

Double Truth: How are we to look at it?¹

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Abstract: There is consensus among historians of medieval philosophy that the Double Truth was never held by late medieval scholastics. Double Truth is the position that conflicting philosophical and religious ideas are both true. It was denounced in the Condemnations of 1277 by the Bishop of Paris, and criticised in Aquinas's *De unitate intellectus* (1270). The consensus is based on accounts of Double Truth in these two sources, examination of scholastic texts potentially presenting Double Truth positions, and the Aristotelian definition of philosophical contradiction. However, close reading of the two sources does not support the definition of Double Truth used by historians. This article analyses the evidence, and proposes that we modify how we define Double Truth to account for a genuine historical phenomenon warranting the reactions of Aquinas and the Bishop of Paris. It also suggests that we reconsider Boethius of Dacia and possibly Siger of Brabant as proponents of it.

Key Words: Double Truth; Condemnations of 1277; Thomas Aquinas; Boethius of Dacia; Siger of Brabant; medieval faith-reason issues.

When on 7 March 1277 Étienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, issued the famous Condemnations of 219 philosophical principles, he decried a view, or practice, which historians call the “Double Truth”². In the preamble to the decree, he claimed that scholars at the University of Paris were saying that some things were true according to philosophy but not according to Catholic faith, “as if there were two contrary truths”³. Historians of medieval philosophy have discussed the Double Truth at length, and have carefully studied extant texts by late medieval scholastics in an effort to identify instances of proponents of it. The consensus is that no scholastics actually held the position⁴. This seems to be

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² L. BIANCHI traces the origin and use of this term by historians in *Pour une histoire de la “double vérité”*, Paris 2008, esp. pp. 7-13. There has been some question as to whether the Double Truth has roots in Averroes, but R. Taylor has shown that this is not what Averroes taught. Averroes held that philosophical and religious truths were consistent with each other, so long as philosophical demonstration was well constructed and interpretation of Scripture was not mistaken (such interpretation might have to be allegorical). See R.C. TAYLOR, “‘Truth Does Not Contradict Truth’: Averroes and the Unity of Truth”, in: *Topoi* 19 (2000), pp. 3-16, at 5 and 10-11. Nevertheless, Averroes seems to stray from this principle in the contradiction between his teaching on the intellect and the Muslim doctrine of personal immortality: *ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

³ See quotation at n. 27.

⁴ The consensus goes back a century; see: H. THIJSEN, “Condemnation of 1277”, in: *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2018): <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/condemnation/>; L. BIANCHI's introduction to his Italian translation of Boethius of Dacia's *De aeternitate mundi* in *Sull'eternità del mondo, sui sogni, sul sommo bene*, Milan 2017, pp. 14-15 and 39-46 (regarding Boethius of Dacia); *idem*, “From Pope Urban VIII to Bishop Étienne Tempier: The Strange History of the ‘Doctrine of Double Truth’”, in: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 64 (2017), pp. 9-26; *idem*, *Pour une histoire de la “double vérité”*, pp. 17-18 (in general and regarding

an accurate conclusion, if we compare the definition given to Double Truth to what we find in surviving scholastic treatments of the most controversial theories of the time. That is, no one makes a statement or takes a position in a text which we could identify as simultaneously holding two

Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia); *idem*, *Censure et liberté intellectuelle à l'Université de Paris (XIII^e-XIV^e siècles)*, Paris 1999, pp. 184-187 and 191 (regarding Boethius of Dacia); A. DE LIBERA, *L'unité de l'intellect. Commentaire du De unitate intellectus contra averroistas de Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris 2004, p. 520 (referring to the "pseudo-doctrine" of the Double Truth, an idea explained on p. 26); *idem*, *Penser au moyen âge*, Paris 1991, pp. 122-129 (in general and regarding Boethius of Dacia); *idem*, "Philosophie et censure. Remarques sur la crise universitaire parisienne de 1270-1277", in: J.A. AERTSEN – A. SPEER (eds.), *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?*, Berlin 1998, pp. 71-89, at 83 (regarding Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia); *idem*, in notes to his French translation, *Contre Averroès. Thomas d'Aquin, L'unité de l'intellect contre les Averroïstes, suivi des textes contre Averroès antérieurs à 1270*, Paris 1994, p. 280, n. 350 (regarding Siger of Brabant); J.F. WIPPEL, "The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 and 1277", in: J.J.E. GRACIA – T.B. NOONE (eds.), *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Malden, MA 2002, pp. 65-73, at 68; *idem*, *Medieval Reactions to the Encounter between Faith and Reason*, Milwaukee, WI 1995, pp. 2 and 58 (regarding Siger of Brabant) and 68 (regarding Boethius of Dacia); *idem*, introduction to English translation of *Boethius of Dacia: On the Supreme Good, On the Eternity of the World, On Dreams*, Toronto 1987, pp. 4, 9, 14 and 17 (regarding Boethius of Dacia); *idem*, "The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris", in: *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 7 (1977), pp. 169-201, at 172, n. 8, 176, n. 18 (regarding Siger of Brabant), and 197 (regarding Boethius of Dacia); D. PICHÉ, *La condamnation parisienne de 1277*, Paris 1999, pp. 183-225 (in general, and regarding Boethius of Dacia and Siger of Brabant); R.C. DALES, "The Origin of the Doctrine of the Double Truth", in: *Viator* 15 (1984), pp. 169-179 (regarding Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, and in general); A. MAIER, "Il principio della doppia verità", in: A. MAIER, *Scienza e filosofia nel medioevo. Saggi sui secoli XIII e XIV*, Italian transl. M. PARODI-A. ZOERLE, Milan 1984, pp. 383-430, Italian translation of: "Das Prinzip der doppelten Wahrheit", in: *Metaphysische Hintergründe des Spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie*, Rome 1955, pp. 1-44; B.C. BAZÁN, "La réconciliation entre la raison et la foi était-elle possible pour les aristotéliciens radicaux?", in: *Dialogue* 19 (1980), pp. 235-254 (regarding Siger of Brabant); F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, Louvain-la-Neuve / Louvain 1991, pp. 349-350 (regarding Siger of Brabant); *idem*, *Maître Siger de Brabant*, Louvain / Paris 1977, pp. 151 and 242 (in general and regarding Siger of Brabant); *idem*, "'Averroïsme' et 'double vérité' au siècle de saint Louis", in: *Septième centenaire de la mort de saint Louis (Actes des colloques de Royaumont et de Paris, 21-27 mai 1970)*, Paris 1976, pp. 351-360, at 358-360 (in general, and regarding Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia); *idem*, "Une légende tenace: La théorie de la double vérité", in his *Introduction à l'étude de la philosophie médiévale*, Louvain / Paris 1974, pp. 553-570, esp. 559, 561 and 567 (regarding Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, and in general); *idem*, "Nouvelles recherches sur Siger de Brabant et son école", in: *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 41 (1956), pp. 130-147, at 139-147 (regarding Boethius of Dacia); *idem*, *Siger de Brabant d'après ses oeuvres inédites*, Louvain 1942, 2 vols., vol. II, p. 688 (regarding Siger of Brabant); R. HISSETTE, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277*, Louvain / Paris 1977, p. 285 (regarding Boethius of Dacia); *idem*, "Note critique sur le *De aeternitate mundi* de Boèce de Dacie. A propos d'une interprétation récente", in: *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 40 (1973), pp. 208-217, at 215-216 (regarding Boethius of Dacia); T. GREGORY, "Discussioni sulla 'doppia verità'", in: *Cultura e scuola* 1 (1962), pp. 99-106; R.-A. GAUTHIER, entry on Géza Sajó, *Un traité récemment découvert de Boèce de Dacie*, in: "Bibliographie critique" of *Bulletin Thomiste* 9 (1954-1956), pp. 926-932, esp. 931 (regarding Boethius of Dacia); P. MICHAUD-QUANTIN, "La double-vérité des Averroïstes. Un texte nouveau de Boèce de Dacie", in: *Theoria* 22 (1956), pp. 167-184; S. MACCLINTOCK, *Perversity and Error: Studies on the "Averroist" John of Jandun*, Bloomington, IN 1956, p. 80; A. MAURER, "Boetius of Dacia and the Double Truth", in: *Mediaeval Studies* 17 (1955), pp. 233-239 (regarding Boethius of Dacia, Siger of Brabant and in general); É. GILSON, "Boèce de Dacie et la double vérité", in: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 22 (1955), pp. 81-99 (regarding Boethius of Dacia); *idem*, "La doctrine de la double vérité", in his *Études de philosophie médiévale*, Strasbourg 1921, pp. 51-75, at 59-63 and 68 (regarding Siger of Brabant and Paris philosophers in general).

An exception to this consensus is the work of S. LANDUCCI, who has argued for the presence of the Double Truth in authors such as Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, and has described two kinds of Double Truth, "normale" and "fortissima", in *La doppia verità: Conflitti di ragione e fede tra medioevo e prima modernità*, Milan 2006, pp. 23-38, 68-71 and 76-77; *idem*, "Alla ricerca della 'doppia verità'", in: *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia* 72 (2017), pp. 1-27 (focusing on Siger of Brabant). Cfr. BIANCHI, *Pour une histoire de la "double vérité"*, pp. 16-17.

contradictory ideas, both held in the same way and both held as true. At best, it would seem that the bishop overstated the positions of the scholars under his authority or, more extremely, that he invented the idea⁵. Matters could rest here, if it were not for the fact that the statement on the Double Truth features prominently in a decree intended to have a strong impact on the Paris academic community⁶; and that it is presented as part of the problem the decree addresses, to help contextualise the prohibition and threatened punishment. Given the importance placed on the phenomenon in the decree – as well as the continued interest in modern scholarship – it is worth re-examining the matter by asking two questions: did the bishop actually say that scholars were holding contradictory truths? And, if we establish what he said, did any scholars hold a position that could fit what he denounced? Integral to this inquiry is the manner in which the bishop referred to contradictory truths, and what was meant by “according to faith” (*secundum fidem*), an expression many historians interpret in this context as meaning “according to theology” or, as we shall see below, “according to philosophy”⁷. If, in answering these questions, we find that the medieval description of Double Truth does not fit the definition we have been using, and that there were possible instances of scholastics taking a position that could fit the medieval description, we ought to ask a third question: should we change the definition we give to Double Truth to something accurate to the history?

I would argue that close scrutiny of the bishop’s words as well as other statements historians have identified as representing Double Truth shows that our definition does not accurately represent these statements; and that what is described in them is consistent with scholastic positions we have previously not accepted as instances of Double Truth. That is, the bishop condemned a particular offense involving pairs of truths that was indeed taking place, but our definition of Double Truth does not provide an account of it. To be sure, some studies of this history indicate that the position described in the sources is not the one of contradictory truths in the definition⁸. They maintain, nevertheless, that no one held the Double Truth at this time. Yet if medieval descriptions of what we are calling Double Truth provide us with grounds for an alternative definition – one which historians are inclined to think fits a position held by some scholastics – it would be constructive for the account of this history to apply a definition that fits it. The definition as it stands risks our overlooking the fact that a particular philosophical position involving two truths was identified as an offense. It also jeopardises our ability to evaluate the purpose of the statement in the decree, with regard both to contemporary practices being addressed and to implementing the

⁵ See, e.g.: PICHÉ, *La condamnation*, pp. 208-215; F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, *Introduction à la philosophie médiévale*, Louvain / Paris 1974, pp. 567-570; DE LIBERA, *Penser au moyen âge*, p. 123; *idem*, “Philosophie et censure”, p. 83; WIPPEL’S introduction to his English translation of Boethius of Dacia’s *De aeternitate mundi*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁶ On the impact of the Condemnations of 1277, see: J.F. WIPPEL, “Godfrey of Fontaines at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century”, in: J.A. AERTSEN et al. (eds.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts / After the Condemnation of 1277: Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century*, Berlin 2001, pp. 359-389, at 386-389; E.P. MAHONEY, “Reverberations of the Condemnations of 1277 in Later Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy”, in: *ibid.*, pp. 902-930, at 909-911; J.E. MURDOCH, “1277 and Late Medieval Natural Philosophy”, in: *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?*, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-121; L. BIANCHI, “1277: A Turning Point in Medieval Philosophy”, in: *ibid.*, pp. 90-110; *idem*, *Il vescovo e i filosofi. La condanna parigina del 1277 e l’evoluzione dell’Aristotelismo scolastico*, Bergamo 1990, pp. 25-30; R.C. DALES, *Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World*, Leiden 1990, pp. 178-198; E. GRANT, “The Effect of the Condemnation of 1277”, in: N. KRETZMANN et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, Cambridge 1982, pp. 537-539.

⁷ Many of the studies listed in n. 4 above take these views. While this paper generally considers the perspective of philosophy, Section I-B below examines how the religious truth might be held according to theology or philosophy. For a study grounded on the perspective of theology, see A. SPEER, “The Double Truth Question and the Epistemological Status of Theology in Late 13th Century Debates at Paris”, in: *The Modern Schoolman* 89 (2012), pp. 189-207.

⁸ See, e.g., nn. 30 and 43-45 and the text they accompany.

decree. If, however, as a result of examining the sources, we adjust our definition to reflect what they tell us, we can provide a historical account that in terms of philosophy is accurate and in terms of the history explains a real phenomenon which provoked episcopal intervention.

Statement of the Problem

In examining this matter, I would like to reconsider the assumption in studies of this history that, for a position to be identified as Double Truth, both truths must in the speaker's view be true according to reason, in the form of philosophy or philosophical theology. This prevailing definition has to do with terms in the Condemnations, interpreted together with the Aristotelian explanation of contradictions and medieval perceptions of levels of discourse. The decree accuses proponents of holding that philosophical ideas can be "true according to philosophy but not according to Catholic faith, as if there were two contrary truths". The simultaneous holding of "two contrary truths" – a pairing of a proposition and its negation (P and not-P) as both true – is something Aristotle taught was impossible. It violates the fundamental principle of non-contradiction: contrary opinions or contradictory statements about the same thing cannot both be true at the same time and in the same respect⁹. Thus, for example, Aristotle's theory that the world is eternal and the Christian doctrine that it is not, when taken together, form a contradiction and cannot both be true.

Crucial to modern discussion of Double Truth is the way the two truths are held. While as statements they contradict each other, if they are held in different ways the contradiction may be avoided. If one idea is held as true according to philosophy and the other is held as true but not according to philosophy, there is no contradiction. Using the example above, it is not a contradiction for a medieval scholar to hold that the world is eternal according to philosophy (as the product of a necessary demonstration), while simultaneously believing in Creation without a philosophical demonstration.

