed the public of that fact: people still interpreted the event through their own ideo-affective lenses, shaped by and reflecting the dominant structure of feeling. The administration’s inability to tamp down public emotion shows the ineffectiveness of attempting to combat heightened emotions with logic-based discourse.

Looking at the public response to the administration’s official response is illuminating. As historian of science Peter Galison writes, despite the advance anticipation, “American policy experts, politicians, military officers, and atomic scientists reacted with an alarm bordering on panic.”⁸⁰ This alarm, I argue, was born not only of the event itself, but also of what was perceived to be a lack of shock and alarm from the Truman administration. Essentially, the record of public responses show that many rejected the administration’s explanations on the grounds that their affective tone was sorely misguided. In other words, because the emotional state of administrative discourse did not match the emotional state of public opinion, the public remained unswayed in their thinking.

⁷⁹ Mercer, “Emotional Beliefs,” 20.

⁸⁰ Peter Galison, “War against the Center,” *Grey Room*, no. 4 (2001): 14.

Attempts to reason with the public without recourse to their fears did not match the now-dominant structure of feeling, one partially of the administration's own making.

Media coverage of Joe-1 and the administration's reaction to Joe-1 show the extent of the disjunction between the administration's affective tone and the public structure of feeling. As one newspaper put it, "the event had been expected for quite a while, but yet – ."⁸¹ There had been anticipation of the event, but that alone did not mean that the event was not seen as shocking to contemporary observers. Writing in *America* magazine, M. Amrine and E.A. Conway spoke not only of the fear they felt at the prospect of an atomic Soviet Union, but also a sense of betrayal by the lack of seriousness with which some elites seemed to treat this cataclysmic event. Their piece is worth quoting at length:

We were...shocked when a man as respected for his perception as Dwight D. Eisenhower...said flatly: 'I see no reason why a development that was anticipated years ago should cause any revolutionary change in our thinking or in our actions.' If there is *not* such a change, the land we love may not live through the next decade. We were shocked even more by the statement, obviously carefully considered, of a man most qualified to comment, a man whose understanding of human relations we have always admired – David E. Lilienthal....Mr. Lilienthal said he felt now precisely as he had before he knew Russia had the bomb....The atom bomb is no longer a mysterious something we dropped on the other side of the world, killing some thousands of unknown Japanese. Today your life is involved in the truth or falsity of statements like Lilienthal's.⁸²

The administration, in attempting to mollify public fears, showed that it could not be trusted. Other papers could barely believe that the U.S. government had willingly revealed to the world that it knew about the Soviet bomb – after all, "disclosure might give away the workings of the U.S. atomic detection network."⁸³ How could the president not understand the gravity of the situation?

Letters sent directly to President Truman similarly focused on his being out of touch and underestimating the nature of the Soviet threat. A man from Oakland demanded to know why, "Now we know that the Russians have an A-Bomb...we [are] going to abide

⁸¹ Gordin, *Red Cloud at Dawn*, 245.

⁸² M. Amrine and E.A. Conway, "The Price of Our Survival," *America*, October 8, 1949, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box OF 692a – 1687, Reaction to Russian Bomb, HSTPL.

⁸³ *Time* Magazine qtd. in Gordin, *Red Cloud at Dawn*, 224.

by the customary ethics of warfare, stand around and twiddle our thumbs until they throw another 'Pearl Harbor' on us, leveling some of our great cities to the ground and slaughtering hundreds of thousands of our people at one snap of a finger." He closed his letter by demanding that we "BLAST THEM BEFORE THEY BLAST US,' do a good job of it too."⁸⁴ Other letters followed up on the theme of demanding a preemptive strike on the Soviet Union – "We have reached the end of our waiting period. Let us declare war immediately before it is too late"; "If we wait for our enemies to strike first we will all of us be dead or slaves. If we are ready and strike first we can still be free men" – or merely of expressing the alarm that people felt was being inadequately expressed by the administration – "I would suggest that all officials begin to make arrangements to be scattered in groups, in smaller cities"; "No Pearl Harbor; Alert Nation."⁸⁵

The president and his official compatriots had shown themselves to be out of sync with the public structure of feeling, rendering them less persuasive and less trustworthy. Several senators picked up on this, with Vandenberg warning that the event meant that "this is now a different world."⁸⁶ Truman and his administration had attempted to calm the public through a tamping campaign counterpoised to the ramping one they had attempted before. But this time, their reason-based calmness campaign proved no match for a climate of fear.

4.2 *Explanation and calm in the fall of China*

As discussed above, the "fall" of China – the loss of control of the government by the Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek to the Communist Mao Zedong – was expected to occur sooner rather than later. After passing the China Aid Bill, the U.S. had to watch as the

⁸⁴ Scott A. Fuller, Letter to Harry S. Truman, November 4, 1949, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box OF 692a – 1687, Reaction to Russian Bomb, HSTPL.

⁸⁵ Letters from Mr. Arena of Miami, September 24, 1949; J. Allison of Odessa, TX, September 23; F.E. McDonald of Wichita Falls, TX, September 26; Victoria F. Perna, Stamford CT, September 23; Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, Box OF 692a – 1687, Reaction to Russian Bomb, HSTPL.

⁸⁶ Vandenberg qtd. in Gordin, *Red Cloud at Dawn*, 245.

KMT suffered major military defeats in Tsinan, Manchuria, Huai-Hai, and Beijing. Secretary Marshall, among others, knew that the war was a lost cause and began cutting back on any form of diplomatic support, forbidding “overt United States opposition to Chinese government compromise with the Chinese Communists or even secretly expressed opposition, which would become known.”⁸⁷ A few months after the CCP had captured Nanjing and Shanghai, Mao declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949. In December, Chiang and the remnants of the Nationalist government fled the Chinese mainland for Formosa (Taiwan), setting up an alternative government in exile.

Unlike the detonation of the Soviets’ first atomic bomb, the fall of China did not happen in one fell swoop. This meant that the administration’s response was more extended and proactive than had been their response to Joe-1. Yet it too followed a consistent theme of emphasizing the expected. In this case – perhaps since diplomatic processes were not considered to be nearly as valuable as atomic secrets – this took the form of continued public explanation and appeals to rationality.

The first major step in discussing the China situation with the public was the issuance of the “China White Paper.” Early in 1949, John Melby, a foreign service officer in China, and John Davies of the State Department Policy Planning Committee drafted a “Mr. X article on China,” a piece aimed at a public audience that was designed to achieve the same policy clarification goals as George Kennan’s earlier *Foreign Affairs* piece. However, upon deciding that the situation was too complex for one article, they settled on the idea of a governmental white paper that could explain why the government was operating in the manner that it was toward China. In February 1949, Truman ordered Melby, among others, to follow a similar explanatory approach that he would take several months later with his issuance of a statement on Joe-1. He should write a governmental

⁸⁷ Tsou, *America’s Failure in China 1941-50*, 482–84, 487.

White Paper on the history and conduct of U.S.-China policy, consisting of all of the vital parts of the documentary record. As Truman said, “write the record and write it straight, no matter who is hurt; tell the truth. That’s the best way to set the American public straight on this thing.”⁸⁸ Melby later commented that “the hope was that in presenting the whole complex record, the looming domestic disaster could be averted and discussion about China elevated once again to the level of reason.”⁸⁹ The administration would present the public with the original documents, stating its case for why it had made the decisions that it had.

The group of authors set out collecting all documents relevant to the history of United States involvement in China, then choosing selections from over one hundred thousand possible candidates.⁹⁰ The final book, released to the public at \$3 a copy, reached over 1,000 pages and included summaries of historical policies, important speeches and statements, chronologies of the Chinese Civil War, the reports of missions by people like Patrick Hurley and George Marshall, and descriptions of military and economic policies. In offering documentary accounts of the KMT’s failures alongside the Americans’ abortive efforts to encourage dialogue between the warring factions, the book was meant to pave the way for the public to adjust to the impending victory of the Communists over the Nationalists.

Published in August 1949, the book, formally titled *United States Relations with China*, was prefaced by a “Letter of Transmittal,” signed by Acheson.⁹¹ The fifteen-page letter explained the purpose of the book: “to present a record which would reveal the salient facts which determined our policy toward China during this period and which reflect the execution of that policy.” In keeping with the goal of a straight reckoning with the public

⁸⁸ John Melby, Oral History Interview, 168, HSTPL.

⁸⁹ John Melby, “The Making of a White Paper,” 4, John F. Melby Papers, Box 32, Melby Article – “The Making of a White Paper.” HSTPL.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Melby later commented that that letter “was one of those products of a committee....Acheson had signed it thinking it didn’t make any difference.” John Melby, Oral History Interview, 167-168.

for the purpose of invoking reasoned responses, Acheson promised that the pages to follow his introduction would prove to be

a frank record of an extremely complicated and most unhappy period....No available item has been omitted because it contains statements critical of our policy or might be the basis of future criticism. The inherent strength of our system is the responsiveness of the Government to an informed and critical public opinion. It is precisely this informed and critical public opinion which totalitarian governments, whether Rightist or Communist, cannot endure and do not tolerate.⁹²

In addition to appealing to rationality, this letter attempted to invoke a reaction from its readers by, as in the case of the Truman Offensive, depicting a duality – totalitarian governments vs. an America that invites critique – that offered a secure identity to those on the American side of the binary. The rest of the letter went on to briefly describe the history of U.S.-China relations and the long precedence of the American policy of “noninterference in its internal affairs and support of its unity and territorial integrity.”⁹³ Acheson then walked readers through the events of the previous five years, offering a summary of the thousand pages ahead. He hammered home the point that “the reasons for the failures of the Chinese National Government” were because the KMT was corrupt and incapable of governing. “The Nationalist armies did not have to be defeated; they disintegrated.” This meant that “the only alternative open to the United States was full-scale intervention on behalf of a Government which had lost control of its troops and its own people,” which was simply too high a price for the U.S. to bear. This remained true even while “fully recognizing that the heads of the Chinese Communist Party were ideologically affiliated with Moscow.” With this heavy dose of reality, Acheson wrote, “the unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States.”⁹⁴

In analyzing the affective content of this letter, we can see the ambiguous nature of the discursive approach. As Truman intended, and as was explicitly stated in Acheson’s

⁹² United States Department of State, *United States Relations with China*, iii.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, vi.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, xiv–xv.

introductory letter, the book deliberately was focused on laying out the “facts” of the situation. The administration took this approach in order to evoke public emotions of calm and confidence; were the public to truly understand the situation, the officials reasoned, then they would clearly draw the appropriate conclusion that everything was under control. However, despite the different intentions, there remained some similarities to the Truman Doctrine, even reverberations from it. As pointed out above, Acheson depicted a duality between totalitarian regimes and America, reifying the reality of the danger of totalitarian regimes even as he tried to justify not becoming involved in stopping one such regime’s ascent to power. Similarly, while the very evocation of the word “communist” in the “Chinese Communist Party” would be enough to scare many (a fear enhanced by the Truman Doctrine itself), Acheson made his words even more anxiety-provoking by drawing an explicit connection between the Chinese Communist Party and Moscow, first in his description cited above where he stated that connection as fact, and second, in his closing argument of the letter, where he warned that the CCP’s collaboration with the Soviet Union would be grounds for invoking American and U.N. action. While this was clearly intended as reassurance to a jittery people, the words themselves brought up a possibility that was among many Americans’ worst fears.

In the public eye, the tension between efforts at calm alongside threatening references that hearkened back to the Truman Offensive was resolved, like the case of Joe-1, in favor of fear and distrust. Truman and Acheson had high hopes for the publication of the White Paper, which, in the words of Truman, was “one of our most important actions for some time to come.”⁹⁵ However, public reaction to the book ending up “creating more heat than light.”⁹⁶ At best, the media coverage was mixed, though, as the State Department summarized, “a barrage of heavy criticism [was] leveled at the Dept.’s White Paper by a

⁹⁵ Truman qtd. in Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 96.

⁹⁶ Christensen borrows this phrase from Gaddis’ *Strategies of Containment*.

number of varied sources.”⁹⁷ While some pro-administration observers hoped that the “bleakly persuasive argument” would halt a “suicidal campaign” that encouraged intervention, many papers instead denounced the book as a “whitewash.” Many of the critiques focused on what documents had been omitted, which, the *New York Times* remarked, made “the reader wary rather than sympathetic.”⁹⁸ Given that the stated purpose of the publication was to provide a frank and honest portrayal of China policy, to “let the chips fall where they may,” disclosures as to what had been omitted from the publication gained damning strength.⁹⁹

The fear of communism loomed large, as columnist Edgar Mowrer mused that “the U.S., in the Far East, paid Russia’s price at China’s expense” and *The World Herald* commented that Acheson’s closing warning to the CPP was little more than “hitting them with a pillow.”¹⁰⁰ The *Washington Post* wistfully labeled the book a “praiseworthy aid to public knowledge,” but capped off that faint praise when they called “Don Quixote,” the hapless tilter at windmills, “the hero of the White Paper.”¹⁰¹ The public would prove even less sympathetic: by mid-August, only 26% of those who had heard about the publication approved of it, with 53% disapproving.¹⁰²

The White Paper did not fare any better in Congress. As the Department of State summarized in bureaucratic language designed to cushion the blow, “congressional comments on the White Paper have been both favorable and unfavorable; however, the unfavorable comments have been more numerous and have come from both Republicans and Democrats.”¹⁰³ Vandenberg, the Republican often-ally of the administration, dismissed

⁹⁷ Untitled, August 9, 1949, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 59, Foreign Relations – China, HSTPL.

⁹⁸ Department of State, “Daily Summary of Opinion Developments,” August 8, 1949, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 59, Foreign Relations – China, HSTPL.

⁹⁹ See, for example, Arthur Krock, “Some Omissions from the White Paper,” August 11, 1949, *The New York Times*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 59, Foreign Relations – China, HSTPL.

¹⁰⁰ Untitled, August 9, 1949, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 59, Foreign Relations – China, HSTPL.

¹⁰¹ “Acheson and Judd,” August 29, 1949, *The Washington Post*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 59, Foreign Relations – China, HSTPL.

¹⁰² Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 97.

¹⁰³ Department of State, “Daily Summary of Opinion Developments.”

the document immediately, claiming it did not “even ask, much less does it answer, the crucial questions.”¹⁰⁴ Senator Dulles summed up the opinions of many of the unfavorable crowd when he characterized the White Paper as “an attempt to explain and excuse past failures.”¹⁰⁵ Congressman Walter H. Judd offered one of the most stinging critiques, chastising the administration for preferring a communist regime to the Nationalist leader Chiang. “How much better it was to be an *enemy* of the US,” he wrote, “rather than a *friend*.”¹⁰⁶ Judd’s comments and accusations of 16 counts of omission/distortion in the publication drew so much attention that Acheson had to issue a statement addressing each and every one of them.¹⁰⁷ Rather than providing the grounds for reasonable reevaluation, the White Paper’s revelations had ignited the pro-Chiang China Lobby, allowing them to link the case of China more definitively to the global struggle against communism and to place the blame for CCP victory squarely on the Truman administration. The administration had “believed [the White Paper] would call off the dogs,” as Melby later recalled, “but of course it did nothing of the kind.”¹⁰⁸ The administration’s calm and portrayed sense of confidence proved alienating to people who saw the situation as threatening, because they were interpreting it through the ideo-affective lens of the dominant public structure of feeling.

Even as the administration attempted to face down the storm of controversy surrounding the White Paper, events continued to transpire in China. Chiang’s regime was in its death throes, and by the end of the year, it had officially lost all power. The Truman administration’s handling of the situation and its communication strategy to the public mimicked that attempted in the case of Joe-1, and followed on from the White Paper: the

¹⁰⁴ Vandenberg qtd. in Tsou, *America’s Failure in China 1941-50*, 510.

¹⁰⁵ Department of State, “Daily Summary of Opinion Developments.”

¹⁰⁶ Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford University Press, 1990), 5.

¹⁰⁷ Dean Acheson, “Analysis of Sixteen Charges of ‘Dishonesty’ in the White Paper,” *Department of State Bulletin*, September 5, 1949, pg 351-352, 359. George M. Elsey Papers, Box 59, Foreign Relations – China, HSTPL.

¹⁰⁸ John Melby, Oral History Interview, 168.

administration decided to show that what others claimed to be shocking was not in fact a shock at all. Just as with Joe-1 and the White Paper, however, this strategy of explanation and reassurance based on precedence failed to capture the attention and assent of either the public or the political class. The public was won over instead by a group using the very affective tactics that the administration had deployed in the case of the Truman Offensive – and even tying the China case directly to the fears and situation the administration had described two years prior.

Despite internal debates raging over whether or not to recognize the new People's Republic of China as the legitimate government and what to do about Formosa, Truman did not make another public statement about China until January 1950.¹⁰⁹ At a news conference on January 5, he announced the continuation of a policy of disengagement towards China, and assured the assembled press that “The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa, or on any other Chinese territory....The United States government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.”¹¹⁰ The administration would stand firm, on both the substance of the policy – nonintervention – and style – reassuring openness and explanation.

Neither the substance nor the style of the policies would prove reassuring to the American people. The question, “who lost China?” would become a staple of American politics. Joseph McCarthy, in his quest to rid the State Department of subversives, began connecting communist infiltration to the success of the CCP, accusing China hands like Owen Lattimore of espionage. This inextricably linked the fall of Chiang's KMT to the failures of the Truman administration, making the “loss” of China seem even more scandalous.¹¹¹ In this account, China had fallen because, in the words of McCarthy, “Stalin

¹⁰⁹ He was asked about it in several news conferences, but just gave general answers. Truman did not mention China at all in his January 1950 State of the Union address.

¹¹⁰ Harry S. Truman, “The President's News Conference,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, January 5, 1950, Online.

¹¹¹ Tsou, *America's Failure in China 1941-50*, 540–46.

had help from inside our ranks.”¹¹² The problem was more serious than had been previously understood, and the administration was guilty of a cover up:

It was not Chinese democracy under Mao that conquered China, as Acheson, Lattimore, Jessup, and Hansen contend. Soviet Russia conquered China and an important ally of the conquerors was this small left-wing element in our Department of State.¹¹³

The administration’s campaign of fear and shock minimization had backfired. With the Soviet Union’s explosion of an atomic bomb, it had been because they were not seen to be fully understanding the implications of the matter. With the China matter, while dissent started that way, it quickly morphed into something more sinister and accusatory, as McCarthy began to spread the idea that the loss of China had occurred due to duplicity. In both cases, however, the administration failed in its tamping campaigns because its “just the facts” approach felt suspicious to a public steeped in the anxious and fearful structure of feeling that the administration had itself helped to create.

5 Alternative explanations and counterfactuals

As the above demonstrates, by 1949 the Truman administration evinced a clear desire to tamp down the emotions that they had deliberately evoked in 1947. Through discursive tactics designed around calm, explanation, and expectedness, Truman attempted to assure a worried public that the Soviet development of an atomic weapon and the CCP victory in China had been anticipated and planned for. Yet, these events became known as the “shocks of 1949,” and, in the above words of Eric Goldman, “a turning point.” These events were not inherently shocking in themselves, but were made to be shocking because of the ideo-affective mismatch between the administration’s attempted tamping and the fearful and anxious public structure of feeling, a mismatch that was deliberately emphasized and heightened by political opposition. Truman failed to persuade the public

¹¹² Ibid., 544.

¹¹³ Ibid.

not only because of what he said, but also because of the way he said it. He tried to match affect with reason, falling into a false understanding of a dichotomy between the two and neglecting to take into account the ideo-affective interpretation of his presentation of “just the facts.” Understood this way, the period following the Truman Offensive through 1949 becomes an important part of the process that links the emotional ramping campaign of 1947 with the events, discussed in the next chapter, of 1950.

It is this process which shows the inadequacy of purely discourse-based constructivisms in explaining the beginning of the Cold War. The administration carefully constructed the events so that they fit into a discourse of expectation and calm. However, the public almost immediately rejected this discourse in favor of a more affectively laden one – that the Soviet Union was ascendant and could be out for blood. An ideo-affective explanation explains why the latter discourse became more salient, providing a clear theory of affective resonance. The tamping discourses surrounding Joe-1 and the CCP victory had both the Aristotelian *ethos*, (the rhetorical authority of the executive branch), and *logos*, (logically consistent internal reasoning). But they failed to persuade because of the inadequacy of *pathos*.¹¹⁴

6 “A critical need for action”

In the face of both the CCP victory and the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb, the Truman administration attempted to introduce an atmosphere of calm at the news of two potentially unpleasant events. However, in doing so via recourse to reason-based explanation, they failed to appeal to the emotional needs of a people steeped in a previously constituted structure of feeling. Consequently, this only made the situation

¹¹⁴ Looking specifically at Ronald Krebs’ work, as his is the most recent discursive study of the beginning of the Cold War, he predicts that new narratives will win out when they are able to destabilize hegemonic ones, especially in times of military victory. He is unable, however, to account for the ascendancy of one instantiation of a structurally similar narrative over another, especially in the face of what is construed as a military defeat. Only by adding in affect can we begin to understand why the public reacted the way that it did to the administration’s calming efforts. Krebs, “How Dominant Narratives Rise and Fall”; Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security*.

worse. The Truman administration had set into motion a constitutive cycle that they had not intended, beginning with the Truman Offensive in 1947 and bolstered by the emotional dynamics of spillover and issue-linkage in the months and years following, leading to a form of entrapment. No longer were emotions enabling the administration to do what it wished; instead, emotions constrained and limited them, showing the effects of ramping and the limits of tamping.