One scholastic defending this position, Boethius of Dacia, elaborated on Aristotle's thinking on contradictions in order to explain it. Aristotle had specified that a pairing of opposing ideas that are both held as true, but not in the same respect, is not a contradiction because the ideas are held in different ways¹⁰. He distinguished between two ways of being true: in a conditional sense and in an absolute sense. If we speak of, for example, a black box with a portion painted white, it is true to say the box is black in a qualified sense, but false to say this in an absolute sense. Aristotle set out the distinction in *Sophistical Refutations* to show how some fallacies are based on misinterpretations of statements as qualified or absolute when in fact the opposite is the case¹¹. Boethius of Dacia used

⁹ *Metaphysics* IV, 3, 1005b19-32: "... the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect This, then, is the most certain of all principles If it is impossible that contrary attributes should belong at the same time to the same subject ..., and if an opinion which contradicts another is contrary to it, obviously it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be and not to be; for if a man were mistaken in this point he would have contrary opinions at the same time. It is for this reason that all who are carrying out a demonstration refer it to this as an ultimate belief..."; and *Metaphysics* IV, 6, 1011b14-17: "... contradictory statements are not at the same time true Now since it is impossible that contradictories should be at the same time true of the same thing, obviously contraries also cannot belong at the same time to the same thing", quoting from J. BARNES (ed.), *Aristotle. The Complete Works*, Princeton 1984, 2 vols., vol. II, pp. 1588 and 1597. Cfr. *Prior Analytics* I, 32, 47a8-9: "... everything that is true must in every respect agree with itself", BARNES ed., 1, p. 75.

¹⁰ *Sophistical Refutations* 5, 166b37-167a20; and 25, 180a22-b8, esp. 180a26-29: "For it is impossible for contraries and opposites and an affirmative and a negative to belong to the same thing without qualification; there is, however, nothing to prevent each from belonging in a particular respect or relation or manner, or to prevent one of them from belonging in a particular respect and the other without qualification", quoted from BARNES ed., 1, p. 307.

¹¹ *Sophistical Refutations* 5, 167a7-20.

this terminology in a nuanced way, not to distinguish between two ideas discussed within the bounds of philosophy (as in Aristotle’s explanation), but to distinguish between two truths in which one, held in a conditional sense (*secundum quid*), was produced through reason and was true according to philosophy, and the other, held in an absolute sense (*simpliciter*), was not the product of reason and was true independently from it (a sense of “*simpliciter*” already employed by Alexander of Hales in the 1230s)¹². In this interpretation “*secundum quid*” applies to ideas that are true within the context of a system of rational thought, such as natural philosophy or metaphysics, in that they are produced from principles pertaining to that system and so are certain (true) within it; but outside of that science they are not necessarily true. “*Simpliciter*”, in this context, applies to ideas held as true without rational demonstration, independently from (or beyond) any system of rational thought. For example, someone believing in the Trinity without demonstrative proof of its existence could be said to hold this divine truth *simpliciter*. This sense refers to the way the idea is held, not the idea itself. This same truth could also be held *secundum quid*: someone holding it as the product of a rational demonstration would do so in a way that was conditional, not absolute.

This *secundum quid/simpliciter* terminology is a shorthand for a view some scholastics may have taken in which two ideas, one pertaining to philosophy and one regarding religion, could seem to form a contradiction but did not because of the way they were held. These two ways of holding a truth operate on different levels of discourse – in the example of the Trinity, reason and divine mystery. Basing themselves on scholastic parlance, historians discussing Double Truth sometimes refer to the two kinds of truth as being on different epistemological levels, with the religious truth held without demonstration being superior to truth held at the level of reason¹³. The consensus is that Double Truth entails a contradiction formed by a pair of truths both held according to reason; and that a scholastic holding what might appear to be a contradiction, but with religious truth held without demonstration, was not a Double Truth proponent. It was on these grounds that they resolved on not regarding as proponents of the Double Truth Boethius of Dacia and Siger of Brabant, the Paris arts faculty masters generally identified as representing the “Averroists” or “Radical Aristotelians” of this time¹⁴. Both figures held religious truth without rational demonstration, so they did not formulate a contradiction.

¹² Section II-A below discusses the position of Boethius of Dacia as expressed in his *De aeternitate mundi*. On the *secundum quid/simpliciter* distinction in his thinking, see: L. BIANCHI, “From Pope Urban VIII”, pp. 20-21; *idem*, *Pour une histoire de la “double vérité”*, pp. 42-44; DE LIBERA, *Commentaire du De unitate intellectus*, pp. 25-26; A. RODOLFI, “‘Verum simpliciter’ e ‘verum secundum quid’: Enrico di Gand ‘critico’ di Boezio di Dacia”, in: *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Classe di Lettere e Filosofia*, Series IV, vol. 3 (1998), pp. 361-379; P. BERNARDINI, “Veritas, Error, Positio. Some Aspects of the Debate Concerning the Eternity of the World in the 13th Century”, in: M. GADEBUSCH BONDIO – A. PARAVICINI BAGLIANI (eds.), *Errors and Mistakes: A Cultural History of Fallibility*, Florence 2012, pp. 17-80, esp. 45 and 50. For similar use of “*simpliciter*” by ALEXANDER OF HALES see *De duratione mundi seu de materia prima*, membr. 6A and 6B, in: H.M. WIERZBICKI (ed.), *Quaestiones disputatae quae ad rerum universitatem pertinent*, Grottaferrata 2013, pp. 185-196 and 203-214, at 189 (contrasting with “*naturaliter loquens*”, p. 191) and 210.

¹³ See, e.g., B.C. BAZÁN, “Boethius of Dacia”, in: GRACIA – NOONE, *A Companion to Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 227-232, at 229; *idem*, “Siger of Brabant”, in *ibid.*, pp. 632-640, at 635; PICHE, *La condemnation*, p. 164; BIANCHI, *Pour une histoire de la “double vérité”*, p.77. See also: L. BIANCHI – E. RANDI, *Le verità dissonanti. Aristotele alla fine del Medioevo*, Bari 1990, p. 42; MAIER, “Il principio della doppia verità”, p. 391. Regarding the different epistemological levels, see SPEER, “The Double Truth Question”. For examples of scholastics referring to the different levels of philosophical and religious truth, see AQUINAS in n. 19 below, and *Summa contra gentiles* I, Ch. 6, in: *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*, Rome 1918, vol. 13, p. 17; SIGER OF BRABANT in n. 104 below; ALEXANDER OF HALES, *De duratione mundi*, membr. 6A, pp. 189-191 (“*supra naturam*” three times, and “*philosophi illi qui non transcendebant naturam*”), and membr. 6B, p. 209; and Bonaventure’s discussion relating to how rational conclusions are spoken of as being below, and belief without rational demonstration as being higher: BONAVENTURE, *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum* III, D. 24, Art. 2, Q. 3, *contra*, 4 and ad 4, in: *Doctoris seraphici S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia*, Quarrachi 1887, vol. 3, pp. 521-524, at 522 and 524.

¹⁴ See n. 4.

I would like to re-evaluate whether Double Truth must be defined as involving two truths both held according to reason. This question involves considering the presence of two terms in medieval accounts of Double Truth on which the consensus in scholarship is based: “contrary” (“*contrarie*”/“*contraria*”), and “according to faith” (“*secundum fidem*”) or “through faith” (“*per fidem*”). There are two descriptions of Double Truth we know of from the height of the Aristotelian controversy at the University of Paris, both of which use these terms. They are in the preamble to the Condemnations of 1277, and at the end of Thomas Aquinas’s *De unitate intellectus* (1270)¹⁵. In addition, three examples of Double Truth positions have been identified among the articles (condemned propositions) listed in the Condemnations (Articles 90, 113 and 184)¹⁶. One contains the word “contrary” (Article 184), and two use the expression “according to faith” (Articles 113 and 184).

In none of these accounts do we find a scenario necessarily involving two truths according to reason. In looking at them below, we will distinguish between what the alleged Double Truth proponents are reported to have said, and what is insinuated as an outcome of their position. The words “according to faith” or “through faith” are the expressions they are said to have used; whereas that the philosophical and religious truths are philosophically “contrary” is an imputation about the consequence of their words. The expression “according to faith”, taken on its own, does not make clear whether the religious truth is held as the product of reason. It is the presence of the word “contrary” that has caused historians to take it to mean “according to reason” (according to philosophy or philosophical theology, as discussed below in Section I-B). Without the medieval sources’ caustic insinuation of “contrary” truths, the report of the culprits’ position is not necessarily one of a contradiction, and the religious truth held “according to faith” could possibly be held without philosophical demonstration, above the level of reason.

What follows is an enquiry into the definition of Double Truth according to the scholastic levels of discourse. For ease of discussion, I will sometimes refer to truths held on the same/different levels, truths of equal/unequal valence, or “equi-valent”/“non-equi-valent” truths. Section I below examines whether Double Truth should be defined as having two truths on the same level or instead could involve non-equi-valent truths; Section II considers scholastics who might be considered Double Truth proponents if we accept a scenario of non-equi-valent truths. Section I begins by analysing what we find in contemporary representations of Double Truth (Section I-A), and what form a pair of two equi-valent truths could conceivably take (Section I-B). The conclusions indicate that we might reconsider Double Truth as possibly involving non-equi-valent truths, a position which in itself was provocative (Section I-C). Section II proposes that, if we accept this way of looking at the Double Truth, we should reassess as possible proponents of it Boethius of Dacia and Siger of Brabant (Sections II-A and B). A possible objection to this proposal is that there might be wider-ranging implications regarding the views of other, prominent figures and their followers, in particular scholastics who took the position that they could not disprove certain philosophical theories conflicting with faith, and simultaneously held religious beliefs without philosophical demonstration. Figures to consider in this context are Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great. Analysis (in Section II-C) distinguishing between philosophical possibility and necessity with regard to what the speaker holds as true shows that Aquinas and scholastics following his teaching could not be said to stray into Double Truth; while, depending on how one interprets Albert’s views on the domains of philosophy and theology, there might be a case for his being characterised in this vein.

¹⁵ For quotations presenting these descriptions, see nn. 27 and 35, and the text they accompany.

¹⁶ For quotations of these articles, see nn. 46-48 and the text they accompany.

I. Double Truth: Truths of Equal Valence?

As part of assessing how medieval sources represented the Double Truth, we must consider whether only a pairing of equi-valent truths was objectionable, or instead a pairing of non-equi-valent truths could also cause offense. Some historians have suggested that a position of holding two contrasting truths, one according to philosophy and a religious one held without a rational basis, would have been a subtle distinction lost on the bishop, or else not a mitigating factor in his eyes¹⁷. Yet would such a position have been acceptable?

In other contexts, placing philosophical and divine accounts on the same level – that is, reducing religious truth to the level of philosophical conclusion – was criticised or avoided. For instance, in his commentary on the *Sentences* of the early 1260s, the Dominican Peter of Tarentaise (the future Pope Innocent V) addressed the question of whether the world was eternal in a way that was criticised and reported to his Order's Master General, who assigned an internal examiner to review Peter's text and the complaint (comprising 108 diverse points). Peter had referred to each of the philosophical views of Plato and Aristotle on the world's eternity and the divine truth of Scripture (Creation) as both a "position" ("*positio*") and an "opinion" ("*opinio*")¹⁸, causing the internal examiner to balk. The examiner was Thomas Aquinas, and his objection was that Peter had not been sufficiently reverent, because he seemed to place the three accounts on the same level¹⁹. The terms "position" and "opinion" refer to the products of reason which can be disagreed with, not truths held unconditionally on the level above. This rebuke came notwithstanding the fact that Peter had described Creation (the "opinion of Moses") as the only true answer, and Plato's and Aristotle's opinions as "heretical". Such a slur was avoided in another *Sentences* commentary, of the late 1260s, again in a *quaestio* on the eternity of the world. This one was by the Franciscan William de la Mare (who, incidentally, had consulted Peter's *Sentences* commentary when composing his own). After describing the opinions of Plato and Aristotle on the world's eternity, he preserved and then corrected the terminology for speaking about Creation: "The opinion of Moses, or rather the faith of Moses, was and is ... that the world began"²⁰. In this way, William avoided reducing religious truth to a mere position.

¹⁷ See, e.g.: PICHÉ, *La condamnation*, p. 202; HISSETTE, *Enquête*, p. 285; DALES, "Origin of the Double Truth", p. 179; WIPPEL's introduction to his English translation of Boethius of Dacia's *De aeternitate mundi*, *op. cit.*, p. 17; and see n. 5 above.

¹⁸ "Ponentium mundum a Deo factum *triplex* praecipue legitur circa mundi aeternitatem *positio*, quam tangit hic Magister [Sententiarum]. Una Platonis, qui *posuit* mundum ab eterno fuisse in potentia materiae, non in actu specie: et operatione divina eductum de potentia in actum, non ab eterno sed in tempore. Altera Aristotilis qui *posuit* mundum ab eterno actu in materia, et in specie, et in statu generationis et corruptionis, sicut modo. Tertia Moysi, qui *posuit* mundum non fuisse ab aeterno, nec in potentia materie, nec in actu, sed in sola potentia agentis; et in tempore factum a Deo quoad materiam et speciem. *Prima et secunda opinio iudicatur* [iudicantur] *esse haeretica* [hereticas]: *tertia sola vera est et tenenda*" (emphasis added): PETER OF TARENTEISE, *Innocentii Quinti Pontificis Maximi in IV libros Sententiarum commentaria*, Toulouse 1649-1652, reprinted Ridgewood, NJ 1964, II, D. I, Q. 2, art. 3, resp., p. 11; additional or alternative words offered in square brackets are variants appearing in an isolated copy of this *quaestio* in MS Tours, Bibliothèque Municipale 704, published in O. ARGERAMI – R.C. DALES, *Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World*, Leiden 1991, pp. 65-66. Regarding the use and meaning of "*positio*" in this kind of discussion, including Aquinas's thinking, see BERNARDINI, "Veritas, Error, Positio". See also the remarks on Siger of Brabant's avoidance of such terminology in DE LIBERA, *Commentaire du De unitate intellectus*, p. 520.

¹⁹ "Quod vero XCVII proponitur, 'opinio Moysi fuit quod mundus non esset aeternus', non satis reverenter dictum est; nisi forte dicatur per comparationem ad opiniones aliorum, ut si diceretur, 'Opinio Aristotilis talis fuit, sed opinio Moysi talis', ad significandum huius excellentiam super alios": THOMAS AQUINAS, *Responsio ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis de 108 articulis*, in: *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia*, Rome 1979, vol. 42, pp. 279-294, at 293.

²⁰ The full statement is: "Opinio Moysi, immo fides Moysi, fuit et est omnium fidelium quod mundus coepit ex tempore nec fuit ab aeterno": WILLIAM DE LA MARE, *Scriptum in secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. H. KRAML,

Was raising divine truth higher than philosophical conclusion all that was required to avoid reproof? If one did this with conflicting philosophical and religious truths, was this acceptable? Roger Bacon had objected strongly to this behaviour in his *Communia naturalium* (completed by 1270). He regarded it as concealing errors when he attacked supporters of the unicity of the intellect for doing this very thing, and said they were as deceptive as the vilest heretics²¹. We should thus bear in mind, when we assess whether Double Truth necessarily concerned a pair of equi-valent truths or possibly non-equi-valent truths, that even the latter scenario was not benign and could provoke outrage.

I-A. Double Truth in Contemporary Description

Two contemporary sources are cited as descriptions of the Double Truth. One is that of the Condemnations of 1277, and the other is a scathing remark by Thomas Aquinas to an unnamed opponent of around seven years earlier in his *De unitate intellectus*. In addition, historians have identified certain articles listed in the Condemnations as expressions of Double Truth. The following is an examination of each of these in terms of whether they present us with a definition of Double Truth involving truths of equal valence.

1. Condemnations of 1277

Let us begin by appraising whether the Condemnations report the Double Truth as necessarily involving equi-valent truths by examining the decree's statement. The decree is comprised of a preamble followed by a list of 219 principles condemned as errors, which was compiled by a panel of Paris University theologians assisting the bishop. The errors are philosophical views which were circulating in Paris²². The preamble describes in tones of shock and anger how arts faculty members

Munich 1995, Q. 2 ("Utrum mundus sit aeternus"), pp. 5-9, at 7. On William's consultation of Book II of Peter's *Sentences* commentary, see the introduction in *ibid.*, p. *23. William is an interesting example because he is famous for later criticising Aquinas for holding that religious truths, such as Creation/the non-eternity of the world, cannot be demonstrated philosophically – a process which produces conclusions at the level of reason.

²¹ Roger Bacon, *Communia naturalium* I, Part IV, Dist. 3, Ch. 3, in: *Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi*, Oxford 1911, Fasc. III, pp. 286-287: "Et est istud secundum de unitate et pluralitate anime intellective. Ponunt ergo quod anima intellectiva sit una numero in omnibus. Palliant ergo errorem suum quando artantur dicentes quod per philosophiam non potest aliter dici nec per rationem potest haberi aliud, set per solam fidem. Sed menciuntur tanquam vilissimi heretici."

²² There has been much discussion on whether the principles were taken from written works and/or oral disputations, whether the culprits were masters and/or students, and whether they were only philosophers in the arts faculty or some were theologians. Connections between articles in the decree and contemporary texts have been identified in HISSETTE, *Enquête*, including a summary with cross references on pp. 314-318. That the decree targeted ideas extracted from these works, rather than the authors themselves, is shown in D. CALMA, "Du bon usage des grecs et des arabes. Réflexions sur la censure de 1277", in: L. BIANCHI (ed.), *Christian Readings of Aristotle from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance*, Turnhout 2011, pp. 115-184. Regarding the possibility of oral expression, see: PICHÉ, *La condamnation*, pp. 176-180, esp. 180; WIPPEL, "The Parisian Condemnations", p. 67; *idem*, "The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris", pp. 181 and 197. M. DE MOWBRAY argues that the condemned articles were the product of student disputations: "1277 and all That-Students and Disputations", in: *Traditio* 57 (2002), pp. 217-238, esp. 219-222; *idem*, "The *De Aeternitate Mundi* of Boethius of Dacia and the Paris Condemnation of 1277", in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 73 (2006), pp. 201-253, at 224, 234-235 et seq. and 241; and see the response in L. BIANCHI, "Students, Masters, and 'Heterodox' Doctrines at the Parisian Faculty of Arts in the 1270s", in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 76 (2009), pp. 75-109. Regarding the targeting of theologians, contemporaries believed that some articles represented the opinions of Aquinas, directly or indirectly, such that in 1325, two years after he was canonised, the Bishop of Paris annulled articles which touched on his teaching: Decree of the Bishop of Paris (14 February 1325), in H. DENIFLE – E. CHATELAIN (eds.), *Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis*, Paris 1889-1897, 4 vols., vol. II, pp. 280-281, at 281.

holding erroneous philosophical positions support them with “gentile” writings which they say they cannot disprove²³:

... they support the said errors with writings by the gentiles, which²⁴ – for shame! – they declare in their ignorance are so forceful that they do not know how to answer them. However, so that they not seem to assert what they hint at, they conceal their responses in such a way that, while thinking to avoid Scylla, they fall into Charybdis²⁵.

What is hinted at and avoided is evidently the implication that, if the erroneous theories as taught by the gentiles are so strong that they cannot be disproved, the religious doctrine they conflict with must be false. In avoiding this Scylla of denying doctrine, they sink into the Charybdis of Double Truth, which does not deny it:

For they say things are true according to philosophy but not according to Catholic faith, as if there were two contrary truths, and as if, against (*contra*)²⁶ the truth of sacred Scripture, there were truth in the statements of the damned gentiles ...²⁷

This account of the Double Truth is set out in three clauses. The first is a report alleging what the culprits say (“*dicunt*”): something is true according to philosophy but it is not true according to faith. The second berates them for doing this “as if” (“*quasi*”) there were two contrary truths; and the third completes the criticism, adding “and as if” (“*et quasi*”) philosophical statements by “gentile” philosophers could be true when they contradict Scripture. The second and third clauses are expressed in the decree not as something the culprits say, but as an interpretation or accusation. The following is an examination of the clauses to determine what can be understood from them.

“For they say ...”

The question for us in this clause concerns what it tells us about the truths being held and, more importantly, how they are held. The statement describes only how the culprits hold one of the truths, philosophical truth: as “true according to philosophy but not according to Catholic faith” (“*vera secundum philosophiam, sed non secundum fidem catholicam*”). It is held “according to philosophy”, and so is true on this condition. The philosophical truth is described in the decree as theories taught in the writings of the “gentiles” (Aristotle and his Greek and Muslim interpreters), which the culprits say are “so forceful that they do not know how to answer them” (“*sic cogentes, ut eis nesciant respondere*”), meaning they withstand counter-arguments, which is the condition for producing a necessary philosophical conclusion or truth. Yet how the culprits say they hold religious truth is not specified. The pairing of “true according to philosophy” and “not true according to Catholic faith” might seem to be a P and not-P pairing – but only if the latter means “not true according to philosophy” (or philosophical theology, as discussed in Section I-B), as P and not-P must

²³ The relative pronoun “*quas*” refers (grammatically) to “*gentilium scripturis*”, but the rest of the statement suggests that it is the errors/philosophical theories together with these writings that are “*sic cogentes, ut eis nesciant respondere*”, causing the culprits to make the Double Truth statement. The theory/error and gentile writing components of the problem are then addressed separately in the two phrases beginning “*quasi*”.

²⁴ See n. 23.

²⁵ Condemnations of 1277, in: PICHÉ, *La condemnation*, pp. 72-74: “... errores predictos gentilium scripturis muniant quas – proh pudor! – ad suam imperitiam asserunt sic cogentes, ut eis nesciant respondere. Ne autem, quod sic innuunt asserere uideantur, responsiones ita palliant quod, dum putant uitare scillam, incidunt in caripdim. Dicunt enim ea esse uera secundum philosophiam, sed non secundum fidem catholicam, quasi sint due contrarie ueritates, et quasi contra ueritatem sacre scripture sit ueritas in dictis gentilium dampnatorum...”; previously published in DENIFLE – CHATELAIN, *Chartularium I*, pp. 543-555, at 543.

²⁶ See n. 31.

²⁷ See n. 25.

be products of reason to be in opposition. The terms in this clause, however, do not indicate this is necessarily the case. The answer depends on the meaning of “according to faith”. Without elaboration in the source, it remains possible that “according to faith” refers to unsubstantiated belief.

We are limited in what we can deduce from this clause. Basing ourselves strictly on these words, an interpretation of “according to faith” as necessarily being according to philosophy overstates the evidence. The first clause, then, tells us what the culprits are reported to have said, but does not yield a definition or permit an inference regarding how religious truth is held.

“As if there were two contrary truths”

The presence of one word in particular has caused historians of philosophy to consider the truths in the Double Truth to be on the same level: the word “contrary” in the clause “as if there were two contrary truths” (“*quasi sint due contrarie veritates*”)²⁸. The reference to “two contrary truths” would point to a position pairing contrary views held on the same level if it were not for how it is phrased. Introduced by the words “as if” (“*quasi*”), this clause is not an account of an actual view, but rather an insinuation about the culprits’ position, a polemical device²⁹. It imputes to them the absurdity of maintaining a philosophical impossibility without saying they actually do this. This characterisation of the statement is sharpened if we look at the lines preceding it, and consider it in the context of the heated tone and burst of rhetoric introducing the Double Truth accusation. An angry cry of “for shame!” precedes the description of how the philosophers claim they cannot disprove the offending theories. Then we are told that, in avoiding the dangerous implications of their views, they circumvent “Scylla”, the crime of denying doctrine, only to tumble into “Charybdis”, the Double Truth, their insistence that they do not deny doctrine, while persisting in holding the philosophical conclusion conflicting with it. This “as if” clause is not an account of the culprits’ statements, but rather a polemical *reductio ad absurdum*³⁰.

Given that this clause is an imputation, and given the limits to what can be determined about the culprits’ position on religious truth in the prior clause, we are left with a possibility that the Double Truth as articulated by the culprits did not necessarily involve two truths held on the same level, but possibly put religious truth on the level above reason. Such a position – whether sincere or strategic – would avoid denial of doctrine, but would still be unacceptable because the offending philosophical view would be held as true. The palpable rage in the decree would be understandable, as would this “as if” clause turning the philosophers’ words against them. If this is the case, I would regard the imputation in this clause not as a misunderstanding of the position, but as a rhetorical device to discredit the philosophers. It is a hard-hitting admonishment that makes them hypocrites. By amplifying the implications of their position, the reproach renders it outrageous in their own terms, accusing them betraying their science as well as their faith.

“And as if, against the truth of sacred Scripture ... ”

The introduction of the problem of the philosophers’ view tells us the culprits support philosophical theories/errors with “gentile” texts. Having dealt with the theories in the first “as if” clause, the accusation now takes up the matter of texts. It presents us with a pairing of authorities: “and as if,

²⁸ See the references in n. 4, esp. MAIER, “Il principio della doppia verità”, and BIANCHI, “From Pope Urban VIII”, which give accounts of the problem of contraries; and see TAYLOR, “Truth Does Not Contradict Truth”.

²⁹ On how “*quasi*” makes the phrase an inference, see BIANCHI, “From Pope Urban VIII”, pp. 18-19.

³⁰ On this characterisation of the Double Truth accusation, see: GILSON, “La doctrine de la double vérité”, p. 68; BIANCHI, *Pour une histoire de la “double vérité”*, p. 15. See also n. 43 and the text it accompanies.

against³¹ the truth of sacred Scripture, there were truth in the statements of the damned gentiles” (“*et quasi contra veritatem sacre scripture sit veritas in dictis gentilium dampnatorum*”). Again, this is not an account of what the culprits say, but an interpretation and a reproach, introduced by the words “as if”.

There are two questions we might explore in considering this phrase in isolation. The first is whether this clause is a warning to philosophers against claiming their treatments of theories are merely explanations of writings by Aristotle and his ancient and Muslim interpreters. The clause’s insinuation is that the culprits think these texts contain truth. Would the conclusions in their treatments be truths in a philosophical sense, produced through demonstrations, or truths taken on the authority of the texts? Truths produced through demonstrations would be held in the form of necessary conclusions, and could not be disowned as mere explanations of the text. By contrast, truth taken on the authority of the texts would be held on the level above reason, without proof. I am inclined to see this clause as indeed a warning, but, as I will explain presently, one of a different form.

The other question we might ask is whether, in naming a pair of authorities, the clause refers to pairings of truths held without demonstration, one received from gentile writings and the other from the Bible, forming a pair of contraries on the level above reason. This is unlikely for two reasons. The clause does not seem to refer to the simultaneous holding of a pair of truths: the words of the gentiles are described as being “against” the Bible, and so denying it, leaving only one truth. As to the way the truths are held, this would mean that a group of philosophers was thought to hold gentile writings as true without rational grounds, simply because they were authorities. The bishop clearly did not think that the scholars he was concerned about held gentile philosophical teachings strictly in this way: the issue the Condemnations addressed was not that philosophers were adhering blindly to provocative statements in the books they read, but that they held the conclusions listed in the decree’s articles through reason.

I think that this clause does two things. Together with the other “as if” clause, it links the two components of the problem at the core of the crisis: the combination of rational demonstration of necessary truths and reliance on gentile writings as authoritative sources of theories and the arguments/cases producing them. It also brings to bear the authority of the Church in the matter. It threatens the culprits with being accused of holding ideas against Scripture. Views denying the Bible, if persistently or stubbornly defended, amounted to the crime of heresy³². This clause, then, like the other “as if” clause, serves not to define the Double Truth but to add thunder to its denunciation.

³¹ The word “*contra*” can mean “against” or “contrary to”. While “contrary to” might suggest the word introduces a pair of philosophical contraries, in the scholastic context neither “*contra*” nor “*in contrarium*” necessarily did this. As the standard term in a *quaestio* introducing discussion of the opposite view, “*contra*” usually presents an opposing argument or authority, such as the Bible. For instance, in a *quaestio* on the issue of the eternity of the world, “*contra*” could introduce a contrary philosophical opinion or argument, or it could be followed simply by a reference to Genesis 1.1, “*In principio*”. The former is held according to philosophy, while the latter is held without the support of rational arguments. The same is true for the expression “*in contrarium*”, which can introduce an argument (e.g., in AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae* I, Q. 66, art. 1, ad 4) or biblical authority, even without specific references, as in “*Sed in contrarium sufficit auctoritas scripturae*” (in the *contra* sections in AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae* I, Q. 69, art. 1, Q. 70, arts. 1 and 2, Q. 71 and Q. 72). Again, the latter is held without arguments.

³² Consider the definition of heresy which ROBERT GROSSETESTE is said to have made in 1253: “Heresy is an opinion chosen by human faculties, *contrary to sacred Scripture*, openly held, and pertinaciously defended” (“*Haeresis est sententia humano sensu electa, Scripturae Sacrae contraria, palam edocta, pertinaciter defensa*”) (emphasis added); quoted in MATTHEW PARIS, *Chronica majora*, ed. H.R. LUARD, London 1880, 7 vols., vol. V, p. 401. Inquisitor and theologian GUIDO TERRENI expounded on how speaking *contra sacra scripturam* constituted heresy in his *Summa de haeresibus*, Cologne 1631, Ch. 4, p. 7.

Taken together, the three clauses of the Double Truth statement outline a problem, but do not provide a complete account. What we see does not permit a conclusive answer as to how religious truth is held by the culprits. What we can say is that the Condemnations do not present us with a Double Truth defined as two truths of equal valence, and that they do not exclude the possibility that it entails truths of unequal valence, one according to reason and one without rational explanation. To understand more about the nature of the Double Truth, we must look to the representations by Aquinas and in articles in the Condemnations identified by historians as expressions of it.

2. Aquinas's *De unitate intellectus*

The other extant contemporary description of the Double Truth is by Thomas Aquinas in his *De unitate intellectus*. In this attack on the theory of the unicity of the intellect, he addresses Averroists in general and, toward the end, an unnamed opponent whom most historians believe was Siger of Brabant³³. Aquinas accuses this opponent of the Double Truth, giving a description that permits a more detailed understanding of what the position may have entailed. It is preceded by an angry account of the opponent's stand regarding the unicity of the intellect and its conflict with faith, presented as reported speech/views of the opponent and Aquinas's reactions.

It is yet more astounding, or even worthy of indignation, that anyone professing to be Christian should presume to speak so irreverently of Christian faith, such as when he [the opponent] says that, "The Latins do not accept this as a principle", namely, that there is only one intellect, "perhaps because their law is contrary to it". There are two evils in this: first, because he questions whether this is against faith; second, because he hints that he is alien to this law. Afterward he says, "This is the reason Catholics seem to hold their position", where the doctrine of faith is called a "position". Nor is what he later dares to assert of less presumption, that God cannot bring about that there be many intellects, because this implies a contradiction³⁴.