It is worth revisiting for a moment Stuart Symington's above letter in which he stated that the general consensus of the government when approaching the Soviet Union's detonation of a nuclear weapon was to play it straight so as not to create a "snowball of fear." His letter continued from there in a slightly different vein. After acknowledging that everyone agreed to base government policy on "sober reflection rather than reaction to a single dramatic event," Symington issued a warning: "There may be equal danger, however, that we may become inured to crisis and assume a 'business as usual' course of inaction when there is a critical need for action." There should be "all reasonable effort [made] to avoid exaggeration or over-statement," but in the end, "we must conclude that the question of the survival of the United States may be involved."¹¹⁵

In the next chapter, I turn to this phenomenon outlined in the second half of Symington's letter. When attempted tamping through reasoned reaction proved ineffective in the face of a ramped up structure of feeling, the administration decided that it needed to change its approach. I turn now to analysis of America in 1950, and investigate the third part of the ideo-affective process: revamping.

¹¹⁵ Stuart Symington, "Memorandum to Secretary Johnson," November 8 1949.

Chapter 4: Revamping, NSC-68, and the Onset of the Korean War

1 Introduction

On June 25, 1950, fighting broke out at the 38th parallel on the Ongjin Peninsula in Korea.¹ U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio telegraphed the Secretary of State, informing him that “North Korean forces invaded ROK [Republic of Korea] territory at several points this morning....It would appear from the nature of attack and manner in which it was launched that it constitutes all out offensive against ROK.”² The news out of Korea was grim. The Joint Chiefs contended that the South Korean capital, Seoul, would likely fall within 24 hours, and MacArthur warned the president that “a complete collapse is possible.”³ Seoul fell within days, and the ROK army relocated southward, fleeing the incoming communist troops. By the end of June, 50% of the Southern army became casualties of war, as did 70% of their weapons.⁴

Prior to the events of June 1950, the Korean peninsula had been low on the list of American priorities. Troops stationed there after World War II had been removed a year earlier, as resources were deemed to be more necessary elsewhere. Were another world war to break out, or some other global conflict with the Soviet Union to materialize, “the Joint Chiefs of Staff planned to abandon Korea.”⁵ Korea was simply not as important as Europe.

But on June 26, 1950, that changed. There was general, immediate agreement among the top members of the Truman administration, including the president himself:

¹ Who precisely started the fighting is still unclear. The North Koreans have always claimed that the South Koreans were the original aggressors, and vice versa. However, as historian Bruce Cumings writes, “Whether 17th Regiment [of the ROK] soldiers may have occupied Haeju on June 25, or even initiated the fighting on Ongjin, is still inconclusive, with the existing evidence pointing both ways. There is no evidence, however, to back up the North’s claim that the South launched a general invasion; at worst there may have been a small assault across the parallel, as happened many times in 1949. Whatever transpired, the North met it with a full invasion.” Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History* (New York: Modern Library, 2010), 10.

² John J. Muccio, Telegram to Secretary of State, June 25, 1950, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF, Box 197, Korea and the Korean War, HSTPL.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Events in Korea,” June 26, 1950, and White House Files, “Teleconference with MacArthur,” June 26, 1950, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 71, Korea–June 26, 1950, HSTPL.

⁴ Cumings, *The Korean War*, 11.

⁵ Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” 572.

the United States would have to get involved. When Truman addressed the nation on July 19, he explained why the U.S. had entered the Korean conflict, alongside U.N. forces: “This attack has made it clear, beyond all doubt, that the international Communist movement is willing to use armed invasion to conquer independent nations.” The United States was prepared to fight, for the North Korean invasion was merely the first front in the struggle against the Soviet-backed forces of international communism. The U.S., Truman declared, was “united in detesting Communist slavery.”⁶ This language was not that of the China White Paper or the careful explanation of the Soviet Union’s procurement of an atomic weapon. It most closely mirrored that used during the Truman Offensive. Nor was the decision to commit U.S. troops to an indefinite all-out war similar in any way to the decision made in the face of the Chinese Civil War. The about-face on policy shocked observers: as General MacArthur remarked when he heard the news of U.S. intervention, “I don’t believe it. I don’t understand.”⁷

While historians continue to battle over the exact moment in which the Cold War started, virtually all agree that the conflict was underway by the beginning of the Korean War.⁸ As Robert Jervis wrote in 1980, “the Korean War shaped the course of the cold war by both resolving the incoherence which characterized U.S. foreign and defense efforts in the period 1946-1950 and establishing important new lines of policy.”⁹ The Korean War remade the U.S. defense budget, raising it to levels previously unimagined in a nation obsessed with economizing to curb inflation. It inaugurated a range of civil defense programs, education campaigns, and other domestic programs that brought the Cold War

⁶ Truman, “Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Korea, July 19, 1950.”

⁷ Alan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North* (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2010), 118.

⁸ The only slight exception to this characterization is Ronald Krebs, who argues that the Cold War consensus did not coalesce until 1953, with the death of Stalin and the stalemate of the Korean War. However, he does not argue that the conflict itself was not underway until that point, just that the mainstream understanding of the centrality of superpower competition in global affairs and notions of Communism as monolithic and aggressive had coalesced in newspaper editorials by that point. See Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of U.S. National Security*, chap. 6.

⁹ Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” 563.

to Main Street (and the newly crafted bunkers beneath it). The Korean War was a true “turning point...much beloved by historians.”¹⁰

This thesis argues that the ramping efforts of the Truman Offensive began an ideo-affective shift that allowed for the large-scale public and elite mobilization that constituted the Cold War. To do so, it sees the Korean War as a turning point, though not in the manner of Jervis or Gaddis. Rather, I argue that the onset of the Korean War and the decision-making that led to U.S. intervention was a turning point in that it was the fulfillment – and an unintended one at that – of the ideo-affective shift begun in 1947. The Truman administration had strategically ramped up emotions in the Truman Offensive as a tool of persuasion, and by 1949, those tools had come to be used against them, preventing the success of a tamping campaign. In 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea, Truman and his advisors succumbed to the very ideo-affective forces that they had once sought to control, revamping their own ideo-affective approach in a case of affective blowback. When this last step occurred, there was a general synchronization between the public structure of feeling and the policymaking elites, allowing for the mass mobilization that laid the foundations for an all-out Cold War.

In this chapter, I argue that the Truman administration, following their alterations to the public structure of feeling, revamped its ideo-affective approach to their own foreign policy. While the previous chapter detailed the changed conditions of possibility both initiated by and foisted upon the Truman administration, this chapter focuses on how the original agents exercised their agency in response to those changed conditions. Here I describe the third step in the process of ideo-affective constitution, following on from ramping and tamping: revamping. In this third step, we observe the mutually constitutive effects of ideo-affective structures rebounding back upon the originating agents, reconstituting and reshaping them.

¹⁰ Gaddis, “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?,” 402.

In this chapter, then, I am attempting to make two arguments. First, I argue that, realizing the lack of success in public persuasion that came through tamping, the administration reverted back to ramping up emotions, a tactic that had served them well in 1947. And second, I argue that while there were certainly strategic decisions behind this calculus, there was also a genuine reconstitution of the decision-makers' beliefs and judgments, spurred on by the changed structure of feeling. In making these arguments, I begin with the codification of official strategy in NSC-68 and continue by looking at that strategic (and, more significant, ideo-affective) enactment in June 1950.

Before proceeding to the analysis of NSC-68 and the American entry into the Korean conflict, it is worth pausing for a moment to revisit the notion of levels of analysis. As discussed in Chapter 1, the notion of ideo-affective politics requires analysis of both individual policymakers and the social milieu in which they are embedded. Because the theory is situated within the structures by which policies are made and enacted, attention must be paid to the actual process of policy production. Consequently, in this chapter, I analyze more fully particular individuals who were responsible for the actual decisions to bring the United States into Korea. This analysis of Truman and his advisors ought to be seen in service of the larger analysis and argument. Truman alone was not responsible for the Cold War ideo-affective shift that I identify. The story that I tell is one about how the United States came to be mobilized for an all-out conflict, not how Truman evolved in his beliefs so that he might single-handedly start the Cold War. By understanding the Cold War as beginning through a harmonization of popular and elite emotions and understandings, both the popular and elite levels are crucial to making my argument.

2 NSC-68

In this section, I analyze the production and content of the seminal document NSC-68. Below, I show how it reflected a new ideo-affective approach, one more aligned

with an anxious and fearful structure of feeling than with its political antecedents of the Clifford-Elsey report or NSC-20/4. I also argue that this revamped approach displayed an awareness of the political successes and failings of the past three years, as it contains explicit theorization of the public and the best means by which to persuade it. The report advocates ramping up emotions – but doing so in such a way as to avoid going too far. NSC-68 was not approved by President Truman until after the Korean War was underway, but it helps to provide evidence of the newly revamped ideo-affective framework in which initial evidence out of Korea was interpreted and policies were designed.

2.1 *Background*

Until the end of January 1950, the United States had no formal document codifying their strategy of what had become known as containment. As John Lewis Gaddis details in his *Strategies of Containment*, the State Department’s Director of Policy Planning from 1947-1949, George Kennan, always resisted specifying what the policy implications ought to be of his notion of “containment.” Kennan feared that the inability “of men to define hypothetically in any useful way, by means of general and legal phraseology, future situations that no one could really imagine or envisage” would circumscribe necessary actions in unknown situations, committing to rigid bureaucratic practice doctrine that which ought to retain strategic fluidity.¹¹ By the end of 1949, however, after Kennan had resigned his post and the U.S. had been pummeled with the events detailed in the previous chapter, this lack of codification became seen as a strategic liability for the Truman administration.¹² On January 31, 1950, Truman ordered the State and Defense departments to produce “a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these

¹¹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 87.

¹² For good overviews of the history and origins of NSC-68, see Wells, “Sounding the Tocsin”; Ernest R. May, *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68* (Boston: St. Martin’s Press, 1993). The latter slim volume contains both eyewitness accounts and historical interpretations.

objectives on our strategic plans.”¹³ Since Kennan had resigned at the end of 1949, the committee responsible for the production of the document, called “NSC-68,” was headed by the new Director of Policy Planning, Paul Nitze.¹⁴ Tasked with creating this comprehensive study of U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union, Nitze’s interdepartmental committee of State and Defense Department officials set out to gather information and opinions from other government officials, synthesizing previous NSC documents into a coherent whole.¹⁵

Members of the NSC-68 Review Committee undertook their drafting duties with the same sense of alarm that was sweeping across other American populations. Two days into the writing process, Nitze informed the committee that he believed that the danger of war with the Soviets “seemed considerably greater than [it had seemed] last fall,” and asked committee member John Paton Davies Jr. to study in depth the likelihood of U.S.-Soviet armed conflict “in the immediate future.” Nitze had a bleak assessment of Soviet motives, arguing, “the USSR had already committed itself to the defeat of the United States.”¹⁶ Nitze was not the only developer of NSC-68 who feared for the future of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations: the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned of the possibility of the Soviets using an atomic bomb “against us in a new type of a Pearl Harbor attack of infinitely greater magnitude than that of 1941”; the CIA cautioned that by 1956-57, “an all-out Soviet atomic attack”

¹³ On the same day, Truman also announced “the intention of this Government to continue work to determine the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon.” Harry Truman letter to Dean Acheson, January 31, 1950, *FRUS* 1950, Vol. I, 141-142.

¹⁴ There is a longstanding branch of historiography that seeks to determine whether NSC-68 was an appropriate response or not to the Soviet threat, given the material realities and capabilities of the two parties. I sidestep this argument, for in looking at the sociolinguistic construction of the Soviet threat, I examine *why* the authors thought the document to be appropriate, not whether or not it was in actuality. For examples of historians who engage in this debate, see Paterson, who characterized NSC-68 as a “flawed, even amateurish document” or Newman, who calls it a “hallucination” of Nitze’s. Robert P. Newman, “NSC (National Insecurity) 68,” in Medhurst and Brands, *Critical Reflections on the Cold War*; Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan*.

¹⁵ While most historians view the production of NSC-68 as a genuine attempt to produce a strategy by which the United States might best combat the Soviet Union, some historians – like Curt Cardwell – see it as a part of a larger “postwar global systemic economic crisis know as the dollar gap of which the Soviet threat played but one aspect.” For more on this, see Curt Cardwell, “The Cold War,” in Costigliola and Hogan, *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941*, 109; Cardwell, *NSC 68 and the Political Economy of the Early Cold War*.

¹⁶ Nitze qtd. in Wells, “Sounding the Tocsin,” 125.

could threaten the American mainland; and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson argued that without a countervailing American “all-out program” for developing the hydrogen bomb, the U.S. national security could be fatally jeopardized.¹⁷ It was with this bleak outlook that the committee undertook their writing tasks.

2.2 *A text with two audiences*

Though traditionally understood as a document of strategic codification, NSC-68 was as much a document of persuasion. The authors of the report considered two audiences: the internal government officials who would need to approve the measures that NSC-68 advocated, and the wider public, who would need to empower their representatives to allow the proposed measures to be passed. NSC-68 would not itself be released to the public, but its ideas and policies would be. Within the government, there was a split between the Cold War hawks, like Acheson and Nitze, who believed that the United States needed to increase its commitment to fighting the Soviet Union, and “economizers,” including many congressmen, who argued for balanced budgets above all. In writing NSC-68, Nitze and his coworkers sought to convince the president that the only way to meet the looming Soviet threat was through a massive investment. As Acheson wrote in his memoirs, “the purpose of NSC-68 was to so bludgeon the mass mind of ‘top government’ that not only could the President make a decision but that the decision could be carried out.”¹⁸ That bludgeoning would involve the employment of affective strategies similar to the ramping tactics of the Truman Offensive, when he too sought to make his meaning “clearer than truth.”¹⁹

When it came to the public audience, the administration sought a bludgeon as well, but one carefully wielded. In the discussion surrounding the Truman Doctrine, officials

¹⁷ Ibid., 125–27.

¹⁸ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 374.

¹⁹ The specific discursive strategies undertaken to do this in NSC-68 will be discussed below.

had discussed “scaring the hell” out of the American public. In the approaches to informing the public of the fall of China and the explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb, the administration sought to do exactly the opposite. Now, with the writing of NSC-68, officials reverted back to the Truman Doctrine approach, but one tempered by the lessons they had learned over the past three years. Committee member Edward R. Barrett “fear[ed] that the U.S. public would rapidly tire” of the greatly increased resources required for the type of national security push required by the new strategy, and advocated embarking on a “psychological scare campaign” to ensure public approval.²⁰ Acheson’s later recollections of this period reveal a similar approach. In his memoirs, he wrote, “The task of a public officer seeking to explain or gain support for a major policy is not that of the writer of a doctoral thesis. Qualification must give way to simplicity of statement, nicety and nuance to bluntness, almost brutality, in carrying home the point.”²¹ Robert A. Lovett demanded that it was of strategic importance that the government “giv[e] the facts to the public” because, as he wrote in terms reminiscent of the Truman Doctrine:

We must realize that we are now in a mortal conflict; that we are now in a war worse than any we have ever experienced. Just because there is not much shooting as yet does not mean that we are in a cold war. It is not a cold war; it is a hot war. The only difference between this and previous wars is that death comes more slowly and in a different fashion.²²

Since the American people had been lulled into what Acheson dubbed “a false sense of security,” it was time to educate the public in order to, as Nitze wrote, “strengthen the moral fiber of the people.”²³ In the words of Stephen Casey, “when lumped together, these concerns about electoral cycles, congressional politics, and the inherent difficulty of generating mass support all pointed in one direction: an immediate and intensive education campaign aimed both at awakening the public to the gravity of the threat and convincing

²⁰ Barrett qtd. in Steven Casey, “Selling NSC-68: The Truman Administration, Public Opinion, and the Politics of Mobilization, 1950–51,” *Diplomatic History* 29, no. 4 (September 1, 2005): 655, 656.

²¹ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 374–75; Casey, “Selling NSC-68,” 656.

²² Lovett qtd. in Wells, “Sounding the Tocsin,” 129.

²³ Acheson and Nitze qtd. in Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 300.

everyone that the United States had a constructive approach to deal with this dangerous new world.”²⁴ In doing so, it would be necessary to “whip up sentiment.”²⁵ While in 1949, the administration had sought to meet emotional upheaval through tamping efforts of reason devoid of emotional content (which, of course, can never truly be achieved), in 1950, the administration sought to meet it through a re-cultivation of affect in a direction that would be helpful to them.

But while many scholars have imbued the rhetoric and selling of NSC-68 with the exact same affective criteria as that surrounding the Truman Doctrine and accompanying Truman Offensive, there remained an interesting difference, at least in intent.²⁶ In the materials surrounding the drafting and debates over selling NSC-68, one can see a renewed sense of caution in over-affecting the public. The public was seen to be wildly bipolar, swinging from one mood to another, with the line between motivation and outright panic a very thin one indeed. In his seminal 1950 study of public opinion, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, Gabriel Almond warned that the “superficiality and instability of public attitudes toward foreign affairs creates the danger of under- and overreaction to changes in the world political situation.”²⁷ The public had been unmotivated to provide necessary economic aid in the immediate postwar period, then clamored for unnecessary interventions in 1949. The drafters of NSC-68 would seek to walk the lines between too much and too little.²⁸

In the rest of this chapter, I argue that even as the administration sought to temper their rhetoric and affective approach, they would prove unable to do so, because of a) the

²⁴ Casey, “Selling NSC-68,” 660.

²⁵ “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Barrett) to the Secretary of State,” April 6, 1950, *FRUS* 1950, Vol. I, 225-226.

²⁶ Casey, “Selling NSC-68,” n. 4; Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 300–301; Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 125–27.

²⁷ Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, 86. Thomas Bailey’s popular 1948 *The Man in the Street* also cautioned that the public was “changeable and impulsive.” Thomas Bailey, *The Man in the Street: The Impact of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1.

²⁸ In the media coverage of prospects for atomic warfare, commentators noticed the wavering public attitudes as well, remarking on the oscillation between “atomic apathy and hydrogen hysteria.” Casey, “Selling NSC-68,” 663.

precedent that they themselves had set, beginning with the emotional ramping of 1947, and b) their own changed standards, as their priorities had been reconstituted and revamped throughout the past few years. Before turning to evidence of those changes as seen in the context of the decision-making surrounding the Korean War, I first analyze the text of NSC-68 to see how it approached its goals of persuasion.

2.3 *Tripartite analysis*

In what follows, I use the same tripartite analytical scheme that I employed in previous chapters to show that NSC-68 was a document deliberately laden with affect. Given that this is a piece of classified governmental doctrine, the categories have been slightly adapted to adjust for the fact that the actual words were not designed to be shared with the public, although they were designed to be shared with other officials.

2.3.1 Paratextual affect

As a written, classified government document, the paratextual sources of affect in NSC-68 were limited to the Aristotelian “*ethos*,” or character of the writers. In this case, it stemmed from the authority imbued in the National Security Council and the State and Defense Department officials involved with the production of the document.

2.3.2 Content affect

It is the content of NSC-68 that has received the most scholarly notice in subsequent academic literature. It is hard not to be struck by the document’s apocalyptic tone and ideas. The United States was presented as a nation being confronted with the ultimate existential threat: “budgetary considerations will need to be subordinated to the stark fact that our very independence as a nation may be at stake.”²⁹ On the ideas front, NSC-68 advocated a massive buildup of American defenses and military spending. The

²⁹ “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” [hereafter “NSC-68”], April 14, 1950, Ideological Foundations of the Cold War Research File, HSTPL. 56.

Soviet Union was characterized as a fearsome, expansionist enemy in possession of nuclear capabilities that would only increase in the coming years. They were seen to be investing a far higher proportion of their gross national product into military and defense-related industries than the United States was, portending an impending gap in what was now a tense geopolitical stalemate.³⁰ Current national security initiatives were inadequate, and what was needed was for “this trend [to] be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world.”³¹ This was absolutely vital, for “the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake.”³²

These notions were affectively laden in and of themselves: the Soviet Union was the much maligned national enemy of the United States, and the authors of the document were informing readers not only that the U.S.S.R. was more dangerous than previously anticipated, but also that the U.S. was less prepared to meet it than had been previously understood. The way that these ideas were presented in writing only heightened the affective power of the document. The piece was characterized by what Lovett referred to as “Hemingway sentences,” or short declarative sentences that cut right to the point.³³ Powerfully descriptive adjectives and adverbs abounded, from the introductory background section – which characterized the current period as one defined by “deepest peril” – throughout the body of the text – which warned that U.S. national security preparedness levels were “dangerously inadequate.”³⁴

Beyond “strong” language, the authors also employed a number of figures of speech that were similar to the ramping discourse of the Truman Offensive. One was the creation of a powerful binary between “us” (the United States) and “them” (the Soviet

³⁰ The U.S.S.R. allocated 13.8% of its gross available resources to defense, while the United States dedicated 6.5%. NSC-68, 25.

³¹ Ibid., 64.

³² Ibid., 65.

³³ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 301.

³⁴ NSC-68 4, 32.

Union).³⁵ In the very first section of the document (“I. Background of the Present Crisis”), Nitze and his co-authors set out this dichotomy: “the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own...” The contrast between those two “faiths” rendered the United States “the principal enemy [of the Soviet Union] whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.”³⁶ The authors hammered home the incompatibility of social and ideological systems between the two powers in Section II: “The Fundamental Purpose of the United States”; Section III: “The Fundamental Design of the Kremlin”; and Section IV: “The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of Ideas and Values Between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin Design.” “Freedom” was contrasted with “slavery”; “a government of laws” with “the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin”; “individual freedom” with “domination”; a “free and democratic system” with a “totalitarian dictatorship.”