With the escalation of these denunciations, the subsequent paragraph arrives at the Double Truth accusation:

Even more serious is what he says next, "Through reason I conclude necessarily that the intellect is one in number; nevertheless, I firmly hold the opposite through faith." Therefore he thinks that faith is of things whose contraries can conclude necessarily. Since nothing can be concluded necessarily unless it is a necessary truth – whose opposite is false impossible (*falsum impossibile*) – it follows from his statement that faith is of the false impossible, which even God cannot make happen and the ears of the faithful cannot bear³⁵.

³³ See n. 89.

³⁴ AQUINAS, *De unitate intellectus*, in: *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia*, Rome 1976, vol. 43, pp. 289-314, at 314: "Est etiam maiori ammiratione uel etiam indignatione dignum, quod aliquis Christianum se profitens tam irreuerenter de christiana fide loqui presumpserit: sicut cum dicit quod 'Latini pro principiis hoc non recipiunt', scilicet quod sit unus intellectus tantum, 'quia forte lex eorum est in contrarium'. Vbi duo sunt mala: primo, quia dubitat an hoc sit contra fidem; secundo, quia alienum se innuit esse ab hac lege. Et quod postmodum dicit 'Hec est ratio per quam Catholici uidentur habere suam positionem', ubi sententiam fidei positionem nominat. Nec minoris presumptionis est quod postmodum asserere audet, Deum non posse facere quod sint multi intellectus, quia implicat contradictionem."

³⁵ *Ibid.*: "Adhuc autem grauius est quod postmodum dicit 'Per rationem concludo de necessitate quod intellectus est unus numero, firmiter tamen teneo oppositum per fidem'. Ergo sentit quod fides sit de aliquibus quorum contraria de necessitate concludi possunt; cum autem de necessitate concludi non possit nisi verum

As with the account in the Condemnations, we are presented in the second paragraph with an attribution of a statement by the Double Truth proponent and remarks building upon it. The discussion below examines the attributed statement and Aquinas's comments, taking into account from the preceding paragraph significant elements in the reported speech and Aquinas's interpretations.

“Through reason I conclude necessarily ... nevertheless, I firmly hold the opposite through faith”

In the Double Truth statement Aquinas attributes to his opponent, the characterisations of the two truths is clearer than what we encountered in the Condemnations. Both truths are identified: one is a necessary conclusion arrived at through reason (*“per rationem concludo de necessitate”*); the other is held through faith (*“firmiter tamen teneo oppositum per fidem”*). The philosophical conclusion is held according to reason. While the opponent holds it necessarily, he nevertheless holds the religious truth firmly (*“firmiter tamen teneo”*). The religious truth is not a matter of deduction or any form of reason: it is not said (in the way that the philosophical view is described) to be the product of reason, or a conclusion, or held as necessary. Instead it is something held “firmly”, a term suggestive more of conviction of belief than an opinion formed by a logical outcome. The opponent also holds it in spite of (*“tamen teneo”*) the necessity of the philosophical conclusion. A religious truth which is not the product of reason, and is held notwithstanding the necessity of the opposite view, is truth held at the level above reason.

The remarks Aquinas makes following this are illuminating, as is terminology relating to them in the previous paragraph. The terminology and context must be assessed carefully to avoid ambiguity: on the one hand, the opponent can be said to treat religious doctrine as being on the level of reason; on the other, he can be said to hold it on the level above, not according to reason. Testing religious truth on the level of reason is what he does in the context of philosophical debate, while in his personal view he holds it without proof. The next two subsections examine these two aspects. What emerges is a view that is consistent, defensible and ostensibly obedient to Catholic law, but outrageous and infuriating to Aquinas.

“Therefore he thinks that faith is of things whose contraries can conclude necessarily”

Let us start with observations regarding whether the opponent might be said to put religious doctrine on the level of reason. In Aquinas's account, as in the Condemnations, we have the term “contrary”: “Therefore he thinks that faith is of things whose contraries can conclude necessarily” (*“Ergo sentit quod fides sit de aliquibus quorum contraria de necessitate concludi possunt”*). While “contrary” might seem to introduce a pair of truths both held according to reason, here again is an inference (“therefore he thinks”), not a description of what the opponent actually holds. This inference may have been triggered by views Aquinas attributes to his opponent in the previous paragraph. The opponent himself seems to have introduced the concept of contraries by saying, “The Latins do not accept [the unicity of the intellect] ... perhaps because their law is contrary to it”, and by holding that “God cannot bring about that there be many intellects, because this implies a contradiction”. In this light, Aquinas's own use of the term “contraries” seems to be a disputational device, typical of the scholastic debating environment in which he is writing, where an opponent's words or allegations are turned back on him³⁶.

necessarium, cuius oppositum est falsum impossibile, sequitur secundum eius dictum quod fides sit de falso impossibili, quod etiam Deus facere non potest: quod fidelium aures ferre non possunt.”

³⁶ For historiographical opinion on how this remark is not a direct accusation of holding a logical contradiction but instead a strategy to corner his opponent, see n. 43 and the text it accompanies.

There are, however, grounds in the preceding paragraph for Aquinas to project this idea and to characterise the opponent as holding religious truth on the level of reason: the opponent referred to religious truth as a “position”. Speaking in the context of dialectical debate, the opponent allegedly said, “This is the reason Catholics seem to hold their position”; and in reporting this Aquinas adds with contempt “where the doctrine of faith is called a ‘position’”³⁷. Calling the doctrine of faith a “position” had angered Aquinas in the past, as we saw in the case of Peter of Tarentaise. Reducing religious truth to the level of reason made it capable of being put in dialectical contest and found false. When Peter called Creation the “position” of Moses, Aquinas said he was not sufficiently reverent (“*non satis reverenter*”)³⁸. Aquinas uses the same word to describe his opponent in *De unitate intellectus* in the paragraph rebuking him for a similar offense: “It is yet more astounding, or even worthy of indignation, that anyone professing to be Christian should presume to speak so irreverently (*irreverenter*) of Christian faith”³⁹. This case could be characterised as graver than that of Peter of Tarentaise. Peter explained that, regarding Creation, only the religious account was true, while philosophical accounts of the world’s eternity were heretical. By contrast, as we shall see presently, Aquinas’s opponent in *De unitate intellectus* has apparently spoken of religious truth in the context of dialectical contest and found it to be false.

These observations show how the opponent’s words and views in the context of philosophical debate might suggest he regards religious truth as being on the level of reason. However, as the next discussion shows, these same indications have implications which put religious truth beyond reason in the way the opponent holds them.

“It follows from his statement that faith is of the false impossible”

Aquinas tells us that, to the opponent, the necessary philosophical conclusion accepting the unicity of the intellect constitutes truth, because “nothing can be concluded necessarily unless it is a necessary truth”. From this Aquinas reasons that, to the opponent, the religious teaching it denies is false: the necessary conclusion’s opposite “is false impossible”, such that “faith is false impossible”. Indeed, the opponent is described in the previous paragraph as holding that God’s making a multiplicity of intellects “implies a contradiction”. It is thus accurate to say that, in philosophical terms, to the opponent the religious teaching is false, and that this conclusion/truth is at the level of reason.

However, the level at which the opponent holds that this religious teaching is instead true is not that of reason. The conclusion in philosophical terms in fact strengthens the higher sense of how the opponent says he personally holds religious truth. According to reason he holds that the unicity of the intellect is “necessary” (his word, according to Aquinas) or “true” (Aquinas’s word) and that a multiplicity of intellects implies a “contradiction” (his word) or is “false impossible” (Aquinas’s words). Yet, as discussed above, he says he nevertheless holds the religious truth (“*firmiter tamen teneo oppositum per fidem*”). Since according to reason the religious truth is false, if he holds it he must do so not according to reason but at the level beyond.

This brings us to another characterisation of religious doctrine made by the opponent: in the previous paragraph he calls it Christian “law”. He says, “their law is contrary to it [the unicity of the intellect]”; and Aquinas echoes this term use when fuming “he hints that he is alien to this law”. To hold an idea because it is Christian law is to hold it not as the product of reason but rather at the level above. In debating philosophically, the opponent may refer to Catholic doctrine as a “position”, but he regards the way Catholics hold it as being above reason. His personal way of holding the

³⁷ See n. 34; and see BERNARDINI, “Veritas, Error, Positio”, p. 20.

³⁸ See n. 19 and the text it accompanies.

³⁹ See n. 34.

multiplicity of intellects is no different. He holds this in spite of its not being possible according to philosophy, such that the grounds for holding it is Christian law.

Aquinas's final remarks indicate an awareness that the opponent holds religious truth in the absence of demonstration. Aquinas emphasises that he has destroyed the error of the unicity of the intellect not by referring to Christian dogma but by addressing philosophers' arguments and statements ("*non per documenta fidei, sed per ipsorum philosophorum rationes et dicta*")⁴⁰. This emphatic statement and the deliberate effort behind it in composing the treatise suggest that what he is doing is something that has not been done already by the Averroists to whom the treatise is addressed: they have not shown rational grounds for doubting or disproving the unicity of the intellect. Indeed, immediately prior to this statement, he fulminates against his opponent for presuming to treat purely religious topics by disputing whether the soul suffers hellfire⁴¹, and for saying that the doctors' teachings on this matter should be reprobated⁴². Aquinas's outrage is not that an arts master is proving religious doctrine to be true, but the reverse, that he is proving it is philosophically false. So when Aquinas rebukes his opponent for referring to the Catholic "position" and insinuates that he produces "contraries", he does not think the philosopher is holding two truths according to reason. He is quite aware his opponent holds the philosophical conclusion according to reason and divine truth without demonstration.

In sum, according to what we find in *De unitate intellectus*, there is no Double Truth of equivalent truths in what the opponent is reported to have said, nor in what Aquinas understands from his statements. In the opponent's philosophical view the religious truth is false, but in his personal view it is true on the level beyond reason. The opponent holds a Double Truth of non-equivalent truths.

This conclusion is not at odds with some expert opinion. Luca Bianchi has characterised Aquinas's Double Truth accusation as a "polemical strategy", and says, "Thomas *does not* openly charge Siger with defending 'double truth': Thomas rather tries to drive him into a corner"; Alain de Libera calls it a "piège logique" which Aquinas sets his adversary; François-Xavier Putallaz and Ruedi Imbach remark, "Thomas tente manifestement d'enfermer son adversaire dans une contradiction logique"; and Étienne Gilson already in 1921 described the Double Truth as "une réduction à l'absurde" imposed on Averroists such as Siger "comme une conséquence nécessaire de l'attitude qu'ils avaient adoptée"⁴³. These assessments concur that the imputation of holding of a P and not-P contradiction is a deliberate manipulation of the opponent's view. That the opponent's view is one of non-equivalent truths is highlighted in a comparison Alain de Libera has drawn between the Double Truth in Aquinas's rendition and the paradox of G.E. Moore, which shows there is not a contradiction in the statement "The cat is on the mat, but I don't believe it"⁴⁴. Hearers of this statement may perceive it as a contradiction, but to say "I don't believe it" is not to say "the cat is not on the mat". Both parts of the statement can be true and not in contradiction. Similarly, Aquinas's opponent is not making a contradiction when he says "Through reason I conclude

⁴⁰ AQUINAS, *De unitate intellectus*, p. 314; the full statement is: "Hec igitur sunt que in destructionem predicti erroris conscripsimus, non per documenta fidei, sed per ipsorum philosophorum rationes et dicta."

⁴¹ Part of the evidence identifying Siger of Brabant as possibly being the target of Aquinas's treatise is the mention of this topic, which Siger had previously addressed; see n. 52.

⁴² AQUINAS, *De unitate intellectus*, p. 314: "Non caret etiam magna temeritate, quod de hiis que ad philosophiam non pertinent, sed sunt pure fidei, disputare presumit, sicut quod anima patiat ab igne inferni, et dicere sententias doctorum de hoc esse reprobandas; pari enim ratione posset disputare de Trinitate, de Incarnatione et aliis huiusmodi, de quibus nonnisi cecutiens loqueretur."

⁴³ BIANCHI, "From Pope Urban VIII", p. 25; DE LIBERA "Philosophie et censure", p. 83; *idem*, *Commentaire du De unitate intellectus*, p. 18; F.-X. PUTALLAZ – R. IMBACH, *Profession: philosophe. Siger de Brabant*, Paris 1997, p. 46; GILSON, "La doctrine de la double vérité", pp. 68 and 59.

⁴⁴ DE LIBERA, *Commentaire du De unitate intellectus*, pp. 507-509 et seq.

necessarily that the intellect is one in number; nevertheless, I firmly hold the opposite through faith”⁴⁵.

Notwithstanding these conclusions, the consensus remains that the Double Truth is defined as a pair of equi-valent truths in contradiction, while this same pair of truths, held in a non-equi-valent way, does not constitute Double Truth. Yet was such a pair of non-equi-valent truths an acceptable position? Clearly not. Aquinas is appalled by the audacity of it. His tone in this account is uncharacteristically angry, fuelled by shock and indignation. It is this pairing of non-equi-valent truths that he rejects, finding it hypocritical of the opponent to say he holds the doctrine of faith when he has just argued that it is false, a hypocrisy compounding that of dissociating himself from Catholics when referring in philosophical discourse to “the Latins”, “their law” and “their position”, causing Aquinas to bristle “he hints that he is alien to this law”. Aquinas is not objecting to holding religious truth without demonstration (this was also his own view; see Section II-C), but he is alarmed that someone would think it acceptable to hold this while maintaining as necessarily true a view that denies it philosophically. He has identified a pairing of truths that is disturbing and dangerous. It is not the contradiction of equi-valent truths in the polemical reference to “contraries”, but it is intolerable all the same.

3. Articles in the Condemnations of 1277

Returning to the Condemnations of 1277, we have, in addition to the preamble’s Double Truth account, several articles among the 219 prohibited ideas which historians have identified as presenting Double Truth statements. The following is a consideration of three articles in terms of whether they can be said to represent a Double Truth entailing that both truths are held on the same level. Whether the articles accurately represent opinions scholastics actually held cannot be said for certain, but our concern here is the characterisation of these views as unacceptable and their prohibition. I would argue that they do not posit a scenario of truths necessarily of equal valence.

Article 113: “That the separated soul is not alterable according to philosophy, although according to faith it is altered”⁴⁶.

The first clause in Article 113, on philosophy, is held at the level of reason (“*secundum philosophiam*”). The second clause, on religion, is held according to faith (“*secundum fidem*”). What *secundum fidem* means is not explained, though on the surface it would appear that it is taken without arguments, and so not according to reason.

Article 184: “That creation is not possible, although the contrary must be held (*tenendum*) according to faith”⁴⁷.

The first clause in Article 184 presumably concerns a position held according to philosophy, given the presence of the words “not possible”, suggesting a position on creation’s possibility/demonstrability (and given the decree’s purpose of curbing philosophical excesses listed in its articles). The second clause, on religion, is expressed along the lines of the clause on faith in Article 113, but with “*tenendum*” adding a sense that, since one is obliged to hold this truth, it is not already convincing

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 508.

⁴⁶ PICHÉ, *La condamnation*, p. 112, Article 113: “Quod anima separata non est alterabilis secundum philosophiam, licet secundum fidem alteretur”; previously published in DENIFLE – CHATELAIN, *Chartularium* I, p. 550.