The document also employed metaphors to add to the affective content. Just as with the Truman Doctrine, metaphors of health and bodily wellbeing abounded, portraying the Soviet Union as the source of disease and the U.S. as a corporeal being under threat. The Soviet Union “mortally challenged” the United States with a “virulent blend of hatred and fear”, and its actions constituted an “assault” on American institutions. Intriguingly, unlike with the Truman Doctrine, NSC-68 offered a counter to the previously employed metaphors of health and contagion that made the Soviet Union so dangerous: “The idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea of submission to authority.”³⁷ In contrast to this force, descriptions of the Soviet Union were dominated by metaphors of prisons and incarceration. The “iron curtain isolate[d] the Soviet peoples from the outside world”; “The Soviet monolith is held together by the iron

³⁵ For analysis of the creation of this binary in NSC-68 based on Foucaultian poststructural analysis, see Emily Rosenberg in May, *American Cold War Strategy*, 160–64.

³⁶ NSC-68, 6.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 14, 8.

curtain around it and the iron bars within it”; and “the concentration camp is the prototype of the society which these policies are designed to achieve.” One method of defeating this isolated society came through metaphors of growth and flourishing: there is “rot within its system” and, were the ideas of freedom to truly penetrate the prison walls, “the seeds of decay within the Soviet system would begin to flourish and fructify.”³⁸

A final content-based strategy was the figure of speech of omission. A reader will notice quickly what is not there: an estimate for what the implementation of NSC-68 would cost. Anticipating the inevitable opposition that would arise from Truman and other executive and congressional “economizers” focused on balanced budgets, Nitze and his co-authors deliberately decided to omit any specific budgetary requests. As Dean Acheson later commented, the lack of “any section discussing costs” was “not an oversight. To have attempted it would have made impossible all those concurrences [of other departments’ officials] and prevented any recommendation to the President.”³⁹ Internal estimates held that costs could top \$50 billion, and ultimately, there would be a 262% increase in defense appropriations.⁴⁰

2.3.3 Contextual affect

When it came to context factors, as scholars like Michael Hogan and Melvyn Leffler have argued, “NSC-68 recapitulated many of the arguments outlined in earlier NSC documents but gave them a greater sense of urgency and integrated them more fully into a national security ideology.”⁴¹ In this way, NSC-68 mimicked much of the affective power of the earlier Truman Doctrine: in both documents, ideas that had been previously discussed were codified in a unified framework, whose unification per se and the language surrounding that unification both served to increase the urgency of the situation. For the

³⁸ Ibid., 13, 15, 16.

³⁹ Acheson qtd. in May, *American Cold War Strategy*, 97.

⁴⁰ Casey, “Selling NSC-68,” 660; Steven Casey, *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3.

⁴¹ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 295; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 356.

Truman Doctrine, the overall framework was the establishing of competition between two ways of life, outlining what would come to be known as the Cold War; for NSC-68, the framework was one of establishing the national security state.⁴²

The nature of the contextual affective factors of NSC-68 stemmed not from the complete novelty of the ideas and recommendations it presented, but the urgency with which those ideas were presented.⁴³ NSC-68 was a radical departure from notions of containment as expressed by the concept's original architect, George Kennan. Whereas Kennan's containment of the "Long Telegram" and "X Article" emphasized a "strongpoint defense" committed to an asymmetrical meeting of Soviet challenges only at significant points crucial to American strategy, Nitze's work represented a "perimeter defense," whereby every Soviet threat at any point along a defined perimeter would have to be met.⁴⁴ In many works, Kennan is painted as a tragic figure, a 20th century Cassandra whose warnings against American excess and belligerence went unheeded.⁴⁵

Just as the Truman Doctrine drew some of its affective power from stating unequivocally from a seat of authority what had previously only been whispered in the wings, so too did NSC-68 seek to build upon ideas and documents that had been floating around the administration, borrowing from them and extending their impact. The Clifford-Elsey Report of 1946 had warned that the "fundamental tenet of that communist philosophy embraced by Soviet leaders is that peaceful coexistence of communist and

⁴² For more on this, see Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 291–312.

⁴³ Melvyn Leffler argued that NSC-68 was in fact not new at all, as "Nitze simply called for more, more, and more money to implement the programs and achieve the goals already set out." Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 356. While correct in acknowledging NSC-68's origins within other proposals and policies, Leffler's assertion of "more, more, and more" not being new sets aside the affective differences between the 1950 document and its precursors.

⁴⁴ Like Kennan, Charles Bohlen also eschewed the "universalism" with which policies were designed and presented, worrying that it would overcommit the United States to undesirable, over-expansive policies. Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?," 397–98; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 57.

⁴⁵ Robert P. Newman, for example, argues that NSC-68 would have looked drastically different if Kennan were still in charge of the Policy Planning Staff. Citing a memo dated February 17, 1950 – 11 days after Nitze's committee had begun work on NSC-68, and the day before Kennan left for a Latin American tour – Newman argues that this document and its "calm and unexciting" analysis of Soviet foreign policy shows "what NSC-68 would have looked like had Kennan rather than Nitze been in charge....Meanwhile, Nitze's committee was planning for Armageddon." Newman, "NSC (National Insecurity) 68," 64–65.

capitalist nations is impossible.”⁴⁶ The parallels between that document and NSC-68 are striking. Both were intended to set out a playbook for future American-Soviet relations.⁴⁷ Both acknowledged the division of the world – in Clifford-Elsey, an impending division; in NSC-68, a division already evident – into free, democratic, American and unfree, communist, Soviet spheres. Both urged the necessity of military strength to constrain the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union. Both stressed the need for intelligence procurement and non-military mobilization alongside traditional military solutions. In some ways, the two documents represent the “outset and conclusion of an intellectual journey”: the Clifford-Elsey report was the exploration of a conflict that felt likely, though not inevitable, while NSC-68 was a description of that conflict as it is seen to come to pass.⁴⁸

So too did NSC-20/4 contain aspects of what was detailed in NSC-68. That report, “Report by the National Security Council on U.S. Objectives With Respect to the U.S.S.R. To Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security,” had been approved by the President on November 24, 1948, and was quoted extensively in the “Conclusions” section of NSC-68. NSC-20/4 shared many of the same assumptions of its successor, including the expansionist nature of the Soviet Union and the notion that “the will and ability of the

⁴⁶ Clark Clifford, “American Relations With The Soviet Union” [“Clifford-Elsey Report”], September 24, Ideological Foundations of the Cold War Research File, HSTPL.

⁴⁷ In a later oral history interview, Elsey recalled that this was not Truman’s original desire in requesting that he and Clifford pen this report. In July 1946, “the President...talked with Clifford and said he was concerned at the fact that the Russians couldn’t be trusted and didn’t keep agreements that they had made, and he wanted a list of the agreements that the Russians had violated or broken.” Clifford discussed this request with Elsey, and together they decided that this “was entirely too narrow a question, that the President seemed to be basing too much of his attitude towards the Russians at that point, on this rather narrow point of whether they did or did not adhere to agreements. I thought the whole question of our relations with the Soviet Union at that point was a much more comprehensive, much broader, matter than this technicality of agreement breaking or agreement keeping, that there were far more fundamental issues involved, that the nature of these issues didn’t seem to be clearly understood in large parts of the executive branch (witness the fiasco of Henry Wallace).” Instead, the two men set about producing “a report on the totality, if you will, of U.S.-Soviet relations,” so that “it could be used judiciously by the President, giving copies to individuals in the executive branch or elsewhere, using it as a basis for discussion with people so that we wouldn’t have any more Henry Wallace kind of blowups.” Jerry N. Hess, “Oral History Interview with George M. Elsey,” April 9, 1970, Online, HSTPL, 263-264.

⁴⁸ Adam Quinn, *US Foreign Policy in Context: National Ideology from the Founders to the Bush Doctrine* (Routledge, 2009), 130.

leaders of the U.S.S.R. to pursue policies which threaten the security of the United States constitute the greatest single danger to the U.S. within the foreseeable future.”⁴⁹ Nitze later tried to minimize the novelty of NSC-68 by arguing that it did not “recommen[d] a sharp departure in U.S. policy. On the contrary, the report concluded by calling for the reaffirmation of what was already approved policy in NSC-20/4.”⁵⁰

And yet, while writing NSC-68, Nitze had claimed, “The programs...mark a new course, not a tack....They will result in a secular change in national existence. Every person in the country will feel their impact.”⁵¹ It was this notion of “secular change” that stemmed not from the mere collation of previously written documents, but their extension to novel areas. This was especially true of the ways that threats were defined in NSC-68. The authors wrote, “[s]ince everything that gives us or others respect for our institutions is a suitable object for attack, it also fits the Kremlin’s design that where, with impunity, we can be insulted and made to suffer indignity the opportunity shall not be missed.”⁵² In other words, threats were not just military or economic, as Kennan had contended, but *affective* as well – U.S. “respect” was a crucial source of power, and “insult” and “indignity” were powerful weapons of war. As Gaddis puts it, “changes in the balance of power could occur not only as a result of economic maneuvers or military action, but from intimidation, humiliation, or even loss of credibility.”⁵³ Emotions were powerful weapons, and Soviet affective resources must be combated.

Because of this, NSC-68 introduced a new bit of context as well: how to deal with the public. When it came to the treatment of the American public in the Clifford-Elsey report and NSC-68, the difference is one of absence and presence. In Clifford-Elsey, the

⁴⁹ NSC-20/4, “Report by the National Security Council on U.S. Objectives With Respect to the USSR To Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security,” November 23, 1948, *FRUS* 1950, Vol. I, 663-669.

⁵⁰ Nitze qtd. in Newman, “NSC (National Insecurity) 68,” 81.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² NSC-68, 46-47.

⁵³ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 90.

American people were mentioned twice, with the most significant reference coming on the very last page⁵⁴:

Only a well-informed public will support the stern policies which Soviet activities make imperative and which the United States Government must adopt. The American people should be fully informed about the difficulties getting along with the Soviet Union, and the record of Soviet evasion, misrepresentation, aggression, and militarism should be made public.⁵⁵

There was no explication of the ways in which the public was to be informed, nor anything else beyond the general idea that the American people must remain informed so as to be supportive of what will be burdensome policies aimed at countering the forces of the Soviet Union.

By the writing of NSC-68 three and a half years later, references to the necessity of bringing the public alongside the government had moved beyond lip service. For those writing in 1950, the idea that there must be “a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of present international trends” was one of several obviously necessary “prerequisites” for any successful program.⁵⁶ The authors of the report maintained that one of the strategic resources available to the American government was the “confidence” and “cohesive” nature of the American people. For these resources to be mobilized, however, required a dedicated effort on the part of the government. This effort required

firstly, that sufficient information regarding the basic political, economic, and military elements of the present situation be made publicly available so that an intelligent popular opinion may be formed. Having achieved a comprehension of the issues now confronting this Republic, it will then be possible for the American people and the American Government to arrive at a consensus. Out of this common view will develop a determination of the national will and a solid resolute expression of that will. The initiative in this process lies with the Government.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ The first reference is two sentences long with no accompanying explanation for how the goal is to be achieved: “The Soviet Government will never be easy to ‘get along with.’ The American people must accustom themselves to this thought, not as cause for despair, but as a fact to be faced objectively and courageously.” Clifford-Elsey Report, 72.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 78-79.

⁵⁶ NSC-68, 57.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

That an informed public will necessarily converge upon a unitary popular opinion – and one aligned with that of the government – was hardly a given, and required “the initiative” of “the Government.” This initiative was necessary because the “the democratic process necessarily operates in the open and at a deliberate tempo. Weaknesses in our situation are readily apparent and subject to immediate exploitation.” This meant, “dissent among us can become a vulnerability.” Intriguingly, the authors paused on the root causes of that dissent, dissent with which the executive branch of 1950 had become all too familiar: “Sometimes the dissent has its principal roots abroad in situations about which we can do nothing. Sometimes it arises largely out of certain weaknesses within ourselves, about which we can do something – our native impetuosity and a tendency to expect too much from people widely divergent from us.”⁵⁸ The report concluded with the following paragraph:

The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of the present international situation. The prosecution of the program will require of us all the ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity demanded by the vital importance of the issue and the tenacity to persevere until our national objectives have been attained.⁵⁹

Without the support of the American people – essential to allow the democratic ratification of policies that could potentially lead to economic hardship and a lowered quality of life – none of the rest of the ambitious program could ever even take place.

2.4 *An accomplishment and a way forward*

NSC-68 represented both the fulfillment of a revamped affective approach – Nitze’s committee had produced a document that employed different tactics in order to

⁵⁸ Ibid., 24.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 65.

enflame its government readership – and the outlining of a revamped affective rubric for future decision-making and public communication. While the document itself was a drastic departure from the internal approach that had been taken in the previous year, the question remained as to whether the government’s external approach would shift to match it. It was not clear that it would immediately: the President stalled on making a decision as to whether or not to formally approve NSC-68 by seeking consultations and further studies.⁶⁰ But the invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950 showed both that the ideo-affective approach evident within NSC-68 and the public affective approach advocated by the report would be abided. NSC-68 was the discursive outlining of a revamped ideo-affective approach; the beginning of the Korean War would be its practical expression.

3 The onset of the Korean War

3.1 Background

Truman and Stalin had agreed at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 to jointly occupy the Korean peninsula, with the Soviet Union controlling the northern half and the United States controlling the south. In the absence of a firm line of demarcation between south and north, Stalin’s troops pressed forward until a second agreement established the 38th parallel as the dividing line between U.S. and U.S.S.R. territories.⁶¹ The communist party, led by Kim Il Sung, controlled the northern territory, and the anti-communist Syngman Rhee ruled in the south.

While affairs on the Korean peninsula had occupied a significant amount of the Truman administration’s foreign policy agenda in the aftermath of World War II, within a few years it had begun to fade in urgency. As negotiations over the eventual reunification

⁶⁰ This reception would prove yet another striking difference between the Clifford-Elsey report and NSC-68. While Truman did not immediately approve NSC-68, waiting until the Korean War was underway to do so, he buried the Clifford-Elsey report, ordering all copies returned to him and locked away before anyone could read them. Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine*, 39–40.

⁶¹ Alex Roberto Hybel, “Harry Truman and the Decisions to Intervene in the Korean War and to Cross the 38th Parallel,” in *US Foreign Policy Decision-Making from Truman to Kennedy* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 57.

of the northern and southern territories stalled with the Soviet Union, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee – the same body responsible for much of the formulation of policy for the Truman Doctrine – requested in September 1947 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff study whether or not the United States ought to continue its Korean military presence. In their response issued two weeks later, the Joint Chiefs argued, “from the standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea.”⁶² The troops were a liability rather than an asset, as they would be useless in an East Asian conflict – which, it was thought, was unlikely to occur on the peninsula but rather elsewhere on the mainland – and were taking away valuable troop power from other bases where they were in greater demand. The Joint Chiefs concluded, “continued lack of progress toward a free and independent Korea, unless offset by an elaborate program of economic, political and cultural rehabilitation, in all probability will result in such conditions, including violent disorder, as to make the position of United States occupation forces untenable.”⁶³

Despite continued tumult in the region, the Truman administration followed the Joint Chiefs’ urgings. The cabinet voted to begin the withdrawal of troops, and an NSC plan of the withdrawal contended that the same goals of reunification and self-government could just as easily be pursued without the presence of American ground forces. In the words of George Kennan, “our policy should be to cut our losses and get out of there as gracefully as possible.”⁶⁴ The Soviet Union appeared to be in agreement: by December 1948, they had withdrawn their troops, and by June 1949, the U.S. had similarly left,

⁶² Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Memorandum for the Secretary of State: The interest of the United States in military occupation of South Korea from the point of view of the military security of the United States,” September 27, 1947, in Truman, “Further Statement by the President on the Decision to Withdraw U.S. Forces from Korea, 1947-1949.”

⁶³ Ibid. The National Security Council agreed with this assessment, writing in NSC-8, “It should be the effort of the U.S. Government through all proper means to effect a settlement of the Korean problem which would enable the U.S. to withdraw from Korea as soon as possible with the minimum of bad effects. National Security Council, “NSC-8: The Position of the United States with Respect to Korea,” April 2, 1948, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Papers, Box 1.

⁶⁴ Kennan qtd. in Hybel, “Harry Truman and the Decisions to Intervene in the Korean War and to Cross the 38th Parallel,” 58–59.

leaving only 500 military advisors behind to help train the army of the newly formed Republic of Korea.⁶⁵ On June 19, 1950, the week before the North Koreans launched their attack on South Korea, President Syngman Rhee met with John Foster Dulles in Korea to beg the U.S. to guarantee ROK security in the face of a northern invasion; Dulles declined to make any promises, since “it was the opinion of the best informed minds in the U.S. government that Soviet Russia did not for the present wish to become involved in a shooting war.”⁶⁶

The waning military urgency of the Korea situation was reflected not only in troop movements, but in official speech as well. In January 1950, Dean Acheson famously gave a speech before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. In this address focused on the administration’s policies in Asia, Acheson announced that the American “defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus....to the Philippine Islands.”⁶⁷ This perimeter notably left out Korea, leaving many to assume that the state was outside the geographically-defined defensive perimeter, much as China had been.⁶⁸ As Warren I. Cohen has written, “that a civil war in Korea would provide the critical turning point in the postwar Soviet-American relationship, and raise the possibility

⁶⁵ Ibid., 59.

⁶⁶ Dulles went on to say that if a war *did* in fact break out, “the attack might just as likely come first in New York as in Seoul.” That a potential North Korean invasion was understood by Dulles to be a question of Soviet Union priorities shows the extent to which the U.S. viewed the North Koreans as mere Soviet puppets, and ineffective ones at that. As a January 7, 1950 report concluded, “The real power in North Korea today, of course, is not the NKLP [North Korean Labor Party] but the USSR. The NKLP is merely an instrument of Soviet control over the northern half of the peninsula....It contains little of the energy or enthusiasm found in the Chinese Communist Party.” Memorandum of conversation between Rhee, Dulles, Limb, Muccio, and Allison, June 19, 1950, RG 59, 1950-1954 Central Decimal File, Box 4262, Item 795B.00/6-1950, NACP; Everett F. Dumright, “Current Conditions and Trends within the North Korea Labor Party,” January 7, 1950, RG 59, 1950-1954 Central Decimal File, Box 4262, Item 795.00/1-750, NACP.

⁶⁷ Acheson qtd. in Department of State, “Secretary Acheson and the Defense of Korea,” 1950, Whistlestop Study Collection, Online, HSTPL.

⁶⁸ The reality of whether Acheson meant to exclude South Korea from the list of American priorities is far more complex. Acheson mentioned South Korea earlier in the speech, warning of the dangers of “subversion and penetration” (rather than invasion or occupation), and when it came time to list the “defensive perimeter,” the countries he listed were those that General MacArthur had listed in a previous speech. Given the confusion that Acheson’s omission would engender – and the critiques it would provoke from political opponents who argued that Acheson had failed to properly protect South Korea – Stueck argues that “Acheson would have been wise to omit mention of the U.S. defense perimeter” altogether. William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 30.

of world war, seems, in retrospect, nothing short of bizarre.”⁶⁹ From the American point of view, budgetary conservatism reigned, Acheson had left Korea out of the defined American defense perimeter, and troops were deemed to be more useful elsewhere (on the Asian mainland or in Europe). In other words, “Korea was low on nearly everyone’s list of priorities.”⁷⁰

Partially as a cause and partially as a consequence of that low ranking, there was a general understanding – in spite of disconfirming evidence – that it was unlikely for North Korea to invade South Korea. Intelligence and military sources suggested the potential for the event at some point: the CIA had warned in 1948 that North Korean forces might invade the south once the U.S. had removed its troops, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee warned that the U.S. pullout could result in a communist takeover “whether we want it or not.”⁷¹ Newspapers and other general sources, however, discounted the likelihood of such an attack.⁷² The intelligence reports warning of the possibility of invasion mattered little when South Korea was not valued among the top priorities of the administration. When South Korea was invaded, therefore, this came as an unanticipated shock not only to the American public, but also to the policymaking elite.

3.2 *Affective blowback and the decision to intervene*

When that shock occurred, administration officials had to interpret the facts as they saw them with the ideo-affective tools at their disposal. In the section that follows, I argue that the Truman administration’s decision to intervene on the Korean peninsula is evidence of affective blowback, or the internalization of the ideo-affective stance that had previously only been put forth instrumentally as part of the ramping campaign of the

⁶⁹ Cohen, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: America in the Age of Soviet Power*, IV, 63.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, IV, 65.

⁷¹ Mercer, “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” 232.

⁷² Alexander L. George, “American Policy-Making and the North Korean Aggression,” *World Politics* 7, no. 2 (1955): 210.

Truman Offensive. The Truman administration interpreted the evidence provided from Korea through their newly revamped ideo-affective lens, one that mirrored the reconstituted structure of feeling. Readers will recall from Chapter 1 that, as Jonathan Mercer writes, “feelings influence interpretations of evidence” and “emotion [is] evidence.”⁷³ When confronted with an unfamiliar situation, individuals both interpret phenomena through an affective-cognitive process and use their own affective responses as evidence of the nature of the phenomena. This implies that in situations that elicit shock from certain actors, those actors would be likely to understand the events as inherently shocking, thereby escalating the stakes of the events emotionally and discursively. In the case of the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the Truman administration used their own feelings to interpret the evidence before them (as all actors do), showing the extent to which they had had their own ideo-affective approach revamped from that of 1947 in a case of ideo-affective blowback.