⁴⁷ PICHÉ, *La condamnation*, p. 134, Article 184: “Quod creatio non est possibilis, quamvis contrarium tenendum sit secundum fidem”; previously published in DENIFLE – CHATELAIN, *Chartularium* I, p. 553.

on rational grounds and thus is held without demonstration. The word “contrary” appears here, but if it refers to a view contrary in philosophical terms (the possibility of Creation), the way the idea is held is not in philosophical terms, as it “must be held” – apparently without substantiation – according to faith.

Article 90: “That the natural philosopher must deny absolutely (*simpliciter*) the newness of the world because he relies on natural causes and reasons. The believer (*fidelis*), however, can deny the eternity of the world because he relies on supernatural causes”⁴⁸.

The first sentence in Article 90, representing the philosopher’s position, seems to refer both to holding an idea on the level of the absolute (*simpliciter*), without rational grounds, and conversely to holding it on the level of reason. The presence of the word “*simpliciter*” is puzzling, given that it seems to contradict the rest of the sentence’s description of a position held according to natural causes and reasons (“*quia innititur causis naturalibus, et rationibus naturalibus*”). The sentence would make better sense without the word, leaving the explanation of the position as one grounded on rational arguments. Historians have speculated that the word “*simpliciter*” might be a misrepresentation of the original source: if it were not for its presence, the condemned statement would be consistent with the position of Boethius of Dacia⁴⁹. We might ask whether “*simpliciter*” here is used in not in the sense of absolute truth not grounded on reason, but as an indication of truth held in an absolute way within natural philosophy (the way Aristotle explained absolute truth) – while in the context of the article’s full statement this truth is relative to philosophy and not true outside it. These suggestions may not be satisfactory explanations, but the distinct assertion of natural grounds in the sentence seems to override the idea of this truth’s being held without demonstration.

The second sentence, regarding religion, could also be taken as held either according to reason or without rational explanation. The reference to supernatural causes, contrasting with the natural causes in the first sentence, could be seen as an appeal to another rational explanation, albeit in a different philosophical system (metaphysics rather than physics). If both sentences are taken as calling on philosophical explanation, Article 90 could be regarded as a Double Truth statement of equi-valent truths held according to reason. Interestingly, the historiography presents a different interpretation. The many studies suggesting the article is meant to represent the view of Boethius of Dacia show a strong link between it and a similar statement in his *De aeternitate mundi*. Boethius’s position was one of non-equi-valent truths, with religious truth held without demonstration. In these studies, the supernatural cause in Boethius’s position is described as representing truth held according to divine revelation rather than relying on philosophical explanation⁵⁰. If Article 90 is interpreted in the same way, the reference to “supernatural” causes serves simply to contrast with the “natural” causes of the previous sentence, to distinguish religious

⁴⁸ PICHÉ, *La condemnation*, p. 106, Article 90: “Quod naturalis philosophus simpliciter debet negare mundi nouitatem, quia innititur causis et rationibus naturalibus. Fidelis autem potest negare mundi eternitatem, quia innititur causis supernaturalibus”; previously published in DENIFLE – CHATELAIN, *Chartularium I*, p. 548.

⁴⁹ See, e.g.: BIANCHI’S introduction to his translation of Boethius’s *De aeternitate mundi* in *Sull’eternità del mondo*, p. 40; *idem*, “From Pope Urban VIII”, p. 19; *idem*, *Il vescovo e i filosofi*, pp. 117-118; *idem*, *Pour une histoire de la “double vérité”*, p. 43; *idem*, *L’errore di Aristotele. La polemica contro l’eternità del mondo nel XIII secolo*, Florence 1984, p. 69; PICHÉ, *La condemnation*, pp. 200-201; HISSETTE, *Enquête*, p. 285; WIPPEL, “The Parisian Condemnations”, p. 70; *idem*, introduction to his English translation of Boethius of Dacia’s *De aeternitate mundi*, *op. cit.*, p. 18; VAN STEENBERGHEN, “Nouvelles recherches”, p. 146.

⁵⁰ For studies showing the link between Article 90 and Boethius of Dacia, see the sources in n. 49 and MAURER, “Boethius of Dacia and the Double Truth”, p. 234. Regarding the characterisation of Boethius’s view on the religious truth in this pairing, see esp. PICHÉ, *La condemnation*, pp. 200-208, esp. 200-202; BIANCHI, *Pour une histoire de la “double vérité”*, pp. 43-44. For Boethius of Dacia’s statement, see n. 80 below.

truth from conclusions in philosophy (God and his action are beyond philosophical explanation). In that case, Article 90 should be taken as a pairing of non-equi-valent truths.

These three Double Truth articles in the Condemnations of 1277 do not appear to posit a scenario of truths necessarily of equal valence. Instead, there is scope in them for a Double Truth involving non-equi-valent truths. As with the accounts of Double Truth in the decree's preamble and in Aquinas's *De unitate intellectus*, if we are to maintain that these articles are examples of Double Truth, we ought to reconsider our definition of the position. I would argue that Articles 184 and 90 have stronger indications of a pairing of non-equi-valent truths than one of truths on the same level. If this is the case, these articles are witnesses to a prohibition against pairing contrasting non-equi-valent truths.

I-B. Religious Truth according to Theology and Philosophy

Having examined the sources identified in modern scholarship as describing or representing Double Truth, let us turn to the definition given to the position and how manifestation of it has been sought (and not found) in medieval texts. The purpose here is to consider interpretations given to the expression "according to faith" ("*secundum fidem*") when it is assumed to refer to religious truth held as part of a contradiction, so that we can evaluate whether they offer a realistic approach to this history. The Double Truth definition invites an expectation that the religious truth would be held according to reason because, to form a contradiction, the religious truth would have to be held on the same level as the philosophical truth. Strictly speaking, as the philosophical truth is held according to philosophy ("*secundum philosophiam*", in the Condemnations) or through reason producing a necessary conclusion ("*per rationem concludo de necessitate*", as reported by Aquinas), the religious truth should be held according to philosophy if it is to be held in the same respect. Given that philosophical method (a rational approach capable of producing necessary conclusions) was used in the theology of this time, the religious truth might alternatively be held according to theology.

Research has generally focused on identifying evidence of practice of Double Truth in writing, with the religious truth taking the form of the product of a theological or philosophical case. Pairing this with a philosophical case for the philosophical theory, the written evidence to look for might be a *quaestio*/treatment, or pair of *quaestiones*/treatments, addressing P and not-P positions, and in a manner indicating that the author sustains both simultaneously (one case does not override the other). Scholarship considering theology and philosophy as avenues to the religious truth has examined and discounted possible (rare) examples in the two fields, involving pairs of written treatments presenting opposing cases. The following is an evaluation of religious truth held according to theology (which used the methods of citing authorities and employing rational argument) and according to philosophy (as applied to both philosophy and theology), taking note of two examples in these fields that have been dismissed as instances of Double Truth.

Theology

Prior to the Condemnations, Paris arts faculty members had been prohibited from taking up questions on theology in their faculty's statute of 1272, to which they were all sworn⁵¹. While some may have handled such matters prior to the statute⁵², it is not evident that in the years between the

⁵¹ Arts Faculty Statute of 1272, in: DENIFLE – CHATELAIN, *Chartularium I*, pp. 499-500.

⁵² Siger of Brabant had treated the theological matter of whether the separated soul could suffer fire prior to his faculty's statute in his *De anima* commentary of c. 1265, the same work in which he presented the theory of the unicity of the intellect (see n. 86, below and the text it accompanies). His behaviour regarding religious subjects would change in his *De anima intellectiva* of c. 1272/73, as we shall see in Section II-B. The early

statute and the Condemnations there were transgressors, let alone a number of them significant enough to provoke suppression by the bishop⁵³. Nevertheless, let us consider what would be involved if “*secundum fidem*” referred to direct treatment of theological matters.

Late medieval theology as a scientific field was practiced using citations and elaborations of authorities such as patristic sources, and/or rational approaches employing philosophical arguments. Although a rational approach would be in keeping with the production of a conclusion held in the same respect as the philosophical theory, the approach involving authorities has also been entertained as a possibility for manifestation of Double Truth. There was at one time speculation over a text characterised as a pairing of contradictory philosophical and theological cases in which the theological case was based on authorities. This work, *De amore* (1184/86) by Andreas Capellanus, was banned in the preamble of the Condemnations of 1277. While it was probably condemned for transgressing Christian morality, historians have examined it for the Double Truth⁵⁴. *De amore* is in three books, the first two presenting a case for romantic love as the best thing in the world and the source of all good. The third book, *De reprobatione*, repudiates the first two, and makes a case, based on religion and authorities, that this love is sinful and the source of wickedness. Notwithstanding this pairing of cases, *De amore* has not been accepted as an example of Double Truth. Roland Hissette pointed out that the work is not an example because the two truths are not held simultaneously, as the second case is meant to cancel the first⁵⁵.

In the late thirteenth century at the University of Paris, theological discourse was dominated by the method of philosophical argumentation. Theological treatments took the form of *quaestiones* setting out demonstrations like those produced for philosophy; and *Sentences* commentaries, like commentaries on philosophical works, took the form of volumes of *quaestiones*. The similarities are so strong that if, for instance, one examines a *quaestio* on the eternity of the world extracted from a larger work, it is not immediately clear whether it belongs to a *Sentences* or *Physics* commentary. Thus, a Double Truth pairing of a philosophical case (for a philosophical theory) and a theological case (for religious truth) could be called contradictory if the theological case employed philosophical demonstration, making the two conclusions true in the same respect. This method of arriving at a pair of truths held according to reason is considered in the next section.

quaestio appears in: SIGER OF BRABANT, *Quaestiones in tertium De anima*, ed. B. BAZÁN, *Siger de Brabant. Quaestiones in tertium De anima, De anima intellectiva, De aeternitate mundi*, Louvain / Paris 1972, pp. 1-69, Q. 11 (“Utrum anima separata pati possit ab igne”), pp. 31-35 (calling it a “*quaestio non multum philosophica*” on p. 31). See also DE LIBERA, *Commentaire du De unitate intellectus*, pp. 511-515.

⁵³ The preamble to the Condemnations refers to arts faculty members exceeding the boundaries of their faculty, but this seems to refer to the ramifications of demonstrations of philosophical theories, not demonstrations directly testing the philosophical possibility of tenets of faith; for the text, see PICHÉ, *La condamnation*, p. 72; previously published in DENIFLE – CHATELAIN, *Chartularium I*, p. 543.

⁵⁴ There are several editions and translations, e.g.: ANDREAS CAPELLANUS, *De amore*, Latin ed. and Eng. transl. P.G. WALSH, *Andreas Capellanus. On Love*, London 1982. For the citation in the Condemnations of 1277, see PICHÉ, *La condamnation*, p. 76, identifying the work with the incipit of Book I and the explicit of Book III (also known as *De reprobatione amoris*); previously published in DENIFLE – CHATELAIN, *Chartularium I*, p. 543. For a discussion of the work, see PICHÉ, *La condamnation*, pp. 231-236. Regarding the hypothesis of the presence of the Double Truth in *De amore*, see: A.J. DENOMY, “The ‘De amore’ of Andreas Capellanus and the Condemnation of 1277”, in: *Mediaeval Studies* 8 (1946), pp. 107-149, at 107-108 and 148-149; M. GRABMANN, “Das Werk *de Amore* des Andreas Capellanus und das Verurteilungsdekret des Bischofs Stephan Tempier von Paris vom 7. März 1277”, in: *Speculum* 7 (1932), pp. 75-79, at 79.

⁵⁵ R. HISSETTE, “Une ‘duplex sententia’ dans le ‘De amore’ d’André le Chapelain?”, in: *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 50 (1983), pp. 246-251; *idem*, “André de Chapelain et la double vérité”, in: *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 21 (1979), pp. 63-67.

Before proceeding to that discussion, we should bear in mind an important aspect of theology concerning how the field was perceived by some scholastics. For there to be a pair of truths held on the level of reason, the theological demonstration would have to produce a conclusion which the author himself considered true on that level. Owing to the eternal, divine principles involved in theology, its conclusions could be regarded as true on the level above reason, notwithstanding their production through philosophical method. This is so especially if truths arrived at through theology are considered true independently from the rational mode of arriving at them. This was the view of, for example, theologian Henry of Ghent, who put theology on an exalted epistemological status on the grounds that it involves unchangeable, genuine truth, which he considered accessible not through reason alone but with the aid of divine illumination or grace⁵⁶. Arguably, holding theological truths produced in this way could be said not to result in a contradiction with a philosophical theory because the truths are held at different levels. For a Double Truth candidate to produce a contradiction, he would have to regard both theological and philosophical conclusions as true according to reason.

Philosophy

To date, no pair of philosophical demonstrations has been identified as the outcome of a Double Truth position. There is an example of a pair of philosophical demonstrations of the period 1272-77 which has been evaluated in this context but found not to represent the position. It is a pair of *quaestiones* on the unicity of the intellect in an anonymous commentary on *De anima* (Anon., ed. Bazán 1971; probably a *reportatio*)⁵⁷. In the commentary on Book III, Q. 21 (“*Utrum unus intellectus in numero sit in omnibus*”) takes a stand against the unicity of the intellect, presenting arguments for it and rebuttals to them, with the author interjecting to reject the theory because it opposes faith⁵⁸. Immediately following this, Q. 22 asks the same question (“*Utrum unus intellectus in numero sit in omnibus*”) and takes the opposite stand, this time presenting arguments and rebuttals to support the opinion of Averroes⁵⁹. These two *quaestiones* even employ or address some of the same arguments⁶⁰.

Interestingly, this pair of *quaestiones* has not been seized upon as an example of Double Truth involving a P and not-P pairing of truths. The editor of the commentary, Bernardo Carlos Bazán, concluded both that the author did not hold the unicity of the intellect and that he felt his arguments against Averroes (i.e., defending faith) were insufficient⁶¹. Indeed, the author presents

⁵⁶ See RODOLFI, “‘Verum simpliciter’ e ‘verum secundum quid’”; SPEER, “The Double Truth Question”, pp. 197-202; and see the considerations in BIANCHI, *Pour une histoire de la “double vérité”*, pp.32-36. Cfr. in this context the discussion in Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, Q. 1, Art. 5.

⁵⁷ B. BAZÁN, “Un commentaire anti-averroïste du Traité de l’âme (Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16.170, f. 42-52)”, in: M. GIELE – F. VAN STEENBERGHEN – B. BAZÁN (eds.), *Trois commentaires anonymes sur le Traité de l’âme d’Aristote*, Louvain – Paris 1971, pp. 349-517, at 510-514. On the probability this work is a *reportatio* (and not corrected by the master), see pp. 363-365.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 511: “sed hoc est impossibile dicere secundum fidem nostram; ergo impossibile est esse unum intellectum in omnibus”, and “notandum quod negando Commentatorem, qui unum ponit intellectum in omnibus, et fidem tenendo, dico ad argumenta Commentatoris”.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 513: “tenendo opinionem Commentatoris”. Bazán compares QQ. 21 and 22 in his introduction, pp. 375-376.

⁶⁰ One argument is that, if there were a single intellect, we would all think the same things at the same time: *Ibid.*, in Q. 21 on p. 511, and in Q. 22 on pp. 513 and 514. Another argument is that, if the world were eternal, the human race would be eternal and there would be an infinity of souls of the deceased, producing the impossibility of an actual infinity – a problem resolved if all souls of the departed are reabsorbed into a single intellect: *Ibid.*, in Q. 21 on pp. 510 and 512, and in Q. 22 on p. 514; see also Bazán’s analysis on pp. 375-376.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 364 and 375 (esp. n. 45). BAZÁN did not believe any arts masters held the Double Truth, a view restated more recently in B.C. BAZÁN, “Radical Aristotelianism in the Faculties of Arts. The Case of Siger of

the cases differently: in the case supporting the unicity of the intellect (Q. 22) he casts his treatment as merely an exposition of Averroes's teaching, while in the case against the theory (Q. 21) he speaks with certitude about faith⁶². In this interpretation, P is not held as true; and not-P is not demonstrated, so it is not held as true according to reason. By contrast, Alain de Libera sees this pair of *quaestiones* as an example of the arts masters' pedagogical practice of conducting expositions of both sides of a question (*sic et non*) to show how the arguments work; and he suggests this practice may have been the phenomenon at the root of the statements by the Bishop of Paris and Aquinas about Double Truth⁶³. Such an exercise, of course, merely shows how the cases for the two sides work: they do not reflect an author's conviction that both conclusions are true.

Where does this leave us in the search for a pair of philosophical conclusions constituting Double Truth? Bazán's view on the lack of evidence of the Double Truth in practice is enlightening. He has remarked that arts faculty masters did not adopt this "illogical thesis" – a Double Truth of equi-valent truths – precisely because of their Aristotelian logical training⁶⁴. I would agree. While there are limits to how much we can speculate, it is unlikely that a philosopher would defend such a position, let alone a group of them large enough to attract episcopal attention. In a treatment or pair of treatments of both sides of the problem, neither conclusion would be the product of a complete demonstration proving one side and disproving the other. The competing cases would leave the philosopher with two inconclusive opinions, not a pair of necessary demonstrations or truths of which he was convinced. Thus, not only do we have no textual evidence of Double Truth involving pairs of philosophical cases, it is doubtful that we would find it.

This conclusion is sound, but insufficient. If, proceeding from it, we say that Aquinas and the Bishop of Paris misunderstood or exaggerated the position of non-equi-valent truths, are we saying that, while a position of equi-valent truths was offensive, one of non-equi-valent truths was not? We should bear in mind that, in the scenario of non-equi-valent truths, religious truth does not cancel the philosophical truth: even while the religious truth is held true without demonstration, the philosophical theory is still persistently held as true according to reason.

I-C. Double Truth of Non-Equi-Valent Truths

The discussion in Section I-A shows that the prevailing definition of Double Truth as necessarily composed of truths of equal valence is not borne out by what we find in contemporary descriptions. The sources do not say that the truths are both held according to reason; and that they accuse the culprits of producing a contradiction is a polemical device. Furthermore, Section I-B shows that, while one might deduce that a religious truth held on the level of reason would be a the product of a philosophical (or philosophical-theological) case, even when a pair of philosophical cases has been found it has not been considered an example of demonstrations producing two truths convincing to the author, nor is it thought that Paris arts faculty members would have held such a position. In sum, an example of Double Truth has not been found, nor should we expect to find one. Nevertheless, we have two sources reacting angrily to offending statements by arts masters. The offense is that these scholars hold one truth according to philosophy/reason, and the other "according to faith"

Brabant", in: L. HONNEFELDER – R. WOOD – M. DREYER – M.-A. ARIS (eds.), *Albertus Magnus und die Anfänge der Aristoteles-Rezeption im lateinischen Mittelalter. Von Richardus Rufus bis zu Franciscus de Mayronis / Albertus Magnus and the Beginnings of the Medieval Reception of Aristotle in the Latin West. From Richardus Rufus to Franciscus de Mayronis*, Munster 2005, pp. 585-629, at 589.

⁶² QQ. 22 and 21 in BAZÁN, "Un commentaire anti-averroïste", pp. 513 and 511; and see nn. 59 and 58 above.

⁶³ DE LIBERA, *Commentaire du De unitate intellectus*, pp. 31-32; however, see nn. 44-45 above and the text they accompany regarding de Libera's view in this commentary that the position drawing Aquinas's criticism was one of non-equi-valent truths.

⁶⁴ BAZÁN, "Radical Aristotelianism in the Faculties of Arts", p. 589.

(Condemnations) or “through faith” (Aquinas). Is it unreasonable to suggest that the culprits held the religious truth without proof? Given what we have seen, is it possible that the Double Truth entailed non-equi-valent truths? Let us be clear: the two truths, taken as propositions, would form a P and not-P contradiction; but the way they were held would not. The proponents of such a position would still be guilty of simultaneously holding erroneous theories as necessary and insisting that nevertheless they did not waver in their faith. We do not need to speculate regarding the reaction to such a position. We know that hearing it was galling enough to provoke rage and accusations of hypocrisy because Roger Bacon has shown us. He said scholars holding it were as “deceptive as the vilest heretics”⁶⁵, and gave the impression that it was not an uncommon position in the 1260s⁶⁶.

I would suggest that, while a Double Truth necessarily of equi-valent truths does not fit the collected evidence, one of non-equi-valent truths can. It is possible within the scope of the statement in the Condemnations; it is the probable scenario in Aquinas’s *De unitate intellectus*; and it reflects what was rationally possible for a Christian philosopher to hold. It is also conceivable that we might find proponents of it, which could account for the shock and rage resounding in the sources, making this emotion a response to an actual phenomenon.

II. Reopening the Question of Double Truth Proponents

A Double Truth entailing non-equi-valent truths fits how historians have described the positions of Boethius of Dacia and Siger of Brabant. Both arts masters articulated views that conceivably sound like Double Truth; but the consensus in scholarship is that they did not hold this view, on the grounds that both held divine truth to be higher than philosophical truth⁶⁷. Let us examine their thinking in light of the discussion above.

II-A. Boethius of Dacia

Boethius of Dacia showed support for the philosophical possibility that the world is eternal in his *De aeternitate mundi* of c. 1270/72⁶⁸. In this work he set out a position that could be classified as the Double Truth according to the suggestion above. When Géza Sajó published the first edition of Boethius’s treatise in 1954, he presented it as an example of the Double Truth⁶⁹. The response of other scholars was to disagree, because Boethius had described divine truth as higher than philosophical truth. Sajó was persuaded by this view, and the thinking on Boethius has remained that he was not a Double Truth proponent⁷⁰.

⁶⁵ See n. 21.

⁶⁶ See Raymond Macken, “La temporalité radicale de la créature selon Henri de Gand”, in: *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 38 (1971), pp. 211-272, at 217 and n. 35.

⁶⁷ See n. 4.

⁶⁸ BOETHIUS OF DACIA, *De aeternitate mundi*, in: N.J. GREEN-PEDERSEN (ed.), *Boethii Daci opera. Topica – Opuscula*, Copenhagen 1976, 6.2, pp. 335-366. For explanations of the theory of the eternity of the world and the arguments supporting it see H.A. DAVIDSON, *Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy*, New York / Oxford 1987; DALES, *Medieval Discussions*.

⁶⁹ G. SAJÓ, *Un traité récemment découvert de Boèce de Dacie “De aeternitate mundi”*, Budapest 1954, pp. 34-37 and 73-79.

⁷⁰ For the first reactions to Sajó’s publication, see: MAURER, “Boetius of Dacia and the Double Truth”; GILSON, “Boèce de Dacie et la double vérité”; MICHAUD-QUANTIN, “La double-vérité des Averroïstes”, esp. pp. 177 and 182; VAN STEENBERGHEN, “Nouvelles recherches sur Siger de Brabant”. For Sajó’s revised opinion, see G. SAJÓ, “Boetius de Dacia und seine philosophische Bedeutung”, in: P. WILPERT – W.P. ECKERT (eds.), *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung*, Berlin 1963 (*Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 3), pp. 454-463, esp. 458-460. For an account of this discussion, see: BIANCHI, *Pour une histoire de la “double vérité”*, pp. 8 and 12; WIPPEL’s introduction to his translation of Boethius of Dacia’s *On the Eternity of the World*, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4. For an explanation on the position of Boethius of Dacia on truth according to science and to faith, see S. EBBESEN,

The issue of Boethius of Dacia and the Double Truth has to do with statements he made in his *De aeternitate mundi*, rather than the philosophical position he took in it. The view he demonstrates and defends is not the world's de facto eternity, but merely the philosophical possibility of the theory. This work is in a *quaestio* format, opening with the question "Whether the world is eternal" ("*Utrum mundus sit aeternus*"). Boethius presents three sets of principal arguments: a set of 11 *quod non*, that the world is not eternal⁷¹; 5 for the possibility of the world's eternity (*quod mundus possit esse aeternus*)⁷²; and 13 for the actual eternity of the world (*quod mundus sit aeternus*)⁷³. Against these cases, he presents 13 counter-arguments invalidating those for the actual eternity of the world⁷⁴. Although he indicates that he will refute the 11 arguments for the non-eternity of the world⁷⁵, he later refrains from doing so, saying they are sophistical⁷⁶. The only arguments Boethius does not undermine are the five he identified as being for the possibility of the world's eternity. Thus in his estimation the cases that the world actually is, or conversely is not, eternal do not hold; but the case for the possibility of its eternity stands.

The statements Boethius made that could indicate a Double Truth position are in connection with his defence of the philosopher's right to follow reason to its logical conclusion. He said that a natural philosopher had to hold any opinion logically produced in philosophy, and deny any truth contrary to philosophical principles and destructive of philosophy itself; but he also said that these positions were held or denied according to natural principles, and false if taken without this qualification⁷⁷. Regarding religious truths, Boethius felt strongly that the philosopher must not deny them on the grounds that they cannot be demonstrated philosophically; rather, they are beyond what philosophical principles can account for⁷⁸.

One lengthy statement draws together the nuances of his view. It starts by accepting both religious truth, that the world began to be, and the philosophical opinion contradicting this, that the world did not begin to be, an opinion Boethius calls "truth" in this context. However, this philosophical conclusion is only true according to natural principles; and if it is held as true without this qualification it is false.

To this it must be said that just as one can say both that there was a first motion and that the world began to be and yet that the world did not begin to be through natural causes and

"Boethius of Dacia", in: *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2020): <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/boethius-dacia/#>

⁷¹ BOETHIUS OF DACIA, *De aeternitate mundi*, pp. 336-338. These are common contemporary arguments to demonstrate the impossibility of the eternity of the world.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 339-340.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 340-346.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 357-364.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

⁷⁶ Boethius says he refrains from presenting counter-arguments because, although the arguments against the world's eternity can be solved because they are sophistical, "for the sake of the conclusion" he will grant them; *ibid.*, p. 364: "Rationes ad partem oppositam gratia conclusionis concedantur, licet solvi possint, cum sint sophisticatae." His scruples here are not clear: if he means a conclusion of his treatise (that Creation in time cannot be demonstrated), then it would seem that he ought to present refutations; yet if he means an aim of the treatise, that philosophers defending the world's actual eternity err in their reasoning and in their faith, then perhaps such restraint is intended to avoid any mis-impression of support for their position. Regarding the perplexing nature of this remark, see WIPPEL'S comment in the introduction to his English translation of Boethius of Dacia's *De aeternitate mundi*, *op. cit.*, p. 64, n. 50.

⁷⁷ BOETHIUS OF DACIA, *De aeternitate mundi*, pp. 351-352.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 351: "... naturalis istas veritates causare non possit nec scire, eo quod principia suae scientiae ad tam ardua et tam occulta opera sapientiae divinae se non extendunt, tamen istas veritates negare non debet."

principles, so too one can say, if he carefully considers the situation, both that the world and the first motion began to be and that the natural philosopher speaks the truth when he denies that the world and the first motion began to be. This is so because the natural philosopher denies *as* a natural philosopher that the world and the first motion began to be, and this is for him to deny that the world began to be from natural principles. Whatever the natural philosopher denies or concedes *as* natural philosopher, this he denies or concedes from natural causes and principles. Wherefore the conclusion wherein the natural philosopher asserts that the world and the first motion did [not] begin to be is false when it is taken without qualification; but if it is referred back to the arguments and principles from which the natural philosopher derives it, it follows from these⁷⁹.

It is in this sense of qualified and unqualified truths that we are meant to understand a statement that soon follows (text which Article 90 of the Condemnations of 1277 strongly resembles):

Thus the Christian speaks the truth when he says that the world and the first motion began to be ... for such things are conceded to be possible by reason of a cause whose power is greater than that of any natural cause. The natural philosopher also speaks the truth when he says that such things are not possible from natural causes and principles; for he concedes or denies something only from natural principles and causes ...⁸⁰

The treatise concludes with the thought that the philosopher and the Christian can be the same person if the difference between qualified and unqualified truths is respected⁸¹. The identity of the Christian philosopher, who can hold contrasting truths but must hold Christian truth in an absolute sense, resonates in repeated labelling as “heretical” anyone who defends the actual eternity of the world while taking a position explicitly denying faith. Boethius uses the term “heresy” six times to refer to adherents of the actual eternity of the world and their refusal to believe divine truth without philosophical demonstration. He says that: it is heretical not to believe religious truth unsupported by rational argument; it is heretical to refuse to believe what must be held according to faith; the arguments of heretics maintaining the world’s eternity against Christian faith have no

⁷⁹ WIPPEL, English translation of Boethius of Dacia’s *De aeternitate mundi*, *op. cit.*, p. 52 (italics and correction are in this translation); original text in BOETHIUS OF DACIA, *De aeternitate mundi*, p. 352: “Dicendum ad hoc quod sicut simul stant motum primum et mundum esse novum et tamen non esse novum per causas naturales et principia naturalia, sic simul stant, si quis diligenter inspiciat, mundum et motum primum esse novum et naturalem negantem mundum et motum primum esse novum dicere verum, quia naturalis negat mundum et motum primum esse novum sicut naturalis, et hoc est ipsum negare ex principiis naturalibus esse novum. Quicquid enim naturalis secundum quod naturalis negat vel concedit, ex causis et principiis naturalibus hoc negat vel concedit. Unde conclusio in qua naturalis dicit mundum et primum motum <non> esse novum accepta absolute falsa est, sed si referatur in rationes et principia ex quibus ipse eam concludit, ex illis sequitur.”

⁸⁰ WIPPEL, English translation of Boethius of Dacia’s *De aeternitate mundi*, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53; original text in BOETHIUS OF DACIA, *De aeternitate mundi*, pp. 352-353: “Sic verum dicit christianus, dicens mundum et motum primum esse novum ... cum tamen hoc concedatur possibile esse per causam cuius virtus est maior, quam sit virtus causae naturalis. Verum etiam dicit naturalis qui dicit hoc non esse possibile ex causis et principiis naturalibus, nam naturalis nihil concedit vel negat nisi ex principiis et causis naturalibus...” Regarding this statement and Article 90 of the Condemnations of 1277, see note 50 above and the text it accompanies.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 365-366: “Dicunt enim quod christianus secundum quod huiusmodi non potest esse philosophus, quia ex lege sua cogitur destruere principia philosophiae. Illud enim falsum est, quia christianus concedit conclusionem per rationes philosophicas conclusam non posse aliter se habere per illa per quae concluditur. Et si concludatur per causas naturales, quod mortuum non redibit vivum immediate idem numero, hoc concedit non posse aliter se habere per causas naturales per quas concluditur; concedit tamen hoc posse se aliter habere per causam superiorem quae est causa totius naturae et totius entis causati. Ideo christianus subtiliter intellegens non cogitur ex lege sua destruere principia philosophiae, sed salvat fidem et philosophiam neutram corripiendo.”

force; the arguments for the actual eternity of the world are by heretics who use them to attack the Christian tenet that the world is new; a Christian should be prepared with rebuttals to confront such a heretic; and someone who does not believe truths of faith which are not demonstrable is a heretic⁸².