When North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel, the United States decided almost immediately to intervene. Acheson was the driving force behind the decision-making, but he was met with very little resistance from anyone else. As Acheson later wrote, “It was an interesting discussion, because as I recall it the assumption by everybody – I don’t think there was a question in anyone’s mind or that it entered into the discussion that took place – as to whether we would or would not stand up...I think it was just sort of clear to us, almost without discussion, that we were going to.”⁷⁴ During the first meeting at Blair House, after the president had arrived from Missouri, Omar Bradley argued, “we must draw the line somewhere” and suggested that the U.S. “act under the guise of aid to

⁷³ Mercer, “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” 221. In this section I am especially indebted to Mercer’s work. The focus of his piece is slightly different from my own work – he is concerned with emotions and signaling in interpreting events between the U.S. and Soviets – but his evidence, especially that which focuses on Truman’s own emotional reasoning, is invaluable to my work.

⁷⁴ Acheson qtd. in David Detzer, *Thunder of the Captains: The Short Summer in 1950* (New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Company, 1977), 103.

the United Nations.” As Daniel Detzer writes, “Note the word ‘guise’; note also that no one objected.”⁷⁵ The top decision makers were in broad agreement.⁷⁶

Truman certainly did not object. He agreed with “drawing the line,” for the prestige of the United States was now at stake. This was the logic of intervention: if the U.S. did not stop the Soviet Union now, would it ever be able to do so? On June 26, one day after the North Koreans had begun their invasion and minutes after the administration had drafted their first statement to the public regarding the events of the Far East, George M. Elsey lingered after a meeting to try and suss out Truman’s true feelings as to the state of international affairs. Truman admitted that he was not terribly worried about the state of Korea in and of itself; instead, “he was more worried about other parts of the world.” Pointing to Iran on a globe in his office, he commented, “Here is where they will start trouble if we aren’t careful.” For Truman, “Korea is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough now, if we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won’t take any next steps. But if we just stand by, they’ll move into Iran and they’ll take over the whole Middle East. There’s no telling what they’ll do, if we don’t put up a fight now.”⁷⁷ For Truman, the analogue of the situation at hand was that which had spurred the Truman Doctrine, the situation in Greece, rather than that which had spurred the White Paper, the situation in China (despite the more obvious parallels of civil conflict, the Asian continent,

⁷⁵ Ibid., 102. For an alternative official view written several weeks after the event, see “Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea,” which contends, “As explained by Secretary Acheson to the press on June 28, as soon as word of the attack on Korea was received in Washington, it was the view of the President and of all of his advisers, that the first responsibility of the Government of the United States was to report the attack to the United Nations.” “Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea,” July 3, 1950, RG 59, 1950-1954 Central Decimal File, Box 4264, Item 795.00/7-350, NACP.

⁷⁶ See also Alan R. Millett, *The Korean War: The Essential Bibliography* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), 20–21. This agreement as to overall approach – intervention as opposed to nonintervention – continued. Meeting with the National Security Council on June 29, Truman reviewed developments in Korea and, following on from this, requested that the NSC “undertake a resurvey of all policy papers affecting the entire perimeter of the USSR.” He need not have done so; he was immediately informed that the Defense and State departments were already working on that very subject. Without intentional coordination, the different departments were all on the same page regarding the implications of the particular situation in Korea for the larger conflict against the Soviet Union. National Security Council, “Memorandum for the President,” June 29, 1950, Papers of Harry S. Truman, PSF, Box 188, Memoranda for the President: Meeting Discussions: 1950, HSTPL.

⁷⁷ Memorandum, “President Truman’s conversations with George M. Elsey,” June 26, 1950, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 71, Korea–June 26, 1950, HSTPL.

and U.S. supported nationalist leaders⁷⁸). Note also that Truman, via Elsey's recollection, did not use words of thought or cognition; rather, he said that he was "worried." In the same meeting, all agreed that Truman's public commitment to the South Koreans meant, "we may find ourselves in trouble in Korea. Therefore...what has been done may make it imperative to accept full-out war."⁷⁹ Unquestioningly, the President agreed, citing only one reason to potentially withhold troops at any point – if they were needed elsewhere. In other words, unlike in the cases of Greece, Turkey, or China, "full-out war" was an acknowledged and accepted consequence of American actions.⁸⁰

As Robert P. Newman has written, "There is one great, obvious void in the account of this discussion. No one had the gall to say: 'What is all the excitement about? We wrote off Korea, put it outside our defensive perimeter, and the secretary of state

⁷⁸ As Bruce Cumings points out, while Americans generally think of the Korean War as being a discrete conflict from 1950-1953, the formal U.S. participation represented merely a tiny portion of a much larger civil conflict, spanning from the age of Japanese imperial conquest (beginning in 1931) through to today, as the peninsula is still not reunified. Cumings, *The Korean War*; Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). This point of view, that the Korean War was a civil war, is somewhat contested. One of the preeminent scholars of the period, William Stueck, contends that "although the fighting contained an important civil dimension, its outbreak at that time and at that place can only be explained through the interaction of Korean and non-Korean elements and through decisions made in Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, as well as Pyongyang and Seoul. The fact is that, however nationalistic Koreans may have been – they were intensely so – their fate was so closely tied to the designs of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China that their ability to act independently was severely circumscribed." In characterizing the Korean War as a form of civil war, I seek not to enter the Cumings vs. Stueck historiographical argument, but rather to contend that there were important parallels between the situations in Korea and China – where, while the conflict was primarily civil, considerations of non-Chinese powers (including the U.S. and Soviet Union) also circumscribed certain behaviors (for this, see Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)). William Whitney Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* (Princeton University Press, 2002), 66.

⁷⁹ William A. Boettcher, III, *Presidential Risk Behavior in Foreign Policy: Prudence or Peril?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 105.

⁸⁰ Acheson had drafted the statement that would be approved at the June 29 meeting the day before. In it, he outlined the policy that he believed that the U.S. ought to hold itself to: "The decision now made to commit United States air and naval forces to provide cover and support for South Korean troops does not in itself constitute a decision to engage in a major war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervene in Korea. The decision regarding Korea, however, was taken in the full realization of a risk of war with the Soviet Union. If substantial Soviet forces actively oppose our present operations in Korea, United States forces should defend themselves, should take no action on the spot to aggravate the situation, and should report the situation to Washington." Truman later expressed comfort with the substance of the statement, but asked for it to be reworded for public purposes, as he did not want to allude to the possibility of war with the Soviets. Dean Acheson, Draft Statement to Louis Johnson, RG 59, 1950-1954 Central Decimal File, Box 4263, Item 795.00/6-2850, NACP.

announced this publicly.”⁸¹ While Newman may be overstating the extent to which one speech was constitutive of all of American Korea policy, the spirit of his question is a good one⁸²: why did no one question why the U.S. ought to intervene in this overseas conflict in a region outside of Western Europe – and one in which they recently withdrew their own occupying forces?

Bradley’s comments that “we must draw the line somewhere” and Truman’s invocation of the Greece analogy shows the extent to which this was framed in broad terms of global conflict. The decision to intervene in Korea was not really about Korea at all. It was about the Soviet Union, and “standing up to them,” as Elsey recalled. These policy elites had selected a broad, nearly universalist narrative of aggressive conflict, eschewing any milder assessment of local conflict or opportunism. This was the case, I argue, because the policymakers’ understandings of the conflict had been made within an ideo-affective structure of feeling, one that they themselves had strategically deployed, then attempted to circumvent.

The affective shock that policymakers felt at the news of the invasion is evident in their immediate responses. Truman told Acheson, “Dean, we’ve got to stop those sons of bitches no matter what” and “By God, I am going to let them have it!” In a letter to his wife, the president wrote that “Haven’t been so badly upset since Greece and Turkey fell into our lap.” General Bradley commented that he and his fellow decision makers were struck by “an intense sense of moral outrage.”⁸³ Rosemary Foot, among others, has argued that President Truman reacted so emotionally to the events on the Korean peninsula because they activated a deep sense of guilt that he carried with him over not supporting

⁸¹ Newman, “NSC (National Insecurity) 68,” 76.

⁸² In his memoirs, Acheson argued that the Soviets would not have been misled by his speech. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, 476.

⁸³ The British ambassador to the U.S. commented on these feelings with a sense of disdain, musing that “there are too many Puritan avenging angels about who feel that at last a straight moral issue of real principle has been raised and there is a clear Call to get on with punishing the guilty.” Mercer, “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” 232.

the League of Nations following World War I and voting for neutrality legislation in the lead up to World War II. This provoked in him an analogical comparison to Neville Chamberlain and the Munich Conference of 1938, as he could not bear to sit idly by if another potential totalitarian threatened the world.⁸⁴ John Foster Dulles had a similar reaction. Upon hearing the news in Tokyo, he sent a telegram to the State Department warning, “To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war.”⁸⁵ These responses were a far cry from the administration’s previous enunciations of Korea’s lack of importance, and from Dulles’ own meeting a week earlier.

We can see evidence of the administration’s reconstituted emotional beliefs not only in the immediate understanding among many that the U.S. would need to intervene, but also in one of the main reasons that administrators gave for intervention: that the U.S. needed to uphold its “reputation” and “credibility” by “drawing the line somewhere.” In other words, the Truman administration believed that it had to make a stand or risk the Soviets taking advantage of them elsewhere. Notions of reputation are inherently emotional beliefs, Mercer points out, for they are one’s assessments of what others think of oneself. The way one feels is powerful evidence in this assessment, making the judgment a much more recursive one than the judge thinks that it is. As Mercer writes, “although Stalin did not give the United States a reputation for irresolution, American decision makers thought he did, and they were certain that a failure to respond in Korea would destroy America’s reputation.”⁸⁶ Truman and his fellow policymakers did not seek evidence for how Stalin thought that they would act; instead, they relied on their own feelings of worry and fear to intuit what Stalin must understand their reputation to be. They never sought external validation as to whether or not the rest of the world was panicked over

⁸⁴ Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953* (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 32.

⁸⁵ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 107.

⁸⁶ Mercer, “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” 231.

whether or not the United States would intervene. At one point, Acheson's decision was made during a period in which he "had everyone and all messages kept out of my room for an hour or two while I ruminated about the situation," highlighting the lack of external sources of information that were consulted for these assessments.⁸⁷ Instead, shock and alarm were enough evidence that something had to be done.

The reversal of policy from one in which a U.S. invasion was seen as laughable to one in which it was seen as a necessary and logical policy position cannot be explained without taking into account the affective reactions of top policymakers. It is crucial to remember that those reactions were not merely physiological responses: if North Korea had invaded South Korea four years earlier, the Truman administration would have been unlikely to react with the same sense of alarm. Instead, we ought to see those affective responses as being influenced by the dominant structure of feeling. When faced with a surprising event, these individuals and the group that they comprised clung to an understanding that matched with the ideo-affective one that now dominated. These agents had deployed ideo-affective politics to achieve their own strategic ends in 1947, then attempted to combat them when they were used in an oppositional manner. By 1950, these policymakers, in the face of uncertainty, had succumbed to the results of those very policies themselves. Affective blowback had resulted in the internalization of their own strategic statements, leading to revamped ideo-affective notions and interpretations.

4 Selling the war

Now fully committed to an invasion that had once been considered unthinkable, the administration set out to sell the war to the American public. In doing so, the administration attempted to follow the guidance it had set out in NSC-68: to invoke emotional reactions within the public, but to avoid over-scaring them and bringing them

⁸⁷ Acheson qtd. in *Ibid.*, 239.

into a state of panic.⁸⁸ The sellers had learned their lessons from their overheated ramping of 1947 and their failures of tamping in 1949, and would revamp their own tactics accordingly. However, this limited form of emotional expression would not prove persuasive to the public. After three weeks of this more limited approach, Truman turned to a fully revamped public discourse.

4.1 *The first three weeks*

The first three weeks of Truman's statements showcase the difficulty of walking the line between persuasive ramping and panic-inducing ramping. While some scholars have noted the "calm and factual" tone of Truman's early Korean war statements, a comparison with his statements about the Chinese Civil War a year earlier showed the abrupt shift in tone.⁸⁹ Yes, the later Korea speeches would become far fierier than the early ones. But the early ones show the extent to which "calm and factual" now referred to a significant level of affective content, and that that level would no longer be enough to persuade a public attuned to the ideo-affective outlook of the Truman Offensive.

In the first week after the North Korean invasion of South Korea, Truman made several statements to the press and public. In them, he moved quickly from a brief analysis of the situation at hand to a more expansive reading of the status of the Korean issue within the context of the broader U.S.-Soviet conflict. The president issued his first public statement on June 26, one day after the events had begun. In the six-sentence document, Truman did not take the same dispassionate tone he had taken in the cases of Joe-1 and the fall of Chiang Kai-Shek's regime. Instead, while he said that he had spoken to the Joint Chiefs about "the situation in the Far East created by unprovoked aggression against the

⁸⁸ Historian Steven Casey argues that this June 1950 period was characterized by an effort to "keep the home front cool." While I agree with Casey that that was the stated intent of the administration, I depart from Casey's conclusions, showing the mismatch between that stated attempt and deliberate efforts to ramp up the emotional persuasiveness of presidential addresses in the period (see below for my tripartite analysis of the president's first major address on July 19). Casey, *Selling the Korean War*.

⁸⁹ Casey, "Selling NSC-68," 668–69.

Republic of Korea,” he gave few other specific details about what had actually happened. The short statement reflected a clear sense of the party in the right having been horribly aggrieved, expressing his satisfaction that the United Nations would seek to ensure that “this serious breach of the peace” was addressed. Truman closed his statement by warning “those responsible for this act of aggression” to “realize how seriously the Government of the United States views such threats to the peace of the world. Willful disregard of the obligation to keep the peace cannot be tolerated by nations that support the United Nations Charter.”⁹⁰ The incident was framed within a larger Cold War context and larger structure of feeling, couched in strong language but restrained in the form of a short written statement.

One day later, the president issued a slightly longer statement announcing that he had “ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.” After beginning with a few sentence summary detailing North Korea’s failure to accede to the United Nations’ demands to cease hostilities, Truman turned to the significance of the affair: “The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security.”⁹¹ These sentences made plain that North Korea was not the specific object of Truman’s ire; instead, it was “communism,” the “it” which had “defied the orders” of the U.N. Following on from the framing set out in the Truman Offensive, the North Korean invasion was merely the specific incident representing the larger abstract ideology against which the U.S. was at war. Again, however, the president issued a written statement rather than addressing the nation.

⁹⁰ Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President on the Violation of the 38th Parallel in Korea,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, June 26, 1950, Online.

⁹¹ Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, June 27, 1950, Online.

The next day, on June 28, the president spoke before the Annual Convention of the American Newspapers Guild. His speech was recorded and broadcast later that day. He began on the topic of the importance of labor unions – the hot button domestic issue of the moment – before turning to the consequences of poor labor conditions for working people. In other parts of the world, he said, communists had taken advantage of economic unrest, pressing their advantage in places where chaos had begun to take hold. “The Communists are attempting to turn the honest dissatisfaction of these people with their present conditions into support for Communist efforts to dominate their nations,” Truman maintained. “The Communists in these countries use the weapon of fear. They constantly threaten internal violence and armed aggression. The recent unprovoked invasion of the Republic of Korea by Communist armies is an example of the danger to which the underdeveloped areas particularly are exposed.”⁹² Again, the Korean situation was a mere “example” of a larger trend of worldwide communist aggression. And again, this speech reached only a limited audience.

Throughout these few weeks, Truman was not the only member of the administration making statements about the situation in Korea. Dean Acheson addressed the same conference of newspaper professionals a day after the president’s speech. He took a slightly different approach to that of Truman, though conformed in the end to the same narrative. When planning the speech, his special assistant Marshall Shulman suggested “the Secretary’s speech be dedicated to a calm and factual treatment of the Korean issue.” In giving background on the situation, Acheson could “kee[p] public discussion informed and in perspective, and would help to guide tone of response domestically and abroad.”⁹³ The emphasis on “perspective” and the need to “guide” tone reflected the administration’s difficulties in managing responses to the shocks of 1949 and,

⁹² Harry S. Truman, “Address Before the Annual Convention of the American Newspaper Guild,” *UCSB American Presidency Project*, June 28, 1950, Online.

⁹³ Marshall Shulman, “Memo: Secretary’s Speech to Newspaper Guild,” June 28, 1950, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 71, Korea–June 28 1950, HSTPL.

perhaps especially in the State Department under Acheson, the attitudes toward China. Acheson took his advisors' suggestions and delivered a lengthy seven-page address that covered the details of the present crisis and the history of the conflict. For the majority of the speech, the Secretary of State gave a straightforward record of events that was reminiscent of his 1949 tamping efforts, using few adverbs and no metaphors or other figures of speech. However, in several places, the Secretary's calm and calculated demeanor gave way to editorializing in the manner of the president's address: the entry of U.S. forces allowed "peace-loving nations the world over...to hope that this act of brutal, unprovoked and naked aggression would not be allowed to succeed"; "a peaceful people ruled by a sovereign independent government of their own choosing, brought into being and recognized by the great majority of the free nations of the world, was attacked in a cynical and brutal act of aggression"; "It is now clear to all – if indeed it was not clear before – that free nations must be united, they must be determined, and they must be strong, if they are to preserve their freedom and maintain a righteous peace. There is no other way."⁹⁴

Within the first few days, the administration's public narrative and ideo-affective stance was set through these piecemeal statements and limited emotional evocation, rather than a coordinated all-out effort. But this bit-by-bit approach was not achieving its persuasive goals. When news of American intervention first reached the public, 81% of Gallup's sample had supported the action. But that support in both the public and the press had begun to wane as the fighting continued for several weeks without a full address by the president.⁹⁵ Some members of the press corps even accused Truman of being complacent and overconfident, echoing the 1949 objections that had dogged the administration during its attempted tamping campaigns.⁹⁶ The administration had sought to

⁹⁴ Dean Acheson, "Address Before the 17th Annual Convention of the American Newspaper Guild," June 29, 1950, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 71, Korea–June 29 1950, HSTPL.

⁹⁵ Casey, *Selling the Korean War*, 35.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

persuade the public through limited affective appeals, rather than undertaking full-scale ramping, but it proved not to be enough for the reconstituted public structure of feeling.

Press Secretary Charlie Ross soon had to deal with increasing demands for Truman to speak out.⁹⁷ Within the administration itself, officials debated over when to begin addressing the public. Acheson and the State Department wanted to go to Congress as early as July 5, while members of the Defense Department urged waiting until the facts on the ground had stopped changing so rapidly. The latter unit prevailed, and the speech was deferred.⁹⁸ The next week was characterized by a flurry of legislative activity as the various members of the executive branch debated what precisely the President should ask Congress for in terms of legislative action. Intriguingly, even without any form of consensus as to what the President needed, Acheson lobbied for an immediate presidential address – something most others found ludicrous, given that no one had any idea what the president should say.⁹⁹ He was committed to an immediate public relations strategy, one modeled closely on the ramping of the Truman Offensive. Finally, it was decided that the president would deliver two addresses on July 19, one to Congress and one to the public. Those addresses would depart fully from the tamping efforts of 1949, reverting towards emotional ramping and showcasing the difficulties of finding a happy revamped medium between the two.

⁹⁷ “Truman Not Planning Report to Congress Now, Ross Says,” July 5, 1950, *Washington Star*, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 71, Korea–July 19, 1950–Message to Congress on Korean Situation (folder 2), HSTPL.

⁹⁸ The decision to defer the presidential addresses was aided by the fact that the House was in recess for the week, and the July 5 session would be only a token one. George M. Elsey, “Preparation of President's Message to Congress on Korea, July 19 1950,” George M. Elsey Papers, Box 71, Korea–July 19, 1950–Message to Congress on Korean Situation, HSTPL.

⁹⁹ Elsey wrote that he “personally regarded Acheson’s pressure as highly offensive; it seemed ridiculous to force the president to make a speech prior to the time that he could announce decisions on (a) necessary legislations and (b) necessary supplemental appropriations.” George M. Elsey, “Preparation of President's Message to Congress on Korea, July 19 1950.”

4.2 *The July 19 addresses*

The drafting of the congressional message began in earnest on July 15. George Elsey's marked-up copy of the speech outline is illuminating as to the approach that the administration decided to take. The outline begins with "1. History of Korean Incident," next to which Elsey wrote, "a straight chronological narrative." This would echo the beginning of the Truman Doctrine, which began with details of the situation in Greece. The next item on the outline reads: "2. Events in Korea are further evidence that communist aggression can break loose anywhere." Again, like the Truman Doctrine – although earlier on, in this latter document – the particulars of one event were used as mere examples for a larger point about the expansive nature of communism. Revealingly, one of the sub-points of this second item showed the extent to which the administration had learned from the failure of their tamping efforts over the previous year, as well as from the lackluster reaction of their previous three weeks of limited emotional appeals. The outline originally read, "aggression could happen anywhere – we have been taking steps for a long time." Elsey crossed out everything after the hyphen, making clear that the administration's previous tactic of emphasizing the anticipated nature of certain events was no longer seen to be a viable tactic of public persuasion.¹⁰⁰ Instead, the speech would only focus on the first half of the statement: that a communist attack could happen anywhere. Once again, fear – a ramping tactic – triumphed over reassurance – a tamping tactic.