This fierce defence of religion notwithstanding, Boethius did promote in principle the position of holding philosophical conclusions simultaneously with religious truths they opposed. While his raising of Christian truth to absolute status caused historians to disassociate him from the Double Truth, in light of the discussion in Section I it is worth reconsidering him as a possible Double Truth proponent.

II-B. Siger of Brabant

The other contender for this dubious title, whose candidacy has been excluded on the same grounds, is Siger of Brabant⁸³. Like Boethius of Dacia, Siger regarded the eternity of the world as philosophically possible⁸⁴, but he is most famous for supporting Averroes's theory of the unicity of the intellect, which denied the afterlife of individual souls and thus their salvation or damnation⁸⁵. He took this position in his *quaestiones* on *De anima* of c. 1265⁸⁶. His thinking subsequently changed, evolving in stages, and he abandoned this opinion in his *quaestiones* on the *Liber de causis* of 1274/76⁸⁷, calling it "heretical"⁸⁸. In November of 1276, Siger was summoned to appear the

⁸² *Ibid.*: "eis [things we must believe according to religion] nolle credere sine ratione haereticum est" (p. 335); "ne etiam incurramus haeresim nolentes credere quod ex fide teneri debet ..." (p. 335); "quod rationes quorundam haereticorum non habent vigorem, per quas contra christianam fidem mundum tenent esse aeternum ..." (p. 336); "Istae sunt rationes per quas quidam haeretici tenentes aeternitatem mundi nituntur impugnare sententiam christianae fidei, quae ponit mundum esse novum; contra quas expedit, ut christianus studeat diligenter, ut sciat eas perfecte solvere, si haereticus aliquis eas opponat" (pp. 346-347); and "Sunt enim multa in fide quae per rationem demonstrari non possunt Et qui his non credit haereticus est" (p. 356).

⁸³ Pierre MANDONNET described Siger's "equivocal" and "contradictory position" (the expression "Double Truth" came into use soon after) in *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^e siècle*, Louvain 1911, 2 vols., vol. I, pp. 148-153. Already in 1921, Étienne GILSON argued that Siger was not a proponent of the Double Truth in "La doctrine de la double vérité", pp. 59-62. On the origin and use of the expression "Double Truth", see n. 2. For other studies concluding that Siger was not a proponent of the Double Truth, see n. 4. On Siger's view on the uncertainty of truth produced through reason, see VAN STEENBERGHEN, *Siger de Brabant d'après ses oeuvres inédites*, pp. 582-586.

⁸⁴ Siger showed the philosophical possibility of the eternity of the world c. 1272 (focusing on the eternity of the human species) when he showed the weakness of a case for the newness of the world/human species in Siger OF BRABANT, *Tractatus de aeternitate mundi*, ed. BAZÁN, *Siger de Brabant. Quaestiones in tertium De anima, De anima intellectiva, De aeternitate mundi, op. cit.*, pp. 113-136 (regarding the statement at the conclusion, see BAZÁN, "La reconciliation", p. 238, and n. 5). In *De aeternitate mundi*, Siger presented the case for eternity as a report of the philosophical opinion: "Haec autem dicimus opinionem Philosophi recitando, non ea asserendo tamquam vera" (p. 132); and see pp. 115, 116, 117, 118, 119 and 131. See also Siger's statements that the world's eternity is probable but not necessary in *Quaestiones in tertium De anima*, p. 6; and *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, ed. W. DUNPHY, Louvain-la-Neuve 1981, p. 144. For a description of Siger's view on the world's eternity, see: PUTALLAZ – IMBACH, *Profession: philosophe*, pp. 84-88; VAN STEENBERGHEN, *Maître Siger de Brabant*, pp. 305-313; and the summary in BAZÁN, "Siger of Brabant", p. 637.

⁸⁵ For a description of the theory of the unicity of the intellect and its philosophical antecedents, see H.A. DAVIDSON, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect*, New York / Oxford 1992.

⁸⁶ Siger held the unicity of the intellect in Siger OF BRABANT, *Quaestiones in tertium De anima*, Q. 9 ("Utrum sit unus intellectus in omnibus"), pp. 25-29, esp. 26 and 28-29.

⁸⁷ Siger OF BRABANT, *Quaestiones super librum De causis*, Q. 27 ("Utrum intellectus multiplicetur multiplicatione hominum aut sit unus in omnibus"), ed. A. MARLASCA, *Les Quaestiones super librum De causis de Siger de Brabant*, Louvain / Paris 1972, p. 112. Siger's thinking between his *De anima* and *Liber de causis* evolved in a

following January for investigation for heresy, though it is not known what ideas were at issue. It is generally thought that it was to Siger that Aquinas addressed his *De unitate intellectus* (1270) and the scathing Double Truth remark examined above⁸⁹.

No single pronouncement by Siger survives showing his simultaneous holding of two conflicting truths, but historians have pulled together information from several of his works to determine his view. Let us begin to evaluate Siger in connection with the Double Truth by considering his positions on philosophical issues (whether the conclusions were necessary), and on the relationship between philosophical conclusion and religious truth it clashed with (whether he held both, and at the same time). If we consider his philosophical positions shortly before his investigation summons and the Condemnations of 1277, he does not appear to hold the Double Truth. He regarded the eternity of the world as merely philosophically possible⁹⁰, and the unicity of the intellect as heretical and not a rational conclusion⁹¹. Regarding the relationship between philosophy and faith, he made clear statements on the superiority of religious truth, going so far as to say that philosophical demonstrations should not be built against it, and that philosophical conclusions conflicting with religious truth must be abandoned⁹². However, these statements about actively restricting or rejecting philosophy (which we will discuss presently) are from works composed in the 1270s, after he had changed his opinion on the unicity of the intellect, and at a time when the atmosphere at the University of Paris was growing tense. The year 1270 saw condemnations of the theories of the eternity of the world and the unicity of the intellect⁹³; and 1272 saw the Paris arts faculty statute forbidding its members to come to philosophical conclusions contrary to faith⁹⁴.

Before this, in the 1260s, Siger accepted the unicity of the intellect. In his *De anima*, he presents a *quaestio* making a case for the theory (Q. 9. “*Utrum sit unus intellectus in omnibus*”), without stating whether he regards it as a necessary conclusion, but his demonstration seems to make this case⁹⁵. He begins by taking the position *quod sic*, that there is only one intellect for all human beings; and then quickly presents two strong arguments in opposition, one about the intellect’s role as a motor, and the other, a common objection, that a single intellect would result in all human beings learning the same thing at the same time. The *quaestio* concludes with counter-

lost work, *De intellectu*, and his *De anima intellectiva*. For a description of Siger’s view on the unicity of the intellect, the evolution of his thought, and the works evidencing these changes, see: PUTALLAZ – IMBACH, *Profession: philosophe*, pp. 34-39, 47-55 and 149-158; VAN STEENBERGHEN, *Maître Siger de Brabant*, pp. 339-383; B. NARDI, *Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del Rinascimento Italiano*, Rome 1945, esp. pp. 17-24 and 46-47 (though published before the discovery of Siger’s *Liber de causis*, and so not accounting for the full evolution in his thought); BAZÁN, “Siger of Brabant”, pp. 633 and 637-638.

⁸⁸ SIGER OF BRABANT, *Liber de causis*, p. 112: “Sed ista positio in fide nostra est haeretica, et irrationalis etiam sic apparet.”

⁸⁹ See, e.g., PUTALLAZ – IMBACH, *Profession: philosophe*, p. 46; E.P. MAHONEY, “Saint Thomas and Siger of Brabant Revisited”, in: *The Review of Metaphysics* 27 (1974), pp. 531-553, at 532; BIANCHI, “From Pope Urban VIII”, p. 25. Regarding the probability of an interaction with Aquinas which prompted Siger’s change of opinion, see, e.g.: BAZÁN, “Siger of Brabant”, p. 633; NARDI, *Sigieri di Brabante*, pp. 21 and 46; MAHONEY, “Saint Thomas”; WIPPEL, “The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris”, p. 183. Alain de Libera gives a nuanced understanding of the degree to which the views Aquinas attributes to his opponent fits those of Siger; see: DE LIBERA, “Philosophie et censure”, p. 83 (and n. 30); and the running notes and commentary in his French translation of the work, *Contre Averroès*, and *Commentaire du De unitate intellectus*.

⁹⁰ See n. 84.

⁹¹ See n. 88.

⁹² See nn. 104-105.

⁹³ Condemnations of 1270, Arts. 1 and 5, in: DENIFLE – CHATELAIN, *Chartularium I*, pp. 486-87, at 487.

⁹⁴ See n. 51.

⁹⁵ SIGER OF BRABANT, *Quaestiones in tertium De anima*, Q. 9, pp. 25-29.

arguments undermining these, and restoring the position to the original *quod sic* view. In the previous *quaestio*, Siger addresses the problem of how a single intellect can be in many bodies, and argues that it cannot be in them, but it can inform or move them⁹⁶. Does Siger demonstrate the unicity of the intellect as necessary? Whereas earlier in the same work, in Q. 2 on whether the intellect is eternal, he states repeatedly that the philosophical position is not necessary but probable, and that he is reporting the Aristotelian position⁹⁷, in Q. 9 on the unicity of the intellect he does not do this. Instead, what he presents, in terms of logical structure and tone, is a demonstration of the unicity of the intellect as a necessary conclusion⁹⁸.

What has caused historians to conclude that Siger was not a proponent of the Double Truth are clear statements he made later, in the 1270s, about holding religious truth without proof. These statements appear in his *De anima intellectiva* (c. 1272/73) and his teaching on *Metaphysics* (1271-1276). In *De anima intellectiva*, Siger clearly distinguished philosophical opinion from truth. This work marks an intermediary stage in the evolution of his thought on the unicity of the intellect, which concluded with his *Liber de causis* and its rejection of the theory. Some historians regard it as a response to, or influenced by, Aquinas's *De unitate intellectus*⁹⁹. In it, Siger considered the cases for both the unicity theory and its opposite, the multiplication of intellects, and made several explicit statements that, in discussing the intellect and presenting the theory, he was not declaring this as his opinion or as the truth, but rather as an explanation of the teaching of the philosophers, particularly Aristotle¹⁰⁰. When he took up specifically the issue of the unicity of the intellect (Ch. 7. "*Utrum anima intellectiva multiplicetur multiplicatione corporum humanorum*"), he repeated that he was discussing the intentions of the philosophers, not the truth, as he was "proceeding philosophically"¹⁰¹. In the same chapter, he expressed doubts over difficulties the theory presented, and said in such circumstances one should adhere to faith, which is beyond human reason¹⁰².

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, Q. 8, pp. 24-25, at 25: "Ad rationem dicendum quod verum est quod indivisibile non potest esse vel situari secundum suam substantiam in pluribus, bene tamen potest informare plura vel movere plura, et sic patet ad illud."

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, Q. 2, pp. 4-8: "Estne hoc necessarium? Dicendum quod, licet hoc sit probabile, non tamen hoc est necessarium" (p. 6); "Qui ergo voluerit scire utrum intellectus factus sit de novo vel factus sit aeternus, oportet eum investigare formam voluntatis Primi. Sed quis erit qui eam investigabit?" (p. 7); "Dico autem quod, licet non sit necessaria positio Aristotelis, sicut ostensum est, ipsa tamen <est> probabilior quam positio Augustini, quia non possumus inquirere novitatem vel aeternitatem facti a voluntate Primi, scilicet quod non possumus cogitare formam voluntatis suae" (p. 7); "Et sic intellectus, quantum est de natura propria, est factum aeternum et non de novo. Propter hoc positio Aristotelis probabilior est quam positio Augustini. Si igitur credatur Aristoteli, planum est quod non est credendum Augustino. Si vero credatur Augustino, erit aequaliter" (p. 8). On Siger's regard in this *quaestio* for the philosophical conclusion as not necessary, see BAZÁN, "La réconciliation entre la raison et la foi", p. 237.

⁹⁸ On the *quaestio*'s outcome emerging as a necessary conclusion, see B.C. BAZÁN, *La noétique de Siger de Brabant*, Paris 2016, pp. 206-209, esp. 207.

⁹⁹ See n. 89.

¹⁰⁰ Siger of Brabant, *De anima intellectiva*, prologue, p. 70: "Et ideo, exposcentibus amicis, eorum desiderio pro modulo nostrae possibilitatis satisfacere cupientes, quid circa praedicta sentiendum sit secundum documenta philosophorum probatorum, non aliquid ex nobis asserentes, praesenti tractatu proponimus declarare." *Ibid.*, VI, p. 99: "[N]ostra intentio principalis non est inquirere qualiter se habeat veritas de anima, sed quae fuerit opinio Philosophi de ea." *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84: "Quaerimus enim hic solum intentionem philosophorum et praecipue Aristotelis, etsi forte Philosophus senserit aliter quam veritas se habeat et sapientia, quae per revelationem de anima sint tradita, quae per rationes naturales concludi non possunt. Sed nihil ad nos nunc de Dei miraculis, cum de naturalibus naturaliter disseramus."

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, VII, p. 101: "Circa septimum prius propositorum, videlicet utrum anima intellectiva multiplicetur multiplicatione corporum humanorum, diligenter considerandum, quantum pertinet ad philosophum, et ut ratione humana et experientia comprehendi potest, quaerendo intentionem philosophorum in hoc magis quam veritatem, cum philosophice procedamus."

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 108: "Et ideo dico propter difficultatem praemissorum et quorundam aliorum, quod mihi dubium fuit a longo tempore quid via rationis naturalis in praedicto problemate sit tenendum, et quid senserit

Around this time, Siger made explicit remarks in his teaching on *Metaphysics* regarding the relative values of philosophical conclusion and religious truth. Our record of his thoughts is complicated – or enriched – by multiple, diverse *reportationes*, which probably reflect different teaching cycles, and would date variously within the period 1271 to 1276¹⁰³. In one of them, Siger places limits on what can be done with philosophy: one should not try to use it to investigate religious truth, which is above reason; one should not use it to try to disprove religious truth; and, since even a great philosopher is capable of errors, one must not, based on any philosophical argument, deny Catholic truth, even if one does not know how to counter that argument¹⁰⁴. In another *Metaphysics reportatio*, when discussing the issue of eternal creation, Siger goes further. It is not enough for him to say that the theory is probable, not necessary; indeed, because the theory conflicts with divine truth, he holds that even if rational argument arrives at this conclusion, the conclusion ought to be denied¹⁰⁵.