Two days after this meeting, the speechwriters began crafting the second address aimed at a radio broadcast to the public. While the speech would closely parallel that of the congressional address, Elsey noted that the public radio address should differ from that aimed at lawmakers in that it would have a "style...very much simpler than the message to Congress."¹⁰¹ For this address, Truman commented that "he was doing his best to avoid

¹⁰⁰ George Elsey copy, Outline of Truman Korea address to Congress, July 15, 1950, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 71, Korea–July 19, 1950–Message to Congress on Korean Situation (folder 2), HSTPL.

¹⁰¹ George Elsey, "Preparation of the President's Radio Address on Korea."

any feeling of panic and to keep people from being scared.”¹⁰² What that meant in practice becomes clear in looking at the progression of the drafts. Just as with the process of writing the Truman Doctrine (although less explicitly this time), the writers worked to ramp up the affective appeal of the speech. From the second to third drafts of the speech, the writers changed “armed forces from the north attacked the Republic of Korea” to “communist forces from the north attacked the Republic of Korea,” more firmly associating the attack with the red existential enemy. Further, while the speech previously ended with a basic description of U.S. troop movements (“We have sent land, naval, and air forces to assist in these operations”), Elsey wrote in a new concluding sentence, justifying why American actions mattered in issues much larger than the Korean peninsula: “We have done this because we know that what is at stake here is nothing less than the peace of the world and our own national security and freedom.”¹⁰³

4.3 *Analyzing the speech to the public*

On July 19, President Truman sent the special message to Congress in the morning, and then, at 10:30 PM, addressed the nation from the White House on television and over the radio. In the section that follows, I conduct my tripartite analysis on the public address alone, rather than both the public and congressional addresses. I do so because, as the drafting process above shows, the two documents followed similar outlines, and differed only in tone and level of detail. I choose to analyze the public address for two reasons: first, it was aimed at the public, and therefore, everyone – including members of Congress – would have to take it into account in their analysis of the Korea situation, whereas not everyone would do the same for the congressional address; and second, the public address was delivered orally and visually, whereas the congressional one was not, thereby negating

¹⁰² Mercer, “Emotion and Strategy in the Korean War,” 236.

¹⁰³ George Elsey copy, “Radio Address on Korea Second Draft,” July 17, 1950, George M. Elsey Papers, Box 72, Korea–Radio address of Korea, July 19 1950, HSTPL.

aspects of the paralinguistic techniques that an orator might use. Where the two addresses differ substantively or stylistically, I make note below.

Paralinguistically, as discussed above, the president himself orally addressed the nation through both radio and television.¹⁰⁴ This represented a departure from the 1949 tamping approaches, where statements were written and distributed by non-presidential actors at press conferences. It also represented a strategic shift to the delivery of the Truman Doctrine, which was a combined address to both the public and Congress. In the case of the speech to the Korean War, officials calibrated that they could more effectively meet their public ideo-affective goals if they spoke separately to the public.

There are a number of content features that added to the affective appeal of the address, especially when contrasted with the written message delivered to Congress. The first facet is the explicit referencing to communism. Whereas the Truman Doctrine and July 19, 1950 special message to Congress both referenced communists/communism exactly once, the public July 19 speech mentioned “communist” or “communists” 13 times.¹⁰⁵ The world itself can be seen as a cultural trigger, given its loaded intellectual baggage (emphasized and heightened over the course of the Truman Offensive and subsequent periods), but the manner in which the communist threat was presented in this speech added to its power. In the Truman Doctrine, the one occasion of the word arose when describing the conflict in Greece – “the Communists” referred to the specific political party participating in the events in question. In this public address, however, the thirteen references are used differently; whereas in the special message to Congress, Truman referred to the aggressors in the conflict as the North Koreans, in this public address, Truman labeled the “communists” – both in Korea and abroad – as the enemy.

¹⁰⁴ Television was a new medium for governmental communication with the public. For dedicated studies on this subject, see Nancy Bernhard, *U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Nancy E. Bernhard, “Clearer than Truth: Public Affairs Television and the State Department’s Domestic Information Campaigns, 1947–1952,” *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 4 (October 1, 1997): 545–67.

¹⁰⁵ Truman, “Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Korea, July 19, 1950.”

Table 2: References to "communist[s]" in Truman's Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Korea, July 19, 1950

<i>As specific label for invading North Korean army:</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “On Sunday, June 25th, Communist forces attacked the Republic of Korea.” • “The Communist invasion was launched in great force, with planes, tanks, and artillery.” • “The Security Council met just 24 hours after the Communist invasion began.” • “The Communist invaders ignored the action of the Security Council and kept fighting on with their attack.” • “We know that it will take a hard, tough fight to halt the invasion, and to drive the Communists back.” • “under General MacArthur's magnificent leadership, they have quickly adapted themselves to meet the deliberately planned attack of the North Korean Communist forces” • “The fact that they are preventing the Communists from overrunning Korea-- which this calculated attack had been designed to accomplish--is a splendid tribute to the ability of our Armed Forces to convert quickly from the peaceful duties of occupation to the grim duties of war.”
<i>As abstract enemy in larger conflict:</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “This attack has made it clear, beyond all doubt, that the international Communist movement is willing to use armed invasion to conquer independent nations.” • “By their actions in Korea, Communist leaders have demonstrated their contempt for the basic moral principles on which the United Nations is founded.” • “the Communist authorities never have permitted the United Nations observers to visit northern Korea to see what was going on behind that part of the Iron Curtain.” • “It was from that area, where the Communist authorities have been unwilling to let the outside world see what was going on, that the attack was launched against the Republic of Korea on June 25th.” • “the fact that Communist forces have invaded Korea is a warning that there may be similar acts of aggression in other parts of the world.” • “We are united in detesting Communist slavery.”

As can be seen in the references pulled out in Table 2, mentions of communism broadly fell into two groups. First were the references to the specific military force responsible for the invasion of South Korea. As alluded to above, this decision to apply the label “communist” to these forces, rather than “Northern” suggests a deliberate effort to elide the specific events in North Korea with a broader communist force. These efforts at elision become all the more clear in the second group of communist references, those which affix the label communist to forces beyond the North Korean borders. These

instances refer both to a larger body of antagonists (“Communist authorities”; “Communist leaders”) and to the larger ideology that the U.S.’s democratic freedoms were set against (“international Communist movement”; “Communist slavery”).¹⁰⁶ These references to communism were designed to raise the specter of a larger menace.

Figures of speech served this purpose as well. As in the case of the Truman Doctrine, clear binaries were erected between the “communists” and “all free nations”/“free peoples”; “lawless aggression” and “members of the United Nations”; “the invaders” and “the Korean defenders”; “worldwide threat” and “free nations”; and “democratic freedom” and “communist slavery.” Truman used similar metaphors of disease and contagion, referencing not only foreign invasion, but also “outbreaks of aggression.” He also included a reference to appeasement via historical analogy to the Munich Conference of 1938, seeking to touch a nerve when he commented, “The free nations have learned the fateful lesson of the 1930s. That lesson is that aggression must be met firmly. Appeasement leads only to further aggression and ultimately to war.”

Taken together, these attributes present a discursive intervention much more closely aligned in affective content to the ramped up Truman Offensive than the tamped down efforts of informing the public about the CCP’s victory or Joe-1. The administration had revamped its 1949 ideo-affective strategic approach, seeking to evoke public emotions to persuade once more. For all of the talk in NSC-68 and in the speech’s preparation about avoiding public panic, however, the reader will notice that there seems to be very little difference in tripartite approach between this 1950 speech and the Truman Doctrine (other than coming after the Truman Doctrine, which detracted from the novelty of the later speech). This would suggest that while they understood the difficulties that could arise through an emotional ramping campaign like that of 1947, after which they lost control,

¹⁰⁶ Despite all of these clear references, interestingly, the word “communism”, the simplest reference to the broader ideology, never appears in the speech.

the Truman administration seemed to have little conceptualization of how to undertake a more measured approach in 1950. In their revamping, the Truman administration reverted once more to trying to ramp up public emotions.

As in the case of the Truman Doctrine, the administration's efforts proved persuasive. Letters flooded the White House, the vast majority of which expressed bipartisan support.¹⁰⁷ "I am a Republican but I am behind you to the nth degree," wrote Vera A. Boyer of Washington, D.C. Edward C. Bernst of Los Angeles agreed, saying, "I didn't vote for you last time, but I am 100 percent for you now you are a real old good American," while Gordon Berendsen added that "all of us, including those who did not vote for you, are for you 100%. We enjoyed your speech last night and think seriously of every word." New Yorker Robert B. Baird focused not only on the impending action in Korea, but on the speech itself: "Your speeches...to the Congress and to the people of this great land, will be, and I believe already have been, a source of inspiration to us all. Mary M. Baumwell agreed, asking for more: "Talk to us again, at least every six weeks and let us know what the situation is and how we can help best to keep up our end of the burden."¹⁰⁸ The administration's ideo-affective presentation was now firmly in sync with the public structure of feeling, one that they had originally helped to constitute. It is with this harmonization that we can see evidence of the public and elite all-out support that came to characterize the beginning of the Cold War.

Of course, July 19 hardly represented the end of the administration's ideo-affective campaign. From July until the declared end of hostilities in 1953 – after the Truman administration had been replaced by that of Republican Dwight Eisenhower – public support for the Korean War waxed and waned. As it did so, the administration constantly

¹⁰⁷ For public responses to Truman's July 19 speech, see the Truman Library's collection of letters to the president, which has far more "pro" responses than "con" ones.

¹⁰⁸ Selected letters from Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Personal File, Box 377, Message to Congress and Radio Address on Korean Situation, July 19 1950, Letters to Truman about address on Korean situation, July 19 1950, pro, HSTPL.

moved between trying to invigorate and calm the public, flipping between strategic ramping and tamping efforts. As historian Steven Casey writes, “Particularly during periods of military defeat in the summer of 1950 and the winter of 1951, officials deemed it vital to make sustained efforts to head off potential hysteria and panic. In these months, there was to be no psychological scare campaign.”¹⁰⁹ But outside of those months, the campaign resumed, drumming up public support through the strategic evocation of public emotion. Throughout the long stalemate that would come to pass after the brief moments of progress, then loss, in the early months of the war, the administration would continue to try to persuade the public through evoking their emotions. These appeals, deployed strategically as tools of persuasion, were nevertheless genuinely advanced within and helped to strengthen the dominant elite and public ideo-affective concordance that would come to characterize the Cold War.

5 Alternative explanations

This chapter has examined the writing of NSC-68 and the onset of the Korean War to argue that by 1950, the Truman administration’s ideo-affective approach had been revamped to one mirroring that which they had instrumentally introduced in 1947. NSC-68 showcased both the strategic understandings that had arisen within the administration after the successes of 1947 and failures of 1949, as well as the genuine fears and anxieties of the authors that now conformed to the dominant public structure of feeling. That the strategic document’s ideo-affective stance would come to bear upon the administration’s future policies was confirmed in June 1950, when Truman and his advisors interpreted the available evidence coming out of Korea through that lens of fear and anxiety, thus remaking their original assessments of the region as not worthy of defending. I argue that this was a case of affective blowback, or the internalization of the ideo-affective approach

¹⁰⁹ Casey, “Selling NSC-68,” 689.

that they had previously espoused only instrumentally. I then traced the public relations campaign that emerged in the first few weeks of fighting the war, showing that the administration soon dropped its commitment to restraint and not over-terrifying the public in favor of a revamped ideo-affective discourse that most closely resembled the ramping campaign of the Truman Offensive and the ideo-affective outlook with which NSC-68 had been imbued.

One could counter that the American entry into the Korean War was simply strategic adjustment along the lines of a realist approach. In other words, while Truman could afford to let China fall to the Communists, the changing international system (e.g. growth in Soviet military capacities, the Berlin standoff, etc.) combined with the structural features of this particular conflict (e.g. that Soviet involvement was suspected, that the U.S. had claimed South Korea as part of its sphere of influence) meant that Truman would have been compelled to respond, regardless of ideational or affective forces. While this explanation helps to explain the rising likelihood of a conflict, it does not explain why the Korean conflict turned into a military intervention rather than a diplomatic standoff, as had the Berlin crisis, nor why that military intervention was seen as part of a global war rather than a local issue.

If we turn instead to an ideational/discursive adjustment argument, we gain more explanatory power but still fall short of accounting for certain empirical facts. An ideational argument would contend that the Truman administration decided to intervene in Korea when it had previously held back (in China, Berlin, Iran, etc.) because a new dominant discourse came to the fore. That allows us to understand the Cold War as developing into an ideological conflict, where the Truman administration shifted from a) a narrative that contended that the Soviet Union was a power that could be negotiated with, even if those negotiations were conducted with wariness to b) a narrative that contended that conflict was inevitable between the aggressive expansionist communism of the Soviet Union and

the democratic freedoms of the United States. However, while this discursive explanation is persuasive in identifying how those shifting dominant narratives resulted in shifting policies, it struggles to explain either why the latter narrative became hegemonic over other contenders, or the suddenness of its utility in interpreting events in June 1950. The North Korean invasion of South Korea did not necessarily have to be interpreted as a Soviet salvo in a globalized conflict that had to be met with armed force, especially because the geographic area previously had been deemed irrelevant. Instead, it could have been seen as a local war (as had the Chinese Civil War) or a case of Soviet opportunism in one particular locale. The more aggressive and total narrative was selected over other available narratives by policymakers in the heat of the moment because of its ideo-affective resonance with the dominant structure of feeling.

That resonance with the public structure of feeling and subsequent harmonization of public and elite ideo-affective outlooks brings us back to one of the original debates mentioned in Chapter 1: what is the role of public opinion in the making of foreign policy? Historians of the Truman administration have come to the conclusion that the public played a minor role, if any at all, during this period. Thomas Paterson's work typifies this point of view. Despite officials' protestations to the contrary, Paterson argues, the Truman administration was never hemmed in by public opinion. Instead, "President Truman charted his own foreign policy course and worked successfully to persuade the reluctant to walk his path."¹¹⁰ There may have been resistance, but in the end, Truman and his administration was largely able to do what they wished in the international sphere. My analysis has shown that while public *opinion* may not have been the constraint that officials claimed that it was, public *feeling* certainly was. To borrow from Paterson's phrasing, Truman did in fact "chart his own foreign policy course" and "work successfully to

¹¹⁰ Paterson, "Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress," 2. See also Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat: Truman to Reagan*.

persuade the reluctant to walk his path” in 1947, but in 1949, that successful work left him with the “reluctant” followers pulling him in another direction. In 1950, he may have indeed persuaded the public to follow his course once more, but what he now understood to be “his” course had been shaped by those he once considered his reluctant followers.

Intriguingly, in coming to this conclusion I share some of the spirit of Thomas Bailey, who wrote his seminal study of public opinion, *The Man in the Street* in 1948, in the middle of the period that this thesis analyzes. Bailey, like Paterson, acknowledges the lack of general public awareness of foreign affairs – and therefore, a concomitant lack of any firm “public opinion” – but concluded that the lack of awareness did not matter in the end: “Public opinion is so apathetic and preoccupied, so changeful and impulsive, so ill-informed and misinformed, that critics are apt to sneer at its power. Yet a giant who is fickle and ignorant still has a giant’s strength, and may use it with frightful effect.”¹¹¹ My analysis does not agree with Bailey’s condescending take on an “ignorant” public, but I do agree that the public’s strength can be wielded in ways not captured by traditional understandings of public opinion. Emotions matter in the making of policy.

This, then, is how the Cold War came to the United States. The public, the elites, the policymakers: all were on the same ideo-affective page by mid-1950. The process by which this happened, I have argued, is inextricable from the ramping-tamping-revamping dynamics set in motion by Truman’s original speech and affective campaign of 1947. What began as a strategic effort to persuade the public of the need to invest more aggressively in Europe ended up – via a long and winding process, including a period of resisting this progression, however ineffectively – remaking American foreign policy in the image of that instrumental strategy. The Korean War, I argue, would likely not have taken on its global resonance without the aid of the ideo-affective dynamics embedded in the public structure

¹¹¹ Bailey, *The Man in the Street*, 1.

of feeling from 1947 to 1950. And if that had not happened, the Cold War would have been a very different historical period.

Conclusion

1 K₁C₂

In the 1952 presidential election, Republicans saw the opportunity to take back government leadership for the first time since the rise of Franklin Roosevelt. As the war in Korea turned to stalemate and McCarthyist fears of communist subversion reached fever pitch, Truman's Democrats looked vulnerable. The Republicans set out to enact a party-wide strategy that might prove successful. Senator Karl Mundt coined what was to be their winning formula: K₁C₂, or "Korea," "Communism," and "Corruption."¹ The Republicans would continue to take advantage of the emotions that Truman had unleashed in 1947 and had been unable to tamp down in 1949, hammering home these emotionally-resonant issues. Tapping into the fearful and anxious public structure of feeling, Republicans would accuse Truman of not being an effective or enthusiastic enough Cold Warrior. The formula worked: 25% more voters went to the polls than had done so in 1948, and they lent their support to the Republican presidential candidate. Eisenhower received 442 electoral college votes to Democrat Adlai Stevenson's 89.² Truman's party had been defeated, partially at the hands of the emotional appeals that had helped to create.

In the preceding chapters, I have outlined an ideo-affective pathway that explains the changing foreign policies and all-out mobilization for the Cold War from 1945-1950. Theoretically, I began by looking at "ramping," or the deliberate strategic cultivation of public emotions for the purposes of public and congressional persuasion. I argued for the

¹ The story of the winning formula has been somewhat mischaracterized by a number of historians. Starting in 1956 with Eric Goldman's *The Crucial Decade*, some historians have portrayed K₁C₂ as a vital public-facing approach in the presidential and congressional campaigns of 1952. Going back to Goldman's source material, however, Kevin M. Kruse argues that the formula was an internal strategy, not one that was ever presented directly to the public. See Kevin M. Kruse, "'Why Don't You Just Get an Actor?': The Advent of Television in the 1952 Campaign," in Gareth Davies and Julian E. Zelizer, *America at the Ballot Box: Elections and Political History* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 167–68.

² Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (1960): 403–8.

difficulties of controlling public emotions once evoked due to the creative capacities of emotions, the political shepherding of those emotions by oppositional officials, and those factors' constitutive effects on the structure of feeling. When ramping no longer suits the strategic purposes for which it was originally designed, I posited that officials will turn to "tamping," or deliberate efforts at calming public sentiment and restoring the balance between the public and elite structures of feeling. If that tamping proves unsuccessful (which it is more likely to than not), I argued that the next step in the theoretical pathway would be "revamping," or the reconstitution of the initiating actor's ideo-affective approach to reharmonize with the public. This, I posited, may be undertaken for both strategic and non-strategic reasons.

As Chapters 2-4 have endeavored to show, this theoretical framework helps us to understand the beginning of the Cold War. Following the end of World War II, the public and Congress turned towards anti-internationalist ideas, rejecting the continuation of overseas commitments, including in the form of certain foreign aid packages. In 1947, after the delivery of the British notes, the Truman administration turned to a new strategy of trying to evoke public emotions of fear and patriotism through the delivery of the Truman Doctrine and other accompanying addresses and events (which together comprised what I call the "Truman Offensive"). This new tactic of ramping worked: the public was shocked, and a hostile and partisan Congress approved the foreign aid proposals put forward.

Almost immediately, however, the Truman administration found itself embroiled in other consequences that they did not intend to encounter. Opponents took advantage of and reinforced the newly-excited public structure of feeling, linking the Truman Doctrine to the situation in China and domestic anti-communism, despite official discourse disavowing these connections. When events beyond the administration's control took place in 1949 – such as the CCP's victory in China and the successful Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb – they attempted to undertake the "tamping" down of public emotions. In

trying to calm the public down, however, the administration found themselves out of sync with the newly reconstituted public structure of feeling, and merely worsened their political situation through ineffective ideo-affective tactics.

Finally, by 1950, having experienced the political difficulties born of the unsuccessful tamping down of public emotions, the Truman administration “revamped” its ideo-affective approach, deciding almost at once to intervene in the Korean conflict – despite its earlier conclusions that the area was strategically irrelevant. This transition – from the attempted calm of the 1949 tamping campaign back to the arousal of fear and patriotism that had previously characterized the Truman Offensive’s ramping efforts – occurred for both strategic and genuine reasons. Recognizing the failure of tamping in 1949, the Truman administration strategically revamped their approach, giving the people the ideo-affective outlook that they appeared to crave. Yet this change was also a genuine reappraisal of policy interests based on affective blowback, for when the unanticipated North Korean invasion of South Korea occurred, administration officials internally interpreted the evidence provided by events through a new ideo-affective lens. By mid-1950, the public and foreign policymaking elites were both committed to the ideo-affective outlook that would come to characterize the Cold War.

To conclude this thesis, I turn to some of the larger questions that this analysis of one case has raised. I reevaluate the proposed ramping-tamping-revamping pathway to show its explanatory contributions and analytical weaknesses, before turning to other potential ideo-affective pathways that researchers might empirically observe. I then discuss the generalizability of the ideo-affective approach to cases beyond the American foreign policy of the beginning of the Cold War. Finally, I address future research pathways that could build on the work done in this thesis.

2 Strengths and limitations of the ramping-tamping-revamping pathway

I have proposed explaining the all-out elite and public mobilization that characterized the Cold War via recourse to a three-part conceptual pathway: the ramping up of public emotions, the failed attempted tamping down of public emotions, and the revamping of the original actor's ideo-affective approach to match the reconstituted public structure of feeling. It is a story that draws heavily on constructivist understandings of how an actor both constructs and is then reconstructed by the structures in which he or she is embedded.

In applying what we now know about affect and reasoning to the case of the Cold War, the ramping-tamping-revamping framework provides a clear conceptual pathway where other explanations have previously focused on individual steps. While Gaddis and his interlocutors debated the impact attributed to the Truman Doctrine, Freeland emphasized how the tactics of foreign policy provided fodder for McCarthyism, and Mercer analyzed the Truman administration's Korea decision-making process, my theory is able to identify a constitutive pathway connecting these different episodes and explaining their relationships to one another.

Beyond offering a wider empirical scope, this pathway offers further theoretical strengths. In retaining analytical focus on both the elite policymakers and the publics that they interact with, my ideo-affective approach allows for a more faithful capturing of policy production. In addition to being theoretically attuned to the particular institutions of democratic foreign policymaking, this approach has the added advantage of encouraging empirical richness and contextual clarity, something that is vital to a historical case study. I can thus explain more variation than a higher-level approach – such as a structural realist approach, like Waltz's – can, while still taking account of factors beyond the individual level of analysis. To purely discursive analyses, like Ronald Krebs', I am able to theorize the

affect latent in these explanations (in factors like “salience” and “resonance”), thus adding a “why” where there was previously only a “how.”

These attributes shed new light on the events of the period. Whereas Gaddis and his compatriots dismiss the Truman Doctrine as mere rhetoric, I show the constitutive effects of that rhetoric alongside the expressive and practice-based tactics that accompanied it, tracing its usage in oppositional campaigns against Truman and its dynamic impacts on the public structure of feeling. While Krebs’ focus on a purely discursive understanding of the Cold War meant that he could not see any form of consensus form until 1953 – when elite newspaper editorials reflected narrow agreement – I argued for the harmonization of elite and public opinion as early as 1950, making explicit what remains unexplained in Krebs’ account. And while scholars like Legro and Welch of the “exogenous shock” school fail to account for why the shocks of 1949 were so shocking, I offer an explanation by highlighting the mismatch between elite and public ideo-affective understandings.

Finally, I offer a new theoretical understanding of the construct that is the “Cold War.” In taking the ramping-tamping-revamping approach that I do, I argue that the Cold War was not merely a narrative construction, but an affective one as well. The Cold War then is not just an assemblage of politics, ideas, and material forces, but of emotions as well. The Cold War consensus becomes an ideo-affective stance, one that reflects the harmonization of ideas *and* the structure of feeling.

Of course, no social theory will ever be a perfect depiction of the reality it seeks to elucidate. Just as the only perfect map would be one the exact size and shape of the topographical object it represents, so too does a theory take necessary shortcuts in the interest of parsimony and generalizability (see Section 3 below for discussion of generalizability). While I argue that my theory offers a compelling explanation, there are several shortcomings that must be addressed. The first is its non-deterministic nature. My

ideo-affective theory seeks to answer a “how possible” question, and consequently, in its current form it is not predictive. It offers a possible constitutive pathway that shows when that path may fork and why (i.e. from ramping that does or does not work, to tamping that does or does not work, to revamping that does or does not work) and thus allows for hypothesizing regarding conditions of possibility. However, as formulated now I do not seek to predict which forks in the pathway events are certain to take at any point in time. As I argue below, this shortcoming ought not be seen as a flaw, but rather as a site for exploration in future research.

Within the empirical analysis itself, the ramping-tamping-revamping pathway is faced with two epistemic difficulties that require further refining: first, the difficulties in separating “purely” ideational consequences from ideo-affective consequences; and second, the difficulties in discerning “genuine” emotions from “strategic emotions.” Regarding the first count, the ontological distinctiveness, yet inextricability, of emotions and ideas presents a challenge. My strategy to meet this challenge is twofold: a) using a form of tripartite affective discourse analysis to search for evidence of emotion in texts, and b) looking for evidence of emotions in effects that cannot be explained by discourse alone (for example, in looking for affective dynamics like spillover, and in searching for extra-discursive strategies of expression or practice). The fact remains, however, that the emotions and ideas appear and are interpreted in tandem, so my theory is not able to empirically ever truly isolate one phenomenon from the other.

Second, it remains difficult to distinguish between a strategically expressed emotion and a genuinely expressed emotion. In Chapter 4, I attempted to make the case that the revamping of the Truman administration’s ideo-affective political approach – one that led to intervention in the Korean War – was attributable to both strategic forces (the logic of “if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em”) and a genuine reconstitution of ideo-affective beliefs. It is impossible, however, to ever truly be able to differentiate between a strategic and non-

strategic emotion. Emotions remain socially constituted, conforming to social expectations even in private. An individual may never have access to what he or she is genuinely feeling, and it becomes difficult to conceive of what that plausibly even signifies. I account for this shortcoming in my theory by arguing for the differentiation of strategic from genuine emotion on the basis of what the interlocutors themselves said were strategic and tactical emotions versus what they expressed in private away from the public eye. In short, the logic of strategic emotional expression is that the expression serves a purpose. If, however, we see emotions in settings where such incentives are absent, we may be on firmer ground arguing that the actors in question at the very least believed that the emotions they were expressing were authentic. While we can never truly know a genuine emotion, the same limitations lies in analyses of other forms of internal states, like ideas or identities, and these limitations have been surmounted by investigating scholars through similar methodological tools aimed at capturing expressions and effects.

3 Generalizability

This thesis introduces an ideo-affective theory of politics to explain a particular historical situation. Consequently, it is generalizable along some axes but not others. It is worth exploring each axis of the theory at hand to see where it can be extended, and where it cannot. First, this theory answers a question regarding U.S. foreign policy. In being attuned to the politics of the United States, it takes into account the democratic institutions that govern American policymaking, including the important role of the public sphere. This would suggest that while the theory may be amenable to studies of other democratic polities, it cannot necessarily be expanded to non-democratic states without robust public spheres that seek to hold their governments to account. If the public were not relevant to elite decision-making, the ramping-tamping-revamping theory would lose much of its forward logic. Of course, the public may be relevant, albeit in a different way, to the

operation of non-democratic polities as well. One might posit the application of these dynamics to imperial Germany, a case explored by Jack Snyder in his *Myths of Empire* (which work introduced the “blowback” that I extend to ideo-affective phenomena).

Beyond the formal institutions of the United States, this thesis is also attuned to the political culture of the case under study, including both the cultural reservoir of materials in the security imaginary as well as the culturally constructed nature of emotions themselves.³ A researcher seeking to extend this framework to another case would need to explore deeply the object of their analysis so as to understand their emotional cultures and imaginaries. The researcher must also remember that the particular culture under analysis is located not only in one place but also one particular historical period, in this case, 1945-1950. Plausibly, the time factor should not be a bar to generalizability, since the temporal location of an object of analysis does not play into the parameters of ramping, tamping, or revamping. However, there is an important methodological caution that must be taken into consideration when looking at other time periods. What we take today to be expressive of a certain emotion may not be the case in other times. Within the discipline of History, the burgeoning field of the “history of emotions” seeks to address this issue. Scholars within this field seek to historicize emotions as an analytical category, applying it across different types of studies.⁴ What this means for the question of generalizability is that we must be attuned to the cultural constructedness of emotion, not just due to place but also due to time. For example, as historian William Reddy points out, the conceptual differentiation of romantic love and sexual desire did not arise until the 12th century for Westerners

³ For more, see Jack Holland and Ty Solomon, “Affect Is What States Make of It: Articulating Everyday Experiences of 9/11,” *Critical Studies on Security* 2, no. 3 (September 2, 2014): 262–77; Koschut, “The Structure of Feeling”; Shinobu Kitayama and Hazel Rose Markus, eds., *Emotion and Culture: Empirical Studies and Mutual Influences* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1994).

⁴ For overviews of the field, see Jan Plamper, *The History of Emotions: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Jan Plamper, “The History of Emotions: An Interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns,” *History and Theory* 49, no. 2 (May 1, 2010): 237–65.

accustomed to the Georgian tradition, and even later for those living in Heian Japan.⁵ Emotions have histories themselves, and the careful historical researcher must remain attuned to them. The notion of the structure of feeling is especially important in this regard, and the researcher looking to investigate ideo-affective politics in another time must pay close attention to the particularities of its construction, including of its temporal location.

Third, as discussed above, my theory is neither deterministic nor predictive. This means that the ramping-tamping-revamping pathway is not the only possible ideo-affective pathway. Different events may take different paths when the road forks. That is not to say that anything can happen, however, or that the pathway introduced here has no heuristic value in other contexts. As discussed above, I outline the parameters of the forks as well as the conditions during which one fork may be taken over another. In generalizing my analysis, we must remain attuned to the attributes of each stage and fork. For example, we might expect to see a case in which after ramping was begun, no tamping was ever attempted, as the ramped up emotions either subsided over a long period of time which elite actors were content to let elapse or the emotions were sustained and reinforced by continued elite ramping. In that hypothetical pathway, we could hypothesize revamping occurring anyway, given that the actors would continue to espouse a particular viewpoint, but this would result in a revamping of expressed emotion to genuine emotion, rather than a particular change in public expression (conforming more closely to Snyder's original conception of blowback). A less likely path would be one involving successful ramping and immediately successful tamping, as I have argued theoretically that, due to affective dynamics and the strategic interests of opposition politicians, it is more difficult to instrumentally counteract an emotion than it is to intensify it. Further sensitive ideo-affective analyses may see variants of the precise pathway shown to be in operation at the beginning of the Cold War, but those variants can be understood and interpreted in terms

⁵ William Reddy qtd. in Plamper, "The History of Emotions," May 1, 2010, 237–38.

of this ideo-affective logic set out above. This theorization of ideo-affective politics provides a generally valid interpretive tool.

Beyond the value of the theoretical pathway in elucidating individual cases of foreign policy, my thesis also has implications for the theorization of emotions in politics and foreign policymaking. It shows that emotions can be a powerful tool of public persuasion in selling a policy, and also demonstrates that it can be incredibly difficult to control these dynamics once emotions are unleashed. In this manner, my work suggests that it is easier to ramp up emotions than tamp them down. At the same time, my theory also shows the non-deterministic nature of public emotion, showing how it can be used both to support and undermine foreign policy decisions. It also reconceives of notions of public opinion through operationalizing the structure of feeling, adding affective factors into what is generally understood as a cognitive or discursive category.

This ideo-affective theory thus provides a useful tool for analyzing cases of mobilizing for major foreign policy change. While readily applicable to modern American foreign policy studies, this analysis could conceivably extend beyond the temporal-spatial locale of modern American politics, so long as the researcher remains attuned to the cultural facets of emotion construction in different times and places.

4 Future research

In addition to this generalizability, we might consider several ways to extend this research in the future. First, researchers could look for similar ramping-tamping-revamping dynamics (or the appropriate variant) in different empirical cases. A prime candidate to apply this framework to would be the massive foreign policy changes that took place in the United States surrounding the attacks of September 11, using the George W. Bush administration's construction of the War on Terror as the site for evaluating initial ramping, and looking for evidence of revamping in the strategic decisions made to invade

Afghanistan and Iraq. We would be able to apply similar institutional and cultural constraints to explore alternative ideo-affective pathways, especially as there did not appear to be any form of attempted tamping during this period.⁶ A second candidate, going back to archival materials, would be the American wavering between internationalism and anti-interventionism of the inter-war period. Moving beyond the United States, sufficiently informed researchers may want to explore the shifts in Soviet Union foreign policy before and after Stalin's death, or the changes undertaken during and after the Meiji Restoration in Japan, for example. In both cases, there were major efforts to mobilize the public for foreign policy endeavors, providing excellent candidates for future research.

Beyond applying the theory to additional cases of public mobilization and foreign policy change, each section of the theory could be explored in different ways. To begin with ramping, further research could extend into different types of emotional ramping – e.g. that designed to evoke anger vs. fear vs. confidence – and their impacts on public persuasion. Further, studies of ramping could integrate an embodied ontology further into the socio-cultural study of emotions and their impact on public mobilization. While this thesis took into theoretical account the embodied nature of affect, analysis of this aspect was circumscribed by being a historical case study without access to the primary actors. Lab-based or survey experiments might be able to shed more light on the corporeal dynamics of ramping in contemporary politics. With regards to historical cases, more sensitive methods of identifying emotions and affect in historical practice should be explored. I devised an affectively-sensitive discourse analysis that I used to analyze texts and discourse, but analyses of demonstrations, protests, actions, and other non-discursive practices rely on the realm of identifying the self-reported. More work needs to be done across the board in advancing new methods of capturing emotions, within and outside of

⁶ It should be noted that I chose to explore the beginning of the Cold War over this 21st century case specifically because most current affective IR studies use the latter case for empirical analysis. Rather than add to the burgeoning affective analysis of this particular period, I wanted to show the theoretical applicability to historical studies as well, offering researchers more analytical pathways going forward.

discourse, especially in historical and archival materials, where participants cannot be hooked up to brain scanners or neurological equipment.

With regards to tamping, I have stated above that calming (or, in its closest analog, the Copenhagen School's "desecuritization") has remained underexplored in many different theoretical realms. While I tried to give the category its theoretical due, the empirics of the case meant that tamping occupied less space than ramping or revamping because the Truman administration's tamping efforts were unsuccessful. More research is needed to explore the regulation of emotions in international politics, especially to test my theoretical claim that ramping is much easier than tamping. Further studies could also look at the tamping of different types of ramped up publics, seeing if it is the types of emotions aroused or intensity of those emotions that impacts most upon the successes or failures of the tamping process.

Finally, with regard to revamping, more research can be done into the differentiation of strategic and non-strategic emotions. There are ontological limitations to this differentiation (see above) but there remains a methodological case to be made for seeking ways to better capture private emotion. Scholars can also explore further the ways that the initial structure of feeling enables or constrains its reconstitution. Are there particular ideo-affective approaches that are stickier than others, and thus will be less likely to undergo revamping? Are there particular actors with either psychological or institutional characteristics that make revamping more or less likely, or make it more likely to be genuine or strategic? These questions ought to be explored further by researchers interested in emotions and the making and changing of foreign policy. What this thesis has done is provide a theoretical platform from which such enquiries can be launched, and into which such findings may be integrated.

This thesis has sought to account for the beginning of the Cold War through recourse to ideo-affective politics, or the analysis of the intersection of ideas, emotions, and political processes. It has introduced a conceptual pathway of possibility, outlining how the ramping up of public emotions, the failed tamping down of those emotions, and the revamping of the initial actor's beliefs and approaches led to the form of all-out public and elite mobilization that allowed for the construction of nearly a half-century of global conflict. Through analyzing archival and public sources and engaging with existing historiographical debates, I have shown that the Truman administration's decisions to undertake the Truman Offensive in 1947 set into motion certain ideo-affective dynamics that, when the administration proved unable to control or counteract them, would transform their perceived interests. Truman may have thought himself a master sorcerer, but he turned out to be only a lowly apprentice, at the mercy of forces he could not control.

Appendix

This appendix contains the list of the 626 documents that I included in the “Pre-Truman Doctrine corpus,” cited in Chapter 2. These include all of President Truman’s speeches, news conferences, proclamations, statements, messages, and public letters delivered during the period from his assumption of the presidency on April 12, 1945 through to his issuance of the “Truman Doctrine” on March 12, 1947. All documents can be accessed at the UCSB American Presidency Project site.

1. Statement by the President After Taking the Oath of Office. April 12, 1945
2. Proclamation 2648 - Announcing the Death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, April 13, 1945
3. Authorizing Certification for Probational Appointment of Persons Who Lost Opportunity for Probational Appointment Because of Entry Into the Armed Forces, April 13, 1945
4. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, April 16, 1945
5. Address Broadcast to the Armed Forces, April 17, 1945
6. Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Extending the Lend-Lease Act, April 17, 1945
7. Proclamation 2649 - Mother's Day, April 17, 1945
8. The President's News Conference, April 17, 1945
9. Statement by the President on the Senate's Approval of the Water Utilization Treaty With Mexico, April 18, 1945
10. Statement by the President on the Death of Ernie Pyle, April 18, 1945
11. The President's News Conference, April 20, 1945
12. Joint Statement With Allied Leaders Warning Against Mistreatment of Prisoners in Germany, April 23, 1945
13. Address to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, April 25, 1945
14. Letter to Secretary Wallace Requesting a Study of the Patent Laws, April 26, 1945
15. Statement by the President Announcing the Junction of Anglo-American and Soviet Forces in Germany, April 27, 1945
16. Statement by the President Announcing the Appointment of Dr. Isador Lubin to the Reparations Commission, April 27, 1945
17. Letter to Edwin W. Pauley Appointing Him as the President's Personal Representative on the Reparations Commission, April 27, 1945
18. The President's News Conference on the Rumor of German Surrender April 28, 1945
19. Letter to the Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, Concerning Key Personnel of the War Agencies, May 1, 1945
20. Statement by the President Commending the Office of Price Administration, May 1, 1945
21. Letter to the Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, Concerning Key Personnel of the War Agencies, May 1, 1945
22. Statement by the President on the Surrender of German Forces in Italy. May 2, 1945
23. Statement by the President Concerning the Termination of the Office of Civilian Defense. May 2, 1945
24. Messages to Allied Commanders on the Surrender of German Forces in Italy, May 2, 1945
25. The President's News Conference, May 2, 1945
26. Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to Take Possession of and to Operate Certain Coal Mines, May 3, 1945
27. Veto of Bill Providing for the Deferment of Additional Agricultural Workers, May 3, 1945
28. Statement by the President Concerning Philippine Independence, May 5, 1945

29. Proclamation 2650 - National Rehabilitation Week, May 5, 1945
30. Statement by the President on the Timing of the Announcement of the German Surrender, May 7, 1945
31. Messages to Allied Leaders and to General Eisenhower on the Surrender of Germany, May 8, 1945
32. Broadcast to the American People Announcing the Surrender of Germany, May 8, 1945
33. Statement by the President Calling for Unconditional Surrender of Japan, May 8, 1945
34. Proclamation 2651 - Victory in Europe Day of Prayer, May 8, 1945
35. The President's News Conference on V-E Day, May 8, 1945
36. Proclamation 2652 - National Farm-Safety Week, 1945 May 9, 1945
37. Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Extending the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, May 9, 1945
38. Statement by the President on German Reparations, May 15, 1945
39. The President's News Conference, May 15, 1945
40. Proclamation 2653 - Emergency Board, Colorado & Wyoming Railway Company--Employees, May 16, 1945
41. Statement by the President Following a Discussion With Foreign Minister Bidault of France, May 18, 1945
42. Remarks Before the Congress on Presenting the Medal of Honor to Sergeant Jake W. Lindsey, May 21, 1945
43. Letter to Heads of War Agencies on the Economic Situation in the Liberated Countries of Northwest Europe, May 22, 1945
44. The President's News Conference, May 23, 1945
45. Letter Accepting Resignation of Marvin Jones as War Food Administrator, May 23, 1945
46. Letter Accepting Resignation of Francis Biddle as the Attorney General, May 23, 1945
47. Letter Accepting Resignation of Frances Perkins as Secretary of Labor, May 23, 1945
48. Letter Accepting Resignation of Claude R. Wickard as Secretary of Agriculture, May 23, 1945
49. Special Message to the Congress on the Organization of the Executive Branch, May 24, 1945
50. Special Message to the Congress on Unemployment Compensation, May 28, 1945
51. Proclamation 2654 - Flag Day, 1945, May 28, 1945
52. Letter Accepting Resignation of Stephen T. Early as Secretary to the President, May 31, 1945
53. Special Message to the Congress on Winning the War With Japan, June 1, 1945
54. Letter to the Chairman, House Civil Service Committee, Concerning Reduction in Hours of Work, June 1, 1945
55. The President's News Conference, June 1, 1945
56. Letter Declining To Accept Resignation of Samuel I. Rosenman as Special Counsel to the President, June 1, 1945
57. Citation Accompanying Presentation of the Legion of Merit to Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq, June 1, 1945
58. Statement by the President on the Continued Need for Food, June 2, 1945
59. Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the Defense Aid Program, June 4, 1945
60. Letter to the Chairman, House Rules Committee, Concerning the Committee on Fair Employment Practice, June 5, 1945
61. Statement by the President on the Transportation Problem, June 7, 1945
62. Letter to the Director, Office of Defense Transportation, Concerning Redeployment of the Armed Forces, June 7, 1945
63. Letter to General William S. Knudsen on His Retirement From Active Duty, June 7, 1945
64. The President's News Conference, June 7, 1945
65. Statement by the President on the Forthcoming Visit of President Rios of Chile, June 8, 1945
66. Citation Accompanying the Distinguished Service Medal Honoring General Edwin M. Watson, June 8, 1945
67. Statement by the President on Paper Conservation. June 9, 1945
68. Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the Salaries of Members of Congress, June 12, 1945
69. The President's News Conference, June 13, 1945