These are views Siger expressed after 1270, when he had changed his opinion on the unicity of the intellect, and when the atmosphere at the University of Paris had hardened. Did he hold religious truth on the level above reason before this time? This cannot be answered with certainty, but it would seem plausible that he did. Historians have disregarded Siger as a Double Truth proponent because of these statements; yet if, in the 1260s, he held religious truth without philosophical demonstration, while presenting the unicity of the intellect as a necessary conclusion, then during this time he would fit the revised Double Truth definition suggested above in Section I.

II-C. Conclusions and Implications

With the above observations in mind, we might reconsider Boethius of Dacia and Siger of Brabant (in the 1260s) as possible proponents of the Double Truth. Rather than say that no one took the Double

Philosophus de dicta quaestione; et in tali dubio fidei adhaerendum est, quae omnem rationem humanam superat.”

¹⁰³ *Reportationes* of Siger’s *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* have been published in editions named after the locations of the manuscripts, in three volumes of the series *Philosophes Médiévaux*: Munich *reportatio* (Books II-V) and Vienna *reportatio* (Books V-VII), ed. W. DUNPHY, Louvain-la-Neuve 1981, vol. 24; and Cambridge *reportatio* (Books II-VII) and Paris *reportatio* (Books II-VII), ed. A. MAURER, Louvain-la-Neuve 1983, vol. 25. The Munich and Paris *reportationes* are revisions of editions by C.A. GRAIFF, Louvain-la-Neuve 1948, vol. 1, the edition cited in modern studies of the Double Truth before 1981. Dunphy explains the problem of dating these *reportationes*, proposing for all of them a *terminus a quo* of 1271/72, the first academic year after William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, and a *terminus ad quem* of November 1276, when Siger was summoned for investigation. See DUNPHY’S introduction in his edition, pp. 20-25, esp. 21-22.

¹⁰⁴ SIGER OF BRABANT, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, Paris *reportatio*, ed. MAURER, III, Q. 5 (“Utrum non ens purum possit recipere esse”), pp. 411-412, at 412 (previous ed. GRAIFF 1948, III, Q. 15, pp. 128-141, at 140): “Propter hoc sciendum quod sententia philosophi ab his qui eius libros suscipiunt exponendos, non est celanda, licet sit contraria veritati. Nec debet aliquis conari per rationem inquirere quae supra rationem sunt, vel rationes in contrarium dissolvere. Sed cum philosophus quantumcumque magnus in multis possit errare, non debet aliquis negare veritatem catholicam propter aliquam rationem philosophicam, licet illam dissolvere nesciat.”

¹⁰⁵ SIGER OF BRABANT, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, Munich *reportatio*, ed. DUNPHY, III, Q. 19 (“Utrum incorruptibile possit esse principium corruptibilis immediate”), pp. 144-145, at 144 (previous ed. GRAIFF 1948, III, Q. 19, pp. 154-156, at 154-155): “Dico quattuor circa istam rationem. Ratio enim ista quae probat quod incorruptibile immediate non potest esse principium corruptibilis, non potest solvi nisi interempto uno quod est probabile, non tamen necessarium. Quando enim tu accipis quod universaliter existente toto eo unde debet esse causa efficiens ab aeterno, debet esse effectus ab aeterno, dico quod haec non est necessaria. Secundo, dico quod multa sunt credibilia et vera, quae, quia repugnare videntur magis manifestis, negata sunt; quare tunc non possem illud negare? Tertio, dico quod propositio probabilis est tantum, non necessaria. Quarto, quod ratio humana ducit in hoc quod debet negari.”

Truth position because no one held two contradictory truths of equal valence, we should consider what was logically possible for a Paris scholastic to hold, and what, realistically, the Bishop of Paris could have been reacting to in the Condemnations of 1277. If we accept that the Double Truth was conceivably a position of two truths of unequal valence, then any Paris scholastic who held a controversial philosophical opinion as necessary or true *secundum philosophiam*, while remaining a devout Christian and believing the opposite unconditionally, was potentially guilty of Double Truth¹⁰⁶.

What I am suggesting about how to regard the Double Truth might raise a question of whether this would re-class a large number of scholastics as proponents of the position, in particular those accepting the philosophical possibility of controversial theories. This is not the case. In approaching this subject, an important distinction should be borne in mind between necessity and possibility in philosophical conclusions. In the context of the Double Truth, for the philosophical theory to be held as true, it must have been demonstrated as a necessary conclusion to the satisfaction of the person holding it. Someone concluding instead that a theory cannot be proved or disproved, and thus remains theoretically possible, is not endorsing Double Truth, even if he also holds the religious truth his conclusion is at odds with. He holds that the philosophical conclusion is possible, not necessary, and therefore does not hold that it is true. In this regard, we should pause to consider two figures, Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great, and whether their positions on the relationship between philosophy and religion could be construed as Double Truth involving non-equi-valent truths.

Thomas Aquinas

The way of seeing Double Truth proposed here does not open the field of proponents to include Aquinas and thinkers agreeing with him. For instance, we could not consider Aquinas a Double Truth proponent for accepting the philosophical possibility of the world's eternity, simultaneous with his belief that God newly created the world. Nor, to take an example of like-minded scholastic, could we regard Giles of Rome (before his investigation in 1277) as a Double Truth proponent for holding the same view. Aquinas held that ideas conflicting with Christian faith could be shown by rational means to be false or at least not necessarily true. Divine truths, for their part, such as Creation and the Trinity, were not demonstrable, but had to be believed on the authority of Scripture (with the exception of God's existence, which could be demonstrated). In the case of the eternity of the world, neither the world's eternity nor Creation could be demonstrated¹⁰⁷. This left the theory philosophically possible, but not philosophically true. This view was shared by other scholastics, Giles of Rome being one of them¹⁰⁸. Granted, the position of philosophical possibility could put a scholar on politically dangerous ground. Aquinas was clearly worried about reactions to his view when he

¹⁰⁶ This could open re-evaluation of Alexander of Hales in the context of Double Truth (in the 1230s), given the way he spoke of epistemological levels and accepted that the world's eternity according to natural philosophy constituted truth on the level of nature, while Creation was true at the level above. See nn. 12 and 13 above; and ALEXANDER OF HALES, *De duratione mundi*, membr. 6A, esp. p. 190: "philosophi illi qui non transcendebant naturam verum dicebant".

¹⁰⁷ On the undemonstrability of divine truth and the need to hold it on the authority of Scripture, see: AQUINAS, *Summa contra gentiles* I, Chs. 2 and 6, pp. 6 and 17. Regarding the existence of God, see: *Summa contra gentiles* I, Ch. 13, pp. 30-34; *Summa theologiae* I, Q. 2, in: *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*, Rome 1888, vol. 4, pp. 27-32. On the undemonstrability of both the eternity and non-eternity of the world, see: *Summa contra gentiles* II, Chs. 32-38, pp. 344-356; *Summa theologiae* I, Q. 46, Arts. 1-2, pp. 478-482. In *De aeternitate mundi*, Aquinas showed how the strongest arguments against the world's eternity could not be undermined: AQUINAS, *De aeternitate mundi*, in: *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia*, Rome 1976, vol. 43, pp. 85-89.

¹⁰⁸ Giles of Rome accepted the possibility of the world's eternity in his early *Sentences* teaching: GILES OF ROME, *Reportatio lectionum super libros I-IV Sententiarum* II, D. 1, Q. 7, ed. C. LUNA in *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia*, Florence 2003, vol. 3.2, pp. 204-207.

introduced it in *De aeternitate mundi* (c. 1270/72), which he opened with a long argument about how his conclusion was not heretical¹⁰⁹. In 1277 the danger was more tangible: when Giles of Rome was put under investigation that year, one of the charges against him concerned the philosophical possibility of the world's eternity¹¹⁰. Yet notwithstanding the risks, this position did not make these figures Double Truth proponents because they did not think the world's eternity was demonstrable.

Albert the Great

Albert the Great's position presents an interesting question. Albert is well known for having defended the autonomy of philosophical pursuit, independent from religious considerations; and historians have asked whether we might regard him as having held the Double Truth. One's answer to this question depends on one's view of Albert's thinking. While I do not have an opinion on this matter, I would like to set out in brief the possible views and conclusions, and indicate where my suggestion on how to see the Double Truth could put Albert's thought. What follows does not do justice to the complexities of his thought and historians' detailed analyses of it, but I hope it is enough to indicate the parameters I would suggest for evaluating Albert in the context of the Double Truth.

Historians' discussion has centred on remarks and opinions in Albert's early and mature works (such as his teaching on celestial causation) to determine his views on the field of philosophy, and on the separation of philosophy and religion. A central question on Albert's regard for philosophy has concerned whether in his philosophical works he merely explained the teachings of earlier thinkers without endorsing their opinions¹¹¹, or in fact held these views¹¹². On the subject of the separation of philosophy and faith, discussion has involved several questions, most importantly¹¹³: (1) whether Albert regarded philosophy and theology as completely separate sciences with distinct principles and domains¹¹⁴; (2) or he thought instead that philosophy's conclusions, valid within its sphere, could be (a) corrected by theology¹¹⁵, or (b) superseded by divine miracles beyond its competence¹¹⁶; (3) or in fact there was unity in his philosophical and theological conclusions¹¹⁷.

¹⁰⁹ AQUINAS, *De aeternitate mundi*, p. 85.

¹¹⁰ For these investigation charges and Giles's responses, see GILES OF ROME, *Apologia*, Arts. 30-31 and 50, ed. R. WIELOCKX in *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia*, Florence 1985, vol. 3.1, pp. 55 and 59.

¹¹¹ Bruno Nardi, who indicated that the Double Truth could result from Albert's views, nevertheless held that Albert was merely reporting the teachings of earlier philosophers: B. NARDI, "La posizione di Alberto Magno di fronte all'averroismo", in: B. NARDI, *Studi di filosofia medievale*, Rome 1960, pp. 119-150, esp. 122-128.

¹¹² See A. DE LIBERA, *Albert le Grand et la philosophie*, Paris 1990; L. STURLESE, *Storia della filosofia tedesca nel medioevo. Il secolo XIII*, Florence 1996; D.B. TWETTEN, "Albert the Great, Double Truth, and Celestial Causality", in: *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 12 (2001), pp. 275-358. These three studies take as their case in point Albert's view on celestial causality.

¹¹³ Nuanced analysis of Albert's thought may produce some linking in these perspectives (see, e.g., nn. 111 and 117), but I have set them out with clear distinctions for the purpose of evaluation.

¹¹⁴ Consider the famous quotation: ALBERT THE GREAT, *Metaphysica* XI, Tract 3, Ch. 7, Cologne 1960, vol. 16.1, p. 542: "Theologica autem non conveniunt cum philosophicis in principiis quia fundantur super revelationem et inspirationem et non super rationem, et ideo de illis in philosophia non possumus disputare." But see the discussions in, e.g.: TWETTEN, "Albert the Great", pp. 348-358; É. WÉBER, "La relation de la philosophie et de la théologie selon Albert le Grand", *Archives de Philosophie* 43 (1980), pp. 559-588; and VAN STEENBERGHEN, *La philosophie au xiii^e siècle*, p. 270.

¹¹⁵ See, e.g., n. 117.

¹¹⁶ See STURLESE, *Storia della filosofia tedesca*, pp. 86-87 and 95.

¹¹⁷ See TWETTEN, "Albert the Great", e.g., pp. 358 and 355. Twetten's conclusions are nuanced: notwithstanding Albert's position on philosophy's autonomy in arriving at its conclusions, there is no contradiction between philosophy and theology in his mature thought, a unity possible to some extent because philosophy underlies

Answers to these questions condition whether one can say Albert is implicated in the Double Truth. His thinking on the relationship between philosophy and religion is complex – as the diversity of historians’ opinions on it reflects – but I would suggest the following. If one holds that Albert’s philosophical works only reported the opinions of others, he cannot be implicated, as he would not have regarded the ideas as true (according to philosophy). If one holds instead that Albert did hold controversial philosophical conclusions to be true, then the question of Double Truth arises, and his view on the role of religious truth must be considered. In keeping with this paper’s discussion, I shall distinguish between theology as a science (relying to some extent on rational argumentation), and faith in undemonstrated divine truths.

Taking theology first, if one regards Albert’s conclusions according to philosophy and theology as consistent with one another (position 3 above), there is not a case for Double Truth, as there is unity in his thinking and not two contrasting or contradictory truths. However, if Albert’s theology in some way contrasts with his philosophy (resulting from position 1) or even corrects it (position 2-a), this could risk Double Truth, provided one regards Albert as having held the conflicting ideas simultaneously. That is, the philosophical conclusion nevertheless remains valid within philosophy, even while the theological corrective stands (whereas if the theological corrective silences the philosophical conclusion, the truths are not simultaneous). If theology is on the level of reason with philosophy, such a position would be consistent with how historians have regarded Double Truth: two truths held according to reason, and at the same time.

Lastly, let us turn to faith in undemonstrated divine truths. If one thinks that Albert regarded miracles and undemonstrated tenets of faith as overruling contrary philosophical conclusions (position 2-b) while nevertheless persistently maintaining those conclusions as true according to philosophy, this would be a scenario of non-equi-valent truths, or Double Truth according to my suggestion. However – and this is important – this would not be the case if Albert held philosophical opinions as theoretical possibilities, not necessary conclusions.

Conclusion

The discussion above offers a suggestion of how we might regard the Double Truth, and how we could account for its denouncement in the Condemnations of 1277. In the absence of specification in the Condemnations that the scholars accused of Double Truth held both truths according to reason, and with indications in Aquinas’s *De unitate intellectus* and Condemnations Articles 184 and 90 that the religious truth was held without demonstration, there are grounds for considering the Double Truth as having entailed a pairing of non-equi-valent truths held simultaneously. This is a position a scholastic philosopher could reasonably hold; and it is what we find in Boethius of Dacia’s defence of philosophical enquiry, and perhaps in the early thought of Siger of Brabant.

In this position, the two truths taken strictly as propositions form a contradiction, but in terms of how they were held they do not. All the same, the position would cause offense. Given the outrage expressed by Roger Bacon in confronting it, and Aquinas’s similar reaction in *De unitate intellectus*, it seems reasonable to suggest that the anger of the Bishop of Paris in 1277 could be accounted for by this same position, particularly if it is possible to identify proponents of it. The offense is clear: even if the proponent holds the philosophical theory as true only within philosophy and the religious doctrine as true without demonstration, he still persists in holding the theory is true. It takes little to twist his words to form a contradiction. And yet to re-cast the position as a contradiction is not out of place with the purpose of the decree. The decree is meant to quash

his theology (pp. 348-352). Twetten also identifies in Albert’s view a role for theology (or the theologian) in correcting philosophy (pp. 357 and 358).

expression of theories clashing with faith, forcing scholars to abandon the 219 errors listed in the articles. If it is to be implemented successfully, it must be possible to confront transgressors with their errant opinions without their being able to persist in holding them while insisting they do not deny doctrine. What might pass in university debate as a non-contradiction could not be tolerated in investigative proceedings. The Double Truth denouncement thus conceivably serves to prevent future transgressors from taking the position, sincerely or strategically, when under investigation pursuant to the decree. By identifying and disallowing Double Truth, the decree becomes resilient to it and can be enforced.