70. Statement by the President on Driving Safety, June 18, 1945
71. Special Message to the Congress on the Succession to the Presidency, June 19, 1945
72. The President's News Conference at Olympia, Washington, June 21, 1945
73. Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Continuing Certain Subsidy Payments, June 23, 1945
74. Address in San Francisco at the Closing Session of the United Nations Conference, June 26, 1945
75. The President's News Conference at Independence, Missouri, June 27, 1945
76. Remarks Upon Receiving an Honorary Degree From the University of Kansas City, June 28, 1945
77. Address Before the Senate Urging Ratification of the Charter of the United Nations, July 2, 1945
78. Memorandum Reducing the Workweek of Federal Employees to 44 Hours, July 3, 1945
79. Letter Accepting Resignation of Harry L. Hopkins as Special Assistant to the President, July 3, 1945
80. Statement by the President - The Fourth of July, July 4, 1945
81. Statement by the President Commending the Work of the United National Clothing Collection, July 4, 1945
82. Statement by the President on the Death of John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, July 4, 1945
83. Statement by the President Announcing Establishment of Diplomatic Relations With the New Polish Government, July 5, 1945
84. Joint Statement Following Discussions With Foreign Minister Sofianopoulos of Greece, July 5, 1945
85. The President's News Conference, July 5, 1945
86. Exchange of Messages With the Prime Minister of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, July 5, 1945
87. Veto of Bill Relating to Law Enforcement in the District of Columbia, July 6, 1945
88. Memorandum to Federal Agencies on the Handling of Government Funds, July 6, 1945
89. Statement by the President - Bastille Day – July 13, 1945
90. Letter to Secretary Morgenthau Concerning the Appointment of Fred M. Vinson as His Successor, July 14, 1945
91. Proclamation 2655 - Removal of Alien Enemies July 14, 1945
92. Statement by the President on the Manpower Needs of the Western Railroads, July 16, 1945
93. Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Transmitting Reports on Foreign War Relief Activities, July 17, 1945
94. Special Message to the Congress on Amending the Surplus Property Act To Provide for a Single Administrator, July 17, 1945
95. Remarks at the Raising of the Flag Over the U.S. Group Control Council Headquarters in Berlin. July 20, 1945
96. Proclamation 2657 - National Defense Pipe Line the Texas-Empire Pipe Line Company July 20, 1945
97. Letter to David K. Niles, Administrative Assistant to the President. July 20, 1945
98. Proclamation 2656 - Air Force Day July 20, 1945
99. Letter Read by Secretary Vinson at the Humanitarian Award Dinner of the Variety Clubs of America, July 25, 1945
100. Letter to Alben W. Barkley on the Eighth Anniversary of His Election as Majority Leader of the Senate. July 27, 1945
101. Veto of Bill Authorizing the Improvement of Certain Harbors, July 28, 1945
102. Proclamation 2658 - Regulations Relating to Migratory Birds and Certain Game Mammals July 31, 1945
103. Veto of Bill Conveying Certain Property to Norwich University July 31, 1945
104. Joint Report With Allied Leaders on the Potsdam Conference, August 2, 1945
105. The President's News Conference August 8, 1945
106. Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference. August 9, 1945

107. Letter to Edward R. Stettinius Appointing Him U.S. Representative on the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations. August 9, 1945
108. Letter to the Chairman, War Production Board, on Measures To Speed Reconversion. August 9, 1945
109. Citation Accompanying the Distinguished Service Medal Presented to James F. Byrnes. August 13, 1945
110. Proclamation 2659 - Eliminating Certain Lands From the Santa Rosa Island National Monument and Reserving Them for the Use of the War Department for Military Purposes August 13, 1945
111. Statement by the President on the 10th Anniversary of the Social Security Act, August 13, 1945
112. Statement by the President Commending Federal Employees. August 14, 1945
113. Statement by the President Announcing a Reduction in the Draft. August 14, 1945
114. The President's News Conference August 14, 1945
115. Statement by the President - Jewish New Year. August 15, 1945
116. Proclamation 2660 - Victory in the East--Day of Prayer August 16, 1945
117. Statement by the President Proposing Measures To Insure Industrial Peace in the Reconversion Period, August 16, 1945
118. The President's News Conference August 16, 1945
119. Proclamation 2661 - Fire Prevention Week, 1945 August 22, 1945
120. The President's News Conference August 23, 1945
121. Citation Accompanying the Legion of Merit Presented to President de Gaulle of France. August 24, 1945
122. Memorandum Concerning Veteran Preference in Federal Agencies, August 24, 1945
123. Citation Accompanying the Legion of Merit Presented to Georges Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France. August 24, 1945
124. Statement by the President on the 25th Anniversary of the Women's Suffrage Amendment. August 25, 1945
125. Joint Statement Following Discussions With President de Gaulle of France. August 25, 1945
126. Statement by the President Concerning Veterans Hospitals. August 25, 1945
127. Letter to the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Military Affairs on Army Manpower Requirements. August 27, 1945
128. Memorandum Concerning Reimbursement of War Contractors for Wages Paid for Work on August 15 and 16. August 28, 1945
129. The President's News Conference August 29, 1945
130. Letter to George E. Allen Concerning the Liquidation of War Agencies. August 30, 1945
131. Letter to Byron Price Requesting Him To Study Relations Between U.S. Forces of Occupation and the German People. August 30, 1945
132. The President's News Conference August 30, 1945
133. Statement by the President Upon Signing Order Concerning Government Information Programs. August 31, 1945
134. Radio Address to the American People After the Signing of the Terms of Unconditional Surrender by Japan. September 1, 1945
135. Statement by the President - Labor Day, September 1, 1945
136. Radio Address to the Members of the Armed Forces. September 2, 1945
137. Citation Accompanying the Distinguished Service Medal Presented to Howard Bruce. September 5, 1945
138. Citation Accompanying the Distinguished Service Medal Presented to Harry L. Hopkins. September 5, 1945
139. Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Transmitting Proposed Reductions in Appropriations for Civilian War Agencies. September 5, 1945
140. The President's News Conference September 5, 1945
141. Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period. September 6, 1945
142. The President's News Conference September 6, 1945
143. Proclamation 2662 - Removal of Alien Enemies September 8, 1945

144. Letter to the Surgeon General Concerning Termination of the Nurses Training Program. September 8, 1945
145. Citation Accompanying the Congressional Medal of Honor Presented to General Jonathan M. Wainwright. September 10, 1945
146. Proclamation 2663 - Discontinuing the Casco Bay, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Boston, Cape Hatteras, and Key West Maritime Control Areas September 11, 1945
147. The President's News Conference September 12, 1945
148. Message to General Pershing on His 85th Birthday. September 13, 1945
149. Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Transmitting Proposed Reductions in Appropriations for the Navy. September 14, 1945
150. Statement by the President on the European Relief and Rehabilitation Program. September 17, 1945
151. Statement by the President on the Liberation of Korea. September 18, 1945
152. The President's News Conference September 18, 1945
153. Statement by the President Concerning Demobilization of the Armed Forces. September 19, 1945
154. Letter Accepting Resignation of Henry L. Stimson as Secretary of War. September 20, 1945
155. Letter to Secretary Byrnes Concerning the Development of a Foreign Intelligence Program. September 20, 1945
156. Letter to General William J. Donovan on the Termination of the Office of Strategic Services. September 20, 1945
157. Citation Accompanying the Distinguished Service Medal Presented to Henry L. Stimson. September 21, 1945
158. Proclamation 2664 - National Employ the Physically Handicapped Week, 1945, September 21, 1945
159. Statement of Policy, Approved by the President, Relating to Post-War Japan. September 22, 1945
160. Letter to Henry J. Kaiser Calling Upon Him To Head the Second United National Clothing Collection Campaign. September 23, 1945
161. Message Approved by the President Concerning the Extent of General MacArthur's Authority in Japan. September 24, 1945
162. Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Transmitting Proposed Reductions in Appropriations for the War Department. September 25, 1945
163. The President's News Conference September 26, 1945
164. Veto of Bill for the Relief of the City of Council Bluffs, Iowa. September 27, 1945
165. Telegram to the Governor of New York Concerning the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Projects. September 27, 1945
166. Proclamation 2667 - Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf September 28, 1945
167. Proclamation 2665 - Columbus Day, 1945 September 28, 1945
168. Proclamation 2666 - Immigration Quotas for Austria and Germany September 28, 1945
169. Proclamation 2668 - Policy of the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas September 28, 1945
170. Statement by the President on Announcing the Termination of the American Production Mission in China. September 29, 1945
171. Letter to General Eisenhower Concerning Conditions Facing Displaced Persons in Germany. September 29, 1945
172. Proclamation 2669 - End of the Emergency Period Defined in Section 124 of the Internal Revenue Code September 29, 1945
173. Letter to Harry L. Hopkins Concerning the Roosevelt National Memorial Committee. October 1, 1945
174. Radio Address Opening the 1945 National War Fund Campaign. October 2, 1945
175. Special Message to the Congress on the St. Lawrence Seaway. October 3, 1945
176. Special Message to the Congress on Atomic Energy. October 3, 1945
177. The President's News Conference October 3, 1945

178. Statement by the President Concerning Government Operation of Petroleum Refineries Closed by Strikes. October 4, 1945
179. Citation Accompanying the Distinguished Service Medal Presented to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. October 5, 1945
180. Letter Accepting Resignation of J. A. Krug as Chairman of the War Production Board. October 5, 1945
181. Remarks at the Presentation of the Congressional Medal of Honor to Fourteen Members of the Navy and Marine Corps. October 5, 1945
182. Remarks at the Pemiscot County Fair, Caruthersville, Missouri. October 7, 1945
183. The President's News Conference at Tiptonville, Tennessee October 8, 1945
184. Address and Remarks at the Dedication of the Kentucky Dam at Gilbertsville, Kentucky. October 10, 1945
185. Statement by the President on the 34th Anniversary of the Chinese Republic. October 10, 1945
186. Proclamation 2670 - General Pulaski's Memorial Day October 11, 1945
187. Remarks on Presenting the Congressional Medal of Honor to Fifteen Members of the Armed Forces. October 12, 1945
188. Letter to Representative Powell of New York Regarding the Refusal of Permission to His Wife for a Concert in Constitution Hall. October 12, 1945
189. Special Message to the Congress on Puerto Rico. October 16, 1945
190. Statement by the President Following the Visit of President Rios of Chile. October 16, 1945
191. Memorandum on the Community War Fund Campaign in the National Capital Area. October 17, 1945
192. The President's News Conference October 18, 1945
193. Statement by the President on the Anniversary of the Founding of the Czechoslovak Republic. October 22, 1945
194. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Universal Military Training. October 23, 1945
195. The President's News Conference October 25, 1945
196. Letters to the High Commissioner to the Philippines and to the Heads of Federal Agencies Recommending Measures for the Assistance of the Philippines. October 26, 1945
197. Address on Foreign Policy at the Navy Day Celebration in New York City. October 27, 1945
198. Address in New York City at the Commissioning of the U.S.S. Franklin D. Roosevelt. October 27, 1945
199. Letter to Dr. Lyman J. Briggs on His Retirement as Director of the National Bureau of Standards. October 29, 1945
200. Radio Address to the American People on Wages and Prices in the Reconversion Period. October 30, 1945
201. Proclamation 2671 - Woman's Enfranchisement Day October 31, 1945
202. The President's News Conference October 31, 1945
203. Letter to Edgar F. Puryear on Receiving Report of the Review Committee on Deferment of Government Employees. November 1, 1945
204. Statement by the President on Announcing the Mission to Japan of Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley, Personal Representative of the President on Reparations Matters. November 1, 1945
205. Address at the Opening Session of the Labor- Management Conference. November 5, 1945
206. Proclamation 2672 - Armistice Day, 1945 November 5, 1945
207. Letter to the Chairman, House Appropriations Committee, Concerning the Need for Additional Funds for Advance Planning of Public Works. November 7, 1945
208. Proclamation 2673 - Thanksgiving Day, 1945 November 12, 1945
209. Letter to Francis Biddle in Response to His Report on the Nurnberg Tribunal. November 12, 1946
210. Letter to Prime Minister Attlee Concerning the Need for Resettlement of Jewish Refugees in Palestine. November 13, 1945
211. Statement by the President on the Problem of Jewish Refugees in Europe. November 13, 1945

212. Special Message to the Congress on U.S. Participation in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. November 13, 1945
213. Letter to President Osmena of the Philippines Upon Approving a Bill of the Philippine Congress. November 14, 1945
214. Statement by the President on the Tenth Anniversary of the Philippine Commonwealth. November 15, 1945
215. The President's News Conference Following the Signing of a Joint Declaration on Atomic Energy November 15, 1945
216. Special Message to the Congress Recommending a Comprehensive Health Program. November 19, 1945
217. The President's News Conference November 20, 1945
218. Letter to General Hans Kramer Appointing Him U.S. Representative in Negotiations Between Colorado and Kansas for Division of Waters of Arkansas River. November 21, 1945
219. Statement by the President Concerning Government Operation of Transit Facilities in the District of Columbia. November 21, 1945
220. Citation Accompanying the Legion of Merit Awarded to Crown Prince Olav of Norway. November 23, 1945
221. Citation Accompanying the Legion of Merit Awarded to Air Marshal Douglas Colyer. November 27, 1945
222. Citation Accompanying the Distinguished Service Medal Awarded to Field Marshal Sir Henry M. Wilson. November 27, 1945
223. Citation Accompanying the Legion of Merit Awarded to Fleet Admiral Sir James F. Somerville. November 27, 1945
224. Citation Accompanying the Legion of Merit Awarded to Lieutenant General Sir Gordon N. Macready. November 27, 1945
225. Letter Transmitting Report on the Occupation of Germany to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. November 28, 1945
226. The President's News Conference November 29, 1945
227. Letter to the President, Society for the Advancement of Management, Concerning Full Employment. November 30, 1945
228. Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Concerning Federal Assistance for Child Care Centers. October 4, 1945
229. Special Message to the Congress on Labor-Management Relations. December 3, 1945
230. Veto of Bill Granting Benefits to Enlisted Men for Foreign Service Between 1898 and 1912. December 3, 1945
231. Telegrams to Management and Labor Leaders Concerning Industrial Disputes Involving the General Motors Corporation and the U.S. Steel Corporation. December 3, 1945
232. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Government Corporation Control Act. December 6, 1945
233. Proclamation 2674 - Revoking Certain Regulations Relating to the Control of Alien Enemies December 7, 1945
234. The President's News Conference December 7, 1945
235. Joint Statement With the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada Concerning Removal of Wartime Trade Controls. December 10, 1945
236. Statement by the President Concerning the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (Palestine Commission). December 10, 1945
237. Letter to Wilson Wyatt Appointing Him Housing Expediter. December 12, 1945
238. The President's News Conference December 12, 1945
239. Citation Accompanying the Medal for Merit Awarded to Henry Morgenthau. December 12, 1945
240. Citation Accompanying the Medal for Merit Awarded to Ralph K. Davies. December 12, 1945
241. Citation Accompanying the Distinguished Service Medal Awarded to Admiral Ernest J. King. December 14, 1945
242. Statement by the president - United States Policy Toward China, December 15, 1945

243. Veto of Bill Raising the Rank of Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs of Naval Bureaus. December 17, 1945
244. Special Message to the Congress Recommending the Establishment of a Department of National Defense. December 19, 1945
245. Special Message to the Senate Transmitting Nominations of United States Representatives to the United Nations. December 19, 1945
246. The President's News Conference December 20, 1945
247. Letter to Senator Wagner and Representative Manasco Concerning the Full Employment Bill. December 20, 1945
248. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Reorganization Act of 1945. December 20, 1945
249. Letter to Dr. Isaiah Bowman on Federal Assistance for Scientific Research. December 20, 1945
250. Letter to the Administrator, Federal Works Agency, Asking Him To Head a Conference on Traffic Safety. December 21, 1945
251. Proclamation 2675 - Revocation of the Proclamation Suspending the International Load Lines Convention in Ports and Waters of the United States December 21, 1945
252. Statement and Directive by the President on Immigration to the United States of Certain Displaced Persons and Refugees in Europe. December 22, 1945
253. Memorandum of Disapproval of Bill Reducing Certain Appropriations and Contract Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1946. December 23, 1945
254. Proclamation 2676 - Granting Pardon to Certain Persons Who Have Served in the Armed Forces of the United States December 24, 1945
255. Address at the Lighting of the National Community Christmas Tree on the White House Grounds December 24, 1945
256. Letters to the Members of the Board of Directors on the Termination of the Smaller War Plants Corporation. December 27, 1945
257. Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Extending the Second War Powers Act. December 28, 1945
258. Proclamation 2677 - George Washington Carver Day December 28, 1945
259. Proclamation 2678 - Revoking Proclamation No. 2537 of January 14, 1942, Prescribing Regulations Relating to the Control of Alien Enemies December 29, 1945
260. Letter to the Chairman, National War Labor Board, on the Establishment of the National Wage Stabilization Board. December 31, 1945
261. Letter to General Bradley Regarding the Establishment of a Department of Medicine and Surgery in the Veterans Administration. January 3, 1946
262. Radio Report to the American People on the Status of the Reconversion Program. January 3, 1946
263. Letter Accepting Resignation of Admiral Land as Chairman and Member, U.S. Maritime Commission, and as Administrator, War Shipping Administration. January 4, 1946
264. Statement by the President on the Victory Clothing Collection for Overseas Relief. January 6, 1946
265. White House Statement on Anglo-American Committee Hearings on Palestine and the Problems of European Jews. January 7, 1946
266. Statement by the President on Demobilization. January 8, 1946
267. Citations Accompanying Distinguished Service Medal Presented to General Henry H. Arnold. January 8, 1946
268. The President's News Conference January 8, 1946
269. Statement by the President on Releasing Report of Fact-Finding Board on the General Motors Labor Dispute. January 10, 1946
270. Letter to the Speaker of the House Transmitting Proposed Reductions in Appropriations. January 11, 1946
271. Citation Accompanying Distinguished Service Medal Presented to General William J. Donovan. January 11, 1946
272. Statement by the President Following a White House Meeting To Avert a Steel Strike. January 12, 1946
273. Citation Accompanying Medal for Merit Presented to Byron Price. January 15, 1946

274. Citations Accompanying Legion of Merit Presented to Three Members of the White House Signal Detachment, U.S. Army. January 15, 1946
275. The President's News Conference January 15, 1946
276. Statement by the President Following Rejection of His Compromise Offer by the U.S. Steel Corporation. January 18, 1946
277. The President's News Conference on the Budget, January 19, 1946
278. Message to the Congress on the State of the Union and on the Budget for 1947 January 21, 1946
279. Letter to the Chairman and Members of the President's Steel Fact-Finding Board. January 22, 1946
280. Directive on Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities January 22, 1946
281. The President's News Conference January 24, 1946
282. Citation Accompanying Medal for Merit Presented to Samuel I. Rosenman. January 24, 1946
283. Directive Concerning the Shipment of Wheat and Coal to Liberated Countries January 25, 1946
284. Statement by the President Announcing Agreement To Arbitrate the Railway Labor Dispute. January 26, 1946
285. Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Financial Agreement With the United Kingdom. January 30, 1946
286. Radio Remarks on Behalf of the March of Dimes Campaign. January 30, 1946
287. The President's News Conference January 31, 1946
288. Letter to Senator McMahon Concerning a Bill for Domestic Development and Control of Atomic Energy. February 2, 1946
289. Statement by the President Announcing Emergency Measures To Relieve the World Food Shortage. February 6, 1946
290. Statement by the President Upon Disapproving a Bill of the Philippine Congress February 7, 1946
291. The President's News Conference February 7, 1946
292. Statement by the President on the Veterans' Emergency Housing Program. February 8, 1946
293. Remarks to Heads of Agencies and Personnel Directors on Reconversion of the Civil Service. February 9, 1946
294. Statement by the President Marking the Bicentennial of the Birth of Thaddeus Kosciuszko. February 11, 1946
295. Proclamation 2679 - Red Cross Month, 1946 February 14, 1946
296. Statement by the President Upon Issuing Order Modifying the Wage-Price Policy. February 14, 1946
297. Statement by the President Concerning Reestablishment of the Office of Economic Stabilization. February 14, 1946
298. The President's News Conference February 15, 1946
299. Statement by the President Concerning Provisions in Bill Affecting Philippine Army Veterans. February 20, 1946
300. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Employment Act. February 20, 1946
301. Statement by the President Urging Continuation of the Victory Garden Program. February 21, 1946
302. The President's News Conference February 21, 1946
303. Remarks to a Delegation from the United Jewish Appeal. February 25, 1946
304. Statement by the President on the Agreement Reached at the Civil Aviation Conference in Bermuda. February 26, 1946
305. The President's News Conference February 26, 1946
306. Telegram to Leading Citizens Concerning the Need for a Voluntary Food Conservation Program. February 27, 1946
307. Statement by the President Recommending a Nationwide Voluntary 'Share-the-Housing' Program., February 28, 1946
308. Remarks to Members of the Conference Called To Develop a Food Conservation Program. March 1, 1946
309. Radio Remarks Opening the Red Cross War Fund Drive. March 1, 1946

310. Special Message to the Congress Transmitting a Statement on Foreign Loan Policy. March 1, 1946
311. Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Concerning Measures To Stimulate Veterans Housing Construction. March 1, 1946
312. Statement by the President Upon Receiving a Resolution Endorsing the British Loan Agreement. March 4, 1946
313. Address in Columbus at a Conference of the Federal Council of Churches. March 6, 1946
314. Proclamation 2719 - Army Day and Army Week, 1947 March 7, 1947
315. Citation Accompanying the Medal for Merit Presented to J. Edgar Hoover. March 8, 1946
316. The President's News Conference March 8, 1946
317. Citation Accompanying the Medal for Merit Presented to John J. Pelley. March 8, 1946
318. Citation Accompanying the Medal for Merit Presented to John Monroe Johnson. March 8, 1946
319. Special Message to the Congress Recommending Establishment of an Office of Selective Service Records. March 10, 1947
320. Telegram to Leading Citizens Requesting Them To Serve on a National Famine Emergency Council. March 12, 1946
321. Proclamation 2680 - 'I Am an American Day,' 1946, March 12, 1946
322. Proclamation 2681 - Redefining the Area of Great Sand Dunes National Monument, Colorado March 12, 1946
323. Letter to Senator O'Mahoney Transmitting a Proposed Wool Price Support Program. March 12, 1946
324. Letter to Edwin W. Pauley Consenting to the Withdrawal of His Nomination. March 13, 1946
325. Letter to Owen D. Young Approving the Cancellation of the Congressional Awards Dinner. March 14, 1946
326. Statement by the President Concerning the Reemployment of Veterans. March 14, 1946
327. The President's News Conference March 14, 1946
328. Statement by the President Upon Receiving Reports Concerning Enemy Collaborators in the Philippines. March 16, 1946
329. Exchange of Messages With President Bierut of Poland Concerning Grain Shipments by UNRRA. March 18, 1946
330. Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Report Concerning the United Nations. March 19, 1946
331. Proclamation 2682 - Army Day, 1946 March 20, 1946
332. The President's News Conference March 21, 1946
333. Address at the Jackson Day Dinner. March 23, 1946
334. Proclamation 2683 - Cancer Control Month, 1946 March 25, 1946
335. Letter to Herbert H. Lehman Upon His Resignation as Director General, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. March 25, 1946
336. Remarks on Presenting the Congressional Medal of Honor to Commander Richard H. O'Kane, USN, and Master Sergeant Charles L. McGaha, USA. March 27, 1946
337. Proclamation 2684 - Pan American Week March 28, 1946
338. The President's News Conference March 28, 1946
339. Letter to Secretary Anderson Concerning the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. April 1, 1946
340. Statement by the President Upon Releasing Report of the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion. April 3, 1946
341. The President's News Conference April 3, 1946
342. Statement by the President Concerning Benefits for Philippine Army Veterans. April 4, 1946
343. Address in Chicago on Army Day. April 6, 1946
344. The President's News Conference With the Keen Teen Club of Chicago April 6, 1946
345. Proclamation 2685 - Removal of Alien Enemies April 10, 1946
346. Statement by the President Upon Signing Order Terminating the Office of Inter-American Affairs. April 10, 1946
347. Statement by the President Announcing Revised Budget Estimates. April 11, 1946

348. Remarks Upon Presenting the Collier's Congressional Awards to Senator Vandenberg and Representative Monroney April 11, 1946
349. Address at the Dedication of the Home of Franklin D. Roosevelt as a National Shrine. April 12, 1946
350. Statement by the President Concerning Preparations for Nuclear Tests in the Pacific. April 12, 1946
351. Proclamation 2686 - Child Health Day, 1946 April 13, 1946
352. Proclamation 2687 - National Maritime Day, 1946 April 13, 1946
353. Address Before the Governing Board of the Pan American Union. April 15, 1946
354. The President's News Conference April 17, 1946
355. Telegram to Herbert Hoover, Honorary Chairman, Famine Emergency Committee. April 18, 1946
356. The President's Special Conference With the American Society of Newspaper Editors. April 18, 1946
357. Radio Appeal to the Nation for Food Conservation to Relieve Hunger Abroad - April 19, 1946
358. Proclamation 2688 - Death of Harlan Fiske Stone April 24, 1946
359. Letter to the U.S. Chairman, Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. April 25, 1946
360. Proclamation 2689 - Mother's Day 1946 April 27, 1946
361. Proclamation 2690 - National Farm Safety Week, 1946 April 27, 1946
362. Statement by the President Upon Signing Bills Providing for Philippine Rehabilitation and Trade. April 30, 1946
363. Letter to Senator Murray Concerning a Bill for a National Health Program. April 30, 1946
364. Statement by the President on Receiving Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. April 30, 1946
365. Citation Accompanying the Medal for Merit Awarded to Julius A. Krug. May 1, 1946
366. Message to the Congress Transmitting Corporation Supplement to the Budget for 1947. May 2, 1946
367. The President's News Conference May 2, 1946
368. Statement by the President Upon Reappointing Myron Taylor as His Personal Representative at the Vatican. May 3, 1946
369. White House Statement Concerning Controls Over the Price and Distribution of Meat. May 3, 1946
370. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Veterans' Priority Bill for Surplus Property. May 3, 1946
371. Statement by the President on the Forthcoming National Highway Safety Conference. May 3, 1946
372. Letter to Secretary Krug Concerning Termination of the Petroleum Administration for War. May 3, 1946
373. Statement by the President Concerning Plans for Development of California's Water Resources. May 3, 1946
374. Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Bill for Inter-American Military Cooperation. May 6, 1946
375. Statement by the President Commending CARE. May 7, 1946
376. Citation Accompanying the Legion of Merit Awarded to Major General Ulysses S. Grant III. May 7, 1946
377. Citation Accompanying the Distinguished Service Medal Awarded to Major General Philip B. Fleming. May 7, 1946
378. Statement by the President on the Anniversary of V-E Day. May 8, 1946
379. Joint Statement With the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada Concerning the Combined Food Board. May 8, 1946
380. Address Before the President's Highway Safety Conference. May 8, 1946
381. Proclamation 2691 - Discontinuing the Hawaiian, Cristobal, Gulf of Panama, San Francisco, Columbia River, Puget Sound, Southeastern Alaska, Prince William Sound, Kodiak, Unalaska, Los Angeles and San Diego Maritime Control Areas May 8, 1946

382. Veto of Bill To Establish an Army Optometry Corps. May 9, 1946
383. The President's News Conference May 9, 1946
384. Statement by the President Upon Meeting the President-Elect of the Philippines. May 10, 1946
385. Address at Fordham University, New York City, Upon Receiving an Honorary Degree. May 11, 1946
386. Citation Accompanying the Medal for Merit Awarded to William D. Pawley. May 13, 1946
387. The President's Regular News Conference May 16, 1946
388. Statement by the President Upon Disapproving Bills of the Legislature of Puerto Rico May 16, 1946
389. The President's Special News Conference on the Coal Strike May 16, 1946
390. Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 1 of 1946. May 16, 1946
391. Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1946. May 16, 1946
392. Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 3 of 1946. May 16, 1946
393. Statement by the President Upon Issuing Order Directing Possession and Operation of the Railroads. May 17, 1946
394. The President's News Conference on the Railway Labor Negotiations May 18, 1946
395. Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House Transmitting Bill on Philippine Veterans' Benefits. May 18, 1946
396. Letter to the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion Concerning the Establishment of U.N. Headquarters. May 22, 1946
397. Radio Address to the American People on the Railroad Strike Emergency. May 24, 1946
398. Special Message to the Congress Urging Legislation for Industrial Peace. May 25, 1946
399. Proclamation 2692 - Flag Day, 1946 May 29, 1946
400. The President's News Conference May 31, 1946
401. Letter Accepting Resignation of Edward R. Stettinius as U.S. Representative to the United Nations. June 3, 1946
402. Statement by the President Upon Signing the National School Lunch Act. June 4, 1946
403. The President's News Conference June 6, 1946
404. Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Transmitting Proposed Reductions in Appropriations for War Agencies. June 7, 1946
405. Special Message to the Senate Urging Ratification of the International Convention on Civil Aviation. June 11, 1946
406. Statement by the President Upon Appointing a Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems. June 11, 1946
407. Veto of the Case Bill. June 11, 1946
408. Letter Accepting Resignation of Randolph Paul as Special Assistant for Negotiations on German Assets in Switzerland. June 12, 1946
409. Veto of Bill To Promote Former Prisoners of War in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. June 14, 1946
410. The President's News Conference June 14, 1946
411. Letter to the Chairmen, Congressional Committees on Military and Naval Affairs on Unification of the Armed Forces. June 15, 1946
412. Letter to the Secretaries of War and Navy on Unification of the Armed Forces. June 15, 1946
413. Citation Accompanying Medal for Merit Honoring Rudolph Forster, June 16, 1945
414. Letter to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, Concerning Integration of Federal Medical Services. June 18, 1946
415. Letter Accepting Resignation of Harold D. Smith as Director of the Bureau of the Budget. June 19, 1946
416. The President's News Conference June 20, 1946
417. Statement by the President Upon Appointing the Committee for Financing Foreign Trade. June 26, 1946
418. Proclamation 2693 - Suspension of Additional Processing Tax on Certain Coconut Oil June 27, 1946
419. Statement by the President on Making Public a Progress Report on Famine Relief. June 27, 1946

420. The President's News Conference June 27, 1946
421. Letter Commending the Federal Communications Commission. June 28, 1946
422. Letter Accepting Resignation of Chester Bowles as Director of Economic Stabilization. June 28, 1946
423. Veto of Bill Relating to Claims Against the United States by Certain Indian Tribes June 28, 1946
424. Letter to the President, Civil Service Commission, Concerning Employees of Liquidated Agencies. June 28, 1946
425. Letter to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, Concerning Termination of the Office of the Director of Liquidation. June 28, 1946
426. Radio Address to the Nation on Price Controls. June 29, 1946
427. Veto of Bill Providing for Exchanges of Property Within Glacier National Park. June 29, 1946
428. Joint Statement With the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada Announcing Creation of the International Emergency Food Council. June 29, 1946
429. Veto of the Price Control Bill. June 29, 1946
430. Letter Accepting Resignation of the Chairman and Members of the Fair Employment Practice Committee. June 30, 1946
431. White House Statement on the President's Meeting With Leaders of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. July 2, 1946
432. Letter to the Chairman, Wage Stabilization Board, Requesting the Members and Staff To Remain at Their Posts. July 2, 1946
433. Recorded Message to the People of the Philippines Upon the Occasion of Their Independence July 3, 1946
434. Statement by the President on the Independence of the Philippines. July 3, 1946
435. Special Message to the Congress Upon Approving the Hobbs Bill. July 3, 1946
436. Proclamation 2694 - Designating Properties Suitable for Diplomatic and Consular Establishments of the United States in the Philippine Islands July 3, 1946
437. Proclamation 2695 - Independence of the Philippines July 4, 1946
438. Proclamation 2696 - Immigration Quota for Philippine Islands July 4, 1946
439. Letter to the President, American Theatres Association, Concerning Government Informational Films. July 8, 1946
440. Statement by the President Upon the Death of Sidney Hillman. July 10, 1946
441. Statement by the President Summarizing Reconversion Progress. July 11, 1946
442. The President's News Conference July 11, 1946
443. Remarks to the Members of the Conference on Emergency Problems in Higher Education. July 11, 1946
444. Proclamation 2697 - Army Air Force Day - 1946 July 12, 1946
445. Statement by the President Upon Releasing Report on Famine Relief Food Shipments. July 12, 1946
446. Letter Appointing Members to the National Commission on Higher Education. July 13, 1946
447. Recorded Message to the President and People of France on Bastille Day. July 14, 1946
448. Remarks to the Members of the Youth Conference on Famine Relief. July 15, 1946
449. Statement by the President Following Approval of the Financial Agreement With Great Britain. July 15, 1946
450. Remarks Upon Presenting a Citation to a Nisei Regiment. July 15, 1946
451. Remarks Upon Presenting Presidential Unit Citations to Eight Aircraft Carriers. July 16, 1946
452. Remarks to a Group of Editors and Executives of the McGraw-Hill Publishing Company. July 17, 1946
453. The President's News Conference July 18, 1946
454. Statement by the President Upon Approving Bills for River and Harbor Improvement and for Flood Control. July 24, 1946
455. Special Message to the Congress Upon Signing the Second Price Control Bill. July 25, 1946
456. Letter to the National Commander, Veterans of Foreign Wars, on Representation of Veterans at the Peace Conference. July 26, 1946
457. Statement by the President Condemning Acts of Terrorism in Palestine. July 23, 1946

458. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act. July 23, 1946
459. Letters to Congressional Leaders Urging Enactment of the Housing Bill July 25, 1946
460. The President's News Conference July 25, 1946
461. Special Message to the Congress Transmitting a Recommendation of the International Labor Organization. July 26, 1946
462. Letter to the National Commander, American Legion, on Rehabilitation Problems. July 27, 1946
463. Statement by the President Upon Nominating Edwin G. Nourse as a Member of the Council of Economic Advisers. July 29, 1946
464. Special Message to the Senate Transmitting a Treaty and Protocol With the Philippines. July 30, 1946
465. Statement by the President Concerning U.S. Membership in UNESCO. July 30, 1946
466. Veto of Bill Granting Veteran Status to Certain Former Members of Revenue Cutter Crews. August 1, 1946
467. Veto of Bill Concerning Title to Offshore Lands. August 1, 1946
468. The President's News Conference August 1, 1946
469. Memorandum on the Need for Reducing Expenditures. August 1, 1946
470. Proclamation 2698 - Victory Day - 1946 August 2, 1946
471. The President's News Conference on the Review of the 1947 Budget August 2, 1946
472. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Legislative Reorganization Act. August 2, 1946
473. Veto of Bill To Authorize Exchange of Public Lands by the Secretary of the Interior. August 2, 1946
474. Letters Calling for Reductions in Expenditures for Construction. August 3, 1946
475. Letters Calling for Reductions in Expenditures for National Defense. August 3, 1946
476. Statement by the President on the Review of the 1947 Budget. August 3, 1946
477. Statement by the President Concerning the Coinage of Commemorative Half-Dollars. August 7, 1946
478. Proclamation 2699 - Amendments of Regulations Relating to Migratory Birds and Game Mammals August 8, 1946
479. Memorandum of Disapproval of Bill Relating to Construction of a Weather Bureau Station in Michigan. August 8, 1946
480. Remarks to Delegates of Boys Nation. August 9, 1946
481. The President's News Conference August 9, 1946
482. Memorandum of Disapproval of Bill To Create a Theodore Roosevelt National Park in Medora, North Dakota. August 10, 1946
483. Statement by the President Marking the Centennial of the Smithsonian Institution. August 10, 1946
484. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Foreign Service Act. August 13, 1946
485. Memorandum of Disapproval of Bill To Authorize Financial Readjustments by Debtor Railroad Corporations. August 13, 1946
486. Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Creating the Indian Claims Commission. August 13, 1946
487. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Hospital Survey and Construction Act. August 13, 1946
488. Statement by the President Upon Approving the Farmers' Home Administration Act. August 14, 1946
489. Memorandum of Disapproval of Bill Reducing Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Premiums. August 14, 1946
490. Memorandum of Disapproval of Bill Authorizing Certain Activities of the Bureau of Reclamation. August 14, 1946
491. Statement by the President Upon Approving Bill To Expand Basic Research in Agricultural Problems. August 14, 1946
492. Statement by the President - The Jewish New Year, August 15, 1946
493. White House Statement on Palestine and on the Problem of Displaced Persons in General. August 16, 1946

494. Memorandum of Disapproval of Bill To Abolish the Parker River National Wildlife Refuge. August 16, 1946
495. Statement by the President, Labor Day, August 31, 1946
496. Proclamation 2700 - Fire Prevention Week, 1946 September 3, 1946
497. Letter to the Chairman, American Veterans Committee, Concerning Discrimination on the Campus. September 4, 1946
498. The President's News Conference September 5, 1946
499. Proclamation 2701 - One Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of Washington's Farewell Address September 6, 1946
500. Proclamation 2702 - Enlarging the Deschutes National Forest, Oregon September 9, 1946
501. The President's News Conference September 12, 1946
502. Statement by the President on Employment of Disabled Veterans and Other Handicapped Persons September 12, 1946
503. Proclamation 2703 - National Employ the Physically Handicapped Week, 1946 September 12, 1946
504. Remarks at a Meeting With the National Conference of Business Paper Editors. September 13, 1946
505. The President's News Conference on Foreign Policy September 20, 1946
506. Statement by the President Concerning the National Wage Stabilization Board. September 21, 1946
507. Remarks to a Group of Democratic Congressional Candidates at the White House. September 24, 1946
508. Remarks to Members of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. September 25, 1946
509. Proclamation 2704 - General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1946 September 25, 1946
510. Proclamation 2705 - Columbus Day, 1946 September 25, 1946
511. The President's News Conference September 26, 1946
512. Remarks to the Cadet Corps at West Point. September 28, 1946
513. Radio Address Opening the Annual Campaigns for the Community Chest and the United Service Organizations. October 1, 1946
514. The President's News Conference October 3, 1946
515. Statement by the President Following the Adjournment of the Palestine Conference in London. October 4, 1946
516. Letter to Representative Pittenger of Minnesota Concerning Coal Supplies in the Midwest. October 8, 1946
517. The President's News Conference October 10, 1946
518. Letter Accepting Resignation of Judge John J. Parker as Alternate Member of the International Military Tribunal. October 12, 1946
519. Letter to James E. Markham Upon the Conclusion of His Duties as Alien Property Custodian. October 14, 1946
520. Radio Report to the Nation Announcing the Lifting of Major Price Controls. October 14, 1946
521. Proclamation 2706 - United Nations Education Day October 17, 1946
522. Statement by the President Upon Signing Order Establishing the President's Scientific Research Board. October 17, 1946
523. Letter to Justice Jackson Upon the Conclusion of His Duties With the Nurnberg Tribunal. October 17, 1946
524. Proclamation 2707 - National Air Mail Week October 19, 1946
525. Statement by the President Concerning the National School Lunch Program. October 22, 1946
526. Address in New York City at the Opening Session of the United Nations General Assembly. October 23, 1946
527. Statement by the President Concerning the Estonian Refugees in Florida. October 24, 1946
528. Statement by the President Concerning Limitations on Military and Public Works Expenditures. October 24, 1946
529. The President's News Conference October 24, 1946

530. Proclamation 2708 - Emergency Due to Housing Shortage-Free Importation of Timber, Lumber, and Lumber Products October 25, 1946
531. Letter to the Governor of Puerto Rico Disapproving a Bill Passed by the Territorial Legislature. October 26, 1946
532. Message to the King of Saudi Arabia Concerning Palestine. October 28, 1946
533. Letter to David Lilienthal on His Appointment as Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. October 28, 1946
534. Statement by the President Upon Appointing Gordon R. Clapp as Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority. October 28, 1946
535. Proclamation 2709 - Thanksgiving Day, 1946 October 28, 1946
536. Proclamation 2710 - Armistice Day, 1946 October 28, 1946
537. The President's News Conference October 28, 1946
538. Statement by the President Commemorating the Founding of the Czechoslovak Republic. October 29, 1946
539. Proclamation 2711 - Dedication Day, 1946 October 30, 1946
540. Statement by the President on the Status of the 48 Estonian Refugees. November 2, 1946
541. Statement by the President Concerning the Japanese Mandated Islands. November 6, 1946
542. Statement by the President on the Forthcoming International Conference on Tariffs and Trade. November 9, 1946
543. Statement by the President Upon Terminating Price and Wage Controls. November 9, 1946
544. The President's News Conference November 11, 1946
545. Statement by the President Endorsing a Plan for Negotiations Between Coal Miners and Operators. November 15, 1946
546. Statement by the President Concerning Myron Taylor's Mission in Rome. November 23, 1946
547. Citation Accompanying the Medal for Merit Awarded Paul V. McNutt. November 27, 1946
548. Letter to Members of the National Famine Emergency Committee. November 29, 1946
549. Letter Accepting Resignation of Paul Porter as Price Administrator. November 29, 1946
550. The President's News Conference December 3, 1946
551. Proclamation 2712 - Amending Proclamation No. 2599 of November 4, 1943, Entitled 'Merchandise in General-Order and Bonded Warehouses,' December 3, 1946
552. Statement by the President on the Veterans Emergency Housing Program. December 4, 1946
553. Letter Accepting Resignation of Wilson Wyatt as Housing Expediter. December 4, 1946
554. Letter Accepting Resignation of J. D. Small as Civilian Production Administrator. December 5, 1946
555. Message of Condolence to King George II Upon the Death of the Greek Ambassador. December 7, 1946
556. Proclamation 2713 - Bill of Rights Day, 1946 December 9, 1946
557. The President's News Conference December 12, 1946
558. Statement by the President Outlining the Housing Program for 1947. December 14, 1946
559. Letter to Granville Conway Asking Him To Serve as Coordinator of Emergency Export Programs. December 17, 1946
560. Statement by the President - United States Policy Toward China, December 18, 1946
561. The President's News Conference December 18, 1946
562. Statement by the President Concerning the Transportation of Refugees to the United States. December 19, 1946
563. Remarks to the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training. December 20, 1946
564. Statement by the President Upon Signing Order Creating an Amnesty Board To Review Convictions Under the Selective Service Act. December 23, 1946
565. Letter Accepting Resignation of Edwin A. Locke, Jr., as Special Assistant to the President. December 23, 1946
566. Address at the Lighting of the National Community Christmas Tree on the White House Grounds. December 24, 1946
567. Proclamation 2714 - Cessation of Hostilities of World War II December 31, 1946
568. The President's News Conference on the Termination of Hostilities of World War II December 31, 1946

569. Letter Accepting Resignation of Bernard M. Baruch as U.S. Representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. January 4, 1947
570. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union January 6, 1947
571. Letter Accepting Resignation of James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State. January 7, 1947
572. Special Message to the Congress - The President's First Economic Report, January 8, 1947
573. Memorandum Concerning the Red Cross Campaign. January 8, 1947
574. The President's News Conference on the Budget January 8, 1947
575. Annual Budget Message to the Congress - Fiscal Year 1948, January 10, 1947
576. Statement by the President on Highway Safety. January 15, 1947
577. Remarks to Members of the President's Committee on Civil Rights. January 15, 1947
578. Letter to Secretary Patterson and Secretary Forrestal Concerning Unification of the Armed Services. January 16, 1947
579. White House Statement Concerning the President's Recommendation of an Additional Repeal of Authorized Appropriations. January 17, 1947
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